People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations: A Psycho-Culturological Approach (Contributions to International Relations) 981996119X, 9789819961191

Citation preview

Contributions to International Relations

Huipeng Shang

People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations A Psycho-Culturological Approach

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations and related fields. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed.

Huipeng Shang

People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations A Psycho-Culturological Approach

Proofreader: Dr. Zaitsev Iaroslav

Huipeng Shang School of International Relations Huaqiao University Xiamen, Fujian, China

ISSN 2731-5061 ISSN 2731-507X (electronic) Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-981-99-6119-1 ISBN 978-981-99-6120-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Preface

This book is based on the course “Theories and Practices of International Relations” taught by the author at the School of International Studies at Peking University and is a unique exploration of state and international relations from the perspective of psycho-culturology by a Chinese scholar. It is an application of psycho-culturology to the study of international relations by introducing two core paradigms of psychoculturology: Human Constant and psychosocial homeostasis, to the study of state actors and international relations. The basic logic of this book, as the title suggests, is to reveal the relationship between people, the state, and interstate relations. It is important to note that “people” here refers to people as a relational body, i.e., a survival system, which is the concept of people (Jen) in the Chinese semantic system. As a kind of survival system, “human” has some constant things; that is, all people need to constitute some kind of relationship with others, with things, and with cultural ideas, and these relationships are constant, so it is called “Human Constant”. The characteristics of the Human Constant influence the psychological and behavioral patterns of human beings, as well as the form of the state and the pattern of interstate relations. This analytical perspective is the psycho-culturological one. By reading this book, the reader may find it useful to understand the following issues. What is the relationship between the modern international system, the modern nation-state form, and the basic interpersonal state in Western societies? What are the basic states of being, national forms, and international systems of people outside the Western world such as China, India, and Japan? How do we recognize the relationship between Chinese ways of behaving, forms of state, and the ancient East Asian world system? What are the challenges facing China today? Will a strong China threaten the world? What is the relevance of the experience of non-Western civilizations to the world today? The Chinese version of the book was published in August 2021. At the time of the publication of the Chinese edition, the world was in the midst of the coronavirus

v

vi

Preface

pandemic, and China was taking a different approach to the pandemic than most countries in the world. The pandemic has not yet passed, and the Russo-Ukrainian war has broken out. Both of these events were disasters for humanity, one natural and one manmade. Both disasters showed that our human bodies are quite fragile, as is the civilization from which humans evolved. Both catastrophes deeply changed the world order and could not fail to influence the author of a book that explores international relations from a psycho-culturological perspective. The author has rethought some issues, such as the civilizational basis of the modern international system and the question of how China fits into the world system. The English version corrects some points in the Chinese version. These corrections are mainly reflected in Chaps. 8 and 9 of the book. The most important feature of this book is the study of international relations from the psycho-culturological perspective. Psycho-culturology is a theory that the author has refined by incorporating the findings of scholars such as Francis L. K. Hsu, a Chinese-American psychological anthropologist, Louis Dumont, a French sociologist, and Keishun Hamaguchi, a Japanese scholar. This book uses the conceptual tools of a refined psycho-culturological science. Some of these concepts are unfamiliar in the English-speaking world, such as Jen (human) in China and the concept of “the contextual” by Japanese scholar Keishun Hamaguch; some concepts that exist in the English-speaking world are given special meanings by psycho-culturology, such as Human Constant and psychosocial homeostasis. A language is not only a way of expression but also a way of thinking. I am not confident about how these psycho-culturological concepts can be expressed in English and whether they can be accepted by readers in the English-speaking world. I have been confused and even a little anxious about it. That is when ChatGPT, a powerful artificial intelligence bot, was introduced. It is said to be a large language model trained by 170 billion parameters. It was highly sought after. Some even said that the “singularity” of technological development had arrived. I tried to use ChatGPT to solve the problem of English expression that I was worried about. My experience is this. For example, it was surprising to see how well it could solve the problem of transcribing Japanese literature in a book into Japanese phonetics and translating it into English and how well it could express some concepts in English. Based on its reminders, I have re-examined some important concepts in the book, added a note on “why not use the individual and collective category instead of the individual-interpersonal category”, and added an appendix at the end of the book explaining the proper nouns so that readers in the English-speaking world can easily understand the concepts in the book. However, it shows great limitations when it is used to solve some more specialized problems. Some of the specialized questions it either does not know or does not answer to the best of its ability. Moreover, it does not associate or innovate. For example, it does not link Dumont’s concept of Homo Hierarchicus, Keishun Hamaguchi’s concept of the contextual, Hsu’s concept of “Human Constant”, or the concept of Jen in Chinese culture. It is unable to develop a new perspective on the basis of this. The answers it gives are basically nothing new. Nevertheless, ChatGPT is a useful tool, especially in expressing an idea in English, and I have benefited from the world’s most powerful artificial intelligence language model, so I would like to thank this “assistant” on the occasion of the publication. I

Preface

vii

will have to wait for the reaction of English-speaking readers as to whether the content of the expression and the new research perspective it embodies will be accepted. I would like to thank Yu Kuo Lung, a professor at Huaqiao University. Chapter 15 of this book was written by him, and some concepts and ideas in this book were discussed with him. I would like to thank Ms. Ying Ying Zhang of Springer, who made this book possible through her efforts. Finally, I would like to give special thanks to my friend and coworker, Dr. Zaitsev Iaroslav. It took time out of its unstable and busy life to read the entire book and to suggest many changes to the English presentation. Xinglin Bay, Xiamen, China March 2023

Huipeng Shang

Introduction

This book introduces two core paradigms of psycho-culturology—“Human Constant” and “psychosocial homeostasis”—to the study of state actors and international relations. It is an application of psycho-culturology to the study of international relations theory. The book distinguishes state actors into “civilizational” and “organizational” levels, emphasizes the influence of civilizational attributes of states on state behavior, and analyzes the basic interpersonal states of four large civilized societies, namely China, the United States, Japan, and India, as examples. The book explains the characteristics of state behavior and the evolution of the international system from the psycho-culturological level, using China, the United States, Japan, and India as examples, and analyzes the characteristics of the basic interpersonal states of these societies and their relationship with the state form and the international system. In particular, the book offers a Chinese scholar’s view of how to understand the relationship between Chinese ways of behavior, state forms, and the ancient East Asian world system, how to recognize the challenges facing China today, and what the civilizational foundations of the modern international system and the recognition of non-Western civilizational experiences mean for the world today. This book is suitable for scholars of international relations, students of international relations in universities, and readers interested in international relations, as well as in Chinese culture and civilization.

ix

Contents

Part I 1

2

3

Psycho-Culturology and International Relations: Perspectives and Paradigm

Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create a “Chinese School” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Development of Contemporary Mainstream International Relations Theory and Its Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Discussion of “Chinese School” and Its Background . . . . . . . . . 3 Where is the Entry Point for Establishing a “Chinese School” of International Relations Theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Several Issues on the “Relational Theory” of International Politics: Discussion with Professor Qin Yaqing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 3 8 13 17 25

Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Two core concepts: “Psychosocial Homeostasis” and “Human Constant” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Types of the Human Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Dimensions of Human Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Psychosocial Homeostasis and Human Constants: Characteristics and Implications of Two New Paradigms . . . . . . . . . . 5 Psycho-Cultural Paths in the Study of State Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Two Sides of Being a State Actor: “Civilizational Entity” and “Organizational Entity” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Civilizations and Interstate Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The “Chinese School” in International Relations Theory: The Introduction of a New Perspective and a New Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

27 32 38 42 44 47

49 56 61 64

xi

xii

4

Contents

From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining the Ontology of International Relations in the Era of Strong World Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Ontological Foundations of the Schools of International Relations Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 From the Ontology of International Politics to the Ontology of International Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Testing the Ontology of International Relations in the Era of Strong World Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part II

65 65 66 71 77 83 84

The Lun Jen (伦 伦人) and Their Outer World

5

Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 1 An Examination of Several Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 2 A Few Points of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 3 The State Form of the Ancient China: The Kinship-State . . . . . . . . . 99 4 Lun Jen and the Kinship-State: An Exploration of Psychological Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

6

The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Li (Rites): An Ancient East Asian International Order Based on the “Role Principle” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Operation of the Role Principle: The Three “Cultures” of the “World” System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Internalization of the “All-Under-Heaven” System . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Shortcomings of the Chinese Tributary System and Its Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

“Harmony” and the Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Lun Jen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Harmony in a Negative Sense: Characteristics of the PSH Model of the Lun Jen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harmony in a Positive Sense: Psycho-Cultural Orientation of the Lun Jen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 “The Myth of Chinese Expansionism”: A Psycho-Culturological Perspective Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

109 111 115 120 126 128 129 130 134 137 142

Contents

8

China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward and the Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Challenge 1: A Model of the Kinship-State that Has Lasted for Thousands of Years Versus a Modern Nation-State System . . . . . 2 Challenge 2 China’s Unique Civilizational Experience and International Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Challenge 3 Rapidly Increasing “Hard Power” and Weaker “Soft Power” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Challenge 4 Order and Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

143 146 151 153 155 160

Part III “The Individual Jen” and the Contemporary International Order 9

The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 “The Individual Jen”: The “Human Constant” in Western Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 “The Individual Jen” and Modern Western “Nation-State” . . . . . . . . 3 Psychosocial Homeostasis and Human Evil: The Cultural and Psychological Foundations of the “Security Dilemma” in the Modern Nation-State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The International System, Modern Civilization, and the “Individual Jen” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Origins of the Modern International System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The International System and Peace After World War II . . . . . . . . . . 3 The International System and Peace in the Age of Globalization . . . 4 Restraining War: The Civilizational Evolution of the International System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 “The Rugged Individual Jen”: The American Human Constant and the Analysis of Its Psychosocial Homeostasis . . . . . . . . 1 The Rugged Individual Jen: The American Human Constant and its Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Rugged Individual Jen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Affective Control Mechanisms and Libido Factors in the Process of Psychosocial Homeostasis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

163 163 166

173 175 179 181 182 188 191 197 199 201 202 205 208 213

xiv

Contents

12 The “Outer World” of the Rugged Individual Jen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 “Ego” of the Rugged Individual Jen and Messianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Transactional Human Relations and the Tendency to Worship “Profit” and “Power” in U.S. Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Competitive Interpersonal Relations and Illusory Tendencies in U.S. Foreign Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Soft power, Cultural Attractiveness and Rugged Individualism . . . . . 2 The Performance of U.S. Soft Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Psychological and Cultural Foundations of American Soft Power: American Human Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Why is American Soft Power Attractive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Limits of Individualism as the Basis of U.S. “Soft Power” . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

215 216 220 225 229 231 231 233 236 238 241 247

Part IV State Forms and Interstate Relations of Japan and India 14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Efforts to Explore Japanese Behavior Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 “The Yuan Jen”: The Human Constant of the Japanese People . . . . . 3 Ethnicity and Japanese Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 “Peace”, “Harmony”, “Nemawasi”, and Japanese Diplomacy . . . . . . 5 Amae, Okami, and Japanese Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Japan’s Iemoto-State and Iemoto System: Formation and Operation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere . . . . . 1 The Unit of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: Iemoto-State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Structure of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere: Iemoto System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Emergence of the Iemoto System: Changes in the Positions of Units Within the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Cultural Traditions and the Establishment of Western-Style Political Systems in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Pluralistic and Composite Cultural Tradition and Modern Political System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Decentralized Power Model and Modern Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Hinduism’s Dharma and the Modern Political System . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

251 251 254 258 264 266 269 271 272 275 278 282 283 287 288 292 295 298

Contents

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Dharma System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 How the Dharma System Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Caste-State: The Form of State Under the Dharma System . . . . . . . . 4 The Psycho-Cultural Roots of the Dharma System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Impact of the Dharma System on Modern South Asia . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xv

299 299 302 311 312 316 319

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

About the Author

Huipeng Shang (尚会鹏) was born 1953 in Henan Province of China. Huipeng Shang is Distinguished Professor of Huaqiao University. (Retired Professor of Peking University). Huipeng Shang is Director of the Institute of Psycho-culturology, Huaqiao University. Huipeng Shang’s major research includes psychoculturology, culture and international relations, and Indian Culture and society. Huipeng Shang’s major publications are Marriage, Marriage Customs and Sexuality in Chinese Rural Society (2018), Decoding Sino-Japanese ‘CulturalGenetics’ (two books) (2017), Essentials of PsychoCulturology: Theory and Method for Large-Scale Comparative Studies of Literate Civilizations (2013), Chinese and Hindus: A Comparative Study of Cultural Traditions (2003), Caste and Hindu Society (2001), and A History of Indian Culture (1998). e-mail: [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0002-1765-5586

xvii

List of Figures

Chapter 2 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Psychosocial equilibrium schema (Hsu 1971, p. 26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Types of human constant (Jen) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Four dimensions of human constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31 36 39

Chapter 3 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

State actors and their two sides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference between civilization and organizational entities . . . . . . . Four types of interstate relations (these four interstate relationships and their schematic diagrams are based on the suggestions of Dr. Yu Kuo Lung) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52 57

58

Chapter 4 Fig. 1

State actors and the three types of relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

Chapter 5 Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Model 1: The Lun Jen’s interpersonal relationship model. Note The solid line between the circles of “relatives” and “acquaintances” indicates nonconvertible, while the dotted line between “acquaintances” and “strangers” indicates convertible. The dotted line between the “acquaintance” and “stranger” circles indicates convertibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Model 2: The Kinship-State model described in the Shangshu-Yugong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90 92

xix

xx

Fig. 3 Fig. 4

List of Figures

Model of ancient Chinese tribute system. Source Hamashita (1999, p. 38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Model 4: the Confucian model of body cultivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93 94

Chapter 14 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

PSH model of the Yuan Jen (Japanese human constant) . . . . . . . . . . PSH model of the Lun Jen (Japanes human constant) . . . . . . . . . . . .

257 258

Chapter 15 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Hierarchy of the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. Source Made by the author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International hierarchy of the anarchy system constructed by Fukuzawa Yukichi. Source Made by the author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Japan’s attempt to confront the West’s goals. Source Made by the author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

277 280 281

Chapter 17 Fig. 1

Illustration of the “King’s Circle” in the “Theory of Profit”. Source The author’s diagram is based on the description in Chap. 2, Volume 6 of the Theory of Profit. The sun in the center of the diagram represents the core state actors as “conquerors”, the black circle represents “enemies”, the white circle represents “allies”, the black circle represents the “enemy”, the white circle represents the “ally”, and the diagonal circle represents the “neutral” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

305

Part I

Psycho-Culturology and International Relations: Perspectives and Paradigm

Part I of the book is an exploration of theories and research perspectives on international relations and consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 is an exploration of theories and perspectives on international relations, consisting of four chapters. The first chapter compares the mainstream international relations theory, analyzes its limitations, and examines the term “Chinese school”. The author argues that the bottleneck in the creation of a Chinese school lies in the lack of new disciplines and the introduction of new research methods. New approaches need to take into account the experience of non-Western civilizations, the perspective of culture and civilization, and the introduction of a “human” perspective. The chapter also criticizes the “relational theory” proposed by the Chinese scholar Qin Yaqing. Chapter 2 introduces the perspective and theoretical framework of psychoculturology founded on the theory of comparative study of literate civilizations by the Chinese-American psycho-anthropologist Francis L. K. Hsu, focusing on two core paradigms of psycho-culturology, Human Constant and psychosocial homeostasis, notes that with these two new paradigms as the core, psycho-culturology provides a model for grasping human beings as a whole, which constitutes something like a human “spectrum of existence” that allows examining the basic states of human existence in different civilizations and the civilizational experiences accumulated on the basis of them. The chapter also introduces the principles and characteristics of psycho-culturology and its relation to Chinese culture as a tool that can be used for the intellectual comprehension of the Chinese civilizational experience, as well as for the analysis of state behavior and international relations. This is the theoretical source on which the whole book is based. Chapter 3 describes an intermediate aspect of the application of psychoculturology to the study of international relations, namely the civilizational entity and organizational entity of the state. The state is a combination of a civilization and an organization, and state behavior is influenced by the “cultural genes” recorded within the civilization, while the “Human Constants” are important elements of the attributes of civilizations. Different Human Constants constitute the characteristics

2

Part I: Psycho-Culturology and International Relations: Perspectives …

of different civilizations, which in turn influence the organizational level of the state. In this way, the analysis of “Human Constants” is connected with the analysis of state behavior. Chapter 4 critiques the mainstream international relations theory represented by neorealism as being based on a single ontology and proposes a logically selfconsistent ontological foundation of international relations. At the unitary level, the unit constituting international relations is a plurality of states considering both sides of the civilizational entity and the organizational entity. At the relational level, international relations is a complex network composed of multidimensional human activities. At the systemic level, international relations are an evolutionary system of human co-presence in plural societies in the international field.

Chapter 1

Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create a “Chinese School”

1 The Development of Contemporary Mainstream International Relations Theory and Its Limitations Human activity can be divided into individual, family, subgroup, social, national, international, etc. Foreign countries and foreign cultures constitute our “Outer World”. Human beings have lived in a relatively closed environment for most of their history, and the “international” level of activity came after the emergence of the state (or, to be precise, the modern nation-state). We generally had little or no contact with “foreign” countries outside our own group, or only hearsay knowledge. In modern times, a new form of community, the independent “nation-state”, has emerged, and on top of it the modern international order. The signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is generally considered to have marked the establishment of the modern international order, which is less than 400 years ago. Therefore, the theory and knowledge we have accumulated at the international level are relatively poor compared to other levels of human activity. Textbooks explain international politics as the political relations between various international political actors in the international community, also known as international relations. What is commonly referred to as international politics refers to the political relations between nation-states in the contemporary international order that arose in modern Europe. However, it was not until the twentieth century that Westerners began to summarize and attempt to theorize the activities of interstate dealings under the social science system that the theory of international politics (or international relations) began to take shape. Hans J. Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations (Morgenthau 2006), published in 1948, is considered to be a landmark in the establishment of contemporary theories of international relations. Academics generally agree that there are three major schools of mainstream international relations theory, namely realism (including neorealism), liberalism, and constructivism. Hans Morgenthau, considered the originator of the realist school, expressed his main ideas in his book Interstate Politics in six principles: (1) politics is governed by © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_1

3

4

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

objective laws, which are rooted in human nature; (2) interest is defined by power; (3) interest defined by power is a universally applicable objective principle; (4) universal morality cannot be used to guide state behavior; (5) state morality is not equivalent to universal morality; and (6) political realism is an independent school of theory. The academic community considers Morgenthau to have laid the foundation for the theory of international relations, and his theory came to be known as realism. Morgenthau argues that human nature’s quest to maximize power and profit is the main factor influencing international relations. However, there is a problem here, namely that human nature cannot be falsified, and it cannot be an operational variable and, therefore, cannot be a tool for scientific analysis. Scholars want the theory of international relations to be similar to the natural sciences, expressing the laws of international relations in terms of a few operational variables. 1979 saw the publication of Kenneth N. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in which he drew on classical economic theory to argue that the international system is a market and that states can be seen as buyers and sellers in the market. The international system, once established, is not limited by the state but rather becomes something like a market that is self-contained, independent, and above buyers and sellers. Since the system is anarchic, states can only seek to protect themselves to survive, and thus, the international system is a “self-help” system in which states help themselves to survive. In this logic, the structure of the international system determines the behavior of the state and not the other way around. His theory has three basic assumptions: (1) The state is the most important actor in international politics; (2) force is an available and effective policy tool, although other tools are available, but the use or threat of force is the most effective tool for exercising power; (3) military security is the most important, dominating economic and social affairs. Power in the international system is distributed according to the number of major actors and their importance, such as unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, and decentralized, just as economists divide the structure of the market system into perfectly competitive, monopolistically competitive, oligopolistic, and fully monopolistic. Waltz’s theory is called neorealism to distinguish it from Morgenthau’s classical realism. The main reason for calling it “neo” is that he replaced the unfalsifiable concept of “human nature” in Morgenthau’s doctrine with the “rational man” hypothesis of classical political economy, which is considered to have completed the scientificization of realist theory. He is considered to have completed the scientificization of realist theory. Another influential school of international relations theory is the liberal school. This school is based on the idealist ideology represented by former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, which had a wide impact after the World War I. Idealism was more optimistic than realism in its estimation of human nature, believing that human nature could be transformed, interests could be reconciled, wars could be avoided, and international institutions could achieve world peace. However, with World War II, idealism took a serious blow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the atmosphere of cooperation among nations rose, and the liberal school of thought, which emphasized international cooperation, regained importance, represented by Joseph Nye, Robert O. Keohane, and others, known as neoliberal

1 The Development of Contemporary Mainstream International Relations …

5

institutionalism. Neoliberal institutionalism, in keeping with the idealist fundamental judgment of human nature, believes that relations between states will not always be subject to power struggles but can develop for the better through the efforts of people. For neoliberals, anarchy does not mean the absence of order. Since members of the international community have the concept of international community, there are certain norms of behavior in the international community. Although states all seek their own interests, interests do not necessarily bring conflict but may also bring cooperation. Thus, in the logic of neoliberalism, the interaction between states constitutes the process of the international system, and this process in turn influences state behavior. Nonetheless, neoliberalism does not reject the basic assumptions of neorealism but argues in recognition of it. As both Nye and Keohane acknowledge, they are not abandoning the insights of realist theory but constructing a broader theoretical framework that can both include realists’ concerns about power structures and at the same time propose explanations for the changes in international system processes. Thus, it can be argued that neorealism and neoliberalism belong to the same paradigm under the same debate, only with different explanatory perspectives and emphases. Alexander Wendt, and others introduced sociological research methods into the study of state relations, forming a school of research known as constructivism. At the end of the twentieth century, constructivism became an important theory of international relations, alongside neorealism and neoliberalism. The representative works of this school include Social Theory of International Wendt Politics (Wendt 2000) and International Relations in a Constructed World (Kubálková et al. 1998). Like neoliberalism, constructivism likewise does not reject the structure of the international system proposed by Waltz. However, Wendt sees the structure of the international system as being constructed by socially shared ideas and gives dynamics to this structure. A shared conception of society is what Wendt defines as culture, which is the common conception that emerges from the interaction of members of a society in a social situation and the understandings and expectations that members of a society share. Wendt famously said, “500 British nuclear weapons are not as much of a threat to the United States as five North Korean nuclear weapons” (Wendt 2000, p. 75). Because what gives meaning to these weapons is a shared understanding, what gives meaning to the destructive force is the relationship in which that force is placed, that is, the shared perceptions that construct violence between nations. These conceptions can be cooperative or conflictual in nature. In his Social Theory of International Politics, he identifies three anarchic cultures: (1) Hobbesian culture. States are positioned as “enemies” of each other, and enemies do not have the right to live and be free, resulting in a purely “realist” approach to international relations. (2) Lockean culture. States position each other as “rivals” who have the right to live and be free but not the right to be free from violence, resulting in military competition. Wars sometimes break out, but they are kept within limits. (3) Kantian culture. The mutual orientation of states is that of “friends”, who assume mutual obligations, do not use violence to resolve disputes, and help each other in case of aggression, resulting in pluralistic and collective security. Although constructivism accepts realism’s basic assumptions about the structure of the international system and identifies the state

6

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

as the main actor in international relations, as Wendt emphasizes the role of culture in the formation of international structures, different ways of interaction between states can produce different cultures. While Waltz argues that the structure of the international system determines the behavior of states, Wendt explains the formation of the international system structure from the perspective of socially shared perceptions, where the interaction between states forms the international system structure, and the international system structure in turn constructs the identity and interests of states. Thus, in constructivist logic, the anarchic international system described by neorealism is just one of the cultures. The above is a very brief introduction to the three dominant paradigms of current international relations theory. There are, of course, other perspectives on international relations theory, such as the “British School”, which is characterized by a methodological emphasis on historical, discursive approaches; the psychological school, represented by Robert Jervis, which analyzes how the psychological perceptions of national decision makers affect national policies at the individual psychological level; and the civilizational perspective on international relations represented by Samuel Phillips Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. However, these are not the mainstream of international relations theories, and it is not the purpose of this book to go into the details of international relations theories. It should be said that mainstream international relations theory has some explanatory power for the existing international order based on nation-states. Therefore, as long as the existing international order remains unchanged, mainstream international relations theory will remain the mainstream. However, mainstream international relations theory also has obvious limitations, which I believe are mainly manifested in the following three aspects. In terms of the context in which they emerged, the three mainstream theories of international relations are mainly based on the experience of Western civilization. The modern international order originated in modern Europe and was a product of the European civil war. The theory about this order was originally a summary of Western experience in dealing with nations, later this order gradually spread outward and eventually dominated the world, and the summary of that experience became the theory of international relations today. The United States is a version of Western personal society, and since the United States became the core actor of the international system after the war, the three major schools of mainstream international relations theory all emerged in the United States, and it would not be wrong to consider modern international relations theory as a theory based on the postwar American experience. There were certainly other types of international systems in human history, but non-Western countries were not part of the modern international system, so the mainstream theories explaining the modern international system naturally do not consider these non-Western international systems. This raises the problem that what is taken for granted under the existing international system (e.g., emphasis on power, anarchy, parity, etc.) may not be so in other types of international systems, at least not under the ancient East Asian system, as discussed later. The deep-seated

1 The Development of Contemporary Mainstream International Relations …

7

problems of the current international system are to a large extent linked to a particular civilizational experience—the Western civilizational experience based on individual societies. Recognizing this enables us to look objectively at the international system today, to recognize the shortcomings of the current international system, and to consider a more desirable new world order by drawing on the experience of non-Western civilizations. Second, an examination of the academic history of international relations theory shows that the study of international relations does not have its own methodology, and international relations theory has been constructed by borrowing methods from other disciplines. Since the modern international dimension is one of the latter among many levels of human activities, the conceptual tools and methods accumulated by other social disciplines have been borrowed extensively in grasping international relations. For example, the realist school draws on the methods of classical economics, the psychological school on the methods of psychology, the constructivist school on the methods of sociology, and the cultural and civilizational school on the methods of history. International relations is an intercommunity activity, and international society is composed of various actors, which is very similar to the composition of society; therefore, international relations draws on the conceptual tools of economics, sociology, and anthropology, which are the disciplines that study society. Because of its short history and lack of independent research methods, international relations has long been dependent on other disciplines (e.g., political science, history, sociology). Although international relations has been freed from its dependence by the efforts of researchers in international relations theory (mainly American scholars), its theory and methodology are still highly controversial, and it is still a relatively advanced discipline in the social sciences. One manifestation of this is that while international relations has borrowed many conceptual tools and research methods from other disciplines (or the international relations theory community can be seen as an experimental field of multiple social science methods and concepts), few other disciplines have borrowed conceptual tools and methods from the international relations discipline. This characteristic of international relations theory makes it lack an examination of the applicability of concepts and methods, and as a result, almost all international relations theories have obvious methodological shortcomings, are at best only partially valid in explaining the international order and international affairs and are often highly controversial. Third, in terms of basic assumptions, the three major mainstream international relations theories adopt a human assumption that has greatly influenced modern social science, namely the “rational man” (or “economic man”) assumption. This assumption presupposes that all people are self-interested and compete for their own interests. Neorealism assumes that national actors are all the same and that the international community is viewed as a marketplace of buyers and sellers, following the laws of the market without regard to the cultural differences and emotional factors of the actors. Neither the liberal nor the constructivist school denies this assumption. Obviously, this assumption is advantageous for constructing a scientific theory that is parsimonious, deterministic, and pursues causal explanations because the fewer the variables in the subject of study, the easier it is to construct a theory

8

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

such as a robot program. However, in fact, the “rational man” assumption is highly questionable, and the classical economics based on it has been widely questioned. Both people and states are actors, and their behavior has more complex motivations, such as national sentiments, actors’ demands for status and recognition, and culture, all of which influence their behavior. This complexity even makes us doubt any social science theory that is based on the assumption of simplifying the behavior of actors. In my opinion, the “economic man” hypothesis, which is the premise of many social sciences, including mainstream international relations theory, is inseparable from the particular experience of Western individual societies (or, more precisely, Western European societies since the development of modern capitalism) because in individual societies, the “economic man” or “rational man” is a conceptually extreme form of this state of human existence. Although this assumption does not even correspond to the facts of individual society, the implication of the theory of international relations based on this assumption for the behavior of states cannot be ignored. In reality, there seems to be an increasing number of politicians, scholars, officials, and even the general public who put “national interest” on their lips and take naked realism for granted, which cannot be said to be unrelated to the implication of realist theories. It is time to think deeply about the limitations of mainstream international relations theory and the negative implication it brings.

2 The Discussion of “Chinese School” and Its Background The study of international relations can be divided into two aspects: technical and theoretical. The technical side of research is concerned with relations between countries, tracking international events and making analyses that tell what is currently happening in the international community, in what direction it is moving, how to respond, etc. The theoretical side of research is a rational grasp of international relations, a regular understanding of human activity at the international level. The three dominant paradigms in international relations theory—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—can be counted among the theories. Objectively speaking, Chinese international relations research is mostly technical in nature, and theoretical research is very weak. China still has not developed its own theory of international relations. On the whole, with the exception of a few scholars, researchers in this field are still basically at the level of translating and commenting on Western writings, so much so that some Western scholars have come to the perhaps biased conclusion that Chinese research papers in this area are “nothing more than profound journalism” (Qin 2012, p. 3). In recent years, the Chinese international relations research community has recognized the problem of weak theoretical research, and calls have emerged for the establishment of a “Chinese school” of international relations theory. This call is inseparable from the reality of China’s economic development in recent years and the dissatisfaction of Chinese scholars with the limitations of existing international relations theory.

2 The Discussion of “Chinese School” and Its Background

9

China’s rapid economic growth has become the most dramatic event in the world since the end of the twentieth century. Unlike the rise of other world powers in recent times, China is a vast country with a large population, a long history, and a rich and unique civilizational experience, and it has been at the center of a unique international system, the Chinese tributary system, for a considerable period of time in the past. With China’s economic development and increased importance in the international community, the question of “What is China”, the question of China’s self-perception and identity in the current international system, has become increasingly prominent, and it is in this context that the question of the so-called Chinese school has been raised. The question of “What is China” is a question of self-identity for China itself or a question of the self-positioning of Chinese civilization. The gap between its long history and glorious civilization and its recent experience of poverty and weakness has created anxiety about China’s self-identity in the pursuit of modernity. In the face of the west’s eastward trend, modern China could not help but reflect on its own civilization, which it had been proud of for thousands of years. The power of the West in modern times is not only in terms of science and technology but also in terms of its civilizational foundation, which is comprehensive in terms of technology, institutions, values, culture, and even international systems. This raises the question: Was China’s modern backwardness caused by Chinese civilization itself? How can it modernize itself? On this question, our understanding often wavers as the situation changes. In the late Qing Dynasty, “middle school is the body, Western learning is the application” was one kind of judgment, while after the May Fourth Movement, fundamental doubts about Chinese culture and even the view of “total westernization” were another kind of judgment. China’s great economic success after the reform and opening up has once led some Chinese to believe that they can just absorb science and technology and develop the economy without Western systems and values, which seems to be a return to the position of “middle school as the body, Western learning as the application. As reform progressed further, it encountered institutional, value and cultural barriers, a deep-rooted identity problem in China’s development. China’s call for the Chinese factor in international relations theory is a reflection of the unresolved self-identity issues of modern China in the academic world. Historically, China was a central actor in the East Asian international system and the Chinese tributary system but was excluded from the modern international system for a long time after its collapse. The change of status from the core of one system to the periphery of another is another important cause of identity confusion. For more than 2000 years, from the Qin and Han Dynasties to the modern era, China did not need to consider its identity in the international system because it was the core of the system, or almost the system itself, and its identity was clear and unquestionable. However, in the last 100 years or so, confusion has arisen about China’s self-identity vis-à-vis the international system. Whereas in the past, regions that were not influenced by Chinese culture were “barbarians”, now, in the face of Western civilization, it seems that we have become barbarians ourselves. Since China was excluded from the modern international system for a long time until the reform and opening up, China had no substantial contact with the international system, so the

10

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

problem of identity positioning was not very serious. After the reform and opening up, China began to truly integrate into the modern international system and had to think seriously about how to deal with other countries in the system and how to integrate into the international community, so the issue of self-identity truly came to the fore. The current issue of establishing a “Chinese school” of international relations theory can be said to be the pursuit of a discourse system that more effectively solves the problem of China’s positioning in the current world system. For the world, the question of “What is China” is a question of how to understand China’s behavior and how to smoothly accept China as a member of the world system. The call for a “China school” is a response to the fact that existing theories of international relations do not take into account the experience of non-Western civilizations, including China. The fact that China’s economic miracle was created on the soil of Chinese civilization has forced the world to reassess the great dynamism and identity of Chinese civilization. The economic achievements of the so-called Four Asian Tigers have given the world a first insight into the basis of their civilization—the Chinese Confucian civilization—and now it is the rise of the Chinese dragon. Now it is the rise of the Chinese dragon, whose significance is even more profound and whose impact on the world is even greater, that raises the question of how the world can reconnect with the Chinese civilizational experience and how to accept China as a member of the international system. After China joined the international system, its identity and behavior underwent significant changes. The rules and ways of behavior that China, as an ancient civilization, used to be familiar with in dealing between countries that are now out of order, and it still has a process of familiarization and adaptation to the rules of the new system. During this process, its thoughts and behavior will inevitably bear the imprint of the past, and it cannot fully explain its behavior in accordance with the rules of the modern international system. This uncertainty naturally raises doubts and a certain unease in the world: “What is China?” “Why does it do things differently than we do?” “Will China abide by international rules?” “Will China invade other countries when it becomes powerful?” These are the cognitive reasons why the “China threat theory” has emerged in the world. If China itself has some kind of self-identification anxiety, then the “China threat theory” represents that at least some of the world’s people and countries have some kind of cognitive fear of China. In this way, the challenge for China is twofold: how to understand itself and how to explain itself to the world. China’s humiliating recent history has given it a strong and sometimes restless need to seek recognition from the world, and it is sensitive to how it is perceived by the outside world. From China’s hosting of the Olympics to its recent (2015) military parade and its actions to strengthen and promote China’s soft power in the world, these are all efforts to give a good impression to the outside world in the wake of China’s changed status. The calls and attempts in the Chinese international relations community regarding the Chinese school of thought can be seen as an academic manifestation of this effort. Thanks to the efforts of some Chinese scholars, a number of theoretical explorations have emerged in the field of Chinese international relations studies, resulting in a number of theories known as the “Chinese school”. Many papers consider Zhao Tingyang’s theory of the world system (Zhao 2005), Qin Yaqing,’s theory of relations

2 The Discussion of “Chinese School” and Its Background

11

(Qin 2012), and Yan Xuetong’s moral realism (Yan 2019) are the three major theories of the “Chinese school” in the field of Chinese international relations studies. However, whether these theories can be called the “Chinese school” is highly controversial. In the author’s view, there are several problems in the research perspectives and methods of the theories called “Chinese school”. First, in terms of research methodology, these theories all claim to draw resources from traditional Chinese culture. Qin Yaqing’s relational theory draws on Chinese philosophical concepts such as Yin and yang and the zhongyong (中庸); Zhao Tingyang draws on the concept of the “world system (天下体系)”; Yan Xuetong draws on the concept of the “Way of Kings” (王道). In fact, these are imprecise concepts with widely divergent meanings, and these particularistic concepts are hardly suitable for regions outside of China. It is doubtful that such China-centered theories are universally relevant. China lacks a scientific tradition, and it is a fact that there are few concepts from Chinese culture in the existing social science system. “Relationalism” is supposed to be a scientific method, but basing it on vague concepts such as yin and yang, bagua, and zhongyong becomes a non-scientific method (we will discuss Qin Yaqing’s “relational theory” in more detail in the next section). The Chinese civilizational experience requires the adoption of appropriate conceptual tools and methods for intellectual enhancement, but it must be acknowledged that the traditional Chinese academic tradition has not provided the tools and methods needed to accomplish this task. The scientific method of thinking, characterized by clear concepts, empirical methods, and rigorous logic, which has been developed since modern times, is the basic method for understanding the world and examining the experiences of different civilizations, and this method of thinking has become part of the common wealth of human civilization and the human knowledge system, which can be enjoyed by all regardless of East, West, or China. If we depart from this approach, the establishment of a “Chinese school” is likely to be a mere “self-talk” and may even slip into the opposite of what we criticize as “Western-centrism”— “Oriental-centrism” (or “Chinese-centrism”). There are still not too many but too few ways of thinking scientifically for China, which lacks rationality and a tradition of thinking with certainty. The Chinese civilizational experience needs to be examined in the context of the world’s scientific body of knowledge, not apart from it, back in the vague system of traditional Chinese academic discourse. Second, in terms of research perspectives, these theories all give high marks to China’s unique civilization. China does have its unique civilizational experience, but this experience should not be exalted and go into the misconception that Chinese culture is superior and ignores the common civilizational achievements and common values of human beings. In fact, the Chinese civilizational experience is mainly an agrarian civilizational experience based on blood relations, and there are many negative things that do not fit into the changing world trend. For example, the “world system” envisioned in ancient China was a utopia that was never realized, and the international system that was in fact practiced throughout history was a tribute system based on hierarchy, which cannot be overestimated and is a negative legacy in East Asia today. Moreover, the role of Chinese Confucian moral norms such as “ritual”, “benevolence”, and “virtue” in the tribute system should not be overestimated. These

12

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

concepts were so vague that rulers could interpret them at will to justify the legitimacy of their rule. It is neither possible nor necessary to try to adopt these moral norms to compensate for the anarchic and immoral shortcomings of the modern international system. It is important to see that the modern West is ahead of China in terms of material, spiritual, and political civilization, and that these achievements have become the common wealth of all mankind and can be enjoyed by all, regardless of East, West, China, or foreigners. The success of China today is based on the acceptance of modern Western civilization, including science and technology, management experience, and values, after the reform and opening up of China. If the creation of a “Chinese school” is based on an overemphasis on “Chinese characteristics” and “Chinese model”, it may ignore the common civilizational achievements and universal values of mankind; thus, this will hinder China’s integration into the modern world. Third, as already pointed out, the so-called Chinese school emerged in the context of China’s economic achievements in recent decades. China’s success has led some scholars to seek theoretical explanations for China’s current achievements in order to gain recognition from the outside world, more or less explaining the “Chinese model” and the government’s foreign policy and competing with the West for the “right to speak”. The “Chinese school” has a clear purpose to serve politics and a lack of scholarship. This is related to the lack of an independent academic tradition in China and the fact that many scholars have a serious “world and people” and “imperialist” attitude, which is not conducive to the formation of a real academic school with academic vitality. If Chinese scholars are to build a theory of international relations, they should pursue a more explanatory and universal theory that takes into account the experience of Chinese civilization, rather than an expedient and particularistic interpretation of a certain practice of the moment. The modern international body is an achievement of the evolution of human civilization, and now China is integrating into the world order, an ancient civilization that is adapting to new changes in its environment. However, China also has reservations about the existing international order, and it will not and cannot become an actor exactly like Western countries. At the same time, the existing international system, which has its origins in the West, has its drawbacks. Under the existing international system, competition between states has led to many wars, including two world wars, and the self-interest of states has led to serious environmental damage. There is a growing call for moral principles in the international order and the elimination of the “state of nature” in international relations, and the experience of non-Western civilizations, such as China, may contain inspiration for solutions. China’s rise may neither challenge nor be completely assimilated into the existing international system but to some extent reduce the weight of the “West” in the existing international order and form a new regional international order that is parallel to the existing one. Some Western scholars worry that the future world of China’s rise will be a “world without the West”, but this is actually too much. Although the existing international system has its origins in the West, it has been widely internalized by the world and is still sufficiently viable that China cannot (and does not need to) overthrow the existing international system and create another one. However, this does not mean that China should stop at integration and “internalization”. China can become a coconstructor

3 Where is the Entry Point for Establishing a “Chinese School” …

13

of the new world order with its own civilizational experience, and it is possible to propose something new based on its own civilizational experience to compensate for the shortcomings of the current international system. The current problem is that mainstream international relations theory is unable to provide a discourse system that would enhance the Chinese civilizational experience intellectually, and there is a need to try to build a new international relations theory that incorporates Chinese (and possibly other non-Western) civilizational experiences. In this sense, the discussion among Chinese scholars on the creation of a “Chinese school” may involve an effort to look to non-Western civilizations for ways to overcome the shortcomings of the current world order.

3 Where is the Entry Point for Establishing a “Chinese School” of International Relations Theory? Chinese scholars have various views on how to establish a “Chinese school” of international relations theory. For example, some scholars believe that the sources of Chinese international relations theory should include four aspects: (1) Marxist theory on international relations; (2) the theory and practice of international relations in New China; (3) the essence of Chinese culture; and (4) foreign international relations theory (Qin 2006, No. 3). Qin Yaqing points out three sources of thought and practice of the Chinese school: first, the Confucian culture’s view of the world and the practice of the tribute system; second, China’s modern sovereignty thought and China’s revolutionary practice; third, China’s reform and opening-up thought and practice of integration into the international community, etc. Apart from the discussions of a few scholars, in general, the current discussions on the construction of a “Chinese school” of international relations theory lack new conceptual tools and methods, and many of them remain at the philosophical level, which I call the “contingent” level; i.e., many of the discussions are still at the philosophical level, which I call the “ought” level; i.e., the discussions are more focused on the hollow questions of “how should”. In addition, the so-called Chinese school is only a vision. The so-called Chinese school of international relations theory should not stop at the philosophical level of “how it should be” and “commonalities” and “particularities”. It should seek entry points to the “real” level and explore specific perspectives, conceptual tools, and methods. Many commentators have emphasized the use of Marxist guidance to create a Chinese school of international relations theory (Liang 2000, 2005; Li 2005; Fu 2005; Guo 2004). However, there is no theory of international relations in the Marxist system, and what some scholars have done is just to collect together some of the Marxist founder’s discourses related to international order and international relations in different places. The creation of a Chinese school cannot be carried out in isolation from the current vein of international relations theoretical development but only on the basis of recognizing the limitations of mainstream international relations theories

14

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

to propose targeted supplements, corrections, and innovations. Without exploring solutions to overcome the limitations of mainstream international relations theory, any effort to create a new theoretical school risks falling into the pit of hollowness and dogmatism and at best can only do some patchwork work on the existing mainstream international relations theory. In the author’s view, the “Chinese school” is not a rigorous academic concept. A school is not a deliberate creation but a natural emergence from the study of a range of issues. The main questions that Chinese scholars of international relations need to address include how the world views China’s rise, how China views the world, how it perceives itself, and what approach China takes to dealing with the world. To solve these problems, the author believes that the first thing to consider is not the question of what school of thought to create but the question of what approach to choose and what methods to adopt. The author believes that the solution to these problems should start from the following three aspects. First, it is necessary to introduce a new research perspective that can take into account the experience of non-Western civilizations. This requires relativizing modern mainstream international relations theory, which is based primarily on modern nation-state analysis, as a product of primarily Western individual social experience. The call for the establishment of a “global international relations science” that has emerged in recent years in the field of international relations studies may represent at least some of the scholars’ awareness of this issue (Acharya 2015). Among the six core elements of “global international relations” proposed by Amitav Acharya, the importance of grasping international relations from the perspective of human civilization is highlighted the six core elements that are as follows: First, global international relations is based on pluralistic universalism. Second, global international relations are based on world history. Third, global international relations encompass rather than replace existing international relations theories and approaches. Fourth, global international relations studies incorporate regionalism and regional studies. The Chinese school is welcomed. Fifth, global international relations avoids exceptionalism. Sixth, global international relations scholarship recognizes multiple sources and forms of dynamism, including resistance, normative behavior, and the regional architecture of the global order (Acharya 2015), arguing that “traditional international relations theory is derived almost entirely from Western history, and the history, voices, and contributions of other civilizations have been marginalized”. “Thinking in terms of civilizational studies as a complement to the nation-state perspective, the nation-state perspective takes us back 500 years, while the civilizational perspective can take us back 5000 years. The nation-state perspective is consistent with the dominance of the West, while the civilizational perspective shows the diverse forces of human progress” (Acharya 2015). This perspective is not the same as the so-called localization of international relations theory. Although “localization” considers local experience, it is mainly through learning and borrowing existing theories to explain local phenomena, such as Chinese versions of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The result of localization is at most a local interpretation and validation of Western theories. To understand international relations

3 Where is the Entry Point for Establishing a “Chinese School” …

15

from a civilizational perspective is not to create a “Chinese school” but to understand China and the world from the perspective of the civilizational experience of all mankind and to integrate China’s civilizational experience into the theory of international relations by improving it intellectually. The establishment of a “Chinese school” reflects the self-confidence of some scholars in the context of China’s rise, but this self-confidence is sometimes reflected in the neglect of the experience of modern civilization and the importance of China’s integration into the world system. A civilizational perspective on international relations can provide space for the study of the civilizational experience of the non-Western world and can summarize the experience accumulated in the non-Western world in terms of the state and the world system, making up for the shortcomings of existing theories of international relations. If Chinese scholars offer a unique and logically self-consistent set of views on these issues facing China, they will be known as the “Chinese school”, if not as a school of thought. Second, new disciplinary approaches need to be introduced. As noted earlier, the study of international relations itself has no methodology of its own, and all schools of international relations theory have borrowed the research methods of other disciplines. It can be inferred that without the introduction of new disciplines and new methodologies, any effort to establish a new school of theory will be futile. The real bottleneck in the establishment of a Chinese school is not the lack of theory to guide it but the lack of introduction of new disciplinary methods. It is impossible to solve problems without appropriate tools and methods, just as it is impossible to cross a river without bridges, boats, and other tools. The feature that international relations theory draws on a variety of disciplinary approaches is conducive to Chinese scholars drawing on the tools and methods of other disciplines to construct a school of theory. In the author’s view, since international relations is a level of human activity, it is appropriate to draw on the methods accumulated by sociology and anthropology in the study of human culture. One important reason for the prevalence of constructivism in the field of international relations research in China is that, compared to the other two theories (i.e., structural realism and neoliberalism), which draw more on the study of natural objects, constructivism uses more flexible analytical tools such as “culture” and “concepts” to provide a better understanding of international relations and other analytical tools that provide greater scope for understanding the experiences of ancient civilizations such as China. Of course, to call these concepts “flexible” is not to deny their scientific validity but rather to say that, in contrast to structural realism’s pursuit of “certainty” based on the assumption of “economic man”, constructivism’s approach is different from that of sociology and anthropology. The path of constructivism is closer to the path of sociology and anthropology and is more suitable for the study of human beings and states, which are emotional actors whose behavior is influenced by their environment. The behavior of people and states is ambiguous and cannot be described in the same way as natural phenomena, but the study of human behavior still requires a scientific approach to thinking. This is just as “fuzziness” is not a science, but “fuzzy logic” and “fuzzy mathematics”, which study fuzziness, are. The research paradigm and methods of psycho-culturology that will be introduced in this book are an attempt in this direction.

16

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

Again, there is a need for a more explanatory theory that grasps the “person”. The current mainstream international relations theory is not divorced from the grasp of human beings, but as mentioned earlier, it presupposes that human beings are the same and state actors are the same, and they can be further reduced to “economic man” or “rational man”. According to the author, this presupposition arises from the experience of Western “personal” societies, where the “person” in question is a particular form of existence (what we call the “Human Constant”), the “individual”. In fact, human beings live in a system in which people in different societies and cultures are in different states of being, or in other words, different civilizations are based on different Human Constants. This requires a different explanatory model of human beings, which takes into account the complex motives of human behavior, the emotional factors of the actors, and the human being as a “mind–body interactive multidimensional dynamic equilibrium”. From this perspective, the “individual” is only one particular type of Human Constant among many states of existence, and the modern mainstream international relations theory based on the social experience of the “individual” has only relative significance. In this way, we can see the deep flaws of the existing international order and turn our attention to the summaries of the experiences of non-Western civilizations with a concern for the fate of humanity. The conclusions drawn from this perspective may not be as simple and clear as the mainstream international relations theory, but they may be closer to reality. It should be noted that the current world system, which has roots in the individual societies of the modern West, is extremely inclusive, and non-Western societies are largely included in this system. The universalization of the current international system is in line with the interconnected world processes of the “individualization” of human beings and the “nation-statization” of nations and is fundamentally a manifestation of the development of human individuality. The establishment of the Chinese school is not a fundamental rejection of the current international system and the mainstream international relations theory that explains this order but rather a scholarly enhancement of the experience of non-Western civilizations to enrich the accumulated knowledge in this area, emphasizing the importance of explaining the experience of non-Western civilizations in terms of their own discourse system since the experience of each civilization is unique and relative. The fundamental difference between natural sciences and social sciences lies in the fact that the former studies the material world, while the latter’s object of study is human beings. The object of the study of international relations is the state and its interrelations, and the state is composed of people who are essentially a cultural being. The experience and historical memory accumulated by people in a specific sociocultural context will produce different “collective experiences” consisting of different systems of social representation and knowledge, thus forming different cultures. In other words, people’s social practices and interactions are different under different geographical and historical conditions. Based on this fact, there is controversy in academic circles as to whether there are objective social laws that can be discovered or even whether social science should be called “science”. In the field of international relations studies, especially after the end of the Cold War, structural realist theory, which was considered the most scientific and based on the assumption of “rational

4 Several Issues on the “Relational Theory” of International Politics …

17

man”, has been more criticized for its lack of effectiveness in explaining major issues such as the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of emerging countries. The so-called cultural turn in the field, marked by the rise of cultural or civilizational schools, is natural. Some have criticized the approach that emphasizes cultural perspectives and opposes the idea of putting all the unclear issues into the “basket” of culture. It is true that the concept of culture itself is ambiguous and that culture is not decisive (Huipeng 2013, pp. 14–18), but ignoring culture provides little insight into states and interstate relations. At the level of international interaction, culture plays an important role not only in defining the goals of a country’s foreign policy but also in influencing the process of foreign policy making and the way and style of diplomacy of a country. Interactions between states are fundamental to international relations, and states in general can only play a role and influence international affairs through elite figures representing national interests that are nurtured by their internal structures. Culture influences patterns of human interaction as well as judgments about the Outer World. The state actor is both a civilization and an organization (more on this later), and culture influences state behavior through civilization. Mainstream international relations theory excludes (or ignores) the analysis of cultural differences in states, while a new perspective must take cultural differences into account.

4 Several Issues on the “Relational Theory” of International Politics: Discussion with Professor Qin Yaqing In his article “The Relational Theory of International Politics” published in World Economy and Politics, No. 2, 2015, Professor Qin Yaqing names his new view on international relations the “relational theory” of international politics, which can be seen as a new formal formulation of Professor Qin’s perennial research results (systematically expressed in his book “Relations and Processes” (Qin 2012). The numbers in parentheses below are the page numbers of the book where the citations are found). The “relational theory” can be briefly described as follows: The current three mainstream international relations theories (structural realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism) have neglected the importance of “relations” and need to “draw on some basic assumptions and some basic assumptions of constructivist international relations theory”. It is necessary to “draw on some basic assumptions of constructivist international relations theory and some social factors as the main analytical framework, absorb the sociological discourse on social relations”, adopt the Chinese element of “relationality” and combine it with the theoretical approach of Western international relations theory, and design a “process constructivism”. He adopts a “process constructivist” theory of international relations (36). He makes four assumptions about “relationality” that form the basic framework of his theory: (1) The assumption of relationality—relationships are the key pivot of social life

18

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

and the basic unit for analyzing social life. (2) Relational rationality is assumed. Western rationality excludes the element of relationship, and rational people are independent and separate actors, while “relational rationality” means that people’s trade-offs between interests and benefits unfold in the field of social networks. (3) Relational identity assumption—the relational identity assumption is that the identity of an individual can only be determined in a relationship. (4) There are two levels of meaning: Relations conceive rights, and relations are rights (61–67). He takes the Chinese idea of “yin and yang” as a kind of “meta-relationship”, which constitutes the philosophical foundation of “relational theory”, and the Chinese tradition of “middle-ground dialectic” as a method. He uses the Chinese dialectic as a methodological basis to explain China’s integration into the international order (76–111), “global governance” (120–157), and East Asian regional cooperation (168–246), which are currently important issues in the international community. In the author’s view, Qin Yaqing does not stop at the “ought” level of discussion but moves to the “real” level of exploring operable methods and tools. Among the current attempts to construct a so-called Chinese school in Chinese international relations theory, “relational theory” comes closest to having the conditions for a theoretical school: having core conceptual tools and ontological and methodological support. This is his “substantial and innovative effort to theorize and conceptualize”. (3) However, in the process of thinking about this theory, I have encountered several confusing questions, which I would like to raise here to discuss with Professor Qin Yaqing. Any serious academic views and schools of thought are formed through questioning and discussion, and if the constructors of “relational theory” can explain these confusions of the author, they may make this theory more perfect. First, the three main theoretical paradigms of mainstream international relations have neglected the discussion of interstate relations. Qin argues that mainstream international relations research theory now emphasizes processes at the expense of relationships. “It can be argued that mainstream Western international relations theory has not developed a real theory of discussing ‘relations’ although the discipline is named international relations”. (41) It is indeed a bold judgment to say that mainstream international relations does not discuss relations, and if it holds, it would indeed serve as a kettle of fish for the three mainstream international relations theories (structural realism represented by Kenneth Waltz, neoliberalism represented by Robert Keohane and others, and constructivism represented by Alexander Wendt) and international relations as a whole. However, to make this judgment, I am afraid that one needs to be prepared for the argument that the concepts of “structure”, “system”, and “order” in international politics, as we use them, are meant to mean. The interaction between state actors is a relationship. Is not our discussion of peace, conflict, war, compromise, rules, cooperation, parity, checks, and balances between states an analysis of international relations? Alexander Wendt might argue: Are not the three cultures I talk about in The Social Theory of International Politics, namely Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures, the types of relations that I am talking about? They might argue that we simply interpret international relations from different perspectives and with different emphases: Structural realism emphasizes material power, neoliberalism emphasizes institutions and cooperation, and constructivism

4 Several Issues on the “Relational Theory” of International Politics …

19

emphasizes the construction of ideas and identities. Does any of this make sense if we leave the interactions between states or call them relations? Obviously, it is more difficult to refute their arguments and argue that what they are discussing is not a relationship. However, if we concede that they are also discussing relations, it is only a particular type of relationship, a “contract” between independent nationstates that presupposes state actors as “economic” or “rational” beings, a relationship based on the Western concept of the “economic” or “rational” state. “It is a type of relationship based on the particular civilizational experience of Western individual societies, which seems to be more acceptable. The concepts of “structure”, “system”, and “function” used in international relations theory are borrowed from anthropology and sociology, where scholars use the terms “social systems”, “coercive partners”, “institutions”, “integration”. In anthropology and sociology, scholars define “social structure” by “social system”, “compulsory partner”, “system”, “integration”, and “network of responsibilities and obligations”. It seems that the concept of “structure” in international relations should also be interpreted as a certain network of relations between state actors. “The individual orientation of Western society determines that Western social theory treats the independent individual as the basic unit and the core bond of society. We can think about Rousseau’s Theory of the Contract and Locke’s Theory of Government and why they raised the issue of the contract in the political sphere. Only when individuals are considered the central ontology in society and their identities are seen as separate and distinct can the social contract be taken as the basic rule that binds and regulates the relationship between them. This is also how the modern Western international system was developed. 1648 saw the creation of the Westphalian international system, with states likened to members of this society, which had the same basic connotations as the Western society made up of individuals. It is for this reason that people invented sovereignty, an important contractual system, to ensure the survival and security of individual states and to regulate and constrain the behavior of individual states among themselves. As this is true of the practice of Western international relations, Western international relations scholarship is bound to be based on it as well”. (43) This is true, but it requires recognition that contractual relations are also a relationship. It would seem that the three dominant theories of international relations need to be judged with caution for neglecting “relations”, and rather than neglecting the discussion of “relations”, they focus only on a particular type of relationship based on the experience of individual Western societies, namely they focus on a particular type of relationship based on the experience of individual Western societies, namely the relationship between independent nation-states, and ignore other types of relationships. Second, whether the behavior of actors (both state and human, here mainly state actors) is determined exclusively by “relations” or “types of relations”. Relational theory is based on a basic judgment of human behavior: “Relationality means that any social person makes decisions and takes actions based on relations, judging situations and making decisions according to his or her position in the network of relations here and now and the relative relationship of this position to other actors in the network” (Qin 2015). This concerns the subjectivity of the actor and the motivation to act. While the authors acknowledge the existence of a relationship with a

20

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

clear subject, “relational theory” argues that “it is the type of relationship between the units of behavior in a system that determines the characteristics of the system rather than the characteristics of the units of behavior themselves. Different types of relationships lead to different forms of rule, modes of governance, and principles of order in different systems, such as the Westphalian system, the tribute system, and the Tokugawa shogunate system” (Qin 2015). In this way, this theory denies the role of the subjective characteristics of the actors and the motives for their behavior in determining the characteristics of the system. It must be acknowledged that the type of relationship is an important environmental variable that actors refer to when they adopt a certain behavior, but both the person and the state, as an actor, also have a subjective aspect and an active behavior based on the requirements and needs of the unit of behavior itself, so the motivation of the actor and the characteristics of the unit itself also need to be considered. There is no such thing as a behavior that depends entirely on environmental variables, just as there is no such thing as a behavior that does not take them into account at all. The so-called type of relationship can be seen as the pattern of interaction of actors with other actors to satisfy their own requirements in the context of environmental variables. One of the differences between international and interpersonal patterns is that the lack of common moral norms, religious beliefs, and values among nations makes it easier for the behavior patterns of strong actors to prevail in a system, which is why we can always see a certain core pattern of behavior of actors in an international order, for example, the Chinese in the ancient East Asian order and the American in the modern international order, behavior pattern in the ancient East Asian order, the behavior pattern of the United States (and in some sense the West) in the modern international order, the behavior pattern of the Indians in the ancient South Asian international order, etc. In a certain sense, an established international order or system always sees the behavior patterns and cultural factors of certain dominant actors, while those noncore actors have internalized (or socialized) the behavior patterns and culture of the core actors to varying degrees, either voluntarily or by force. If the behavior of state actors depends entirely on “the type of relationship between units rather than on the characteristics of the units themselves” (such actors do not exist; even a mollusk jellyfish has its own subjectivity), there is no consistency observed in an order dominated by the core actors, and it is impossible to grasp the characteristics of the order. It is doubtful whether it can even constitute a certain order. It is not possible to grasp international relations exclusively from relations without subjectivity, but international relations should be a combination of subjectivity and the relationality of state actors. The subjectivity and relationality of actors (human beings or states) correspond to two basic attributes of human beings: “individuality” and “mutuality”, respectively. “Individuality” refers to the fact that each actor is a being that can neither be separated nor merged, while “mutuality” refers to the fact that the actor is in constant interaction with the other. Just as elementary particles have “wave–particle duality”, the existence of actors is a combination of individuality and mutuality. Mainstream international relations theory tends to emphasize the subjectivity of actors and ignore mutuality (relationality), which is a way of grasping the problem based on Western personal social experience. However, if we go to the other extreme, that is, if we take

4 Several Issues on the “Relational Theory” of International Politics …

21

relations as the ontology of behavior without considering subjectivity, it is not only theoretically problematic but also inconsistent with reality because there is hardly any international order without core actors. It cannot be said that there is no subjectivity. Third, whether it is appropriate to use the concepts of rationality and relationality in a contrasting sense. The concept of “rationality” or “rationalism” used in the academic world is generally based on Max Weber’s authoritative interpretation. Weber divided human behavior into two main types, namely rational and irrational behavior. Rational behavior is subdivided into purpose-oriented “instrumental rationality” and value-oriented “value rationality”, while irrational behavior includes traditional behavior that follows customs and habits and emotional behavior that is influenced by feelings and emotions (Max 1997, p. 56). According to this classification, Chinese Confucianism is also a doctrine of rationality (belonging to “value rationality”). If understood correctly, the term “rationality” or “rationalism” as used in relational theory refers to the “instrumental rationality” that forms the basis of modern scientific thinking methods. Although Professor Qin acknowledges that the Chinese concept of “relation” is also a kind of rationality (what he calls “relational rationality”), in his context, he has been using the concept of “relationality” in a sense opposite to rationality. The former is a calculable, parsimonious, definite causality, while the latter is a vague, unemphasized definite causality, and thus one can more easily understand the latter as “irrational”. Logically speaking, the opposite of “rationality” is “irrationality”, or the two types of rationality, “instrumental rationality” and “value rationality”, “instrumental rationality” and “value rationality”, but not “relational”. What is the counterpart of “relationality”? In the context of relational theory, “relationality” in most cases refers to the connectedness or state of connection between actors, which should be contrasted with the independence or state of independence of actors, i.e., “individuality” or “subjectivity. subjectivity”. The terms “relationality” and “individuality” are based on two basic properties of human beings (or actors): mutuality and individuality. These two basic attributes are emphasized differently in different societies and cultures, resulting in different states of existence. Qin’s so-called relationship, an important concept in Chinese cultural tradition, refers to a mode of grasping human beings in Chinese society that “emphasizes the mutuality of human beings and weakens their individuality”, while “rational” and “irrational”, or “instrumental rationality” and “value rationality” under the same category of rationality, are also related to the way of grasping people. The “instrumental” and “irrational” thinking traditions, or “instrumental” and “value” thinking traditions under the same category of rationality, are also related to the way people are grasped. Instrumental rationality (the basis of the modern scientific way of thinking) is a product of Western individual society that emphasizes the “individuality” of human beings because in a society that emphasizes the individual (which can be called “individual society”), human beings are regarded as independent and autonomous individuals, and they tend to be in a society that emphasizes the individual (which can be called “individual society”), people are regarded as independent and autonomous individuals, they tend to look at others at equal distance, and people tend to be strangers to each other. In this state, “freedom” becomes the fundamental mark of a human being. To be “free” is to be “oneself”, and “oneself” can only be achieved through the

22

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

“eternal” unchanging. In this way, the control of human emotion turns to “purposive reason”, and the pursuit of eternal, definitive knowledge becomes a free enterprise. In ancient Greece, a person was not worthy of being a true human being without the pursuit of science, and this was the rationalist tradition of thinking. In China, individuals live in a circle centered on blood ties, and people are not autonomous and independent individuals but rather a “relational body”. Confucianism treats the management of interpersonal relationships as fundamental to human beings, and the reconciliation of interpersonal relationships becomes the ideal of the whole culture. Under this mode of life, the focus of life is “love” (affection) rather than “reason” (rationality), and the control of human emotions shifts to a “value-rational” mode, to the reason of man (ethics) rather than the reason of things (rationality). Therefore, highly characterized and relative norms, such as filial piety, fraternity, benevolence, loyalty, respect, and trust, were developed, elite culture was expressed more in the form of rituals and ethics, which regulate the behavior of individuals and groups, and core values were mostly based on them, while the pursuit of purely rational and definitive knowledge took a secondary position. Qin cites Feng Youlan’s view that “for Western understanding and thinking, knowing and controlling the material world is the most important thing; for Chinese understanding and thinking, knowing and controlling the human mind is the most important thing. If the basic thought and practice of the West is to find happiness in the material world,…. China is seeking to know what is within ourselves, to seek permanent peace within the heart.” (20), so that the certainty sought by reason loses its meaning. However, the more common approach to “knowing and controlling the human mind” or “seeking permanent peace within the mind” is to use religion or psychoanalysis and control, and if Chinese culture was focused on the human mind, religion would be well developed and the culture would be markedly introspective. However, this does not seem to be the case in China. The focus of Chinese culture is not so much on the mind as on human relationships, or the “permanent inner peace” of the Chinese is achieved primarily through the search for harmonious human relationships. The lack of an instrumental rationalist tradition in China has led the Chinese to focus their lives on solving human relationships since value rationality is more conducive to connecting people and achieving a state of harmony between them than instrumental rationality. Fourth, is it appropriate to use the term “relational” to summarize Chinese Confucianism? “Relationship” is a word used in Chinese sociology, anthropology, and psychology and is also widely used in Chinese social science and everyday language. However, many people may not know that “relationship” in Chinese is a “foreign word”, similar to “individual” and “society”. “Relationship” is the translation of English relationship or relationship and is a recent borrowing of authentic “Japanese and systemic Chinese” from Japanese. In the traditional Chinese context, the word “relationship” does not exist, but only expressions similar to this concept, such as “human family” and “Lun Chang”, whose meaning is to take relatives as the core and push them outward, dividing people into the meaning of this concept is to divide people into close and distant relatives. Therefore, “relationship” in the modern Chinese context has two meanings. One is the meaning translated from relation or relationship, which refers to the relationship between independent and

4 Several Issues on the “Relational Theory” of International Politics …

23

clearly defined individuals; the other is the meaning associated with the unique state of existence of Chinese people, that is, from an intimate circle composed mainly of kinship, the network of interpersonal relationships extrapolated from one circle to another, that is, “human family”. The meaning of “human relations” includes the use of personal interpersonal resources to seek political or economic benefits, which is the meaning of “making connections” and “pulling strings” in daily life. In the traditional Chinese context, only relationships in the latter sense, and therefore, to be precise, “human ethics” or “ethics” rather than “relationships”, constitute the Chinese “cultural elements and background knowledge that have been accumulated over long historical time” (Qin 2015). Anthropology and sociology first noticed the special meaning of “relationship” in the Chinese context around the 1970s and 1980s, and some Western literature defines “relationship” in this sense as “a special interpersonal relationship”. Some Western literature defines “relationship” in this sense as “a special relationship” or “particularistic ties”. Some define it as “friendship”, “connection”, “exchange”, “social capital”, or “social resources”(social capital), etc. Some anthropological works simply translate “relationship” as “guanxi”, which is perhaps the most appropriate treatment. This sense of relationship actually refers to the Chinese experience based on the “anthropocentric” way of life, which has the shortcomings of ignoring the individuality of human beings and the universal rules (contract) and therefore cannot be promoted as a universal thing, nor can it be directly used to supplement the “contract” relationship in Western individual societies. It cannot be directly applied to complement the “contract” relationships in Western individual societies. Relational theory is a commendable effort to borrow the concept of “relationship” from local Chinese sociology and anthropology, but “relationship” or “relationality” has been more clearly defined in local Chinese sociology, anthropology, and psychology. However, “relationship” or “relationality” has been more clearly defined and more precisely examined in Chinese sociology, anthropology, and psychology, while relational theory borrows concepts that have not been analyzed and examined. If this concept is directly applied to the construction of a new theory, it runs the risk of “universalizing particular experiences” (which is the problem with the current mainstream international relations theory), and it cannot explain the current need (and in fact is) for China to integrate into the international order and internalize international rules (which is commonly referred to as “convergence with the world”). “Relational” as a Chinese cognitive model of human beings, i.e., a cognitive model that “emphasizes the mutuality of human beings and weakens their individuality”, is universal, but only partially so, because it is based on ignoring another fundamental attribute of human beings. It is only partially universal because it is based on the premise of ignoring another fundamental attribute of human beings—“individuality”. Only after such an analysis is made and relations are elevated to the level of the “human grasp model” can the Chinese civilizational experience be brought into dialogue with the Western civilizational experience, and the deficiencies of the mainstream international relations theory based on the Western civilizational experience can be considered for repair. The proponents of “relationship theory” should consider whether it is appropriate to

24

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

summarize an unidentified foreign word “relationship” as an important Chinese idea and use it as a key word for a theory. Fifth, the method is used to enhance the Chinese civilizational experience. According to Qin, the concept of Yin (阴) and Yang (阳) in traditional Chinese philosophy is a “meta-relationship”, and the idea of yin and yang and their balance constitutes the philosophical basis of the theory of relationship. In terms of methodology, he proposes a “Zhon-yong (中庸) dialectic” (middle-of-the-road tolerance) based on Chinese Confucianism, which is the counterpart of the Hegelian dialectic. He believed that the dialectic middle-of-the-road (Zhongyong) tolerance and mutual adaptability, not understanding relations as mutually antagonistic but as harmonious and neutral, is the epistemological and methodological basis of the theory of relations. When Qin calls his theory “process constructivism”, it can be assumed that he adopts a constructivist approach (sociological approach) and that relational theory is a Chinese version of constructivism, but after he introduces the traditional Chinese concepts of yin and yang and the middle to relational theory, it seems that he wants to eliminate constructivism in methodology and epistemology and return to the traditional Chinese philosophical approach. However, there are several issues here that are at least unclear. One, can the complete content of Hegel’s dialectic be understood as summarized by Qin? Second, can a dialectical system opposed to the Hegelian dialectic, called the “dialectic of the middle”, be summarized in the Chinese cultural resource base? Third, the idea of yin and yang is a very vague philosophical idea, the division of everything into yin and yang is almost arbitrary, and there can be any relationship between yin and yang. If such a concept is used as the philosophical basis for the theory of relations, will it be “seemingly explaining everything, but actually explaining nothing”? Let us leave these questions aside for a moment and examine the efficacy of relational theory in explaining real problems after returning to the traditional Chinese philosophical methodology. If the explanation of real problems is more effective, then we can go backward and admit that this methodological return is feasible. However, in general, perhaps due to the authors’ preference for “uncertainty” (mainstream international relations seeks “certainty”, the authors seem to go in the opposite direction), or perhaps due to a combination of a vague philosophy and methodology (the two may be consistent), the new theory’s explanatory validity for the explanatory validity of the new theory for real problems is at least lower than the author expected. For example, using the doctrine of yin and yang and the values of the middle way to explain that a strong China would not be a threat to the world (a proposition that itself implies the premise that state actors are actors) seems no more valid than “China is the country of the middle way, the country of humanity”. The old thesis that “China is a country of the middle way, a country of harmony” has no more academic support than the old thesis that “China is a country of the middle way, a country of harmony”. Another example is the use of relational theory to explain East Asian regional cooperation (Qin 2012, chapters 5 and 6), which gives the impression that East Asian regional cooperation is ongoing, with multiple forces, multiple heads, many soft rules, and active “participation” by all parties, but without any substantive results and with great uncertainty. There are structures, rules, institutions, and shared perceptions, but the reality of the region cannot be explained by

References

25

a single factor. Relational theory does not explain why cooperation in East Asia is this model and not the other (e.g., the EU model, the South Asian model), nor does it provide some degree of prediction based on the new theory. If the new theory emphasizes only a process, a “fluid relationship” within that process, and does not seek definitive conclusions or explain causal links, then it may be subject to the same criticism as yin-yang theory, which “explains everything but nothing”. It may be subject to criticism such as “explains everything, but nothing”. It is possible to draw some inspiration from Chinese yin-yang thought, but it must be admitted that it is not a precise approach after all. Native Chinese sociology, native psychology, and anthropology each uses their own methods and tools to make the concept of “relationship” in the traditional Chinese context clearer, but in the theory of relationship, it seems to become blurred again due to the combination with the concepts of yin and yang and the middle ground. This also strengthens the author’s view that the rationalization of Chinese civilization’s experience and its introduction into international relations theory to create a school of international relations with traces of Chinese culture may still require the adoption of rational scientific methods and relatively precise conceptual tools, rather than getting rid of rational thinking methods and returning to the vague path of yin-yang and zhongyong.

References Acharya, Amitav. 2015. Global international relations and the Chinese school of international relations theory: Are they compatible. World Economy and Politic (Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi) (2). Fu, Yaozu. 2005. A few thoughts on building China’s theory of international relations. Foreign Affairs Review (5). Guo, Shuyong (ed.). 2004. International Relations: Calling for Chinese Theory (Guoji Guanxi: Huhuan Zhongguo Lilun). Tianjin People’s Publishing House. Huipeng, Shang. 2013. Essentials of Psycho-Culturology: Theory and Method for Large-Scale Comparative Studies of Literate Civilizations (xin li wenhua xue yaoyi: da guimo wenming shehui bijiao yanjiu de liun yu fangfa). Press of Pekeng University. Kubálková, Vendulka, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (eds.). 1998. International Relations in a Constructed World. ME Sharpe. Li, Bin. 2005. What is the Marxist theory of international relations? World Economy and Politic (Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi) (5). Morgenthau, IHansm. 2006. Interstate Politics: Power Struggle and Peace. Beijing University Press. Qin, Yaqing. 2006. The possibility and necessity of generating a Chinese school of international relations theory. World Economy and Politic (Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi) (3). Qin, Yaqing. 2012. Relationships and Processes (Guanxi yu Guocheng). Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Qin, Yaqing. 2015. The relational theory of international politics. World Economy and Politic (Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi) 2. Shoude, Liang. 2000. Theory of International Politics (Guoji Guanxi Lilun). Peking University Press. Shoude, Liang. 2005. Exploration of the theory construction of international politics in China. World Economy and Politic (Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi) (2). Weber, Max. 1997. Economy and Society, vol. 1. Translated by Lin Rongyuan. Commercial Press.

26

1 Mainstream International Relations Theory and Attempts to Create …

Wendt, A. 2000. Social Theory of International Politics. Translated by Qin Yaqing. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Yan, Xuetong. 2019. Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers. Princeton University Press. Zhao, Tingyang. 2005. The World System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions. Jiangsu Education Publishing House.

Chapter 2

Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the entry point for seeking to establish a “Chinese school” of international relations theory should be in three areas: drawing on the approaches of other disciplines, introducing a perspective that takes into account the experiences of non-Western civilizations, and a more generalized theory that captures human beings (Jen). The author argues that, in drawing on Hsu, F. L. K.’s approach, the author should be able to take into account the experiences of nonWestern civilizations. In my opinion, psycho-culturology, which is based on Hsu, F. L. K.’s psychological anthropology theory, seems to have such conditions. This chapter provides a brief introduction to psycho-culturology.

1 Two core concepts: “Psychosocial Homeostasis” and “Human Constant” Psycho-culturology is a separate discipline from modern psychological anthropology, which is mainly engaged in the comparative study of large-scale civilized societies through the perspective and method of combining psychology and culture advocated by the American psychological anthropologist Francis L. K. Hsu (1909– 1999). Its predecessor can be traced back to the “culture and personality” school in the 1920s and 1930s, whose theoretical framework and core concepts were proposed by Francis L. K. Hsu, a Chinese-American psychological anthropologist and a representative figure of nationality studies, and developed by the author. It is based on the concept of psychosocial homeostasis. It is based on two interrelated core concepts, psychosocial homeostasis and Human Constant, and provides a model that attempts to grasp people as a whole (Huipeng 2013). 1. Psychosocial homeostasis Psycho-culturology views human existence as a system, a “field” (below) with nine layers from the inside out, and this “field” is called “psychosocial homeostasis” (PSH). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_2

27

28

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

The seventh and sixth layers, “unconscious” and “preconscious”, are the deepest layers of the human heart and belong to the repressed or semirepressed contents. Freud’s psychoanalysis elaborated on these two layers, so Hsu did not elaborate on them. The fifth level of “unexpressible consciousness” is that each person has something hidden deep inside that he or she is aware of but does not usually pass on to others. The main reasons for not passing them on to others are fear (e.g., fear of reprisal for not being happy with the boss), or even if they want to pass them on, the content is too personal for others to understand, or it is difficult to express in words, or they are too shy to express. The fourth layer of “expressible consciousness” includes thoughts, feelings, ideas, and beliefs, such as love, hate, greed, dislike, and fear, as well as cultural norms ranging from the country, nation, world, freedom, filial piety, and women’s chastity to table manners and greetings. These contents can communicate with each other and can be easily understood, accepted, or responded to. The third layer, “intimate society and culture”, is the part to which each person is strongly attached and includes intimate people, artifacts, and cultural norms. People with intimate relationships are those who are able to release their guard and tell each other things and receive comfort, sympathy, and support without thinking about repayment. Everyone is willing to have an intimate relationship with another person or group of people so that we can feel meaningful, psychologically and physically stable, and comfortable. Artifacts include beloved objects such as collectibles, which are not only useful to us but, more importantly, to which we are emotionally attached; i.e., we care about their existence; pets also fall into this category. Cultural norms include religious beliefs, ideals, etc. The content of this layer is as important to us as food, air, and water and is the basis for our sense of security, identity, and satisfaction. The fourth layer of “expressible consciousness” above is mainly for this layer. The loss or change of this layer can have a strong impact on the individual, for example, the death of a loved one, the shattering of a treasured antique, the shattering of an ideal, and so on. If this layer is missing, we will use other layers to compensate for it to achieve a new balance. If this layer is not replenished for a long time or if drastic changes in this layer are inflicted on the individual for a long time, the individual will most likely develop psychological problems, mental illness, or even suicide. The content of this layer varies from culture to culture; something may belong to layer 3 in some cultures and layer 2 in others (e.g., gods belong to layer 2 for most Chinese and layer 3 for most Hindu). People also often think that the third layer of human content in other cultures is unreasonable. In the second layer, “operative society and culture”, the people, artifacts, and cultural norms in it are primarily useful to us, but we do not necessarily have feelings for them. We generally relate to people in this layer only in roles, such as teacher and student, businessman and customer, employer and employee, and ruler and subject. They are playing roles, and playing roles do not require intimate emotions. Artifacts include things that are useful to us, such as transportation, money, utensils, and even ashtrays and fans. Cultural norms include rules of the road, tests and exams, customs of politeness, ways of greeting, ways of buying and selling, and ways of

1 Two core concepts: “Psychosocial Homeostasis” and “Human Constant”

29

using machines. The cultural norms in this layer differ from those in the third layer in that we act on them only because they are useful, not because we have feelings about them. Therefore, in general, people do not resist changes in this layer as much as they do changes in the third layer. The first layer, “wider society and culture”, is the emergence of people, artifacts, and cultural norms within larger societies that are dispensable to our lives. Examples include the Terracotta Warriors for most Chinese, the pyramids for modern Mexicans, the relationship of the average person to vinegar-producing factories and electricity boards, and so on. Generally, we have neither a role nor an emotional relationship with them. Layer 0 “Outer World” includes people, customs, and artifacts of other societies, i.e., “foreign culture”. Generally, most members of society have little contact with this layer, lack awareness, or have only some misconceptions. According to Hsu’s elaboration, the basic points of the principle can be summarized as follows. 1. Human existence can be understood as a “sociocultural field” consisting of human and human, human and object, human and cultural norms, and the interaction between the inner world and the Outer World, which is divided into eight different levels from the inside out. 2. People need to invest more emotion in certain people, objects, and cultural norms to build closer relationships to make their lives meaningful. In other words, each person has a critical “operative society and culture” (layer 3). 3. The relationship between man and the layer of “operative society and culture” is generally in a dynamic equilibrium, and the imbalance brings about a certain psychological tension and attempts to restore it. If someone, something, or a cultural norm is missing from this layer, the person will use the content of other layers to fill it. 4. The “expressible consciousness conscious” (layer 4) and the “operative society and culture” (layer 3) of a person, as well as part of the “unexpressible consciousness” and part of the “operative society and culture”, constitute the “Human Constant” of a person. The dynamic equilibrium of the psychosocial process of man is mainly carried out in this sphere, which is the essence of man as a human being (called Jen in Chinese). 5. The model of equilibrium of the psychosocial has not only individual differences but also cultural differences. Understanding the characteristics of the model and how the process of dynamic equilibrium is achieved is key to understanding the characteristics and changes in culture and society. 2. Human Constant (Jen) In this “field” of people, objects, and cultural norms, people need to bet more emotion on certain people, objects, and cultural norms to establish closer relationships, i.e., each person has a crucial “intimate society and culture” (layer 3). In this layer, there are our close people, our beloved things, and our obsessive ideas. We have strong feelings for people, objects, and cultural norms in this layer. All our human needs, especially the higher-level needs, are mostly satisfied in this layer, which is as important as air, water, and food to us, so

30

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

it can be called the “life package” of human beings. In this model, it consists of “expressed consciousness” (layer 4) and “intimate society and culture” (layer 3), plus part of “unexpressible consciousness” (layer 5) and part of “operative society and culture” (layer 2), constituting the “Human Constant” (diagonal part in the figure above). According to Hsu, this concept is the Chinese concept of “Jen” ( 人). He argues that this concept can be used as a social science conceptual tool that is closer to the reality of human existence.1 He elaborates on the relationship between the concept of “Jen” and Chinese culture. Borrowing a term from the Chinese, I call the shaded area in the diagram (Fig. 1 Psychosocial equilibrium schema of this book—Quoter) Jen. This is the Chinese word meaning “man”, and if we must have an English equivalent for it, we may roughly designate it as personage. I suggest the term Jen advisedly because the Chinese conception of man (also shared by the Japanese but pronounced jin) is based on the individual’s transactions with his fellow human beings (Hsu 1971 p. 7). The author agrees with Hsu’s view and use as a main analytical tool in this book. Jen is not an individual person but a relational body. In the Chinese cultural context, a person is defined in a matrix of interpersonal relationships. It can be defined as “a man who is in interpersonal relationships”. It is larger than the concept of “individual” and smaller than the concept of “group”, which is the smallest unit for understanding and grasping people and society. There is no suitable term that corresponds exactly to “Jen” in the modern social science context. The process of so-called psychosocial homeostasis of a person is carried out in this “field”. The relationship between the concepts of Human Constant and psychosocial homeostasis is that the latter is a description of the process of social and psychological equilibrium of human beings, while the former refers to the system of human beings as biological subjects, which is a collective term for the system of mutual cognition and communication between human beings. Each person’s circle of interaction and feelings is different, so the “Human Constant” shows individual differences. In addition, Human Constants are culturally molded, and each society has a culturally molded, dominant Human Constant. This concept is the key to understanding sociocultural systems, the most basic operational unit for comparative studies of large-scale civilizations, and the core concept of psycho-culturology. So at this point, if you ask, “What is a person?” The psycho-cultural answers this way, “It is the individual, plus the Life Package, and the dynamic equilibrium model of you and the Life Package.”. This answer is different from the modern mainstream social sciences such as economics, sociology, and psychology in their understanding of human beings; it is closer to the Chinese word Jen. The Human Constant (Jen) is the most basic state of human connection that determines the nature of a culture and is the smallest unit that maintains the social and cultural attributes of a person. It is a fairly stable nature and is the part of culture that is difficult to change. There are individual differences in the types of “Human Constants”, i.e., the types of life packages and psychosocial homeostasis patterns 1 Jen is the Wittorian pinyin for the Chinese character 人. The common pinyin for mainland China is Ren, and Hsu, F. L. K.’s term is used here.

1 Two core concepts: “Psychosocial Homeostasis” and “Human Constant”

31

Fig. 1 Psychosocial equilibrium schema (Hsu 1971, p. 26)

of different individuals in the same culture, as well as cultural differences; i.e., the types of life packages and psychosocial homeostasis patterns of people in different cultures are also different. Analyzing the characteristics of Human Constants and their dynamic equilibrium is the key to understanding the characteristics and changes of culture and society. From the point of view of Human Constants, society is not based on the dichotomy of individuals and groups (although this model is a special form of individual society) but on different Human Constants. It is by studying the Human Constants as the basic operational unit that the genetic code of civilized society can be truly deciphered.

32

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

The concept of psychosocial homeostasis answers the question of the fundamental motivation of human behavior. The motivation of human behavior is understood as a process in which individuals interact with people, objects, and cultural norms in their “life package” to satisfy many requirements, such as security, status, and interaction. Different types of Human Constants give individuals a different sense of security, and thus, individuals have different patterns of psychosocial homeostasis and behavior. The above model of psychosocial homeostasis, supported by these two paradigms, can be regarded as the “spectrum of existence” of human beings. To analyze human society by psycho-cultural thinking is, in a sense, to identify and position a society in the “spectrum of existence”. This approach may be similar to the use of spectral analysis in the natural sciences to study matter. We know that visible light is refracted to reveal different colors, forming a spectrum. Each substance (atom) absorbs and emits special wavelengths of light, showing unique spectral lines in the spectrum. The spectral lines of substances are similar to human fingerprints, which are different from each other. Therefore, the chemical composition of substances can be identified based on their spectra, and even the composition of celestial bodies deep in the universe can be understood by this method. Human societies have evolved different social cultures and formed different patterns in dealing with human–human, human nature, human-supernatural, and consciousness-matter relationships, thus treating each layer of the psychosocial homeostasis model differently and forming a unique Human Constant and psychosocial homeostasis model. If the psychosocial homeostasis model is compared to the spectrum of nature, then the unique human constraints and psychosocial homeostasis patterns of each community can be compared to the unique spectrum lines shown on the spectrum, which can be described accordingly in the “spectrum of survival”.

2 Types of the Human Constant The use of Human Constants as a fundamental unit for understanding large-scale civilized societies requires their classification, which is an important addition we want to make to this concept. The classification of Human Constants is based on two fundamental attributes of our humanity, namely individuality and mutuality. Individuality refers to the fact that we are an entity that can judge, decide, and act alone and that can neither be merged nor disentangled. “Mutuality” means that we are in contact and interaction with the other at all times. Human existence, in fact, is in a dynamic equilibrium of connection with others and independence from each other, but due to different environments (natural and social), we human beings emphasize these two attributes differently, resulting in different human constraints. The first major type of Human Constant is the Individual Jen (个人, or just “individual” for short), which is characterized by the emphasis on the individuality of human beings. This is a system of people who “emphasizes the independence of the person and weakens the mutuality of the person” and “deliberately cuts off the

2 Types of the Human Constant

33

individual from others or reduces the dependence on others in interaction under the concepts of independence and freedom, or advocates this state” (Dumont 1980, p. 18). In terms of the “spectrum of existence”, this Human Constant emphasizes the part within the fourth level, where the system of human existence is reunited with the person as an individual. In this state, the actor perceives the individual as a unit of perception, lives more closely to the basis of the organism, emphasizes more the needs and expectations of the organism, emphasizes more the independence and freedom of the individual, and clearly distinguishes the individual from the other. A society based on the “Individual Jen” is called an individual society, and this type of society is typical of Western (especially Anglo-Saxon) societies. The system of values reflecting this Human Constant is called “individualism”, and it has found its richest and most complete expression in Western societies. What is commonly referred to as “Western civilization” can be said to have been created by human beings on the basis of this Human Constant. Here, it is necessary to distinguish between the individual and the individual person. The French sociologist Louis Dumont pointed out that the individual has two meanings: one is the flesh-and-blood, walking, thinking, emotional subject of behavior that can be found in all kinds of societies, i.e., the individual person; the other is the individual as the subject of rational existence and institutional norms and is associated with values such as freedom and equality. The other meaning is the human system as the subject of rational existence and institutional norms and associated with values such as freedom and equality, which is “a conceptual, idealistic representation unique to and created by Western society” (Dumont 1980, p. 18). The individual in this sense refers to a culturally molded Human Constant that is predominant in Western societies. In societies such as China, Japan, and Hindu India, individual persons exist, but the individual as a Human Constant does not predominate. The Individual Jen as a basic model of interpersonal state can be divided into several subtypes: “ancient Israelite”, “ancient Greek”, and “modern European and American”. The Human Constant, which is fully developed in American society, is the “rugged Individual Jen”, which is a refined version of the individual.2 The second major category of Human Constants is characterized by an emphasis on another human attribute, mutuality, which we can define as “a human system in which the individual recognizes that he or she cannot escape from the situation in 2

In its full sense, the individual and the system of values about the individual, individualism, emerged after the European Renaissance, but this is not to say that the individual as a fundamental. However, this is not to say that the individual as a fundamental interpersonal state has emerged only in modern times. The anthropological perspective of this paper requires freezing for the moment the question of the emergence and evolution of the object of discussion. However, we can first briefly point out that the historical evolutionary material does not contradict our view: there is evidence that the family structure and the Human Constant in ancient Greece were characterized by a greater emphasis on the individual. There are different forms of the Human Constant of the individual, and the individual who emerged after the European Renaissance is only its modern form. The Renaissance movement was to “revive” the ancient Greek tradition of the individual (one of the classical forms of the individual), without which there would be no “renaissance”, as we cannot, for example, “revive” the individual in China or India. We cannot, for example, “revive” the personal tradition in China or India.

34

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

which he or she finds himself or herself and his or her specific and specific interconnectedness with the other, and therefore is in a state of interdependence with the other in an inclusive form, or considers this state to be the human norm, and exercises interrelated control in the self-other domain.” (This definition is based on the definition of “individual body” by the Japanese scholar Keishun (Esun 1998, pp. 55, 75). From the point of view of the spectrum of existence, this Human Constant emphasizes the part beyond the fourth level, and the human system does not overlap with the individual person but is larger than the individual person. The meaning of human existence in this Human Constant is not in the individual but in the relationship with others, and the person exists not as an individual but as a “relational body”. The “mutuality” of human beings is as important as the “individuality’, maybe even more important than the individuality, because from the knowledge we have accumulated, there are more communities in the world based on this state than on the first one. If the Human Constant characterized by an emphasis on individuality is called the Individual Jen, then the Human Constant characterized by an emphasis on mutuality should also be expressed by a corresponding concept. The problem of the limitations of existing intellectual frameworks and paradigms is encountered here. The present intellectual framework and research paradigm are basically based on the Western experience of “individual society”, which is certainly important, and under which humans have accumulated a rich and precise knowledge of human life, but it is not comprehensive because the so-called individual is just a human system with a special PSH model, just a form of the basic human interpersonal state. There is another equally important (if not more important) basic human state characterized by an emphasis on human mutuality. However, because of the spectacular material achievements of Western societies built on the first basic human state in recent times, the mainstream of contemporary social science, which is based on this social experience, has little understanding and many misconceptions about the equally important experience of another basic human state. The concept of “individual” does not exist in Chinese context, and the Japanese translation of the English word individual as “ 个人” (pronounced “geren” in Chinese and “kojin” in Japanese) person dates from the Meiji Restoration. China borrowed this translation from Japanese. Although this concept is translated into Chinese, we usually use it in the sense of an individual person rather than a Human Constant. In fact, although our society is also composed of individual people, the Human Constant is not the individual. The only counterparts to “individual” in modern social science are “group” or “collective”, and such concepts cannot be used to describe Chinese “human system” reality. In view of this, we use the concept of “the Contextual Jen” (间人) proposed by the Japanese scholar Eshun Hamaguchi to refer to another type of Human Constant, i.e., the Individual Jen. Eshun Hamaguchi himself uses the concept of the Contextual Jen to refer to the Human Constant of Japanese people, but in fact, not only Japanese people but also Chinese people, Hindu, and many other non-Western societies.3 The 3

A number of hypotheses have been put forward by scholars as to the causes of these two types of Human Constants. One of the more influential is the so-called ecocultural hypothesis (Berry 1982). This hypothesis suggests that the interactions between organisms and the environment in which they

2 Types of the Human Constant

35

life of the Contextual Jen tends to be closer to interpersonal connection rather than individual desires and expectations and emphasizes not individual independence and freedom but interpersonal connection or interdependence within a group. A society based on the Individual Jen can be called the individualistic society, and a society based on the Contextual Jen can be called the contextual society. The value system of an individual society is called individualism, and the value system of a contextual society is called contextualism. The Individual Jen and the contextual Jen are the two major Human Constants. Each of the two major types of the Human Constant has a number of subtypes; the subtypes of the Individual Jen are the Ancient Israelite type, Ancient Greek type, and Modern American-European type, and the subtypes of the Contextual Jen are the Chinese type, Japanese type, and Hindu type. The names of the Human Constant (Jen) types and their relationships are as follows (Fig. 2). The various Human Constants are roughly equal to individual person plus the “life package” (layer 3 of PSH). The “life package” is the people, objects, and ideas on which the individual has invested his or her feelings. The different types of Human Constants depend to a large extent on the content of the “life package” and the way the individual person interacts with it. This is the key to our understanding of human societies and cultures. The following is a summary of the Human Constants and their characteristics in four literate civilizations: China, India, the United States, and Japan. Chinese Human Constant, or Lun Jen (伦 伦人) and its characteristics. Lun Jen belongs to a subtype of the Contextual Jen. The main characteristic of this Human Constant is that the members of relatives constitute the main members of “close people” in the individual’s life package, and the individual’s relationship with them is constant and long-lasting in a stable and intimate interpersonal network. “Beloved things” are mainly related to ancestors and family, such as ancestral tablets and ancestral halls. “Believed ideas” are mainly filial piety, Bao-en (报恩, repayment of gratitude), Renqing (人情, human feelings), Guanxi (关系, relationship), etc. Because the life package is relatively stable, individuals can obtain psychosocial balance without using the contents outside the third layer of PHS, so human psychological and behavioral patterns are consistent and stable. In such a society where Human Constants prevail, the clan, concluded on the kinship principle and directly extended from the live give rise to certain economic, demographic, sociocultural, and biologically adapted social types. A common type is the nomadic style: hunting and gathering as the basis of subsistence, with low concentration of production and relatively low levels of role change and social stratification, resulting in a so-called loose culture. This type of society puts pressure on individuals to succeed. The pressure on individuals in such societies is directed toward success, independence, and self-confidence, and individuals are less likely to conform to group pressure. In contrast, another common type is the sedentary style: a fixed village, an agricultural-based economy, a high degree of concentration of production, a large number of social strata, and a dense population, resulting in a so-called tight culture. The pressure on the individual in this type of society is directed toward obedience to the demands of others and the group (Pelto 1968). According to this hypothesis, the Human Constant of the individual is associated with nomadic societies, a loose culture, while the Human Constant of the textual is associated with sedentary societies, a tight culture. The textual basic interpersonal state is associated with sedentary societies and is a close-knit culture.

36

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives Human Constant (Jen)

the Contextual Jen (characterized by an emphasis on the mutuality of human)

Jen the characterized by an emphasis on the individuality of the human)

Ancient Israel type

Ancient Greek type

Modern American-European type

Hindu type: Hierarchical Jen,

Japanese type :Yuan Jen

Chinese type:Yuan , Jen

Fig. 2 Types of human constant (Jen)

family, is the predominant secondary grouping, and nonkinship, nonterritorial voluntary groups are not developed. The form of the state is the kinship-state (patriarchal state), where the family and the state are co-constituted, and the ruling ethic of the state extends from the family ethic. American Human Constant and its characteristics The American Human Constant is The Rugged Individual Jen, which is a subtype or refined form of “the Individual Jen” and is derived from the concept of “Rugged Individualism”. The most characteristic feature of this human norm is that an individual person has an unstable life package (the third layer of psychosocial homeostasis). There is a lack of “close people” because kinship members are only temporary members of the life package. “Beloved things” and “believed ideas” are mostly associated with personal independence, freedom, individual rights, and personal preferences. Due to the lack of close and lasting interpersonal relationships, individuals have greater insecurity and have to use more diverse means to achieve psychosocial dynamic balance, so human psychological and behavioral patterns are more dynamic and changeable.

