Frustrated Relations?: China with Central and Eastern Europe (Contributions to International Relations) 9819937299, 9789819937295

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Contributions to International Relations

Hongfei Gu

Frustrated Relations? China with Central and Eastern Europe

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations and related fields. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed.

Hongfei Gu

Frustrated Relations? China with Central and Eastern Europe

Hongfei Gu School of International Relations Guangdong University of Foreign Studies Guangzhou, Guangdong, China

ISSN 2731-5061 ISSN 2731-507X (electronic) Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-981-99-3729-5 ISBN 978-981-99-3730-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3730-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface: The Return of Central and Eastern Europe

Corresponding to its cross status in the perceptions of people from other parts of the world, the region of Central and Eastern Europe does not rank highly in Chinese public discourse or the Chinese people’s inspiration. Little public awareness is paid to this region by the reports or the populace, and ordinary Chinese people have minimal personal experience of the area. However, when prompted, it will almost immediately occur to most Chinese people that Central and Eastern Europe is a critical region, closely associated with Chinese history.1 In fact, Central and Eastern Europe feature in the Chinese collective memory of the renowned Soviet-led communist family, which connotes substantial bilateral relations during the decade-long honeymoon in the 1950s. China received much support from Central and Eastern European countries. However, the relationship also undergoes tortuous development, when the split in the Sino-Soviet relations at the beginning of the 1960s. After the end of the Cold War, relations between China with Central and Eastern European countries are normalized. Both China with Central and Eastern European countries experience dramatic transformations since their previous relationship. Through several speeches by Xi Jinping and other Chinese foreign policy leaders’ takeover of power since 2012. China comes to articulate a new strategic direction for Chinese foreign policy known as “Fen Fa You Wei” (striving for achievement) to replace “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (hide capabilities and keep a low profile), which was set in place by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s.2 China shows its rising power by proactive posture for its external affairs toward its West, 1

Song (2017). The traditional phrase which China had used to describe its engagement with the region and the world was “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead). This was China’s core strategic axiom in a period when China’s wealth and power were growing. In favor of these phrases: “Fen Fa You Wei, You Suo Zuo Wei”, a more activist policy, a policy in which China can have a role to play and influence to bring to bear. It underlines a deep change in China’s strategic view about being passive recipients of a diplomacy or an international order or a set of international institutions set by somebody else in an earlier period. It is no longer to focus on keeping a low profile but rather to start showing and using capabilities and claiming or “striving” for leadership.

2

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Preface: The Return of Central and Eastern Europe

however, in recent years, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have mostly back to Europe, the two begin to rediscover each other and quickly develop bilateral relations. Nowadays, the China-Central and Eastern European countries cooperation mechanism has been in operation for over ten years, promoting cooperation in various fields between China with Central and Eastern European countries, enriching the practice of multilateralism, and becoming an important part of the development of China–Europe relations and a model for cross-regional cooperation. At the same time, with the intensification of the China-US strategic competition and the strengthening of distrust in China–Europe relations, especially the acceleration of changes in the world caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, unprecedented challenges and difficulties have arisen for China-Central and Eastern European countries cooperation. The most prominent characteristic is the obvious regional or field differentiation in China policy. Some countries are more aggressive in certain fields, while some have become overall more hard-line. In terms of relations with Taiwan, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have also strengthened their economic and social exchanges with Taiwan and shown a certain tendency to be pro-Taiwan and anti-mainland. 3 For example, in 2019, the mayor of Prague, Zdenˇek Hˇrib, announced the termination of sister-city relations with Beijing and signed a sister-city agreement between Prague and Taipei in December 2019. In November 2021, Lithuania allowed the Taiwan authorities to establish a “Taiwan Representative Office in Lithuania”, which violated the political commitment made in the communiqué on establishing diplomatic relations with China and actually damaged the “One China Policy”. In terms of participating in the “Belt and Road” Initiative and “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism, the past outcomes have attracted the attention from both the European Union and the United States. Some recurring controversies argue that Chinese practices in Central and Eastern Europe includes using investments strategically, while seeking influence and political leverage. For instance, Chinese telecommunications investments (e.g., Huawei) have raised security concerns now being considered on both sides of the Atlantic. In January 2019, Poland arrested a Huawei employee on charges of espionage. In August 2019, Romania signed a 5G technology memorandum of understanding with the United States, and announced a legislative proposal to prevent Huawei from entering the 5G market in August of the following year. In 2020, Lithuania refused China’s investment in the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda and withdrew from the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism in May 2021. In August 2022, Latvia proposed that in view of the current foreign and trade policy priorities, which decided to stop participating in the cooperation framework with China. In February 2023, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service released the annual report “International Security and Estonia 2023”, which considered that China holds a Cold War mentality and China’s development constitutes an increasingly greater threat to the world. 4 3 4

Andrijauskas (2020). Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (2023).

Preface: The Return of Central and Eastern Europe

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Therefore, for such changes in relations with China and CEE countries, or more precisely, Central and Eastern Europe is not a single political or economic community,5 how China engages with this region in the past and for the future? The purpose of this book is to examine contemporary relations between China with Central and Eastern Europe. It assesses China’s approach to Central and Eastern Europe through the “China-CEEC” (or “16/17+1”) cooperation mechanism. It traces the evolution of the mechanism, from its predecessor to its most recent development, focusing on how such cooperation mechanism amidst uncertainties regarding promoting bilateral ties. This book provides a sophisticated and nuanced picture of the relationship between China and Central and Eastern Europe. The analysis focuses on its operational mechanism, China-Central and Eastern European countries cooperation mechanism, or namely the “16/17+1” cooperation mechanism. As this book is intended to explain the growing dynamics between China, Central and Eastern Europe, it illustrates the limited magnitude of multilateral relations. The presented research involves both qualitative and quantitative approaches, in contrast to a pure research approach. Therefore, it provides greater flexibility and is better suited for the analysis of social phenomena. At the same time, case studies typically see as better for testing hypotheses. With the research techniques outlined earlier, case study design is another conventional method of research.6 In general, a case study can define as “a research strategy based on the in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a small number of phenomena”, “conceptualized and analyzed empirically as a manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events”.7 Hence, a case study corresponds to “an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units”.8 In addition to offering practical insights into the emerging phenomenon of China’s relationship with CEE countries, this book also contributes to the related analytical concepts. From this perspective, this book starts, since it begins with the several significant cases. It uses China-CEEC collaborations on heterogeneity and asymmetry, as well as different dimensions of cooperation as case studies to answer the critical research questions above. This book designs by three parts with four main chapters, which focus on the internal heterogeneity and external asymmetry that China faces in its cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, an evolution of various trilateral relations, as well as local cooperation between China and CEE countries. The four studies are outlined in Chaps. 2–5, and each chapter examines a different dimension of China-CEE countries relations.

5

Góralczyk (2017). Yin (2009); George and Bennett (2005). 7 Vennesson (2008). 8 Gerring (2004). 6

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Preface: The Return of Central and Eastern Europe

The first part of the book introduces the general context of Central and Eastern Europe, and, China’s policy toward Central and Eastern Europe through the “ChinaCEEC” cooperation mechanism. Chapter 1 summarizes the history of the development of relations between China with Central and Eastern Europe from a brief historical point of view. The second part revolves around two core issues: the heterogeneity of Central and Eastern European countries and the asymmetry in delivering cooperation with China. Chapter 2 traces the issue of heterogeneity between Central and Eastern European countries. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe have the different historical backdrop, and the degree of economic development, therefore, in the context of such a highly heterogeneous status, the cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries is still in its preliminary stage. Regarding the specific risks for current cooperation, first, the political and security status is unstable in some countries, the stability of the political systems, and geopolitical anti-risk ability. Second, the level of economic development is unbalanced in CEE countries, the emerging and transition countries are relatively powerless to resist external risks. Moreover, the long-term stable investment environment has not yet formed. Therefore, the coordination of the cooperation concept, policy, and behavior of the CEE countries is a prerequisite for the formation of cooperation within a mechanism without forming a political alliance. Chapter 3 analyzes the asymmetry of bilateral relations. The CEE countries are not a strictly strategic entity, or even a political or economic entity. The two sides are now facing the problem of “one to CEE”; moreover, for the relationship between China and the EU, China cannot be as a member state or even a power to arrange the CEE countries as a political group. Therefore, the asymmetry of bilateral cooperation requires China to optimize its policies on CEE countries for further development. Part three of the book addresses the global and local dimensions of the China’s relations with Central and Eastern European countries, focusing on the institutionalization process and the interactions between China with Central and Eastern Europe at the different levels, including great powers and local authorities with substantial stakes and influence in the region. Chapter 4 focuses multilateral factors at global dimensions to the Central and Eastern Europe, which with sturdy stakes and interests in the region, including the United States, Russia, and the European Union to the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism and interactions between those actors, particularly China. The “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism is not essentially an inward-looking organization that concentrates on managing internal relations and developing cooperation between its member states. However, external factors to the “China-CEEC” cannot ignored. Since the organization’s inception, its implications have extended beyond Central and Eastern Europe, and increasingly it develops links with other major powers to promote its international visibility and participation. Chapter 5 touches on China’s local cooperation process with Central and Eastern Europe. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not in essence as a whole country, multilayers local cooperation receives continuous attention since it operates,

Preface: The Return of Central and Eastern Europe

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and it well serves as the substantial support for the cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries. Guangzhou, China

Hongfei Gu

References Andrijauskas, K. (2020). Sino-Lithuanian relations in 2020: Shedding the masks? Eastern Europe Studies Centre. https://www.eesc.lt/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/SINO-LITHUANIAN-REL ATIONS.pdf George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (illustrated ed.). The MIT Press. Gerring, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? The American Political Science Review, 98(2), 341–354. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4145316 Góralczyk, B. (2017). China’s interests in Central and Eastern Europe: Enter the dragon. European View, 16(1), 153–162. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0427-9 Rosin, K. (2023, February 8). International security and Estonia 2023—Estonian foreign intelligence service. https://raport.valisluureamet.ee/2023/en/ Song, W. (Ed.). (2017). China’s relations with Central and Eastern Europe: From “Old Comrades” to new partners. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315226644 Vennesson, P. (2008). Case studies and process tracing: Theories and practices. In D. Della Porta & M. Keating (Eds.), Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences: A pluralist perspective (pp. 223–239). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511801938.013 Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods. Sage.

Acknowledgments

The present monograph is partially based on my doctoral dissertation presented to the Department of Asian Studies at University of Łód´z (Poland). I should say first that I would not have been able to accomplish this milestone if it were not for the continuous encouragement, support, and above all, patience of my advisor Prof. Dominik Mierzejewski (University of Łód´z). I am indebted and grateful for his guidance and the generous time he spent reading various drafts of this work. I have consistently abused his patience and knowledge and bothered him with minute details. Having been under his tutelage is a matter of which I am very proud. I am also grateful to Prof. Song Weiqing (University of Macau) as my supervisor during my postgraduate studies, and Prof. Bogdan Góralczyk (University of Warsaw) and Prof. Agata Zi˛etek (Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin) for serving as my dissertation reviewer and providing bountiful comments and suggestions. I am equally grateful to Prof. Liu Zuokui (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) for serving as the supervisor during my postdoctoral fellowship and for his extensive feedback on the manuscript. Moreover, throughout my days at Beijing he provided constant feedback and was always available to discuss with me my progress. My parents have accompanied my progress since the beginning of my doctoral studies at University of Łód´z, and their encouragement has been an additional driving force that helped me navigate through my studies. While at University of Łód´z, I benefited greatly from the generosity of the China Scholarship Council, the fellowship allowed me to complete my Ph.D. journey. I am also grateful for the generous support of the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation, the Institute of European Studies, and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) for grants that allowed me to do research in Central and Eastern Europe, and for the support of the Xi’an International Studies University (XISU), for a fellowship that facilitated to work on manuscript collection. Also, I am grateful to the research grant from the Academy of International and Regional Studies of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (GDUFS), for their timely and decisive support. Several teachers, colleagues, and friends read drafts of this monograph at different intervals of its progress. I am thankful for the time they invested, and above all for the valuable comments and suggestions they provided me with, which decreased the xi

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Acknowledgments

amount of naivety in this work. I am especially grateful to Prof. Bartosz Kowalski (University of Łód´z), Prof. Ju Weiwei (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Prof. Ji Wengang (Xi’an International Studies University), Prof. Wang Shunyu (Xi’an International Studies University), and Dr. Wang Qichao (Xi’an International Studies University). I should also acknowledge the marvelously helpful comments of the anonymous reviewers who reviewed this book for Springer Publishers, whose criticism and suggestions made a great difference in the quality of the final work. My colleagues during at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) played an important role by providing an outstanding intellectual and professional milieu that was most conducive to the success of a monograph of this magnitude. Special thanks go to Dr. Yang Kai, Dr. Zhang Chaoying, Dr. Han Meng, Dr. Chen Siyang, and Dr. Guan Shilin. Thanks are also due to Emily Zhang, Umamagesh Perumal and Rajesh Manohar, who edited this book and prepared it for publication. At Springer, the outstanding editorial team made the publication process such a wonderful experience. Finally, I apologize if I have inadvertently omitted to acknowledge any of the many people to whom I owe thanks, whether for this book or the dissertation. To all of you, again, I remain obliged.

A Note on Terminology

The number of countries may differ from the definitions of CEEC (which stands for Central and East European countries). The acronym CEEC in this book refers from the initiative by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs between China and countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Although Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have withdrawn from the mechanism, the purpose of this book is to review the course of cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries, so these countries are still included in the discussion.

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Contents

1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Preliminary Contact during the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Alienation in Times of Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Beyond Development from New Century to 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 A New Interpretation Since 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 China and the CEE in the New Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 3 6 9 12 17 21 21

2 Heterogeneity: Internal Dimensions among Central and Eastern European Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Central and Eastern Europe: A Brief Historical Perspective . . . . . . . 2.2 Political Images of Central and Eastern European Countries . . . . . . 2.3 Levels of Economic Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Differences in “Return to Europe” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Diversified in Security Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25 26 28 33 35 36 38 38

3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Asymmetric Cooperation in a Changing Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Asymmetric Nexus in China-CEEC Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Economic Cooperation with CEE Countries: Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Asymmetry and Non-complementarity on Economic Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Asymmetry in Strategic Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Asymmetry in Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Pragmatic Practice of Overcoming Asymmetric Dilemmas . . . . . . . 3.5.1 Preliminary Establishment of the Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2 Carving Out Footholds in Central and Eastern Europe . . . . .

41 42 44 44 48 51 53 55 56 62 xv

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3.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65 66

4 Relations in the Wider Neighborhood: Global Dimensions . . . . . . . . . 69 4.1 Reconceptualizing Central and Eastern Europe in a Multipolar World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 4.1.1 United States: A New Status Quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4.1.2 The Russian Neighborhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.1.3 The European Union: Priority for CEE Countries . . . . . . . . . 80 4.2 China-CEE Relations in the Wider Neighborhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 4.2.1 Different Approaches to China-EU-CEEC Relations . . . . . . 87 4.2.2 Germany’s Perception on “China-CEEC” Cooperation Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 4.2.3 China–Russia–CEEC Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4.2.4 China-US-CEEC Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 5 Local Cooperation: New Highlights of China with Central and Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Emergence of Local Cooperation in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Glocalization: A Type of New Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 Diversity in Local Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Local Cooperation Between China and CEEC: An Overview . . . . . 5.3 Local Cooperation in Practice: Sister Cities and City Network . . . . 5.3.1 Sister Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 City Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Case Study: Shaanxi Province with CEE Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Case Study: Chengdu and Łód´z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1 The “Rong-Ou+ ” (Chengdu-Europe) Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Challenges and Opportunities for Local Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 Conclusion Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Conclusion: The Next Decade of Pragmatic Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Main Achievements of Cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1 Promoting Connectivity with China and CEE Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.2 Focus on Green Development with CEE Countries . . . . . . . . 6.1.3 People-To-People Exchange and Local Cooperation . . . . . . . 6.1.4 Health Cooperation amidst Covid-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Main Challenges of Cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Era of World Drastic Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Constraint Difficulty on Cooperative Projects . . . . . . . . . . . .

115 116 117 118 119 122 124 127 129 133 134 137 139 140 143 144 144 145 146 147 147 148 150

Contents

6.2.3 Complicated Issues of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Roadmap for High-Quality Development of Cooperation Between China and CEE Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Improving Mechanisms for Coordinated Development . . . . . 6.3.2 Facilitating Multilevel Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Fostering People-To-People Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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151 152 152 153 155 156

About the Author

Dr. Hongfei Gu is an assistant professor at the School of International Relations, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (GDUFS), China. He obtained his Ph.D. degree in Political Science from the University of Łód´z in Poland, M.A. in European Studies from the University of Macau, and B.A. in Journalism from Tianjin Foreign Studies University. Prior joining GDUFS, he served as assistant professor at the School of International Relations, Xi’an International Studies University (XISU), and postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). He was a trainee at the O´srodek Spraw Azjatyckich (Center for Asian Affairs) in University of Łód´z and research assistant in University of Macau. Specializing in Eastern European Politics and China-EU relations, he has published a number of articles in peer-reviewed journals and edited volumes on those topics. As the winner of a number of research grants from the Chinese Postdoctoral Foundation and Ministry of Education (PRC), he has conducted research into Chinese interest representation in the EU as well as China’s cooperation with the Central and Eastern European countries. He is a regular contributor to Chinese and international media, including China Daily, Global Times, China Radio International, etc., and has spoken at dozens of international conferences across countries in Asia and Europe.

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List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 2.1 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3

Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 5.1

Fig. 5.2

Value of trade between CEE countries and China (2001–2012). Data World Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geographical location of Central and European countries . . . . . . . Trade between China and CEE countries (2012–2022). Data CEI Network Statistics Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . China’s trade intensity index to CEE countries (2012–2021). Data UN Comtrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CEE countries’ trade intensity index to China (2012–2021). Data UN Comtrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Multitrilateral relations among actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trade between Germany and CEE Countries (2012–2022, in billion USD). Data Statistisches Bundesamt (The Federal Statistical Office, DE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total Trade between Germany and CEE Countries (2012–2022, in billion USD). Data Statistisches Bundesamt (The Federal Statistical Office, DE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EU imports of energy products from Russia. Data Eurostat (trade in net mass) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trade between US and CEE countries (2022). Data International Trade Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trade Comparison of China and US to CEE countries (2012–2022). Data International Trade Administration . . . . . . . . . Friendly cities between China with Central and Eastern Europe. Data China’s provincial People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annual distribution of signing sister cities between China and CEE countries. Data China’s provincial People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 30 45 50 50 71

94

95 99 106 106

125

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4

Documents signed by China and CEE countries since 2012 . . . . Sub-mechanisms in the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Partnership relations between China and CEE countries (until December 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Major religious beliefs in CEE countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International organizations membership status of CEE countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Population, territory and GDP information of CEE countries (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of economic and trade situation between China with Central and Eastern European countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . China’s investment in Central and Eastern European countries in 2012–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . China’s infrastructure projects invested in Balkans (Portion) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of basic situation between China and Central and Eastern European countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of national coordinators of China-CEEC cooperation mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . China and CEE countries policy communication platform (2012–2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NATO’s membership in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Previous local cooperation meetings between China and CEEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . China and CEE countries in city networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sister cities of Shaanxi with Central and Eastern Europen countries (until 31.12.2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lodz Voivodeship and Sichuan (and Chengdu) in area, population, and GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 15 17 31 31 34 46 47 48 49 60 63 78 123 128 130 135

xxiii

Chapter 1

China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

Central and Eastern European countries are not only a geographical category of regional location, but also are perceived as the political concept with many dimensions, such as ideology, different models of economic and social developments and different geopolitical positions. During the Cold War, the CEE countries refer to the European socialist countries other than the Soviet Union. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in the social system of these countries, the geographical connotation of the word “Central and Eastern Europe” gradually reappeared. With the emergence of the cooperation mechanism between China and the CEE countries, the concept of “Central and Eastern European countries” is now rediscovered. For China’s foreign affairs, the Central and Eastern European countries are not only a geographical concept, but also a political concept that includes various dimensions such as ideology and geopolitics.1 A total of seventeen countries during most of the time,2 namely Central European countries, four countries in Central Europe, or namely Visegrád Group, Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia; the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; and other countries of Southeastern Europe, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania; and Greece finally, joined in 2019.3 These countries are different in the economic and social situations, religious culture backgrounds, international strategies, and other aspects, but at the same time also have certain generality: most of the countries belong to eastern bloc before, they experienced arduous and uncompleted institutional transformation. These similarities provide the cornerstone for the establishment of the cooperation mechanism between China and CEE countries,

1

Liu (2020). In March 2021, the Lithuanian parliament agreed to leave the “17 + 1” format, and in August 2022, Estonia and Latvia stepped out of the format. Later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China no longer represented this cooperation mechanism by numbers. 3 During the China-CEEC leaders’ summit held in Croatia’s Dubrovnik in 2019, Greece became a full member of the mechanism (previously an observer country). 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Gu, Frustrated Relations?, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3730-1_1

1

2

1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

and the China-CEEC relations have become an essential part of China’s diplomatic strategy in the new era. Apparently, after the Cold War, the geopolitics of CEE countries dramatically changed, their foreign policy and external relations modulate correspondingly. In the field of external relations, the meaning of the external affairs for CEE countries is no longer distinguished by ideology, but mainly to weaken the political, military, and economic relations with the Soviet Union, and to expand political, economic, and military contacts with the western powers to “return to Europe” eventually. In the context of global economic integration, while strengthening regional cooperation, the goal of “returning to Europe” is achieved by joining the process of European integration. A historical expansion in 2004 marked the reunification of Europe after decades of division. Majority of Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU since 2004, such as Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Three years later, on 1 January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union. Moreover, on 1 July 2013, Croatia became the latest new member of the EU. At the same time, NATO drastically expands eastwards regarding member states, with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltics, Romania, and Bulgaria all joining from the mid-1990s and onwards. Since 2012, China and leaders of CEE countries meet regularly, which marks the formal opening of the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism. The cooperation mechanism references the successful experience of cooperation between China and developing countries, and it considers the particularities of the developed regions of Europe. It is a breakthrough attempt at cooperative diplomacy. However, the mechanism has its particularity which is different from other regional cooperation. Looking back at the history of bilateral relations with the countries of the world after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it finds that the relationship between China and CEE countries has much uniqueness. First, many CEE countries are the first countries that recognize the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and establish diplomatic relations with China onwards. In the beginning, the recognition and support of the CEE countries played a significant role. The similarity ideology also strengthens the affinity between the state and the people. It heads a profound traditional friendship between China and these CEE countries. On the other hand, bilateral relations also undergo tortuous development. During the Cold War, due to the enormous impact of the Sino-Soviet relations. China treats CEE countries from the beginning of “brothers” into “enemies”. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between China and the CEE countries gradually develops into the mature and stable mechanism cooperation, which experiences a rather long and bumpy road of development. After a careful study of the relationship between China and the CEE countries since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the process of development is mainly divided into the following stages. This chapter will analyze the evolution of the developing relations between China and CEE countries since the establishment of diplomatic relations.

1.1 Preliminary Contact during the Cold War

3

1.1 Preliminary Contact during the Cold War During the Cold War, the relationship between China with Central and Eastern European countries was primarily influenced by the international political landscape and ideological differences. With the world divided into two major blocs, namely the Western camp led by the United States and the Eastern camp led by the Soviet Union, most of the Central and Eastern European countries were under the influence and control of the Soviet Union, becoming part of the Eastern bloc. In this context, these countries established political, economic, and cultural interaction with China. China actively sought friendly relations with socialist countries and developed a certain degree of cooperation and exchange with Central and Eastern European countries. At that time, the cooperation between China and these countries mainly focused on the economic and technological sectors. The assistance and economic cooperation provided by China were appreciated by the Central and Eastern European countries, and it to some extent strengthened the exchanges and cooperation between the two sides. However, during the Cold War, the cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries also encountered some limitations due to ideological and political factors. Many times, the Central and Eastern European countries were constrained by the Eastern bloc’s integration policies under the Soviet control, which restricted their cooperation with China. Additionally, the cooperation between China and these countries was relatively focus in the economic and technological fields, with limited collaboration in the political and military domains.4 For example, in the case of Poland. China proposes that the socialist countries be an independent sovereign state, the relationship between the socialist countries should establish by the five principles, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The Chinese leadership initially enumerates these principles in 1954 when China, with a communist government, is trying to reach out to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.5 Chinese scholar Shen Zhihua believes that during this period, China’s relations with Poland was “duality”.6 Moreover, in 1956, it is an era of intense turmoil for Poland, China, and even the entire socialist camp. It is also an essential stage in the development of China–Poland relations. This year, the Poznan protests (Pozna´nski Czerwiec) and the October Revolution (Polski pa´zdziernik 1956) took place in Poland. As a result, political turmoil in the country and relations with the Soviet Union are strained. However, Poland is the first who recognized China, in particular, the Polish government under the leadership of Bolesław Bierut is ready to help the New China defeat the US trade embargo. Of course, due to Moscow’s intervention, China’s role in the Korean War is also one of

4

Pei (1998). This chapter’s partial timeline division is based on Professor Richard L. Edmonds and Professor Long Jing’s introduction to the history of China’s relations with Central and Eastern European countries. See Edmonds (2002), and Long (2014). 6 Shen and Li (2006). 5

4

1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

the reasons why the Soviet Union had to put pressure on Poland.7 However, after the Soviet Union’s 20th National Congress and Khrushchev’s secret speech causes a storm, Sino-Poland relations is further closer.8 Particularly, when dealing with the Polish-Hungarian revolts in 1956, the Chinese Communist Party always adheres to two principles: On the one hand, it repudiates Stalin’s agitation to emphasize the principle of independence and equality in the relations between socialist countries, it cooperates with the Central and Eastern European countries to get rid of the Stalinism of the Soviet Union. The handling of the Polish crisis demonstrates this principle prominently. Another aspect is to reconcile the Soviet Union-Eastern relationship. It emphasizes the unity, solidarity, and stability of the socialist camp. It resolutely excludes and combats all measures and tendencies that are likely to deviate from the socialism, the most visible manifestation of this principle is the handling of the Hungarian crisis. However, why China does not approve of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland but asks Khrushchev to change his original decision and send troops to Hungary? Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee believe that Poland opposes the Soviet power, while Hungary opposes socialism. Mao Zedong is all for the former, but the latter is in any case intolerable. However, like Moscow’s initial miscalculation of the situation in Poland, Beijing’s subsequent judgment on the development of the situation in Hungary is also wrong. Imre Nagy and his government, of course, lack foresight in dealing with the crisis and misguide measures, but they never betray socialism.9 During this period, it can be said that the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations was one of the main reasons. China and the Soviet Union had serious ideological and political disagreements, leading to an escalation of tension between the two countries. The Soviet Union was the main ally of the Central and Eastern European socialist countries, while China pursued a relatively independent path and emphasized revolutionary struggle. China believed that the Soviet Union deviated from the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the international communist movement, which criticized the Soviet Union’s influence and attempts to lead the world communist movement. Moreover, relations between China and the major Central and Eastern European countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and then East Germany deteriorated in the 1960s. These countries are firmly on the side of the Soviet Union, and denounce the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC).10 China, on the other hand, is trying to seek more independence and autonomy in its relations with Central and Eastern European countries. This situation continued to exist in the following years, with the evolution of the international situation and the desalination of the Cold War, a series of changes have taken place in the relationship between China with Central and Eastern European countries. From the 1970s to the early 1980s, China’s willingness to normalize relations with CEE reflects the fact that China no longer continues to engage in ideological 7

Gnoinska (2018). Shen and Li (2006). 9 The above content comes from the archives collected from Professor Shen Zhihua. 10 Bandelj and Solinger (2012). 8

1.1 Preliminary Contact during the Cold War

5

arguments when dealing with state relations. It also guides China’s relations with the countries of CEE after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Although the political relations between China and the CEE countries while shelving, the two sides manage to maintain a low level of economic and trade relations. A landmark event during this period, for example, in 1971, Poland celebrates the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Polish shipping company, Chipolbrok (Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company), it is the first joint-stock shipping company in China with a foreign partner, and both countries hold 50% of the shares. The company goes through political changes in Sino-Polish relations.11 At the ceremony, Yang Jie, former Chinese Minister of Communication and Jerzy Szopa, former Polish Minister of Transportation with the presence of Shareholders. The exchange of visits between the two sides restores the ministerial exchanges between the two countries. Afterward, Li Xiannian, former Vice Premier of China holds the meeting of the Polish governmental delegation participated in Chipolbrok 20th anniversary of activity.12 Since 1989, the domestic situation in Central and Eastern Europe experiences the most dramatic and profound changes since World War II. First, the Polish parliament holds a general election, and the Solidarity (Niezale˙zny Samorz˛adny Zwi˛azek Zawodowy, “Solidarno´sc´ ”) wins the first non-communist-led government in Eastern Europe. Later, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania, the Communist Party’s one-party governance is gradually changed. After more than a decade of reforms, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe countries generally adopt the multiparty parliamentary democracy in politics and economically establish the market economy based on private ownership. As the Central and Eastern European countries experience political changes, the relationship between China and these countries undergoes significant shifts. One notable change is the disappearance of historical associations with the Soviet era that once linked CEE countries and China. Additionally, the two sides have moved beyond common ideological barriers, fostering a more open and diverse engagement. Another crucial aspect is that the formulation of Chinese policy towards CEE countries is no longer limited to political elites but is influenced by various political forces within China. Moreover, the influence of values and pro-American sentiments has started to impact the interactions between China and CEE countries. Amidst these changes, commercial exchange and economic interests have taken center stage as the priority direction of diplomatic activities for both China and CEE countries. China starts assumes a more neutral stance regarding the political situation and economic development in the region, choosing to observe and engage primarily from an economic perspective.

11 12

Wróbel (2016). Rowi´nski and Jaskułowski (2006).

6

1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

1.2 Alienation in Times of Transition In the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, China’s relations with Central and Eastern European countries underwent a series of transformations. This period marked the gradual democratization and market economy reforms in Central and Eastern European countries, while China was also advancing its own process of reform and opening up, gradually stepping onto the global stage. However, during this time, the bilateral relationship also faced some challenges and limitations. Central and Eastern European countries were going through a period of political and economic transition, and internal reform and stability issues remained prominent. Some countries in CEE had unstable policies and imperfect market systems, leading to certain uncertainties in cooperation. Simultaneously, constrained by economic and political factors, the cooperation priorities of Central and Eastern European countries still tended to lean towards joining the European Union and aligning themselves with Western countries.13 During this period, Central and Eastern European countries were eager to attract more foreign investment and expand trade cooperation, while China sought to access more markets and resources. Both sides realized that through collaboration, mutual benefits could be achieved, fostering economic development and prosperity. China with Central and Eastern European countries signed a series of economic and trade cooperation agreements, promoting collaboration in areas such as trade, investment, and technology. China gradually became one of the important trading partners for the Central and Eastern European countries, importing goods and technology products, while also investing and cooperating in some advantageous industries in these countries. For example, in mid-November 1997, the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwa´sniewski pays a state visit to China, which is the first official visit to China of Polish heads of state in the past years. The heads of state sign “The Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Poland”, which opens the prelude to the warming of the bilateral relations in the next stage.14 Relations between Poland and China flags since the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 1960s, when Poland is a Soviet client state. At this moment, there have tensions over issues like human rights and Poland’s discreet links with Taiwan. It was also during this time, China’s then-Premier, Li Peng, canceled a visit to Poland after Polish and Chinese Member of Parliaments clash verbally over China’s human rights record during a visit by Polish parliamentarians to Beijing. Significantly, Poland’s newly appointed foreign minister, Bronisław Geremek, who is chair of Poland’s parliamentary foreign affairs committee at the time, did not take part in the President Kwasniewski visit to China. Reports say the Polish side hopes that Beijing would “support” Poland’s bid to join NATO and the EU. The joint communiqué refers only to Chinese “understanding”. The communiqué also mentions human rights 13 14

Zhu (2016). Górlaczyk and Miao (2014).

1.2 Alienation in Times of Transition

7

but emphasizes people’s right to subsistence and development, rather than political rights.15 However, President Kwa´sniewski comes under strong domestic criticism in Poland because he did not touch the human rights issue. However, the primary emphasis of the visit is undoubtedly on trade, particularly, the glaring imbalance in favor of China. By the standards of the leading trading nations, Poland’s trade with China is modest but is growing fast, due to the rapid rise in Chinese imports.16 President Kwa´sniewski accompanies a sizeable group of Polish merchants. He undoubtedly was trying to impress on his hosts the image of Poland as a medium-sized power with a rapidly expanding economy (6% annual growth over the then past four years at that time). Another topic for discussion is cooperation in combatting crime, which includes the drugs trade. Chinese traders are now a familiar sight on Poland’s streets, as they are in much of Central and Eastern Europe. However, there are also worries about the less desirable aspects of private enterprise.17 After the mid-terra in the nineties of the twentieth century, the relations between China and the CEE countries enter a new stage, which realize the normalization of relations. In 1991, the former State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited five Central and Eastern European countries, namely, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. It is the first senior-level visit paid by China to Central and Eastern Europe after its drastic change and was of great importance. During his visit, the foreign minister stresses that difference in the social system, ideology, and values (later known as the “three beyond”, “San Chao Yue” principle) should not stand in the way of developing relations between China with Central and Eastern European countries. China respects the right of the Central and Eastern European countries to choose their social systems and path of development, and he expresses that China desires to develop good bilateral relations with them by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Such high-level exchange of visits improves mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation between China with the Central and Eastern European countries, and brings about substantive progress in the bilateral political relations.18 In 1994, Li Peng, the then-Chinese Prime Minister, in Bucharest for talks with President Ion Iliescu and the Romanian government. During his visit in Romania, Li Peng presents the four political principles that China applies in Central and Eastern Europe: (1) to respect the popular will of the sovereign countries and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the respective countries; (2) to develop the mutual friendship and to live in peace and cooperation; (3) to develop bilateral ties in order that both parties develop and flourish; (4) to encourage peaceful responses toward interstate disputes thus creating a safe zone for investments.19

15

Ibid. Starzyk (2009). 17 Ibid. 18 Wang (2020). 19 Wang (2020). 16

8

1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

In July 1995, at the invitation of Hungarian President Árpád Göncz, Chinese thenPresident Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to Hungary, which is the first presidential visit to Hungary by China since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. During the visit, then Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Hungarian Foreign Minister László Kovács signed the agreement on mutual assistance and cooperation between the customs of the two countries. Moreover, during his visit, then-President Jiang Zemin demonstrated the primary political position on the development of relations with CEE countries by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.20 The assertion of “peace and development” as the two major themes of the contemporary world is an important aspect of China’s understanding of the current era and the global situation since China’s Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978. This understanding is particularly relevant to the international situation that has been shifting from tension to relaxation and from confrontation to dialogue since entering the 1990s. China’s foreign relations, especially the introduction and implementation of a strategic partnership approach, have not only improved China’s international environment but also become a crucial means for China to promote the transformation of the international order. From the foreign policy perspective, pragmatist sets peace and development as China’s primary international goals because economic prosperity is seen as the priority and the foundation for China’s rising aspirations.21 In the meantime, political stability at home is emphasized as the necessary condition for the attainment of Chinese modernization.22 Furthermore, the Chinese government respects the institutional choice of the people of CEE countries, which is respect for the political changes of the CEE countries since 1989, and the abandonment of the socialist system to the Western capitalist system. China hopes to develop relations with the countries of CEE by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the countries of CEE, the cooperation of both sides is following bilateral principles. China expands economic and trade cooperation with the countries of CEE under the principle of equality and mutual benefit and promotes the development of each other’s economies for the benefit to the people of their respective countries. China supports the peaceful settlement of disputes by CEE countries, and it strives to improve the level of regional cooperation. Given the turmoil in the CEE countries after the political upheaval and the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Chinese government shows its final attitude. After the collapse of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, China successively recognizes the newly independent countries, namely, Yugoslavia (later Serbia, Montenegro), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and North Macedonia, and establish formal diplomatic relations at an appropriate time. After the declaration, the bilateral political and economic relations between China and the CEE countries are gradually warming. 20

Ibid. Mierzejewski (2012). 22 Zhao (2015). 21

1.3 Beyond Development from New Century to 2012

9

1.3 Beyond Development from New Century to 2012 Since the beginning of the new century, most Central and Eastern European countries have joined the European Union, it has significantly bolstered the economic development and potential of the new member states, and elevating their international standing. For China’s relations with Central and Eastern European countries during this period, the EU enlargement has made the EU’s external policies more diverse and extensive. With China’s significant increase in national strength, cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries has deepened, mutual interests have grown, and their national interests have become more compatible, providing important support for active interactions between China with Central and Eastern European countries. The cooperation between the two sides achieves initial results, and the trade volume between China with Central and Eastern European countries increased from 2.14 billion USD in 2001 to 68.07 billion USD in 2012. For specific countries, such as Poland, China’s largest trading partner in CEE, in 2004, trade between two countries’ turnover is 2.33 billion dollars, and eight years later, in 2012, the turnover is more than six times as 14.385 billion dollars (Fig. 1.1).23 At the same time, China and CEE countries exchange high-level visits, communicate with each other, increase political mutual trust, and the quality of bilateral relations. On June 8–14, 2004, Hu Jintao, then China’s president, successively paid a state visit to Poland, Hungary, and Romania to meet and talk with the leaders of those countries, and jointly issued a joint statement with the three countries to

Value of Trade (in billions USD) 80 68.07

70

58.73

60 50 40

28.57

30 20 10 0

2.14 3.09 4.35

7.05

12.26

32.77

38.71 28.96

18.52

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Fig. 1.1 Value of trade between CEE countries and China (2001–2012). Data World Bank 23

Eurostat (2023).

10

1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

promote bilateral relations as “friendly partners”. During his visit to Romania, Hu Jintao proposed four new proposals for developing relations with the Central and Eastern European countries: First, to enhance friendly exchanges, boost mutual political trust, deepen mutual understanding, expand consensus, and support each other, especially the major political concerns of each other, to further develop their bilateral relations under the principles of mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Second, to expand economic and trade cooperation and promote joint development, adhere to the principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity, and try to increase the investment and technological content of their economic cooperation to become each other’s stable economic and trade partner through sharing complementarity. Third, to expand cultural exchanges and consolidate traditional friendship, enhance exchanges in the fields of culture, sports, science and technology, tourism, health, and journalism to enrich the content of their cooperation continually. Fourth, to strengthen international cooperation and jointly cope with important challenges, enhance strategic dialogue and cooperation on counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, combating cross-border crimes and giving play to the role of the United Nations, and remain committed to safeguarding world peace and stability.24 On the other hand, while prioritizing the development of relations between the United States and Western Europe, Central and Eastern European countries is increasingly value their relations with China. For example, Poland, Hungary, and Romania include China as a target country for crucial development relations. Polish thenPrime Minister Leszek Miller states that: “We must actively promote the political and economic cooperation between Poland and China. Now, China is the country with the fastest economic growth in the world. Poland’s relations with China must be out of the shadow and become a concern of our foreign policy”.25 At the same time, when Hungarian then-Prime Minister Medgyessy Péter visited China in August 2003, the Hungarian government is willing to view Hungary-China relations from a long-term perspective and establish a “long-term constructive partnership” with China.26 China notes that Central and Eastern European countries play an essential role in China–Europe relations after these countries joining the European Union. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. At the same time, with the increasing role of the EU in global affairs, it is necessary for China to strengthen communication and cooperation with EU member states including the Central and Eastern European countries on several essential issues. It reflects the more significant expansion of cooperation between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the improvement of the quality of bilateral relations. China’s relations with Central and Eastern European countries thus cross a new period.

24

China.org.cn (2004). Górlaczyk and Miao (2014). 26 China.org.cn (2003). 25

1.3 Beyond Development from New Century to 2012

11

Furthermore, since 2004, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, these eight CEE countries become as the member state of the European Union. In some crucial areas of the EU, especially those involving significant political, economic, and diplomatic issues, unanimity is required for decision-making. This decision-making mechanism reflects the importance of member states’ sovereignty, ensuring equitable representation and active participation for every member state. Examples of unanimity decision-making in the European Council include: any major changes to EU Treaties require unanimous consent from all member states, the accession of new member states to the EU also requires unanimous consent from existing member states, or the adoption of certain tax policies requires unanimous agreement from all member states. Unanimity decision-making ensures that EU policies and actions receive broad support in areas of significant importance and provides assurance to member states, avoiding discontent and conflicts that may arise from forced decisions. Therefore, when these CEE countries consider their relations with China, they need to incorporate the EU’s will into it. As the EU emphasizes the unanimity of its foreign policy, the relations between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to China are also included in the framework of the EU’s China policy to some extent. In 2003, the EU issued its third official report on China’s policies: A Maturing Partnership: Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations.27 In 2006, the EU published a policy paper entitled Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities A Policy Paper on EU-China Trade and Investment: Competition and Partnership which submits to the EU Council.28 For China, in October 2003, China released its first Policy Paper on EU.29 As a result, the relationship between Central and Eastern European countries with China has become into dualism; that is, while maintaining bilateral relations, it also participates in the EU’s multilateral relations with China. This duality relationship is likely to have an impact on the relations of CEE countries to China and the EU’s relations with China. Therefore, the following situation arises: the political relations between Central and Eastern European countries with China are multilateral, while the economic relations are mainly bi-lateralization. Such as Poland, since 2004, and even more so since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, China, and Poland, particularly, economic and trade exchanges are to be also structured within prevailing EU policies, such as the agreement on mutual economic cooperation and the European Union regulations from June 2004, and in operation from April 2005. In this light, the Polish economic relation strategy with China follows significant guidelines, and Polish exporters are advanced to reduce the enormous gap between exports and imports, with Chinese direct investments in Poland are encouraged.30

27

EUR-LEX (2003). EUR-LEX (2006). 29 China’s EU Policy Paper (2004). 30 Palonka (2010). 28

12

1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

1.4 A New Interpretation Since 2012 On April 2012, then-Premier Wen Jiabao visited CEE and attended the second ChinaCEE Economic and Trade Forum in Warsaw. During the meeting, the Chinese side raises China’s Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with CEE countries to promote practical cooperation, which marks a new stage in the development of relations between China and the CEE countries. Since the founding of “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism, as a cross-regional cooperation platform created by China with Central and Eastern European countries based on traditional friendship and a common desire for cooperation. Since its establishment, it has focused on pragmatic cooperation and established a comprehensive cooperation framework covering multiple areas, including economic and trade, culture, education, youth, agriculture, tourism, technology, health, think tanks, and local exchanges. Through multiple meetings held in Bucharest, Belgrade, Suzhou, Riga, Budapest, Sofia, Dubrovnik, and Beijing, China with Central and Eastern European countries have achieved fruitful results in various fields of cooperation, playing a positive role in deepening bilateral relations between China with Central and Eastern European countries and enriching the China-Europe relationship. As the latest practice of China’s external relations with European countries, China holds several high-level meetings with CEE for many years and issues a cooperation framework to extend bilateral relations further. On September 6, 2012, the establishment of the Cooperation Secretariat of China-CEE countries is critical in these initiatives, which is the first special administration established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to promote cooperation with this region. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the new leadership of the CPC Central Committee inherits the basic national policy that is comprehensively developing China and the relations between China and CEE. For the upcoming years, the two sides issued a series of guidelines for further cooperation (Table 1.1). By comparing the above outlines, from the Bucharest Guidelines in 2013 to Beijing List of Activities in 2021, the evolution of the past guidelines goes from the six major areas in the first guideline to the numerous items in the Outcome List of China-CEEC Summit. On November 26, 2013, China-Central and Eastern European leaders met in Romania to jointly formulate and issue The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European Countries. The Bucharest Guidelines cover six major areas, (1) promote investment, economic and trade cooperation, (2) expand financial cooperation, (3) enhance cooperation in connectivity, (4) expand cooperation in science, technology, innovation, environmental protection, and energy, (5) promote dynamic people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation, (6) encourage and support cooperation at the sub-national level as one of the essential pillars. This first guideline sets the direction and formulates the prelude of medium-term agenda. It also made long-term institutionalization of the annual meeting between leaders of China with Central and Eastern Europe.

