Greece’s Ostpolitik: Dealing With the ‘‘Devil’’ (Contributions to International Relations) [1st ed. 2021] 3030611280, 9783030611286

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Contributions to International Relations

Andreas Stergiou

Greece’s Ostpolitik Dealing With the ‘‘Devil’’

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations and related fields.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16658

Andreas Stergiou

Greece’s Ostpolitik Dealing With the ‘‘Devil’’

Andreas Stergiou Department of Economics Universit of Thessaly Volos, Greece

Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-3-030-61128-6    ISBN 978-3-030-61129-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61129-3 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my nephews Jortzaki, Sea and Nani and my niece Aggeliki

Acknowledgement

The task of compiling this book has been a meticulous, solitary and highly explorative voyage that lasted, with interruptions due to other obligations and projects, many years. Reaching the end of this voyage, I wish to thank all those who have supported my efforts for the realisation of this book by offering multi-faceted assistance. First of all, I would like to thank the Stanley J. Seeger ’52 Center for Hellenic Studies in Princeton, where I was visiting research fellow in 2020, for its generous support in materializing this study. I am grateful for their multilayered help to Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, Sotiris Rizas, Evi Gkotzarides, Evanthis Hatzivasilliou, Maximilian Goepp and my multi-talented niece Aggeliki Petsi. The staff at Springer deserve special thanks as they embraced the project and contributed to its materialisation.

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Contents

Introduction: The Theoretical and Analytical Framework��������������������������    1 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    13  Greece’s Security Problems in the Cold War������������������������������������������������   17 The Role of the Left-Wing Parties ������������������������������������������������������������������    34 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    41  Greece and Eastern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s ������������������������������������   45 The Economic Factor ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    45 Political Rapprochements and the New Balance of Power������������������������������    52 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    64 The Cyprus Problem as Variable in the Soviet Bloc’s Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean����������������������������������������������������������������   69 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    84 The Unholy Alliance: Athens Military Regime’s Ties with the Communist Bloc������������������������������������������������������������������������   87 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   111 The Ostpolitik in the Context of the Country’s Multidimensional Foreign Policy in the 1970s����������������������������������������������������������������������  115 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   132 PASOK’s Foreign Policy Course Towards the Socialist Countries in the 1980s ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  137 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   169 Conclusions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  175

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About the Author

Andreas  Stergiou  is associate professor in the Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, who specialises in European institutions and international relations, and is a teaching fellow at the Open University of Greece. He has studied history (B.A.) at the Department of History of the Ionian University (Greece) with scholarships granted by the Greek State Scholarship Foundation and the Minor Asia Refugees Foundation. He completed his master and Ph.D. thesis on history and political sciences at the University of Mannheim (Germany) with scholarships granted by the Greek State Scholarship Foundation, the Alexander Onassis Public Benefit Foundation, Koelner Foundation and the Hermann Weber Foundation. He has also completed Postdoctoral studies in the History of International Relations at the Department of History of the Ionian University 2004–2006 with EU funding grant and a Postdoctoral seminar on American Politics and Political Thought at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst (Summer 2010) with US State Department Scholarship. He has been Visiting Research Fellow at the Truman Institute for advancement of Peace in the Hebrew University in 2013 and 2018 and Research Affiliate 2014–2015, at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO) in Moscow in 2015, at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA University) in 2017 and at the Princeton University of the United States (Stanley J. Seeger ’52 Center for Hellenic Studies) in 2020. He has been a teaching fellow at the University of Mannheim, the University of Heidelberg, the University of Crete, the Diplomatic Academy of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National School of Public Administration, the Hellenic Open University, the National Trade Confederation (ESEE) and the School-Research Center of the Union for Civil Servants (ADEDY). He has published in French, English, Greek, German and Portuguese.

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Abbreviations

AKEL

(Cypriot Communist Party) Anorthotiko Komma toy Ergazomenou Laou [Progressive Party of the Working People] AMAG American Mission for Aid to Greece AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System CINSOUTH Commander-in-Chief of NATO Forces in Southern Europe COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance COMINFORM Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties COMINTERN Communist International EDA Eniaia Dimocratiki Aristera [United Democratic Left] EC European Community EEC European Economic Community ECE European Economic Commission for Europe FRG Federal Republic of Germany GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDR German Democratic Republic KKE Kommounistiko Komma Elladas [Greek Communist Party] NARA National Archives and Records Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs MAP US Military Assistance Program to Greece OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries PASOK Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands [Socialist Union Party of Germany = East-German Communist Party] TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Introduction: The Theoretical and Analytical Framework

Greece’s Ostpolitik, i.e. the opening of the Greek State to the Communist countries during the Cold War, though so far has been a terra incognita of European history and politics, was an important chapter of the Cold War international relations. Ostpolitik, in its literal sense, means “Eastern politics” and relates to the policy of conducting affairs with the Eastern European states including the Soviet Union. From the late 1960s onwards, the term Ostpolitik has shifted towards representing a policy of détente with the Eastern European countries, based on the acceptance of Europe’s post-war division and the struggle for a regulated coexistence in a world of Blocs. Above all, the term Ostpolitik owes its reputation to Willy Brandt’s Eastern policy. From October 1969 onwards, Brandt as German Chancellor initiated a policy of rapprochement towards Eastern Europe including East Germany (German Democratic Republic-GDR), West Germany’s (Federal Republic of Germany -FRG) archenemy. Although today Brandt’s Ostpolitik is commonly perceived as the policy that paved the way for the reunification of Europe, at that time Brandt’s vision was not unanimously praised. To the contrary, Ostpolitik was a highly controversial and explosive foreign policy, since it dealt with one of West Germany’s main national interests; the reunification of Germany and the surrender of its former Eastern territories to third countries (Bierling, 1999, pp. 171–217). Ostpolitik was viewed as a means to achieve “détente”. The term détente defines, in the given historical context, the coexistence of states with different social and political order, in particular the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. More precisely, in the 1960s the division of the European continent could not any longer be dismissed as temporary. Against this background, Western European countries began seeking ways to foster détente: establish contacts with the Eastern European countries, reduce the level of military tensions, bring trade benefits and lighten the heavy hand of the Kremlin’s control over its satellites. The culmination of the détente was considered to be the normalisation of Soviet-­ German relations in the early 1970s, the inclusion of the two German States into the United Nations in 1973 and the Helsinki Act of 1975. Some scholars believe that the © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Stergiou, Greece’s Ostpolitik, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61129-3_1

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détente had begun earlier, in the so-called “Khrushchev Era” 1953–1965, after the crises over Berlin and Cuba, which highlighted the danger of an unintended nuclear war and precipitated a tacit arrangement for balance in the international system, as well as, in the global nuclear arms race (Graf, Gülstorff, Lomellini, Stoilova, & Zaccaria, 2011). In the Soviet discourse of détente, two historic episodes were of great importance; the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the improvement of Soviet-French relationships since 1966 and after France’s withdrawal from NATO. France, under President Charles de Gaulle, had indeed pioneered the détente of the 1960s, partly to show its independence from the United States. In the Soviet view, however, the leitmotiv of détente was the strength of socialism in the economic, political, scientific and military sector that compelled the “imperialistic states” to abandon their hitherto Cold War strategy and to steer towards a course of friendly coexistence. The Détente was thus the result of the changed world politics constellation in favour of the Socialist Alliance (Jahn, 1983, pp. 67–90). Both Détente and Ostpolitik were associated with dramatic changes in the Cold War world politics, because they employed engagement and negotiation, rather than confrontation. Established realities, like the division of Germany, considered until then a cornerstone of the Warsaw Pact, were suddenly transformed into an object of bargaining. As a scholar very strikingly described it, détente forced both sides in the Cold War to deal with the opposing devil. For differing reasons, both sides sought the prize of learning how to coexist more peacefully; both had to make concessions in pursuit of this prize (Sarotte, 2001, pp. 5–6). Studying the relations between Greece and Eastern Europe from early 1950s until the end of 1980s, as this book does, one can conclude that the term Ostpolitik, as it has been conceptualised in literature, only incompletely applies to the Greek case. Greek state’s tentative opening to the Communist Bloc in the 1950s and 1960s, culminated in the 1970s 1980s, only partly dovetails with the notion Ostpolitik. The security fears pushing Western European countries to seek a peaceful modus vivendi with their Communist enemies, formed part of Greece’s concerns only in the 1950s and 1960s. Greece’s Ostpolitik in the period of military junta 1967–1974, particularly from 1969 onwards, was of a unique, peculiar nature. Military regime’s Ostpolitik served predominantly propaganda purposes and, notwithstanding the appearances and the ostentatious trade-offs, did not even come close to the foreign policy concept, designed and implemented by pragmatic and visionary politicians like Willy Brandt and Charles de Gaulle. The real policy of rapprochement followed by the Greek governments in the 1970s and 1980s did not have the character of the West European Ostpolitik either. Though it was marked by flourishing, multiple political and economic contacts between Capitalist Greece and most of the Communist countries around the world, it was not driven by the desire of establishing a peaceful coexistence between states with different political and social status quo. It rather addressed the necessity to combat an existential threat for Greece from the same Western Alliance, i.e. the Turkish threat. Although the Cold War was still playing out, unlike the 1950s and

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1960s, the real security problem for Greece was no longer the Warsaw Pact countries, but an equally capitalist country and NATO-ally. Greece’s “devil” from 1974 onwards was Turkey. Thus, it is argued that among the various interrelated factors accounted for Greece’s Ostpolitik, for the period 1974–1989, the most crucial one was the Greek-­ Turkish rivalry. Unlike the West-European countries’ Ostpolitik in the 1960s and 1970s, Athens did not seek the cooperation with the Communist camp to ease its security concerns deriving from the adversary economic, political and military Alliance, to gain leverage to ward off the “danger from the East” represented by Turkey. In a dramatic reversal of history, what was Greece’s archenemy in the 1970s and 1980s, had been its closest ally in its efforts to become member of Western military Alliance some decades ago. In early 1950s, Greece approached Turkey seeking its help in order to retain accession to NATO and protect itself from the Communist countries that threatened its sovereignty. In the 1970s and 1980s, Greece approached the same Communist countries seeking their help to protect itself from Turkey that threatened its sovereignty. As Greece has persistently occupied a marginal place in much of the Cold War research of historians and political scientists, scholars have not laid enough stress on this topic. There is only one exception to this academic-methodological choice: the period covering the outset of the Cold War between 1946 and 1949, during which the Greek civil war played an important role in the global state of affairs. Notably, Greece’s political destiny was manoeuvred in the Western Block through the “percentages agreement” clinched by Stalin and Churchill in 1944. However, it would not be long before a British request for shouldering the economic responsibility of Greece’s reconstruction, would be passed to the Americans. The latter, as voiced by their President Harry Truman before Congress in March 1947, would commit to making available immediate economic and military aid, so that Greece would not “perish” behind the Iron Curtain.1 Truman’s reasoning was down to the bloodiest Civil conflict in modern Greek history between the Communist rebels and the national, right-wing government that was inflicted to the country from 1946 until 1949. The Greek Communist Party leadership received significant assistance from the Communist countries,2 making the success of the Civil War dependent on factors that could not be controlled or predicted. The insurgents received considerable 1  Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (henceforth cited as HAGFM): folder 84, subfolder 1/4, “Dispatch from Greek Embassy in London to the Greek Foreign Ministry January 28, 1948, Extract from the Foreign Secretary’s speech in the parliamentary debate on Greece external problems, January 22, 1948”. 2  Even before the Civil War broke out, in November 1945, Molotov seems to have instructed Bulgarian authorities to deliver to the KKE 100,00 dollars. In spring 1946, the Greek Communist leader Zachariadis appears to have obtained promises of military support from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. At the same period Moscow advised him to proceed gradually and to avoid an untimely armed intervention by the British. Zachariadis, however, ignored it and moved towards full-scale insurrection (Iatrides, 2005, pp. 21–23).

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Introduction: The Theoretical and Analytical Framework

quantities of weapons, ammunition and communication equipment from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, countries bordering with Greece. Those countries’ training facilities and refuge were of great importance for the guerrillas, who crossed the porous northern borders seeking medical treatment and rest there. Greek Communists also received help from non-Balkan Communist countries, mainly clothing and footwear, medical supplies, food as well as products of personal hygiene and money. However, when in December 1947, the Greek guerrillas announced the establishment of a provisional government hoping to attain recognition at least from the Communist countries, neither the Soviet Union nor any of the newly established “People’s Democracies” in Eastern Europe, granted recognition to the provisional government most probably out of fear of an American reaction. Moreover, the Communist guerrillas suffered a tremendous blow from Greek public opinion -even for long time after the end of the Civil war- after they tacitly approved a plan for the establishment of an “Independent Macedonian People’s Republic” that was conform with Balkan Communist Countries’ interests (Iatrides, 2005b, p. 140; Sfikas 2001, pp. 52–56; Kontis, 2012, pp. 235–265; Barker, 1987, pp. 297–308; Kontis & Sfetas, 2000; Maratzides & Tsivos, 2012; Stergiou, 2001, pp. 29–37; Baev, 1997, pp.  163–168; Archives of the General Staff of the Hellenic Army, 1998: vol. 9, pp. 428–438, 440–452; vol. 12, 124–127; vol 16, 155–159). In order to contain its Communist neighbours’ support to the insurgent cause, the Greek Government made repeated pleas to the United States for military and economic assistance.3 The Greek armed forces were supplied, equipped and trained under American sponsorship and Greek defence plans were defined by American strategists (Iatrides, 1980, p. 69). In order to expose Balkan countries’ activities and discredit Greek Communists in the eyes of beholder, Athens filed repeated complaints to the Security Council of the newly established United Nations. As a consequence, the organisation established a Special Committee to investigate the accusations. After reviewing the evidence gathered by its own observation groups by direct observation and through the testimony of witnesses, the Committee concluded that, …in varying degrees, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were furnishing support to Greek Communist guerrillas… The Committee also concluded that Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria had supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece; Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were supporting the separatist movement among Slav-Macedonians in Greece with a view to incorporating Macedonia in the Yugoslav Federation; The continued reiteration of Greek territorial claims against Bulgaria and the latter’s claims to Western Thrace as well as Greece’s claims against Albania tended to increase the tension between the countries concerned. The Special Committee further concluded that as long as such aid to the Greek guerrillas continued the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece would remain under threat, and

3  HAGFM: folder 84, subfolder 1, “Correspondence between Greek Embassy in the United States and Greek Foreign Ministry, February 1948”.

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international peace and security in the Balkans would be in danger, … (Yearbooks of the United Nations, 1947–1948, pp. 298–302, 337–352; 1949, pp. 238–256). Eventually, in August 1949, the Greek Communist rebels suffered total defeat in the Grammos/Vitsi mountains battles but a considerable force succeeded in withdrawing to Albania and from there to spread to the entire Communist Bloc. At an extraordinary plenum, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikos Zachariadis, declared that the continuation of the armed struggle would be an expression of a petit bourgeois mentality of despair and a lack of perspective. Instead, in line with the “Soviet proposals”, the armed conflict must cease and activity must be focused on the organisation of the political and economic struggle of the working people. Zachariadis also attributed the defeat to the American aid to the Greek “monarcho-fascism” and to the “Tito’s treachery” and the exploitation of this treachery by the Americans. It is estimated that during and after the end of the Greek Civil War (1949) over 60,000 adults and some 25,000–30,000 children were forced to go into exile as a result of the defeat,4 seeking asylum in various foreign countries, especially in Eastern Europe and the USSR.5 Most of them were compelled to remain in exile for the decades to follow (Kitroef, 2006, pp. 75–94; Stergiou, 2006, pp.  147–149, 154–157; Lampatos, 2006, pp.  164–165; Tsaroucha-Szabo, 2006, pp. 175–181).

4  The way the children left the country has been to date a hotly disputed topic. The political right has persistently argued that the Communists abducted the children, while many Communist cadres in their memoires have argued that these children were orphans or belonged to fighters of the Communist guerrilla forces. The author’s opinion resulting from many interviews he has conducted with persons who as children left the country, as well as with other persons involved in this historical episode is that the majority of the children were either orphans or belonged to families, whose members fought for the Communist guerrilla forces. However, as the former General Secretary of the Communist Party Grigoris Farakos also admitted in personal communication with the author (Athens, April 1999) many of them were abducted. The personal story of those people is a modern Greek tragedy not only because they were deprived of their family but also because for the most part the Greek state randomly stigmatised them as well-trained, indoctrinated enemies of the Greek nation. Greek authorities were afraid that they might have been “contaminated” by the “communist virus”, dehellenised and converted to enemies of their own homeland. As a consequence, when many of them in the 1950s and the 1960s sought to return to Greece, they learned that they had been pronounced persona non grata. Given the fact that some Eastern European Bloc countries never recognised them as full citizens, they had to survive until the 1970s and 1980s, when the Greek state enabled their repatriation, either with temporary passports or with passports granting them the legal but also very emotional charged definition: “Greek without homeland”. 5  The partisans who sought sanctuary in the Communist countries, formed numerous communities across Communist Eastern Europe under the auspices of the receiving governments and the Greek Communist party leadership. A big amount of the exiled were transported covertly very far from Greek borders to then capital of Uzbekistan Tashkent, where they lived for years as “stateless persons”. Only after 1953 they received the official status of “political refugees”. Out of the whole Soviet Union Tashkent was chosen to host the bulk of the defeated leftist combat units who had arrived in the country after the defeat of their army. For the next three decades, until political developments in Greece made repatriation possible, the capital of Uzbekistan became the emblematic city of the Greek Communist movement (Karpozilos, 2014, pp. 62–87; Afinian, Kontis, Papoulidis, Smirnova, & Tomilina, 1999, pp. 191–208).

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Introduction: The Theoretical and Analytical Framework

Among the victims of the Civil War, children represented the most vulnerable part of refugees fleeing Greece following the cessation of the military operations. They also stood in the epicenter of a decades-long ideological, political and propaganda struggle of wide propositions between the two sides. The controversy was about the circumstances under which these children left the country and the way they were educated and brought up in the various Communist countries (Ristovic, 1998, pp. 196–197; Jones, 1985, pp. 65–85; Antoniou & Kalyvas, 2015; Yearbooks of the United Nations, 1950, pp. 378–383; Yearbooks of the United Nations, 1951, pp. 325–337; Yearbooks of the United Nations, 1952, pp. 285–290). Greece’s post-Civil War security policy was heavily influenced by the prevailing Cold War balance of power and the spheres of influence dividing the European continent. Greek policy-makers regarded the country as a forward post of the Western Alliance, a narrow strip of land which completed the Western defence “defensive perimeter” and blocked the exit of the Soviets to the Mediterranean.6 In its efforts to hold back what Greek defence-makers depicted as the “Slav danger or tide”, i.e. the threat of an imminent attack by the Balkan Communist countries, Greece was in constant need of the support of the Western Bloc’s larger states. All the more, because the country bordered with some of the frontline states of the communist camp in Europe and was military inferior and geographical vulnerable. The strategic doctrine dominating Greek military planning and defence policy until the mid-1970s, was mainly designed to repel a possible Soviet and Bulgarian attack along the strategically thin border of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace (Hatzivassiliou, 2006). US officials on the other hand attributed a specific role to Greece in the realm of the East-West confrontation. Greek military had to be prepared and capable of stemming the Communist threat. This means, that it had to develop a modicum of prestige and confidence which, in the event of a global war, would be capable of causing some delay to Soviet and/or satellite state advance and of assisting, within its capabilities, in the overall war effort.7 While Greece joined NATO and established close ties with the United States, the Balkan Communist states were overwhelmingly the minor allies of the Soviet Union. Thus, any radical change in this fragile geopolitical architecture of power, could have side-effects in other parts of Europe, conceivably provoking a global war. In 1951, the CIA concluded that the Soviet Union would react to a US commitment to defend Turkey and Greece by exerting increased pressure upon the countries of the Near East. Such measures would include intensified political warfare, including various modes of political and economic pressure upon Western coun-

6  HAGFM: folder 84, subfolder 1, “Council of Political Affairs, minutes of discussion on the East and West Camps, March 5–12, 1948”. 7  Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforth cited as FRUS) vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa: “Telegram of The Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece (Jenkins) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 26, 1950”.

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tries, diplomatic action in the United Nations and elsewhere, propaganda and perhaps covert support to revolutionary activities in vulnerable areas.8 Although the interest of the Soviet Bloc in Greece was not always very high, the security concerns of the Western Alliance about the real intensions of the Communist countries in this very sensitive region for Western geostrategic interests were enormous. Today, we know that in a strikingly similar way, the two Blocs saw Greece as the weakest link in the Western Alliance. The reason for that was its domestic and economic instability and its troubled relationship with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. As source of domestic political and economic instability was construed the widespread social unrest and the soured political atmosphere in the post-Civil War society, especially the state obsession with a possible resurgence of the internal communist threat. The Turkey-Greece confrontation from 1955 onwards, permanently threatening to destabilise NATO’s southern flank, was simultaneously a serious cause of concerns for the West and a welcome opportunity for meddling in the Eastern Mediterranean interstate affairs for the Soviet Bloc. Since Greek and Turkish political elites were aware of those Western fears and concerns, they did not shy to systematically exploit them for their own benefit, either to gain support for their internal political games or to elicit additional military, economic and political support from NATO and the United States “to prevent Greece from falling under the communist influence”. Against this background, Greece’s tentative opening to the Soviet Bloc in the 1950s was tied up with the whole security concept of Greece’s foreign policy and resembled West Germany’s and France analogous course with Communist Europe. Athens’ opening to the Eastern European countries was an extremely difficult undertaking. First of all Greece numbered a wide range of pending “national issues” with the neighbouring Balkan states: unsettled territorial borders, the “Macedonian Question”, the issue of political refuges as well as the issue of the Greek Minority, who lived in the Southern Albania or Northern Epirus (as the Greeks are accustomed to terming this region). Τhe latter issue of the rights of the populous Greek minority in Southern Albania affected heavily the Athens-Tirana relationship for decades. Dormant before the World War II, when the Greek minority recognised by the League of Nations had been guaranteed educational, and religious rights, the issue of the rights of the minority became again a major problem in the 1940s. During the World War II, Albania became a springboard for the Italian offensive against Greece. Albanian regiments participated in the operations, deployed by the Italian forces in many cases against the Greek State. In response to the Italian attack, Athens declared Albania a belligerent country and the Greek army after a successful counter-­ offensive temporarily occupied the Northern Epirus. The Greek forces pulled back after few months, but the state of war continued to be in place even after the end of 8  CIA-releases 2017: “Estimate of reactions to varying degrees of US military commitment and activity in the Near East prepared by the Estimates Group Office of Intelligence Research, May 1951” and “Report on probable Soviet reaction to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Western Defence Agreements prepared by the office of national estimates of the CIA June 13, 1951.”

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the war. As a result, the borders between the two countries remained hermetically sealed for the decades to come. The repressive Communist regime, established in Albania after the end of the World War II, systematically suppressed the Greek minority during the whole Cold War period. Another problem burdening Greek-Albanian relations was the issue of the brutally evicted Albanian minority from Greece (Chams), due to its collaboration with the Italians and Nazis during the occupation of Greece (1941–1944). Members of that minority who had lost relatives and properties, bolstered by the Albanian government, founded organisations in Albania and harboured resentments and claims against the Greek State in the decades that followed the troubled 1940s (Ntagios, 2015, pp. 54–184). Greece’s relations with the Serbs had been friendly and cordial for most of the history of the two nations. As Serbia gained its independence from the Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century, it was the first country with which Athens forged close ties after the Greek Independence in 1830. This rapidly changed in the late 1940s, because of the assistance provided by Yugoslavia to the Greek Communist guerrillas. Tito’s clash with Stalin from 1948 onwards, brought Yugoslavia closer to Greece, as both states, supported by the Western Alliance to which Belgrade was entertaining political and economic ties, pursued a détente since early 1950s. Nevertheless, their divergent and opposing perceptions over the Macedonia region, an apple of discord for many Balkan countries’ nationalisms since the nineteenth century, remained a source of friction. Yugoslavia was the first Socialist country Athens normalised its relations with, as Belgrade appeared to believe that Greek-Yugoslavian relations presented a way to improve Belgrade’s relations with the West. Allies’ pressure was decisive in this rapprochement, but Athens was, principally, reluctant to further deepen economic cooperation because of the “Macedonian Issue”. In general, Cold War tensions and pending bilateral issues permanently hindered trade and economic cooperation with Bulgaria, Albania and at a lesser extent Romania. This was the case at least until the mid-1960s, when some thorny pending issues with Bulgaria and Romania were settled, evidently in the spirit of the “bridge-building” and détente political atmosphere (Wallden, 1991, vol. I 67–69). Relations between Greeks and Bulgarians had been marked by intense hostility since the end of the nineteenth century, when the Bulgarian national leaders disputed the spiritual supremacy of the Greek-led Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. The two countries also engaged in bitter wars in the beginning of the twentieth century over the control of the Macedonia region. Relations were further poisoned by the deep scars of the World War II, when Bulgaria allied with Nazi Germany and occupied parts of Northern Greece. Sofia’s behaviour towards Greece during the war had a clear revanchist character. Despite a Nazi ally, Bulgarians avoided to declare war or to participate in operations against the Soviet Union, Great Britain and United States. They confined their participation in the war by solely undertaking a part of the axis occupation of Greece from 1941 until 1944. During the Cold War, Bulgaria was the main representative of the Soviet Bloc in the Balkans and hence the course of the Athens-Sofia relationship reflected, to a certain

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degree, that of Greece to the entire Bloc. The fact that Bulgaria retained a wellequipped army in defiance of the 1947 Bulgarian Peace Treaty stipulations was about to become a constant concern for Athens at least until the 1970s.9 Despite being a Balkan country, Romania had no common borders with Greece and did not belong to the so-called Slav tide. The only remarkable point of friction in the Greek-Romanian relations and cause of problems until the beginning of the twentieth century had been the existence of an ethnic group living in Greece called Vlachs whose language has many similarities with the Romanian language. Bucharest’s aspirations to appear as the protector of this group, soured the Greek-­ Romanian relations for decades. During the Cold War, Romania was of great importance for the Greek state, because Bucharest became the residence of the exiled leadership of the Greek Communist party until 1968 and hence a hotbed for Communist activities that were monitored by Greek authorities. For methodological reasons Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland will be treated in this book in a different context than the Balkan neighbouring countries. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, though not directly tied-up with the cardinal national interests of the Greek state, were significant components in the general context of Greece’s opening to the East, albeit in a different way than the other Communist countries, whose even domestic developments impacted Greece. East Germany and Soviet Union hold a central place in the current analysis. These two countries are of inordinate importance for the understanding of the nexus between state and left-wing parties’ policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. When it comes to the Soviet Union, interpreting Kremlin’s policy in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Cold War represents a difficult task. The Soviets followed a policy of “fishing in muddy waters” that is, of slow but steady strategic, political, and economic penetration into the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, but also Syria and Israel. That penetration was primarily achieved through indirect tactics. Rather than taking overt political actions, Moscow supported various political (mainly but only pro-Soviet, Marxist-­ Leninist and Communist-friendly organizations) or even religious groups, with a view to weakening their ties with the West, while extending Soviet influence southward. However, Moscow, despite all its ideologically designed declarations in the context of proletarian internationalism, could not afford any other policy for securing its long-term economic and political interests than sticking absolutely and cynically to a risky and complex policy of balance. This meant that the Soviet Union endeavoured to carefully avoid offering real and substantial support to any country

9  After the outbreak of the Korean War, Athens was worried that there would be a resurgence of large -scale guerrilla activities in the country, supported by Bulgaria and possibly by the other Eastern European countries. Greek General Staff repeatedly warned the United States of the Russian T–34 tanks that were stationed in Bulgaria and requested advice how to repel an armoured attack with their present military means, which consisted of a limited number of 2.36 bazookas, a few six pounders, 8 recoilless rifles 75 mm and a limited number of AT mines. FRUS: vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa: “Telegram of The Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece (Jenkins) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 26, 1950”.

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of the region, as it would instantly put at risk its relations with another (Stergiou, 2014/2015, pp. 204–205). For this reason, Soviet strategy was very sophisticated. During the Cold War, Moscow developed a wide variety of tactics to achieve its goals: espionage and gambits such as deception, concealed penetration and subversion, psychological warfare, and, above all, efficient exploitation of every conceivable form of division in capitalist societies, either on an international scale or within the domestic framework of capitalist states (Baev & Grozev, 2009, pp. 148–15, 150, 152, 167, 177). There is enough evidence that in early 1960s the Soviet Union decided to infiltrate and manipulate the non-communist press of Western Europe and the developing world, through a process known as Active Measures and Disinformation. One of the primary targets was Greece, since it was considered to be one of the weakest links in the Western Alliance. The main goal of the Soviets seems to have been the incubation of anti-Western sentiments on such a scale as to bring about the loosening of Greece’s ties with the West and ultimately its degrading to what international relations scholars call as finlandisation (Anastasi, 1988, p. 116). The whole Soviet Block developed a sophisticated strategy to undermine Greek loyalty to NATO and the Greek economic relationship with the Western countries, particularly the Federal German Republic and the United States. Soviet Bloc’s economic diplomacy found fertile ground in Greece. Since early 1950s, the Communist countries launched a trade offensive towards Greece, offering to relieve the country from its unsold stocks in tobacco and other agricultural products. Greece’s efforts to rebuild its economy after the World War II and the Civil War, were not compatible with the Cold War restrictions and defence consideration towards the Soviet Bloc countries, imposed by the United States and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Since Greece had a small internal market and an uncompetitive economy and given the limited export options of Greek products, there was permanently a production excess. Communist countries’ command economy, that was often adjusted to foreign policy objectives, often far from any market logic, presented a very attractive choice for Greek producers. As the export of those products were of vital importance for the Greek economy and for the starving population, the Greek authorities tried, in many cases, to circumvent the GATT’s and after 1960 EEC’s restrictions and prohibitions. Since Greece, as any other Western country, was expected to follow the Cold War trade-­ restrictions, Athens was found in very difficult situation and a very delicate balance. If Greek governments decided to pursue close economic relations with Communist countries, they would alienate its Western allies, on whose military and economic support they had been completely dependent since the end of World War II. If Greek governments decided to reject Communist countries overtures for economic cooperation, they would displease the poor farmers and other domestic pressure groups whose economic transactions with the Soviet Bloc was a matter of survival. Indeed, trade with Eastern European countries played, domestically, an important economic and political role during the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, even anti-Communist ministers and MPs were compelled to seek for trade opportunities with Communist countries, thereby striving to ponder their electorate. The history of Greek opening towards

Introduction: The Theoretical and Analytical Framework

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the Soviet Bloc in the 1950 and 1960s is, for the most part, the account of country’s efforts to balance security considerations with economic needs (Wallden, 1991, vol. I). Since the Communist countries were well aware of this situation, they were willing to absorb significant amounts of Greek agricultural products and to foster economic ties with Greece. Yet, at the same time they tried to link these transactions to political issues, thus expecting concessions from the Greek governments. They sought, for example, to force Athens to reject the US plans to station American Jupiter missiles in Greece in the late 1950s, or to upgrade the international status of the East German state (GDR). Above all, the Soviet Bloc countries exerted tireless efforts to weaken Greece’s loyalty to NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC), in which Greece became an associated member in 1961. Especially Greece’s economic relations with Balkan neighbours were impregnated by political considerations. Economic exchanges were mostly driven by the commonality of interests rather than ideological differences in the socioeconomic organisation of the states. In the 1950s however, Greece used trade also as a means to curtail hostility with those countries (Agreements with the rest of Eastern Europe followed the pattern of setting optimistic ceilings of trade). In early 1960s, it was Romania, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria who used trade as a means to curtail hostility with Greece (Botsas, 1987, p. 222). Among the USSR’s satellites the German Democratic Republic (GDR) turned out to be the most loyal ally of the Soviet Union and the most reliable promotor of Soviet objectives in Greece. The Greek-East German relationship was multifaceted and experienced many turns. In the context of the Eastern Bloc strategy to affect Greece’s adherence to the West, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was assigned the role to undermine West Germany’s dominant position in Greek economy as well as the paradoxically excellent post-war Greek-West German diplomatic relations. The feud between the two “Germanies” is very crucial for understanding Soviet Bloc policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the outset of the Cold War, as Greece came into the American sphere of influence, the United States undertook responsibility for both the security and the economic recovery of the country. Gradually, however, because of Washington’s commitments around the world in the context of its global containment policy, the character of American assistance to Greece changed. Gradually, US economic aid to Greece from the late 1950s onwards, was intended to prepare the country for a possible confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, and, therefore, concentrated principally on military assistance. As this shift seriously affected the economic reconstruction of the post-war Greek state, Washington made a strategic choice. It replaced its massive participation in Greek reconstruction with West Germany’s economic potential in order to share the burdens of keeping Greece within the Western sphere of influence (Pelt, 2006). Against this background, East Berlin launched goodwill offensives in the cultural and economic fields towards the Greek public by exploiting the traditional left-wing slants of Greek artists. The Greek left-wing parties’ agitation for the benefit of the German Democratic Republic turned out to be very conducive. The

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a­ gitation mainly aimed at revealing “the imperialist foreign policy of the German Federal Republic which opposed the peaceful, proletarian East German foreign policy”. Secondly, Greek left-wing parties endeavoured to stir issues such as the War reparations, prosecution of war criminals, Athens and Bonn had tried “to expeditiously settle” after the World War II (Stergiou, 2017, pp. 703–706). Athens military, anti-Communist regime’ close relations with the Soviet Bloc in the timespan 1967–1974, though unique in the European Cold War history, was overrated by contemporary observers. Many in West considered this “unnatural relationship” very disconcerting, as it played out amid serious political developments in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe, fuelling the fundamental Cold War security concerns. However, despite some spectacular events, the rapprochement between Athens and Soviet Bloc in this period served mainly propaganda purposes: the Greek junta weaponised it in order to ridicule domestic opposition and the Soviet Bloc countries to mitigate their marginalisation after the invasion of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Greece’s multidimensional foreign policy after the restoration of parliamentarism in 1974 marks an important chapter in Greece’ Ostpolitik. Charles de Gaulle’s paradigm seems to have inspired a comprehensive opening to the Soviet Bloc. The global détente proved to be very conducive for Greece’s rapprochement with the Communist world. Greece’s Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis foreign policy in the 1970s profited greatly from the international détente spirit, culminating in the signing of the Helsinki Act. Regional developments such as the Cyprus tragedy in Summer 1974 and the escalation of Greek-Turkish tensions in the Aegean pushing Greece to rearrange its security priorities, played an important part. Since the Communist threat was not considered a security priority, Greece’s security policy-­ makers strove to ensure Communist Balkan neighbours’ neutrality in the event of a war with Turkey that looked more and more likely. Not accidentally, Greece and Turkey invariably ranked as the countries with a relatively high military burden among NATO members. Despite their multiple social and economic problems, during 1960–2014 an annual average of 3.9% of GDP was allocated to defence by Greece, and 3.4% by Turkey, while the NATO average was 2.9% (Brauer, 2002). From 1974 onwards, there was little evidence that Greek security planners were still concerned with the possibility of a direct attack by Warsaw Pact forces on Greece’s narrow and difficult-to-defend land strip in Thrace and Macedonia. To the contrary, there were multiple concerns about neighbouring Turkey’s revisionist aims towards Aegean Sea and Cyprus. The fact that Greece had suspended its participation in the military command of NATO from 1974 until 1980 due to the Cyprus imbroglio, made the rapprochement with the Soviet Bloc, in combination with Greece’s accession to the European Communities, an almost imperative strategic choice. The rise of the Greek Socialist Party (PASOK) to power in 1981 ushered Greece’s relationship to the Soviet Bloc into a new era. Although it was factually a continuation of Karamanlis’ foreign policy and still faced with the strategic necessity to contain the Turkish aggressiveness in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus, it caused many

References

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turbulences within the Western Alliance, because it evolved within a completely different international political framework. The global détente spirit had faded away and the Cold War was coming into a new hot period fraught with serious tensions. Greece had been reintegrated to NATO and had become a European Community member. Developing close relations with the hostile Bloc during the hot phase of the Cold War, run necessarily counter to NATO and the European Community. PASOK’s radical Third World Socialism-­oriented rhetoric and foreign policy escapades with many Communist countries raised serious Western concerns about Soviet infiltration in the Eastern Mediterranean. The fierce anti-Turkish rhetoric of the Greek Socialist leader Papandreou, enriched with anti-American tirades of hate, reinforced fears of a dismantling of NATO’s Southern flank. These fears culminated in April 1987 when the re-inflamed Greek-Turkish conflict made the possibility of the total disruption of NATO Southern flank a real time scenario. This study tries, for the first time, to touch upon all these issues in the framework of a single monograph covering the whole Cold-War period. However, it should be clear that the aim of the book is not a detailed round-up of Greece’s relations with each of the Communist countries, but rather an analysis of its foreign policy concept termed in the academic literature and journalistic jargon as Ostpolitik. Though determined efforts have been undertaken to gather as much literature as possible in various languages on the topic, the book persistently and deliberately draws upon empirical material, utilising primary sources from various countries: Greece (various state and private archives), the Republic of Cyprus (state archives), NATO, the United States (NARA, Dwight Eisenhower Library archives, CIA releases), the Federal Republic of Germany (West and East Germany’s state and party archives) as well as the United Kingdom (Public Record Office and Liddle Hard Centre for military archives). It has also gleaned information from interviews with people from Greece and Russia with inside knowledge on these topics.

References Afinian, V., Kontis, V., Papoulidis, N., Smirnova, D., Tomilina N. (Eds.) (1999). Oi Scheseis KKE kai KK Sovietikis Enosis sto diastima 1953–1977 simfona me ta eggrafa to Archeiou tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKSE [The relations between the Greek and the Soviet Communist Parties according to the documents of the archive of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party]. Federal Archive Service of the Russian Federation and Institute for Balkan Studies. Thessaloniki, Greece: Paratiritis Publisher. Anastasi, P. (1988). Soviet manipulation of the press and political opinion in Greece 1974–1988. In N. Stavrou (Ed.), Greece under socialism. A NATO ally adrift (pp. 99–163). New Rochelle, NY: Aristide Caratzas Publishing. Antoniou, G., & Kalyvas, S. (Eds.). (2015) Oi Politikoi Prosfyges tou Emfyliou Polemou. Koinonikes kai Politikes Proseggiseis [The political refugees of the Greek Civil War. Social and political approaches]. Thessaloniki, Greece: Department of Balkan, Slavic and Eastern Studies. Baev, J. (1997). O Emfilios Polemos stin Ellada – Diethneis Diastaseis [The Greek Civil War, a view from outside]. Athens, Greece: Filistor Publisher.

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Baev, J., & Grozev, K. (2009). Bulgarien. In L.  Kaminski, K.  Persak, & J.  Gieseke (Eds.), Handbuch der kommunistischen Geheimdienste in Osteuropa 1944–1991 (pp.  143–197). München, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Barker, E. (1987). The Yugoslavs and the Greek Civil War of 1946–1949. In L.  Baerentzen, J.  Iatrides, & O.  Smith (Eds.), Studies in the history of the Greek Civil War 1945–1949 (pp. 297–308). Copenhagen, Denmark: Tusculanum Press. Bierling, S. (1999). Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Normen, Akteure, Entscheidungen. München-Wien, Germany: R. Oldenbourg Verlag. Botsas, E. (1987). Greece and the East: The Trade Connection, 1851–1984. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 5(2), 207–235. Brauer, J. (2002). Survey and review of the defence economics literature on Greece and Turkey: What have we learned? Defence and Peace Economics, 13(2), 85–107. Graf, M., Gülstorff, T., Lomellini, V., Stoilova, V., & Zaccaria, B. (2011). The Shape of “Détente” (1963–1979). European Détente and the Global Cold War? Zeitgeschichte, 38(6), 409–435. Hatzivassiliou, E. (2006). Greece and the Cold War: Frontline state, 1952–1967. London: Routledge. Iatrides, J. (1980). American attitudes toward the political system of postwar Greece. Ιn: Th. Couloumbis and J. Iatrides (Εds.). Greek American relations. A critical review (pp. 49–73). New York: Pella Publishing Company. Iatrides, J. (2005a). Revolution or self-defence? Communist goals, strategy and tactics in the Greek Civil War. Journal of Cold War Studies, 7(3), 3–33. Iatrides, J. (2005b). George Kennan and the Birth of containment. The Greek test case. World Policy Journal, 22(3), 126–145. Jahn, E. (1983). Friedliche Koexistenz und Entspannungspolitik in sowjetischer Sicht. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung Jahrbuch 1982/83. Zur Lage Europas im globalen Spannungsfeld, pp 67–90. Jones, H. (1985). The Diplomacy of Restraint: The Unites States’ efforts to repatriate Greek children evacuatued during the civil war of 1946–49. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 3(1), 65–85. Karpozilos, K. (2014). From fighters to political refugees in the Cold War. Journal of Cold War Studies, 16(3), 62–87. Kitroef, A. (2006). Metapolemiki Metanastefsi [Post-war immigration]. In I. Hasiotis, O. Katsiardi-­ Hering & E. Abatzi (Eds.), Oi Ellines sti Diaspora 15ος-20ος aionas [Greeks in the diaspora 15th–21th century] (pp. 75–94). Athens, Greece: Greek Parliament. Kontis, V. (2012). Sosialistika Krati kai KKE ston Emfylio [Socialist States and Greek Kommunist Party in the Greek Civil War]. Thessaloniki, Greece: Epikentro Publisher. Kontis, V., & Sfetas, S. (2000). Emfylios Polemos. Egrafa apo ta Giougkoslavika and Voulgarika archeia [The Greek Civil War. Documents of the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian Archives]. Thessaloniki, Greece: Paratiritis Publisher. Lampatos, G. (2006). Polonia [Poland]. In I. Hasiotis, O. Katsiardi-Hering & E. Abatzi (Eds.). Oi Ellines sti Diaspora 15ος-20ος aionas [Greeks in the diaspora 15th–21th century] (pp. 164– 165). Athens, Greece: Greek Parliament. Maratzides, N., & Tsivos, K. (2012). O Ellinikos Emfylios kai to Diethnes Kommunistiko Sistima. To KKE mesa apo ta Tsechika Archeia [The Greek Civil War and the international Communist Movement. The Greek Communist Party in the light of Chech archives]. Athens, Greece: Alexandria Publisher. Ntagios, S. (2015). Ellada kai Albania: 50 chronia amoiveas dyspistias (1945–1991) [Greece and Albania: 50 years of mutual distrust 1945–1991]. Thessaloniki, Greece: Literatus Publisher. Pelt, M. (2006). Tying Greece to the West. US-West German-Greek relations 1949–1974. Copenhagen, Denmark: Museum Tusculanum Press. Ristovic, M. (1998). Duk povratak kuci [Long journey home. Greek refugee children in Yugoslavia 1948–1960]. Belgrade, Serbia: Institute for Balkan Studies.

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Sarotte, M. E. (2001). Dealing with the Devil. East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973. Chapel Hill, NC/London: The University of North Carolina Press. Sfikas, Th. (2001). Polemos kai Eirini stin stratigiki tou KKE 1945–1949 [War and Peace in the strategy of the Greek Communist Party 1945–1949]. Athens, Greece: Filistor Publisher. Stergiou, A. (2001). Im Spagat zwischen Solidarität und Realpolitik. Die Beziehungen zwischen DDR und Griechenland und das Verhältnis der SED zur KKE. Mannheim: Bibliopolis. Stergiou, A. (2006). Anatoliki Germania [East Germany] and Tsechia-Slovakia [Czech Republic – Slovakia]. In I.  Hasiotis, O.  Katsiardi-Hering & E.  Abatzi (Eds.), Oi Ellines sti Diaspora 15ος-20ος aionas [Greeks in the diaspora 15th–21th century] (pp.  147–149 and 154–157). Athens, Greece: Greek Parliament. Stergiou, A. (2014/2015). The Communist party of Cyprus and Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Modern Greek Studies Yearbook, 30(31), 199–221. Stergiou, A. (2017). Greece, German reunification, and the 1995 EU enlargement. In M. Gehler & M. Graf (Eds.), Europa und die deutsche Einheit. Beobachtungen, Entscheidungen und Folgen (pp. 701–720). Vandehoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen, Germany. Tsaroucha-Szabo, E. (2006). Ouggaria [Hungary]. In I. Hasiotis, O. Katsiardi-Hering & E. Abatzi (Eds.), Oi Ellines sti Diaspora 15ος-20ος aionas [Greeks in the diaspora 15th–21th century] (pp. 175–181). Athens, Greece: Greek Parliament. Wallden, S. (1991). Ellada kai Anatolikes Chores 1950–1967. Oikonomikes Scheseis kai Politiki [Greece and Eastern Countries 1950–1967. Economic Relations and politics]. Athens, Greece: Odysseas Publisher, Vol. I and II. Yearbooks of the United Nations. (1947–1948). Yearbooks of the United Nations. (1947–1948 II). Yearbooks of the United Nations. (1949). Yearbooks of the United Nations. (1950). Yearbooks of the United Nations. (1951). Yearbooks of the United Nations. (1952).

Primary Sources

Greece Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cited as HAGFM): Folders on Cyprus, Greek-British relations, NATO, US-Greek relations, Communist Activities, Warsaw Pact, Greek-Turkish Relations.

United States CIA Releases 2017.

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Published Primary Sources and Archival Documents Archives of the General Staff of the Hellenic Army-Directorate of the history of the Army. (1998). Archeia Emfiliou Polemou 1946–1949 [Archives of the Civil War]. Athens, Greece: Hellenic Army-Directorate of the history of the Army. Foreign Relations of the United States (cited as FRUS): 1952–1954, vol. VIII, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean; vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa; vol. X, part 2, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe. Finland, Greece, Turkey.

Greece’s Security Problems in the Cold War

Notably, Greece’s strategic location has been both an asset and a liability. Its real and enduring strategic importance for both the Western and the Soviet Alliance during the Cold War derived from many political and geographic conditions and circumstances. Since it laid directly across Soviet sea and air lines of communication to the Mediterranean and beyond, it offered vantage points for the United States and NATO from electronic reconnaissance and surveillance. Greece provided continuity to the Southern region of the Alliance, not only for the purpose of military communications, but also in protecting Italy from the East and Turkey from the West. The greatest Greek strategic asset, however, was its land mass which, along with the nearly 3000 Greek islands of the Aegean gave strategic depth in Alliance defence. The Aegean Sea with its islands, in the given conditions of naval warfare, constituted a natural extension of the Turkish Straits, enhancing NATO’s manoeuvrability in the Eastern Mediterranean and limiting that of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Greece’s geographic position astride the straits and the Aegean islands provided NATO with control over the sole exit for the Soviet Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean. Not accidentally, access to the Aegean Sea had been a traditional Russian objective, dominating the diplomacy of the so-called “Eastern Question” in the late 19th and the beginning of the twentieth Century. Access to the Aegean together with control of the Bosporus Straits was to become a major Soviet strategic goal in the early post-World War II period (Coufoudakis & Valinakis, 1987, pp. 32–33; Stearns, 1992, p. 53). Greece’s pivotal place and importance for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the overall security of the United States was highlighted routinely and with slight changes in almost all National Security Council and Greek Embassy’ analyses on Greece since 1947. The maintenance of its territorial integrity and political independence at any cost was regarded as precondition for safeguarding US interests in the region: …The maintenance of efficient Greek armed forces of moderate strength serves as a deterrent to Soviet satellites’ aims of adventures in this area. In the case of general warfare these forces in the initial stages could serve to engage sizeable Soviet or satellite military efforts. So long as Greece © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Stergiou, Greece’s Ostpolitik, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61129-3_2

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remains in the free world, the Soviets are denied use of this strategic territory as a site for military bases and operations and also active utilisation of Greek manpower and resources. A USSR occupation of Greek territory would provide the Soviets with the potential of effectively controlling the eastern Mediterranean by air and naval operations and Blocking the vital line of communication through the Suez Canal. In case of general warfare, it would also provide the USSR with year-round open ports from which active naval operations in the Mediterranean could be based and as a point from which amphibious operations could be staged for the further extension of Soviet-controlled area. A USSR-controlled Greece would encircle Yugoslavia and flank Turkey, thus placing them in an untenable military posture. Nearby and Middle Eastern states probably would be brought under irresistible hostilities, Greece would provide a protective flank facilitating a Soviet drive on Middle Eastern oil fields. Yugoslav defection from the Cominform was facilitated by the fact that American assistance in Greece assured Yugoslavia an opening to the Western World and that no serious communist attack would arise from that quarter. A Soviet-­ dominated Greece would almost entirely preclude any possibility of an Albanian or Bulgarian defection….1 Therefore, the Greek Civil War, that came to an end in 1949 with the victory of the anti-communist coalition with the overwhelming support of the USA, possesses a pivotal place in the history of US foreign policy. For the first time, after 1945, the United States engaged in a war against Communism. For the first time, the United Nations sent ad hoc observers to monitor a civil strife within a member state. It was finally the first time that the United Kingdom internationally confessed its inability to protect its strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, by abandoning a protectorate (Kuniholm, 1980). The Greek Civil War challenged United States’ long-term commitment in multiple levels. First of all, the Truman Doctrine provided for the establishment of a program of economic-military assistance in Greece, the American Mission for aid to Greece (AMAG).2 During the period from 1947 to 1949, the United States supplied the Greek government with military advise, equipment and training in its fight against the Communist guerrillas, which eventually enabled the Greek national army to defeat the last remnants of the Communist guerrilla-organised resistance by the fall of 1949. In the context of the Marshall plan, the Greek government received further assistance with the aim of reconstructing its ailing economy and ruined infra-structure. However, as the survival of the Greek State was very questionable, American officials, mostly but not exclusively in the framework of the implementation of the Marshall Plan, acquired virtual control over all state functions to secure the smooth implementation of the generous American economic support (Ypourgeio Exoterikon, 2002, pp. 62–82, 142–151, 156–158, 234–236, 249–256, 262).

1  National Archives and Records Administration (henceforth cited as NARA): RG 59, Box 39, “Director of International Security Affairs’ briefing on Greece, December 5, 1950”. 2  The American economic aid program was terminated in 1962.

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Although some serious historians3 have questioned it, gradually, all key decisions regarding the country’s domestic economic and security affairs passed, with the full cooperation and acquiescence of the Greek governments, through American hands. According to the Constitution of 1952, executive authority rested with the King, but it was exercised by the responsible government and no royal act was valid unless signed by a Minister. The offices involved in foreign policy-making were primarily that of the Prime Minister seconded by the Foreign Minister, the National Defence Minister,4 and the Co-ordination Minister. However, the so-called “allied factor”, primarily the United States government and its diplomatic representatives in Greece, seems to have maintained a steady influence on the foreign policy-­ making of successive Greek cabinets (Stefanidis, 2001, pp. 17–18). What in particular caused concerns to US and NATO policy-makers, was Greece’s inability to defend itself against the Warsaw pact, that for some, not always comprehensible reason, never stopped to be regarded as very likely. During the 1950s and 1960s, US and NATO officials estimated that, in a global or local war, a considerable part of the Greek and Turkish territory was indefensible and could be quickly overwhelmed by Soviet Bloc forces. A report prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA) in 1950 that provided the pattern of virtually all future appraisals, points out that Greece is one of the areas in the perimeter of the Soviet world for which the Kremlin might consider that a Korean-like aggression (an attack involving only satellite troops) could be successfully repeated. It was impossible to determine at this time whether the Soviet satellite forces would resort to hostilities in the Balkan or, whether, in the event where hostilities would occur, they would be directed against Yugoslavia, Greece or both. Known troop dispositions in Bulgaria would not appear to indicate an imminent attack against Greece. Although the available information admittedly was still fragmentary, it was assumed that a dangerous situation could arise without adequate warning of the United States. The presence of Soviet troops in Bulgaria would serve to stabilise conditions within the country and would constitute an imminent threat to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, thus intensifying present anxieties and unrest. According to the same appraisal, there was also a Cominform propaganda charging that the “Athens-­ Belgrade Axis”, under American and British direction, was preparing for aggressive action against Albania and Bulgaria and was menacing the peace of the Balkans. This propaganda campaign could further lay the foundation for a Bulgarian attack against Greece. Such an attack could perhaps occur via the support of the Greek guerillas, presently in Bulgaria who were estimated to number between 5 and 15,000. Bulgarian forces were estimated to be the best trained and best equipped 3  Miller for example heavily controverts the image of the then U.S. Ambassadors as “proconsuls”, a perception idea that, as he correctly notes, is deeply ingrained in the Greek collective memory, recurrently revived by the Greek press, and thus probably a not erasable one. In his opinion, neither the liberal Henry Grady nor his conservative and controversial successor, John Peurifoy, fit the imperial mold (Miller, 2009, p. 25). 4  The military, partly as a result of its role in the civil war, perceived its role as the protector of both the prevailing social order and the country’s allegiance to the Western Alliance.

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Greece’s Security Problems in the Cold War

among the Soviet satellite forces. The USSR could, without involving Soviet troops, place an additional demand on the already strained military resources of the United States, by sanctioning an attack against Greece by solely utilizing Bulgarian forces alone or in conjunction with other satellite troops. In the event of an attack by the “hated” Bulgarians, the Greek Army, strengthened by American advise and equipment, could be expected to respond sharply. …Nowhere outside the North Atlantic Treaty is United States prestige more deeply committed that in Greece. Failure of the United States to provide adequate support to prevent Greece falling within the Soviet orbit would produce a tremendous impact on the will to resist of the non-­ Communist world. In few areas of the world have the aggressive aims of international communism been more clearly revealed than in Greece….5 Against this background, Greece, Turkey and Iran (the so-called Northern Tier) constituted in the 1950s a barrier between the Soviet world on the one hand and the vital oil lands and strategic communications routes of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, on the other. Therefore, the development of sizable armed forces had to be promoted by all means. Greece for example, although it was a small, underdeveloped nation, had to maintain an extraordinarily large and expensive military machine. In mid-1951, when Europe had an average of 12.6 men per thousand under arms, Greece had 21.6. In fiscal years 1952–1953, appropriations for the Greek security forces totaled at least 36% of state expenditures and 49% of the country tax revenues (Wittner, 1982, pp. 285–295). However, despite their energetic efforts,6 Greece and Turkey were not included in the countries participating in the foundation treaty of NATO in 1949. Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, objected their inclusion. British objections emanated from the London plan to establish a Middle Eastern regional defensive structure under British control.7 The Scandinavian and Benelux countries’ objections derived from the fear the Alliance, on which they counted for their own security, would be involved into the Greek Civil War. They also feared that incorporating new member into NATO would minimise the US

5  NARA: RG 59, Box 39, “McGhee’s Report (NEA) to Matthews, subject: How to determine United States actions in the event of an attack against Greece by Soviet Satellite forces July 22, 1950”. 6  The Greek and Turkish diplomats organised a vivid diplomatic campaign in the Western European Capitals as well as in the United States and Canada with the aim of persuading the initial signatory members of the North Atlantic Treaty to engulf Greece and Turkey otherwise they were in danger to be incorporated in the Soviet system. Especially for Greece, the Greek diplomats highlighted that there was the possibility that a Communist Government would be forced upon the country. They mostly received the answer that the “free world” cared about Greece’s and Turkey’s independence and their contribution to the straggle against “Communist Totalitarianism” was much appreciated but their accession to the military Alliance would be considered at a later stage: HAGFM: folder 84, subfolder 1/4; folder 80, subfolder 2, part 1 and subfolder 3, part 1; folder 133, subfolder 1/4/6, part 1/1/1 (ΝΑΤΟ: Greece and accession); Folder 168, subfolder 2, part 1 (Turkey’s and Greece’s accession to NATO: Negotiations and Talks 1948–1949). 7  HAGFM: folder 133, subfolder 1/1, “Telegram of Greek Embassy in Turkey to Greek Foreign Ministry, October 16, 1951”.