2 Types of the Human Constant

37

The most important secondary grouping in such a society, where Human Constants prevail, is a variety of free associations (clubs) concluded on the contract principle, and the state is a modern nation-state based on contractual relations. Hindu’s Human Constant (Hierarchical Jen, or Hierarchicus for short, 阶序 人) and its characteristics The Human Constant of Hindu is the Hierarchical Jen, a subtype of the Contextual Jen. The term Hierarchicus comes from Homo Hierarchicus used by French sociologist Louis Dumont, who used the term to describe the hierarchical structure of traditional Indian society. The Hierarchicus in psycho-culturology describes the Hindu Human Constant. The characteristics of this Human Constant can be summarized as follows: Gods, priests, and religious gurus are important members of the “close people” of the individual “life package” (the third layer of psychosocial balance). “Believed things” are things related to religion, such as statues and temples. “Believed ideas” are Dharma, Atman, Muksa, etc., which are related to religious transcendence. The pursuit of religious transcendence and the pursuit of higher status in the caste sequence are important elements of the psychosocial dynamic equilibrium, so human psychological and behavioral patterns are introspective and spiritual in character. In such a society where Human Constants are dominant, caste concluded by the hierarchy principle is the most important secondary grouping. This Human Constant also affects the relationship between communities. The state form of caste society is the caste-state, i.e., a union formed by an unequal number of caste groups. Japanese Human Constant (Yuan Jen, 缘人) and its characteristics The Yuan Jen is a subtype of the Contextual Jen. The third layer of psychosocial equilibrium is not strictly distinguished from the second layer, so the relationship between kin members is diluted. The “beloved things” and “believed ideas” in the life package are similar to those of the Chinese, but they are diluted to some extent. It is somewhat more difficult for individuals to achieve psychosocial balance than the Chinese, but easier than for individuals in the Human Constant. In a society where Human Constants are dominant, the Iemoto that concludes with the kin-tract principle (halfblood, half-contract principle) is the most important secondary grouping, and the state form has some characteristics of the Iemoto. Here, the following two points need to be clarified. First, human individuality and interdependence do not exclude each other. For most people, both attributes manifest themselves in behavior. However, it must be acknowledged that cultures assign different values to these two aspects of human nature. Some cultures place more emphasis on the individuality of people and have developed a system of values that emphasize individuality, and interpersonal social institutions and even forms of state are characterized by a greater emphasis on individuality. Some cultures, on the other hand, place more emphasis on the interconnectedness and interdependence of people (the relational character of their interactions), and their value systems, interpersonal patterns, and even state forms are characterized by a greater emphasis on relations. It makes sense to refer to these two ways of being as the two basic interpersonal states and to describe them as the individual and the contextual, respectively, because if humans place the same emphasis on both attributes, then there is no cultural difference. We certainly know that human existence is diverse and complex, and any abstraction runs the risk of

38

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

simplifying this complexity, but we cannot help but make some simplifications and abstractions to better understand human diversity and cultural differences. When we use the individual to refer to a basic interpersonal state, we do not mean that this basic interpersonal state does not take into account human interdependence at all but rather that people in this basic interpersonal state emphasize individual subjectivity, the importance of self-reliance, and the fact that individuals are responsible for their own success and happiness, values and behaviors based on their individuality. Similarly, the contextual does not mean that individuality is not taken into account at all but rather that there is a general concern for collective interests and responsibilities and that individual behavior and decisions should take into account values and behaviors based on the reciprocity of human beings in relation to family, society, and organizations. The same principles apply to the delineation of subtypes of basic interpersonal states. The reader should bear in mind not to oversimplify when using these concepts. Second, why use the concept of “contextual” rather than “collective”. In the English-speaking world, the more commonly used concepts are “individual” and “collective” and the associated “individualism” and “collectivism”. It is important to note, however, that a collective is not a Human Constant but a social structure that is artificially constructed to achieve the same goal and fulfill certain functions. The dichotomy between “collective” and “individual” is derived from individual social experiences and contexts and is not suitable for describing societies where the Human Constant is not the individual. From the perspective of the Human Constant, the opposite of the individual is not collective but contextual. A “collective” can be composed of both the individual and the contextual. In connection with this, the opposite of “individualism” is not “collectivism” but “contextualism”. A Chinese person who emphasizes filial piety toward his parents and the importance of relationships with others is not a “collectivist” but a contextualist. Similarly, a Hindu who emphasizes the pursuit of relationships with the divine and the importance of relationships with religious teachers and priests is not a collectivist but a contextualist. It is only that contextualism manifests itself in different contents based on different subtypes of the Human Constant. The individual and the contextual and the individualism and the cotnextualism associated with them are more general and explanatory than individuals and collectives and the individualism and collectivism that want to be associated with them.

3 Dimensions of Human Constants The Human Constant is a “field” of human existence that includes psychological and social interactions. To say that it is a “field” only suggests a perspective and a tool for grasping people, and to grasp and use this tool, we need to distinguish several dimensions. The Human Constant can be distinguished into four dimensions, namely the group dimension, the exchange dimension, the self-perception dimension, and the emotional control dimension. The first two dimensions belong to the sociocultural

3 Dimensions of Human Constants

39

(S) state of human existence, and the last two dimensions belong to the psychological (P) state. The organic combination and interaction of these dimensions constitute the “whole person”, and the Human Constant can be called the unified body of these four dimensions. To truly grasp the whole person, it is necessary to start from at least four dimensions, namely what is the pattern of human relationships with others, what are the characteristics of the group in which the person lives, how the person defines the self, and what is the pattern of human feelings. These four dimensions can be represented graphically as follows: take an arbitrary point on the line between layers 4 and 3 of the PSH schema, take this as the center, draw a circle with the radius of the dotted part of the PSH schema, and enlarge it as in Fig. 3. The left side of the K-line is the psychological part of the person, including all of layer 4 and part of layer 5 (unexpressible consciousness), the “emotion” and “self”. The left side of the K-line is the psychological part of the person, including all of layer 4 and part of layer 5 (unexpressible consciousness). On the right side is the social component, which includes all of layer 3 (intimate social relations and culture) and part of layer 2 (role social relations and culture), and the dimensions of “exchange” and “group” are largely related to this component.

Self-Co gnitive Dimens ion

5

Emotional control Dimension

4

Fig. 3 Four dimensions of human constant

Exchange Dimension

K

3

Group Dimension

2

40

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

These four dimensions of existence as a “person” are related to the five aspects of human behavior (i.e., cognition, evaluation, decision, implementation, and management by means) described in Chap. 1, which include both psychological and social aspects of the person. The so-called person is composed of these four dimensions.4 Each dimension and its characteristics are described separately below. 1. Group dimension: This dimension describes the style in which people conclude groups or the way in which people conclude groups with others and can be called the external image of the Human Constant. This is a very important aspect of our life and belongs to layers 3 and 2 (partly also to layer 1) of the PSH model. Among other things, the nature and characteristics of kinship groups determine how easy it is for an individual to feel secure and influence the PSH equilibrium model and the conclusion of major subgroups. When one group becomes the main content in layer 3, the role of other groups decreases, and their position moves to other layers. People in different Human Constants conclude kinship groups and major subgroups in different ways, thus forming kinship groups and major subgroups with different characteristics, which in turn constitute the most important sociocultural context in which people live and in turn have an important influence on their psychology and behavior. 2. Exchange dimension: This dimension describes how individuals interact with others in a particular sociocultural context, and its content belongs mainly to layers 3 and 2 of the PSH (partly to layers 4 and 1). “Exchange” belongs to the scope of economic research, but the perspective of economics and modern exchange theory ignores the role of culture, while the perspective of psychoculturology focuses on the relationship between exchange patterns and Human Constants. We introduce emotional factors into value and propose concepts such as emotional value and equivocal exchange. Human relationships are essentially reducible to various exchange relationships. In the exchange process, people determine what is meaningful, what is not meaningful, and the magnitude of meaning according to values; thus, exchange has different patterns and follows different rules. Different Human Constants have dominant exchange patterns that are consistent with them, and the measure of whether exchange is balanced is closely related to the type of PSH. The analysis of exchange patterns can capture the characteristics of human interaction patterns. 3. Emotional control dimension: This is a dimension of the Human Constant at the psychological level. Emotional control is an important driver of PSH, which is mainly carried out in layers 4 and 3 (and involves a few parts within layer 4) of PSH. Human emotions are certain in total; if more emotion is invested in some people, some things, or some cultural norms, less emotion will be invested in 4

The concept of the dimensions of human constant draws on personality psychology’s approach of capturing personality in a number of dimensions. One widely accepted approach captures “personality” in terms of five dimensions: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Each dimension is a continuous expression of emotional intensity, such as “openness”, which is extremely open at one end and extremely closed at the other, and each person’s personality is somewhere on this continuum of intensity.

3 Dimensions of Human Constants

41

others. Human emotions always seek a dynamic balance. There are cultural differences in the control mechanisms of emotions, and different Human Constants have different patterns of human emotion control mechanisms. Among them, the control of sexual desire constitutes an important element of emotional control. 4. Self-cognition dimension: Cognition is the process of processing external information by individuals. The cognition of people is divided into the cognition of “self” and the cognition of “others”. Self-perception is an important aspect of human socialization, and this dimension can be called the “internal image” of the Human Constant. Self-awareness originates from past life experiences and is a cognitive generalization of the self obtained from life experiences. In general, knowing what kind of person one is and processing information about oneself forms a cognitive structure about one’s image and characteristics. This structure influences the individual’s interpretation of others or events and the way information is processed. Different Human Constants have different characteristics of human self-perceptions, resulting in different views of the self, and these characteristics can be interpreted in the PSH model as an emphasis on different levels of content. It should be noted that each dimension partially overlaps in the “spectrum of existence”. The group dimension involves approximately two layers: “operative society and culture” and “intimate society and culture”, the exchange dimension involves approximately “intimate society and culture”, “operative society and culture” and “expressible consciousness”, the self-perception dimension involves approximately “intimate society and culture” to “unconscious”, and the emotional control dimension involves approximately from the “expressible consciousness” to the “pre-consciousness”. These four dimensions are intrinsically linked: the emotional control dimension is the main content of the psychological dimension of the Human Constant, and the configuration and control patterns of affect determine the meaning of one’s life. The self-cognition dimension is the internalized image of the Human Constant, which interacts with the configuration and control patterns of emotions. The exchange dimension is the main content of the social dimension of the Human Constant, the way of interaction with the other, and the exchange dimension interacts with the emotional control dimension. The group dimension is the external expression of the Human Constant, which is influenced by the exchange dimension of the person and is an extension of the exchange dimension outwardly but also influences the way the person exchanges. It seems that the organic combination of these dimensions and their mutual influence constitute the “whole person”, and the Human Constant can be regarded as the unity of these four dimensions. These four dimensions include the relationship between people and people, people and things, and people and cultural concepts. In short, to truly grasp the human being, we need to start from at least four aspects: what is the pattern of human relationships with others, what are the characteristics of the group in which the human being lives, how does the human being define himself or herself, and what is the emotional pattern of the human being.

42

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

4 Psychosocial Homeostasis and Human Constants: Characteristics and Implications of Two New Paradigms Psychosocial homeostasis and Human Constant proposed by Hsu, and refined by me, are two core concepts of psycho-culturology and new research paradigms. Our entire analytical work can be said to be based on these two paradigms. The research from this perspective has several important features. First, these two concepts understand human beings as a “sociocultural field” rather than as isolated individuals, freeing us from the limitation of grasping the character traits of ethnic groups exclusively from the perspective of “personality”. The most fundamental element of human existence is the interpersonal nexus, not the individual. The “Human Constant” is the smallest unit of study of human society and culture, the individual plus the “life package”, and the patterns of interaction with it. This concept takes into account the more complex elements of human existence, which are grasped in relation to the larger social and cultural context and which are consistent with the human being as a “dynamically balanced multidimensional whole of mind–body interaction”. One of the presuppositions of this theory is that human beings cannot exist completely independently and need to establish various connections with others. The most fundamental element of human existence is the interpersonal chain of relationships rather than the individual person. The concept of “fundamental interpersonal state” views the individual human being in a position similar to the way physics views fundamental particles. Quantum theory tells us that there is neither a completely isolated elementary particle in nature nor a particle that is completely united with other particles without any individuality, but a particle is actually in a state between self-regulated individuality and complete union, which is called the “wave–particle duality” of particles. L. Dumont, after studying the caste system in India, believes that this situation also applies to human society. In human society, completely independent, unconnected with other individuals, self-sufficient individuals do not exist; individuals are usually individuals of the whole. Even in individual societies, where independence and freedom are prized, the individual is in various connections with the other, and the “individual” of complete independence and freedom is only an idea. On the other hand, there is no such thing as an individual who has no independence and is completely integrated with others. Even in a highly “collectivist” society, individuals have independent judgment, independent decisions, and independent behavior. The relationship between the “individuality” and “mutuality” of human beings is similar to the “wave–particle duality” of elementary particles. The perspective of “field” reflects the grasp of this characteristic of human beings. The “individual” in Western society can be regarded as a special form of “human system”, a special form of “field” that freezes or weakens the property of human mutuality. A theory based on “field” can generalize “individual”, but a theory based on the latter cannot generalize the former. This model can be called the spectrum of human existence, which can be compared to a spectral diagram in physics, and each type of Human Constant (person) can be compared to monochromatic light

4 Psychosocial Homeostasis and Human Constants: Characteristics …

43

with a specific wavelength and frequency, in which the various states of existence can be located and described accordingly. Individual society emphasizes the individuality of human beings, just as physics emphasizes the solidity of particles, which can be said to emphasize one of the characteristics of human existence. Interpersonal society emphasizes the mutuality of human beings, which can be compared to the emphasis on particles as “waves” in physics and emphasizes another characteristic of human existence. In contrast, the “Human Constant” of psycho-cultural science considers human beings as beings with “wave–particle duality”. If the emphasis on the individuality of human beings is similar to classical mechanics theory, then psycho-cultural science, which recognizes the “wave–particle duality” of human beings, can be compared to quantum mechanics theory. From this point of view, both the values and cultural ideals of individual societies, which emphasize “complete freedom of the individual”, and the cultural ideals of interpersonal societies, such as Chinese society, which emphasize “complete harmony among people”, emphasize one aspect of the human being. The emphasis on “complete freedom of the individual” as emphasized by values and cultural ideals, or “complete harmony between human beings” as emphasized by cultural ideals of interpersonal societies such as Chinese society, both emphasize one aspect of human beings and envision an ideal state in this aspect and thus are impossible to achieve. The psychoanalytic school founded by Freud focuses on the preconscious and subconscious, which are the two innermost layers of the person (i.e., layers 7 and 6 of the PSH), and Freud’s doctrine can be said to be based mainly on the understanding of the subconscious. The concept of “personality” used by the “culture and personality school” is also based on these two parts of the person, the “inner forces” of the individual, and focuses on the complex and unsettling mental states within the individual rather than on the interaction with society and culture. The concept of “personality” used by the “personality school” is also based on these two parts of the person, the “inner strengths” of the individual, and focuses on the complex and troubled mental states within the individual rather than on the interaction with society and culture. Such a concept of “personality” is more appropriate for people in the “individual” state because in the Human Constant of “individual”, individuals are more concerned with their emotions, feelings, desires, and instincts than with their relationships with others. Therefore, the concept of “personality” involved in Freud’s psychoanalysis, “culture and personality”, and personality psychology is, in most cases, an individualistic personality. The emphasis on the importance of the subconscious and preconscious layers of the person is clearly more appropriate for the Human Constant of “defining the person as an individual who is primarily limited to the basis of the organism” (and within layer 4 of the PSH). In contrast, the psycho-cultural theory derived from Hsu’s theory emphasizes the sociocultural context in which people live (and layers 4 and 3 of the PSH), and based on this, Hsu suggests to using the Chinese concept of “person” instead of the concept of “personality”. The concept of the “Human Constant” emphasizes the importance of the “sociocultural field”, which allows the study of the person to move away from the Western individual-centered model to a more universal sociocentric model.

44

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

Second, grasping people from the perspective of psychosocial dynamic equilibrium is in line with the characteristics of people as a dynamic equilibrium body. There is a long history in the West of explaining the motivation of human behavior in terms of a single human desire, from Karl Marx’s view that people must first eat, drink, live, and dress before they can engage in politics, science, art, religion, etc., to Freud’s formulation that sexuality is the original motivation for a wide range of activities, including politics, science, art, and religion, to the realist school of international relations theory. The emphasis on the motives of “interest” and “power” of state actors is the same. The concept of psychosocial homeostasis is not entirely from the sociocultural or psychological point of view but from the point of view of the dynamic equilibrium between society, culture, and psychology, considering human beings as a dynamic equilibrium between human beings, human beings and objects, human beings and cultural norms, psychological activities, and social environment. As an individual of a living organism, each person strives to maintain consistent and favorable physiological stability in the organs and tissues under his or her control, as well as to maintain balance in his or her spirit and relationships with others. Obviously, this dynamic equilibrium approach is more appropriate for the study of the human being as a living being with desires, emotions, choices, and cultural mold. The third layer of the “survival spectrum” constitutes our “life package”, and examining the characteristics and equilibrium patterns of the life package is an important clue to reveal human behavior and cultural mysteries. For example, in traditional China, dogs and cats were members of the second layer of people, i.e., people kept them mainly because they were useful: dogs for guarding and cats for catching rats. However, in Western societies, they are “pets”, and people have emotions for them, belonging to the third level. Currently, many people in China who live in urban areas also keep pets, and dogs and cats have been transformed from Tier 2 to Tier 3 members. This is because the content of Tier 3 has changed for Chinese people: the lack of some kind of intimate human connection in their lives is compensated by keeping pets. Thus, the PSH principle is a seemingly simple but profound theory. It is simple in the sense that it is about a common sense that people “want to eat when they are hungry and are not hungry when they are full”, but profound in the sense that the mystery of human psychology and behavior is related to this simple truth. The truth is simple, but because of its simplicity, it is often overlooked.

5 Psycho-Cultural Paths in the Study of State Relations The academic community has called for the integration of the grasp of the human being into the study of international relations, but there is a lack of concrete and operational ways to grasp it. Psycho-culturology offers such a perspective and approach: the perspective of the “whole person” and the two operational tools, i.e., “psychosocial homeostasis” and “Human Constant”.

5 Psycho-Cultural Paths in the Study of State Relations

45

According to this path, each state actor is linked to a unique Human Constant; in other words, different types of Human Constants form the basis of different civilizations and constitute the “cultural genes” of state actors. The scholar Robert Ardrey sees the society of living organisms as a game of division of power, intragroup sequencing, attack and defense, a “competitive game with the goal of obtaining a prescribed prize by prescribed means”. Such human games can be divided into two main categories: individual-based games and group-based games. From our point of view, it seems more appropriate to consider human civilization as a game played by human beings in two Human Constants: One is a game played under the “individual” system, where the player is an “individual”; the other is a game played under the “interpersonal” system. The other is the game played under the “interpersonal” system, where the player is a “relational body”.5 The “individual” is only a special form of the Human Constant, and this “human system” is dominant in Western societies. Western European civilization (which we regard as a refined form of civilization characterized by the emphasis on individual independence, freedom from tradition, control of nature, importance of individual rights, importance of law, etc.) is based on this basic human state. In such societies, the Human Constant coincides with the great weight of the individual as the basis of the organism, while the “human system” in most non-Western societies is not the “individual”. Therefore, the modern mainstream international relations theory’s approach of reducing human beings to “individuals” and thus to “economic human beings” is, after all, based mainly on the experience of Western individual societies. The author believes that the core of civilization is not religion but the “Human Constant”. Huntington’s approach to dividing civilizations from a religious perspective poses the problem that a certain civilization sometimes belongs to a different religious “civilization”. Today, more than half of Koreans practice religions other than Confucianism, and among those who do, Buddhists and Christians are almost equal. According to Samuel Phillips Huntington’s division (Huntington 1996), “Western civilization” should also be divided into Christian (Protestant) and Catholic civilizations because since Orthodox Christianity is a separate civilization, there is no reason why Christianity (Protestantism) and Catholicism should not be divided into two civilizations. Religion is certainly an important symbol of civilization, but according to our view, religion is only a system of expressions of values that are integrated in a specific basic human state under a specific psycho-cultural orientation, and the basic human state is the basic system of human existence, which carries social and cultural genetic information hidden in civilization and belongs to the “principle of civilization”. Although it is also affected by social changes, it is similar to the genes of living organisms and has a more stable nature. Civilizations may decline and die,

5

This latter category of games is subdivided into two cases: (1) communitarian. There is competition between groups, but there is a high degree of equality between individuals within the group; (2) Ordinal. To avoid intergroup competition, there is a strict ordinal arrangement among individuals within the group (Ardrey 1966).

46

2 Psycho-Culturology: Core Concepts and Perspectives

and religious beliefs may change, but as long as the people who make up the civilization are not eliminated or broken up, they will still be arranged in the same Human Constant according to some principle. The concept of psychosocial homeostasis is concerned with the motivation of actors’ behavior, and the principle of psychosocial homeostasis provides a concrete basis for studying the proposition of “the influence of culture on state behavior”. This concept understands a person as a human being. This concept understands people as a dynamic equilibrium “field” of interaction between people and people, people and things, people and cultural norms, and people engage in political, scientific, artistic, religious, and other activities only as part of the “field” of “people”. The activities of people in politics, science, art, and religion are only part of the dynamic equilibrium of the “field” of “people”. The attitude and behavior of the state actor toward the “Outer World” (another country or foreign culture) are associated with the subject’s cognitive model of the person and the model of interpersonal relations associated with it. The PSH model tells us that the “Outside World” is part of the sociocultural “field” of the “person” and is at the very periphery of this “field”, including the foreign culture. The “Outside World” is part of the sociocultural “field” of “people” and is at the outermost edge of this “field”, including foreign cultures, peoples, and even foreign planets. Generally speaking, because the “Outer World” is a heterogeneous existence with the “internal world”, this refraction often produces misconceptions and wrong behaviors. The perceptions and behaviors of the Outer World are linked to the perceptions and behaviors of the internal world and are part of the way people deal with the world they face. In this sense, there is no particular “external view” or “external relationship” of a community or country. The “international view” is derived from the “domestic view”, and the former can be seen as a natural extension of the latter (with some differences, of course). Generally, we have no direct contact with people in the “Outer World” layer and only little or no knowledge of them. People generally project their perceptions and ways of interacting with people in the third and second layers onto this layer, and the way they handle relations between countries is a reflection of the way they handle relations between people in the country. Whether or not we have enough security is an important factor that affects our judgment of the Outer World (enemy or friend, security or threat, etc.), and people’s security mainly comes from the third layer of the psychosocial homeostasis model (intimate social relationships and culture). Therefore, the existence of a stable third layer is important for judging whether individuals, and thus communities and even national actors, have sufficient security. Different Human Constants have different patterns of psychosocial homeostasis. Some Human Constants provide individuals with a greater sense of security, while others provide individuals with less security, which is an important reason why state actors have different attitudes and behaviors toward the outside world. In addition, the concept of psychosocial homeostasis requires that more complex psychological and emotional factors, such as the satisfaction of needs for status, security, and interaction, be taken into account when grasping the behavior patterns of people and state actors.

References

47

Thus, it seems that the psycho-cultural path of international relations research is quite different from structural realism, which emphasizes the cultural or civilizational “properties” of actors abstracted by structural realism and develops tools and methods. Rather than simplifying actors and giving them complex personalities, it does not seek concise, universal “scientific” conclusions but rather aims to reveal differentiated, relative meanings. The psycho-cultural path attempts to place state actors under a new framework and grasp them with the tools of the heart, thus potentially providing a more compatible operational platform for understanding the limitations of current mainstream international relations theory based on the experience of individual Western societies and for enhancing the scholarship of the experience of non-Western civilizations.

References Ardrey, Robert. 1966. The Territorial Impertive: A personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations. New York: Dell Publishing Co. Berry, J.W. 1982. Ecological analyses for cross-cultural psychology. Crose-cultural Psychology 2. Dumont, Louis. 1980. Homo hierarchicus: The caste and its implications. Translated by Mark Saintsbury. Louis Dumont and Basia Gualti. Eshun, Hamaguchi. 1998. Original Theory of Japanese Studie (Nihon Kenkyu Genron). Ariake. Hsu, F.L.K. 1971. Psychosocial homeostasis and Jen: Coceptual tools for advancing pychological anthropology. American Anthropologist 73 (1). Huipeng, Shang. 2013. Essentials of Psycho-Culturology: Theory and Method for Large-Scale Comparative Studies of Literate Civilizations (xin li wenhua xue yaoyi: da guimo wenming shehui bijiao yanjiu de liun yu fangfa). Press of Pekeng University. Huntington, Samuel Phillips. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster. Pelto, P.J. 1968. The differences between “tight” and “loose” societies. Trans-action 5.

Chapter 3

People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations

From the theory of psycho-culturology briefly described in Chap. 2, it is clear that the Human Constant constitutes the main content of a society and a civilization, while the Psychosocial Homeostasis is the principle that explains individual and social changes. When introducing the core concepts of Human Constant and psychosocial homeostasis to the analysis of state behavior and even interstate relations, it is necessary to add an intermediate link between the two dimensions of the state: the civilizational entity and the organizational entity. The information about the Human Constant is recorded in the civilizational entity, through which the core of a civilization influences the state actor.

1 Two Sides of Being a State Actor: “Civilizational Entity” and “Organizational Entity” “State” and “nation” are two different concepts; “state” usually refers to a political entity with political and administrative power, also known as a country. A state can be controlled and governed by a group of people whose sovereignty is recognized by the international community; usually has its own government, territory, population, constitution, and legal system; and participates in international affairs by establishing diplomatic relations with other countries. In contrast, “nation” usually refers to a social group defined by factors such as shared culture, history, language, ethnicity, or religion. They are sometimes confused or used as synonyms. Scholars who study international relations, such as Waltz and Went, sometimes use nations and sometimes use the state. Both states and nations are made up of people (people), and people are in different cultures, histories, and religions (which can be collectively called civilizational content). Thus, when states are grasped as actors, there are two levels: one is the civilizational level, a civilizational entity, and the other is the political organizational level, an organizational entity. The behavior of states and the relations between them are influenced by national psychology, cultural traditions, and patterns © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_3

49

50

3 People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations

of interpersonal relations and thus can also be analyzed with the tools of psychoculturology. The terms “caste-state”, “kinship-state”, “Iemoto-state”, and “nationstate” used in this book are the first half of the concepts “caste-state”, “kinship-state”, “Iemoto-state”, and “nation-state” used in this book refer to the civilizational side, while the second half refers to the political organization side. It is clear that the socalled nation-state is only a form of state. Similarly, a nation is not only a civilizational entity but also a political entity. A nation as a political entity is not necessarily related to a nation in the fully anthropological sense; a nation as a political entity may be composed of multiple anthropological nations, and a nation in the anthropological sense may be scattered among multiple states. These two dimensions of state, however, are neglected in current international relations research. Those of different schools of thought emphasize only one of these dimensions. When Hans Morgenthau, the realist originator of the theory of international relations, proclaimed the inevitability of competition for power and profit among states based on human evil, he effectively presupposed the state actor as a monster with no civilization to speak of. In addition, when Samuel Huntington, a representative of the civilizational school, emphasized the importance of civilization and predicted that future conflicts in the world would occur mainly among the major civilizations (Huntington, 1996), civilization seemed to him to be a monster with a different face. Huntington is right to emphasize the important role of culture (which he often confuses with civilization,1 but he does not clarify the relationship between “civilization” and “state actors”, and his concept of “civilization” is large and ambiguous. His concept of “civilization” is so large and ambiguous that we simply cannot use what he calls civilization as an operational unit of analysis in the study of international relations. For example, what he calls Islamic civilization, Confucian civilization, etc., are in fact not a whole but include several state actors, only that several state actors are in a similar, vague cultural context, and the contradictions and conflicts 1

He argues that both civilization and culture involve the comprehensive way of life of a people, that civilizations are amplified cultures, and that they both include values, rules, institutions, and modes of thinking that have been given primary importance by successive generations in an established society (Huntington 1996, pp. 24–25) Many scholars, however, do not agree with his approach of confusing civilization with culture. Japanese international relations scholar Kenichiro Hirano, who has a background in cultural anthropology, criticizes Huntington for simply comparing the concepts of “civilization” and “culture”. He believes that the level of culture is higher than that of civilization (Hirano 2011, pp. 31–32). The author believes that the distinction between civilization and culture made by the Japanese scholar Kumon Sunpei is appropriate: culture is “a complex of principles of human behavior and the design principles of civilization that members of society learn, adapt, and pass on almost Unconsciously”; civilization is “a complex of principles of human behavior and the design principles of civilization under the influence of the design principles of culture and the environment”. Civilization is “a complex or group of devices of the type of social life, both spiritual and material, that is consciously produced by human beings under the influence of various factors such as cultural design principles and the environment, and is the system of human life.” (Kumon 1994, p. 17). While civilization can be compared to the manifestation of an organism with changes of growth, development, aging, and death, culture can be compared to the genes of an organism, which are more stable and fundamental than civilization.

1 Two Sides of Being a State Actor: “Civilizational Entity” …

51

between states in a similar civilization context are not smaller than those with other civilization contexts. To illustrate the importance of culture, Huntington gave the famous example of Ghana in Africa in the 1960s and South Korea, whose economic statistics were very similar, but 30 years later, South Korea was an industrial giant with the 14th largest economy in the world, while no such change had occurred in Ghana, whose per capita GNP was only 1/14th of South Korea’s. He attributed this to the Korean people’s “He attributes this difference to the Korean values of” thrift, investment, hard work, education and discipline (Harrison and Huntington, 1997). This example may seem convincing, but it simplifies and exaggerates the relationship between culture and country. According to Heinz’s logic, the culture-deprecating theorists can also refute the opposite and possibly more convincing example: South Korea and North Korea, which belong to the same culture, were one country 60 years ago and should have the same values of frugality, investment, diligence, education, and discipline, but now (2011) North Korea’s GNP is only 1/34th of South Korea’s. Despite the widespread criticism of Huntington’s clash of civilizations, it is indisputable that after him, the field of international relations studies began to pay attention to civilizations and cultures.2 Naturally, in this field of study, the discussion has not focused on sociological and cultural anthropological perspectives, such as the aforementioned “role of values in social development”, but rather on the validity of the role of civilizations as agents of international politics and the nature of the relationship between civilizations. Huntington’s view has been criticized as “essentialist” for treating cultural communities, with their wide range and unclear boundaries, as crucial factors in world politics. Critics argue that civilization is of little use in the study of state-centered international relations and is not the most important attribute affecting relations between states. These two perspectives can be seen as one or the other, but in fact, state actors are both “civilizational entities” and “organizational entities”. When Huntington speaks of the important role of values, he discusses state behavior in the sense of “civilization”, but civilization is not an actor because civilization itself does not act; it is only a “group of devices”. A variety of tangible or intangible artifacts that individuals or groups consciously produce and enjoy in their social lives.”(Kumon 1994). The values embodied in civilization must be expressed through the behavior of state actors (as an organizational entity). The values of “frugality, investment, diligence, education, and discipline” (if that is the case) that he claims to be part of the Korean cultural tradition can only be expressed through a series of institutional designs and policies implemented by the state through the people’s association with certain groups. Those who disparage the role of culture fail to see that although there is a huge gap between the economic and social development of North and South Korea today, people still share a certain cultural core, i.e., they still have values and behaviors in common, such as the values of frugality, diligence, discipline, and loyalty to family, organization, and nation that North and

2

The hallmark may be the publication of a trilogy of civilizations edited by U.S. international relations scholars Patrick Jackson and Peter Katzenstein between 2007 and2012.

52

3 People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations

Fig. 1 State actors and their two sides

South Koreans still enjoy.3 The combination of cultural kernels and different group organizations, systems, and policies has evolved in different directions and produced different results. The state actor consists of the “civilization” and the “organization”, and the “civilization” can be regarded as the intermediate link between culture and international relations. The relationship between the “state actor”, “organization” and “civilization” is shown in Fig. 1. The state consists of people, as a civilizational and organizational entity, composed of the same group of people, but the two emphasize different aspects. A civilizational entity can be considered a community of knowledge, beliefs, norms, and ideas that emphasizes the human state of being, emotional patterns, and values and ways of behavior, etc. The organizational entity is a collection of groups and institutions and emphasizes social structures, institutions, etc. States as organizational entities can be classified as democratic states, authoritarian states, etc. The state as a civilization body can be based on the “individual” and “contextual” societies.4 It should be noted that the concept of “civilization” here includes both civilization as a “complex of social life types or groups of devices” and culture as a “civilizational 3

During the Asian financial crisis, South Koreans showed a similar loyalty to their country as North Koreans did to their country and leader. In his 2013 New Year’s address, North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un said that he “created an economic power with the spirit of having conquered the universe”, and at the same time, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said in his exit speech that South Korea was “the central country of the world”. We seem to see a similar spirit in such expressions. 4 Psycho-culturology believes that in the sense of “human system”, it is not the “collective” or “group” that corresponds to the “individual”. In the sense of “human system”, the counterpart of “individual” is not “collective” or “group” but “interpersonal” (Huipeng 2013, pp. 60–63).

1 Two Sides of Being a State Actor: “Civilizational Entity” …

53

principle”. The relationship between civilization and culture here is not a relationship between large and small, as Huntington suggests, but a relationship between biological expression and genes. Civilization and organization are mutually influential. On the one hand, the civilizing body influences the organizing body and, through the latter, the state actor’s view of the Outer World and its relations with other countries; on the other hand, the organizing body influences the civilizing body. By their nature, organizational entities change more rapidly and are easily observable, while civilizational bodies change more slowly and have greater continuity. Rapid changes at the level of a society’s institutions (the study of which constitutes an important element in the study of so-called modernization) can affect changes in civilization, but such changes are mainly manifested in civilization as a “complex or group of devices of social life types” but not in civilization as a “principle of civilization”. Culture as the “principle of civilization” is not easily changed. The behavior of state actors can be properly understood only if the state is understood as both an organizational and a civilizational entity. Emanuel Adler, who sees civilization as a “community of practice”, is right in his formulation of the relationship between civilization and the state in the organizational sense: “on the one hand, the community of practice gives the political entity the property of action, and the political entity can represent the knowledge, identity, and discourse of the community of practice. Community’s knowledge, identity, discourse, and norms to take distinctive action. On the other hand, political entities reinforce, legitimize, and institutionalize the knowledge and discourse of the community of practice through practical means.” (Katzenstein 2012, p. 76). Thus, the U.S. attack on Iraq was an act of organizing the body, but the United States can be said to be trying to do so in the sense of a civilized body when it claims to promote freedom and democratic institutions and values in Iraq and the Middle East in general. Countries in the same civilizational context may be completely separate countries (e.g., China, Vietnam, Korea, and South Korea in the Confucian civilizational sphere, India and Nepal in the Indian civilizational sphere, etc.) that have both sides of the civilizational entity and the organizational entity, except that they share a common civilizational context or are branches of a larger civilizational community. Sometimes, however, there is unity as a civilizational entity, while there may be a split as an organizational entity, such as during the American War of Independence and later with Britain. Civilizational bodies are usually combined with organizational entities to form state actors, but not always, and there are cases where the state as an organizational entity dies out or lacks a state form in the sense of being an organizational entity for a long time but continues as a civilizational entity. For example, Indian civilization flourished for a long time and over a wide area, but it had few complete forms of state as an organization, lacked strong military power and effective political form, and was constantly in civil strife and conquered by foreign peoples. An organization is a collection of institutions and organizations, while a civilization is a collection of ways of being. An organization can be destroyed, but a civilization cannot be destroyed by force. The fall of the Soviet Union illustrates how easily an organized state can be destroyed, no matter how high-tech weapons and a strong

54

3 People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations

economic base it is built on, but the values and way of life of the Russians were not destroyed when the Soviet Union collapsed. Based on this, the relationship between civilization and organization can be compared to the relationship between nutrient solution and strain: the nutrient solution obtains its existence through the strain, the strain cannot survive without the nutrient solution, and a nutrient solution can cultivate multiple independent strains. Only by combining civilization and organization can the influence of culture on state actors be effectively grasped, the so-called civilization in world politics can be located, and a “pluralistic and multidimensional perspective of civilization” (Katzenstein 2012, p. 1) can be established. It must be admitted that although the discussion of civilization and culture has started to be emphasized in the study of international relations theory since Huntington, it is still controversial and far from being the mainstream of international relations research, and what constitutes the modern mainstream of international relations theory is still, shall we say, state-centered and presupposes state actors as some kind of “economic man” or “rational man”. The realist and liberal schools of thought, which presuppose state actors as some kind of “economic man” or “rational man”, still constitute the mainstream of modern international relations theory. Mainstream international relations theories emphasize the organizational side of the state, such as Waltz’s view of the international system as a kind of anarchy. If one looks only at the organizational level, he is right because there is indeed no authoritative, world government-like organizational body in the international arena. However, this perspective completely freezes the civilizational body dimension of the state, and any theory that lacks a civilizational body perspective, no matter how concise and beautiful its form, is destined to have limits in its explanatory power because state actors cannot be reduced to mere organizational entities. Why has this theory become the mainstream of international relations theory today? This may be due to two reasons that are easily overlooked by researchers: first, the civilizational entity was originally hidden in the organizational entity, and the state actors at the time of the emergence of the modern international order were in the same civilizational (i.e., Western civilization) context. The civilizational side of the state becomes the “national body”, and the behavior of the state can be reduced to the organizational entity. When this order of Western origin is universalized into an international order that includes non-Western countries, people still follow the old way of thinking and ignore the civilizational side. When people move in the same house, the influence of the house on the actors is the same, so it can be ignored, but if we examine the activities of people living in different houses (civilizations), we cannot ignore the influence of the environment (house) in which they live. Second, to pursue “scientificity”, modern mainstream international relations theory (as well as many social science disciplines) must freeze variables that are not easily grasped, such as culture and civilization, and reduce states to rational actors seeking to maximize their own interests based on the assumption of “economic man”. It is easier to “scientifically” generalize concise and beautiful laws and to form the hard core of a scientific theory and thus easier to be considered a scientific theory.

1 Two Sides of Being a State Actor: “Civilizational Entity” …

55

Perhaps due to the influence of mainstream international relations theory, people tend to grasp today’s China only from the organizational side, i.e., as a “nationstate” in the Western sense, and ignore its civilizational side. In fact, not only China but also most countries in South Asia, Africa, South America, the Middle East, and other regions today are not strictly speaking “nation-states” in the Western sense, and their behavior cannot be grasped by focusing only on their organizational aspects and ignoring their civilizational nature. Some scholars have noted this problem, but the lack of a proper formulation system in the existing theoretical framework of international relations has often led to conceptual confusion. For example, in his somewhat sensationalist book “When China Rules the World”, British scholar Martin Jacques argues that the modern concept of nation-state is inappropriate for China, which is not a “nation-state” but a “civilizational state”. He argues that some of the principles behind the political behavior of the Chinese today still follow the political experience of traditional China. “To say this is not to deny that China has changed fundamentally, but to emphasize that China is also characterized by a very vital connectedness—and, to make a scientific analogy, its DNA is still intact as it was.” (Jacques 2010, p. 332). The dominant face of China today, including its social relations and customs, its way of life, its sense of superiority, its concept of nationhood, and its obsession with unity, is a product of Chinese culture rather than a manifestation of its recent emergence as a nation-state. On the surface, it appears to be a nation-state, but at heart it is a civilized state. Others refer to today’s China as a “civilizational state” that combines “nation-state” and “civilizational state” into one. However, there is a problem with this statement. They use the term “civilized state” or “civilized state” in contrast to the concept of “barbaric state” or “obscurantist state”. If we call China a civilized country or a civilized country, are other countries barbaric countries? If China has achieved anything economically and socially today, it is not because of the “miracle” of “combining the strengths of a nation-state and a civilized state” but because of its civilized nature, that is, the unique nature of Chinese life. It is the product of the combination of China’s civilizational nature, i.e., the unique Chinese way of life and values, and its organizational nature, i.e., its unique state system and policies. If the world is still unable to understand or even misunderstand China’s behavior today, it is mostly because China has had to squeeze the rich information recorded in its civilizational entity into a narrow organizational (nation-state) dimension when expressing its demands and explaining its behavior, and the world has tended to understand China’s behavior accordingly while ignoring its civilizational side. The solution to the problem is to grasp today’s Chinese behavior not only from the organizational side but also from the civilizational side. China is not a “nation-state”, at least not as defined in the current mainstream theory of international relations. The concept of “civilization” may better explain many of the characteristics of today’s China that are different from those of contemporary nation-states (Wang 2008).

56

3 People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations

2 Civilizations and Interstate Relations Human beings live in civilizations, and information about the principles of human behavior and patterns of interpersonal relations is recorded in civilizations, which influence the behavior of states and relations between states through human beings. The construction of what constructivism calls “shared knowledge” and “perceptions” (such as interests, threats, security, etc.) is also done through people and therefore is also influenced by civilizations. The relationship between state actors cannot be simply reduced to the relationship between people, but it is certainly influenced by the latter because (1) a state’s political system is operated by people; (2) state organizations and groups are composed of people; (3) a state’s foreign policy is formulated and implemented by people; and (4) a state’s judgment and perception of other countries and the Outer World as a whole are done by people. Generally speaking, people living in the same sociocultural system have greater similarity in dealing with problems and treating others than people living in another sociocultural system, which makes the diplomatic model of one country different from another, and the judgment of the Outer World, as well as the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, are also marked by culture. Judged from this perspective, people’s perceptions, judgments, and decisions in international politics are not only individual but also cultural differences. People’s existential systems (Human Constants) and motivational systems (psychosocial homeostasis patterns), which are recorded in civilizations, form an important background for a country’s perception of the outside world and influence its foreign policy and behavior in a subtle way. Why do we say that “states are people” and “relations between states are also human relations”? The theoretical basis is the psycho-cultural theory of Human Constants and psychosocial homeostasis: human behavior patterns are molded by Human Constants, and the characteristics of psychosocial homeostasis patterns determine attitudes and behavior toward Outer World. The principles of dealing with interpersonal relations are extended and projected onto interstate relations. The concept of civilizational entities provides tools for illustrating the connection between human and state behavior and interpersonal and interstate relations. Just as the “person” should be reduced from an “individual” to a system (a Human Constant), the state should be reduced from an organism (nation-state) to a system that combines an organism with a civilization. When we consider the civilizational side, the state cannot be understood only as a “nation-state” (although it is now the main form of state actor), and the relationship between states is not only a relationship between organizations but also a relationship between civilizations. The two are related but not the same thing (as shown in Fig. 2). In terms of composition, the organizational entity is a functional body composed of social groups, state forms, political systems, etc. (i.e., what mainstream international relations theory calls “structures”), while the civilizational entity is a cultural information carrier, an information community composed of human constituents, values, behaviors, and shared knowledge.

2 Civilizations and Interstate Relations

Compositi on basis

Impact

(Hard power): functionaries: military power, families, economic social power, groups, political forms of power state, political systems, etc. Groups, institutional

Cultural informatio n carriers: Human Constants, values, behaviors

(Soft power): attraction, enticeme nt, persuasio n

57

Relationshi p Form

Associat ed

Cooperation or confrontatio n: various international organizations, military alliances, etc.

Internati onal treaties, internati onal law, etc.

Civilization al integration. Culture clash or integration

Shared values, shared judgmen ts, etc.

Fig. 2 Difference between civilization and organizational entities

In terms of influence, the organization mainly embodies “hard power”, including military power, economic power, and political power, while the influence of civilization is mainly “soft power”, including attraction, enticement, and persuasion. As far as the forms of relations are concerned, the forms of relations between organizations are cooperation and friction between states, political alliance and confrontation, and the resulting various international organizations, military-aligned organizations, regional cooperation organizations, etc. In contrast, the form of relations between civilizations is mutual borrowing between civilizations, mutual penetration of values, international cultural exchange activities, and the resulting cultural conflicts or integration. While organizations are generally connected to each other through international treaties, international law, etc., civilizations are connected to each other by shared values and judgments arising from common concerns about the future of humanity (what constructivism calls “shared knowledge” includes both types of ties). Through the interaction of states in the sense of organizations connected by various international treaties and international laws, various international organizations and certain international regimes (today’s United Nations, etc.) will gradually emerge, and eventually (just possibly) some kind of world governing organization—a world

58

3 People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations

government—may emerge. As civilized nations bound to each other by a minimum code of human ethics and certain common values, a kind of “world civilization community” may eventually emerge. Considering the two sides of civilizational and organizational entities, the relations between state actors can be arranged and combined into four subordinate types: 1. relations between different organizational entities under the same (or similar) civilizational entity. (1) Relations between local states during the period of Chinese division, relations between North and South Korea, etc.; 2. relations between different civilizations under the same (or similar) organizational entity. The relationship between the United States and Japan today, the relationship between the United States and Korea, and the relationship between socialist countries (such as China and the Soviet Union) during the Cold War. This could explain why countries belonging to the same camp during the Cold War were unable to cooperate better, thus leading to their defeat in the Cold War. 3. relations between different bodies of organizations under different bodies of civilizations. The relationships between North Korea and the United States, between China and the United States, between Iran and the United States, etc.; 4. The relationship between the same (or similar) civilizations under the same (or similar) organizations. The relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, the relationship between the countries of the European Union in a certain sense, and the relationship between China and Korea, Vietnam, etc., under the tribute system. These four types of interstate relations are represented in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 Four types of interstate relations (these four interstate relationships and their schematic diagrams are based on the suggestions of Dr. Yu Kuo Lung)

2 Civilizations and Interstate Relations

59

These four categories can summarize all interstate relations, and only this generalization is closer to the relations between states. From this perspective, it is clear that the concept of “international relations” as we now use it is limited: it refers primarily to relations between independent nation-states. Nation-states, which originated in the modern West, can be considered largely “civilizational and organizational homogeneous” (roughly of the fourth type), and when the concept of international relations is extended to relations among all states, the civilizational factor tends to be ignored. Therefore, strictly speaking, international relations as they are currently used are only part of the interstate relations that we have outlined, and the full validity of the concepts of “system” and “structure”, as they are called in modern international political theory, is established only in this type of interstate relations. … All four types of relationships mentioned above may or may not be in conflict. Whether conflicts occur between state actors depends on complex factors such as the nature of the organizational entity (social system, nature of the regime), the nature of the civilization body (Human Constant and the psychosocial homeostasis pattern of people), and the judgment of state actors on security and interests. Countries under the same civilization are not necessarily free of conflicts with each other, and the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula today (probably the most serious in the world today) is also taking place between countries with the same civilizational nature. Even between countries of the same civilization and organization, there is not necessarily less animosity than between countries of different civilizations and organizations; for example, both world wars occurred between countries of the same civilization and organization. Considering the behavior of states at the level of civilizations, we need to recognize that civilizations have a continuum and a kernel of different characteristics that have a continuous and significant impact on the behavior of states. The kernel of a civilization gives it a certain “character” that makes state actors behave differently: more aggressive and proactive or more introverted, moderate, conservative, etc. (Morgenthau 2007, chapter 13). From this perspective, our judgment for the future is that conflicts of international significance will continue to take place between state actors in a civilizational context rather than between ambiguous “civilizations” as Huntington predicted. Our caveat is that one needs to look beyond the limitations of thinking only in terms of “nation-states” (or “geopolitics”) and give the necessary weight to the nature of civilizations when judging this issue. In the case of China, for example, the rise of China in recent years has given rise to fears of a “China threat theory”, at least in the Western world. From our perspective, this view is based largely on the experience of modern nation-states (individual societies that emerged in the modern West) and ignores the impact of China’s unique civilizational dimension, i.e., the Human Constant, values, and cultural traditions of the Chinese people, on state actors. Back then, a major pretext for the United States to launch the Vietnam War and later to improve relations with Vietnam was to prevent China’s expansion. Hsu, F.L.K. has revealed the Chinese way of life, attitudes, and behavior toward the outside world from a psycho-cultural perspective, citing numerous examples in response to the prevailing “Chinese expansionism” at the time, pointing out that the perception of “Chinese expansion” was a myth. This issue is still unresolved today,

60

3 People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations

and today’s “China threat theory” can be said to be a continuation and replication of the “China expansion theory” of those days. We can also point out from the same perspective that today’s “China threat theory” is also a judgment of the West based on its own experience. Of course, this is not to say that China will not clash with other countries at all in the future. As mentioned earlier, whether there will be conflicts between state actors depends on more complex factors, and if China fully internalizes the existing international order in the future, the nature of the Chinese civilization will also change, and the external behavior of state actors may become more aggressive and more offensive. However, changes in the nature of civilizations, such as genetic changes in organisms, are extremely slow, and as of yet, there have been no major changes in the nature of China’s civilization. Taking the nature of civilizations into account when thinking about the behavior of state actors can at least avoid the limitations that come from thinking only in terms of organizations, and it facilitates thinking about cooperation among state actors, the ongoing dialogue of civilizations in world politics, the importance of civilizational symbiosis in understanding each other’s societies, how they have come to be what they are today, and what traditional elements and national mentality behind their development. Only then can we know where we stand and what is the most appropriate way to engage with others. From this perspective, it is also possible to think about some deep-seated problems of the existing international order. For example, some of the major problems currently facing the world are difficult to solve because of the two basic driving principles behind the current international order, which originate from individual societies: profit and power. The root cause of the environmental pollution problem is the consumerist lifestyle that originated in the West and then spread to the world, and if this lifestyle is not curbed, the prospects for its solution are not promising. The root cause of the current nuclear weapons dilemma is that the fundamental principle that currently dominates the world is still the de facto principle of power and that an increasing number of states can be expected to possess nuclear weapons if those who possess them do not first give them up. Both of these principles are closely linked to the existing international order, which has its roots in Western societies in which the “individual” is the Human Constant and is distinctly civilizational in character and is therefore unlikely to solve these problems on its own civilizations, including non-Western civilizations. In other words, the civilizational experiences recorded by large-scale civilizations such as China and India may form part of a future human civilizational community that can provide lessons for solving such deep-seated problems. It is important to note that for China, the emphasis on the civilizational side of the state does not mean that China does not need to familiarize itself with the existing international order, internalize the rules of international law, and act on its own. It is important to see that the trend of integration among the world’s civilizations has led to an increasingly obvious sharing of information and knowledge and interpenetration of values among independent countries, and it is possible that in the future, the world will see the emergence of some kind of world government along with some kind of world civilization. For China, on the one hand, as a civilization, China has thousands of years of history, and we should be confident of the rich civilizational experience

3 The “Chinese School” in International Relations Theory: The …

61

recorded in civilizations; on the other hand, as a modern nation-state with only a few decades of history, China still has insufficient experience in this area and faces many heavy tasks in interpreting its own behavior and accepting existing international rules. For example, territory, sovereignty, and state equality are all concepts of the modern nation-state, and China, as a modern nation-state, cannot help but assert its clear borders and exclusive sovereignty, which often contradicts its historical experience as a civilized body with unclear borders and invisible rule. It goes without saying that we cannot look at the world and conduct interstate relations today exclusively from our own civilizational experience, for example, by applying the ancient notion that “nothing under the sky is but the king’s land, and nothing in the land is but the king’s subject” to our foreign relations today. China today cannot ignore the changes in the international order, and if it wants to become a member of the international order, it cannot ignore the rules of international law and international organizations by emphasizing its own unique civilizational experience or by stressing that it is not the author of the existing international order and the rules of international law.

3 The “Chinese School” in International Relations Theory: The Introduction of a New Perspective and a New Paradigm The issue of how to create a “Chinese school” of international relations theory (another term for it is “international relations theory with Chinese characteristics”) has been discussed in Chinese academia for many years. It is not unreasonable that the constructivist and civilizational schools, which emphasize social and cultural factors, have received attention in the field of Chinese international relations studies over the years because the realist and liberal schools have made the hard core of theory very hard and precise, and there is no more room for them to play, while the constructivist and civilizational schools emphasize “soft” aspects such as culture and concepts. The constructivist and civilizational schools, with their emphasis on the “soft” aspects of culture and concepts, seem to offer more room for enhancing the experience of non-Western civilizations, including China. It should be said that the constructivist school pays attention to the civilizational side of the state, but from the disciplinary background, both the constructivist school and the civilizational school are in the same lineage with realism and liberal theory, with the same basic assumptions and the same discourse system, but with different emphases on different aspects. Without the introduction of new disciplines, new perspectives, and new conceptual tools, the limitations of existing international relations theories cannot be overcome, and any discussion of new schools of thought will be reduced to empty talk. When we change the assumption of actors in mainstream international relations theory from “individual” to “Human Constant” (Jen) and the assumption of actors’ motivation from “interest satisfaction” to “psychosocial homeostasis”, it fundamentally shakes the foundation of modern mainstream international relations theory and

62

3 People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations

opens up a wider discourse space. This fundamentally shakes the foundation of modern mainstream international relations theory and opens up a broader discursive space. The new discourse space is like a computer operating platform that can run different systems, on which all kinds of human games in Human Constants can be run, without the need to review the rules of the game of “tug of war” in the “chair grabbing” game system. Using such a new operating platform, we can gain new insights in at least the following aspects. First, when the theoretical definition of state actors is relaxed and the concepts of human existence and the psychosocial homeostasis model are considered important factors of state actors, the limitations of the current mainstream international relations theory, which mainly analyzes states, become clearer. The validity of the existing mainstream international relations theory is conditioned by the fact that the actors it analyzes are based on the “individual” as the Human Constant specific to Western society. Among the important human constituents that we know about, the “individual” is the one in which the individual has the most difficulty gaining security, and in this way, the individual is made the most “refreshing”, free from dependence on others and gaining the greatest degree of freedom. This way, the individual is the most “refreshing”, and the individual is free from dependence on others to the greatest extent possible and gains the greatest degree of freedom. The lack of security of state actors on top of this Human Constant has the same psychological and cultural basis as the anxious and uneasy inner world of individuals in this state, and it is not inappropriate to consider the former as a group external projection of the latter. In this way, we can understand the deep psycho-cultural reasons for the so-called Hobbesian fear in modern international relations. Realist theory tells us that conflicts and wars between states arise from the human nature of the pursuit of interests and power, and the basic logic of this view is that human nature is evil, so there is national evil, and national evil leads to conflicts between states. Important concepts in the existing classical theories of international relations, such as “anarchy”, “structure”, “power”, “interests”, “sovereignty”, “war”, “sovereignty”, “national foreign policy”, “strategy and security”, can be said to be based on the basic judgment of “human evil”. The basic judgment of “human evil” is based on the experience of individual society. Along this line of thought, we can further analyze such questions as the Human Constant of Western society—the “individual”—and the question of the origin of the modern international order, the American The Human Constant and its influence on the pattern of American diplomacy. The relationship between slavery, freedom, and the Human Constant of Western society, the relationship between the Human Constant of Americans and the soft power of the United States—the concepts of “human rights”, “freedom”, and “equality”—can also be discussed. The relationship between slavery, freedom, and the Human Constant of Western society, the Human Constant of Americans and the soft power of the United States—“human rights”, “freedom”, and “equality”—can be explored. When we look at the existing international order in relative terms, it undermines both the cult of power in the realist explanatory system of international relations theory and the liberal view that universal, secular liberal norms are superior to other norms. It can explain the phenomenon of collective identities that transcend states, such as the one

3 The “Chinese School” in International Relations Theory: The …

63

that arose in Europe, and it also reserves theoretical space for countries with similar civilizational backgrounds, such as those in Asia, to generate the same collective identities. Second, grasping state actors from both the organizational and civilizational sides can make the proposition proposed by Huntington doctrinally supported and easily operationalized. Since civilizational experiences are mainly recorded in civilizational entities, emphasizing the civilizational side of state actors is significant for understanding the behavior of emerging state actors with long civilizational traditions, such as China and India. As mentioned earlier, China and India are not “nation-states” in the modern sense, and their behavior cannot be explained solely from the perspective of nation-states. Under the existing international order, they have either voluntarily or by force internalized the principles of state behavior that originated in Western societies, but not so completely and thoroughly, and their behavior still follows its own logic, with its own unique civilizational experience and unique understanding of the international order. Just as it is impossible to squeeze the connotation of the Jen of the Chinese into the concept of the “individual”, it is impossible (and unnecessary) to squeeze the connotation of the Chinese civilized body into the narrow framework of the nation-state (i.e., the organizational entity) because this “distance” from the modern nation-state may be the space for China to make a new contribution to the international order based on its unique civilizational experience. If theory cannot explain reality, it must be theory, not reality, that is wrong. From this perspective, we can also propose new interpretations of the following questions: What is the relationship between the Human Constant of the Chinese people and the state form? The Human Constant of Chinese people and the international order—the principle of the “world system” and its psycho-cultural basis, the psycho-cultural basis of the concept of “harmony”. This provides a space for improving the Chinese civilizational experience. Of course, this perspective can also try to explain the behavior of non-Western countries other than China. Third, when we consider the side of civilization and thus expand the definition of state actors, the concept of “state” is, to some extent, a return to the concept of “nation” in the traditional Chinese context. The returned concept of state includes both relations between states (independent “nation-states”) in the context of modern international relations and relations between different organizations under the same civilization (e.g., between the “Five Hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Period” in Chinese history, between Wei, Shu, and Wu in the Three Kingdoms era) and between today’s states. The relationship between the “Five Hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Period” in Chinese history, between Wei, Shu, and Wu in the Three Kingdoms era, and between mainland China and Taiwan today. On the question of a Chinese school of international relations, I have always held the view that instead of shouting about the establishment of a school, we should first consider some questions: What are the limitations of existing international relations theories in addressing the problems facing the rise of China? What new perspectives and conceptual tools can be introduced to overcome these limitations to enhance the Chinese civilizational experience in a scholarly manner? A theory of international relations that introduces the main conceptual tools and methods of

64

3 People (Jen), States, and Interstate Relations

psycho-culturology may become less “scientific” and may be more difficult to draw concise and elegant conclusions, but it may be closer to the facts and better able to explain the realities of China. If Chinese scholars adopt different conceptual tools and explain many specific issues from new perspectives with careful thought and sufficient doctrinal support, then it is only natural to call it the “Chinese school”. Of course, this may take several generations.

References Harrison, Lawrence E., and Samuel P. Huntington (ed.). 1997. Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. Chinese Version, Xinhua Press, 2010. Hirano, Kenichiro. 2011. International Cultural Theory (Guoji Wenhuaron). Translated by Zhang Qixiong and others. Beijing: China Encyclopedia Press. Hsu, F.L.K. 1971. The Challenge of the American Dream: The Chinese in the United States (Chinese vorsion, The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K, Xu Langguang Zhuzuoji, vol. 7), Tai Bei, Nantian Shuju. Hsu, F.L.K. The myth of Chinese expansionism. Journal of Asian and African Studies XIII (2–4). Huipeng, Shang. 2013. Essentials of Psycho-Culturology: Theory and Method for Large-Scale Comparative Studies of Literate Civilizations (xin li wenhua xue yaoyi: da guimo wenming shehui bijiao yanjiu de liun yu fangfa). Press of Pekeng University. Huntington, Samuel Phillips. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World. Simon & Schuster. Jacques, Martin. 2010. When China Rules the World: The Rise of China and the Decline of the Western World. CITIC Press. Katzenstein, Peter (ed.). 2012. Civilization in World Politics: A Pluralistic and Multidimensional Perspective. Translated by Qin Yazheng et al. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Kumon, Sunpei. 1994. Theory of Information Civilization (Jyoho Bunmeiron). NTT Publishing Corporation. Morgenthau, Hans. 2007. Interstate Politics: Power Struggles and Peace. Peking University Press. Wang, Mingming. 2008. China: National body or civilized body? Wenhua Zhonheng (Culture Vertical) (12).

Chapter 4

From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining the Ontology of International Relations in the Era of Strong World Connections

1 Introduction In a paper published in 2016, Justin Rosenberg, a professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom, made a somewhat surprising judgment about International Relations: International Relations has been bound to a “political science cage” and has failed to address the ontological singularity (Rosenberg 2016, pp. 127–153). International Relations has been around for a hundred years, since 1919, when the first Chair of International Relations was established at the University of Wales in England. It may sound unbelievable that a discipline that has been born for a whole century has not solved the problem of ontology, but on reflection, one has to admit that this is basically true. As a response to Rosenberg’s question, I intend to re-examine the three levels of the ontology of the schools of international relations theory—units, relations and systems—and try to propose a new ontological foundation for international relations and test it against the realities of the era of strong linkages in the world. It is important to note that ontology in the philosophical sense is the theory of the ultimate nature of all reality, which includes both “reality” and “nature”. In the field of international relations studies, “ontology” is a theory of the ultimate nature of all realities. In the field of international relations research, “reality” refers to the “object of study” of international relations, while “ontology” is a generalization of the essence of the object of study. The research object of international relations can be divided into three levels: unit (international actors), structure (relations between international actors), and system (international system), and the different levels reflect the position of different research objects. It is in this sense that Rosenberg raises the issue of the ontological singularity of international relations, and the author uses the concept of ontology in this sense as well. It should also be noted that the object of study in the ontological sense of international relations is not exactly the same as the three levels—individual, state, and system—in the hierarchical analysis of international relations proposed by Kenneth N. Waltz and other scholars. In the hierarchical analysis, the relationship between international actors is not considered © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_4

65

66

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

a separate level of analysis but belongs to the category of “structure” in Waltz’s theory. In fact, I believe that the third level of the hierarchical analysis, the system, can be subdivided into two levels: international relations and the world system. The ontological concept used by the author considers individuals and states as a unitary level, relations between actors as a separate level, and the world system composed of these relations as a systemic level.

2 The Ontological Foundations of the Schools of International Relations Theory Neorealism (also known as structural realism), neoliberalism, and constructivism are the three major schools of mainstream international relations theory, among which the neorealist theory proposed by Waltz is the most influential. This theory is based on the famous “anarchy hypothesis”. Since there is no authority over independent states to guarantee national security, it derives two basic features of international relations: first, state actors must maintain security on their own, and the international system is a self-help system; second, states pursue power politics, and competition and conflict between states is the norm (Waltz 2003). This assumption has been so influential that it has been called the “Rosetta Stone” of the State Gate theory (Baldwin 2001, p. 4). The neorealist assumption of anarchy is simple and beautiful but ontologically seriously flawed. Waltz, influenced by the trend of the “behaviorist scientific revolution”, defines “a system as a series of interacting units, which at one level contains a structure” and “at another level contains interacting at another level, a system contains interacting units” (Waltz 2003, p. 42). Waltz argues that in international politics, the behavior of actors varies with the structure, which is a set of constraints in the system and is the cause of the functioning of the units in the system, which can determine the shape of the units and ultimately cause them to function in a way that produces results of the same nature. This assumption, like almost all social science theories influenced by behavioral science, shares a common flaw, namely the oversimplification of the object of knowledge in the deliberate pursuit of the simplicity of classical natural science, in the hope of transforming the world into a few simple rules. Ontologically, the anarchic assumption of neorealism is based on an oversimplified ontological foundation: at the unitary level, the basic units that constitute the structure of the international system are reduced to individual, political units that follow the principle of rational choice—“nation-states”, and these state actors resemble isolated blobs on a tabletop, with the blob connecting only under the action of external forces. At the relational level, international relations are reduced to a power relationship, and international politics is an extension of domestic politics without central authority. At the systemic level, the “structure” (or system) constituted by state actors is closer to a simple physical system, and the relationship between structure and function is reduced to a linear relationship.

2 The Ontological Foundations of the Schools of International Relations …

67

Neoliberalism, represented by Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, among others, has focused its criticism of neorealism on the following points: first, although international society is in a state of anarchy, actors are interdependent, and rational states are not necessarily in conflict with each other; second, neoliberalism recognizes the important role played by nation-states but also values the role of nonstate actors, supranational and transnational organizations at the international level; third, the international system is the most important feature of the international system (Keohane 2002). The reason why states may still exhibit different behaviors and behavioral orientations when the structure of the international system remains unchanged is that there are differences in the degree of institutionalization of different international systems. The connotation of international actors recognized by neoliberalism has been expanded compared to neorealism, but it does not touch the ontological basis of the latter. At the unitary level, neoliberalism still takes the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis, and at the systemic level, it still takes the anarchic assumptions of realism as its basic premise, only adding the importance of interstate cooperation, institutions and rules at the relational level. Thus, Waltz comments, neoliberalism “has neorealism at the core of its theory, and they have merely tried to extend it” (Waltz 2003, p. 18). Among the various theoretical schools of critical neorealism, constructivism, represented by Alexander Wendt, has been the most influential (Qin 2001, pp. 135– 145; Liu 1998, pp. 26–30; Yuan 2003, pp. 36–44). According to Wendt, “Anarchy…… itself has no logic at all to speak of; everything depends on the structure of ideas shared between states. Anarchy is created by the state” (Wendt 2000, p. 41), “Self-help and power politics arise as a result of the interactive processes and practical activities of the members of the international system and have no direct causal relationship with anarchy” and “are the product of interstate interaction” (Qin 2001, pp. 135–145). Constructivism does not deny the neorealist assumption of anarchy but simply says that anarchy is created by the state and is constructed by actors in the social practice of interaction. The assertion that “anarchy is a conceptual structure” has three implications: first, anarchy does not exist objectively but is constructed, which suggests that it is inherently changeable; second, anarchy is a conceptual rather than a material structure; and third, there are multiple paths and ways in which states interact, so anarchy has multiple logics. Third, there are multiple paths and ways in which states interact, so there are multiple logics of anarchy. The Hobbesian anarchic logic of “every man against every man’s war” is only one of them, and there are also “Lockean states” and “Kantian states” (Wendt 2000, pp. 313–383). The constructivist questioning of the “structure” of neorealism could have touched the single ontological foundation that underpins the assumption of anarchy, but instead of following this line of analysis, Wendt jumps from the material structure of neorealism to the elusive “conceptual structure. Instead, he jumps from the material structure of neorealism to the elusive “conceptual structure” and falls into a relativistic interpretation (Wendt 2015). Academics generally see constructivism as a sign of a “return to sociology” in the study of international relations (Yuan 2005). However, this is not the right view. Wendt does not offer a more sociological explanation of international relations, and when he deconstructs the concept of

68

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

“structure” in terms of “ideas” that originated from social analysis, it is not so much a “sociological return” as a departure from the concept of “structure. It is more of a departure from sociology. Constructivism is only a revision based on the recognition of a single ontology of neorealism. Because of the flexibility of the constructivist “concept”, it has been welcomed by many scholars of international relations who are dissatisfied with the existing concept of international politics. They have shoved elements outside politics (including philosophical concepts, visions of the good, and other factors that lack the support of scientific methods) into the constructivist framework, thus making the various “constructivist” theories that attempt to follow this path to remedy the shortcomings of neorealism more or less ambiguous and arbitrary (Qin Yaqing proposes a “relational theory” of international politics, which he calls a “process constructivist” theory. See Chap. 1, Sect. 4 of this book). Thus, the three major schools of mainstream international relations theory all share the same ontological basis; they all take the nation-state as the basic unit of international relations, confine interstate relations to political relations, and understand the international system as a domestic political system that lacks central authority. Therefore, it may not be inappropriate to regard the three major schools of mainstream international relations theory as three branches under one paradigm. If we accept Rosenberg’s “political science cage”, neoliberalism and constructivism’s criticism of neorealism are just some repairs to this “cage”. The emergence of complexity sciences in the 1980s marked a new stage in the development of systems science. A complex system is a nonlinear system consisting of an adaptive subject that acts based on local information and multiple interdependent and synergistic subsystems, characterized by emergent properties and coevolution. Since then, some researchers have criticized the shortcomings of neorealism as too simplistic and argued that the study of international relations should draw on the results of complexity science. Robert Jervis, an American scholar, published his book Systemic Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life in 1997, which is considered to be a sign that complexity studies truly entered the field of international relations (Jervis 1997). Some Chinese researchers believe that international relations research based on complexity science should replace the traditional “stable, equilibrium, linear model” with a “nonlinear, self-organizing, emergent model” (Liu 2011, pp. 1–2). From this perspective, the basic unit of international relations cannot be reduced to a single state actor. The actors are not material but biological “adaptive subjects”, and the relations between states are not simply linear power relations but multidimensional and nonlinear ones. The international system is a complex system composed of a plurality of actors. Theoretically, it is impossible to predict a complex system because any small change within the system can cause a complex set of effects (the so-called butterfly effect), and it is impossible to know when qualitative changes will occur in an “emergent” manner. However, this criticism is also problematic: complexity science itself was only developed at the end of the twentieth century and is basically a philosophical discourse that does not give a clear idea of how to replace the “stable, equilibrium, linear model” of traditional international relations research with a “nonlinear, self-organizing, emergent model”. It does not give a clear answer on how to replace the “stable, equilibrium, linear model” of traditional international

2 The Ontological Foundations of the Schools of International Relations …

69

relations studies with a “nonlinear, self-organizing, emergent model”. The neorealist “system of international relations” has undergone a double simplification, one in the methodological sense, that is, reducing the complex system to a simple system of linear causality, and the other in the ontological sense, that is, reducing the complex international relations to political power relations. The criticism from the path of complex science only addresses methodological issues and does not touch on its ontological defects. Beyond the three mainstream theories of international relations, there are researchers who view international relations exclusively from a civilizational perspective. Samuel Huntington, known for his theory of the clash of civilizations, is a representative scholar in this regard. He argued that after the Cold War, the clash of ideologies would no longer be important and that international conflicts would occur between what he classified as the eight major civilizations of the world. Huntington’s view has been widely influenced by the subsequent events of the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States (Huntington 2002). In fact, Huntington’s contribution was not that his cautionary tale was corroborated by subsequent terrorist activities around the world but that he introduced a civilizational element that was both completely ignored by mainstream international relations theory and obscured by the Cold War. However, Huntington’s concept of civilization is large and ambiguous, and his view of the relationship between civilizations is too simplistic. After all, international relations are not only intercivilizational, and conflicts of international significance now and in the future will continue to take place between state actors with certain civilizational backgrounds, not between civilizations with blurred borders. Another important representative of the civilizational perspective on international relations is Peter Katzenstein. He criticizes the monistic view of civilization and tries to give international relations a “pluralistic and multidimensional” ontological basis (Katzenstein 2009). In contrast to Huntington, Katzenstein’s view of civilizational relations is that “intercivilizational contact and cross-civilizational convergence are the mainstream, while the clash of civilizations is an occasional tributary” (Katzenstein 2010, pp. 14–17). Both scholars have tried to introduce civilizational factors into international relations, but neither has addressed the issue of the relationship between civilization and the state. Ontologically, it seems that in them, the basic unit constituting international relations is not the state but civilization. Interstate relations become intercivilizational relations. Therefore, they deal less with the ontology of international relations than with the ontology of civilizational relations. The school of thought represented by Robert Gilpin and Paul Kennedy, among others, emphasizes the importance of economic factors, arguing that the driving force of change in international relations ultimately lies in changes in the economic and technological levels of nations. Gilpin argues that in a state of international anarchy, there is an endless struggle between states for power and wealth (Gilpin 2006). This perspective argues that the pursuit of economic interests in the arena of international relations is the most important goal for any state and that a state’s economic power largely determines its position in the international structure. Ontologically, the perspective does not fully overcome the narrowness of realist ontology. Although this

70

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

school of thought often draws parallels between politics and economics, it largely replaces the power relations of political realism with economic ones because it regards economic factors as the ultimate causes, and in this sense, it may not be wrong to call it “economic realism”. In terms of methodology, this perspective also has obvious linear causal analysis. In particular, in Kennedy’s analytical framework, everything else will emerge naturally as soon as the economy develops, and the state seems to be a mechanical thing governed by a predetermined process of economic development (Kennedy 1989). To varying degrees, this approach overlooks the fact that the “international” is a field of human activity and that it is human beings who make up the state, and it is the actions of human beings with different purposes that lead to the actions of the state. The aforementioned Rosenberg also belongs to scholars who study international relations from the perspective of political economy, but unlike other scholars, he takes into account civilization-related factors such as “cultural phenomena” and “knowledge production” and tries to place the study of international relations on a broader ontological basis. He attempts to place the study of international relations on a broader ontological basis. He emphasizes that the “international” is a system of relations that is pluralistic, diverse, interactive, and integrally developed and that the discipline of international relations should try to understand not only what happens in international politics but also the meaning of social diversity for the social world as a whole. Rosenberg points out that for a long time, “international relations has never been an independent professional field, but has emerged as an extension of political science or political science, trapped in a borrowed ontology”, calling it “the prison of political science” (Justin 2017, pp. 4–21). Therefore, he advocates that International Relations should be freed from the “prison of political science” and be truly analyzed in a sociological sense. Rosenberg applied the theory of “unbalanced and integrated development” of Russian Marxist Lev Trotsky (Lev Davidoviq TpockiN) to the analysis of international relations, trying to overcome the shortcomings of the study of the separation of domestic and international phenomena. Taking the political and economic development of Germany and Europe before World War I as an example, he analyzed how the imbalance in development led Germany to war. Rosenberg rightly points out that modern international relations is based on a single ontology rather than on the “presupposition of diversity and interaction. He defines the “international” in sociological terms as “a Dimension of social reality generated from multiple coexisting societies”. “The international is something much larger than political science, or even a branch of political economy. Undoubtedly, it does include the geopolitical sphere and interdependence that are the focus of realist and liberal theory. However, it equally encompasses the meaning of social diversity, expressed in all the so-called ‘domestic’ aspects of social life: social structures, economic systems, knowledge production, cultural phenomena, and so on” (Rosenberg 2017, p. 14). Fundamentally, however, Rosenberg adopts the perspective and approach of political economy, where “imbalance” and “integrated development” are both political economy concepts. His so-called imbalance is, in the end, an imbalance in economic development. He criticizes the ontology of neorealism as being too narrow, but his analysis only emphasizes economic development factors and external

3 From the Ontology of International Politics to the Ontology …

71

conditions more than neorealism, at least in the context of his analysis of pre-World War II Germany. Rosenberg convincingly articulates the legitimacy of constructing a new ontology of international relations, but he does not construct a clear ontological framework. In his case, social structures, economic systems, knowledge production, and cultural phenomena are simply listed together, lacking an internal logic that ties them together. “Cultural phenomenon” and “knowledge production” seem to be redundant parts in his view, and “pluralism” and “interaction” can also be used. The “unbalanced” and “integrated development” of economic development can be substituted.

3 From the Ontology of International Politics to the Ontology of International Relations A brief review of the lineage of international relations research shows that the criticism of the mainstream international relations theory represented by neorealism is mostly focused on methodological aspects, and its ontological singularity deficiency has not been fully discussed. It must be admitted that Rosenberg’s judgment that international relations has no unique ontological foundation of its own because it has been confined to political science for a long time is basically valid. This is why “international relations” is almost synonymous with “international politics” in the field of international relations today. The study of international relations should escape from the “political science cage” and seek a new ontological foundation. Although Rosenberg does not propose an ontological framework, he proposes an enlightening idea of exploring the nature and characteristics of “international” from the phenomenon of the “copresence of plural societies” (Rosenberg 2017, p. 12). Along this line of thought, I try to define the new ontological basis of international relations as “an evolutionary system of multidimensional human relations that takes into account the plurality of states in the civilizational sense as the main actors” and suggest moving from a single ontology of international politics to a more pluralistic and closer to the factual ontology of international relations. The new ontological basis of international relations can be discussed at three levels: unitary, relational, and systemic. First, at the unitary level, the state as a unit of international relations is not simply a unit of power but an adaptive actor with both civilizational and organizational dimensions. The new ontology still considers the state as the basic unit of international relations (although more nonstate actors have emerged in the era of strong world association), but here, the state is not simply a “nation-state” as a political unit but a state with both organizational and civilizational dimensions (see Fig. 1 in this book). The organizational entity includes the political and economic system and the form of the state, while the civilizational entity includes the value system and the “basic human state”. Among them, the “Human Constant” is similar to some “cultural genes” and constitutes the core of a culture. International relations are the relations between state actors with the attributes of civilizational and organizational entities.

72

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

Fig. 1 State actors and the three types of relations

Waltz’s political realism, which treats the “nation-state” as the basic unit of international relations, emphasizes only the organizational side of the state actor (in fact, what he calls the state not only freezes the civilizational side of the state but is not even an actor in the sense of a complete organization but is reduced to a unit of power). Huntington simplifies in the other direction: the state actor is reduced to an ambiguous “civilization” without considering its organizational side. As Katzenstein criticizes, in Huntington, “civilization is cohesive and consensus-based, solidified, and has the capacity to act as a state” (Katzenstein 2010, pp. 14–17). Civilizations seem to become “nation-states” in another sense, and the conflict between civilizations becomes a replica of international anarchy. Although Rosenberg is aware of the importance of the cultural attributes of the state and analyzes the phenomenon of cross-cultural transmission of some literary works, he lacks a suitable tool to consider culture as part of the state actor, i.e., he does not theorize culture. The actor in Rosenberg’s case is to a large extent just a political-economic unit. The author reveals that the state has two sides, the civilizational and the organizational, which helps to understand the nature of the “plurality” of the world. By “plurality”, I mean not only the diversity of states in terms of size, population, geography, political and military power, and degree of economic development but also diversity in the civilizational sense. This aspect of the civilizational entity is what gives international relations a different basis from the ontology of sociology, which is concerned with actors (individual persons, groups) belonging mostly to the same civilizational background, without considering the civilizational entity. An important feature of the “international” is the lack of central governmental authority among actors in the organizational sense, as well as the lack of common values and norms of behavior in the civilizational sense, which is largely responsible for the former. The reason why mainstream international relations theory ignores the civilizational attributes of states may be that the modern international system originated

3 From the Ontology of International Politics to the Ontology …

73

in Western societies and is based on Western “civilized” states, while non-Western states are treated differently as “barbaric” states, depending on their degree of colonial subordination. They were not considered to be part of the international community. Thus, the nation-states that make up the Western system are in the same civilizational context (i.e., Western civilization) and have the same civilizational basis, so the civilizational aspect of the state can be ignored. Such interstate relations without regard to civilizational variables theoretically become the relations between estate A and estate B, between village Zhang and village Li, and international relations become an extension of domestic politics. As the international system evolves, countries from different civilizational backgrounds become involved in the international system, and the “core-periphery” structure of the system is broken. A new feature of today’s world is the rapid development of large and civilizationally diverse countries such as China, India and Russia, whose deep cooperation is driving the restructuring of the international landscape. It is difficult to fit countries such as China and India into the narrow concept of a “nation-state” in the modern sense. Some scholars rightly complain that there is no place for non-Western societies in the framework of mainstream international relations theory (Acharya and Buzan 2007, pp. 287–312; Acharya 2015, pp. 10–15). The tendency in recent years to explore non-Western theories of international relations in academic circles and the discussion of the establishment of a “Chinese school” in a less rigorous sense in the Chinese international relations research community at (Guo 2017, p. 11; Rosenberg 2017, p. 11) can be seen as a dissatisfaction with the systematic neglect of non-Western civilizational societies. Complementing the civilizational side of the state can provide ontological support for the inclusion of non-Western civilizational societies. On this point, I agree with Rosenberg’s judgment that “ultimately it is diversity, not politics, that provides the most profound code of international existence as a feature of human existence” (Rosenberg 2017, p. 11). However, the “diversity” here is not only the diversity of political systems or stages of economic development but should be understood as the diversity of states as international actors in the civilizational sense. The state that considers both the organizational and civilizational sides is not so much a self-help body in terms of political power as it is an adaptive actor capable of selection and variation in response to external pressures. The behavior of nonWestern states with unique civilizational backgrounds such as China can thus be better explained. Rosenberg analyzes China’s economic success in terms of developmental imbalances, arguing that China has used the “privilege of historical backwardness” to create a “capitalism” run by a more rapid industrialization and communist state “by far the most paradoxical synthesis” (Rosenberg 2017, p. 19). However, to the author, his description seems more appropriate to illustrate China as a complex actor with adaptive characteristics. It is true that China has partially embraced foreign values under external pressure, absorbed technologies and institutions from the West, and aligned itself with the modern international system. However, this change took place in the context of its own civilizational attributes, its particular political system and political culture, its “grand unified” form of state with its “service state” character, its family, and its interpersonal patterns, all of which have contributed to the “paradoxical” nature of China that Rosenberg claims is difficult to understand. The

74

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

“paradoxical synthesis” that Rosenberg calls incomprehensible in China is the reason for this. Sometimes this civilizational property even manifests itself in surprising “historical cycles”. China’s changes and behavior in the world today cannot be understood in isolation from its unique civilizational personality. Second, from the level of relations, interstate relations are not purely political but a complex network of relations consisting of multidimensional human activities. After overcoming the homogeneity of international relations units, it is necessary to overcome the homogeneity of relations between them. Interstate relations belong to the category of “structure” in Waltz’s system theory, and he understands interstate relations as a pattern of power distribution among the major powers. In fact, interstate relations should be understood as an independent level of international relations, not only as political relations but also as economic and cultural relations. Interstate relations are multidimensional. “International” is a field of human evolution in which human beings carry out three main types of activities: political, economic and cultural activities, with the state as the main unit, which has both organizational and civilizational sides. These three types of activities can be considered three “games”, namely the game of power, the game of wealth, and the game of mind (Kumon 1994, p. 215). “International” is the arena where the three games are played. These three games are played by different means: the game of power relies on power, mainly in the form of war, conquest, and coercion; the game of wealth relies on exchange, mainly in the form of various trade activities; and the game of mind relies on persuasion and induction, mainly in the form of the proliferation of ideas and the spread of religion. These three games correspond to political, economic, and cultural relations, and international relations are a network system of these three types of relations (the relationship between state actors A and B and the three games is shown in Fig. 1). The neorealists reduce interstate relations to power relations, so that there are only power games between states and only political relations between states. In fact, in a complex network system, the relationship between actors is a “flow of resources” including politics, economy, culture, etc. This kind of complex, multidimensional, and resource flow relationship between actors is the real international relationship. Considering that states have both civilizational and organizational sides, there are four theoretical types of interstate relations: first, both organizational and civilizational bodies are the same or similar; second, both organizational and civilizational bodies are different; third, organizational entities are the same or similar, but civilizational bodies are different; and fourth, organizational entities are different, but civilizational bodies are the same or similar. Importantly, all four types of relationships may or may not be in conflict. The conflict between countries with the same civilization is not necessarily absent, and the fierce confrontation on the Korean Peninsula once occurred between countries with the same civilizational nature. Even countries with the same civilization and the same organization are not necessarily less hostile to each other than countries with different civilizations and different organizations, such as the two World Wars that occurred between countries with the same civilization and organization. However, there is also some evidence that some clusters (such as the European Union, a regional cooperation organization) have less conflict and more successful cooperation among their members because

3 From the Ontology of International Politics to the Ontology …

75

they share a common or similar civilizational and value base. Other clusters (such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) do not cooperate as much because they lack a common or similar civilizational and value base. Third, from the systemic level, the international system is not a simple system but a complex evolutionary system in which multiple social copresentations of human beings occur in the international arena. Although the structural realists represented by Waltz also claim to grasp the international system with a systemic approach, their system is close to a simple physical system in the context of taking simple, isolated states as the basic unit and reducing the relationship between states to power relations. However, the international system is a complex system. The characteristics of the complex system of the international system are manifested in the fact that the international system, which is composed of multidimensional relationships between multidimensional and complex actors, is a complex network structure. The international system is not a social group and lacks the clear boundaries and internal order that social groups have; it is not a hierarchical organization, and there is generally no authority for dispute resolution; it is also different from the general social structure in that it lacks a common culture and behavioral norms, and there is no central government; it is also different from the market in that the relationships among actors are more durable than trade relationships. The structure of the international system is closer to the social network theory definition of network structure as a “durable pattern of relations” consisting of a limited group or groups of actors and the network of relations that defines them, a complex network system of relations between civilized societies. We need to see international relations as a network structure of relations, as a web rather than a pile of sand. This means that the basic assumptions and approaches of social network theory may be used to overcome the problem of the homogeneity of the neorealist ontology of international relations (Scott 2007). Social network theory arose around the 1960s and 1970s, developed a new set of analytical paradigms and theories in the 1970s and 1980s, and started to be used in the field of international relations research after the 1990s (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009, pp. 559–592). However, the current application of social network theory in international relations research is mainly focused on specific issues such as dispute resolution, nontraditional security, global governance, international trade, and global climate change or applied to test mainstream state relations theory (Chen and Liu 2009, p. 104) and does not fundamentally question the premise assumptions of mainstream international relations theory. According to the theory, in a complex system of relational networks, system functions act through multiple sets of relationships and multiple subsystems, the network of relationships acts to diminish, enhance, substitute, and transform the functions of the system, and the structure and functions are not symmetrical. The causal relationships in the system are nonlinear, and any small change in the system may lead to unexpected consequences. It is theoretically impossible to predict the events occurring in the system. The complex system of the international system is also characterized by the fact that a system composed of adaptive actors capable of making choices and mutations

76

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

under external pressures is not a complete self-help system but a bioevolutionary system with coevolutionary functions. International is the field of evolution of actors, whether it is conquest and subjugation at the level of organization or conflict and integration at the level of civilization, and it should be understood as an evolutionary process of human society. All neorealists are opposed to the evolutionary view, and in their eyes, the international system seems to have always remained the same (Tang 2017, p. 58). However, human beings have been playing these three games in the international “field”, and the international system has been gradually evolving to a higher stage. At different stages of evolution, the importance of the three types of games varies. The premodern international system was a territorial international system in which power games, mainly by means of force, played a major role. After the international system evolved to the stage of treaty system, the game of wealth with trading as the main means began to occupy an important position, and many invasion and conquest activities were for trade and competition for markets. The information revolution that emerged in the late twentieth century made human activities evolve in the international field with new characteristics, and the game of mind with persuasion and induction as the means began to be significantly involved in the international field. At this point, the three major games of human beings extended from the regional to the international field, and a truly international society emerged. What neorealism reveals from the perspective of power games is only a positive feedback mechanism that violates the laws of evolution: when countries become powerful, they pose a threat to other countries, and other countries have to develop more sophisticated weapons for their own security, thus causing an arms race. However, the modern international system is also evolving in terms of restraining war, such as respecting the will of the majority of a country, recognizing the inviolability of sovereignty, advocating the condemnation of aggression, and limiting brutal means of war, and the existence of common rules, which can be seen as the evolution of human beings in the international arena under the law of biological “symbiosis” to make the modern international system also follow the law of biological evolution (for a detailed discussion of the evolutionary character of the world system, see Chap. 10 of this book). According to Rosenberg, human interaction at the highest group level of the “international” system “will not end in a single form of authority, but will not simply diminish into a vacuum; rather, it will develop into a lateral field of coexisting societies, a coexisting field that provides the basis for each individual society to develop its own culture at the international level. This coexisting field adds a whole new level of social reality to each individual society outside the domestic structure” (Rosenberg 2017, p. 12). Considering the world system as an evolutionary system in which multiple societies coexist helps to understand the relationship between the modern international system and Western civilization, as well as the current issues of the integration of culture and modernity. Throughout history, mankind has had multiple forms of international systems linked to a particular civilizational experience. The modern international system evolved from Western civilization and bears a clear imprint on Western civilization. Western society emphasizes the independence of the individual

4 Testing the Ontology of International Relations in the Era of Strong …

77

and the nation-state, contractual relations between people in society and treaty relations between nation-states (see Chap. 9 of this book). There is a logical connection between the modern international system and the Western domestic democratic political system that limits the power of the state and guarantees the rights of the individual. In terms of modernity, the trend of interdependence among nations and globalization formed under the modern international system has impacted many premodern institutional designs and values, and some basic ideas of the system have gradually been accepted by most countries in the world as modern international rules. The modern democratic system associated with the system has also undergone widespread proliferation as a political system of modernity. According to Huntington’s book “The Third Wave—The Late 20th Century Democratization Wave”, the world has experienced three waves of democratization since the birth of modern democracy. The second wave occurred in 1943–1962, in the aftermath of World War II, and affected some 36 countries; the third wave began in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which affected 30 countries (Huntington 2002, p. 25). From the perspective of social evolution, the emergence of the modern international system is similar to a “genetic mutation” of human beings in the social organism of Western Europe, which has replaced other premodern international systems because of the “survival advantage” of the traits expressed in this system. This international system and its associated democratic political system have evolved into a common civilizational achievement of mankind, which has been “socialized” and accepted by the majority of international actors, so it is also a process of transformation of a premodern international actor into a modern state and the creation of a modern international society. It should be noted that this process is combined with the cultural traditions of the international actors themselves, and the “socialization” of the international system and its rules is also a process of self-adaptation of the international actors. The current trend of globalization, strongly driven by technology, is not only the strengthening of organizational ties but also the collision and integration of different civilizations. With the emergence of non-Western civilizations such as China, their civilizational experiences may be integrated into the international system, and a postmodern international system may not be impossible to evolve in the international arena in the future. On the issue of the evolution of plural civilizations, I agree with Kazenstein that the evolutionary activities of civilizations “constantly shape and reshape human behavioral and symbolic frontiers. In today’s world, these processes of practice converge to form a global civilization of modernity” (Katzenstein 2010, pp. 14–17).

4 Testing the Ontology of International Relations in the Era of Strong World Connections Forty years have passed since Waltz proposed neorealism, and the new technological revolution, with information technology at its core, has profoundly changed the world. An important feature of this change is that more human activities are

78

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

more deeply involved in the international arena. Three major types of human activities have formed three major types of networks, namely the network of interstate relations characterized by the proliferation of regional groups of countries and international organizations,1 the network of world trade characterized by the tremendous growth of trade and the frequent flow of capital and2 technology between countries, and the network of information characterized by the rapid and instantaneous flow of vast amounts of information between actors brought about by the Internet and mobile devices.3 These three networks bring the world closer together and form a multifaceted and deeply interactive network system. The development of a new generation of information technology and artificial intelligence, represented by 5G technology, will enable more actors and even objects to be connected in a more effective way, which will further strengthen the trend of strong connectivity in the world. Actors, whether actively or passively isolated from this environment, will pay the price of survival. Some new features of the era of strong world connectivity will support a re-examination of the ontology of international relations. First, in the era of strong world connectivity, the reality of multidimensional human activities being deeply involved in the international arena supports the view of international units as pluralistic and diverse adaptive actors at the unitary level. The depth of multilevel interactions among states highlights the fact that states are made up of people, and the need to understand them as pluralistic and diverse adaptive actors is even more important. This is actually based on the simple truth of social life: the more comprehensive and deep the interactions between people, the more important it is to grasp each other as a complex whole. If the interaction with a person is not deep (e.g., just business), it is not necessary (and not required) to consider the other person’s character, values, behavior, etc., but if there is a deep interaction with someone (e.g., marriage), these factors must be taken into account. The same is true for the international community. The more human activities that are involved in the international arena, the more complex the attributes of international actors need to be considered. In an era when human economic activities are more deeply involved in the international arena, the state as an international actor can no longer be considered a mere unit of power but should be understood as a unit of political economy. The international 1

According to the Yearbook of International Organizations, there were 200 first international organizations in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century, growing to more than 1000 in the 1950s, increasing to more than 8200 in the late 1970s, approximately 2 to about 27,000 in 1990, approximately 4 to about 8000 in 1998, and more than 58,000 at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As of 2016, there are more than 62,000 international organizations in the world. See http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/rdzt/gjzzrcfw/zygjzz/201604/t20160413_237 951.html, accessed May 28, 2019. 2 Total international trade, for example, was $59 billion in 1948, $579 billion in 1973, $3688 billion in 1993, and $1598.5 billion in 2015. In 67 years, it has increased by about $16 trillion. In the last 22 years, it has also grown nearly fivefold. See “World Trade Statistical Review 2016”. https:// www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2016_e/wts16_toc_e.htm. Accessed May 28, 2019. 3 In 2015, the number of global Internet users was 3.2 billion, the number of cell phone users reached 7.1 billion, and cell phone signals have covered more than 95% of the global population. See “2015 Internet survey report: 3.2 billion global Internet users, 7.1 billion cell phone users,” http://www. askci.com/news/chanye/2015/12/01/142515fck2.shtml, accessed May 28, 2019.

4 Testing the Ontology of International Relations in the Era of Strong …

79

system is not a mere power system but a political-economic system. In today’s era of strong connectivity driven by new technologies, all three types of human games are involved in the international arena, and international actors are more complex and diverse. For strongly connected international relations in the era of world networking as the main feature, not only the narrow ontological basis of the power of neorealism cannot be accommodated, even after considering the political-economic relations between countries (i.e., the relations between organizations) can no longer be fully recognized, it is also necessary to consider the cultural (i.e., the relations between civilizations) relations in the sense of values and ways of behavior, i.e., The deep interaction between countries brings about different problems of conflict and integration of civilizations (see Chapter 6 of this book). Current emerging countries such as China and India have been the core of a civilization and a regional international system; for example, China was the core of the civilization of the “world system” in East Asia in ancient times, and India was the core of the civilization of the international system in South Asia (see Chap. 17 of this book). It is difficult to understand the domestic changes and international behaviors of these non-Western civilizations, which have been forced, voluntary, or semi-voluntary into the modern international system in recent times, within the narrow framework of “nation-states” without considering their civilizational attributes. As the power of these states grows and the ties between them increase, they internalize the rules of the modern international system and at the same time integrate their unique civilizational experience into the international system, thus bringing the world into an era of pluralism in the true civilizational sense. Only by overcoming the narrowness and homogeneity of the ontology of international relations can there be room for discussing the experience of non-Western civilizations in the sense of civilizational evolution. In an era of strong connectivity, several key concepts that have underpinned traditional state theory—violence, war, territory, and power—have undergone fundamental changes, necessitating a reconceptualization of the state as a unit of international relations. For example, under the new technological revolution, violence and warfare may be intangible, and the physical territory, territorial waters, and airspace are no longer a barrier to foreign attack. The state has no way to control the production and use of invisible weapons, to prevent the formation of invisible violent organizations, and to define, control, and defend their digital borders. Therefore, the meaning of the state needs to be redefined (Wang 2019, pp. 93–100). In the era of strong global connectivity, not only has the connotation of international actors changed, but their extension has also expanded, i.e., international actors are no longer limited to states. Today, the United States has large multinational corporations such as Apple, Google, and Microsoft, whose wealth and influence on the world have surpassed those of many small- and medium-sized countries, in fact playing the role of international actors. In addition, international actors have a broader scope after human cultural activities have been deeply involved in the international arena. The popularity of a song or a movie can become a major international event, and the associated singer, movie star, or antagonist (e.g., terrorist leader bin Laden) can become an actor of international influence by having thousands of “fans”. In a highly networked international system, each unit can have a huge international impact against a backdrop

80

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

of strong network support. Although the basic unit of international relations is still the state with strong control, it no longer encompasses all international actors. At least in theory, those organizations and individuals who could not become actors in the international system in the era of weak linkages have the possibility to become international actors. People’s identification with the state in the era of strong world connection is also an issue worth discussing. What is certain is that the role of the nation-state in the traditional sense as the subject of the power game decreases due to the extensive movement of people, money, and information between countries. On the one hand, in a fully networked system, the independent role of actors existing as network nodes decreases and sometimes even becomes irrelevant. On the other hand, with the increase in interstate connections and cooperation, a series of new regional cooperation organizations such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union, and the League of Arab States have emerged in the world, and these organizations, which are “supranational” to varying degrees, are also a manifestation of the diversity of international actors. The era of strong world association supports our ontology of considering the state as the main actor of civilization and the “international” as a multidimensional field of human activities and a global system that carries human knowledge and practice. Second, in the era of strong world connectivity, the reality of widely connected state actors supports our grasp of international relations at the relational level as complex relationships consisting of multidimensional human activities. Convenient transportation such as highways, high-speed railroads, and supersonic aircraft have increased the international movement of people, developed communication technologies and facilities have made possible the instantaneous flow of huge amounts of information, and the development of commercial trade has made the system of division of labor truly worldwide, all of which have made the world a network system with strong connections and substantial interactions. In the era of weak connectivity, due to the underdevelopment of transportation and information, “foreign country” may be a concept that is only recognized when countries conquer or are conquered. In the era of strong linkage, however, the links between actors are multifaceted, and the boundaries between countries, domestic and foreign, become blurred due to the frequent and rapid flow of people, goods and information, and “international” becomes a field of substantive interaction between actors. In the ancient world, it may have taken decades or even centuries for people in other regions to learn about something that happened in one place by reading historical materials. Today, however, events in any place can be instantly transmitted around the world. The era of strong global connectivity has also led to an increased interplay of ideas, values and lifestyles, and never before have our thinking and behavior been so “internationally” influenced and potentially “internationally impacted” as they are today. This is the main reason why the proportion of mind games has increased, the proportion of power games has decreased, and the relationship between nations has become one of conflict and integration in the civilizational sense.

