Europe-Central Asia Relations: New Connectivity Frameworks 9811987068, 9789811987069

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EUROPE-ASIA CONNECTIVITY

Europe-Central Asia Relations New Connectivity Frameworks Edited by Kashif Hasan Khan Anja Mihr

Europe-Asia Connectivity

Series Editor Gulshan Sachdeva, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Delhi, India

The current phase of globalization is being defined by geo-economics and geopolitics of connectivity. Europe-Asia Connectivity book series covers Europe and Asia connections under the EU-Asia connectivity strategy, Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, Russian Eurasian Economic Union, G7 Build Back Better World (B3W) as well as individual country plans from India, Japan, South Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Central Asian republics. These connectivity initiatives can be looked at bilaterally, regionally, or internationally. Topics covered would be as wide as energy connectivity, digital connectivity, trade and investment connectivity, or people-to-people connectivity. Different forms of transport linkages (for example, air connectivity) would also be covered separately. The focus of the series is initiatives or projects that have the potential to promote connections between Europe and Asia.

Kashif Hasan Khan · Anja Mihr Editors

Europe-Central Asia Relations New Connectivity Frameworks

Editors Kashif Hasan Khan Silk Road Research Center Ala-Too International University Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

Anja Mihr Center on Governance through Human Rights Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform Berlin, Germany

ISSN 2730-9452 ISSN 2730-9460 (electronic) Europe-Asia Connectivity ISBN 978-981-19-8706-9 ISBN 978-981-19-8707-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Anton Balazh, shutterstock This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

Since their independence in the 1990s, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have required capital investment assistance and international attention. Nevertheless, in international research and academic debate, the dramatically changing role and position of the Central Asian Region (CAR) are often overlooked, and hence, in the debates, one often remains unaware of the region in detail, confusing their names and locations. Therefore, efforts toward international recognition and establishing goodwill led to a range of economic reforms and re-connectivity between Asia and Europe. Such reforms, however, have not so far brought longterm peace and prosperity. Academics, economists, historians and political scientists often refer to the dynamics surrounding CAR geopolitics as ‘The Great Game’ a notion used by Britain to explain their geopolitics in the region and vis-à-vis Russia in the nineteenth century. This volume pays tribute to the term which is still widely known and used in Central Asia and in Europe. However, it has also been extensively argued that the new geopolitics is not only a ‘Great Game’ but a ‘Great Gain’ for the CAR particularly after 2013 when China announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). New gamers have pushed the region into a competitive zone chiefly between Russia, China and Europe and beyond in such significant matters as the global economy, trafficking, security and democratization. Beyond this, however, the CAR is today not only a region for external powers, such as the Europe, Russia and China, to reintroduce a new ‘great game’ but also for connectivity. The notion of a ‘new game’ currently v

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refers to the ‘seeking to promote stability while reaping the maximum benefits in the region by stopping other powers from interfering in these geopolitics.’ Moreover, today, the concept of game has been expanded by global security matters and economic strategies, such as BRI and the Europe’s connectivity strategy. It is the European dimension to which this book aims to make a contribution. Overall, it is Chinese BRI which has pushed the regional states into a competitive zone between Russia, China and Europe. Whether the BRI is a strategy or a policy is for others to answer. This book aims to look at the consequences of the BRI and the Europe’s strategy on the relationship between the CAR and Europe. But despite being beneficially and strategically located at the ‘crossroads of Asia’ on the traditional Silk Road trading routes, Central Asian countries are poorly connected to one another and the rest of the world. The region is landlocked, remote from European and East Asian population centers. Most of the region’s territory is either agricultural or mountainous, paired with areas of political instability, for example, in Afghanistan. The sparsely populated region and ample steppes contribute to the overall general perception that the region is politically weak and unstable. The political legacy of the Soviet Union often led to a backlash to democratic efforts. Most countries today struggle between being politically semi-democratic or fully authoritarian. For this and many other reasons discussed in this book, most of the economic help is considered development aid which has put the governments in poor positions to negotiate or perform as equal political actors in the international arena let alone between major powers, viz. Russia, China and the European states. The USA and Europe claim that assistance provided by them, in building civil society, technical assistance for the healthcare sector, allocating scholarships and education, and setting up human rights dialogues, is helping to alleviate the region’s political tensions which it is hoped will lead the CAR governments into reliable trading partners. China’s investments (Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank) have improved the infrastructure, under the umbrellas of the BRI initiative. It seems to revive the ancient trading route (Silk to Belt and Road) that may lead to a new nexus between the major powers in Eurasia, while Russia works to maintain the political and military stability in the region. Therefore, this compilation aims to contribute to the current debates on the new role the CAR can play in its ‘rediscovered’ crossroad function—willingly or unwillingly.

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The EU adopted its Central Asia strategy in 2019. Earlier, India had also announced its Connect Central Asia policy in Bishkek in 2013. China may have taken the spotlight with their Silk Road initiative through its enormous BRI venture. Nonetheless, the European Union (EU) was equally instrumental in resuscitating the Silk Road through its Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) activity dispatched in 1993. The EU also gives importance to digital connectivity and peopleto-people links in its Central Asia policy. It should be mentioned that within the EU, Germany has been particularly active in engaging the Central Asian countries, both through the EU platform and also bilaterally. Germany is the only EU member to have embassies in all the five Central Asian countries. Hence, according to the 2019 EU-Central Asia Strategy, the CAR is an overlooked region, but one that is gradually becoming more important for the European Union. The EU has steadily intensified diplomatic relations with the region, at the same time as ramping up development aid. On the other hand, Russia is pursuing its own vision of interconnectivity especially with the Eurasian Economic Union to standardize the legal norms, taxes and duties between trading nations. While the Russian vision focuses on military and political stability that allows the more connectivity with the region, the United States hopes that Central Asian states don’t pursue such close relations with China and Russia. However, since the collapse of Russia’s relationship with the West over Ukraine, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership has become more of a reality. Russia and China are also blamed for sharing a common desire to challenge principles of the Western-dominated international system. The balance of competition and cooperation is most evident in Central Asia, the Russian Far East and the Arctic. Engagement in these theaters has tested Russia’s and China’s abilities to manage their differences and translate the rhetoric of partnership into tangible gains, which the USA perceives as a threat. The New Cold War between the USA and China in the last few years, and very recently the COVID-19 pandemic, has escalated such tensions.

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The EU has human rights dialogues with each of the five countries holding annual meetings at which human rights concerns are discussed will also give leverage to political and civil society engagement in the region. Against this backdrop, the authors in this compilation touch upon crucial factors, i.e., security challenges, democratization process, border management, migration, rule of law, human rights, energy sector, etc. In this context, this book also provides a better understanding of Central Asia’s multi-faceted relations in rapidly evolving geostrategic dynamics. It serves as a timely insight into the contours of Central Asian states policies, emerging trends and significant features of these interactions. The chapters are authored by academics and researchers from Central Asia and Europe and other parts of the globe to provide a wide spectrum of opinion and analysis with regard to the subject. Therefore, it is the European countries, China and Russia that have maximum impact in the region. The particular role in this context of Europe is often understated, because it works on a civil society level and in trade rather than in exploiting resources in the region and making strong (and loud) political alliances within the CAR. However, as argued by authors in this book, one can share the view that a small ‘game’ could also be witnessed in Central Asia in two ways. Firstly, relatively smaller powers like India have certain interests and respective policies for Central Asia, but they cannot compete with the EU, China or Russia. The small game also means that the regional countries are vying for their space and are yet to cooperate at regional level. In this volume, the initial argument of the authors is that in thirty years of independence, several major events have had long-term consequences in the region. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to link the BRI with the Eurasian Economic Union projects in 2015. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which CARs are members (or guests: Turkmenistan), was established way back in 2001. Hence, the CARs are well embedded in regional cooperation, beyond the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN efforts. The EU is seen as a distant regional entrepreneur, with strong trading and standards and the only serious counterpart in economic terms to the BRI in the region. Moreover, other players in the region, such as Iran and Turkey, although they continue their policy in the region, are not delivering as much as expected by the countries in the region. Even the Chinese interest in Central Asia, however important the BRI may be, is not about the CAR but

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about broader global routes to connect the region to the Middle East and Europe and also to the Uighur region which is ethnically Central Asian. The book has compiled different perspectives which sometimes move beyond the CAR and look further into Eurasia. June 2022

Kashif Hasan Khan Ala-Too International University Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan Anja Mihr OSCE Academy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

Contents

1

Introduction: Background to the Book Kashif Hasan Khan and Anja Mihr

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Part I Contextual Overview of European Policies Towards Central Asia 2

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Assessing Europe: Central Asia Connectivity Through Linkage and Leverage Ana-Maria Anghelescu

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The Policies of the European Union and Russia vis-à-vis Central Asia Agnieszka Kuszewska-Bohnert

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The 2019 European Union Strategy on Central Asia: Future Challenges Ana Belén Perianes Bermúdez

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The European Union’s Sustainability Standardisation of World Trade: A Challenge for Central Asia? Axel Marx and Nazik Beishenaly

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Development of Central Asia and European Union’s Assistance Programme Bedelbai Mamadiev

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Part II Central Asia’s Connectivity: Human Rights, Rule of Law and Good Governance 7

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Human Rights in Central Asian States and European Initiatives Anja Mihr

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European-Central Asian International Election Observation Cooperation and Contestation Rick Fawn

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Implementing Good Governance in the Framework of Europe’s New Strategy for Central Asia: Lessons from the Baltics Ivo Rollis

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Part III Old Games in New Frameworks: Regional and Geopolitical Perspectives 10

Great Game vs Small Game: Europe, India and Japan in Central Asia Raj Kumar Sharma

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Regional Connectivity and the China Factor Bipul Biplav Mukherjee

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EU-Central Asian Cooperation on Border Management, Migration and Mobility Ildar Daminov

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Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Kashif Hasan Khan is Associate Professor and Director of the Silk Road Research Center, Ala-Too International University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. He teaches in the Economics Department of Ala-Too and the Finance Department of International Black Sea University, Tbilisi, Georgia. Previously, he worked as International Business Consultant in the Philippines and as a consultant economist with the Asian Development Bank. His latest works are on Central Asia include Emerging Central Asia: Managing Great Powers Relations (Blue Dome Press, USA) and “The Strategy of (Re) Connectivity: Revisiting India’s Multifaceted Relations with Central Asia”. Anja Mihr is DAAD Associate Professor at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and Director of the Master Program for Human Rights and Sustainability (MAHRS) in Central Asia. She is a professor of human rights, governance, public policy and transitional justice. She is also the Founder and Program Director of the Center on Governance through Human Rights at the Berlin Governance Platform in Germany. She has held full professorships at the Willy-Brandt School of Public Policy, Erfurt University, Germany, and at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM), University of Utrecht, Netherlands, and at SIPA, Columbia University in New York. From 2006 to 2008, she was the

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European Program Director for the European M.A. Degree in Human Rights and Democratization (E.MA) at the Global Campus for Human Rights in Venice in Italy.

Contributors Ana-Maria Anghelescu Faculty of Political Science, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania Nazik Beishenaly Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Ildar Daminov Central European University, Vienna, Austria Rick Fawn School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK Kashif Hasan Khan Silk Road Research Center, Ala-Too International University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan Agnieszka Kuszewska-Bohnert Faculty of International and Political Studies, Institute of the Middle and Far East, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland Bedelbai Mamadiev OSCE Academy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan Axel Marx Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Anja Mihr Center on Governance Through Human Rights, HumboldtViadrina Governance Platform, Berlin, Germany Bipul Biplav Mukherjee Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Ana Belén Perianes Bermúdez University Institute General Gutiérrez Mellado-UNED, Madrid, Spain Ivo Rollis University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia Raj Kumar Sharma Institution of Eminence, University of Delhi, Delhi, India

List of Figures

Chapter 8 Fig. 1

ODIHR IEOMs in Central Asia

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Chapter 9 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Fig. 3

The hierarchy of medium and short-term documents in the strategic planning framework [author’s creation] GDP per capita (USD) development dynamics 1995–2018 (constant 2010 USD), World Bank (2020) (Source World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?end=2018&locations=UZTM-KZ-LV-LT-EE-KG-TJ&start=1995) The efficiency of public administration performance in the CEE countries (Source European Commission, 2017)

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List of Tables

Chapter 3 Table 1

Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

CARs in ease of Doing Business (DB) ranking and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 2020: global and regional rank EU (27) merchandise trade with CARs in 2019 (in billion EUR) Central Asian Republics in Russia’s exports (in %) Central Asian Republics in Russia’s imports (in %)

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Chapter 6 Table 1 Table 2

EU assistance to Central Asian countries 1991–2006 (e millions) Performance of 2006 operations in comparison with 2005 and 2004

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Chapter 9 Table 1 Table 2

Examples of typical documents within the national development planning system Key national long- and medium-term development strategies and programs in the countries of Central Asia (Source World Bank, 2020)

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Chapter 12 Table 1

Table 2

Table 3

Summary of the existing instruments of cooperation on migration, border management, and mobility between the EU (Source Compiled by the author based on desk research) Identification of endogenous and exogenous impact factors of the EU policies in Central Asia (Source Compiled by the author based on desk research) Summary of policy options for the EU in reassessing its cooperation with Central Asia (risk management perspective) (Source Compiled by the author based on desk research)

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Background to the Book Kashif Hasan Khan and Anja Mihr

Thirty years ago, in 1991, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) became independent from the Soviet Union. It is time to reassess their geopolitical and economical role in the center of the Eurasian continent. Today, one cannot think of these five states merely as a region of conflict between great powers, such as China, Russia or Europe, but also a space of connectivity and “new gamers”. In addition, despite its growing importance and geopolitical location, the Central Asian region remains a peripheral and often conflict-torn region in many ways. Central Asia is composed of states such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan but also further beyond Mongolia and Afghanistan. The region

K. H. Khan (B) Silk Road Research Center, Ala-Too International University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan e-mail: [email protected] A. Mihr Center on Governance Through Human Rights, Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_1

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has, nevertheless, proved its centrality not only for its geopolitical placement, but also in terms of trade routes and security policies, which brought about new forms of connectivity over the past 30 years. Expansion of big “gamers” such as China, Turkey, Russia, India, Iran and Europe has consequently changed the rules of the game. To look more at this new emerging connectivity where the CAR stands between the East, North, South and West is where this compilation aims to make a difference. This new role as a nexus by Central Asian countries and their relationship to another emerging external player in the region, the European Union(EU)/Europe and bilateral politics with European states, is the central interest of this book. The Europe-Asia link is the overarching topic between the chapters. The EU issued its Central Asia strategy in 2007. This provided the way for the development of cooperation and relations between the EU countries and the Central Asian republics in various fields including security (combating terrorism, border protection), economics (energy), education (European educational initiative), legislation and law (Rule of Law initiative) and human rights protection. For each area of cooperation, appropriate approaches and forms of implementation were developed, which are in a multilateral, region-wide Central Asian format, as well as more differentiated approaches to deepen cooperation with individual republics in the region. However, it was replaced by the 2019 strategy. The core areas covered include sustainable economic development, human rights, connectivity, environmental protection, transport and energy. The EU-Central Asia Strategy is involved in all sorts of politics between the CAR and the EU will revolve around who has more to offer, particularly in the economic sphere of influence and what this necessitates. The CARs are seeking to increase and improve their relations with other powers such as the European Union that could lead to strengthen the nexus and land-linkage between Asia and Europe. The previous Strategy for Central Asia adopted in 2007 was intensely scrutinized for its broad character and lack of responsiveness to local needs. Central Asia has traditionally received a lower priority from the EU given the greater interests and more urgent developments in its immediate neighborhood, but this situation is gradually changing. During the following decades, EUCentral Asia relations will depend on the interests and developments in both regions and other external factors, like the Chinese or Russian roles

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in Central Asia. Several internal challenges may have a significant probability to impact on their external relations, in both the EU and Central Asia. On the part of the EU, its lack of cohesion, the heterogeneity of its member states and their external engagement priorities will be on the basic factors determining its role toward other regions. Chinese interest in Central Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also not about Central Asia, but about global routes to connect Central Asia to the Middle East into Europe as well as the Xinjian region, the population of which is ethnically Central Asian. In order to curb the so-called terrorist activities by Uighurs and ally border securities, China continues to invest in the CA region to keep the region under their influence. It is increasingly focusing on its security in Central Asia. Stories of Chinese private security organizations emerging in the region sit alongside more overt displays of strength through the building of bases, the conduct of joint training exercises and the provision of equipment for Tajik forces along the Chinese border with Afghanistan. There have been reports of joint training exercises between Tajik, Kyrgyz and Uzbek forces. However, another question remains: does Russian supremacy remain intact in the region? Does a common language and increasing cross-border labor mobility help Russia maintain its hegemony and monopolize military sales? In this context, the proposed book aims to explore how the Central Asian Republics seem to manage their relations with small and major powers 30 years after the collapse of the USSR. (1) In the context of the BRI and other regional strategies, CAR and Europe may develop more linkage and connectivity on economic and mobility levels to counterbalance Russia and China and consequently could turn the CARs into the missing link between Asia and Europe. (2) The strong relations between the Europe and CAR may push other players or “new gamers” in the region such as India, Japan and Turkey to expand their role through a soft power approach and develop procedures to enhance their presence in the region. Ana-Maria Anghelescu’s chapter titled, “Assessing Europe: Central Asia Connectivity Through Linkage and Leverage” highlights that the EU framed its Strategy through the security agenda, both regarding energy, as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and to some extent Uzbekistan have significant resources, as well as in terms of counter-terrorism as Central Asia was perceived as an effective containment region for Afghanistan. The challenges of directly connecting the EU and Central Asia in order to allow

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the flow of energy resources gave rise to many prospective projects which lack any significant progress. Her emphasis is that Central Asia is not perceived as a priority region by the European states, primarily because of the distance and the inherent difficulty of a direct connection, but also because not all European states have the capacity to develop largescale projects that meet the needs of states in the region. However, in recent years, there has been an increase in the involvement of some European states in the implementation of EU projects, especially following the adoption of the Strategy for Central Asia in 2007, through participation in initiatives launched in this context, which respond to their own national interests and would otherwise require more national resources for bilateral cooperation. As an evaluation of the framing in Central Asian official strategies, discourses and actions showed, the EU’s role is perceived predominantly through its potential as an economic market for local products. The image of the EU as a donor provides the local governments with a legitimizing instrument for allowing the activities of the civil society, but nevertheless the EU’s impact remains partial because of the small-scale projects implemented. Furthermore, European funding and technical assistance provided to the local governments is perceived mostly as part of a less normative agenda and as an additional support for the services supplied by the state. Additionally, although the EU continues to seek a unified position in its external relations, the intense activity of some Member States, especially Germany, is having an ambiguous effect on this goal. In her chapter, “The Policies of the European Union and Russia visà-vis Central Asia: Reassessing Selected Prospects and Challenges for Interregional Cooperation,” Agnieszka Kuszewska has investigated the selected political and socio-economic trajectories of interregional interactions engaging three political actors: the EU, Russia and Central Asia (CA) and relate them to the challenges posed by the rapidly evolving security landscape. The core assumption is that current geopolitical fluctuations are likely to have a profound impact on the trajectories in the EU-Central Asia and Russia-Central Asia interactions; consequently, there is an urge to explore the dynamics of these interactions in a more detailed manner. By both the EU and Russia, the CARs are recognized as geopolitically vital points of reference in their foreign strategies, albeit their capabilities to upgrade their engagement in Central Asia substantially differ. The chapter investigates selected Russian and EU’s priorities visà-vis Central Asia by referring primarily to the following major questions:

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(1) To what extent is the EU’s strategy new and in what way does it provide a workable framework for an upgraded role of the EU in Central Asia? (2) What are the already existing channels of cooperation and how should the EU improve its policy vis-à-vis this region, in the political environment of rivalry with Russia? (3) What are Russia’s objectives in the region and which factors influence its current strategy vis-à-vis the CARs? In her chapter, “Challenges for Future After the 2019 European Union Strategy on Central Asia,” Ana Belén Perianes Bermúdez argues that as a bridge connecting Europe to China as well as to Afghanistan and to the Middle East, Central Asia has a key role in global efforts to promote Euro-Asian connectivity and these endeavors should bring comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable economic development and local benefits to the whole region. Moreover, Central Asia represents a source of relevant energy imports to the EU. During the next decades, EU-Central Asia relations will depend on the interests and developments in both regions and other external factors, like the Chinese or Russian roles in Central Asia. She has analyzed the main challenges between the EU and Central Asia relations after the launch of 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia; she further makes recommendations for improvement and to identify lines for future research. She highlights that the EU should also be flexible in its approach to the region and put the emphasis on “working together” instead of “teaching how to live”, particularly with respect to highly sensitive political issues but ensuring the legitimacy, local capacity-building, accountability and internal consistency of its policies. For that purpose, the EU has to balance the normative aspects of its agenda (advancing human rights and democracy) with the search for European interests in the areas of trade, energy and security. To help this process, it would be interesting if future lines of research could address how to better develop and implement political measures to improve non-politically sensitive areas of cooperation among the EU and Central Asian States, at both the national and local levels jointly with the public and private sector and the civil society. Axel Marx and Nazik Beishenaly argue in their chapter titled, “The European Union’s Sustainability Standardization of World Trade: A Challenge for Central Asia?” that connectivity from the perspective of EU-Central Asia trade relations in a global context pursues a sustainability agenda in the form of the 2030 Sustainability Development Goals

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(SDGs). Despite the impact of COVID-19, which created a very significant impact on the SDGs, the 2030 agenda will constitute a global framework which will underpin efforts to create greater connectivity. The future of trade relations will be less about lowering tariffs but more about aligning standards in accordance with sustainable development. To achieve greater access, Central Asian countries need to consider two things. Firstly, they are already doing that to a large degree, they should acknowledge the importance the EU attaches to what is called fair and sustainable trade. International trade which complies with a series of social and environmental requirements the EU wants to prioritize. Secondly, they might invest to become more integrated with global value chains. This investment is critical because the nature of trade has changed significantly in the last decades with the emergence of global value chains. They focus on the “institutional dimension” of connectivity in the context of trade relations. Many developing countries and middle-income countries, such as the countries in Central Asia, are excluded from global value chains due to their inability to comply with international standards owing to the high costs involved. This creates unequal access to markets in developed countries. This new form of exclusion and inequality should be addressed in order to create genuine connectivity. Integration in global value chains can lead to social and economic upgrading generating additional income for countries and its citizens. If the aim is to achieve true connectivity this will imply changing production methods and processes to take into account sustainability. Bedelbai Mamadiev’s chapter, “Development of Central Asia and European Union’s Assistance Programme” focuses on how the EU has been one of the main supporters of the Central Asian countries. Just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991, Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program was introduced for providing technical assistance to 12 post-Soviet countries, including Central Asia, which lasted until the end of 2006. The EU’s interest has an increasing pattern; after 2000, the EU paid more attention and interest to the region and established its representative offices. In 2002, the EU prepared the “Central Asia Strategy Paper 2002–2006” and “Indicative Programme 2002–2004 for Central Asia” designated to provide technical assistance to the region specifically. In 2007, a new strategy for Central Asia was launched—“Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the Period 2007–2013”. In this strategy, one can notice economic development and poverty reduction

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as main directions. After this strategy, in 2014, “Multiannual Indicative Programme Regional Central Asia 2014–2020” was accepted. Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) includes the followings: economic and trade reforms, governance and rule of law, institutional and legal reforms, administrative law, public administration reform, green economy, and environmental and climate change policies. Recently, a new strategy for the period of 2021–2027 was adopted, defining main areas of cooperation between EU and Central Asian countries. In her chapter titled, “Human Rights in Central Asian States and European Initiatives,” Anja Mihr focuses on the five Central Asian States human rights records and the role the European institutions, such as the EU and the Council of Europe as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), play in responding to changes and improvements of human rights. Rick Fawn’s chapter titled, “European-Central Asian International Election Observation Cooperation” highlights that international election observation is a European norm, espoused by the OSCE, the EU, the Council of Europe and their Member States. More recently, state formations made exclusively or predominantly of post-Soviet states have proclaimed the same. How states engage with different types of election observation missions, it is posited here, inform of their wider political orientations. This contribution determines how Central Asian states participate with international election observations and compares that to practices of other post-Soviet states. The chapter draws from the comparative engagement of Central Asia with Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and ODIHR’s calibrated use of different types of its IEOMs, as well as the region’s use of alternative IEOMs to determine Central Asian engagement with and rejection of this type of European norms. Ivo Rollis’s chapter titled, “Implementing Good Governance in the Framework of Europe’s New Strategy for Central Asia: Lessons from the Baltics”, focuses on the experience of the Baltic states that reforms could be successful and sustainable if they are ambitious and multidimensional. Their implementation requires policy planning and coordination mechanisms in the government to achieve a common vision and overcome different administrative hurdles. In addition, supported by sustainable political and civil service senior management, effective change can be promoted and managed on all the levels of executive power. In the Baltic states, the “first wave” of reforms began with the EU accession

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requirements for establishing professional and depoliticized civil service systems. The restricted internal capacity and effort were compensated with external support. Nevertheless, an initial limited strategic orientation and ownership of reforms led also to mixed results. The chapter aims to revisit some of the key elements of good governance—strategic planning and policy coordination—experience of essential structural reforms on the national level in the Baltic states and share the main lessons for the CAR countries. The system of core strategic planning and implementation documents should be harmonized and aligned with the government’s financial circumstances to ensure ability to achieve the relevant objectives. Lastly, the Centre-of-Government (CoG) institutions should fulfill all critical functions, in particular, to a well-organized, consistent and competent policy-making system and meet key requirements for the strategic planning and policy coordination, policy planning and coordination of the Baltic states during the EU accession period and membership. Raj Kumar Sharma’s chapter titled, “Great Game vs Small Game: Europe, India and Japan in Central Asia” focuses on how, unlike the big powers like the US, Russia and China, there are limitations to the role played by India, Japan and the EU in Central Asia. The great game is about interests of big powers in the region while the small game is about the differences and issues among the Central Asian countries. India, the EU and Japan have a similarity in their policies toward Central Asia as they focus on capacity-building and thus, help in solving the regional issues woven around the small game. The three sides give priority to development aspects in their engagement with Central Asia, a region which is generally framed in geopolitical terms by many countries. To provide connectivity to landlocked Central Asia, India is working on the International North South Transport Corridor and Chabahar port in Iran, Japan and ADB have the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program while the EU will spend e60 billion ($65 billion) on a EU-Asia connectivity plan in the coming years. The three sides should cooperate to align their initiatives according to the needs of Central Asian people to avoid duplication and wastage of funds. Local connectivity is necessary to make grand projects a success and India, the EU and Japan should focus on this aspect in Central Asia. Together, they can provide a sustainable model of development and connectivity to the region in times when China’s Belt and Road Initiative is taking the lead.

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In his chapter, “Regional Connectivity and the China Factor”, Bipul Biplav Mukherjee addresses the current state of the economic development of Central Asian republics and the importance of Europe as a significant emerging partner of the Central Asian region. Within the wider European perspective, the chapter argues that the EU as a supranational organization plays a critical role in shaping Europe’s policy toward the Central Asian region and could be used to gauge wider European success there. The paper argues that Europe’s presence in Central Asia has been limited when compared with China’s involvement in the region after the independence of Central Asian States in early 1990s until 2007. The synergies between the two regions, however, suffer from concerns regarding the nature of development and a diverse understanding of the connectivity objectives. The EU’s involvement in the region is multidimensional—in economic terms it seeks to foster cooperation in improving the investment environment; development of the private sector; promotion of regional trade, cooperation and connectivity; and enhancement of Central Asia as an energy supplier to the EU. The focus is on soft infrastructure which is against Chinese understanding of development where major focus is on building hard infrastructure. Ildar Daminov in his chapter titled, “EU-Central Asian Cooperation on Border Management, Migration and Mobility” argues that cooperation between the EU and Central Asia remains one of the main pillars of the Eurasian security architecture, especially in light of the most recent developments in Afghanistan. In its 2019 strategy on Central Asia, the EU particularly stressed the need to step up cooperation on migration and border management-related issues. Due to its strategic geographical location at the crossroads of Eurasia, Central Asia is seen as an increasingly important region for the EU and broader Europe in such fields as combating internationally organized crime, migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and the illicit drug trade. This significance is amplified by the region’s border with Afghanistan, where political instability remains a serious security challenge for the EU and broader European region. This chapter, therefore, explores the question of how the EU and Central Asia can better cooperate to improve European and Eurasian security in the areas of migration and border management. Overall, this chapter contributes to the examination of the first hypothesis of the book. Drawing on the existing international legal framework and bilateral agreements between the EU and Central Asia, the chapter describes the main political and legal instruments that the EU uses in

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the region to foster linkages and connectivity among Central Asian countries. It also assesses the EU’s cooperation strategy with Central Asia and identifies the existing gaps by using the method of qualitative and comparative intraregional analysis. Finally, the last section of the chapter proposes several policy recommendations for the EU in the broader European and Eurasian contexts.

PART I

Contextual Overview of European Policies Towards Central Asia

CHAPTER 2

Assessing Europe: Central Asia Connectivity Through Linkage and Leverage Ana-Maria Anghelescu

1

Introduction

Following the breakdown of the USSR, Fukuyama argued that the “end of history” was unfolding, as there was no possibility of a new level of ideological dissonance which could not be solved within the limits of the “liberal democracy” (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 14). As such, Europe began a reunification process, with the European Union (EU) as the main institutional structure promoting liberal democracy in the former Communist space, by integrating the Central and Eastern European countries in its structures by 2007 and establishing the first bilateral relations with the newly independent states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the relations between Europe and Central Asia in the aftermath of the USSR collapse, and offer an overview of the main instruments through which the connectivity between the

A.-M. Anghelescu (B) Faculty of Political Science, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 13 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_2

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two continents is realized. For the purpose of this study, I will refer to Europe as the countries located on the European continent. I will also focus on the EU as an organization advancing relations with Central Asia, especially since there are European states with insufficient resources to pursue a wide bilateral agenda, but are active promoters of the bi-regional dialogue. The chapter uses the leverage and linkage theory of Levitsky and Way, with the improvement made by Tolstrup regarding the role of gatekeeper elites, as it offers a better defined framework of analysis, combining both structural factors and elements pertaining to the agent. Moreover, Tolstrup does not limit the leverage and linkages only to Western influence, thus rendering the theory widely applicable, especially in the post-Soviet space, where the influence of Russia and China cannot be discounted. In the early post-independence period, Central Asia was evaluated through its oil and gas resources, which was later replaced by the concern for connectivity in the sense of transport and logistics not just for their own energy resources, but for intercontinental trade as well (Murashkin, 2018, p. 457). However, connectivity is not limited to palpable infrastructures, also referring to the facilitating policies, as well as the perceptions of state’s elites regarding the partners and the possible benefits of developing such projects. Therefore, the leverage and linkages theory, with the caveat of gatekeeper elites’ influence, provides an easy operationalization of the concept of connectivity, by allowing the evaluation of the breadth and depth of the relations between actors. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the theoretical and methodological frameworks of the study. The analysis section maps the linkages between Europe and Central Asia, offering an understanding of the degree of leverage European countries and the EU hold over Central Asia, taking into account the role of Russia and China, as well as the perceptions of the Central Asian elites.