1.4 A New Interpretation Since 2012

13

Table 1.1 Documents signed by China and CEE countries since 2012 Places and date

Documents

Warsaw, 2012

Press Communique of Meeting between China and CEE Leaders

Warsaw, 2012

China’s 12 Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with CEE

Bucharest, 2013

The Bucharest Guidelines

Belgrade, 2014

The Belgrade Guidelines

Suzhou, 2015

The Suzhou Guidelines

Suzhou, 2015

The Medium-Term Agenda

Riga, 2016

The Riga Guidelines

Budapest, 2017

The Budapest Guidelines

Budapest, 2017

Five-year Outcome List of Cooperation

Sofia, 2018

The Sofia Guidelines

Dubrovnik, 2019

The Dubrovnik Guidelines

Beijing, 2021 (Via virtual)

Beijing List of Activities

Beijing, 2021 (Via virtual)

Documents in the Outcome List of China-CEEC Summit

Source The author collected from the website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

On December 16, 2014, the China-CEEC Leaders Meeting was held in Serbia. The participants jointly formulate and issue The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries. In Belgrade Guidelines, it reiterates that China-CEEC cooperation is in line with China-EU relations, thus contributing as appropriate to the implementation of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, it supports the efforts to start formulating a medium-term agenda. Based on the Bucharest Guidelines, similar medium-term agenda such as the five-year plan are rarely seen in the framework of past Chinese bilateral, multilateral cooperation. Moreover, starting from the Belgrade Guidelines, a memorandum on the implementation of relevant measures in the previous year’s annex appends to the guidelines. For example, in the appendix of Belgrade Guidelines, 32 related measures are summarized. On November 24, 2015, China-Central and Eastern European leaders met in Suzhou, China. In addition to the Suzhou Guideline, the Participants state their readiness to formulate The Medium-Term Agenda for Cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European Countries. The agenda involves: (1) economic cooperation, (2) cooperation on connectivity, (3) cooperation on industrial capacity and equipment manufacturing, (4) financial cooperation, (5) agricultural, forestry, and quality inspection cooperation, (6) cooperation in science, technology, research, innovation, and environmental protection.

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1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

On November 5, 2016, the fifth China-Central and Eastern European countries’ leader’s meeting was held in Riga, Latvia. In the Riga Guidelines, the cooperation in industry, energy, science, and technology is added. It reflects that there are few industrial cooperation projects between China and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly, in high-end industries is particularly inadequate. Among the Central and Eastern European countries, except Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, China and other Central and Eastern European countries are dominated by interindustry trade.31 Moreover, China guides with a total of 100 billion euros of China-CEE fund to collaborate with the mechanism. As China’s first government-supported nonsovereign overseas investment fund, which plans to leverage the project credit funds of 50 billion euros. Another highlight is in the Riga Guidelines, China initiates the “Port-Area Cooperation” between China and CEECs bordering the Baltic, Adriatic, and the Black Sea, and the establishment of China-CEEC Secretariat for Maritime Issues in Poland, to promote cooperation among the major ports of the coastal areas. During the 2017 Budapest meeting, China with Central and Eastern European countries release the Budapest Guidelines. Also, China takes stock of the achievements of the past five years and makes an outcome list with over 200 items, covering five areas, including policy communication, connectivity, economy and trade, finance, cultural and people-to-people exchange. Among these outcomes, agriculture, forestry and environment protection cooperation, people-to-people contacts, health cooperation, and especially the local cooperation, are very rare in the past in the process of cooperation between China and European countries. At the same time, according to the importance of each country in different fields, it also establishes administrative bodies and secretariats with some countries. The illustrative examples are the Association of Tourism Promotion Agencies and Businesses in Hungary, Association on Transport and Infrastructure Cooperation in Serbia, Association for the Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation in Bulgaria, Association of Provincial Governors in the Czech Republic, Association on Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Cooperation in Latvia, Contact Mechanism for the Investment Promotion Agency and Coordinating Secretariat for Maritime Issues in Poland, Coordination Mechanism on Forestry Cooperation in Slovenia, Virtual Information Platform in Slovakia (Table 1.2). At the same time, China sings separate partnership with different countries. At present, China adopts a “dual-track diplomacy” strategy in its interactions with Central and Eastern European countries. It not only develops diplomatic relations with the European Union but also conducts exchanges with its various member states. Among the countries except for the EU member states, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania are candidates for membership, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a potential candidate for joining the EU. It determines that cooperation between China and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe is based on the overall framework of China-EU relations. It constitutes a multitrack exchange level and platform between the overall relationship and the bilateral relations of member states. However, at 31

Liu (2020).

1.4 A New Interpretation Since 2012

15

Table 1.2 Sub-mechanisms in the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism Location

Host city

Sub-mechanisms

Time

CEE

Belgrade

Association on Transport and Infrastructure Cooperation

2015.11

Bratislava

Virtual Information Platform

2016.11

Bucharest

Center for Dialogue in Energy-related Projects

2016.1

Budapest

Association of Tourism Promotion Agencies and Businesses

2014.5

China

Federation of Chinese Medicine Societies

2017.3

China-CEE Institute

2017.4

China-CEE Chinese Medicine Center

2017.6

China-CEEC Inter-Bank Association

2017.11

Ljubljana

Coordination Mechanism on Forestry Cooperation

2015.11

Podgorica

Environmental Protection Cooperation Mechanism

2018.9

Prague

Association of Provincial Governors

2014.8

Riga

Association on Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Cooperation

2016.5

Sarajevo

Science Veterinary Cooperation Center

2018.12

Skopje

Cultural Cooperation Coordination Center

2018.3

Sofia

Association for the Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation

2015.6

China-CEEC Global Partnership Center

2019.4

Warsaw

China-CEE United Chamber of Commerce

2015.12

Coordinating Secretariat for Maritime Issues

2017.2

Zagreb

SMEs Center

2018.7

Beijing

Contact Mechanism for the Investment Promotion Agencies

2014.9

Hangzhou Ningbo

Think Tanks Network

2015.12

Secretariat of China-CEEC Publishing Union

2018.8

China-CEEC Global Partner Center

2019.4

China-CEEC Union of Music Conservatory

2017.9

Secretariat of China-CEEC Library Union

2018.1

China-CEEC Customs Information Center

2021.4

China-CEEC Public Health Industry Alliance

2021.6

China-CEEC E-commerce Cooperation Dialogue

2021.6

China-CEEC Health and Phytosanitary Working Group Mechanism

2021.6

China-CEEC Innovation Cooperation Research Center

2022.6

Shenzhen

China-CEEC Agricultural Products (E-commerce) Logistics Center

2018.5

Suzhou

China-CEEC Health Cooperation Promotion Federation

2016.6 (continued)

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1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

Table 1.2 (continued) Location

Host city

Sub-mechanisms

Time

Tianjin

Higher Education Institutes Consortium

2014.9

Source The author arranges from Chinese documents according to Professor Huang Ping, Liu Zuokui, and Xu Gang

present, none of the countries in the Central and Eastern European countries can negotiate on behalf of the CEE countries. It requires China to carry out multilateral coordination in the process of cooperation and maintain the necessary balance among the CEE countries. With the promotion of the “China-CEEC” framework, China’s strategic partnership is more substantial in Central and Eastern Europe. The strategic partnership between China and the Czech Republic (2016), Hungary (2017) grows from scratch. Meanwhile, China upgrades a comprehensive strategic partnership with Poland and Serbia in 2016. The friendly partnership with Hungary promotes as a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2017 (Table 1.3). In July 2018, Chinese then Premier Li Keqiang attended the 7th China-Central and Eastern European Countries Leaders’ Meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria. During the meeting, China and CEE countries jointly issued the “Sofia Guidelines” for China-CEEC Cooperation, which placed more emphasis on cultural exchanges and more detailed cooperation, such as in local government, tourism, and aviation. They also proposed the establishment of the “China-CEEC Global Partnership Center”, which is managed by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), a think tank under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, more than 20 cooperation agreements were signed in the fields of transportation and energy infrastructure construction, industrial parks, finance, education, culture, quality inspection. In April 2019, the 8th China-Central and Eastern European Countries Leaders’ Meeting was held in Dubrovnik, Croatia. During the meeting, the “Dubrovnik Guidelines” for China-CEEC Cooperation were issued, which recognized that cooperation between China and CEE countries is an important part of China–Europe relations, a beneficial supplement to the China–Europe comprehensive strategic partnership, and the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. All parties reaffirmed their commitment to deepening the China–Europe partnership for peace, growth, reform, and civilization, and recognized the importance of the Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s Eurasian Connectivity Strategy. It was also during this meeting that Greece officially joined the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism as a full member.

1.5 China and the CEE in the New Era

17

Table 1.3 Partnership relations between China and CEE countries (until December 2022) Country

Date of diplomatic ties Remarks

Albania

1949.11.23

Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995.4.3

N/a N/a

Bulgaria

1949.10.4

Comprehensive friendly cooperative partnership (2014)

Croatia

1992.5.13

Comprehensive cooperative partnership (2005)

Czech Republic

1949.10.6

Strategic partnership (2016)

Estonia

1991.9.11

N/a

Greece

1972.6.5

Comprehensive strategic partnership (2006)

Hungary

1949.10.6

Friendly cooperative partnership (2004) Comprehensive strategic partnership (2017)

Latvia

1991.9.12

N/a

Lithuania

1991.9.14

Downgraded to “charge d’affaires” level (2021)

North Macedonia

1993.10.12

N/a

Montenegro

2006.7.6

N/a

Poland

1949.10.7

Partnership (2004) Strategic partnership (2011) Comprehensive strategic partnership (2016)

Romania

1949.10.5

Serbia

1955.1.2

Comprehensive friendly cooperative partnership (2004) Strategic partnership (2009) Comprehensive strategic partnership (2016)

Slovakia

1949.10.6

N/a

Slovenia

1992.5.12

N/a

Source The author arranges according to the information from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1.5 China and the CEE in the New Era Since the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, the cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries has undergone significant changes. In May 2021, Lithuania announced its withdrawal from the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism,32 while altering the expanding trend of cooperation since its launch. In August 2022, Estonia and Latvia also announced their exit from the China-CEEC cooperation,33 raising doubts about the effectiveness of the cooperation and casting a shadow on its prospects due to the “structural gap” in the Baltic region.

32 33

Lau (2021). Stankevicius (2022).

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1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

The outbreak of COVID-19 is clearly a significant factor that led to changes in the cooperation situation between China with Central and Eastern European countries. The pandemic seriously impacted trade and investment cooperation between China and CEE countries and interrupted people-to-people exchanges. The decline of tourism cooperation, which was highly anticipated by CEE countries, was precipitous. The level of activity and visibility of cooperation between China and CEE countries has obviously decreased. The more important reason for the setback in China with Central and Eastern European countries cooperation is the significant changes in the external strategic environment, represented by the all-around competition in China–US relations becoming the new norm. During the Trump administration, the Central and Eastern European region has become an object of competition between China and the US, becoming the main battlefield in the competition between China and the US. In particular, the issue of whether to adopt Huawei 5G equipment has become the focus of the struggle.34 Since Biden took office, the US has placed more emphasis on uniting its Central and Eastern European allies through multilateralism to restrain China, increasing the external pressure on China-Central and Eastern European countries cooperation. In the context of the continued deterioration of Sino-US relations, the ideological dispute between China and Europe based on different values has also intensified. One of the most obvious examples is that sensitive issues related to China such as Taiwan or Tibet have gradually emerged in the cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries. For example, Zdenˇek Hˇrib, from the Czech Pirate Party, stirred up the “Taiwan-related clauses” in a friendly city agreement after he took office as the mayor of Prague in 2018,35 which led to the termination of the friendly city relations between Beijing and Shanghai and Prague in October 201936 and January 2020.37 In November 2021, Lithuania approved the establishment of the so-called Taiwan Representative Office in Lithuania by the Taiwan authorities, subsequently, China protested against Lithuania’s abandonment of the “one China” political commitment made in the communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. China has decided to downgrade diplomatic relations between the two countries to the level of charge d’affaires.38 On top of that, under the Trump administration, the United States has taken a series of restrictive and repressive measures against China, including sanctions against Chinese technology companies such as Huawei. These measures have affected China’s science and technology (S&T) cooperation with CEE countries to a certain extent. As the United States has allies and influence in the CEE region, some CEE countries may be more cautious in their S&T cooperation to avoid conflicts in their relations with the United States. This also leads to the possibility that CEE countries may have reservations about S&T investments and technological cooperation from 34

Friis and Lysne (2021). Tait (2019). 36 Eckert and Turcsányi (2019). 37 CGTN (2020). 38 Dw.com (2021), Lau (2021). 35

1.5 China and the CEE in the New Era

19

China, increasing CEE countries’ distrust of China. And the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian conflict has had a significant geopolitical and economic impact on CEE countries, with some CEE countries standing firmly on the side of Ukraine and condemning Russia’s aggressive behavior. The security concerns in CEE countries have significantly risen following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. On the one hand, the US has taken advantage of the opportunity to incorporate Eastern European countries more deeply into the NATO system. On the other hand, the US has exploited Central and Eastern European countries’ “anti-Russian sentiment” to label China as “sympathetic and supportive of Russia”,39 deliberately widening the gap between Central and Eastern European countries and China. The US has also manipulated public opinion in some CEE countries, hyping up China’s disregard for their security concerns and positioning China alongside Russia in the NATO-Russia confrontation, attempting to fortify the division between China with Central and Eastern European countries along the lines of the Russian boundary. After the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the US economic assistance to Central and Eastern European countries increased significantly. This move aims at strengthening the cooperation between the United States with Central and Eastern European countries, and at the same time countering the influence of China and Russia in this region. The US Export–Import Bank (EXIM) then signed an export credit agreement worth $600 million with Lithuania to encourage its anti-China actions.40 After Estonia and Latvia announced their withdrawal from the China-Central and Eastern European Countries cooperation mechanism, the US swiftly declared that it would provide economic assistance to both countries.41 The US also encouraged Romania to abandon its agreement with the China-Central and Eastern European Countries cooperation mechanism and instead signed a similar memorandum of cooperation with US businesses.42 The European Union is another major external factor affecting cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries and its stance and attitude have undergone significant changes. Among the Central and Eastern European countries that cooperate with China, majority countries are EU member states, and other countries are also striving to join the EU. Since the start of cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries, the EU has held a conflicting attitude toward this mechanism. On the one hand, the EU welcomes the benefits that Central and Eastern European countries receive from cooperation with China, thereby enhancing the overall development level of the EU, but on the other hand, it suspects that China is using Central and Eastern European countries to “divide and rules” the EU.43 Therefore, in the early stages of the cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries, the EU generally neither expressed approval nor fully opposed it, mainly by restraining the EU member states in Central 39

Wang (2022). EXIM (2022). 41 Mix (2020). 42 Ciurtin (2022). 43 Grieger (2018). 40

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1 China, Central and Eastern Europe: Way towards Rediscovering

and Eastern Europe and limiting their independent development of relations with China, to exert a restraining influence on cooperation between the two sides. As China’s rising, the European Union feels increasingly powerless in dealing with China and is seeking ways to reverse its passive position in China–Europe relations. With the Biden administration taking office, the US and Europe have increased policy coordination on China and found common ground in interfering with and undermining cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries. The US interferes with China-Central and Eastern European cooperation mainly from the consideration of strategic competition with China, while the EU aims to maintain its dominant power. After China imposed economic sanctions on Lithuania, the EU immediately released a draft Regulation to counter the use of economic coercion by third countries against the European Union or individual EU member states,44 simultaneously, the EU sued China at the World Trade Organization for trade discrimination against Lithuania.45 Initially, the European Union exerted influence over the cooperation between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; but, as time passed, the United States became the dominant external power, followed by joint interference by the US and EU. The external environment has shifted from a period of relative calm to an unprecedented period of adversity, which has had a considerable impact on the attitude of CEE nations toward cooperation with China. Due to the simultaneous pressure exerted by the United States and the European Union, a number of CEE countries have been compelled to compromise their national sovereignty and independence, placing security considerations above economic goals. Nonetheless, the changes in the condition of China-CEE collaboration have also shown deficiencies in China’s development and relations with CEE countries. From an economic standpoint, China’s economic cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries is a far cry from supplanting the EU market. Although China has become the leading trading partner of more than 130 nations, it ranks low on the list of trade partners and especially export partners of Central and Eastern European countries. China’s investments in CEE countries lag far behind those of the EU. On the security front, CEE countries and China continue to maintain a low degree of security cooperation due to their concerns regarding the EU and NATO. Cooperation is also limited in non-traditional security domains, such as transnational crime. As a result of the commencement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Sino-Russian alliance erected a barrier of mistrust between China with Central and Eastern European countries, casting a shadow over future cooperation.

44 45

Veronique (2022). European Commission (2022).

References

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1.6 Concluding Remarks China’s ties with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have gone through phases of warmth and closeness followed by estrangement and coldness. Since 2012, the relations for both sides have progressed from one of stable development to comprehensive development, with the scale of cooperation growing, the level of cooperation deepening, and the quality of the relationship now entering a new stage. Central and Eastern European countries are not a unified bloc, and China’s collaboration is not without its bumps. China’s investment in any fields with a group of countries in Central and Eastern Europe is rapidly growing for the past decade. However, it cannot ignore the vast demographic, economic, religious, and migratory variations between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The nation regions are impacted by these dissimilarities. Differences in the areas, scope, scale, and even outcomes of China’s cooperation with them are directly related to the degree of cohesion between the two groups. In addition to these relatively significant differences, as a human-made new region, the homogeneity of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe is relatively weak, as a result of domestic and international factors, history and reality, beliefs and culture, and other multiple complex factors. Nowadays, China with Central and Eastern European countries cooperation mechanism have been in place for over ten years. During this time, the mechanism has played a significant role in promoting the development of China-CEEC relations, especially in enhancing practical cooperation, and has become one of the main drivers of China’s relationship with European countries. But after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, the friendly cooperation between China and CEE countries has weakened, and the three Baltic countries have withdrawn from the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism. Furthermore, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors have posed unprecedented challenges for China-CEEC cooperation. The distrust caused by the cognitive dislocation between China with Central and Eastern European countries has troubled the good momentum of bilateral relations. It is a major task that requires deep reflection and concerted efforts to properly address these challenges and ensure that China-CEEC cooperation continues to maintain its positive momentum and sustainable development in the next days.

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Remarks by spokesperson of the Chinese embassy in Slovakia on Karol Galek’s visit to Taiwan. (n.d.). Retrieved February 19, 2023, from http://sk.china-embassy.gov.cn/slo/sgxx/xwdt/202112/t20 211207_10463668.htm Rowi´nski, J., & Jaskułowski, T. (2006). Polski pa´zdziernik 1956 w polityce s´wiatowej. PISM. Shanghai terminates sister-city ties with Prague over Taiwan issue. (n.d.). Retrieved February 19, 2023, from https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-01-14/Shanghai-terminates-sister-city-ties-withPrague-Nfq3yCM4Za/index.html Shen, Z., & Li, D. (2006). The Polish Crisis of 1956 and Sino-Polish Relations: Archives and Internal Reports from China. Russian Studies, 03, 45–58. https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/ detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFD2006&filename=ELSY200603010&uniplatform= OVERSEA&v=uABTi32ssaVJ-kIWI8D3NQdC3roCG_1UqIZBkRT4HPoCQJIX__JV0mNL yh5Xtq9A Stankevicius, A. (2022, August 11). Latvia, Estonia withdraw from China cooperation group. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/latvia-estonia-withdraw-china-cooper ation-group-2022-08-11/ Starzyk, K. (2009). Stosunki gospodarcze Polski z Chinami na tle ich przemian w latach 1978– 2008. In B. Góralczyk & H. Miao, Polska-Chiny. Wczoraj, dzi´s, jutro. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek. Strengthen cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries and promote all-round development of China-EU relations. (n.d.). Retrieved February 19, 2023, from http:// www.china-ceec.org/eng/msc_1/dsj/201610/t20161020_6828873.htm Stuart, L. (2021, October 27). Taiwanese minister’s covert trip to Brussels adds to EU-China tensions. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/joseph-wu-taiwan-brussels-beijing-czechrepublic-slovakia-diplomacy/ Tait, R. (2019, July 3). Zdenˇek Hˇrib: The Czech mayor who defied China. The Guardian. https:/ /www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jul/03/zdenek-hrib-the-czech-mayor-who-defied-chinataiwan Taiwan opens representative office in Lithuania. (n.d.). Dw.Com. Retrieved February 19, 2023, from https://www.dw.com/en/taiwan-opens-representative-office-in-lithuania/a-59853874 Veronique, G. (2022). EU response to economic coercion by third countries. European Parliament Think Tank Briefing. Wang Q. (Ed.). (2020). The diplomatic history of the People’s Republic of China (1949–2019). Contemporary China Publishing House. Wang, W. (2022, March 18). Why do many Chinese sympathize with Russia in the Ukraine conflict? https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/why-do-many-chinese-sympathize-withrussia-in-the-ukraine-conflict/ Wróbel, J. (2016). Chipolbrok: Z dziejów polsko-chi´nskiego sojuszu morskiego 1950–1957. Instytut ´ Pami˛eci Narodowej—Komisja Scigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. Oddział. Wu, S. (2022, March 7). Ukraine’s fight an inspiration for Taiwan, foreign minister says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-fight-an-inspiration-taiwan-foreign-ministersays-2022-03-07/ Xu, G. and Yang, B. (2022). A Ten-Year Cooperation between China and CEE Countries: Evaluation and Reflection. Journal of Eurasian Economy, 260(05): 31-47+125. https://kns. cnki.net/kcms2/article/abstract?v=YUk1thMFhg44FQibPvJlsR7hnz0zJ7BDHF4VxApCOT4hEG-AD-5x5FKBdmq-fHNCpZeXtMXB8RwHUEmcdaNmBRpgTQNDCb7Y6tSvTJKv_ 8P7Wmj6JGZSJmHR-wxOEESMJRy-G0QhUYh_Au9Gq4THQ==&uniplatform=NZKPT& language=CHS Zhao, D. (2015). The Confucian-legalist state: A new theory of Chinese history (Illustrated edition). Oxford University Press. Zhu, X. (2016). Several issues on central and eastern European studies. The Journal of International Studies, 37(05), 47–66. https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode= CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2016&filename=GJZY201605003&uniplatform=OVERSEA& v=rzf69hIGJJF_E1s_ho6VgJTUiWUQEOvbCwou3-p77RqVcdaz8lRBAgXJliZBgzAf

Chapter 2

Heterogeneity: Internal Dimensions among Central and Eastern European Countries

The return of China’s layout reminds onlookers of Sir Halford Mackinder’s famous “Heartland Theory” which defines Central and Eastern Europe as part of the central heartland area of the World Island.1 China’s expansion to Central and Eastern Europe are different from military strategy and geopolitical thinking from the current scope of cooperation. It makes the image of the “World Island” different from the past. It also gives the meaning of the concept of “World Island” to advance with the times. However, yet, countries of Central and Eastern Europe possess different historical contexts, level of economic development, political and party system. In the context of such a highly heterogeneous status, such cooperation is laborious. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe are highly heterogeneous, and most countries cannot provide public goods. However, China with Central and Eastern European countries cooperation mechanism proposed by China has created incremental and constructive regional public goods. It is using cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe to moderate risks and ensure that various approaches to access into the field. Public goods are often associated with economies of scale. For public goods, the more people are used, the more cost-effective, that is, the larger the scale, the lower the unit cost. China’s population size and large market, coupled with the financial support brought by high savings rate, combined with the government’s input and guidance, China was able to invest heavily in infrastructure construction and other fields in the past. On the contrary, with a “multispeed” and “fragmented” Central and Eastern Europe, the mechanized cooperation between China and CEE countries needs to adapt to such changes. The diversity of the economy, culture, and geopolitics within CEE countries, which has become an important internal factor challenging the cooperation between China and CEE countries.

1

Mackinder (1904).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Gu, Frustrated Relations?, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3730-1_2

25

26

2 Heterogeneity: Internal Dimensions among Central and Eastern …

2.1 Central and Eastern Europe: A Brief Historical Perspective The concept of Central and Eastern Europe is complex in itself. The geographical meaning of Central and Eastern Europe and the research meaning are not the same by these countries. Additionally, although Central and Eastern European countries have commonalities, their geographical locations and geopolitical situations are not the same, and there are also significant differences in ethnicity, religion, and historical development. Arguably, the definition of CEE countries can vary in different contexts and perspectives. The history of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe is ancient and diverse, as this region has witnessed the rise and fall of numerous empires, kingdoms, and republics. Even in ancient times, Central and Eastern Europe served as a crossroads for several important civilizations. Around 1,000 BC, the Celts and Illyrians established their own kingdoms on this land. However, the expansion of the Roman Empire led to the decline of these kingdoms. In the 4th century AD, the Roman Empire split into the Western Roman Empire and the Eastern Roman Empire, with the latter incorporating Central and Eastern Europe into its domain. Subsequently, the Visigoths, Huns, and other nomadic tribes entered the region, bringing about cultural and political changes. During the 9th to 10th centuries, Slavic people began migrating to Central and Eastern Europe, gradually forming their own settlements and kingdoms. One of the most famous Slavic states was the Great Moravia, established in the late 9th century, but it only lasted for a short 76 years. Meanwhile, in the Bohemia region, the Czechs established the Kingdom of Bohemia, which existed for over 700 years and reached its peak in the 14th century. In the later medieval period, the region of Central and Eastern Europe faced threats from the Mongol Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The Mongol invasions led to the decline of some Slavic states, while the expansion of the Ottoman Empire posed a threat to the Christian world. During this period, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth emerged as one of the largest countries in Central and Eastern Europe, uniting the territories of Poland and Lithuania and establishing a multi-ethnic federal system. During the 16th to 17th centuries, the region of Central and Eastern Europe became a battleground for the Protestant Reformation. The ideas of the Reformation spread rapidly and led to conflicts between Catholicism and Protestantism. The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) was one of the most significant conflicts of this period, impacting the entirety of Europe. Additionally, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth reached its zenith during this time, becoming a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state. In the late 18th to early 19th centuries, the influence of the Napoleonic Wars extended to the Central and Eastern European region. Napoleon’s conquests resulted in territorial rearrangements of many countries, shattering the old order. Simultaneously, the emerging wave of nationalism flourished throughout Europe, and nationalist movements began to rise in Central and Eastern Europe. This period witnessed independence movements in countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Czechia.

2.1 Central and Eastern Europe: A Brief Historical Perspective

27

In relations to the above, the social development of countries in Central and Eastern Europe was shrouded in the shadow of great powers in the modern era. It could even be argued that major issues such as the survival of the national states in the region were determined by powers. The various groups in Central and Eastern Europe were only able to comply and accept their fate, lacking the power to resist. Thus, the existence of national states in the modern era of Central and Eastern Europe was the result of bargaining among major powers in the aftermath of wars. The 20th century in Central and Eastern Europe was a period marked by tragedy and conflict. Serbia became a target of the Central Powers at the beginning of World War I due to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in the Sarajevo incident, which served as the trigger for the war. However, Serbia successfully resisted the Austrian Empire’s attacks and expanded its territory during the war. Ultimately, Serbia emerged as the core of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia following the victory of the Allies. Poland, prior to World War I, was partitioned and did not exist as an independent nation, being divided among three neighboring powers—the AustroHungarian Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Kingdom of Prussia. During World War I, the Polish territory became a battlefield on the Eastern Front. With the collapse of the Russian Empire, the Polish independence movement gained an opportunity for development. In 1918, Poland regained its independence and established the Second Polish Republic. Romania maintained neutrality at the outset of World War I but later joined the Allied Powers. Romania’s entry into the war provided support for the Allied Southeastern European front and aimed to regain the territories occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, Romania’s war effort experienced a series of setbacks and conflicts. Ultimately, a ceasefire agreement was reached with the Allies following the conclusion of World War I. After the conclusion of the World War I, several new nation-states emerged on the territories recovered from Germany, Austria–Hungary, and Russia with the support of the Allied Powers. New countries such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary came into being. The Czechs and Slovaks declared the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic in October 1918. Meanwhile, the South Slavic nations of Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia established the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Hungary’s situation was somewhat unique as it declared independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October 1918 and established the Hungarian Soviet Republic in March of the following year, but this was short-lived as it was replaced by a military dictatorship under Admiral Horthy Miklós. It is important to note that the territories of these newly formed ethnic nations were defined by the Treaty of Versailles. World War I caused immense destruction and turmoil in Central and Eastern European countries. The war led to the dissolution of empires, territorial reconfigurations, and the reshaping of borders. However, these countries were subjected to aggression and occupation by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during World War II. Central and Eastern European countries once again became significant battlegrounds during the global conflict, experiencing profound transformations, conflicts, and devastation. World War II inflicted tremendous damage and casualties on Central and Eastern European countries. Many nations endured occupation and atrocities. Nevertheless, the war also presented an opportunity for many countries in the region to

28

2 Heterogeneity: Internal Dimensions among Central and Eastern …

strive for independence and liberation, fostering numerous resistance movements. As the World War II was coming to an end, the Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and the democratic Germany that had been divided from Germany were incorporated into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and became the Eastern European nations in the geopolitical context, while Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were merged into the Soviet Union and became the Republics of the Union. In the subsequent years, the Soviet Union forced the Eastern European nations to adopt its socialist development model and “hardly separated” from the Western capitalist social development model, while the foreign relations of these countries were tightly bound to the Soviet Union. Although there were valiant struggles of the people led by Communist Party leaders against the fascist forces, in general, the adoption of the Soviet-style socialist path and alliance with the Soviet Union was not a result of the autonomous choice of these nations, but rather a consequence of the Yalta system. Therefore, their departure from the Western model and the West was unwilling, and their entry into the Soviet model and the Soviet Union was also unwilling. However, within the framework of the Yalta system, they were powerless to change this reality, and their subtle “soft connection” with Western Europe could only be hidden in their hearts. It was not until 1989 that Central and Eastern European countries gained the chance for independence and democracy. The Eastern European revolutions and the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the socialist system. This period witnessed the Solidarity movement in Poland, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, and the democratization processes in other nations. Consequently, following the cessation of the Soviet Union, the former Eastern European states (including those with unchanged national structures and newly independent states), as well as the newly independent Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, abandoned the Soviet model in their pursuit of social development and aimed to “return to Europe”. Central and Eastern European countries actively seek EU membership and have gained economic, political, and social development support through joining the EU. Accession to the EU enables these countries to integrate into the process of European integration, enjoy the benefits of the European market, and engage in broader cooperation and resources. Meanwhile, the United States, through the Marshall Plan, also provided economic assistance to post-war reconstruction in Europe, including Central and Eastern European countries. This aid helped these countries with reconstruction and economic development.

2.2 Political Images of Central and Eastern European Countries Heterogeneity, as a commonly used term, means: (a) different; unlike; incongruous; (b) composed of parts of different kinds; having widely dissimilar elements or constituents.2 It refers to a proper term in the field of biological genetics, as opposed to homogeneity, which refers to the lack of common characteristics of substances. 2

McIntosh (2013).

2.2 Political Images of Central and Eastern European Countries

29

Professor Daniel W. Bromley explains the existence of political heterogeneity in his book The Economic Interests, and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundation of Public Policy.3 The primary point discussed by in the book is that economic reasons cause political heterogeneity. However, unfortunately, the author did not give a precise definition of political heterogeneity. Trond Vedeld argues that in the Village Politics: Heterogeneity, Leadership and Collective Action, the political heterogeneity in which there is limited support for the authority structure.4 Also, Kolle discussed the role of heterogeneity from the perspective of cooperation.5 The author believes that the cause of heterogeneity comes from its capability and valuation. The reason for promoting collective action does not come from the heterogeneity itself, but the level of supply of public goods. Therefore, in connection with the related concepts in political science, the author acknowledges that in contrast to homogeneity, heterogeneity in international cooperation refers to the division of fixed and unchangeable standards among different countries in cooperation. These criteria mainly include religion, race, ethnicity, language. It deems that the heterogeneity in international cooperation has the following characteristics, members in cooperation have high loyalty to their respective groups. Religions, languages, races, and cultures are all essential social criteria. In general, the constituent members cannot choose according to their wishes. Moreover, the sense of identity is formed in a long-term process. In line with the above definition, it outlines the current state of heterogeneity in Central and Eastern Europe from the following significant aspects: geopolitics, territory and population, economic development, religion, and international participation. Geopolitically, there is no strict description of the region by “Central and Eastern Europe”. Firstly, Eastern Europe, which is a concept existed during the Cold War, it refers to the eight European countries that were closely associated with the Soviet Union and its socialist system after World War II in Europe: Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. After the end of the Cold War, Berlin Wall was brought down. Czechoslovakia was dissolute by Velvet Divorce, and Yugoslavia broke up into six countries. As thus, with Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, a total of thirteen countries (excluding Kosovo) were called as Central and Eastern European countries. Of course, what China refers to as the “Central and Eastern European countries” is, in addition to the above thirteen countries, as well as the Baltic countries and Greece (Fig. 2.1). Regarding the distribution of beliefs, there are also substantial differences between Central and Eastern European countries. The nationalities and religions of the CEE countries cultural ownership have their priorities. The main religions in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia are Catholicism and Protestantism. The main religions in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro are Orthodox Christians. Albania and Bosnia 3

Bromley (1991). Vedeld (2000). 5 Kölle (2015). 4

30

2 Heterogeneity: Internal Dimensions among Central and Eastern …

Fig. 2.1 Geographical location of Central and European countries

and Herzegovina are three kinds of religions coexisting, but most people believe in Muslim (Table 2.1). The participation of Central and Eastern European countries in international organizations (or systems) is not the same simultaneously. Among the current Central and Eastern European countries, there are seven eurozone countries, 12 EU member states (Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are Candidate Countries, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are Potential Candidates). Also, 15 countries are NATO members (Bosnia and Herzegovina joins the Membership Action Plan of NATO) (Table 2.2). The above overview of the heterogeneity in CEE countries also needs to be based on their immanent factors (independent variables). After a fundamental transformation of their whole system, the CEE countries adopt the new political institution, that is, the separation of powers, parliamentary, and multiparty system. Kornai refers that the capitalist operation has gradually been consummated, although the transition from the Stalinist model to the present has lasted over decades.6 Moreover, after that, missions of shaping and consolidating democratic institutions consequently. While discussing the heterogeneity, it needs to recognize the latest situation in Europe, when it comes to the political transition or even deeper the level of democracy. In recent years, in Europe, Britain has approved its withdrawal from the EU, and 6

Kornai (1992).

2.2 Political Images of Central and Eastern European Countries

31

Table 2.1 Major religious beliefs in CEE countries Country

Catholicism

Albania

16.7

Orthodox 6.8

Muslim 58.8

Bosnia and Herzegovina

15.4

33.2

50.7

Bulgaria

0.8

59.4

11.1

Croatia

3.8

85.5

1.5

Czech Republic

10.3

0.5

0.1

Estonia

< 0.1

16.2

0.8

Greece

0.5

81.1

0.5

Hungary

37.2

11.6

0.3

Latvia

< 0.1

19.8

0.3

Lithuania

< 0.1

4.1

0.2

Macedonia, FYR

3.2

64.8

33.3

Montenegro

3.4

72.1

19.1

Poland

87.2

0.6

0.1

Romania

4.7

86.8

0.3

Serbia

4.1

84.5

10

Slovak Republic

62

0.6

0.1

Slovenia

57.8

2.4

< 0.1

Note that the percentages may not add up to exactly 100 due to rounding or the presence of other religious groups not included in the table Source The author collected the information from World religion database, and discussed with Professor Kong Fanjun in 2018

Table 2.2 International organizations membership status of CEE countries Country

AL

BA

BG

CZ

Eurozone

×

×

EU

× √

×

× √

× √

√

√

NATO Country Eurozone EU NATO

LV √ √ √

×

EE √

GR √

HR √

√

√

√

× √

√

√

√

√

ME

MK

PL

RO

RS

×

× × √

× √

×

× √

× √ √

√

× ×

HU

SI √

LT √ √ √ SK √

√

√

√

√

Source Summarized by the author

many right-wing parties have risen in this continent. Moreover, in Poland, Hungary introduced a series of retrogression policies, whether these will impact the “third wave” by Samuel Huntington it requires further observation and judgment.7 7

Huntington (1993), Kong (2019).

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2 Heterogeneity: Internal Dimensions among Central and Eastern …

Czech political scientist Pavel Machonin has put forward five factors on the political heterogeneity in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the transition.8 First and foremost, the contradiction between the original privileged and the new class during the transition period is one of the leading senses of the current heterogeneity. The differences reflect the productivity of the privileged and the new strata; that is, it transferred from an internal factor to an external extension. Second, because of the disparity between the gaps resulting from the expansion of wage inequality, especially after 1989, 18–25% of workers were beneficiaries, while 25–30% of workers fell to the bottom as a result of poverty and exclusion.9 The egalitarianism of the essential social equilibrium disappeared, and then it evolved into inequality of income, of course, it is undeniable that the egalitarianism is slightly artificial to some extent. Thirdly, the division between extremists, authoritarianists, and bureaucracies regard as an update of the opposition between traditionalism and Westernism. Authoritarianism emphasizes nationalism, and status of the state in history, it against abortion, and advocates religious beliefs. Fourth, supporters of the EU and those who doubt the EU not come to a consensus, and most of the EU supporters are in favor of the postmodernism. Those who are skeptical about the EU are more likely to miss the egalitarianism of the previous socialist period. Moreover, there are still differences between ethnic minorities. Thus, as a crucial reason for the heterogeneity of the Central and Eastern European countries after 1989 is the social stratification of the Soviet socialist system that lasted nearly half a century. The dominant egalitarianism prompted the lack of identity stratification, education, and property, and of course, the conflict of different interests. French scholar François Bafoil once proposed the “center-edge” theory of heterogeneity in Central and Eastern Europe.10 Center and edge are the poles that determine the structure. From sovereignty, an essential indicator of polarization of political parties, each political party is based on this guideline or alliance with an external center. Alternatively, even try to reconstruct the position of the center by the national dimension, which emerges in the different historical environment. It encourages the supporters of authoritarianism and liberalism who tend to interfere with the state and the people who are inclined to the market. In the context of specific circumstances, liberals and the former Communists may reach an alliance, as an opposing sovereign supremacist and religious fundamentalist to preserve national values. For example, Kuzio reports that Poland, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, the former Communist Party and the Bulgarian Orthodox supporters’ alliance, or the Czech Communist Party alliance with its opposition.11 However, for present Europe, the division of geopolitics is also based on the “center-edge” axis, the extreme political parties in CEE countries and populist parties through the liberalism, cosmopolitanism, the European Union and, for example, Polish criticism to the Social Democratic Party.

8

Machonin (1997). De Waele et al. (2002). 10 Bafoil (2006). 11 Kuzio (2008). 9

2.3 Levels of Economic Gaps

33

Heterogeneity, which still exists in its process of integration, despite its frequent goals and general process. For example, the big gap between the Central European countries and the Balkan countries, particularly the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the political development process.12 The countries gained membership realized the peaceful transfer of power between political parties, it consolidated parliamentary and multiparty systems, but for countries that had not yet joined the European Union, even the political situation is still not stable enough in some countries. These are the specific problems in the process of cooperation between China with central and eastern European countries.

2.3 Levels of Economic Gaps It has been more than decades since the signing of the Treaty of Accession in the case of Central and Eastern European countries, the heterogeneity of development is inevitable, and the integration of political system and society is a long process. For the heterogeneity of the CEE countries and the resulting growth effect, the past from the perspective of economic integration defines by the five stages, namely free trade zone, customs union, common market, economic union, and complete economic integration. Most of the CEE countries are small countries in relative terms, and most countries cannot provide public goods in such group. According to the data from World Bank until 2022, CEE countries have significant differences regarding population and surface area and economic development. As shown in Table 2.3, in 2022, the GDP of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe is 2037.7 billion US dollars, accounting for 2.14% of the world total. The population is 0.13 billion, accounting for 1.63% of the world’s total population. The four countries of Visegrad (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) accounted for 48.87% population of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and 36.45% of land area, 57.27% of GDP in the CEE countries. The economic scale of Central and Eastern European countries varies significantly, ranging from the largest economies like Poland and Romania to smaller ones like Slovenia and Estonia, resulting in substantial differences in GDP and per capita income among these nations. Over the past few decades, some Central and Eastern European countries have achieved rapid economic growth, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, while others have experienced slower development, like Croatia and Bulgaria. Additionally, there are notable disparities in terms of resource and energy dependence: certain countries in the region possess abundant resources and energy reserves, such as Poland’s coal and Hungary’s natural gas, while others are relatively lacking in these aspects. From the perspective of GDP, among the six countries in Central and Eastern Europe with a GDP exceeding 100 billion US dollars, they are Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Greece, Hungary, and Slovakia. Except for

12

Bayou et al. (2006), Kong (2018).