4 Testing the Ontology of International Relations in the Era of Strong …

81

In the era of weak connectivity, there were many “structural holes (meaning that some state actors were not substantially connected to each other)” in the “international” network system (The concept of “structural holes” was introduced by Burt in 1992). According to Burt, both individuals and organizations have two forms of social networks: first, any subject in the network is connected to other subjects, and there is no interruption in the relationship, which is a “hole-free” structure from the perspective of the whole network. This form exists only in small groups; the second is that one or some individuals in the social network only have direct contact with some individuals but not with others, and there is no direct contact or relationship interruption. The network as a whole appears to be a cave in the network structure, so it is called a “structural hole”, while as more human activities became involved in the international system, there were significantly fewer “structural holes” in the network of the world. As more human activities become involved in the international system, the number of “structural holes” in the world’s web becomes significantly smaller. Except for a few actively closed countries, the vast majority of countries are in a system of multidimensional networks of relations, with more significant interactions between countries and between foreign and domestic countries. In addition, the behavior and relationship patterns of actors in a strongly connected state also change. Common sense tells us that one of the reasons why societies need government is that the public needs to obtain public goods (such as law, order, public services) through organizations (including government) that they cannot obtain on their own. When actors are in a strongly connected network system, the system’s ability to “selforganize” increases, public goods become more accessible, and some functions of social organizations are weakened or replaced. The various “groups” on the Internet today are able to interact with each other as actors without the need for traditional market or social organizations but only through the Internet itself. To some extent, this also applies to the international community. A strongly connected networked system may make the world more “anarchic” (the anarchy of highly networked structures is more often reflected in the behavior of nonstate actors evading traditional authority control), while at the same time, as the functions of governments and organizations can be replaced by increased systemic self-organization, state actors are able to interact with each other in accordance with the “life and death” principle. At the same time, as the functions of governments and organizations can be replaced by increased systemic self-organization, the likelihood of state actors interacting according to the “law of the jungle” will decrease, and the likelihood of interstate interactions moving from “big moves” to complex “microcoordination” will increase. As a result, the likelihood of actors “helping each other” and “helping each other” increases. When public goods become more accessible and the likelihood of other assistance and mutual aid increases, the ways and means for states to ensure their existential security will increase, and state actors may become more optimistic about the likelihood of conflict. “Cyberspace brings multiple actors closer together, greatly enhancing the interdependence of the international system and alleviating the security dilemma in anarchy. Because cyberspace actors (especially state actors) are highly dependent on the facilitating effects of network technologies on economic

82

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

and social development and because these actors inhabit the same network system with blurred borders and relatively open access, this creates certain conditions for international actors to discipline their own behavior and further develop universally accepted rules” (Liu 2017, pp. 15–32). Strong evidence of this has emerged: after the end of the Cold War, the international system changed from a bipolar structure to a “one superpower, many powers” structure with US superhegemony, but there were no alliances in the world to resist US hegemony, as predicted by neorealist logic. An important reason for the increase in interstate ties without the emergence of antagonistic alliances may be that the sense of solidarity and security that comes with strong ties reduces actors’ uncertainty about a powerful force, which changes the perception of security by state actors. New perceptions include the declining significance of territory and resources and the importance of power relations, with markets, big data, and information storage and processing capabilities becoming important new resources; the fact that state survival and security are not necessarily achieved through power politics and that material power is difficult to sustain over time; and the fact that confrontation in the form of alliances is too costly. Of course, this is not to say that power games are no longer important, but only that the importance of power games by means of strength has decreased, and the importance of mind games by means of persuasion and induction has increased. Third, the trend of “communalization” in the era of strong world connectivity supports our systemic view of the international system as an evolutionary system in which multiple human societies coexist. Humanity has evolved civilizational achievements in the international arena that limit conflicts and wars, while the social nature of the world system has increased in the era of strong interactions among nations. The world, like families, villages, and other social organizations, has developed the need to regulate the behavior of actors with common norms of behavior and values, and there is a tendency to “communalize” the world (so-called globalization, community of destiny, global home, global village and other concepts are all descriptions of this feature). The author has noted that there are two senses of community and community consciousness in the world. One is the “security community” and its sense of community among the Western liberal capitalist powers that constitute the basic structure of the international system. These countries (especially developed industrialized countries) generally have an expectation of a low probability of war between countries with political systems that guarantee individual rights and check the power of the state, and this expectation serves as a check on interstate wars. Another type of community is a certain consensus among human beings in the face of common problems such as the environment, nuclear war, terrorism, drugs, cybercrime, etc., that may threaten the security of all humanity, creating an allegiance to a higher goal that transcends national political systems and transcends ideology. Although the latter sense of community does not have a solid institutional and value basis but only a vague sense or vision, it can still serve to promote human cooperation and reduce the probability of large-scale war (see Chap. 10 of this book). The tendency of “communalization” of the world also needs to be understood from the perspective of social evolution: it is the expression of the principle of biological symbiosis in the international arena, an adaptive response of human

5 Conclusion

83

beings in the face of the new environment of the world’s strongest connection, the recognition of the interests of human beings as a group, and the importance of human symbiosis. This trend supports our understanding of the international system as a civilizational evolutionary process in which “multiple societies coexist”, rather than as a system of power games or economic power struggles. Of course, the evolution of the international system is incomplete, uneven, and often repetitive, such as the recent “reverse globalization” phenomena of “Brexit” and the withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations and some world treaties, which are similar to the historical phenomenon of Western countries knocking on the doors of non-Western countries with commodities. It is a kind of rejection reaction when the environment changes. The current evolutionary environment of deep human interaction supported by new technologies is irreversible, so the trend of “communalization” of the world cannot be reversed. From the perspective of the current “trade war” between China and the United States, there are realists in both China and the United States who believe that this is evidence that China and the United States will fall into a “Thucydides trap” and the world will fall into a “new Cold War”. However, at the beginning of the trade frictions, I have judged the relationship between China and the international system from the perspective of the evolution of the international system as a synergistic evolutionary relationship.4 In the harsh competitive pressure of the “international” arena, China needs to gradually mutate through hard choices to adapt to the new environment, while the modern international system, dominated mainly by Western liberal capitalist countries, also needs to gradually accept a new individual with a large volume and a unique form of civilization and organization. The conclusion of the first phase of the U.S.–China trade agreement and other signs of a de-escalation in U.S.–China relations are consistent with this author’s judgment.

5 Conclusion In an era of strong world connectedness, a deeply pluralistic global international community is rapidly emerging, characterized by deep pluralism and the emergence of new centers of wealth, power and cultural authority. The world is once again becoming truly whole, not only in the sense of what is commonly understood as “globalization” but also in terms of a modernity that is constantly rooted in humanity. However, international relations, which has been bound by the “political science cage”, has not truly acquired an ontological foundation and therefore has not been able to respond to the demands of the times for the establishment of a global science of 4

The concept of “coevolution (coevolution)” was developed by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a 2014 conversation with former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, former German Ambassador to the U.S. Wolfgang Ischinger and economics professor Yasmin May Yi Fager in a conversation. He interpreted the phrase as “development with mutual proximity”. The conversation was published on the website of the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit on January 21 under the title “Arrogance toward China is wrong”. The Chinese version of the article can be found at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-01/4782327.html?agt=15438. Login on 2019-04-07.

84

4 From “International Politics” to “International Relations”: Examining …

international relations (Achaya and Buzan 2019, p. 25). If premodern international relations can be largely reduced to political relations, in the modern international system, where economic activities have become involved in the international arena, international relations have largely become political-economic relations. In the era of strong world connection, when all three types of human “games” are involved in the international arena, international relations have become much broader, deeper and more complex. We need a more globalized international relations science that can understand culture and modernity and reflect global integration, and broadening the ontological basis at the three levels of units, relations and systems is the first step in constructing this new international relations science. It should be noted that a broader ontological foundation does not mean that international relations has no boundaries; the study of how states interact with each other (conflict and peace issues are only one aspect of this) remains the main task of international relations, but this study takes into account more complex factors of actors, types of relationships, and the nature of interaction. This is both a need to adapt to the profoundly changed realities of the world and a return of world relations to explaining the complexity of human behavior. While this direction of inquiry will not lead to a theory as simple and elegant as neorealism, if the choice is between simplicity and beauty but far from reality and less simplicity and beauty but closer to reality, we should prefer the latter.

References Acharya, Amitav. 2015. Global International Relations and the Chinese School of International Relations Theory: Are the Two Compatible. Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics) 2. Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan. 2007. Why Is There No Non-Western IR Theory. International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7 (3). Achaya, Amita, and Barry Buzan. 2019. Toward a global international relations science: reflections on a century of the discipline of international relations. Translated by Zhang Failing. Chinese Social Science Evaluation, (Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Pingjia) 4. Baldwin, David. 2001. Neorealism and Neoliberalism. Translated by Xiao Huanrong. Zhejiang People’s Press. Chen, Chong, and Feng Liu. 2009. Social Network Analysis of International Relations. Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue (International Political Science) 4. Gilpin, Robert. 2006. The Political Economy of International Relations. Translated by Yang Yuguang et al. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Guo, Shuyong. 2017. The Growth of Chinese Consciousness and the Future of the Chinese School in the Construction of Chinese State-Gate Theory. Guoji Guancha (International Insight) 1. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. et al. 2009. Network Analysis for International Relations. International Organization 63 (3). Huipeng, Shang. 2013. People, Civilizations, and Interstate Relations. International Political Studies (Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu) 4. Huntington, Samuel. 2002. Clash of Civilizations and the Reconstruction of World Order. Chinese version, Xinhua Publishing House. Jervis, Robert. 1997. The Systemic Effect: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton University Press. Translated by Li Shaojun, Yang Shaohua and others. Shanghai People’s Publishing House.

References

85

Katzenstein, Peter (ed). 2009. Civilization in World Politics: A Pluralistic and multidimensional Perspective. London. Katzenstein, Peter. 2010. A World of Multiple and Plural Civilizations. Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 1: 2010. Kennedy, Paul. 1989. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Vintage. Keohane, Robert (ed). 2002. The New Realism and its Critique. Translated by Guo Shuyong. Peking University Press. Kumon, Sunpei. 1994. Theory of Information Civilization (Jyoho Bunmeiron). Tokyo: NTT Publishing Corporation. Liu, Yongtao. 1998. Western Neorealist Theory and Constructivist Criticism. World Economy and Politics (shijie jingji yu zhengzhi) 11. Liu, Hui. 2011. Studies in Complex Systems and World Politics (Fuza Xitong yu Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjium). Nanjing University Press. Liu, Yang-ye. 2017. Rethinking the Impact of Network Technologies on the Transformation of the International System. International Perspectives 4. Qin, Yaqing. 2001. The Anarchy of the International System—Reading Wendt’s . American Studies (Meiguo Yanjiu) 2. Rosenberg, Justin. 2016. International Relations in the Prison of Political Science. International Relations 30 (2): 2016. Rosenberg, Justin. 2017. International Relations in the Cage of Political Science. Collected Works of History (Shixue Jikan) 4. Scott, John. 2007. Social Network Analysis. Translated by Liu Jun. Chongqing University Press. Tang, Shiping. 2017. The Social Evolution of International Politics. Translated by Dong Jie Min and Zhu Ming. CITIC Press. Waltz, Kenneth. 2003. Translated by Xin Qiang. Shanghai Century Publishing Group, in Chapters 4 to 6. Wang, Shaoguang. 2019. The New Technological Revolution and the Theory of the State. Journal of the Central Socialist Academy 5: 2019. Wendt, Alexander, 2000. The Social Theory of International Politics. Translated by Yaqing Qin. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Wendt, Alexander. 2015. Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social ontology, 2015. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yuan, Zhengqing. 2003. A Constructivist Examination of Anarchy. Pacific Journal 2: 2003. Yuan, Zhengqing. 2005. The Sociological Turn in International Political Theory: A Study of Constructivism. Shanghai People’s Publishing House.

Part II

The Lun Jen (伦 伦人) and Their Outer World

What are the essential features of the Chinese civilizational experience? How do you see China’s behavior in the world today? What are the challenges that China faces in the world? These are the questions to be answered in this section. This part consists of five chapters, which are an analysis of the basic interpersonal state of the Chinese people and the behavior of the Chinese state using the core paradigms and methods of psycho-culturology. In Chap. 5, the author argues that the Human Constant of the Chinese people is the “Lun Jen”, which is characterized by an important role of kinship ties in interpersonal relationships, where individuals have a stable “life package” and people enter into relationships based on kinship principles. Life is divided into different circles, each with different rules. The Chinese civilizational experience is based on this Human Constant. The form of the state based on Lun Jen is a concentric circle structure based on close and distant relationships, with decreasing degrees of obligation, responsibility, and intimacy from the inside out and a variety of ways of ruling. The author refers to this model of state as the kinship-state. In this model, imperial power is based on the authority of the father in the family, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled is based on a pseudo father-son relationship, and the legitimacy of the state is based on family ethics. However, the central dynasty was unable to control the grassroots, and the people were apathetic to politics. Chapter 6 begins with the analysis of several schemas, analyzing the Human Constant of the Lun Jen in relation to the idea of the world system (called Tianxia in Chinese, and its name is the “tribute system”) and the international system of ancient East Asia, the “world system”. It is argued that, in contrast to the modern international system’s principle of “unit equality”, the ancient East Asian international system, with Chinese actors at its core, operated on the principle of “roles” based on family ethics, i.e., each actor was in a hierarchy and acted according to his or her role and expectations of each actor. This principle is “ritual” (Li). In contrast to the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures that exist in the Western international system, those that exist in the Chinese tributary system can be called “kin culture”, “acquaintance culture”, and “stranger culture”. On this basis, the characteristics and internalization of the world system are also discussed.

88

Part II: The Lun Jen (伦人) and Their Outer World

Chapter 7 analyzes the relationship between the characteristics of the Human Constant of Chinese people and the idea of “harmony”. The kinship group occupies a supreme position in psychosocial homeostasis, and because of the constant, automatic, and nontransferable nature of kinship group membership, individuals live in a highly stable, intimate circle where psychosocial homeostasis is easier to obtain. The associated psycho-cultural orientation is “anthropocentric”, and the cultural ideal is “complete harmony between people”. These characteristics are reflected not only in the daily behavior of Chinese people but also in the attitudes and behavior of Chinese actors toward the “Outside World”. By analyzing these characteristics, the author illustrates the psycho-cultural basis of the concept of “harmony” proposed in China today in both negative and positive senses. Chapter 8 discusses China’s progress and dilemmas in the current international system from the perspective of the combination of civilization and organization. China has joined the international system of nation-states, but it is not yet a nationstate in the full sense of the word; it also has the characteristics of a kinship-state. This chapter analyzes the main challenges that today’s China may encounter in its achievements from the perspective of combining civilization and organization: how to resolve the contradictions between the kinship-state model, which has lasted for thousands of years, and the modern nation-state system, how to combine China’s unique civilizational experience with universal international rules, how to deal with the rapidly increasing hard, how to deal with the contradiction between rapidly increasing hard power and weaker “soft power”, and how to deal with the contradiction between order and freedom. This chapter provides a psycho-cultural approach to the problems that China is currently encountering.

Chapter 5

Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

1 An Examination of Several Models Lun-Jen’s interpersonal relationship model As opposed to the Western individual, I use the term Lun Jen to refer to the Human Constant of the Chinese people, which is a subtype of the Contextual Jen. The interpersonal relationship pattern of the Lun Jen is a concentric circle structure (Mr. Fei Xiaotong’s “Differential Order Pattern” that starts from kinship and extends outward in circles, with “self” as the center). It can be divided into three circles from the inside out, namely the “circle of relatives”, “circle of acquaintances”, and “circle of strangers”. The closeness of the relationship between “oneself” and other individuals, as well as the intensity of responsibilities, rights and obligations associated with them, decreases outward. In this model of interpersonal relationships, different circles tend to apply different rules: the innermost “kin circle” is composed of close relatives, and the “kinship rule” applies, with constant and close relationships. The “circle of acquaintances” consists of acquaintances, friends, etc., and the “rules of human kindness” apply. The “circle of acquaintances” consists of acquaintances, friends, etc., where the “rules of human kindness” apply: they help each other and talk about “human kindness” and “face”; the “circle of strangers” consists of strangers who have neither. The “circle of strangers” consists of strangers who have neither “kinship” nor “favors”, and the “rules of fairness” apply, just like buying and selling things in Libreville, fair trade, bargaining, the transaction is completed, and no one owes anything (The results of Taiwan scholar Huang Guangguo’s research on Chinese interpersonal relationships are drawn upon here, Guangguo et al. 2005, pp. 49–66). Among these three circles, the “circle of relatives” is not convertible, such as no matter how close friends will not become “relatives”, brothers and sons will not become “acquaintances” even if they are at odds with each other or “strangers” (can become “enemies”). The “circle of acquaintances” and the “circle of strangers” can be interchanged: “strangers” can become “acquaintances” through interaction, and “acquaintances” can become “enemies”. The “acquaintance” can become “acquaintance” through interaction, while the “acquaintance” can become “acquaintance” © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_5

89

90 Fig. 1 Model 1: The Lun Jen’s interpersonal relationship model. Note The solid line between the circles of “relatives” and “acquaintances” indicates nonconvertible, while the dotted line between “acquaintances” and “strangers” indicates convertible. The dotted line between the “acquaintance” and “stranger” circles indicates convertibility

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

The Self

Acquaintances

strangers

when they turn against each other. If we represent this interpersonal state graphically, we can obtain a model (Fig. 1). According to our idea of introducing the concept of Human Constant into the study of International Relations, the interpersonal model affects the state model (which should belong to the interpersonal model) and affects the attitude and behavior of the state model (which should belong to layer 1 of the psychosocial homeostasis) and even toward the “Outer World” (layer 0 of the psychosocial homeostasis) form (at least in the traditional sense), and the main features of the ancient East Asian international order centered on this form can be explained in terms of the Lun Jen model of interpersonal relations. In fact, when we turn our analysis to the traditional Chinese state form and the world model “world”, we do find several interpersonal models that are highly consistent with and derived from the Lun Jen model of human relations that are highly consistent with and better explained by the latter. Examining these models in relation to each other, we were able to reveal the essential features of these models and their interconnections. This leads us to consider the need for a new perspective on the Chinese experience of human relations, the state, and even the world order. The kinship-state model described in Shang Shu-Yu Gong According to the literature, China had a well-developed idea of the national and world order as early as the Shang Dynasty, which is called the “Wufu (five suits) system”. It was a kind of world map centered on the emperor’s residence (kingship) and divided according to geographical distance and the concentration of “virtue”. The Zhou dynasty systematized and idealized the system of the Shang dynasty as

1 An Examination of Several Models

91

a guideline for the world because it established the idea of "no place under the sky is other than the king’s land" as the common master of the world. One of the five scriptures of Confucianism, the Shangshu-Yugong (尚书·-禹贡), contains the following statement: “The Five Hundred Li, was called dianfu (甸服), Within the first hundred li, tribute is collected in the form of taxes; within the second hundred li, tribute is collected in the form of tin; within the third hundred li, tribute is collected in the form of coarse cloth; within the fourth hundred li, tribute is collected in the form of millet; within the fifth hundred li, tribute is collected in the form of rice. The area five hundred Li beyond the Dianfu was called the houfu (侯服), Within the first hundred li, officials are appointed; within the second hundred li, local leaders are selected; within the third hundred li, feudal lords are established. The Five Hundred Li Peaceful System: Within the first three hundred li, emphasis is placed on education and cultural development; within the second two hundred li, efforts are focused on strengthening military defense. The area five hundred Li beyond the houfu was called the suifu (绥服), Within the first three hundred li, efforts are made to assimilate and civilize the barbarians; within the second two hundred li, the state of Cai is included. Five hundred Li beyond the suifu was called the yaofu (要服), Within the first three hundred li, efforts are made to subdue the savage tribes; within the second two hundred li, measures are taken to pacify the nomadic tribes. Five hundred miles beyond the yaofu was called the huangfu (荒服), within the three hundred Li is a barbaric area, and the remaining two hundred Li is also a place of exile for sinner” (Shang Shu: Yu Gong 尚书-禹贡). In fact, beyond the “huangfu”, there were also “foreign” (化外) or “extinct places” (绝域). If this account is represented graphically, it is shown in Mode 2 (see Fig. 2). The model of the Chinese tributary system in ancient China The “tribute system” was a hierarchical network of political order that existed mainly in ancient East Asia and was centered on the central Chinese regime. In this system, the Central Plains regime was central, and the tributary states recognized this status and paid homage to the central regime in some form or another on a regular or irregular basis, depending on their proximity to it. Takeshi Hamashita, a professor at Kyoto University in Japan, divides the proximity of the Chinese tributary system into six classes: central, local, tusi-tukoku, feudal, tribute, and mutual market. Model 3 is drawn according to the position of each country in the Chinese tributary system (see Fig. 3). It should be noted that if the “five suits” model (Model 2) largely reflects the national and international concepts centered on feudal China in ancient times, then this schema gives a model of the international order in East Asia that actually existed for more than two thousand years from the unification of the Qin and Han dynasties until the fall of the Qing dynasty. The Chinese tributary system is one of the main systems of international relations, along with the treaty system and the colonial system. “The prototype of the tribute system” can be regarded as the Kinship-State model, while its heyday was largely during the Ming Dynasty, which collapsed around the end of the nineteenth century. Of course, the system was chaotic and disorganized during the decline of the Chinese regime, and sometimes there were

92

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

huangfu yaofu

Wang Ji Dien waitin

suifu Appea Houfu To Dianfu desert WangJi

Fig. 2 Model 2: The Kinship-State model described in the Shangshu-Yugong

“subsystems” under the larger system (e.g., Japan vs. the Sulfur, Vietnam vs. some Southeast Asian countries), as China’s history varied from dynasty to dynasty and from relationship to neighboring countries and regions. By and large, however, the basic structure of the ancient East Asian order as depicted in this schema can be said to have remained largely unchanged for more than two thousand years. If we simplify this diagram slightly, we can obtain a concentric circle structure model similar to model 2: with the “central government” as the center, the “local”, “Tusi-Tuguan”, “feudal”, “tribute” and “mutual market” in order. “Local”, “tribute”, and “mutual market”, and the strength of their relationship with the central government and the responsibilities and obligations associated with them are also decreasing. The Confucian model of body cultivation There is a famous passage in the Confucian classic The Da Xue (The Great Learning): Things have their origin and their end, and things have their beginning and their end. If you know the order of things, you are close to the way. In ancient times, those who wished to make their virtue clear to the world first ruled their country. Those who want to rule their country first make their families whole. Those who want to make their families whole first cultivate their bodies. Those who want to cultivate their bodies first correct their hearts. If you want to correct your heart, you must first be sincere. If you want to be sincere, you must first achieve knowledge. To attain knowledge is to grasp things. After the material

1 An Examination of Several Models

93

Fig. 3 Model of ancient Chinese tribute system. Source Hamashita (1999, p. 38)

is grasped, knowledge will be achieved. After the knowledge is attained, the intention is sincere. When the mind is sincere, the heart is correct. After the heart is right, the body will be cultivated. After the body is cultivated, the family will be unified. When the family is unified, the country will be ruled. When the country is ruled, the world is at peace.

What is expressed here is a Confucian worldview. This worldview understands human beings as a social and cultural “field”, including different levels of human consciousness, subconsciousness, individual person, family, society (country), and foreign culture (world). If this passage is also expressed graphically, we obtain a multilayered structure of concentric circles (Model 4) from the inside out: knowledge, intention, mind, body, family, country, and world (see Fig. 4).

94

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

Fig. 4 Model 4: the Confucian model of body cultivation

Country

The World

Home body heart intent Kno

Know

2 A Few Points of Analysis These models contain a wealth of information and deserve to be explored in depth. Before proceeding with the analysis, it is necessary to organize these models. It is obvious that these models are all plural concentric circles, and they reflect a multilayered cosmogram with the observer as the center and extrapolating in a circle to the world order. These different models represent different parts of these multilayered concentric circles: the interpersonal circle model of the Lun Jen represents the circle of human interaction, and the Kinship-State model and the Tribute System model describe the world outside the home. The Confucian Model of Body Cultivation is a model that attempts to describe the human heart, society and world order as a whole. If the world expressed in these models is divided into “psychological”, “social”, and “international” dimensions, it can be roughly organized as shown in Table 1. After this organization, we can then consider the essential features, implications, and interconnections of these models. The author believes that there are at least the following points for discussion. First, these models reveal a “humanistic” cosmology that views the world from the kinship system, embodying a kind of “differential love” and implying a spirit of tolerance and pacifism toward heterogeneous and alien parts. Among these models, the model of “human relations” (Model 1) is the most fundamental, and all other models can be derived from it. The three circles of Model 1 (i.e., the “circle of kin”, the “circle of acquaintances”, and the “circle of strangers”) are in fact broadly based on several other models. For example, the “circle of kin” is roughly equivalent to the central and local levels of the “tribute system” (model 3), the “circle of acquaintances”

2 A Few Points of Analysis

95

Table 1 Connection between similar models Models

Psychological level

Social level

International level

1. Lun-Jen model

Define “self” in a close, permanent circle of relatives

Relatives, acquaintances, strangers

Strangers

2. The Kinship-State model A sense of group (Shangshu-Yugong) certainty and security derived from the order of inferiority and affinity

Dianfu, Houfu, Suifu, Yaofu

Wilderness, uncultivated place

3. Model of the tribute system

Central, Local, Tusi, feudal

The feudal, the mutual market and the world beyond

Body Home Country

The World

A sense of group certainty and security derived from the order of inferiority and affinity

4. The Confucian model of Knowledge mind, body cultivation heart, “body”

is roughly equivalent to the tusi and clans, and the “circle of the living” corresponds to the “mutual market” and the world beyond (including the Islamic, Indian, European, and Russian civilization spheres), while Japan and Korea are in the “living” and “familiar” spheres. The “acquaintance” and “stranger” circles are sometimes “strangers” and sometimes “acquaintances”, while the ethnic minorities are sometimes “relatives” and sometimes “relatives”. Sometimes they are “relatives”, and sometimes they are “acquaintances”. In fact, the so-called state form in this period was extended from kinship relations, and the so-called five suits (wufu) derived from the five kinship relationships and their corresponding obligations to mourn are a mapping of kinship relationships between states. The relationship between the dynasty and the clans in the Chinese tributary system was a natural extension of the ethical political order of Chinese society. This cosmology is completely different from the Western “individualistic” cosmology, and therefore, these models may be called Lun Jen models of world order. These models embody the concept of “differential love”. Confucianism advocates different love for different circles of people, loving one’s parents more than one’s clan, loving one’s clan more than one’s countrymen, loving one’s countrymen more than one’s countrymen, and loving one’s countrymen more than one’s countrymen. In other words, it is recognized that people are divided into relatives based on geographical and blood proximity, and the intensity of obligations, responsibilities and relationships decreases from the inside to the outside. In fact, it is a common phenomenon for human beings to form a number of unequal circles and bet on unequal feelings centered on themselves because each person cannot have the same

96

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

intensity of relationship and responsibility with all people. The line between “one’s own” and “outsiders” is evident in all parts of the world. Members of criminal groups, for example, kill innocent people but talk about their families incessantly. This line is most horrific in war, where mass murder is always the extermination of outsiders. This is because, first of all, in our human psychology, the plight we see with our own eyes is more real than what we hear, and we are more likely to help those close to us and our families and ignore those distant from us. The second is that the happiness and peace of our circle may be indispensable to our survival, while the happiness and peace of a distant circle may not be, or may even be, a threat. Therefore, it is impossible to give the same moral care to people outside of the group to which we belong (the so-called love without difference). The Chinese model is characterized by the development of this natural principle of “differential love” into a central set of values and an elaborate system of organization based on it. These models embody a relativist philosophy that recognizes the existence of different truths in different contexts and implies a spirit of tolerance and pacifism toward heterogeneous and alien parts. Second, the order of rituals has a distinction between superiority and inferiority, but the difference between each circle and the others is not based on unnatural factors such as class, belief, racial superiority or inferiority, or strength or weakness, but on differences that come mainly from family members, such as affinity, internal and external, and proximity. It should be noted that the ritual order is based on the “inequality” between state actors, and it recognizes that the “state” at the center of this order (China) occupies a higher position and enjoys more power than other states. It recognizes that the “state” at the center of the order (China) occupies a higher position and enjoys greater prestige than other states. There is no doubt that this order is characterized by “ethnocentrism”. However, it is important to realize that the “ritual” as a world order is actually an extrapolation of the “ritual” as a family and social order. Just as we cannot use the concept of “equality” to explain the relationship between father and son in the family, we cannot use the concept of “equality” in modern international relations to explain the “ritual”. We cannot use the concept of “equality” in modern international relations to describe the relationship between actors under the “ritual” order. According to the concept of “ritual”, the surrounding areas are uncivilized but not evil, barbaric but neither pagan nor inferior, but simply because they have not yet reached a certain stage of civilization. These areas were called “raw clans” as opposed to “cooked clans”, and the “raw” and “cooked” here mainly. It is very similar to today’s practice of distinguishing people as “illiterate” or “university graduates” according to their education, and countries as “developed” or “developing” by their degree of development, “developing countries”. The key to moving from a “raw clan” to a “mature clan” is to improve civilization by interacting with the central region, and this can be done by any ethnic group. Therefore, from the “ritual” perspective, the difference between ethnic groups is not one of superiority or inferiority but one of superiority or inferiority, and the relationship is not one of competition, conquest or subjugation, slavery or servitude but one of learning from low to high, from “raw” to “mature”. The relationship is not one of competition, conquest and conquest, slavery and slavery, but one of learning from low to high,

2 A Few Points of Analysis

97

from “raw” to “mature”. Since the relationship is not essentially one of conquest and subjugation, slavery and enslavement, the relationship is described in terms of “oppression” and “slavery” and their counterparts, “equality” and “freedom”. “Freedom” to describe this order is meaningless. The order of “ritual” is not “racism” in the modern sense but at most a negative “ethnocentrism”. Third, the moral and moderate world order extrapolated from family ethics. The national or international system derived from the position and role of “man” in the kinship group and its corresponding ethics extrapolates the family ethics to the “world”, the largest scope of human interaction known to the ancient Chinese, and the logical result is not only orderly (something like a “world government”) but also moral, an integration of morality and politics order (something like a “world government”) but also an emphasis on morality, an integration of morality and politics. This is an order based on human kinship ties, an idea of “family and harmony”, which is completely different from the essentially disorderly and anarchic character of the modern international order (Laozi: “Tao Te Ching—Chap. 54). In this way, the importance of morality is emphasized, and it can be seen as a manifestation of “humanism” at different levels. The relationship between the state and the nation is sometimes a kind of pseudobrotherhood, pseudofatherhood, and pseudoking-subject relationship, and this is how the ideals of “the commonwealth of the world” and “all brothers within the four seas” were introduced. This kind of world order, which is essentially based on family ethics, must emphasize morality, and the ideal order must be introverted and moderate. Of course, this ideal world order is difficult to realize in reality, but it is a concept that is the value basis for the existence of this “world” order and attracts the defenders of this order to work in this direction. It is completely different from the modern international order derived from independent and free “individuals”, which is essentially immoral or weak in morality because the relationship between “individuals” is characterized by competition and interests, and the international order model derived from this basis is also characterized by interests and the admiration of strength. The ideal order is not a moral order but an order of competition according to certain rules. The value base of the world order based on the individual society is not moral. Fourth, the logical outcome of these models is not only orderly and morally emphatic but also a harmonious order that extrapolates from the inner harmony of human beings. These models embody a philosophy that considers human psychological harmony and interpersonal harmony in connection with national governance and even world order. Harmony is based on order, and without order, there is no harmony. Here, the dimensions of personal cultivation, national governance and international order are not clearly distinguished; rather, they are considered as a whole. Politics is integrated not only with morality but also with the human heart. Of course, a fully integrated international order has never been achieved, but it must be admitted that the Chinese did recognize the human being, the family, the state and the world order as a whole and that a somewhat integrated national form and international order based on this understanding did exist for a long time. The “tribute system” that lasted for more than 2000 years collapsed in modern times, but the principles it embodied were not useless, and the Chinese experience of perceiving and interacting with the

98

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

“outside world” did not become worthless with the collapse of this system. Indeed, just as key features of the basic Chinese model of human relations are still at work today, the idea and practice of grasping the international order in terms of human psychological, social, and national harmony constitutes a unique Chinese experience and may influence our view of the world, at least at the level of the collective Unconscious (e.g., building a “harmonious society”, “harmonious world”), and the concept of “harmonious world” is linked to this experience. Fifth, the significance of social science methodology. The Chinese-American psychological anthropologist Hsu, F.L.K. proposed a model of psychosocial homeostasis (PSH) to describe the psychological, social, and cultural relationships of people. I have pointed out the consistency of Francis L.K. Hsu’s PSH model with the Chinese Confucian model of body cultivation and the Chinese cultural background of Hsu’s theory, and I have also argued that this model and its associated “Human Constant” can provide us with a new perspective and method for studying international politics. When we put the PSH model together with the above models, we find that it is largely compatible with all of them. What does this tell us? First, the PSH model is not only consistent with the Confucian model of body cultivation, but it is also consistent with the collective memory and experience of the Chinese people— the structure of kinship systems, the Contextual patterns, behaviors, and cosmology. It is also consistent with the collective memory and experience of Chinese people— kinship structures, interpersonal patterns, behaviors, and cosmology. This suggests the possibility of using Hsu’s theory to summarize and reveal the essence of the above models, thus elevating the Chinese experience to a doctrinal level. Second, the kinship-state model, the Chinese tributary system model, and the Chinese Confucian model of body cultivation embodied in the Chinese cosmology and behavior model may have important methodological significance. We know that the dominant approach to the study of international relations is the modern social science approach, which treats the individual, family, society, and state as well-defined concepts and tends to treat human psychology, interpersonal relations, the state, and even international relations as discrete fields. This is an “individualistic” approach to research, which is fundamentally based on the Western social experience of the “individual” and is more conducive to the interpretation of the experience of the individual society, whereas it is inappropriate to use this approach to interpret the experience of the “human” society. It is inappropriate to use this approach to interpret the experience of “human” society. Francis L.K. Hsu proposes a more explanatory social science paradigm based on the Chinese experience. The new paradigm is suitable for explaining both Western individual societies and Chinese societies. The Lun Jen and the Individual Jen are different “Human Constants” with different “psychosocial homeostasis”. We do not want to interpret the Western experience in terms of the Chinese experience (“Oriental-centrism” is just as wrong as “Western-centrism”), but we want to explain Chinese society with the help of a generalized and more explanatory theoretical approach. We want to explain the Human Constants, state forms, and international order in ancient East Asia by means of a broad and more explanatory theoretical approach.

3 The State Form of the Ancient China: The Kinship-State

99

Sixth, the relationship between Model 2 and Model 3. Model 2 describes an international order in China during the Zhou dynasty. This order was centered on the Zhou dynasty, with the Zhou tianzi as the common lord of the world, and the areas outside the king’s capital were neatly divided into a number of equidistant zones, which had decreasing obligations and responsibilities to the central dynasty. This is an imaginary international order that simulates kinship relations and does not correspond to the actual situation. The model of the international system that in fact operated in ancient East Asia is closer to the 3 model. However, the two models are intrinsically linked: they are both orders that are extrapolated in a circle with a central dynastic center. This is consistent with the Chinese model of human relations and cosmology and is the basic form of the kinship-state system. Model 2 can be seen as a rudimentary, idealized form of Model 3.

3 The State Form of the Ancient China: The Kinship-State In contrast to the nation-state, the ancient Chinese form of state was the kinship-state, or patriarchal state. This form of state is associated with the basic interpersonal state of the Chinese people. The Kinship-State was not composed of a single ethnic group but of plural kinship groups, and the state was a union of some form of kinship groups. This state is an expansion and extension of the family. In the homogeneous pattern of the family-state, the family is a small state and the state is a large one. Within the family and clan, the father-parent is supreme in status and power; within the state, the king is supreme in status and power. The paternal parent because of its lineage on the patriarchal status, and this patriarchal status through the bloodline inheritance, from generation to generation. The kinship group to which the emperor belonged was the ruler of the state, and the ruler resembled the head of the family or patriarch, and the state became the private property of the emperor’s kinship group. The kinship principle and moral copy to the state level, the authority of the father in the family extended to the state level, officials are loyal subjects of the emperor, and the people are the emperor’s subjects. It was an absolute patriarchal centralized system in which the emperor’s power was unchecked. However, the absolute authoritarian power of the kin state generally did not affect the grassroots level; below the county level, it was governed by gentry and mandarins, and clan organizations in fact functioned as law enforcement and administration. People in pro-ethnic countries have a weak sense of nationhood, are indifferent to their rulers, and are insensitive to who is ruling them. There have also been many instances of heterogeneous rules in Chinese history. The people simply demanded that the ruler behaves in accordance with the role (elder brother, father), and it did not matter to which kinship group the ruler belonged. Rulers of kinship-states always affirm that they are blessed by their ancestors, rather than claiming divine blessings as rulers in India do. There has been much academic discussion on the form and nature of the Chinese state, but it may be possible to think about it from the perspective of the Human

100

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

Constant and psychosocial homeostasis. The author has pointed out that the modern Western nation-state and the Human Constant of the “Individual Jen” are a kind of “isomorphic mapping” relationship, and the understanding of the contemporary international order cannot be separated from the grasp of the Human Constant of the “Individual Jen”. The understanding of the contemporary international order cannot be separated from an understanding of the Human Constant of the individual. This perspective is also valid for explaining the Chinese state form and the Human Constant of Chinese society. We know that modern international society is composed of “nation-states”, and although they are all called “nation-states”, they are based on different sociocultural foundations and therefore take different forms and operate in different ways. Even for countries with the same political system (e.g., the United States and Japan both have modern democratic political systems), the nature and operation of the state are very different, not to mention countries with different political systems (e.g., China and Western countries). From this perspective, the difference between the Chinese form of state and the Western countries is based on the difference of the Human Constant, the difference of construction and principle, not the difference of big apple and small apple, red apple and green apple but the difference of apple and pear. Unlike the “individual”, in the Human Constant of the Chinese people, the “person” is not an independent “individual “The “self” of “the Lun Jen” is defined within a relational body (usually consisting of close, interdependent relatives). The relationship between the individual and the other is extrapolated from the kin group, and the intensity of closeness and the responsibilities, rights, and obligations associated with it decreases in descending order. From the previous examination of several models, it is clear that many features of the state form of the “contextual person”—the “state”— are associated with the Lun Jen. It has distinctly different characteristics from the Western “nation-state” based on the Human Constant of the individual: (1) The state is a structure extrapolated from the family; “person”, “family”, and “state” is only a round of relations between the Human Constant of “the Lun Jen” on a larger level, one level in a series of concentric circles; (2) The “state” is characterized by the “family” and has the function of the “family”, and the ethics of the state are directly copied from the ethics of the family; (3) the indifference of the people to the political rulers and the low level of intervention of the latter in the lives of the former; (4) a great inclusiveness in the way of ruling based on “the existence of different truths on different occasions”. In light of this, it is reasonable to question the use of such a concept as the “nationstate” to express the form and nature of the Chinese state. At the very least, this concept does not fully reflect the reality of the matter. Of course, the discrepancy can be solved by adding modifiers (e.g., “Chinese”, “oriental”) before the term nationstate, but it should be noted that this is not a logical approach from the facts themselves; rather, it is a way of applying and tailoring the facts with certain preconceived notions. After careful consideration, I have proposed the concept of the Kinship-State to describe the Chinese state. In contrast to the modern nation-state, which is based on

3 The State Form of the Ancient China: The Kinship-State

101

the individual as the Human Constant of Western society, the kinship-state is based on the Lun Jen Human Constant. There is a consistent principle at work between the kinship-state and the Human Constant of Lun Jen. The author believes that this concept is conducive to our interpretation of the Chinese state form and its operating principles from China’s own logic, as well as to the doctrinal enhancement of the Chinese political experience. In the following, I would like to elaborate on several aspects. First, this concept can better express the “kinship-state isomorphism” characteristic of the Chinese state form. Mencius said, “People have constant words, all saying ‘the state of the world’; the foundation of the world is the state, the foundation of the state is the home, and the foundation of the home is the body” (Mencius—on Li Lou). Some scholars have also concluded that the Chinese state is “homogeneous with the state” (Qingping 1990). In both conception and reality, there are many examples of “family” and “state” being mixed and “family” and “state” being combined. The example of the combination of “family” and “state”. At the organizational level, the traditional Chinese state and the family are isomorphic bodies, and the state can be seen as an expanded family, while the family can be seen as a reduced state. The patriarchal system is the basis of the monarchy, which in turn consolidates the patriarchal system. The meaning of the Chinese word “服” (fu) originally referred to the obligation of mourning arising from kinship but was later extended to a geographic concept of the state to refer to various parts of the state with different strengths of relationship and obligations to the central government. This model of statehood originated from the blood feudal state of the Zhou Dynasty, but the basic characteristics of this model can be said to have continued into modern times, so the concept of the kinship-state describes this characteristic more accurately. This concept is consistent with the Human Constant of the Chinese people and helps us to better reveal the psycho-cultural mechanism between the state form and the Human Constant and even the structure of the kinship system. According to the principle of psychosocial equilibrium (PSH), the characteristics of the “intimate social and cultural layer” (layer 3 of PSH, whose importance can be considered our “life package”). The values and orientations embodied in the “family” are internalized in human behavior through socialization, thus influencing not only people’s attitudes and participation in political affairs but also projecting the rules and behaviors practiced in the “family” to the national level. This not only influences people’s attitudes and participation in political affairs but also projects the rules and behaviors practiced in the “family” to the state level. An important feature of the Human Constant of the “family” is that the members of the kin constitute the most important element of the third layer of PSH, where the individual is embedded in an almost permanent kinship system with an extremely stable pattern of psychosocial equilibrium. The clan, as a direct extension of the family, is the most suitable external form of the Lun Jen. The clan organization is well developed, and there is a lack of nonblood, nonterritorial, voluntary associations between the “state” and the “family”, so that the “state” is built directly on the “family”. It can be said that the “state” is directly based on the “family”. We know that the state form of “individual” society is based on various “associations”, and there is a large tension between the association or the state and the “individual”. However, in

102

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

the state of lunacy, not only is the definition of a “person” not separable from the kin group (“family”) to which he belongs, but there is also no similar tension between the “state” and the “family”. There is no intermediate link between the “state” and the “family” such as the “association” in individual societies, and the “family” not only provides the direct impetus for the restoration of the “state”. The “family” not only provides the direct impetus for the restoration of the “state” but also serves as the information carrier for the organizational structure of the state, providing a direct template for its restoration. In the absence of intermediate groups, the only model of rule that the state could draw on and imitate was the “family”. Because the family is a more stable structure than the intermediate groups in Western societies, the Chinese form of state actually has a more solid foundation than the Western state. The family system in traditional China existed as a prototype for the state, and the high degree of compatibility and integration between the “state” and the “family” made it possible for Chinese dynasties to rise and fall repeatedly without abolishing the state system because turmoil and foreign invasion destroyed only the external form of the dynasty. The “family” as the prototype and template of the state could not be destroyed. In terms of state ethics, the kinship-state and family are based on the same ethical foundation, and state ethics are directly copied from family ethics. An important feature of the Lun Jen model of interpersonal relations is that individuals spontaneously give and return favors in a circle of mutual trust and interdependence. This feature was also copied to the state level and constituted a special pattern of relationship between traditional Chinese rulers and their subjects. Many missionaries who came to China in the early years noted that the relationship between the ruler and his subjects in traditional China was less like that of conqueror and conquered or master and slave in Europe and more like that of father and children in a family: the ruler had the obligation to his subjects “as if to protect his children” and the subjects were loyal and obedient to the ruler, a pattern of relationship that reflects the integration of Chinese morality and politics. Both the state and the family emphasize obedience and loyalty to authority and the filialism adopted by successive governments. In our context, this is an expression of Chinese contextualism. The so-called relationship between ruler and subject, official and citizen at the state level is only a copy and amplification of the relationship between father and son in the family. As the orderly body of the state, the principle of the inferior one’s reverence for the superior one and obedience to the father’s parents was carried out, and the state mastered the codified household and the people through the patriarchal system, while this principle was extended and applied to the relationship between the state and its subjects of ruling and being ruled, forming the absolute obedience of the ruled to the ruler. Filial piety to the father in the family was transformed into loyalty to the ruler, and the ethics of filial piety, respect, and fraternity in the family were transformed into loyalty, propriety, and the three rules and five rules at the state level. It emphasizes the closeness and distance of relationships, not competitive relationships, not enemy relationships. The integration of ethics and politics was based on the extension of roles and moral ethics in the family, and the people had a relationship of trust derived from the family to the emperor, to government officials, and to family members.

3 The State Form of the Ancient China: The Kinship-State

103

Second, this concept better expresses the pattern of relations between the ruler and the people in China. Since the members of kin constitute the constant and stable content of the third layer of the Lun Jen’s PSH, the individual is in a close and solid protective shell of internal relations, and almost all social requirements can be met within the close circle of interpersonal relations to which he belongs. The clan, as a poor extension of the family, functions as a self-governing community and even sometimes as part of the government. Those ambitious people who seek merit and fame also tend to attribute their success to the clan group to which they belong to glorify their ancestors. According to the PSH principle, we have a certain amount of psychological energy, and the more an individual bets on a certain type of community (e.g., family, clan), the less he or she bets on other levels (e.g., state, nation). Chinese clans are extremely cohesive, attracting almost all of the individual’s affective bets, and their psychosocial equilibrium process generally does not use the first level, so individuals generally have less or no affective investment in the nation. In this case, the individual is highly disconnected from the state, the state is a distant existence isolated from the individual’s life, and the people are “distant” from the ruler of the state. The disconnect and indifference of the subjects to politics was outwardly manifested in loyalty and cooperation with the state and the rulers, and the Chinese could safely leave the state in the hands of a select group of elites, with little resistance even to tyranny. The so-called loyalty and obedience here were mainly for the social elites who were directly or indirectly related to the monarch (who were also the ruling class of society), while for the common people, their attitude was not so much “loyalty” and “obedience” as “obedience” and “obedience”. For the common people, their attitude was not so much “loyalty” and “obedience” as it was indifference to political rule. The description of “the emperor is high in the sky”, “working at sunrise, resting at sunset, digging wells and drinking, plowing fields and eating, and the emperor’s power is not mine” is the inevitable result of the extrapolation of the Chinese people’s humanistic way of life in a circle. As the space for the functioning of the psychosocial equilibrium of the individual is more independent and stable, the life of the individual is relatively relaxed (Xu 2006). This greatly reduces the psychological anxiety of the individual arising from the suppression of state power, or the individual does not feel such suppression at all. Linked to this, traditional Chinese rulers were passive in their governance of the state. State power was authoritarian and centralized, but state control over society was crude, and the state interfered less in the lives of individuals. The traditional Chinese concept of family and the Human Constant prevented the emergence of an active and powerful government such as that of Western individual societies, and there seemed to be a tacit agreement between the ruler of the Kinship-State and his subjects: state power could be centralized, but on the condition that it did not interfere or interfered less in the lives of individuals. The state generally does not actively change the beliefs and lifestyles of its subjects, and Taoist thought holds that the best ruler is one who is not felt by the people: The best ruler is not known to the people; the second, the people are close to him and praise him; the second, the people fear him; and the second, the people despise him. It is the ruler’s lack of integrity that makes the people distrust him. Sages rule with ease and comfort and seldom give orders. Even if he issues a

104

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

decree and successfully implements it, the people will think, “This is the way we were meant to be.” (Laozi: “Tao Te Ching”—Chap. 17). “Governing a country is the same as cooking a small fish; it is not appropriate to turn it over and over again, not to disturb the people at every turn, and not to toss it around.” (Laozi: “Tao Te Ching”—Chap. 60) is not only the Taoist philosophy of governance, but in fact those emperors who were considered good usually practiced this as well: thin taxation and light taxation, focus on the people’s recuperation and less interference in the people’s lives. The ruler’s attitude toward the people under his rule was negative, and I often wonder if the modern meaning of “autocracy” (often associated with the suppression of “personal” “freedom”) to describe this I have often wondered whether the modern meaning of “autocracy” (often associated with the suppression of “personal” and “freedom”) to describe this mode of power overestimates the initiative of Chinese rulers and the material conditions for its realization. China has historically been able to achieve a “small government, big society” model of economic governance for a long time (there was an official number of about 7000 people in the early Han Dynasty and 3000 people in the early Qing Dynasty). In my view, the reason for this is laissez-faire, laissez-faire rule. This concept also helps explain another characteristic of the Chinese form of state, namely the diversity and flexibility of ways of ruling. The Chinese form of state has always been grand unification, but the state has multiple natures and multiple ways of ruling. In terms of state form, the traditional Chinese state was a dual or triple state, i.e., the state model was one of a king, vassal or Emperor, and vassal king, as well as a dual or triple monarchy in which king, vassal, minister (qing), senior official (dafu), or emperor, vassal king, and lord coexisted. This pattern was especially evident before the Warring States, and for most of the period from the Qin to the Qing dynasties, there were also empires and kingdoms or empires and vassal states, although sometimes the kingdoms and vassal states existed in name only. In terms of polity, the main part of the state was a county or feudal system, but there were also various ways of ruling over ethnic minorities, tusi and tuguan. The relationship between these regions and the central government was very loose, and the central government rarely intervened in specific governance matters. The strength of the rule declined outward and eventually disappeared into thin air. Some were “emphasis on unification, not on governing”, some were “unified but not ruled”, and some were de facto “not unified but not ruled”, the relationship was only symbolic. The state allowed people in the areas it ruled to have different ways of life but did not require them to change their way of life or their religion. In this sense, China has been “one country, many systems” since ancient times. This may explain the fact that historically the Chinese were not so sensitive to who ruled, that some emperors ignored the government for years without affecting the continuity of the state and that there were even several monarchs of foreign origin throughout Chinese history. The emphasis on closeness and proximity between people in Chinese society reduced the tension of internal divisions caused by interpersonal competition. Externally, the emphasis on respect and honor rather than on control, change and conquest has led to a high degree of resilience in the way of rule, reducing conflict between nations and regions and decreasing the resistance that would build up from the outside as

4 Lun Jen and the Kinship-State: An Exploration of Psychological Culture

105

a result of slavery, conquest, and control. It is perhaps for this reason that China has snowballed and grown into the vast “multiethnic” fusion that it is today. From this perspective, this feature of the Chinese state is consistent with the Lunarian philosophy that “different truths exist on different occasions” and that the pattern of “pluralism” is the result of the “differential order” style. The pattern of “pluralism” is the result of the “differential” Leninist way of life.

4 Lun Jen and the Kinship-State: An Exploration of Psychological Culture In the Chinese experience, “individual”, “family,”, “society”, “nation”, “nation” (which are the core concepts of modern international political studies) are not clear concepts. Such concepts as the “person”, “family”, “nation”, and even the “world” originally represented a huge continuum with differential scalability. The definition of “man” cannot be separated from “family”, nor can “country” be separated from “family”. In other words, the concepts of “man”, “family”, “state”, and “world” in the Chinese context must be frozen or increased by certain conditions before they can roughly approach modernity to the concepts of “individual”, “family”, “state”, and “international order” in modern social science, concepts in modern social science. Since this is the Chinese experience, the Chinese problem should be studied on the basis of such an experience. When our empirical facts do not fit well with existing social science concepts, it is the concepts rather than the facts that must be wrong. When we adjust our research perspective to examine the state in relation to Chinese kinship systems and human constraints, we find that rather than inconveniencing our analysis, these unclear concepts bring us closer to the facts of China. The new perspective also requires us to abandon the “progressive” and “developmental” viewpoint derived from the historical “evolutionary theory”, and not to view either Lun Jen or the state forms and state ethics based on it as associated with some backward, primitive, “too uncivilized” society,1 but rather with the principle of cultural anthropology, which states that “culture is relative” and that the “human being” and the Western “individual” are considered two different Human Constants (or “human systems”), while the “suiting state” and the nation-state are the state forms associated with these two Human Constants, respectively. There has been more criticism in recent scholarship about the shortcomings of the Chinese state form, such as 1

Hegel, for example, thought that the Orientals had no personality: “The Chinese are regarded by themselves as belonging to their family, and at the same time as sons and daughters of the state. Within the family they are not personalities, because the unit of solidarity in which they live is one of descent and natural obligation. Within the state, they are just as lacking in independent personality, for within the state the relationship of the great head is most prominent, and the emperor is like a strict father, the foundation of the government, governing all the departments of the state.“ (Hegel,G,W.F. 1956, p. 165) Marx believed that in societies like India and China, the individual, like the individual bee cannot be separated from the hive, cannot be separated from the “umbilical cord of the clan or commune” for long. (Marx,K., Engels,F.,1972, p. 96).

106

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

its authoritarianism, backwardness, and suppression of individual freedom, and it should be said that much of this criticism is true. It must be noted, however, that most of these criticisms are based on a new system of reference based on the experience of Western individual societies that emphasizes human freedom, competition, social development, and material progress. It is inappropriate to criticize the content of one reference system based on another reference system; for example, Chinese people do not exist as “individuals” (“individual” is a recent translated concept), and “suppression of the individual” is a “non sequitur” which is to say that there is no target. Just as one cannot complain that an apple is not sweet enough based on the taste of a pear, it is neither correct nor fair to adopt a “modern” research method, which is basically based on individual social experience, to elaborate a completely different form of state and its principles. This “modern” approach reflects the anxiety of Chinese researchers who have lost their self-confidence and subjectivity under the pressure of “modernization” since the modern era. We are not, of course, praising the state form and state ethics of Leninist society, nor are we criticizing the modern state form with this reference system. A perspective that combines the state with Human Constant and psychosocial homeostasis theories can provide a more convincing explanation for China’s ability to maintain great cohesion over time. The Chinese model of great unity has been in place for more than two thousand years since the Qin dynasty, and it continues in some form even today in the midst of high levels of information technology, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the widespread spread of Western democracy around the world. Many Western observers have repeatedly predicted the collapse of China, but they have failed to do so. Not only China has not collapsed, but unlike the tendency of countries around the world to become increasingly divided, with the return of Hong Kong and Macau, China has shown a stronger tendency to coalesce. Although there are forces in Taiwan, represented by the Democratic Progressive Party, that advocate independence from the mainland, and a few people in Hong Kong have advocated “Hong Kong independence” since the 2014 “Occupy” incident, the forces opposing secession have been stronger until now. It can be argued that only China has achieved this in the experience of any human civilization that has existed, uniting such a large population, lasting for such a long period of time, and still showing a strong tendency to coalesce. This tremendous cohesiveness and high degree of resilience cannot be explained by modern social science theories because modern sociological and cultural anthropological theories of group cohesion suggest that increased family cohesion inevitably causes larger groups, e.g., nations and states, to decline in cohesion. According to this theory, in a society such as China, where kinship groups have great cohesion, the state should be fragmented. However, this is not the case in China, where the Chinese have a tremendously cohesive kinship system, as well as a very cohesive nation and state. Chinese history has been much more unified than divided and less warlike than in the West (many wars came from nomadic encroachments). Why cannot modern social science theories explain various phenomena? The fundamental reason is that the analytical paradigm used in the existing social sciences is itself problematic. The current theory of group

4 Lun Jen and the Kinship-State: An Exploration of Psychological Culture

107

cohesion is based on the Western experience of “individual” societies, which presupposes that “individual” and “group” are dichotomous. The group is the antithesis of the “individual” and suppresses the individual, and the cohesion of the group and the freedom of the individual are mutually exclusive. The famous Western psychologist Jung’s saying “the larger the group cohesion, the smaller the individual becomes” (Jung 2001, p, 10) is a typical expression of this view. This dichotomy in social science is fundamentally based on the experience of Western individual societies where individuals have a more unstable “psychosocial equilibrium” structure. This can be well explained from our perspective. The “human” is a Human Constant that differs from the Western “individual” in that it has a more stable and centripetal “psychosocial equilibrium” structure. The individual (in the sense of a non-Human Constant) and the group in human society are not in a dichotomous relationship but in a differential relationship of enlargement and reduction, of inclusion and inclusion. The high degree of isomorphism between “state” and “family” means that the organization of the state is based on a foundation that places greater emphasis on human biological ties and is therefore more firmly grounded. The Lun Jen emphasizes closeness, proximity, and inferiority but is not competitive, or the arrangement and the set of ethical norms associated with it are designed to mitigate the competitive nature of people and increase the cohesiveness of the group. The cohesiveness of the group is not a matter of one thing and another but rather of a differential scaling pattern, depending on the “field” and “role” of the group members and the level of pressure. For example, brothers who are at odds with each other may immediately unite when in conflict with someone outside their clan. Two conflicting clans may also put aside their conflicts when their village clashes with an outside village. Similarly, when the whole nation and country are invaded by foreign enemies, Chinese people usually make common cause and show a high degree of social mobilization and cohesion. This is the principle of “blood is thicker than water” and “brother against brother, brother against brother, brother against brother”. Since this principle is derived from “family”, the “love of country” shown by individuals is more based on natural family emotions rather than political and ideological factors and is therefore more fundamental and stronger. The obedience of individuals to the state and their trust in the ruler (based on indifference to political rule) maintain the long-term stability and continuity of society and the state while being able to show greater cohesion and a higher degree of social mobilization when invaded by foreign enemies or major natural disasters. The author believes that it is this principle of cohesion based on the Leninist way of life—the principle of differential order—that is the real reason for the long-term continuity of the Chinese state form and the great cohesiveness of the Chinese nation. Just as the characteristics of Chinese interpersonal patterns continue to influence the way Chinese people interact with each other today, the Chinese political experience of Leninism continues to have a deep cultural impact on the form of the state, the ethics of the state, and even the way China views the world today. From the perspective of modern discourse and “modern” research methods and perspectives, China has failed because it has not fully transformed itself into a modern state in the face of recent Western challenges. From our perspective, however, China’s success

108

5 Lun-Jen and the Kinship-State

in maintaining its cultural identity and strong cohesion in the face of the powerful challenges of the modern West suggests that the Chinese political experience has been quite successful. What needs to be studied is not “why China failed” but “why China was so successful. Much of the confusion, doubt, and even fear in the West’s perception of today’s China stems from the reality that China has not fully internalized the modern international order and is still acting according to its own logic, but because our academic discourse is largely based on Western experience, it fails to properly articulate our behavior and experience, while the West interprets China’s behavior in terms of its own political experience. If one shifts the perspective and reads China according to its own logic and with a discourse based on the experience of Chinese society, one comes to another conclusion: Chinese society is probably the only highly civilized society based on the interpretation of human kinship to the extreme, and the form of the state and the relationship between states in traditional China follows a different principle from that of the modern West, as the Chinese conception and practical experience of world order, the value of the “Lun Jenism” and the ethics of the state on which it is based are of unique value, and may be as much a part of the human experience that can bring us well-being as the value of “individualism” and the ethics of the modern state. It may provide the world with a higher order and principles than the modern international order, with a certain “postmodern” character. Thus, China’s “out-of-touch” or “alternative” character to the Western world in some respects today may not only threaten the world but may also be beneficial to humanity.

References Hamashita, Takeshi. 1999. International Opportunities in Modern China: The Tribute Trade System and the Modern Asian Economic Sphereinda (Zhongguo de guoji qiji:chaogong maoyi tixi yu jindai guoji Jingjiquan). Translated by Zhu Yingui, and Ouyang Fei. China Social Science Press. Hegel, G.W.F. 1956. Philosophy of History, Life, Books, and Knowledge. Huang, Guangguo, and Hu Xianjin et al. 2005. Favor and Face: The Chinese Power Game (Renqing yu Mianzi: Zhongguoren de Quanli Youxi), ed. by Huang Guangguo. Renmin University Press. Jung, Carl Gutav. 2001. The Undiscovered Self , Chinese version, International Culture Publications. Marx and Engels. 1972. The Complete Works of Marx and Engels. Chinese version, vol. 23. People’s Publishing House. Qingping, Yue. 1990. China’s Family and State (Zhonguo de jia yu guo). Jilin Literature and History Press. Xu, Zhenzhou. 2006. Freedom from Life. Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu (International Political Studies) 3.

Chapter 6

The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

In recent years, there has been a movement in Chinese scholarship to re-evaluate the Chinese idea of the Tianxia (the world). For example, Sheng Hong sees “worldism” as a pacifist proposition at its best (Hong 2010), and Zhao Tingyang notes the value of the concept of the “world” from the perspective of political philosophy. The value of the concept of “All-under-Heaven” is a full and complete philosophical concept1 and He Xinhua’s paper (He 2006). They try to suggest that this concept has implications for the establishment of a postmodern system of international relations. However, it is important to note that the concept of “Tianxia” has two dimensions: an ideal idea of world order, and the other is the institutional dimension, i.e., it is also an international order that has been operating in ancient East Asia for more than a thousand years, and this order is the “tribute system”. To focus on the “world” as an idea and ignore the world as a functioning international system (i.e., the tribute system) would indeed be easy to criticize as a mere “beautiful legend”.2 In fact, the international system that operated in ancient East Asia until its complete collapse in the nineteenth century was the tribute system. It was a unique system that was fundamentally different not only from the modern international order but also from the imperial system (colonial system) of the ancient Roman era. The Chinese tributary system took different forms at different times; for example, its primary form was the Jifu (畿服) system of the Zhou Dynasty (see Model 2 in Chap. 5 of this book). It also took the form of the Jimi (羁縻) system (a system whereby central dynasties set up highly autonomous states in areas with few ethnic groups) and the Cefeng (册 封) system (a system whereby central dynasties granted the title of king to the rulers of neighboring states and regions as a sign of recognition of their legitimacy) from the Qin dynasty onward. However, the Chinese tributary system, as an international system, is consistent in its fundamentals and has some common features. What are the basic principles of this system? How is it characterized? How does it relate to the 1

Zhao’s definition of “Tianxia”: geographically, “all the land under heaven “The world is one in the sense of ethics/politics”, i.e., a full and complete philosophical concept in which geography, psychology and social institutions are integrated. (Zhao 2005). 2 http://cuikl.blog.sohu.com/3533347.html. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 109 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_6

110

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

basic interpersonal state of the Chinese? Why did it last for over a thousand years in East Asia before collapsing in modern times? These are the questions to be explored in this chapter. The Chinese tributary system, as the international order of ancient East Asia, is a unique system that is fundamentally different not only from the modern international order but also from the imperial system (colonial system) of the ancient Roman era (the modern international order is intrinsically linked to the ancient Roman colonial system). There is no suitable framework to describe this system. Alexander Wendt, a representative of constructivism, cites three basic “cultures” in contemporary international society, namely the “Hobbesian culture” characterized by all-out war and killing, the “Lockean culture” characterized by rules and competition, and the “culture of cooperation and friendship”. However, we cannot use any of these states to describe the international order in ancient East Asia. The scholar Qin Yaqing points out that the characteristics of this system “are clearly not Hobbesian, because the relationship between units in the system is not hostile; not Lockean, because the relationship is not competitive; and not Kantian, because the relationship between members of the system in Kantian culture is equal. The ideal of the structure of heaven embodies the difference between the Father and the Son, which is why there is not only a difference in order but also a difference in love. On the one hand, it does not regard such a jungle culture as Hobbes’ war of every man against every man as a basic feature of the international system; on the other hand, it does not recognize a basic belief shared by Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and others, namely, the principle of equality of the system’s units “(Qin 2006). However, there are several important questions that need to be addressed here: First, if not the “principle of equality of units”, then what principle is at work? Can the model of “not only differential order but also differential love” based on the difference between fathers and sons in the family be called a principle that guides international actors as much as the “unitary equality principle”? Second, if it is a principle, what are its main features, and how does it operate concretely among international actors? Third, how has this principle been internalized by international actors? Obviously, only when these questions are addressed can we talk about a scholarly examination and enhancement of the Chinese experience of international politics. This chapter examines the operational dimension of the “world” (Tianxia), the international system in ancient East Asia, which was dominated by the “tribute system”. We relate this system to the “Human Constant” of the Chinese people, the “Lun Jen” (Huipeng 2013, pp. 71–74). This is part of our project to introduce the study of “people” into international political studies. The focus of the examination from this perspective is not on the details of the historical evolution of the system and the functions it has performed, for which there is a considerable literature, but on some of its enduring rationales, forms of functioning, and the psycho-cultural foundations of its existence.

1 Li (Rites): An Ancient East Asian International Order Based …

111

1 Li (Rites): An Ancient East Asian International Order Based on the “Role Principle” The analytical framework that examines the international order in relation to the “Human Constant” of human beings has a basic presupposition that an international order must have a central actor (state or cultural entity) with great power and influence and that the rationale for the operation of the order is largely aligned with the “Human Constant” of human beings living in this central state or culture and is “internalized” to varying degrees by the noncore actors. The operating principles of this order are to a large extent consistent with the “Human Constant” of the people living in this core state or culture and are “internalized” to varying degrees by the noncore actors. The “world” is an international order based on the Lun Jen of Lun Jen, the rationale of which is based on the experience of Chinese society. From Hsu’s model of psychosocial homeostasis, the “world” mainly involves the outermost layer of psychosocial homeostasis, i.e., the “Outer World” (including foreign countries, foreign cultures, etc.). The “world” mainly involves the outermost layer of the PSH diagram, i.e., the “outside world” (including foreign countries, foreign cultures, etc.). According to this theory, it is impossible for a group of people to approach the “outside world” using a completely different principle than their everyday interpersonal relationships; in other words, Chinese attitudes and behaviors toward the “outside world” are influenced by the Chinese interpersonal model. … Similar to the concepts of “people”, “family”, and “country”, “world” is also a very scalable concept. It can refer to both domestic (such as “fighting the world” and “gaining the world”) and world order and can be seen as a reduced “world” as “country” or as an enlarged “world”. “It can also be seen as an enlarged “country”. This chapter discusses the “world” as the “world order” (i.e., the Confucian sense of “cultivating one’s body, ruling one’s country, and pacifying the world”). From the conceptual point of view, the “world” as a world order is in line with Rhenish cosmology, which consists of concentric circles and is a harmonious and ideal extrapolation from the “body” and “mind” of human beings. It is a harmonious and ideal cosmic order extrapolated from the human “body” and “mind” Refer to Chap. 5 of this book. On an institutional level, the world is also an actual international order, or “Li” (ritual). Before the modern international order was encountered in the midnineteenth century, an international order based on the “tribute system” existed in East Asia (Hamashita 1999, p. 38). From our perspective, there is an inherent logical relationship between the Lun Jen, the “the Contextual state” and the “world” as the world order: the “world “is part of a vast continuum of order, linked to the “state” and the “family”, and is based on the Lun Jen. The “family” is the starting point of a circle of extrapolation. “Ritual” is a kind of order suitable for family, society, and the international community. From this perspective, it is possible to define the concept of “All-under-Heaven” on two levels: as a concept, “All-under-Heaven” is a kind of “one world” and “harmony among all nations”. As a concept, “All-under-Heaven” is an ideal of the world order of “harmony among all nations”, and as an institution, it is an ancient East Asian international order based on the Human Constant of Lun Jen,

112

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

with the Chinese tributary system as its main element, international order. Although the content of this system varied from one period of history to another, its basic pattern remained unchanged until modern times. Thus, the principle that governs the international order of rituals can be called the “role principle”. The author defines the “role principle” as the principle that actors act in accordance with their different positions in the system and in response to the interaction of their own and external expectations of the actors.3 It differs from the “unit equality principle” in that under the former principle, the behavioral expectations and evaluation criteria of the actor are mainly derived from the role the actor plays, while under the latter principle, they are mainly derived from the presupposition of an identical qualification of the actor; the former applies to a differential structure of differently qualified persons, while the latter applies to a differential structure of identically qualified persons. The former applies to a differential structure composed of differently qualified persons, while the latter applies to a homogeneous structure composed of equally qualified persons; the “role principle” is consistent with the Lun Jen, the Human Constant of Chinese people, and is epistemologically based on the perception of the natural differences in human relationships within the kinship system, while the “unit equality principle” is based on the Human Constant of the individual and epistemologically based on the perception of the isolated, atomic “individual”. Once we know that the system is based on a different rationale than the modern international order, it is necessary to consider the discourse and frame of reference used when discussing the system. For example, the biggest criticism of the system is the “inequality” in the relationship between the core actors of the system and those in the noncore regions, especially those who used to be in the noncore regions and countries of the system, and it is easy to use the concepts of “equality” or “inequality” to describe the noncore actors. The concept of “inequality” is easily used to describe the pilgrimage of noncore actors to the central government and to accuse core actors of “aggression” and “expansion” for helping noncore actors put down rebellions. Nationalism or other political reasons aside, at the cognitive level, this is a misinterpretation of the discourse and frame of reference used to describe the modern international order when it is inappropriately applied to another object. Indeed, the system of the world was a hierarchical structure centered on the Chinese dynasty that spread out in all directions, with noncore regions divided according to their geographical proximity to the center and the degree of radiation they received from the central culture, while neighboring countries and regions 3

R. Linden, a representative of the “cultural person and personality school”, defined “role” as a set of norms provided to actors as part of culture in any given context. Around the 1960s, American political scientists introduced role theory to study political phenomena and behavior, arguing that different political subjects are in different positions in the political system. Each political status has a certain behavior pattern. When political subjects carry out activities according to the political behavior pattern corresponding to their political status, they are playing a certain political role. The behavior pattern corresponding to a certain political status is determined by “role expectations”. Role expectation is the process of interaction between external and internal expectations of the role subject.

1 Li (Rites): An Ancient East Asian International Order Based …

113

recognized the authority of the central dynasty and regularly paid homage to it, while the latter provided protection to the former in terms of trade and security. However, this relationship cannot be interpreted in terms of “equality” because we know that the concept of “equality” in the context of modern international relations is mainly relative to the relationship between the enslaved and the enslaved, the oppressed and the oppressed, and the colonial and the suzerain in the competitive international order. The international order of the ancient Roman Empire was based on the relationship between the suzerain and the colonial power, and the core actors were conquering, controlling, enslaving, plundering, and actively preaching to the noncore actors, so it can be called “inequality”. The modern international order is based on the principle of “equality of units”, but this “equality” began mainly for the Western powers, which also had a relationship of servitude and servitude with the colonial powers, and it was only with the development of the national independence movement of the colonies that the unit of “equality” was established. It was only with the development of the colonial national independence movement that the unit of “equality” included non-Western countries. In this sense, the modern international order is a variation of the international system of the ancient Roman era. However, under the “ritual” system, the relations between international actors are not competitive, not an order of slavery and servitude, oppression and oppression, and certainly not equal. The actors described by “equality” and its opposite—slavery, oppression—are all equally qualified competitors, and the world is an order based on (or simulating) family roles, order of difference, an order in which the role ethics of the family are copied into the relations of international actors and thereby determine the way in which actors behave. Thus, despite its sometimes problematic practical effects, the East Asian international system, with the Chinese tributary system at its core, can be described as a genuine “international family” based on a family template. The central dynasty is the head of the family, with the highest status but also with greater responsibility. The noncore actors are similar to the children of the family, respecting the parents but receiving various protections from them. “Parents” can act on their “children”, but they cannot use the words “slavery” or “oppression” to describe such actions. To accuse this principle of “inequality” is to use inappropriate words and frames of reference, just as parents cannot be accused of interfering with or controlling their young children by wiping their bottoms or wiping their noses. Unlike religion-based (e.g., caste system in India) or class-based (e.g., slavery in ancient Europe and hierarchy in the Middle Ages), the hierarchy based on the perception of family roles stems from the difference of different roles in the family, such as husband and wife, father and son, and brothers, who have different roles, different qualifications, different requirements, and different responsibilities and norms of behavior. In the contextual person model, human existence is first and foremost a role rather than an independent individual, and the concept of the contextual person in the Chinese context is different from that of “interperson” in the Western context. The concept of “interperson” in the Chinese context differs from that of “interperson” in the Western context in that the sum total of “interpersonal” is not “social” but

114

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

“earthly” or “worldly”. The sum of “human beings” is not “society” but “All-underHeaven” or “All-under-Heaven”, and “All-under-Heaven” is not outside the boundaries of the subject but is the sum of the common parts (or interdomains) between individuals. Therefore, it also includes part of the subject. The same difference exists between the concept of “All-under-Heaven” and “the nations” in the Chinese context and the concept of “international” in the Western context, namely International refers to the duality between independent actors, focusing on the sovereign individual, and the fundamental condition is the competition between the self and the other between individuals with legal equality, while the concept of “All-under-Heaven” lacks the sense of sovereignty, is not a dualistic opposition, and the subjects. There are only distances and relations between subjects. When the role of differences in religion, race, and economic power is reduced and “roles” are emphasized, the “qualifications” of actors tend to be different, and their demands and behaviors tend to be differentiated, with the result that the competitive tension between actors is reduced. The relationship between states under the “world” system is not basically competitive and therefore not one of servitude and servitude. Of course, it is not a contractual relationship based on freedom and equality but an ethical relationship of roles. It must be acknowledged that the “ritual” order was designed with China at the center, and it cannot be denied that the central actors in the system were sometimes arrogant and contemptuous of the peripheral actors. However, if one recognizes the context in which this order exists and the limits of our human perception of the world, one may be able to keep the criticism of the “Chinese-centric” character of this ancient international order at an appropriate level. The “ritual” order is based on the fact that China has long been at the heart of a civilizational sphere that is significantly more civilized than its neighbors and has a great cultural appeal to them. Geographically, the deserts, mountains, and oceans around China isolated China from the other three civilizations and made it the only strong civilization in East Asia, and for a long time, there were no materially or culturally strong challengers. It seems to be a common feature of our human cognition to construct an orderly world by gradually extrapolating from our own group. It is true that in Chinese history, there were “Da Qin”, “Da Han”, “Da Tang”, “Greater China”, and so on. However, this is not unique to China either. Japan is called the “Yamato”, “Great Japanese Empire”, and the same name applies to the Republic of Korea and Great Britain., etc. So behind all these concepts, there is in fact a model of perception of the world that is “my-groupcentered”. The important problem with the international order of “All-under-Heaven” is not that it is constructed in a self-ethnocentric way but that it is based on a negative “my-ethnocentric” cognitive model, a moderate, internal, humanistic worldview that extrapolates from the family role ethic. It is a moderate, introverted systemic structure based on a worldview that extrapolates from the family role ethic and is based on ethnocentrism.

2 The Operation of the Role Principle: The Three “Cultures” …

115

2 The Operation of the Role Principle: The Three “Cultures” of the “World” System It is important to note that the three basic “cultures” in contemporary international society cited by Alexander Wendt, the “Hobbesian culture”, the “Lockean culture”, and the “Kantian culture”, are judged by the relevance of the Other to the I and the degree of competition associated with it: Those “others” that pose a serious threat to the existence of “I” are enemies to be eliminated, and those that pose a threat but do not endanger the existence of “I” are competition. “The others that pose a threat but do not endanger our survival are competitive partners, and those that are beneficial to our survival are friends with whom we need to cooperate and help each other. The “principle of equality of units” is based on the individual, the Human Constant of Western society, and the actors see the problem from the individual, which in the end is based on the state as an international actor is a magnification of the individual as a social actor. The three states cited by Wendt can be regarded as an extension of the competitive interpersonal relations in the individual society. The world system, with the Chinese tributary system at its core, is also an order in which there is a common culture, but it cannot be described in terms of any of the three cultures described by Wendt because it is governed by a principle different from the principle of unitary equality. Under the role principle, the relationship between actors and the “other” is not primarily based on the “other’s” relevance to the “I”. Rather, it tends to divide people into different circles from the actors’ position in the system, distinguishing between internal and external, distant and close, close and distant, raw and familiar, elder and younger, respectful and inferior, and requiring the actors’ behavior to conform to the role they are expected to play. This principle contains not only the natural legitimacy of identifying with parental authority and the superiority of elders but also the responsibility of parents, children, elders to the young, and children’s participation in family affairs and coexistence and coprosperity with parents. We have already discussed that Mr. Fei Xiaotong’s so-called Differential Pattern is manifested in practice as three circles of the interpersonal relationship pattern of Lunyan society and their applicable principles, namely the “circle of relatives” and the “law of kinship”, “circle of acquaintances” and “law of human feelings”, “circle of strangers” and “law of fairness”.4 Theoretically, these principles are also reflected in Chinese people’s dealings with people from the “outside world”. That is, when we examine an international order in which China is at the center, the role principles that govern the basic interpersonal status of the core actors still come into play, also by first distinguishing between different circles, the circle of relatives, the circle of acquaintances, and the circle of strangers, and by applying different rules 4

Here, we draw on the findings of the “local psychology school” and “cultural psychology” in psychology, which focus on the characteristics of Chinese people’s interpersonal relationships and psychological patterns. Among them, Taiwanese scholar Huang Guangguo’s outline of the three circles and three principles of interaction among Chinese people is a refined analysis of Fei Xiaotong’s “Differential Pattern” (For details, see Hu et al. 2005, pp. 49–66).

116

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

in different circles. If we also use the concept of “culture” in the sense of common knowledge as described by Wendt, we can say that there were also three cultures in the ancient tribute system, but not the three cultures as described by Wendt, but the “culture” based on the model of interpersonal relations of the contextual person It is the “culture of kin, culture of acquaintance and culture of strangers” based on the interpersonal relationship model. These three cultures and their operations are discussed in more detail below. The first is the “kin culture”. This circle is an amplification of the first circle of the “Lun Jen”. The first circle of Chinese interpersonal relationships is composed of relatives, and this circle applies the “law of kinship”, which means that people in this circle trust each other completely, rely on each other, “do not distinguish between you and me”, and unconditionally help others while accepting help from others. The Chinese saying “blood is thicker than water” is an expression of this law. For example, in the relationship between the central dynasty and the Tusi, although the central dynasty usually rarely interferes in the internal affairs of the Tusi, when the Tusi are in conflict with other external actors, the central dynasty will give help, regardless of the cost, without any pay. Sometimes such a law was also applied to a few actors that were very close to the core actors, in which case the core actors were linked to other actors in a kind of mock-kinship relationship, and the former regarded the latter’s security as their own and the latter’s difficulties as their own and could give help regardless of pay or reward (historically, the central dynasty helped Korea, Vietnam, and other countries. Some practices can be classified in this category). In part, this state is similar to what Winter calls “Kantian culture”, except that the relationship between actors in this state is not based on an explicit contract and the actors are not equal, but on a kind of pseudokinship relationship, a “pseudokinship” In this state, the relationship between actors is not based on an explicit contract, nor are the actors equal, but rather on a pseudokinship relationship, a “pseudokinship”, a close friend in the sense of human. The second type can be called acquaintance culture. This circle can be regarded as a simulation of the second circle of Chinese, the circle of “acquaintances”, and the prevailing law can be regarded as a copy of the “Law of Humanity”. The prevailing law can be seen as a copy of the “laws of human kindness”. The pattern of relations between the core actors and most of the noncore actors within the system falls into this category. Actors in the circle are helping each other, but usually on a conditional basis (a condition that is not usually defined in terms or otherwise explicitly), i.e., I help you in this matter, and I also expect you to help me in some other matter. I give you a favor, and I expect you to return the favor; otherwise, I am not being facetious or humane. “Face”, “righteousness”, and “fame” play an important role in this circle. It should be noted that in this type of relationship, some of the closer relationships still tend to simulate kinship ties, or at least with the form of kinship, such as brother or father and son, concluded or expected to conclude a proposed brother or proposed parent–child relationship (proposed monarchy can be considered a form of proposed father-child relationship). Unlike competitive interpersonal relationships in individual societies, actors in incestuous societies tend to view the other as a potentially trustworthy and dependable object. The actor exerts some influence on the other, but usually not by

2 The Operation of the Role Principle: The Three “Cultures” …

117

changing his or her beliefs or lifestyle but by trying to draw him or her into his or her own interpersonal network (i.e., what is commonly referred to as “ties”). This is also evident in the relationship between China as a central actor and other actors. Ancient Chinese diplomatic “tie-up” (cajoling and bribing vassals so that they would not be dissident), “enfeoffment” (establishing the relationship between the proposed rulers and subjects), “peace” (entering into marriage), etc., can all be (to establish a pseudokinship relationship), and However, these relationships are usually nominal, and only some of them are integrated with the core actors over time, entering their “circle of kin”. Most actors remain independent and do not reach the level of “kinship” relationships. There are no or very few treaties between actors in this order, just as human relationships in the human state value mutual trust and do not require treaties (this is called “great faith but no treaty”). The conclusion and maintenance of the world system, with the Chinese tributary system at its core, relied neither on “interests” nor “power” but on “fame”. The socalled name was originally the status of an individual in the kinship system (i.e., “seniority”), which gave actors a code of conduct and was an important basis for “ritual. The status of the actors under the “name” was not equal, nor was the exchange between actors equal. Although China is a tributed country, economically, it is often not economical for China to pay tribute to some special products, while China, being tributed, not only has to “return the gift” but also often exceeds the value of the tribute many times, which is called “generous to the past but thin to the present” (similar to the Chinese This is the so-called generosity (similar to the Chinese practice of “you respect me a foot, I respect you a ten foot” when dealing with interpersonal relations). Over time, China has developed a mindset of “fame” rather than “profit” in its foreign relations. Of course, as a tribute-paying country, China also had something to gain, and satisfying the demand for “fame” was the most important gain of the tribute-paying countries. In the traditional tribute discourse, “fame” and “profit” are two different things, and the trade opportunities and security protection that the tributary countries receive are closer to the concept of “profit”, while the tributed China receives mainly “profit”. The trade opportunities and security protection received by the tributary states were closer to the concept of “benefits”, while the tributed China received mainly “name”. The exchange was also “equivocal” in the sense that each actor received something, but the equivocation was not one of use value but of “meaning”. This is a “premodern” (but also “postmodern”) mode of exchange, and one of the benefits of this approach for China is the ability to maintain good relations with neighboring countries and regions without having to pay a military price. The third type is the culture of strangers. This is the application of the third circle of Len people. The circle of strangers is generally composed of strangers who are distant and unrelated, and the Chinese classics have different expressions for this part, such as “extinct domain”, “the land outside of the world”, and “they are usually less culturally developed. They are usually less culturally developed, have not accepted Chinese culture or have accepted very little Chinese culture, and are not enemies but friends, or can be both enemies and friends. What modern international relations theory calls “anarchy” appears in part in this state. People in this circle are

118

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

outside the system of rituals, they have minimal information about them, they have no “shared knowledge” with the core actors, and the “role principle” does not come into play in the circle of the living. The “role principle” does not work in the circle of strangers, so it is difficult to locate them, and the “role principle” works only after turning this group of people into “acquaintances” or “relatives”. This group of people can enter the “acquaintance” circle through interaction and learning with core actors, i.e., “raw clan” can become “acquaintance”, but after they change from “raw” to “acquaintance”, they can become “acquaintance”. “The first thing you need to do is to get to know the people you are dealing with. The specific performance is: or ignore, indifferent, or you and I, fair game”. “If people do not offend me, I will not offend, if people offend me, I will offend” is the concrete embodiment of the “culture of strangers”. It is worth noting that, among these three cultures, only dealing with “living people” is the closest to the law of “fairness”, and only the actor as a “living person” is the closest to “equality”. Only the “living” actors are the closest to “equality”, and their exchange is the closest to the equivalence model. This is just like when we go to Libreville to buy vegetables, the vendors are usually “strangers” whom we do not know, and we bargain with them to buy and sell fairly, but not if the vendors are our relatives or acquaintances. Historian Ban Gu has a wonderful comment on this: “The government and religion are not their people, and the righteousness is not added to their country; they come to punish and defend, and go to prepare and guard. Their admiration for righteousness and contribution is received with courtesy…..”. “Soft faraway people will return to the four directions” “sent to usher in (Note: to, then for the award of the festival to send it; come, then rich its commission to welcome it.) We are so soft to the distant people” (Li JiZhongyong, The Book of Rites—The Middle Kingdom). When the Western powers knocked on the door of the Chinese dynasty in modern times, the Western countries also belonged to the circle of “strangers” to China, and the Chinese people followed the “culture of strangers” to deal with them. They were not only materially powerful but also belonged to a system in which the “role principle” was not dominant, it is impossible to convince these new “strangers”. Gunboats and commodities embodied the principles that governed the new world of strangers. The old Confucian experience of dealing with strangers failed completely in the face of these new strangers. As we pointed out in our discussion of the Lun Jen relationship model, it is difficult to convert the circles of “kin” and “acquaintances”, i.e., it is difficult for acquaintances to become “kin” no matter how close they are. In the world system, however, “kin” and “acquaintance” are not easily converted. However, in the world system, the conversion between “raw” and “familiar” is self-evident, and “relatives” and “acquaintances” are also convertible. In many cases, it is difficult to distinguish between “kin culture” and “acquaintance culture”, and the distinction between these two is more important than the distinction between “raw culture” and “acquaintance culture”. This may be because the perception of the circle of kin in society is based on blood and marriage, while the perception of the relationship between international actors is based more on the more variable factors of culture and interaction. In the world system, there are cases where the original belonged to a vassal state and then gradually integrated with the core actors and became part of them.

2 The Operation of the Role Principle: The Three “Cultures” …

119

In the opposite case, China was not always at the top of the order, and according to Confucianism, without moral rule (i.e., “benevolent rule”), the highest-ranking actors would fall behind the others. The role principle encompasses the underlying logic of role interchange. These three “cultures” thus appear to be quite different from the three cultures outlined by Wendt. These international actors are not independent, equal, and equally qualified “individual states”; they are not inherently competitive with each other, or if they are, the system tends to be designed in such a way as to keep such competition to a minimum. Of course, it is not that there is no conflict and no enemy under such a system, but rather, under this principle, there is a tendency to distinguish people from each other, and the problem of “enemy-versus-us” arises when there are problems in dealing with different people based on different principles. In other words, “enemy” is a secondary problem of behavior rather than a presupposition of behavior. Enemies can arise in all of these cultures. In the first state, the enemy arises when the kinship relationship or the proposed kinship relationship breaks down. For example, if a family divides its inheritance, it should act according to the principles of brotherhood, brotherly respect, and mutual understanding, but if one or both parties do not act according to the principle of kinship, a so-called “kinship dilemma” arises when brothers “turn against each other”.5 In the circle of acquaintances, if one party does not act according to the rules of human kindness, the other party may take care of face and not immediately take hostile action, but if you do not give face or tear face, it is possible to become enemies. The “stranger” is the least informed, most distant, and most uncertain category, and this state is the most likely to have hostile relationships. However, it is worth noting that even “strangers” are not objects of conquest, enslavement, control or change. “The other, unlike the native, is only strange, distant, or alienated, but not antagonistic, intolerable, or in need of conquest” (Zhao 2005, p. 51). If the Lun Jen model of interpersonal relations still influences our behavior today, then some of the principles of the world order derived from this Human Constant still influence, at least on an Unconscious level, the attitudes and behavior of core actors toward the “outside world”. If this is the case, then the discussion in this book may help explain some of China’s external behavior today. In fact, China’s foreign behavior patterns today still have a “humanistic” orientation that values “human feelings” and “relationships” and wants to build personal trust with the other side, such as China’s frequent use of. For example, China’s “old friend” diplomacy strategy is a manifestation of this. When two countries are in a difficult relationship, they are expected to break the deadlock through good relations with them. Of course, it can be argued that leaders of any country have this expectation of good personal relations to play a role in solving the problems of both countries, but this approach seems to be more often used in Chinese diplomacy. The so-called friendship diplomacy that has 5

It is a misconception that there is no conflict in kinship relationships. On the contrary, relatives are sometimes more vulnerable because of proximity and unclear rules, so sometimes conflict and hatred are worse between “brothers” who “turn against each other” than with “acquaintances” or “strangers. Sometimes the conflict and hatred between “brothers” who have turned against each other is more serious than with “acquaintances” or “strangers”.

120

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

been pursued for a long time since the founding of New China, “political accounts but not economic accounts”, is difficult to explain in terms of modern nation-state theory but can be explained by traditional Chinese models of interpersonal relations. China’s policies and patterns of behavior in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet are based on the “kinship culture”. In the period after the founding of New China, China joined the new international order of the “socialist camp” and still defined itself and its relations with the Soviet Union in terms of the role principle, although the new order differed from the ancient East Asian international order in that the central actor was not China but the Soviet Union, and China reported to the Soviet Union as its “big brother”. China expected the Soviet Union to play the role of “big brother”, but instead of taking care of and helping China’s “little brother” as China expected, the Soviet Union tried to control, interfere with, and change the behavior of its “little brother”. The Soviet Union was very disappointed, and the relationship eventually broke down. For a period of time, China’s relations with Vietnam, Albania, and North Korea were rather based on a “pseudokinship” relationship, so “comradeship plus brotherhood”, “fraternity”, and “compatriotism” and “fraternity” appear very frequently in this model of relations. China’s behavior toward these actors still conforms to the role principle as it understands it: it helps and takes care of its “brother” in the role of “big brother”, but, unlike the Soviet Union, does not try to change or influence the latter (or does not attempt to do so strongly). It is understandable that when the U.S. and other Western countries complain about China’s negative attitude toward North Korea and demand that China exert more pressure on North Korea in talks on resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, they are still judged by the Western model of relations, and a similar misjudgment is manifested in Western countries’ perception of the model of relations between China and Africa.

3 The Internalization of the “All-Under-Heaven” System The “Tianxia system” (the world system) governed primarily by the “role principle” is said to be a shrewd and peaceful framework for the international order in which the message of peace between China, as the central actor, and its neighbors on the left and right was evident and in which, for at least 100 years from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries, East Asia was more peaceful and stable than Europe, which had another international system. For more than 100 years, from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, East Asia was much more peaceful and stable than Europe, which practiced another international system. This family-derived principle can be applied among international actors because it is based, first, on the Human Constant of the central actor. While we have examined the principle and its forms of operation from the perspective of the central actor, for the “role principle” to become a principle that governs the international system, in addition to its compatibility with the behavior of the central actor, it must also be internalized to varying degrees by those actors on the periphery of the system. That is, actors outside of China in the ancient East Asian international system must also accept the rationale, at least to some extent,

3 The Internalization of the “All-Under-Heaven” System

121

and acknowledge the “roles” assigned to the central actors and themselves under the rationale, as well as the corresponding behavioral expectations. We therefore also need to look at the system from the perspective of noncore actors and examine why and how this long-standing international order was internalized. “Internalization” is a sociological and cultural anthropological concept that refers to the process by which an individual accepts social and cultural norms and grows from a biological person to a social person. The constructivist school seems to appreciate this term and apply it to the study of international relations. Indeed, the process of perception and acceptance of international rules and order by international actors is very similar to the process of socialization of human beings. Winter elaborates three levels of internalization of an international order. The first level is out of compulsion, which is the most elementary internalization. This is the case for China’s acceptance of unequal treaties in its modern history. Since it is forced, it is not strictly speaking a true internalization. The second level is that of interest, i.e., a choice made by the actor after considering the factor that “accepting the system will bring benefits”. This is the case in everyday life: there are rules that we do not like but have to accept because we cannot survive without them. This also applies between international actors. The third level is conscious acceptance based on jurisprudence, which is the highest level of internalization, such as the acceptance today of the principles of “equality” and “sovereignty” of the modern international order (Wendt 2000, pp. 338–344). Wendt’s analysis of the internalization of the international order is largely applicable to the ancient Chinese tributary system as well. While ritual is certainly a world order designed from the core actors, it is also internalized by noncore actors. In traditional Chinese contexts, the internalization of institutions was usually expressed in the Chinese-centric term “kingdomization”, which involved peripheral actors accepting Confucianism and acting in accordance with “rituals”. There are at least two facts that suggest a high degree of internalization. First, although there were times when the system failed due to the constant change of dynasties in China and the numerous rises and falls of neighboring countries, the system provided a largely peaceful and stable order in East Asia for more than 2000 years (its collapse was only the result of recent Western shocks). Second, many peripheral actors throughout history have taken it upon themselves to demand moral education from the core actors, to be “ennobled” by the Chinese emperor, and to take pride in receiving a seal of recognition from the central dynasty (e.g., the “Seal of the Japanese King” in Japan), a request that was sometimes denied by the Such requests were sometimes rejected by the central government (mainly out of disdain). The high degree of internalization of the system by international actors is what makes the system work so effectively over time. The reason why an international order is internalized by international actors is first that actors, like individual human beings, have demands for security, status, and interaction. The noncore actors in the world system are able to satisfy this demand by receiving practical benefits such as protection, trade order, and security as a result of accepting “rituals”. From the perspective of the core actors, China’s longstanding material and cultural dominance allows it to provide a “public good” to the system. According to Japanese scholar Takeshi Hamashita, the Chinese tributary

122

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

system provided three public goods to East Asia: security (the tributary states did not have to maintain a permanent military force, which meant that most intraregional disputes did not have to be resolved by force), commercial opportunities, and a system of cultural and trade exchanges (cultural exchanges and commercial transactions between different vassal states were possible) (Hamashita 1999). To this can be added the legitimacy given to the governing order of the vassal states through enfeoffment, the pacification of civil strife, etc. (Junbo 2009) and the core actors gaining respect, the “name” of submission, and the legitimacy of their own rule. However, the functionalist perspective can only explain the internalization of international actors in a general sense because the same explanation applies to the ancient Roman colonial order as well as to the internalization of the modern international order. The modern system of international relations that originated in the West has been “internalized” to varying degrees by most state actors in the world today because the West has been in a position of power since modern times and actors internalizing this order can gain security, order and status. The majority of countries in the world today accept the U.S. hegemonic position in the world to varying degrees also because this arrangement can provide order, security and other “public goods” to most countries (of course not all state actors have reached the third level of internalization). Therefore, the functionalist explanation does not explain how the internalizing behavior of the world system differs from the internalizing behavior of the international system governed by other principles. The author believes that it needs to be complemented by the interaction of international actors to characterize the model of internalization of the world system. First, the higher moral demands of the role principle on actors reduce the tensions within the system, giving it a more moderate and introverted nature and thus increasing the degree of voluntariness of the internalization of the system by actors. In contrast to the unit equality principle, which is based on the Human Constant of the “Individual Jen” and has a more competitive and juridical orientation, the role principle, which is based on the “human” model, has a more competitive and juridical orientation. The “role principle”, based on the Individual Jen’s Human Constant, has a stronger moral orientation and higher moral requirements for actors. It requires that the supreme ruler of the state, the emperor, and the core actors of an international order should be the highest moral role model, such as the father in the family, and must restrain the urge for “profit” and the desire for power, not to bully, plunder, or enslave the weak, but to assume the responsibility of caring and helping like a father and a brother. This is reflected in the system’s emphasis on moral concepts such as “virtue”, “benevolence”, “harmony”, and “the human heart”, “To govern with virtue is like the North Star, in which all the stars arch” (Lunyu-Weizhengpian, The Analects of Confucius—For the Government). Virtue is the key word not only for understanding Chinese politics but also for understanding the order of the world. Of course, it is not that the core actors of the system have at all times been “virtuous” and “benevolent” but that these moral concepts, repeatedly outlined by scholars and constantly proclaimed by the rulers, are the Human Constant of the operating principles and central actors of this international order. They are a natural expectation of the role of the “elder”, and actors will be praised if they do so and blamed if they do

3 The Internalization of the “All-Under-Heaven” System

123

not. Guided by this orientation, the actor’s behavior toward the “outside world” is likely to be rooted in negative “egocentric” behaviors such as indifference, apathy, or arrogance but is unlikely to be rooted in positive “egocentric” behaviors such as conquest egocentric behaviors such as conquest, missionary and hegemonic. Historically, the higher moral demands on the core actors are also consistent with the fact that the system was not maintained primarily by forceful conquest, ideological unification, or coercive changes in the behavior of neighboring actors but primarily by the Chinese “rituals”—the organizational form of the polity, the rituals of the people, and the rituals of the people—the organizational form of the polity, the concept of Leninism, the cultural attraction—to maintain the relations between the core actors and the vassal states, and thus it is essentially a noncoercive international system. The Chinese could ignore the circle of “strangers” as long as they did not interfere with their own lives, rather than actively conquer or change them. Even in its heyday, the Chinese empire did not establish colonies, and there was no large-scale enslavement, plundering, or slave trade by sovereign states under the tribute system, as there was under the ancient Roman Empire and the modern Western international order. A vassal state was not a colony; it not only maintained its independence but also did not need to change its beliefs and way of life. If it did change, it was mainly the result of voluntary, active absorption and imitation by the actors. The emphasis is on their “self-education”, which is “to be benevolent for themselves”.6 It is important to understand this because many Westerners today do not understand the relationship between the core actors in this system and the vassal state but only as a suzeraincolony relationship based on the experience of their individual societies (as many Westerners believe was and is the case with the Chinese central authority and Tibet, for example). Western history has referred to “Hellenistic states” and “Romanized states”, discourses that express a more positive way of acting by core actors over noncore actors in the international order, but one cannot use the term “Chineseness”. The term “Sinicization” cannot be used to describe the international system of ancient East Asia, where the core actors behaved in a more negative way. This is an introverted approach of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you” (a model that does not take into account that “what you do not want” may be “what people want”), not (which does not take into account that “what one wants” may not be “what one wants”), and therefore the institutionalization of the system is less resistant. The resistance to institutionalization is low. This more voluntary mode of internalization is perhaps illustrated by the story of Zhuge Liang’s seven captures of Meng Huo in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, which is a household story among Chinese people: Zhuge Liang was in absolute power both materially and culturally, but Zhuge Liang knew that he could not convince Meng Huo by force alone, so he captured him seven times and finally convinced him by the power of morality. One of the incredible things for people living in today’s international order 6

“To be benevolent is up to you, not to others”. The author believes that this is not only a way of personal cultivation but also a way of “establishing the world order”, that is, the establishment of the world order of “benevolence” should depend mainly on each country itself rather than on external forces. A country cannot impose its will on another country, and it is not "benevolent" to force other countries to belong to it.