2

Background

The degree of transformation was different within the former Soviet countries; therefore, various theories of modernization and transformation were developed, taking the development of the Western European countries and North America as a final goal and the benchmark against

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which progress was measured. The original theory of leverage and linkages defines Western leverage as the vulnerability of the state to external positive or negative pressure, which is dependent on material aspects pertaining to the country’s raw size, military and economic strength, as well as to the breadth of the Western partner’s agenda and the existence of alternative regional powers (Levitsky & Way, 2005, pp. 21– 22). Linkage is determined by the amount of ties between the country and Western partners, on five main dimensions: economic, geopolitical, social, communication and transnational civil society, all of them being highly dependent on geography (Levitsky & Way, 2005, pp. 22–23). The theory also explains the role of actors with different agendas, named “black knights”, offering economic, military or diplomatic alternatives to Western influence (Levitsky & Way, 2010, pp. 40–41). According to Levitsky and Way, the leaders have to face costs associated with the pressure resulting from various degrees of leverage and linkage, but they have no input in shaping the relations with the external partners (Way & Levitsky, 2006, pp. 386–387). Nevertheless, as the dynamics of international relations show, the state’s actions are based also on leaders’ decisions, thus rendering the bilateral linkages with external powers not only a result of structural factors, but an interplay of motivations of national elites, termed by Tolstrup “gatekeeper elites”. The author argues that there are three main categories of gatekeeper elites which are relevant in shaping the linkages and balancing the leverage: the political elites, specifically the ruling political elites, the economic elites and the civil society groups, the latter two having to not interfere directly in the political game (Tolstrup, 2013, p. 720). Although the theory is used for evaluating the degree of democratization, the leverage and linkages theory can offer an understanding of the strategic environment within which states develop. The theory explains the interference between states with different agendas in Central Asia, thus creating a holistic view of the interactions between the EU, as a democratic norm entrepreneur, and Russia and China, with alternative understandings of connectivity and multilateral relations. Connectivity is a function of the types of linkages developed and the kind of leverage European countries and the EU have been exercising within Central Asia in the 30 years of independence. At the beginning of the period of analysis, connectivity was essentially understood as infrastructure to transport oil and gas between Europe and Central Asia, which meant that Western

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Europe was on the demand side of the market, but in a superior position due to its development and its economic might. However, little by little, East Asian states, mainly China and Japan, developed their own connectivity projects, either through Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) or the Asian Development Bank, long before the Belt and Road Initiative (Murashkin, 2018, pp. 462–463). This changed the perceptions regarding Central Asian states from mere suppliers at the mercy of superior Western customers into states who could advocate for their own interests in the process of developing connectivity. The role of their political elites into defining the external agendas was enhanced and their own perceptions regarding foreign actors came into play when connectivity projects unfolded, a situation which can be explained through the linkages and leverage theory and the role of gatekeeper elites. In order to analyze the dynamics of the relations between European countries and the EU with the Central Asian states, I will use document analysis, focusing on strategic frameworks for foreign policy on both sides, as well as discourse analysis, based on interviews and press releases, in order to understand the bilateral perceptions and how they impact the connectivity between Europe and Central Asia. Additionally, I rely on the insights provided within field interviews, which I conducted in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, between October and December 2019.

3 The European Union and Central Asia: Weak Leverage and Paternalistic Linkages In the wake of the Central Asian independence in 1991, the EU started engaging with the region through the signing of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), which regulated the political and economic cooperation on a bilateral level. The main instrument used to fund the cooperation between the EU and Central Asia was TACIS.1 However, the political engagement of the EU with the Central Asian states was narrow, due to little knowledge of the region and the limited capacity of the EU 1 TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) was a foreign aid and technical assistance programme developed and implemented by the European Commission to assist the CIS countries (as well as Mongolia) in their transition to market-oriented economies. TACIS was replaced in 2007 by other instruments, Central Asian countries coming under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).

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to deal with a region which was not within the close neighborhood of the then EU-15, compared to Central and Eastern Europe. In a communication from 1995, the European Commission defined Central Asia mainly in terms of its economic potential, both as energy supplier and as market for European products (European Commission, 1995, pp. 8–10). Considering these aspects, both the leverage and the linkages the EU maintained with Central Asia were limited, which diminished the perspectives for consistent democratization in the 1990s. On the other hand, the relations developed by the Central Asian states with the EU can be defined as ambiguous and have to be understood as a function of the general foreign policy pursued by the leaders of these countries. Consequently, the first years were dominated by the politics of nation and state building and balancing behaviors through multi-vector foreign policies. In the 1990s, since the EU was not a consolidated unitary actor in terms of foreign policy and it was struggling with its own challenges of enlargement and conflict management in the Balkans, the Central Asian states did not have specific expectations from the EU in terms of bilateral relations. Rather, as the dynamics of the contacts of the period show, Central Asian governments were preoccupied with promoting free trade and accepting the EU intervention for building institutions and mechanisms compatible with free markets and democracy, with the notable exception of Tajikistan, which was struggling with the Civil War. Considering this, during this period, the EU consolidated its role as a donor preoccupied with technical assistance programs loosely associated with a normative agenda. Although not mainly defined in terms of geography, the leverage the EU exercised in Central Asia increased following the eastward enlargement of 2004 and 2007, which was the underlying reason of the adoption of a targeted strategy. In 2007, the EU adopted the first Strategy for Central Asia, following the lead set by Germany, which was heading at the time the Council of the European Union. Up to this day, Germany is the main European partner of the Central Asian countries, having established diplomatic relations and representation in the region from early 1990s. The adoption process of the 2007 Strategy was quite short, needing to fit within the 6 months Presidency term of Germany and thus lacking a proper consultation with the local representatives regarding their own needs. As such, the Strategy for a New Partnership continued to employ a conditionality approach, which was already part of the EU’s external relations agenda, but was expanded to candidate countries.

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However, Central Asia remained a region which did not share a common border with the EU, thus limiting the real involvement of Brussels and the member states in pursuing the ambitious political goals of democratization. Additionally, the decision-making structure of the European foreign policy made it dependent on the member states’ own interest, which made the immediate neighborhood to be placed at the top of the priority list. The two reviews from 2012 and 2015 showed that the framing of the relations in a conditionality perspective did not prove successful, as the EU did not significantly improve its leverage over the region, but maintained a patronizing relation, disconnected from the local challenges.2 Moreover, the EU framed its Strategy through the security agenda, both regarding energy, as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and to some extent Uzbekistan have significant resources, as well as in terms of counterterrorism, as Central Asia was perceived as an effective containment region for Afghanistan. The challenges of directly connecting the EU and Central Asia in order to allow the flow of energy resources gave raise to many prospective projects which lack any significant progress. The pursuit of security issues, as well as a democratization agenda focused on human rights and rule of law, proved to be at least tedious, with little progress achieved through the EU leverage in improving the state of human rights in the region (Boonstra, 2015, p. 2; Peyrouse, 2017, p. 3; Spaiser, 2018, p. 76; Voloshin, 2014, p. 50). The conflicting interests of the EU agenda, coupled with the complex structure of the foreign policy decision making, limit the autonomy of the bloc in the relations with Central Asia and place the democratization agenda on a secondary level. Lastly, EU leverage has been limited by the existence of alternative regional powers, which offer not only cooperative relations without placing a political price of reforming the states, but even provide security guarantees for regional and national stability. Even though not all Central Asian countries are members of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia maintains its influence through economic migrants (Tajikistan), energy imports (Turkmenistan) and in the case of Uzbekistan, through the latter’s position as an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union. 2 For a more detailed analysis of the implementation of the 2007 EU Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, see Anghelescu, A. M. (2020). Drawing lessons of past cooperation between EU and Central Asia for the implementation of 2019 strategy (OSCE Academy Policy Brief, No. 58). http://www.osceacademy.net/upload/file/PB_58.pdf.

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In the case of China, all Central Asian countries, with the exception of a neutral Turkmenistan, are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This offers China an edge in security cooperation, close contact with Russia, on top of the expanding economic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, which has projects in all five countries. Despite the fact that the elites are trying to keep a balance between Russia, China and the West, while not fully trusting the political and economic agendas of Russia and China, the Central Asian states remain dependent on the two regional powers in economy and security (Duarte, 2018, p. 11; Spaiser, 2018, pp. 112, 127).

4

The Economy and Security Linkage

Central Asia is not perceived as a priority region by the European states, primarily because of the distance and the inherent difficulty of direct connection, but also because not all European states have the capacity to develop large-scale projects that meet the needs of states in the region. However, in recent years, there has been an increase in the involvement of some European states in the implementation of EU projects, especially following the adoption of the Strategy for Central Asia in 2007, through the participation in initiatives launched in this context, which respond to their own national interests and would otherwise require more national resources for bilateral cooperation. In general, the presence of business representatives from European countries, dependence on energy imports and historical ties were prerequisites for strengthening relations with Central Asia (Sharshenova, 2018, p. 115). Most of them have established diplomatic relations with Central Asian countries since declaring their independence, but during this period there are some European states that have extended cooperation beyond regular political dialogues. Germany is the most visible European country in the region, with political, economic and cultural cooperation with all five states, but also with a consistent financial contribution for development, which supports the popular view of the equivalence between Europe and Germany. The most visible categories of European involvements focus on pragmatic cooperation in specific areas, in particular trade and energy, but also complemented by the dimension of cultural diplomacy, as is the case in Austria, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Another category of states is the former communist bloc, which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, and used the opportunities offered

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by the launch of the European Strategy in 2007, namely the creation of communication channels in technical fields, coordinated by European institutions, to participate with their own experts in project implementation (interview with a representative of the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, November 2019). The foreign policy of the Central and Eastern European states in the period before their accession to the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was mainly focused on integration and with a limited attention to the neighboring areas. Following accession, the opportunity to influence European foreign policy has been used to increase involvement in the Eastern Partnership states and to a lesser extent on the Central Asian states. In their relations, representatives from Central and Eastern Europe relied more on bilateral initiatives, while European platforms and initiatives were used as secondary tools for advancing their own interests (Bossuyt, 2016, p. 104). Thus, the states of Central and Eastern Europe have carved niches for themselves through their involvement in the European Education Initiative (Poland, Latvia and Romania), or in the Water Initiative (Hungary and Romania), by sending national experts and even coordinating inter-regional cooperation dialogues. For the representatives of the Central and Eastern European states, European coordination on the ground at the level of the diplomatic representations is welcomed, enabling the promotion of trade opportunities and the sharing of experience, which is all the more relevant in Kazakhstan, where most European states’ diplomatic missions are located (Plenta, 2016, p. 89). Finally, the most numerous category is that of states that do not have specific interests with Central Asia, including countries such as Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Bulgaria. Cooperation between them and Central Asia is achieved in the context of European initiatives and the OSCE, and through a delegation of the normative rhetoric at the European level (Plenta, 2016, p. 89; Sharshenova, 2018, pp. 117–119). Belgium’s ambassador to Kazakhstan suggested in an interview that the country could not be a more relevant player in the region because of its size and the fact that the rule of law issues posed a threat to Belgian small and medium-sized companies that would have potential interests in the area (Shayakhmetova, 2018). Such an explanation also applies to other European countries that would have potential interests in Central Asia, but are not willing to cooperate in a political context unfavorable to free competition.

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EU member states have the advantage of multiple levels of coordination, which enable them to complement their efforts and enhance their own positioning in their relations with the Central Asian countries. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, there are Donors Coordinating Councils, where all international donors take part, with the notable exceptions of Russia and China. These councils represent a framework where European initiatives are fine-tuned with other major players’ ones, especially Switzerland, Norway, Japan, South Korea or the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and others. Within the EU, the coordination is done both formally, the working group on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) of the Council of the EU, and informally, through direct dialogues between the diplomatic representatives in Central Asia (interview with a representative of the IMF, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, October 2019; interview with a representative of the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, November 2019; interview with a representative of German Embassy in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, December 2019). Among the European non-EU member states, the most notable are Switzerland and Norway. For Switzerland, the issue of water security is the highest priority for regional cooperation, since it represents an instance of the “Swiss hydro-diplomacy approach”, realized through the Blue Peace initiative and aligned with the agenda promoted by other donors, including the other European states. The Swiss normative agenda focuses on promoting the accommodation of democratic and market liberalization standards, especially in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while with Kazakhstan, political consultations are held regularly and have focused, since 2016, on human rights as well. From a diplomatic point of view, it is significant to note that Switzerland represents all the Central Asian republics on the Executive Boards at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan at the EBRD Executive Board (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, 2017). Switzerland is internationally recognized for its neutral foreign policy, which gives it the advantage of an honest broker, as shown by its representation of Central Asian interests. However, the Swiss authorities promote a marked normative agenda, in line with the democratization promoted by other Western donors, which clearly differentiates it from the so-called black knights, with which it does not exclude the possibility of cooperation. On the other hand, Norway’s relations with Central Asia are defined mainly by the region’s proximity to Afghanistan and its rich energy

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resources. As NATO member, Norway participated in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and has been an advocate within the OSCE for linking Central Asia to Afghanistan (Permanent Delegation of Norway to the OSCE, 2013), even though this did not translate into significant development assistance for the Central Asian countries. However, not all bilateral relations of Norway in Central Asia are as harmless, as proven by the corruption accusations against Norsk Hydro, a conglomerate whose majority shareholder is the Norwegian government, and its dealings with the Tajik aluminum company Talco (Cooley & Heathershaw, 2017, pp. 88–97), as well as Telenor’s minority stake in VimpelCom, which bribed Uzbek government officials to gain authorizations for access to the telecom market (Cooley & Heathershaw, 2017, pp. 119–121; Putz, 2016). To this day, Kazakhstan remains the main economic and political partner in the region for Norway, with most Norwegian companies investing in the petroleum sector in Kazakhstan (Fjaestad & Overland, 2013, p. 3), and even Kazmunaigas and the National Fund, which collects revenues from the extraction of energy resources, a creation based on the Norwegian model (Marat, 2021). Given the economic development of the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan is the main trading partner for European countries, due to both its energy resources and the proactive policy of the political elite in Kazakhstan to advance economic relations. At the same time, many European states have local diplomatic missions in Kazakhstan, accredited for representation and in relation with other Central Asian states, thus explaining the existence of offices of economic, cultural and educational representation mainly in Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan is generally the second preferred area of interest for opening diplomatic missions of European states, followed by Kyrgyzstan, where there are representatives of international donors (including some European countries).

5

Central Asian Perceptions of Europe

As the development path followed after the end of Cold War focused on the promotion of market economy and democratization, the Central Asian states embarked in tentative reforms in these fields, focusing mainly on integration into the international market. Cooley argues that the common denominator of the policies pursued by the Central Asian states focused on regime survival through the use of resources for personal

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gain (Cooley, 2012, p. 19), while McGlinchey shows that the institutional continuity of the Perestroika period has been enhanced by the direct correlation between the degree of fragmentation of the elite and the necessary payoffs to ensure their loyalty (McGlinchey, 2011, p. 26). The post-Soviet transition in Central Asia has been marked by patrimonial interests, where the same elites controlled the access to resources in order to ensure loyalty and stability in the country (Engvall, 2017, p. 78). At the same time, the elites tried to identify with various strategies to legitimize their rule, either through nation-building projects, imbued with symbolism and performance (Cummings, 2012, p. 174), or by mediating globalization influence in the state-building process (Cummings, 2012, p. 176). Throughout independence, Kazakhstan has tried to position itself as the leading partner in Central Asia, a bridge between Asia and Europe, a position which was easier to defend due to Uzbekistan’s isolationism during Islam Karimov’s presidency. The main drivers of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy continue to be the integration into the global economy and a multi-vector approach. Although not different from the goals of the foreign policies of the other Central Asian countries, the multi-vector approach was pursued more intently by Kazakh political elite and by Nazarbayev himself (Patalakh, 2018, p. 2), with a focus on creating its own model of development drawn upon the successes of other countries (Patalakh, 2018, p. 5). This pattern has supported, on the one hand, the rapid economic development of the country through reforms and access to international markets for the rich energy resources, while, on the other hand, it has enhanced the patronage system and authoritarianism (Cummings, 2012, p. 130; Spaiser, 2018, pp. 40–41). Considering the path of development adopted by Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev became the main source of policy strategies, aiming at maintaining a multi-vectoral foreign policy in order to obtain benefits from all partners. In this way, Kazakhstan expected the European countries and the EU to act as a model for development, providing access to the necessary knowledge of building institutions and economic reforms that would contribute to the achievement of the goal of modernization and development set forth by Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan remains the biggest trade partner of the EU and all European states in Central Asia, which created expectations for the Kazakh leadership to have more leverage when negotiating their relations. In the case of the EU, as

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Sharshenova argues, although the EU could have used the trade opportunities to push for more democratization and respect for human rights, the negotiations for the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) showed that progress could be made only on Kazakhstan’s terms and pace, which downgraded the importance of the EU’s normative agenda (Sharshenova, 2018, p. 151). Although the EU tried to project its role as a normative power, Kazakhstan expected it to act more on the technical aspects of their relationship, and perceived and made use of the EU’s weak foreign policy position, determined by internal disagreements and a pragmatic approach. In the latest concept of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, the predominant economic aspect of the cooperation with the EU is again emphasized, while mentioning the expectation of facilitating the access of Kazakhstani nationals into the EU through a visa-free regime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014). Kazakh-European relations can be defined as instrumental (Patalakh, 2018, p. 6), since they serve a functional purpose of providing access to the international market, as well as a legitimation source for the political regime, an attitude extended to other organizations as well (e.g., 2010 Astana Summit of the OSCE and 2017–2018 tenure as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council). Overall, Kazakhstani political elites’ expectation of the EU is to limit the pursuit of its normative agenda without threatening the stability of the political regime, anticipation fulfilled by the EU through its funding of small-scale projects aimed at facilitating the socio-economic conditions for democracy. At the same time, the EU responds to this expectation by promoting judicial and administrative economic reforms for the improvement of the investment climate (Sharshenova, 2018, pp. 158–159), which confirms the perception of the EU as an economic partner seeking to consolidate its position in Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan had pursued extensive privatization measures in the 1990s, which have led to a weak economic performance because of the creation of patron-client networks (Sharshenova, 2018, p. 87). Although Kyrgyzstan was the first post-Soviet country to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1998, the economic performance of the country was also impeded by the political struggles. As the second poorest country in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan was highly dependent on foreign aid (Spaiser, 2018, p. 44), which led to a more sustained contact with the international donors, facilitated also by the perception of Kyrgyzstan as an “island of democracy” (Pomfret, 2006, p. 26). However, by 1998, because of

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the economic crisis and general low economic indicators, Kyrgyzstan was skeptical to pursue the reforms proposed by the international economic institutions (Pomfret, 2006, p. 40), while the subsequent path to centralization of the presidencies of Askar Akaev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev has weakened its democratic position (Spaiser, 2018, p. 160). Regarding the situation in Kyrgyzstan, civil society has a louder voice, although the political elites still try hard to limit their activism. According to public opinion polls conducted by the International Republican Institute in Kyrgyzstan, the positive assessment of relations with the EU has raised from 50% in 2014 (International Republican Institute, 2014, p. 5) to 62% in 2019 (Centre for Insights in Survey Research, 2019, p. 47). In 2014, 39% of the residents of Kyrgyzstan had a favorable opinion of the EU, while 43% did not respond (International Republican Institute, 2014, p. 24). In 2019, 25% of the Kyrgyzstanis considered the EU as an important economic partner, as compared to Russia (88%), while 6% of the respondents considered EU as an economic threat, compared to 54% who chose China (Centre for Insights in Survey Research, 2019, p. 48). This attitude toward the economic potential of the European market may be due to the limited impact of the inclusion of Kyrgyzstan on the GSP+ list on the situation of local producers’ exports, despite its positive initial feedback (Chekirova, 2019, p. 1). As the EU focuses mostly on support for the governmental institutions and the NGO sector, public knowledge of the work and influence the EU exerts in Kyrgyzstani society is limited and difficult to understand, as Kyrgyz analyst Emilbek Juraev argued (Peyrouse, 2014, p. 8). On the official level, in the Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2007, the EU was mentioned as a significant partner with whom relations were “profitable”, while explicitly mentioning Germany as “a leading partner and donor” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, n.d.). Through this formulation, the leadership framed the role of the EU in economic terms, placing its contribution in the field of economic support and development aid, with the expectation of limiting the promotion of its normative agenda. In the 2019 Foreign Policy Concept, there is no explicit mention of any international partner of Kyrgyzstan, with the exception of the member states of the United Nations (Office of the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, 2019). As we can see, overall, the dynamics of the Kyrgyz-European relations are shaped by the political elites, with some pressure from the civil society, which need access to international assistance in order to survive.

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As the first decade of Tajikistan’s independence was dominated by the Civil War, the relations with European countries were realized through the assistance provided during the war and by post-conflict reconstruction aid (Spaiser, 2018, p. 44). The bilateral perception for most of the 2000s was dominated by the security concerns and the EU’s role, spearheaded by countries such as Germany, Austria and France, in the securing of borders, the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking. Some analyses have shown that Europe’s focus on security has served the Tajik government as a legitimation mechanism for its own authoritarian agenda (Boonstra & Shapovalova, 2012, p. 8; Fumagalli, 2007, p. 2), thus limiting the impact of the European normative agenda. A comprehensive review of the high-level contacts between EU officials and President Rahmon was done by the Tajik Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Rustam A. Soliev, who demonstrates that the EU is expected to increase its economic presence, through investments in the country and energy cooperation, and continue working on security issues related to Afghanistan and preventing terrorism. Through the framing of the overview, the normative EU agenda of human rights and democratization is present as a rhetoric tool and not as an area to which the Tajik side attaches great importance (Soliev, 2018). Given these national priorities, Tajikistan prefers to pursue bilateral relations with European states. Although Turkmenistan sees the EU as a potential market for its energy exports (Rinke, 2016), these talks have yet to be materialized (Kozma, 2020, p. 12). The relations of Turkmenistan with the EU are channeled through the political elite, which prefers to deal directly with European states in securing investment projects for developing infrastructure by European companies (Peyrouse, 2014, p. 11). In the case of Uzbekistan, considering the EU’s normative agenda, the Uzbek ruling elite attempted to avoid too close political ties, focusing also on enhancing economic cooperation, which was, however, not as successful as in Kazakhstan’s case, partly because of the limited economic interests of the member states and partly because of the prioritization of human rights issues (Paramonov et al., 2017, p. 100). During Karimov’s presidency, the follow-up on the human rights violation in Andijan in 2005, when the EU imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan, but subsequently lifted them under pressure by European countries interested in security cooperation with the Uzbek leadership, contributed to the perception of the EU as a weak political force, which is subordinated to pragmatic economic interests and security cooperation (Spaiser, 2018, p. 78). This

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situation further consolidated the view that the EU is a mighty donor, but a relatively weak political actor, with the more powerful European states being better suited to satisfy the economic and security interests of the Uzbek leadership. Even following the 2016 change in leadership, Uzbekistan continues to view Germany as a more important partner, along with certain member states, in economic and political terms, and the EU is perceived mostly through its normative agenda (Salomov, 2019, p. 11). As this section has shown, the Central Asian states are driven primarily by the benefits they can gain from their foreign policies, which justifies the perception of the EU as a normative donor which has to be contained. The fact that the EU is not a unitary political actor in terms of foreign policy has enabled the Central Asian countries to pursue pragmatic and more substantial relations with the European states. Among them, generally, the great powers of Western Europe have established themselves as traditional partners, with the means and will to deliver on their commitments in the relations with the Central Asian states, which strengthened their positive perceptions in the region. Meanwhile, the EU’s normative agenda of human rights and democratization is consistently downplayed, and the EU is unwilling to lose the limited presence it gained during years in the region, and tones down the criticism, focusing on small-scale projects for civil society, while pursuing the more advantageous prospects of economic partnership.

6

Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to analyze the connectivity between Europe and Central Asia as seen through the linkages and leverage theory, by taking into account the role of the gatekeeper elites’ perceptions. The research’s goals were limited by the insufficient access to first-hand statements regarding the Central Asian perceptions of the European countries and their connectivity projects. However, given the fact that the national foreign policies of these states are personalized and centralized, the individual perceptions of low-ranking officials, to whom access would have been more likely, are shaped by the institutional framework and have a limited bearing on the actual design of foreign policy strategic thinking. Document analysis and discourse analysis, corroborated with insights from field research, have shown that Europe is perceived as a standard of development, but from the political point of view the economically and

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politically strong European countries have priority even over the countries with similar historical and institutional experiences. More precisely, Central Asian states are interested in attracting investment and forging strong partnerships with the big Western European states, which have the means and willingness to pursue broad bilateral agendas. The Central and Eastern European countries maintain an open dialogue with their Central Asian counterparts, but rely mostly on the EU’s institutional frameworks of cooperation, in order to showcase their transition experiences and diplomatic advantages. As the evaluation regarding the framing in Central Asian official strategies, discourses and actions showed, the EU’s role is perceived predominantly through its potential as economic market for local products. The image of the EU as a donor provides local governments with a legitimizing instrument for allowing the activities of civil society, but nevertheless the EU’s impact remains partial because of the small scale of the projects implemented. Furthermore, European funding and technical assistance provided to the local governments are perceived mostly as part of a less normative agenda, but as an additional support for the services supplied by the state. Additionally, although the EU continues to seek a unified position in its external relations, the intense activity of some member states, especially Germany, is having an ambiguous effect on this goal.

References Boonstra, J. (2015). Reviewing the EU’s approach to Central Asia. FRIDE - EU Central Asia. Boonstra, J., & Shapovalova, N. (2012). Thinking security, doing development? The security-development nexus in European policies towards Tajikistan (EUCAM Working Paper No. 12). European Union Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM). Bossuyt, F. (2016). Central and Eastern European EU member states’ involvement in the EU’s democracy promotion in Central Asia. In B. Berti, K. Mikulova, & N. Popescu (Eds.), Democratization in EU Foreign Policy: New member states as drivers of democracy promotion (pp. 102–127). Routledge. Centre for Insights in Survey Research. (2019). Public opinion poll residents of Kyrgyzstan. International Republican Institute. Chekirova, G. (2019). The European market remains a dream for Kyrgyz exporters (EUCAM Commentary No. 32). European Union Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM).

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Cooley, A. (2012). Great games, local rules. The new great power contest in Central Asia. Oxford University Press. Cooley, A., & Heathershaw, J. (2017). Dictators without borders: Power and money in Central Asia. Yale University Press. Cummings, S. N. (2012). Understanding Central Asia: Politics and contested transformation. Routledge. Duarte, P. (2018). China in the Heartland: The challenges and opportunities of OBOR for Central Asia. In M. Laruelle (Ed.), China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its impact in Central Asia (pp. 11–21). Central Asia Program, The George Washington University. Engvall, J. (2017). License to seek rents: “Corruption” as a method of PostSoviet governance. In J. Heathershaw & E. Schatz (Eds.), Paradox of power: The logics of state weakness in Eurasia (pp. 73–88). University of Pittsburgh. European Commission. (1995). Communication from the commission—Towards a European Union strategy for relations with the independent states of Central Asia, COM/95/206 FINAL. Fjaestad, K., & Overland, I. (2013). Norway and Central Asia (European National Policies Series Policy Brief No. 16). European Union Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM). Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, 16, 3–18. Fumagalli, M. (2007). Tajikistan and the EU: From Post-conflict reconstruction to critical engagement (CEPS Policy Brief No. 130). Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). International Republican Institute. (2014). Public opinion survey residents of Kyrgyzstan. International Republican Institute. Kozma, T. (2020). Turkmen natural gas in the European energy security discourse: Perceptions, realities, outlook (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Policy Brief No. 53). OSCE Academy. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2005). International linkage and democratization. Journal of Democracy, 16(3), 20–34. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. Marat, T. (2021, April 26). Kazakhstan and Norway: Discovering each other twenty years since Nazarbayev’s first visit to Oslo. Retrieved October 30, 2021, from The Astana Times: https://astanatimes.com/2021/04/kazakhstanand-norway-discovering-each-other-twenty-years-since-nazarbayevs-first-visitto-oslo/ McGlinchey, E. M. (2011). Chaos, violence, and dynasty: Politics in Central Asia. University of Pittsburgh Press. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2014, January 21). KoncepciR vnexneu politiki PK na 2014–2020 gg [The concept of foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2014–2020]. Retrieved

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February 29, 2020, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan: http://mfa.gov.kz/ru/erevan/content-view/koncepcia-vnesnejpolitiki-rk-na-2014-2020-gg Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. (n.d.). KoncepciR Bnexneu Politiki Kypgyzckou Pecpybliki 2007 [Foreign Policy concept of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan 2007]. Retrieved February 29, 2020, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan: http://mfa.kg/ acts/koncepciya-vneshnei-politiki-kr_kg.html Murashkin, N. (2018). Not-so-new silk roads: Japan’s foreign policies on Asian connectivity infrastructure under the radar. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 72(5), 455–472. Office of the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. (2019, March 12). Ppezident podpical Ukaz «O koncepcii vnexneu politiki Kypgyzckou Pecpybliki» [The President signed the Law on “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan”]. Retrieved February 29, 2020, from Office of the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan: http://www.president.kg/ru/sobytiya/ukazy/13605_prezident_ podpisal_ukaz_okoncepcii_vneshney_politiki_kirgizskoy_respubliki Paramonov, V., Strokov, A., & Abduganiev, Z. (2017). BliRnie Evpopeuckogo CoHza na CentpalbnyH AziH: obzop, analiz i ppognoz [The impact of the European Union on Central Asia: Overview, analysis and forecast]. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Patalakh, A. (2018). Kazakhstan’s EU policies: A critical review of underlying motives and enabling factors. Asian Journal of German and European Studies, 3(4), 1–23. Permanent Delegation of Norway to the OSCE. (2013, April 11). Statement by Norway in response to the EU special representative for Central Asia Patricia Flor as delivered by Ambassador Robert Kvile to the Permanent Council. Retrieved October 30, 2021, from Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: https://www.norway.no/contentassets/940388c8d0dd4e8a8d625fa664d dd766/04-11-statement_by_norway_in_response_to_the_address_by_amb._ flor_eu_special_representative_for_central_asia.pdf Peyrouse, S. (2014). How does Central Asia view the EU? (EUCAM Working Paper No. 18). European Union Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM). Peyrouse, S. (2017). A donor without influence: The European Union in Central Asia (PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 478). Plenta, P. (2016). The European two-level game in Central Asia: Visegrad countries and Kazakhstan. Asian International Studies Review, 17 (2), 79–101. Pomfret, R. (2006). Economic reform and performance in Central Asia. In S. Babu & S. Djalalov (Eds.), Policy reforms and agriculture development in Central Asia. Natural resource management and policy (pp. 25–57). Springer.

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Putz, C. (2016, February 19). Telecom giant nears settlements on massive Uzbek corruption probe. Retrieved October 30, 2021, from The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/telecom-giant-nears-set tlements-on-massive-uzbek-corruption-probe/ Rinke, A. (2016, August 29). Turkmenistan says in talks with EU on possible gas deliveries. Retrieved February 29, 2020, from Reuters: https://www.reu ters.com/article/us-turkmenistan-germany/turkmenistan-says-in-talks-witheu-on-possible-gas-deliveries-idUSKCN1141NQ Salomov, J. (2019). Mirziyoyevs Uzbekistan: Towards openness and real democracy? (EUCACIS Online Paper No. 6). Sharshenova, A. (2018). The European Union’s democracy promotion in Central Asia: A study of political interests, influence, and development in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2007–2013. Ibidem-Verlag. Shayakhmetova, Z. (2018, August 1). Belgian envoy predicts ‘interesting results’ from combining Brussels’ experience with Astana’s potential. Retrieved aprilie 2, 2021, from The Astana Times: https://astanatimes.com/2018/08/bel gian-envoy-predicts-interesting-results-from-combining-brussels-experiencewith-astanas-potential/ Soliev, R. A. (2018). Ocnovnye Mexanizmy UctoNqivyx OtnoxeniN Meҗdy PecpyblikoN Tadҗikictan I EvpopeNckim CoHzom [Main mechanisms of sustainable relations between Republic of Tajikistan and the European Union]. Scientific Notes, 3(56), 34–42. Spaiser, O. A. (2018). The European Union’s influence in Central Asia: Geopolitical challenges and responses. Lexington Books. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. (2017). Swiss Cooperation Strategy Central Asia 2017– 2021. https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/deza/en/documents/laender/swisscooperation-strategy-central-asia-2017-2021_en.pdf Tolstrup, J. (2013). When can external actors influence democratization? Leverage, linkages, and gatekeeper elites. Democratization, 20(4), 716–742. Voloshin, G. (2014). The European Union’s normative power in Central Asia: promoting values and defending interests. Palgrave Macmillan. Way, L. A., & Levitsky, S. (2006). Linkage versus leverage. Rethinking the international dimension of regime change. Comparative Politics, 38(4), 379–400.