34

2 Heterogeneity: Internal Dimensions among Central and Eastern …

Table 2.3 Population, territory and GDP information of CEE countries (2022) Country

Population total

Surface area (km2 )

GDP, current USD (in billion)

GDP per capita, current USD

Albania

2,831,741

28,748

16.1

5678

Bosnia and Herzegovina

3,186,448

51,197

18.1

4707

Bulgaria

6,951,482

110,994

67.7

8252

Croatia

4,058,165

56,542

62.9

15,809

Czech Republic 10,746,468

78,867

267.1

23,425

Estonia

1,315,707

45,227

33.2

23,399

Greece

10,701,345

131,957

191.4

19,059

Hungary

9,769,518

93,028

174.6

16,140

Latvia

1,895,146

64,589

34.4

15,394

Lithuania

2,729,383

65,300

55.4

19,389

North Macedonia

2,081,826

25,713

13.6

5597

628,960

13,812

5.8

8691

Poland

37,726,551

312,696

614.2

15,726

Romania

12,656

Montenegro

19,474,097

238,391

264.7

Serbia

8,709,838

77,474

49.8

7523

Slovakia

5,472,799

49,035

111.1

21,038

Slovenia

2,105,593

20,273

57.6

29,895

Source World Bank open data

Montenegro with a GDP of less than 6 billion US dollars, other countries are between 10 billion US dollars and 70 billion US dollars. Looking at the GDP per capita data, there are 11 countries in Central and Eastern Europe with a GDP over 10,000 USD. Apart from Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Greece, which are relatively large in terms of size, the rest have a small total GDP. It can be said that despite the economic growth and development in Central and Eastern European countries, their GDP is indeed lower compared to some other European nations. Historically, these countries were once part of the socialist system and underwent a process of economic transition. During this period of transition, some countries faced difficulties and instability, which impacted their economic growth. Additionally, some countries have relatively mono-structured economies, overly reliant on certain specific industries, which might limit economic diversification and sustainable development.

2.4 Differences in “Return to Europe”

35

2.4 Differences in “Return to Europe” Central and Eastern European countries have a rich history and profound cultural traditions, but the degree of their historical connections and separations varies among them. Some countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, were once part of powerful kingdoms or empires on the European continent, and they have had close historical ties with other European countries. The level of their reintegration into Europe is relatively high, and they possess a deep understanding and identification with European culture, values, and institutions. Additionally, these countries have experienced similar political system transitions in history, transitioning from communist regimes to democracy and market economies, which has facilitated their alignment with the European mainstream. On the other hand, some Central and Eastern European countries have had less historical connections with other regions in Europe and might be considered “peripheral” countries. For example, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have long been under the influence of Russia and the Soviet Union, leading to relatively weaker historical ties with other European countries. As a result, the level of their reintegration into Europe might be lower, and they may focus more on shaping their independent identities, with a lower degree of identification with Europe as a whole. During the communist era, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were almost part of the Soviet Union or the Eastern Bloc, and experienced similar social systems. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these countries embarked on political and economic system transformations, moving towards democratic and market-oriented development. Some countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, successfully completed their institutional transitions, adopting multiparty systems and market economies, which facilitated their reintegration into the European mainstream. These countries actively engaged in cooperation with the European Union and other international organizations, strengthening their ties with other European nations. However, other countries, like Croatia and Bulgaria, faced difficulties and challenges during their transition process. Political instability and lagging economic reforms may have slowed down their path to rejoining Europe. These nations require more time and effort to advance political and economic reforms and further integrate themselves into the European mainstream. As Professor Kong Hanbing (fanjun) once discussed the political and economic transition of Eastern European countries, he argued that Dahrendorf in his article “Has the East Joined the West?” that “it takes six months to establish new political institutions, draft a new constitution and election law, six years to establish a fundamentally viable market economy, and sixty years to build a civil society”.13 For the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Dahrendorf’s words may be somewhat exaggerated, but the time difference in the political, economic, and diplomatic transformations of these countries is objectively present. The political transition away from the Soviet model was relatively short, and it could even be said to have been accomplished during the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the process of collapse, these countries quickly 13

Dahrendorf (1990).

36

2 Heterogeneity: Internal Dimensions among Central and Eastern …

implemented a parliamentary system, established a new political system through the constitution, and held multiparty elections. Economic transformation mainly occurred through privatization and marketization, but due to different initial conditions, some countries adopted radical “shock therapy”, while others took a gradual approach. Therefore, over time, in terms of “Returning to Europe”, there are significant internal differences in the economic size and development level among Central and Eastern European countries. Some countries, such as Poland and Romania, have a larger economic scale and higher per capita income, making them the economic engines of the region. These countries have achieved rapid economic growth over the past few decades, with substantial industrial upgrades and technological innovations, leading to an increase in their status and influence within Europe. As a result, they are better positioned for cooperation with other regions in Europe and integration into the European economic system. On the other hand, some Balkan countries have experienced relatively slower economic development and face more challenges. These countries may be overly reliant on certain specific industries, leading to a relatively monotonous economic structure that renders them vulnerable in the global economic competition. For instance, some countries might heavily depend on traditional industries like coal and heavy manufacturing while lacking the development of emerging industries and technologies, which restricts their economic diversification and sustainability.

2.5 Diversified in Security Perceptions The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict that began on February 24, 2022, have continuously stimulated the security needs of Central and Eastern European countries. For the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, considerations regarding security interests are not uniform. Due to different interests, histories, and geographical locations, there is still room for diversification in security strategies and concepts among Central and Eastern European countries. In terms of the level of military threats, some countries in the region, especially those sharing borders with Russia or having close geopolitical ties, face evident military threats from Russia. Particularly, due to the Russian military aggression against Ukraine in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and NATO’s eastern flank countries represented by Poland can perceive Russia’s military activities in their neighboring regions. On the other hand, some other Central and Eastern European countries, although not directly facing military threats, still feel the impact of regional instability and conflicts. They may be concerned that the turbulence in neighboring areas could have spill-over effects on their security and stability. In terms of regional cooperation and collective defense, some Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland and Romania, have chosen to join NATO to ensure their own security. Through cooperation with NATO allies, these countries seek to enhance regional collective defense capabilities and obtain more security

2.5 Diversified in Security Perceptions

37

guarantees. On the other hand, some other Central and Eastern European countries may be more inclined to develop cooperation frameworks within the region to strengthen mutual trust and collaboration. The recent Russo-Ukrainian conflict is still a clear example, including countries like the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where there might be some internal differences on how to deal with Russia, but at the national policy level, they fully align with NATO and the United States. Hungary, for example, does not provide weapons to Ukraine nor allows other countries to directly transport weapons to Ukraine through its territory, but it still agrees to host NATO troops on its territory. It can be said that these different security perspectives still exist, just like in the case of Serbia, facing strong external pressures from the EU and other powers. In such a situation, many political leaders may not be able to choose a more balanced and independent security strategy as they used to. However, in reality, the NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe is not one of equal cooperation.The “border countries” in Central and Eastern Europe continuously express and reinforce their loyalty to NATO in order to obtain security guarantees. For example, the Baltic states, are particularly sensitive due to their geographical location, as they have longer borders in direct contact with Russia, making them more susceptible to the direct impact of Russia’s military activities on their security. These countries have a deep historical awareness of potential threats from Russia, as they were formerly under Soviet rule, especially need to establish an image of “European countries” rather than “Eurasian countries” through external behavior toward the EU and NATO.14 These nations are located in close proximity to Russia and are directly exposed to potential military threats from the neighboring country. This need for taking sides becomes more apparent when Russia’s relationship with the EU or the United States is in conflict. The outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and Russia’s military activities in its surrounding regions have further intensified the security concerns of these countries. Therefore, they attach great importance to cooperation with NATO to strengthen regional collective defense capabilities. By joining NATO, they can collectively respond to security threats from Russia alongside other NATO allies and receive security assurances from the alliance. The deployment of NATO troops and military exercises within their territories also demonstrates NATO’s commitment to enhancing regional defense, which helps bolster the confidence of these countries in terms of security. Furthermore, besides military threats, Central and Eastern European countries also face a series of non-traditional security challenges. Due to differences in geographical location and the international situation, these countries exhibit significant variations in dealing with immigration and refugee issues. Particularly since the RussoUkrainian conflict, some countries, like Poland, share direct borders with Ukraine and serve as the main gateway for war refugees entering Europe. Among the Central and Eastern European countries, the distribution of refugees varies greatly in terms of economic capacity, and the substantial costs of hosting refugees pose new challenges. Take Poland as an example, being the European Union member state that receives the highest number of Ukrainian refugees. Not only has it urgently appealed to the 14

Vilson (2015), Hutt (2022).

38

2 Heterogeneity: Internal Dimensions among Central and Eastern …

European Commission for assistance and requested the EU to fairly distribute the responsibility of receiving refugees, but it has also canceled subsidies to families that host Ukrainian refugees. The substantial influx of refugees has strained the resources and capacities of certain countries, impacting their economies and social structures. The issue of immigration and refugee management reflects the complexity of the non-traditional security challenges faced by Central and Eastern European countries. The varying capacities of each country to handle such challenges may lead to differences in policy approaches and cooperation with international organizations in addressing these issues.

2.6 Concluding Remarks The development of relations and cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries is an important component of China’s “Belt and Road” top-level strategy. Understanding the internal heterogeneity of Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the differences within these countries, and observing the relationship and role of cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European countries from the perspective of China’s global strategic framework are prerequisites for the effective operation of China’s cooperation with these countries. The economic development, historical and cultural backgrounds, and religious beliefs vary among the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Especially after the Cold War, these countries have chosen different development models. Central and Eastern European countries are not a political organization like the European Union. Therefore, when cooperating with these countries, China needs to consider their commonalities and also cater to their respective development needs. Based on this, a pattern of coordinated cooperation with different emphases should be formed. Some countries in Central and Eastern Europe are relatively developed, while others have lower levels of development. Some are EU members, while others are non-EU countries. These differences determine that China will face different issues and challenges in cooperation with different countries, and the modes and fields of cooperation will also vary. Therefore, in the future process of cooperation, it is necessary to further strengthen top-level design, take into account the diversity among the countries, categorize policies, design different cooperation models, and plan different areas of cooperation, in order to enhance the overall effectiveness of the cooperation.

References Bafoil, F. (2006). Europe centrale et orientale: Mondialisation, européanisation et changement social/François Bafoil. Presses de Sciences po. Paris. http://mediatheques.collectivitedemartini que.mq/BDP/doc/SYRACUSE/285989/europe-centrale-et-orientale-mondialisation-europeani sation-et-changement-social-francois-bafoil

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Bayou, C., Blaha, J., Lhomel, É., & Potel, J.-Y. (2006). Populisme et extrémisme en Europe centrale et balte. Le Courrier Des Pays De L’est, 1054(2), 27–43. https://doi.org/10.3917/cpe.062.0027 Bromley, D. W. (1991). Environment and economy: Property rights and public policy. Environment and economy: Property rights and public policy. https://www.cabdirect.org/cabdirect/abstract/ 19921898862 Dahrendorf, R. (1990). Has the east joined the west? New Perspectives Quarterly, 7(2), 41–43. De Waele, J.-M., Drweski, B., Gueorguieva, P., Kanev, D., Levrat, N., Márkus, G., Medina Lockhart, P., Novak, M., Roger, A., Seiler, D.-L., Soare, S., & Vandermotten, C. (Eds.). (2002). Partis politiques et démocratie en Europe centrale et orientale. Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/24508 Eggert, K. (2021, May 4). Lithuania’s challenge to China is risky, but clever. Dw.Com. https:// www.dw.com/en/opinion-lithuanias-challenge-to-china-is-risky-but-clever/a-57071394 Garding, S. E. (2022). Romania: An overview. Congressional Research Service. Hegedüs, D. (n.d.). Why Central and Eastern Europe will matter for the Biden administration. GMFUS. Retrieved February 20, 2023, from https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-central-and-eas tern-europe-will-matter-biden-administration House, T. W. (2022, February 24). Remarks by President Biden on Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ speeches-remarks/2022/02/24/remarks-by-president-biden-on-russias-unprovoked-and-unjust ified-attack-on-ukraine/ Huntington, S. P. (1993). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (Nachdr.). University of Oklahoma Press. Hutt, D. (2022, July 20). How European countries stand on 2% of GDP defence spending. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/07/20/how-european-countries-standon-2-of-gdp-defence-spending Kolle, F. (2015). Heterogeneity and cooperation: the role of capability and valuation on public goods provision. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 109, 120–134. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.11.009 Kong, H. (2018). The Heterogeneity and Complicacy of the Eastern Central Europe and the “Precise Correspondence” of China-CEE Cooperation. Social Sciences Academic Press (Cina). Kong, T. (2019). Thirty-Year Economic Transition of CEE Countries: lnstitutional Change and Performance. Journal of Eurasian Economy, 03, 1–27. https://kns.cnki.net/kcms2/article/abs tract?v=3uoqIhG8C44YLTlOAiTRKibYlV5Vjs7iLik5jEcCI09uHa3oBxtWoHpr5B67XVp zrMT3G6qfrOav8cdffx024gdnepNG1F8A&uniplatform=NZKPT Kornai, J. (1992). The socialist system: The political economy of communism (Repr). Clarendon Press. Kuzio, T. (2008). Comparative perspectives on communist successor parties in Central-Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 41(4), 397–419. https://www. jstor.org/stable/48609624 Machonin, P. (1997). Social transformation and modernization: On building theory of societal changes in the post-communist European countries (1. vyd ed.). Sociologické nakladatelství. Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The geographical pivot of history. McIntosh, C., & Cambridge University Press (Eds.). (2013). Cambridge advanced learner’s dictionary: With CD-ROM (4th ed.). Cambridge University Press. NATO 2022—Strategic concept. (n.d.). Retrieved February 20, 2023, from https://www.nato.int/str ategic-concept/ O’Hanlon, M. E. (2022, June 21). Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strengthening-theus-and-nato-defense-postures-in-europe-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ Paulauskas, A. (2004). Lithuania’s new foreign policy. Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 13–14, 7–16. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=174904

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Poland to ramp up defense budget to 4% of GDP. (2023, January 30). Dw.Com. https://www.dw. com/en/poland-to-ramp-up-defense-budget-to-4-of-gdp/a-64555544 Vedeld, T. (2000). Village politics: Heterogeneity, leadership and collective action. The Journal of Development Studies, 36(5), 105–134. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380008422648 Vilson, M. (2015). The foreign policy of the Baltic states and the Ukrainian crisis: A case of Europeanization? New Perspectives, 23(2), 49–76. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26470109

Chapter 3

Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

Central and Eastern European countries are not a strategic entity, China with the CEE countries are now facing the problem of “one to CEE”, and CEE countries cannot be consistent with their policy toward China. Moreover, for the relationship between China and the EU, China cannot play as a member state or even a power to arrange these CEE countries as a political group. Secondly, although China improves relations with countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Serbia in economic and trade cooperation recent years, however, regarding bilateral trade, there is still a significant gap for both trade volume and bilateral ties that show an asymmetry status regarding economic cooperation. So, whether it is possible to achieve asymmetric sustainable cooperation or not? The “China-CEEC” framework is a relatively new cooperation format initiated by China with CEE countries in 2012. Since its formation, the “China-CEEC” mechanism makes some progress in strengthening dialogue and cooperation between China and CEE countries. The heads of state of the member countries meet annually, and each meeting results in a list of guidelines. While the above initiatives make so far, it is not difficult to trace that in China and the CEE countries, the significant differences in the countries among the CEE bring the complexity of interaction. For example, in terms of positive economic results, it is worth mentioning infrastructure projects in the Western Balkans, indisputably the region needs infrastructural development, and thus Chinese interest in this field is welcome. The projects are mostly reliant on Chinese capital, i.e., credit and loans. Such capital is generally easier to get from China than from the EU or IMF. While for China, a positive effect is the expanding trade surplus with Central and Eastern European countries, including exports of products and manufacturing capacities.1 But this trade deficit is a significant problem for Central and Eastern European countries. In addition, there are many non-significant Chinese investments and mergers and acquisitions. When it comes to infrastructure projects, Chinese proposals are based on credit from its policy banks, with requests for sovereign guarantees, and 1

Szczudlik (2018).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Gu, Frustrated Relations?, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3730-1_3

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3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

implementation by Chinese workforce and contractors. The credit may increase the host country’s public debt. Those concerns, known as China’s debt trap diplomacy,2 as well as projects that are not always economically justifiable, are the reasons for EU criticism of China’s economic engagement. Furthermore, there are concerns that China’s involvement with CEE’s non-EU countries might pull those countries away from the EU.3 Therefore, the development of China’s relations with CEE countries now is facing opportunities and challenges simultaneously. The asymmetry of bilateral cooperation requires China to optimize its policies on CEE countries for further development. This chapter will analyze the bilateral asymmetric relations in the context of “ChinaCEEC” cooperation mechanism and discuss how China cooperates with Central and Eastern European countries in this situation.

3.1 Asymmetric Cooperation in a Changing Context The various perspectives on the international politics offer the different perspectives of the asymmetric power. Therefore, most of the international cooperation must be asymmetric cooperation as well. The most direct consequence by thus asymmetric cooperation should be the asymmetry of cooperative benefits distribution, as long as there is no denying the zero-sum status in the competition of international relations. Olson in his Logic of Collective Action points out that the common interest does not necessarily generate the cooperation.4 In the context of normal circumstances, as a country develops rapidly, it also forms large interest groups. These large interest groups gradually transform into wealth distribution groups rather than wealth-producing groups. That is to say, they only consider self-interest and seek to maximize their share of total wealth. Such a free-riding would result in ignoring the overall interests of the state. Therefore, is it possible to reach a partnership without the equal power of both parties? In a broad sense, cooperation is a ubiquitous phenomenon in human society, there is no lack of allies in the contemporary international politics, but the ultimate goal of the alliance is balancing of power, the emphasis of which is still the conflict. It can explore from the Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History by Joseph Nye and David Welch.5 The core concept of international relations theory is power, and the definition of power as the ability to change people’s behavior implies potential conflicts; it causes the study of international relations more inclines to discuss power competition. In Keohane and Nye’s

2

Montenegro is an example with its debt of about 80% of the GDP. Benner et al. (2018). 4 Olson (1971). 5 Nye and Welch (2016). 3

3.1 Asymmetric Cooperation in a Changing Context

43

Power and Interdependence,6 they explain how to generate power in interdependence, and on the other hand, they explore the possibility of cooperation from their analysis of interdependence; but finally, it is inevitable that the focus to power and conflict again. In this sense, the incomplete rationality of power makes cooperation divorced from the core field of political science. Chinese scholar Sun Jie once argued the critical difference between the international relations and economics in the concept of power and interests that economics is what fundamentally individualistic, so collectivism is only an option to maximize individualistic utility. Therefore, in the view of economics, there is no conflict between individual interests, so while others are pursuing their utility maximization, it does not necessarily take effect in most cases. Pareto improvement is the typical expression of this explanation.7 The process of China’s opening up and participation in globalization is a clear example: as long as it can gain more benefits and faster development than self-reliance, or even paying a few costs is also worth it. However, regarding international politics, because the power itself is zero-sum, and growth of one party’s power must necessarily mean the weakening of the power of the other. Therefore, international relations studies explore more conflicts. This view expresses by Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics.8 In case of international politics, as long as interaction exists rather than “Iron Curtain”, there is nothing more than conflicts or cooperation. Cooperation depends on reasonable trade-offs, while conflicts can be opportunistic or limited rational decision outcomes. Conflicts among the balance of power result in internecine conflicts; moreover, in the context of asymmetric status is even more apparent. In the sense of probability, as long as the outcome of the conflict can expect, the occurrence of the conflict is always opportunistic or limited rationality. Also, if there is no cooperation, enmity will not stop if the war is caused by the military conflict. It is undeniable that cooperation itself brings conflict, but the consequences of conflict are led to cooperation by rational cognition. Cooperation can be either explicit or implicit, formal or informal. Even if cooperation is rational, it may replace by conflicts at any time, as rationality may overwhelm by irrational impulses. Cooperation does not eliminate conflicts. Nevertheless, with deepening cooperation may increase the cost of conflict. In this sense, the fostering of cooperation continually enhances conflict resolution, thereby reducing the likelihood of future conflicts. Although cooperation is rational, due to the asymmetries in the contemporary world, equally cooperation is doomed to be an ideal state. So, not only power generates in interdependence, but it also generates in cooperation, so cooperation and power to some extent can coexist, even hegemony and compromise. Therefore, it is not necessarily equal. The formation of cooperation is based on the relative benefit or absolute benefit balance; moreover, the win–win cooperation is not universal in reality. However, cooperation is only possible due to the asymmetric pursuit of relative benefit and absolute benefit between the two sides. Furthermore, in the case of 6

Keohane and Nye (1977). Keohane (2005). 8 Mearsheimer (2014). 7

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3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

the coexistence of the finitely versus infinitely repeated games,9 the dynamic results of cooperation appear new status because of the changes in asymmetric power. The theory of cooperative evolution puts forward the assumption that the two parties are symmetrical.10 However, in the real cooperative system, both sides of the game are almost asymmetric relations of unequal power. If the power of the two sides in the game is not equal, the frequency of conflict between the two sides is closely related to the power. In other words, asymmetry limits the possibility of conflict. That is the higher power contrast between the two sides, the higher frequency of cooperation, and the highest frequency of conflict when the power is equal. So, the asymmetry between interacting groups (or individuals) may be one of the impetus for the evolution of cooperative relationships, and there is no solid pure strategy Nash equilibrium for asymmetric cooperative systems. Therefore, in such a dynamic context, for China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the issue of asymmetry in the cooperation mechanisms between the two sides is increasingly prominent. This asymmetry is manifested in the fact that Central and Eastern European countries are not a strictly unified strategic entity or a political and economic entity, leading to a “one-to-CEE” challenge in bilateral cooperation. Despite the continuous growth in economic and trade cooperation between the two sides, most Central and Eastern European countries are not among China’s top strategic priorities, and vice versa, resulting in a pattern of “economically warm but politically cool” bilateral relations. Additionally, while seeking cooperation with China, Central and Eastern European countries also exhibit significant differences in their policies towards China and their “China views”.

3.2 Asymmetric Nexus in China-CEEC Economic Relations 3.2.1 Economic Cooperation with CEE Countries: Current Status In recent years, the trade between China and Central and Eastern European countries develops rapidly. For example, in 2022, bilateral import and export trade amounted to 142.79 billion USD, which raises 154.6% than 2012, and the share of total trade with CEE countries accounting for China’s total foreign import and export increases from 1.45% in 2012 to 2.26% in 2022. Among them, China’s exports to Central and Eastern Europe countries increased by 161.67% from 42.4 billion USD in 2012 to 110.95 USD billion in 2022. China’s imports from Central and Eastern European countries increased by 132.73% from 13.68 billion USD in 2012 to 31.84 billion USD in 2022 (Fig. 3.1).

9

Kreps et al. (1982). Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Sun (2016).

10

3.2 Asymmetric Nexus in China-CEEC Economic Relations

45

160.00 140.00 120.00 100.00

Unit: billion USD

80.00 60.00 40.00 20.00 0.00

China Exports to CEEC

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

42.40 43.74 47.90 45.83 47.94 54.24 65.69 70.63 75.95 101.58 110.95

China Imports from CEEC 13.68 15.03 16.86 14.36 15.20 18.92 23.60 24.82 27.50 34.60 31.84

Fig. 3.1 Trade between China and CEE countries (2012–2022). Data CEI Network Statistics Database

However, the establishment of the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism, to a certain extent, the economic and trade cooperation between Central and Eastern European countries and China is even closer. For the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Greece, Slovakia, and Romania are China’s major trading partners in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, China is also the largest trading partner of these countries in Asia. In 2022, the total amount of trade between China and six countries is 118.83 billion US dollars, while accounting for 83.22% of the trade volume between China and Central and Eastern European countries. Since 2012, with the gradual improvement of the cooperation mechanism between China and the Central and Eastern European countries, China consolidates its import and export growth with major trading partners in Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of trade relations, the trade volume between China and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe has increased steadily over the past decade, but the growth rates have varied significantly. With the exception of Poland and Czech Republic, the growth in trade with China for other Central and Eastern European countries has been relatively modest. For example, the import and export trade between China and Latvia and Estonia has regressed to the level of a decade ago (Table 3.1). For the product structure, China’s exports to CEE countries, and the main products are mechanical and electrical products, base metals, textiles and raw materials, furniture, toys, and so on. The primary import commodities are mechanical and electrical products, base metals, and transportation equipment. Over the past ten years, the trade structure between China and Central and Eastern European countries is continuously optimized. The proportion of trade in electromechanical and high-tech products exceeds 60%. Local consumers favor both parties’ affordable daily consumer goods. Moreover, its proportion gradually is increasing. Such as, on October 10, 2017, Poland participates in the 14th China International Small and

46

3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

Table 3.1 Comparison of economic and trade situation between China with Central and Eastern European countries CEE-17

Total

Import from CEE

Export to CEE

Comparison Trade

2012

2022

2012

2022

2012

2022

Albania

0.49

0.89

0.14

0.19

0.34

0.70

0.40

0.04

Import

Export 0.36

Bosnia and Herzegovina

0.07

0.31

0.02

0.12

0.05

0.19

0.24

0.10

0.14

Bulgaria

1.89

4.12

0.84

1.27

1.05

2.85

2.23

0.43

1.80

Croatia

1.37

2.42

0.07

0.16

1.30

2.27

1.05

0.08

0.97

Czech Republic

8.73

23.65

2.41

5.42

6.32

18.23

14.92

3.01

11.90

Estonia

1.37

1.25

0.14

0.30

1.23

0.95

− 0.12

0.17

− 0.29

Greece

4.02

13.82

0.43

0.83

3.59

12.99

9.80

0.41

9.39

Hungary

8.06

15.52

2.32

5.05

5.74

10.47

7.46

2.73

4.73

Latvia

1.38

1.40

0.07

0.38

1.31

1.03

0.02

0.31

− 0.29

Lithuania

1.72

1.88

0.09

0.09

1.63

1.79

0.16

0.00

0.16

Montenegro

0.17

0.27

0.02

0.05

0.15

0.22

0.10

0.03

0.07

North Macedonia

0.23

0.41

0.14

0.18

0.09

0.23

0.19

0.04

0.15

Poland Romania

14.38

43.22

2.00

5.06

12.39

38.16

28.84

3.06

25.78

3.78

10.47

0.98

3.07

2.80

7.40

6.69

2.10

4.60

Serbia

0.51

3.55

0.10

1.38

0.41

2.18

3.04

1.27

1.76

Slovakia

6.08

12.15

3.66

7.71

2.42

4.44

6.07

4.05

2.01

Slovenia

1.82

7.45

0.26

0.59

1.57

6.86

5.63

0.33

5.29

Source World Bank open data

Medium Enterprises Expo (SME Expo), CEE countries’ commodities such as beef and mutton, dairy products, and other high-quality agricultural products as well as food, wine, and other products are further enhancing and its exports to China are rising sharply. Also, by the end of 2021, China’s stock of investments in CEE countries is 3.01 billion US dollars, and it is 2.25 times compared with the end of 2012. Poland, the Czech Republic, Serbia, and Hungary are the four major significant destinations for China’s investment in CEEC. By the end of 2021, China’s stock of investment in these four countries up to 1.927 billion US dollars, which accounts for 64% of China’s investment in CEEC over the same period (Table 3.2). Since 2013, China with Central and Eastern European countries successively adopt the Guidelines of Bucharest (2013), Belgrade (2014), Suzhou (2015), Riga (2016), Budapest (2017), Sofia (2018), and Dubrovnik (2019). It takes investment as an important area of bilateral cooperation and promotes the rapid growth of China’s investment in CEE countries. Moreover, China makes significant leaps in

3.2 Asymmetric Nexus in China-CEEC Economic Relations

47

Table 3.2 China’s investment in Central and Eastern European countries in 2012–2021 Year

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Albania

0.004

0.007

0.007

0.007

0.007

0.005

0.006

0.007

0.006

0.005

Bosnia and Herzegovina

0.006

0.006

0.006

0.008

0.009

0.004

0.004

0.017

0.023

0.021

Bulgaria

0.127

0.150

0.170

0.236

0.166

0.250

0.171

0.157

0.156

0.151

Croatia

0.009

0.008

0.012

0.012

0.012

0.039

0.069

0.098

0.253

0.246

Czech republic

0.202

0.205

0.213

0.224

0.228

0.165

0.279

0.287

1.198

0.527

Estonia

0.004

0.004

0.004

0.004

0.004

0.004

0.057

0.063

0.005

0.005

Greece

0.006

0.120

0.121

0.119

0.048

0.182

0.242

0.231

0.126

0.133

Hungary

0.507

0.532

0.556

0.571

0.314

0.328

0.321

0.427

0.342

0.382

Latvia

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.012

0.012

0.017

0.021

Lithuania

0.007

0.012

0.012

0.012

0.015

0.017

0.013

0.010

0.012

0.007

Montenegro

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.004

0.039

0.063

0.085

0.153

0.201

North Macedonia

0.000

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.036

0.021

0.017

0.018

Poland

0.208

0.257

0.329

0.352

0.321

0.406

0.524

0.556

0.682

0.536

Romania

0.161

0.145

0.191

0.365

0.392

0.310

0.305

0.428

0.313

0.220

Serbia

0.006

0.019

0.030

0.050

0.083

0.170

0.271

0.165

0.311

0.482

Slovakia

0.086

0.083

0.128

0.128

0.083

0.083

0.099

0.083

0.083

0.004

Slovenia

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.027

0.027

0.040

0.190

0.047

0.050

Source Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (2012–2021), data for 2022 have not yet been released

investments in the former Yugoslavia countries such as Croatia and Serbia in the fields of machinery, chemicals, telecommunications, logistics, and trade. China has a wide range of investment in Central and Eastern Europe, of which manufacturing investment is mainly concentrated in Poland, Hungary, and other countries. Major investment projects include the acquisition of BorsodChem Chemical Company of Hungary by Yantai Wanhua Industrial Group (2011), Guangxi Liugong Machinery mergers and acquisitions of Poland HSW Engineering Machinery Company (2012), Hubei Tri-Ring Group acquisition of Poland’s largest bearing manufacturer KFLT Bearing Company (2013), Shandong Jinhe Biochemical Group and Anhui Fengyuan Biochemical Company invested about 100 million euros in Hungary Citric acid factory (2014), and so on. Investments in infrastructure and energy sectors are outstanding in recent years in Southeast European countries in the Balkans such as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Since 2013, Chinese enterprises have invested in some projects in Serbia, including the upgrading of the Kostolac coal power plant, the construction of the Morawa Hydropower Station, and the construction of the Pupin Bridge over the Danube (Table 3.3).

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3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

Table 3.3 China’s infrastructure projects invested in Balkans (Portion) Date

Project

Holder

Amount (Billion USD)

2011.1

Zemun-Borca Bridge (SRB)

CRBC

26

2013.5

E-763 Highway (SRB)

Dynamic

33

2013.11

Kostolac Power Station (SRB)

CMEC

71.6

2013.5

Stanari Thermal Power Plant (BIH)

DEC

67.5

2013.11

Highway Project (MKD)

Sinohydro

0.36

2014.12

Moracica Bridge (MNE)

CRBC

11

Source Information collected by the author with Professor Huang Ping and Professor Liu Zuokui during field research

Currently, there have been several model projects that have emerged from the cooperation between China and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, In 2022, significant progress was made in infrastructure projects such as the prioritized section of the Montenegro North-South Highway, the Peljesac Bridge in Croatia, and the steady advancement of the Hungary-Serbia Railway, showcasing highlights of cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries. Simultaneously, countries like Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia have become important channels and destinations for the China-Europe Railway Express. The construction of the China-Europe Land-Sea Express is actively underway, with the Port of Piraeus in Greece ranking among the top Mediterranean ports in terms of throughput. The logistics cooperation between China and countries such as Poland, Slovenia, and Croatia is becoming increasingly close, particularly in the realm of port logistics.

3.2.2 Asymmetry and Non-complementarity on Economic Cooperation Since 2012, China-CEE cooperation mechanism becomes mature gradually; moreover, during the Suzhou Summit in 2015, CEE countries with China state their readiness to formulate the Medium-Term Agenda for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries in terms of the future cooperation. In 2022, the Secretariat released the Documents in the Outcome List of China-CEEC Summit. However, CEE countries now are in different status with different demands. For China, the challenges of asymmetric relations and the diversification of interests cannot underestimate. It requires that China while in developing its economic and trade relations should consider the different circumstances of the political, economic, and social development of each country. Because most of the countries in CEE are small- or medium-sized countries with matching volumes, so they are difficult for China to form united trade-related cooperation. However, if CEE countries well coordinate in some convergence or similar industries, from the regional level, bilateral investment cooperation, it progresses smoothly, and it is easier to succeed than

3.2 Asymmetric Nexus in China-CEEC Economic Relations

49

a country alone to cooperate with China. Also, if there is no coordination, CEE countries may create competition in attracting Chinese investment. First, for the overall scale by both sides, according to the data from World Bank, China and CEE countries have considerable differences regarding population, GDP, and surface area. As Table 3.4 shows that, China’s territory is 6.58 times by the total of countries in CEE, with the population of 10.83 times and GDP of 8.8 times. Secondly, the trade volume between China and CEE countries in 2022 is 142.79 billion USD, which accounts for only about 2.26% of China’s global trade turnover in the same period. The size of the population and the territory could directly affect the level of demand for a specific product and the depth of cooperation. The trading environment, as mentioned above, the trade cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries is highly asymmetric. Such as China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment to Central and Eastern European countries, Poland (0.536 billion USD) is more than 107.2 times the size of Albania (0.005 million USD) by the end of 2021. The trade dependence can directly reflect the bilateral trade development trend of China and CEE countries. The trade combination degree (TII) will be used to characterize the level of trade relations between the two sides, and it also can confirm the dependence of the market from one to the other (the trade intensity index or as intensity index (T ) is used to determine whether the value of trade between two countries is higher or smaller than would be expected on the basis of their importance in world trade. It is defined as the share of one country’s exports going to a partner divided by the share of world exports going to the partner). The bilateral trade intensity index refers to the ratio of one country’s exports to its country’s total exports versus the total import to the world’s total imports, and the specific formula is as follows: TIIab =

X ab / X a Mb /Mw

where X represents exports, M represents imports, a, b refer to countries a and b, w represents the world, and ab refers to country a to country b. TED is the trade intensity index, with 1 as the critical value, if the index is higher than 1, it indicates that the trade between the two countries is tight, and vice versa (Figs. 3.2 and 3.3). As the data shows above, first, the two sides for each trade intensity index are not so strong. Majority countries’ TII is less than 1 (the world average is 1). The computation Table 3.4 Comparison of basic situation between China and Central and Eastern European countries Population

Land area (km2 )

GDP (2022)

Trade (2022)

China

1.4118 billion

9.6 million

17.94 trillion USD

6310 billion USD

CEEC-17

0.1304 billion

1.46 million

2037.7 billion USD

142.79 billion USD

Source World Bank open data

50

3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

1.500

1.000

0.500

0.000

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Fig. 3.2 China’s trade intensity index to CEE countries (2012–2021). Data UN Comtrade

1.000

0.500

0.000

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Fig. 3.3 CEE countries’ trade intensity index to China (2012–2021). Data UN Comtrade

results demonstrate that from 2012 to 2021, except for the year 2018, the degree of trade intensity index between China and Czech Republic was greater than the critical value of 1, while for all other countries, the values of trade intensity were below the critical value of 1. This suggests that China’s trade relations with the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are not very close. The trade intensity indices (TII) of the Central and Eastern European countries with China consistently remained below 0.5 throughout the years analyzed, far from reaching the critical value of 1. This indicates that the trade volume between these countries was relatively low, suggesting that they have not been significant partners in the past and present. However, it also highlights

3.3 Asymmetry in Strategic Priorities

51

the immense potential for future trade development between both sides. Despite the current lower level of TII, there is a strong indication that mutually beneficial trade relations can be fostered and expanded in the future. Especially, the European economy has not yet fully recovered, the Chinese market has great trade potential for Central and Eastern European countries. The above data shows that the market in Central and Eastern Europe is more robust to China’s commodity demand. Central and Eastern Europe’s TII is relatively lower, which indicates that China’s demand for commodities in Central and Eastern Europe is relatively lower, and it cannot deny that it contains the passive factors of the CEE countries and the EU restricting the export of high-tech products in China, but this does not change the dependence on the exchange of goods between the two sides. Therefore, in the face of the above asymmetric cooperation, the China’s cooperation with CEE countries could provide a stable economic environment for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe for a larger scale with more functional and regional shared support mechanism. It has the characteristics of public stability and joint regional demand; to realize its function, it also needs to meet specific internal and external conditions.

3.3 Asymmetry in Strategic Priorities The asymmetric strategic priorities between China and the Central and Eastern European countries also serve as a significant obstacle to achieving further cooperation. Situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, the CEE countries are particularly sensitive to geopolitical changes and security threats, which drive their unique demands. Some of these countries have experienced historical dominance under the Soviet Union, leaving them with a deep historical awareness of potential threats from Russia. These historical experiences and their economic transition processes have influenced their needs and choices regarding external cooperation. Certain CEE countries, especially those bordering or geographically close to Russia, such as Poland and the Baltic States, face obvious military threats from Russia, making their demand for security cooperation and support from NATO more urgent. For them, security cooperation and NATO’s backing are vital requirements. On the other hand, apart from some major regional or global issues, i.e., Serbia-Kosovo relations, there seem to be fewer issues of paramount concern to China that require its international support. China’s needs in this regard are relatively minor, primarily focused on ensuring its own regional security and stability. China places greater emphasis on equality and multilateralism in international affairs, advocating for peaceful dispute resolution and opposing external interference. Meanwhile, the political and diplomatic stances of Central and Eastern European countries may differ due to historical and geopolitical factors. Some countries prioritize cooperation with the European Union (EU) and NATO, maintaining closer ties with Western nations. Although the foreign strategies of CEE countries tend to be

52

3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

diverse and pragmatic, they still consider the EU and the United States as key diplomatic focuses. In recent years, the “decoupling” strategy has put forward between China and the United States, coupled with the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic, has made the political sensitivity of cooperating with China more pronounced for the CEE countries. Additionally, the EU has taken substantive actions in areas such as investment security screening and recognizing China’s status as a fully market economy, which has raised doubts about China-CEE cooperation. Consequently, as the global political landscape becomes increasingly complex, some CEE countries’ attitudes towards China have been significantly influenced by the positions of the United States and the EU. Despite their willingness to cooperate closely with China, they also need to consider the attitudes of the US and the EU. In this context, such as Poland and the Czech Republic have shown noticeable signs of ideological consideration in their approach to China, contrasting with Serbia and Hungary, which maintain friendly attitudes towards China. The attitudes of these countries towards China reflect the varying degrees of alignment with Western powers and their own geopolitical considerations.11 A clear example that, one of the major advantages of cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries is that there are no historical legacy issues between the two sides, but almost none of the Central and Eastern European countries need to stand up for China on major domestic issues. On the contrary, China needs the support of Central and Eastern European countries on issues related to Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, South China Sea sovereignty, and human rights, and this support has become increasingly important with the intensification of the US-China and China–Europe competition.12 It can be said that initially, the cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries was mainly driven by economic considerations. They were generally concerned about the EU’s economic slowdown in the coming years and sought to enhance their economic resilience against external shocks and potential economic risks. China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” and the “China-CEEC Cooperation” mechanism have identified connectivity and infrastructure development as important areas for collaboration. In this regard, China is willing to provide funding and technological support to CEE countries to promote infrastructure construction and connectivity development. CEE countries have significant demands for infrastructure development, but due to their economic scale and financial limitations, they may require external support to achieve this goal. As the world’s second-largest economy with a strong industrial base, China has a huge economic scale. In contrast, the economic size and development levels of CEE countries vary. Some countries, such as Poland and Romania, have larger economic volumes in the CEE region, while others have smaller economies. This often places China in the role of providing more economic assistance and investment, while CEE countries need to attract foreign investment to boost their economic development. Despite cooperation, in terms of actual trade and economic exchanges, China remains a relatively smaller economic partner for CEE 11 12

Bojinovi´c Fenko et al. (2019), Song (2020). Žižek (2006), Xu and Yang (2022).

3.4 Asymmetry in Values

53

countries compared to the EU. This discrepancy further enhances the perception of asymmetry in the cooperation. China is promoting stable and long-term cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, focusing on economic and trade exchanges and people-to-people interactions while avoiding involvement in sensitive political and security issues. China hopes that such matters can be addressed and communicated through bilateral frameworks or in other fields. However, in recent years, the security demands of CEE countries have been increasing, and they hope to see more security elements addressed within the framework of China-CEE cooperation. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the “16/17+1” framework cannot fully resolve this issue. From the perspective of CEE countries, there is a growing concern about whether China can engage in certain security or even geopolitical sensitive issues, such as the situation in Ukraine. Moreover, in dealing with major regional issues, China should have a deeper understanding of the concerns of CEE countries, especially in terms of countering Russia’s behavior. Additionally, topics like the Eastern Partnership program and the refugee issue have gradually become focal points in China-CEEC cooperation. Despite the limitations of the current framework, China and CEE countries are increasingly addressing security-related topics and regional concerns. It will be essential for China to take these concerns into account and find appropriate ways to address them to enhance trust and further promote cooperation.

