Nuove prospettive critiche sul Leviatano di Hobbes: nel 350° anniversario di pubblicazione 8846455614

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NUOVE PROSPETTIVE CRITICHE SUL LEVIATANO DI HOBBES NEL 350° ANNIVERSARIO DI PUBBLICAZIONE a cura di Luc Foisneau e George Wright

NEW CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOBBES’S LE VIATHAN UPON THE 350" ANNIVERSARY OF ITS PUBLICATION edited by Luc Foisneau and George Wright

Collana di filo sofia — a

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NUOVE PROSPETTIVE CRITICHE SUL LEVIATANO DI HOBBES NEL 350° ANNIVERSARIO DI PUBBLICAZIONE a cura di Luc Foisneau e George Wright

NEW CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOBBES'S LEVIATHAN UPON THE 350" ANNIVERSARY OF ITS PUBLICATION edited by Luc Foisneau and George Wright

FrancoAngeli

Proprieta letteraria originaria dell’ Universita degli Studi di Milano. Volume pubblicato con il contributo del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell’ Universita degli Studi di Milano.

In copertina: Thomas Hobbes, A Prognosticall Prediction (1644)

Copyright © 2004 by FrancoAngeli s.r.1., Milano, Italy Ristampa

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aS 4

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2004

2005

2006

2007

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E vietata la riproduzione, anche parziale, effettuata a qualsiasi titolo, eccetto quella ad uso personale. Quest’ ultima è consentita nel limite massimo del 15% delle pagine dell’ opera, anche se effettuata in più volte, e alla condizione che vengano pagati i compensi stabiliti dall’art. 2 della legge vigente. Ogni fotocopia che eviti l'acquisto di un libro è illecita ed è severamente punita. Chiunque fotocopia un libro, chi mette a disposizione i mezzi per farlo, chi comunque favorisce questa pratica commette un reato e opera ai danni della cultura. Stampa: Tipomonza, via Merano 18, Milano.

INDICE

Introduction

pag.

Hobbes and Theology Karl Schuhmann, Phantasms and Idols: True Philosophy and Wrong Religion in Hobbes Luc Foisneau, Beyond the Air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Omnipotence of God Franck Lessay, Hobbes: une christologie politique? Cees Leijenhorst, Hobbes’s Corporeal Deity Kinch Hoekstra, Disarming the Prophets. Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power Johann Sommerville, Hobbes and Independency George Wright, Authority and Theodicy in Hobbes’s Leviathan

Hobbes and Politics Tom Sorell, The Normative and the Explanatory in Hobbes’s Political Philosophy Karlfriedrich Herb, Au-delà de la citoyenneté: Hobbes et le proble-

me de l'autorité A.P. Martinich, Hobbes’s Reply to Republicanism G.A.J. Rogers, Hobbes, Sovereignty and Consent

Hobbes and Metaphysics Yves-Charles Zarka, Liberté, nécessité, hasard: la théorie générale de l'événement chez Hobbes Agostino Lupoli, Hobbes e Sanchez Gianni Paganini, Hobbes e lo scetticismo continentale Review Essays Noel Malcolm, The Printing and Editing of Hobbes’s De Corpore: A Review of Karl Schuhmann’s Edition Patrick Riley, Michael Oakeshott as a Critic of Hobbes’s Theory of the Will Index

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INTRODUCTION

Two tableaux arrest the attention in thinking about Hobbes’s return to England. The first is recounted in a diary entry, dated 7 Sept., 1651, by John Evelyn, who describes a procession he witnessed in Paris as guest at Thomas Hobbes’s apartment overlooking the parade route. He and his host looked down from the window upon a resplendent prince, attending Parlement for the lit de justice that would presage a splendid reign, the longest in Europe’s history. They saw the «whole equipage and glorious cavalcade of the young French monarch Lewis the XIV" passing to Parliament, when first he tooke the kingly government on him, as now out of minority and Queene regents

pupillage»!. The scene is an event whose iles due to civil politically agile,

rich in irony and implication. We see the two men witnessing associations may well have caused them pain. Both were exwar and on the losing side: the one youthful, well-connected, if rather compliant; the other advanced in years, «discounte-

nanced» before the English court in exile, menaced by French authorities, ap-

prehensive about returning to England. Though much lay ahead before he could claim to rule France, Louis had just emerged victorious over a popular insurrection. The Englishmen’s king, having lost to the men of Parliament, had not long before taken a walk that would end not only his reign and life but also forms of government, both political and ecclesiastical, that England had known for over 600 years. Not long after the tableau at the window, we have another, this time from Hobbes himself, as he describes his return to England and the terms of his resettlement there: I returned to my homeland, not quite sure of my safety. But in no other place could I have been safer. It was cold: there was deep snow; I was an old man; and the wind was bitter. My bucking horse and the rough road gave me trouble. Coming to London, in order to avoid the appearance of having arrived secretly, I had to be reconciled to the 1. See Diary of John Evelyn ed. by William Bray vol. 4 (London: Bickers and Son, 1906), p. 26.

8

Luc Foisneau, George Wright

Council of State. With this accomplished, I immediately retired in utter peace, and I devoted myself to my studies as before’.

Hobbes had left the company of several good friends, among whom he had grown greatly in stature and reputation. And, while, returned from exile, he would retain, resume and make new friendships, the years in Paris were his

most productive and fruitful, especially as regards the development of his political philosophy. Over the next decades, while he continued to publish, he would have extended, often futile and bitter exchanges with other men of learning, Bramhall,

Wallis, Boyle, that diminished

which he might have expected recognition,

his standing in fields in

leaving him marginalized

and

rather isolated and, at times, threatened.

This volume commemorates the 350" anniversary of the publication of Leviathan, the work that established his reputation as a political thinker among his countrymen. For, while those on the Continent would long know him better as the author of De cive (1642 and 1647), the English Leviathan of 1651 caused an uproar in post-Civil War England that never abated and has perhaps never been more lively than now, if for different reasons. It is the editors’ hope for this volume that it represents a snapshot of the latest thinking in Hobbes studies, and it may be useful to remark on two points of current interest. One is the influence that the work of the late Arrigo Pacchi, of the University of Milan, continues to exert, not least among our French and

Italian contributors. His work on the theme of conventionality in Hobbes’s thinking has given rise to fresh insights in this field, especially as regards the second point, namely, interest in the theological aspects of Hobbes’s thinking. Once disregarded as a sterile and meaningless terrain, Hobbes’s theological views have received sustained attention, as is reflected here in several essays. To reflect this, we have divided the essays according to this relationship of religion and politics, together with a brief section on Hobbes’s metaphysics, followed by two review essays. It may be useful to turn to those essays which deal with Hobbes’s religion to provide the reader brief summaries of their contents. The editors wish to express their thanks to Prof. Enrico Rambaldi Feldmann. It was he who first suggested the idea for this commemorative volume, and he has seen it through every stage of production with warm encouragement and the greatest courtesy.

Hobbes and Religion On a terrain which is generally marked by sharp division of opinion and controversy, what is striking in the essays that follow is their unanimity on one

2. Quoted from the translation of The Life of Thomas Hobbes that appeared in Interpretation 10 (1982): 1-7.

Introduction

2

point, namely, avoiding or either implicitly or explicitly rejecting the so-called Strauss thesis. Advanced many years ago by the highly influential political philosopher Leo Strauss, the thesis has been taken up by several, more recent students of Hobbes’s thought. By its reasoning, Leviathan was intended to send double messages regarding its author’s beliefs and their role in his political thinking. On the one hand, in order to placate one set of readers, he included traditional elements of Christian political theology. But, in so doing, he revealed the true state of his mind by way of the incomplete, strange or often self-contradictory character of his statements, leading the knowing reader to discern his actual lack of belief or outright atheism. Always controversial and very bold, always a-historical, if not in intention, then certainly in effect, the Strauss thesis has led attention away from a literal reading of the text to pursue a shadow world of misdirection, clues, veiled hints and arrières-pensées. Whatever its merits or faults as an interpretive methodology, the Strauss thesis certainly made it easier, not to say imperative, to ignore the undoubted difficulties of Hobbes on religion. That course of action no longer seems justified or prudent. The essays which follow produce results from a straight-forward reading of Hobbes on religion that both clarify his religious teachings and allow us to consider possible links with other areas of his thought. It may be helpful here to summarize some of these results. Karl Schuhmann’s essay focuses with great acumen on a central problem which Hobbes set out to remedy, namely, the politically disruptive potential of those making claims of immediate supernatural experience, based, for example, on dreams, the embassies of angels and visions. Confident of victory despite his variance not only with common but also learned opinion, Hobbes offers his natural philosophy as the way both to lay the ghosts of superstition and to prevent political aggrandizement through popular credulity. Tracing the philosopher’s use of the Greek concept of pavtacia (phantasia), as first employed by Aristotle and then in scholastic terminology, Schuhmann uncovers the political point contained in Hobbes’s insistence on motion and matter in his natural science. In a response that is both appreciative and critical, Luc Foisneau addresses several questions raised by the well-known work of Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Hobbes and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). Foisneau shows that the dispute between Hobbes and Robert

Boyle stemmed not only from social or epistemological matters but also from divergent interpretations of the status of religion and theology. Insisting on the importance of Hobbes’s theory of natural religion, the author links the concept of omnipotence, as Hobbes develops it, to the natural obligation to obey the laws of nature. Nonetheless, the figure of the almighty God who rules over humanity through fear of death is only indirectly rooted in the science of nature, and it is here that Foisneau marks a key difference between Hobbes and Boyle, for whom experimental science could provide a naturalistic re-founding of

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LucIFoisneau, George Wright

Christian theology. Reverting to Cartesian arguments regarding the immortality of the soul and divine providence, Boyle believed that experiments obliged the mind of the researcher to witness to God’s transcendence and government of the world. Thus disposed by the new science, the scientist «naturally» becomes Christian. The striking similarity between the position of Hobbes’s political sovereign on earth now and the position of Christ following His return after the Last Judgment is the final insight of many contained in Franck Lessay’s trenchant essay. Pursuing several lines of analysis into Hobbes’s ecclesiology, Lessay seeks to show its singularity and radicalism vis-a-vis any other contemporary position. The constant attempt to undercut any pretended independence of the church from the civil government is characteristic of Hobbes’s approach, and in this he is far more Erastian certainly than Laud or also Hooker. An extended focus upon Hobbes’s doctrine of the Trinity yields several important insights regarding the central role of the Christ, as Hobbes understood it, as well as the merely commemorative meaning of the sacraments established by Him. As in other articles in this section, Lessay shows important links between Hobbes’s theology and his politics. Cees Leijenhorst’s essay is largely a response to two articles. The first is by Edwin Curley, «/ Durst not Write so Boldly or How to Read Hobbes’ Theolo-

gical-Political Treatise», Scienza e Politica ed. by D. Bostrenghi (Naples, Italy: Bibliopolis, 1992), 497-593. Leijenhorst goes through several of Curley’s arguments to show that the supposed atheism which is the logical outcome of Hobbes’s remarks, as read by Curley, in fact do not lead to that conclusion. The second article is Agostino Lupoli’s «*Fluidismo’ e Corporeal Deity nella Filosofia Naturale di Thomas Hobbes: A Proposito dell’ hobbesiano ‘Dio delle Cause’», Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, 54 n. s. (1999): 573-610.

In broad agreement with Lupoli, Leijenhorst refines and somewhat revises the latter’s arguments to show greater consistency and continuity of thought in Hobbes. He concludes, «There does not appear to exist any reason for doubting Hobbes’s sincerity with respect to his outspoken endorsement of the orthodox Christian creatio ex nihilo». Kinch Hoekstra takes up another question related to supposed revelatory experience, namely, the claim to prophesy, and, more particularly, why Hobbes’s concern with it grows during the decade after 1640, what varieties of it preoccupy him and what his responses are to them. Of central importance for Hobbes was his contemporaries’ concern with biblical prophecy, both radical and royalist. Trying to «pluck its political sting», Hobbes argues that apocalyptic prophecy is a form of madness but more broadly seeks to place the interpretation of scripture solidly within the purview of the sovereign. «By blunting the belief in prophecy, Hobbes disarms the prophet». The affinity which the English Leviathan evinces for Independency is the focus of Johann Sommerville’s article. Among the links the author traces is a concern to stress that clergymen have no independent jurisdiction over the laity, in contrast to positions shared by Catholics, Presbyterians and Anglicans.

Introduction

1]

But, Hobbes has no doubt that the Independents themselves were fanatics, prescribing religious duties that might conflict with those of the lawful sovereign. Independents also taught resistance to the sovereign, while it is a key aspect of Hobbes’s political theory to teach submission to political authority. To summarize, while Leviathan agrees with the Independents in rejecting divine right theories of church government, it cannot be read as a defense of Independent thinking in general. In Authority and Theodicy in Hobbes’s Leviathan, George Wright traces a conceptual link between Hobbes’s teaching on authority, both human and divine, and on theodicy, the justification of «the wayes of God to men», as Milton had it. The key distinction between human and divine authority is captured in the differing positions of the slave and the hired man, as these were known in antiquity. The author then links authority to theodicy by way of the distinction that Hobbes consistently drew between God as cause and God as

person.

Hobbes and Politics

In The Normative and the Explanatory in Hobbes’s political philosophy, Tom Sorell modifies an interpretation he presented in his Hobbes (1986). He continues to maintain that Hobbesian natural philosophy and Hobbesian civil philosophy are methodologically quite distinct, as well as distinct in subjectmatter. But it is misleading to put this by saying that civil philosophy is normative and natural philosophy is explanatory, as if civil philosophy itself weren't supposed to be explanatory. Civil philosophy can be explanatory in the sense of specifying normative precepts for achieving a certain goal — precepts that correspondingly explain the achievement of that goal. Explanatory civil science is still quite distinct from explanatory natural science, however, contrary to what is claimed by Sorell’s critics. In Au-delà de la citoyenneté: Hobbes et le problème de l'autorité, Karlfriedrich Herb shows that the new theory of representation in Leviathan implies a rejection of direct democracy, which was still referred to, and active as a political model, in The Elements of Law and De cive. Since the social contract gives full authority to the sovereign, there is no longer any reason to consider democracy as the original form of all governments. Democracy thus plays no part in the definition of the citizen’s liberty, and consequently the liberty of the subject is not at all a matter of participation in political life. To the contrary, this civil liberty is directly proportional to the independence left to the citizen by the legislator. The famous maxim defining liberty as the silence of the law is therefore to be considered anew in the perspective of the theory of representative sovereignty. The authority of the sovereign has nothing to do, in Hobbes’s thought, with the authoritas of the ancient Romans, since actual peace is its only source of legitimacy. It is not possible, therefore, to include Leviathan in a history of Republicanism.

Luc Foisneau, George Wright

12

In his Hobbes’s Reply to Republicanism, A. P. Martinich aims at explaining Hobbes’s criticism of Republicanism. Trying to adopt a middle position between subjection and liberty, Hobbes develops a theory of natural liberty which is compatible with both fear and necessity and civil liberty. He thus defines civil liberty as the extent to which a subject is free from laws and obligations, the degree of freedom not being determined by the kind of government a citizen is obliged to. As far as the liberty of states is concerned, Hobbes establishes that there is no more liberty in the one than in the other. Martinich’s demonstration draws very much on §§ 14 and 15 of chapter 21 of Leviathan, that is, on Hobbes’s theory of political obligation, because in those paragraphs Hobbes answers the objections made by republicans to the theory of alienation which he expounded in his Elements of Law and De cive. In Leviathan, Hobbes has abandoned this former theory in seeking to generate obligation out of authorization. In Hobbes, Sovereignty and Consent, John Rogers explores the concepts of recognition, command and authority and test their validity in several cases presented by Hobbes, ranging from parental authority to the omnipotence of God. The general thesis he defends is that, for Hobbes, autonomy always goes hand in hand with the possession of power. Even for the individuals in a civil society, there is no autonomy but in a condition of empowerment. But, at the same time, the strength of the laws of nature rests in their rationality, and there can be no doubt that their compelling force comes from their being rational. The comparison with mathematical theorems furnishes an important element of understanding, since the laws of nature are conclusions concerning that which conduces to the conservation of oneself. Although there is an empirical element in the deduction of those practical theorems, this is no objection to the analogy being drawn, since this empirical element belongs to the learning process and not to the rationality of the law itself. In the light of this conception of natural law, Hobbes thus appears as a rationalist in morals and politics.

Hobbes and Metaphysics

In Liberté, nécessité et hasard : la théorie générale de l'événement chez Hobbes, Yves Charles Zarka seeks to show that Hobbes conceives of causes as

events and that the progressive constitution of his theory of causality, from the Short Tract up to De corpore introduces all elements required of a theory of event. Such a theory raises special problems as to the nature of rationality, theological foundations of a system of events and the status of politics in a physical universe governed by necessity. Some of those special problems include the well-known objections raised by Cudworth, Bramhall and Leibniz. Zarka stresses in particular the importance of the debate between Hobbes and Bramhall on liberty, necessity and chance in the formulation of those problems. One thesis of this paper is that such a theory of event can explain why Hobbes’s materialism can be changed, in his political thought, into its opposite.

Introduction

13

In Hobbes e Sanchez, Agostino Lupoli considers anew the skeptical elements in Hobbes’s Logica. At variance with Popkin’s approach, which he finds insufficient, and in the line with the late Arrigo Pacchi’s insights, which he intends to extend, he shows that De corpore contains both more than traces of skepticism and a very engaged discussion of the thesis of Quod nihil scitur, the famous, but seldom read, book by Francis Sanchez, who taught philosophy and medicine in France (Toulouse) in the early years of seventeenth century. In line with nominalist logic, Sanchez makes a very sharp criticism of Aristotelian theory of the definition, whose ontological claims he criticizes. In accordance with this criticism is Hobbes’s strict nominalism, his tautological conception of the proposition as well as other elements in his logic. In Hobbes e lo scetticismo continentale, Gianni Paganini addresses the question of Hobbes's relationship to the skeptical tradition, both ancient and

modern. If Hobbes borrows from ancient skepticism the idea that it is impossible to distinguish between dreams and waking perceptions, he owes to Montaigne the idea that our sensations, although they can be misleading, are our only access to knowledge. Gianni Paganini gives a systematic account of Hobbes's skeptical arguments, showing how those arguments are included in a more general dogmatic framework, resting upon the assumption that reason can infer the existence of bodies beyond the appearances or phantasms which are given in perception. Although Hobbes tends to insert skeptical elements in a causal and materialist approach to reality, he nevertheless remains, from De principis to De corpore, indebted to old and new skeptical arguments. To put it in another way, phenomena or appearances are for him our unique access into the real world. Beyond Leviathan, it is therefore Hobbes's whole work which

is here presented, along the way opened by Richard Popkin, in the perspective of skepticism.

Review Essays In Michael Oakeshott as a Critic of Hobbes’s Theory of the Will, Patrick Riley asks why the post-War Oakeshott stopped speaking of the incoherence of Hobbes’s philosophy of volition, as he had in his Hobbes studies before the War. One answer is that he became more and more sensitive to the necessity of counterbalancing the determinist reading of Hobbes, which tended to be dominant in the 1970s’ Hobbes studies. He cites the example of Thomas Spragens’s The Politics of Motion (1973), according to which the human will appears only as a natural movement in a material universe. Although Jürgen Overhoftf’s Theory of the Will (2000) advances the view that there is complete coherence in Hobbes’s conception of volition, Riley finds his arguments unconvincing. In the end, Riley declares himself favorable to Oakeshott’s «less satisfactory» in-

terpretation of Hobbes, given the incoherence between the Hobbesian critique of free will, fully developed in The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity

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Luc Foisneau, George Wright

and Chance, and the requirements of a political theory of contract in terms of a theory of rational will. In a careful and appreciative review of Karl Schuhmann’s edition of De corpore, Noel Malcolm points out some shortcomings stemming from what he takes to be a flaw in interpretive perspective, namely, the adoption of editorial standards and procedures better fitted for authors of the period of classical antiquity than for those of the early-modern period.

HOBBES AND THEOLOGY PHANTASMS AND IDOLS: TRUE PHILOSOPHY AND WRONG RELIGION IN HOBBES by Karl Schuhmann

1. Introduction

Errors in philosophy, Hobbes was convinced, were not merely an academic affair, but would through the education of divines at the universities eventually reach the common people, be it only under the guise of religious tenets, and kindle in them an inclination to resist their sovereign’s orders. A case in point is the common belief in spirits, demons and the like. These are believed to tell people what they should do, absolutely regardless of the sovereign’s orders, and thus constitute a source of civil disobedience and anarchy. In order to stamp out this danger, Hobbes must not only demonstrate that there are no such things as spirits, but in addition explain the origin of that widespread belief in them. He also must explain why this erroneous doctrine was taken over into Christian religion, and finally show that the Biblical texts invoked in favor of that doctrine, can all of them be fully understood on the basis of his own

philosophy, i.e., without recourse to such dubious entities. In fact, it is in the interest of the state to stamp out, in harmony with Hobbesian philosophy, this belief which threatens to introduce a source of authority removed from state control and therefore potentially instigating civil war. The first step of the argument pertains to the theory of cognition. Cognition, For spirits and the like entities are constructs of our mind, the basis of

which consists in the phantasms present in us. Indeed, cognition depends, Hobbes maintains, on the having of phantasms. First of all we are thus to understand the true nature of the phantasm. To begin with, a few words on terminology seem in order. Hobbes’s English term «phantasm» of course has its ultimate roots in Aristotle’s pavtéoua. meaning that which comes about according to gavtacia'. Both terms are rendered by Latin authors, and therefore also in scholastic philosophy, either by the loanwords phantasma/phantasia or by the purely Latin words imaginatio/imago. In Hobbes, phantasm is quite common in his English 1. Aristotle, De an. II, 3 (428 a If.).

Karl Schuhmann

16

works, just as phantasma is in his Latin ones. In those Latin works, phantasia is also often used (a few times with explicit reference to the Greek origin of this term)’, but in his English works he prefers fancy. Now two things are noteworthy in this respect: First, that the more old-fashioned «phantasy» occurs only once throughout Hobbes’s English works, namely in the early The Elements of Law written in 1640, where it is applied to the type of imagination remaining after sense (EW IV, 9). That is to say that Hobbes uses it here in one of its classical scholastic acceptations, in which it designates a faculty located between sense and intellect. But also in The Elements of Law Hobbes’s official term for that faculty is fancy (EW IV, 55f.). In The Elements of Law the term phantasm in turn is reserved for afterimages such as remain «before the eye after a steadfast looking upon the sun» or «that appear before the eyes in the dark» (EW IV, 11f. and 62). A second element worth of note in this context is

that in his later works Hobbes generally runs together phantasm and fancy, so that they become interchangeable terms’. Moreover, he expands the meaning of these terms in such a way as to comprehend not only all kinds of images, but even all kinds of presentations in general. According to Hobbes, everything occurring in the mind is a phantasm (or fancy respectively). This clearly testifies to a terminological development. But it should be noted that also this later use of these terms can appeal to Aristotle, in whose view the phantasm «as such and with regard to itself», i.e., the act of presenting, and the phantasm as «appearance of something else» are just

two aspects of one and the same phenomenon’. And gavtacia, Aristotle says, is not a specific mental activity, such as sensing, judging, rational knowledge or intellectual insight, but rather «a kind of motion» occurring in beings that

have sense”. However, this change of terminology does not of necessity involve a change of doctrine. For from his earliest works onward Hobbes applies a great number of equivalents for phantasm and (its equivalent) fancy®. These terms are equated not only, as one may easily expect given the scholastic tradition, 2. Cf. OL I, 323; OL II, 8,- Hobbes’ s works are quoted from the edition by William Molesworth, EW designating the English Works and OL the Opera Latina. Volume numbers are in Roman, page numbers in Arabic numerals. The abbreviation DM refers to Hobbes’s De Motu (published as Critique du De Mundo de Thomas White. Introduction, texte critique et notes par Jean Jacquot et Harold Whitmore Jones, Paris 1973); page references are to this edition. In general, the titles and data of Hobbes’s works will not be mentioned, as they are irrelevant to our purpose; we will suffice to give the relevant reference. 3. Thus Hobbes himself translates his own term «fancy» both by «phantasma» (OL III, 6, 12) and «phantasia» (OL II, 8). 4. Aristotle, De mem. 1 (450 b 24f.).

5. De an. II, 3: «) dè gavtacia kivnois tig Soxet eivar» (428 b 11). 6. For a list almost identical with the one given here, cf. Yves Charles Zarka, “Le vocabulaire de l’apparaître: Le champ sémantique de la notion de phantasma”, in Yves Charles Zarka (ed.), Hobbes et son vocabulaire,

Paris 1992,

16. In general, this scholarly

article should be consulted as a most valuable background to our own discussions.

È

Phantasms and Idols

17

with image’ and imagination®. In harmony with the etymological derivation of

pavtäcuo from the verb gatvecBon («to appear»), Hobbes gives as parallels to fancy and phantasm also terms such as appearance (=the act of appearing)’

and apparition (=that which appears)'°. In addition he identifies them with idea!!, thinking'*, figment’, representation!* and the scholastic notion of the species! Given the fact that all these terms are equivalent to fancy and phantasm, it will not come as a surprise to see Hobbes identify also one of these alternative terms with the other without reference to the intermediary term phantasm. In this respect the pairing of idea and image is probably most common

in him'®. But the terms which we have enumerated, are in addition identified with new ones not mentioned thus far. Most prominent among these are the

identifications of idea with conception (=the act of conceiving)!’ and concept (=that which is conceived)'’, but also with notion!”. Many of these terms are brought together in Hobbes’s early The Elements of Law, where he states: «This imagery and representations [...] is that we call our cognition, imagination, ideas, notice”, conception or knowledge» (EW IV, 3). This makes it clear that Hobbes’s overall intuition remains the same throughout his career,

7. Cf. DM, 117 («imago sive phantasma»); OL I, 377 («imaginem, id est, phantasma»); OL III, 484 («juxta phantasma vel imaginem»); OL HI, 512 («phantasma, nimirum [...] imago»). Cf. also EW VII, 84: «fancy or image». 8. Cf. DM,

351 («phantasma [...] dici solet imaginatio»); OL II, 9 («imaginatio sive

phantasma»); «imaginations» at EW III. 93 is translated at OL III, 84 as «phantasmata». Hobbes identifies of course imagination and image: «the imaginations [...]; that is to say, [...] ideas, or mental images» (EW III, 673).

9. Cf. DM, tum»). Cf. also 10. Cf. EW or phantasm»);

119 EW III, OL

(«apparentia, phantasma»); DM, 128 («apparentiarum sive phantasmaIII, 4: «fancy; which signifies appearance». 649 («phantasms, which is [...] apparitions»); EW IV, 308 («apparition III, 6 («apparitio [...] sive phantasma»).

11. Cf. OL I, 17 («ideae sive phantasmatis»); OL I, 22 («idea sive phantasma»); OL I,

377 («ideam sive imaginem, id est, phantasma«); OL HI, 29 («ideam, sive [...] phantasma»); OL III, 484 («juxta phantasma vel imaginem»); OL III, 512 («phantasma, nimirum idea»). 12. DM, 380: «cogitationem sive phantasma». 13. Cf. DM, 119 («apparentia, phantasma et fismentum«); OL I, 15 («figmenta [...] et phantasmata»). Note here, too, Hobbes’s identification of the act and its object: «Fictiones sive [...] Figmenta» (DM, 351). 14. DM, 125: «phantasma sive repraesentatio». 15. DM, 146: «phantasmata sive species». 16. Cf., e.g., OL IV, 259 («ideam sive imaginem»); DM, 420 («speciem sive imaginem sive ideam»); EW II, 93 («an idea, or image»); OL I, 54 («idea sive imago»). 17. EW II, 17, EW V, 397 (both times «idea or conception»); EW VII, 100 («concep-

tions and ideas»). 18. OL II, 88 («ideam sive conceptum»); OL I, 59 («conceptus sive idea»). The English expression «no idea or conception» (EW III, 17) is translated by Hobbes himself as «idea neque conceptus» (OL II, 20). 19. OL I, 68: «notio sive idea». 20. Again, notice is to notion as the act is to its object.

18

Karl Schuhmann

notwithstanding a certain variation in his terminology. At all events, that which he came to call the phantasm, played a basic role in his theory of knowledge, as it is Hobbes’s comprehensive term for what knowledge is about. A last element to be mentioned is that among other novatores in seventeenth century philosophy, the widespread scholastic term «phantasm» is, for the very reason that it is part of the scholastic vocabulary, far less popular than it is in Hobbes. Descartes, one knows, prefers the term «idea», Gassendi in turn «perception» or «apprehension», which latter term is also the one used by Hobbes’s friend Kenelm Digby.

2. Phantasms as the Source of Cognition To Hobbes, it is a fact beyond all doubt that we continually experience certain phantasms or appearances that reach us through our senses. However, in order to find out their cause, «ratiocination is needed» (OL I, 59): this is a mat-

ter of philosophy or science (the knowledge of causes), and more specifically — because our senses are bodily organs — of that part of philosophy called physics or natural philosophy (OL I, 66; EW I, 75). Now philosophy teaches us that «the imagination proceedeth from the action of external objects» (EW IV, 54), i.e., of real bodies! that work upon our own body. Now interaction between bodies takes place by way of motion and transfer of motion. Thus in the external body there exists only motion, and through the effect this motion has on us, the body in question enters into a relation with us, and this is what it means to produce a phantasm in us (DM, 116). «All the effect of a body upon the organs of our senses is nothing but fancy» (EW VII, 84). Hobbes illustrates this by reference to a person listening to another person’s speech: the speaker’s voice «is the same thing with the hearing and a fancy in the hearer, though the motion of the lips and other organs of speech be his that speaketh» (EW IV, 312). The difference of phantasms derives in part from different motions present in the external object, but more importantly from the structure of of our senses which are touched by the object’s motion. Only with regard to the first aspect can the phantasm in a limited sense be called an image of the object (DM, 116; OL II, 475). But in general it will certainly not simply mirror the

nature of this external body??. Now it is a basic tenet of Hobbes’s philosophy that motion can generate nothing but motion. Also the phantasm itself, because it is produced by motion

21. Cf. EW VII, 28: the cause of sense is «always in a real body». 22. I say «in general», given the fact that there are at least two phantasms which, notwithstanding their subjective nature, faithfully picture some feature really present in the object: space, which is our phantasm of a body’s magnitude (DM, 117), and time, which is the image of a body’s motion (OL I, 125; EW VII, 84). For magnitude and motion are the only two accidents of bodies present not only in our fancy, but in bodies themselves.

Phantasms and Idols

19

coming from the object, cannot be but motion imprinted on our own body. «All fancies are motions within us», Hobbes declares (EW III, 11), and «the

phantasm is nothing but motion in the brain» (DM, 350). Arriving from outside, this motion will inevitably have an inward direction. Yet given the specific consistency of our body which in the heart possesses a source of internal motion of its own, this inward motion will, according to the laws of motion of necessity, cause a reaction in the opposite direction. Now the most admirable thing in the world, an item utterly inexplicable to Hobbes, is that this backward or outward motion appears to us, not as motion, but rather as a phantasm>*. Thus the phantasm can be defined as «the reaction of the sensory apparatus» (OL I, 395) or, more precisely, as arising from that reaction (OL I, 318, 396). The decisive element in this process is, however, that this outward motion «is not felt as motion, but as phantasm» (DM, 162). It appears not as that which it is, but rather as that which it is not. Two diametrically opposed aspects of the phantasm can therefore be distinguished. On the one hand, it is, as Hobbes likes to call it, «motion in the brain» (DM, 350). In this respect it is a reality or something that genuinely exists. For motion is a real occurrence in real bodies. On the other hand, it does not appear as such, but as containing sensible qualities. Under its first aspect it is an act taking place in a subject, our real body, whereas under the second aspect it has a content that appears to us. Now to appear is not to be, and by consequence the phantasm in this second respect, i.e., taken as such, is not something real and existing, but rather a non-being and nothing at all. Phantasms, Hobbes says, «may be considered [...] either as internal accidents of our mind [...], or as species of external things, not as really existing, but appearing only to exist» (EW I, 92). In the first respect they are entia; in the second they are non-entia. In this sense, «phantasms are not, but only seem to be somewhat» (EW HI. 394). The fact that these apparently conflicting determinations are but different aspects of one and the same thing goes a long way to explain, why Hobbes cannot but run together the act («fancy») and its content or object («phantasm»). Fancy or phantasm being the general name for all mental experiences, it is but logical that Hobbes, according to whom all such experiences derive from sense perception, declares time and again that «all sense is fancy» (EW VII, 28. cf. 84)**. With regard to the object that causes it, sense is fancy originating «when the object is present» (OL I, 322), i.e., as long as it continues to act upon us (DM, 327); with regard to other types of phantasms depending on it, sense is «original fancy» (EW III, 3). However, this presence of the object does not mean that the object itself was given to sense; rather, each time «the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another» (EW III, 2f.), and they co-

23. Cf. admirable themselves 24. Cf.

EW I, 389: «Of all the phenomena or appearances which are near us, the most is apparition itself, to; @aiveoBo1; namely, that some natural bodies have in the patterns almost of all things». also EW III, 2: «this seeming or fancy is that which men call sense».

Karl Schuhmann

20

incide as little as cause and effect ever given, not objects. In the object there is In the process of sensation, the objects contrary is passion (DM, 350). So all about phantasms,

will. In sensing, sensible qualities are motion; in us we experience qualities. are the source of action; sense on the our cognitive activity will always be

not things, and in this sense it makes

little difference

for

cognition whether things exist or not (OL I, 82). Light, color, sound and the like are not objects seen and heard, but only phantasms present in us (OL I,

319): Just as «fancy» and «phantasm» are often applied by Hobbes in the broad sense of having mental experiences in general (and, to begin with, sense perception), so also are, as we have seen, their Latin equivalents «imagination» and «image». But in accordance with widespread scholastic terminology”, Hobbes uses «imagination» also in a restricted sense for the faculty that comes next after sense: «after the object is removed or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call imagination» (EW III, 4:). True, in principle he would prefer the Greek gavtaota (latinized as «phantasia» and rendered in English as «fancy»), because, Hobbes says, it «signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another» (EW III, 4). By consequence it is the better and more appropriate term. Images, on the other hand, are «proper to things visible» (OL IU, 8), and therefore one must first stretch this term so as to comprehend the phantasms of all others senses, before one can call «imagination» the ca-

pacity to keep «the phantasm remaining after the object is removed or past by» (EW I, 396). Still, if in this way one acquiesces in scholastic terminology, there remains a capital difference between scholastic doctrine and Hobbes: in Hobbes, sense and imagination are not different faculties of the soul, but dif-

ferent names applied to one and the same event according to different ways of considering it. One and the same motion present in us, if the present action of the object on our body is taken into account, is called sense; if this object is no longer present, this very same motion is called imagination proper (DM, 327). After all, according to the principles of motion, any motion, once produced, will continue undiminished, no matter whether the cause of that motion is still

around or not. The presence or absence of the object therefore does not somehow change the internal nature of the motion; it only puts it in a different relation to its source or object. This much, however, is clear, that there can be talk of imagination only after there has first been sense. For only after it has been produced, will a mo-

tion exist and continue to exist. In this sense, imagination «proceedeth from sense» (EW IV, 61). «All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense» (EW III, 11). Nevertheless, the law of the conservation of motion

25. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, qu. 78, art. 4: the «phantasia sive imaginatio» keeps and preserves the «forms» received through sense as in a store-house. The source of this view is Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, V, 4: sense has to do with «figure

in some underlying matter», imagination with «figure without matter».

Phantasms and Idols

21

does not imply an endless continuation of the phantasm. For this law fully applies only in ideal circumstances, i.e., in case no countermovement occurs. But the phantasm is motion in certain parts of the body which mutually cohere and therefore also are in mutual friction. Moreover, new objects uninterruptedly act upon our senses and make them move in a way different from the earlier one, which is to say that we have an input of new phantasms all the time. As a result, the given phantasm, when no longer supported by the direct action of the object, will inevitably diminish. With an expression taken over from Aristotle’s Rhetoric («imagination is a kind of feeble sensation»)*°, Hobbes therefore describes imagination as «decaying sense» (EW III, 4) or «a diluted and

vanishing phantasm» (OL III, 8). As compared with sense, it is «weak» (EW III, 5) or at least «weaker»

than sense (DM, 327; OL III, 8), «dwindling or

weakened sensation» (OL I, 323). Because of their dependence on sensation, the sequence of imaginations is the same with the original sequences of «neighboring» sensations, such that in the course of time so many different sensations will have followed a given one that also in imagination almost any phantasm can follow any given one (DM, 352; EW III, 11). Still, imaginations may be ranged under different heads according to the degree of their distance from original sense. Closest to it are afterimages which, as we said above, are the only phenomena to receive «for distinctionsake» in the early The Elements of Law the name of «phantasms» (EW IV, 12). Examples of afterimages are «a spot before the eye that hath stared upon the sun or fire» (EW VII, 27). Also «from being long and vehemently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark [...] have the images of lines and angles before his eyes» (EW III, 6). These afterimages are «strong imaginations» (EW IV, 62) producing a «great impression» (EW III, 6) in us, because they are images persevering immediately after the object has ceased to act, 1.e., when the image is not yet worn down and has not yet grown obscure. So it is difficult to distinguish them from genuine sensations. Nevertheless, they «are of the regiment of fancy, without any body concealed under them, or behind them, by which they are produced» (EW VII, 27). Another type of imaginations of relevance here are dreams which are «the imaginations of them that sleep» (EW III, 6; OL I, 323)*’. In sleep the animal spirits pervading our body retreat from the outskirts to the interior parts and

26. Rhet. I, 11: «n de Bavtacia gotw aicOjoic tic GoVevnc» (1370 a 28f.). On this issue, as well as on the scholastic background of Hobbes’s doctrine of imagination in general, see Cees Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism. The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy, Leiden - Boston - K6In 2002, pp. 89-97. 27. This classical scholastic notion of the phantasm is the one still present in Hobbes’s Short Tract: «By a Phantasma we vnderstand the similitude or image of some externall Obiect, appearing to vs, after the Externall obiect is remoued from the Sensorium; as in Dreames» (III.P.2; Thomas Hobbes, Court traité des premiers principes, ed. Jean Bernhardt, Presses Universitaires de France 1988, p. 40). The notion of «phantasma» in the Short Tract would deserve a treatment of its own which, however, lies outside the scope of

the present article.

20

Karl Schuhmann

therefore do not transport any longer the motions that come in from the objects. So in dreams there can occur nothing new; only the phantasms which are already there, being no longer suppressed by fresh ones, will more clearly come to the fore. In this dependence on the contents of earlier sense experience, dreams do not markedly differ from fictions, such as the imagination of «castles in the air, chimeras, and other monsters» (EW IV, 11). The only mental activity involved

in their make-up is that we bring together parts that were given to us in different contexts before. Thus we feign a golden mountain from our earlier experience of gold and of mountains. However, fiction and dream differ insofar as in feigning we are conscious of the fact that we are but producing fiction. This is, e.g., the poet’s case who deliberately produces fiction. People mistaking their fictions for realities are clearly out of their senses. In dreams, on the contrary, things always and of necessity appear to us as «strong and clear, as in sense itself» (EW IV, 9). This is why in dreaming we are not aware of the fact that we dream. In the imagination itself there is no noticeable difference, say, between a tree seen and a tree dreamt of (OL I, 52), so that often we take dreams to be

veridical experiences. Fancy here is «the same waking, that dreaming» (EW III, 2). In order to distinguish between them, additional reflection is needed,

such as attention to context and the coherence of the different imaginations. Dream sequences often are illogical and do not fit in with the rest of our imaginations; sense perception on the contrary does. So if dreams seem to cohere with real life, i.e. if «we observe not that we have slept», we may be deceived by them, «which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts; and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chair» (EW II, 8). Now it is clear that not everybody and in all circumstances will apply the circumspection necessary for distinguishing between mere imaginations and genuine sense perception. As said, the content of these mental images also does not allow for such a distinction. To this we are to add another general fact concerning phantasms, namely, that they arise only when the motion coming in from the object is reflected and takes an outward direction. This is why all phantasms seem «to exist outside» (OL I, 331), to be «some external thing» (DM, 350) and «to lie beyond the organ» (OL I, 318). By consequence phantasms seem to be «absolutely independent from the mind» (OL I, 82). They present themselves to us as if they were the things themselves (OL I, 66). People who do not sufficiently reflect on the origin and nature of phantasms — in one word, almost everybody — cannot but believe that our phantasms, which in fact are but accidents of our own body, are «external substances» (EW III, 96). This makes Hobbes state that «it is by nature instilled in all living creatures that at first blush they think a given image to be the thing seen» (OL II, 7). And this natural prejudice is so strong that, e.g., regarding the nature of light not only common people, but even the philosophers of the past (i.e., the writers on optics) did not manage «to conceive of those images in the fancy and in

Phantasms and Idols

23

the sense otherwise than of things really without us» (EW III, 637f.). This is a feature common to all phantasms and which applies to perception as well as to dreams. The error this involves will be most tempting in the case of dreams, because in dreams we are completely unaware of their internal origin and thus consider them in a way no different from other strong and clear phantasms, viz. those of sense which we are naturally inclined to take for external things. People therefore cannot but tend to think that the voices they hear in their dreams are not phantasms, «but things subsisting of themselves, and objects without those that dreamed» (EW I, 402). Dream phantasms, that

is to say, are turned into idols. True, in a most general sense of the term «idol» is just another word for «phantasm». Where the latter means that which appears, the former (a Greek word, too) signifies more narrowly that which is seen (EW III, 649). Examples of idols are things seen «in a looking-glass, in a dream» (EW III, 382; OL I, 329) or «the effects of glasses, how they multiply and magnify the object of our sight» (EW VII, 79); in short, «the idea or image of a thing, not the thing itself» (OL III, 512). As the matter of fact, this is how already Aristotle him-

self uses the term eidmAov’*. But in a narrower sense (developed only by the early Christian authors), the meaning of «idol» is restricted to religion: an idol is a statue or picture of some heathen god, such as «the idol Moloch» (EW II, 447) or «the idol Rimmon» (EW III, 493). The starting-point of such representations of gods is always an idol in the first sense of the term, namely «an idol, or mere figment of the brain» (EW III, 150). In such «idols of the brain» (EW III, 382, 640) or «of the fancy» (EW IV, 308) the figure of a god is conceived.

Idolatry begins when such phantasms are taken to be entities having a certain influence on us and on our lives.

3. Phantasms as Idols

This is in fact how the belief omnipresent among common people (and philosophers) in spirits, ghost, specters, fairies, goblins, sprites and the like came into the world. To begin with, this error (or, better, ignorance) concerning the nature of phantasms lies at the base of «the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and the like» (EW III, 9). «The Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the imagery of the brain, for things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy» (EW III, 389). Now, the persons they saw in their sleep, were of necessity colored and figured, but could not be touched

(EW

III, 382) and therefore

were by them called spirits”. Because of their dimensions on the one hand and 28. Cf. e.g., De div. per somnum:

«napandiov. cvupoaiver tT pavtdopata toîg ev

toîg VSaow eid@Aoig» (464 b 8f.; «dream images are almost similar to images reflected in water»).

29. The term «spirit» has two main significations in Hobbes, meaning «either a subtle,

24

Karl Schuhmann

their perceptual instability on the other? they were believed to be «bodies and living creatures, but made of air, or other more subtle and ethereal matter» (EW III, 637). These «aerial living bodies» (EW III, 66) they considered to be gods (EW IV, 292) or demons (EW III, 387). «Almost all nations worshipped specters, i.e. phantasms, calling them, probably out of fear, demons» (OL II, 352). The voices which the heathens of old heard in their dreams they took to be the voices of these gods, and according to what they demanded of them, they considered them to be good or evil demons. As a matter of fact, «there is almost nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a god, or devil» (EW III, 99): so all-comprehen-

sive was this demonology which had grown out of the misinterpretation of the ontological status of phantasms. A noteworthy element in this context is that also Greek philosophy, and especially Aristotle, perhaps because motivated by Greek folk belief as laid down by the important Greek poets*', taught the existence of such immaterial entities. True, he did not call them demons and the like, but subsumed them

under such in fact meaningless philosophical names as «abstract essences, and substantial forms» (EW III, 672).

Jewish religion as laid down in the Bible is free from that erroneous and superstitious belief. Yet after the Jews had come in contact with Greek culture, they, too, «without any thing in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion, (except the sect of the Sadducees,)» that there were such spirits (EW III, 389). Instead of demons, they spoke, however, of «angels» good or bad (EW III, 387). These they conceived to be permanent entities from time to time sent by God to men for making known his will, his punishments, his promises, etc. fluid, and invisible body, or a ghost or other idol or phantasm of the imagination» (EW II, 382). Though the first meaning of this term, according to which spirits are «substances which work not upon the sense, and therefore not conceptible» (EW IV, 62), is the one most often used by Hobbes, we will here limit our considerations to its second meaning. It should, however, be clear that these two meanings are not mutually exclusive. For the basic meaning of «spirit» is «a body natural, but of such subtilty, that it worketh not on the senses; but that filleth up the place which the image of a visible body might fill up. Our conception therefore of spirit consisteth of figure without colours (EW IV, 60f.). This seems to contradict the affirmation that spirits do have figure and color, though they do not offer resistance to touch. But the definition of spirit as a substitute for the image of a visible body makes it clear that by spirit is to be understood the - colorless - objective substance to which the colored image or phantasm is wrongly attributed, as if it were an accident of it. 30. Phantasms, as we saw above, «do not remain, but disappear» (OL II, 475), according as they are superseded by new ones. Also the gentiles «saw that they vanish easily» (DM, 127) and therefore did not think of them as stable bodies of the usual kind. 31. Hobbes does not give a specific reason for Aristotle’s belief in entities (intelligences) separated from matter. But in view of the fact that he accuses Aristotle’s political philosophy to have been modelled after the actually existing political situation of his time (EW III, 202), it could that be his opinion regarding this issue in Aristotle was not so much different. Now Hobbes is convinced that in Greece belief in demons had been spread mainly by «the poets, as principal priests of the heathen religion» (EW II, 638).

Phantasms and Idols

Ds)

It is not clear to which degree the different Jewish sects could according to Hobbes have played a role in the process of taking over those, in last resort, heathen views into the Christian Church. At all events, given the fact that not only many early converts, but also the church’s leaders often had a general Greek cultural background and more specifically a Greek philosophical training, this erroneous doctrine managed to find refuge also in the Church. Even today, Hobbes says, we err «by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets, that is to say, their fabulous doctrine concerning demons, which are but idols or phantasms of the brain, without any real nature of their own distinct from

human

fancy»

(EW

III, 605).

In addition,

in later time

«Greek

de-

monology was left in the Church» through its accepting the Aristotelian philosophical «doctrine of separated substantial essences and forms» (OL III, 499).

What had been a kind of superstition among air of respectability even among the scholars. The effect of all this was that Christians, them (EW III, 473), followed the old heathen idols in the sense of simulacra produced by

the uneducated ones, gained an

not unlike certain Jews before practice of fabricating material craftsmen (OL IV, 383). These

idols, «painted, carved, moulded, or moulten in matter» (EW III, 649), were

not so much meant to be faithful images and true copies of the phantasms in their minds, but rather loose representations of them. There was therefore «little regard to the similitude of their material idol to the idol in their fancy» (EW HI, 650). This is probably why early converts to Christianity who from their heathen past owned

idols and who because of «the immoderate

esteem, and

prices set upon the workmanship of them» preferred «to retain them still in their houses», could simply rebaptize these idols, making, e.g., «that an image of the Virgin Mary, and of her son our Saviour, which before perhaps was called the image of Venus, and Cupid» (EW II, 659f.). For similarity did not matter, and so a man could easily worship in the idol «any fancy of his own, which he thinketh to dwell in it» (EW III, 656): in his heathen time a heathen

god, in his Christian period a saint or other figure of the New Testament. The idol or statue was thus considered to be like an «animate body, composed of the matter and the phantasm, as of a body and soul» (EW III, 651). Idols were treated as if they were living persons, and in fact living persons of some superior kind.

4. The Political Inadmissibility of Idols It is but a consequence of this that, with regard to these idols, people considered it reasonable and legitimate to behave in the same way they used to behave vis-a-vis their own superiors: they felt the need to worship and obey them, because they were afraid of their — unknown, and therefore potentially infinite — power either to hurt them or to do them good. This kind of idolatry is widespread among people and almost inevitable to anyone ignorant of the causes of phantasms (OL II, 352). «They that make little, or no inquiry into

26

Karl Schuhmann

the natural causes of things [...], are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of un-

expected good success, to give them thanks» (EW III, 93), «as if they had limitless power to help and to harm them» (OL III, 475). Thus people easily attribute to these gods created out of their own fancy, a power higher than that which their lawful sovereign possesses, whose power never extends beyond the sum of the power of his subjects. It is not difficult to imagine what will follow from such views: in case of conflict, people will always give preference to the supposed commands they receive through the voices or the (self-proclaimed) representatives of these idols, above those of their own sovereign. As far back as the time of Moses, Hobbes states, that «if the people had been permitted to worship and pray to images (which are representations of their own fancies), they had had no further dependance on [...] Moses

[...]; but every

aman had governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter eversion of the commonwealth and their own destruction for want of union» (EW HI, 646). The disastrous political consequences of this worship of idols, i.e., of self-construed phantasms, are obvious. It is here that philosophy steps in. True, its general demonstration that the subject of all phantasms, including those of sense, is (some part of) our body, and not the object — a demonstration first given by Hobbes already in the opening chapters of his first work on political philosophy, The Elements of Law (EW IV, 4-8) — will hardly convince many people. Not ordinary human beings, because it runs counter to their natural instinctive beliefs; not philosophers, because they have imbibed Aristotelian (and scholastic) doctrine to the opposite. But true, 1.e., Hobbesian philosophy is, to begin with, in a position to point out certain phenomena that make it clear even to the most unschooled mind that phantasms are not accidents of the objects, but downright nothing. Thus it is clear even to the meanest understanding that we are right to call a man seeing himself in a mirror, a substance (a hypostasis, as the Greeks have it), but his image which he sees in the mirror or in water, a phantasm (OL IH, 497; EW IV, 308). In fact, it would be nonsense to call a person or a star one thing and

the image of this person or of the stars in the river another thing, namely their ghosts (EW III, 638). Another fact well-known from experience is that certain glasses multiply a given object, for example a shilling, into many shillings, «and if you set a mark upon it, you will find the mark upon them all». Now just looking through a glass cannot make objects «really more than they are». By consequence these appearing objects are so many phantasms, «mere nothings» (EW VII, 79), as opposed to the true object that underlies them all. In general, everybody knows that the same object such as a tower «appears sometimes greater, sometimes lesser, sometimes square, sometimes round [...]; but the true magnitude and figure of the thing seen is always one and the same, so that the magnitude and figure which appears, is not the true magnitude and figure of the object, nor anything but phantasm» (EW I, 59f.). In short, phantasms are continuously changeable, even if the object remains

Phantasms and Idols

27

unchanged, and so they cannot be part of this object (EW III, 648f.). Moreover, all people know that the image of a thing is often in one place, whereas the thing is in another. You may see the sun reflected upon the water, but will know that it is truly up there in heaven, and if you look there you will see a shining surface of a given diameter, but will know that the real sun is in fact many times greater than the phantasm you see. However, more important both regarding common people and scholars than such examples is the fact that the correct philosophical view of the ontological zero status of phantasms, once it has been reached by merely natural means, will function as an eye-opener for our interpretation of the Bible. It is accepted theological doctrine that in understanding God’s word «we are not to renounce our senses, and experience; nor |...] our natural reason» (EW III, 359).

Hobbes wholeheartedly subscribes to this. For how could a word, even that of God, mean anything to us if we did not understand it, i.e., if we did not bring along our faculty of understanding? True, Hobbes also concedes that many Biblical sayings are above our understanding, which is to say that we should not try to examine them. But most Biblical texts are open to rational scrutiny, and it is in this instrumental function of an enlightened reason that philosophy plays a decisive role in establishing a correct theology free from any admixture of heathen philosophy — a mésalliance time and again castigated by Hobbes as detrimental to political stability. An important case in point is that only the doctrine of the non-existence of phantasms makes us see that it is explicitly confirmed by St.. Paul, who says that «an idol is nothing» (1 Cor. 8:4): a verse Hobbes for this very reason quotes or at least alludes to many, many times”. This is but an exemplification of the general fact that the Bible in fact agrees with true philosophy on this issue throughout; all theological interpretations to the contrary must therefore be deemed influenced by that corrupting heathen philosophy which under the name of scholasticism has crept mainly into Catholic theology and was in part upheld also by Protestant theologians who had failed to carry Reformation to its utmost goal of banning from Christianity all remnants of «gentilism». Philosophy comes to the rescue of political peace mainly in questions regarding an individual’s supposed direct contact with God. There cannot be any doubt, Hobbes agrees with the New Testament (Acts 5:29), that we are to obey God more than man. But philosophy not only shows that no individual can prove the truth of a claim of his to have received a direct message, i.e., an immediate revelation from God. More importantly, it can positively show that no such claims will ever hold. God speaks to a given person either in dreams or visions or by sending a supernatural messenger, an angel. Now regarding dreams we have already seen that they are phantasms, the immediate cause of which is not to be attributed to some supernatural entity; rather, they wholly

32. E.g., EW III, 150, 382, 645; OL III, 457, 481, 512, 515, 537, 563; EW IV, 308; EW VIZI» BW Vil; 79.

28

Karl Schuhmann

depend on prior phantasms present in our sensory apparatus. Now visions, too, are nothing but dreams (EW III, 361). So if somebody claims divine supernat-

ural inspiration for the announcements he pretends to make in the name of God, there is no reason at all to believe him. Rather, if he did not simply misunderstand his own dreams, it is likely that he succumbed to that all too human aspiration for power over other people, and found this claim of direct inspiration a most convenient trick to satisfy his aspirations. In sum, «visions and dreams, whether natural or supernatural, are but phantasms» (EW III, 658). True, often such a would-be prophet genuinely believes himself what he preaches. But again this only shows that he is ignorant of the origin of dreams and visions. In other words, he is unaware of the fact that to say that God has «spoken to him in a dream, is no more than to say he hath dreamed that God spake to him» (EW III, 361). However this may be, there is no reason at all for other people to accept such claims, no matter which private person will issue it.

But, Hobbes’s most extensive application of the results of his philosophy to his understanding of the Bible, concerns the Biblical notion of angels functioning as God’s direct messengers to certain people chosen by God for this very purpose. In a first step, Hobbes excludes the doctrine of angels from philosophy (OL I, 9) and declares that they are no fit subject for investigations by means of natural reason (OL II, 412), because «neither good nor bad angels can be conceived or comprehended by our imagination» (DM, 312). They are «spirits» in the sense of entities that cannot work on our senses and therefore cannot produce any phantasm in us. They are, in other terms, messengers incapable of delivering any message at all. For humans, that is to say, there is no reason to believe in the existence of such entities. This is, however, not to reject a study of the relevant Biblical texts concerning angels on the base of Hobbes’s own philosophy, in order to see how they can make sense. For that which cannot conceived or understood regarding angels is not their nature as such, but rather their nature as understood by traditional theology based on Aristotelian philosophy. According to Hobbes, it is indeed outright meaningless to call them immaterial entities or incorporeal spirits. With regard to angels, Hobbes treats the Old and the New Testament separately. In the Old Testament, by «angel» is meant anything that makes known God’s «extraordinary presence [...], especially by a dream, or vision» (EW III, 388). This implies of course that angels must be phantasms, and not «real and permanent substances» (OL III, 564). The difference between an ordinary phantasm and an angel must, then, lie in this, that God’s extraordinary presence consists in producing «supernatural phantasms»**, i.e., phantasms not originating in previous sense experience, but directly brought about by God by way of some «extraordinary operation» (EW III, 394). Nevertheless, we are to stick to the fact that «visions and dreams, whether natural or supernatural, are

33. This expression is to be found, e.g., at EW III, 389, 392f., 658; OL III, 13, 286,306,

564.

Phantasms and Idols

29

but phantasms» (EW III, 658). And regarding the origin of phantasms, we know of but one explanation. Talk of a supernatural causation of phantasms therefore is to remain an empty possibility that cannot be filled by any means accessible to reason. An individual’s protestation that some of his phantasms were of supernatural origin cannot be verified. For more often than not we are not aware of the origin of our dreams and of those voices we hear in our dreams. Whoever lacks sufficient natural philosophy regarding the origin of dreams will therefore be inclined to attribute his dreams to some divine inspiration. But subjective ignorance of the cause is not the same thing as a supernatural cause. So the distinguishing character of angels in the Old Testament is to be looked for neither in the unverifiable origin of certain phantasms nor in the specific content of some given dream — after all, anybody may dream anything —, but rather in this, that certain phantasms have a special signification. An angel is an image in the fancy meant «to signify the presence of God» (EW III, 389). This is of course a matter of interpretation. Only if we understand a dream as signifying God’s special presence may we call it an angel of God. Correspondingly no prophet ever had dealings with angels in the sense of existing things, but rather with his own phantasms, which he understood as signs sent by God. Now one should not overlook the fact that in Hobbes the sign relation is a non-necessary relation. Concluding from the sign to the thing signified is always a fallible process which gains a certain reliability only through accumulated experience. But it goes without saying that in the case of an extraordinary sign relation such an accumulation is excluded by the very nature of that which is signified. All affirmations about a prophet’s communications

with angels must therefore be judged with great reservations. For in all cases a natural understanding of the meaning of his phantasms would have been more — natural. However this may be, nobody will ever by rights be in a position to plead that some angel sent by God had visited him and through him commanded mankind to do (or to forbear to do) certain things in the same way the prophets of the Old Testament had been told by God’s angels to demand or to forbid certain things to be done. For there are no such messengers in God’s retinue, who from time to time would be dispatched by their boss to talk to certain people about certain affairs of importance for them or, by preference, for other people. Having thus neutralized the Old Testament reports on angels, Hobbes applies a different strategy regarding the New Testament. «The many places of the New Testament, and our Saviour’s own words, and in such texts, wherein

is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have extorted from my feeble reason, an acknowledgment, and belief, that there be also angels substantial, and permanent», he grudgingly concedes (EW III, 394). But he insists that nothing said about angels in the New Testament allows us to conceive them as «ghosts incorporeal». Rather, they «can be moved from place to place» and therefore must «take up room» (EW III, 388) and have dimension — «and whatsoever hath dimension, is body». «To me therefore it seemeth», Hobbes

30

Karl Schuhmann

concludes, «that the Scripture favoureth them more, that hold angels and spirits for corporeal, than them that hold the contrary» (EW IV, 62). Angels «are spirits corporeal, (though subtle and invisible)» (EW II, 644). Is this to capitulate? Certainly not. For «the proper signification of spirit in common speech is [...] a subtle, fluid, and invisible body» (EW HI, 382). Examples of such spirits are air, wind, the ether, and the «vital and animal spirits» (DM, 312; EW II, 382, 388). To call them spirits, is not to place them in a category of entities beyond bodies. But they are not angels either. In order to come to grips with the latter, it is necessary to give a more strict definition of «spirit», according to which this term means a most fine, transparent and untouchable body. But that is to say that spirits do not work on any of our senses (EW IV, 60f.) and are «therefore not conceptible» (EW IV, 62). Hobbes’s concession of spirits as real substances in the New Testament clearly cannot be cashed out in rational terms. Therefore here, too, only the second meaning of the term «spirit» is left, according to which it signifies «the images that rise in the fancy in dreams, and visions» (EW III, 388). And this is exactly the meaning the term «angel» had also in the Old Testament. Altogether there is therefore little reason for believing in the existence of messengers directly sent from God to individuals who then could in God's, i.e., in their own, name preach doctrines contrary to public peace and to the laws promulgated by the sovereign. Hobbes was aware of the fact that in many questions he held a minority position not shared by most common people nor by the great majority of philosophers. However, this does not undermine his conviction that it is only his own philosophy which, when duly taught at the universities and through a welltaught clergy influencing society at large, will guarantee stable peace. On the one hand, recourse to empirical fact such as the conviction of the overwhelming majority of men is not a valid counterargument to his rational conclusions, precisely because it is not an argument at all. Even if all the world were to build houses on sand, «it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be» (EW III, 195). On the other hand, Hobbes states in a comparable case (concerning the general conviction of the immortality of the soul, which rests on the conception of the soul as a spirit-like entity of its own), that it is in fact this so-called majority position which is that of a negligible minority only. For the views of the common people who are more intent on making a living, acquiring riches, honors and the like, are not based on any reflection of their own at all and therefore do not count as well-established doctrine. And this is true also of the vast majority of the philosophers; they simply repeat the tenets of their masters, in whose words they swear. Altogether therefore only a small handful of philosophers, the very founders of those philosophical schools or 34. Cf. also EW IV, 309: «Spirit is thin, fluid, transparent, invisible body». 35. One should remember that according to Hobbes fluid things are «those, whose parts may by very weak endeavour be separated from one another» (EW I, 425f.), i.e., which offer no resistance to touch,

Phantasms and Idols

31

sects, does count (OL III, 525). Now all of them without exception were hea-

thens and had in turn, as said before, inherited their wrong opinion from the popular heathen poets. Altogether there is therefore little reason to be afraid of an unequal battle opposing Hobbes to the rest of the world. Rather, Hobbes may be confident to have won this battle in advance.

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BEYOND THE AIR-PUMP: HOBBES, BOYLE AND THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD* by Luc Foisneau

In their history of the origins of modern scientific experimentation, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer highlight the social conditions of experimental practice as it developed, starting in 1660, within the institutional framework of the Royal Society. Their analysis of the controversy between Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle over the bearing of experiments conducted with an airpump’, presupposes that «solutions to the problem of knowledge are embedded within practical solutions to the problem of social order, and that different practical solutions to the problem of social order encapsulate contrasting solutions to the problem of knowledge»’. The proliferation of sects and their doctrinal disputes in the Interregnum was a major social problem that concerned both Hobbes and Boyle during the Restoration. The authors of Leviathan and the Air-Pump brilliantly demonstrate that the disagreement between Hobbes

* A first version of this paper was presented at the British Society’s Conference on Athens and Jerusalem. Christianity and the History of Philosophy over 2000 years (Univer-

sity of Keele, 6-9 avril 2000). It has much benefitted from the discussion that followed with John Rogers, Sarah Hutton, and George Wright. The present volume, as well as this paper, thus find in this Conference their far origin, thanks to John Rogers for having invited me to participate in the Conference, and thanks to George Wright for having taken the initiative of the volume. 1. The following can be cited among works treating the controversy: R. Boyle, New Experiments Physico-Mechanical touching the Spring of the Air, in The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. Thomas Birch, 2d ed., 6 volumes, London: J. & F. Rivington, 1772; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966, vol. I, pp. 1-117; An Examen of Mr. T. Hobbes his Dialogus Physicus de Natura Aéris, 1662, in The Works, op.

cit., vol. I, pp. 186-242; Animadversions upon Mr. Hobbes’s Problemata de Vacuo, 1674, in The Works, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 104-128; T. Hobbes, Dialogus physicus de natura aeris, conjectura sumpta ab experimentis nuper Londini habitis in Collegio Greshamensi. Item de duplicatione cubi, 1661, in Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis opera philosophica quae Latine scripsit omnia, ed. W. Molesworth, London: John Bohn, 1839-1845, vol. IV, pp. 23396; Problemata physica..., 1662, in Opera omnia, vol. IV, pp. 297-359. 2. Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump. Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, chap. 1, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 15.

34

Luc Foisneau

and Boyle on questions of scientific method was also a difference in approach to modalities of pacification of the conscience’. Whereas Hobbes advocated the prevalence of royal authority in religious matters on an authoritarian model of imposed ecclesiastic discipline, Boyle sought to leave room for interconfessional debate within a clearly defined framework. The Gresham College naturalist considered the mode of operation of the experimental community as a proper model for the restoration of religious peace. The philosopher of Malmesbury, who favored the restoration of discipline, warned of the danger of forming a new intellectual clergy — the experimentalist sect — inclined, in his opinion, like any other clergy, to assert its independence from royal religious authority*. Where Boyle saw a promise of civil and religious harmony in the social dissemination of the Gresham College model, Hobbes saw the danger of anew Kingdome of Darknesse, in which experimentalists would replace the scholastic philosophers. I will try to show that the opposition between Hobbes and Boyle was based not only on social or epistemological causes, but also on divergent interpretations of the status of religion and theology. Of course we must allow for the immediate political context surrounding the controversy, as well as the social situation of the protagonists, and their methodological differences. Nevertheless their divergent philosophic interpretations of the status of religion cannot be reduced to the hermeneutic circle defined by sociologists of science. Even if we admit that scientific method reflects the social conditions of production of knowledge which themselves must be interpreted in function of a political form of organization of scientific life, this does not necessarily mean that the philosophical analysis of religion fits into the same circular configuration. It is certainly appropriate to consider in and of itself the way Hobbes and Boyle envisaged the articulation of science and religion, each with his specific modalities, though both rejected the scholastic synthesis as outdated. The scholastic synthesis of Thomist inspiration had fallen with the collapse of the antique Aristotelian paradigm of science, leaving an open field for new configurations of the relation between philosophy and revelation. How did Hobbes and Boyle proceed within this reconfiguration? To what extent did their dispute go beyond the question of the air-pump and reach into the philosophic refoundation of Christian theology? To answer this question I begin by asking myself, on the basis of an analysis of the relation between natural religion and revealed religion, how each of these scholars construed the foundation of theological authority. The demonstration of a radical opposition between Hobbes’s political-theology and Boyle’s physical-theology will bring me back to their divergent interpretations of the contradictions that arise between scientific truths and theological truths. Their positions on the question of the relation between reason and faith, a commonplace of Christian apologetics, will elucidate the

3. Ibid., chap. 7. 4. On the subject of Hobbes’s description of his experimentalist adversaries, see Dialogus physicus, in Opera Latina, op. cit., pp. 236-37.

Beyond the Air-pump

35

nature of Boyle’s intended rupture with political determination of theology and Hobbes’s rupture with its naturalist determination. In conclusion I will show how Boyle’s theological reorientation functions as an extension of Cartesian metaphysics in its dualism of substances, obviously, but also in the underlying thesis on the omnipotence of God”. Here his opposition to Hobbes, who advocated a different conception of divine almightiness, was secondary to Boyle’s choice of a Cartesian conception of the authority of science which concomitantly discredited, in theology as in philosophy, Hobbes’s model of the institution of the truth.

1. Political-theology or physical-theology? Hobbes’s theory of religion deserves full development. For the purposes this analysis I will limit myself to a few factors that uphold my view that theory is based less on principles deduced from the natural sciences than on analysis of the conditions required by the nature of the law, in particular by nature of natural law.

of his an the

1. A legalistic foundation of natural religion. This does not mean that Hobbes did not allow for the natural principles of religion — fully described in chapter 12 of Leviathan — or said nothing about the rational foundations of the existence of God; in fact he proposed an anthropological genesis of religious belief®, and the beginnings of a proof of the existence of God based on effects’. Distant heir of Epicurus in one case, vague descendent of saint Thomas in another, his thoughts on the matter cannot be said to represent a strong positive derivation of religious sentiment. His arguments in favor of a natural cult ‘are more of a stumbling block than an ultimate foundation of the theory of religion. In The Catching of “Leviathan”, bishop Bramhall acknowledged Hobbes’s declarations in favor of natural worship*, but oriented his attacks 5. On the general thesis that Hobbes’s philosophy rests on a specific conception of God’s omnipotence, see L. Foisneau, Hobbes et la toute-puissance de Dieu, Paris: PUF, 2000. 6. «And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for Prognostiques, consisteth the naturall seed of Religion» (Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck, Cambridge: CUP, 1996, XII, 11, p. 79). 7. «But the acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their

severall vertues, and operations; than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come» (Leviathan, XII, 6, p. 77). 8. «This is acknowledged by T.H. himself in his lucid intervals. “That we may know what worship of God natural reason doth assign, let us begin with his attributes, where it is manifest in the first place, that existency is to be attributed to him”. To which he addeth, “infiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, ubiquity”. Thus for attributes; next for actions. “Concerning external actions, wherewith God is to be worshipped, the most general precept of reason is, that they be signs of honour”; under which are contained, “prayers, thanksgi-

Luc Foisneau

36

against the legalistic determination which underlies the theory of natural religion in De Cive and Leviathan. In his critique of the omission of the God of nature in Hobbes’s description of the contents of the laws of nature, the bishop did not do justice to the political-legalistic foundation of Hobbes’s theology. In his deferred reply, Hobbes himself was not completely aware of the articulation between the natural cult and natural law in Leviathan. His reference to the term-to-term correspondence between Biblical law and the twenty natural laws in chapter 4 of De Cive was insufficient. For is it not conceivable that the laws of nature, construed as principles of the «constitution or settlement of a commonwealth»’, are in themselves independent of the existence of God? If it is of the State the true that before the divine revelation and the establishment laws of nature were but theorems of human reason «tending to peace, and those uncertain, as being but conclusions of particular men, and therefore not properly laws»!°, it is no less true that there are specific laws of nature relative to the devotion men owe to God, inasmuch as they are by nature submissive to him. In the realm of God by nature, men must obey the laws of nature not only with respect to their proper rationality but also with respect to God’s omnipotence. In fact, «Whether men will or not, they must be subject alwayes to the Divine Power»!!. It is by this irresistible power that God naturally exercises his right of dominion over men, and it is also by this might that he afflicts them as he so pleases. It follows logically from this right of divine dominion that men have duties to each other and to God, duties which are none other than the laws of nature that God dictates to them by way of their reason: «Having spoken of the Right of Gods soveraignty, as grounded onely on Nature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine Lawes, or Dictates of Naturall Reason; which Lawes concern either the naturall Duties of one man to another, or

the Honour naturally due to our Divine Soveraign»!?. Contrary to what might be inferred from Hobbes’s awkward reply to Bramhall, he did give a theological foundation to his theory of natural religion; but his theological perspective was legalistic, not physical. There is a God of nature in his religious theory, but he is less the Aristotelian First Mover or first cause of all causes, though this aspect is mentioned", than the almighty God who founds the natural obligation to obey the laws of nature. As expressed in De Cive, divine om-

vings, oblations, and sacrifices”’» (Bramhall, The Catching of «Leviathan«

(1658), in The

Works of Archbishop Bramhall, Oxford, 1842, vol. IV, pp. 519-520). 9. Bramhall, The Catching of «Leviathan», in The Works, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 519-520. 10. Hobbes, An Answer to Bishop Bramhall, in English Works, ed. W. Molesworth, London: John Bohn, 1839-1845, vol. IV, p. 285.

11. Leviathan, XXXI, 2, p. 245. 12. Leviathan, XXXI, 7, p. 248. 13. «For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe profoundly into the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God» (Leviathan, XII, 6, p. 77).

Beyond the Air-pump

37

nipotence imposes an obligation on men to obey the laws of nature because of their weakness (imbecillitas)'*. And it is precisely this constituent weakness, which can be shown to follow from human mortality!, that leads natural reason to worship the almighty God. Independently of the revelation, men have the sentiment of an obligation to worship the power that has dominion!’ over them: «Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the Power, and Goodness of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly of his Power and Goodness, as is possible. And of that opinion, the externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship»!”. Within this theoretical framework,

God is less the author of nature than the

sovereign Power who, in the absence of a State, confers the force of obligation on the laws of nature. This same figure of God as sovereign Power stands at the forefront of Hobbes’s interpretation of the revelation. When religion is not the work of human

legislators, as in the Roman

times of Numa

Pompilius, it comes

from a

divine act of institution: «But where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there he also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes, not only of behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another»!*. The Mosaic revelation is in fact a complete legislation, where God

gives his people both civil and religious laws. Considered from the author’s viewpoint, these laws define the outlines of what Hobbes calls «a Divine Politiques»!?. Nevertheless, in the civil state the force of obligation of divine laws, whether natural or revealed, is derived from the person of the human sover-

eign, who is responsible for their interpretation and application. This thesis implies that religion does not make an exception to the principles that govern the political order and, without the social contract, the divine illumination does

not suffice to establish or restore social order. In answer to Bramhall’s accusa-tion that he had put «his pacts, and surrenders, and translations of power»? in

the place of the «natural seeds of religion», Hobbes asked if the bishop «hope[s] to make any wise man believe, that when this nation very lately was an anarchy, and dissolute multitude of men, doing every one what his own reason or imprinted light suggested, they did again out of the same light call in the king, and peace again, and ask pardon for the fault, which that their illumination had brought them into, rather than out of fear of perpetual danger and

hope of preservation»7!. 14. De Cive, XV, 7, ed. H. Warrender, Oxford: OUP, 1983, pp. 222-223.

15. On the subject of this demonstration, see L. Foisneau, «Obéissance mortalité

humaine

selon Hobbes»,

in Id., ed., Politique,

droit et théologie

Grotius et Hobbes, Paris: Kimé, 1997, pp. 283-305. 16. Leviathan, XXXI, 7, p. 248.

17. 18. 19. 20.

Leviathan, XII, 22, p. 83. Leviathan, XII, 12, p. 79. /bid. Bramhall, The Catching of «Leviathan», op. cit., p. 520.

21. Hobbes, An Answer to Bramhall, op. cit., p. 287.

politique et chez Bodin,

38

Luc Foisneau

The mediation of the human pact in the foundation of the political order does not cast doubt on the subordination of men to divine might which can be assumed to stand in the background of Hobbes’s theoretical construction as the theological principle of human mortality. But if the theology in Leviathan can hardly be reduced to the art of humane politics, it undeniably remains a political theology in that the figure of the almighty God who rules over humanity by the fear of death is only indirectly rooted in the science of nature. His function is less to convince incredulous minds by proofs drawn from knowledge of nature than to serve as the ultimate foundation of the natural obligation to obey the laws of nature. This does not demand deep knowledge of nature and its mechanisms; the thesis of almightiness is beyond the means of natural science. 2. An experimental bridge to pass from natural to revealed religion. Though Boyle did not discuss Hobbes’s theology in detail, he had a perfect understanding of its general orientation. He did not believe, as Martinich

sought to establish °°, that the function of Hobbes’s theology was to adapt the Christian message to the new science. The author of Leviathan did in fact operate a reorientation of post-scholastic Christian theology, but he did so in an essentially political perspective, and hardly as a naturalist scholar. As against that political-legalistic orientation, Boyle proposed a naturalist refoundation of Christian theology. He countered Hobbes’s political-theology with a physicaltheology that would meet with broad success in the following century. What is the principle of this reorientation, which also breaks with scholastic theology, but in an entirely different way? Instead of seeking to know God on the basis of the Aristotelian formal substances, Boyle seeks his traces in the process of experimental knowledge. Refusing a solely political foundation for the authority of religion, he aims .to show that the new experimental science, far from leading to atheism, holds unexpected resources in the matter of apologetics. In other words, he aimed to demonstrate that there is a real connection between

the New Experiments Physico-Mechanical touching the Spring of the Air (1660) and the reinforcement of religious sentiment in Restoration England, making it possible to build a bridge between natural religion and the Christian religion. However, to understand Boyle’s aims we must note that the natural religion he envisages is not derived from natural law or from irrational fear of the powers of nature, but from experimental knowledge obtained in laboratories. On the first point, the Gresham College physicist totally rejected the idea that the finality of natural science could be to learn the laws of nature: «I look upon a law as a moral, not a physical cause, as being indeed but a notional thing, according to which, an intelligent and free agent is bound to regulate its ac-

22. Here I am referring to A. P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 7: «One of Hobbes’s chief projects was to create a new theory for Christianity, a theory that would make it compatible with the modern science of Copernicus, Galileo, and Harvey».

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tions»?! To the extent that inanimate bodies are incapable of understanding or applying a law, it must be said that their actions are the product of a «real pow-

er, and not the result of laws, the latter having meaning only for intelligent beings», Consequently, no confusion is possible with Hobbes’s conception of natural religion as religion according to natural law. On the second point, it is perfectly clear that the natural motives that lead an experimentalist of the Royal society to believe in God pertain to reason, not to imagination. Before coming to the proofs themselves, Boyle outlined the required conditions for what one would be tempted to call the experimental production of religious sentiment. The first condition of success for this religious experience is epistemological, The meaning of the word «experiment» as it figures in experimental philosophy should be clearly understood. Contrary to scholastic philosophers steeped in Aristotelianism, the new philosophers were not satisfied with a «few and obvious experiments» to uphold hazardous systematic constructions, «they consult experience both frequently and heedfully; and not content with the phenomena that nature spontaneously affords them, they are solicitous, when they find it needful, to enlarge their experience by trials purposely devised; and ever and anon reflecting upon it they are careful to conform their opinions to it; or, if there be just cause, reform their opinions by it». It is this controlled experimentation that Boyle intended to use to support his refoundation of theology based on science. The condition he designates can be qualified as a moral condition. In order to be touched by religious sentiment, the experimentalist must have «a well-disposed mind», meaning, negatively, that he must not be biased against the Christian religion. Is this not begging the question? The supposition would seem to be that the disposition to believe is a necessary condition for belief. Boyle argued, conversely, that it is their immorality which prevents atheistic naturalists from letting themselves be convinced by the proofs discovered in their experimental practice: «For most of these do as little understand the mysteries of nature, as believe those of Christianity; and of divers of them it may be truly said, that their sensuality, and lusts, and passions, darkened and seduced their intellects: their immorality was the original cause of their infidelity; nor were they led by philosophy to irreligion, but got and perverted some smattering of philosophy, to countenance the irreligious principles they brought with them to the study of it»?°. Not only does irreli-

giosity block the development of natural religious sentiment in the laboratory, it also keeps the naturalist from bringing to light the mysteries of nature. The role of the moral condition — «a well-disposed mind» — is thus essential, be-

23. Boyle, The Christian Virtuoso, in The Works, op. cit., V, p. 521.

24, Ibid., pp. 513-514, 25. This expression is repeatedly used by Boyle, notably in The Christian Virtuoso, in The Works, op. cit., V, p. 522: «the experimental philosophy might afford a well-disposed mind considerable helps to natural religion». 26. The Christian Virtuoso, in The Works, op. cit., V, p. 514.

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cause it is the very condition of experimental life. In other words, every labo-

ratory should have a warning sign over the door: «Let he who is not disposed to believe in God not enter here». Certainly this point is not as naive as it seems at first glance; it fosters an awareness of the strong subjective conditions for the foundation of «objective» knowledge. Boyle considered the experimentalist as more than just a technician who makes machines function; he is also a philosopher who must place himself in the proper moral conditions in order to separate, with the help of his experiments, the true from the false’. And the success of his experiments depends to a certain extent on his ability to let himself be experimentally convinced of the existence of God. Once these conditions are recognized as such it remains to be seen how experimental practice naturally tends to produce religious convictions, and how these convictions predispose to acceptance of Christian revelation. 3. The three major principles of natural religion experimentally demonstrated. Given that natural religion stands on three major principles — the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the providential organization of the world — Boyle, the apologist, has to show how experimental science contributes if not to prove at least to inspire belief in each of these principles. Concerning the existence of God, the thrust of the argument is not new; it consists of showing how the order of the world must be the intelligent project of a transcendent being because it could not be the result of simple chance. The superiority of the experimental method over classical proofs of the existence of God lies in the precision of the naturalist’s observations and the exactitude of his understanding of natural mechanisms. Where the neo-Aristotelian theologian relied on a summary description of nature in terms of «substantial forms and real qualities»®, the experimental scholar offers a profound study of «the peculiar fabrics of bodies, and the skilifully regulated motion of them, or of their constituent parts»?°. This study makes him a privileged witness of the complexity of nature, able to appreciate in detail the intelligent organization of natural mechanisms. As a privileged observer of nature the naturalist is in an ideal position to measure God’s action in the fabrication of the world: «And the more wonderful things he discovers in the works of nature, the more auxiliary proofs he meets with to establish and enforce the argument, drawn from the universe and its parts, to evince that there is a God». To a well-disposed mind the activity of research should induce an ever-increasing religious sentiment because the discovery of nature’s mechanisms gives the motives to acknowledge and adore the intelligent author who fashioned them.