CHAPTER 3

The Policies of the European Union and Russia vis-à-vis Central Asia Agnieszka Kuszewska-Bohnert

1

Introduction

The primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate the selected political and socio-economic trajectories of inter-regional interactions engaging three political actors: the European Union (EU), Russia and Central Asia (CA) and relate them to the challenges posed by the rapidly evolving security landscape. The core assumption is that current geopolitical fluctuations are likely to have a profound impact on the trajectories in the EU-Central Asia and Russia-Central Asia interactions; consequently, there is an urge to explore the dynamics of these interactions in a more detailed manner. By both EU and Russia, the five Central Asian Republics (CARs) are recognized as geopolitically vital points of reference in their foreign strategies, although the capabilities to upgrade their engagement in Central Asia substantially differ. The EU has improved

A. Kuszewska-Bohnert (B) Faculty of International and Political Studies, Institute of the Middle and Far East, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 33 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_3

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its cooperation with CA over the last two decades; it is primarily based on socio-economic and normative pillars. Russia meanwhile continuously regards CA as its traditional geostrategic backyard and fiercely defends this position: Moscow is implementing a combination of hard and soft power, with particular concern over China’s expansion in the region. In times of evolving regional security landscape, largely determined by ongoing power rivalry, the CARs are undertaking the challenging efforts to augment their geopolitical and socio-economic position, on the external and intra-regional level. Among the key conclusions of this chapter are: (1) the EU’s policy vis-à-vis Central Asia involves multiple sectors of cooperation and is expanding substantially, but the involvement in the cooperation with the CARs must be continuously adjusted to the current socio-political, security-related and economic challenges: (2) dynamically changing security environment, including Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban and its potentially disastrous consequences, is likely to have a substantial impact on the international perception of the multidimensional political and security-related challenges of the region: (3) Russia has potentially aggressive geostrategic objectives, including the urge to renew and upgrade its historically rooted presence in the region. This investigation refers to the three distinctive international relations players: an organization consisting of sovereign, democratic states, a regional power with historically inherited interests and geostrategic ambitions, and a resource-rich region that includes the republics referred to as post-Soviet due to their historical linkages and political dependence on the USSR. The investigation is anchored in contemporary IR analysis with the assumption that, considering the contemporary security-related dynamics, there is an urge to fill the discursive gap and reassess the often troublesome and challenging interactions on a trilateral level. The European Union has become an important member of international affairs and has achieved a notable success in deepening the institutionalized cooperation between its member states. In the multipolar world with evolving security trajectories, enhancing worldwide interconnectedness and power shifts in global economy, the organization tries to shape its international identity as an actor capable of enhancing its geostrategic competencies and strengthening its position as a normative power, which creates incentives for a better international recognition of democratic norms and the implementation of good governance, human rightsoriented and economic reforms. Notwithstanding the current internal

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challenges (Euroscepticism used by some populist leaders as a political tool, potential post-COVID-19-related economic crisis, challenges connected with migrations), the EU remains an economically stable and multi-dimensionally integrated organization, which continues to shape its international image as a values-based actor, that promotes democracy and the rule of law. While investigating the policy of the EU towards its Eastern neighbours, in particular Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Licínia Sim˘ao and Vanda Amaro Dias (2016: 97) appositely highlight the neighbourhood policies of the EU, which are aimed to ‘facilitate and justify the expansion of European integration as a stabilization mechanism’. These geostrategic and socio-political efforts have substantially affected the EU’s interactions with Russia, which remain highly prone to escalation particularly in the shared neighbourhood. The looming (at the time of writing this chapter, in January 2022) crisis in Ukraine is yet another manifestation of this dynamics and the ongoing mistrust between the EU and Russia. Due to its geographic location and lack of direct land connectivity with the EU, Central Asia can be regarded as a distinctive region when it comes to the intensity and character of its interactions with the EU and is characterized by the markedly stronger presence of Moscow in its affairs. By using soft power capabilities with emphasis on normative identity enshrined in its rhetoric, the EU seeks to promote regional integration, economic progress, democracy, human rights, justice and equality in its relations with the third states and regions (Khaliq, 2008, p. 12). These principles are regularly invoked in the official documents, reports and speeches (Voloshin, 2014, p. 5). Ian Manners, who coined a discursive framework known as Normative Power Europe (NPE), argues that the EU (which formally came to existence following the Maastricht Treaty, effective since November 1993) is an entity with shared principles which should act to spread these norms in the international system (Manners, 2002, p. 252). However, the partial and insufficient implementation of these values by the EU in international practice and the prioritization of the economic member states’ interests above the declared norms inspire to conclude that the normative role and significance of the EU in international politics remains a challenging objective and such efforts should be intensified. Since the 1990s, Central Asian Republics: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic (also referred to as Kyrgyzstan), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan that emerged on the international scene as independent states,

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have undertaken the ambitious task of constructing their independent policies and international identities. The strategy of disengaging themselves from Moscow’s multi-dimensional domination has been partially achieved, yet cooperation with this powerful neighbour remains a key element of the policies of the Republics. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Central Asia is regarded by global and regional powers as strategically vital point of reference in their policies. Consequently, the key players, including the EU and Russia, have embarked upon a strategy of developing and sustaining multi-dimensional relations with the CARs to materialize their respective political objectives. During the last three decades, the engagement of the EU in Central Asia has gradually developed. It can be assumed that the upcoming dynamic transformations in the international system, which are likely to characterize the 2020s decade, with China’s rise and shifts in global power structures, demand reshaping the EU-CA interactions to channel common interests and pave the way for long-term mutual benefits. The chapter investigates selected Russia’s and the EU’s priorities in Central Asia by referring primarily to the following major questions: (1) To what extent is the EU’s strategy new and in what way it provides a workable framework for a stronger role for the EU in Central Asia? (2) What are the already existing channels of cooperation and how should the EU improve its policy towards this region, in the political environment of rivalry with Russia? (3) What are the goals of Russia in the region and what factors influence its current strategy with respect to the CARs?

2

The Post-Cold War and New Millennium

The particular dynamics of Russia-Central Asia and the EU-Central Asia relations in the post-Cold War era deserves a brief investigation in order to understand and re-evaluate the current specificity of these interactions. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decade that followed were key milestones in the history of all three players and vital geostrategic turning points on a regional and global level. The new era which at that time began paved the way to unprecedented expansion of the Western governance, political values and enhanced economic cooperation to the Central and Eastern Europe, which was followed by multi-faceted regional integration. The EU upgraded its political identity and bolstered internal integrity with the Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force in 1993. Gradually, the EU started to look beyond the region. In 1994,

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the European Commission adopted a document Towards a New Asia Strategy; it was focused primarily on the rising ‘tiger economies’ of Southeast Asia, but it also laid a foundation for the deepening of the region-to-region relations with an emphasis on trade development and the enhanced economic, political and security-related presence of the EU in Asia (Kuszewska, 2015, pp. 213–214). Parallel to these developments, in the same year, the EU delegation was opened in Kazakhstan; thereafter, the organization started developing certain instruments to provide economic, commercial and state-building support for Central Asia. However, the Republics, which shortly before gained their independence following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, were not prioritized in terms of the EU’s foreign strategy, and it took another decade to introduce a major shift in this regard. Meanwhile, in Central Asia, the process of constructing the CARs international identity, security and economic strategy (entering the global economy, attracting foreign direct investments), rediscovering cultural distinctiveness and developing sovereign policies vis-à-vis important regional actors gained momentum. Till today, some analysts regard the Republics as passive elements rather than active agents of interactions within Greater Eurasia (Kazantzev et al., 2021, p. 57). Expanding external interaction, bolstering trade and attracting investors became strategically crucial objectives for the ruling establishments in all republics. An important step to adjust to the new post-Soviet geopolitical environment was taken in the mid-1990s when the EU took the initiative of signing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with CARs. The PCAs include a wide variety of issues, including trade, investment promotion, energy, environment cooperation, tourism, etc. Pursuant to these agreements, the states grant each other the status of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) with respect to customs tariffs and encourage introduction of the EU trade standards. Furthermore, PCAs highlight human rights and respect for democratic principles and international law; until 2001, they were the key instruments of the EU’s policies in Central Asia, which were primarily based on ad hoc projects (Efegil, 2010, p. 72). Four PCAs were in force at the time of writing (with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan since 1999 and with Tajikistan since 2010); Turkmenistan’s ratification is still pending (EP, 2019, p. 2). A new generation of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs), which upgrade bilateral trade relations, was introduced with Kazakhstan

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(signed in Astana1 in 2015 and entered into force in March 2020). This is the first Central Asian state with which the EU has signed the EPCA; following the ratification by all Member States and the European Parliament, the agreement will replace the former agreement, PCA. The EPCA, in addition to promoting bilateral trade and investments, expands the areas of relations in multiple additional areas, including financial cooperation, energy, transport, environment and climate change, employment and social affairs, culture, education and research (European Union External Action, 2019). The post-Soviet Russia, weakened strategically and economically in the 1990s, continued to perceive Central Asia as its traditional sphere of influence. In order to institutionalize cooperation in the post-Cold War era, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was established. It is a Russian-led intergovernmental military alliance that, among others, currently includes three Central Asian Republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed in May 1992 in Tashkent and amended by the Protocol on amendments to the CST, signed on December 10, 2010. The CSTO was regarded by Moscow as a useful instrument for the pursuit of its strategic objectives, with a particular focus on Central Asia. Similarly to NATO, the CSTO has a military assistance provision (Article 4), which states that aggression against one party will be considered as an attack on all parties (CST, 1992, May 15). At the turn of the centuries, the negative connotation regarding the Soviet past was gradually transformed into ‘an asset of shared proximity’ and Russia, thanks to its geostrategic and economic revival, regained a more positive image in the CAR’s (Laruelle, 2010, p. 150).

3 ‘Stronger Partnership’ Between Europe and Central Asia The need to adopt a new strategy towards Central Asia gained particular significance at the beginning of the twenty-first century, with the 9/11 terror attack in the United States being a ‘cornerstone for the

1 Since 2019, the Kazakhstan’s capital city is renamed Nur-Sultan to honour the longruling president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, shortly before he resigned from the office.

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European Union’s policy’; the relations with Central Asia from a projectbased approach gradually increased to a strategic partnership (Efegil, 2010, pp. 72, 78). In 2001, a Special Representative for Central Asia was established; in 2006, then new strategy was adopted, with a focus on democratization, good governance, human rights and eradication of poverty. Concerns about transnational terrorism, poverty considered a source of radicalization and regional security dynamics (the US-led so-called war on terror in Afghanistan), along with the urge to diversify energy sources, became vital frameworks for reassessing the external strategy of the EU. Correspondingly, the Central Asian states (mainly Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) were interested to diversify their energy export markets and ease hurdles for foreign investors. Of all the CARs, Kazakhstan holds the largest offshore oil and gas reserves, and Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth largest natural gas reserves. Following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, its new Central European members embarked upon a strategy of advocating enhanced political and socioeconomic relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states. It seemed that a successful transformation of the former Soviet satellite states of Central/Eastern Europe could serve as a role model and foster democratization processes in the CARs. Almost two decades later, it may be concluded that these forecasts were not materialized due to many strategic, socio-cultural, historically-rooted and political reasons. Nevertheless, the interactions between the EU and the CARs have undergone a substantial development in multiple fields. As a result of the political changes of the EU in the first years of the twenty-first century, the annual EU+ 5 ministerial meetings have been organized since 2005. They have been supplemented by an annual highlevel political and security dialogue at foreign minister level since 2013 (EP, 2019, p. 10). The EU also opened delegations in all Central Asian states2 and established bilateral human rights dialogue. In May 2007, the European Council adopted the Strategy for a New Partnership as a core foreign policy instrument vis-à-vis Central Asia. It highlighted the interest of the EU in regional exchange and dialogue in a globalized world and, at the same time, reiterated its interest in a peaceful, democratic and economically prosperous CA. The EU appreciated the 2 The detailed information about the EU’s delegations to Turkmenistan available here: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/turkmenistan/4870/about_en and Kazakhstan: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan_en.

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‘considerable evolution in political and economic transformation’ of the CARs and pointed out its commitment towards enhanced cooperation within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Special emphasis was devoted to the political and economic transformation of Central Europe states, portraying them as an example of the successful transition into stable states adhering to international norms (EU, 2007, pp. 2–3; Hoffman, 2010, p. 88) and on the fact that the EU depends on the external energy resources. This fact remains one of the vital elements of improved cooperation. Notably, the Central Asian Strategy was introduced through instruments such as mutual partnership agreements between the EU and CARs, various programmes and projects of bilateral or multilateral character, adjusted to the political, economic and legal conditions of a particular Central Asian state. The new strategy pledged to address several issues of special importance: (1) establish a regular dialogue at the Foreign Minister level, (2) launch the European Education Initiative with support for education at all levels, including higher and vocational education, and with the aim of establishing a virtual Silk Road, (3) start an EU Rule of Law Initiative, (4) establish a Human Rights Dialogue with every Central Asian Republic and (5) conduct energy dialogue with all Republics (EU, 2007, pp. 3–4). The 2007 strategy indicated the shift in the perception of the CARs by the EU and provided an important framework for the future-enhanced cooperation with the emphasis to a bilateral cooperation, tailored to the needs and interests of a particular Central Asian partner. In 2017, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to upgrade its relations with Central Asia, and on 17 May 2019, the EU set out a revised Central Asia strategy. Joint Communication on ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ by the High Representative and the European Commission (EC, 2019) and the Council’s conclusions (EU, 2019a) provide the renewed policy framework for the third decade of the twenty-first century with emphasis on the Euro-Asian connectivity and mutual interests of the two actors. The document highlighted the new opportunities to advance the EU-Central Asia partnership due to political changes in Central Asia, including integration-oriented efforts in CA illustrated, for example, by the first informal Summit of Central Asian leaders of March 2018 in Astana (Nur-Sultan) and the ambitions of the CARs to play a greater role in regional affairs. The strategy’s emphasis on deepening and intensifying the relations was aimed at showing the EU’s determination to the EU-CA interactions to a higher level. To counter

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multi-dimensional security-related threats, many projects, regular highlevel and experts meetings with a broadened agenda (such as EU-Central Asia High-level Political and Security Dialogue) were planned. The new strategy points to the enhanced cooperation between Central Asia and Afghanistan, which must be taken into consideration thoroughly when developing the extended neighbourhood policy by the EU (EC, 2019, p. 1). The priorities of the EU’s strategy vis-à-vis Central Asia were specified and updated in the 2019 Strategy titled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’, which is a more detailed version of the 2007 Central Asia Strategy. It is aimed at taking bilateral relations to a new level and opening new opportunities for multi-dimensional cooperation. The European Parliament has traditionally emphasized the importance of democracy, human rights and social development. The new strategy resulted in the intensification of talks and meetings, particularly in 2021, and then COVID-19-related flight restrictions were lifted. On 5 November 2021, the first high-level EU-Central Asia Economic Forum was held in Bishkek. The meeting illustrated political and economic dynamics in Central Asia, which could signify that the CARs are no longer willing to play only the role of the passive elements of inter-regional politics. In particular, Kazakhstan demonstrated its willingness to respond to the climate change problems, Uzbekistan representatives highlighted the significance of a democratization process, and Turkmenistan—market economy-oriented endeavours (Keegan, 2021). The meeting was organized within the framework of the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia and the continuation of the talks in the upcoming years was announced. On 22 November 2021, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jutta Urpilainen, took part in the 17th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting, in Dushanbe (17th EU-Central Asia ministerial meeting—Turning …). It was hosted by the Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, Sirojiddin Muhriddin, and was chaired by Borrell, with the participation of the Foreign Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan (17th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting—Turning …). The Joint Communiqué published after the meeting highlighted the need to strengthen cooperation in the areas of trade, transport, energy, digital and people-to-people contacts, to increase action on biodiversity, to support a green and sustainable post-COVID-19 recovery and

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to work together to tackle some of the challenges emerging from developments in Afghanistan. The EU announced a new multiannual financial framework for the prosperity- and development-related future cooperation; the organization pledged preparations for two regional Team Europe Initiatives, respectively on Digital Connectivity and on Water, Energy and Climate, both identified in crucial areas for Central Asia’s sustainable economic and human development. Participants highlighted the importance of Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements to advance bilateral relations between the EU and the CARs (Joint Communiqué, 2021, November 22). Josep Borrell pointed out that ‘The EU has high stakes in seeing Central Asia develop as a more resilient, prosperous and more closely interconnected economic and political space’ (17th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting, 2021, November 22). Importantly, some CARs gradually improve their position in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report—in particular Kazakhstan, which, as Table 1 shows, has a high 25th position in the world. According to these data, ‘the government of Kazakhstan has embarked on a bold programme to reform the investment climate, an effort that has already transformed the regulatory landscape at the national level. Kazakhstani authorities have implemented 43 reforms acknowledged by Doing Business since 2008. This effort is ongoing under the Business Roadmap 2020 and extends beyond it with the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, which aims to position the country among the 30 most developed nations by 2050’ (Doing Business in Kazakhstan, 2019). The unrest in Kazakhstan in early 2022 showed how surprisingly resilient is the civil society there and how people are determined to voice their discontent against rampant corruption, economic mismanagement and systemic inequalities. Uzbekistan has the second, Kyrgyzstan has the third, and Tajikistan has the fourth position among CARs; the data for Turkmenistan is not provided. At the same time, the CARs still face enormous challenges when it comes to transparency and other factors crucial for investors, ranking low on Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index (yet the situation within the CA region also varies as depicted in Table 1, primarily between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). The global and regional ranks regarding doing business and corruption largely overlap: Kazakhstan has the highest position in Central Asia in attracting business and managing corruption. Kyrgyzstan is the second in the region in managing corruption, but holds the third position in attracting business, giving the second place to Uzbekistan. Corruption is particularly rampant in Tajikistan and

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Table 1 CARs in ease of Doing Business (DB) ranking and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 2020: global and regional rank Country

DB global DB global DB regional CPI rank score rank global rank

CPI global score

CPI regional rank

Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan

25 69 80 106 –

38 26 31 25 19

1 3 2 4 5

79.6 69.9 67.8 61.3 –

1 2 3 4 –

94 146 124 149 165

Source Ease of Doing Business Report, World Bank (2020)

Turkmenistan, performing the worst among the CARs, with ignominious 149th and 165th positions in the world, respectively (out of 180 ranked states).

4

Direct Neighbours: European Union–Russia–Central Asia

Contrary to the EU, which does not have a direct security dilemma with respect to Central Asia due to the lack of direct geographical proximity and historically inherited strategic presence, for Russia, the internal dynamics and political shifts in the CARs are regarded a potential source of threat. Russia, a ‘former colonizer of the region’, as Marlène Laruelle (2010, pp. 149–150) puts it, vehemently defends its interests in Central Asia, regarding the republics as its geostrategic depth. In particular, this challenge gained significance in August 2021, with the United States withdrawal and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, and then, in January 2022, with massive protests in Kazakhstan, the biggest in its 30-year independent history. As the unrest rapidly spread, president Kassym-Jomart Tokaev labelled the protesters as terrorists, and asked the CSTO for support. The troops deployed thereafter, were mostly from Russia. The first such operation in the alliance’s history proved Vladimir Putin’s steadfast reliance on hegemonic approach towards the region. The evolving strategic and security-related circumstances are likely to have a key impact on Russia-Central Asia relations, with Moscow’s potential enhanced footprint.

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The rapidly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan may result in the Central Asian states and Russia confronting the Afghan threats of narcotics, terrorism, fundamentalism and destabilization. In Russia, these concerns were present much earlier, for example, in the ‘Overview of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’ (OFP) prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which Vladimir Putin approved on 27 March 2007 (De Haas, 2010, pp. 22–23). The Strategy towards 2020 published in February 2008 stated that there is a growing interest of the outside world in Central Asia due to its strategic resources. Additionally, the attempts and initiatives aimed at renationalization of security policy by the CARs leadership are regarded as a potential source of conflict and, therefore, an external threat by Russia. Russia seems more appealing to CARs than China, and historically more able to play a defence-related role there, but the two seemingly contradictory processes seem to run in parallel when it comes to Russia’s interactions and presence in the region. On the leaders of the one hand, the CARs manifest their political and symbolic independence from Russia (e.g. Nursultan Nazarbayev decided to change the Kazakh alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin, the Republics engage in cooperation with China under the Belt end Road Initiative, markedly announced by Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, which manifests the geo-economic importance of Central Asia to Beijing); on the other hand, they turn to Russia to receive aid when necessary and when security threats escalate (e.g. Kazakhstan unrest in January 2022). Apart from the energy cooperation, certain areas of multi-dimensional connectivity between the European Union and Central Asia are particularly noteworthy and need to be further developed. The following subchapters briefly exemplify and discuss them. Trade exchange between the CA and the EU is a vital element of bilateral interactions and needs to be further developed. As of 2019, the EU is a top trading partner for Central Asia with a third position in imports after Russia and China and the first position in exports; the trade relations with the EU constitute 24.1% of the CARs’ overall trade (15.9% of import, 30.7% of export). The EU’s export to CA includes manufactured goods, such as medicines, cars and machinery. Import is led by raw materials and low value-added manufactured goods (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan: oil; Kyrgyzstan: gold; Tajikistan: aluminium, textiles; Uzbekistan: chemicals, textiles) (EP, 2019, p. 3). According to the EU, Central Asia’s integration

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Table 2 EU (27) merchandise trade with CARs in 2019 (in billion EUR)

Country Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

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Import

Export

Balance

18.4 4.6 0.0 0.4 0.2

5.9 1.6 0.2 0.6 2.5

−12.5 −3.0 0.1 0.2 2.3

Source European Commission Statistics

into the global economy by full membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) constitutes a prerequisite for facilitated trade and economic relations with the region, which could result in the spread of Western economic standards (Voloshin, 2014, p. 32). Among the Central Asian Republics, only Turkmenistan has so far not applied for WTO membership. Three CARs are members of WTO (Kyrgyz Republic since 1998, Tajikistan since 2013, Kazakhstan since 2015); in June 2019, Uzbekistan expressed its will to join the system in the foreseeable future. Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan benefit from favourable access to the EU market, through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which provides preferential access to the EU market and reduced tariffs. Kyrgyz Republic also benefits from the GSP+ scheme, introduced in 2016, which is supposed to grant additional preferences. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as of the upper middle income level, are no longer entitled to benefit from the GSP. The position of the Central Asian states in bilateral trade relations with the EU and the volume of exchange largely differs, as Table 2 shows. Kazakhstan is a priority country within the Central Asia strategy of the EU, with the EPCA cooperation scheme (mentioned above). The EU is Kazakhstan’s first trade partner, representing 31.6% of its total foreign trade (third import partner, after Russia and China and first export partner).3 The main EU exports to Kazakhstan include machinery and transport equipment, other manufactured goods and chemicals; imports are overwhelmingly dominated by products of the energy sector (minerals, fuels) products (92.2% in 2019). The EU is also the largest investor in Kazakhstan.

3 Detailed information on EU’s trade with all CARs: European Commission, Statistics.

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As of 2019, the EU is the sixth trading partner for Kyrgyz Republic with only 5% of Kyrgyz total foreign trade (fourth import partner with 5.7% share and eighth export partner with only 2.9% share). The GSP+ scheme, which was granted to Kyrgyzstan, is yet to bring more benefits. The bilateral trade rose slowly in the years 2016–2019, with the EU exporting primarily machinery and transport equipment and importing primarily gold and agri-food products. The bilateral trade relations between the EU and Tajikistan are relatively limited: in 2019, the EU was Tajikistan’s sixth major trade partner, after Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Turkey and Kazakhstan, with a 6.2% share of its total external trade (EU Trade in goods with Tajikistan, 2020). The EU-Turkmenistan relations are regulated by an Interim Trade Agreement signed in 1998 and the ratification of PCA is as of mid-2020 still pending. The EU was in 2019 a third trading partner with only 8.3% of its total foreign trade (second import partner after Turkey with 22.5% share and second export partner with only 4.1% share, after China, which dominates Turkmenistan’s export with 77.9%). According to the Index of Economic Freedom 2020, published by Washington-based think tank, the Heritage Foundation, Turkmenistan’s economy with its 170th position out of the 180 states that are ranked, belongs to one of the most globally repressed, government-controlled economies with little business freedom (IEF, 2020). According to this ranking, Central Asian economies differ significantly: Kazakhstan holds the 39th position, Kirgiz Republic the 81st (both regarded moderately free economies), Uzbekistan the 114th position and Tajikistan the 155th (viewed as mostly unfree). For Uzbekistan, the EU is the fourth trading partner after China, Russia and Kazakhstan, accounting for 8.8% of its total foreign trade (third import partner, after China and Russia with 14.5% share in Uzbekistan’s import, and seventh export partner with only 3.4% share). Hydrocarbons and minerals represented almost 60% of the CARs total exports in 2018; it is therefore important to support the transformation of CARs economies into ‘diversified and competitive private sector-driven economies which can create jobs, integrate in regional and global value chain’, as promised by the new EU strategy (EC, 2019, p. 8). 4.1

Education

Central Asian societies are relatively young, with more than half of the population under 30 years of age. More precisely, 39.1% in Kazakhstan,

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46.09% in Kyrgyzstan, 49.5% in Tajikistan, 41.9% in Turkmenistan and 39.8% in Uzbekistan are below the age of 25 (data for each country: CIA World Factbook). Strengthening the CARs education system is particularly important in developing democratic societies. The EU’s regional programmes are aimed at strengthening multi-dimensional cooperation, including sustainable development and security. The EU has allocated EUR 1.1 billion to development cooperation with Central Asia for 2014– 2020, including more than EUR 454 million for regional programmes, of which EUR 115 million is for Erasmus+ . In 2017, there were 800 Central Asian university staff and students participating in Erasmus educational exchanges (EP, 2019, p. 6), between 2014 and 2018; more than 250 two-year master-level scholarships were awarded to students from Central Asia under the Erasmus Mundus programme (EU Factsheet, 2019, p. 2). The EU offers also bilateral projects; for example, 2014–2020 EU bilateral assistance with Kazakhstan is focused on education and vocational training (EUR 37 million between 2014 and 2017). Importantly, the 2019 strategy promises to foster research on Central Asia and on EU-Central Asia relations and promote more opportunities for interaction between researchers and think tanks from both regions (EC, 2019, p. 14). During the 17th EU-Central Asia ministerial meeting on 22 November 2021, the EU and Central Asian representatives reaffirmed the importance of international research and innovation collaboration, particularly through the joint scientific projects and funding opportunities offered by the EU’s Framework Programme for Research and Innovation Horizon Europe (Joint Communiqué, 2021).

5 Europe’s Human Rights and Democratization Efforts The international efforts related to the democracy and human rights of the EU were appreciated in 2012, when the organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Committee highlighted EU’s commitment to a ‘successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights. The stabilizing role played by the EU has helped to transform most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace’ (The Nobel Peace Prize, 2012).

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Fostering democratization and human rights standards is a wellestablished pillar of the EU’s normative international performance. The EU uses the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to promote democratic institutions and civil society, and monitor human rights protection, including vulnerable groups, gender empowerment, etc. Values-oriented policy and encouraging prodemocratic transitions in Central Asia should unchangeably remain a necessary element of the policy vis-à-vis the CARs and should be balanced with other strategic needs. Some authors (Scott, 2016, p. 118) argue that diversification of energy supplies is prioritized by the EU, which makes democratization and human rights largely neglected. Economic development and multi-dimensional democratization processes should constitute two major pillars of the EU-Central Asia interactions. According to Democracy Index (2019, pp. 12–14), an annually published report by the Economist Intelligence Unit, among the five republics only the Kyrgyz Republic is considered a hybrid regime, and the rest four are ruled by authoritarian regimes. Stable, democratic and internally integrated Central Asia could emerge as a unique actor and a noteworthy centre of power in the multipolar world. There have been many documents and reports which provide a detailed recommendation regarding better democratic standards in Central Asia. The development of different programmes aimed at education, providing scholarships for students from the region to study at European universities, which would enable them to understand better the mechanisms of pluralist, transparent representative democracies, where the governments are accountable for their decisions, seems an indispensable investment for the future. These students will acquire the necessary competence to implement these standards in their own countries. A noteworthy, first-ever cooperation project between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and the European Union was launched in November 2019. The programme, titled ‘Supporting the Economic Empowerment of Afghan Women through Education and Training in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’, is an initiative of the Kazakh government, to which the EU has contributed EUR 2 million. It will enable 50 Afghan women to complete undergraduate, postgraduate and technical courses in agriculture, statistics and mining in various academic establishments across Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (EU Report, 2019, pp. 67–68). By engaging in more projects like this in future, the EU should further combine the

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promotion of regional interconnectivity and human rights with the focus on gender empowerment. The EU attaches substantial importance to the political dynamics in Central Asia. Following the 2–11 January 2022 protests sparked due to gas price increases in Kazakhstan (but also because of corruption, poor working conditions and continued crackdown on dissent) that spread across the country and led to large-scale unrest, the organization expressed its concern. The EU External Action Service (EEAS) encouraged ‘a peaceful resolution of the situation through inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders and respect for the fundamental rights of citizens’. The EU also urged the Kazakh government ‘to respect the fundamental right to peaceful protest and proportionality in the use of force when defending its legitimate security interests’ (European Union External Action, 2022, January 5). The rule of law, human rights and good governance-based values the EU internationally promotes have yet still limited impact on gradual democratic transitions in the Central Asian Republics; it may be assumed that this is likely to be a long-term process. The EU’s enhanced presence and cooperation with CARs may counterbalance the growing influence of powerful actors, particularly China, Russia and India, which also aims to upgrade its policy of re-connectivity with Central Asia. The EU accentuates normative and socio-economic aspects of its strategy vis-à-vis Central Asia; the significant diplomatic offensive which, markedly, entered a new phase in 2021, is expected to give a new dimension to the EU-CARs cooperation. It is hard to predict to what extent it will be successful: the evaluation of its results will be possible in the next few years.

6 The Downward Spiral: Terrorism and Trafficking Security-related issues seem to have more significance in the EU’s policy towards Central Asia. It is directly connected to the dynamics in the region, particularly in Afghanistan. After the Taliban takeover, on 22 November 2021, the Foreign Ministers of CARs and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission and the Commissioner for International Partnerships, held the 17th EU-Central Asia ministerial meeting in Dushanbe. They, among others, highlighted the necessity to provide humanitarian

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assistance to Afghani civilians and raised concern about the Afghan territory being used as a base for hosting, financing or exporting terrorism to other countries. Joint cooperation in ‘security and border management, as well as in the joint fight against terrorism, transnational organized crime, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, trafficking of small arms and light weapons, transnational drug trafficking and cybersecurity threats’ was emphasized. Due to the geographical location of CA between the major drugproducing regions (Afghanistan, Pakistan) and the drug markets, drug trafficking remains a vital problem for Central Asia. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been substantial expansion of drug smuggling via Central Asia. Narcotics trafficking routes provide transit primarily from Afghanistan, which continues to dominate the global opium market; Central Asia became a major hub for smugglers with patronage networks throughout the region. Around 80% of heroine seized in Europe comes from Afghanistan, most of which is smuggled via CA; drug addiction became also a problem of young adults from Central Asia, who constitute a majority of addicts in the region (Knight & Bhatia, 2010, pp. 103– 104). The regional report on Central Asia published by the Council of the European Union on 4 November 2019 highlighted the problem of drug trafficking by emphasizing that ‘Central Asia has long been considered as a transit territory for an increasing amount of Afghan opiates trafficked to the major consumer markets in Russia, Europe, and the USA’ (EU, 2019b, p. 4). Drug trafficking and terrorist groups activities intersect in various parts of the region with jihadist militants directly engaged in the process (more: Omelicheva & Markovitz, 2019). With Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban after 2021 plunging into chaos that is likely to be accompanied by an increased risk of intensified drug smuggling, the EU should take more action in collaboration with the Central Asian leadership to strengthen efforts to deal with this ominous forecast.

7 Green Economy, Climate Change and Water Management Enhanced collaboration in sustainable development, environment protection and green economy is one of the EU’s priorities. Central Asia faces many challenges related to the environment and climate change. The EU supports such initiatives and provides funding as part of various programmes. In particular, the efforts of Kazakhstan, which in

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2013 started Green Economy Transition Plan, are appreciated. In the years 2015–2018, the EU supported the green economy initiatives in Kazakhstan through its 7 million euro bilateral programme aimed at contributing to the state’s environmental sustainability. Cooperation in these areas is included in the EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation agreement, which entered into full force in March 2020. Certain diplomatic initiatives within the European Union Climate Diplomacy were introduced even in difficult COVID-19 pandemic times, for example planting 27 trees in Nur-Sultan in September 2020; the online green master classes for students were also planned as part of the EU-Kazakhstan cooperation (European Union External Action, 2020). Access to shared resources of water remains a crucial problem in Central Asia and a factor escalating regional tensions. Resolving water scarcity related challenges will require multilateral cooperation among the CARs; it is therefore crucial to encourage intra-regional dialogue. The EU provides support for such water and environment initiatives, for example through the EU-Central Asia Platform for Environment and Water Cooperation, which was established in 2009. Within the framework of the project ‘European Union—Central Asia Water, Environment and Climate Change Cooperation (WECOOP)’, renewed in October 2019 for three years, certain initiatives were introduced. Their purpose is to improve environmental awareness among decision makers, industry and civil society, support environmental policies and frameworks in Central Asia, including on water and climate change, and provide environmental-friendly infrastructure investments (WECOOP). Climate change-related challenges were one of the key pillars of the 5 November 2021 EU-Central Asia Economic Forum.