3.4 Asymmetry in Values Central and Eastern European countries experienced the wave of democratization in Europe, and some of them successfully joined the European Union. However, shortly after the transition and during the post-transition period, they encountered the European debt crisis. Even now, they still face many problems deeply rooted in the transition period, and have not fully achieved all their transformation goals. Many of the pre-transition propaganda slogans and objectives have fallen short. More importantly, their economic growth models have undergone significant changes after the transition. Except for Poland, most other CEE countries heavily rely on exports and foreign investment to drive their economies, and their domestic enterprises lag far behind those of Western Europe in terms of innovation and output. Against this historical backdrop, as China, a rising major power, becomes increasingly active on the European stage, it presents a new possibility for cooperation with CEE countries. Therefore, CEE countries view China as a new investor and export market, and they have certain demands for trade, investment, and infrastructure cooperation with China. Their perception of the Belt and Road Initiative and China-Europe cooperation focuses more on analyzing how China implements relevant policies, how it deals with interests frictions or conflicts, and how CEE countries can attract more investment to maximize their gains. However, due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and deteriorating China-US relations, some CEE countries have developed economic anxieties and skepticism about the usefulness of cooperation, which affects their

54

3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

enthusiasm for working with China. The gap between high expectations and slow results is exacerbated by frequent changes in political leadership in CEE countries. Ruling parties hope that the cooperation agreements signed during their terms will quickly yield results to help them win the next election. They are hesitant to let such agreements become political capital for their opponents after they come into power. This urgency to achieve short-term and immediate cooperation projects with China leads to a lack of long-term planning for bilateral sustainable and strategic cooperation. It can be said that this high expectation and the gap with reality have intensified the sense of mistrust between China and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. From an ideological perspective, differences in cultural traditions and asymmetry in values remain significant barriers to cooperation between China and CEE countries. The cultural sense of belonging and differences in values have a considerable impact on the effectiveness of cooperation. China is a socialist country that follows the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, emphasizing centralized and unified leadership and the leading role of the Communist Party. On the other hand, CEE countries gradually shifted towards democratic systems and adopted multiparty competition and democratic elections after the Cold War. This has resulted in evident differences between China and CEE countries in terms of political systems. Moreover, China and CEE countries have different perspectives on human rights and democracy. China emphasizes economic development and social stability as priorities, and advocates the principle of relative human rights, emphasizing the balance between economic, social, and cultural rights. CEE countries generally place more emphasis on basic human rights values such as democracy, freedom of speech, and religious freedom. Since the COVID-19 pandemic has brought the issue of values to the forefront of international relations, highlighting conflicts over values. In recent years, both the United States and the European Union have increased their pressure on Central and Eastern European countries to conform to their values and engage in value diplomacy. Since the Biden administration came into power, there has been a trend toward the alliance-building of human rights attacks against China. Although these countries’ foreign policies have shifted towards balance and pragmatism with the changing times, past policies towards China still persist in the views of right-wing media, non-governmental organizations, and even politicians, forming a negative narrative that hinders the positive development of China-Central and Eastern European countries cooperation. Especially since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there has been a noticeable shift in the views and judgments of CEE countries towards China, gradually becoming more negative. For example, China is sometimes seen as a “systemic competitor” with a different liberal democratic system from the West, and some perceive China-CEE cooperation as merely “lip service” without tangible benefits. Therefore, despite the current positive recognition and participation of China-CEE cooperation by governments of both sides, if the effectiveness of this cooperation mechanism fails to show timely results, and economic and trade relations do not deliver the expected benefits to the people, such criticisms from opposition groups may reemerge. Additionally, the lack of

3.5 Pragmatic Practice of Overcoming Asymmetric Dilemmas

55

understanding among the general public about China will further fuel the proliferation of such negative opinions. From the perspective of their real national interests, China’s global economic influence and specific means of exerting influence, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and “China-Central and Eastern European Countries Cooperation”, have had practical impacts on the Central and Eastern European countries. In recent years, pragmatic cooperation between Central and Eastern European countries with China has continued to develop, allowing these countries to reap tangible benefits and see prospects for cooperation with China. However, in the context of escalating China-US tensions and increasing regional security uncertainties, Central and Eastern European countries, as small and medium-sized nations, are concerned about the growing uncertainty in the international landscape, which poses threats to their own development and interests. Therefore, based on their real interests, understanding China’s economic dynamics and developing relations with China while seeking a “balance” amid China-US competition have become important factors influencing their perception of China’s image. During the transition from socialism to capitalism, most Central and Eastern European countries thoroughly rejected their socialist political, economic, and cultural systems, emphasizing and strengthening the perception of their socialist era as a “negative” historical experience. Throughout the Eastern European upheavals, these countries put forward the slogan of “returning to Europe” and completely embraced Western values and ideologies of “freedom”, “democracy”, and “human rights”. The combination of their historical experiences and Western values has led to two characteristics in their perception of China’s image: firstly, evaluating China’s political system and social development through the lens of Western values; secondly, assessing various aspects of contemporary China based on their own historical experiences, believing that the Chinese people and society are currently going through a period similar to their past socialist era.13

3.5 Pragmatic Practice of Overcoming Asymmetric Dilemmas The above statistics and findings show that the asymmetry between China with Central and Eastern European countries in the political, economic, and many related fields still exists. China with Central and Eastern European countries have achieved relatively fruitful cooperation results in the past ten years, have established a network cooperation mechanism based on bilateral and multilateralism, and initially fostered a relatively stable cooperation mechanism among those member states. Then, in such asymmetrical situation, how China with Central and Eastern European countries cooperate to overcome the asymmetry dilemma?

13

Natasa and Wei (2018).

56

3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

3.5.1 Preliminary Establishment of the Institution China and the CEE countries actively create various conditions, the economic contacts between the two sides are closer recently. In this process, the economic interdependence between countries is deepening, and this status makes the cost of disconnecting, the economic link is increasing, thereby inhibiting the conflict to some extent. When committing to the development of the economy, the countries with economic exchanges take the initiative to promote bilateral relations, it creates a good environment for economic exchanges and promotes political and economic mutual promotion. The shifts taking place between China and Central and Eastern European countries since the Warsaw Summit defines the new terms of their relationship, but the gap in material power and asymmetry between the two parties still exists, an emphasis on economic benefits alone cannot solve these problems. Successful cooperation depends on careful strategic planning and, ideally, a solid foundation of common values and norms. More fundamentally, sustainable cooperation in the economic sphere ultimately relies on a dynamic market force, rather than political will alone.14 Multilateral cooperation requires a certain degree of structure to maintain, because cooperation does not mean that there is no conflict. On the contrary, cooperation is mixed with conflicts. From the origin to the maintenance of cooperation, it is not impossible for all parties to be without conflict, and it is impossible to be completely equal in fact. However, in the “China-CEEC” cooperation, actions are mostly carried out in bilateral and multilateral structures. Therefore, the differences between the Central and Eastern European countries are not conflict with each other, but in turn enhance the diversity and vitality of cooperation to a certain extent. According to the think tank report published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,15 since 2012, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro are mainly cooperated with China in infrastructure such as roads and railways, and Albania and Croatia are mainly in the tourism industry. Slovenia, Romania, and Poland are mainly in the field of cultural and non-governmental exchanges. Slovakia and the Czech Republic focus on strengthening cooperation with China to help the EU’s Strategy for the Danube Region. Although the structure of the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism is relatively loose and there is no strong binding regulation, however, the “China-CEEC” cooperation is based on the “demand–supply” cooperation. So far, the activities of China with Central and Eastern European countries are only defined as “cooperative mechanism” and are often referred to as “agreements”, “platforms”, and “framework”,16 which are not formally defined as institution. In general, many scholars focus on the actions taken by international organizations and the impact of these actions on major issues such as war, peace, power, and security in international relations. Rationalism treats institution as “a set of rules governing 14

Song (2017). Huang (2018). 16 Ibid. 15

3.5 Pragmatic Practice of Overcoming Asymmetric Dilemmas

57

international behavior”, and “it is a statement that prohibits, requires, or permits certain types of actions”.17 Keohane defines the international institution as “a system of rules that are consistently functioning and interrelated (formal or informal), stipulating the role of actors, constraining activities, shaping expectations”.18 Constructivist defines institution primarily by norms, it believes that institution is built by the ideas shared by its members.19 In addition, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore define the institution as a collaborative process of unconscious construction.20 Oran Young considers institution as a practice from a sociological perspective, which calls the institution as a “recognized behavior or practice model, and people’s expectations revolve around these models”.21 Therefore, the author believes that the institution is the recognized behavioral model of the country concerned. The concept of the international institution is constantly evolving, and it is increasingly open and inclusive. The “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries can be called the international institution. The cooperation mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries is characterized by voluntary participation and flexibility. It is these characteristics that make it more operational and overcomes the asymmetry of cooperation dilemma. For example, since 2015, according to the Belgrade Guidelines, the China-Central and Eastern European Countries Investment and Trade Expo is held annually in Ningbo, China. For this purpose, Ningbo City sets up the Central and Eastern European Expo Conference Hall and the Perennial Exhibition Hall. The relevant booths are free for use by Central and Eastern European countries. Imported goods participating in the Expo are not taxed, and products sold on the Chinese market are imported in accordance with the special preferential tariffs set by Ningbo for the Expo. Although the Expo is mainly for the Chinese market, CEE countries also achieve considerable transactions with each other. Moreover, bilateral ministerial meetings are also held during the Expo. The delegations of Central and Eastern European countries attending the Expo include representatives of foreign trade ministers, ambassadors to China, and foreign investment promotion agencies. During the Expo, there were more bilateral meetings between countries and fewer multilateral meetings, thus establishing a bilateral network structure. Bilateral ministerial talks and meetings promote the foreign investment and cooperation of relevant countries. Moreover, during the second expo, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary used the opportunity to participate in the Expo to hold bilateral talks to discuss the development of the two countries. The talks reached an important agreement to open a route between Sarajevo and Budapest, which is operated by a low-cost carrier

17

Simmons and Martin (2002). Keohane (1988). 19 Wendt (1999). 20 Barnett and Finnemore (1999). 21 Young (1989). 18

58

3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

in Hungary, which has reliable operational experience and flight records in Tuzla, Bosnia, and Herzegovina.22 Since the official launch of the China-Central and Eastern European countries cooperation in 2012, the leaders’ meeting has passed the cooperation guidelines of Bucharest, Belgrade, Suzhou, Riga, Budapest, Sofia, and Dubrovnik Although there are various forms of regular meetings under the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism, the implementation of the cooperation program can better reflect the results of cooperation. The guideline generally establishes the overall cooperation agenda, and then the task is decomposed into mechanisms in different fields, such as trade and investment, interconnection, industrial energy, science and technology, financial cooperation, agricultural and forestry environmental cooperation, health cooperation, local cooperation, and humanities exchange. The draft guideline is prepared by the Chinese side before the leaders’ meeting. After the Chinese side made the draft, then it sends to the relevant parties for review and revision. The embassies of Central and Eastern European countries then express their opinions and designate a diplomat to be responsible for preparing revisions and tracking the entire review and consultation process. After the countries propose their own amendments or express their consent, the embassy in China will send the final version approved by the country to the secretariat. Once the outline is adopted, those countries that wish or agree to participate in certain projects must appoint the relevant agencies to be specifically responsible, make recommendations on promoting cooperation, and then implement them through policy actions. It is generally necessary to confirm and evaluate the implementation of the last adopted guideline before the leaders’ meeting.23 Second, as mentioned earlier, China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries is asymmetrical. And cooperation cannot avoid the asymmetry of power, but if the power in asymmetric cooperation becomes hegemony, it will completely deviate from the basic characteristics of cooperation and become an external coercion. Cooperation is that the parties are at least roughly equal in form, and this feature will not be specifically changed by the form of cooperation. Among the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism, Central and Eastern European countries generally participate in the agenda setting and choose project that suits its development. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs establishes the China-Central and Eastern European Countries Cooperation Secretariat as the coordinator and invites Central and Eastern European countries to designate a relevant department as the coordinating agency for docking. In 2012, when the leaders of China-Central and Eastern European countries met for the first time, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proposed twelve measures to promote friendly cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. This is the earliest programmatic document, which stipulates that a coordination mechanism should be established based on the “voluntary principle”. In addition, the choice and 22

Huang (2018). According to the interview with Liu Zuokui, Executive Director of the China-CEE Countries Think Tanks Network Office in July 2018.

23

3.5 Pragmatic Practice of Overcoming Asymmetric Dilemmas

59

designation of national coordinators by countries also reflect their willingness to participate and the level of participation expected. The coordinators from different countries come from different departments. For example, Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina respectively designate the Minister of Finance (Mиниcтapcтвo финансија) and the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (Ministarstvo vanjske trgovine i ekonomskih odnosa) as national coordinators, indicating that the key areas for cooperation between the two countries are industry, economic, and trade cooperation. Montenegro designates the Deputy Prime Minister as the coordinator. The Croatian coordinator is the Minister of Sea, Transport, and Infrastructure (Ministarstvo pomorstva, prometa i infrastructure), while Albania and Czech Republic are the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs ˇ (Ministria për Europën dhe Punët e Jashtme/Ministerstvo zahraniˇcních vˇecí Ceské republiky). Other countries arrange special personnel to coordinate cooperation with China. For example, the coordinators of Hungary and Poland are the directors responsible for bilateral relations. The coordinators of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the directors or counselors of the Asian Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The designation and appointment of coordinators by countries fully reflect the principle of voluntary participation in “China-CEEC” cooperation (Table 3.5). Until 2022, a total of seventeen meetings of national coordinators are being held. The first meeting is hosted by the China-Central and Eastern European Countries Cooperation Secretariat in Beijing. At that time, China’s twelve measures to promote friendly cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries also include the proposal to set up an advisory committee to study infrastructure construction between China and Central and Eastern European countries. The Ministry of Commerce of China is a coordinating unit that discusses the construction and reconstruction of regional railways and highways on a voluntary basis. Although such a committee is not established immediately, the idea is accepted and put into practice by countries such as Serbia, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Montenegro, which are in urgent need of infrastructure. So far, the guidelines proposed and adopted at previous leaders’ meetings have all mentioned the “voluntary” characteristics of institution building and cooperative practice. With the analysis of the documents and related agreements, these initiatives reflect the differences between voluntary participation and mandatory diplomacy. For example, China initiates the establishment of association for infrastructure construction. On the one hand, it adheres to the principle of voluntary participation, and on the other hand, it follows the EU transport regulations and plans, thereby expanding the opportunities for all members to participate all the year round. Moreover, the norms and initiatives under the framework of China and the EU are increasingly being adopted to attract EU member states in the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism.24 The first China-Central and Eastern European country leaders meeting in 2012 highlighted connectivity. Then, in the Bucharest Guideline proposes that, “support the establishment of a China-CEEC association on infrastructure cooperation and 24

Men (2021).

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3 Cooperation in Asymmetric Dilemmas

Table 3.5 List of national coordinators of China-CEEC cooperation mechanism Country

Name

Title

Albania

Agron Tare

Deputy Minister of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs

Bosnia and Mirko Herzegovina Šarovi´c

Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations

Bulgaria

Ivan Dimitrov

Deputy Head, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Croatia

Zdravka Buši´c

Minister of Sea, Transport, and Infrastructure

Czech Republic

Martin Tlapa Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Estonia

Andres Talvik

Greece

Kostas Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Economic Diplomacy and Fragogiannis Openness

Hungary

Márta Mészáros

Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Latvia

Andrejs Pildegovics

Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Lithuania

Eduardas Borisovas

Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

North Macedonia

Vasile Andonoski

Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Montenegro

Jovetic Goran

Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Policy and Financial System

Poland

Marcin Przydacz

Undersecretary of State (Deputy Foreign Minister) for Security, the Americas, Asia, and Eastern Policy

Romania

Alexandru Victor Micula

Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Counselor of East Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Serbia

Sinisa Mali

Minister of Finance

Slovakia

Lucia Kišš

Director General, Economic and Development Cooperation Section, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs

Slovenia

Iztok Grmek

Ambassador, Director General, Directorate for Economic and Public Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia

Source Secretariat for cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries

relevant Chinese and CEEC agencies and businesses are welcome to join on a voluntary basis”.25 Since then, in June 2014, the first meeting of the Sino-Hungarian Transport Infrastructure Cooperation Joint Working Group was held in Beijing. At the same time, the high-level transportation logistics conference was held in Riga. 25

Bucharest Guidelines (2013).

3.5 Pragmatic Practice of Overcoming Asymmetric Dilemmas

61

In the Belgrade Guideline which was adopted the following year, the fifth-ranked “infrastructure construction cooperation” rose to the third place.26 In 2015, on the voluntary principle, the first meeting of the customs clearance facilitation cooperation framework agreement was held by China, Hungary, Serbia, and Macedonia. At the same time, the first customs inspection technical seminar was held. Macedonia did not participate at the beginning, but later voluntarily chose to participate.27 At the end of the Suzhou leaders meeting in late 2015, the status of infrastructure cooperation on the agenda has been at the forefront. The section on interconnection and cooperation in the outline refers twice to the “voluntary principle”.28 As an advocate, China insists cooperation on a voluntary basis and, on the other hand, tries to expand the participation of other countries in areas such as interconnection, transportation infrastructure, and customs facilitation, the approach is to encourage participants to support the EU’s existing priorities and its extension to the Western Balkans, the infrastructure construction cooperation also takes into account existing EU policy measures, including some pilot projects under the China-EU Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation.29 Later, the leaders’ meetings in Riga (2016), Budapest (2017), Sofia (2018), and Dubrovnik (2019) also emphasized the need to strengthen internal linkages based on voluntary participation under the “ChinaCEEC” cooperation mechanism. Institutional cooperation must be based on unanimity and not externally enforced. Then, institutional cooperation is not only the advanced form of cooperation but also the ultimate form of cooperation. Because it is further promoted on the basis of institutional cooperation, it is likely to become a cooperative behavior under the institution, thus deviating from the original intention of cooperation. The cooperation agreements under the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism are all signed on a voluntary basis. In general, the meeting mechanism is voluntarily established with the relevant Central and Eastern European countries, and then the cooperation agreement is negotiated during the meeting. It should be noted that not all Central and Eastern European countries must (or need to) participate in all meetings under the “ChinaCEEC” cooperation mechanism, fully respect the wishes of all parties, which reflect the flexible and open features of the institution. Only countries that believe they can benefit from cooperation mechanisms and related agreements will participate in the cooperation and sign the agreement. Therefore, these agreements are fully based on voluntary principles. For example, in terms of the quality inspection cooperation agreement, only some Central and Eastern European countries have signed the agreement. In 2013, Hungary, Serbia, Latvia, North Macedonia, and China signed the agreement. A year later, Romania, Slovenia, and Poland also joined the agreement. Regardless of whether these countries sign the agreement because of their openness to China or the technical 26

Belgrade Guidelines (2014). According to the interview on July 2018 with Ambassador Huo Yuzhen, the former special representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for China-CEEC cooperation. 28 Suzhou Guidelines (2015). 29 European Commission (2017). 27

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issues of the terms to the agreement, the choice of cooperation is based on voluntary behavior. The process of the institution does not force members to sign or comply with all relevant agreements. In fact, voluntary participation is also an important reason for attracting actors to participate in cooperative arrangements.

3.5.2 Carving Out Footholds in Central and Eastern Europe In contrast to the current state of asymmetry proposed in the previous section, the following is mainly to examine the development of cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries and the cultivation of cooperation institution from two areas of bilateral politics and economy. In order to achieve objective, comparable, and effective research data, the most representative work conferences in each field are the practice and institutional indicators of institutional cooperation. In the political arena, the meeting to build a policy communication platform is the basis for selection. In the economic field, the conference on the construction of economic, trade, financial, and infrastructure interconnection and cooperation is selected as an indicator. Policy Communication Platform In 2012–2022, the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism held several high-level official meetings to build a policy communication platform. On the one hand, these meetings open new areas of cooperation, and on the other hand, they become the communication “hub” of CEE countries’ pragmatic cooperation at other lower levels and the agenda-setting mechanism for further deepening cooperation. This phenomenon also shows that the attendance rate of the meeting is very high, and deepening cooperation is a practical need of all parties. At the same time, the leaders of China-Central and Eastern European countries are relatively consistent since 2012 which meet once a year. Moreover, the National Coordinator Meeting is held for the first time in 2012 and twice a year since then. The national coordinators are appointed by the countries and the candidates are relatively stable, which indicates that the overall support for the activities of the Central and Eastern European countries in this area is remained basically stable. The increase in the number of high-level meetings to build a policy communication platform is mainly due to the expanding and deepening of cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries in the political arena, and the platform for policy communication is becoming more diverse (Table 3.6). Since the launch of the 2012 Leaders Meeting and the National Coordinator Meeting, the policy communication platform is expanded and enriched, including high-level officials from Central and Eastern European countries visiting China, and Central and Eastern European ambassadors to China convene a regular meeting with the Chinese side every quarter. The China-Central and Eastern European Countries Political Parties Dialogue is a policy dialogue between the Chinese Communist Party and major political parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Generally, political parties

4

3

High-level visits to China by CEE countries

2014

8

2

1 16

2

1

2015

2016

3

2

1

Source Secretariat for cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries

2

1

National coordinator meeting

2013 1

1

Leader meeting

2012

Table 3.6 China and CEE countries policy communication platform (2012–2022) 2017

5

2

1

2018

6

1

1

2019

5

2

1

2020

0

1

0

2021

0

1

1

2022

3

1

0

3.5 Pragmatic Practice of Overcoming Asymmetric Dilemmas 63

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are invited to participate in each country. Before the dialogue, China usually visits 3–4 of the most influential parties in each country. Most of the parties eligible to participate in this dialogue have a social-democratic nature, such as the Bosnia and Herzegovina Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska Partija, SDP), which is also the ruling party at the time. Therefore, the party dialogue considers the nature of each party, as well as its political influence and political status. In addition, the Young Politicians Dialogue further broads the platform for policy dialogue between China and Central and Eastern European countries. The diversity of policy communication platform also enhances the understanding of both sides to a certain extent, especially at the political level to reduce bilateral asymmetry. Cooperative Development in the Economic Field China’s economic engagement with the Central and Eastern European countries largely follows its government-dominated practice, many obstacles exist at the very practical dimension of the economic sphere. This complicates and is partially explained by some deep-rooted institutional problems. There are some meaningful outcomes for both China and its partners in the CEE region, in terms to narrow their economic asymmetric relationships and pursue mutual benefits, i.e., the institutionalization of cooperation in economic, trade, financial, and infrastructure interconnection. It is difficult to distinguish economic and trade cooperation from other cooperation, because even political dialogue often discusses and sets economic and trade cooperation goals. In reality, economic and trade cooperation involves more individual needs, goals, and interests of specific countries. It may be possible to get more intuitive feelings and understandings from the candidates of national coordinators. The national coordinator can indeed have a corresponding political influence on cooperation due to his/her position and political status in the country, but the coordinator meeting mechanism mainly promotes trade and Investment cooperation. In the past ten years, the institution has not only produced a large number of cooperation outcomes in various fields and at all levels, but more importantly, it promoted the formation of active cooperation habits among participating countries, and it initially overcomes the asymmetry dilemma in the cooperation between the two sides. China with Central and Eastern European countries participate in this institutional process, not to build an institutional system or institutional order, but to promote economic and social development through pragmatic cooperation. Thus, the process does not target strong rules and identities, but rather forms a flexible and open institutional network of bilateral, and multilateral cooperation agreements and cooperative arrangements.

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3.6 Concluding Remarks Mechanism cooperation has enabled the development of China’s relations with Central and Eastern European countries from obscurity till present. Historically, since the 1960s, Central and Eastern Europe has been on the periphery of China’s diplomacy, and China’s relations with these countries have been relatively weak. However, the establishment of the mechanism in 2012 has significantly increased China’s trade and investment in the region, making bilateral relations increasingly important, expanding China’s diplomatic space, and broadening China’s opening up to the outside world. At the same time, Central and Eastern European countries have also benefited economically from this mechanism, particularly in terms of gaining more attention politically from Europe and even the international community, enhancing their ability to conduct foreign relations and their opportunities to exert international influence. But economically, the CEE countries is much less dependent on China than it is on the rest of the European Union. There has been no significant increase in China’s economic presence in the CEE countries since the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism’s initial stages. The CEE countries host negligible amounts of Chinese investment, Chinese investment constitutes less than 1% of overall foreign direct investment (FDI) in the CEE region, and more than 90% of Chinese FDI into the European Union goes to Western Europe. Although Chinese leaders by saying that more CEE products will be exported to China, but increasing trade is hardly a new idea, indeed, the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism is very unlikely to affect China–CEE trade. The majority of CEE goods are re-exported from other EU countries to China as part of regional and global value chains, and direct exports are conducted almost exclusively by corporations. At present, China and CEE cooperation still running just over a decade, but internal and external’s high concern adequately demonstrates the existence of powers influences. Since 2021, the Baltic states have withdrawn from the China-Central and Eastern European Countries cooperation mechanism, and the Czech House of Representatives has also proposed to withdraw from the mechanism. Although other CEE countries have not openly rejected bilateral cooperation with China, some of them have shown a negative attitude toward the development trend of the China-CEEC leaders’ meeting and other mechanisms since the outbreak of the pandemic and Russo-Ukrainian War. Another example, the EU’s concerns over the development of China’s regional cooperation stems partly from concerns about its institutional interests. It still roots in the trust deficit between the two sides, moreover, it does not understand the underlying reasons behind China’s policies or strategies, and it is worried about its internal cohesion. The EU also worries about the impact of China as an “external power”, especially the increase in the number of countries that not yet join the EU, and the reform effect of conditionality. Due to the lower overall level of trade and economic cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries compared to China’s trade with Western European countries, CEE countries generally believe that the mechanism has promoted bilateral economic and trade exchanges, but some countries believe

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that the actual results have fallen far short of expectations, or that China’s economic and trade relations with different countries are not balanced, such as investing more in some countries and less in others. However, the existence of the above issues is constrained by objective factors and even economic development laws and cannot be solved solely by China’s efforts. Clearly, trade and investment relations should be based on their respective resource endowments and economic development levels, rather than wishful thinking. The perception of some CEE countries regarding their economic and trade relations with China is not based on science but on emotions. However, the reality is that those countries that believe that economic and trade exchanges under the mechanism have not brought much benefit to their country have begun to foster a sense of distrust in the mechanism. Some countries even believe that the mechanism has hindered the opportunity for CEE countries to develop closer relations with the core countries of the EU. The above-mentioned distrust and questioning will undoubtedly damage the effectiveness and authority of the mechanism.

References 2013 Bucharest Bucharest guidelines. (n.d.). Retrieved February 23, 2023, from http://www.chinaceec.org/eng/zywj/ldrhhcgwj/202112/t20211222_10474155.htm 2014 Belgrade Belgrade guidelines. (n.d.). Retrieved February 23, 2023, from http://www.chinaceec.org/eng/zywj/ldrhhcgwj/202112/t20211222_10474157.htm 2015 Suzhou guidelines. (n.d.). Retrieved February 23, 2023, from http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ zywj/ldrhhcgwj/202112/t20211222_10474159.htm Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390– 1396. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7466396 Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. International Organization, 53(4), 699–732. https://www.jstor.org/stable/260 1307 Benner, T., Gaspers, J., Ohlberg, M., Poggetti, L., & Shi-Kupfer, K. (2018). Authoritarian advance: Responding to China’s growing political influence in Europe. GPPi and MERICS. Bojinovi´c Fenko, A., Lovec, M., Požgan, J., & Crnˇcec, D. (2019). Euroscepticism as a functional pretext for populism in Central and Eastern European states: The Eurozone, migration and Ukrainian crises. EU action plan on human rights and democracy 2020–2024. (n.d.). ENoP. Retrieved February 22, 2023, from https://www.enop.eu/publications/joint-statement-on-the-eu-action-plan-onhuman-rights-and-democracy-2020-2024/ EU-China strategic framework for customs cooperation signed today. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved February 23, 2023, from https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-china-strate gic-framework-customs-cooperation-signed-today-2017-06-02_en Huang, P. (Ed.). (2018). China and central and eastern European cooperation: The belt and road initiative. Paths International Ltd. Keohane, R. O. (1988). International institutions: Two approaches. International Studies Quarterly, 32(4), 379–396. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600589 Keohane, R. O. (2005). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy (With a New preface by the author edition). Princeton University Press. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Little, Brown and Comp.

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Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 245–252. https://doi.org/10. 1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). The tragedy of great power politics (Updated edition). W.W. Norton & Company. Men, J. (2021). The EU-China diplomacy and the belt and road initiative. Routledge. Natasa, M., & Wei, L. (2018). Pragmatic Institutionalism: Cooperation Between China and Central and Eastern European Countries. World Economics and Politics. 455(07), 41–68, 157–158. Nye, J. S., & Welch, D. A. (2016). Understanding global conflict and cooperation: An introduction to theory and history (10th ed.). Pearson. Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press. Reuters. (2020, October 7). Negative views of China soar in western countries, poll finds. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/07/negative-views-of-china-soarin-western-countries-poll-finds Salama, V., & Lubold, G. (n.d.). Biden says he sees china as “stiff competition.” WSJ. Retrieved February 22, 2023, from https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/biden-press-conference-live-upd ates-analysis/card/ifirn5yjOObkp0pm2Lzv Simmons, B., & Martin, L. (2002). Handbook of international relations. In Handbook of international relations (pp. 192–211). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/978184860 8290 Song, W. (2017). China’s relations with Central and Eastern Europe: From “old comrades” to new partners (1st ed.). Routledge. Song, L. (2020). People-to-People Exchanges between China and CCE States: Cooperation Process, Influencing Factors and Prospect. Contemporary World. 461(04), 17–21. https://doi.org/10. 19422/j.cnki.ddsj.2020.04.003 Sun, J. (2016). Cooperation and Asymmetric Cooperation: Understanding International Economy and International Relations. China Social Sciences Press. ´ Szczudlik, J. (2018). Perspektywy formatu Europa Srodkowa—Chiny po szczycie w Sofii. https:// www.ceeol.com/search/gray-literature-detail?id=852544 Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press. https://doi. org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183 Xu, G., & Yang, B. (2022). A Ten-Year Cooperation between China and CEE Countries: Evaluation and Reflection. Journal of Eurasian Economy, 260(05), 31–47, 125. https://kns.cnki.net/kcms2/article/abstract?v=YUk1thMFhg44FQibPvJlsR7hnz0zJ7BDH F4VxApCOT-4hEG-AD-5x5FKBdmqYang, Y., & Yin, C. (2022). The reasons for the divergence in policy of Central and Eastern European countries towards China. Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making, 13(06), 28–47, 101–102. https://kns.cnki.net/kcms2/article/abstract?v=3uoqIhG8C44YLTlOAiTRKibYlV5 Vjs7iJTKGjg9uTdeTsOI_ra5_Xa_SMYoxyoK4hcvZtlrGqFWMpBpfZn9oLy1BHFvf6H9K& uniplatform=NZKPT Young, O. R. (1989). The politics of international regime formation: Managing natural resources and the environment. International Organization, 43(3), 349–375. https://www.jstor.org/stable/ 2706651 Žižek, S. (2006). Against the populist temptation. Critical Inquiry, 32(3), 551–574. https://doi.org/ 10.1086/505378

Chapter 4

Relations in the Wider Neighborhood: Global Dimensions

Since the end of the Cold War, the structure of Europe is becoming more intensive. After the collapse of the bipolar system, the Soviet forces dissipated from most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Currently, there is a power vacuum in this arena. The United States seized the opportunity to quickly expand its influence in Central and Eastern Europe, especially with NATO’s eastward expansion reinforces the US power base in Europe. However, the relationship between the United States, the European Union, and Russia changes dramatically in recent years. The pattern of power, therefore, begins to move toward multipolarity and shows a new trend. At the same time, the political and economic development of CEE countries in the post-Cold War era gradually become on track and shows more autonomy in geopolitics under the multipolar system constructed by Russia, Europe, and the United States. In recent years, a growing sense of distrust toward China has emerged in Central and Eastern European countries, bringing uncertainty to future cooperation. This situation is related to geopolitical pressure from outside actors as well as changes in the domestic political landscape of CEE countries. Essentially, CEE countries have long been caught at the center of great power competition, and the geopolitical situation in the region determines the strategic direction of most CEE countries. Therefore, in the various multilateral relations among China, CEE countries, and major powers, it is imperative to analyze the development of those relations from a strategic approach.

4.1 Reconceptualizing Central and Eastern Europe in a Multipolar World The logic of the triangular relationship applies in any international environment that meets specific criteria; i.e., it imposes restrictions on the possible relationship between the three rational and autonomous actors, the bilateral relationship between any of them depends on their relationship with the third party, and each actor actively © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Gu, Frustrated Relations?, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3730-1_4

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seeks a deal with both to prevent conflict of betrayal or hostility and to gain benefits.1 However, the focus is primarily at the interrelations level between each game player, but only the Dittmer model applies to the reality of a specific period or stage, but there is little interaction with the triangular relationship to look at the policies that the game players may take. In fact, the status of the actors in the triangular relationship pattern often determines the policies they may implement, and this policy precisely determines the development trend of the triangular relationship, which is more favorable for themselves in competing for triangle relations with each other. A more excellent initiative obtains a new power pattern. As an example of the triangular relationship, each model has a vital policy meaning for the remote party, which prompts the remote party to change the policy in time to respond to changes in the external environment.2 In the traditional strategic triangle, there is no question of the nature of the “actor” or whether each of the three actors in the triangle can recognize each other. The concept of “actors” becomes an important issue in the new strategic triangle with the EU as an example.3 To some extent, it is not clear whether the other two participants view the EU as an “actor” in triangular relations, especially when faced with critical issues, whether other actors would bypass the EU and directly interact with them, it is questionable for member states to negotiate. From a political point of view, it is tough for the European Union to be classified merely in the category of a country or an international organization, because the EU goes far beyond international organizations like the United Nations.4 Although in recent years, the EU gradually imposes strict restrictions on the balance of power among its member states, it is only in a limited area. Such as the agenda concerning the core interests of member states (i.e., geopolitical security, taxation), the power of decision still rests with the member states themselves. This uniqueness gives the EU a unique position in the triangular relations between Europe, the United States, and Russia, also for China’s cooperation, and also affects the EU’s decision-making. Therefore, it is necessary to improve Dittmer’s model. That is to say, the CEE in the triangle regards as an actor that includes both the CEE as a whole as well as the member states of the EU. These represent both the visible role of the EU in its entirety (Commission/Council); at the same time in a particular political environment, it also on behalf of the non-member states of the EU, while interacting with the United States, Russia, and China. Conducting theoretical model deductions can prove invaluable in explaining numerous challenges arising from the interaction of multiple trigonal relationships. Additionally, it facilitates a deeper comprehension of the reasons behind the United States and Russia’s tendency to independently engage in negotiations with the EU member states, bypassing the EU in regional and international political contexts conducting such theoretical model deductions can help

1

Dittmer (1981). Ibid. 3 Hallenberg and Karlsson (2006). 4 Wiarda (2001). 2

4.1 Reconceptualizing Central and Eastern Europe in a Multipolar World

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Fig. 4.1 Multitrilateral relations among actors

to explain many of the problems that arise during the interaction of multiple trigonal relationships. It also provides a better understanding of why the United States and Russia, on regional and international political realities, often bypass the EU separately from the EU member states for negotiations (Fig. 4.1). Besides, in the course of studying the model of the Dittmer’s Triangle Relationship, there is the fact that one of the actors in the trilateral relation pattern as mentioned above has a particularity; it must also realize that since the Cold War ended, the elements of the triangle relations show new characteristics. This new feature highlights the fact that the pattern of international power is no longer the polarization of the Cold War era, but the “multipolarization” that the number of significant actors is multiple. First, there is no change in the status of the United States as a superpower. Despite the devastation of the strength of the United States in the aftermath of the 2003 war in Iraq and the financial crisis in 2008, it fundamentally not challenges fundamentally. Second, China achieves a sustained rise in the process of reform and opening up. Russia also achieves the rapid growth of regional strength within the same period. Of course, including many Central and Eastern European countries, they become a prominent indicator of the decline and pattern changes of power in the world.5 Third, the triangular relations in the post-Cold War era not fault for the bilateral ties as the triangular relations in the Cold War era. That is, the diplomatic relations between 5

Qin (2009).

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the two countries witness a sharp deterioration. In the context of globalization, the diversity of the agenda and its spillover effect make it entirely tricky for any two players to experience the absolute deterioration of the so-called relationship. At the same time, the relevance of the different problem areas also causes the triangular relations to show a relative development trend. On this basis, there is no absolute zero-sum game phenomenon in the triangular relations. At the same time, in Central and Eastern Europe, the increase in the number of actors and the frequent formation of new triangular regional relations are closely related to the multipolarization of global politics and economy after the Cold War. One noticeable characteristic of such triangular relations is that the rise of China. In this context, if the actors in the triangular relations in a specific region are in a disadvantage and thus cause structural imbalances, the disadvantaged party can get some compensation from the development of the state relations with other regions, which in turn affect the overall landscape. Then, a triangular relationship may have a migration effect, while affecting the other triangular relations, thus deriving the relevance of multiple trigonometries. In short, changes in the triangular relations in one region lead to changes in another. For example, changes in one of the multitriangular relations also affect the development of the other triangular relations in some sense, and the spillover effect of security issues and the relevance of the problem domain can cause changes in the relationships among many actors. Therefore, in terms of gaining a clearer understanding of the development trend of triangle relations in Central and Eastern Europe, it is essential to conduct a brief review of relevant historical events. This will enable us to comprehend the behavioral changes and evolutionary patterns of triangular relations within the context of globalization and the power structure. Of course, it also needs to pay attention to examining the strategic triangle of Europe, US, and Russia. The new strategic triangle also contains other imbalances; the two actors in the new strategic triangle are European actors, the EU and Russia. For the sake of its geographical interests, the United States acts as a “European country” since the end of World War II. Of course, this is a matter of “strategic choice”, not of de facto European actors. The United States is the only country that has the freedom to choose this policy. The United States, the EU, and China are global economies. The United States, Russia, and China are the major military powers that control strategic nuclear weapons. Also, China, the United States, and Russia have another strategic freedom, that is, how to engage with the EU. Washington, Moscow, and Beijing can either choose to cooperate with Brussels or engage with EU member states, and China can also work directly with Central and Eastern European countries. It means that the bilateral relations between the various parties are evolving dynamically, which means that multiple actors in the new strategic triangle play different roles. The role of the US, the EU, and Russia in the China-Central and Eastern Europe relationship needs closer examination, especially given the changes taking place in the wake of the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism.

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4.1.1 United States: A New Status Quo The US policy on Central and Eastern Europe is a part of its European policy and Eurasian geopolitical strategy. When it comes to discussing the US policy toward Central and Eastern Europe, it needs to move from its geostrategic power to Europe and Eurasia. During the Cold War, Western Europe is the most important ally of the United States against the Soviet Union. The United States passes its security assurances and largely controlled the foreign policies of Western European countries. To confront the Soviet Union, the United States supports the economic union and integration of Western European countries and disintegrates the Soviet Union with the attraction of the Central and Eastern European countries through the democracy and prosperity in Western. After the Cold War, the United States vigorously helps Central and Eastern European countries join the EU and NATO; it consolidates the process of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. During the 1990s and early 2000s, most Central and Eastern European countries complete the process and the United States thus reach the geostrategic goal of Eurasia in a phased manner. First, the United States reaps its trust and loyalty through supporting “Westernization” demands in Central and Eastern Europe. It cultivates a pro-American group within the European Union and NATO. The power of Central and Eastern Europe may be weak, but it can also provide the United States with the necessary assistance. Such as the Iraq war in early 2003, Western European countries represented by Germany and France strongly oppose the Bush’s decision, but Central and Eastern European countries supported it collectively.6 Second, the United States has its limits in supporting European integration. It hopes that the EU acts as its partner in advancing the global strategic goals. However, the US does not want to see the EU becomes as a global player or a competitor to the US. Central and Eastern Europe, which can help to prevent the EU from forming a corporate, diplomatic and defense power in the region.7 Thirdly, the United States uses Central and Eastern Europe’s phobia against Russia to promote the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU. It has strengthened Russia’s sense of containment and insecurity and created a rivalry between Eurasia and Europe, thereby continuing the influence of the United States in Eurasian affairs. During the Bush administration in the United States, he pushes forward the construction of the anti-missile system in Central and Eastern Europe in Poland and the Czech Republic, which further aggravate the tension between NATO and the EU and Russia.8 After Obama takes office, the United States and Central and Eastern Europe entrees a relatively new stage.9 The US interest in Central and Eastern Europe and the EU dropped, while the latter is disappointed and disapproved of the United States. The Obama administration announced a high-profile announcement of “restarting” its relations with Russia and abandoning its anti-missile system in Poland 6

Fawn and Hinnebusch (2006). Lundestad (1998). 8 Dumbrell (2002), and Weitz (2010). 9 Hynek et al. (2009). 7

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and the Czech Republic. In making this decision, it does not consult with Poland and the Czech Republic, that is, it does not take into account the feelings of two extremely pro-American countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Soon afterwards, particularly the Czech government, had to muster significant political resources and undertake a challenging persuasion campaign to gain their people’s acceptance of the US anti-missile system. This involved fostering strong convictions among their citizens regarding the necessity and benefits of such a system. For Poland, for instance, the United States announces the cancelation of the antimissile system in Central and Eastern Europe on September 17, 2009, the “70th anniversary of Soviet invasion of Poland”. The sudden US reversal of the Central and Eastern European policies stun Central and Eastern European countries, especially Czech and Poland, which forced them to rethink how to deal with Russia.10 Of course, the United States makes its decision with more important geopolitical considerations, the so-called rebalancing of the Asia–Pacific region. The United States believes that East Asia is more crucial to its future. The importance of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU is declining. Since it cannot balance its increasingly limited military and economic resources globally and wants to “rebalance” East Asia, it must withdraw itself from Central and Eastern Europe and the EU. However, the “rebalancing” of the United States in the Asia–Pacific region accompanies by the general disappointment and dissatisfaction with Central and Eastern Europe and the EU as a whole. For example, unlike the 2003 war in Iraq, none of the Central and Eastern European countries follow the United States and NATO in the Libyan war in 2011.11 Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland and the Baltic states, try to ease their relations with Russia to varying degrees. Central and Eastern Europe still regard the United States as an essential lean, but the relations have not been as close as before. The consequences of the United States’ initiative to distance itself from Central and Eastern Europe have been twofold: an enhancement of its security standing in the region and, concurrently, a sense of disappointment and dissatisfaction among countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as within the EU. While the latter may not be a pressing concern for the United States, it reflects the complexity of the geopolitical dynamics in the region. The United States always focuses on its interests. However, the development of global and Eurasian affairs is not entirely under the control of the United States. As the United States turns to Asia and the Pacific, the adverse effects of ignoring Central and Eastern Europe and the EU have also begun to become apparent gradually. First, the EU starts to push forward its strategy of “rebalancing” and gradually deepens its cooperation with Russia and China. The approaching of Europe-Russia and Sino-Europe does not match the strategic interests of the United States. The emergence of integrated and closely Eurasian relations will undoubtedly become a strategic mistake in the United States. Second, as Europe and the United States, due to mutual dissatisfaction and transatlantic alliance, which have become looser, the most crucial link between Europe and the United States is the uncertainties in 10 11

Chappell (2012). Koenig (2011).