124

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

is that, due to the emphasis on “virtue”, traditional China was not sensitive to the boundaries of the state and to the geographical and ethnic origins of the rulers (there are many examples of the Central Plains being ruled by foreigners in history) because the legitimacy of rule lies in the presence of “virtue”, and the geographical and ethnic origin of the ruler became less important. The Chinese were sensitive to foreign rule only in modern times after they accepted the idea of the nation-state. Second, from the perspective of actors’ cognition, the role principle of internalization of actors basically does not touch on the identity of ethnic groups, thus reducing the resistance of neighboring ethnic groups in institutionalization. The division of people under the role principle was not based on the merits of ethnicity and religious beliefs but on closeness and civilization. The relationship between the heavenly dynasty and the vassals in the order of the world is only a natural extension of the rational order of Lun Jenism, which has a center but implies a concept of inclusiveness that transcends national and racial boundaries, without absolute “other” and “alien”. The concept of “one family under heaven” and “all brothers within the four seas” is not just a utopian idea but leads to important cultural and political consequences. The so-called family and brotherhood here transcend not only race and blood but also religious beliefs. This concept gives legitimacy to the coexistence and coprosperity of different races, religions, rituals, and ways of life. It is undeniable that the concept of ritual is “ethnocentric” in that it recognizes the superiority and inferiority of actors. The ancient Chinese terminology of barbarians, Rong (戎), Di (狄), Qiang (羌), Man (蛮), Min (闽), and Yi (夷),7 also reflects the arrogance of ancient Chinese. It should be noted, however, that the division of the “ritual” order was not primarily based on the racial principle of “superiority” or “inferiority”, nor was it based on the religious principle of dividing into “clean” or “dirty”, my religion or paganism, but on the basis of the level of culture to distinguish affinity, proximity and inferiority. According to this philosophy, China was surrounded by uncivilized but not evil people, barbaric lands but neither pagans nor inferior people, but only because they had not yet reached a certain stage of civilization. These areas were called “raw clans” in contrast to the “mature clans”. The perimeter was considered barbaric more from a cultural point of view than from a religious-theological basis. The people in the culturally underdeveloped areas were not considered inferior races, and even the backward and barbaric areas were not objects to be changed and conquered but were “benevolent” by their own strength, which meant allowing them to maintain their own beliefs and lifestyles, and letting the “barbarians This meant allowing them to maintain their beliefs and ways of life, and letting the “barbarians” remain “barbaric” (to the extent that the central dynasty often suffered blows from neighboring actors who had not returned to “benevolence”). This stress-free, pacifist approach gave 7

In the Shuowen Jiezi, the word "Qiang" is interpreted as follows: The Western Rong shepherd is also a sheep herder. From human, from sheep, sheep also sound. The southern barbarians from the worm, the northern Di from the dog, the eastern raccoons from the radical, the western Qiang from the sheep: these six species also. Southwestern Bo, Jiao Yao, from the people; cover in the Kun land, quite smooth nature. Only the eastern barbarians from the big, big, people also. Yi customs benevolent, benevolent life, there is a gentleman immortal country. Confucius said: “The road does not work, the desire to suffer from nine barbarians, the rafter floating in the sea. There is to also”.

3 The Internalization of the “All-Under-Heaven” System

125

dignity to the communities living in the periphery of the central dynasty, making them less anxious about internalizing the “ritual” order and thus abandoning (or at least mitigating) their resistance to institutionalization. There is no doubt that the world system, with the Chinese tributary system at its core, is an outdated international system based on the “law of kinship”, “law of human kindness”, and “law of the living”, which are based on the humanistic approach. The fact that it works between international actors with different qualities is related to the unclear concept of “sovereignty” of ancient states, unclear territorial boundaries, low trade and human interaction, and insufficient information exchange. It is clear that this is no longer the case in today’s world, and to ignore this without properly emphasizing the rationality and desirable dimensions of the system is to seek a sword. This book is not intended to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the system, nor is it an attempt to restore it. However, we are merely pointing out that it has been a largely effective international order in East Asia for more than a thousand years, that it is governed by a completely different rationale than the one we are familiar with that governs modern international relations and that this rationale is likely to be overlooked and misinterpreted, as people today are accustomed to seeing things through the frame of reference of modern international relations. Our view is that since the modern international order of Western origin is also imperfect, it should allow for a more objective, non-Western-centric approach to discussing other types of international institutions that have existed throughout history and to consider the question of whether their experience as human beings has anything to offer today. In the author’s view, the “role principle”, based on the social experience of the Len people, has operated successfully for a long time as the governing principle of an international system over a large area of the planet. The hierarchical structure of this system, with its orderly and hierarchical structure of respect and inferiority, should be more introverted and moderate than the system governed by the “unitary principle of equality” and more capable of bringing order and stability and harmony. In fact, the principle of role ethics also plays a role to a certain extent in the current international order, as international actors still constitute different “roles” depending on the size, power, cultural attractiveness, geography and economy of the country, and people still have different behavioral expectations of countries with different roles, such as what is usually referred to as the “great power’s role”. What is commonly referred to as “the demeanor of a great power” and “the responsibility of a great power” is an expression of role expectations. This principle also implies that to be recognized as a great power by others, a great power must break the fetish of power and commit to moral goals. The modern concept of the nation-state was built on the basis of individual societies, and the competition between states, born of competition between individuals, induced states to blindly pursue purely material power. Because of this, all modern orders based on a balance of power have been fragile and have always ended in brutal wars and the simultaneous destruction of all sides of the balance of power. Most of the discourses on interstate relations are based on the assumption that states are in a state of jungle, but in no case can the “international order” be determined exclusively by “hard power”. The greatness of the great powers

126

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

in the international order lies primarily in their ethical power, not only in their hard power. The use of military power requires moral approval to be most effective.

4 The Shortcomings of the Chinese Tributary System and Its Collapse How was the Chinese tributary system able to remain largely effective in East Asia for a thousand years? This was mainly because the region had been dominated by China alone. For thousands of years, China had virtually no rivals, either in terms of culture or power, and even if China’s neighboring countries were united, they would not be able to confront the Chinese dynasty. The Chinese tributary system was not an anarchic system. The Chinese Empire became de facto the dominant power in this system. The central king of the empire functioned as the horticultural government of the system, and this allowed the values and principles of behavior of the core actors to influence the noncore actors and become the fundamentals of the system. The stability of the Chinese tributary system depended largely on the changing balance of power between the central dynasty and the neighboring states. When the central empire was unified and strong, the order was able to maintain peace and stability for a longer period of time, while when the central empire was divided and weakened, warfare occurred. In addition, the tribute system, which was linked to the unclear concept of “sovereignty” of the ancient kin states, the lack of territorial boundaries, the low level of trade and people-to-people exchanges, and the inadequate exchange of information, was able to provide a more stable order in East Asia for a longer period of time. At the same time, however, the Chinese tributary system also had its own drawbacks. It was a hierarchical, networked international system with the Chinese central dynasty at its core. Its basic tenets of ritual and the virtues and benevolence that underpin the legitimacy of the regime are not procedural rules that link modern nation-states to each other, but rather the system’s ethical norms of the culture of the core actors are not universally accepted by all noncore actors. The standards of these moral codes are difficult to grasp, for example, what constitutes “ritual” and what constitutes “virtuous” or “benevolent” rule, and their interpretation is highly. This means that the core actors have a greater degree of discretion. This means that the core actors have a greater possibility of interpreting their own actions as legitimate and those of noncore actors as illegitimate. Central dynasties often “lecture” smaller neighboring states who are disrespectful, just as a strict father lectures his disobedient children. Under this system, states were ranked according to their proximity and thus had different responsibilities and obligations, not as equals, and the peripheral states paid tribute as an expression of their obedience to the central dynasty. This system was a “Chinese-centric” imperial system in which the core actors developed a sense of “national arrogance”, a sense of arrogance and discrimination toward the neighboring world, and a sense of Greater China. On the other hand, the neighboring

4 The Shortcomings of the Chinese Tributary System and Its Collapse

127

countries had an inner resentment that the people of the core actor countries could hardly experience. In addition, the prolonged dominance of one country prevented competition between countries and prevented the creation of external conditions to restrain the absolute royal power of China as a core actor, making it difficult to bring about changes in the social and political system. An important reason why the Peace of Westphalia is regarded as a point in the formation of the modern nation-state is that an evenly balanced situation had been created, and through 30 years of war, a series of power entities with their own nationalities had to mutually recognize the boundaries of their respective power/strength and had to accept units of interest based on a balance of power. They had to accept units of interest based on the balance of power and their power based on strength. This historical situation had not existed in East Asian history since the Qin dynasty. This is one of the reasons why a new international system has not emerged. It was inevitable that the Chinese tributary system would collapse under the impact of the modern international system. The ancient Chinese concept of “Tianxia” (the world) was an ideal model of the world system. In this ideal state, all people in the world were linked by a kinship principle, forming a large, harmonious kinship group, the so-called one family under heaven and all brothers within the four seas. This state of affairs is described as “one family” and “all brothers within the four seas”. It should be noted, however, that this ideal state has never been realized and is a kind of utopia. The attempt to extend the ethics of the family to “Tianxia” and to establish a righteous order for the world is still primitive thinking (Huang 2023). The de facto Chinese tributary system that existed in ancient East Asia never fulfilled this ideal, and to apply this ideal to the Chinese tributary system is to idealize the international system of ancient China. To attempt to design a future international system from this ideal that is superior to the modern international system is even more of a metaphysical dream. It is a one-sided idea of Chinese scholars from the standpoint of China, the central actor in the tribute system, and in the end, it is a manifestation of Chinese imperial thinking. The Chinese tributary system is an outdated international system, and it is impossible to use the idea of the Chinese tributary system to overcome the flaws of the modern international system. China today does not want to restore the dynastic system (and indeed it cannot) but to integrate into the modern international system. Chinese scholars should be fully aware of the fact that the Chinese tributary system is now a negative cultural heritage for most countries in East Asia that were once under it and that the modern international system is more attractive.

128

6 The Lun Jen and “All-Under-Heaven” (Tianxia)

References Hamashita, Takeshi. 1999. International Opportunities in Modern China: The Tribute Trade System and the Modern Asian Economic Sphereinda (Zhongguo de guoji qiji:chaogong maoyi tixi yu jindai guoji Jingjiquan). Translated by Zhu Yingui, and Ouyang Fei. China Social Science Press. He, Xinhua. 2006. An Experimental Analysis of Ancient China’s. Southeast Asian Studies (Dongnanya Yanjiu) 1. Hong, Sheng. 2010. For a Peaceful World (Wei wanshi kai taiping). China Development Press. Hu, Xianjin, et al. 2005. Face: The Chinese Power Game (Mianzi: Zhongguoren de Quanli Youxi), edited by Huang Guangguo. Beijing: Renmin University Press. Huang, Yusheng. 2023. The Dual Identity of the Modern State and the Principles for the Construction of a Possible Future World System—A purely theoretical analysis and conjecture. Journal of Tsinghua University, Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition (Qinghuadaxu Xuebao) 1. Huipeng, Shang. 2013. Essentials of psycho-culturalism: Theory and Method of Comparative Studies of literate civilizations (xin li wenhua xue yaoyi: da guimo wenming shehui bijiao yanjiu de liun yu fangfa). Press of Pekeng University. Junbo, Jiane. 2009. The Chinese Tribute System: Conceptual Structure and Function. International Political Studies (Guoji Zhengzhi yanjiu) 1. Qin, Yaqing. 2006. The Possibility and Necessity of a Chinese School of International Relations Theory. World Economics and Politics (Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi) 3. Wendt, Alexander. 2000. Social Theory of International Politics. (Chinese version) Shanghai Century Publishing Collection, Mission. 2000. Zhao, Tingyang. 2005. The World System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions (Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhexue daolun). Jiangsu Education Press.

Chapter 7

“Harmony” and the Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Lun Jen

In the face of China’s rise, the waves of “China threat theory” in the West may not all be malicious, but there may be a cultural misinterpretation behind it because in the Western historical experience (and to a large extent in modern international relations), the rise of a great power must be accompanied by foreign expansion and, in most cases, ultimately by force. The problem is solved by force. It is natural to associate China’s future strength with its expansion and to feel a sense of insecurity based on this experience. China has been explaining to the world that it will not threaten the world even if it is strong, and one attempt to do so has been the introduction of a series of ideas centered on “harmony”. However, the challenge for China in explaining its behavior is that it must be able to justify a pattern of behavior that is different from that of modern nation-states and has a different experience from that of the existing international order. Most of the current explanations for China’s behavior lack academic backing, and many clichés do not go beyond the old imperial examination system of essay writing for scholars. Therefore, it is perhaps understandable that some in the West see “harmony” as a hollow slogan for Chinese self-glorification. Contemporary China is a national actor embedded in a rich civilizational system. Although it has internalized some of the norms of behavior in the contemporary international order, it is not a modern nation-state in the full sense of the word. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret China’s behavior patterns exclusively on the basis of modern “nation-state” theory and modern international relations experience. We need to go beyond the theoretical context of modern international relations and seek a research perspective that takes into account the rich cultural connotations and qualities of actors. Psycho-culturology can meet this requirement. Rather than simply declaring a nation to be peace-loving or nonpeace-loving or drawing simple conclusions such as “secure personality” or “anxious personality” as earlier researchers of nationhood did, this perspective views the state as an actor that is primarily influenced by its internal culture. Rather, we link actors to their “state of being” (what we call “Human Constant”), examine the sociocultural context and psychosocial equilibrium model in which they are located, and identify what emotional control and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_7

129

130

7 “Harmony” and the Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Lun Jen

psychosocial orientation forces guide their behavior. The actor’s behavioral patterns are characterized by this. The author believes that only “harmony” in the sense of human-people, humangroup, and group–group relations is close to the meaning of “equilibrium” in psychocultural science. “Harmony” in this sense can be understood as a vague understanding of Chinese people’s own behavior pattern, which is translated into a professional expression in psycho-cultural science: a psychosocial homeostasis pattern associated with the Human Constant of Chinese people—Lun Jen. Harmony has both negative and positive meanings. Harmony in the negative sense means that the Human Constant of Lun Jen has a high degree of equilibrium, and the behavior of the actors tends to be static, negative, and introverted; harmony in the positive sense means that people in the Human Constant of Lun Jen have a value orientation that promotes the harmony of interpersonal relationships as the most worthwhile thing to pursue, and this value orientation directs the behavior in the direction of pursuing harmony.

1 Harmony in a Negative Sense: Characteristics of the PSH Model of the Lun Jen The two core concepts of psycho-culturology, “Human Constant” and “psychosocial homeostasis”, and their implications for the analysis of state actors have been described earlier (Chapter 2 of this book). According to this idea, the social environment in which we live can be compared to a shelf on which we place family, parents, marriage, gods, beloved people and things, as well as ideals, beliefs, and other cultural norms that we give different meanings and place in different places. We put the most important and frequently used things closest to us and where we feel most comfortable using them (equivalent to layer 3 of the psychosocial homeostasis schema: “intimate social relationships and culture”), and these things form a “life package” with which we maintain. When something is missing from the life package, we feel uncomfortable and inconvenient and move things from other layers of the shelf to make up for it. Psycho-culturology considers this dynamic process of cultural differences not only as the mystery of social and cultural change but also as the key to grasping the behavior of national actors. Psychosocial homeostasis (line B in Fig. 4 in Chap. 2, and see Huipeng 2007) is an important concept we propose to measure the ease with which Human Constants can achieve equilibrium. Each Human Constant maintains a dynamic equilibrium, except that some are easier to achieve, while others require more diverse means to reach equilibrium. The closer the Human Constant is to the individual, the more difficult it is to achieve security, and the equilibrium tends to be lower, while the opposite tends to be higher. Human Constants characterized by an emphasis on human mutuality and a weakening of human independence have a higher equilibrium than states characterized by an emphasis on human independence and a weakening of human mutuality, and among the several basic human interpersonal states we know about, the Lun Jen

1 Harmony in a Negative Sense: Characteristics of the PSH Model …

131

is the one designed to achieve security most easily. This is mainly because the kin group occupies the highest priority in the psychosocial homeostasis model of the Lun Jen and is the most important element of the Life Package (in contrast to the Western “individual” Human Constant, where the peer group occupies the highest priority). “There are many possible models of psychosocial homeostasis, and some cultures are more likely than others to maintain the stability of psychosocial homeostasis. In traditional Chinese social culture, the most commonly expressed characteristic of most people is a network of relationships through kinship connections, and this is relatively the easiest (model). Almost all people begin their lives in a family life dominated by parent–child relationships. Parenting has the highest priority to occupy the third level of the individual. Most people experience leisurely and comfortable emotions here. For the Chinese and others like them, because their culture dictates that a person’s self-esteem and future must be closely tied to his basic group, his parents, brothers, sisters, and relatives become permanent residents of his third tier. This group can share his glory and is the one to whom he must seek solace when he is disillusioned” (Hsu 2002). Individuals living in Chinese society can easily fulfill the requirements of psychosocial homeostasis within the third layer without having to jump to the outer layer. Interpersonal intimacy is constant and readily available to him. If for reasons beyond the individual’s control (e.g., war or famine) he must cross to the outer layer, he will seek the ties of a previously existing but then unknown kin group or regional group, develop kin-like ties, continue ties to the original kin group or local group, or play the necessary role to enable him to have a foothold in a nonkin environment” (Hsu 2002, p. 249). There is a wealth of material on the nature of traditional Chinese patriarchal society and the powerful cohesiveness of the Chinese kinship system, so I will not dwell on it in this book. The author intends to cite only the vivid description of Chester Holcombe, an American missionary to China at the end of the Qing Dynasty, to corroborate this point. He described that the Chinese had strong ties to their families and that they left home only because they had business or personal matters to attend to. After leaving home, whether in a foreign country or in another country, he always sees it as a kind of exile, more or less homesick. Those who died in other countries almost always made the same arrangements. They ask someone to bring their remains back to their hometown and bury them next to their ancestors. He says that this Chinese attachment to home gradually developed into a religion, a final return regardless of life or death (Holcombe 2006). A controversial point might be whether the kinship system of today’s Chinese people is still so cohesive, given that China has changed so much? It is true that China today is very different from the time He described, but the Human Constant resembles something like a biological gene that is unlikely to change fundamentally. This cohesiveness is still evident even today, when the tide of the commodity economy has drawn many Chinese from their families to the metropolis. This is evidenced, for example, by China’s annual “Spring Festival”, perhaps the world’s largest folkloric migration phenomenon. The Chinese do not have deep-rooted religious beliefs or religious holidays, and the two major holidays, Spring Festival and Mid-Autumn Festival, are days of family reunion. The Chinese “New Year” (Spring Festival) has

132

7 “Harmony” and the Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Lun Jen

become a sort of religious ritual, so it is not too much to say that the Chinese have evolved from an attachment to home to a religion. The “holy land” in the hearts of Chinese people is “home”, and “going home for the New Year” can be called a “pilgrimage” for Chinese people. “Home” can be called the “pilgrimage” of Chinese people. “Home” is the “root” of the Chinese people, and the emotion of “home” extends to attachment to the homeland, forming a strong overseas Chinese “return to the roots of the leaves”. The “home” sentiment extends to attachment to the homeland, forming a strong “return to the roots” sentiment among overseas Chinese. The grand ancestral rituals held annually in many places related to the Chinese ancestors, the Yellow and Yan Emperors (such as birthplaces and burial sites) in China today seem to continue to bear out Chester Holcombe’s description from more than 100 years ago. The next question that needs to be addressed is: What makes the Human Constant of kinship group supremacy the highest degree of equilibrium? The answer lies in the characteristics of kinship groups themselves. We know that, in contrast to other types of groups (e.g., peer associations in individual societies), kinship group membership is constant, automatic, and nontransferable, and there is little room for individual speculation about gaining or changing membership. Moreover, since members of kinship groups play different roles, they rarely have the same demands as each other, and therefore, there is little competition. This makes the circle of traditional Chinese life very stable, and it is not necessary to mobilize the inner subconscious (they do not care much about the soul or the afterlife, the Chinese do not have a religion, there is no place for gods in the Life Package, and the dead ancestors are more important than the gods), nor is it necessary to mobilize the outer layer (e.g., exploring, preaching, conquering others) to obtain a high degree of security. A certain Human Constant is consistent with a certain mechanism of emotional control. Emotional control mechanisms are the restrictions that society places on its members in terms of the people, objects, and cultural norms to which people will bet their emotions and the ways in which they will bet them, and these restrictions are important tools for individual socialization. The emotional control mechanism associated with the Human Constant of Chinese people is the “contextual-inhibitory” type, as opposed to the “normative-repressive” type of control in individual societies, which is characterized by the fact that actors act primarily on the basis of context rather than norms and adopt this control mechanism. This control mechanism is characterized by the fact that actors control emotions based on context rather than norms and by “suppression” rather than repression. First, in contrast to the “normative” model of behavior, this control mechanism allows individuals to behave based on specific social situations (e.g., role, status) rather than on a constant internal norm. Due to the high degree of kinship group cohesion, individuals are firmly bound to their kinship circle, and they are more sensitive to the distinction between “my circle” and “others’ circle” and tend to perceive different circles as different qualitative worlds with different rules, and their behavior is different depending on the context. Human behavior has different meanings depending on the context. As the circle of intimacy of a person extends outward, the individual’s responsibility and obligation to the other decreases in order.

1 Harmony in a Negative Sense: Characteristics of the PSH Model …

133

“Contextual” behavior tends to be more flexible in its approach to problems, thus causing less internal anxiety when one behavior is in conflict with the other. Since the actors are highly emotionally invested in the circle to which they belong, they usually do not have strong emotional reactions and impulses to interfere with things outside the circle and are more likely to accept the concepts of “others have their own saints” and “they live and let others live”. They are less enthusiastic about devoting themselves to certain abstract ideas and ideologies and therefore are less likely to try to change the beliefs and behaviors of people in other circles. Second, unlike the “repressive” control mechanism, this control mechanism does not forcibly suppress those desires and emotions that are incompatible with cultural requirements into the subconscious but rather suppresses them into the shallower levels of consciousness (mainly the “restricted surface consciousness” or “preconscious” level). “If the process of socialization emphasizes repression, the main part of stress will tend to be internalized, and the main psychological needs will be focused on inner balance rather than on harmony with Outer World. On the other hand, if the socialization process emphasizes inhibition, the main part of stress will be focused on the relationship with his immediate peers, and the manifestation of psychological needs will emphasize harmony with the world in which he lives rather than internal balance” (Hsu 2002). An important manifestation of the inhibitory control mechanism is the tendency of emotional configurations to be in the interpersonal circle to which the individual belongs and to be integrated with roles, i.e., the role or ethicalization of emotions. Emotions are highly specialized into specific forms such as filial piety, fraternity, loyalty, faithfulness, and respect, and each specific form of emotion is applicable only to a specific role and cannot be transformed into each other. These highly specialized emotions are very effective for interpersonal connections but are less likely to shift from one emotion to another, just as some animals have highly specialized organs that are highly effective for one particular function but difficult to adapt to other functions. Therefore, one of the drawbacks of ronin society is that it is less capable of concluding nonkin and nongeographical voluntary groups. These characteristics of emotional control, in turn, reinforce Chinese connections within intimate circles, placing individuals in a highly stable state where they are in a state of “you in me, me in you” with others and are more likely to achieve psychosocial homeostasis and less likely to have internal anxiety (and if they do, they are more likely to resolve it). The individual’s behavior is more likely to be easy to follow and to gain peace, tranquility, balance and understanding of the meaning of life’s origin in a less material life.

134

7 “Harmony” and the Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Lun Jen

2 Harmony in a Positive Sense: Psycho-Cultural Orientation of the Lun Jen A certain Human Constant is also associated with a certain psychosocial cultural orientation (PCO). Psychosocial cultural orientation refers to the psychologically stable choice tendencies of people in a common cultural tradition and is a collective term for a group’s value system. It is a directive that defines what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is bad, what is expected and what is avoided, what is encouraged and what is denigrated by group members. “Psycho-cultural orientation” guides the process of “psychosocial equilibrium”. There are various models of psychosocial homeostasis, and no matter which model there is, there is a force that encourages certain ideas to be superior to other ideas and gives them a dominant position, and people are guided by it to choose what is important and ignore what is unimportant from a variety of choices. This force is psycho-cultural orientation. Psycho-cultural orientations mold people’s psychosocial homeostasis processes into certain patterns. As noted earlier, the Lun Jen is a Human Constant in which individuals are more likely to feel secure; thus, the psychosocial homeostasis pattern is static in character, and the psycho-cultural orientation associated with it leads people to make choices in the direction of pursuing harmonious interpersonal relationships. Psychocultural orientation can be divided into two interrelated levels, namely people’s activity orientation and cultural ideals. The activity orientation of human society is “human-centeredness”, and the cultural ideal is “complete harmony between people”. Harmony in the positive sense refers to these two levels of psycho-cultural orientation. In contrast to the “individual-centered” orientation of individual societies (American and European societies) and the “supernatural-centered” orientation of hierarchical societies (Hindu societies), the orientation of people’s activities in ethnocentric societies is “anthropocentric”. The orientation of people’s activities in human society is “human-centered”. The orientation of this level is to regard human relationships, with kinship as the core, as the most valuable and to place them at the top of the third level of psychosocial homeostasis (PSH), while independent individuals, supernatural gods, etc., are not emphasized. The experience of Chinese civilization can be said to have focused on human relationships, such as the “Three Principles and Five Constants” category introduced by the dominant Chinese ideology, Confucianism, and the resulting development of a set of values such as filial piety, loyalty, fraternity, respect, propriety, trust, and temperance, all of which address how people should get along with each other: how to be a good son, a good father, a good husband, a good wife, a good ruler, a good subject, etc. Chinese drama and fiction literature also focus on solving the problem of human relationships. In such societies, individuals live in a circle of close relatives, close to each other and dependent on each other, each being both a transmitting and receiving terminal, and people deal with each other according to their role in the group and according to the reciprocity principle of “repayment”. Remembering the benefits of others, we receive and return the favor. If you return more than you receive, you will be encouraged by society (i.e., “repay

2 Harmony in a Positive Sense: Psycho-Cultural Orientation of the Lun Jen

135

a drop of kindness with a spring”); if you return less than you receive, you will be accused of “not knowing the world”; if you do not return, you will be accused of “ungratefulness”. In connection with this, the cultural ideal of human society is “complete harmony between human beings” (as opposed to “complete freedom of the individual” in individual society and “complete unity between human beings and the supernatural” in hierarchical society) (as opposed to “complete freedom of the individual” in the society of individuals and “complete unity of man with the supernatural” in the society of ordered men). The cultural ideal is the value goal of most members of society, i.e., the ultimate state that a culture seeks, and it provides an ideal picture for people. Cultural ideals are generally embodied in mainstream ideologies such as religion and recorded in classical literature as well as in the writings of society’s sages. The cultural ideal of Chinese society is mainly embodied through the dominant culture—Confucianism. The cultural ideals of the Chinese people lead people in the direction of pursuing harmony between people. The ancient Chinese took “harmony” as the basic moral standard of human beings and proposed the idea that “the use of ritual is the most important thing, and harmony is the most important thing” and that people should practice loyalty and forgiveness in dealing with each other. In such a direction, it is not worthwhile to aspire to and pursue a picture of the afterlife; Chinese culture does not have a “heavenly” setting similar to Christianity or the “other side world” of other religions, and the world after death is envisioned as no different from the real world. Chinese culture also does not have the utopian ideas of taking what you want, equality for all, and complete freedom for the individual who have emerged in modern Western societies, and the ideal Chinese society is one in which people keep their own parts and have harmonious relationships with each other. Tao Yuanming’s description of the Peach Blossom Garden is considered to be the ideal society to which the Chinese aspire, and the Chinese often use the metaphor of “the paradise of the world” as a metaphor for those impossible ideals. There are good fields, beautiful ponds, mulberry and bamboo. The paths of traffic, dogs and chickens hear each other. Among them, men and women dressed like outsiders. Yellow-haired children, and enjoy themselves”. This picture of society is neither linked to the afterlife world nor some supernatural, nor is it a utopia that is fundamentally different from the real society, but rather an order without competition and intrigue, without interference, with men cultivating and women weaving, with self-sufficient production and harmonious interpersonal relations, which can be said to be only an “optimized version” of the real society. The “commonwealth society” described by Confucianism is the concrete form of Chinese culture’s premier vision: “The way of the world is public: choose the virtuous and the capable, and talk about faith and cultivate harmony. Therefore, people should not be alone in their relatives, not alone in their sons; so that the old will have an end, the strong will have a use, the young will have a growth, the reserved, the widow, the orphan, the lonely, the invalid and the sick will have a support; men will have a share, women will have a return. Goods, the evil is abandoned in the ground, do not have to hide in their own; evil is not out of their own body, do not have to be their own. This is why the plan is

136

7 “Harmony” and the Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Lun Jen

closed and not rise, theft and chaos and thieves do not make, so the outside door and not closed. This is called ‘Cosmos’ (礼记 大同篇 The Book ofRites)”. The essence of the Cosmos society is still ethnocentric and emphasizes “complete harmony in human relations”, and this ideal is not too far from reality: some Western high welfare societies today have already achieved this in part. The cultural ideal also extends to attitudes and behaviors toward the outside world, which is the “world” as an ideal world order. The ideal world order should be “all brothers within the four seas” and “all nations in harmony”. When dealing with different cultures and different peoples, we should recognize the differences between them, and the interaction between different countries should be voluntary rather than forced, and the countries should be harmonious but not uniform, different but not in conflict with each other. Harmony is the basis for coexistence and cogrowth. This ideal world order is derived from the idea of “harmony in the family”, an expanded and harmonious proposed kinship group—this can be seen as an amplification of Peach Blossom Garden. It is important to note that to say that the cultural ideal of an ethnocentric society is “complete harmony among human beings” does not mean that human relations in an ethnocentric society are necessarily harmonious. In fact, all cultural ideals cannot be fully realized, just as the ideal of “complete freedom of the individual” in individual society and the ideal of “complete unity between human beings and the supernatural” in order society cannot be fully realized, so the cultural ideals of ethnocentric society cannot be fully achieved. The cultural ideal of a human society cannot be fully achieved either. However, the significance of the cultural ideal cannot be denied because of its idealistic nature. The significance of cultural ideals lies in the fact that they encourage people to work in a direction and form a set of values that are consistent with this direction and govern people’s behavior; those who conform to this direction will be praised, and those who do not will be denigrated. For example, the traditional Chinese cultural values of praise and concessions, praise and fighting, praise and literature, praise and martial arts, praise and stillness, praise and motion, praise and double, praise and single, praise and cooperation, praise and division, praise and aggregation, praise and dispersion, praise and balance, praise and imbalance, etc., are consistent with the cultural ideals of Chinese society. It should also be noted in passing that this value orientation, which aims to promote harmony in human relations, has universal significance and is still needed in today’s world and is an important resource for China’s soft power in the future. The general value of “complete harmony between people” not only guides people’s behavior toward the outside world but also becomes a worldview that is widely reflected in Chinese philosophy, art, Chinese medicine, drama, fiction, painting, and various forms of materialization. For example, the Chinese courtyard and the Great Wall of China have been criticized as materialized forms of conservative Chinese thinking. However, if we look at it from another perspective, the Great Wall, as the world’s largest fortification, precisely materializes the nonoffensive values of the Chinese that praise and depreciate fighting. Lu Xun once criticized the conservatism and backwardness of the Chinese for the different uses of their four inventions in China and in the West: Westerners use gunpowder to make guns to

3 “The Myth of Chinese Expansionism”: A Psycho-Culturological …

137

conquer others, but the Chinese use it to make firecrackers and fireworks to dispel ghosts and pray for blessings; Westerners use the compass to sail and explore, but the Chinese use it to read Feng Shui. However, from our perspective, these examples are equally convincing to prove that the Chinese value harmony and lifestyle.

3 “The Myth of Chinese Expansionism”: A Psycho-Culturological Perspective Explanation We have already described that this Human Constant of the Lun Jen is characterized by a high degree of equilibrium; that the behavior patterns of actors in this state tend to be generally static, introverted, cohesive, and moderate; and that psycho-cultural orientations orient people toward valuing interpersonal harmony. The next step is to examine the past behavior record of this actor in China through the literature and accepted facts. If we generalize the general orientation of a person’s personality and behavior by analyzing his or her upbringing and psychosocial homeostasis patterns, then we would do well to examine his or her past behavior record. If his past behavior is generally consistent with the theoretical analysis, it will not only verify the correctness of the conclusions but also predict his future behavior to some extent. Much of the West’s concern about the future of China stems from a lack of understanding of China’s past behavior. A major pretext for the U.S. war in Vietnam was to prevent communist China from expanding abroad. Francis L.K. Hsu, a scholar of behavioral science and founder of psycho-culturology, wrote an article entitled “The Myth of Chinese Expansionism” (Hsu 1997, p. 106), which not only revealed the Chinese way of life, attitudes, and behaviors toward the outside world from a psychocultural perspective but also gave numerous examples in response to the prevailing theory of Chinese expansion. More than 40 years later, this problem remains unresolved: the West still judges China by its own experience, and China continues to justify itself loudly. Therefore, it is still relevant today to revisit the examples analyzed in. Hsu’s article and to add some new ones to illustrate Chinese attitudes and behavior toward the outside world. Historically, the Chinese were not expansionist toward the outside world. Ancient China was strong enough to establish a large number of overseas colonies characterized by conquest and enslavement, but historically, China did not establish such colonies and1 did not engage in large-scale slave trading activities. We know that slavery was about controlling people as crops, that the slave trade bought and sold 1

“The Chinese by nature are not, and cannot be, colonists without a radical change in their nature. Although there were Chinese in South and North America, in the Australian colonies, in Burma, Siam, in the East Indies, Java, and Japan, none of them was their place of settlement. They were not colonists, but only temporary immigrants. They are much like migratory birds, living in one place for a few months, then building a nest somewhere far away in memory and raising their offspring for a long time without change. They are forced to leave home and live in exile because of an emergency. However, before they left they had made well thought out plans to return home. These

138

7 “Harmony” and the Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Lun Jen

people as commodities and that this extreme form of control and enslavement of others had a psycho-cultural basis: a Human Constant based on the competitive interpersonal relationships and insecurity of the actors. The relationship between the central dynasty and the neighboring vassal states under the Chinese tributary system was neither an exploitative nor exploited relationship of “centralized power extracting surplus products” as defined in Western textbooks (Leighton 2005, p. 120). The relationship is not one of slavery and servitude, as in the case of a sovereign and a colony. China’s attitude toward the vassal states was negative, and in most cases, the relationship was symbolic, with no intention of changing their way of life or beliefs, let alone enslaving them (this point is discussed in detail in Chap. 6 of this book). Historically, China has lacked active outward missionary or ideological dissemination activities, and there have been no religious wars of the kind seen in Western history aimed at crushing pagans. The spread of Confucianism in China’s neighboring regions can be said to have been entirely automatic, a conscious act of internalization by neighboring actors. Some vassal states took the initiative to ask the central government to send people to spread Confucianism, which the central government refused (mainly out of disdain). For example, in 730 A.D., a Tibetan king and his son-in-law asked the Tang Dynasty emperor to teach them about ancient Chinese texts and history. However, the request was refused. When the Tibetan king asked again and was denied, he sent 400,000 troops to attack the Tang Dynasty after the death of his princess. Additionally, during the Tang Dynasty, approximately three thousand Chinese Buddhist monks traveled to India on foot in groups. Their purpose was not to spread the wisdom of Confucius or other Chinese sages but to learn the teachings of Buddha and obtain the true scriptures to bring back to China (Hsu 1997, p. 106). Hsu uses the example of Zheng He’s voyages to illustrate Chinese behavior. “only a few Chinese explorers in history are famous. A great eunuch general (Zheng He) of the Ming Dynasty led a large Chinese fleet to the Atlantic (Southeast Asia) and as far as the east coast of Africa. …… in this regard, Chinese and European immigrants present a strong contrast in history. European immigrants established independent countries such as the United States, Mexico, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand. Chinese immigrants have never independently developed a new country in a new territory, except once in Borneo, where they established a new territory for ten years. The Chinese were highly inclined to their homeland” (Hsu 2002, p. 356). The year 2005 marked the 600th anniversary of Zheng He’s seven voyages to the West, and some Chinese criticized Zheng He’s voyage as a “mere masturbation”, saying that Zheng He only served to proclaim the majesty of the emperor and was forgotten, without having any significant impact on the world.2 This criticism is obviously seen from an offensive position. Zheng He did not spread beliefs such as Confucianism, did plans and hopes they always took to heart.” See T.J. Ho, “The Chinese People as They Are,” Part II, Sect. 8: “Why the Chinese Cannot Become Colonists?”. 2 Cai Jun: “Zheng He went to the West, the biggest masturbation in history” http://www.china.com. cn/culture/txt/2006-11/06/content_7323489_2.htm.

3 “The Myth of Chinese Expansionism”: A Psycho-Culturological …

139

not try to change the beliefs and lifestyles of the locals, and did not establish colonies and enslave the indigenous population. If a voyager kills and enslaves wherever he goes so as not to be “forgotten”, then it is better to have no such influence. From our point of view, the Chinese Zheng He and the Western Magellan and Columbus embodied different lifestyles and values in the same mass voyages: Zheng He’s behavior was more pacifist. A Westerner named Eric Durschmidt, standing in the position of the West, commented on Zheng He’s behavior in a book: “Fortunately, Western civilization survived thanks to a young Chinese emperor of the Ming Dynasty who was partial to slander and ordered the navigator Zheng He to return to the sea. Had Zheng He continued his voyage westward, he might have been able to destroy the merchant ships of Venice and Genoa, as well as the sultans of Istanbul” (The Guardian (UK), April 5, 2008). The author’s uninformed commentary is, in the words of an old Chinese saying, “to judge a gentleman with the heart of a villain”. In recent times, China has accepted some positive, progressive, and upwardly mobile values and ideas from the West, which have led to some changes in the way Chinese people behave. However, the basic Chinese interpersonal state and the corresponding psychological and cultural orientations are not easily changed. Except for a few special periods, there is still a great deal of continuity in Chinese perceptions and attitudes toward the outside world. Take, for example, the pattern of Chinese behavior in dealing with border issues, which is well illustrated by the study of American international relations scholar Taylor Fravel on China’s handling of border disputes. After compiling its practices in all border disputes from the new China to 2004, Fourtellin concludes that “since 1949, China has made substantial concessions in 17 of its 23 territorial disputes. …… It has only gained less than half of the disputed territory. In 15 of these disputes, China’s compromises have provided for the signing of bilateral treaties and the final resolution of territorial disputes. In contrast, China has never compromised on six of the 23 disputes, but has been adopting a delaying strategy toward them” (Taylor Fravel 2005, pp. 55). It is clear that China’s approach to border disputes is “more often to compromise than to use force” (Taylor Fravel 2007, p. 44). He believes that the Chinese compromise in dealing with border issues is primarily motivated by the stability of the domestic regime. However, we ask: Is not it also an option to be tough on the border issue out of concern for the stability of the regime at home, thus shifting the domestic conflict outward? The author believes that a psycho-cultural explanation seems more convincing: Chinese people’s value orientation of praise and concessions in dealing with interpersonal relations and nonaggressive behavior in praising and fighting are important reasons for China’s compromising behavior in dealing with border issues. Taking war as an example, it is not true that there were no wars of aggression under the ancient tribute system, but in general, most of the wars in Chinese history were defensive, mostly against the attacks of the nomads in the north. There were also times when China took the initiative, but they were actively defensive, a “lesson” to the aggressors. Ancient China rarely stationed its troops after helping neighboring countries quell rebellions but rather withdrew them. Several conflicts that have emerged since the founding of New China can be said to have inherited this pattern: these wars (e.g., Sino-Vietnamese, Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indian, etc.) all arose from border

140

7 “Harmony” and the Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Lun Jen

issues. China’s behavior in these conflicts was characterized by the fact that when the border dispute reached a certain point, China counterattacked, but when the counterattack reached a certain point, it did not continue to advance but withdrew its troops. This is a “teach the aggressor a lesson” model. Although China has said proactive things such as “liberating the whole world” during some extraordinary times (e.g., the Cultural Revolution), it has not shown this in its actions (e.g., stationing troops abroad). One might argue that China sent troops to foreign countries during the Korean War, but the Korean War was clearly an extension of the border conflict, as China was aware of the threat to itself. The pattern of behavior of the new China on border conflicts is intrinsically linked to the pattern of behavior of ancient China in conducting wars to pacify and garrison borders. Thus, A.J. Toynbee, a scholar more familiar with Chinese history, is right: “Rather than being a people with foreign ambitions to pursue conquest, the Chinese were by nature robustists who wanted peace and tranquility in their own country. In fact, China has never attacked first, as long as it did not attack first. In modern times, the Opium Wars, the Sino-Japanese War, the Korean War, and the wars related to China thus far could all be called wars of self-defense in any case” (Toynbee and Ikeda 1985, p. 290). From this, we might predict that if there is a war in the future, China is likely to remain in this pattern of behavior. “The Chinese have never supported a single missionary movement or experienced any major religious disputes or persecution, and only very few subgroups exist outside of kinship and geographical groups. …… Of all the Chinese emperors who went to war abroad, none had any interest in spreading religion or the Chinese way of life” (Hsu 2002, p. 249). This nonideologicalism that characterizes Chinese attitudes and behavior toward the outside world is still more or less evident in the Chinese today. The Chinese still tend to believe that there are various kinds of truths in the world, different ones for different occasions, and thus cannot accept the view that some universal principles are supreme. The basic principles of Chinese diplomacy— “noninterference in each other’s internal affairs”, “peaceful coexistence”, “equality of nations regardless of their size”, “opposing hegemony” and “peaceful settlement of disputes”—are not only diplomatic rhetoric but also reflect, to some extent, the values of traditional Chinese culture. It is also consistent with the Chinese behavior of “minding one’s own business” and “cleaning one’s own snow”. Today, China is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations, but she is still not very enthusiastic about matters that do not directly concern her but rather devotes much of her energy to countering criticism of China’s human rights in the Western world and to internal issues such as Taiwan and Tibet. That is, her behavioral orientation has thus far been primarily devoted to gaining external recognition and defending against attacks rather than selling herself and attacking others. One can accuse this pattern of external response of lacking enthusiasm for certain universal human principles and of being characterized by solipsism, but one cannot say that it is offensive and hegemonic. Even during the Cultural Revolution, when China claimed to “liberate all mankind” (an ideological slogan that was the result of learning from the West), it did not send its troops and propagators of Maoist thought abroad. It is difficult to assume that a strong China would promote its ideas abroad.

3 “The Myth of Chinese Expansionism”: A Psycho-Culturological …

141

Perhaps the following points need to be made to make the analysis in this book more valid. First, the behavioral characteristics of the Chinese that we analyze are neutral and nonvalue judgments. Chinese behavior is both introverted and peaceful and at the same time passive and conservative. Historically, China has had little conquest, colonization, or missionary activity, but at the same time, it has lacked concern for and protection of the outside world and has been prone to self-indulgence and delusions of grandeur. While being introverted, normal, and contented, they also lacked the internal drive to seek newness and change, so the society of Lun Jen as a whole exhibited stagnant characteristics. The higher the psychosocial homeostasis, the easier the means for actors to obtain equilibrium, and the more negative their behavior. This is the two sides of the same coin, accepting that one side must also accept the other side. Second, the Chinese psychosocial homeostasis model discussed here and the Chinese attitudes and behavioral styles toward the Outer World associated with it speak of an archetype, where we freeze the change factor. In modern times, the Chinese have embraced progressive, enterprising, and revolutionary values of Western origin, which have had some influence on the way people behave. However, deep culture, which is the principle of behavior, does not change as easily as superficial culture, such as dress and food. We did not become Americans by drinking Coca-Cola, wearing cowboy clothes, or watching American blockbusters; there is still a great deal of continuity in our patterns of interpersonal relationships and in our attitudes and behavioral principles toward the outside world. This continuity gives us stable patterns of behavior, which are the basis of our cultural identity and the basic presupposition of this book’s analysis of the problem. Third, predictions about China’s future behavior certainly do not mean that China will not necessarily follow an expansionary path in the future. This depends on a variety of factors, including the world situation and the factors of those in power, as well as changes in the basic human condition of the Chinese people. If China places too much emphasis on internalizing the existing international order (this is what we usually call “international convergence”), for example, by overemphasizing interests and fetishizing material (military) power, then the logic of Chinese behavior will change, and it is not impossible that China will end up on the path of foreign expansion. Theoretically, the more China internalizes the modern international order, the greater the Human Constant of Chinese people changes to a “personal” model, the more positive and active their attitudes and behavior toward the outside world become, and the more likely they are to engage in foreign expansion and hegemony. What I want to emphasize here is that the attitude and behavior of an international actor toward the outside world has a lot to do with the Human Constant of that actor. Human Constants that provide individuals with a high degree of security are more conducive to viewing the Outer World and conducting international affairs in a peaceful manner than those that do not. Our analysis also suggests the problems that can arise when too much emphasis is placed on being “in tune with the world”.

142

7 “Harmony” and the Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Lun Jen

References Holcombe, C. 1895. The Real Chinaman. Dodd, Mead, 1895. (Chinese version: Zhonguoren Bense). China Yanshi Press, 2006. Hsu, F.L.K. 1983. Rugged Individualism Reconsidered: Essays in Psychological Anthropology University of Tennessee Pr; 1st. The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K. (Chinese version: Xü Langguang zhuzuoji), vol. IX. Taibei: Nantian Shuji, 2002. Hsu, F.L.K. 1997. The Challenge of the American Dream. The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K (Chinese version: Xü Langguang zhuzuoji), vol. 7. Taibei:Nantian Shuji. Huipeng, Shang. 2007. Types, Dimensions, and Dynamics of Psycho-Social Equilibrium of “Human Constants”: Some Interpretations and Additions to Hsu’s Theory. International Political Studies (Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu) 3. Leighton, Robert. 2005. The Vision of the Other: An Introduction to Anthropological Theory, 120. Hwa Hsia Press. Taylor Fravel, M. 2005. Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes. International Security 30 (2): 55 (Fall 2005). Taylor Fravel, M. 2007. Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes. International Security 32 (3) (Winter 2007/08). Toynbee, A, and Daisaku Ikeda. 1985. Looking to the 21st Century. Translated by Xun Chunsheng, Zhu Jizheng, and Chen Guoliang. International Cultural Publishing Company.

Chapter 8

China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward and the Dilemma

After the end of the Cold War, some scholars predicted, based on the experience of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, that China would also collapse. In their framework, China appears to be an unspeakable monster. On the other hand, China’s achievements in recent years have given us such confidence that the academic community has developed the concept of the “Chinese model”, arguing that China’s achievements and development concepts reflect the requirements of a new era and a new mission and further reasoning that “traditional Chinese culture has the capacity to abandon. The Chinese traditional culture has the ability to abandon Western capitalist modernity” (Ye 2009). In the context of modern international relations theory, it is true that China’s behavior in the world today has many unexplained uniquenesses, but are these uniquenesses such that it is possible to disregard the principles of the current international order and the changing trends in the world and find a different way out? Obviously, this is both a practical question about how to grasp the present and future China and an inescapable academic question when we think about people, civilization, and the state from the psycho-cultural path. From our perspective, the two extreme views are the result of different emphases on two dimensions of the state: the organizational and the civilizational. The view of China as a monster places more emphasis on China in the organizational sense and ignores China’s special attributes as a civilization, while the overconfident view places more emphasis on the civilizational side of China and ignores the dilemmas China encounters as an organizational entity in the current world system. As already pointed out, the foundation of Chinese civilization is Chinese society, and the traditional Chinese state form is a concentric circle type of “kinship-state” based on the Human Constant of “Lun Jen”. This characteristic has been influential to this day. In a certain sense, China today is not a “nation-state” in the full sense of the word, but it continues to have some of the characteristics of the kinship-state of the past. Kinship-state is the obligation of mourning according to blood relations, and “kinship-state” is a form of state with different ways of ruling according to the closeness of relations. It is consistent with the Lun Jen model of social order. The nation-state emerged in the modern West only a few hundred years ago, and China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_8

143

144

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

accepted this concept in an even shorter period of time, and the characteristics of China’s own kinship-state model did not change radically as a result of its acceptance of the nation-state concept. Moreover, the characteristics of China’s own kinship-state model were not radically changed by its acceptance of the concept of nation-state but only by squeezing the rich connotations of being a kinship-state into the narrow concept of “nation-state” in its system of expression. Many scholars in this country today have recognized this point. A few foreign scholars have also recognized this, such as the British scholar Martin Jacques, who, in his somewhat sensationalist book When China Rules the World, recognized that the modern concept of the nation-state is inappropriate for China and that China is not a “nation-state” but a “civilized state”. “The dominant face of China today, including its social relations and customs, its way of life, its sense of superiority, its concept of nationhood, and its obsession with unity, is a product of Chinese culture rather than a manifestation of the modern NationState. on the surface, it resembles a nation-state, but at heart, it is a civilized state” (Jacques 2010, p. 332). I believe that what he calls a “civilized state” is a civilizational view of China’s “costal state” and its behavior following its own logic. However, Martin Jacques sees China exclusively from the perspective of the civilizational entity, exaggerating the influence of the civilizational entity on Chinese state actors and ignoring (or underestimating) the organizational side of China and the dilemma it faces in today’s nation-state world system. Moreover, they misunderstood the concept of the “nation-state”. While civilizations can answer the question of what kind of foundation and heritage we have and reveal some characteristics of Chinese state behavior, China, as an organization, is also a member of the current world system of nation-states and cannot act without taking into account some universal “rules of the game” under the international system. China, as an ancient civilization, is acting in a changed world and therefore must also be examined in a new world context. What are the fundamental changes that have occurred in the world since modern times? In the author’s view, the following three changes are the most fundamental for China. First, a new international system (or the “Westphalian system”) has emerged in the West in modern times and gradually spread to the world. The vast majority of countries in the world now accept this system and deal with each other on a fundamentally different principle and in a different way from our historical “tribute system”. Second, the urbanization that emerged after the Industrial Revolution in the West has dramatically changed our way of life, causing a great change in the family, and the Human Constant and values that form the basis of our civilization are being emphasized. This trend of change is worldwide, but it is contrary to our traditional society. Third, the great progress in science and technology has changed and is still changing the world, and the development of transportation and information technology has made the world truly one, and today people are seriously discussing topics such as “world governance”. Fundamentally, all three of these changes originated in the Western world and are foreign to Chinese civilization, but they are world trends and constitute the general environment in which we live. Thousands of years of Chinese civilizational experience need to be tested by a changed world, and this is where the dilemma of today’s and tomorrow’s China may come into play. If discussing the

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

145

basic human state of the Chinese people and the characteristics of Chinese civilization linked to it is similar to testing the genes of living organisms, then examining China’s behavior in today’s world and the future direction of China cannot be done without considering the changes in the environment, both in the world and in our own society. We know that organisms evolve by constantly adapting to their environment, which affects the expression of their genes, resulting in the emergence of new traits and new genera of organisms, while some become extinct because they cannot adapt to the changed environment. China’s strong civilizational continuity and its huge scale can be compared to a “dinosaur” that has survived evolutionary adaptations and is still very much alive today. This “dragon” has survived and is still very much alive, showing that it has a strong ability to constantly correct its mistakes to adapt to new environments. China today has recognized that the world has changed and is still changing dramatically and is making perhaps the most drastic changes in the world to adapt to its new environment. The unprecedented profound changes and the unprecedented vitality of this ancient civilization suggest that it may not become a dinosaur to be eliminated from the evolutionary path. Civilization and organization are mutually influential. On the one hand, the state as an organism is built on the soil of civilization, and the functioning of the organism is influenced by the characteristics of civilization. This influence is summarized by the fact that today China is still not a “nation-state” in the full sense of the word, but it still has a certain nature of a “servant state”, and the changes that have taken place in China and its behavior in the international community follow its own logic. Without an understanding of the civilizational side of the state, the Chinese themselves will be unable to establish themselves in a changing world because they have lost the roots of their cultural identity, and the outside world will easily lose sight of China’s unique experience as a civilizational entity and fail to truly understand China. On the other hand, organizational entities can also influence civilizational bodies. Changes in national political and economic systems, advances in technology, and the influence of foreign values can affect families, basic interpersonal conditions, and the way people behave, affecting the expression of the “cultural genes” recorded in civilizations. If we consider China as a civilization without examining its organizational aspects, we will easily fall into the problem of overemphasizing China’s specificity, failing to explain its changes and adapt to the new world environment, and we will be on the path of holding on to the past and contradicting the world trend. The legacy of the “kinship-state” to China is twofold: it has both drawbacks and strengths, difficulties and opportunities, and China’s achievements and challenges are equally great, both arising from the same foundation. There is a contradiction between civilization and organization, and in a sense, the problems facing China today stem from the contradiction between the two. However, it is also the interplay between civilization and organization that gives China its distinctive cultural personality, its dynamism of change, and the possibility of making a unique contribution to the world. China’s interaction with the world today is characterized by transplantation, integration, and adaptation at the organizational level, as well as competition, dialogue, and integration at the civilizational level. China’s progress and dilemmas seem to boil down to the question of how to graft modern forms of state organization on top of ancient Chinese

146

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

civilization, both of which can be interpreted in the context of the interconnection and mutual influence of civilizational and organizational entities. The author summarizes the challenges and dilemmas that China faces in the modern world system in the following main areas. The author is of course aware that these aspects are not merely academic issues, but it is inevitable to discuss the theme of “the relationship between man, state, and nation” in order to give thoughts on the problems and directions China is facing today from the perspective of academic research.

1 Challenge 1: A Model of the Kinship-State that Has Lasted for Thousands of Years Versus a Modern Nation-State System China has continued as a largely intact and unified civilization for more than 2000 years since the introduction of the county system in the Qin Dynasty. During this time, there were divisions, but the time of unification was much longer than the time of division. Each time the political unity was broken, it was a great fusion of races and cultures that prepared the conditions for a new political unity and eventually still allowed the civilization to recover and expand. Moreover, there is another interesting phenomenon in Chinese political history: even during the period of division, none of the divided parties considered division to be the norm, all considered themselves to represent orthodoxy, and all claimed that they would achieve unification once conditions were ripe. Great unity has been the heritage of Chinese history and culture for thousands of years, and China’s preference for alien domination over division is arguably unique in the history of human civilization. How one looks at this issue depends on the perspective of the observer: if one looks at it from an organizational perspective (as the mainstream of modern international political theory tends to do), one might ask: why has China’s highly centralized political rule remained fundamentally unchanged for so long? However, from a civilizational perspective, the question might become: why has China succeeded in bringing together such a large population over such a vast land area for such a long period of time? These two questions from different sides have a common answer, namely China is a nation of service based on the Human Constant of the Luns. At present, China is organized in the form of a “People’s Republic”, but in the civilizational sense, it still has the nature of a contextual state, or the nation-state as an organizational form is based on the civilizational entity of a contextual state. The combination of the high concentration of political power on the organizational side and the grand unification on the civilizational side is, in a sense, still the legacy of the contextual state. The nation-state system has its roots in Western individual societies but has evolved into a common human civilizational achievement. The modern nation-state system is widely accepted around the world because it has advantages not found in other systems, such as the Chinese kinship-state system.

1 Challenge 1: A Model of the Kinship-State that Has Lasted …

147

One of the advantages of the nation-state system is that under this system, the legitimacy of political power comes from the nation (people). The state is integrated with the interests of the majority of the population, and the state is no longer a “private property” that the ruler can dispose of at will but a “national interest”. The state is no longer a “private property” at the disposal of the ruler but a “national interest”, and the people are no longer indifferent, subservient subjects of the state, but citizens (although, of course, this transformation usually requires a series of institutional designs). However, under the Chinese Fu-state system, the legitimacy of political power did not come from the people but from the father as the head of the family. The boundaries between family, society, and state are unclear. The “family state”. Another advantage of the nation-state system is that it affirms states rather than empires, dynasties, or certain religious beliefs, and it affirms the right of the members of the system to choose their own beliefs without outside interference and that the state, regardless of size and wealth, and regardless of belief, is an independent and equal member of the system, whose sovereignty and territory are inviolable. Although this system has not always been possible, it is undeniable that the establishment of the system has not prevented wars, but after continuous twists and turns, these principles have been accepted by most countries. However, the kinship-state system is hierarchical, and its rationale is based on the role of “ritual” rather than on the unit of equality. The third advantage is that the bond of connection between nation-states is not moral, blood, geopolitical, or religious but only a purely procedural rule. That is why the nation-state system is also known as the treaty system. Provisions are not substantive with a value orientation but neutral beyond religion and value judgments, providing, Kissinger’s words, a “procedural design” that is acceptable to any state (Kissinger 2015, p. 24). This system provides a public measure of international law for the peaceful coexistence of nation-states. These three points are the most important reasons why the modern international system is superior to any international system known to man and has been “internalized” by the behavior of most of the world’s nations. Chinese kinship-state system: there is a lack of procedural rules between states that transcend culture, belief, and morality. The fourth advantage of the nation-state system is based on the limitation of state power in the form of laws, the guarantee of individual rights, and the mutual restraint of state power. The king is under the law, and state power is exercised in accordance with the law and is subject to oversight. However, under the kinship-state system, here is a lack of checks and balances on the core power of the state; individuals or organizations are de facto able to override the written law, and their will can either operate outside the law or can become the law itself. The nation-state system has more merits than any other international system in history, which is why it has spread throughout the world and is today accepted by the vast majority of the world’s nations as part of the achievements of modern human civilization. The need to transform China’s “kinship-states” system into a modern nation-state system is one of the great challenges facing contemporary China. However, the nation-state system also has drawbacks. The basic tendency of this system is to divide, and since its establishment, countries have been split up, becoming

148

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

more and more numerous and smaller, i.e., the world has a tendency to “individualize”. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 established the borders of the countries of the European continent, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Portugal gained independence, and the nation-state became the basic legal and political unit of the world system. In the eighteenth century, the American War of Independence was won, and the first nation-state, the United States, emerged in America. Inspired by the American example, the people of Latin America started an unprecedented national independence movement in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and established 19 nation-states between 1804 and 1828, including Haiti, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Argentina. During the two world wars in the twentieth century, many countries in Asia and Africa gained independence from the imperialist colonial system and established a large number of nation-states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, there was another surge in the establishment of nation-states in Europe, with 15 nation-states emerging from 1990 to 2006 (when Montenegro became independent). By this time, all countries of the world (the number of sovereign states in the world increased to 197 in 2011) were included in the nation-state system. Thus, the basic trend of the modern nation-state system is that the states are becoming increasingly divided and smaller. However, China has not changed in this direction; it has thus far resisted the worldwide trend toward national division and maintained an intact unity. Not only has it not split, but with the return of Hong Kong and Macau and China’s constantly expressed consistent position on Taiwan, it has instead demonstrated its clear tendency to coalesce. It accepts the modern international system, but it still maintains strong cohesion. Many predicted China’s split based on the trend of nation-state development under the modern international system, but all failed. Is it possible for China, which is facing the emerging world environment of the nation-state system with its ancient and large body, to avoid splitting up and to transform itself directly into a new “world state”? There are different views on this point. The visionary historian Toynbee saw this in Chinese civilization and gave it high praise: “Taken as a whole, the history of imperial China is one that has been politically successful and continues to exist today in the form of a ‘People’s Republic’. This is in stark contrast to the history of the Roman Empire, which attempted and failed to achieve lasting political unity and peace in the West” (Toynbee and Daisaku Ikeda 1985, pp. 287–289). According to the British historian Toynbee, it seems that in the future, too, the West will not be able to complete the political unification of the world, and that among the several ancient civilizations of the world, only China is extremely resilient and capable of completing such unification (Toynbee and Daisaku Ikeda 1985, pp. 287–289). He believes that of the few ancient civilizations that exist in the world, only China has been so resilient. India is also an ancient civilization that has continued for a long time, but the national situation in India today is rather the creation of the recent British colonial rule, and the ancient South Asian subcontinent was mostly divided. However, it would be irrational for the Chinese today to listen to him and become complacent, thinking that China can dominate the world. Toynbee, as a philosopher of history, saw more of China’s achievements as a civilization and the drawbacks of the modern nation-state

1 Challenge 1: A Model of the Kinship-State that Has Lasted …

149

system and less of the drawbacks of China’s ancient Chinese tributary system and the advantages of the modern international system. China as an organism is still a member of the nation-state world system. Its behavior is still subject to the principles of the international system. Its highly centralized nature is still characterized by the “home rule” of traditional imperial China, and the disadvantages of this model in the contemporary world are becoming increasingly apparent and may even outweigh its advantages. Reforming this model and dealing with the resulting problems is a great challenge for China in the future. In this regard, Kissinger has a good grasp of the situation, commenting on China today with a civilized perspective: “The ‘rise’ of China in the twenty-first century is not a new thing, but a replay of history. Unlike the past, China has returned to the center of the world stage, even as the inheritor of an ancient civilization but also as a modern power acting on the Westphalian model. It has maintained the traditional notion of the “world” as a monarchy but also pursued modernization through technological governance and sought to merge the two in the twentieth century, undergoing dramatic upheavals” (Kissinger 2015, p. 286). Therefore, if China wants to avoid the path of nation-state fragmentation and transform itself into a modern “world state”, it needs to complete the transformation both in terms of the way it is ruled and in terms of the value base of the state’s existence. In terms of ruling style, there are multiple ways of ruling within the traditional kinship-state, which is a de facto “one country, n system”. The state’s control over the lives of the people was weak, and the administration was loose. The multiple and loose forms of rule maintained the resilience of the Chinese Empire and reduced the tension from internal divisions. From these characteristics, it would be better to say that traditional China had a certain “postmodern state” character. China is about the size of Europe, with almost twice the population, and Europe is divided into 48 sovereign states. In a global country such as the United States, each state has considerable independence and power, including legislative power. In today’s world of highly complex social division of labor and state governance techniques, maintaining a huge political unity such as China’s would be insufficient to cope with the rapidly changing and complex environment without a more flexible and diverse approach to rule. In this sense, China today is on the right path to reform its political system by “decentralizing” the government, establishing a more flexible relationship between the central government and localities, and giving greater autonomy to minority regions. In a sense, this is a return to the traditional way of ruling, not simply a return to the traditional way of ruling, but a return to a higher level, a return to the wisdom of traditional Chinese ruling combined with the decentralization and mutual restraint of power under the legal framework that characterizes the modern state. While dinosaurs became extinct because their large bodies were unable to adapt to their new environment, elephants, although also large, were flexible enough to adapt to their environment and thus became a successful species in today’s animal kingdom. China’s transformation into a modern world state will also require a more flexible approach to rule.

150

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

Another condition for becoming a modern cosmopolitan state is overcoming narrow nationalism, establishing a cosmopolitan outlook, and completing the transformation of the value base of the state’s existence. A politically unified cosmopolitan state must transcend nationalism, which is narrow and brings about increased religious and ethnic conflicts and a tendency to divide the country. In the period between the founding of New China and its reform and opening up, China had the slogan of “internationalism” as a general principle to unite its people and solve international problems. Although the slogan was heavily ideological in nature, it was supranational in nature, a transcendent pursuit of values that provided, at least formally, a basis for the legitimacy of the state’s existence. After the reform and opening up, especially after the end of the Cold War, China no longer mentions the slogan of “internationalism” but vigorously carries out patriotic education, and nationalism became the main means of internal cohesion and the principle of external relations. Although nationalism can serve to unite people and ease social tensions, its disadvantages are obvious: it is exclusive and narrow-minded, often evoking the narrow sentiment of “the interests of the nation above all else” and increasing resentment and even hatred toward other nationalities. The unifying effect of nationalism is therefore only for some people, and not only does it not serve as an ideology to avoid the division of the country, but it can also provoke ethnic conflicts and sow the seeds of national division. In view of the shortcomings of nationalism, some scholars have turned to traditional culture to find resources for new values. Some scholars have tried to reinterpret the traditional idea of “All-under-Heaven” (Tianxia, 天下), arguing that the Chinese worldview has been “worldism” (Tianxiazhuyi, 天下主义) rather than nationalism since ancient times and that people have no concept of “national interest”. They argue that the Chinese worldview has been “universalist” rather than nationalist since ancient times and that people have no concept of “national interest” and are not sensitive to the territory of the state or even to the fundamental question of which nationality rules the country. This “worldism” (Tianxiazhuyi) may replace nationalism or patriotism and provide the value basis for a new cosmopolitan state (Zhao 2005; Sheng 2010, pp. 37–47). The author considers this path undesirable. As already analyzed in Chap. 6 of this book, the idea of the world is essentially a hierarchical idea centered on the Chinese empire, a utopian idea based on the principle of Chinese proposed kinship. It has never been realized, nor can it ever be. Moreover, the idea of the world has always been entangled with an arrogant nationalism, which is the source of the idea of “all nations coming to China”. The idea of Tianxia contains legacies such as the distinction between Chinese and foreigners, the distinction between inside and outside, the distinction between inferiority and superiority, and the idea that “the world (Tianxia) belongs to the king”, all of which are incompatible with the way China is positioned and interacts as a modern nation-state today. Even if reinterpreted, it could easily take the form of a new version of Chinese imperial chauvinism, which would be more likely to raise fears of “attempts to restore the Chinese empire” for those countries around China (especially the weaker ones) that were formerly under the tribute system. This is especially true now that China’s power

2 Challenge 2 China’s Unique Civilizational Experience and International …

151

has increased and that globalism will bring greater uncertainty and insecurity to the neighboring countries and the world and is therefore more sensitive and vigilant. “Worldism” (Tianxiazhuyi) was originally a particularist concept linked to nationalism, so overcoming the narrowness of nationalism is not “worldism” (Tianxiazhuyi) but a shift to some universalist concept. This is the idea of democracy in the modern nation-state. The concept of democracy is a liberalism that asserts the rights of the individual. It presupposes the universal nature of human beings, that is, that we are human beings first and foremost, before we are so-called Chinese, Americans, Japanese, etc. Since we are all human beings, we have some universal fundamental rights, and the right to freedom is one of the most fundamental. A modern nationstate is a state with a democratic system that is founded on the “universal free will” of the people (Huang 2023). The “nation” here is no longer a nation in the purely anthropological-sociological sense but a “political nation”, that is, “a community under a unified law” (Huang 2023). Such a state becomes a “civil state” based on a contract. The relationship between the nation and the other and the internal and external policies of the state are unified on the basis of the “universal free will” of man: the legitimacy of state power lies in the guarantee of the right to freedom of every citizen of the nation and, for the same reason, the external respect for the choice of freedom of the other. The principle of liberalism underpins both the legitimacy of modern nation-state power and the principle of human rights in the modern international system. Such principles are logically incompatible with narrow nationalism. Many nation-states around the world have already completed their transformation into modern nation-states (civil states); China is not yet a modern nation-state; it needs to complete its transformation into a modern national identity and absorb the universalist liberal principles that guarantee individual rights to eliminate the defects of nationalism.

2 Challenge 2 China’s Unique Civilizational Experience and International Rules The grave terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, and the chilling statements issued by ISIS afterward once again bring to mind the American scholar Huntington’s prediction of a “clash of civilizations” 20 years ago. Of course, extremist groups cannot be confused with Islam, but the ongoing brutality in the name of God has forced people to accept the reality that no political, economic, or military conflict is as unbearable as a religious or cultural one. Chinese civilization is not a religious civilization but a civilization based on an anthropocentric approach. Huntington cites Islamic civilization and Confucian civilization as opposing forces to Western civilization and is particularly concerned about Confucian civilization joining forces with Islamic civilization against Western civilization. Although there are people in China who are critical and even sometimes radical toward Western civilization in intellectual and political circles, China as a

152

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

civilization is still rational and moderate toward Western civilization as a whole and cannot see the conflict between Chinese Confucian civilization and Western civilization. The nature of the conflict between Chinese Confucianism and Western civilization is not visible. In contrast, it is learning from the West in a “modernized” way, trying to “converge with the world”. The experience of the last 40 years of reform and opening up illustrates China’s active integration into a world order that is largely based on Western civilization. The international manifestation of the kinship-state is the international order of ancient East Asia based on the ritual system, where the relationship between states was not equal, but based on hierarchy, the status of state actors was divided into high and low, and the relationship was divided into close and distant. “Ritual” is a hierarchical order that originates from kinship groups, which is relative and hierarchical in nature and is an extrapolation of patriarchy (see Chaps. 5 and 6 of this book). With the collapse of the modern tribute system, this model of state-to-state relations has become obsolete. Today’s world is based on equal national treaties linked to each other. The treaty-based modern international system developed on the basis of individual social contractual human relations. These treaties and the spirit of solving problems by designating rules constitute the essence of the modern system of international rules, which is clearly superior to any other international system in history and thus has caused widespread internalization as a civilizing experience for all humanity. Of course, the world today is far from being governed by universal rules, but it cannot be denied that this is a more desirable way of governing the world and a world trend. China is integrating into the world system, is a beneficiary of existing international rules, and is committed to abiding by them (this is what we mean by “being in touch with the world”). Becoming a member of international rules and international treaties makes China part of the international order. From our point of view, this process is a reflection of the tendency of “individualization” in Chinese society on the part of national actors. Currently, the world is no longer the era of “everyone sweeps the snow in front of his own door, not caring about the frost on the tiles of others”, and the affairs within a country often go beyond national borders and become a matter of the world. World peace is maintained by all, and many international affairs require cooperation among major countries. It is good for the world that each country abides by some common rules to manage the world’s affairs and that dictatorial and barbaric rule is condemned by the international community. The establishment of the global order, international organizations, and the international community also requires some universally meaningful and commonly observed rules. Certain current major issues that transcend national borders, such as the environment, energy, terrorism, Internet management, multinational corporations, transnational crime, must be regulated by international rules (manifested in various international conventions, international law, international agreements, and international impulses, etc.). In this regard, if too much emphasis is placed on the specificity of national civilizations, the advantages of contemporary international rules, such as equality, the nonhierarchical nature of the world system and the importance of treaties, may be overlooked, creating obstacles to integration into the international system and compliance with international rules.

3 Challenge 3 Rapidly Increasing “Hard Power” and Weaker “Soft Power”

153

Kissinger said, “… However, China, despite its membership in the Westphalian system, has a very complex mentality. This is attributable to how it was pushed into the interstate system. China has not forgotten that when it was forced to engage with the existing international order, it was treated in a way that was worlds away from its historical orientation of itself and indeed the opposite of the principles that the Westphalian system pledged to abide by. When they hear foreign countries urging China to abide by the ‘rules of the game’ and ‘responsibilities’ of the international system, many Chinese, including senior leaders, instinctively think that China did not participate in setting the rules of the system. The Chinese have agreed, after some deliberation, to the demand that China abide by rules it did not participate in making. However, they expect the international order to evolve in a way that allows China to be a central player in future international rulemaking and even to modify some of the existing universal rules. Sooner or later they will act to fulfill that expectation”. While China’s contribution to international rules is almost negligible for now, this is not to say that it will remain so in the future. China should (and can) make up or improve existing rules or even create some new ones with its own unique civilizational experience and is well positioned to play its own role and make a unique contribution based on the acceptance of the existing international system. For example, it can take the initiative to initiate the conclusion of some international conventions that incorporate its own civilizational experience. Each country has its own unique way of accepting international rules, and they all bear their own cultural imprint. In the process of accepting international rules of exogenous origin, China may internalize them as part of its own behavioral norms through the process of integration with its own civilizational experience.

3 Challenge 3 Rapidly Increasing “Hard Power” and Weaker “Soft Power” With the development of China’s economy in recent years, China’s status in the world has rapidly increased. Currently, China is the second largest economy in the world, and it may overtake the United States to become the world’s largest economy in the future. However, compared with the rapidly increasing “hard power”, China still has a large gap in “soft power”. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: China’s image abroad is still not good, there are still many serious problems in China’s relations with neighboring countries, China’s education and scientific research and innovation capabilities are still weak, China’s political system is still unattractive, it lacks a set of universal and attractive value systems, it is still relatively isolated in international affairs and diplomacy, and China’s weight as a moral force in the world is still insufficient. China’s political system is still unattractive, it lacks a set of universal values, it is relatively isolated in international affairs and diplomacy, and its weight as a moral force in the world is still insufficient.

154

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

From our perspective, China should proceed in two ways in enhancing its soft power, one by discovering resources from civilizations and the other by absorbing the fruits of modern civilization. China can return to the traditional Chinese tradition of convincing people with virtue so that the world can recognize China’s moral power to the world. In fact, the idea of soft power is not unfamiliar in Chinese tradition, as it is expressed in traditional contexts such as “convincing people with virtue”, “attacking the heart is the best”, and “giving up the army without fighting”. In this regard, there are rich resources in Chinese civilization. Ancient China was a powerful attraction for neighboring countries, partly because of its great material power (hard power) and, more importantly, because it had a set of institutions and values that were widely shared. Although China is large, it is not a colonial empire, it has no ambitions outside, it has rarely taken the initiative to conquer outside, it does not take the initiative to change, conquer, or control others, it does not do to others what it does not want, and it pursues a world order that is “kingly” and not “hegemonic”. The pursuit of the world order is the “kingly way” and not the “hegemonic way”, “big but not hegemonic”, “strong but not hegemonic”, and convincing people with virtue—this is the valuable heritage of Chinese civilization and the traditional Chinese culture heritage, and the most important reason for the attractiveness of traditional Chinese culture. In traditional China, the state is the guide of moral behavior and social order. Regardless of the way of ruling or who the ruler is, the legitimacy of the ruling lies in having “virtue” and in giving benevolent governance. “To rule with virtue is like the North Star, where all the stars arch”. The leader of the state must be a moral example, requiring that the emperor, the supreme ruler of the state, and the central actor of an international order be the highest moral example, such as the father in the family. However, it should be noted that in the modern world, these traditional Chinese ideas need to be interpreted and defined in a new way to serve as a resource for Chinese soft power. For example, “virtue” and “benevolence” are good ideas, but there is a lack of clear criteria and institutional design as to what constitutes virtue and what constitutes benevolence. This is why some brutal regimes in Chinese history also claimed to be “benevolent”. In a modern state, there is a need to define the criteria of the “benevolent rule”: a rule that systematically safeguards the rights and interests of its citizens internally and practices pacifist diplomacy externally is benevolent. Laozi said, “I have three treasures that I hold dear. one is compassion, the other is frugality, and the other is not daring to be the first in the world”. If one defines “compassion” and “frugality” as “systematically safeguarding the rights and interests of citizens internally” and “not daring to be the first in the world” as “pacifist diplomacy abroad”, then these ancient ideas will enable a strong China to remain moderate and restrained. Today, China has its high status as a civilization, and few seem to deny its glorious civilizational achievements. Surveys about the world’s image of China today show that China’s appeal is mainly on the cultural side. China has world-class cultural, gastronomic, and human resources, which are in very rich reserves but are not yet unleashed and unrecognized. It is still not enough to work only on the civilizational side to discover traditional cultural resources. In a hierarchical system with closed information and few interactions between countries, the ability to be “strong

4 Challenge 4 Order and Freedom

155

but not hegemonic” could be recognized by other national actors, but now that the world has changed, the reality that has to be acknowledged is that China is not very attractive on the organizational side (political and economic system), and to turn the resources on the civilizational side into soft power, it still needs the cooperation of the organization body. The promotion of China’s soft power requires more work at the organizational level. The solution to China’s domestic crisis at the political, economic, and social levels was solved through political system reform and economic restructuring, including the reconstruction of social, cultural, and core values, and the enhancement of China’s soft power in the world needs to be achieved through a similar reform approach, especially the need for political system reform and the reconstruction of values. As the world has changed, not only has the small environment in which we live changed (i.e., the individualization of society), but the larger environment of the world has also changed (i.e., worldwide individualization and democratization). Adopting values and institutional designs that are in line with these two trends, embracing the fruits of modern civilization’s creativity, and absorbing those institutional designs and values that are already widely accepted will not only remove the obstacles to China’s rise in the international arena but will also greatly enhance China’s soft power in international affairs. Today, improving China’s soft power is about combining traditional Chinese cultural heritage with the values of freedom and equality in modern society. Respecting freedom and equality in every country requires abandoning the idea that a country’s image and soft power can be enhanced by controlling public opinion at home and abroad because now that the Internet and smartphones are widespread, anyone, anywhere in the world, can communicate instantly and have access to vast amounts of information at the click of a finger, and any attempt to influence people’s judgment by controlling information will not only be ineffective but also counterproductive. In this context, any attempt to influence people’s judgment by controlling information will not only be ineffective but may also be counterproductive. In a world that places greater importance on individual freedom, leaving the issue of attractiveness to individual judgment and choice is itself an important expression of soft power.

4 Challenge 4 Order and Freedom The experience of Lenin society is “order over freedom”, and all our experiences can be said to be based on this. Individual freedom is sacrificed for the sake of social order, for the sake of family and social stability. Our civilizational experience is mainly based on the social order aspect, not on the freedom aspect. In China’s “cultural DNA”, there is no “gene” for freedom, or, although there is such a gene, its expression is inhibited. The Chinese “May Fourth” period proposed introducing the “virtue” (democracy) and “science” (science) from the West, which are lacking in our civilizational experience. This is the reason why we adapted to the changing trends in the world and carried out reforms in the direction of democratization.

156

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

Today, China is highly open and free economically and has integrated economically with the international economic system, becoming a major player in the era of globalization, as recognized by the world. However, politically, China rejects the Western political system. Traditional China’s emphasis on order and discipline is a civilizational legacy. China’s economic success and stable social order relies on such a civilizational heritage. China’s economic success was not achieved under the old model of valuing order but only after giving individuals certain freedoms and rights. China today is therefore faced with the task of using its own civilizational experience to find a balance between freedom and order and to build a democratic system with Chinese characteristics. Both world order and domestic social order, if they are to be sustainable, require some balance between human freedom and order. Without a stable framework for maintaining order, there can be no real freedom for people. An order without freedom will lack vitality and will eventually create forces against itself to undermine that order. From the perspective of civilization, human society emphasizes order at the expense of human freedom and hierarchy at the expense of equality. As we have already pointed out, the Lun-jen, as a Chinese human constant is a basic type of interpersonal state that “emphasizes the mutuality of human beings and weakens their individuality”, it emphasizes hierarchical differences based on status and ignores equality. The three rules (i.e., the king is the rule for his subjects, the father is the rule for his sons, and the husband is the rule for his wife) and the six rules (i.e., the father is good, the uncle is righteous, the clan is orderly, the disciples are close, the teacher is respectful, and the friends are old) define the hierarchy in politics and society. Each person acts according to his or her role and status. This feature of Chinese civilization allowed China to maintain a stable social order and political unity for a long time, but at the cost of relative social stagnation and periodic disruptions of order. The lack of checks on the power of the rulers and the lack of effective channels for public discontent caused periodic social unrest, constituting a unique balance between order and freedom in ancient Chinese society. This characteristic has even influenced China today to a certain extent. The way for China to emerge from this strange circle and to form a new mechanism of balance between order and freedom is to implement democratic reforms. In addressing human freedom and social order, the concept of democracy and institutional design should be said to be the better experience we humans have accumulated thus far. Although there are different definitions of democracy, it is generally not denied that democracy is an idea and institutional design that can better guarantee individual freedom. Its basic characteristics are (1) equal legal status, equal identity, and equal rights of citizens; (2) free, fair, and regular election of leaders by citizens; (3) free expression of opinions; (4) multiple sources of information; and (5) autonomy of associations. Democracy as an ideology and value insists that people are equal, thus taking care of the human dignity of all people, especially the weak. People may have disparities in property, family history, talent, education, ability, etc., but they are equal in personality and values and have greater freedom of choice with free access to comprehensive information. The author agrees with the judgment that democracy and its institutions are a cleverly designed and less flawed political experience to

4 Challenge 4 Order and Freedom

157

address the legitimacy of power. This design may have some orderly costs, such as constant bickering, weakening of the government’s power to mobilize society, and decreasing efficiency, which are common in democratic societies. The traditional model of balancing order and freedom is becoming increasingly costly, especially under the general trend of worldwide individualization and democratization and the increasing emphasis on individual rights. Here actually involves a question of “what is the purpose of development”. It is very narrow to understand the purpose of development as merely raising the material standard of living of people. In this regard, the Indian economist Amartya Sen’s view of development is instructive. In his view, the purpose of development is the acquisition of a substantive freedom for people, defined as “the opportunity or ability of an individual to live according to his or her values”, which includes legal rights and a wide range of entitlements. Both freedom of the rule of law and democratic rights are extremely important parts of substantive freedom. The improvement of material life can be called “freedom from material want”, while starvation (starving to death), disease (treatable but unconditionally treated), and illiteracy (unable to attend school without financial support) constitute unfreedom. In Sen’s view, political participation and uncensored freedom of expression are part of the goal of development in themselves, without which there can be no development (Sen 2014). The author agrees with Sen’s view of development that takes into account the full range of human freedoms. Because China has no tradition of democratic politics, Chinese scholars have a tendency to underestimate the civilizing value of modern democratic institutions. Human progress is a process of freedom from slavery and violence, and slavery and violence originate to a large extent from power. Therefore, freedom from slavery and violence is also a process of taming power. The modern democratic political system is the least badly designed system in terms of taming power. It guarantees the rights of the individual, the sovereignty of the state rests with the people, the power of the state is constrained, the king is under the law, and the acquisition and maintenance of power no longer depends on violence but on the choice of the people. At its roots, modern democracy is based on a Western society of individuals. It originated in ancient Greece and was perfected in modern Britain. After its formation, this system spread throughout the world, and democratization became a trend in the modern world. According to Huntington in The Third Wave—The Late twentieth Century Democratization Wave (Huntington 2013), the world has roughly experienced three waves of democratization. The first wave was from 1828 to 1926 (originating from the American and French revolutions), when more than 30 countries established democratic systems. The second wave was from 1943 to 1962 (which began with the World War II) and saw more than 50 countries democratize. The third wave began in 1974 and has since seen more than 100 countries adopt democracy. Some scholars predict that the fourth wave of democratization will occur in the future in authoritarian and dictatorial countries such as the Middle East and North Africa. [Recently, there have been noteworthy new trends in democracy in some Asian countries: on November 8, 2015, Myanmar successfully held general elections that had been interrupted for 25 years. on November 25, 2015, the 10th session of the

158

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

13th National Assembly of Vietnam passed Vietnam’s first Referendum Law. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung is reported to have said that Vietnam wants universal suffrage in 2020.] Of course, not all democratized countries have been successful, but on the whole, those that have been successful or relatively successful remain in the majority. It is important to note again that democracy is not without its problems; it is simply a weighed alternative with fewer drawbacks. As Winston Churchill said, “In this sinful and unfortunate world, men have tried and will try many forms of government. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or wise. Democracy is the least bad of all the polities that have been tried”. Just because China does not have the foundations of a democratic system does not mean that it cannot learn from such a system. Many countries in the world did not originally have the same civilizational foundations as Western individual societies, such as large-scale civilizations such as Japan and India, which also did not have a foundation for democracy at the level of civilizations, and democratic politics was later transplanted from outside and worked largely well. Therefore, the fear of democratic ideas and institutions and the belief that China is unsuitable for democracy is not true. Of course, it is a fundamental principle of the contemporary international system that countries have the right to choose their social systems, beliefs, and ways of life, but there must be a reason why so many countries have chosen a democratic system, which shows that democratization is a world trend. The abrupt fall of the Soviet Union, the sudden death of Ceausescu, the fragility of the popular support base for unstoppable dictators such as Saddam and Qaddafi, and the current state of affairs in countries that rely on violence, artificially closed information, and brainwashing to maintain their family regimes also show that the choice of a democratic system is a good one for most countries. One only has to look at our own history and experience everyday life to see that Chinese people also love freedom, equality, and democracy and are not only suited to living under an authoritarian, hierarchical system. The idea of democracy was a goal pursued by the benevolent people of modern China, and our society has indeed changed in the direction of democracy in recent times. China abolished its imperial system and achieved a republic at the end of the Qing Dynasty. Anyone would admit that politics after the Republic was more democratic than the Qing Dynasty and that China in the period after 1949 was more democratic than under the Republic. Today, democracy is not only enshrined in our Constitution but is also part of our “core socialist values”. This means that, at least legally and conceptually, we recognize that democracy is good. In our daily lives, we all like leaders who have a sense of equality and democracy, who do not like our parents arranging our marriages, who do not like others interfering in our lives, who will fight when our legal rights are infringed upon, etc. Society in general is changing toward democracy, and our people want to be respected in terms of free choice and dignity with access to adequate information (or so we have become). Even from the point of view of the rule of the state, democracy is an advantageous design. How an unelected government can gain legitimacy is a great challenge for Chinese politics today. The legitimacy of the traditional Chinese imperial system, which was based on the “king-making” and lineage of the founding emperor, has long

4 Challenge 4 Order and Freedom

159

since become obsolete, and the legitimacy of a modern democratic state is based on popular elections, which have more advantages than a lineage basis. The legitimacy of the Chinese state today is based neither on imperial lineage nor on elections as in a democracy but primarily on economic development and government efficiency. The government is under enormous pressure to deliver results and to meet the growing expectations of the people and is charged with the dual function of maintaining political and moral order. If the economy stagnates, the government becomes inefficient or even has problems with the moral order, and people will complain about the government, making it less credible and even socially unstable. In traditional Chinese society, the people had a tradition of obedience to authority, but this is no longer the case. The emergence of the term “rights protection” and the emergence of individual cases of rights protection are indicative of the increased awareness of rights in China today and the fact that defending one’s rights in accordance with the law is becoming the norm in society. This is a step forward for society, and it places higher demands on the government. A democratic system can solve the problem of the legitimacy of power. China has put forward many good slogans, such as “putting power in a cage” and “the people are happy, satisfied and agreeable”. However, the question is, how do people express their happiness and satisfaction? If the people are not satisfied, do they have the right to choose those in power? The division of social classes has created conflicts of interest, and various classes (especially the disadvantaged) also need to express their legitimate interests, but at present, society is not yet able to provide institutionalized channels for citizens to do so. A good society does not depend on how many good ideas there are but on whether there are institutional arrangements to implement them. In ancient China, Confucianism included the people-centered idea that “the people are more important than the ruler” and the idea of equality that “all people can be Yao Shun”. For example, there is no system to protect people’s rights to life, property, and freedom of speech and action, nor is there a mechanism to limit the power of kings and to check and balance power. It should be recognized that modern democracy is an institutional arrangement that brings to fruition a peoplebased ideology similar to that of “the people are more important than the king”. The modern democratic ideology and its institutional design are the experience of a civilization that has evolved and become the common wealth of all mankind, an experience that is lacking in Chinese civilization. To borrow from democracy is to use the accumulated experience of all mankind to solve China’s problems. The absorption of modern democratic ideas and institutions cannot be separated from the soil of Chinese civilization. It is a challenge for China to graft modern democratic institutions onto the soil of Chinese culture. The reform of democratization may bring short-term social unrest, but it is worth paying a certain price if it solves the problem of the legitimacy of power, the alternation of power, and the maintenance of nonviolence and if it leads to the long-term stability of China. On the basis of the world’s experience of democratization and a full assessment of the problems brought about by the reform, a political reform proposal that is in line with China’s national conditions and takes into account the balance between freedom

160

8 China in the Modern Nation-State System: The Way Forward …

and social order, between the people’s “protection of their rights” and the government’s “maintenance of stability”, in order to gradually complete the transition to democracy. This may be the path of reform that China must take sooner or later.

References Huang, Yusheng. 2023. The Dual Identity of the Modern State and the Principles for the Construction of a Possible Future World System—A Purely Theoretical Analysis and Conjecture. Journal of Tsinghua University, Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition (Qinghuadaxu Xuebao) 1. Huntington, P. Samuel. 2013. The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late 20th Century . Translated by Ouyang Jinggen, Renmin. University of China Press. Jacques, Martin. 2010. When China Rules the World. CITIC Press. Kissinger. 2015. World Order (Chinese Version: Shijie zhixu). CITIC Press. Sen, A. 2014. Development as Freedom (1999). In The Globalization and Development Reader: Perspectives on Development and Global Change, 525. Sheng, Hong. 2010. From Nationalism to Worldism. In For a Peaceful World. China Development Press. Toynbee, Arnold, and Daisaku Ikeda. 1985. Looking to the 21st century. Chinese version, International Cultural Publishing Corporation Ye, Xiaowen. 2009. Welcoming the “Renaissance” of the New Era. People’s Daily (Overseas Edition, May 8, 2009). Zhao, Tingyang. 2005. The World System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institutions (Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhexue daolun). Jiangsu Education Press.

Part III

“The Individual Jen” and the Contemporary International Order

This part is an analysis of the Human Constants, state forms, and interstate relations in Western society. Chapter 9 discusses the relationship between the Human Constant of the Individual Jen and the origins of the contemporary international system. The emergence of the contemporary international body in the West is not accidental; it is the product of the internal logic of individual society. The relationship between independent nation-states and independent, free “individuals”, between independent states (socalled international relations) and independent individuals, is a kind of “isomorphic mapping” in the sense that the author calls modern independent nation-states. In this sense, I refer to the modern independent nation-state as an “individual state” (as opposed to an individual) and argue that the contractual nature of the modern international system is consistent with the contractual ties between persons in individual societies. The chapter further analyzes the connection between competition in individual societies and the principle of power and interest in international societies. Chapter 10 analyzes the lineage of the origins and development of the modern international system around the issue of peace. The modern international system has its origins in Western individual societies, and its fundamentals are logically linked to them. The sovereign equality of nation-states, procedural ties of association, the limitation of war by parity, and the legislation of war are civilizational achievements that have evolved in the international sphere and are the fundamental reasons why the modern international system has been able to become a truly universal international system. This system has shortcomings, but it is still irreplaceable at present. Chapter 11 turns to the analysis of the Human Constant of the United States and the characteristics of American behavior. From the psycho-cultural point of view, the Human Constant of American society is the “extreme individual”, which is a refined version of the Human Constant of the individual, so the analysis of American society is in a sense also an analysis of Western society. The most important feature of the Human Constant of the “extreme individual” is that the individual has an unstable “life package” and the psychosocial homeostasis pattern is dynamic and diverse. This pattern stimulates not only a high degree of individual creativity but also a

162

Part III: “The Individual Jen” and the Contemporary International Order

greater sense of individual insecurity. This feature influences American interpersonal relationships and attitudes and behaviors toward the Outside World. Chapter 12 is an analysis of American attitudes and behavioral patterns toward the “Outside World”. The independent ego model of extreme individuality gives the United States a “natural sense of mission” to save the world, and the transactional exchange model gives American interpersonal relations a concise, functional character, which is expressed in diplomacy as “interest” and “power” worship. This is reflected in the diplomatic tendency to worship “profit” and “power”. In addition, the competitive interpersonal relationships of the ultimate personal society are characterized by a tendency toward illusionism in American foreign relations. Chapter 13 answers the questions of what are the main aspects of strong U.S. soft power, what its root causes are, and what the limitations of U.S. soft power. The authors argue that values such as freedom, equality, democracy, and human rights are at the core of U.S. soft power and that these values are based on the embodiment of the Rugged Individual Jen, a basic state of being that places great emphasis on the “individuality” of human beings. These values have universal appeal because they are consistent with the worldwide trend toward “individualization” that has emerged since the modern era. At the same time, however, American soft power has limitations: individuals are in a more isolated situation due to the complete disruption of traditional interpersonal relationships. Competitive interpersonal relationships have brought about the misery of the loser, consumerism, and convenience of life have brought about environmental problems, and the export of American values abroad has been resented and resisted by the imported party.

Chapter 9

The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International Order

1 “The Individual Jen”: The “Human Constant” in Western Society A common feature of Western (especially Anglo-Saxon Teutonic) societies is that the “Human Constant” is “the Individual Jen”. The Individual Jen is a “system of people who deliberately sever their ties with others or reduce their dependence on others in their interactions, under the concepts of independence and freedom, or who advocate such a state of being”. According to French scholar L. Dumont, the individual has two meanings: a flesh-and-blood, walking, thinking, and feeling person, and an “ideal representation” associated with Western values such as equality and freedom (Dumont 1980, p. 18). The latter refers to a “human state”. Humans have two fundamental properties, namely “individuality” and “mutuality”. The former refers to the fact that we are an entity that can judge, decide, and act alone and that can neither be merged nor disentangled, while the latter refers to the fact that we are in constant contact and interaction with others. Human beings are in fact in a dynamic balance between the two states of being independent of each other and being connected to the other. However, cultures emphasize these two attributes differently depending on the context (natural and social) in which they exist, resulting in different human constraints. The Individual Jen is a state of being characterized by an emphasis on the “individuality” of the person and a weakening of the “mutuality” of the person, and this Human Constant makes the most important cultural encoding of individual human beings and places them in the most important position of the “sociocultural field”. A society based on this Human Constant is a “society of individuals”. The values reflecting this Human Constant are “individualism” (the richest and most complete expression of which is found in Western culture). Of course, individualism in its full sense emerged after the European Renaissance, but that is not to say that the Individual Jen as a Human Constant has only emerged in modern times. There is ample evidence that the ancient Greco-Roman family structure and Human Constant were characterized by a greater emphasis on the “individual” and that its literature, art, mythology, law, and morality were all characterized by the luster © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_9

163

164

9 The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International …

of the “individual”, which is different from modern Western society’s emphasis on human rights, claims, abilities, and happiness. There is a clear inheritance between this and the “individualism” of modern Western society, which emphasizes human rights, demands, abilities, and happiness. The Individual Jen who emerged after the European Renaissance is only a re-expression and refinement of the ancient GrecoRoman form (classical form) (modern form).1 What we commonly call “Western civilization” is the most splendid achievement created by human beings under this Human Constant. The Human Constant has several dimensions: “self-perception”, “affection”, “exchange”, and “group”. The characteristics of the Individual Jen model in these dimensions can be briefly described as follows. In the dimension of self-cognition, the life of the actor is closer to the foundation of the organism, with more emphasis on the needs and expectations of the organism. The Individual Jen has a clearer sense of “self”, i.e., the Individual Jen is more conscious of his or her own existence, uniqueness, sense of direction, goals, wishes, emotions, etc. When faced with the three existential situations of nature, others, and oneself, the Individual Jen tends to grasp the Outer World and one’s own destiny by presenting one’s true existential structure as an individual and takes one’s own feelings as the criterion for weighing all things and even transfers one’s own nature to those things. Individuals in this state are more sensitive to the distinction between “I” and “the world outside of me”, and there is a clear and difficult line between “I” and “the other”. There is a clear and insurmountable boundary between the “I” and the “other”. The other in the “world outside me” (including the closest people) is completely different from the “me” and tends to be treated at an equal distance. This mode of self-perception can be compared to Ptolemy’s “geocentrism”: the “I” is the center of the world, and the world moves around the “I” (Marsella 1985, pp. 36–37). This characteristic can be expected from the fact that an individual person in this state places more emphasis on personal “rights”, “interests”, “expectations”, “demands”, “pleasures”, and “happiness” that tend to be biologically based. In the affective dimension, due to the emphasis on individual independence and freedom, constant and close interpersonal ties become difficult to reach (because all close ties are a form of bondage), so there is a greater sense of uncertainty within the Individual Jen. The Individual Jen needs to take diverse means to obtain PSH equilibrium, and thus, the Individual Jen’s feelings tend to be cast in more directions. In this state, the Individual Jen’s feelings are released more closely to the basis of the organism, with more emphasis on subjective experiences based on the needs and expectations of the organism, rather than “specializing” into specific feelings for a certain direction or a specific object (such as the Chinese “filial piety”, “loyalty”, “brotherhood”, “faith”), so Francis L. K. Hsu considers it to be a “universal and undifferentiated” pattern of feelings. The pattern of emotions in the West: “Western emotion remains universal and undifferentiated, because it is always more or less tied 1

As the name implies, the so-called Renaissance is about “reviving” the Greco-Roman tradition of the Individual Jen. Without such a tradition, there is no “Renaissance”, and we cannot, for example, “revive” individual traditions in China or India.