27. On the status of these conditions of knowledge and their subordinated function in modern science, see M. Foucault, «Cours du 6 janvier 1982», Cités, 2 (2000), pi 159%

28. The Christian Virtuoso, in The Works, op. cit., V, p. 516. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid.

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The argument in favor of the immortality of the soul draws marginally, but significantly, on the superiority of experimental activity. The essential argument, strongly marked by Cartesianism, lies in the distinction between body and soul, and the immateriality of the spiritual substance. However, it is as if Boyle simply transposed the developments of Descartes’s metaphysical experiment into the register of physical experiments, that is, «real philosophy». When he lists the faculties of his rational soul (inter alia, understand, demon-

strate, wish), a «learned adversary» can but observe that the «prerogatives, that are peculiar to the human mind, and superior to any thing, that belongs to the outward senses, or the imagination itself, manifest, that the seat of these spiritual faculties, and the source of these operations, is a substance, that being in its own nature distinct from the body, is not naturally subject to die or perish with it»*!. However approximate this demonstration of the distinction between body and soul it has the merit, for Boyle, of escaping the mortalist consequences that can be drawn from the Aristotelian notion of the soul. Because if a soul is granted to animals it is more difficult to contest the principles of those who, following Pomponazzi, assert that the human soul being by nature indistinct from that of animals it is just as mortal as theirs. However, the effective contribution of experimental philosophy does not lie in this point, but in the knowledge it procures of the true causes of putrefaction, and «other kinds of corruption»**. Given that decomposition of matter is the result of «the avolation, or other recess of some necessary parts, and such a depraving transposition of the component portions of matter»**, and that these causes of destruction have no reason for being in the rational soul, because it is a spiritual substance, Boyle concludes that the soul is immortal. Though experimental knowledge does not serve as the foundation of this argument, it helps support the overly metaphysical proof of Descartes. The argument in favor of divine providence is thoroughly developed because «in this grand article, as well as in the two foregoing, a man may be much confirmed by experimental philosophy». In fact, the systematic observation of the organization of such a complex machine as the world leads one to think, first, that this machine must have been produced by «a cause exceedingly powerful, wise, and beneficent»**, second, that this cause could not have abandoned «a master piece so worthy of Him, but does still maintain and preserves it», and third, that the creator who cares for even the smallest crea-

tures must have granted particular attention to man because of the superiority of his faculties. Additional confirmation of these three arguments is found in two proofs drawn from Cartesian principles which, Boyle opportunely recalls, «are embraced by a great part of the modern virtuosi»*. The second proof is

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Ibid., p. 517. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 519. Ibid. Ibid., p. 520.

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particularly interesting for our analysis because it upholds in an original way Boyle’s vision of the connection between the thesis of the dualism of substances and the thesis of an extraordinary intervention of God in nature. If the distinction of substances implies God’s providence it is because there is no way to understand how, without an extraordinary intervention of divine might, an embryo formed in a woman’s womb could receive a soul. Without providential intervention how could a piece of matter attract an immaterial substance, and how could they remain united for decades. Consequently, a special divine providence is required, and the hypothesis of the laws of nature put forth by certain deists to explain the formation of the world is not sufficient cause for rejecting that providence. Boyle, who advocated an understanding of nature from «real powers of causes», could not entertain the hypothesis of regulation of the world by impersonal laws. Thus, the religious effects of experimentation are clear: they oblige the mind of the scholar to bear witness to God’s transcendence and intelligent government of the world. And in fact the image of the divinity that emerges is quite similar to the experimentalist himself. Does not Boyle speak of the «differing and excellent methods and tools» with which the divine artisan «accomplish[es] what he designs» and «stratagems and fetches of the divine skill»*’? In a way, the scholar in his laboratory experiences the world as God’s laboratory. This unexpected encounter convinces the scholar of the bounty of the divine experimentalist who bestowed on him the partial faculty to know and the necessity to obey and venerate him. This natural disposition of the scholar’s mind leads him by a «natural tendency» to supplement his discoveries with rational conclusions concerning the immortality of his soul, and to hope for a «supernatural discovery of what God would have him believe and do»**. Thus disposed by the new science, the scholar can become Christian, so to speak, naturally: «And thus the consideration of God’s providence, in the conduct of things corporeal, may prove, to a well-disposed contemplator, a bridge, whereon he may pass from natural to revealed religion»*’.

2. Two different ways of reconciling reason and religion

Boyle’s solution to the problem of natural religion still does not resolve the apparent contradiction between certain Christian dogmas and philosophical truths. To what extent can a naturalist philosopher be led to agree with propositions that are manifestly beyond his understanding? The way Hobbes and Boyle answer this problem gives us insight into the implications of their respective theological rationalism. Hobbes argues that acceptance of something

37. Ibid. 38. Ibid., p. 522. 39. Ibid.

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beyond scientific rationality is justified on the basis of the rational foundation of politics; Boyle claims that the suspension of ordinary rationality reflects the necessity of acknowledging God’s absolute power and the regime of exception it permits in theology. I. What is above reason is not contrary to reason. In Leviathan Hobbes states the principle that in theological matters, «we are not to renounce our Senses, and Experience; nor (that which is the undoubted Word of God) our naturall Reason».

This means, for the least, that in all points of exegesis we

must not renounce the light of reason. But it does not mean that reason can understand all; when the revealed word is incomprehensible, it is fitting to commit one’s understanding to the letter of the text. Hobbes uses the following opposition to support his argument: «For though there be many things in Gods Word above Reason; that is to say, which cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilfull Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination»*!. The claim that truths which are above reason are not contrary to it leads to twa distinct attitudes toward revelation. The first consists of using interpretation and rationality to make the mysteries of religion compatible with human reason; this is the path chosen by the Socinians*. But Hobbes argued that in some circumstances one must suspend reason. Confronted with the mysteries of revealed religion, the Christian must not strive to understand but to submit his understanding to the truths of revelation. By definition incomprehensible, the mysteries don’t «fall under any rule of naturall science, but must be swallowed down whole like medicinal pills, for fear of vomiting if one chewed them». This does not imply that we can go against «Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason, and Opinion»™, for they are not subject to

40. Leviathan, XXXII, 2, p. 255. 41. Leviathan, XXXII, 2, p. 256. 42. On Hobbes’s Socinianism, see F. Lessay, Introduction to La capture de Léviathan, in Hobbes, De la liberté et de la nécessité, French translation by F. Lessay, Paris: Vrin, 1993, pp. 132-145. 43. «For it is with the mysteries of our Religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect» (Leviathan, XXXII, 3, p. 256; cf. De Cive, XVIII, 4, p. 285). This passage, which is cited by many commentators who have defended the thesis of Hobbes’s atheism, should not be considered as proof. Some theologians in Hobbes’s day had no particular repugnance at the idea of comparing the mysteries of the faith to indigestible pills. In an Easter sermon given at Oxford in 1617, entitled «Concerning the Abuses of Obscure and Difficult Places of Holy Scripture, and Remedies against Them», John Hales criticizes those who «deal with Scriptures as Chemickes deai with naturall bodies, torturing them to extract that out of them which God and nature never put in them» (cited in P. J. Johnson, «Hobbes’s Anglican Doctrine of Salvation», in eds. R. Ross, H. W. Schneider, T. Waldman, Thomas Hobbes in his Time, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1974, p.

107). 44. Leviathan, XXXII, 4, p. 256.

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the will; it means that we must submit our will to obedience «where obedience is due»*>. For want of understanding the mysteries of revelation, the Christian is left with the possibility of understanding the natural reasons for his obedience to political authority, because that is what finally enjoins him to believe in the mysteries of the faith. Thus, Hobbes believes that the «reason» of the mysteries resides in the political reason that governs the establishment of a civil religion. Finally, it is the social contract that makes us aware of the mysteries of the Christian religion, because the reason that governs their dissemination is none other than the reason that governs the institution of the State. 2. The absolute power of God and the limits of reason. Hobbes’s argument for the reconciliation of Christian religion and reason was unacceptable to Robert Boyle on the grounds that it does not explain why God is not subject to the general principles that govern nature. If God is indeed the author of the universe and the «free establisher of the laws of motion», «we cannot but acknowledge, that, by with-holding his concourse, or changing these laws of motion, which depend perfectly upon his will, he may invalidate most, if not all the axioms and theorems of natural philosophy»*f. In fact, once this view of divine power is accepted, independently of what God effectively wanted, one must recognize the lack of a foundation for science, because one can not be assured that «the course of nature, and especial-

ly the established laws of motion among the parts of the universal matter» will continue to ordain the manifestation of the phenomena. In other words, we must recognize that God can do much more than what he really brings into existence. In the language of classical theology, which Boyle follows scrupulously here, we must say that the absolute power of God can suspend the ordinary course of nature whose order he maintains by his power. Perfectly ac-

quainted with this distinction which is found in numerous medieval texts*’, Boyle shows that the rule of natural philosophy, causae necessariae semper agunt quantum possunt, does not imply that «the fire must necessarily burn Daniel’s three companions, or their clothes, that were cast by the Babylonian king’s command into the midst of a burning fiery furnace, when the author of nature was pleased to withdraw his concourse to the operations of the flames, or supernaturally to defend against them the bodies, that were exposed to

them»**. This potentia ordinata/absoluta Dei distinction was an effective theoretical tool for Boyle who sought to establish that the full exercise of human

45. Ibid. 46. R. Boyle, Some considerations about the reconcileableness of reason and religion (1675), in The Works, op. cit., IV, p. 161. 47. On the history of the theology of almightiness, see W. J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition. A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power, Bergame: Pierluigi Lubrina Editore, 1990. 48. Ibid., p. 162. See F. Oakley’s enlightening commentary on this passage in «Jacobean Political Theology: the Absolute and Ordinary Powers of the King», Journal of the History of Ideas, 29-1 (1968), pp. 336-37.

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reason is not incompatible with the affirmation of the transcendence of God. For example, the distinction allows him to simultaneously consider the resurrection inconceivable from the point of view of the natural order and possible from the point of view of the omnipotence of God: «That men once truly dead cannot be brought to life again, hath been in all ages the doctrine of mere philosophers; but though this be true, according to the course of nature, yet it

will not follow, but that the contrary may be true, if God interpose»*’. It results logically that the doctrine of miracles can be reconciled with the doctrine of science, because to demonstrate that something is impossible it is not enough to show that it contradicts the ordinary course of nature, it must be shown to be contrary to the absolute power of God, that is, contradictory in itself. Arguing from this notion of God’s might, Boyle went on to an all-out critique of the principles of Hobbes’s physics which undeniably entails a heterodox notion of divinity. Rather than sacrifice truth to theology, Boyle preferred to show the contradictions of Hobbes’s theory of theological principles of physics. 3. Boyle's critique of the theological inconsequence of the principles of Hobbes’s physics. Basing his argument on the distinction between what is above reason and what is contrary to reason, Boyle aimed at the fundamental principle of Hobbes’s physics, according to which «nothing is removed but by a body contiguous and moved»°’. After recalling the controversy between Hobbes and the Royal Society on the existence of the void, he raised the following question: If no body can possibly be moved, but by a body contiguous and moved, as Mr. Hobbes teaches; I demand, how there comes to be local motion in the world? For either all the portions of matter, that composed the universe, have motion belonging to their nature, which the Epicureans affirmed for their atoms; or some parts of matter have this motive power, and some have not; or else none of them have it, but all of them are na-

turally devoid of motion*!. Each of these three possibilities poses specific problems. The first resolves the problem forthwith, because if all parts of nature move themselves, there is no more reason to question the origin of local movement, «the concession quite overthrowing the hypothesis». If certain parts move themselves and others don’t, the assertion contributes nothing because the answer is not universal. If no part of matter moves itself but all are moved by an outside force, it remains to ask what is this cause outside the world. One possible answer, the one retained by Boyle himself, is to say that God communicates motion to every part of matter. Nevertheless this solution is counter to Hobbes’s mechanical principles. Then two hypotheses come to mind: either God is a corporeal

49, 50. 51. 52.

Ibid. R. Boyle, Some considerations, in The Works, op. cit., IV, p. 167 Ibid. Ibid.

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substance or he is an incorporeal substance. If he is incorporeal and he communicates motion to all parts of matter, then it is not true to say that every body is moved by a body which is itself moved. To dismiss this supposition, Boyle draws on a probable reconstitution of Hobbes’s argument, showing that the conclusions he draws from Hobbes’s physics are not deduced by Hobbes himself: But because Mr. Hobbes, in some writings of his, is believed to think the very notion

of an immaterial substance to be absurd, and to involve a contradiction; and because it may be subsumed, that if God be not an immaterial substance, he must by consequence be a material and corporeal one, there being no medium negationis, or third substance, that is none of those two. I answer, that, if this be said, and so that Mr. Hobbes’s deity

be a corporeal one, the same difficulty will recur, that I urged before”. Boyle argues that if God is corporeal the same rules that apply to bodies in general must be applied to him, notably the rule according to which any body that is moved must receive its motion from another body that is moved and contiguous. Consequently God could not move the parts of matter of the

world, «without it be itself contiguous and moved»*. But this hypothesis of divine matter in motion supposes that parts of divine matter can move other parts, following a pattern comparable in all points to the regression from cause to cause that led the scholar to formulate the hypothesis of a divine cause of motion of the matter of the universe. Two new difficulties then arise. First, if such a hypothesis were valid, the distinction between divine matter and worldly matter would have to be determined on the basis of examination of the physical causes themselves. Second, the principle that a body cannot be moved by another body itself in motion would have to be infringed. For indeed, if the bodies that belong to the world are to be moved by contiguous moved bodies, the divine body would have to include tiny parts that could move each part of matter in the world. But these particles could not escape being carried off by a regression to the infinite unless they held their motion from themselves. The alternative is clear: either the motion proceeds from an immaterial God, or it proceeds from corporeal particles that receive their motion from themselves. In either case one of the principal axioms of Hobbes’s physics is invalidated, because it cannot be said that «Nothing can move itself». Here the contradiction between a thesis in physics and a thesis in theology is derived neither from physics nor theology in general, but, if Boyle’s reconstitution of Hobbes’s argument is to be believed, it follows from Hobbes’s conception of the foundation of physics.

53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Hobbes, Court traité des premiers principles, Le Short Tract on First Principles de 1630-1631, sect. 1, conclusion 10, text, french translation, and commentary by J. Bernhardt, Paris: PUF, 1988, p. 19.

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3. Cartesian Theology versus Hobbesian Theology However, Boyle’s critique is based less on Hobbes’s choice of axioms in physics than on his lack of an adequate theology that would clearly mark the limits of their validity. Boyle argues that Hobbes misconceived the difference between the natural order based on God’s ordained might and the supernatural order which depends on his absolute might. He explains that from a methodological viewpoint the scholar rightfully reputes certain articles of Christian faith as false, because he cannot believe that

which in the natural sphere does not conform to laws established by nature, meaning by God’s ordained might. Therefore he legitimately suspends judgment, so as not to judge that which exceeds the limits of nature. Nevertheless he must judge that God «is capable of knowing and doing many more things»? than we can understand. And especially he must admit, as we saw above, that, «given that physics leads men to recognize that there is a God, it is not contrary to reason, that, if it pleases God to interpose his might, he can [...] make iron float». Boyle pinpoints the insufficiency of Hobbes’s physics on this distinction between the ordained might and the absolute might of God. To back

up this solution

and counterbalance

Hobbes’s

contradictions,

Boyle calls on a second argument, which closely resembles an argument of authority. Citing Descartes as a model against the bad example of Hobbes, Boyle attempts to place his own theses in the extension of the Cartesian thesis. Though he is careful to emphasize that his opposition is directed less at Hobbes’s mechanistic thesis than against the consequences his supporters try to draw from it, his praise of Descartes is equivalent, within the logic of his words, to an all-out critique of Hobbes: As then to this grand position of Mr. Hobbes [i.e., «nothing is removed but by a body contiguous and moved»]°*, though, if it were cautiously proposed, as it is by Des Cartes, it may perhaps be safely admitted, because Cartesius acknowledges the first impulse, that set matter a moving, and the conservation of motion once begun, to come from God; yet, as it is crudely proposed by the favourers of Mr. Hobbes, I am so far from seeing any such cogent proof for it, as were to be wished for a principle, on which he builds so much, (and which yet is not at all evident by its own light,) that I

see no competent reason to admit it”.

This preference for Descartes’s position is interesting, because it shows that what makes Hobbes’s thesis unacceptable to Boyle is less its signification in physics than its theological signification, be it inferred from statements by his partisans. If, as Boyle says, Hobbes’s thesis erred only by lack of prudence, it would be hard to understand why Boyle would systematically prefer

56. R. Boyle, Some considerations, in The Works, op. cit., IV, pp. 169-70. 57. R. Boyle, Some considerations, in The Works, op. cit., IV, p. 163. 58. R. Boyle, Some considerations, in The Works, op. cit., IV, p. 167. 59. R. Boyle, Some considerations, in The Works, op. cit., IV, p. 168.

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Descartes’s theological thesis. He himself admits that the difference between the principles of Cartesian physics and Hobbes’s physics is not sufficient to privilege the solution proposed by Descartes. His fundamental reason for favouring the «theology»° of Descartes to the detriment of Hobbes’s theology seems to me to lie in Descartes’s position on the theology of almightiness. Though Descartes raised «the mechanical powers of matters higher than any of the modern philosophers»®! before him, he never considered, Boyle underscores, that what was impossible for nature was impossible for God, or that the might of God was not superior to the might of nature. For proof of his interpretation, Boyle cites a passage from article 24 of Principes de la philosophie and a letter from Descartes to a «learned adversary». In answer to the arguments of his correspondent, who could have given him «a strong temptation to limit the omnipotence of God», Descartes takes the position that «we ought never to say of any thing, that it is impossible to God», because «all, that is true and good, being dependent on his all-mightiness», we must not say «that God cannot make a mountain without a valley, or cannot make it true, that one

and two shall not make three». It is just the nature of our God-given soul, the potentia ordinata Dei, that makes us unable to conceive that there could be a

mountain without a valley or that the sum of one plus two could equal a figure different from three. This thesis pronounced and developed by Descartes in the three letters to Mersenne in 1630 states that we should not confine divine might within our limited capacity to understand it. Whatever might be elsewhere the Cartesian signification of the thesis of the creation of eternal truths, Boyle gives it an undeniably voluntarist interpretation. He says that the limits of our understanding should not keep us from positing God as infinite and reading the almightiness under that infinity. In the title of article 24 of Principes de la Philosophie, Descartes relates the notion of infinity to the notion of might: «That after knowing what God is, to pass to the knowledge of creatures, we must remember that our understanding is finite, and the might of

God infinite». Undoubtedly Boyle saw Descartes as a defender of the voluntarist tradition in theology, and more exactly a defender of the cardinal distinction between the potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata Dei. Boyle conceives the God of Descartes as the theoretical principle of surpassing the order of nature rather than its guarantor. Or, more precisely, his God is not the prin60. Descartes makes clear that the thesis of the creation of eternal truths and consequently the associated thesis on the almightiness, do not pertain to theology as he defines it, but rather to metaphysics because, as he says, with reference to Mersenne’s theological question, «it does not touch on that which depends on revelation, that I call theology proper; but it is rather metaphysics and must be examined by human reason» (A Mersenne, 15 avril 1630, AT, I, p. 144). 61. R. Boyle, Some considerations, in The Works, op. cit., IV, p. 163. 62. Ibid. 63. R. Boyle, Some considerations, in The Works, op. cit., IV, pp. 163-64. 64. J.-L. Marion, after J. Laporte («La liberté selon Descartes», Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1937, p. 369), contests the bearing of the voluntarist interpretation of the 1630 letters (Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, Paris: PUF, 1981, p. 31, note 6).

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ciple of order of the world except to the extent that he has the might to override it. Boyle is not primarily concerned to know if this might is realized: it is enough for him to find in Descartes the idea of God as infinite reserve of power. Boyle is aware that the theology of almightiness according to Hobbes does not lead to the same conclusions. Hobbes explicitly rejects the classical distinction between absolute power and ordained power, thereby going back to a prior theological outline in which divine almightiness is defined not by the opening of the field of possibles but by God’s capacity to fulfill his will: «omnipotence signifieth no more, than the power to do those things that he [i.e., God] will do». Further, where Boyle draws on the Cartesian omnipotence of God to justify the existence of a spiritual God and an incorporeal soul, Hobbes seeks to reconcile the affirmation of divine almightiness with the affirmation of the corporeality of God and the soul. The thesis of the corporeality of the soul, in particular, contributed greatly to his rejection of Hobbes’s theo-

logy. When Boyle counts Hobbes among the «new Somatici»®’, he manifestly has in mind

the passage

from the Third Objections

to Descartes,

in which

Hobbes declares that the mind «is none other than a motion in certain parts of the organic body». Boyle declared that «he, that shall intelligibly explicate to [him] the modus of matter’s framing theories and ratiocinations, will [...] not only instruct [him], but surprise [him] too»®’. And yet what is most surprising

is not that Hobbes could thus defend strictly materialist positions but that he could reconcile this strict materialism with a theology of the almightiness of God. (Translated from the French by Nidra Poller)

65. Hobbes, The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, English Works, V, p. 427. 66. Boyle, The Christian Virtuoso, in The Works, op. cit., V, p. 520. 67. R. Boyle, Some considerations, in The Works, op. cit., IV, p. 166. This term antedates the term somatist that, after 1694, designated the materialist. 68. AT, IX, p. 138. 69. R. Boyle, Some considerations, in The Works, op. cit., IV, p. 171.

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HOBBES: UNE CHRISTOLOGIE POLITIQUE? par Franck Lessay

L’hétérodoxie des positions théologiques de Hobbes n’a plus guére a étre démontrée. Le sujet a fait l’objet d’études parfois excellentes, notamment en Italie avec les travaux pionniers d’ Arrigo Pacchi', mais aussi aux Etats-Unis avec les savantes recherches de George Wright’. L'édition critique des textes de Hobbes les plus probants, à cet égard, a permis de mettre en lumière la singularité de certaines thèses du philosophe*. Quand même on a soutenu l’idée de son orthodoxie religieuse — en allant sans doute trop loin dans cette direction —, c'est en reconnaissant le caractère relatif d’une telle notion dans le contexte anglais du XVIIe siècle et en posant d’emblée une nécessaire distinction entre ce qu'on peut dire avoir été orthodoxe et ce qui relevait des doctrines courantes, admises d’une majorité de confessions chrétiennes*. Non moins intéressant, le lien rattachant certaines des positions de Hobbes à sa théorie politique a été souligné, notamment par Luc Foisneau qui a su montrer que la curieuse défense du mortalisme faisait parfaitement sens dans le cadre d’une théologie de la toute-puissance de Dieu, qu’elle est une illustration de l’anthropologie qui en découle et qui rend seule pensable l’ordre politique en fondant le statut du citoyen dans ce qu’il a de précaire, comme celui du souve-

1. Voir Filosofia e Teologia in Hobbes, Unicopli, Milano 1985; Scritti hobbesiani (1978-1990), études réunies par Agostino Lupoli, préface de François Tricaud, Franco Angeli, Milano 1998. 2. Voir, en particulier, “Hobbes and the Economic Trinity”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (3), 1999, p. 397-428, où George Wright retrace la généalogie de la doctrine trinitaire de Hobbes, dont il montre la parenté avec les conceptions des Pères cappadociens. 3. Voir De la liberté et de la nécessité (volume contenant l’ouvrage Réponse à un livre intitulé La capture de Léviathan, référencé ci-après sous le titre Réponse à la capture de Léviathan) ainsi que Hérésie et histoire (recueil d’opuscules divers), tomes

11-1 et 12-1 des

Œuvres de Hobbes en français, traduction et édition critique de Franck Lessay,Vrin, Paris 1995: 4. Voir Aloysius P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 2-5.

52

Franck Lessay

rain dans son absoluité juridique et les limites concrètes qui l’affectent”. Les implications civiles de la conception hobbesienne de la Trinité ont également été évoquées®. Je voudrais examiner ici plus précisément la pertinence, voire le caractère fondateur de la christologie de Hobbes vis-a-vis de sa théorie politique.

1. Problématiques théologico-politiques Le souverain hobbesien, on en conviendra, se trouve dans une position spéciale par rapport à Dieu: position de soumission, certes, puisqu'il est un homme et que son pouvoir est mortel; mais position qu’on peut, qu’on doit supposer particulière dans la mesure où il s’agit du souverain, c’est-à-dire de quelqu’un — personne singulière ou pluralité d’individus — dont c’est la fonction que de mettre en œuvre, dans la société, en usant des moyens qui lui paraissent appropriés, ces lois de nature par lesquelles Dieu rend ses volontés intelligibles aux hommes. Encore cette singularité s’accuse-t-elle dans le cas de la nation juive ou des nations chrétiennes, puisque le souverain y exécute des lois spécifiques édictées par Dieu pour les siens, ce qui paraît lui conférer un statut d’exception: celui d’intermédiaire entre les hommes et Dieu ou, mieux encore, de porte-parole de Dieu parmi eux. Cette situation, cependant, ne simplifie aucunement la question du rapport de Léviathan au Créateur. On pourrait même considérer qu’elle signale d’autres difficultés dans la mesure où une république qui se réclame de la Révélation est confrontée à la nécessité de concilier les commandements explicites de Dieu et les lois civiles, qui peuvent ne pas coïncider. L’enjeu est alors décisif: il s’agit de faire en sorte que les sujets sachent jusqu'où va leur devoir d’obéissance au souverain et quelle conduite adopter s’il leur semble que leur soumission aux ordres de ce dernier contrevient aux commandements de Dieu. Ce n’est pas trop de dire que, pour connaître la nature et l’étendue exactes des devoirs civils, il est nécessaire de connaître la nature et l’étendue de nos devoirs envers Dieu. Tant que l’articulation entre les lois civiles et les lois divines n’a pas été élucidée, il reste place pour le doute dans l’esprit du sujet sur son statut de membre de la république: sujet de Léviathan, 1l l’est assurément, mais il appartient aussi, et, d’une certaine manière en premier, à une communauté beaucoup plus vaste qui est celle des sujets de Dieu. Il est donc essentiel de clarifier la nature de cette double sujétion, pour parer au risque que la soumission politique se trouve mise en cause. On sait l'importance cruciale, dans les débats du temps, c’est-à-dire dans l'Angleterre de la période révolutionnaire mais également dans toute l’Europe

5. Voir Hobbes et la toute-puissance de Dieu, Presses Universitaires de France. Paris 2000, p. 392. 6. Voir l’article cité de George Wright, “Hobbes and the Economic Trinity”, p. 413414.

Hobbes: une christologie politique?

35

des XVIe et XVIIe siècles, de cette question de la limite où s’arréte l'autorité du souverain et où commence de s’exercer celle de Dieu à l'exclusion de toute autre’. Hobbes, pour sa part, est plus que quiconque sensible à la portée de cette interrogation. Deux raisons corollaires l’expliquent. Il voit l’une des principales causes de dissolution de la république dans «cette doctrine inconciliable avec la société civile» selon laquelle «chaque fois qu’un homme agit contre sa conscience, c’est une faute», et que, en cas d’incompatibilité apparente entre les lois civiles et les commandements de Dieu, il faut suivre les seconds selon l’idée que nous en donne notre conscience’. Par surcroît, étant admis que, aux

yeux d’un chrétien sincère, rien n'importe plus que la vie future, c’est-à-dire une éternité de bonheur ou de souffrances (de quelque manière que l’on comprenne ces expressions), 1l se déduit de là, pour ceux à qui nous nous en remettons du soin de déterminer les règles de conduite que nous devons suivre (lorsque, par exemple, nous avons le sentiment d’une contradiction entre nos obligations envers Dieu et envers le souverain), une puissance supérieure à toute autre, puisque confinant au pouvoir d’assurer notre salut. La solution à la première difficulté réside dans une redéfinition de la conscience comme un simple jugement, qui peut être erroné et ne peut donc prévaloir, comme règle de conduite, que dans l’état de nature’. Mais il n’y a là qu'un début de réponse au dilemme mentionné, comme Hobbes en convient un peu plus loin dans la même œuvre: Il ne nous manque plus, pour connaître entièrement les devoirs civils, que de savoir quelles sont (les) lois de Dieu. En effet, si on ne le sait pas, on ne sait pas non plus, quand la puissance civile vous ordonne de faire quelque chose, si cela est ou non contraire à la loi de Dieu: ce qui conduit soit à offenser la majesté divine par un excès d’obéissance civile, soit à transgresser les commandements de la république de peur

d’offenser Dieu’®. Le propos sert d'introduction à une clarification décisive qui consiste en la distinction entre le royaume naturel et le royaume prophétique de Dieu. Celleci est trop connue pour qu'il soit nécessaire d’en rappeler le contenu. Relevons, en revanche, certains de ses effets sur le mode d’exercice de la souverai-

7. Pour simplifier, on résumera le dilemme des chrétiens de ce temps en mettant en parallèle les paroles de saint Paul — «Que toute personne soit soumise aux autorités supérieures; car il n’y a point d'autorité qui ne vienne de Dieu» (Rom., XIII, 1) — et celles de

saint Pierre — «Il faut obéir à Dieu plutôt qu'aux hommes» (Actes, V, 29). 8. Léviathan, XXIX, 7. Le premier chiffre renvoie au chapitre, le second à l’alinéa, selon la numérotation proposée dans l’édition d’Edwin Curley (Hackett, Indianapolis 1994). Traduction française de François Tricaud (Sirey, Paris 1971). 9. Voir l'affirmation: «encore que celui qui n’est pas assujetti à la loi civile commette une faute chaque fois qu’il agit contre sa conscience (puisqu'il n’a pas d’autre règle à suivre que sa propre raison), il n’en va pas de même de celui qui vit dans une république, car la loi est alors la conscience publique, par laquelle il a antérieurement accepté d’être guidé» (ibid.). 10. Ibid., XXXI, 1.

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Franck Lessay

neté divine. Du royaume naturel de Dieu ne font partie que «ceux qui croient qu’il y a un Dieu qui gouverne le monde, qui a donné des préceptes au genre humain et établi pour lui des récompenses et des chatiments»'': autrement dit, des êtres qui font usage de leur raison, et qui en font bon usage. De fait, le

mode sur lequel Dieu s’adresse 4 ces hommes, ce sont les «prescriptions de la raison naturelle», qui constituent la «parole rationnelle de Dieu» et peuvent être appelées «lois divines»'*. Dans ce royaume naturel règne une rationalité qui est celle-là même qui nous pousse à nous assujettir à une autorité humaine: au titre de nos devoirs naturels envers Dieu, nous lui rendons un culte en considération de sa force irrésistible, comme

nous pactisons entre nous et au-

torisons un homme — ou plusieurs — à nous gouverner devant le constat que l’emploi de la force pour régler nos différends nous voue a une violence perpétuelle. Il n’y a donc pas, sauf circonstances exceptionnelles — une république où le souverain tenterait d'imposer comme paroles d’adoration des mots outrageants pour Dieu, ce qui serait évidemment contraire à toute raison et, de ce fait, inadmissible et irréalisable!? — à choisir entre Dieu et le souverain. Il ne saurait en aller ainsi, à première vue, dans l’autre royaume de Dieu: celui où il règne, non pas en vertu de sa force irrésistible, mais en vertu d’un pacte, lequel ne peut concerner qu’une fraction de ces hommes qui reconnaissent son existence; autrement dit, le royaume prophétique, expression qui tient à ce que «s’étant choisi pour sujets les membres d’une nation particulière (la nation juive), (Dieu) les gouvernait, et eux seuls, non seulement par la raison naturelle, mais aussi par les lois positives qu’il leur donnait par la bouche de ses saints prophètes»!*.Dieu a d’abord conclu un tel pacte avec Abraham: par là, celuici «s’obligeait, lui et sa descendance après lui, à reconnaître l’autorité des commandements de Dieu et à leur obéir»!. Ce pacte a été renouvelé avec Isaac, puis avec Jacob, puis avec Moïse et, plus tard, avec le Christ, dont Hobbes affirme que sa mission a été de «restituer à Dieu, par un nouveau pacte, le royaume qui, lui appartenant par l’ancien pacte, lui avait été arraché par

la rébellion des Israélites à l'élection de Saiil»'®. Encore peut-on rappeler que le baptême, qui scelle notre adhésion à la parole de Dieu exprimée dans I’ Ecriture, est aussi un renouvellement du pacte conclu entre Dieu et son peuple!?. 11. Ibid., XXXI, 2. 12. Ibid., XXXI, 3, 4 et 7. Ces lois de nature — équité, justice, pitié, humilité et autres vertus morales — ont été examinées aux chapitres XIX et XV. 13. Cf. l'affirmation: «Mais parce que toutes les actions ne sont pas des signes rendus tels par une décision, et que certaines sont naturellement des signes d'honneur, alors que d’autres expriment un outrage, une puissance humaine ne peut pas faire de ces dernières (qui sont celles qu’on a honte d'accomplir devant les gens qu'on respecte) un élément du culte divin, ni en écarter les premières (telles qu’un maintien décent, modeste et humble)» (ibid., XXXI, 39). 14. Ibid., XXXI, 4. IS PIN: 16. Ibid., XLI, 4. 17. Voir le passage: «Nous convenons que les Ecritures sont la parole de Dieu. Mais elles sont loi par pacte, je veux dire, pour nous que le baptême a faits membres de l’allian-

Hobbes: une christologie politique?

55

D’Abraham au Christ s’observe une continuité indiscutable. Dieu s’est adressé à tous ces hommes, ainsi qu’aux grands-prétres et aux prophètes d’Israël, par des révélations surnaturelles. Il a parlé aux Juifs et aux Gentils à travers eux. Il leur a permis d’accomplir des miracles qui les ont accrédités comme ses porte-parole auprès des autres hommes. Cet ensemble de signes — révélations et miracles — constituent la parole prophétique de Dieu dont la trace palpable est l’Ecriture'S. Dès lors se pose une série de questions qui ne touchent pas seulement à l’interprétation de la Bible, mais aussi au type même de pouvoir qui s'exerce dans une république chrétienne (la république juive ayant cessé d'exister). Une telle république, en effet, repose sur deux pactes: celui qui a été passé avec Dieu, scellé par les deux alliances successives, et celui qui a institué la république elle-même. Il faut en conclure à l'existence de deux souverains, donc d'une double sujétion, donc d’un risque, pour le sujet, d avoir à choisir entre deux allégeances, ce qui est, on l’a vu, l’assurance de la ruine de la république!”. Dans le royaume naturel de Dieu, cet écart virtuel est inconcevable. Tel n'est pas le cas dans la république chrétienne qui semble, pour cette raison, vouée à une certaine instabilité. L'interprétation de la parole de Dieu est le premier terrain sur lequel se manifeste sa fragilité. Qui détiendra le pouvoir de déterminer la signification de l’Ecriture et de l’ériger en doctrine publique se trouvera investi de la plus grande puissance imaginable, parce qu'il sera en position de capter l’obéissance de la plupart des croyants. Que ce pouvoir échoie à un autre que le souverain civil, et celui-ci sera, de fait, dé-

pouillé de son autorité. Aussi la reconsidération de ce qu’est ou doit être une république chrétienne passe-t-elle d’abord par la mise au point des principes de lecture de l’Ecriture et de leurs conditions d’application pratique, puis par l'établissement des raisons qui peuvent nous convaincre de croire intimement — et non pas seulement de convenir en paroles — qu’un homme dit vrai quand il affirme que Dieu lui a parlé et que, par conséquent, nous devons recevoir ce qu'il nous déclare au nom de Dieu comme règle de notre croyance ef de notre action s’il nous commande d’agir d’une manière ou d’une autre”. Il importe, cependant, de mesurer ce que Hobbes parvient ainsi à démontrer. La première opération consiste à faire valoir la nécessité rationnelle de nous en remettre à celui ou à ceux qui peuvent légitimement (/awfully) nous commander de professer telle ou telle opinion: quand, en effet, notre raison se

heurte, au cours de notre lecture, à des mystères impénétrables, la sagesse est

ce» (Réponse à la capture de Léviathan, dans De la liberté et de la nécessité, op. cit., p. 241). 18. «L’Ecriture tout entière est parole de Dieu» (Leviathan, XXXVI, 3). 19. Il faut remarquer, à ce propos, ce qu’ écrit Hobbes au sujet de la parole de Pierre citée plus haut: «la parole de l’Ecriture, ‘il vaut mieux obéir à Dieu qu’aux hommes’, a sa place là où Dieu règne en vertu d’un pacte, et non là où il règne par nature» (ibid., XXXI, 39). Cette affirmation sera relevée par l’évêque Bramhall, qui demandera: «Pourquoi? La nature elle-même nous enseigne qu’il vaut mieux obéir à Dieu qu’aux hommes» (Réponse à la capture de Léviathan, dans De la liberté et de la nécessité, op. cit., p. 241). 20. Voir les chapitres XXXII à XXXIX du Léviathan.

Franck Lessay

onn

de laisser «subjuguer» notre entendement par qui est dans son rôle en nous proposant une interprétation de |’ Ecriture?!. Encore convient-il de déterminer à qui, précisément, nous pouvons ainsi accorder notre confiance ou notre foi”; ou encore, qui peut dire qu'il parle au nom de Dieu. C’est l’objet de la seconde opération, qui aboutit à plusieurs conclusions assurément décisives. L’Ecriture nous offre deux «marques» certaines nous permettant de reconnaître les faux des vrais prophètes qui peuvent exciper de cette qualité pour requérir notre obéissance. Ils doivent être en mesure d'accomplir des miracles: mais il faut observer que de faux prophètes peuvent en réaliser (comme le montre l'exemple des sorciers d'Egypte). En outre, la doctrine qu'ils préchent ne doit pas viser à susciter la révolte contre l’autorité établie. Autrement dit, ils doivent enseigner le respect des lois du pays et, si c’est le cas, de la religion choisie par ces lois. S’il manqueà cet enseignement la capacité d’accomplir des miracles, on ne saurait dire qu’on a affaire à des prophètes: or, 1l faut constater A i sia digit qu'il ne se produit plus de miracles depuis l’époque du Christ”. Il est donc hors de question d’aller chercher des règles et des préceptes applicables à nos devoirs envers Dieu et envers les hommes chez ceux qui prétendent à une inspiration surnaturelle. Il faut accepter pour guides ceux dont c’est la fonction que d’enseigner les choses de la foi, c’est-à-dire, soit le souverain en tant que pasteur suprême, soit les pasteurs qu'il aura désignés et autorisés à remplir cette charge. Le point d’aboutissement de la démonstration est formellement atteint avec l’affirmation: «les souverains chrétiens sont les pasteurs suprêmes, et les seules personnes en qui les chrétiens entendent maintenant parler Dieu, excepté ceux à qui, de nos jours, Dieu s'adresse surnaturellement»?*. A peine de voir la république se dissoudre dans le chaos d’un affrontement entre des pouvoirs concurrents (temporel et spirituel), la parole de Dieu doit être filtrée par le souverain. Celui-ci doit en être l’unique interprète public ou officiel (ce

21. On se souvient notre religion comme telles quelles, ont une part vomies sans avoir

de la formule acerbe (et si audacieuse): «il en est des mystères de des pilules médicinales destinées aux malades, lesquelles, avalées vertu curative, mais qui, si on les mache, sont pour la plus grande produit leur effet» (Léviathan, XXXII, 3).

22. Foi et confiance,

en ce sens,

sont

identiques.

«Avoir

foi en un

homme»,

écrit

Hobbes, «se fier à lui, le croire, tout cela désigne la même chose, à savoir: l'opinion selon laquelle cet homme est véridique» (ibid., VII, 6). 23. Voir tout le chapitre XXXII du Léviathan. 24. Ibid., XLII, 6. La réserve exprimée à la fin de cette phrase n’a guère de signification que rhétorique puisque, a-t-il été démontré au chapitre XXXII, nous n'avons aucun moyen de savoir avec certitude si un homme a réellement bénéficié d’une révélation divine. S'il affirme que Dieu lui a parlé par le canal de l’Ecriture, autrement dit en empruntant la voix des prophètes ou des apôtres, n'importe quel chrétien peut en dire autant. S’il déclare que Dieu s’est adressé à lui dans un rêve, cette affirmation signifie simplement qu’il a rêvé que Dieu lui parlait, ce qui n’est pas de nature à nous convaincre. Il peut dire encore qu’il a eu une vision ou entendu une voix, ce qui indique uniquement que, entre sommeil et veille, il a rêvé qu'il voyait ou entendait quelqu'un ou quelque chose. Enfin, s’il prétend être inspiré de Dieu, il ne nous révèle rien d’autre que son désir de parler et la haute opinion qu'il a de lui-même, ce qui ne nous oblige nullement à le croire.

Hobbes: une christologie politique?

57

que chacun pense dans son for intérieur est une autre question): le souverain chrétien est nécessairement, et au sens propre, le porte-parole de Dieu. Il existe, suggèrera Hobbes en réponse aux objections de Bramhall, une hiérarchie de pasteurs au sein de laquelle le souverain occupe la position d’un échelon obligé entre Dieu et le reste de ses serviteurs: les évêques «sont les pasteurs de pasteurs et, néanmoins, les brebis de celui qui est, sur cette terre, leur pasteur souverain, lequel, à son tour, est une brebis de ce suprême pasteur qui est au Ciel». C'est pourquoi le souverain peut seul contracter avec Dieu. En effet, écrit Hobbes, «passer une convention avec Dieu n’est pas possible, sauf par l'intermédiaire de ceux à qui Dieu parle, que ce soit par une révélation surnaturelle, ou par ses représentants qui gouvernent sous lui et en son nom»*. Ces conclusions où s'exprime un érastianisme radical semblent dire le dernier mot de la doctrine hobbesienne des rapports entre le souverain et les institutions ecclésiales. Elles appellent, pourtant, trois observations. Contrairement à ce qu’on pourrait attendre, elles ne fondent aucune ecclésiologie particulière: celle que formule Hobbes dans le Léviathan n’en découle pas logiquement. Elles n’expliquent pas la structure singulière du long développement consacré dans cette œuvre à la question centrale du pouvoir ecclésiastique: c’est par des considérations historico-théologiques que commence le chapitre XLII. Enfin, elles impliquent un présupposé christologique qui n’a certes rien d’indifférent et qui est, me semble-t-il, la condition de leur intelligibilité: la mise en question du statut reconnu à Jésus par la tradition chrétienne.

2. La reconfiguration du Christ et quelques-uns de ses effets Pour aborder la question par son aspect le plus formel, constatons l’agencement frappant du chapitre XLII du Léviathan, qui aborde sans transition le sujet affiché, le pouvoir ecclésiastique. Le seul lien établi avec le chapitre précédent, relatif à «la fonction de notre Sauveur béni», est la référence à |’ Ascen-

sion du Christ, événement qui marquerait, semble-t-il, le commencement d’une ère nouvelle dans l’organisation des rapports entre le pouvoir ecclésiastique et le «pouvoir civil souverain»,

cette ère elle-même

se subdivisant en

deux périodes de longueur très inégale: entre |’ Ascension et la conversion des rois (c’est-à-dire de Constantin) au christianisme; après la conversion des rois. Pour analyser «ce qu'est le pouvoir ecclésiastique et en qui il réside», Hobbes va donc s’appuyer sur une interprétation historique et, plus précisément, sur une relecture de l’histoire de l’Eglise primitive, de son mode de fonctionnement interne et des conditions dans lesquelles s’est opéré le passage du statut

25. Réponse à la capture de Léviathan, dans De la liberté et de la nécessité, op. cit., p.

225% 26. Léviathan, XIV, 23. Faut-il le souligner, l’allusion à ceux à qui Dieu parle «par une révélation surnaturelle» ne peut plus, depuis l’ Ascension du Christ, désigner personne qui soit identifiable avec le moindre degré de certitude.

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d’Eglise persécutée à celui d’Eglise officielle, entretenant un type de relations bien déterminé avec le pouvoir civil. L’enjeu de cette enquête est clair. Il est d’examiner la nature de la mission que l’Eglise s’est employée à remplir au temps de sa fondation; sur quelle injonction elle a assumé cette mission; partant, à quelle place et à quel rôle elle peut prétendre dans le cadre d’une république chrétienne. Comme on le découvre au bout de plusieurs pages seulement, il va s’agir de réfuter les arguments du cardinal Bellarmin, choisi com-

me porte-parole de tous ceux qui soutiennent que, en vertu de ses origines, l'Eglise est en droit de prétendre à l’autonomie vis-à-vis du pouvoir civil, et plus encore à une supériorité sur celui-ci. D’une certaine manière, tout ce long chapitre va être une controverse de Hobbes avec Bellarmin. En réalité, comme le montreront les réactions provoquées par certaines de ses thèses, Hobbes atteindra (très probablement de propos délibéré) plusieurs cibles à la fois?”. Quoi qu’il en soit, il paraît nécessaire à Hobbes, pour les besoins de sa démonstration, de faire retour sur l’épisode capital de la fondation de l'Eglise. Le Christ ayant été au centre de cet épisode, il faut revenir sur ce qu'il a été, sur les buts qu’il a poursuivis, sur les finalités de son action, sur les objectifs qu'il a assignés à ses disciples. De là procèdent les affirmations au contenu purement théologique du début du chapitre, qui prolongent le propos du chapitre précédent et, en quelque sorte, en tirent les conséquences logiques. La théologie politique développée dans ces pages va être d’abord une christologie politique, ce qui explique la longue reformulation, à l’alinéa 3, du dogme trinitaire, dont on pourrait se demander ce qu’elle vient faire à cet endroit. Ce point répond pourtant à une nécessité cruciale, dont l'évidence se découvrira au fil de la démonstration: il s’agit de savoir si l'Eglise fondée par le Christ est, de ce fait même, d'institution proprement divine et si elle peut, par conséquent, se prévaloir de son origine transcendante pour revendiquer l’autonomie, voire la supériorité déjà mentionnées. La Trinité n’est pas pur objet de spéculation: elle engage, selon la façon dont on entend la nature du Christ et, bien sûr, du SaintEsprit, une certaine ecclésiologie et, au-delà, une certaine théorie de l'Etat. De ce point de vue, le chapitre XLI a parfaitement préparé le terrain pour les affirmations qu’on va trouver ici, en opérant une reconfiguration du Christ. La fonction du Christ, y a-t-il été dit, comporte trois parties. Comme rédempteur, le Christ est «celui qui paye la rançon du péché (laquelle rançon est la mort)»; celui qui devait être «sacrifié, portant par là nos iniquités sur sa propre tête et les emportant de dessus nous, selon ce que Dieu avait exigé». En cela,

il «fut à la fois le bouc sacrifié et le bouc émissaire»: le bouc qui est mort et le bouc qui s’est échappé dans le désert après qu’on l’eut symboliquement chargé de tous les péchés d'Israël. Observation complémentaire de grande portée, dans la mesure où, d’une part, celui qui rachète n’a pas de titre sur la cho-

27. Les réactions de Bramhall, en particulier, seront significatives de l’effet produit par cette partie du Léviathan. 28. Léviathan, XLI, 2. 29. Ibid.

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se rachetée avant le rachat et où, d’autre part, le rachat était, en I’ occurrence, la propre mort du Christ, celui-ci ne pouvait étre le roi de ceux qu’il rachetait. Plus exactement, il ne pouvait étre leur roi avant de mourir et de ressusciter. En d’autres termes, comme il le dit lui-même, son royaume ne pouvait être de ce monde: son royaume ne pouvait, ne peut advenir que dans un monde futur, après la résurrection générale qui aura lieu lors du Jugement. En ce monde-ci, le Christ «était le Messie», «c’est-à-dire le prêtre oint et le prophète souverain de Dieu», Au terme de cette première étape capitale, en renvoyant le royaume du Christ au temps du Jugement, Hobbes réduit le Messie à une fonction prophétique*!. Il lui confère le même statut ontologique qu’aux autres prophètes, comme on le perçoit clairement en lisant qu’«il devait avoir tout le pouvoir qu’avaient détenu le prophète Moïse, les grands-prétres qui avaient succédé à Moise, et les rois qui avaient succédé aux prêtres»*?. Par sa seconde fonction, le Christ a été pasteur, docteur, conseiller. Le but

qu'il a poursuivi a été de renouveler le pacte conclu entre Dieu et les hommes en l’élargissant d'Israël défaillant à l’ensemble des nations”. Il a rempli cette mission par la prédication et par des miracles visant à convertir Juifs et Gentils. Par là, prend soin de préciser Hobbes, il n’a rien fait ni enseigné «qui tendit à abaisser le droit civil des Juifs ou de César»*4. Si l’on se souvient qu’une marque distinctive du vrai prophète est le fait qu'il n’incite pas à l’insoumission, cette observation accentue l'identification du Christ à une figure prophétique. Enfin, au Christ est échue la fonction de roi. Comme on l’a vu, il ne la rem-

plira pas avant la Résurrection. De surcroît — considération à nouveau significative, qui va dans la direction mentionnée —, il exercera cette royauté «sous l'autorité de son Père»: s’il doit être roi alors, ce n’est que comme le subordonné et le vicaire de Dieu le Père, comme l’étaient Moïse dans le désert, les grands-prêtres avant le règne de Saül, et les rois par la suite. C’est en effet l’une des prophéties concernant le Christ, que par sa fonction, il sera comparable à Moïse”.

Sous-jacente à cette assimilation de Jésus à un nouveau Moïse, se découvre une redéfinition du rapport du Christ à Dieu qui est esquissée à la fin du chapitre XLI et sera amplifiée au début du chapitre XLII, redéfinition conduite en termes de représentation et, devrait-on dire, de représentation historique. On lit d’abord: 30. Ibid., XLI, 3. 31. Ce point n’échappera pas à Bramhall, qui remarquera: «Il démet le Christ de son véritable office royal en disant que son royaume “ne commence pas avant le jour du Jugement» (voir La réponse à la capture de Léviathan, dans De la liberté et de la nécessité, op. cit. 2p#199): 32. Ibid. 33. Voir le passage cité p. 54 (ibid., XLI, 4).

34. Ibid., XLI, 5. 35. Ibid., XLI, 7. Mes italiques.

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Donc notre Sauveur, tant dans son enseignement que dans son règne, représente, comme le faisait Moïse, la personne de Dieu, lequel est depuis ce temps, appelé Père (alors qu’il ne l'était pas auparavant), et, tout en étant toujours une seule et même substance, est une personne en tant que représenté par Moïse, et une autre personne en tant que représenté par son fils le Christ. En effet, la personne étant relative au représentant, la pluralité des représentants a pour conséquence la pluralité des personnes, même quand il s’agit de représenter une seule et même substance“.

Le lexique — «substance», «personne» — est celui de la théologie traditionnelle. Il reçoit, en réalité, des significations nouvelles dont la portée se perçoit plus clairement dans la formulation que Hobbes donne de la Trinité au début du chapitre suivant: Dieu le Père, en tant que représenté par Moïse, est une personne; en tant que représenté par son fils, une autre personne; et en tant que représenté par les Apôtres et par les docteurs qui enseignent en vertu d’une autorité qu'ils tiennent des Apôtres, c’est une troisième personne: et pourtant, chacune de ces personnes est la personne d’un seul et

même Dieu*?. Cette formulation est étonnante à beaucoup d’égards. Elle suggère plusieurs constats. La Trinité ne se compose plus de Dieu le Père, du Fils et du Saint-Esprit, mais de Moïse, du Christ et des Apôtres et des docteurs désignés par ces derniers. Les «personnes» de la Trinité sont ces représentants purement humains de Dieu dans l’histoire. Il n’est aucune différence ontologique entre le Christ, d’une part, et, d’autre part, Moïse, les Apôtres et les docteurs: où disparaît la double nature du Christ, humaine et divine, ainsi que le Saint-Esprit qui ne réapparaît qu’un peu plus loin, au sens de la force prêtée par Dieu

aux Apôtres afin de leur permettre de remplir leur mission. De pouvoir ecclésiastique, il n’a pas encore été question. Les premières pages du chapitre ont été consacrées à l’action de témoignage de Moïse, du Christ et des Apôtres. Pourtant, sans doute est-ce aussi ce que Hobbes veut laisser entendre dans la discussion qui va commencer: que le pouvoir ecclésiastique n’est qu’un pouvoir de témoignage, c’est-à-dire d'enseignement et de prédication, qui repose sur le seul usage de la parole (dans le cas du Christ et de certains prophètes, il s’y ajoutait des miracles, mais on sait que, depuis I’ Ascension, il ne s’en est plus produit). Au principe de l'Eglise, on ne trouve qu'un homme, et un homme dont la seule arme (en dehors de miracles qu’il n’a été au pouvoir de personne de répéter) était la parole. C’est sur ce fond christologique trés singulier que va se dérouler la démonstration offerte par

36. Ibid., XLI, 9. 37. Ibid., XLII, 3. 38. Voir l'alinéa 4. Sur les dimensions théologiques, politiques et juridiques de la théorie hobbesienne de la personne et les controverses auxquelles elle a donné lieu, voir Franck

Lessay, “Le vocabulaire de la personne”, dans Hobbes et son vocabulaire. Etudes de lexicographie philosophique, volume publié sous la direction d'Yves Charles Zarka, Vrin, Paris 1992, p. 155-186.

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Hobbes au chapitre XLII. L’objet en est simple: réfuter de la manière la plus radicale la revendication pour l'Eglise d’un pouvoir indépendant qui puisse à quelque degré que ce soit comporter une dimension proprement coercitive. Plusieurs arguments sont avancés qui mettent en relief la place centrale qu’ occupe, dans le dispositif hobbesien, le Christ en tant qu’homme placé en position subordonnée vis-à-vis de Dieu et dépourvu de toute autorité particulière. Jen retiendrai cinq. * Si Pon demande quelle sorte de pouvoir le Christ a laissée aux «gens d’Eglise», la réponse est qu'il n’a pu s’agir d’un pouvoir coercitif, mais seulement d’un pouvoir d'enseigner, de précher, de convaincre. En effet, comme il a été montré, le royaume du Christ n’est pas de ce monde. Il n’est donc pas concevable que le Christ, au cours de sa première venue sur la terre, ait exercé un pouvoir de commandement sur les hommes. Personne, en conséquence, ne peut «requérir l’obéissance en son nom», en tant que son successeur ou son

héritier®®. * Le temps compris entre |’ Ascension du Christ et la résurrection générale à venir n'est pas appelé «règne», mais «régénération», c’est-à-dire préparation à la seconde venue du Christ. Celui-ci ne saurait donc exercer de commandement sur les hommes pendant ce temps, ni quiconque en son nom“. * Etant entendu que la fonction des ministres est de susciter la foi dans le Christ, il faut observer qu’une telle mission ne peut découler du moindre commandement. En effet, la foi n’a aucune relation ni dépendance à l'égard de la contrainte et du commandement; elle ne dépend pas de ces choses, mais seulement de la certitude ou de la probabilité d'arguments tirés soit de la raison, soit de quelque chose qui est déjà objet de

croyance“|. .* L'«autorité légitime» que lui-même s’est gardé d’exercer, le Christ l’a laissée aux princes, «tant chrétiens qu’infidèles» (de nombreux passages du Nouveau Testament l’attestent, en particulier Col., III, 20; Rom., XHI; 2 Pier-

re, II). C’est donc à eux qu'il faut obéir, et non pas à des ministres qui pourraient nous commander de faire des choses incompatibles avec les ordres du

souverain*”. * Les Apôtres n’ont reçu du Christ aucun mandat qui impliquât «quelque autorité que ce soit sur la communauté». Ils n’ont pas exercé de «pouvoir magistral», mais seulement un «pouvoir subordonné» qui consistait à enseigner, à

précher et à baptiser“. Prophète et, en cette qualité, investi d’un ministère de parole, le Christ s’est acquitté de tâches que les Apôtres ont assumées sur le même mode (sans les 39. Leviathan, XLII, 6. 40. Ibid., XLII, 7. 41. Ibid., XLII, 9. 42. Ibid., XLII, 10. 43. Ibid., XLII, 15-18. Je reviendrai plus loin sur la conception hobbesienne du baptème, que je crois indissociable de cette christologie.

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miracles), dans une même relation de libres échanges avec ceux qui les écoutaient. Tel est l’objet d’une partie ultérieure de la démonstration, dans laquelle Hobbes examine le rôle des Apôtres et des premiers serviteurs de l'Eglise. Saint Paul, pour sa part, s’institua assurément

sans mandat qui lui permit d’imposer qui il s’adressait étaient donc libres de de faire de l’Ecriture une loi, autrement partenir qu’au souverain civil: ce point le Décalogue devint loi, c’est parce que

interprète des Ecritures, mais

une quelconque interprétation: ceux à le croire ou non”. Au reste, le pouvoir dit de la rendre canonique, ne peut apest démontré par l’histoire d'Israël (si Moïse, Aaron et les grands-prêtres qui

leur succédèrent étaient souverains civils), comme

par l’histoire chrétienne (11

fallut la conversion des empereurs romains au christianisme pour que l’ensemble de l’Ecriture, Ancien et Nouveau Testaments réunis, acquît force de loi); de ce point de vue, l'intervention des conciles n’eût été d’ aucun effet sans

la volonté du pouvoir civil. Enfin, quant aux fonctions ecclésiastiques telles qu’elles existaient au temps des Apôtres, on observe que les évêques n'étaient que des pasteurs, des anciens, des docteurs chargés d’enseigner et de conseiller les fidèles et qu’ils étaient élus à cette charge. Il en allait de même des diacres, eux aussi librement désignés par les fidèles pour remplir diverses

tâches au service de I’Eglise*®. Sans origine transcendante puisque fondée par un homme (quelles que fussent les qualités éminentes de celui-ci), l'Eglise décrite par Hobbes n’est le véhicule d’aucune grâce. Fort logiquement, les sacrements qu’elle administre sont de purs signes qui n’ont de valeur que symbolique ou commémorative. Alors que l’efficace prétée aux sacrements par l'Eglise de Rome comme par celle d’ Angleterre tient à leur institution par le Christ et à la présence agissante de celui-ci en eux, il en va tout différemment chez Hobbes en raison de sa

christologie particulière, qui exclut, précisément, une telle présence, renvoyée à un passé historique révolu en même temps qu’à un futur indéterminé*’. Ne reste qu’un processus de signification abstraite: Un sacrement, c’est le fait de mettre une chose visible à part de l’usage commun, et de la consacrer au service de Dieu, soit comme un signe de notre admission dans le royaume de Dieu en tant que membre de son peuple particulier, soit comme une

commémoration de cette admission**.

44. Ibid., XLI, 32-35. 45. Ibid., XLII, 36-57. 46. Ibid., XLII, 48-59. 47. Pour la conception romaine, voir le texte: «Célébrés dignement dans la foi, les sacrements confèrent la grâce qu'ils signifient. Ils sont efficaces parce qu’en eux le Christ Lui-même est à l'œuvre: c’est Lui qui baptise, c’est Lui qui agit dans ses sacrements afin de communiquer la grâce que le sacrement signifie» (Catéchisme de l'Eglise catholique, $ 1127; Mame/Plon, Paris 1992, p. 247). En ce qui concerne la conception anglicane, rappelons que le 25ème des 39 Articles définit les sacrements comme des «signes effectifs de grâce» par lesquels Dieu «agit invisiblement en nous». 48. Léviathan, XXXV, 19.

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Aucune différence d’essence ne sépare les sacrements chrétiens des sacrements lévitiques: qu’ils soient signes d’admission (circoncision ou baptême) ou de commémoration (manducation de l’agneau pascal ou sainte cène), ils marquent notre appartenance à l’une ou à l’autre des deux alliances (également identiques en essence): ils «sont comme nos serments solennels d’allé-

geance»*”. La doctrine hobbesienne du baptême illustre ce caractère contractuel des sacrements: il s’agit d’une immersion accompagnée de paroles dont le sens est le suivant: celui qui est baptisé est immergé, lavé, pour signifier qu'il devient un homme nouveau, un sujet loyal envers ce Dieu dont la personne était représentée par Moïse et les grands-prétres, lorsqu'il régnait sur les Juifs; loyal envers Jésus-Christ, son Fils, Dieu et homme, qui nous a rachetés et, dans sa nature humaine, représentera la personne de son Père dans son royaume éternel après la résurrection; loyal enfin pour reconnaître que l’enseignement des Apôtres qui, assistés par l'Esprit du Père et du Fils, nous ont été laissés pour guides pour nous mener à ce royaume, est le seul moyen assuré d’y

parvenir”. Le langage trinitaire d'apparence traditionnelle employé ici n’affecte en rien la définition sous-jacente de la Trinité en termes de représentations historiques successives, assortie de l’assimilation réitérée de Moïse à la première personne de la substance divine et des Apôtres à la troisième personne. Le lien entre la christologie «humanisante» de Hobbes et sa doctrine des sacrements comme symboles d’un engagement réfléchi, délibéré du croyant, résultant d’une appréciation rationnelle des paroles prononcées par les prédicateurs, paraît peu discutable, qui amènera l’anglican Bramhall à observer, non sans raison: La puissance, la vertu, l'utilité et l’efficace qu'il attribue aux saints sacrements tiennent tout à ce qu'ils sont des “signes” ou “commémorations”. Pour ce qui est de sceller, de confirmer, ou de conférer la grâce, il n’admet rien. Il affirme la même chose en

particulier au sujet du baptême”.

La même valeur commémorative est reconnue à la cène, «qui nous remet en esprit notre délivrance du servage du péché, opérée par la mort sur la croix

de notre Sauveur béni»°. Sur ce point décisif encore, Hobbes s’éloigne de la doctrine anglicane. On lit en effet, dans le vingt-huitième des 39 Articles de l'Eglise d’ Angleterre, que «le corps du Christ est donné, pris et mangé lors de la Cène, seulement d’une manière céleste et spirituelle». La formule peut sem49. Ibid. 50. 1bid., XLII, 18. 51. Cité par Hobbes dans la Réponse à la capture de Léviathan. Voir De la liberté et de la nécessité, op. cit., p. 218-219. Hobbes maintiendra, dans sa réplique: «On me baptise pour commémorer mon engagement» (ibid., p. 220). Quant aux résonances nettement zwingliennes de la doctrine hobbesienne, voir les notes qui acccompagnent ce texte ainsi que l’introduction (p. 121-154). 52. Léviathan, XXXV, 19.

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bler d’inspiration calvinienne. Si elle ne permet pas d’écarter toute dimension commémorative de l’eucharistie, elle implique aussi une présence active que rejette la conception hobbesienne. Il convient d’admettre, écrit Bramhall, que le «sacrifice eucharistique» est une «commémoration du sacrifice de la Croix». Mais, «dans le langage de la Sainte Eglise, les choses commémorées sont rela-

tées comme si elles avaient alors lieu». Aussi faut-il déduire de cette «représentation» du sacrifice du Christ une «impétration de son bénéfice», une «application de sa vertu», qui font de la cène «un sacrifice commémoratif, impé-

tratif, applicatif». En parfaite cohérence avec cette conception des sacrements, et non moins

significative du point de vue ecclésiologique, l’excommunication telle que l'entend Hobbes met en évidence les effets juridiques de sa christologie. Cette sanction constitue la censure ecclésiastique la plus sévère (dans les Eglises de Rome, d’ Angleterre ou de Genève) parce qu’elle implique l'interdiction de l’accès aux sacrements et, en tout premier, à la cène. C’est le droit de l'Eglise de parler au nom du Christ qui la légitime. Elle est une traduction du pouvoir de lier et de délier, ou pouvoir des clefs, que le Christ a conféré aux Apôtres et

à leurs successeurs“. On ne saurait la séparer de l'institution divine de l’Eglise. Tout autre est la doctrine de Hobbes, qu’il paraît impossible de comprendre si on ne la rattache pas à une histoire purement humaine de l'Eglise. Simple usage issu de «la pratique par laquelle les Juifs excluaient de leurs synagogues ceux dont ils estimaient contagieuses les mœurs ou la doctrine»*”, l’excommunication n’a pas de fondement en Ecriture; elle est dépourvue d’effet sur ceux qui ne se reconnaissent pas dans l'Eglise (infidèles ou apostats) comme sur les chrétiens sincères; elle est sans conséquence en l’absence d’un souverain chrétien ou encore tant que le pouvoir civil n’a pas résolu de la faire appliquer; elle ne peut avoir d’autre objet que la conduite des fidèles, puisque leurs opinions (c’est-à-dire, en réalité, l'expression publique de leurs opinions) ne sont pas

53. The Bishop of Derry’s Answer to the Epistle of M. de la Milletiére (1653), Works, Oxford,

1842-1845, vol. 1, p. 54-55. Ma traduction, comme

pour toutes les citations d’ou-

vrages publiés en anglais. Cette œuvre ne fait pas partie de la controverse de Bramhall avec Hobbes. 54. La position de Calvin souligne ce point. Par l’excommunication, écrit le Réformateur, «ceux qui prétendent faulsement la Foy de Christ, et cependant, par vie deshoneste et meschante, scandalisent son nom, doibvent estre exterminez et chassez d’entre le peuple de Dieu» (Institution de la religion chrétienne, IV, “De la foy”; Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1961, p. 136). Il précise: «Et à fin que nul ne mesprise un tel jugement de l'Eglise, ou estime petite chose d’estre condamné par la sentence des fidèles, le Seigneur a testifié, que cela n’est autre chose, qu’une declaration de sa propre sentence, et que ce qu’ilz auront dict en Terre sera ratifié au Ciel» (ibid., p. 137). Le texte renvoie ici 4 Matt., XVIII. On y trouve le pas sage où le Christ déclare: «En vérité, je vous le dis, tout ce que vous lierez sur la terre sera lié dans le ciel, et tout ce que vous délierez sur la terre sera délié dans le ciel» (Matt.,

XVIII, 18). Bramhall, de son còté, après avoir évoqué la conception de Hobbes, interrogera: «Qu’est-il advenu, à présent, de ce pouvoir de lier et de délier?» (cité dans la Réponse à la capture de Léviathan, voir De la liberté et de la nécessité, op. cit., p. 224). 55. Léviathan, XLII, 20.

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l'affaire de l’Eglise, mais celle du souverain; ce dernier, s’il est chrétien, ne

saurait en être justiciable puisque ce serait reconnaître la supériorité d’un pouvoir extérieur au sien”. Expulsion temporaire de l'Eglise qui ne peut entraîner par elle-même une mise au ban de la société, l’excommunication n’a pas à être redoutée du chrétien à la vie irréprochable. La frayeur qu’elle inspire parfois repose sur l’invocation d’un Christ divinisé que rien n’autorise et qui a même des relents de paganisme, comme en témoigne l’origine de l’expression fulmen

excommunicationis: Ces mots de fulmen excommunicationis (qui signifient les foudres de l’excommunication) vinrent de ce que l’évêque de Rome qui en usa pour la première fois s’imaginait être le roi des rois, à la manière dont les païens faisaient de Jupiter le roi des dieux, lui attribuant, dans leur poésie et dans leurs effigies, un foudre pour réduire et châtier les géants qui oseraient nier son pouvoir. Le fait qu’il s’imaginait cela se fondait sur deux erreurs: premièrement, que le royaume du Christ fût de ce monde, chose contraire aux propres paroles de notre Sauveur, mon royaume n’est pas de ce monde; deuxièmement, qu'il fût le vicaire du Christ, établi non seulement sur ses propres sujets, mais sur tous les chrétiens du monde: idée sans fondement dans l’Ecriture, et dont le contraire sera

prouvé dans son lieu?”.

3. Une république chrétienne sans Christ? La réaction affligée de Bramhall à ces propos le démontre: c’est la nature même de l'Eglise et, par conséquent, sa place dans la société civile qui étaient en cause dans ces affirmations relatives à la discipline eccésiastique. Comment, dès lors, ne pas poser la question de ce que Hobbes entend par république chrétienne, au-delà de ce qu’il en dit explicitement dans la troisième partie du Léviathan? La volonté affichée de délégitimer la distinction entre pouvoir temporel et pouvoir spirituel n’est pas, en effet, sans susciter quelque interrogation. Existe-t-il, aux yeux de Hobbes, une véritable spécificité de la république chrétienne? On serait tenté, dans un premier temps de l’analyse, de répondre par l’affirmative en observant que l’entreprise hobbesienne consiste moins en un simple rejet de la distinction mentionnée que dans la justification d’une complète absorption du pouvoir spirituel dans le pouvoir civil, d’où découle une hypertrophie exceptionnelle de ce dernier. En la personne du souverain se cumulent les fonctions de rex et de sacerdos, qui lui confèrent une puissance qu’on jugerait, en vérité, sans précédent, tout au moins dans le contexte de l’Europe chrétienne. La description qu’en donne Hobbes a d’abord un caractère général: si tout souverain chrétien est le pasteur suprême de ses propres sujets, il semble qu'il ait aussi autorité, non seulement pour prêcher (ce que, peut-être, personne ne niera),

56. Ibid., XLII, 20-31. 57. Ibid., XLII, 31.

Franck Lessay

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mais aussi pour baptiser et pour administrer le sacrement de la Cène du Seigneur, et pour consacrer, en vue du service de Dieu, aussi bien les temples que les pasteurs: ce que la plupart nient, en partie parce que les souverains n’ont pas coutume d’en user ainsi, et en partie parce que l’administration des sacrements et la consécration des personnes et des lieux en vue d’usages saints requiert l’imposition des mains d'hommes qui ont été investis d’un semblable ministère par une semblable imposition, transmise de génération en génération depuis le temps des Ap6tres®*.

En réaction aux critiques de Bramhall, Hobbes celle du monarque anglais telle que la Réforme Histoire nationale et histoire biblique sembleront comme le philosophe le suggèrera en affirmant que

associera cette puissance à anglicane l’avait fagonnée. se recouper sur ce point, «le roi d’ Angleterre possè-

de la totalité du droit que possédait tout roi d’Israél»°’. En cela, pourtant, il ira bien au-delà de la réalité institutionnelle anglaise. Le trente-septieme des 39 Articles déclare en effet: «Là où nous attribuons à Sa Majesté le roi le principal gouvernement», «nous ne confions pas à nos princes |’ administration ni de la parole de Dieu ni des sacrements». De fait, comme le rappelle le méme texte, Elisabeth avait renoncé à l’exercice des fonctions pastorales (épisode que

Hobbes évoque dans la version latine du Léviathan®):

Acte de Suprématie de

1559 l’avait bien désignée comme «le seul gouverneur suprême de ce royaume», «en toutes choses ou causes spirituelles ou ecclésiastiques aussi bien que temporelles»®', mais, fût-ce par conviction ou pour des motifs de circonstance, la reine avait résilié les prérogatives que Hobbes, quant à lui, revendique pour tout souverain chrétien. Au nom de l’«indivisibilité du droit politique et ecclésiastique chez les souverains chrétiens», affirme Hobbes, il est «évident» que ceux-ci «ont sur leurs sujets toute espèce de pouvoir qui peut être donné à l’homme pour le gouvernement des actions extérieures des hommes, tant en politique qu’en reli-

gion». S’il convient d'admettre qu’ils n’ont pas coutume d’exercer les fonctions pastorales qui leur appartiennent (de même qu'ils siègent rarement dans les cours de justice et n’enseignent presque jamais dans les universités, alors qu'ils ont aussi ce droit), c’est uniquement parce qu’ils n’en ont pas le temps et qu’il leur est plus commode de déléguer ces tâches à des subordonnés®. On pourrait, d’ailleurs, imaginer que l’un d’eux commit le soin de la religion au

58. Léviathan, XLII, 72.

59. Réponse à la capture de Léviathan, dans De la liberté et de la nécessité, op. cit., p. 224. La précision qui suit limite, cependant, la portée du rapprochement et laisse suffisamment entendre que le propos s'inspire de considérations rationnelles plutôt qu’historiques: «[et] que tout autre roi ou assembléée souveraine dans leurs Etats» (ibid.). 60. Voir, dans la traduction française de François Tricaud, p. 569, n. 489. 61. Dans G. R. Elton (ed), The Tudor Constitution. Documents and Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 335. Hobbes reprend la formule presque terme à terme lorsqu’il écrit que le souverain chrétien «détient le pouvoir suprême à l’égard de toutes les causes, aussi bien ecclésiastiques que civiles» (Léviathan, XLII, 80). 62. Léviathan, XLII, 79. 63. Ibid., XLII, 71-79.

Hobbes: une christologie politique?

67

pape, mais ce serait à la condition que celui-ci reconnût sa suprématie™. Le

pape n'est qu'un évêque parmi d’autres, qui ne jouit d’ aucune primauté. La juridiction ecclésiastique que détiennent les évêques n’a pas d’autre source que la volonté des souverains. A supposer qu’on puisse la dire de jure divino, elle est de jure divino mediato®: le Christ n’a confié une telle juridiction à person-

ne; seuls les souverains peuvent revendiquer un pouvoir de jure divino. En effet, «tout pouvoir légitime est de Dieu, immédiatement en ce qui concerne le chef suprême, et médiatement chez ceux qui disposent de l'autorité sous

lui»°°. Aussi est-il plus juste de considérer que les évêques sont, vis-à-vis du souverain, dans le même rapport que tous les pasteurs, les magistrats municipaux, les juges des cours de justice et les commandants des armées: en d’autres termes, qu'ils sont comme «les ministres de celui qui est le magistrat de toute la république, le juge de toutes les causes, et le chef de toutes les armées», en même temps que le «pasteur suprême» de son peuple. Tous s’acquittent de leur charge jure civili, «en vertu du droit, c’est-à-dire de l’autorité du souverain civil», tandis que ce dernier détient sa puissance jure divino, «en

vertu d’une autorité reçue directement de Dieu»®’. Une fois de. plus, Hobbes s’écarte de la doctrine anglicane. Les protestations de Bramhall lattestent®*, comme son affirmation que l’unique différence existant entre les anglicans et les catholiques romains sur le point de l’épiscopat est que, pour ces derniers, le pape tient seul sa juridiction «immédiatement du Christ», tandis que, pour les premiers, «tous les évéques» sont dans ce cas’. Le prélat ne fait qu’exposer ce qui est la thèse de l’Eglise d’ Angleterre de l’époque. S’exprimant devant la Chambre étoilée en 1637, l’archevêque de Cantorbéry William Laud déclare que «depuis le temps des Apôtres, en toutes époques, en tous lieux, l'Eglise du Christ a été gouvernée par des évêques, et l’on n’a jamais entendu parler de conseils des anciens avant que Calvin inventât ce système à Genève». Il précise: «bien que notre office soit de Dieu et du Christ immédiatement, nous ne pouvons néanmoins exercer ce pouvoir, d'ordre ou de juridiction, que de la manière que Dieu nous a prescrite», c’està-dire, «par et sous le pouvoir du roi qui nous a chargés de l’exercer»/°. Bien que ce texte donne à percevoir l’ambiguïté de la position anglicane, il permet également de mesurer la distance qui sépare l’ecclésiologie hobbesienne de celle de l'Eglise d’Angleterre. Si un même érastianisme s’y déploie, c’est à

64. Ibid., XLII, 80. GaP ibid. XL MIO: 66. Ibid. Le début de la phrase, faut-il le souligner, est une citation a peine voilée de saint Paul (Rom., XIII, 1).

67. Ibid., XLII, 70-71. 68. Voir les propos que rapporte la Réponse à la capture de Léviathan, dans De la liberté et de la nécessité, op. cit., p. 222. 69. Schism Guarded and Beaten Back upon the Right Owners (1658), Works, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 453. 70. Dans J. P. Kenyon

(ed), The Stuart Constitution.

Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 148.

Documents

and Commentary,

Franck Lessay

68

travers deux versions fort éloignées l’une de l’autre, celle de Hobbes apparaissant beaucoup plus radicale. Avec Richard Hooker, le philosophe a en commun la défense de la suprématie religieuse du souverain et l’affirmation du caractére unitaire de la respublica christiana (Etat et Eglise doivent former un seul corps, une seule polity, sur le modéle d’Israél, écrit Hooker). Cependant, ces deux principes essentiels exceptés, Hooker admet pleinement la validité de la distinction entre pouvoir temporel et pouvoir spirituel. Il assume le refus de reconnaître au souverain le droit de précher, d’administrer les sacrements, d’ordonner les pasteurs, de juger en matière ecclésiastique (l'Eglise doit disposer de sa propre justice), d’excommunier. Il soutient qu’en cela est démontré le fait que la puissance du souverain ne saurait être illimitée: elle a pour bornes la loi de Dieu et la loi de nature, mais encore la loi positive (coutume et actes du Parlement), dont il précise qu’elle s’applique au domaine spirituel aussi bien

qu’au temporel/!. Aussi peine-t-on à suivre Aloysius Martinich lorsqu'il identifie la conception hobbesienne des rapports entre l'Eglise et l’Etat à celle des anglicans, en arguant d’un même souci de contrer les prétentions romaines à la suprématie papale”. La réalité de cette préoccupation ne peut se nier. Elle ne conduit aucunement aux mêmes effets: dans un cas — celui de l’école de Hooker —, elle légitime une subordination strictement juridique de l'Eglise au souverain et maintient l’existence de deux pouvoirs séparés; dans l’autre, elle se traduit pas la fusion du temporel et du spirituel dans la personne du souverain et inclusion dans son statut propre de toutes les fonctions pastorales (leur délégation, parfaitement envisageable, étant une pure affaire de circonstances). La définition que donne Hobbes de l’Eglise le démontre: celle-ci n’a de substance que juridique. Elle n’est rien d’autre qu’une institution civile et ne peut exister que sous l’autorité du souverain qui en est nécessairement le chef au sens plein. Dans la mesure où elle désigne «la réunion assemblée d’hommes qui professent le christianisme, que leur profession de foi soit véridique ou contrefaite», elle s’appréhende comme une «société d'hommes professant la religion chrétienne, unis dans la personne d’un souverain unique, sur l’ordre duquel ils doivent s’assembler, et qui ne doivent pas s’assembler sans être couverts par son autorité»’*. Dès lors, la république chrétienne ne sera jamais qu’une république qui se trouve étre composée de chrétiens, les dénominations d’Eglise et d’ Etat servant à envisager sous deux aspects une même réalité strictement temporelle: Par conséquent, une Eglise, j'entends une Eglise ayant pouvoir d’ordonner, de juger, d’absoudre, de condamner, ou d’accomplir toute autre action, ne diffère en rien d’une

république civile constituée de chrétiens; on l’appele Etat civil, en considération de ce que ses sujets sont des hommes, et Eglise, en considération de ce que ce sont des chrétiens. Gouvernement temporel et gouvernement spirituel, ce sont là deux mots qu’on a 71. Voir le huitième livre des Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, en particulier 8, I, VII et 8, Il, XVEXVII.

72. A. P Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan, op. cit., p. 281-285. 73. Léviathan,

XX XIX, 3-4.

Hobbes: une christologie politique?

introduits souverain ‘ seulement tibles. En

69

dans le monde afin que les hommes voient double et se méprennent sur leur légitime. Sans doute, les corps des fidèles, après la résurrection, seront non spirituels, mais éternels; mais dans cette vie, ils sont grossiers et corrupconséquence, il n'y a pas d'autre gouvernement en cette vie, ni de l'Etat, ni

de la religion, qui ne soient temporels’*. C’est à juste titre que Bramhall observe: «A ce compte, il n’exista aucune Eglise chrétienne en ces régions du monde pendant plusieurs siècles après

le Christ, puisqu'il n’y eut point de souverain chrétien»/*. Encore constate-til: «Il n’est personne qui ne distingue l'Eglise de la république: seul T. H. en fait une seule et même

chose»/*. Comme

pour lui donner raison, parmi les

motifs de la mise à l’Index du De Cive (en 1654), puis du Léviathan (en 1703), figure de manière récurrente la volonté relevée chez Hobbes par les censeurs romains d’assigner au souverain une puissance absolue qui inclut le pouvoir spirituel et, au nom du principe selon lequel «una est Ecclesia et Civitas christiana», d'effacer la différence d'essence qui existe entre l’Eglise

et l’Etat””. Comment comprendre cette orientation de la philosophie hobbesienne qui fait de l’ecclésiologie une fonction de la théorie de l’Etat (notion qu’il faut entendre dans un sens strictement civil), sans la rapporter à son fondement théologique, c’est-à-dire à la christologie spécifique que l’on a évoquée? Paradoxalement, la «religion de Hobbes» se ramène à un christocentrisme en ce qu’elle situe avec insistance l’essence de la foi chrétienne dans la croyance que Jésus est le Christ, c’est-à-dire,

le roi que Dieu avait déjà promis, par l'intermédiaire des prophètes de |’ Ancien Testament, d’envoyer en ce monde, pour régner éternellement sur les Juifs et sur celles des autres nations qui croiraient en lui, sous son autorité, et pour leur donner cette vie éter-

nelle qu'ils avaient perdue par le péché d’ Adam”.

En cette croyance consiste le seul article de foi nécessaire au salut. La théologie ramène par là de deux manières à la politique. En premier lieu, Vunum necessarium fixe une limite infranchissable à la puissance du souverain. Celui-ci a le droit d’imposer la religion de son choix à l’Etat, de déterminer le culte «public», de trancher entre des interprétations divergentes de l’Ecriture. Il ne possède pas pour autant la capacité de réaliser le salut de ses sujets: parce que les dispositions intérieures qui produisent la foi dépendent de la volonté toute-puissante de Dieu” et, en toute hypothèse, échappent aux mé-

74. Ibid., XXXIX, 5. 75. Réponse à la capture de Léviathan, dans De la liberté et de la nécessité, op. cit., p.

214. 76. Ibid. 77. Voir Artemio Enzo Baldini, “Censures de l'Eglise romaine contre Hobbes: De Cive et Léviathan”, Bulletin Hobbes XHI, Archives de Philosophie, tome 64, cahier 2, avril-juin 2001, p. 2-7. 78. Léviathan, XLUI, 11.