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the direction of NATO’s transformation. Therefore, it might make the United States reduces its grip on Europe. Third, the United States is making every effort to push for its pivot to Asia. However, it does not work hard at it but fails to obtain the support of Europe. Therefore, starting with the second term of the Obama administration, some new changes have taken place in the US-European relations. The United States targets and intensifies its efforts to fight for Europe. One of the main signs is that both sides decide to launch the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiation. The agreement is not only for strengthening the EU-US ties but also for its strong geopolitical considerations, at least from the view of the United States. Some commenters called it the “economic NATO”.12 The crisis in Ukraine becomes an important opportunity for the United States to re-strengthen its influence and control over Central and Eastern Europe and the EU, and the United States “returned to Europe”. However, since Trump comes to power, TTIP shelves again. The relations between the United States, the EU, and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe correctly show in the following aspects: First, the United States takes the lead in implementing actions. At the same time, promoting the EU’s sanctions against Russia and weakening the economic and trade ties between Europe and Russia.13 Europe and Russia have close economic and trade ties. Europe is Russia’s largest trading partner, and Russia is the third largest trading partner of Europe. Europe is also the most significant sources of foreign funds to Russia. By contrast, while Europe and the United States imposed sanctions against Russia, the United States is almost unaffected, while the trade between Europe and Russia drops sharply. Before the crisis in Ukraine, in 2012, the trade volume between Europe and Russia makes the highest record of 338.5 billion euros, but since 2014, it dropped to 284.6 billion euros in 2015 and 209.6 billion euros in 2016.14 The stalemate in Europe and Russia also affects the investment environment in Russia. The EU’s investment in Russia is also indirectly affected, which in the long run affected the relations between Europe and Russia. Second, the United States uses the security concerns of Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland and the Baltic countries, which strengthened its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, nearly 270 NATO military exercises conducted in 2015, and half of which holds in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO formulates a “readiness plan of action” (RPA) and sets up a “Force Mobile Reserve” (FMR) and expands the rapid reaction force to 40,000. It also sets up eight Central and Eastern European Command and Control Centers and a permanent joint logistics headquarters to optimize its command structure, which authorized the NATO and European Allied Forces Command to prepare for military deployment and operations ahead of schedule. In February 2016, the United States announced a 3.4 billion USD increase in its military budget for Europe in 2017, which including the deployment of an approximately 4500 armored combat brigades in CEE. Besides, 12

Ames (2015). Hughes (2007). 14 Database—Eurostat. 13

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the United States sends fighter aircraft such as the F-22 to Romania and other Central and Eastern European countries to show their strength to Russia. From May 2 to 19, 2016, NATO holds the largest annual military exercise codenamed “Spring Storm” in Estonia; it is covering nearly 6000 people. The exercise venue locates in Tartu and other regions close to the Russian border. On May 12, 2016, the US anti-missile facilities built at the Deveselu Air Base in Romania complete and put into operation. On May 13, the US anti-missile facilities in Poland start operations and schedules to be completed by 2018. By then, the United States establishes a complete European missile defense system.15 Third, the US urges Europe to speed up its efforts to get rid of its energy dependence on Russia, which aims to strengthen the energy infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe and weaken Russia’s energy influence on the EU, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. The United States also starts to export liquefied gas to Europe. Even if it cannot wholly replace Russia’s energy sources, the United States can significantly weaken the energy link between Europe and Russia and strengthen the influence of the United States on European energy sources. Although Central and Eastern Europe is not a US geopolitical center, it still plays a unique role in realizing the geopolitical goals of the United States and Eurasia. First, since the end of the Cold War, the strategic choices of Central and Eastern European countries have not remained static. However, their two main foreign policy pillars have consistently been EU and NATO membership, aiming to achieve external security and sustainable modernization. Leveraging this demand, the United States sees the importance of Central and Eastern European countries. Especially as a significant number of them join the EU, their influence within the EU rises, allowing the US to incorporate its strategic needs more effectively. The United States is still strategically focused on the Asia–Pacific region, and it does not want to have violent clashes with Russia. However, Central and Eastern Europe could maintain a proper confrontation between Europe and Russia and partly help the United States to achieve the geopolitical goals of impeding the closeness of Europe and Russia. Second, it can contain Russia’s development. The military presence of the United States in Central and Eastern Europe does not have substantive military significance, but it plays a role in stimulating Russia. Russia is forced to disperse its resources to meet the challenges from the United States and NATO. Since Biden took office in January 2021, the US policy toward Central and Eastern Europe has changed in form and means, but the fundamental goal has not changed. Compared to the Trump administration, the US has shifted its means of countering China in Central and Eastern Europe from overt coercion to “behind-the-scenes leadership” and has re-united allies under the banner of shared values. For example, countries such as Poland and Baltic states, due to their strong anti-Russia sentiment, have made developing alliances with the US a top priority in their foreign policy. Given the huge asymmetrical interdependence between the US and these countries in terms of power and strategy, these countries have to make certain trade-offs in

15

Donaldson (2017).

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their economy to align with the US’s interests, in exchange for the security guarantees provided by the US. Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, some Central and Eastern European countries have chosen the United States as their energy supplier, despite the economic costs, while also accelerating their “deRussification” process. This choice can be understood as a consideration of energy security by these countries. Due to Russia’s significant role in energy supply in the region, some countries are concerned about the political and economic risks associated with dependency on Russia. Therefore, they have opted for diversifying their energy supply and seeking closer energy cooperation with other supplier countries, including the United States.

4.1.2 The Russian Neighborhood Russia places more emphasis and attention on Central and Eastern Europe because of its geographical reasons. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia demonstrates a somewhat active resistance against the accession of Central and Eastern Europe to NATO and long-term strained political relations with Central and Eastern European countries. However, in recent years, Russia becomes less aware of the emotional causes of its perceptions and policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia’s policy towards Central and Eastern European countries is constrained by its overall strategy towards the West, while the policies of Central and Eastern European countries towards Russia are also influenced by the policies of the United States and Europe towards Russia.16 Therefore, Russia’s geopolitical goals in Central and Eastern Europe are mainly following aspects. First of all, it seeks to prevent the formation of an anti-Russian coalition. First, it avoids the collective action by anti-Russia in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, the policies of Central and Eastern European countries toward Russia both similar to Poland and the Baltic countries. Although they do not pose a serious threat to Russia, they considerably contain Russia’s policy toward Europe and pose a negative impact on Russia’s internal and external relations. The second important pillar here is to avoid the EU’s opposition to Russia. If most of the Central and Eastern Europe countries oppose Russia, Russia might expect to receive the support of France or Germany, but Europe as a united actor and it is unpredictable for Russia’s external relations. Thirdly, Russia needs to avoid the impact on the US. The United States attempts to contain and suppress Russia is visible. In particular, US does not want Europe and Russia approach a closer tie. If Europe and US as an alliance, it severely damages Russia’s geopolitical interests. Especially after Ukraine’s crisis breaks out, Europe and the United States continue to step up sanctions against Russia. Russia is much more isolated in Europe and the West. Therefore, it is seeking more support from its partnership countries, so it is crucial for Russia.

16

Jakóbowski and Kaczmarski (2017).

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Table 4.1 NATO’s membership in Europe Year

Member countries

Founding Belgium members Italy (1949) 1952

Greece

1955

Germany

1982

Spain

1999

Czechia

Canada

Denmark

France

Luxembourg Netherlands Norway

Iceland

Italy

Iceland

Portugal

UK

US

Türkiye

Hungary

Poland Latvia

1994

Bulgaria

Estonia

2009

Albania

Croatia

2017

Montenegro

2020

North Macedonia

Lithuania Romania Slovakia Slovenia

Source NATO

Secondly, it can maintain as the buffer zone by Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and the West, especially the United States. There is no natural barrier on the Western border of Russia. Historically, Russia is not only suffered the invasion of France and Germany but also suffered invasions by the Swedes, Poles, and Lithuanians, and even in the contemporary era. It remains stable buffer awareness. During the Cold War, NATO’s area is 1800 km away from Russia, but if Ukraine accessed NATO, the distance would reduce to less than 500 km. Therefore, Russia fears it may lose the buffer zone, and precisely because of this buffer zone, Russia historically survives the attacks of Napoleon and Hitler.17 It is also the geopolitical reason that why Russia attaches great importance to the buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe join NATO, so Russia never wants to see that NATO expands to Ukraine and other countries (Table 4.1). Third, due to the geographical proximity between Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, the Russian banks, energy companies, and other countries are widespread in Central and Eastern Europe. Some Central and Eastern European countries, especially the Baltic states, also have a large number of Russians. Although the Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe gradually declined after the Cold War, its political, economic, and security interests remained. Therefore, there is still substantial will to maintain its traditional influence. In recent years, especially since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, Russia steps up its geopolitical campaign against Central and Eastern Europe in response to the new geopolitical situation. First, military capability is a significant comparative advantage of Russia over that of Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe. In recent years, Russia frequently 17

Buzan and Lawson (2015).

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engages in military affairs and national defense. The first is the appearance of new weapons. For example, the latest RS-24 intercontinental missile starts in action and a complete replacement of the latest equipment complete by 2022. The maximum range of the RS-24 missile is 11,000 km and is equipped with 3–4 independently guided sub-missile warheads while carrying the confused equipment that can overcome the anti-missile system. In response to the missile defense system set up by the United States in Poland and Romania, Russian President Vladimir Putin warns that retaliation takes Poland and Romania as targets. On May 4, 2016, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Russia is taking a series of measures to deal with NATO’s expansion of forces near the Russian border, including the establishment of three new divisions, two in the Western military region and one in the southern military region. The work completes by the end of 2016. Besides, in 2015, a total of 4000 military exercises conducts in Russia. Large-scale individual exercises such as the one held in six states on August 24–29, 2015, which provide comprehensive support for the operational cluster and enhance materials, engineering, and psychological protection level. Moreover, Russia deploys “Iskander” (9K720) ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad, which enclaved bordering Poland, and it directly deters Poland and other countries. Although Russia’s military operations mainly aim at the United States and NATO, it undoubtedly can also play a dominant deterrent role for Central and Eastern European countries. On the one hand, it makes the Central and Eastern European countries realize that the military confrontation with Russia is meaningless and may instead bring itself as potential significant security threats. On the other hand, Russia is no less inferior to NATO and the United States in military strength and capable of carrying a deadly blow to NATO, and Russia urges Central and Eastern European countries to recognize that NATO and the United States are not necessarily their credible defenders. Second, energy is the essential link between Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. For historical and geographical reasons, Russia and Central and Eastern Europe form interdependent energy relations. Central and Eastern Europe is the traditional channel for Russia’s oil and gas to enter Western Europe, and they can benefit from the transit. However, its dependence ratio on Russian oil and gas is also very high. Some of the natural gas supply in Central and Eastern European countries is 100% from Russia. Therefore, Russia makes full use of energy leverage and selectively strengthens its cooperation with partner countries. Since the Soviet era, the majority of Central and Eastern European countries have been highly dependent on Russia for natural gas imports, and the region has remained an important market for Russian natural gas exports. Additionally, countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia are the most important transit states for Russian natural gas exports to Western Europe, creating an asymmetric interdependence relationship among them. After the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, as a countermeasure against European sanctions, Russia reduced the gas supply volume and eventually shut down the “Nord Stream 1” gas pipeline for various reasons. The “Yamal” pipeline was also deactivated. Russia attempted to use natural gas as an “energy weapon” and a bargaining chip in political negotiations to gain concessions and compromises from European countries regarding the Ukraine

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issue. While these measures did not directly change the situation in Ukraine, they had a significant impact on the economy and society of European Union countries, sparking public dissatisfaction with their governments. In 2022, the spot price at the European Title Transfer Facility (TTF) reached a historical high of 120 euros/MWh, eight times higher than the average price from 2016 to 2020. The average price of natural gas in Europe in 2022 also soared to $34/Mbtu, five times higher than the average price from 2016 to 2022.18 In the field of nuclear energy, the Soviet Union built 24 reactors in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Lithuania, and many of the nuclear power plants currently operating in Central and Eastern Europe have Soviet backgrounds.19 Currently, in Central and Eastern European countries, Hungary and Slovakia have nuclear power plants. Hungary has a nuclear power plant located in Paks, which was designed, constructed, and supplied with fuel by Russia. The Paks Nuclear Power Plant is the main source of energy for Hungary, providing approximately one-fourth of the country’s electricity. Slovakia also has two nuclear power plants, namely the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant and the Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant. These nuclear power plants are crucial components of Slovakia’s energy system, providing a stable electricity supply for the country.20 It is worth noting that besides Hungary and Slovakia, other countries in Central and Eastern Europe do not currently have their own nuclear power plants. However, some countries have expressed interest in nuclear power generation and are considering the construction of nuclear power plants in the future to meet their energy needs. Furthermore, it should be noted that Russia is involved in some nuclear energy projects in the region, including supplying nuclear technology and participating in construction efforts. These cooperative projects primarily focus on commercial and energy cooperation to enhance regional energy security and economic development.

4.1.3 The European Union: Priority for CEE Countries It is different from the United States and Russia for CEE countries. Many Central and Eastern European countries are part of the European Union. Majority of the CEE countries as the member states of the EU. Other countries, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia are candidate countries; Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate. In other words, these countries take the EU as a priority policy for diplomacy. Although the majority of Central and Eastern European countries are already as members of the European Union, they have commonalities because of their late entry and relatively backward development and unique relationship with Russia. However, the complete integration of East and West Europe cannot complete rapidly. Besides, 18

Gazprom Export (2020), Rutland (2008). Baev (2016) and Wang (2022). 20 Khan (2015). 19

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the five countries such as Serbia do not yet join the EU, and the EU’s policy cannot expect full support from the candidate countries. In other words, the EU does not fully realize its geopolitical goals in Central and Eastern Europe. It still needs to guard against the influence of extra-territorial countries, notably Russia, to thoroughly incorporate the Central and Eastern Europe into the “Europeanization”. Over the years, the EU reforms Central and Eastern Europe by its normative power, which promoting its political democratization and economic liberalization to CEE countries. In 2004, the EU made its first eastward enlargement with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined to the EU. In 2013, Croatia became a member of the European Union. At present, there are different comments on the impact of the EU’s eastward enlargement.21 It is undeniable that many governance problems emerge within the EU. However, it should also note that the geopolitical and economic benefits of the EU’s eastward expansion far outweigh its negative impact. CEE countries strengthen the EU’s power and geographical impact. Therefore, the EU’s eastward expansion policy stabilizes the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, including some of the solutions to the Kosovo issue. Therefore, the overall EU policy toward Central and Eastern Europe is successful. In the geopolitical gaming of Central and Eastern Europe, it is more potent than that of Russia. However, in recent years, due to the Ukrainian crisis and the disputes between Brussels and Poland, Hungary, and other “New European” countries, the EU’s control over Central and Eastern Europe is declining. First, the debt crisis weakens the attractiveness of the euro. According to the Lisbon Treaty, Central and Eastern European countries have the legal obligation to join the Eurozone. However, since the outbreak of the debt crisis in early 2010, the problems in the Euro area take troublesome, and the economy is sluggish. In particular, the controversy surrounding the bailout of Greece triggered the Eurozone, which strengthened the perception of the CEE countries against the Euro, and it raised even more doubts about the sustainability of the Eurozone and weakened the attractiveness of the Euro by these countries. Among the major countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the suspicion of the European Union in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and other countries rise. In particular, they denied joining the eurozone. Undeniably, Central and Eastern European countries still generally recognize the identity of EU member states, and they are unlikely to follow Britain’s footsteps. However, to some extent, the “Britishization” in Central and Eastern European policies toward Europe means that they do not surrender their sovereignty over the EU. Second, the crisis in Ukraine exposes EU military shortcomings. Since the end of the Cold War, with the collapsed of the Soviet Union, the majority of European countries no longer attach importance to defense, and military spending in many countries are declining. Western European countries even reduce or give up their containment power instead of building lightweight, military forces suitable for rapid foreign intervention. During Cold War, there are 495,000 troops, 4100 leopard tanks and 600 fighters in West Germany. However, the size of the German military now 21

Epstein and Jacoby (2014).

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reduces to only about 85,000 and fighter jets are less than half.22 The construction of the German army no longer mainly focuses on defending its territory. More consideration gives to how to better participate in peacekeeping operations in other parts of the world, such as Kosovo, the Middle East, and Africa, where paratroopers and helicopters, rather than tanks, are prioritized. From the EU level, the Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP) and the so-called European military do not make any substantive progress in the long run. After the Ukraine crisis breaks out, Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland, the Baltic countries, and Romania, they fell into a security panic. In this regard, the US and NATO status and importantly once again highlighted. Besides, the refugee crisis aggravates the centrifugal tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe. The problem of refugees gradually evolves into a serious social issue in Europe, and it occasionally erupts violently in the form of riots and even terrorism, such as the two massive terrorist attacks in France in 2015 and Belgium in March 2016. Due to historical and geographical reasons, the Muslim groups in Central and Eastern European countries are relatively small. So basically, there is no such predicament as Western European countries, and precisely because of the issues learned from Western European countries, Central and Eastern Europe countries have a conservative attitude toward immigration and refugees, primarily Muslim immigrants. The outbreak of the Middle East refugee crisis in 2015 brings for the first time Central and Eastern Europe into the problem of Muslim immigrants. Germany demands that other EU countries, including Central and Eastern European countries, should share the burden together. However, Central and Eastern European countries believe that they are neither the initiator of the issue of refugees in the Middle East nor the invitees of refugees to Europe. The invited people are then German Chancellor Angela Merkel.23 Moreover, the proposal of the EU refugee allocation proposed by Germany fundamentally fails to solve the problem. Therefore, it has a stiff resistance to the refugee issue. In 2003, since the Thessaloniki Summit gave the prospect for the Western Balkan countries, peace in the Western Balkans achieves. However, in recent years, due to many internal problems, the pace of EU expansion significantly slows down. The Western Balkan countries themselves also increased their accession difficulties. In addition to the “Copenhagen Criteria” (Accession Criteria) of the European Union, it must also solve their historical issues such as the Kosovo issue in Serbia, the political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia’s name dispute with Greece. These problems are hard to be solved in the short term. Therefore, the Western Balkan countries that not yet enter the EU once again highlighted the domestic economic, social, and political issues. For instance, the most political crisis and security crisis in Macedonia in 2015 continues to deteriorate so far.24 The normative power of the EU is also significantly 22

Buzan and Lawson (2015). Cienski (2018). 24 Bechev (2017). 23

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reduced. It cannot control the direction of internal and external diplomatic relations among countries in Western Balkan states. Another example, after the EU and Russia faces a crisis of Ukraine, these countries repeatedly demanded that Serbia follow the EU sanctions against Russia. However, there is not any response.25 With the decline of the status and influence of the EU, the United States and Russia replaced the advantages and strengthened their presence in the region. The EU becomes more anxious and worried about being “divided and ruled”, thus starting to increase its investment in the Central and Eastern Europe. In light of the security issues, since the Central and Eastern European countries’ accession to the European Union, the EU has played a crucial role in ensuring security in the region. The EU is committed to safeguarding the security and stability of Central and Eastern European countries through various mechanisms and policies, thereby promoting peace and prosperity throughout Europe. Encouraging cooperation among member states to collectively address potential security threats, the EU also supports collaboration with Central and Eastern European nations in enhancing defense capabilities and combating terrorism and transnational crime. Furthermore, Western European countries such as Germany and France maintain close cooperation with the Central and Eastern European region in matters of security. Some Western European nations engage in tight collaboration with Central and Eastern European countries in military assistance, intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises, with the aim of bolstering defense capabilities and security mechanisms in the region. Especially amidst the ongoing Ukraine crisis, these countries actively participate in the NATO military exercises holds in Central and Eastern Europe and promise not to slash their defense budgets after the Ukraine crisis.26 For example, previous German Defense Minister Ursula Gertrud von der Leyen announces that by 2023, Germany expands the army by 7000 to add 4400 civil service civilian personnel, followed by further strengthening of the armed forces concerning equipment, budget, and personnel.27 Of course, while this plan carries symbolic significance, it is primarily aimed at sending a message to Russia. Following the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Germany has taken a clear stance against these actions and has joined the camp of countries imposing sanctions on Russia. The Ukrainian crisis has resulted in a heightened sense of mutual vigilance in RussiaGermany relations. On the other hand, Germany’s military expansion is likely to provoke dissatisfaction from Russia. The EU has limited military capabilities and military affairs, and it is even more potent on energy issues. It frequently engages Russia in blocking operations. The “South Stream” project is a major political and economic project for Russia in Central and Eastern Europe and the EU. In the context of the crisis in Ukraine, the project becomes controversial. The EU also steps up its pressure from the periphery to become involved directly. In July 2013, the European Commission launched an antitrust investigation into the Bulgarian, while requesting that the “South Stream” 25

Bassuener (2016). Schilde (2017). 27 Ibid. 26

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project must stop or the penalty process initiate.28 As a result, Bulgaria has to suspend the “South Stream” project and Russia forces to announce the relocation of the “South Stream” project on December 1, 2014. Besides, in April 2015, the European Commission formally initiated antitrust allegations against Gazprom (Russia), which refers to its members in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. These countries suspect of monopoly, which blocks the free competition in these countries’ gas markets, which crowding out competitors and manipulating gas prices. According to EU law, if there is a monopoly, the maximum fine can amount to 10% of the company’s global turnover, i.e., e10bn to e15bn. Besides, to ease the energy dependence of Central and Eastern Europe on Russia, the EU also steps up the integration of energy markets. On March 19, 2015, the EU summit approves the “A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy”, which it launches 248 networking projects focusing on energy issues in some member countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It includes the energy connection between the Baltic countries, the European continent, and the construction of liquefied petroleum gas hubs in Central and Eastern European countries such as Poland.29 For the Western Balkan countries that not yet join the EU, then German Chancellor Angela Merkel launches the “Berlin Process” on August 28, 2014, the summit for Western Balkans, which aims to reiterate its commitment to joining the countries of Western Balkans through the annual summit. The participants in the summit are Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYRoM), Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. At the same time, Slovenia and Croatia, and the summit organizers Germany, Austria, France, and Italy also attended. On the one hand, the purpose of the “Berlin Process” is to stabilize the situation in the region and to promote the development of the region. It is essential to compete with Russia for regional influence.30 Therefore, the EU must at least morally support EU member states such as Poland, Romania, the Baltic Sea, and other Central and Eastern European countries, and at the same time, it needs to urge Russia to make appropriate concessions. Of course, while considering its security interests, the EU also considers it necessary to stop Russia and therefore supports the United States and NATO inappropriately increasing the military presence in CEE and using the power of the United States to contain Russia. However, the EU also needs to work with Russia based on more pragmatic approach. Russia, for example, must play an indispensable role in Syria and other issues. Therefore, if the EU opposes the permanent stationing of the United States and NATO in Central and Eastern Europe on the issue of supporting Poland and other countries, it might further be worsening the security environment in Europe.31 In short, in this set of multitriangular relations, the EU should not only coordinate 28

Dempsey (2014). European Environment Agency (2015). 30 Vuksanovic (2019). 31 Kaplan (2016). 29

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with the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but it also needs to consider its interests and pragmatically handle the relations with the United States and Russia.

4.2 China-CEE Relations in the Wider Neighborhood The outbreak of the 2019 coronavirus pandemic, coupled with the ongoing competition between China and the US, has led to growing differences in values between the US, Europe, and countries in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Hungary. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 also escalated the geopolitical offensive against Russia by the US and Europe, leading to new changes in the balance of power among major countries in the Central and Eastern European region. At the same time, China actively promotes the “Belt and Road” Initiative and “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism. The increasing economic exchanges with Central and Eastern European countries enhance China’s economic presence and influence in Central and Eastern Europe. The influx of Chinese influence or economic power, on the one hand, further complicates and diversifies the “Grand Chessboard” in Central and Eastern Europe. Central and Eastern Europe shows the same game as China, the European Union, the United States, and Russia. On the other hand, it provides an opportunity to ease the tense geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The “Belt and Road” and “China-CEEC” advocated by China are trying to transcend traditional power politics and go beyond the parochialism. It pursues a destiny community of mutual benefit. However, after China’s accession to the “Grand Chessboard” of Central and Eastern Europe, whether it can genuinely seek peace and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe depends mainly on China’s overall strength and its ability in strategic planning. A core feature of the trilateral relationship is the bilateral relationship between any two of the three actors, all of which are related to third parties, that is, they are affected by third parties or have an impact on third parties.32 It is also the key to the trilateral relationship being able to surpass the three groups of bilateral relations and thus having an independent structural character. Since the financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent debt crisis in Europe, the relations between China and Central and Eastern Europe are steadily developing. By 2012, the cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries makes a great leap. The two sides start the cooperation mechanism between in the context of the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism. Central and Eastern Europe have a significant geographical advantage in Eurasia. In this diverse bilateral and multilateral region, if China is to cooperate with Central and Eastern European countries, it inevitably comes into contact with the three leading great powers, the EU, the United States, and Russia. Therefore, the interaction of multiple trilateral relations is inevitable. 32

Womack (2016).

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Central and Eastern Europe are at the crossroads of different civilizations and political cultures. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are located in Central Europe, and Western European civilization and Russian civilization mainly influence their nationalities. The foreign cultural influences of the peoples of Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, and other places located in South-Eastern Europe are not only Western European civilization but also Russian civilization, as well as Islamic civilization. In the interactions among the various civilizations, the CEE countries are not as strong as a whole compared to the Germans France in the west and Russia to the east. Their political development is always shrouded in the shadow of the surrounding great powers. From ancient times to the present, the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire of Turkey, the Tsarist Russia, Prussia, Austria, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Third Reich, the Soviet Union, Germany, Russia, and the United States exert their own influence on the peoples and nations of Eastern Europe in different ways.33 To compete for Europe and the world, for an extended period, the powers often turn the Central and Eastern Europe into a battlefield, and the primary bearers of the consequences of the war are often Central and Eastern European countries themselves. Central and Eastern Europe as an intersection located in a robust sphere of influence. Because of the convergence by significant powers, war is the most accessible place to take place in this area. After the end of the Cold War, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are still competing by great powers, such as the United States, Western Europe, and Russia to varying degrees. The relationship between Central and Eastern European countries and major powers is of great strategic significance on the geopolitical arena, just like the weight of the balance. It can be said that the foreign and security policies of Central and Eastern European countries are often closely watched and influenced by major powers.34 As for the meaning of the term trilateral relations, what the author wants to emphasize is, firstly, it is different from the “triangular relations” during the Cold War which formed by military confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, there is a new kind of trilateral diplomacy. Although there is still a balance of forces in such trilateral diplomacy, the major aspects of the trilateral diplomacy after the Cold War are seeking cooperation, mutual benefits, promoting peace and development. It is not the “zero-sum” game, especially the ideological and military aspects as it was during the Cold War. Second, as Central and Eastern Europe now occupies a prominent position not only in Eurasia but also in the global political economy. Therefore, the trilateral relationship in Central and Eastern Europe presents a variety of features, and there is a variety of complex overlap of trilateral relations. To sum up, there are the primary trilateral relationships in Central and Eastern Europe with China: European Union (and Germany), Russia, and the United States. Besides, the trilateral relations mention that here is a general summary of the actual situation of international relations. In fact, there can be no pure “trilateral” because 33 34

O’Sullivan (2014). Brzezinski (1998).

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there always be a fourth, fifth, and even more external factor for each “trilateral”. However, when it advances each set of bilateral relations, it considers the third-party factors, regardless of whether the third-party factor is a country or a group of countries of the same nature and meaning, which classifies as “triangular relationship”. Therefore, to a certain extent, the “trilateral relations” are also a way of thinking to observe and analyze multilateral international relations.

4.2.1 Different Approaches to China-EU-CEEC Relations After the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, on November 1, 1993, the European Union, which is developed by the European Community, was formally established. Since May 2004, the number of member states increases to 27 countries. The eastward expansion of the EU makes Central and Eastern Europe a geostrategic choice for post-Cold War Europe. First of all, the addition of Central and Eastern European countries makes the Baltic Sea the EU’s inland sea, which is conducive to the deepening and development of the European Union’s economy.35 Second, because of geographical advantages, the EU’s attractiveness to CEE countries is higher than that of the United States. Central and Eastern Europe is a vast market. Similarly, the situation in the Balkans has an unpredictable role for the EU. The European Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are naturally the countries or political entities that play the primary and critical role in the Central and Eastern Europe, while China is a next country in the Central and Eastern Europe but plays an important role. Although Central and Eastern European countries have their unique characteristics in the development of both their internal and external affairs, these countries have inherent similarities in the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe, that is the Europeanization. As Central and Eastern European countries, the EU and China are the closest and most direct parties to the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism, and they also show a consistent sense of responsibility and cooperation in local affairs. This trilateral relationship is the most central part of the relations in Central and Eastern Europe. Since 2012, Central and Eastern Europe has gradually become an essential part of China’s multilateral diplomacy, while the CEE countries located in the heart of the Eurasian corridor, and China does need to give more business. Similarly, the strategy of the “Belt and Road” Initiative proposed by Xi Jinping also brings new opportunities for the cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries. It emphasizes the importance of Europe to China’s political and economic development. At the same time, both sides have deeper cooperation in 35

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and the EU has agreed on a deal with the European Union over travel arrangements for Kaliningrad (Joint Statement of the European Union and the Russian Federation on Transit between the Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the Russian Federation), a Russian enclave that will be surrounded by the EU after 2004.

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economy, security, and politics. In particular, infrastructures such as railways and highways enable Central and Eastern European countries to become the bridgehead for China’s entry into the European market to help make it easier for China to access the EU market and acquire EU technology. Then, CEE countries play a role in the strategy of the “Belt and Road” Initiative.36 In 2003, China and the EU established a comprehensive strategic partnership. In 2003, China published its first EU policy document. In 2013, both sides published the “Strategic Plan for China-EU Cooperation 2020”. In 2014, China and the EU proposed the establishment of the four major partnerships for peace, growth, reform, and civilization. Then China issues the second EU policy document. As nearly, 70 consultation and dialogue mechanisms established by both sides, covering various fields such as politics, economy and trade, culture, science and technology, energy and the environment. However, the relations between China and Europe are still going through several twists and turns. For example, Jing Men deduces that the partnership experiences more difficulties since 2005,37 such as anti-dumping, arms embargo, and other issues. Richard Balme and Brian Bridges point out that each other’s expectations after 2005 have returned to the level of “greater realism”.38 Jean-Pierre Cabestan also points out that the diplomatic relations between China, the United States, and the EU as the authoritarian monarchies such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Iran sour EU-China relations.39 Jonathan Holslag believes that the relationship between China and the EU enters a profound state of the transition period.40 Although China and the EU have different opinions based on their history and culture and their respective positions on their status, such as “multilateralism”, “multipolarity”, and “relations with the new great powers”,41 China and the EU’s extensive practice in the field of cooperation is beyond doubt from 2003 to 2014 which is more closed. The new issues and new areas such as the new Silk Road and urbanization cooperation in the “China’s Policy Paper on the EU” at least provide some room for tension and expansion for a stable, comprehensive strategic partnership.42 Also, the EU introduced elements for a new EU strategy on China in 2016 and A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. In the elements for a new EU strategy on China, the strategy paper emphasizes explicitly that “The EU must project a strong, clear and unified voice in its approach to China. When member states conduct their mutual relations with China, whether one-on-one or as groups of countries such as the “China-CEEC” format, they should cooperate with the Commission, the EEAS, and other member states to help ensure that aspects relevant to the EU are in line with EU law, rules, and policies, and that the overall outcome is beneficial for the EU as a whole”. At the same time, the EU pursues a 36

Liu (2015). Men (2010). 38 Balme and Bridges (2008). 39 Cabestan (2006). 40 Holslag (2011). 41 Zhou (2017). 42 China’s Policy Paper on the European Union (2018). 37

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coherent approach that “deepen trade and investment with China, seeking a level playing field, intellectual property rights protection, greater cooperation on high-end technology, dialogue on economic reform, human rights and climate action” in A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.43 Till the present, the European Union has increasingly emphasized its “competitive” and “systemic rival” identities in its strategic positioning toward China, with human rights and values becoming more prominent in its China policy. The evolution of the EU’s strategic positioning toward China and its identity in the US-China strategic competition has been evident since 2016. The 2016 EU policy toward China was “principled, practical, and pragmatic”. In March 2019, the European External Action Service formulated a new “strategic outlook”, characterizing China as a “partner”, “competitor”, and “systemic rival”, but did not emphasize political values.44 A turning point occurred in December 2019 when the new European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen described itself as a “geopolitical commission”. Since 2020, the EU has highlighted political values in its China policy, frequently pointing fingers at China’s domestic affairs on the grounds of human rights and the rule of law, which has had a negative impact on EU-China relations.45 The EU maintains an underlying continuity in its strategic awareness and core policy stance toward China; it emphasizes that new opportunities must be seized to strengthen the relations. Of course, it also shows some new trends. The relationship between China and the EU also exhibits the following characteristics: First, in the debt crisis in Europe, it is clear that China-EU relations overwhelmingly dominate the trade agenda. For example, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama in 2008, he refuted China’s solemn remark. However, in 2011, he forgot the Tibet issue and his initiative was to urge China to invest in France.46 European leaders also understand that a hardline stance on maintaining the human rights issue in Tibet leads to the breakdown of trade relations. Therefore, the trade-off policy of individual member states marks as a “hypocrisy or pragmatism” dual policy, but there is no doubt that EU member states and China’s bilateral trade agreements become a trend, even though they differ from the overall EU policy. Second, given the impact that profound changes in the global economic order, it is necessary for Europeans to reassess their attitudes and approaches to China. China steps in front of the EU to readjust its approach and change to negotiations from the massive bureaucratic structure to bilateral agreements with individual countries. David Shambaugh points out that it is necessary for Europe to devote more resources to training experts in China studies that make up more professionals with in-depth knowledge and proficiency,47 because of the growing number of European experts 43

A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2019). EU-China Strategic Outlook: Commission and HR/VP contribution to the European Council (2019). 45 Rühlig (2020). 46 Pan (2012). 47 Shambaugh (2005). 44

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in the Chinese government. At the same time, Europeans need to rediscover the past practices of issues such as human rights, which they are ineffective threats to China and it should raise the EU’s sensitivity to China’s sovereignty and self-determination. Also, China’s comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU is a long-range goal which requires a more long-term process. Thirdly, for Central and Eastern European countries, the pivot of Central and Eastern European countries and the promotion of China-EU FTA become the critical issues in the new economic and trade cooperation between China and the EU. Central and Eastern European countries scatter around the EU’s borders or centers. Some have essential ports or land-based hubs. The Central and Eastern European countries play an important geopolitical position as Europe-to-Asia channels.48 It is also why China needs to rely on them to promote economic and trade cooperation. Therefore, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe take as the part of “Silk Road Economic Belt” in China’s BRI to connect Asia to Europe. At the same time, in the process of China and the EU negotiating bilateral investment agreements and establishing FTA, CEE countries become a driving force for the China-EU economic and trade negotiations because of their open market expectations. Thus, with diversified cooperative mechanisms such as China-EU Leaders’ Meeting, China-EU Highlevel Strategic Dialogue, EU-China High-level Economic and Trade Dialogue, “AsiaEurope Meeting” (ASEM), diversified platforms further increase bilateral economic, trade, and investment cooperation. Besides, the China-EU described above FTA with the output value of billions of dollars which can provide opportunities for improvement in reducing the economic difficulties for both China and the EU, moreover, while recognizing the market economy status (MES) that mainland China hopes to obtain. Fourthly, as a third party that contends with Russia and the United States, Europe needs to accept the viewpoints of the cultural plurality to coexist and coordinate with each other. As John Fox and François Godement,49 and Dariusz Kalan50 points out, China’s counter-hegemonic policy cannot accept by Europe at this stage. However, the divide and conquer policy by China draws the attention of European observers. The motivation and goal of China’s recent peaceful development to increase soft power are yet to see. Throughout the course of history, the European Union has been cautious and vigilant regarding the establishment and development of the ChinaCentral and Eastern European cooperation mechanism. The EU is concerned that China might utilize economic means to politically divide the CEE countries, creating a pro-China “mini bloc” to reduce the EU’s appeal and hinder the formation of a unified EU foreign policy agenda. But both China and Europe must understand that the relations between the two sides are based on peace rather than conflict. Robert W. Cox and Michael G. Schechter state that “to accept the vision of a plurality of cultures and civilizations, each with their truths, and to search for compatibilities

48

Fallon (2014). Fox and Godement (2009). 50 Kalan (2012). 49

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and reconciliation among them”.51 Under the support of the China-CEE cooperation mechanism and the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s relations with the CEE countries have entered a fast track of development since 2012, achieving remarkable and substantial accomplishments. However, it would be oversimplifying matters to assume that China-CEE relations will inevitably continue along this trajectory without any possibility of change. The future development will depend on various factors, particularly how both sides perceive themselves and each other, and the interactions built upon these perceptions, which will play a decisive role in shaping the direction and future of China’s relations with the CEE countries. In essence, accurate and positive perceptions, as well as mutual consensus on cognition among international actors, will contribute to fostering a sound, friendly, and cooperative relationship between China and the CEE countries. Conversely, negative, or erroneous perceptions, as well as cognitive differences and conflicts between the two sides, may lead to the bilateral relations heading in the wrong direction. The theory of constructivism shows that the shared concept of cooperation creates the possibility and continuity of cooperation between countries (or regions).52 In the current cooperation between China and CEE, the economic and trade exchanges make considerable progress in comparison with the initial period of cooperation. Both sides (whether in China or the Central and Eastern European countries) overlook a crucial factor, that is, there is lack of consensus on the formation of a joint concept. The “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism wins the warm welcome of Central and Eastern European countries, but Western European countries in the EU are concern that China’s use of EU members in Central and Eastern Europe affects the EU’s politics and strategy. Piotr Maci˛az˙ ek, an energy and geopolitical expert, states that many cooperation projects are limited to the scope of EU financial support, and it is difficult to imagine activities outside the EU.53 In particular, the Balkan countries not yet form a link between the economy and infrastructure, and they fall behind the EU countries to some extent. European scholars notice that the cooperation between CEE and China restricted by many EU laws and policies.54 For example, EU laws restrict Chinese enterprises’ entry into the government procurement market in Central and Eastern Europe, which additional bidding procedures for infrastructure projects with EU funds, and increasingly high technical standards and labor rules. It shows that if China does not pay attention to the policies and projects at the EU level, the cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries will face many difficulties, and it will not release the comprehensive cooperation. Most of CEE countries have become EU member states, establishing close economic, political, and legal ties with the EU through their accession. As EU members, they enjoy the benefits of the EU’s internal market, such as the free movement of goods, services, and capital, and they benefit from EU common policies, regulations, and financial 51

Cox and Schechter (2002). Wendt (1999), Qin (2009). 53 China-CEE Institute (2018). 54 Jakóbowski and Kaczmarski (2016). 52

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support. However, the relationship between Central and Eastern European countries and the EU also presents challenges and complexities. On one hand, these countries underwent political, economic, and social transformations before joining the EU, and they have had to adapt to EU rules and standards while driving domestic reforms to meet the requirements of EU membership. On the other hand, some of these countries face challenges such as uneven economic development, social transformation issues, corruption, and brain drain, which may have an impact on their relationship with the EU. Moreover, there may be differences in positions and interests between Central and Eastern European countries and the EU. Some of these countries (such as Poland and Hungary) emphasize the preservation of national sovereignty, the development of their own economies, and the protection of domestic industries, which may conflict with the EU’s integration process and common policies. At the same time, Central and Eastern European countries actively seek to exert greater influence in EU decision-making to safeguard their national interests. This claim is supported by the relevant research results of Central and Eastern European scholars, such as Chinese scholar Wang Hongyi and Professor Zdzisław Mach of the Institute of European Studies at Jagiellonian University in Poland, who pointed out that Central and Eastern European countries have a significant commonality, namely identity anxiety, which is rooted in fear.55 On one hand, these countries went through long periods of communist rule before joining the European Union, which led to a reassessment of their own traditions and history. After joining the EU, these countries needed to adapt to a new European identity and values, which may have generated concerns about the dilution or disappearance of their own cultural and traditional identities. On the other hand, globalization and the process of European integration have presented challenges for Central and Eastern European countries. In the wave of globalization, some countries or individuals worry that their local culture and identity will be impacted and eroded by external influences. Additionally, EU integration may create tension between a “European identity” and a “local identity”, as well as concerns about national sovereignty and independence.56 This sense of identity anxiety can manifest politically, socially, and culturally. Politically, some Central and Eastern European countries have witnessed a resurgence of nationalism and conservatism, reflecting a strong identification with local values and cultural traditions. Socially, individuals may experience unease about their social status and opportunities, fearing the marginalization of their national culture and values. Culturally, there may be resistance and rejection of foreign cultural influences as a means of preserving the authenticity of their local identity and culture.

55 56

Wang (2022). Esteban and Otero-Iglesias (2020).

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4.2.2 Germany’s Perception on “China-CEEC” Cooperation Mechanism Germany is the most important political and economic partner of most CEE countries without any doubt. Germany is the leading investor and top trade partner for the region; German companies employ almost a million people in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, and in the rest of the CEE countries. When it comes to the China-CEEC cooperation, the perceptions of Germany are utmost important. While the concerns of Brussels or of the EEAS are political in nature, the German point of view has economic motivations as well. Berlin considers CEE countries as an economic backyard and sphere of influence; thus, the emergence of China in the region is under close surveillance by Germany.57 After the reunification of Germany, it creates a new type of relationship with Central and Eastern European countries regarding politics, economy, and diplomacy. Politically, Germany takes a corresponding position on the question of being deported Germans and confirming their borders with their eastern neighbors. In November 1990, Germany and Poland signed a border agreement between the two countries, recognizing that the edge of Granica na Odrze i Nysie Łu˙zyckiej (Oder-Neisse line) is the border between the two countries. In February 1992, Germany signed a friendship treaty with Czechoslovakia, known as Czech-German Declaration; it improves relations between the two countries. Moreover, the German government also does not support the demand for “return to Eastern (central) Europe” for the German nationals who are expelled by some Eastern European countries after the World War II (compensation for land and property).58 In January 1997, Germany and the Czech Republic issued a joint declaration on the Sudeten German Question and the expulsion of German nationals. The two sides abandon the political and legal issues arising from history and jointly looked to the future. As a result, Germany and the related Central and Eastern European countries achieve a historic reconciliation, which dramatically improves bilateral relations and settle a stable legal and political foundation for further consolidation and development of relations between Germany and Central and Eastern Europe. Regarding economy, the reunified Germany, with its geographical location, economic strength, and market demand, it continuously expands its economic ties with Central and Eastern European countries, and a significant amount of capital flows into CEE countries and creates industrial clusters in these countries. According to the data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe become the world’s fastest-growing automobile production area after China. Some Central and Eastern European countries, i.e., Poland, Czech Republic, become an integral part of the German industry chain, or their companies, i.e., Skoda, are included in the German market system and standards.

57 58

Matura (2017) and Song (2018). Zhu (2016).

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200.00 Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia

150.00

Czechia Estonia Greece Hungary

100.00

Latvia Lithuania Montenegro North Macedonia

50.00

Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia

0.00 2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Fig. 4.2 Trade between Germany and CEE Countries (2012–2022, in billion USD). Data Statistisches Bundesamt (The Federal Statistical Office, DE)

From the perspective of trade between Germany and Central and Eastern European countries, it shows the continuous expansion and deepening of economic ties with Central and Eastern European countries. From 2012 to 2022, the total value of imports and exports in Germany and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (as shown in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3) is 321.81 billion to 522.62 billion. In addition, compared with China, Germany has closer trade with Central and Eastern European countries. In the past ten years, Germany’s trade volume with CEE countries has been higher than that of China. Regarding diplomacy, Germany actively interacts with Central and Eastern European countries regarding multilateral relations and promotes its accession to NATO and the European Union. While joining NATO and the European Union is mostly independent of these countries, Germany remains one of the principal collaborators in joining the EU process, which provides Germany with virtually the possibility of influencing countries in Central and Eastern Europe. To continue to promote the expansion of the EU, Germany starts the “Berlin Process”. While encouraging countries in the Western Balkans to unremittingly move closer to the European Union, Germany hopes to strengthen its political and economic relations with these countries, thereby furthering the economic and political impact to the entire Central and Eastern Europe region and at the same time dilute Russia’s interests. After nearly 30 years of adjustment and mutual adaptation, Germany and CEE countries are forming new interdependencies in the political and economic affairs of the European continent, even though this dependency is not symmetrical.