1 “The Individual Jen”: The “Human Constant” in Western Society

165

to the roots of the organism”. This model of emotional control tends to use repression to bury sexuality, the core element of emotion, in the subconscious. “Because emotions tend to be universalized and always contain a libidinal component, Western forms of emotion are easily agitated in any direction, and diffuse sexuality can always provide a direction for strong tendencies of opposition or approval. The universal or undifferentiated emotional character makes it easier for the Individual Jen to cross preexisting boundaries or to detach from them, while the never-ending libido drives him, once he has decided on a goal, with great emotional power” (Hsu 2002, p. 354). The characteristics of this dimension suggest that the Individual Jen has a more unstable inner world and a more positive attitude toward the Outer World. In the dimension of exchange, because of the tendency of individuals to regard close ties with others as bondage, interpersonal exchange relations tend to be a deemotional “transactional” mode (the pure form of which is “commodity exchange”). This form of exchange is characterized by profitability, equivalence, and transience. Benefits refer to the fact that both parties want to benefit from the exchange at the beginning, and the exchange process is not affected by affection, loyalty, attachment, etc.; equivalence refers to a simple “give” and “take” relationship with equal exchange value. Transience refers to the fact that the exchange process is generally completed within the same time, and the relationship between the exchangers ends when the exchange process is completed. It is not true that all interpersonal relationships in personal societies are such exchange relationships, but it is a characteristic of interpersonal relationships in personal societies that transactional exchange relationships profoundly affect all kinds of relationships or that all kinds of interpersonal relationships tend to be transactionalized (or de-emotionalized). This dimension can explain why the modern capitalist mode of production characterized by commodity exchange emerged in Western personal societies. In the group dimension, the most suitable group type of Individual Jen is a nonkin, nonterritorial voluntary group concluded according to the principle of contract— “association” (or club). The most complete expression of the characteristics of the Individual Jen is found in such a group. The main feature of this principle is that it clearly defines the rights and obligations of each participant, the time of the conclusion and termination of the relationship, the conditions for the conclusion and termination of the relationship, etc. It is concise and does not affect the independence of individuals, so the contract becomes an accepted “convention”. Since interpersonal ties tend to be “inorganic” (less influenced by blood, geography, loyalty, and other emotional factors), individuals can theoretically enter into a group with any object at any time, so societies based on Individual Jen have more developed organizations and show stronger organizational power. Interpersonal relations in the society of Individual Jen have several distinctive features. First, the “interpersonal relations” in such a society are the relations between individual persons, and the society can be reduced to a separate and independent unit—individual person. The Individual Jen is the starting point and the final goal, while the group, society, state, etc., are the means and exist as the antithesis of the Individual Jen. Such an individual person tends to preserve his or her own struggle rather than adapt to others, neither relying on others nor refusing to be relied on by

166

9 The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International …

them, but relying only on himself or herself and taking responsibility for himself or herself. Individuals are more selective in the relations they enter into with each other. Thus, the values of “independence”, “freedom”, and “equality” are highly valued and cherished. Due to the greater emphasis on individuality, the role, status, age, gender, blood, and situation of the person are relegated to a secondary position in interpersonal relationships and tend to a comprehensive reciprocal relationship of individual A to individual B. Second, interpersonal relationships in such societies are clearly profit-oriented and influenced by transactional exchange relationships, and social relationships become a means to achieve “personal” ends. Individuals are encouraged to make rational decisions based on their own best interests, and concern for self-interest is evaluated as a positive value that can lead to market growth and social development. “A person’s primary concern is his own interests—self-expression, self-development, and selffulfillment. These interests are more important than the interests of any group” (Hsu 2002, p. 354). Since such a society of individuals tends to shape each individual into a “like-qualified” person pursuing the same or similar goals (so-called equality for all), individuals are less bound by kinship, loyalty, geography, kingship, etc., in pursuing their own goals, and intense competition is another important feature of such interpersonal relationships. Social and cultural systems encourage individuals to strive for their own desires and interests, and competition is positively evaluated. Since there is competition, every individual other than “I” is at least theoretically a competitor, and society is a playground where such individuals compete for benefits, and “survival of the fittest” is at least potentially accepted. Obviously, this design is conducive to maximizing the potential of individuals, so society has a greater internal drive for change, but at the same time, due to the transient nature of interpersonal relationships and the tendency to instrumentalize them, individuals are placed in a more uncertain and therefore insecure state. Competition over others, conquest of the outside world, and belief in exclusive gods become the means to compensate for the lack of security.

2 “The Individual Jen” and Modern Western “Nation-State” The modern state, in its pure form, refers to the form of the state born in modern Europe, with clear internal and external political sovereignty, a clear spatial territorial scope, and a social dimension that includes individuals (citizens) who are independent and enjoy various rights. The contemporary international order consisting of such states, characterized by the principles of anarchy, interest, and power at work in practice, is also generally considered to have been established since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. However, we should not forget the historical fact that the modern form of the state and the modern model of international relations based on it originated in the Greco-Roman era. The city-states of the ancient Greek era, despite their

2 “The Individual Jen” and Modern Western “Nation-State”

167

differences, practiced citizenship politics to varying degrees, and there is a certain continuity between the citizen’s assembly in Athens, the council of elders in Sparta, the senate in Rome, and the parliaments of modern states. There is a striking similarity between the hegemony between the ancient Greco-Roman states and the checks and balances between modern states and between the colonial expansion of the Greek and Roman states and the colonial movements of modern Western states. In this sense, rather than “producing” independent forms of statehood and modern modes of international relations in the modern West, they are both variations and refinements of an ancient type. This is consistent with the point that the Individual Jen form of the modern West is a re-expression and refinement of the classical individual form. From our perspective, the fact that these two processes are highly interrelated and synchronized is significant: it suggests that the grasp of the state and international relations from the perspective of the “Human Constant” is not only a theoretical construct and a methodological type but is also supported by historical facts. There are various perspectives on the origins of the modern state, but our analytical framework at least offers what is probably the most logical explanation of the relationship between the Individual Jen and the modern state in the West: the state and the mode of international relations originally belonged to the “Jen” layer of the “sociocultural field” we described earlier. The “Human Constant” model influences people’s perceptions of their own country (which is part of layer 1 of the PSH schema: “larger society and culture”) and of other countries (layer 0 of the PSH schema: “outside world”). Between the Western “Human Constant” (Individual Jen), the “individual society”, and the state (“individual” state) and the model of international relations, there is a necessary intrinsic connection. Between the “Individual Jen” and “independent state”, there is a high degree of isomorphism. In this sense, such a state can be referred to as an “individual” state (as opposed to the previously mentioned “contextual” state). In connection with this, the relations between “individual states” (international relations) and the relations between individual persons (interpersonal relations in societies of Individual Jen) are also more relevant. From this perspective, it may be appropriate to consider the emergence of the state type in the modern West as the logical result of the process of re-expressing and refining the Individual Jen in Western society and to consider the modern international relations model of Western origin as the result of the extension of the relationship model between individual persons in Western society. A number of scholars have noted the relationship between the Western nation-state and family and kinship relations in the West. The French scholar Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, for one, has highlighted the links between family organization and ideology and politics: pointing to the profound significance of the study of kinship, and changes in kinship, for the study of national and state identity, arguing that changes in the way people think about kinship inevitably affect the way they think about national and ethnic identity. “As a metaphorical pater familias, nationalism states that the members of the nation are a large family: through the national courts it punishes its disobedient children. It is an abstract version of something concrete about which every individual has strong emotions, nationalism tries to transfer this emotional power to the state level. In this way, nationalism appears as a metaphoric kinship ideology tailored to fit

168

9 The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International …

large-scale modern society” (Eriksen 2010, p. 130). However, he only points out the problem and does not show how the family organization and kinship of individual Western societies affect the nation-state. We have already described the influence of the Chinese kinship system on the form of the state, and the form of the state and the international order in ancient China were derived from the Chinese view of kinship, where “state” and “family” were isomorphic and the state was not a nation-state but a kinship-state form. In the same vein, the relationship between the nation-state and the Individual Jen in Western society needs to be noted here. Of course, the analysis of this idea needs to be further developed. In the author’s view, there is a logical link between the emergence of the nation-state and the process of refinement of the “Individual Jen” in Western kinship relations. In the following, we will first analyze the connection between the process of refinement of the Individual Jen and the emergence of the nation-state. The author believes that this issue can be examined from the following three aspects. First, there is a connection between the boundaries of individual person and clear definition of state boundaries. Since the cultural orientation emphasizes the independence and freedom of individual person, in the society of Individual Jen he or she has clearer boundaries because the more independent the individual is, the more “inorganic” (without emotions) the connection with the other tends to be, the more the individual tends to “self-impose limits” and form a closed system, and the clearer the boundaries of the acting subject. The concept used in Western discourse to express such clear individual boundaries is “interperson” (meaning the margin of independent individuals), and “interpersonal relations” refers to interactions in the realm outside the margins of the Individual Jen. The sum of interpersonal relations constitutes society, which refers to the part beyond the boundaries of individual person. Likewise, the independent state, as a special form of group consisting of many individuals, is a clearly defined subject of action. The emphasis on the free movement of people (a part of individual freedom) brought about the problem of delimitation and management of national boundaries, which made the territory of the own state absolutely separate from the territory of other states. Clear territorial boundaries became an important condition for the modern nation-state. The concept used in Western discourse to express this characteristic is international (i.e., the border of an independent state). The term international relations refers to the realm beyond the borders of the independent state. The sum of international relations constitutes the international community. Both the international and interpersonal concepts express a reinforced border character of the subject. The similarity between them is logically connected. Second, there is a connection between individual self-consciousness and national self-consciousness. The formation of human self-consciousness is a special psychological process based on the human body and the social wealth (social resources) to which it belongs. Individuals in the society of Individual Jen are less bound by blood, geography, and hierarchy, have stronger self-discipline and will to choose, and are more strongly aware of the existence of “I”: my dignity and my power cannot be violated, and my body and my property cannot be dominated by others. I cannot be dominated by others. Likewise, when individuals in such society form a group, those

2 “The Individual Jen” and Modern Western “Nation-State”

169

who have the same qualifications, the same demands and interests, the same values, and clear boundaries with each other tend to associate together in a contractual way, and individuals become more conscious of the demands and interests of the community (the collection of individual demands and interests). The boundaries between “my group” and “other group” become clearer and even more absolute. Such a group becomes more exclusive: our power and our interests cannot be dominated by others. The domination of the state by foreigners and the cutting, ceding, and gifting of the state as property (which was common before modern times) become unacceptable, and this is how the identity of the national community or national self-consciousness emerged. We know that the ancient Greek city-states had this kind of identity that transcended natural ties such as tribal blood and geography and that a spirit similar to today’s patriotism emerged in foreign wars. National self-consciousness is a clear perception of the interests of the national community, which is a collection and sublimation of the Individual Jen’s self-consciousness because the interests of the national community are also a collection and extension of the interests of individual persons. The perception of such interests can easily form the basis of political identity and patriotic sentiment. It is only at this point that the concept of “nation” is transformed from one that used to be used primarily to indicate common origin and homeland ties to a political concept and a mechanism that is strongly exclusionary. When the people at large are not independent, free individuals, there is no clear sense of self, no real national self-consciousness, and no real loyalty to the nation-state. The exclusivity of national consciousness is reflected in the requirement that members be loyal only to their own national community and even that members of the nation go out of their way to sacrifice themselves for the survival of the nation-state when the need arises. This exclusivity sometimes manifests itself in a strong rejection of outsiders and other ethnic groups. Both the Greek city-state and the nation-state of modern Europe were national organizations in which citizens collectively banded together to defend their interests and were associated with the devaluation of other peoples, the oppression of some, and the exclusion of outsiders, ethnic and religious minorities. This exclusionary character is consistent with the self-consciousness of Individual Jen. Third, there is a correlation between the emphasis on the interests and rights of the Individual Jen and the homogenization of the functions of the state. The emphasis on the rights and private life of individual person, first, drove the state out of the individual person’s social life, and the state became a “political state” by managing only those areas outside of personal life (such as legislation, taxation, national security). When religion becomes a purely personal matter, the state is driven out of religious affairs and becomes a secular state with a separation of church and state. In normative terms, the nation-state is “a community of free and equal partners in rights” (Habermas 2002, p. 136). As people become equal and free individuals, the “other” tends to become a potential “stranger” with greater uncertainty and unreliability, which requires the formulation and maintenance of a large number of detailed rules (mainly codified contracts and laws), so that the function of maintaining the rule of law was separated from the family and local groups, and the nation-state became a “state of law”, and the united individuals living together gained legitimacy. The

170

9 The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International …

clarification of individual power extends to the way the state is ruled: individuals participate in political rights, and the will of the people determines who rules them and how they are ruled, making the state the political representative of individuals, which is why such a state is called a “representative democracy”. However, in doing so, the state actually “deprives” the individual person of some of his or her rights. From the very beginning, the state was in a contradiction with the individual: on the one hand, the emergence of the nation-state was the result of the development of the individual’s rights, and the state was able to guarantee these rights and bring security; on the other hand, it is also the antithesis of the individual, a machine for suppressing and limiting the individual (even with violence if necessary). Under such circumstances, the individual might have greater psychological and cultural anxiety due to the suppression. In this way, the modern state has “genes” similar to those of the Individual Jen. The emergence of the modern state is the product of a certain degree of refinement of the Individual Jen to solve the problem of social cohesion, and the state can be seen as an “individual” in the domain of international relations. It is a kind of abstraction of the Individual Jen. In this sense, it may be more appropriate to call such states “individual states”. In society, the subject of the game of power and interests is the individual; in the international arena, the subject of the game is the “individual state”. Due to the highly isomorphic character of individual persons and individual states, some important features of the relations between individuals (interpersonal relations) are also manifested in the relations between individual states (international relations). The demand for independence and equality of nation-states can be seen as an extension of the demand for independence and equality of individuals at the national level. After the Westphalian system established the principle of sovereignty, sovereign equality in the juridical sense became not only the basic norm of the international system but also a generally accepted system in the international system (which is perhaps the most commendable aspect of this model of international order). The concept of sovereign equality presupposes that international actors are independent “identical persons”. Only if they are “independent” can there be a clear concept of sovereignty and a sovereignty regime, and only if they are “equally qualified” can there be so-called equal rights. The logical connection between this norm of international relations and the Human Constant of the Individual Jen is that when independent, free, and equal individuals form a group (community of nations), it is impossible to accept the dependence of “my group” on the “other group”. Such a state necessarily appeals to freedom, which includes both collective freedom (national freedom) and individual freedom, the latter being a prerequisite for the former and the former being the collective expression of the latter in the international arena. In this process, “the private occupies the central domain of the subject’s freedom” and “these rights of the subject are transformed into human and civil rights, i.e., the citizens’ right to political freedom” (Habermas 2002, p. 132). The politics originally used to secure and support individual liberty was also applied to national issues. The will of the people may determine who should rule them and how they should be ruled. Which nation a people should be ruled by is also part of this decision. The

2 “The Individual Jen” and Modern Western “Nation-State”

171

absolute sovereignty of the nation-state also consists of two kinds, namely the absolute sovereignty of the nation and the absolute sovereignty of the people. The former can be considered a collection of the latter, and both are equally sacrosanct. The formation and development of the modern Western state is a process of interaction between the two kinds of sovereignty. The interests that characterize “interpersonal relations” in societies of Individual Jen are also reflected in “international relations”. A group of people who emphasize individual interests and well-being must also be a group that emphasizes the interests of its members because the interests of the group are a collection and extension of the interests of individuals. States also act in their own interests in the international political arena, just as individuals do in society. Nation-states are also “like-qualified” in pursuit of the same or similar goals, and intense competition is an important feature of nation-states. Moreover, since there is (and cannot be) an authoritative organization such as a government above the independent state and there is generally no value system such as religion, customs, or laws to regulate the behavior of people in each country, the interests and competition of interpersonal relations in individual societies are more generalized and reinforced at the state level. The result of the further intensification of interest characteristics at the level of state relations is that relations between states become more instrumental, a naked relationship of interest, with political and military relations tending to serve interests. The most appropriate and common expression for friendship is friendship “in our interest”. “National interest” has become a sacred symbol with religious connotations, and any despicable act can be approved under the name of “national interest”. Morality does not work in international relations (as the realists insist), or if it does, it is not the same as at home, where the supreme principle is interest, and “trust”, “intimacy”, “friendship”, etc., are only descriptions of a state of affairs more favorable to the acquisition of benefits. Since each international actor is shaped to fight for its own best interests and the interests are constantly changing, this favorable state of affairs will not last, and the so-called no permanent friends, only permanent interests is an exaggerated but largely true description of this situation. The competitive character of the Individual Jen is also reinforced at the national level, with the result that there is mutual suspicion, fear, and a tendency toward a certain cult of violence among nations (perhaps the greatest drawback of this model of international order), and independent, equal nation-states are shaped as competing for their own interests, “equally qualified”, and in the absence of government as well as common moral restraints, this competition can manifest itself at any time in the form of war. Habermas notes that “normatively speaking, the social boundaries of a community of free and equal rights partners are full of contingencies. Since the arbitrariness of legislative practice is only a fiction of rational law, the contingency of history and the reality of events in the world, as we know, will always depend on who wins the power to delimit the political community. As a rule, spontaneous orders always begin with violent conflicts, wars and civil wars. What is called national freedom is, by its very nature, primarily an ability to defend one’s independence with military force in critical situations” (Habermas 2002, p. 132). Fearing to be eaten by

172

9 The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International …

the strong, the weak nations wanted to be strong, and the strong nations, fearing to be overtaken by the weak and thus wanting to be stronger, went on to expand and conquer other nations.2 The frequent wars, colonization, and slavery in European history, as well as the two largest and most violent wars of mankind (the world wars), have their psychological and cultural roots in the Individual Jen societies of the West. States are sensitive to “power” (both economic power and force, with force being more important), and the principle of power is still at work in today’s international order, at least on a potential level. We see this logic at work in, for example, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the second Iraq war, and the current nuclear weapons dilemma. The emphasis on the anarchic character of the international order is the basic view of the realist and neo-realist schools of international political theory. It should be said that this view corresponds to the reality of the international order at present. The only addition provided by our perspective is that this reality is deeply rooted in the Human Constant of the Individual Jen. Constructivism cites three cultures of international society (Wendt defines “culture” as “socially shared knowledge”, which is different from the concept of culture we use. Wendt (2000, p. 181): the “Hobbesian culture” characterized by war and killing, the “Lockean culture” characterized by rules and competition, and the “Kantian culture” characterized by cooperation and friendship (Wendt 2000, pp. 313–387). In such a world, survival is difficult, barbaric, and shortlived. The so-called Lockean culture is a state in which rivals are allowed to exist but need to win the competition. From the logic of competition, although it is in the best interest of self-survival to eliminate rivals and thus eliminate competition at all, it is not easy to do so in reality. Having made the judgment that rivals cannot be eliminated and that they pose a threat but do not endanger self-survival, allowing rivals to exist and following some rules (such as international law, treaties) to check each other is the main characteristic of Lockean culture. The so-called Kantian culture is a state of competitive compromise in which we cooperate with and even help each other after judging that the existence of the opponent not only does not endanger our own survival but may be beneficial to our own survival. This state of affairs, of course, requires more detailed rules to facilitate mutual compliance with rights and obligations and to maintain a balance of interests and strengths. Obviously, these three states follow the principles that are consistent with the essential characteristics of individual social interpersonal relations.

2

The history of Europe illustrates this point well. “Over the centuries, Europe has seen a constant change of aggressor states, such as Spain under Philip II in the sixteenth century, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, Germany during the two world wars, and the contemporary Soviet Union. The policies of these states have all undergone a process of transition from defense to reasonable security requirements to conquest” (Zhou 2005). If we add to the European experience, we may need to add the earlier eastern conquests of Alexander the Great, the expansion of the Roman Empire, and the more recent somewhat meaningful American attack on Iraq.

3 Psychosocial Homeostasis and Human Evil: The Cultural …

173

3 Psychosocial Homeostasis and Human Evil: The Cultural and Psychological Foundations of the “Security Dilemma” in the Modern Nation-State Realist international relations theory tells us that conflicts and wars between states arise from the human nature of the pursuit of interests and power. The pursuit of profit and power leads to a “security dilemma” between states or a “state of fear”. The basic logic of this view is that human nature is evil, so there is national evil, and national evil leads to international conflict. Important concepts in the existing classical theories of international relations include “anarchy”, “structure”, “power”, “interests”, “sovereignty”, and “sovereignty”, “sovereignty”, “national foreign policy”, “strategy and security”, etc., can be said to be based on the basic judgment of “human evil”. This basic judgment is based on “human evil”. In fact, revealing the evil of human nature, the evil of national nature and the tragic nature of international conflicts arising from it has a long history in Western academic history. From Thucydides, the author of the ancient Greek History of the Peloponnesian War, to Machiavelli, the author of the Monarchy, to the realist school of modern international relations theory, the pessimistic understanding of human nature is consistent. Freud, on the other hand, found grounds in the depths of psychology: the human instinct for destruction and the urge to destroy are at the root of all human conflicts. However, this premise, which is almost self-evident for the realist school, is problematic. It is difficult to determine whether the nature of humans is good or evil. In questioning this view of the realist school, Wendt says, “Most classical realists would probably hold the same view. Even neo-realists, when they need to support their pessimistic arguments for anarchy, say that human nature is selfish and powerseeking…. Human nature cannot show whether people are good or bad, aggressive or peaceful, power-seeking or power-giving, or even self-interested or altruistic” (Wendt 2000, p. 165). In fact, human nature may well be both self-interested and altruistic, both evil and good. Both self-interest and altruism may be necessary for human beings to sustain themselves and perpetuate the species. We cannot prove that human nature is good or evil, but we can prove the relevance of the judgment that human nature is evil to the culture of Western society, which is based on the Human Constant of Individual Jen. The life of a person in the society of Individual Jen is closer to the biological basis of the person, emphasizing the desires and interests of individual persons (including the body, physical needs, food, clothing, shelter, and other material possessions), and therefore requires more confrontation with the problems posed by the biological nature of humans (the socalled animal nature). As individual self-interest (at least legitimate self-interest that does not harm others) is more encouraged by society and custom, fierce competition and de facto “survival of the fittest” becomes a common social reality in individual societies. It is logical to link the phenomenon of fierce competition arising from the pursuit of individual desires and interests with the cruelty of the “strongest of the weak” common in the jungle and to draw pessimistic judgments about the nature of human beings. As a means of resolving the conflict between desire and society, social

174

9 The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International …

ideology tends to regard human desire as sin (e.g., the Christian doctrine of “original sin”) and tries to suppress it to the depths of the human heart (the “subconscious” layer of PSH) to purify human behavior. The “subconscious” layer of the PSH is used to purify human behavior. The seeming contradiction between the greater emphasis on individual desires in life and the religious view of desires as sins and attempts to suppress them are in fact complementary because a way of life that is too close to the biological basis has a tendency to destroy all social and cultural settings, and the latter is a check on the former. It should be said that the existing mainstream international political theory is mainly based on the historical experience of the West, and human evil is a kind of human judgment with cultural characteristics. This judgment has important relevance to the historical experience of the Western “personal society”, or it is not wrong to call it a summary of the experience of the “personal” society. It is not inappropriate to call it a summary of the experience of “personal” society. Moreover, we can prove the relevance of the “security dilemma” in modern countries to the “psychosocial homeostasis (PSH)” model of the Human Constant of the Individual Jen. According to the theory of “psychosocial homeostasis (PSH)”, humans are a self-balancing body in the psychosocial sense, and whether we have enough security affects our judgment of the Outer World (enemy or friend, security or threat, etc.). People’s sense of security mainly comes from the third layer of PSH (“intimate social relations and culture” layer), so the existence of a stable third layer is an important indicator of whether an individual or even a community has sufficient security. Some types of Human Constant provide individuals with a greater sense of security, while others provide individuals with a lesser sense of security. Among the important Human Constants we know about, the Individual Jen is probably one of the most difficult designs for individuals to feel secure. This design makes the Individual Jen the most “refreshing”: the greatest degree of freedom from dependence on others, but at the same time, it means that close interpersonal relationships and the resulting security are the most difficult for the Individual Jen to attain. This characteristic is also reflected at the national level. From our point of view, national security is not just about “territorial integrity” or the like but is also a state of mind for international actors, a confirmation of a stable, trustworthy relationship in which one can act with confidence and without threat. Obviously, this was difficult for the modern nation-states, which were based on individual societies, because the “nation-states” competed with each other for their own interests, and the “other” was, at least in theory, a rival or even an enemy to be controlled and defeated. Therefore, the more aggressive pursuit of power and profit (which manifested itself in colonial expansion, slavery and control of other countries, trade, missions, aid, etc.) was an important way for “individual states” to gain a sense of security. As “relations” between “individual states” became more instrumentalized, “friends” and “friendship” became more powerful. “Trust” is more expedient and instrumental, and thus, international actors tend to believe in relying on their own strength (force) to protect themselves and overcome the other. “People can never be 100% sure of each other’s intentions because they cannot know exactly what the other is thinking, and people’s thoughts are always changing. This “problem of other’s intentions” is particularly important for states because the international system is less institutionalized; that is,

4 The International System, Modern Civilization, and the “Individual Jen”

175

states receive less information in international affairs than in domestic affairs, and misjudgments in international affairs can have serious, even fatal, consequences. In such a world, it is reasonable to assume that prudent states will estimate the motives of other states in the worst possible light. This means that states base their interests on the possible opportunities arising from the distribution of power, rather than on the probable chance of the goodwill of others” (Wendt 2000, p. 137). The lack of security among international actors is very similar to the inner world of anxiety in the Human Constant of Individual Jen, and it is not inappropriate to consider the former as a form of external expression of the latter. I believe that this is the deepseated psychological and cultural cause of the so-called Hobbesian fear in modern international relations.

4 The International System, Modern Civilization, and the “Individual Jen” Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari, in his influential book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, writes: “By now, we are used to a world where many bombs are tied up and many missiles are useless. The law of the jungle and the law of Chekhov are perfectly broken” (Yuval 2017–2, pp. 15–16). What was not expected was that in February 2022, war broke out between Russia and Ukraine, and missiles produced by Russia and the United States were killing people on Ukrainian soil. Although we cannot say that the world has returned to the “age of the jungle”, Yuval Heraly’s view is too optimistic; the “law of the jungle” in the international community has not disappeared. The war in Ukraine has led us to rethink the relationship between the modern international system and civilization. 1. The modern international system is a civilizational achievement that has evolved in the international sphere and is superior to any international system in the history of mankind [Huipeng Shang From “International Politics” to “International Relations”—An Examination of the World’s Strong Connections From “International Politics” to “International Relations”—An ontology of International Relations in the Era of Strong World Connections World Economy and Politics, vol. 2, No. 2, 2020, pp. 24–43]. Its basic principles have been accepted by the vast majority of countries in the world. The treaty system has created a number of important principles between states, one of the most important of which is the “inviolability of sovereign states”. The fact that Russia does not recognize Ukraine, which became a full member of the United Nations in 1991 following a referendum on its independence, is a violation of the basic rules of the modern international system. Russia’s claims that “NATO’s expansion to the east threatens Russia’s security” and that “Ukraine was originally Russian territory” are untenable. The referendum on the return of four Ukrainian states to Russia proves that Russia has territorial expansion aims. Putin describes the basic rules of the modern international system as something that “those in power do as they

176

9 The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International …

please”, whereas the principle of “inviolability of sovereign states” in the modern international system denies that those in power “do as they please”. The “inviolability of sovereign states” principle of the modern international system denies the “will” of those in power. The modern international system (also known as the treaty system), which originated in Western Europe, has since spread beyond the geographical boundaries of the West and has been accepted by the vast majority of the world’s countries (the United Nations has 193 member states) and can therefore no longer be called the Western system but the world system. There have been various international systems in human history, such as the “Roman system” in the West, the “Tribute system” in East Asia, the “Dharma system” in South Asia, and the “Socialist camp system” in the Soviet era. However, these were only regional systems and were eventually eliminated. The modern international system, and in particular the international system that emerged after the World War II as the latest stage of that system, has created great achievements in freeing mankind from thousands of years of the “law of the jungle” and in maintaining world peace (which will be discussed in detail in Chap. 10 of this book) and has evolved into the most just and effective international system that mankind has ever known, from which all the countries of the world that have joined this international order have been beneficiaries to varying degrees. Putin’s war is his way of practicing the law of the jungle, depriving a country of its existence, and undermining the rules-based international system. Fortunately, in this RussoUkrainian war, the vast majority of the world’s countries were on the side of the invaded, and modern international rules were upheld by the world in an unprecedented unanimity. In G20, none voted against it, except Russia itself. Russia’s confrontation with an international system that the majority of the world’s countries accept and benefit from is inevitably opposed by the majority of the world’s countries. 2. The modern international system did not emerge in isolation. The Industrial Revolution of the mid-eighteenth century marked the emergence of a new civilization, mainly characterized by industrial mass production, known as industrial civilization. The modern international system is only one part of a new set of social institutions and values. The civilizational foundations of this system include: (i) The nation-state as linked to political democracy. The nation-state is a new form of state, as opposed to a royal state, and is associated with a political democracy characterized by the limitation of royal power and the guarantee of individual rights. The main features of this type of state are that sovereignty is vested in the people, that the power of the state is constrained, that it derives from popular choice, and that power is no longer obtained or maintained by violence. Democracy first emerged in England with the signing of the Magna Carta. It was the signing of the Magna Carta, the execution of Charles I in 1649, the Glorious Revolution (1780s), and the enactment of the Bill of Rights (1698) that established the modern system of parliamentary democracy and transformed Britain from a royal state into a nation-state. The system later spread throughout Europe, causing

4 The International System, Modern Civilization, and the “Individual Jen”

177

the transformation of European kingships into nation-states, on which the modern international system is based. Today, more than 110 countries in the world have established such a system, and a significant number of them have completed the transformation from kingdoms to nation-states. The guarantees of national sovereignty and human rights in today’s international law and the rule that a state may not conquer or control another state through violence can all be seen as an extension of the democratic political system in the international sphere that emphasizes the rights of the Individual Jen and limits the power of the state. (ii) A market economy system characterized by private ownership and free competition. The free market economic system facilitated the development of investment and productivity, promoted the application of science and technology, increased the efficiency of production leading to an increase in human wealth, and achieved unprecedented success in freeing mankind from material deprivation. It became the basic economic system of European nation-states and was adopted by many other nation-states around the world. The market economy system facilitated world trade and changed the nature of relations between states from a purely political relationship between kingdoms to a political-economic relationship between nation-states. (iii) A civil society characterized by the rule of law. A society governed by the rule of law means that state power and social relations operate according to a clear legal order in which everyone is equal before the law, rather than according to the personal preferences and affinities of the rulers who decide public affairs in political, economic, and social matters. Under the law, the ruler and the people are also in a contractual relationship. In the modern international system, the state is linked by a nonreligious, nonmoral procedural rule that emphasizes the role of international law, international treaties, and international rules. This system can be seen as an extension of the rule of law at the international level. (iv) With liberal humanist values that emphasize individual rights, freedom, and equality. In modern civilization, traditional religions have declined, and a liberal humanism has emerged that emphasizes individual rights, freedom, and equality, constituting a new “religion” of modern civilization. Under this value, the Individual Jen is guaranteed the right to choose his or her own behavior according to his or her own will. These are the values on which the legal system of the nation-state is based, as well as international law, international rules, and the international order. Culture and civilization are different concepts. Culture does not distinguish between backwardness and advancement, whereas civilization is “the sum of the characteristics of an advanced people in their lives or at a particular stage of history”. Encyclopaedia Britannica defines civilization as “the sum of the characteristics of an advanced people in their lives or at a particular stage of history the sum of the characteristics displayed by an advanced people at a particular stage of life or history”.

178

9 The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International …

There is a distinction between advanced and backward. The term civilization itself is relative to barbarism. Huntington’s division of civilization by religion ignores the distinction between advanced and backward civilization (Huntington 1996). What he calls the world’s major civilizations, in terms of the advanced and backward dimensions, are all agrarian civilizations. Industrial civilizations are more advanced than agrarian civilizations, which in turn are more advanced than lithic civilizations. Advanced civilizations and backward civilizations are a matter of replacing and being replaced, of transcending and being transcended. Of course, modern civilization has its own problems, such as the plundering of nature, the destruction of the environment, the widening of the gap between rich and poor as a result of economic globalization, and the lack of individual security. However, these issues need to be addressed in a “postmodern civilization” rather than a “premodern civilization” through the development of new energy sources and more energy-efficient technologies, the adoption of more environmentally friendly lifestyles and closer cooperation worldwide. There are conflicts in the world today, some of which appear to be clashes between civilizations but are in fact clashes between barbarism and civilization. For example, the radical Islamic forces oppose the education of women and advocate the return of stoning of women, which conflicts with the values of modern civilization, but this is not a conflict between civilizations but between barbarism and civilization; the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a conflict between the law of the jungle and the rules of modern international law, which is also a conflict between barbarism and civilization. The modern international system is part of modern civilization, so Russia’s challenge to the modern international system is also a challenge to modern civilization. 3. Modern civilization evolved on the basis of the human constant of individual jen. this human constant has more of the genes of modern civilization and is better suited to its emergence. The free market requires the protection of individual property rights, without which free market economy cannot be created. People in industrial societies need the freedom to choose their occupation and to move. A democratic political system requires civic participation, political accountability, and the rights of individual persons to be safeguarded. The Human Constant of Individual Jen, where the individual is least bound by blood and tradition, places greater emphasis on individual rights, and this emphasis on the rights inevitably leads to a check on public power. This Human Constant is more conducive to the emergence of the free individual who industrial civilization requires. A nation built on individuals, in which people are linked by a contract, is more conducive to the formation of a self-organizing civil society based on the rule of law. The Individual Jen has a greater inner urge to be free from bondage and to pursue freedom. In the West, after the religious revolution, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment, the Christian faith was liberalized and privatized, and man was freed from the bondage of God and transformed from being “God’s slave” to being his own master. In connection with this, a system of values was formed that was

References

179

in keeping with modern civilization, valuing the existence of individual person, and emphasizing human freedom and equality. 4. With the Industrial Revolution in Britain, Western society entered modern civilization (industrial civilization). Modern civilization became widely accepted as a dominant form of civilization because of its greater advantages in freeing humanity from material want, slavery, and violence. Industrial civilization arose in the West, but it was a new civilization, different from that of medieval Europe, so it is not appropriate to call it “Western civilization” but modern civilization. Modern civilization has spread, and non-Western countries have embraced it, a process known as “modernization”. “Modernization” is not “Westernization” because modern civilization is also new to the West, which has also undergone a process of modernization, except that the West has evolved from itself to become a modern civilized state. It is a kind of “endogenous” modernization, whereas non-Western countries entered modern civilization through learning and transplantation, which is an “exogenous” modernization. As modern civilization is a set of institutional designs and value systems, modernization in non-Western societies is not merely industrialization but a process of accepting modern civilization in its entirety, a process of transforming a country into a modern state on both the organizational and civilizational sides. There are different paths to modern civilization and therefore different versions of modern civilization, but the basic elements of modern civilization, i.e., the market economy, political democracy, a society based on the rule of law, and values that emphasize the dignity of human life, rights, and freedoms, are universal, and modernization in non-Western countries is a transplantation of these elements in some form and to some extent on their own cultural soil. On the other hand, these elements of modern civilization will have a profound impact on the way people live and change their Human Constant, so that the modernization of contextual societies will be accompanied by a process of transformation from the Contextual Jen to the Individual Jen.

References Dumont, Louis. 1980. Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste and Its Implications. The University of Chicago Press. Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 2010. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. Pluto Press. Habermas, Jürgen. 2002. Inclusion of the Other (Baorong tazhe). Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Hsu, F.L.K. 1983. Americans and Chinese: Passages to Differences. University of Hawaii Press, 1980. Chinese Version, The Collected Works of Francis L.K.H. (Xu Langguang Zhuzuoji), vol. IX. Tai Bei, Nantian Shuji, 2002. Huntington, Samuel Phillips. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World. Simon & Schuster. Marsella, Anthony J., George De Vos, and Francis L. K. Hsu (eds). 1985. Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectives. London: Tavistock. Translated by Ren Ying, Chinese version, Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 1988.

180

9 The Individual Jen, the Individual State, and the Modern International …

Wendt, Alexander. 2000. Social Theory of International Politics. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Yuval, Noah Harari. 2017. Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow {Weilai jianshi). Translated by Junhong Lin. Beijing: CITIC Press. Zhou, Gui Yin. 2005. Christianity, History, and International Politics-Herbert Butterfield’s Ideas on International Relations. European Studies {Ouzhou Yanjiu} 2010, 4.

Chapter 10

Peace and the Evolution of the International System

The withdrawal of the United States from some world organizations and treaties after the election of Donald Trump and the “trade war” between China and the United States have prompted me to think about this question: is the trend of “globalization” going to be reversed? China and the United States truly want to fall into the so-called Thucydides trap? At this moment, Ms. Chen Ziling, the editor of Hainan Publishing House, passed me the Chinese translation of the anthology “Peace, Love & Liberty, War is not inevitable” compiled by Mr. Tom G. Palmer from the United States (Palmer 2018) and invited me to write the preface for the book. The main point of the book is that the achievements of civilizations created by human beings, such as governments and restrictions on them, commercial mechanisms, international society, intergovernmental organizations, means of response to aggression, measures of reconciliation, humanist counterideologies (Palmer 2018, pp. 31–32), etc., have reduced human wars and conflicts at both the social and international levels. For example, at the social level, the disappearance of human sacrifice and torture, the demise of slavery, and the decline in homicide, rape, domestic violence, and child abuse; at the international level, the reduction in the number of wars between nations and the number of deaths, etc. (2018, pp. 23–26). Finally, the book concludes that “war is not inevitable”. Using the basic principles of classical liberal political economy, the author illustrates some of the famous assertions of classical political economy, such as “the self-interest of men objectively creates a good social order”, “where trade does not go, armies do”, and “where trade does not go, armies do”. “If wealth is not acquired through trade, it is necessarily plunder” and so on. Although these assertions are old, they imply the inner logic of the world’s development into today’s era of “globalization” and, in a sense, the achievement of today’s America. Unfortunately, in today’s America, these claims seem to have become some kind of “political correctness” and become incorrect. In the author’s opinion, the conclusion that “war is not inevitable” deduced from the classical liberal viewpoint is logically self-consistent and supported by a large amount of evidence in reality, but there are still two points that need to be argued in terms of theories: First, what is the relationship between the progress made by human © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_10

181

182

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

beings at the social level and the reduction of conflicts at the international level? Unless we understand “international” as a level in the evolution of human civilization, just as humans have evolved civilizational achievements at the social level to limit excessive human competition, we have also evolved civilizational achievements at the “international” level that help curb large-scale wars. Achievements. Second, the phrase “trade produces peace” is not always true and1 overestimates the role of free trade in limiting war. In fact, trade can produce both peace and war, even large and brutal wars. From the perspective of the evolution of the international system, human efforts to limit conflict and war at the “social” level have extended to the “international” level, but there have been more wars at this level than at the social level, and human efforts to limit war at this level have gone through a much slower and more tortuous process. Human efforts to limit war at this level have undergone a slower and more tortuous process. This chapter will discuss the issue of peace (“war avoidance” in the sense of the evolution of the international system) and describe how human efforts to limit war have evolved at several important stages in the history of international relations, perhaps bringing our understanding of the nature of the current international system and the question of “can war be avoided” under this system closer to the truth. The question of “whether war can be avoided” under the current international system may be brought closer to the truth.

1 The Origins of the Modern International System The “international” is a level of human interaction, and the basic unit that constitutes the “international” is a political grouping of some kind (in the modern international system, a “nation-state”). Such groups are also composed of human beings, and therefore, like other groups composed of human beings, there are both conflicts and wars between them and efforts to limit them, thus forming something like social norms that govern the actors. The human process of limiting war between states is the process of the evolution of the international system, which is part of the evolution of human civilization. Since the emergence of the state as a group, there have been various interactions between states, such as trade, cultural exchange, and conquest by force. In the process of interaction, those state actors who are stronger in terms of organization and civilization will, through conquest, annex and integrate other actors, and their values and cultural norms will spread outward, thus forming a certain order among state actors, that is, a regional international system centered on the core actor and bearing the imprint of the civilizational experience of the core actor. The premodern international system is this kind of regional international system, such as the historical “world system” in East Asia, the “Great Law system” in South Asia, and the ancient 1

One branch of classical liberalism is free tradeism. It was represented by Richard Cobden (1804– 1865) in England. He made a classic point in 1840: “We can rid the world of war, and I believe that trade is the way to do it”, quoted in (Nye 2005, p. 53).

1 The Origins of the Modern International System

183

Roman system. A territorial international system usually has a core actor that functions as a kind of government, providing public goods such as trade opportunities and security protection to system members, who in return are attached to the core actor in a hierarchical manner. The culture of the core actors spreads to the noncore actors, and a kind of “socialization” occurs within the system. The behavior of the core actors in such systems is not completely unregulated, and certain concepts based on morality, religion, or witchcraft, such as the “Dharma” system, which is based on the Hindu concepts of “Dharma”, “no killing”, and “no killing”, are not unregulated (Ahimsa), and the world system is based on the “virtue”, “benevolence”, and “harmony” of the “human” social experience (which are often ambiguous), and hierarchical norms, all served to some extent to restrain the warlike impulses of imperial monarchs and to maintain order among states. The emergence of the state has led to lower war death rates than in fully anarchic tribal societies (according to Peace and Love, war death rates in anarchic tribal societies were approximately five times lower than those in earlier states), and the emergence of a territorial international system has reduced war death rates even more. However, the flaws of this territorial international system are obvious, such as the fact that it is based on national inequality, usually with an empire powerful enough to overwhelm the countries of the system and with a certain hierarchical political order at the core of that empire. This order generally lacks mechanisms to limit warfare, and whether war occurs between states and the scale of warfare depends largely on the power of the empire itself, the personal character of its rulers, morality, religious ambitions, and other factors. Under the territorial international system, the alternation and rise and fall of empires and dynasties has been accompanied by slavery, wealth plunder, and a great deal of war in the name of religion. Due to the restricted exchange of people, goods, and information, the “social” nature of the territorial international system is not yet high in the three major “games” of human society—power, wealth, and mind. Among the three major “games” of human society—power, wealth, and mind—the main game involved in the system is the power game, while economic activities (wealth game) and cultural activities (mind game) are strongly influenced by the power game. The regional international order is usually the result of interstate conquest and is characterized by coercion. The acquisition of wealth between states is mainly based on plunder or compulsory tribute rather than trade, and the spread of ideas is more dependent on conquest by force or religious war than on cultural attraction. Despite the differences in the characteristics of regional international systems, such orders lacked procedural agreements and institutional safeguards, and wars between states for the purpose of plundering wealth, spreading religion, and enslavement were common and often brutal due to the lack of rules governing war itself. A new international system, the modern international system (also known as the treaty system, or the Westphalian system), emerged in the world, marked by a series of treaties signed between Western European countries in the mid-seventeenth century.2 2

It consisted of the Treaty of Münster and the Treaty of Osnabrueck, signed on October 24, 1648, in two towns in Westphalia by the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Queen of Sweden, respectively, hence the name “the Treaty of Peace of Westphalia” Westphalia.

184

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

The prototype of this system appeared in Western Europe, and as the power of modern Western countries grew stronger and expanded outward, the system gradually spread outward, and by the end of World War II, the system had basically included countries from all over the world. It was the first time in human history that an international system in the true sense of the word, including the global countries, emerged, and it was a new stage in the evolution of the human “international” circle. The emergence of this system puts an end to the brutal “Thirty Years’ War” in Europe, so it was not the result of conquest by force among nations but of mutual compromise. From the point of view of the evolution of the international system, the origin of the modern international system “created certain historical ‘genes’ that largely defined the basic directions and main features of the future evolution of the state of affairs” (Shi 2007). The establishment of the system and its worldwide spread was a process of so-called internationalization in which the local international system collapsed and countries of different religious and cultural backgrounds were gradually integrated into the “international” sphere. “With the clever conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia in the seventeenth century, the negotiators of peace did not realize that they were laying the foundations of a globally applicable system” (Kissinger 2015, preface, p. XI). The treaty system is a new international system, the emergence of which has had a profound impact on human warfare in several ways. First, the principle of “inviolability of national sovereignty” established by the system brought the “nation-state” to the historical stage for the first time and gave a new standard of war legality. “National sovereignty” is the most important attribute that distinguishes a state from other social groups and is the inherent supreme power of a state at home and its independent and autonomous rights at the international level. According to this principle, any state has the right to choose its own social system, its own form of state, to organize its own government, and to decide and conduct its internal and external affairs independently and autonomously, and no other state has the right to any form of encroachment or interference. This new principle, which appeared in the Treaty of Westphalia, became the basic method of resolving conflicts and contradictions among nations for centuries after the treaty was signed and gave a new basis for the legitimacy of war. Whereas previously the justness of a war had been judged more on the basis of religious, natural sovereignty, or domestic politics, the treaty system led to the dismantling of the theocratic world that had once dominated Europe, and the legitimacy of war was no longer based on religious ideas or personal power but on whether the sovereign state was violated. European wars ceased to be fought in the name of religion and began to be fought between nation-states for secular “national interests”, with political entities such as the state replacing moral norms and religious tenets of engagement with foreign policy based on the protection and expansion of “national interests” principles. It should be noted that the principle of the inviolability of sovereign states embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia was not always observed, and some states often used national interests as a pretext for waging war and interfering in the internal affairs of other states, which is why Europe and the world remained in a state of war after the treaty was signed. This new concept procedurally defined the limits of the power of the empire (Holy Roman Empire), a limit to the unlimited kingship of, for example, ancient times,

1 The Origins of the Modern International System

185

and at least juristically restrained the ambitions of the supreme ruler of the state to expand through war. “The structure established by the Peace of Westphalia was the first human attempt to institutionalize an international order based on universally accepted rules and constraints, and one based on a multitude of states rather than on a single state that overwhelmed all nations. For the first time, concepts such as ‘national justification’ and ‘national interest’ did not celebrate power but rather sought to limit and legitimize it” (Kissinger 2015, p. 25). While restraining power does not necessarily prevent war, unrestricted power is indeed an important source of many wars and conflicts. Constraints on power, whether intra- or interstate, have served to keep war and conflict at bay. Second, the principle of equality of states regardless of size and religion established by the treaty system has created a new model of state relations and a mechanism to regulate warfare. Under the principle of equality of states, states are all units with the same qualifications, and there is no longer any authority above the state, which negates the authority and hierarchical relations between states based on religion, population, territorial size, cultural traditions, etc. Since states are equal to each other, the bond that binds them can only be procedural rules. Unlike vague religious and moral concepts, procedural rules are universal rules that transcend states as well as individual character and cultivation. The lack of recognition of religious or moral authority and the equality of all nations is the reason for the “anarchic” and “amoral” character of the international hierarchy. However, this is undoubtedly an improvement because it is precisely this design that ensures that the members of the system can keep their cultural, political, and religious beliefs free from foreign interference, thus providing the conditions for more actors to be included in the system and to form a truly international system. States in a state of “anarchy” are not free from any constraints, and the procedural rules established by the system, some in the form of international law, provide the basis for a rules-based international order. Since states are equal, it is logical that the system sets a precedent for international dispute resolution by means of international conferences. The establishment of such principles and corresponding mechanisms gives a certain social character to the international sphere of humanity. Since states are equal, a new mechanism for maintaining the international order has emerged, which no longer relies on religion, imperial authority, and hierarchical relations between states but on the combination of power and relations between states (mainly the great powers), which is called the mechanism of “balance of power”. “Parity” is an institutional design that inhibits war between states in the modern international system. However, since there are many factors that determine the “balance of power” and it is very easy to change, when the balance of power is broken, war will easily occur. Kissinger argues that “parity triggers wars, but it also limits the scale of wars” (Kissinger 2015, p. 26). In fact, given the subsequent World Wars I and II, the system did not limit the scale of wars, and one of the major drawbacks of the “parity mechanism” is that checks and balances between large countries often come at the expense of small ones. A major drawback of the “balance of power mechanism” was that checks and balances between the major powers often came at the expense of the smaller ones. Nevertheless, human warfare has evolved into modern warfare since the establishment of the

186

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

treaty system. Modern warfare differs fundamentally from traditional warfare in that (1) it is no longer waged out of religion or personal honor; (2) it usually involves many nations, i.e., it becomes a systemic war; and (3) it is governed by certain rules, such as the commencement and termination of war, the need for public announcements, and the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction. This nature of modern warfare and the mechanism to regulate it in a “balance of power” manner is an important feature of the modern international system. Third, the treaty system has developed a new set of norms that dissipate the brutality of war. For example, chemical weapons are banned, landmines are prohibited, the killing of unarmed persons is prohibited, prisoners of war are treated well, and the Red Cross is not to be attacked when entering the battlefield. Mass murder of prisoners of war has been a frequent occurrence in human history, and the treaty embodies the idea that prisoners are human beings and that their personal rights are inviolable. This was the first time that rules were established for war itself, and it was a step forward in the evolution of human civilization. Fourth, the treaty also provides for collective sanctions against states that violate its provisions. This is the first time that the concept of “collective security” has been introduced, and it promotes compliance with the rules of the contracting states by making it costly to violate them. From the perspective of civilizational evolution, this provision is of great importance: it provides for the first time a feedback loop for state behavior in the international sphere, making state behavior testable, assessable, rewardable, and punishable, similar to human behavior in socialization, which makes it possible to form a mechanism for evaluating and monitoring the behavior of state actors to more effectively limit the state’s impulse to war and restrain anarchy at the international level. This offers the possibility of. From the point of view of civilizational evolution, the world order under the Westphalian system evolved from the Western European social order and bears the obvious imprint of the civilizational experience of Western European society. There is an inherent logical connection between the emergence of independent “nation-states” and independent “individuals”, as well as between the equality of states and the equality of individuals (Huipeng 2007). In the Western tradition of understanding, there is a fundamental understanding that moral or religious means cannot be expected to change the evils of human nature and the resulting conflicts between people and nations and that rules (contracts) that limit power and guarantee individual rights (rights) (both of which complement each other) can reduce the organized violence of human beings in the form of conflicts and wars. This understanding became the basic idea of the modern Western political system. Historically, the emergence of the treaty system is inseparable from the emergence of modern political institutions in Western European societies, which opposed royal power and sought universal individual rights and freedoms. “The Bill of Rights” was enacted in 1698. The historical facts of shattering the concept of “the state” and “divine right of kings” and establishing democratic republics at the domestic political level in Western Europe and the emergence of the modern international system occurred in almost the same era, and there is a logical connection between the two. In essence, the international political order after the establishment of the treaty system may be

1 The Origins of the Modern International System

187

regarded as an extension of the modern democratic political order that had already emerged within Western European countries in the international sphere. Some of the basic concepts of the system reflect the efforts and progress of mankind to regulate the behavior of state actors by rules and to limit brutal wars. Some of the basic ideas embodied in the treaty have played a sort of biological “genetic” role in the evolution of the modern international system, largely defining the path of the evolution of the modern international order. It has become a civilizational achievement accepted by most countries in the world today, which is the main reason why the system has evolved into a global one. While this new international system reflects mankind’s efforts to curb war, its true role cannot be overestimated. The treaty system is a real “geopolitical” system characterized by anarchy, in which naked power becomes an important goal for states, thus staging a round of wars for hegemony (maritime hegemony) and a live drama of the rise and fall of hegemonic states in modern history. In addition, the game of wealth with trade as the main means in this period was involved in the international circle, and the laws of economy gradually involved various countries and regions in the world division of labor system and began to lay the foundation of the modern international political and economic system. Along with the internationalization of trade activities, competition for profits became another major goal pursued by national actors. Thus, after the international system shed its religious and moral trappings, power and interest became the basic principles (i.e., the de facto “law of the jungle”), and while religious wars decreased, wars for hegemony (at sea) and economic interests (mainly production of raw materials, markets, and trade opportunities) increased and wars of aggression have increased. The two largest wars in the history of mankind—the World Wars I and II—caused by Western countries over colonies were the inevitable result of the internal logic of this system. However, it must also be acknowledged that the world political and economic structure that emerged from the involvement of the game of wealth in international circles, with trade as the primary means, had a greater procedural basis than the political power structure, with power alone as the primary means, because economic activity was ultimately governed by economic laws and actors in trade activities were more likely to follow certain universal rules. Although much of the trade of this period was still unfair, and even the plundering of wealth in the name of “fair trade” was not uncommon, the plundering of wealth and wars of conquest were somewhat more limited than in the premodern international system. Moreover, the development of international trade has opened up another possibility of restraining war: it is more economical to acquire wealth through trade than to plunder it through war (the logic of classical liberal political economy is based on this). This is intrinsic to the ability of the modern international system to spread further outward and to evolve further toward the restraint of war.

188

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

2 The International System and Peace After World War II The international system that emerged after the World War I (the Yalta-Washington system) was developed on the basis of the treaty system. It reaffirmed and refined some important principles embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia, further developed the idea of regulating war by rules, formulated important international treaties such as the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of International Law, developed and improved the concept of collective security on the basis of the “balance of power system”, and established international organizations such as the United Nations to guarantee the implementation of the concept of collective security. “The establishment of international organizations such as the United Nations to ensure the implementation of the concept of collective security was the basic feature of the international system to regulate war in this period”. First, the application of “nation-state” was expanded, and the principle of “sovereign independence” became more popular. At the beginning of the treaty system, the term “nation-state” was only applied to a few countries in Western Europe and did not include non-Western countries that were colonies, semicolonies, and vassal states at that time. After World War II, these countries became independent, the concept of “nation-state” was extended to almost all countries in the world, and the principle of “sovereign independence” was enshrined not only in the UN Charter but also in some subsequent acts of war and the UN definition of “war of aggression”. The principle of “sovereign independence” was not only enshrined in the UN Charter but was also the basis for a number of subsequent acts of war and the UN definition of the “war of aggression”.3 The popularization of the principle of “sovereign independence” broadened the scope of application of the term “illegal war”: in jurisprudence, only wars of aggression between a small number of countries in Western Europe were illegal, while wars with colonies or wars over colonies were not illegal. After the war, wars of aggression against colonial countries also ceased to be legal in jurisprudence. In addition, with the expansion of the scope of sovereign states and the popularization of the principle of sovereign independence, the idea of peace was able to spread more widely and deeply after the war. Second, although the Cold War pattern formed after the war with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, competing for supremacy, was still essentially a form of the equilibrium mechanism, the collective security mechanism began to work during this period, thus alleviating the shortcomings of the mere equilibrium mechanism that made it difficult to effectively prevent war. As early as after World War I, humanity reflected on the equilibrium mechanism developed under the treaty system and proposed the idea of replacing the equilibrium system with collective security. After World War II, mankind learned from the lessons of the two world wars and further developed and refined the idea of collective security. The Charter 3

On December 14, 1974, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a bill defining aggression as “the use of force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as declared in this definition”.

2 The International System and Peace After World War II

189

of the United Nations stipulates that under the guarantee of collective security, an attack by an aggressor on any one state in the collective security system is considered an attack on all states4 and provides specific elements of collective security, such as peaceful settlement of international disputes, resistance to aggression, arms reduction, disarmament, and assistance in “peacekeeping”. These provisions constitute a comprehensive body of law that serves as a “response to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”. “The principle of unity” among the major powers is an application of the concept of collective security. Despite the limitations in its actual operation, the collective security mechanism has overcome to a certain extent the shortcomings of the traditional balance of power mechanism in the past, in which countries relied on their own strength or allied with other countries to ensure security. The replacement of individual security by collective security cannot but be considered progress in human efforts to avoid war at the international level. Third, international institutions and organizations should be established to guarantee the application of the principles embodied in the treaty system to the settlement of disputes between states and armed conflicts. After World War I, the world began to set up organizations to settle disputes between states in a peaceful manner, such as the Permanent Court of International Arbitration established in 1921, which is an international institution that uses legal procedures such as mediation and arbitration to settle disputes between states; after World War I, the League of Nations was established. This is the further practice and application of the concept of restraining war by rules. Although this effort failed to prevent the outbreak of the World War II, it laid the foundation for the establishment of international organizations and institutions after the war. After the war, a new international organization, the United Nations, was established on the basis of the League of Nations. The establishment of the United Nations, the world’s largest international organization, is perhaps the highest organizational achievement created by mankind in the international sphere. Although it is still far from being a “world government”, its great role in safeguarding human rights, maintaining peace operations, reducing local wars, and avoiding world wars does have the function of a world government. When Iraq invaded the sovereign state of Kuwait in 1990, the UN activated the collective security mechanism, and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 660, which condemned Iraq’s violation of the UN Charter and demanded its withdrawal by 14 votes in favor and 0 against, effectively restraining the aggression and punishing the aggressor, making it the most successful case of collective security mechanism implemented by the UN after the war. It became the most successful case of a collective security mechanism implemented by the United Nations after the war. As the 2005 Panel of Eminent Persons on UN Reform said of the UN in its report, “Without the UN, the post-1945 world 4

The first (1) of the UN Charter states that the primary purpose of the United Nations is the vision of collective security: “to maintain international peace and security; and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace; and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”.

190

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

would have been a much bloodier place. the second half of the twentieth century saw fewer interstate wars than the first half”. Fourth, after World War II, mankind’s efforts to follow the direction of “regulating war by rules” embodied in international treaties reached a new height, and the number and completeness of international conventions related to the limitation of war signed were unprecedented. Important treaties include the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the International Convention against Terrorism, the Convention on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (as amended) (China has signed most of these conventions). Most importantly, the greatest international treaty of the postwar era is the UN Charter. This charter was the first “fundamental law” of mankind. It began with the express purpose of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of two world wars. The Charter reaffirms some of the basic principles embodied in the treaty system, such as equal rights of nations large and small, respect for treaties and international law, the maintenance of international peace and security, the nonuse of force, and the nonabuse of prisoners of war,5 and adds such things as the guarantee of fundamental human rights and the use of international institutions for the economic and social advancement of all peoples. The UN Charter’s reaffirmation and development of some of the basic concepts of the treaty system may be seen as a sorrowful reflection after the bitter lessons of the two world wars. These efforts to restrain war in the post-World War II international system, which evolved from the treaty system, have been effective, and the absence of large-scale wars in the more than 70 years since the end of World War II is one of the strongest testimonies to the enormous achievements of the postwar international system. “After the end of the Korean War in 1953, there were no more wars between the major military powers, whereas for the previous 600 years there had been two new wars a year in Western Europe. There were 300 deaths per 100,000 people during World War II, nearly 30 per 100,000 during the Korean War, and more than a dozen per 100,000 during the Vietnam War; in the 1970s and 1980s, that number dropped to single digits, and in the twenty-first century, less than one” (Palmer 2018, pp. 22– 23). Despite this success, the postwar international system remains imperfect. The system is still one in which the principles of power and interest come into play, and many of the deeper problems of the international system remain unresolved. Although the United Nations has established a collective security system, in the actual implementation process, the major powers have difficulty making unanimous resolutions out of their own interests, so much so that sometimes the mechanism almost loses its function. The two superpowers still often sacrifice the interests of small countries to fight for hegemony. In addition, there are still problems such as the weak normative power of international organizations and international rules over

5 The basic idea of the fundamental rights of prisoners of war is also reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.

3 The International System and Peace in the Age of Globalization

191

national actors. Therefore, under the postwar international system, although largescale wars have decreased, regional wars and small-scale wars are still frequent, such as the Korean and Vietnam wars in the 1950s and 1970s, the five Middle East wars between Arab countries and Israel, the three wars between India and Pakistan, and the war in Afghanistan in the early 1980s.

3 The International System and Peace in the Age of Globalization Since the 1980s, a number of new features have emerged in the international system, marked by the “globalization” of the economy.6 Economic globalization is governed by economic laws, and trade activities and capital flows have promoted a worldwide division of labor, involving most countries and regions in a system of division of labor. This in itself is a logical consequence of the political and economic system under the treaty system. At the same time, economic globalization is strongly driven by technology, and the great progress of technology has involved all three major types of human games (power games, wealth games, and mind games) in the “international” arena, forming three major types of networks, namely the proliferation of regional groups of countries characterized by regional cooperation and the proliferation of international organizations. The network of interstate relations, the network of world trade, characterized by the enormous growth of trade and the frequent flow of capital7 and technology between countries, and the network of information, characterized by the rapid and instantaneous flow of massive information between actors brought about by the Internet and mobile devices.8 These three network systems are bringing the world closer together, changing the political and economic structures on which the modern international system is based and constituting a new environment for the evolution of our humanity in the international sphere. One of the most obvious features of the new environment is that the “international” sphere has become more 6

Some scholars have divided the post-Cold War international system into two phases, and Wang Jisi argues that the world has entered a new phase, marked by the European refugee crisis in 2015, the UK’s decision to leave the EU in 2016, and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president (2016). He also considers “increased geopolitical competition and the risk of war” as one of the characteristics of this phase (see Wang Jisi, “World Politics Enters a New Phase”, China International Strategic Review 2018 (in Chinese), World Knowledge Press, 2018). However, it is still too short a time for these landmark events to occur as a new phase of the world system, and it remains to be seen whether the world has entered a new phase. 7 It was 59 billion in 1948, 579 billion in 1973, 3688 billion in 1993, and 15,985 billion in 2015. (In 67 years, that is an increase of about $16 trillion.) Or in the 22 years from 1993 to 2015, trade increased nearly fivefold. See “World Trade Statistical Review 2016”. https://www.wto.org/english/ res_e/statis_e/wts2016_e/wts16_toc_e.htm, May 28, 2017. 8 The number of people using the Internet worldwide is 3.2 billion, and the number of cell phone users is 7.1 billion. Cell phone signals have covered more than 95% of the global population. Internet Survey Report 2015: 3.2 Billion Internet Users Worldwide, 7.1 Billion Cell Phone Users, December 1, 2015. http://www.askci.com/news/chanye/2015/12/01/142515fck2.shtml, May 28, 2017.

192

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

“social”, the boundaries between foreign and domestic spheres have tended to blur, and the world has witnessed a tendency towards “communalization”, characterized by a wide range of links and deep interaction among actors and a certain “sense of community”. The so-called “globalization”, “community of destiny”, “global home”, “global village”, etc. are all descriptions of this tendency. If the post-World War II international system is still a modern one, there are new signs that the world is evolving into a new phase, which may be called the “postmodern international system” (the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was a political sign of a new phase of the international system). From the observable facts that have emerged, some features of the new phase of the international system may be more conducive to avoiding large-scale war, but at the same time, they bring with them some new factors of insecurity and uncertainty. First, the “strong linkage” between state actors increases the likelihood of “othering” and “mutual assistance” of actors, which further reduces the self-help nature of the international system and the likelihood of large-scale war. This further reduces the self-help nature of the international system and the likelihood of large-scale war. The globalization of the economy and the flow of information have placed most of the world’s countries in a system of interdependence, making the international system a system of “strongly interconnected” interactions. The pattern of interaction of state actors in a state of “strong ties” has also changed: the self-organization of actors has increased. In the era of “weak linkages”, one of the main reasons why society needs government is that it needs to obtain public goods (such as law, order, public services) through organizations (including government) that the public cannot provide on its own, but when actors are in a structure of strong linkages, the self-organization of society increases and public goods become more accessible. When actors are in a strongly connected structure, the self-organizing capacity of society increases, public goods become more accessible, and some functions of social organizations, such as government, are reduced or replaced. It may help to understand this issue by citing the example of the various “clusters” on the Internet today: “clusters” in the network are able to interact with actors and provide certain public goods without the need for traditional market or social organizations, but only through the Internet itself. To some extent, this also applies to the international community. This will make the world more “anarchic”, while “anarchy” may be reduced, as the functions of governments and organizations can be replaced by increased systemic self-organization. As public goods become more accessible and the potential for “other help” and “mutual aid” increases, the ways and means of national survival and security will increase, and state actors will become more cautious about conflict and war. Although “strong connections” structures do not necessarily reduce conflict between actors (there is evidence that increased interdependence increases friction), they do make large-scale warfare more costly because of the huge volume of mutual investment, trade, and economic and human interaction between two actors in a “you in me, me in you” situation. There can be no absolute winner in any war between two actors who have a huge amount of mutual investment and trade and whose economies and people are in a “you in me, me in you” situation. The potential costs and costs of war for the major powers are much higher than the potential benefits. “Stronger linkages” also

3 The International System and Peace in the Age of Globalization

193

increase the likelihood that states will move from more drastic actions to complex “microcoordination” and increase the selectivity of actors. This increased mutual understanding helps to establish crisis prevention and crisis management mechanisms among potentially conflicting countries in general. All of this can diminish the effect of the “law of the jungle”, where you live and you die. Second, the increase in substantive interaction among states has further increased the “social” nature of the international community, with international organizations and treaties playing a greater role in regulating state actors and limiting war. Today’s international system has evolved to include international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the three major rating agencies, the World Trade Organization, and various regional organizations from the European Union to ASEAN9 And has developed a cobweb of international treaties, norms, and value standards that limit the exercise of power, both domestically and vis-à-vis other states. The prohibition of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the UN peacekeeping mechanism, and the nuclear arms control mechanism, established under the coordination of the world’s major powers, are playing a more effective role in curbing large-scale warfare, to the extent that a certain “international governance structure” has begun to emerge among states that is different from the traditional political and economic structure. This new structure will play a greater role in containing or reducing the intensity of international conflicts and even stopping civil wars in some countries. However, it should still be noted that most international organizations are not as strong as social organizations in regulating states, international rules are not as binding as social norms in regulating the behavior of actors, and the established international system may still be destroyed at any time. The withdrawal of the United States, the world’s number one power, from international contracts and organizations10 and from unilateral trade protectionism seems to change the long-established world political and economic landscape, which is largely dominated by the United States and inhibits the “law of the jungle” in the international sphere. Challenging the civilization that humanity has managed to accumulate in the international sphere will cost the world an increased risk of war. Third, there is a trend of increasing “community consciousness” in the world. A “social community” is one whose members share common values and lifestyles and common interests and needs. A “sense of community” means “mutual sympathy and loyalty; we-feeling, trust and consideration; at least partial agreement on self-image and interests; and the ability to predict each other’s behavior and to act accordingly” 9

According to the Yearbook of International Organizations, there were more than 200 international organizations in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century, growing to more than 1000 in the 1950s, increasing to more than 8200 at the end of the 1970s, approximately 27,000 in 1990, more than 48,000 in 1998, and more than 58,000 at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As of 2016, there were more than 62,000 international organizations in the world. http://www.mohrss. gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/rdzt/gjzzrcfw/zygjzz/201604/t20160413_237951.html, May 28, 2017. 10 Under the Trump administration, the United States has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the United Nations Paris Climate Agreement, the Global Compact on Migration, and the United Nations Human Rights Council.

194

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

(Ikenberry 2005, p. 266). The strong connection and deep interaction of actors in the international sphere has led to the emergence of a certain communal character and a certain sense of community in the world, as in the case of social organizations such as families and villages. This is mainly manifested in the emergence of the world with two senses of community and sense of community. The first is the “security community” among the Western liberal capitalist powers, which constitute the basic structure of the international system and the strengthening of the sense of community. This sense of community originated from the sense of “collective security” that emerged at the beginning of the modern international system, which has evolved and become perfect and has an institutional basis, especially after the end of the “Cold War”. The sense of “security community” in these countries has increased since the end of the Cold War.11 “The security community of liberal and capitalist democracies, which includes most of today’s great powers, has certain fundamental values and norms that have a more or less hegemonic character in the contemporary international order, including the human rights norms that bind the sovereignty of states and the rules that maintain the openness of the international economy. Becoming a recognized and rule-abiding member of the international community means accepting human rights norms and an open world economic system” (Ikenberry 2005, p. 276). The nature of the current international system, whose fundamentals are derived from the civilizational experience of the Western “society of individuals”, has not changed per se, but it is important to acknowledge the fact that as the modern international system has gradually become accepted by most countries of the world, the modern democratic political system associated with this system has also generated a widespread.12 There is a widespread expectation among these countries (especially developed industrialized countries) that the probability of war between countries with political systems that guarantee individual rights and check the power of the state is not high, and this expectation serves as a check on interstate wars. In addition, another sense of community has emerged in today’s world, namely a certain consensus among human beings in the face of common problems such as the environment, nuclear war, terrorism, drugs, cybercrime, and other issues that may threaten the security of all humanity, creating an allegiance to higher goals beyond national political systems and ideologies and a need for global governance measures. However, this sense of “community consciousness” is still only a vague view of certain issues that are broadly similar and lack a clear common value and institutional basis (and therefore hardly a true sense of community and “community consciousness”).13 However, such a common or similar

11

The current trade war with China on the one hand and the near-zero tariff trade alliance with the EU, Japan and other developed countries on the other can be seen as the latest example of the importance of this community of intent. 12 The second wave, 1943–62, began in the World War II, with approximately 36 countries, and the third wave, 1974-, began in the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, with 30 countries. Huntington, translated by Liu Junning, The Third Wave—The Wave of Democratization in the Late twentieth Century, Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 1998, Chap. 1, Sect. 3. 13 China has long been outside this system, and today, it is not strictly speaking a full member of this community, although it has accepted most of the rules and has stated that it will not challenge

3 The International System and Peace in the Age of Globalization

195

view also helps peace as a value to take root in people’s minds, thus reducing the probability of large-scale war. One strong evidence that the new features of the international system have reduced the likelihood of large-scale war is that the international system has changed from a bipolar structure to one of U.S. superhegemony since the end of the Cold War, while no alliances have emerged in the world to resist U.S. hegemony in accordance with the logic of “balance of power”. One of the more convincing explanations for this is that the traditional “balance of power” mechanism governing warfare has changed and the “collective security” mechanism is playing a greater role. The tendency toward world community, brought about by “strong ties” and “deep interaction”, has reduced the instability of state actors due to the exclusion of one powerful force and changed their perceptions of security. The new perceptions of security include the declining significance of territory and resources, the fact that state survival and security are not necessarily achieved through the pursuit of power politics, the difficulty of sustaining those who rely on traditional material forms of power, the high cost of confrontation in the form of alliances, and the concept of rule-based checks rather than power-based checks and balances. The concept of “checks and balances” is more deeply rooted. In terms of the trade friction between China and the United States, although there are realists in both China and the United States who believe that this is evidence that China and the United States will fall into a “Thucydides trap” and the world will fall into a “new cold war”. This conflict caused by trade friction, the United States’ accusations against China and the measures taken and China’s response, have not yet gone beyond the framework of the existing system of “rule-based conflict management” and negotiated solutions. The probability of a major hot war between the U.S. and China is extremely low because the costs to both sides are too high. The U.S. government’s judgment and approach to China based on “checks and balances” thinking are at odds with the changed world, leaving the world’s elite, including the U.S. elite, puzzled: “Do Americans truly think that their U.S. government has no other way to deal with another powerful country than to go to war?”14 Even if there is a “new Cold War” between China and the United States, judging from the profoundly changed world situation, China’s historical and cultural traditions, and the changes in China’s integration into the international system that are beginning to occur, it is unlikely to be a “Cold War” in the sense of checks and balances. The “new Cold War” may be so “new” that it cannot be called a “Cold War” and cannot be ruled out as an almost “coevolutionary” one. The possibility of a “coevolution”15 process: the system. The concept of a “community of human destiny”, as proposed by China’s leaders and discussed by many Chinese scholars, is very much a community in the second sense. 14 The March–April 2018 combined issue of Foreign Affairs magazine features an article coauthored by Kurt Campbell and Eli Ratner: “Thinking about China” and a set of discussion articles surrounding the article. This quote is from one of the articles by Rui Xiujian, former U.S. Ambassador to China and founder of the Kissinger Institute for U.S.–China Relations at the Woodrow Wilson Center. 15 The concept of “coevolution” was introduced by former U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger in a 2014 conversation with former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former German Ambassador to the United States Wolfgang Ischinger, and

196

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

China’s gradual mutation to a new environment through hard choices under severe competitive pressures in the “international” sphere and the gradual acceptance by the modern international system, dominated mainly by Western liberal capitalist states, of a large and distinctive civilization. The modern international system, dominated mainly by Western liberal capitalist countries, is gradually accepting a new, large, and distinctive civilizational and organizational form. The international system of the new era is characterized by an overall reduction in the occurrence of large-scale wars, but it must be recognized that the international rules and institutions for avoiding large-scale wars are still quite fragile, and the root causes of wars are far from being eliminated. Moreover, these new features of the international order have added new uncertainties and insecurities to the world, such as the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, environmental problems, terrorism, drugs, cybercrime, and more “strong links” and “deep interactions” that bring more small-scale frictions and conflicts. The biggest insecurity factor is that technologydriven economic globalization has exacerbated the inequality of economic development and the inequitable distribution of wealth. Currently, the per capita GDP of rich countries is more than 100 times that of the poorest countries. A single multinational corporation can have more wealth than a medium-sized country.16 In the era of weak linkages, people may not have a real sense of the difference between rich and poor countries because of the distance, but in the era of “communization”, the problem is as strong as the experience of seeing a neighbor’s family get rich at home. Although classical political economy theory warns that “it is a good thing that your neighbor is richer than you” (Palmer 2018, p. 3), the fact is that the actual experience of the gap between rich and poor makes people vulnerable to feelings of deprivation and insecurity. This is illustrated by the current political polarization and division in the world, as well as the so-called antiglobalization tendency represented by the prevalence of populism and nationalism. The growing gap between the rich and the poor has become a major cause of instability, chaos, and even large-scale wars in the world order. If this problem is not solved, the hard-won civilizational achievements of mankind in limiting wars may go down the drain.

economics professor Yasmin May Yi Fager. The conversation was published on the website of the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit on Jan. 21 and was entitled “Arrogance toward China is wrong”. He interpreted the phrase as “development with mutual proximity”. 16 For example, in August 2018, the stock market value of Apple (which had 110,000 employees in 2015) has crossed the trillion dollars mark, becoming the first company in history to reach a market value of $1 trillion. In contrast, Indonesia, with a population of 264 million people, only had a GDP of $960.438 billion in 2017.

4 Restraining War: The Civilizational Evolution of the International System

197

4 Restraining War: The Civilizational Evolution of the International System Idealism and realism (each of which has its own branch) are two opposing theoretical schools in the field of international relations studies. Idealism tends to believe that the inherent cooperative nature of human beings motivates people to develop their inherent collegial nature in accordance with the laws of nature while rationally preserving the self, interacting with other individuals and forming orderly societies. This is also true of the state as a collection of individuals: although states are selfinterested, they are driven by reason to automatically cooperate for mutual benefit through interdependence, i.e., they pursue their own interests while promoting the interests of the international community as a whole, thus establishing an international order under anarchy and thus avoiding war. Realism, on the other hand, holds that the desire for power is human nature, that competition between individuals and states is inevitable, and that international politics is a relationship between states competing for power and profit. Since international society is in anarchy, countries can only adopt the realpolitik strategy of “security first” and rely on self-help to survive, conflicts and wars are the norm, and short-lived peace is only the result of maintaining the balance of power between countries. The history of the evolution of the international system should be said to support both idealist and realist views. On the one hand, the history of the evolution of the international system is replete with evidence of the “goodness” aspect of human nature that idealism emphasizes. In the long run, the human endeavor to create rules and ideas to limit the “evil” and violence in human nature extends from “society” to “the international”. International relations are not exactly the “law of the jungle” as realists believe, but in the international sphere, mankind has created international institutions, international organizations, international laws, numerous treaties, and rules governing war. At least since World War I, international law has steadily increased the restrictions on the historic power of nations to wage war, and the slaughter on the battlefield has led the global community to consider wars of conquest to be illegal. Some of the main tenets of the modern international system, such as the equality of all sovereign states, the resolution of conflicts through consultation and negotiation rather than through violence, and the basic institutional design, have been internalized by most international members and have become civilized achievements of all humanity. Although progress has been slow and tortuous, humanity has indeed “used its cognitive capacity to withstand disasters such as plague and famine just as they have been able to use it to deal with the scourge of war” (Palmer 2018, pp. 31–32). The international world is indeed evolving in a more rule-based and therefore more civilized direction. From observable facts, the current international system has evolved to a new stage in which war and violence are more restricted and their likelihood of occurrence is decreasing. Thus, the overall trend in the evolution of the international system supports the conclusion that “war is not inevitable”. On the other hand, the history of the evolution of the international system also shows that humans do have a “sexual evil” aspect, as emphasized by realism, and that

198

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

because there are no authoritative institutions such as “governments” and common moral and value norms in the international sphere, it is more difficult to limit war than in the international sphere. The international sphere of activity is more difficult to limit war than the social sphere and therefore more fraught with war. In the history of international relations, wars have never ceased, and with the advancement of human technology and the development of more lethal weapons, wars of greater scale and with more casualties have emerged. Even the new phase of the international system with increased interdependence among nations that has emerged in recent decades is not enough to completely exclude the concerns of nations about survival and security and the possibility of war. The pursuit of welfare in the “low politics” of economics and trade has not always prevented conflict in the “high politics” of security. While international organizations and regimes can help create “orderly anarchy” and international law can be used to regulate the behavior of states and maintain world peace, this role should not be overestimated; international organizations and regulations are still quite fragile, and “perpetual peace” remains an elusive goal. Therefore, the conclusion that a “war is not inevitable” is not supported only by historical fragments of the evolution of the international system. In fact, if one considers the international as an evolutionary circle of humanity and compares the history of the evolution of the international system to a long river, the general trend is that humanity has been trying to limit war and has made progress, but this progress is not linear; this river is full of rapids and treacherous shoals, with advances and retreats, iterations and setbacks. Both idealism and realism find plenty of examples from the history of the evolution of the international system to support their views, and both only look at the problem from one side. The history of the evolution of the international system has both the idealistically seen side of human efforts to limit war and achieve remarkable success, and the realist theory emphasizes the war-filled side, probably related to the fact that the evolution of our human race in the international sphere also follows the biological law that the biological world is governed by the law of symbiosis and dependence, in addition to competition and exclusion between individuals and populations of the same species. Both individual organisms and populations compete for resources and space under the pressure of survival, thus causing conflicts and wars. However, there is also a need for symbiosis and dependence between individual organisms as well as groups to form an order or an ecosystem. A negative feedback mechanism prevails in the biological world, i.e., when competition exceeds a certain limit, factors that inhibit competition emerge so that the relationship between organisms can be largely maintained at a certain equilibrium point. That is why groups of organisms have evolved traits adapted to different geographical areas, different food types, and different activity times, occupying an ecological niche and thus avoiding competition. Humans are dependent on social norms (civilizational achievements) to limit competition. Yes, because the international level does not have authoritative institutions such as governments and common moral norms such as the social level, conflicts and wars are more likely to occur at the international level, which is the harsh reality of international relations as emphasized by realism. However, since the international is also a system of human evolution (the level of group interaction),

References

199

the biological laws of competition and symbiosis are not entirely inapplicable. There is not only competition among international actors but also a so-called socialization that constantly internalizes certain rules to govern their own behavior, evolving some common norms that limit competition. The emergence of an international order is a balance between competition and symbiosis among human groups. The concepts and rules governing war in the modern international order may be seen as a common culture that has evolved in the international sphere to save human beings from their own destruction under the law of biological symbiosis. Realism, with its overemphasis on interpopulation competition, describes a positive feedback mechanism in international society that violates the laws of evolution: when a country becomes powerful, it poses a threat to others, who in turn develop more sophisticated weapons for their own security, thus causing an arms race. According to this logic, there will be no equilibrium point between human populations, which will inevitably or sooner be destroyed. However, not only has our world not been destroyed in a power game, as in the logic of realism, but now there is a trend toward less and less conquest between nations. This is the other side of the reality of international relations highlighted by idealism: the constant effort to limit war at the international level, the level of evolution of human civilization, and the remarkable achievements that have been made. Humanity is not yet able to create a “permanent peace” order in the international sphere (complete avoidance of war may never be achieved), and the current model of international politics, which is based on a modern democratic political system characterized by the limitation of state power and the guarantee of individual rights, with rules governing state actors, may be our human adaptation in adaptive choice in dealing with group relations. Theoretically, there should be a better international system that incorporates the experience of non-Western civilizations, but there is no alternative system that has fewer drawbacks and is acceptable to the majority of the world’s countries. The system itself has many shortcomings, and there are new factors of insecurity and uncertainty, but the technological progress that has facilitated economic globalization and strong ties and substantive interaction among international actors has not stopped, and the trend toward a “communalization” of the world that could reduce large-scale wars cannot be reversed. Therefore, we have reason to be cautiously optimistic about the future: with continuous trial and error and improvements based on this system, we may expect the world to evolve to a “more rules-based” international system that “cannot be completely avoided but can continuously reduce wars”.

References Huipeng, Shang. 2007. The Individual Jen, the Individual Jen State, and the Origins of the Modern International Order—A Psycho-Cultural Perspective. Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics), 10.

200

10 Peace and the Evolution of the International System

Ikenberry, John. (ed.). 2005. America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Meiguo Wudi: Junshi de Weilai). Beijing University Press. Kissinger, Henry. 2015. Shijie Zhixü, World Order (shijie zhixu). CITIC Publishing Group. Nye, Joseph Jr. 2005. Understanding International Conflict: Theory and History, 5th edition in Chinese (Lijie guoji chongtu: lilun yu liishi). Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Palmer, Tom G. (ed.). 2018. Peace, Love & Liberty, War is not inevitable. Chinese Version: Heping yu ai: zhanzheng bingfei bukebimian. Translated by Feng Ling. Hainan Publishing House. Shi, Yinhong. 2007. The Origin of the Modern International System: A Discourse from the Dual Perspective of System and Unit. Journal of History Monthly (Lishixue Yuekan), 7.

Chapter 11

“The Rugged Individual Jen”: The American Human Constant and the Analysis of Its Psychosocial Homeostasis

Commentators often cite individualism as the key to understanding American society and culture. From our perspective, two points need to be made: first, American individualism is both related to and distinct from European individualism; the former is a refined version or extreme form of the latter, so the American version of individualism should be named differently from European individualism. Second, "individualism" is a value system or ideology that is a reflection of a more fundamental fact—the “Human Constant”—that individualism is a system of values or ideology. That is, individualism is the “end”, and the “Human Constant” is the “essence”. The Human Constant is the key to analyzing and understanding a society and culture. Based on this understanding, I advocate calling the Human Constant of America “the Rugged Individual Jen”.1 The Rugged Individual Jen is a subtype and a refined version of the Individual Jen (the dominant type of “Human Constant” in Western society). 2 It is a type of Jen that exists and can therefore be called American Jen. The value system that reflects this Human Constant can be called Rugged Individualism. Of course, the American version of the Human Constant and its value system differs from the West not in essence but only in degree, so that when we use the concept of Rugged Individual Jen and Rugged Individualism to analyze American society, it also applies to a less extent to Western society in general. This chapter will analyze the Rugged Individual Jen as the Human Constant of American society, focusing on its four dimensions and the process of psychosocial homeostasis, to decipher the mystery of American society and culture.

1

We do not know who first coined the term Rugged Individualism, but according to my research, it seems that President Hoover was the first to call for the replacement of traditional individualism with Rugged Individualism in American history. 2 Again, we use the concept of “individual” in the sense of what Dumont calls the “normative subject” rather than the “actor-subject”. The individual in the former sense is an individual. An individual in the former sense is a Human Constant. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_11

201

202

11 “The Rugged Individual Jen”: The American Human Constant …

1 The Rugged Individual Jen: The American Human Constant and its Dimensions In our analytical framework, the Rugged Individual Jen as an extreme form of the Individual Jen is characterized by four dimensions of self-perception, affect, exchange, and group that are consistent with the individual, except that they are more extreme, and some indicators of these four dimensions tend to be at the bottom end of the schema. In the dimension of self-perception (which can be called the “internal image” of the Human Constant), the Rugged Individual Jen tends to believe that only the independent individual is the only real and truly valuable being among all things in the world. The definition of “person” is almost identical to that of the Individual Jen as the basis of the organism. The individual person in this state is more thoroughly crafted: he or she becomes an independent, free actor that has broken free from almost all constraints. The individual has a clearer, harder “ego” core, and the “independent self” is not only considered to be a sign of a person’s maturity and normal personality, but even some thinkers and social philosophers have promoted the “independent self” to a sacred level.3 The “independent self” here means autonomous motives, autonomous choices, self-reliance, and the individual’s right to decide his or her own life and future, so the individual’s life in this state has a strong egocentric tendency, and “self-realization” has also become a kind of religious (Protestantism) pursuit in life. Hsu compares this mode of self-cognition to the “toleration” view of the universe in astronomy: “I” is the center of the world, and the world revolves around “I”.4 The core of the “I” is so hard that the whole world is absolutely differentiated into “my world” and “the world outside of me”, and individuals tend to start from the “I” position. The individual tends to judge the world from the standpoint of “I”, “my feelings”, “my pleasure”, “my happiness”, etc. Individual perceptions based on organisms such as “my feelings”, “my happiness”, and “my well-being” are highly emphasized. It is true that a full “independent self” emerges only after overcoming various worldly constraints, which is not possible in real life, but as a mode of selfperception, those who are free from all constraints and embody their independent self are highly valued, while those who are still too closely connected to members of their kin and older people at the age of independence are likely to receive negative 3

The idea that the individual, as part of the Supramental Spirit, can each claim his or her own holiness, and that each person is a small universe by virtue of sharing in the Universal Spirit. As Emerson wrote: “Who will define the individual for me? I look upon this unique Universal Spirit in so many manifestations with awe and joy. I see myself melting into it, as a plant is born of the earth, and I grow in the midst of God. I am only a form of Him, and He is my soul”. He believed that if one looks at a person correctly, each person “contains all the other human natures”. In the heart of a person, that which is “deepest is divine”. The sacred individual is not to be violated by anyone, not even his family members: “I cannot sell my liberty and power to preserve their sensitivities”. Emerson encourages each individual to “accept the place which the divine has found for you”. Emerson’s statements are reminiscent of Hindu and Buddhist discourses on ataman. 4 In contrast, the Chinese have a “Galilean” view of the self: the “I” revolves around a larger center together with the other (Massei et al. 1988, p. 267).

1 The Rugged Individual Jen: The American Human Constant and its …

203

comments such as “lacking independence” and “depending on others”. “Privacy” is a central part of this type of “self”, and “privacy” means that the individual has an internal world that is hardened and inaccessible even to the closest people. The emphasis on “privacy” implies the absence or at least the lack of intimate connections in the individual’s “life package” because the establishment of intimate connections requires breaking with each other. The establishment of intimate connections requires breaking the privacy of each other to enter each other’s inner worlds. In the emotional dimension, the emotional configuration and control mechanisms of the Rugged Individual Jen are more extreme. First, the range of emotional configurations is larger and more uncertain. Since people who belong to this Human Constant tend to cut off all ties (and at the same time an intimate connection), there is a lack of permanent members in their “life package”, and it is difficult to “specialize” the individual’s feelings to some specific people (such as filial piety, loyalty, righteousness, respect). Moreover, because of the strong emphasis on “privacy”, it is difficult to establish intimate connections with others, so individuals have a greater sense of insecurity. According to the PSH principle, individuals in this situation are forced to use more diverse means to seek psychosocial homeostasis. The fact that feelings are not “specialized” provides the possibility to transform them at any time, in any direction, and for any object. Second, the control mechanism of emotions is based on the internal world (within the 4th level of the psychosocial homeostasis schema, including expressible conscious, unexpressible conscious, preconscious, and unconscious) rather than the influence of external situations because the life of the Rugged Individual Jen is closer to the basis of the human organism. In other words, the individual’s internal feelings and experiences, such as pain or pleasure, liking or disliking, sadness or joy, repression or catharsis, passion or calmness, guilt or accomplishment, are more important to one’s decisions and actions, while external forces, such as the evaluation of others, traditions, customs, orders, status, etiquette, are secondary. The individual in this state tends to exaggerate certain feelings, and expressing his feelings frankly and openly is praised as a virtue because the Rugged Individual Jen considers this to be the most genuine and admirable state of a human being. At the same time, he tends to suppress certain bad desires, demands, and thoughts that cause guilt to a deeper level of the heart—the unconscious. The exchange dimension of the Rugged Individual Jen is characterized by the tendency of interpersonal relationships to become more transactional. Since all interpersonal relationships that bet on emotions are essentially a form of bondage, human relationships in the “extreme personal” state tend to expel the emotion factor, and interpersonal relationships tend to be a de-emotional, fully equivalent exchange (typically in the form of commodity exchange). The principle of commodity exchange invades almost every aspect of social life to the point that everything has a tendency to be “conditional” and “public”. In this model, it is more common for biological fathers and sons to pay for their own meals and for spouses to be financially independent of each other. This exchange model is timely, equitable, and beneficial. It is simple and clear, in line with the mathematical theorem of “A equals B, B equals C, and A equals C”. For example, a person may have many “friends”, but they are mostly functional: partners in work, partners in fishing, travel, and other interests,

204

11 “The Rugged Individual Jen”: The American Human Constant …

partners in sexual relationships, etc. Interest is another characteristic of this relationship model. In real life, Americans are often impressed by their unapologetic behavior of self-interest. They believe that not only is private interest not contradictory to public interest but also that the public interest will be maximized only when everyone pursues their own interests (so-called social progress). This is not only a consensus but also the premise of many social science theories and social system designs. When this occurs in extreme form (and seems to occur more easily in this mode of exchange), it becomes greed. The desire to make a profit, to make money for the sake of making money, is more thoroughly present in American society throughout all economic activity and is the ultimate goal of all economic activity. The Human Constant of Rugged Individual Jen is characterized by the group dimension (which can be called the “external image” of the Human Constant): various free associations are not only numerous but also have a greater impact on the life of the individual. Traditional ties such as blood and geography are minimized, and “free association” is called the most suitable form of group for the Rugged Individual. It is a misconception that the Rugged Individual does not participate in any organization, is not bound by any norms, and is completely “alone” (which is actually impossible). Rather, because such a person lacks the security of close interpersonal ties within the kin group, the urge to seek close ties with others outside the kin group is stronger, including relationships with nonkin, role-based people in PSH Tier 2. Just as standardized machine parts can be combined with parts of any standard, the “inorganization” (freedom from traditional ties) of the individual reveals a greater ability to “combine” with different qualifiers into groups, and this is the reason why Americans, who are extremely individualistic, are also highly “associationist”. Not only are there more religious and moral groups, literary and scientific societies, business organizations, and leisure and recreational societies, but there are also more civic organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and volunteer organizations than anywhere else in the world. Large American multinational corporations (such as Microsoft, IBM, Coca-Cola, Disney) are dominant worldwide because of their great vitality and competitiveness, and some of the most boring and humble organizations (such as the Slacker’s Club, the Scruffy Housewives Club, the Club of Non-Brushers5 ) are also well organized and dynamic. This effort has made American social organizations diverse and complex to the point of dazzling. However, the development of free association is not the same thing as the acquisition of intimate 5

According to the European Daily News, there are many strange and bizarre associations in the United States, such as the “Draggers Club” (6100 members, all of whom would never do anything today), the “Humanity Will Never Fly Memorial Society” (members have been discussing since the beginning whether the Wright brothers flew up there or not), the “Flat Earth International Research Society” (members are convinced that the earth is flat and that it stretches endlessly), the “Girdle Seekers Club” (for overweight gay men over 21), the “The International Gay Asshole Society (which gives members the opportunity to confirm that they are unapologetically big assholes), the Bald Men’s Club (18,000 people dedicated to the idea that baldness is beautiful), the Jim Smith Society” (1480 people are called by this name), the “Stinky Husband Club” (members love curry and promote not brushing their teeth), the “International Organization of Nerds”, “Distracted People’s Club” (even the nature of their own club is not clear), etc.

2 The Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Rugged Individual Jen

205

ties. According to the PSH principle, the existence of a large number of free associations is precisely a sign of a lack of intimate interpersonal ties. Because there are fewer personal bonds of blood and loyalty, most of these associations lack permanence for individuals, who are always quick to form groups and quick to dissolve them and quick to form new ones and quick to leave them.

2 The Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Rugged Individual Jen From our point of view, even in the Human Constant of the Rugged Individual Jen, which places great emphasis on individual independence, individuals are not completely isolated, i.e., they all have “life packages”, but the content of their “life packages” and the dynamic equilibrium pattern between the individual and the “life package” have their own characteristics. As explained in Chap. 2 of this book, different types of Human Constants have different levels of difficulty in obtaining security, i.e., different levels of psychosocial homeostasis. The Individual Jen is already a Human Constant design that is more difficult to feel secure, and the Rugged Individual Jen, the ultimate form of this Human Constant, is even worse. Americans are trained from an early age to view their ties to those around them as temporary, with no unassignable identity to anyone other than their own constructed world, leaving them with a lack of stable members in their “life package” and individuals struggling to get to the “person” as a “sociocultural field”. Individuals try harder to seek close ties to all layers of the “sociocultural field”. This process manifests itself as a psychosocial homeostasis direction that unfolds in both the internal and external directions of the PSH, mobilizing the contents of each layer to replenish the unstable “life package”.6 Hsu identifies several directions of mobilization in the psychosocial homeostasis model of the “individual” and (Hsu 1983, p. 255) suggests that these analyses are also applicable to the Rugged Individual in the United States and that they all take on more extreme forms. The first is the mobilization of the inner layers of PSH (mainly the “subconscious” and “preconscious” layers), i.e., the exploration of the inner world by means of introspection. This can manifest itself in various ways: (1) the practice of an exclusive religion. By placing an exclusive deity in the “life package” and by establishing a close and unique connection with it, the individual can gain a sense of certainty. The American Protestant tradition does not require any intermediary but rather a close connection with God through “soul training”, which is a much simpler way of communicating with God and man that is easier for the soul to settle and relieves greater inner anxiety and anxiety. (2) Receiving psychoanalysis or psychotherapy. 6

One of the presuppositions of the PSH principle is that a person has a certain amount of psychological energy and that betting more emotional energy in one direction means betting less in other areas. The PSH model of the Rugged Individual Jen is characterized not by a greater total psychological energy but by a greater variety of ways to achieve balance.

206

11 “The Rugged Individual Jen”: The American Human Constant …

The subconscious layer is unconscious and difficult to mobilize, but when society and culture overemphasize the “individual self” as the foundation of the organism instead of the “social self”, the “self” hidden in the deepest part of the heart becomes the most important part of thinking and being thought. When society and culture place too much emphasis on the “individual self” as the basis of the organism rather than the “social self”, the “self” hidden in the deepest part of the being becomes the object of reflection and mobilization. The school of psychoanalysis founded by Freud, which is mainly characterized by the analysis of the human subconscious, although it emerged in Europe, has gained the most widespread application in the United States today.7 It is the result of the overemphasis on the individual self in the Human Constant of the Rugged Individual Jen. Since there is a lack of close people in the “life pack” who can put down their arms and talk to each other, and going to church and giving your worries to God is still not a way to get rid of your inner anxiety, then paying someone (a psychologist) to listen to you (the content of the preconscious or limited surface consciousness) becomes a natural choice to solve the problem. Psychoanalysis or psychotherapy is like an oxygen tank, an artificial kidney or glasses to a patient who lacks intimate connection in the “life package”, except that the psychiatrist is not using a medical device but only mobilizing the subconscious mind, and the person being treated is not so much getting treatment as getting a confession. (3) If even God and the psychiatrist are not able to solve the problem, then the only way is to resort to drugs: either to stop the inner confusion, fear, and helplessness with antidepressants or to indulge in drugs and alcohol to create transient hallucinations and trances (Hsu 1983, p. 255). Second, the mobilization of the second layer (“functioning social and cultural layer”). Since it is difficult to establish intimate interpersonal relationships in kinship groups, seeking contact (so-called socialization) in the “functioning social and cultural layer” (layer 2) becomes an important complement. The need for individuals to deliberately organize and plan social events, even to the extent of organizing private “parties” on a regular basis and with whom, becomes an indicator of one’s maturity and status. By entering into a variety of clubs, one seeks alternatives to intimate connections to control or rescue others, to follow others (e.g., various “fans”) or to gain followers (e.g., celebrity figures), to help others, or to surpass others. However, unlike kin members, the residents of this second tier are mostly “likequalified”, pursuing the same or similar goals, and are in competition, which can dilute or destroy the ties they have made, so individuals need to constantly leave old groups and join new ones to seek new ties. As 1830s, The French scholar de Tocqueville noted that in the United States, an egalitarian society, contact between people was easier and interactions were more open than in older societies, but relationships were also more casual and transient. Relationships of mutual trust are not predetermined but artificially constructed and must be sought more actively by individuals. However, because the establishment of intimate relationships requires, at least to some extent, a break with privacy and because the Rugged Individual does 7

There are 550 counselors for every 1 million people in the United States, and 30% of people see a psychiatrist regularly and 80% irregularly. This rate is probably the highest in the world.