Franck Lessay

70

canismes de la volonté8; parce qu’il n’a pas le pouvoir de donner à une opinion force de vérité*!. C’est pourquoi l’excommunication fulminée contre un croyant intimement convaincu que Jésus est le Christ ne peut étre d’aucun effet, de quelque autorité qu’elle émane**. Que le souverain se préoccupe de religion est une nécessité impérieuse au regard des exigences de la paix civile. Sans doute, s’il est pieux, sera-t-il naturel qu’il témoigne sa sollicitude spirituelle à ses sujets en s’efforçant de soutenir les croyances qui lui semblent les plus fondées. Cependant, assurer leur salut n’entre pas pas dans ses missions: la république chrétienne n’a pas, en ce sens, de vocation surnaturelle. En second lieu, la doctrine de l’unum necessarium fournit une clef de compréhension de l’histoire chrétienne en soulignant, une fois encore, le caractère strictement humain de l’Eglise et la nécessité purement rationnelle que le souverain ait pleine autorité en matière religieuse. Parmi les arguments invoqués par Bellarmin pour justifier la puissance papale figurent les paroles adressées par Jésus à Pierre, «Tu es Pierre, et sur ce roc je bâtirai mon Eglise»*. A la conclusion classique selon laquelle cette formule démontrerait le mandat universel et permanent du pape, c’est l’unum necessarium qu’oppose Hobbes, comme preuve de ce que l’enjeu de cet échange était, non pas |institution de l'Eglise, mais l’objet de la croyance des chrétiens. Ayant rappelé les mots cités avec le verset qui suit («Et je te donnerai les clefs du ciel; tout ce que tu lieras sur la terre sera lié, et tout ce que tu délieras sur la terre sera délié dans le ciel»), il commente: Or ce passage, si on le considère attentivement, prouve simplement que l'Eglise du Christ a pour fondement un unique article: à savoir, celui que saint Pierre professe au nom des Apôtres, donnant à notre Sauveur l’occasion de prononcer les paroles citées.

79. C’est pourquoi il est vain de prétendre contrôler, plus encore forcer les consciences: «il ne devrait pas y avoir de pouvoir à s'exercer sur les consciences des hommes en dehors de la parole elle-même, qui opère la foi en chacun, non pas toujours comme l’entendraient ceux qui plantent et arrosent, mais comme l’entend Dieu lui-même, qui donne la croissance» (Leviathan, XLVII, 20).

80. Aussi ne croit-on pas par obéissance: «autre chose est d’obéir, autre chose de croire [...]. Obéir est faire ou s’abstenir comme on en reçoit l’ordre, et dépend de la volonté; or,

croire ne dépend pas de la volonté, mais du soin et de la direction de nos cceurs, qui sont entre les mains du Dieu Tout-Puissant. Les lois seules requièrent l’obéissance; la croyance requiert des professeurs et des arguments tirés de la raison, ou bien de quelque chose à quoi Von croit déjà» (Réponse à la capture de Léviathan, dans De la liberté et de la nécessité, ODAGUEPEZIONE

81. En réponse a une objection de Bramhall, Hobbes écrit: «Si deux rois interprétent un passage de l’Ecriture dans des sens contraires», il ne s’ensuivra pas que les deux sens sont vrais, car «serait-elle le fait d’une autorité légitime, l'interprétation n’est pas, pour autant, toujours forcément vraie» (ibid., p. 218). 82. «Celui qui croit que Jésus est le Christ est exempt de tous les dangers qui menacent les excommuniés. Celui qui ne le croit pas n’est pas chrétien. Par conséquent, un chrétien véritable et sincère n’est pas passible d’excommunication»

(Léviathan, XLII, 29).

83. Matt., XVI, 18; Léviathan, XLII, 84. François Tricaud s'explique du choix du mot inhabituel «roc» p. 574, n. 517, dans l'édition citée.

Hobbes: une christologie politique?

71

Pour comprendre clairement cela, on doit considérer que notre Sauveur ne prêcha pas autre chose, tant par lui-même que par l'intermédiaire de Jean-Baptiste et de ses Apôtres, que cet unique article de foi, qu'il était le Christ, tous les autres articles ne requérant notre foi qu’en tant qu'ils sont fondés sur celui-ci. [...] C’était l’article fondamental, c’est-à-dire le fondement de la foi de l'Eglise. [...] On voit clairement par là qu'il faut entendre, par pierre fondamentale de l'Eglise, l’article fondamental de la foi

de l’Eglise®. Indissociable de la déclaration du Christ, ajoute Hobbes, est la question du pouvoir des clefs. Ce n’est pas Pierre, seulement, qui en reçut le dépôt, mais, affirme-t-il, tous les disciples, comme on peut le déduire du passage du méme évangile de Matthieu (XVIII, 18) où le Christ dit à ces derniers: «tout ce que vous lierez sur la terre sera lié dans le ciel». Or, dans la mesure où un tel pouvoir, de quelque manière qu’on le comprenne, entraîne celui d’enseigner et de convertir, On ne saurait concevoir que, au-delà des Apôtres, il ne soit pas échu aux souverains en tant que pasteurs suprémes de leurs peuples: quelle que soit l'interprétation qu’on donne à ce passage, il n’est pas douteux que le pouvoir qui est ici accordé appartient à tous les pouvoirs suprémes, tels que sont tous les souverains civils chrétiens dans leurs propres empires: à tel point que si saint Pierre ou notre Sauveur lui-même avait converti l’un d’entre ceux-ci à croire en lui et à reconnaître son royaume, il aurait cependant, parce que son royaume n’est pas de ce monde, laissé au seul souverain le soin suprême de convertir ses sujets; car autrement, il l’eût privé de la souveraineté à laquelle est inséparablement attaché le droit d’enseiggner>85 4

Deux logiques se rejoignent ici et se confortent, dont on peut douter qu’elles soient séparables: celle de la souveraineté, qui implique l’extension du pouvoir civil au domaine spirituel; celle d’un christocentrisme qui inscrit l’action du Christ dans une histoire profane. Reprenant, dans une étude fort

éclairante, les analyses d’Hannah Arendt sur l’autorité**, Luc Foisneau fait justement valoir qu’une spécificité majeure de la théorie de Hobbes est de dévaloriser l’idée même de tradition en substituant à la notion religieuse de fondation, essentielle à la pensée romaine comme à celle de l’Eglise, la notion logique de fondement; en remplaçant l’origine, qui renvoie à une temporalité empreinte de transcendance, par le concept, anhistorique par nature; en postulant, à la source du pouvoir, non pas un acte concret d’ institution, mais l’hypo-

thèse à valeur heuristique du contrat social*’. Il me semble que la christologie de Hobbes valide cette interprétation en mettant en relief une double extériori-

84. Ibid. 85. Ibid., XLII, 85. 86. Voir les études d’ Hannah Arendt réunies dans La crise de la culture. Huit exercices de pensée politique, traduit de l'anglais par Patrick Lévy (1972), Gallimard, Folio/Essais, Paris 1991. 87. Voir “L'autorité de la scolastique: enjeux politiques de la critique du libre arbitre (Hobbes, Bramhall, Suarez)”, dans Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie po-

7?)

Franck Lessay

té du Christ: au processus de création et de développement de l'Eglise, qui a dépendu de facteurs historiques purement séculiers**; au contenu même de l’idée de république chrétienne, dont la signification se limite à une coïncidence des appartenances politique et religieuse. Le souverain doit être le seul interprète de la Parole de Dieu parce que nul pouvoir humain ne peut se prévaloir d’une extraction sacrée qui l’habilite à revendiquer une telle prérogative. Il est nécessairement le seul intermédiaire entre Dieu et ses sujets parce que le Christ, dont c’était la fonction reconnue par les doctrines «orthodoxes», n’est plus, aux yeux de Hobbes, le Médiateur qui assure le salut des hommes grâce à sa double nature, humaine et divine. Le pacte sur lequel repose le royaume prophétique de Dieu, conclu avec Abraham et renouvelé avec Isaac, Jacob, Moise et Jésus, ne conserve sa force que par le souverain parce qu'il est le dernier de cette lignée de prophètes. Le Christ reviendra bien sur la terre: mais «c’est dans sa nature humaine que notre Sauveur doit régner sur son royaume», et, «s’il doit être roi alors, ce n’est que comme le subordonné et le vicaire de Dieu le Père, comme l’étaient Moise dans le désert, les grands-prêtres avant le règne de Saiil, et les rois par

la suite»®. L'histoire connaîtra un nouveau départ. Les élus jouiront d’une vie éternelle, mais au sein d’une république qui, pour être devenue universelle, tiendra beaucoup, et sur des points essentiels, «de ce grand LÉVIATHAN, ou plutôt, pour en parler avec plus de révérence, de ce dieu mortel auquel nous devons, sous le Dieu immortel, notre paix et notre protection».

litique moderne, ouvrage dirigé par Yves Charles Zarka, Presses Universitaires de France. coll. “Fondements de la politique”, Paris 1999, p. 167-190. 88. Sur la conception et la pratique hobbesiennes de ce qu’on appelait |’ «histoire sacrée», voir Franck Lessay, “Hobbes and sacred history”, dans Hobbes and History. ouvrage dirigé par G. A. J. Rogers et Tom Sorell, Routledge, “Routledge Studies in SeventeenthCentury Philosophy”, Londres/New York 2000, p. 147-159. 89. Léviathan, XLI, 6-7. 90. Ibid., XVII, 13.

HOBBES’ CORPOREAL

DEITY

by Cees Leijenhorst

Introduction

Hobbes’ affirmation of the corporeal character of God remains as controversial today as it was in the seventeenth century. Hobbes is famous for having rejected in his Leviathan the scholastic notion of incorporeal substance as a contradiction in adjecto: all substances are bodies, hence to accept the existence of incorporeal substances would be identical to affirming the existence of an incorporeal body, which is absurd. The Leviathan, however, does not extensively deal with the question what this means for God, who was traditionally conceived to be an incorporeal substance. Hobbes’ opponents, however, filled in the details. For instance, Bishop John Bramhall, quoting Hobbes’ statement in the Leviathan, that «to say that an Angel or Spirit is an incorporeal substance, is to say in effect that there is no Angel or Spirit at all»', concludes that: By the same reason, to say that God is an incorporeal spirit, is to say there is no God at all. Either God is incorporeal, or he is finite and consists of parts, and consequently is

1. L 34 (EW III, 393). References Molesworth edition (London,

to Hobbes’

works

are given according to the

1839; Reprint Aalen, 1966), except for De Corpore, which is

cited after the critical edition by Karl Schuhmann (Paris, 1999). EW designates the English Works, OL the Opera Latina. Volume numbers are in Roman, page numbers in Arabic nu-

merals. The following abbreviations are used: DCo = De Corpore (followed by the chapter in Roman and the article in Arabic numerals); DHo = De Homine (followed by the chapter in Roman and the article in Arabic numerals); DCi = De Cive (followed by the chapter in Roman and the article in Arabic numerals); EL = Elements of Law (followed by the chapter

in Roman and the article in Arabic numerals); L = Leviathan; DM = De Motu. By De Motu, I refer to the manuscript still known under the misleading title of Anti-White. On the title De Motu, see K. Schuhmann, “Hobbes dans les publications de Mersenne en 1644”, pp. 45. OMC = Objectiones ad Cartesii Meditationes; HN = An Historical Narration concerning

Heresie; ABB = An Answer to Bishop Bramhall; App. ad LL = Appendix ad Leviathan Latine; Dialogus = Dialogus Physicus de Natura Aeris; DP = Decameron Physiologicum: CRL = Mr Hobbes Considered in His Loyalty, Religion, Reputation, and Manners. I thank Christoph Liithy for his valuable linguistic comments.

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no God. This, that there is no incorporeal spirit, is that main root of Atheisme, from which so many lesser branches are daily sprouting up”.

What Bramhall appears to mean is that by denying that God is an incorporeal substance, Hobbes implies that God is a body. But that is the same as saying that God does not exist, since to be a body means to have parts and to be finite, which is in conflict with God’s infinity and indivisibility, which are both canonically accepted divine attributes. Ergo, Hobbes is an atheist, whether he admits it or not. Bramhall’s book of 1658 is by no means the only attack on Hobbes’ religious convictions (or lack thereof). The 1660’s were witness to what looks al-

most like an orchestrated campaign against Hobbes’ alleged heresies and atheism. Following the great fire of London of 1666, the House of Commons set up a committee to consider a «Bill against Atheisme Prophaneness and Swearing impowered to receive Informacion toucheing such bookes as tend to Atheisme Blasphemy or Prophaneness or against the Essence or Attributes of God. And in perticular [...] the booke of Mr Hobbs called the Leuiathan»*. A salient

version of these events can be found in the Brief Lives by John Aubrey, who narrates how some of the bishops proposed a motion in Parliament «to have the good old gentleman burnt for a heretic»*. Fortunately for Hobbes, the order to set up a committee was countered by his then protector, the Secretary of State Henry Bennet, Baron of Arlington. Hobbes answered these charges of heresy and atheism in a number of works, only few of which appeared in print during his lifetime’. In these works, he unequivocally states that God is indeed a body. However, he also tries to show that there is nothing heretical or atheist about this assumption, but that it is in line with Scripture, the Early Church Fathers, the first four Church Councils and the Nicene Creed. To the extent that this defence was known to Hobbes’ contemporaries, they clearly remained unimpressed®. Hobbes’ notion of God is still being debated among scholars. In this paper, I discuss two questions that are linked with his notion of corporeal deity. The first issue concerns the consistency of his position throughout his publishing 2. 3. 4. 5. script

Bramhall, Catching of the Leviathan, p. 471. Malcolm, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. xxv. Aubrey, Brief Lives, vol. 1, p. 339. 1) “Hobbes and the Law of Heresy”, JHI 29 (1968), pp. 409-414. This is a manu(Hardwick MS 145, no. 18) edited by Samuel Mintz. According to Franck Lessay,

the text should be dated between

1666 and 1668 (Lessay, Hérésie, p. 61) 2) Appendix ad

Leviathan Latine, in Opera Omnia (Amsterdam, by Dr Bramhall [...] (London,

1668). 3) An Answer to a Book Published

1682). According to Lessay (De La Liberté, p. 121), Hobbes

wrote this book in 1668. 4) An Historical Narration concerning Heresie, and the Punishment thereof (London, 1682). Again, according to Lessay (Hérésie, p. 17) this work was written around 1668. Also of interest is Mr Hobbes Considered in His Loyalty, Religion, Reputation, and Manners. By Way of a Letter to Dr Wallis (London, 1662). 6. On seventeenth-century

reactions

Hunting of Leviathan, pp. 63-133.

to Hobbes’

materialism

and atheism,

see Minz,

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career. The second question concerns the extent to which the notion of a corporeal deity fits Hobbes’ physics. With respect to the first question, I take issue with the position defended by Edwin Curley, who argued that Hobbes was fundamentally inconsistent with respect to the corporeal character of God’. According to Curley, the Latin Leviathan of 1668 is more or less the only publication in which Hobbes unequivocally claims that God is a body. In his earlier works, he had defended a range of different, but mutually contradicting, positions. According to De Motu, for instance, we should trust Scripture, which tells us that God is an incorporeal substance. Curley states that Hobbes was not inconsistent for a lack of philosophical subtlety, but for reasons of prudence. According to Curley, Hobbes was in his heart of hearts a downright atheist. Given that a defense of this view in public would have been sheer suicide, Hobbes played a hide and seek game: in different works, he tried different positions, none of which represented his true convictions about God. The publication that comes closest to his hidden atheism is the Latin Leviathan. This work, however, was published overseas and in what Curley considers a foreign language. Moreover, by then, he was at a very advanced age, which probably subdued any fear of persecution. Curley thinks that this work propounds what Hobbes himself calls «atheism by consequence», which he defines as defending a position that is so contradictory to all established descriptions of God, that it practically entails atheism®. According to Curley, upholding the corporeality of God is in fact an example of such a position: «But if God were corporeal, he would not be God, for well-known reasons. Therefore, God does not exist»’. In this respect, Curley finds himself in the good company of Bishop Bramhall, who equally thought that affirming the corporeal character of God amounted to denying His very existence. In this paper I shall show that, contrary to what Curley claims, Hobbes’ position on the nature of ‘ God remained consistent throughout his publishing career. Furthermore, there are no reasons for why we should take his notion of a corporeal deity as «atheism by consequence». The second problem that surrounds Hobbes’ corporeal deity is the question of how to make this notion fit in his physics. Agostino Lupoli has recently giv-

en a highly interesting analysis of this problem!°. He shows that Hobbes defines God as a subtle spirit, 1.e., as a fine, fluid body. The question Lupoli asks is how this fluid body relates to the other fluids Hobbes lists in his physics, where a kind of ether is mentioned that pervades all solid bodies and where prime matter is described as a primum fluidum created by God. Lupoli argues that these descriptions of different fluids cannot be squared with each other and explains this in terms of an inner conflict in Hobbes’ account of creation. On the one hand, he declares that all questions about the beginning of the

7. Curley, “I Durst Not Write So Boldly” and “Hobbes versus Descartes”. 8. For Hobbes’ definition of «atheism by consequence», see ABB (EW IV, 383-384). 9. Curley, “Hobbes versus Descartes”, p. 108. 10. Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity”.

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world are non-philosophical and the prerogative of those that are appointed by the sovereign to interpret Scripture. On the other hand, he is tempted to give a more detailed, physical description of the corporeal deity and His relation to the physical cosmos. In the end, according to Lupoli, he preferred his account to remain sketchy and paradoxical, rather than transgressing the boundaries of the philosophically knowableas as he had himself defined them. However, I shall try to show that Hobbes’ «fluidism» is less paradoxical than Lupoli claims it to be. The integration of the corporeal deity in Hobbes’ «fluidist» physics is admittedly sketchy, but it does show the contours of a consistent position. Before treating the two questions of the consistency of Hobbes’ position on the corporeal deity and its possible integration into his physics, I shall first say a few words about his distinction between philosophical and religious discourse. As we shall see, this distinction provides the key to understanding his notion of corporeal deity.

1. The Separation of Reason and Faith Hobbes offers several explanations for why reason and faith should be kept separate. The first might be called an external one. Reason and faith, philosophy and religion are two different practices, each with its own sets of rules. Philosophy is the domain of private opinion and of debate between these opinions. Religion, by contrast, is neither a set of articles that can be demonstrated

rationally, nor a supernatural source of truth. As is known, in the Leviathan Hobbes demonstrates on scriptural grounds that all spiritual authority ultimately lies in the hands of the sovereign, since the prophetic age in which God revealed Himself directly to human kind lies in the past. Religion is basically a set of laws, promulgated by the sovereign, with which all citizens have to comply. Faith is thus essentially a matter of law and common public conduct, while philosophy belongs to the sphere of private opinion'!. Hobbes distinguishes between practises that should not be confused: one does not play rugby on a tennis court. Hobbes, however, does not just offer an external but also an internal, epistemological criterion for the separation of reason and faith. Philosophy deals with things that are conceivable to us. Since God is incomprehensible, He can never be the object of scientific demonstration. We find in Hobbes’ work sev-

eral specifications of why God is incomprehensible!?. The most important for 11. See DCo, Ep. Ded.: «Contra hanc Empusam [sc. scholasticam dictam B£0Xoyiov] exorcismus (credo) melior excogitari non potest, quam ut Religionis, id est, Dei honorandi colendique regulae a legibus petendae, a Philosophiae regulis, id est, a privatorum hominum dogmatibus distinguantur, quaeque Religionis sunt, Scripturae Sacrae, quae Philosophiae sunt, rationi naturali tribuantur». 12. See DM 149, 317, 319, 384; L 12 (EW III, 97); EL XI, 1 (EW IV, 59); OMC (OL V, 259-260); DCi XVII, 28 (OL II, 412-413), DCi XVIII, 4 (OL II, 420).

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our purposes is exemplified by a passage from the Leviathan, in which Hobbes

explains that philosophy deals with what has first been in the senses!?. The only things that are accessible to our sense perception are bodies that have a finite, determinate magnitude, and hence a determinate place. Moreover, bodies

with finite magnitude are divisible into parts. Now, according to all canonical texts (Scripture, the Nicene Creed etc.), God has no parts, He has no circumscribed place but is omnipresent, and He is infinite. Hence, we can have no idea of God’s essence.

All in all, human reason can only infer that God exists, not what He is!*. In this context, Hobbes uses one of the traditional proofs for the existence of God, namely the causal one. By postulating the existence of a first cause, an infinite regress of causes is prevented. One of the most interesting formulations of this argument is found in the Objections to Descartes’ Meditations, where Hobbes compares the finding of God as the first cause with a blind man, who upon feeling the heat of the fire concludes that there actually is a fire that causes the heat, but which he cannot see!>. Similarly, we conclude that there must be a cause of our ideas, which again must have a cause, until finally we arrive at the supposition of an eternal cause that has no further cause. Just like in the case of the blind man, we infer that there must be a cause, but we have

no positive idea or conception of it.

13.

L 3 (EW III, 17): «Whatsoever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea or

conception of any thing we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power.

When we say any thing is infinite, we signify only, that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the things named; having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him (for he is incom-

‘ prehensible; and his greatness and power are unconceivable); but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense,

either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have, or can be incident to sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all), from deceived philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving schoolmen».

14. DM 319, 384, 395-396; EL XI, 2 (EW IV, 59); OMC (OL V, 260); L 34 (EW II, 383). 15. OMC

(OL V, 260): «Videtur ergo nullam esse in nobis Dei ideam. Sed sicut caecus

natus, saepius igni admotus, et sentiens se calere, agnoscit esse aliquid a quo calefactus est, audiensque illud appellari ignem, concludit ignem existere, nec tamen qualis figurae aut coloris ignis sit cognoscit, vel ullam omnino ignis ideam vel imaginem animo obversantem habet: itaque homo cognoscens debere esse causam aliquam suarum imaginum vel idearum, et causae illius aliam causam priorem, et sic continuo, deducitur tandem ad finem sive suppositionem alicujus causae aeternae, quae quia nunquam coepit esse, causam se habere priorem non potest, necessario aliquid aeternum existere concludit: nec tamen ideam ullam habet, quam possit dicere esse ideam aeterni illius, sed rem creditam vel agnitam nominat vel

appellat Deum».

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In all contexts, the basic idea is the same: in Hobbes’

mechanistic universe

bodies can only be put in motion by other bodies. These, in turn, also need an external cause. In order to prevent an infinite regress of external causes, we need to postulate a First Mover. In De Corpore Hobbes adds that unlike the Aristotelian First Mover, the one he postulates should also move itself, the rea-

son being that bodies can only be moved by other bodies if those are them-

selves in motion!®. As Arrigo Pacchi has shown, Hobbes uses here a traditional proof for the existence of God, but adapts it to his own, non-traditional, purposes. Its function is not to demonstrate rationally an article of faith and defend it against the infidels, as had been the case, for instance, for Thomas

Aquinas.

Rather, it

gives «some kind of reassurance that a conception of Nature and of man — as part of a mechanically regarded Nature — grounded on a deterministic principle or causal necessity, is really well grounded»'’. As Pacchi rightly points out, in Hobbes’ case the traditional via is not a proof or formal demonstration at all, but rather some kind of hypothesis at which we arrive at by carefully considering the natural world. In the passage from the Objections, Hobbes indeed speaks about the «supposition of an eternal cause» (suppositionem alicuJus causae aeternae). Thus, against Descartes’ notion of innate ideas, Hobbes makes it clear that even if we can infer God's existence, we still do not have a positive idea of His essence. This means that all the names that we give to God cannot be seen as cognitive statements concerning His nature, but only as a non-cognitive or performative expression of our wish to honour Him. This is shown by the fact that we largely use negative expressions: God is in-finite, in-comprehensible etc. God clearly transcends our rational categories. This does not mean that according to Hobbes God can be reached through some kind of ecstatic unio mystica. Rather, to return to our athletic metaphor: speaking of God is not the task of science or philosophy, but part of the ballgame of religion, a matter of public conduct regulated by the sovereign and those that are appointed by him as the official interpreters of Scripture. The only characteristic of God that is the prerogative of the philosopher is to speak of His bare existence («Deus est»)!8. From this short summary, it should be clear that according to Hobbes nothing good can come from mixing the domains of faith and reason. This also clearly emerges from Hobbes’ analysis of the history of heresy which he offers 16. DCo XXVI, 1 (OL I, 336). 17. Pacchi, “Hobbes and the Problem of God”, p. 181. See also Pacchi, “Hobbes e il Dio delle cause”, p. 303. 18. DM 395-396: «Ego vero, dum considero Dei naturam esse inconceptibilem, propositiones autem esse orationes quasdam, quibus Conceptus nostros de naturis rerum pronuntiamus, in eam opinionem propendeo nullam propositionem veram esse posse circa naturam Dei praeter hanc unam: Deus est, neque ullam appellationem naturae Dei convenire praeter unicum nomen Ens, caetera omnia tribui non ad veritatem philosophicam explicandam, sed ad affectus nostros, quibus Deum magnificare laudare et honorare volumus declarandos».

Hobbes’s Corporeal Deity

WS)

in his writings of the 1660’s. According to Hobbes, the term «heresy» originally meant nothing other than simply a private opinion, and in particular an opinion held by one of the various Greek philosophical sects (Academics, Peripatetics, Epicureans, and the like)!”. However, Greek philosophy colonised the Early Church, giving the concept of heresy a different meaning. Heresy came to stand for a prohibited, false belief held by a minority, and thus opposed to «catholic» orthodoxy. Hobbes argues that the introduction of the Greek philosophers’ «heresies» had a pernicious effect on the Early Church: Most of the pastors of the primitive church were [...] chosen out of the number of these philosophers; who retaining still many doctrines which they had taken up on the authority of their former masters, whom they had in reverence, endeavoured many of them to draw the Scriptures every one to his own heresy. [...] And this dissension amongst themselves, was a great scandal to the unbelievers, and which not only obstructed the way of the Gospel, but also drew scorn and greater persecution upon the

church?0.

One of the main functions of Hobbist histories is to illustrate a philosophical doctrine?!. The main lessons to be learned from the history of heresy is also a point that Hobbes frequently makes in his philosophical works: reason and faith should be kept absolutely separate. Both difference of opinion and debate have their natural place in philosophy. However, they can only wreak havoc if they are introduced into the religious realm, because conformity in religious behaviour and obedience to the sovereign are absolute prerequisites in maintaining civil peace and stability. Hobbes, however, not just warns against confounding the two practices of religion and philosophy, but he also criticises transgressions of the epistemological boundaries between religion and philosophy. His best known attacks ‘are found in the fourth part of the Leviathan, («The Kingdom of Darkness»)

especially in its chapter 46, «Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy and Fabulous Traditions»??. Hobbes discards scholastic metaphysics and theology as a combination of Christian faith and heathen philosophy. By trying to philosophise on matters of faith, which should have been founded upon belief and submission, the scholastics were inevitably reduced to using meaningless expressions or «insignificant speech», as Hobbes calls it. In the end, it is not just scholastic theology that Hobbes rejects but any theology that presents itself as a science of the divine. Traditionally, theology was defined as the doctrine concerning the nature and attributes of God. However, in the beginning of De Corpore, Hobbes excludes from the sciences precisely

19. HN (EW IV, 387-390). 20. HN (EW IV, 389). 21. See Sommerville, “Hobbes, Selden, Erastianism, and the History of the Jews”, p. 180: «Hobbes found in history what theory had already proved». 22. On Hobbes’ critique of scholastic metaphysics, see Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism, pp. 27-34 and 38-50.

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this form of theology, namely «the doctrine concerning the nature and attributes of the eternal, ungenerable and incomprehensible God» (doctrinam de natu-

ra et attributis Dei aeterni, ingenerabilis, incomprehensibilis)*. Philosophy has to do with how causes generate effects and how effects are generated by their causes. God, however, is ungenerated. To use Hobbes’ terminology: in God there is no «composition and division». Hence, He cannot be the object of scientific demonstration. The only «theology» that remains is the interpretation of Scripture, which is an inherently practical discipline. It interprets the revealed word of God not as a means of getting to know His nature, but in order to teach the subjects of a commonwealth the right kind of submission to their lawful sovereign. However, if we look at the way Hobbes himself interprets Scripture, especially in the extensive third and fourth parts of the Leviathan, we may instead witness a heavy use of philosophy. Pacchi rightly says that Hobbes is among the first to develop a historical-critical and rational method of biblical interpretation on

the basis of his philosophy’. In this sense, Hobbes himself seems to trespass on the premises to which he had denied access to all philosophers. Nevertheless, his trespassing is less paradoxical than it may appear at first sight. For Hobbes only permits the use of reason and hence of philosophy in the interpretation of scripture as long as it does not pretend to give speculative insight into that which will always remain inaccessible to it, namely the nature and attributes of God”. Thus, despite his use of reason in the interpretation of Scripture, Hobbes maintains the distinction between philosophy and religion both in an epistemological and a pragmatical sense. The divine mysteries remain hidden from the philosophical mind and Hobbes does not venture to formulate a private opinion in a realm in which obedience is due, but instead defends the very concept of obedience, which he bases on an interpretation of Scripture that he submits to the sovereign.

235 DEo M8 (O9) 24. Pacchi, Scritti Hobbesiani, p. 98. 25. See the famous beginning of part 3 of the Leviathan (L 32; EW III, 359-360): «Nevertheless, we are not to renounce

our senses, and experience;

nor (that which

is the un-

doubted word of God) our natural reason. For they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase ofjustice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in God’s word above reason; that is to say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilful interpretation or erroneous ratiocination. Therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for our examination, we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words; and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion, as with wholesome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect. But by the captivity of our understanding, is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty, to the opinion of any other man; but of the will to obedience, where obedience is due».

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Pacchi has also underlined the fact that Hobbes’ use of his materialist and determinist philosophy in the interpretation of Scripture does not in principle clash with his separation of science

and faith?°. Nevertheless,

according to

Pacchi, in another sense Hobbes does venture a few «illegal» philosophical excursions into the religious realm. As one example of these transgressions, Pac-

chi mentions precisely Hobbes’ digressions about God’s corporeal nature in

the Appendix to the Latin Leviathan and other works of the 1660’s?’. Nonetheless, as will become clear, these digressions do not violate the «no access signs» posted by Hobbes himself.

2. The Consistency of Hobbes’ Notion of Corporeal Deity As said, Curley claims that throughout his published and unpublished works, Hobbes takes different, even contradictory positions on the issue of God’s (non-)corporeality. According to Curley, especially De Motu stands out for its fideism. This fideism also emerges from Hobbes’ rejection of White’s contention that natural reason can prove the existence of God. Curley thinks

that this contradicts Hobbes’ causal proof for the existence of God??. Martinich, by contrast, has pointed out that what Hobbes rejects here is White’s claim of having offered a formal demonstration of God’s existence. As we have seen above, Hobbes only thinks that we can arrive at the hypothesis of God’s existence. Just as the blind man has no conception of the fire that warms him, we do not have a conception of God. This precludes any formal demonstration of God’s existence, because demonstrations only apply to what we actually conceive*!. In other words, De Motu is not more or less fideistic than the works that propound Hobbes’ causal hypothesis of God’s existence. In fact, De Motu itself quite specifically states that the only true philosophical propo-

sition concerning God is that He exists**. Again, this is perfectly in line with Hobbes’ general view that philosophy can only state that God exists, not what

He is*. But also with respect to God’s corporeality, De Motu constitutes much less of a fideistic anomaly than Curley makes it out to be. Curley actually makes a

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. praeter unicum

Pacchi, “Hobbes and the Problem of God”, p. 186; and Scritti Hobbesiani, p. 99 Pacchi, Scritti Hobbesiani, p. 105. See DM 308f. Curley, “I Durst Not Write So Boldly”, p. 580. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan, p. 348. DM 308-309. DM 396: «Propendeo nullam propositionem veram esse posse circa naturam Dei hanc unam: Deus est, neque ullam appellationem naturae Dei convenire praeter nomen Ens».

33. Neither Curley nor Martinich refer to the earlier article by Pacchi that resolves the

seeming contradiction between De Motu and Hobbes’ other works with respect to the causal proof of God's existence (see Pacchi, “Hobbes e il Dio delle Cause”, p. 306).

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distinction between three different positions Hobbes is supposed to have defended throughout his works. In Curley’s words, the Leviathan and the Elements ofLaw say that «God exists, but we cannot know his nature; so, we can-

not know whether he is corporeal or not»**. De Motu says that «reason cannot instruct us on this subject, either one way or the other; therefore, it is necessary to recur to Sacred Scripture, which tells us that God is immaterial»*. Finally, in the 1660’s Hobbes states that «God exists, and he is corporeal, and there is no theological problem with that position». In order to judge the validity of this claim, let us first examine Leviathan and Elements of Law. The Leviathan starts with the familar assertion that philosophy can only conceive of bodies, i.e. entities with determinate dimensions and a determinate place. Given this restriction, Hobbes strongly suggests that we might as well simply equate the concept of being and the concept of body: «the universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are, is corporeal. [...] and because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing; and consequently no where»*’. Subsequently, Hobbes examines what this restriction implies for diverse kinds of beings. As for finite spirits, such as angels and human souls, Hobbes is very clear. We cannot conceive of them otherwise than

as bodies, i.e. as entities with determinate dimensions**. The fact that they are not visible does not make any difference. As is well-known, Hobbes devotes a

lot of space in the Leviathan to prove that Scripture does not state that angels, souls and other spirits are incorporeal substances, but rather that they are beings with determinate dimensions. God, however, is a different issue: But for spirits, they call them incorporeal; which is a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety be attributed to God himself; in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth best his nature, which is incomprehensible; but what best expres-

seth our desire to honour Him”. God is infinite, omnipresent and indivisible. In other words, He does not share any of the defining characteristics of natural bodies. In that sense, it is not unwarranted to call Him incorporeal. Paradoxically, however, philosophy can also state (though not formally demonstrate) that God exists. Since philosophy teaches us that everything that exists, is a body, God would actually be a body, something that Hobbes implies but does not explicitly admit. The result of these considerations would be that God is in fact an incorporeal substance, a notion which, as said, in Hobbes’

eyes contains a contradiction

in

adjecto. Although Hobbes himself prefers to call God an incomprehensible substance rather than an incorporeal substance, he does not object to this

34. Curley, “Hobbes versus Descartes”, p. 108.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

Curley, “Hobbes versus Descartes”, p. 109. Curley, “Hobbes versus Descartes”, p. 109. L 46 (EW III, 672). L 46 (EW III, 672). L 46 (EW III, 672).

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qualification". The only condition is that we make clear that we do not speak «dogmatically,

with intention to make the divine nature understood; but pi-

ously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossness of bodies visible»*!. By using this philosophically absurd notion, we only emphasise our inability to grasp His nature. Thus, when we speak of God as an incorporeal substance, we are playing a religious ballgame, not a philosophical one: we speak «piously», not «dogmatically». Paradoxical as it may seem, God is thus both a body and an incorporeal substance. When we speak as philosophers, we say that God exists, which philosophically speaking means that He is a body. However, He is a body whose nature transcends our rational categories. So, if we switch to a religious discourse, we may actually also call Him an incorporeal substance. Exactly the same position is found in the Elements of Law. Throughout the Elements, the same identification of «being» and «body» is operative. Here, Hobbes also claims that finite spirits such as angels and human souls are fine, imperceptibly thin, bodies. He also states that this is more in line with Scrip-

ture than the view that they are incorporeal substances”. Likewise, the Elements make the same distinction between finite bodies and the infinite, incom-

prehensible substance of God. Just as in the Leviathan, Hobbes allows also in the Elements for the use of the non-philosophical, non-biblical term «incorporeal substance», as long as we make clear that when we attribute the name of spirit unto God, we attribute it not as the name of anything we conceive, no more than when we ascribe unto him sense and understanding; but as a signification of our reverence, who desire to abstract from him all corpo-

ral grossness*.

In other words, Hobbes again refers to the distinction between philosophi. cal and religious discourse, between things that we «conceive», and things that command our «reverence». Curley suggests that the real difference is between Elements of Law and Leviathan, on the one hand, and De Motu on the other. De Motu is more «fideistic» than the other works in that it lets Scripture decide that God is indeed an immaterial substance.

In reality, however, Hobbes defends the same

position, albeit phrased somewhat differently, than in the Leviathan and Elements of Law. Hobbes repeats that the human mind can only conceive of sub-

40. See also L 34 (EW II, 383-384), where Hobbes

uses the label «incorporeal sub-

stance» without further qualification: «The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. Here if by the Spirit of God be meant God himself, then is motion attributed to God, and consequently place, which are intelligible only of bodies, and not of substances incorporeal;

and so the place is above our understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is body». AN eet, (EWA: 42. EL XI, 5 (EW IV, 62). 43. EL XI, 4 (EW IV, 61).

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stances with finite, determinate dimensions and with a determinate place. Hobbes therefore explicitly equates the concepts of being (ens) and body (corpus)". On account of his infinite dimensions, God is incomprehensible. Philosophy, however, can sustain the proposition that God is a being (ens), with the implicit consequence that He is a body. However, He is a substance whose nature goes beyond our philosophical understanding. In religious terms, Chris-

tians have called God an incorporeal substance, inspired by Scripture*. Although Hobbes does in this context not explicitly reject the claim that the notion of incorporeal substance is biblical, he emphasises again that it is a philosophically absurd notion. It may, however, be used in religious discourse, where we do not employ language that expresses our knowledge of God, but

our sole wish to praise and honour Him“. In sum, De Motu propounds the same «fideism» as Hobbes’ two main English political works. What Curley fails to note is that the «materialist» description of God’s corporeality and the «fideist» label of incorporeal substance do not mutually exclude each other. I agree with Curley that in the Elements Hobbes suggests that «God is a subtle corporeal substance»*’. Philosophically speaking, God is a corporeal substance for the same reason that He is a being. This however, does not prevent the Elements from simultaneously affirming that we may perfectly well name God an incorporeal substance in a religious context. This seeming paradox is not the mark of a bad philosopher, or, for that matter, of one who tries to play desparate hide-and-seek games. It is simply the result of Hobbes’ basic distinction between philosophical and religious discourse, which he consistently applies in all three works discussed. The same distinction is at work in Hobbes’ later works, where he unequivocally admits God’s corporeity. Let us look at the following passage from Hobbes’ acrimonious polemics with John Wallis: Is not Mr Hobbes his way of attributing to God, that only which the Scriptures attribute to him, or what is never any where taken but for honour, much better than this bold undertaking of yours, to consider and decipher God’s nature to us?*.

In other words, Hobbes clearly states that his admission that God is a «a most pure, simple, invisible spirit corporeal»* does not pretend to give any insight into God’s nature, which remains as hidden as it had been in his earlier works. Hobbes emphasises that in describing God as a subtle, corporeal spirit that is moreover infinite, he is not speaking philosophically about the nature of God, which is in fact what he accuses Wallis of doing. The notion of an infi-

44. DM 312. 45. DM 127. 46. DM 396: «Caetera omnia tribui non ad veritatem philosophicam explicandam, sed ad affectos nostros, quibus Deum magnificare et honorare volumus». 47. Curley, “I Durst Not Write So Boldly”, p. 582. 48. CRL (EW IV, 426). 49. ABB (EW IV, 313). See also App. ad LL (OL III, 561).

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as that of an incorporeal sub-

stance. For, as said, the human mind can only conceive of bodies that have a fi-

nite and determinate magnitude and a determinate and circumscribed place. Furthermore, Hobbes describes God as an «infinitely pure» spirit, i.e., as a body that has absolutely the same nature throughout all of its constituent parts. The implication is that given its absolutely «simple» nature, it is in no way divisible. Now, according to Hobbes, human minds can only conceive of bodies that have potentially infinite divisibility. The notion of a body that has no parts is as repugnant to human reason as that of a body with infinite dimensions. The only difference between this position and the earlier one of De Motu, Elements of Law and Leviathan is that in the Appendix to the Leviathan and other works of the 1660’s, Hobbes explicitly rejects the notion of incorporeal substance as a suitable name for God. In his earlier works, Hobbes had already indicated that the notion of incorporeal substance is unbiblical — a claim which by the way has a good deal of truth in it - and that he himself had rather not use this philosophically absurd notion. However, in principle he did not have any objections to it, as long as it was made clear that one was speaking «piously» and not «dogmatically» about God. In his later works, however, Hobbes took a stricter position on the use of what he considered non-biblical vocabulary. We can only guess at the reasons behind this change of mind. One reason could be that Hobbes had witnessed how in the intense polemics surrounding the Leviathan, his opponents had used the notion of an incorporeal substance in a non-religious, philosophical way, pretending thereby to provide an insight into God’s nature. This may have led Hobbes to dissociate himself completely from the non-biblical vocabulary that he had only hesitantly accepted anyway. In sum, Curley’s claim that through the years Hobbes offered a whole -range of different, even contradictory conceptions of God’s (non-)corporeality is wrong. On the contrary, there is a remarkable structural consistency of Hobbes’ position on this issue, despite the minor changes that did occur. There is thus no evidence for Curley’s contention that for strategic reasons Hobbes tried out different positions, which, however, did not represent his true convic-

tions. For Curley, the position that comes closes to Hobbes’ hidden atheism lies in the later public admission that God is a corporeal spirit. According to Curley, on the logic of Hobbes’ own philosophy, this assumption leads to the inevitable conclusion that God does not exist. In other words, the notion of a corporeal deity would be Hobbes’ most explicit signal that in reality he did not believe in God’s existence at all. In order to buttress this claim, Curley patches together arguments gathered from various of Hobbes’ works”: 1) God is corporeal.

2) The universe is the aggregate of all bodies.

50. Curley, “I Durst Not Write So Boldly”, p. 587.

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3) Therefore, God is identical either with the whole of the universe or with a part of it (an inference from 1) and 2), but accepted by Hobbes at EW IV, 349).

4) To hold that God is identical with the whole of the universe is equivalent to atheism, since it denies that the universe has a cause.

5) If God is identical with a part of the universe, he is finite, since no part of any whole can be infinite.

6) To hold that God is finite is equivalent to atheism, since God, by definition, is infinite. 7) Therefore, to affirm 3) is to embrace atheism.

Martinich has rejected this argument by arguing that it is patched together from works that span three decades. Moreover, according to Martinich, Hobbes’ «ability to see the consequences of his premises was surely flawed»?!. This is not a very effective counterargument. Hobbes is known as a thinker whose philosophy underwent very few major transformations. In that sense, it is not a priori wrong to quote from works that were written at such large intervals of time. However, contrary to what Curley claims, Hobbes’ text does not necessarily lead to supposedly atheist consequences. Therefore, the question of whether or not Hobbes foresaw the consequences of his own premises is irrelevant for this issue. The crucial step in the argument is 3). The statement Curley refers to occurs in Hobbes’ discussion with Bramhall. It responds to an objection that the Bishop had already voiced on other occasions. If, as Hobbes says in the Leviathan, the universe is the aggregate of all bodies, and whatever is not a body is nothing, God is either a finite body or nothing, both of which leads straight to atheism. Against this, Hobbes repeats that God is a «corporeal, but yet a pure spirit»°?. Moreover, Hobbes says that by universe he means «the aggregate of all things that have being in themselves». Since God has being, «it follows that he is either the whole universe, or part of it». In his Answer, Hobbes does not specify whether God is the whole or just a part. If, however, we look at the Leviathan, it becomes quite clear what answer Hobbes

would

have given to the Bishop. As Curley rightly stresses, the Leviathan explicitly

rejects any form of pantheism, because it implies that the world has no cause”. This leaves no other choice than to admit that God is a part of the universe. Indeed, in the passage Bramhall criticises, Hobbes suggests that this is in fact the case. As already mentioned, after having claimed that «the universe, that is,

the whole mass of all things that are, is corporeal»**, Hobbes discusses the different «regions» of the universe:

finite bodies, finite spirits, and God, which

implies that He is a part of the universe. Since God is a being, He is necessarily a «part» of the universe as Hobbes defines it, namely the «aggregate of all being». But, according to Curley, this

51. 52. 53. 54.

Martinich, ABB (EW L 31 (EW L 46 (EW

The Two Gods of Leviathan, p. 350. IV, 349). III, 351). III, 672).

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in turn must lead to the atheist conclusion that God is finite, given that De

Motu unequivocally states that no part of a whole can be infinite’. Although this is correct, Curley omits another crucial tenet of Hobbes’ mereology: the notions of whole (totum) and part cannot be meaningfully applied to infinite entities*®. Since our finite minds cannot conceive of parts other than as finite, the whole that is composed of parts will inevitably also remain finite. Since God is infinite, this means that He cannot in any meaningful way be called either a whole or a part. Now, this does not contradict Hobbes’ own statement from his Answer to Bishop Bramhall. What we have here is simply the abovementioned distinction between philosophical and religious discourse about God only in another guise. Since God is a being, He is a «part» of the universe, and since the universe is corporeal, He is corporeal too. However, as we have seen, He is a body that does not have any of the characteristics of normal bodies, but instead infinity, omnipresence and indivisibility. Hence, we might as well call him an incorporeal body, or in any case a body whose nature transcends our understanding. Likewise God is a part of the universe that does not have the normal characteristic of parts, namely finitude?”. In other words, God is a part of the corporeal universe of which we can have no conception. The application of the concept of part thus runs completely parallel to that of the concept of body. There is therefore no reason to assume that by calling God either the whole of the universe or its part, Hobbes is giving covert atheistic signals to his readers. While Curley’s interpretation of Hobbes’ corporeal deity is not tenable, the one by Zarka that he criticises is not completely convincing either. Zarka claims that Hobbes only affirms the corporeal nature of God, when he is pressed by his opponents**. This statement should therefore not be taken literally. If we have to say something about God’s nature, the best we can do is to .Say that he is corporeal, because we do not have any other concept of substance. However, in itself this label does not have any validity. It is «the blasphemy of a reason that wants to pass beyond the limits of the knowable»?°. Hobbes’ strict position is that God exists, but that His nature is not conceivable

by us. Only when his opponents put pressure on him, does he relinquish this position. In answer to this, Curley in fact rightly points to the lost London Letter of

November

1640 to Mersenne, which criticises Descartes’ Dioptrique®. We

only have Descartes’ reply to this letter, but on the basis of this reply and the

55. DM 111. 56. DCo VII, 12 (OL I, 88). 57. See DCi XV, 14 (OL II, 341) where Hobbes says that it is wrong to say that God Himself «habeat partes, aut quod sit totum aliquid». 58. Zarka, Décision métaphysique, p. 148. 59. Zarka, “Espace et représentation chez Hobbes”, p. 175: «C’est bien plutôt un blasphéme, le blasphème d’une raison qui veut sortir des limites du connaissable». 60. Curley, “Hobbes versus Descartes”, p. 107.

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epistolary exchanges between Mersenne, Descartes, Hobbes and Charles Cavendish we can actually reconstruct what Hobbes must have said. Descartes there mentions Hobbes’ affirmation of the corporeal character of the human

soul and of God, to which he does not wish to answer®’. It is thus not strictly true that Hobbes only affirms the corporeal character of God when his opponents press him to do so. I would like to add that despite what Zarka says, «God is a body» should be taken literally, because it is equivalent to saying «God exists» which is all a philosopher can say «dogmatically» about God. Contrary to what Zarka implies, Hobbes makes it quite clear that the thesis «God is an infinite, simple corporeal spirit» is not meant as a «dogmatic» insight into His nature, but as a «pious» way of honouring Him. It is as incomprehensible and non-blasphemous a title as that of «incorporeal substance», which Hobbes had acknowledged with hesitation in his earlier works. In his polemics with Bramhall and others Hobbes did not pass beyond «the limits of the knowable» that he had himself stipulated. I agree thus with Zarka contra Curley that Hobbes’ strict position is indeed that God exists, but that His nature is not known by us. I disagree, however, that Hobbes’ notion of corporeal deity is in conflict with this position. In his writings on heresy, Hobbes claims that his view on the corporeality of God is backed by the Church Fathers, notably Tertullian, as well as by Scripture. A full examination of this argumentative strategy and the question concerning the extent to which it is convincing or makes sense in the context of seventeenth-century theology has to be deferred to another occasion®?. What can be concluded here is that Hobbes’ position on the corporeality of God is neither inconsistent nor implicitly atheistic. What does constitute a problem, however, is the fact that Hobbes explicitly says that all questions concerning either the finitude or infinity of the world, its creation by God, and its duration cannot be answered by natural philosophy. All these questions concern entities with infinite dimensions, which cannot be conceived by finite, human, minds. Now, in the above-mentioned passages, Hobbes implies that the universe, i.e. the aggregate of all being, is in fact infinite, as God himself makes «part» of it. Hobbes thereby appears actually to answer one of the questions that he himself had declared anathema to the natural philosopher. In this sense it appears that the thesis of God’s corporeality does necessitate Hobbes to answer physical questions about Him. Another example of this would seem to be Hobbes’ discussion of «fluidity», to which we turn next.

61. Descartes to Mersenne, for Hobbes, 21 january 1641, in Correspondance du P. Marin Mersenne, vol. 10 (Paris, 1967), p. 427. 62. For a discussion of Hobbes’ «orthodoxy», see Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan. Martinich, however, devotes relatively little attention to the notion of corporeal deity. 63. DCo XXVI, 1 (OL I, 334-337).

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3. God, Primum Fluidum and ether

In his illuminating article, Lupoli analyses the relations between three types of fluid Hobbes mentions in his works, namely the so-called primum fluidum, the subtle ether that pervades the universe and God, whom Hobbes defines as a fine, subtle body®*. According to Lupoli, the relation between these types of fluid is wrought with paradoxes. To begin with, the notion of primum fluidum remains vague. In order to understand this concept, one should keep in mind Hobbes’ distinction between fluidum and durum. A fluid body is defined by him as a body, whose parts are easily separable. According to Hobbes, this separability is due to the fact that the parts of a fluid body have little motion. In his kinetic universe a phenomenon such as cohesion has to be explained in terms of actual motion. To cohere or to resist pressure is an action, and all action is motion. Therefore, in contradiction to Descartes, Hobbes ex-

plains the hardness or strong cohesion of a body as the result of the swift motion of its constituent particles. Conversely, fluid bodies easily yield to pressure on account of the slow motion of their parts. Now, in some passages Hobbes suggests that fluids had been created before solid bodies®’. According to Lupoli, Hobbes thought that the first matter out of which the universe was created was an absolute, motionless fluid. Through some kind of compression, God then created solid atoms that subsequently constituted solid natural bodies. This notion of a primary fluid is difficult to square with another concept of fluid found in Hobbes’ work, namely that of the fluid ether. This subtle body is said to fill all voids in the universe and also plays an important role in the transmission of light. In contrast to the motion-

less primum fluidum, Hobbes describes this ether as a very mobile body. This description by itself makes it difficult to identify the two notions of fluid. To , make matters even more perplexing, Hobbes qualifies the ether as prime matter (materia prima). The latter, however, is also said to be simply a name

(merum nomen)”. It is a term that refers to body in general, not to any specific body or component of material reality. There thus appears to be a tension between the metaphysical concept of prime matter as non-entity and the physical description of prime matter as an absolutely fluid body. This tension is amplified by the fact that strictly speaking the creation of solid bodies out of the primum fluidum should have led to the disappearance of the latter, because if the parts of the motionless fluid are compressed and hence set in motion,

64. Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity”. 65. DM 185: «Fluidum appellare omnes solent id cujus partes a se invicem facile separantur».

66. Dialogus (OL IV, 285).

67. Dialogus (OL IV, 285). See Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity”, p. 595. 68. DCo XXVI, 5 (OL I, 348). 69. DCo XXVII,

1 (OL I, 364). See Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity”, p. 588.

70. DCo VIII, 24 (OL I, 105).

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they lose their status of fluid body’!. How then, can Hobbes still speak of a fluid ether that obviously fills all voids in the universe ? Matters become even less transparent if we turn to the third notion of fluid, namely God Himself. According to Lupoli, Hobbes entertains several models of creation (or, for that matter, of non-creation)

without making a definitive

choice for any of them’. Hobbes pays lip service to the Christian notion of a creatio ex nihilo, implying that God created the primary fluid, out of which he subsequently formed the universe. But in other contexts, Hobbes presents a weaker concept of creation according to which God acts as a kind of Platonic Demiurge on a pre-existent fluid. Finally, one also finds traces of a possible pantheist identification of God with the fluid ether and possibly even with the primary fluid. Lupoli states that, in the end, Hobbes possibly shied away for all the heterodox consequences of his various models and chose the option of agnosticism. Although, despite his own warnings, Hobbes did speculate about various forms of divine creation, his final answer remained that the notion of

creation cannot be grasped by our finite human mind, and that hence all problems about the beginning of the world and its relation to God are religious questions that are the prerogative of the sovereign and those appointed by him as interpreters of Scripture. Hobbes chose to remain undecided on these matters, rather than adopting what Lupoli deems the most obvious solution: an identification of the primum fluidum with God, attributing «self-moving pow-

ers to a unique primary matter»’?. Although Hobbes’ account of the relation between the Creator and His creation is indeed complicated, the picture that emerges from it is clearer than Lupoli suggests. First of all, the relation between the primary fluid and the subtle ether is not as paradoxical as it may seem at first sight. Most of the paradoxes that arise according to Lupoli have to to with the fact that Hobbes appears to identify the ether with prime matter. If, however, we look at the passage that according to Lupoli propounds this identification, we have to reach a different conclusion: And lastly, I suppose, that the parts of the pure aether (as if it were the First Matter) have no motion at all but what they receive from bodies which float in them, and are

not themselves fluid”. Hobbes evidently compares the parts of the ether with prime matter, but does not identify them. Moreover, Hobbes does not refer here to his own no-

71. Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity”, p. 597. 72. Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity”, pp. 606-607. 73. Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity”, p. 609: «Mai prende corpo nei suoi scritti una chiara e univoca ipotesi che attribuisca a un’unica materia originaria un potere autocinetico». 74. EW I, 448; DCo XXVI, 1 (OL I, 364): «Denique in partibus puri aetheris (tanquam in materia prima) motum praeter illum, quem habet ab innatantibus sibi corporibus non liguidis, suppono esse nullum».

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tion of prime matter but to the classical scholastic notion. In the Aristotelian-

scholastic tradition prime matter is the inert, homogeneous «stuff» that receives the form and hence also its principle of mobility. As said, Hobbes no longer maintains this notion of matter as a material constituent but simply defines prime matter as body in general or body, taken in a universal sense, omitting all particular characteristics of individual bodies”. Just as prime matter in the classical, non-Hobbesian sense is itself motionless and receives motion from God, the parts of the pure ether have no proper motion but are moved by the solid bodies that float in it. This implies that contrary to what Lupoli claims, Hobbes does not confound the metaphysical notion of prime matter and the physical notion of pure ether. This passage also solves another problem noted by Lupoli, namely that the primary fluid is motionless, while the pure ether is described as inherently mobile. In the passage quoted above, Hobbes does not say that the ether as a whole is in rest, but only that its parts do not have their own motion. This is in line with Hobbes’ general notion of fluid. As he explains in his Dialogus Physicus, a fluid as a whole may move, while its parts are in relative rest”. As said, the parts of a fluid have no or only a minimal power of resistance. In Hobbes’ vocabulary, they have no proper conatus, the conatus being defined as the smallest conceivable motion. Rather, the parts merely touch but do not press each other. It is precisely this lack of conatus of the parts of the ether that explains why they can so easily be moved by solid bodies that float in it. From the lack of motion of the parts of the primary fluid, Lupoli appears to infer that the primary fluid is motionless as a whole, just like prime matter,

which according to Hobbes has no motion’’. Apart from the fact that Hobbes does not identify the primary fluid and prime matter, the inference from the parts to the whole is also wrong: the parts of a fluid may be in relative rest, while the fluid as a whole is mobile. In sum, contrary to what Lupoli states,

there is no reason for refraining from an identification of the supposedly immobile primary fluid with the inherently mobile subtle ether. Parts of this mobile ether may have been compressed into solid bodies, whose particles move

very swiftly. This, however, does not mean that the ether completely goes out of existence, as Lupoli suggests. Nor will it lose its motion as a whole. According to Lupoli, the real problems only start when we try to fathom the relation between the physical fluid(s) and God. In some passages, Hobbes appears to hint at an identification of the subtle ether and God. The most convincing passage Lupoli adduces is the following: Because He that created them [sc. natural bodies] is not a fancy, but the most real sub-

75. On the relation between Aristotelian accounts and Hobbes’ concept of matter, see Leijenhorst, Mechanising Aristotelianism, pp. 150-155. 76. Dialogus (OL IV, 284): «Per quietem intelligo duarum partium inter se quietem, cum se mutuo tangunt quidem, sed non premunt. Nam et fluida moveri tota possunt, retenta fluiditate; et dura quiescere, ut tamen partes eorum moveantur». 77. Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity”, p. 597.

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stance that is, who being infinite, there can be no place empty where He is, nor full

where He is not”. If we recall that the task of the subtle ether is described by Hobbes as having to fill all empty places of the universe, this description of God does indeed come very close to that of the subtle ether. Nevertheless, according to Lupoli, a full identification of the two entities not only remains paradoxical for theological reasons, but certainly also for philosophical reasons. Lupoli thinks that the absolute lack of motion of the primum fluidum cannot be squared with God being the eternally moved source of motion of all bodies”. Given that Lupoli’s attribution of absolute rest to the primum fluidum is incorrect, this argument cannot be valid either. There is, however, a more convincing reason for why Hobbes did not pantheistically identify God and the subtle ether or the primum fluidum which is the same. In De Motu, Hobbes unequivocally mentions the ether as an example of a spiritus that can be conceived by human reason*”. In other words, Hobbes clearly considers the ether to be a finite, created body and

not the infinite corporeal Deity. The pantheist solution to the problem of the relation between supranatural and natural fluid(s) therefore appears to be ruled out by Hobbes himself. According to Lupoli, there still remain two possible scenarios: either God created the primary fluid and subsequently the whole universe or God acted as a kind of Demiurge on a pre-existent fluid. Lupoli notes that Hobbes has a certain preference for what he calls a «weak version» of creation out of pre-exis-

tent matter8!. However, the two passages that Lupoli quotes in order to substantiate this claim are not conclusive. The first passage is taken from the Dedicatory Epistle to De Corpore, which compares the construction of a coherent philosophy with God’s creation of the world. Hobbes describes this creation as an ordering of a confused chaos. However, first of all he is not making a philosophical point here, but uses metaphorical language befitting the rhetorical context of a dedication. Secondly, God’s ordering of a confused chaos does not necessarily imply that this chaos pre-existed. In many alchemical accounts of creation, for instance, God is supposed to impose order on a chaos that He himself had first created*’. The second passage is from the beginning of De Homine, where Hobbes explicitly summarises a view of creation held by others, adding that we can have no knowledge about the creation of the world and

have to rely on the authority of Scripture instead*. Therefore, this passage does not give us any indication as to Hobbes’ preference for a given version of

78. DP (EW IV, 89). 79. Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity’, p. 605. 80. DM 312: «Spiritus itaque, si entia sint, quae concipi possunt, ut aer, aether, spiritus animalis vel aliud tenuius, corpora sunt». 81. Lupoli, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity”, p. 607. 82. See Holzhey and Schmidt-Biggeman, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, p. NW), Soe DH, (OI):

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creation. In sum, there does not appear to exist any reason for doubting Hobbes’ sincerity with respect to his outspoken endorsement of the orthodox

Christian creatio ex nihilo®*. But there still remain a number of problems. Hobbes describes the universe as a plenum, in which all potentially empty spots are filled by the subtle ether. It appears,

then, that there is no room

left for the most

subtle fluid of all,

namely God Himself. This, however, is hard to square with passages such as the one mentioned above in which Hobbes speaks of a direct intervention of God in the material world on account of His omnipresence, which he compares with the mixture of water with a saline solution, producing a substance that looks milky. The parts of the water and the solution do not merge, since

two bodies cannot simultaneously be in one place. Instead, the mixture is the result of «the activity of the mineral water, changing it [sc. the water] every where to the sense, and yet not being every where, and in every part of the water»®. In the same way, God «who is an infinitely fine Spirit, and withal intelligent, can make and change all species and kinds of body as he pleaseth». This comparison does not solve the problem of God’s location. In the case of the two liquids, we have to suppose that their parts occupy distinct, finite places. God, however is a different story: as said, no place is full unless He is present. But does this not mean that the divine, corporeal fluid violates the fundamental principle of natural philosophy that bodies cannot coincide ? Hobbes again gives his standard agnostic answer: «the way by which God

Almighty worketh [...] is past my apprehension». As Lupoli rightly remarks, the fact that Hobbes draws God into the material cosmos creates problems not only of a theological nature, but also of a physical nature. In this sense, Hobbes’ usual agnostic answer is far from satisfactory. Nonetheless, it has become clear that his account of the relation between divine and mundane fluids is less incoherent than Lupoli claims it to be. Hobbes appears to favour the notion of one single fluid, both subtle ether and primum fluidum, out of which solid bodies were created. In line with his general rejection of pantheism, Hobbes rejects the identification of subtle ether and corporeal Deity. The question of how we should conceive of the creation of the mundane fluid by the divine one remains, however. Hobbes gives a sim-

ple, if not simplistic, answer: don’t. The notion of creation cannot be conceived by philosophers who can safely leave this kind of questions in the hands of the religious authorities.

84. App. ad LL (OL III, 513). 85. ABB (EW IV, 310). 86. ABB (EW IV, 310).

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Conclusion

Hobbes’ notion of corporeal deity is the outcome of a materialist (or better: corporealist) ontology and an empiricist epistemology. Given the reduction of all being to exclusively corporeal entities, God’s being automatically implies His corporeality. On the other hand, our finite human minds can only conceive of finite bodies with determinate dimensions and places. Hence, God may be a body, but His nature remains cognitively impenetrable. In this connection, Ronald Hepburn has spoken of a tension in Hobbes’ account of God*’. On the one hand, Hobbes «skies» God to the point of radical incomprehensibility. On the other, he involves «God too closely with nature, as part of nature itself». However, what Hepburn sees as an unresolved tension is the logical outcome

of Hobbes’ sharp distinction between philosophical and religious discourse about God. God is transcendent in an epistemological sense: His nature is inconceivable by our finite minds, which have to take recourse to faith in speaking about God. Philosophically speaking, however, God makes part of the «aggregate of all being», which according to Hobbes is corporeal. Thus, God is immanent in an ontological sense, although His immanence epistemologically transcends our limited cognitive abilities. We have seen that Hobbes’ notion of corporeal deity is no strategy aimed at hiding his atheism, as suggested by Curley. Hobbes’ corporeal deity is the result of a consistent application of the distinction between philosophical and religious discourse. Although his formulation of this concept underwent some changes, the basic idea remained the same from the beginning of his philosophical career until its very end. Nevertheless, we have also seen that Hobbes could not always resist the temptation to speak philosophically about the modes of presence of the corporeal deity in the material universe. Although his account of the relation between the divine fluid and the subtle ether He had created is not free from paradoxes, we have concluded that it is more coherent than suggested by Lupoli. Hobbes appears to have sported an unorthodox interpretation of the orthodox creatio ex nihilo: God created the subtle ether which acted as the primum fluidum, out of which solid bodies were subsequently formed. There are still many questions that could be asked with respect to Hobbes’s notion of corporeal deity. Although it was the outcome of Hobbes’ corporealist and empiricist philosophy, Hobbes believed that it was perfectly orthodox. But did he realiy escape blatant heresy? How are we to evaluate his quotations from Tertullian and other Patres in favour of his corporealist theology? These and many other questions require a closer look. In any case, we have seen here that Hobbes’ doctrine of corporeal deity is largely consistent and can be taken at face value. It may be disastrously heterodox, but it does not hide an atheist agenda. 87. Hepburn, “Hobbes on the Knowledge of God”, pp. 101-103. 88. Hepburn, “Hobbes on the Knowledge of God”, p. 101.

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Bibliography J. Aubrey, Brief Lives, Chiefly of Contemporaries, Set Down by John Aubrey, Between the Years 1669 and 1696, ed. A. Clark (Oxford, 1898).

J. Bramhall, The Catching of Leviathan or the Great Whale (London, 1658; Reprint New York, 1977). E: Curley, “/ Durst not Write so Boldly or How to Read Hobbes’ Theological-Political Treatise”, in P. Bostrenghi (ed.), Scienza e Politica (Napoli, 1992), pp. 497-593. ia Curley, “Hobbes versus Descartes”, in R. Ariew and M. Grene (eds.), Descartes and his Contemporaries. Meditations, Objections and Replies (Chicago, 1995), pp. 97-109. . Hepburn, “Hobbes on the Knowledge of God”, in M. Cranston and R.S. Peters (eds.), Hobbes and Rousseau (Garden City, NY, 1972), pp. 85-108. . Holzhey and W. Schmidt-Biggeman (eds.), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, vol. 4/1: Das Heilige Romische Reich Deutscher Nation. Nord- und Ostmitteleuropa (Basel, 2001). . H. Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism. The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy (Leiden, 2002). . Lessay, Thomas Hobbes. Textes sur l’hérésie et sur l’histoire (Paris, 1993). . Lessay, Thomas Hobbes. De la liberté et de la nécessité (Paris, 1993).

. Lupoh, “Fluidismo e Corporeal Deity nella filosofia naturale di Thomas Hobbes: a proposito dell’Hobbesiano Dio delle Cause”, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 54 (1999), pp. 573-609. Malcolm, The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, 1994).

P. Martinich, The Two Gods ofLeviathan. Thomas Hobbes on Religion (Cambridge, 1992). . Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan. Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge, 1962). A . Pacchi, “Hobbes e il Dio delle cause”, in La storia della filosofia come co. Studi offerti a Mario dal Pra (Milano, 1984), pp. 295-307. A . Pacchi, “Hobbes and the Problem of God”, in G.A.J. Rogers and A. Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, 1988), pp. 171-187. A. Pacchi, Scritti Hobbesiani (Milan, 1998).

and Politics Materialism

sapere critiRyan (eds.),

K. Schuhmann, “Hobbes dans les Publications de Mersenne en 1644”, Bulletin Hobbes

VII. Archives de Philosophie 58 (1995), pp. 2-7. à P. Sommerville, “Hobbes, Selden, Erastianism, and the History of the Jews”, in G.A.J. Rogers and T. Sorell (eds.), Hobbes and History (London, 2000), pp. 160188. re -Ch. Zarka, “Espace et représentation chez Hobbes”, Recherches sur le XVIIe siècle 7 (1984), pp. 159-180. DA -Ch. Zarka, La décision métaphysique de Hobbes (Paris, 1987).

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THOMAS

DISARMING THE PROPHETS: HOBBES AND PREDICTIVE POWER by Kinch Hoekstra

Hearken not vnto the wordes of the prophets that prophecie unto you.

Jeremiah!

1. Introduction

In the first version of his practical philosophy, The Elements of Law (1640), Hobbes deals with prophecy briefly, almost in passing. In the De cive (1642, expanded edition 1647), prophecy plays a much greater role. His concern remains high in subsequent works, and it is central in the English Leviathan (1651), occupying two entire chapters and many additional passages”. Moreover, it is the distinctive foundation of the whole of Part 3 of that work, «Of a

Christian Commonwealth», for «the Word of God delivered by Prophets is the main principle of Christian Politiques»*. I intend to analyze elsewhere the structure of Hobbes’s arguments in the chapters about prophecy in Leviathan;

1. The Booke of the Prophet Ieremiah 23:16, The Holy Bible... (London,

1611).

. 2. Chapters 32 and 36 are devoted to prophecy and the word of God. Ultimately, however, the question of the word of God is subordinate to that of prophecy. He states the relation most clearly in the De cive: «And because all and only that is the Word of God which is revealed as such by a true Prophet, it cannot be known what the Word of God is before knowing who is a true Prophet; nor the Word of God believed before believing in a Prophet» (16.11: «Quoniam autem Verbum Dei id omne & solum est, quod pro tali exhibetur à vero Propheta, sciri quid sit Verbum Dei antè non potest, quam cognoscatur quis sit Propheta verus; nec Verbo Dei credi, quam credatur Prophetae»). References to The Elements of Law and De cive are to chapter and article number. For the former, I follow Ferdinand Tonnies’s edition (variously reprinted), though with citations to continuous chapter numbers (1.e., to chapters 1-19 instead of 1.1-19, and 20-29 instead of II. 1-10); for the latter, I follow Howard Warrender’s Latin edition (Oxford, 1983), to which

I give page references if the citation is to the dedicatory epistle or preface. References to Leviathan are to chapter and paragraph number, followed by the page number of the Head edition of 1651; references to De homine are to Elementorum philosophiae sectio secunda de homine (London, 1658), according to chapter and article number; citations of Behemoth

are to the page number of the T6nnies edition. 3. Leviathan 32.1, p. 195. This is the first marginal notation of Part 3. In the body of 32.1, Hobbes says: «the ground of my discourse must be, not only the Naturall Word of

God [as in Parts | and 2], but also the Propheticall».

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here, I shall address the questions of why Hobbes’s concern with prophecy crescendos during the decade after 1640, what kinds of prophecy particularly preoccupy him, and what his responses are to these particular challenges. Hobbes examines natural religion in detail in the twelfth chapter of Leviathan*. There, he maintains that «the naturall Cause of Religion» is «the Anxiety of time to come»?. A man «who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth», will necessarily be constantly worried about the future®. This anxiety about the future leads him «to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past», and thus to predict an event from the fact that such an event once followed an occurrence that has now recurred; and «also to believe the like Prognostiques from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion»’. The proclivity to prognosticate or rely on prognosticators, therefore, is one of the natural origins of religion®. It may be because of this natural religious drive, constituted in part by the appeal to prophecy, that Hobbes comes to affirm that «’tis not in man’s power to suppress the power of religion»’. One source of Hobbes’s greater emphasis on prophecy, therefore, may be that he increasingly sees prophecy as natural, perhaps ineliminable. We cannot fully grasp Hobbes’s escalating concern, however, until we come to some understanding of the place of prophecy in the minds of Hobbes’s contemporaries. This will, in turn, help us to understand why he increasingly sees religion, and prophecy in particular, as part and parcel of the natural condition". Most of Hobbes’s contemporaries inhabited a world of divine intervention and magic, in which the influence of sacred objects or words, and the actions of devils, witches, or the Almighty himself, could be invoked to explain or al4. In the Elements, Hobbes does say that we may «naturally know that God is, though not what he is» (11.2), and discusses what we are doing when we refer to him. This analysis is expanded in De cive 15, which is recast in Leviathan 31. 5. Leviathan, marginal summary of 12.5, p. 52. 6. Leviathan 12.5, p. 52. 7. Leviathan 12.10, p. 54; cf. De homine 14.12. Cf. the account of a conspiracy of false prophets in Jasper Mayne’s translation of Lucian’s «Alexander, or the false Prophet», which he presented to his employer, William Cavendish, earl of Newcastle, in 1638 (Part of Lucian Made English from the Originall (Oxford, 1663), p. 130): they «easily perceived that the two great Tyrants over the life of man were Hope, and Fear. For they saw, that both to him who was troubled with Fear, and him who nourisht Hopes, Prophecie, and Presage, was most necessary, and desireable». Compare Hobbes, Historia Ecclesiastica Carmine Elegiaco concinnata (London, 1688), pp. 20-2, lines 429-56, with Mayne’s dedicatory epistle (written in 1663), sigg. A6v-A7r. 8. Leviathan 12.11, p. 54. 9. Behemoth, p. 82. This work is a dialogue between «A» and «B»; nonetheless, whether or not Hobbes endorses the positions he attributes to one or the other is usually obvious, given the context of the work and of his other works. 10. The causal link between the character and influence of contemporary prophecy and the nature of Hobbes’s examination of prophecy can only be suggested. If the following analysis provides a more plausible account of that link than other available accounts (and than the position that there is no link), then it may be provisionally accepted.

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ter events. Foxe’s influential Acts and Monuments propagated the view that the godly could have supernatural knowledge of the future, and presented history

as a series of fulfilled prophecies!!. The popularity of prophecy surged so much before mid-century as to seem a novel phenomenon. «In England», notes Christopher Hill, «the revolutionary decades gave wide publicity to what was almost a new profession — the prophet, whether as interpreter of the stars, or of traditional popular myths, or of the Bible»'*. After official censorship broke down in 1641, the number of published prophecies rose sharply!*. Keith Thomas writes that «the real boost to ancient prophecy [...] came with the Civil War, when Galfridian prophecies joined astrological prognostication and religious revelation to place an unprecedented amount of prophetic advice before the lay public. [...] The literature of the Civil War period suggests a disposition to welcome any type of prophetic utterance, regardless of the foundation upon which it purported to rest»!*. Clarendon wrote in 1652 that the peo-

ple of England were «alarmed and even half dead with prophecies»!. Prophets did not suddenly spring up fully armed in 1641, of course. The history of prophecy is as long as history itself!°, and Hobbes was born in a year about which prophecies had been particularly rife. Regiomontanus had predicted that 1588 would bring upheavals and perhaps even the end of the world; a sense of foreboding was widespread'’. This was transformed by the 11. Posthumous editions of Foxe’s work became increasingly activist. In 1610, additions were made which claimed that England’s special status in the struggle against Rome was confirmed by the defeat of the Armada and the foiling of the Gunpowder Plot; in 1632, a lengthy treatise was incorporated which called its readers to martyrdom. William Haller’s thesis that Foxe himself clearly identified England with the elect nation is convincingly criticized in Richard Bauckham, Tudor Apocalypse (Appleford, 1978), and Katharine R. Firth, The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain, 1530-1645 (Oxford, 1979).

12. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution (London, 1972), p. 73. For a history of English political prophecy that reaches back to the early medieval period, see Rupert Taylor, The Political Prophecy in England (New York, 1911). 13. In the seventeenth century, the period in which the most secular prophecies were printed was 1641-51. See p. 13 of Ursula Miihle-Moldon’s helpful survey, «Every Prediction is a Twin»: Sdkulare Prophetien im England des 17. Jahrhunderts (Frankturt, 1993).

Harry Rusche provides a concise account of such prophecies in «Prophecies and propaganda, 1641 to 1651», The English Historical Review 84:333 (1969), pp. 752-70. Keith Thomas, in his superb Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in popular beliefs in sixteenth and seventeenth century England (London, 1971), puts these prophecies in a broader framework. Accounts abound of the nature and influence of religious prophecies of the time; Christopher Hill’s analyses are especially lucid. 14. Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 409. The 1640s and 1650s «thus saw an unprecedented number of traditional prophecies put into print» (p. 410). 15. Quoted in Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 413. 16. A classic study of prophecy in the ancient world is Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité, 4 vols. (Paris, 1879-82). See also Bouché-Leclercq, L’astrologie grecque (Paris, 1899). 17. Cf. the verse autobiography, Thomae Hobbesii Malmesburiensis Vita (London, 1679), lines 3-6 of p. 2.

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defeat of the Armada, «which fused apocalyptic excitement and patriotic fervor», as Bernard Capp writes: «What emerged was a belief in England’s unique role as God’s elect nation, with Spain portrayed as the epitome of

evil»!8. What changed with the outbreak of the civil war was not only the diffusion of prophecy, but its targets. Whereas many of the prophecies of Hobbes’s youth promoted what were understood to be the aims and the unity of England, prophecy of all kinds after 1640 was markedly factional. Each side accused the other of false prophecy — and the appearance of false prophets was itself understood as a scriptural sign of the last times — and of representing the fulfillment of true prophecies of evil. Sometimes the flagrantly partisan prophesying brought about opposed construals of the same events: so an unusual celestial phenomenon in the mid-1640s was interpreted by parliamentary prognosticators as foreshadowing the destined political revolution, and by royalist astrologers as a sign that the revolt was horribly unnatural. There were some strategic differences. The parliamentarians more commonly wielded the biblical prophecies of the last days, accusing the royalists of antichristianity; the royalists were ready to undercut parliamentary authority as founded on mere enthusiasm, the usurpation by the individual of prophetic authority. The proliferation and partisanship of prophecies seems to have encouraged Hobbes to make a detailed study of prophecy. Not only does he devote chapters of Leviathan to a close analysis of the scriptural understanding of prophecy, and a dissection of Christian eschatology; he provides, in chapter 12, a new catalogue of secular prophecy, in which he classifies dozens of forms of superstitious divination or prognostication!?. A few of these forms of prophecy merit separate consideration for their widespread influence in Hobbes’s time, especially judicial astrology, enthusiasm, and dream interpretation. First, however, we shall consider the most unsettling form of prophecy in seventeenth-century England, that which was based instead on the texts and traditions of Christianity.

2. Apocalypse later

A person who claimed special illumination to predict the future could expect some scepticism; but it was widely accepted that the Bible contained true prophecies of the times to come, and one could instead simply choose from the storehouse of prophecies to be found there, ready to be interpreted and explained to believers. There was little reluctance to do just this, and portentous passages, particularly from the books of Daniel and Revelation, were pressed into prophetic service alongside verses with no apparent predictive aim. 18. Bernard S. Capp, «The political dimension of apocalyptic thought», in C. A. Patrides and Joseph Wittreich, eds., The Apocalypse in English Renaissance thought and literature (Ithaca, NY, 1984), p. 97. 19. Leviathan 12.19, p. 56.

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Before the ascension of Charles I to the throne, the scriptures were frequently parsed to predict the fall of the Catholic church. Arthur Dent, in his hugely popular The Ruine of Rome, argued in 1603 that the defeat of the Armada was the first battle of Armageddon, and called Protestant kings to arms. In line with the established view of the Church of England, James I expounded at length his interpretation of the pope as Antichrist. Although designed as a patriotic call to rally behind the king and his policies, this position came to threaten them. On the one hand, such a doctrine did not necessarily support the government’s foreign policy, as had been shown by vocal demands for intervention in the Palatinate to support the Protestant cause, and by strident opposition to the Spanish Match. In both cases, opposition to James was hard to controvert, given that it was presented as opposition to James’s avowed neme-

sis, the Roman Antichrist?. On the other hand, the doctrine could be turned against the domestic and ecclesiastical policies of the king and his party, a reversal which proved extremely costly to Charles I?!. At its forceful simplest, the argument was that the Laudian church under Charles, with its hierarchy of bishops, was popish, or sympathetic to the church of Rome. Thus, the established Church of England, headed by Charles I, was itself antichristian. The duty owed by an Englishman to his sovereign was hereby seriously undermined, and rebellion made into a religious duty. It was noticed that the roman numerals in VVILL LAVD added up to 666, and, along with the pope, Laud was identified with a horn of the Beast in Daniel 8:8, with the Beast itself, and with Antichrist; the episcopal church was

tantamount to the whore of Babylon”. By the end of the 1630s, many mainstream Puritans had adopted a position that only a few years earlier had been considered extreme: that the Laudian church, and even episcopacy itself, was antichristian. «Hatred traditionally directed outwards towards the pope or Habsburgs», Capp observes, «was now turned inwards»??. The identification of the Laudian church with Antichrist initially depended on the middle term of the pope. Having failed to distance itself from the pope, 20. James does seem to have had some concerns about the political disadvantages of a subject preaching to other subjects the doctrine that the pope, a fellow head of state, was Antichrist. See Christopher Hill, Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England (London, 1971), pp. 34-5; and Anthony Milton, Catholic and Reformed: the Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant thought, 1600-1640 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 60. 21. Already under James, interpreters made bold to use the apocalypse to enjoin the king to change his behavior. So John Napier warns James to «Reform the universal! enormities of your Countrey; and [...] begin at your Majesties own House, Family and Court, and purge the same of all suspition of Papists, and Atheists, or Neutrals, whereof this Revelation foretelleth, that the number shall greatly encrease in these later days» (sig. A2v (dedication leaf) of A Plaine Discovery of the whole Revelation of St. John). Unsurprisingly, the work was epitomized and reissued in the 1640s; I quote from the fifth edition (Edinburgh, 1645), which on its title page calls particular attention to this admonitory epistle. 22. See Hill, Antichrist, pp. 68-77; Capp, «The political dimension», p. 109; and Mühle-Moldon, Every Prediction is a Twin, pp. 23-9.

23. Capp, «The political dimension», p. 107. See also Milton, Catholic and Reformed, p. 104, and the works there cited.

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the Church of England endeavored to distinguish the pope from Antichrist. Although James had contended at length that the pope was Antichrist, he did frame his case as follows: «As for the definition of the Antichrist, I will not

vrge so obscure a point, as a matter of Faith to bee necessarily beleeued of all Christians»?4.