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95

600.00

500.00

400.00

300.00

200.00

100.00

0.00

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 China 56.08 58.77 64.76 60.19 63.14 73.16 89.29 95.45 103.45 136.18 142.79 Germany 321.81 344.51 377.77 343.92 363.92 403.70 451.39 439.34 424.48 513.14 522.62

Fig. 4.3 Total Trade between Germany and CEE Countries (2012–2022, in billion USD). Data Statistisches Bundesamt (The Federal Statistical Office, DE)

Politically, Germany demonstrates a firm political will in the face of the major crises by the EU (such as the refugee crisis and the “Brexit” of the UK), which highlighting Germany’s political role as a major EU country. Therefore, more Central and Eastern European countries are included in the German economic circle. The economic development of Germany has a significant impact on the economic status of Central and Eastern European countries. The reliance of the Central and Eastern European countries on the German market is further strengthened. Regarding diplomacy, Germany is already the chief decision maker and executor of the EU’s foreign affairs. It leads to the fact that in the coming period, Central and Eastern European countries have to strengthen their cooperation with Germany in foreign affairs. On the other hand, this new repositioning of “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism signals profound worries in Berlin that the mechanism in its present form might be doing more harm than good to larger Berlin’s interests in Europe. Nevertheless, Berlin objects many times to the further development of the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism. For example, then German Chancellor Angela Merkel raised the topic during her visit to China in late May 2018. Shortly after the end of her visit, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi met with his German counterpart in Berlin, where he suggested that Germany would be welcome to participate trilaterally in the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism’s activities.59 Following the EU’s concerns about increasing Chinese involvement in Europe, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi met his German counterpart, Heiko Maas, on May 31 to assuage European fears. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described the “China-CEEC” 59

Wang Yi Meets with Foreign Minister Heiko Maas of Germany (2018).

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cooperation mechanism as in keeping with the EU’s regulations, explaining that EU representatives are invited to events, including the upcoming seventh annual meeting in July. The ministry also made clear that all previous summits are promoted European integration, with encouragement toward collaboration with more EU countries. China also describes the close relationship between Germany and central and eastern Europe, explaining that China is considering trilateral cooperation with Germany and the CEE countries. The economic advantages of China and Germany would support the developmental potential of CEE, allowing for collaboration on specific projects. Furthermore, to stress good intentions, China states that “Germany and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe enjoy close ties; therefore, we are actively considering opening a tripartite cooperation with Germany in Central and Eastern Europe. We look forward to combining the advantages of economic complementarity of China and Germany with the development needs of the Central and Eastern European region, to jointly carry out concrete project cooperation”.60 But in fact, as the previous guidelines reached by the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism put interconnection and intercommunication on priority cooperation matters, Germany and EU institutions view the Chinese actions with suspicion, not only do they believe China’s initiative are basically aimed at exporting Chinese industrial overcapacity and revising global standards on trade and investments, they are also concerned that the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism could make EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe dependent on Chinese resources and, accordingly, aligned with Beijing’s policies. Moreover, some nations in Europe intend to search for balance in a distorted relationship, which aim to bolster their economic growth with the help of Chinese investments and loans.61 As they grow increasingly indebted to Chinese lenders, it is believed these countries could be pushed into sabotaging the EU’s attempt to set up a screening mechanism for foreign investments in security-sensitive industries, which is principally designed to protect the EU’s high-tech sector from China’s unfair investment practices. When then Chinese premier, Li Keqiang talks with Merkel, he emphasized that Beijing had always supported European integration. But behind Germany’s pushing back against Chinese transport investments in Europe’s peripheral countries, there could actually be Berlin’s own national interest, rather than the protection of the EU as a whole. For example, Duisburg, in Western Germany, is the European hub for China’s new rail Silk Road. Duisburger Hafen, the public company that runs the local fluvial port, signed a deal last year to create a connection with Italy’s northern port of Trieste, which is expected to become the Western end of Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road. Germany is keen to remain the only intermodal terminal in Europe of the BRI framework. The Duisburg-Trieste connection serves this purpose, as its development is alternative to another China-sponsored Silk Road route, the planned transport corridor that should link the Greek port of Piraeus, the Balkans, and Central Europe, of which the Belgrade-Budapest rail line is a key segment.

60 61

Wang Yi responds to European concerns about “16 + 1 cooperation” (2018). Matura (2017).

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Despite all this, in terms of the size of Germany’s trade with China, it is unsurprising that Merkel handles with care the issue of China-related investments in Europe during her meetings with Xi Jinping in 2018. The Chinese giant is Germany’s largest trading partner in 2017. Their combined trade stands at US$218.5 billion in 2017 with Beijing running a surplus of $17.5 billion.62 Just like in the case of Germany’s ties with Russia, which are currently marred by mistrust and tensions, Merkel appears intent on finding “islands of cooperation” with China. Berlin and its major EU allies are ready to cooperate with Beijing on Eurasian connectivity, but only on an equal basis, and in accordance with internationally recognized standards for financing, labor conditions, environmental protection and procurement procedures. Germany and China could work together to as the EU’s alternative plan for Europe–Asia connectivity, which is in the offing. So, there is evidently room for win–win cooperation between Germany and China on Eurasian integration, provided the Chinese government does not overplay its hand in Europe. Therefore, China’s relationship with Germany not only has an impact on the already existing alliance relations within the EU and the geopolitical aspects of the European continent but also has a certain degree of influence on the relations between the Central and Eastern European countries. It can be said that the Central and Eastern European countries are Germany’s most important neighbors, and German interests in the region are comprehensive. Regardless of the political or economic structure, the region has certain exclusive characteristics. During the early stages of transition in the Central and Eastern European countries, Germany seized the opportunity of privatization in each country and acquired a large number of banks in the region, directly influencing the policies and intensity of corporate and personal loans in those countries. At the same time, German manufacturing conglomerates acquired numerous companies in the region and entered the Central and Eastern European market through greenfield investments and other forms, which to some extent promoted the privatization process in the region but also resulted in a heavy reliance of the Central and Eastern European countries on German capital and technology. Since Olaf Scholz taking office in 2021, the new government has emphasized a value-based foreign policy. This policy principle regards human rights, democracy, rule of law, equality, and multilateralism as core values and incorporates them into important aspects of Germany’s foreign relations.63 Furthermore, the Scholz government emphasizes the importance of European integration and sees it as key to promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. They support strengthening EU unity and cooperation to address common challenges, and through promoting inclusive and sustainable European growth, aim to achieve prosperity and fairness in Europe.64 As a recent example, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, during his visit to Lithuania, publicly stated that the

62

Eurostat (2017). Maihold et al. (2021). 64 Rühlig (2020). 63

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coercive measures taken by China against Lithuania are unacceptable and should be revoked.65 In conclusion, the current release of relatively continual interaction mechanisms within Europe results in the emergence of a new possibility of closer ties between China and Europe. If the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism initially serves the development of relations between China and CEE countries, Europe, the destination of the “China-CEEC” eventually becomes the most “dazzling” partner with its developed economy and solid foundation of trilateral relations.66

4.2.3 China–Russia–CEEC Relations Concretely, the trilateral relations between China, Russia, and Central and Eastern European countries are manifested in the following three aspects. First, competition and cooperation in the energy sector. From the perspective of the three countries in the world energy field, Russia is the energy supplier, while China and the Central and Eastern European countries are the energy demanders. This pattern determines that the cooperation of any two of the three can form a constraint on third parties. Due to its eagerness to get rid of its dependence on Russia’s energy sources, Central and Eastern European countries hope to increase natural gas imports from Central Asia in recent years,67 and this undoubtedly forms a direct competitive relationship with the energy strategy of Central Asia that China increasingly values in recent years. Unlike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe where energy is highly dependent on Russia, the low degree of energy dependency between China and Russia determines that there is no complicated interest dispute between the two sides in energy development. Second, on the competition and cooperation in the construction of the Eurasian transport corridor. China is trying its best to build its “Belt and Road” Initiative, as a modern version of the Silk Road, it intends to build a transportation infrastructure that links Eurasia to the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean and ultimately achieve economic integration of the Eurasian continent. The entire (or most) of the Eurasian transport corridors that have actual transport capacity need to transit Russia, including the Siberian Landbridge, the New Eurasian Land Bridge, and the newly opened “China Express Railway”. It forms a situation in which Russia monopolized the existing European and Asian transportation landscape. Therefore, on the issue of building a future Eurasian transport corridor, it forms the basis for China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries and its competition with Russia. In the process of connecting with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, China also opens up new channels for the passage of Russia to realize the diversification of the Eurasian transport system. The construction of direct

65

China lashes out at US for supporting Lithuania in feud with Beijing over Taiwan (2020). Gu (2018). 67 Rousseau (2012). 66

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350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

Million Tones

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022Q1Q3

2022-Q1

2022-Q2

2022-Q3

319.1

300.2

264

275.6

156.2

65.1

54.5

36.6

Fig. 4.4 EU imports of energy products from Russia. Data Eurostat (trade in net mass)

transport links to CEE can significantly reduce the logistics costs between these two regions. For example, when Chinese leaders visit Serbia in 2016, they expressed support for The Zemun-Borca Bridge project and considered that develops the EuropeanBalkan-Asian transportation corridor; it is necessary to strengthen the cooperation between China and the Balkan countries.68 On the other hand, European institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also participate in the construction of China’s infrastructure construction in CEE. But since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022, the EU seeks its independency on energy relations with Russia. Majority of European countries’ imports of all kinds of energy from Russia gradually fell across each quarter of 2022. While 275.6 million tons of energy products were imported from Russia in 2021, only 156.2 million tons were imported in the first three quarters of 2022 (Fig. 4.4). For example, from 2007 to 2014, Russia cooperates with the Balkan countries through the construction of the “South Stream” project. In 2008, Gazprom signed an agreement with Serbia to purchase 51% of the Naftna industrija Srbije (Petroleum Industry of Serbia) for 400 million euros. The company accounts for 78% of Serbia’s oil product share. It has two refineries, one gas training plant, 388 gas stations, which distributed in Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this sense, China and Russia end natural gas negotiations for more than a decade. One of the principal reasons is the catalytic effect of the intensified conflict between Europe and Russia during the current Ukrainian crisis. Secondly, the geopolitical conflicts between Europe and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe are deeply concerned about the future changes in Russia’s identity and thus have a substantial potential impact on China. Moreover, The EU-Russia relationship under the background of the EU and NATO’s eastward expansion is crucial for Russia’s final choice of European identity 68

Sekularac (2016).

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or Eurasian identity. Judging from the current situation, because of the tight relations between the United States and Russia, and the recent conflicts between the EU and Russia on the Ukrainian issue, Russia’s “Europeanization” cannot be realized in the short term. In fact, under the pressure of the EU and the United States, Putin’s Russia increasingly tends to choose its “Eurasian countries” status. The choice of identities subtly influences the policy orientation of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Far East, and thus has a substantial impact on China’s CEE’s strategy. The outline of the trilateral relations between China, Central and Eastern Europe, and Russia emerges in the current Ukrainian crisis, the construction of the Eurasian energy development and transportation system. It undoubtedly reflects the significance of the rise of Central and Eastern Europe as a geopolitical sector in international politics. A prominent feature of the current China-CEE-Russia relationship is that there is no mature trilateral coordination mechanism among the three parties. If references scholars define the existing trilateral relations, the political legitimacy of the trilateral mechanism is still questionable.69 However, the author believes that the trilateral mechanisms are not necessarily related to the trilateral relations. The lack of a trilateral coordination mechanism between China, CEE, and Russia does not hinder the trilateralization of their relations. Whether or not the trilateral relations can form a coordination mechanism mainly depends on the degree of zeroness embodied in this trilateral relationship, that is, whether the three bases on a competitive relationship or a cooperative relationship. In the trilateral with a robust zero-sum relationship, the three parties exhibit competitiveness and lack the basis for cooperation, for example, Sino-US-Russian relations, Sino-US-Japan relations. On the contrary, the three parties show active cooperation, and their trust mainly bases on common ideology or geopolitical interests, for example, the United States-Japan-Australia relations. Take geopolitical relations as an example, the zero-sum nature of the trilateral relations between China, CEE, and Russia reflects in the fact that because the geopolitical focus of Central and Eastern European countries remains in Europe, and the trilateral geopolitical interests are still more conflict-prone than cooperative. Therefore, the participation of Central and Eastern European countries in Eurasia naturally inhibits in both the will and the practice. It marks by a specific European stand. Therefore, it not delighted by Russia in particular. Russia still controls the core area of Eurasia. It is geographically closely linked to China with Central and Eastern Europe. However, China with Central and Eastern European countries not wholly abandon their defense against Russia. As far as China-Russia relations are concerned, although relations between the two countries reach an unprecedented tie, Russia apparently not gives up its precautions against China. In Russia, the Chinese threat theory still exists extensively.70 Especially in recent years, the economic strength of China and Russia is shifting.

69 70

Womack (2016). Solomentseva (2014).

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This sharp contrast inevitably puts pressure on Russia. It is worried that the rise of China will threaten Russia’s security. For Central and Eastern European countries relations with Russia, Poland, and Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia urge NATO to characterize Russia as a “potential aggressor” in the summit communique. Moreover, take Poland as an example, Polish foreign policy toward the Russian threat, aptly assessed by the current governing party, rightly criticizing for the preceding eight years the unjustified trust shown by the PO-PSL government in the good intentions of Putin’s Russia, as well as improving and giving substance to the bilateral relations with its eastern neighbors.71 Russia’s policy determines the situation to the east of Polish borders. Such as it is developing close ties with the Central and Eastern European countries, which share Poland’s point of view concerning the nature of the threat posed by Russia. Similarly, for the Czech Republic, although its former Minister of Industry and Trade Jan Mládek regards Russia as the main non-EU economic partner of the Czech Republic, in the diplomatic and defense fields, Russia is still regarded by the Czech Republic as a potential threat. According to a study by Poland think tank, OSW (O´srodek Studiów Wschodnich, The Centre for Eastern Studies), the majority of the Czech public are loyal to the trans-Atlantic orientation.72 For Russia, Russia is particularly concerned about the implementation of NATO and US missile defense system projects in Europe, especially at the base of Redzikowo, Poland. Niinistö Plan, as an initiative, intends at reducing the number of flight incidents by obliging NATO member states, Sweden, and Finland, and above all Russia, but in fact to reduce tension with Russia. It also responds to the security risks caused by NATO missile defense systems in Romania and Poland. Because, after all, the United States is deployed missile defense systems in Romania and Poland, and the possible consequences of such infrastructure remain the biggest threat to Russian security.73 At the end of February 2022, Russia launched military actions against Ukraine with the objective of achieving the “demilitarization” of Ukraine and removing the aggressive threat posed by NATO’s ongoing eastward expansion since the end of the Cold War. For Central and Eastern European countries, a stable and secure external environment remains a priority in their foreign policies. After most of these countries joined NATO and the European Union, the question of how to maintain relationships with the major powers remains a pressing issue. Due to the heterogeneity of Central and Eastern European countries, there are significant differences among them, and their interests vary. Therefore, the relationships between Central and Eastern European countries and Russia are individualized rather than based on a collective approach. Despite the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict for over a year, there are still evident internal divisions among the Central and Eastern European countries. For example, the Baltic states, representing the more radical faction, consider Russia’s security threat as the most important security issue 71

Zurawski (2016). Groszkowski (2015). 73 Darczewska and Zochowski ˙ (2017). 72

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and believe that the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict requires “defeating Russia”. In particular, after the outbreak of the conflict, the majority of Central and Eastern European countries firmly stood with Ukraine, strongly condemning Russia. They once again participated in the various sanctions imposed by Western countries against Russia and called for NATO to enhance military deployment on the eastern border, demonstrating a clear sense of vigilance towards Russia. In response, Russia included all EU countries, including most Central and Eastern European countries, in its list of “unfriendly countries”. For China, it finds itself in an awkward position between Russia and the vast majority of Central and Eastern European countries due to geopolitical factors and constraints from traditional partnerships. On one hand, China prioritizes its relationship with Russia in its foreign relations. China and Russia are neighbors, and their relationship has gone through many ups and downs, ultimately culminating in a close strategic partnership in the 21st century. On the other hand, while hoping to continue developing relations with Central and Eastern European countries, China is unable to directly express its stance in this situation. It should be acknowledged that there is a certain level of competition between China and Russia in the economic realm within Central and Eastern European countries. China needs to pay attention to the future cooperation trends between Russia and these countries.74 Given these complexities, China faces challenges in navigating its relationships with both Russia and Central and Eastern European countries. China’s approach will likely involve careful considerations of its own interests, balancing its partnerships, and seeking to maintain stability and positive engagement in the region.75

4.2.4 China-US-CEEC Relations Amid the intensifying strategic competition between China and the United States, the competition between the two countries has affected the Central and Eastern European region. Central and Eastern European countries are mostly allies or security partners of the United States. Through a series of bilateral alliance relationships, the United States not only maintains its military presence in the region but also upholds its regional hegemony. Simultaneously, the United States’ allies, including Central and Eastern European countries, often consider American regional interests and will in their decision-making processes, particularly when dealing with foreign relations and formulating policies towards China. Looking at the challenges China has faced in recent years while conducting diplomacy in Central and Eastern European countries, it is evident that China encounters difficulties in avoiding the direct or indirect influence exerted by the United States in regional multilateral mechanisms, as well as in economic and trade interactions when engaging in strategic competition with the United States in the region. 74 75

Gu (2018). Veebel (2015).

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China’s cooperation in CEE countries has suffered many setbacks since the turnaround in China-US relations. For example, some politicians have accused China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China-CEE Cooperation (“16/17+1”) of creating a “debt trap” and inducing corruption and opaque cooperation. At the same time, the US has pressured Central and Eastern European countries on the grounds of information and economic security, trying hard to pull Central and Eastern European countries to ostracize the Chinese company Huawei. In the case of infrastructure development, for example, some Western media and think tanks have been trumpeting the “debt trap” and the “China threat theory”.76 Simultaneously, the Biden administration has departed from the “decoupling” strategy of the Trump era and adopted a three-pillar approach towards China focusing on “investment, alliance, and competition”. It aims to maintain continued cooperation with allies on common goals while making significant domestic investments in competitiveness, innovation, and democracy. These developments have led to a more challenging environment for China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. Accusations of debt traps and concerns about China’s influence have cast a shadow over Chinese initiatives, while the United States has actively engaged in countering China’s presence in the region. The competition between the United States and China for influence in Central and Eastern Europe has added complexities to the dynamics of regional cooperation. Since the Trump administration took office, the United States has initiated a trade war with China and imposed restrictions on Chinese technology, aiming to achieve substantial decoupling in the technology sector. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has modified the Export Administration Regulations, placing Chinese companies on the Entity List, thereby strengthening export controls on high-tech technologies and products under the guise of “national security”. The United States seeks to separate Chinese technology products from the global tech supply chain, employing extraterritorial jurisdiction to restrict the export of core products by other countries to China and hinder normal business activities of Chinese enterprises. A recent example of Chinese practices in other parts of the world includes strategic investments aimed at obtaining influence and political leverage. Chinese telecommunications investments, such as Huawei, have raised security concerns, which are now being considered on both sides of the Atlantic. Taking Poland as an example, Huawei holds a significant market share in Poland and has conducted tests of 5G technology with Orange, Poland’s largest telecommunications operator. However, the United States is concerned that China’s progress in Poland through commercial transactions and infrastructure investments has become a core issue in the strategic competition between the United States and China in Poland. In January 2020, the European Union issued policy measures for member states in building 5G networks, which identified so-called high-risk vendors. Although these measures did not specifically mention companies like Huawei, they indicated the increasing vigilance of the EU regarding the alleged potential risks posed by Chinese

76

Ma (2022).

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suppliers to European network security. These factors have contributed to the worsening attitudes of many central governments, including those in Eastern European countries, towards China. This is particularly evident in their stance on 5G security issues related to China.77 In addition, at the strategic level, to counter China’s “16/17+1” Cooperation Mechanism, the United States has reached out to its allies and proposed the “Three Seas Initiative” since 2016. The Three Seas Initiative is a regional cooperation platform in Central and Eastern Europe that aims to enhance connectivity, infrastructure, and energy security among its member countries. The initiative takes its name from the fact that it involves countries located around the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea. The Three Seas countries include Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This initiative overlaps significantly with China’s “16/17+1” cooperation mechanism in terms of the geopolitical map. On the one hand, the Three Seas Initiative reflects the development needs of transportation, energy, and telecommunications networks along the north-south axis of Central and Eastern European countries. On the other hand, it serves as a primary means for the United States to assist in the energy diversification of Central and Eastern European countries. The Three Seas Initiative is primarily a geopolitical-economic project, but the competition in the energy sector carries geopolitical implications. Therefore, against the backdrop of great power competition, countries such as the Czech Republic and Lithuania in Central and Eastern Europe have immediately taken countermeasures against China. Clearly, their policies towards China are not simply about balancing or following, but rather a strategic choice of employing both approaches simultaneously. It can be said that China’s diplomatic relations with the United States’ allies have already transcended the scope of bilateral relations. In the current international environment where sovereign norms are widely accepted, the influence of the United States on the foreign behavior of its allies is not achieved through coercion or solely through the exchange of interests but rather through authoritative relationships. After many Central and Eastern European countries join the European Union, the US’s attitude toward Europe continent undergoes subtle changes, and it no longer supports it as thoroughly as the Cold War. To prevent the emergence of a competitor who challenges the global hegemony of the United States. The primary geostrategic means of the United States in the Western wing of Eurasia is NATO’s eastward expansion. It proposes a new NATO strategy, that is, the active intervention from the collective defense to the outside of the region. NATO is a transatlantic military security organization led by the United States. After the eastward expansion, NATO is the tool for the United States to maintain its dominance in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, NATO’s eastward expansion allows the United States to control the strategic vacuum that emerges after the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe. It prevents Russia from regaining control after it re-emerged.

77

Report on the EU 5G Toolbox Implementation by Member States Published (2020).

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What is even more important is that after the eastward expansion of NATO, the center of Europe moves further eastward, which also increases the status of Germany in NATO. Due to the reunification of Germany’s concerns and the competition between France and Germany for European leadership, the cohesiveness of Europe weakens to some extent. It gives the United States more significant role in Central and Eastern European affairs. Therefore, NATO’s eastward expansion is an essential measure for the United States to consolidate and expand the achievements of the Cold War. At the same time, China’s rise is also facing tremendous geopolitical pressure from the United States. With China’s increasingly close cooperation in the Central and Eastern Europe region, the United States’ strategic interests in the Central and Eastern Europe region also challenged. Regarding the US military presence in Europe, the Central and Eastern European countries are not optimistic about the EU’s military capabilities and operational capabilities. They hope to rely on the United States and NATO that it provides more stable and longer-term protection for its territory to withstand possible threats from Russia. In international security affairs, Central and Eastern European countries also go even closer with the United States. For the United States, the Trump administration focuses more on internal issues. The US government still regards Europe as the most critical partner. It continues to “invest” in the US-Europe partnership, but it expects that Europe plays a more important role in world security affairs and increase military spending. The investment of resources makes greater contributions to NATO’s global actions and accelerate the “rebalancing” of Europe and the United States within the framework of NATO. In this group of trilateral relations, China is more concerned with economic and trade issues. If it looks at the volume of trade in 2022, the economic and trade relations between the United States and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not very close, that is, the volume of trade between the United States and the Central and Eastern European countries is not very large. The United States has the most significant trade volume with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. At the same time, the trade deficit for these countries is also the greatest (Figs. 4.5 and 4.6). Although the bilateral trade volume between China and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe also increases rapidly in the past years, for the sake of both China and the United States, the United States shows a trade deficit in the trade balance and China has a surplus. However, US multinational corporations are the mainstay of US investment in Central and Eastern Europe. The US investment in Central and Eastern European countries concentrates in various manufacturing industries such as electronic products, machinery, and automobiles. Many of the well-known giant manufacturing multinational companies in the United States have investment projects in Central and Eastern European countries such as Microsoft, IBM, Dell, General, Johnson Controls, HP, Whirlpool, AT&T, and Philip Morris International. Especially in the IT industry, the investment of US companies is increasing. At present, most Chinese companies investing in Central and Eastern Europe are large-scale state-owned enterprises and mainly concentrates on infrastructure cooperation.

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4 Relations in the Wider Neighborhood: Global Dimensions 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00

Bosn ia Mon Alba and Bulg Croa Czec Esto Gree Hun Latvi Lithu tene nia Herz raia tia h nia ce gary a ania gro egov ina

Nort h Pola Rom Serbi Slov Slov Mac nd ania a akia enia edon ia

Import from CEE-17 0.15 0.17 1.51 0.86 7.54 1.38 2.28 7.71 0.75 2.63 0.01 0.23 11.91 3.78 0.70 6.51 3.00 Export to CEE-17

0.12 0.03 0.52 1.77 3.80 0.40 2.17 2.87 0.40 2.49 0.04 0.06 11.33 1.35 0.25 0.38 0.39

Total

0.26 0.20 2.04 2.63 11.34 1.78 4.45 10.58 1.15 5.12 0.05 0.28 23.23 5.13 0.95 6.89 3.39

Fig. 4.5 Trade between US and CEE countries (2022). Data International Trade Administration

160.00 140.00 120.00 100.00 80.00 60.00 40.00 20.00 0.00

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

China 56.08

58.77

64.76

60.19

63.14

73.16

89.29

95.45

103.45 136.18 142.79

US

33.53

37.28

37.61

37.90

42.12

48.36

51.54

49.92

31.20

2020

2021 61.56

2022 79.46

Fig. 4.6 Trade Comparison of China and US to CEE countries (2012–2022). Data International Trade Administration

In Riga Declaration,78 China supports Port Area cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries bordering the Baltic, Adriatic, and the Black Sea, and establishment of China-CEEC Secretariat for Maritime Issues in Poland, to promote cooperation among the major ports of the coastal areas, support building coastal industrial clusters, and encourage cooperation in infrastructure development, including railways, roads, waterways, and logistics hubs. The Port Area countries include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in the Baltic Sea region, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Herzegovina and Albania in the Adriatic Sea region, and Romania and Bulgaria in the Black Sea region. The population is about 85 million, and the total GDP exceeds 1 trillion US 78

Riga Declaration (2016).

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dollars.79 There are more than 50 coastal ports in the region, of which there are more than 20 international ports, and the annual cargo throughput reaches 120 million tons. Although this is similar to the Three Seas Initiative initiated by Poland and Croatia in 2016, also known as the Baltic, Adriatic, Black Sea (BABS) Initiative, A regional cooperation mechanism that spans Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe aims to integrate together the European countries around the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. The Three Seas Initiative has twelve-member countries along a north–south axis from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea— Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2017, the Port Gdansk signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Port of Rijeka in Croatia. Bo˙zena Jankowska,80 deputy finance director of the Port Gdansk, believes that the development of the European transport network is one of the priorities of the Port Gdansk. Memorandum signs with the port of Rijeka, including projects related to the “Three Seas Initiative” and the TEN-T program, marks an important step toward close cooperation. Although in the 2017 Budapest Guidelines, “Participants take note of the Three Seas Initiative proposed by relevant countries, and welcome Croatian and Slovenian progress on Mediterranean railway corridor from Port of Rijeka and Port of Koper toward CEECs and seek to investigate”. However, for countries such as Poland and other “three-sea countries”, they are on the eastern edge of the European Union and in the eastern frontier of NATO. They have both psychological distances and development gaps with Germany, France, and other “Western” European countries. They also directly face the unresolved and powerful Russia. The diversified demand for energy sources is, therefore, more urgent. In recent years, with the continuous increase of natural gas production in the United States, the export of LNG to the Central and Eastern European countries by the United States is becoming a new area of bilateral economic and trade cooperation. On ´ June 8, 2017, the first LNG ship in the United States is dismantled at Port Swinouj´ scie in northwestern Poland. In July of the same year, Trump states at the Three Seas Summit in Warsaw that “The United States is proud to see that our abundant energy resources are already helping the Three Seas Nations achieve much-needed energy diversification”. Exporting liquefied natural gas to Europe can not only enable the United States to obtain substantial economic benefits but also to some extent ease the dependence of Europe, especially the Central and Eastern European countries, on Russian energy sources, which can enable these countries to formulate more flexible policies toward Russia.81 US Energy Information and Administration (EIA) reports that in 2017, US natural gas (liquefied) exports by vessel to Poland is 3.44 billion cubic feet, and Lithuania is

79

World Bank Open Data (2022). Port of Gdansk Authority and Port of Rijeka sign memorandum of cooperation (2017). 81 Kono´ nczuk and Matuszak (2017). 80

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6.844 billion cubic feet. After Trump comes to power, he advocates energy independence and abolishes the Obama administration’s policies to curb traditional energy development and encourage clean energy. At the same time, it increases infrastructure investment and market expansion for oil, natural gas, and shale oil extraction. Europe, which lacks oil and gas resources, is naturally one of the markets that the United States is targeting and working hard to develop. One-third of the European countries’ natural gas supply comes from Russia.82 Due to the geographical friction, especially the security friction caused by NATO’s eastward expansion, the strategic game between the United States, Europe, and Russia is unable to strip politics and trade in the energy sector. Therefore, the diversification of natural gas and energy security in Europe becomes a new consensus between the United States and Europe in dealing with Russia. The security and economic objectives of US policy toward Central and Eastern Europe have not undergone substantial changes from the Trump administration to the Biden administration. What has changed is the means by which the US confronts China in the region, shifting from direct coercion to behind-the-scenes guidance and re-engaging allies under the banner of a values-based alliance to launch a new round of containment and exclusion against China. Under the influence of the United States, a significant number of Central and Eastern European countries have joined the NATO alliance and engaged in various political and military cooperation within its framework. Against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe, driven by the United States, have conducted multiple large-scale military exercises to strengthen NATO’s military presence in the region. Meanwhile, the implementation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly the construction of the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line, may potentially compete with the strategic corridor projects pursued by the United States in the region. It remains a subject of further scrutiny whether the United States would use the pretext of safeguarding the security of strategic transport routes in Central and Eastern Europe to obstruct China’s infrastructure development in the region.83 Additionally, while China’s investment in Central and Eastern European countries has grown rapidly over the past decade, there are still many issues in the economic and trade relations between China and these countries. For instance, there is a significant trade imbalance in favor of China, limited investment diversification, and a single trade structure in the investment field between Central and Eastern European countries and China. Chinese companies also face challenges in adapting to the local environment. The presence of the United States has to some extent squeezed the space for China’s economic and trade interactions with Central and Eastern European countries. For example, during Trump’s administration has pursued “pivot to Central and Eastern Europe” strategy to develop investment and trade relations with these countries. In terms of trade and investment integration, particularly with the European Union, the United States still holds a considerable advantage over China. With the advancement of the Biden administration, the economic and trade relations 82 83

Poland–US Energy Information Administration (2018). Biden (2020).

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between the United States and Central and Eastern European countries may become more prominent compared to China.

4.3 Concluding Remarks The implementation of the diplomatic strategy is primarily constrained by the policies of major powers, namely the United States, the European Union, and Russia toward Central and Eastern European countries and their mutual relations. The US, its headed NATO, and the European Union as acceptors of the Central and Eastern European countries determine the process of CEE countries. Russia, as a long-term threat in the eyes of most CEE countries, and CEE countries still remain wary of Russia’s policies and intentions. The United States, the European Union, and Russia are far from forming a three-way status. The United States is still the only superpower in the world. Although there are differences between the United States and the EU, the fundamental values and social system are the same, and there are many common interests, whereas Russia is the goal of the United States and Europe to prevent.84 In this context, most CEE countries join NATO and the EU, and all CEE countries can be expected to become members, although this may be a long process. This formula of the US, the European Union, and Russia will present for a long time, which is a structural limitation that China’s cooperation policy cannot eliminate. Such restrictions force China to consider the core interests of the EU and other countries; it challenges the core interests of either party leads to corresponding policy setbacks and difficulties in achieving the set goals. The rapid expansion of China’s involvement and influence in the Central and Eastern Europe creates new multilateral relations between China, the United States, Russia, and the EU that are centered on Central and Eastern European affairs. As a newcomer, the expansion of China’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe, in the views by the Western powers and Russia, weakens the traditional influence of the United States, Russia, and especially the European Union in this arena, and forcing them to change their original policies. However, if one abandons one’s preconceptions, one will find that there are also many intersections of interests in promoting stable development in Central and Eastern Europe, which can serve as a basis for future cooperation. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began at the end of February 2022 has systematically changed the security structure of the Central and Eastern European region. Indeed, the consequences have reinforced negative perceptions of China among Central and Eastern European countries. In the prevailing political environment of “anti-Russia” sentiment, China’s image in these countries has been negatively affected due to its association with Russia. China finds itself in a disadvantaged position within the public discourse of Central and Eastern European countries. Furthermore, following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the position and influence 84

Nye (2008).

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of CEE countries within EU decision-making have increased. The deterioration of China’s relations with countries such as Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and the Czech Republic, along with the growing proximity of China-Russia relations, has generated dissatisfaction among Central and Eastern European countries, thus exerting an unfavorable impact on China-Europe relations. Simultaneously, the Biden administration has strengthened strategic coordination with Central and Eastern European countries in their approach towards China. This coordination aligns more consistently on ideological, economic, trade, technological innovation, and geopolitical issues with countries such as Poland, resulting in a more prominent influence of the United States in China’s relations with Central and Eastern European countries. After the RussiaUkraine conflict, Central and Eastern European countries have become more reliant on the United States in terms of security, strategy, and critical energy matters, thus restricting their strategic autonomy and making them more susceptible to American influence in their relations with China. The influence of the United States is expected to become more pronounced in future cooperation between Central and Eastern European countries and China, particularly in areas related to security and defense, investment review, technology exports to China, and geopolitical concerns such as Taiwan issues.

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Hughes, J. (2007). EU relations with Russia: partnership or asymmetric interdependency? In N. Casarini & C. Musu (Eds.), European foreign policy in an evolving international system: The road towards convergence (pp. 76–94). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978023059 3145_6 Hynek, N., Stritecky, V., Handl, V., & Koˇran, M. (2009). The US–Russian security ‘reset’: Implications for central-eastern Europe and Germany. European Security, 18(3), 263–285. https://doi. org/10.1080/09662831003657192 Jakóbowski, J., & Kaczmarski, M. (2017). Beijing’s mistaken offer: The ‘16+ 1’and China’s policy towards the European Union. Kalan, D. (2012, July 10). Is China picking off individual EU members? EUobserver. https://euo bserver.com/opinion/116926 Kaplan, R. D. (2016, February 15). Eurasia’s coming anarchy. Foreign affairs, March/April 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-02-15/eurasias-coming-anarchy Khan, T. (2015, October 31). Russia dominating nuclear energy market. https://www. valuewalk.com/russia-dominating-nuclear-energy-market/, https://www.valuewalk.com/russiadominating-nuclear-energy-market/ Koenig, N. (2011). The EU and the Libyan Crisis—In quest of coherence? The International Spectator, 46(4), 11–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2011.628089 Kono´nczuk, W., & Matuszak, S. (2017). Dark clouds over the Ukrainian gas market reform. Centre for Eastern Studies. Liu, Z. (2015). The role of Central and Eastern Europe in the building of Silk road economic belt. MeÊynapodni Ppoblemi, LXVII(2–3), 184–195. https://www.ceeol.com/search/articledetail?id=1022819 Lundestad, G. (1998). “Empire” by integration: The United States and European integration, 1945– 1997 (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. Ma, J. (2022, February 25). The myth of the “debt-trap” in China-CEEC cooperation: A fact check. https://china-cee.eu/working_papers/the-myth-of-the-debt-trap-in-china-ceec-coo peration-a-fact-check/ Maihold, G., Mair, S., Müller, M., Vorrath, J., & Wagner, C. (2021). German foreign policy in transition: Volatile conditions, new momentum. SWP Research Paper. Matura, T. (2017). Hungary and China relations. Routledge. Men, J. (2010). The EU-China political dialogue. EU-China Observer, 5, 2–8. Nye, J. S. (2008). Understanding international conflicts: An introduction to theory and history (7th ed.). Longman. O’Sullivan, P. (2014). Geopolitics. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315749617 Pan, Z. (Ed.). (2012). Conceptual gaps in China-EU relations: Global governance, human rights and strategic partnerships. Palgrave Macmillan. Poland economy briefing: economy development in Poland—China-CEE Institute. (2018, April 4). https://china-cee.eu/2018/04/04/poland-economy-briefing-economy-development-in-poland/ Poland—U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (n.d.). Retrieved February 27, 2023, from https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/POL Portnews. (16:31:00+03). Port of Gdansk Authority and Port of Rijeka sign memorandum of cooperation. Poptnb c. https://en.portnews.ru/top_news/249905/ Press, T. A. (2022, January 6). China lashes out at U.S. for supporting Lithuania in feud with Beijing over Taiwan. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2022/01/06/1070856065/china-lashes-out-atus-for-supporting-lithuania-in-feud-with-beijing-over-taiwan Qin, Y. (2009). Development of international relations theory in China. International Studies, 46(1– 2), 185–201. https://econpapers.repec.org/article/saeintstu/v_3a46_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a1-2_ 3ap_3a185-201.htm Report on the EU 5G toolbox implementation by member states published. (2020, July 24). [News Item]. ENISA. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/member-states-report-on-eu-5gtoolbox-released-today Rousseau, R. (2012). The EU looks to central Asia for energy security.

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Rühlig, T. (2020). Towards a more principled European China policy: Democracy, human rights and the rule of law in EU-China relations. Center for Asian Studies, 20. Rutland, P. (2008). Russia as an energy superpower. New Political Economy, 13(2), 203–210. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/13563460802018547 Schilde, K. (2017). European military capabilities: Enablers and constraints on EU Power? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(1), 37–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12444 Sekularac, I. (2016, June 19). China’s Xi sees Serbia as milestone on new “Silk Road.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-china-idUSKCN0Z50DV Shambaugh, D. (2005). The new strategic triangle: U.S. and European reactions to China’s rise. The Washington Quarterly, 28(3), 5–25. https://doi.org/10.1162/0163660054026470 Solomentseva, A. (2014). The “Rise” of China in the eyes of Russia: A source of threats or new opportunities? Connections, 14(1), 3–40. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326384 Song, W. (Ed.). (2018). China’s relations with central and eastern Europe: From “old comrades” to new partners. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Studies (OSW), C. for E., Jakóbowski, J., & Kaczmarski, M. (2016). The EU on granting China market economy status: A compromise or a dodge? 221. https://www.academia.edu/31693809/ Jakub_Jak%C3%B3bowski_Marcin_Kaczmarski_The_EU_on_granting_China_market_eco nomy_status_a_compromise_or_a_dodge_OSW_Commentary_No_221_05_08_2016 The President of Russia: Vladimir Putin took part in the fifth World Congress of compatriots living abroad in Moscow. (n.d.). Presidential Library. Retrieved February 27, 2023, from https://www. prlib.ru/en/events/671722 Veebel, V. (2015). Russian propaganda, disinformation, and Estonia’s experience. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Vuksanovic, V. (2019, October 28). Why Serbia won’t stop playing the Russia card any time soon. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/80188 Wang Yi meets with foreign minister Heiko Maas of Germany. (2018, May 22). https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3265_665445/3296_664550/3298_664554/201805/t20 180524_576077.html Wang Yi responds to European concerns about “16+1 cooperation.” (2018, May 31). http://www. xinhuanet.com/world/2018-05/31/c_1122920711.htm Wang, H. (2022). New Trends in the Great Power Game in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and Opportunities for China-CEEC Cooperation, Global Review, 14(02), 78–98, 152. https:// doi.org/10.13851/j.cnki.gjzw.202202005 Weitz, R. (2010). Illusive visions and practical realities: Russia NATO and missile defence. Survival, 52(4), 99–120. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2010.506824 Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183 Wiarda, H. J. (2001). European politics in the age of globalization (1st ed.). Cengage Learning. Womack, B. (2016). Asymmetry and international relationships. Cambridge University Press. World Bank Open Data. (n.d.). Retrieved February 27, 2023, from https://data.worldbank.org/ Zhou, H. (2017). An overview of the China-EU strategic partnership (2003–2013). In H. Zhou (Ed.), China-EU relations (pp. 3–31). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1145-0_1 Zhu, X. (2016). Several issues on central and eastern European studies. The Journal of International Studies, 37(05), 47–66. https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode= CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2016&filename=GJZY201605003&uniplatform=OVERSEA& v=rzf69hIGJJF_E1s_ho6VgJTUiWUQEOvbCwou3-p77RrgI9XyHxtVjHVMWGlt-LQ8 Zurawski, vel G. P. (2016). Polska polityka wschodnia 1989–2015: Wymiar narodowy i unijny. Osrodek Mysli Politycznej.