Greece’s Security Problems in the Cold War

21

resources and supplies aimed for their own defence (Chatam House, 1952, pp. 13–15; Stefanidis, 1999, pp. 62–65). The exclusion of Greece and Turkey from the initial stage of the North Atlantic defensive system, which, to their dismay, included a former enemy, Italy, instead, filled the countries with disappointment and anxiety about their survival. Fearing that they might be targeted by the Eastern Bloc countries, Athens8 and Ankara9 began agitating for an official statement by NATO or the individual countries, some sort of security guarantee, for their and possibly Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.10 However, when the topic was discussed within the International Working Group of NATO, many countries (Canada, Netherlands, Great Britain, France) opposed it out of fear for possible Soviet retaliation, consenting only to an abstract declaration of solidarity that never came.11 Soon after, trying to deflect from the fact that it was the country that opposed NATO’s enlargement via the inclusion of the South Eastern European countries,12 and to gain diplomatic benefits by offering some kind of verbal comfort to Athens and Ankara, London decided to act unilaterally. So the British

8  HAGFM: folder 89, subfolder 7/1, “Foreign Minister Tsaldaris’ telegram to the Greek embassies of Washington, London, Paris, Ankara to notify the local governments about Greece’s precarious position due to its non-inclusion to NATO March 14, 1949”; folder 88, subfolder 5/1, “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Ankara (Skeferis) to Athens March 31, 1949” and “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Iran (Koustas) to the Greek Foreign Ministry in Athens April 11”, 1949 and “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Washington circulated to the Greek Embassies from Ankara, London and Rome April 18, 1949”. 9  Turkish Foreign Minister, Sadak, went so far to express to British officials his fear that a new line of demarcation from Italy to Scandinavia was developing apart from the Iron Curtain. This had shown itself in the discussion on the European Council and would be emphasized if Italy were included in the Atlantic Pact, with depressing psychological effect on Turkey and other countries excluded from the circle. Turkish press suggested that Turkey should remain neutral in the event of a Third World War. Archive of the British Foreign Office in the Public Record Office (Henceforth FO) 371/78328, “Telegram of Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Ankara February 17, 1949. 10  FO 371/72367, “Telegram for Talbot to Wallinger, January 4, 1949”; FO 371/78328, “Telegrams from British Foreign Office to the British Embassy Athens, February 10, 1949 and to the British Embassy in Ankara March 8, 1949”; FO 371/78329, “Dispatch from the Commonwealth Relations Office Dawning Street to the British Embassy in Ankara April 12, 1949”. 11  NARA: RG 59, Central Decimal Files 1945–1949, Box 5653, “Sessions of International Working Group January 18, 1949 and February 1, 1949” and Box 5654, “Office Memorandum: subject “Declaration on Greece, Turkey and Iran April 1, 1949” and Box 5656, “Telegram of the US-Embassy in Paris to State Department May 31, 1949”; FO 371/72367, “Telegram of Talbot for G.A. Wallinger January 4, 1949” and 371/78328, “Sir O. Sargent statement (minute) February 10, 1949”. 12  HAGFM: folder 151, subfolder 1/1, “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in London (Melas) to the Greek Foreign Ministry April 13, 1951” and folder 118, subfolder 5/1, “Internal report of the Foreign Ministry (Second Department for Political Affairs) June 30, 1951” and “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Paris (Rafail) to the Greek Foreign Ministry June 27, 1951”.

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government issued a public statement that Great Britain remained concerned about the independence and integrity of both countries.13 As an alternative option to secure Western support against a Soviet attack, Athens and Ankara endeavoured to establish a defence pact with various Mediterranean countries, a Mediterranean Pact. The pact was envisaged to be the extension of NATO’s defensive line to the Mediterranean with the simultaneous participation of Great Britain, France and Italy, as well as countries from the Near East to the Middle East, including Iran.14 The project had been proposed by Athens and Ankara already in the 1948 as a counterpart to the Brussels Treaty and the Western Pact under the protection guarantee of the United States. However, the proposal was shelved, because first it was completely delusional and second NATO, that was created in the year after, took over the military capabilities of the Western Pact. Apart from it, most of the countries that could be potential members of the pact, mainly Mediterranean, but also those Western European that could be security guarantors, were reluctant to participate, because they were striving for their inclusion into NATO and the US shelter.15 The sequel-project also turned out to be unrealistic. It could not alone provide for sufficient security guarantee to its participants, even if a formal treaty could be brought off diplomatically. The Western powers were reluctant to commit themselves in this way,16 though some of them initially conveyed the impression they  HAGFM: folder 89, subfolder 7/1, “Statement by his Majesty’s principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs shared by the British Embassy in Athens to the Greek Foreign Ministry March 19, 1949” and “Telegram by the Greek Embassy in Washington to the Greek Foreign Ministry in Athens March 23, 1949”. 14  HAGFM: folder 84, subfolder 1, part 2, “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Brussels to the Greek Foreign Ministry March 10, 1948”; folder 84, subfolder 1, part 4, “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Brussels to the Greek Foreign Ministry April 14, 1948” and “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Washington to the Greek Foreign Ministry April 20, 1948” and “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Hague to the Greek Foreign Ministry April 22, 1948”; folder 69, subfolder 5/1, “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Washington to the Greek Foreign Ministry January 13, 1949”. 15  Tsaldaris Archive: folder 44, subfolder 2, “Greek Embassy’s report in Ankara (Mouzas, Kosmadopoulos) December 2, 1949” and “Telegram of the Greek Ambassador (Skeferis) in Ankara to the Greek Foreign Ministry December 30, 1949”; HAGFM: folder 69, subfolder 5/1, “Exchange of telegrams between the Greek Embassies in Washington D.C., Paris, London, Rome, Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Hague, Ottava, Madrid with the Greek Foreign Ministry November March – March 1949”. In one case the Italian Foreign Minister Sforza was reported to say in a very undiplomatic and awkward way to the Greek Foreign Minister Tsadaris (March 14, 1948) that he did not care at all about any Mediterranean Pact. 16  Even the public in various in Western Europe was not well-disposed to such a scenario. In various telegrams, sent to the Greek Foreign Ministry by the Greek embassies in the Western capitals, are attached newspaper articles reflecting these negative feelings. In an representative article sent by the Greek Embassy in London to the Greek Foreign Ministry on April 24, 1949 (HAGFM: folder 69, subfolder 5/1) was stated the following:..There is no reason at all to suppose that Mr. Acheson or Mr. Bevin thinks it necessary that there should now be a Mediterranean Pact. It is difficult, too, to see any good reason why the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers should continue to propagate the idea that their countries would gain much by such a pact. Whereas signatories of the Atlantic Pact are still queuing for an uncertain amount of military aid, Turkey has been getting a 13

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23

were in favour of it. Due to the different security interests of its participants, the pact could have never provided any strong deterrent to Soviet aggression. Since no other Mediterranean country had common frontiers with Russia or its satellites, a Soviet attack in the Mediterranean could have to be directed only against Greece and Turkey. Thus, it was highly unlikely that under a Mediterranean Pact, Arab, Jewish or Italian armed forces or the present garrisons of Cyprus, Malta, Gibraltar, Corsica or Toulon would be moved to the northern frontiers of Greece and Turkey. But even if they were moved, it was doubtful whether they would provide much additional support to these menaced countries.17 Furthermore, as a contemporary analyst aptly wrote, a Mediterranean Pact would in all probability remain a mere diplomatic instrument with little or no practical meaning. It was feared that such a paper Alliance providing solely an illusion of security would give American isolationists an excuse to whittle down the present American aid to Greece and Turkey, which was the real guarantee of their security. A Mediterranean Security Pact, of which America was not a member, would be worthless, because it would lack a core and it would even be harmful, because it would foster illusions among its members, while giving gratuitous provocation to Russia.18 Following the rejection of the pact, Athens and Ankara began exercising pressures to the Western countries that were already NATO member to be included a posteriori into NATO.19 In September 1950, the Turkish Government repeated officially its request for admission into the North Atlantic Treaty. The North Atlantic Council contemplated it, taking into account that any arrangement made in the case of Turkey should also be extended to cover Greece. It opined again against the

good deal of equipment and weapons regularly and without public debate. Whereas Norway and Denmark wonder how quickly forces would reach them if they were attacked, Greece has British troops on the spot, a large fleet of naval vessels on loan and two Mediterranean squadrons of cruisers and aircraft carriers more or less permanently in the offing. Turkey, moreover, has a quite clear treaty of mutual aid with this country and the independence of Greece is guaranteed by the Truman doctrine, several times repeated and underlined in terms as challenging as those of the Atlantic Pact. It is of course fashionable to be a member of a regional defence pact and the Greek and Turkey positions are vital for Britain and America – but even so what would be gained by forging yet another instrument of collective defence? Could the same pact cover both Israel and Egypt, until recently enemies in the field? Finally, can it be that both the Greek and the Turkish Governments have overlooked this fact: that as things stand they get protection and aid without undertaking any obligations to American or Britain, whereas the Atlantic Pact demands as much from the smaller as from the greater partners? 17  Tsaldaris-Archive: folder 44, subfolder 2, “Report with the title Mediterranean Pact 1949”; HAGFM: folder 69, subfolder 5/1 and folder 84–89, “Political Correspondence between the Foreign Ministry and the Greek Embassies abroad 1948–1949 about Mediterranean Pact and North Atlantic Treaty” and folder 69, subfolder 5/1, “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Washington to the Greek Ministry June 17, 1949” and “Dispatch from the Greek Embassy in London to the Greek Foreign Ministry March 24 and April 11, 1949” and “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Beirut to the Greek Foreign Ministry 25 May, 1949” and “Telegrams from the Greek Embassy in Paris to the Greek Foreign Ministry April 22 and 28, 1949”. 18  The Scotsman-Newspaper, March 8, 1949. 19  FO 371/96540, “Telegram of British Embassy Ankara to Western Organ. Dept., May 11, 1951”.

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admission of the two countries into NATO stating that…at the present stage of development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization it would not be feasible to extend the Treaty to either country. Instead, it decided to make arrangements concerning the defense of the Mediterranean, which would permit the two countries “to be associated as appropriate with phases of military planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”. The purpose of these arrangements would be to facilitate coordinated military planning, without extending the membership of the Treaty.20 In March 1951, the British Joint Services Mission in Washington reported to the Ministry of Defense in London that the problem of linking Greece and Turkey with NATO was becoming increasingly urgent. The apparent lack of interest on the part of NATO, had it been allowed to continue much longer, it could seriously affect the prestige and authority of NATO and lead to unilateral intrigues of both Greece and Turkey with France and the United States.21 Concerning Turkey, the British were ready to accept the admission of Turkey into NATO on the understanding that there would be an Allied Middle East Command organisation under British control and that Turkey would belong to it.22 Tentatively and, given the progress of the Cold War confrontation, Turkish and Greek pressure towards finding a solution started bearing fruit. The Korea War proved a catalyst in this regard, as Washington started reconsidering its strategic planning and priorities towards NATO.23 On May 19, 1951 the Standing Group of the alliance decided, apparently upon US demand, to establish a Greek and Turkish national command within the Supreme Commander of the Mediterranean as appropriate planning liaison with the British Middle East Headquarters.24 This step could, indeed, pave the way for a full admission of the two countries into NATO. However, most of the European countries were still opposing Turkish and Greek admission, provoking lambasting comments from the Greek and Turkish press.25 Turkish diplomats also complained to their British counterparts that the

 NATO-Archive: IMSM 119-96, “Note by the secretaries to the North Atlantic Defence Committee on association of the Turkish and Greek governments with the military planning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, October 7, 1950”. 21  FO 371/96539, “Telegram of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington to the Ministry of Defence in London March 23, 1951”. 22  FO 371/96404, “Telegram of the United Kingdom deputy on the North Atlantic Council to Foreign Office, subject: Defence programme distribution, October 16, 1951”; FO 371/96405: (WU 10746/24) “Secretary of State’ report, subject: Admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO, October 19, 1951”. 23  HAGFM: folder 151, subfolder 1/1, “Dispatch from Greek Foreign Ministry, Second Department for Political Affairs to the Office of Commander-in-Chief April 23, 1951”. 24  FO 371/96542, “Reach North Atlantic Treaty Command Arrangement May 19, 1951”; FO 371/96540, “Telegram of rom the United Kingdom deputy in the North Atlantic Council to Foreign Office to the Western Organisation and to the Southern Department, Bowker and Dixon April 11, 1951”. 25  FO 371/96542, “Report of the Western Organization Department of the Foreign Office May 21, 1951”; FO 371/96540, “Telegram of the British Embassy in Ankara to Western Organisation Department (Minutes) May 11, 1951”. 20

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25

rejectionist attitude of the Western countries had failed their people and boosted the Communist who tried to precipitate a neutral foreign policy.26 Nonetheless, London’s strategy aimed at circumventing Greek-Turkish and American pressure on the admission of the two countries to NATO by presenting alternative security guarantees to them. London was aware of the fact that this policy could severe British special relationship with these countries. Therefore, the Foreign Office instructed the British representative to NATO and the British Ambassadors in Ankara, Washington and in Athens to handle this matter as subtly as possible, to avoid the impression that London opposes the American strategy as well as the Turks and Greeks on their desire to achieve their inclusion into the North Atlantic Alliance. The British Ambassadors were also warned to call neither Greece nor Turkey as part of the Atlantic Community, strictly speaking, as the word membership “would complicate” military problems, not only of Western Europe but of Middle East as well.27 The French, on their part, were afraid that Greece’s and Turkey’s accession into NATO or any security guarantee that would be provided to them, could extend Western Alliance to the Balkan powder keg. In the event of a local dispute, thus, NATO could not remain neutral precipitating a global high-scale war.28 The other NATO members29 were against Greece and Turkey’s inclusion into NATO on the grounds that such a move would represent a departure from the original concept of NATO as a defencive Alliance of the North Atlantic Community, including only democratic countries with common cultural heritage. They also feared that the Alliance would be extended to a frontier area, with no buffer zone between it and the Soviet sphere.30 In some cases they were very annoyed by

 FO 371/96542, “Telegram of the British Embassy in Ankara to Foreign Office May 23, 1951”.  FO 371/96542, “Telegrams from the Foreign Office to the British Deputy on NATO May 26, 1951” to the British embassy in Ankara, in Athens May 25 1951, to the British Ambassador in Washington May 23 and 29, 1951”; FO 371/96543, “Telegrams of the Common Relations Office in London to the embassies of Great Britain in Athens, Ankara and Washington June 1951”. 28  FO 371/96541, “Conversation between the secretary of state and the French Ambassador May 18, 1951” and FO 371/796543, “Letter from the British Ambassador in Athens to the Foreign Office May 23, 1951”; HAGFM: folder 151, subfolder 1/1, “Telegram of the permanent Greek Delegation to the United Nations (Politis) to the Greek Foreign Office, April 11, 1951, subject: Possible participation of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic or similar pact” and “Telegram of the Greek embassy in Paris (Rafail) to the Greek Foreign Ministry April 5, 1951” and “Telegram of the Greek embassy in London (Melas) to the Greek Foreign Ministry March 29, 1951” and “Telegram of the Greek embassy in Washington (Politis) to the Greek Foreign Ministry March 31, 1951”. 29  Italy was in the forefront of those advocating the inclusion as it would gain more security from the extension of NATO to the East and also hope that through the participation of these countries in the council could increase its influence in the Mediterranean Affairs. Belgium and Portugal seemed also to be supportive: FO 371/96543, “Telegram of the British Deputy on NATO to the Foreign Office May 25, 1951”; HAGFM: folder 89, subfolder 2, “Telegrams from the Greek embassy in Lisbon to the Greek Foreign Ministry September–November 1948”. 30  CIA releases 2017: “Memorandum of information for the National Estimate Board, subject: Reactions of NATO governments to US proposals to include Greece and Turkey in NATO, May 28, 1951”. 26 27

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Washington’s insistence on that matter, which contradicted the views of most of the NATO members.31 Nevertheless, the United States were determined to go ahead with their strategy and in May 1951, decided to commence negotiations with the biggest NATO countries to achieve a unanimous decision on the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty. By the late August, early September 1951 the United States had suppressed other countries’ objections32 and pushed through their strategic priorities33 regarding Greece and Turkey.34 Denmark, Norway and Great Britain, however, tried until the last moment of the final round of talks, held in Ottawa in early autumn 1951, to prevent the accession of the two countries to the Alliance, suggesting instead “that the matter be given further consideration”. They also submitted a proposal according to which the two

 FO 371/96542, “Telegrams of the British Deputy on NATO to Foreign Office May 24 and 25, 1951”; HAGFM: folder 118, subfolder 6/1, “Telegram of the Greek embassy in Paris (Rafail) to the other Greek embassies in Europe and in the USA July 2, 1951 and folder 133, subfolder 4/1, “Greek Foreign ministry’s internal report based on the telegrams from Greek Foreign embassy in Paris June 14, 1951” and “Telegram of the Greek embassy in Rome (Exintaris) September 29, 1951”. 32  For its campaign against the American, Greek and Turkish efforts, the British only succeeded in securing the establishment of a naval command for the Mediterranean under a British Commanderin-Chief based in Malta and directly responsible to SACEUR that was to include both the Greek and Turkish navy (Stefanidis, 1999b: 450–451). 33  Department of State (ed.), American Foreign Policy 1950–1955. Basic Documents vol. I, United States, 1957. “Statement by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff before the senate committee on foreign relations January 15, 1952”, pp. 856–857: “…Greece and Turkey occupy strategic locations along one of the major east-west axes. They offer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation large and capable forces in being. Their territories are suitable for the conduct of defensive operations essential in the event of an aggression. Greece is situated at the southern end of the Balkan Peninsula immediately adjacent to the satellite state Albania. Therefore, both occupy key positions in a sound Atlantic system. Allied with the free nations, they would compel a diversion of the forces of Soviet Russia and her satellites in any aggressive move against the West. Located as they are and allied with the ‘free nations’ they serve as powerful deterrents to any aggression directed toward southern Europe, the Middle East or North Africa. The successful defence of those areas – any one or all of them- is dependent upon control of the Mediterranean Sea. Greece and Turkey Block two avenues to the Mediterranean which an aggressor might endeavour to use should they decide upon a thrust there… and “Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 1952”, p. 871: …The reasons for inviting Greece and Turkey to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty which were among others: The protections of their territory will serve to insure the benefits which our economic and military aid has brought these countries. Their accession will also add to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which are strategically important to the defence of the free world. The Southeastern flank of General Eisenhower’s NATO army will be greatly strengthened. Greece and Turkey have sizable forces in a good state of readiness and of tested valour…”. 34  HAGFM: folder 133, subfolder 1/1 and 4/1, “Telegrams from the Greek embassy in Ottawa (where the final negotiations on NATO enlargement took place) to the Greek Foreign Ministry August and September 1951”. 31

Greece’s Security Problems in the Cold War

27

countries should be granted the status of the “member elect” and perhaps the status of advanced membership at the next high-level meeting of the Alliance.35 British counterefforts to the Greek and Turkish efforts were so embittered that after the conclusion of the negotiations, the British representative to NATO reported to London that the proceedings of the meetings should by no means be ever disclosed to the Greeks.36 Eventually, in October 1951, it was decided that on 18 February 1952, Greece along with Turkey would join NATO. The accession of the two countries was followed by the establishment of two commands, the Allied Forces Southern Europe, headquartered in Naples, and the Allied Forces Mediterranean, headquartered in Malta. The Soviet reactions to the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO were not that vigorous. Moscow sent but two notes verbales to Turkey expressing its displeasure about this development.37 In 1953, Greece and United States concluded a bilateral agreement on the use of Greek territory by American military forces. The latter were authorised to utilize roads, railways and areas, including territorial waters as well as to construct, develop, use and operate military and supporting facilities in Greece for the implementation of approved NATO plans. Further, the United States were allowed to transport, install and quarter military personnel in Greece (Couloumbis, 1966, pp. 45, 77). Despite the fears linked to the inclusion of Greece to NATO and the mistrust of NATO officers against the Greek and Turkish fledglings,38 the British Secretary of State noted in 1953 that the accession of Greece to NATO had not thrown up any particular problems. In general, the Greeks tended to take their lead from the Turks in matters of regional concern. They also appeared to have been quite satisfied with the establishment of a separate South East European Command, covering Greece and Turkey under General Wyman, who was in turn subordinate to Commander–in– Chief South (Admiral Carney). The Secretary of State also admitted that the Greek defense contribution was high in relation to some of the smaller NATO powers. Greece was spending 9% of its gross national product on defense – an excessive ration especially in view of its backward economy and its low standard of living. There were nine divisions available at the outbreak of war, a relatively efficient Navy and a small Air Force, which, nevertheless, was not up to full NATO standards. The only Greece-related Cold War “incident” affecting NATO was the trouble over Gamma island, in the Evros river, in April 1953, where the Greeks rather

 FO 371/96551, “Telegram of the British Deputy to NATO from Ottawa to the Foreign Office September 19, 1951”; FO 371/96552: “Telegrams from the British embassy in Washington to Foreign Office 20 and 26 September 1951”. 36  FO 371/1024473, “Telegram of the British Deputy on NATO to Foreign Office December 31, 1951”. 37  At that time Turkey was still perceived by Athens as an “honest ally” against the Soviet assertiveness. HAGFM: Folder 23, Subfolder 3/1, “Report of the Chief of Staff of the Hellenic Infantry March 7, 1952”. 38  Interview with Diplomat Herbert Daniel Brewster in: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Program Library of Congress. 35

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rashly started shooting on Bulgarian territory and serious consequences might have followed. Beyond that, the Greeks showed great interest in promoting counter-­ propaganda studies with a view to prompt NATO action against Communist ­propagandists within the NATO area.39 Athens’ vigilance in propaganda matters within NATO, reflected on the way Greek authorities sought silence the many Greek Communists who were still carrying on their activities from the safety of “asylum” in Western Europe, showcases the deep-routed anti-Communist security syndromes post-Civil War Greek state. Yet, although Greece and Turkey were formally members of NATO,40 it appears that the Greek and Turkish forces were never properly integrated in the overall NATO military command structure. There was ample evidence that they merely seemed to function as national forces rather than as allied ones. Therefore, very soon a fear of strategic nature began circulating among the highest NATO operational and component levels of command. In case of war in the Balkans, a Soviet Bloc offensive operation could cut easily the NATO forces off, forcing them to fight different battles in separate sub-theatres because no contact between Greek and Turkish land forces would be maintained (Chourchoulis, 2012, pp. 639–640). This inherited problem of the NATO integrated military command could never be erased outright. To the contrary, whenever, from 1955 onwards, a crisis in the Greek-Turkish relations occurred, an unwholesome gap between the two countries and their NATO allies was manifested in full display. These crises quickly escalated into serious disputes threatening to disrupt, first, Turkey’s ability to control the only sea-connection between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, with its possession of the Dardanelles and second, the whole NATO’s defence capability in the region. This was multiple times the case since the 1955 Turkish pogrom against the Greek population living in Istanbul in response to the outbreak of the Greek-Cypriot revolt in Cyprus against the British colonial rule with the aim of achieving an incorporation of the island in the Greek territory.41 The incident ended up in damaging relations between Greece and the Western countries temporarily and Greece and Turkey for good. Indeed, in 1955, the Greek government proceeded into recalling the Greek Ambassador in London and ordering the withdrawal of Greek personnel from the NATO South-Eastern European Command Headquarters in Izmir, Turkey. The Greek Government, without informing prior to the event the allies, made all arrangements  FO 371/107500 (folder on GREECE AND NATO), “Brief for visit by Secretary of State to Greece April 7, 1953”. 40  The NATO Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe was established in Izmir, Turkey, in September 1952, with the mission of exercising operational command of the field armies of Greece and Turkey in the event of war, in Naples, Italy. 41  The pogrom was allegedly a response to the in 1955 bombing of the building where Atatürk was born in Thessalonica, Greece. This was, however, the first significant action carried out by the Turkish contra-guerrilla abroad, after its foundation, and was exploited by the Turkish government with the assistance of its supporting press to incite the Turkish public against Greek and other nonMuslim minorities living in Turkey. Three people were killed and 30 injured. The attacks were conducted in an extremely organised and well-prepared manner (Gökay, 2006, p. 78). 39

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29

directly with senior Greek officers in NATO. When, in June 1955, the Greek government organised an airlift for the evacuation of all the military and civilian personnel and their families, NATO authorities were apparently caught by surprise about the Greek “shock move”.42 NATO’s failure to mediate between Greece and Turkey provoked the first serious discord within the Alliance. As the US officials in Greece noted in their reports, the Cyprus revolt and the riots in Istanbul had provoked a catholic indignation against the West, while US prestige and influence suffered a sharp downturn alongside with decline of popular support for NATO.43 Two years later, the Greek NATO staff gradually resumed activities in connection with responsibilities in Izmir after the satisfaction of various requests, namely: (a) the signing of papers by NATO officers on top of the Turks which would allow the resurgence in exchange of papers between Greek staff in the NATO headquarters in Izmir (b) the allocation of NATO officer status to the recalled Greek officers and the endorsement of the latter to perform NATO duties in Greece for Izmir headquarters, (c) the conduct of NATO exercises without Greek participation and contact between Greek and Turkish officers, and (d) the prohibition of Greek officers to visit Turkey and of Turkish officers to be ordered to Greece. These requirements were met and in 1958, Greek military officers began participating in NATO exercises on the basis of no contact between Greek and Turkish officers and resuming their responsibilities at Izmir and Greece. Greek officers were prohibited from going to Turkey, while no Turkish officers could be ordered to Greece, as Athens had requested.44 Eventually, in February 1959, the Greek Ministry of Defence informed the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) that the Greek government decided the Greek Military personnel of NATO Headquarter would return to Izmir to undertake its duty.45 However, things would never be the same again. As the US representatives in Greece estimated, the damage precipitated by these developments was irreparable: …Both the Greek government and people feel strongly that we have abandoned our principles and deserted Greece over the Cyprus question. That we blatantly discriminate in favor of Turkey economically, politically and militarily and that our Middle East policies are unwise as well as not in the Greek interest. In addition, large segments of the government and people believe our policy towards the Soviet Bloc is too rigid and in particular resent what they think is our policy of attempting to involve Greece in the dangers of atomic war by pressing her to accept atomic  Dwight Eisenhower Library, papers of Lauris Norstad (henceforth cited as Norstad papers), Country files series (Greece) box 49, A 373R227, “Bulletin on Greece”. 43  NARA: RG 59 (Records related to internal affairs of Greece 1955–1959), “Dispatch from the US army department in Greece to the Department of State September 17, 1955”. 44  Norstad papers, Collection, box 63, “Telegrams from US Embassy in Paris to Secretary of state in Washington January 1959”. 45  Lauris Norstad papers: “Telegram of the Ministry of Defence in Greece to SACEUR February 21, 1959”. 42

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weapons and installations… (…) The impact of the Cyprus problem has become so embittered to impair seriously the effectiveness of Greece’s participation in NATO, to threaten Greece’s place in the Western Alliance and this to bring into question the ultimate value of the Greek military establishment, in which we have made so substantial an investment, as a factor in Western defence…”.46 Greek political and military elites did not only worry about their Turkish ally. They also seemed to feel insecure within the Alliance fearing that, in the case of a general war, they would be the most likely target of a Soviet attack or retaliation, while they were not confident in the ability of NATO to promptly respond in aiding Greece. During the Cuba missile crisis in early 1960s, Greece asked for additional security guaranties and pushed for further unity within the Alliance and a more coherent common policy against Communism. Athens’ suggestion was that the latter could be accomplished via the establishment of consultation procedures which would be able to tackle such problems. It also devised the idea of establishing NATO multilateral special fund to subsidise deficiencies in national military budgets. As Athens urged higher levels of assistance, it willingly lined up with the United States during its 1959–63 clashes with the Soviet Union. In the same respect, Athens looked suspiciously at the prospect of détente in the West-Ost relations and was pre-­ occupied by the concern that its Western allies might sacrifice Greek security interests in case of an overall deal. These concerns were augmented by the simultaneous aggressive Soviet pressure to Athens to reject the US intermediate Range Missiles.47 The decision to station Jupiter Inter Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) armed with warheads in selected NATO countries was taken at the half-yearly NATO meeting, held from 16 to 19 December 1957. The successful launching of the Sputnik on 4 October of the same year, had precipitated strong fears both in the American public and among US allies, that the Soviet Union had taken a significant lead in missile technology. While other states like Italy and Turkey had agreed to the stationing of the Jupiters until September 1959, the Greeks initially sent out mixed signals. Karamanlis’s government declared its principal willingness to accept the missiles but, at the same time, postponed the enforcement of the resolution in the period after the launching of Cyprus independence. Despite deep-seated security concerns, Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, was reluctant to take another political risk and to strengthen leftist propaganda allegations on the country’s servility to the Western powers.48  NARA, RG 59, “Dispatch from the US Embassy in Greece to the Department of State in Washington May 5, 1958”. 47  NARA: Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs’ report for the Secretary of State on Greek concern over alleged lack of US support. July 13, 1962”; FRUS: vol. XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Washington United States Government Printing Office: “Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 19, 1961” and “Telegram of the US Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, September 13, 1961” and “Telegram of the US Embassy in Greece to the Department of State. Athens, December 2, 1961”. 48  Norstad papers: Greece – Problems, Box 88, “Telegram Thurston to Secretary of State relating 11 July 1958”, “Message Thurston to Secretary of State relating IRBM 20 January, 1959” and “Telegram Thurston to Secretary of State 31 August, 1959”, “Telegram of Stoessel to Secretary of 46

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31

In July 1959, Athens informed NATO that Greece could accept more warheads under the precondition that additional expenses attributable to this missile will be borne by a source other than Greece. This included initial hardware, construction and training expenses plus forces maintenance. Greece could supply raw manpower but not the financial support.49 Eventually, during July and August 1959 agreements came into force between the USA and seven other NATO countries, including Greece, permitting closer cooperation in the field of atomic weapons. Kremlin’s main concern was that intermediate range missiles (the Thor and Jupiter) might be stationed on the periphery of the Soviet Union, mainly Turkey. Under these circumstances, as the Atlantic Pact began considering the deployment of intermediate range missiles, the level of Soviet opposition markedly increased (Harris, 1974, pp. 43–46). The Greek government announced in March 1960 that the USA would deliver the equipment for the first battalion of Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft guided missiles for Greece. In July 1960, despite heavy USSR and Bulgaria reactions and threats, a new US-Greek military protocol, complementary to this of 1953, was signed, granting military facilities to US forces for mutual defence and NATO purposes (Kourkouvelas, 2011, pp. 136–145). Eventually, Greece and USA signed four additional bilateral agreements in 1959–60, which provided for the storage of US tactical nuclear weapons in the country, under what could be described as a “dual key” regime: the warheads would remain under US custody, and the Greek army would control the delivery systems (Hatzivassiliou, 1995, p. 194). Another source of concern for Greek as well as Western defence policy-makers, was the increasing presence of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean. The demonstration of naval force, a tactic manifested in the repeated presence of the Russian fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, was a powerful gambit in demonstrating Moscow’s interest in the region. In the Mediterranean there was no clear-cut front dividing East and West like in continental Europe along the Iron Curtain. The region was, nevertheless, of vital importance for the European Defence system, as bulwark against Soviet expansionism towards Africa, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and for the protection of maritime lines of communication through which, Europe received vital supplies such as oil from the Persian Gulf (Amosov, 2002; Leonardis, 2002). After World War II, the Soviet fleet appeared in the Mediterranean Sea for the first time in 1954, when a naval group formed by the cruiser Admiral Nachimov and two destroyers, arrived in the Albanian port of Durazzo. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union established an imposing naval presence in the eastern half of the Mediterranean, the Fifth Operational Squadron, through which it shattered NATO’s State regarding Gen. Norstad’s visit to Athens 3 September 1959” and “Telegram of the US Embassy in Athens to Secretary of State regarding Gen. Norstad visit to Athens September 2, 1959”. 49  Norstad Papers, “Telegram of The Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece Greece to the Chief of the United States European Command of NATO, July 1959”.

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naval monopoly in the Mediterranean and facilitated Soviet pro-Arab policy. Its main task was to monitor the U.S. Sixth Fleet.50 Each American aircraft carrier was followed by at least one Soviet vessel meant to combat threats from carrier-borne strike aircraft, as well as from the early Polaris missile systems Moreover, the scenario developed by Soviet strategists provided for a situation in which the Soviet navy would provoke a U.S. attack at the outbreak of war and thus deny the United States the option of withholding their nuclear weapons for a subsequent stage of war. In this case, the Soviet navy would be deployed within weapon range of U.S. strategic delivery units. If Soviet forces could, to some extent, prevent U.S. units from launching strikes against Soviet territory, so much the better. To counter this threat, NATO established a Mobile Force—a multinational, multi-service force—capable of rapid deployment on the flanks and, later, a new command, the Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean at Naples, which increased surveillance capability in view of the Soviet naval presence (McGwire, 1987, pp. 102–3). By 1964, the number of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean Sea began to increase quantitatively and qualitative exponentially. The number of vessels in summer 1969 totalled nearly seventy, including helicopters, cruisers and a balanced force of nuclear surface craft, submarines, intelligence collection vessels and auxiliary ships. The Mediterranean squadron consisted of elements of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets conducting out-of-area training in the region before returning to home waters or steaming to alternative naval facilities, for specialised maintenance or refitting. This training taking place in new waters was considered to be valuable providing command-and-control exercise in interfleet coordination, a common weakness in Soviet naval proficiency. Moscow also promoted the psychological and political impact of its naval presence through an active campaign to “show the flag”. In 1969, Soviet warships made port calls to 28 nations and to all Arab countries (Whetten, 1971, pp. 22–27). The increased capabilities of the Soviet squadron, particularly the anti-carrier capabilities, were also intended to serve as a reminder to the US and others that Soviet interests must be reckoned with in any military move in the Middle East. The CIA estimated at the time, that the navy was set to depart from its traditional defencive role and become an instrument for projecting Soviet power and influence abroad. In pursuit of this new policy several shipbuilding programs were initiated, and Soviet submarines and surface ships began to operate further at sea in increasing numbers and with much greater frequency.51 The rapid, unprecedented growth of the Soviet Navy during the 1960s modified the global naval balance. For nearly twenty years, the Mediterranean was a  In response, NATO countries were also monitoring the Soviet naval activities. For example, in the Greek Embassy in Nicosia many foreign broadcast information services and radio transmitters operated with the aim of registering and observing Russian ships. HAGFM: Central Department, USSR, Foreign Relations folder 62, subfolder 3, “Telegrams from the Greek Embassy in Nicosia to the Greek Foreign and Defence Ministry 1961”. 51  CIA releases 2017: “Directorate of Intelligence Report on the Soviet Squadron, December 1968”. 50

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33

“NATO lake” and within its waters the sixth fleet’s superiority had remained unchallenged. When Turkey and Greece joined NATO, no Soviet power base existed in the Eastern Mediterranean. This development also marked an important change in the naval strategy of the Soviets and enhanced the role of naval power, when compared to Moscow’s land forces, which played a largely preponderant role in the past. However, the mobility of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was hampered by the restrictions established by the Montreux Convention for the passage of the Bosporus and Dardanelles and the lack of a sovereign or leased harbour area (Vali, 1972, pp. 108–117). Indeed, in pure military terms, the Soviet fifth Eskadra never represented a serious threat to European freedom of navigation and had very poor capacity of landing forces, even in 1969, when its strength became temporarily superior to the combined fleets of Western European countries in the area (Leonardis, 2002, p. 525). This, however, could not be ascertained at that time, while this sort of military presence enabled the USSR to be recognised as a major Mediterranean power and a political equal of the United States and NATO in the area (Whetten, 1971, p. 38). Another security-related hardship that steadily strained Greece’s relations to the West was the Greek defence expenditures. Country’s overall defence budget, corresponding to about 5% of Greek national product, was among the highest within the Alliance, while income per head and gross national product were among the lowest of NATO members. In the whole 1950s through the mid-1960s there was an intense debate about the amount of Greek military expenditures, as a result of Greece’s obligations to NATO standards. Karamanlis’ governments repeatedly asked for relief for the unbearable burden the country had to bear, on the frontline of Cold War (Karamanlis published Archive, 1997, vol. II pp. 256–258, pp. 476–581). Even US officials acknowledged that the modernisation of Greek armed forces should be slowed down, because of its impact on the inflation and the balance of payments.52 In 1958, the US Embassy in Greece admitted that, judged by NATO standards, the Greeks were making a very large effort, in terms of force goals, total manpower currently under arms, and most significantly, in terms of the financial effort involved. Greece’s self-financed military budget had placed the country on a par with the German Federal Republic, and ahead of Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal and Turkey, most of which controlled substantially greater resources.53 As a consequence, despite continued strict monetary and fiscal policies followed by the Greek governments, the Greek foreign exchange reserves were in decline in 1956 and 1957. This was also the result of the slowdown in world economic activity, the rapid fall of earnings out of American orders to the Greek industry and the difficulty of absorbing increased quantities of US agricultural surplus commodities as a result of higher priced Greek agricultural crops. In order to stem this deficit, the  NARA, RG 59, “Dispatch from the US army department in Greece to the Department of State October 2, 1955”. 53  NARA, RG 59, “Dispatch from the US-Embassy in Greece to the Department of State May 2, 1958 on the state of Greek Armed forces.” 52

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Greek government requested in 1958 from the US government defence support. The requested aid amounted to $35  million to be used for the procurement of goods other than agricultural surplus commodities, a supplementary contribution to the defence burden of Greece, as well as the renewal of its offshore procurement orders for an amount of about $20 million per annum.54 As it will be illustrated in the next chapter, the insufficient absorption of Greek agricultural products was about to become “the Trojan horse” for the Eastern European penetration into the Greek economy.

The Role of the Left-Wing Parties Communism as ideology, including its various conceptions and political structures in which it was embodied, was also perceived by Greek political elites as a serious national security problem. The Greek post-Civil War state was constantly pre-­ occupied by “the national mission” to address the Communist infiltration in the public sector, education, press, trade and worker unions, church or in the armed forces. Gradually, a widespread tendency grew, even among well-respected politicians and personalities, to reject Communism as being something incompatible with Greek mentality and nation.55 The ideology of ethnikofrosyni connoting the orthodox way of thinking, reduced patriotism to anti-Communism. Communists, including intellectuals, artists, journalists and so on were accused of being vehicles of espionage and sabotage on behalf of Soviet Bloc countries.56 The so-called “Slav-Communist conspiracy”, i.e. an imminent attack by the Communist Balkan countries to Greece with the help of the Greek Communists inside and outside Greece, was designated as the most dangerous threat to country’s security.57 Not surprisingly a strong and, in some cases, also pathological, anti-Communist institutional, political, ideological and social framework was established in post-­ Civil War Greece, that, despite significant liberalisation-attempts undertaken by some governments, prevailed with short intervals until 1974. The members of the Communist partisan groups who remained in the country alongside with those  NARA, RG 59, “Aide-Memoire of the Greek Government submitted on September 1, 1958 to James Smith, Director of I.C.A. on American economic assistance to Greece.” 55  Personal Papers of Constantine Tsatsos, Minister to the Premier’s Office in the Karamanlis Government (1956–1961): Folder 56, subfolder 6, “Communist activities” (henceforth cited as Tsatsos papers): “Propositions aimed at organising the national education, submitted by the Minister to the Premier’s Office to the Head of the Hellenic Government February 23, 1959”; “Miscellaneous texts, public announcements on Communism 1956–1961”. 56  Tsatsos papers: Folder 56, Subfolder 5, “Top Secret report for the Head of the Hellenic Government subject: Eastern Bloc countries intelligence service’s activities in Greece December 3, 1959”. 57  Triantafyllakos papers: “Report on the precautionary measures for the upcoming elections July 28, 1961”. 54

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designated as their sympathisers, suffered extensive prosecution and socio-political discrimination (Karagiannis, 2008, pp.  3–44). In this respect, Communists were denied recognition for their decisive part in the national resistance against the axis powers, as some of them also participated in the Communist partisan army during the Civil War. The extreme measures adopted by the Civil War governments were incorporated into the post-civil war, political and constitutional order that was based on the theory of the “standing civil war”. As a consequence, the police, army, intelligence units with numerous civilian collaborators across the society developed to an independent and all-mighty force, empowered to act even independently from the government. This paramilitary apparatus, i.e. a set of shadowy groups operating on the state’s margins, took on “the task” to spread a climate of terror, persecute dissidents and instigate assassinations of personalities deemed as potential threats to the Greek nation and state. This political state of affairs led many to coin the term “sickly democracy” for the Greek post-civil war political regime (Alivizatos, 1995) and others to describe the constrictions on the political and social system as a form of “repressive parliamentarism” or “guided democracy” (Mouzelis, 1976). In many cases, legal abuses and policy terror were also directed against supporters of the political center opposition parties, as well as moderate politicians and members of parliament (Gkotzaridis, 2016). Northern Greece, beeing in direct vicinity with Communist countries, comprised stationed elite units, which had broad powers over civilian matters as well. There are numerous reports by foreign observers about the extensive use of violence and intimidation in elections and in various political events.58 Especially the prospect of a leftist victory in the general elections of 1958 put the American officials, dealing with Greece, on full alert forcing them to contemplate precise measures to influence the result of the upcoming

 NARA, RG 59, “Memorandum of Conversation on Economic aid between the Greek Ambassador Melas and American officials. Department of State May 21, 1958”. Melas asked for assistance in order to combat the Communist threat; Triantafyllakos papers: “Report by Georgios Georgalas, expert on Soviet Issues of the Department for Education of the Hellenic Republic, to Georgios Papandreou without date on the subversive actions by Greek Communists”. There are plenty similar reports, mostly uncatalogued, warning Greek Ministers and bourgeois political parties on the Communist’s plans to overthrow Greece’ constitutional order sent after EDA’s electoral success in the 1958 general elections; Report by the Federation Internationale des Droits de l’ Homme on the freedom of press in Greece (in French) Paris March 4, 1960” rejected by Minister Triantafyllakos with his response-letter May 28, 1960. Liddle Hard Centre for military archives, King’s College London (henceforth Liddle Hard Archives): Letter from Alan Paterson to Frederick Elwyn Jones Esq. Labour MP, October 19, 1961 (Correspondence of the League for Democracy in Greece with Greek MPs).

58

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elections.59 Those left-wingers who were abroad, no matter in which country they lived, were also stigmatized as state enemies.60 Greek military authorities were convinced that a Soviet and Communist propaganda conducted with various methods among the Greek armed forces. So there was a high concern that the Communist propaganda, arguing that as a vanguard of the United States, Greece was in danger in the event of war of being annihilated by atomic bombs, targeted the country’s participation in the North Atlantic Treaty and aimed at alienating Greece from NATO. According to the Greek military authorities, the Greek communist broadcasts from Moscow and satellite radio stations sought to demoralise the Greek soldiers. For instance, they propagated that army exercises were too intensive, that military training was unbearably rigorous, and that the length of military service, the stoppage of army leave impoverished soldiers’ families. Finally, the excessive military expenditure resulted in the low standard of living in Greece.61 It took three years from the end of the Civil War until Greek leftists, non-directly associated with the defeated and exiled Communist party, rallied again around a new political formation, called the United Democratic Left (EDA) that was founded in 1952 with the covert participation and involvement of Greek Communists.62

 …Attention should be called to the dangers of Communism and the consequences that may result from political coalition with the Communist party. We must make a wide distribution of photostats and translations of the famous Russian Plan, which was laid out by them during the Second World War concerning the fate of the Greeks at the time the Communists were to become the masters of Greece…” NARA, RG 59, Political Activities and Parties-General, Greece 1961: “Memorandum of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs January 1961”. 60  Papers of Tryfon Triandafyllakos in the Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (henceforth Triantafyllakos papers): “Greek Intelligence Service’ Report (Gogousis) on activities of Communists abroad against the Greek State, March 2, 1961”; “Uncatalogued Report with the Title I Kommounistiki Propaganda stin Ellada” [The Communist Propaganda in Greece]; Georgios Papandreou Cultural Centre Archiv: “Police information reports 1964”; HAGFM: Folder 349, Sub-folder 1 (1961), Communists abroad”: There are numerous reports by various Greek authorities on Greek Communists’ activities in various countries and especially of their accusations against the Greek State of persecutions of Greek leftists submitted to international organisations. One of the cases that repeatedly was subject of accusations was Manolis Glezos, a very prominent former resistance fighter against the Nazis who was incarcerated and convicted to death twice in the 1950s and 1960s. The Greek Communist Party and other Western and Eastern European leftist and liberal organisations organised a gigantic campaign for his rescue in Western and Eastern Europe. See also Archives of the Mass Organizations and the Political Parties of the Former East Germany (henceforth cited as AMOPP), DY 30 IV 2/20/253, “Notiz über eine Ausspache der griechischen Parlamentarierdelegation mit Vertretern des Deutschen Komitees zur Befreiung von Manolis Glezos” and DY 30 IV 2/20/253, “Vermerk über eine Unterredung des Mitarbeiters der Kammervertretung Athen Geyer mit dem Mitglied des Präsidiums I. Iliou vom 12.9.1959”. 61  NATO archive: “NATO confidential document, AC/52-D/lll, Original text in French August 26, 1955, Committee on information and cultural relations. Soviet and Communist propaganda among the Greek armed forces. Note by the Greek Delegation”. 62  Tsatsos papers: Folder 56, Subfolder 5, “Briefing Report to Ministers of the Hellenic government on EDA’s activities 1955”. 59

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Advocating a moderate political agenda, EDA gradually developed into a well-­ organised party reaching the astonishing, for Greek political standards, electoral result of 25% (79 seats) in the general elections of 1958. EDA strongly opposed Greece’s participation in “the aggressive American Alliance-NATO” and repudiated the deep-seated anti-Communist security concerns of the post-Civil War Greek state. Instead, it agitated for closer relations with all the Eastern European countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence allegedly “a fundamental principle of the Soviet foreign policy”, as well as, the settlement of the pending issues accruing from WWII and the Civil War with the Communist neighboring countries. It also spoke out against the 1961 association agreement with the European Common market, which, in EDA’s eyes, was economically ruining Greek agricultural population (Dimitriou, 1978; vol I pp. 134–138; Labrinou, 2017, pp. 289–313). EDA’s role was of inordinate importance in the political events of 1963–64. From 1961 onwards, Greece experienced a turbulent political tumult ending up in the change of government in 1963, terminating the political supremacy of Democratic Rally governments under the leadership of the charismatic and buoyant personality of Karamanlis (1955–1963). EDA’s indirect assistance to the Center Union party under Georgios Papandreou enabled it to win the elections and form a political centrist government. In return, EDA took advantage of a temporary relaxation of security restrictions to increase its activity.63 By July 1965, Greece entered into a period of new political turbulences and upheaval in the context of which the Prime Minister George Papandreou resigned due to the conflict with King Constantine concerning who had the right to replace the Minister of Defense and the governing party, the Centre Union, was divided. The political atmosphere was further poisoned by the accusations against Andreas Papandreou, the son of George Papandreou and more leftist than his father, for his alleged involvement in ASPIDA, a clandestine organisation of leftist officers with allegedly subversive aspirations. George Papandreou called for new elections, which were postponed numerous times. Short-lived or caretaker governments were trapped in continuous political manoeuvring and pre-occupied by serious and daunting domestic problems through April 1967, when a coup d’ etat took place ushering Greece into a sever year dictatorship. The link between Communist parties, pro-Communist organisations and Soviet foreign in the Eastern Mediterranean constitute an extremely important component in the Cold War history, which has fuelled a rather polemical debate over time. As a matter of fact, the regional Communist parties, ideologically adherent and, in many cases, financially dependent on the Soviet Union, were of crucial importance in Moscow’s regional strategy, which, steadily, aimed at fostering ties with mutually antagonistic and adversary countries. Local Communist parties assumed the role of justifying or whitewashing Moscow’s ambivalent and contradictory policy, by propagating the course of the “peace camp” against the “Western

 CIA releases 2017: “Memorandum to the Director of the CIA on the Prospects for Greece September 11, 1965”.

63

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Imperialism”. The most successful among all the Communist parties in the region and the most suitable one to take over this mission, was the Communist Party of Cyprus, AKEL, whose electoral success post Cyprus independence rendered it to a powerful political and social factor on the island. At the same time, the Moscowled Greek Communist Party was outlawed, the Communist movement in Turkey had to fight against the Kemalist state and Islamic religion, Iraqi Communists were suppressed by the Baathists, and Kurdish Communists were divided as a result of the anti-­Communist course followed by the countries where Kurds lived (Stergiou, 2014–2015). Weaponizing the Western communist parties as parallel and obedient tools of Soviet diplomacy seems to have been a consistent Soviet strategy from the first Congresses of the Comintern (Communist Internationale) in 1919–20 to the very end of the Stalinist years and even after the replacement of the Comintern through the Cominform in the period from 1947 to 1956. Cominform was not under the absolute control of Moscow, because the Bulgarian and Yugoslavian Communist leaders Dimitrov and Tito always tried to influence things towards a pro-Bulgarian or pro-Yugoslavian direction, with the aim of promoting their own nationalist aspirations in the Balkans. Nevertheless, Tito’s proposition to invite the Greek Communist Party into the kick-off meeting of the Cominform was rejected by Stalin who looked askance at Tito’s increasing influence (Gräfe, 2002, pp. 69–71). Other Scholars believe that the conspicuous absence of the Greek Communists from a so important meeting for the international Communism, as well as the fact that there was no mention of the Greek Civil War in the Cominform communique, was the result of the Stalin-Churchill agreement on spheres of interest of 1944 (Wittner, 1982, pp. 259). Thanks to the international Communist associations, Soviets could rely on a double structure, which was unique in the world: an official apparatus, the governmental one, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an unofficial one, the Communist structure, which were meant to influence, through the Western European parties, Capitalist countries’ public opinion in a favourable direction. There is enough evidence today that in 1947 the Cominform adopted the principle of direct and large-­ scale financing. The structure was further implemented in 1950. Officially, funds were given through an International Trade Union Fund in order to disguise the political dimension of the action. However, in 1966, the Fund was transformed into an International Fund to help workers’ and leftist organisations. Among the Communist parties that benefited from that aid were the Greek Communist party that received 0.78% of the whole amount in 1956, and the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) that received 0.44% in 1966 and 0.7% of the whole amount in 1973 (Rey, 2004, pp. 200–212). When it comes to the Greek Communist party (KKE), it should be remembered that the party had necessarily relied on help from Soviet Bloc countries in order to survive against the permanent persecutions by the Greek state authorities, which began shortly after its foundation and lasted, with short intervals, until 1974. After the end of the Civil War in 1949 and until the relegalisation of the Greek Communist party 1974, the party’s survival in exile was dependent outright on the

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assistance of various Communist countries. The assistance was channelled to the KKE in many ways. In many cases the support was of humanitarian nature (hospitalisation and medical care or economic assistance for incapacitated party-members and so on). The party also was granted economic and material support for its cadre organisations and its schools for the refuges as well as propaganda apparatus granting of scholarships et al. The most generous of all the Communist countries was, according to the ex-General Secretary Harilaos Florakis, East Germany.64 There is ample evidence that, at certain periods of time (after the military coup in 1967), the KKE received economic support, with the objective to prepare a guerrilla war in Greece, that was to be directed both against the Greek junta and NATO targets (Oichaliotis, 2004–2005, pp. 62–69). The installation of propaganda apparatus with a big radio station, the voice of the party for its cadres and supporters across Europe, was of great significance for the political agitation of the party inside and outside Greece. The decision for the construction of the station was made by Cominform in 1948. The city of Bucharest was chosen as the location. Beside that, there was another one in Moscow that had broadcasted since 1947 (Adibekov, 2002, pp. 269–271). But even after its legalisation in 1974, the KKE continued to receive financial support from other Communist parties, especially the East German Communist Party (SED) for private economic business the party was engaged in. The profits from these businesses made it possible for the KKE to pay its numerous professional cadres and to finance well-funded election campaigns. In the 1970s, these businesses were mainly building firms, which often built houses for party officials. In the 1980s, the KKE was more engaged in publishing companies. A considerable part of the party’s assets came from the financial kickbacks they received for initiating the honouring of state contracts by Eastern Bloc firms. Participation in handling these commissions was handled mostly by companies that were close to the party. These included the Greek-Soviet Transorient Shipping and Trading Company, which had its headquarters in Piraeus and carried out maintenance on Soviet ships in Greek shipyards and the party’s tourist agency, Lev Tours, which organised tourism in Eastern Europe. There was a closer financial entanglement with the East German Communist party than with other “brother parties”. This went well beyond sharing the profits from Greek contracts awarded to East German firms. For example, through Athens the SED regime handled an extensive trade in weapons for Angola, Eritrea and Iran. In 1982, the Communist publisher Typoekdotiki received a credit in the sum of 6.7 million marks from an SED “cover firm” in Luxemburg in order to equip a printing company. Some of the SED money, as well as profits generated by the publishing business, helped to finance Greece’s largest party headquarters, the so-called House of the People in the Athens district of Perissos. The significance of the KKE in the SED’s financial activities was demonstrated, when Athens was one of the first European cities visited by the Party of Democratic Socialism chairman, Gregor Gysi, after the transformation of the SED in July 1990.

64

 Personal Communication with Florakis Athens (Perissos Party- Headquarters) April 1998.

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As the magazine Der Spiegel reported at the time, the purpose of the visit was to “park money” (Stergiou, 2011, pp. 123–124). Not surprisingly, and in line with most West European communist parties during the Cold War, the Greek communist party perceived the protection of the heartland of the revolution and the interests of the Soviet Union as its essential task. It rigorously interpreted the world as split between the capitalist/imperialist forces on one side, and the peace forces (that were the pro-Soviet forces) on the other. There was no room in this simplistic divide for either an intermediary or for partial allegiances. The corollary was that all of the international organisations, institutions or bodies, e.g. European Economic Community, European Council, were included in this Manichean view (Stergiou, 2016). Greece’s association with the European Community in 1961, presented by Karamanlis as an alternative option to trade relations with the Communist Bloc and as a further step towards country’s integration into the western camp, was merciless attacked by the Greek left. From the first moment, the Greek Communists, in line with Kremlin’s stance towards Greece’s association with the EEC in 1961,65 declared an unrelenting war against the country’s aspiration to achieve its inclusion into the European Community. From that time on, every criticism of Greek governments by the KKE leadership was accompanied by a reference to the destructive nature of the EEC and calls for the immediate dissociation of Greece from the body. Only in 1988, under the influence of the recent agreements between the European Community and the Eastern Bloc (EC-CMEA relations) did the Greek Communists proceed to modify their hitherto negative stance towards the EC. In a special party publication called “Theseis” (propositions), Greek Moscow-oriented Communists praised the agreement as the starting point of a new road towards the creation of a Europe of the people, peace and cooperation (Stergiou, 2019). The role of Greek left-wing parties (EDA and KKE) was also an important variable in the trade with the East, as the latter remained a controversial political issue throughout the Cold War era. For general ideological but also domestic political reasons, these parties were committed to a targeted and skilful agitation in favour of Greece’s trade with the Eastern European Countries. This agitation took various forms but, on the whole, followed a particular pattern. It touted the economic success of the Socialist countries it highlighted the impoverished situation of Greek agricultural producers and the country’s trade deficit and economic backwardness arising from Greece’s compliance with NATO and COCOM’s restrictions. It also savaged Greece’s association with the European Economic Community (EEC) from 1961 onwards. Finally, it advertised trade with the East as the solution to the country’s economic problems and as an alternative to the association to the European Community (Wallden, 1991, vol I pp.  168–175; Stergiou, 2002, pp.  149–150; Afinian et al., 2003, pp. 171–174, 180–182).  HAGFM: Greek Soviet Relations 1956–1964: Folder 62, Sub-Folder 2/1 and 10/2 and Folder 63, Sub-Folder 7, “Telegrams from the Greek Embassy in Moscow to Athens about the heavy reactions by the Soviet press to Greece’s association treaty with the European Community, May and June 1961”.

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In April 1960 and ahead of the commence of Greece’s customary union with EEC, EDA impeached the Karamanlis government, after continuous attacks to the cabinet for not upgrading Greece’s economic relations for allegedly political reasons to the Eastern European countries (Karamanlis published Archive, 1997: vol. 4). The interdependence between politics and economy in Greece’s relations with the Soviet Union and other members of the Communist Bloc was registered at the time by the British Embassy in Athens. The British diplomats stressed mainly in their reports that (a) the support by EDA and nationalist opposition parties’ for Communist offers was targeted towards relieving Greece of its agricultural surpluses and (b) the onerous position of the government to ignore the benefits of East trade to reject the advantageous trade offers in order to satisfy the Americans.66

References Adibekov, G. (2002). Das Kominform und Stalins Neuordnung Europas. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang. Afinian, V., Kontis, V., Papoulidis, K., Prozoumechicov, M., Smirnova, D., & Tomilina, N. (Eds.). (2003). Sovietiki Enosi kai Valkania stis Dekaeties 1950 kai 1960, Sillogi Eggrafon [Soviet Union and Balkans in the 1950s and 1960s, collection of documents] Federal Archive Service of the Russian Federation and Institute for Balkan Studies. Thessaloniki, Greece: Paratiritis Publisher. Alivizatos, N. (1995). Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922–1974. Opseis tis ellinikis empeirias [Political institutions in crisis 1922–1974. Aspects of the Greek experience]. Athens, Greece: Themelio. Amosov, I. (2002). Russia and the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean. In Hellenic Committee of Military History (Ed.), Military conflicts and the twentieth century geopolitics. Twenty-seventh international congress of military history (pp.  531–539). Hellenic Committee of Military History: Athens, Greece. Chatam House Study Group. (1952). Atlantic Alliance. NATO’s role in the free World. Royal Institute of International Affairs: London/New York. Chourchoulis, D. (2012). A nominal defence? NATO threat perception and responses in the Balkan area, 1951–1967. Cold War History, 12(4), 637–657. Coufoudakis, V., & Valinakis, Y. (1987). The evolution of Greece’s defense strategy in relation to NATO contingencies. The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 22(1), 30–35. Couloumbis, T. (1966). Greek political reaction to American and NATO influences. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dimitriou, P. (1978). I Diaspasi tou KKE mesa apo ta keimena tis periodou 1950–1975 [Greek Communist Party’s split viewed through the texts of the period 1950–1975], Athens, Greece: Themelio Publisher vol. I. Gkotzaridis, E. (2016). A Pacifist’s life and death: Grigorios Lambrakis and Greece in the long shadow of Civil War. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

 FO: FCO 371/144519, “Sir Roger Allen (Embassy Athens) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office) Subject: Greek political troubles Athens, December 5, 1959. Collection of Documents Greece during the early Cold War the view from the Western archives.