Laud, too, pronounced the matter obscure, and intractably so,

and thus criticized those who confidently identified the pope with Antichrist”. Others were left with the trickier business of severing the link. Anthony Milton gives two examples: The tradition that the pope was Antichrist was also firmly rejected by the pro-government polemicists Christopher Dow and Peter Heylyn. Heylyn ignored a century of Protestant reasoning on the matter by arguing that the pope could not be Antichrist [...]. Since the volume in which Heylyn advanced this argument had been specifically commissioned “by authority” to defend it against the charges levelled by Henry Burton, this might be taken to express the Caroline government’s official “line” on this point. Christopher Dow received promotion at court specifically on the strength of his own

tract. The Laudians also furthered this goal by editing passages in works to be licensed which referred, even casually, to the papal Antichrist, and by simply refusing to publish apocalyptic works?’. While some of their number downplayed the role of apocalyptic speculation altogether, others provided alternative contemporary candidates for the role of Antichrist and other prefigurations of the apocalypse. So, for example, John Cosin, in his Christmas Eve sermon of 1639, targeted «the Puritane Antichrist»; and in the dedicatory epistle to Laud of the Treatise of the Sabbath-Day, Francis White held that the anti-Laudian separatists were fulfilling the prophecies of the coming of false

prophets”®. These sandbags could not hold back the rising flood. The 1630s witnessed a shift from a wide acceptance of the view held by most Elizabethan and Jacobean bishops, that the pope and the church of Rome were Antichrist, to the view that the bishops of the Church of England were themselves Antichrist, or

at least antichristian’’. After 1640, there is a further important shift, as the at24. A Premonition to All Most Mightie Monarches, Kings, Free Princes, and States of Christendome, in The Workes of the Most High and Mighty Prince, lames (London, 1616),

p. 308. 25. Hill concludes: «After Laud’s rise to dominance the English church no longer proclaimed the Pope to be Antichrist» (Antichrist, p. 37). 26. Milton, Catholic and Reformed, p. 117. 27. Milton, Catholic and Reformed, pp. 120-1; Hill, Antichrist, p. 37. 28. Milton, Catholic and Reformed, pp. 118-19. In his prose Vita, Hobbes adduces his willingness to pray with Cosin according to the rites of the Church of England as «a great sign of reverence for Episcopal Discipline» (Thomae Hobbes Angli Malmesburiensis philosophi vita (London, 1681), p. 7: «Magnum hoc erga Disciplinam Episcopalem signum erat reverentiae»). In A Premonition to All Most Mightie Monarches, James I had said that

«lesuits are nothing but Puritan-papists» (The Workes, p. 305). 29. Hobbes’s colleague Jasper Mayne writes in 1647 that «for some yeares» the people

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tacks, no longer restricted to the bishops, are directed against the government that supported them*°. Apocalyptic discourse had helped marshal popular backing for Henry VIII’s split from Rome, and then to drum up antipathy to Spain under Elizabeth; now parliament availed itself of this volatile rhetoric to garner public support in the struggle with Charles. The Christian call to pull down Antichrist was transformed into a revolutionary responsibility. In sermon after sermon, those who preached to the House of Commons in 1641 insisted that God would use parliament to destroy Antichrist and prepare the way for the kingdom of Christ. There can be little doubt that the honorable members — who chose the preachers, voted to thank them, and had their sermons published by official order — welcomed their climacteric role*!. After the outbreak of hostilities in 1642, the pitch grew sharper still. Stephen Marshall argued that the question before parliament was only «whether Christ or Antichrist shall be Lord or King [...] the Protestants owning the one, and the pa-

pists and popish-affected the other, as their cause»*?. Marshall interpreted the deeds of the parliament as the destruction of Babylon and the creation of Zion, and assured its members that they were constructing the walls of a glorious Jerusalem”. He presents his readers with a stark choice: the earl of Newcastle is «now Generall of the Armie of Papists in the North», and they can either conform to God’s will and resist the pope’s oppression, or be slaughtered**. «And though a civill War be miserable, yet no such misery as the peace which

«have been falsely taught to thinke the Order of Bishops Antichristian, so looking upon their persons through the mist cast by some False Prophets before their eyes, it ought to be no wonder if their [the Bishops’ ]best Actions have seemed Popery» (A late Printed Sermon against False Prophets, Vindicated by Letter, from the causeless Aspersions of Mr. Francis Cheynell ({Oxford],

30. bishops popery Charles

1647), p. 60).

Hill, Antichrist, was sometimes directly, or was to the Devil by

the Kingdome

p. 77-8. The popery (and therefore antichristianity) of Laud or the laid at the door of Charles, and at other times he was accused of implicated in another way. An instance of political sorites from way of Buckingham was published in 1644: «Our King [...] rul’d

then, but the Duke rul’d him, the Jesuites rul’d the Duke, the Pope the Je-

suites, and who (d’ye think) ruled the Pope? » (A Prognosticall Prediction of Admirable Events that are like to Happen within his Majesties Dominions... (London, 1644: printed «according to Order» of parliament), p. 6).

31. Capp, «The political dimension», p. 109; Hill, Antichrist, pp. 82-3. 32. Marshall, A Sacred Panegyrick... (London, 1643), p. 21. A translation of Johann Alsted’s work, published in London in 1642 (The Worlds Proceeding Woes and Succeeding Joyes), promised a revolution of government that very year. 33. Marshall, Gods Master-piece. A sermon tending to manifest Gods glorious appearing in the building up of Zion (London, 1645). 34. The Scots had rebelled against Laud’s attempt to impose the liturgy of the Church of England on the Presbyterians; in 1639 Newcastle raised an army to fight the rebels. The following year, Hobbes dedicated The Elements of Law to Newcastle, and later — after the Scots’ incursion into England had forced the king to summon the Long Parliament, which proved ready to prosecute those who proclaimed tenets that were also central to the Elements — fled to Paris.

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they would beteeme us, a Sicilian vespers or a Parisian massacre»”. Even

more radical millenarian ideas were expressed by divines abroad; taking a position that was to be repeated many times in the following decades, John Archer argued from Arnhem that the enemy of Christ to be overthrown was

monarchy itself’. By this time, the interpretation of prophecy on behalf of

parliament had been digested into learned works. One example is Jeremiah Burroughes’s lengthy exposition of the prophecies of the end times, which culminates in approbation of Thomas Brightman’s calculation that Revelation shows that «these latter dayes [...] will come out about the yeare 1650»*7. And such popular tracts as The Camp of Christ and the Camp of Antichrist (1642) and England’s Alarm to War against the Beast (1643) brought the message to the many in no uncertain terms. It is little wonder that Richard Hayter, looking back during the reign of Charles II, remarked that «a great inlet to our late civil wars, hath been the misinterpretation of the Revelation»*’. Henry Hammond expressed his frustration with this doctrinal reversal, which had taken such hold that in some circles it was considered heretical to doubt that the king was on the side of Antichrist or that it was the divine role of the people to bring him down. Since the new Revelations have assured men that Antichrist must now be cast out utterly from among us, it is become necessary that our Soveraigne should be a Papist. [...] But should his Majesty be so malicious as to prove Protestant in earnest, then what would become of that sure word of Prophecy that so many have beene perswaded to depend on, that Antichrist must now be cast out of this Kingdome, which saith the

Objecter cannot be, unlesse the people doe it while the King bewailes*’. 35. Marshall, A Copy of a Letter...to a friend of his in the City, for the necessary vindication of himself and his Ministry... (London, 1643), pp. 23, 30. 36. Archer’s position, in his 1642 The Personall Reigne of Christ upon Earth, influenced the Fifth Monarchists of the 1650s (Bernard S. Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men: A Study in Seventeenth-century English Millenarianism (London, 1972), p. 46). 37. Burroughes, An Exposition of the Prophesie of Hosea (London, 1643), pp. 748-9. The choice reflects a certain impatience, as Brightman had emphasized that the final overthrow of Antichrist would not occur before

1695 or 1696 (cf. A Revelation of the Revela-

tion... (Amsterdam, 1615), p. 559). For evidence that many learned laymen thought that Christ’s coming was imminent, see chap. 3 of Bryan W. Ball, A Great Expectation: Eschatological Thought in English Protestantism to 1660 (Leiden, 1975). 38. Capp, «The political dimension», p. 112. 39. Hayter, A Meaning to the Revelation (London, 1676), dedicatory epistle, quoted by William M. Lamont, Godly Rule: Politics and Religion, 1603-1660 (London, 1969), p. 21. Cf. Sarah Barber, Regicide and Republicanism: Politics and Ethics in the English Revolution, 1646-1659 (Edinburgh, 1998), p. 107: «The attack on Charles in 1648 employed the prophets to great effect [...]. Quotations from Isaiah, Jeremiah and Daniel built up the anticipation of liberty [...]. The prophetic books were also quarried for the blood-curdling language of vengeance against the oppressor. Most of the pamphlet literature of late 1648 which emerged from the publishers which specialised in sectarian pieces was illustrated with a passage from the prophets». 40. [Henry Hammond], Of Resisting the Lawfull Magistrate under colour of Religion... (Oxford, 1644), pp. 28-9.

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Hammond criticized Stephen Marshall («having gotten so much authority, as to be the Augustine, the truly polemicall Divine of our times») for his sermon of 1641 on Judges 5:23, pointing out that it was unjustifiable to apply «the curse that fell on the Inhabitants of Meroz, Jud. 5. (for not helping their Soveraigne, namely Deborah, against a forraigne Enemy, Jabin) to those that

will not joyne with himselfe against his Soveraigne and his Cavaleirs, i.e. those Forces raised by him»*!. Similarly, Edward Symmons, a royalist chaplain, upbraided Marshall and his fellows for singling out such verses as «remove the diadem, and take off the Crowne [...] exalt him that is low, and abase him that is high»; «Cursed be he that with holds his hand from bloud»; and others to this effect, and for applying them in their sermons to the prejudice of the royal party. Symmons concludes that «the very truth is, these very men have beene the cheifest exciters unto, and promoters of this most accursed and

unnaturall Rebellion». It is often noted that Hobbes agrees that the English were preached into the rebellion. What becomes clear upon examining the sermons of these preachers is their markedly prophetic cast. One of the most revealing passages about the polarizing role of apocalyptic prophecy depicts enemies in the civil war explaining their actions by passing the Bible between them, pointing to particular verses in the book of Revelation. In his preface, Symmons recounts having asked some parliamentary soldiers held prisoner at Shrewsbury why they had taken up arms against their sovereign. They answered me, that they took up Armes against Antichrist, and Popery; for (said they) ‘tis prophesied in the Revelation, that the Whore of Babylon shall be destroyed with fire and sword, and |...) we are the men that must help to pull her downe. I answered that the Revelation tells us, that ’tis the worke of Kings (signified by those ten Hornes, Rev. 17. 12. 16) to pull downe the whore of Babylon [...]. But as for them, they (in my apprehension) laboured to keep up the whore of Babilon, that shee might not fall, by their endeavouring to pull downe Kings, who were appoynted of God to pull downe her: they replyed, that ’tis said in the Revelation, that the People, the Multitude and Nations should also pull her downe: but I reading the verse out of one of their Bibles, shewed them their mistake [...]. And then I inform’d them further, of their mistake in another particular, namely in thinking Popery (which they fancied they fought against,) to be that whore of Babylon, which in the Revelation is threatened to be destroyed with fire and sword; for that Antichrist and whore of Babilon [...] dwelt at Rome, and not here in England: and it was the very Roman seat or City which was to be so abolished; and not the Romish faith, or Popish Religion [...]: they told me that all the true godly Divines in England [...] were of their opinion, that Antichrist was

here in England as well as at Rome, and that the Bishops were Antichrist, and all that did endeavour to support them, were popishly affected, Babilonish and Antichristian too [...] and therefore they thought, they were bound in Conscience to fight against

41. [Hammond], Of Resisting the Lawfull Magistrate, p. 84. The sermon in question is Meroz Cvrse for not Helping the Lord Against the Mighty... (London, 1641). 42. Symmons, Scripture Vindicated, from the Misapprehensions Misinterpretations and Misapplications of Mr Stephen Marshall... (Oxford, 1644), p. 85.

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them, and us that took part with them, and in so doing, they did but help God against his Enemies®.

Like many royalists, Symmons does not deny the relevance of apocalyptic prophecy, but he thinks that it works to justify his side. He mirrors his opponents in arguing that they are being used by the devil, that they are restoring popery in England, and that they are aiding the Beast*. In a later work, in which he agrees that «these are the last days», he even assimilates parliament

itself to the Beast of Revelation 13%. Hobbes’s long-time associate Jasper Mayne tried to turn the tables on the parliamentarians who claimed the antichristianity or popery of the bishops by asserting that such claims were themselves the prophesied false prophecies?°. Other royalists tried to harness the power of eschatological prophecy by arguing that Cromwell, Essex, Fairfax, and Waller were the four horns of the Beast in Daniel 8:8, that in all there had

been a total of 666 members of the Long Parliament, and so on*’. Radicals, in turn, recapitulated the apocalyptic accusations of royalists: whereas the Fifth Monarchists, for example, began by claiming that the Little Horn of the Beast of Daniel 7:8 was Charles I, or English monarchy as a whole, they later interpreted it as Cromwell, and argued that the number of the

Beast referred to him**. Just as the royal party had found that their campaign against Antichrist was turned against them by parliament, so parliament found that these religious weapons were wielded against themselves by the army; the Independents turned apocalyptic discourse against the Presbyterians; and millenarians cried down the Rump, then the Barebones Parliament, and finally Cromwell in the same apocalyptic terms once reserved for the pope, and then for Laud*. As Protector, Cromwell (who had been motivated by his belief in the fulfillment of prophecy’) found that his professed objectives of stability and order required him to bridle the revolutionary vehemence of eschatology. 43. Symmons, Scripture Vindicated, Sig. A3r-v. 44. Symmons, Scripture Vindicated, p. 88. 45. Edward Symmons, A Vindication of King Charles I. or A Loyal Subjects Duty (London, 1693), pp. 19, 266. This work was first printed in 1648. 46. Mayne, A late Printed Sermon against False Prophets, Vindicated, p. 60. 47. Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 194. While some, such as Edmund Hall, in Manus Testium movens already argued in 1651 that the Beast was the army under Cromwell, such claims came into their own at the restoration. So, for example, «Williams’ The Great Antichrist Revealed (1660) applies all the apocalyptic passages to puritanism which had earlier been used against the established church»

(Milton, Catholic and Reformed, p- 219 'n.

93). 48. Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 194. 49. For examples of each, see Capp, «The political dimension», pp. 112-15. 50. «Oliver Cromwell believed in providences, and it could be argued that the group of regicides would never have summoned up the courage to chop off Charles I’s head if they had not believed that the finger of God pointed unmistakably in that direction» (Hill, in Christopher Hill, Barry Reay, and William Lamont, The World of the Muggletonians (London, 1983), p. 15). For two of many examples, see Cromwell’s contributions at Putney on I Nov. 1647, and his letter to John Cotton of 2 Oct. 1651.

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In 1640, Hobbes indicates his utter disregard for all apocalyptic discourse, dismissing it curtly as learned madness. «Amongst the learned madmen may be numbered (I think) also those that determine of the time of the world’s end,

and other such points of prophecy»?'. Such prophecy, however, could not be swept aside so simply. First, although Hobbes continues to discredit prophetic claims as mad, he walks a fine line in doing so, for he cannot set aside the biblical claims in this way. This is not because, or not only because, it is impru-

dent or impious to do so; more pointedly, Hobbes regards the claims of the Bible as sanctioned by the sovereign, and therefore not to be contradicted. Second, after 1640 it became obvious that the learned madness of eschatology was not an easily dismissed fringe phenomenon. Together, these reasons explain why Hobbes strove to discredit eschatological excess from the commonly accepted basis of scripture. This is one of the central projects of the second half of Leviathan. Despite claims from all sides to have discovered the characters, actions, and the very terrain of the prophesied last days in the setting of contemporary England, Hobbes seems to have been of the opinion that now is always a bad time

for apocalypse’. When James I wrote that «this beast or Monarchie, is [...] euen that Monarchie which presently reignes [...] and this Monarchie shall be within short space destroyed», his assault on the pope opened the English monarchy to the same attack”. Especially after the elimination of government printing controls in 1641, the explosive accusation of antichristianity could be leveled against anything one disliked?*, so it was necessary to pin it down as something politically harmless. And this is what Hobbes endeavors to do on scriptural grounds in the Leviathan. Arguing at length against Bellarmine,

S1. Elements 10.9. 52. Even under the new government, Jasper Mayne continues to insist that the apocalypse will not be played out on the English stage: to say as they do, that the Church of England is that Babylon the great; or that our Parish Congregations,

from which they do divide themselves,

are the Habitation of Divels [...]

here mentioned in this chap. [viz., Revelation 18] is such a piece of /gnorance, as well as zealous slander, that they will never be able to prove it, till they can make the Capitol of Rome stand in our London streets, or till they can make the River Tiber run, where now our Thames doth (A Sermon against Schisme: or, The Seperations of these Times (London, 1652), p. 22). Cf. Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London, for the Improving of Natural Knowledge (London, 1667), p. 358. 53. A Paraphrase vpon the Revelation of the Apostle S. lohn, in The Workes, pp. 39-40. 54. Hill, Antichrist, p. 75; cf. Joseph Sedgwick, Learning’s Necessity to an Able Minister ofthe Gospel, printed with A Sermon, Preached at St. Marie’s in the University of Cambridge May Ist, 1653. or, An Essay to the discovery of the Spirit of Enthusiasme and pretended Inspiration... (Cambridge, 1653), p. 39: «I heartily desire that encroaching term of Antichrist

and Antichristian

(so frequent

in some

mens

mouths

[...]) had its unlimited

bounds once somewhat fixt by assigning a Conception that might tell us wherein the nature of Antichristianisme consists. It seems to me one of those words that have worn out all their signification by frequency of being used: or else only a nickname to reproach any opposer of our private opinions or designes».

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Hobbes grows conciliatory when the question is whether the pope is Antichrist: «For my part, I see no argument that proves hee is so, in that sense the Scripture

useth the name». Although he argues against the jurisdiction of the pope in the dominions of other princes, he explicitly refuses to base such an argument on the resistance required against Antichrist®. Hobbes attempts to limit gardenvariety Antichrists to those who both profess to be the Christ and deny that Jesus is the Christ. This exempts anyone from the Christian denominations or sects, including the pope, the English bishops, and the radicals. Those who did claim to be Christ in seventeenth-century Europe claimed to be Jesus come again, and were, like

James Naylor, treated as madmen. Those who denied Je-

sus to be the Christ were generally non-Christians, who were hardly eager to profess to be Christ. Specifically, with each criterion Hobbes excludes one of the usual candidates for Antichrist, the pope and «the Turk». More generally, he excludes almost any conceivable Christian or non-Christian. Hobbes accepts that a special Antichrist will appear in the last days, but points out that his advent is to be accompanied by such events as the darkening of the sun and moon

and the falling of the stars; therefore the Antichrist «is not yet come»?’. When the stars fall, then we can worry about combating Antichrist. 55. Leviathan

42.87,

p. 303.

In his note

on

this passage,

Edwin

Curley

remarks:

«Hobbes’ defense of the Pope against this charge is somewhat unexpected, since it seems unnecessary for his argument against Bellarmine» (Leviathan, with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 (Indianapolis,

1994), p. 377). The

criticism

of Bellarmine

is

added, however, as part of Hobbes’s argument that ecclesiastical power is held by the civil sovereign of each Commonwealth; and this, as the foregoing context should make clear, was threatened by the availability of the accusation of antichristianity. Richard Tuck plausibly suggests in the introduction to his edition of Leviathan (Cambridge, 1991) that the implicit target of Hobbes’s attack on Bellarmine is the Presbyterian assault on the authority of the civil sovereign in ecclesiastical matters (p. xxiii; cf. Leviathan 47.34, p. 387); this would further account for his wariness to unleash the charge of Antichrist, so often leveled by Presbyterians against the English sovereign. Cf. Leviathan 44.17 (p. 341) and 47.4 (p. 382). 56. Leviathan 42.87, p. 303. Cf. Thomas Browne, Religio Medici and Other Works, ed. L. C. Martin (Oxford, 1964), p. 6 (I 5), who rejects «those popular scurrilities and opprobrious scoffes of the Bishop of Rome» (such as «Antichrist, Man of sin, or whore of Babylon»), «to whom as a temporall Prince, we owe the duty of good language». Religio Medici was first published by Andrew Crooke in 1642. 57. Leviathan 42.88, pp. 303-4; this seems to echo Bellarmine’s De Summo Pontifice, Part 3 of the Controversiae generales, Book 3, chapter 8, p. 22, col. 2 of Roberti Bellarmini opera omnia, vol. 2 (Paris, 1870). Around 1590, Francisco Ribera had pioneered this «futurist» doctrine as a reply to the Reformers’ attempts to apply apocalyptic prophecies to the Church of Rome. Ribera responded that those events of Revelation that had not taken place long ago would take place in the distant future, when a single Antichrist would deny Christ and pretend to be God. On Ribera, and the development of futurism by Bellarmine and others, see Le Roy Edwin Froom, The Prophetic Faith of our Fathers: The Historical Development of Prophetic Interpretation, vol. 2 (Washington, DC, 1948), pp. 486-505. Although Hobbes appears (in Leviathan 42. 81-135, pp. 300-20) to attack each of the five books of Bellarmine’s work seriatim, when he comes to the third he not only agrees with its conclusion, he simply recapitulates Bellarmine’s case for it: cf. esp. De Summo Pontifice

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This is one of Hobbes’s specific strategies against apocalyptic prophecy™. He also tries to pluck its political sting with a much broader argument, which

hands the authority for all scriptural interpretation to the sovereign*”. The identification of Antichrist with the sovereign or his party is hereby pre-empted in another way. For according to Hobbes’s doctrine, it is up to the king himself to determine whether or not he is the Antichrist predicted in the New Testament. And one could expect the stars to fall well before he would give an affirmative answer to this question. These two strategies could, in principle, contradict one another. That is, Hobbes’s interpretation of Antichrist, even if it is designed to support the power of the sovereign and the stability of the commonwealth,

could be gainsaid

by the sovereign’s own interpretation. Hobbes is clear, however, about what should happen in the case of such divergence: he should offer his opinion to the sovereign as a matter of private counsel, but must fall in line with the sov-

ereign’s determination, even if he thinks that determination imprudent9°. And Hobbes does follow the government’s official position that the pope is not Antichrist. This may mean that Hobbes’s own view of this matter, as with many others, cannot with certainty be recuperated.

3. Bringing the stars down to earth One problem with deferring apocalypse until the sun and moon darken and the stars fall is that there are solar and lunar eclipses, comets

and shooting

stars. Prophets have never been far behind. Despite its scientific dress, judicial astrology, the art of predicting the destinies of individuals and the outcome of human events from the positions and motions of heavenly bodies, was palpa-

3.1-2, 3.7, 3.9, and 3.14 (Opera omnia, vol. 2, pp. 6-7, 22, 25-6, 38-42).

The dispute be-

tween Reformation and Counter-reformation theorists earlier in the century had shifted va-

lence by mid-century: whereas Reformers argued on behalf of Protestant sovereigns that the papacy was the Antichrist, Hobbes argues on their behalf that no one then living, and in particular not the pope, could be the Antichrist (and so no one could be antichristian for being popish). 58. On another front, he goes back to a strategy used under Elizabeth and James, characterizing the Catholic Church throughout Part 4 of Leviathan in terms of pagan demons and spirits. Hobbes presents both pagan and Roman tales as superstitions designed to scare the people into following their purveyors. 59. In Elements and De cive, the authority of interpretation was left in the hands of the established church, but the church was identified with the commonwealth, and the sovereign was left at the head of the church. In Leviathan, Hobbes clearly draws the conclusion that the sovereign is therefore the ultimate interpreter of scripture. 60. Hobbes does not employ another strategy that would have undercut apocalyptic pronouncements, that of following Erasmus in denying that John the Evangelist was the author of Revelation, and therefore questioning its place in the canon. This option was not open to Hobbes, whose sovereign had required his subjects to follow his pronouncement of its canonicity.

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bly employed as a partisan political weapon. fluence of astrological prediction, in England teenth century, are astonishing. Astrological period, and contemporaries avowed that they

The diffusion and perceived inat their height in the mid-sevenalmanacs outsold Bibles in this were the single greatest cause of

the royalist defeat*!.

There were astrologers ready to support the range of political positions in

the civil war period, from the fringes to the center. Nonetheless, there was a

widespread and understandable identification of astrologers as radicals, especially republicans, atheists, or enthusiasts®?. In this compass I cannot well explore the complex topic of astrology during the civil war, and so will focus on the astrologer Hobbes singles out for censure: William Lilly, «that prophesied all the time of the Long Parliament», according to Hobbes, elegized by Obadi-

ah Blagrave as «Our Prophet»*. Lilly did not confine himself to astrology, but drew on scriptural sources, and at the time was probably the most prolific purveyor of traditional secular prophecies as well, some of which he claimed to have unearthed from medieval manuscripts in the libraries of the realm. These are frequently intertwined with astrological arcana and dark forebodings. In 1644, for example, he relates the prophecy of «the White King» and that of «Dreadfull Dead-man» (who turn out to be the same person)™. The former prophecy predicts the flight, capture, and death of the White King, liberally incorporating details of actions that his readers would recognize as those of Charles I and the cavaliers as signs of the White King’s imminent fall. As Lilly later helpfully pointed

out, «nor was any King crowned in White apparell but King Charles»®. The latter prophecy concludes: «Then all the people of the land rejoyced, and the

61. Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, p. 72. 62. Patrick Curry, Prophecy and Power: Astrology in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 22, 38. 63. Hobbes, Behemoth, p. 187; Curry, Prophecy and Power, p. 53. «Our Prophet’s gone», lamented George Smallridge in «An Elegy upon the Death of William Lilly the Astrologer», affixed to Mr. William Lilly’s History of His Life and Times, from the Year 1602, to 1681 (London, 1715). Cf. Black Munday Turn’d White: or, The Astrologers Knavery epitomized (London, 1652), p. [3], where the author calls Lilly one of «the Grandees of this Age», who «is accounted the Herculean Astrologer, and Prince of Prognosticators». 64. William Lilly, A Prophecy of the White King: and Dreadfull Dead-man Explained (London, 1644), «Published according to Order». Lilly reports of this work that «there were sold in three Days eighteen Hundred, so that it was oft re-printed» (Mr. William Lilly’s History, p. 45).

65. Lilly, Monarchy or No Monarchy in England... (London, 1651), p. 36; cf. p. 39. Lilly ignores the coronations in white of Richard Il and Henry VI; perhaps he did not know of these precedents, or decided that the advantage of pointing out that those who had worn white had died violent deaths was outweighed by the possibility that the prophecy would then be regarded as having been already fulfilled in one of those cases. Already in A Collection of Ancient and Moderne Prophesies, Concerning these present Times, with Modest Observations thereon (London, 1645), Lilly adds annotations to the prophecy of the White King making explicit that Charles is currently fulfilling it.

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Citie was quiet, after they had slaine the Dreadfull Dead-man with the sword». The next year, Lilly waxes bolder, adducing several prophecies to the effect that there will be no king after Charles or a short time thereafter. In sum: «All old Prophecies do intimate a final subversion of Monarchy in England». And he now inserts himself in the symbolic struggle he depicts. Having identified Charles I with the Lion, Lilly sets down the last of the prophecies (this one «very ancient»), which begins: «The Lilly [...] shall be moved

against the seed of the Lion»®. It was above all his perceived pre-eminence in judicial astrology, however, that led members of parliament, noblemen, and leading radicals to consult him, and that gave him an enormous popular reputation. It is difficult to know what most people made of his astrological demonstrations, but it is probable that many regarded the hard-to-refute details of longitude and latitude, ascensio and descensio and elevatio, cusps of houses, and so on, as upholding — without their having understood quite how — the arresting conclusions Lilly drew from them. The interspersed predictions were clear and striking: «The wars

we

now

grone

under,

and

the infinite

pressures

wee

suffer, by his

Majesties aversnesse from his Parliament, and City of London [...] do all make way [...] for the utter desolation of this Kingdom, and his Majesties Posterity»®. Moreover, «abundance of the common people shall dye by the Sword, Mortality, &c. And where these afflictions are in most force, there, and

in that Land, shall the King or principall Officer dye»’°. These are just two instances of what Ann Geneva has called «the juggernaut of prophecies of the

King’s death»”!. Some astrological demonstrations were similarly easy to understand. So in interpreting the significance of a solar eclipse, Lilly provides a catalogue of the supposed effects of previous eclipses, among which there are many deaths of kings; cites the judgment of Junctinus that this particular kind of solar eclipse «doth signifie and declare [...] some famous King or Prince his Exile

or Banishment, his restraint of liberty, or Captivity, whether you will; as also,

66. Lilly, A Prophecy of the White King, p. 22. 67. Lilly, A Collection of Ancient and Moderne

Prophesies, p. 39. He also collects prophecies that there will be no kings in England after Charles in Monarchy or No Monarchy, pp. 54-69. 68. Lilly, A Collection of Ancient and Moderne Prophesies, p. 45. 69. Lilly, Englands Propheticall Merline, Foretelling to all Nations of Europe untill 1663. the Actions depending upon the influence of the Conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter, 1642-3... (London, 1644), p. 103. 70. Lilly, The Starry Messenger; or, An Interpretation of that strange Apparition of three Suns seene in London, 19 Novemb. 1644. being the Birth Day of King Charles... (London, 1645), p. 21. For Hobbes’s explanation of the appearance of multiple suns as a product of reflection and refraction, see De corpore 28.17. 71. Geneva, Astrology and the seventeenth century mind: William Lilly and the language of the stars (Manchester, 1995), p. 204. See chapters 7 («The King Must Die: Charles I Death Prophecies») and 8 («The “Hieroglyphic King”: Death by Cipher»).

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William Lilly, The Starry Messenger (1645), p. 26

his Slaughter»”; and, most pithily, relies on a traditional association between the sun and the king. «Church men began our misery, war, and death shall end it. I was ever fearfull of the effects of that Eclipse: for he that observes it, shall finde that the Sun is Lord of the tenth, and he is Eclipsed by the Moon in the eighth: Per Solem reges duplicitér intelliguntur, per Lunam populus, sive vulgus: an easie Artist may put this into sense». The sun is to be understood as representing kings, and the moon the common people; thus, as he puts it in a work of the same year, «Monarchy shall be eclipsed and darkned»”*. That such declarations did end up looking prophetic buoyed Lilly’s reputation, but he was also ready to adduce astrological phenomena and ancient 72. Lilly, The Starry Messenger, pp. 27-9, 34. 73. Lilly, Englands Propheticall Merline, p. 38. 74. Lilly, A Prophecy of the White King, pp. 3-4.

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prophecies to show that the events that had already happened were destined. So in 1651 he offers further ancient prophecies that Charles I had to die, and monarchy with him: «Prophecies and Oracles are best understood, when they are performed»? Prophecies could be adduced after the events they supposedly predicted in order to give those events the seal of inevitability and divine ap-

proval’®. The regime that emerged out of the shocking events of civil war and regicide craved such legitimation. The skies were open for interpretation, however, and not everyone was willing to see parliamentary sovereignty in the stars. The most prominent royalist astrologer during the 1640s and 1650s was the unrelenting George Whar-

ton’’. Accepting Lilly’s equations of the sun with the king and the moon with the many, he rejects the prediction based on them. First, he annotates the moon, who naturally (and in this case especially) signifieth the many-headed-monster Multitude (such persons as in January 1641. tumultuously assembled themselves (to the hazard of his Maiesties royall Person) to cry for Blood in the Tearms of Justice; those who through their pretended zeal to I know not what, have brought the curse of God upon themselves and the whole Kingdom, first by slaying the Innocent in cold Blood, and ever since by engaging their persons and estates in this most unnaturall and bloody War against his Maiesty.)

His diagnosis is that the moon, «who is the naturall significatrix of such mean Capacities, is [...] very sick», whereas «the severall Positions of the Heavens {...] do generally render His Majesty and his whole Army unexpectedly vic-

75. Lilly, Monarchy or No Monarchy (London, 1651), pp. 36-69; quotation from p. 33. - See the millenarian Mary Cary’s The Little Horns Doom & Downfall: or a ScriptureProphesie of King James, and King Charles, and of this present Parliament, unfolded (London, 1651), in which she argues that the prophecies of Daniel foretold the fate of Charles I:

«prophesies are then best understood, when they are fulfilled» (sig. A7r; cf. p. 46). Lilly provides (p. 32) a seemingly ancient prediction of the immediate past from «The Scotish Sybilla», that the monarchy shall have been extirpated in 1649. He also supplies more recent prophecies, including one from Nostradamus, and a catalogue of relevant portents. 76. Prophecies were also issued retrospectively because the accuracy of those published after the fact was considerably greater. This criticism is common in the work of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Bacon maintained that the primary reason that prophecies are given credit is «that almost all of them, being infinite in Number, have beene Impostures, and by idle and craftie Braines, meerely contrived and faigned, after the Event Past» («Of Prophecies», in The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall, ed. Michael Kiernan (Cambridge, MA, 1985), p. 114). Gassendi, in Animadversiones in decimum Librum Diogenis Laertii (Leiden, 1649), repeatedly notes that we hear about most seemingly accurate prophecies only after the events that they supposedly preceded (e.g., on p. 162: all references are to the part of this work translated as The Vanity ofJudiciary Astrology. Or Divination by the Stars (London, 1659); Gassendi’s attack is recapitulated in Syntagmatis Philosophici, Physicae 2.6, pp. 717-52 of the first volume of his Opera omnia (Lyons, 1658)). Even when the prediction had been made before the event it claimed to predict, the principle of selection ensured that most prophecies that had proved mistaken were quietly ignored.

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torious and successfull in all his Designes». Thus he admonishes London: «thy miseries approach, they are like to be many, great and grevous, and not to be diverted, unlesse thou seasonably crave pardon of God for being Nurse to this present Rebellion, and speedily submit to thy Princes mercy»’®. Lilly prefers to describe the moon as «afflicted», and focuses instead on the recent and forthcoming eclipses in Leo”. He concedes that «the figure doth at the beginning promes successe», but concludes by closing ranks: «the end of this march will be unlucky, and [...] will afford us an absolute victory

over you». Writing on the eve of the decisive parliamentary victory at Naseby, Lilly claims not only to have discerned indifferent fate, but providence*”. «God is on our side; the Constellations of Heaven after a while will totally appeare for the Parliament»*!. Wharton was unbowed, continuing through the interregnum to predict a royalist resurgence, using many of the same tools that Lilly had used against Charles I. For example, Lilly drew on the tradition that a bearded comet was a sign of the fall of a great prince to predict the downfall

of Charles,

and Wharton

to predict the demise

of Cromwell*?.

77. On the battle between Lilly, John Booker, and Wharton, see Harry Rusche, «Merlini Anglici: Astrology and Propaganda from 1644 to 1651», The English Historical Review 80:314 (1965), pp. 322-33; and Geneva, Astrology and the seventeenth century mind. 78. Wharton, An Astrologicall Judgement Upon His Majesties Present March: Begun from Oxford, May 7. 1645 ([London: «As it was Printed at Oxford»], 1645), printed with The Starry Messenger, sig. x4r-v. 79. Cf. above, on Charles I as the Lion; cf. also Giordano Bruno’s Spaccio de la bestia

trionfante... (Paris [but London], 1584), sigg. *Sv-*6r, p. 40 (The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, trans. and ed. Arthur D. Imerti (Lincoln, NE, 1992), pp. 84, 115: «Leo drags with himself Tyrannical Terror, Fear, Formidability, Perilous and Hateful Authority, the Glory of Presumption, and the Pleasure of being feared rather than loved»; thus, «let there fall [...] the Leo of Tyranny»). 80. In addition to the royalist defeats at Naseby and Colchester, Lilly predicted the fall of Oxford, pressing the term «both» into heavy service in his zeal: «Oxford shall suffer both Sword, Sicknesse, Famine, Plague, if not finall Subversion» (The Starry Messenger, p. 23). 81. Lilly, Postscript, dated 12 June 1645, printed with The Starry Messenger and Wharton’s Astrologicall Jvdgement, sig. *r-v. 82. Cf. The First Booke of Lucan Translated into English in Fredson Bowers, ed., The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1981), vol. 2, p. 294 (line 527): «And Commets that presage the fal of kingdoms». Hobbes dismisses divination by «Ecclipses, Comets, rare Meteors» and other events that were thought «to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come» (Leviathan 12.19, p. 56). Northampton’s strategy of «making plaine, that neyther Princes alwayes dye when Comets blaze, nor Comets euer blaze when Princes dye» would be congenial to Hobbes (Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson of supposed Prophecies..., 2nd edn. (London, 1620), fol. 74v, with many examples; cf. Sir Thomas Browne's Works, ed. Simon Wilkin, vol. 4 (London, 1835), p. 391). Giovanni Pico had already tackled this subject, and Giovanni Ferrerio, in De vera cometae significatione contra astrologorum omnium vanitatem (Paris, 1540), argues at length against the idea that a comet portends the downfall of the king. Hobbes had a keen interest in comets, but was unable to devise an explanation of their origin and nature that satisfied him. In his critique of Thomas White, he devoted chapter 8 to a

Disarming the Prophets. Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power

115

Wharton was imprisoned for his prognostications, and risked execution for

treason’. In 1645, Wharton complained of Lilly and another parliamentary trologer, the even more incendiary John Booker, that

as-

their sole endeavour hath hitherto been by most disloyall and ambiguous Phrases to animate and hasten on the Rebels and other Conspirators to plot and attempt Mischiefe against His Majesty; whereas an honest and discreet Artist ought not to divulge any thing (especially of Princes) that may any way tend to endanger their Persons, but ei-

ther not to meddle at all, or else to deale privately with the Prince himselfe84.

Lilly did keep up the artifice of presenting his dire predictions about the king and his cause as counsel from a well-disposed subject, but behind such protestations the comparisons were treacherous and the threat rang out: Sir, Some delude you, others harden your heart, promising unto you (like vaine fellowes) a conquest and victory over your Parliament at Westminster; the Spirit of lying doth guide their shallow braines; its otherwayes determined, it will not be so. Had Pharoah harkened to Moses, he had not beene drowned in the red Sea [...].Were I in private with you, I must advise it: at this distance, I publikely wish it. Fac hoc & .

vives

85

~.

As Lilly himself reports, Charles was hardly won over, though not because he shunned astrological predictions. In 1648, after consulting Wharton’s almanac on what the day had in store, Charles reportedly inveighed against Lilly to William Allen. «“I do not care for Lilly”, said his Majesty, “he hath been always against me”, and became a little bitter in his Expressions». Wharton complained that the parliamentary astrologers incite and further rebellion. Lilly, while promising that «we may fully expect a grand Revolu-

brief history of comets and their characteristics, and to criticisms of a number of theories about them (Jean Jacquot and Harold Whitmore Jones, eds., Critique du De Mundo de Thomas

White (Paris, 1973). Cf. also De corpore 28.17, and note the presence in Hobbes’s

library of books by John Bainbridge and Thomas Feyens on the famous comet of 1618 (pp. 64 and 79 of Hobbes MS EIA at Chatsworth), which Hobbes also observed (Critique du De Mundo 8.1). 83. Rusche, «Merlini Anglici», p. 331; Geneva, Astrology and the seventeenth century mind, pp. 205, 221-2. 84. Wharton, An Astrologicall Jvdgement, Sig. x1v. Cf. Hobbes, An Answer to a Book Published by Dr. Bramhall...

(London,

1682), p. 65: «What is the story of Eliah and Ahab

(1 Kings 18.) but a confirmation of the Right, even of Ahab to be the Judge of Prophesie? Eliah told Ahab, he had transgressed the Commandement of God. So may any Minister now tell his Soveraign, so he do it with sincerity and discretion» (as published in the 1682

Tracts..., concluding emphasis added; cf. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmes-

bury, ed. William Molesworth (London, 1839-45), vol. 4, p. 332). 85. Lilly, A Collection of Ancient and Moderne Prophesies, sig. A2r-v. The admonition («Do this and live», Christ’s words to the lawyer in Luke 10:28) is in the dedicatory epistle to Charles. 86. Mr. William Lilly’s History, p. 63, quotation marks supplied.

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Kinch Hoekstra

tion» soon, takes exception to the fact that in his almanac for 1645 Wharton «called our Parliament, and their valiant souldiery Rebels above 100 times»*’. A few years later, Lilly finds himself on the side of the established government, and does not hesitate to condemn the prophecies against it as «rebellious». Although prophecy may be harnessed to support authority, its capacity to endanger it persists. In 1651, Lilly rails against recent prophecies as «extravagant», «corrupt and purely false», and «dispersed [...] purposely to stir up

Rebellion against this State»**. As one familiar with the tricks of the trade, he is quick to accuse the author of The Future History of Europe of fraudulently claiming that his work based on «obscure Manuscripts concealed in clandestine Libraries», and of twisting such prophecies as those of the Lion of the North and the Fifth Monarchy to favor Charles Stuart and the Presbyterians:

«and all this to terrifie the Vulgar from assisting the present Authority»*’. Such «flattering Prediction» is designed «to vilifie the present Government». As they are designed to make people «rebellious to this present Parliament», Lilly professes to expose «these far-fetcht fooleries and Nonsences», so that «the Reader may see the jugling of some, and the imposture of others to foole the English, and make them beleeve such things as were meerly devised to uphold

a malicious and stifnecked faction». This is an apt summary of Hobbes’s own strategy for secular prophecies: debunk them as imposture to undermine their capacity to compromise present government. Hobbes does not begin from the baseline of rectified prophecy, however, for Wharton is as bad as Lilly. His methods are at least as likely to impair order as to fortify it, and Hobbes would have disapproved of Wharton’s attempts to undermine the settled government of the Commonwealth as well as Lilly’s to overthrow monarchy. Scepticism about astrology has a venerable tradition. Since Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, self-styled modern thinkers built up a storehouse of argu-

ments against judicial astrology’!. Perhaps for this reason, Hobbes does not spend much time in his published works on the question of astrology, prefer-

87. Lilly, The Worlds Catastrophe, or, Europes many Mutations untill 1666. The Fate

of Englands Monarchy untill its Subversion... (London, 1647), sigg. A3r, A4r. 88. Lilly, Monarchy or No Monarchy, sig. A2r. Already in the quarrel between Wharton and John Booker in 1644-5, each had accused the other of rebellious imposture. 89. Lilly, Monarchy or No Monarchy, sig. A2v. The work in question is A brief Description of the future History of Europe... (s.1., 1650), which Lilly attacks along with what is apparently the version of Grebner’s prophecy included in [George Wither], Vaticinium Votivum (London,

1649).

90. Lilly, Monarchy or No Monarchy, pp. 10, 19, 20. 91. See his 1496 Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem, 2 vols., ed. Eugenio Garin (Florence, 1946). Critical assaults on astrology began much earlier; so the editor of a recent edition of Sextus Empiricus’ criticisms writes that his second century work is «the final link in a long tradition» (Emidio Spinelli, ed., Contro gli astrologi (Naples, 2000), p. 15). Relevant texts are collected in Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum, ed. Franz Cumont, et al. (Brussels, 1898-1953).

Disarming the Prophets. Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power

117

ring to criticize secular prophecy in general as imposture’’. He does indicate the degree of his contempt when he says of Lilly that he was «a pretender to a pretended art of judicial astrology; a mere cozener»?’. That Hobbes nonetheless took seriously the damage caused by this pretended prophet is indicated by his singling out Lilly by name. In the Behemoth, Hobbes is usually very careful to analyze the causes of the civil war without contravening clauses I and XXIV of the Act of Oblivion, which (with a few exceptions) forbade naming the living perpetrators of injuries during the war and the interregnum°*. That he is willing to sail close to the wind in this case may well indicate his 95 outrage ”. In the twelfth chapter of Leviathan, Hobbes suggests that the predictive part of «judiciary Astrology» is one of the «vaine conceipts» by which people are «drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance»”®. Yet in the table of the branches of science in the ninth chapter, astrology is given as the science of consequences from the influence of the stars’’. The most plausible explanation is that it is only judicial astrology, which claims to predict human events, that Hobbes condemns as perilous knavery”’. Although the relevant distinctions are drawn in various ways, James I can be taken as representative. He distinguishes between astronomy (which is lawful, necessary, and commendable) and astrology; and then between two parts of astrology, the first of which (sometimes called natural astrology) involves predicting the weather and other natural events (and is lawful «if mod-

erately used»)”’. The second part is to trust so much to their influences, as thereby to foretell what com92. This is not to say that Hobbes simply agrees with the traditional arguments against astrology. The animadversions of Giovanni Pico, for one, would not be shared by Hobbes insofar as they target astrology as demonic and deterministic. 93. Behemoth, pp. 187-8. 94. See Behemoth, pp. 27, 99, and 117. 95. He technically avoids violating the Act by relying on the widespread awareness of Lilly’s notorious predictions and justifications of Naseby, the execution of Charles I, etc. He thus can replace an accusation of injury with the conspicuous understatement that, Lilly «no doubt had been called in question [by the Long Parliament], if his prophecies had been any way disadvantageous to that Parliament» (Behemoth, p. 188). 96. Leviathan 12.19, p. 56. 97. In chapter 9 of the Latin Leviathan, Hobbes does not identify astrology as a science, though the classification there is much less detailed. 98. As Curley suggests in his edition of Leviathan, p. 49 n. 2. 99. Cf. Jean Calvin, who, drawing on the traditional distinction with examples from ancient sources, distinguishes between «l'astrologie naturelle», which is «la vraye science d’astrologie» and «cette astrologie bastard» practiced by «noz astrologues contrefaitz» (Advertissement contre l'astrologie, qu'on appelle ludiciaire..., pp. 56, 62; cf. pp. 53-7 and 7981. This work was first published in Geneva in 1549; I refer to the edition of Olivier Millet (Geneva, 1985). Cf also, e.g., Aphorismi episcopales ex doctorvm Sententijs collecti, ed. Scipione de Rubeis (Rome, 1631), pp. 55-6.

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mon-weales shall flourish or decay: what persons shall be fortunate or vnfortunate: what side shall winne in any battell: what man shal obtaine victorie at singular combate: what way, and of what aage shall men die [...] and diuers such like incredible things [...]. This part now is vtterly vnlawfull to be trusted in, or practised amongst Christians, as leaning to no ground of naturall reason: and it is this part which I called

before the Diuels schoole!°”. Hobbes, too, distinguishes between

astronomy

and astrology'”’. In the

table of sciences referred to above, he lists astronomy as the distinct science of

consequences from the motion and quantity of the stars, rather than of the con-

sequences of their influence!”. In the De corpore, he employs the distinction to deny the scientific status of astrology. Whereas James decrees judicial astrology illegal, Hobbes decrees it unphilosophical. Hobbes maintains that philosophy excludes, not onely all Doctrines which are false, but such also as are not well ground-

ed; for whatsoever we know by right Ratiocination, can neither be false nor doubtfull:

100. Daemonologie, in Forme of a Dialogve, in The Workes, pp. 100-1. On p. 99, the devil’s school is identified as «the Astrologie iudiciar». 101. E.g., in The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance (London, 1656), p. 213 (English Works, vol. 5, pp. 267-8): «And for the Astrologer (unlesse he means Astronomer) I would have him throw away his whole trade». The distinction was thought to be as old as astronomy. Cicero relates that Eudoxus, reputed to be the first of the astronomers, distinguished his activity from the Chaldeans’ attempts to predict human events (De divinatione I 42). The distinction became a commonplace, invoked even by those who defend some kinds of divinatory astrology, which they correspondingly expand the category of astronomy to include (see, for example, Gargantua’s letter to Pantagruel in Rabelais, 2.8). The main way in which Hobbes’s distinction differs from that of James I is that Hobbes does not consider astrology to involve demons or devils. See note 112, below. 102. Hobbes distinguishes in this table between the knowledge of «Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the [...] Starres» (astronomy),

of «Consequences

from the

Light of the Starres» (sciography), and of «Consequences from the /nfluence of the Starres» (astrology). It is not obvious how the concerns of natural astrology would not fall under the rubrics of consequences from the motion, quality, and light of the stars. Together with his view of light as matter in motion, this may be why Hobbes, in chapter 9 of the Latin Leviathan, reduces the three to the single category of the study of the motions of the stars, or astronomy. The tripartite division in the English version may reflect the scholastic debate over whether the stars exercised influence by their light only, by light and movement, or by these plus influentia. The scholastics who argued for the latter, however, usually regarded influence in this restricted sense as an incorporeal or spiritual power, a conception Hobbes would reject. (On the scholastic debate, see Pierre Duhem, Le systéme du monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, vol. 8 (Paris, 1959), pp. 435-6.) In his analysis of Thomas White’s work, Hobbes defines influence as «that imperceptible motion in parts of the stars by which motion is extended over distance by a continuous impulse of the medium» (Critique du De Mundo 36.2: «Estque influentia (ut vocem illam definiam) nihil aliud praeter illum motum in astrorum partibus sensu non perceptibilem, quo propagatur motus

ad distantiam, continua

medii protrusione»).

and, typically, the incorporeal to the merely invisible.

Influence

is thus reduced

to motion,

Disarming the Prophets. Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power ee

119 __ Lar

and therefore Astrology, as it is now held forth, and all such Divinations rather then

sciences, are excluded!™, Hobbes here employs «philosophy» to mean the study of bodies, and does devote much of Part IV of this work to considering the influence of extraterrestrial bodies on earthly events, including the motion of tides and the growth of plants. So such bodies do have influences. Astrology «as it is now held forth», however, is not well grounded, and its conclusions are either false or doubtful. Hobbes pokes fun at the current state of astrology in chapter 36 of his critique of Thomas White’s 1642 De mundo dialogi tres. He protests that there is no basis in experience for regarding the rising of a given sign of the zodiac as fruitful rather than sterile, hot rather than cold, male rather than female, beneficent rather than noxious'°*. This is not to say that we cannot use knowledge of

the stars to make accurate predictions. «It is true that some things, depending not on the influence but on the revolution of the stars, can be predicted; [...]

such predictions, however, are not the astrologer’s, but the astronomer’s»!. Hobbes has in mind predictions of eclipses, or of when a given planet will be in a certain position. In contrast, «predictions of the behavior and fortunes of

men have no foundation»! This dismissal is a general one, not confined to the current state of the field. Unlike many critics of astrology, Hobbes does not dismiss it because the stars have little or no influence on us or our environment, but because such influence is too pervasive to distinguish meaningful-

103. Elements of Philosophy, the First Section, Concerning Body (London, 1656), 1.8. A number of ancient and early modern writers exclude astrology from philosophy and

mathematics, but defenders of astrology are unwilling to capitulate. So Mellin de SaintGelais calls judicial astrology philosophy (Advertissement sur les jugemens d’Astrologie, published anonymously at Lyon in 1546: cf. pp. 256, 275 of vol. 3 of Oeuvres completes, ed. Prosper Blanchemain (Paris, 1873)); and Calvin retorts that such divination has no foundation in reason or science (Advertissement contre l'astrologie, p. 92). A traditional criticism of astrology was the wide divergence among astrologers, even about questions of basic method

(see, e.g., Gianfrancesco

Pico della Mirandola,

Opera omnia,

vol. 2 (Basel,

1573), pp. 576-82; Heinrich [«Henrie»] Cornelius Agrippa, Of the Vanitie and vncertaintie of Artes and Sciences, tr. James Sanford (London, 1569), foll. 45v, 47v-48r; Gassendi, The Vanity of Judiciary Astrology, p. 135; John Gaule, Hoç-uavria, The Mag-astro-mancer, or the Magicall-Astrologicall-Diviner, Posed, and Puzzled (London, 1652), pp. 115-17): such

discrepancies would be sufficient for Hobbes to exclude it from the category of science or philosophy. 104. Critique du De Mundo 36.9. Hobbes’s criticism on this point is similar to that found in, e.g., G. C. [George Carleton], AZTPOAOTOMANIA. The Madnesse of Astrologers... (London, 1624), pp. 10-11. 105. Critique du De Mundo 36.8: «Eorum verd quae non dependent ab influentia, sed a conversione astrorum [...] praedici aliqua possunt [...] quae quidem praedictiones non astrologorum sunt, sed astronomorum». 106. Critique du De Mundo, heading of 36.9: «Praedictiones de moribus & fortunis hominum nullum habent fundamentum». The contrast is a common one. Cf., e.g., Cicero, De divinatione II 6-7; and [Carleton], AZTPOAOTOMANIA, pp. 48-9.

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ly!°’, Hobbes admits that «everything in the future depends on the present force of the stars»; nonetheless, an astrologer cannot predict future happenings based on that influence, for «every influence of every star contributes to every

effect»!98, «It is impossible to conceive of all the influences of all the stars because of their countless multitude and imperceptible motion; so it is certain that the effect that follows from them cannot be foreknown»!. Although astrology as it is practiced is delusion or imposture, an omniscient being would be able to practice it. «For nobody knows what will be, unless he knows everything, since all things impinge on everything»!!°. According to this account, any human claim to astrological prediction is false. It is not plausible to think, however, that in practicing his pseudo-science the astrologer is making an innocent mistake: «The almanac maker does not know what the next day will bring; [but] he deceives knowingly»!!!.

To vitiate astrological prognostications, Hobbes calls into question not only their supposedly scientific foundation, but also the motives of the prognostica-

107. For a history of some theories of the mechanisms of influence, see John D. North, «Celestial influence — the major premiss of astrology», in Paola Zambelli, ed., «Astrologi hallucinati»: Stars and the end of the World in Luther’s Time (Berlin, 1986), pp. 45-100. 108. Critique du De Mundo, headings of 36.5 («Futura omnia dependere a praesente vi astrorum») and 36.3 («Ad omnem effectum omnes omnium astrorum influentias concurrere»). Cf. Girolamo Savonarola, Scritti filosofici, ed. Giancarlo Garfagnini and Eugenio Garin (Rome, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 332-3 (this work, Tractato contra li Astrologi, as Savonarola states on p. 351, dates from 1497); and Reginald Scot’s 1584 The Discoverie of Witchcraft..., ed. Hugh Ross Williamson (Carbondale, IL, 1964), p. 184. Cf. also Claude Pithoys, Traitte cvrieux de l’astrologie ivdiciaire (1641) 2.3.2-4, pp. 137-45 of P. J. S. Whitmore, A Seventeenth-Century Exposure of Superstition (The Hague, 1972). 109. Critique du De Mundo 36.8: «nimirum ad omnem effectum producendum concurrere omnes omnium astrorum influentias, quas, quia propter multitudinem innumerabilem, & propter motuum insensibilitatem concipere impossibile est, certum est effectum ex illis sequiturum praesciri non posse». On this basis, Hobbes concludes that even prediction of the weather (another activity of the astrologers) is impossible. His idea is that accurate prediction would require data for what particular meteorological phenomena occurred at which precise locations in which conditions of the universe, and that such a data set would be infinite. An important issue unexamined in the scholarship concerns the relation of Hobbes’s view that all influences all and his conclusions from it, with his views of prudence, knowledge, and scientific reason. 110. Historia Ecclesiastica, p. 15, lines 319-20: «Scit enim quid erit nise qui sciat omnia nemo; / Omni contribuunt omnia namque rei». The English translation renders this as the standard claim that only God can know future contingents, omitting Hobbes’s justification (A True Ecclesiastical History, from Moses, to the Time of Martin Luther, in Verse (London, 1722), p. 22; cf. Leviathan 3.7, p. 10). Hobbes says that «all Endeavour, whether strong or weak, is propagated to infinite distance; for it is Motion» (Concerning Body 15.7). John Wallis ridicules the idea: as if «the skipping of a Flea did propagate a motion as farre as the Indies» (Due Correction for Mr Hobbes; or, Schoole Discipline for not saying his Lessons right (Oxford, 1656), p. 89). 111. Historia Ecclesiastica, p. 16, lines 321-2: «Nescit Ephemeridum confector postera quid sit / Allatura dies; decipit ille sciens».

Disarming the Prophets. Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power E N LENS R e

121 A

tors''*. Hobbes inclines to the explanation that astrologers are moved by selfish imposture rather than naive delusion. In the Historia Ecclesiastica, he calls

astrologers «deceivers» and «villains»''*. In the Decameron Physiologicum, he discusses

the Ethiopian

astronomers,

who

(according

to Diodorus

Siculus)

were able to parlay their predictions of eclipses and other celestial phenomena into thoroughgoing power not only over the people, but over the kings themselves. Although they practiced true science, they cantilevered therefrom a reputation for communication with the gods, playing the charlatans in order to

gain property and power!!*. The Chaldeans, who Diodorus reports were famed for their prophecies based on astrology and dream interpretation, are similarly regarded by Hobbes as having inspired admiration and fear with their «knav-

ery»'!>. In this only are they unlike gypsies, Hobbes suggests, for gypsies are

112. Hobbes refrains from taking up another common weapon in the anti-astrological arsenal, that of citing scriptural authority against astrology. Two influential sets of anti-astrological works that do make use of it are those of the Church Fathers and of the Reformers (though it is much more widespread). Calvin, for example, argues that God decrees

through Isaiah that the transformations and destruction of kingdoms cannot be read in the stars, and that God will punish those who attempt it; that according to Deuteronomy and Leviticus all divination is an enormous and detestable sacrilege; and that judicial astrology and Christianity go together like fire and water (Advertissement contre l’astrologie, pp. 75, 97, 98). Among the Reformers, Melanchthon argues most forcefully for their compatibility (cf. Stefano Caroti, «Comete, portenti, causalita naturale e escatologia in Filippo Melantone», in Scienze,

credenze occulte,

livelli di cultura (Florence,

1982), pp. 393-426;

and

Aby Warburg, The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity: Contributions to the Cultural History of the European

Renaissance,

trans. David

Britt (Los Angeles, CA,

1999), pp. 597-697).

It

may be that Hobbes was dissuaded from invoking scripture by the ambiguity of the biblical

evidence (which is marshaled by Lilly, for one, in support of astrology), or because scriptural condemnation was often based on the demonic nature of such divination. This association would have posed two problems for Hobbes: on the one hand, it allows for the possibility of accurate prophecy that is not inspired by God, an allowance in tension with Hobbes’s deflationary analysis; on the other hand, it relies on the demonology that Hobbes thinks is used to justify and further non-sovereign religious authority. Assimilating astrology to sorcery or magic inspired by the devil is not only unreasonable, it empowers those who claim special abilities to combat such infernal forces. 113. Historia Ecclesiastica, p. 10, line 194 («Quos deceptores diximus Astrologos»); p. 11, line 212 («latrones»).

114. Until King Ergamenes, who had been educated in Greek philosophy, was not willing to be mastered by this superstition, and killed all of these priests (Decameron Physiologicum: or, Ten Dialogues of Natural Philosophy (London, 1678), p. 5 (English Works, vol. 7, pp. 73-4); cf. Diodorus III.6, which was IV.1 in seventeenth-century editions). In the

Behemoth (pp. 94-5), Hobbes countenances this action, chillingly comparing it with how nearly 100,000 people would have been saved if the civil war had been avoided by massacring the roughly 1000 seditious Presbyterian ministers before they had had the opportunity to incite it with their preaching. In Historia Ecclesiastica, Hobbes praises «Ergamenes the wise, the noble Ergamenes» («Ergamenes sapiens, nobilis Ergamenes») for hereby bringing reason to Ethiopia (p. 11, lines 213-16). 115. Behemoth, pp. 92-3; Decameron Physiologicum, p. 6 (English Works, vol. 7, p. 79):

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«counted rogues» rather than feared and admired. Fear and admiration of them last, however, only so long as their knavery is not recognized as such. Ptolemy, Hobbes says, deserves great credit for his excellence in astronomy and geometry in the Almagest, «but then for his Judiciar Astrologie annexed to it, he is

again a Gypsie»!!°. In his criticism of Thomas White, Hobbes went so far as to deny that the latter work was in fact by Ptolemy, preferring to think of its author as «a Gipsy [...] of the number of those who wander throughout the world, and who, being beggars, even now receive alms for answering questions about the life, characters, fortunes, and death of men»!!’.

The distinction between astronomy and astrology is not only made scientifically, but also morally, and in terms of class. In the locus classicus of scepti-

cism about prophecy, Cicero’s De divinatione, even Quintus, after pledging his full confidence in divination, excepts when it is from «frivolity, deception, or

cunning»; and clarifies that he cannot believe those «who prophesy from the motive of profit»'!®. «Astrology, which by Contemplation of the stars dares to judge chance future events or give judgment one way or the other, is not a science», Hobbes writes in De homine; «it is instead a man’s stratagem to escape

indigence by taking away the property of foolish people»'!’. This is a method that Hobbes employs to strip the astrologers of their adherents, and to put William Lilly — reputed prince of the astrological prophets, consulted by politicians and hailed by the many — in his place. Hobbes suggests that Lilly tailored his prophecies to please the parliament in power, and asserts that he was «a mere cozener, to get maintenance from a multitude of ignorant people»!?°. A 116. Decameron Physiologicum, p. 6 (English Works, vol. 7, p. 75). Cf. Historia Ecclesiastica, pp. 15-16, lines 307-24. 117. Critique du De Mundo 36.10: «Aegyptium [...] ex eorum numero qui per omnes gentes vagantur, mendicantesque de vita, moribus, fortunis, exituque hominum, etiam nunc accepta stipe respondent interrogati». 118. De divinatione 1 58: «levitate, vanitate, malitia»; «qui quaestus causa hariolentur». The suggestion that the pursuit of profit is incompatible with the pursuit of truth is common after Plato thus distinguishes the sophist and the rhetorician from the philosopher. (Hobbes equates the astrologers with sophists who lord over the king in Historia Ecclesiastica, p. 10, lines 193-4.) Cf. Northampton, who stipulates that one of the marks of a true prophet is that he does not seek his own profit (A Defensative against the poyson, foll. 146r-148v): and Mayne, A Sermon against False Prophets. Preached in St. Marjes [Mary’s| Chvrch in Oxford, shortly after the Surrender of that Garrison ({Oxford], 1646), p. 32. Although he does not mention it by name, Hobbes was familiar with Cicero’s De divinatione. In Leviathan 46.11, p. 370, he cites II 58, appealing to the authority of an ancient philosopher in order to impugn the authority of ancient philosophers; and in line 2069 of the Historia Ecclesiastica (p. 95), he adapts the opening of II 24, where Cato wonders how one diviner can keep from laughing when he sees another. 119. De homine 14.12: «Quod Astrologia Contemplatione siderum de futuris eventibus fortuitis judicare vel in utramvis partem pronuntiare audet, non scientiae est; sed fugiendae egestatis Causa, hominis stratagema est, ut praedam auferat a populo stulto». He adds that all who pretend to prophecy without doing miracles have the same aim. 120. Behemoth, p. 188. Rusche, «Merlini Anglici», p. 333, quotes E. W. Brayley from 1841 that «Lilly paid more attention to profit than principle, and was ever ready to yield his

Disarming theIR Prophets. Thomas Hobbes O NE IES and eS a Predictive NEA Oe Power le

O123

see

concern about money was particularly damning for one who claimed to know the future: for if destiny is adamantine, he should resign himself to the financial fate the stars foretell; and if it is not (as Lilly believed, following the Ptolemaic rather than the Avicennan tradition), he should have been able to enrich himself

by profiting from future probabilities!*!. Astrologers like Lilly gained credit by simultaneously exploiting popular superstition and reverence for learned discourse. In Hobbes’s work, they face a corresponding dilemma. Insofar as the astrologer claims that his predictions are those of a science, Hobbes can debunk him by reason. Insofar as the astrologer claims inspiration or revelation, Hobbes will criticize him as an enthusiast. Both arguments are aimed at the astrologer’s fellow citizens, to undermine his authority with them. As always, though, Hobbes wishes to reserve the right of judgment for the sovereign, who is not only the authorized interpreter of texts, but also of events. Whether a deformed birth counts as human

is to be determined by the sovereign or someone he designates!??; similarly, he is to determine whether or not we are to treat as genuine a claim to revelation, services to any party for the sake of gain», and adds a similar judgment of his own (contrast The Late Storie of Mr. William Lilly (London, 1648), pp. 8, 10-11; this work is purportedly by «Collonel Th.» but is more probably written by Lilly). It may well be that such opinions do not so much confirm Hobbes’s verdict as reflect it. This kind of denunciation of astrologers was, however, a commonplace. So Agrippa says that judicial astrology «is nothing els but a false coniecture of superstitious parsons, which thorow long practise haue made a Science of things vncertaine, whereby they deceiue the simple sorte, to thende to spoile them of theire monie» (Agrippa,

Of the Vanitie and vncertaintie, fol. 45v).

121. This is one of Gassendi’s favorite taunts in The Vanity of Judiciary Astrology: he mocks the astrologers for their inability to enrich themselves (pp. 71-2), or to predict the misfortunes that will happen to them (pp. 3, 88, 157-8). So Hudibras ridicules Sidrophel, the character Samuel Butler based on Lilly: «By this, what Cheats you are, we find, / That in your own Concerns are blind» (Hudibras, ed. John Wilders (Oxford,

1967), Second Part,

Canto III, lines 1075-6, p. 183). Agrippa adopts More’s reproof of the astrologer: To thee thou airie Prophet all the Starres themselues do showe: And do declare what destinies, all men shall haue bylowe. But no Starres (though they all thinges see) admonish thee of this: That thy wife doth with erie man, behaue her selfe arnisse. (Of the

Vanitie

and

vncertaintie,

fol. 47r-v;

cf. Thomas

More,

Epigrammata...

(Basel,

1518), p. 35.) 122. Cf. Elements 29.8 and De cive 17.12. Among the superstitious forms of divination Hobbes wishes to neutralize are predictions of calamities following «Monsters, or unusuall accidents;

as [...] uncouth

Births», as well as eclipses, comets,

and meteors

(Leviathan

12.19, p. 56). Hobbes here expresses his concern that subjects may have their fear and ig-

norance manipulated by an interpreter of such events: his response is to try to diminish that fear and ignorance, and to undermine the authority of any independent interpreter. The political volatility of prophecy may help explain Hobbes’s choice of illustrations of the matters of controversy that are to be resolved by the sovereign. Such portents were used politically, as in A Declaration of a strange and Wonderful monster: Born ... without a head (after the mother had wished rather to bear a childe without a heade than a Roundhead) and had curst the Parliament... (London, 1646); cf. Five wonders seene in England (London,

1646).

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or how we are to interpret an eclipse. Lilly maintained that «the more holy thou art, and the neer to God, the purer Judgement thou shalt give», and does

thereby open himself up to the charge of enthusiasm!*’. Indeed, he was arrested in 1661 as a «supposed fanatic». Even committed opponents of astrology could risk unwittingly encouraging the fanatics. For a common criticism of astrologers was that they pretended to a knowledge that only God could reveal, and that only those whom God had inspired could engage in such predictions. So Gassendi, in reserving the knowledge of future events as God’s prerogative, commends the heathens who «enquired concerning future successes, of only such, as they beleeved acquainted with the secrets and Counsells of Divinity, and were Divino Numine afflati, or Entheati»'**. By the 1640s, however, Hobbes had reason to be as wary of those with the reputation for divine inspiration or possession as of partisan astrologers.

4. Isolating the enthusiast

In Hobbes’s extensive catalogue of «superstitious wayes of Divination», the type immediately before judicial astrology is prognostication by «the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit». Among the Gentiles, he says, this «they called Enthusiasme; and these

kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or Prophecy»!*. Hobbes does not simply dismiss the ravings of those already recognized as mad, for he goes so far as to consider the claim of inspiration itself a sufficient 123. Quotation from Curry, Prophecy and Power, p. 30. Astrology and enthusiasm are sometimes closely coupled. Agrippa, for example, concludes his chapter «Of Furie» with the claim that prophecy by those who are mad or in a trance is ultimately grounded in astrology (Of the Vanitie and vncertaintie, fol. 54r-v). 124. The Vanity ofJudiciary Astrology, p. 4. 125. Leviathan 12.19, p. 56. Hobbes’s identification of enthusiasm in terms of prophecy is one commonly made at this time. So Edward Pagitt, Heresiography (London, 1645), p. 33, identifies the enthusiasts as the sect of Anabaptists who pretend to «a gift of prophecie by dreams». Similarly, Friedrich Spanheim says that the «Enthusiasts are those, which boasted above the rest, of divine inspirations, extasies, and secret communication with God, obtruding their Prophesies for the word of God, and preferring them before the written Word; yea, contended, that that was to be judged by their dreams» («Frederick Spanhemius», Englands VVarning by Germanies Woe: or, An Historicall Narration, of the Originall, Progresse, Tenets, Names, and severall Sects of the Anabaptists... (London,

1646), p.

24). Meric Casaubon maintains that «Enthusiasme [...] is most properly used to imply Divination, such as is by inspiration» (A Treatise Concerning Enthusiasme, As it is an Effect of Nature: but is mistaken by many for either Divine Inspiration, or Diabolical Possession (London, 1655), p. 22). And Henry More expresses his apprehension about «the dazeling and glorious plausibilities of bold Enthusiasts, who speaking great swelling words of vanity, bear down the weak and unskilfull multitude into [...] a belief of Supernaturall graces and inspirations in their admired Prophet» («Phil[o]philus Parresiastes», Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, or, a Discourse of the Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure, of Enthusiasme (London, 1656), pp. 1-2). Cf. also Gaule, /JdDg-uavtia, p. 192.

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sign of madness. Writing of the «folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired», Hobbes reaches the bold conclusion that «if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough»!”°, Hobbes’s sweeping dismissal of enthusiasm is an assault on all of those who claimed to have special access to the word of God while contradicting the interpretation provided by the established church, as sanctioned by the sovereign. Histories of enthusiasm in England have typically focused on the postrestoration criticism of enthusiasm, the theoretical articulation of which begins

in earnest with Meric Casaubon and Henry More!?”. Robert Burton is usually referred to along with Hobbes as a forerunner, and a gesture may be made to the treatment of enthusiasm by Plato and Aristotle. Much of the intermediate territory has been skipped over, probably in part because «enthusiasm» predominates as the privileged term of analysis only after works by Casaubon and More are published in 1655 and 1656, and especially once the restoration writ-

ers fix on this term when apportioning blame for the civil wars!°3. The freer relevant vocabulary prior to this has also led to a simplified account of Hobbes’s critictsm of enthusiasm, which he does not frequently discuss under 126. Leviathan 8.21, p. 36. To support the identification of prophecy with temporary madness,

Hobbes

appeals in Leviathan

scripture. Cf. Behemoth madmen

36.8 (p. 226) not only to the Greeks, but also to

188, where Hobbes refers to «the dreams and prognostications of

(for such I take to be all those that foretell future contingencies)». Cf. also De

Mirabilibus Pecci, being the Wonders of the Peak in Darby-shire, Commonly Called the Devil's Arse of Peak (London, 1678), pp. 54-5. 127. Although this emphasis obscures a great deal, claims that English enthusiasm was born around the onset of the civil war do reflect a shift in its character and influence. Thomas Fuller’s claim of its novelty is unrepresentative only in the precision with which he dates its appearance («this day hapned the first fruits of Anabaptisticall insolence») to 18 January 1641 (The Church-History of Britain; from the birth of Jesus Christ, untill the Year MDCXLVIII (London, 1655), Book XI, p. 172). 128. As More observes, however, a claim that someone is «immediately and extraordinarily inspired of God, that he is a speciall Messenger sent by him, the last and best Prophet, the holy Ghost come in the flesh, and such like stuff as this [...] has been ever and anon set on foot in all ages by some Enthusiast or other» (Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, p. 13). Cf. Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson, fol. 31r: «this colour and pretence of Prophesie, and secret inspiration from the Gods aboue, both is and euer hath beene, a veyle or shadow for aspiring thoughts». Claimants to reason being no rarer than claimants to revelation, critics of enthusiasm have set up shop no less persistently. An essential chapter of a thorough history of enthusiasm and its critics in England would focus on the writers reacting to the Anabaptist disturbances in Germany in the sixteenth century. A particularly important work written at that time is Northampton’s Defensative, first published in 1583. Like the De Rerum Praenotione of Gianfrancesco Pico (Opera omnia, vol. 2, pp. 366-709), it is one of the greatest renaissance works on prophecy. Northampton is overlooked as an early source of the discussion of enthusiasm, or «the frantick Prophets» (fol. 35r of 1620 edn.): he anticipates Burton on the relation between

melancholy and enthusiasm, Hobbes on the political motivations behind feigned enthusiasm, and Casaubon and More on its natural causes. His work ranges much more widely than the anti-enthusiasm tracts, as he targets all extant forms of pretended prediction.

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that name!?°. To understand that criticism properly, we would need to pay attention to what Hobbes says about a range of related topics, including prophecy, fanaticism, inspiration, zeal, superstition, visions, private judgment, and the

spirit of God!*°. Although Hobbes sometimes dismisses all enthusiasts as madmen, this is only part of the story. At other times, Hobbes treats them, as he treats astrologers, as deceitful rather than deluded. Even in the passage where he regards prophetic enthusiasm as «the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men», he associates it with «pretended Revelation» and the manipulation of people by those who exploit their fear and ignorance!!. This discussion occurs in Hobbes’s anthropology, the consideration of human nature outside of civil society: like delusion, deceit and manipulation are natural. Imposture is legitimate in the state of nature so long as one considers it conducive to self-preservation. Prognostication and claims of divinity or special access thereto are pre-

dictable strategies of dominance in the natural condition'**. Some of those who have observed that the fear of things invisible is a natural seed of religion have undertaken «to nourish, dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it

of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers»!**. Although it must be quelled in the commonwealth, the prophetic imposture of private individuals is part and parcel of the state of nature. Hobbes bitterly condemns religious imposture because it is generally undertaken by subjects encroaching on civil power. When a subject pretends divinity or privileged access to divinity, he gains unauthorized leverage with the people, at the expense of sovereign control. When there is no established civil power, however, there is no such threat, and, correspondingly, no condemnation of the imposture. What is more, it has gone unremarked that there is arguably a kind of enthusiastic imposture that Hobbes commends, at least in its 129. Contemporaries, by contrast, were ready to translate. So the compiler of the broadsheet The Last Sayings, or Dying Legacy of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmesbury (London,

1680) paraphrases the discussion of Leviathan 7.7 (p. 32) about a «Prophet» who speaks «in the name of God», as a discussion of an «Enthusiast». 130. When Hobbes does explicitly discuss «enthusiasm», he usually associates it with the (claim of) possession of a divine entity within oneself, rather than with (a claim of)

privileged access to or communication from God. I refer to enthusiasm and inspiration in both senses rather than just the former. 131. Leviathan 12.19, p. 56. 132. The Hobbesian state of nature is not a simple situation of individuals waging war against one another by brute force: Hobbes insists that in the natural condition each man may aim «by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can» (Leviathan 13.4, p. 61). Thus, «Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues» (L 13.13, p. 63), and

one may use either method («vim & dolum») according to the natural right of self-preservation («necessitate conservationis propriae jus naturale»: De cive epistle, p. 73). Religion is natural and so can be manipulated in the state of nature. 133. Leviathan 11.27, p. 51.

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historical context. This is when the pretender uses imposture to set up sovereign order where there was none, or to reinforce it where he is already sovereign. In this case, the pretender is not compromising sovereign authority, but bolstering it. Immediately after the passages quoted above, Hobbes discusses the historically vital role that enthusiasm has played in the erection and maintenance of commonwealths. Giving the examples of Numa Pompilius, Mohammed, and Manco Capac, first king of the Incas, Hobbes strongly suggests that some claims of enthusiasm are for the public good. And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls, that their Lawes might the more easily be

received! Hobbes may feel a certain amount of envy for that time when «there was peace and a golden age», when the ancients concealed the science of justice in fables rather than exposing it to disputation, and sovereigns could keep the people in peace by the power of command rather than having to resort to argument! This was made possible, however, by the fact that the people «venerated the sovereign power as a kind of visible divinity»!9. Hobbes follows these observations by an example, showing that the myth of Ixion conceals the lesson that disorder and war follow when a private individual takes it upon himself to judge questions of justice, which should be the sole prerogative of

the sovereign!*’. That Hobbes does not altogether eschew myth is shown most 134. Leviathan 12.20, p. 57. In the following paragraph, Hobbes emphasizes that legislators employed this strategy to make the common people «lesse apt to mutiny against their

Governors», thus realizing their end, «which was the peace of the Commonwealth» (cf. 45.2, p. 353). That Hobbes does not condemn this kind of imposture may have something to do with the fact that these are the first legislators, who are presumably setting up a commonwealth from a state of nature, where imposture may be legitimate. Hobbes makes clear, however, that he recognizes that the imposture he allows does not cease with the establishment of government. If he highlights one thing here, it is not imposture as an aid to setting up government, but as a way to discourage rebellion against the newly established government. 135. De cive preface, pp. 79, 78: «pax erat & seculum aureum»; «veteres illos qui Justitiae scientiam fabulis contectam, quam disputationibus expositam esse maluerunt»; «nec disputationibus, sed vi Imperii in Pace continebantur». 136. De cive preface, p. 78: «potestatem summam [...] tanquam divinitatem quandam visibilem venerabantur». Cf. Anthony Ascham, Of the Confusions and Revolutions of Goverments (London, 1649), p. 142: «So those Princes who claim’d highest Allegiances, feigned that they were either begot of the Gods, or were sent by them to undertake the Government [...] That they might frame the People to a more facill obedience [...]. But those times are gone». 137. De cive preface, p. 79. The model of Hobbes’s exegesis is Bacon’s De sapientia veterum.

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strikingly when he describes the person of the commonwealth as «that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) [...] that Mortall God»!®. Nonetheless, imposture will generally not be conducive to the common good, even if it is undertaken for that purpose by the sovereign. Consider the Act which required that the following be read in churches across the country every year on 5 November, as a thanksgiving for the thwarting of the Gunpowder Plot. That plot would have turned to the utter ruin of this whole kingdom, had it not pleased almighty God, by inspiring the King’s most excellent Majesty with a divine spirit, to interpret some dark phrases of a letter shewed to his Majesty, above and beyond all ordinary construction, thereby miraculously discovering this hidden treason not many hours

before the appointed time for the execution thereof!9. Such a claim is not verifiable by natural reason, and indeed is against it. Al-

though Hobbes would require subjects to read out what was demanded of them and not to deny it, he could not have counseled the king that such an Act was prudent. We need neither believe nor obey someone without sovereign authority who pretends «that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately»: but «if he be my Soveraign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I beleeve him not; but not to think any otherwise then

my reason perswades me»! As his use of the argument that one without sovereignty can require neither belief nor obedience shows, however, an appeal to belief can be considerable, and a sovereign should be wary of requiring that subjects obey despite reasonable adverse belief. The sovereign will sit most securely on his throne if his claims to rule are believed as well as obeyed. Hobbes’s own method of encouraging obedience appeals to belief, so he would not have thought that belief is irrelevant to obedience. Disbelief in the sovereign’s claim to divine inspiration may undermine his authority, and even belief in such a claim may prove corrosive. For just as belief in the divine inspiration of the sovereign would further his authority, so belief in the inspiration of a subject would further his authority, at the expense of the sovereign’s. If divinity or special access to divinity confers authority, then it is difficult to restrict that authority to the sovereign, as nothing can stop God from entering into or communicating with whomever he chooses. This may help us understand why Hobbes refrains from invoking sacral monarchy or the traditional form of the divine right of kings. Instead, Hobbes provides a secular argument for the necessity of the sovereign determination of religious doc-

138. divinity a mortal 139. Canons mations, 140.

Leviathan 17.13, p. 87. Note that the ancients revered their sovereign as a visible (see note 136, above), and Hobbes would have his readers revere their sovereign as god. 3 Jac. I cap. 1, as given in The Thirty Nine Articles, and the Constitutions and of the Church of England; Together with several Acts of Parliament, and ProclaConcerning Ecclesiastical Matters... (London, 1739), p. 97. Leviathan 32.5, p. 196.