Chapter 5

Local Cooperation: New Highlights of China with Central and Eastern Europe

Local government’s external relations emerge in the context of the relationship between the central and the local governments. As an institutional distribution method, it appropriately alleviates the problem of uneven development domestically. As a part of China’s internationalization process, the active involvement of China’s local governments has knock-on effects on their surrounding areas. The existence of globalization enables local government cooperation to generate higher revenue expectations from global contacts. The participation of local governments in international affairs has become an issue of concern in the development of China’s foreign relations. As a sub-state actor, when the interest pursued at the local level is the same as that of the country, local governments act as a useful complement to the country’s overall diplomatic strategy. Starting with the Bucharest Guideline in 2013, cooperation at the local level is encouraged and supported as one of the crucial pillars of China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. This chapter illustrates local cooperation between China and countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It is divided into three parts. The first part will briefly review the development of local cooperation between China and the CEECs. In the second part, it will examine the institutional arrangements of local cooperation to see how they have evolved, in terms of sister cities and city networks, and what has been achieved thus far. The third part will analyze the case of China-CEEC local cooperation within provincial level, involving China’s Western Shaanxi Province with its strategies, and Western Sichuan Province and Łód´z in Poland as examples, and thus gain a realistic and detailed understanding of local cooperation in China-CEEC relations. The examination of these cases not only reveals some fundamentally different understandings of economic changes brought by local governments but also indicates the challenges of China’s future position and policy. The investigation of subnational actors’ activities requires a comprehensive approach. Therefore, in this part of the study, data will be obtained through various reports issued by the Chinese and CEECs government, as well as data published on relevant websites.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Gu, Frustrated Relations?, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3730-1_5

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5.1 The Emergence of Local Cooperation in China In the context of central–local relations, the autonomy of local governments in their external behavior can serve as an institutional mechanism for mitigating issues of regional development imbalance within the domestic environment. As a testing ground for China’s internationalization process, local governments also have a significant diffusion and spillover effect on neighboring regions. The central government can respond to the spillover trend of local internationalization and promote a second wave of internationalization in other regions, which is influenced by both international system factors and considerations of balance in open strategy. In December 2018, State Councilor (now the Director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office) Wang Yi stated at the National Conference of Local Foreign Affairs Directors that local cooperation is essential for Chinese diplomacy,1 as it provides assistance and services to help local areas develop better, while also acting as a crucial and active force in facilitating communication and promoting cooperation between foreign and Chinese localities. From a national perspective, internationalization is one of the most significant phenomena that has emerged in China’s international system in the more than 40 years since the policy of reform and opening-up began. The process of internationalization has become an important link between Chinese regions and the global community, strengthening local dependence on the global system and causing regions to play an extremely important role in China’s internationalization process. In an open economic environment, globalization has created higher expected returns for regions from global connections, and the attractiveness of internationalization has made regions an important internal economic driving force for China’s opening-up. In terms of the country’s foreign relations, the internationalization of regions and the strengthening of their global connections indirectly place regions on the front lines of national foreign relations. The orthodox definition of diplomacy assigns absolute control over diplomacy to the central government. However, as regions’ status in global connections rises, their economic and social functions in the country’s foreign relations may be showing an increasingly expanding trend. The internationalization of regions and their global connections reflect the fact that China’s interdependence with the world is strengthening and is an important foundation for China to establish “partnerships” with the global community. The higher the degree of internationalization, the more obvious the international competitive advantage possessed by regions, and the more likely regions are to support China’s more extensive participation in the international economic system.

1

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018).

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5.1.1 Glocalization: A Type of New Interaction In the context of globalization, cooperation of local governments in international affairs plays an increasingly significant role. Globalization has empowered local governments to have a greater impact in international affairs, prompting them to engage in broader and deeper cooperation and exchanges with other countries, regions, organizations, and non-governmental entities. At the same time, to some extent, the globalization process is accompanied by the process of “regionalization,” which provides an important foundation for global regional and local cooperation. When the author discussed with Professor Zang Shumei once noted that, “Regionalization” itself has two levels of meaning: One is the integration process of regions (and sub-regions) beyond the national level, such as the EU integration process, the sub-regional integration process in Europe, and the other meaning is the gradual increase of regional and local level power within countries.2 These two meanings of “regionalization” are to some extent driven by the forces of globalization and are consistent with the inherent logic of globalization. They can be regarded as a global expression and embodiment of regionalization. In the context of globalization and regionalization, cooperation of local governments in international affairs plays a crucial role. They actively engage in various forms of collaboration including economic integration, regional alliances, crossborder infrastructure development, cultural exchange, and environmental protection. Local governments seek to establish economic ties and promote trade, investment, and cross-border economic activities with neighboring regions or countries to foster regional economic development and competitiveness. Simultaneously, they participate in regional alliances, establish networks and organizations to address common challenges and enhance regional cooperation. Through cross-border infrastructure development, they enhance regional connectivity, facilitate trade, and promote people-to-people exchanges. Local governments actively promote cultural exchange and tourism cooperation, organizing cultural events, festivals, and exhibitions to showcase their unique heritage and attract international visitors. Collaborating with other local governments, they develop joint tourism packages and marketing campaigns to promote regional tourism destinations. Furthermore, local governments collaborate on joint environmental protection and sustainable development initiatives, sharing knowledge, technologies, and best practices in areas such as renewable energy, waste management, and environmental conservation. In summary, local governments actively participate in international affairs in the era of globalization and regionalization through economic integration, regional alliances, infrastructure development, cultural exchange, and environmental cooperation. Their engagement not only strengthens regional cooperation but also contributes to global sustainability and prosperity.

2

Inforegio—EU Regional and urban development (2023), Zang (2020).

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5.1.2 Diversity in Local Cooperation Diversity is an inherent characteristic of local cooperation. In the context of local government cooperation, diversity refers to the variations and differences among different localities in terms of their cultural, economic, and political aspects. These differences contribute to the richness and complexity of local cooperation efforts. Firstly, there may be differences in cultural backgrounds, values, and administrative systems among different regions. These differences can affect mutual understanding and communication between partners and require strengthening through exchange and interaction. Additionally, there may be variations in legal systems and regulatory frameworks across different regions, necessitating an understanding and adherence to the legal and regulatory requirements of all parties involved. Secondly, there may be disparities in economic conditions, industrial structures, and levels of development among different regions. Some areas may be economically advanced with advanced industries and infrastructure, while others may be in the early stages of development, facing economic challenges and demands. Furthermore, there may be variations in policy orientations, development priorities, and interests among different regions. In local collaborations, it is essential to fully consider the economic and policy differences of all parties involved to ensure mutually beneficial and sustainable development. The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) once released a strategic document titled “Regional Cooperation is the Key to Poland–China Strategic Partnership”,3 which noted that the upgrading of Poland–China relations to a strategic partnership marked closer cooperation between the two countries. However, highlevel relations alone are not sufficient to fully realize the potential of the partnership, and local administrative authorities are most likely to promote practical cooperation. Therefore, it is necessary to vigorously promote “interregional cooperation” or “pan-regional cooperation”. This includes establishing basic point-to-point collaborations, such as one province (city) partnering with one country, as well as implementing typical forms of local cooperation, such as cooperation between sister cities. It is important to gradually develop “one province to one region” collaborations in accordance with the reality of China’s large scale and the smaller scale of Central and Eastern European countries. According to the “Research Report on China-CEEC Local Cooperation” published in 2020 by numerous scholars engaged in research on Central and Eastern Europe in China,4 local cooperation is an important component of China-CEEC country cooperation. Local cooperation to some extent makes up for the unequal market between China and CEE countries and can also stimulate the autonomy and initiative of local governments to participate in China-CEEC country cooperation, injecting endogenous power into promoting complementary advantages and improving cooperation mechanisms between China and CEE countries. Only by rooting in local areas can China-CEEC country cooperation draw more nourishment. 3 4

Skorupska and Szczudlik-Tatar (2014). Liu and Han (2021).

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5.2 Local Cooperation Between China and CEEC: An Overview It seems that by highlighting the strategic importance and opportunities of China with the “European” frontier, Chinese scholar Wang Jisi regards this “matching westwards” action as a rebalancing of geostrategy by the Chinese government. In fact, Chinese policymakers took the opportunity to engage with the region almost immediately after the former Soviet republics become independent in the early 1990s. Since then, China has made continued efforts to manage relations with Central and Eastern European countries through pursuing its interests and impacts in the region. What makes China’s effort in the region different now is its practice of largely experimental multidimensional diplomacy. This practice centers on the “China-Central and Eastern European Countries Cooperation Mechanism”, such a network that brings together China, European Union member states: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia; and four Candidate countries: Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Moreover, there is one potential candidate, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the academic literature on China-CEE relations, little attention is placed, in terms of research, on the subnational dimension compared to traditional diplomatic issues. Although there are some empirical studies,5 they are concentrated rather on intra-European activities, not on relations with third countries. However, some recent publications have been trying to recover this phenomenon. Kami´nski takes the case of the Lodzkie region’s (Poland) cooperation with Sichuan Province in order to answer the question of what the factors behind the success of the Lodzkie region are.6 The primary motivation for this is to recognize the conditions that may play an important role in the process of building strong bilateral links between European and Chinese subnational units. Moreover, as one of the Polish leading think tank, the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) issued a report named the Subnational Dimension of EU-China Relations;7 it analyzed selected case studies of European regions cooperating with Chinese partners. Besides this, Mierzejewski presents a picture of bilateral relations between Poland and China,8 so as to indicate the role of local governments in bilateral relations. Local authorities play an ever more critical role in shaping Poland–China relations. The author innovatively puts forward the role of local governments in the integration of the diplomatic relations between China and Poland. Furthermore, Chinese scholars provide a systematic investigation,9 with a clearly defined overarching organizational framework for its vital research themes and questions. Apart from the local interactions, the above research omitted providing a timeframe for the relations between China and the CEECs in a systematic manner. 5

Blatter et al. (2008), Nagel (2010), Tatham (2016). Kami´nski (2019). 7 Kami´ nski, Skorupska and Szczudlik (2019). 8 Mierzejewski (2017). 9 Liu (2017), Song (2017), Yuan (2018) 6

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In particular, the effect of local cooperation is not discussed in detail in the existing literature. Local governments in international affairs have become an issue of concern in China’s foreign relations. The local cooperation is another crucial dimension of China’s tactics concerning Central and Eastern Europe. The Chinese leadership is determined to construct a “comprehensive, multilevel, multifaceted” approach for its diplomatic agenda for the new era. The frameworks are further elaborated in President Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2017.10 The top Chinese leadership commits to the idea that China will continue to promote friendship and partnership with countries in Central and Eastern Europe, consolidate friendly relations, and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation to ensure that China’s development and policies bring more benefits to these partners. China is, therefore, putting an unusual focus on its relations, which places particular emphasis on local cooperation and marks Guidelines achieved in the past by both leaders. As a sub-state actor, when the interest pursued by the local level is the same as that of the country, local governments act in order to complement the country’s overall diplomatic strategy. Starting with the Bucharest Guideline in 2013,11 cooperation at the local level is encouraged and supported as one of the crucial pillars of ChinaCEEC cooperation. In this context, the willingness of Central and Eastern European countries to seek cooperation with countries such as China becomes increasingly stronger. Such changes in interdependence also contribute to the active participation of local governments. This also makes it possible for local governments to participate in international activities and also provides favorable conditions for China to enter into the regions. Central and Eastern European countries are closer to the EU in terms of culture and norms. Some of China’s policy instruments (such as the $10 billion special loans) still encounter problems with European Union law, resulting in China’s investment and engineering contracting in the region still being mostly being concentrated in nonaccess countries (such as the Balkan countries). In terms of investment preference, Central and Eastern European countries generally prefer greenfield investment, while China prefers the model of corporate mergers and acquisitions. For example, 86% of China’s investment in Europe in 2016 was corporate mergers and acquisitions. As an increasingly internationalized and globalized world economy, local governments with enhanced economic functions can take advantage of opportunities embodied in internationalization to highlight their merits in low-level political agendas such as economics and culture. Local cooperation provides China with the opportunity to integrate into the Central and Eastern European markets and to cooperate. Moreover, the lessons learned from the transformation and development of Central and Eastern European countries can provide a reference for China’s reform. For example, Poland’s experience in regional and urban management: local officials from Gdansk, Poland, and the visiting Chinese 10

Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress (2019). The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (2013).

11

5.2 Local Cooperation Between China and CEEC: An Overview

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delegation have a strong interest in the city’s taxation, finance, and sports facilities management. In addition, China’s Guangxi Liugong Machinery and the Huta Stalowa Wola (HSW) Group in Stalowa Wola County, Poland, have reached agreements to establish a manufacturing and R&D base. The top bulldozer production line of Polish companies will help China further develop the Central and Eastern European markets.12 In addition, after strong growth in 2017 and early 2018, global economic activity slowed notably in the second half of last year, the diversification of development in various regions of Europe is further intensified. In particular, the situation in Ukraine and the refugee crisis highlights the difference between East and West Europe. The cohesive bonds that exist between the EU and European countries are gradually weakened, and the Central and Eastern European countries show that centrifugal force in the current refugee crisis. In this context, the trust of Central and Eastern European countries to China’s promise is gradually “overdrawn”, and the weakening of the institution also means that state power shifts at this regional level, such transferal correspondingly leads local governments to continue to search for it, so as to provide a driving force for deepening cooperation at the local level. Moreover, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have a total area of about 1.34 million square kilometers, which is close to 1/7 of China.13 The total population is 123 million, which is close to 1/10 of China.14 This scale is similar to the provincial units in China. In addition, the total trade volume with China is less than 1/10 of the total EU trade with China. Such a huge asymmetry also spawns the role of local governments in their broader participation in decision-making, implementation, and interest advancement, for example, Chinese narratives concerning cooperation with the CEE countries as an economic bridgehead of the “Belt and Road” Initiative.15 In recent years, China’s Hebei, Chongqing, Chengdu, Suzhou, Ningbo provinces, among other provinces or cities, have started to cooperate with the Central and Eastern European regions based on their local characteristics and open needs. However, the localities of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are complex, and economic status is different in their respective countries. For example, between China and Poland, the most important issue is the huge trade imbalance,16 and China’s huge trade volume inevitably causes a huge asymmetric impact. In addition, the complexity of local governments also creates uncertainty. When obstacles are detected on the Polish governmental side and the agreements from Xi Jinping’s Warsaw visit are not properly implemented, the Chinese turn to the Polish local authorities, which are mainly held by the political parties who are in opposition to the current Polish government, and signs new agreements with them.17

12

Huang and Liu (2018). World Bank Open Data (2023). 14 Ibid. 15 Kowalski (2017). 16 Kami´ nski et al. (2019). 17 Góralczyk (2017). 13

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As China’s power grows, especially in its global strategy, China is exerting its ambitions even more proactively. China finds it much more useful to exercise its economic statecraft, for example, by providing preferential loans and constructing necessary infrastructure in return for market, energy and other resources. However, it cannot overlook that the Central and Eastern European countries have considerable differences regarding population, economic development levels, religious beliefs, and degrees of return to Europe. These differences will, to some extent, affect these countries as an entire region. This in turn largely determines the long-term sustainability of China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries.

5.3 Local Cooperation in Practice: Sister Cities and City Network At present, local cooperation is considered as the method with which cities or local governments aim at pursuing local interests and develop interactive relationships with other actors in the international political arena.18 Similar references to local cooperation include “city-to-city diplomacy”, “sister cities”, “local diplomacy”, “local foreign policy”, “subnational government foreign affairs”. China’s local cooperation in practice arises in the context of the globalization era. It mainly comes from two reasons: First, as the country’s diplomatic system becomes more open, the local level gains more massive arena and abundant resources, it has appropriate diplomatic identities and plays a unique role in foreign affairs. Second, in the era of globalization, general foreign-related affairs are likely rising to become crucial for the overall situation. As a critical node connecting China and the world, cities play an essential role in dealing with related issues. Cities establish relations of international friendship so that their economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges and cooperation can be facilitated. For the city, the development of globalization completely changes in the country and even the world, so that the economic centers of each country more fall to the unit with the city as the main part. Globalization is increasingly enhancing the city’s resource allocation capabilities, while causing a global market demand for the role of cities. Pushed by the Internet information wave, that emerges simultaneously with globalization, it brings a broad flow space to the city and makes it possible for the city to participate on a global level. It jointly promotes the city’s participation in the global governance system; the city thus establishes a stable and sustainable connection with the international system. Local cooperation has achieved prosperity development when promoting ChinaCEEC cooperation under multiforms since the “China-CEEC” framework was established, i.e., Local Leaders Meetings, Working Meetings of China-CEEC Association of Provincial Governors, and Meetings of CEEC Capital Cities (Table 5.1). 18

Pluijm and Melissen (2007), Gu (2019).

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Table 5.1 Previous local cooperation meetings between China and CEEC Local leaders’ meeting Chongqing, China (2013) Prague, Czech Republic (2014) Tangshan, China (2016) Sofia, Bulgaria (2018) Shenyang, China (2021) Working Meeting for the China and CEEC Association of Provincial Governors Langfang, China (2015) Tangshan, China (2016) Sofia, Bulgaria (2017) Plovdiv, Bulgaria (2018) Dalian, China (2019) Shenyang, China (2021) Forum for Mayors of CEEC Capital Cities Sofia, Bulgaria (2016) Podgorica, Montenegro (2017) Belgrade, Serbia (2018) Shenyang, China (2019) Ningbo, China (2021) Source Data collected by the author

Local cooperation is represented by establishing city diplomatic ties, which has taken over the external affairs framework in the general sense. Chinese President Xi Jinping has called on the CPAFFC association (Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries) to innovate and explore ways to allow for more people-to-people exchanges, help build more sister cities, and promote exchanges between localities. The local dimension is further elaborated in President Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Moreover, the number of friendly cities is increasing. According to CPAFFC association statistics, as of 2022, China with Central and Eastern European countries form 185 pairs of friendly cities at the provincial level, and at the city level. Meanwhile, some local universities or colleges set up language majors in Central and Eastern European countries to meet the demand for talent. Second, with the promotion of bilateral local cooperation, direct flights facilitate bilateral economic, trade, and personnel exchanges between Chinese cities and CEE countries. At the same time, various cities in China with Central and Eastern Europe have opened freight rail-routes, such as Suzhou-Warsaw, Yiwu-Riga, Chengdu-Lodz (Poland), Wuhan-Pardubice (Czech Republic), and Changsha-Budapest.

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5.3.1 Sister Cities The prominent role of Chinese cities in external exchanges, especially furthering the work of sister cities, is carried out with the aim of reform and opening-up trade routes.19 The need for foreign exchanges brings a huge adjustment in the relationship between the central and local governments. Local governments become important participants in China’s foreign affairs. Chinese cities have taken on the most active role in participating in diplomacy following decentralization. The construction of international friendship cities also become the main way for Chinese cities to realize their foreign exchange functions. In addition, with the deepening of regional integration, the exchanges between cities provide a new platform and act as a conduit for urban and rural cooperation between Chinese and foreign cities. Many cities in China are also promoting the development of urban foreign exchange under the mechanism of multilateral regional cooperation. In this process, sister cities have done a lot of work to attract foreign investment, introduce projects, and expand exchanges. At the same time, there are many opportunities for cooperation in the construction of soft environment, environmental protection, and sustainable development among cities in adjacent areas. The expansion of China’s sister cities in the international geospatial context is in fact synchronized with the process of China’s integration into the world system. Historical and cultural factors are the most important factors influencing the development of friendly cities. This is the most effective entry point for China, which is just beginning full contact with the world, to surpass the political obstacles at the time and promote cooperation between cities. With the deepening of China’s reform and the opening-up of its market, economic factors have become the main driving force for friendly city exchanges since the 1990s. This can be proved from the geographical distribution of China’s sister cities. The closer to the globalized regions, the friendlier cities are able to move toward depth and breadth of relations, and the more advanced the level of urban modernization. This fully reflects the interaction between globalization and urbanization factors in the development of sister cities. In recent years, friendly city exchanges increasingly become the main means of coordinating the country’s overall diplomacy. Therefore, developing a friendly city is not only to shape the international image of the city, to promote the history and culture of the city but also to promote the overall internationalization strategy of the city by carrying out humanities exchanges, and to laying the foundation for the development of the city from both economic and cultural aspects. The local governmental engagement between China and the Central and Eastern European countries began on June 18, 1980. Shanghai and Zagreb, the capital city of Croatia, officially became sister cities. Since then, China has started its local interaction with Central and Eastern European countries. However, the progress between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is not always entirely prosperous. For example, when we look at the statistics of the sister cities for friendship, 19

Chen (2001).

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there are three significant problems in China’s city relations with Central and Eastern European countries. First, the overall quantity remains at a low level compared with other areas. Second, it stagnates in some years. Third, they are unevenly distributed in China and vice versa. International friendship cities can also be called sister cities, since the mainland of China started its friendly city activities in 1973. As of December 31, 2022, China account for a total of 185 pairs of sister cities in 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities (excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao) with CEE countries (Fig. 5.1). As of December 2022, China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have jointly formed 185 friendship cities (including voivodeship) relations. However, from the perspective of Europe (including 27 EU countries and 5 Central and Eastern European countries that have not yet obtained formal membership), the CEE countries account for 50% of the total number of Europe, but the number of sister cities

Fig. 5.1 Friendly cities between China with Central and Eastern Europe. Data China’s provincial People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries

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Number

12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

Year

Fig. 5.2 Annual distribution of signing sister cities between China and CEE countries. Data China’s provincial People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries

accounts for only about 18%. From a global perspective, Central and Eastern European countries accounted for only about 6.5% of all the 136 countries that have signed sister city relations with China. This is still inconsistent with the prospects for the development of bilateral relations. Moreover, in the past years, despite the fact that annual quantity shows an overall upward tendency, there is also a stagnation period in the early stages. Figure 5.2 shows the changes in the number of China and CEE sister cities each year. In 2015, the number of sister city friendships reached a peak of 15 pairs, but during the other years, there was still fluctuating and small numbers, and even stagnant phenomena such as from 1990 to 1991. The reason why this problem occurs is that there is a specific correlation between the dynamic changes in the relations between China and Central and Eastern European countries: for example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the political turmoil in China in 1989. On the other hand, the visits of Chinese President Xi Jinping Poland, Czech Republic, Serbia, and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe have helped to further cooperation. Also, after the occurrence of political protests in China, the relationship between sister cities has gradually resumed. It also shows that city diplomacy, as a semi-official form, can make a useful contribution to the maintenance of bilateral relations even when they are not normalized and can be a useful supplement to bilateral diplomatic strategies. Regarding statistical data and geographical distribution, the provinces with the most sister cities (ten or more) are mostly located in the eastern part of China, such as Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Fujian provinces. Cities in networks tend to have both a hierarchical system and a spatial concentration primarily in regions such as Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta region. Moreover, urban networks, under the framework of “Belt and Road”, show several significant corridors and more opportunities for more cities, particularly Western cities, for example, Guizhou Province, which is developing the big data industry; in fact, the government of Pomerania Province (Województwo Pomorskie) has already cooperated with Guizhou Province in this regard. Also, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds several events promoting local provinces to the global media.

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This was the case for Sichuan in 2016; Minister Wang Yi stressed that Sichuan is Connected with Central Asian and European countries to the West, aligned with the China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor to the north, integrated in the China– Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor to the south, as well as reaching the golden waterway of Yangtze River to the east, Sichuan boasts broad prospects in its blueprint for comprehensively opening-up.20

5.3.2 City Network A network, as an organizational model that promotes collective action, serves as a global governance approach. The American scholar Zeev Maoz states that “international relations have become a network relationship”.21 Moreover, the concept of “network power” has come to exist.22 As an emerging player, the city is involved in various transnational social networks in the era of globalization. China with Central and Eastern European countries have relatively little cooperation in transnational city networks; however, such initiatives as Global Cities Dialogue, UCLG, Organization of World Heritage Cities, and Mayors for Peace cover many countries in CEEC. China and CEE countries under these networks collaborate on related issues. For example, Guangzhou, one of China’s UCLG chairman cities, has been discussing cooperation issues with Lodz in urban governance issues in 2017 (Table 5.2). China and CEE countries are participating in transnational city networks. From a spatial perspective, cooperation in a transnational city network covers different spatial scopes, including the cross-border urban network between Asia and Europe and also involves participation in multinational city network cooperation such as UCLG. The Chinese central government retains significant control over foreign affairs at the local level. For instance, the state-organized “Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries” coordinates Chinese cities’ participation in UCLG. China with Central and Eastern European countries have limited local cooperation through their participation in transnational city networks. It needs to be particularly pointed out that it is still difficult to judge whether there are apparent interactions between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in these networks. For the participants, i.e., local governments (cities), non-governmental organizations, bilateral or multilateral development agencies, and academic and research institutions, the primary focus is on the low-politics field, especially on environmental protection and sustainable development. Due to its cross-border and diffuse nature, environmental issues become one of the most critical issues for network governance, followed by urban construction issues. At the same time, cooperation in the fields of 20

Sichuan Global Presenting Activity Was Held in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016). Maoz (2010). 22 Grewal (2008). 21

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Table 5.2 China and CEE countries in city networks Organization

Date of founding

Number of CEEC

Number of China

Remarks

Global Cities Dialogue

1999

13

2

City development

World Association of Major Metropolises (Metropolis)

1985

4

19

City development

Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40)

2005

1

12

Climate change

Regions of Climate Action (R20)

2010

2

1

Climate change

United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG)

2004

16

20

Comprehensive

Organization of World Heritage Cities

1993

14

6

Culture

UNESCO Creative Cities Network

2004

8

4

Culture

World e-Governments Organization of Cities and Local Governments (WeGO)

2008

1

7

Information technology

International Association for Peace Messenger Cities

1988

9

1

Social issues

Mayors for Peace

1982

16

7

Social issues

Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI)

1990

9

1

Sustainable development

Source Collected by the author

tourism, culture, economy, and trade, and logistics. It reflects a substantial economic interest orientation. Most urban networks have a strong continuity of cooperation: The standing meetings of each mechanism are being operated for more than ten years, and this continuity is an essential guarantee of effectiveness. Meanwhile, the merits of network cooperation are its non-binding property. Taking environmental cooperation as an example, China with Central and Eastern European countries have not formed a binding institutional framework based on the treaty system for environmental cooperation. The governance network with local governments (cities) as the leading player is more flexible and can solve common concerns through the use of voluntariness, mutual benefit, and consultation. This kind of cooperation at the local level has its own flexibility and advantages, and it provides a fundamental role in promoting overall regional integration. Such network cooperation emphasizes the participation of multiple actors and has significant governance characteristics. As the information exchange and dissemination center, the city is also the core area of information production. Non-government actors can rely on the city to participate in the global governance process. Moreover, the city can participate in the global civil society through non-governmental actors. For example, during the operation of UCLG, it divides into different sections according to regions, and the participation of actors in different fields is fully mobilized.

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Finally, the network can promote mutual learning and consensus among participants. For example, the participation of organizations such as the C40 and UCLG gains experience for the development of sustainable urbanization in China and CEE countries, and it provides a basis for cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries. China started relatively late in the process of participating in transnational city networks, and their progress is relatively sluggish. However, the transnational city network is a new trend of local cooperation between China and CEE countries. It helps cities to communicate with each other and share successful practices and governance experience. It also helps to solve the common problems of both cities.

5.4 Case Study: Shaanxi Province with CEE Countries In terms of strategic planning, Shaanxi Province is continually advancing toward the goal of becoming a new inland hub of reform and opening-up. The implementation of the national “Belt and Road” Initiative has transformed Shaanxi from an inland city into a frontier region of the country’s westward opening-up and from a geographical concept of the “land of three Qin” to an economic highland. As of March 2021, Shaanxi Province and the city of Xi’an have established international sister city relationships with eight provinces (cities) in Central and Eastern Europe. As of the end of 2020, the total number of international (regional) air routes at Xi’an Xianyang International Airport reached 67, with 75 routes connecting 36 countries, 74 major hubs, and tourist cities worldwide. Direct flights have been established between Xi’an and two tourist cities, Prague and Budapest, making it a new engine to serve the development of the “three economies” in Shaanxi and constructing a major air channel for Shaanxi’s opening-up to the world. On May 11, 2021, the opening ceremony of the national pavilion for the guest country of the 5th Silk Road International Exposition and China East–West Cooperation and Investment and Trade Fair was held in Xi’an. Slovakia, located in Central and Eastern Europe and the guest country of the Silk Road Expo, promoted cooperation between Shaanxi and Central and Eastern European countries and regions through investment talks and commodity trade by showcasing the guest country’s overall image, investment areas, and major cooperative projects. The status of a gateway city, together with the Belt and Road Initiative, has increasingly made Shaanxi a strategic high ground for domestic and foreign companies to seize the Western Chinese market and a preferred destination for multinational enterprises to invest in Western China (Table 5.3). In terms of trade cooperation, based on available data as of 2019, investment enterprises belonging to Shaanxi Province have cumulatively invested 6.7 million US dollars in Central and Eastern European countries. Among them, Shaanxi Tobacco Industrial Co., Ltd. has invested 6.68 million US dollars in Romania, mainly engaged in tobacco manufacturing industry. Shaanxi PV Industry Co., Ltd. has cumulatively invested 30,000 US dollars in the Czech Republic. In 2018, only Romania invested in

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Table 5.3 Sister cities of Shaanxi with Central and Eastern Europen countries (until 31.12.2022) China

Central and Eastern Europe

Time

Shaanxi (Provincial)

Romania

11 April 2008

Xi’an (City)

Weinan (City)

Buz˘au

Romania

Hunedoara

16 March 2021

Hungary

Csongrád

21 November 1995

Romania

Ias, i

6 December 1994

Greece

Kalamata

17 September 2009

Montenegro

Kotor

25 November 2013

Serbia

Kragujevac

18 June 2016

Hungary

Szeged

27 October 1999

Source Data collected by the author from the Shaanxi People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries

Shaanxi among the Central and Eastern European countries, with one newly established joint venture, Shaanxi Loying International Trading Co., Ltd., with a contracted foreign investment of 150,000 US dollars but actual foreign investment of 0. In 2019, only Poland and Romania from the 17 Central and Eastern European countries invested in Shaanxi, with two newly established companies in Poland, including a wholly owned enterprise, Qiaona International Trade (Xi’an) Co., Ltd., and a joint venture, Xi’an Meiyu Education Consulting Co., Ltd., with a total contracted foreign investment of 440,000 US dollars but actual foreign investment of 0. Romania established one new wholly owned enterprise, Xi’an Ludian Business Consulting Co., Ltd., with a contracted foreign investment of 140,000 US dollars but actual foreign investment of 0. From the data, the existing export-oriented economic foundation is not strong, and the efficiency of factor allocation and the level of international development are not high, which is reflected in the gap in the actual utilization of foreign capital and the number of foreign-funded enterprises compared with other provinces in China. In terms of educational cooperation, exchanges between Shaanxi universities and foreign countries, including Central and Eastern European countries, have been increasing significantly. According to current statistics, in 2019, the number of international students studying in Shaanxi ranked ninth in China. The Silk Road University Alliance initiated and established by Xi’an Jiaotong University has attracted 151 universities from 38 countries and regions, including Central and Eastern European countries, to join, playing a positive and unique role in promoting interuniversity exchanges, talent cultivation, scientific research cooperation, and cultural communication. Corporate and university exchanges have not only enriched the content of Shaanxi’s external exchanges but also created new platforms for Shaanxi’s external exchanges. As an implementation of the “Bucharest Guidelines for China-Central and Eastern European Countries Cooperation” jointly issued by China with Central and Eastern European countries in 2013, the China-Central and Eastern European Countries University Association was officially established in September 2014 to promote cooperation with universities in Central and Eastern European countries.

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Subsequently, Xi’an Jiaotong University signed an agreement with the China Education Association for International Exchange to undertake the construction of the “China-Central and Eastern European Countries University Association” website and also took on the work of the evaluation meeting for the “China-Central and Eastern European Countries University Association Joint Education Program” in 2020. In terms of connectivity, the “Chang’an” train of the China–Europe Block Train is a notable initiative by Shaanxi Province to open up to Central and Eastern European countries. The opening of the China–Europe Block Train connects the Asian and European continents, radiating and linking economic and trade exchanges in Western China, Europe, and Russia. In terms of international regional cooperation, the bilateral business exchanges brought about by the operation of the China–Europe Block Train have promoted the upgrading of local cooperation between the two sides. In 2020, the “Chang’an” train of the China–Europe Block Train operated 3720 trains throughout the year, covering four major cities in three Central and Eastern European countries, including Malaszewicze and Warsaw in Poland, Budapest in Hungary, and Riga in Latvia. The core indicators of the train’s operation, including the operating volume, container loading rate, and cargo volume, ranked first in the country. The quality evaluation index of the China–Europe Block Train throughout the year also ranked first in the country, becoming a model for the high-quality development of the China–Europe Block Train in the country. The efficient direct transportation of the train adopts the “five-fixed mode” of fixed route, fixed station, fixed train, fixed time, and fixed price, running the entire route as a whole and not disassembling along the way. In addition, the train offers fast and favorable prices, with a transportation time that is one-third of traditional rail-sea intermodal transportation and a transportation cost that is one-fourth of air freight. The train operates on a regular basis, with fixed weekly departure times and no interruption in service during the winter. The fast customs clearance of the train achieves full-process EDI electronic customs clearance, adopting a fast clearance mode of “one declaration, one inspection, and one release”. The train’s operation is safe and reliable, with the entire train’s operation tracked by GPS and special containers equipped with electronic security locks. The train adopts a social public logistics platform operation model, accepting full container and less than container load business from social organizations.23 Under various advantageous conditions, the operation of the train between Shaanxi and Central and Eastern European countries has gradually become an international logistics hub for linking and interacting economic and trade activities in various regions of Asia and Europe, achieving connectivity of transportation and trade, and promoting Shaanxi’s integration into a new global economic landscape with deeper influence. Since the beginning of the reform and opening-up policies, the attraction of globalization has made local areas an important internal political and economic driving force for China’s openness. The increasing internationalization of local areas and their enhanced connections with the world have indirectly pushed these areas to the 23

Xie (2018).

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forefront of China’s foreign relations. In China’s political structure and hierarchy of foreign relations, local areas have become an important link in the country’s diplomatic process. With the introduction of a balanced policy of openness, the internationalization process of inland regions has gradually been initiated, greatly stimulating their cooperation drive. China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative has pushed the inland regions of China to the forefront of the country’s openness through the establishment of international channels and economic corridors with countries along the route. This has provided significant opportunities for inland regions to adapt to the new international and domestic economic development situation and to share in the new achievements of China’s reform and opening-up. Therefore, integration into the development of the “Belt and Road” has become the inevitable choice for many inland regions. In line with the five strategic directions of channels, hubs, nodes, hinterlands, and industries, Shaanxi Province has effectively promoted its trade with Europe and enhanced its market influence by following the implementation path of “strengthening organizational implementation, enhancing hub functions, constructing a cargo network, encouraging foreign trade and capacity transfer”. Xi’an Port, currently the only inland port in China with both international and domestic codes, has entered the global shipping system, having been approved as a first-class railway port, secondclass highway port, designated port for imported grain, designated port for imported meat, and imported vehicle port. In recent years, the cooperation between local entities in China with Central and Eastern European countries has become increasingly diverse. Chinese-funded enterprise projects have landed in Central and Eastern European countries, and both sides have seen a significant increase in their market share. Guided by the “Belt and Road” Initiative, the Shaangu Group, a local enterprise in Shaanxi Province, acquired Czech company EKOL through international mergers and acquisitions in 2015, making it the largest investment in the Czech manufacturing sector by a Chinese company that year and also accelerating the international development of Shaangu. Currently, Shaangu has 12 overseas companies and service agencies, including a European research and development company in Germany, a European service center in the Czech Republic, EKOL in the Czech Republic, a service center in India, an engineering representative office in Indonesia, a Hong Kong company, and a Luxembourg company. The spillover effects of enterprise landing have also promoted more business and trade exchanges between China and the Czech Republic. In 2017, Shaangu Group opened the first Czech language training class for business people in Shaanxi Province, cultivating a group of business talents who understand the Czech language and culture. The “Shaanxi International Production Capacity Cooperation (Czech Republic) Promotion Center,” led by the Shaanxi Provincial Department of Commerce, has now been officially unveiled at Shaangu EKOL in the Czech Republic. As the director unit of the center, Shaangu Group will use this platform to lead Shaanxi enterprises to connect and exchange with Czech and Central and Eastern European enterprises, carry out production capacity and finance cooperation, jointly build “Overseas Shaanxi,” and help expand Shaanxi’s overseas space, driving regional economic development.

5.5 Case Study: Chengdu and Łód´z

133

It should not be ignored that China’s local government cooperation with foreign countries has taken a tilted approach from coastal to inland, rather than a balanced approach, which has become an important external factor of imbalance for local areas, industries, and sectors. The open tilt allows coastal areas to enjoy more favorable policies in foreign trade, investment, taxation, and labor mobility than central and Western regions. Places with location and policy advantages have closer global connections between their internal and international markets, and they are the first to benefit from globalization. The existing mechanisms for local cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries tend to be procedural, with many memoranda of understanding signed, but the number of actual projects realized remains relatively low. Moreover, the form of local cooperation often equates to pure economic cooperation, lacking diversity. Opportunities for trade and investment between China and Central and Eastern European countries are not equal, and the two-way interaction is still weak. Faced with the complex investment environment in Central and Eastern European countries, Chinese companies have a wait-and-see attitude. In addition, successful international cooperation requires trust and accurate perception. As the most basic unit of cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, local cooperation can promote mutual understanding through diverse cultural exchanges and facilitate cultural prosperity in Shaanxi. Particularly in today’s world, which is accelerating globalization and internationalization,24 whether local people have a global vision and the ability to respond to various foreign cultural challenges, and whether they can embrace inclusivity, also determines the ability of Shaanxi to respond to global challenges and the size of its capacity.

5.5 Case Study: Chengdu and Łód´z The subnational relations of Polish regions with Chinese partners are distinctive to some extent. In particular, the cooperation between the Lodzkie region (and its capital city of Lodz) and Sichuan (and its capital city Chengdu) serves as an example of the success of a CEEC region developing strong links with China. It is presented in numerous analytical publications and media reports in Europe.25 For Poland, the present Polish government desires to change the current status quo; and the development of relations with Asia, especially China, is conducive to mitigating diplomatic pressure. Therefore, Poland regards Asia as a new target of its external affairs. Moreover, regarding infrastructural initiatives, the President of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opens Poland to China as potentially its largest investor and largest market outside the EU. Poland has an opportunity to assume the role of a hub (main distribution center) for Chinese exports to Europe under the Chinese “Belt and Road” Initiative. 24

Chen (2001). Casarini (2015), Mierzejewski (2017), Shepard (2016), Szczudlik-Tatar (2015), Tiezzi (2016), Kami´nski (2019).

25

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At the same time, although the economies of China and Poland still maintain an upward trend, the downward pressure on the economy is increasing. China and Poland stated clearly in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Declaration in 2016 their wish to expand cooperation between the central and local governments of both countries. Local cooperation is an essential driving force and a new growth point for the comprehensive development of China–Poland relations. Under the impetus of the governments of China and Poland, the China–Poland Local Cooperation Forum, an important symbol of local cooperation between China and Poland has held six sessions in Guangzhou (2014), Wuhan (2017), and Chengdu (2018) in China, as well as in Gdansk (2013), Lodz (2015), and Warsaw (2016). The local forum continuously expands the cooperation between the two countries in the fields of culture, education, and tourism. In this context, Lodz, a city in the center of Poland, has ambitions of becoming a transport hub for reloading goods;26 this coincides with the development strategy of Chengdu. The Sichuan and Lodzkie provinces signed friendly cooperation agreements at provincial and city levels on June 29, 2015, and April 29, 2016, respectively. Lodzkie and Sichuan provinces established friendly relations, and the Lodzkie capital of Łód´z becomes a friendly city with Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province. Such cooperation between Sichuan and Łód´z has been in tandem with China–Poland relations at the national level. According to China’s Xinhua News Agency, in 2014 and 2015, Chengdu and Lodz, the capital cities of Sichuan and the Lodzkie region, were awarded the China– Poland Friendly Cooperation Award by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries in terms of praising the intensive pragmatic cooperation between partners. Currently, Poland is Sichuan’s largest trading partner in Central and Eastern Europe, despite the fact that the Sichuan and Lodzkie provinces are completely different in terms of the economic scale. That said, both from an economic and social development level the two provinces are becoming more and more alike. To further cooperation, the Sichuan Province in Southwest China is now facilitating cooperation and exchanges with more countries and regions along the Belt and Road, with an intercontinental railway network connecting it to Europe and other parts of Asia. The route stretches 9826 km, almost along the ancient Silk Road, linking Chengdu with Lodz, an emerging European logistics hub in Poland (Table 5.4).

5.5.1 The “Rong-Ou+ ” (Chengdu-Europe) Plan In most cases, Central and Eastern European countries export raw materials to European markets, and these countries export their goods to China. Thus, Central and Eastern European countries’ exports to China are underestimated. In recent years, 26

Mierzejewski (2017).

5.5 Case Study: Chengdu and Łód´z Table 5.4 Lodz Voivodeship and Sichuan (and Chengdu) in area, population, and GDP

135

Specification

Lodz Voivodeship

Sichuan

Chengdu

Area (km2 )

18,219

486,000

14,312

Population (million)

≈2.42 (2022)

≈83.68 (2022)

≈21.19 (2022)

GDP (billion euro)

32.1 (2019)

605.9 (2019)

209.2 (2019)

GDP per capita (euro)

13,100 (2019)

7607.86 (2019)

14,104.3 (2019)

Source By the Sichuan Provincial Bureau of Statistics, and Statistical Office in Lodz

the opening of the Rong-ou Express Railway enabled the two sides to improve their import and export trade. Due to the spectacular failure of the first attempt at the construction of Poland’s A2 motorway by China Railway Engineering Corp (CREC), the Chengdu-Lodz railway did not attract much attention at the beginning. In May 2013, Hatrans, a local logistics services company in Lodz, launched the first regular railway container connection between Chengdu and Lodz. Within three years, the interest of customers increased significantly and subsequently an increase in the frequency of use.27 The achievement of the Lodz regional authorities in establishing a connection with various Chinese regions and being potentially able to reach to Chinese markets has significant implications. The arrival of the first cargo train from China on the January 2, 2013, after a 2-week journey, the arrival of 41 carriages, mostly filled with electronics, was welcomed with hopes that the Lodzkie region could become a significant regional transportation hub. It may turn out that rail transport is competitively priced with sea transport. In China, many factories are located in the interior of the continent, thus for the transportation of goods by sea reloading takes place, which incurs additional payments. Then in the European ports, it is necessary to reload the cargo in order to transport if further around the continent. Therefore, in the case of a freight train which sets off from Chengdu to Lodz, the whole duration of the trip decreases by one-third compared to sea transportation, and the cargo size is increased by a quarter. The “Rong-ou+” strategy accelerates the construction of Chengdu International Railway Port and promotes the construction of its logistics, manufacturing, and service industry. The railway created a new bridgehead across Eurasian corridors. As of the first half of 2018, Rong’ou Express Railway (Chengdu-Lodz) operates 153 lines, it fulfills the goal of the daily operation, and carries a total of 5906 containers. The European terminus extends to Nuremberg in Germany and Tilburg in the Netherlands, and an overseas company and Polish office in Lodz has been established. From the perspective of Sichuan’s trade volume with Europe, the effect of the “Rong-ou+” strategy is significant. The proportion of Sichuan’s cumulative imports from Europe 27

Janduła (2016).