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Gökay, B. (2006). Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–1991. Soviet foreign policy, Turkey and communism. London/New York: Routledge. Gräfe, K.  H. (2002). Das Kominform-Neuaflage der Komintern? Zur Geschichte des Informationsbüros kommunistischer Parteien Europas (1947–1956). Halbjahresschrift, 2, 63–77. Harris, G. (1974). The Soviet Union and Turkey. In I. Lederer & W. Vucinich (Eds.), The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era (pp. 25–54). Stanford, CA: Hoover University Press. Hatzivassiliou, E. (1995). Security and the European option: Greek foreign policy, 1952–62. Journal of Contemporary History, 30, 187–202. Karagiannis, G. (2008). Koinonia kai politiki stin metmfiliaki Ellada. Opseis kai diastaseis ton Syllogon stin periochi tis protevousas [Society and politics in the Post-Civil War Greece. Aspects and dimensions of the Associations in the Capital region], Epitheorisi Koinonikon Erevnon, 127(3), 3–44. Kourkouvelas, L. (2011). I Ellada kai to zitima ton Pirinikon Oplon 1957–1963 [Greece and the issue of Nuclear Weapons 1957–1963]. Athens, Greece: Patakis publisher and Institute of Democracy. Kuniholm, B. R. (1980). The origins of the cold war in the near east: Great power conflict and diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Labrinou, K. (2017). EDA 1956–1967. Politiki kai Ideologia [EDA 1956–1967. Policy and ideology]. Athens, Greece: Polis Publisher. Leonardis, D. Μ. (2002). The Mediterranean in NATO Strategies during the Cold War. In Hellenic Committee of Military History (Ed.), Military conflicts and the twentieth century geopolitics. Twenty-seventh international congress of military history (pp.  519–529). Athens, Greece: Hellenic Committee of Military History. McGwire, M. (1987). Military objectives in soviet foreign policy. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Miller, J. (2009). The United States and the making of modern Greece. History and power, 1950– 1974. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina press. Mouzelis, N. (1976). Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece. New Left Review, March– April, 57–80. Oichaliotis, R. (2004–2005). Gia ti mistiki diisdisi sti diktatoriki Ellada. Ta ellinikou endiaferontos stoicheia apo to archeio Vasili Mitrochin (On Soviet secret penetration in Greece. Documents from the Vasili Mitrochin archive). Tetradia Politikou Dialogou-Erevnas kai Kritikis, 49, 59–69. Rey, M.  P. (2004). The Western European Communist Parties in the Cold War, 1957–1968. In W. Loth (Ed.), Europe, cold war and coexistence 1953–1965 (pp. 200–212). London: Frank Cass Publishers. Stearns, M. (1992). Entangled allies. US policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. New York: Council on Foreign Relations press. Stefanidis, I. (1999). Apo ton Emfilio ston Psichro Polemo. H Ellada kai o Simmachikos Para­ gontas 1949–1952 [From the Civil to the Cold War. Greece and the allied factor 1942–1952. Athens, Greece: Proskinio. Stefanidis, I. (1999b). The Contraction of British Influence in Greece, 1947–55. Thetis, 5–6, 449–454. Stefanidis, I. (2001). Pressure groups and Greek foreign policy, 1945–67. London: The Hellenic Observatory at the European Institute of the London School of Economics & Political Science papers. Stergiou, A. (2002). “Im Kampf gegen den Westdeutschen Imperialismus”: Die Politik der SED im Mittelmeerraum. Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismus-Forschung, 141–65. Stergiou, A. (2011). The SED’s bizarre relationship with the Greek Communist Party in the period 1968–1989. Twentieth Century Communism, 3, 114–130. Stergiou, A. (2014–2015). The Communist party of Cyprus and Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Modern Greek Studies Yearbook, 30(31), 199–221.

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Stergiou, A. (2016). Die Europapolitik der kommunistischen Parteien Griechenlands und Zyperns. In F. Di Palma & W. Müller (Eds.), Kommunismus und Europa. Europapolitik und -­ vorstellungen europäischer kommunistischer Parteien im Kalten Krieg (pp. 205–220). Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh. Stergiou, A. (2019). The perestroika and the Greek left. In F. Di Palma (Ed.), Perestroika and the party. National and transnational perspectives on European communist parties in the era of soviet reform (pp. 256–277). New York/Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books. The Scotsman-Newspaper. (1949, March 8). Vali, F. (1972). The Turkish straits and NATO. Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press. Wallden, S. (1991). Ellada kai Anatolikes Chores 1950–1967. Oikonomikes Scheseis kai Politiki [Greece and Eastern countries 1950–1967. Economic relations and politics]. Athens, Greece: Odysseas Publisher, vol. I and II. Whetten, L. (1971). The Soviet presence in Eastern Mediterranean. New York: National Strategy Information Center INC.. Wittner, L. (1982). American intervention in Greece, 1943–1949. New York: Columbia University Press.

Primary Sources

Greece Archive of Tryfon Triandafyllakos (cited as Triandafyllakos Papers) in the Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Minister of Coordination in the Konstantinos Karamanlis’ administrations). Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cited as HAGFM) : folders on Greek-Soviet Relations, NATO, Greece’s relations with Balkan countries and Eastern Europe, Turkish-Soviet relations, Political Refugees, Communist Activities abroad, European Army, United States, Mediterranean Pact, Warsaw Pact, East-West relations. Georgios Papandreou’s Archive in the Georgios Papandreou Cultural Centre in Athens: Folders relating his administration as Prime Minister (1963–1965). Konstantinos Tsatsos Archive (cited as Tsatsos archive): Minister to the Premier’s Office in the Karamanlis Government (1956–1961): Collection number: Folder 56, subfolder 6, “communist activities”. Collection held at Gennadius Library in Athens. Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Archive in Athens: Folders on Foreign and Defence Policy relating his administration as Prime Minister 1955–1963 and 1974–1980 (NATO-bilateral relations-EEC-­ National Issues-US policy in the Mediterranean-Warsaw Pact, the Cyprus Issue and so on). Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archive in the Konstantinos Karamanlis archive in Athens: Folders relating Tsaldaris’ Foreign Policy administration (1946–1950).

NATO-Archive Miscellaneous Documents relating Greece, Greece and Turkey, Greece and Soviet Bloc.

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United Kingdom Foreign Office (cited as FO): folders on Greece, Cyprus, Political relations between Greece and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Greece and NATO, Greece and Balkans, Greece and Balkan Cooperation, Greece-Turkish Dispute over the Aegean, Balkan Nuclear Free Zone. Liddle Hard Centre for military archives (Liddle Hard Archives) at the King’s College in London.

United States CIA releases 2017. Dwight Eisenhower Library and Archives: Lauris Norstad papers and collection. National Archives and Records Administration (cited as NARA): folders on Greece, Turkey, NATO, Eastern Mediterranean, Warsaw Pact.

Published Primary Sources and Archival Documents Association for Diplomatic Studies: Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Georgetown University Washington D.C.: http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/about. html. Foreign Relations of the United States (cited as FRUS): 1952–1954, vol. VIII, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean; vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa; vol. X, part 2, 1958-1960, Eastern Europe. Finland, Greece, Turkey; vol. XVI, 1961–1963, Eastern Europe, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey; vol. XVI, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, 1964–1968: Konstantinos Karamanlis Archeio. Gegonota kai Keimena (1997 and 2005 (The 2005 edition was made by Kathimerini newspaper and is divided in more volumes than the 1997 one.)) Konstantinos Karamanlis Archive. Incidents and Texts. Konstantinos Svolopoulos (Ed). Athens: Idryma K.  Karamanlis-Ekdotiki Athinon publisher (cited as Karamanlis published Archive). Yourgeio Exoterikon tis Elladas-Ypiresia Dplomatikou kai Istorikou Archeiou [Diplomatic and Historical Archives of Greek Foreign Ministry] (2002). I Ellada sto Metechmio enos neou kosmou. Psichros Polemos, Dogma Truman, Schedio Marshall. Mesa apo diplomatika kai istorika eggrafa [Greece at the threshold of a new world. Cold War-Truman Doctrine-Marshall plan. By means of diplomatic and historical documents], edited by Foteini Tomai-Konstantopoulou. Vol III, 1948–1951. Athens: Kastaniotis Publisher.

Interviews Charilaos, F. (1999). General secretary of the Greek Communist Party from 1973 until 1989. Athens: April.

Greece and Eastern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s

The Economic Factor In early 1950s, a combination of macroeconomic and microeconomic developments entailed severe repercussions for the Greek economy and society. It was the time that post-war reconstruction was still in process after a decade fraught with armed confrontations. From 1953 onwards, the US economic aid was channelled into the Greek defence budget for the most part. As a result of Greece’s participation in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation the Greek governments were forced to liberalise the economy and gradually abolish the protectionist regime home business hitherto enjoyed. As a consequence, foreign companies were no longer compelled to purchase certain quantities of Greek goods in return of the permission to distribute their products in the Greek market. Given that a large passive trade balance had been a traditional feature of the Greek economy, the devaluation of the drachma in 1953 increased the prices of imports but did not equally boost post-war Greek exports. The reason for this was that exports had over time consisted largely (to the extent of some 65%) of two or three semi-luxury commodities, e.g. tobacco and fruits. Thus, Greece found itself very soon in a vulnerable position. Until 1958, the deficit in the trade balance sheet rose to $ 238 million (153%), reaching the amount of approximately 150% of the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves (Delivanis, 1961, pp. 556; Eliades, 1954, pp. 22–72). At the same period, Greece faced unsurmountable difficulties and strong competition from other countries to expand the market of its agricultural products. This applied especially to its main export goods, raw tobacco and tobacco products that made up 47% of its total exports. By mid-1950, stocks of unsold tobacco were piling up in Greece, reaching the alarming sum of 45,000 tons, threatening to cause large-scale unemployment and social unrest. In Northern Greece, tobacco growers began voicing strongly worded criticism against the government and Marshall Plan. The crisis created fertile ground for the circulation of Soviet propaganda against the United States and in favour of trad with the Soviet Bloc (Pelt, 2006, pp. 110–111). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Stergiou, Greece’s Ostpolitik, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61129-3_3

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However, trade relations with the Communist Bloc had been severed during the Civil War. Balkan Communist countries’ assistance to the Greek partisans as well as pending issues in their relations with Greece that in many cases dated back to the World War II were a serious barrier for the development of trade. In addition, the Greek conservative governments (1952–1963) feared the growing popularity of the economic performance of the neighbour states in the Greek society, as some of them had achieved remarkable industrialisation progress that in turn was vehemently advertised by the left-wing EDA party (Wallden, 1991, Vol. I). Another barrier Greek exports confronted at the time, was the restrictions that had been imposed by the United States and the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), to which the Greek State had to abide by. The committee had been established by the Western countries in the first years of Cold War in order to oversee the embargo of certain products imported by Communist countries. In the Cold War reasoning, trade between the open market economies and the Soviet Bloc was considered to be dangerous, because it was believed that the Communist countries would use trade for political purposes, which, in turn, would possibly destabilise world’s free markets. As a result, COCOM’s technical embargos and controls restricted East-West trade within tightly regulated bilateral spheres. On the other hand, the United States followed a rigid policy for restricting trade in strategic, military items, prohibiting exports of equipment and data to the USSR while embodying certain items of advanced technology that could adversely affect US national security. For example, the US Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (the Battle Act) of 1951 entailed an array of controls, supervised by the COCOM, on exporting “strategic” commodities to the Soviet Bloc (McGlade, 2005, 47–62). A turning point in Greece’s economic relations with Communist countries was the election of the strongly conservative Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos government in the November 1952 general elections. Since Papagos was the man who had crushed the Communist uprising, he could hardly be accused of having sympathy to the Communist Bloc. The accession to NATO one month earlier calmed down, for some part Greek, insecurities. “Astonishingly”, it was the Papagos administration1952–1955 – albeit not Papagos himself but members of his cabinet- that laid the foundations of a rapprochement between the Greek state and the Communist Bloc. The death of Stalin initiated a new more liberal USSR’s political and economic era and proved conducive for the relaunch of trade relations (Rizas, 2008, pp. 130–142). The work carried out by the European Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which was founded in 1947 in the context of the United Nations with 18 members with the aim of helping the reconstruction of post-war Europe, facilitated the East-­West trade (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1957, 50, 51, 96, 109). In the years after the termination of the Civil war the American Mission in Greece maintained that trade should resume with Communist Yugoslavia, since the USA sought to reinforce Belgrade’s break with Moscow and its binding to the West (Botsiou, 2000, pp. 314–345).

The Economic Factor

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Once Greece engaged into trade transactions with the Soviet Bloc, the overall volume of the trade with Communist countries became a cause of concerns, as it exceeded the psychological threshold of 10% of its total trade volume early on. Since Greece was regarded vulnerable because of its trade balance problems, its NATO allies tolerated the “excessive trade’ with the Eastern Bloc until a certain degree, and only, when the trade increased “excessively”, they wielded pressure on Greek governments to curtail it. The high shares of Greek trade with communist Europe were regarded as an anomaly. In principle, every country that received US economic and/or military assistance had to adhere to the provisions of the Battle Act. However, as the economic assistance declined through time, Greece’s adherence to the Act declined too. Technically, adherence to export controls was not supposed to present any particular problems for Greek trade with the East for various reasons. More importantly, Greece did not produce most of the restricted items under the Battle Act. Yet, the Greek government in some cases prohibited Greek-­flag vessels from carrying strategic items to the Soviet Bloc countries, however what caused concerns, was Greece’s overall reliance on the “East-trade” (Botsas, 1987, pp. 222–224). Indeed, the Communist countries were a very attractive trade partner. Since they counted on their own controlled market, they could determine demand and supply at whim. Hence, they were able to present themselves as deus ex machina to alleviate the hardships of the Greek society. As impoverished Greek farmers were agonisingly grappling with their surpluses, seeking new markets for their products, conservative post-Civil War governments came into the extremely difficult position to justify their anti-Communist stance (Wallden, 1991: 161–183). Given the domestic farmers pressure, unsurprisingly, conservative and hard anti-­ communist governments tentatively chose a “business approach” in this regard. Not rarely, a political paradox occurred in the Greek parliament. Greek right-wing and political centre politicians surpassed left-wing MPs in advertising their efforts to develop economic relations with the Soviet Bloc.1 Since the American officials dealing with Greece were aware of the sensitivity of the issue, Athens tried to take advantage of it. For instance, it exerted efforts to elicit low tariffs on Greek tobacco so that Greek farmers were not forced to deal with Soviet Bloc countries.2 The first agreements on the trade sector with various Communist countries were concluded in 1953. They had the form of clearing agreements and were linked, in some cases, to bank agreements with the same countries. Evidently, the need to achieve surpluses in the balance of payment and the dire farmers economic c­ ondition 1  See some very distinctive examples in: Hellenic Parliament’s Debates and Voting (Praktika Ellinikou Koinovouliou), 1946–1967: November 25, 1964 meeting, speech of Spyros Markezinis; September 15, 1959, speech of Vasileios Efremidis, Stylianos Alamanis, Spyros Merkouris and of the Minister of Trade Leonidas Dertilis; June 10, 1958 meeting: Speech of the Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis. 2  FRUS: vol. XVI, 1961–1963, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, “Memorandum of Conversation. Washington, July 31, 1961”.

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explains why Greece was one of the first Western countries to develop trade relations with the Eastern European countries, despite its staunch anti-Communist foreign policy orientation and its strained political relations with those countries during the Civil War. Greek-Soviet Bloc commercial exchanges increased exponentially within the next five years. Greek Export dependence on Eastern Markets was very high from the early 1950s until the end of the Cold War. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the importance of the Eastern European countries as a source of Greek imports and market for Greek exports increased the most. From 1958 to 1970 the Eastern European share in Greek exports amounted to almost 25% that was among the highest in the West. Exports to Eastern Europe reached a peak in 1966 and then began to decline. Eastern Europe’s share in Total Greek Trade Years Exports 1950–54 6.1% 1955–59 15.8% 1960–64 25.8% 1965–69 24.0% 1970–74 17.2% 1975–79 13.5% 1980–84 10.3% 1985–89 6.5%

Imports 1.8% 8.2% 10.2% 10.0% 6.6% 8.1% 7.2% 6.7%

Total Trade 2.8% 10.4% 14.1% 13.6% 9.6% 9.7% 8.2% 6.7%

Source: Wallden (1993: 309)

In the beginning of the 1960s, Greece found herself depending more on Eastern Europe for export expansion, as the prices of agricultural exports were declining, making it necessary to export greater quantities to pay for the same quantities of imports. In some cases, Greece’s trade with Communist countries increased faster than trade of Greece with the rest of the world. For example, for the period 1959–62, total exports to Yugoslavia equalled exports to France (Botsas, 1987: 220–228). In 1953, Greece signed bilateral trade agreements with Bulgaria and USSR and in 1954 with Romania. The agreement with Bulgaria provided for a trade volume of $1.8 million each year, while the agreement with Romania provided for an analogous $3 million trade volume. Greece exported Tobacco and imported raw materials, energy, and timber (Waldden, 1991, vol. I). The unofficial visit by the USSR Foreign Minister Shepilow in June 1956 to Athens gave the Greek-Russian relations a decisive boost. Numerous agreements across various sectors such as trade, tourism, scientific exchange, exchange of visits of artistic groups, exchange of Mayors visits et al. were signed. This paved the way for similar agreements with other Soviet Bloc countries.3

3  NATO archive: “Confidential note of the Greek delegation to NATO for the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations on exchanges between Greece and Soviet Bloc, July–December 1956, February 5, 1957”.

The Economic Factor

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Of great importance for the Greek-Soviet trade was the bilateral energy cooperation. Though Greece had signed contracts with foreign companies committing itself to buy oil only from West, it simultaneously acquired Soviet oil, as it was cheaper and reduced the country’s import reliance of fossil fuels on big Anglo-American group corporations.4 In the timespan 1956–1959, Athens signed an array of agreements in trade, transport, exchange of technological knowhow and electricity with all the Soviet Bloc countries. Most of these agreements and deals that essentially alleviated Greece’s sales problem, were based on the exchange of goods in return of tobacco and agricultural products. Athens envisaged a closer relationship particularly with Belgrade. The economic cooperation (Karamanlis Published Archive, vol. 4, p. 160), however, though it enabled various transactions and the conclusion of an agreement on free border traffic in 1959, was handicapped by political differences over the Macedonian issue. Greek-Romanian economic relations flourished, especially in the energy field. To the contrary, trade exchanges with Albania remained at a very low level. In 1958, trade agreements were also signed with United Arab Republic (Botsiou, 2000, pp. 348–359). Greece’s economic interactions with East Germany constitute a relevant component of the overall complex of Greek-Eastern European countries economic ties. The conclusion of a bank and trade agreement between the German Central Bank of East Germany and the Bank of Greece in December 1953 marks the advent in the Greece-GDR economic relations. The agreement, which was tacitly renewed for a further two years, followed the pattern of agreements Greece had signed with almost all the Eastern European countries. It stipulated that East Germany would export to Greece capital equipment goods (mechanical and electrical engineering), as well as fertilisers, chemicals, glass and ceramics. Greece, in return, would supply the GDR mainly with agricultural products (tobacco, raisins, figs, oranges etc.). The most important clause of the agreement provided that the GDR, despite not having been recognised by Greece, was allowed to establish a Chamber of Commerce representation in Greece, a semi-official entity available for both East and West Germans. Against the regulations, however, East Berlin staffed clandestinely the chamber representation with diplomatic personnel that was trying to cultivate GDR’s profile as a second equal German state contra to the West German foreign policy. In order to achieve this goal, the GDR presented itself towards Greece as being very generous, thereby suffering enormous losses that it never recouped (Stergiou, 2001, pp. 66–73). In 1956, the Communist states submitted many proposals to the Greek government to participate in various industrial projects in the framework of the Greece’s 5-year upcoming economic plan for the years 1959–1963. These were very ­attractive

4  Report prepared for the Central Committee of KP of the Soviet Union on the discussion between the Soviet Ambassador in Greece, Sergejew, with the Greek Minister for Trade and Industry, Papaligouras, on the development of the Greek-Soviet trade relations November 14, 1957″ (Afinian et al. 2003, pp. 167–170).

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bids, because they could provide capital equipment in return of agricultural products, for which Greece desperately sought a market.5 These proposals resonated very well with various interest groups in Greece, which increasingly pushed for some flexibility and a linkage policy tο the Eastern Bloc. However, and despite the domestic pressure, Karamanlis’ government viewed these overtures as vehicle for Soviet propaganda and rejected all of them with the exception of a deal with Poland, clinched in March 1960, on the construction of a sugar factory by Serres in Northern Greece. According to the deal stipulations, the factory for agricultural products should have been constructed by Poland and paid by Greece (Wallden, 1991, vol. I pp. 136–159). The growing dependency of Greek exports on the trade with the Soviet Bloc gradually caused concerns to the Greek governments, as it threatened the prospects of achieving some form of production quality and competitiveness. Tying the economy to the less developed socialist economies could have profound political and security implications. The excessive and continuing reliance on barter agreements with the Eastern Bloc, as well as the disproportional dependence on Communist countries as trade partners, could be used as an economic and political lever against Greece. Above all, this undermined Prime Minister Karamanlis’ vision of achieving the inclusion of Greece into the European Economic Community (EEC). Karamanlis was convinced that Greece’s association with the European Economic Community had the potential to change the structure of the Greek economy, “freeing” it from the protective walls. Under this protection, Greek manufacturing production was becoming complacent, highly atomistic, inefficient, and oriented towards small scale output. Additionally, thanks to the protective regime, this small output brought high profit margins to enterprises freeing them from the need to make investments and improvements to become more competitive (Botsiou, 2000, pp. 314–359). As Karamanlis pointed out in his letters to the EEC Premiers, Greece was interested in orienting its economy towards the EEC instead of the “easy solution” of exports to the Soviet Bloc, which might easily make Athens economically dependent on the Moscow-led Bloc (Hatzivassiliou, 1995, p. 197). On the other hand, the

5  In 1959, there were rumours that the Soviet Union made a spectacular gesture to Greece in the economic field by offering to buy all Greek agricultural surpluses up to a limit of $100,000,000. The Greek Minister of Commerce Dertilis, however, denied these reports about the Soviet offer, pointing out that the Greek market was unable to absorb industrial products of the Soviet Union in the value of $100,000,000, because there was a consumers’ preference in Greece for products of the free exchange countries. Moreover, Dertilis stated, the Soviet Union could not pay for the products through the construction of large technical projects either, because it had not participated in the competitive international biddings of the Greek State. Nevertheless, the Greek-Soviet trade increased from $2.3 million in 1955 to $17 million in 1958. Greece’ s exports of tobacco to the communist Bloc represented 13.9% of its total tobacco exports. FO 371/152972: Telegram of the Athens Chancery to Southern Department, subject: US President Eisenhower’s visit to Athens January 8, 1960″ (Documents Collection: Greece during the early Cold War: the view from the western archives).

The Economic Factor

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Eastern European Countries considered the prospect of the association of Greece with the EEC as serious potential disruption in their trade relations with Greece.6 Athens’ efforts of entering both the EEC and the European Free Trade Area began in 1956–1957. The Foreign Minister Averof, as well as the director of the Greek Central Bank Zolotas, visited several times the capitals of all EEC members to tout the Greek application. It was a very difficult undertaking, because, as it had been the case with the participation in the defence organisations, the European states were reluctant to engulf Greece into their community of advanced and highly industrialised states.7 Once again, the US support to the Greek application turned out to be very conducive and decisive. The United States strongly advocated the Greek membership in the EEC, since Washington was convinced that Greece’s participation in the European community, whose members were NATO members as well, would strengthen its ties with them and consolidate Greek state finances.8 Greece’s association with the Economic Community in 1961 did not lessen its reliance on trade with the Soviet-led Bloc. In 1965–1966, another round of commercial agreements with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia took place. At that time, Greece inaugurated a new transaction method. Greek exports such as wheat should be paid for in currency and not in products as the clearing agreements had hitherto provided for. Athens also endeavoured to facilitate deals of Greek businessmen in various Soviet Bloc countries such as the building of Greek commercial ships in Soviet docks et al. (Wallden, 1991, vol. I pp. 250–253, 297–302). Soviet trade initiatives with Greece seemed to mirror, both in timing and in scope, similar initiatives undertaken towards Turkey. A typical example of apparent economic duality occurred in October 1964, when it became public that Turkey and the Soviet Union would jointly build a $15 million dam and irrigation project on the Arpa River. Less than a week later Greece and the Soviet Union signed a five-year trade agreement which pledged, among other things, to double the value of their trade by 1969. As détente gained momentum in the 1970s and 1980s boosting East-­ West economic interaction, Soviet economic overtures to Greece and Turkey increased (Myers, 1982, p. 102).

6  Averof Archive: folder 8 Α, sub-folder 33, “Press from Eastern European countries of the year 1961”; HAGFM: Folder 62, Subfolder 10, “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Budapest to the Greek Foreign Ministry in Athens December 3, 1961” Yugoslavs appear to be worried about how Greece’s association with ECC would affect trade with Yugoslavia and the other Communist countries. 7  (Karamanlis published Archive 2005, vol. 4 pp. 162–163, 170–173, 206–208, vol. 5 pp. 108–109, 114); Averof Archive: folder 13A and folder 4A. 8  HAGFM: folder 13Α/2347–2354, “Zolotas’ talks with Dillon and Miner in Washington September and October 1960″, “Telegrams from Zolotas and the Greek Embassy in the United States (Liatis) to the Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Greek Foreign Ministry September 29–October 3, 1960″.

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Political Rapprochements and the New Balance of Power The rapprochement in Greece’s relations with the Eastern Bloc was partly the result of the Western policy in the Balkans and partly the result of the Balkan countries’ efforts to mitigate the Cold War tensions. In the 1950s, despite the prevailing anti-­ Communist political atmosphere, few bourgeois politicians in the Greek political scene (Spyros Markezinis, Giorgos Kartalis, Sofoklis Venizelos, Spyros Merkouris, Stylianos Alamanis) did not share the concerns of an imminent attack from the neighboring Communist countries. They rather argued in favour of a more conciliant policy towards Soviet Bloc, because the prolonged state of emergency against Communism forced the country to over-proportionately focus on its defence than on its social-economic development (Hatzivassiliou, 2009, pp. 139–148). As justified this argumentation may sound, it was, in political terms, out of place at that moment. Nevertheless, in early 1950s Athens decided to follow a course towards the Soviet Bloc that can be regarded as equivalent to French and West German Ostpolitik. In the 1950s and 1960s, Greece’s relationship to the East aimed, namely, at alleviating or mitigating security concerns emanating from the Cold War’s tensions and polarisation in the geo-strategically sensitive Balkan region. However, the normalisation of the Greek-Yugoslavian relations, in the autumn of 1950, was for the most part instigated by the State Department. Apart from the Greek Civil War legacy that burdened the bilateral relations, the two countries had completely different perceptions over the Macedonian region. Yugoslavia had been accusing Greece of depriving the “Macedonian minority” that live in Greece of its cultural heritage. Greece, to the contrary, had steadily been denying the existence of such an ethnical minority (Katsanos, 2013, pp. 23–40). By the end of 1949, the US strategy-makers had concluded that Yugoslavia’s independence vis-à-vis the East could be an asset. Hence, they decided to politically and economically support Tito’s regime to sustain any possible confrontation with the Soviet Union. The State Department estimated that a possible Soviet success in the Moscow-Belgrade dispute could overthrow the balance of power in the region, endangering Greece’s and Italy’s position. Thanks to the American support, Belgrade received generous loans from the International Bank in 1949, while US and British officials started exercising pressure on Athens to proceed into a political rapprochement with Belgrade as soon as possible (Stefanidis, 1986, pp. 327–330). Bulgaria’s policy in Balkans proved very conducive for the Greece-Yugoslavian rapprochement. In early 1950s, frontier incidents and artillery duels frequently took place between the Greek and the Bulgarian armies. By that time, any reasonable forecast would suggest that these tensions would once more escalate into a series of regional conflicts (Hatzivassiliou, 2012, pp.  519–521). Moreover, by 1952, the Bulgarians began raising claims on Greek Macedonia. As the Bulgarian propaganda intensified, so Greece was pushed closer to Yugoslavia. Belgrade’s fears of a Soviet-­ Bulgarian-­Albanian encirclement also drew Yugoslavia closer to Greece (Veremis, 1982, pp. 6–9).

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NATO allies’ sponsorship also was crucial for the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, concluded in 1953 in Ankara between Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, followed up by a Military Alliance signed in 1954 in Bled. The treaty provided for the establishment of a Permanent Secretariat for the Foreign Ministers’ conferences. The Western backing of the tripartite Balkan military cooperation relied on the assumption, that this kind of cooperation could enhance stability in the Balkans, alleviate some of the traditional security fears, thereby mitigating to some extent the lack of a NATO robust defence in the region.9 As the British embassy in Athens observed at the time, the Soviets attempted to capitalise on this tripartite cooperation, by launching a “peace” offensive towards Greece. In October 1953, the Soviet government replaced its Charge d’ Affaires in Athens with a very active and uninhibited Ambassador. The new Ambassador, immediately after his arrival, assiduously wooed (particularly with fair words about trade prospects) both, polite society and trade business community, as well as anyone else in Greece whom he could influence. At the same time, all the Soviet Union’s satellites were ordered to play their part in support of the Soviet drive. Bulgaria offered, through the United Nations, to open discussions about the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, the indefinite nature of which, along the Evros River, had given rise to many incidents in the past and to resume the broken bilateral diplomatic relations. The Romanians also offered to resume their broken relations with Greeks, whereas the Albanians made the overture to open discussions on the pending issue of the Greco-Albanian borders. Since there was still a state of war between Albania and Greece, talks could be held only at the level of military commanders.10 The second pillar of the tripartite cooperation, the military Alliance between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, envisaged by the Bled Treaty, aimed at the formation of a common front for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea from Soviet expansion. Yugoslavia, however, was reluctant to go ahead with this aspirational course, fearing a Soviet response. Belgrade was rather focused on economic and cultural relations. Therefore, although the Balkan Consultative Assembly was founded, it never convened. The Permanent Council met by rotation in Belgrade (1954), in Ankara (1955), in Athens (1956) and again in Belgrade (1957) without any tangible results. The Balkan Institute, despite being envisaged in the treaty, it was never created. Suggestions to organise common military exercises, to establish a common Balkan Chamber of Commerce and to collaborate in nuclear research, remained unfulfilled. Shortly after its conclusion, the Balkan Pact was practically void, but no party was willing to denounce it (Sfetas, 2012, pp. 194–195).

9  FRUS: vol. VIII 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Document No. 306, “Telegram of the Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) to the Department of State February 10, 1952”; Document No. 307, “Telegram of the Acting Secretary of State (Webb) to the Embassy in Turkey to Washington, February 13, 1952; Document No. 308, “Telegram of the Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, May 6, 1952″; Document No. 309, “Telegram of the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State, Belgrade, June 6, 1952″; Document No. 419, “Telegram of the Chargé in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State, February 7, 1952″ 10  FO 476/8, “Greece Annual review for 1953”.

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Regardless of the Balkan Pact, Athens and Belgrade, boosted by NATO, developed in the 1950s and 1960s close relations in several fields. Yugoslavia became the only Communist country, which Greece established military ties with.11 In 1959, the two countries established a zone of free movement, stretching 10 kilometres on both sides of the common borders. Tito’s policy regarding the Yugoslavian Federal Republic of Macedonia was a permanent barrier. Especially its gambit to gather the so-called Slav-Macedonians, who hitherto had lived stray in the various Eastern European countries, within the Federal Republic of Macedonia, infuriated Athens.12 All Greek governments strongly believed that this move was intended to transform this federal part of Yugoslavia into some sort of Piedmont of the “Slav-Macedonian nation” (Sfetas, 2018, pp. 99–119). Unless this issue was somehow settled or singled out from the general context of the bilateral relations, no rapprochement between the two countries could materialize. For this reason, the Greek-Yugoslavian Foreign Ministers, Averof-Popov, Gentlemen Agreement in 1962 freezed the Macedonian Question, which had seriously strained Athens-Belgrade relationship (Michailidis, 2008, pp. 267–284). The Center Union party administration (1963–1965), led by Giorgos Papandreou, took advantage of this agreement and dramatically fostered Greek-Yugoslavian ties. Rhetorically at least, the Center Union party was more well-disposed to an opening with the East, than the previous conservative governments under Konstantinos Karamanlis and Alexandros Papagos (1952–1955). Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou himself, despite his fervent anti-Communist slant, had argued in favour of better relations with the Soviet Bloc. Nonetheless, to a large extent, the Centre Union government followed the pattern of the previous government: the détente policy was relied on NATO solidarity and the integration in the European Economic Community (Hatzivassiliou, 2013, pp. 485–486). Nevertheless, Papandreou’s administration instigated some important qualitative and quantitative changes in Greece’s relations with the Eastern Europe indicating a real Ostpolitik. Athens-Belgrade relations, in particular, benefited a lot from this opening to the East. Amid heavy reactions by the conservative opposition, due to the still unresolved Macedonian Question, an array of low politics agreements were signed this period, while, in February 1965, Papandreou paid a state visit to Belgrade (Katsanos, 2013, pp. 310–325). The Greek-Bulgarian relations in this period are of inordinate importance. Athens and Sofia decided in 1954 to establish diplomatic relations at the level of

 In 1953, NATO decided to equip Yugoslavia with f-86 type aircraft. It also contemplated to equip Greece and Italy with the same aircrafts mainly for political reasons. In the next years Greece and Yugoslavia tentatively forged a military cooperation under the auspices of NATO. Lauris Norstad papers, message series box 39 (January 1954) “Telegram of Tunner to Norstad re aircraft to Italy, Greece and Turkey”; Norstad Collection, box 63: “Correspondence between Dovas (National Defence General Staff) and Norstad in the years 1956–1957”. 12  Tsatsos papers: Folder 56, Subfolder 5, “Greek intelligence service’s and Greek Gendarmerie’s reports on Tito’s plan to scrape together Slav-Macedonians to the region near on the Greek Borders (1957)”. 11

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Chargé d’ Affairs, but not of Ambassadors. The political rapprochement with Bulgaria, however, was more thorny than this with Yugoslavia, due to the mutual lack of trust and the burdened legacy of the past.13 Athens’ mistrust derived mainly from Bulgaria’s post-war rearmament in defiance of the 1947 Peace Treaty, due to which the Bulgarian army attained an overwhelming supremacy in manpower, tanks and artillery. Bulgaria’s refusal to pay reparations to Greece, according to the same Treaty stipulations, further aggravated that mistrust. Bulgaria was perceived as the main threat for country’s security in the 1950 and 1960s, while the reparations issue was the main snag of all Greek– Bulgarian negotiations throughout this whole period. The pending reparation issue also prompted Athens’ rejection of the Sofia’s proposal for the conclusion of a non-­ aggression pact in August 1957 (Stefanidis, 2002, pp. 101–104). In addition to these two main issues, there were also other points of frictions in the bilateral relations such as the disputed islets on the River Evros in Thrace. This dispute caused repeatedly frontier incidents, the most important of which led to an artillery conflict in July 1952. A new artillery battle took place in March 1953 (Yearbooks of the United Nations, 1952, p. 291; Yearbooks of the United Nations, 1953, 245–249). These were very dangerous incidents, since they invoked direct engagement of NATO and Soviet-Bloc forces. A few months later, Athens proposed the set-up of a mixed commission which would redraw the frontier line. The Bulgarians in a “peace offensive” strategy accepted the proposal, consenting to the establishment of a special commission. Sofia’s move was a clever response to regional developments. While the Bulgarian army was the cause of deep concern in Athens, Sofia on its part had to deal with its own security fears. The February 1953, the tripartite Greek– Turkish–Yugoslav pact had placed Bulgaria in a strategic disadvantage. Hence, in early September 1953, Sofia proposed, as already mentioned, via the UN, the full normalisation of relations with Greece and Yugoslavia. Athens was suspicious that this move aimed at hampering the ongoing Greek–Turkish–Yugoslav détente, but eventually decided to partially accept the proposal, i.e. to establish the first level of bilateral relations and to assume negotiations on the reparations issue (Hatzivassiliou, 2006, pp. 45–46). The negotiations finally led to a result in 1964, when the two countries did proceed into the full normalisation of their relations with the signing of 12 agreements, settling all pending bilateral issues included the reparation issue. The bilateral agreements covered virtually all types of economic activities such as the use of waters of the rivers running through the territories of the both countries, long-term trade and shipping, railway and road transportation, on postal communication and telecommunications et al. (Hatzivassiliou, 2004, p. 153).

 Greek authorities closely followed Greek Civil War refugees’ activities in Bulgaria, because they were suspicious that they were trained to take on military or espionage activities against the Greek State. Tsatsos papers: Folder 56, Subfolder 5, “Report on Greek refugees’ activities by the Greek Consul in the Bulgarian City Plovdiv to the Greek Foreign Ministry July 23, 1957″.

13

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The settlement of the reparation issue, however, obliging Bulgaria to the payment of just $7 million, was far from satisfying for the Greek side that had been claiming $45 million in value of 1938 (Perrakis, 1994, pp. 546–547). The normalisation of the bilateral relations necessitated an official statement by Bulgaria, that Sofia did not have any territorial claims over Greece. This statement was a crucial development, as Greeks had agonizingly but unsuccessfully, sought since 1919 to remove the poisonous problem of territorial claims from the picture. Sotiris Rizas believes that Bulgaria’s economic predicament at the time played an important role in the successful outcome of the negotiations (Rizas, 2006, pp. 127–128). The extend of Greece’s security concerns against Bulgaria is showcased in Greece’s Prime Minister Georg Papandreou’s complains to the American Officials in the period of rapprochement. They were summarized in the fact that any reduction of the American Military assistance and economic Aid would adversely affect Greece’s defence position vis-à-vis Bulgaria.14 Predictably, Athens-Moscow ties were the barometer and the litmus test of Greece’s relations with the whole Soviet Bloc. It was a multifaceted relationship linked to many challenges and critical issues. For most of the 1950s, the Soviet embassy in Athens followed, as a contemporary observer noted the so-called “diplomacy of smiling” (Höpker, 1957, p. 724). This was not enough to eliminate the fundamental mistrust of the post-Civil War governments towards Moscow. Greek political elites were convinced that there was a clear interdependence between the Soviet foreign policy and the Greek domestic politics. Athens permanently complained to the Soviets about Greek political refugees in the Soviet Union and Soviet support to the then illegal Greek Communist party or to the legal EDA party.15 Even after the end of the Greek Civil War, the bilateral relations were soured by various incidents. In 1952, the Greek Government decided to restrict the movements of official Soviet representatives in Greece as a response to the Soviet government’s decision to restrict the movement of Greek official representatives in the Soviet Union.16 Athens had to maintain a balance it its relations with Moscow. It was in desperate need of the Soviet market for Greek agricultural products (Greek exports to the Soviet Union increased from $2.2 in 1955 to $11,7 in 1959 and the imports from the  NARA: RG 59 Political Affairs and Relations, “Senator J.W.  Fulbright visit to Greece and Turkey May 6–8, 1964”. 15  HAGFM: folders relating Greece and USSR (1953–1956), folder 26, subfolder 4, “Telegrams of the Greek Embassy in Moscow to the Greek Foreign Ministry in Athens (Kontoumas) November 1955”; “Report on a talk between Greek Foreign Minister Averoff and Soviet Ambassador Sergeef in Athens March 30, 1956”; Averoff complained to Sergeef about Moscow’s support to the Greek Communist party, whereas Sergeef replied that Moscow did not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs. Sergeef also complained about Athens’ refusal to allow the overfly of 20 Soviet airplanes on their flight to Egypt. 16  NATO archive: “Note by the Executive Secretary on restrictions on movements of Soviet nationals in Greece March 24, 1952”. 14

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Soviet Union to Greece $1,9 to $15,9 in 1959)17 and Soviet support in the United Nations on the Cyprus problem. Concurrently, it was extremely annoyed by the Soviet support to EDA and the repeated attacks on Greece by the Soviet state-­ controlled press.18 Greece’s governments were also displeased by the Soviet reluctance to facilitate the repatriation of some political refugees, living in Tashkent at that time. Although the Greek state had banned the repatriation of the overwhelming majority of exiled political refugees, also depriving them of their Greek citizenship, there was a small portion of political refugees whose repatriation was desirable. According to the Greek authorities’ estimations, there were 350 Greek soldiers and military officers, who could be repatriated. 140 of them were prisoners taken during the Civil War by the Communist partisans, while the rest had defected to the leftist guerillas. By pronouncing them war prisoners, Athens attempted to achieve their repatriation, through the United Nations. However, this was very problematic in legal terms, as the two countries had never been in a state of war. This complicated the repatriation of other refugees as well. The only category of refugees whose return was out of question were the Slavophones who had been accused of collaboration with the occupation forces during the World War II.19 According to the former General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party Nikos Zachariadis, the USSR did not allow the registration of the Greek refugees as political refugees by the international organisations, and this resulted in the peculiar situation, in which the Greeks were living in the USSR as political refugees without the rights of political refugees (Papaioannou, 1986, pp. 60–61). The repatriation issue remained troublesome for the decades that followed. Between 1955–1963, the Greek state passed 135 laws and decrees, depriving many political refugees of their Greek citizenship. For decades, Greek political refugees struggled against all odds, occasionally against the Communist party leadership as well, to attain the right to return to their country, and to regain the Greek citizenship they had been deprived. Gradually their number increased, as many of them raised their own families in exile and sought to achieve repatriation for all family members. Nonetheless, until 1974, with the exception of some cases, all Greek governments refused a general amnesty and repatriation of the refugees. Their long stay in exile attracted the interest of many prominent personalities, intellectuals, artists and others, who made public pleas for their repatriation (Vamvouri, 2007, pp. 491–494; Stergiou, 2018, pp. 122–123). In July 1953, Kremlin announced that the Soviet diplomatic representation in Greece was to be upgraded from the charge d’ affaires level to the Ambassadorial status. In 1955, Moscow launched a more comprehensive “peace offensive” towards  HAGFM: folder 63, sub-folder 7 (1961), “Greek Ministry of Trade’s report to the Greek Foreign Ministry on Greek-Soviet relations 1955–1959 February 2, 1961”. 18  HAGFM: folders relating Greek-Soviet relations (1960–1961): folder 62, subfolder 2, Part 1, “Averof’s report on his conversation with Soviet Ambassador Sergeev December 6, 1960”. 19  HAGFM: folder relating Greek-Russian relations, “Internal Report of the Greek Foreign Ministry on pending issues in the Greek-Soviet relations (1956)”. 17

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Greece. Beside the trade offers and deals, the Soviet Union invited mumerous groups of artists to visit Soviet festivals. In that year, the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church Spyridon was invited by the Russian Patriarch Alexios to pay a 2-week visit to Moscow, but Spyridon declined the invitation. The Athenian Academy of Science declined another offer by the Moscow Science Academy to send a delegate to the Atomic Energy Conference in July 1955 in Moscow.20 In 1956, Khrushchev instigated officially his new foreign policy course in alignment with the favoured Soviet theme of peaceful coexistence.21 In this context, he seemingly tried to improve the image of the Soviet Union in many regions, including the Balkans. Towards Greece, Kremlin apparently decided to follow a carrot and stick policy, with the obvious desire to lure it as far away as possible from the influence of the United States.22 Greece was identified by the Soviet Party leadership as a particularly promising target for such an undertaking, as it was believed that Greek national sensitivities and security concerns could be easily manipulated or stirred up. On one hand, as it will be showcased in the next chapter, the Soviet Union supported Greek positions pertaining Cyprus in the United Nations. On the other hand, as it was the case in the official letter of the formal leader of the Soviet government, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. Bulganin, to the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis in December 1957, Moscow unmistakably warned Athens that …NATO leadership’s intentions to convert Greece into an unsinkable aircraft carrier may convert the country into a battlefield... This message was reinforced in January 1958, when Bulganin delivered a second letter to Karamanlis, very much along the same lines (Ulunyan, 2003, p. 48). The Soviet warnings came on the heels of some “peace attacks” that had taken place some months ago, in the context of the Soviet Foreign Minister Sepilov’s visit in Athens. Sepilov conveyed several Soviet bids for economic cooperation and assured Greek Foreign Minister Averoff, that Moscow wished a détente and for that reason actually opposed the Bagdad pact and NATO. Sepilov also handed over an official invitation to Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff to visit Moscow. The Greek government, that was looking with suspicion at the Soviet overtures, accepted the invitation, posing, nevertheless, conditions which equated to a mild rebuff: it agreed to go “only after certain progress has been achieved in the

 RG 59: Records of the Department of State relating to internal affairs of Greece 1955–1959, “Dispatches from US army department in Greece to the Department of State June 21 and 25, 1955”. 21  In the Soviet discourse the term of “peaceful coexistence” was construed as a means to foster the transition of the West to Communism without a global war and to give the Communist Bloc the chance to demonstrate its alleged superiority over the Capitalist West. 22  In 1958 Greek authorities received information about scenarios circulated by Soviet diplomats in various countries that a radical change in Greece’s external orientation towards neutralism was imminent: Triantafyllakos papers: “Note on unclassified information by the Greek Military Attaché in Paris, July 2, 1958”. 20

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way of a fuller understanding between Greece and the Soviet Union”.23 Apparently, Athens feared a political exploitation of the visit by Kremlin. As a matter of fact, when in Spring 1959, Spyros Markezinis, an influential political figure of the political center-right spectre, visited Moscow, the Soviet side tried to exploit it. Markezinis received Moscows’ public criticism on the Greeks who “behaved themselves more American than the Americans themselves”. He also was reminded of how important was to remove US nuclear weapons from Greece and to expand the bilateral commercial exchanges. In the autumn of 1959, Markezinis published an article in Pravda, in which he floated the idea that the so-called small nations had a significant role in European security and disarmament. The article was construed as pro-Russian (Ulunyan, 2008, pp. 398–399). The carrot-stick policy was intensified in the wake of Karamanlis administration’ decision to set up American guided nuclear missile bases on Greek soil. In this respect, Soviet and Moscow satellite states’ propaganda pressed the Greeks to accept the proposals for regional denuclearisation and a meeting of Balkan heads of government on this issue. On the other hand, they attacked the Greek Government for accepting the nuclear missiles as “out of step with the spirit of the times”. On the question of denuclearisation, Athens, however, counter-argued, that as long as Balkans could still be bombed from Soviet territory, was not interested in removing missile bases or atomic bombs from the country.24 Therefore, and given the fact that the US-assistance had already been trimmed, the Greek Governments steadily endeavoured to convince its allies, and particularly the United States, of their obligation to assist the country. Athens’ argument was that Greece was one of the main targets of Soviet and communist pressure and hence it was in a particularly exposed position.25 Apart from the interstate relations, Moscow sought at the same time to gain influence in the society. In this respect, Soviet Ambassador Sergeev’s active “charm diplomacy” in Athens proved very fruitful. Spreading anti-Western feelings in the Greek society, triggered by Western countries’ attitude to the Cyprus issue, pro HAGFM: folders relating Greek-Russian relations in 1956: “Exchange of telegrams between the Greek foreign ministry and the Greek Embassy in Moscow (Greek Ambassador Kontoumas) April–July 1956 regarding the Sepilov’s visit”. On 13 July 1956 Averof send an official letter to the foreign ministries of Western countries on Sepilov’s visit informing them that Sepilov’s visit was unofficial. Averof also informed Greece’s allies that his government did not intend to sever ties with West because of its trade relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet support to Greek petitions in the United Nations. 24  FO 371/144519, “Sir Roger Allen (Embassy Athens) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office) Subject: Greek political troubles Athens, December 5, 1959”: In Documents Collection: Greece during the early Cold War the view from the western archives. 25  FO 371/152972, “Athens Chancery to Southern Department. Subject: President Eisenhower’s visit to Athens, Athens, January 8, 1960” (Documents Collection: Greece during the early Cold War the view from the western archives); HAGFM: folders relating the Greek-American Relations: folder 11, subfolder 5, “Telegram of the Greek Military mission in Washington to the Greek Foreign Ministry regarding US military assistance September 1, 1961”: The American Military officials are reluctant to provide gratis assistance but only loans. However, they were ready to borrow or to gift some destroyers and naval vessels to the Greek navy. 23

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vided fertile ground for it. A prominent British Conservative Party politician wrote to the British Secretary of State in 1957, rounding up his impressions from a recent visit in Greece, that: …there is an apparent pro-Russian feeling in Greek politics. Russian goods are displayed in central streets, while there is a new anti-Western and anti-British trend in the newspapers. For example, although the Americans have poured many millions of dollars into Greece and the country is full of permanent examples of the help this money has been, the press openly insults America. The message of most of the newspapers seems to be that Greece’s friends are not America, Britain and France, but Egypt and Russia. They show the greatest interest and sympathy for Egypt and Nasser and the 80.000 Greeks living in Egypt but they do not show any interest in the hundreds of thousands of Greeks who have emigrated to Commonwealth countries or America and flourished there….26 In 1959, after the conclusion of the agreement for the installation and storage of nuclear weapons in Greece, Soviet Bloc’s policy towards the country began to radicalise. This was manifested in various borders incidents, espionage activities and continuous press attacks against the Greek state, in successive notes from USSR Bulgaria and Romania to Athens, as well as some very threatening and aggressive statements made by Khrushchev during his visit in Albania. The pressure was so high, that the US embassy in Athens urged the Secretary of State, who was at the time in Geneva, to visit Athens, even if inevitably of few hours, to reaffirm US interest and support for Greece “in this hour of heavy tribulation”.27 Once again, the Karamanlis government asked, more intensely this time, the United States for economic and military assistance to contain “Soviet Union’s and its satellites’ aggression” (Karamanlis Published archive, 1997: vol. 4: 223–229 and 298–299, vol 5: 45–47 and 121–12). Despite Athens’s efforts to reassure Eastern European countries of its adherence to its hitherto trade policy, Greece’s association with the European Economic Community,28 as well as the controversial general elections of 1961, regarded as rigged by the political center and left- wing opposition, further strengthened Eastern European states’ offensive course against Greece. Communist countries’ press launched continuous assaults to the Greek government, depicting Greece as US-German protectorate and a “subsidiary of German militarism”, that stockpiled nuclear weapons, suppressed the opposition parties and violated basic human rights. The offensive stance was also evident in gatherings of all Socialist countries, in which demonstrations against the foreign and domestic policy of Karamanlis’ government took place.29  Colonial Office documents in the Public Record Office (henceforth CO): CO 926/594, “Letter by Sir George Harvie-Watt to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1957”. 27  FRUS: vol. X, part 2, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe. Finland, Greece, Turkey, “Telegram of the Embassy in Greece to the Secretary of State Herter, at Geneva June 1, 1959”. 28  HAGFM: folders relating Greek-Russian relations (1961): folder 62, “Greek Foreign Ministry advises the Greek Embassies in the Eastern Bloc countries to assure the local governments that there will be a continuity in the trade policy, February 23, 1961”. 29  HAGFM: folders relating Greek-Soviet Relations: folder 62, “Report by the 1th Political Directorate on the Greek-Soviet relations January 21, 1961”; “Greek foreign ministry’s internal 26

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Concurrently, the Greek Foreign Ministry and the Greek embassies in the Eastern European countries received demarches and complaints about the “hysteric, anti-­ Communist and anti-Soviet attacks of the Greek press and Athens’ obedient support’ to NATO’s aggressive policies”. Athens, on its part, was increasingly worried where this pressure would end up in, and whether this was the prelude of a bigger attack or not. Very disconcerting was for Greek foreign policy-makers the Khrushchev’s statement at the Soviet-Romanian friendship meeting in August in November 1961. Khrushchev was reported to have threatened that, “if the US imperialists and Adenauer unleashed a war, Moscow should not hesitate to strike at the military bases of the North-Atlantic Bloc stationed in Greece. In that case, the responsibility, Khrushchev stated, would lie with those who jeopardised cities, peoples and historical monuments”.30 Athens believed that in the event of a Soviet attack Moscow would not hesitate to weaponize Greek political refugees against Greece.31 Turkey experienced an analogous carrot-and stick policy from the USSR, i.e. polemical warnings combined with proposals of mutual disarmament and cooperation.32 The tensions with the Soviet Bloc lasted until the end of 1964, even after the government change in Greece in 1963. Despite its previous declarations over an opening to the East, the new, more left-leaning Papandreou’s government, in its first year in power, was very skeptical about the détente between the two great powers. As the predecessor government, it also feared that this could lead to a departure of the US commitment to the safeguard of Greece’s security.33 Gradually, however, and parallel to the improvement of the Soviet-Turkish relations, Athens-Moscow rela-

report in the Greek-Soviet relations March 9, 1961; sub-folder 10, part 2: “Report of the Greek Press Bureau in Jerusalem to the Greek Foreign Ministry, January 30, 1961″: Soviet sources indicate that the attacks of the Soviet press against the “pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi government” in Greece will continue; Sub-folder 9, “Telegrams from the Greek Embassy in Moscow to the Greek Foreign Ministry March–November 20, 1961″: The embassy estimated that the repeated attacks of Moscow, the KKE and the KKE were part of an integrated plan to topple the democratic governments in Western countries”; folders relating Greek-Soviet Relations 1961–1963: folder 41, subfolder 8, “Telegrams from Greek Embassies in Eastern European countries to the Greek Foreign Ministry December 1961″. 30  HAGFM: folder 62, sub-folder 9 and folder 63, sub-folder 1, “Exchange of telegrams between the Greek Foreign Ministry and the Greek Embassy in Moscow, October–December 1961”. 31  HAGFM: folders relating Greece’s relations with Balkan neighbours and the USSR: folder 44, sub-folder 6 and 9, “exchange of telegrams between the Greek Embassies in Eastern Europe and Greek Foreign Ministry in the last months of 1961 and the first months of 1962”. The Greek embassy received the information from Turks that Communist guerillas had gathered in the GreekAlbanian borders. HAGFM Central Department: Folder 62, Sub-folder 3 and 4, “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Ankara to the Greek Foreign Ministry July 3, 1961”. 32  HAGFM: Central Department: Turkish-Soviet Relations, Folder 9, Sub-folder 2, “Cables from Greek Embassy in Ankara to Athens 1957–1958”. 33  HAGFM: folders relating East-West relations: folder 30, sub-folder 1, “Telegrams from the Greek Representation to NATO to the Greek Foreign Ministry February–November1964”. Warsaw Pact’s military drills, in particular, in the region around Greece seem to have heavily unsettled Athens.