2 The Psychosocial Homeostasis Model of the Rugged Individual Jen

207

not want to share privacy with others, it is more difficult to develop feelings of attachment to any association that is linked to loyalty, affection, and genuine friendship, so the effort to form new groups is never finished. Third, the material world is mastered in many ways. People will devote themselves to the mastery of the material world because they have nothing to hold on to and experience a sense of self-existence from the mastery of the material world. People also actively pursue material wealth because of insecurity, and material wealth increases self-confidence and security to a certain extent. As a result, the strong desire to master the material world provides great psychological energy for the development of science and technology that explores the smallest particles and the universe, great business successes in society, and the emergence of more millionaires and giant multinational corporations than anywhere else in the world. “Private property” is an appendage of the undivided, unshareable, highly emphasized “self” when the “spiritual self” and the “social self” are both of greater importance. When both the “spiritual self” and the “social self” have greater uncertainty, the emphasis on the “material self” can increase one’s sense of certainty, so the concept of “the sanctity of private property” is more revered in the United States than anywhere else in the world. It is only natural that the consumerist lifestyle, characterized by the pursuit of comfort and convenience, is more sought after in the United States than anywhere else in the world.8 In addition, when there is a lack of permanent residents in the “life package” layer, animals are sometimes brought in, with the result that the pet industry is more developed in the United States than anywhere else in the world.9 It seems to us that these are just one of the countless ways in which the Rugged Individual aspires to master the material world in search of “psychosocial homeostasis”. Fourth is the mobilization of Tier 1 (“more distant society and culture”). This layer includes the state and the government, on whose affective bets are expressed the enthusiasm of Americans for politics, the election of national leaders by campaigning, and the development of a democratic political system characterized by the importance of the expression of individual will. When the French scholar de Tocqueville visited the United States, he found that the country was a country full of political activity: judicial decisions were formed through the expression of public will and the political actions of political parties and local governments. The will of the people is expressed in a political way. In our view, a well-developed democracy is the inevitable result of a fundamental interpersonal state of the Individual Jen being pushed to its limits. The developed network of associations attracts the emotional bets of the people, which are at the same time a force for the promotion and protection of democracy 8

Former U.S. Vice President Al Gore was awarded the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for a documentary on environmental protection. However, ironically, Gore himself uses 190,000 kW of electricity in his home. 9 There are now 360 million pets in the United States, approximately 1.3 times the population of the United States, and $41 billion in annual pet spending. In the past, Chinese people kept cats to catch mice and dogs to watch over them (part of the “functioning social healing culture” layer), rarely to keep their owners company. The importance of pets in China (especially in metropolitan areas) now indicates a change in the Chinese PSH model, i.e., dogs or cats have moved from our former “operational social and cultural” layer to the “intimate social and cultural” layer.

208

11 “The Rugged Individual Jen”: The American Human Constant …

and a constraining force for the state. In this model, it is natural that political activity is highly performative in nature and that politicians have a tendency to be highly starry-eyed. The coexistence of ardent ideological advocates, passionate statists, and admirers of politicians with fierce anti-institutionalists and anarchists who see the state as a repressive force against the individual and have a strong hatred for politicians, and the strong emotional ties that accompany both opposite directions, is a manifestation of the Rugged Individual Jen’s commitment to the second layer of his PSH. Fifth, the mobilization of layer 0 (“outside world”). This layer is the furthest from us and includes people, customs, and artifacts from other societies, i.e., the “other” or “foreign” culture. Generally speaking, most members of society have little contact with this layer, lack awareness, or have only a few misconceptions. However, the Rugged Individual also has a strong emotional stake in this layer, which manifests itself in active foreign missions, exploration of virgin lands or tribes, expeditions and foreign aid activities, strong intentions to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, and more active ideological exports (see Chap. 12 of this book). The most important feature of the Human Constant of the Rugged Individual Jen is that the individual has to build his own world by various means to solve the problem of “psychosocial homeostasis”. This in fact is tantamount to forcing a person into a situation of anxiety where no progress is possible. From a psychological point of view, anxiety often motivates people to summon the strength to cope with the crisis that occurs and thus perform at an extraordinary level; for example, people can often work longer or run faster and with more strength when under stress. The Rugged Individual Jen has no fixed place in his mind and needs to be in a never-ending search for new ways of doing things, and his model of psychosocial homeostasis is more dynamic. He has a strong urge and desire to achieve success, but failure and frustration are also serious problems. One’s life may be full of achievements, but one’s hopes and desires are also vulnerable to setbacks, and mania and restlessness may constantly assault one’s mind and body. Americans are constantly encouraged by their teachers from kindergarten and elementary school to be confident and courageous in their pursuit of success, and one cannot expect such an individual to be highly resistant to frustration when he or she is almost always given “great” praise for whatever he or she does. Moreover, Americans lack a close circle of people to talk to about their failures, so the shock and pain of failure and the fear of failure are unimaginable.

3 Affective Control Mechanisms and Libido Factors in the Process of Psychosocial Homeostasis We bet our feelings on certain people, objects, and cultural norms, and these people, objects and cultural norms that we bet our feelings on constitute our “life package”, so the process of seeking psychosocial homeostasis can be seen as a process of seeking “psychosocial homeostasis”. Thus, it can be seen as a process of betting our emotions

3 Affective Control Mechanisms and Libido Factors in the Process …

209

on the internal and external layers of PSH. The process of seeking psychosocial homeostasis in multiple directions is analyzed above because the content of the “life package” is unstable and the Rugged Individual Jen must use various means. In fact, the Rugged Individual Jen is not only characterized by multiple directions in the configuration of emotions but also in the control mechanism of emotions. The following further examines the process of psychosocial homeostasis of this Human Constant in relation to the mechanism of emotional control. Although we have feelings, we cannot be completely “emotional”, and every society places some limits on its members to control the expression of feelings. In the process of socialization, we have gradually internalized an emotional control mechanism to address the expression of feelings. Due to differences in culture, there are two types of emotional control mechanisms, namely “repression” and “suppression”. The former is “to exclude painful and unpleasant things from the consciousness and expressions” (Hsu 2002, pp. 122–153). Pressure mainly comes from a fixed internal norm, and what is repressed is buried in the subconscious; the latter is “to deliberately restrict certain behaviors from occurring because of external conditions” (Hsu 2002, pp. 122–153). The suppressed part is not generally buried in the subconscious but is at most suppressed to the “surface consciousness” layer, where it can be easily called out at any time. The lust for a parent that is buried in the subconscious due to guilt as an infant is called “repression”, and the fear of police and car accidents that leads to obeying traffic rules as a driver is called “suppression”. “In general, individuals in every society are subject to some repressive forces and some inhibitory forces. However, some cultures prefer repression as a mechanism of socialization; others prefer inhibition as a mechanism of society. If a culture prefers to use inhibition as a means of socialization, then external control will be more important than internal control. If a culture places more emphasis on repression as a means of socialization, then internal control will be more important than external control” (Hsu 2002, pp. 122–153). According to Hsu, Chinese emotional control mechanisms tend to be “inhibitory”, focusing on interpersonal connections, and human behavior tends to be “situational”: “formed on the basis of inferences about behavioral norms”. When an individual’s behavior is inconsistent with external situations and roles, it usually causes “shame”, and inhibition does not result in severe personal anxiety. Western emotional control mechanisms tend to be “repressive”, focusing on the internal world of the person, and human behavior tends to be “normative”: “some stereotyped social expectation that forms the norm for behavior”.10 When an individual’s behavior is not in line with social norms, it is more likely to cause “guilt”, and the result of repression is more likely to produce internal anxiety. However, we know that sexual desire is at the core of human feelings, so the control mechanism of feelings can be fundamentally attributed to the control of sexual desire, and the cultural difference in the control mechanism of feelings is also largely 10

These two types of behavior have been discussed in detail by the Japanese scholar (Eshun, Hamaguchi, who was influenced by Hsu’s theory (Eshun, Hamaguchi, 1988, pp. 22–23). I believe that this is what Hsu, F.L.K. meant when he referred to the Chinese people’s “situation-centered” psycho-cultural orientation Hsu (2002).

210

11 “The Rugged Individual Jen”: The American Human Constant …

expressed in the difference in the control of sexual desire. If we compare sexual desire to a pool of water deep inside our hearts, the Chinese “inhibitory” control mechanism can be compared to a “sparse” approach: sexual desire and feelings are highly differentiated, and each has its own channel of release, and the cultural norms acquired by individuals in the process of socialization make individuals. The cultural norms that individuals acquire in the process of socialization make them tend to achieve, on the one hand, sexual desire without feelings and, on the other hand, feelings unrelated to sexual desire. The “repressive” control mechanism can be compared to the “blocking” approach, in which the social norms learned in the socialization process focus on trying to exclude sexual desire from feelings, but since sexual desire is a major human desire, it cannot be completely excluded, and the result of its exclusion is that it is only repressed into the subconscious mind. The process of revealing the repression of sexual desire and the anxiety it generates constitute the main content of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, and the entire theory of Freud can be said to be based on the predominance of the “repressive” control mechanism in Western personal society. Why is the cultural mechanism of libido control in the Rugged Individual Jen (and in a certain sense in the West) repressive? This is because in the Human Constant of the “individual”, one’s life is too close to the basis of the human organism. In this state, the important consideration of the correctness of human behavior depends more on personal desires and expectations, desires, feelings, beliefs, etc., or, in other words, people’s lives are more focused on the undisturbed self, which is close to the “original” existence. Since sexuality is one of the most fundamental desires of our organism, the individual in this state is under greater sexual compulsion, and feelings are accompanied by a greater sexual component. However, sexual desire is destructive to human social bonding, and the need for greater cultural repression of sexual desire to coalesce into larger social groups is an important feature of the Western “individual” mechanism of emotional control. “The more emphasis is placed on the individual, the heavier the role of sexual desire, because social life always tends to be based on the organism. In such an environment emotions must be strongly advocated, and in the process sexuality must be strongly excluded (repressed) in order to form larger and lasting groups” (Hsu 2002, p. 345). The repressive control mechanism is the pattern of emotional control developed by individuals in the process of socialization under this cultural orientation of strong exclusion of sexual desires. This control mechanism brings several characteristic results to the process of human “psychosocial homeostasis”. First, this control mechanism leads to the fact that the Rugged Individual Jen is unable to deal with sexuality in the same way as with biological requirements such as eating but tends to have an either-or attitude. The behavior of individuals in this state is hardly of the “middle way” and “eitheror” type but is more likely to be extreme in the opposite action. On the one hand, out of individual guilt, the Rugged Individual tends to repress sexual desire into the subconscious, as in the case of the Christian virgin birth and the ascetic life of the clergy, both of which exhibit the demand for repression of sexual desire, which can be a means of “self-realization”. However, at the same time, out of the anxiety

3 Affective Control Mechanisms and Libido Factors in the Process …

211

caused by the suppression of desire, there are times when absolute sexual freedom and sexual indulgence are demanded, even as a means of “self-actualization”. Second, the repressed sexual desire will be pushed in all possible directions. The repression of sexual desire is similar to the physical phenomenon of action and reaction, in that repression causes reaction, and the stronger the repression, the stronger the reaction, and the sexual desire that is repressed in the subconscious mind is like unstoppable water that leaks out in all directions without being noticed, spreading everywhere. If the way of life places too much emphasis on the individual as the basis of the organism, the proliferation of sexual desire as part of the organism cannot be controlled, even though the culture shows a strong tendency to suppress sexual desire. In this way, we can understand why Western art (literature, sculpture, painting, etc.) has always expressed an entangled sexual desire, and why “romantic love” based exclusively on sexual attraction (which is depicted to the extreme in Hollywood blockbusters) is highly valued and even revered in American society to the point of being. It is also possible to understand why there is a widespread proliferation of sexuality in American film and television, in games, and in all aspects of daily life. Repressed sexuality not only causes proliferation in all spheres of life but also, more importantly, becomes a great driving force and a strong emotional force to support the individual’s behavior. This situation also tends to bring out the fullest potential of the person, showing greater creativity and internal drive for newness and change while also being more prone to rebellious, transgressive, and destructive behavior. “The development of sexuality may give rise to violence, crime and disorder, but it also generates sustained pressure for change and transformation. This trend provides a direction. The universal or undifferentiated emotional character makes it easier for the individual to cross or disengage from preexisting boundaries, while the ever-present sexuality drives him and has great emotional power once he has decided on a goal” (Hsu 2002, p. 354). Therefore, the mechanism by which sexual desire is controlled in the psychosocial homeostasis of the Rugged Individual Jen is that the more emphasis is placed on the individual, the greater the culture tends to adopt a repressive approach to sexual desire, and the more repressive the approach, the greater the repressed sexual desire will spread in the more it causes proliferation on all fronts, the more it provides a stronger emotional force for individual creativity or rebellion, and the greater the courage, strength, and creativity of people who are part of the vitality of the individual are encouraged by society and culture. Indeed, American society highly encourages the individual’s motivation to achieve “success” and the creativity to do so, and thus the highest recognition of a person is his or her characterization as “successful” and the highest praise is calling them “creative”. The great creativity of American education and research, the great dynamism of American business, and the amazing achievements of the United States in terms of social progress and material wealth have all been made possible by this strong motivation and creativity within the individual to achieve success. However, the other side of creativity is destruction and rebellion, because creation and rebellion are two sides of the same coin. “All innovation is a form of rebellion, a deviation from the norm. We call innovation the rebellion that society supports, and rebellion the innovation that

212

11 “The Rugged Individual Jen”: The American Human Constant …

society does not support”. (For example, a creative scientific achievement can draw attention to itself and bring the joy of success, while the assassination of a president or a celebrity can also draw attention to itself and bring the thrill of “success”.) This is why American society is so creative and dynamic and at the same time so violent and incredibly deviant.11 Whether good or bad, radical or conservative, violent or peaceful, the Rugged Individual Jen often acts with amazing energy. Historically, they have organized hunting associations to hunt and kill wildlife, but the American Campaign to Prevent Cruelty to Animals, Whale, Dolphin and Bison Protection, and the Campaign Against Fursuit are also very active. Historically, they have abused American Indians and enslaved blacks in an organized manner, but there are even stronger antiracist organizations and activities to defend the rights of blacks and minorities. Under their effective struggle, the status of blacks and other people of color has improved significantly, so much so that people of different racial backgrounds such as Kissinger, Powell, Rice, and Obama have also been able to gain high positions in the government. American pacifist organizations and movements have shown a high degree of enthusiasm and dedication in promoting human peace and opposing war, but there has also been considerable antisocial crime and violence. The various evangelistic organizations in the United States have trained many good missionaries who are working unselfishly for the relief of the poor or the restoration of traditional morality, etc., both on American soil and in other parts of the world, but those advocates of homosexuality and sexual liberation are mercilessly ridiculing traditional morality. Consumerism has the broadest sociocultural base in the United States, but Americans are also the most active in protecting the environment, and the environmental movement has the largest popular base. If we look at the broader picture, we can also understand why Western history has been so dynamic, with so many wars of conquest and so many social movements with strong personal ties (e.g., the Christian movement, the Reformation, Alexander the Great’s East, the Roman Wars, the Crusades, the Inquisition, the Nazi and Fascist movements, the Communist movement, the antivivisection movements, feminist movements, slavery, the slave trade and abolitionist movements, colonial and nationalist movements, the two world wars, etc.). All of these lasted for quite a long time, and most of them produced many martyrs and a large number of participants. From our perspective, all of this was underpinned by a great internal drive from the “original” individual, linked to sexuality. To date, we have not dealt with a review of the strengths and weaknesses of the Human Constant in the United States. In fact, all of the strengths and weaknesses 11

The Chinese government’s newly released 2007 U.S. Human Rights Record says: One violent crime occurs every 22.2 s in the United States, including one murder every 30.9 min, one rape every 5.7 min, one robbery every 1.2 min, and one vicious assault every 36.6 s. The United States is the world’s largest prison, and its per capita inmate population is the highest in the world. The United States has only 5% of the world’s population and 25% of the world’s inmates. While these numbers may reflect all the facts, there is another side to the United States: the consistently record number of Nobel Prize winners, an education and research system that encourages innovation, and a very dynamic modern business and volunteer organization. From the academic perspective of this paper, these two facts have the same psycho-cultural basis.

References

213

of American society derive from the characteristics of the Human Constant of the Rugged Individual Jen. The American model shows us how far our physical potential can go and how brilliantly it can bear fruit when the individuality in us is maximized, but because this Human Constant places all the pressure of success and failure on the individual, the individual has a great deal of anxiety and insecurity while exploding with energy. Incidentally, there seems to be a tendency to “individualize” our world, and the values that reflect the Human Constant of the Rugged Individual Jen are spreading around the world. However, an important implication of the book’s research is that if our Human Constant is changing in the direction of greater emphasis on the individual, then it seems important to consider whether we are prepared to pay the price of greater internal anxiety and more unstable relationships.

References Hsu, F.L.K. 1983. Rugged Individualism Reconsidered: Essays in Psychological Anthropolgy. Univ of Tennessee Pr; 1st. 1983. Chinese Version, Xü Langguang Zhuzuoji (The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K.), vol. IX, Tai Bei, Nantian Shuji, 2002. Hsu, F.L.K. 1988. American and Chinese, Xü Langguang Zhuzuoji (The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K.), vol. IV [Eshun, Hamaguchi, Nihon Rasisa no Saikatuken (The Rediscovery of Japanese Identity)]. Kodansha Academic Library. Hsu, F.L.K. 1997. Inhibition and Repression: A Psychological Interpretation of Four Cultures as Examples. In Xü Langguang Zhuzuoji (The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K.), vol. IX. Hsu, F.L.K. 2002. Clan, Caste and Club, Xü Langguang Zhuzuoji (The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K.), vol. V, Tai Bei, Nantian Shuji, 2002. Massei, A., et al. 1988. Wenhua yu Ziwo Culture and the Self. Translated by Ren Ying. Zhejiang People’s Publishing House.

Chapter 12

The “Outer World” of the Rugged Individual Jen

We refer to the basic Human Constant of Americans1 as The Rugged Individual Jen— a refined version of the Individual Jen—and use it as a key to understanding American society and culture. According to the principles of science, if a concept is key to understanding something, it must be used to explain many aspects of that thing. Indeed, when we use this concept to explain American attitudes and patterns of behavior toward the “outside world”, we find that it does have strong explanatory power. For example, some literature discussing U.S. diplomacy from a cultural perspective point to the “natural human rights”, “individualism”, “liberalism”, “racism”, “utilitarianism” and “expansionism” of American culture.2 However, when asked further about the roots of these characteristics and how they are intrinsically linked, there are few convincing explanations. When these cultural observations of American diplomacy are examined in relation to the notion of the Rugged Individual Jen, a fundamental American interpersonal state, it is possible not only to examine the appropriateness of these expressions but also to elucidate their roots and reveal their interconnectedness. In our analytical framework, “human” is the “sociocultural field”, and the external response model is the outermost layer of psychosocial homeostasis, that is, layer 0 of the “Outer World”. This layer is made up of “others” with different values and behaviors and “foreign cultures”. When people at this level constitute a national actor, we refer to them as “foreign” and their interaction with them as “diplomacy”. However, despite the term “diplomacy”, our attitudes and behavior toward them are still more influenced by the internal interpersonal model. This is mainly because we do not generally live in this layer, have less relevant information and are usually misinformed; therefore, we can only deal with them according to our familiar reference system. Thus, at least theoretically, a state’s “diplomatic” behavior can be seen in terms of its internal systems—from our perspective, mainly the “Human Constant” 1

Rather, it refers to the bearers of mainstream American culture, the “White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Christians” (abbreviated WASP in English). 2 The published literature in this area includes Wang (2005a, b), Zhu (2001), Zhang and Guo (2005), Men (2001), etc. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_12

215

216

12 The “Outer World” of the Rugged Individual Jen

and the Psychosocial Homeostasis model. This is a basic presupposition of our analysis. Of course, analyzing U.S. foreign relations patterns from this perspective is not a substitute for technical studies such as “U.S. foreign strategy” and “U.S. Middle East policy”, because our perspective focuses not so much on the “state of affairs” in foreign relations as on the “state of affairs” in foreign relations. Our perspective focuses not so much on the “state of affairs” as on a certain “state of mind”. Understanding the “state of mind” certainly helps to understand the “state of affairs”, but it does not necessarily explain all the “states of affairs” because, after all, the focus of attention and the research methods followed are different.

1 “Ego” of the Rugged Individual Jen and Messianism The Rugged Individual Jen defines the “person” in a way that tends to be identical with a “separate body” which is considered to be the basic unit of analysis. Due to the strong emphasis on the independence and freedom of the individual, the individual tends to be free from all constraints, and thus, the “life package” of the individual (the third layer of psychosocial homeostasis: “intimate social relations and culture”) lacks stable and permanent kinship relations. The individual’s “life package” (the third layer of psychosocial homeostasis: “intimate social relations and culture”) lacks stable and permanent kinship. In this way, the individual person is made more independent and freer, while at the same time being placed in a situation of greater insecurity and anxiety. According to the principle of “psychosocial homeostasis”, individuals are more likely to invest great psychological energy in the inward and outward layers to achieve equilibrium. Both the inward and outward layers affect the way they judge and interact with the “outside world”. An important feature of the “self-knowledge” model of the Rugged Individual Jen is that individuals are more conscious of their own existence, uniqueness, direction, goals, wishes, and emotions. When faced with the three existential situations of nature, other, and oneself, the Rugged Individual Jen tends to master the Outer World and his or her own destiny through his or her individuality and takes one’s own feelings as the criterion for weighing all things and even imputes one’s own nature on those things. Individuals in this state have a clearer and more rigid “ego” core, their perception of the world and lifestyle tend to be more “egocentric”, and their spiritual world has a greater tendency to be objectified. Francis L.K. Hsu compares the “independent ego” cognitive model to the “toleration” cosmology in astronomy: “I” is the center of the world like the sun, and the world revolves around “I”.3 This cognitive feature is reinforced by the Rugged Individual, which is a refined version of the “Individual”. This pattern of self-perception is manifested at the ethnic level in a strong sense of national mission and self-centeredness. An examination of American diplomacy and 3

In contrast, the Chinese view the self in terms of a “Galilean” cosmology: the “I” and the “other” revolve together around a larger center (Marcelle and.Hsu 1988).

1 “Ego” of the Rugged Individual Jen and Messianism

217

American history shows that a strong sense of “self-appointed mission” and “messianic spirit” seems to accompany America’s judgment of the outside world and its foreign behavior in relation to it. This sense of mission has sometimes manifested itself in a religious call to “fight for God”, but more often in an ecumenical attitude that emphasizes a sense of secular responsibility to lead and defend the free nations of the world and to spread the gospel to the world. This sense of mission to edify the world emerged from their basic judgment of the “I”—the United States—and the “outside world”. The basic judgment was that the outside world was, on the whole, a negative, needy being, either despotic, corrupt, degenerate, or both, and that the United States was an example for the world to emulate (Wang 2000, pp. 85–86). The emphasis on the United States as the world’s strongest democracy and its responsibility to defend the free world is not only an important feature of American foreign policy and diplomatic behavior today but has also become a culturally specific style of American leaders in foreign affairs. More recent and perhaps more typical examples are President Bush Jr.’s reaffirmation to the world after 9/11 that “America is the hope of all mankind, the light in the darkness”, and his 2002 speech at Tsinghua University in China, in which he said “Americans have a special sense of responsibility to protect the poor and the weak”. In terms of its intellectual origins, the “natural mission view” is linked to the Christian view of “God’s chosen people”, but it is not without a psychological and cultural basis that this idea, especially as developed by Protestantism, has deeply influenced the way Americans interact with each other abroad: the strong natural mission view in American diplomacy and its associated strong missionary outlook in American diplomacy and the missionary mentality associated with it are linked to an extreme form of “tolerational” selfperception, a manifestation of the Rugged Individual’s heightened focus on the self, an amplification and externalization of that hardened “ego” core. In this sense, it is not wrong to call it a kind of “collective narcissism”. The “Human Constant” is a more fundamental existence than religious belief, and people will only believe in a religion that conforms to the Human Constant, and if it does not, they will transform it. This “missional vision” is also often associated with a sense of racial superiority. This so-called racial superiority is not the same thing as systemic racist ideology or institutional racism but rather expresses a “state of mind”. We know that institutional discrimination and persecution against blacks is a thing of the past in the United States and that there is little support for systematic racism in the United States today. The United States has a long tradition of antiracism and clear, well-developed antiracism legislation. However, this is not to say that there is no mentality of racial superiority. In contrast, racial superiority has a greater correlation with the Rugged Individual Jen model of self-understanding. The provisions of U.S. law on racial equality and the strong reaction to racial discrimination in life are the result of the Rugged Individual’s long struggle against racial discrimination (enslavement of the blacks), and in a sense, it is the existence of a clear sense of discrimination and discrimination in life that has contributed to the improvement of antiracial discrimination laws and people’s sensitivity to racial equality. The emphasis on the complete independence and freedom of the individual (which was an important element of

218

12 The “Outer World” of the Rugged Individual Jen

the Protestant Reformation movement) had a twofold result. On the one hand, there was a strong sense of equality among Americans and a strong social force against discrimination and persecution. The experience of persecution and discrimination of the American forefathers made it impossible for them to get along with the people of the Old World, and they ran away to a new place to build a new country, which is very similar to the experience of a child who is dissatisfied with his parents’ discipline and runs away from home because he wants to be free. The American War of Independence can be compared to the adolescent Americans beating up their parents (the British suzerainty) who still insisted on disciplining them with their fists, finally freeing themselves from slavery and becoming completely independent. On the other hand, the strong egocentric self-perception model is very prone to racial superiority and racial discrimination because in this model, individuals need to use various ways to emphasize the difference between “I” and “the other” to maintain their superior status, and physical differences and differences in beliefs are the most easily exploited factors. Otherwise, we cannot explain why the American ancestors were discriminated against and persecuted in the Old World, nor can we explain the fact that the American ancestors who were discriminated against and persecuted still practiced black slavery in the New World.4 In this sense, Americans’ racial superiority is something like a “cultural gene” inherited from their European ancestors. Of course, the racial superiority of “my people” over “other people” is a common phenomenon among humans, but the Rugged Individual Jen’s more egocentric sense of “I” and “the outside world” is not. The more egocentric mode of perception of the “I” and the “outside world” undoubtedly reinforces this characteristic in our species, and the “God’s Chosen People” view provides the theological basis for racial superiority. At least on an Unconscious level, the Rugged Individual tends to believe that his race (white Americans, especially of British descent, to be exact) is among the best, that he is God’s chosen people, that the United States is the highest civilization ever produced by man and is entitled to special rights and duties and that the ability of other peoples to reach the level of the United States is considered. The ability of other peoples to reach the level of the United States is considered to depend at least as much on the example set by the United States as on its efforts to educate them. The tremendous achievements of the United States and the emergence of a certain tendency to “Americanize” the world have undoubtedly reinforced the American “To succeed, you must be like me. Our way is the only way”.5 America’s foreign behavior to date seems to be tied to the mentality that the world is an arena of racial and national competition and that in a competitive and sometimes violent world, where collisions between civilized and savage races are inevitable, it is America’s noble duty to find and subdue the challengers. We know that Native cultures and societies within the United States (which are also the “outside world” to mainstream Americans) have 4

More than 140 years after slavery was abolished, the U.S. House of Representatives reportedly issued its first formal apology to blacks for the “brutal, cruel and inhumane” slavery and segregation laws on July 29, 2008. 5 Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Reconstruction of World Order. Translated by Zhou Qi, Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1999 edition, p. 64.

1 “Ego” of the Rugged Individual Jen and Messianism

219

been destroyed and replaced and that the human rights situation of Indian, African American, and other minority Americans in the United States remains problematic to this day, with racial prejudice and discrimination still having a significant impact on people’s interactions, marriages, and employment. Racial prejudice and racial discrimination still have a significant impact on people’s interaction, marriage, and employment. This situation at home is consistent with the U.S. attitude toward the “outside world”. Both at home and abroad, the sense of racial superiority and racial discrimination is difficult to eliminate, at least in part, because it is rooted in the society of the Rugged Individual Jen that emphasizes equality for all: the “egocentric” cognitive model reinforces racial superiority, which is a magnification of the former at the ethnic level. The latter is an amplification of the former at the ethnic level, and racism is a “serious and unintended consequence” of egalitarianism.6 The French scholar Dumont notes the relationship between egalitarianism and racism: “In an egalitarian world, human beings are no longer considered as belonging to social or cultural categories with different status in the hierarchy, but as essentially equal and equivalent; on this premise, the nature of the differences between human communities is sometimes re-emphasized in a damaging way: the difference between communities is reasserted. Under this premise, differences in the nature of human communities are sometimes re-emphasized in a damaging way: differences between communities are considered to be the result of biological characteristics—this is racism”.7 An examination of U.S. diplomatic history reveals that the tradition of “isolationism” is another recurring theme in U.S. diplomacy. The “isolationist” tradition and the aforementioned “universalist” tradition appear to be complete opposites, but in fact, they are two sides of the same coin, both psycho-culturally rooted in a highly egocentric mode of self-perception of the Rugged Individual Jen. Isolationism is the emphasis on American society as a “city on top of a mountain”, a city that has escaped the corruption of the European church and state and become a model for the world to admire, which is the source of later “American Exceptionalism”. This was the source of the later theory of American exceptionalism. The idea of “God’s Chosen People” and “The City on the Hill” and “American Exceptionalism” became the main symbols by which Americans distinguished themselves spiritually from the rest of the world after the founding of the United States. It is important to point out that the so-called American Exceptionalism here is the main symbol of the American people. It is important to note that the so-called isolationism here is not at all a “mind your own business” or “other people have their own way of life” approach to the world based on some kind of relativistic solipsism. It is a more positive mindset that wants to demonstrate the charisma of “God’s chosen people” and wants the world to follow suit. Isolationists believe that the best thing they can do for the world is to show their own light. One effect of this mentality on Americans today is that many Americans seem to take for granted that everyone in the world speaks English and acts according to American standards and therefore lack the desire to understand 6 7

Dumont (1980, p. 72). Ibid.

220

12 The “Outer World” of the Rugged Individual Jen

and appreciate foreign cultures and the interest in respecting “other cultures”. This is certainly related to the powerful position of the United States in the world today, but from a psycho-cultural point of view, it is also a sign of the Rugged Individual’s high level of focus on the self. The “City on the Hill” in the American mind is in line with the independent kingdom of the “self” within the Rugged Individual Jen, which is in a sense the “I am unique” and “I am the only one” in the daily life of the Americans. The “city on the hill” is consistent with the independent “self” kingdom of the Rugged Individual and is in a sense a shadow of the “I am unique” and “I am the only one” self-evaluation of everyday Americans, a projection and externalization of the latter. The diplomatic tradition of isolationism follows the same mechanism as the behavior of the Rugged Individual Jen who does not want to live in the same neighborhood as the “losers” and does not want to associate with black people in real life. It is also important to note that a strong focus on self has led Americans to reflect deeply on their own diplomatic behavior. While many U.S. diplomatic actions, motivated by a strong sense of “natural mission”, have caused problems for other countries and the world, it must also be acknowledged that the most critical and severe critics of U.S. foreign policy are precisely the Americans themselves. Each major international action is generally followed by a serious review and evaluation, such as the Vietnam War, where introspection has not ceased, and there have always been forces within the United States that oppose U.S. foreign wars. The author believes that this characteristic constitutes the greatest psychological force for self-restraint in the overseas behavior of the superhegemonic nation that is the United States today and gives the U.S. foreign policy a great capacity for self-regulation. The existence of a strong sense of racial superiority and the resulting sometimes destructive behavior along with a strong spirit of introspection (both of which stem from a strong sense of extreme personal self-concern) may be an important psychological reason why many countries in the world today do not feel particularly threatened by the United States and therefore do not appear to counterbalance the phenomenon of American hegemony (Ikenberry 2001).

2 Transactional Human Relations and the Tendency to Worship “Profit” and “Power” in U.S. Diplomacy In our analysis of the Human Constant of the “individual”, we noted that the individual has a strong urge to master and conquer the material world as an important means of “psychosocial homeostasis”. The mastery of the material world (the pursuit of wealth is one of its manifestations) brings a feeling of “success” and increases one’s sense of reality. In the Human Constant of the Rugged Individual Jen, this individual impulse is maximized, and the mountains, oceans, deserts, forests, polar regions of the earth, the moon, and even Mars can all be considered objects of conquest and transformation, as well as objects of passionate protection. This effort has enabled

2 Transactional Human Relations and the Tendency to Worship “Profit” …

221

the United States to achieve material achievements that are the envy of the world and to become the most powerful material force in the world. It is important to note that emotional energy’s greater bet on navigating the material world and less investment in human relationships go hand in hand. Because of the Rugged Individual’s strong emphasis on personal independence and freedom, human relationships tend to be “de-emotionalized” because any relationship that is sustained and deeply emotional is prone to loyalty, dependence, and admiration, and the Rugged Individual cannot accept such “bondage”. The “de-emotionalization” of interpersonal ties allows the individual to have a greater emotional stake in mastering the material world (of course, it can also be said that the strong emotional stake in mastering the material world dilutes interpersonal ties). In this way, the individual, who has been made very “fresh”, has a relationship with others that is characterized by greater material exchange (the developed form of which is commodity trading). While in other societies, commodity-exchange relations may exist only in certain areas (e.g., markets) and among certain groups of people (e.g., businessmen and customers), in the society of the Rugged Individual, the entire interpersonal relationship has a tendency to be transactionalized (or profoundly influenced by commodity-exchange relations). The pursuit of profit is not only an important feature of interpersonal relations in the society of the Rugged Individual Jen but also a code of behavior and value orientation of the society. The manifestation of this feature of human relations in attitudes and behavior toward the outside world is the stronger utilitarian or realist character of American diplomacy. Just as Americans are unapologetic about making friends for personal gain, the emphasis on profit has always been the first priority of U.S. foreign policy. Americans rarely conceal their goal of pursuing self-interest in diplomacy, viewing the nature of state-to-state relations as one of interest and the supremacy of national interest as a natural tenet of U.S. foreign policy. This can be seen by looking at the words commonly used in U.S. diplomacy: if the U.S. says to a country, “Your behavior is detrimental to our interests”, it can be interpreted as an expression of the most serious anger and hostility. When the U.S. says “you are acting in our interest”, it is not wrong to interpret it as a synonym for friendship and friendship. The confusion over the U.S. position toward China during the Bush administration was resolved by former Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick’s brainstorming of a “stakeholder” term. “Stakeholder” is a neutral term that can either “harm” or “serve” U.S. interests, avoiding “potential”. It avoids the resentment from China that “potential competitors”—a more likely “detriment” to U.S. interests and thus a more hostile position. However, it also does not detach itself from judging the issue by “interests”, which is a most American expression of wisdom. No one can deny the obvious utilitarian character of the United States in dealing with international relations, whose “work” is to seek to dominate the world and whose “interest” is to satisfy its own interests and to dominate the world to better satisfy its own interests. From the perspective of psychological culture, the so-called national interest can be regarded as an amplification of individual “self-interest”, and American diplomacy is not only the most

222

12 The “Outer World” of the Rugged Individual Jen

blatant but also the most justifiable pursuit of “interest”. The most blatant and justifiable pursuit of “interest” in U.S. diplomacy is a projection of the transactional interpersonal relationships between “rugged individuals” at the national level. In this apparently utilitarian mindset, the United States positions itself in the world and behaves in a way that is more akin to a “corporate” identity in a market economy. We know that the motivation of a business is to generate more profit, but it pays taxes and therefore objectively benefits society. The U.S. essentially applies this same economic assumption of “economic man” to its position in the world: all U.S. diplomatic actions serve its “self-interest”, and it provides the world with some kind of “public good” (stability) while reaping the benefits of the world. “The more it profits, the more it contributes to the world”. Although the United States is a “free economy” and opposes direct state intervention in the economy, its behavior in the international arena shows that its foreign attitude and behavior is the closest to the model of international actor as “economic man”, and in a certain sense the United States is also the international actor with the most “corporate” characteristics of a sort of profit-making behemoth. For example, the interests of large multinational corporations, oil and arms merchants, and other business giants (a concrete manifestation of national interests) shape (or at least strongly influence) the diplomatic orientation of the U.S. state, which makes no secret of the fact that it aims to make profits for large corporations and actively helps them to defeat other countries’ companies and capture the world market. Through these large multinational corporations, the United States exerts its penetration and control over the world economy. The so-called globalization that the U.S. is pushing for is essentially a way for U.S. companies (and the U.S. as well) to profit more smoothly worldwide. The U.S. has forced Japan, China and other countries to appreciate their currencies to protect their own economies, which have serious problems due to uncontrolled consumption. The war in Iraq was nominally a push for democracy in the Middle East, but it was truly about oil.8 No empire in our civilizational experience seems to have had such a “corporate” character as the present one in the United States. It is only natural that the so-called American school of international relations theory that emerged from this has a distinctly “realist” character. Incidentally, it is a worrying fact that due to the current position of power of the United States, the supremacy of the American national interest and the realism of the American theory of international relations to elaborate this behavior have become something like a “public good” that it offers to the world, influencing the behavior of many countries and the academic world to the extent that many people mistakenly believe that this is the nature of interstate relations and the theory of international relations as it should be. A high level of insecurity is a characteristic of the psychosocial homeostasis model of the Rugged Individual Jen, and material power is an important complement. In such a state, wealth is more likely to be an important (if not the most important) criterion for judging one’s success, and individuals are more likely to derive a sense of success and 8

The U.S. started the Iraq war because Iraq had “weapons of mass destruction”, but it was proven that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. The four U.S. and British oil giants divided the postwar Iraqi oil, completely revealing the true purpose of the U.S. war in Iraq.

2 Transactional Human Relations and the Tendency to Worship “Profit” …

223

respect from such evaluations. It is natural, therefore, that there is a greater tendency to worship material power in the society of the Rugged Individual. This tendency is also present in American judgments and interactions with the “world of the other”. For example, in 2006, the bimonthly magazine Foreign Policy published a list of “failed states” around the world, dividing the world’s countries into “failed states” and “successful states”, and here the so-called success or failure is largely based on economic good or bad, which in the end is a projection of how Americans judge a person’s success based on wealth. The cult of material power also manifests itself in the United States’ particular enthusiasm for economic sanctions against countries it deems “nefarious” and in the generous assistance it provides to followers whose behavior meets American standards. Both “economic sanctions” and economic aid are based on a deep belief in the judgment that the behavior of state actors can be changed by altering their material conditions. The practice of economic sanctions is motivated by the same mentality as American parents who try to change their sons’ behavior in their daily lives by cutting off financial help to them. This behavior is very much in line with the “stimulus proposition” of the exchange theory based on “rational economic man”, proposed by American sociologist G.C. Homans: “If a person’s past activity in a certain situation was rewarded or punished, and if in the past the person’s activity in a certain situation was rewarded or punished, the person’s behavior in a certain situation will be changed. rewarded or punished, he will repeat or not repeat such activity when the same situation arises”.9 However, while this approach may work in the context of “internal diplomacy” (rather, extremely personal interpersonal relationships with transactional characteristics) with the same value orientation, it may not work when applied to “diplomacy”. U.S. economic sanctions have proven to be ineffective in most cases, whether against North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, or once China, and in many cases they have had the opposite result of what the architects of the sanctions intended: a more cohesive and empowered opponent as a result of economic sanctions. A strong belief in material power is certainly not the same as a reverence for violence, but there seems to be no insurmountable line between the two; the former is a little further than the latter. Violence is not an evil in American culture (which is also an individualistic culture); it is a necessary and even a good for the sake of justice and the destruction of evil. There is more material available on the problems in American culture and society, such as the proliferation of violence in movies and games, as well as the high number of homicides in society, the rate of inmates, the number of gangs, and the number of individuals who own guns.10 Since power is an

9

Homans is one of the key founders of modern social exchange theory. His famous five universal propositions on exchange behavior are: the proposition of success, the proposition of stimulus, the proposition of value, the proposition of deprivation and satisfaction and the proposition of attack and approval. These propositions are based on the basic assumption that “man is a rational economic agent” (Homans 1950). 10 The Chinese government’s newly released 2007 U.S. Human Rights Record says: one violent crime occurs every 22.2 s in the United States, including one murder every 30.9 min, one rape every 5.7 min, one robbery every 1.2 min, and one vicious assault every 36.6 s. The United States is the

224

12 The “Outer World” of the Rugged Individual Jen

important means for individuals to gain security and to win in competitive interpersonal relationships, Bill Gates’ billions have the same meaning as the fist power of boxer Ali and Tyson: they are both a form of power. This also affects U.S. behavior in the international arena. The United States has become the world’s “Bill Gates” as well as the world’s “boxing champion” and has tried to maintain it over time. It has invested highly enthusiastically and financially in the development of more advanced weapons (the U.S. is said to be developing a more “clean” gamma-ray bomb, second only to the source bomb), reflecting a behavioral orientation that believes in force (or, more precisely, in the quantity and sophistication of weapons) as a solution. While it is undeniable that the United States has an institutional design that limits the state’s misuse of violence abroad, there are also institutional factors (such as a well-developed arms industry) that motivate the state to use violence and a psychological and cultural base that does not so much denigrate it.11 Its diplomatic history has a record of frequent wars, from the Vietnam War, the bombing of Yugoslavia several years ago, the Iraq War, and more recently the sanctions against Iran, all of which demonstrate a mentality that places too much faith in the use of force to solve problems. in February 1998 then-Secretary of State Albright justified U.S. actions in firing cruise missiles into Iraq by saying, “If we have to use force, it is because we’re America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see far”. A few short sentences express a basic American mindset toward violence. The use of violence abroad is usually done in the name of “justice”, but in many cases it is not so clear whether it is done in the name of justice or in the name of “profit”. Sometimes it is clear that “justice” is only an excuse and profit is the goal. The most worrying aspect of the empire, therefore, seems to have been not only its powerful force but also its combination of profit motive and force based on the Rugged individual Jen with no end in sight and no effort at restraint. The American historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has reflected deeply on this point: “We have always thought of ourselves as a gentle, tolerant, benevolent people…. However, this is by no means the only temperament of our tradition. We must acknowledge that there is a destructive desire within us. It stems from the darkness and tensions that have characterized our social systems throughout history. After all, we have been slaughtering Indians and enslaving blacks from the very beginning. There is no doubt that in the past we did these things with Bible and prayer book in hand…. Deep within it, in its traditions, in its social institutions, in its conditioning and in its soul, there is a propensity for violence buried deep” (Wang 2006, p. 117). From our perspective, both of these tendencies he identifies are characteristic of the “Psychosocial Homeostasis” model of the Rugged Individual: helping and protecting those in need of protection and developing the strength to overcome the other or stop the challenge of the other are both important means of world’s largest prison, and its per capita inmate population is the highest in the world. The United States has only 5% of the world’s population and 25% of the world’s inmates. 11 On the relationship between the expansion of Western civilization and violence, Huntington’s view is more sober: “The Western world won the world not through the superiority of its ideas, values or religion (few other civilizations have converted to it), but through its superiority in the use of organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.” (Huntington 2002, p. 37).

3 Competitive Interpersonal Relations and Illusory Tendencies in U.S. …

225

gaining security. The reason is simple: if a person is insecure or feels threatened all the time, he is more likely to focus on his own fist; if his fist is not strong enough, then the “soldier” is not an “ominous weapon”. Will feel safer with a wooden stick in his hand. If insecurity persists or even increases, he will try to improve it. If insecurity persists or even increases, he will try to improve the stick. The stick in the hands of Americans can be said to have been improved to the point of invulnerability, but the role of force in increasing the sense of inner security is limited, and the sense of inner security of Americans today does not seem to have increased, as evidenced by the U.S. agencies abroad, Americans traveling overseas, and security checks at major places such as airports and ports in the United States, as well as the high crime rate and frequent shootings at home. shooting incidents. Force is even less of a complete solution to the world’s problems. The U.S. reliance on sophisticated weaponry to nearly level Iraq seems to have created more problems than it is trying to solve when one considers the large number of innocent lives lost in the process, the increase rather than decrease in terrorist activity, and the seeds of hatred planted between Western and Muslim societies.

3 Competitive Interpersonal Relations and Illusory Tendencies in U.S. Foreign Relations The “intimate social relations and culture” layer (belonging to the third layer of the Psychosocial Homeostasis) of the Rugged Individual Jen lacks consistency and continuity, close ties between the members of the kinship, and it needs to find substitutes in the It is necessary to conclude various relationships in the layer of “operative social and culture” (the second layer of Psychosocial Homeostasis) in order to find substitutes. However, in contrast to the members of the third layer, such as parents and other relatives, the second layer is mostly composed of people with the same qualifications who pursue similar or identical things and therefore are in fierce competition with each other. Competition is one of the most distinctive features of this model of interpersonal relationships, and the entire dynamism and design of the social system of the society of the Rugged Individual Jen can be said to come from this competitive situation in which individuals are placed in a “no-go-or-no-go” situation. Theoretically, each “other” in this model is a potential competitor of “I”, and “I” needs to surpass or overcome the “other” to improve myself, or at least the “I” needs to surpass or overcome the “other” to improve itself, or at least not to degrade itself. This characteristic of interpersonal relations in the society of the Rugged Individual Jen is also manifested in the external relations of the United States; that is, the United States also tends to view its relations with the “outside world” (the zero layer of psychosocial homeostasis) as competitive. In fact, because of the lack of common religious, value, customary, and legal constraints with the “other world”,

226

12 The “Outer World” of the Rugged Individual Jen

the United States approaches its relations with the “outside world” with a more reinforced competitive attitude. When dealing with people in the “outside world”, the primary consideration is: Does the other side pose a threat to you? Is it a competitor? If the other side is not a competitor now, will it be in the future? To prevent the other party from becoming a threat and a competitor and to maintain their advantage in the competition, what should they do on their own initiative? At all times, it is necessary to have a clear and definite position of the “other world” with a competitor’s eyes to take a clear corresponding behavior. To achieve this, sometimes even an illusory relationship with the “other world” is substituted for an actual relationship, and the relationship with the other is handled in an idealized way. Naturally, the enemy is the first thing that needs to be located. For the inhabitants of the “other world”, the Rugged Individual tends to use a clear dichotomy to distinguish between enemies and friends, devils and angels, progress and backwardness, barbarism and civilization. The “enemy” is the direct challenger of the United States, the object to be fought and defeated so that the United States can have a goal to move forward. Locating the enemy requires a clear standard of good and evil, a clear standard of good and evil, and behavior will be confident and firm. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. was once confused by the absence of enemies. After September 11, a new enemy was quickly identified—the terrorists. However, the new enemy is not so easy to define and is not so clear in its image, which is perhaps the most confusing thing for the United States at the moment. President Bush Jr.’s suggestion to the world that countries that do not support U.S. actions will be considered to be in league with terrorists, and his reference to Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an “axis of evil”, is an “either/or” approach to establishing a clear enemy.12 The United States seems to need enemies at all times, and if it does not have them, it has to create them. Therefore, the so-called enemies of the United States are in many cases more illusory than real. Second, competitors need to be identified. A competitor is a potential “enemy” that could challenge the U.S. position in the future and therefore must be won over. The Bush administration changed its position on China from a “strategic partner” under Clinton to a “strategic competitor”, and hostility rose because it judged that China might challenge the United States in the future. Later, it was changed to “stakeholder”, and hostility declined based on the new judgment that China would not challenge the United States. Regardless of how it is positioned, the basis is “whether it challenges the United States”. U.S. fears about future competition have appeared in a variety of official and private U.S. strategic reports, serious academic writings by some scholars, and in some sci-fi movies.13 Of course, most of these 12

March 16, 2006—U.S. President George W. Bush released his second “National Security Strategy Report” since becoming president, reaffirming the U.S. strategy of “preemptive military strikes” and considering Iran as the greatest possible threat and challenge to the United States. The report also reaffirmed the U.S. strategy of “preemptive” military strikes and identified Iran as the greatest possible threat and challenge to the United States. 13 Professor Huntington, in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Reconstruction of World Order”, has imaginatively depicted the future war situation among world civilizations (Huntington, 2002, pp. 361–366).

3 Competitive Interpersonal Relations and Illusory Tendencies in U.S. …

227

depictions are fictional, but these fictional future world scenarios are typical of the fanciful nature of the U.S. positioning of all competitors. In addition to “enemies” and “competitors”, the Rugged Individual Jen also needs to identify those in the “other world” who he perceives as lower, more backward, and in need of help. The Rugged Individual sometimes needs to convert the people of the “other world” or become part of his own “intimate social and cultural” layer and therefore often shows a strong emotional connection and a positive attitude toward the other: caring for them, helping them, saving them and even sacrificing them. However, this is only possible if those who are being helped never challenge the position of the helper and are completely subservient to the helper. Out of a universalist view of the world, the Rugged Individual is more likely to react emotionally and intervene when he sees starving children, people under tyranny, and genocide in Africa. The United States meddles in the affairs of other countries around the world, interfering in their internal affairs but at the same time providing a great deal of humanitarian aid and sincerely helping the people of those countries. While the U.S. has its own political agenda and is often played as a diplomatic card in its great concern for human rights situations around the world, it would be untrue to say that these American actions are entirely insincere. We see dedicated NGOs from the United States and large numbers of energetic volunteers active around the world kissing and treating AIDS patients, embracing and rescuing African children struggling with hunger and squalor. When U.S. soldiers brazenly drove tanks into Iraqi territory in the name of “justice”, we also saw brave American antiwar activists stand with Iraqis to try to stop the war. Some American volunteers are also genuinely helping Iraqis when someone derives a “joy of success” from abusing Iraqi prisoners of war. It is important to note, however, that the helper and the helped are not and cannot be equals. Psycho-culturally speaking, they show the same high level of dedication as the equally dedicated missionaries, all of whom are motivated by a condescending “I’m saving you” mentality. Of course, their orientation toward those in need of salvation is still as illusory as their own. As Francis L.K. Hsu brilliantly argues, “Based on the same mentality, this illusionism also extends to international relations. The Rugged Individual is constrained by the notion of self-centeredness and is taught to shape the world in his own imagination. He has to rise above all obstacles to elevate himself. He will even endure subservience if needed to achieve his goal. However, for those of low status, he will demand that everyone conform to his expectations. He may put a lot of effort into taking great care of them, helping them, educating them, and not be afraid to take the trouble to reform them until they bow down and do what he tells them to do. The most intolerable thing for him is for those he considers to be of lower status to demand equality with him, or worse, to actually lord it over him. Since the ultimate goal of the Rugged Individual is to rise above all others, he cannot tolerate frustration or change in his leadership. He will refuse to acknowledge such a change and cancel unsolicited contact. He will, of course, resort to force, if necessary, to stay ahead. Then, he will try to construct some satisfactory reason for doing so, whether or not it is convincing to others. In the interpersonal relations of white society, the maximalist individualist may temporarily admit a lower status as a stopgap measure, but in international

228

12 The “Outer World” of the Rugged Individual Jen

relations, the maximalist individualist can never stand to have his society lag behind others” (Hsu 2002, pp. 10–11). The changing attitude of the United States toward China may well illustrate this point. Before and at the beginning of the reform and opening up, China was weak and had no ability to compete with the West. For the sake of confronting the Soviet Union, China was seen by the United States as an object in need of help and protection and therefore had a better image. As China grew stronger, the United States began to feel challenged, and criticism of China’s political system intensified. To be fair, although there are still many problems and China is generally improving compared with the prereform period, the fact is that the U.S. view of China is becoming increasingly negative. The reason for this negative attitude stems from US anxiety that China can challenge its position, even though such anxiety is not based on reality but on illusion. A similar situation exists with respect to the U.S. attitude toward Japan. The U.S. attitude toward any formerly vulnerable “other” becomes sensitive and distorted as soon as it appears to threaten (or is perceived by the U.S. to threaten) U.S. leadership. Some commentators regard “expansionism” as an important feature of U.S. diplomacy (Wang 2000, pp. 174–227). The history of the U.S. founding has an obvious expansionist flavor to it; for example, the U.S. used “strong ships and powerful guns” to open up the frontier and gradually expanded from 13 to 50 states in North America at the beginning of the founding. However, I think it cannot be compared with the expansionism of the colonial powers. The Declaration of Independence and many U.S. presidents condemned colonialism, and in fact, the United States has no overseas colonies, and sometimes the United States has been dragged into world affairs “reluctantly”. This so-called expansionism, in my opinion, is called a strong emotional connection to the “outside world” based on the Psychosocial Homeostasis of the Rugged Individual Jen. “Interventionism” may be more appropriate. This includes both active subjugation of enemies (e.g., Gulf War, Iraq War) and victory over competitors, as well as passive involvement in wars (e.g., World War II). By emphasizing its “city on a hill”, the U.S. has a more positive mindset of showing the world what is bright about itself and hoping that the world will follow suit. The United States believes it has the right and the obligation to make the world a better place by intervening in world affairs as the world’s policeman, even though sometimes it may not be entirely willing to do so. We often criticize this American meddling as “hegemonic”, but Americans are not sensitive to it. More than insensitive, they are baffled by the refusal of those they help: What’s wrong with me pulling you out of the darkness and out of tyranny? It is also true that the United States was a major force in preventing acts such as the genocide, the annexation of the weak neighbor Kuwait by the dictator Saddam, and saving the world from genocide and brutal rule. What seems important to us is not these acts themselves, but that, on the one hand, Americans always do so in connection with a call from God and a strong sense of morality and thus with a stronger emotional and religious sense of salvation from suffering. On the other hand, the United States can retreat to isolationism at any time, for when it takes on the illusory attitude of rescuing those in need in the “other world”, the results are often far from what it expected, and the latter are even found to be so “irredeemable” that their enthusiasm is easily discouraged. America’s “isolationist”

References

229

and “interventionist” approaches to the outside world may seem contradictory, but they are two expressions of the same thing. Both are accompanied by a more positive mood. From a psycho-cultural point of view, both are manifestations of the Rugged Individual Jen’s lack of inner security and the need to obtain psychosocial balance by various means, except that one points to the inner self and the other to the Outer World.

References Dumont, Louis. 1980. Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste and Its Implications. Translated by Mark Saintsbury, Louis Dumont and Basia Gualti, Nature of Human Society (NHS), 1980, Chinese Version. Taipei: Yuanliu Publishing Company. Homans, George C. 1950. Social Behavior, Its Elementary Frorms, 1961. The Human Group. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Honghua, Men. 2001. The Factor of Cultural Values in U.S. Diplomacy. International Studies (Guoji guanxi yanjiu), 5. Hsu, F.L.K. 1983. Rugged Individualism Reconsidered: Essays in Psychological Anthropolgy Univ of Tennessee Pr; 1st. The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K. (Chinese Version: Xü Langguang Zhuzuoji), vol. IX. Tai Bei: Nantian Shuji, 2002. Huntington, S. 2002. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World, Chinese version. Ikenberry, John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton University Press. Marcelle, A., and F.L.K. Hsu (eds.). 1988. Culture and the Self: A Perspective on East and West, Tavistock Publications New York 1985 (Wenhua yu ziwo, Translated by Ren Ying et al.). Zhejiang People’s Publishing House. Wang, Xiaode. 2000. American Culture and Diplomacy (Meiguo wenhua yu waijiao). World Knowledge Press. Wang, Mingming. 2005a. Religious Factors in U.S. Government Foreign Policy Decisions. International Economic Review. Wang, Tao. 2005b. An Experimental Analysis of the Influence of Religious Culture on U.S. Diplomacy. Henan Social Science, 4. Wang, Jishi. 2006. Rational Reflections on International Politics (Guoji zhengzhi de lixing sikao). Beijing University Press. Zhang, Yuquan, and Jingyan, Guo. 2005. Cultural Factors and U.S. Policy Toward China. Southeast Asian Studies 2. Zhu, Shida. 2001. Cultural Reflections on U.S.–China Relations. Journal of the European-American Association.

Chapter 13

Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant

1 Soft power, Cultural Attractiveness and Rugged Individualism The concept of “soft power” proposed by Joseph Nye, an American scholar and former dean of the Harvard School of Government, seems to have become a popular topic in international relations studies in recent years. The concept of “soft power” (also translated as “soft power” or “soft power”) proposed by Joseph Nye, an American scholar and former dean of the Harvard School of Government, seems to have become a popular topic in international relations research in recent years. Nye defines soft power as “the ability of a country to gain the benefits it desires internationally through intrinsic attractiveness”. “Soft power is the ability to achieve what one wants by means of attraction rather than coercion or bribery, and it stems from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political perceptions, and policies” (Nye 2004). He defines soft power as culture (which works where it can be attractive to others), political values (when it truly lives up to those values at home and abroad) and foreign policy (when the policy is seen as having legitimacy and moral authority) (Nye 2004, p. 2). If the values embodied in a country’s diplomacy are attractive to the public and are understood and supported by other countries and the public, they contribute to the achievement of the country’s diplomatic goals. Nye also notes that in an informationbased and interdependent world, transformative power is weakened and diffusion is increased, which leads to structural changes in the international system and a decline in the role of military power. In this situation, soft power, marked by “assimilation”, is playing an increasing role. “Assimilative power is acquired by the attractiveness of a state’s ideas or by the ability to establish a degree of political orientation that reflects the will of other states” (Nye 2004, pp. 107–108). The difference in the nature and source of behavior of soft power is manifested in the dominant and absorbing power. Dominance is the ability to use coercion or enticement to change the behavior of others, while absorption is the ability to use the attractiveness of culture and values or to manipulate the choice of political agendas to make people feel that their own goals are impractical and abandon the expression of their personal aspirations. There © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_13

231

232

13 Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant

is also a difference in the degree between dominance and absorption depending on the means. Forceful coercion has greater dominance than enticement, and values and culture have greater absorptive power than institutional institutions. It is important to point out the cultural background of the concept of “soft power”. “Soft power” is opposed to hard power, where conquest by force is “hard power”, while voluntary change of behavior by the other side through value export and evangelism is “soft power”. The “soft power” is to make the other side voluntarily change its behavior through values export and missionary. However, regardless of whether it is hard or soft, “power” is a force that is exerted on others, trying to change and conquer them. The concept itself reflects the positive and aggressive attitude of individuals and societies toward the outside world, but the name is just a little better than “hard power”. Therefore, some scholars have criticized the promotion of soft power as a form of U.S. hegemony, as it inflates one’s own soft power with a “strength” sufficient to counteract or subsume others and suppress the possible attractiveness of other cultures.1 From the perspective of cultural communication, “soft power” refers to the phenomenon of cultural interaction, the attractiveness or influence of a country on other countries, or a kind of assimilation ability. The soft power of a country is related to the hard power and influence of the country. In international society, the values and behaviors of core actors usually spread to noncore actors, and noncore actors, either voluntarily or under duress, internalize the values and behaviors of core actors, which is the phenomenon of “socialization” between state behavior systems. The strong soft power of the United States is certainly related to its superpower status and power, but if the values of core actors do not have a certain appeal to noncore actors, they will not cause the latter to internalize them. Nye et al. argue that for a country’s cultural power to be attractive to others, it must bring “the dominant culture and ideas of the country closer to universal global norms”. Criticizing “universal global norms” as “U.S.-dominated cultural hegemony” is arbitrary and emotional, or at least, it fails to address the core component of soft power: values and their internalization. An important reason for the spread of U.S. soft power around the world is the attractiveness of its core elements—the values of freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy. Therefore, it is not inappropriate for Nye to refer to those values that are recognized by the majority and can be consciously internalized as “universal global norms”. It is noteworthy that scholars who advocate soft power actually make the American version of individualistic values the core of American soft power. In this way, the issue of American “soft power” can be transformed to a considerable extent into the issue of the appeal of Rugged Individualism. The earliest scholar who thought deeply about the American individualist system was Alexis de Tocqueville of France, whose 1

Since Joseph Nye introduced the concept of “soft power”, Chinese scholars have published several articles criticizing the concept as a way to promote U.S. cultural hegemony. “For them, soft power is a skill that is disguised for the sole purpose of conquering others and gaining personal benefits. They try to inflate their culture and soft power in order to suppress the possible attraction of other cultures and consider each other as a threat”. Le Deyun, “How Chinese Culture is Facing the World”, available at http://news.ifeng.com/opinion/lecture/special/ledaiyun/.

2 The Performance of U.S. Soft Power

233

magnum opus on American Democracy discussed the differences between American individualism and European individualism. Francis L. K. Hsu continued along this path, calling the American version of individualism a “Rugged Individualism” in his works “The Chinese and the Americans”, “Clans, Castes, and Associations”, and “Reflections on Radical Individualism”, and seeing it as the key to understanding American character and American society. Today, with the end of the Cold War and a more pronounced U.S. influence in the world, the American liberal school, represented by Joseph Nye, has linked U.S. “soft power” to U.S. values and proposed the idea of reassessing the core of U.S. soft power—Rugged Individualism and the question of its appeal and limitations—in light of a changed world.

2 The Performance of U.S. Soft Power While the concept of “soft power” is widely debated and even criticized as a rhetoric of promoting American cultural hegemony, it is a fact that the American model has achieved remarkable success and that American core values and culture have caused widespread proliferation around the world. Joseph Nye was outspoken in asserting that the United States has more traditional hard power resources than any other country, as well as ideological and institutional soft power resources to maintain its leadership in the new realm of interdependence among nations. Indeed, especially since the end of the Cold War, the United States has more soft power than at any time in its history, and more of which Americans can be proud. It has achieved many admirable economic and technological results, and universities with top-notch research capabilities attract the world’s best and brightest. American research and education have demonstrated a high degree of creativity. As an example, the distribution of Nobel Prize winners in science from 2004 to 2015 is 43 from the United States, accounting for 50.6% of all winners.2 American supermarkets and fast food restaurants are constantly being copied around the world.3 The names of major multinational corporations such as Coca-Cola, Intel, Microsoft, and Ford are almost all household names. According to data published by The Boston Consulting Group (BCG), U.S. Companies accounted for one of the top 50 global innovators in 2020. The United States accounted for 30 of the top 50 universities in the 2019 World University Rankings.4 Much of the business and industrial management knowledge in textbooks of many countries around the world comes from the United States. The United States is the world’s “oldest” modern nation-state, arguably the laboratory of modern democratic politics for our species, with a long-established, consistently applied written constitution and proven constitutional experience, as well as 2

http://ask.kedo.gov.cn/zhidao/lifewiki/820006.shtml, 2016-1-27. McDonald’s fast food restaurants can be considered as a representative. The company has more than 30,000 locations worldwide and employs 1.5 million people. Its outlets can be found in 119 countries around the world, from the Arctic Circle to the southern tip of New Zealand. 4 https://www.sohu.com/a/272326263_181782. Login Time: 2021-02-04. 3

234

13 Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant

lessons on how to find coexistence among a wide range of ethnic and cultural groups. Although the U.S. presidential election at the end of 2020 revealed some flaws in the U.S. constitutional government, the regime change was done within the framework of constitutionalism, and its political system showed a strong capacity for self-correction. American movies and pop music are popular in many parts of the world. Many young people in China work around the clock to prepare for the TOEFL or GRE exams in order to achieve the “American Dream” in the United States, so much so that a new industry has sprung up in this regard, while we do not seem to hear about the “German Dream” or the “Japanese Dream. We do not seem to hear about the “German Dream” or “Japanese Dream”.5 After the “financial tsunami” in the United States in 2008, the view that the United States has declined,6 especially since the outbreak of the new crown epidemic in the United States in the year in response to the epidemic policy failures and the two U.S. presidential elections in 2016 and 2020 revealed the flaws of the U.S. constitutional system, more support this view of the United States. It should be noted, however, that the United States remains the most powerful and creative nation in the world during its lifetime, and whether it continues to be the world’s most powerful nation in the future does not diminish the luster of what the United States has accomplished. It is also worth noting that this negative view of the United States ignores its strong capacity for self-reflection and self-correction. Historically, in every crisis, the harshest criticism and the most vocal voices of disdain for the United States have come from the United States itself. Some in China today take American self-criticism as evidence of a bad American system, but on the contrary, the existence of intense self-criticism is itself a sign of the system’s self-awareness and ability to correct itself. The aforementioned manifestations of U.S. soft power are not the most important. The core of a nation’s soft power is the attractiveness of its values. The interrelated values of freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy form a major part of the values promoted by the United States (or at least by mainstream society in the United States) and are the key ideas on which the United States was founded. Freedom is the most important of these values, and it has even become synonymous with the American (and in a sense, Western) system. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States of America, and the Bill of Rights all affirm this idea of liberty. It was distilled during the Roosevelt era into the four rights of man, known as the “Four Freedoms”: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. “The concept of the Four Freedoms can be considered

5

On November 29, 2012, Chinese leaders proposed the “Chinese Dream,” defined as “the greatest dream of the Chinese nation since modern times to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” which is clearly holistic and completely different from the “American Dream,” which emphasizes individual struggle for success. It is obvious that this concept is holistic and has a completely different meaning from the “American Dream” which emphasizes individual struggle to achieve success. 6 A more recent, more seriously analyzed article singing the praises of America can be found in Fortune Magazine: 12 Signs America is Declining. http://finance.sina.com.cn/world/20150727/223 222803813.shtml, 2015-10-06.

2 The Performance of U.S. Soft Power

235

one of the great spiritual achievements of modern human civilization, based on the individual society and exquisitely expressed in American society”. Other elements of key American values are linked to the idea of “freedom”: “equality” is a prerequisite for a free person because people cannot be free if they are bound to hierarchy, totalitarianism, and traditional ties (e.g., blood, geographic ties). The essence of “human rights” is the inviolability of the rights to body, property, honor, speech, etc., which are related to the existence of our life. The starting point and destination of the idea of human rights is the pursuit of individual freedom. This value encourages individual freedom and enables individuals to experience the existence and dignity of their own behavior; “democracy” as a value is a concept that respects individual expression, individual rights, individual dignity, and individual choice, and the political democratic system is an institutional design based on this concept. Individualism is the product of a society of individuals, with a long tradition in the West, which has developed into a more refined form in the United States. This set of mutually supportive values can be described as a refinement of individualistic values, or what might be called “Rugged Individualism”. This set of values is recognized by mainstream American society as the ideological basis for its existence and great achievements, as well as the value base for the legitimacy and moral authority of American foreign policy. Viewed without prejudice, this set of values is attractive to people and has become more widely accepted in the world. Although the U.S. promotes these values with its flaws and often uses them as a tool to suppress other countries for political purposes; it is consistent internally and externally and does contain universal human values. Of course, in reality, this set of values is difficult to fully realize (as is the case in all societies), but it describes a vision worth pursuing that has considerable appeal, and people of good will in many countries around the world have been attracted to such ideas and have fought for them at the risk of their lives. Although people have also criticized the flaws of the American political system, pointing out that the United States also has serious human rights problems, etc., few people seem to have openly and completely rejected the ideas of freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy. In this sense, it would be appropriate to call it a “universal global norm” in the words of Joseph Nye. The attractiveness of American core values and the achievements of American society have made American politicians speak with confidence and even with arrogance. The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union have convinced policy makers in Washington that this is an absolute victory for American values and its system, marked by the global popularity of the “American standard” and even the saying that “globalization is Americanization”. The speeches of U.S. leaders are full of this confidence, and in 2002, Bush said in a speech at Tsinghua University, “There’s a reason why our country is a beacon of hope, and there’s a reason why so many people around the world dream of coming to America, because we are the land of the free”.7 In his Jan. 12, 2016, speech, Obama said that at this stage, the United States was the most powerful nation on earth. He denied that the 7

http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2002-02-23/0022482803.html, 2016-1-27.

236

13 Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant

United States has declined, saying that “every time there’s an important international issue, the world does not look to China or Russia to take the lead, they look to the United States”.8 During the Trump administration, the “America First” policy was implemented, and U.S. leaders no longer frequently advocate saving the world, but after the Biden administration, the U.S. resurrected the slogan of leading and guiding the world. We must acknowledge that the achievements of the American model and the increased influence of the United States in the world, especially since the end of the Cold War, give the Americans reason to be proud. However, it should also be seen that the problems facing the world have not diminished and that the world has not become more peaceful. In contrast, terrorism, badland destruction, proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc., can be said to be almost consistent with the greater influence of the United States in the world. The arrogance of U.S. politicians (and probably some academics) has rightly caused resentment in some countries of the world. The United States is now arguably a “superman” reveling in its own amazing achievements. However, these arrogant people need to be warned: excessive self-indulgence can prevent a deep reflection on the limitations of their own “soft power”, which is not good for the United States itself or the world.

3 The Psychological and Cultural Foundations of American Soft Power: American Human Constant The Human Constant of “Individual Jen” is the least balanced and the most unstable type of human “Life Package” (layer 3 of the Psychosocial Homeostasis) from the perspective of the “spectrum of human existence” proposed by psycho-culturology (Huipeng 2013, p. 159). The American Human Constant is the extreme form of the Individual Jen, and its instability is even greater. In this Human Constant, the content of the individual’s “Life Package” is fluid, and the members of the kin are only temporary members. In this model, the individual’s independence and originality are more emphasized and less bound by kinship, tradition, custom, hierarchy, supernatural, etc. “Independence” in the psychosocial homeostasis schema means defining the self primarily in terms of the content of layer 4 (“Expressible Conscious”). Such an ego is an “independent” ego type, in which the individual usually thinks in terms of the satisfaction of personal social requirements such as rights, pleasures, happiness, status, and opportunities from the standpoint of the first-person singular “I”. Americans are trained from an early age to be independent, to not depend on anyone, to be taught that “I am the most important” and “I am unique in the world” and to be proud of being independent and free and ashamed of being dependent and bound. Independence is a sign of maturity and a very high value. The mode of exchange tends to be equivalence, i.e., a mode of exchange free of any personal bondage and emotional ties. In such a society, “complete freedom of the individual” becomes the ultimate 8

President Obama’s final state of the Union address, Jan. 12 2016.

3 The Psychological and Cultural Foundations of American Soft Power …

237

cultural ideal, and with this goal, society integrates a set of “bundles of values”: freedom, independence, equality, self-fulfillment, competition, progress, creativity, success, etc., which constitute American “individualism” (what we call “Rugged Individualism”) is the main content. These values are based on the “individuality” of the human being (the other major attribute of the human being is “mutuality”), where the desires, demands, rights and sense of being based on the human organism are emphasized and drive the individual to strive relentlessly to achieve his or her goals. Since the Human Constant of Individual Jen places more emphasis on the individual as a separate organism, those values that contribute to the satisfaction of the individual’s biological attributes are emphasized. The basic requirements of being an organism are twofold: those related to the continuation of our own life, such as food, drink, security and possession of material goods, and those related to the continuation of the population, i.e., “sexual” needs. The values associated with the first category are those that make our bodies feel comfortable and our lives feel convenient and are therefore more likely to be the basis for consumerism, hedonism, and convenience in life. The second type of associated value is expressed in the proliferation of sexuality. Sex is a part of human vitality, including Hollywood romance blockbusters, intense rhythmic dancing, and the satisfaction of personal requirements that lead to a sense of comfort. A case that illustrates this is the June 26, 2015, U.S. Supreme Court decision that legalized same-sex marriage.9 The legalization of gay marriage is typical of values that are centered on personal feelings and personal happiness: as long as there is love, one can marry without regard to gender, whether one has children, and whether it is beneficial for raising the next generation.10 The values associated with these two requirements are integrated and distilled into the core of Rugged Individualism—namely freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy. Individualism differs from mercantilism in that the former embodies the idea of democratic liberty. Liberalism and Rugged Individualism are twin brothers. Individualism was already prevalent in the Western world in the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century, individualism and the idea of the individual developed into a more refined form of Rugged Individualism in the United States, which also formed the core of American ideology. The United States was a vibrant, enthusiastic, entrepreneurial nation where innovation was encouraged and where political adherence to democratic principles built inhospitable North America into the most powerful nation in the world today. The individualistic way of life has brought out the full potential of the individual human being, and through its outstanding economic, engineering, and biomedical achievements, it has kept us free from physical pain, hunger, malnutrition, and physical injury due to natural disasters and disease and ahead of other 9

This means same-sex couples can henceforth register to marry in all 50 states. http://www.china. com.cn/cppcc/2015-06/27/content_35922194.htm, July 6, 2015. 10 In the author’s opinion, nondiscrimination against homosexuality and legalization of homosexual marriage are not the same thing. The author’s concern is that if “two adults who love each other, of their own free will, and without harm to a third party” is enough to legitimize same-sex marriage, then there is no reason why consanguineous marriage, incestuous marriage, and group marriage should not be legalized based on logical self-reference and standard homogeneity.

238

13 Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant

societies in the search for material enjoyment and comfort. The achievements of the United States arguably represent the greatest achievement we can make as human beings in our basic human state of “individuality”, and its experience should be part of our human wealth. “It is not religion or romantic love but ideology, technology, organizational fervor and skill that has enabled Westerners to rise above the rest of the world over the past three hundred years. The ideology of self-reliance has enabled it to abandon the shackles of parental authority, imperial power, and medieval magic and move toward larger organizations such as democracies and centralized states, universal salvation churches and industrial empires. When the West met Africa and the East, it was the technology and well-organized weapons of the West that subdued or dominated the rest of the world” (Hsu 2002a, p. 14).

4 Why is American Soft Power Attractive? Understanding U.S. “Soft power” in the sense of “cultural attractiveness” requires answering the question of “why U.S. soft power is attractive”. Here, we will focus on the attractiveness of the values of freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy, which are the core of U.S. soft power. Values are the standards of right and wrong by which a certain social group judges social affairs, and they are the views of human beings on the issues of “what is important” and “what is valuable”. Different civilizations have different value rankings on the question of what is valuable, and therefore, different value systems are formed. However, there are some basic values that humans share, such as the fact that killing and throwing oneself in the air are bad behaviors regardless of civilization. In today’s world, where human beings are interacting increasingly closely and the integration among civilizations is deepening, there is a consensus among human beings on some basic values, and some values originally associated with a certain civilization are generally accepted by human beings. For example, the values of equality, freedom, human rights, and democracy originated in Western individual societies and were promoted by American society and culture, but these values are also embodied in the abovementioned international documents, and the values of respect for the lives of all people and the rights of individuals embodied in them have become a kind of consensus among all mankind and are common achievements in the evolution of mankind to modern civilization. Throughout history, when a state becomes a central actor in an international order, the values of that central actor spread outward, but none of them seem to have appeared so widely diffused as the values originating in Western individual societies in today’s world. When modern industrial civilization emerged from the West, the diffusion of Western cultural components occurred with the trade and colonial domination of Western nations around the world, and it has not stopped since the end of colonial rule. This is mainly manifested in the spread of facilities such as automobiles, spring beds and luxurious air-conditioned apartments that make our organisms feel more comfortable, the invention of expensive and tasty foods and

4 Why is American Soft Power Attractive?

239

drinks that satisfy our tastes, and the use of electronic products that make our lives more convenient. These material advances have inspired us with desires we never had before, making us marvel at how many wonderful pleasures life has to offer. We have embraced many new values and behaviors, such as the freedom to work unencumbered and the dislike of our parents’ marriages. We appreciate the spirit of independence and demand that our children be independent and self-supporting. We also celebrate creativity and promote the development of creative minds. Now, even the idea of “privacy”, which is based solely on personal social experience, has entered our daily lives and become a legal right. We have embraced the idea of equality between men and women, complained about the current inequality in education and health care, and want the disadvantaged to be on an equal footing with the advantaged, so that more people can have access to things that used to be available only to a few, and so on. Fundamentally, these changes are the result of our acceptance of values that emphasize the individuality of people. To deny the impact of these values on our behavior and society is inconsistent with the facts of everyday life. The proliferation of values based on the foundations of our organism is also manifested in the proliferation of sexuality. The proliferation of sexuality in our lives is increasing. Chinese society is becoming more open to sex, and “sex appeal” has become a positive term in our lives, with sexually charged pictures, television and movie images, and sexually charged advertisements entering our daily lives in large numbers. Free love marriage, with its emphasis on love, has become the main form of marriage for us, or at least the ideal form of marriage for many people. The experience of previous world civilizations shows that few societies have allowed individuals to decide for themselves about marriage; the free marriage system practiced in the United States is a notable exception in this regard, but it now represents a growing trend that is occurring in many parts of the world today. The free rhythmic music, the chaotic and rhythmic dance steps popular among young people in China, and the thrilling love stories depicted in Hollywood blockbusters all resonate with the biological desires buried deep within our hearts. Based on such facts, it can be judged that the decision on the legality of same-sex marriage in the United States has a demonstration effect, and we may also accept same-sex marriage in the future (in fact, our attitude toward the phenomenon of homosexuality today has changed significantly in the direction of acceptance). The clothes we wear have changed from the wide clothes that did not expose our bodies in the past toward comfort, convenience, and highlighting our individuality (to a large extent, our sexuality), with women’s bathing suits getting shorter and shorter to the bikinis that are popular today. If someone were to make us wear old-fashioned shoes with no distinction between left and right and “crotchless pants” with no distinction between front and back, we would not be able to accept it. We also like democracy, the idea of equality and democracy makes us experience the joy of exercising our political rights, and we like leaders who are approachable and say they have a sense of equality. The emphasis on individual power, freedom, and equality can make us feel valued and dignified in our own existence (at least conceptually). The protection of the right to freely express dissent, to criticize leaders, and to criticize the government allows us

240

13 Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant

to experience the liberating joy of freedom and liberty. China’s decades-long practice of reform and opening up has unleashed the dynamism of society and transformed our lives for the better. Fundamentally, this is mainly due to the release of human individuality. Why do these things appeal to individuals growing up in “impersonal societies” (including China, India, and Japan)? This is a question that deserves deeper consideration. The important reason is the tendency to “individualize” our world. This trend is consistent with the process of industrialization and urbanization that originated in the West in recent times. Economic development has led to the growing independence of the individual, while urbanization has led to the weakening of family, group, authority, obedience, loyalty, and the strangulation of people. The process of “individuation” began almost simultaneously with the outward expansion of Western culture, and it is still ongoing all over the world today. Of course, the worldwide spread of Western values and lifestyles is related to the conquering power (hard power) of the West since the second half of the eighteenth century. However, this is only part of the reason and does not explain the whole picture. When colonial rule ended, many values and ways of life based on the individuality of people continued to spread widely. They caused widespread “internalization” in the non-Western world. These things correspond to one of the two fundamental attributes of our human being— individuality—and these values and ways of life are rooted in the organic basis that enables the individual to live comfortably and freely. “Individuality” is an inherent property in us that seeks to free ourselves from all kinds of constraints and to release repressed desires, and “individuation” awakens this part of us to the point that we find it difficult to resist the temptation when we are exposed to values and lifestyles that are developed on the basis of individuality. It is difficult to resist the temptation to be exposed to values and lifestyles developed on the basis of individuality. Individuality is the “receptor” that exists in us to actively internalize those elements of our culture that, although exogenous, are consistent with individuality. As long as the tendency to “individualize” exists, values and lifestyles based on the needs of the individual organism will continue to be attractive. This is not a bad thing for us, it is what we want, and it is in our human interest. Three things are currently changing the world: science and technology, characterized by innovation; a market economy, characterized by the exchange of goods; and a political democracy, characterized by greater respect for the dignity of the individual. These three things have an impact on our lives that we can all feel. If there is anything that represents “globalization”, I am afraid it is these three things. These three things are based on the Individual Jen, and they all stem from the pursuit of a happy, comfortable and individual life, in line with the trend of “individualization” of the world. Those values that are based on the mutuality of human beings, such as the Chinese values of loyalty, filial piety, modesty, righteousness, benevolence, and propriety, and the Hindu values of Brahma, Atman, and Dharma are all conditional on the suppression of human individuality, and therefore, in today’s world trend of “individualization”, these values are not easily accepted by individuals. Although Hsu predicted that “under holism, the larger groups that follow will be largely dominated and controlled by the state, with occasional concessions to individual desires;

5 The Limits of Individualism as the Basis of U.S. “Soft Power”

241

under democracy, the larger groups that follow will be largely organized and maintained by private individuals, with occasional allowances for some state intervention. Both of these trends developed at the expense of the Chinese or Hindu way of life” (Hsu, F. L. K.). However, bot Hsu and Tocqueville underestimated the strength of the proliferation of individualistic lifestyles. Because information technology has accelerated the worldwide trend toward individualization, the end of the Cold War and the dramatic changes in ancient civilized societies such as China and India under the influence of market economies and individualism have only occurred in recent decades.

5 The Limits of Individualism as the Basis of U.S. “Soft Power” There is no denying that the increasing “individualization” of the world is making American soft power increasingly attractive to people in many countries and imitating it in all regions of the world. This appeal will continue as long as the trend toward “individualization” does not stop. This seems to give the impression that America’s so-called soft power represents the future of the world and that the values of individualism will spread around the world, especially after the end of the Cold War. The success of rugged individualism has also led the United States to promote freedom and democracy and lifestyles abroad with religious fervor, but there is a worrying side to the trend toward “individualization” of the world, and we need to recognize the limits of soft power. The first is the breakdown of family ties and human loneliness. The Rugged Individual Jen model is a model in which the “individuality” of human beings is emphasized to the extreme in the Human Constant of human beings. It is characterized by the instability of the human life package. In our analytical context, this is the problem of the low PSH of the Rugged Individual. The strength and weakness of this model is that it pushes the individual to the extreme. Individualism, as it is often said, is a double-edged sword. The instability of the Life Package brings with it a high degree of individual creativity along with a lack of inner security. The goal of achieving maximum personal freedom in real life means the maximum abandonment of intimate human connections. This has made it possible to achieve great material achievements to enable us to live comfortably and conveniently without physical pain, hunger, malnutrition, and physical injury due to natural disasters and diseases, while inevitably bringing about a lack of close human ties, high divorce rates, family breakups, large numbers of single-parent families and unwed pregnancies, and mental isolation. The comforts of life and material progress are only a part of our lives, and according to the theory of PSH equilibrium, they are not the biggest and most important part. According to Hsu, “Human benefits include at least the following two components: (1) freedom from physical pain, hunger, malnutrition, and physical injury due to natural disasters and diseases; (2) freedom from

242

13 Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant

boredom, aimlessness, fear of others, and severe anxiety about one’s place in society” (Hsu 2002a, vol. 9, p. 514). We also need harmonious human relationships and emotional fulfillment, i.e., freedom from boredom, aimlessness, anxiety, and fear of others. “Freedom from scarcity does not mean freedom from interpersonal anxiety and hostility”. The minimalist lifestyle should be considered a success for the first aspect of human benefit but a failure for the second aspect, human freedom from boredom and fear, because human freedom from boredom and fear must be based on close interpersonal ties, and the minimalist lifestyle blocks the establishment of any intimate ties. As the Chinese proverb goes, “You cannot have both the fish and the bear’s paw, Rugged Individualism brings with it a price of individual isolation and dysfunction, along with a surprising amount of individual creativity. The emphasis on ingenuity and misbehavior are two sides of the same coin. The extreme society will continue to produce more geniuses and stars who win superiority in every field, but it will also relentlessly breed more disorder and crime, whose antisocial creativity will reach more worrying levels. For popular perception, there is no longer a clear line between criminal and socially celebrated or popular behavior” (Hsu 2002a, vol. 9, Preface xvii). The United States has the highest percentage of prisoners in the world, with 70 million people with some sort of criminal record and 20 million convicted of a felony, according to figures cited by President Barack Obama. According to the 2014 Uniform Crime Report statistics released by the FBI, more than 1.16 million violent crimes were committed in the United States in 2013, an average of 367.9 violent crimes per 100,000 residents.11 It was also reported that 20 percent of people in the U.S. suffer from mental illness each year, or one in five.12 Statistics from 2012 show that the number of people with serious mental illness in the U.S. has reached 356,268, far exceeding the figure of 35,000 in state hospitals.13 U.S. prisons have become the largest mental hospitals in the United States. Of course, every country has problems of one kind or another, but the United States has one of the highest rates in this area when compared to other Western countries that are also “personal societies”. These figures are cited without any political intent but rather to make people aware of the price to be paid when individualism is taken to its extreme. Those parts of the world that have embraced the values of individualism have had and continue to have similar or identical problems to those of individual societies. Second, the miserable situation of the loser is brought about by excessive social competition. Because no one can share the failure, it needs to be borne by one person. This in turn creates the problem of reverence for the powerful and the problem of violence in American society. American society is characterized by both extreme social inequality and the reality of equality. On the one hand, there is a great disparity between the rich and the poor, and on the other hand, there is a reinforced notion of equality. For example, men and women are equal, and the government and the people are equal. The emphasis on independence, freedom, and equal values not only does not save one from aimlessness, depression, and spiritual emptiness, but 11

http://www.guancha.cn/america/2015_11_04_340056.shtml, 2016-01-27. http://www.holine.com/DEC/123102.htm, 2016-01-27. 13 http://www.biosmonthly.com/contactd.php?id=4749, 2016-01-27. 12

5 The Limits of Individualism as the Basis of U.S. “Soft Power”

243

it can lead us to such a situation. Loneliness and high insecurity, transgression and originality, equality and competition all follow each other. Winning in competition (success) is an important means for individualists to gain security, status, and social interaction. The problem is that the security and joy of winning through competition is short-lived compared to the security and joy gained through close interpersonal ties. The joy of winning a sports competition is intense but short-lived. You may have more wealth than your competitors, than the people around you, and get happiness, but it is also temporary. Because he may surpass you tomorrow, there are usually richer than you. More importantly, one person’s success is followed by more people’s failure. The ratio of success to failure is not 5:5 or 2:8 but 1:9! Taking the example of various competitions, so many people participate in the competition, we remember that the first place is usually. Who pays attention to those behind the first place? The concentration of wealth and the severe disparity between rich and poor creates greater interpersonal tension. The emphasis on competition favors the strongest, and since it is entirely up to the individual to face the world, with no close relations to share his pain, the loser is miserable. When an American succeeds, he wants the whole world to know about his or her success and share it, and when he fails, only he bears the burden. There is no protection mechanism for failure because the culture has made the individual too “complete” and there is no one close to him to share his anxiety. Individualism has brought Americans greater wealth, greater social progress, and greater insecurity and inner anxiety. The mind seemed more insecure, and people became more hostile to each other as they became more individualistic. “Individualism has given Westerners a distinguished place in today’s world, so why can it no longer be so in tomorrow’s world? The answer must be found in a foundational anthropological discovery: that human ideologies, technological and scientific methods of organization operate within social and cultural chakras that determine not only their meaning but also their outcome”. “The key to peace among human groups and to individual happiness lies in our relationships with others, not in our control over other things”. “The key to discovering and developing deeper, more constant human relationships must be sought in the cradle of human development—the family” (Hsu 2002a, vol. 9, p. 151). “Freedom from scarcity does not mean freedom from interpersonal anxiety and hostility”. Third, there are environmental problems brought by consumerism and convenience. The satisfaction of desires is endless, which will bring about the destruction of the body and the natural environment. Unlike the spiritual joy that comes from religious freedom from the material world, the wonderful pleasure we obtain from the satisfaction of our desires, material enjoyment, and competitive “success” is only short-lived. Material wealth, status, and fame are quickly replaced by greater material desires and the desire for higher status. The current capitalist economic system, which is based on the satisfaction of human greed, implies a certain “positive feedback” mechanism, i.e., economic development requires constant stimulation of consumption, excessive consumption of resources, and excessive dependence on oil. This is related to the Rugged Individual Jen and Rugged Individualism associated with it, which stems from the emphasis on individual desires. There is an overemphasis on material satisfaction for the sake of our physical comfort and ease

244

13 Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant

of life. As a result, U.S. soft power is not sustainable in the long run. The current spread of consumerism, hedonism, and convenience lifestyles has gone far beyond saving our organisms from hunger and malnutrition. Excessive consumption is a deprivation of future people, and if the world were to reach the American standard of living, we would need roughly seven earths. The modern economic system, based on individual desires, creates a “positive feedback mechanism” in which consumption must be constantly stimulated to increase production to increase economic growth, regardless of whether people actually need it or not. This system is produced not for need but for human greed, which ultimately destroys the ecology of the planet. In this sense, are some religious extremists not justified in criticizing the spread of individualism for bringing about the degradation of the world? The problem is also that overly encouraging economic competition and exaggerating the pursuit of material things has not improved people’s happiness. In the half-century from the late 1940s to the late 1990s, the U.S. economy boomed and GDP per capita tripled, but there are scientific tests of happiness that show that the average American happiness level has not improved at all. The fact that a person rides in a fancy bulletproof car with bodyguards in front of and behind him shows exactly how insecure that person is. While the economy is growing, Americans are becoming increasingly psychologically stressed. Although Americans have tripled their real wealth over the past 50 years and owned possessions that were beyond the reach of many Americans in the 1940s, such as air conditioners, computers, and home theaters, they are no happier than their forebears. America’s democratic opposition to declining living standards makes it difficult to automatically reduce consumption. In connection with this, the United States is the largest country in the world that lives on debt, and living on debt is a disguised deprivation of others, and the United States becomes very dependent on other countries (especially creditor countries) in practice. We can see here that when individualism is pushed to the extreme, it goes to the opposite of the core of individualism—the spirit of “self-reliance”. When a country and the majority of its people are in debt, can we not say that the spirit of “self-dependence” of the country has collapsed? Fourth, the backlash and resistance that the U.S. has caused it to export its values abroad. The trend of individualization of the world does favor the U.S. export of its soft power based on the Rugged Individual Jen. The basic principles of contemporary international relations theory actually became popular as Westerners’ organizational power, technology, and ideology gained dominance in the world. Its basis is also based on the individualistic values and lifestyle of Westerners, represented by the United States, and has given rise to widespread “internalization”. However, it must be recognized that this is an act of voluntary internalization, not a forced one. The United States has often encountered problems in this regard as a result of wishful thinking in promoting its values. The author agrees with Huntington’s analysis that every civilization absorbs foreign influences in a self-centered way. Indian Buddhism spread to China, and China did not become India; Chinese culture influenced Japan, and Japan did not become China. Universal values are the illusion of great powers, and every civilization has considered its own values to be universal. When a civilization believes itself to be universal, it is often the beginning of the end of its heyday.

5 The Limits of Individualism as the Basis of U.S. “Soft Power”

245

Fulbright, for example, compared the United States to ancient Greece, the early Roman Empire, the Napoleonic Empire, and Hitler’s Third Reich, arguing that the United States, like them, ultimately exhibited “the arrogance of power” and did not understand that “power” tends to confuse itself with virtue. A great power is particularly susceptible to the idea that its power is a sign of God’s favor, a special responsibility given by God to other nations—to make them richer, happier, and wiser, that is, to remake them in its own shining image.14 Of course, the present United States cannot be compared exactly to the several empires that have emerged in Western history, but it is not entirely unreasonable to think that they are somehow culturally connected and that their lessons are worth learning. First, we must recognize that cultural kernels change similarly to biological genetic changes, which are extremely slow. Some see the West’s dominance in cultural communication and media as proof of universal values, which Huntington points out is a superficial misunderstanding. The popularity of cowboy clothes, Coke, and Hollywood movies does not bring about cultural unity. Anti-American terrorists can wear cowboy clothes and drink Coke while using civilian planes to bomb New York according to the American movie genre. The fact that societies outside the United States build modern businesses and drink Coca-Cola to embrace the concepts of democracy and freedom does not indicate that they will be Americanized. Patterns of human relationships are difficult to change, and these things need to operate in a cultural vein. In addition, the cultural vein is not that easy to change. As for the question of why culture, which is the principle behind our behavior, is not so easily changed, many aspects of it are not clear to us yet. However, a persuasive hypothesis is that if our behavior were that changeable, the diversity of cultures in the world would have ceased to exist long ago, and the so-called issues of national identity and cultural identity would not exist. Ideas such as freedom, equality, and democracy are not as easy to export as Coca-Cola or McDonald’s fast food because they are part of the “emotional model” of culture, which is difficult to change. These things are meant to operate in a sociocultural context and be given meaning. When these values are extended to the “outside world”, there is a big problem. True human independence cannot be achieved, even in American society, where the Individual Jen is the dominant Human Constant, and complete freedom and independence cannot be achieved. If man is truly free, he must return to the animal world, not to mention exporting to the heterogeneous “outside world”. When independence, freedom, and democracy begin to dismantle the traditional ties that bind people in societies in the “outside world”, they often cause resentment and discomfort, as well as hatred for America’s hegemonic behavior in the world. In the non-Western world, while there is a large acceptance of American culture based on Rugged Individualism, there is also a large perception of this influence as “cultural imperialism”. While exporting freedom and equality, U.S. soft power has also exported rebellion, violence, and alienation of human relations, causing local ethnic cleavages, intensified religious conflicts, and fierce anti-American sentiment. The U.S. soft power has exported freedom and democracy based on individualism and a certain “personal fundamentalism” that 14

http://ias.cass.cn/show/show_project_ls.asp?id=950, 2016-01-27.

246

13 Soft Power, Rugged Individualism, and American Human Constant

cannot overcome religious fundamentalism. The positive effects of the U.S. export of democracy to the Middle East are not obvious, but rather the negative effects such as the increase of local terrorist activities and the expansion of terrorist organizations. The rampant Islamic extremism and the terrorism associated with it were not expected by the promoters of liberal and democratic values. Replacing Saddam’s brutal rule with pluralistic democracy proved more difficult than overthrowing the dictator, and long-standing conflicts within Iraq between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds evolved into religious and ethnic conflicts that could not be integrated under U.S.style democratic elections. The Arab Spring, centered on the Egyptian revolution, ultimately proved to be nothing more than an “Islamic awakening” that the United States did not like. The United States is often unable to understand how its sincere efforts to help others can have the opposite effect or even be met with fierce opposition and resistance from those it helps. In this sense, the psychological and cultural basis of equality and freedom is a factor that makes it difficult for Americans to live with themselves and others. More importantly, the U.S. has encountered a problem in marketing its soft power abroad that contradicts its core values: for example, recognizing that people in the “outside world” are truly free requires recognizing their right to choose their own beliefs and lifestyles without interference, which contradicts the U.S. act of promoting its soft power. Again, if nations are equal and free, then every nation has the right to develop nuclear weapons, which is also unacceptable to the United States. A relationship of complete equality cannot bring security to the individualist; a relationship of equality between people can only bring a fleeting connection and is only a means to pursue success. The individualist’s ultimate goal is to be above all else, to have more emotional connections and more positive relationships with the outside world, either to help them, to liberate them, or to control and conquer them. The ultimate goal of the individualist is to be above all, to have more emotional connections and more positive relationships with the outside world, or to help them, liberate them, or control and subjugate them. True equality means that people in the Outer World have the same rights as themselves, are on par with them, and may even surpass them, which is unacceptable to the individualist. The strength and status of the outside world is judged to be even somewhat close to his own, and he is judged to be his own failure. The individualist cannot tolerate claims of equality from those he considers inferior, or worse, he may even resort to hostility and violence in defense of his self-perceived superiority. That is why Americans cannot tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons by countries such as Iran and North Korea and fundamentally cannot accept the power of backward countries such as China and India or the establishment of a “world democracy” in which world affairs are decided by a worldwide vote. American values based on Rugged Individualism are spreading (and will continue to spread) throughout the world, but there are limits to them, and they are limits to

References

247

the current trend toward “individualization” in the world and to our humanity.15 An examination of American society and democracy shows what we can achieve and what we can pay when the “individuality” of human beings is brought to its fullest extent. The American experience is the experience of all mankind, and the problems brought about by American Rugged Individualism may also be the problems brought about by the worldwide trend of “individualization. The force that causes the “individualization” of the world in the name of “modernity” is eroding families, groups, nations, and all traditional ties, such as the mysterious “dark energy” that exists in the universe, accelerating the expansion of the universe. It is like the mysterious “dark energy” in the universe, which is accelerating the expansion of the universe and making the celestial bodies farther and farther apart. In this sense, the United States is a laboratory for all mankind, from which we can learn a lot.