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Connectivity Strategies: Russia -Central Asia

In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and, by extension, the USSR-CARs single economic space, Russia’s trade relations with the region suffered a major crisis. The shortcomings of centrally planned economies had a profound negative impact on subsequent developments. As of 2019, Russia is the 11th global economy in terms of GDP and the 13th exporter in the world. Tables 3 and 4 show the position of CARs in Russia’s export and import. Kazakhstan, the richest Central Asian Republic, is the most important export partner for Russia in CA, with a

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share of 3.42% of total Russia’s export and a value of 13.9 billion dollars and 2.44% in import, with a value of 5.81 billion dollars (Observatory of Economic Complexity). The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant negative impact on Central Asian economies and the healthcare system, suffering from limited capacity due to long-term underfunding and corruption (OECD, 2020). As part of crisis response, Russia tried to upgrade its trade-related cooperation with the region. During bilateral talks held in November 2021, both sides emphasized that from January to August that year, the exchange increased by over 30% compared to the same period in 2020 and exceeded 16 billion dollars (Russia-Kazakhstan Talks, 2021). Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among 16 countries (others being, for example, India, Iran, Germany) where Russia plans to send ‘digital attachés’ for its trade missions in 2022. They will be responsible for promoting Russian IT industry (KUN.UZ, 2022). Russia has made various attempts to improve its presence in the economies of the CAR. One of them is the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), projected by Russia as an economic integration Table 3 Central Asian Republics in Russia’s exports (in %)

Table 4 Central Asian Republics in Russia’s imports (in %)

Country Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan Turkmenistan

Country Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyz Republic Turkmenistan Tajikistan

Percentage 3.42 0.94 0.4 0.23 0.13

Percentage 2.44 0.86 0.15 0.061 0.015

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initiative.4 It is the union of certain post-Soviet states (among the CARs Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic are full members), which came into force on 1 January 2015. Russia tries to convince the Uzbek authorities that full membership in the EEU (as of 2021 Uzbekistan has the observer status) will be beneficial for Tashkent. Tajikistan continues to postpone its final decision; according to the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (the think tank quoted a Tajiki opposition leader in exile Sharofiddin Gadoyev), it is caused by monopolization of the Tajik market by members of the authoritarian President Emomali Rahmon’s family (RISS, 2020, June 19). Russia incessantly regards Central Asia as its strategic backyard and undertakes initiatives to safeguard its position. The Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization formed a Collective Rapid Reaction Force deployed in Central Asia and continued to build up its military forces. Furthermore, the CSTO proposed that the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization)5 members join its efforts on post-conflict rehabilitation of Afghanistan (de Haas, p. 41). In July 2021, Tajikistan appealed to members of the CSTO for help in dealing with security challenges emerging from neighbouring Afghanistan. Thousands of Afghans, including police and government troops, fled to Tajikistan after the Taliban took over. The CSTO may become an important security mechanism, bolstering Russia’s and CAR’s cooperation in dealing with regional threats. The lack of confidence in the Afghan government’s ability to control Islamic rebels and drug traffickers on its territory seems entirely justifiable. Russia has embarked upon the strategy of upgrading the CSTO capabilities and strength. On 20 September 2021, Tashkent hosted a conference ‘Russia and Uzbekistan face the challenges of development and security in a new historical stage of interaction’. During the meeting, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko suggested that Moscow would like Uzbekistan to rejoin the CSTO 4 In its meaningful report, a world leading London-based think tank, Chatham House, took a critical approach towards this Russia-led organization, arguing that it cannot be assessed as an authentic project in economic integration, because it is ‘not governed by strong common institutions capable of devising and enforcing a corpus of common rules’, but instead it is ‘dominated by Russia’s ad hoc trade policy, which involves offering favourable deals to loyal states while punishing disloyalty’. See Wolczuk (2021, May 13). 5 The Shanghai Five involving China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was established in 1996. In 2001, following the accession of Uzbekistan, it was transformed into the SCO. In 2018, India and Pakistan joined the organization.

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(Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the CSTO in June 2012, for the second time). Notably, on 23 August 2021, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev attended the CSTO’s (online) summit, as ‘an invited guest’. The unprecedented unrest, which erupted in Kazakhstan in early 2022, provided the opportunity for Russia to reinforce its geostrategic position in the region. Moscow decided to deploy its troops to quell the dissent. Protection of the long (7600 km) Russian-Kazakh border is particularly important for Russia, which has vast interests in Kazakhstan, the largest of the former Soviet Republics. Moreover, the outer space cooperation is a key pillar of bilateral interactions: Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union the Baikonur spaceport, which Russia leases for approximately $115 million a year. Historically, politically, culturally and linguistically (Russian is the most widely used international language in the region), Russia has a substantial security-related advantage in CARs over other regional or global powers, interested in expanding relations in Central Asia, including the EU, China, India or the United States. After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, for Russia it is China’s growing footprint (primarily economic, but also involving socio-political engagement) in Central Asia which remains a matter of substantial concern. As of early 2022, the visibly developing strategic relations between Russia and India (rooted in history: India and the CARs use Russian defence equipment) are marked by the lack of New Delhi’s criticism of Russian involvement in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. In addition, Narendra Modi’s administration renewed its initiatives to engage in Central Asia, regarded as India’s ‘extended neighbourhood’.6 These political manoeuvrings may signify an upgraded, trilateral Russia-India-CARs cooperation in the foreseeable future, primarily in security-related matters, with the aim to counterbalance China’s ambitions in Central Asia (the spectre of China’s domination in the region haunts Russian and Indian leaderships alike), and respond to a wide variety of threats from Afghanistan ruled by Taliban. Russia’s hard power role and capabilities in the fast evolving regional dynamics

6 The first India-Central Asia Summit was organized on 27 January 2022, with the

emphasis on ‘centuries-old close civilizational, cultural, trade and people-to-people linkages between India and Central Asian countries’. See Delhi Declaration of the 1st India-Central Asia Summit (2022). On 17 November 2021, the CARs, India, Russia and Iran took part in the Third Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan, held in New Delhi. Markedly, both China and Pakistan refused to attend, which symbolizes the regional power dynamics.

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in Central Asia are much greater than those of the EU, but the former may have a growing contribution to supporting democratic transition processes in some of the republics. India, balancing between the urge to bolster its cooperation with the West, and at the same time, wooing Russia and renewing its engagement with the CARs, may play an interesting role on the regional geostrategic chessboard.

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Conclusion

Regarding regional policies, the strategic goal of the EU for the upcoming future is to strengthen its position in global governance and to adapt its external strategy to changing international configurations. To successfully materialize the existing potential and develop the already implemented projects, the presence of the EU in Central Asia in the evolving world order must be enhanced with a greater recognition of the unique political and socio-economic distinctiveness of the region and its increasing geostrategic significance. One of the crucial purposes of the strategy vis-à-vis different regions, including Central Asia, is to promote the democratic norms and to strengthen the rule of law. The combination of values-oriented approach with economic, security-related interests and socio-cultural issues should be included in a holistically understood cooperation framework with all Central Asian Republics, anchored on both bilateral and multilateral platforms. In 2021, the EU-Russia interactions became tense due to the border crisis in Central Europe and Moscow’s threats towards Ukraine. It seems that persistent lack of trust is likely to characterize these interactions, but tensed relations between Brussels and Moscow are rather unlikely to have substantial impact on their respective policies vis-à-vis Central Asia. The EU will continue to support the initiatives of the Central Asian leaders that aim to intensify intra-regional collaboration, such as the third consultative summit of the Central Asian leaders held on 5–6 August 2021 in Awaza (Turkmenistan). The EU’s regional cooperation programmes include a variety of areas of cooperation, discussed and developed between the CARs during such meetings, for example, trade facilitation, people-to-people contacts, and water and energy cooperation. Moreover, there are multiple initiatives and projects in various fields in which the EU is engaged while pursuing its norms-based policy vis-à-vis Central Asia. The analysis of a newly adopted strategy leads to

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a conclusion that declared perception of CARs has undergone a noteworthy re-evaluation from primarily energy resources-rich region to a geostrategically, economically and socio-culturally significant actor, with which it is necessary to strengthen multi-dimensional cooperation. The new strategic goals provide a workable framework for an improved role of the EU in Central Asia and, if materialized, would undoubtedly raise bilateral interactions to a new level. In the coming years, the EU strategy in Central Asia should be conducted with a realistic approach and a comprehensive analysis of what can be achieved and how to use or develop existing tools in the post-pandemic conditions. Furthermore, in the changing geostrategic landscape with the growing ambitions and influences of China, which need to be counterbalanced by norms-oriented democracies, a stable transition of the CARs into states with more democratic, transparent and pluralist governance is in the interest of the EU and Central Asian nations. The EU’s strategic efforts, combined with multi-faceted aid programmes, enhanced trade exchange, which would include a wider variety of Central Asian products, should be pushed forward with greater assertiveness in the struggle against nepotism, corruption and bureaucratic hurdles. The future cooperation scheme should focus on several priorities that combine the normative approach with factors related to economic and security. First, expanding cooperation schemes with all CARs with upgrading them to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs) and supporting the initiatives aimed at diversifying their economies away from hydrocarbons. Second, further encouraging the changes that ensure political transition into democratic states with a better commitment to human rights standards. There is an urgent and ongoing need to promote transparency and economic freedom, and support private business. Third, undertaking mutual initiatives aimed at preventing corruption and adhering to international anti-corruption standards enshrined, for example, in the UNCAC (the United Nations Convention against Corruption). Fourth, providing more support in addressing the problem of using Central Asia as a route for drug trafficking, which remains a huge challenge if we take into account the situation in post-war Afghanistan. For that purpose, more multilateral initiatives which foster inter-regional cooperation and engage the EU, Central Asia and (possibly) Afghanistan should be introduced. Regarding bilateral trade, more attention should be devoted to better networking, including e-networking, promoting virtual and in-person contacts between producers, including the representatives of Small and

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Medium Enterprises (SMEs) (notably, the EU’s strategy promises to prioritize support for the SME’s). Special courses (including e-courses) or double degree programmes of vocational education should be organized both in the EU states and in CARs, which would contribute to overcoming cultural differences and provide a better understanding of legal norms (e.g. protection of property rights), business culture and needs of potential consumers. Taking into account the necessity to introduce online teaching during the pandemic and the largely limited travel opportunities, it is crucial to prioritize the E-silk highway project, introduced with the newly adopted strategy in 2007. Developing an internet-based communications network and providing support for highcapacity internet will provide the necessary link for Central Asian students, teachers, academics, and scientists and the EU institution. The emphasis on the e-network provides a better connectivity and significantly enhances participation in modern forms of distance teaching/learning. Importantly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, in July 2020, the EU initiated a comprehensive 3 million EUR Central Asia COVID-19 Crisis Response (CACCR) solidarity package to provide the necessary support. The long-term aim of the programme is to boost the underfinanced national health systems of the CARs by improving their capacities to respond to potential future public health risks. Russia also bolstered its cooperation related to COVID-19 response. For example, the Sputnik V vaccine is being produced at the Karaganda Pharmaceutical Complex in Kazakhstan. Inoculation programmes in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were largely based on this Russia-made vaccine; Uzbekistan, however, more willing to improve cooperation with Beijing, was accepting the Chinese offer (Bartlett, 2021, February 7). During the pandemic, Central Asia became one of the theatres of (soft) power rivalry framed under the so-called vaccine diplomacy. The energy cooperation between the EU and Central Asia will remain a vital socio-political and economic goal for both sides and at the same time a major and challenging test of the geostrategic capabilities of the EU in the dynamically evolving international system and regional power rivalry in the upcoming decade. Energy cooperation, including the new energy supply roots, remains a crucial element of the EU and CARs strategic goals and economic interactions. The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP), an ambitious, yet politically and financially challenging, connectivity project from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, is a geostrategically vital endeavour that would provide natural gas from Central Asia (Caspian

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Sea basin) to the EU market bypassing the territory of Russia and Iran (Indeo, 2018). The TCGP could not only provide cheaper (than Siberian) Turkmen gas to the EU, but also become a crucial game changer with capability to affect the structure of the geopolitical system by enhancing the EU’s political and economic role in Central Asia (more: Cutler, 2020, March 1, pp. 1, 6–7). It could pave the way to a multi-dimensional development, overcome the economic crisis hampered by low energy prices, reinforce sovereignty of the CARs and balance Chinese and Russian influences in Central Asia. It has been a challenging process to define common goals and interests of the European Union and Central Asia, which started in the early 1990s and was accompanied by three decades of profound and rapid geopolitical, and socio-economic changes within the two regions. These shifts enabled both regions to develop their international actorness and identify geostrategic goals, which unalterably include enhancing multidimensional collaboration. The 2007 and 2019 EU strategies constitute a milestone in defining the main areas of cooperation with Central Asia. As highlighted in this chapter, many initiatives have already been introduced, and they need to be continued and improved with consideration of regional specificity, the newly emerging challenges (post-2021 Afghanistan) and realistically assessed capabilities of both regions and dynamically evolving geostrategic environment. There is a need to materialize better the existing potential as the EU and CARs are united by the need to further develop their long-term mutually beneficial cooperation within the framework of extended neighbourhood policy, as included in the EU’s 2019 strategy vis-à-vis Central Asia. There seems to be a notable degree of positive approach towards improving the relations with Russia among the inhabitants of the CARs. In a public opinion poll carried out in Central Asian states (Turkmenistan was not included), referred to by Kirill Nourzhanov and Amin Saikal (2021, p. 51), Russia was reckoned by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as the first country (among the top three) with which the positive relations need to be further developed. The EU was enumerated only in Kazakhstan, on the second place. In particular, the poll results in three states accentuated the strengthening of the intra-regional interactions, namely, with Kazakhstan; China was on the third position only in Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. Russia’s longterm strategy in Central Asia is substantially influenced by security-related matters: the region is a geostrategic backyard and it is highly likely, that

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due to the dynamics in Afghanistan, its role as a buffer zone against extremism will be of additional significance for Moscow. The potential threats make the CARs compelled to deal with security concerns arising from perennially unstable Afghanistan and to react accordingly to the evolving security landscape. In this regard, the political and securityrelated relations with Russia are likely to be substantially augmented, but, taking into consideration the foreign power’s multi-dimensional engagement with the CARs and the Republics’ willingness to enhance their foreign interactions, Moscow’s attempts to rebuild its absolutely dominant position in CA are likely to be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the early years of the third decade of the twenty-first century see Russia as a core security provider, competing with China in bolstering its geo-economic footprint in the region.

References 17th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting—Turning Challenges into Opportunities. (2021, November 22). European Commission Press Release. https://ec. europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_6219 Bartlett, P. (2021, February 7). Russia pulls ahead of China in Central Asia vaccine diplomacy. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Corona virus/Russia-pulls-ahead-of-China-in-Central-Asia-vaccine-diplomacy CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fac tbook/ Corruptions Perception Index. (2020). https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/ 2020 CST. (1992, May 15). Collective security treaty. https://en.odkb-csto.org/doc uments/documents/dogovor_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/#loaded Cutler, R. M. (2020, March 1). The Trans-Caspian is a pipeline for a geopolitical commission (NATO Association of Canada, The Energy Security Program Policy Paper Nr.1). http://natoassociation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 04/Trans-Caspian-Pipeline-Geopolitical-Commission-ESPPP01.pdf De Haas, M. (2010). Russia’s foreign security policy in the 21st century. Putin, Medvedev and beyond. Routledge. Delegation of the European Union to Kazakhstan. https://eeas.europa.eu/del egations/kazakhstan_en Delegation of the European Union to Turkmenistan. https://eeas.europa.eu/ delegations/turkmenistan/4870/about_en Delhi Declaration of the 1st India-Central Asia Summit. (2022). https://mea. gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34773/Delhi_Declaration_of_the_1st_ IndiaCentral_Asia_Summit

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Democracy Index. (2019). The economist intelligence unit. http://www.eiu. com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2019.pdf& mode=wp&campaignid=democracyindex2019 Doing Business in Kazakhstan. (2019). The World Bank. Washington. https:// www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/SubnationalReports/DB19_KAZ_Full-report.pdf Ease of Doing Business Report. (2020). The World Bank. Washington. https:// www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/pdf/db2020/DoingBusiness-2020_rankings.pdf EC. (2019). The EU and Central Asia: New opportunities for a stronger partnership. High Representative and the European Commission. https://eeas.eur opa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_-_the_eu_and_central_asia_-_ new_opportunities_for_a_stronger_partnership.pdf Efegil, E. (2010). The European Union’s New Central Asian strategy. In E. Kavalsky (Ed.), The New Central Asia. The regional impact of international actors (pp. 71–88). World Scientific Publishing. EP. (2019). The EU’s New Central Asia Strategy. Briefing. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/633 162/EPRS_BRI(2019)633162_EN.pdf EU. (2007). The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a new partnership. Council of the European Union. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ ST-10113-2007-INIT/en/pdf EU. (2019a). Council conclusions on the new EU strategy on Central Asia. Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ 39778/st10221-en19.pdf EU. (2019b). Regional report on Central Asia. Council of the European Union. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13350-2019bINIT/en/pdf EU Factsheet. (2019). EU builds strong and modern partnership with Central Asia. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_centralasia_2019.pdf EU Report. (2019). EU annual report on human rights and democracy in the world 2019. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/annual_report_e-ver sion.pdf European Commission. Statistics. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countriesand-regions/statistics/regions/ European Union External Action. (2019, January 15). EU–Kazakhstan relations. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/ 4076/EU-Kazakhstan%20relations European Union External Action. (2020, September 30). European Union in Kazakhstan plants 27 trees in Nur-Sultan. https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/ europe-and-central-asia/86094/european-union-kazakhstan-plants-27-treesnur-sultan_en

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European Union External Action. (2022, January 5). Kazakhstan: Statement by the spokesperson on the latest developments. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquart ers/headquarters-homepage/109425/kazakhstan-statement-spokesperson-lat est-developments_en EU Trade in Goods with Tajikistan. (2020). https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_tadjikistan_en.pdf Hoffman, K. (2010). The EU in Central Asia: Successful good governance promotion? Third World Quarterly, 31(1), 87–103. IEF. (2020). Index of economic freedom 2020. The Heritage Foundation. https:// www.heritage.org/index/ranking Indeo, F. (2018, July 10). Settling the Caspian issue and realizing the transCaspian energy corridor. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/ settling-the-caspian-issue-and-realizing-the-trans-caspian-energy-corridor/ Joint Communiqué: 17th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting. (2021, November 22). European Union external action service. Dushanbe. https:// eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/107666/joint-com muniqu%C3%A9-17th-eu-central-asia-ministerial-meeting_en Kazantzev, A., Medvedeva, S., & Safranchuk, I. (2021). Between Russia and China: Central Asia in Greater Eurasia. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 12(1), 57–71. Keegan, K. (2021, November 10). EU-Central Asia economic forum: Is Central Asia ready for more assertive EU policy? The Diplomat. https://thedip lomat.com/2021/11/eu-central-asia-economic-forum-is-central-asia-readyfor-more-assertive-eu-policy/ Khaliq, U. (2008). Ethical dimensions of the foreign policy of the European Union. Cambridge University Press. Knight, W. A., & Bhatia, V. (2010). The United Nations and Central Asia. In E. Kavalsky (Ed.), The New Central Asia. The regional impact of international actors (pp. 89–113). World Scientific Publishing. KUN.UZ. (2022, February 7). Russia to send “digital attachés” to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. KUN.UZ. https://kun.uz/en/news/2022/02/07/russiato-send-digital-attachs-to-uzbekistan-and-kazakhstan Kuszewska, A. (2015). Central Europe, the European Union and emerging Asia. In K. Srinivashan & F. Erixon (Eds.), Europe in emerging Asia (pp. 209–232). Rowman & Littlefield International. Laruelle, M. (2010). Russia and Central Asia. In E. Kavalsky (Ed.), The new Central Asia. The regional impact of international actors (pp. 149–176). World Scientific Publishing. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, 235–258. Nourzhanov, K., & Saikal, A. (2021). The spectre of Afghanistan. Security in Central Asia. I.B. Tauris.

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Observatory of Economic Complexity, Country Profile, Russia. https://oec. world/en/profile/country/rus OECD. (2020). Covid-19 crisis response in Central Asia. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. https://www.oecd.org/corona virus/policy-responses/covid-19-crisis-response-in-central-asia-5305f172/ Omelicheva, M. Y., & Markovitz, L. P. (2019). Webs of corruption: Trafficking and terrorism in Central Asia. Columbia University Press. RISS. (2020, June 19). China and Russia blur lines on “Division of Labour” in exerting influence over Central Asia. Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. https://en.riss.ru/article/605/ Russia-Kazakhstan Talks. (2021, November 2). Mikhail Mishustin held talks with Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan Askar Mamin. The Russian Government. http://government.ru/en/news/43715/ Scott, D. (2016). “From Brussels to Beijing”. Comparing the regionalization strategies of the EU and China. In E. Kavalski (Ed.), China and the global politics of regionalization (pp. 109–122). Routledge. Sim˘ao, L., & Dias, V. A. (2016). The securitisation of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood: What role for Russia? In R. Piet & L. Sim˘ao (Eds.), Security in shared neighbourhoods foreign policy of Russia, Turkey and the EU . Palgrave Macmillan. The Nobel Peace Prize. (2012). https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/ 2012/press-release/ The United States Strategy for Central Asia. (2019–2025). https://www.state. gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FINAL-CEN-Strategy-Glossy-2-102020-508.pdf Voloshin, G. (2014). The European Union’s normative power in Central Asia: Promoting values and defending interests. Palgrave Macmillan. WECOOP. European Union—Central Asia Water, Environment and Climate Change Cooperation. https://wecoop.eu/about/ Wolczuk, K. (2021, May 13). Myth 10: “The Eurasian Economic Union is a genuine and meaningful counterpart to the EU”. Chatham House Report: Myths and Misconceptions in the Debate on Russia. https://www.chatha mhouse.org/2021/05/myths-and-misconceptions-debate-russia/myth-10eurasian-economic-union-genuine-a

CHAPTER 4

The 2019 European Union Strategy on Central Asia: Future Challenges Ana Belén Perianes Bermúdez

1

Introduction

This study addresses the key challenges for the future of EU-Central Asia relations after the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia and provides recommendations for improvement. The 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia,1 adopted by the European Commission on 15 May 2019, sets out a comprehensive approach to Central Asia.2 This Strategy is a flexible statement of intentions that will 1 The 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia may be consulted at the document of the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, “The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership”: https://eeas.europa. eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_-_the_eu_and_central_asia_-_new_opportuni ties_for_a_stronger_partnership.pdf. 2 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

A. B. Perianes Bermúdez (B) University Institute General Gutiérrez Mellado-UNED, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 63 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_4

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guide EU policy towards Central Asia over the coming decade. As it can be expected from a strategy document (Boonstra, 2019), it does not propose new instruments that could significantly alter the current state of relations between them and neither identifies specific implementation methods and measurement tools. Central Asia has traditionally had a lower priority for the EU given the interests at stake and developments in its immediate neighbourhood (in Northern Africa, the Sahel, Near and Middle East, Eastern Europe…), but this fact is gradually changing. During the upcoming decades, EUCentral Asia relations will depend on the interests and developments in both regions and other external factors, such as the Chinese and Russian roles in Central Asia. There are several internal challenges with a significant probability of impacting on EU-Central Asian external relations. On the part of the EU, its lack of internal cohesion, the heterogeneity of its member states and their priorities in terms of external engagements will be part of the basic factors determining the European role towards other regions. And for the Central Asian juristic, despite positive trends found in the five countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), it is noteworthy that key factors could alienate some states from others (for instance, gaps in the economic development, trade vectors, external economic engagements, political interests, the rate of development of societies, the state of the rule of law, etc.). In this chapter, I will analyse the main challenges for the future of EU-Central Asia relations after the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia and to make recommendations for improvement and to identify lines for further research. It is based on the fact that the eurostandard of connectivity (which is founded upon sustainable economic development and a comprehensive, international rules-based way of interconnection in contrast to the Chinese approach) brings the opportunity to address increasing concerns in Central Asia regarding the lack of economic development and environmental sustainability. With respect to the particular social, economic and political context of Central Asian States, it is worth stressing that the most appropriate way of developing and implementing projects and initiatives in the framework of the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia is through cooperation in the field of non-politically sensitive areas with both public and private sectors and civil society at the national and local levels.

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The geostrategic significance of Central Asia for Europe is increasingly gaining in importance for the European continent. As a region connecting Europe to China as well as to Afghanistan and to the Middle East, Central Asia has a key role in the current global efforts to promote Euro-Asian connectivity. These endeavours should bring comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable economic development and local benefits across the region. Moreover, Central Asia represents a key source of energy for the EU. This paper is structured as follows: after the introduction, the article outlines the theoretical framework and literature review to approach the object of study. Then, this study analyses the major points of the EUCentral Asia relations background; the key facts resulting from the analysis of the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia; the findings of this research, focusing first on the internal challenges on the part of the EU, secondly the internal challenges from Central Asia and thirdly, other main external factors (China, Russia and Afghanistan). Finally, the article identifies some recommendations for advancing EU-Central Asia relations following the adoption of the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia. It should be noted that this research has been limited by the relative novelty of the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia and by the fact that both the EU and Central Asia have always had a reduced mutual interest with each other. Accordingly, the EU-Central Asia relations are in constant evolution.

2

Background

The EU-Central Asia relation needs to be considered on the basis of the different social, cultural, economic and political characteristics in which both parts are founded. For instance, while the EU is in itself an advanced form of cooperation among nation-states, Central Asia is among the world’s least integrated regions (Cornell & Starr, 2019, pp. 15–24). The 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia is based on the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy3 and the Connecting

3 Detailed information can be consulted at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/hea dquarters-homepage_en/17304/A%20Global%20Strategy%20for%20the%20European% 20Union’s%20Foreign%20and%20Security%20Policy.

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Europe and Asia—building blocks for an EU Strategy4 (the Connectivity Strategy) (Cornell & Starr, 2019, pp. 47–48). Within the framework of this research, it is important to define the EU’s vision of connectivity, particularly given the fact that both China and Russia are promoting their own understanding of connectivity and that they are quite different from the EU’s view (Saari, 2019, p. 7). Connectivity is an important point of EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy5 and the European Commission recognises its significance for prosperity as one of its ten priorities (European Commission, 2018, p. 1), defining the “eurostandard” concept of connectivity as a sustainable, comprehensive and international rules-based way of working.6 The European way of connectivity estimates that this tool needs to be economically, environmentally and socially sustainable in the long term; that human dimension and people’s interests and rights must centre the policies (for instance, providing networks of transport links, digital and energy facilities in which people’s well-being is at the core of the policy goals); and that open and transparent procurement processes should be promoted (European Commission, 2018, p. 1). It is worth stressing that by definition, a strategy document must set the broad priorities of a policy, not the most concrete details of its implementation. In this regard, the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia is a next step in the EU’s engagement with this region. Therefore, researchers, analysts, policymakers and practitioners cannot wait for a thorough and detailed policy implementation from this 2019 EU Strategy (Cornell & Starr, 2019, pp. 47–48, 70–71). Although Central Asia is not a priority of the EU’s external affairs, this region has become an important niche topic for the Union (SEnECA, 2019a). At present, the EU is one of the main economic partners of Central Asia and accounts for about a third of the region’s external 4 More information is available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_com munication_-_connecting_europe_and_asia_-_building_blocks_for_an_eu_strategy_201809-19.pdf. 5 The European Neighbourhood Policy can be consulted at https://ec.europa.eu/info/ policies/european-neighbourhood-policy_en. 6 The “eurostandard” way of connectivity can be analysed in more depth in the Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank “Connecting Europe and Asia-Building blocks for an EU Strategy” https://ec.europa. eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5803.

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trade (Russell, 2019, p. 3). As the graphics below show, the EU’s trade and investments are concentrated mainly in Kazakhstan, especially in the country’s oil sector7 (which accounted for 88% of its exports to the EU). But by contrast, the total turnover of the EU’s trade with Central Asia remains low (European Commission, 2020)8 and the region as a whole, particularly in its smaller economies, represents less than 1% of the EU’s total foreign trade and investment (Russell, 2019, p. 3). It has to be emphasised that China is the main trading partner of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan but at the regional level, the Chinese are in a distant second position to the EU (with the 20%) in terms of foreign trade, followed by Russia in the third place (slightly under 20%). With respect to Central Asian exports to the EU, they are focused on a few commodities, especially crude oil, gas, metals and cotton fibre. On the other hand, the EU’s exports to Central Asia centre on machinery, transport equipment and other manufactured goods. With regard to the overall institutional framework for the EU’s cooperation with Central Asia, it should be highlighted that the EU and the countries of the former Soviet Union (including Central Asian countries) began negotiating partnerships and cooperation agreements (PCAs) in the 1990s (European Commission, 1995). With the exception of Turkmenistan (with whom the EU signed a partnership and cooperation agreement in 1998, but it has not yet been ratified9 ), the partnership cooperation agreements between the EU and Kazakhstan (1999), Kyrgyzstan (1999), Tajikistan (2010) and Uzbekistan (1999) respectively came into force some time ago (as can be seen in the image below). The general scope of the partnerships and cooperation agreements covers these areas under state democratic values, respect for human rights and market economy principles: political dialogue (including the possibility of meeting at the political level); trade in goods (on the basis of the most-favoured-nation treatment); provisions affecting businesses and 7 Detailed information can be consulted at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/

factsheets/country/details_kazakhstan_en.pdf. 8 Broader information about EU trade in goods with Central Asia can be consulted in https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/region/details_central-asia-5_en. pdf. 9 Pending ratification, it should be noted that an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related issues entered into force on 1 August 2010.

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investments, including labour conditions and the establishment and operation of companies; cross-border supply of services; payments and capital; competition rules in the field of intellectual, industrial and commercial property protection; and economic cooperation in many areas (European Commission, 1995). The strengthening of dialogue between the EU and Central Asia has led to a new generation of enhanced partnerships and cooperation agreements (EPCAs) in some Central Asian countries, which elevate relations to a new level. In this sense, the EU’s bilateral trade relations with Kazakhstan are developed by an EPCA (signed in 2015). This new agreement10 constituted the first of its kind signed by the EU with one of the Central Asian countries and its provisional application started on 1 May 2016 (European Commission, 2020). The EU’S cooperation with Kazakhstan includes other forms of instruments and programmes,11 for instance: the Nuclear Safety Instrument and Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace; the Renewable Energy/Energy Efficiency programme, which promotes renewable energy, energy saving and energy efficiency in the countries of Central Asia; the Central Asia Invest programme, with the aim to promote the sustainable economic development of the Central Asian Countries by encouraging the development of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs); the Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA); the Central Asia Drug Action Program (CADAP); and Erasmus+ supporting mobility of students and academic staff. It should be highlighted that the EU has concluded an EPCA with the Kyrgyz Republic (which is now pending signature) and it is also negotiating another EPCA with Uzbekistan (European Commission, 2020).

10 Detailed information can be consulted at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/ kazakhstan_factsheet_web.pdf. 11 More information can be consulted at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headqu arters-homepage_en/4076/EU-Kazakhstan%20relations.

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A PCA12 governs the EU’s bilateral trade relations with the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Russell, 2019, pp. 1–5). These agreements are not preferential and are devoted to ensure most-favourednation treatment and to prohibit quantitative restrictions in bilateral trade. Furthermore, with the aim of providing better access to the EU market for goods originating in these countries, these PCAs include EU traderelated technical regulations and standards, sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, protection of intellectual property rights and other key legislative issues and practices. Three countries (Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) benefit from favourable access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences.13 In this respect, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as uppermiddle-income-level economies, can no longer benefit from this scheme. The Kyrgyz Republic also profits from the GSP+ scheme, which grants additional preferences (European Commission, 2020).

3

European Investments in Central Asia

Another key point concerning EU-Central Asia relations is in the development aid. As shown in the graphic below, for 2014–2020, the EU Development Cooperation Instrument grant funding was over 1 billion euro. With respect to the period 2021–2027,14 the European Parliament adopted the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)—“Global Europe”, allocating a total amount of 79.46 billon Euro15 for cooperation with third countries outside the EU (European Commission, 2021b). With this decision, the EU will 12 It is relevant to point out that World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership of the Central Asian countries is a pre-condition for closer trading and investment relations with the EU (Kyrgyz Republic has been a WTO member since 1998; Tajikistan became a WTO member in 2013; Kazakhstan became a WTO member in 2015; Uzbekistan expressed in June 2019 a renewed commitment to join the WTO in the near term; and Turkmenistan has not yet applied for WTO membership). 13 More information can consulted at https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countriesand-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/. 14 More information available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/doc uments/multiannual-financial-framework/2021-2027_es. 15 This amount represents a 12% increase compared to the long-term budget 2014– 2020.