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tionship warmed up, partly because Kremlin adopted a new foreign policy doctrine, e.g. the famous Lenin’s principle of peaceful coexistence.34 The bilateral trade volume increased and the cultural and educational exchange intensified. In early March of 1965, the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou accepted a Soviet invitation to visit Moscow, as many Western leaders had already done. However, the planned trip could not sustain strong reactions from the opposition and the United States and it was, eventually, cancelled (Drakoularakos, 1989, pp. 70–72). In the very same period, Athens’ relationship with East-Germany was of great significance in the overall Soviet Bloc’s policy towards Greece. As it has been already mentioned, in the burden sharing among the Western powers West Germany took over significant obligations towards Greece post-war reconstruction. The Greek-German economic and political collaboration lent West Germany a privileged status in Greece that could be threatened by the emergence and establishment of East Germany as a second legitimate German State. Indeed, until the beginning of the 1970s, the primary aim of East Berlin diplomacy was to present the country as independent internationally, and to break through the diplomatic isolation imposed by the Federal Republic of Germanys Hallstein Doctrine. The latter asserted that the FDR would suspend diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the GDR as a legitimate international entity. In early 1950s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR (MfAA) began to target countries, in which it believed could gain influence, paving tentatively the way for the normalisation of the bilateral diplomatic relations. Best suited to this purpose were the states of the third world, but these were generally regarded as insignificant. More importance was attached to the capitalist countries of the European continent. East German diplomacy particularly focused on two NATO members of the Western Bloc. These were Iceland and Greece, because of the flexible stance they had towards the NATO Travel Board Agreement in first place.35 Moreover, and in full compliance with the Soviet Bloc’s policy in the region, East Berlin targeted Greece because of: a) its precarious position within the NATO Alliance due to its confrontation with Turkey on Cyprus, and b) its severe deficit on the balance of trade with Western capitalist countries (Stergiou, 2001). In collaboration with the Greek left-wing parties, East-Berlin endeavoured to capitalise on some very sensitive issues within the Greek society.36 For example, it  HAGFM: folder 80, subfolder 5 and folder 89, subfolder 2 (Greek-Soviet and Turkish-Soviet relations1964–1967): “Exchange of telegrams between the Greek Foreign Ministry and the Greek Embassies in Moscow and Ankara”. 35  Unlike the other Western countries, Iceland and Greece did not demand from East German diplomats to prove their identity at the allied travel board. In this way, the East Germans were not compelled to accept the discriminating designation “Presumed German” in their travel documents, as they had to do at all Western travel boards in order to pass through. Admittedly, Greece formally upheld this regulation that had been imposed by NATO. In practice, however, Greek authorities looked away and allowed East Germans to enter the country using their “German” identity. 36  Federal Archive in Koblenz, Federal Chancellor Office of the Federal Republic of Germany: Folder 5, document cluster 3, Foreign Affairs B 136: “General Hans Speidel’s report to Federal Diplomatic and Military Mission in France regarding Greek Queen’s official visit to Federal Republic in July 1958”. 34

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systematically stirred up the issue of War reparations and the insufficient or even reluctant persecution of former Nazi War criminals by the Greek Law enforcement authorities. “Paradoxically”, Greece had been one of the first formerly Nazi-occupied countries to vehemently pursue post-war reconciliation with West Germany. With regard to anticipated economic benefits, post-war normalisation of Greek-German relations started with the reopening of Greece’s general consulate in Bonn and Germany’s consulate in Athens in March and December 1950 respectively. Both consulates were upgraded to embassies in the spring of 1951. This paved the way for an unprecedent economic cooperation that, at the time, was of existential importance to the Greek economy still facing the daunting challenges of post-War II and post-Civil War reconstruction (Karamanlis published Archive, 1997: vol. 3, pp. 271, 297–302). The Cold War rearranged priorities for both countries, forcing them to put the resolution of “unpleasant” issues from the past on hold, leaving ethical questions aside. The Greek authorities did little to pursue legal proceedings against wartime criminals and to punish war crimes. War crime courts were quicker to abandon their mission than anywhere else in Europe, while “over-conscientious” prosecutors were transferred to provincial postings to keep them away from the capital. The payment of German reparations was shelved as well. In return, Greece secured German investments and loans that were vital for the recovery of Greece’s ailing post-war economy. For that reason, and with the generous help of East-Berlin that provided archival documents and economic support, the left-wing parties in Greece attacked the post-­ war governments for “servile” attitude towards Bonn. They also conducted targeted and skilful propaganda for the benefit of the GDR, with the aim of revealing “the imperialist foreign policy of the German Federal Republic, which opposed peaceful, proletarian East German political practice” (Stergiou, 2017). The relations with Albania, with which a state of war existed since 1940, remained almost non-existed in the 1950s, as the various Greek governments took a tougher line towards the Communist regime in Tirana. There were several issues poisoning the bilateral relations: the Moslem and Albanian speaking minority of Chams that had been evicted from Greece in the 1940s, Greece’s claims on North Epirus and the status of the Greek minority in Albania. In the 1050s, sporadic fights in the common borders between Greek and Albanian soldiers still continued. At the same time, the United States and Great Britain used Greece as basis for organising subversive activities against the Communist regime in Tirana (Michailidis, 2018, pp. 87–89). In the 1950s, Athens instantly repudiated Albanian proposals, submitted via the United Nations, to Greece on border cooperation. Greece’s rejectionist stance was based on the absence of a peace treaty and the unsettled issues in the bilateral relations. Greek Political elites were still under the misimpression that the “Northern Epirus” (South Albania) issue could be reexamined in favour of Greece’s claims on that region. Thus, the two sides barely managed to work out an agreement on clearing mines from the Corfu straits in 1958, followed up by a gesture of good will by

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the Albanian regime in 1963 to grant permission to 123 persons of the Greek minority living in North Epirus to visit Greece (Malkidis, 2007, pp. 140–141). The Greek-Romanian relations unfolded in very different way. Though fully normalised since 1956, the bilateral relations were strained by the Romanian Prime Minister plan, announced in September 1957, to ban nuclear weapons from the Balkans and to establish a nuclear-free zone in the region. In June 1959, Bucharest came up with a more explicit proposition on the denuclearisation of the Balkans, which was this time strongly but diplomatically supported by the Soviets. Greece followed on this issue NATO that dismissed the Romanian proposals as propagandistic and hypocritical. NATO regarded as paramount to deploy nuclear means for countervailing Soviet conventional forces, as well as the threats posed by long-­ range tactical nuclear weapons deep in the Soviet Union (Valinakis, 1987, pp. 184–185). The Romanian proposition, however, fueled an intense political confrontation inside Greece, as the left-leaning party EDA extensively used it repeatedly against the Karamanlis government. In 1964, the Georgios Papandreou government, in the context of its opening to the East, initiated again talks with Romania with the aim of settling bilateral, economic differences (Rizas, 2013, p. 67). The fact that the Greek Communist party’s headquarters in exile was in Bucharest and a big amount of Greek political refugees still lived in Romania were additional points of friction. These obstacles in the Greek-Romanian relations could be removed only after the split of the Greek Communist party and its departure from Romania. This was to take place during the military dictatorship in Greece, in 1968, and to unleash developments that no one could predict at the time.

References Afinian, V., Kontis, V., Papoulidis, K., Prozoumechicov M., Smirnova, D., & Tomilina N. (Eds.). (2003). Sovietiki Enosi kai Valkania stis Dekaeties 1950 kai 1960, Sillogi Eggrafon [Soviet Union and Balkans in the 1950s and 1960s, collection of documents] Federal Archive Service of the Russian Federation and institute for Balkan studies. Thessaloniki, Greece: Paratiritis Publisher. Botsas, E. (1987). Greece and the East: The trade connection, 1851–1984. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 5(2), 207–235. Botsiou, K. (2000). Griechenlands Weg nach Europa. Von der Truman-Doktrin bis zur Assoziierung mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1947–1961. Frankfurt am Main, Germany/ Berlin, Germany: Peter Lang. Delivanis, D. (1961). Die Probleme der Zahlungsbilanz und die außenwirtschaftliche Integration Griechenlands. In R. Vogel (Ed.), Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Südosteuropas (pp. 544–560). München, Germany: Südosteuropa. Drakoularakos, G. (1989). Ellada kai Anatoliki Evropi 1967–1987 [Greece and Eastern Europe 1967–1987]. Athens, Greece/Komotini, Greece: Sakkoulas Publisher. Eliades, E. (1954). Stabilization of the Greek economy and the 1953 devaluation of the drachma. Staff Papers of the International Monetary Fund, 4(1), 22–72. Hatzivassiliou, E. (1995). Security and the European option: Greek foreign policy, 1952–62. Journal of Contemporary History, 30, 187–202.

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Hatzivassiliou, E. (2004). Negotiating with the enemy: The normalization of Greek–Bulgarian relations, 1960–1964. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 4(1), 140–161. Hatzivassiliou, E. (2006). Greece and the Cold War: Frontline state, 1952–1967. London: Routledge. Hatzivassiliou, E. (2009). Sofoklis Venizelos: Mia enallaktiki protasi gia tin exoteriki politiki, 1953–1963. In T.  Sakelaropoulos, & E.  Hatzivassiliou (Eds.), Sofoklis Venizelos. I Politiki Diadromi. To prosopo. I epochi [The political career, the person, the era] (pp.  139–157). Athens, Greece: Museum of Benaki and Eleftherios Venizelos foundation. Hatzivassiliou, E. (2012). Revisiting NATO’s stabilizing role in southeastern Europe: The Cold War experience and the longue durée. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 12(4), 515–531. Hatzivassiliou, E. (2013). Geopolitics, vulnerability and populism. Greece’s failure to pursue a comprehensive Ostpolitik 1959–1972. Thetis, 20, 476–486. Höpker, W. (1957). Griechenland im Blickfeld Moskaus. Osteuropa, 7(10), 721–726. Katsanos, K. (2013). To “Anyparkto Zitima”. Oi ellinojiougoslavikes scheseis kai to Makedoniko 1950–1967 [The “non-existent question”. The Greek-Yugoslavian relations and the Macedonian question]. Thessaloniki, Greece: Epikentro publisher. Konstantinos Karamanlis Archeio. Gegonota kai Keimena (1997 and 2005) [Konstantinos Karamanlis Archive. Incidents and Texts]. Konstantinos Svolopoulos (Ed). Athens, Greece: Idryma K.  Karamanlis-Ekdotiki Athinon publisher (cited as Karamanlis published Archive) (The 2005 edition was made by Kathimerini newspaper and is divided in more volumes than the 1997 one.). Malkidis, T. (2007). Oi Ellinoalvanikes scheseis [The Greek-Albanian relations]. Athens, Greece: Gordios Publisher. McGlade, J. (2005). COCOM and the containment of the Western trade and relations. In J. Eloranta & J. Ojala (Eds.), East-West trade and the Cold War (pp. 47–62). Jyväskulä, Finland: University of Jyväskulä. Michailidis, I. (2008). Epodini geitonia: Oi Ellinoyougoslavikes Scheseis stin Skia tou Mekedonikou Zitimatos [Painful Neighbourhood: The Greek-Yugoslawian relations in the shadow of the Macedonian question]. In A. Rigos, S. Seferiadis, & E. Hatzivassiliou (Eds.), I Syntomi Dekaetia tou 1960 [The short 1960s] (pp. 267–284). Athens, Greece: Kasataniotis Publisher. Michailidis, I. (2018). Se anazitisi neon isorropion. I Balkaniki politiki tis Elladas 1950–1967 [In search of new balances. Greek Balkan policy 1950–1967]. In N. Maratzidis, I. Michailidis, & E. Hatzivasilliou (Eds.), I Ellada kai o Psichros Polemos. Epekteiontas tis Ermineies [Greece and the Cold War. Expanding the interpretations] (pp. 75–89). Thessaloniki, Greece: Epikentro. Myers, A. (1982). Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey: Contrast within coherence. Thesis submitted at the US Naval Postgraduate School. Papaioannou, A. (1986). I Diathiki tou Nikou Zachariadi. Opos tin empistefthike o archigos tou KKE ston Achillea Papaionnou sto Sourgout tis Sivirias [Zachariadis’ will entrusted on Papaionnou in Sourgout in Siberia]. Athens, Greece: Glaros publisher. Pelt, M. (2006). Tying Greece to the west. US-West German-Greek relations 1949–1974. Copenhagen, Denmark: Museum Tusculanum Press. Perrakis, St. (1994). I Valkaniki Politiki tou Georgiou Papandreou [Giorgos Papandreou’s Balkan Policy]. In P. Petridis, & G. Anastasiadis (Eds.), Giorgos Papandreou. 60 Chronia parousias stin Politiki Zoi [Giorgos Papandreou. Its 60 years long presence and acting in the political life] (pp. 541–550). Thessaloniki, Greece: University Studio Press. Rizas, S. (2006). Ta Balkania kai i Ellada se Metavasi: Apo ton Psichro Polemo stin Ifesi 1960– 1974 [The Balkans in transition: From the Cold War to the Détente]. Athens, Greece: Sideris Publisher. Rizas, S. (2008). I Elliniki Politiki meta ton Emfylio Polemo. Koinovouleutismos kai Diktatoria [Greek politics after the Civil War. Parliamentarism and Dictatorship]. Athens, Greece: Kastaniotis Publisher. Rizas, S. (2013). Domestic and external factors in Greece’s relations with the Soviet Union: Early Cold War to Détente. Mediterranean Quarterly, 24, 57–80.

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Sfetas, S. (2012). From Ankara to bled marshal Tito’s visit to Greece (June 1954) and the formation of the Balkan Alliance. Thetis, 19, 194–206. Sfetas, S. (2018). Oi Metallaxeis tou Makedonikou. O makris dromos pros tis Prespes [The mutations of the Macedonian question. The long road to Prespes]. Athens, Greece: Sideris Publisher. Stefanidis, I. (1986). United States, Great Britain and the Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement, 1949– 1950. Balkan Studies, 27(2), 315–343. Stefanidis, I. (2002). Asymmetroi Etairoi. Oi Hnomenes Politeies kai I Ellada ston Psichro Polemo 1953–1961 [Asymmetric partners. The United States and Greece in the Cold War 1953–1961]. Athens, Greece: Patakis Publisher. Stergiou, A. (2001). Im Spagat zwischen Solidarität und Realpolitik. Die Beziehungen zwischen DDR und Griechenland und das Verhältnis der SED zur KKE. Mannheim, Germany: Bibliopolis. Stergiou, A. (2017). Das Dreiecksverhaltnis BRD–DDR–Griechenland und die ‘Bereinigung der Kriegsfolgen’ aus der Zeit der Nazi–Okkupation. In M. Hillemann & M. Pechlivanos (Eds.), Deutsch–griechische Beziehungen im ostdeutschen Staatssozialismus (1949–1989): Politische Migration, Realpolitik und interkulturelle Begegnung (pp. 33–44). Berlin, Germany: Edition Romiosini/CeMoG, Freie Universitat Berlin. Stergiou, A. (2018). The struggle for the past: Socialists against communists in Post-Junta Greece. In H. Richter (Ed.), Aspekte neugriechischer Geschichte, Gesammelte Aufsätze, Monographs-­ series PELEUS (pp. 114–127). Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz-Publishers. Ulunyan, A. (2008). Karamanlis’ Greece and Soviet Union (Flashpoints and observations, late 1950s–1970s. In K.  Svolopoulos, K.  Botsiou, & E.  Hatzivassiliou (Eds.), Konstantinos Karamanlis in the twentieth Century. Conference proceedings (pp.  395–405). Athens Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation vol. II. Ulunyan, A. (2003). Soviet Cold War perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945–58. Cold War History, 3(2), 35–52. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. (1957). The first ten years. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Valinakis, Y. (1987). Exoteriki Politiki kai Ethniki Amyna 1974–1987. I Ellada sto Sistima Anatolis-­Dysis [Foreign policy and National Defence. Greece between East and west]. Thessaloniki, Greece: Paratiritis. Vamvouri, C. (2007). Oi prospatheies metavasis ton Valkanikon Choron stin evropaiki oikonomiki diastasi os kathoristikos paragon gia ton epanapatrismo ton Ellinon Politikon Prosfygon tou Emfylioy Polemou [Balkan countries’ europeanisation efforts as factor for the repatriation of Greek civil war political refugees]. In University of Western Macedonia (Ed.), Diastaseis tis metavasis kai I evropaiki prooptiki ton Balkanion [Aspects of transition and the European perspective of the Balkan countries] conference proceedings (pp. 491–512). Thessaloniki, Greece: University of Macedonien-publication. Veremis, T. (1982). Greek security: Issues and politics: Introduction. The Adelphi Papers, 22(179), 1–37. Wallden, S. (1991). Ellada kai Anatolikes Chores 1950–1967. Oikonomikes Scheseis kai Politiki [Greece and Eastern countries 1950–1967. Economic relations and politics]. Athens, Greece: Odysseas Publisher, Vol. I and II. Wallden, S. (1993). Greece and Eastern Europe: Economic Relations. In H. Psomiades and S. Thomadakis (Eds.), Greece, the New Europe and the changing international order (pp. 285– 309). New York: Pella publishing company. Yearbooks of the United Nations. (1952). Yearbooks of the United Nations. (1953).

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Primary Sources

Greece Archive of Tryfon Triandafyllakos (cited as Triandafyllakos Papers) in the Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Minister of Coordination in the Konstantinos Karamanlis’ administrations). Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cited as HAGFM): folders on Greek-Soviet Relations, NATO, Greece’s relations with Balkan countries and Eastern Europe, Turkish-Soviet relations, Political Refugees, Communist Activities abroad, European Army, United States, Mediterranean Pact, Warsaw Pact, East-West relations. Georgios Papandreou’s archive in the Georgios Papandreou cultural Centre in Athens: Folders relating his administration as Prime Minister (1963–1965). Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Archive in Athens: Folders on Foreign and Defence Policy relating his administration as Prime Minister 1955–1963 and 1974–1980 (NATO-bilateral relations-EEC-­ National Issues-US policy in the Mediterranean-Warsaw Pact, the Cyprus Issue and so on). Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archive in the Konstantinos Karamanlis archive in Athens: Folders relating Tsaldaris’ foreign policy administration (1946–1950). Konstantinos Tsatsos Archive (cited as Tsatsos archive): Minister to the Premier’s Office in the Karamanlis Government (1956–1961): Collection Number: Folder 56, subfolder 6, “Communist activities”. Collection held at Gennadius Library in Athens.

Germany Federal Archive in Koblenz: Chancellor Office of the Federal Republic of Germany in Koblenz.

United States Dwight Eisenhower Library and Archives: Lauris Norstad papers and collection. National Archives and Records Administration (cited as NARA): folders on Greece, Turkey, NATO, Eastern Mediterranean, Warsaw Pact.

United Kingdom Foreign Office (cited as FO): folders on Greece, Cyprus, Political relations between Greece and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Greece and NATO, Greece and Balkans, Greece and Balkan Cooperation, Greece-Turkish Dispute over the Aegean, Balkan Nuclear Free Zone. Liddle Hard Centre for military archives (Liddle Hard Archives) at the King’s College in London.

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Published Primary Sources and Archival Documents Greece during the early Cold War the view from the western archives: documents, edited by D. Chourchoulis, Ch. Christidis, V. Kalogrias, P.-S. Karavis, M. Koumas & S. Papastamkou. Project: Thalis carried out under the supervision of N. Maratzidis (MIS: 380436). [Collections of documents from various countries]. Foreign Relations of the United States (cited as FRUS): 1952–1954, vol. VIII, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean; vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa; vol. X, part 2, 1958-1960, Eastern Europe. Finland, Greece, Turkey; vol. XVI, 1961–1963, Eastern Europe, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey; vol. XVI, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, 1964–1968:

The Cyprus Problem as Variable in the Soviet Bloc’s Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean

Due to its pivotal strategic position at the crossroads of three continents, Cyprus has been coveted by various external powers throughout its long history. Soviet Bloc’s interest in the island, however, did not emerge out from these obvious geostrategic reasons. Notably, in the twentieth century, Cyprus was associated with one of the most intractable, old conflicts registered in the United Nations, which also was a source of frictions and problems for the entire Eastern Mediterranean region and an apple of discord between the great powers. By the end of 1940s, Greek Cypriots began demonstrating their long-desired demand for self-determination, namely the abolishment of the British Colonial regime and the Union of Cyprus with the Greek motherland (Enosis). Nevertheless, all Greek Cypriots’ efforts were met by the UK’s categorical refusal to consider an independent Cyprus or to cede the island to Greece. Instead, the British colonial power was only willing to discuss a limited autonomy. Very soon, a wave of exasperation swept over the island galvanizing coordinated efforts aimed manifestly at redoubling pressure on the UK to grant Cyprus’s union with Greece. Further, the Greek Enosis campaign began to resonate well with the international public.1 The fact, that, the Cypriot Communist party, AKEL, and its affiliated organisations, mainly the trade unions, took on a leading role in the anti-colonial protests,2 offered the British colonialists the opportunity to warp the national, anti-colonial 1  CO 67/328/8, “Telegram of the British Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office in London May 15, 1951”. 2  Resolution of the 6th congress of the AKEL published in the party journal Dimocratis, 1(1) (September–October 1949); Resolution of the 7th congress of AKEL published in the party journal Dimocratis, 4(12) (December 1951) It is worth mentioning that the AKEL was in favour of Enosis, despite the fact that an incorporation of Cyprus by Greece would entail the ban of the Cypriot Communist party, as it was the case with the Greek Communist party. In a report by the colonial authorities of Cyprus of a pro-Enosis rally, dated on February 2 1950 (CO 67/368/1), there is a reference to the affectionate speech of the Communist leader Ploutis Servas that was received the strongest applaud: …We know that if Enosis is realised today, we shall be the first to be exiled, imprisoned and assassinated…

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Stergiou, Greece’s Ostpolitik, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61129-3_4

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nature of the protests, downgrading it into Cold War conflict. Once the anti-colonial protests gained momentum, the British conveyed to the Greek government their serious worries about both the Cypriot Communist and Soviet Bloc agitation about Cyprus. In fact, the Cyprus problem was subject of daily broadcasts in all over the Eastern European countries for long time.3 Ιn general, Greek diplomats appeased British and Americans on the possible effect of the controversies in Cyprus on the Western defence of Eastern Mediterranean. They also reassured the British of the pro-British feelings of the Cypriot people. However, as the time was running by, huge discontent and displeasure were brewing both in Cyprus and Greece related to the existing colonial status quo of the island.4 Greek diplomats blamed the Communists for stirring up the Cyprus Question in order “to take full advantage of the delicate nature of the matter of national interest deeply touching the whole of the Greek nation”. They also blamed them for intending to bring the issue before the United Nations, thought this was broad popular demand, in order to make the Greek government’s life difficult.5 In other words, Cypriot Communists’ active, but unarmed anti-colonial struggle, became a subject of multi-layered exploitation by many sides. When Turkey began expressing interest for its “lively interests” on the island, it began depicting Greece as a pro-Soviet state (Nicolet, 2001, pp. 19–27). The British invoked the “Communist danger” to justify internationally their suppressive actions and maintain their colonial yoke in Cyprus. Athens also alluded to the danger that the Communist Bloc would take advantages on the turmoil on the island, in order to elicit British concessions for Cyprus. As the struggle for self-determination in Cyprus gained momentum, placing Athens under extreme pressure from the domestic public, Greek diplomats started accusing the British that their recalcitrance on the Cyprus Issue “…would be playing into Soviet hands to withhold self-determination indefinitely on grounds of strategic interest. This was morally indefensible and played into the hands of the Soviets…”.6 Eventually, however, it was the Greek Government that, succumbing to the pressure of the public in Greece and Cyprus (Grivas, 1964: 21), decided in August 1954, to formally request the United Nations that self-determination for the people of Cyprus be included on the agenda of the General Assembly’s next session. While the Greek recourse on Cyprus was pending before the United Nations, Anglo-Greek relations were practically frozen. The UN General Assembly’s decision in December 1954 “not to consider the problem further for the time being”, drove an unbridgeable rift between the Greek Cypriots and the UK.  It took no long time until the 3  CO 67/368/8, “Telegrams from the British Embassy in Athens and Ankara to the Foreign Office in London in 1951”. 4  CO 67/368/11: “Pro-Enosis activities”. 5  CO 67/328/8, “Memo on the conversation between the Greek Ambassador in London and British official Sir William Strang February 23, 1951”. 6  CO 926/193, “Telegrams no. 645 from the UK permanent delegation to NATO (Paris) to the Foreign Office April 25, 1956 and December 19, 1956”; CO 926/188, “Telegram no. 55 from the British Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office in London July 25, 1956”.

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s­ ituation escalated ushering into a full-blown armed revolt against the British colonial rule, that raged from 1955 until 1959 (Richter, 2006). Apart from it, the United Nations turned out to be the forum, which enabled the involvement of the Soviet Bloc in the Cypriot affairs. UN mission to Cyprus would mean active Security Council involvement, which, in turn, would provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to become an active participant (Kyrou, 1974: 283; Xantopoulos-Palamas, 1978, p. 275). Therefore, inscribing the Cyprus problem on the agenda of the UN General Assembly filled Washington with apprehension, as it permitted the Soviets to assume an anticolonialist stance, which the United States, in this instance, was reluctant to adopt. Washington viewed the Cyprus problem as a serious distraction from the overriding need to contain Soviet expansion. As the level of violence on the island mounted after 1955, Washington found itself uncomfortably caught between Athens and London. Victory for the Cypriot anti-colonial fighters would alienate the Turks; defeat would alienate Greeks; and if neither side prevailed, British relations with Greece would be irreparably damaged (Stearns, 1992, p. 26–30). The more the independence war escalated, the more Athens voiced its indignation to the United States, “because with their one-dimensional policy in the Middle East, favoured some countries (Turkey) and wronged others, (Greece) pushing them to the Soviet embrace.” The Cyprus problem pre-occupied NATO as well, not only because it seriously disrupted the military cooperation between Greece and Turkey. During the summer 1958, on the very high levels of the Alliance there were fears that Greece could break diplomatic relations with Britain over the Cyprus question. Such a development would, in these times, come as far more of a shock for this system of mutual defence than it would in times past; Even the very thought of a formal break between two of its fifteen members seemed for NATO intolerable.7 London, on its part, endeavoured to avoid any prospect of the Cyprus issue to be raised in the NATO Council, as it was still regarding Cyprus vital for its interests in the Middle East and in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this respect, given that the Cypriot people’s desire for self-determination found a good echo to some countries at least on sentimental grounds, the UK representatives to NATO tried to present the problem as an increasing bitterness between Greece and Turkey.8 Under British influence, NATO Officials began exerting pressure on the Greeks to take a more conciliatory stance to the Cyprus question and let it act as an intermediary.9 7  Lauris Norstad papers: box 79, “Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Memorandum for General Norstad, August 1958”. 8  CO 926/193, “Letter from the UK Prime Minister Office to the Foreign Office, May 1, 1956”; “Dispatch from the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Athens, May 11, 1956”; UK Colonial Office’ internal report May 12, 1956; “Dispatch from the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Ankara June 6, 1956, Extract from an official report of the House of Commons June 13, 1956”. 9  CO 926/193, “Foreign Office report for internal use made by W.A. Morris 18th December 1956”; “Telegram of the Foreign Office to the UK representatives in NATO October 10, 1956”.

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In November 1957, the US Embassy in Athens reported to the State Department that Greece had already essentially disengaged from the American policy, which it had followed since the end of the Second World War. To the contrary, Greece’s attitude toward the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc underwent an accelerated process of softening since 1955. Greece felt that the United States had ignored their special geostrategic position and had supported more strongly its ancient enemy, Turkey. In Greek eyes, the Americans had failed to support the Greek position on the Cyprus issue, and to the Greeks there had not been more important problem in this decade.10 The reports sent by the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office in the same period conveyed the same impression about Greek feelings for the Western Alliance countries. The British were monitoring the disconcerting “increase of pro-­ Soviet articles in the Greek press”, as well as Greek MP’s statements on British atrocities in Cyprus. The latter, in turn, the British feared, it could press the Americans to make statements on Cyprus, that would be friendly to the Greek claims. All the more, because Athens tried to link the Cyprus Problem with the Eisenhower doctrine on the Middle East and to invoke the Communist danger in the case of non-solution in Cyprus. Moreover, the British suspected that the Greek government was behind of many anti-colonial struggle activities in Cyprus.11 The Turks, on their part, accused the Greeks of instrumentalising the North Atlantic Council to promote their aspirations in Cyprus.12 In February 1954, the Turkish Government officially declared its opposition to any regime change in Cyprus making clear that, if negotiations between Greece and the UK pertaining to Cyprus were to be held, Turkey would seek participation. Turkey pointed out that it could not remain indifferent to the destiny of an island, in its close vicinity, a quasi-­ geographical extension of Turkey, whose political regime was so crucial for its security. Turkey, motherland of the Turkish Cypriot minority (18% of the population), categorically rejected any possibility of Cyprus’ union with Greece. The uttermost sacrifice Turkey could offer, was partition (Taksim) and simultaneous partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, a position voiced clearly by 1957. There is

 NARA, RG 59, “Dispatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Penfield) to the Department of State. Subject: Greece’s Disengagement from United States Policy, November 4, 1957” (Documents Collection: Greece during the early Cold War the view from the western archives) 11  CO 926/594–595, “Greek Interest in the political situation in Cyprus-miscellaneous: Reports from the British Embassy to the Foreign Office (1957)”. 12  In a briefing report circulated to the NATO Council by the Turkish permanent representative in September 1956 was mentioned that…the agitation for Enosis and self-determination had been created, provoked and consciously aggravated by Greek governments, by Archbishop Makarios and by Communist elements in Cyprus. The Greek Government have done all they can to carry the Cyprus Question into the United Nations, the Council of Europe and many international meetings and conferences of all kind. They have attacked Turkey and Great Britain without restraint by all possible means and have incited terrorism in Cyprus and supported it by sending arms, ammunition, funds, agents etc. The Greek boycott of certain NATO manoeuvres and exercises and of the permanent council of the Balkan Pact should also be remembered…. In CO 926/193, “Telegram no. 645 from the UK Delegation to NATO (Paris) to the Foreign Office, September 7, 1956”. 10

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ample evidence13 that Turkey’s attitude was the result of a British divide and rule policy. As the UK was coming under increasing international pressure to give up its colonial Status in Cyprus—in June 1955 the first International Congress of Jurists had stated that rights were severely limited in Cyprus by the non-elected British administration— it tried to draw Ankara’s attention to the “threatened rights of the Turkish minority”. In fact, this was a diplomatic gambit to circumvent article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), by which Turkey had pledged to “renounce all rights and title” over Cyprus (Mallinson, 2010). Further, with the so-called Lord Radcliff’s constitutional proposals on Cyprus, in 1956, London tried to equalise Greek and Greek-Cypriot struggle for self-­ determination by invoking Turkish rights on the island as well as the partition-­ possibility: …In any eventual exercise of Self-determination, the Turkish Cypriots will equally with the Greek Cypriots have the right to decide their own future; consequently partition must be included among the eventual possibilities… Simultaneously, the UK permanent delegation to NATO was instructed to try to influence NATO’s General Secretary Lord Ismay to press the Greek government not to reject Radcliff’s proposals, otherwise the Turks would be encouraged to pursue partition.14 To the dismay of the British, however, Athens rejected NATO’s General Secretary Lord Ismay’s offer of arbitration.15 Moreover, the inclusion of Turkey in the talks about Cyprus led to a rapid deterioration of the Greek-British relations.16 The clash between the Greek Cypriot popular movement, the UK and Turkey, turned the Cyprus question into a fierce dispute, at a time when the wider region, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, was going through successive crises endangering the South Eastern flank of NATO. It was in the midst of this upheaval that Washington and London realised that any prolongation of the anti-colonial fight would seriously undermine their and NATO’s interests in the region. Therefore, they decided to proceed into negotiations with the motherlands of the two main Cypriot communities with the view of establishing an independent Cyprus. In return, Athens and Ankara agreed, in February 1959, in Zurich to abandon Enosis and Taksim. The compromise hampered out in Zurich and London 1959–1960 might have been satisfactory for the United Kingdom that secured itself unpresented rights for its military bases (Stergiou, 2015), but not for the Cypriot people, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Only 3  years after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, in December 1963, on the occasion of Makarios’ unilateral and provocative action to amend the  The diplomat Vyron Theodoropoulos, who served in many positions related to Cyprus was adamant about it. He personally was the recipient of British Diplomats confessions about their role in Cyprus. Personal Communication with Vyron Theodoropoulos (Athens, November 2005). 14  CO 926/193, “Telegram of Foreign Office to the UK permanent delegation to NATO (Paris), December 18, 1956”. 15  CO 926/595, “Greek Interest in the political situation in Cyprus-miscellaneous: reports from the British Embassy to the Foreign Office (1957)”. 16  NARA: RG 59, Documents relating to internal affairs of Greece 1955–1959: “Telegrams from US army department in Greece to the Department of State (1955)”. 13

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constitution, inter-communal violence broke out in Nicosia, spilling over very soon to the rest of the island. Hardliners in both communities, bitterly opposed to the Zurich and London Treaties, found a unique opportunity to undermine the Republic. In the wake of the riots the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the House of Representatives resigned, thereby prompting a constitutional gridlock. The crisis led nearly to the collapse of the state and resulted in the complete incapacity of key state organs to operate. At this point, the international community decided to intervene to prevent the outbreak of a war between the two motherlands of the Cypriot Communities. In 1964, an interim peacekeeping force, the Joint Truce Force, was put together by the UK, Greece and Turkey. A few months later, it was replaced by a United Nations peacekeeping force, deployed following UN Security Council Resolution 186. Stationed on the island ever since, it has attempted to pacify the feud. In the meantime, while the riots continued, Turkish fighters started raiding villages in the Tylliria region, whereas Ankara threatened to intervene with a mass land invasion, professing its obligation to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority. It was becoming clear, that the Turkish government preferred partition or, at the very least, complete autonomy for the Turkish Cypriot population and not a maintenance of the Republic (Richmond, 1998). To stop the civil strife and prevent the risk of a Greek-Turkish war, Washington decided to get involved in Cypriot affairs. After several consultations had taken place between British and American officials, Johnson decided to approve a plan for American participation in a peace force. This proposal, however, which called for the deployment of an all-NATO force on the island for a limited period of 3 months, was rejected by Makarios (Richmond, 1999, p. 241). Seemingly after Makarios’s encouragement, Khrushchev sent letters to the main Western countries’ leaders, including the Premiers of Turkey and Greece, warning the Atlantic Alliance powers to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Cyprus. In this letter, that was published immediately in the press (New York Times 1964), Khrushchev declared that attempts to encroach on Cyprus’s sovereignty would present a “serious danger to general peace” and, could become “the source of international complications fraught with grave consequences”. This wording represents markedly the Soviet policy towards Cyprus during the Cold War. It raises the impression, that Moscow is interested in the Cyprus affairs, however, it, demonstratively, does not pinpoint the main stakeholders of the problem: Greece, Cyprus and the two Cypriot communities. It is directed, instead, to NATO, “as US-led organisation” that was not a stakeholder in the problem. However, NATO was a Soviet Union’s problem. US president Lyndon Johnson also intensified his efforts to resolve the crisis by equally sending a letter to Ankara and Athens that was couched in a rather undiplomatic way. In this notorious letter, published a short time later in the Turkish press, Johnson warned that if one of these countries intervened militarily in Cyprus, the USA would no longer support it, in the event of a Soviet attack. However, as Turkey was the country poised to intervene, this move was considered by Ankara as a blatant offence. Since almost the whole arsenal was of US origin military action

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became virtually impossible. In the next years, Washington really attempted to mediate in several cases between Greece and Turkey on the status of Cyprus. It, also, tried to prevent any flare up of communal violence,17 that occurred sporadically in the 1960s and 1970s, and could entail a war between the two members of the Alliance, offering Moscow an opportunity to gain influence in the region. The Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the State Department feared, at the time, that, in the absence of prompt, firm external diplomatic intervention, Greece and Turkey would feel bound to gradually increase their active support to their respective communities. The US policy-makers estimated, however, that Athens and Ankara would seek to avoid a direct confrontation, while demanding outside intervention. In this case, the USSR and the Arab states would give diplomatic and propaganda support to an independent Cyprus. The United Kingdom would give diplomatic support to peacekeeping efforts. The US policy-makers were also pondering to deploy to 6th fleet to discourage Soviet maritime activity if Turkey decided to issue an ultimatum to Makarios.18 In retrospect, it can be argued that Washington’s policy towards Cyprus failed blatantly. First of all, in Cypriot domestic politics the results were disappointing. Robert Keeley, one of the main officers of the State Department dealing with the region, visited Cyprus in March 1967 and spoke with people of the two communities. He concluded that there was a factual partition on the island and an increasing psychological gulf between the two communities, though both sides pretended not see it. The Turkish Cypriots, Keeley stressed, had a lot of what they wanted. They had physical separation from the Greek Cypriots, a separate administration and their own government, e.g. a factual partition of the island, although the territory, in which they lived, was not economically viable with the Turkey’s subsidies they received. Keeley was amazed by Greek Cypriots’ complacency. They faced a de facto partition, separate administrations, the threat of Turkish military intervention and with all this, they, apparently, confidently expected to win their case and their cause!19 Contrary to the US strategy towards Cyprus, Soviet diplomacy towards Cyprus was much more sophisticated and effective. As it was the case with Greece, Moscow counted on other Soviet Bloc members’ support, who were utilised depending on

 NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974, “Correspondence between the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and the US Embassy in Athens, November 15, 1967, on the violent incidents in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of the village of Agios Theodoros in Cyprus in which the Cypriot hardliner General Grivas was involved”. The US diplomats concluded that Athens should be pressed to exert influence in Cyprus, so that the situation could be calmed and a resolution of the problem through diplomatic means could be hampered out. 18  NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974, Box 9, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Dispatch from Chalmers Wood to the US Ambassador in Athens Phil. Talbot, February 3, 1963”. 19  NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Memorandum from R.V. Keeley to K. Bracken, subject: impressions of Cyprus, April 4, 1967”: 17

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who Kremlin considered appropriate to act in any particular situation.20 Alas, this coincided with the first President of the Republic Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios’ flirtations with Moscow and his domestic co-operation with the very popular Cypriot Communist party, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL).21 Makarios, an extremely ambitious person, apparently wanted to preserve what was left of his once quasi-independent state and fight off efforts to impose a purely “NATO solution” that would restrict his power. Under his leadership, Cyprus turned to the anti-Western Non-Aligned Movement that, in the eyes of the West, was communist-­infiltrated. Moscow was more than satisfied with Cyprus’s neutrality, within a region fully controlled by NATO. Soon, Cypriot-Soviet relations began to flourish. Makarios himself officially visited the Soviet Union in 1971. Unsurprisingly, both Cypriot and Greek left-wing parties (Trikkas, 2009, pp. 434–442, 496–499) agitated in favour of President Makarios’ foreign policy and against …the satanic and clandestine plans of the imperialists (…) and their puppets who want to turn Cyprus into a NATO military stepping stone (…) Thus the party will not ease to give its whole-hearted support to the president of the republic Archbishop Makarios, to its government and to his policy of resistance against the imperialist partition plans…(AKEL, 1965, pp. 18; AKEL, 1968, pp. 18–24). Greek Cypriot Communist’s agitation was directed especially against the British Sovereign Military bases.22 The British Sovereign Military Bases, whose conspicuous, post-colonial status de jure diminished the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, were targeted by the Communists, because their existence also contradicted the Soviet interests in the region. The Soviets were very adamant and clear about how they viewed the British bases. During a conversation between the President of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus, Glafkos Klerides with President of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Presnief, in Nicocia in August 1961, Presnief pointed out that:… if the British Military bases, forced upon the Republic by the Treaty of Establishment were used against the USSR either by the British,  Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Former East Germany in Berlin (henceforth cited as MfAA): A 12890, Department for European Affairs, “Report about GDR’s relations to Cyprus March 11, 1964”; A 184–5, “Conversation between the First Secretary of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, comrade Tolstow, and the director of the Department for European Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of the German Democratic Republic about the development of the GDR relations to Greece and Cyprus December 15, 1964”; HAGFM: folder 89, sub-folder 2, “Special Report sent by the Greek Representative S. Itzhakis in Israel to Athens on his conversation with the new Soviet Ambassador in Israel Tchoubakhine, November 30, 1964”. 21  PIO archive: Folder 1969, party documents of the Cypriot Communist Party AKEL: Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Party Central Committee, October 1963; Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee February 21, 1969; Resolution of the second Plenum of the Party Central Committee November 21, 1970; Resolution of the fourth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, February 19, 1972 22  Athens was very concerned about the demonstrations by Greek Cypriot Communists against the British bases. Since they were taking place without the participation of their Turkish Cypriot Communist comrades, they made the Greek Cypriot community look an instability factor on the island. HAGFM: folder 49, sub-folder 1 (1961): Communists abroad, “Greek National Defence Ministry report to the Greek Foreign Ministry June 27, 1961”. 20

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Americans or NATO forces or against Soviet allies would have to retaliate and under modern warfare such retaliation although directed against the military bases, may have devastating effects on the inhabitants of the island. Hence the government of Cyprus should at all international conferences and levels stress the fact that it does not desire the existence of these bases in Cyprus… The Soviet government however, Presnief pointed out, was willing to give technical and financial aid to Cyprus at this first stage of independence. Klerides replied that Cyprus had no alternatives, but to accept the bases, just to secure the independence. Hence, for any attempt to raise the question of the bases, Klerides stressed, the Greek Cypriots would face strong opposition by the Turks, who wished the existence of them and got their directions from Ankara.23 Soviet security concerns were quite justified. There is conclusive evidence in British and American documents today, that in the 1960s the British stored nuclear weapons in the Sovereign Base Areas at Akrotiri at the time the civil strife on the island reached a climax in 1964 particularly. London resorted to this action in alignment with British nuclear commitment to the Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact) (Nicolet, 2000, pp. 373–376). US policy in the region did not bring about the expected results with regard to Turkey either. Johnson’s involvement in the intercommunal violations of 1963–164, combined with earlier President Kennedy’s decision to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, precipitated Turkey’s disenchantment with the United States. This, in turn, led to a Turkey- USSR rapprochement. Turkey began acting independently from American policy until the late 1970s (Nicolet, 2001, p. 294). Improvement in relations with Moscow was part of this new course. Stalin’s demands for control of Dardanelles and Black sea and the cession of territories in Eastern Anatolia had pushed Turkey to seek shelter in the Western Alliance. Various “peace attacks” after the death of Stalin had not proved very fruitful. As the spirit of détente came to mark the relations of major NATO powers with the USSR after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Turkish leaders began to question the utility of maintaining a harder position as demanded by the leading members of the Alliance. Since the Soviet government had long sought some sort of accommodation with Turkey, the Soviet–Turkish détente developed quickly. Soviet economic credits were offered in the fall of 1965 for a series of development projects. Hence, in early 1966, they refused to permit the United States to renew its scientific flights from Turkey and they became increasingly sensitive to Soviet criticism of the passage of United States naval vessels into Black Sea waters.24 The Soviets, on their part, took advantage of Ankara’s decision to allow the deployment of a cruiser and two destroyers through the straits (The Montreux  HAGFM: folder 62, subfolder 3 (1961): “Report by the President of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Klerides, on the talks he held with Presnief, President of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in Nicocia, August 14, 1961”. 24  NARA: Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: “NEA’s report on Turkish Relations with the Soviet Union, April 21, 1967”. 23

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Convention permits transit by capital ships of Black Sea powers escorted by no more than two destroyers). In this way, by 1966, the Soviets had built up their Mediterranean force to an average daily strength of 15 ships, which were making port calls from Egypt to Gibraltar (Cutler, 1991, pp. 190–193). Turkish opening towards the Soviets proved fruitful for the Turkish position to the Cyprus issue. The USSR had hitherto slightly supported the Greek Cypriots, thereby weakening Turkey’s position on the Cyprus question. To the dismay of the Greek Cypriots, in 1965, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko talked of “two national communities” in Cyprus which might choose federation as a form of government. At the time, this reflected the Turkish position on Cyprus (Stergiou, 2007, p. 95). Furthermore, a delegation from the Supreme Soviet, headed by Politburo member Nikolai Podgorny, visited Turkey in January 1965, initiating a series of reciprocal, official visits by leaders of the two countries.25 The most visible product of the new relationship was in the economic field. In the next years, Turkey received generous credits from the USSR for industrial projects. By the end of the 1970s, Turkey was reported to have received more Soviet economic assistance than any other Third World state. In 1972, the two countries signed a Declaration on the Principles of Good Neighbourly Relations, although this did not amount to much in practical terms. More important for Turkey, there was a significant shift in the Soviet position on Cyprus, as the Soviet government evidently decided that it would be more profitable to try to accommodate the Turks, than give unconditional support to the Greeks. At the same time, however, Soviet Union provided the Republic of Cyprus through Czechoslovakia weapons for the Cypriot gendarme in order to strengthen Makarios against his domestic nationalistic opponents (Hale, 2013, pp. 108–109). The other Soviet Bloc countries joined the Soviet Union in its policy towards Makarios and expressed their support, at least verbal, to his presidency. In the 1960s, the Republic of Cyprus also became the focus of the Ministry for foreign relations of the German Democratic Republic, but for slightly different reasons, than in the case of Greece. The main goal of the GDR, this time, was not the undermining of West Germany,26 but, given Cyprus’ neutrality, East Germany’s official recognition as second parity German State. Further, while Prague was the “meeting point” for the GDR’s contacts with Western countries, Cyprus became the point of its contacts  Greek diplomats tried to take advantage on the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement. Strongly antiCommunist Iran was very annoyed by Cyprus’ close ties with Egypt after the foundation of the Republic. Instead, it was very much interested in the state of the Moslem Turkish Cypriot brothers. Therefore, Greek diplomats were very quick to inform their Iranian colleagues about Turkish Cypriot close ties with the Soviet Union. HAGFM: folder 89, sub-folder 2 (Greek-Soviet relations), “Report on the meeting between the Greek and the Iranian Foreign Minister December12, 1964”. 26  Nevertheless, at the same time the Cypriot Communist party AKEL did not miss any opportunity to accuse “the West German revanchists as the solely responsible, together with the AngloAmerican imperialists” for the Middle East upheaval (AKEL, 1967, pp.  3–5) and PIO archive: Folder 1969, party documents of the Cypriot Communist Party AKEL: Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Party Central Committee, October 1963. 25

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and deals with Eastern countries. East Germany was predestined to this tactic, because it did not exist as a state for the Western state community and could not be officially reprimanded for its political practices. Hence, East Berlin took on some responsibilities towards the Republic of Cyprus, on behalf of the whole Communist Alliance. During the bicommunal riots of 1963–1964, the GDR immediately expressed its support for the Makarios government, and the East German government made certain gestures of goodwill. It provided humanitarian assistance in the form of equipment to the victims of Turkish bombardments (coverlets, blankets, etc.) as well as construction material for the rebuilding of ruined villages. The various political and governmental bodies of the GDR (Parliament, Foreign Ministry, etc.), officially condemned the “intervention plans of NATO and West Germany” and expressed “solidarity with the struggle of the Cypriot people for self-­ determination” and Makarios against his internal opponents (Stergiou, 2007, pp. 93–94). The opposition to Makarios consisted mostly of former anti-Colonialist fighters, rallied around the General Grivas. Grivas, a controversial figure, had managed to carry-out a brave independence straggle, but never embraced the 1959–1960 independence treaties. There is enough evidence that his organisation received large clandestine shipment of arms by the military regime in Athens with a view to oust Makarios from power.27 Indeed, after the military coup in Greece in 1967, relations between Athens and Nicosia steadily worsened. President and Archbishop Makarios, who was supported domestically by the Cypriot Communist party AKEL (AKEL, 1967, pp. 1–4 and 1969: 20–23), resisted the strident Greek junta’s demands that Greece be recognised as the “national centre” of Hellenism. Eventually, Makarios’ domestic enemies, guided by the junta, orchestrated in July 15, 1974 a coup d’ etat, evicting him temporarily from power. Five days later, Turkey, a guarantor power of the Republic, invaded and occupied, in two phases, 37% of the island, expelling the local Greek Cypriot population from the occupied areas and prompting the de facto division of the island ever since. During the summer 1974 crisis, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union proved capable or willing to step in and to prevent the dramatic events. Of course, there were factual constraints. NATO was not empowered to act beyond its accepted remit. It also could never intervene in an out-of-area conflict against an Alliance member, like Turkey, in order to protect a non-Alliance member like Cyprus, which also happened to be a leading member of the anti-Western Non-Aligned Movement. If nothing else, Turkey would have vetoed such an intervention. However, according newly revealed, declassified information, Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State at the time, seems to have backed the Turkish invasion. Kissinger is reported to have told then U.S. President, Gerald Ford, that Turkey was entitled to seize part of the island (The National Herald 2018).

 FRUS: 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, “Telegram of the US Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, September 16, 1972”.

27

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During the summer 1974, Moscow also remained demonstratively inert. Initially, it felt satisfied with the declarations of the Turkish government, that the invasion aimed at the “restoration of constitutional procedures” and the return of president Makarios to power. Likewise, the Soviet press justified the Turkish invasion, as a logical reaction to the Greek intention of annexing Cyprus and transforming it into a NATO Base (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2012, p. 132). However, when it became salient that Turks were determined to retrench themselves on Cyprus, despite previous declarations of its readiness to protect the Republic of Cyprus, Moscow was remarkably self-restrained. Kremlin’s strategic interests in the region did not dovetail with the survival of Makarios, as President of the Republic. The compromise of internal security in the Republic of Cyprus during the Greek coup was, sequentially, accompanied by Moscow’s silent acquiescence to the latent Turkish ambitions. Non-accidentally, the Kremlin avoided to exercise any pressure, or even to issue the faintest warning against the impending Turkish military intervention. Moreover, on the second day of the invasion, Communist party leader Leonid Brezhnev, indirectly, offered its public blessing to Ankara for the alleged restoration of the status quo ante (Savvides, 2014). A serious factor accounting for Moscow’s inertia, was the global Cold War détente. The Soviet rapprochement with Turkey and détente with the US had started before the 1974 events, creating a balance among them, that Moscow was not willing to jeopardise. When Turkey gave assurance to the Soviet Union that it would not annex part of Cyprus, Moscow backed the Turkish action in Cyprus. Kissinger also tried to decrease the Soviet suspicions of a NATO plot to subvert Cyprus. In his communication with the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, he seems to have guaranteed the US support to the existing constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and to the détente that apparently tip the scales on the superpowers’ behaviour (Aslım, 2016, pp. 257–258). Later interpretations by junta members, who were directly or indirectly involved in the events, blaming for the Cyprus disaster Makarios and the Cypriot Communist, who allegedly undermined the military defence of the island, expecting a dynamic Soviet response (Androutsopoulos, 1993, pp. 283–291), are far from reality. The Cyprus crisis had serious fallouts for the entire architecture of power in the region. In August 1974, Athens decided to withdraw unilaterally from NATO’s integrated military structure, as a protest “against the Alliance’s inactivity” during the Turkish invasion in Cyprus. Almost simultaneously, the United States imposed embargo on arms sales to Turkey. Greece stopped taking part in, among others, the NATO Defence Planning Committee, in joint military drills and sharing information with its allies on the common air defence. However, it continued participating in some Alliance activities of the political structure of the Alliance, which Athens believed were not related with its withdrawal declaration in August 1974.28

  Karamanlis archive: folder 20B NATO-Greece (1974–1978), “Negotiations on Greece’s withdrawal”.

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Greece’s remaining in the political structure of NATO could not be paralleled with the French case some years ago. It barely had symbolic meaning and did not commit any of both sides, NATO and Greece, to provide support in the event of war. France did take the same risk. After its withdrawal, it declared that, in the case of war, it would participate in the Alliance activities, though France did not border on any Warsaw Pact member and faced no threat from another Alliance member.29 While the Greeks probably hoped that such a gesture would cause NATO to put pressure on Turkey to change its course in Cyprus, Athens evidently did not study the practical consequences for Greek security.30 As US-diplomats estimated at the time, a strong tide of popular emotion made it necessary for the Karamanlis regime to make some dramatic gesture and therefore the decision to withdraw, bolstered his domestic position.31 It seems that the State Department was initially not concerned about Greece’s withdrawal from NATO, as the American officials considered it to be temporary. However, there was a great concern about the consequences this move might have on US military presence in Greece. That’s way, the US Congress savaged Kissinger for his actions.32 Soon after, however, it became obvious that the repercussions of Athens decision would be long-lasting. In its reports to the State Department, the US embassy in

 Karamanlis archive: folder 9 (Greek-Turkish relations), “Brief memorandum by the Greek Minister of Defence for the Head of the Government January 6, 1975”. 30  In his letter to the Prime Minister of Denmark laid out the reasons for his government’s decision:…The Treaty could not and was not intended to encourage aggression by its signatories either against non-member countries or against each other… However, recent events in Cyprus have revealed grave weaknesses in the fabric of the Alliance. Fundamental provisions of the Treaty regulating relations among member-countries and obligating them to use peaceful manner for the composition of their differences were disregarded… Arms provided to be used in the common defence of the Alliance were turned against an independent member-state of the United Nations, to sow death and destruction and ultimately to lead to its dismemberment…Using naked force, Turkey violated all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and all the ceasefire agreements, in utter and cynical contempt of all norms of international order and morality. It is now evident that the aim of the massive Turkish forces which landed on Cyprus in violation of existing treaties was not to protect the island’s Turkish minority but to implement Turkey’s expansionist and imperialist plans…Faced with these tragic events, when a member of the Alliance attacked an independent country, the Alliance reacted with surprising apathy, strangely limiting itself to the role of a mere bystander…My government have therefore decided that they must assume themselves the protection of the independence of Greece and place again the Greek land, sea, and air forces heretofore assigned to the integrated allied military organization under national command…because EastWest relations remain unchanged in their basic elements, Greece although withdrawing from NATO does remain a member of the Atlantic Alliance dedicated to its fundamental principles… Karamanlis archive: NATO-Greece 20B, 43–352, “Letter from the Prime Minister Karamanlis to the Prime Minister of Denmark August 28, 1974” 31  FRUS: 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey 1973–1976: “Intelligence Memorandum. Implications of the Greek withdrawal from military participation in NATO, Washington, October 1974”, pp. 97–99. 32  Karamanlis archive: folder 20 B NATO-Greece (1974–1978): “Telegram of the Greek Embassy in Washington to the Greek Foreign Ministry August 17, 1974”. 29

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Athens underscored the high frustration of the Greek government and the Greek people against NATO. Therefore, the State Department urged, when the dust settled, to give their appropriate weight to the basic elements tying Greece to the United States and its NATO allies; because Greece is a small country surrounded by hostile and potentially hostile forces. Geographically, it clearly needs friends with democracy in the process of being.33 Greece’s withdrawal from NATO, undermined the cohesion of the Alliance on its South-Eastern flank, as it did the US embargo on arms sales to Turkey. As a very experienced US diplomat later admitted, the reluctance of the United States and NATO to be distracted from their principal mission of Soviet containment by political differences within the Alliance, like those between Greece and Turkey, came at a very high price for NATO’s defensive capability in the Aegean. The paradox is that this happened, despite the generous US Military and economic assistance to Turkey (totalling over 13 billion) and to Greece (totalling 9 billion dollars) between 1946 and 1987 and repeated efforts to mediate between Athens and Ankara on Cyprus.34 Both, assistance and mediation efforts, proved insufficient to create a sense of mutual trust, to bring US respective priorities into closer alignment with both countries, or ease problems of communication. Moscow, to the contrary, was more deft than Washington was at its treatment of Greeks and Turks, staying clear of Greek-­ Turkish problem, thereby exploiting them to the detriment of NATO (Stearns, 1992, pp. 3–4, 17–18, 62–70). In the years that followed the division of Cyprus, Soviet diplomacy and propaganda concentrated on what really mattered for Moscow: securing recognition for the continued independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, as well as the withdrawal of “foreign armed forces” from the island. That is, the Soviets called for the restoration of the status quo ante the coup, plus the evacuation of all British, Greek, and Turkish troops from the island. They also called, with increasing vigour, for a stronger UN engagement in the conflict. Their accusations against Western imperialism and NATO’s “behind-the-scenes diplomatic manoeuvres intended to dismember Cyprus and create a NATO stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean”, were popularised by Communist35 and in many cases right-wing propaganda as well. For  NARA (releases 2005): “Telegram of the US Embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington August 1974, subject: Greece, NATO, and the United States  – some reflections; “Telegram of the US Embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington October 1974, subject GREECE AND NATO”; “Report from the US Embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington October 1974, subject: US response to Karamanlis letter”; “Telegram of the US Embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, Subject: NATO Ministerial guidance and Greece 30 October 1974, Greece: NATO infrastructure,” 34  FRUS: 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey: Documents 1–155 and 302–342. 35  State Archive of Cyprus Republic: Relations between Soviet Union and Cyprus: Folder FA 2/267: “Article by the member of the Central Committee of the AKEL Kostas Partashidis in the Pravda newspaper (in Russian) December 10, 1976 with title “AKEL view on Anti-Sovietism in Cyprus”; “Article by Mr. Gromyko in the Soviet Journal Kommunist, No. 14 (October 1976) elaborating on Soviet position on the Cyprus”; “Interview of the Soviet Ambassador in Greece, Ivan Udaltsov, in the newspaper Athens News in English, August 6, 1976”. 33

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example, in August 1974, the US embassy in Athens briefed the State Department that both, left- and right-wing Athens press, was attempting to create the impression that the Soviet Union had offered active support to the Greek government in its dispute with Turkey over Cyprus. To the contrary, the United States were depicted as to have supposedly supported Turkey.36 For Moscow, on the other hand, Turkey was the victim, not instigator of “the conspiracy against Cyprus”, and hence, Ankara’s intervention reversed plans to bring Cyprus beneath NATO’s umbrella through union with Greece. At the same time, the Soviet Union made excessive use of its influence on Makarios and the powerful Cypriot Communist Party to agitate a different picture in the Cypriot and Greek society. By encouraging anti-Americanism and anti-Western sentiment among Greeks, and tolerating Turkish positions, the Soviet Union secured benefits from Turkey and ensured a festering open wound within NATO. The longevity of this status quo was one of the greatest successes of Soviet foreign policy. Accordingly, the covert Turkish-friendly Soviet policy on Cyprus, unknowingly applauded by a misinformed pan-Hellenic public, was one of the USSR’s most significant propaganda victories during the Cold War period (Drousiotis, 2014). Unexpected harsh criticism for its handling of the Cyprus problem received Moscow by its adversary, China that in this period of time was following a very active policy in the Balkans. In July 1976, the People’s Republic of China mission to the United Nations made public, with a press release, China’s view on the Cyprus Problem. According to the Chinese press release, Moscow had stirred up trouble and sown discord out of fear that it would have no chance to meddle in Cyprus, if the situation there calmed down: …The Soviet Union’s preach for internationalising the Cyprus question, in the final analysis, is to legalise its intervention in Cyprus. Cyprus, which lies in in between Europe and the Middle East flanking Europe, is the biggest island in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Soviet Union has long been keeping a covetous eye on this strategic island but have not managed to find an opportunity to dish up the internationalisation and other proposals. Once an international conference is convened or an international investigation mission is sent, the Soviet Union will be involved and will become a party concerned, which has nothing to do with the Cyprus question. In so doing, it can both interfere in the internal affairs of Cyprus and contend for hegemony in the Mediterranean with other superpower….37 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets and their allies continued to prop the position of the AKEL and Makarios (until his death in 1977) in Cypriot politics. Repeated visits by all Eastern Bloc countries’ officials to Cyprus aimed at demonstrating Soviet Bloc’s interest and support for Greek Cypriot struggle for reunification of the island and self-determination. On the other hand, they constantly used the forum of the United Nations as a political and agitation instrument. By avoiding condemnation of Turkey and calling for the convocation of an international conference  NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US Embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State August 10, 1974, subject: Greece denies reports of Soviet offers of assistance”. 37  State Archive of Cyprus Republic: Relations between Soviet Union and Cyprus: “Press release of the People’s Republic of China mission to the United Nations 16 July, 1976”. 36

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i­ncorporating all states involved in the problem, Moscow made its point. However, the Soviet proposal was rejected by Great Britain and the United States, since both favoured inter-communal talks instead. Furthermore, Moscow’s ritual, expedient and strategically very opportune position was focused on repeated calls for withdrawal of all foreign forces, including British troops in the British Sovereign Military Bases (Stergiou, 2015, pp. 211–214). In the crucial UN discussion on the Cyprus Issue in March 1975, the Soviet delegation also joined the Security Council resolution that the unilateral creation of an isolated, the so-called separate Turkish-Cypriot State, in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus was fundamentally against the genuine interests of the Cypriot people, both Greek and Turkish. The Soviet delegate did not omit, however, to state that a genuine settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the relevant decisions of the Council and the General Assembly was still being blocked by certain circles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “which were actually responsible for creating the Cyprus crisis”.38 In the 1980s, the government of Mikhail Gorbachev demonstrated interest in the Cyprus question. It submitted proposals for the final settlement of the problem, which, however, did not deviate even slightly from its predecessors’ line. In 1986, the USSR government prepared a draft proposal for a peaceful settlement of the situation in Cyprus. The proposal called once again for the creation of a federal government and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus (e. g. the island’s complete demilitarisation) that of course engulfed the removal of the Sovereign British Military Bases (Nikitina, Kuznetsov, Rustamova 2019, p. 189–190).