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trine. He also adduces scriptural authority for the sovereign’s religious monopoly, but this is to demonstrate that the office of sovereignty per se has a divine Warrant, not to show that God speaks especially to or is embodied in the sovereign'*!. Although God does not dwell in or speak especially to the sovereign, he nonetheless requires us to accept the word of the sovereign as his own word. There appears to be a predicament about the status of this claim. Is it true that God directly requires that we obey the word of the sovereign as his own word, or is that requirement, too, mediated by the sovereign? If it is God’s direct command, then it would seem that there could be other direct divine commands, which could conflict with sovereign requirements. If we know this command only via the sovereign’s interpretation, however, it does not appear to have the sort of independent status that can confer further authority on the sovereign, for the sovereign is effectively its author. That Hobbes is not concerned with this dilemma may be attributed to the structure of his approach: he argues for the dependence of divine authority on sovereign interpretation, and then, for anyone who nonetheless holds that there can be independent divine authority, he argues that if such an independent authority requires anything, it requires that we should follow the sovereign authority, even on religious questions. Hobbes’s reluctance to rely on a traditional version of the doctrine of the divine right of kings can also be seen to follow from his view about the appropriate locus of sovereignty, or the proper potential bearers of sovereignty. Hobbes holds that sovereignty is absolute whether it is held by one, some, or all. And sovereignty changes hands when power changes hands and receives the consent of the people. As becomes particularly clear in «A Review, and Conclusion» of Leviathan, Hobbes thinks that any doctrine that asserts the right of dominion of someone who does not have effective control of that dominion is one likely to cause sedition. The doctrine of the divinity of kings (or of a particular monarch, or the nobility, or the voice of the people) could lead to civil strife rather than stability, for when the party that claims a divine right to rule is not in power, its adherents will not accept the established ruler or rulers. Against such particular claims, Hobbes quotes scripture to show that God requires obedience to whomever holds the reigns of power. If the sovereign can win recognition of his authority without depending on a claim to be specially and miraculously inspired by God through a divine spirit, he will be more secure. The history of the Jews under the high priests and kings is instructive: Hobbes says that «the civill troubles, divisions, and calamities of the Nation» arose from subjects who had come to expect that sovereign authority would be confirmed by «great miracles», and so withdrew

141. Hobbes may equivocate about the idea of sovereign enthusiasm, especially in the case of Moses. Cf. Leviathan 36.11-13, pp. 227-8; 36.14, p. 229 and Hobbes’s alteration thereof in British Library MS Egerton 1910; and the Latin Leviathan (Amsterdam,

200. Cf. also note 185, below.

1670), p.

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their obedience when they did not see such miracles. This is not to say, however, that the sovereign can consolidate his authority if he simply refrains from a claim to enthusiasm, for the people’s natural anxiety for the future will then lead them to put their faith in independent prophets. When they lost faith in the miraculous powers of the sovereign, and so everyone did whatever «was right in his own eyes», the people turned to «such men, or women, as they

guessed to bee Prophets by their Praedictions of things to come»'**. Hobbes does argue that the sovereign is the supreme prophet'*, but that he must nonetheless be wary of arrogating divinity to himself — and he must be especially concerned to pre-empt such arrogation by any of his subjects, or he will lose the command over those subjects and any who believe in them. Hobbes therefore develops a strategy to harness faith to the cause of obedience without the consequence that obedience fails when faith fails. Hobbes contends that «the most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian Common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man, then when their Commandements are one contrary to the other». To resolve this long-standing predicament, he must topple the prophets and anyone else who claims independent authority by speaking for God or as God. The «many false Prophets, that sought reputation with the people, by feigned Dreams, and Visions» strove «to govern them for their private benefit»'**. Divination is natural not only because anxiety about the future is natural, but because imposture as a strategy of domination is natural. This natural strategy is, however, incompatible with commonwealth. Men must be very wary of obeying the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a Prophet, requires us to obey God in that way, which he in Gods name telleth us to be the way to happinesse. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and reign over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected of Ambition and Imposture: and consequently, ought to be examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience!*.

The situation where anyone may claim such divine powers in order to govern any other (or refuse to be governed by any other), is anarchic, a state of na-

ture'*°. Hobbes thinks he has at last «sufficiently resolved» the great seditious «difficulty» with a series of arguments: to obey God is to obey the right inter-

142. Leviathan 40.12, p. 255; cf. 12.24, p. 58. 143. Leviathan 36.13-14, pp. 228-9. 144. Leviathan 43.1, p. 321. 145. L 36.19, p. 230. Hobbes adds the caveat that one should yield obedience to the pretender in question «when the Prophet is the Civill Soveraign, or by the Civil Soveraign Authorized». 146. Hobbes maintains that when everyone followed his own «imprinted Light» or «illumination», the nation was «an Anarchy, and dissolute multitude of men» (Answer to Bramhall, p. 6 (English Works, vol. 4, p. 287)). 147. Hobbes herewith attacks both enthusiastic and Catholic claims, which were also

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pretation of the word of God; the chief judge of the rectitude of all such interpretation is the head of the church; and the civil sovereign is the head of the church'. Therefore, to obey the sovereign’s «laws and public edicts, is not to

disobey, but to obey God»! Hobbes differs from others who react to enthusiasts and their followers not only in the remedy he proposes, but also in his identification of the disorder. As Christopher Hill has shown in several studies, the usual reaction to enthusi-

asm in England after 1640 was to a great extent against the presumptuous assertion of authority by the lower classes. The most forceful reactions in the 1640s and in the 1660s were typically from those who identified with both the royal party and the Church of England! Jasper Mayne, for example, the chaplain to the earl of Newcastle, is troubled by the same problem that so disturbs Hobbes. Have not men beene taught that they cannot give God his due, if they give Cesar his? [...] And have not the Teachers of these strange, unchristian Doctrines, delivered the flanking threats to the Church of England. Catholics were quick to characterize Protestantism as inherently enthusiastic. So Philip Scot castigates Protestants in general, and Socinians in particular, as «Enthusiasts» who rely solely on «their impetuous imaginary instinct, and private spirit: or what is the same, their particular ratiocination»; he approves, however, of Hobbes’s condemnation of such private judgment, concluding that «he speaks more reason, then any others of these new ones» (A Treatise of the Schism of England. Wherein particularly Mr. Hales and Mr. Hobbs are modestly accosted (Amsterdam [London?], 1650), p. 141). And Burton admits that an overzealous opposition to Rome and Antichrist weakens obedience even without linking them to the present government, for it leads to admitting of «no discipline, no ceremonies, but what they invent themselves» — in short, to the enthusiastic opposition to all authority (The Anatomy ofMelancholy, vol. 3, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda L. Blair (Oxford, 1997), 3.4.1.3, p. 387). On the other hand, Catholics were themselves subject to the charge of enthusiasm because of their reliance on non-scriptural traditions (cf. Spanheim, Englands VVarning by Germanies

Woe, p. 29).

148. Behemoth, p. 53, where Hobbes gives the chain of argument in summary form. Especially after 1650, Hobbes sometimes skips the step about the head of the church, arguing immediately that the sovereign is the only legitimate interpreter of the word of God. 149. From

the late

1640s

until the restoration,

the concerned

parties differed

as the

holders of power differed. Just as apocalyptic and astrological discourse that had worked against the royal party was turned against parliament and then against Cromwell, so it was with enthusiastic discourse. Already in 1646, parliament had ordered publication of a trans-

lation of Spanheim’s work on Thomas Muntzer and the peasant revolt. Spanheim laments «that the authority of Ecclesiasticall order was weakned, by the licentiousnesse of Enthusiasts, venting their own dreams and inventions», and that religious choices were «committed to the rude multitude; the sacred keyes also, which ought to be born by the representative church» were «exposed to the pleasure of every one, and so a kind of Anarchy & intollerable disorder brought into the House of God» and into the commonwealth (Englands VVarning by Germanies Woe, p. 45). In the history of enthusiasm and antinomianism, a recurring theme is that those who are accused of it when challenging authority accuse others of it when they have won a measure of authority. Luther’s debates with his radical followers provide one example, the 1637 Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at the Court at Newton another.

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them to the people in the holy stile of Prophets’? Have they not called a most unnatu-

rall, civill Warre, the burden of the Lord ?!°°.

In identifying these teachers, Mayne’s contempt is representative of the hostility of the clergy and nobility: Teachers so obscure, so bred to manuall Occupations, Teachers so sprung up from the basest of the people. Lastly, Teachers so accustomed to the Trewell, Forge, and Anvill, that I almost blush to name them in the Pulpit. ’Tis not now said, we are ofPaul, And we are of Apollos; But we are of Wat Tyler; We are of Jacke Cade; We are of Alexan-

der the Coporsmith; We are of Tom the Mason; and we are of Dicke the Gelder!!.

Hobbes, by contrast, wields the charge of enthusiasm against the clergymen themselves: A minister ought not to think that his skill in the Latin, Greek, or Hebrew tongues, if : he have any, gives him a privilege to impose upon all his fellow subjects his own sense, or what he pretends to be his sense, of every obscure place of Scripture: nor ought he [...] think he had it by inspiration: for he cannot be assured of that; no, nor that his interpretation, as fine as he thinks it, is not false: and then all this stubbornness and contumacy toward the King and his laws, is nothing but pride of heart and ambition, or

else imposture!*?. Although Hobbes does express concern for the situation in which «every man, nay, every boy and wench [...] thought they spoke with God Almighty, and understood what he said», he is chiefly preoccupied by how this thought

was propagated, or by enthusiasts with a following!>>. It is because of their captive audience that those who pretend from the pulpit to be divinely inspired are especially threatening. Whereas churchmen often attack enthusi-

150. A Sermon against False Prophets, p. 33. 151. A Sermon against Schisme, p. 10. Cf. [Jasper Mayne], A Sermon Concerning Unity & Agreement. Preached at Carfax Chvrch in Oxford, August 9. 1646 ([Oxford], 1646). Cf. also Leviathan 47.20, p. 385. 152. Behemoth, p. 53. Hobbes’s usual target when criticizing enthusiasm is the clergy, though sometimes he singles out the learned and sometimes the unlearned. So in Leviathan 29.8 (p. 169), Hobbes says that «the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evill; or to make Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired, to the Dissolution of all Civill Government» has arisen «chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned Divines; who joyning the words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot stand together». Hobbes criticizes the clergymen both for claiming inspiration themselves, and for encouraging their congregations to do the same. So he says that the Presbyterian ministers furthered their «ambitious plot [...] to raise sedition against the state [...] by preaching up an opinion that men were to be assured of their salvation by the testimony of their own private spirit» (Behemoth, pp. 24-5). 153. Behemoth, p. 21. Conversely, Mayne is worried about the influence of seditious preachers: cf. A Sermon against False Prophets, pp. 26, 33, 37. The difference of emphasis is nonetheless notable.

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asm for compromising their independent spiritual authority, Hobbes encourages individual scepticism of such pretended authority unless it is sanctioned by the sovereign. In Hobbes’s 1650 Answer to Davenant, he says of «our Divines» that they have «had the name of Prophets; Excercised amongst the People a kind of spirituall Authority; would be thought to speake by a divine spirit; have their workes [...] passe for the word of God, and not of man; and

to be hearkened to with reverence». Hobbes reprehends them for this, ridiculing anyone who, «enabled to speake wisely from the principles of nature, and his owne meditation, loves rather to be thought to speake by inspiration, like

a Bagpipe»+. Many critics of enthusiasm, including Casaubon and More, follow Burton in focussing on the psychology and physical pathology of the enthusiast,

demonstrating that his condition is one of disease or madness!*, Hobbes, however, is above all concerned to confine this disease, to cut off the enthusiast from anyone else who could be adversely influenced. He argues that it is absurd for someone to require us to recognize as divine law that which has been delivered to him by private inspiration, as the same kind of authority can be adduced for a contradictory law: if every man should be obliged, to take for Gods Law, what particular men, on pretence of private Inspiration, or Revelation, should obtrude upon him, (in such a number of men, that out of pride, and ignorance, take their own Dreams, and extravagant Fancies, and Madnesse, for testimonies of Gods Spirit; or out of ambition, pretend to such Divine testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their own consciences,) it were im-

possible that any Divine Law should be acknowledged!$f. A requirement delivered by private inspiration, therefore, «obliges onely him,

to whom in particular God hath been pleased to reveale it»'>’. The enthusiast is hereby isolated, stripped of the legitimate support of others. Hobbes provides further arguments to compromise the authority of the enthusiast. He argues against enthusiasm in the strong sense of possession, deny154. Sir William Davenant’s Gondibert, ed. David F. Gladish (Oxford,

1971), pp. 48,

49. Hobbes defines inspiration in Leviathan 34.25 (p. 214) as, properly speaking, «nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and subtile aire, or wind, in such manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath». 155. See also Sedgwick, A Sermon, Preached...May Ist, 1653, esp. pp. 5-6. The position that apparent possession can be a product of melancholy or mental illness was considered earlier by Nicole Oresme, Girolamo Cardano, Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, Ludwig Lavater, Johann Weyer, and Reginald Scot. Cf. note 172, below. 156. Leviathan 33.24, p. 205. In 8.21, p. 36, Hobbes asserts that the claim ofinspiration reveals that the claimant is mad; though none of them are particularly attractive, he here admits of other sources of or motivations for such a claim. 157. Leviathan 33.24, p. 205; cf. 26.39, pp. 148-9 (and especially the Latin version of this passage, pp. 135-6 of 1670 edn.). Frederick C. Beiser lays out similar arguments made by anti-enthusiasts, which force one who claims revelation to choose «either a nonrational but private religion, or a public but rational one», in The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ, 1996), pp. 210-13.

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ing that the «Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God

spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream»!°*. He even argues that divine inspiration is not the «supernaturall entring of the Holy Ghost into a man», but the «acquisition of Gods graces, by doctrine, and study». Otherwise we should worship those who are inspired as embodying God, but this would be idolatrous; even «the Apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped»! If faith and sanctity were to be attained by supernatural inspiration or infusion rather than by study and reason, then one would not be required to render a reason for his faith, every Christian would be a prophet, and each man would not need to «take the Law of his Country, rather than his

own Inspiration, for the rule of his action»!°%. Most importantly, he relies on arguments that we owe obedience to our sovereign before any professed enthusiast, and that we should not accept a claim to divinity without sufficient reason. The crucial question, then, is what is to count as sufficient reason. As we saw above, Hobbes argues that those who pretend to be prophets «ought to be examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience»!'®!. This suggests that each individual should be sceptical of one who claims enthusiasm or the gift of prophecy (though if the claimant is sovereign, the scepticism should not be public). Hobbes relies here on 1 John 4:1, a verse he quotes several times, using it in De cive to uphold the authority of the church to examine the claims of prophets and teachers to be inspired by the Holy Spirit!9?. As he holds that the sovereign is the head of the church, Hobbes proceeds to argue in Leviathan that unless we have directly experienced divine revelation, we are to accept the sovereign’s examination of spirits and doctrines!®*. Nonetheless, he

also seems to take the verse as a call to use our own reason'™. If the person who requires obedience on the basis of inspiration is sovereign, our belief or disbelief in his inspiration is irrelevant to the obedience we owe anyway. If he is not sovereign, then Hobbes wants to undercut such a requirement in two ways: first, by arguing that we must accept the sovereign’s decree on the matter; second, by pressing us to employ reason, and then providing arguments for why we never have good reason to accept a claim of inspiration as requiring our obedience'®. Hobbes even uses the verse to show that scripture requires us

158. Leviathan 8.25, p. 38, emphases added. 159. Leviathan 45.25, p. 361. 160. Leviathan 29.8, p. 169: Hobbes evidently thinks that these have the force of reduc-

tios. 161. Leviathan 36.19, p. 230. 162. De cive 17.24. Michael Heyd says of this verse that it «was the standard battle cry in the struggle against the enthusiasts» from Luther in 1522 through the early eighteenth century («Be Sober and Reasonable»: The Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries (Leiden, 1995), p. 23). 163. Leviathan 43.6, p. 323. 164. Leviathan 46.41, p. 379; cf. Elements 11.7. 165. If the sovereign requires us to accept a claim that we cannot reasonably accept, we

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to question the requirements of our pastors unless they are from the sovereign pastor: they that are bound to obey their Pastors, have no power to examine their commands. What then shall wee say to St. John who bids us (1 Epist. chap. 4. ver. 1.) Not to beleeve every Spirit, but to try the Spirits whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone out into the world? It is therefore manifest, that wee may dispute the Doctrine of our Pastors; but no man can dispute a Law'®.

Hobbes emphasizes the examination of the prophets by reason, both insofar as we can apply our natural reason and insofar as we have reason to invoke sovereign dictate to stand in for right reason. Despite sometimes casting inspiration in terms of reason, however, Hobbes does not simply deny that there can be supernatural revelation!9”. Instead, he makes it a matter of political irrelevance, as only one person can be bound by it. «As for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation, or Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given, because God speaketh not

in that manner, but to particular persons, and to divers men divers things»!98. Nor does he leave the individual enthusiast in peace. On the one hand, he tries

are to accept it publicly despite our belief in its falsity. Hobbes aims to pre-empt cases in

which the sovereign requires us publicly to accept a claim that we reasonably reject by counseling the sovereign that such requirements are imprudent; but such imprudence is irrelevant to our obligation. 166. Leviathan 42.109, p. 310. Hobbes (Answer to Bramhall, p. 60, Questions, p. 215 (English Works, vol. 4, p. 328; vol. 5, p. 270)) sees the verse as at once compatible with the sovereign’s sole authority to determine whether or not the doctrines of professed prophets shall be taught publicly, and with each person’s right to judge whether the prophet is a true one. Although he argues that everyone «is bound to make use of his Naturall Reason, to apply to all Prophecy those Rules which God hath given us, to discern the true from the false» (Leviathan 36.20, p. 231), this individual judgment is constrained both by its limitation to belief and by the insistence that one can only be a true prophet if his teachings do not contradict the established religion (Leviathan 32.7, p. 197). «By which it is manifest, that no Subject ought to pretend to Prophecy, or to the Spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by him, whom God hath set in the place of Moses», i.e., by the sovereign (Leviathan 40.8, pp. 252-3). 167. Nonetheless, his references to supernatural inspiration do prompt a reader to wonder about his belief in it. For example, in Concerning Body 1.8, Hobbes says that philosophy «excludes all such Knowledge as is acquired by Divine Inspiration, or Revelation, as not derived to us by Reason, but by Divine grace in an instant, and as it were by some sense supernaturall». Such a sense is not one that Hobbes recognizes in his analyses of sense, and he generally seems to suggest that we have no reason to believe in inspiration, and that if it is above reason it is incomprehensible. 168. Leviathan 31.3, p. 187. The Latin version runs: «And supernatural sensation, since it is nothing other than Revelation made to a particular man, obliges only him to whom it is

made» (p. 167: «Sensus autem supernaturalis, cum sit nihil aliud, quam Revelatio homini singulari facta, illum solum obligat, cui facta est»). The upshot of Hobbes’s analysis of the word of God is that however God may speak to a man, we are never obliged to believe that he has done so (Leviathan 32.5-6, p. 196).

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to deliver a knockout blow to all contemporary prophecy by appealing to the Protestant doctrine that miracles have ceased, while making miracles a neces-

sary sign of true prophecy, thus concluding that there are no more prophets®”. On the other, he argues on independent grounds that those who claim enthusiasm are mad, mistaken, or deceiving. Each of these conditions is taken to be naturally explicable. As we saw above, imposture of divinity is a natural strategy of domination. Delusion is to be explained by mental disease or by mistake — typically, mistaking one’s dream for waking experience. Prophets with followers are much more of a threat to political order than individual madmen or fools; but one way to defuse the threat is to show potential followers that pretended prophets, when they are not charlatans, are mere madmen or fools. Hobbes explains that we would recognize as madmen even those in both the Old and New Testaments who are considered prophets, demoniacs, or sub-

ject to enthusiasm or possession by a spirit?. And he maintains that those in the civil war who «pretended the Spirit, and New Light» were «Phanaticks»:

«And what is a Phanatick but a Madman?»!"! Like Casaubon and More after him, Hobbes thinks that enthusiasm can be the result of a kind of disease or

madness caused by physiological factors'’”. And the insane who have heard or

169. Passages in which Hobbes maintains the cessation of miracles include Elements 26.11; Leviathan 32.9 (p. 198) and 45.9 (p. 356); De homine 14.4; Answer to Bramhall, p. 57 (English Works, vol. 4, pp. 326-7); and Historia Ecclesiastica, p. 61, line 1311. For an

outline of the doctrine, see D. P. Walker, «The Cessation of Miracles», in Ingrid Merkell and Allen G. Debus, eds., Hermeticism and the Renaissance: Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe (Washington, DC, 1988). Passages in which Hobbes gives performance of a miracle as a necessary condition for being a true prophet include De cive

16.11, and Leviathan 12.28 (p. 59) and 32.7-8 (pp. 197-8). In Leviathan 32.9, p. 198, Hobbes concludes: «Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private man». We can deduce all divine and human duties, «without Enthusiasme, or supernatural! Inspiration», from scripture: «Miracles ceasing, Prophets cease, and the Scripture supplies their place». 170. Leviathan 8.25-6, pp. 37-9; cf. 34.3 (p. 208) and 45.4 (p. 353). 171. Answer to Bramhall, p. 59 (English Works, vol. 4, p. 328); cf. Historia Ecclesiastica, p. 3, line 49.

172. Beiser (The Sovereignty of Reason, p. 207) argues that «Hobbes sees enthusiasm as a form of madness that springs from excessive passions like vainglory or melancholy. But he lays no stress upon physiological factors». Rather, «the ultimate source of enthusiasm, Hobbes is convinced, is the same as that for all human actions: the desire for power. Whether he is aware of it or not, the enthusiast attempts to dominate people». Hobbes, however, distinguishes himself from the Aristotelian Problems, Burton’s Anatomy, and those who follow them, by opposing enthusiasm to melancholy (cf. Elements 10.9-11); he does emphasize physiological causes of belief in enthusiasm, especially such belief that derives from dreams; and it is not clear that he argues that the enthusiasm that arises from madness

or mistake can be understood as an attempt to dominate. In some ways, Hobbes is more inclined to physiological reduction: Burton, Casaubon, and More at some point admit the possibility of enthusiasm

from demonic

possession or the influence of the devil, whereas

Hobbes not only explains dreams, angels, and inspiration in terms of a mechanistic psychology, he also says that «Daemons [...] are but Idols, or Phantasms of the braine, without

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read scripture proclaim meaningless strings of sacred words, which seem divine to the ignorant: «for one who has no reason, and whose speech appears divine, will necessarily be thought to be divinely inspired»!”. Such a reputation should dissolve once the ignorant are informed about

the natural causes of the enthusiast’s condition'’*. Although the belief in the divine authority of the enthusiast should be eliminated by reason, the imitative propagation of the conviction may require other measures. Hobbes characterizes enthusiasm as a disease not only because of its source, but also because of the way in which it spreads. He looks back on what he identifies as the outbreak in 1640, «when an amazing Disease beset the Country, from which countless wise Men later died. Whoever was touched by this disease supposed that divine and human right were known by himself alone. And

now War stood in readiness»!’>. Enthusiasm is not simply madness, it is a contagious madness. Burton observes:

Considering «Prophets, Enthusiasts, and Impostors»,

«he that is bitten with a mad dog bites others, and all in

the end become mad, either out of affection of novelty, simplicity, blind zeale, hope, and feare, the giddy headed multitude will imbrace it, and with-

out farther examination approve it»'’®. Some kind of quarantine is required if war is to be avoided. If reason does not work, the only hope is to play on a countervailing passion'’’. Labeling a potential leader as mad may be effective on both counts. Not least, Hobbes makes clear that the madness of the enthusiast need not be a morally neutral medical case, for its probable origin

any reall nature of their own, distinct from humane fancy» (Leviathan 44.3, p. 334; cf. 45.2,

pp. 352-3), and holds that by the devil was meant a disease, as frenzy, madness, or lunacy (Leviathan 45.4-5, pp. 353-4; cf. 38.12-13, p. 244). The belief in possession or enthusiasm is to be explained by the common «want of curiosity to search naturall causes» (Leviathan

8.25, p. 38).

173. De cive 12.6: «cuius enim ratio nulla, oratio diuina apparet, is necessariò diuinitus videbitur inspiratus». This concern is absent from the parallel section of the Elements, whereas here it illustrates the «seditious opinion» — which receives still greater attention in Leviathan — that faith and holiness are only to be had by supernatural infusion or inspiration. 174. Hobbes consistently uses the naturalistic explanations of enthusiasm to debunk it, whereas others who provide them sometimes do so to explain true prophetic abilities. Cf. the Aristotelian Problems (30.1, 954a) and Of Prophesying by Dreams; Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, vol. 1, ed. Faulkner, Kiessling, and Blair (Oxford, 1989), 1.3.1.3, p. 400; and Casaubon, Treatise Concerning Enthusiasme, p. 31. 175. Lines 19-23 of the verse Vita (cf. Leviathan 29.6, p. 168): Cùm Patriam invasit Morbus mirabilis, unde

Innumeri docti post periére Viri. Quo quicunq; fuit tactus, divina putabat Atq; humana uni cognita jura tibi. Jimque in praecinctu Bellum stetit. 176. Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, vol. 3, p. 383 (3.4.1.3). Cf. Mayne, Part of Lucian Made English, p. 20.

177. Cf. Hobbes’s report (Leviathan 8.25, p. 37) of the method used to cure the madness of the Milesian maidens.

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is his vehement pride or self-conceit, which is a violation of the law of na-

ture!”®,

A claim of «private Inspiration, or Revelation» may arise from those who, «out of pride, and ignorance, take their own Dreams, and extravagant Fancies

[...] for testimonies of Gods Spirit»'”’. To be divinely inspired is to have the spirit of God, which can mean «the gift of Prediction by Dreams and Visions»; and Hobbes numbers prognostication by dreams as one of the forms of sup-

posed divination in its own right'*. Hobbes makes clear that the origins of dreams are physiological: «And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams. And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreames of Feare», and so forth!#!. Although they can be explained naturally, dreams lack coherence: «our Phantasmes [...] appear to us without any order at all» in dreams, where thoughts are «impertinent one to another»'*”. Hobbes thus reduces natural dreams to meaninglessness. And he reduces much of the religious worldview — including angels, the Holy Spirit, and the voice of God — to dreams or visions (which are dreams that we mistake for waking experience)!#. He allows, however, that there can be supernatural

dreams!**, and even contends that God «spake alwaies by a Vision, or by a Dream»'®. The word of God in its proper sense (that is, as communicated to

178. Leviathan 8.17-22, pp. 35-6; 15.21, p. 77. 179. Leviathan 33.24, p. 205. It was common to regard enthusiasts as those who prophesy by dreams; cf. note 125, above. 180. Leviathan 34.8-9, p. 209 (quotation from marginal summary); 12.19, p. 56. Hobbes is less concerned by dream interpretation as an independent form of divination than by claims of religious visionaries; he aims to compromise the greater contemporary authority of the latter by reducing it to the former, dismissal of which was common in the renaissance. For example, Agrippa essentially refers his readers to Cicero’s criticisms in De divinatione as decisive against «Oniriocritica», and says that in the many books on the subject «there is nothinge but meere dreames writen of dreames» (Of the Vanitie and vncertaintie, fol. 53r). (After a discussion of astrology, Cicero turns in De divinatione II 48-72 to a critical scrutiny of frenzy or enthusiasm and divination by dreams.) 181. Leviathan 2.6, p. 6. 182. Concerning Body 25.9; Leviathan 3.3, p. 9. Cf. John Donne’s comparison of dreams to «rude heaps of Immaterial-inchoherent drossie-rubbish-stuffe, promiscuously thrust up together» (Paradoxes, Problemes, Essayes, Characters... (London, 1652), p. 70). The ideas that dreams have natural causes and that they are hopelessly confused can be found together in Giovanni Battista Della Porta, Magiae naturalis siue de miraculis rerum naturalium (Naples, 1558); and in Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft, Book 10. 183. Angels: Leviathan 34.16, p. 211; Holy Spirit: Leviathan 34.25, pp. 214-15; voice of God: Leviathan, «A Review, and Conclusion», par. 12, pp. 393-4; visions: Leviathan 82:06 p 4190: 184. E.g., at Leviathan 34.9, p. 209. 185. Leviathan 36.10, p. 227, emphasis added. Hobbes limits this claim to «after the time of Moses». In «A Review, and Conclusion», par. 12 (pp. 393-4), however, he appears to drop the restriction, interpreting «the praeeminence of the manner of Gods speaking to Moses» as consisting only «in the cleernesse of the Vision» (cf. Leviathan 36.11, 13 (pp.

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true prophets) turns out to be tantamount to «the imaginations which they had

in their sleep, or in an Extasie»!5°. This is made even more problematic by the fact that false prophets can dream that they have received God’s word, and that they can feign such dreams. The problem of criteria of judgment about dreams would not have escaped Hobbes, one of the original objectors to the Meditations of Descartes. Hobbes is unequivocal that one need not believe that God appeared to someone else. And if the word of God can only appear in a dream, then one cannot even have

sufficient warrant for the belief that God appeared to oneself!*. To make a prophet tantamount to someone to whom God speaks in a dream is to dismantle his authority, for it is to have no guarantee of his reliability. To say that he [viz., God] hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no more then to say he

hath dreamt that God spake to him; which is not of force to win beleef from any man [...] To say he hath seen a Vision, or heard a Voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking [...] as not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by supernaturall Inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which hee can alledge no naturall and sufficient

reason’®S.

If a supernatural dream is just a dream of the supernatural, it confers no authority'*®. Reputations of divinity or divine favor often stem from a confusion 227-8), and note 141, above). If the word of God is but a dream, it seems that all of revealed religion may rest on illusory foundations. As the figure of Fridericus says in Bodin’s Colloquium heptaplomeres: «If we reduce the apex of our religion and salvation to idle dreams, religions are done for» (Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime, Marion

Leathers

Daniels Kuntz, tr. and ed. (Princeton, NJ, 1975), p. 182). John Smith is

one who both reduces prophecy to the word of God as given in a dream or vision, and attempts to show «the difference of the true Prophetical spirit from all Enthusiastical imposture». But he concludes, with Maimonides, that «all Prophesie makes it self known to the Prophet that it is Prophesie indeed» (Select Discourses... (London, 1660), p. 208): the only criterion is one available to the dreamer as he dreams. 186. Leviathan 36.11, p. 227. 187. Cf. Leviathan 27.20, p. 156; and Behemoth, p. 53: «nor ought he [...] think he had it by inspiration: for he cannot be assured of that». «For a man, without certain evidence, to think himself inspired» is a form of the madness of spiritual pride, differing only in degree from one who claims to be Christ (Elements 10.10). 188. Leviathan 32.6, p. 196. In 36.12, p. 228, Hobbes provides a somewhat different account of prophets who speak «by the Spirit, or Inspiration»: this is simply the same, he assures us, as a prophet who has a dream or vision. In reducing a vision to a dream that one does not recognize as such, Hobbes transforms the boast of a divine vision into a confession of both ignorance and a guilty conscience: cf. Leviathan 2.7-8, pp. 6-7; Concerning Body DID 189. Cf. Cicero, De divinatione I 68, on Alexander’ s dream that a snake spoke to him; and Leviathan 7.7, p. 32: «If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy». This is part of Hobbes’s argument that when we believe that God said or did something, we are really believing in the people who relate this to us, and so our faith is not in God, but in those people. Because any word of God requires an interpreter, the faith on which religious belief is based is faith in that interpreter.

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of the imaginations of a dream with things real and substantial. Religions have mostly arisen from the «ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from Vision and Sense», from mistaking «apparitions» in dreams which «are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy» for «reall, and externall Substances»!°°. Those who claim a holy vision, divine revelation, or in-

spiration are revealed as, at best, deluded dreamers’”'. Even in a supernatural dream, what appears as divinity does not reliably represent divinity at all. «Visions, and Dreams, whether naturall or supernaturall, are but Phantasmes: and

he that painteth an Image of any of them, maketh not an Image of God, but of

his own Phantasm»!”’. In 1640s Paris, philosophers were wrestling with the sceptical challenge of distinguishing dreams from waking reality. Hobbes had engaged in this debate, but grew more concerned with those who did mistake their dreams for reality, and especially with those who mistook the dreams of others to be real. Religious visions are only someone’s phantasms, but if they are not recognized as such, they are capable of causing civil destruction'”’. Hobbes is a materialist acutely aware of the power of illusions to have material conse-

quences". The false belief that something unreal is real can lead to real effects, including war. For example, the power of the Pope outside of Rome «consisteth

190. Leviathan 2.8, p. 7; 12.7, p. 53. This mistake is not only responsible for «the greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past [...] and now adayes the opinion that rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches» (Leviathan

2.8, p. 7; cf. Concerning Body 25.9 and Historia Ecclesiastica p. 66, lines 1425-34); it is also found from the beginning of Christianity. Speaking of the time of the early church, Hobbes says that «Phantasms were taken then, and have been ever since, by unlearned and superstitious men, for things real and subsistent» (An Historical Narration Concerning Heresie, and the Punishment thereof (London, 1680), p. 5). Cf. Leviathan 34.17-18, 20 (pp. 211-12). Whereas in Leviathan 2.8, p. 7, Hobbes explains witchcraft as the mistaking of dreams for reality, in 12.19, p. 56, he says that of «the Prognostiques of time to come [...] the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference with the dead [...] is but juggling and confederate knavery»; and in 37.10, p. 236, he concludes that witchcraft is due to both «Imposture, and delusion». The topic of witchcraft is closely related to the foregoing issues of this essay, including possession, Antichrist, astrology, and prophecy. For analysis of some of these relations, see Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford, 1997).

191. Cf. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 130: «Most of the “visions” and “revelations” which were so common during the Interregnum were probably what we should call dreams». 192. Leviathan 45.31, pp. 363-4. 193. Cf. Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson, foll. 39v-40r: «we must be diligent in weeding vp the causes of debate and strife within the Church, as diuersity in dreames, which would neuer haue an ende, if it were free for euery prating iacke to controule the Maiestrate, vpon pretence of reuelation». 194. On the centrality of this theme in Hobbes, see S. A. Lloyd, Ideals as interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan: The power of mind over matter (Cambridge, 1992).

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onely in the Fear that Seduced people stand in, of their Excommunication; upon hearing of false Miracles, false Traditions, and false Interpretations of

the Scripture»!”. Demonstrating their falsity destroys the belief, and obviates the effect. Such an intention to expose and enfeeble illusion can be seen, for example, when Wharton writes in 1647 of Lilly’s Merlinus Anglicus that it is «no better than a meer Scarcrow purposely devised to deter His Majesties

Friends from any longer adhering to him»'*®. Mayne’s concern «that yes, and fictions, and things that are not, shall bring to nought Realityes, and Truths, and things that are», reverberates throughout the civil war and its after-

math!?’, One of Hobbes’s strategies to devalue religious dreams and visions is, similarly, to argue that they are merely human fancies. He does not rely only on enlightenment, however, adding that those who do not realize this can be punished despite their ignorance. Fear of serious harm normally justifies the actions based on it, but only if it is justified fear, whereas fear of spirits is unjustified. A man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange Dreams and Visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit, is contrary to the Lawes; And that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime.

[...] he that presumes to

break the Law upon his own, or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth, leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own, or another private mans brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man should have leave to do [...] there could no Law be made to hold, and so

all Common-wealth would be dissolved!”*. The threats and promises of prophecies are based on deceptions or phantasms; and if «the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall», it is a crime to

attempt to avoid it by breaking the law!’’. Hobbes repeatedly emphasizes that the capacity for subjects to incite civil discord will otherwise be insurmountable.

195. Leviathan 47.33, p. 387. 196. The Works of George Wharton, ed. John Gadbury (London, 1683), p. 296. 197. A Sermon against False Prophets, p. 32; cf. p. 20, and A Sermon against Schisme, pp. 21-2. 198. Leviathan 27.20, pp. 155-6. 199. Leviathan 27.20, p. 155. Potential political consequences thus require a distinction that would be difficult to sustain on independent grounds. On the one hand, this raises questions about the culpability of those who act from fear of spirits in situations where such a fear is justified (given the information available, etc.); on the other, it raises questions about why actions are justified if they proceed from «Bodily Fear» (loc. cit.) in a situation where the commonwealth would be compromised were everyone allowed to aci therefrom.

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5. Self-fulfilling philosophy

Hobbes tries to discredit prophecy because he believes that it readily leads to disobedience and civil war. If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they

are for civill Obedience”. Looking back after the restoration at those who pretended inspiration, Hobbes makes clear that nothing «can be more pernicious to Peace than the Revela-

tions that were by these Phanaticks pretended»?!. Many of Hobbes’s predecessors had reached similar conclusions about the terrible political impact of prognosticators. Agrippa states that «there is no kinde of men more pestilent to the publike wealth, then these»?”?. Northampton complains that pretended prophecies «are perillous to the peace and quiet of a Commonwealth; the persons which professe them, are for the most part Infesti regibus»*®. And Burton warns against those who accept «No discipline, no ceremonies, but [...] such as their owne phantasticall spirits dictate»: «Some of them turne Prophets, have secret revelations»; «some of them are so far gone with their private Enthusiasmes, and revelations, that they are quite madde»; some call into question «Princes, civill magistrates, & their authorities, as Anabaptists, will doe

all their own private spirit dictates, and nothing else»?

In 1646, Mayne

laments the «many strange Prophets, of our wild, licentious times», who «have

preacht up almost five yeares Commotion for a Holy warre»?®®. The political authorities had long recognized the dangers. As Calvin remarked, in the Jewish state astrology was a capital crime; and Roman law was

often as harsh7°°. There were at least nine orders for the expulsion of astrologers and other fortune tellers from Rome, and at other times such activi-

ties were prohibited altogether, violations being punishable by death?”’. «It was often given out as an Edict», relates Thomas Bromhall, paraphrasing an incident from Suetonius, «That whosoever either privately or publickly did

200. Leviathan 2.8, pp. 7-8. 201. Answer to Bramhall, p. 59 (English Works, vol. 4, p. 328).

202. Agrippa, Of the Vanitie and vncertaintie, fol. 46v. 203. Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson, sig. A7r; cf. chap. 5 (foll. 18v25r) on the impropriety and danger of political prophecy. 204. Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, vol. 3, p. 387 (3.4.1.3). 205. Mayne, A Sermon against False Prophets, pp. 14-15. 206. Calvin, Advertissement contre l'astrologie, p. 98. For Roman laws, see e.g., Codex lustinianus IX xviii 2 ff. and Codex Theodosianus IX xvi 4, 8, 12. 207. See David Potter, Prophets and Emperors: Human and Divine Authority from Augustus to Theodosius (Cambridge, MA, 1994), esp. pp. 171-82. This now must be weighed with the argument of Marie Theres Fügen, Die Enteignung der Wahrsager. Studien zum kaiserlichen Wissensmonopol in der Spätantike (Frankfurt, 1997).

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predict or foretell the death of any man, should suffer death»? «Finding how dangerous they haue bin euer to the state of a Common-wealth», Northampton reports from Tacitus, Tiberius dealt with prophets by asking their opinion «on

the top of a steepe Rocke bending to the sea»? During the middle ages, it was illegal in England to predict the death of the king by any form of divination; by 1581 it had been made a statutory felony even to cast the ruler’s nativ-

ity?!°. Laws limiting or prohibiting prophecy were common

in England

throughout Hobbes’s lifetime, as they were on the Continent; often their explicit aim was to prevent rebellion?!!. The monopoly of the Company of Stationers granted by James in 1603 stipulated that «all conjurers and framers of almanacs and prophecies exceeding the limits of allowable astrology shall be punished severely in their persons», setting up a system of censorship to ensure the efficacy of the prohibition?'’. However, official censorship broke down with the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in July 1641; and in June 1643, parliament appointed Lilly’s ally John Booker as official licenser of

books on mathematics, almanacs, and prognostications?!3. Lilly recognized that his activities were still officially restricted?!4*. For example, he acknowledges that it was illegal to handle the nativity chart of the king, and (falsely)

asserts that neither he nor Booker had done so7!. The prophets were naturally eager to point out the potential political benefits of their activities. Lilly, for one, argued that his predictions of trouble for the king and his party should be taken as helpful warnings, whereas Wharton maintained that his predictions of disaster for the rebels showed them the importance of changing their course?!°. Predictions of negative events were seen

208. Bromhall, A Treatise of Specters. Or, an History of Apparitions, Oracles, Prophecies, and Predictions,

with Dreams,

Visions, and Revelations... (London,

1658), p. 222.

209. Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson, fol. 103r. Cf. foll. 103r-104v for

examples of laws against and punishments of prognosticators; cf. also Gianfrancesco Pico, Opera omnia, vol. 2, pp. 546-58. 210. Hilary M. Carey, «Astrology at the English court in the later middle ages», in Patrick Curry, ed., Astrology, science, and society: historical essays (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1987), p. 50; Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 344. 211. Henry Rusche gives a brief account of a number of such laws passed against prophesying from the reign of Henry IV to that of Elizabeth («Prophecies and propaganda», pp. 753-4, n. 2). Germana Ernst summarizes a number of papal bulls from the 1630s with a similar aim («Astrology, religion and politics in Counter-Reformation Rome», in Stephen Pumfrey, Paolo L. Rossi, and Maurice Slawinski, eds., Science, culture and popular belief in Renaissance Europe (Manchester, 1991, pp. 249-73). 212. Curry, Prophecy and Power, p. 20. 213. Walter Wilson Greg, Some Aspects and Problems of London Publishing Between

1550 and 1650 (Oxford, 1956), pp. 13-14. 214. Lilly, Englands Propheticall Merline, sigg. b2v-b3r and b4v; Anglicus, Peace, or no Peace, sig. A4v. 215. Lilly, Postscript, sig. *v. He later admits that in the 1645 Anglicus he did make use of the king’s nativity in forecasting his defeat (Mr. William Lilly’s History, p. 46). 216. E.g., Lilly, The Starry Messenger, sigg. *v and A2r-v; Wharton, Astrologicall Jvdgement, sig. X4V.

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to allow for positive effects?!’. Correspondingly, it was alleged that positive

predictions could result in negative effects: so Lilly argues that Wharton damaged the king and his followers by «singing to them his Sirenian songs, and soothing them on with lies to their destruction»?!*. Agrippa argues that prophesied success causes complacency and failure. Those who confide in judicial astrologers «become of all menne the moste vnhappie [...] and to whome the Astrologers haue promised all ioyefull thinges, all haue chaunced sorrowful»?!°. While others point out that prophets tend to prophesy success to the powerful in order to gain, Gassendi emphasizes the avidity of the powerful for positive predictions: «we observe Great Persons generally much to favour Diviners, and to embrace with all greediness the very dreams of such, as seem to promise them a continuance, or encrease of their Grandure». Like Agrippa, he provides a list of examples to show that «no Princes have been so unhappy, as those who most confided in the predictions of Astrologers, that promised them rare and singular felicities»??. Hobbes’s particular concern is with those prophecies that produce the result they predict. Both positive and negative effects can proceed from their prediction (and whether such self-verifying predictions are positive or negative will often be a matter of circumstance or judgment). Nonetheless, there was a

widespread view that soothsayers were doomsayers. As John Oldmixon said about a prophet who was thought to have foretold the civil wars and the execution of Charles I, «Prophets are generally for Raw-Head and Bloody-Bones [...] these Sooth-Sayers are great Butchers, and every Hall is with them a Slaughter-House»??!, In John Aubrey’s chapter of Miscellanies on «secondsighted persons», two people gifted with foresight answer the question whether «the Objects of this Knowledge, be sad and dismal Events only; such 217. Cf. Browne, Religio Medici, p. 30 (I 31): «those many prodigies and ominous prognostickes which fore-run the ruines of States, Princes, and private persons, are the charitable premonitions of good Angels». The cautionary value of prophecy requires that the predicted event not be inevitable. «If the Heavens be averse», Lilly says, «more caution must be had, and fit election of times framed, to contradict and weaken the malevolent in-

fluence» (Anglicus, Peace, or no Peace. 1645. A Probable Conjecture of the state of England... (London, 1645), p. 9). The determinist Hobbes would have sympathized with

Gassendi’s rejection of this middle ground: «Nor can Astrologers excuse themselves by saying, that such unhappy misfortunes Presignified by the starrs; and being fore-known, may be avoided. For, it is plain, that if they be avoided, they were not presignified: but rather the avoidance of them, which was really to ensue, ought rather to have been presignified» (The Vanity of Judiciary Astrology, p. 88; cf. Savonarola, Scritti filosofici, vol. 1, pp. 344-5). 218. Lilly, The Worlds Catastrophe, p. 61; see Charles Herle, Ahab’s Fall by his Prophets Flatteries... (London,

1644), where Ahab is Charles I.

{

219. Of the Vanitie and vncertaintie, fol. 47r. 220. The Vanity of Judiciary Astrology, p. 149. Cf. Giovanni Pico, Disputationes 2.2, pp. 108-110; Savonarola, Scritti filosofici, vol. 1, pp. 345-6; and Gaule, I1ds-uavtia, pp. 364-8. 221. John Oldmixon, Nixon's Cheshire Prophecy at large, 10th edn. (London, 1740), p. 4.

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as Deaths and Murders? Or joyful and prosperous also?» The first lugubriously replies: «Sad and dismal Events, are the Objects of this Knowledge: As sudden Deaths, dismal Accidents: That they are Prosperous, or Joyful, I cannot learn». The second provides an even more harrowing list: «They foresee Murthers, Drownings, Weddings, Burials, Combates, Manslaughters, of all which

many instances might be given»???. Prophets were especially known to forecast political disaster. Carleton observes that «if you looke vpon their examples, wherein they set the glory of their Art, you shall finde [...] they foretell the deaths of Princes vpon such a day: the fortunes of Kings, the ruines of Kingdomes, the ouerthrow of

Armies»**. Gassendi concurs that the predictions of astrologers «for the most part relateth to the Death, Disposition, and Calamities of Princes»?**, And Francis Cheynell reassures parliament that it is simply the divinely sanctioned

role of prophets to «foretell the ruine of Monarchies and States», Candidates for the role were plentiful. Lilly repeatedly foretold the death of the king and the demise of the monarchy; Mother Shipton’s prophecy concluded that there would no longer be kings or queens in England; and Eleanor Audeley was interpreted as predicting the same thing’”°. Cromwell and Ireton evidently consulted the prophetess Elizabeth Poole in the weeks before the execution of

Charles I°?’; and it was thought that, based on a prediction, Lilly advised «the Councell of Warre to put him to death the 30. of January»*#.

222. John Aubrey, Three Prose Works: Miscellanies, Remaines of Gentilisme and Judaisme,

Observations,

ed. John

Buchanan-Brown

(Fontwell,

Sussex,

1972), pp.

113-14,

1 £9. 223. [Carleton], ASTPOAOTOMANIA, p. 12. Lilly lays claim to «High and deepe knowledge [...] concerning the fate and period of Monarchies and Kingdomes» (A Collection of Ancient and Moderne Prophesies, sig. A3v). Cf. Luther, Works, vol. 7, p. 28: «Such predictions [...] gratify the curiosity of men concerning the fate ot kings, princes, and others of prominence in the world»; and Gaule, [ic-wavtia, pp. 339-45. 224. The Vanity of Judiciary Astrology, p. 150. Cf. Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson, fol. 114r (and cf. fol. 18v): «whosoeuer noteth the right drift and scope of these glaring prophesies, with a single eye, shall finde their greatest Ordinance to bee bent against persons of the greatest state». 225. Cheynell, A Plot for the Good of Posterity... (London, 1646), p. 2. 226. The prophecies of Ursula Shipton were published in 1641, 1645, and 1651; the interpretation of Eleanor Audeley’s closing lines is in Strange and Wonderful Prophecies (London, 1649), p. 8. Charles Mackay reports an eyewitness account of the 1666 fire of London according to which many people allowed London to be reduced to ashes because Shipton had prophesied that it would be. «Hundreds of persons, who might have [...] saved whole parishes from devastation, folded their arms and looked on. As many more gave themselves up [...] to plunder a city which they could not save» (Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, 2nd edn. (London,

1852), p. 267).

227. David Underdown, Pride’s Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1971), p. 183. 228. I reproduce the quotation from Geneva (Astrology and the seventeenth century

mind, p. 254), who cites the 1650 Anglicus, sig. F8v.

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It was often claimed that dire political predictions helped cause dire politi-

cal situations, perhaps even to match what was predicted’. Although Hobbes

ridicules the prophets for their inability to predict the future, he is not so disturbed by their failure as by «when the evils that they call down come to pass

as they wish»?*°. It is probably with Lilly in mind that Hobbes maintains that «the almanac maker» does not know the future but does know that he deceives; and he goes on to assert that such a pretended prophet deserves a trai-

tor’s fate for aiming with his prediction to bring about what he predicts??!. «And in prophesying public disaster, he is considering how he might bring it

about, and deserves to be hanged»?*?. 229. Cf., e.g., Agrippa, Of the Vanitie and vncertaintie, fol. 46r; Lilly, Monarchy or No Monarchy, pp. 10, 19-20; Francis Osborne, A Perswasive to a Mutuall Compliance under the Present Government... (Oxford, 1652), p. 6; Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society, pp. 364-5. Often the fulfillment of a prediction is ascribed to the effect the prediction itself has on an individual’s psychology: cf. Cicero, De divinatione II 9; Agrippa, loc. cit.; Benito Pereira (Benedictus Pererius), De magia, de observatione somniorvm,

et de divinatione as-

trologica, libri tres (Cologne, 1598), p. 235; Gassendi, The Vanity of Judiciary Astrology, pp. 86, 151; Gaule, I10ç-uavtia, pp. 130, 134. Others point out how chance can bring it about that the prediction itself leads to the event happening because of steps taken to avoid it: cf. Jean Bodin, The Six Bookes of aCommonweale,

tr. Richard Knolles (London,

1606),

p. 214; Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson, foll. 123v-124r. And others argue that prognostication is bad for the individual regardless of whether it is true or false or good or evil: cf. Calvin, Advertissement contre l'astrologie, p. 77; Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson, fol. 118v; and especially those who follow Favorinus (from Aulus Gellius 14.1), including Gianfrancesco Pico, Opera omnia, vol. 2, p. 533; Pereira, De magia, p. 193; and George Hakewill, An Apologie or Declaration of the Power and Providence of God in the Gouernment of the World, 3rd edn. (London, 1635), p. 114. Editions of the works by Cicero, Aulus Gellius, Agrippa, Pereira, Bodin, Northampton, and Hakewill (along with several other works cited in preceding notes) are listed in the catalogue of the library Hobbes supervised (Chatsworth Hobbes MS EIA, in Hobbes’s hand, circa 1630). 230. De homine 14.12: «cum mala quae imprecantur contingunt ut volunt». 231. Cf. Mayne, A Sermon against False Prophets, p. 27: «prosperous successes were foretold to wicked undertakings, and the Prophets dealt with the people, as some bold AImanack makers deale with us». Cf. also John Donne in 1628: «that addition of the name of a Prophet, gave them a further qualification; for, Nabi, which is a Prophet, is from Niba; and Niba, is venire facio, to cause, to make a thing to come to passe. So that a Prophet was not onely praefator, but praefactor, He did not only presage, but preordain» (The Sermons of John Donne, vol. 8, ed. Evelyn M. Simpson and George R. Potter (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1956), p. 298). 232. Historia Ecclesiastica, p. 16, lines 321-4: Nescit Ephemeridum confector postera quid sit Allatura dies; decipit ille sciens.

Et cum praedicit mala publica, cogitat illa Quo pacto faciat; dignus & est laqueo. The extant English translation misses the point that the prophet aims to bring about the prophesied doom. Cf. De homine 14.12: «So they do not know the future; rather, what they aspire for the future to be is what they decide on [...] not undeservedly are they punished» («Illae ergo futura non sciunt, sed quae optant, futura esse sperant [...] non immeritò puniuntur»).

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Many political thinkers nonetheless remarked that rulers could reap great advantages from self-fulfilling prophecies. Victory gained because victory was promised is a common theme in Roman histories and the commentaries on them. In his Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli observes that «it much helpes an

Armie towards the winning of a battell, to make them confident, that in any case they cannot chuse but vanquish», and that the Romans never forwent this help: «Nor ever would they have undertaken any expedition, till first they had

perswaded the souldiers, the Gods had promis’d them the victory». Also commenting on Livy, Bacon remarks that «it often falls out, that Somewhat is produced of Nothing: For Lies are sufficient to breed Opinion, and Opinion

brings on Substance»**4. And Northampton relates that «during the ciuill warres betweene Caesar and Pompey, neyther party wanted Prophets, which

both gaue them courage to proceede, and hope to preuaile»?*>. As Selden remarks of prophecies, «they make a man goe on with boldness & courage upon a Danger»**°. George Hakewill remarks: Certainly the force of imagination is wonderfull, either to beget in us an abilitie for the doing of that which wee apprehend we can do, or a disabilitie for the not doing of that which wee conceive wee cannot do [...]. Prognostications and Prophesies often helpe to further that which they foretell, and to make men such as they beare them in hand

they shall bee; nay by an unavoidable destinie must be?*?. And Hobbes concurs that «the expectation of a promised victory is always the

greatest cause of good military service»?**. The problem was that in the 1640s the most effective use of prophecy to encourage the troops was unquestionably that made by the rebels. The parliamentary troops were rallied by apocalyptic exhortation. «Gods promise is your encouragement», William Bridge told them: «Your victory is certain, which

the Scripture promiseth, and first or last the victory shall be to you»?*’. Yet 233. Dacres] 234. 235.

Machiavels Discovrses. upon the first Decade of T. Livius..., tr. E. D. [Edward (London, 1636), p. 594 (III 33), pp. 75-6 (I 14). Bacon, «Of Vaine-Glory», The Essayes, p. 161. A Defensative against the poyson, fol. 116v.

236. As if it were not one, Selden continues: «or a Mistress» (Table Talk of John Selden, ed. Frederick Pollock (London, 1927), p. 115). Cf. Machiavels Discovrses, p. 78 (I 14): «Nor was there any other end of this manner of southsaying, then to incourage the souldiers to fight, for boldnesse alwayes wins the victory». 237. An Apologie or Declaration, p. 20. Hakewill quotes here without attribution from Vergil’s Aeneid V 231 («possunt, quia posse videntur: they can because they seeme they can»), and gives Varro’s argument to this effect in his commentary on Augustine’s De civitate Dei 3.4. 238. Historia Ecclesiastica, p. 66, lines 1441-2: Spes ostentata triumphi, Militiae est semper maxima causa bonae. 239. A Sermon Preached unto the Voluntiers of the City of Norwich and also to the Voluntiers of Great Yarmovth in Norfolke (London, 1642), pp. 20, 18. Cf. p. 19: «Beloved, you are now again coming out of Egypt (for the Romish superstition, and that party is called

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again, the clearest example is that of Lilly’s admixture of apocalyptic, secular, and astrological prophecies. «When we have probable hopes of good successe before hand promised us», he acknowledges, «it might encourage our

Souldiers to attempt greater actions». And he avows: «We shall not be over-

come by them, but shall have victory over our enemies: It’s comfort to be promised victory before hand: It may encourage us to stand stoutly for our de-

fence»?!. In 1648, Lilly and Booker even went to prognosticate for parliament at the siege of Colchester, where they «encouraged the Soldiers assuring them the Town would very shortly be surrendered, as indeed it was»?*. Before a committee of parliament, a «Mr. R.» confirmed the importance of Lilly’s assistance: You do not know the many Services this Man hath done for the Parliament these many Years, or how many times, in our greatest Distresses, we applying unto him, he hath refreshed our languishing Expectations [...] I assure you his Writings have kept up the Spirits both of the Soldiery, the honest People of this Nation, and many of us Parlia-

ment-men*, One contemporary remarked that the people «put more confidence in Lilly than [...] in God»; others were reported to say that «his Majesty had better have had Lilly’his friend, or else stand neuter, then halfe a dozen of his best

regiments»?4%, In the 1650s, many prophecies were in turn directed against the new rulers. As Hobbes remarks, much that «serveth to the establishing of a new Government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the

old», In discussing the events of 1656 in his Behemoth, Hobbes gives the example of James Naylor, who «would be taken for Jesus Christ»: the parliament sentenced him to harsh corporal punishment and then to Bridewell. Hobbes then relates a case from a couple years earlier, of a prophetess in Cornwall, «much famed for her dreams and visions, and hearkened to by many, whereof some were eminent officers. But she and some of her accom-

Egypt, Sodome, Babylon: you are now coming out of Egypt) marching up into the promised Land, and promised Ordinances; nothing can make you fall in the way, but unbelief: wherfore be all of good courage». Bridge was already calling for the blood of Charles I: cf. Two Sermons..., printed by order of the House of Commons

(London,

1642), p. 27.

240. Anglicus, Peace, or no Peace, p. 9. 241. A Prophecy of the White King, p. 6. 242. Mr. William Lilly’s History, p. 67. Cf. p. 83, where he reports that on one of Cromwell’s campaigns in Scotland, «a Soldier stood with Anglicus in his Hand; and as the several Troops pass’d by him, “Lo, hear what Lilly saith; you are in this Month promised Victory; fight it out, brave Boys”, and then read that Month’s Prediction». 243. Mr. William Lilly’s History, p. 71. Geneva, Astrology and the Seventeenth Century Mind, p. 64, misidentifies the speaker as Walter Strickland, but it is likely to be Robert Reynolds. 244. The first remark is quoted by Curry, Prophecy and Power, pp. 29-30; the second is from The Late Storie of Mr. William Lilly, p. 7. 245. Leviathan, «A Review, and Conclusion», par. 13, p. 394.

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plices being imprisoned, we heard no more of her»*. It is then that Hobbes draws the contrast with William Lilly, «that prophesied all the time of the Long Parliament». Not only «his prophecies were of another kind», as «he was a writer of almanacs»; but parliament did nothing to him, for his prophecies were in no way «disadvantageous to that Parliament». And how, the interlocutor wonders, could the «dreams and prognostications» of any such

madmen «be of any great disadvantage to the commonwealth»?? In reply, Hobbes displays his concern with the possibility of prophecy causing what it predicts. You know there is nothing that renders humane Councells difficult but the incertainty of future time, nor that so well directs men in their deliberations as the foresight of the sequells of their actions, Prophecy being many times the principall cause of the event

foretold. If upon some prediction, the people should have been made confident that Oliver Cromwell and his Army should be upon a day to come utterly defeated, would not every one have indeavour’d to assist, and to deserve well of the party that should give him yt defeat? Upon this account it was that Fortune-tellers and Astrologers were

so often banished out of Rome?.

Actions based on the fear inspired by prophecy were especially thought to bring about the prophesied event: Pereira’s examples include that of Nicias’ superstitious fear of defeat; Northampton’s include that of the murder of Domitian (in which the prophets were both «the authors and actors»)**’. «The course which is resolued to preuent the same», observes Northampton about

how people react to prophecy, «doeth oftentimes fall out, to bee the meane or

instrument of putting it in execution».

«By meanes of their very feare»,

Hakewill says, «they fall into that which they stand in feare of: feare being the betrayer of those succours which reason affords»*>'. Hobbes agrees, pointing 246. Behemoth, p. 187. 247. Behemoth, pp. 187-8. 248. This passage is found in Behemoth, p. 188, though for this quotation I follow the manuscript, St. John’s College, Oxford MS 13, foll. 89v-90r. 249. Pereira, De magia, p. 236; in Hobbes’s 1629 translation of Thucydides (Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre), this incident is on p. 444. For a reconstruction of Domitian’s death as the result of self-fulfilling astrology, see Michael R. Molnar, «Blood on the Moon in Aquarius: The Assassination of Domitian», The Celator 9:5 (1995). Gaule collects further cases from the historians in [T0¢-wavtia pp. 345-7. 250. Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson, foll. 123v-124r; cf. fol. 119r. Northampton’s analysis of the destructive logic of «forestalment» on fol. 113v bears comparison with Hobbes’s analysis of «Anticipation» in Leviathan 13.4, p. 61, according to which the state of war may arise from people resorting to violence as their best strategy if they have a motive to fear violence. 251. Hakewill, An Apologie or Declaration, p. 114. Cf. the bishop of Carlisle’s advice to the king in The life and death of King Richard the Second, WI ii (Mr. William Shakespeares Comedies, Histories, & Tragedies (London, 1623), p. 35 (of the Histories), col. A): To feare the Foe, since feare oppresseth strength, Giues in your weakenesse, strength vnto your Foe; Feare, and be slaine....

Kinch Hoekstra

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out that by listening to the claims of those other than the sovereign in order to be saved, people compromise their salvation, which requires that they obey their sovereign. «In superstitious fear they refuse to render the obedience due

to their Princes, by the fear itself falling into that which they fear»**. And he discusses «the woman of Endor, who [...] foretold Saul his death», whose im-

posture was «a means of Sauls terror and discouragement; and by consequent,

of the discomfiture, by which he fell»°?. According to Hobbes, the prophecy of the fall of the king is itself the cause of his fall. Hobbes would have been familiar with prophecies that were necessary conditions of their own fulfillment, stretching back to that about Oedipus. During Hobbes’s

lifetime, even the officially sanctioned

doctrine of salvation had a

similar form. The very consideration of the principle of predestination and election, set down in Article XVII of the Thirty-Nine Articles, is supposed to «greatly establish and confirm» the faith of the elect (who are saved only by virtue of faith, according to Article XI), and to bring about the «most danger-

ous downfall» of those who are not predestined’*. The truth of the doctrine depends on the effect of the doctrine, and the effect follows because of the belief in its truth?°9. Hobbes recognizes the importance of this structure, in which the truth or the fact of something depends on its being believed; for to bring about a belief may thus be to bring about that which is believed, and to under-

mine a belief may be to prevent that about which it is a belief?°°. So, for example, «because men believe that someone is powerful who is honored, that is, regarded as powerful by others, it happens that honor is increased by venera-

tion; and by the opinion of power, true power is acquired»*°’. The sword of the

252. De cive 12.5: «superstitioso metu obedientiam Principibus debitam praestare nolint; ipso metu in id quod metuunt incidentes». 253. Leviathan 36.8, p. 226; cf. 36.20, p. 231. Hobbes’s reading of the case of the woman of Endor (1 Samuel 28-31) as one of self-fulfilling prophecy is tenuous. 254. In 1628, Charles I reaffirmed the Articles, «requiring all Our loving Subjects to continue in the uniform profession thereof, and prohibiting the least difference from the said Articles» (The Thirty Nine Articles, p. 1).

255. So, too, prophets must address the possibility that a prophecy would itself falsify that prophecy. Cf. James I, A Paraphrase vpon the Revelation, in The Workes, pp. 712: «And

hee [the Angel] also said vnto mee, Despaire thou not of the effect of this Prophecie, although it profite nothing the wicked, but to make them the more inexcusable: For God hath fore-signified, that he who doeth harme, notwithstanding this Prophecie shall yet continue his wrongs; and hee who is filthie, shall yet notwithstanding this remaine filthie; euen as on the other part, it shall confirme and encrease the iust man in his

iustnesse, and the holy man in his holines: for it is not the words of Prophecie spoken, but the Spirit which is cooperant with it, which makes the seed of faith to take root in any mans heart». 256. This role of belief is generally ignored in recent philosophy, or set aside as illegitimate or anomalous. Cf., e.g., David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford,

1984), Oe SE

«the ordinary function of a belief is to be true and not to make itself true, and to be rational and not to make itself rational. Beliefs are just not made for such heavy work». 257. De cive 15.13: «Quoniam vero homines, quem honorari, id est, pro potente haberi

Disarming the Prophets. Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power

151

prophet is like that of excommunication: «a Sword that hath no other edge but

what is given to it by the Opinion of him against whom it is used»**. By blunting the belief in prophecy, Hobbes disarms the prophet. The sovereign may legislate against prophecy, as Hobbes recognizes in the cases of the Roman banishment of the fortune tellers and astrologers, and parliament’s effective punishment of influential prophets. The philosopher may influence that legislation, and may undermine the beliefs that make it necessary. As Bacon says of prophecies, «they ought all to be Despised |...]. Though when I say Despised, I meane it as for Beleefe: For otherwise, the Spreading or Publishing done much Mischiefe: them». And Hobbes Prophecies of the future

of them, is in no sort to be Despised. For they have And I see many severe Lawes made to suppresse says: «That dreamers [...] believe their dreams are is foolishness; that they require belief is madness; that

they recklessly predict evil for the Commonwealth is a crime»?9°, In 1645, Lilty concludes his epistle to the reader with the affirmation that «many can preach that cannot fight», but his point is that his prophesying is itself a kind

of combat**'. Hobbes’s response is twofold. He agrees with Northampton in deeming such ‘prophets «to be rather moouers and abettors [...] then forewarners of the mischeefe», and so concludes that those who engage against the

sovereign by such prophecies should be hanged as traitors?°°, Unless the people learn to despise such prophecies, however, prophecy will remain a potent threat. Seditious beliefs, Hobbes says in concluding his Latin Leviathan, «cannot be eliminated by arms». «However such evils come into being, so they are extinguished»: the ink of the enemy «is washed away by preaching, writing,

and disputing»?™.

ab aliis vident, potentem esse credunt, contingit honorem cultu propagari; & potentiae existimatione, potentiam acquiri veram». 258. Memorable Sayings of Mr. Hobbes in his Books and at the Table, a folio broadside published shortly after Hobbes’s death; cf. Leviathan 42.23-4, pp. 276-7. Prophecy has its edge from belief, though not exclusively from the belief of those against whom it is used. In De cive 15.15, Hobbes quotes Martial VII 24.5-6: «The one who fashions the sacred images from gold or marble does not make the Gods; he who prays makes them». («Qui fingit sacros auro, vel marmore vultus, / Non facit ille Deos, qui rogat, ille facit».) 259. «Of Prophecies», The Essayes, p. 114. 260. De homine 14.12: «Quod somniatores somnia sua [...] futurarum rerum Prognostica esse putant, stultitia est; quod postulant sibi credi, in sania est; quod praedicant temerè Civitati mala, crimen est». 261. Lilly, The Starry Messenger, Sig. A4v. 262. Northampton, A Defensative against the poyson, fol. 124r; Hobbes, Historia Ecclesiastica, p. 16, lines 323-4. 263. 1670 Leviathan, p. 327: «tolli armis non posse. Mala hujusmodi, quo modo nata, eodem extinguenda sunt [...] atramentum [...] praedicando, scribendo, disputando eluendum est» (cf. Leviathan 30.4, pp. 175-6). Note that «praedicando» also means prophesying or foretelling (cf., e.g., note 260, above).

Kinch Hoekstra

1152

A Prognosticall Prediction (1644), title page

ii

j

When Hobbes writes this, it is in the context of justifying the publication of his own theory. The source of the prophet’s power is a false belief in the authority of his pronouncements; as shown above, Hobbes’s own writings aim in a number of ways to demonstrate that falsity and undermine that independent authority. One such way appeals to a central position of Hobbes’s political theory. As he says in Behemoth, «because men can never by their own wisdom come to the knowledge of what God hath spoken and commanded to be observed [...] they are to acquiesce in some human authority or other». Sover-

eigns «are the onely Interpreters of what God hath spoken»*®, so claims that it is God’s will that we rebel against or overthrow the commonwealth, or that he has said that we should resist the sovereign, are unjustified. Hobbes’s philosophy has a practical aim: his is not only a theory of what is, it is also a theory by which he aims to make something come to be. For the power of the sovereign to ensure obedience, it must first, and continually, be created by obedience. The sword of sovereignty, too, has its edge from the opinion of those

who fear it*?, 264. Behemoth, p. 46. 265. Leviathan 40.4, p. 250. 266. Cf. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago,

1953), pp. 200-1.

267. This essay is respectfully dedicated to the memory of Arihiro Fukuda (1964-2003), author of Sovereignty and the Sword.

Disarming the Prophets. Thomas Hobbes and Predictive Power

153

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), title page

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HOBBES AND INDEPENDENCY di Johann Sommerville

And so we are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: Which, if it be without contention, and without measuring the Doctrine of Christ, by our affection to the person of his Minister, (the fault which the Apostle reprehended in the Corinthians), is perhaps the best (Leviathan, ed. Tuck, pp. 479-80 [1651 ed., p. 385]).

Not so long ago, the last two parts of Leviathan were little read and less understood, though they take up almost half the book. Their religious and ecclesiastical contents were treated as largely irrelevant to Hobbes’ political message. Nowadays, things have changed. Through the efforts of Edwin Curley, A. P. Martinich, Richard Tuck, George Wright, and others, the second half of Leviathan has come to seem not only much more interesting in itself than it used to, but also much more relevant to Hobbes’ project as a whole. There is, indeed, a heartening degree of consensus amongst modern Hobbes scholars on the centrality of his ideas about religion and church-state relations to his philosophy in general. There is rather less harmony, however, on just what he thought about God and the church. For example, Curley and Martinich have adopted widely differing views on whether he was a Calvinist Christian who held some unorthodox tenets — Martinich’s position — or, alternatively, something close to an atheist, and certainly not a Christian — Curley’s line!. Nor is there consensus on what Hobbes had to say about church-state relations. Though he expressed himself trenchantly on such matters, his meaning has been variously interpreted. Martinich views him as an Anglican who pre-

1. Edwin Curley, “I Durst Not Write So Boldly” or How to Read Hobbes’ TheologicalPolitical Treatise. In Hobbes e Spinoza, Scienza e politica, edited by D. Bostrenghi. Naples, Bibliopolis, 1992; Curley, “Calvin and Hobbes, or, Hobbes as an Orthodox Christian”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 34(1996), 257-283; A. P. Martinich, “On the Proper Interpretation of Hobbes’s Philosophy”, in Journal of the History of Philosophy 34(1996), 273-283: Curley, “Religion and Morality in Hobbes”, in Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, ed. J. L. Coleman and C. W. Morris, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Johann Sommerville

156

ferred church government by bishops to other forms, but held that circumstances sometimes force us to do without episcopacy’. Richard Tuck, on the other hand, claims that in Leviathan Hobbes abandoned royalism and Anglicanism, and instead defended Independency. Both the text and the context of Leviathan lend evidence

to Tuck’s

thesis. Nevertheless,

the claim that Leviathan

was

written, at least in part, to support Independency has received relatively little scholarly attention. This essay examines the links between Hobbes and Independency. As we shall see, Hobbes did indeed share a number of ideas with the Independents. In particular, both he and they argued that the clergy have no independent, Godgiven jurisdiction over the laity. Catholics, Presbyterians, and Anglicans typically asserted that by divine right clerics have jurisdictional powers over lay folk. These powers, they said, are distinct from civil authority, and are not de-

rived from the state. Hobbes and the Independents opposed such views. Howe i

A

ik ng

rs

For unlike him, they were puritan «fanatics»*. According to them, God has imposed many religious duties upon believers. If the sovereign forbids us to do what God orders, we must obey God, not him. If our consciences impel us to break the state’s laws, then we should do so. According to Hobbes, on the other hand, God commands us to obey our sovereigns. The doctrine that «whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne», he declared, is «repugnant to civil society». Hobbes held that in every state there should be an absolute sovereign, who cannot legitimately be resisted by his subjects, and who is not accountable to them for how he governs. Independents, however, commonly claimed that rulers can be resisted and even deposed by their subjects if they misgovern, for instance by infringing rights of conscience. In summary, Independents could have endorsed some of the things that Hobbes said i divineaa SI > ead government,dei as HER tiea

The fist section Below sets outPhe case t for supposing that PA saith was intended to support Independency. The second section is about who the Independents were and what they said. The third surveys Hobbes’ ideas and compares them with those of the Independents. The fourth and last looks in detail at some of the evidence on Hobbes’ links with individual Independents, and then sums up the argument of the whole essay.

2. A. P. Martinich, Hobbes. A Biography, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999172, 3. Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament, ed. Ferdinand Tônnies, with an introduction by Stephen Holmes, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990, 136: the preaching of power-hungry clerics led to the formation in England of «a great number of sects, as Brownists, Anabaptists, Independents, Fifth-monarchy-men, Quakers, and divers others, all commonly called by the name of fanatics». 4. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Tuck, 223 (ch. 29; ed. 1651, p. 168).

Hobbes and Independency

I. In the «Review, and Conclusion»

157

to Leviathan, Hobbes considered the

question of when a conquered people becomes subject to the conqueror, for he found «by divers English books lately printed» that the recent Civil Wars had not yet taught his countrymen the truth on so important a point. He argued that if my sovereign is no longer protecting me, and I find myself instead under the protection of his victorious enemy, I am entitled to submit to that enemy. If I consent to the latter’s rule, | become his subject. Hobbes obviously intended his remarks to justify royalists who submitted to the government of the Rump Parliament, which took control of England in 1648. Some royalists had qualms about assisting their parliamentarian enemies. Hobbes pointed out to them that if they refused to submit to the Rump, it would seize all their wealth; but if they did submit they would be allowed to keep much of it. So «there is no reason to call their Submission, or Composition an Assistance; but rather a Detri-

ment to the Enemy>>. This looks like rather a backhanded way of supporting the rule of the Rump. But modern scholars do often argue that a principal purpose of Leviathan was precisely to justify the Rump and to defend the Engagement — a pledge of allegiance to the Rump, imposed on all adult males in 1650. Hobbes was in exile in France when he wrote Leviathan, and he returned to En-

gland less than a year after its publication. A plausible deduction is that «the work was intended to expedite Hobbes’s return to England»*. The idea that Hobbes wrote Leviathan as a contribution to the controversy over the Engagement has been well known ever since the publication of a series of seminal articles by Quentin Skinner in the 1960s and early 1970s’. More recently, Richard Tuck has suggested that Hobbes intended to support the Rump not just on political but also on religious questions. In other words, Leviathan was written not only to vindicate the Rump’s authority in political matters, but also to endorse the form of church government which it favored, namely Independency, or Congregationalism. Independents argued that churches should be voluntary associations, or congregations, of godly people. The local congregation of the faithful, they held, should be autonomous in church affairs. On civil and political questions, indeed, congregations would be subject to the state authorities. But they would not be subordinate in ecclesiastical affairs to any national or regional hierarchy of churchmen, nor to any synods, assemblies or councils. In church affairs each congregation would be independent — hence Independency. 5. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Tuck, 484-5 (‘Review, and Conclusion’; ed. 1651, p. 390).

6. Jeffery R. Collins, “Christian Ecclesiology and the composition of Leviathan: a newly discovered letter to Thomas Hobbes”, in Historical Journal 43(2000), 217-31, at 218. 7. Quentin Skinner, “History and ideology in the English Revolution”, in Historical Journal 8(1965), 151-78; Skinner, “The context of Hobbes’s theory of political obligation”, in Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters, eds., Hobbes and Rousseau, New York, 109-42; Skinner, “Conquest and consent: Thomas Hobbes and the Engagement controversy”, in G. E. Aylmer, ed., The Interregnum: the Quest for a Settlement, London, 79-98.

158

Johann Sommerville

During the opening decades of the seventeenth century, the English church was governed by bishops, who were appointed by the king and were subordinate to him. Bishops had their own courts, which tried people for religious and moral offenses. In the 1630s, Archbishop William Laud of Canterbury made himself especially unpopular by the vigor with which he enforced the bishops’ authority. When Civil War broke out in 1642, many people on both the royalist and parliamentarian sides believed that Laud and his supporters had acted objectionably. But royalists as a whole held that the church should continue to be run by bishops, while parliamentarians proposed replacing episcopacy with a different system of government. Parliament commissioned an Assembly of Divines, which met at Westminster, to thresh out the details of this alternative scheme. In the Assembly, the majority voted for the introduction of Presbyterianism — rule by a hierarchy of ecclesiastical officials and councils, with a national synod at its apex. Within the Westminster Assembly, Presbyterianism was opposed by the learned layman John Selden, who was to befriend Hobbes after the latter’s return from exile. Like Hobbes, Selden was deeply hostile to all efforts by clerics to establish a form of government separate from the state. The Presbyterians also encountered opposition in the Westminster Assembly from the Dissenting Brethren — a small number of Independents. Though the Independents, and Selden and his allies, challenged the Presbyterians at every step of their argument, the Assembly eventually resolved in favor of Presbyterianism. For a while it looked as though parliament would back the scheme, with due modifications to safeguard its own powers. However, after the defeat of the royalists, parliament fell out with its own army, which was under the command of Oliver Cromwell and others. Cromwell and the army intervened violently in politics, purged parliament (thus setting up the Rump — the name given to the members whom the army permitted to stay), executed the king, and prevented the institution of Presbyterianism. Under the Rump, and under the Protectorate of Cromwell (who dissolved the Rump in 1653), the Independents got the freedom from Presbyterian discipline which they so much desired. In De Cive — first printed in 1642, and first published in a widely available edition in 1647 — Hobbes included material suggesting that he endorsed the conventional Anglican and royalist view that the church should be run by properly ordained clerics, who were the successors of the Apostles. The 1647 and later editions of the book explicitly endorsed episcopacy, claiming that bishops had existed in the early church’. But some fascinating letters from Hobbes’ close friend Robert Payne — an Anglican clergyman and a scientist — to Gilbert Sheldon (later Archbishop of Canterbury) reveal that relations between Hobbes and the Anglican clergy had greatly worsened by the time he wrote Leviathan. In March 1650, Payne learned that Hobbes had been greatly angered «that he had lost the reward of his labours with the Pr[ince] by the sinister sug8. Johann P. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, London, Macmillan, 1992, 120.

Hobbes and Independency

159

gestions of some of the clergy». Payne commented that «I am very sorry to hear that any of our coat have had the ill fortune to provoke so great a wit against the Church». In May 1650 he found that Hobbes was hard at work on an English book about politics (namely Leviathan) and that he had written thirty-seven chapters of it. It became clear to Payne that the book would not defend the bishops, and though he tried to persuade Hobbes to treat episcopacy gently, he had little confidence that his appeals would be effective’. When we turn to Leviathan, argues Tuck, it becomes easy to see why Payne was so horrified by it. For on ecclesiastical matters it endorsed «precisely the principles held by the men who had executed the King», namely the Independents. Just like Hobbes, Cromwell and his army, and their supporters in parliament, favored a system of church government «in which congregations were relatively independent in doctrinal and disciplinary matters, and the State exercised only a loose, supervisory role». Tuck suggests that «the ecclesiastical regime put into place by the new republic after 1649 was very close to what Hobbes seems to have wanted on general grounds, and which he may well have enthusiastically preferred to traditional episcopacy». Earlier, he had voiced Anglican'and episcopalian ideas because his political allies were royalists. But with their defeat he was free to express his agreement with Independency. His alliance with the Independents, then, was rooted not simply in selfinterest, but also in principle. After his return to England, says Tuck, Hobbes took an active part «in the struggle between Independents and Presbyterians at Oxford» in the mid-1650s and «engaged in an acrimonious controversy with a prominent Oxford Presbyterian, John Wallis». Moreover, «he provided aid and advice to the Independents at Oxford fighting against men such as Wallis». His Oxford associates «ranged from a young don called Henry Stubbe (who began to translate Leviathan into Latin) to the Vice-chancellor himself,

an ‘Independent who had been put into place by the republican government». Indeed, Leviathan was «widely admired among particularly the more radical Independents», and Stubbe, who was «one of the leading Independents at Oxford [...] sought to persuade other Oxford Independents (including even the Vice-Chancellor, John Owen) of the merits of Hobbes’s ecclesiology — with, it seems, a certain amount of success»! The Independents lost power when Charles II was restored in 1660, and the Restoration once more established episcopacy as the legal form of church government in England. In the Latin Leviathan of 1668, Hobbes dropped his explicit defense of Independency — mindful of the subject’s obligation not to attack institutions which the sovereign upheld. At much the same time, however, he was penning Behemoth — an account of the civil wars and Interregnum. Revealingly, he there «played

9. Nicholas Pocock, “Illustrations of the State of the Church during the Great Rebellion”, in The Theologian and Ecclesiastic 6(1848), 161-75, at 170, 172, 173; the originals are in B. L. Harleian MS 6942, letters 127, 128, 130. 10. Richard Tuck, Hobbes, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1989, 29-30, 32. Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 336.

Johann Sommerville

160

down» «the triumph of Independency» and treated Oliver Cromwell «with considerable respect»!!. «Hobbes’s return to England in 1651», argues Jeffrey Collins, «was cer-

tainly eased by his convenient theory of political obligation, but the dominant Independents cannot have been disheartened by his hostility to episcopacy and his endorsement of the Congregational Way». As Payne noted in his correspondence with Sheldon, Hobbes’ Leviathan was targeted particularly at episcopacy. «Contemporaries often accused Hobbes of having betrayed the Stuart cause», and modern historians commonly interpret these charges in terms of his defense of submission to conquerors. «Far less often noticed by historians, but equally significant for contemporaries, was the extent to which Hobbes willingly associated himself with the revolutionary Independents, enemies of

the episcopal church»!?. I

itiabe]

ah

lefen-

se Independency. of As we have now seen, one kind of evidence that has been brought to bear on this question is contextual. Relevant items here include his warm relations with Independents in the 1650s, their wide admiration for Leviathan, that book’s influence on their arguments, Hobbes’

later studied silen-

ce on Independency, and his respectful treatment of the Independents’ main political supporter, Oliver Cromwell. But however suggestive such contextual material is, the thesis that Hobbes intended to endorse Independency rests centrally on what he and the Independents said. Let us begin with the Independents.