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assign 60.38 billion Euro for geographic programmes (at least 19.32 billion Euro for the European Neighbourhood, at least 29.18 billion Euro for sub-Saharan Africa, 8.48 billion Euro for Asia and the Pacific, and 3.39 billion Euro for the Americas and the Caribbean)16 (European Commission, 2021a). Despite the considerable amount of EU development aid funding for Central Asian countries, according to the size of its population, Central Asia received less funding than the two country groups that the EU prioritises in terms of development aid (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the EU Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood). However, as shown in the graphic below, in relation to its size of population, Central Asia gets much more funding than other region of the world, compared to Northern, Southern or Southeast Asia (with a much higher populations). EU development aid funds regional and bilateral programmes. Concerning Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, these countries participate only in regional programmes because they are not eligible countries for bilateral aid (since 2014 and 2017, respectively) after becoming upper-middle-income countries. Moreover, EU financial support to Central Asia provides loans from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development17 and the European Investment Bank.18 Also, the EU’s Investment Facility for Central Asia19 is a mixture of grants and loans. Finally, the EU adopted its first strategy20 for Central Asia in 2007. This document defines the priorities in diplomatic and development aid terms with the general aim of achieving peace, democracy and prosperity 16 Further information can be consulted at https://ec.europa.eu/international-partne rships/news/eu-external-action-budget-2021-2027-final-adoption_en#:~:text=The%20E U’s%20long%2Dterm%20budget,post%2DCOVID%2D19%20Europe. 17 Detailed information by countries can be consulted at https://www.ebrd.com/cs/ Satellite?c=Page&cid=1395236447626&d=Mobile&pagename=EBRD%2FPage%2FWher eWeAre. 18 The EIB is currently active in 4 Central Asian countries: Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. More information is available at https://www.eib.org/en/ projects/regions/central-asia/index.htm. 19 Detailed information about the EU’s Investment Facility for Central Asia implementation, results and projects can be consulted at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/multisite/ devco/regions/central-asia/investment-facility-central-asia-ifca_en. 20 The 2007 EU strategy on Central Asia is available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/ eeas/files/st_10113_2007_init_en.pdf.

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in the region. The strategy proposals are grouped under six principal headings: (1) combating common threats and challenges; (2) human rights, rule of law, good governance, democratisation; (3) youth and education; (4) economic development, trade and investment; (5) energy and transport links; and (6) environment and water. But the progress on the initiatives proposed in this strategy has been unequal and criticised (Centre for European Security Studies, 2018) for allocating insufficient resources for such a broad range of goals and for approaching Central Asia as a single region rather than five separate countries with different needs. At this stage, it is necessary to remember that the role of a strategy document is to provide a broad framework for action, in the programming of the targeted priorities.

4 The 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia: Key Points After a process of consultations with Central Asian governments and other stakeholders, the EU launched a new Strategy on Central Asia in 2019 to update the former one due to the significance of the developments that were taking place in the region. Some of them were mainly regarding Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms and its increasingly conciliatory foreign policy; China’s growing influence in Central Asia through its standard of connectivity together with the need to respond to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative; and the fact that Central Asian nationals had committed deadly terrorist attacks in European territory and elsewhere and joined Daesh in Iraq and Syria, which justified the requirement of further addressing the long-standing threat of radicalisation (Russell, 2019, pp. 11–12). Many of the existing priorities remain in force and the scope of the strategy has been narrowed down (Cornell & Starr, 2019, pp. 5–10), but this new strategy does not propose new instruments that could clearly transform the current state of relations between all or some of Central Asian states with the EU (SEnECA, 2019b). In sum, this strategy constitutes a slight (Laumulin, 2019) attempt to influence the EU-Central Asia relations and, consequently, to enhance its normative agenda (that is to say, the social, political and economic principles and values that are at the very core of its eurostandard of connectivity) in this region. The EU responded to China’s Belt and Road Initiative developing its own approach to connectivity within the framework of this strategy since

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the EU initiatives in energy and transport links had been overshadowed by the Chinese investments. In this sense, while the Chinese’ focus is ove rwhelmingly on huge financial resources to invest on infrastructure, the EU advocates a broader approach on Central Asia including non-physical elements, such as promoting people-to-people projects or dealing with regulatory barriers (Centre for European Security Studies, 2019a, p. 4). This Strategy provides a key difference in comparison with the Chinese perspective due to the eurostandard of connectivity stands for putting human dimension, external relations and people’s interests, well-being and rights at the centre of policies. Accordingly, this fact particularly refers to the European focus on critical interconnected priorities such as promoting resilience; democracy, human rights and the rule of law; cooperation on border management; enhancing environmental, climate and water resilience; prosperity through the promotion of sustainable economic and social development, and fostering local ownership of projects and initiatives. With respect to the Chinese concept of connectivity (Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation), their investments have not been considering the negative consequences linked to the BRI projects connectivity approach in terms of short- and long-term implications for sustainable economic development in this area (Saari, 2019, pp. 4–5). In this regard, by way of example, as concerns are rising in Central Asian countries about predatory Chinese loans/investments and environmental protection, the EU should enhance the promotion of practical measures to foster sustainable economic development in the region (DZhuraev & Muratalieva, 2020, pp. 10–11). 4.1

Internal Challenges from the Part of the EU

The EU’s role towards other regions is determined by such key factors which lead the EU to “economise” its external policy vectors (SEnECA, 2019a, pp. 13–15). This fact also applies to the Central Asian region. In this regard, the level of internal cohesion in determining its role towards other powers and other regions is frequently inadequate and insufficient. The EU’s coherence is diminishing due to internal political divisions between the EU State members, eroding its overall position (Lehne, 2017) and increasing the risk of wanting to achieve too many results with limited resources. In this sense, although the EU Member States share common goals, they have divergent interests in the way of

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how to achieve them due to particular relationships with foreign powers, specific regional interests, priorities or internal constraints (Lehne, 2017). Therefore, the EU is in need of delivering unity in its action messages towards Central Asia (Anghelescu, 2020, pp. 11). Another factor to consider in this analysis is the level of current EU institutional and political integration. This means that it is indispensable for the EU that to advance towards an increased integrated European project. This is to achieve a more visible and active role not only in Central Asia, but also in other regions. In this case, it is noteworthy that the huge institutional heterogeneity of the State members (with different EU institutions and a complex institutional design that hampers productivity, a large number of civil society organisations with different interests) and the fragmentation of the public perception about international events is a handicap for the EU to achieve coherence in its common policies. In this regard, the EU countries external engagement priorities tend to prioritise their national foreign policies (Cornell & Starr, 2019, pp. 5–10). In the current European context, some topics are particularly relevant for this study. The consequences of the British exit from the EU are yet unknown and it is clear that the UK’s decision to leave the Union has damaged the EU’s global image, implying other key consequences for the EU-27, such as the loss of 16 per cent of its economic force and one of its strongest foreign policy players (Lehne, 2017). Other issues (SEnECA, 2019a), which may affect members States engagement with unitary external relations policy across the EU, are the financial crisis and it has an impact on the medium term and long term in terms of the scope of its policies, the effect that the COVID-19 outbreak will be on EU domestic and external policies (Gehrke, 2020), the increasing populism and Euroscepticism as well as the refugee crisis at the European level (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). Ultimately, the EU needs to balance the normative aspects of its external agenda (advancing human rights and democracy through soft power) with an investigation of European interests in the fields of trade, energy or security in Central Asia (Cornell & Starr, 2019, pp. 5–10). Accordingly, the EU should ensure the legitimacy and internal consistency of its policies not only in Central Asia, but also in the other regions where it is present.

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4.2

Internal Challenges from the Part of Central Asia

As a starting point, it should be noted that Central Asian connectivity today presents the particular feature of its Soviet legacy. During the Soviet Union era, connectivity ended at the borders of Central Asian countries as they were effectively closed to the outside world. But the extinction of the Soviet space caused an almost complete loss of infrastructure networks and with them, the associated flows of interaction. Infrastructure in Central Asia. Soviet and post-Soviet railways and pipelines. This fact weakened the foundations of their economies, leading to the partial deindustrialisation of the region and contributing to political tensions between the States for the control of shared resources (for instance, water distribution, the cutting of energy and gas deliveries or the closing of borders and key transport routes) (Saari, 2019, pp. 2–3). In this regard, the political leaders of Central Asia have recently agreed to establish regular consultations in order to take action to overcome the effects of vertical Soviet connectivity. In addition, the inefficiency of its borders (trading across borders) (Fengler & Vallely, 2019), public and private corruption, and informal and clientelistic networks arising after the demise of the Soviet Union have negatively affected economic transparency and regional economic development (Saari, 2019, pp. 2–3). As criminal and terrorist networks have particularly benefited from this key route in Central Asia through which Afghan opiates are trafficked, the region suffers from the negative impact on its development and potential sustainable growth. Moreover, deficiencies in Central Asian countries educational systems have had a negative impact on economic and social development (Centre for European Security Studies, 2019b). In this sense, youth unemployment in the region has increased in part due to a lack of skills. In this area, despite the initiatives developed by the EU, the impact of European assistance on Central Asia’s education field has been below expectations because of several issues, mainly: (a) the EU has frequently used a one-size-fits-all approach trying to transfer Western education system to the post-Soviet space excluding local stakeholders (teachers, parents and students) disregarding the region’s diversity with its multiple historical, political, economic, social and cultural contexts and values and, (b) Central Asian governments have shown resistance to change and they have restricted foreign donor’s access to local stakeholders, resulting

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in little sense of local ownership of European education programmes (Centre for European Security Studies, 2019b).

5

The Role of China, Russia and Afghanistan

China is financing hard energy and infrastructure projects; soft power initiatives in the form of people-to-people projects are not a priority for China in Central Asia. In this regard, the Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team-CADGAT21 (OSCE Academy in Bishkek and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) states that China is increasingly in need of improving its image whilst spreading its influence across the region (Central Asia Data-Gathering & Analysis Team, 2019, p. 1). In addition, China has become the world’s largest official creditor. Tracking Chinese money is difficult because of limited transparency in disclosure and due to the fact that most of these loans are provided to vulnerable borrowers (The Economist, 2019). These countries may struggle to pay these loans especially the case of Kyrgyzstan whose debt to GDP ratio stands above 50% and the 70% of this public debt is to China (OSCE Academy in Bishkek, 2018, p. 15). This is a major issue due to the fact that if the Kyrgyz government defaults on its loans payments, China could demand to take over some state assets. Russian foreign policy in Central Asia has several goals: promoting security and military-technical cooperation, facilitating energy projects in the oil and gas sector and hydropower and reinforcing the integration institutions of the Eurasian Economic Union (Gusev, 2019). Moscow has positioned itself as a unique actor able of countering regional security threats through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and its own military presence in the region. Moreover, it is worth stressing that Russia is neither able nor willing to compete economically with China and nor does it want Western involvement in the region (for instance, through the implementation of American and European energy and security-related projects) (Lang & Popescu, 2015). At another level, it should be pointed out that Central Asian countries have an important dependence on their citizens’ remittances mainly from Russia (but also increasing in Turkey) (SEnECA, 2019a).

21 http://www.osce-academy.net/en/research/cadgat/.

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The emerging security threats which arise from Afghanistan22 (from narcotics and weapons trafficking to extremism spreading), terrorism risks—such as the rise and strengthening of the so-called Islamic State, its move towards the borders of Central Asia and the activity of Al-Qaedarelated groups—and the recent return to power of the Taliban, among other issues of concern—influence the security level in the entire Central Asia. The traditional absence of a collective far-reaching strategy towards Afghanistan and the lack of intra-regional cooperation to address these kinds of shared security challenges among the Central Asian countries is a question of particular concern (SEnECA, 2019a). The conflict in Afghanistan requires a multilateral approach from Central Asian states, which should agree on a framework for cooperation in order to preserve stability in the region. The Talibans’ return to power in August 2021 greatly increases the security and stability challenges for Central Asian states. These countries (particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) depend on a stable Afghanistan for the continuity of their trade and energy links. In this respect, Uzbekistan needs the cooperation of the Taliban for SouthCentral Asian economic connectivity, trade and transit and Turkmenistan requires security to allow the country’s exports of natural resources and to work on the diversification of its export energy markets. This is particularly the case in projects such as the following: Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission Project, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-PakistanIndia Gas Pipeline Project or the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Power Interconnection Project, among other ones of interest (Observer Research Foundation, 2021).

6

Conclusions

The EU will remain in the next decade as only one of the several important players in Central Asia due to the above-mentioned internal challenges and Europe’s large number of external engagement priorities. In this regard, the EU and its member states need to decide which is the best format of cooperation (regional, bilateral or selecting groups of 22 Afghanistan is bordered with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It should be highlighted that Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share an approximately 2.400kilometre-long porous border with Afghanistan.

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member states) to address particular subject areas and where to allocate resources, being realistic about what it is able to achieve and what it is not able to achieve in Central Asia in the coming decades. The EU should also be flexible in its approaches to the region and put the emphasis on “working together” instead of “teaching how to live”, particularly with respect to highly sensitive political issues but ensuring the legitimacy, local capacity-building, accountability and internal consistency of its policies. For these purposes, the EU has to balance the normative aspects of the European agenda (advancing human rights and democracy) with the search for its interests in the areas of trade, energy and security. Although economic issues are expected to continue as the top priority for the EU, they are likely to help to promote good governance and the rule of law through the eurostandard of connectivity. This is the main issue differentiating the EU with the other regional powers operating in Central Asia. To that end, the EU should be able to respond to local social and economic needs, going beyond cooperation with ruling elites. Therefore, the so-called less sensitive policies like education and science will be a key win-win field for improving the EU-Central Asia relations. However, the EU should develop more targeted bilateral cooperation projects in these fields, considering several smaller national projects funded with a consistent amount of money in the long term and more adapted to local contexts and their needs (for instance, infrastructures, direct training in line with market needs, language training, a greater focus on basic and elementary education or fellowships in universities) rather than focusing on broader reforms. To help this process, it would be interesting if in the future, lines of research could address how to better develop and implement political measures to improve non-politically sensitive areas of cooperation among the EU and Central Asian States, at both national and local levels jointly with the public and private sector and civil society.

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References Anghelescu, A. (2020, April). Drawing lessons of past cooperation between EU and Central Asia for the implementation of 2019 strategy (OSCE Academy in Bishkek. Policy Brief 58). Retrieved June 5, 2020, from http://www.osce-aca demy.net/upload/file/PB_58.pdf Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. Full text: Vision and actions on jointly building silk road economic belt & 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. http://beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html Boonstra, J. (2019, October 3). A new EU strategy for Central Asia: From challenges to opportunities. Italian Institute for International Political Studies. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/ 09/09/connecting-central-asia-to-the-world/ Central Asia Data-Gathering and Analysis Team. (2019). BRI in Central Asia: People-to-People projects. OSCE academy in Bishkek and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Central Asia Regional Data Review, 27 , 1–10. http://osce-academy.net/en/research/cadgat/catgat27/ Centre for European Security Studies. (2018, February). Towards a new EU Strategy for Central Asia. EUCAM Watch. Issue 18. https://biblio.ugent. be/publication/8548965/file/8548973.pdf Centre for European Security Studies (2019a, January). How “central” is Central Asia in the EU-Asia connectivity strategy? EUCAM Watch. Issue 20. https://eucentralasia.eu/2019a/01/how-central-is-central-asia-inthe-eu-asia-connectivity-strategy/ Centre for European Security Studies. (2019b, June). Reconsidering EU Education Assistance to Central Asia (EUCAM Policy Brief nº 37). https://eucent ralasia.eu/2019b/06/reconsidering-eu-education-assistance-to-central-asia/ Cornell, S. E., & Starr, S. F. (2019, November). A steady hand: The EU 2019 strategy and policy toward Central Asia (Silk Road Paper). Central AsiaCaucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. https://www.silkroadstud ies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/1911EU-CA.pdf Dzhuraev, E., & Muratalieva, N. (2020, March). The EU strategy on Central Asia. To the successful implementation of the new strategy. Global and Regional Policy. Bishkek Policy Group and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. European Commission. (1995). EU’ partnership and cooperation agreements with the countries of the former Soviet Union. Press corner. https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_95_12 European Commission. (2018, September 19). Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank. “Connecting Europe and Asia-Building blocks for an EU Strategy”. Brussels. JOIN (2018) 31 final. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ IP_18_5803

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European Commission. (2019, May 15). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. “The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership”. Brussels. JOIN (2019) 9 final. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_-_the_ eu_and_central_asia_-_new_opportunities_for_a_stronger_partnership.pdf European Commission. (2020). Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/gen eralised-scheme-of-preferences/ European Commission. (2021a). EU external action budget: European Commission welcomes the final adoption of the EU’s new long-term external action budget for 2021–2027 . https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/ news/eu-external-action-budget-2021a-2027-final-adoption_en#:~:text= The%20EU’s%20long%2Dterm%20budget,post%2DCOVID%2D19%20E urope European Commission. (2021b). Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)—“Global Europe”. https://ec.europa.eu/ international-partnerships/system/files/factsheet-global-europe-ndici-june2021b_en.pdf European Council on Foreign Relations. (2019). EU Cohesion Monitor. https:// www.ecfr.eu/eucohesionmonitor Fengler, W., & Vallely, P. (2019). Connecting Central Asia to the world. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/09/09/ connecting-central-asia-to-the-world/ Gehrke, T. (2020). After Covid-19: Economic security in EU-Asia connectivity. Asia Europe Journal, 18. Published: 26 May 2020. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s10308-020-00579-y Gross, E. (2015). Recalibrating EU-Central Asia relations (Brieg 16/2015). European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/ content/recalibrating-eu-central-asia-relations Gusev, L. (2019, October 2). The importance of Central Asia for Russia’s foreign policy. Italian Institute for International Political Studies. Lang, J., & Popescu, N. (2015). Central Asia: The view from Russia (Alert 1/January 2015). European Union Institute for Security Studies. https:// www.iss.europa.eu/content/central-asia-view-russia Laumulin, M. (2019, December 3). The EU’s incomplete strategy for Central Asia. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80470 Lehne, S. (2017, December). Is there hope for EU Foreign Policy? Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_322_Lehne_EU1.pdf Observer Research Foundation. (2021, September 10). Resurgent Taliban and implications for Central Asia-analysis. Eurasia Review. https://www.eurasiare view.com/10092021-resurgent-taliban-and-implications-for-central-asia-ana lysis/

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OSCE Academy in Bishkek. (2018, October). Central Asian security: Factors of fragility, sources of resilience. http://www.osce-academy.net/upload/file/Sec urity_Alumni_Conference_Summary_Report.pdf Russell, M. (2019, January). The EU’s new Central Asia strategy. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/BRIE/2019/633162/EPRS_BRI(2019)633162_EN.pdf Saari, S. (2019). Connecting the dots: Challenges to EU connectivity in Central Asia (Brief 6/June 2019). European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/connecting-dots-challengeseu-connectivity-central-asia SEnECA. (2019a, May). Central Asia in 2030: SEnECA forecasts for the region and the role of the European Union (Policy Paper nº 13). https://www.sen eca-eu.net/policy-papers-recommendations/policy-paper-no-13-central-asiain-2030-seneca-forecasts-for-the-region-and-the-role-of-the-european-union/ SEnECA. (2019b, September). The 2019 EU strategy on Central Asia: SEnECA recommendations for implementation (Part I. Policy Paper nº 14). https:// duepublico2.uni-due.de/receive/duepublico_mods_00070533 The Economist. (2019, July 12). Chinese loans to poor countries are surging. Daily Chart. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/07/12/chi nese-loans-to-poor-countries-are-surgi

CHAPTER 5

The European Union’s Sustainability Standardisation of World Trade: A Challenge for Central Asia? Axel Marx and Nazik Beishenaly

1

Introduction

Central Asia is located in the heart of Eurasia. It is also in the middle of a dynamic geopolitical milieus such as regional integration initiatives, i.e. the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative. The region is a strategic partner for the European Union (EU) and the EU New Strategy on Central Asia adopted on 17 June 2019 has

A. Marx (B) Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] N. Beishenaly Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 81 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_5

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recently reconfirmed the interest of the EU in the region.1 The Strategy seeks to continue promoting regional cooperation, notably on environmental and climate issues, education, the rule of law, inclusive sustainable growth and trade.2 Within these priority directions, fostering sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity is an important pillar of the Strategy.3 In this chapter, we will address connectivity from the perspective of EU-Central Asia trade relations in a global context which pursues a sustainability agenda in the form of the 2030 Sustainability Development Goals. Despite the impact of COVID-19, which resulted in a very significant impact on the sustainable development goals (SDGs), the 2030 agenda will constitute the global framework which will underpin efforts to create greater connectivity. The future of trade relations will be less about lowering tariffs but more about aligning standards in accordance with sustainable development. The EU is Central Asia’s main trading partner, accounting for about a third of its overall external trade. However, Central Asian countries export to the EU only a few commodities that represent less than 1% of the EU imports. This means there is potential for growth in trade through diversification, and better connectivity can contribute to greater access to EU markets. To achieve greater access, Central Asian countries need to consider two things. Firstly, they are already doing that to a large degree, they should acknowledge the importance that the EU attaches to what is called fair and sustainable trade. International trade which complies with a series of social and environmental requirements is what the EU wants to prioritise. Secondly, they might invest to become more integrated with global value chains (GVCs). This investment is critical because the nature of trade has changed significantly in recent decades with the emergence of GVCs. GVCs can be defined as the “full range of activities that firms and workers do to bring a product from its conception to its end use and beyond” (Fernandez-Stark & Gereffi, 2016, p. 4). Today, international production, trade and investments are increasingly organised within GVCs, which represent different stages of the production process located

1 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_centralasia_2019.pdf. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-work/central-asia_en. 3 Council Conclusions on the New Strategy on Central Asia n. 10221/19, Brussels, 17 June 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39778/st10221-en19.pdf.

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across different countries, because firms try to optimise their production. Even the most simple of products such as a coffee mug or a cotton T-shirt is made through GVCs. Integration in these GVCs, and hence the global economy, is not so much conditional on tariff levels or price mechanisms but on compliance with international standards related to a range of issues related to products and production processes. Hence, the notion of (rules-based) connectivity goes beyond physical infrastructure and cultural ties. It is increasingly linked to the institutional dimension of connectivity that consists of agreements, rules and standards, which became a key prerequisite not only for trade but also for achieving the goals of sustainable social and economic development. The objective of this chapter is to discuss the importance of commitments to sustainability standards and goals in the context of the trade relations of Central Asia with the European Union (EU). These sustainability standards are represented by the EU mandatory standards and requirements, but also by a large number of private voluntary sustainability standards (VSS), which can also facilitate the access of producers to the EU market as they allow them to comply with the EU environmental, health, safety, good governance and other sustainability rules and principles. This commitment towards sustainability holds for both governments and economic operators. For governments, this implies aligning with international commitments and conventions. Central Asia has been putting efforts to align with the requirements of the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) especially within the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, known as the “GSP+”. For economic operators, this implies alignment with a whole range of sustainability standards also known as voluntary sustainability standards (VSS). This chapter reveals that Central Asian countries lag behind other regions of the world in terms of access to and participation in voluntary sustainability standards (VSS), which can constitute a significant barrier for joining GVCs. A low level of adoption of VSS translates missed opportunities from trade, but also indirect benefits for the economic, social and ecological aspects of development. The chapter first introduces and discusses the importance of the sustainability values and standards for the European Union’s cross-border trade policy. Next, we look at how Central Asian countries are doing with regard to participating in GSP and VSS. Next, we discuss some of the key implications for Central

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Asia and draw policy recommendations for developing trade between the EU and Central Asia. It is expected that this chapter contributes to increasing awareness regarding the complexity of the global trade rules and informing decision-makers on the importance of a standard-based perspective to sustainable development.

2

EU, Trade and Sustainable Development

The EU has put sustainable development at the heart of its trade policy for over a decade. A first move towards sustainability was initiated by the Lisbon Treaty which involved the European Parliament in the decision-making process on new trade agreements. This resulted in the introduction of trade and sustainable development chapters in trade agreements (Van den Putte et al., 2014). With the introduction of the trade strategy “Trade for all” (European Commission, 2015), the then Commissioner Cecilia Malmström put additional emphasis on the importance of sustainable development. Also subsequent EU trade strategy documents emphasised the importance of integrating sustainability concerns in trade policy. This has led to a shift in trade policy from trade versus sustainable development over trade and sustainable development to arguably trade for sustainable development. As a result, the EU does not only pursue a trade liberalisation agenda via its trade policy but also a normative agenda (Damro, 2012; Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). This focus on values and standards was very recently made clear by the EU President Charles Michel when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly in September 2020. In his speech, he stated: “More than ever, the European Union is defending the rules-based international order and cooperation based on universal values. The European Union wants to be stronger, more autonomous, and firmer, to defend a fairer world. And it is in this spirit that we lead the implementation of the Paris Agreements. And that we have already integrated the objectives of the 2030 Agenda [referring to sustainable development] into our system of economic governance”. He continued: “We are now developing these values and this open model with greater awareness of our strength, with more realism, and perhaps less naivety. We have faith in the virtues of free and open economies, never in protectionism. But access to our large market—the second largest economic zone in the world, and the first in terms of international trade—will no longer be sold off. From now on,

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we will better enforce the level playing field, in a market open to those who respect its standards. Whether they leave our Union or want to move closer to it”. This levelling the playing field implies that the EU will not lower their standards with regard to, for example, sustainability, but that trading partners should align upwardly their standards with those of the EU. Pursuing sustainable development through trade can be executed by making compliance to specific standards mandatory for market access, or by providing additional preferences as an incentive to ratify and effectively implement a series of international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance instruments (such as in the case of GSP+). Hence, several policy initiatives, unilaterally as well as bilaterally, which link trade policy with sustainable development, have been developed by the EU. The sustainability commitments in trade take many forms and apply to governments and economic operators. For governments, there is the request to comply with multilateral international conventions and agreements. This approach is pursued to the generalised system of preferences (GSP). Economic operators are required to comply with voluntary guidelines and mechanism such as voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) if they want to access the EU market. Both are important for Central Asia. We discuss each.

3

Generalised Scheme of Preferences

An important EU trade instrument to pursue sustainable development is the European Union’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). GSP is a preferential trade arrangement by which the EU grants unilateral and non-reciprocal preferential market access to goods originating in developing countries. The EU has operated a scheme of tariff preferences for more than five decades,4 with the objective of assisting developing countries to reduce poverty, and to promote good governance and sustainable development.

4 Regulation (EU) No 978/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, recital (1).

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Under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+5 ), beneficiary countries can qualify for additional tariff preferences and duty-free access on a number of products (European Commission, 2021). The duty-free access is conditional on the ratification and implementation of 27 international conventions concerning human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance. The additional preferences are a compensation or reward, for ratifying and implementing the international conventions. GSP+ fosters the achievement of its goals by offering the ‘carrot’ of preferences. In terms of integrating in the GSP scheme, and establishing connectivity, Central Asia is doing well. As of 1 January 2020, Standard GSP beneficiaries included Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.6 The GSP+ arrangement requires from countries to ratify 27 core international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance. As of 2019, there were 8 GSP+ beneficiaries: Armenia, Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. It is expected that Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will graduate into the GSP+ system. So three out of (in the future) 8 countries which will be included in the ambitious GSP+ scheme are from Central Asia. This will strengthen the institutional connectivity between the EU and Central Asia and might contribute to a better compliance with the standards the EU wants to uphold.

4

Voluntary Sustainability Standards

A second way the EU pursues sustainable development is through market access regulations. These regulations put sustainable development-related conditions on access to the European market. Often they are based on due diligence requirements. Due diligence requirements put obligations on firms in relation to identifying, assessing and addressing sustainable development-related risks in their operations. If they do not comply with these requirements, they do not get access to the European market. Several examples of these regulations are already enforced or are under 5 GSP+ is one of the three arrangements under the GSP regulation. The other two are the Standard GSP and the special arrangement for the least-developed countries named “Everything But Arms”. 6 List of GSP beneficiary countries: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/ may/tradoc_157889.pdf.

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consideration. Examples of already existing regulations include the EU Timber Regulation, the EU Renewable Energy directive and the conflicts mineral regulation. The Timber Regulation requires importers to ensure that they do not import illegally harvested timber. In order to achieve this, they need to manage their value chain in such a way that all operators work with legally harvested timber, including forest owners and managers who manage the forests from where the timber originates. The management of wood value chains is often done by using voluntary sustainability standards or other systems. The conflicts mineral regulation takes a similar approach and aims to prevent that minerals, used for the production of electric equipment such as laptops, do not enter the European market. Finally, the Renewable Energy directive aims to ensure the supply of renewable energy sources including biofuels which come from outside the EU. In order to ensure that these imported biofuels come from sustainable production, they need to be certified by one of a dozen recognised VSS. This approach of regulating companies on sustainability issues down their GVCs is now further applied in other proposed legislation by the EU. As a result, the European Commission proposed in 2022 a new directive on corporate sustainability due diligence which aims to implement human rights due diligence requirements. In addition, the European Commission has launched in 2021 a proposal for a regulation on deforestation-free products. These regulations and approaches have global effects. This was recently made clear by Anu Bradford (2020) in her recent book on the “Brussels Effect”. In her book, Bradford argues that the EU has become a global governance actor in its own right through exporting its standards and norms through trade and integration in the global economy. Via the mechanism of the activities of multinational enterprises which dominate GVCs and adhere to European standards, European standards are getting spread and diffused throughout the world. Complying with them means access to the European market but also integration in GVCs. In other words, the EU in the recent decades became an influential actor in global governance due to its market size, regulatory capacity, stringent standards, inelastic targets and legal non-divisibility, also called the “Brussels effect” (Bradford, 2020). This normative power is built into the process of addressing the harmonisation needs of the EU internal market and constitutes a global governance mechanism in its own right

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since it exports EU standards across the globe through multinational corporations and their GVCs. Hence, these regulations such as the timber regulation have extraterritorial effects since they target companies and their value chains. As predicted by the Brussels effect of Bradford (2020), these standards and approaches are diffused across the globe to other important trading countries. For example, the Republic of Korea’s Act on the Sustainable Use of Timbers follows a European approach and aims to promote sustainable forest management (Korea Forest Service, 2017). What all these developments have in common is that they integrate private governance instruments such as VSS in market access instruments. VSS systems are a market-based approach to promoting sustainable production and business practices by creating demand for sustainable products and supply to meet that demand (Komives & Jackson, 2014). The United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS, 2018, p. 3) defines VSS as “standards specifying requirements that producers, traders, manufacturers, retailers or service providers may be asked to meet, relating to a wide range of sustainability metrics, including respect for basic human rights, worker health and safety, the environmental impacts of production, community relations, land use planning and others”. Consequently, the adoption of VSS becomes important for producers and countries if they want to be integrated in GVCs. The number of VSS has increased substantially over the last three decades and they now represent a main transnational governance instrument to make trade more sustainable (Marx & Wouters, 2015). Today, VSS are found in all countries of the world. For Central Asian exportoriented economies, VSS can therefore represent a strategic choice for gaining greater access to the EU market and integrating the GVCs. However, considerable variation exists between countries concerning the adoption of VSS. The United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards 4th Flagship report provides an overview of the number of VSS per country. The report shows that VSS adoption depends on the size of the economy, income levels and the importance of exports for the economies (UNFSS, 2020). The International Trade Centers Standards Map references 324 VSS all over the world as of September 2022.7 They can be both public and

7 International Trade Center, The Standards Map, https://www.sustainabilitymap.org.

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private. Public VSS include the European Union’s Ecolabel. Private VSS are implemented mainly by NGOs and the private sector or a collaboration between both (so-called) multi-stakeholder initiatives. Examples are the Better Cotton Initiative, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Fair Wear Foundation, Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS) and the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). These standards were set up to enable producers and workers to sell at a fair price and promote sustainability principles in different sectors, as, for example, using material from a sustainably managed forest or fishery and taking into account health and safety issues and social and environmental impact. These VSS constitute non-tariff measures (NTMs). NTMs comprise a large number of regulatory measures such as quotas and subsidies, but also quality, safety, performance and environmental protection standards and regulations. NTMs are a key issue in debates on access to markets for producers from developing and middle-income countries. Although VSS introduce the risk of excluding producers from developing countries from participation in the trade of certified goods (Marx & Wouters, 2015), it also offers opportunities of accessing markets (Maertens & Swinnen, 2009). In this way, VSS can positively impact economic development since they enable local producers to increase their exports (Marx, 2011; Trienekens, 2011). Moreover, VSS can generate positive effects through learning effects. Finally, VSS can contribute a positive impact on the environment due to applying more sustainable production methods (UNFSS, 2018).