References AKEL: Resolution of the 6th congress of the AKEL published in the party journal Dimocratis, 1(1) (September–October 1949). AKEL: Resolution of the 7th congress of AKEL published in the party journal Dimocratis, 4(12) (December 1951). AKEL. (1965). Resolution of the Pancyprian meeting of AKEL’s cadres Nicosia February 7, 1965. Newsletter of the Central Committee of the Progressive Party of the Working People (February– March 1965). AKEL. (1967). Statement by the politburo of the central committee of the AKEL on the Middle East situation, Nicosia June 8, 1967. Newsletter of the Central Committee of the Progressive Party of the Working People (May 1967). AKEL. (1968). Resolution of the Organisational Conference of AKEL Nicosia January 28, 1968. Newsletter of the Central Committee of the Progressive Party of the Working People (January 1968). AKEL. (1969). Statement of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the AKEL. Newsletter of the Central Committee of the Progressive Party of the Working People (December 1969).

 State Archive of Cyprus Republic: Relations between Soviet Union and Cyprus: Folder FA 2/267, “Speech of the Vice-President of the USSR at the Security Council of the United Nations during the discussion on the Cyprus Issue March 12, 1975”.

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Androutsopoulos, A. (1993). I Martyria enos Prothipougou [The testimony of a Premier Minister]. Athens, Greece: Smpilias-To Oikonomiko publisher. Aslım, I. (2016). The Soviet Union and Cyprus in 1974 events. Athens Journal of History, 2(4), 249–262. Cutler, R. (1991). Soviet relations with Greece and Turkey: A systems perspective. In D. Constas (Ed.), The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s domestic and external influences (pp. 183–206). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Drousiotis, M. (2014). Kypros 1974–1977. I Eisvoli kai oi Megales Dynameis. I realpolitik ton HPA kai to diplo paichnidi tis Sovietikis Enosis [Cyprus 1974–1977. The US realpolitik and the USSR’ duplicity]. Nicosia, Alfadi Publisher. Grivas G. (1964). The Memoirs of General Grivas (Ch. Foley, ed.). New York/Washington, DC: Frederick Praeger publishers. Hale, W. (2013). Turkish foreign policy since 1774 (3rd ed.). London/New York: Routledge. Kyrou, A. (1974). Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki [Greek Foreign Policy]. Athens, Greece: Vivliopoleio tis Estias. Mallinson, W. (2010). Partition through foreign aggression. The case of Turkey in Cyprus. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota. New York Times-staff. (1964). Khrushchev Warns NATO On Intervention in Cyprus. February 8. Nicolet, C. (2000). British nuclear weapons in Cyprus in the 1960s. The evidence from the archives. Thetis, 7, 373–376. Nicolet, C. (2001). United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954–1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention (Peleus monographies series vol. 9). Mannheim, Germany/Möhnesee, Germany: Bibliopolis. Nikitina, Y., Kuznetsov, D., & Rustamova, L. (2019). Diplomatic relations between Cyprus and the Soviet Union/Russia: From cold war games to friendship and comprehensive cooperation. The Cyprus Review, 31(3), 181–198. Richmond, O. (1998). Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot communities and the United Nations. London: Frank Cass. Richmond, O. (1999). The Cyprus conflict, changing norms of international society, and regional disjunctures. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 13(1), 239–253. Richter, H. (2006). Geschichte der Insel Zypern 1950–1959 (Vol. II). Möhnesee, Germany: Bibliopolis. Sakkas, J., & Zhukova, N. (2012). The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus problem, 1967–1974. Les cahiers Irice, 2(10), 123–135. Savvides, P. (2014). The collapse of a fallacious myth: The role of kremlin and Whitehall in the Cyprus crisis of 1974. In M. Kontos, S.-C. Theodoulou, N. Panayiotides, & H. Alexandrou (Eds.), Great power politics in Cyprus: foreign interventions and domestic perceptions (pp. 85–105). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Stearns, M. (1992). Entangled Allies. US policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. New York: Council on Foreign Relations press. Stergiou, A. (2007). Soviet policy toward Cyprus. Cyprus Review, 19(2), 83–106. Stergiou, A. (2015). The exceptional case of the British military bases on Cyprus. Middle Eastern Studies, 51(2), 285–300. The National Herald  – Staff (2018). White House 1974 Cyprus Meeting: Kissinger Backed Turkey Over Greece. https://www.thenationalherald.com/212131/white-house-1974-cyprusmeeting-kissinger-backed-turkey-over-greece/ Trikkas T. (2009). EDA 1951-1967. To neo prosopo tis aristeras [United Democratic Left 1951– 1967. Left’s new face] Athens, Greece: Themelio Publisher. Xantopoulos-Palamas, C. (1978). Diplomatiko Triptycho [Diplomatic Triptych]. Athens, Greece: Filoi tou Vivliou publishing.

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Primary Sources Cyprus State Archive (Nicosia): folders relating Cyprus’s relations with the Soviet Union and the Non-­ Aligned Movement. Press Information Office of the Republic Cyprus (PIO) -Archive in Nicosia: Party documents.

Germany Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Former East Germany in Berlin (cited as MfAA).

Greece Diplomatic Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cited as HAGFM): Folders on Cyprus, Greek-British relations, NATO, US-Greek relations, Communist Activities, Warsaw Pact, Greek-Turkish Relations.

United States National Archives and Records Administration (cited as NARA): folders on Greece, Turkey, NATO, Eastern Mediterranean, Warsaw Pact.

United Kingdom Public Record Office (PRO) in London 1949–1989: Colonial Office (cited as CO): folders on Cyprus.

Published Primary Sources and Archival Documents Foreign Relations of the United States (cited as FRUS): vol. XVI, 1961–1963, Eastern Europe, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey; vol. XVI, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, 1964–1968; FRUS: 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey 1973–1976.

The Unholy Alliance: Athens Military Regime’s Ties with the Communist Bloc

On the night of April 20–21, 1967, a group of army officers acting on a NATO plan drawn up for use in the event of civil disturbances, seized power in a bloodless coup d’ etat in Athens and installed a military dictatorship. The widespread and continuing perception that this small group of extremist lower-ranking officers had been trained by the CIA for counter-insurgency operations and guided by the US in effectuating coup, is not proved by the current archival documents.1 Rizas (2001), Karakatsanis and Swarts (2018), and Maragkou (2006) have come to the same conclusion. As E. Hatzivassiliou has pointed out, on the morning of the 21st April 1967, the US Embassy in Athens did not even know who these officers were (Hatzivassiliou, 2013, pp. 483–484). Notably, the coup was carried out by three Colonels, who arguably preempted a military coup which might have taken place by more senior generals. The US embassy was certainly aware of rumors of this potential coup planned by certain generals who were well known by the Palace. Despite these rumours that had been circulating in the months prior to April 1967, the United States seems to have not been convinced that any of these plots was likely to be attempted. To the contrary,

1  The CIA, as it is showcased by its intelligence memoranda, the days after the military takeover, does not seem to be aware of what was going on in Athens at these days. CIA releases 2017: “CIA intelligence memorandum on the military takeover April 22 and 26, 1967”. It is noteworthy, however, that the CIA analysts feared an attempt by Greek troops in Cyprus to overthrow the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, and to set up a government more compatible with the new regime in Athens, i.e. more hard-nosed and overtly anti-Communist. That the Americans were caught by surprise, is more obvious in the following State Department’s briefing paper on the coup: …The 21 April coup came as a surprise in spite of tenuous indications from unconfirmed reports that something big was in the wind for that day. It was thought at first that the coup was implementation of the Hawk Plan, in the king’s approval but events soon showed that the takeover was carried out by a group middle grade officers without the knowledge of the high command and the king… RG 59: General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Office for Greece’s affairs: Records relating to Greece 1963–1974, Box 1, “Briefing Paper about the background and current political situation in Greece April 26, 1967”:

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Stergiou, Greece’s Ostpolitik, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61129-3_5

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the position of the embassy was that no coup was the proper solution to the prevailing political instability in the country.2 Moreover, it appears that policy-makers in the State Department, the White House, and US embassy had been consistently opposed — as a matter of principle but also on pragmatic grounds—to any kind of “deviation” from constitutionalism in the tumultuous several years before the coup. It was estimated that a coup, in the instant political context, would likely produce a far worse outcome for Greece and the US than the parliamentary intrigues and instability gripping the mid-­1960s. Some very conservative circles’ argument that the left posed a significant threat to US interests was also met with fundamental scepticism by the United States. Therefore, US policy-makers scornfully derided the Colonels’ justification for their coup that it had been deemed necessary to “save Greece from communism” (Karakatsanis & Swarts, 2018, pp. 202–203). Indeed, 10 days before the coup US Ambassador Phillipe Talbot had informed the Secretary of State about the situation in Greece pointing out that Greece was facing with a choice between (a) a dictatorship of the right, or (b) a radical left-­ leaning Andreas Papandreou-led government which would probably undermine the monarchy and Greece’s ties with the West. He suggested that Papandreou would probably win a majority (rather than merely a plurality), if elections were held as planned. With his father’s health in decline, Papandreou would play the dominant role and could well become a kind of Mediterranean Bhutto or Nasser. Moscow, in this case, would not be slow to take advantage of such a situation. An election resulting in the Center Union wining only a plurality, would be the best solution, since the Center Union would then need to collaborate with the conservative ERE party and thus would exclude Andreas Papandreou from any sensitive cabinet post. …We should encourage (this) diplomatically and with whatever resources can be made available to us…The only way to avoid dictatorship would be by very heavy U.S pressure on Palace, armed forces and rightist politicians….3 On the other hand, according to Soviet propaganda that was naively reproduced and widely spread by the Communist parties in Greece and Cyprus that it became common knowledge in post-dictatorial Greece, NATO was behind the coup. Although Soviet propaganda media were comparatively prompt in their vehement condemnation of the coup, it was not until July 6 that the Kremlin officially published its pronouncement. It implied US collusion in effecting the junta’s seizure of power and depicted the newly established regime as a tool of NATO leaders. It also (correctly as we know today) accused the junta of intending to overthrow President Makarios and to impose a pro-Western military dictatorship on Cyprus. This was aimed, according to the Kremlin, at making Cyprus a major NATO base for ­potential

2  This is the witness of Norbert L. Anschutz, Deputy Chief of the US Mission1964–1967, Athens. Association for Diplomatic Studies: Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Georgetown University Washington D.C. 3  NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), “Report from Rockwell to Battle (April 14, 1967), subject: Crisis in Greece”.

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aggression against the Communist countries, the Arab states, and national liberation movements.4 The Colonels, on their side, tried to masquerade their takeover as a “revolution” to which they necessarily proceeded with a view of abolish the conditions, “which thwarted freedom, parliamentarism and democracy in the country”. The objective of the “revolution” was to avert, at the very last minute, a “threatening civil war”, “which would have had catastrophic effects for the country, for the North Atlantic Alliance and for all the Western world”.5 Immediately after taking power the regime dissolved the parliament, abolished hundreds of labour and youth organisations, imposed a rigid censorship of the press and arrested over 6000 alleged leftists. By naming a civilian, Konstantinos Kollias, to the Premiership, the regime attempted to disguise its essentially military character. Its initial political ineptitude was exceeded only by its extremely conservative, nationalist and anti-Communist outlook (Stebins, 1968, pp. 214–216). In May 1967, Malcolm Kenneth Macmillan, a Scottish Labour Party Member of Parliament, visited Athens and described his impressions in a report sent to the House of Commons. In his view, Greeks overwhelmingly felt deep outrage and betrayal and were utterly opposed to the dictatorship. The dictatorship’ pretence of normalcy and claim to its “acceptance” by the Greek people, were clearly fraudulent, directed to foreign opinion and tourists. In the more “exposed” small towns and villages, so Macmillan wrote, the sense of intimidation and insecurity was general; all political talk was “out”, especially with strangers.6 Thus, it took no long time until the US policy-makers began to worry about “the ongoing Greece’s departure from democratic processes”. From the very beginning of the dictatorship, there were two main schools of thinking within the US State Department officials tasked with dealing with Greece. The first favoured a hard line towards the new regime in Athens, arguing for imposing sanctions with the aim of restoring democracy. The second rather favoured a de-politicised course of “business as usual”.7 In this regard, the suspension of the delivery of certain major items, announced in May 1967, including tanks, aircraft, ships and missiles in the US military assistance program for Greece, a few days after the coup, can be construed as a temporary victory of the first school of thinking. The US tried to indicate some sort of displeasure with the overthrow of the previous constitutional government and

4  See the official Kremlin public pronouncement of 6 July1967 on the Greek military junta in Adams and Cottrell (1968: 50–51). 5  NARA: RG 59 General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Office for Greece’s affairs: Records relating to Greece 1963–1974, Box 1, “Memorandum on the situation in Greece April 26, 1967”. 6  Liddle Hard Archives: “MacMillan’ report to the House of Commons May 18, 1967″. 7  NARA: RG 59 General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Office for Greece’s affairs: Records relating to Greece 1963–1974, Box 1 and: “Correspondence between military and diplomatic officials June, July and August 1967”.

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d­ isassociation from the regime. They also attempted to exercise pressure on the regime to move towards a return to the constitutional processes.8 According to a very optimistic estimate by the US embassy, this displeasure paid dividends very quickly. “Thanks to this pressure”, US officials noted, after the initial phase of the junta, when all the obnoxious aspects of the military takeover were in evidence (arrest of people, censorship etc.), in June 1967 already the situation in Greece “had begun to improve”. The martial law had been lifted. The army had moved out from the cities. The censorship of mail and foreign publication – but not of domestic press- has been relaxed and more than half of the 6100 prisoners have been released. Most importantly, a committee of prominent jurists and lawyers had been appointed to revise the constitution. However, it was concluded, Greek people, and the world at large, disliked the coup. Even though Greece remained a valuable NATO ally, the appraisal went, the regime should be pressured to restore constitutional processes.9 It is likely that those estimations were mainly directed to the US Congress, where the political situation in Greece was the subject of intense discussion. Many reports written by the US embassy or the State Department during the 7 years dictatorship conveyed a very optimistic picture on Greece. The Committee of Foreign Affairs of US Congress convened, shortly after the coup, to examine, whether Greece could or ought to be ousted from NATO. The NATO Treaty itself and the October 22, 1951 protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey into the Alliance did not contain provisions according to which one member could be ousted by the other members. It was argued that in the absence of any exclusion clause, an effort to expel a member state would have to be justified on grounds that this state had breached the Treaty. Examples of such a breach are: (1) the country became a Communist state or (2) the country attacked a NATO member. Since Greece had not committed such a breach, the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the US Congress concluded the United States could not initiate any action to exclude Greece from NATO. It was argued, regarding the violation of the core values of the Alliance, that the principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law, contained in the North Atlantic Treaty were de-emphasised in the Portugal precedent. Portugal also did not qualify as a democratic country with free institutions, yet it had been an unchallenged member since NATO establishment in 1949. However, another aspect was decisive in co-­determining the US Congress stance. Greek expulsion from NATO would cause the United States to lose various privileges such as overflight rights. More importantly it would seriously question the continuation of many US installations, including vital communications facilities. The Committee of Foreign Affairs also dealt with the political and military implications ensuing from the suspension of US military assistance to Greece. Initially, 8  NARA: RG 59: General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Brewster’ background paper on Greece May 22, 1967”. 9  NARA: RG 59 General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Brief Memo of the US embassy in Greece for the Senator Symington ahead of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee session on the situation in Greece June 26, 1967”.

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US military officials estimated that suspension of deliveries of major Military Assistance Program (MAP) items to Greece would not significantly affect NATO forces planning and goals, unless the suspensions extended into 1968. Should deliveries of the suspended items be not restored, military force capabilities would suffer. Greece was either unable or unwilling to cover any deficit by diverting of funds earmarked for economic development and other government programs. A total cutoff of MAP granted support would have a drastic effect, because almost 95 per cent of Greece’s military equipment was of US origin. The elimination of spare parts alone would severely limit Greece’s operational effectiveness. In addition, it also was asserted that should the suspension become permanent, there would be major political implications for Greece and the entire Atlantic Alliance, since Greece would be unable to serve as a mainstay on NATO’s southeastern flank. Without Greece in the NATO, Turkey would be seriously exposed and, having the sole responsibility for maintaining NATO flank, would expect additional military aid. NATO defence planning for Turkey was predicated that the Greek peninsula and islands would remain in friendly hands. Their neutralisation would require a major overhaul of Turkey’s defence planning, because NATO’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean would be seriously weakened strategically and psychologically; …Greece’s withdrawal from NATO in the wake of French withdrawal could conceivably deal a death blow to that organization. The new government might seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union of the type achieved by other non-Communist countries in the Middle East….10 Apart from the West’s geo-strategic concerns linked to Greece’s ouster from NATO, the regime had several windfalls in the following years that strengthened its position: (1) the flare-up of the Greek-Turkish rivalry in the Aegean Sea,11 (2) the Arab-Israeli war, (3) the Soviet naval expansion in the Mediterranean, and (4) the Libyan coup d’ etat that made the US sixth fleet depend more heavily on Greece’s harbours and airfields (Sulzberger, 1970, p. 310).

 NARA: RG 59: General Records of the Department of State 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Brewster’ background paper on Greece May 22, 1967”. 11  In November 1967, the US embassies in Ankara and Athens were instructed to damp down the tensions between the two countries. The Greeks were complaining about Turkish training flights in the Aegean, which in their opinion penetrated deeply into Greek airspace, came within a few miles of the Greek capital and were not conducted in accordance with ICAO (international Civil Aviation Organisation) regulations. The Greek air force was placed in Orange state, a NATO alert condition indicating possible enemy attack within hours. Athens’ estimation was that these actions were part of a concerted Turkish attack including a Turkish press campaign against the minority in Greek Thrace and an increasingly hardened Turkish position on the Cyprus question. The Turks, for their part, claimed that the flights over the Aegean were training exercises and they were conducted according to NATO regulations that were similar to ICAO regulations. Therefore, they argued, those exercises had to take place over the Aegean, since, under NATO regulations, such flights could no longer be operated over the Black Sea. They also claimed that Greeks were trying to turn the Aegean into a “sort of mare nostrum”. NARA: RG 59: General Records of the Department of State 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), “Confidential report on upcoming meeting with the Greek Ambassador Palamas November 14, 1967″. 10

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The outbreak of the Arab-Israeli Six Days War in June 1967 and the total Arab defeat propelled the Soviet Union to deploy significant combined naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean amplifying Greece’s and NATO’s security concerns. Moscow’s acquisition of regular access to Egyptian and Syrian naval facilities enabled it to become a serious regional political and military player. France’ withdrawal from integrated NATO naval and military commands and Italian’s decision to limit allied landing rights policy under the increasing influence of leftist parties further weakened NATO’s weight (Chourchoulis, 2015, p. 19). By June 1967 the US embassy in Athens reported to the State Department how much the Israeli-Arab conflict had dramatised the importance of access to Greek land and air space and the need for cooperation with the Greek government in controlling that space. During the war, the Greek government had granted the United States unrestricted overflight privileges. It also permitted the staging of evacuation craft at Greek airfields and the servicing of such aircraft, it provided blanket permission for Sixth Fleet’s visits to Crete, and it welcomed to Greece thousands of Americans, evacuated from other Middle East countries. Hence, the United States faced a hard reality; One Arab country after another had broken relations with United States, and the number of ports and airfields available to US forces in the area decreased. This background vividly impressed the Americans with the strategic importance of a Greece, friendly to the West, to the US and to NATO.12 Thus, only 6  months after the Colonels’ takeover the State Department concluded that though the coup had marred the image of NATO as an organization of democratic states and deeply disturbed the American public opinion, for several reasons it was advantageous to maintain close relations with Greece: The US should exercise its leverage on the government to move more in the direction of constitutionalism and the restoration of democratic processes; to maintain a high level of military assistance, so that Greece could fulfill its NATO role.13 Greek forces were essential to NATO’s deterrent capability. The Greek army was less mobile and had fewer medium tanks and artillery than the Bulgarian army. Naval effectiveness was limited by obsolescence, but the Greek navy could provide some anti-submarine, mine warfare, and amphibious support. The Greek Air force was more relatively effective, but with the disadvantage of having 50% fewer jet combat aircraft than Bulgaria. Thus, Greece’s capability to meet the Soviet Bloc’s threat, depended almost entirely on US assistance which made up almost all the military capital equipment.14

 NARA: RG 59 General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Brief Memo of the US embassy in Greece for the Senator Symington ahead of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee session on the situation in Greece June 26, 1967”. 13  US policy-makers assumed that pressing for an early return to constitutionalism through aid reductions would have limited impact, causing, instead, general hostility toward helping a nondemocratic regime. NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: “Outline policy paper for National Security Council Meeting, December 26, 1967” 14  NARA: RG 59 General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), “Report on issues involving Greece in forthcoming state-budget bureau consultations October 26, 1967”. 12

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The Colonels tried to take advantage of these US defence considerations, as they sought a resumption of suspended items of the American Military Assistance Program by invoking traditional Cold-War security concerns. So, they referred (1) to Bulgaria, a traditional enemy of Greece and Moscow’s key ally in the region that participated in the military invasion of Czechoslovakia, (2) the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and (3) to the possibility of predatory Soviet moves against Yugoslavia and Romania in the region.15 The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia had indeed a strong phycological impact on American strategy makers, sharply contradicting the global détente spirit that theoretically prevailed in the world politics since early 1960s. US official reports of the late 1968 and 1969 are very much akin to those of late 1940s, where the Civil War in Greece was still raging and there were fears of a large-scale global war. Once again, there were estimates that Greece faced a possible threat of war from the Warsaw Pact nations. Greece’s capability of resisting a concerted attack from those states would be very limited unless it was provided with air and naval reinforcements from NATO and/or the United States. The well-equipped Bulgarian army and air forces were depicted as an effective primary threat to Greece, with less concern about Albania and Yugoslavia. Bulgarian ground forces had a mobilization capability of 12 divisions compared to 9 Greek divisions. Additionally, the suspension of Military Assistance Program deliveries of items had a serious and cumulative impact on Greece’s program to modernise its armed forces.16 Nevertheless, the widespread outcry against the regime by the West, inside and outside the United States and in Congress were imperatives for Washington to push for more civil liberties and constitutional implementation. The more the Colonels turned aside any effort to launch a discussion of plans for moderating the state of siege,17 the more second thoughts were incubated in the US embassy about the regime. For instance, the US Ambassador Talbot suggested to make it apparent that the US did not look on the Papadopoulos government as necessarily the only hope for the future of Greece. Consequently, the US should, moderately, increase both the level and the frequency of contacts with King Constantine and Konstantinos Karamanlis (who had been in Paris since 1963) and encourage other old politicians, like Markezinis, to join the government. Other suggestions were (1) to establish an honest and genuine opposition that would play under the rules of the new constitution; (2) attempting to persuade the Greek government to show greater respect for

 NARA: RG 59 General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), “Confidential report on upcoming meeting with the Greek Ambassador Palamas November 5, 1968”. 16  NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Confidential report on Greece’s defence posture, November 12, 1968” 17  NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “letter from the US Ambassador Phillipe Talbot to Daniel Brewster on his meeting with Papadopoulos, December 31, 1968”. 15

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civil liberties, (3) discreet leaking of information to selected media representatives to help them focus attention on glaring abuses of civil liberties.18 The State Department partially shared the US embassy’s concerns about the junta’s intransigence. They were mainly derived from Greece’s enhanced strategic value in an unstable region, especially after the deteriorating situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya’s revolution that jeopardized the retention of US Wheelus airbase and Lebanon’s trouble. However, it was concluded that the risks and the feasibility of trying to oust the junta, were still greater that those in attempting to prod it into becoming politically more acceptable to the Greek people and to the Atlantic community. If continued efforts over the next 6–8 months to persuade the regime to move more convincingly toward representative government should prove fruitless, the US would probably have to consider alternative courses with heavier pressure.19 1968–1969 were difficult years for the US-Greek relations because of the geopolitical uncertainty prompted by the Warsaw pact invasion in Prague, but also for reasons related to junta’s ruling modus operandi. For instance, the extensive purging of the military and civilian bureaucracies had led to mounting frustrations of the displaced political and intellectual elements with whom the United States had worked closely in rebuilding the recumbent economy after the Truman Doctrine up to the early 1960s. It had prompted a growing distaste for the present Greek regime by political groups in other NATO countries. Shortly before Ambassador Talbot left Greece in early 1969, he summarised the relations between the United States and Greece in recent years: “…It is important to remember that we have faced the dilemma of having to deal with a regime of tarnished reputation at a time when the Middle East situation, increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and the dangerous tensions in the Warsaw Pact area and the contiguous ‘gray zone’ have made our strategic reliance on privileges and facilities granted us in Greece greater than ever. In the circumstance, I believe we have done well to begin delinking restrictions on military assistance from our effort to get the Greek regime to move forward politically as did Turkey in the years after the military coup of 1960…”.20 The regime’s anticommunist rhetoric and self-label as “a bulwark against Slav expansionism to the Mediterranean and as a revolution that had averted the danger

 NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Exchange of letters between US Ambassador Phillipe Talbot and Daniel Brewster, December 1968”. 19  NARA: RG 59, Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: “Briefing report from R.D. McClelland to the new US Ambassador in Greece Tasca (December 1, 1969), subject U.S.  Policy toward Greece: Some Tactical Considerations”. 20  NARA: RG 59, Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Report by the US Ambassador Phillipe Talbot for Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and upcoming new US Ambassador in Greece, February 11, 1969”. 18

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of another bloody round with the Communists” increased after Richard Nixon became President of the United States in January 1969.21 However, the Nixon administration initially followed a less favourable course to the junta than had President Johnson. The embargo on heavy weapon that was lifted in October 1968 was re-imposed, the post of Ambassador was left unfilled for almost a year, and highly critical statements were made by US key officials. In June 1969, President Nixon’s advisors presented three option pertaining to the Greek Military Aid Program: Option 1: Cut it off; Option 2: Ship non-major items but continuing suspending major military items; 3: Resume full military aid.22 From September 1969 onward, the Nixon administration became more favourable. The nomination of Ambassador Henry Tasca resulted in cleansing of those embassy members who had been critical of the regime. Not to mention the September 1970 Nixon’s lift of the embargo on heavy arms (Goldbloom, 1972, pp. 246–248). During the following years, Washington became more and more accommodating to the regime for pure strategic reasons which dominated the negligible US economic or political interests. The October 1969 Memorandum on the Military Supply Policy toward Greece illuminates the current policy: (1) Greece’s military forces (160,000 men) were viewed as capable of a conventional defense against attack by Bulgaria (159,000 men) without significant US assistance or the use of nuclear weapons. Besides defending Greece itself, these forces could help divert Warsaw Pact forces or substitute for US forces in a US-Soviet conflict. (2) Greece could provide base and staging rights to the US for the Middle East. It was generally believed that the US bases in Greece were both suitable and available for the staging of humanitarian, peace-keeping or military intervention missions. With the increasing restriction on US use of its bases in Libya or Turkey, the US had no other bases near the Middle East with comparable ease-of-access. (3) Greece also provided the US and NATO with a number of military facilities including communication links for the 6th Fleet and Turkey, and logistics bases for their support.23 This scheme of the US policy toward the regime oscillated between opportunist calculations and disapproval. The suspension of supplies of heavy military equipment was abortively removed, either covertly by various administrative manipulations or overtly during the Czechoslovakian crisis of August–September 1968. The various expression of disapproval, occasionally uttered by the State Department, were clouded by frequent visits to Athens by American admirals, generals or congressmen, sponsored by pro-junta Greek-American diaspora organisations. For its

  FRUS 1969–1976: Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, “Memorandum of Conversation with Greek Ambassador Palamas, Washington, March 1, 1969”. 22   FRUS 1969–1976: Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Subject: Military Sales to Greece Washington, June 14, 1969”. 23  FRUS 1969–1976: Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, “Draft Memorandum for the President, Washington, October 7, 1969. Subject: Military Supply Policy Toward Greece—The Issues”. 21

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part the regime provided special legal tools to attract investments by US firms (Xydis, 1972, pp. 195–199). In the meantime, the increased Soviet military strength in the Mediterranean put NATO on higher alert, as it continued to regard the Soviet presence as a direct threat to its Southern flank. The regular Report for the Future Tasks of NATO for 1967 warned the Alliance that despite the détente they could not consider themselves assured against the danger of armed conflict; military planning had to account for the risk of deliberate attack. The possibility of hostilities arisen by accident or miscalculation, escalating to greater intensity, should also be considered. The report states that NATO countries continued to require formidable military capabilities to cover the full spectrum of potential conflicts. They also should sustain and modernise the collective strength of the Alliance to maintain deterrence and create the security climate indispensable to progress towards a permanent political settlement in Europe.24 In December 1968, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, General Lauris Norstad, received, upon his request, a report on the political situation in Greece and Greek military’s army current condition. The report, authored by the officer Orestis Vidalis, provides insights into the then Greek military. According to Vidalis, the regime undertook serious efforts to neutralise opposition inside and outside Greece. In Great Britain and in the United States, the Colonels hired public relations experts and invited prominent personalities of the Greek-American Community to Greece receiving “red-carpet treatment”. The regime enjoyed large support from the army. In the navy and in the air force, however, the number of members and supporters for the junta was negligible; these branches were monarchists. Moreover, Vidalis inserted, the junta established a political/security hierarchy in the military, “from the unit level to the top, entirely different from the chain of command”. These units controlled and reported through their own channels all items pertaining to the security aims of the junta as a political organisation. The degree of loyalty to the junta varied. There was a small group of staunch junta supporters and a number of junior officers and low-rank officers who lent support to the regime. Those officers were font of the slogans of the junta, their promotion, the increased pay, as well as their expanded responsibilities. A large number of officers disliked or were indifferent to the regime. However, these officers did not incubate any intention to act against the regime. Finally, there were many high-rank officers who vigorously disliked the regime but were neutralised or unable to carry out any action against it.25 In general, the NATO Alliance was not very critical of the regime. When the then Danish Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jens Otto Krag, tried to raise the Greek question in a NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris in May 1967, the Secretary-­  NATO archive: “Report from the Secretary General to the Permanent Representatives October 18, 1967, subject: Study on the future tasks of the Alliance: transmission of resume of rapporteurs report”. 25  Lauris Norstad papers: Box 129, “Vidalis’ Personal and Confidential Report for General Norstad December 13, 1968″. 24

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General of the Alliance, Manlio Brosio, turned it down, as an unacceptable ­interference in the internal affairs of a member country, arguing, instead, that the military coup did not affect the Alliance as such. A similar fate had befallen later the West Germany Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Bradt’s initiative. Approximately half of the members expressed strong concerns about the political situation in Greece. Though many countries proposed a suspension of Greece’s participation in manoeuvres with NATO forces, or concerns about the issue of democracy,26 they supplied their dissatisfaction with the regime only individually, not collectively (Trehold, 1972, pp. 216–217). European parliamentarians, sitting at the North Atlantic Assembly, a cosmetic body of the NATO Alliance, rebuked the regime. However, the North Atlantic Council of Ministers could afford to ignore these motions (Stefanidis, 2016/2017, pp. 176–177). Contrary to the American and NATO “pragmatic” policy towards Greece, many West European countries individually adopted a critical stance. Initially, Bonn was reluctant to criticise the Colonels, as many German businessmen did very lucrative deals with the regime (Miroschnikoff, 1969, p. 36). After the Social Democrats came to power in 1969, and Willy Bradt took over the Chancellorship, Bonn also adopted a hostile stance to the Athens’ regime, conniving with or supporting, in some cases exiled Greek resistance groups operating from Germany. The only blatant West German exception was the prominent, ultra conservative Bavarian politician, Josef Strauss, leader of the Christian Social Union party, who assisted the Colonels in many ways (Richter, 2013, pp. 374). Other Western European countries (Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Belgium) likewise followed this course of criticism and disapproval,27 resorting either to diplomatic demarches or to critical public statements, or even to restriction of actual diplomatic exchanges. The Greek diplomatic envoys in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm were withdrawn for a long time. The career Ambassadors in Paris and London (initially nominees of the regime) were replaced by retired generals, probably because they did not properly advertise the regime. In Germany, where the Greek embassy and consulates became involved in Greek secret police operations against Greek oppositions figures, students, politicians and workers, demonstrations and even bomb attacks were conducted against them (Xydis, 1972, pp. 195–199). In May 1967, the European Economic Community executive also decided to withhold the balance of the development loans due to Greece and to freeze any progress to full membership.28  NARA releases 2005: Telegram of the US embassy in Brussels to Washington and other US embassies Subject: Issue of Democracy in Greece, November 30, 1973″. 27  The US Ambassador in Greece, Talbot, suggested that the State Department should devote some attention to advising their NATO allies (primarily Norway and Denmark who were the most vociferous against the regime) against allowing domestic politicking to prejudice international security. NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Telegram of the US Ambassador Phillipe Talbot to Daniel Brewster January 2, 1969”. 28  However, the European Economic Community continued the process of reducing the tariffs and 26

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The Council of Europe turned against the junta, once it became aware of its use of torture and the abolishment of civil liberties. Concerns about the legitimacy of Greece’s being part of the Council, very soon began to spread among its members; this resulted in criticism of the junta’s disregard for human rights, and in a planned expulsion from the organisation. In turn, the Colonels withdrew participation in the Council of Europe, prior to the anticipated expulsion, in hopes of avoiding the ignominy and entertaining international criticism of the regime (Stefanidis, 2016/2017, pp. 176–177). Although the Papadopoulos government was indisputably in control of the country, after the Strasbourg fiasco, it was compelled to back off from some already planned moves, as it was the decision to execute the opposition figure Panagoulis29 and to send Theodorakis back to the Peloponnesian mountains (exile). The US embassy in Greece was thus convinced that the apprehension resulting from the Soviet move against Czechoslovakia would overshadow any criticism of Greece’s internal politics, and highlight the country’s strategic, military importance to the Alliance. Even so, the Greek government’s persisting failure to make any progress toward representative, democratic government represented a potential danger to NATO.30 As the Colonels lacked legitimacy in the Western community of states (Spain’s Foreign Minister’s visit in August 1971 was the only one by a Western European Minister during the time of the dictatorship) and experienced increasing political, if not economic, isolation from Western Europe, the regime started looking for alternatives in Eastern Europe and the Third world. This was not a well-designed, long-­ term strategy, but rather an array of piecemeal initiatives without taking into consideration Greece’s position in the world power politics. Lacking any experience in foreign affairs, the Colonels invited three older experienced diplomats to head the foreign ministry: Pavlos Economou-Gouras in 1967, Panayiotis Pipinelis in 1967–1970 and Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas in 1970–1972. The Foreign Minister in 1970–1973 was officially the mastermind of the military coup, Georgios Papadopoulos. These experienced diplomats might have believed that the diplomatic service could maintain some autonomy. However, soon they realised that the country’s foreign policy was subject of utter populism (Hatzivassiliou, 2013, pp. 484–485). Panagiotis Pipinelis had had long experience in Balkan affairs. Drawing on preand post-war experiences, and assisted by competent diplomats, Pipinelis used effectively international and Balkan parameters to work out tangible relations with the Balkan neighbours both on the economic and political level. After his death in 1970, his successor further fostered this policy, which resulted in the signing of

barriers in the trade transactions that resulted in a significant increase of imports from EEC countries’ goods into the Greek market. 29  In August 1968, Alekos Panagoulis made an assassination attempt on Papadopoulos. He was arrested and condemned to death but the execution was never carried out. 30  NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Telegram of the US Ambassador Phillipe Talbot to Daniel Brewster January 2, 1969”.

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v­ arious agreements providing for an annual convocation of mixed inter-Ministerial commissions (Palamas 1978, pp. 275–282). An important factor facilitating the rapprochement between the East Bloc and the Greek dictators was the détente. In the early 1970s, the European countries began to orientate themselves to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which eventually took place in July 1973 in Helsinki, with the participation of Foreign Ministers of 33 European countries and the United States. A necessary condition for the success of the conference was the unconditional participation of all European states; any kind of opposition to the southern European dictatorial regimes of Portugal, Spain and Greece would be counter-productive. On the other side, Eastern European countries welcomed this rapprochement despite the downside of the legitimisation of a staunch anti-Communist dictatorial regime in order to satisfy their own interests (for instance ending their marginalisation following the Prague Spring) (Maragkou, 2014, p. 653). Moreover, the Soviet Bloc sought to take advantage of its relations with the regime by demonstrating its technological and economic achievements. In the Soviet propagandist discourse, the Western capitalist states paid a high tribute to them by trying to establish ties with Communist states despite its ideological aversion in order to gain benefits from the Soviet technological superiority (Wallden, 2009). Furthermore, the Communist countries tentatively started to realise that the Greek junta was not a temporary regime they could afford not to deal with (Rizas, 2006, pp. 164–167). The regime’s plan for its relations with the “hateful Communists” was more ambitious. It was seeking to accomplish two objectives, domestic consolidation, through international respectability and economic aid, to startle Greece’s traditional allies in the West and pay back for their rejections. For instance, in 1971 the Alternate Greek Foreign Minister, Palamas, tried to come to an understanding with Bulgaria and with Romania on its old plan on the establishment of a Balkan nuclear free zone. At the same time, it threatened his NATO allies by half-implying that Greece had other options if “the malevolence” shown towards it continued (Pedaliu, 2017, pp. 208–211). In 1970, the CIA appears to share the Soviet Bloc’s conclusion about the stability of the regime. The authoritarian, anti-Communist regime was likely to rule Greece for the next several years, though some fairly remote contingencies existed which could bring about its downfall. CIA analysts estimated that relations with the USSR would probably remain correct but distant: “there had been very little open hostility displayed by either side towards the other”. The Soviets and their allies, CIA analysts concluded, had been careful to seek good bilateral relations with the Greek regime and had restrained Greek Communist party members inside the country from attacking it. At the same time, the CIA analysts observed, that Communist propagandists had sought to weaken NATO by exploiting the widespread West European distaste for the Papadopoulos government and Greek Communists exiled in Eastern Europe had bitterly attacked the regime in black radio broadcasts. Thus, so the appraisal went, when the Greeks deemed it to their advantage they would from time to time reach agreements, principally economic, with the Soviets and East Europeans. If they deemed the US was not forthcoming in arms supplies, they

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would suggest that they may seek Soviet military equipment and closer political ties. The regime’s relations with some NATO countries, notably Holland, Denmark, and Norway, would also remain strained and the United States would incur some onus in these and other West European countries for any support given the regime. But the Alliance itself was not likely to rupture because of the Greek issue. The regime would continue to value good relations with the US and continue looking to it for military aid, but would approach France and West Germany if necessary.31 The advent of Greek junta’s Ostpolitik should be dated from the spring of 1968, when the then Greek Foreign Minister Panagiotis Pipinelis officially proposed the establishment of a Balkan code of good conduct. The concept embraced non-­ interference in domestic affairs of other countries and close relations with Eastern Europe. At the same time, one of the chief figures of the regime, Stylianos Patakos, proposed a peace plan for Southeastern Europe, disregarding any differences in political and social systems. His original proposal was met with indifference. The first Balkan countries’ responses to the coup of April 1967 were hypercritical, which led to a period of almost 2 years of actual freezing of bilateral relations (Stergiou, 2001, 119–120). After the events in Czechoslovakia and Albania’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, however, Pipinelis’ propositions gained attractiveness. Eastern European countries interpreted. The installation of dictatorship in Greece as the natural development of the bourgeois state, a symptom of the crisis within the capitalist world. Many non-Moscow-led moderate West-European leftist intellectuals, such as Nikos Poulatzas, shared grosso modo this interpretation. In his book The Crisis of the Dictatorships. Portugal, Greece and Spain. Poulatzas used the dependence theory32 to analyse the installation of the dictatorships in Southern Europe. He argued that those regimes were the outcome from their dependence on the imperialist metropolises in the present phase of imperialism. Simultaneously Poulatzas criticised Soviet Bloc countries for their trade and diplomatic exchange with the Colonels’ junta (Poulatzas, 1976, p. 39). The Soviet Bloc countries varied in their embrace of the opening. The Czechoslovak crisis and the subsequent announcement of the Brezhnev doctrine had once again cooled Belgrade-Moscow relationship and had underscored the

 CIA releases 2017: Central Intelligence Agency Office of national estimates, “Memorandum, subject; Greece, Europe, and the US 23 April 197O”. 32  The Dependence Theory was a very popular theoretical approach in the 1950s and 1960s with which many scholars of Marxist origin attempted to explain the lack of development in the Third World. According to its main theoretical assumptions, the metropolitan Capitalist countries exploited the underdeveloped countries by producing some sort of economic dependency. The economic underdevelopment was mainly caused by the peripheral position of affected countries in the world economy. Poor countries offered cheap labour and raw materials on the world market which, in turn, were reaped by advanced Capitalist economies. Subsequently, capitalistically advanced states transformed them into finished goods and sold them to capitalistically underdeveloped countries. The poor countries purchased these finished products at high prices, depleting the capital they could otherwise devote to upgrading their own productive capacity. In order to secure and this economic dependency, thereby consolidating the exploitation of those countries, the metropolitan Capitalist countries did not hesitate to impose dictatorships with which they could collaborate politically and economically. 31

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value of the Greek connection as an additional link to the West. Romania’s new course toward Greece lent Bucharest a degree of independency in its international relations. Isolated Albania saw in a possible improvement with Greece an opportunity to break its isolation and gain access to the Western world (Kofos 1991, pp. 100–102). Prompted by a non-ideological pragmatism, Greece and Communist countries set up a new relationship despite the adversarial rhetoric they were using domestically. By spreading doubts about the actual orientation of the regime and showing the dangerous consequences this criticism may have, the Colonels apparently tried to silence their external critics by using a kind of blackmail. This policy suited Eastern European countries. So they began to build up their relations with the junta on the basis of peaceful coexistence between different political and social systems. Simultaneously, they supported the Greek Communists but this was not regarded as problem, even despite the fact that this ambiguous policy created disillusionment between the Greek Communist movement.33 While the Eastern Bloc press and radio harshly attacked the junta the regime profited from the reciprocal visits of Foreign Ministers with most of the Eastern European countries (Xydis, 1972, pp. 199–200). From the early 1970 onwards, Greece began signing trade agreements with various Communist countries such as Bulgaria and Romania; agreements with other Soviet Bloc countries followed. The regime granted a privileged status to the Soviets that made them highly competitive on the Greek market. More precisely, the Greek government unilaterally reduced duties by 50% on many Soviet products, totaling value $4,3 million. In response, the Soviets promised to give Greece technical aid for projects along the Bulgarian border and began buying more Greek tobacco. Though the Soviets made limited use of this regulation, this practice was considered to be a violation of GATT rules. Therefore, Greece was convinced and punished for this by the GATT watchdog (Wallden, 2009, pp. 298–303). In the 1970s some Greek Eastern Bloc countries joint ventures materialised. Trade with the Eastern Bloc continued to be a means to diminish surpluses of agricultural products, especially after the freezing of the Association Agreement with the European Economic Community that affected Greek exports. Purchases of Eastern capital equipment increased and economic ties were fostered in sectors such as tourism, water management, transport, etc. Nevertheless, on the whole the percentage of Eastern Europe in Greek foreign trade decreased sharply. The total volume of exports dropped from 28% to 16% in 1974. This was not a result of the regime’s policies, but of the transformation of the Greek economy initiated in the 1960s. After 1966, several new export-oriented industrial units began boosting Greek exports to the West (aluminum and alumina, steel and petrochemical products, ferro-nickel et  al.) thereby reducing the need for exporting agricultural ­products. In the overall East-West trade volume, Greece’s trade with the Eastern Bloc went back from 1,9% in 1966 to 1,0% in 1974. Greece’s most important trade partners were the USSR (24%) and Yugoslavia (23%). The share of Czechoslovakia,

33

 Personal Communication with Grigoris Farakos (Athens, September 1999).

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Romania, Poland and East Germany was 8 to 10%, Hungary 6%, Albania 0,6%, China 0,4%. Nevertheless between 1967 and 1974 Greece continued to be one of the countries with the highest export dependence on Communist countries (Wallden, 2009, pp. 247–250). The year 1970 marks the real turning point in Greece’s relations with the Soviet Bloc. Relations considerably improved until the end of 1973 and declined in 1974. Greek alternate Foreign Minister, Palamas, seems to have played a very conducive role in this rapprochement. He was convinced that Greece had retained in its foreign policy a residue of the civil war that was not opportune anymore. His first overtures to Moscow did not find fertile ground. Only by 1970 he managed to establish a linkage with Moscow on the issue of the European Security Conference, which was persistently promoted by the Soviet Union (Rizas, 2013, pp. 72–73). Some months after the military coup, Moscow had accepted the accreditation of the new Ambassador of the Hellenic Republic, thereby granting recognition da facto to the regime (Drakoularakos, 1989, pp. 147–166). In 1969, representatives of the regime had made positive statements about the possibility of closer ties and the renewal of trade agreements with the Eastern European countries. Furthermore, contrary to the Western European countries’ boycott of the European Athletics championship held that year in Athens the Communist countries participated with extraordinary large teams. Before the games, Moscow had issued an official statement warning Athens against anti-Communist propaganda (Wallden, 2009, pp. 111–114). The junta’s opening to the Soviet Union perplexed the West. This was expressed in various articles published in Western newspaper outlets. The award of a survey of peat usage (paid with Greek tobacco) to Soviet technicians of the peat fields near Philippi, northwest of the port of Kavala in northern Greece, was construed as galling reversal of policy. These fields were the frequent site for NATO manoeuvres. Although the Russians were known experts in exploiting this fuel, previous Greek Governments had refused to let Soviet technicians roam the militarily vulnerable strip land that separates Bulgaria from the Aegean (Modiano, 1970). In May 1973, the two countries officially signed the contract earmarking the production of 375 MV electricity in value of $90 million, the biggest project Greece had ever awarded to a Communist country. In January of the same year, the Greek and Soviet governments agreed on the inauguration of direct flight and train connections between Athens and Moscow (Wallden, 2009, pp. 202–205). Western reactions to this opening were exaggerated. The Colonels used relations with Communist countries mainly for propaganda purposes. The junta’s opening toward the Communist states fitted the regime’s attempt to project a Nasserist self-­ image, accommodating thus nationalism and socialist reforms. However, their real goal was to counteract West European pressure for restoration of democracy and civil liberties, as well as spread confusion among left opposition forces. Still, as also a valuable source from the then Soviet Foreign Ministry confirmed,34 Moscow was

34

 Personal communication with Victor Olenchenko, head of the consular department of the USSR

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well aware that Colonels’ opening to the Eastern Bloc was not very honest and heralded no serious change in Greece’s orientation to the West. Moscow just wished a good relationship and did not expect any spectacular developments to ensue over this. The rapprochement had trade benefits for both, but it was never translated into a remarkable change of Greece’s defence and foreign policy. When the Greek military regime decided in February 1972 to grant extensive port facilities in Attica to the US Sixth Fleet,35 the Soviets reacted angrily. Greek Foreign Minister, Palamas,36 opposed it, convinced that this would jeopardise relationships with the Soviet Bloc and the Arab World, despite facing strong reactions from the United States (Palamas 1978, p. 284). Pravda articles ensuing in the next months condemned the regime for putting Greek territory at the disposal of “the most militantly inclined NATO circles” and for converting Piraeus into “a permanent base for sixth fleet”. In giving the US a naval base, the regime was accused of having done what previous governments had not risked, even in the days of the Marshall plan and the Truman doctrine. However, with the various Greek-Soviet air and rail agreements the cooperation was still continuing.37 The Colonels takeover led to estrangement with Yugoslavia, with previous agreements being cancelled. The Macedonia issue continued to strain bilateral relations, as many Greeks, especially in the North, believed that Belgrade was creating an

in Greece during the 1970s and 1980s (Moscow September 2015). 35  According to Rodger Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, the establishment of a homeport in Piraeus for the Sixth Fleet was highly relevant to the deterrent stance of NATO and the influence of the United States on the European continent and hence of paramount importance to the preservation of the Western influence and position in Europe as well as in the Mediterranean. Athens-Piraeus were chosen over alternative ports in the Mediterranean for an array of reasons: (1) The Greek people were extremely hospitable and welldisposed toward Americans; (2) There was a mutuality of interests in the security area; Davis assumed that though it was probably inevitable that homeporting would be seen by some as an act of support for the Greek regime and there was the fear that certain elements, including the Soviets, would misconstrue the motive for propaganda reasons, this was actually an administrative measure to ameliorate a human problem. It was a measure that did not involve development of major new facilities or base rights, but it was purely designed to improve the living conditions and morale of American servicemen, thereby allowing the Sixth Fleet to meet its commitments in the Mediterranean within stringent budgetary limits. ΝΑΡΑ: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963– 1974: “Statement by Rodger Davies, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs before the subcommittees of Europe and the Near East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee March 8, 1972”. 36  Spyros Markezinis, who served for a short time as Prime Minister in 1973, was also critical of homeporting in the Athens area, as he also attached great importance to Greek-Arab relations, which at the time contradicted US interests in the region. NARA: RG 59: General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Office for Greece’s affairs: Records relating to Greece 1963–1974, “Report of the US Ambassador, Tasca, on US-Greek relations, November 24, 1973” 37  NARA releases 2005: “Telegram of the US Embassy in Moscow to the US Embassy in Athens, subject: Soviet attitude toward Greece March 30, 1973”

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artificial nationality in the Yugoslav federal state of Macedonia.38 In January 1971, a bomb detonated in the Greek consulate in Skopje, the capital of the federal state. Political bilateral relations warmed up after the Greek Foreign Minister, Xanthopoulos-Palamas visited Belgrade in September 1971 which was reciprocated by his Yugoslav opposite Minister Tepavac. Trade ties remained strong until the end of dictatorship in 1974 (Sfetas, 2018, pp. 118–119). At the culmination of the Cypriot crisis in August 1974, shortly after the collapse of Junta, Yugoslavian President Tito sent the Foreign Minister Milos Minie to Athens to hand over to the new Prime Minister Karamanlis a message: Belgrade was taking side with Greece, refused to accept the fait accomplis created by the Turkish invasion and asked for the reestablishment of an independent and unaligned Republic of Cyprus and the restoration of the Makarios government (Aleifantis, 1987, pp. 106–107). Greek-Bulgarian contacts also flourished. Initially, the Bulgarian leadership also complied with the common Socialist countries’ course of isolating the regime. The US-Greek homeporting agreement strained further the bilateral ties. Reciprocal visits at high government level tentatively brought about a thaw in the bilateral relations.39 The main factors accounted for Sofia’s cordial policy toward Greece were (1) the need to counterbalance Romanian domination in Balkan affairs, (2) to prevent a potential Greek–Albanian reconciliation, and (3) to deflect China’s attempts to increase its presence in the Balkans. In 1973, the Foreign Ministers of both countries signed agreements that allowed Sofia to open a consulate general in Thessaloniki and to gain an easier access to its port. In turn, Greece received the right to open a consulate general in Bulgaria’s second largest city Plovdiv. The Declaration on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation, signed simultaneously, was the first political agreement between a NATO and a Warsaw Pact country in the Balkans (Kostadinova, 2014, pp. 331–332). Already in the 1960s Washington appears to have deduced that the time had come for Greece to improve its relations with Albania and settle their bilateral issues, as Tirana did not stand under Soviet influence anymore. Encouraged by Washington Athens Athens undertook an opening to the neighbouring country and the Albanian leadership responded positively. In January 1970 the two countries signed a trade agreement of $1500.000 in Paris that paved the way for full normalisation of their relations. In February an exchange of cordial statements in those Albanian and Greek press outlets that functioned as the mouthpieces of the two regimes, further fostered the rapprochement. Eventually, in May 1971, Greece and Albania announced the resumption of diplomatic relations after a 30 years hiatus. As Tirana did not proceed to any concessions regarding the right of Greek minority living in South Albania, it is astonishing that the Greek deeply nationalist regime was so accommodating (Ntagios, 2015, pp. 273–278). After the normalisation that  NARA releases 2005: “Telegram of the US consulate in Thessaloniki to the Secretary of State, US embassy in Athens and Belgrade, subject: Greek-Yugoslavian relations March 23, 1973”. 39  NARA releases 2005: “Telegram of the US embassy in Sofia to the Secretary of State and to the US embassy in Athens, subject: Bulgarian Foreign Minister to visit Greece”. 38

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did not include a lift of the state of war between the two countries, the bilateral trade grew impressively. From 1971 and until the collapse of junta in 1974, Albanian exports to Greece had multiplied 14 times and Greek exports to Albania 26 times (Nafpliotis, 2009, p. 130). As Albania had been a de facto ally of Communist China, Greece began to consider a reappraisal of its Chinese policy. The two countries reached an agreement in May 1972 to establish diplomatic relations on the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, and mutual interests. The normalisation of bilateral relations required recognition of the Peoples Republic of China by Greece government as China’s sole legitimate government. Greece thus adopted the principle of “one-China” policy. In turn, Athens was required to terminate its “official” relations with Taiwan. One important reason accounting for the Greek-Chinese rapprochement was the desire of Greek ship owners, a powerful lobby, to conduct business with the China. China was particularly interested in taking advantage of the sizable merchant Greek fleet in furthering Chinese seaborne trade (Chourchoulis, 2019, pp. 62–84). Greek-Romanian relations unfolded in a very unusual way. Bucharest isolated both in the Eastern and the Western world, responded very cordially to Greece’s initial overtures to the Communist world. In 1966, the two countries already had concluded a treaty for cooperation in trade, shipping, industry, communications and cultural relations. After a short break in 1967–1968, during which Bucharest castigated the coup and the ensuing regime, bilateral contacts were resumed in October 1969. That same month the Greek Minister of Trade paid an official visit to Bucharest, reciprocated in December 1970 by the Romanian Minister of Trade. In the context of the latter’s visit, the two countries proceeded into the renewal of their previous trade agreement with one of five-years. A series of high-level official visits continued. The most important one played out in July 1971, when the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manescu, visited Athens to discuss further bilateral technical, economic and cultural cooperation (Trehold, 1972, pp. 221–225). This visit was reciprocated by the Greek deputy Foreign Minister’s visit in Bucharest, in November 1971. Ceauşescu himself twice extended an official invitation to Papadopoulos. Ceauşescu’s scheduled visit to Athens was cancelled following the events at the Athens Technical University in November 1973.40 The Greek communist movement split in 1968 proved very conducive to the rapprochement. Romania was the country in which both the outlawed KKE leadership had its main residence in exile and a large number of Civil War refugees had settled. In the late 1960s, the accumulated animosities and feuds within the party came into full display. The conflict leading to the split, was played out at the highest level in Budapest, where the twelfth plenum of the KKE met in February 1968. The two rivalling fractions – the so-called “domestic” one, the underground Eurocommunist organisation acting within Greece- and the “overseas”, or “exile” fraction, which  NARA: US Department of State: “Telegram of the US Embassy in Bucharest to the Secretary f Stare about the postponement of Ceaucsescu’ visit to Athens in November 1993 due to the Student disturbances November 1973″

40

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continued to remain a stalwart of Moscow’s line, clashed heavily during the plenum. The “exiled” fraction enjoyed Soviet support, while the Eurocommunist fraction had the support of the Romanian communist party which since 1965 under the leadership of Ceausescu had steered into a collision course with the USSR. Thus, the “exiles” was forced to leave Bucharest and relocate the party headquarters on more secure ground. One part of the party machinery headed to Budapest. The most important part, however, including the propaganda apparatus, resettled in the German Democratic Republic. The latter took on what Romania wanted, to get rid of the protection of the Greek Communist party which was opposed to the Athens regime (Stergiou, 2011). The GDR was the optimal place for relocation of the Greek Communist party, because, apart from Albania, was the only “people’s democracy” which had no diplomatic relations with Greece. There was no danger of jeopardising any relations with Greece by providing shelter to the “ultimate state enemy”. Nevertheless, like other Communist countries East Germany was also pursuing a rapprochement with Greece at the same time. Hence, “the proletarian solidarity” was associated with considerable political risk. From 1970 onwards, the economic relations between Greece and the GDR improved rapidly. In that year, Greece decided to ramp up the establishment of a permanent Greek trade mission in East Berlin laying the foundation of a de facto recognition of the Pankow regime (Stergiou, 2011). In December 1972, West and East Germany signed the so-called Grundlagenvertrag [Basic treaty], that provided for the normalisation of their relations. The latter marked the formal abandonment of Bonn’s claims to speak for all of Germany. This eliminated what had been a serious obstacle to the recognition of East Germany (Wentker, 2007, pp. 339–345). In this context, and in a very rare, tragicomic coincidence in the modern European history, in 1973, two events simultaneously happened: While Greece and East Germany concluded successfully negotiations aimed at establishing official diplomatic relations, the exiled Communist party initiated in GDR its reorganisation. While in East Germany, after the 1968 split, Greek Communists had been preparing for their struggle against the junta that had imprisoned or exiled almost all the party cadres or sympathisers that had been in Greece. The reorganisation process culminated in the convention of the historic 9th Congress of the party the same year, which was held under extreme clandestine conditions in the GDR in December 1973.41 The conclusion of diplomatic relations between the GDR and the Greek fascists was a heavy blow for the Greek Communists, especially for those who were being imprisoned at the time.42 Their German comrades pursued a realpolitik at the expense of “proletarian internationalism”.