2. The Independents were puritans, who shared much of the outlook of Elizabethan Separatists, or Brownists. Robert Browne and later Separatists believed that the post-Reformation English church had not been properly reformed,

and that it was steeped in popery and corruption. Though the law — in the shape of the Act of Uniformity of 1559 — required people to conform to the religion of the established church, Separatists held that true Christians had a duty to break this law and to set up their own godly congregations outside the structure of the national church. The Independents likewise asserted that the godly (or the saints, or the elect) should not be forced to worship alongside 11. Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 343; Tuck, Hobbes, 35. 12. Collins, “Christian Ecclesiology and the composition of Leviathan: a newly discovered letter to Thomas Hobbes”, 227-8. 13. M. R. Sommerville, “Independent Thought, 1603-1649”, unpublished Cambridge University Ph. D. dissertation, 1982, 5-11. I am much indebted for what follows to this fine dissertation, the fullest and best account of its subject. Other important discussions of the Independents and their origins and contexts include Murray Tolmie, The Triumph of the Saints, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977; Champlin Burrage, The Early English Dissenters in the Light of Recent Research, 2 vols., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1912; A. Zakai, “Religious Toleration and its Enemies: the Independent Divines and the Issue of Toleration during the English Civil War”, in Albion 21(1989),

The Independents and the English Civil War, Cambridge, Cambridge 1958.

1-33: G. Yule,

University Press,

Hobbes and Independency

161

sinners in the parish churches of England, but should be free to set up their own autonomous congregations. They differed from the Separatists in claiming that the existing parish churches were not all totally corrupt. But they agreed with them in arguing that the saints ought not to be compelled to worship with the worldly, papistical, and unregenerate mass of the population, but should be free to gather their own congregations. Within each congregation there were to be members and officers. The officers instituted by Christ were pastors, teachers, elders, and deacons. No one could be coerced into membership, but an erring member could be expelled by the elders with the consent of

the congregation!*. The Independents wanted the godly to worship in their own independent congregations. They did not want the civil authorities to have any power to impose ceremonies or rites of worship on these congregations. Nor did they want the congregations to be subject to the jurisdiction of any hierarchy of churchmen — whether they were bishops, or Presbyterian synods. In the Westminster Assembly, the Independent case was voiced by five Dissenting Brethren, who also laid their views before parliament and the public in the shape of An Apologeticall Narration humbly submitted to the honourable Houses of Parliament. The five were Thomas Goodwin, Philip Nye, William Bridge, Jeremiah Burroughes, and Sidrach Simpson. After the establishment of the Rump, Thomas Goodwin was appointed President (that is to say, head) of Hobbes’ old Oxford coliege, Magdalen. At much the same time, Sidrach Simpson became Master of Pembroke Hall in Cambridge. A third Independent who held high academic office during the 1650s was John Owen, who was appointed Dean of Christ Church Oxford, and who, along with Philip Nye and Thomas Goodwin, was one of Cromwell’s main advisors on ecclesiastical matters. Nye, Goodwin, Owen and

others were responsible for the Savoy Declaration of 1658, which is sometimes seen as the key statement of Independent beliefs!. Bridge ministered to a congregation at Great Yarmouth. Before the Civil War, he and Burroughes (who died relatively young in 1646) had been in charge of a congregation in Rotterdam. All of the five Dissenting Brethren went into exile in Holland in the 1630s because their consciences would not permit them to obey the English authorities in religious matters. After they returned to England, all five became enthusiastic supporters of parliament in its quarrel with the king. Independents held that the authority of Scripture rests not on the testimony of any humans, however compelling that might be, but upon the working of 14. A Declaration of the Faith and Order owned and practised in the Congregational Churches in England; agreed upon by their Elders and Messengers in their meeting at the

Savoy, Octob. 12 1658, London 1659, 24-5. 15. The Savoy Declaration is the usual name given to A Declaration of the Faith and Order owned and practised in the Congregational Churches (see previous note for full title). The complete text is available at

http://www.reformed.org/documents/index.html?mainframe=index_docu.html. Substantial extracts are in Gerald Bray, ed., Documents of the English Reformation, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1994, 521-43.

Johann Sommerville

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the spirit within us. Our «full perswasion and assurance of the infallible Truth and Divine Authority» of the bible, said the Savoy Declaration, is from «the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts». The bible, they insisted, and not any human authority — whether that of the pope, the bishops, a king or a presbytery — was the «Supreme Judge by which all controversies of Religion are to be determined». Scripture and Scripture alone was the definitive repository of all religious truths, and the sole and complete source of information on how the faithful should worship God!°. Where God’s word is silent on questions of worship, the Independents affirmed, he wants us to be free. Christian liberty, and liberty of conscience, consist in freedom from all obligation to obey human commands on religious matters. Indeed, Christians have not just a right but a duty to disobey human orders in an area where God has left us free. «God alone», asserted the Savoy Declaration, «is Lord of the Conscience, and hath left it free from the Doctri-

nes and Commandments of men which are in any thing contrary to his Word, or not contained in it». According to Burroughes, secular rulers could require people to perform actions in the civil sphere without always explaining the reasons that underlay their commands, for «there are Arcana imperii, mysteries of state, that are not fit for every man to know». In religious affairs, however, there were no such mysteries, and it was necessary for people «to understand as well as to doe». «I may doe a thing for a civill good», he declared, «wherein I may trust another mans reason», but the case was very different in spiritual as opposed to civil matters. To «reach to a spirituall good, I must see the reason, the ground, the rule of the action my selfe; I must judge by the Word, that this action at this time cloathed with all its circumstances is by Ch-

rist fitted for such a spirituall good that I aime at». In secular matters, the individual could sinlessly trust the judgment of the authorities, and obey their commands without fully comprehending the reasons that underpinned them. In religious affairs, however, it was the individual’s duty to test the government’s

commands against the word of God. If scripture did not command the same things as the authorities, then we ought conscientiously to disobey them. Back in the evil days before the Civil War, the bishops had argued that the sovereign — the Supreme Governor of the English church — could issue binding commands in matters indifferent — that is to say, matters on which scripture issued no orders or prohibitions. But this was not so, for «if things meerely indifferent be enjoyned, then is Christian liberty violated»!’.

16. A Declaration of the Faith and Order owned and practised in the Congregational Churches, 2, 3.

17. A Declaration of the Faith and Order owned and practised in the Congregational Churches, 15. Jeremiah Burroughes, /renicum, to the Lovers of Truth and Peace, London 1646, 159-60. Similar warnings against using human prudence to add to the bible’s requirements on religious rites occur in e..g Thomas Goodwin et al., An Apologeticall Narration humbly submitted to the honourable Houses of Parliament, London 1643, 10; Sidrach Simpson, Reformation’s Preservation, London 1643, 4.

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163

On religious questions, then, it was the duty of the individual not to obey the government’s commands but to question them. John Owen instructed the saints to search the scriptures diligently, and to «examine, and try by them the doctrine that publikely is taught». When the godly studied the bible, the Holy Spirit revealed to them its meaning. Once they had learned the truth, they had a duty to share it with others and not to keep their beliefs to themselves while outwardly following the secular authorities into error. «Truth revealed unto any», declared Owen, «carries along with it an unmoveable perswasion of Conscience (which is powerfully obligatory) that it ought to be published and spoken to others»!*. Publicly proclaiming truths despite the prohibitions and persecution of human authority was, indeed, a mark of the saints. When authorities enforced patently popish and Antichristian ceremonies, as they had in the dark days of Archbishop Laud, the saints’ mission of speaking truth to power was particularly urgent!”. But it was not only egregiously popish rites which were objectionable. A// ceremonies instituted by human authority violated Christian liberty. And any form of church government imposed on the godly without scriptural warrant was invalid. Neither episcopacy nor Presbyterianism were authorized in the bible. The state could, indeed, arrange for the ungodly mass of the population to be subjected to — or treated to — edifying sermons by painful preachers, in the hope that exposure to God’s word would convert some of them to true religion. So a national church could exist to cater for the unconverted, and try to bring them to God. But the state ought not to interfere in the religious affairs of the churches of the saints, which were gathered congregations, not a national institution. It was a mark of the godly that they were especially active in refusing to conform to human commands in religious matters. John Owen was accused of having conformed under the bishops, but he indignantly rebutted the Antichristian charge, adding that his father too «was a non-conformist all his dayes»?0. The saints not only refused to conform to religious requirements imposed by the state, but also took the vanguard in denouncing the errors of people in authority, in both the spiritual and secular spheres. It was these «mourners in Sion», said Burroughes, who «out of conscience» «ventured themselves to have suffered in denying illegal taxations» and «in refusing superstitious innovations» in religion?!. They had been perfectly justified in their disobedience, and, indeed, in taking up arms against the evil regime of Charles I. Kings, declared Bridge, derive their power «originally from the people themselves». 18. John Owen, The Duty of Pastors and People distinguished, London 1644, 42-3, 38. Owen describes himself as a Presbyterian at p. 42, but he did not change his mind on these points when he became an Independent. 19. Independents commonly linked Antichrist to popery and to the government and ceremonies of the English church as it existed before 1640: Christopher Hill, Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, 24, 28, 82-3 20. Owen, A Review of the True nature of Schisme, Oxford 1657, 37-8. 21. Burroughes, Sions Joy. A Sermon preached to the Honourable House of Commons, 1641, 19.

Johann Sommerville

164

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AUTHORITY AND THEODICY IN HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN: «WE ARE GOD’S SLAVES»! by George Wright

The purpose of this essay is briefly to analyze the concepts of authority and theodicy as Hobbes links and develops them in the English Leviathan. Its thesis is that authority, divine and human, may be distinguished one from the other by the identities and roles of the superior and subordinate parties. In the latter case, the political sovereign stands in a relation to the subject as master to hired man. The divine sovereign stands in relation to the subject as master to slave. Hobbes works out the distinction between hired man and slave largely by reference to the Greek law and experience of slavery. Given their importance, we will draw upon the reforms brought about in Athens by Solon (c. 640- c. 561 BC) to illuminate this distinction. Finally, we will elucidate the

role of the divine sovereign as master by way of the distinction Hobbes consistently draws in many writings between God as first cause (causa causarum or causa prima) and God as author. This distinction lies at the root of his theodicy, his justification of the «wayes of God to men».

1. I would like to thank participants at the colloquium, “Hobbes and la question de I’ autoritè dans le Leviathan’, held by the Centre Thomas Hobbes, December 15-16, 2001, CNRS, Paris, for helpful comments, especially those of Luc Foisneau. A. P. Martinich’s comments have also been of the greatest help. I quote throughout from MacPherson’s familiar edition of Leviathan and have consulted Prof. Edwin Curley’s learned edition, published by the Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1994. The citation form is as follows: Leviathan 2.17.2.223 means Leviathan, part 2, chapter 17, paragraph 2, page 223 in that edition. Citations to Hobbes’s other works are to the Molesworth edition, English Works (EW) or Opera Latina (OL). I cite my English translation of the 1668 Appendix (/nterpretation 18 (1991): 323-413), with some emendations, and the King James

Version of the Bible. 2. He describes this concern at Leviathan 2.31.6.398: This question, why evil men often prosper, and good men suffer adversity, has been much disputed by the ancient, and is the same with this of ours, by what right God dispenseth the prosperities and adversities of this life; and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not only of the vulgar, but of philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence.

176

George Wright

The relation of divine and human authority is thus complementary. We may determine the scope and range of the political sovereign’s authority as developed in Leviathan by reference to that of the divine sovereign, and we may determine the scope and range of the divine sovereign’s authority by reference to the dependency of the slave. Precisely what constitutes one a slave on Hobbes’s account will prove the key not only to investigating the conceptual content of political authority but also to describing the ground and possibility of theodicy. Let us begin with a brief comparison of slavery first among Jews and Christians and then among Greeks and Romans’.

Slavery in Israel

Unlike either ancient Greece and Rome or the American South, the economy of ancient Israel never became dependent upon slave labor. Benevolent requirements towards Hebrew slaves in Mosaic law prevented profitable largescale dealing in slaves*. Thus, loss of an eye or tooth while in service entitled the slave to freedom (Exodus 21:26-27; Leviticus 24:22). Extradition of fugi-

tive slaves seeking shelter in an Israelite home was prohibited (Deuteronomy 23:15-16)°. The Israelite slave of an Israelite was circumcised and was thereby entitled to the paschal sacrifice (Exodus 12:44), all the Jewish festivals (Deuteronomy 12:12, 18; 16:11, 14) and the Sabbath rest (Exodus 20:10-11;

Deuteronomy 5:14). Moreover, terms of service were limited; freedom was granted after seven years of service, in the year of jubilee, which occurred

3. The literature on ancient slavery is extensive; see, for example, Slavery in Antiquity ed. by Moses Finley (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968); Moses Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology (New York: Penguin Books, 1983); Classical Slavery, ed. by Moses Finley (Totowa, NJ: F. Cass, 1987); Yvon Garlan, Slavery in Ancient Greece revised and

expanded edition trans. by Janet Lloyd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), and Peter Garnsey, /deas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

4. The treatment of aliens substantially differed. Thus, for, example, non-Israelites purchased by Israelites or taken as prisoners of war were not released after six years. (Leviticus 25:44-46). Indeed, the standards of practice set out for Jewish slaves must often have been merely hortatory; the reality was presumably often far harsher. 5. «You shall not give up to his master a slave who has escaped from his master to you; he shall dwell with you, in your midst, in the place which he shall choose within one of your towns, where it pleases him best; you shall not oppress him» (Deuteronomy 23:15-16). Moreover, Moses’ law may have applied to fleeing non-Israelites as well, given that the founding narrative of exodus from Egypt meant that the nation itself, once the victim of harsh treatment, was an escaped “slave” from Egypt: “Love the sojourner therefore; for you were sojourners in the land of Egypt” (Deuteronomy 10:19); «you shall love your neighbour as yourself...The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to you as the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself; for you were strangers in the land of Egypt» (Leviticus 19:18, 34).

Authority and Theodicy in Hobbes's Leviathan

177

every 50 years (Leviticus 25:39). Relatives might redeem the slave, and, if not redeemed, the slave’s service ended after six years, together with a gift of cattle or fruit from the master (Exodus 21:2; Deuteronomy 15:12-15). One’s wife and children also went free unless the slave had received her from the master, in which case she and her children remained in servitude (Exodus 21:4). Children of Hebrew

slaves became

slaves of their parents’ master, although this

was not permanent (Exodus 21:6; Deuteronomy 15:17). Female betrothed slaves could not be sexually violated. (Leviticus 19:20). Children of defaulting debtors could be sold to pay the debt or were claimed along with their fathers as slaves until the succeeding year of jubilee (Exodus 21:7; Leviticus 25:39-41, 47, 54; 2 Kings 4:1; Nehemiah 5:15; Isaiah 50:1; Job 24:9). Exploitation of widows and orphans whether slaves or not was forbidden. (Exodus 20:17; 21:2, 11, 26-32). One might become a slave through poverty, the inability to sustain oneself and one’s family (Leviticus 25:39, 47; cf. Deuteronomy

15:12-13). Some of

David’s followers were defaulting debtors who had fled their creditors (/ Samuel 22:2). Restitution for theft also was a way to enslavement. The law required thieves to return double what they had stolen, and those unable to do so were sold into slavery (Exodus 22:1-4).

Abduction could also result in slavery, as in the case of Joseph, whose brothers sold him as a slave (Genesis 37:27-28; cf. 45:4), though reduction to

slavery of a kidnapped person was a crime punishable by death in the codes both of Hammurabi, «the shepherd of the oppressed and of slaves» (#14) and of Moses (Exodus 21:16; Deuteronomy 24:7).

In his sixth year of service, the slave could choose to become a permanent slave by coming before the elders and having his ear bored through with an awl against a doorpost (Exodus 21:6; Deuteronomy 15:17)°. This seems to be the custom to which the writer refers in Hebrews 10:5’, where he speaks in the words of the Psalter (Psalms 40:6-8), attributing them to Jesus himself®:

6. A vestigial belief in the sanctity of the gods of comings and goings associated with doors may lie behind this practice. The ceremony by which slavery became permanent is described in Exodus 21:6: «Then his master shall bring him unto the judges; he shall also bring him to the door, or unto the door post; and his master shall bore his ear through with an aul; and he shall serve him for ever». 7. This option for permanent slavery must have been open only to those whose slavery might end, viz., Jewish slaves, and it is to this custom and its social practices that Paul refers in Hebrews. 8. On Paul’s metaphorical use of slavery and its cognates, see Dale Martin, Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); David I. Williams, Paul’s Metaphors: Their Context and Character (Peabody,

MA: Hendrickson Publishing, Inc., 1999), esp. pp. 111ff. As both authors make clear, Paul drew heavily upon both the classical and Jewish/Christian experience of slavery, especially in describing the nature and cost of redemption. Thus, while he knew of the Jewish ceremony by which slavery became permanent, he also drew upon the customs of classical antiquity in describing himself as branded as Christ’s slave; see Galatians 6:17.

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Wherefore when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not’, but a body hast thou prepared me!°: In burnt offerings and [sacrifices] for sin thou hast had no pleasure. Then said I, Lo, I come (in the volume of the book it is written of me), to do thy will, O God.

Taking David as type!!, Paul, the Jewish convert to Christianity, describes Christ’s faithfulness to the Father in terms of the slave’s desire for permanent servitude to a master. In so doing and in then applying it to himself as apostle, Paul employs a vocabulary that will determine later Christian theology of worship and of commitment, namely, the language of service and servitude sig-

naled by his use of the Greek terms Aatpeia, dovAeia, SovAog (latreia, douleia and doulos), as in the salutation beginning his letter to the Romans: TIAYAOZ S00A0¢ Xpiotod'INncod, KAntds &ndoTOADS Gpopiouévos Eig EDAYYEALOV Oeot. (Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, separated unto the

gospel of God)!. Or, later, in the same letter, at 12:1:

Tapaxard ov duac, &dergot, 51& TV OiKTIPU@V TOD Oeod, napaotijoa ta cœuato buôv Bvotav GHouv ayiav TH O£ò edapeotov, tv Aoyixmv Aatpetav

9. On the rejection of the sacrificial principle, see Psalms 50:9-12; Psalms 51:16-17, and Mark 7:15. On sacrifice, see below, p. 194. 10. The writer of Hebrews quotes the Septuagint version (Psalm 39) of the passage; the Hebrew version in translation (Psalm 40) has: «Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire;

mine ears hast thou opened: burnt offering and sin offering hast thou not required» (Emphasis added). 11. On typology and figure, see Erich Auerbach, “Figure” Yale French Studies 9 (1952): 3-101 “Figurative Texts Illustrating Passages of Dante’s Commedia” Speculum 21 (1953): 474-89, and “Figura,” Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973). See also Paul Korshin, Typologies in England, 1650-1820 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). Auerbach stresses an important check upon the role and authority of prefiguration, namely, that it is knowledge based upon human intuition of God’s knowledge of the world as immediate presence. As he says (“Figure,” op. cit., p. 10), «The eternal coexistence in God’s mind of all historical events is a conception best expressed by Saint Augustine’s doctrine that God keeps present in his mind all things past and future in their true reality — that therefore it is not correct to speak of God’s fore-knowledge, but simply of his knowledge — scientia Dei non praescientia sed tantum scientia dici potest. Figurism gives the basis for the medieval fusion between realistic naiveté and otherworldly wisdom». The Protestant understanding of prophecy was quite different, as is evident from Luther’s keen interest in the prophetic literature both of sacred scripture and of his era; see, for example, his introduction to the Vitae Romanorum

Pontificum of the Eng-

lish reformer Robert Barnes (Basel and Wittenburg: J. Klug, 1536). On prophecy in Hobbes, see Kinch Hoekstra, “Disarming the Prophets’, Rivista della storia di filosofia, in this volume. 12. Williams challenges Martin’s assertion that slavery in these contexts connotes not subjection but a first step toward a better social position; see Williams, op. cit., p. 126, note 21, commenting on Martin, op. cit., p. 137. The rhetorical power of the latter interpretation seems to make it clearly preferable to Martin’s.

Authority and Theodicy in Hobbes's Leviathan

LAD

Luv. (I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your

bodies Sua a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service).

Paul is often taken to be conservative in his reactions to the institution of slavery as he knew it, urging slaves to serve their masters well and returning his helper and run-away slave Onesimus to his master Philemon!*. His preaching however tended to undermine the social and cultural hierarchies of his era by insisting that all shared together in the epochal event of the Christ, as in Galatians 3:28: «There is no such thing as Jew and Greek, slave and freeman,

male claim ing a slave

and female, for you are all to be a slave of God was to special stamp of authority, of God!°. The leader making

one person in Christ Jesus». Moreover, to claim a specially privileged position, carryas was also the case with Moses, another such a claim thereby manifested a calling to

a life of service to God and fellow man!°. Paul’s language of servitude, commitment and worship knew a long development in Christian theology, culminating in several distinctions drawn by the Roman Catholic Church between Scien Latinized as dulia, and Aatpeta, latria: +

If it is addressed directly to God, it is superior, absolute, supreme worship, or worship of adoration, or, according to the consecrated theological term, a worship of latria. This sovereign worship is due to God alone; addressed to a creature it would become idolatry;

13. Cf. Galatians

1:10; Ephesians 3:7; Colossians

1: 23 and 25; Colossians 4:7, and Ti-

tus 1:1. Williams detects a contrast which Paul is drawing between pagan cultic sacrificial es and the service owed by Christians to God (op. cit., p. 250): His goal for them was to become «an offering acceptable» to God. This echoes his earlier plea that his readers should offer themselves, «their bodies as a living sacrifice», in contrast with the slain animals of the cultus (cf. Romans 6:8, 11, 13), not as

a propitiatory sacrifice but a sacrifice of praise, «holy, acceptable to God, as their

spiritual service». He then glosses the passage in a note (op. cit., n. 52, p. 256): Tnv Aoyixhv Aatpetav du@v: Aoyixkôc, an cld word, «reasonable, rational». Here the phrase means «worship rendered by the reason», i.e., inward or spiritual worship. Only here and in / Peter 2:2 in the New Testament. Aatpeta (from Aatpevo) «to work for hire, to serve», itself from A&tpic «a hired servant»): «Hired service, service». In the Septuagint nine times, always, with one exception, in a cultic connection, «divine service, worship», as also in Romans 9:4 and Hebrews O26:

14. See Philemon 12: «In sending [Philemon] back to you, I am sending my heart». 15. See / Chronicles 6:49; 2 Chronicles 24:9, and Nehemiah

10:29; cf. Hebrews 3:5.

16. On Paul’s authority as an apostle, see Acts 15:6ff. Martin argues that the topos of the enslaved leader was well-known in classical antiquity, especially as distinguished from that of the «benevolent patriarch»; see Martin, op. cit., pp. 86ff. Paul’s self-enslavement was different in kind from the classical models and had practical significance in dealing both with the expectations of low-class gentile audiences and with the high-born gentiles’ expectations regarding his own model of evangelization. More importantly, it also was a central metaphor of Pauline salvation theology; see Martin, op. cit., pp. 129ff.

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When worship is addressed only indirectly to God, that is, when its object is the veneration of martyrs, of angels, or of saints, it is a subordinate worship dependent

*

on the first, and relative, insofar as it honors the creatures of God for their peculiar

*

relations with Him; it is designated by theologians as the worship of dulia, a term denoting servitude, and implying, when used to signify our worship of distinguished servants of God, that their service to Him is their title to our veneration; As the Blessed Virgin has a separate and absolutely super eminent rank among the saints, the worship paid to her is called hyperdulia!!.

Dulia may find expression in external acts of reverence and by invocation not only to the saints but also to objects closely related to the saints, such as

their garments, relics and images!*. We shall see that the Protestant Hobbes drops hyperdulia, and, recasting the dulia/latria distinction, he employs it in

his own way, using classical reference points!?.

Slavery among Greeks and Romans

Hobbes is an apt interpreter of the experience of Greeks and Romans; his knowledge of ancient languages, culture and institutions was impressive, as was that of his era, given the re-awakening of interest in antiquity stemming from the Renaissance. It was in this vein that he undertook his first major publication, the 1629 translation of Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War, a work whose author’s mastery both of Greek and of English prose style is evident even today”. The English Leviathan gives several examples of his knowledge of Greek and Roman antiquities, including his recounting of a famous incident at Abdera, when, due to the heat of the summer, a presentation of Euripides’ Andromeda led the inhabitants of that city to declaim and speak

17. See Catholic Encyclopedia, sub voce “Christian worship”, found at www.newadvent.org/cathen/15710a.htm. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 2.2.103.3. 18. The practice continues; see, for example, Pope John Paul’s apostolic letter Duodecimum

Saeculum,

in which

he celebrates

the twelfth centenary

of the second

council

of

Nicaea (787), with its endorsement of icons as against the iconoclastic movement in the East: «Hence Nicaea II solemnly reaffirmed the traditional distinction between the “true adoration” (Aatpeta) which, “according to our faith is rendered to the unique divine na-

ture” and the “prostration of honor” (tywetuch mpooKtvectc) which is attributed to icons, for he who prostrates himself before the icon does so before the person (dréotao1ic) which

is represented therein». See Mansi, Sanctorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio (1757-1798), XII, 377E. 19. Given the substantial changes he makes to it, it may be more accurate to say that Hobbes rejects the Roman Catholic distinction. Certainly, he emphasizes the intentional context within which any action of honor must be understood; see below, p. 186. 20. Hobbes wanted to supply the need for a more accurate English translation than that of Thomas Nicolls of 1550, whose text had been a French translation by Bishop Seyssel of Marseilles, working from Lorenzo Valla’s Latin translation of the original. See Richard Schlatter, “Introduction”, Hobbes’s Thucydides (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1975), pp. xiff.

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in iambics*!. Also, his contemporaries. the ancient practice a shrine, known in

181

he seeks to trace remnants of ancient practices in those of Thus, he detects in the honors shown the Roman pontiff of bearing images of divinities before admiring crowds in Latin as a thensa or tensa, borne on a litter or palanquin,

known as a ferculum”: Leviathan 4.45.36.680: The carrying about of images in procession, is another relic of the religion of the Greeks, and Romans: for they also carried their idols from place to place, in a kind of chariot, which was peculiarly dedicated to that use, which the Latins

called thensa, and vehiculum Deorum*; and the image was placed in a frame, or shrine, which they called ferculum: and that which they called pompa”, is the same that now is named procession. According whereunto, amongst the divine honours which were given to Julius Caesar by the senate, this was one, that in the pomp (or procession) at the Circaean games, he should have thensam et ferculum, a sacred chariot and a shrine; which was as much, as to be carried up and down as a god: just as at this day the Popes are carried by Switzers under a canopy. 21. See Leviathan 1.8.25.142. The episode is recounted by Lucian of Samosata (c. 125c. 180), an author whose Greek, if not his religion, Hobbes commends in the Appendix added to the Latin Leviathan of 1668; see $107. Hobbes also cites him in the Elements of Philosophy, the Answer to Bishop Bramhall and the Dialogue between a Phylosopher and a Student. Both Laurence Sterne, in his A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (1768), and Christian Martin Wieland, in his Geschichte der Abderiten (1777), mention the incident at Abdera. 22. The images of the gods could also be carried on men’s shoulders, as was pictured on the architrave of the temple of Aesclapius (“Apollo Medico”) on the Tibertine island. There, Augustus’ triumphs of 29 BC over the Germans and Egypt and at Actium were memorialized in stone. The Vulgate uses ferculum in describing the silver and gold vehicle which Solomon made for himself out of wood from Lebanon, described in Song of Songs SULA 23. Suetonius notes in his life of Caesar ($76) that ferculum et thensa at the circus was accorded Caesar, an honor thought too great for mortals. Other honors included an uninterrupted consulship; the dictatorship for life; the censorship of public morals; the forename Imperator; the surname of Father of his Country; a statue among those of the kings; a raised couch in the orchestra; a golden throne in the curia and on the judgment seat; temples, altars, and statues beside those of the gods; a special priest; an additional college of the Luperci, and the calling of one of the months by his name. 24. In addition to showings at triumphs given war heroes, the gods were borne in thensae at the Circensian games, that is, those celebrated in the Circus Maximus at Rome. The games began with a solemn procession known as the pompa circensis, during which all those who would take part in the day’s festivities would parade before the assembly with images, statues, chairs of divinities, litters, thrones, crowns and costumes. Tertullian, in De Spectaculis, says that the solemn character of the parade betrays the games’ origin in pagan superstition, and, clearly, Hobbes is taxing the Roman church with vestigial elements of paganism, both in its ceremony and the development of its doctrine; see his vivid description of Roman theology as Empusa, the demonic, underworld goddess, mentioned by Aristophanes in The Frogs 294 and Ecclesiazusae 1057, crowned with flaming hair and having for legs one of brass and the other of a donkey. Hobbes mentions her again in such works as the Elements of Philosophy and the Six Lessons; on this, see Douglas M. Jesseph, Squaring the Circle: The War between Hobbes and Wallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 31 1ff.

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As we shall see, the problem with Hobbes’s use of classical antecedents

to explain concepts of political philosophy is an interpretive one; it does not lie with his knowledge of the former. Enslavement among the Greeks and Romans is attested in records as far back as we have; along with the American South, they provide the relatively rare instances of slavery as a basic institution in human affairs. In Greece, it came to be predicated on the distinction between citizen and non-citizen: only non-citizens could pass from being a person to being property, though enslavement was permitted among citizens, but only after physical ejection from the community (fictitiously in the case of exposed children) or as commutation of

capital punishment”. Enslavement of outsiders and their conversion into property meant deracination, loss of name and of all the normal ties of kin and na-

tion, even of gods, replaced by new attachments supplied by the master and his society. Slaves were employed throughout the gamut of human activities, though, of course, they could not engage as citizens in political activity. Crime, war and piracy were the chief sources of slave supply, though Greek slave-traders surely dealt with “barbarians”, whose supply came either through warfare amongst themselves or through the sale of children. Problems associated with institution had become acute in Athens?”, for which we have the greatest attestation, just prior to the archonship of Solon

25. See below, p. 183. 26. Giorgio Agamben has brilliantly discussed the homo sacer, the haunted figure excluded from political life, as the precondition for the distinction between friend and foe developed by Carl Schmitt; see his Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998). 27. This is how Plutarch describes it, in Dryden’s translation: All the people were indebted to the rich; and either they tilled their land for their creditors, paying them a sixth part of the increase, and were, therefore, called Hectemorii and Thetes, or else they engaged their body for the debt, and might be seized, and either sent into slavery at home, or sold to strangers; some (for no law forbade it) were forced to sell their children, or fly their country to avoid the cruel-

ty of their creditors; but the most part and the bravest of them began to combine together and encourage one another to stand to it, to choose a leader, to liberate the condemned debtors, divide the land, and change the government. Then the wisest of the Athenians, perceiving Solon was of all men the only one not implicated in the troubles, that he had not joined in the exactions of the rich and was not involved in

the necessities of the poor, pressed him to succour the commonwealth and compose the differences. Cf. Aristotle, On the Athenian Constitution, parts 7 and 12, and the accounts given by Herodotus and Pausanias as well as the comparison Plutarch draws between Solon and Publicola. 28. It is always dangerous to extrapolate from the experience of Athens, which may often have been singular; see Frangois de Polignac, Cults, Territory and the Origins of the Greek City-state trans. by Janet Lloyd (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,

1995).

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(594-903). His cercaydeta (seisachtheia), the «shaking off» or canceling of all debts for which land or personal liberty was security, freed Athenians from debt-bondage and tended to close the point of access of Athenians into slavery. Also, he either created or added to the division of the Athenian population into census classes based on wealth and military performance (téAn) rather than birth. The innetg (hippeis) were the “knights”, rich men who provided their own horses and had political sentiments corresponding to their wealth. The Cevyitoi (zeugitai) were those of moderate substance who could provide their own armament or yoke of oxen. Corresponding roughly to farmers and craftsmen, this class also supplied the hoplites of the Athenian army, those who went down on their knees (onAita1) to fight with sword and shield against opposing archers or cavalry. The Oftec (thetes) were day laborers or hired men, the humblest class in a Greek city, those who could not afford a horse or suit of armor. They did not serve in the hoplite ranks, though they

fought as light-armed soldiers and found service later as paid rowers, sailors and marines

in the triremes of the Athenian

navy, as at the battles of Ther-

mopylae and Salamis. Citizens whose income did not reach 150 bushels of grain, measured in drachmas, the Oftes participated only in the éxxAeota (ekklesia), the assembly of the people, which selected the magistrates. But, they also served on the courts of justice, thereby obtaining a measure of real political power, especially through the review of the actions of the magistrates. To these, Solon evidently added the revtaxociougàwvor (pentakosiomedinoi), literally, the “500-bushel men”, those whose annual income exceeded the value of 500 drachmas. In shifting the ground of political privilege from birth to wealth, Solon secured the rights of all citizens to some share in the government and broke the monopoly on power enjoyed by the nobles (evratptdat),

thereby laying the foundation of the future democracy*®. It may have been an effect of Solon’s reforms that slavery came to be seen as fit only for non-citizens or even non-Greeks. This may be the cultural precondition of Aristotle’s doctrine of natural slavery; as he says in the Politics (1.2.8): «To rule and be ruled are, therefore, not necessary but also beneficial, and straight from birth some are marked to be ruled and others to rule».

Slave and Free in Hobbes

Incongruously perhaps, it is upon this background in the experience of an-

29. On Solon, see W. J. Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator: A Study of the Agrarian Problem in Attika in the Seventh Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), and A.W.G and W. G. A., Oxford Classical Dictionary sub voce “Solon” 2d ed. by N. G.. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 999ff.

30. Aristotle has this comment: «He might have made himself a despot by attaching himself to whichever party he chose, but he preferred, though at the cost of incurring the enmity of both, to be the savior of his country and the ideal lawgiver»; op. cit., part 11.

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cient Greeks with their slaves that Hobbes draws in distinguishing the reverence which subjects owe to their various masters, human and divine: Leviathan 4.45.13.667: The worship we exhibit to those we esteem to be but men, as to kings, and men in authority, is civil worship: but the worship we exhibit to that which we think to be God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies, gestures, or other actions be, is

divine worship. To fall prostrate before a king, in him that thinks him but a man, is but civil worship: and he that but putteth off his hat in the church, for this cause, that he thinketh it the house of God, worshippeth with divine worship. They that seek the distinction of divine and civil worship, not in the intention of the worshipper, but in the

words dovAeia and Aatpeta, deceive themselves. For whereas there be two sorts of servants: that sort, which is of those that are absolutely in the power of their masters, as slaves taken in war, and their issue, whose bodies are not in their own power, (their lives depending on the will of their masters, in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least disobedience), and that are bought and sold as beasts, were called S500A01, that is properly, slaves, and their service dovAeta: the other, which is of those that serve (for hire, or in hope of benefit from their masters) voluntarily, are called @ntec; that is, domestic servants, to whose service the masters have no further right, than is contained in the covenants made betwixt them. These two kinds of servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour is appointed them by another: and the word Aütpic, is the general name of both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether, as a slave, or a voluntary servant. So that Aatpeta signifieth generally all service; but dovAeta the service of bondmen only, and the condition of slavery: and both are used in Scripture (to signify our service of God) promiscuously; dovAeia, because we are God’s slaves; Aatpeia, because we serve him°!. And in all kinds of service is contained, not only obedience, but also worship; that is, such actions, gestures, and words, as signify honour.

The reverence due the immortal divinity is that which slaves owe to their master, namely, absolute submission such that their very lives and bodies are

in another’s power. This description indeed recalls the power of Greek and Roman masters, who could maim or kill their human property largely with impunity, but it sorts rather badly with the rather temperate and limited slavery known among ancient Jews. In the latter case, as we have seen, slavery, made

permanent through an act of will, could become a metaphor for faithful service and ground a claim of authority, as in the cases of Moses and Paul. By comparison to that of the slave, the reverence owed the mortal god, from whom, under the immortal God, we secure our peace and defense, is like that owed by a hired man to his master. Encompassed in this relationship are both the responsibilities and duties of the hired man as well as the limits upon the authority of the master. Among the latter we may include the requirements

31. On Aatpeta, see John SovAeta, see Romans

16:2; Romans

9:4 and 12:1; Hebrews

9:1 and 9:6. On

8:15 and 8:21, Galatians 4:24 and 5: 1, and Hebrews 2:15. The ci-

tations to dovd.og are too numerous in the Christian scriptures to list. I find no entry for AaTPIC”.

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of natural justice, based on reason and incumbent upon all, whether in the state

of nature or political community’. Hobbes’s distinction between the Xatpeia owed civil sovereigns and the dovAeia owed the divine sovereign rests upon some familiar features of his thinking regarding honor and worship, which he recounts in detail in chapter 10 of Leviathan.

Honor, Price and Power

At the root of any honor rendered to another lies some conception of worth or value, that is, the price at which others set the use .of one’s powers, for, while one may wish to set his or her use at the highest price, in fact it is not the seller but the buyer who determines price, which varies with circumstance. A temperate and learned judge is of great price in peace, but not so in war. Nor is all power rightly esteemed: Leviathan 1.10.14,151: The sciences, are small power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few, and in them, but of a few things. For science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it.

And, the true ground and source of power may be misperceived: Leviathan 1.10.15.151: Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war; because they confer to defence, and victory, are power: and though the true mother of them, be science, namely the mathematics; yet, because they are brought into the light, by the hand of the artificer, they be esteemed (the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother), as his issue.

In turn, at the root of perceived worth or value lies power, one’s present means to obtain some future apparent good. Power may be both natural and instrumental. Natural power consists in such strengths of the mind and body

as: extraordinary strength*, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Instrumental are those powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good luck. For the nature of power, is in this point, like to fame*, in-

32. On natural, ethical obligation, see Alan Ryan, “Hobbes and Individualism,” Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes ed. by G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). i 33. The strength must be extraordinary, presumably to impress the onlooker, as ordinary strength would not. 34. «Form» here likely means beauty; the Latin formosa, full of form, means beautiful. 35. «Fame» here likely means repute, rumor or gossip (fama in Latin), whose power to expand at an ever increasing rate was noticed by Vergil, Aeneid 4:173ff.:

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creasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste. Signs manifest the honor and dishonor we feel for one another; they are the

means whereby we communicate our estimations of others’ power in the struggle for recognition that is daily life**. Such estimations occur naturally and in commonwealths, and they have nothing necessarily to do with goodness

and justice or their opposites, Hobbes says, but only with opinion of power*’: Leviathan 1.10.48.156: Nor does it alter the case of honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power), be just or unjust: for honour consisteth only in the opinion of power. Therefore the ancient heathen did not think they dishonoured, but greatly honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their poems, committing rapes, thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: insomuch as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his adulteries?*; nor in Mercury, as his frauds, and thefts: of whose praises, in a hymn of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented music at noon, and before night, stolen away the cattle of Apollo, from his herdsmen*”.

As honor is in the eye of the beholder, so the efficacy of signs of honor, if

Extemplo Libyae magnas it Fama per urbes—Fama, malum qua non aliud velocius ullum; mobilitate viget, viresque adquirit eundo... 36. See Leviathan 1.11.2.161: So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. 37. On paternal and «despotical» power, see generally Leviathan, chapter 20. The analysis that Hobbes gives in that chapter bears out the view expressed here that, while he understands the power which the master initially exerts over the «servant» to encompass life and death, should the master offer a contractual relationship establishing political community, entrance into that relationship is voluntary for both, even if forced upon the servant by dire circumstance. See Leviathan 2.20.2.252. While the quotation from J Samuel 8 regarding Moses’ power (Leviathan 2.20.16.257) defines it as «absolute», that is, neither divided nor contingent, this evidently regards the scope of power as once established, that it be «as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it» (Leviathan 2.20.18.260). Hobbes’s theory of the will is controversial; cf., for example, G. A. J. Rogers, “Hobbes, Sovereignty and Consent,” and Patrick Riley, “Michael Oakeshott as a Critic of Hobbes’s

Theory of the Will,” Rivista di storia della filosofia, this volume. 38. Hobbes is referring to such incidents as the god’s ravishing of Io, of Ganymede, of Leda, etc., by way of a variety of instrumentalities. 39. In the Homeric poem to Hermes, “Homer” describes the trickster god of thieves: With all the mortals and immortals both He has dealings: seldom though does he help but unceasingly cheats Throughout the gloomy night the tribes of mortal men. Quoted from The Homeric Hymns trans. by Michael Crudden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

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not prescribed, lies in the estimation of those to whom they are made:

Leviathan 2.31.11.400: And of arbitrary worship, there be two differences: for sometimes it is a commanded,

sometimes voluntary worship: commanded,

when it is such

as he requireth, who is worshipped: free, when it is such as the worshipper thinks fit. When it is commanded, not the words, or gesture, but the obedience is the worship. But when free, the worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are no worship; because no signs of honour; and no signs of honour; because a sign is not a sign to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.

«Rational Worship» Though, in discussing honor, he withholds moral condemnation for the nefarious exploits of the gods depicted by Homer and Hesiod, in his own natural theology, Hobbes incorporates a key facet of Western theological discourse, namely, the attempt to arrive at forms of worship, language and thought worthy of the intuition we have of the divine. Criticism of Homer and Hesiod among the Greeks led to a movement away from local, anthropomorphic and anthropopathic gods, beginning with Xenophanes (570-475), who complained that «Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace among mortals, stealing and adulteries and deceiving of one another» (Diehls, frag. 11). His conception of the divine led him to affirm the existence of: [a] single god, the greatest among gods and men, not similar to men either in form or in thought [...]. He sees in his entirety, thinks in his entirety, hears in his entirety [...]. But without effort he governs everything by the force of his spirit [...]. And he dwells always in the same place, without moving at all, nor does it suit him to displace himself from one side to the other. (Diehls, fragg. 23-26)

Xenophanes inaugurated what became the philosophic criticism of popular religious conceptions and forms of worship; it is found in Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Epicureans, then also in the Greek and Latin Church Fathers and

the Reformers*®. It is operative in our day in the theology of Paul Tillich, for example, whose discussion of the religious symbol“! bears within it the awareness of theology’s need to cast off antiquated forms, much as the true deity re40. On Xenophanes, see Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers trans. by Edward S. Robinson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), and «A History of the Concepts Beorpétes and iepompétec» (thesis submitted by Harold Anton Thrap Reiche, April, 1955; Harvard University, Department of Classics). I owe this reference to my friend Larry Dickey. See also Silvia Lanzi, Theos Anaitios: Storia della teodicea da Omero ad Agostino (Rome: Il Calamo, 2000). 41. See his Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), passim and esp. pp. 239ff., where he says that the sole non-symbolic statement about God is that

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places the false one in Diderot’s famous essay Rameau’s Nephew: The true, the good and the beautiful will prevail. lenged, but in the end they are acknowledged, and tion. Inferior things may be esteemed for a time Change is gradual. The foreign god takes his place tle asserts itself, and one fine day elbows out his Robertson (sic) there’s the idol, flat on its back*.

Their rights may at first be chalpeople come to yield their admirabut the end is a great yawn [...] next to the native idol, little by litfellow — before you can say Jack

‘ Hobbes too participates in this long tradition of critical theology, in at least two ways. For one, especially in the second half of Leviathan, he develops the common Protestant criticism brought against what he considered Roman superstition, the «kingdom of darkness», for example, the practices of exorcism

and holy water. But, in chapter 31, the pivotal transition to the second half, he also sets out a detailed, positive description of the criteria of «rational worship», deriving them from his conclusions regarding what natural reason discovers as to God and His attributes**. Thus, as he sums up the book’s first half and makes the transition from natural knowledge to revelation, he states the natural ground of our servitude to God, namely, His irresistible power, the concept which Prof. Foisneau has so persuasively analyzed“:

God is being-itself, the structure of being, possessing the power of determining the structure of everything that has being. Apart from this statement, everything else said of God is symbolic in the sense that every segment of finite reality used as a symbol, while it participates in the power of the divine to which it points, nonetheless is transcended by that very power: The segment of finite reality which becomes the vehicle of a concrete assertion about God is affirmed and negated at the same time. It becomes a symbol, for a symbolic expression is one whose proper meaning is negated by that to which it points. Still, it also is affirmed by it, and this affirmation gives the symbolic expression an adequate basis for pointing beyond itself. 42. Quoted from Rameau’s Nephew and Other Works trans. by Jacques Barzun and Ralph Bowen (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956), pp. 66ff. This essay, which traveled in 1784 with Diderot’s other writings to L’Hermitage as the property of Katharine the Great, might never have been read but for a second copy smuggled out of Russia and circulated first in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. It first reached Schiller, then Goethe, and its entrance into public awareness may be dated to 1805, just two years prior to the publication of Hegel’s Phenomenology, in which it is quoted. 43. See, for example, Leviathan 4.46.18.691. It is peculiar that Hobbes concentrates on

the alleged abuses of the Catholic Church in 1651, after the execution of the king and the Independents were at the height of their power. The late Karl Schuhmann once proposed that Hobbes incorporated into Leviathan a tract, not now in existence, against Bellarmine, his target in chapter 42. Or, he may have felt that the English Presbyterians perpetuated some key errors of the Roman church. If so, the extension of his argument against Catholicism, with its condemnation of the importation of Greek demonology into Christian theology, seems inapposite. 44. The noetic status of these conclusions is difficult to assess; I hope to write at greater length on this topic in the future. 45. See Luc Foisneau, Hobbes et la toute-puissance de Dieu (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000).

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Leviathan 2.31.5.397: The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them, as if he required obedience, as of gratitude for his benefits; but from his irresistible power. I have formerly shown, how the sovereign right ariseth from pact: to show how the same right may arise from nature, requires no more, but to show in what case it is never taken away. Seeing all men by nature had right to all things, they had right every one to reign over all the rest. But because this right could not be obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that right, to set up men (with sovereign authority) by common consent, to rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of power irresistible; there had been no reason, why he should not by that power have ruled, and defended both himself, and them, according to his own discretion. To those therefore whose power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of power; and consequently it is from that power, that the kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and gracious; but as omnipotent. And though punishment be due for sin only, because by that word is understood affliction for sin; yet the right of afflicting, is not always derived from men’s sin, but from God’s power.

Then, in a novel approach, Hobbes links the divine attributes, discovered by natural reason, to the language of worship which they rationally require*° Leviathan 2.31.14.401: That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of nature, I will begin with his attributes.

For one, we do not do honor to that whose existence we doubt, so the first

requirement of proper worship is to attribute existence to God: Leviathan 2.31.14.401: Where, first, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him existence. For no man can have the will to honour that, which he thinks not to have any being.

For another, God must be distinguished from world as its cause: Leviathan 2.31.15.401: Secondly, that those philosophers, who said the world, or the soul of the world was God, spake unworthily of him; and denied his existence. For by God, is understood the cause of the world; and to say the world is God, is to say there

is no cause of it, that is, no God.

Awareness of the world’s dependence upon God is secured by language recognizing that it is created and not eternal: Leviathan 2.31.16.402: Thirdly, to say the world was not created, but eternal, (seeing that which is eternal has no cause), is to deny there is a God.

46. While I agree with Prof. Sorell that Hobbes describes «un Dieu dont les attributs sont dictées par une philosophie de la science,” I cannot agree that “Il ne joue pas de rôle important dans la science politique qui y est enseignée». See Tom Sorell, “Le Dieu de la Philosophie et le Dieu de la Religion chez Hobbes,” Politique, Droit et Théologie chez Bodin, Grotius et Hobbes ed. by Luc Foisneau (Paris: Éditions KIMÉ, 1997), pp. 243-64.

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Recognition of God’s concern for the world, His providence, is an affective

source of the worship we render Him: Leviathan 2.31.17.402: Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) ease to God, take from him the care of mankind*’; take from him his honour: for it takes away men’s love, and fear of him; which is the root of honour**.

The language of worship must also express a will to magnify God and not slight Him or contain Him within the frame of our limited understanding, unless it be by way of metaphor: Leviathan 2.31.18.402ff.: Fifthly, in those things that signify greatness, and power; to say he is finite, is not to honour him: for it is not a sign of the will to honour God, to attribute to him less than we can; and finite, is less than we can; because to finite, it is

easy to add more. Therefore to attribute figure to him, is not honour; for all figure is finite: Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an idea of him, in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is finite: Nor to attribute to him parts, or totality; which are the attributes only of things finite: Nor to say he is in this, or that place: for whatsoever is in place, is bounded, and finite: Nor that he is moved, or resteth: for both these attributes ascribe to him place: Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all finite: for there cannot be more than one infinite: Nor to ascribe to him (unless metaphorically, meaning not the passion but the effect) passions that partake of grief; as repentance, anger, mercy: or of want; as appetite, hope, desire; or of any passive faculty: for passion, is power limited by somewhat else. And therefore when we ascribe to God a will, it is not to be understood, as that of man, for a rational appetite; but as the power, by which he effecteth every thing. Likewise when we attribute to him sight, and other acts of sense; as also knowledge, and understanding: which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things that press the organical parts of man’s body: for there is no such thing in God; and being things that depend on natural causes, cannot be attributed to him.

He concludes his discussion of the language of rational worship with a powerful statement of negative or apophatic theology”: Leviathan 2.31.28.403: He that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by natural reason, must either use such negative attributes, as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible; or superlatives, as most high, most great, and the like; or indefinite, as good, just, holy, creator; and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is, (for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our fancy), but how much we admire 47. See the arguments in book ten of Plato’s The Laws. 48. Cf. Luther’s constant stress in his Small Catechism that we must love, fear and trust God. 49. On apophasis, see Jaroslav Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 36, 40-56, 94, 137-38, 197-98 and 200-14, and his more recent What Has Athens To Do with Jerusalem?: Timaeus and Genesis in Counterpoint (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997). See also Werner Jaeger, Humanism and Theology (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1943), esp.

pp. S8ff.

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him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is a sign of humility, and of a will to honour him as much as we can: For there is but one name to signify our conception of his nature, and that is, I AM°°: and but one name of his relation to us, and

that is God; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord*!.

He then goes on to discuss the actions of divine worship and in so doing paraphrases a line from the Roman satirist Martial>*: Leviathan 2.31.29.403: Concerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most general precept of reason, that they be signs of the intention to honour God; such as are, first, prayers: For not the carvers, when they made images, were thought to make them gods; but the people that prayed to them.

Enumerating the forms of worship due to God, he comes to the fear which knowledge of God provokes in us and the theological restraint it requires of us. But, he also emphasizes the limits of human knowledge and language, not only in the sphere of theology but generally:

50. A reference to Exodus 3:13: And

Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and

shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses,

I AM THAT

I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Is-

rael, I AM hath sent me unto you. Note the similarity between Hobbes’s

statement and Tillich’s, quoted above, note 41,

uttered some 300 years later. Hobbes clarified the meaning of the statement «God exists» as early as the response to Thomas White’s De Mundo: Personally, while I hold the nature of God is unfathomable, and that propositions are a kind of language by which we express our concepts of the natures of things, I incline to the view that no proposition about the nature of God can be true save this one: God exists, and that no title correctly describes the nature of God other than

the word “being” [ens].

See “De Mundo” Examined trans. by H. W. Jones (London: Bradford University Press in association with Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1976), p. 434, as quoted in Richard Tuck, “The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes,” Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain ed. by Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1993), pp. 122ff., slightly emended. For Thomas’ discussion of whether “He who is’ is most properly applied to God as name, see Summa Theologiae 1.13.1. 51. The attribution of these titles to God is a feature of ancient, specifically Platonic and especially Stoic, origin, so that, while the similarity with Christian terminology is striking, it is because the latter is indebted to the former, as well as to Jewish practice. These titles are appropriate in Hobbes’s natural theology and do not here necessarily imply Christian commitments. Defining the distinction between natural and revealed religion is of the greatest moment in chapter 31 because the former sets natural limits of reason upon public confession and worship in the case of the latter, even, or especially, in the case of Christian civil religion. On civil religion in Hobbes, see Tuck, op. cit. pp. 120-38. 52. See Martial, Epigrammaton, book 8, poem 24:

Qui fingit sacros auro uel marmore uultus,

non facit ille deos: qui rogat, ille facit. See also De cive, chap. 15.

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Leviathan 2.31.33.404: Fifthly, it is a part of rational worship, to speak considerately of God; for it argues a fear of him, and fear, is a confession of his power. Hence fol-

loweth, that the name of God is not to be used rashly, and to no purpose; for that is as much, as in vain: and it is to no purpose unless it be by way of oath, and by order of the commonwealth, to make judgments certain; or between commonwealths, to avoid war. And that disputing of God’s nature is contrary to his honour: for it is supposed, that in this natural kingdom of God, there is no other way to know any thing, but by natural reason; that is, from the principles of natural science; which are so far from teaching us any thing of God’s nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature living.

Hobbes’s sweeping statement regarding the limits of human knowledge should neither lead us to slight the human capacity for thought nor blind us to some distinctions he makes as to different mental operations. As to the first”, clearly, Hobbes intends to bring all rational conjecture whereby we understand our experience of the world under quite restrictive epistemological premises, whether it concerns the divine nature, our own nature or that of the least bacterium: «the principles of natural science, which are so far from teaching us...». Truth is a matter of words, not things; that our definitions and propositions are well-defined and well-ordered is no guarantee that any of the objects of our study in fact exist. Truth is in this sense conditional, so that the import of any statement regarding the existence of something is always hypothetical: Leviathan 1.7.1.131: No discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but only, that if this

be, that is; if this has been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing. And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms; the end or last sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE.

While this is the case, there are differences among the truth claims which we may make regarding our reasonings. In insisting, as he does against his

friend White’, that «apiAoodgmc faciunt qui profitentur se demonstraturos, quod Deus existit» (They do so unphilosophically who claim that they will demonstrate that God exists), Hobbes is not denying that the existence of God

may be proven, as he himself does”. He is insisting upon a distinction be53. On what follows, see A.P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes

on Religion and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 348ff. 54. See Hobbes, De Mundo, op.cit., XXVI, 2. 55. See below, pp. 194ff.

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tween proof and demonstration whose origin lies in the technical vocabulary of Aristotelian philosophy. Demonstration is argument whose propositions are a priori and necessary; as such, it is unable to prove the existence of any given state of affairs. Proofs for existence require empirical premises, such as the evidence of order in the world, which proves the existence of God. Certainly, reason neither demonstrates nor proves the existence of God as He is revealed in the scriptures, that is, as creator of the world°° and legislator of its laws. And, to deny that it does is to insist upon a key distinction within his own the-

ology, whereby nature and grace are separated into different spheres*’. As should be clear to this point, we have treated what natural reason teaches as to the attributes of God, that is, Hobbes’s natural theology, and the language of rational worship which it requires. In that the existence of order in the world proves the existence of God, however far from demonstration this insight departs, it would be in error to describe it as psychological or stemming merely from feeling, though it surely gives rise to feeling. For, as we shall see, Hobbes is at pains to distinguish superstition from «true religion», and this can be done only on the basis of their differing sources: the first in fear and interest; the second in thought. Both the superstitious and the rational worshipper fear God. But, the fear of God of the idolater is different in kind, source and object from the fear of God as omnipotent, resulting in the will to rational worship. The first is unwarranted because its object is non-existent,

«nothing»; the second is warranted and approved by Hobbes? as stemming from a conclusion of reason regarding the necessity with which causes follow

one another, as shall appear®’. Hobbes’s commitment to the Xenophantic criterion of worship is apparent in his discussion of the ancients’ worship of their gods: Leviathan 2.31.34.404: Sixthly, in prayers, thanksgivings, offerings and sacrifices, it is a dictate of natural reason, that they be every one in his kind the best, and most significant of honour. As for example, that prayers and thanksgiving, be made in words and phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor plebeian; but beautiful, and well composed; For else we do not God as much honour as we can. And therefore the heathens did absurdly, to worship images for gods: but their doing it in verse, and with music, both of voice, and instruments, was reasonable. Also that the beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the gifts

56. This is to say that Hobbes refrains from opining as to whether the world is eternal, a restraint exercised by Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Ockham before him; see Martinich, ibid. 57. See below, pp. 199ff. I hope to write on this point at greater length at a later time. 58. Fear may follow upon knowledge of God as first cause, but fear is not the origin of the concept of God as first cause. See below, p. 198. 59. Leviathan 2.31.33.404: «Fifthly, it is a part of rational worship, to speak considerately of God; for it argues a fear of him, and fear, is a confession of his power». 60. See below, pp. 195ff. Hobbes eschews the term «rational fear» (see “Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance”

animadversion

to XXV

(d)), but some

such

term would seem to capture the sense he intends in approving fear at God’s irresistible power. But, it is a fear that stems from a rational insight and thus is unlike the irrational fear of the idolater, stemming from interest and leading to «feigning» of its objects.

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they offered, and their actions in worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention

to honour him*'. But, the greatest act of divine worship required by natural reason is obedience to the laws of nature: Leviathan 2.31.36.405: Lastly, obedience to his laws (that is, in this case to the laws

of nature), is the greatest worship of all. For as obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice®’; so also to set light by his commandments, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the laws of that divine worship, which natural reason dictateth to private men.

«True Religion» and Theodicy We have seen that Hobbes believed that Greek popular religion did well to honor its gods in fitting forms of worship, though it failed to achieve an adequate conception of divinity, that is, one properly grounded in reason, with a fit object for its worship. But, Hobbes did find such a conception in the thought of ancient philosophers who described God as first cause; indeed, the conception of God as first cause remains for him the rational ground upon which we owe God the honor, worship and devotion of the slave. For, reason, led by curiosity, at last concludes that God is first cause and as such the rightful object of our rational worship, as our discussion will show. Moreover, operating within the distinction between nature and grace, Hobbes sharply separates the conception of God discovered in nature from that revealed by grace through covenant™. Precisely the distinction between

61. Signs of worship can be both natural and instituted: Leviathan 2.31.39.406: But because not all actions are signs by constitution, but some are naturally signs of honour, others of contumely, these latter (which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence) cannot be made by human power a part of Divine worship; nor the former (such as are decent, modest, humble behaviour) ever be separated from it. But whereas there be an infinite number of actions, and gestures, of an indifferent nature; such of them as the commonwealth shall ordain to be publicly and universally in use, as signs of honour, and part of God’s worship, are to be taken and used for such by the subjects. And that which is said in the Scripture, It is better to obey God than men, hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature. 62. That is, on natural grounds, apart from the teachings of revealed religion. 63. See above, p. 178. 64. Hobbes had distinguished between God as the God of nature and God as the God of Abraham, as early as De cive chapter 16: 10. Now those [laws] are known to all, to wit, the decalogue, and those other, as

well judicial as ceremonial laws, which we find from the twentieth chapter of Exodus to the end of Deuteronomy and the death of Moses. Now of those laws, delivered in general by the hand of Moses, some there are which oblige naturally, being

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God discovered as first cause and God revealed as author grounds his theod-

icy First, let us recall Hobbes’s definitions of superstition and religion, true or

not: Leviathan 1.6.36.124: Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the

power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION. Theological truth, so to speak, is the circumstance in which what one rationally takes to be the case about God is in fact the case. «And when the power

imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE

RELIGION. ..»°8. And, reason’s

made by God, as the God of nature, and had their force even before Abraham’s time. Others there are which oblige by virtue of the covenant made with Abraham, being made

by God

as the God

of Abraham,

which

had their force even

before

Moses’s time, by reason of the former covenant. But there are others which oblige by virtue of that covenant only, which was made last with the people themselves; being made by God, as being the peculiar king of the Israelites. 65. To the term author, we might also add «person» in that God’s disclosure of His personal identity over time is the substance of Hobbes’s doctrine of the Trinity, revealed in promise to the Israelites and then in fulfillment to Christians; on this, see my “Hobbes and

the Economic Trinity,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1999): 397-428. Cf. Aquinas’ statement, «It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason»; Summa Theologiae 1.32.1. Also, that God is legislator of the natural laws is a truth only of revelation; see Leviathan 1.15.41.216, but also Leviathan 2.31.2.395. 66. It is usual to assert that Hobbes separates reason and religion, but, as this discussion

of his natural theology hopefully shows, that is at best a half-truth. 67. In his edition at this point, Prof. Curley questions whether this definition commits Hobbes to a purely political definition of religion. This seems correct in that, like Luther and Ludwig Feuerbach, Hobbes describes the inclination to worship as inborn and natural and thus prior to politics. See Leviathan 1.11.26.167: And they that make little, or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their gods. By which means it hath come to pass, that from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible, is the natural seed of that, which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that worship, or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition. 68. In De cive (II, 21), Hobbes distinguished the natural knowledge of God from given forms of worship and confession in which it is expressed: «For though by the light of nature it may be known that there is a God, yet no man thinks he is to swear by him in any other fashion, or by any other name, than what is contained in the precepts of his own proper, that is (as he who swears imagines) the true religion». He makes a similar point later (XV, 16): And seeing men cannot be afraid of the power they believe not, and an oath is to no purpose, without fear of him they swear by; it is necessary that he that sweareth, do it in that form which himself admitteth in his own religion, and not in that form

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discovery of God as first cause is evidently true, for that realization is the final conclusion in the pursuit of the knowledge of the causes of things: Leviathan 1.11.25.167: Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes®, draws a man from consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God”. So that it is impos-

sible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes, without being inclined thereby

which he useth, that putteth him to the oath. For though all men may know by nature, that there is an Almighty power, nevertheless they believe not, that they swear by him, in any other form or name, than what their own (which they think the true)

religion teacheth them. 69. Hobbes earlier described curiosity as the “lust of the mind;” Leviathan 1.6.35.124: Desire to know why, and how, CURIOSITY;

such as is in no living creature

but

man: so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure. I believe this answers the criticism of A. E. Taylor’s theory that it failed to relate Hobbes’s psychology to his philosophy; see “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes,” Hobbes Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp.35-55. For a discussion of related points, see Kinch Hoekstra, “Hobbes on Law, Nature and Reason,” Journal of the

History of Philosophy 4 (2003): 111-20, commenting on an article previously published in that journal by John Deigh.

70. Hobbes is careful to characterize «God» as an indefinite name, which he defines in Elements of Law (EW V, 6), as names «we limit not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer». The term has a long history as a technical expression in scholasticism, and its special trick is that, in the case of non-finite objects, such as God, it is by definition impossible to render such a name

finite, that is, to attach to it a definable reference and, by

consequence, an identifiable meaning, in a sense to which everybody would be obliged to subscribe. Of course, the attempt to give a definable reference to God and thereby render Him an object of science would be fruitless and contrary to several of Hobbes’s most keenly argued theses regarding the scope of knowledge and the «nature» of God. Also, to do so would scarcely be characteristic in the Christian tradition; see above, note 49. Nonetheless, if, as I believe, Hobbes’s theology grounds his theory of natural obligation, then we should not be surprised if the latter is difficult to analyze and define; its ground in natural theology is similarly difficult to define. His adoption and use of the Xenophantic criterion of religious language and worship is a clear indication of his intentions in discussing theological themes, even if the tendency of his thought would seem to disparage theology as «rhetoric», in contrast to «philosophy». Clearly, he intends his remarks and arguments as means of arriving at outcomes in religion more favorable to peace and concord than the theological disputes and impasses that had led to civil war. On his inability to maintain the philosophy/rhetoric distinction in his own writing, see Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). More broadly, one must question whether the theoretical tools which he uses are adequate to the project he assays; his insights may have been superior to his means of expressing them. On Hobbes’s nominalism, see Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology trans. by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp.

191-92.

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9

to believe there is one God eternal’'; though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature.

Hobbes then gives an eloquent simile to explain how one may arrive at a conception of something without a prior perception of the thing itself: Leviathan

1.11.25.167

con't: For as a man

that is born blind, hearing men

talk of

warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there, which men call fire, and is the cause of the heat he feels; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an idea, or image of him in his mind.

We may distinguish true religion from superstition on the basis of their different origins: in the latter, fear and interest; in the former, knowledge of causes: Leviathan 1.12.6.169: This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something”. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some power, or agent invisible: in which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old poets said, that the gods were at first created by human fear: which spoken of the gods, (that is to say, of the many gods of the Gentiles) is very true.

Hobbes thus agrees with Luther that the superstitious invent («feign»; in Latin, fingere) their gods out of fear, as the reformer says in his Large Catechism, explaining the First Commandment: Thou shalt have no other gods before Me. That is: Thou shalt have and worship Me alone as thy God. What is the force of this, and how is it to be understood? What does it mean to have a god? or, what is God? Answer: A god means that from which we are to expect all good and to which we are to take refuge in all distress, so that to have a God is nothing else than to trust and believe Him from the whole heart; as I have often said, the confidence and faith of the heart alone make both God and an idol [...] [Y]ou

can easily see and judge how the world practices only false worship and idolatry. For no people has ever been so reprobate as not to institute and observe some divine worship; every one has set up as his special god whatever he looked to for blessings, help, 71. The force of «inclined» is difficult to judge. If the conclusion as to the existence of God necessarily lacks the force of a demonstration, in that it follows an analysis of the train of causes, it seems more than a mere psychological tendency or propensity. It seems to be a necessary conclusion of reason, and, as we have seen above, note 68, that Hobbes is willing simply to state that nature teaches the existence of an omnipotent deity. 72. Hobbes may be said to describe a projection theory of superstition based on the human need to operate in the world free of fear. This is not so different from many ancients’ views or even from that of Feuerbach, though, unlike him, Hobbes explicitly withholds from extending his criticism to the conception of God as first cause, much less that revealed by faith.

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and comfort [...] Therefore the heathen really make their self-invented notions and

dreams of God an idol, and put their trust in that which is altogether nothing. Thus it is with all idolatry; for it consists not merely in erecting an image and worshiping it, but rather in the heart

While the Reformer emphasizes the elements of trust and belief for pagan and Christian alike, Hobbes gives a much more fully rationalist account of natural theology, stressing the discovery of God as first cause as the ground of true religion, while both stress fear as the cause of superstition. Again, as Hobbes is at pains to emphasize, the ground of the natural belief in God is not fear and interest but curiosity into the causes of things: Leviathan 1.12.6.169, con’t: But the acknowledging of one God”, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues, and operations; than from the fear of what

was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the heathen philosophers confessed)”* one first mover; that is, a first, and an eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the

name of God”: and all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both inclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods, as there be men that feign

them”.

73. Curiosity evidently leads one to acknowledge what was antecedently true, namely, the existence of «one God», the first mover. In the Latin text, «acknowledgement» is rendered as «agnitio»; OL Ul, 86. 74. Hobbes allows for pagan philosophers’ possession of knowledge of God as first cause, as developed for example in book ten of Plato’s The Laws. In the Appendix to the Latin Leviathan, §109, Hobbes says of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus that they were «truly philosophers according to the understanding of the pagans», that is, «men devoted to truth and virtue». Here in Hobbes, we glimpse the figure of the virtuous pagan, developed in Christian thought, as in the patristic idea that classical thought anticipated Christian revelation as well as in Dante’s placement of the ancient philosophers in limbo. 75. The point here is evidently that, whatever they call Him, men rightly intend the concept, God as first mover. On the naming of God, cf. Aquinas’ statement, Summa Theologiae, 1.13.10:

Reply to Objection 5; Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion. So a pagan can take this name «God» in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not. 76. The Latin text may be helpful in deciphering the last lines of this quotation: ...atque hoc sine omni fortunarum suarum cogitatione, quarum (scil. fortunarum) sollicitudo et metum gignit et ab inquisitione causarum naturalium animum avertit, simulque Deorum fingendorum occasionem praebet, quot sunt fere qui eos fingunt; OL, III, 86.

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We may now distinguish true religion both from superstition, with its corollary concept, idolatry, and also from atheism. Superstition is belief in a false god, based upon the natural human impulse to worship, stemming from fear and hope of gain. Atheism is the false belief that there is no divine sovereign as first cause. Superstition, we have seen, expresses itself in the manifold deities and practices which humans have invented to assuage their fears at their own ignorance, weakness and impotence in the face of nature. Atheism is the result of the miscarried application of reason to the question of the meaning of existence. Both the idolater and the atheist are wrong, though in different ways. The superstitious person is right to feel the need to worship but wrong in the object of his worship, namely, a non-existent god, and this is why he is an idolater, namely, because he worships non-existent beings’’. The atheist has not proceeded from fear and has taken thought but has ended in a faulty conclusion, one contrary to reason, namely, that God does not exist. For, reason discovers, as we have seen, that God exists as first cause. Thus, just as

warranted fear of God as first cause may be distinguished from irrational fear and its expression in superstitious idolatry, so may it be distinguished from atheism, that is, the considered denial of God’s existence. This was a point emphasized by Hobbes in his defense against Bishop Bramhall in their extended exchange. Bramhall had challenged Hobbes on the status of the atheist: Bramhall:

[Hobbes] proceedeth further, that atheism itself, though it be an erroneous

opinion, and therefore a sin, yet it ought to be numbered among the sins of imprudence or ignorance. He addeth, that an atheist is punished not as a subject is punished by his king, because he did not observe laws: but as an enemy, by an enemy, because he would not accept laws. His reason is, because the atheist never submitted his will to the will of God, whom he never thought to be. And he concludeth that man’s obligation to obey God proceedeth from his weakness, (De cive, xv. 7: vol. II. p. 336): Manifestum est obligationem ad prestandam ipsi (Deo) obedientiam, incumbere hominibus propter imbecilitatem. First, it is impossible that should be a sin of mere ignorance or imprudence, which is directly contrary to the light of natural reason. The laws of nature need no new promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in the heart of man. The law of nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God, without our assent; or rather, the law of nature is the assent itself. Then if nature dictate to us that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped in such and such a manner, it is not possible that atheism should be a sin of mere ignorance.

Instead, according to Hobbes, having considered the question of God’s ex-

77. This is how Paul sets the matter out in / Corinthians 8, in discussing whether the new Christians could eat meat sacrificed to idols: 4We know that an idol is nothing at all in the world and that there is no God but one. 5 For even if there are so-called gods, whether in heaven or on earth (as indeed there are many «gods» and many «lords»), 6 yet for us there is but one God, the Father, from whom all things came and for whom we live; and there is but one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things came and through whom we live.

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istence, through an error in reasoning, the atheist is led to a faulty conclusion, namely, the non-existence of God, contrary to the dictates of reason, which shows that God exists as first cause, and this error is why he is a fool and less

rational than even the superstitious idolater: Hobbes: [...] Fear of invisible powers, what is it else in savage people, but the fear of somewhat they think a God? What invisible power does the reason of a savage man suggest unto him, but those phantasms of his sleep, or his distemper, which we frequently call ghosts, and the savages thought gods; so that the fear of a God, though not of the true one, to them was the beginning of religion, as the fear of the true God was the beginning of wisdom to the Jews and Christians’*? Ignorance of second causes made men fly to some first cause, the fear of which bred devotion and worship. The ignorance of what that power might do, made them observe the order of what he had done; that they might guess by the like order, what he was to do another time. This was their prognostication”? [...] I said superstition was fear without reason. Is not the fear of a false God, or fancied demon, contrary to right reason? And is not atheism boldness grounded on false reasoning, such as is this, the wicked prosper, therefore there is no God? [Bramhall] offers no proof against any of this; but says only I make atheism to be more reasonable than superstition; which is not true: for I deny that there is any reason either in the atheist or in the superstitious. And because the atheist thinks he has reason, where he has none, I think him the more irrational of the two [...] In that I say

atheism is a sin of ignorance, he says I excuse it. The prophet David says, the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. Is it not then a sin of folly? It is agreed between us, that right reason dictates, there is a God. Does it not follow, that denying of God is a sin proceeding from misreasoning?

There is thus a well developed theory of natural theology in Hobbes’s account, which implicates both his psychology, through the concept of curiosity as the «lust of the mind», and his anthropology, through an understanding of what we might term the religious a priori, though it remains for another time to link it to his theory of political obligation. Clearly, he is the inheritor of a long tradition, both classical and Judaeo-Christian, which drew the spheres of reason and religion together rather more closely than some do today, though he is concerned not to arrogate to reason what remains mysterious in religion®!: Leviathan 3.32.2.409: For though there be many things in God’s word above reason; that is to say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet

78. The fear which is the beginning of wisdom (Proverbs 1:7) may be the conception of God as creator of all things, contained in the doctrine of creation announced in Genesis and the presupposition of all biblical theology. This may mark a change from the doctrine taught in the English Leviathan regarding what we may know about creation; see above, note 56. Determining whether it is or not must await, in my view, a more fully developed understanding of Hobbes’s theological development. 79. Hobbes is evidently referring to such ancient practices as consulting oracles, wearing amulets, casting horoscopes and the taking of the auspices. 80. Cf. William Alexander Johnson, On Religion: A Study of the Theological Method in Schleiermacher and Nygren (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964). 81. See below, p. 201.

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there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilful interpretation, or erroneous ratiocination.

Fear of God as first cause is the basis of the rational worship which Hobbes prescribes in the 31% chapter of Leviathan®?, and, because he is discussing the

kingdom of God by nature and not by revelation, his prescriptions are valid for all forms of divine worship, whatever one’s religion, Christian, Jewish, pagan, etc. Clearly, given the social dislocations that, he felt, had caused the Civil War, the attempt to prescribe forms of worship and belief which could restrain sectarian violence lay very close to his interests as a theorist; whatever its success, his description of rational forms of worship and confession is intrinsic to his theoretical project. The transition of chapter 31 is thus key; it is the pivot of the book. This is not because

the first part deals with reason

and the second

part does

not,

though, even on this ground, the chapter proceeds only in the light of «natural reason», as we have seen Hobbes emphasize. Reason plays a very important role throughout Leviathan, not least in its revealed religious elements, as he states it should: Leviathan 3.32.2.409: Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses, and experience; nor (that which is the undoubted word of God) our natural reason. For they are

the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith*5, but employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in God’s word above reason; that is to say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilful interpretation, or erroneous ratiocination.

In addition, the textual analysis of the Bible that Hobbes

pursues in

82. Leviathan 2.31.1.395: That the condition of mere nature, that is to say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are sovereigns, nor subjects, is anarchy, and the condition of war: that the precepts, by which men are guided to avoid that condition, are the laws of nature: that a commonwealth, without sovereign power, is but a word, without sub-

stance, and cannot stand: that subjects owe to sovereigns, simple obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the laws of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written. There wants only, for the entire knowledge of civil duty, to know what are those laws of God. For without that, a man knows not, when he is commanded any thing by the civil power, whether it be contrary to the law of God, or not: and so, either by too much civil obedience, offends the Divine Majesty, or through fear of offending God, transgresses the commandments of the commonwealth. To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know what are the laws divine. And seeing the knowledge of all law, dependeth on the knowledge of the sovereign power; I shall say something in that which followeth, of the KINGDOM OF GOD. 83. A reference to the servant in the parable of the talents who unproductively laid up his master’s money in a napkin; see Luke 19 and Matthew 25. Hobbes puns on “implicit” in that the Latin implicare means to fold up.

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Leviathan should be seen as fundamental to its larger project as well as an important contribution to modern biblical studies**. Few of Spinoza’s insights into scripture, for which he is so noted, are not stated or implied by Hobbes. And, the attempt to develop rational criteria and methods and a reasoned approach to theological discourse has been cited as a contribution to the reasoned tone of 17°-century theological discussion”, though, of course, his own substantive theological treatments, such as his doctrine of the Trinity, were round-

ly and vociferously rejected*°. If we take his assertion that scripture is the source of doctrine together with his insistence upon the utility of reason in coming to know, if not understand, doctrine, then a summary of Hobbes’s position is that the Bible is the source of the Christian faith, with reason its neg-

ative criterion.

God as first cause and as author

God as first cause must be distinguished from God as author, just as reason and nature must be distinguished from faith and grace or God’s natural kingdom, so to speak, from his prophetic kingdom. Precisely, this distinction between God as first cause and God as author is the ground of Hobbes’s theodicy, as a brief survey of citations from early and late points in his writings shows. In his long exchange with Bishop Bramhall, beginning in Paris in or soon after 1645, Hobbes

was led to exculpate God as the author of sin, allowing

nevertheless that He was its cause. In their exchange, the bishop exclaims how he hates Hobbes’s identification of causal necessity with the familiar «divine decree» of natural theology®”.

84. On this point, see generally Klaus Scholder, The Birth of Modern Critical Theology: Origins and Problems of Biblical Criticism in the Seventeenth Century trans. by John Bowden (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990), and, more particularly, Henning Graf Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World trans. by John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp.194ff.: «So, if Hobbes towers above the circle of his intellectual contemporaries as an original thinker, and his efforts toward strict rational consistency have produced an impressive system providing a basis for sovereignty over the state and the state church, in his intrinsic presuppositions and his religious attitudes, which are also the basis of his entire thought, he is completely a child of his time»; at pp. 221 ff. 85. See Samuel Mintz, The Hunting of “Leviathan” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), passim.

86. Bramhall describes him as «blind Bayard», the horse whose impetuosity led to a reputation for foolhardiness; see Answer to Bramhall EW IV, 315: «Who is so bold as blind Bayard? The emblem of a little boy attempting to lade all the water out of the sea with a cockle-shell, doth fit T. H. as exactly as if it had been shaped for him, who thinketh to measure the profound and inscrutable mysteries of religion, by his own silly, shallow conceits». 87. See the discussion in Of Liberty and Necessity, EW 4.

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Attempting a coordination of natural science and theology, Hobbes describes every outcome in the natural world, including every human action, as a confluence of causal chains producing the given effect and at the same time unified immutably in the will of God as first cause: That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action (that [Bramhall] may no longer doubt of my meaning), is the sum of all those things, which now being existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined to be of such as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the decree of God.

The bishop objects that his determinism renders both humans the passive objects of mechanical actions and God the cause of sin. Hobbes is forced to address a familiar dilemma:

is there no sin in the world, or is God its cause?

He answers: {T]hough God be the cause of all motion and of all actions, and therefore unless sin be no motion or action, it must derive a necessity from the first mover; nevertheless it cannot be said that God is the author of sin, because not he that necessitateth an action, but he that doth command and warrant it, is the author.

The distinction between

cause

and author would reappear throughout

Hobbes’s works. Then, approaching the close of his long life, in the 1668 Latin Leviathan, Hobbes showed that he was unconvinced by critics who had argued that, in describing God as the cause of all things, he made God the author of sin. He crowed over his own skill as he took an accustomed jab at the scholastics: Itaque Scholastici, ubi videri voluerunt subtilissimi, ibi hebetudinem indicarunt maxime. Si subtiles fuissent, differentiam inter causam facti et authorem facile invenissent. Auctor facti is est, qui fieri jubet; causa est is per cujus vires factum est. (And so, just at the point where the scholastics wanted to seem most subtle, they most showed their dullness. If they had been sharp thinkers, they would easily have found the distinction between the cause of something that is done and its author. The author of that which is done is he who orders that it be done; the cause is he [sic] through whose powers it is done).

The distinction between God as first cause and God as author clarifies Hobbes’s quarrel with medieval natural theology and natural-law theory, which, he evidently felt, had too closely identified the biblical God of faith

with concepts drawn from the philosophy of the ancients*’. His approach in-

88. On theodicy in Hobbes, see Sergio Landucci, “La Potenza e la Giustizia di Dio,” La Teodicea nell’ Eta Cartesiana (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1986), pp. 99-126. 89. This is a common Protestant argumentative trope. For a discussion of God as the cause of things, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1.2.3. and 1.19.4.

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stead is to relate natural and revealed theology by means of several distinctions, one of which expresses itself in his theodicy as that between God as first cause and God as author. To conclude, if it is the case that the civil worship of the political sovereign is properly that of the 9ftec to their master, then knowledge of God as first cause is the basis of the divine worship of the slave of God. This attitude of fear before that which reason discovers as first cause is what distinguishes true religion and the rational worship owed the divine sovereign from superstition and the irrational invention and propitiation of gods caused by our ignorance of the true cause(s) of things. Yet a third factor, largely unexamined here, namely, revelation, determines an attitude of worship that is based neither solely on fear nor on reason but on confidence in the scriptural witness of the

miraculous events in the life of the Christ”. Finally, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Hobbes has transposed concepts deriving from one people’s experience for use in explicating another people’s experience. The Hebrew God, whom one is proud to serve «freely» in life-long devotion, assumes the guise of the Greek slave-owner. The moderate slavery idealized among Israelites is exchanged for the deracinated slavery of the Greeks. But, Hobbes is not consciously transposing contexts, it seems to me. He sees these matters with two eyes, one of reason, the other of faith, as

Karl Lòwith once said?!, and, because of this, his sight is dimmer than that of either his Greek or Christian forebears.