References Hsu, F.L. K. 2002a. Rugged Individualism Reconsidered: Essays in Psychological Anthropology. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983 Chinese vorsion, Xü Langguang zhuzuoji (The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K. ), vol. IX, Tai Bei, Nantian Shuji. Hsu, F.L.K. 2002b. American and Chinese (Chinese version, The Collected Works of Hsu (Xu Langguang zhuzuoji), vol. IV. Tai Bei, Nantian Shuji. Huipeng, Shang. 2013. Essentials of Psycho-culturology: Theory and Method for Large-Scale Comparative Studies of Literate Civilizations (xin li wenhua xue yaoyi: da guimo wenming shehui bijiao yanjiu de liun yu fangfa). Press of Pekeng University. Nye, Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.

15

In view of its limitations, some scholars suggest promoting a “moderate individualism” or “qualified individualism” to overcome its drawbacks. This is a separate issue, however, and will not be discussed here.

Part IV

State Forms and Interstate Relations of Japan and India

This part includes four chapters that focus on the Human Constants and patterns of state behavior in Japan and India. Chapter 14 discusses the characteristics of the Human Constant of the Japanese people and the characteristics of Japanese diplomacy. The Human Constant of the Japanese people is “Yuan Jen” (缘人), and its characteristics are reflected in their attitudes and behavior patterns toward the Outside World. The ambiguity of Japanese diplomacy, the emphasis on internal consensus (the so-called nenkai (根回)), and the subservience and pampering of the powerful are reflective of the characteristics of the Human Constant of the Japanese. Chapter 15 discusses Japan’s proposed Asian international order, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, during the Second World War. The author argues that the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” was a Japanese design for an international order in East Asia at the time and that this order bores certain characteristics of the major subgroup of the Japanese people, the family gen. These characteristics were also reflected in the interpersonal relationships of the Japanese people, such as the proposed kinship, hierarchy, and supreme authority of the head of the family. The combination of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, an international order proposed by the Japanese, with the basic interpersonal status of the Japanese is a new perspective and leads to new conclusions. Chapter 16 discusses the state form of Indian society and the establishment of the modern Western political system in India, analyzing the relationship between India’s diverse and composite cultural traditions, decentralized power patterns, and the Hindu “law” and the modern Indian political system. Chapter 17 discusses the Human Constant of India, the orderly man, and the characteristics of the international system in ancient South Asia. There was also an international system in ancient South Asia, and “strong civilization and weak organization” was the main characteristic of the international system. The chapter also explores the relationship between the “Dharma system” and the “Hindu Human Constant”.

Chapter 14

The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

1 Efforts to Explore Japanese Behavior Patterns Commentators often talk about “the West of individualism” and “the East of syndicalism” and conclude that Japanese people are completely submerged in their organizations and “lack subjectivity”. They conclude that Japanese people are completely submerged in their organizations and “lack subjectivity” and “have no self” (Reischauer 1980; Hirosi 1983). Obviously, this opinion is based on a society with “subjectivity” and “self” (in fact, the American and European individual societies) as a reference point, which implies “immaturity” and “underdevelopment”, “underdeveloped” in a pejorative sense. Other scholars, seeing the difficulties in explaining Japanese behavior using social science concepts based primarily on Western experience, have tried to move away from a Western-centric position. For example, Kenro Doi’s Amae theory attempts to express the unique psychological and cultural characteristics of Japanese people, and Chie Nakane’s “Tate-society” (Huipeng 1997) theory attempts to describe the characteristics of Japanese people’s interpersonal relationships. Although they recognize, to varying degrees, the inappropriateness of using concepts derived from Western personal societies to describe Japanese society (Chie 1967, pp. 14–15), they still give the impression that “the West is normal and Japan is special” when they emphasize the uniqueness of Japanese society and culture, although they may not intend to do so and often deny it. The economic miracle of postwar Japan greatly boosted Japanese self-confidence, and one of the responses in the academic world has been a greater rethinking of Western-centric research methods. Some scholars have begun to develop a new paradigm for analyzing Japanese society from a methodological perspective, as reflected in the theories of some scholars of the so-called Japanese civilization school.1 These scholars are no longer satisfied with the positioning of Japan as a 1

The “Japanese School of Civilization” is the name given by Japanese anthropologist E, Sofu, to Japanese scholars of civilization and culture. There are many scholars including Shuntaro

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_14

251

252

14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

“subculture” or “satellite civilization” but see Japan as an independent civilization system (e.g., Tadao Umesao’s “the Historical View of Civilization from the View of Ecology”). Some scholars even go further and consider Japanese civilization to be superior to Western and Chinese civilizations (e.g., Kobon Sunbei’s “Theory of Japanese Cyber Civilization”). Eshun Hamaguchi can be considered an important representative of the “Japanese School of Civilization”. He was influenced by Hsu F. L. K. He is one of the translators of the Japanese edition of Hsu’s book Clan, Caste and Club, and his theory has a psychological dimension. He began by asking: If Japanese people have “no subjectivity”, how can they achieve high economic growth? From the perspective of “human systems”, he argues that the problem lies in the concept of “the individual” used by the researcher, which is mainly based on Western experience. In response, he proposes the concept of “the contextual” as opposed to the individual to refer to the “human system” of Japanese society. The individual emphasizes the personal, while the contextual emphasizes the interrelationship. In the societies of Contextual Jen, persons tend to determine their own behavior with reference to the behavior of others and can be described as a “person in harmony with others”. In the societies of Individual Jen, persons interact with each other under the condition of clear boundaries, and each tends to use interaction as a means, while in case of the Contextual Jen, persons do not have clear boundaries and share a common living space with each other, and each considers this common space as an essential element of human existence, i.e., almost a. In other words, it is almost a state of “you in me, I in you”. The human being in this state is not so much an independent individual as a “relational body”. The essence of human existence is the unity of “mutuality” and “individuality”, and “interpersonal” is a state of existence that emphasizes the mutuality of human beings. From a global perspective, the Contextual is a more common state of existence than the Individual (Eshun 1998, p. 22). The concept of the Contextual is the core of Hamaguchi’s entire theory, and from this concept, the system of values associated with the Contextual is called “contextualism”. Hamaguchi believed that this was something completely different from Western “individualism” that underpinned the whole of Japanese human relations. Hamaguchi outlines three characteristics of contextualism in contrast to individualism (Eshun 1998, p. 22). First, interdependence. This Human Constant presupposes that people cannot exist independently, that interdependence is essential and that people need to take care of others and receive care from others. Individualism, on the other hand, is based on the idea that the self is based on a clear sense of personhood and is seen as the center of social life, not depending on others and refusing to be dependent on but relying only on oneself and taking responsibility for oneself. Second, mutual trust. To achieve interdependence, it is necessary to trust others, i.e., to believe that they will respond to one’s actions with understanding. Individualism, on the other hand, is self-reliance, and the individual has an underlying distrust

Ito’s “Comparative Civilization Studies,” Tadao, Umezaki’s “Preface to the Ecological History of Civilization,” and Haruhira, Ueyama’s “History of Japanese Civilization,” a seven-volume work.

1 Efforts to Explore Japanese Behavior Patterns

253

of others. Third, the relationship with others is seen as an end in itself. Relationships built on mutual trust are not exploited for strategic reasons but are honored as something of value and are expected to continue unconditionally. In the case of individualism, on the other hand, individuals use the relationships they have established with others only as a means of personal survival (Eshun and Kumon (eds.) 1982, p. 22). Hamaguchi believes that the modernization of Japanese society has followed a path of contextualism that is completely different from Western individualism, whose basic characteristic is that persons are not atomized and that it emphasizes group interests and group harmony. It emphasizes the interests of the group and the harmony of the group, mutual trust and interdependence. Hamaguchi disagrees with the concept of “groupism” in describing Japanese behavior and advocates replacing individualism as a methodology with contextualism as a methodology. The author does not fully agree with these generalizations of Eshun Hamaguchi. His theory, like other scholars of the “Japanese civilization school”, tends to overestimate the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese civilization and underestimate individualism, a shortcoming of his theory that has been demonstrated especially since the collapse of the Japanese bubble economy in the 1990s. This shortcoming of his theory has been proven, especially since the collapse of the Japanese bubble economy in the 1990s. However, the author highly appreciates his approach of asking questions from the perspective of the “human system” and his efforts to propose a new research paradigm that would fundamentally change the Western-centric tendency in the study of Japanese society and culture. We know that the Japanese words “kojin” (個人 individual) and “shakai” (社会 society) are translations of Western words. In Japan, “society” was translated as “shakai” and individual as “kojin” in 1878 and 1885, respectively.2 Although these concepts are translated into Chinese characters, the basis of Japanese society is different from that of the West.3 When used to describe Japanese (and possibly other non-Western) societies, they naturally refer to something different from the West, and researchers have often overlooked this issue. Hamaguchi tries to show that Japanese behavior differs from Westerners not in degree but in principle of life, so a new paradigm must also be used in describing Japanese society and culture. The theory of Contextual is a school of thought known as the “Japanese theory”. It should be noted that China and Japan share Chinese character resources and influence each other in creating new concepts, and Hamaguchi’s attempt to move away from the Western concept of translation and use Chinese character resources to create a new, more local research paradigm has implications for our research. However, the use of the concept of the Contextual to refer to the “human system” of the Japanese is also problematic. The author finds that he uses this concept at two levels: the first is the level of the Western individual. At this level, the Contextual 2

China borrowed these translations from Japan in modern times, so they should be used at a later date. 3 The Japanese scholar Kinya, Abe, said something similar: There are two systems that run through Japan, a modern social system since the Meiji era and a historical, traditional system. Western society presupposes independent individuals, and society is made up of dignified individuals one by one. Unlike Western European societies, the Japanese “world” has no individuals (Kinya 1995).

254

14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

does not emphasize the independence of human beings but the mutuality of human beings, who are not independent individuals but a relational body. It should be noted, however, that the characteristics of “Contextualism” and “contextual society” that he points out at this level do not seem to be unique to Japan but also to other nonWestern societies (such as China, India, and societies of Southeast Asia). Second is the level of “Japanese Qualities” not only relative to the West but also to other non-Western societies. Hamaguchi also notes that human existence is different in the same Eastern society and tries to summarize what is unique to Japanese people, such as the “co-ordinationism” in behavior and the “On-Gi” (On and Giri) relationship, and assigns these characteristics to the concept of the Contextual as well. I believe that it is inappropriate to use the concepts of the Contextual and Contextualism to summarize these two levels, and that using of Contextualism to refer to Japanese interpersonal patterns is like the use of “relational orientation”4 to refer to Chinese people, which does not capture the most salient features of the subject. The author believes that a distinction should be made between two levels of content. The terms “Contextual” and “Contextualism” can be used at the level corresponding to “Individual” and “Individualism”. In addition, we need a subordinate concept that specifically describes the unique interpersonal pattern of Japanese people, which distinguishes the basic interpersonal status of Chinese and Hindu, who also belong to the category of the Contextual.

2 “The Yuan Jen”: The Human Constant of the Japanese People The Yuan Jen is a subcategory of the Contextual, a type of Jen that can be observed in mainly non-Western societies. Many characteristics of the Yuan Jen have been described by many scholars, including Eshun Hamaguchi, and there is a need to generalize and systematize these characteristics according to a certain theoretical framework. I believe that Hsu’s PSH model is an effective analytical tool that can be used to describe the basic characteristics of Yuan Jen with some modifications and refinements to the model. The author further refines the two aspects of the model (psychological and social) into four aspects, i.e., the psychological aspect is further divided into “self-perception” and “affective mode”, and the social aspect is further refined into “exchange mode. The social aspect is further subdivided into two aspects: “exchange pattern” and “basic group type”. The following is an attempt to grasp the basic interpersonal status of Japanese people in these four aspects and to point out the characteristics of Japanese interpersonal relationships that distinguish them not only from the basic interpersonal status of Western “individuals” but also from those of other societies 4

For more information on the inappropriateness of “relational orientation” in describing the Human Constant of the Chinese people, and the Human Constant of the Chinese people, see Chap. 2 of this book.

2 “The Yuan Jen”: The Human Constant of the Japanese People

255

that belong to the East (such as China). The following is a brief description of the four dimensions of self-knowledge, emotion, exchange, and group that characterize the Human Constant of Yuan Jen. It is these characteristics that I believe constitute the true “Japanese identity” sought by Hamaguchi. (i) Self-perception Dimension. In contrast to the Western, the individual in which human self-perception emphasizes the individual as the foundation of the organism and social life tends to be closer to the foundation of the organism, Japanese and Chinese (both of whom belong to what Hamaguchi calls the Contextual) both perceive themselves in a close interpersonal circle, and social life tends to be divided into several distant and close circles. In Japan, the innermost circle is made up of “relatives” (“Miuchi”), the outermost circle is made up of strangers (“Tanin”), and the middle circle is made up of acquaintances, friends and colleagues (“Nagama”). However, the most important characteristics of the reference group for the self-perception of Yuan Jen are as follows: first, although the kin group is also important, it is not an absolute priority; the kin group is not so constant and durable but has a certain convertibility, i.e., the Japanese kin group includes some nonblood relations that he has to meet. Second, the “self” in the several interpersonal circles of the Yuan Jen is not so obvious, which is different from the Lun Jen’s more explicit definition of the self, based on its own concentric circles of interpersonal circles (what Fei Xiaotong calls the “Differential Pattern”), which are obviously centered on “oneself”; third, the circle of Japanese also has a certain sequence, but this sequence is not entirely based on the proximity of blood, the roles of people, and their associated. It also takes into account other differences, such as age, gender, education, strength, talent, and situation. (ii) Emotional Dimension. The emotional model includes two parts: “emotional configuration” and “emotional control”. The emotion configuration and control mechanism of Yuan Jen is similar to that of the Lun Jen, but it does not point to the group of close relatives as Chinese do but emphasizes more the “situation” in which the individual is located and the relative “position” in this situation. This means that there is more flexibility in the configuration of individual emotions. The configuration of karmic emotions allows the emotions to be directed to something absolute or sacred, but this absolute is generally neither a god nor a soul, but an authority figure or a social organization, which is the idea of absolute loyalty. In addition, it is also permissible to point to the primal lust, the animalistic impulse to stay and revel. In terms of emotion control (or emotional transformation), the main control mechanism of emotion in the Yuan Jen is the same as that of the Lun Jen, which is the suppression type (Hsu 2002, p. 104), which means that the individual does not mainly suppress those primitive desires and emotions that are incompatible with the social and cultural requirements into the This means that the individual does not mainly suppress those primitive desires and emotions that are incompatible with social and cultural requirements into the Unconscious but suppresses them to a shallow level of consciousness (e.g., restricted or Pre-Conscious), and the

256

14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

pressure to transform emotionally and rationally comes not from some abstract idea deep inside the individual but from the specific social situation in which the individual lives. This control mechanism is characterized by “context-centered” behavior, sensitivity to “shame”, and a life of performance. However, unlike the Chinese, who are highly ethical and role-based in their feelings, the Yuan Jen does not use the rules of ethics and discipline but rather the comments of the “world” and the comments of others as pressure for emotional control. The individual has a strong ability to empathize with others and to adjust his or her behavior with reference to others. (iii) Exchange Dimension. It is an asymmetrical type of exchange, and Eshun Hamaguchi summarizes it as a “goodwill first” type of exchange relationship (Eshun 1998, p. 116). There are relationships of grace and righteousness within the circle of interaction, emphasizing the role of grace (On), righteousness (Giri), and humanity kindness (Ninjyo) in human association. However, unlike in China, the exchange relationship within the circle of Yuan Jen is neither automatically reciprocated nor is the rate of reward roughly balanced, but the rate is higher or lower depending on the order and status in the group, and anyone can be the giver. Once the relationship is formed, it is usually longterm and, in many cases, even lifelong. The Yuan Jen also adopts different laws for the three circles: for “relatives” (Miuchi), the law of “Amae”,5 for friends and colleagues (Nagama), the law of righteousness (Giri), and for strangers (Tanin), the law of competition. Unlike the Lun Jen, the three circles of the Yuan Jen and their applicable laws are more convertible. (iv) Group Dimension. The “Iemoto” is a typical group concluded by individuals in the state of Yuan Jen, and it is also the most suitable external expression of this Human Constant. This group has the characteristics of both a family and a contractual organization. It is a copy of the laws of Japanese groups adapted to the subgroups. The principle of concluding such a group is the “principle of kin-contract” proposed by Francis L. K. Hsu. The characteristics of the “Iemoto” organization appear in a more or less diluted form in all subgroups of Japanese society. The values associated with the Yuan Jen can be called “Japanese contextualism”, and Japanese society can be called “contextual society”. There are a number of characteristics that can be outlined separately, but again, space is too limited to elaborate them here. The psychosocial homeostasis model of the Yuan Jen has similarities and differences with that of the Lun Jen. To illustrate, we draw the PSH patterns of the two Human Constants (Figs. 1 and 2) for comparison.

5

“Amae” is a unique Japanese word that refers to an emotion and behavior that resembles the pampering of children. Japanese scholar Kenro Doi has elaborated on the cultural psychological meaning of “Amae” (Kenro 1981).

2 “The Yuan Jen”: The Human Constant of the Japanese People

257

Fig. 1 PSH model of the Yuan Jen (Japanese human constant)

First, the “intimate circle” of the (Yuan Jen) individuals (i.e., layer 3 of the Psychosocial Homeostasis model: “intimate social relations and culture” is not distinguished from the second layer of the Psychosocial Homeostasis model (i.e., “Operative Society and Culture”), or the second layer is included in the third layer. This implies that Japanese groups are different from those who are not in the same category because of their social relations and culture. This means that the Japanese group and those who are not related to each other due to some chance of living together (members of Iemoto, colleagues in modern social workplaces, etc.) constitute an important element of the third layer and that the two are not only convertible, but sometimes the latter is even more important than the former. In other words, the individual brings the emotional relations in the family to the layer of “Operative Society and Culture” and concludes them in a proposed relative relationship. Second, the second layer of the karmic PHS model is also not strictly distinguished from the first layer (indicated by a dashed line in the schema). This suggests that the emotional configuration of the karmic person is also more likely to bet on this layer. The first layer includes state affairs as well as state-level people (e.g., the emperor) and cultural norms (e.g., ideologies such as nationalism). Affective betting on this layer means that individuals are more likely to devote themselves to the state as well as to national-level ideologies and the like as something absolute or sacred. This process is not usually active, however.

258

14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

Fig. 2 PSH model of the Lun Jen (Japanes human constant)

Third, there is no strict distinction between the two innermost levels of both models (“subconscious” and “preconscious”) (indicated by dashed lines). This indicates that this innermost layer is less important for both the karmic and the lunatic, since both tend to have an emotional configuration that is oriented toward human interaction, without the need to mobilize the subconscious layer or to go to the transcendental world in search of spiritual support, or to gain a sense of the reality of individual existence through insight into what lies behind the soul.

3 Ethnicity and Japanese Diplomacy The geographical environment of a country forms the basis for the specific lifestyles, customs and values of its citizens and in turn influences their personalities and behaviors, which naturally affect their perception of the outside world and their interactions with other countries.

3 Ethnicity and Japanese Diplomacy

259

There are many generalizations about Japan’s natural environment and Japanese nationality, but I believe that the following generalizations will help us understand the pattern of Japan’s foreign interactions. These generalizations include the beautiful, soft island geography and the feminine character of the Japanese people who love grass and nature; the climatic conditions of volcanic eruptions, typhoons, and floods that change dramatically in spring, summer, fall, and winter and the fickle and unsustainable character of the Japanese people; the unique historical experience of lack of interaction with different countries due to the relative isolation of the island; and the Japanese people’s perception of “self” and “other” countries, often due to fear of being in a lower position. The unique historical experience of the lack of interaction with different countries due to the relative isolation of the island and the fear of being in a lower position in the perception of “self” and “other” countries. Japan’s natural environment is not, in general, of the harsh type that requires male power to conquer to survive. With the natural barrier of the ocean, Japan has never historically been subjected to foreign invasion and domination and thus has not experienced resistance to foreign aggression. There were fights within the island, but they did not seem to go beyond fraternal bickering. This is very different from the situation in Western Europe or China, which have constantly fought against foreign nations and experienced foreign domination. This feature of Japanese nature and history may be an important reason for the long matriarchal society of ancient Japan and the feminine character of Japanese culture. We know that the highest deity traditionally worshipped in Japan was Amaterasu okami of Ise Jingu, a goddess who represented the earth, was extremely inclusive, and produced great goodness for the world. In connection with this goddess worship, ancient Japan called its country “Ubunasu”, and the god of fertility was called “Ubunasu” and gave high praise to fertility and reproductive behavior. The belief in goddesses, together with the relatively superior natural conditions and relatively peaceful historical experiences, have influenced the values and character of the Japanese people. The Japanese character is characterized by a high degree of sensibility and emotionality, and such characteristics are often said to be possessed by women. In its dealings with other countries, some scholars have described Japanese diplomacy as “diplomacy with female characteristics” (Yoichi 1999, p. 248). This is reflected in the fact that Japanese diplomacy is often not based on rational judgments but on emotions and therefore often acts irrationally, unconventionally, and incomprehensibly to outsiders. The characteristics of the female state sometimes exhibit a certain intermittent irrational behavior that is unique to women. Some Japanese scholars call this “group hysteria”. “Japanese people usually have a weak sense of nationalism and national consciousness, but once they exceed a certain limit of criticism and insult, or once they feel a real threat to their survival, they will ignore the calculation of rationality and the comparison of power, and a strong sense of nationalism will emerge, and a group hysteria characteristic of a matriarchal state will break out, showing violent resistance beyond the limit and releasing great energy. of energy” (Yoichi 1999, p. 255). This is perhaps the expression of the Japanese character of “quiet passion” and “calmness of battle” as outlined by the Japanese scholar Tetsuro Watsuji. According to the Japanese scholar

260

14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

Yuji Aida, Japanese hysteria has three characteristics: first, they ignore the objective conditions of their surroundings, their own position and their ability to achieve their wishes and demands; second, they become frantic when their demands are not immediately met; and third, they expect to obtain results without hard preparations. People with this type of constitution are often capricious and have a sense of inferiority (Yoichi 1999, pp. 249–250). The “Shenyang Consulate Incident” in 2002 illustrates this feature. This incident was reported in detail in the media and will not be repeated here. The Chinese were surprised: First, why did Japan react so aggressively to this diplomatic incident? After the incident, from the Prime Minister to the Foreign Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Vice-Minister and the Chairman of the Senate, they unanimously accused the Chinese military police of “intrusion” and demanded an apology from the Chinese side. Japanese television stations repeatedly broadcast video clips of the interception of women by the military police, and the media were full of voices “protesting against China’s infringement of sovereignty”, so it can be said that public opinion was in a “mass hysteria”. Second, why did the Japanese jump to a conclusion without investigating the truth of the incident? On May 9, Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yukio Takeuchi met with Chinese Ambassador Wu Dawei and accused the Chinese side of violating the Vienna Convention by forcibly taking the consulate officials away without heeding their request to investigate the intruders. On May 10, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi summoned Chinese Ambassador Wu Dawei and demanded that China apologize for the incident and return the five intruders to Japan, warning that the incident would damage bilateral relations between Japan and China; on May 11, the Japanese side announced that it would send a vice minister of foreign affairs to Beijing to “ask for people” and continue to demand an apology from China. The official results of the Japanese investigation were announced on the afternoon of May 13. This can be said to be an irrational reaction against the norm. In fact, if we look at the history of Japanese diplomacy, we can see many similar manifestations of “group hysteria”. For example, in Meiji 24, when the Russian Crown Prince came to Japan with a fleet of ships, the Japanese thought that the Russians had come to scout the terrain of Japan for invasion. This incident shocked all of Japan. The Japanese thought that Russia was going to retaliate and that Japan was going to be finished. The head of the government hurried to Kyoto to visit the assassinated man and sincerely thank him, and telegrams of condolence came one after another from various associations, schools, and companies. A 27-year-old woman named Isako Kitabatake, who was not related to Sanzo Tsuda, rushed to Kyoto on hearing about the incident, committed suicide in front of the city hall and left a note of thanks to Russia. Acknowledgment became a popular phenomenon at that time. The headquarters of each Buddhist sect (Honzun) held the “Great Prayer of Goheyu” and made it a rule that no child born in the future should be named Sanzo.

3 Ethnicity and Japanese Diplomacy

261

We can also give other similar examples.6 In the Second World War, the “Special Attack”, the “Kamikaze”, the “100 million deaths” and “10 deaths and zero lives”, the campaign against the Vietnam War in the 1960s, and the “Security Struggle” were all characterized by Japanese “group hysteria”. In its dealings with the outside world, Japan sometimes also exhibits an extended familyism characteristic of matrilineal societies, i.e., Japan shows a tendency to deal with certain events in such a way that the whole of Japan is an extended family and the actions of one person are connected to the whole family. For example, in 1973, three young Japanese radicals attacked the Dravid Airport in Israel, killing 25 people. Immediately after the incident, the Japanese government gave $1 million to the Israeli government. However, many people, including Israel, thought that Japan’s move was a cunning act to buy good with money because normally a country is not responsible for the personal actions of its nationals abroad, especially when the perpetrators are fugitives wanted by the government, so it was thought that Japan must have some purpose for giving so much money. This reaction from the outside world came as a big surprise to the Japanese. It is true that Japan was sincere in paying the money, and the foreign minister at that time was Takeo Fukuda, who was always known to be unemotional, and he was greatly emotional in announcing the decision. Not only the government but also most of the people were upset by this. This behavior was based on the principle that the nation is a family and the citizens are children. According to this principle, the hijacking was committed by Japanese youths, and their actions damaged the reputation of Japan, just as the parents apologize to the victim for the bad deeds done by the unruly children of a family, and the country should pay compensation. From the same principle, Japan certainly cannot understand the outside criticism of the government’s act of paying for compensation. “Japanese, who are centered on the extended familyist thinking characteristic of female society, cannot calmly recognize the heterogeneity between themselves and the other when interpreting the actions of other nationals, and are prone to impose their own values and feelings on each other” (Yoichi 1999, p. 249). A similar example can be found in the fact that in October 1972, wanted Japanese Red Army elements hijacked a domestic flight to Korea, and in the three days following the incident, the whole of Japan could be said to have been deeply involved in the events, with people standing motionless in front of their television sets watching the developments. This emergency stimulated Japan’s instincts as a matriarchal family nation (Gregory 1983, p. 193).

6

At the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan signed a peace treaty with Russia. Many people in Japan were strongly dissatisfied with the fact that the Russian side did not pay war reparations to Japan in the peace treaty. The actual situation in Japan at that time was that Japan had won the war but had lost its vitality and was unable to continue fighting. The public did not understand this, and almost all the newspapers at that time were fanning the flames and advocating for another war. In this atmosphere, on September 5, 1905, more than 30,000 people gathered in Hibiya Park in Tokyo to demand the abolition of the peace treaty and the continuation of the war. The rally turned violent and burned down 2 police stations, 219 police stations, 13 churches, and 53 private houses. The nation was plunged into anarchy and the government had to issue martial law.

262

14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

Had the island nation also been surrounded by countries of similar size and civilization (e.g., between Britain and Germany and France), the situation might have been different. However, Japan was not only an island nation but also, for much of the premodern period, on the periphery of the civilizational center of East Asia as a member of an international political circle centered on China. This unique position brought two characteristics to Japan’s interactions with the outside world: first, interactions were limited to a few countries (mainly China and Korea). Second, instead of recognizing and evaluating each other as a heterogeneous culture and interacting with each other as equals, it treats the other as a homogeneous being in a higher or lower position that can change its mutual position through learning. Historically, it has been observing and understanding China as a model for imitation, or understanding China to gain recognition from China, or to take in Chinese culture, while treating Korea as an equal. History and geography have provided Japan with too short a time to deal with many countries on an equal footing and with a normal mind. This unique historical experience has caused confusion in Japan’s perception of “self” and “other”, and it is easy to go to extremes, to glorify and idealize the objects of knowledge and to despise them when they are destroyed. Japan is sensitive to its place in the international order and often has difficulties in positioning itself. For example, in ancient times, Japan revered China and positioned itself with reference to China, but this reverence was actually glorified and idealized. When the ideal image of China in modern Japan was shattered, Japan positioned itself with reference to Western countries and took the path of “leaving Asia and entering Europe”, despising and invading China. This change has transformed Japan from a marginal position in the Chinese system to a marginal position in the Western European system. In recent years, under the new situation that Japan’s economy continues to be in the doldrums and China and other Asian countries are developing rapidly, Japan has put forward the slogan of returning to Asia. However, the actual situation is that Japan is neither fully “into Europe” nor fully “back to Asia”, and it has been in a marginal position. It is natural for Japan to be isolated for fear of being left behind and abandoned. Now Japan can be said to fear both being abandoned by the West and becoming an “Asian orphan”. Of course, any country or nation will at some time position itself and change its status by referring to “other countries” or “other peoples”, but it is rare that a country such as Japan is so sensitive to its position and has so much “positioning”. However, it is rare to find a country that is so sensitive to its position and has so much “positioning confusion” as Japan. In terms of national psychology, this is a manifestation of Japan’s confusion over its “self-perception”. Accompanying this positioning confusion is a strong sense of insecurity and victimization. Japan fears not only that it is lagging behind, that it is being left behind but also that it is being victimized. The Japanese have a tendency to portray themselves as weak and victimized. There is a sense of victimization that exists deep in the Japanese psyche and sometimes manifests itself in foreign interactions, and much of Japan’s foreign policy can be said to be based on this perception of fear of victimization. For example, Japan tends to emphasize its own “defenselessness”, its own victimhood or the assumption that it will be victimized, both with strong countries (such as the United States today) and with weak countries (such as China,

3 Ethnicity and Japanese Diplomacy

263

Korea, and North Korea in recent times). For example, whether in the Japanese media or in conversations with Japanese people, we often hear them complain about how the U.S. is suppressing Japan and pushing Japan to give in, and how Japan is holding back in front of the U.S. and at advantage of the situation. Of course, such complaints cannot all be said to be nonsense, but the image of the poor victim that the Japanese portray themselves as is usually exaggerated. Similarly, they often exaggerate their complaints about China, saying how cunning and scheming China is and how they have suffered in their dealings with China. It should be noted that the “China threat theory” that has emerged in Japan in recent years is also based on the hypothesis that Japan will suffer if China becomes strong. The same attitude is also expressed in the view of South Korea and North Korea.7 In terms of national psychology, this fear is based on a sense of victimization linked to a sense of insecurity. Japanese psychologist Keigo Kojiki points out, “Because the Japanese psyche is so schematic, it always justifies its aggression by seeing its attackers as a powerful and cunning presence and itself as a weak victim. The Japanese always have to set a boundary of their own endurance, even though they do not yet know whether they are weak or not. A typical example in this regard is what Japan did in the Pacific War. This war was the release of the hatred that had accumulated over the years amidst the cries of ‘devilish Britain and America’ and later came events such as the attack on Pearl Harbor. That is, when threatened or attacked by others, the Japanese immediately considered it unjustified and then painted a picture of themselves as weak, defenseless victims, and accordingly demanded some Japanese of explicit compensation from the attackers, or deep gratitude, or in serious cases, payment. This sense of victimhood among the Japanese is also frequently seen in business activities at home and abroad” (Robert 1988, p. 32). On the issue of “historical awareness” that affects relations with Asian countries, Japan has also always emphasized that it was a victim of the war without recognizing the fact that it was a perpetrator in the first place. Japan’s aggression against Asian countries in the Second World War seems to be related in some sense to the national psychological background that “it is better to inflict harm first than to be harmed later”.

7

On August 31, 1998, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea launched a missile and Japan reacted with allergy. At one time, “Can Japan still guarantee safety?” and “What will Japan do if it cannot guarantee safety?” and other questions flooded the media. Japan also published a large number of special magazines with titles such as “What if we fought against North Korea”. According to a July 12, 1999 news release by Kyodo News, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force began a topsecret study on the use of fighter jets to attack North Korea’s missile launch bases after North Korea launched the Nodong missile in 1993. The study targeted the North Korean missile launch site in Nodong, located on the east coast of the Sea of Japan, where the DPRK launched the “Labor” missile. In contrast to Japan’s overreaction, South Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung rejected a U.S. proposal to bomb North Korea.

264

14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

4 “Peace”, “Harmony”, “Nemawasi”, and Japanese Diplomacy Interactions between states are fundamental to international relations, and in general, states can only play a role and influence international affairs through elite figures representing national interests that are nurtured by their internal structures. The figures who are active on the international stage grow up in a specific cultural atmosphere, and they are called outstanding figures of a country obviously because their speech, behavior and even psychology are in line with the national spirit of the country, i.e., they embody the cultural patterns that characterize the nation. In this sense, it is not inappropriate to consider a country’s diplomatic model as a projection and extension of its human relations model. Historically, Japanese people have lived in communal village societies for a long time, and they are very concerned about how they are perceived by others, and they behave in an “other-oriented” manner. Japanese society places more emphasis on group harmony than on individual prominence, and “harmony” and “unanimity” are given a high priority. Japanese-style groups generally place more emphasis on “consensus” (prior consultation to achieve unanimity) and “Nemawasi” (consultation with all parties involved) when making decisions, and this approach allows the group to show greater consistency, but this usually comes at the cost of longer time and greater effort and greater effort, and the Japanese also exhibit greater ambiguity in language and behavior. Naturally, this characteristic is also reflected in Japan’s diplomacy. Compared with the diplomacy of the United States, China, Russia and other countries, Japan’s diplomacy is more concerned with the question of “how other countries evaluate Japan” and shows a greater degree of ambiguity. The so-called ambiguity is, of course, a qualitative description and refers mainly to the following tendencies of Japan’s diplomatic approach, which are derived from empirical observation. • Japan has a long history of vacillating attitudes on major international issues, generally not expressing clearly what it supports or opposes, and always adopting an evasive attitude, either intentionally or unintentionally. Although Japan has generally followed the United States in diplomacy for a long time, its attitude has been mostly uncertain. Many examples can be cited in this regard. For example, the attitude toward the Gulf War and the bombing of Kosovo by the U.S.-led NATO forces in 1999 were ambiguous.8 8

A report in the Asahi Shimbun (page 13) on June 16, 1999, titled “Japan cowered as Russia boasted of its contribution to Kosovo issue,” illustrates the clear difference between Japan’s attitude on this issue and Russia’s. During his visit to Japan, the head of Russia’s lower house defense committee, Vladimir Pukhbich, said, “Without Russia, the UN Security Council would not have been able to reach a resolution”. Japanese Congressman Takashi Kosugi said, “The Japanese government only understands the circumstances of the air strikes, but does not support them”. Hiroki Nakama, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, said, “We are also worried that the UN is not playing its full role”.

4 “Peace”, “Harmony”, “Nemawasi”, and Japanese Diplomacy

265

• on specific diplomatic occasions, Japanese diplomats are often silent or vague, giving the impression of ambiguity. Ambiguity is sometimes an attempt to avoid the substance of the issue, not wanting to assume or reduce responsibility, as exemplified by the well-known statement by Kakuei Tanaka during the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration that Japan’s invasion of China was “a problem” for China.9 Sometimes, ambiguity is the fear of offending the other side, trying not to say things too bluntly, not to seem so aggressive.10 • Japan usually takes a long time to make an important decision. Senior Japanese government officials and even the Prime Minister are constrained by various aspects and often find it difficult to make a decision, thus giving the impression that they are hesitant and not decisive enough. There are also many examples of this. In mid-August, the U.S. government made a four-point request to the Japanese Ministry of the Sea regime: (1) to provide financial assistance to the multinational force; (2) to provide assistance to the Gulf States; (3) to increase funding for U.S. forces in Japan; and (4) to support the contribution of multinational forces in terms of personnel. The Japanese government responded positively to the first and second points. The initial decision on economic assistance to the Gulf States was $10 million, and on funding for the multinational force, initially proposed at $1 billion, the U.S. argued for at least $3 billion before a decision was made in mid-September for a total of $4 billion in economic assistance. After repeated requests from the U.S., Japan finally came up with more than $10 billion but was still criticized by the U.S. as “too little, too late”. • Passive diplomacy (Yoichi 1999, pp. 248–250). Japan’s diplomatic behavior is mostly in response to foreign demands and criticism, and diplomats seem to be mainly dealing with pressure from all sides. In its dealings with the United States, for example, Japan often acts passively, making concessions and compromises under U.S. pressure. In Sino-Japanese relations, Japan also seldom puts forward any positive ideas on issues such as the development of Sino-Japanese relations; it is more often the case that the Chinese side puts forward ideas and proposals and the Japanese side does something to supplement them. For example, the heads of the world’s major advanced countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and eight other countries) have met once a year since 1975, and 9

Tanaka Kakuei used the word “confusion” to describe his reflection on the war at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan (Zhang 1998, pp. 37–38). The Japanese word “confusion” means “the idea that what one has done has caused trouble or discomfort to the other party or to those around one” (Kaneda Kyosuke et al.). It is not that there is no word for “crime” in Japanese, but Tanaka is clearly trying to use ambiguity to avoid the essence of the problem. 10 In the early 1970s, when the U.S. and Japan had friction over fiber, U.S. President Richard Nixon criticized then Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who replied at the time that he would “deal with it in a good manner”. The U.S. side considered this answer as a promise, but Japan did not deal with the matter later. The U.S. side was angry and accused Japan of not keeping its promise, but Japan denied making the promise. After investigation, the problem arose from the Japanese word for “good deal”. The word is not a promise to deal with an issue in Japanese, nor is it even a word with a clear meaning; it is roughly equivalent to what some of our officials call “research”.

266

14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

although Japan has been one of its members since the first meeting, Japanese leaders have not put forward any positive ideas at the meetings. • Diplomacy is less clear on strategic goals and the means to achieve them. Policy formulation and implementation are unclear and less broad in vision. “The diplomacy of today’s heads of state is breaking down the boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs, placing domestic politics in the larger context of international politics, and actively engaging in foreign relations to promote national interests. In contrast, in Japan, only those who are well versed in the struggles and personnel arrangements within political parties are likely to become leaders. As a result, there is internal conflict, and of course, vision is affected” (Hui 1995, pp. 23–37). • Japanese leaders and diplomats appear to be incompetent in expressing and implementing foreign policy in concrete terms. Sometimes they even show undue “restraint”. For example, Japanese government officials often make “slips of the tongue” or “gaffes” on diplomatic occasions or on certain diplomatic issues11 and are criticized by other countries. Of course, the ambiguous impression of Japanese diplomacy is related to the special position of Japan in the international community. Japan is both an Eastern and a Western country, culturally belonging to the East and institutionally belonging to the West. This special position between the East and the West makes it often want to please the West and not to offend the East in its foreign relations. In addition, its status as a major economic, scientific and technological power and a politically defeated country is also the reason for its diplomatic ambiguity. However, from a cultural point of view, this characteristic in the diplomatic pattern is closely related to the abovementioned characteristics of the composition of the Japanese people group and the characteristics of interpersonal relations.

5 Amae, Okami, and Japanese Diplomacy The word “Amae” is a unique Japanese word, and its general meaning refers to a special dependency feeling or behavior similar to a child’s pampering of his mother. According to Japanese scholar Kenro Doi, “Amae” is the most prominent feature of Japanese cultural psychology. This mentality is commonly reflected in all aspects of Japanese interpersonal relationships, such as the dependence of children on their mothers at home, the dependence of subordinates on their superiors in companies, and the dependence of students on their teachers and junior students on senior students 11

There are many examples of Japanese senior officials being criticized both inside and outside of Japan for their gaffes, such as when Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Masayuki Fujio said in 1986 about the invasion of Korea, “Korea also has some responsibility and there are things that should be considered”. This statement was immediately protested by the Korean government. In the same year, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said that Japan was a mono-ethnic society and discriminated against blacks, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans. In 2000, at a party in Johannesburg, Yoshiro Mori referred to China as “Sina”.

5 Amae, Okami, and Japanese Diplomacy

267

in schools (Kenro 1983; and Huipeng 1998, pp. 324–338). In connection with this concept, there is also the unique concept of okami in Japanese. okami has two meanings, one is “above”, “above”, which is written in Chinese as “上”. “The word okami is usually used to refer to the emperor, the court, the government, or the government office. okami in this sense is also sometimes written as “female general” (referring to the female owner of a hotel)”. okami means “the person who has the power to decide things”, and “the person who can safely make decisions for himself or herself”. “The person who makes the final decision is the one who decides the policy”. Japanese people would say things like, “This is an order from okami” or “I wish I could ask okami”. The second meaning is to refer to a supernatural or supernatural-related being such as a god, and in this sense, okami is often referred to as “okami”. In ancient times, okami referred to Amaterasu okami, the god of Shintoism (the ancestor of the Japanese imagination). In this sense, okami also refers to the emperor because in the traditional Japanese religious thought of the “divine and human lineage”, Amaterasu Okami and the emperor can be considered the same thing, or, in other words, the latter is a representative of the former. In either sense, okami is a being who is above oneself and has extraordinary power to protect and benefit oneself, and one can trust and rely on okami, and one’s relationship with okami is one of dependence. This relationship is expressed in the relationship between the nation and the government and has an impact on the way Japan’s internal and external policies are decided. The national government is the “okami”, and there is a greater relationship of trust between the government and the people. “The final decision is made by the “okami”, and the okami takes care of everything, and we can rely on it without worrying about it”. This sense of the people and the associated relationship of trust with the ruler may be one of the major reasons for the great continuity of the regime in Japan’s history, which is clearly different from other East Asian countries such as China.12 The Japanese people today still have an okami-like relationship of trust in the government. This trust usually leads people to have high expectations of the government. However, at the same time, when the government’s behavior falls short of people’s expectations, people easily shift in the opposite direction, i.e., they complain about okami’s behavior, become extremely disappointed with the government, and hope for a new government team. This explains such an incredible phenomenon in Japanese politics: the change of government in Japan is probably the most diligent among developed countries, and the prime ministers of Japan change like literally a walking light, but each regime does not deny the work of the previous government, and all claim to be doing things on the basis of the previous government. When the Great Hanshin Earthquake occurred in January 1995, the Japanese media quickly reported on it. The amount of coverage, the details of the disaster, and 12

It should be noted that this mentality is similar to the traditional Chinese mentality of “sage government”, but unlike Japan, the Chinese believe that it is the responsibility of the people to overthrow the government when it fails to perform its duties well. That is why Chinese history has been marked by the overthrow of regimes and the change of dynasties, and each new regime has tried to belittle the previous one by stating that it has no connection with the previous one in time or content.

268

14 The Human Constant of the Japanese People and Japanese Diplomacy

the calmness of the media attitude reached an unparalleled level. What is incredible, however, is how little coverage there was of the relief activities. The media used modern means such as helicopters to broadcast the disaster, but one wonders why these advanced tools were not used to save lives. Is it more important to report on the disaster than to save lives? In the aftermath of the incident, it seems that the most discussed issues in the Japanese media were not about citizens organizing their own relief efforts but rather about the government’s inability to take measures and the poor system of communicating government orders. Behind this behavior, there may be a sense that disaster relief and rescue are the business of the okami (government) and that citizens only have to wait for instructions. When the government, the okami that can be relied on, does not do its duty, it turns into a great dissatisfaction with the okami. This was also the attitude of the nation toward the government’s foreign policy. For example, in the summer of 1998, the safety of Japanese in Indonesia became an issue as riots spread in the country. A debate arose over whether to send SDF planes to rescue Japanese people in Indonesia. Some thought it was necessary to be “cautious”. Once a decision was made to dispatch planes, there was immediate criticism that it was too late. The reason for this drastic change was that the people understood that it was an okami decision, and the faction that opposed the dispatch withdrew their arguments (Yoichi 1999, p. 114). The attitude of the public toward the government before and after the Shenyang consulate incident also illustrates the problem. When the Chinese side announced the truth about the incident at the Japanese Consulate General in Shenyang later, Japanese public opinion was in an uproar, accusing the government of not doing its job as an okami. In a survey on the credibility of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s investigation report on the Shenyang consulate incident, 55% of the respondents said they “basically did not believe it”, and another 20% said they “did not believe it at all”. The other 20% said they did not believe it at all. In other words, more than 70% of Japanese people do not believe the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ survey report.13 This is in contrast to the one-sided attitude of people before the release of the survey report. This dependable okami may manifest itself in foreign dealings as dependence on a powerful foreign power. This may be explained by the fact that alliances with the most powerful country to achieve strategic purposes have been an important feature of Japanese diplomacy in recent times. For example, the alliance with Britain, the most powerful country in the world at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the alliance with Germany, the most powerful country at the time of the Second World War, and the alliance with the United States, the world’s top power, became Japan’s okami after the war (Hideyoshi 1999, pp. 109–126). The serious imbalance in the diplomatic balance of Japan’s relations with the United States and with Asia is also a reflection of this characteristic. Japan’s obedience to the United States has almost reached the point of “obedience”. As U.S. official Michel Blaker put it, Japanese diplomats give more priority to not upsetting the U.S. and not being internationally isolated in their 13

Asahi Shimbun, May 20, 2002.

References

269

diplomacy than to pursuing diplomatic results, and all efforts are focused on gaining “imperial payment” from the U.S.14 … For Japan, the U.S. played the role of okami, and although Japan was dissatisfied with the U.S. and had some tendency to demand independence, this was a dissatisfaction with okami, and the independence demanded was an independence that was not separated from okami “protection”. This tendency to obey the powerful is somehow related to the Japanese way of behavior that relies on “pro-division” or okami. Therefore, from a cultural point of view, simply blaming Japan for its dependence on the United States does not solve the problem, and it may be necessary to consider the question of who Japan would depend on if it did not depend on the United States.

References Chie, Nakane. 1967. The Relationship between People in Tate-Society (Tate Syakai no Ningen Kankei (The Relationship between People in Tate-Society) Kodansha. Chikushi, Tetsuya. 1985. The World’s View of the Japanese (Sekai no Nihonjinkan) Jiyokokuminsha. Eshun, Hamaguchi. 1998. Nihonkenkyu Genron (The Original Theory of Japanese Studies: Japanese People and Japanese Society in the “Relational Body). Ariake. Eshun, Hamaguchi, and Sunpei Kumon (eds.).1982. Nhonsiki no Syudangsyugi (Japanese-Style Syndicalism), 22. Ariake. Gregory, Clark. 1983. The Japanese: The Source of Unikosha, Masami Muramatsu. Hideyoshi, Takemasa. 1999. Japan’s “ okami” and the Nation”. In Japan’s Foreign Policy Decision Factors, ed. Society for the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Factors, PHP Institute, 109–126. Hirosi, Minami. 1983. Nhon no jiga (Japan’s Self). Iwami New Book. Hsu, F.L.K. 2002. Clan, Caste and Club, Chinese version, Xü Langguang Zhuzuoji (The Collected Works of Hsu, F.L.K.), vol. V, Tai Bei, Nantian Shuji. Huipeng, Shang. 1997. An analysis of Chie Nakane’s theory of Tate—Society. Riben Yanjiu (Japanese Studies) 3. Huipeng, Shang. 1998. (Chinese and Japanese: A Comparative Study of Social Groups, Behavior and Cultural Psychology (Zhongguoren yu Ribenren). Peking University Press. Kenro, Doi. 1983. Amae no Kozo (The Construction of Amae) Hirofundo, second edition, 1981. Kinya, Abe. 1995. Segen wa Nanika? (The World and What It Is?). Kodansha. Reischauer, Edwin O. 1980. The Japanese, Chinese edition, Shanghai Translation Press. Robert, M. 1988. Methods of Interaction with Japanese People. Japanese edition, Translated by Tomoko Kawaguchi. PHP Institute. Tang, Hui. 1995. A trial of Japan’s summit diplomacy. Japanese Studies (Riben xue), 5th series, Peking University Press. The Society for the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Factors (ed.). 1993. Key Causes of Japan’s Foreign Policy Decisions, 1999. Yoichi, Hirama. 1999. The influence of nationalities on Japanese diplomacy. In The Determinants of Japan’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Nihon Gaik¯o Seisaku no Kettei Y¯oin). PHP Research Institute. Zhang, Xiangshan. 1998. A review of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic talks. Journal of Japanese Studies 1. 14

In the past, a Japanese general or daimyo gave his retainer a text message with a seal or signature, usually containing instructions, orders or permission, or approval from his superior (Chikushi 1985).

Chapter 15

Japan’s Iemoto-State and Iemoto System: Formation and Operation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere

Mainstream international relations theories originating from the United States, such as neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism, are all systems theories based on the presupposition of anarchy. Waltz (1979) argued that the fundamental difference between domestic and international politics is that domestic political systems are centralized and hierarchical, while international political systems involve relations between equal actors, with no country having the authority to issue commands. Therefore, he considered the international political system as a structure of anarchy, viewing states as “like unit” actors. He assumed that, in the pursuit of selfpreservation, states would have similar reactions under an anarchic system, thus abstracting states’ values and cultures to become sameness units of the system and explaining the impact of changes in the international system on the actors. Keohane and Nye argued that although the international system is anarchic, international mechanisms can promote cooperation between countries, emphasizing the role of international mechanisms and developing the theory of neoliberalism (Keohane 2005; Keohane and Nye 1973). The constructivist school, represented by A. Wendt, made modifications to the structure of the system. Wendt (1999) argued that the international system has different cultures, and agents’ perceptions of the anarchic international system change based on their interactions with other countries, forming Hobbesian culture in the role of enemy, Lockean culture in the role of rival, and Kantian culture in the role of friend. His structural analysis is different from Waltz’s international system-level analysis, focusing on the microlevel structure of the unit/agent interaction level. With interactions between agents or processes, different cultures emerge within the international system. However, regardless of whether the analysis is conducted at the macro- or microlevel, international relations theorists argue that the fundamental difference between international and domestic politics is the state The chapter by Yu Kuo Lung. The author of this book participated in the design and discussion during the writing of the thesis article. The paper, which is part of the study of international relations from a psycho-culturological perspective, has been slightly adjusted for inclusion in this book with the author’s permission. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_15

271

272

15 Japan’s Iemoto-State and Iemoto System: Formation and Operation …

of anarchy, making theories developed under this presupposition unable to explain international systems with authoritative government organizations. Domestic political systems can be differentiated into monarchies, oligarchies, and democracies (Heslop 2022), and international political systems may also have structures beyond anarchy. Modern Japan, faced with the expansion of Western nationstates in East Asia, attempted to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the early twentieth century, an international system different from anarchy. Japan is one of the few countries in the world that has been able to respond positively to Western expansion, learning from Western political systems and changing its shogunate system to a so-called constitutional monarchy (Dower 1999). However, it did not seek survival and self-preservation or view the international system as a certain culture, as described by international relations theorists. Instead, Japan believed that anarchy led to global instability and tried to establish a completely new international order (Benedict 2005). Therefore, as an actor in the system, what are Japan’s unique attributes? What are the structural features of the international system it has created? Why, under an anarchic system, would different international systems emerge? This article intends to explore these questions, providing a point of knowledge growth for the study of international systems.

1 The Unit of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: Iemoto-State What is the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? Japan has its own cultural characteristics. Since the twelfth century, Japan has been ruled by shoguns controlling the power of the state, with the emperor serving only as a symbolic figurehead. The distribution of power is similar to that of Western constitutional monarchies, but because it is controlled by the shogun, it is referred to as the shogunate system by scholars (Dower 1999). The arrival of American “black ships” in 1854 prompted Japan to undergo political reforms (Jansen 2002). Japan adopted a constitutional system modeled after Western countries, enacting the Constitution of the Empire of Japan and transferring real power to the emperor, initiating Japan’s modernization process. Japan also began to expand outward, successively incorporating the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and other territories (James 1951), attacking Korea and Manchuria, occupying large areas of northern China, proposing ideas such as “Greater Asianism” and “Greater East Asian Construction”, and attempting to compete with the Western international system (Yellen 2019). In 1940, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Y¯osuke proposed the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in his “Imperial Way Diplomacy Declaration”: “Although I advocate announcing the Imperial Way to the world as the mission of the Imperial Country, from the perspective of international relations, the Imperial Way should bring benefits to the people and nations of all countries. That is, as

1 The Unit of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: Iemoto-State

273

the embodiment of the spirit of the Imperial Way in our current foreign policy, we must first strive to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of Japan, Manchuria, and China, and contribute to the establishment of a just world peace by promulgating the Imperial Way” (Gaimu Mondai Kenky¯ukai et al. 1941). In the same year, at the “Ogawa Conference”, Japan established the scope of influence for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: “Based on Japan, Manchuria, and China, former German territories administered by Japan, French Indochina, French Pacific islands, Thailand, British Malaya, British Borneo, Dutch East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, and India” (Hashikawa et al. 1976). Before Japan’s surrender in 1945 following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it had effectively controlled parts of China, the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, British Malaya, Burma, the Bismarck Archipelago, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Siberia, and Timor (Zhang 2000). On November 5, 1943, Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo held the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo. Representatives of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere attended the conference, including Prime Minister of Manchukuo Zhang Jinghui, President and Premier of the Republic of China Wang Jingwei, Thai Prince Wan Waithayakon, President of the Philippine Free State José P. Laurel, Burmese Prime Minister Ba Maw, and Chief Representative of the Provisional Government of Free India Subhas Chandra Bose (Levine 1995). This represented recognition of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by several Asian countries (Abel and Abel 2015), and they were willing to participate in the international system led by Japan. Unit Attributes of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. According to the Japanese Emperor’s edict, the basic idea of constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere originates from the founding spirit of “Hakk¯o ichiu” (八紘一宇, eight crown cords, one roof). The grand spirit of “Hakk¯o ichiu” is the keynote of the Great East Asia construction, and it is also the foundation of our country’s world policy. In summary, the grand spirit of “Hakk¯o ichiu” is the idea that the whole world is just like one family. The foundation of the grand community in Japan is dozoku (同族) and has maintained the national tradition for three thousand years… Its essence is to connect the blood relationships, love, and affection between parents and sons, brothers and couples, and at the same time to link between peoples… so that each nation finds its proper place in the hierarchy. This grand spirit of uniting the “Hakk¯o ichiu” must be grasped by the Japanese people. When constructing a new world order, teach it to other nations… (Kikakuiinkai Kenky¯ukai 1943, pp. 14–19). This Japanese term is at the core of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and fundamentally differs from the anarchic discussed by international relations theorists. Literally, it aims to turn all the world’s nations into a Japanese-style family, teaching them the Japanese way of establishing political communities and allowing them to form Japanese-style political communities. Therefore, what is a Japanese-style political community? The “Essence of the National Polity”, published by the Japanese Ministry of Education in 1937, states: “The Empire of Japan is a nation under the eternal rule of the Emperor, whose line is unbroken for ages eternal … As a grand dozoku state, all subjects are loyal to the Emperor by decree. This is the essence of our political system” (Monbush¯o 1937).

274

15 Japan’s Iemoto-State and Iemoto System: Formation and Operation …

The core of the Japanese-style political community is the so-called a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal (萬世一系). The Japanese people are descendants of the sun goddess Amaterasu and must accept the rule of the Emperor (Gluck 1985). Before the Meiji Restoration, although the Japanese people had Shinto beliefs, after the Meiji Restoration, Shintoism became the official ideology and was combined with politics to form “State Shinto” (Hardacre 2017). From the perspective of the national element of the population, many scholars mistakenly believe that Japan is a nation-state or even a typical monoethnic state because it is mainly composed of the Yamato people. Undeniably, the Empire of Japan is indeed composed of the Yamato people who use the Japanese language and have common bloodlines and beliefs in Shinto. However, from the perspective of territory, nation-states emphasize the coincidence of national territory and ethnic boundaries (Gellner 2008). The political ideal of the Yamato people, on the other hand, is to break the boundaries between national territories and ethnicities, turning all peoples of the world into a dozoku. This is entirely different from the idea of national self-determination, which asserts that a nation has the right to determine its political status (Smith 1991). Furthermore, looking at the element of sovereignty, the sovereignty of the Japanese Empire does not come from a social contract granted by the people, from a divine right (Oakley 2010), or from the formation of a national or ethnic community consciousness or identity (Anderson 2016). Instead, it is directly ruled by the gods. Therefore, Japan’s national leaders are both representatives of the gods in the human world and the heads of the Japanese family. Japan’s sovereignty includes not only political rule but also divine authority and dozoku management rights. The social and political foundation of the Japanese Empire is very different from that of nation-states as a type of political community. The Japanese Empire is a political, religious, and familial community in which the Japanese people’s loyalty to the Emperor is not only national loyalty but also religious faith and, of course, familial sentiment. Based on Japan’s social and political organization, the author refers to this type of community as the Iemoto-state and the feelings of the Japanese people as Iemoto-lism to distinguish it from nation-states and nationalism. The Purpose of Japan’s Establishment of the International System: Incorporating All Ethnic Groups into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere The purpose of Japan’s establishment of the international system is to incorporate all ethnic groups into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, making them like the Yamato people and generating Iemoto-lism. Thus, the unit of this international political system is the Iemoto state. It becomes a homogenized unit not because it removes the values and culture of the state but because it must internalize the spirit of the “Hakk¯o ichiu” and others.

2 Structure of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere: Iemoto System

275

2 Structure of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere: Iemoto System Hsu (1975) pointed out that Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the world’s planning, is a world system of the Iemoto model (p. 232). The imperial edict mentioned that the dozuku must be understood through the operation of the Iemoto organization. Iemoto refers to an organization of individuals with special skills, responsible for inheriting orthodox skills, managing a school’s affairs, issuing licenses for the school’s skills, and families or households in a prominent position in the traditional arts field. It is a secondary group in Japan’s tradition, and tea ceremonies, flower arrangements, kendo, etc., all belong to an Iemoto organization. According to Hsu’s view, Iemoto organizations are organized by the Kin-tract principle. The Kin-tract principle refers to “a fixed and unalterable hierarchical arrangement voluntarily entered into among a group of human beings who follow a common code of behavior under a common ideology for a set of common objectives” (Hsu 1975, p. 62). “Kin-tract” is a term proposed by Hsu, composed of the first half of “kinship” and the second half of “contract”. The kinship principle is the way Chinese clans are formed, and the contract principle is the most popular way American clubs are formed (Hsu 1963). The Kin-tract principle is partly rooted in kinship organizations because some of its features (such as hierarchy and spontaneity) reflect the characteristics of Japanese kinship groups, but it is also rooted in contracts because individuals have the will to choose whether to join the Iemoto organization. Therefore, Iemoto has the characteristics of both family organizations and contract groups. It has the nature of transcending kinship groups and can accept those with different bloodline qualifications. On the other hand, the qualifications of some of its members (at least those in the highest Iemoto positions) are based on bloodlines, and those without blood relationships are linked together in a way similar to kinship relationships, but its internal master-subordinate relationships, authority, and hierarchical arrangement among members are entirely imitations and reinforcements of the characteristics of Japanese kinship groups (Hsu 1975). Hsu believes that the content of the “Iemoto” system structure, namely the Kintract principle, provides the most important resources for organizational loyalty and organizational power in modern Japanese enterprises. Thus, Japan’s response to the challenges of the West has been so good since the 1860s, and its recovery after the complete defeat of World War II has been so rapid (Hsu 1975, pp. 218–219). In other words, the operation principles of Iemoto not only affect Iemoto organizations but also play a role in various modern Japanese enterprises and other secondary groups, such as political parties, associations, schools, and other groups (Hsu 1975). Based on this assumption, the international system of “Hakko Ichiu” created by the Yamato people of Japan is also influenced by this principle. The organizational principles of the Iemoto organization are then used to structure the Iemoto system. The structural analysis of the international system currently has two approaches: Waltz analyzes the level of the international system, while Wendt analyzes the unit/ agent level, which is the interaction structure of agents and their interactions that

276

15 Japan’s Iemoto-State and Iemoto System: Formation and Operation …

generate causal forces (Wendt 1999, p. 146). Different claims regarding the levels of the international system and interaction levels constitute the ontological basis of the international political system. Wendt (1999) believes that Waltz only focuses on the material factors of the structure, ignoring the ideational factors, pointing out that “states are people too” (p. 215). States are also purposive actors with a sense of self, emphasizing the importance of analyzing the interactions of agents. However, the Iemoto system is a system with authoritative governments, so we must analyze the system-level structure of the Iemoto system to clarify its differences from anarchic systems. Additionally, we need to analyze the unit/agent level, as the changes in the Iemoto system are caused by agents and their interactions. Structuring the Iemoto system through macro- and microlevels can clarify the ordering principles, power distribution, unit functions, and system changes of the Iemoto system. 1. Ordering Principles of the Iemoto system. Waltz’s (1979) international system has a decentralized, anarchic ordering principle (p. 88), but the Iemoto system has three ordering principles. The first principle is centralization, with the emperor having absolute authority, which is the fundamental difference between the two systems. The second principle is that the system’s units are hierarchical, forming an interlinking hierarchy. In Waltz’s anarchic system, the relationship between units is equal and does not require a second ordering principle. The third principle concerns the master-subordinate relationship between the core and noncore actors. In Waltz’s anarchic system, the relationship between units is equal, with no authoritative institutions and no subordinate relationships between units. However, the Iemoto system is a hierarchical organization, necessitating a discussion of power distribution, with the authoritative government as the core actor and the remaining units as noncore actors. 2. The Character of the Units in the Iemoto system. In Waltz’s international system, the system’s units are sameness, with their values and cultures removed, making them “like units” (p. 93). The units within the Iemoto system are also similar, but the values and ideas of the core actors are public goods within the system, such as the Hakko Ichiu and the basic concepts of the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Noncore actors must internalize these values and ideas, becoming homogeneous units, or the aforementioned Iemoto-state, so that various ethnic groups also generate Iemoto-lism and pledge loyalty to the emperor. 3. Defining the Hierarchical Position. The hierarchical positions within the Iemoto system are determined by the order in which they join the system and the degree to which they internalize public goods. Wendt’s (1999) interaction structure defines the roles of agents as enemy, rival, and friend, leading to cultural changes in the system (p. 246). However, within the Iemoto system, the roles are not enemy, rival, and friend but rather “senbai” (せんぱ

2 Structure of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere: Iemoto System

277

Japan

oknawa

koera

Philippines

Guam

Manch uria

taiwan

HongKo ng

Malaya

,

Fig. 1 Hierarchy of the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. Source Made by the author

い) or “kohai” (こうはい)1 of homogeneous units. Actors define their hierarchical positions in interactions based on the degree to which they internalize public goods. The changes in the Iemoto system are not cultural changes; the Iemoto system has only one logic, which is that the emperor has absolute authority, and changes in the system structure refer to changes in the hierarchical arrangement of units. Based on these three steps, the structure of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere can be represented as follows (Fig. 1). In the process of conceptualizing the system architecture, the author emphasizes both holism and individualism in the relationship between the system and structure. This is because the arrangement principle of the family system is centralized, with the emperor having absolute authority, and the units within the system must internalize the public goods within the system to become homogenized family states. In terms of interaction, the author emphasizes both materialism and idealism, advocating the impact of individuals on the change in system structure. This is because the units/actors within the system interact based on the degree of internalization of public goods, defining different hierarchical positions in the process and causing the system to change (Wendt 1999: 29). International relations theorists have different 1

The Japanese words “senbai” and “kohai” describe a relationship prevalent in Japanese society, a hierarchy based on age, experience, or status. “kohai” typically look to the “senbai” for guidance and advice, and the “senbai” has the responsibility to teach and care for the “kohai” this relationship has an important place in Japanese culture and influences daily life and interpersonal interactions.

278

15 Japan’s Iemoto-State and Iemoto System: Formation and Operation …

ontological views on the relationship between the international system and units/ actors, as well as the components of the international structure. At first glance, it may seem that the author is advocating a middle-ground approach because international relations theorists believe that in the contemporary international system, political power is bifurcated in form: it is vertical within the state (a “hierarchical system”) and horizontal between states (an “anarchical system”) (Wendt 1999: 13). However, the author believes that the family system is vertical both within and between states. Different views on the system lead to different ontological perspectives.

3 The Emergence of the Iemoto System: Changes in the Positions of Units Within the System The emergence of the Iemoto system is not a mutation; it follows the logic of the attributes of the system’s units themselves. Waltz borrowed structural analysis from anthropology, emphasizing the importance of structure but neglecting the role of unit attributes, that is, the role of their content (Hsu 1959). Wendt focuses on state interactions, explaining the impact of the process on the structure, but it also neglects the cultural differences emphasized by anthropologists and uses cultural selection as the theoretical basis for the process (Yu 2011). Anthropologists believe that the process consists of the manner in which every social organization operates to maintain itself and/or to undergo change due to external pressure or internal impetus. However, it is content that makes the process exert strong pressure against deviation or allow a good deal of room for deviation. It is content that causes process to be laden with internal impetus to change or to remain without significant urge toward innovation (Hsu 1959). The emergence of the Iemoto system is due to its content, that is, the Kin-tract principle at work. The operation of the Iemoto organization mainly relies on the Kin-tract principle, which plays an important role in the formation of the Iemoto system. As mentioned earlier, part of the Kin-tract principle is rooted in the contractual principle, where individuals have the freedom to choose to join the Iemoto organization. However, unlike the contractual principle, which allows for easy exit from the organization, once a Japanese person joins an Iemoto organization, there is no opportunity to leave because other Iemoto organizations do not like to accept members from other organizations. Thus, the Iemoto organization effectively has a lifelong characteristic. However, this is not a disadvantage for Japanese people because they can continuously improve their hierarchical position with the addition of new members. The problem is that Iemoto organization membership is not as stable as the kinship principle because it is not based on kin, and if they make mistakes, they may be expelled from the Iemoto organization. Additionally, hierarchical positions are not fixed; if the “kohai” imitate the skills of the grand Iemoto and are more loyal to them, they may surpass their position (Hsu 1975). Therefore, members of the Iemoto

3 The Emergence of the Iemoto System: Changes in the Positions of Units …

279

organization are actually filled with a sense of insecurity about changes in their hierarchical position. They must define their positions in interactions with outsiders to adopt an appropriate tone and attitude in their interactions. Otherwise, they may be scolded by their “senbai” or even suppressed and excluded, leading to their hierarchical positions being overtaken by their “kohai”. Hence, defining hierarchical positions in interactions becomes a primary consideration in their actions. In the nineteenth century, when Western powers invaded East Asia, the Japanese were aware that the international system dominated by the West was in an anarchic international system. However, they still hierarchized the international community according to their own perceptions and ranked countries by their perceived status. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901) was one of the most important enlightenment thinkers of modern Japan, and his famous concept of “leaving Asia and entering Europe” was proposed by him. He divided the countries of the world into three levels based on their level of civilization. The first level comprised the most civilized countries, mainly European countries and the United States. The second level included semi-civilized countries, such as Turkey, China, Japan, and other Asian countries. The third level consisted of barbaric countries, such as African countries and Australia (Fukuzawa 1991). Fukuzawa believed that China and Japan belonged to the same status and to avoid being seen as backward and unprogressive by the West, like China and Korea, they must innovate. If the old autocratic system of the Chinese and Korean governments has no laws to rely on, Westerners will suspect that Japan is also a lawless country; if Chinese and Korean intellectuals indulge themselves without knowing what science is, Westerners will think that Japan is also a country of Yin and Yang and the Five Elements; if Chinese people are humble and do not know shame, the chivalry of the Japanese will be obscured; if the Korean state uses cruel punishment on people, the Japanese will be speculated to be equally inhumane. Examples such as this are innumerable. (Fukuzawa 1933, pp. 40–42). Fukuzawa Yukichi stirred up a sense of insecurity in the Japanese people by focusing on changes in hierarchical status. Although the international system dominated by the West emphasized the equality of national sovereignty, Fukuzawa Yukichi interpreted the anarchic international order from a hierarchical perspective, positioning Japan at the second level and then enlightening the Japanese people to actively move toward modernization. Many thinkers, such as Nakae Chomin (1847–1901), contributed greatly to the development of modern Japan during the same period as Fukuzawa. However, Fukuzawa is still considered the most important enlightenment thinker of modern Japan, and his portrait continues to be printed on Japan’s tenthousand-yen banknotes because his ideas stimulated a sense of crisis among the Japanese people (Fig. 2). After expanding abroad, Japan first defeated China, a second-level country, in the First Sino-Japanese War and later defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, which could be said to have climbed to the position of a civilized country as described by Fukuzawa. Therefore, why were the Japanese not satisfied with their first-level position and still attempted to establish an international system dominated by themselves? This is also due to the kin-track principle. According to Hsu’s research, there

280

15 Japan’s Iemoto-State and Iemoto System: Formation and Operation …

Fig. 2 International hierarchy of the anarchy system constructed by Fukuzawa Yukichi. Source Made by the author

are several situations in which Japanese people compete with each other in the Iemoto organization: (1) if they are only members of the Iemoto, they may try to achieve eminence in their Iemoto or become the most illustrious branch Iemoto under the grand Iemoto; (2) if they are not affiliated with some master already, they may start a new and bigger Iemoto; and (3) if they are already a grand Iemoto,2 they will try to recruit more disciples or followers (Hsu 1975, p. 229). Although Japan has climbed the hierarchical status constructed by itself and has become a world-recognized major power (Jansen 2002), the order of this international system is not the hierarchical order Japan idealizes, and Japan had to establish an international system of imperial authority and recruit more members to feel comfortable in its dominant order and feel its international status improved. Benedict points out that there was anarchy in the world as long as every nation had absolute sovereignty; it was necessary for her to fight to establish a hierarchy—under Japan, of course, since she alone represented a nation truly hierarchal from top to bottom and hence understood the necessity of taking “one’s proper place”. Japan must lead this international order, help its backward brother nation—China, drive the United States, Britain, and Russia out of East Asia, and allow each country to find its proper place. All nations were to be one world, fixed in an international hierarchy (Benedict 1946). Although Japan has entered the Western-dominated international system, joined the League of Nations and became a permanent member, it has not internalized the idea of equality of the Western sovereign state and still understands the world from the kin-tract principle (Fig. 3). In July 1942, Japanese scholars held an academic conference called “Overcoming the Modern”, aiming to provide ideological support and justification for the Pacific War launched in December 1941. The so-called overcoming the modern refers to overcoming or transcending Western modernity. It is a broad concept, including various problems, dilemmas, and challenges faced by Japan after accepting Western 2

The first letter of the term Iemoto is capitalized when it refers to the head of the Iemoto.

3 The Emergence of the Iemoto System: Changes in the Positions of Units …

281

Fig. 3 Japan’s attempt to confront the West’s goals. Source Made by the author

modernization (Harootunian 2001). The content of this conference reflects the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people with Western culture, which occupies an important position in Japanese modern thought and culture. Scholars attending the conference unanimously agreed that the leaders of the world order are Western countries. They have gained political and cultural advantages worldwide by virtue of their technological advantages since the Enlightenment. However, this so-called modernization concept has significant cultural drawbacks and is the root cause of crises. Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Naritaka pointed out that if the Greater East Asia War was to overthrow Europe’s external domination of the world order, then “overcoming the modern” should be a change in the internal order, that is, a change in human spirit (Kawakami and Takeuchi 2005). Japanese academician Shimokawa Yoritomo emphasized, “What we call the ‘modern’ originated from Europe, at least becoming today’s problem of overcoming the ‘modern’. Therefore, if we can regard overcoming the modern as a problem, specifically, it is nothing more than a confrontation with Europeanization” (Harootunian 2001, p. 301). Scholars participating in this conference, regarding the problems Japan encountered when entering Westerndominated international society, proposed different views and were divided into Romanticists, the Kyoto School of Philosophy, modern science and technology, and others. However, they unanimously agreed that Japanese culture is superior to Western culture, emphasizing that Japan needs to take on the responsibility of saving the world with the Eastern spirit, showing the desire to surpass the West. From the cases discussed above, Japan positions itself according to its understanding of the international system. After entering the Western-dominated international system, Japan constructed a hierarchical order under an anarchic system based on its understanding of the world. As Japan’s hierarchical status increased, it criticized the shortcomings of the anarchic system and attempted to establish an Iemoto system with the emperor as the authority. The anarchic system did not affect Japan’s state behavior, which may be because Japan’s character as a unit of the system was not simplified as Waltz described (Waltz 1979). Japan understood the world in its way, which is more in line with the role of ideational structures emphasized by Wendt’s constructivism. However, unlike constructivist theory, Japan did not identify its role as an enemy, rival, and friend (Wendt 1999), resulting in constructivism’s inability to explain Japan’s behavior.

282

15 Japan’s Iemoto-State and Iemoto System: Formation and Operation …

4 Conclusion The focus of the three major IR theories is the structure of the system, constructing theories under the assumption of anarchy, and debating the characteristics of the system structure. They all overlook the possibility of differences in the attributes of actors. Waltz (1979) simplified the functions of units, making them like units without tradition and culture (p. 82). Wendt’s (1999) constructivism adopts a minimalist view of the state, focusing only on the five properties of essential states: (1) an institutional-legal order, (2) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, (3) an organization with sovereignty, (4) a society, and (5) territorial, and stripped of its contingent forms (p. 202). They also ignored that different countries might have different reactions to the same event, which is the root of contradictions in today’s international society and the cause of clashes of civilizations. If the anarchic system is all Western countries, perhaps the attributes of states need not be considered, but when non-Western countries enter the Westerndominated international system, the assumption of homogeneity of units can no longer be made; otherwise, the explanatory power will be significantly reduced and difficult to become a general theory. Some might argue that after Japan’s defeat, its political organization was transformed by the United States, and it will not repeat past expansion, so there is no need to overemphasize national characteristics. However, the author believes that such a view overemphasizes the role of structure while ignoring its content. In fact, Japan’s unique kin-tract principle has not changed; it is manifested in different ways. Although several postwar Japanese prime ministers proposed goals for an independent foreign policy, such as Takeo Fukuda’s “omnidirectional diplomacy” and Takeo Miki’s “equidistant diplomacy”, scholars believe that Japan has not had an independent foreign policy since the war. Japan is almost solely concerned with what the United States is thinking and how its foreign policy is changing, adopting different strategies entirely in line with U.S. diplomacy (Shang et al. 2021). In the eyes of most Americans, Japan is an objective existence without an independent personality or merely a shadow of the United States in international affairs (Li 2005). However, from the perspective of the kin-tract principle, Japan was defeated by the United States in World War II, positioning itself below the United States in terms of hierarchy and treating the United States as the head of the international system, following in its footsteps. In the 1980s, during the early stages of China’s reform and opening up, there was a relatively good interaction between China and Japan. At that time, Japan’s economy was very strong, considered an economic miracle, while China’s economy was relatively backward. Japan regarded China as a “kohai” with a lower system status, believing it could help China during its development. However, as China’s economy grew better and had the opportunity to surpass Japan as the world’s secondlargest economy, Japanese people became anxious about changes in their hierarchical status. The “China threat theory” became prominent in Japan, and the Japanese media’s biased reporting and even malicious attacks on China were prevalent (He 2003).

References

283

In June 2022, the author found similar remarks to those of Fukuzawa Yukichi in a media report. Yasushi Harada, the author of Japan’s Lost Decade (1999), commented during an interview with South Korean media. Around 1840, China was defeated in the Opium War and fell significantly behind Western Europe. Although it knew that reforms were necessary, it remained indifferent, ultimately perishing in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Japan is the same today, clearly unable to function normally but doing nothing about it. If the current situation continues, Japan may withdraw from the Group of Seven industrialized Western countries and developed countries. Even if it does not withdraw, it may be pushed to the lowest level of developed countries (Ju 2022). Although Fukuzawa Yukichi has been dead for over a century, Harada’s remarks are identical to Fukuzawa Yukichi’s, reflecting Japanese people’s anxiety about changes in international status and attempting to inspire Japan to reform from this perspective. The Western states’ systemic project focuses on studying the anarchic international system because of their unique cultural background. During the process of nation-state independence, they emphasized the idea of national self-determination, stubbornly believing in the equality of sovereign states. Their basic claims for nationstates actually reflect the unique social and political organization foundations and are related to the contract principle. If the behavior units of the world have become homogenized, there is no need to consider the attributes of the behavior units in the international system research project. Otherwise, studying the operating principles of different types of international systems has a certain reference value.

References Abel, J. R., and J. R. Abel. 2015. 194Organizing co-prosperity: The greater East Asia conference. In The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan’s Global Engagement, 1933–1964. University of Hawai’i Press. https://doi.org/10.21313/hawaii/9780824841072.003. 0008 Anderson, B. 2016. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. Benedict, R. 1946. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword; Patterns of Japanese Culture. Houghton Mifflin Co. Benedict, R. 2005. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Britannica, T., Editors of Encyclopedia. 2020. Shogunate. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www. britannica.com/topic/shogunate Dower, J.W. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. W. W. Norton & Company. Drea, E. 2009. Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945. University Press of Kansas. Fukuzawa, Y. 1991. The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa. Translated by Eiichi Kiyooka. Columbia University Press. Fukuzawa, Y. 1933. My course of study (Waga gakumon no gangyo). Keio-gijuku University Press. Gaimu Mondai Kenky¯ukai, Gaimush¯o Ch¯osa-bu, and Matsuoka Y¯osuke. 1941. Matsuoka Gaish¯o Enzetsush¯u [Matsuoka Foreign Minister Speech Collection]. Nihon Kokusai Ky¯okai. Gellner, E. 2008. Nations and Nationalism. Cornell University Press.

284

15 Japan’s Iemoto-State and Iemoto System: Formation and Operation …

Gluck, C. 1985. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Harada, Y. 1999. Nihon no ushinawareta j¯unen: Shippai no honshitsu fukkatsu e no senryaku. (Japan’s Lost Decade: The Essence of Failure and Strategies for Revival). Nikkei BP Marketing Nikkei BP Marketing (Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha). Hardacre, H. 2017. Shint¯o and the State, 1868–1988. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Harootunian, H.D. 2001. Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan. Princeton University Press. Hashikawa, B., A. Sakamoto, S. Uno, T. Nozaki, and N. Yamamoto. 1976. Kindai Nihon Seiji Shis¯oshi II: Kindai Nihon Shis¯oshi Taikei 4 (Modern Japanese Political Thought History II: Modern Japanese Thought History Series Vol. 4). Yuhikaku. He, D.-G. 2003. Rìbˇen méitˇı chˇaozuò de bèihòu [Behind the hype of Japanese media]. Guójì Xi¯anhù Dˇaobào. Retrieved December 15, 2003, from https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-12-15/112223 78318.shtml Heslop, D. Alan. 2022. Political System. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/ topic/political-system Hotta, E. 2014. Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy. Vintage Books. Hsu, F.L.K. 1959. Structure, function, content and process. American Anthropologist 61: 790–850. Hsu, F.L.K. 1963. Clan, Caste, and Club. Van Nostrand. Hsu, F.L.K. 1975. Iemoto: The Heart of Japan. Schenkman Pub. Co. James, D. 1951. The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1st ed. Routledge. https://doi.org/10. 4324/9780203845196 Jansen, M.B. 2002. The Making of Modern Japan. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Ju, Feng. 2022. Rì j¯ıng jì xué ji¯a: Rìbˇen xiànzài hé Q¯ıngcháo mòq¯ı chà bùdu¯o zhí b¯ı f¯adá guóji¯a zuìd¯ı shuˇıpíng [Japanese economist: Japan’s current situation is similar to the late Qing Dynasty, approaching the lowest level of developed countries]. Ifeng News. https://news.ifeng.com/c/8Gq J4osFi0o Kantorowicz, E.H. 1957. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kawakami, H., and Takeuchi, Y. 2005. Overcoming modernity: Synchronicity and image-thinking. Translated by Richard F. Calichman. State University of New York Press. Keohane, R.O. 2005. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press. Keohane, R.O., and J.S.J.S. Nye Jr. 1973. Power and Interdependence. 15 (4): 158–165. Kikakuiinkai Kenky¯ukai. 1943. Dai T¯oa Kensetsu no Kihon K¯ory¯o (Basic Principles of Greater East Asia Construction). Tokyo: D¯omei Ts¯ushinsha. Kushner, B. 2012. Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice. Harvard University Asia Center. Levine, A. 1995. The pacific war: Japan versus the allies, vol. 130. Greenwood Publishing Group. Li, Q.-S. 2005. Mˇeiguó rén rúhé kàn rìbˇen: Y¯ıgè méiyˇou dúlì réngé de kègu¯an cúnzài [How Americans view Japan: An objective existence without an independent personality]. Huánqiú Shíbào. Retrieved February 18, 2005. http://news.sina.com.cn/cul/2005-02-18/4022.html Monbush¯o. 1937. Kokutai no Hongi [The True Meaning of the National Polity]. Monbush¯o. Nishiyama, M.Y. 1959. Iemoto no kenky¯u (A Study of the Iemoto system). K¯odansha. Oakley, F. 2010. The Medieval Experience: Foundations of Western Cultural Singularity. University of Toronto Press. Shang, H.P., J.L. Zhang and K.L. Yu. 2021. RI ben ren yu ri ben guo yan jiu : xin li wen hua xue fan shi xia de kao cha (The Japanese and Japan: An Approach of the Psycho-culturology), She hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she. Smith, A.D. 1989. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. B. Blackwell Oxford. Smith, A.D. 1991. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Takeuchi, Y. 2005. Jìndài de ch¯aokè (Overcoming the Modern). Translated by Lˇı Gémù. Original work published.

References

285

Waltz, K.N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley. Wendt, A. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press.https://doi. org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183 Yellen, J.A. 2019. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War. Cornell University Press. Yu, K.L. 2011. Mo yin xue yu Wen te jian gou zhu yi jin cheng li lun: Wen hua xuan ze de pou xi yu tan tao [Memetics and Wendt’s constructivist process theory: Analysis and discussion of cultural selection]. Guo ji zheng zhi yan jiu, 03, 145–153+197. Zhang, Y. 2000. Da Dongya Gongrongquan de Mimeng [The illusion of the Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere]. In Taipingyang Zhanzheng Xin Lun [New Perspectives on the Pacific War], ed. L. Yu, 224. China Social Sciences Press. Zhuang, N. 2016. Riben "Guotilun" Yanjiu: Yi Jindai Guojia Jianzhu Wei Shijiao [Research on Japanese "National Body Theory": From the Perspective of Modern State Building]. China Social Sciences Press.

Chapter 16

Cultural Traditions and the Establishment of Western-Style Political Systems in India

India and China are both ancient civilizations that have experienced invasion and domination by Western colonialists in recent times and have become independent from colonial rule almost simultaneously. The difference, however, is that politically, India pursues a Western-style political system, with a parliamentary system, multiparty elections, and relative decentralization of power as its main features. China, on the other hand, has opted for a socialist system with Chinese characteristics, with “multiparty participation under one-party leadership”, “democratic centralism”, “people’s congresses”, and the relative concentration of power. The nature of these two systems, and their pros and cons, are viewed differently by different people, such as Indians who boast of being “the most populous democracy in the world” and “the most democratic country in the developing world”. The Chinese, too, are grateful to have chosen the socialist path and have shown great antipathy and rejection of Western democracy. It is not scientific to draw categorical conclusions about these different views. In this regard, two things are certain. First, the political system chosen by each of these two ancient societies is something new, either in theory and practice from the West (the Indian option) or in theory from the West (the Chinese option). Second, after nearly half a century of experimentation, the institutions chosen by each have largely taken root in their countries and show no signs of collapsing in the foreseeable future, so that they can be said to fit their respective national conditions. One can analyze why China and India made such different choices in terms of political, economic, historical, and specific international and domestic conditions. However, in addition, I believe that it is also related to cultural traditions. That is, the very different characteristics of each of these two civilizations determine their “affinity” with one new form of politics and not with another new political system. In the case of India, the Western-style political system was established with the rule of the Western colonies. The British imported commodities to India and at the same time carried parliamentary democracy to India. While it can be argued that the Western political system was imposed on India by the colonizers, it is important to acknowledge the fact that India, a country with thousands of years of cultural tradition, accepted this new political system almost wholesale without any rejection. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_16

287

288

16 Cultural Traditions and the Establishment of Western-Style Political …

This is in stark contrast to China. The author believes that there is a certain “affinity” between traditional India and the political system of the modern Western way. This chapter is intended to explore this aspect. Before discussing this issue, it is necessary to define the characteristics of the modern Western political system. However, the limitation of space makes it impossible to discuss this issue in detail. We can only point out some of its characteristics from a comparative point of view. In other words, the “modern Western political system” is relative to the “ancient Eastern political system”. The “ancient eastern political system” refers to a large extent to the “ancient Chinese autocratic and centralized political system”. Compared with the two, the former has the characteristics of decentralized and pluralistic power composition, while the latter has the characteristics of centralized and monolithic power. In terms of the decision-making process, the former is characterized by “nonauthoritarianism”, while the latter emphasizes authority. In the way of ruling, the former has the characteristics of “rule of law”, and the latter has the characteristics of “rule of man”. This is the starting point for our analysis.

1 Pluralistic and Composite Cultural Tradition and Modern Political System As a whole, the Indian cultural tradition is composite, pluralistic, and decentralized, lacking the “grand unity” that characterizes China. This is consistent with some of the principles embodied in modern Western political systems. The composite, pluralistic, and decentralized nature of India’s cultural traditions can be articulated at three levels: political, social, and cultural (in the narrower sense). (i) The long-standing political division and the relatively weak control of the central government over local forces are in line with the principle of “decentralization” embodied in modern Western political systems. India has a long history of lack of unity and has been divided for much of its history, with multiple centers of power often existing within a single period. This contrasts sharply with China’s long period of unification. Comparing the histories of the two societies, the following points can be drawn. First, the period of unification in China was considerably longer than the period of division, while the situation in India was exactly the opposite. The ratio of time between unification and division in China is approximately 7:3, while the ratio of time between unification and division in India is less than 3:7. Second, as mentioned earlier, even during the period of division in China, neither ruler considered division to be the normal state of affairs, and neither wanted to perpetuate it. They all took the great task of unification as their mission and always tried to implement it whenever possible. With the exception of the Peacock Dynasty, the Siddha Dynasty, and the Mughals, who attempted to unify all of India, Indian history was mostly a competition between kingdoms for “survival”. Even during the

1 Pluralistic and Composite Cultural Tradition and Modern Political System

289

unification period, no single dynasty encompassed all of India, and the area south of Vindhyas remained relatively independent. Third, most of the dynasties in Indian history were not only short-lived, but the political control of each dynasty was far from comparable to that of the Chinese dynasties. The establishment of a “county system” similar to that of China was very late (13th–fourteenth centuries AD) and never developed to the degree of sophistication of China. This affected the dynasty’s control over society. Even during a period of unification under one power, the influence of the king’s power on society was weak. In the case of the Peacock Dynasty, which was roughly the same era as China’s Qin Dynasty, for example, imperial rule over localities was largely symbolic, as the empire did not issue a unified currency, nor did it adopt the unification measures of “the same rules for cars and books” as the Qin Dynasty did, and the real center of power remained with the local princes. Several other larger dynasties also did not have a thoroughly centralized system of government like that of China, and the emperor was merely the “head of the kings” (Rajati-Raja). Political fragmentation and the relatively weak control of state power over society have often created a “political power vacuum” in India, making it easier for foreigners to establish rule. Without sufficient power to resist the challenge of foreigners, foreigners have historically conquered and ruled India like a horse and buggy. When the Western colonialists came to India, they were confronted with such a fractured and politically “deficient” opponent. The British conquered India by adopting a strategy of attacking each other. In contrast, when the West came knocking on China’s door, it encountered a politically unified opponent. The “Heavenly Kingdom” was corrupt, but its political system worked well. With the deterrent of absolute autocratic power, it still largely ruled China effectively and was able to effectively mobilize society to resist in the face of foreign challenges. Obviously, the establishment of a new political system in such a society would have been more difficult than in India. Moreover, the long division and the repeated conquests of foreign peoples, which in turn blunted the people’s sense of nationhood, made it less likely that the British would meet resistance to the introduction of their political system in India. The Western-style political system was based on greater power and autonomy for local authorities, and British rule did not touch hundreds of native states (approximately 2/5 of India’s territory and 1/3 of its population). Even “British India”, which was directly ruled by the British, was not a “one-stroke rule. Even in “British India”, which was directly ruled by the British, it was not a “one-shot” method of rule. For social life, the British adopted the principle of separation between administration and society and did not interfere much with religion, customs, and village affairs, at least in the early years of their rule, as long as they did not hinder colonial rule and colonial plunder. In this respect, British rule was no different from the ancient conquest of India by foreign peoples. In this way, there was a tendency for Indians to conform to a Western-style political system. Of course, conformity to the Western political system was not the same thing as conformity to colonial rule. The British colonial rule was strongly resisted by the Indian people, and the rising national independence movement continued to fight and eventually ended British colonial rule. However, with the exception of a few advocates of retrogression (such as Mahatma Gandhi), it was only “British rule” that

290

16 Cultural Traditions and the Establishment of Western-Style Political …

was opposed, not the Western-style political system itself established by the British. The British were driven out, but the Western-style political system took root in India. (ii) At the level of the social system, the caste system restricts state power, and the resulting power pattern is similar to the “benefit sharing” and “balance of power” principles embodied in the modern western political system. In terms of the social system, the biggest difference between traditional Indian society and Chinese society is that Indian society is a highly hierarchical society. It was divided into many caste groups. It was a hierarchical system with Brahmin monks at the top and the vast number of “untouchables” at the bottom, and each caste was further divided into many subcastes. These groups were self-sustaining, based on the same origin and hereditary occupation, and were segregated from each other. They do not intermarry and do not communicate with each other. Caste is based on inequality, which is incompatible with the idea of “equality” embodied in the modern Western-style political system. However, this system has some affinity with the modern Western-style political system. First, caste is a kind of interest group that has some of the potential of modern interest groups. Caste and Chinese clan groups are both groups concluded on the basis of blood qualification, but the difference between caste and clan is that the former has common occupation and common religious beliefs. That is, it is both based on blood relationships and transcends blood relationships. The common occupation makes the caste generally have the same economic status and have common interests to pursue. Common religious beliefs enable people of the same caste to maintain a common way of life. Therefore, compared with the Chinese clan group, caste is a more uniform group, closer to the “class” of modern Western society. Organizations such as “caste panchayats” often mobilize members of their own caste to fight against other castes to protect the economic interests of their own caste or to fight for a higher ceremonial position in the caste system, which is similar to the role of political parties, an important element of the modern Western political system. The role of political parties is somewhat similar to that of political parties, an important element of modern Western political systems. Brahmin monks were mainly engaged in sacred work, but some large Brahmin aristocrats also peeked at political power and came into conflict with the royal class (who were supposed to belong to the Kshatriya caste). The Kshatriya caste was also divided into many subcaste groups, and these groups were always fighting for more political power and economic benefits. In this way, the formation of a system of mutual struggle and checks and balances between secular and monastic forces, groups within the state rulers, and between high and low castes to maintain the caste order so that society is not destroyed by excessive strife has been considered the most important function of the state in India. The national government cannot help but “walk a tightrope” between various interest groups. In contrast, the Chinese imperial class had an absolute monopoly on state power and lacked the competition and constraints that the Indian monastic power and hereditary aristocratic groups had. There was also a lack of intermediate interest groups between kinship groups and the state. We know that a basic prerequisite for the establishment of a modern Westernstyle political system is the distribution of power and the balance of interests among

1 Pluralistic and Composite Cultural Tradition and Modern Political System

291

the various interest groups. For example, when a conflict arises between a farmer and a machine manufacturer or a conflict of interest between a worker and an employer, it is left to the government to adjust (including through repressive measures). In a certain sense, the government appears to be a balancer between various interest groups. From this point of view, it is better to say that the political tradition of caste society is closer to the modern Western-style political system. Second, caste has strong self-regulation and self-sustainability. Caste has its own laws and regulations, “caste panchayat” is responsible for caste law enforcement, judicial, security and administrative affairs, has the power to approve marriages, settle disputes, fine and even expel those who violate caste laws and regulations, and regulate the professional competition among the same caste. The caste panchayat, composed of elders of the caste, has greater authority, and the decisions they make have great normative power over caste members. Obviously, it plays the role of local government and replaces some functions of the government. Because of this feature, Indian society is free from any interference in the internal affairs of the caste under the state of “government” and can function normally under the state of “no government”. This situation is in contrast to the “panpoliticized” character of Chinese society and is in line with the principle of relative separation of political and social life embodied in modern Western political systems. (iii) The extreme diversity of cultural (on a narrower level) languages, religious beliefs, and philosophical schools coincides with the principle of pluralistic values, freedom of speech and belief embodied in modern Western political systems. Consistent with its long tradition of political fragmentation and lack of absolute authoritarianism, India exhibits great diversity at the ideological level. Hinduism itself is a very heterogeneous system in which there are countless sects, gods, rituals, and doctrines that are completely different or even completely opposed. There are many religions outside of Hinduism, and it would be an understatement to say that India is a “religious museum”. All religions and philosophical schools have a certain number of followers, a long history, and no attempt to swallow other schools of thought, so none of them is in danger of being eliminated. The Peacock Dynasty era can be considered an exception. Ashoka, in the process of unifying India, tried to replace the various local faiths of the time with Buddhism. However, even then, Buddhism failed to completely replace the old faiths. In Chinese history, after the collapse of the Zhou dynasty, society was divided, and there was a “blossoming of a hundred flowers and a hundred schools of thought” in the field of thought, with a hundred schools of thought writing books and setting up schools of thought and preaching. However, this situation did not last long, and with the political unification of the Qin Dynasty, people’s thoughts were increasingly confined. China’s cultural tradition of “great unity” manifested itself in political unity and absolute centralization and in ideology in the use of coercion to eliminate “heresies” and set ideological beliefs in one place. The use of political power to restrict ideological schools of thought that are unfavorable to those in power is one of the characteristics of Chinese autocracy and centralization. The “banning

292

16 Cultural Traditions and the Establishment of Western-Style Political …

of Confucianism” by Qin Shi Huang can be considered an extreme example of this, which is less common in Indian history. If the relative homogeneity of schools of thought was the norm in Chinese history and the “blossoming of a hundred flowers” was the exception, the opposite is true in India, where unparalleled cultural diversity was the norm and fixation on one was the exception. This unparalleled cultural diversity is both a result of the chronic lack of absolute political authoritarianism and the basis for the latter, since successful political rule in a society that considers a great diversity of beliefs, values, and behaviors must be predicated on more tolerant policies. It is difficult to imagine a form of power in such a situation that is absolutely authoritarian.