 Personal Communication with Thanasis, Georgiou: Correspondent of the newspaper Rizospastis, mouthpiece of the Greek Communist Party in Berlin at the time (Berlin, March 1998). 42  Personal Communication with Grigoris Farakos (Athens, September 1999. 41

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Junta’s ties with the other East European countries were confined to trade. In February 1970 Poland organised a major book exhibition in Athens and consistently sent large representations to the Thessaloniki International fair. The Middle East policy of the regime vacillated between Greece’s traditional friendly attitude to the Arab countries and the junta’s desire not to hinder United States support for Israel. Greece had followed an Arab-friendly policy in the Near East since the Second World War. This course aimed at serving some of Greece’s vital interests, such as the protection of prosperous Greek communities living in the Arab countries, securing cheap Arab oil, support in the Cyprus question, control of the Jerusalem Patriarchate, as well as the unrestricted passage through the Suez Canal. The Arab states, Egypt in particular, threatened Greece that if it supported the partition of Palestine by recognising the state of Israel, severe measures would be taken against members of the large Greek community in Egypt. These measures would target Greeks in other Arab states and hit hard the Greek Orthodox Church, which had many followers and considerable property in the Arab world. Despite being under US economic and political hegemony in the late 1940s, Greece withstood US pressure to vote in favour of Palestinian partition and the creation of the Israeli state at the United Nations in 1947–48 and kept supporting the Arabs in the following decades. Greece’s wish to elicit Arab support on the Cyprus issue in the United Nations was also a major reason behind Greece’s stance (Israel State Archives 1984: 546–547; 1986: 513–515, 530, 664–666 and 735–737). The Colonels, despite some antisemitism due to their far right ideological and political orientation, admired the Israeli military mighty. Therefore, they proceeded into a significant improvement of Greece’s stance toward the Jewish state. They did not dare to normalise fully relations with Israel, but they did appoint, for the first time, a full Ambassador as “diplomatic agent” in Jerusalem, simultaneously endeavouring to maintain Greece’s traditional relation to the Arab world. This contradictory policy came on full display in September 1970, when the United States asked the junta to grant facilities for passage and refuelling both for US planes that were flying to Jordan to evacuate American nationals, and for US military reconnaissance planes able to fly over Arab countries. This concession cost Greece much of the good will it had earned with the Arab world (Xydis, 1972, pp. 204–205). By the end of 1973, the Balkan détente ran out of steam. Superpower détente, together with America’s attempt to develop a triangular relationship with the two foremost communist countries, and yet another Middle Eastern war (Yom Kippur War), made the international situation too perilous. The global recession precipitated by the OPEC’s oil embargo dented all Balkans economies and slashed interstate trade. Greek and Yugoslav economies were closely linked to Western economies and were particularly badly hit.43 The oil crisis did not directly affect Romania, but the prolonged stagnation in the global economy hurt its exports as well. In the wake of this crisis, Bulgaria became even more dependent on Russia’s oil, and from 1973  The energy crisis, however, despite the growing inflation that entailed for the Greek economy, underscored once again Greece’ strategic importance due to the Greek shipowners who had at the time the largest tanker fleet and implemented a refinery expansion program.

43

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onwards its foreign debt country increased dramatically, forcing it to turn to tourism to earn the foreign currency to pay for oil. Lastly, in the new economic context, Albania returned to its previous isolationism (Pedaliu, 2017, pp. 210–211). By the end of 1972, Washington had begun to distance itself from the regime after it became obvious, that despite various promises of a gradual return to parliamentarism the Colonels did not implement any such an option. The CIA became more severely privy of the general displeasure and frustration inside and outside the regime with the leader of the junta Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. The reasons for that laid, according to the CIA, in the concentration of power in Papadopoulos’ hands. From the beginning of the coup Papadopoulos had gradually concentrated more and more power to himself. By 1972, he had occupied the posts of Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for Government Policy. In addition, he had taken over the post of Regent for King Constantine. Constantine had been in exile ever since his abortive attempt to overthrow the regime in December 1967.44 Against this background, the US Congress, both Senate and House of Representatives, were contemplating imposing restrictions on the approval of further military assistance to Greece, via linking any aid to a presidential waiver certifying that Greece met the requirements of US security. The State Department, however, was very skeptical about this regulation, arguing that country-by-country restrictions were against NATO rules. It thought such a Senate bill would create the anomalous situation in which the US could offer Greece military assistance only, if it was demonstrated that Greece did not need it. However, both the United States and the North Atlantic Council had determined that Greece was in need of continuing foreign assistance to finance its defence so it could remain an effective military ally.45 The year 1973 turned out to be an eventful one for the regime in Athens. The main events of the year were the proclamation of a Republic by the leading figure of the regime Papadopoulos. The regime decided to set up a civilian government under an old politician, Spyros Markezinis, and to promise free elections for early 1974. The martial law was lifted, general amnesty declared for political prisoners and civil liberties were restored. Other important events were the bloody Polytechnic riots of 17 November and a new coup engineered by the head of the military policy, the hardliner Dimitrios Ioannides, took place. The Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, head of the much-feared military police and the interrogation force known for its use of torture, staged a putsch against the initial masterminds of the 1967 coup with a view to stop the liberalization of the regime. He also was considered maniacally pro-­ NATO and pro-US. Together with his accomplices installed a new more rigorous regime reversing what the Colonels had instigated (Mallinson, 2005, pp. 136–137). Since this was another confirmation of junta’s lack of interest to return to  CIA releases 2017: Office of National Estimates, “Memorandum, subject: Some alternatives to Papadopoulos’ regime, November 9, 1972″. 45  NARA: RG 59 Records relating to Greece 1963–1974, “Report of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, subject: Aid to Greece, August 21, 1973”. 44

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c­ onstitutionalism, it sped up the US estrangement process from the junta (Rizas, 2001, pp. 148–173). One day before the Ioannidis’ coup on 24 November 1973, Tasca, the US Ambassador triumphantly noted in his report to the Secretary of State that the liberalisation of the regime was the outcome of the US policy of patience and persuasion within a framework of non-intervention that had eventually bore fruit. Tasca suggested a policy of support to the new Markezinis government that faced serious calamities such as student unrest and Cyprus. Papadopoulos had been resentful of Congressional criticism and somewhat US standoffish attitude, particularly since President Nixon had visited Greece’s Communist neighbours. The US-Greek Security relationship nevertheless still marked by friendly and effective cooperation and high-Level military relations, although it had cooled a little under General Angelis, a “xenophobic curmudgeon”, it had improved under his successor, General Zagoriannakos. The Greek high Command had recently reaffirmed Greece’s readiness to go ahead on phase II of Homeporting.46 Therefore, some US diplomats were contemplating at the time, whether they should exercise some pressure on Greek politicians to participate in the Markezinis civil government. The reasoning behind this was that US interests could be better served by a Democratic government than the military junta. However, there was no consensus within the US military and diplomatic service about sales of weapons to Greece. Under congressional pressure, the US government had refused in 1971 to sell guns and munition to the Greek military.47 Therefore, the conspiracy theory that the Papadopoulos dictatorial regime was overthrown by the United States in 1973 does not bear resemblance to the truth (Kallivretakis, 2014; Stefanidis, 2016/2017, pp. 176–177). In line with this theory, propagated in the next years mainly by pro-junta or far right political circles, the junta leaders allegedly refused to assist US support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The archival documents lead to the conclusion that the Dimitrios Ioannidis coup could not have been supported by the United States (and perhaps the “Jews” as conspiracy theories also suggested). Further, the Polytechnic uprising a few days earlier had not been a provocation planned by the same forces in order to create the political conditions and necessary climate for the overthrow of Papadopoulos by Ioannidis. Markezinis was against the second phase of the homeporting program for the US navy.48 However, Athens never stopped serving the US security interests in  NARA: RG 59: General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Office for Greece’s affairs: Records relating to Greece 1963–1974, “Report of the US Ambassador in Greece, Tasca, on US-Greek relations, November 24, 1973” 47  NARA: RG 59: General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Office for Greece’s affairs: Records relating to Greece 1963–1974, Boxes 20–21, various documents, 1973. 48  In 1973, the homeporting program was extended to host some 550 families of servicemen attached to units of the sixth fleet homeported in the Athens area. The program insured the continued effective operations of the US navy in the face of strict budgeting constraints and reduced ship and personnel levels. NARA releases 2005: “Telegram of the Secretary of State to the US embassy in Athens April 18, 1973”. 46

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the region. Even when Athens declared neutrality during the Yom Kippur War, Greek commanders permitted American aircraft traffic —other than heavy transport—and unrestricted movement of naval units through military airports and Suda Bay harbor. In 1974, it became harder for the United States and NATO to keep the Dictatorial regime in line, especially with the dramatically deteriorating Greek-Turkish relations, analysed in the previous chapter.49 Tasca’s appraisal of the political situation in July indicates that he had been proved incapable apprehending both forces were driving Greek internal and external policies and the geopolitical architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the July 14 report to the State Department 1 day before the Cyprus crisis Tasca estimated that regarding Cyprus Ioannides saw one of two things happening: either Cyprus would slowly drift left and become a Cuba of the Mediterranean (this drift would be caused by the communist propaganda, which was being taught in the school system), or the 80% Greek majority would achieve union with Greece. The one thing that could not happen, was union with Turkey. Regarding Greece, Tasca assessed that Greece really did not want war with Turkey concluding that the only winner in such a war would be the Soviet Union. Greece would not attack Turkey preemptively but would not permit Greek interests in the Aegean (Aegean oil rights) or Cyprus to be jeopardized. The United States could assist in preventing a Greek-Turkish war by selling Greece the arms it needed to achieve a level of military strength sufficient to prevent a successful Turkish attack on Greece. According to Tasca, the Greek government had been receiving letters from hundreds of Greeks living abroad who pledged to return to their homeland if war with Turkey erupted.50 The long-incubated crisis took a dramatic turn in July 1974. The regime’s failed coup in Cyprus in July 15 and the threat of war with Turkey over Cyprus, led to domestic turmoil. Within a week, Ioannides’ colleagues conspired and in another one bloodless coup ousted him from power. Consequently, they asked the long respected Konstantinos Karamanlis, a charismatic politician with unpresented administrative abilities and diligence, to return from his self-imposed Parisian exile and become the new Prime Minister. After 7 years, the army went back to its barracks. A general Greek-Turkish war did not break out, but the Communists did not take the power in Cyprus. Union did not materialise with Greece despite Tasca’s predictions. Turkey occupied 37% of the island adding another scar in the troubled Greek-­Turkish relationship.

 NARA releases 2005: “Telegram of the US mission to NATO to the Secretary of State in Washington May 13, 1974, subject: US policy towards Greece”. 50  NARA releases 2005: “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, Subject: foreign policy views of Brigadier General Ioannides 14 JUN 1974”. 49

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Rizas, S. (2001). Oi Inomenes Politeies, h diktatoria ton sintagmatarchon kai to kypriako zitima 1967–1974 [The United States, the military dictatorship and the Cyprus issue]. Athens, Greece: Patakis Publisher. Rizas, S. (2006). Ta Balkania kai i Ellada se Metavasi: Apo ton Psichro Polemo stin Ifesi 1960– 1974 [The Balkans in transition: From the Cold War to the Détente]. Athens,Greece: Sideris Publisher. Rizas, S. (2013). Domestic and external factors in Greece’s relations with the Soviet Union: Early Cold War to Détente’. Mediterranean Quarterly, 24, 57–80. Sfetas, S. (2018). Oi Metallaxeis tou Makedonikou. O makris dromos pros tis Prespes [The mutations of the Macedonian Question. The long road to Prespes]. Athens, Greece: Sideris Publisher. Stebins, R. (1968). The United States in world affairs 1967. New  York: Council of Foreign Relations. Stefanidis, I. (2016/2017). America’s projection and promotion of democracy: Τhe voice of America, the Greek dictatorship, and Cauşescu’s Romania. Modern Greek Studies Yearbook, 32(33), 167–237. Stergiou, A. (2001). Im Spagat zwischen Solidarität und Realpolitik. Die Beziehungen zwischen DDR und Griechenland und das Verhältnis der SED zur KKE. Mannheim: Bibliopolis. Stergiou, A. (2011). The SED’s bizarre relationship with the Greek Communist Party in the period 1968–1989. Twentieth Century Communism, 3, 114–130. Sulzberger, G. L. (1970). Greece under the colonels. Foreign Affairs, 48(2), 300–311. Trehold, A. (1972). Europe and the Greek dictatorship. In R.  Clogg & G.  Yannopoulos (Eds.), Greece under military rule (pp. 210–227). London: Secker & Warner. Wallden, S. (2009). Paratairoi etairoi, Elliniki Diktatoria, Kommounistika Kathestota kai Vlakania (1967–1974) [Unssemly partners: Greek dictatorship, communist regimes and the Balkans 1967–1974]. Athens, Greece: Polis Publishing. Wentker, H. (2007), Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949– 1989. München: Oldenbourg. Xydis, A. (1972). The military regime’s foreign policy. In R.  Clogg & G.  Yannopoulos (Eds.), Greece under military rule (pp. 191–209). London: Secker & Warner.

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The Ostpolitik in the Context of the Country’s Multidimensional Foreign Policy in the 1970s

The collapse of the seven-year dictatorship in July 1974 and the restoration of democracy in Greece paved the way for another 6  year-term of Konstantinos Karamanlis as Prime Minister. In the elections of 17 November 1974, Karamanlis’s new right-wing party New Democracy accomplished a landslide victory with an unprecedented 54% of votes cast. After almost 30 years, Communist parties were allowed to run again in elections. The legalisation of Communist parties marked a turning point in Greece’s Cold War security perceptions and laid the ground for the repatriation of almost 35,000 political refugees until 1981.1 At the level of foreign and security policy, the 1974 Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the emergence of an intractable Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean Sea had precipitated a dramatic rearrangement of Greece’s security priorities and concerns that seemed alien to the still continuing Cold War (Rizas, 2006, pp. 99–105). The Aegean dispute had already occurred in 1973 in the context of the discovery of commercially significant oil deposits off the Greek North-Aegean island Thassos. Since the potential oil rich continental shelf areas had never been bilaterally delimitated, the discovery created ever since a permanent state of tension in the GreekTurkish relationship.2 1  As it was the case with other European countries that had experienced military regimes, the political environment in post-dictatorship Greece was marked by the emergence of a dynamic young left-wing generation and an increasingly Left-oriented electorate courted by Communist and Socialist political forces, and by a political culture veering to the Left. A sure sign of the new ideological tendency is that 53 party formations identified themselves as Communist in 1974 (Spourdalakis & Tassis, 2006, p. 497) 2  In November 1973, Turkey awarded mineral exploration licenses to the Turkish state-run Petroleum Company in the Eastern Aegean Sea and published a map in the Turkish Official Gazette showing a delimitation of respective continental shelves in the Aegean that did into account the presence of the Greek islands. Greece’s official announcement of the discovery of oil off the Greek North-Aegean island Thassos in February 1974 was reciprocated in May 1974 by Ankara’s decision to send the survey vessel Candarli into the area to conduct exploration that was conspicuously accompanied by Turkish warships. When Greece filed diplomatic protests, Turkey announced that

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Not accidentally, since 1973 Turkey began questioning the legal status of the Aegean Sea in many ways. Various attempted exploration activities ever since, like these carried out by the Turkish Petroleum corporation in the 1976 and 1987, brought the two countries on the verge of war and the NATO South-East flank near to collapse (Heraclides, 2007, pp. 69–150). Against this background, the Karamanlis government proceeded into a reorganisation of the Greek army by building up defence capabilities, re-equipping the armed forces, strengthening defence infrastructure and fostering a sense of professionalism within the officer corps. It was obvious that the “threat from the East”, as the perceived Turkish threat was called, posed for Greece new defence challenges. Defence expenditures increased in real terms from around $3.8 billion in 1973 to $7 billion by 1977. At the same time the government undertook the first steps towards developing a domestic arms industry. In 1977, the Greek Parliament passed a bill restructuring the armed services (Act 660).3 That same year women were admitted to service for the first time. Another innovation was the strengthening of the civilian control over the National Defence General Staff by the establishment of the Supreme National Defence Council consisted of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and selected cabinet officials.4 A new feature of the period that had commenced after the collapse of military, remaining strong and resilient in the decades that followed, was the emergence of a dominant left-leaning political culture and a widespread anti-Americanism. This was down on some still commonly-held perceptions: (1) that the United States had abandoned Greece in its hour of need and “tilted” towards the Turks during the Cyprus crisis; (2) that the United States had imposed and supported the military regime in 1967 and disposed of it in 1974, after the Colonels had fulfilled their “mission”, i.e. to deliver Cyprus to more “NATO-loyal” Turkey. Moreover, fierce anti-American and often slightly pro-Soviet propaganda in the post-dictatorial era in Greece and Cyprus5 established a common and unquestioned belief that NATO was responsible for the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus (Drousiotis, 2014, pp. 194–200, 581–591). Anti-American sentiments were reportedly shared not only by traditionally anti-­ American leftist circles, but also by the hitherto pro-American political right and centre-right as well as military officers. The sentiments were being cultivated by the it would continue exploration preliminary drilling, granting additional exploration licenses by simultaneously submitting to Athens a list with issues to be negotiated on, which engulfed among others the demilitarization of the Greek islands, the territorial waters and the Aegean shelf. 3  Legislation Act 660/1977 on National Ministry of Defence, Supreme Commander Posts and Control of Defence Army (Gazette A/218). 4  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Papandreou and the Military. An Intelligence Assessment (Secret) April 1983”. 5  See some examples in: PIO archive: Folder 1969, party documents of the Cypriot Communist Party AKEL: “Official Communique of the Central Committee of the AKEL August 19, 1974”; “Resolution of the Second Ordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the AKEL March 1, 1975”; “Resolution of the extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the AKEL June 14, 1975”.

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Greek press and fed by similar comments in American newspapers. Anti-US and anti-CIA feelings, (CIA officers were depicted in the public opinion as group of ruthless assasins) apparently accounted for the assassination of the CIA officer Welch in 1975  in Athens by a leftist domestic terrorist organisation called 17 November.6 Leftist propaganda mainly aimed at discrediting the United States and the NATO Alliance, but not at promoting a plan, according to which Greece would totally withdraw from NATO and enter the Warsaw Pact. The latter was never a subject of agitation. Even the Soviets had no illusions that such a scenario could ever be realised and therefore did not see an incentive to mobilise vast material or human resources to that end.7 What, however, was feasible and therefore targeted by Soviet propaganda, naively reproduced by many Greek media outlets, was the removal of the US military bases from Greek soil. Given the fact, that Greece did not belong to the NATO integrated military command anymore, the Soviet propaganda advertised with valour “the true will of the Greek people to tear their country away from NATO’s military chariot and pursue their own true national interests”.8 In October 1975, in a turnaround Athens announced that it would consider joining again NATO military command, after its adventurous leaving in August 1974, but in the mode of a special relationship, similar to that of Norway. This means Greek military units would remain under national control during peacetime and revert to NATO direction during wartime. Greece would conditionally participate in military exercises of NATO within and outside the country, as authorised, however, in each case by the Greek government. It should also be possible for other NATO forces to use the Greek land, sea and airspace, according to the common needs of the Alliance, following authorisation by the Greek government. Nuclear weapons should further remain stored in Greece and nuclear planning should continue for the purpose of supporting operations for the defence of the Greek space. Greece should continue to participate in the exchange of information between the NATO allies and in the preparation of basic intelligence documents.9 This reversal of attitude was largely attributed to the concern that Turkey could easily promote its claims in the Aegean Sea without Greece in the Alliance. Therefore, gradually Athens altered its initial position for a special relationship to 6  CIA releases 2017: “Memorandum on Anti-Americanism in Greece August 15, 1974” and “Leftwing terrorism in Greece: A Status report March 1983”. 7  Personal Communication with Victor Olenchenko, head of the consular department in of the USSR in Greece during the 1970’s and 1980’s (Moscow, September 2015). 8  NARA: 2005 releases, “Telegram of the US embassy in Moscow to the Secretary of State in Washington copied to the US embassies of all NATO members August 15, 1975, subject: Pravda on NATO and US bases in Greece”. 9  Karamanlis Archive: Folder 35B, “Report of the permanent representative of Greece to NATO, Ambassador Vyron Theodoropoulos, to the Greek Foreign Ministry about his presentation in the North Atlantic Council on the Greek positions relating the future place on Greece in the Alliance, October 9, 1975”.

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an arrangement that would bind Greece more closely to the Alliance and more importantly give itself a NATO command similar to that of Izmir in Turkey.10 However, while Athens was negotiating its reintegration into NATO, Turkey tried to impose its terms by putting obstacles almost at every stage of the arduous negotiations between NATO and Greece. For example, it was opposing the restoration of Greece’s pre-1974 operational responsibilities in the Aegean and Athens’ access to sensitive intelligence should Greece be relinked to the Alliance.11 In February 1977, the Turkish representative to NATO informed the NATO council that Turkey objected Greek demands and especially Greece’s request for a guarantee by other members of the Alliance against the alleged danger of Turkish aggression. At the same time, Ankara informally started pushing for some concessions from the United States, some sort of compensation for reintegrating Greece to NATO. Turkey was very much interested in the restructuring of the Land-Southeast NATO command at Izmir that would allow it to replace the American commander with a Turkish one with an American deputy responsible for nuclear matters.12 Against this background, Greek policy and defence makers came to the conclusion that relying exclusively on the West, would not be a sufficient condition to stem the Turkish menace. This conclusion was reinforced by Washington’s decision in 1978 to lift the arms embargo to Turkey, which had been imposed in 1974. In the new concept, it was generally believed that Greece as a small country could not afford, in pure security terms, multiple open fronts in its external relations and hence had to eradicate what could be a distraction from the main security challenge posed by Turkey.13 During the late 1970s and the 1980s, there was little evidence that Greek security planners were still concerned with the possibility of a direct attack by Warsaw Pact forces on Greece’s narrow and difficult-to-defend land strip in Thrace and Macedonia. To the contrary, there were multiple concerns about neighbouring Turkey’s revisionist aims towards Aegean Sea and Cyprus. In this context, NATO’s role as a means of achieving an institutional settlement of the Greek–Turkish conflict, due to its interest in consolidating operational normality and cohesion on its southern flank, seems to be the main, if not the exclusive, reason for Greece’s efforts to reintegrate into the Alliance (Tsakonas, 2010, pp. 33–35).  NARA: 2005 releases, “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington copied to the US delegation to NATO and US embassy in Ankara January 27, 1978, subject: Greece-NATO: Greeks will propose command arrangement “similar” to Izmir headquarters” 11  FRUS, 1977–1980, volume XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece: Document no. 177, “Telegram of the Department of State to the US embassy in Greece, June 7, 1978, subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis in New York on June 3, 1978”; Document no. 184, “Telegram of the US Embassy in Greece to the Department of State Athens, October 21, 1978”. 12  NARA: 2005 releases, “Telegram of the US mission to NATO to the Secretary of State in Washington, subject: Greek reply to NATO on Greece-NATO relations: Turkish reaction, February 15, 1997”. 13   Personal Communication with the prominent diplomat Vyron Theodoropoulos (Athens, November 2005). 10

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As the US embassy in Greece repeatedly reported to the Secretary of State during the 1970s, the Greek Government was convinced that the United States bowed to Turkish “blackmail” in lifting the embargo. As Karamanlis himself stressed to American officials, Turkey had been permitted, owing to the indifference or acquiescence of NATO members, to create obstacles to Greece’s reintegration into the Alliance. This ensued over its insistence that air and sea commands in the Aegean, which were in dispute before Greece’s withdrawal, be settled as a condition for re-­ entry. This played into opposition in Greece demands that the country should withdraw from NATO altogether. If this situation, Karamanlis pointed out, were to develop, it would place in jeopardy the legal basis on which US military facilities were permitted in Greece. Other Alliance and European Community members also appeared disinterested in the fate of Greece, Karamanlis complained, and seemed willing to act only in response to the importance of Turkey. Ankara’s “blackmail” was rewarded at the expense of Athens and no one seemed to care that such a continued neglect of Greece could ultimately lead to the departure of the country from the West.14 Accordingly, Athens adopted a very tough position in the negotiations on NATO reintegration, periodically threatening to abort the process and review the status of US military facilities in Greece (meaning to renegotiate the 1953 US-Greek agreement leasing bases and other facilities to the United States) if “no satisfactory arrangements regarding NATO reintegration were made”.15 On the same trajectory, Karamanlis ended the American sixth fleet’s important home-porting privileges in Piraeus and Eleusina and reduced the American presence at the Athens airport. For the American diplomatic mission in Athens, more worrisome than Karamanlis’ actions, was Andreas Papandreou’s harsh anti-American statements. Papandreou, a new dynamic, political factor in Greek politics, became a source of concern because his appeal as opposition leader of the new founded political party PASOK was gradually rising. The more the time run by, the more provocative his rhetoric became. Papandreou called for the expulsion of the American military bases from Greek soil and Greece’s complete disengagement from NATO, which in turn made him more and more popular (Maragkou, 2014, pp. 658–659). In the mid-1970s, the further improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations aggravated the confusion in NATO southern flank. After its accession into the North-­ Atlantic Alliance in 1952, Turkey had remained totally committed to NATO until the early 1960s. As already mentioned, this loyalty began to totter after President Kennedy’s agreement with Premier Khrushchev in October 1962 to remove missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of missiles from Cuba. This development  NARA: 2005 releases, “Telegram of the US embassy in Greece to the Secretary of State in Washington, copied to the US mission to NATO and to other US embassies, subject: Karamanlis’ mood, June 30, 1974.” 15  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, volume XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece: Document no. 185, “Telegram of the US embassy in Greece to the Department of State October 25, 1978, Subject: Deputy Secretary’s Visit—Taking Stock”. 14

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alarmed the Turkish military establishment and security planners. Ankara realised that Turkey’s strategic importance was declining and hence its role and status within NATO was to be revised accordingly. The repercussions of the b­ icommunal riots in Cyprus in the following year tipped the scales in this process of Ankara’s “declining loyalty” to the Alliance (Ahmad, 2004, pp. 32–33). As a response to the US arms embargo, in 1975 Turkey cancelled unilaterally the US-Turkey Defence Cooperation Agreement of 1969 which among others provided for the legal framework off the non NATO-related US Military facilities on Turkish territory (Athanasopoulou, 2013, pp. 30–31). In December 1975, the Soviet Premier Kosygin paid an official visit to Turkey that was reciprocated by the visits of the Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil and the Premier Minister Ecevit to Moscow in March 1977 and June 1978 accordingly. This exchange of visits resulted in the signing of various economic protocols and accords on cultural and scientific cooperation and arrangements for fishing and oil exploration in the Black Sea. The bilateral trade also increased dramatically in the next years. More significantly, the two countries signed a common political accord for Good-Neighbourly and Friendly Cooperation. That political accord was of extraordinary importance, as Turkey and Soviet Union pledged not to use force against each other and not to allow other nations to use their territory for “aggressive and subversive actions against other states”. In practice, the agreement could refer only to the United States, which had bases in Turkey that were temporarily closed in retaliation for the American embargo on arms shipments. Though the Turkish-Soviet agreement did not have the force of a treaty, it fueled fears of a fundamental reversal of Turkey’s strategic position (Whitney, 1978). Moreover, during his visit to Moscow, Ecevit announced that his government would be diminishing its cooperation with the US and NATO, as the USSR no longer constituted a threat to Turkish security. One month later, in July 1978, the Turkish Foreign Minister attended the non-aligned Ministers meeting in Belgrade seeking an independent role for Turkey in NATO, similar to that of Romania in the Warsaw Pact at the time. However, this demonstration of independence did not amount to the withdrawal from NATO, as the Soviets had hoped. The only tangible result was Turkish reluctance from that point of time on to allow the US to use Turkish bases for flights by U-2 reconnaissance aircraft to monitor the expected strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT II) between the superpowers (Hale, 2013, pp. 117–118). In 1975, Soviet aid to Turkey rose to 650 million dollars, which equaled the total amount of aid over the previous 8 years. By 1978, Turkey had become the largest non COMECON16 country recipient of Soviet aid receiving 800 million dollars, far more than the US had ever given to Turkey. The USSR was involved in 44 different projects in Turkey, while the bilateral trade also expanded. Moscow proved to be very generous offering to Turkey cheap credits, energy, as well as a big market for  The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was an economic organisation during the Cold War which comprised the Eastern Europe Countries along with a number of socialist states elsewhere in the world.

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Turkish exports. Above all, the Soviets succeeded to exploit Turkish dissatisfaction with the US to the full. This is witnessed by Turkey’s New Defence Concept, designed in the 1970s with a view to diversify its arms supplies and hence to make Turkey less dependent militarily on the US in the wake of the embargo. This, in turn, might be the reason for the US Congress’ decision to lift the arms embargo against Turkey in August 1978. At the same time, Ankara proceeded vigorously into building ties with the other Soviet Bloc countries as well. In response to Greece’s foreign policy, Turkey sought to secure support or at least an assurance of neutrality in the of Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus. For instance, the TurkishBulgarian declaration on the principles of Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation, signed between the two countries in 1976, gave to Turkey that assurance (Eaton, 1987, pp. 13–26). In the new geopolitical context, Athens began reconsidering relations with Communist countries, especially with the country’s Northern Balkan neighbours. This fresh opening to the Soviet Bloc markedly differentiated from that of earlier times, because it was thought to counterbalance the perceived Turkish hegemonism, ameliorate Greek defence problems and move the Communist countries to shift away from their neutrality in the Greek-Turkish conflict (Drakoularakos, 1989, p. 160). The recent Soviet-Turkish rapprochement appears also to have decisively impacted the design of Athens’ new course towards the Soviet Bloc (Tsardanidis, 1988, p. 288). It is worth mentioning that most of the Balkan Communist countries had adopted a pro-Greek stance during the Cyprus crisis in summer 1974, condemning the Turkish invasion and division of the island, thereby supporting the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, Bulgaria hosted 5000 Cypriot displayed refugees from the Northern occupied part of the island in its soil, granting them work permit for long time. Romania also took some initiatives on international level regarding the Cyprus problem. The Romanian leader Ceauşescu himself raised officially the Cyprus issue in his talks with the US President Gerald Ford, who visited Bucharest in August 1975 (Emmanouilidis, 2014, pp. 104–105). At the international level, the ongoing détente in the East-West relations was very conducive for a further amelioration of Greece’s relations to the Communist Bloc. Of the 105 treaties and agreements that had been signed until 1975, since the United States and the Soviet Union had assumed official relations, 58 were concluded between 1969 and 1975. The assumption of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1972 and, more significantly, the convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Helsinki in 1975 -albeit it had modest results- were further milestones in the détente process that seemed irreversible (Buchan, 1977, pp. 297–300). Against this background, Karamanlis envisaged a détente policy in the Balkans with primary aim to attain regional stability. In the eyes of Greek Security planners, stability served Greece’s interest at the time, whereas instability and geopolitical crises favoured Turkish expansionism. The Balkan countries for their own reasons turned out to be responsive to the Greece-led détente. This, in turn, contributed not

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only to stability but also to a defusing of old divisive minorities and territorial issues haunting the region for decades (Kofos, 1991, pp. 102–103, 114–116). Four persons played a very important role in the context of the new, active Greek Ostpolitik: Dimitris Bitsios, the Foreign Minister in 1974–1977, a distinguished former diplomat who had served as Permanent Representative in the United Nations (1961–1965); George Rallis, the Foreign Minister after 1978 (who eventually succeeded Karamanlis in the premiership in 1980), who had been a prominent political figure since the mid-1950s; Vyron Theodoropoulos, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry in 1976–81 and main designer of country’s new foreign policy17; Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas, Greece’s Defence Minister from 1974 until 1981, who also advocated and co-implemented the re-orientation of the defence policy of Greece in the 1970s towards the Soviet Bloc (Hatzivassiliou, 2004, pp. 161–167). While being in the self-imposed exile for almost 12 years in Paris, Karamanlis had the opportunity to study Charles de Gaulle’s governing style, sense of duty, of course his Ostpolitik as well as the Gaullist challenge to the United States. These all also affected his new multidimensional foreign policy concept and worldview (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2015, pp. 57–58). It is noteworthy, that the new course in the foreign policy was not intended to entail an alienation with the United States. A dependent relationship with the United States still remained at the epicentre of the Greek foreign policy. However, there was a rearrangement of security priorities. Addressing the “menace from the North” and a possible Warsaw Pact’ aggression was not a basic priority anymore, but the Turkish threat to Greece.18 Nonetheless, Greek-American relations came to a stagnation in the next years.19 Whenever, during the 1970s, Greece came to an interaction with a Communist country, either in the context of an official visit of the clinching of an agreement, the Greek government had to deny various reports in the international press that Athens was showing a tendency to follow a neutralist policy. Athens official stance was that the so-called Slav-communist danger no longer existed for the country. Instead, Greece was faced with Turkish expansionism. It was reasonable, therefore, for Greece to turn to the Balkan countries in order to develop normal relations with them. Athens also denied speculations that it was intending to create a “Balkan axis”. Its policy was focused on the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral contacts, which, in turn, could lead to better multilateral relations and regional stability.20  Personal Communication with Vyron Theodoropoulos (Athens, November 2005).  FRUS, 1977–1980, volume XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece: Document no. 185, “Telegram of the US Embassy in Greece to the Department of State October 25, 1978, Subject: Deputy Secretary’s Visit—Taking Stock”. 19  FRUS, 1977–1980, volume XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece: Document no. 188. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, May 10, 1979, Subject: Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis’s Dissatisfaction with Standstill in Greek-American Relations” 20  NARA: 2005 releases, “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, copied to the US embassies in the other Balkan countries, subject: ‘Balkan axis’ officially denied, May 29, 1975”. 17 18

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Greece’s calculation was that a friendly disposition of Communist countries could be useful in case of hostilities with Turkey, at least within the United Nations, and enable Greece to make a bilateral problem into a multilateral one. In particular, Yugoslavia’s influence on the non-aligned movement was considered important by the Greek foreign policy-makers in relation to the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus Question. For example, when, in early August 1976, the Turkish Sismik survey ship began to carry out explorations between the Greek islands of Lemnos and Mytilini, Karamanlis, following the rejection by Turkey of two notes of protest, requested a meeting of the UN Security Council. Athens’ request claimed that Turkey’s repeated violation of Greece’s sovereign rights over the Aegean continental shelf had created an imminent danger to peace (Clogg, 1991, p. 16). Though the regional cooperation with the Communist countries did not prevent Turkey from sending the ship into the Greek sovereign waters, it propelled some Communist countries to act, thereby raising international awareness on the dispute. Bulgaria offered itself to mediate in the crisis and to host talks between the Greek and Turkish Prime Minister. Bucharest also took the initiative to mediate between the two countries in dispute with a view of deescalating the crisis and achieving a solution in the framework of the United Nations (Emmanouilidis, 2014, pp. 99–100). In return, Greece also took positions within the United Nations on several issues, which, in general, were in favour of the nonaligned Bloc countries. But even, whenever the US pressure made it impossible for the Greek representatives to the UN to vote in favour of the non-aligned Bloc (for instance with regard to the American Samoa, Guan and the US Virgin Islands), the Greeks preferred to abstain.21 In the spring 1975, short time before the imminent convocation of the Helsinki Conference that took place between late July and early August, Karamanlis undertook his first tour in the Balkan capitals to promote his Balkan détente vision. The visit of the Greek Foreign Minister, Dimitris Bitsios, to Bulgaria a few months ago with a view of seeking for opportunities to bolster broader cooperation in economic, cultural and tourism areas, paved the way for Karamanlis’s tour.22 This new diplomatic undertaking was skillfully designed as a further manifestation of the new “Helsinki spirit” in Europe, aimed at initiating the convocation of a multilateral Balkan conference as a means of a new political, cultural and economic regionalism. The Greek Prime Minister visited Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia. After visiting an enthusiastic Nicolae Ceaucescu in Romania in May 1975, and Yugoslavia in June of the same year, he was received by Todar Zhivkov of Bulgaria on 2–3 July. Especially his visit to the Bulgarian capital was historic. This was the first ever official visit of a Greek Prime Minister in Sofia. It also was the advent of a series of mutual official visits in the next five years. The de facto leader of the

 NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, copied to various US embassies in other countries, subject: multilateral affairs: the Greek prospective for 1976 March 1, 1976”. 22  NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, subject: Greek/Bulgarian relations  – Foreign Minister’ visit viewed as improving bilateral cooperation”. 21

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People’s Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, assured Karamanlis in their meeting that Bulgaria did not harbour territorial claims towards Greece and would therefore respect its Northern borders. Given the burdened past, this constituted the necessary precondition for any further fostering of the bilateral relations (Hatzivassiliou, 2012, p. 522). Concurrently, Karamanlis endeavoured to promote his ultimate goal: to depict Turkey’s aggressiveness against Greece as a destabilising factor in the Balkan Peninsula and secure mediation of the Balkan countries in the Greek-Turkish conflict. Predictably, Athens’ initiatives met Turkish hostility. Though Athens’ initiative for a new regional collaboration necessarily engulfed Turkey, as a Balkan country, Ankara was, in general, reluctant to participate in the multilateral Balkan dialog, as it did want the Greek-Turkish differences to be part of it. However, it did not want to be singled out from the process and finally did take part (Tsardanidis and Aleifantis, 1987, pp. 176–186). The opening paid very quickly some strategically relevant dividends for Greece. The Balkan countries gave assurances that they would not mobilise military troops at their common borders with Greece because of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Further, Greece and Yugoslavia agreed in the early 1975 to remove troops from their common borders and to deploy them in other parts of their territory (Emmanouilidis, 2014, p. 98). Bulgaria’s stance, Greece’s traditional enemy in the region, to the Balkan détente was of supreme importance for the success of Greece’s Ostpolitik in the 1970s. The leadership in Sofia was well aware of the Greek interest in securing strategic partnerships in order to counteract Turkish policy in the region. Karamanlis’s first visit to Sofia was reciprocated by Zhivkov’s first official visit of a Bulgarian head of state to Greece in 1976.23 As Zhivkov’s visit coincided with the US announcement to increase its military aid to Ankara, was perceived as one of Greece’s means to exert pressure on the United States. During the first contacts, however, Bulgarians were careful to offend Turkey, and merely urged a peaceful settlement of the issue in accordance with UN regulations (Kostadinova, 2014, pp. 334–335). In early 1976, following the Greek proposal, the Balkan conference took place in Athens with the participation of all Balkan countries except Albania. The main subject of the conference was technical and economic cooperation. The results were modest despite the participant’s interest in multilateral cooperation. The Conference revealed the differences of Greece, Turkey, Romania, and Yugoslavia on one side and Bulgaria on the other. Bulgarian loyalty to the Warsaw Pact remained a serious obstacle for the multilateral Balkan cooperation. Bulgaria attended the summit to avoid discouraging the two NATO participants  - Greece and Turkey  - from their dialogue with the Eastern Bloc. However, it preferred bilateral relations and opposed Balkan multilateralism in principle. Thus, it attempted to enlarge the initiative by including other non-Balkan East European nations such as Hungary. Bulgaria also asked for the term “Balkan Conference” to be replaced by “Meeting of Consultants”. Yugoslavia and especially Romania reacted strongly to Bulgarian demands. In the  Karamanlis Archive: Folder 10, “Report of the First Political Directorate of the Greek Foreign Ministry on the Balkan Policy of Greece April 11, 1979”.

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end, and in order to avoid a stalemate, all governments agreed to indicate issues to be discussed in a second multilateral conference. Despite the obstacles and the different perceptions on Balkan multilateralism, this was the first time in modern ­history that all the states of the region participated in a multilateral process, which was not directed against another regional power (Kourkouvelas, 2013, p.  1060; Veremis, 1982, p. 9). After long time, Greece engaged again in a multilateral diplomacy in the Balkan region, that lent the country an international prestige.24 Karamanlis could have secured Greek security and domestic concerns by improving relationships solely on a bilateral level. However, he persistently focused on a multilateral network of agreements, apparently in order to commit Turkey in a multilateral cooperation. Given the background of wars, fear and hostility that had traditionally clouded Greece’s relations with its communist neighbours, Athens was convinced that the Balkan countries were in a position to mutually reduce the possibilities of instability in the area, while dealing with common problems.25 In the past, such efforts had failed on the mutual antagonisms among the individual Balkan states. It is noteworthy that the Karamanlis Balkan cooperation in the 1970s, in contrast to other foreign policy areas, was the only policy goal supported to the same extent by all political parties from the far right to the left (Karamouzi, 2013, p. 602). However, after the first Balkan conference in Athens, the initiative seemed to stumble. Athens attributed the stagnation to the Bulgarian reluctance to go on with the initial project. Athens also suspected the Bulgaria’s attitude had been most probably dictated by Moscow.26 Indeed, renewed efforts by Karamanlis to give the Balkan Summit Meetings a regular and institutionalised character were politely rebuffed by Bulgaria, reflecting perhaps Soviet fears that this could undermine the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact and possibly increase the independence of its Balkan partners in the Eastern Bloc (Ulunyan, 2008: 404). Athens’ initiative also faced Turkish hostility out of the fear that a Balkan Pact might contribute to Turkeys isolation, which, in turn, prompted other Balkan countries’ reluctance to isolate or to offend Turkey (Veremis, 1982, p. 9). Consequently, the four inter-Balkan conferences that followed at expert and technical levels without the presence of Ministers or head of governments in Ankara in 1979, in Sofia in 1981, in Bucharest in 1982, and in Belgrade in 1984 produced few tangible results, despite high hopes. However, they provided a platform for further consultation on possible areas of economic cooperation and, what was of  NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, copied to various US embassies in other countries, subject: multilateral affairs: the Greek prospective for 1976 March 1, 1976”. 25  NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, copied to the US embassies in the Balkan countries, subject: foreign relations: Greece and its northern neighbours April 19, 1979”. 26  Karamanlis Archive: Folder 10, “Vyron Theodoropoulos’ briefing report on Greek foreign policy 1974–1977 (without date)”. 24

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importance for the Greek side, secured Bulgarian participation, despite Sofia’s discomfort for such gatherings (Karamouzi, pp. 612–613). The stagnation of the Balkan multilateralism boosted bilateral contacts. Karamanlis’ official visit in Sofia in July 1978 constitutes a milestone in the relations between the two countries. Karamanlis was accompanied by a large diplomatic mission consisted of officials in charge of various sectors, who held comprehensive talks at different levels and fields of cooperation (Karamanlis published Archive 2005, vol. 10, pp. 276–282). At the political level, until the deterioration of the Bulgarian–Turkish relations in the second half of the 1980s, Sofia complied with the Soviet policy of favoring Turkey. Sofia, however, functioned as mediator between Greece and the Soviet Union, preparing the soil for the next and most important Karamanlis mission in the context of his Ostpolitik, the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Apart from it, the Graeco-Bulgarian commerce increased from $104 million in 1978 to a total of $157 million in 1980, while cooperation on various fields was also initiated (Kostadinova, 2014, pp. 334–335). However, despite the seven meetings between Karamanlis and Zhivkov, within which the two men evidently established a real personal rapport, the controversial issue of the utilisation of the Nestos River waters could not be solved.27 An extensive exchange of goodwill visits between Karamanlis and the Yugoslavian leader Tito, as well as between government members of different ranks gave a significant impulse to the Greek-Yugoslavian rapprochement. During his four visits to Yugoslavia as Prime Minister of Greece (1956, 1960, 1975 and 1979) Karamanlis managed, despite their different ideological background, to develop a friendly relationship with Tito (Karamanlis published Archive 2005, vol. 8, pp. 425–439). Karamanlis and Tito agreed to promote the ambitious plan of the construction of an oil pipeline linking the two countries and continue their defence cooperation. Motivated by common regional reasons, the two countries proceeded into exchange of chiefs of staff and defence Ministers in 1978. Yugoslavia was the closest Greece ever came to a military relationship with an Eastern bloc country (Eaton, 1987, p. 31). Karamanlis assured Marshal Tito that after Greece’s entry into the common market, he would support Yugoslav interests within the European Community. The bilateral trade volume increased, though the two countries abandoned in 1977 the clearing system. Trade between Greece and Yugoslavia grew from $120 million in 1975 to $250 million in 1980, bolstered by the signing of a new trade agreement in 1977. Old problems such as the creation of a free zone at Thessaloniki and the usage of the Axios river were also settled.28

 FO: FCO 9/3186, “Telegram of the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office June 4, 1981, subject: Visit of Mr. Zhivkov to Greece: 27–30 May 1981”. 28  Karamanlis Archive: Folder 10, “Report of the Directorate of Political Affairs of the Greek Foreign Ministry on Greece’s relations with Communist countries (without date)”. 27

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However, the Macedonian Question continued to pre-occupy bilateral relations in the 1970s.29 The new Yugoslav constitution, adopted in 1974, gave the constituent Republics of the Yugoslavian Federation and hence the Federal Socialist Republic of Macedonia (Skopje) more competence in drafting of foreign policy matters. Tito avoided to raise this thorny issue in his meetings with Karamanlis in the 1970s, focusing instead on the exchange of views on the latest international developments. Unlike the central Yugoslavian Government, Skopje kept the issue of the recognition of a “Macedonian minority” high on its agenda, stumbling the overall improvement of the bilateral relations (Batakovic, 2008, pp.  456–458; Veremis, 1982, pp. 7–9). In the same period, Greek-Albanian relations improved on many levels, as Athens became for Tirana a window to the outside world. However, the progress in Athens-Tirana relations ranked behind that with other Balkan countries. Both Greek public opinion and the Greek Moscow-led Communist party looked with mistrust the pro-Chinese Albanian regime. Furthermore, Greek-Yugoslavian ententé cordiale were viewed in Tirana with skepticism and some distrust. The 1977 decision of the Albanian regime to require the Greek minority to give to newborn babies only Albanian names or names of flowers or trees prompted strong demarches from Athens, thereby outlining the limits of the rapprochement (Kofos, 1991, pp. 110–113). Nevertheless, commercial, cultural and scientific exchanges multiplied, while a regular air link between Athens and Tirana and the Krystallopigi road connection were inaugurated in 1978.30 For the very first time Albania participated in the international fair of Thessaloniki and Greek music bands visited the land of Shqiptar after decades.31 Especially, the weekly olympic airways company flight between the two capitals gave Albania an opening to the West beyond the control or monitoring of other communist nations and reduced its isolation. At the same time, the status of the populous Greek minority in Albania (with exemption of the Northern Epirus territorial issue, the most serious obstacle in the Greek-Albanian relationship over time) was also upgraded.32 Concerning relations with Romania, Athens’s focus was on the big number of Greek university students in Romania and the thorny question of Greek Civil War refugees who were still living in Romania, especially the social security or pension

 Karamanlis Archive: Folder 10, “Report of the First Political Directorate of the Greek Foreign Ministry on the Balkan Policy of Greece April 11, 1979”. 30  Karamanlis Archive: Folder 10, “Report of the First Political Directorate of the Greek Foreign Ministry on the Balkan Policy of Greece April 11, 1979”. 31  Karamanlis Archive: Folder 10, “Report of the Directorate of Political Affairs of the Greek Foreign Ministry on Greece’s relations with Communist countries (without date)”. 32  NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, copied to the US embassies in the Balkan countries, subject: foreign relations: Greece and its northern neighbours April 19, 1979”. 29

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rights for those who returned to Greece.33 Apart from it, there was a remarkable improvement in bilateral trade and economic exchanges as a result of Athens Bucharest agreement to double the trade volume until 1980 and to establish a common Greek-Romanian committee to seek ways to bolster cooperation. Nevertheless, Athens and Bucharest could not come to a common approach of the Cyprus problem, as the Greek side hoped.34 Greek-Soviet relations became the litmus test for the entire Greece’s opening to the Communist world. The surge of the bilateral trade from 1974 onwards pave the way for the political rapprochement. Until 1979 the overall bilateral trade-volume tripled and reached $372.4 million, transcending the average volume in Soviet commercial relations with West European countries. In 1975, the Greek-Soviet association, that had been active before the imposition of the military dictatorship in 1967, was reactivated. In the same year, a comprehensive Greek-Soviet educational agreement was signed (Ellinosovietika Chronika, 1980, issues 48, 55, 56). The increase of the trade volume was the outcome of hard negotiations. Although the Greeks purchased more Soviet high-tech products (Soviet-made zhiguli automobiles for example) than before, they had reservations about soviet exports, because they comprised some products of low quality. The Soviets were concerned about the prospective full membership of Greece in the European common market.35 Although Moscow followed its traditional goal to loosen the cohesion of NATO’s southeast flank, the overall Soviet diplomacy towards Greece and Turkey was noticeably cautious and careful during this period. In the Aegean conflict, the Soviet position was not very favourable to Greek interests. The Soviets made crystal clear that the extension of Greece’s territorial waters and air space limited international waters thereby affecting equally Turkish and Soviet interests and therefore Athens should avoid it. In the autumn of 1978, Greece’s Foreign Minister, Georgios Rallis, visited Moscow with the aim of developing a high-level working relationship with the Soviets (Rizas, 2013, pp. 74–79). Rallis’ visit was followed up in October 1979 by Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis’s official visit to the Soviet Union. In this year that marks the culmination of Greece’s Ostpolitik, Karamanlis paid official visits not only to the Soviet Union, but also to the People’s Republic of China (the first a Greek Prime Minister ever paid to this country) to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Surveys of that time showed that more than 65% of Greek citizens approved of their Prime Minister’s trip to the USSR. The new phase in the Greek-Soviet relationship had a novel aspect. In the wake of the recent global oil crisis, Greece was in desperate need of securing  NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, copied to the US embassies in the Balkan countries, subject: foreign relations: Greece and its northern neighbours April 19, 1979” 34  (Karamanlis published Archive 2005, vol. 8, pp.  395–408); Karamanlis Archive: Folder 10, “Report of the Directorate of Political Affairs of the Greek Foreign Ministry on Greece’s relations with Communist countries (without date)”. 35  NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, subject: Soviet-Greek commercial relations, January 24, 1977”. 33

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additional sources of petrol and natural gas. Especially, the second global oil crisis of 1979 gave an urgent tone to energy needs, making the supply of electricity a central field of Greek Soviet cooperation (Kourkouvelas, 2013, pp. 1053–1055). The Greek-Soviet cooperation covered many fields. The two countries also clinched an agreement over the utilisation of the Syros shipyard by the Soviet fleet’s “auxiliary” ships, which turned out to have serious geopolitical repercussions. It seems that the Greek Foreign Minister who championed the idea, envisaged the project as an effort to pressure the United States on the issue of Greece’s reintegration into NATO (Rizas, 2013, pp. 74–79). However, the news about the agreement alarmed the United States and NATO. NATO circles began to worry that the deal could entail servicing support vessels of the Soviet Mediterranean navy squadron (Cutler, 1991, p. 193). The United States suspected that the ship repair agreement could lead to some short of establishment of a soviet naval base in Greece and therefore responded to it with a demarche to the Greek government. Newspapers inside and outside Greece gave over their front pages to the case for long time.36 Western concerns were also fuelled by Athens’ decision to grant overflight rights to the Soviet Union during the Ogaden War of July 1977–March 1978 between Somalia and Ethiopia in which the Soviets were military engaged. It is noteworthy that the United States were involved in that war supporting the opposing forces! (Eaton, 1987, p. 29). It should be clear that Greece’s evolving relationship to the Soviet Bloc in this period is for the most part a response to Turkey’s analogous policy. This interactive effect is discernible in the following chronological summary of several key events in Soviet-Greek and Soviet-Turkish relations in the second half of the 1970s: In January 1976, Athens sent an observer to attend Soviet Kavkaz military manoeuvres in Armenia and Georgia. In June 1978, Ankara sent its own observer to attend Soviet “Kavkaz” military manoeuvres in Armenia and Georgia. In June 1978, the Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit visited the Soviet Union. In September 1978, the Greek Foreign Minister Rallis visited Moscow for a new trade deal. In September 1978, two Greek Destroyers payed a port visit to Odessa. In October 1978, two Soviet Warships docked in Athens. In November 1978, two Soviet Warships docked in Istanbul, whereas in December 1978, two Turkish Warships payed port visit to Odessa. In May 1979, the Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit declared that Soviet permission would have to be obtained in advance of American U-2 flights over Turkish territory for SALT-II missiles verification purposes. In September 1979, the Greek government announced that it would allow the repair of Soviet Naval auxiliary vessels at Greek shipyards. In October of the same year, the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis paid his own official visit to the Soviet Union (Myers, 1982, pp. 105–107).  NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US embassy in Moscow to the Secretary of State in Washington, subject: Soviet press commentary on Greek ship repair agreement, September 25, 1979”.

36

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Moreover, like Turkey, Greece also tried to foster relations with the other Soviet Bloc countries. In the timespan 1974–1981, Greek-East German relations stagnated, though this time marks the culmination of GDR’s active foreign policy. Indeed, in the 1970s, 132 countries normalised their relations with GDR.  East Germany attained its inclusion in various international organisations as well (Howarth, 2001, pp. 87–93). However, the wave of normalisations between East Germany and numerous countries had its backlash. As the GDR had accomplished its main goal, it stopped being generous in its trade policy. This was the case with Greece as well. Demands for war indemnities and reparations from the time of the World War II, which had been eased due to the unofficial non-existent diplomatic relations and raised by Athens in the 1970s, caused frictions in the bilateral relations (Stergiou, 2001, pp. 135–140). Greece’s opening towards Hungary did not prove fruitful, in political terms, as Budapest preferred to follow a pro-Turkish policy. Relations between Hungary and Turkey, that had been characterised by a deep-rooted friendship over time, reflected on Budapest’s positions on the Cyprus issue (Sarikaya, 2017, pp. 6). Nevertheless, Athens and Budapest proceeded into an exchange of high-rank official visits and the clinching of several agreements and deals. Between 1974 and 1980 about 3000 Greek refugees from the Civil War were repatriated (Drakoularakos, 1989, pp. 110–125). Poland, on the other hand, adopted a more pro-Hellenic stance in the Greek-­ Turkish rivalry. Moreover, the Greece and Paland concluded an array of agreements and protocols on various sectors (tourism, education, television, sports, social maters pertaining the refugees et al.), while the overall trade volume considerably increased.37 In 1977, the Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios, became the first Foreign Minister of Greece to ever visit Poland. His visit was reciprocated by that of the Polish Foreign Minister Wojtaszek they year after. During the political crisis in 1980–1981, Athens suspended the payment of Poland’s debts to Greece and granted new long-term credits. Between 1974–1981 about 5000 Greek political refugees were repatriated (Drakoularakos, 1989, pp. 13–22). Czechoslovakia maintained a neutral stance in the Greek-Turkish conflict. The bilateral economic relations, however, took off. Exports to Czechoslovakia rose from $ 26 million in 1976 to $ 76 million in 1980, while imports rose from $38 million in 1976 to $ 71 million in 1980. In the same period 8500 Greek refugees repatriated. Another 4500 followed until 1987 (Drakoularakos, 1989, pp. 130–146). In October 1979, in the context of Karamanlis’ visit in Czechoslovakia, the two countries signed a declaration of Common principles as well as numerous agreements in various fields (Michalopoulos, 1988, p. 349).