90. Confidence (or faith, which is an equivalent term here) in the reports of witnesses (uaptòpec, martyres) of the events of salvation history, as recorded in the scriptures, distinguishes the Christian faith from pagan belief: Leviathan 4.45.24.672: The Gentiles worshipped for gods, Jupiter and others; that living, were men perhaps that had done great and glorious acts; and for the children of God, divers men and women, supposing them gotten between an immortal deity, and a mortal man. This was idolatry, because they made them so to themselves, having no authority from God, neither in his eternal law of reason, nor in his positive and revealed will. But though our Saviour was a man, whom we also believe to be God immortal, and the Son of God, yet this is no idolatry; because we build not that belief upon our own fancy, or judgment, but upon the Word of God revealed in the Scriptures. Note Hobbes’s awareness of the teaching of Euhemerus (fl. c.300 B.C., Cyrenaic philosopher, b. Sicily). 91. See Karl Lòwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 206: The modern mind is not single-minded; it eliminates from its progressive outlook the Christian implication of creation and consummation, while it assimilates from the ancient world view the idea of an endless and continuous movement, discarding its circular structure. The modern mind has not made up its mind whether it should be Christian or pagan. It sees with one eye of faith and one of reason. Hence its vision is necessarily dim in comparison with either Greek or biblical thinking. On Hobbes’s analysis of Aristotle’s debts to popular superstition, see my “The Haunting of Thomas Hobbes”, forthcoming.

HOBBES AND POLITICS THE NORMATIVE AND THE EXPLANATORY IN HOBBES’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY by Tom Sorell

A set of precepts for achieving a certain goal can explain someone’s success in accomplishing something, or explain why a person fails in what they set out to do. The precepts can explain success, where taking steps that satisfy the precepts is effective in fulfilling the goal. They can explain failure, where the corresponding steps are ineffective, or where they are effective but have not been followed properly. In the same way, a set of precepts for making something can explain why an artifact has certain properties and not others. A bad recipe for a soufflé can explain why the resulting dish fails to retain air. Sometimes an explanation can suggest the appropriate precept. ‘Adam became obese because he did not take enough exercise’ suggests that Adam should have taken more exercise, and maybe it suggests as well that anyone who wants to avoid obesity ought to take plenty of exercise. These obvious points have a bearing on the question of whether Hobbes’s civil philosophy is explanatory, or normative, or both.

In earlier work on this topic!, I suggested that the claim of Hobbes’s political philosophy to count as a science does not depend on its sharing a method with natural philosophy, or on having a subject-matter strongly comparable to the subject-matter of natural philosophy. On my earlier interpretation, natural philosophy is straightforwardly explanatory. It identifies causes of observed effects based on conjectured mechanisms that could have produced those effects, and it also identifies the effects of different sorts of motions in general,

starting with those needed to generate plane and solid figures in geometry. This picture of natural philosophy fits in with the way that Hobbes tends to define it in his philosophy of science, and also with his derivation of his own natural scientific results in his optical treatises and his reports of the results of others in e.g. De corpore. Civil philosophy works differently. The three treatises which can be taken to state this civil philosophy do not consist of inferences

1. See my Hobbes (London: Routledge,

Politics’, in G. A.

1986) chs. 1 and 2; ‘The Science in Hobbes’s

J. Rogers and A. Ryan, Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Claren-

don Press, 1988), pp. 67-80.

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from observations to causes, or from very abstractly conceived types of motion to their possible effects. Instead, they contain very general arguments for the moral necessity of total obedience of subjects to sovereigns, and for sovereigns having to exercise their rights to the full. These arguments draw on theses that can be supported by Hobbesian physiology and psychology, but they are not natural scientific arguments themselves, and except for some metaphors for commonwealths that seem to classify them as bodies similar to those studied by medicine, there is little to suggest that natural and civil philosophy are similar kinds of science. Indeed, the metaphors can be dropped and the political treatises still count as works of political science. So I argued. I continue to believe that this general interpretation is correct’, and that Hobbesian natural philosophy and Hobbesian civil philosophy are methodologically quite distinct, as well as distinct in subject-matter. But it is misleading to put this by saying, as I sometimes have come close to saying, that civil philosophy is normative and natural philosophy is explanatory, as if civil philosophy weren’t supposed to be explanatory in the humdrum sense I mentioned at the beginning. For civil science to be explanatory in this sense, however, is not for it to approximate to, or to depend essentially upon, natural science. 1. Any interpretation of Hobbes’s philosophy of civil science — his account of the method and subject matter of civil science, and his distinction between civil science and civil pseudo science or pre-science — must meet three conditions of adequacy. First, it must treat all the statements of the civil philosophy as scientific, since each comes with the claim that it presents the doctrine of politics from first principles, or demonstratively, or on a foundation of reason. In particular, the doctrine of The Elements of Law must count as scientific no less than the doctrine of De cive or Leviathan. This requirement does not by itself imply that all statements of Hobbes’s civil philosophy have to be sciences in the same sense, but since there are very close textual parallels between the three books, it would be surprising if entirely different conceptions of science fit each of them or if one conception fits a pair of the books but not the other. A second condition of adequacy is this. Hobbes’s own descriptions of the method of civil science in any of the books cannot be taken as authoritative, unless there is evidence in the body of the books that the method described is actually being followed. Or, in other words, whatever way of proceeding is claimed to prevail in any one book had better be recognizable from the body of the book as the way it does in fact proceed. Hobbes wanted to be recog-

2. For criticism of the interpretation, see Alan Carter, ‘The Method in Hobbes’s Madness’, Hobbes Studies 12 (1999) pp. 72-89. David Boonin-Vail appears to agree with my interpretation in regard to Hobbes’s politics, but thinks that Hobbes’s politics needs to be distinguished from Hobbes’s ethics. See his Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 12ff.

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nized as the author of a science of politics, and this depended for him on resemblances between his books of political science, especially De cive, and scientific books from the Continent; so there was a temptation for him to describe the procedure he followed so as to maximize the similarities to the methods of those books, which were one and all books of natural science. There was a corresponding risk of overstating the similarities. On the other hand, his account of the failure of pre-scientific books of moral and political philosophy does not seem to call for a method borrowed from or similar to that of postscientific books of mechanics or astronomy. In discussing the prescientific books of the Greeks and Romans and of his contemporaries who were influenced by the Greeks and Romans, Hobbes does not complain that these writers do not know enough mechanics. He says that they have not managed to find a single basis or the right basis for their admonitions to practice the virtues. The basis that Hobbes proposes is the value of peace. All the virtues can be understood to promote peace, and pursuing peace — defined in a certain way — is the supreme moral priority. Deriving the moral precepts from the precept that peace is to be pursued does not involve Hobbes in any natural science, according to me, and any method that Hobbes claims to be following has to fit that derivation as it actually unfolds in his books. The third condition of adequacy on an interpretation of Hobbes’s civil science is that it fit in with what Hobbes himself says both in and out of the political writings about the resemblances and differences between civil science and natural science. Many commentators have aimed only to make the account of Hobbes’s civil philosophy cohere with the De corpore definition of ‘philosophy’ and that definition comes at the beginning of a book in Hobbes’s trilogy that is mostly to do with the requirements for natural philosophy. But there are many other relevant sources in Hobbes’s writings, and not just the well-known writings. Among the more obscure sources are the Epistle Dedicatory to the Six Lessons to the Professors of Geometry, and Considerations on the Reputation etc. of Thomas Hobbes. An acceptable interpretation must make sense of this whole array of passages. It is possible that not all the passages are consistent with one another, but even so, a line of thought that aims to make sense of them all is to be preferred to one that is very selective about the textual evi-

dence in the first place. 2. Now what I take to be the standard interpretation of Hobbes’s philosophy of science? violates all three of these conditions of adequacy. It lays special weight on De cive, takes some, but not much, notice of Leviathan, and virtually ignores The Elements of Law. It focuses on a passage from the 1647 preface to De cive announcing the method of the rest of the book, but it does not establish whether this method fairly represents what actually goes on in rest of the book . And it is selective in its acknowledgement of passages that

3. This interpretation is due primarily to 2nd ed. (London: Gower, 1973), ch. 4.

J. W. N. Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas,

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concern the similarities and differences between natural and civil philosophy. After quoting the relevant passage and expounding the standard interpretation that it has inspired, I will call attention to its many shortcomings. Then I will propose an interpretation that makes the passage cohere better with what is done in the rest of De cive. Later I will try to show that the proposed interpretation of the «method» of De cive fits the other two political treatises. The passage from the preface to De cive on which the standard interpretation lays particular weight runs as follows: As far as my Method is concerned, I decided that the conventional structure of a rhetorical discourse, though clear, would not suffice by itself. Rather I should begin with the matter of which a commonwealth is made and go on to how it comes into being and the form it takes, and to the first origin of justice. For a thing is best known from its constituents. As in an automatic Clock or other fairly complex device, one cannot get to know the function of each part and wheel unless one takes it apart, and examines separately the the material, shape and motion of the parts, so in investigating the right of a commonwealth and the duties of its citizens, there is a need not to take the commonwealth apart, but to view it as taken apart, i.e. to to understand correctly what human nature is like, and in what features it is suitable and unsuitable to construct a com-

monwealth, and how men who want to grow together must be connected (Tuck and Silverthorne, p. 10).

The interpretation placed on this passage is that Hobbes follows the resolutivecompositive method in De cive. This same method is supposed to be applicable to natural bodies. If I think about a gold object and resolve or analyze its nature into a certain collection of properties, then I can understand some of the properties of things made out of gold, including the gold thing I started with. I can understand e.g. that gold things don’t rust, or that they are malleable. This, too, is understanding the whole in the light of the parts. Now although the passage from De cive suggests that the commonwealth is to be understood by its constituents and that these constitutents are analogous to the pieces of the clock mechanism, it is not entirely clear which parts of the commonwealth are meant. Does the passage mean individual institutions — families, businesses, towns, cities, churches? Does the passage mean the indi-

vidual men? Does it mean the various roles individual men play as subjects and as parts of the government? Does it mean human nature? Going by how the passage itself spells out the analogy, the answer would appear to be «human nature». But in what sense is human nature a constituent of a commonwealth? Surely not in the same way as a wheel is a part of a clock? A more satisfactory analogy between the parts of the commonwealth and the working parts of the clock would exist if what corresponded to the wheels were the institutions —judicial, economic and advisory— involving the whole population of any commonwealth. But although this is sometimes the way the metaphor of the body politic as artificial man appears to be cashed out, e.g. in 4. I use the edition and translation by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne, On the

Citizen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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the Introduction to Leviathan, the anatomization of the body politic is not what one gets from the other political treatises or all of Leviathan. Admittedly, chapters 22 to 29 of Leviathan do keep going and elaborate the artificial man metaphor, but the working parts of the artificial man are not what the civil science starts from. It starts from the state of nature — from what human nature looks like when each person does what he likes with no-one and nothing to stop him but more powerful competitors. This is the starting point in each of the other treatises as well. If Hobbes had said that he took his beginning not from the analysis of the commonwealth but from the analysis of human nature, there would be no difficulty matching the body of each of his political treatises to his method. But then analysis would be being practiced on the nature of a natural kind of body — the nature of a human being , and not an artifact. Hobbes might have said that human nature is disguised by the effects on human behavior of coercive institutions, like penal law, and by the opinions of the ancients, so that one has to consider human nature in isolation from these things, through the thought experiment of the state of nature, or through candid reflection on the human habit of back-biting. Had he said this, his practice would have fit his claimed method, but the analogy with the clock mechanism would have been sacrificed. As it is, we have a shaky analogy and no sense, at the beginning of De cive or anywhere else, of a body politic being resolved into parts. What we have instead, especially in the Elements of Law and De cive, 1s a strong sense of human nature being resolved into its parts. The opening words of De cive echo those of the Elements of Law, and yet

Elements of Law has no hint of a claim of a method of taking a commonwealth apart as a clock is. De cive open as follows: The faculties of human nature may be reduced to four kinds: Physical force, Experience, ‘Reason, Passion. They are the starting point of the doctrine which follows (Tuck and Silverthorne, p. 21). Human nature is the starting point, not the idea of the commonwealth. And it

is the same in The Elements of Law. Chapter One is all to do with the general division of man’s natural faculties. Hobbes acknowledges that for the work of the whole, the ideas of human nature, body politic and law have to be understood (ch. 1.1), but he does not say that one reaches the idea of human nature by resolving the idea of the body politic. And he does not proceed as if the faculties of man or the idea of human nature before analysis was derived from the idea of the body politic. It looks as if in both books the analysis of human nature proceeds with no preliminaries —no conception of a body politic, no process of getting from such a conception to a raw, unanalyzed idea of human nature. So while there is no denying that Hobbes’s advertisement of his method at the beginning of De cive suggests that he is following the resolutive-compositive method on bodies politic, the advertisement proves false or misleading.

3. If Hobbes begins De cive and the Elements of Law with analysis, albeit analysis of the idea of human nature rather than the idea of commonwealth or

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a body politic, is not his civil tive/compsitive method? This analogy between, on the one deducing from a knowledge

science a product of analytic/synthetic or resoluclaim would be plausible, if there were a strong hand, resolving the nature of gold into parts and of those parts the properties of gold things that

present themselves to observation, and, on the other, what happens in civil sci-

ence. But there is not a strong analogy. Hobbes is not offering to say why commonwealths

are as they are, given what human nature is like; he is offer-

ing to say how commonwealths ought to be, given what human beings are like, and he insists that commonwealths as they ought to be are nothing like commonwealths as we experience them. That is why, in famous passages in Leviathan, he says it is no objection to his argument that rulers in commonwealths ought to have an undivided power of law-making, punishment, taxraising and so on that no actual commonwealth functions this way. At the end of chapter 20, Hobbes writes, The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and when, such Power [as Hobbes says belongs rightfully to sovereigns] has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask again, when or where has there been a kingdom long free from sedition and Civil Warre [...] But howsoever, an argument from the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes, and

nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundations of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on practise onely; which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the the curiousity, or the method to find out (Tuck, p. 145).

Hobbes is clearly suggesting that the prescientific practice of making and maintaining commonwealths is comparable to a practice of laying the foundations of houses on sand. And in ch. 30, he responds in similar terms to the claim that if the principles sustaining the rights of sovereigns existed, they would have been discovered before the appearance of Leviathan Wherein they argue as ill, as if he Savage people of America, should deny that there were any grounds, or Principles of Reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they never saw any so well built. [...] [LJong time after men have

begun to constitute Common-wealths imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may Principles of Reason be found out [...] to make their constitution (except by external violence) everlasting (Tuck, p. 232).

He is saying in both passages that civil science has been unknown to humanity in general, subjects and sovereigns alike, which is why states so often crumble from the inside. If we go back to the supposed analogy between clocks and commonwealths, Hobbes has to be interpreted as saying that there has never been a properly functioning clock! There has never been a properly functioning clock, and that the clocks that it principally makes sense to understand in

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terms of their parts are broken clocks or malfunctioning clocks. If the analogy is taken seriously, then the supposed point of the method of composition or synthesis is to take parts that could go to make a functioning watch and show how they need to be put together to have that effect. Now I deny that in any of the political treatises Hobbes gives any example of a malfunctioning state which he subsequently tries to analyze. The application of analysis to a commonwealth is entirely left out. So there is no analogy between what would need to be done to a malfunctioning clock to make it work and what would be needed to make a certain malfunctioning state work*. What happens is that human nature is revealed, and with that the need to avoid war. Then a set of precepts (never before stated) for avoiding war is outlined, and these, as well as

(up to then unheard of) rights of sovereignty they entail, are outlined, which Hobbes is sure people will rail against unless they see clearly how fearful war is, and how inevitable war is, given a whole variety of human temperaments. Unlike the parts of even a malfunctioning clock, the matter of the ideal commonwealth is not initially suited to forming commonwealths, needing only to be put together properly, as the so far malfunctioning watch needs to be. Internal reform of people is also needed. They need to be ruled by a kind of reasonable self-interest rather than passions, and by a clear view of consequences, rather than by the immediate effects of what they do. And this doesn't come naturally. That is why even an ideal commonwealth is not constitutionally robust — because human nature, which always threatens to reassert itself, is anti-social. It is as if the best clockwork available is hard plastic rather than jewels and steel. Since Leviathan does not aim to construct the properties of commonwealths as observed from the properties of human nature, but from rules for taming human nature, its method is not any kind of analysis and synthesis comparable to what one finds in natural philosophy. The same is true in De cive and Elements of Law. Not only is it no part of either book’s aims to throw light on the properties of actual commonwealths or bodies politic, but there is some strain in representing their conclusions as conclusions about bodies politic in any pointed sense of ‘bodies’ at all. In both books, Hobbes is giving reasons to citizens why they should obey their rulers in a far more thoroughgoing way than they are used to, and he is giving reasons why rulers should exercise their powers more thoroughgoingly than they are used to. It fits what he is doing to say that he is stating and defending precepts of citizenship and rulership, and not deducing properties of bodies from causes, which is the business of resolutive/compositive method. This is true even of De cive. Both the body of the book and more prominent parts of the prefatory material than the passage about clocks and commonwealths, make clear that the main job of the De cive is to set out the duties

people have. The very first paragraph of the Preface to the Readers says as much in so many words: 5. Contrary to Carter, op. cit., p. 78.

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This book sets out men’s duties, first as men, then as citizens, and lastly as Christians. These duties constitute the elements of the law and nature and nations, the origin of force and justice, and the essence of the Christian Religion (so far as the limits of my design allow) (Tuck and Silverthorne, p. 7).

In reading this passage it is important to give full weight to the use of the term ‘elements’. Hobbes is introducing a book belonging to the trilogy called Elements of Philosophy and he is identifying what the elements or fundamentals of civil philosophy are. These elements, according to the passage before us, are duties, statable in the form of precepts understood to be binding on everyone to whom they are addressed. These precepts start to be expounded in chapter 2 of De cive, where they take the form of the laws of nature, and the statement of them lasts two chapters. It is in the light of them that Hobbes turns to the causes and generation of the commonwealth. For it is by following the laws of nature, specifically the law enjoining the transfer of right or the sake of peace and the law enjoining the keeping of agreements, that Hobbes justifies obedience to civil laws, and obedience to civil laws is what citizenly duty consists of. Hobbes goes on from citizenly duty to an argument showing that absolute obedience to civil law is consistent with the requirements of religion. The metaphor of the artificial man and his anatomy does not organize Hobbes’s exposition in De cive°, and the idea of a commonwealth as a species of body, which is admittedly present in some of Hobbes’s writings, is noticeably absent from De cive’s definition of commonwealth: A COMMONWEALTH, then, (to define it) is one person, whose will, by the agreement of several men, is to be taken as the will of them all; to make use of their strength and resources for the common peace and defence (ch. 3, ix).

And although Elements of Law uses the term ‘body politic’ for the union that results from the transfer of right from the many to the few, Hobbes is not introducing it as a technical term, but as a piece of common parlance: 8. This union, so made, is that which men call now-a-days

a BODY POLITIC or civil

society (ch. 19. viii).

It is not until De corpore that civil and natural philosophy are related to one another as sciences of the two chief kinds of body (ch. 1, ix. EW, 11) ina

pointed sense, and even there, it is a question whether ‘body politic’ is more a metaphor than anything else, since the definition of body as thing taking up space and existing without the mind is clearly a definition of natural body only. In the same way, De corpore is a work of natural philosophy, even though it doesn’t bother to say that its subject is natural body. Now I have conceded that Leviathan does make reasonably heavy use in its middle chapters of the analogy between diseases and cures for human beings and diseases and cures for the artificial man that a commonwealth is 6. It comes in apparently as an afterthought in ch.6, xvix.

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metaphorically said to be; so there is some reason to claim that it is a treatise on politics in as much as it is a treatise on bodies politics. It still does not follow, however, that the claim of the book to state a science of politics depends on any strong analogy between scientific medicine and scientific politics. On the contrary, passages in Leviathan which bear on this question strongly suggest that what matters to the science of politics is its stating what Hobbes calls «theorems» of moral doctrine, and there is no question that by «theorems» in this connection Hobbes means not his diagnosis of the diseases of the body politic, but the systematic derivation of the laws of nature from the necessity for seeking peace, on the one hand, and the derivation of the duties of the sovereign from the concept of salus populi on the other. As textual evidence for this claim, I first adduce a passage from the very end of Part Two. Hobbes has just asked himself whether his civil science is too esoteric to be grasped by sovereigns unless they are also philosophers. His answer is ‘No’: But when I consider again, that the Science of Naturall Justice, is the onely Science necessary for Soveraigns, and their principall Ministers; and that they need not be charged with the Sciences Mathematicall, (as by Plato they are) further, than by good Lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other Philosopher hithero, hath put in order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern and how to obey; I recover some hope [...that...] this writing of mine , may fall into the hands of a Soveraign who, [...] by the exercise of entire Soveraignty[...will] convert this Truth

of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice ( ch. 31, Tuck, p. 254).

He is saying that no philosopher before himself has proved the theorems enabling people simultaneously to rule and obey. These theorems constitute the Science of Natural Justice. And he has previously identified some of these theorems with the Laws of Nature: Now the science of Vertue and Vice is Moral | Philosophie, and the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie [...] These dictates of Reason, men used to call by the name of Lawes, but improperly; for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves (ch. 16, Tuck, p: 111).

I do not think that the whole of the science of politics is constituted by the doctrine of the laws of nature, for the laws of nature by themselves do not give us all of the doctrine of the rights and duties of sovereigns. The rights of sovereigns are partly deduced from the character of the transfer of right that creates the commonwealth and the nature of the agreement to obey the sovereign; but the duties of the sovereign are treated separately in all of the political treatises (EL, ch. 28; De cive, ch. 13; L, ch. 30). Nevertheless, the rights and duties of sovereigns and subjects taken together are stated as precepts, and they are derived from two precepts intelligible independently of the natural philosophy: namely, the requirement that people seek peace, and the requirement that sovereigns act for the public safety.

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4. I have been arguing that, in practice, Hobbes does not unfold his civil science of politics by resolving bodies politic into parts and then reconstructing the observed properties of bodies politic as the effect of those parts. Indeed, the part/whole apparatus is hard to impose on what is actually done in the political treatises. The most natural way of organizing the work of the political treatises is as a statement of a variety of means that must be implemented by different agents to create and keep the peace or to assure the public safety. This is Hobbes’s civil science, and the means of making and keeping the peace are stated against the background of a theory of the war that results when human beings individually retain the right to be their own judges of how to secure their well-being. Now occasionally, Hobbes describes the use of resolution and composition in such a way that the method coheres with the means/end reading of the civil science. In chapter 6 of De corpore, Hobbes writes how by resolution and composition we can arrive at an answer to the question whether a certain action is just: For if a question be propounded, as whether such an action be just or unjust; if the unjust be resolved into fact against lawand that notion law into he command of him or them that have coercive power; and that power be derived from the wills of men that constitute that power, to the end that they may live in peace, they may at last come to this, that the appetites of men and the passions of their minds are such, that, unless they be restrained by some power, they will always be making war upon one another; which may be known to be so by anyone’s experience, that will but examine his own mind. And therefore, from hence he may proceed, by compounding, to the determination of the justice or injustice of any propounded action (EWI 74).

But what Hobbes is describing here is not the process of compounding an appearance out of some conjectured motions of bodies that might cause it, but simply reasoning through a chain of definitions to some conclusion about whether something is or is not against the law of a legitimate coercive power. If the reasoning reaches the conclusion that the action is against the law, then it is unjust; if not, then it is just. Now the relevant reasoning does not need to be described as a case of resolution and composition at all, and it fits in with the philosophy of science of The Elements of Law, which equates scientific truths with universal truths derived syllogistically, and which does not recognize analysis and synthesis as methods in the way De corpore does’.

7. Part of the problem in this whole area is that lots and lots of reasoning, causal and otherwise, is probably described as resolutive/compositive in the 17th century. But for this method to unify the different branches of philosophy that Hobbes is introducing in his triology, something like the problematic identification of «bodies» as its subject-matter is probably inevitable. And this runs afoul of the two major differences between civil science and natural science that Hobbes insists upon in certain parts of the trilogy and elsewhere, namely that civil philosophy describes an ideal polity and is normative, and also that proceeds, like geometry, from a precognition of causes. It is no good trying to insist on Hobbes’s adherence to resolutive/compositive method if too many kinds of reasoning counts as resolu-

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It is hard to see the question of whether a given action is just or unjust as a causal question, and yet resolution and composition is supposed to be a method for reasoning to and from known or possible causes. De corpore certainly encourages readers to think that the pursuit of causal questions is universal in the sciences. Chapter 6, article 2 says: [In our knowledge [...] of the causes of any thing, that is, in the sciences, we have more knowledge of the causes of the parts than of the whole. For the cause of the whole is compounded of the causes of the parts; but it is necessary that we know the things that are to be compounded, before we can know the whole compound. Now, by parts, I do not mean here parts of the thing itself, but parts of its nature, as by the parts of man I do not understand his shoulders, his arms etc but his figure, quantity, motion, sense, reason and the like, which accidents being compounded or put together constitute the whole nature of man, but not the man himself (EWI 67).

Hobbes does not say that he is speaking of the natural sciences only. In the same vein, there is this passage from the Epistle Dedicatory of the Six Lessons: The science of every subject is derived from a precognition of the causes, generation, and construction of the same (EW VII 184).

Hobbes goes on to say that in some sciences there is room for the demonstration of effects, and in others only the possibility of reconstructing effects from probable causes. But all sciences, he seems to be saying generate effects from causes. It is no accident that the confinement of science to causal questions comes in De corpore, and it is no accident either that a single model of resolution and composition tends to prevail there as well, a model which does not fit politics as well as it fits geometry, physics, optics, and the theory of the passions. For the fact is that De corpore is primarily a work of natural philosophy and offers a picture of philosophical method and of resolution and composition appropriate to natural philosophy. Although its chapters on philosophy and on the method of philosophy are officially chapters about philosophy in general and the method of philosophy in general, the chapters on method have primarily to be adequate to introduce later chapters of De corpore on geometry, pure mechanics, astronomy and physics. The method of the last part of philosophy — namely politics — and of the third volume in the Elements of Philosophy can perhaps with some justice be lightly sketched. Besides, as Hobbes says often, it rests on its own principles — truths about the functioning of the passions, which, though they are intelligible against the background of he general sciences of motion, are also supposed to be accessible or at least verifiable in the light of the evidence of introspection. Civil philosophy is supposed to be autonomous in the sense that its distinctive claims about the way human passions invite war are supposed to seem true to experience on their face. To the extent tive/compositive. This is one disagreement (among many) that I have with Carter’s approach. See esp. loc. cit. pp. 81ff.

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that Hobbes tries to sketch a method and a kind of question that is characteristic of philosophy across the board, he does not, according to me succeed very well. But the idea that there is not just one method of philosophy, and the idea that natural and civil philosophy are different in subject matter and methodologically different are already latent in the early chapters of De corpore and

elsewhere in Hobbes’s writings. 5. If one had to put in a nutshell the difference between the subject matter of Hobbesian civil science and that of natural science, it would be excusable to reach for the distinction between the normative and the explanatory. Hobbesian civil science is first and foremost a practical science, a science for doing things, namely obeying and ruling. Rather than telling us what obedience and rulership is by observing those practices, it says how those practices ought to be conducted given the purpose of forming commonwealths: namely to avoid war. And this purpose is dignified as the supreme moral purpose. Not only does every traditionally recognized moral virtue promote it; but «peace» arguably harnesses together the main sorts of human well-being and the kinds of harm (including, at the extreme,

the violent loss of life) that human

beings

need to be protected against. So civil science is the normative science par excellence. Natural science is explanatory. It doesn’t tell us how things ought to be but only how things as they are might have been brought about. It is a theoretical, not a practical science. This is not to say that learning the probable causes of an effect cannot help one bring it about. A theoretical science can have practical applications. But it is not itself a practical science. And its conclusions about causes are not normative. To the extent that resolutive compositive method has a characteristic application it is to the theoretical and explanatory side of the distinction between theoretical and practical sciences. It has been objected to this way of putting the difference between the method and subject matter of natural and civil philosophy that it is anachronistic: Hobbes, like many of his contemporaries, argued within the natural law tradition. And for some in that tradition, no hard and fast distinction was drawn between natural laws which ere descriptive or explanatory, on the one hand, and normative, on the other’.

Certainly within moral philosophy Hobbes argued within the natural law tradition, but it is a mistake, indeed a howler, to suggest that for Hobbes it could be explanatory to explain an observed effect in a body by suggesting that it was following a given law of nature, or a law of God. This is wrong on two clear counts. First, Hobbes denies that we can say how a natural effect actually comes about, only how it might have. This is because God is infinitely resourceful and cannot be pinned down to just one means of producing a certain effect. So there is no stating a definite divine law covering the effect. Sec-

8. For a full survey of the textual evidence, see my Hobbes , ch 2. 9. Carter, op. cit. p. 79

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ond, Hobbes clearly places himself outside the Aristotelian tradition of physical explanation that makes final and formal causes the causes central to physical explanation. In a much more thoroughgoing way than even Descartes,

Hobbes confines the causes that physics can cite to efficient and material causes, but especially efficient causes. For Hobbes everything — even mathematical figures — is the effect of motions. So it is not properly explanatory to say what God willed physical objects to do. There are no final causes except in moral philosophy (EW VII 83). Nor is it ever explanatory to say that something is F because something is a G and it is in the nature of Gs to be F. So the objection that the way of distinguishing natural and civil philosophy being considered is anachronistic, is wrong. It is true that the explanatory/normative way of distinguishing between natural science and civil science seems compelling, given our modern conception of science, but this conception — trite as it is to say so — is partly the inheritance of the gang of 17° century philosophers that includes Hobbes and his Continental contemporaries. There is a better objection to the explanatory/normative distinction between natural and civil science, and it is the one I indicated in the first paragraph of this paper. Normative precepts can explain some of the properties of things done or made by people who are following the precepts. And things done badly or mismanufactured can have properties explained by the fact that the precepts were broken. Not only is this possible in the abstract, but there are places in Hobbes’s writings where Hobbes is clearly correlating causal claims — claims that certain things tend to weaken commonwealths — with implied claims that things that need to be done to keep commonwealths strong have been omitted. A whole chapter of Leviathan — chapter 29, «Those Things that Weaken a Common-wealth» — clearly recounts a series of possible violations of the precepts for subjects and sovereigns outlined in chapter 18 and elsewhere. It is the same in the other political treatises. Chapter 27 of The Elements of Law is given the title ‘The Causes of Rebellion’ but these causes can all be redescribed as departures from the normative — from the Hobbesian supreme desiderata of absolute obedience and thoroughgoing rule. It is the same for chapter 12 of De cive. And Hobbes’s histories work along similar lines. What were the causes of the English Civil War? It is hard not to read Behemoth’s explanation as the story of what happened when the precepts of

Leviathan failed to be observed during the rule of Charles I'°. The normative and explanatory, then, are not antagonistic categories in Hobbes. But the truth in this statement is easy to turn into a distorted and badly grounded account of Hobbes’s philosophy of science. I have tried to indicate a reading of the philosophy of science that keeps faith with Hobbes’s intentions.

10. See Luc Borot, ‘Hobbes’s Behemoth’ in G. A. J. Rogers and Tom Sorell (eds.), Hobbes and History (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 141.

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AU-DELA DE LA CITOYENNETE HOBBES ET LE PROBLÈME DE L’ AUTORITE par Karlfriedrich Herb

Dix ans avant la publication de son chef-d'œuvre politique, l’auteur du Léviathan se présente déja comme fondateur de la nouvelle science politique moderne. Pressé par les circonstances actuelles et anticipant l’accomplissement futur de son système, Hobbes fait publier la troisième partie de ses Elementa philosophiae sous un titre prometteur. L’ceuvre avec laquelle l’auteur poursuit des ambitions peu modestes s’appelle De cive, Du citoyen: établir pour la première fois un fondement scientifique à |’ autorité de l’Etat fait de principes sûrs. Cette ambition demande toujours une critique de la tradition précédente qu’il réduit rapidement au paradigme aristotélicien. De fait, Hobbes tente d’abord de présenter sa nouvelle science politique comme un projet anti-aristotélicien. Il s’ oppose radicalement à l’idée d’un Etat intégré dans l’ordre naturel et à celle d’une nature humaine destinée à la communauté politique: l’Etat n’est pas issu de la nature, pas plus que l’existence politique ne fait partie du bagage naturel de l’homme. Loin de présupposer que l’Etat est de tout temps naturel, Hobbes se pose le problème de l’ultériorité de l'Etat par rapport à la condition naturelle des hommes (naturall condition of mankind). Il est évident que ce renverse-

ment de la causalité entre cité et individu devrait aussi mener a une modification du concept de la citovenneté. Ce n’est plus la nature, mais plutôt l’action conjointe des individus, symbolisée par l‘unio civilis, qui figure dorénavant comme point de repère de la citoyenneté. Tout comme le corps politique, ses membres, les citoyens deviennent pour Hobbes le produit de l’art humain. Si l’on fait abstraction de cette définition générale, le concept de citoyenneté apparaît toutefois moins clair que le titre de l’ouvrage, Du citoyen, ne peut le laisser penser. Dans

les œuvres

anglaises de l’auteur, la notion-clef de la

pensée politique moderne n’aboutit guère. Après avoir publié sa philosophie politique en 1641 sous le signe du citoyen, Hobbes raie cette notion du vocabulaire du Léviathan. Cette déflation terminologique n’est nullement innocente: elle reflète la marginalisation que subit la citoyenneté dans la pensée politique de Hobbes. Il faut dès lors se méfier des mots et des évidences. Suivant en cela une histoire vaste et complexe de la notion de république, on s’est habitué en France à traduire le Commonwealth hobbesien par le terme de répu-

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blique, alors que le Léviathan est tout sauf un livre républicain. Il présente plutot un discours antirépublicain sur l’autorité politique et va décidément contre les anciennes et modernes traditions du républicanisme. A tout prendre, il vaudrait mieux considérer Hobbes davantage comme

un partisan de la liberté né-

gative avant la lettre, car il traite le problème de la légitimité de l'autorité politique indépendamment, ou au-delà, de la citoyenneté. Il semblerait qu’au début de son histoire intellectuelle, Hobbes ait montré encore quelque sympathie envers la pensée républicaine. Malgré son refus catégorique de la «philosophie bavarde» d’Aristote, les Elements of Law de 1640 évaluent d’une manière positive l’équation aristotélicienne entre liberté et démocratie et ont recours à l’idée d’un gouvernement démocratique, Hobbes envisageant la possibilité d'accorder aux citoyens, après la conclusion du contrat, la liberté au sens d’une participation politique active’. C’est dans les Elements of Law que l’établissement de la démocratie coincide avec la constitution de l’état civil. La démocratie figure comme moment privilegié dans le processus de la constitution de l’autorité politique. La monarchie et l’aristocratie sont, en ce sens, des héritières de la démocratie. Néanmoins, Hobbes ne cache pas son scepticisme profond à l’égard du principe du gouvernement démocratique. Ce n’est que provisoirement que la démocratie possède toute sa légitimité dans la constitution de l’Etat. En tant que forme de gouvernement, la démocratie recèle une instabilité générale, qui résulte du processus de décision de l’assemblée populaire. De fait, l'autonomie collective finit par être la décision de quelques particuliers, voire d’un seul. La démocratie tend toujours à dégénérer en Aristocracy où Monarchy of Orators?. Eu égard à la vie des citoyens eux-mêmes, la démocratie entraîne également des inconvénients: la nécessité d’assemblées fréquentes se fait au dépens de la vie privée des citoyens souverains. La vie quotidienne dans une démocratie directe finit par nuire à l’agrément de la vie (comodity of living). On peut dire ainsi que Hobbes condamne, ou plutôt commence à condamner le régime démocratique, au nom

de la bourgeoisie naissante. Lorsque Hobbes prend peu à peu ses distances par rapport à la position qui est la sienne dans les Elements of Law, ce n’est donc pas seulement à cause des défauts de la démocratie directe. L'idée de gouvernement non représentatif qui va de pair avec cette conception de la démocratie était en effet à contrecourant du changement conceptuel qu’il opère dans le Léviathan, à savoir la substitution du modèle de l’autorisation au modèle du transfert des droits. Cette autorisation originelle légitime d’une manière définitive tout usage futur du

pouvoir souverain selon la maxime «volenti non fit iniuria». L'idée d’une représentation qui absorberait en quelque sorte les citoyens s’oppose à l'esprit

I. «Now seeing freedom cannot stand together with subjection, liberty in a commonwealth is nothing but government and rule, which because it cannot be divided, men must expect in common; and that be no where but in the popular state, or democracy» (Elements of Law, abrégé en EL, II, 8, 3, éd. Tònnies, Londres, Frank Cass, 1969). DCE 2S:

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du républicanisme en ne recourant au vote du citoyen que dans l’acte d’ autorisation. Au-dela de ce vote originel, le représentant s’appuie sur le silence des représentants. Le nouveau pacte d'autorisation rompt avec la théorie antérieure; la démocratie perd ses-anciens privilèges. Loin d’être la cause de la représentation, la souveraineté se révèle comme sa conséquence. En outre, la nouvelle logique du Léviathan met les formes traditionelles des régimes politiques sur le même plan. Monarchie, aristocratie et démocratie ont la même origine contractuelle, le même caractère absolu par rapport aux citoyens, et peuvent garantir le même niveau de libertés civiles. La liberté du citoyen n’a plus de foyer propre. On sait que Hobbes refuse toute limitation contractuelle et institutionnelle du représentant, car une telle limitation aboutirait selon lui aux conditions désastreuses de l’état de nature. L'autorité politique ne supporte aucun frein institutionnel: ainsi le gouvernement mixte, constitution de référence de la tradition républicaine, est-il considéré comme une forme pathologique. Distribuer

la souveraineté

entre

plusieurs

mains,

c’est introduire

une

sorte

d’aliénation mentale dans l’âme de l’autorité politique. A défaut d’une théorie de la réglementation institutionnelle du pouvoir, Hobbes ne peut faire confiance qu’à la force déentologique du droit naturel. Il importe toutefois de comprendre pourquoi la théorie de la représentation rend la figure du citoyen aussi marginale. C’est fondamentalement que la participation politique est pensée par Hobbes comme une menace pour l’unité de l'Etat. Plus encore, prenant le contre-pied de l’argument républicain, Hobbes met en doute les instincts démocratiques du citoyen. Tandis que le monarque réalise une unité naturelle entre les exigences de sa fonction et ses intérêts personnels, l’homme démocratique se caractérise par une profonde ambiguïté, ses passions naturelles étant en contradiction avec ses obligations civiques”, les passions qui sont les siennes en tant qu’individu primant sur les exigences de la res-publica. On comprend dès lors que Hobbes ne pouvait plus maintenir en 1651 l’évaluation positive de la liberté républicaine que l’on trouve, en 1640, dans les Elements of Law. Le Léviathan tranche ainsi le lien qui unissait chez Aristote liberté politique et institution de la démocratie, comme l’exprime très clairement l'affirmation selon laquelle, «Qu’une République soit monarchique ou populaire, la liberté y reste la méme»*. Ainsi Hobbes ne souligne-t-il pas seulement le fait que la forme du gouvernement est indifférente à la liberté des citoyens, mais disqualifie en outre, sans s’y attarder et comme s’il s'agissait d’une évidence, l'inscription de la liberté individuelle dans le principe de la participation politique. En localisant systématiquement ce dernier principe

3. «And for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason [...] In Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects» (Leviathan, abrégé en Lev, XIX, C.B. Macpherson (ed.), Londres, Pinguin Books, 1982, p. 241-242; cf. Léviathan, abrégé en Lév, trad. F. Tricaud, Paris, Sirey, 1971, p. 195).

4. Lév, XXI, p. 227.

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dans la théorie de la domination, Hobbes signifie on ne peut plus clairement que la liberté politique ne constitue plus pour lui une priorité de la théorie politique. De fait, la liberté conçue comme participation n’apparait plus dans le chapitre qui porte sur la liberté civile, le célèbre chapitre XXI du Léviathan étant consacré uniquement aux libertés des sujets au sens propre du terme. C’est dans la théorie de l’état de nature que Hobbes fournit une première définition abstraite, si l’on peut dire, de la liberté civile. Il s’appuie sur la dichotomie contractualiste entre état naturel et état civil pour déterminer réciproquement liberté naturelle et liberté civile. Lorsque, selon l’analyse des contradictions du jus in omnia, la liberté naturelle implique un antagonisme originaire du droit naturel, la liberté correspondant à l’état civil doit être déterminée originellement par le moment de la limitation. La liberté civile et la garantie des droits subjectifs individuels ne peuvent être obtenus que par le biais d’une limitation générale et forcée de la liberté naturelle de tous. La position du Léviathan est déjà celle de la future doctrine du droit de Kant, selon laquelle la liberté et le droit ne sont possibles et réels qu’à la condition de tenir compte de cette limitation légale”. Le sens juridique du passage à la liberté civile se manifeste d’une manière éclatante dans l’idée d’une liberté résiduelle, qui constitue la figure fondamentale de la liberté du sujet. Elle se définit tout d’abord par son opposition à la législation de l’Etat, la liberté individuelle n’existant en tant que telle qu’au-dela des lois. Elle est, selon le De cive (XIII, 5), le résidu de la liberté naturelle. Le Léviathan reprend cette conception de la liberté résiduelle à travers sa célèbre théorie de la liberté qui réside dans le silence de la loi: «Dans les cas où le souverain n’a pas prescrit de règle, le sujet a la liberté de faire ou de s’abstenir, selon qu’il juge bon». Hobbes part manifestement de l’idée selon laquelle les individus disposent, en vertu des limites factuelles du pouvoir d'intervention, d’un large champ d'actions individuelles. Ces limites ne sont pas dues à une restriction juridique de l’autorité, mais résultent de la logique qui sous-tend la législation. L’étendue concrète du pouvoir interventionniste a pour finalité la garantie de la paix à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur. La où la réglementation législative s’avère nécessaire, elle doit être minimale. Le souverain limite la liberté dans l’exacte mesure où la sauvegarde de la paix l’exige. Une limitation qui dépasserait ce cadre ne s’inscrirait pas dans la logique du Léviathan. Cette logique n’est pas absolutiste, encore moins fotalitaire. Elle implique plutôt une distinction conséquente entre la sphère privée et la sphère publique, identifiée à celle de l'Etat. L’inspiration libérale de Hobbes se manifeste ainsi à travers l’exigence d’un interventionnisme minimal, que traduisent parfaitement les exemples qu’il cite dans le Léviathan anglais, qui correspondent à autant de modèles de sphères libres d'intervention de l’action individuelle. Les adiaphora du souverain constituent, en effet, le noyau de la vie

5. Cf. Karlfriedrich Herb, Bernd Ludwig, «Naturzustand, Eigentum und Staat. Immanuel Kants Relativierung des “Ideal des Hobbes”», in Kant-Studien, 84 (1993), p. 283-312.

6. Lév, XXI, p. 232.

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de la société civile : il s’ensuit que la sphére privée et la sphére d’ action économique et contractuelle sont soustraites 4 l’emprise du souverain’. On peut toutefois douter que l’idée libérale d’une sphère pacifiée par l’intervention d’une main invisible soit compatible avec le modèle d’un état naturel que caractérise la concurrence ruineuse de tous avec tous et qui appelle l’exigence d’une régulation de toutes les sphères sociales. La liberté du sujet ne saurait, cependant, être réduite à la liberté résiduelle, puisqu'elle découle de la nature spécifique du contrat. De fait, si le souverain est autorisé à prendre des décisions suprêmes, il n’en demeure pas moins que la finalité de son institution requiert une limitation a priori. Le droit à la conservation de soi, que seul un souverain absolu peut garantir, mais qui relativise simultanément ce pouvoir absolu, n’est pas une disposition contractuelle. Dans le cas d’un dysfonctionnement de l'Etat, l'individu est dispensé de l’obéissance civile. Or, c’est dans une telle liberté que Hobbes voit précisément la «vraie liberté des sujets»®. Cette version téléologique du droit naturel ne va pas cependant sans problème. Du point de vue de la pratique politique, l’octroi d’une telle liberté constitue un droit complètement illusoire. D’un point de vue juridique, «la vraie liberté des sujets» risque, en outre, de perturber la logique de la souveraineté, puisqu'elle aboutit à restreindre l’autorité politique au nom du droit naturel. Tout comme la liberté de l’individu, la loi de l'Etat renferme également une ambivalence spécifique puisqu'elle est à la fois limitation et expression de la liberté individuelle. Si la loi s’ oppose expressément à la liberté — ou, pour dire les choses en latin, la lex au jus —, elle en constitue aussi sa condition. C’est en ce sens que Hobbes parle des lois comme de haies (Hedges) qui ne doivent pas entraver la liberté d’action des citoyens, mais la garantir au contraire en assurant leur compatibilité. La caractérisation des lois comme des «règles revêtues d’une autorité» («Rules Authorised») rappelle en outre que ces limitations ne visent pas l’individu dans ce qui lui est étranger, hétéronome, mais qu’elles résultent de l'autorisation originelle que le souverain a reçue de la part des contractants. Les lois ne sont donc pas des «obstacles extérieurs au mouvement» selon les termes de la liberté prise au sens propre du mot, mais elles sont l’expression

7. «The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath praetermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like» (Lev, XXI,

6, p. 264). 8. «To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do» (Lev, XXI, p. 268). 9. «For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind the People

from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion; as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not the true End of a Law, is not Good» (Lev, XXX, p. 388).

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de l’identification des gouvernés aux gouvernants, qui est la fiction que l’on trouve au fondement de la légitimité de l’état civil. Si Rousseau prendra cette fiction juridique à la lettre, Hobbes s’oppose pour sa part à une interprétation réaliste du principe de l’autonomie que l’on peut découvrir au principe du contractualisme, refusant par avance de fonder la légitimité du politique sur la participation des citoyens. Quelque soit la forme ou l’origine historique de l'autorité politique, la légitimité du pouvoir souverain reste la même, l’exigence de paix sociale l’emportant sur toute autre considération, et notamment sur le souci de la participation politique. Hobbes se méfie de la participation et ne croit pas à la vertu des conflits sociaux. Il craint la stasis républicaine. Tandis que Machiavel évoque la mémoire de l’origine pour renforcer la république, Hobbes ne veut prendre en compte que le présent et cherche à libérer les autorités existantes du fardeau de l’auctoritas, comprise comme une fidélité aux commencements de la cité. La décision en faveur du meilleur régime relève de la contingence historique; c’est, somme toute, une affaire de circonstances. Lorsque l’autorité est capable d’établir un ordre juridique stable, toutes les autres préférences normatives peuvent être négligées!®. Par conséquent, que ce soit dans la vision lucide de l’histoire des Etats ou dans la téléologie juridique du Léviathan, l’autoconservation constitue la fin ultime. Selon cette téléologie réductionniste, l’Etat ne constitue plus la sphère d’une existence réussie et vertueuse, mais représente plutôt une institution de garantie des droits, à laquelle la fin dernière de l’homme demeure totalement exté-

rieure. Elle sert à assurer les conditions juridiques d’une recherche possible du bonheur individuel, mais n’a pas pour fin de réaliser ce bonheur par ses propres moyens. Aristote liait la finalité de l’homme à la constitution de la cité ; en tranchant ce lien, Hobbes

retire à l’Etat sa fonction de creuset de

l’épanouissement de l’homme. Le Léviathan ne fait naître ni la communauté dans les belles actions ni la république du Contrat social. Il n’y a donc pas à choisir entre faire un homme ou faire un citoyen. La conversion purement juridique de l’homme en citoyen n’exige pas davantage la métamorphose du caractère intéressé, possessif et non vertueux de l’homme moderne. La vertu politique n’est tout simplement pas le principe du régime hobbesien. En cas de besoin, ce régime doit être viable, y compris pour un peuple de démons. Dans le débat actuel entre communautariens et libéraux, Hobbes se rangerait sans doute du côté de ces derniers, étant peu soucieux des conditions empiriques du lien social démocratique. Ce manque d'intérêt théorique ne doit rien au hasard: le Léviathan propose une théorie de la légitimation de l'autorité politique, non pas une sociologie du lien social. Il est clair par là même que le Léviathan ne peut satisfaire les passions républicaines pour autant qu’il décharge l'individu du souci de s'identifier avec l'Etat, tandis qu’il fait de l'Etat une entité juridique indiffé-

10. «The present [form] ought alwaies to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best» (Zev NES DAS 7):

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rente à l'identité de ses citoyens. Si l’autorité souveraine constitue l’identité du corps politique, l'identité de ses membres lui échappe. La question de l’identité à soi concerne, selon Hobbes, les individus, mais pas les citoyens. De cet individualisme résolu Hobbes ne s’est jamais écarté. C’est aussi pourquoi le Léviathan ne figure pas dans l’histoire républicaine de la citoyenneté. Honni soit qui mal y pense.

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HOBBES’S REPLY TO REPUBLICANISM by A. P. Martinich Will ye submit your necks, and choose to bend The supple knee? Ye will not, if I trust To know ye right, or if ye know yourselves Natives and sons of heav’n possessed before By none, and if not equal all, yet free, Equally free; for orders and degrees Jar not with liberty, but well consist. Who can in reason then or right assume Monarchy over such as live by right His equals, if in power and splendor less, In freedom equal? (Paradise Lost, Book V, lines 787-97)

1. Republicanism, Liberty and Authorization. Thomas Hobbes, like God, was a monarchist. John Milton, like Satan, was a republican. My goal in this article is to explain Hobbes’s criticisms of republicanism. Most political theorists today prefer the politics and personality of Satan, but it is important to understand Hobbes’s criticisms. Seventeenth-century republican or neo-roman political theorists in England claimed that citizens could not be free under an absolute monarch!. Even if that monarch’s policies were not obviously arbitrary or oppressive, no citizen was free, since citizens had no guarantee that they might not become so’. Hobbes thought that this view contributed to the outbreak of the English Civil War’. In chapter 21* of Leviathan, Hobbes tried to neutralize the republican theory partly by denying that any civil state was freer than any other, but more

1. Quentin Skinner, “John Milton and the Politics of Slavery”, Prose Studies 23 (2000),

1-22. 2. Most republicans were willing to accept a limited or constitutional monarch and «stressed the compatibility of their theory of liberty with regulated forms of monarchical government» (Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], p. 22, n. 67). It was absolute monarchy that was tantamount to tyranny. 3. Quentin Skinner, who has done the most to explore the importance of republican theory in Renaissance and modern thought, was also the first to point out Hobbes’s reply to republicanism. See for example, “Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society fifth series 40 (1990), pp. 121-51. 4. Chapter 21 has two main purposes, I believe. This article deals with one of them, the neutralization of republicanism. The other purpose is the justification of the Commonwealth according to Hobbes’s theory of covenants, especially for conflicted royalists. His justification should be understood partially in terms of contrast with the de facto and conquest theorists.

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importantly by presenting a version of his theory of absolute sovereignty that purportedly proved that citizens have as much freedom or liberty under an absolute monarch as they have within a republic’. Some of Hobbes’s assertions in this chapter are implausible in themselves, and, compared when with assertions in other parts of Leviathan, are so surprising as to invite the conjecture that he is not being serious. Notwithstanding the difficulty of reading Hobbes’s mind, I think he was being serious, just as I think he was being serious when he claimed that mathematical points have an extension, that he had squared the circle, and that God is material. Hobbes is an intriguing thinker partly because he is an odd thinker; and part of the oddity is his ability to advance apparently contradictory views or bewildering arguments with sang froid. For example he used democratic political premises to defend absolute sovereignty, with a preference for monarchy. republicanism His reply to is another example of how he could finesse premises to yield surprising conclusions. To say that Hobbes is serious is not to say that he is persuasive. Sometimes when he wants to have things both ways it is clear that he cannot. Apropos the subject of this article, he claims that people take on all the actions of their sovereign and also retain their right to all the means they may think are necessary to self-preservation. Since any tax imposed on a citizen could turn out to be the amount of money that the citizen might need to protect himself from others, including the sovereign, Hobbes’s claim seems to entail that any citizen

might legitimately (albeit surreptitiously) try to avoid a tax, even though it may be legal and appropriate. The same desire to have things both ways, again with respect to a person’s rights, is inherent in Hobbes’s statement of the covenant that citizens make to enter a civil state. He says, it is «as if every man should say to every man, / authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men» (17.13)°. The contradictory concepts stand cheek by jowl: authorizing and giving up. In order to authorize a person to do something, one must have a right to do that thing oneself. For example, in order to authorize a person to sell a piece of property, for example, one must own the property; and that means that one has not given it away or otherwise disposed of one’s right to it. However, a person disposes of a right when he says «I give up my right» as a person does when he says, «I [...] give up my right of governing myself». That Hobbes means what he says is confirmed by the second half of the

5. Hobbes’s view was not unprecedented. For example, Thomas Hedley said in 1610, «This kingdom enjoyeth the blessings and benefits of an absolute monarchy and of a free estate [...] Therefore let no man think liberty and sovereignty incompatible, [...] rather like twins [...] they have such concordance and coalescence, that the one can hardly long subsist without the other» (quoted from Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution [University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992], p. 6). 6. References to the English Leviathan within the body of the article are to chapter and paragraph. References to the Latin Leviathan are to the page number of the Molesworth edition, volume 3 of Opera Latina. References to The Elements ofLaw are preceded with the abbreviation ‘EL’; references to De cive are preceded by ‘DC’.

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«covenant-making formula». The person enters the civil state «on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner» (17.13; see also 20.1). The concepts of giving up and authorizing are being applied to the same thing. One might object to my interpretation on the grounds that Hobbes is not saying that the same thing is both being given up and authorized. What is being given up, according to the objection, is «my right of governing myself» while what is being authorized are the actions of the sovereign. So the first half of the sovereign-making formula, the objection continues, is more clearly rendered as: / authorize [the actions of this man or assembly of men] and give up my right of governing myself, to this man or to this assembly of men. This way of reading the first half is confirmed by the wording of the second half of the formula. The clause «on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him» shows that what is given up is independent of what one authorizes; for the statement of what gets authorized appears in a separate clause: «and authorize all his actions in like manner». My reply to this objection is two-fold. First, what a person authorizes the sovereign to do is to govern him; but this is just the right that the person has given up. The sovereign is not authorized to do things other than to govern. Certainly a citizen has the theoretical right to criticize the sovereign for doing something that the citizen judges is not part of governing. However, this is a vacuous right since, in giving up one’s right to self-government, the citizen gives up his right to judge what is part of governing and what is not. Second, the Latin version of Leviathan makes clear that the very same thing is being given up and authorized: Ego huic homini, vel huic coetui, authoritatem et jus

meum

regendi meipsum concedo, ea conditione, ut tu quoque tuam authori-

tatem et jus tuum tui regendi in eundem transferas (p. 131). “Concedo” takes both “authoritatem” and “jus meum regendi meipsum” as objects and “transferas” takes both “tuam authoritatem” and “jus tuum tui regendi in eundem”

as objects. The contradiction is the result of Hobbes’s ambivalence about the alienation theory. In both The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic and De cive, Hobbes had used only the concept of alienation to support his theory of absolute sovereignty (EL 15.3; DC 6.20). Given that a citizen has given up his rights to those things necessary for the sovereign to govern, the citizen will have no justification for complaining about anything the sovereign does in governing. Unfortunately, this doctrine has a high cost. Citizens who realize that their sole relation to the sovereign is that of subjection will have little or no motivation to help the sovereign accomplish his goal of governing. They would not identify with the sovereign or his actions. Even if alienation would result only in making people servants of the sovereign and not his slaves’

7. Hobbes’s argument that subjects are not slaves is not an academic exercise. Some of the opponents of Charles I argued that absolute sovereigns have slaves for subjects. See Skinner, “John Milton and the Politics of Slavery”.

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(20.13-16), their interest in sovereign’s success would be small. In contrast, what would motivate citizens is the belief that their liberty depends on supporting the sovereignty. After the execution of Charles I, Hobbes had another political motive for adding a theory that promoted the ideology of liberty. When he wrote The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic and De cive, England was de jure a monarchy; so citizen-subjection, not liberty, was still politically tenable. However, once the Commonwealth had been established, the ideology of subjection was out and that of liberty in. Preferring subjection but recognizing the rhetorical force of “liberty”, Hobbes assumed the stance of a moderate in the Dedication

of Leviathan*: «For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great liberty, and on the other side for too much authority, ‘tis hard to pass between the points of both unwounded». Notwithstanding his words, it is safe to assume that Hobbes worried more about too great liberty than about too much authority both because unrestricted liberty is the state of nature, in which human life is «solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short», and because no matter how oppressive a government is, living in a civil state is always better than the alternatives. Hobbes presented his solution to the challenge of republicanism in chapter 21. 2. Natural Liberty. There are two kinds of liberty: natural and political. Natural liberty, the one «properly» called «liberty», is the absence of external objects that would prevent the motion of a body that could otherwise move (21.1). Although natural liberty applies to both human and nonhuman objects, Hobbes has a special interest in the nature of the former. Natural liberty is compatible with both fear and necessity. Concerning liberty and fear, Hobbes says that «generally all actions which men do in commonwealths, for fear of the law, are actions, which the doers had liberty to omit» (Leviathan 21.3). This applies to monarchies as much as to republics. Consequently a person is as free in one as in the other’. One might object that a person under a monarchy is less free because, due to his fear, he can perform fewer actions than the person who is not stifled by fear. A reply on the behalf of Hobbes is that a person does not necessarily perform fewer actions if she is afraid than a person

who is not afraid!°. One simply performfs different actions.

A person who does

not do something at a particular time, say, take an apple, because of her fear of

being punished, simply does something else, say, looking away from the apple!!. 8. The Dedication to Francis Godolphin was not included in the manuscript copy that Hobbes presented to Charles II. 9. Filmer criticized Hobbes’s claim that there is no difference between the freedom of a citizen in a republic as opposed to a monarchy in Observations Concerning the Original of Government Upon Mr. Hobbes’s Leviathan, etc. (1652), section 10. 10. I ignore the fact that there is a problem with the concept of counting actions. 11. One might then object that it is not the number of individual actions but the range and kinds of actions that is more limited under a monarchy than under other forms of government. At the beginning of the next section, section 3, we will see Hobbes deny that this

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Another objection is that for a person to act from fear is for that person not to act as he wishes, and hence to be less free than the person (in a republic) who does not act from fear. To this objection, Hobbes responds that a person acting from fear acts «as he wishes» every bit as much as a person acting from some passion other than fear. To act «as one wishes» is to have one’s body caused to move by a desire; and fear is one of the desires!? that causes a body to move. A person might not eat an apple because of her fear that she will be punished if she does. This is not to deny that the person may have at the same time another desire, say, the desire to steal and eat an apple, which would have been the cause of a different action, stealing and eating the apple, if the person had not had the fear of being punished. But this does not mean that these other desires (e.g., of stealing and eating an apple) are somehow better than fear; for to act from a desire other than fear is formally or structurally identical to acting from fear. In both cases, some desire causes an action. According to Hobbes, a person acting from fear is not less free than a person acting from another passion: «Fear and liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his

goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink» (21.3). It is not even true that acting from fear is a bad thing: «a man sometimes pays his debt, only for fear of punishment, which because nobody hindered him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty» (21.3). Hobbes then goes on to show that liberty and necessity are consistent with each other. In fact it could not be otherwise. Since God is the cause of everything, God is the cause of the liberty of humans (21.4). Although Hobbes does not make it explicit, by showing that liberty is compatible with fear and necessity, he has undermined any attempt to prove that the Commonwealth government was not legitimate because it arose either from fear of the army or the necessity of staying alive. At the end of paragraph 4, Hobbes says, «And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that naturall liberty» (21.4). And

hence begins his discussion of political liberty, the liberty of subjects. 3. Political Liberty and Individuals. The political liberty of a subject is the extent to which a subject is free from laws and obligations (21.5). According to the proponents of republicanism, liberty is greater in republics than in monarchies!*. Hobbes refutes this view in the first instance, not by showing . that the citizens of republics are never freer than those of monarchies, but by showing that the degree of freedom is not determined by the kind of government. (Later, we shall see a second and more important refutation of republicanism.) Since political liberty may be taken in two ways, either as applying to is true. Independently of Hobbes’s things necessarily gives one more mits the firing of rifles and pistols does not. 12. Fear is an aversion and an 13. A fortiori, republics have have none.

reason, it is doubtful that permission to do more kinds of freedom. It is worse to live under a government that perwithin city limits at any time of day than under one that

aversion is a desire to move away from an object. more liberty than monarchies if subjects in monarchies

25?

a commonwealth as a whole or as applying show for both that republican governments are ty than other kinds are according to his theory He begins with the liberty of individuals.

A.P. Martinich

to each citizen, Hobbes has to not better with respect to liberof absolute sovereignty. Since no government can lay

down «Rules enough [...] for the regulating of all actions» (21.6), it follows

that all subjects have some freedom, no matter what kind of government they live under. In short, liberty consists in what the laws do not prohibit, what he later describes as «the silence of the laws» (21.18). It is true that «Liberty is in some places more and in some lesse; and in some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty shall think most convenient» (21.18). If republics always prohibited fewer activities than monarchies, then it could be said truly that citizens had more liberty in them than they do under monarchies. But, Hobbes held that this is not the case. Englishmen under monarchs were so free that the king permitted subjects to sue him. If a Subject have a controversie with his Sovereaigne, of Debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign. ...[A]nd consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law (21.19).

It is arguable that in the seventeenth century it would not have been clear to all that republics were better governments than monarchies. A republic dominated by puritans would be more restrictive than one governed by a libertine monarch. Socrates was executed by a democracy, and the reigns of David and Solomon were represented in the Bible as ideal. Whether Hobbes is right or wrong about the opportunities for liberty under monarchs, his argument here is sensible at least to the extent that he sees laws as restricting liberty and that different governments will restrict liberty to different degrees. But, Hobbes thinks, people may draw the wrong conclusion from the fact that different governments allow different degrees of personal liberty. It is absurd for people to advocate liberty as «an exemption from laws» (21.6); for others would have the same exemption and hence people's lives would be endangered. I think that Hobbes is misrepresenting what people want. It is not everyone’s exemption from the law but only their own. Perhaps Hobbes does not see this because he seems to think that laws are not only general in form but affect everyone to the same extent. This is of course not true. For example,

the American law that states «The American and National League Baseball League is not a business, but a national pastime and thereby exempt from antitrust legislation», is neither general nor applicable to everyone in the sense of benefiting all citizens. Further, even laws that have a general form can be written such that they apply only to one or two people: All female American citizens named “Martinich”, born on September 2, 1975 in Austin, Texas are ex-

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empt from paying income tax. Often laws are not so flagrantly narrow, but still affect only a small class of people, such as a law against sleeping under bridges. It applies to everyone but affects only the homeless. Granting all of the above, someone might think that the fewer the laws the freer the citizens; and the freer the citizens the better off the citizens. Hobbes agrees with the first conjunct but not the second. Civil states with greater «freedom from chains, and prisons», as presumably republics would be, are inherently no better than those with less freedom, as presumably monarchies would be, as indicated in the previous section. If one contemplates the consequences of eliminating various felonies, fraud, aggravated battery, pollution of air, water and food, his point is persuasive. Consider the United States; its weak gun control laws make the citizens freer than European countries, but not happier or more secure in their personal safety, for they fear the guns of others. Or consider France, which gives citizens the liberty to smoke almost anywhere, seemingly indifferent to the health problems such liberty carries with it. In short, having more laws is often better than having fewer laws. The discussion of these points, namely, the varying degrees of political freedom under governments of various forms and the desirability of being relatively free or unfree, does not complete Hobbes’s discussion of the liberty of individual subjects. He takes up another aspect of this issue after he discusses the second object of political freedom, the commonwealth as a unity. (See section 5.)

4. Political Liberty and Commonwealths. According to their theorists, republics enjoy more freedom than other forms of government, specifically, more than monarchies. That is supposedly why Lucca had «Libertas» inscribed on its turret. One could argue for the greater liberty of republics in various ways. They, it might be argued, have citizens who are more committed to the state and hence more inclined to keep it free of subservient relationships. Or it might be argued in analogy with an individual human being, that republics are healthier than nonrepublics because they are more concerned about the health of the entire body and not just the one or two parts that the monarch or aristocrats are interested in; and they are concerned with the whole body

because the whole body has input into its governance!*. Hobbes does not mention or try to refute these claims. Rather, he asserts his own view that every civil state is as free as every other. It is the freedom of the state of nature: every commonwealth, (not every man) has an absolute liberty, to do what it shall judge (that is to say, what that man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual war, and

14. See Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers, and cannons planted against their neighbours round about. [...] Whether a commonwealth be monarchical, or popular, the freedom is still the same (21.8; see also 21.9)”.

It is characteristic of Hobbes to take a boast and deflate it!°. Far from Lucca being unique in having liberty, liberty is the standard condition of states. Moreover, the kind of liberty all civil states have is nothing to be relished. One might recoil from Hobbes’s apparent misunderstanding of the claim that Lucca and other republics make and be inclined to say that he must have known that he was evading the issue. (In conversation, I once agreed to this.) But I think that he did not know he was talking past the point for two reasons. First, if he knew that he was doing this, then he would have known that he had not made a cogent case for his own view; and I think he was so confident in

his abilities that he must have thought he had. Second, Hobbes thought that his theory was general enough to account for every kind of government. Since on his theory every government is free in the sense of being in the state of nature with respect to every other nation, it followed that republics were free in exactly this sense. So it would be appropriate for him to say so. 5. Liberty, Submission and Obligation. We can now return to the topic of the liberty that an individual has in a commonwealth. Hobbes has already conceded that the degree of political liberty a citizen or subject may have will vary from state to state depending upon how many laws there are. So that is no longer an issue. Rather, the issue now is the nature and extent to which liberty

is limited by entering a civil state’. To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign (21.10).

15. Thomas Hedley made essentially the same point: «This kingdom enjoyeth the blessings and benefits of an absolute monarchy and of a free state [...] Therefore let no man

think liberty and sovereignty incompatible, [...] rather like two twins [...] they have such concordance and coalescence, that the one can hardly long subsist without the other» (in Foster, Proceedings in Parliament 1610, II, p. 191: quoted from Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution , p. 6). 16. The simplest case of this, I think, is his blasé statement that «God appeared to me in a dream» means the same thing as «I dreamed that God appeared to me». 17. I have not been able to decide whether Hobbes is talking here about natural or political liberty. On the one hand, his saying in paragraph 10 that the issue is «the true Liberty of a subject» is ambiguous. “True” liberty suggests liberty “properly” so-called, that is, natural liberty; and he says «there is no restriction at all, of his own former natural liberty» (21.14). On the other hand, liberty of a «subject» suggests political liberty, as does the issue of the «rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth» (21.10). I think my treatment of 21.14 and 21.15 is not affected by this unresolved ambiguity.

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Hobbes is primarily concerned with political liberty in ured this passage. This is obscured by the fact that he uses the phrase «true Liberty», which might easily be confused with the liberty «properly» so-called, which he said is natural liberty (21.1). And shortly later Hobbes in fact answers the question «What Liberty [do] we deny ourselves?» The answer is «None». As he says at 21.14: «The Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in these words, / Authorize, or take upon me, all his actions; in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former natural Liberty» (see also 22.9). Nonetheless,

that civil liberty, and not natural liberty, is the focus of paragraph 10 and the next six of seven ones is indicated by the phrase, «the Liberty of a Subject» and his explanation that he is asking what «though commanded by the Soveraign», a subject may refuse to do «without Injustice». Hobbes lists two possible sources for the obligation that arises from entering a civil state. It must come, he says, «either [...] from the expresse words, / Authorise all his Actions, or from the Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth)» (21.10). In paragraph 14, he finally commits himself to the conclusion that obligation arises from the intention of submitting to a sovereign because it cannot arise from the words of authorization. He excludes the possibility that obligation arises from the words of authorization with this cryptic argument: For by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. It is one thing to say, kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say, J will kill myself, or my fellow (21.14) (Hereafter: the killing-passage).

Is Hobbes, as this passage suggests, actually claiming that citizens allow, that is, authorize the sovereign to kill them? I believe he is, because he says in the immediately preceding sentence that the subject authorizes «all his [the sovereign’s] actions». There is no better way to illustrate the unrestricted scope of this authorization than by indicating that subjects authorize the sovereign to kill them!*. This interpretation fits with Hobbes’s earlier claim in paragraph 10 that citizens own «all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or the Assembly we make our Soveraign». Since Hobbes puts the phrase «without exception» within parentheses, I assume he used the phrase reflectively and not nonchalantly. This position, that subjects own the actions of the sovereign without exception, had led him earlier to say that «if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such an attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do» (18.3; see also 20.13).

It may seem odd for Hobbes, in the passage from paragraph 14 that is being considered, to contrast one kind of killing of «me, or my fellow» with that of another kind of killing of «myself, or my fellow». In light of the privileged 18. For clarity, I should add that Hobbes also points out that this authorization does not impose an obligation on the subject to kill himself if the sovereign commands it.

236 a a

A.P. Martinich rr

position given self-preservation, one might expect him to contrast the killing of «me» with the killing of «my fellow», because there is an obvious asymmetry of these two cases. A sovereign can legitimately command me to kill my fellow but not legitimately command me to kill myself, because the latter is a «right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred [...] Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd» (21.11). Certainly, it seems!’, the sovereign

may command a subject «to kill himselfe, or any other man» (21.15). But the issue, recall, is not what the sovereign may command, but what «though com-

manded by the Soveraign he [the subject] may neverthelesse without Injustice,

refuse to do» (21.10)°°. And what a subject may without injustice refuse to do is anything he has no obligation to do. With these preliminary comments behind us, let’s look at the killing-passage again. (A) For by allowing him to kill me, (B) I am not bound to kill myself when he com-

mands me. (a) It is one thing to say, kill me, or my fellow, if you please; (b) another thing to say, J will kill myself, or myfellow (21.14).

The claim in the first sentence is that for a subject S to authorize a sovereign to kill S, is not thereby for S to be obligated to kill S even when the sovereign commands it. The claim is communicated in two parts, (A) and (B), and these two parts are coordinate with two parts of the next sentence, (a) and (b), respectively. Hobbes wants to illustrate (A) with (a). But (a) is confusing

because it talks both about the speaker of the sentence and also about his fellow. My conjecture as to why Hobbes talks about both the speaker and his fellow in (a) is that he wants to give a limiting case of an authorization that cannot give rise to an obligation. The utterance of “Kill me, if you please” is such a case. His purpose is to show that while the sovereign is authorized to kill both the speaker and his fellow, a sovereign’s (apparent) command to kill a subject S cannot impose an obligation on S to do so. What is important about (a) is that it is an example of words that authorize the addressee to kill. That authorization, rather than commandment,

is performed is indicated by

the words “if you please” ?!. Although the sentence, “Kill me, or my fellow” 19. I say “it seems” because the sovereign may utter a sentence that gives the appearance of issuing in a command and the sovereign may be trying to issue a command, but the attempt might fail because some other condition for commanding has not been satisfied. For example, a sovereign may try to command something but not succeed because what he is trying to command would frustrate the end of governing. This is in fact the case in attempting to command a subject to kill himself. However, people often speak imprecisely and say that someone has «commanded» someone to do something that cannot be done. 20. In other words, the issue concerns the relationship between authorizing the sovereign to kill me and having an obligation to kill myself when the sovereign commands me to do so. Hobbes is maintaining that “x is authorized (has the authority) to kill y”, entails “if x commands y to kill z and ~(y=z), then y has the obligation to kill z”. But it does not entail “if xcommands y to kill y, then y has the obligation to kill y”, because no one can be obliged to kill herself. 21. The oddities are preserved in the Latin version, which seems to be a translation of

Hobbes’s Reply to Republicanism

2301

is in the imperative mood, it is not an example of a command, because a com-

mand would be inappropriate in the first half of the second sentence of the passage we are considering. In short, with (a), Hobbes is pointing out that authorization itself does not impose any obligation on the speaker: «No man is bound [by the words of authorization] themselves, either to kill himselfe, or

any other man» (21.15). With (b), Hobbes is pointing out a case in which an obligation can arise by making a promise (that is, by uttering a first person, future tense sentence). Part (b) is odd, for two reasons. First, to be perfectly coordinate with

(B), (b) should concern a command, which would thereby give rise to an obligation, not a promise’. Second, the utterance of, “I will kill myself’, can never succeed in imposing an obligation of the speaker because such an assertion would frustrate the intention with which the speaker authorized the sovereign (hereafter: the civil intention). I conjecture that Hobbes used, “I will kill my selfe, or my fellow” in (b) instead of “I [the sovereign] command you to kill yourself, or your fellow” because Hobbes wants to illustrate how a subject limits his liberty by acquiring an obligation through his own action. The utterance of “I will kill my selfe, or my fellow”, does this, while the utterance of “I [the sovereign] command you” etc. does not. Thus Hobbes explains in the immediately following paragraph, paragraph 15, how obligation arises. Obligation arises from the civil intention. He says: No man is bound by the words [of authorization] themselves, either to kill himself, or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but on the [civil] Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. (21.15).

Recall 21.10: obligation arises «from the Intention of him that submitteth himself to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth». In short, a person’s obligations, far from being coerced, are part of or the means of his own intentions. He who wills the end (safety and security) wills the means (the obligation to obey the sovereign). Whenever a person enters a civil state, she authorizes the sovereign to kill herself or her fellows; but from this authorization, no obligation can ever arise for someone to kill herself, because suicide would frustrate the civil intention.

the English: «Etsi enim ut me occidat concedam, non obligor ut jussu ejus occidam meipsum. Aliud enim est dicere, occide me vel concivem meum, si vis; aliud autem dicere, occidam me aut concivem meum»

(EW 3:165).

22. Jo Ann Carson suggests that the quoted sentence of (b) should be understood not as a promise but as an acknowledgement of an obligation arising from a command. The point of (b) would then be to show that the acknowledgement “I will kill myself” is defective while the acknowledgment “I will kill my fellow” is not.

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The case is different for one’s fellow. Although the obligation to kill one’s fellow does not arise from the words of authorization (or from the words “Kill [...] my fellow, if you please”), that obligation may arise if the civil intention would be frustrated if one did not kill one’s fellow. (The obligation is expressed by the sentence, “I will kill my fellow”). And hence Hobbes can conclude: «When therefore our refusall to obey frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained [the civil intention]; then there is no Liberty to refuse; otherwise there is» (21.15). The upshot is that the default condition of authorization is liberty; liberty is restricted only when it is necessary to fulfill the civil intention. Hobbes’s argument in paragraphs 14 and 15 are important for his reply to republicanism because he presumably thinks that it applies generally to governments of every kind; and thus republicans cannot claim that their theory gives people more liberty than other kinds of government. 6. Conclusion. In chapter 14, Hobbes explained that obligation arises from the alienation of rights; and transferring them to their sovereign is one way of doing this: «when a man hath [...] abandoned or granted away his Right; then is he said to be OBLIGMED, or BOUND» (14.7). It was important for him to contrast law and obligation with right and liberty. Thus, he said, «law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty» (14.3). But he was reluctant to avow that dichotomy in chapter 21, when he wanted to undermine republicanism, because, as I have suggested, if he were to admit that his theory required that alienation of rights, it would look less desirable than republican theory. I think this largely explains why at 21.10 he makes the paradoxical claim, «For in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty». It appears from this sentence that obligation and liberty are, if not twins, boon companions. This impression is reinforced later in the same paragraph when he says, «The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived». The singular verb, «is», gives the impression that obligation is identical with liberty! And it is misleading, though perhaps not false, for Hobbes to say that the liberty of the subject is «derived» from or dependent on something. Liberty exists on its own in the state of nature. It is only when liberty is invaded by obligation that the existence of liberty depends on the existence of something else, namely, obligation. The liberty that survives is the liberty that is not killed off by obligation. As regards the meaning of the sentence, «For in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty» etc.,

“consisteth” presumably is not to be paired with “in” to mean “consisteth in”, that is, that obligation and liberty depend for their existence on the act of our submission. Rather, in order for the sentence to be saying something sensible according to Hobbes’s philosophy “consisteth” must mean something like “stand or exist together”; and though they exist together obligation and liberty co-vary. As obligation increases, liberty decreases, and vice versa. In conclusion, the challenge of republican theory exposes at least an ambivalence in Hobbes’s political theory. On the one hand, his instincts favor the

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239

theory of alienation; which is the easiest way to justify both obligation and absolute sovereignty. On the other hand, the theory of alienation makes Hobbes’s theory look much less attractive than republican theory. Thus, in chapter 21, Hobbes tries to make authorization do the work of alienation; he tries to gen-

erate obligation out of authorization”.

23. I want to thank Jo Ann Carson, Kinch Hoekstra, and Leslie Martinich for comment-

ing on an earlier version of this article.

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HOBBES, SOVEREIGNTY

AND CONSENT

by G. A. J. Rogers

Introduction

In this paper I shall be examining aspects of Hobbes’s account of authority in so far as it is concerned with the issuing of commands or in other ways requiring as a matter of right for the commander other individuals to follow some course of action. The single most important fact from which everything else flows in Hobbes’s account of authority is that it depends upon recognition which itself depends upon agreement. What the word «recognition» means in this context is something very precise and is not its everyday meaning although it is closely connected with that everyday meaning. For to recognize somebody as having authority depends on having already accepted that person has been granted the authority. Our language often shows that we recognize such an authority. When I say «Mr. President» I am thereby both acknowledging such authority and agreeing to accept it. When I say «Madam Chairman» to the chairman of the academic meeting, I am recognizing what has already been agreed between us and the rest of the meeting, that that person has authority to control the seminar. When in England I call somebody «Your Worship» I thereby recognize her authority as mayor of the city. Those who refuse to stand when the national anthem is played thereby show that they do not accept the authority of the state or some other authority (e.g. that of the crown) and so on. That is to

say the person or persons accepting some body or individual as an authority have to see that person as having a legitimate right to expect to be obeyed or accepted as the person in authority. Although Hobbes is often regarded as providing a theory of the state and of authority which requires minimal religious content I doubt if his argument can be fully appreciated without consideration of the place occupied by religious claims within it. This is as true of his account of authority as of any other part of his argument. And the recognition of God’s authority by men is something central to it. For Hobbes, understanding the recognition of God’s authority comes about only through an acceptance of the part that men play in that

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G. A. J. Rogers

recognition. Further, like all those in authority, the authority is exercised through the use of language. Hobbes explains his position very clearly in Leviathan, Chapter 31, «Of the Kingdom of God by Nature». Whether men like it or accept it or not, they are governed by God; «By denying the existence, or providence, of God», he says, «men may shake off their ease but not

their yoke»! (EW, p. 344). He then tells us that God can be only said to reign if he «governs his subjects by his word, and by promise of rewards to those that obey it, and by threatening them with punishment that obey it not» (ibid). To rule by words - the only way in which rule is possible - requires the ruler to make known

his law, which God does, Hobbes

says, in three ways:

natural

reason, revelation, and by the voice of some man, namely, his prophets who establish their credibility through the workings of miracles. To these three ways of discovering God’s laws correspond «right reason, sense supernatural, and faith» (EW, p 345). The normal mechanism for recognition is some kind of verbal act: a performative which seals the recognition and the agreement. Hobbes tells us little about how we accept and recognize God’s authority. For him it must presumably have been a private act of worship (prayer?) from man to God, or the more public act of accepting a particular church, itself an artificial person that can issue commands and require obedience (cf. L. Ch. 39 $$4, EW, 3, pp. 459-60). In this paper I wish to explore these concepts of recognition, command and authority as they are deployed by Hobbes and to test their coherence and validity.

Communication

The first point to notice about Hobbes’s understanding of the interrelationship between recognition, agreement and authority which is fundamental to his whole account in both Leviathan and De cive is that they presuppose both the possibility and the success of rational communication between human beings. Hobbes explains this very clearly in chapter 26 of Leviathan which is concerned with the nature of civil law. He writes that from the fact that the law is a command, and a command consists in a «declaration or manifestation of the

will of him that commandeth, by voice, [or] writing» we see that «the command of the commonwealth is law only to those, that have means to take notice of it» (EW 3, p 257). And that excludes all those who cannot understand

language: «natural fools, children, or madmen» over whom there is no law. So the law applies only to those who can understand it. So we need to know who are the ones to whom the law applies. The essential line between those who are subject to the law and those who are not is given by whether or not they are language users. Hobbes says there arc two kinds of law: the first is natural law which is embodied in the laws of 1. Leviathan

(EW).