5

The Relevance for Central Asia

With the VSS and GSP schemes, exporting to the European Union can be a complex and costly process requiring investment in technical expertise, know-how in order to comply with the international conventions and sustainability standards. It is therefore legitimate to ask the question for Central Asian governments and economic operators: why export to Europe when there are closer markets, which are easier to access? Central Asian countries, represented by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, are predominantly agricultural and natural resource-based economies. The regions’ population remains mainly rural—it represents 47% in Kazakhstan, 49% in Turkmenistan, 63% in Uzbekistan, 64% in Kyrgyzstan and 73% in Tajikistan of a total population (World Bank data, 2018). Agriculture remains the most important

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labour market in Tajikistan, where the share of employment was 51.6% in 2017, but also in Kyrgyzstan (26.7%), Uzbekistan (21.9%) and Kazakhstan (18%) (ILOSTAT, 2018). Despite the importance of agriculture as a source of jobs, food security and foreign currency inflows for the economies of the region, they still need to address the sustainability issues, notably on countering the effects of the negative environmental externalities of production, as well as the consequences of the ecological disasters of socialist collectivisation and industrialisation policies. Sustainable approaches to production and trade have particular significance also in relation to the large-scale infrastructural projects that are part of the upcoming Belt and Road Initiative. The EU is the biggest trade partner of Central Asia representing 30% of the region’s total trade and e62 billion of direct investments that go largely to Kazakhstan (EU Strategy for CA).8 Today, the EU imports from Central Asia mainly raw materials and low value-added manufactured goods: oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; gold from Kyrgyzstan; aluminium and textile from Tajikistan; chemicals and textiles from Uzbekistan.9 These imports from Central Asia represent less than 1% of the EU total imports, which means there is a potential for growth if the countries can integrate the principle of rule-based connectivity to their trade relations. The institutional dimension of connectivity that consists of agreements, rules and standards is the most important as it becomes a key prerequisite for global trade. However, developing countries are often excluded from GVCs due to their inability to comply with international standards due to the high costs involved. And yet, it is not impossible: around 50% of Europe’s imports originating from outside the EU come from developing countries. Despite the intense competition for accessing EU markets and GVCs, many developing countries succeeded to put in place standardisation systems. Complying with sustainability standards is particularly important for the economies, in which agricultural sectors play an important role as the largest number of VSS can be found in the agricultural sector (UNFSS, 2020). Agriculture is important for the Central Asian republics, in which rural population represents from half to two-thirds of the population: for 8 Council Conclusions on the New Strategy on Central Asia n. 10221/19, Brussels, 17 June 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39778/st10221-en19.pdf. 9 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/633162/EPRS_B RI(2019)633162_EN.pdf.

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Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, agriculture is one of the major economic sectors, while for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, agriculture is an important sector for economic diversification and employment of the rural population. Data provided by the Standards Map show that Central Asian countries have obtained access to around forty VSS which is a relatively low number since many countries have more VSS. The relatively low number of VSS can constitute a barrier for their inclusion in GVCs. In fact, VSS adoption scores show that Central Asian republics are in the lower part of the global ranking: Kazakhstan is the 118th, Uzbekistan is the 133rd, Turkmenistan is the 142nd, Tajikistan is the 152nd, while Kyrgyzstan is the 156th country in the list (UNFSS, 2020). In Kyrgyzstan, for example, thirtytwo standards10 regulate the exports to the European Union: twenty-two standards apply to exporters of agriculture, fish and processed food, and fourteen to textile products. Hence, there is ample room to improve on compliance with sustainability standards. Why such a strategy should be pursued is discussed in the next section.

6

Sustainability at Stake

What are the opportunities offered by complying with standards and values? Below, we discuss a few reasons why it is important to access the EU market and comply with these standard requirements: access to the GVCs, gaining in economic complexity, increasing attractiveness for foreign direct investments, contributing the sustainable development goals and positive spill-over effects. 6.1

Access to EU Markets

Europe represents a market of 500 million consumers with a GDP of 25 thousand euros per capita. About 50% of supplies outside the EU come from developing countries, and it represents a market with a high purchasing power for processed goods. The Europe is also the largest importer of processed fruit and vegetables in the world, absorbing more

10 Standards Map: https://www.sustainabilitymap.org/.

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than 40% of the global supplies.11 European consumer has access to a wide range of products from all over the world; however, recent trends in consumption show potential for products, which have an ethical dimension such as sustainable methods of production and are based on a fair trade value system (ITC, 2019). Although today the trade between the EU member states and Central Asian republics is mostly commoditydriven, Central Asia has advantageous natural endowments in terms of soil, water resources and climate for producing high value-added products and services. The trade between Central Asia and Europe was limited by a range of factors including the distance between the regions. However, with the Belt and Road Initiative and a new transport infrastructure, it was expected that there will be less tariff and non-tariff barriers, and products from the region can reach foreign markets more quickly (Russel, 2019). 6.2

Accessing GVCs

The nature of trade has changed significantly in recent decades with the emergence of GVCs. Today, international production, trade and investments are increasingly organised within so-called GVCs, which represent different stages of the production process located across different countries because firms try to optimise their production (OECD website). Integration into these GVCs, and hence the global economy, is less conditional on tariff levels or price mechanisms but on compliance with international standards related to a range of issues related to products and production processes. Complying with the sustainability standards and accessing the EU market are therefore not only about immediate direct monetary benefits but also about integrating the GVCs. Failing at complying with standards undermines the capacity of the country to exploit advantageous trade possibilities. For developing countries, GVCs offer opportunities to diversify their exports, shift from unprocessed raw materials to producing value-added goods, increase demand for opportunities for better skilled workers, better productivity and being a driver of structural transformation in developing countries (World Development Report, 2020).

11 CBI-Center of Promotion of Imports, Agency of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Increase in Economic Complexity.

The Atlas of Economic Complexity12 shows that there is a direct relationship between the level of the complexity of goods and services and the degree in which a country can develop. Economic complexity is achieved by those societies that can combine large amounts of useful knowledge and organise people to create a diverse range of knowledge-intensive products (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). The Economic Complexity Index (ECI) shows that in 2018 Central Asian countries trade mostly with low complexity products: Tajikistan is the 116th in terms of economic complexity with its export structure based on gold and rare metals, Turkmenistan is the 106th as it exports mostly oil and gas; Kazakhstan ranks as the 93rd most complex country, which makes the country less complex than expected for its income level as the country exports mainly crude oil, petrol and minerals. Uzbekistan’s economy is more diversified and country ranks the 80th in terms of product complexity. Kyrgyzstan ranks 59th as its economy gained in complexity due to the diversification of exports in the area of ICT services, which makes the country more complex than expected for its income level. Producers that experience improvements of their products due to sustainability implementations can contribute to shaping an innovative environment, in which the knowledge spillovers can be diffused over time thus contributing to social accumulation of productive knowledge (UNFSS, 2018). 6.4

Increasing Investment Attractiveness

Complying with sustainability standards and integration in the GVCs can attract foreign direct investments (FDI). In fact, in many developing countries, GVCs’ expansion became a significant catalyst of FDIs for output and trade in developing countries, producing a positive impact on employment, foreign exchange and other (Farole & Wrinkler, 2014). Investors consider a broad range of factors in their decision to invest, including macroeconomic stability, labour force, but also country rankings such as the Doing Business of the World Bank, and other (Jayasuriya, 2011; World Bank, 2018), in which sustainability standards and ratification of the GSP+ conventions are important ones. A country that uses child labour and suppresses civil society and freedom of speech 12 https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu.

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will attract investors who ignore social and environmental impacts and concerned only by profitability, which can further escalate corruption and non-transparent governance (Wang & Zadek, 2016). 6.5

Contributing to the SDGs

Central Asian countries have committed to Agenda 2030, and achieving the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and VSS is recognised as catalyst of sustainable development (UNFSS, 2018). This was measured in benchmarking SDGs against the requirements of the VSS and showing strong connection between SDGs and VSS. The impact is particularly pronounced in the areas such as decent work (SDG 8), responsible production and consumption (SDG 12), and life on land (SDG 15). Studies confirm that VSS may be an effective way to reduce the negative impacts of agriculture production (Smith et al., 2019), and VSS can promote decent work, better wages and collective bargaining (Bennett, 2018), abolishing child labour, ensuring gender equality and advancing the use of environmentally-friendly methods of production (UNFSS, 2020). 6.6

Other Positive Spillovers

Products that have obtained VSS certifications and have accessed the European market can also contribute to country’s capacity to increase its visibility on the global markets, increase their regulatory capacity and bargaining power and help to diversify their exports. These spillovers into the local economy can also lead to increased availability of sustainable products and the transfer of knowledge to non-adopters (UNCTAD, 2020). Organising entrepreneurial activity, business learning, creating jobs in adjacent industries such as marketing, translation services, information technology and other can also have positive effects on the society.

7 Implications for European-Central Asia Policies Although certification and standards can improve access to global markets, increase productivity and contribute to the social and economic goals, they also expect from countries to comply with the costs associated

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with obtaining information, training, changing production techniques and other. Trade with the European Union and complying with the mandatory and voluntary standards can be a challenging endeavour as it depends on a range of inter-dependent factors. The World Development Report (2020) highlights that the important factors for international trade and joining the GVCs are: policy priorities, natural endowments, market size, geography and institutions. Our policy implications are therefore related to the following elements: Policy priorities of the Central Asian countries focus today mostly on the short-term benefits from commodity-based trade with neighbouring countries. VSS need to be therefore integrated in countries’ policy commitments to the SDGs and recognised as part of the environmental strategies of the countries as they promote sustainable practices and technologies in export-oriented sectors, which represent a high environmental risk in Central Asia due to climate change, infrastructural and mining projects, high levels of water consumption such as cotton production and other agricultural sectors. VSS also need to be recognised as part of the trade policies that aim at joining the GVCs and the increasing sustainability and complexity of export-oriented production. VSS offer greater access to the world markets, but also opportunities of new learning on how to organise production processes in order to comply with sustainable standard requirements. VSS need to be also integrated into agricultural policies as it contributes to the modernisation of the sector, building regulatory capacity and local knowledge. It requires investing in skills and technical knowledge both in higher education institutions and in professional learning programmes, strengthening information and advisory systems, extension services and supporting research institutions. Current production processes and export orientation of the republics are still influenced by the institutional design and sectoral priorities set during the communist regime. Intensified trade and globalisation require novel approaches to governance and trade policies that prioritise sustainability, transparency and accountability. Factor endowments and integration in GVCs depend on factor endowments such as skilled labour, access to finance, foreign capital and natural resources (World Development Report, 2020). The labour force from Central Asia fills the gap for low skilled workers in Russia, and although remittances represent an important source of cash inflow for receiving countries, it is widely recognised as a short-term strategy. Creating jobs at home and boosting local entrepreneurship represent important policy

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priorities for Central Asian states; however, various political and economic issues hinder these strategies. In this context, VSS and close interactions with global markets would allow economies to upgrade skills necessary for integration in more complex GVCs. Standard-setting based on international conventions and assuring compliance with standards, however, requires the existence of cooperation networks among the producers that will share an understanding of sustainability practices and implement them jointly to achieve marketable volumes of production. In the agricultural sector, service cooperatives could be an option for addressing the issue of small-scale production and liberalisation of the state-owned agricultural enterprises in Central Asia (Beishenaly & Dufays, 2023). For example, the well-known Fair Trade certification system reports that 97% of certified coffee is produced by cooperatives. In fact, cooperatives help to realise economies of scale, create markets and give access to (long-distance) markets, manage risks, increase market efficiency, reduce transaction costs (e.g. by standardising contracts and organising quality controls) and promote innovation (Karakas, 2019). Market size and geography matter, and in today’s Central Asian countries mostly export to Russia and China, although Kazakhstan has larger geography for its exports. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and in 2019, Uzbekistan expressed its commitment to join the WTO in the near term. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are also members of the Eurasian Economic Union with Russia, Belarus and Armenia. Countries export primarily oil and gas, gold and agricultural and textile products and lack of a systematised approach to implementation of VSS. Certification infrastructure complicates international trade as standards apply not only in the area of product quality and safety, but also to a variety of requirements regarding ethical, environmental, social and other indirect aspects of production (OECD, 2018). It is recognised that GVC participation can enhance institutional quality, strengthening regulatory capacity and harmonising rules with international standards (World Development Report, 2020). Institutions play a crucial role in the context of Central Asia as the business environment is strongly impacted by the weaknesses in the institutional environment, such as corruption, weak property rights or arbitrary taxation and regulation (OECD, 2018). Additionally, political context, lack of capacity, a deficit of coordination and lack of clear strategy also complicate the access to foreign markets. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, where

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a lack of certification laboratories is a known barrier to trade, a disproportionately large number of laboratories are opened for the scale of the Kyrgyz Republic, while only two would be enough, according to the EU GSP+ mission to the country. Therefore, for international trade to take off, it is essential to develop institutional coordination and shared vision on the strategy of integrating VSS in the national policies. Increasing government effectiveness and regulatory quality requires new approaches to governance, perhaps by introducing performance-based management systems that can increase accountability and coordination of government institutions.

8

Conclusion

The key concept in EU-Central Asia relations is “connectivity”. This can refer to several things. In this chapter, we focus on the “institutional dimension” of connectivity in the context of trade relations. Many developing countries and middle-income countries, such as countries in Central Asia, are excluded from GVCs due to their inability to comply with international standards owing to the high costs involved. This creates unequal access to markets in developed countries. This new form of exclusion and inequality should be addressed in order to create genuine connectivity. Integration in GVCs can lead to social and economic upgrading generating additional income for countries and its citizens. If the aim is to achieve true connectivity, this will imply changing production methods and processes to take into account sustainability. Indeed, the nature of trade has significantly changed over the past decades because of the increasing size and intensity of trade, complexity of administrative issues in trade-related matters, growing sustainability challenges, changing consumption patterns and the opportunities offered by the technological progress. The present chapter contributes to the discussion of the growing importance of the voluntary sustainability standards in the global trade. It notably discusses the fact that Central Asian economies are among the countries with the lowest degree of adoption of the VSS in the world, which undoubtedly hinders their export potential and affects the degree of the economic complexity and impacts the achievement of the economic objectives and sustainable development goals. A lack of knowledge and structured information about standards might be one of the key challenges of Central Asian exporters. Lack of a systematised approach might make international trade difficult. Therefore, for trade

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cooperation and EU-Central Asia connectivity to take off, it is essential to develop the necessary capacity to fully engage with sustainability issues and standards. VSS contribute to rule-based connectivity and allow greater access to the GVCs and generalise sustainability practices, however require from countries investment in compliance and monitoring systems with necessary capacity and technical resources. Although it is a decision of each country to implement or not the policies and practices promoting sustainability standards, the challenges of sustainable development urge for global commitment and concerted action from all countries of the world. It is therefore important to sensitise the society and policy-makers on the standardisation issues, envisage linking GSP and VSS policy priorities, and putting greater emphasis on generating both technical and policy relevant knowledge and evidence on different aspects of sustainability standards.

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States of America, 106, 10570–10575. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.090 0943106 ILOSTAT. (2018). International Labour Office, Department of Statistics. https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/ International Trade Centre. (2019). The European Union market for sustainable products. The retail perspective on sourcing policies and consumer demand. ITC. Jayasuriya, D. (2011). Improvements in the World Bank’s ease of doing business rankings: Do they translate into greater foreign direct investment inflows? (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5787) Available at SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1923545 Karakas, C. (2019). Cooperatives: Characteristics, activities, status, challenges. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635541/EPRS_BRI(2019)635541_EN.pdf Komives, K., & Jackson, A. (2014). Introduction to voluntary sustainability standard systems. In C. Schmitz-Hoffmann, M. Schmidt, B. Hansmann, & D. Palekhov (Eds.), Voluntary standard systems: A contribution to sustainable development. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35716-9_1 Korea Forest Service. (2017). Act on the sustainable use of timbers. Available at https://www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/ library/2017-09-22-korean-act-on-thesustainability-of-woodext-en.pdf Maertens, M., & Swinnen, J. (2009). Trade, standards and poverty: Evidence from Senegal. World Development, 37 (1), 161–178. Marx, A. (2011). Global governance and the certification revolution: Types, trends and challenges. In Handbook on the politics of regulation (chapter 43). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9780857936110.00062 Marx, A., & Wouters, J. (2015). Is everybody on board? Voluntary sustainability standards and green restructuring. Development, 58(4), 511–520. https:// doi.org/10.1057/s41301-016-0051-z Meunier, S., & Nicolaïdis, K. (2006). The European Union as a conflicted trade power. Journal of European Public Policy, 13, 906–925. OECD. (2018). Enhancing competitiveness in Central Asia, competitiveness and private sector development. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/ 9789264288133-en Russel, M. (2019). Connectivity in Central Asia reconnecting the Silk Road (Briefing PE 637.891). European Parliamentary Research Service, EU Parliament. Smith, W. K., et al. (2019). Voluntary sustainability standards could significantly reduce detrimental impacts of global agriculture. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 116(6), 2130. https:// doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1707812116

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Trienekens, J. H. (2011). Agricultural value chains in developing countries a framework for analysis. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 14(2). https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048514991-003 UNCTAD. (2020). Framework for the voluntary Sustainability Standards assessment toolkit. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditctabin f2020d5_en.pdf UNFSS. (2018). Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS), trade and sustainable development. 3rd Flagship Report of the United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS). https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLib rary/unfss_3rd_2018_en.pdf UNFSS. (2020). Scaling up Voluntary Sustainability Standards through Sustainable Public Procurement and Trade Policy. 4th Flagship Report of the United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS). https://unctad.org/ en/PublicationsLibrary/unfss_4th_2020_en.pdf Van den Putte, L., et al. (2014). The European Parliament’s new role in trade policy: Turning power into impact. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/european-parliaments-newrole-trade-policy-turning-power-impact/ Wang, Y., & Zadek, S. (2016). Chinese outward direct investment and sustainable impact: A review of the literature. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/ sustainability-impacts-chinese-outward-direct-investment-literature-review.pdf World Bank. (2018). Global investment competitiveness report 2017/2018: Foreign investor perspectives and policy implications. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1175-3. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO. World Bank. (2020). World development report 2020: Trading for development in the age of global value chains. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1457-0

CHAPTER 6

Development of Central Asia and European Union’s Assistance Programme Bedelbai Mamadiev

1

Introduction

Five Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—used to be a part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the largest country in the world of the twentieth century, governed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During that period member states could not develop bilateral relations with other countries. However, the USSR collapsed in 1991 and 15 new countries appeared on the global map. The collapse served as an opportunity for the European Union/European Commission (EU/EC) for developing relations with them. Leaders of the Belorussian SSR (now Belarus), Ukrainian (now Ukraine) SSR, and Russian SFSR (now The Russian Federation) formed a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991. Eight post-Soviet countries, including Central Asian countries, joined the CIS by signing

B. Mamadiev (B) OSCE Academy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 101 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_6

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the Alma-Ata Protocol. Like developed countries and international organisations, the EU/EC was interested in the development of the post-Soviet region, and decided to assist new Nation-States. This paper aims to discuss assistance Central Asian countries received from the EU funds (assistance provided by private and public foundations is not included). During a meeting in Rome in 1990, The European Community decided to help USSR via a technical assistance programme. The programme aimed to support selected areas, to realise economic reform and recovery. It was the starting point of TACIS (Niehus et al., 1995). European Economic Community (EEC) planned assistance in transition to a market economy in the USSR was determined to be ECU 400 million for 1991, and the amount for 1992 would be determined. The help would be in the form of technical assistance and funds would be provided as grants, in several tranches, depending on project developments and realised reforms. Areas of importance were in “public and private-sector management training, financial services, energy, transport and foodstuffs” (The Council of the European Communities, 1991). However, suddenly the USSR collapsed and the designated programme had to be tuned according to new conditions and requirements. The collapse impeded the development and implementation of the initial programme of the EU—TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States). The aims of the aid and technical assistance programme implemented by the European Commission were to help new CIS countries (and Mongolia, a non-CIS country) transition to a market economy, and support democracy and rule of law (EURLex Home, 1999). There was something more about TACIS—nuclear safety. It included three main directions, namely, support for the promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture; the development of spent fuel and nuclear waste management strategies, and participation in relevant international initiatives. Other measures supported by TACIS can be listed as follows, such as “transfer of knowledge”, “expertise and know-how” (organising training, for example); industrial cooperation and partnerships between public and private bodies, with possible secondment of European specialists, technical assistance to accompany investment and investment financing, particularly in the areas of cross-border cooperation, promotion of SMEs, environmental infrastructure and networks; and the purchase of supplies required in the implementation of technical assistance (European Union Regulations, 2000).

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The programme started unexpectedly, without prior preparation, so the rules and procedures were raw at the beginning. A small group of experts were immediately prepared and sent to the region. Moreover, there was little information about the region, structures of countries, and connections were weak which made the mission harder. Also, there were more uncertainties because of continuous institutional changes. Therefore, the group had to work at “learning by doing”. Alexander Frenz remembers the story with a local partner where he had to explain that “technical assistance” is not providing equipment or infrastructure, as it sounded in Russian, but providing consultancy for optimising the bureaucratic processes (Frenz, 2007). The Council of the European Communities’ Regulation No 253/93 (1993) pointed out the prerequisites of effective implementation of provided technical assistance as free and open democratic systems that respect human rights, and towards market-oriented economic systems. Newly born CIS countries were still working on the abovementioned issues, and their effort had to be further supported. So, Council determined the list of the following countries, beneficiary States, to be supported via a technical assistance programme: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Mongolia. Moreover, the Council determined the priority areas as human resources development, for example, “training including manpower training, restructuring of public administration, employment services and social security advice, strengthening of the civic society, policy and macro-economic advice, legal assistance including approximation of legislation, enterprise restructuring and development, and support in the form of technical assistance for development of small and medium sized enterprises, conversion of defence-related industries, restructuring and privatisation, financial service”. Those areas (Infrastructural programmes such telecommunications, energy (including nuclear safety) and food production, processing and distribution) were also among priority areas like previously listed areas. The TACIS Committee received reports on programme developments every six months, including detailed information about contracts awarded. Moreover, indicative programmes for every 3 years were introduced, where previous years’ results were presented, and according to results new priorities for the next years are determined (The Council of the European Communities, 1993).

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CA countries received e366,3 million between 1991 and 2001 via TACIS programme: Kazakhstan—e134,6 million, Kyrgyzstan e42,3 million, Tajikistan e8,0 million, Turkmenistan e42,3 million, and Uzbekistan e118,2 million. The figures are only funds received via the TACIS programme. Actually, they received more than e944 million EU aid through different programmes, European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO) and—in French—the Fonds Europeen d’Orientation et de Garantie Agricole (FEOGA). It is estimated that the EU spent almost e100 million every year on the development of Central Asian countries in the first decade of cooperation through different programmes. Tajikistan received the highest amount of funds—more than e328 million; Turkmenistan received the smallest amount of funds—more than e89 million. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan received e159,5 million—e190,5 million—e176,9 million, respectively. When it comes to TACIS, countries had different priority areas in national TACIS programmes but these ones were almost in all of them “legal, institutional and administrative reform, overcoming the social consequences of transition, economic development through promotion of (small) business activities, rural development, and statistics” (European Commission, 2002). The EU’s interest in the Central Asian countries was geopolitical and economic despite being remote. Until 1995 Central Asia was not perceived as one region, that’s why the negotiations with Central Asian countries were held on bilateral basis. In 1995 EU established a communication regarding the Central Asian countries towards a European Strategy for Relations with the Independent States of Central Asia, formally accepting them as a separate region (Commission of the European Communities, 1995). When new countries joined EU in 2004, the EU became physically closer to CA. New conditions led to the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, giving CA countries a status of “the neighbours of our neighbours”. For a strong presence in the region current programmes were not enough, so in order to increase to a higher level an EU Special Representative was appointed in 2005 (Jan Kubis), and an Ambassador in 2006 (Pierre Morel). Plottka (2015) highlighted that regional cooperation was not at the desired level because countries with rich resources were in favour of bilateral relations, whereas only Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan identified their

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dependence on the regional integration for a better future. Despite all factors, the EU encouraged the regional cooperation of the countries. We see increasing interest in the EU in Central Asian countries. The EU signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1995, and with Uzbekistan in 1996, to have stronger ties. PCA with Tajikistan was signed in 2004 but entered into force in January 2010. However, the situation with Turkmenistan is far different. Initial bilateral Trade and Cooperation agreement was signed in 1998 but not been ratified. The European Parliament does not want to expand economic ties because it is not happy with human rights problems in the country. That’s why, economic ties have been defined by the Interim Trade Agreement with Turkmenistan.

2

The Strategy Papers

According to the Strategy Paper 2002–2006 (2002), another e150 million Indicative Programme was prepared for the period of 2002–2004 for Central Asian countries. There were 2 agendas: national and regional. Firstly, the national agenda, included state-building, security, economic reform, and unequal income distribution and poverty. Consolidation of power of Central Asian leaders was a source of instability, which negatively affected civil society, free media and human rights. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was a security issue for countries, and their collaboration was suggested. When it comes to economic reforms, despite the fact that some reforms were carried out, they were not enough for the development of new industries, creating jobs, exporting value added goods instead of raw materials, finding new export opportunities. Second, regional agenda, included regional cooperation and regional interdependency. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both wanted to be the leader of the region, whereas, Turkmenistan announced its neutrality. Neutrality status was used as a barrier for any kind of Central Asian cooperation. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the poorest countries in the region, depend on other neighbours. Central Asian countries were interdependent as they had border delimitation and demarcation, water management, interconnected electricity grid issues (European Commission, 2002). The same strategy describes the common problems and challenges of the Central Asian countries. The problems listed as democratic transition, human rights, terrorism, fundamentalism and security issues, demographic pressure, and socio-economic development and poverty. Those factors were

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important because they were prerequisites for the effective implementation of TACIS. What did the region have? Democratic transition was slow because people did not have the knowledge or culture of it. Almost all leaders of the newly established independent countries were former communist party leaders. Even in Kyrgyzstan, where the leader was not a former communist party leader, there was an increasing tendency of autocracy year by year. Moreover, opposition members encountered problems, even in doing business, status of the women was not well reflected economically nor socially, and we could witness a clan rivalry for power. Furthermore, religious radicalisation was a threat. Uzbekistan had problems with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which wanted to change the regime and extended its geography from Afghanistan and Tajikistan to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the beginning of 2000s. Researchers of the defence industry in Central Asia, particularly those who research weapons of mass destruction, were risk groups who could spread the knowledge. Educated people continued to leave the countries—brain drain, unfortunately, the new labour force was lacking in desired skills because of poor education. What’s more, Central Asian leaders’ statements and the required economic reforms of the region to be completed did not overlap. Economic and financial problems still negatively affected countries. Agriculture could not supply with enough food because of lack of technology and knowledge. The challenges were described as border disputes, the sharing of natural resources, access to world markets, and investment. The main border issue was indicated in the Ferghana Valley, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The problem was reported to decelerate regional cooperation. Not only did Central Asian countries share borders but water and energy resources as well. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were upstream countries, whereas Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were downstream ones. The desire to be autonomous led to inefficiencies in water management and energy in the region. The only country that joined the World Trade Organisation was Kyrgyzstan, gaining access to world markets. Investments were mostly in natural resources because the countries were financially fragile (European Commission, 2002). Relying on the problems and challenges mentioned above the Indicative Programme 2002–2004 with three tracks was accepted with a total budget of e150 million, such as Regional Cooperation Programme: supporting projects in two or more Central Asian countries (allocated funds—e40 million). The track included transport, energy, JHA/fight

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against drugs, border management and environment, border management having the greatest share—e12 million. Furthermore, there are Regional Support for programmes implemented at national level: trade and investment climate improvement, policy advice, etc. (allocated funds—e80 million). The track included PCA implementation (including WTO and FSP), customs, education reform/Tempus /MTP, EIDHR (funded from non-TACIS budget lines) and Bistro, PCA implementation having the greatest share—e39 million; and last, there is a Pilot Poverty Reduction Scheme targeted the most vulnerable groups: long-term projects for vulnerable groups in rural areas (allocated funds—e30 million). Moreover, according to the EU Commission, the strategic approach includes the allocation of funds per country as follows, for example, in Kazakhstan—e19 million, in Kyrgyzstan—e13 million, in Tajikistan— e13 million, in Turkmenistan—e6 million, and in Uzbekistan—e29 million (European Commission, 2002). What was the amount of assistance to Central Asian countries in the period of 1991–2006? Table 1 shows us how much assistance and aid each Central Asian country received from EU. As seen from Table 1, Tajikistan received the highest amount of assistance and aid because it needed reconstruction after the civil war. Was TACIS successful? On one hand, there is criticism that EU funds could be used more effectively with Russian experience and expertise in border management, drug trafficking, etc. Moreover, EU funds were Table 1

EU assistance to Central Asian countries 1991–2006 (e millions)

Programme

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Programmme Total

TACIS 168,5 107,95 ECHO 28,4 Food aid 121,2 Reconstruction 2,0 Financement 24,9 22,7 CE Country 193,4 282,25 Total Grand total for CA countries

69,25 165,1 109,8 5,5 149,5

64,35

168,95

2,1

1,2

44,9

58,7

650 193,5 243,3 7,5 300,7

499,75

111,35

228,85

1387

Note Adapted from European Community, Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–2013, pp. 41–42

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mostly spent on travel and daily allowance expenses of EU experts travelling to the region, and sending students from the region to the EU for studying and exchange. By doing so the EU actually created new jobs for its citizens (Pryakhin, 2011). However, we should not forget that at the very beginning, the aims of the TACIS programme were providing technical assistance, help countries and institutions work according to new conditions and training of people. Timakova (2021) states that the predefined aims of the PCAs were not launched despite the fact that EU was very strict on financing the projects and activities. As a consequence, desired reforms were not at the desired level. On another hand, there are results of EU’s Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM), an external monitoring system aimed at enhancing the European Commission’s internal control, accountability, and management capacity with a strong focus on results (European Union, 2021). TACIS’s ROM monitoring system included systematic monitoring from the beginning of the projects until the end assessment of the projects. Monitoring results are given in Table 2. Performance metrics defined as follows: A = very good (3.51–4.00); B = good (2.51–3.50) C = problems (1.51–2.50) D = serious deficiencies (0–1.50). According to performance indicators, TACIS programme’s performance is GOOD.