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to Sichuan has increased from 12.9% in 2017 to 13.8% in 2018. The proportion of exports to Europe is maintained at about 18%. Also, the transit time from Chengdu to Lodz is only about ten days; it is lower than the average of 13 days for all ChinaEU freight trains. It operates 11 services a week (six outwards and five inwards); it achieves bidirectional operation. By the end of 2018, the Rong-Ou express railway had boosted Sichuan’s total import and export trade by nearly 4 billion US dollars. In 2018, the total import and export volume of Sichuan-Poland exceeded 230 million USD, a year-on-year increase of 74%. Moreover, with the support of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine, Sichuan actively sets up a designated port for the entry into the airport. In 2018, the first batch of Polish apples was successfully exported to China through Chengdu. Sichuan Province and Chengdu City have strengthened the mechanism of exchange visits while establishing new mechanisms and platforms, i.e., the Chengdu international railway port and free trade zone. Since 2013, Chengdu international railway port has been continuously upgraded with the Chengdu-Europe Express Railway. Since 2017, the Qingbaijiang railway port in Sichuan inland free trade zone has been successfully approved; it became the first free trade zone area which relies on railway ports to be established. The Chengdu-Europe Express Railway is an essential instrument for Chengdu to expand its relations with Poland and even Europe. The relationship between Sichuan and Lodz has accelerated since the opening of the “Rong-ou” Express. In 2014, the Lodzkie Province sets up an Economic and Trade Representative Office in Chengdu (becoming Poland’s second Economic and Trade Representative Office in China, after Shanghai) alongside Chengdu’s EU Project Innovation Center. In 2015, the Polish Consulate General in Chengdu officially opened, which is Poland’s third consulate general in mainland China. Later, Chengdu and Lodz formally signed a friendship city agreement. On November 22, 2018, Poland’s Economic and Trade Representative Office in Chengdu was inaugurated at the China–Europe Center in the Chengdu High-tech Zone. It enables the representative office to greatly promote investment between the two sides and provide a platform for cooperation in aviation, supermarkets, railways, containers and other fields. At present, Chengdu and Lodz National Economic Development Zone have signed a strategic cooperation agreement, and the two sides have in-depth cooperation in building a major international logistics channel. With the opening of Chengdu-Europe Express Railway, Sichuan has become the fastest-growing region in China’s Western provinces. The Rong-Ou Express Railway has connected Sichuan to Europe’s major transportation arteries.

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5.6 Challenges and Opportunities for Local Cooperation Currently, local cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries has been fully launched and has shown good development trends in some fields and regions. However, due to the late start of comprehensive cooperation and the absence of precedents, there are still many areas for further improvement and issues to be resolved. The role of local governments in Chinese diplomacy has two aspects: first, local governments are among the most important subjects, so they still have a strong government attribute; second, an important part of local foreign affairs is civilian exchanges, and there are also a large number of social actors involved, giving it a certain non-governmental characteristic. A country’s diplomacy needs both government forces to directly execute national foreign policy and activities with less government color and weaker policy characteristics to complement the development of national diplomacy, while providing more space for government diplomacy (especially central government diplomacy) to maneuver. For a long time, China’s foreign exchanges have been dominated by government forces, and social forces have been weak, which has always been a weakness in Chinese diplomacy. Currently, apart from a few state-owned enterprises and associations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the vast majority of enterprises and associations are managed by local governments, and they have actually become the main force of China’s local foreign exchanges. How to better integrate these non-governmental resources into national diplomacy through local governments is also an area where local governments can focus on improving their external cooperation. First of all, in a multilateral framework, cooperation should not only reflect the scale effect of each party, but also demonstrate a focus on exemplary effects, achieving a combination of both. There are significant differences among the Central and Eastern European countries, and even within each country, the development levels of different regions vary. Therefore, the participation and benefits of China-CEEC cooperation are also different. Generally speaking, cities such as Warsaw, Budapest, and and some major cities in Central and Eastern Europe have greater development space, potential, and demand, and cooperation with Chinese cities above medium size is feasible. In contrast, other cities have less demand for the Chinese market. From the Chinese perspective, regional differences are also quite obvious, and disorderly competition among different regions and industries still exists. Many provinces and cities, such as Ningbo in Zhejiang and Cangzhou in Hebei, are actively promoting China-CEEC cooperation and local cooperation within its framework, but it seems difficult to identify a clear division of labor and positioning. After the establishment of related mechanisms such as the China–Europe Railway Express Coordination Committee, and China–Europe Railway Express Special Coordination Mechanism, the lack of coordination issues that existed before have been somewhat alleviated, but they have not been completely resolved. In addition, the phenomenon of Chinese enterprises clustering in one or a few countries or even engaging in vicious competition also exists. The goal of local governments to create favorable conditions for the opening and operation of a China–Europe express was mainly to reduce freight

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costs, so that the China–Europe express can play an active role in overcoming local development obstacles and foster new economic growth points in local provinces and cities. However, despite the continued willingness of the two sides to cooperate at the local level, regardless of whether this can be sustainability achieved, many problems that hinder development are also encountered. As mentioned earlier, there is a huge asymmetry in the economic scale of both sides. Take the China–Europe express between Chengdu and Lodz as an example. First of all, in the freight cooperation between the two sides, the target market is not subdivided according to commodity cost, time, scale and other factors. On the contrary, in order to maintain or increase the number of trains to transport all technically feasible goods indiscriminately, the operation quality is reduced, and the ability for sustainable development is restricted. As a result, some cities in China mainly rely on low prices to compete for the supply of goods. Secondly, although the existing coordination mechanism has played an important role in promoting the development of China–EU express, its defects also restrict the development of trains. For China, the prominent contradictions between the central and local governments, line platform companies, domestic carriers, and other domestic entities are one of the main factors restricting the improvement of the development quality of China–Europe express. The existing coordination mechanism relies more on initiative guidance than enforcement norms to exert its influence. It is difficult to play a significant role in resolving conflicts between the relevant local interests of industries, politics, and economy. At the same time, the transport infrastructure in the countries along the route from Chengdu to Lodz is, to varying degrees, backward. These countries either have slow train operation speeds, due to aging tracks and a state of disrepair of the railways, or have difficulty in keeping up with the increasing demand between China and Poland (and Europe) due to insufficient locomotives, less equipment for changing trains, less line layout, etc. Therefore, the cooperation and interaction between the two sides at the local level, represented by China–Europe express, need to continue to supplement and establish specific working systems and norms of coordination mechanisms at the transnational, domestic and industry levels, and at the same time, it is necessary to establish an emergency mechanism to deal with unexpected problems so as to provide a basis for better coordination and resolution of obstacles to operation. Secondly, national differences should be highly valued. Although local cooperation is a localized behavior and is related to historical traditions, it is also deeply influenced by the current level of relations between countries. From the current positioning of bilateral relations, the relationship between Central and Eastern European countries and China can be broadly classified into types such as comprehensive strategic partners and strategic partners. In terms of trade and economic relations, countries such as Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania, and Serbia have more trade with China, but other Central and Eastern European countries volume is very small compared to these CEE countries. These inevitably have an impact on local cooperation under the China-CEEC cooperation framework. It is necessary to conduct a

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realistic analysis of issues such as bilateral trade deficits and differences in Chinese investment flows and put forward targeted recommendations. Finally, it is important to further expand the platforms for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Local cooperation within the framework of China-CEEC cooperation includes both bilateral platforms, such as industrial parks, technology parks, and China–Europe freight trains, as well as multilateral frameworks, such as local leaders’ meetings and the “Capital Mayors’ Forum”. However, there is currently no cooperation framework at the sub-regional level, and some multilateral cooperation mechanisms exist only in name but not in reality. For example, the previously mentioned industry mechanisms, associations, or centers for China-CEEC cooperation are not evenly distributed, mostly concentrated in the capitals of countries like Hungary and Poland, and are less established in other countries and non-capital cities of the aforementioned countries. In addition, there are currently 185 pairs of sister cities between China and Central and Eastern European countries. However, the author’s investigation found that these sister cities, although they cover almost all forms of exchange and cooperation, also have some obvious shortcomings, such as insufficient personnel and cultural exchange activities, limited collaborative efforts, lack of substantive cooperation, a single exchange model, and a concentration of sister cities in capital cities. At the same time, exchanges are more procedural and routine, and the overall influence of China-CEEC cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe is weak due to inadequate participation.

5.7 Conclusion Remarks Over the 45 years since the reform and opening-up of China, local exchanges and cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries have gone through ups and downs. The “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism launched in 2012 has gradually formed local leaders’ meetings, “Capital Mayors’ Forum”, sister city cooperation, the China–Europe Express and other platforms. Cities in China’s Shaanxi, Sichuan provinces, and cities in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Warsaw (Poland) and Lodz (Poland), have been active in participating in and advancing “China-CEEC” local cooperation. However, there is still room for further improvement in “China-CEEC” local cooperation. Such as the demonstration effect and the scale of the economy must be highlighted, country differences should be highly valued, and multilateral cooperation platforms need to be further expanded. There are currently 185 pairs of friendly cities between China and Central and Eastern European countries. However, these friendly cities also have obvious deficiencies, such as insufficient quality of economic and trade cooperation, fewer cultural exchange activities of personnel, less coordination and cooperation between friendly cities, less substantive cooperation, a single exchange mode, and the concentration of twinning in provincial capitals or state locations. At the same time, communication is in a more procedural and routine

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stage. Some cities do not have enough participation in the “China-CEEC” cooperation mechanism and their overall influence in central and eastern Europe is relatively weak. Therefore, their role in China-central and eastern Europe cooperation is also negligible. It may be possible to build a cooperative network of friendly cities between China and Central and Eastern Europe, promote cultural and personnel exchanges in friendly cities in-depth, and form a regular exchange mechanism for friendly cities, for example, to strengthen complementary cooperation in specific economic fields, support sister cities in Central and Eastern European countries to host and provide assistance to the “China-CEEC” local leaders’ meetings, and actively invite more sister cities to cooperate in the EU and international networks in order to broaden local cooperation channels to further enhance the sustainability of cooperation.

References Blatter, J., Kreutzer, M., Rentl, M., & Thiele, J. (2008). The foreign relations of European regions: competences and strategies. West European Politics, 31(3), 464–490. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01402380801939743 Casarini, N. (2015). China’s rebalancing towards Europe. The International Spectator, 50(3), 122– 129. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015.1061781 Chen, Z. (2001). Subnational governments and foreign affairs. China Changcheng Press. Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress. (n.d.). Retrieved February 27, 2023, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm Góralczyk, B. (2017). China’s interests in central and eastern Europe: enter the dragon. European View, 16(1), 153–162. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0427-9 Grewal, D. S. (2008). Network power: the social dynamics of globalization (1st ed.). Yale University Press. Gu, H. (2019). Subnational actors in the relations between China and Central and Eastern European countries. Eastern Review, 8, 101–121. https://doi.org/10.18778/1427-9657.08.10 Huang, P., & Liu, Z. (2018). The Cooperation Between China and Central & Eastern European Countries (2012–2017). Social Sciences Academic Press (China). Inforegio—EU Regional and urban development. (n.d.). Retrieved February 27, 2023, from https:/ /ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/home_en Janduła, M. (2016, December 23). Hatrans: Przetarli´smy szlak dla poci˛agów Chiny-Polska. https://www.rynek-kolejowy.pl/mobile/hatrans-przetarlismy-szlak-dla-pociagow-chiny--pol ska-79567.html Kami´nski, T. (2019). What are the factors behind the successful EU-China cooperation on the subnational level? Case study of the Lodzkie region in Poland. Asia Europe Journal, 17(2), 227–242. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-00532-0 Kami´nski, T., Skorupska, A., & Szczudlik, J. (2019). The Subnational Dimension of EU-China Relations. Polski Instytut Spraw Mi˛edzynarodowych. https://www.ceeol.com/search/book-det ail?id=843824 Kowalski, B. (2017). China’s foreign policy towards Central and Eastern Europe: The “16+1” format in the South–South cooperation perspective. Cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary. Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies, 1, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.22261/7R65ZH Liu, Z. (2017). Europe and the belt and road initiative: responses and risks. China Social Sciences Press.

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Liu, Z., & Han, M. (2021). Local cooperation between China-central and eastern European countries (2020). China Social Science Press. https://www.sklib.cn/booklib/bookPreview?SiteID= 122&ID=9275341&fromSubID= Maoz, Z. (2010). Networks of nations: the evolution, structure, and impact of international networks, 1816–2001 (Illustrated edition). Cambridge University Press. Mierzejewski, D. (2017). Between central and local interdependence: Dimensions of Poland’s relations with China. Routledge. Nagel, K.-J. (2010). Foreign policy: The case of the German Lander. Foreign Policy of Constituents Units at the Beginning of 21st Century. Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, Barcelona, 121–141. Pluijm, R. van der, & Melissen, J. (2007). City diplomacy: The expanding role of cities in international politics. Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”. Shepard, W. (n.d.). How Those China-Europe “Silk Road” Trains First Began. Forbes. Retrieved February 27, 2023, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/06/29/the-story-ofhow-those-china-europe-silk-road-trains-first-began/ Sichuan Global Presenting Activity Was Held in Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016, October 10). https://www.sc.gov.cn/10462/10758/10760/10765/2016/10/10/10398581.shtml Skorupska, A., & Szczudlik-Tatar, J. (2014). Regional Cooperation Key to Polish-Chinese Strategic Partnership. PISM Strategic File, 25, 61. Song, W. (2017). Introduction: contextualizing China-central and eastern European relations in the new era. Routledge. Szczudlik-Tatar, J. (2015). One belt, one road”: mapping China’s new diplomatic strategy. PISM Bulletin, 67(799), 2. Tatham, M. (2016). With, without, or against the state? Oxford University Press. The Bucharest guidelines for cooperation between China and central and eastern European countries. (n.d.). Retrieved February 27, 2023, from http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ldrhw_1/2013bj lst/hdxw1/201610/t20161020_6828708.htm Tiezzi, S. (n.d.). China’s Xi Brings ‘Belt and Road’ to Serbia, Poland. Retrieved February 27, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/chinas-xi-brings-belt-and-road-to-serbia-poland/ Wang Yi attended the 2018 national conference of directors of local foreign affairs offices and delivered a report. (n.d.). Retrieved February 18, 2023, from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjb_ 673085/zzjg_673183/wsgls_674701/xgxw_glj_674703/201812/t20181227_7678930.shtml World Bank Open Data. (n.d.). Retrieved February 27, 2023, from https://data.worldbank.org/ Xie, J. (2018). The analysis of the current situation and development trend of Chengdu international railway express. Logistics Engineering and Management, 40(11), 36– 37+47. https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/frame/list.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=spcy20 1811012&dbname=CJFDLAST2018&RefType=1&vl= Yuan, H. (2018). China’s strategic narrative and challenges: the case of Poland. Stosunki Mi˛edzynarodowe, 54(2), 121–141. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=767155 Zang, S. (2020). China-CEEC Regional and Local Cooperation in the Context of the “Belt and Road” Initiative: An Analysis of A Multi-level Cooperation Mechanism. Journal of Social Sciences, 473(01), 50–62. https://doi.org/10.13644/j.cnki.cn31-1112.2020.01.006

Chapter 6

Conclusion: The Next Decade of Pragmatic Cooperation

The previous chapters discusses the formation and evolution of the China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries and covers a range of issues related to the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism’s organizational development. It includes the broad context of China’s foreign policy, a coherent framework analyses of institution and cooperation issues, the internal aspects of the heterogeneity, and external aspects of its asymmetry interactions, and cooperation in the two primary dimensions of great powers engagement and localization. In November 2017, the leaders of the China-CEEC Cooperation Mechanism member states meet in Budapest, Hungary, to celebrate the mechanism’s 5th anniversary. The Five-year Outcome List asserts that the mechanism creates as a result of “remarkable achievements” and “resonates well with people from both China and CEE countries”.1 It boasts of more than 200 of achievements makes over the previous years, the first being that it “takes stock of the achievements of the past five years, covering five areas, including policy communication, connectivity, economy and trade, finance, cultural and people-to-people exchange”. The mechanism partners have good reasons to celebrate on the momentous occasion of the 5th anniversary as they have all benefits from this multilateral association to a greater or lesser extent. Four years later, the China-CEEC Summit was held in Beijing via online on February 9, 2021. Chinese President Xi Jinping personally chaired the Summit and delivered a keynote speech. The Summit has drawn extensive attention as the leaders of China with Central and Eastern European countries discussed plans of development and drew a blueprint for cooperation.2 Despite some progress, the problems and limitations of the China-CEEC Cooperation Mechanism are not inconsiderable. The China-CEEC cooperation mechanism needs to be supported by the construction of specific cooperation mechanisms in various fields such as infrastructure construction, economy, and people-to-people exchanges. The China-CEEC cooperation mechanism needs to focus on setting 1 2

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017). Xi (2021).

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issues, making policy recommendations, and formulating rules to achieve mutual benefits and sustainable development for all members.

6.1 Main Achievements of Cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European Countries Being an important mechanism matches with the Belt and Road Initiative of China’s cooperation with European countries, the academic consensus holds that the international institution is characterized by a series of principles, standards, norms, and decision-making processes, which are implemented through international organizations or mechanisms, which plays a crucial role in promoting international peace and cooperation.3 The core of pragmatic institutionalism is guided by cooperative interests, featuring voluntary participation and flexible openness. The cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries reflects these characteristics, as demonstrated by the many collaborative projects that represent a significant achievement in the high-quality construction.

6.1.1 Promoting Connectivity with China and CEE Countries Infrastructure development in transportation is an important aspect of pragmatic cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries. In November 2015, the Chinese-built “Zemun-Borca” bridge in Serbia was completed, and the construction of the North–South Highway in Montenegro is proceeding smoothly. The flagship infrastructure project of the China-CEEC cooperation, the Hungary–Serbia Railway, is also making progress. The section in Serbia (Belgrade to Novi Sad) is finished in 2022, while the section in Hungary overcame various difficulties and signed a loan agreement in April 2020, marking the imminent implementation of the Hungarian section. These transportation infrastructure projects follow the principles of joint consultation, joint construction, and shared benefits among all parties, and make full use of China’s preferential loans and financing for CEECs, as well as widely involving various European partners, while complying with EU and national regulations and standards. The projects are labeled as part of the “Belt and Road” Initiative in terms of facilitating connectivity. In the field of interconnectivity, the China–Europe Railway Express (also known as the “Chongqing–Xinjiang–Europe Railway”) has been actively promoting the integration of CEECs into the “Belt and Road” interconnectivity network. Despite the global pandemic in 2020, the China–Europe Railway Express remained safe, stable, and accessible, with over 12,000 trains operating and a 50% increase in the number of trains, and an overall container load factor of 98.4%. CEECs are 3

Keohane (2005), March and Olsen (1983).

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important transfer hubs and cargo distribution centers for the China–Europe Railway Express, with most trains passing through Małaszewicze, Poland, for gauge conversion, and direct services available in other CEECs such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Serbia. Prior to the opening of the China–Europe Railway Express, CEEC products faced many obstacles to entering the Chinese market. By relying on the Railway Express, Chinese consumers and CEEC producers are closely linked, unleashing the growth potential of CEECs while also improving their supply chain risk resilience. In addition to promoting “hard connectivity” with CEECs, the China-CEEC Cooperation also establishes “soft connectivity” through various platform mechanisms, such as the “Transport Infrastructure Cooperation Union”, the “Logistics Cooperation Union”, and the “Customs Cooperation Union”, which provide convenient channels for further coordination with the “Belt and Road” soft connectivity mechanisms.

6.1.2 Focus on Green Development with CEE Countries Green development has become an important mode of cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries, which has been widely accepted by all parties. China and CEE countries have not only established mechanisms for ecological and environmental cooperation, but have also reached a “green consensus”. In 2021, it was designated as the “China-CEE Year of Green Development and Environmental Protection”. In practical cooperation projects, Jiangsu Zhongyi PV Co., Ltd.’s photovoltaic power station project in Bucharest, Romania, Zhejiang Yuhui Sunshine Group’s photovoltaic power station project in Poland, and Shanghai Electric Power Group’s Mozura Wind Power Plant project in Montenegro have all been put into operation. These clean energy projects optimize the energy structure of relevant countries and promote sustainable energy development. In addition, traditional energy projects are also required to meet high standards for “green” and “environmental protection”. The Stanari thermal power plant in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the first cooperation project to use the “USD 10 billion Special Loan for China-CEE Cooperation”, which was put into operation in 2016. The Chinese independently developed boiler technology used in the power plant meets or exceeds EU standards in controlling sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, effectively solving the problem of coal pollution. In new thermal power plant projects, China actively collaborates with third countries to increase transparency. For example, the Tuzla thermal power plant Unit 7 project in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will also use equipment from third parties such as the United States and Germany. These energy and transportation infrastructure cooperation projects fully comply with EU environmental, market, and labor standards, and enterprises follow generally accepted international rules and standards in project construction, operation, procurement, bidding, and other aspects, in line with the green development concept.

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6.1.3 People-To-People Exchange and Local Cooperation Since the establishment of the China-CEEC Cooperation Mechanism in 2012, bilateral cultural exchanges have steadily advanced. The China-CEEC Year of Culture and Media Exchange, as well as important mechanisms for cultural cooperation such as the Cultural Cooperation Forum, Education Policy Dialogue, Young Political Leaders Forum, and High-Level Think Tank Symposium, all place the topic of the cooperation as an important component of exchange dialogue. From multiple perspectives and levels, these mechanisms focus on how to promote cultural exchange and people-to-people connectivity in the CEE region. The establishment of institutionalized platforms such as the China-CEEC Think Tank Exchange and Cooperation Network, the China-CEEC Global Partnership Center, the China-CEEC University Alliance, and the China-CEEC Cultural Coordination Center has promoted cooperation and exchange between Chinese and CEEC’s think tanks, universities, and research institutions, providing a more accurate and comprehensive introduction of China’s relationship with the CEE region, and making a positive contribution to dispelling doubts and concerns. In addition, since 2016, the Confucius Institute Headquarters has held four consecutive summer camps for Confucius Institutes in CEE countries, with more than 3500 teachers and students from CEE countries visiting China. This not only enhances the visibility of Chinese language and culture in the CEE region but also serves as an effective channel for promoting the China’s image to its media and people. In 2013, local cooperation was first written into the cooperation guidelines between the two sides,4 from “encouraging and supporting local cooperation” to the establishment of the “Year of Local Cooperation” between China and CEE countries in 2018,5 providing momentum for cooperation between China and CEE local governments. China and CEE countries have formed multiple platforms for local cooperation, including meetings of local leaders, a forum of capital city mayors, joint associations of local governors, and sister city partnerships, and local cooperation has flourished in various fields such as economy and trade, investment, education, tourism, energy, medicine, health, think tanks, culture, and logistics. As of December 2022, China and CEE countries have established 185 pairs of sister provinces and states (cities), more than half of which have been formed since 2012. Domestic provinces and cities such as Sichuan, Chongqing, Zhejiang, and Hebei, as well as CEE countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Serbia, have been more active in this area, and cities such as Ningbo, Chengdu, Chongqing, and Cangzhou have become “star cities” for local cooperation.

4 5

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013). Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018).

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6.1.4 Health Cooperation amidst Covid-19 In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic spread globally, and China proposed the concept of building a “Healthy Silk Road”, which drew worldwide attention. In March 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak occurred in European countries, including Central and Eastern Europe. On May 2020, relevant departments in China with Central and Eastern European countries successfully held a video conference of COVID-19 prevention and control experts to strengthen cooperation in the field of public health.6 China also provided medical supplies, opened up channels for the transportation of epidemic prevention materials, dispatched medical expert groups, assisted Serbia in building nucleic acid testing laboratories, and provided COVID19 vaccines to Hungary and Serbia in a timely and effective manner. Serbia and Hungary not only vaccinated a large number of people with Chinese vaccines but also established or are establishing vaccine production lines, greatly enriching the connotation of China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. A health cooperation promotion federation, a hospital alliance, and a public health cooperation mechanism, among other medical and health cooperation platforms, have been established between China and Central and Eastern European countries. In addition, various other cooperation mechanisms and platforms between China and Central and Eastern European countries played a role in jointly combating the epidemic during this period. In the future, in the process of building a “Healthy Silk Road”, the cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries can not only provide valuable experience but is also an important force in promoting the construction of the “Healthy Silk Road” itself.

6.2 Main Challenges of Cooperation between China with Central and Eastern European Countries It is evident that the pragmatic cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries involves many areas, and the content of cooperation is constantly expanding and deepening according to the needs of various parties, laying the foundation for cooperation. Through this cooperation with “pragmatic institutionalism”, the voluntariness and purposefulness of the participants are reflected, providing a good example and demonstration of the China-CEEC’s cooperation in Europe. However, pragmatic institutionalism also has weaknesses, mainly manifested in: First, the stable system environment required by pragmatic institutions is easily influenced and impacted by the external international environment. Second, the binding force of pragmatic institutions is weak, and there is no legal binding force on the decisions of participating countries and the cooperative projects they reach. Third, the flexibility of pragmatic institutions also leads to the complexity of internal issues 6

State Council Information Office (2020).

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and the easy dispersal of cooperative forces. In the practical process, the pragmatic institutionalism in the cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries is also facing increasing challenges.

6.2.1 Era of World Drastic Changes As a cooperative mechanism that features “weak institutions”,7 the China-CEEC cooperation demands a stable environment for cooperation, as only in a stable environment will all parties participate on an equal and cooperative footing. Currently, the world is undergoing major development, transformation, and adjustment. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, profound changes in the geopolitical landscape, and the intensifying competition between major powers have made the international environment increasingly complex, and the uncertainties of international cooperation have increased sharply. This dramatic change and adjustment have caused a certain impact on the stable environment required for pragmatic cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries, mainly manifested in following aspects: First, the United States attempts to lure Central and Eastern European countries to participate in the strategic game against China. In recent years, the United States has increased its intervention in the Central and Eastern European region, which has created external pressure on China-Central and Eastern European cooperation. During the Trump administration, the United States successively proposed the “Three Seas” Initiative, “Clean Network” and “Blue Dot Network” plans, which involved critical infrastructure such as digital and energy and accused Chinese companies of “forcing technology transfer” and “controlling the resources of Central and Eastern European countries”. Its essence is to exclude Chinese companies from the Central and Eastern European region. Trump himself, as well as the then Secretary of State Pompeo, visited Central and Eastern European countries many times in 2019–2020 and directly interfered with China’s pragmatic cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries in the fields of digital technology and energy facilities. The Biden administration is attempting to build a unified front against China with the “United Europe Against China” plan, weakening Central and Eastern European countries’ rejection of the United States. Some Central and Eastern European countries have shown policy swings, with countries such as the Czech Republic and Romania announcing that they will exclude Chinese companies from their nuclear power projects. Second, the EU’s suspicions of China have not been eliminated, and the barriers to China-Central and Eastern European cooperation have increased. Due to the relative changes in strength and influence between China and Europe, some European politicians, think tanks, and media cannot face up to China’s development and rise, artificially expanding the differences between China and Europe and creating misunderstandings between the two. The EU has always been concerned that China will 7

Maric and Wei (2018), Ju and Gu (2022).

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use economic means to “divide” Central and Eastern European countries, reduce the attractiveness of the EU, and hinder the EU’s common foreign policy objectives by forming a pro-China “small group”. Driven by the above psychological factors, the EU has not only labeled China-Central and Eastern European cooperation as “violating EU rules”, “leading to debt traps”, and “destroying the ecological environment”, but has also gradually taken practical actions on China’s investment projects, strengthening security assessments and rule reviews of Chinese investments, and emphasizing that member states need to comply with EU rules on debt levels, environmental standards, and labor utilization. For non-EU member countries in the Balkans, the EU has strengthened its monitoring of the region through various investment tools and platforms, making it difficult for China to enter the region. The barriers to China-Central and Eastern European cooperation have thus increased. Thirdly, the Central and Eastern European countries increasingly view practical cooperation through the lens of geopolitical strategy. Some think tanks in these countries believe that both the Belt and Road Initiative and China-Central and Eastern European countries cooperation are driven by geopolitical ambitions to make China a global superpower, and that these initiatives are merely a “packaging” of this purpose. They argue that “China is attempting to construct an international order centered around itself”.8 Most of the Central and Eastern European countries are members of both the European Union and NATO, and their socio-economic development heavily depends on the EU, while their geopolitical security and military defense rely on the support of the United States. When Europe and the United States raise geopolitical security concerns about China, it is difficult for these countries to avoid being affected. In summary, practical cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries is increasingly influenced by geopolitical factors, and the stable environment necessary for pragmatic institutionalism is severely impacted. A typical example of this is the Lithuanian Foreign Minister’s announcement in May 2021 that Lithuania would withdraw from the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism. Estonia and Latvia followed suit and also withdrew from the cooperation within this framework. The outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in February 2022 has heightened the security concerns of Central and Eastern European countries, especially those bordering Russia. They are facing military threats from Russia, which has made their security needs more urgent. The uncertainty caused by changes in the regional situation has also led Central and Eastern European countries to have doubts about China’s position and geopolitical role, and they believe that China may not deliver on its promises in cooperation. Additionally, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has had an impact on the perception of China among the general population in Central and Eastern European countries. Some right-wing media, non-governmental organizations, and political figures may hold negative views of China, leading to skepticism among the public about cooperation with China, which has affected the progress of cooperation.

8

Kratz et al. (2016), Wei (2022).

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6.2.2 Constraint Difficulty on Cooperative Projects Pragmatic institutionalism is characterized by “voluntary participation”, and all parties choose a cooperative path based on independent selection and voluntary negotiation. The relevant rules belong to “soft rules” or “weak rules”. Due to the weak normativity of cooperation, especially in multilateral cooperation projects related to China-CEE country cooperation, the binding force on the participating entities is not strong. This can easily lead to a lack of effective planning, approval, supervision, and implementation mechanisms before, during, and after the signing and execution of cooperation agreements, resulting in a situation where form is emphasized over substance. In addition, the mechanism has no legal procedure to intervene in CEE multilateral affairs (even economic affairs), which limits its ability to resolve conflicts between China and CEE at the multilateral level, and due to the limitations of the mechanism itself, China and CEE countries can only deal with issues at the national level and cannot truly solve multilateral problems in a multilateral form. The pragmatic institutionalism of China-CEE country cooperation is based on voluntary participation and seeks multilateral cooperation. Because it does not have strong constraints, the cost of participating parties not executing the agreement or even withdrawing from the mechanism is relatively low, and it is easy to attribute the poor implementation of cooperation projects to the advocating country. Therefore, without mechanism reform, it is difficult to break through this dilemma—bilateral cooperation under multilateralism is difficult to reconcile multilateral conflicts. Moreover, it should be noted that the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism, as a multilateral arrangement, is not typical and differs from classical cooperation defined by regionalism or inter-regionalism. This uniqueness determines that the mechanism has no precedents to follow, so in practice it often does not present itself as a genuine multilateral cooperation project, but rather as bilateral cooperation within a multilateral framework. Only a few forums or discussions have adopted multilateralism, but the action plans, especially specific cooperation projects, are generally bilateral in nature. This characteristic makes it difficult for the mechanism to solve the problem of multilateralism, some CEE countries misunderstand cooperation as a China-dominated “unilateralism” platform, which undermines the essence of “multilateralism”. Europe does not regard China-CEE country cooperation as a form of multilateral cooperation but instead considers it a China-dominated unilateralist cooperation mechanism or a bilateral cooperation mechanism under the guise of multilateralism. Some European think tanks believe that China leads the cooperation agenda, and the “cooperation outlines” published over the years reflect more of China’s intentions. Although cooperation has been defined as multilateralism, it is still primarily a collection of bilateral relationships and does not reflect the characteristics of multilateralism. The multilateralism of China-CEE country cooperation aims to make small countries respect China’s core interests, but this kind of multilateral framework is neither a mechanized bilateral alliance nor a security cooperation organization that can deal with real strategic issues.

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6.2.3 Complicated Issues of Cooperation The “flexible openness” of pragmatic institutionalism in issue setting, cooperation methods, and path selection allows participating parties to bring their various concerns into the cooperative mechanism, forming a “bottom-up” agenda-setting model. The complex national conditions of CEE countries have led to differences in their willingness to cooperate and sense of achievement. Additionally, as CEE countries are situated in a geopolitically sensitive region, China-CEE cooperation has encountered internal challenges, especially with respect to the complexity of the issues involved, the singularity of the driving force, and the lack of recognition of the nature of multilateralism. First, the open agenda of pragmatic institutionalism has made the China-CEE cooperation issues relatively complicated. Since the establishment of the mechanism in 2012, and in keeping with the spirit of pragmatic cooperation, proposals for all kinds of cooperation, except those related to politics and security, have been included in the China-CEE cooperation mechanism. For example, under the China-CEE cooperation mechanism, there are various issues related to education and culture, such as the University Alliance, the Cultural Coordination Center, the Dance, Culture and Arts Alliance, the Music School Alliance, the Art Creation and Research Center, the Publishing Alliance, the Library Alliance, the Youth Art Talent Training and Practice Center, and the Cultural and Creative Industry Exchange and Cooperation Center. On the one hand, the refinement of issues has brought about a thriving picture of China-CEE cooperation mechanism. On the other hand, the complicated issues may give outsiders a sense of “all talk and no action” and unclear cooperation priorities. Second, the cooperative driving force is relatively singular, and there has been no formation of a multilateral push. The establishment of the China-CEE cooperation mechanism was initiated by multiple parties, but the results were driven by China. At the time of the mechanism’s establishment, China proposed “12 measures” that included preferential loans, funding assistance, scholarships for foreign students, and investment facilitation policies, all of which had unprecedented strength for CEE countries. However, the mechanism has not formed a multilateral push for a long time. On the one hand, due to the natural inequality between CEE countries and China in terms of economic size, population, and market capacity, and on the other hand, many CEE countries have adopted a diplomatic strategy of “hedging their bets” and “sharing the benefits”, which makes them more enthusiastic about favorable cooperation and more reluctant to cooperate in difficult situations. As global economic pressures increase, China’s investment in cooperation and the strength of its mechanism have decreased compared to the initial stage of establishment, especially as the quota for the “double excellent loan” has been nearly exhausted, and the support for future cooperation is becoming increasingly scarce.

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6.3 Roadmap for High-Quality Development of Cooperation Between China and CEE Countries Despite the European Union’s long-term integration efforts, the CEE countries exhibit significant differences. The “pragmatic institutionalism” of the China-CEE cooperation mechanism also faces various challenges and issues, but it is important to recognize that these challenges are not caused by “pragmatic cooperation” itself. The fundamental approaches and methods of pragmatic cooperation will not change, and pragmatic cooperation has universal applicability, which should continue to be upheld in the future. However, it is necessary to address the limitations and unfavorable factors of “pragmatic institutionalism” from the perspective of the challenges and to adapt to the changing international situation, promoting the deepening of China-CEE relations, China–Europe relations, and the Belt and Road construction under the backdrop of the “profound change unseen in a century”.

6.3.1 Improving Mechanisms for Coordinated Development As the “Belt and Road” Initiative develops with high quality, international cooperation or multilateral agreements with binding structures or institutions are necessary to promote it. However, the cooperation between China and CEE countries is mainly carried out in a bilateral or small multilateral structure. Within the framework of China-CEE cooperation, bilateral cooperation is the foundation, and China-CEE cooperation is the platform, with both supporting and promoting each other. The China-CEE cooperation mechanism is not only helpful for deepening and solidifying China’s bilateral relations with CEE countries, but also for deepening the level of regional integration in the CEE region. It can also contribute a “Chinese solution” to the construction of a new type of international relations and global governance model, thereby embedding it deeply in the “Belt and Road” Initiative. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the coordination between China’s bilateral relations with CEE countries and the China-CEE cooperation mechanism. Based on the cooperation mechanism, the bilateral relations between China and CEE countries can be strengthened, and benign interaction and positive feedback can be formed between bilateral and multilateral relations. At the same time, the China-CEE cooperation mechanism should consider the diversity and differences of CEE countries, as each country has multiple identities on the international stage, especially for most CEE countries, which are both EU member states and belong to the Baltic, Visegrad, Western Balkans and other regions. When cooperating with these countries, attention should be paid to both the “radiation effect with point-to-surface” and the “superimposed effect with surface-to-point”. Bilateral, trilateral, or small multilateral cooperation should be conducted simultaneously within the multilateral framework, in order to improve cooperation efficiency, address the shortcomings of cooperation, and coordinate cooperation differences.

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The China-Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) cooperation mechanism is characterized by its openness and inclusiveness, which is reflected in its loose organizational structure, with the annual leaders’ summit being the core mechanism and the China-CEEC Cooperation Secretariat being the permanent institution. Despite ministerial-level meetings on various topics such as economic, trade, investment, and cultural education, the focus of attention is still on the annual leaders’ summit, resulting in limited achievements and low interest in other ministerial meetings. Therefore, it is necessary to enhance the quality and level of various ministeriallevel meetings, fully play their role in policy communication and guidance for ChinaCEEC cooperation, and ease the pressure of excessive concentration on the leaders’ summit. In addition to the core mechanism, the cooperation platform mechanisms in various fields lack binding and supervisory mechanisms, leading to the “zombification” and excessive proliferation of platform mechanisms. Therefore, it is necessary to consider improving the platform management system in the future, promoting mutual learning and reference among platforms, introducing timely exit mechanisms, and avoiding fragmentation and quantification. Furthermore, a reasonable dispute resolution mechanism is the most important guarantee for regional cooperation. The establishment of an effective dispute resolution mechanism has been widely recognized by member states. Based on the experience of relevant dispute resolution mechanisms, a more targeted and diverse dispute resolution mechanism should be established, based on the principles of fairness, efficiency, peace, and flexibility. The mechanism should also include private entities, fully consider the interests of all parties, and provide strong legal guarantees for the stable development of cooperation. Finally, the improvement of the cooperation mechanism is not only the improvement of the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism itself but also the coordination of various mechanisms for domestic and international cooperation and exchanges between China and CEEC. It is recommended to establish or improve the ChinaCEEC Cooperation Center, aiming to promote cooperation between China and CEEC in the fields of trade, investment, tourism, education, and culture. As a onestop information and activity center, the China-CEEC Cooperation Center covers multiple issues such as economic, trade, investment, education, and culture, avoiding redundant resource waste and making greater contributions to the deepening of friendly exchanges and cooperation between China and CEEC in the fields of trade, investment, education, culture, tourism, and media.

6.3.2 Facilitating Multilevel Cooperation The cooperation between China and CEE countries exhibits the characteristic of “multilevel” cooperation, which includes both supranational-level multilateral cooperation (between China and the European Union) and national-level as well as subnational-level cooperation involving local governments and social organizations.

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Currently, the cooperation between China and CEE countries is gradually shifting from the “big picture” to finer-grained and more specific cooperation across various industries and localities. However, the national-level coordination remains an important way for China and CEE countries to cooperate, and it is mostly guided by the central government. The positive interactions between “top-down” and “bottom-up” have not yet been fully manifested. Multilevel cooperation can integrate various practical cooperation issues into different cooperation levels, allowing issues that require coordination between countries, such as investment and trade policies, and crossborder connectivity projects, to be discussed at higher levels. Smaller issues, such as sports and cultural exchanges, and scientific and technological innovation, can be addressed at the local government and social organization levels. This can prevent various complex issues from being included in high-level cooperation between countries and governments, thus avoiding the dispersion of resources in the top-level mechanisms of China-CEE cooperation while promoting the participation of various social forces. The complexity and diversity of the CEE region pose many challenges for China’s cooperation with CEE countries. As an external actor in the CEE region, China needs to strengthen its relationship with regional powers such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and friendly countries to China like Hungary and Serbia, and tend to elevate their cooperation status and role under the framework of the ChinaCEE cooperation mechanism. In recent times, Poland and Hungary have had many conflicts with the European Union over issues of rule of law and democracy. Poland’s constitutional court ruling that “domestic law in Poland has priority over European Union law” has led to a deterioration in relations with the European Union. Under such circumstances, Poland and Hungary have shown a stronger interest in developing pragmatic cooperation with China. The Orbán government in Hungary has consistently emphasized pragmatic cooperation with China, and well-known Polish foreign policy experts have suggested that Poland should maintain and strengthen its cooperation with China amid the complex trilateral relationship between China, the United States, and Europe.9 Against the backdrop of the changing international political relations within Europe, it is important to actively deepen high-level political exchanges with CEE countries such as Poland and Hungary and promote deeper pragmatic cooperation, so as to further integrate these countries into the cooperation mechanism. In addition, the major countries referred to here also include Western European countries such as Germany, France, and Italy, whose institutional appeal and economic influence in the CEE region cannot be ignored. In the future, through the development of third-party cooperation and the deepening of regional cooperation with Western European powers, it will be possible to stimulate their participation in China-CEE cooperation and to leverage their own influence and demonstration effect.

9

D˛ebski (2021).

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6.3.3 Fostering People-To-People Exchanges Due to the significant distance and differences in historical development processes, cultural traditions, and social environments, cultural and social differences have always been a major obstacle hindering the deepening of pragmatic economic and trade cooperation between China and CEE countries, a situation that is widespread among the countries along the Belt and Road. Therefore, China should focus on fulfilling its commitments on time and enabling CEE countries to share opportunities for Chinese development, demonstrating China’s responsible attitude as a great power and striving to win more understanding and support from CEE countries. Improving the corresponding foreign communication capabilities is an essential means for building a cooperative social foundation. The media of a country is the most important channel for its ordinary citizens to understand the world, and the media can have a significant impact on their perception and attitude toward another country. In the context of China’s cooperation with CEE countries, China’s foreign communication capabilities and content are particularly important. Currently, China’s external communication process is largely limited to official promotion, and there is relatively little content related to enhancing emotional identity along the Belt and Road and promoting people-to-people connectivity. This has led to some countries having a limited understanding of the BRI initiative and questioning China’s pragmatic cooperation with CEE countries. In external cultural communication, attention should be paid to constructing discourse mechanisms that tell China’s story in a way that can be heard, understood, and accepted by the people of CEE countries. Whether it is the Belt and Road Initiative or China-CEE cooperation, it is necessary to reduce the many doubts of countries along the Belt and Road. Therefore, efforts to increase confidence and dispel doubts should highlight social forces, promoting and strengthening dialogue through existing multilateral, bilateral, formal, and informal mechanisms, and constructing a public opinion foundation that benefits equal exchange and mutually beneficial cooperation among different countries and ethnic groups. Currently, China’s proposed high-quality construction and sustainable development mean that the way it cooperates with other countries is shifting from a “freehand sketch” to a “meticulous brushwork”. The core of pragmatic cooperation is the driving force behind China-CEE cooperation, and in promoting pragmatic cooperation, the “political account” and “economic account” must be well-balanced to maintain the interest of CEE countries in the face of the complex international environment. Relevant cooperative projects should pay attention to environmental protection and green principles, and search for new areas of cooperation in fields such as digital and green economies. A complete evaluation system should be established for each specific cooperative project, covering pre-project, in-project, and post-project stages, to prevent projects from being unfinished or incomplete.

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