(hereafter L) Ch. 31. Quotations will be taken from The English

Works

Hobbes, Sovereignty and Consent

243

nature. We recognize the law of nature by our innate capacity to reason. It is not necessary that the law of nature be written down because it is evident to all who have that capacity to reason. Reasoning for Hobbes «in this sense, is nothing but reckoning, that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men»’. So language is necessary for reasoning as we have to know what the general names signify if we are to understand the laws of nature. When we do so then we see that they are necessary truths. We «ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain ti, that he may seek, and use all helps, and advantages of war»? is self evident to our reason if we consider it seriously, says Hobbes. They are, as he says in De cive, «the silent dictates of right reason». And so too, Hobbes claims, are all the other laws of nature. The laws of nature are necessary in at least two senses. First; they are nec-

essary truths; second, they are necessarily binding on our actions. These two senses of necessity are very different. To say that the laws of nature are necessary truths is to say that they cannot be denied without contradiction. Their denial entails the rejection of a law of logic and is some kind of linguistic absurdity. However, to say that a law of nature is necessarily binding on our behavior is to say that behavior which denies it i.e. behavior which breaks or infringes a law of nature is irrational and can never be justified. The authority of a law of nature is, therefore, always the authority of reason. But, the laws of nature are, at least for the most part, obviously true, whereas the truths of reason are often obscure, or at least not self-evidently true. Think, for example, of Pythagoras’s Theorem or the answer to the question, «what is 83 x 427?» The answer to which is certainly necessarily true but far from self-evident. The laws of nature are self-evident in the same way as are the definitions and axioms of Euclidean geometry. Once we understand them, we see they must be binding. It follows from this that we do not have to see the laws of nature as the commands of God. Of course, being supremely rational, their truth is selfevident to God. But, they are quite unlike the positive commands that God gave to the people of Israel and which are and can be known only be revelation. They are the commands of reason, not of authority. The capacity to reason correctly, Hobbes tells us, is «attained by industry, first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another and so to syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that it is men call SCIENCE»

(L., EW 3, p.35).

In any state or commonwealth, as well as laws of nature there are other positive laws. Once again it is language which is crucial for knowing what

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HOBBES E LO SCETTICISMO CONTINENTALE* di Gianni Paganini

I rapporti tra Hobbes e lo scetticismo sono tuttora oggetto di controversia fra gli studiosi. In particolare si discute se le tematiche scettiche abbiano svolto un ruolo di qualche importanza nella formazione del suo pensiero filosofico e, nel caso, se questo influsso sia stato di carattere positivo o prevalentemente di tipo polemico: La definizione di un Hobbes «post-sceptical» non è accettata da tutti, da alcuni viene anzi esplicitamente rifiutata e, tra coloro che pure la condividono, variano i significati attribuiti al prefisso «post» e all’aggettivo «sceptical». Molte delle discussioni traggono poi origine dal fatto che non vengono adeguatamente esplicitati i contesti storici effettivi rispetto ai quali un ipotetico “scetticismo” di Hobbes potrebbe essere messo in relazione. Le considerazioni che qui verranno svolte prenderanno invece decisamente questa via: non solo reperire le tracce lasciate dalle correnti scettiche nella filosofia hobbesiana, ma anche riportarle alle “fonti” e agli “interlocutori” che più chiaramente ne furono il tramite. * Si pubblica qui in anteprima la traduzione italiana della relazione inglese presentata al Congresso: “Scepticism as a Force in Renaissance and Post-Renaissance Thought: New Findings and New Interpretations of the Role and Influence of Modern Scepticism”, Los Angeles, UCLA

Center for 17th and 18th cent. studies and William Andrews Clark Memo-

rial Library, 8-9 Marzo 2002, organizzato da Richard H. Popkin e José R. Maia Neto, i cui Atti sono in preparazione. Sono grato alle persone con cui ho potuto discutere questo testo: Dick Popkin, Chris Laursen, Tom Lennon, Harry M. Bracken, J.-R. Armogathe, L. Floridi,

José Maia Neto. Più lontano nel tempo, vorrei ricordare quanto ho appreso su Hobbes e sullo scetticismo dalle conversazioni con Mario dal Pra, Arrigo Pacchi e Karl Schuhmann, alla cui memoria questo articolo è dedicato. 1. Alcuni studi di Richard Tuck hanno definito Hobbes come un pensatore “post-sceptical”. Cfr. R. Tuck, «Hobbes

and Descartes».

In Perspectives on Thomas

Hobbes,

G.A.J.

Rogers and Alan Ryan, eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 11-41; «Optics and Sceptics: the philosophical foundations of Hobbes’s political thought». In Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Philosophy, Edmund Leites, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 235-63. Sugli aspetti politici e religiosi dello scetticismo si vedano le importanti considerazioni di Richard H. Popkin, svolte in due articoli ripresi in: Id., The Third Force in Seventeenth-Century Thought, Brill, Leiden-New York, Kobenhavn, Koln 1992 («Hobbes and Scepticism I», pp. 9-26; «Hobbes and Scepticism II», pp. 27-49). Per lo sfon-

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Gianni Paganini

1. Hobbes e lo “scetticismo” della Prima Meditazione

Se in generale il rinvio ai contesti “scettici’’resta implicito, vi è tuttavia un caso in cui Hobbes si è esplicitamente confrontato con quello che ai suoi tempi poteva presentarsi come l’itinerario del dubbio per eccellenza: la prima Meditazione di Descartes. Nel testo delle Objectiones tertiae colpisce il fatto che, mentre banalizza le riflessioni cartesiane sulle «cose che si possono revocare in dubbio», negando loro ogni originalità e riportandole agli argomenti di «Platone e di altri antichi filosofi sull’incertezza delle cose sensibili», Hobbes

ne riconosce tuttavia la validità e anzi la «verità» («Veritatem ergo hujus Meditationis agnoscimus»). Più esatto di Descartes nell’indicare nel problema classico del criterio («nullum esse kriterion») il fulcro delle obiezioni scettiche

(riassunte sinteticamente nell’impossibilità di distinguere in modo certo tra i «sogni» e la «veglia e la sensazione vera»), l’autore delle Obiezioni interpreta però a modo suo la funzione del dubbio: come gli rimprovera puntualmente Descartes, finisce per prendere per «vero» ciò che invece si sarebbe dovuto ammettere soltanto come «verosimile»; conferisce cioè una portata reale e de-

finitiva agli argomenti scettici che da Descartes erano stati evocati soltanto in una funzione dialettica”. È fin troppo noto che il quadro generale della concezione hobbesiana si distacca nettamente dalla metafisica cartesiana e gli impedisce pertanto di seguire il percorso argomentativo che nelle Meditazioni conduceva al superamento del dubbio, con il riconoscimento della veracità divina e con l’affermazione del dualismo. La definizione della res cogitans come sostanza immateriale, Ia distinzione tra «idea» e «immagine» sensibile, il ricorso

do generale si veda ora: Id., History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (new revised and expanded edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003 (in part. chapt. 12: “Political and Practical Answers to Scepticism: Thomas Hobbes”, pp. 189-207). Prendendo in esame le posizioni di Popkin e Tuck, Tom Sorell («Hobbes without doubt», History of Philosophy Quarterly 10 (1993), pp. 121-35) ha negato la pertinenza degli argomenti scettici per la comprensione della filosofia di Hobbes: nella sua prospettiva il filosofo inglese appare assai più “anti-Aristotelian” che “post-sceptical”. Più in generale, la maggior parte degli studi ha considerato il rapporto tra Hobbes e lo scetticismo dal punto di vista della morale e della politica. Si vedano, in questa prospettiva: Anna Maria Battista, Alle origini del pensiero politico libertino. Montaigne e Charron, nuova edizione, Giuffré, Milano 1979 (prima edizione 1966); Marshall Missner, «Skepticism and Hobbes” political philosophy», Journal of the History of Ideas, 44 (1983), pp. 407-27; molto generico Flathman, Richard E. Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality and Chastened Politics. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993, spec. pp. 2-3, 21-22, 52; Andrew Lister, «Scepticism and Pluralism in Thomas Hobbes’s Political Thought», History of Political Thought, XIX (1998), pp. 35-60. In una prospettiva completamente diversa, cioé in chiave gnoseologica e metafisica, si veda invece il mio saggio: G. Paganini, «Hobbes among ancient and modern sceptics: phenomena and bodies», in: G. Paganini (ed.), The Return of Scepticism from Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle, “International Archives of the Ihistory of Ideas”, vol. 184, Kluwer, Dordrecht-Boston-London 2003, pp. 3-35. 2. In Descartes, René, Euvres. Paris: éds. Ch. Adam et P. Tannery, 1897-1913 [indica-

to come

AT], vol. VII, p. 171 (Meditationes:

authoris). Ob. I.

Objectiones tertiae cum

responsionibus

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all’idea di Dio, da cui deriva «la certezza dell’esistenza delle cose materiali» («de rerum materialium existentia»): sono queste le tesi puntualmente respinte da Hobbes, mentre da lui vengono affermate le tesi contrapposte. Non si danno idee né di Dio né dell’anima, l’evidenza («lux in intellectu») è ridotta ad

espressione «metaforica», a cui non corrisponde una reale funzione «argomentativa», l’esistenza di Dio e la creazione non risultano ancora dimostrate. Ma anche se si potesse arrestare il confronto tra i due pensatori alla fase del dubbio e dunque al livello della prima Meditazione, si dovrebbe tuttavia constatare che pure la rappresentazione degli argomenti scettici subisce nella lettura di Hobbes una significativa ‘distorsione’. Almeno nella prima fase, quella del dubbio metodico anteriore al dubbio iperbolico, Descartes aveva mantenuto, anche nel caso estremo delle «false illusioni» indotte dal sogno, l’esistenza di un rapporto di similitudine con le cose reali e vere («veluti quasdam pictas imagines»)?. Soprattutto nel caso delle cosiddette qualità primarie (natura corporea, estensione, figura, grandezza, numero, luogo, tempo), cioè per le cose più semplici e universali («magis simplicia & universalia»), all’ autore delle Meditazioni sembrava che sussistesse pur sempre un rapporto di rappresentazione «vera» rispetto alla realtà, da cui «tutte queste immagini delle cose, che risiedono nel nostro pensiero, siano esse vere e reali, siano finte e

fantastiche, sono formate»*. Almeno le nozioni dell’aritmetica e della geometria, se non quelle della fisica, dell’astronomia o della medicina, venivano dunque considerate, a quello stadio del dubbio cartesiano, come «immagini» vere di cose realmente esistenti>. Saranno

necessarie, com’è noto, l’iperbole

del dio ingannatore e quella del genio maligno per proiettare su queste superstiti certezze l’ombra di una possibile e sistematica fallacia. Giunto così al limite estremo del dubbio volontario indotto da una precisa scelta («me ipsum fallam...»)°, il mondo esterno («cuncta [...] externa») potrà infine presentaglisi come un insieme di «ludificationes somniorum», «insidie tese alla credu-

lità» del soggetto”. Hobbes, com'è noto, nelle Obiezioni neppure menzionera l’ipotesi del genio maligno e taglierà alla radice il ricorso all'ipotesi teologica. In questo modo riuscirà a mantenersi entro il perimetro descritto dai tradizionali argo3. R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, Med. I (AT VII p. 19): «tamen profecto fatendum est visa per quietem esse veluti quasdam pictas imagines, que non nisi ad similitudinem rerum verarum fingi potuerunt». Sulle idee «tamquan rerum imagines» vedi il recente contributo di Raul Landim Filho, «Idée et représentation», in: Descartes. Objecter et répondre, textes réunis et édités par Jean-Marie Beyssande et Jean-Luc Marion, P.U.F., Paris 1994, pp. 187-203 ; sul dialogo assai duro tra Hobbes e Descartes in tema di metafisica, vedi ibi, pp. 149-162 : Edwin Curley, «Hobbes contre Descartes». 4. R. Descartes, Meditationes cit. (AT VII p. 20): «...ex quibus tanquam coloribus veris omnes iste, seu vere, seu false, que in cogitatione nostra sunt, rerum imagines effinguntur.

5. Vedi cid che Descartes dice più sopra delle cose rappresentate nel sonno come immagini di cose vere. 6. Ibi (AT VII p. 22). 7. Ibi (AT VII p. 22).

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menti dello scetticismo classico, rifiutando quelle che anche ad altri oppositori di temperie “scettica” (come Gassendi) erano apparse iperboli ingiustificate, ipotesi artificiose e forzate. Tuttavia, già in queste prime fasi iniziali del dubbio, Hobbes si staccherà da Descartes in un punto molto significativo. Laddove le Meditazioni (come si è visto) descrivevano, sia pure per metterlo in questione, un rapporto di somiglianza («imago», «similitudo») tra le rappresentazioni e le cose, Hobbes sceglie una via affatto diversa, che lo porta a considerare le «conceptiones» come effetti e non come immagini. La via intrapresa è quella della descrizione di entità psicologiche, nel quadro più generale del meccanicismo, con tutto ciò che esso comporta per l’ontologia delle rappresentazioni mentali. Queste si presentano a Hobbes come «phantasmata», non importa che ci vengano durante la veglia o che giungano invece in sogno («phantasmata, qua vigilantes & sentientes habemus»). In entrambi i casi, dal punto di vista della consistenza reale, tali fantasmi si rivelano come «accidenti» che non ineriscono agli oggetti esterni, né pertanto possono fornire argomenti assolutamente probanti a sostegno della loro reale esistenza «fuori di noi» («non esse accidentia objectis externis inherentia, neque argumento esse talia objecta externa omnino existere»). Dunque, ne conclude Hobbes, se seguiamo 1 nostri sensi senza alcun altro ragionamento, «a buon diritto dubiteremo se esista qualcosa 0 no» («Ideoque si sensus nostros sine alia ratiocinatione sequamur, merito dubitabimus an aliquid existat, necne»)’. In apparenza, il risultato è lo stesso della Prima Meditazione, cioè l’epoché totale della conoscenza del mondo esterno («accurate deinceps assensionem esse cohibendam, si quid certi velim invenire»?, aveva scritto Descartes) e in questo senso Hobbes ha ragione a rivendicare anche per sé la «verità» della Meditazione cartesiana. Si tratta in realtà di un risultato che è al tempo stesso più scettico e meno scettico di quello cartesiano. Hobbes appare meno “scettico” di Descartes: «phantasmata» e «accidentia» sono termini con una precisa connotazione di realtà (o di irrealtà), laddove il filosofo francese si era attenuto a formule più generiche e meno impegnative, parlando in modo vago di «opiniones»!°. I termini hobbesiani rimandano invece ad una descrizione assertiva dei contenuti rappresentativi, quale Descartes non avrebbe potuto accettarla, tanto meno in una fase della ricerca in cui aveva

messo tra parentesi ogni tipo di certezza, comune o filosofica che fosse!!.

8. Th. Hobbes, Objectiones tertiae (AT VII p. 171).

9. R. Descartes, Meditationes, I (AT VII p. 22). Vedi più sopra p. 18: «huic mearum opinionum eversioni vacabo». Sul tema del dubbio in Descartes si veda ora: Harry M. Bracken, Descartes, OneWorld, Oxford 2002, pp. 15-36. 10. Vedi ad es. AT VII p. 18. Sulla metafisica cartesiana sono fondamentali le opere di Jean-Luc Marion: Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, Paris 1981 e Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, Paris 1986. Per un’analisi importante e originale dello sfondo scettico delle Meditationes vedi ora: José R. Maia Neto, «Charron’s époché and Descartes’s cogito: the sceptical base of Descartes’s refutation of scepticism» in: The Return of Scepticism from Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle, cit., pp. 81-113. 11. Si veda il passo esemplare di Hobbes (Objectiones tertiae AT VII p. 178), in cui si

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Hobbes, in realtà, è anche più scettico del suo avversario (considerando il problema da un altro punto di vista). Stabilita l'equivalenza tra avere qualche idea e immaginare («ideam aliquam habere» significa «imaginari»!?), nelle III Obiezioni si afferma chiaramente che non abbiamo alcuna «idea» della sostanza e che questo asserto vale non solo per Dio e l’anima (sostanze «inimmaginabili» per definizione), ma anche per quella che Hobbes considera come la sostanza per eccellenza e in senso proprio, il corpo inteso come «materia subjecta accidentibus & mutationibus». La sostanza sarà soltanto inferita mediante il ragionamento («sola ratiocinatione evincitur»). Attribuita «anche ad

antichi aristotelici» non meglio precisati!*, l'affermazione proietta un dubbio radicale su un caposaldo del realismo metafisico cartesiano (la teoria della «realitas objectiva» delle idee)!* e più in generale suggerisce uno scenario in cui, pur senza negare l’esistenza di uno sfondo reale fatto di sostanze e di corpi, si constata tuttavia l'impossibilità di rappresentarlo in modo diretto, per limitare la sfera della percezione immediata ai «fantasmi», agli «accidenti». Questa distinzione tra il mondo

delle essenze e delle sostanze, inaccessibile

alla conoscenza diretta, e il mondo dei fenomeni sensibili che colgono soltanto gli «accidenti», costituiva uno delle eredità più cospicue lasciate dallo scetticismo di Sesto alle correnti neopirroniane del Seicento.

2. Hobbes e il “grande paradosso” della conoscenza sensibile Già prima delle Obiezioni, redigendo gli Elements of Law, Hobbes aveva elaborato con chiarezza la distinzione tra gli oggetti reali e i fenomeni. Il cap. II di quest’ opera utilizza sì le metafore pittoriali per descrivere le conoscenze come «images or conceptions of the things without us»!5, ma insiste poi decisamente sul divario che separa la rappresentazione dalla cosa. «Sense» e «conceptions» (due termini per Hobbes equivalenti) hanno in comune il fatto di «rappresentare», mediante «immagini», «qualità delle cose» e non le cose in se stesse. Queste si trovano in un rapporto di radicale esteriorità rispetto al

manifesta il fondamento materialistico e linguistico sottostante al suo metodo in metafisica: «Si hoc sit, sicut esse potest, ratiocinatio dependebit a nominibus, nomina ab imaginatione, & imaginatio forte, sicut sentio, ab organorum corporeorum motu, & sic mens nihil aliud erit præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici». 12. Ibi (AT VII p. 178). 13. Ibid. «Veteres quoque Peripatetici docuerunt satis clare non percipi substantiam sensibus, sed colligi rationibus». Cees Leijenhorst in particolare ha sottolineato lo sfondo aristotelico-scolastico di alcune dottrine hobbesiane: Hobbes and the Aristotelians.The Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’s Natural Philosophy, Zeno Institute of Philosophy, Leiden-Utrecht 1998 (soprattutto pp. 170-82). 14. R. Descartes, Meditationes (AT VII p. 185; vedi anche p. 178).

15. The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, edited with a Preface and Critical Notes

by Ferdinand Tônnies. Second Edition with a New Introduction by M.M. Goldsmith. London: 1969 (first ed. 1889) [abbreviato El.]: Li, 8, p. 2.

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soggetto che le conosce («qualities of things without us»’®). Hobbes affrontava cosi i temi che saranno tipici della prima Meditazione cartesiana: l’incertezza della conoscenza sensibile, ma sviluppava altresi un argomento suo proprio, quella «main deception of sense», che ci fa apparire come esterno nell’ oggetto quanto è invece interno al soggetto conoscente. Questi sono i punti fondamentali svolti negli Elements. Esiste una connessione assai stretta fra le caratteristiche degli organi di senso, la diversita dei «concetti» e le diverse qualita degli oggetti, essendo queste ultime e non gli oggetti in sé i veri contenuti della rappresentazione sensibile: «By our several organs we have several conceptions of several qualities in the objects»'’. Benché ciò sembri ai più «a great paradox», si dovrà mantenere ben distinta |’ «immagine» o rappresentazione (ad es. l’«image in vision») dalle qualità oggettive («the very qualities themselves»)'®. La rappresentazione sensoriale è «nothing without us really», poiché «the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is not the object or thing seen»!?; i “conceptions” di tutti i sensi ineriscono non all’oggetto, ma al senziente (“their inherence is not the object, but the sen-

tient”), A sostegno di questi argomenti, Hobbes poteva addurre tutta una serie di esperienze, normali e patologiche, che costituivano altrettanti topoi ricorrenti nella letteratura scettica: i riflessi degli oggetti visibili nell’ acqua, i fenomeni acustici dell’eco, i casi di diplopia, le illusioni provocate da lesioni all’occhio o al nervo ottico ecc. Negli Elements l’autore usa assai di raro il termine «phantasm»?! e anche i due lemmi «image» e «representation» verranno soppiantati, nel corso del capitolo II, da termini che denotano l’apparenza, con tutti i suoi derivati: le qualità sensibili sono «seemings and apparitions only», esse non esistono «without us really» benché i sensi ci facciano credere («our senses make us think») che si trovano colà. Rispetto ad altre versioni meno radicali del fenomenismo (come la distinzione galileiana tra qualità primarie e qualità secondarie, o quella cartesiana già evocata tra la «natura corporea in communi» e le apparenze sensibili), la riduzione hobbesiana appare negli Elements assai più 16. El. I, i, 8, p. 2: «This imagery and representations of the qualities of things without us is that we call our cognition, imagination, ideas, notice, conception, or knowledge of them». 17. El. I, ii, 3, p. 3. Seguono gli esempi della vista, dell'udito: «And so the rest of the

senses also are conceptions of several qualities, or natures of their objects». 18. El. I, ii, 4, p. 3. Un paradosso ancora peggiore («worse than any paradox»), anzi «a plain impossibility» è quello che risulta dall’immaginare l’esistenza di «species visible and intelligible» che vanno e vengono dall’oggetto (ibi, p. 3-4), come avveniva nelle teorie scolastiche e in parte ancora nello Short Tract. 19. El. I, ii, 4, p. 3: «That the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is not the object or thing seen». «That that is nothing without us really which we call an image or colour». 20. Ibi, p. 4. Tesi ripetuta in: El. I, ii, 9, p. 7, da confrontare con la clausola di I, ii, 4, p. 4. 21. Una volta nel senso di immagine illusoria (I, iii, 5, p. 10) e un’altra con riferimento

a «ghosts» e «spirits» (I, xi, 5, p. 55).

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estensiva, in quanto sembra coinvolgere anche la trama quantitativa della rappresentazione sensoriale:

non solo il colore, il suono, l’odore o il calore, ma

anche la figura («shape»), la posizione e i dati visivi che pure attestano le proprieta geometriche, tutti i dati sensoriali in genere sono coinvolti nella riduzione a fenomeni («apparitions»), i quali sono «nothing without»??: «accidents or

qualities» che «non sono nel mondo» («they are not there»*), ma solo nel soggetto getto. In verità, anche questa netta contrapposizione fra le qualità sensoriali concepite come interne al percipiente («apparitions unto us») e il mondo «without us» finisce per inquadrarsi in un’ontologia materialistica e meccanicistica, giacché ciò che «appare» al soggetto è, per Hobbes, letteralmente l’apparire di un movimento materiale?*, che dall’esterno («dall’oggetto») giunge al cervello veicolato dagli spiriti animali e di lì si ripercuote di nuovo nei nervi in direzione dell'esterno («it reboundeth back into the nerves outward»), conferendo in

questo modo alla sensazione l’aspetto di «an apparition without». Come si possano formulare asserti circa la realtà dei corpi in movimento («the things that really are in the world without us»*°) a partire dai loro effetti fenomenici, quale rapporto di inferenza conduca dal livello delle rappresentazioni a quello delle sostanze: su questi problemi Hobbes, almeno negli Elements, non sembra

22. El. I, ii, 7, p. 5: in questo passo Hobbes si riferisce alla luce, ma l’espressione ricorre sovente nei suoi testi. Vedi ad es.: Leviathan, edited with an introduction by C.B. Macpherson. London: Penguin Books, 1985 (indicato come Lev. — la doppia paginazione si riferisce in primo luogo all’edizione 1651 e quindi all’edizione moderna indicata): Lev. I, 1,

p. 3/84, ove Hobbes presenta il pensiero («Thoughts») come «a Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us». Sulle particolarità del Leviathan, e sulla tipica combinazione di logica arbitraristica e psicologia empiristica, vedi: Arrigo Pacchi, Convenzione e ipotesi nella filosofia naturale di Thomas Hobbes, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1965, pp. 188-93. 23. El. I, ii, 10, p. 7. Secondo Richard Tuck («Hobbes and Descartes» in: Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, cit., pp. 11-41, spec. p. 28-9) è questo uno dei passi fondamentali che segnano «the invention of modern philosophy»: la «great novelty» di Descartes, Gassendi e Hobbes. 24. El. I, ii, 7, p. 5: «That image and colour is but an apparition unto us of that motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance in the head». Cfr. il passo, identico quasi alla lettera, in I, ii, 5, p. 4: «That the

said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of that motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain or spirits, or some internal substance of the head». DOP BIS OF pa 26. El. I, ii, 10, p. 7. Un’analisi del fenomeno o fantasma o rappresentazione come il risultato di una «radicale eterogeneità tra la sensibilità e la cosa» si trova in: Yves Charles Zarka, La décision métaphysique de Hobbes. Conditions de la politique, deuxième éd. augm., Vrin, Paris 1999, p. 33. Pacchi, op. cit., p. 233 ritrova nell’analisi hobbesiana della percezione «il riconoscimento della validità delle argomentazioni scettiche circa l’impossibilità della mente umana di afferrare la realtà ultima delle cose, al di là dell'involucro sensitivo immaginativo entro il quale essa opera». Un'analisi più dettagliata nel mio saggio: G. Paganini, «Hobbes among ancient and modern sceptics: phenomena and bodies», in: The Return of Scepticism cit.

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fornire elementi risolutivi. Egli si limita piuttosto ad enunciare l’uno accanto all’altro i due lati che compongono insieme la cifra caratteristica della sua po-

sizione filosofica: fenomenismo delle qualita, corporeismo delle sostanze*’. Al

riguardo, anzi, gli Elements contengono indicazioni fuorvianti, poiché Hobbes dichiara che agli inganni del senso fornira rimedio il senso stesso («this is the great deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected»**) o che la «ratiocination» muovera semplicemente da «principles that are found indubitable by experience»?”, secondo una ricetta baconiana a cui neppure Hobbes si atterrà, quando si tratterà di enunciare i fondamenti metafisici della sua “filosofia prima”. Come chiarirà l’anno successivo il testo delle Objectiones, il passaggio dai «seemings» 0 «apparitions» ai «things» (nel lessico degli Elements), oppure dai «phantasmata» o «accidentia» alle «substantiae» (nel lessico del De corpore), non è mai opera del senso, ma frutto della ragione che raziocina o calcola.

3. Vecchi

e nuovi

scenari

dello

scetticismo

continentale:

Sanches

e

Montaigne Prima però di vedere come si collochi questa peculiare via d'uscita dallo scetticismo, sarà opportuno notare come la posizione di Hobbes si inquadri nella più generale congiuntura scettica del neopirronismo moderno. Se la separazione tra il livello delle apparenze sensibili (o esperienze, o fenomeni) e quello delle essenze, o sostanze, rappresenta un dato largamente diffuso fra i protagonisti della rinascita scettica del Seicento (lo si ritrova tanto in La Mothe quanto in Mersenne o in Gassendi, ma era già presente in un antiaristotelico come Sanches), più tipica invece è una posizione (come quella hobbesiana), che combina insieme lo scetticismo sulla conoscenza

sensibile con

un dogmatismo alquanto drastico sulla natura corporea e meccanica (materia in movimento) delle cause che la producono. Formulata già nello Short Tract, modificata con l'eliminazione del concetto ambiguo di “species”, la teoria hobbesiana del processo di sensazione costituisce il terreno di incontro per quelle due diverse tendenze, che a prima vista parrebbero incompatibili. La coesistenza dei due aspetti trovava peraltro la sua base nella teoria del fenomeno, così come era stato enunciata nei classici manuali di Sesto Empirico.

Benché si possa discutere (come ha proposto Conche) se l'orientamento vero della tendenza pirroniana non mirasse al superamento della distinzione tra fe27. El. I, ii, 10, p. 7: «whatsoever accident or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only. The things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused». 28. Ibidem: «And this is the great deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected. For as sense telleth me, when I see directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the

object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by reflection, that colour is not in the object». 29. El. I, v, 12, p. 22; cfr. anche 14, p. 23: «the very first ground of all our knowledge, sense».

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nomeno e realtà e quindi ad eliminarlo come un residuo di dogmatismo, è indubbio d’altra parte che gran parte degli argomenti di Sesto e poi quelli dei suoi continuatori moderni si presentano come l’esplicitazione delle conseguenze che derivano invece da una concezione imperniata proprio su quel dualismo e sul distacco dell’oggetto del conoscere (il fenomeno) rispetto alla cosa in se stessa. Sotto questo profilo, le pagine conclusive dell’Apologie de Raimond Sebond di Montaigne segnano un passaggio decisivo nella storia che ci interessa e marcano la distanza tra uno scetticismo di nuovo tipo, influito dai testi di Se-

sto Empirico, e un più vecchio scetticismo post-aristotelico, ben rappresentato dal quasi contemporaneo Francisco Sanches. Non a caso, quest’ultimo manteneva la nozione aristotelica di species: assicurando il legame fra soggetto e oggetto, la species instaurava un rapporto di somiglianza, se non di copia, fra la rappresentazione e la cosa (rapporto bene espresso dal processo di informazione nel corso del quale il senziente recepisce la forma, non certo la realtà materiale del percepito). In verità, la scepsi, anche estrema, del Quod nihil scitur nasceva più dalla impraticabilità di fatto del paradigma aristotelico che dalla sua critica. Accettando come “normative” le condizioni di “normalità” dell’esperienza sensibile predicate da Aristotele (con il suo riferirsi al percipiente sano, bene disposto, ben collocato ecc.), Sanches le considerava di fatto inat-

tuabili, pur continuando a ritenerle valide almeno in linea di principio. La difficoltà di ottenere e di conservare un temperamento perfetto (che a sua volta richiederebbe un corpo perfetto), la consapevolezza della variabilità universale che investe il conoscente come il conosciuto, l’infinita varietà dei particolari e l’inesauribile molteplicità della natura: sono questi gli argomenti che conducono all’acatalessia, come ad una situazione di fatto che però non infirma di per sé la validità teorica del paradigma. Se mai si arrivasse a conoscere, anche per Sanches non si potrebbe farlo che nella forma dichiarata da Aristotele. Ma poiché nei fatti gli ostacoli frapposti al conseguimento di quel paradigma sono tanti e tali da renderlo irraggiungibile, ergo nihil scitur. Destinata ad influire su tutta la scena dello scetticismo nuovo e anche sull’impostazione hobbesiana, la posizione originale di Montaigne nasce invece da un cambio di paradigma, e non dalla semplice constatazione della sua pratica inattuabilità. Dunque, non solo per la scarsa conoscenza degli argomenti pirroniani, ma anche perché si muoveva ancora entro le coordinate aristoteliche della teoria della conoscenza, Sanches non pervenne a formulare correttamente il problema del criterio. Quest’ ultimo supponeva una separazione tra cosa e fenomeno o oggetto interno del conoscere, di cui non vi è traccia nella dottrina aristotelica. Sotto questo profilo, è Montaigne a segnare il passaggio da una scepsi post-aristotelica ad una scepsi chiaramente anti-aristotelica 0 neopirroniana, giacché nell’ Apologie il rapporto tra il soggetto e l'oggetto non è più concepito secondo il principio della somiglianza o della copia (garantito dalla trasmissione della forma), ma entro lo schema della relazione causa-effetto, ove per

causa si intendono la causa materiale ed efficiente, non quella formale. Di qui

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le novità che segnano l’atteggiamento di Montaigne e che daranno il tono alla scepsi continentale per tutta la prima metà del Seicento: *

in primo luogo l’abbandono del concetto di species e la sostituzione dello schema psicologico aristotelico con quello di impronta stoica, criticato ma anche rilanciato da Sesto, ove la specie è sostituita dalla Phantasia, intesa come effetto della pressione degli oggetti sensibili (pathe ton aistheseon). La fantaisie diventa sinonimo di «apparenza» in generale, equivalente del fenomeno sestano, come oggetto interno del sentire («passion et souffrance du sens»);

in secondo luogo l’articolazione della scena originaria dello scetticismo pirroniano, con la sua netta separazione fra l’apparenza e la natura, fra l’oggetto del conoscere come fenomeno e la cosa; in terzo luogo, l’avvento di una teoria che fa risalire la sensazione all’oggetto esterno come alla sua causa, ma che la rende, dal punto di vista onto-

logico, inerente al soggetto?. 30. Montaigne, Michel de, Les Essais (éd. Pierre Villey, Paris : P.U.F., 1999), II, xii, “Apologie de Raimond Sebond”, vol. II, p. 601 : « Nostre fantaisie ne s’applique pas aux choses estrangeres, ains elle est conceue par l’entremise des sens ; et les sens ne comprennent pas le subject estranger, ains seulement leurs propres passions ; et par ainsi la fantasie et l’apparence n’est pas du subject, ains seulement de la passion et souffrance du sens, laquelle passion et subject sont choses diverses ; parquoy qui juge par les apparences, juge par autre chose que par le subject. » Nella traduzione di John Florio (The Essayes of Michael Lord of Montaigne translated by John Florio, edited with an Introduction and a Glossary by Henry Morley, London, George Routledge and Sons, 1886, p. 309a): «Our phantasie doth not apply it selfe to strange things, but is rather conceived by the interposition of senses; and senses cannot comprehend a strange subject; nay, not so much as their owne passions: and so, nor the phantasie, nor the apparence is the subject’s, but rather the passion’s only, and sufferance of the sense: which passion and subjects are diverse things: Therefore, who judgeth by apparences, judgeth by a thing different from the subject». È appena necessario ricordare che laddove Montaigne parla di «soggetto» («subject») si riferisce alla sostanza («subjectum»), designando piuttosto ciò che noi intendiamo con il nome di oggetto, dunque la cosa e non il percipiente. Il passo citato segue quello in cui Montaigne introduce il problema del criterio («instrument judicatoire») e quello del diallele («rouet»). Nella traduzione di Florio: «To judge of the apparences that we receive of subjects, we had need have a judicatorie instrument: to verifie this instrument we should have demonstration; and to approve demonstration, an instrument: thus are we ever turning round». Nell’edizione Villey la fonte è erroneamente indicata in: Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonianae Hypotyposes, I, xiv. Si tratta piuttosto di P H I, 114-117, dove, in appendice al quarto tropo di Enesidemo (il tropo delle “circostanze”, cioè le «condizioni o disposizioni») Sesto sviluppa quelle che sono probabilmente le sue personali considerazioni, trattando, oltre il problema delle circostanze, la relazione circolare che viene a crearsi tra la «dimostrazione» e il «criterio» (PHI, 114-117). Il corollario esplicito riguarda l'impossibilità di «preferire» (come «più vera») una rappresentazione rispetto all’altra. Per il rapporto tra Montaigne e Sanches e la letteratura che lo concerne

(con esiti alquanto controversi) sia consentito rinviare al mio

saggio: G. Paganini, «Montaigne, Sanches et la connaissance par phénomènes. Les usages modernes d’un paradigme ancien», in: Montaigne et la philosophie, Colloque international organisé par le Centre d’ Etudes Cartésiennes, Collège de France et Université de Paris-Sorbonne, dir. par Jean-Luc Marion, PUF, Paris, sous presse. Per un bilancio della fortuna mo-

Hobbes e lo scetticismo continentale

Di qui l’insorgere della situazione che rende comprensibile il problema del criterio: diventa necessario un criterio, un terzo termine, laddove è avvenuto il distacco tra i primi due, la rappresentazione e l’oggetto, e si è scoperto che la prima appartiene alle modalità ontiche del soggetto e non a quelle dell’oggetto. Non ha più senso formulare il problema della conoscenza in termini di somiglianza, quando si è consumato il divorzio in re fra la rappresentazione e la cosa rappresentata*'. Per citare la traduzione di John Florio, pubblicata nel 1603 e destinata a influire profondamente su tutta la cultura britannica del "600: «And to say that the senses’ passions referre the qualitie of strange subjects by resemblance unto the soule: How can the soule and the understanding rest assured of that resemblance, having of it selfe no commerce with forraigne subjects? Even as he that knowes no Socrates, seeing his picture, cannot say that it resembleth him».

4. «Unica vera basis rerum»: «phantasms» e corpi in movimento

La situazione descritta da Montaigne, non quella rappresentata da Sanches, è dunque la più vicina alla dicotomia tra apparitions e world su cui si apre la derna dello scetticismo di Sesto cfr.: Luciano Floridi, Sextus Empiricus. The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism, “American Philological Association” vol. 46, Oxford University Press 2002 (su Montaigne vedi in particolare pp. 39-51). Floridi tuttavia non rileva che questa parte finale della Apologie de Raimond Sebond è un interessante pastiche basato su P H II, 72-73. Questo fatto, di grande importanza per la storia della tradizione pirroniana nell’età moderna, è stato notato da Jean-Paul Dumont, Le scepticisme et le phénomène. Essai sur la signification et les origines du pyrrhonisme. Vrin, Paris 1972, p. 44-45. Sulle fonti antiche dello scetticismo (Sesto e il Teeteto) e la loro rielaborazione da parte di Montaigne, in rapporto alla posizione di Hobbes, cfr. il mio saggio: «Hobbes among ancient and modern sceptics...» cit., part. pp. 11-28 31. Sul problema del criterio in Montaigne vedi: R. H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle cit., chapt. HI, esp. pp. 54-55. In Montaigne il problema del criterio è strettamente collegato a quello del «giudice delle controversie» («Au demeurant, qui sera propre à juger de ces différences? Comme nous disons, aux débats de la religion, qu’il nous faut un juge non attaché à l’un ny à l’autre party» Apologie: Essais II, xii, p. 600; cfr. la traduzione inglese di Florio cit. p. 308b: «we must have a judge inclined to either party, and free from partialitie») e — come Popkin ha mostrato — anche Hobbes prese in esame la questione cruciale del «giudice» per elaborare «a political rather than an epistemological criterion of truth». Non troviamo in Montaigne questa soluzione “politica” o autoritaria («a special kind of scepticism — come scrive Popkin —, in which there are no intellectual standards of truth and falsity»), ma è evidente che il passaggio contenuto nell’ Apologie diede un esempio di come l’incertezza religiosa provocata dalla Riforma e i dibattiti che vi tennero dietro bene si adattarono alla situazione scettica (ed epistemologica) derivante dall’impossibilità di trovare un tale criterio. Hobbes, naturalmente, sviluppò assai più largamente le conseguenze politiche laceranti di questa incertezza e argomentò di conseguenza la necessità di arrestarne il corso con l’intervento della decisione del sovrano. Popkin si riferisce a De cive, XVII. Sugli aspetti politici dello scetticismo di Montaigne, cfr.: John Christian Laursen, The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume, and Kant, Brill, Leiden, New York, Koln, 1992, pp. 94-144.

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scena degli Elements hobbesiani. E mentre non vi sono certezze definitive che consentano di attribuire a Hobbes una conoscenza diretta del pamphlet sanchesiano, è difficile d’altra parte immaginare che gli fosse ignoto un grande classico della nuova cultura umanistica come gli Essais, e non solo per gli aspetti connessi ai problemi della valutazione morale e dell’ apprezzamento retorico, bene messi in evidenza da Skinner, o per il tentativo di reagire agli effetti più distruttivi del pirronismo etico, sottolineati da Tuck. A buon diritto quest’ultimo ha individuato fra gli elementi che portarono alla «invention of modern philosophy» la «basic idea that we have immediate and veridical knowledge of our sense-impressions and only our sense-impression — there can be no com-

parable knowledge of the external world». E al riguardo si potrà qui aggiungere che (a parte la qualifica di veridicità, messa esplicitamente in dubbio) tale consapevolezza era già ben presente in Montaigne, grazie alle sue letture degli scettici greci, e di lì essa si era diramata tra i padri fondatori della filosofia moderna: Descartes innanzitutto (Gilson e Popkin docent ), ma anche Hobbes.

Montaigne (la cui eredità, attraverso Charron e La Mothe Le Vayer, si era trasmessa a Gassendi e ai membri del circolo di Mersenne) era certamente una presenza dominante nella cultura continentale, e Hobbes poté conoscerne l’opera direttamente nel corso dei suoi viaggi europei, se già non aveva imparato ad apprezzarla grazie ai contatti con Bacon o con il circolo dei Cavendish. La Vita carmine expressa attribuisce la scoperta fondamentale del pensiero hobbesiano al periodo fra il ‘34 e il °37 in cui, «sia in barca, sia a cavallo, sia in carrozza», viaggiando per le città d’Italia e di Francia, il filosofo aveva meditato 32. R. Tuck, art. cit., p. 28, 30. Dal punto di vista della retorica, della dottrina morale e antropologica, il rapporto con Montaigne è stato analizzato da Quentin Skinner in Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 128, 340, che sottolinea lo sfondo scettico del tema oratorio della «paradiastole». Nello

stesso senso, si veda anche il saggio precedente di Skinner: «Thomas Hobbes: rhetoric and the construction of morality», Proceedings of the British Academy 1990; LXXVI; 1-61 (su Montaigne, vedi part. pp. 27-28, 44-49), che a p. p. 46 contiene un'interessante valutazione degli aspetti “morali” e “antropologici” del rapporto Hobbes-Montaigne: «Hobbes has sometimes been portrayed as in some way “replying” to Montaigne and other exponents of Pyrrhonian scepticism. While there may be something to be said for this interpretation of Hobbes’s philosophy of nature, it is important to stress that, when he comes to the question of human custom and law, he appears to be in complete agreement with the lines of argument laid out by Montaigne in his Apology». E ancora a p. 49: «Hobbes is no less sceptical than Montaigne about the possibility of gaining any general agreement about the right way to “see” normative questions and apply evaluative terms». Skinner ha di recente minimizzato l’importanza del contesto scettico per la comprensione del pensiero di Hobbes. Vedi: Q. Skinner, «Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes», in: Quentin Skinner- Yves Charles Zarka, Hobbes. The Amsterdam Debate, edited and introduced by Hans Blom, Olms, Hildesheim 2001, p. 21-22: «I see no evidence that Hobbes was even faintly interested in pyrrhonism, let alone relativism. He is not I think responding to an epistemological crisis at all. [...] Nor was he at all interested in the technical claims put forward by self avowed sceptics, whether pyrrhonian or academic. What I try to show is that that points us in the wrong direction. What Hobbes is really preoccupied by is the neo-classical art of rhetoric and its view about what it is to conduct an argument».

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assiduamente sulla «natura delle cose» («perpetuo naturam cogito rerum»), ragionando sul fatto che «una sola in tutto l’universo è la cosa vera, benché fal-

sificata in molti modi» («Et mihi visa quidem est toto res unica mundo / Vera, licet multis falsificata modis»). Allora la materia in movimento gli era apparsa come |’ «unica vera base di quelle cose che falsamente diciamo essere qualcosa» («Unica vera quidem, sed quae sit basis earum / Rerum, quas falso dicimus esse aliquid»). Alla contrapposizione fra la realta e le apparenze (tema caratteristico sia della scena degli Elements sia dell’ eredita pirroniana) faceva riscontro, nella narrazione autobiografica, la scoperta che alla «phantasia» o rappresentazione sensibile, frutto del nostro cervello («nostri soboles cerebri») non corrisponde nulla al di fuori («nihil extra»), ma che essa é soltanto un effetto di moto delle parti interne («Partibus internis nil nisi motus est»)?}. Stret-

tamente connessa alle riflessioni sui «materiae arcana» e sulla centralita del moto («Hine est quod, physicam quisquis vult discere, motus / Quid possit, debet perdidicisse prius»), questa scoperta restava consegnata ai pensieri («Scribo nihil») o tutt'al più alle conversazioni private con Mersenne e il suo circolo («Hic [Lutetiae] Mersennum novi, communico et illi / De rerum motu quae meditatus eram»): nei termini del racconto autobiografico, si tratterebbe dun-

que di una riflessione del tutto appartata, sganciata dal confronto con altri autori («facio adversaria nulla»), una scoperta fatta sotto la guida di un’unica

«maestra», la natura, che sta sempre sotto gli occhi senza che vi sia bisogno di ricorrere a libri («magistra / Quae docuit, praesens nam mihi semper erat»). Ad eccezione di Mersenne, nell’autobiografia latina non vengono fatti nomi di altri personaggi, con i quali Hobbes fu pure in contatto in quegli anni: né Descartes, l’avversario, ma neppure Galilei con cui ebbe maggiori affinità. Di questa totale solitudine intellettuale è lecito peraltro dubitare, così come dell’assenza di debiti verso autori del passato. Poiché gli scritti filosofici hobbesiani contengono scarsissimi riferimenti ad autori moderni e contemporanei, non deve sorprendere il fatto che neppure venisse menzionato Montaigne, insieme all’eredità scettica di cui quegli era depositario e interprete: eppure, oltre all’uso tecnico del termine «fantaisie» (nel senso di rappresentazione mentale), che richiama il latino «phantasia» della Vita o l’inglese «fancy» del Leviathan, nella parte conclusiva dell’ Apologie de Raimond Sebond Hobbes poteva ritrovare un’interpretazione marcatamente materialistica dell’opposizione tra fenomeni e corpi, di cui già si è vista la pertinenza sia per gli Elements sia per il contesto scettico. In particolare, in Montaigne Hobbes avrebbe potuto leggere una sintesi degli elementi che, provenendo dalla rielaborazione neoscettica, si ritroveranno anche nella sua opera: un risoluto e franco empirismo di fondo, accompagnato però dalla consa33. Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera Philosophica quae latine scripsit omnia in unum corpus nunc primum collecta studio et labore Gulielmi Molesworth, 5 volumi, London, 1839, second reprint Aalen 1966 [edizione indicata come: OL, seguito dal numero romano per indicare il volume]: OL I p. Ixxxix.

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pevolezza (questa si scettica,

e non epicurea) che la sensazione è solo un

modo del soggetto e non una realta nell’oggetto (come dira il Leviathan,

«the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another»?4); una teoria dei fenomeni sensibili come «misti» che risultano dall’agire della cosa e dal patire del senziente, secondo una particolare interpretazione della nozione di «fenomeno», che, invece di arrestarsi alla registrazione “fenomenologica” dell’apparire, ne sottolineava i connotati realistici, descrivendolo in termini di corpi, movimenti, organi di senso (alquanto incoerente con la tesi scettica dell’epoché circa la realtà degli «oggetti di fuori», questa rappresentazione in termini materialistici del «fenomeno» è già presente nel sesto dei dieci tropi, secondo la classificazione di Sesto Empirico, ove si discute di «mistione interna» e «mistione esterna»: il tema verrà riproposto in modo analogo nell’Apologie). Infine, è il continuo movimento della materia a dominare la parte finale dell’ Apologie, secondo una prospettiva che coniuga scetticismo, materialismo ed eraclitismo (confermando così la tentazione ricorrente a combinare

questi diversi orientamenti, contro la quale già Sesto aveva dovuto mettere

in guardia i suoi lettori?9). E analogamente il moto diverrà per Hobbes l’unica onnipresente forma di causalità nell’universo: «all things are in continuall motion». In questa prospettiva, il fenomeno o apparenza, che è una «passion» per Montaigne, diventa un «accident» del soggetto per Hobbes, ma anche per lui esso costituisce una modalità inerente al soggetto (e non all’oggetto); il «seeming» è un effetto materiale prodotto dall’oggetto sul soggetto percipiente. Frasi, come quella di Montaigne che sto per citare, rappresentano il ponte tra l'approccio pirroniano, centrato sul fenomeno come misto (realtà materiale o corporea risultante dall’azione dell’oggetto e dal patire del soggetto), da una parte, e dall’altra, le teorie meccanicistiche della sensazione che vennero affermandosi negli anni ’20 e °30 del XVII secolo e alle quali Hobbes diede un contributo determinante fin dall’epoca degli Elements. Ecco la citazione di Montaigne, nella traduzione di John Florio:

«Our phantasie does not apply it selfe to strange things, but is rather conceived by the interposition of senses; and senses cannot comprehend a strange subject; nay, not so much as their owne passions: and so, nor the phantasie, nor the apparence is the subject’s, but rather the passion’s only, and sufferance of the sense: which passion and subject are divers things: Therefore, who jud-

geth by apparences, judgeth by a thing different from the subject». Se si tien conto del fatto che, essendo il calco del latino subjectum, il «sujet» di Montaigne («subject» nella traduzione di Florio) indica in realtà l’oggetto, sarà ancora più agevole paragonare questo e altri passi consimili con 34. Lev. chapt. I, p. 14/86. 35.PHI, 124-128 36. PHI, 210 sgg. 37. Montaigne, The Essayes, Florio’s translation cit., p. 309a.

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le ripetute affermazioni hobbesiane, in cui si ribadisce che «the subject of their [conceptions that arise from senses] inherence is not the object, but the sentient»Ÿ, per cui dovremmo sospendere la presunzione di realtà che ci spinge a proiettare all’esterno il contenuto delle nostre rappresentazioni («conclude not such things to be without, that are within us»?°). L'apporto di Hobbes va certamente al di là di questo primo stadio della riflessione e, mediante la teoria del «rebound» degli spiriti animali lungo l’arco riflesso organi di senso — nervi — cervello, cerca di spiegare come mai la sensazione 0 «phantasma» assuma quella particolare connotazione di esteriorita che la caratterizza. Ma si deve al tempo stesso riconoscere che questo nuovo problema (come possa apparire esterno al soggetto ciò che invece è interno ad esso, costituendone un «accidente») non avrebbe potuto manifestarsi se prima Montaigne, sulla scorta dei testi scettici, non avesse analizzato le rappresentazioni sensibili nei termini di «passions» appartenenti al soggetto percipiente*®.

5. Le cose “occulte” e i loro segni: Hobbes e Gassendi

Come per lo scetticismo antico ci si è interrogati sul senso del dualismo tra upokeimena e phainomena (in relazione all’asserita impossibilità di fuoruscire dall’involucro sensibile-immaginativo dei fenomeni per attingere l’oggetto nella sua realtà intrinseca), così anche per la teoria empiristico-rappresentativa dei «seemings» o «phantasms» di Hobbes ci si è posto il problema della coerenza rispetto alla trama materialistica e corporeistica sottesa all’ontologia della «philosophia prima». In altri termini: come è possibile giungere alla definizione della sostanza dopo averne dichiarato l’inconoscibilità a partire dalla conoscenza sensibile e dopo aver asserito (almeno è così negli Elements) che ogni sapere, in quanto «power cognitive», è al tempo stesso «imaginative or

38. El. I, ii, 9, p. 7 39. El. I, v, 11, p. 17. Cfr. I, ii, 10, p. 7: «And from thence also it followeth, that whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not

there. but are seemings and apparitions only. The things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused. And this is the great deception of sense, which also by sense is to be corrected. For as sense telleth me, when I see directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by reflection, that colour is not in the object».

40. Sugli aspetti scettici del fenomenismo e i suoi legami con le fonti pirroniane attraverso Montaigne, Gassendi, La Mothe, Mersenne etc. cfr. anche: G. Paganini, Scepsi mo-

derna. Da Charron a Hume, Cosenza 1990. Il discorso sul rapporto Hobbes-Montaigne dovrebbe poi allargarsi ad altri aspetti dell’ eredita umanistica nel pensiero hobbesiano. Mi sia consentito al riguardo rinviare ad alcuni saggi precedenti: G. Paganini, «Thomas Hobbes e Lorenzo Valla. Critica umanistica e filosofia moderna», Rinascimento, XXXIX (1999), pp. 515-568; Id., Hobbes, Valla and the Trinity, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 11 (2003), pp. 183-218; Id., «Hobbes face à l’héritage érasmien: philologie humaniste et philosophie nouvelle», Institut d’Histoire de la Réformation. Bulletin annuel, Genève,

XXIV (2002-2003), pp. 33-51.

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conceptive», essendo i due termini sinonimi e le due realta psicologicamente equivalenti entrambe a «phantasmata»? Hobbes avrebbe potuto attestarsi sulla linea condivisa dagli scettici “costruttivi” (per usare l’efficace denominazione di Popkin), i quali rinunciavano volutamente alla conoscenza delle “essenze” o “sostanze” o “nature intime”, per limitarsi al livello “orizzontale” dell’organizzazione dei fenomeni (la «superficie o colore delle cose», o la «scorza» come diceva Mersenne, opponendola alle «differenze ultime degli individui»). Invece l'ambizione scientifica hobbesiana va ben oltre questo limite e si fonda su due princìpi dichiaratamente non ‘fenomenici’: la determinazione della sostanza come corpo e la riduzione ad essa degli accidenti o delle apparenze, come effetti alla loro causa. Escluse dal proscenio dei fenomeni, le due grandi categorie “dogmatiche” per eccellenza, la sostanza e la causalità, ricompaiono dunque sullo sfondo della scena primaria dello scetticismo, che già abbiamo evocata fin a partire dagli Elements. In verità, ambizioni paragonabili non erano estranee neppure agli esponenti del “nuovo pirronismo” continentale, malgrado tutte le loro cautele scettiche. In particolare, Hobbes poteva guardare alle considerazioni, per molti versi simili, che Gassendi stava svolgendo in un’opera, il Syntagma philosophicum, a lui nota già nel lungo periodo della sua gestazione, se dobbiamo credere alle testimonianze dei contemporanei e a tutti gli indizi relativi al loro sodalizio intellettuale. Nei capitoli della “Logica” dedicati al problema del “criterio” e del “segno” Gassendi si era posto un problema simile a quello hobbesiano, formulandolo però esplicitamente nella terminologia e nelle categorie dello scetticismo di Sesto: come cioè si possa risalire al di là dei fenomeni per accertare che «qualcosa esiste» e come soprattutto si scoprano cose che sono ignote (adela) non solo temporaneamente, ma «per natura» (come le essenze e le sostanze). Se le prime (cose temporaneamente ignote) non costituiscono un vero problema per lo scettico che si attiene a «ta phainomena , apparentia ov-

vero ciò che le cose appaiono essere»*!, le difficoltà insorgono invece quando si va al di là delle «apparenze» per investire la realtà «occulta» (adelon) «per natura»: «la verità di cui si tratta è occulta e si cela sotto le apparenze; poiché non si manifesta da se stessa, ci si chiede se possa tuttavia farsi conoscere per mezzo di qualche suo segno, e se non vi sia in noi un criterio, mediante il qua-

le ci sia consentito tanto di cogliere il segno, quanto di giudicare in base ad

esso della verità o della cosa di cui è segno»*. Dopo aver discusso i diversi 41. P. Gassendi, Syntagma Philosophicum, Pars prima, quae est Logica, lib. II “De Logicae Fine”, cap. IV “Veritatis criteria qui ponant”, in Opera Omnia ... in sex tomos divisa... Tomus primus, Lugduni, Sumptibus Laurentii Anisson et Ioan. Bapt. Devenet, 1658 (ristampa anastatica, introd. di Tullio Gregory, Frommann, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964), p. 80b. Secondo Gassendi: «alioquin Sceptici vulgo admittant ta phainomena apparentia, seu id quod res apparent; ideo utramque veritatem circa id quod apparet, relinquunt, provt et apparentiam exsistere non dubitant (imo et existere rem quampiam sub apparentia non ambigunt, sed solum qualis ea sit minimè sciri argumentantur) et verè enunciari, iudicarique talem apparentiam exhiberi non controvertunt». 42. Ibi, p. 80b.

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tipi di classificazione dei segni reperibili negli Analitici e nella Retorica di Aristotele, nella /nstitutio di Quintiliano e soprattutto in Hypotyposes e Adversus logicos di Sesto Empirico, Gassendi sottolinea il fatto che gli scettici mettono in discussione unicamente il segno «indicativo», riferito a «cose occulte per natura», mentre lasciano sussistere il segno rammemorativo, fondato sulle associazioni tra i fenomeni, la cui ricorrenza giustifica appunto la probabilità del segno (ma non la sua certezza). Di Sesto Empirico, Gassendi non condivide l’atteggiamento negativo nei confronti del segno indicativo; l’autore del Syntagma ritiene infatti che «una cosa nascosta e una verità occulta sono riconoscibili mediante qualche segno»* e che proprio il segno indicativo ci permetta di conoscere realtà altri-

menti inaccessibili al senso (gli esempi gassendiani riguardano l’anima e Dio, ma è chiaro che da un punto di vista scientifico il suo discorso si estende alla struttura materiale delle sostanze, come del resto si evince dalla dimostrazione dell’esistenza di pori o di atomi, realtà sottratte alla percezione sensibile diretta). Del tutto simmetrico rispetto alla correzione dello scetticismo è lo scarto con cui Gassendi prende le distanze dall’empirismo integrale di Epicuro, secondo il quale «il segno è una cosa sensibile». Benché riconosca la necessità di un un segno di tal genere per giungere a conoscere la «rei latentis notitia» (giacché ogni «notitia» acquisita dalla «mens» proviene dai sensi), l’autore del Syntagma non ritiene tuttavia che valga la stessa restrizione per quel che riguarda il «criterio». Del criterio, infatti, si dà per Gassendi una «duplice» varietà: un tipo di criterio con il quale si percepisce il segno, e dunque il senso,

un altro tipo con il quale «comprendiamo mediante il raziocinio la cosa nascosta: cioè la mente, l’intelletto o la ragione» («alterum, quo ipsam rem latentem ratiocinando intelligamus: Mens nempe, Intellectus, seu Ratio»). Mentre il senso si rivela «talvolta ingannevole», così che il segno da esso fornito potrebbe risultare «non sicuro», la «ragione» mantiene invece un potere di controllo assai più elevato: «la ragione che è superiore al senso può correggere la percezione del senso in modo tale da non ricevere da esso il segno se non corretto e

così infine raziocini, o porti il giudizio sulla cosa»**. 43. Ibi, p. 81b: «Jam igitur posse rem quampiam latentem, veritatemve occultam Signo aliquo innotescere, vel ex allatis obiter exemplis declarari potest». 44. Ibi, p. 81b. Le aporie del segno, sviluppate da Enesidemo, sono riportate da Sesto Empirico (Adv. log. II, 215-222, 234-238). La distinzione tra segno indicativo e segno rammemorativo è presente in Adv. log. II, 141-144 e 154-160. Per la distinzione tra cose non evidenti «assolutamente», «per natura» o solo «temporaneamente», vedi Adv. log. II, 145-

155. 45. P. Gassendi, op. cit., p. 81b. 46. Ibi, p. 81b: «attamen quae sensu est superior Ratio sensus perceptionem emendare sic potest, vt Signum ab eo nisi emendatum non accipiat, ac tum demum ratiocinetur, siue de re iudicium ferat». Sulla teoria dei segni in Gassendi e le sue relazioni con i temi scettici vedi: Ralph Walker, «Gassendi and Skepticism», in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. by Myles Burnyeat, University of California Press, Berkeley Los Angeles London, 1983, pp. 319335. La discussione della teoria del segno (di origine stoica) da parte di Sesto è strettamente intrecciata con la l’esame del problema del criterio: cfr. Mario Dal Pra, Lo scetticismo

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Se, come sembra più che probabile, Hobbes conobbe almeno le grandi linee della riflessione gassendiana sul problema del “segno” e del “criterio”, egli dovette certamente apprezzarne alcuni aspetti che andavano in una direzione analoga a quella da lui intrapresa con il passaggio dall’approccio empiristico degli Elements a quello più raziocinativo-congetturale delle Objectiones prima e del De corpore poi. *

In primo luogo, egli avrebbe potuto apprezzare lo sforzo di andare al di là dei fenomeni verso le cose “occulte” (la sostanza innanzitutto), muovendo

però dalla riconosciuta priorità e necessità delle percezioni sensibili, contro ogni teoria innatistica o idealistica di tipo platonico o cartesiano. Oltre ai «marks», un posto importante è riservato anche nella teoria hobbe-

siana ai «signs». Questi ultimi coincidono di fatto con quelli che Gassendi (insieme a Sesto) aveva identificato come «segni rammemorativi» (semeia upomnestika): registrano la congiunzione dell’antecedente con il conse-

guente, descrivono la frequenza della loro associazione in termini di probabilità, e proprio per questo «their assurance is more or less; but never full and evident». Derivando dall’esperienza, ascendono al livello congetturale

della prudenza, non alla certezza dimostrativa della scienza‘, e anche su questo punto Hobbes si sarebbe trovato d'accordo con Gassendi. greco, Laterza, Roma-Bari 19752, pp. 481-496. Secondo Olivier Bloch (La philosophie de Gassendi. Nominalisme, matérialisme et métaphysique, M. Nijhoff, La Haye 1971, pp. 145146), la versione finale della “Logica” del Syntagma, databile agli anni 1646-1649 (lo stesso periodo della composizione delle Animadversiones in decimum libri Diogenis Laertii) sottolinea l’importanza della teoria del segno assai più della redazione precedente (mai stampata) risalente al 1636. Uno studio più recente della teoria gassendiana del segno è quello di Jean-Charles Darmon, «Sortir du scepticisme: Gassendi et les signes», in: Le scepticisme au XVI° et au XVII° siècle, a cura di Pierre-Francois Moreau, A. Michel, Paris 2001, pp. 222-238. 47. EL I, iv, 10, p. 16: «And Prudence is nothing else but conjecture from experience, or taking of signs from experience warily». Cfr. Lev. cap. III e V. Ho svolto molto più ampiamente il tema del rapporto tra Hobbes e Gassendi nel mio saggio: «Hobbes, Gassendi e la psicologia del meccanicismo» in: Atti del Convegno diretto da A. Pacchi, Hobbes oggi, Milano 1990, pp. 351-446. Vedi anche: Gassendi et les Gassendistes, “Libertinage et Philosophie au XVIIe siècle”, journées d’études organisées par A. McKenna et P.F. Moreau, Publications de l’Université de Saint-Etienne, 2000. Per il contesto generale delle teorie psicologiche nel periodo considerato cfr. : Jean-Robert Armogathe, «L’imagination de Mersenne à Pascal», in: Phantasia-Imaginatio, eds. M. Fattori e M. Bianchi, Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Roma 1987, pp. 259-272. Su altri aspetti (etici, politici, psicologici, metafisici) del rapporto Hobbes-Gassendi, sia consentito il rinvio ad altri miei saggi: G. Paganini, «Hobbes, Gassendi et le De cive» in: Materia actuosa. Antiquité, Age classique, Lumières. Mélanges en l’honneur d’ Olivier Bloch, recueillis par M. Benitez, A. McKenna, G. Paganini et J. Salem, Champion, Paris 2000, pp. 183-206 ; «Hobbes et Gassendi: la psychologie dans le projet mécaniste», Kriterion. Revista de Filosofia, XLII (2002), n. 106, pp. 20-41 (fascicolo monografico su: “Filosofia do século XVII”); Id., «Hobbes, Gassendi and the tradition of

political Epicureanism», Hobbes Studies, XIV (2001), pp. 3-24; Id., «Hobbes, Gassendi und die Fiktion einer vôlligen Weltvernichtung», in: Die Konstellationsforschung, Suhrkamp Verlag (in preparazione).

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Benché non menzioni il ruolo dei «segni indicativi» (semeia endeiktika), di fatto alcune delle considerazioni hobbesiane riguardo alle illazioni e alle supposizioni indotte dal raziocinio corrispondono esattamente al secondo tipo di «criterio» individuato da Gassendi. Del resto, già si è visto che nelle Objectiones Hobbes aveva ritenuto sì possibile inferire l’esistenza delle sostanze («cose oculte per natura» nella terminologia di Sesto ripresa da Gassendi), ma solo mediante l’uso del raziocinio, dunque con la «ratio», non con il senso. Pertanto, sia Hobbes sia Gassendi concordavano entrambi sulla possibilità di cogliere la trama “nascosta” della realtà dietro le apparenze sensibili, pur insistendo altrettanto fermamente sul carattere “raziocinativo” di questo passaggio (Gassendi: «rem latentem ratiocinando intelligamus»; Hobbes: «mente concipere, hoc est, ratiocinando colligere rem aliquam esse, vel rem aliquam existere»*’), Benché apprezzasse la distinzione fra due diversi tipi di criteri (l’uno sensitivo, l’altro razionale), Hobbes non avrebbe tuttavia accettato l’idea di fon-

dare anche la «ratio» su una base empirica, come avveniva invece ancora nel Syntagma. Al momento di chiarire come funziona il raziocinio (l’esempio scelto è la congettura dell’esistenza dei pori a partire dal fenomeno della traspirazione*’), Gassendi argomenta che la «ratio» si basa su princìpi indubitati («Ratiocinatur, inquam, assumendo aliunde indubitata principia»), ma che questi a loro volta vengono ricavati per induzione dalle percezioni accumulate nella memoria («propositiones, quas ex rebus item per sensum perceptis inductione collegerit, quasque in Memoria promptuario conseruet, in hunc, aut consimilem»). Induzione e memoria sono dunque i pilastri della «Tatio» gassendiana, ma proprio per questo, avrebbe argomentato Hobbes, essa non avrebbe potuto spingersi oltre il limite empirico della prudenza, per cui da casi simili ci si aspetta effetti simili, ma da cui non si ricava altro ‘che probabilità, e non certo «scienza». Per questa ragione, nel difficile passaggio dagli accidenti o fenomeni alle sostanze, l’autore del De corpore si sarebbe sì affidato alla ratio ma le avrebbe dato un fondamento completamente diverso da quello gassendiano: non l’induzione che generalizza a partire da un patrimonio pur sempre incompleto e limitato di esperienze, bensì l’espediente logico della finzione annichilitoria che consentirà di introdurre definizioni assiomatiche razionali da cui dedurre (calcolando) tutte le conseguenze, con quella certezza che solo consente l’artificio del linguaggio (di

cui siamo noi gli artefici con le definizioni e non la natura con l’esperienza).

6. Andare oltre i «fantasmi»: la funzione della causalità

È noto che, nello «spazio immaginario» susseguente al «finto annichilimento del mondo» («ficta universi sublatio») con cui si apre la «filosofia pri48. Objectiones Tertiae in: AT VII p. 178 (attribuito ai «veteres peripatetici»). 49. P. Gassendi, op. cit., p. 81b: «Mens ex hoc humore, tanquam ex signo sensibili, esse poros ratiocinatur».

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22)

ma» del De corpore, l’entità «corpus» (per Hobbes sinonimo di «substantia») è introdotta come un’entità «subsistens per se», «existens», cioè — per definizione — esistente «extra nos». Tuttavia, proprio perché viene compresa non dai sensi ma soltanto con la ragione («non sensibus sed ratione tantum»), la sostanza sarà denominata «Suppositum et Subjectum», giocando sul doppio significato di «supposto»: sottostante, che sta sotto gli accidenti, ma anche congetturato, ipotizzato per mezzo di un’illazione razionale’. Questa congettura razionale, evidentemente, non sarà il frutto dell’induzione svolta sui risultati dell’esperienza precedente, come pensava Gassendi. Si può invero reagire alle interpretazioni troppo razionalistiche e neokantiane (come in Natorp e Cassirer) del «supposto annichilimento» e sottolineare il fatto che, benché siano solo «ipsi imaginanti interne accidentia», tuttavia le «ideae et phantasmata», che ci appaiono come «esterni» e «indipendenti dal potere della mente», si presentano comunque come il residuato delle esperienze antecedenti: derivano dunque da un’origine a posteriori che rimanda al fondamento empiristico di tutta la filosofia hobbesiana. Resta tuttavia innegabile che l’idea di presentare il raziocinio come un «calcolare i nostri fantasmi» («ne stantibus quidem rebus

aliud computamus quam phantasmata nostra») si mantiene profondamente estranea rispetto all’approccio empirico-induttivo di un Gassendi, tanto più che — aggiunge Hobbes — non fa poi molta differenza ai fini di questa «computatio» che i «phantasmata» siano considerati come «accidentia animi interna» invece di «species rerum externarum»?!, che siano cioè computati come fenomeni interni alla mente “sospendendo” (mentalmente) quell’apparenza di esteriorità in cui per lui consiste l’esistenza («id est, tanquam non existentes, sed existere sive extra stare apparentes»). La sequenza dei «phantasmata» che popolano la mente dell’uomo sopravvissuto all’esperimento (congetturale) dell’annientamento dell’universo (fantasmi dello spazio, del tempo, del corpo) bene descrive la realtà spettrale di un mondo in cui tutta l’esperienza passata è ridotta a ricordo, o viene ravvivata nella luce fatua dell’immaginazione. In verità, il fulcro del fenomenismo hobbesiano (cioè la teoria del fantasma come accidente del soggetto percipiente) contiene al suo interno uno dei dispositivi che consentono il superamento della situazione scettica. Se infatti i fenomeni o «accidenti» vengono considerati

non più in se stessi, come realtà interne al soggetto, ma bensì come «effetti»? («effetti prodotti nel soggetto percipiente da parte degli oggetti che agiscono sugli organi di senso»), l'applicazione di un principio (non empirico, ma razio-

50. De Corpore. Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Prima, critical edition, notes, appendices and index by Karl Schuhmann. Vrin, Paris 1999 : VIII, 1, p. 82-83. 51. De corpore VII, 1, pp. 75-76. Per una parallela ma differente teoria annichilitoria in Gassendi, vedi : Thomas M. Lennon, The Battle of the Gods and Giants. The Legacies of Descartes and Gassendi, 1655-1715, Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 117-137. 52. In De corpore, XXV, 1, p. 267, 1. 26 Hobbes parla di «fenomeni o effetti della natura» («a Phaenomenis sive effectibus naturae»); nel $ 10, p. 277, Il. 34-35 Hobbes scrive

dei «phantasmata» come subjecto sentiente».

di «objectorum

in organa

agentium effectus

[...] producti in

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nale) come quello di causa consentira di individuare nel moto la causa universale dei mutamenti: il moto viene infatti chiamato a spiegare quel complesso processo di produzione dei fenomeni su cui si sofferma il cap. XXV del De corpore, a proposito della «phantasmatis generatio». Il principio di causalità costituisce dunque il baluardo “dogmatico” di tutta la filosofia di Hobbes: non viene mai messo in discussione e anzi rappresenta il presupposto sul quale si basa il collegamento tra la sfera “interna” delle percezioni sensibili e la realtà “esterna” che ne è la causa. I corpi in movimento sono letteralmente le sole «res» concrete veramente esistenti, come sosterrà la Vita e come già spiegava il De corpore, affermando che i corpi sono «cose», per di più non «generate», mentre gli «accidenti sotto i quali variamente essi appaiono» sono «generati», ma non sono «cose»? (e tra gli accidenti stanno in modo primario fenomeni, apparenze, qualità sensibili). Se possiamo qualificare come “dogmatica” l'assunzione del principio di causalità materiale, dobbiamo però aggiungere che Hobbes si trova nel Seicento in buona compagnia e che in essa rientra anche la maggior parte degli ‘scettici’, più o meno ‘moderati’. Malgrado la rinascita pirroniana inaugurata dalle edizioni di Estienne e Hervet, le penetranti osservazioni, contenute nella Hy-

potyposes e rivolte a mostrare l’impossibilità della conoscenza della causa? non sembrano aver lasciato molte tracce nello scetticismo moderno, almeno prima di Hume. Sanches guarda sempre all’ideale aristotelico dello «scire per causas», pur dichiarandone la pratica inattuabilità, data l’infinita varietà della

natura e le difficoltà che impediscono una «rei perfecta cognitio»>>. Una delle più ampie e circostanziate esposizioni della tropologia scettica, quella contenuta nella Verité des sciences di Mersenne, sorvola a tal punto sui tropi anti-causali di Enesidemo che chi si limitasse a leggere quel sunto difficilmente arriverebbe a comprendere che il passo riguarda proprio il problema della causalità, tanto più che in luogo di aitiologia Mersenne usa il termine assai più banale e fuorviante di «raison». Con ben maggiore acribia Mersenne aveva riportato tutte le altre argomentazioni che in ordine diverso e secondo diverse classificazioni erano reperibili negli scritti di Sesto: dai dieci tropi dell’epoché degli «scet-

tici più antichi»°°, in cui peraltro non è questione del problema causale”, ai 53. È l’icastica formulazione di De corpore, VIII, 20, p. 92: «Corpora itaque et accidentia, sub quibus varie appparent, ita differunt, ut corpora quidem sint res non genitae, accidentia vero genita, sed non res». «Philosophi igitur, quibus a ratione naturali discedere non licet, supponunt corpus generari aut interire non posse, sed tantum sub diversis speciebus aliter atque nobis apparere et proinde aliter atque aliter nominari» (ibid.). 54. Attribuite a Enesidemo, queste osservazioni sono riportate da Sesto in conclusione all'esposizione dei tropi (P H I, 180-185) e nel corso della discussione della causa agente (P H HI, 13-19), benché lo stesso Sesto muova da un assunto più conciliante, ritenendo «verosimile che la causa esista» (P H III, 17).

55. Per una delineazione più precisa della posizione di Sanches, sia consentito rinviare al mio: Scepsi moderna cit., pp. 32-36 e Id., «Montaigne, Sanches et la connaissance par phénomènes» cit. 56. PH I, 36-163. 57. Marin Mersenne, La verité des sciences. Contre les Septiques ou Pyrrhoniens, À Pa-

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cinque tropi degli «scettici più recenti»®*, che hanno un carattere più logico-argomentativo, riguardando la discordanza, il regresso all’infinito, la relazione,

l’ipotetico, il diallele, per giungere infine sino ai due modi riepilogativi (che nulla si comprende né di per sé solo né per mezzo di altra cosa’). Anche negli altri contesti in cui si occupa del problema della spiegazione causale, l’autore della Vérité o si limita a constatare la difficoltà empirica di ricostruire la complessità del meccanismo causale (potenzialmente infinito), oppure (quando ad es. riflette sullo statuto della fisica nelle Questions inouyes) riformula in termini più “deboli” l'ideale aristotelico dello scire per causas, rilevando che, almeno in fisica, è impossibile soddisfare il criterio di prova secondo il quale una causa è verificata quando si dimostra l'impossibilità del contrario®'. Mersenne mantiene dunque il valore del legame causale, ma lo libera da un onere di prova che egli ritiene eccessivo. Più in generale, la refutazione dei tropi sestani, che il «filosofo cristiano» oppone allo scettico, si basa sul fatto che anche in presenza di risultanze percettive molto diverse e fra loro irriducibili, tuttavia «noi sappiamo discernere quale sia la causa del fatto che una certa qualità, un certo colore o qualche altro oggetto sia visto in modi differenti da animali di-

SL 62 versi».

Il caso di Gassendi è ancora più eloquente: l’autore del Syntagma non solo sembra ignorare gli argomenti anti-causali di Enesidemo, ma si serve positivamente della nozione di causa per dare una risposta ai problemi sollevati dai

ris, ches Toussainct du Bray, 1625 (ristampa anastatica, Frommann, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1969). Il capitolo XI del libro I è dedicato all’enunciazione dei dieci tropi : «Ou les fondemens des Septiques sont expliquez et renversez particulierement ce qui appartient aus dix manieres de retention, desquelles ils se servent pour suspendre leur iugement» (pp. 130-156). 58. PHI, 164-177. Questi tropi sono riferiti da Mersenne nel capitolo successivo (Ch. XII, pp. 156-163).

59. P HI, 178-179. Agli otto argomenti che mostrano la debolezza delle inferenze causali e il carattere problematico del rapporto causa-effetto (P H I, 180-186), Mersenne, pur citandoli, riserva un’attenzione assai minore: prova ne sia il fatto che omette il settimo ar-

gomento (quello riguardante il contrasto delle cause non solo con i fenomeni, ma anche con le ipotesi); invece di riferirsi al tema enunciato da Sesto nel breve prologo (la confutazione di «qualunque dogmatica spiegazione di cause»), Mersenne riporta il discorso al tema più vasto e indeterminato dell’acatalessia («Onesidemus apporte aussi 8 raisons pour montrer que les Dogmatiques ne sçavent rien») Vérité cit. cap. XII, pp. 158-59. 60. Ad es. Mersenne, La Vérité cit., lib. I cap. I, p. 9: «De plus on ne cognoit point parfaitement l’effet, quand on ignore la cause, laquelle neantmoins nous ne voyons que par l’effect: et puis pour venir à la cognoissance de toutes les causes, il faudroit passer jusques à l’infiny: or l’infiny ne peut estre compris dans les bornes de nostre esprit». 61. M. Mersenne, Questions inouyes ou recreations des scavans. Qui contiennent beaucoup de choses concernantes la Theologie, la Philosophie et les Mathematiques, A Paris, chez Jacques Villery, 1634, Quest. XVIII (il titolo è: «Peut-on sgavoir quelque chose de certain dans la Physique, ou dans les Mathematiques?»), p. 71: «Car on ne peut dire que l’on sçache aucune chose comme il faut, selon les loix et les notions qu’ Aristote et les autres philosophes donnent de la science, si l’on ne demonstre qu’il est impossible que la raison que l’on apporte, ou que la chose que l’on propose, ne soit vraye». 62. M. Mersenne, La Vérité cit., p. 140.

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tropi sestani. Cosi avviene rispetto ai primi quattro tropi: malgrado la varieta dei fenomeni su cui essi insistono («cum tam variae Phantasiae sive apparentiae creentur»), si potra inferire comunque la «verità» e la «certezza» di due «cause» che li spiegano, luna nell’ oggetto («causa in reipsa, siue obiecto eodem»), l’altra nel soggetto («diuersa in facultatibus excipientibus dispositio»). Questo duplice dispositivo causale consentirà di spiegare l'apparente varietà dei fenomeni e di motivare anzi |’ «existendi necessitas» che le apparenze hanno nelle facoltà ove vengono create®. Neppure gli altri modi (posizione, mescolanza, quantità, relazione, rarità, frequenza) rappresentano per Gassendi un ostacolo insormontabile, una volta che siano inquadrati nella categoria di causalità: malgrado la discordanza dei fenomeni, si troverà così la «necessità fisica» per cui vengono prodotte apparenze mutevoli e si conosceranno le «cause

per cui appaiono queste o quelle».

7. Sogno e veglia: fantasmi senza corpi e corpi senza fantasmi Fra tutti gli argomenti dello scetticismo antico, quello che sembra avere interessato Hobbes con maggiore continuità è il topos ricavato dall’indistinguibilità fra le rappresentazioni del sogno e quelle della veglia. Derivato tanto dagli

Academica di Cicerone quanto dagli scritti di Sesto Empirico®, l’argomento svolge un ruolo importante nell’Apologie di Montaigne? e occupa un posto privilegiato negli Elements of Law: qui Hobbes gli riconosce tutta la sua forza, negando vi sia «kriterion or mark by which he [a man] can discern whether it

were a dream or not»°; pertanto, «nor is it impossible for a man to be so far . 63. P. Gassendi, Syntagma Philosophicum, loc. cit., p. 84b: «Satis heic esto non posse quidem eam qualitatem, que uni apparet, ipsissimam dici, que sit in obiecto, cum alia aliis appareant, que idem iuris sibi vendicarentur; verum dici posse obiectum esse reuera vniusmodi, & varias apparentias suam habere in iis, in quibus creantur, facultatibus exsistendi necessitatem». 64. Ibi, p. 84b: «non obstant quominus res ipse in se sint reuera res alique, & necessitate quadam Physica creent has in illis, in istis illas apparentias. Potest autem necessitas huiusmodi non ignorari, & causa cur hec, aliave sic appareant, cognosci; adeo vt possit aliquid certi, verique obtineri, ac sciri» 65. M.T. Cicero, Academica, II = Lucullus, XXVIII, 88; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Log. I, 61-63 e 404-405. È significativo che l'argomento del sogno (e quello della follia) sia usato da Sesto per dimostrare l’impossibilità di riconoscere una «rappresentazione comprensiva» che possa essere dimostrata vera con assoluta certezza e che non derivi dunque da cose non esistenti: di qui l'incapacità di «distinguere, sulla base delle proprietà dell’evidenza e dell’intensità, le rappresentazioni comprensive da quelle non comprensive » (ibi, I, 408). Il termine e la nozione usati da Sesto, per confutarli, sono quelli tipicamente stoici di «kataleptike phantasia». 66. Montaigne, Apologie cit. (Florio’s translation cit. p. 306b): «We wake sleeping, and sleep waking. In my sleep I see not so cleare; yet can I never find my waking cleare enough, or without dimnesse...». «Those which have compared our life unto a dreame, have happily had more reason so to doe then they were aware». GEI LU plz

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deceived, as when his dream is past, to think it real». Nel Leviathan, ove il problema è connesso alla questione ancora più scottante delle apparizioni 0 visioni profetiche, Hobbes sottolinea il fatto che nel caso del sogno l'inganno risulta tanto più facile, in quanto «a Dreame must needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts»®°*. Presente ancora nella critica del De Motu di Thomas White («imaginationes quae vocantur somnia, aeque fortes sunt ac ipsae sensiones»®°), il problema “epistemologico” rappresentato dai «dormientium phantasmata»”? si ripresenterà nella più matura redazione del De corpore, ove Hobbes traccerà una precisa fenomenologia dell’attività onirica indicando le «le cause di questi phainomenoi» nel complesso rapporto fisiologico che si stabilisce tra i «phantasmata sensionis praeteritae», gli «organi interni» ed il «moto interno del cuore», secondo un rapporto complesso per cui le passioni, i desideri e le avversioni sono non solo effetti, ma anche causa dei sogni. Nel De corpore assistiamo infine ad una comparazione conclusiva dei ruoli: i fantasmi dei dormienti («dormientium phantasmata») risulteranno certo meno «forti» delle sensazioni, ma a loro «eguali per chiarezza» (per quanto più intensi delle