Table 2

Performance of 2006 operations in comparison with 2005 and 2004

Re-monitored 2006, 2005 and 2004

TACIS

N° of operations re-monitored

95 (Average)

% of total population re-monitored

26% (Average)

Year

2004

2005

2006

Relevance/quality design Efficiency Effectiveness Impact Sustainability Average

2.74 2.70 2.74 2.86 2.92 2.79

2.93 2.93 2.95 2.99 3.01 2.97

3.10 3.05 3.07 3.07 3.01 3.06

Note Adapted from Frenz, A. (2007). The European Commission’s TACIS programme (1991–2006): A success story (pp. 2–4). European Commission

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3 The EU-Central Asia Programme from 2007 to 2013 In the past, TACIS was a timely responsive programme limited to the funding cycles of the EU for the newly appeared countries which help them in areas, like state-building and transition to market economy. The assistance programme had to be continued. Germany, provider of 20% of EU finds, was the lead country for enhancing the presence of the EU in the Central Asian region. Many of the documents defining the priority areas and instruments related to the region were prepared and adopted during Presidency of Germany, including the Regional Strategy Paper for Central Asia. Germany actively developed diplomatic relations and established its Embassies in the Central Asian countries (Pryakhin, 2011). The new regional strategy was a logical successor of the previous strategy (programmes and actions), depending on the lessons learnt and as a result priorities were set. Together with the strategy, in 2007, a broader regional instrument, Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), was introduced (Tsertsvadze & Boonstra, 2013). PCAs with all Central Asian countries were signed, as mentioned above, but, in 2007 only PCAs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan were in force, whereas Tajikistan and Turkmenistan’s PCAs were still under ratification. The EU determined that there are two important objectives—security and good governance. In 2007, EU had 27 member states, with about 500 million population and generating more than quarter of global GDP, becoming an important player in the global arena. Secure borders were of high important because there was still fear of terrorism (several years passed after 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States), organised crime and spread of weapons of mass destruction. Central Asian countries situated on the route of international drug trafficking, and moreover the collapse of the USSR made borders more fragile against international criminal and drug trafficking groups. Moreover, the EU always highlighted importance of human rights and the rule of law for effective transition (development). In the region, where the autocracy was increasing, there had to be a struggle against corruption and abuse of power. Another important topic for the EU was the energy resources (hydrocarbons) of Central Asian countries, as it wished

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to diversify the supply of energy. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan had important reserves, located close to EU and transportation of their hydrocarbons was an issue to work on (European Community, 2007). European Community’s Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–2013 (2007) consisted of Internal and External Policy Agendas for Central Asian Countries. Among Internal Agendas, “Consolidating democracy, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” appeared to be the first because of “Colour revolutions” in Kyrgyzstan, strict control of opposition, civil society, and media. There were human rights abuses in some Central Asian countries. The second agenda was “Terrorism”. Countries in the region still felt insecure because of radical groups and terrorist organisations. The third agenda was “Enhancing the judiciary and rule of law”. EU wanted to contribute to further improvements in the judiciary system and prosecution. A Moratorium on the death penalty had to be worked out in the whole region. “Effective fight against corruption” was the fourth agenda but the challenge was that all countries had individual approaches. The region needed “Public sector reform”, the fifth agenda. Even though reforms were promised, they happened at the slowest pace. We witness that Security and Defence councils remained power concentration points. The sixth agenda was “Improving the trade and investment climate”. The only WTO member country in the region was Kyrgyzstan. Other countries needed to work on Framework and Standards provision to participate in global trade. “Employment and social policy”, the seventh agenda, were also vital. As unemployment was accepted as an important issue but due to low wages a highly skilled labour force was leaving these countries. Officially the unemployment rates reported to be around 10% because people just did not register their search for jobs; they just left to other countries for surviving. The last agenda was “Poverty reduction and the provision of social services”. Poverty alleviation and rural development, providing better education and healthcare were indicated in all CA countries. As an additional source of financing Public Private Partnership’s importance was recognised. The first External Policy agenda was “Security alliances & Collective security: CSTO, SCO, NATO”. Due to security problems, CA countries joined two important organisations the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organistion (the CSTO), establishing an anti-terrorist centre in Almaty. All five CA countries took part in NATO’s Partnership for

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Peace. Second agenda was “Regional economic integration and cooperation with Russia, China and Japan”. Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC/Evrazes) was established and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Belarus became members. Russia increased investment in the region, especially in energy sector. Japan started “Central Asia Plus Japan” initiative to balance the relations in the region. The third agenda was “Regional Central Asia cooperation”. Central Asian Commonwealth (CAC) established by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—Central Asia Common Market/Free Trade Zone—later changed to Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organisation (CACO), merged with EURASEC. The last agenda was “Special Relationship with the European Union”. Despite the fact that PCAs were signed, they were not ratified for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. All countries were interested in deepening relations with EU. The strategy paper defined common challenges and security risks of the region. The following challenges were listed: “trade and access to world markets, business and investment climate, transport, management of shared natural resources and social development and poverty reduction”.

4 The Strategic and Logistical Challenges Between 2014 and 2020 Over the previous years a number of challenges for EU-Central Asia cooperation such as the trade and access to world markets, have received more attention, among them for example, long-waiting time for export–import operations due to complex and not transparent procedures and poor transport and transit corridors. In Kazakhstan, it took 93 days to complete all export operations and move to the nearest export port. In Uzbekistan, 139 days needed for import operations. Decreasing procedures would let better trade opportunities. Other issues raised by the EU Commission was the Business and Investment climate, because laws and regulations were confusing; registration and licensing procedures were long. Foreign investment level, except hydrocarbons, was low. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were indebted, so PPP’s importance was once again highlighted. Furthermore, the issue of transport, overall the costly new transportation projects were initiated instead of renovating existing ones because of a lack of 100% reliability among leaders. New transportation modes needed to be focused on, and increase their safety regulations to international level. Problematic was the different management of shared natural

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resources: Central Asian countries were interconnected in the management of natural resources due to the infrastructure built in the Soviet times. Water resources problems still remained. Deforestation appeared to be a problem. Hydrocarbons were globally required, so transportation to the EU was still attractive to EU. Social development and poverty reduction and the decrease in Human Development Index was a troublesome issue for both sides. Central Asian countries are behind Eastern Europe and Russia in terms of development and rank among the highest in the world concerning corruption. Poverty rates were very high, especially in Tajikistan (65%) and Kyrgyzstan (70%). High-income imbalance is reported between urban and rural areas. Assistance amount for the period of 2007–2013 was determined to be e750 million, where the share of regional programmes was 1/3 and the share of bilateral initiatives was 2/3, roughly. Assistance was divided into 2 terms: 2007–2010 (e314 million) and 2011–2013 (e321,8 million). It took two years in Uzbekistan, for example, to sign financing agreement between the EU and the government and one year to implement. By the end of 2012, the percentage of signed and paid DCI commitments was 77%. Moreover, there was a fear that high corruption rate in the countries of the region could ruin the Commission’s reputation and reduce the effectiveness of the assistance. Boonstra and Tsertsvadze (2016) also criticised the effect of the assistance being not at high level: transportation of hydrocarbons was not realised, corruption depreciated predefined goals in economic development and democracy. Despite many difficulties, like slow administrative procedures, corruption and the involvement of local authorities not at the desired level, the EU did its job to realise its commitments. We again see the EU trying to transfer knowledge and expertise to the Central Asian countries. Furthermore, the natural gas crisis in 2005–2006 between Russia and Ukraine made EU member states suffer. That’s why energy supply, security of supply, diversification of supply appeared to be vital for the EU. However, energy issues were not solved, transport of Central Asian energy to EU did not happen. The EU declared that international politics was not a competition, and that there were many directions and dimensions for cooperation with Russia in the region. Lessons learnt from those periods would be an input for the next strategies. The EU initiated Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) Regional Central Asia 2014–2020 relying on the experience from past years. In

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the new MIP two main sectors were identified (European Commission, 2015), namely Regional Sustainable and Security for Development. The EU stressed that it aims to transfer knowledge and best practice to promote reforms. First cooperation sector in Regional Sustainable Development was energy. Subsectors of energy were “contribution to development of sustainable energy sector, energy efficiency and renewable energies, energy security, modernisation of infrastructures, supporting Central Asian energy market links on the basis of the EU/international experience and best practices”. Second cooperation sector was environment/water which included “strengthening environmental governance and support the development of legislation following EU/international standards, promoting policies for climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies and pollution reduction and incorporating natural disaster risk, ensuring an integrated water policy and water resources management, establishing proper institutional and operational reforms for rational use of water resources”. Third cooperation sector was socio-economic development with the following subsectors “supporting market regulatory framework and enabling business framework following EU/international practices for the development of SMEs, improving access to credit for SMEs, supporting and further developing a dedicated regional high capacity, high quality connectivity network for education and research purposes”. Regional Security for Development’s sectors included integrated border management, fight against drugs and crime and rule of law, with common four subsectors: (1) supporting development of the legal framework for Constitutional Law and/or the Administrative Law and/or Criminal Law; (2) reform of the Judicial System, Judicial Capacity and accountability and the fight against corruption; (3) contribution to the reduction in the demand for drugs; (4) supporting more efficient border management and law enforcement cooperation conducive to trade and enhanced mobility of people, tackling trafficking in human beings and the fight against drugs traffic and establishing an Integrated Border Management (IBM) system (European Commission, 2015). It has to be indicated that two other instruments, Multi-country Technical Assistance and Support Measures, would additionally support two

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main sectors: “the blending mechanism operating through the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA)” and “the Multi-country Technical Assistance Facility”. Higher education was decided to be supported by new Erasmus+ programme. Indicative allocation of e245 million funds for the Central Asia Regional MIP 2014–2020 was as follows: regional sustainable development—e170 million, regional security for development—e37,5 million, multi-country technical assistance facility— e35 million, and support measures—e1 million (European Commission, 2015).

5

The European Approach for 2027

For the funding cycle, from 2021 till 2027, the EU has adopted a new Strategy in 2019, which is a guide for the aid programmes for the given period. Through the signing of Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs), a more modern and diversified partnership is expected rather than a “trade and aid”. Kazakhstan has signed it and it is already in force. Kyrgyzstan is about to sign; negotiations with Uzbekistan are still going on; Tajikistan will be engaged soon. In the new strategy, the EU’s commitment to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is highlighted, together with the importance of a young and growing population’s needs and economic opportunities. Regional cooperation priorities are energy, environment, climate, water, socio-economic development (education, research, competitiveness, and business environment reforms), the legal and judiciary systems, integrated border management, and drug trafficking. What’s more, the EU wishes to help Central Asian countries to solve intra and extra regional trade regulatory and procedural obstacles. Other priorities are the establishment and growth of small and medium sized enterprises, sustainable production and consumption. Strong civil society will be promoted. During the pandemic, the EU has provided e 123 million (European Commission, 2019).

6

Conclusion

The EU (formerly the European Community) decided to support the USSR to implement economic reform and recovery during “glasnost” and “perestroika”. However, Soviet reform ended with the collapse of the USSR, which enabled the EU to develop direct relations and work

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directly with the Central Asian countries. The EU’s interest was an increasing trend: bilateral partnership and cooperation agreements were signed; representative offices were opened; technical assistance and aid programmes; regional strategies were developed and implemented. The case of the EU is unique. Unlike the United States or Japan, the EU is not a single country but a union of countries, and when it started an assistance programme in 1991, there were only a few members. It has expanded since then, so it is continuously working on its own integration processes; at the same time, aiding Central Asian countries to develop. There were obstacles for realisation of the assistance/cooperation programmes like a lack of market economy knowledge, democracy experience, etc., at the beginning. Then, new barriers appeared—increasing autocracy in the region, radicalisation, corruption, etc. However, the EU went on working by setting new priorities depending on new conditions and requirements. EU assistance programmes focused on transfer of knowledge, experience and best practices in order to make reforms. However, for realisation of those programmes, the following is required: human rights; open and free democracy; and market economy. Interest of the EU in the Central Asia will increase because Central Asia is a neighbour of the EU neighbourhood, so insecurity, radicalisation, and unrest in a neighbour might affect the EU. Also, these countries lie between the EU and China, close to Afghanistan. Therefore, their location is geopolitically and strategically important. Furthermore, Central Asian countries are rich in resources making them attractive to many countries. The EU should rigorously work on human resources development projects because an educated and well-trained people can absorb new knowledge and best practices. Supporting civil society is a correct decision which is a must for building an open and free democracy. Also, the EU should support digitalisation processes in the region to increase transparency and accountability and reduce corruption levels.

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References Boonstra, J., & Tsertsvadze, T. (2016). Implementation and review of the European Union-Central Asia strategy: Recommendations for EU action. Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, European Union. Commission of the European Communities. (1995). Communication from the commission. Towards a European Strategy for relations with the independent states of Central Asia. Commission of the European Communities. EUR-Lex Home. (1999). From the official website of the European Union. https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r17003. European Commission. (2002). Central Asia strategy paper 2002–2006 & indicative programme 2002–2004. European Commission. European Commission. (2015). Multiannual indicative programme regional Central Asia 2014–2020. European Commission. European Commission. (2019). The new strategy on Central Asia. European Commission. European Community. (2007). Regional strategy paper for assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–2013. European Community. European Union. (2021, December 10). ROM (Results Oriented Monitoring). From the European Union. https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/rom/wiki/ what-results-oriented-monitoring European Union regulations. (2000). European Union regulations, European Encyclopedia of law. From Tacis programme: Outline of the Community (European Union) legislation about Tacis programme. https://europeanlaw. lawlegal.eu/tacis-programme/ Frenz, A. (2007). The European Commission’s TACIS programme (1991–2006): A success story. European Commission. Niehus, G., Larsimont, D., & Slotboom, H. (1995). Summary of indicative programmes 1993–1995. TACIS Information Office of the Commission of the European Communities. Plottka, J. (2015). One size fits none: Is there a regional approach to Central Asia? Dans L’Europe en Formation, 375, 123–139. Pryakhin, V. F. (2011). EvpopeNckiN CoHz i CentpalbnaR AziR: poicki novoN koncepcii cotpydniqectva [The European Union and Central Asia: In search of a new concept of cooperation]. Aktualnyie Problemy Evropy [Current problems of Europe], 133–152. The Council of the European Communities. (1991, July 24). Council Regulation (EEC, EURATOM) No 2157/91 of 15 July 1991 concerning the provision of technical assistance to economic reform and recovery in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Official Journal of the European Communities, pp. 201/2– 201/3.

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The Council of the European Communities. (1993, July 29). Council Regulation (EURATOM, EEC) No 2053/93 of 19 July 1993 concerning the provision of technical assistance to economic reform and recovery in the independent States of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia. Official Journal of the European Communities, pp. 187/1–187/5. Timakova, O. (2021). Politika EC v CentpalbnoN Azii: nepealizovannye ambicii i pepcpektivy (The EU in Central Asia: Unrealized ambitions and prospects). Central Asia and the Caucasus Russian Edition, 7–20. Tsertsvadze, T., & Boonstra, J. (2013). Mapping EU development aid to Central Asia. EUCAM.

PART II

Central Asia’s Connectivity: Human Rights, Rule of Law and Good Governance

CHAPTER 7

Human Rights in Central Asian States and European Initiatives Anja Mihr

1

Introduction

In January 2022, over 230 people were shot dead in the Kazak metropole Almaty. The government reported over 4.300 injuries within one week, after heavy riots. In the weeks before, thousands of people across the country had protested the rise in energy costs and thus the dramatic decline of economic and social human rights and entitlements, namely adequate living and housing standards, the right to food, and the right to work. The fact that not only political human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the right to peaceful assembly, access to information, and freedom of expression, had been restricted, but also basic economic and social rights, caused serious instability and uprisal among the people in Kazakhstan.

A. Mihr (B) Program Director, Center on Governance through Human Rights, Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 121 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_7

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The Kazak governments’ response was more suppression, instead of more participation and listening to the claims of the protesters. President Tokayev called upon Russian President Vladimir Putin who is the de facto head of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), founded in 1992 for assistance. Most of the post-Soviet republics are members of the CSTO. The justification by both state leaders was, that the protesters pose a threat to national security serious enough to allow for the shooting civilians. Europe’s’ response, if at all, was in the form of European Union (EU) Parliament resolution that the political violence and repressive measures against the protesters, by stating, that, the EU “(…) regrets the loss of life and strongly condemns the widespread acts of violence that erupted following peaceful protests in Kazakhstan; expresses its condolences to the victims and their families, and (…) stands together with the people of Kazakhstan, who should fully enjoy the right to organize a peaceful rally in protest against the lack of reforms in Kazakhstan and in defense of a prosperous future for the country; strongly condemns the dramatic and continually deteriorating situation of human rights in Kazakhstan, including of freedom of expression and labour and social rights (…).”1 The parliamentarians called upon the Kazakh authorities to abide by their international obligations and treaties and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms that Kazakhstan has ratified. The Council of Europe kept silent because none of the five Central Asian countries is a member or party to the EU nor the Council of Europe and its human rights treaties. Therefore, Europe’s response and the engagement for human rights in Central Asia are traditionally low or absent. The only international human rights treaties, instruments, and mechanisms with relevance for the Central Asian countries are those issued by the United Nations (UN). But the UN, including the High Commissioner for Human Rights Office in Geneva (OHCHR) often holds a merely observatory status and responds at most in its concluding observation through the treaty bodies and reporting systems. UN resolutions on the systematic human rights abuse in Central Asian countries are rare, but in this case, the OHCHR responded. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, called upon the Kazakh government for “(…) all those 1 European Parliament, JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Kazakhstan. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-20220065_EN.html, 19. January 2022.

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arrested and detained solely for exercising their rights to peaceful protest and freedom of expression, to be released.” She stressed that all allegations of human rights violations should be “promptly, independently and thoroughly investigated.”2 Since their independence in 1991, the human rights situation in many post-Soviet states has always been under scrutiny by civil society as well as by international governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the UN. Over the years the number of regional IGOs added human rights-related policies, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), focusing on either economic stability or anti-terrorism. Albeit under constant international surveillance, at the same time the human rights situation has dramatically deteriorated in the five Central Asian countries, correlating with the increasing level of dysfunctional and corrupt political leadership. While the countries have become more transparent, also the autocratization and polarization of anti-Western propaganda, hence anti-human rights propaganda increased, over the past decades (Fauve et al., 2021). Dynastical regimes in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and substantive constitutional reforms in Kyrgyzstan that beamed the country back to a strictly authoritarian presidential regime, reduced the liberal space, media and internet freedoms, and social mobility that was left in some remarkable democratic reforms a decade ago. For all states, the handling of the investigation and the court cases against a plethora of bloggers, protesters, and civic activists arrested is a test of regime-resilience, whether the countries can overcome endemic corruption and move toward greater democracy and respect for human rights or continue on the rapid downward spiral of backsliding democratic norms. Hence, in Kazakhstan as elsewhere in the region, human rights depend on the political context, and we are living in a totally authoritarian state, as stated by Yevgeny Zhovtis, who is the head of Kazakhstan’s International Bureau for Human Rights. Despite the dire realities, the number of lip-service and promises of the government promised to respect universal human rights has increased over the past decade. Kyrgyzstan joined the 2 UN OHCHR, 6 January 2022, ‘Amid alarming reports of deadly violence in Kazakhstan, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Asia have called for restraint and dialogue.’ https:// news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109252.

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UN Human Rights Council in 2015, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 2021. Except for Turkmenistan—that is a story apart—all four Central Asian countries participate in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), of the UN Office of Human Rights in Geneva (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Council. They report regularly on different human rights treaties and have ratified several of the core ten international human rights treaties. One can observe a certain political willingness by governments to respond to international trends, to submit reports, and to comply with human rights standards. And this willingness is brought about by domestic pressure of a growing number of frustrated young people, not by international financial institutions or IGOs. Yet, how to implement and realize human rights is often a matter of interpretation and perception by the respective governments. For example, in February 2019, Uzbek Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov addressed the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) in a letter highlighting the importance of all human rights for the development of the Central Asian Republics (UN Digital Library, 2019). In his letter, he summarized the results of the first Asian Forum on Human Rights, which took place in Samarkand in November 2018. The regularly held Forum was the first of its kind in Central Asia and part of the celebrations for the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to which all Central Asian states adhere. It was supported by the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international, regional, and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The EU or the Council of Europe played no significant role in this forum. All Forum participants stressed that international human rights treaties will continue to be the political yardstick of domestic security policy, and in judicial reforms and development policy—hence, emphasizing that compliance with human rights is an internal matter, not an external one. An ambitious promise, given that the five republics have had severe democratic deficits since independence in 1991, accompanied by a high level of human rights violations, among them serious ones such as systematic torture, illegal killings, and disappearances. Moreover, both the judicial and security apparatuses in these countries are subject to constant accusations of corruption and have not, either symbolically or practically, detached themselves from a Soviet system prone to violence and arbitrariness.

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This former Soviet system of arbitrary and political justice is far from being called a reputable rule of law system, which has not yet been politically, historically, or legally reconstructed. It still runs like a common thread through all the institutions in the Central Asian republics as a political legacy and is reflected not least in the nature and seriousness of human rights violations (Omelicheva, 2018, pp. 57–80). The missed opportunities for structural legal and political reforms, as well as independent state-building after 1991, have now led to a situation, in which the political leadership and civil society depend so much on other hegemonic powers in the region, such as Russia, China, and Turkey, that they are no longer free to determine their own human security and human rights policies.

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The 2018 Samarkand Declaration

At the end of the Central Asian Human Rights Forum in November 2018, the participating states signed the ‘Samarkand Declaration’ highlighting the importance of civil society and underlined their commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as other quasi nongovernmental or independent bodies to monitor human rights compliance in their countries, such as the National Human Rights Institutes (NHRI) and Ombudsmen. They emphasized the importance of an independent judiciary, as well as state authorities and private actors for the well-being of the republics in the future (UN Digital Library, 2019). Apart for these hollow promises, the Declaration has since had an opendoor policy for all those actors in the region, especially NGOs, who have so far faced the claims that human rights are supposedly only ‘Western values and norms’ that do not apply to Central Asia. If at all, the Forum was a clear declaration by member states, that human rights are an internal issue not an external one. In Central Asia, governments are under enormous domestic political pressure to deliver to their youth and a new—albeit very small—middle class that overall aims for more social mobility as well as economic and political freedoms. The overall challenge for all actors in the region is how to fight corruption and nepotism, which blocks any form of serious political reform. One way of ending corruption even in the labor market is through the adherence to human rights and an independent judiciary. Education for all, gender equality, fair access to the labor market, and an open and transparent rule of law-based judiciary, is increasingly

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being demanded by a growing, mostly young group of entrepreneurs, local leaders, officers, activists, and academics. Dismissing this claim as Western propaganda is no longer acceptable vis-à-vis the dramatic eroding economic situations in the countries, the level of corruption and rise of poverty. To blame the West and its human rights entrepreneurship, alone, is no longer resonating. But despite the governments’ relentless emphasis that human rights and compliance with the 2015 SDGs, the goals are a gateway for civil society and small business to confront corrupt and despotic governments and implement better human rights. In paragraph 12 of the Samarkand Declaration, the signatory states emphasize that democratic mechanisms such as an independent judiciary and a free civil society are needed to achieve these objectives, and thus ultimately comply with all the fundamental human rights treaties that have already been ratified. How this can be realized and materialized, of course, was not mentioned in the letter to the UN General Assembly in 2019. What makes the Samarkand Declaration nevertheless remarkable are the signatories. All five Central Asian governments have recognized the problem of corrupt justice and the high degree of kinsmanship, or clientelisms, for the development of their countries. It is, therefore, not a question of whether and to what extent human rights are universal norms, but how they are to be implemented in countries with dysfunctional political regimes? The ‘dependent judiciary’ and judges who are not free of fear and do not want to take decision according to the law, and the corrupt security apparatus that intimates civilians on a day-to-day basis, have been denounced for years by national and international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International. That way, these organizations rely on data and information from: governmentally controlled institutions; smaller NGOs; lawyers and journalists; the diaspora community abroad. But the picture they draw of these countries is thanks to the plethora of social media entries and whistleblowers, and the different accounts show a dire picture of human rights in the region; systematic and arbitrary and political detention, torture and ill-treatment in police custody, restrictions on freedom of expression and the press, control over news and information, discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities and migrants, discrimination against sexual minorities and violence against women and forced marriage of girls—to

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name the most severe human rights violations. Reports of people arbitrarily detained by the police just to be bought ‘free,’ by relatives and friends is a way to supplement police salaries in light of the chronic underfunding of the security and judicial apparatus. With an average salary of around 500 euros per month, judges and police often rely on these ‘free buys’ of detainees, and bribery, to secure their standard of living. As a result of this widespread corruption, blackmailing, and bribes, the way to social and fair mobility is often a bumpy one, if not closed at all. More and more young elites are leaving the country. The brain drains both toward Western countries, but also to the East, to China, is dramatic. All Central Asian countries lose much of their labor force— often the strongest and best educated. Millions of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are working in the service and construction sector in Russia, Turkey, Dubai, Korea, Malaysia and even the Far East, and elsewhere in the Middle East. Another phenomenon that can be tackled by the SDGs and the Samarkand Declaration is the so-called re-traditionalization of women to be housekeepers and bear children, that has taken place since 1991. The return of religious standards and the re-emergence of the Muslim faith and religious freedom are often manifested in traditional Muslim Madrassa (religious schools) and Muslim charity organizations, have changed the paradigms and social attitudes in the region. One result of this is, that many communities return to pre-Russian and pre-Soviet habits and customs of not allowing daughters and girls to study or work. Violence against women is on the rise, and ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities are often branded as scapegoats for a lack of social development. The issue of LGBTIQ3 is usually addressed indirectly, although together with the stigma and the rights of people with disabilities, exemplifies a society’s treatment of its minorities in general. Overall LGBTIQ and disability exemplify male weakness and hence are an attack on patriarchy and toxic masculinity and hence jeopardize the image of strong and invincible dominant male communities, which—according to alleged traditions—ought to rule the countries. But it is again important to state, that the real pressure for human rights reforms and compliance comes from the population within these countries, not from the outside. CSOs are increasingly organized on

3 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer people.

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social platforms, orientated to international human rights standards and exchange messages and reports via WhatsApp, Telegram, and Facebook (Abdusalyamova, 2015). The continuing exodus of young people and economic dependence on third countries such as China, Turkey, the UAE, and Russia are increasing the pressure on governments to respond to this issue if they do not want to lose the small, but well-educated young elite of the country (Sharifzoda, 2019). Because this brain drain largely prevents economic development away from a remittance economy, investments, and innovation for the domestic economy and ultimately the standing of these Central Asian governments vis-à-vis their surrounding hegemons, namely Russia, China, and Turkey. Domestic legal and political reforms and respect for human rights would increase equal opportunities and justice for all and would put an end to a long-term exodus, especially of the well-educated young and post-Soviet generation. The less the countries develop both economically and socially, the weaker they remain vis-à-vis their allies. That is what the 2018 Samarkand Declaration was indirectly admitting and emphasizing in its essence. Central Asia’s high expenditures and restrictive laws that governments enact, for example, in the fight against extremism, media censorship, and the exclusion of minorities, for example, in the form of police raids, prevent sustainable development. Mass detentions of journalists and demonstrators or so-called legal shame trials to intimidate possible opposition, as seen in Kazakhstan in 2022, are expensive to maintain (Lemon, 2019). This is holding back economic development as simple power games at top governmental level are every day harder to justify to the citizens (Pomfret, 2019, p. 31).

3

International Engagement and Collaboration

The transition from an autocratic dysfunctional dynastic political regime that is based on intimidation and oppression, to a democratic, pluralistic, and competitive one takes time, even a generation or two. But the fact that Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan have opened to the UN and collaborated with the OSCE in recent years and other regional organizations, too, such as the Shanghai Cooperation for Security (SCO) or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), can be seen as a small willingness to make concessions toward global norms outside their national borders. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan still insist on their restrictive human rights, although inside these countries, both domestic and international pressure

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is growing. After the withdrawal of ISAF forces, from Afghanistan in 2021 and the subsequent outbreak of civil war in the country, and the Russian agression in Ukraine in 2022 isolation from the international community is the least these countries geopolitically can afford. The gentle openings include, among other things, the submission of regular reports, the UPR to the UN Human Rights Council, the invitation of UN Special Rapporteurs, or the submission of reports to the various human rights committees at the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as the engagement with EU Initiative for Human Rights and Rule of Law in Central Asia since 2020.4 It also includes a willingness to receive appropriate criticism, thus the ‘Recommendations’ from these IGOs. Recommendations of the UN committees to the representatives of the states can be direct and specific. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, for that matter, have been voluntarily participating in the UPRs of the UN Human Rights Council for more than ten years, and recently engaged in the EU initiative for Rule of Law, along with the 2019 EU-Central Asia Strategy. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were elected members in the UN HRC from 2016 to 2019, making them the first two of the five Central Asian countries in the UN’s highest human rights body. Uzbekistan followed as a new member of the HRC in 2021. All five countries have largely ratified the nine most important international human rights treaties, the so-called International Bill of Rights. This means that political, economic, cultural rights, as well as the rights of women, children, people with disabilities, and migrant workers, are recognized, at least on paper. In addition, states undertake under the Treaties to actively contribute to the abolition of torture and ill-treatment and systematic discrimination against people based on their ethnic origin, sexual orientation, or religious beliefs, as well as enforced disappearances of opponents of the regime (OHCHR, Treaty Data Base).5 4 All human rights treaties country reports, UPRs, and Special Procedures of Central Asian Countries can be found on the UNOHCHR database: https://www.ohchr.org/en/ publicationsresources/pages/databases.aspx (January 2022). 5 UN Human Rights Treaties are: UN-Conventions against Torture and Other Cruel

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

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Of all the five republics, Turkmenistan is the least in reporting on human rights and the country is one with the worst human rights records in the world. Independent NGOs and media do not exist, and the country is also highly untransparent and independent investigation and research of alleged human rights abuse is almost impossible. Most reports on labor camps and mass violations come from the diaspora community or satellite pictures of concentration camps. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have ratified most of the treaties and have now submitted several periodic reports to the Council on the general human rights situation. In addition, there are numerous reports by the special committees, which are, however, submitted only irregularly. The same applies to governmental reports on the human rights situation in countries to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in these Warsaw, at the annual Human Dimension meeting in Warsaw. It is a procedure in which all 57 OSCE Member States—half of them being Western European, the USA, and Canada, half of them being post-Soviet, socialist, and countries of the former Yugoslavia countries—must submit and present a report on the human rights situation.6 Kyrgyzstan’s active participation in the UN human rights regime is reflected, among other things, in the fact that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights established its Central Asian regional office in Bishkek as early as 2008. The office and regional headquarter cover all five countries, and its main tasks include advice and training of civil servants and the judiciary, if desired by the governments (OHCHR, Annual Report, 2018). In addition, the office supports national human rights institutions in the region and helps build civil society. It is actively campaigning for the deployment of UN Special Rapporteurs on discrimination, torture, independence of the judiciary, detention conditions or HIV, and domestic violence. What can now be seen in foreign policy, however, is slowly taking shape in domestic politics (Omelicheva & Lawrence, 2019). For example, the Kyrgyz government was one of the first in Central Asia to convene a Human Rights Coordination Council in

(ICESCR); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW); and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 6 OSCE-ODIHR, Annual Human Dimension Implementation Meetings https://www. osce.org/odihr/hdim.

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2013, but it did not adopt an action plan for the implementation of freedoms until December 2019 in response to UN demands (Kabar, 2019). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan also have taken part in earlier EU Human Rights Dialogues in 2008 and beyond. The normative progress at UN and OSCE level and plethora of Action Plans should not obscure the fact that in the past, UN Special Rapporteurs have repeatedly been denied access to countries and civil society or have had their entry delayed through restrictive measures or excuses by governments. The publication of investigative reports has been partially blocked by the Kyrgyz or other governments; rapporteurs have been intimidated and expelled from the country.

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European Human Rights Approach to Central Asia

Back in 2007 the EU Parliament launched its first EU-Central Asia Strategy, and in 2019 the second one, highlighting that Central Asia is back on the European Agenda since 2015 years. In both, Human Rights promotion is a substantive element, side by side, with infrastructural projects and development aid. And at the dawn of the New Cold War in 2021, between Democracy and Autocracy, the EU responded to the challenges ahead. With China taking a lead in promoting autocratic governance through its infrastructural Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and of which Central Asian country are key beneficiary, the EU launched its own 300 billion Euro, Global Gateway Initiative (GGI) as a counteroffensive toward China. In the GGI, the EU announced infrastructural and development programs around the world, including in Central Asia, but with one key difference to the BRI, namely that the EU will “(…) support smart investments in quality infrastructure, respecting the highest social and environmental standards, in line with the EU’s democratic values and international norms and standards.”7 Hence, the difference between Europe’s development approach visà-vis China is that Europe aims to combine infrastructural projects with democratic and human rights issues. Whether this can and will be realized remains to be seen?

7 GGI, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433.

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In 2021 the EU took it one step further. At the eve of the International Human Rights Day on 10 December and the US-driven Summit for Democracy, on the same day in 2021, the EU Commission launched the Global Europe Human Rights and Democracy Program, worth 1.5 billion Euro, until 2027. The EU has for decades been the largest supporter and donor in promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms across the world. By this Program, it has stepped up its volume. It focuses on the universality of human rights and hence on core UN human rights treaties, that have also been ratified by Central Asian states. In its ambitious paper, the Union aims at strengthening the rule of law and accountability for human rights violations and abuses, and defend fundamental freedoms and a free media, while seizing opportunities and countering risks associated with digital and new technologies.8 The money aims to support local human rights capacity building programs for lawyers, financial support for NGOs and Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) (The European Parliament (2007/2102(INI)). But human rights are tools and instruments to unlock what is in the core of every jurisdiction’s investment programs in Central Asia—no matter whether coming from the EU, China, or Turkey—namely Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreements concerning energy, transport, and logistic between Europe and Central Asian countries. With a global energy crisis most likely to rise in the next decade, the region gas and oil fields and hydropower energy supplies will be of interest to any hegemonic state or government in the region. Since 1999, the EU Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Matters has already led to close investment partnership which has mentioned human rights, but not made it a priority until the 2019 strategy and the 2021 GGI. Although it was not a priority for the EU to invest in human rights and democratization in the region the past, it has, however, responded to severe situation of human rights violations in specific countries, as seen by the statement of the EU Parliament in Kazakhstan in 2022. In 2005, for example, the EU imposed economic sanctions on Uzbekistan following the Andijan massacre and uprisals of citizens against their government, which have been consecutively extended, and only partial 8 EU ‘Strengthening human rights and democracy in the world: EU launches a e1.5 billion plan to promote universal values’ 16 December 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/del egations/uzbekistan/109014/strengthening-human-rights-and-democracy-world-eu-lau nches-%E2%82%AC15-billion-plan-promote-universal_en.