 Karamanlis Archive: Folder 10, “Report of the Directorate of Political Affairs of the Greek Foreign Ministry on Greece’s relations with Communist countries (without date)”.

37

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By the end of the 1970s, the US embassy in Athens estimated that Karamanlis’ policy of attempting to reduce contingent excuses for great power intervention in the Balkans (clearly with the Soviets in mind), seemed to enjoy fairly broad support. The issue that most likely could provoke such intervention was, according to the same appraisal, the Macedonian problem. This problem still remained tantalizing and beyond Karamanlis’ ability to influence.38 In pure economic terms, Greece’s Ostpolitik in the 1974–1981 timespan saw an expansion of the economic relations with all the Eastern European countries but especially with the Balkan countries, which belonged to the same region and were in a similar stage of economic development. The rise in oil price and clearing agreements or barter deals precipitated an upsurge of the overall trade volume. The Greek-Albanian and Greek-Romanian trade sprouted up. When it comes to Greek-­ Bulgarian relations, Sofia and Athens signed among others an agreement for export of electricity to Greece. In the same period Athens and Belgrade agreed on the ambitious project of the construction of a gas pipeline from the Aegean to Yugoslavia (Huliaras, 1989, p. 143). The Greek-Yugoslavian trade greatly suffered by Greece’s integration into the Common Market in 1980 and the Yugoslav restrictions on licences for Greek products. The export of Yugoslavian baby-beef to Greece declined the most.39 A significant component of the regional cooperation was the common measures for facilitating international transportation of international goods and passenger transportations through the territories of the Balkan countries, as these countries’ transport infrastructure still were underdeveloped. State procurements of Eastern capital equipment and projects increased. The most important projects that were initiated were the construction of the North-South Trans-European Motorway the junction of the Danube with the Aegean through a waterway along the Axios/Vardar and Morava rivers. Very crucial was the role international organisations on transport matters such as the Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.40 However, doubts on the economic feasibility of the projects and politically motivated second thoughts annulled most of them. In 1977–1978, anticipating the EC regulations against the kind of trade Greece had conducted with the Soviet Bloc, Athens agreed to abolish some clearing agreements with Eastern Communist countries. As a consequence, Eastern Europe’s share in total Greek trade began declining (Wallden, 1993, pp. 285–309).

 NARA: 2005 releases: “Telegram of the US embassy in Athens to the Secretary of State in Washington, copied to the US embassies in the Balkan countries, subject: foreign relations: Greece and its northern neighbours April 19, 1979” 39  FO: FCO 9/3186, “Telegram of the British embassy in Belgrade to the Foreign Office July 3, 1981”. 40  FO: FCO 9/3186, “Telegram of the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office July 2, 1981, subject: Balkan cooperation: meeting of transport experts in Sofia June 15–19, 1981”. 38

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In 1981 the total value of Greece’s exports to Eastern Europe accounted for 0,94 of the country’s GDP with 0,20 deriving from the exports to Soviet Union and 0,74 from the exports to the other Eastern European Countries. Eastern Bloc countries as trade-partners of Greece Exports Imports 1970 1975 1982 1970 16.5% 11.5% 7.9% 5.2%

1975 5.2%

1982 5.3%

Stankovsky (1983, pp. 223–225)

Concurrently, the Greek-Turkish conflict strongly influenced Athens’ policy vis-­ vis the Arab states. Although the Karamanlis and Rallis successive government (1980–1981) kept low profile trying not to displease the Western Community while Greece negotiated its accession to the European Community, economic relations with virtually all Arab countries sprouted up, especially in the shipping sector.41

References Ahmad, F. (2004). The historical background of Turkey’s foreign policy. In L. Martin & D. Keridis (Eds.), The future of Turkish foreign policy (pp. 9–33). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Athanasopoulou, E. (2013). The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s domestic and external influences [Allies but not friends. US-Turkey, 1979–2000). Thessaloniki: Epikentro Publisher Batakovic, D. (2008). K.  Karamanlis and Yugoslavia: Four visits to Tito’s Yugoslavia. In K. Svolopoulos, K. Botsiou, & E. Hatzivassiliou (Eds.), Konstantinos Karamanlis in the twentieth century. Conference proceedings vol. II (pp.  447–464). Athens, Greece: Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation. Buchan, F. A. (1977). The United States and the security of Europe. In D. Landes (Ed.), Western Europe: The trials of partnership. Critical choices for Americans (pp. 297–323). Cambridge, MA/Toronto, Canada: Lexington Books. Clogg, R. (1991). Greek-Turkish relations in the post-1974 period. In D. Constas (Ed.), The Greek-­ Turkish-­conflict in the 1990s domestic and external influences (pp. 12–23). Basingstoke, UK/ Hampshire, UK: Macmillan Press. Cutler, R. (1991). Soviet relations with Greece and Turkey: A systems perspective. In D. Constas (Ed.), The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s domestic and external influences (pp. 183–206). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Drakoularakos, G. (1989). Ellada kai Anatoliki Evropi 1967–1987 [Greece and Eastern Europe 1967–1987]. Athens, Greece/Komotini, Greece: Sakkoulas publisher. Drousiotis, M. (2014). Kypros 1974–1977. I Eisvoli kai oi Megales Dynameis. I realpolitik ton HPA kai to diplo paichnidi tis Sovietikis Enosis [Cyprus 1974–1977. The US realpolitik and the USSR’ duplicity]. Nicosia, Cyprus: Alfadi Publisher. Eaton, R. (1987). Soviet relations with Greece and Turkey. Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy’s Occasional Papers No. 2. Athens, Greece: Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy.

 Karamanlis Archive: Folder 10 (Greek Turkish Relations 1962–1980): “Vyron Theodoropoulos’ report on Greek foreign policy 1974–1977 (without date)”.

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Ellinosovietika Chronika [Greek–Soviet chronicles]: 1980, issues 48-55–56 Emmanouilidis, E. (2014). I Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki sta Valkania 1974–1989 [The Greek foreign policy in the Balkans 1974–1989]. Doctoral dsiisrtation submitted at the Aristoteleion University of Thessaloniki-Grece. Featherstone, K., & Papadimitriou, D. (2015). Prime ministers in Greece. The paradox of power. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hale, W. (2013). Turkish foreign policy since 1774 (3rd ed.). London/New York: Routledge. Hatzivassiliou, E. (2004). Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas 1908–1990. Politiki Viografia [Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas 1908–1990. Political biography]. Athens, Greece: Sideris. Hatzivassiliou, E. (2012). Revisiting NATO’s stabilizing role in southeastern Europe: The Cold War experience and the longue durée. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 12(4), 515–531. Heraclides, A. (2007). Aspondoi Geitones. Ellada-Tourkia: I Dienexi tou Aigaiou [Sworn Neighbours. Greece-Turkey: The Aegean conflict] Athens, Greece: Sideris publisher. Howarth, M. (2001). Die Westpolitik der DDR zwischen internationaler Aufwertung und ideologischer Offensive (1966–1989). In U. Pfeil (Ed.), Die DDR und der Westen. Transnationale Beziehungen 1949–1989 (pp. 81–98). Berlin, Germany: Die Deutsche Bibliothek. Huliaras, A. (1989). The foreign policy of the Greek Sosialists (1981–1986): Farces of continuity and change. Doctoral dissertation submitted at the University of Hull. Karamouzi, E. (2013). Managing the “Helsinki Spirit” in the Balkans: The Greek initiative for Balkan co-operation, 1975–1976. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 24(4), 597–618. Kofos, E. (1991). Greece in the Balkans. In S. Vryonis (Ed.), Greece on the road to democracy: From junta to PASOK 1974–1986 (pp. 97–121). New Rochelle, NY: Aristide Caratzas Publisher. Kostadinova, T. (2014). 60 years of diplomatic relations between Greece and Bulgaria: Challenges and benefits of the reconciliation process. Südosteuropa, 62(3), 326–347. Kourkouvelas, L. (2013). Détente as a strategy: Greece and the communist world, 1974–1979. The International History Review, 35, 1052–1067. Maragkou, K. (2014). The relevance of Détente to American foreign policy: The case of Greece, 1967–1979. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 25, 646–668. Michalopoulos, D. (1988). PASOK and the Eastern Bloc: A growing relationship. In N. Stavrou (Ed.), Greece under socialism. A NATO ally adrift (pp. 339–377). New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Publisher. Myers, A. (1982). Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey: Contrast within coherence. Thesis submitted at the US Naval Postgraduate School. Rizas, S. (2006). Oi Ellinotourkikes Sxeseis kai to Aigaio 1973–1976 [The Greek-Turkish relations and the Aegean Sea]. Athens, Greece: Sideris Publisher. Rizas, S. (2013). Domestic and external factors in Greece’s relations with the Soviet Union: Early Cold War to Détente. Mediterranean Quarterly, 24, 57–80. Sarikaya, A. (2017). Hungarian-Turkish relations after the second world war. Institute for Cultural Relations Policy research papers, vol. 13. Spourdalakis, M., & Tassis, C. (2006). Party change in Greece and the vanguard role of PASOK. South European Society and Politics, 11(3–4), 497–512. Stankovsky, J. (1983). Ost-West Handel und Entspannungspolitik. In Deutsche Gesellschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (Ed.), DGFK Jahrbuch 1982/83. Zur Lage Europas im globalen Spannungsfeld (pp. 211–230). Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Stergiou, A. (2001). Im Spagat zwischen Solidarität und Realpolitik. Die Beziehungen zwischen DDR und Griechenland und das Verhältnis der SED zur KKE. Mannheim, Germany: Bibliopolis. Tsakonas, P. (2010). The incomplete breakthrough in Greek–Turkish relations. Grasping Greece’s socialization strategy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tsardanidis C. (1988). I politiki tis Sovietikis enosis sta Valkania [The policy of the Soviet Union in the Balkans]. In C.  Giallouridis, & S.  Aleifantis (Eds.), Ta Valkania sto Stavrodromi ton Exelixeon [The Balkans at the crossroads of developments] (pp.  270–301). Athens, Greece: Roes publisher.

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Tsardanidis, C., & Aleifantis, S. (1987). Elliniki Valkaniki Politiki 1974–1978 [Greek Balkan Policy 1974–1978]. Diethnes Dikaio kai Diethnis Politiki Journal, 12, 171–203. Ulunyan, Ar. (2008). Karamanlis’ Greece and Soviet Union (Flashpoints and observations, late 1950s–1970s. In K. Svolopoulos, K. Botsiou and E. Hatzivassiliou (Eds.), Konstantinos Karamanlis in the twentieth Century. Conference proceedings (pp. 395–405). Athens Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation vol. II Veremis, T. (1982). Greek security: Issues and politics: Introduction. The Adelphi Papers, 22(179), 1–37. Wallden, S. (1993). Greece and Eastern Europe: Economic relations. In H.  Psomiades & S. Thomadakis (Eds.), Greece, the new Europe and the changing international order (pp. 285– 309). New York: Pella publishing company. Whitney, C. (1978, 24 June). Soviet Union and Turkey sign nonaggression, Trade and Cultural Pacts. The New York Times.

Primary Sources

United Kingdom Public Record Office (PRO) in London 1949–1989: Foreign Office (cited as FO): folders on Greece, Cyprus, Political relations between Greece and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Greece and NATO, Greece and Balkans, Greece and Balkan Cooperation, Greece-Turkish Dispute over the Aegean, Balkan Nuclear Free Zone;

United States CIA releases 2017. National Archives and Records Administration (cited as NARA): folders on Greece, Turkey, NATO, Eastern Mediterranean, Warsaw Pact. State Department Files National Archives Washington D.C.

Greece Foreign Relations of the United States (cited as FRUS): volume XXI 1977–1980, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece Published by the United States Government, Printing Office. Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Archive in Athens (cited as Karamanlis archive): Folders on Foreign and Defence Policy relating his administration as Prime Minister 1955–1963 and 1974–1980 (NATO-bilateral relations-EEC-National Issues-US policy in the Mediterranean-Warsaw Pact, the Cyprus Issue and so on). Konstantinos Karamanlis Archeio. Gegonota kai Keimena (1997 and 2005) [Konstantinos Karamanlis Archive. Incidents and Texts. Konstantinos Svolopoulos (Ed). Athens: Idryma K. Karamanlis-Ekdotiki Athinon publisher (cited as Karamanlis published Archive) (The 2005 edition was made by Kathimerini newspaper and is divided in more volumes than the 1997 one.). Published archival documents and primary sources.

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Interviews Victor, Timochenko: Head of the consular department of the USSR in Greece during the 1970s and 1980s (Moscow, September 2015). Vyron, Theodoropoulos: The Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry in 1976–81 and designer of country’s foreign policy in the 1970s. Previously Vyron, Theodoropoulos had served as Permanent Representative of Greece to NATO and the European Community and as member of the diplomatic personnel in the Greek embassy in Ankara (Athens, November 2005).

PASOK’s Foreign Policy Course Towards the Socialist Countries in the 1980s

In contrast to other Western European countries in which the Eighties were characterised by the cultural dominance of the “New Right”, Greek politics was dominated in the 1980s by the rise of the Greek Socialist Party (PASOK) which came to power in October 1981. Unlikely to the West European Socialist or Social Democratic parties, Greek idiosyncratic socialism was associated with a strong nationalistic and anti-Western, i.e. anti-NATO, anti-American and Anti-European rhetoric. For this reason, before the 1981 general elections, the CIA, terrified by the prospect of a PASOK victory, estimated that should the socialists win, Greece would likely experience domestic turmoil thus becoming unreliable and troublesome partner.1 Though these fears proved unsubstantiated for the most part, during the Greek Socialist administration (1981–1989), the Greek-Turkish dispute ushered into a new phase. Tensions increased dramatically and the two countries came to the verge of a war that in turn seriously threatened to blow up NATO’s South-East flank (Constas, 1991). PASOK’s rise to the power coincided with the end of the superpower détente and the spread of the fear of a limited nuclear war in Europe. The demise of the détente ensued over a continuing military built-up by the superpowers unleashed by the possible introduction of the neutron bomb and NATO’s 1979 dual-track decision. That decision provided for the deployment of advanced, new-generation long-range theatre nuclear forces and came as a response to the deployment of the Soviet intermediate-­range nuclear forces, known as SS-20s, that Moscow had begun to replace in 1977. As NATO had no equivalent weapons, concern began very quickly to grow in West European capitals that Moscow might be trying to revive its old game of driving a wedge between NATO’s American and European allies. The détente spirit of mutual trust was replaced by mutual suspicion poisoning the atmosphere at US-USSR arms control talks which proved abortive throughout the early

1  CIA releases 2017: Greece: “Status report on Greek parliamentary election and US bases in Greece (1981)”.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Stergiou, Greece’s Ostpolitik, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61129-3_7

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1980s (Partos, 1993, pp.  219–223). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the establishment of a military dictatorship in Poland also aggravated the East-West confrontation, instigating a new hot phase in the Cold War. Therefore, in order to entertain fears against a possible systemic change of Greece’s foreign and security policy, the founder and undisputed leader of PASOK Andreas Papandreou assured Greece’s allies that he was totally opposed to the Soviet system and that he believed in a pluralist society; his form of socialism had nothing to do with that of the Soviet Union and its satellites; he was however concerned that the Americans saw the world in simple black and white terms, as he put it, “they were like puritans preaching a sermon”. Furthermore, like other political leaders at the time, he was convinced that the American administration did not intend to negotiate an arms control until pershing and cruise missiles had been deployed. Further he was concerned about the danger of escalation, since the pershing missiles, based in the Federal Republic of Germany, would take less than 6 min to hit targets deep in the Soviet Union. He was also opposed to the installation of any new nuclear weapons.2 Greek Socialists’ administration also coincided with Greece’s reintegration to NATO after a long and arduous process of negotiations and against Ankara’s repeated efforts to thwart the scope of this process. After the reintegration plan finally was reached out, Turkey’s obstructions were directed to plan’s implementation. Ankara was unwilling to accept the new-drawn boundaries of operational responsibility in the Aegean Sea and endeavoured to extend its operational control as much as possible to the West.3 After Greece’s withdrawal from the military structure of NATO in 1974, NATO’s regional headquarter in Izmir had become, to the dismay of Greece, an entirely Turkish command subordinate to the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe stationed in Naples. The reintegration of Greek forces created a separate “Greek” NATO headquarter in Larisa, in Central Greece, whose projected air arm, the Seventh Allied Tactical Air Force, would be the counterpart of the sixth NATO’s regional headquarter in Izmir. Athens and Ankara, however, could never agree on the respective responsibility boundaries of the Larisa and Izmir commands. This issue, that had been left deliberately vague in the reintegration agreement, turned out to be a source of continuous friction in the following years (Stearns, 1992, pp. 68–71). In this geopolitical framework the Greek Socialists’ pre-electoral radical foreign policy positions were seriously tested. While in opposition the unquestionable charismatic leader of PASOK Andreas Papandreou had insisted that the US, NATO, and 2  FO: FCO 9/4050, “Confidential Telegram of the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office, repeated as priority info to the British embassy in Bonn, Washington, Paris and United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, subject: the Soviet Union, Greece and the Alliance call on, May 3, 1983”. 3  Karamanlis Archive: folder 35B (NATO), “Evaluation of the meetings between Greek Military Staff and SACEUR on Greece’ reintegration to NATO July 1978”; “General Military Commandin-Chief’s and Prime Minister Diplomatic Office’s report on Greece reintegration to NATO December 1981”; “Greek Government’s Report (without date) on Greece’s reintegration process to NATO”.

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the “West” were the causes of the “Greek tragedy” and had put the struggle against these forces at the top of his political priorities. According to Papandreou’s world politics analysis, accession to the European Community would lead to national “subservience”, as it presupposed the transfer of national sovereignty to foreign decision-making centres. Although Andreas Papandreou in his writings also promoted the idea of Greece as a country of the semi-periphery, dependent on the capitalist centres of the West, his anti-Westernism did not so much have a Marxist orientation, but rather a populist-nationalist one, engulfing anti-Turkish, anti-­ Western and pro-Arab features. In this respect, Papandreou advocated simultaneous abolition of the two competing military blocs NATO and Warsaw Pact (Pantazopoulos, 2000, pp. 103–115; Spourdalakis, 1988, p. 233). This political concept proved to be very attractive and successful in electoral terms. Moreover, as it resonated well with the overall Greek post-junta society, it shaped the prevailing political culture. As the historian James-Edward Miller aptly noted, in the first decades after the rehabilitation of democratic normality in Greece, the Greek political establishment and Greek public opinion were of the same mind on one issue, namely blaming their errors on the United States. As a consequence, the United States served as a national remedy, attacked by Left and Right, on every possible occasion, to alleviate national feelings of humiliation and to avoid a national debate over the real causes of both the rise of the Colonels and the Cyprus disaster (Miller, 2009, p. 207). The European Community, to which Greece entered in 1980, before the PASOK’s takeover, was a crucial field in which the new vision of Andreas Papandreou’s “independent foreign policy” was tested. The prospect of PASOK’s victory in the 1981 elections had unsettled the officers and leaders of the European Community and rendered the negotiations on Greece’s accession to the Community a difficult task.4 Although it had been elected on the ground of an anti-European Community agenda, PASOK very soon turned its initial, harsh opposition to the European project into a policy “of pursuing a special relationship” with the bloc akin to that of Norway or Yugoslavia. In a bid to stir national sentiments and sensitivities, the Party promised, once in power, to ask the Greek people to express in a free referendum following a full public debate their own decision on the accession to the EEC. However, the proposed referendum, together with many other pre-electoral promises, was never held (Stergiou, 2018, pp. 124–125). The issue of Greek-US relations remained dominant on the PASOK’ foreign policy agenda throughout the 1980s. Greece’s detachment from a “monolithic and damaging” Atlantic orientation was one of PASOK’s well-known declared political commitments and fundamental ideological paroles. PASOK had also defined as its mission “to safeguard Greek national interests by breaking the continuation of clientelistic relations between Greece and America” that allegedly marked all previous governments attitude to the United States (PASOK, 1981a, pp.  15–17; PASOK, 1982). 4  Personal Communication with Vyron Theodoropoulos, head of the negotiating team on Greece’s accession to the EEC in the 1970s (Athens, November 2005).

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For instance, in PASOK’s inaugural governmental statement in October 1981, Andreas Papandreou stated on the issue of the presence of foreign military bases on Greek territory that …the foreign bases have no place in our country because they counteract our national independence, because they do not offer any form of defence for our country in the case of a limited local war and because in the case of a global conflict they will lead to an holocaust… (PASOK, 1981b). However, as it will be showcased in this chapter, despite the rhetoric bombast, changes in the country’s defence and foreign policy solely occurred on the level of low politics. The highly politicised and emotionally charged issue of the US military bases remained unscathed as it remained Greece’s participation in the NATO Alliance. With reference to the crucial issue of defence procurements and military expenditures, despite the strong anti-Western, anti-NATO and anti-American rhetoric the PASOK administration did not implement any far-reaching shift in defence policy that would lessen the country’s defence dependency on the West either. All major weapons systems, the prime source of defence dependence on suppliers, continued to be purchased from the USA or other major West-European arms producers such as Germany and France. Despite this structural change in favour of a greater share of arms imported from EU and other European countries such as Norway and Switzerland. In practice, the Greek defence supply orientation and in particular arms procurement, remained firmly anchored to the West. The only notable change was one of diversification between Greece’s arms suppliers in favour of European countries. This shift gradually led to a decline in the almost monopolistic position US based arms producers in the Greek market. But this diversification should not be viewed in isolation from Greece’s strategic choice to strongly tie its economy and its economic development prospects to the European economic integration process, though arguably this was not a pre-occupation to the PASOK government. Similarly, the rather sluggish economic performance of the Greek state in the same period, did not allow for any noteworthy increases in real military spending despite the tensions, occasionally strongly militarised, in Greek-Turkish relations (Stergiou & Kollias, 2018). Immediately after taking charge of government, PASOK began to cultivate the image of a moderate party, shifting its emphasis  – as it had been the case with Greece’s participation in the European Community – from leaving NATO and the removal of the US Bases in Greece to renegotiating the international agreements signed by previous governments (Mitsotakis, 2005, pp. 155–164). Despite former promises and fears that PASOK’s election could have profound consequences for Western interests and place the future of some base activities in jeopardy,5 in 1983 Greece signed an agreement with the United States that allowed the US bases to remain 5 more years.6 5  CIA releases 2017: Greece: “Status report on Greek parliamentary election and US bases in Greece (1981)”. 6  Hellenic Parliament’s Debates and Voting (Praktika Ellinikou Koinovouliou): Debate on Greek Foreign Ministry legislation draft about military and economic cooperation between Greece and United States, October 30, 1983  – September 28, 1984, vol. I, pp.  812–815, vol. II, pp. 1078–1082.

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Although there was some scepticism and concerns about statements that had been made during Papandreou’s electoral campaign in the US diplomats, it did not take long until US diplomats and politicians expressed their satisfaction with the pragmatism that seemed to characterise Papandreou’s approach to foreign policy after their meetings with Papandreou. Papandreou appeased them that there was little difference in foreign policy aims between himself, his predecessor Karamanlis who meanwhile had become President of Hellenic Republic and the conservative opposition party!7 Moreover, in his conversations with American officials Andreas Papandreou endeavoured to convince that Greece did not harbour any intension to join to the socialist camp and his police was barely intended to contribute to a détente.8 In September 1982, Papandreou responded positively to a US request to allow long-range reconnaissance flights out of Crete in support of the peacekeeping effort in Lebanon and in 1983 and US ships were allowed to visit Greek ports more frequently than in the past. Moreover, as CIA officials pointed out in their reports, despite vacillations in public and government attitudes toward the United States and NATO, Greek officers had continued to work closely with their US counterparts. In this respect, it was very conducive that many of them had received training in the United States and that the armed forces had been highly dependent on the United States for defence hardware, spare parts and maintenance.9 However, mainly for domestic consumption the appearances of the pursuing of an anti-NATO policy were upheld. For example, the US-Greek Defence and Economic Cooperation agreement, negotiated in 1983, was formulated with calculated ambiguity with a view of concealing the fact that joint military facilities, whose existence was extended by the agreement, would support NATO missions. On the other hand, the analogous agreement with Turkey, signed in 1980, referred four times to NATO in the preamble alone. In fact, the Turks emphasised what the Greeks tried to camouflage, namely, that the US facilities on the soil of both countries served NATO purposes (Stearns, 1992, pp. 22–23). Apart from it, Papandreou tried to play a game that many of his predecessors had efficiently played in the previous decades, e.g. to invoke Soviet or the Warsaw Pact danger to elicit more support from NATO and the United States. For example, he complained to the US officials that Turkey was given priority over Greece in US strategic thinking. By implementing its long-term strategy, i.e. trying to move ­westward and having a share in the Aegean Sea at the expense of Greece’s share, Turkey, so Papandreou argued, prevented Greece from fulfilling its obligations as

7  CIA releases 2017: “Confidential Telegram of the US-Embassy in Athens to the US-missions in Ankara, Moscow, Beirut, Nicosia, NATO: Subject: Senator Percy’s meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou, August 23, 1982”. 8  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Confidential Telegram of the US-Embassy in Athens to the US-missions in Ankara, Moscow, Beirut, Nicosia, NATO Senator Percy’s meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou on August 23, 1982”. 9  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Papandreou and the Military. An Intelligence Assessment (Secret) April 1983”.

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NATO ally. This, in turn, meant that Greece could not provide resistance against an attack from its Northern, Balkan Communist neighbours.10 Furthermore, and in line with Konstantinos Karamanlis foreign policy, Papandreou, immediately after he became Prime Minister in October 1981, informed NATO allies that the danger to Greek security came primarily from Turkey and secondly from the Soviet Bloc. Therefore, NATO should extend a security guarantee for Greece’s frontier against potential Turkish aggression. Nevertheless, when in December 1981 at the meeting of NATO countries’ defence Ministers Athens demanded from the Alliance’ members to acknowledge Turkish aggression, it met a categorical denial. In response and in a demonstration of the new foreign policy style, Greece blocked the signing of the NATO joint communique for the first time in the history of the organisation (Papacosma, 2001, pp. 365–366). This was the first sign of a series of deeds, unmistakably highlighting Greek Socialists’ foreign policy priorities. In order to promote them, the Greeks did not hesitate to obstruct NATO military business (infrastructure projects, military exercises and so on),11 raising concerns that they may systematically mess things up on the military side of the NATO preparing the ground for some grand gesture or act of defiance against the Alliance.12 The most striking appraisal about PASOK’s foreign policy in that period comes from the British embassy in Greece. According to the British diplomats, the Papandreou government, partly from natural disposition, partly for reasons of domestic politics, and partly because of the benefits it believed this could bring to the country’s international position, was pursuing a foreign policy which was consciously and deliberately “independent” of that followed by other members of the NATO Alliance. The fact that this policy was not only on occasion embarrassing to other allies but -also damaging to Alliance solidarity appeared to be of little or no concern to the Greek Socialists. Yet, despite the anti-NATO noises made by Papandreou during the election campaign, he showed every sign of wishing to keep Greece in the Alliance and to continue to enjoy the benefits membership brings to his government. Papandreou, so the British appraisal went, was realist enough to know that to leave NATO would run a very serious risk of forfeiting American military support, a consequence which would be a disaster for his government and for Greece’s ability to meet the perceived threat from Turkey. The line he was taking in  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Confidential Telegram of the US-Embassy in Athens to the US-missions in Ankara, Moscow, Beirut, Nicosia, NATO: Subject: Senator Percy’s meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou, August 23, 1982”. 11  For instance, Papandreou linked his approval of various NATO infrastructure projects on the condition that the Alliance would finance projects of Greek interest. He also put down a marker about unfunded Greek projects of previous years. These were basically projects funded nationally by the Greeks, whilst they were outside the integrated military structure but continuing to pay their contributions to the infrastructure budget. FO: FCO 9/3528, “British Delegation to NATO’s reports to Foreign Office and British embassy in Athens, subject: GREECE AND NATO, December 16, 1982”. 12  FO: FCO 9/4055, “British Delegation to NATO’s reports to Foreign Office October and November 1983, subject: Greece and the Αlliance”. 10

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the US bases negotiations was evidence of this. But Papandreou also knew that the other allies were sufficiently aware of the damage which Greece’s withdrawal would do to the Alliance (especially in political terms, but also militarily given Greece’s geographical position on the Alliance’s already very weak south-eastern flank) not to wish to drive him out. Yet, the Greeks were not as important to the Alliance as the French, that had withdrawn from NATO as well. Therefore, the British embassy suggested that Papandreou should be given to understand that London’s patience was not limitless; nor that it accepted his apparent argument that having dissented once he is entitled to continue to dissent as often and as publicly as he pleases. The Americans should play the principal role in this, because as the major supplier of military aid to Greece they had more leverage than any individual European. But the Europeans should not just sit back and allow the Americans to take the flak. This would do nothing to improve the already strained state of transatlantic relations, which in part is the result of an American perception that the Europeans are all too “ready to allow the United States to bear the Alliance burden without contributing their fair share of effort”.13 Nevertheless, the need to address the “Turkish threat”, was regarded by the Greeks at that time as immutable, no matter what this would entail for the North Atlantic Alliance.14 Thanks to the recently released CIA archives, we can today evaluate the exact role of the Greek-Turkish dispute in the East-West conflict. Barring some short intervals, Greek-Turkish political disagreements remained during the 1980s a constant bickering for NATO solidarity and a source of serious concerns about the functionality of the South-Eastern flank of the Alliance.15 Papandreou apparently believed that negotiations requested by Turkey regarding the status of Aegean were out of question. Greece was content with the existing status quo. Upon taking-over power, the PASOK government cancelled all scheduled diplomatic meetings with Turkey, retaining solely a small modicum of communication (Heraclides, 2010, pp. 116–117). In CIA’s judgment, Papandreou’s hard line policy on Turkey and the Aegean, which differed more in tone than in substance from that of his predecessors aimed at eliciting Army’s loyalty and “to strike a responsive chord among military officers”.16 Since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the military had ­encouraged the governments to adopt a tough stand on Turkish-Greek relations  – a position

 FO: FCO 9/4050, “Telegram of the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office in London, subject: the Soviet Union, Greece and the Alliance, April 20, 1983”. 14  British and German diplomats were namely worried about Papandreou’s “emotional reactions” towards Turkey and the repercussions these could have on NATO. FO: FCO 9/4050, “Telegram of the British Embassy in Bonn to the Foreign Office in London June 6, 1983, subject: NATO the Soviet Union Greece and the Alliance”. 15  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 7 April 1988”. 16  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Papandreou and the Military. An Intelligence Assessment (Secret) April 1983”. 13

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bolstered by popular opinion, which, as reflected in press reporting, saw Turkey as a growing regional power with ambitions on Greek territory.17 On the other hand, Turkey became more and more assertive towards Cyprus. In 1982–1983, Ankara threatened to launch a new military operation against the Republic Cyprus under the pretext that the latter provided shelter to members of the Armenian liberation organisations fleeing from Beirut after the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in summer 1982 (Kyrris, 1996, p. 410). Though investigations carried out by the UN peace keeping force stationed in Cyprus did not confirm these allegations, Ankara continued threatening. The situation was further aggravated by the simultaneous failure of the then UN-peace plan (Kyrris, 1996, p. 411). Against this background, Papandreou stepped up his pressure on the Alliance to take a more pro-Greek stance on the Greek-Turkish conflict. The British embassy in Greece estimated that this approach was not based simply on his own ideological whims. Greeks generally, including the leaders of the then opposition, perceived Turkey as the main threat to Greece’s security. Starting from this basic premise, Papandreou had almost universal domestic support in resisting what could be interpreted as a pro-Turkish stance of the Alliance on issues affecting Greek interests in the Aegean. Apart from it, the Greek leader endeavoured to distance himself to some extent from policies of the previous government in order to deliver his pre-electoral promise of “Change”. He thus needed to be seen as to be pushing Greek interests harder than his predecessors. This behaviour, in turn, enraged Greece’s allies who began talk of “the Greek problem” and ask themselves whether Greek membership of the Alliance was more of a drawback than a benefit. However, though, according to the British, there was a need to exercise pressure on Greece, there also was the fear that the Greeks would see that as a patronising attitude:…If they (the Greeks) get the impression that they are being treated like naughty schoolboys who have broken the rules of the class, the effect is liable to be the opposite to that which we are trying to achieve. They see the Alliance as a free association in which, unlike the Warsaw Pact, there is no monolithic approach to world problems and members are entitled to express their own views….18 In November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leadership advantage of the post-election political instability in Turkey and unilaterally declared independence (Dodd, 2010, pp. 147–150). Although the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was soon recognized by Turkey, the rest of the international community condemned the move. Within days the Security Council passed a resolution (Resolution 541 of 18 November 1983) deploring the declaration of the new state considering it as legally invalid and calling for its withdrawal (United Nations, 1984, pp. 15–16). The establishment of the TRNC constituted a major affront to Greece. Greek strategy planners feared that a possible recognition of the break-away regime could aggravate the Turkish threat in the Aegean that also was expected to become more  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Papandreou and the Military. An Intelligence Assessment (Secret) April 1983”. 18  FO: FCO 9/4050, “Telegrams from the British embassy in Athens to the Defence department of the Foreign Office, April and May 1983, subject: The Soviet Union, Greece and the Alliance”. 17

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immediate and menacing. Once again, the Cyprus problem posed a highly inflammatory issue for the US foreign policy and the NATO allies. The involvement of the United Nations in the conflict lent a legitimising role to the Soviet Union, which, as US Security Council member, steadily saw in it an opportunity to fulfil its long-­ cherished ambitions for a permanent presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (Shepard, 1988, pp. 394–395). Unsurprisingly, in mid-1980s tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean ran high again. As horrified CIA officials noted in September 1986,19 several factors suggested that the situation this time was worsening in subtle and potentially dangerous ways. Turkey appeared to be adopting a tougher policy towards Greece as suggested by Turkish Prime Minister Ozal’s public statements about the limits of Turkish patience. Likewise, Papandreou had gone “beyond previous limits in his warning that any attempt to expand the Turkish occupation in Cyprus would lead to open conflict”.20 In 1984, the New York Times revealed that Greece sought to reverse NATO’s approval of Turkish plans for developing its armed forces that included procurement of modernised missiles for use against shipping. It was the first time that one ally attempted to stop a second from improving its forces (Vinocur, 1984). In January 1985, Athens officially announced its new defence doctrine that clearly directed the deterrent attention of its armed forces to Turkey rather than to the Northern Communist countries. The fortification of some Aegean islands, to which Athens had resorted from the 1984 onwards contrary to the Lausanne treaty regulations, was a marked indication for this. Athens of course argued that the fortification served primarily Alliance interests. More precisely, it purported that the fortification extended the strategic depth of North-Eastern Greece and hence of NATO against a Warsaw pact threat, thereby posing a formidable obstacle for the free movement of hostile ships to and from Dardanelles and a deterrent against the Soviet fleet. Athens further argued that the undertaking was designed to resist a Soviet attempt to occupy and transform the islands into naval bases. The Karpathos island, in particular, was presented as a likely objective of Soviet strategy. The construction of new airfields on the various islands were justified as to offering Greek pilots full control over the Aegean Sea. In the case of an East-West confrontation, the success of Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean, the argument went, would largely depend on the support received by backfire bombers taking off from Crimean airfields. A partial defence against their effectiveness could be the network of Greek radars located on various strategically located Aegean islands. Furthermore, the Limnos airfield could provide full air-­ support to land operations in Thrace, and that island, along with Samothrace and Lesvos, forms the first of a succession of choke-points to hinder the passage of the Soviet fleet in the area. If the Soviet Escadra circulating in the Aegean or Eastern Mediterranean attempted to aid Warsaw Pact forces in Thracian land operations,  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Directorate of Intelligence 4 September 1986, Greece-TurkeyCyprus: Trouble ahead?” 20  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Directorate of Intelligence 4 September 1986, Greece-TurkeyCyprus: Trouble ahead?”. 19

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these islands could form the last choke-point for denying the Soviets access to their destination (Veremis, 1993, p. 184). The Greek-Turkish antagonism was salient at another level as well. During the 1980s, Greece and Turkey lobbied against each other bitterly in Brussels and in Washington and often used the same arguments in disrupting NATO’s allocation of infrastructure funds. NATO repeatedly undertook determined efforts to resolve the differences. However, these all was in vain.21 As an experienced US diplomat, who also served in Greece, pointed out, in 1987 and 1988 Athens and Ankara objections to specific projects proposed for infrastructure funding on each other’s territory prohibited the approval of about half of the projects whose disbursement required unanimous consent. Turkey lost 252 $ million and Greece 144. The disputed projects were located in areas, including the Greek island of Limnos and the Turkish coastline adjacent to it that were essential to NATO’s defence of the straits of the Dardanelles but would be equally significant in the event of Greek-Turkish hostilities. Greek-Turkish rivalry also affected common exercises conducted by NATO (Stearns, 1992, pp. 68–71). The prolonged crisis in the Greek-Turkish relations led to a culmination in March 1987, when the Canadian-controlled oil company, that had made the Thassos oil find in Northern Greece, announced that it would drill in an area outside Greek territorial waters claimed by Turkey. Ankara responded by sending a Turkish vessel to conduct a seismic survey in the disputed area confirming dominating Greek perceptions about Turkey’s revisionist policies aimed at changing the status quo in the Aegean Sea (Syrigos, 1993, pp. 224–226). The crisis escalated and nearly led to a war as both countries put their armed forces on alert. Papandreou gave the order to sink the Turkish research ship if it entered in the disputed waters and his counterpart, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal responded in the same way. Eventually, the crisis was solved after an intervention by Peter Carington, the Secretary General of NATO and a phone call conversation between Papandreou and Özal (Lioliou, 1999, pp. 173–175). Subsequently, in January 1988, at a meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos in Switzerland the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers forged a “no-war agreement”, also inaugurating a comprehensive dialog covering all the issues in the Greek-Turkish relations. The two leaders also made public their intension to proceed into military confidence-building measures. This was a watershed in Greek foreign policy. Until then Athens regarded the delineation of the continental shelf as the only open matter in its relations with the Eastern neighbour. The 1988 agreement was followed by what was labelled as “spirit of Davos”, meaning a series of agreements on “low politics” issues (tourism, economy, and culture) as well as certain gestures of goodwill by both sides (Tsardanidis, 2002, p. 244). Nevertheless, the so-called spirit of Davos did not last long, as neither Greek public opinion not Turkey responded accordingly, and eventually the initiative  FO: FCO 9/4055, “Telegrams of the United Kingdom permanent delegation to NATO to the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence in London, August and September 1983, subject Greece and the Alliance”.

21

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failed to resolve any of the substantive questions between the two countries. By the end of the 1980s, Greek–Turkish relations had returned to their depressingly familiar situation of mutually suspicious stand-off (Hale, 2013, p. 122). Furthermore, in the late 1980s, Turkey launched an impressive program to modernise its armed forces (Tsakonas, 2010, p. 34). The fade-away of the Davos Spirit was reflected in the CIA reports of that time. In April 1988, the CIA came to the conclusion that Greece and Turkey could hardly become US allies in a NATO engagement in Southeast Europe.22 Furthermore, the temporary culmination of the Greek-Turkish dispute and the possibility of a total disruption of NATO Southern flank made once again obvious Eastern Mediterranean’s strategic significance in the context of the East-West conflict. CIA officials concluded 2 months after the dramatic incidents in the Aegean Sea that this situation could continue and there were cogent military reasons why Greek-Turkish political differences had to be resolved at any cost.23 Against this geopolitical background, PASOK ventured a new approach to the Soviet Bloc. Though in principle Papandreou’s Ostpolitik unfolded on the same trajectory with that of Konstantinos Karamanlis, Greece’s ties with the Eastern European Socialist countries in the 1980s turned out to have more far-reaching consequences due to the differentiated political and legal framework within which this policy was pursued. Papandreou’s new foreign policy course conveyed to the Western and Eastern European capitals the impression that Greece was a troublemaker of the Western Alliance. However, as it will be showcased, this was the result of Papandreou’s radical rhetoric rather than of its real policy. His enormous popularity in the Greek society and unquestioned authority within his own party secured him a broad leeway for such a maverick policy. It is noteworthy that Papandreou briefed the parliament on foreign policy matters for the very first time in April 1986, 5 years later since he had come into office (Michalopoulos, 1988, p. 353). Especially in the first 2 years of his stint, Papandreou made a very long record of pro-Eastern Bloc positions and statements on various occasions. Typical and well-­ recorded examples that brought Greece to a collision course with the other NATO Alliance and European Community members are the pro-Soviet stance over the solidarity movement in Poland and over the shooting down of the Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 by Soviet forces. Athens, on its part, interpreted its dissident attitude as adherence to the détente. In this regard, Greece together with Austria, Sweden, Turkey, France and Spain refused to join the flight embargo imposed by NATO to the USSR in September 1983 (Rozakis, 1987, pp. 100–104). Papandreou’s radical foreign policy rhetoric served predominantly domestic consumption purposes. For instance, in October 1984 Papandreou repeated his allegations on the shooting down of the Korean jumbo in 1983 in order to draw public  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 7 April 1988”. 23  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Memorandum for NIO/GPF, subject: Mediterranean Workshop 28 May 1987”. 22

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attention to another example of PASOK’s independent foreign policy. More precisely, he commented the Soviet claims about espionage allegedly carried out by the Jumbo on behalf of Western powers. According Papandreou, these claims had been supported by responsible Western newspapers. The American reaction was predictably angry. Both the Pentagon and the State Department spokesmen denied Papandreou’s allegation. Pentagon spokesman said he did not know why the Greek government issued such an irresponsible statement and State Department spokesman demanded clarification of Papandreou’s statement. Not accidentally, this statement occurred shortly after official confirmation that AWACS aircraft would be based in Greece that apparently made Papandreou thinking it necessary to issue a compensating anti-American statement. His statement enraged the British as well, who had a direct interest since they lost one UK citizen and thirteen residents of Hong Kong in the disaster. According to the British embassy in Greece, an independent report of the International Civil Aviation Organization found no evidence to show that the aircraft was on a spying mission, or even that the flight crew were aware that the aircraft was off course; The Japanese, Korean and US authorities cooperated fully with the investigators, whereas the Russians offered no assistance; In addition the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization overwhelmingly passed a resolution (20 for, 2 against and 9 abstentions) which among other things recognised that no evidence had been found to indicate that the aircraft’s deviation was premediated or that crew were aware of the deviation.24 Another pro-Soviet move was Greece’s deviation from NATO over the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe. This marked a clash with the predecessor Karamanlis government that had supported NATO’s 1979 dual-track decision favouring the deployment of Euromissiles. To the contrary, Papandreou argued that Euromissiles’ deployment upset the strategic Cold War balance. Moreover, and most importantly, Papandreou embraced the Soviet view on the inclusion of UK and French nuclear forces in any future East-West negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The fact that Papandreou announced his views on the issue in Budapest in June 1983, i.e. in a Warsaw Pact country capital, infuriated London and Paris. France and United Kingdom deemed it highly inappropriate for the Greek leader to raise the issue of their nuclear capacity, all the more because, in their eyes Papandreou’s remarks were against NATO’s agreed positions and allied interests in general.25 Through the new course, Papandreou not only attained leftists’ support at home but, more importantly, won the sympathy of Eastern Bloc countries as well which now saw him as the Trojan Horse within the NATO’s Southeastern flank. The Soviet Bloc countries tracked very closely the Greek-Turkish confrontation in the Aegean  FO: FCO 9/4652, “Exchange of telegrams between the British embassy in Greece and the Foreign Office in London October 1984, subject: Papandreou’s statement on the shooting down of the Korean airliner”. 25  FO: FCO 9/5386, “Exchange of telegrams between the Foreign Office in London and the British embassies in Budapest, Athens, Paris and the British representation to NATO, June 1983”. 24

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Sea and within NATO. The East German embassy in Athens evaluated Papandreou’s assertive attitude towards Turkey and NATO and especially his opposition to Greece’s reintegration plan to NATO, as an effort to guarantee country’s sovereignty. According to the East German appraisal, Papandreou attached greater importance to the control of the airspace (Flight Information Region) than to the continental shelf because he believed that this would determine the outcome of the dispute between the two countries over the shelf. In this regard, he attempted to achieve an equation of the boundaries of Greece’s operational control within NATO with those emanating from Athens claimed airspace control over the Aegean. The East German diplomats suggested that the community of the Socialist States should support Papandreou’s claims against Turkey and NATO in order to bring him closer to “the détente policy camp”, boost his disrupting actions within NATO and finally hinder a strengthening of the southern flank of the alliance. Yet, this course involved the danger that Soviet security interests in the region be undermined, because Turkey could obstruct the passage of Soviet ships through Bosporus and hence the supplying of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. Soviet security interests could also be harmed by the extension of Greece’s territorial waters in the Aegean, diminishing the international waters used by Soviet ships.26 Beyond that, during the 1980s Greece became the NATO country with which Warsaw Pact countries exchanged most state visits at the highest level. As it was the case with his predecessor Karamanlis, Papandreou’s Ostpolitik started in the Balkans. Similarly, Papandreou also exerted continuing efforts to establish an institutionalised framework for multilateral Balkan cooperation. The Balkan region fitted its global perception of peace and world security and dovetailed with his anti-occident rhetoric. However, unlike Karamanlis, Papandreou utilised as basis for his envisaged regional multilateralism a proposal for denuclearisation. The PASOK government gave energetic support to the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. The idea had initially been proposed by Romania in 1957, adopted by the Soviet Union in 1959 and further promoted by Poland in the 1960s. Shortly before the 1981 general elections, Papandreou had stated that in the event of a victory his government would immediately remove the US nuclear warheads from Greece. In response, Leonid Brezhnev publicly announced in 1981 that the Soviets were ready to sign a bilateral agreement with Greece, should Athens commit itself not to allow the establishment of nuclear weapons on its soil. However, although Papandreou turned against the deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise, gradually he distanced himself from the unilateral removal of US nuclear warheads from Greece, since this would bring him into direct collision with the United States and NATO (Valinakis, 1987, pp. 184–221). Nevertheless, Greece enthusiastically embraced Bulgaria’s and Romania’s proposal for a multilateral commitment on regional denuclearisation. During the visit of Soviet Premier Nikolai Tikhonov to Greece in February 1983, the Greek and the

 MfAA, ZR 1532/84, “Report of the East German embassy in Athens on the Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean Sea 1982”.

26

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Soviet governments agreed that nuclear-weapons-free zones were an important aspect of the disarmament process and called for the limitation of both conventional and nuclear arms to “the lowest possible level” on the basis of equal security (Karamouzi & Chourchoulis, 2019, pp. 53–54). In July 1983, Papandreou invited all the Balkan countries to join the concept and proposed the convocation of a conference on this issue. The idea was to discuss on the Balkan level the Stockholm proposals on disarmament in Europe,27 hence initiating after long time again a discussion about Balkan security problems. However, Papandreou’s initiative for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Balkans looked very much as a unilateral disarmament proposal, since there were no nuclear weapons in Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, Papandreou omitted to brief his NATO colleagues about his idea on the Balkan Nuclear Free Zone and the Balkan Conference he was planning. As a result, the initiative raised questions whether this gambit would weaken Greece’s position within the Western Alliance and affect its defence capabilities.28 Papandreou’s strategy concerning the status of nuclear weapons in the region aimed at representing internationally a more independent attitude within the Western Alliance and gain as much leverage as possible towards the United States. Secondly, the establishment of the nuclear free zone was thought to give an impetus to the declining multilateral cooperation in the Balkans by bringing in a clearly political issue. Thirdly, the initiative seems to have had the goal to isolate Turkey from the process of multilateral cooperation in the Balkans, since Turkey, following the official NATO position on the issue, was against the creation of the nuclear free zone at a regional level (Huliaras, 1989, pp. 148–149). By the end of 1983, the British embassy in Athens assessed Balkan countries’ responses to Papandreou’s proposal as follows: Bulgaria and Romania approved it; Yugoslavia publicly approved, but with some reservations as it believed that the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Balkans presupposed the prohibition of the use of any kind of weapons; Turkey wished to attend the upcoming conference only if the nuclear free zone element in the meeting was buried deep on the agenda. According to the British embassy, this condition was likely to bring about a delay of the conference.29 Tirana sent a six-page epistle explaining its isolationist position on the issue. The main points of the epistle were: (a) the existing tension did not originate in Balkans

 The Stockholm proposals on disarmament in Europe was a multilateral initiative designed to start disarmament negotiations on the basis of confidence-building measures. The measures agreed at the Stockholm Conference that eventually took place in 1986 with participation of 35 states concentrated on an obligatory system of notification, information and observation of military activities. The implementation of these measures had only limited and indirect effects on military activities (Brie, Muller, Schirmeister, & Karkoszka, 1988, pp. 35–36). 28  FO: FCO 9/5386, “Telegram of the British representation to NATO to the Foreign Office in London copied to the British embassies in Athens and Ankara August 29, 1983”. 29  FO: FCO 9/5386, “Telegram of the British Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office in London, subject: Balkan nuclear weapon free zone December 20, 1983”. 27

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but in militarism and adventurism of superpowers; (b) the main factor endangering security of Balkan countries was the fact that two of them were members of NATO, two of the Warsaw Pact, while Yugoslavia was simultaneously tied to both; (c) any Balkan summit would thus be illusory and any decision taken by it would be merely declaratory. Albania could not therefore take part in any meeting on Balkan Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, even if the Balkan countries reached agreement.30 Eventually the Greek initiative failed. Both conferences in Athens in 1984 and in Bucharest in 1986 did not bring about any results. Greece and Bulgaria unreservedly endorsed the idea, but Turkey rejected the proposal outright arguing that Balkan nuclear disarmament should not be carried out in isolation from a general NATO-­ Warsaw Pact arms-control negotiation. Romania believed that it would not gain any profit from Turkey’s exclusion and procrastinated, while Yugoslavia kept a rather reserved attitude (Huliaras, 1989, pp. 148–149). In fact, even if Greece’s initiative had been succeeded, it would not have had any extraordinary impact on the regional security architecture. The nuclear weapons stationed at the time in Greece and Turkey were outdated and obsolete. The US submarines operating in Mediterranean and the AWACS31 constituted a more serious threat for the Warsaw Pact (Valinakis, 1987, pp. 184–221). In the same context of Papandreou’s international engagement against nuclear weapons belongs the political movement that became widely known as the “Initia­ tive of the Six”. It involved a symbolic institutional affiliation of democratic political forces that represented the Governments of small states across the international political spectrum. The political principles of the Movement focused upon a perceived need to establish an independent form of political control of superpower antagonism and nuclear proliferation. It was marked by a joint declaration signed by the leaders of Sweden, Mexico, Argentina, Tanzania, India and Greece in May 1984. Various summit conferences followed (Lioliou, 1999, pp. 156–158). The British Embassy in Greece assumed that the Soviets endeavoured to exploit the Initiative. Shortly before the conference meeting of the six leaders, in Mexico in August 1986, Gorbachev send a special envoy, Konstantin Kornienko, alternate secretary for international relations of the CPSU Central Committee to Crete to meet Papandreou and to hand him over a personal message whose content was never revealed.32 At the same time, the Greek Socialists pursued an upgrade of Greece’s bilateral relations with the each one of the Eastern European countries. On the same trajectory with the Ostpolitik pursued in the 1970s, the new foreign policy course was greatly personalized, marked by Andreas Papandreou personal acting. Equally, the  FO: FCO 9/5386, “Telegram of the British Embassy in Belgrade to the Foreign Office in London, subject: Papandreou proposal on Balkan cooperation: View from Belgrade, July 12, 1983”. 31  AWACS stands for Airborne Warning and Control System, e.g. the system, developed and designed by the US to serve as mobile, long-range radar surveillance and control centre for air defence. 32  FO: FCO 9/5386, “Telegram of the British Embassy in Athens to London and to other British embassies, subject: Gorbachev’s message to Papandreou July 24, 1986”. 30

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Balkan cooperation in the 1980s, in contrast to other foreign policy areas, enjoyed a relatively broad support by the opposition parties. Papandreou’s first visit to a Balkan country was in Belgrade in May 1982. In his statements he regretted the failure of détente attributing it to the American government’s belief that it was losing the arms race (Michalopoulos, 1988, p.  353). Yugoslavia’s nonaligned foreign orientation, its demand for disarmament and its self-managing type of socialism resonated well with the Greek Socialists. Moreover, Yugoslavia’s leading role in the nonaligned movement could potentially entail a positive stance of the not-aligned countries for Greek interests in Cyprus. For this reason and despite the improvement Greek-Albanian relationship, Athens never criticised Belgrade’s harsh measures against irredenta or nationalist manifestations by the Albanian population in Kosovo.33 The only political issue that never stopped burdening the bilateral relations was the Macedonian Question. That question came onto a new phase in the 1980s. The loosening of the central control in the post-Tito Yugoslavia emboldened the nationalistic tendencies of the Slav-Macedonian portion of the Yugoslav Federation (Kofos, 1991, pp. 104–106, 116–117). The Greek-Albanian relations profited the most from 1980s Greece’s Ostpolitik. After the China-Albania break-up, Greece was the only Albania’s contact-point with the rest of world. Therefore, Athens and Tirana signed many protocols on cooperation in various fields. Furthermore, in the early 1980s, Tirana made public its interest to settle its territorial differences with Greece. In February 1984, Papandreou stated publicly that the principle of the inviolability of the European frontiers, stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act, applied also to Albania frontiers removing the suspicion of any Greek irredentist claims. Nevertheless, Tirana regarded this statement as insufficient. In December 1984, the Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias visited Tirana. The visit resulted in the signing of scientific-­technical and cultural cooperation agreements and paved the way for the lifting of the war status between the two countries (Ntagios, 2015, pp. 355–356). Some months later, the special legal department of the Greek foreign ministry judged that the state of war with Albania was not valid any longer. The Paris Peace Treaty and the partial normalisation of Greek-Albanian relations in 1971 had rendered it void. In the next 2 years an intensive exchange of high rank officials took place and many technical agreements were signed that extended both the volume and the scope of the bilateral relations. As a gesture of good will the Albanian regime allowed some Greeks who lived in Northern Epirus to visit Greece for the first time since the war. In August 1987, Greece officially and unilaterally terminated the state

 Even during the previous Georgios Rallis conservative administration, Greece was faced with a potentially serious problem. It appears that in June 1981, the Yugoslavs tried without success to bring the Greeks into a dispute with Albania. More precisely, they circulated in the United States among Albanian emigre circles a map of so-called “Greater Albania”. This map included not only the Kosovo but also a large chunk of North Western Greece (Southern Epirus) including Fiorina, Ioannina and Preveza, described as “Albanian territory”. FO: FCO 9/3186, “Telegrams from the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office in June 1981 on the triangle Greece/Yugoslav/ Albania”.

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of war with Albania. The move prompted heavy and massive reactions. The Greek Orthodox church and diaspora Greeks around the world reacted aggressively to it. Some diaspora Greek organisations brought the issue of maltreatment of the Greek minority in Albania before the United Nations Human Rights Commission and called out the Amnesty International to investigate it (Kofos, 1991, pp. 112–113). Inside’s Greece the Conservative opposition labelled the decision as a treason. The government was accused not to have secured concessions from the Albanian side on the welfare and human rights of the Greek minority living in South Albania. The leader of the Conservative opposition Konstantinos Mitsotakis publicly stated that his party did not feel bound to this “move of national treason” indicating that his party would recall it if it took over. Even the President of the Hellenic Republic Christos Sartzetakis expressed serious doubts about the legal method of resolving the issue of belligerency (Ntagios, 2015, pp. 357–358). Greece proceeded into an additional gesture of good will towards the Albanian regime as well. In March 1988, the Greece’s representative in the United Nations abstained from a voting on conviction of Albania for violations of human rights and basic principles of the UN charter (Malkidis, 2007, pp. 157–158, 167–175). Thanks to the thaw in the Greek-Albanian relations, Tirana began embracing the concept of regional cooperation. Albania had refused to participate in Karamanlis’ project of establishing a multilateral Balkan cooperation scheme, as it did with the Helsinki Summit of 1974. Tirana was convinced that this was instrumentalised by powerful Western states and the Soviet Union to undermine Emver Hoxha’ regime and to drag Albania into their sphere of influence. For the same reasons, in early 1980s Tirana turned down Papandreou’s invitation to take part in his scheme of regional disarmament. Only after the mid-1980s, in the framework of the new Albanian leader Ramiz Alia pragmatic foreign policy designed to break Albania’s international isolation and after Greece’s gestures of good will, Tirana changed its stance. In 1988, for the very first time Albania participated in the conference of Balkan Foreign Ministers convened by the Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade with the aim of reviving Balkan multilateral cooperation (Katsikas, 2004, p. 99). In the PASOK era, Greek-Bulgarian relations also expanded rapidly in all critical areas but mainly in technology and research. Sofia sided with Athens in the Macedonian Question, because Yugoslavia demanded the recognition of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria (Michalopoulos, 1988, p. 360). Bulgarian Communist regime’s campaign against the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria from 1985 onwards offered common ground in the bilateral relations. In the 1980s, that minority still numbered about 900,000 or about 10% of the total Bulgarian population. Probably in order to deflect attention from domestic problems, the Communist regime began targeting the Bulgarian Turks following an aggressive Bulgarisation policy. Many thousands were arrested, imprisoned, uprooted from their homes or even forced to go into internal exile. Bulgarian Turks were also obliged to adopt Bulgarian names and hindered from performing religious ceremonies. In 1989, the Zhivkov regime made a step further by deciding to expel them en masse. During June–August 1989, it is estimated that around 312,000 members of this minority fled to Turkey (Hale, 2013, pp. 121–123).