2 Decentralized Power Model and Modern Democracy The cultural tradition of supernatural centrism diluted the power of the dictator and left India without a cultural and ideological basis for absolute despotism, in line with the “deauthoritarian” character of modern Western political systems. In traditional Indian thought, “supreme”, “supreme”, and “supreme” are never the same thing. The supreme may not be the strongest or the richest, and the strongest may not be the richest or the supreme. Unlike Chinese social life, which is characterized by a “panpolitical” approach, the Hindu cultural tradition is highly spiritual and religious, and the pursuit of religious “liberation” is the goal of every educated Hindu’s life. The importance of this goal often relegates the pursuit of political “fame” and economic “fortune” to a secondary position. In practice, it was the Brahmin monks, not the kings, who had supremacy in life, and Brahmins were treated with great respect even if they were beggars (which was very often the case in practice). The king had great power but not necessarily supremacy. “The lord of the kingdom is compared with the brahmin, and the latter is honored”. “When a 100-year-old king meets a Brahmin child on the road, the king should give way to the Brahmin because the earth belongs to the Brahmin”. The Manava-Dharma-Sastra states, “The king, rising at dawn, should pay homage to the Brahmins who are well versed in the three canons and ethical knowledge, and act according to their teachings” (ManavaDharma-Sastra 1986, pp. 7–37). Some kings’ powers were actually very limited, such as the code that states that the king’s task is to protect Brahmins and cattle according to the will of God. Buddhist culture in India also gave little status to kings who were secular rulers; for example, the scriptures exhort people not to get involved in worldly affairs and to make friends with noble people. Sometimes even to the extreme, such as the Buddhist scriptures compare the king with thieves, saying that the people are very poor, being plundered by the king’s palace officials during the day and stolen by thieves at night, so when a king or a thief comes to the place where religious ceremonies are held, the ceremony should be immediately suspended. This is totally unthinkable in China. Because of the low status of the king, there were many people in Indian history who voluntarily renounced the throne and lived a life of seclusion. Siddhartha Gautama himself attained enlightenment by renouncing the

2 Decentralized Power Model and Modern Democracy

293

throne and despising worldly power. There are also many examples of this in the Hindu tradition. This means that in the Hindu cultural tradition, the emperor, who is the “king of a nation”, is a mere mortal, nothing more. This is in contrast to China, where “imperial power is paramount”, “I am the state”, and the supreme status and power are vested in the emperor. When Buddhism, which did not respect the king’s authority, was introduced into China, where the king’s authority was paramount, there was a long-lasting debate over which was more honored, the Shaman or the Emperor. Some bookish monks argued vigorously that the emperor should not be prostrated, which was clearly unacceptable to the authoritative Chinese emperors. The southern emperor, Song Xiaowu, ordered that all monks who did not kneel before the emperor should be whipped in the face and then killed (“whip the face and wrinkle it and behead it”). From then on, no one dared to mention this, and Buddhism had to meekly make changes to suit the Chinese situation. The ancient Chinese sage Mencius also supported the view that “there are no two masters in heaven and no two masters in man”. In our folk tales and legends, the emperor is usually sacred and has some of the characteristics of a god, such as the emperor’s “golden mouth” and supernatural powers, while monks have little status. In India, however, the person with supernatural powers is usually not a king but a Brahmin priest, an ascetic, an astrologer, etc., while the king has little status. In our cultural tradition, there is a tendency to accept the idea that the supreme must be the strongest, the strongest must be the richest, and the supreme to the strongest to the richest are often linked together. In the Indian cultural tradition, these are several completely different things. That is, Indians have a richer and more complex understanding in this area than the Chinese. This idea in the Hindu cultural tradition is very important. The French sociologist Louis Dumon, after analyzing the Indian caste system, emphasized the revelation of this idea for modern people, pointing out that Indian society “almost eight centuries before Christ, the tradition made an absolute distinction between power and hierarchical status. This is an important point that contemporary research has failed to clarify in its own way” (Dumon 1980, p. 37). An important feature of modern Western-style political systems is the relative separation of power, status, and wealth. In the United States, for example, the president has a great deal of political power, but he or she may not be as respected as an eminent scientist or as rich as a businessman or a ball player. Westerners did not understand this until recent times, whereas Indians understood it thousands of years ago. This legacy of the Hindu cultural tradition has given Indian society a sense of “déjà vu” in regard to modern Western-style political systems. The contempt for political leaders in India today is astonishing. When I was a student at Nehru University in India, I encountered this with my own eyes: my Indian friend, Delong, a graduate student at Nehru University, had a picture of a pack of dogs in his house, and whenever Chinese people came here, he always pointed to the pack of dogs and said, “This is the Indian parliamentarian”. From the Buddha’s admonition to avoid the king when performing religious rituals, to people throwing rotten eggs at Indira Gandhi, the country’s prime minister who gave a speech, and the words and actions of the author’s Indian friend, there seems to be some kind of cultural psychological connection between this.

294

16 Cultural Traditions and the Establishment of Western-Style Political …

Since the monarch is no different from a mortal, theoretically, there is no longer an authority to decide everything. Imperial power was not supreme, and it became possible to evaluate and monitor the monarch’s decision-making process. Compared with Chinese monarchs, Indian monarchs were subject to greater constraints in at least two ways. First are the constraints of supernatural forces. In a culture where everyone was religious and sought liberation, the king’s behavior could not but be subject to greater restraint. The Manu Law admonishes kings to “compare evil virtue with death, and evil virtue is considered the most terrible thing of all, for he who has done much evil virtue falls into the deepest depths of hell, and he who has no evil virtue ascends to the heavenly realm after death” (Manava-Dharma-Sastra 1986, pp. 7–35). The worship of the gods and the fear of being freed after death were like a sharp sword hanging over the heads of the rulers of the state, restraining them from going too far in their policy making, exercise of power, and daily behavior, both in good and bad ways. In contrast, Chinese kings did not believe in evil much. Although Chinese emperors also prayed to supernatural forces in the form of “sacrifices to heaven”, they did so only when human efforts failed to produce results, and their ruling behavior was not very much governed by supernatural forces. The most famous example is that of an emperor in the Sui Dynasty who ordered the heads of all Buddha statues to be cut off when his prayers to Buddha for rain failed. Because they were not subject to supernatural forces, Chinese emperors were often at two extremes: good emperors were ambitious, promoted good and eliminated evil, and showed great vigor and initiative both internally and externally. The bad emperors were extravagant, tyrannical, and lawless. Second, they were subject to the constraints of Brahmin advisors, ministers, and other auxiliaries. In Hindu mythology, even the most powerful gods were not despots, such as the legendary king of the gods, Indra, who had a group of 100 holy immortals called “Mantri-Parisad”, which was a group of think tanks similar to the “Presidential Advisory Council” in American society. This is a group of think tanks similar to the “Presidential Advisory Council” in American society, which provides information, advice, and assistance in making decisions to decision makers. Indra is also known as the “Thousand Eyes”, which does not mean that he has 1,000 eyes but that he has 100 holy immortals as his eyes and ears and assistants. For example, the Rishis say, “The king’s power is completed by the helper. one wheel cannot turn, so ministers should be appointed and their advice should be heard” (Book 1, Chap. 8). The king “should not despise anyone and should listen to all. A wise man should adopt the words of a child, even if they are reasonable” (Kautilya’s Arthashastra 1915, Vol. 1, Chap. 15). The Treatise on Manava-DharmaSastra clearly states that “one should always consult with these ministers on issues that require common discussion, peace and war, national power, revenues, personal and national security, and ways to secure vested interests” (Manava-Dharma-Sastra 1986, pp. 7–56). “After listening to their different opinions, first separately and then centrally, the measures deemed most advantageous in the conduct of affairs may be taken” (Manava-Dharma-Sastra 1986, pp. 7–57). The king must respect the Brahmins and listen to their opinions. These provisions were written into the code as the king’s code of conduct and thus legally binding. The Chinese also considered the ability to “accept advice” and “promote virtue” as a criterion for evaluating the

3 Hinduism’s Dharma and the Modern Political System

295

goodness of the emperor, but there was no legal guarantee. Therefore, for the Chinese emperor, whether to “accept admonition” or “promote virtue” was a choice, while in India, it was a necessity. This “nonauthoritarian” decision-making is certainly closer to the “democratization” principle of decision-making in modern Westernstyle political systems.

3 Hinduism’s Dharma and the Modern Political System A certain tradition of “rule of law” is close to the “rule of law” characteristic of modern Western politics. Dharma is a very important concept in Hindu culture. It means “law, norm, order, custom, profession, duty” and so on. Hinduism declares that there are “three virtues” (or three goals of life) in life, namely Dharma, artha (profit), and k¯ama (desire, especially sexual pleasure), with “Dharma” being the first of the three virtues. It is the law of Hinduism, the law of caste, and the center of the Hindu ethical and moral system. However, it includes some elements of law, such as the ManavaDharma-Sastra, which includes at least the following elements of modern law: (1) constitution; (2) criminal law; (3) marriage law; (4) civil law; (5) administrative law; and (6) animal protection law. Represented by the Manava-Dharma-Sastra, there are various codes of Hinduism. Although these codes are not a “compilation of laws” in the modern sense, they are guidelines for people’s daily lives. Its role in the lives of Hindu cannot be overestimated. In this sense, Hindu society is also a “legal” society, where people are accustomed to “acting according to the law”. Traditional China is a society that emphasizes the “rule of virtue”, and the Chinese sages did not favor imposing external “laws” on people, believing that the ideal society does not need a code of law but relies on the “virtue” within people through edification. Instead, the ideal society should rely on education to inspire people’s inner “virtue” and regulate their own behavior with “virtue”. For this reason, ancient Chinese sages invented a whole set of concepts to express this “virtue”, such as 德 (virtue), 孝 (filial piety), 悌 (fraternit), 仁 (benevolence), 忠 (loyalty), 节 (temperance), 义 (righteousness), and so on. If each person observes the morality that is consistent with his or her identity, society will achieve the greatest harmony. In theory, this idea is extremely good, but in practice, it is very difficult to operate. The status, powers, duties, and behavior of each social class had neither a theological basis as in Indian society, nor were they spelled out in the form of articles as in the Manava-Dharma-Sastra. Even those “laws” that were codified often changed with regime changes or the personal circumstances of the ruler. Therefore, traditional China was nominally “ruled by virtue”, but in reality, it was “ruled by man”. This in turn influenced the people and diluted their sense of law. Although the “law” and the tradition of “law-abiding” in Hindu society cannot be compared with the “legal society” in the modern sense, it is similar to the legal system in the modern sense in the following three points. In contrast to the Chinese tradition of “rule by man”, the “law” and the “law-abiding” traditions of the people are not comparable to the modern “legal society.

296

16 Cultural Traditions and the Establishment of Western-Style Political …

First, the sacredness and, in a sense, the universality of the law. According to the Hindu view, nature and human society operate according to “law”, and all social classes must abide by “law”. Chinese monarchs and the royal family were outside the scope of the law, as evidenced by the Confucian dictum that “punishment is not for the great man”. The power and activities of Indian kings, however, were within the limits of the law. For example, three of the twelve chapters of Manava-DharmaSastra are devoted to the “Dharma of the King”. The king shall act according to the law in his own country. In Arthashastra, it is stated that “the king must not violate the fundamental duties of all beings, for only by making them fulfill their respective duties can he be happy in the afterlife” (Manava-Dharma-Sastra, Chap. 3). The Doctrine of Profit also stipulates the powers of the king, the appointment of officials, and the establishment of political institutions with legal force. The king’s task is to protect the “law”. An ideal society should be one in which “the people adhere to the righteousness of the law”, “all castes keep their place”, and “there is no mixture of castes”. The ideal individual should be “the soul of righteousness”, pursuing profit and desire without going beyond the “law”. In traditional Hindu society, everyone belongs to a fixed caste and has a moral code for the group, that is, the caste “law”. All people must consider whether their actions are in accordance with the “law”. The sanctity of the “law” is also reinforced by the fabrications of the Brahmin monks, the framers of the law, who say, for example, that the Manu Dharma is taught by Manu, the son of Brahma, the god of creation. The content of the law is also the will of God, and only by observing the law of caste can one obtain liberation in the afterlife; otherwise, one may fall down the ladder to liberation and be disqualified from liberation forever. This tradition of close integration of law and theology has fostered an attitude of reverence for the law. Everyone was bound by the law. Of course, the “law” is different for each class. Different classes were punished differently for the same “offense”. The privileges of the Brahmin monks and rulers are obvious. The “universality” of Hindu law here does not mean “equality before the law” in the modern Western political system, but that everyone’s behavior is governed by the law. In modern Western societies, where the legal system is more developed, the law takes precedence over everything, from the state’s affairs to a person’s food, clothing, housing, and transportation to the raising of a dog and cat. In this regard, India has some similarities with Western societies. Second, there is the relative independence of legislation and law enforcement. A distinctive feature of the modern Western political system is the so-called separation of powers, that is, the legislative, judicial, and executive powers are mutually restrained. In traditional Indian society, Brahmin monks were the makers of various sastra (laws and treatises), so although the “laws” were falsely regarded as oracles, they actually came from the hands of monks. According to the “law” of caste, the state was governed not by Brahmins but by Kshatriyas. Theoretically, the king had great administrative power but had to “act according to the law”. In social practice, kings did not always follow the “laws” laid down by Brahmins, and they often tried to weaken the power of Brahmins. Whenever this happened, they were always attacked by the Brahmin monks. In this way, a relationship of mutual restraint was formed

3 Hinduism’s Dharma and the Modern Political System

297

between the secular and monastic forces, i.e., the law enforcers and the legislators. Because of the relative independence of the formulation and implementation of “law” and the sacred nature of “law”, the various codes of Indian society did not change as a result of political changes. While Indian history has seen many dynasties and successive conquests by different peoples, the Hindu “legal system” has remained unbroken. This is very similar to the situation in many contemporary Western countries where legal policies remain unchanged despite changes in government, presidents, and prime ministers. In contrast, the Chinese “laws” of the past generations were directly formulated by the government, and some important laws and decrees were signed by the emperor himself. The emperor is not only the highest legislator but also the highest administrator and enforcer, but not the object of legal constraints. The laws lacked the sanctity of the Indian “law”, and their formulation and implementation did not have the mutual control of monks and secular forces of Indian society, so the laws often rose and fell with the change of dynasties and changed according to the personal interests of the rulers. This tradition is obviously very different from the Western political system characterized by the “separation of powers”. Third, there is the textual nature of the law. Although the content of Hindu “law” is different from modern law, they are fundamentally external and graspable provisions, rather than internal “virtues” that are difficult to grasp. Of course, both the law of modern Western society and the “law” emphasized by Hindu cultural tradition can be said to be a moral system, which is the sum of various morals and values of a society. However, it is an externalized and culturalized morality, which is easier to grasp. For example, for monarchs, the Chinese sages taught that they should be “benevolent” and what to do to be “benevolent”, and Confucius said “the benevolent one loves people”. As for what kind of people to love, how to love them, what will happen if you do this and what will happen if you do not do this, etc., it is up to you to understand, realize and master. Manava-Dharma-Sastra also admonishes the monarch to “love his people”, but the rules are much more detailed and specific. For example, one of the provisions on taxation: “The king may levy in advance one-fiftieth of the gold or silver of the livestock and of the annual interest, and one-eighth, one-sixth, or one-tenth of the grain, according to the nature of the soil and the care needed” (Manava-Dharma-Sastra, 7–130). To exceed this rate is to “impose a tyrannical tax” and not to “love the people”. “The king shall pay his ladies and all his slaves the daily wage appropriate to their position and office”. “The lowest servant shall be given a copper mantle per day, a suit of clothes twice a year, and one drachma of grain per month. In addition, to the highest-ranking slave shall be given six plinas, six sets of clothes twice a year each, and six drachmas of grain per month” (ManavaDharma-Sastra, 7–125, 7–126). Not to do so is not loving the people. A perverse ruler who does not love his people will not only “lose his country, his life, and all his kin” (7–111) but will also go to hell after death (Manava-Dharma-Sastra, 7–53). As we know, the legal tradition of modern Western society has its cultural roots in Christian doctrine, and the “Ten Commandments of Moses” is the earliest written law in the West. Compared with it, the Manu Law Treatise not only includes most of the contents of the Ten Commandments but is also more detailed and more specific. The status, powers, duties, and behavior of Brahmins, kings, industrialists, slaves,

298

16 Cultural Traditions and the Establishment of Western-Style Political …

and other classes are all clearly defined and highly operational. This is reminiscent of the Indian Constitution. The Indian Constitution is considered to be the longest in the world. From the boundaries of the states to the oaths of office of the Prime Minister, the President and the Governors, it has more detailed and well-defined provisions than even the constitutions of Western countries. In terms of cultural tradition, this may not have come about by accident. We seem to see in the Indian Constitution the wisdom of the descendants of the authors of the Manu jurisprudence (Ambedkar, one of the principal drafters of the Indian constitution, is known as the “modern Manu”).

References Dumont, Louis. 1980. Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste and Its Implications, Translated by Mark Saintsbury, Louis Dumont and Basia Gualti. Nature of Human Society (NHS). Kautilya’s Arthashastra. 1915. Translated by R. Shamasastry. Bangalore: Bangalore Government Press. Manava-Dharma-Sastra. 1986. Chinese version, Monu Falun. Translated by Jiang Zhongxin, China Social Science Press.

Chapter 17

State and International System of Ancient South Asia

1 The Dharma System There are now three major international systems, namely the ancient Roman system (Colonial system), the ancient East Asian world system (or tribute system), and the modern international system (or “Westphalian system”) that emerged in modern Western Europe and have spread throughout the world, but there does not seem to be a South Asian international system. The absence of an international system in South Asia is often based on the region’s long history of fragmentation and constant alien invasions. It is undeniable that the lack of credible historical information, the short period of political unification, and the high number of alien conquests are facts, but it does not seem to be possible to conclude that there is no international system in the subcontinent. The reasons for this are as follows. First, the region has also seen larger empires in its history, such as the Maurya Dynasty (321 BC–180 BC), the Gupta Dynasty (320 BC–550 BC), and the Mughal Dynasty (1526 AD–1707 AD), which ruled the subcontinent most of the region and formed a sort of international system, only for a relatively short period of time (compared to China and the ancient Roman Empire); second, the region was politically divided and suffered from foreign invasions only in relative terms, since the history of China and Europe was also marked by political divisions, mutual warfare, killings, and foreign invasions among the small states. In Europe, at least from the collapse of the Western Roman Empire to the establishment of the modern Westphalian system for nearly 1000 years, the region was politically divided, and the number and intensity of wars were no less than those in South Asia. Therefore, if one recognizes the existence of an international system under the Western and ancient Chinese empires of the Roman Empire, there is no reason why the transcendental order established during the unification period of South Asian history should not also be called an international system.1 1

The discussion of the non-Western international system has attracted the attention of the international relations community. In 2005, Bary Buzan and Amitav Acharya launched the research project “Why there is no non-Western international relations” and proposed the concept of “global

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7_17

299

300

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

In fact, the existence of an international system in the history of the South Asian subcontinent depends critically on how the concept of the international system is defined. At present, the concept of international system used by the academic community generally refers to “an abstract entity consisting of sovereign nation-states, regulated by international law and international institutions, which is a fixed combination of relations formed by the interaction of various actors (mainly states) in the international sphere”.2 This definition refers to the international system since modern times, but the emergence of nation-states is only a few hundred years old, and according to this definition, the political order under the ancient Roman and Chinese empires cannot be considered an international system. It is short-sighted to examine the international order only from the perspective of nation-states, and the author prefers to use this broader definition: “An international system is a network of relations between state actors (usually there is some kind of core actor)”.3 According to this definition, various international systems have existed throughout history, such as the ancient Greek city-state system, the ancient Roman system, the medieval European system, and the international systems of the ancient South Asian subcontinent and East Asia. As mentioned earlier, the author proposes the existence of two sides of state actors, the organizational entity and the civilizational entity (see Chap. 3 of this book). According to this view, civilizational bodies are usually combined with organizational entities to constitute state actors, but this is not always the case; sometimes there are different organizational entities under the same civilizational entity, and sometimes states of the same organizational entity belong to different civilizational bodies. For a long time in history, a region lacked a clear form of state, i.e., the state as an organizing body was not clearly characterized, but as a civilizational entity, its integrity and unity could be seen. This was the case in South Asia. The concept of the international system used by scholars of international relations today is characterized by an emphasis on the organizational side of the state, ignoring or freezing the civilizational side, and is therefore not conducive to examining the non-Western international relations”. The concept of "global international relations" was developed. "By taking a closer look at the non-Western predecessors of the international system or regional world order, we can gain many insights. The Amarna religious system, the Chinese world order, and the mandalas of Southeast Asia are clear and important examples. What is crucial here is that we complement our thinking about the Nation-State with thinking about civilization studies. Whereas the Nation-State perspective takes us back 500 years, the civilizational perspective can take us back 5000 years. The Nation-State perspective is consistent with the dominance of the West, while the civilizational perspective shows the diverse forces of human progress". Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations and the Chinese School of International Relations Theory: Are They Compatible” (Amitav 2015). 2 There are various definitions of "international system", and other concepts similar to "international system" include "international order", "international community", and so on. For detailed definitions of several concepts (Liu 2004). 3 The definition used by the author is similar to the definition of the international system given by Martin Wight, a representative of the British school. According to him, a system is a form of cooperation and conflict resulting from the interaction between states, and this interactive link can be direct, associated, or unrelated. However, he also argues that it is a system of relations for a common goal, so it has to have a certain degree of cultural unity; otherwise, the national system could not have arisen (Liu 2004).

1 The Dharma System

301

world, such as India and China, which are both ancient civilizations and have modern forms of state organization. What kind of international system has existed in the history of South Asia? This is the question on which this chapter focuses. In the history of South Asia, the Maurya Dynasty established a vast empire covering most of the subcontinent, known as the Maurya Empire. The third monarch of the empire, Ashoka (268 BC–232 BC), had a distinctly international outlook and attempted to construct an international system. Based on the cosmology of Indian religions (Hinduism and Buddhism), he proposed rules based on Dharma.4 The concept of “Dharma”, an order of nature and human society prescribed by an eternal supernatural force, appears repeatedly in various texts of the Maurya period (especially the edicts carved on cliffs in many places) and served as the basis of legitimacy for the empire and the international system under its rule. Ashoka claimed to be the “King of Dharma”, recognizing that “the victory of the law is the highest victory” (The Great Southern Collection of Scriptures in Chinese Translation, Vol. 65, Ashoka Inscriptions, Chap. 13). Therefore, it is not inappropriate to call the international system, with the Maurya Empire as the core actor, the Dharma system. Strictly speaking, Dharma was Ashoka’s ideal world order, but Ashoka did work to establish such an order and succeeded to some extent. The Dharma system not only existed in most parts of the subcontinent during the Maurya Empire but also had far-reaching effects after the collapse of the empire, so I think it is appropriate to call the international system (or international order) in South Asia. The international system that emerged in South Asia during the Maurya Dynasty is called the “Dharma system” and is placed on par with other international systems, but it may be questioned whether the international system under the Maurya Empire could represent the international system of the entire South Asian region given its short reign (only 100 years). The author’s answer is that the importance of a dynasty cannot be judged by the length of its rule. China’s Qin Dynasty also ruled for a short time, but it was significant, and the political system it created, the county system, has continued in China. The international system that emerged in South Asia during the Maurya Dynasty was short-lived but significant. Currently, mainstream international relations theory tends to overemphasize the “structure” and underestimate the “content” of the international system.5 It is true that South Asia has lacked a clear political structure for most of its history, but if “international structure” is understood as a combination of relations among various state actors, then even after the collapse of the Maurya Empire, relations among various state actors still existed, but the system lacked a clear “core actor” for a longer period of time. “Core actor”. The lack of an explicit structure consisting of states in the sense of organizational entity has been long in 4 "Dharma" is a very important concept in Buddhism and Hinduism. It has multiple meanings, the most important one being that it refers to the ultimate law of the universe. It can also be translated as "the Great Law". 5 In response to the shortcomings of the structural analysis, psychological anthropologist Francis L. K. Hsu proposed the content analysis. He defines structure as "the network of responsibilities and obligations in time and space that connects various roles together". Content is defined as "the qualitative pattern of interactions between people in a social organization” (Hsu 2002, p. 219).

302

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

the history of the subcontinent, but as a civilizational entity, it is something that has continued. Another possible question is why the international system representing the South Asian subcontinent was not the national system of the era of the Gupta or Mughal empires when there were three great empires based on different religions (Buddhism of the Maurya Dynasty, Hinduism and Buddhism of the Gupta Dynasty, and Islam of the Mughal Dynasty) in the history of South Asia. It should be noted here that although Buddhism had declined in the Gupta Dynasty era, it still had considerable influence and even still dominated in some areas, and the rulers pursued a policy of supporting Buddhism and Hinduism. Buddhism also began to integrate with Hinduism, so it can be said to have the same religious basis as the Maurya Dynasty. In addition, the Kushan Empire, another international empire that emerged in North India in the first and second centuries AD, was also based on Buddhism. Although Buddhism was also part of Indian culture, it was a variant of Hinduism, unlike pure Hinduism, and its openness made it more suitable as the ideological basis for an international system. It was during this period that Buddhism became an international religion, providing a common religious foundation for the units of the subsystem. Without this, the Dharma system would not have been possible. Although the Mughals were founded by Muslims, the number of Hindu states under their rule exceeded the number of Islamic states, and many of the so-called Islamic states were mainly rulers who practiced Islam, but their base population was still Hindu (according to the 2011 Census of India, Hindu make up 79.8% of India’s population, and Muslims make up 13.4% of the population). Therefore, it can be said that during the Mughal Empire, the Hindu nature of civilization is still continuing. It is also important to note that there is no concept of the “Dharma system” in the sense of the “international system” in either the Maurya Dynasty or later historical documents. However, the absence of such a concept does not mean that such a system does not exist because people often take for granted the existence of a system in which they live and do not feel its existence, so that there is no need to express it in language and literature. For example, there is no concept of a “tribute system” in the traditional Chinese context (this concept was later generalized by Western scholars), but in fact, this system exists.

2 How the Dharma System Works What are the characteristics of the Dharma system? Because of the relative abundance of credible materials from the Peacock period (including Ashoka cliff carvings, the Peacock canonical texts, the Rituals, and the sutras), we can make some judgments

2 How the Dharma System Works

303

based on them. The following is an attempt to restore some features of the national and international system of this era based on two Ashoka stone edicts.6 In the long past, there was no one who was a great official of Dharma. Therefore, in the thirteenth year of my enlightenment, I established the Dharma Grand Officers. They [the great officials of the Dharma] are for the establishment and growth of the Dharma among all sects, or among the Yona, Cambodian, Kandara, Latiga, and Vitiniga, or among all other western neighbors, and those who are devoted to the Dharma are for the benefit and happiness, busy with the ministry, servants and masters, Brahmins and Vaishyas, solitaries and old men. In addition, among the Brahmins and the Vaishyas, the lonely and the old, among those who are devoted to the Dharma for the benefit and comfort, for the unhindered, busy in their duties, and with the fees of the prisoners, for the unhindered, or if there are many children, or those who are compelled, or those who are old and decrepit, for the release of any of them, busy in their duties. In addition, in all the cities of the capital of the kingdom and in all the localities, and in the harems of my brothers and sisters, or in all the places where I work in relation to my other relatives. Do the great officials of the law abide by the law of man? Do they establish the law? Whether or not they are devoted to giving charity. Those who are dedicated to the law will work in all places within my jurisdiction. … (“Ashoka Inscriptions – Chap. 5, The Great Southern Collection of Scriptures in Chinese Translation, vol. 65).

However, this is the supreme victory of Divine Love’s contemplation and legal victory. In addition, this victory, as it is repeated again and again in [this my territory] and up to six hundred yojanas, among all the neighbors—there is here the king of Yona called Antiyoga, and beyond him the king of Antiyoga, there is the king of Tula-maya, the king of Amtekina, the king of Maka, the king of Arichishodhara, the king of Maka, and the king of Tula-maya. In the south, there are four kings called Tula-maya, Amtekina, Maka, and Alikyasudale, and in the south, there are the kings of Coda, Pamdiya, and Ceylon (Tambapamni). In this way, the territory of this king [of heavenly love] is covered by the Yona, the Nabhaka between the Kamboja, the Bhoja between the Nabhaba-mti, the Amdhra between the Pitinikya, and the Parimda. The Bhoja, the Amdhra among the Pitinikyas, and the Parimda also follow the teachings of the Law of Divine Love everywhere. In the future, they should also follow the teachings of the Law of Divine Love and the rules and regulations of the Law of Divine Love by following the law wherever the ambassadors of Divine Love have not yet arrived. In this way, the victory is obtained in all places, regardless of how it is, that is, everywhere this joy is the essence of victory. However, this joy is 6

This edict is called the Fourteen Chapters of the Dharma Edict, with two additional chapters. It was found in the nineteenth century and was inscribed in seven different ancient Indian scripts on rocks in seven different places (mainly in the border areas of the Maurya Empire in Ashoka’s time), advocating the Dharma and urging people to do good deeds and give charity. There are various translations of the inscriptions in English and Japanese, and there are also various versions of the Chinese translation. After comparison, the translation here is quoted from the Chinese Translation of the Southern Tripitaka, vol. 65, “Ashoka Inscriptions—Chap. 13”.

304

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

only a slight thing. Heavenly love contemplates that only those who are about the hereafter hold great fruit. (“Ashoka Inscriptions – Chap. 13, The Great Southern Collection of Scriptures in Chinese Translation, vol. 65)

The first stone inscription generally describes the situation under the rule of the empire. At that time, the empire’s boundaries were inhabited by the Yonas, Cambodians, Gandharvas, Rautikas, and Maitinis. Society at that time was divided into castes, so the names of the Brahmin and Vaishya (Vipassana) castes appeared, which shows that it was a multi-racial and multi-caste society. Ashoka hoped that these communities and castes would live together in peace, abide by the Dharma, and get along with kindness and love. “Those who are devoted to the Dharma are busy with their affairs for the benefit and happiness of the people”. This is the Dharma system, or at least, it reflects an ideal or an expected order under Ashoka’s Dharma. The second article reflects the territory of the empire and its relationship with its neighbors. It is said that the Maurya Empire covered an area of “six hundred yojanas” (about 9000 km in circumference, which basically covers the entire subcontinent today), and this figure should be taken as the territory of the empire at its peak. Many of the “kings” mentioned here were the empire’s neighbors, so there was indeed an international system with the Maurya Empire as the core actor. It is noteworthy that the rulers wanted to extend the expected imperial system—the Dharma system— beyond the empire and in their relations with their neighbors. The rulers wanted to extend the expected imperial system, the Dharma system, beyond the empire to their relations with their neighbors. The Dharma was a ruling philosophy of the ruler, an ideal basis for order and morality. As the central actor, the ruler sought to implement this philosophy of rule in his relations with all state actors. While Buddhists see the edicts of Ashoka as examples of the promotion of Buddhism, we read into them some information about the structure, philosophy, and mode of operation of the international system in South Asia at that time. Thus, with the success of Maurya Empire’s foreign conquests, a political order transcending ethnic groups and nations emerged in the subcontinent. Moreover, the relationship between states under this order was obviously different from the relationship between the enslaved and the enslaved, the colonized and the colonized under the ancient Roman order, and from the ritualistic relationship under the ancient East Asian order, which was divided by proximity and affinity. The role of Dharma here is similar to the concept of “virtue” (Li) and “ritual” under the tribute system. The international system in South Asia during the Maurya Empire is also partially evidenced by the model of the “Circle of Kings” (Rajamandala) constructed by Kautilya in the Arthashastra.7 Kautilya claims that those kings who strive for victory 7

The manuscript of the Ritual was discovered in the early twentieth century and is said to have been written by Kautilya, the chancellor of the Maurya Empire during the time of Ashoka. It was first translated into English by the Indian scholar R. Shamasastry in 1909 and published in full in 1915: Kautilya, Arthashastra, translated by R. Shamasastry, Bangalore: Bangalore Government Press, 1915. Since then there have been several English editions of the book, such as The Arthasastra/ Kautilya, edited, rearranged, translated, and introduced by L. N. Ranga Rajan, New Delhi: Penguin

2 How the Dharma System Works

305

Fig. 1 Illustration of the “King’s Circle” in the “Theory of Profit”. Source The author’s diagram is based on the description in Chap. 2, Volume 6 of the Theory of Profit. The sun in the center of the diagram represents the core state actors as “conquerors”, the black circle represents “enemies”, the white circle represents “allies”, the black circle represents the “enemy”, the white circle represents the “ally”, and the diagonal circle represents the “neutral”

(vijigishu) are at the center of the mandala,8 their neighbors are natural enemies, and the neighbors of their neighbors (enemies of their enemies) become natural friends (mitra). This creates a concentric circle of friends and enemies, the Circle of Kings (as shown in Fig. 1). This model reflects a world order consisting of concentric circles. The Doctrine of Profit says that all kings of a certain power should and can strive for hegemony and complete unification, becoming “future conquerors” whose ultimate goal is to conquer the entire subcontinent and then rule according to the Dharma. It is noteworthy that Kautilya proposed not only the task of constructing an international system (which other thinkers in ancient India had also thought about) but also the means to accomplish it. For example, the Buddhist masters pinned their hopes for a world order on the “Cokravartir¯aja”, the idea that one day there would be a king with a chakra who would unite the world wherever he went. “The Cokravartir¯aja” has 32 images, was given his chakra by the sky at the time of his reign, and subdued the four directions by turning his chakra. In the Hindu and Buddhist systems, the king is usually a god, and the monarch has a place in the world of reincarnation, but he cannot escape the fate of reincarnation but is only a body of reincarnation. It is even questionable whether the status of the self-sovereign is higher than that of the sovereign of another country. In contrast, the “Circle of Kings” proposed in the Doctrine of Li is the first realistic model of the international system in South Asian history. Significantly, this model differs from the ancient Chinese model of Books India, 1992; The Kautilya’s Arthashastra, Part II, 2nd edition, translated and edited by R. P. Kangle, New Delhi: Motilal Banardisass, 1992. 8 Mandala, a Buddhist and Hindu term meaning "altar" and "field", also refers to all circular patterns.

306

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

the “kinship-state” and the East Asian model of the Chinese tributary system in that it does not extrapolate from the kinship system to an order in which relations and obligations fade according to proximity. In this model, the innermost circles (neighbors) are enemies, while the more distant circles (i.e., “enemies of enemies”) are allies. This model suggests that interstate relations are determined solely by power and are thoroughly realistic. However, it does not address the economic and cultural ties and norms of interaction between states. Examining Ashoka’s concept of Dharma and the model of the international order described in the Arthashastra, we can judge that the international system in South Asia during the Maurya Empire had a distinctly “strong civilizational entity, weak organizational entity” nature. The important manifestation of this is that under this system, national identity and cohesion were mainly religious, while economic and cultural ties were very fragile, and politics were usually divided and centrifugal. It is not inappropriate to consider the Dharma system as an international system based mainly on religious identity. The Dharma system is based on the Hindu-Buddhist concept of Dharma, and because of the special religious nature of this concept, there is a contradiction between it and the real state order. For one thing, the Dharma system is an imaginary order based on the Indian cultural ideal of “complete unity between man and the supernatural”, and the main public goods provided by this system to the region are not the norms of interaction between real actors and the design of mechanisms based on political security and economic relations. Second, the world order under Hinduism and Buddhism’s Dharma is a hierarchical (阶序主义) (请确定一下 “阶序主义” 翻译为hierarchical 是否妥当) order that is formed by giving each actor a specific position in the hierarchical structure, and the community basically maintains its independence by limiting interaction and intermarriage. In the final analysis, it is a caste order close to “mutual indifference”. As a result, there is a lack of integration between communities, loose and fragile ties between states, and limited state power under the Dharma system. This is the main reason why the system is characterized by a strong civilization and a weak organization. Within the territory of the Maurya Empire, the empire and the local powers were to a large extent only a symbolic subordination, the state ruling power was weak, and multi-ethnic and multi-caste groups were separated and politically divided, which was the norm not only when the empire was strong but also in the subcontinental regions after its collapse. The description of the largest state organization of the time, the Maurya Empire, and the international system in the Theory of Profit cannot be overestimated. The empire, as described in Kautilya’s Arthashastra, was a loose and indeterminate union of kingdoms, with weak rule and unstable relations between the empire and the neighboring states. It is also doubtful that many of the governmental departments mentioned in the Doctrine of Profit had any real existence. The people mentioned in the book who appear to be government officials were the leaders of different political entities, such as the chiefs of the earth states and local nobles. The political entities involved in the book are more like associations of autonomous units or self-governing units, each of which seems to have its own complete governing body, leaders, laws, and customs. In other words, even at the height of the Maurya

2 How the Dharma System Works

307

Empire, the ruling power of the state was very limited, and the loose pattern of political relations in the subcontinent remained essentially unchanged. This also means that the establishment and rise, decline and fall of the politically unified Maurya Empire played a lesser role in the maintenance of the international political order in this South Asian region. However, the unity of the subcontinent as a civilization was evident both in the days of the Maurya Dynasty and after its collapse. Although the doctrines of the religious sects that unite the various communities differ greatly, they all have a negative attitude toward this world, recognizing that there is spiritual activity in this world, that the spirit is contaminated by the material world and that the ultimate goal of life is to remove this contamination and attain a state of purity and perfection. Almost all schools accept the theory of karma and rebirth, and they all regard freedom from rebirth and liberation as the highest goal of life. Intellectuals are all concerned with the same problem, namely exploring the unity behind the world and the way to approach this unity. Wherever one went in the subcontinent, regardless of race or language, Vedic knowledge and the Brahmins who possessed it were universally respected, and the discriminatory status of the untouchable was recognized. The Hindu classics, the Vedas and the Books of the Puranas, are available in many local editions and are well known to most people. The ancient religion can provide solace to people all over the subcontinent. The two great epics—the Ramayana and the Mahabharata—have been translated into many local languages and are widely circulated in the subcontinent, and the stories, plays, and legends adapted from them are even more popular among the people. In this way, the two major epics are not only an important part of Indian culture but also play an important role in unifying and uniting it. “In the courts of Tamil and Kanara-speaking localities, the ancient epics Ramayana and Mahabharata were as much read in the intellectual circles of the Taxila in the Western Punjab and Naimisharanya (a Hindu holy place in the present-day Sitapur district, where the ancient sages are said to have written the Book of the Puranas) as they were in the studied with devotion” (Majumdar and Raychaudhuri 1986, p. 14). The Maurya Dynasty, with Buddhist teachings as its tenet, advocated complete pacifism and prohibited mutual killing, even all acts of killing. Among the cliff carvings left by Ashoka are numerous references to nonkilling and repentance for one’s killing behavior. The ideal order is “to be merciful, so that the way of reward and punishment is not misplaced” (Dictionary of Buddhism— Ashoka Inscriptions). Killing is forbidden, and the people are rewarded for their righteousness and freedom from bad karma. This pacifist idea is found in almost all sects of the subcontinent. Although the Dharma system was an ideal, it did not stop Indian politicians from working toward this goal. Many famous kings in Indian history seem to be remembered not for their political conquests and territorial expansion but for their zeal for Dharma. The homogeneity of the subcontinent lies in the homogeneity of civilization, and the fall of the Maurya Dynasty was only the demise of the state form as an organizational entity but not as a civilization. Linked to the characteristic of “strong civilization, weak organization”, the great tension between religious ideas and real interstate relations has been present in the

308

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

international system of the subcontinent during the era of the Maurya Empire and beyond. Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the Doctrine of Profit is the “extreme realism” advocated by the author, Kautilya, in the construction of the international system. He believes that the status of the sovereign is superior to that of other sovereigns, that the interests of the sovereign are superior to those of other countries, that the sovereign must use all means to protect and expand the territory of the state, and that the meaning of the state is to conquer other countries. The “Circle of Kings” envisioned in the Doctrine of Lee is a model of world order based on extreme realism and advocates the typical “law of the jungle”. Although it cannot be said with certainty that Ashoka built the Maurya Empire exactly according to this approach, it is certain that this approach greatly influenced Ashoka, judging from his mass killings of prisoners of war and his repentance in his later years. Ashoka’s Dharma system, which was based on the ideal of “benevolence” and “treating all races, castes, and faiths with love and compassion”, was established by immoral means that were completely contrary to Dharma philosophy. The “Dharma system” of Ashoka was established by such immoral means that are completely contrary to Dharma philosophy. Why, then, does the Doctrine of Profit advocate an extreme realism that is opposed to the thoroughly pacifist spirit of the Dharma and to some extent guides the behavior of the state? This has to do with the deep contradiction between the aforementioned concept of the Dharma and reality. The use of religious thought as a link between communities brings about a religiosity that increases cohesion among people of one faith but hinders the integration of communities of different faiths, weakens the state and its rulers, and prevents the establishment of a certain order within a larger region. The only way to establish an order in a region that has long lacked a tradition of political unity and where nations are at war with each other is to use strength, which is the only way to weaken and control other nations and eventually incorporate them into one’s territory. Moreover, the use of a radical pacifism as the basis of legitimacy for an order in reality raises the question of how to establish a state in the sense of an organism and the political order based on it under such a principle. If one adheres to the total abstention from killing, as advocated in Ashoka’s edict, not only would it be impossible to establish a state in the sense of an organization and a political order based on it, but even daily life would become problematic. Thus, it is understandable that an extreme approach was taken to establish a larger political order. Kautilya, as a vassal of the Maurya Dynasty and Ashoka, first turned the ideal of an international system into reality, perhaps by resorting to extreme realism. The ultrarealist foreign policy is contradictory to the concept of Dharma, and one of the tasks facing the author of the Ritual is to explain the jungle behavior of annexing other countries and establishing hegemony as being in accordance with religious Dharma. In the Hindu context, however, it is not difficult to explain this ambivalence. The essence of “Dharma” is that things operate according to their inherent laws, and the fact that goats eat grass and tigers eat goats in the jungle can be interpreted to mean that both goats and tigers are acting according to their

2 How the Dharma System Works

309

“Dharma”. Brahmins performing religious rituals and warriors killing on the battlefield are also acting according to the law. Perhaps the most famous case in this regard is provided by the Hindu classic, the Bhagavad Gita, in which the chief of the Bhandus, Arjuna, was overcome with compassion before a battle with an enemy army, and the great god Krishna, through the mouth of Arjuna’s charioteer, preached to him the truth of the universe: the soul is immortal, and killing in battle is the “law” of the Kshatriya. Hearing Krishna’s advice, Arjuna, contrary to his sad and compassionate attitude, defeated his enemy by extremely immoral means (Bhagavad Gita, Chinese edition, 1989, pp. 15–24). The two opposing ideas of nonkilling, tolerance, and moderation and the “law of the jungle” of “killing is not killing” are both embodied in the Hindu classics. It is perfectly reasonable to imagine that in a pre-war meeting or on a campaign, Ashoka was as indecisive as the leader of the Pandit army, Arjuna, who was told by Kautilya that the great god Krishna preached to Arjuna that “killing is not killing” (it is believed that the two epics were already in circulation at that time), which led Ashoka to Ashoka’s determination to conquer. In addition, Kautilya advised Ashoka to adopt extreme realism in establishing his hegemony, not by refusing Dharma but by balancing Dharma, Artha (profit) and K¯ama (desire).9 In the context of the Atha Thesis, Kautilya argues that the ultimate goal is not to build a harmonious empire in the sea by ruthless means but to promote Dharma, the eternal moral order that operates according to divinely established principles. The author seems to believe that only after a stable political order is established can the Great Law be better implemented, that conquest is the means and the implementation of the Great Law is the end, and that this is in fact a “military first and then ritual” approach. The contradiction between the advocacy of the “law of the jungle” and the concept of the Great Law may be explained in this way. Despite cultural designs to address the contradictions between religious philosophy and reality, in real life, rulers cannot address such issues without serious internal entanglements. This is demonstrated by the fact that historically Indian kings have always been torn between religious Dharma and realism. According to Buddhist sources, Ashoka, in his later years, recognized the shortcomings of establishing state power through brutal means, awakened and repented from the killings of the conquering Kanishka kingdom, renounced the throne, and converted to Dharma— becoming a devout Buddhist.10 Ashoka was probably the most profoundly introspective and thoroughly corrective monarch in human history for his violent behavior, 9

“A well-thought-out kingship is one that brings law, profit, and desire to its subjects” (Arthashastra, Chapter IV). Hinduism has made Dharma (law), Artha (profit), and K¯ama (desire) the three main goals of life, and the text called Dharma-Sutras, Arthashastra and K¯ama-Sutras. 10 "After eight years of enlightenment and the king of heavenly love and joy, he conquered the kingdom of Karenga. The number of living creatures that were removed from its land [by capturing] was only 150,000, and the number of those killed there was only 100,000, or several times as many. From this, now that he has taken over the kingdom of Karenga, Tian Ai is zealous for the observance of the Law, and for the love of the Law and the teaching of the Law. This is the repentance of Tian Ai for conquering the country of Karenga. In any case, the conquest of the unconquered kingdom, the killing of people, or death or removal in that kingdom, is a cause of anguish, contemplation, and sorrow" (See The Great Southern Tibetan Sutra in Chinese Translation, vol. 65, "The Moment of Ashoka—Chap. 13”).

310

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

and this act of introspection and renunciation based on his religious beliefs can be said to be the direct cause of the decline of the Maurya Dynasty in a very short period of time. The ruler of the empire voluntarily renounced state violence but paid the price of loss of power and the decline of the empire. Few rulers in human history outside the South Asian region seem to have been able to do so. There were more than a few kings, such as Ashoka, in the history of South Asia. It is recorded that Ashoka’s grandfather (founder of the Peacock Dynasty), Chandra Gupta, converted to Jainism in his later years. While it is entirely possible that stories of miracles after Ashoka’s conversion to Buddhism were fabricated by believers for missionary purposes (a common occurrence in Indian history), there is evidence that several kings in South Asian history converted to religion. More importantly, the conversion of these kings to religion, despite the decline of power, was not only blamed but also highly praised, which further illustrates the characteristics of Indian civilization. In this way, on the one hand, religious Dharma is preached as the basis of morality, and on the other hand, extreme realism is employed to establish the real world order; on the one hand, extreme realism is advocated, and on the other hand, extreme realism is most profoundly reflected upon. Both aspects are reflected in the political culture of the subcontinent. The emphasis on religious Dharma made the influence of the South Asian subcontinent on the outside primarily religious. The influence of this system on the world was not primarily one of conquest by force but of cultural expansion and diffusion. “There were no colonies under the Dharma system”. Historically, the South Asian subcontinent has had few external conquests and adventures (only the Jura Dynasty in the eleventh century AD expanded by force into Southeast Asia). In “World Order”, Kissinger compares the ancient Chinese and Indian orders: “China saw no need to go out to discover the world, believing that by promoting morality internally, it had already established order in the world, and the most rational one at that. … Hinduism believes in the reincarnation of history, sees supernatural reality as superior to present worldly experience, treats its world of faith as a complete system, and does not seek to win new converts through conquest or persuasion” (Kissinger). The main outward spread of Indian civilization was religious. Ashoka sent a large number of emissaries and monks, including princes and princesses, to neighboring countries to preach, and it was during this era that Buddhism spread outside India. The aggressive outward spread of Buddhism during the Maurya Dynasty (and later the Kushan Empire of Kanishka) is similar to today’s U.S. efforts to promote democracy and freedom around the world and to China’s efforts to spread “cultural soft power” by opening Confucius Institutes overseas. It is worth noting that the spread of Buddhism differs from the compulsory missionary activities of Western Christianity and Islam in that it has become popular in Asia mainly in a peaceful way, i.e., it is mainly accepted voluntarily and actively internalized in the regions where it is spread. Tibetan Buddhism in the Tibetan and Mongolian regions of China, and so on. In such a large area, the conscious acceptance of Buddhism as a regional public good and its use as an important spiritual link is a cultural miracle of the world, and the emphasis on the spread of cultural soft power with religion (mainly Buddhism)

3 Caste-State: The Form of State Under the Dharma System

311

at its core rather than on conquest by force is perhaps the most important political lesson that the South Asian international system has bequeathed to humanity.

3 Caste-State: The Form of State Under the Dharma System In connection with the Hierarchicus (阶序人), the ancient Indian state took the form of the caste-state. The caste-state was made up of different caste groups and could be called a caste-tribal alliance. The different tribal alliances formed the norm of the ancient Indian state form. Before the British conquered India, there was only one such independent kingdom, not a politically unified India. Even under the British, India was not a fully unified country, and it still had some 600 prince states, covering 45.3% of British India’s total area. These prince states were representative of the “caste-states”. They were under the control of the British colonial authorities and were subordinate to the British, with the princes ruling only nominally and with no right of association with other native states or foreign countries, enjoying a great deal of internal autonomy. They are the autocratic rulers of the people of the state. These states are representative of the caste-state. The caste-state lacks checks on its power, which derives its legitimacy not from popular choice but from the self-proclaimed lineage or religion of the ruler. Indian rulers all claim to be blessed by some deity from a particular caste or religious sect, unlike the rulers of kinship-states in China who claim to be blessed by their ancestors. Moreover, rulers in caste-states often claim to be from a higher caste group. Having a higher class status gives their rule a classist legitimacy that rulers of kin-states do not have. In the absence of clear rules, as in the nation-state system, and of the strong central dynastic power that has long existed in Chinese history, kingdoms have always disappeared quickly, and new ones have emerged. What followed was frequent mutual conquest and warfare between caste-states. Another feature of the caste-states was the constant struggles and disturbances between tribes. These are struggles of the lower castes against the higher castes, and some are struggles of the higher caste classes (or groups of lower caste classes) against the Muslims and other sects, and some are struggles within the lower caste classes or within the higher caste base. In these struggles, many unexpected alliances emerge, alliances between enemies and enemies, alliances between Muslims and lower caste groups, and alliances that yesterday despised each other but today are united and tomorrow may despise each other again. The struggle between such alliances has served to balance and contain powerful authoritarian state institutions such as those in China. India’s history has not been marked by a long period of unity like that of China. It has also prevented the integration of communities and the emergence of large unified communities such as the Han Chinese. There were many protests against social injustice in the caste-states, but unlike in Europe and China, these were rarely directed against the ruling authorities in

312

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

India; the protests were only against the social order controlled by the Brahmins and often manifested themselves as heretical religious movements, such as Jainism or Buddhism, to deny the metaphysical foundations of the present worldly order. Therefore, social protest movements did not bring about substantial changes in the social system. Moreover, because the caste system divided people into relatively closed groups, there were no large-scale peasant revolts in Indian history as there were in China. The struggles between Indian alliances have also generally been difficult to polarize. Indian alliances differed from Chinese patriarchal rivalries. The kind of patriarchal society in China, with its frequent practice of guilt by association, extermination of clans and intergenerational hunting, is difficult to imagine in Indian society. The ruling figures in India were also autocratic, but not in the same way that kings were arbitrary in China. Rulers in caste-states are more held back by caste alliances and religious practices. The rulers of caste-states had different titles, the most common being Raja (king) or Maha Raja (great king). The Hindi root of Raja, however, is “to shine, to lead”, “to satisfy”, indicating that the king’s authority over the tribe depended on the consensus of the people. The rulers of caste-states were more like a type of clan chief or chieftain, many kings did not have taxing powers, and the land within the kingdom lacked clear private rights in the modern sense. In such states, people have a weak concept of nationhood and are insensitive to the question of who is the ruler. India has been repeatedly subject to alien domination throughout its history and has remained divided.

4 The Psycho-Cultural Roots of the Dharma System The relationship between the Human Constant of Lun Jen and the ancient Chinese concept of the world, as well as the East Asian international system with China at its core, has been analyzed from a psycho-culturological perspective (see Chaps. 5 and 6 of this book). Along these lines, the following section will discuss the relationship between the characteristics of the international system in South Asia and the Hindu Human Constant. The Hindu Human Constant is the Hierarchicus. The Hierarchicus is a subcategory of the Contextual Jen and can be called the Hindu Human Constant. The concept of the Hierarchicus was proposed by the French sociologist Louis Domont.11 He defines the 11

The concept of the Hierarchicus was front the French comparative sociologist L. Dumont’Homo Hierarchicus (Dumont 1980, p. 18). As we know, the scientific name for “man” is Homo sapiens, where Homo is the genus Homo and sapiens is the species Homo sapiens. Dumont uses the term Homo Hierarchicus to refer to the Human Constant in Indian society, which is characterized by a strong interdependence between human beings, unified and divided according to the principle of caste. The term Homo Aequalis, Homo Individualis, is used instead to refer to the modern Western Human Constant. The most important feature of the composition of the life package of the Hierarchicus is that gods, priests, and religious teachers (Gurus) occupy an important place and that devotion to supernatural activities is an important means of achieving psychosocial equilibrium.

4 The Psycho-Cultural Roots of the Dharma System

313

Hierarchicus as “the principle used to rank the elements of a whole according to their relation to the whole. We know that in most societies, it is religion that provides the holistic view, and therefore, the ranking is often religious. In traditional Hindu society, religious hierarchy permeates all areas of social life, social organization and people’s lives are hierarchical, and Hindu society has a distinctly hierarchical character. The Hierarchicus refers to the state of existence of interdependent people in Hindu society, which is unified and divided according to the hierarchical principle” (Dumont 1980, 1089). From the category point of view, the Hierarchicus is also a Human Constant characterized by “emphasizing the mutuality of man and weakening the individuality of man”. It is a subcategory of the Contextual Jen, which corresponds to the Individual Jen. From the psycho-culturological point of view, the most important feature of this Human Constant is that the gods and the priesthood occupy an important place in the “life package” (the third layer of the PSH model) to the extent that they dilute the role of kin members. The position of human beings and the responsibilities, duties, and rights associated with them are on a long ladder based primarily on the religious notions of “pure” and “impure” and are grouped in the form of caste, which forms the basis of Hindu society. The society built on this Human Constant is called “caste society”, and the values espoused by “caste society” are Brahma (The Ultimate Reality of the Universe), Atman (Soul), Dharma (the ultimate law of the universe), M¯ay¯a (illusion), and Mokosa (liberation from the cares of the world, attaining a state of immortality). These concepts constitute the key words of Hindu society, which is most completely expressed in Hindu classics and constitutes “Hierarchicalism” (阶 序人主义). Indian civilization can be said to be the most splendid fruit of mankind under the Human Constant of the Hierarchicus (Huipeng 2013). If an international system is understood as a particular pattern of community relations, then caste, the most important social grouping of orderly people, also affects the order of actors in the international system. This problem can be expressed in psycho-cultural terms: people in a certain Human Constant see and deal with the “Outer World” in a way that corresponds to their Human Constant (Huipeng 2013). According to the logic of our analysis, the international system in South Asia, the Dharma system, is different from both the ancient East Asian system of the world based on the Lun Jen and the modern international system based on the Individual Jen. It is an international system linked to the Human Constant of the Hindu, the Hierarchicus. In the Indian religion, Dharma is a caste-based order, and the Dharma system is a cosmic order extrapolated from the hierarchical principle, which can be regarded as the externalization of the caste order to a certain extent. To a certain extent, it can be regarded as the externalization of the caste order. The order constituted by each community is only a part of the total order of the universe. An international system is also a kind of society, and the values and behaviors of the core actors will influence the noncore actors within the system, i.e., the phenomenon of socialization will occur. The socialization that occurs under the Dharma system may be called the generalization of the caste system. The hierarchical principle plays an important role in the relationships people enter into. For details see author’s another work (Huipeng 2013).

314

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

In contrast to the hierarchical groups of other societies in the world, caste is based on the “hierarchical principle”, which is concluded on the basis of the distance between man and supernatural forces (“the ultimate reality”). People are ranked according to their distance from supernatural forces, and the measure of distance is the degree of religious “purity” and “impurity”. The hierarchical principle solidified the sacred nature of caste groups in limiting interaction, contact, and intermarriage. Those of different nationalities were usually considered “unclean”, and Hindu did not intermarry and interact with them, making them a de facto caste group. The caste system was a good self-protection mechanism that allowed Hindu civilization to survive the constant external blows, but it hindered the integration of communities, affected interethnic cultural absorption, and determined the pattern of intercommunal relations and the character of the international system in South Asia.12 “Sanskritization”13 is a concept used to describe the interaction of relations between tribal groups under the caste order. In Hindu society, the gods, ideas, and lifestyles of the higher castes are mostly recorded in Sanskrit literature, and the lower castes and tribes outside the caste system will give up their beliefs and lifestyles and imitate the higher castes to improve their social status, a process called “Sanskritization”. Although in reality, those lower castes who imitate the beliefs and lifestyles of higher castes do not necessarily improve their social status, this concept reveals the characteristics of interaction and integration among Hindu social groups, that is, those who are at the bottom of the caste system or outside the system, mainly through “ordination”—a recognized place on the caste ladder—as a form of acceptance of the Hindu social order. As Hindu civilization spread from the core to the periphery, those tribes or communities living in the periphery were not usually “assimilated”, but became a distinct, internally intermarried caste group by accepting some Hindu beliefs and norms of behavior. Of course, we can also call the process of joining the Hindu caste system “assimilation”, but it is a different kind of assimilation, which is to treat the communities in the marginal areas as a relatively independent part, recognizing their beliefs and customs but not intermarrying with them, so that they become a special caste group in the ladder. In this way, the marginalized groups 12

Japanese scholar Chie Nakane’s examination of Han-Tibetan and Hindu-Tibetan relations in the border area between India and Tibet provides authentic materials for understanding the interaction between Hindu and other ethnic groups. According to her report, Han-Tibetan interactions here have resulted in some characteristic interethnic marriages, for example, Han men and Tibetan women usually live in Tibetan areas, while Tibetan wives are rarely seen moving to and living in Han areas. At the same time, those Chinese families who have lived in Tibetan areas for several generations have been Tibetanized, and it is impossible to tell whether they are Tibetans or Chinese. However, in the neighboring Indo-Tibetan areas on the Indian side, there are almost no Indians living in Tibetan areas. Indians have much less contact with Tibetans than the Han Chinese have with Tibetans. Although many Tibetans are in an admiring mood toward India, intermarriage between Indians and Tibetans rarely occurs because Indians have always strictly practiced caste endogamy within them (Chie 2007). What Nakane’s report is actually a common pattern of Hindu’ dealings with foreigners. 13 “Sanskritization” is a concept proposed by the Indian sociologist Srinivas, and the author has discussed this issue specifically (Huipeng 2001). Chie Nakane keenly notes that this concept is similar to the concept of “Sinicization” which describes the acceptance of Chinese customs and ideas by non-Han Chinese in Chinese society (Chie 2007).

4 The Psycho-Cultural Roots of the Dharma System

315

are recognized as a relatively independent part of the ladder but are not intermarried, making them a special caste group in the ladder that exists alongside the core people. One obvious result of this approach is that Hindu culture is less of a “melting pot” and more of a platter. Most of the countries and regions that we see mentioned in the history of South Asia and in historical documents are named after ethnic groups because the identity of an ethnic group is not primarily based on its geography but on religion and caste.14 In this order, the world may be seen as an enlarged caste system. “Sanskritization” is also reflected in the attitude and relations of Hindu toward foreign peoples. We know that in most parts of the world, when two groups representing different civilizations encounter each other, the general route of integration follows: either the conqueror representing the later civilization replaces the original civilization, or the original civilization is assimilated. In the subcontinent, however, due to the influence of the caste system, most of the alien peoples who came to the subcontinent were not assimilated and did not replace the original cultural forms but existed as a relatively independent part, thus increasing the ethnic and cultural diversity of India. For example, the presumed nomadic Aryans were not fully integrated with the indigenous peoples (Dravidian peoples). The invasion and domination of the Turks in the Middle Ages brought about a dichotomy between Islamic and Hindu cultures (and between Muslims and Hindu). The Persians who arrived in India also maintained their own distinct religion and culture to distinguish themselves from the Hindu. Some of the minorities who entered India gradually embraced Hindu culture and became Hindu after settling in India, but even then, they were usually not assimilated but maintained a relatively separate cultural and ethnic identity as a particular caste group. For example, the Huns and Serbs who had conquered North India, after the conquest, the Brahmin priests performed religious ceremonies for them to “Sanskritize” them, and they became a caste group (of Kshatriy) but still maintained their own cultural individuality. “India, on the other hand, did not try to convert foreign invaders to the Indian religion or to Indian culture, but accepted them with equanimity. India accepted all the achievements and diverse ideas brought by foreigners and never showed any special respect for any party. The invaders built majestic monuments to themselves whenever possible, as if to prove their greatness in the face of local indifference. However, the core culture of the Indian population is comfortable with foreign influences and is impervious to fire and water” (Kissinger 2015, p. 247). The reason lies in India’s caste system. I tend to think that “Sanskritization” is not only a form of caste change in India but also a way of integration of communities in the subcontinent and the “socialization” of international actors under the “Dharma system”. Actors become part of this system through Sanskritization (recognizing the caste system and consciously defining a place for themselves within it). 14

Names such as Gujarat, Bihar, Assam, Tamil, etc., are based on the names of the major ethnic groups in this area. This is in contrast to the perception of many Chinese place names based on geographical features (e.g. Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, Shanxi, Heilongjiang, etc. (Huipeng 2004, p. 235).

316

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

The caste system impedes ethnic integration, which makes it more difficult to form a broad political order as the norm in South Asia. Under such circumstances, it is natural that the state lacks strong forms of organization and social mobilization. The ladder of order that is caste ultimately points to the divine, and from this order itself cannot be deduced a strong state organization and an international order with it as the central actor. The power of the king in Indian history was very limited, and the ruler of the state was only the protector of the caste order, and the power of the state was sometimes interpreted as limited to the “protection of cattle and Brahmins” (m¯anava-Dharma-´sa¯ stra), while the monks were always above the officials and even the king. From the experience of the “Dharma system” established during the Maurya Dynasty, it seems that the establishment and maintenance of a political order on a larger scale in South Asia required two conditions: one was the subjugation of forces through extreme realism, resulting in some kind of transcendent political order; the other was the promotion of an ideology that could weaken the caste system to some extent. The other was the promotion of an ideology that would to some extent weaken the caste system, and this was Buddhism, which Ashoka promoted. In the era of the Maurya Dynasty when Buddhism was prevalent, although caste still formed the basis of society, it was suppressed to a certain extent, and its closedness was weakened. This is manifested in the following: Brahminical legal literature made new additions and explanations to the caste system and recognized many “mixed castes” arising from intermarriage between different occupational groups, tribes, or ethnic groups.15 In addition to the Maurya Dynasty, the Kushan Empire that emerged later to rule the whole of North India also conquered many kingdoms by force, creating an international order in what is today North India and Central Asia, ruled by Buddhists who actively practiced Buddhism.16 However, as mentioned earlier, the state as an organizing body under this order has always been fragile, and unity could not be maintained for long, and after a brief collapse of the unified order, it always fell back into the norm of division.

5 The Impact of the Dharma System on Modern South Asia The “strong civilization, weak organization” character of the South Asian international system, which continued to influence modern times, predetermined the fate of India as a complete colony of the West in the face of Western challenges in modern times. Modern India accepted the international system of Western origin, or rather, the political order of the South Asian subcontinent established in modern times

15

The Manava-Dharma-Sastra treats the Persians, Greeks and Serbs who invaded India as "fallen Kshatriyas", indicating the increase of intercaste marriages at that time (Chap. 10 of ManavaDharma-Sastra). 16 Another example illustrating the popularity of the more open Buddhism with pagan rulers is King Mehranta (reigned BC.165–BC.130), who had Greek roots.

5 The Impact of the Dharma System on Modern South Asia

317

was part of the modern Western international system. The establishment and maintenance of a political order in modern South Asia on a larger scale also fulfilled the two conditions mentioned above. The first was the subjugation of various local powers by means of realism. When the Western colonizers invaded South Asia, the region was politically divided, with ethnic groups and religions opposing each other. The British conquered the small kingdoms by force and established a political order, and India became a colony of Western countries. The second was the weakening of the caste system. The Western political system provided a link between the divided communities in this region, and the principle of secularism associated with this system served to weaken the caste system and religion. Modern political democracy became the new basis for cohesion and identity among the various localities, castes, and sects of India, creating what might be called a “plywood” type of cohesion. Although India is part of the modern nation-state system, the concept of “nation-state” is not sufficient to express the richness of India as a civilization that is a world in itself, and like China, it faces the problem of squeezing the richness of civilization into the narrow concept of “nation-state”. Like China, it faces the dilemma of squeezing the richness of civilization into the narrow concept of “nation-state”. The cohesive bonds of modern democratic political systems are not strong, and the fragility of Indian state power is perhaps one of the political legacies that India inherited from antiquity. Although the British unified India, this unity was fragile, and caste and sectarian rivalries remained strong, in addition to the hundreds of native states that remained outside the administration of the British colonial government under Anglo-Indian rule. Religion unites a group, provides cohesion and trust, and is the “glue” that holds the community together. Especially when it is associated with the caste system, a civilizational device for classifying human communities, it is a knife that divides people. In recent history, leaders of national movements such as Mahatma Gandhi used Hindu language and means to awaken patriotism, an approach that, while effective for Hindu, alienated Muslims and other non-Hindu and exacerbated sectarian tensions between Hindu and Muslims. The Indo-Muslim sectarian conflict culminated in the political consequences of the partition of India and Pakistan and the ensuing mass killings by the two major sects. This shows that the emphasis on national identity in India is inevitably linked to an emphasis on religion, which contradicts the secularist policies that the Indian government has been pursuing and has the effect of exacerbating religious tensions and conflicts. Today’s government wants to unite Indians through propaganda such as “We are all Indians”, but it struggles to find a strong bond of concrete unity. Because the identity of the modern nation-state is usually based on nationalism, the identity of the nation-state needs to be linked to civilizational elements such as a common language and a common religious belief, but the role of strengthening religious and linguistic identities has often stimulated ethno-religious conflicts in India. In recent years, Hindu nationalism has sought to use the revival of Hinduism as a spiritual and cultural link to integrate and unify Indian civilization, thereby expanding outward and contributing to the rise of India and the “Indian Century”. In India, there are sectarian conflicts, caste conflicts (mainly between “untouchables” and caste Hindu), and ethnic conflicts (ethnic separatist movements in the Northeast). In recent years, developments at home and abroad have

318

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

shown that Hindu nationalism, rather than lacking the centripetal and cohesive force that would unify Indian civilization, has often become a source of internal division, and within India, Hindu nationalism has become a major stimulus for centrifugalism among Muslims, lower castes, and other communities and often a source of extremist violence.17 In the 2014 Indian general elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, to which both former Prime Minister Pajwaj and current Prime Minister Narendra Modi belong) won. The BJP is considered to be a nationalist party, with a distinctly sectarian slogan of “Hindutva” (Hindu identity). If they are confined to party views, they can be quite destructive to the democratic system because in India, which is quite diverse in terms of religion and ethnicity, building a national identity based on religious and ethnic factors is bound to tear apart the foundations of the modern state. The combination of sectarianism, caste, and democracy has led to a weak social mobilization of the national government. The heavy burden of historical legacy has made India today a political stumbling giant. It has been argued that the influence of the Dharma system in South Asia as a collective memory has been mainly manifested in the “Greater India Circle” and the “Great Nation” in the minds of certain political and intellectual elites in India. The dream of a “Great Nation” (Zhang 2013). For example, some Indian scholars have proposed the idea of an India-centered “mandala community”, and some political figures have publicly expressed their admiration for the legacy of Kautilya’s international political thought. Former Indian Foreign Minister Yashwan Sinha bluntly used the “mandala model” to explain India’s foreign strategy. He emphasized that “the ‘mandala circle’ that Kautilya spoke of has increasingly become a useful framework for thinking about India’s foreign policy” (Imtiaz 1993). However, we cannot overestimate the impact of ancient political experience on today’s India. Historical memory may be a source of national pride for today’s India, but the international political legacy that the ancient Dharma system can offer to today’s Indians is too weak, and the memory of the “mandala community” is mainly textual, South Asian, and the “mandala community” is not a source of pride. The historical emergence of an international order as an organizing power and its core actors was too brief and weak to provide a model for the construction of a stable regional international order in India today. Even if someone, under the influence of realism, were to attempt to construct a “Greater India Circle” in South Asia today with India as the central actor, the difficulties would be much greater than in the days of the Peacock Dynasty. This is not only because the modern international system is able to prevent the naked conquest of any sovereign state by force as advocated in the Doctrine of Profit but also because Buddhism, which was the basis of the legitimacy of the Dharma system and the spiritual link between the various actors under the Dharma system, has become a major factor in the construction of the Dharma system today. Buddhism, which was the basis of the legitimacy of the Dharma system and the spiritual link between 17

An article by Sumit Ganguly titled "Modi’s Two-Faced Approach" was published on March 26, 2015, on the website of the U.S. magazine Foreign Affairs. The article argues that the government’s ambiguous approach to the rise of Hindu extremism since the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in May 2014 runs counter to Modi’s productive diplomatic efforts since he became prime minister (Sumit 2015).

References

319

the various actors under it, has changed considerably in the region today: India itself is a predominantly Hindu country with only 0.2% of its population being Buddhist. Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia are Buddhist countries, while others (such as Pakistan and Bangladesh) have become predominantly Islamic. The reality of regional cooperation in South Asia today may serve as an example to prove this point: at a time of increasing regional cooperation, the progress of regional cooperation in South Asia has been extremely slow due to the sharp religious and ethnic conflicts among countries in the region and the lack of a basis for cultural cohesion. Although the South Asian Regional Cooperation Organization, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, was established in 1985 (members are eight countries, namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan), and trade, tourism, environment, and although a number of cooperation documents have been signed in trade, tourism, environment, education, etc., the situation in South Asia, which is difficult to make substantial progress in regional cooperation, is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

References Amitav, Acharya. 2015. Global international relations and the Chinese school of international relations theory: Are they compatible. Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics) 2. Ashoka Inscriptions. http://www.fodian.org/DCD9/2011-05-21/74228.html. Accessed: 2015-1101. Bhagavad Gita. 1989. Translated by Zhang Baosheng. China Social Science Press. Chie, Nakane. 2007. China and India: Cultural borderlands from an anthropological perspective. Journal of Peking University Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition(Beijing Daxue Xuebao) 2. Dumont, Louis. 1980. Homo Hierarchicus: The caste and Its Implications. Translated by Mark Saintsbury, Louis Dumont and BasiaGualti. Nature of Human Society (NHS). Hsu, F.L.K. 1983. Rugged Individualism Reconsidered: Essays in Psychological Anthropology, Univ of Tennessee Pr; 1st. Chinese version, Collected Works of Hsu, F. L. K (Xu Langguang zhuzuoji), vol. IX, Tai Bei, Nantian Shuji, 2002. Huipeng, Shang. 2001. Caste and Hindu Society (Zhongxing yu Yindujiao shehui). Peking University Press. Huipeng, Shang. 2004. A Study of Indian Cultural Traditions: A Comparative Cultural Perspective (Yindu wenhua chuantong yanjiu: bijiao wenhua de shiye). Peking University Press. Huipeng, Shang. 2013. Essentials of Psycho-culturology: Theory and Method for Large-Scale Comparative Studies of Literate Civilizations (xin li wenhua xue yaoyi: da guimo wenming shehui bijiao yanjiu de liun yu fangfa). Press of Peking University. Imtiaz, Ahmed. 1993. State and Foreign Policy: India’s Role in South Asia. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. Kissinger. 2015. World Order (Chinese version: Shijie zhixu). CITIC Press. Liu, Ming. 2004. Comparison of international system and world society, international order and world order concepts. Social Science (Shehui Kexue) 2. Majumdar, R.C., and H.C. Raychaudhuri, et al. 1986. An Advanced History of India (Chinese version: Gaoji Indushi), vol. 1. Commercial Press.

320

17 State and International System of Ancient South Asia

Sumit, Ganguly. 2015. Modi’s Balancing Act, India’s conservative social agenda threatens its foreign policy. Foreign Affairs. Zhang, Jincui. 2013. The doctrine of profit and the classical roots of India’s diplomatic strategy. Foreign Affairs Review (Waijiao Pinglun) 2.

Appendix

Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

All Under Heave The Chinese phrase “Tianxia” (天下) is a concept that has been used in ancient Chinese philosophy and political thought. One of the earliest references to this concept can be found in the Chinese classic text “Zhou Li” (周礼), which dates back to the Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BCE). Later, the concept of “Tianxia” was further developed by scholars and philosophers, such as Confucius, Mencius, and Han Feizi, who discussed the political and ethical implications of the concept in their respective works. Historically, the term was used to describe the Chinese empire and its people, who believed that they lived in the center of the world, surrounded by “barbarians” beyond their borders. The idea of “Tianxia” reflected the notion of a harmonious and centralized political order, with the emperor as the ultimate authority. In more recent times, “Tianxia” has taken on a broader meaning, encompassing the idea of a world order in which all nations are united and coexist peacefully under a common framework. The concept is sometimes used in the context of discussions about globalization, international relations, and the future of the world order.

Amae (甘 甘え) Japanese psychiatrist Kenro Doi proposed this term to refer to the psychological dependence of children on their mothers. It is the law of exchanging relationships between people in the intimate circle of Japanese people.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 H. Shang, People (Jen), State and Inter-state Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6120-7

321

322

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

Amaterasu (ア アマテラス) Japanese concepts, the traditional great god of Japan, are considered to be the ancestor of the Japanese people.

Artha Artha is a Sanskrit word that refers to the concept of wealth, material prosperity, and worldly success in Indian culture and philosophy. It is one of the four main goals of human life in Hinduism, along with Dharma (duty and righteousness), K¯ama (pleasure), and Moksha (liberation). In Hindu philosophy, Artha is considered to be a necessary aspect of life and is seen as a legitimate pursuit, as long as it is not obtained through unethical means or at the expense of others. The acquisition of wealth and material prosperity is seen as a means to secure a person’s physical and financial well-being and to provide the means to fulfill their other goals and responsibilities in life. However, Artha is not considered to be an end in itself but rather a means to an end. It is believed that a person must balance their pursuit of wealth and material prosperity with the other three goals of life to lead a harmonious and fulfilling life.

Atman Atman is a Sanskrit word that refers to the concept of the self or the individual soul in Hinduism. In Hindu philosophy, Atman is seen as the essential, unchanging, and eternal essence of each person and is believed to be identical to the ultimate reality of Brahman. According to Hindu teachings, Atman is an integral part of the universe and is said to exist even before physical birth and to persist after physical death. It is believed that Atman is the source of consciousness and that it transcends the physical body and the material world. The goal of Hinduism is to attain self-realization, which is understood as the realization of the true nature of the Atman. This is seen as the ultimate goal of human life and is believed to lead to liberation from the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth and union with Brahman.

Brahman Brahman is a Sanskrit word that refers to the ultimate reality or the absolute, eternal, and unchanging essence of the universe in Hinduism. Brahman is considered to be the ultimate source of all existence and is seen as the ultimate reality that underlies and transcends all things. In Hindu philosophy, Brahman is seen as the underlying

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

323

essence of all things, including the self or the soul. It is believed that everything in the universe, from individual beings to the physical world, is a manifestation of Brahman and that the ultimate goal of human life is to realize the true nature of the self and to attain union with Brahman.

Caste Caste is a social and economic system that was historically prevalent in South Asian societies, particularly in India, where individuals were grouped into hierarchical communities known as castes. The caste system assigned individuals to a specific caste based on birth and defined the occupations and social status that a person could have within that caste. This system led to discrimination and social exclusion based on caste, with certain castes considered to be of higher status and others of lower status. The caste system has been officially outlawed in India, but it continues to impact the social and economic opportunities of many individuals in the country. The caste system remains a controversial and sensitive issue, with ongoing efforts to address the effects of this historical system and promote social equality.

Caste-State Associated with this basic interpersonal state of order people, the form of state in ancient India was the caste-state. The caste-state consisted of different caste groups, which can be called a caste-tribal alliance. Different tribal alliances constituted the norm of the ancient Indian state form. The caste-state is a form of state associated with the Hierarchicus, the Hindu Human Constant.

Cefeng (册 册封) Chinese concepts, a system whereby central dynasties granted the title of king to the rulers of neighboring states and regions as a sign of recognition of their legitimacy.

Chinese Human Constant—Lun Jen (伦 伦人) Chinese Human Constant belongs to a subtype of the Contextual. The main characteristic of this Human Constant is that the members of relatives constitute the main members of “close people” in the individual’s life package, and the individual’s

324

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

relationship with them is constant and long-lasting in a stable and intimate interpersonal network. “Beloved things” are mainly related to ancestors and family, such as ancestral tablets and ancestral halls. “Believed ideas” are mainly filial piety, Baoen (repayment of gratitude), Renqing (human feelings), Guanxi (relationship), etc. Because the life package is relatively stable, individuals can obtain psychosocial balance without using the contents outside the third layer of SHP, so human psychological and behavioral patterns are characterized by constancy and static. In such a society where Human Constants prevail, the clan, concluded on the kinship principle and directly extended from the family, is the predominant secondary grouping, and nonkinship, nonterritorial voluntary groups are not developed. The form of the state is the kinship-state (patriarchal state), where the family and the state are coconstituted, and the ruling ethic of the state extends from the family ethic.

Chinese Tributary System (朝 朝贡体系) The Chinese tribute system was an international system in ancient East Asia in which China was the central player. Under this system, smaller neighboring countries paid tribute to the Chinese emperor in the form of goods. This tribute was seen as a symbol of their submission to the emperor’s authority and recognition of China’s superiority. In return, the emperor would grant tributary states protection, trade benefits, and other privileges. The tribute system (an important aspect of China’s foreign relations) was used to establish and maintain relations with countries throughout Asia, including Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and various nomadic tribes in Central Asia. The tribute system was based on kinship-states, which were linked to each other by proposed kinship ties. The Chinese tribute system was first proposed by James Legge, a nineteenth-century British diplomat, in his book “Outline of Chinese History” (1861).

Civilization Entity One of the two sides of the state value system, behavioral style, basic human state.

The Contextual Jen (间 间人, or Just “The Contextual” for Short) The Contextual is proposed by Japanese scholar Eshun Hamaguchi to refer to a basic Human Constant that emphasizes human mutuality and weakens human individuality, as opposed to another basic Human Constant, the Individual, which emphasizes human individuality and weakens human mutuality. The Human Constant of Chinese,

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

325

Japanese, and Hindu belong to the Contextual type, while the Human Constant of American and west European belongs to the individual. According to this classification, the value formulation system of the contextual people is called “contextualism”, and the value formulation system of the individual people is called “individualism”.

Dharma Dharma is a Sanskrit word with multiple meanings in Indian culture and philosophy. It refers to the concept of duty, righteousness, and moral law. In Hinduism, Dharma is considered to be an essential aspect of an individual’s life and is often viewed as a duty or responsibility that must be fulfilled to lead a virtuous and fulfilling life. In Hinduism, Dharma is often considered to be one of the four main goals of human life, along with Artha (wealth), K¯ama (pleasure), and Moksha (liberation). Each individual is believed to have a specific Dharma that is based on their caste, age, and gender, and it is considered the responsibility of each person to fulfill their Dharma to maintain balance and harmony in the world.

Dharma System Ancient South Asian International System. The system is based on the caste-state and is associated with the Hierarchicus, the Hindu Human Constant. In such system states are linked by the pseudohierarchical principle. It has the characteristics of a strong civilized body and a weak organized body. Under this system, religion plays an important role in state relations, and the state has been politically fragmented for a long time.

Differential Pattern Differential Pattern A model of Chinese interpersonal relationships proposed by Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong. In the differential pattern, each person forms a network centered on himself or herself. This is similar to throwing a stone into a lake, and taking the stone (individual) as the central point, a circle of ripples is formed around it, and the distance of the ripples can indicate the closeness of social relations.

326

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

Giri (義 義理) An important concept in Japanese culture is that of morality, responsibility, and obligation to others, sometimes including responsibilities and obligations that one does not wish to assume but must. Compliance with “righteousness” is an important factor in gaining social respect and recognition, while violation of “righteousness” may lead to social discontent and shame.

Guanxi (关 关系) Guanxi (relationship) is an important concept in Chinese culture, referring to the relationship between people. In China, “Guanxi” is considered to be an important factor in social interaction and business activities and has a great influence on individuals and organizations. In China, building and maintaining good “relationships” is an important factor in achieving success, and the lack of good “relationships” can lead to a variety of problems. A “relationship” can be defined in this sense as “a special relationship” or “particularistic ties”. Some define it as “friendship”, “connection”, “exchange”, “social capital”, or “social resources” (social capital).

Hakko Ichiu (八 八紘一宇) Hakko Ichiu is a national motto proposed by Japan during the World War II, which originally meant “one world, one family, one world”. However, in the atmosphere of the time, it was a national system with the goal of assimilating all the peoples of the world, invading and expanding abroad, and establishing a family system.

The Hierarchicus (阶 阶序人) The Hindu Human Constant is a subtype of the Contextual. The term Hierarchicus comes from Homo Hierarchicus used by French sociologist Louis Dumont, who used the term to describe the hierarchical structure of traditional Indian society. The Hierarchicus in psycho-culturology describes the Hindu Human Constant. The characteristics of this Human Constant can be summarized as follows: gods, priests, and religious gurus are important members of the “close people” of the individual “life package” (the third layer of psychosocial balance). “Believed things” are things related to religion, such as statues and temples. “Believed ideas” are Dharma, Atman, Muksa, etc., which are related to religious transcendence. The pursuit of religious transcendence and the pursuit of higher status in the caste sequence are important

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

327

elements of the psychosocial dynamic equilibrium, so human psychological and behavioral patterns are introspective and spiritual in character. In such a society where Human Constants are dominant, caste concluded by the hierarchy principle is the most important secondary grouping. This Human Constant also affects the relationship between communities. The state form of caste society is the caste-state, i.e., a union formed by an unequal number of caste groups.

Hindutva Hindutva is a term used to describe a Hindu nationalist ideology that seeks to establish India as a Hindu-only nation and to promote Hindu values and culture as the dominant cultural and political force in the country. The term was popularized by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, a Hindu nationalist leader and intellectual, in the early twentieth century, and it has since become a central component of Hindu nationalist thought and political action in India.

Honzon (本 本尊) Japanese concept that refers to the most important Buddha worshiped by a monastery.

Human Constant (基 基本人际状态) Human Constant is one of the core concepts of psycho-culturology proposed by Francis L. K. Hsu, a Chinese-American psychological anthropologist. It is a system of human existence. It consists roughly of layer 4 (expressible Conscious), layer 3 (intimate society and culture), and layer 5 (unexpressible conscious) of the psychosocial homeostasis and part of layer 2 (operative society and culture) (Shaded part in the illustration in Fig. 2.1, psychosocial equilibrium schema of this book). In any culture, human existence is inseparable from other people, objects, and cultural ideas that one has betrayed emotionally (i.e., “intimate society and culture”), which are as indispensable to human existence as water and air and are therefore called Human Constant. The Human Constant is equivalent to the Chinese concept of “Jen” (personage).

328

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

Iemoto (家 家元) Iemoto originally refers to a group that is orthodox in the field of some traditional performing arts (such as flower arrangement and tea ceremony) in Japanese society and is responsible for the transmission and promotion of the arts. The master and the apprentice in the organization form a hierarchical relationship. This form of organization is widespread in all areas of Japanese society.

Iemoto State A special type of political community that is both a political and religious community and a family community. It differs from the nation-state in that it is a community formed on the basis of family rather than nationality, and the members of the community are linked to the leader of the state (usually the emperor) by a mimetic family bond; the sovereignty of the state is not merely embodied in the right to rule politically but is also combined with divine authority as well as the right to govern by the family. The legitimacy of the regime of the family-generated state was not derived from the mandate of the people but from an imagined qualification of divine endowment.

The Individual Jen (个 个人, or Just “The Individual” for Short) The individual is a basic type of Human Constant characterized by an emphasis on the individuality of people and a weakening of their mutuality; this type is predominant in Western societies. Since it is a type of Human Constant, it can also be called the individual.

Japanese Human Constant—Yuan Jen (缘 缘人) The Japanese Human Constant is a subtype of the Contextual Jen. The third layer of psychosocial equilibrium is not strictly distinguished from the second layer, so the relationship between kin members is diluted. The “beloved things” and “believed ideas” in the life package are similar to those of the Lun Jen, but they are diluted to some extent. It is somewhat more difficult for individuals in the society of Yuan Jen to achieve psychosocial balance than for the Lun Jen, but easier than for individuals in the Human Constant. In a society where Human Constants are dominant, the Iemoto

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

329

that concludes with the kin-tract principle (half-blood, half-contract principle) is the most important secondary grouping, and the state form has some characteristics of the Iemoto.

Jen (人 人) In the Chinese context, Jen has two meanings: one is a kind of morality, i.e., benevolent, which is the highest moral code advocated by Confucianism and written as “仁” in Chinese; the other is Human being, which is written as “人” in Chinese. Both characters have the same pronunciation but are written in different ways. This book uses the second meaning of Jen (人). Jen does not mean individual, it is a relationship, is a system of human existence. According to Francis L. K. Hsu’s suggestion, Jen means Human Constant, roughly includes the fourth and third layers of psychosocial homeostasis and a small part of the fifth and second layers. Jen can be thought of briefly as “the individual person plus the life package (the third layer of the psychosocial homeostasis)”. Jen (Human Constant) has different types, and the individual in Western society is just a special form of Human Constant (see Chap. 2 of this book).

Jifu (畿 畿服) Chinese Jifu is an international system of the Zhou Dynasty. The Zhou Dynasty of China had a system of dividing the areas outside the king’s capital into several large regions according to their relationship to the dynasty and their proximity to the king’s capital.

Jimi (羁 羁縻) The ancient Chinese way of governing minority groups on the frontier. The central dynasty set up highly autonomous administrative units in these areas, recognized the rule of local indigenous chiefs, made them princes and lords, paid them generous salaries, and incorporated them into the system of imperial administration.

K¯ama K¯ama is a Sanskrit word that refers to the concept of desire, pleasure, and sensual enjoyment in Indian culture and philosophy. It is one of the four main goals of human life in Hinduism, along with Dharma (duty and righteousness), Artha (wealth and

330

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

material prosperity), and Moksha (liberation). In Hindu philosophy, K¯ama is seen as a legitimate pursuit and an important aspect of life, as long as it does not conflict with or compromise with one’s Dharma or duty. The enjoyment of physical and emotional pleasure is seen as a way to bring happiness and fulfillment to life.

Kamikaze (神 神風) Japanese concepts, the name of a Japanese air assault team in World War II.

Kinship-State Kin-state refers to the fact that the state and the family are closely linked and that the social and political structure of the state is modeled on the structure of the family. The kinship-state was the basic form of the state in ancient China. In kinship-states, the leader of the state is usually seen as the head of the family and the citizens as members of their extended family. The relationship is based on mutual obligations and responsibilities, with the state leader providing protection and support to his or her citizens and the citizens supporting and obeying the leader. The state is an extension and expansion of the family. In the family and clan, the patriarch has the highest status and power; in the state, the king has the highest status and power. The patriarch is the patriarch by virtue of his lineage, and this patriarchal status is passed from generation to generation through blood ties. The kinship-state is a form of state associated with the Chinese Human Constant, the Hindu Human Constant.

Kin-Tract Principle It is a Japanese principle of association. Unlike the contract principle that links individuals in the West, the kinship principle that links the Chinese, and the hierarchic principle that links Hindus, the kin-tract principle is a half-blood (kin), half-contract (tract) principle. The Japanese Iemoto was concluded on this principle.

Kohai (後 後輩) It refers to a person whose age, status, experience, learning, and experience are lower than one’s own and refers to a person of lower status in the Iemoto system.

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

331

Li (礼 礼) The meaning of Li can be roughly translated as “rites”, which is an important concept in Confucianism, and it is a way of dealing with people according to their hierarchical characteristics, that is based on the hierarchical characteristics of human beings that define the way people get along with each other. It is based on the roles of husband and wife, father and son, and brothers in the family and extends to social relationships between rulers and subjects, friends, and superiors and subordinates and then further to state relationships. The essence of Li is that there are distinctions between nobility, inferiority, seniority, and affinity, requiring people to live and behave in a manner consistent with their status and social and political position within the family, with different norms of behavior for different statuses. Under the dynastic tribute system, the relationship between countries was divided into respect and inferiority and superiority based on distance and affinity, so the principle was also Li.

“Life Package” (生 生命包) The life package is a figurative metaphor for the third layer of psychosocial homeostasis (intimate society and culture), and it broadly consists of three kinds of content: close people, beloved things, and believed ideas. This content is as important to human beings as air, water, and food, hence the name “life package”. The individual person plus the life package makes up the Human Constant. The contents of the life package and the mode of interaction with it vary from person to person and from culture to culture.

M¯ay¯a Maya is a Sanskrit word that refers to the concept of illusion or delusion in Hinduism and Indian philosophy. In Hinduism, Maya is the principle of the illusory nature of the material world, and the idea that the reality we perceive with our senses is not the ultimate reality. According to Hindu teachings, Maya is created by the power of Brahman, and it is through M¯ay¯a that the world of appearances and duality arises. M¯ay¯a is seen as a veil that covers the true nature of reality and as a source of ignorance that causes humans to perceive the world in a limited and distorted way.

332

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

Miuchi (身 身内) Japanese concepts, A person who is intimately related, a member of an intimate circle.

Mokosa Moksha is a Sanskrit word that refers to the concept of liberation or release from the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth in Hinduism and Indian philosophy. Moksha is considered to be the ultimate goal of human life and is seen as a state of liberation from the limitations of the material world and the suffering associated with it. In Hinduism, Moksha is achieved through the realization of the true nature of the self, which is believed to be identical to the ultimate reality of Brahman. This realization is believed to be the result of spiritual practices such as meditation, self-reflection, and the study of scripture, which help one overcome the illusions of M¯ay¯a and attain a higher state of consciousness.

Nagama (仲 仲間) Japanese concepts, partners, companions.

Nation-State A form of state that has emerged in modern times. A nation-state is a sovereign political entity consisting of a specific territory and population over which the government has control and decision-making power. Nation-states are characterized by a common culture, language, and history and are generally recognized by the international community as a separate entity with the right to self-determination. It emerged in connection with the individual, a Human Constant of Western society, and in a sense, the nation-state can be called an “individual state”. The modern international system is based on the nation-state, so it is also called the “nation-state system”, in which states are linked by the unit equality principle.

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

333

Nemawasi (根 根まわし) Japanese concepts, informal communication mechanism in Japanese society, prior consultation practice.

Ninjyo (人 人情) Japanese concepts, Ninjyo originally meaning “human feelings”, and extending to love and friendship. It refers to human feelings and extends to friendship and affection between people. Often used in conjunction with Giri.

Okami (御 御上) Japanese concepts, the Japanese address the Emperor, as well as their superiors and the owners of restaurants and companies.

On (恩 恩) In Japanese society, the concept of “on” refers to a system of obligation and social debt, especially within business and professional relationships. “On” is the expectation that one will repay a favor or a kindness, either through reciprocal behavior or through compensation in some other form. This concept is deeply ingrained in Japanese society and is considered an important aspect of Japanese social and business etiquette. It is worth noting that the concept of “on” is distinct from the Western concept of “debt”. In Western cultures, debt is often seen as a negative obligation, while in Japanese culture, “On” is viewed as a positive responsibility to repay a kindness or to fulfill one’s obligations to others. This concept is also found in Chinese culture (pronounced “En”), but the meaning is slightly different.

Organization Entity One of the two sides of the state, mainly the political and economic system.

334

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

Psycho-culturology (心 心理文化学) Psycho-culturology is a discipline that studies the relationship between psychology and culture, focusing on how human psychological processes and behavior are influenced by cultural and social contexts. Psychological anthropologist Francis L. K. Hsu is one of the key proponents of this perspective. He has particularly emphasized the importance of a comparative approach to the study of the interactions between psychology and culture and has developed a unique doctrine by making in-depth comparisons among four large-scale civilized societies: China, India, the United States, and Japan. Psycho-culturology, as used in this book, refers primarily to the scholarship that engages in the comparative study of large-scale civilizational societies through the combined perspectives and methods of psychology and culture advocated by Francis L.K. Hsu.

Psychosocial Homeostasis (PSH) The model describing the complex relationship between people and people, people and things, and people and cultural ideas, proposed by the Chinese-American psychological anthropologist Francis L. K. Hsu is one of the important concepts in psychocultural science. The model conceives man as a sociocultural “field” in which man interacts with man, man with objects, and man with cultural norms. The “field” consists of seven concentric circles with eight layers of content, which are, in order of content, unconscious, preconscious, unexpressible conscious, expressible conscious, intimate social relations and culture, operative society and culture, wider society and culture, and Outer World. By adjusting the content of each layer, the individual achieves psychosocial balance. The content of the layers and the way in which individuals achieve psychosocial balance varies from culture to culture. Understanding this pattern of variation is the key to understanding individual behavior as well as different cultures and societies.

Psycho-cultural Orientation A conceptual tool used to link the relationship between the individual psyche and society and culture. The individual psychological level refers to the deeper conscious or unconscious value orientations, located in the 5th, 6th, and 7th levels of the PSH diagram, which are equivalent to collective psychology and collective consciousness and are the values, attitudes, and norms that are internalized as deeply conscious or unconscious influences on behavior during the socialization process, and we are unconsciously influenced by them in our actions. External to the individual psyche influenced by society and culture is the value orientation that can be consciously

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

335

realized, which is the ultimate goal pursued by a society, the beliefs shared by most people, equivalent to the 3rd level of PSH invested with feelings and difficultto-change value concepts and cultural norms. Psycho-culturology regards psychocultural orientation as a guiding force and cultural ideals as the goal of behavior and explains the relationship between cultural ideals, individual psychology, and behavior from a dynamic perspective.

Raja Raja is a Sanskrit word that means “king” or “ruler” in India. It has been used historically to refer to rulers of various Indian kingdoms and princely states. In modern India, the term “Raja” is used as a title of nobility and respect and is sometimes still used by Indian royal families. However, the formal use of royal titles has largely been abolished in India, and the country is now a republic with a parliamentary system of government.

Rajamandala Rajamandala is a Sanskrit term that refers to a political map or diagram that was used in ancient India to represent the relationships and power dynamics between different kingdoms or territories. The Rajamandala was a visual representation of the various political entities that existed in a particular region and showed how they were related to each other in terms of alliances, vassalage, or conflict. The Rajamandala typically consisted of a series of concentric circles, with the central circle representing the kingdom of the ruler or emperor and the outer circles representing the territories of the vassal states or the territories of the neighboring kingdoms. The relationships between the different kingdoms were depicted using lines and arrows, which indicated the direction of political influence or military power.

The Rugged Individual Jen (极 极致个人, or Just “The Rugged Individual” for Short) The American Human Constant, which is a subtype or refined form of the Individual Jen, is derived from the concept of “Rugged Individualism”. The most characteristic feature of this human norm is that an individual person has an unstable life package (the third layer of psychosocial homeostasis). There is a lack of “close people” because kinship members are only temporary members of the life package.

336

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

“Beloved things” and “believed ideas” are mostly associated with personal independence, freedom, individual rights, and personal preferences. Due to the lack of close and lasting interpersonal relationships, individuals have greater insecurity and have to use more diverse means to achieve psychosocial dynamic balance, so human psychological and behavioral patterns are more dynamic and changeable. The most important secondary grouping in such a society, where Human Constants prevail, is a variety of free associations (clubs) concluded on the contract principle, and the state is a modern nation-state based on contractual relations.

Rugged Individualism (极 极致个人主义) Rugged individualism first appeared in the 1928 campaign speech of U.S. President Saeed Hoover. It is a term that refers to a cultural and political ideology that emphasizes the importance of individual initiative and self-reliance, emphasizing the importance of individual freedom and self-actualization. It is often associated with the idea of the “homemade man”, who rises to success and prosperity through his own hard work and determination. Rugged Individualism is a value system that expresses the Human Constant of the American people.

Sanskritization Sanskritization is a term used in the study of Indian society and culture to describe the process by which lower caste or tribal groups adopt the norms, values, and practices of the dominant upper-caste Hindu groups to raise their social status and to improve their economic and political prospects. This process typically involves the adoption of Sanskrit-based religious practices and beliefs as well as the adoption of Hindu customs and traditions.

Senpai (先 先輩) Refers to people who are older, more senior, more experienced, and more learned and experienced than oneself, as well as those who are higher in the family gen system.

Tanin (他 他人) Japanese concepts, people who have nothing to do with themselves, strangers.

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

337

Tate Society (縦 縦社会) Japanese concepts, a concept developed by Japanese anthropologist chief Nakane, who argues that Japan values hierarchical relationships, sequences, and hierarchical societies.

Tianxia (天 天下) See “All-under-Heaven”.

Ubunasu (う うぶなす, 産土) Japanese concepts, the name of the Japanese Shinto deity, refers to the protective deity worshiped by the ancestors or the place of one’s birth. Therefore, it is also called the local god of the area.

Yin-Yang (阴 阴阳) Yin-Yang is a philosophical concept in Chinese culture that states that everything has a yin and yang side. Yin is considered to be cold, negative, and static, while Yang is warm, positive, and dynamic. This concept has a wide influence on traditional Chinese culture, medicine, religion, and Taoism.

Zhongyong (中 中庸) Chinese Zhongyong means moderate, moderate, avoiding extreme behaviors, and thoughts and maintaining a moderate attitude and behavior. Zhongyong is an important concept in ancient Chinese philosophical thought and is considered one of the core ideas of Confucianism.

338

Appendix: Specialized Vocabulary Explanation

Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere It is an international system with the characteristics of the Ichimoku system, which was proposed by Japan during World War II and included China, East Asian countries in Korea, and East Asian countries in Southeast Asia as the center of the colonization plan.