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In a classic piece of Balkan power-brokering between two mutually antagonistic states in line with the motto “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, Greece and Bulgaria came closer. In September 1986, the two countries signed in Sofia the Declaration of Friendship and Good Neighborliness. In the declaration both parties assumed the obligation not to encourage or commit acts directed against each other, nor to allow their territory to be used for such activities (Huliaras, 1989, pp. 152–154). Moreover, the article 5 of the Declaration stated that in the case of a threat against the peace and the security of one of them, the two countries would immediately come in contact to exchange views for averting that threat. Since Greece assumed military responsibility to protect a country of the hostile Eastern Bloc, this stipulation provoked harsh criticism about an alleged “violation of Greece’s NATO-­ obligations”. The Greeks, on their part, claimed that their Declaration of Friendship with Bulgaria had precedents in former agreements signed between countries of antagonistic Blocs such as the 1971 Franco-Soviet treaty. Further, the article 10 of the Declaration safeguarded all of Greece’s obligations towards the Alliance. According to Athens, the improvement of relations between the two countries was simply the continuation of a process that had been followed by both the junta and Karamanlis governments. After all, Greece needed the best possible relations with its northern neighbours in order to defend itself against the Turkish threat.34 Nevertheless, Greece’s allies in NATO were terribly upset. Especially, Papandreou’s statements during his visit in Sofia in September 1986 on the nuclear security architecture in Europe infuriated West Germany. Papandreou, who at the same time fostered its ties with East Berlin, literally stated that if the nuclear button were pressed in Bonn, Sofia would be only one and a half minutes away from destruction. The federal government was astonished and shocked that Bonn was depicted as a nuclear power, whereas a Warsaw pact country was portrayed as the innocent victim of a possible attack by the Federal Republic of Germany.35 Greek-Romanian relations also continued to improve. In May 1982, the Romanian leader Ceausescu paid an official visit to Athens reciprocated in November of the same year by a Papandreou’s visit to Bucharest. The main event in the bilateral relations was the signing of a “common declaration on the prospects of co-operation between Greece and Romania” (Huliaras, 1989, p. 155). Concurrently, Athens intensified its efforts towards the building of a new relationship with non-Balkan Socialist countries. With reference to Poland, it is worth mentioning that Greek government restrained itself from condemning the imposition of a military dictatorship in 1981. Only after enormous pressure from the public opinion, the Greek government issued a public communique in December 1981 solely stated that…guided by a deep sense of sympathy with the polish people the Greek government is following the implementation of state of emergency measures  FO: FCO 9/5395, “Exchange of telegrams between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the British embassy in Athens September 23 and 25, and October 9, 1986, subject: Greece-Bulgaria declaration of friendship: alleged precedents”. 35  FO: FCO 9/5395, “Telegram of the British embassy in Bonn to the Foreign Office in London, subject: High level Greek visits to Eastern Europe September 26, 1986”. 34

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in Poland with grave concern and expresses its deep grief over the recent dramatic events there. Greece together with other European countries expects that the states which have signed the Helsinki final act will refrain from any form of interference in Poland’s internal affairs. The Greek government believes that Poland must solve its problems alone and without the use of force so that the process of reform and renewal continues….36 Papandreou’s thesis on Poland was that sanctions against the new regime would have a counterproductive effect. He justified his divergence from the West by arguing that there was a danger of mishandling the situation in Poland. Papandreou’s appraisal was that Jaruzelski was a genuine patriot trying to find a way of resisting Soviet pressure. Given Poland’s geographical position between the Soviet Union and East Germany Jaruzelski had an almost hopeless task, as there was a direct Soviet intervention e.g. even on such relatively minor topics as the renaming of dockyards at Gdansk. At informal meetings with West European heads of government, Papandreou expressed the opinion that Jaruzelski was much concerned by the reduction of Western aid for Poland which had been followed by an extension of Soviet influence.37 In October 1984, Andreas Papandreou became the first Prime Minister of a EU and NATO country to visit Poland after the dramatic events of 1981. Like with the other Communist countries, Papandreou used the visit to conclude a long-term agreement on scientific, industrial and technical cooperation and to elicit some support for the Greek cause in the conflict with Turkey. The Polish Foreign Minister Olzwski and the Polish de facto dictator Jaruzelski reciprocated Papanderou’s visit in 1986 and 1987 accordingly. Warsaw did offer some support with regard to Cyprus but remained silent about the Greek-Turkish dispute (Michalopoulos, 1988, pp. 361–364; Drakoularakos, 1989, pp. 26–31). Concerning Czechoslovakia, after some contacts on low politics in 1981 and 1982, in the next years the two countries established a high-level political dialog that was mirrored on the exchange of visits at the level of Foreign Ministers in 1983 and 1987 and Prime Ministers in 1986 and 1987. Nonetheless, Athens could not gain any remarkable support in the Greek-Turkish conflict. The trade ties became loosened because of the termination of the clearing trade method (Drakoularakos, 1989, pp. 130–146). Although Greek-Hungarian relations were marked by an intensive exchange of political, cultural contacts and mutual visits at the highest level in 1983 and 1987 ending up in the signing of a declaration of friendship and cooperation, it turned out to be impossible for Athens to commit Budapest to a clear support of the Greek standpoint in the Aegean dispute (Drakoularakos, 1989, pp. 121–125).

 FO: FCO 9/3186, “Telegram of the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office, subject: Poland A Greek government reaction January 4, 1982”. 37  FO: FCO 9/4050, “Confidential telegram of the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office, repeated as priority info to the British embassy in Bonn, Washington, Paris and United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, subject: the Soviet Union, Greece and the Alliance called on May 3, 1983”. 36

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Greece was the first NATO country in the 1980s, whose both the President of the State and the Prime Minister undertook official visits to East Berlin beside numerous mutual ministerial visits that took place in the same period. Papandreou paid two state visits to the German Democratic Republic (in July 1984 and January 1988) and the President of the Hellenic Republic, Christos Sartzetakis, officially visited East Berlin in September 1986. Friendly relations between the Communist Party of East Germany (Socialist Unity Party) and PASOK coincided with the interstate relations. They unfolded so well that the leader of East Germany (Chairman of the State Council) and General Secretary of the East German Communist Party, Honecker intended to undertake a state visit to Greece in the midst of the PASOK election campaign in spring 1985. Only after serious pressure from the Greek communist comrades was Honecker’s state visit postponed until after the elections. In an incorrect assessment of Papandreou’s real intentions, the East German Communist party and former patron of the Greek Communist party during the junta, cultivated closer ties with PASOK than with its communist “brother party” (Stergiou, 2001, pp. 146–158). This cordial relationship was in line with the then GDR’s efforts to promote its status internationally as an independent and sovereign state. The exchange of state visits, especially with non-Socialist, Western states was considered as very conducive method to achieve this goal. However, the warmth in the Greek-East German relations came at a price for Greece. The multi-level contacts between the East German regime the PASOK administration displeased Bonn. The West Germans began fearing that they would lose its traditionally, dominant political-economic position in Greece. Greece was not the only NATO state in the 1980s that willingly accommodated the GDR’s “Western Offensive,” improving bilateral relations by leaps and bounds, but it was the only NATO state and European Community partner that so blatantly ignored Bonn’s sensitivities on this issue. Unsurprisingly, Bonn began leaving its hitherto strict neutral stance in the Greek-Turkish conflict in favour of Turkey. Only the collapse of the GDR and the fall of Papandreou in the same year made it possible again for West German diplomats in Bonn and Athens to trust the capricious Greeks (Stergiou, 2017, pp. 708–709). Fostering ties with the Soviet Union proved to be a cumbersome undertaking for the Greek Socialists, all the more because Moscow also fostered simultaneously its ties with Turkey and generally avoided to take a clearly pro-Greek position in the Greek-Turkish dispute.38

 For example, in July 1984, a Greek parliamentary delegation, led by the chairman of the Hellenic Parliament Ioannis Alevras visited the Soviet Union and saw Chairman of the Council of the Union Tolkunov, Vice President Kuznetsov and Prime Minister Tikhonov. In the public communiques after the visits the Soviet speakers took a very familiar and aggressively anti-American stance. On Cyprus and the Aegean, however, the Soviet side confined itself to expressing sympathy for the Greek position and repeating earlier statements about the need for peaceful solutions without external interference. FO: FCO 9/4652, “Telegram of the British embassy in Moscow to the Foreign Office, August 1, 1984, subject Greek parliamentary delegation in the Soviet Union”.

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Soviet relationship with Turkey was apparently higher prioritised by Moscow than that with Greece, although the strengthening of ties between Turkey and the United States in early 1980s unleashed growing tension in relations between Ankara and Moscow. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was strongly criticised by the Turks. Several thousand Afghan refugees of Turkic (Kirghiz) extraction were given shelter in Turkey. At the same time, Turkey looked very askance at the Soviet military build-up in the Caucasus and the Soviet re-arming of Syria after the war in Lebanon. The frosty relationship with the USSR continued until 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as Secretary General of the Soviet communist party (Hale, 2013, pp. 121–123). On the other hand, Greek Socialists attached great importance to their relations with Soviet Union and therefore invested a lot of energy in fostering ties with the Kremlin. Only few months before the 1981 general elections, a PASOK delegation had visited Moscow. The delegation declared the party’s commitment to a “nonaligned, independent and truly multidimensional foreign policy based on the principles of tantamount friendship and non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations”, fuelling speculations in West about PASOK’s foreign policy after assuming power. Papandreou’s visit to Moscow in November 1982 – one of the first abroad after assuming power in October 1981 – on the occasion of Brezhnev’s funeral had the clear aim to defrost the post-Afghanistan invasion Greek-Soviet relations (Eaton, 1987, pp. 31–38). The already mentioned PASOK administration’s pro-Soviet actions and statements in 1981–1883 were responded by a series of pro-Greek and anti-Turkish articles in Pravda and Izvestia newspapers criticising human rights violations by Turkey and supporting Greek positions in the Greek-Turkish dispute. While publicising developments in Greek-Soviet relations, however, the Soviet press played up differences between Greece and its NATO allies. For instance, the Soviet press was quick to report the Greek refusal to grant landing rights to American aircraft supplying US forces in Lebanon or a statement by a Greek government spokesman rejecting “attempts by representatives of the US to impose their own views on international problems of Greece”. The Soviet press also highlighted the Greek decision to pull out of the September “Autumn Forge” exercise, because NATO had “failed to ­honour the terms of Greek participation and had taken a position again the Greek interests and in favour of Turkey”.39 In early 1983, 3  months later after Papandreou’s visit to Moscow, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tikhonov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, reciprocated Papandreou’s move by paying an official visit to Athens. According to the British embassy in Athens, Greece, as the maverick of the Western Alliance, had in Soviet eyes the potential to play a role analogous to that of Romania in the Warsaw Pact. Tikhonov’s visit enabled the Soviets to demonstrate that, Poland and Afghanistan notwithstanding, détente was still a case at hand and Soviet peace

 FO: FCO 9/4050, “Report of the British embassy in Moscow to the Foreign Office, November 2, 1983”.

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initiatives had not fallen on wholly stony ground. Tikhonov was careful to avoid controversy and to keep “his head down on Cyprus and the Aegean”. Although the visit did little more than continue relations on the lines established by Karamanlis’s visit to Moscow in 1979, the joint communique ensued from the visit prompted heavy reactions from the United States that handed over a note to the Greek Ambassador in Washington. The communique expressed support for nuclear free zones and equal security implying the inclusion of French and British nuclear forces in the equation of international Nuclear Forces. The main points in the communique were as follows: (a) The two governments reaffirmed their determination to continue to strengthen relations. They favoured the further development of trade on a long-term basis. (b) The parties supported the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments “at the lowest possible level in the conventional and nuclear field” on the basis of equality and equal security with the aim of achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.40 These statements provoked reactions from the Americans who presented a note verbal to the Greek government. While recognising the Greek government’s right to express its opinions, the note suggested that by adopting such positions as were contained in the Greek/Soviet communique, the Greeks were taking a further step in the distancing of Greece from the NATO Alliance. The British, diplomatically more skilful than the Americans, were sceptical to undertake any action, because this would put them in Greek eyes in the category of following (as Greeks tended to think the British always do) the American lead and doing little more than echoing what the Americans had already said. Especially within the NATO, with the Turks present, such an action would make the Greeks even less likely to react positively.41 At the same time, the Soviets were well-represented at annual celebrations of events in Greece (battle of Crete 1941, Navarino naval battle in 1827) in order, as the British embassy appraised, to draw attention to evidence of past cooperation and assistance and “to make capital out of these episodes”.42 But beneath this and the surface froth, the underlying position remained unchanged. Although Greece remained firmly tied to the West, it was European Community and NATO member, and still had US bases and warheads on its territory. For Papandreou, any pro-Soviet gestures were a way of balancing Greece’s western alignment, of reminding the West of Greece’s strategic value, and of undermining the Greek Communist party. The Soviet Union for its part had its own interests (in Turkey, and to a lesser extent in its relationship with the Greek Communist  FO: FCO 9/4050, “Telegrams of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign office February 25 and 26 1983, subject: Visit of Soviet Prime Minister”. 41  FO: FCO 9/4050, “Telegrams of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign office March 1983, subject: Soviet Prime Minister’s visit to Greece”. 42  FO: FCO 9/4050, “Telegram of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign office May 25, 1983”. 40

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party) which constrained the development of relations with the Greek government.43 An important driver for closer Greek-Soviet ties was the growing interest of Greek shipowners, a very influential pressure group in Greece, in expanding their activities in the Soviet Bloc countries. In the 1980s, Greek flag shipping continued to provide considerable amounts of foreign exchange for the Greek economy. The 1979 energy crisis and the world shipping slump which had started in 1981, hit hard the Greek shipowners. The prolonged crisis put them under strain to search for new markets. In 1985, the then Greek Merchant Marine Minister, Katsifaras, made an appeal to the Soviet Union to help the Greek shipowners, who “had been the first to break the blockade of Cuba and now were the victims of international capitalism”. In 1985, Greece and the USSR signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of shipbuilding and ship repair as well as a memorandum on basic guidelines for cooperation in the field of commercial navigation (Huliaras, 1989, pp. 176–183). Apart from the warming up of political relations the bilateral trade grew due to joint interest in barter deals, Greece’s need to find export markets and Soviet Union’s need to export energy. In the timespan 1981–1985, Greece and Soviet Union concluded numerous commercial protocols, agreements and deals at various levels, while official multi-level contacts multiplied. In the first half of 1980s, Greek-Soviet trade links flourished. The agreement on Economic and Industrial Cooperation that had been signed with the Soviet Union in the 1970s and prepared the soil for various projects and agreements, including the establishment of the Mixed Intergovernmental Economic Committee, was complemented by a new one in February 1983. The latter gave to the Greek-Russian relations an enormous impulse. Most of the trade deals concluded between Greece and the Soviet Union were based on financial and economic grounds, rather than political considerations, given the USSR’s willingness to accept Greece’s surplus agricultural produce in barter deals and the generally lower prices it was able to offer. The trade (oil and gas in a period of high prices of these commodities) increased by 45%. Unlike in previous periods marked by trade with the clearing method, the payment in hard currency dominated the transactions (Ellinosovietika Chronika 1981, issue 67; 1982, issues 70–71; 1983, issues 81–82). The deal with the Soviet Union on the exploitation of Greek bauxite reserves, the richest in Europe, was one of the Socialist administration’s biggest successes in the field of foreign investment (Spourdalakis, 1985/1986, pp. 254–259). The proposal for this deal dated back in the late 1970s but was not finalised until the signing of an agreement in March 1984. This 10-year agreement set a price of 13% below the international Alcan-Canada alumina price for the first 3 years of the plant’s operation and at 12.6% below for the next 7 years. However, this price had to be re-negotiated late in 1984 following the abandonment of the Alcan price standard on the international markets that delayed the start of the project. A further problem which was raised is the matter of the electricity supply required by the  FO: FCO 9/4652, “Telegram of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign Office September 24, 1984, subject: Greek/Soviet relations”.

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alumina plant and the price it would pay for its energy supplies. The processing of bauxite into alumina requires large quantities of electricity, and some economic observers expressed doubts that existing Greek supplies will be able to meet these requirements. In January 1985 the Greek Ministry of National Economy announced the decision to purchase 10 billion Drachmes (Greece’s national currency at the time) worth civil engineering equipment for SYKEA (the auxiliary army construction corps) from the USSR.  Ministry of Defence sources commented that this decision was made solely on the basis of cost and not quality; although payment was to be made in hard currency and not through barter deals, the price of Soviet equipment was significantly lower than that offered by Western European companies.44 Nonetheless, the extent of Greece’s trade with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries remained a long way behind the level of Greece’s trade with the Community and United States.45 Apart from it, Greece and Soviet Union struck some commercial deals that raised Americans and British concerns, because they concerned high-tech and sensitive sectors such as NATO intelligence, defence cooperation and so on.46 For instance, the announcement that Greece was interested in purchasing seven MI-17 Soviet helicopters to use as ambulance, caused sensation. This type of helicopter could be configured as an ambulance as well as for general military purposes. Nevertheless, the CIA believed that the Greek Government would not insist that Soviet equipment be considered, in particular because of the Greek army’s attitude towards the USSR.47 The State Department suspected that the contract for supply of Soviet engineering equipment was nominally with a civilian construction organisation, the Bureau of Construction and Reconstruction, which supposedly had no military role except in that in wartime. Given the size of the soviet deliveries, it was possible that the Greeks accepted a small number of soviet engineers for a period as part of the delivery package. There were also rumours that Soviet military officials had been assigned to a Greek military unit with access to military facilities. However, the State Department regarded it as unlikely that Papandreou would take the political risk of having Soviets co-located with Greek military installations, especially since there were no Americans co-located on Greek facilities, and Papandreou would know that the presence of soviet advisers could not long be concealed.48  FO: FCO 9/5080, “Telegram of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign Office, March 4, 1985, subject: Greek-Soviet trade”. 45  FO: FCO 9/4652, “Telegram of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign Office September 24, 1984, subject: Greek/Soviet relations”. 46  FO: FCO 9/5080, “Telegrams of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign Office, January 1985, subject: Greek defence policy and presence of Soviet advisers in Greece”. 47  CIA releases 2017: Greece: “Memorandum by the office of European analysis for the Intelligence Liaison Staff, subject: EURA comments on Greece: Military purchases from USSR, July 19, 1983”. 48  FO: FCO 9/4652, “Exchange of telegrams between the British embassy in Washington and the Foreign Office in London and to the British embassies in Athens and Ankara, subject: Report of soviet officers in the Greek army December 1984”. 44

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The Baltimore Sun newspaper reported in January 1986 on the occasion of the signing of a military agreement between the US and Greece for protecting military technology, that there had been some concerns in the US Defence Department over Greece’s ability to protect advanced military technology from Soviet agents. Those concerns increased in the framework of United States’ intension to sell Greece 40 F-16 airplane fighters.49 Papandreou’s visit to Moscow in early 1985 yielded barely a few economic agreements. It was carefully timed and probably intended to balance the various signals being sent to Washington from mid-July of this year that the Greeks did not wish to see a further deterioration in US-Greek relations, rather than to provoke the Americans.50 Greece and the Soviet Union agreed that at the given time was of paramount importance to prevent war and consolidate a peaceful future for mankind. The two parties also expressed their concern because no solution had been found yet on the Cyprus problem, a fact which constituted a threat to peace and security in the region. Their communique reflected the traditional Soviet positions in the issue which the Greeks naively interpreted as friendly to their interests because of its references to the international law:…Greece and the USSR support the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the non-alignment of the Cyprus Republic. They stand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, for the just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem based on the relevant resolutions of the United Nations without any foreign intervention (…) They believe that the convocation of a representative ­international conference within the UN framework could contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem (..) The USSR and Greece favor strict observance of the provisions of the new Convention on the Law of the Sea and the participation in it of all states. The settlement of emerging questions, included those involving the Aegean Sea should be effected by peaceful means in accordance with the norms of international law….51 The only component of the Soviet-Greek communique that can be regarded as pro-Greek was Soviet support for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that had been signed by Greece but not by Turkey. During the 1980s the Soviets insistently declared that the Republic of Cyprus must remain independent, territorially integral, and united, that all foreign troops on the island must be withdrawn, and that there must be international guarantees. Though Moscow’s interest was focused on the removal of the British Military Bases, given that the approximately 40,000 Turkish troops stationed on the island since the Turkish invasion, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus could be content with a total demilitarisation of the island (Stergiou, 2014/2015, pp. 211–213).  The United States insisted that that agreements designed to protect unauthorised dissemination of military information be signed by all NATO countries. 50  FO: FCO 9/4652, “Telegram of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign Office September 24, 1984, subject: Greek/Soviet relations”. 51  FO: FCO 9/5080, “Telegrams of the British embassy in Moscow to the Foreign office on Papandreou’s to the Soviet Union, February 1985”. 49

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In the next years and until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Greek-Soviet relations came to a stagnation. The exposure by a Soviet defector to the United States of Moscow’s operations in Athens, including disinformation activities and subversion of local peace movements and mass media, soured the bilateral relations. The so-called Bokhan affaire, leaked in the media in 1985, severely strained Greek-­ Soviet relations leading to the recalling of the Soviet Ambassador Igor Andropov, son of the USSR President Yuri Andropov. Sergei Bokhan, Deputy Director of Soviet military intelligence operations in Greece, defected to the United States in May 1885. His revelations about his activities in Greece fuelled an intense political dispute over the extent of Soviet spying in a NATO country. As deputy Chief, Bokhan was privy to all Soviet spy operations aimed at Greece, the United States and the other NATO countries. He also was in a position to provide the Central Intelligence Agency with the names of Greek collaborators of Moscow. It seems that after his defection, he provided many shocking details on Soviet infiltration of the Greek government. He fingered three individuals working for the Greek Government who were providing sensitive information and technology to the Soviets. Bokhan seems to have furnished information on how the Moscow obtained military-oriented Western technology through Greece, on the manipulation of the Greek press by Moscow to foster anti-Western sentiment, and on Soviet support for some terrorist activities in the West.52 Another reason that accounted for the strained Greek-Soviet relationship in 1985–1989, was that Moscow did not alter, even slightly, its neutral stance on the Greek-Turkish conflict and Kremlin steadily refrained itself from supporting Greece positions in the Aegean. For example, in the official communique on Nikolai Tikhonov’s official visit to Athens in 1985, there is no reference to Aegean at all. As it has already been mentioned, the recognition of Greece’s right to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles would deprive the USSR of five important anchorages, in logistic and strategic terms, that its navy had in the Aegean international waters. Moreover, the application of the 12-mile rule, provided by the international law, in the Aegean Sea could also disturb the movement of Soviet ships in the region. In that case the passage of military ships would depend on special authorisation granted either by Athens or Ankara, since it would be impossible for a ship coming from the Straits to enter the Mediterranean Sea without passing either through Greek or Turkish territorial waters. Furthermore, the long-awaited and warmly desired by Athens Gorbachev’s visit to Greece never took place. Athens showed its displeasure by delaying for long time the replacement of the Greek Ambassador Dountas in Moscow, after his resignation, by a new Ambassador. The mutual foundation of a Greek consulate in Odessa and a Soviet one in Thessaloniki never materialised. The trade relations did not grow as much as expected. The Soviet Union linked the absorb of Greek agricultural prod-

 CIA releases 2017: “Report on Greece, subject: Andropov’s son to lose his job in Greece December 9, 1985”.

52

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ucts to Soviet oil imports to Greece. Greece, however, did not have enough reserves in foreign currency to finance more imports (Tsardanidis, 1993, pp. 333–381). Nevertheless, in October 1987, after many delays, the building works of the Greek/Soviet Alumina plant in Boethia were inaugurated. The project earmarked the production of 600 thousand tonnes of Alumina per annum and employment for 650 locals and another 2500 people during its construction that would cost approximately 600 million dollars. The entire output of the plant for 10 years had been sold in advance to the Soviet Union, which would pay for two thirds of it in convertible currency and the remaining third in Soviet products. Although the event was greeted with enthusiasm by nearly all sections of the local community as a significant step towards completion of this long running project, there still were many obstacles to overcome. The project lacked commercial logic. The projections for world demand for alumina were at best uncertain and hence the options of export earnings for Greece limited. The project would cause considerable environmental damage to the area and would provide only a limited number of jobs in relation to the huge investment. The technology which the Soviets would provide, was outdated. The Bulgarians, who were originally supposed to take 25% of the output in exchange for hard currency, they eventually dropped out. However, as the British embassy noted in its reports, the investment project could be utilised by the Greek Socialist government for political purposes. It could be presented as an illustration of the success of its insistence on national independence in both economic and foreign policy. In addition, as the British literally pointed out, “Papandreou had a stick with which to beat any on the left who might criticise his subsequent wooing of Western capital to invest in Greece”. For the Soviets the project marked a major step forward in projecting their economic presence in Greece. It should be viewed as one of a number of projects which the two sides were eager to implement such as the provision of Soviet natural gas, a joint venture to construct a stainless-steel plant and the building of Soviet vessels in Greek yards. According to the British diplomates, the importance of all these activities laid more in their appearance than their substance.53 Indeed, by the end of the 1980s, the bilateral trade shrank as a result of Soviets’ refusal to spend their earnings from trade on Greek goods, while the politically sensitive project of the alumina plant remained dormant (Cutler, 1991, pp. 194–195). At the political level, in July 1987 an exchange of letters between Gorbachev and Papandreou leaked to the press. The publication of the letters was seen as a major political development and captured the attention of the press for an unusually long time. Especially the Conservative newspapers were full of scathing criticism, in particular of Gorbachev’s advice on the sensitive issue of the US bases (he urged the Greek government not to renew the respective US-Greek agreement). In his reply

 FO: FCO 9/5722, “Telegram of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign Office November 27, 1987, subject: Soviet/Greek economic relations the alumina plant and Greek-Soviet trade”.

53

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Papandreou avoided to mention that Greece and the Soviet Union were members of opposed military Alliances. To the contrary, he spoke of an identity of views on many issues and unreservedly supported Gorbachev’s stance on disarmament, even when they run counter to established NATO policy. Moreover, Papandreou promised that the US bases would not engage in any activity “directed against friends of Greece”! The British diplomats in Greece correctly estimated that Papandreou’s moves had more to do with psychology than foreign policy. Papandreou needed the support for the next election of the left wing of his Socialists party and the Greek Communist party, which were strongly opposed to a new US bases agreement. So, he hoped to reduce their opposition by demonstrating the intimacy of his relationship with Gorbachev. With his answer, however, Papandreou accepted a Soviet “droit de regard” over the bases issue. The British appraisal that Gorbachev’s regal tone would be unacceptable to the Greeks if it had come from a western government,54 showcased the Greek anti-Occidentalism, a significant part of the then dominant left-leaning political culture in the Greek society. In this regard, it is noteworthy how the Socialist government viewed the Chernobyl disaster. The government took the line that the disaster was a tragic reminder of the perilousness of nuclear power whether harnessed for peaceful or warlike purposes. This position struck a chord with the Greek public who, after 2 weeks of near hysteria, whipped up by irresponsible journalism, wished to have nothing to do with nuclear energy in any form. The presence in Bulgaria of four reactors, reportedly of a similar design to that at Chernobyl, was ignored. As pointed out by the British embassy in Greece, Papandreou wilfully blurred the issues, of Chernobyl and nuclear disarmament, putting the dangers of both civil and military uses of nuclear energy on the same foot. The accident thus increased the already strong support in Greece for his anti- nuclear policy. At the same Papandreou accused the Soviet Union for its failure to inform Europe of the scale of the accident, arguing that the delay in the release of information had prevented other ­countries from taking measures. It was irresponsible for ’the political leadership to have allowed the installation of nuclear plants without knowing beforehand how to confront an accident of the type which occurred. 55 A significant component of PASOK’s relations with the Soviet Bloc that merits consideration was the handling of the very sensitive issue of the Greek political refugees from the Greek Civil War who still lived in the Communist countries. For decades, Greek political refugees had been struggling against all odds to return to their country and to regain the Greek citizenship they had been deprived of. Meanwhile their number had increased, as many of them had raised their own

 FO: FCO 9/5722, “Telegrams of the British embassy in Greece to the Foreign Office July 15 and 16, 1987, subject: the Papandreou/Gorbachev letters”. 55  FO: FCO 9/5386: Political Relations Greece and Soviet Union, “Telegrams from the British Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office London May and June 1986”. 54

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f­amilies in exile and sought to achieve repatriation for all family members. In the past, with the exception of some cases, all Greek governments had refused a general amnesty and repatriation of the refugees. Even the Konstantinos Karamanlis initiative to facilitate the repatriation of a big number of political refugees had not solved the problem in its entirety. The long exile of those people had attracted the interest of many leading personalities, intellectuals, artists and others who had made public pleas for their repatriation.56 Socialist government’s legislation regarding the expatriated Greek citizens a short time after PASOK came to power, was meant to become an emblematic act of the new government. The Socialist government ventured to do what all preceding governments had refused: to allow and facilitate the massive return of the expatriates (Greek Government’s Joint Ministerial decision No. 106841/1982). However, this turned out to be a very complicated issue. Many of them had been convicted by military tribunals and were in danger of being prosecuted after their return. The main bulk of the people to be repatriated came from the Soviet Union. The transfer of their pension rights proved to be a very thorny matter. Some countries were generous in granting pension claims, but other Socialist states were not. The Soviet Union, for example, granted pension claims only to persons who had officially worked in the country; and this did not apply to all of them.57 In the mid-1980s Greece concluded agreements with all the Warsaw Pact countries, except Romania, for the transfer of refugee social security rights (Wallden, 1993, pp.  298–299). The largest part of those who had settled in Yugoslavia had been listed as “Macedonians” and not as Greeks. Therefore, the Greek State regarded them as a source of problems and denied them the right on return (Michalopoulos, 1988, pp. 361–364). Greece’s accession to the European Community in 1981 and the economic crisis in Eastern Europe had a significant impact trade with the Eastern Bloc that remained a highly sensitive political issue. Greece’s obligatory harmonisation with EC rules precipitated a termination of most of the clearing agreements with Eastern European countries. However, it should be mentioned that Greece was among those European countries that did not fully comply with the European Community rules determining trade relations with Eastern Europe, since previous trade agreements were substituted by cooperation agreements. Especially in the field of public procurement, Greece ignored European Community regulations, even after the 2 years long transitional period provided for by the Accession Act. Yet, even in the cases the agreements continued to exist, exchange of soft goods became more difficult (Wallden, 1988, pp. 169–240).

 Archive of Modern Social History: United Democratic Left-Archive: Political Refugees archive covering the period 1975–1980, box 172, “Political refugees’ appeals to the United Nations in the 1970s”’ and “petitions and statements of support to their cause by prominent personalities inside and outside Greece”. 57  Personal communication with Victor Olenchenko (Moscow September 2015). 56

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In a nutshell, PASOK administration’s cordial political relations with these countries did not coincide with analogous extraordinary economic ties. Although the Socialists reinforced the political bridges built by their predecessors and in some cases built new ones, trade followed its own logic. The expectation that the Communist countries would act contrary to their economic interest proved false. As a matter of fact, they bought and/or invested where their expected profitability was highest. Greece lost the Eastern markets for the same reasons it lost the Western industrialised markets, because it was an uncompetitive economy (Botsas, 1987, p. 233). Inclusion in the Common Agricultural Policy entailed a costly diversion of meat imports from Yugoslavian and COMECON suppliers to EC suppliers. Further, community rules increasingly hampered countertrade requirements in public procurement policies. During most of the 1980s the European Community had only sectoral agreements with some Eastern European Countries (Yugoslavia Romania for example) for industrial goods (textiles, steel) and some agricultural products and only after the 1988 joint agreement between EC and CMEA these agreements were expanded. The socialist government proceeded into various intergovernmental agreements (the so-called long-term programs) that run counter to the dynamics of the membership in the EC. In many cases the pre-accession regime survived in defiance to the community rules in sectors such as public procurement, trade and payment agreements as well as interstate trading. The share of the East German companies Elektrotechnik Export-Import and WMV Export-Import, the Czech companies Stojexport and Vitcovice Steelworks and the Hungarian Company Nimex in the Greek market increased under PASOK administration (Wallden, 1993, pp. 290–292). An important chapter of Greece’s Ostpolitik in the 1980s was its new Middle East policy. From the early 1980s onwards, the PASOK administration began overtly criticising the Western countries for their pro-Israel attitude, while it established close ties with Arab radical regimes, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in particular, and supported various liberation movements in the Third World. Papandreou was an opponent of the Camp David accords and acted accordingly. The invitation of Yasser Arafat to Athens on Papandreou’s first day in office, demonstrated his government’s new order of priorities in the Middle East. Yet PASOK’s populist, aggressive, anti-American, pro-Palestinian and pro-Third World course also seemed to be directly linked to internal policies (Rozakis, 1987, pp. 96–99). The new course was the result of the convergence of ideological, political and economic consideration. On the ideological level, there were some factions within the PASOK advocating the Third World Socialism, popular at that time in many circles of the European left. Politically, Greece’s new sort of opening was expected to elicit the Arab nations’ support in the Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus and in the Aegean. At the economic level, the pro-Arab orientation aimed at bringing Arab investments to Greece. Barring some negligible exemptions, these investments never came (Ioannides, 1991, p. 147). During his stint, Papandreou conducted numerous official visits to most of the Arab countries and proceeded to an array of spectacular pro-Arab actions. To that

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purpose he weaponised Greece’s participation in the European Community to assist the Arab states: He distanced himself from European Parliament’s desire for the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Greece and Israel; reacted against the Community’s decision to contribute troops to the Sinai Peace-Keeping force that was formed in the context of the Camp David agreements and to the Western-led peace-keeping force in Lebanon. Apart from it, in April of 1984, Greece allowed the upgrading of the PLO-representation in Athens following another Arafat’s official visit to the Greek capital (Sarri, 1989, pp. 145–147). Greek-Palestinian’s rapprochement was facilitated by leftist ideology, anti-­ Americanism as well the support that the PLO provided to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an enemy of Turkey and hence potential friend of Greece. After the 1980 military coup d’état in Turkey, Kurdish guerrilla forces had been installed in the Lebanon, where they received PLO (and Syrian) backing (Carpenter, 1985). Another key determinant of Socialist administration’s solidarity towards the Palestinians was the Cypriot experience of partition and exodus, and even the collective memory of the exodus of the Asia Minor Greeks after 1922, largely emphasized by the Greek Socialists (Papastamkou, 2015, pp. 51–55). A significant feature of Papandreou’s foreign policy was Greek-Libyan extraordinary close ties. Papandreou met Muammar Gaddafi for the first time in 1975 in Tripoli. Members of the PASOK executive committee such as Akis Tsohatzopoulos, who served as Minister in several PASOK governments from 1981 to 2004, visited Tripoli in 1976 and 1977. An association of Greek-Libyan friendship was founded in 1978 by PASOK youths of the Trotskyist stream of the party. These contacts were further developed in the next years on various occasions. In the 1980s, the relations improved to that extend that Libyan secret special forces (the so-called “death squads”) were permitted to march in Athens under police protection, shouting praise of Qaddafi and promising the execution of his opponents Reagan, Thatcher et al. (Papastamkou, 2015, pp. 61–65). Greece clinched various deals with Libya during Papandreou’s stint (for instance a U.S. $ 500 million deal for the sale of Greek military hardware) (Carpenter, 1985). The France-Libya understanding over arrangements for bilateral troop withdrawals from Chad, culminating in the Elounda Bay meeting between Qaddafi and François Mitterrand could matrialise thanks to Papandreou’s personal mediation (Sarri, 1989, pp. 145–147). Regarding the Cyprus issue, Arab countries’ support to Greece in containing recognition of the Turkish Cypriot break away regime from 1983 onwards, proved extremely valuable. The November 1983 proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was followed by a series of Ankara’s determined efforts to secure international recognition for the self-proclaimed state. In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 541, the Arab states declared themselves to be opposed to the self-proclamation of the TRNC and did not grant it diplomatic recognition, nor upgraded the observer status the Cypriot-Turkish community held in the Organization of the Islamic Conference to full membership. Yet, this support was to some extent due to the US opposition to the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Roussos, 2005, p. 89).

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Papandreou’s Arab-friendly policy seriously strained Greek-American relations, though Papandreou was trying to appease the Americans about the real depth of those contacts.58 Especially after the Reagan administration adopted in 1985 a tougher stance towards international terrorism emanating from the Middle East Athens, Washington yielded strong diplomatic pressure on Athens to terminate these ties (Papastamkou, 2015, pp. 61–65). Especially Greece anti-terrorist policy was a source of friction in the Greek-­ American relations. The CIA strongly believed that Athens was not resolute enough against Arab terrorists and that this derived from leftist sympathy for “liberation movements” in the wider Arab world, the country’s proximity to the Middle East, and a relatively large resident Arab population which made Greece particularly vulnerable to terrorist reprisals.59 In 1987, after some reports in US newspapers on alleged negotiations between the Greek government and terrorist organisations, the militant Palestinian Abu Nidal-organisation in particular, US officials officially expressed concerns about those contacts, practically accusing Greece of complicity. In return, Papandreou warned the United States that his government would remove the US military bases from Greece by the end of 1988, unless Washington withdrew those charges.60 The CIA analysts were aware of Papandreou’s foreign policy game and estimated, in 1988, during the negotiations on the continuing presence of the US bases in Greece that he actually intended to reach an agreement. However, he wanted to uphold the appearances of anti-Americanism and therefore would protract the negotiations until he decided “how to play them in an election scenario”.61 In 1988 an incident, pertinent to that tug of war, further strained Greece’s relationship with Israel and the United States. In July 1988 Palestinian terrorists carried out in Greece one of their most spectacular terrorist attacks ever. An undetermined number of terrorists began firing at passengers and throwing grenades that started fires on The City of Poros day-excursion ship as it was sailing toward its port near Athens. The attack left nine persons from several West European countries dead and nearly 100 wounded. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but the subsequent investigation into the operation uncovered evidence pointing at both the Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) and their supposed sponsors, Libya. The weapons used in the attack were of Libyan origin, and at least one of the assailants entered Greece on a Libyan passport. The Greek courts were called out to decide whether the known ANO member Muhammed Rashid should be extradited to the United States for terrorist activities or not. However, before the verdict came, the Greek justice Minister arranged for his release and transport to Libya provoking US authorities’ outrage  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Confidential Telegram of the US-Embassy in Athens to the US-missions in Ankara, Moscow, Beirut, Nicosia, NATO: Subject: Senator Percy’s meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou, August 23, 1982”. 59  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Report on Greece of 1989”. 60  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Operation Center Press’ report, subject Athens U.S. bases agreement, June 26, 1987”. 61  CIA releases 2017: “Greece: Report on Greece of 1989”. 58

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over the decision. Libya was at this time engaged in a terrorist campaign against Western Europe and the USA as part of their revenge for Operation El Dorado Canyon, (US Department of State, 1989, pp. 26–28). The Socialist government also tried to foster trade ties with Arab countries and covert political and diplomatic gains into economic benefits. The bridges had been built there before PASOK’s ascent to power. Yet, despite the numerous agreements signed between Greece and various Arab countries and the political capital invested in these contacts, the volume of trade and investment envisioned by the PASOK policies to Arab countries never materialized, except maybe the trade relations between Greece with and United Arab Emirates. Especially in the period 1982–1984 the relative shares of trade with the Middle East declined and the trade deficit increased from $ 554 million in 1981 to $ 948 million in 1984 in spite of the substantial fall of oil prices (Botsas, 1987, p. 232). There were many factors accounted for this humble result such as the oil price, the value of the US dollar and the Iraq-Iran war that led to the termination of many projects prior to their completion. Greece also faced strong competition in Arab markets from other countries that had close ties with Arab governments. Furthermore, Greek State’s red tape and lacking entrepreneurial spirit hindered the efficient marketing of Greek goods to the Arab world. Last but not least, Greece omitted, contrary to its competitors, to establish Greek trade offices in Arab countries in order to promote Greek trade interests there (Stavrou, 2010, pp. 188–202).

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Conclusions

Greece’s Ostpolitik, its political and economic opening to the Soviet Bloc, constitutes an exceptional case in the international politics of the Cold War. It was a multilevel foreign policy course that had serious ramifications in the regional architecture of power and in the coherence of the NATO Alliance. Unlike the French and German Ostpolitik, which was exclusively intended to achieve a détente in their relations with the Soviet Bloc, Greece’s opening to the Eastern European countries was designed to serve multiple purposes. This study argues that the Greek equivalent to the Ostpolitik Paris and Bonn followed during the Cold War, concerns only the period from early 1950s until 1967. Greece’s opening to the Communist World during the military dictatorship (1967–1974) was of a mere propagandistic nature. The more robust, comprehensive Ostpolitik pursued by Athens in the timespan 1974–1989 was aimed at addressing an existential threat for Greece’s security, which came from its own Western Bloc, Turkey. Based on the results of this study, Greece’s Ostpolitik should be divided in three periods: (1) from early 1950 until 1965, (2) from 1969 until 1973 and (3) the timespan stretching from 1975 until in the late 1980s. Greece’s predominant foreign policy objective after the Civil War that came to an end in 1949, was to attend to its existential security syndromes against the neighbouring Communist countries representing a threat that has been called “the menace from the North”. In order to rise to these daunting security challenges, all the Greek governments in the 1950s and 1960s tried to elicit Western support, mainly by invoking the internal and external Communist threat. The country’s accession to NATO in 1952 temporarily served this purpose. Within the North Atlantic Alliance, Greece endeavoured to reap as many economic and military benefits as possible from its NATO allies in its struggle for survival against the Communist Bloc. Various peace overtures made to Greece by the Soviet Bloc in this period were regarded by Greek policy-makers as an effort to undermine its relationship with the Western defence and economic organisations. Thus, despite the significant expansion of Greece’s commercial relations with Soviet Bloc countries during the 1950s and 1960s, Athens remained suspicious of their intentions. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Stergiou, Greece’s Ostpolitik, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61129-3_8

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From the mid of 1950s onwards, however, Greece initiated a policy of rapprochement, a quasi-Ostpolitik, towards the Communist countries, aimed at promoting simultaneously several goals: economic, geopolitical and security-oriented ones. Despite serious security concerns, Athens decided to adhere to the primacy of diplomacy, meaning placing more emphasis on political and diplomatic dialogue than on military deterrence. This was necessitated by the inferiority of the Greek armed forces compared to these of the Soviet Bloc, and the belief that it was not absolutely certain that Greece’s Western allies would come to its aid in the event of a coordinated attack by the Warsaw Pact. Another important driver for change of the foreign policy paradigm was the economy, and especially trade. Until the late 1960s, Greek exports consisted almost exclusively of agricultural products and raw materials, with tobacco and raisins covering almost half of their total value. Demand for these products in Western markets was usually weak and competition strong. This left Greece with huge surpluses in the agricultural sector, further straining the trade deficit. So, trade with Eastern Europe was a vital outlet: agricultural products were bartered for oil, wood, meat and capital equipment. Despite Cold-War restrictions in trade with Communist countries, Greece enthusiastically fostered trade ties with them in the 1950s and 1960s in order to unload excess agricultural output (mainly tobacco), that could not be absorbed by the western markets. Bilateral clearing agreements provided the necessary framework for this trade. Greek tobacco, in particular, exported to the East on bilateral clearance, could not be sold in the international market against hard currencies. Thus, losses in the Western market could be partially offset by gains in the Eastern market. This sort of trade gradually diminished in value, as the industrialisation of the country progressed from the late 1960s onwards. Trade moved in favour of the developing countries and, especially, the Middle East. On the other hand, Greece was ascribed enhanced strategic value in the framework of the 1956 Soviet “peace offensive” towards the West. This course, coordinated with other Communist countries’ policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, aimed at loosening Greece’s, Turkey’s and Yugoslavia’s ties to the West. The cornerstone of this policy was the close connexion between political and economic issues. Greece seemed to be an easy target for such a policy because of its economic problems, especially the big deficit in the trade balance, and Greek population’s displeasure about the Western countries’ stance to the Cyprus conflict. Against this background, Greece’s relations with most of Soviet Bloc countries improved rapidly, mainly at the economic level, heralding a full normalisation of the strained political relations. In the late 1950s, however, when Athens decided to give its consent to the deployment of nuclear weapons on Greek territory, the Soviet “peace offensive” was transformed into a real offensive. The Soviet Bloc staged an aggressive political offensive against Greece threatening to resort to serious reprisals should the Greek government go ahead with the installation of the US nuclear missiles. The Soviet Bloc’s assertiveness was manifested in a concerted radio and TV propaganda campaign, including a penetration of Greek domestic politics, approved at the highest levels of the Soviet State. The Greek government stood its ground, but a lack of confidence

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was entrenched in Greece’s relations with the Soviet Bloc, which remained strong until the late 1960s, despite some progress in the economic and cultural fields. The Cyprus problem was a crucial field in Greece’s relationship with Eastern European countries. During the Cold War, Moscow deployed very sophisticated tactics to meddle in the affairs of the Eastern Mediterranean countries, with the aim of weakening the West’s influence and geopolitical aspirations in the region. Yet, it was a strategy entailing serious risks, as the Kremlin’s diplomacy had to maintain a very sensitive equilibrium: fostering ties with one country without jeopardizing its relations with another that in turn could be possibly sworn enemy of the respective country. The task of justifying or whitewashing this ambivalent and sometimes internally conflicting policy fell to local Communist parties. Hence, the most suitable for this mission could be no other than the most successful among all the Communist parties in the region, the Communist party of Cyprus (the Progressive Party for the Working People, AKEL). As permanent Security Council member of the United Nations, the Soviet Union exploited the repeated political crises in Cyprus and especially the Greek-British confrontation in the UN regarding Cyprus, theoretically to demonstrate its solidarity to the Cypriot people, practically to interfere in the conflict against the Western interests. Cyprus’s neutrality, coupled with the fact that the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, had to rely on the Communists in order to rule, created favourable conditions for Soviet penetration. Contrary to the clumsy US handling of the Greek-Turkish antagonism around Cyprus, Moscow turned out to be diplomatically more deft. It avoided taking a clear position in the Greek-Turkish conflict and it exploited it to the detriment of NATO.  The complete Soviet absence in the Cyprus crisis in summer 1974 was reversed by pro-Soviet propaganda in the following decades leading to a simaltaneous increase of anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, thereby offering a smashing diplomatic victory to Kremlin. The Greek military regime’s policy towards Communist countries from 1969 until 1973 was a constellation of political, economic and geopolitical factors. The Colonels’ non-political relationship with the “hateful communists” was based on reasons related to domestic propaganda and the regime’s attempt to create the impression of an independent foreign policy. Despite the downside of the legitimisation of a staunch anti-Communist dictatorial regime, Eastern European countries embraced Greece’s opening, with a view to end their marginalisation following the Prague Spring. In fact, this approchement served very effectively propaganda ­purposes for both sides. The Greek military regime could boast of its independent foreign policy outside the country and unsettle the leftist opposition inside. The Soviet Bloc demonstrated its technological and economic achievements and entertained the international outcry against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the Soviet propagandist discourse, the Western capitalist states flattered them, to try to establish ties with Communist states despite their ideological aversion, in order to gain benefits. Moral indignation was not allowed to affect the selfinterest of the countries involved. Thus, Greece’s rapprochement with most of the Communist countries of the world was propelled by a commonality of gallous interests, in contrast to those

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determining Willy Brandt’s and Charles de Gaulle’s Ostpolitik in the 1960s and 1970s. In retrospect, it can be easily concluded that it provoked much more perplexity and concern than it really deserved. Undoubtedly, it was marked by some spectacular events, such as the diplomatic normalisation of relations with some countries to which the Greek state had had only limited ties or no ties at all, the clinching of trade deals, as well as the exchange of official visits at the highest level. However, it brought limited tangible results in economic terms (the trade volume declined compared to the previous period) and, contrary to fears in the Western camp amid serious political unrest in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe threatening to disrupt the power equilibrium in the wider region, did not affect Greece’s position in the NATO Alliance at all. Greece’s comprehensive opening to the Communist world began in 1975, after the restoration of parliamentarism and the Cyprus tragedy in the Summer of 1974. The improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations since the mid-1960s and the dramatic deterioration of the Greek-Turkish relations while Greece was not a member of the NATO military structure, were the main drivers of the new foreign policy course. Greece’s withdrawal from the NATO integrated military command as a reaction against “Alliance inertia” during the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in July and August 1974, was a seminal move, albeit not a well thought out one. Greece’s remaining only in the political structure of NATO could not be paralleled with the French case. The country was faced by security challenges, for which it was not equipped. It had a barely symbolic meaning and did not engulf a commitment for both sides to provide support in the event of war. Nevertheless, the French Ostpolitik paradigm that Konstantinos Karamanlis had studied during his self-imposed exile in Paris, seems to have impacted his actions when he became again Prime Minister in 1974. The dissatisfaction with allies, especially the naive perception that NATO had failed to guarantee Greek security against Turkish aggression, ending up in Greece’s withdrawal from NATO, increased anti-Americanism and affected Greek society’s perceptions of global politics. The well resonated demand for more independence from the United States and a multidimensional foreign policy dovetailed with Karamanlis’s new security concept. In the context of the new multidimensional foreign policy, an active Ostpolitik was regarded as a complement to the then main foreign policy objective of the country, the accession to the European Community. The rise of an increasingly popular leftist ideology in Greece after the legalisation of Communist parties in 1974, as well as the internationally favourable environment, shaped by the détente spirit, also provided a strong impetus for a differentiated approach in Greece’s relationship with the Soviet Bloc. Given the Soviet generosity to Turks since the mid-1960s, there was also in Athens an expectation of great economic benefits from a rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc, especially at a moment of economic crisis in Greece. Apart from it, the escalation of Greek-Turkish tensions rendered it imperative for Greece to ensure the neutrality of the Communist Balkan countries in the event of a war. While actively promoting re-integration into NATO’s integrated military command, Athens’ pragmatic policy was being dictated by the belief that since the

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Western Alliance might offer limited, if any, assistance in the event of an escalation of the Greek-Turkish conflicts, the country should have alternatives. As Greece was in great need of diplomatic support in its confrontation with Turkey on Cyprus and the Aegean, Karamanlis envisaged the possibility of a Balkan cooperation as a counteract to the Turkish assertive policy. Against this background and by looking carefully at the meetings, agreements and diplomatic moves Greece undertook in this period towards the various Communist countries, it becomes clear that almost all of them took place immediately after analogous Turkish moves. Athens endeavoured to ensure that Turkey did not gain more advantages in its relations with the Soviet Bloc than Greece, that, in turn, would frustrate Athens’s strategy to counterbalance Turkish aggression through new alliances. The Ostpolitik, pursued by Greece’s conservative governments in the 1970s, sought to promote some other political goals such as the lessening of the dependence of Balkan states on foreign powers, thereby limiting the prospects for latter’s interference in the inter-Balkan affairs. Karamanlis promote his vision of a Balkan multilateralism with circumspection by deliberately leaving thorny political issues out of immediate consideration. Serbia, Romania responded enthusiastically. Bulgaria, however, had reservations, most probably due to Soviet intervention. Turkey, reluctantly, participated in the multilateral deliberations, solely out of fear to be isolated, whereas Albania preferred the fostering of bilateral relations on a selective basis. Despite various setbacks and disappointments, Karamanlis’ Ostpolitik laid the foundation for a solid cooperation with the Eastern Europe, which upgraded Greece’s international profile without provoking any backlash from the Western Alliance. In contrast to other Western European countries in which the Eighties were characterised by the cultural dominance of the “New Right”, Greek politics was dominated in the 1980s by the rise of the Greek Socialist Party (PASOK) which came to power in October 1981. Greece’s foreign and security policy towards the Soviet Bloc in the 1980s unfolded on the same trajectory. An important component of the new era in the external relations of the country was the restrictive framework within which it played out. Contrary to the 1974–1981 period, the Greek Socialist era coincided with the hot phase of the Cold War in the first half of the 1980s, as well as with Greece’s reintegration into the NATO military command and accession to the European Community. In this framework, Greece’s new Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou’s opening to the Eastern European countries was not as skilful as Karamanlis’ policy. While Greece’s Ostpolitik in the 1970s did not precipitate any clash with the Western camp, Athens’ very active analogous policy in the 1980s burdened Greece’s relationship with its European and transatlantic allies. Despite a different rhetoric, the Socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou was well aware that there was no serious alternative to NATO. Although the Greek Socialist administration’s defence and foreign policy in the 1980s remained pragmatic and basically displayed a continuity and coherence with that of their Conservative predecessors, it still irritated the USA and Europe simultaneously. With his unprecedented opening to the Socialist camp and his radical anti-Western

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rhetoric and demagoguery, Papandreou became the “enfant terrible” within the Western Alliance. His resolute stance towards Turkey in a period of dramatic escalation of the Greek-Turkish conflict threatened to disrupt the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, terrifying the NATO Alliance. In fact, US officials appeared by the end of the decade, after the two countries came again to the verge of a war, to have come to the conclusion that Greece and Turkey could hardly become US allies in a NATO engagement in South-Eastern Europe. Therefore, there was some serious consideration about a determined intervention to resolve the Greek-Turkish conflict, though there were differing views on the extent of external involvement about how to put Greeks and the Turks on the right path. On the other hand, the Soviet Bloc’s policy towards Greece since 1974 resembled that towards Turkey. It was characterised by economic benevolence, patience, gradual building of confidence and skilful exploitation of Greek disillusionment and dissatisfaction with NATO. The main political gains were: the reshaping of Greek defence priorities, that, opposed to Cold War security considerations, were directed against Turkey; the permission of overflights by Soviet aircraft carriers at various occasions, especially during the crisis in the horn of Africa in 1978 and during the Lebanese crisis in 1983; and the adoption of pro-Soviet positions within NATO and the European Community. Economic relations between Greece and most of the Eastern European countries also flourished in the same period. Overall, it can be argued that Greece’s relations with the Communist world did not bring about the expected results, either in economic terms or in the country’s confrontation with Turkey. On the political level, the rapprochement certainly defused the Cold War polarisation and mitigated the mutual security concerns, thereby establishing formal and informal channels of political dialogue. In economic terms, economic and technological cooperation stayed, with the exemption of trade, at a low level. Even in the 1980s, political and ideological similarities between Socialist Greece and the Eastern European Socialist countries did not affect seriously trade ties. In retrospect, it can be inferred that trade with the Eastern Bloc was pursued more successfully by right-wing Conservative, anti-Communist governments than by their left-wing counterparts. In relative terms, trade with Eastern Europe culminated in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Even the military regime had higher shares of exports to the Communist Bloc than the post-junta governments achieved. Although the Socialist governments during the 1980s reinforced the political bridges, built by its predecessors, trade followed its own logic. When it comes to the impact on Greece’ confrontation with Turkey, the real focus of Greece’s foreign policy since 1974, Ostpolitik also proved less fruitful. Though most of the Communist countries adopted a slightly pro-Hellenic stance, the Soviet Union’s conspicuous and unquestioned neutrality, even pro-Turkish stance in some cases, on the Greek-Turkish confrontation did not enable Greece to gain any serious benefits. Both the Karamanlis and Papandreou administrations faced a hard reality that could not be overturned, despite their relentless efforts. Turkey was more important for both Moscow and Washington. Archival documents and diplomats’ testimonies

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speak volumes for that. In the 1970s and 1980s, all the US administrations were motivated by a desire to strengthen the Turkish army, the largest standing army in NATO after the American, and to compensate Turkey for the material losses suffered during the arms three-year embargo (1975–1978). The Aegean balance of power, as important as it was for Greece, was a distinctly secondary consideration. Unlike Greece, that was considered difficult, Turkey was considered to be Alliance-­ minded. The Soviet Union also fostered its ties with Turkey more seriously and generally avoided taking a clearly pro-Greek position in the Greek-Turkish dispute. The only exception to this rule was East Germany that deviated from the neutrality or pro-Turkish attitude of the Communist Bloc and clearly supported the Greek positions. Furthermore, Soviet credits to Ankara for various high added-value projects in the 1970s and 1980s were proportionally significantly more that those flowing to Greece in the same period. The Soviet Bloc’s credits to Greece did not involve high-­ tech projects, with the only exception being a Soviet-financed aluminium plant that eventually remained dormant. This study has touched upon a number of key areas. However, there are some other areas in the multi-faceted topic of Greece’s Ostpolitik that have been briefly addressed and deserve a fuller treatment. A detailed analysis of all parameters related to the topic can hardly be the subject of a single monograph. Moreover, there are still documents that either could not be accessed by the author or are still inaccessible to researchers. What those documents might hold, could confirm, or conceivably, alter, the analysis laid out here.