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lifted in 2007. After constitutional reforms in 2018, the sanctions are no longer in function. Moreover, across the Central Asian region, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights has since 2003 accompanied, selectively, penal reform and media freedom, the rule of law, security structures (police/armed forces) and conflict prevention and other human rights-related reforms. Later, after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU Commissions External Action Service (EEAS) launched the first of many EU Human Rights Dialogues in Central Asia, with governments and NGOs as well as the Institution Building Partnership Program. Women’s rights, economic empowerment, protection of minorities, media freedom, and the promotion and enhancement of civil society are at the core to all the EU’s efforts in this regard. But the EU is not simply a driver for human rights, it is primarily pressured by its own constituency, business, and civil society in Europe who aim to engage more, for economic or civic, reasons with the region, ever since the Old Silkroad became the New Silkroad from China to Europe, focusing on transport and energy (Frankopan, 2015). An important driver to push the EU to engage more in human rights in Central Asia is European-based NGOs who have millions of supporters in Europe. Human Rights Watch (HRW), for example, has been calling on the EU to press Central Asian governments to end human rights violations and engage in meaningful political reforms.9 In November 2021, a high-level EU delegation met in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, with the foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to discuss the possible implications for domestic human rights after the Afghan exodus. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan’s repressive human rights records have continued to worsen, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW). Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, access to critical websites remain blocked while human rights groups face harassment in most Central Asian countries. In Turkmenistan, reports of enforced disappearances have become a systematic threat to stability, and no independent civil society groups or media are allowed to report on it. Although none of the Central Asian states is member of the Council of Europe and its human rights mechanisms, such as the European Convention for Human Rights or its Court in Strasbourg, the Council 9 Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, November 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/cen tral-asia-human-rights-european-union/31569193.html.

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and the EU established in 2019, prior to the Pandemic, a joint human rights program for the region. The ‘Central Asia Rule of Law Program’ (2020–2023) was signed in November 2019 in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan and covers all five countries of the region seeking to facilitate democratic political transition and promote good governance, on the basis of the standards, mechanisms, and instruments and hence human rights treaties, conventions and declarations by the Council and the EU. Due to the pandemic, the program has been slowed down but aims to be implemented by European agencies in close collaboration with national partners in 2022 and in the years to come.10 One can assume that after the Russian War in the Ukraine and the annexation of foreign territory into the Russian Federation over the past years that the former Soviet republics in Central Asia will again have to decide and turn their heads in all directions in the call for support to maintain their independence. Europe’s response seems to be open to these claims; however, its response may only have a positive effect if they connect the governments’ will for domestic and sustainable development with the compliance of human rights norms and standards.

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Kyrgyzstan

In 2021, during the presidential election, the citizens of Kyrgyzstan were asked to decide about constitutional reforms that would ultimately shrink civic space and participation of NGOs, as well as shrink the rights of the judiciary, media, and women, to mention but a few. New laws of the country would impose new financial reporting requirements on non-governmental groups and another overly broad bill penalizing ‘false’ information, and the contradiction of universal human rights norms signed and ratified by Kyrgyzstan. Previously, in October 2020, after riots broke out over allegedly manipulated parliamentarian elections, the UN Human Rights’ work in Europe and Central Asia, the OHCHR responded to the post-electoral violence in Bishkek, and the OHCHR established an early warning information platform for political violence and human rights abuse, which enhanced the early warning capacities of the UN Country Team/Resident Coordinator’s Office in Bishkek (UNCT/RCO). 10 Council of Europe, Central Asia Rule of Law Program, Strasbourg, 2019, https:// www.coe.int/en/web/programmes/central-asia.

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Regardless of recent developments, it all started out promising, when in 1991 this small republic became the first Central Asian country to become independent of the Soviet Union. Despite the following years, it struggled with poverty, development, justice/injustice, and emigration Kyrgyzstan received international attention, and respect, for its ‘Tulip Revolutions’ and liberal laws. After the institutionalization of the separation of powers and opening, it quickly became clear the different direction Kyrgyzstan would take, leading to significant democratic reforms. In 2010, the country was rocked by a wave of violence between the Uzbek/Kyrgyz majority which, 20 years after independence, highlighted the full extent of delayed judicial reforms and a lack of respect for human rights. Mass anti-corruption protests took place that year in the capital of Kyrgyzstan in Bishkek, which also had to do with the massive obstruction of justice and discrimination following the 2010 riots. In response, the country adopted a new constitution that weakened the president’s power, while strengthening parliament and the role of the prime minister. The political break led to reforms in the human rights field, such as the establishment of an ombudsman’s office and the Human Rights Coordination Council, as well as greater engagement with the UN. In response to the violence in the country, a UN Special Rapporteur was invited to the south of the country in July 2010. It was intended to document the extent to which international principles of the rule of law are observed against the mostly Uzbek defendants. There have been accusations of serious discrimination against ethnic minorities, and even cases of disappearances, and the report has been blocked by the government. In addition, the UN’ envoy, the Special Rapporteur, was expelled, indicating the high level of politically motivated detentions. One issue that the UN and OSCE are confronting the government with is violence against women, including the abduction of women-called ‘bride kidnapping’—allegedly an old custom of Kyrgyz society, which is neither historically nor scientifically proven, but rather the result of economic direness and poverty, because families can often not afford expensive weddings, and would rather kidnap women to rape and then marry them to their sons. Despite a tightened 2017 domestic violence law, enacted after a 2015 UPR report that requires both the punishment for such violence and kidnapping and better legal protection for victims, perpetrators remain unpunished. Kidnappers and violent husbands are not prosecuted, despite all the legislative reforms and laws which penalize

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such actions. The culture of impunity is omnipresent for torture and ill-treatment (HRW, 2019) of women. The establishment of such a culture is also exemplified by a political, inter-ethnic case, which has already been raised several times before the UN Human Rights Committee, regarding that of the human rights defender Azimjon Askarov. He had been in custody since 2010 and has not received a fair trial despite UN intervention and died in prison in 2020 due to an untreated Covid-19 infection. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, a charge that, according to NGOs, had not been legally proven. Since he was a member of the Uzbek minority, some observers believe that this was an incarceration with a racistethnic background. In January 2018, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) noted that tensions between the Kyrgyz majority and the Uzbek minority persisted and that there was still no open debate about this. Already in the run-up to the unrest, at the first UPR in May 2010, Kyrgyzstan was asked by the UN Human Rights Council to respect the independence of the judiciary and to reopen the case. The requirement was repeated in the second report in 2015 (OHCHR, UPR, 2015). Since 2010, the Kyrgyz government has accepted well over a hundred recommendations from UN committees, including the call for full respect of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, but it is being implemented slowly. The judiciary and the police still justify torture and the disconnection of justice with the supposedly necessary harsh fight against ’Muslim extremism.’ According to NGOs, the laws enacted justify measures that contradict human rights, such as lengthy pre-trial detention without charges and non-transparent procedures. More than 400 people have been convicted since 2010 on charges of religious extremism and, as a result, in the wake of the fight against terrorism; this was and is especially true for the so-called alleged returnees of the Islamic State (ISIS) from the Syrian civil war or Iraq. Since 2018, such accusations and convictions have been on the rise, including allegations of ill-treatment and torture in police custody (HRW, 2019). The UN Anti-Torture Committee (CPT) has repeatedly called for a trial of officials suspected of carrying out ill-treatment or torture. Investigations and trials are delayed or ineffective. Although the Kyrgyz Prosecutor General’s Office has registered and brought these officials to trial, the unnamed members of the UN committee believe that reform is not out of the picture. The Committee then again stated in 2018 that

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most of its 2012 recommendations had not yet been implemented and that safeguards against torture did not adequately protect persons in pretrial detention. Although the Kyrgyz authorities, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have publicly stated that they are taking countermeasures, there has been no significant progress. Contract killings, intimidation, and the disappearance of journalists and activists are also not uncommon, and possible trials are suspended in a fog of corruption and blackmailing (Novastan, 2019). The sensitivity of the issues of impunity shows that, following reports of domestic violence and torture, the state security authorities impose time-long bans on entry of foreign journalists and employees of human rights organizations. In 2019, the Prosecutor General’s Office stated that it had registered more than 9,000 cases of violence against women and children in recent years and had initiated more than 6,000 administrative proceedings and criminal proceedings (HRW, 2019). However, the suicide rate of abducted and raped women is rising, as cases of young women escaping their kidnappers—usually several male members of a family—are piling up on social media, and these outrages are mobilizing society. This includes the case of a young woman who was stabbed to death at a police station by the man who had previously kidnapped her. Since Bishkek became a ‘smart city’ thanks to Chinas’ BRI investments in G5 and cybersecurity measures, kidnapping of women has been reported live on camera in daylight on the streets of the capital since 2020. In response, the OHCHR in Bishkek called on the authorities to take more effective measures to prevent bride kidnapping, forced marriage, and religious child marriages and to ensure the enforcement of national laws and international treaties. Fundamental rights and freedoms such as freedom of expression, media, or assembly are repeatedly restricted, often accompanied by the violation of LGBTIQ rights. Those affected often face abuse, blackmail, and discrimination by state and non-state actors (Omelicheva, 2018). Members of the LGBTIQ community as well as religious or ethnic minorities receive anonymous death threats and are exposed to hate speech on internet portals. Their meetings fall victim to police raids. Consideration of a law that would ban the denigration of so-called non-traditional sexual relations has been delayed. A ‘Gender Study for Kyrgyzstan,’ commissioned by the EU in 2018, found that adequate measures to protect the fundamental rights of LGBTIQ nationals, such as

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those provided for by the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), are not guaranteed (EU, 2018). And in 2019, the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly expressed concern about media freedom and freedom of expression in Kyrgyzstan, especially when it comes to ethnic or sexual minorities (OSCE, 2019a).

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Uzbekistan

In 2021, after the reelection of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to a second term, with no real opposition candidates allowed to run, coincided with setbacks on the country’s human rights record. Yet, in 2017, Uzbekistan entered a new era of substantial constitutional and legal reforms, allowing for more freedom and less censorship in the public space. The new government also called upon the Youth and young diaspora to return to Uzbekistan, to establish business and internationalize education and social life (Fauve et al., 2021). Uzbekistan was the second country to become independent of the Soviet Union in September 1991 and was ruled autocratically by President Islam Karimov until his death in 2016. Since then, the new President Mirziyoyev, who comes from the Karimov cadre, has been seen as welcoming at first as a human rights reformer. As with other Central Asian countries, the issue of counter-extremism and the fight against terrorism is high on the agenda and are, therefore, often the cause or excuse for serious setbacks of human rights fulfillment. This leads to repeated criticism from OHCHR, ODIHR, and EU as well as civil society, because reforms are very hesitant, limited, or fake (HRW, 2019). Nevertheless, in 2018, in the run-up to the Asian Forum for Human Rights in Samarkand, the government released imprisoned journalists and other long-time political prisoners. This was a concession to the co-hosts of the Samarkand Forum, the UN, and the OSCE, and the regime also made concessions on freedom of the press and freedom of expression (Amnesty International 2019). Subsequently, the country successfully applied for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council in the year that followed and claimed that seat in 2021. One reason for this was the slowly increasing pressure of new young elites in the country, who are threatening to emigrate. The latter have not risen against the regime since 2016 at least due to massive economic reforms and increased freedoms (Pomfret, 2019). But with the current setbacks and the false ‘fair and free’ presidential elections in 2021, the disenchantment of the well-educated

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Uzbek Youth continues. Authorities harassed political opposition figures ahead of the presidential election and targeted outspoken and critical bloggers, as independent human rights groups continued to be denied registration. Thus, freedom of the media does not in any way correspond to democratic or international standards. However, with almost 60 percent of the population under the age of 30 and the number of Internet users is steadily growing, both Uzbek and Russian-language online media are experiencing a period of growth—often side-lining governmental authorities—and they contribute to the dissemination of the demand for respect for human rights. Unless there is a complete shutdown of messengers such as Telegram or Facebook, the demands for change by the youth will slowly continue. Online providers such as kun.uz, xabar.uz, and qalampir.uz are repeatedly, but not permanently, blocked, as are Facebook and YouTube (Pomfret, 2019, p. 256). But for journalists and bloggers who are dealing with sensitive issues such as forced labor in the cotton fields or corruption by law enforcement, and other violence and abuse matters in the countries face serious reprecussions, trials, unproportinal charges and often many years in prison. Radio Free Europe remains one of the most reliable sources in this situation, reporting human rights violations throughout Central Asia. But the fact that the online news agency has so far been unable to operate in Uzbekistan, but, on the other hand, has done so in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan shows how fearful the Uzbek government is of media freedom. During the Asian Human Rights Forum 2018, however, the government adopted a new NGO and media law, which is supposed to guarantee, albeit hesitantly, more freedom of action. Visa restrictions have also been lifted, making it easier for international human rights organizations or media representatives to travel to the country and carry out searches on the ground. However, the state authorities can still refuse an exit visa to Uzbek activists and journalists, which is a Soviet-era legacy. Accordingly, the powers of the State Security Service (Uzbek Davlat Xavfsizlik Xizmati, DXX) are still profound and comprehensive. Free elections and political pluralism are not taking place, and HRDs are held in detention for months or years without a fair trial. There is little opportunity for detainees to appeal, including the annulment of unlawful convictions, but access to appropriate medical treatment in pre-trial detention is often denied. NGOs are, therefore, calling for the provisions of the Criminal Code on extremism, which are usually used to criminalize dissent, to be amended and brought into line with international

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human rights treaties (Amnesty International, 2019). But until the DXX is reformed, there will be no significant improvement in the human rights situation. There is no civilian police structure and the existing one, which is under the Ministry of Defense, is in a permanent ‘state of war’ with its own population. The promise after the change of power in 2016/2017 to reform prosecution law to be carried out by civilian authorities has not been implemented. Several claims for reform and human rights compliance remain as purely cosmetic actions, unless the DXX and state bureaucracy is fundamentally reformed. In 2019, for example, journalist and human rights activist Bobomurod Abdullaev, who was tortured in 2017 and whose release was the basis for international campaigns, was released in light of the upcoming Asia Forum. His case should also be legally reopened to promote the new openness and transparency of the judiciary. However, proceedings were never initiated, but were lost in the turmoil of the judicial system and were ultimately stopped by the DXX (Die Welt, 2018). According to non governmental sources, such as HRW, thousands more detainees, including academics, opposition activists, film producers, clergy, soldiers, and journalists, have been detained. Despite this, Uzbekistan has passed the third cycle of the UPR in 2018 in preparation for the Samarkand Forum and the application to the UN Human Rights Council. The recommendations of the Human Rights Council included, among other things, that those detained for political reasons should be given a fair and transparent procedure. Torture and ill-treatment during detention must be combated even more consistently than before and the penal code and the judicial system must be reformed, and international standards adapted (OHCHR, UPR, 2018). Other recommendations included the repeal of the paragraph criminalizing consensual homosexual relations. Uzbekistan is one of the last post-Soviet countries to explicitly criminalize such relations. However, to consider the recommendations of the Human Rights Council following judicial reforms, the government in Tashkent had invited the UN Special Rapporteur on a review of the independence of lawyers and the judiciary (September 2019). After his visit, he urged the country to make greater reform efforts, but at the same time pointed out positively that compared to the first report of 2016, when there had been just six acquittals in reopened ‘political’ proceedings, the number of which has now risen to more than 500, which could indicate, among other things a greater independence of the courts (OHCHR, 2019).

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The extent to which local and traditional practices restrict or violate human rights is also demonstrated by the issue of forced labor in the country’s cotton fields, to which the UN would like to send a special rapporteur, but who has not yet been allowed into the country. This is because the cotton industry is the backbone of the country as is the agricultural sector in general. Forced laborers are ‘contracted’ workers from the rural area, public officials, nurses, school children, and students that are sent in the cotton fields far from home to work during the harvest season. This practice is the legacy of the Soviet dictatorship, when entire school classes, civil servants, doctors, and teachers were seconded at harvest time by local authorities to work in the fields. Failure to comply and threats which could result in job losses or disciplinary measures. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that such operations in the fields affect more than 300,000 people per year (HRW, 2019). The slow pace of urgent legal and political reforms can be seen, among other things, in the rights of women and girls. Social media and the fact that the government has ratified the UN Convention on Women’s Rights (CEDAW) have raised public awareness of violence against women, rape, or forced marriage. However, local authorities routinely refuse to report gender-based violence. Women’s shelters, which are usually set up by international NGOs, are overcrowded, as there is no state duty of care. From the point of view of the authorities, family violence is considered a family matter. They often blame the victims for the violence they endure and block their attempts to display brutality and violence in their marriages. Violent men are rarely or never prosecuted and fuel the culture of patriarchal impunity. Instead, local authorities are trying to reconcile married couples with the aim of ‘saving the family’ and having a low divorce rate. The fact is that this double standard is paid for with the suffering of women, and it does not seem to bother the authorities (Amnesty International, 2019). The violence in families in rural areas, where about 70% of the population lives, is particularly high. There the rules of the traditional municipal councils, the so-called Mahallas, apply, under predominantly male leadership and religious-Muslim councils of elders. The Mahallas are entrusted by the government with the regulation of community life and the performance of many state tasks and act partly as a state within a state, because it is unable or unwilling to enforce the rights of women and children in rural areas. However, the Mahalla leaders are potentially of great importance for the implementation—or violation—of laws, including

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human rights, in that they are judges, municipal police, electoral commissioners, and social servants in one (Gumppenberg, 2002). But instead of implementing UN recommendations and passing equality laws, there is a so-called re-traditionalization or recollection of Islamic norms and standards. For young women, this means a reorientation to domestic activities, the role of mother, the wearing of a headscarf and the so-called burden of virginity. NGOs in Uzbekistan fear that positive achievements from the Soviet era, such as women working, will be reversed. Public discourse reflects conservative stereotypes that emphasize the family and the reproductive role of women. In 2018, Ahmed Shaheed, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, published a report following his visit to Uzbekistan, expressing concerns about the limits of religious freedom and the extreme monitoring of all religious practices in the course of the ‘fight against terrorism,’ which led to false accusations. In response to the report, the Uzbek Parliament adopted a master plan for more freedom of belief in the country (OHCHR, 2018). However, no concrete measures have yet been taken.

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Tajikistan

In April 2021 after a two-day border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over unresolved water sharing protocols which date back to the Soviet, over 40 people lost their lives, most of them civilians, and hundreds were injured. Over 58,000 people in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan fled their homes or were evacuated. Dozens of houses and at least three schools were damaged or destroyed. In Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Tajiks and two nationals of Tajikistan were on trial in Kyrgyzstan for looting private property during the conflict. And in Tajikistan, Kyrgyz nationals went on trial or prosecuted, and borders closed. In addition, the country faced a heavy influx of Afghan refugees and Taliban penetration in 2021, to which it reacted with restrictive and violent measures, including militarizing its borders. Right after the Taliban took over in August 2021, the EU Council President held discussions with the head of states of all Central Asian countries, highlighting that the main concern of the EU is security and the stability of the Central Asian region. Human rights were of secondary importance and were not on the agenda, later that year when Tajik President visit to Brussels to meet with EU officials (HRW, 2019, 2023; EU: Tackle Central Asia Rights Abuse).

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Over the years, the Tajik authorities have continued to jail government critics, including opposition activists and journalists, for lengthy prison terms on politically motivated grounds. They also intensified harassment of relatives of peaceful dissidents abroad and continued to forcibly return political opponents from abroad using politically motivated extradition requests. Censorship of media, the Internet, and civil society as well as harsh anti-terror laws do not allow for any civil society group to emerge. Tajikistan has one of the most repressive regimes in Central Asia, with a low human rights record, since independence from the Soviet Union in September 1991. Since then, it has been ruled autocratically by President Emomali Rahmon and his family, who is about to establish a dynasty. Immediately after the founding of the republic, the country sank into the civil war between Islamic fundamentalists and the new government, which was still strongly communist from 1992 to 1997. Old conflicts swelled, and the Soviet oppression of religious minorities and ethnic groups has taken their toll on human rights over decades. Despite the ratification of core international human rights treaties or the reporting to the UN and ODIHR committees, the human rights situation in Tajikistan has not improved significantly over the past decades. Allegations of severe human rights abuses range from systematic persecution and intimidation of government critics, including opposition activists, journalists, and relatives of dissidents abroad, to the persecution of religious and minority groups (HRW, 2021). As a result, the country loses the brightest and strongest because of emigration, in addition to the most critical minds. The crackdown on freedom of expression, association, and religion extended mainly to social media users. The Internet is deliberately overpriced and is repeatedly interrupted, not to mention censorship measures (Pomfret, 2019, p. 257). Security agencies are persistently blocking access to popular social media and news sites such as Facebook, YouTube, and Radio Free Europe, and regularly cutting access to mobile and news services, by slowing down the Internet or temporarily closure of sides. Journalists and bloggers risk imprisonment of ten years or more. These conditions were also repeatedly criticized by Harlem Desir, the OSCE representative for media freedom, who denounced the harsh and disproportionate condemnation of journalists, bloggers, and other media activists (OSCE, 2019b). Tajiks critical of the regime are persecuted and disappear abroad, while their relatives are subjected to massive domestic pressure, and familydetentions are not uncommon. NGOs rely on references to politically

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motivated extradition requests by the international police organization Interpol, as well as statements by security services in Turkey and Russia, which confirm this systematic persecution and contract killings. The government in Dushanbe, for example, is calling on foreign countries to extradite all members of the Islamic Party of the Rebirth of Tajikistan (IPWT) and the opposition movement Group 24, which are considered both extremist and banned in Tajikistan. Public and fair trials cannot be expected by members of these groups (Amnesty International, 2019). To prevent an escape or asylum application abroad from their side, a ban on all immediate relatives and their relatives, including children and grandchildren, applies. Along with this, the regime controls Islamist groups, criminalizes Salafism, and issued a ban on the wearing of a hijab or long beards. It is likely that such draconian measures will lead to ever more resistance and accelerate the negative spiral. Torture, ill-treatment, and repressions are commonplace. In its third periodic report on Tajikistan in June 2018, the UN Torture Committee (CPT) expressed its concerns about reports from prisons and pre-trial detention, including deaths in police custody. The Committee pointed to serious problems such as domestic violence against women and the persecution of dissidents and homosexuals. It was not until 2019 that the government presented its first report on the ICCPR to the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva. The committee’s criticism was fundamental, as the human rights situation is sometimes so serious that not all individual cases can be listed. Rather, the committee wanted to get the government to undertake fundamental criminal reforms and to combat corruption and partisanship in the judiciary. For example, the Human Rights Committee asks the government to act, including the adoption of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law that would condemn all forms of direct, indirect, and multiple discrimination, including color, religion, opinion, sexual orientation, gender identity (HRC, 2019). The members of the committee criticized the so-called special operations ‘moral and purge,’ which repeatedly allows the security forces to arbitrarily detain, mistreat or discriminate against persons in the sense of state-mandated “moral and ethical norms of interpersonal relations” (Omelicheva, 2018). After all, the Ministry of the Interior is now drawing up new guidelines for the implementation of the Tajik Law of 2013 on the prohibition of family violence.

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Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan, under the autocratic leadership of one family, is one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Turkmen authorities tightly control access to information, severely restrict media and religious freedoms, and allow no independent monitoring groups. HRDs and activists, including those in exile, and their relatives are subject to government reprisals, and enforced disappearance is reported a common practice to silence opposition (HRW, 2022). In line with other Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan declared independence from the Soviet Union in October 1991, but did not form a constitution until 1992, already indicating that state-building was not the priority to the old communist elite who now formed the new government. Until now, due to the lack of transparency and access into the country, the data and information on the human rights situation in the country are opaque. But the reports of the Turkmen diaspora in foreign exile and international NGOs give an approximate picture of the situation in the country, which has been ruled by President Gurbangully Berdymukhamedov and his sons, with a dictatorial hand since 2007. At the top of the list of human rights violations are the suppression and persecution of all forms of religious and political statements that are not authorized by the government. There is no freedom of the media, and the Internet is strictly controlled. All public sectors are strictly controlled including the education sector, and hence, free choice of work and social mobility is not guaranteed. Many opposition activists, journalists, or members of NGOs have disappeared or are in prison. People face several years in prison and torture if they speak to foreign media representatives or provide information, and exit permits are withdrawn again and again (Schwarzkopf, 2019). The government has been resilient to any foreign exchange, may it be with the UN or the EU, expect for a few occasions, and reacts nervously to criticism and begs off any interference in internal affairs. In its periodic report (UPR) to the UN, it advocates a life of dignity for all citizens, but without specifying this dignity (OHCHR, 2019). According to the government in Ashgabat, the president promotes “consistently all measures to fulfil its international obligations to the international community” and (…) ancient democratic [sic!] traditions in Turkmen society

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and the legal framework of the state” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019). Only economic and social human rights are mentioned in the report, not political or civil ones. The OSCE, therefore, concluded in 2018 that neither democratic processes nor political freedoms were guaranteed, as was evident, for example, during the parliamentary elections in March 2018. These had “no important preconditions for a truly democratic electoral process,” according to the organization (OSCE, 2018). Despite a standing invitation to the Turkmen government since 2018 to attend all UN special procedures to visit the country, 15 United Nations Special Procedures have been requested by the OHCHR, but none has been granted, ever. NGOs can only carry out human rights work in exile, because the government constantly threatens civil society activists and their families with reprisals. In 2018, the United Nations working group looked at the high number of suspected arbitrary detentions in the country and criticized the fact that many of the arrests were not lawful or that detainees had disappeared. Turkmen students are often monitored abroad and cannot visit their families, as they are then not allowed to leave for their places of study abroad only after a thorough ‘examination’ by the Ministry of Migration. This aims not only to control, but above all to intimidate young Turkmens abroad, as their families back home can be held in custody, for the ‘wrongdoings’ of their sons and daughters abroad. The aim is to keep them as reticent as possible toward their own regime. It is estimated that the number of people who the Turkmen authorities prohibit from leaving the country each year for travel abroad is around 30,000; with a population of six million, this is a not to be underestimated (HRW, 2019). This concerns migrant workers that leave the country for work in Russia, Dubai and Turkey. Although the government say it puts social, cultural, and economic human rights first and foremost, it is these human rights that are being massively threatened and violated. Uncontrolled authorities expropriate and destroy entire residential areas or villages for major projects of the president without paying adequate compensation to the inhabitants there. Similarly, religious freedoms are severely restricted, because unregistered religious groups and congregations are forbidden, especially Christian or

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Old Persian religious communities such as Zoroastrianism. The authorities censor religious literature and punish unauthorized activities. Conscientious objection is not permitted. Most of them are Jehovah’s Witnesses who are imprisoned for this reason. But supporters of Turkish-Muslim groups who do not follow the state religion are also imprisoned (Amnesty International, 2019). The exact number of political prisoners cannot be determined because of inaccurate data and the lack of access to the country. Figures go into the thousands. The justice system lacks transparency, and, in sensitive cases, proceedings are closed. According to the NGO ‘Prove They Are Alive,’ an international campaign to end the disappearance in Turkmenistan, well over a hundred people are considered missing. Many of them are believed to be held in a prison in Ovadan Depe, notorious for its torture methods (AAAS, 2014). These include those imprisoned for homosexuality, an offense under Turkmen law which can be punishable by a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The Turkmen government rejected recommendations from the UN, which raised the issue in 2018 as part of the UPR. But not only religious and sexual minorities or opponents feel the violence of the state, but also women and children. As early as 2018, the UN Committee on Women’s Rights (CEDAW) pointed to an increase in ‘forced marriages,’ which particularly affect young girls. There is also a re-traditionalization in Turkmenistan with particularly serious consequences for the educational and development opportunities of young women (Schwarzkopf, 2019).

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Kazakhstan

Prior to talks with an EU delegation on human rights in November 2021, Kazakhstan President Qasym-Zhomart Tokayev adopted new laws on peaceful assembly and trade unions to make a concession to EU’s human rights diplomacy and even has abolished the death penalty in 2020. But those supporters of banned opposition movements are still being detained, fined, and prosecuted, while independent trade unions are facing “serious obstacles” to register and operate. And it was these laws that allowed him to crash the protests in January 2022 in Almaty and elsewhere, which cost the lives of over 40 people and thousands injured and tortured and over 10.000 people being arrested. Already back in 2021 there was an increase in spontaneous strikes, with workers across the country demanding better pay and working conditions. And when

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energy costs skyrocketed in January 2022 the protests expanded, causing the government to call for martial law and bringing Russian troops and tanks into the country to crash the protesters. Tokayev ordered the troops to ‘shoot to kill without warning.’ Yet, there had been a period of hope and liberation over the past years, after the peaceful transition of the presidency in 2019, which has been violently muted in 2022. Yet in 1991, Kazakhstan became the last Central Asian Soviet republic to declare independence in December, and until now being a firm supporter of the Russian Federation while hosting one of the largest communities of Russian minorities in the country. From the point of view of human rights, it is above all the fundamental freedoms and civil liberties, such as free assembly, movement, expression, and religious freedoms that are restricted and violated in Kazakhstan (Fauve et al., 2021). These restrictions haven’t substantially changed since the founding of the state, nor has it altered with the change of the president in 2019, that took place without elections being held. The country was the last to part with the Soviet empire, not only because of its large Russian population, but also because of its geographical proximity to Russia; also economically, politically, and administratively, Kazakh authorities practice old Soviet justice, despite the country’s economic wealth (Pomfret, 2019, pp. 69–94). Peaceful protests are disbanded, critics of the regime are imprisoned, the media is censored, and online platforms are strictly controlled. The regime detains activists, bloggers, and journalists and often dismisses them after a short time. This is mainly for intimidation, because crowds of people can be classified as ‘extremist’ without much fuss. Open and fair trials that could confirm or refute this allegation will not take place. It is worth noting the number of cases under the ‘discord’ paragraph, which is applied to all critics of the regime, without pre-trial detention and subsequent public trials. Impunity, perforation, and accusations that the police torture and mistreat remain an issue for the country (Omelicheva, 2018). Critical posts on social media are enough to “incite discord,” and bloggers are considered regime critics. To get rid of them and avoid a proper criminal trial, authorities often transfer them to psychiatric detention. The same applies to ‘incitement to religious discord,’ an accusation used as a defense against Islamic extremism (HRW, 2019). As a result, authorities are blocking websites, including social media such as Ratel.kz, an analytical news portal. Opposition movements such as the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan can be classified as ‘extremist’ and

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the police arbitrarily detain their organizers and participants without trial. In the rich oil-producing country of Kazakhstan, authorities are pursuing, arresting, or letting trade unionists disappear. The revision of the Trade Union and Labour Code has been called for several times by the EU in its dialogue with the country, calling for international rights, which are primarily political freedoms, to be respected for trade unionists (Amnesty International 2019). In connection with the detention and persecution of trade unionists, the UN Anti-Torture Committee (CPT) also expressed concern about systematic torture and ill-treatment in detention. Despite the official statement that torture has been abolished, there are hardly any cases against officials or guards accused of these offenses, for example, after the violent clashes between trade unionists and the security apparatus in 2011 in the oil-producing region in Zhanaozen, which, according to witnesses, resulted in dozens of arrests followed by torture (Eurasianet, 2016). The same city which started the protests and took them to Almaty in 2022. Prior to his abdication in 2019, Nursultan Nazarbajev passed a law to control religious education and sermons in mosques, ostensibly to combat extremism. This law allows the opening of administrative proceedings against individuals or ‘prohibited religious organisations,’ which may result in fines, up to three years in prison or a general ban on prayer. This applies not only to Muslim organized groups, but also to Jehovah’s Witnesses (HRW, 2019). The rights of LGBTI people, children, women, people with disabilities, and ethnic minorities are also being restricted. In 2018, a Kazakh NGO published a report naming abuse of lesbian women, including insults, humiliations, harassment, illegal dismissals, and forced dismissals. The chairwoman of the NGO and editor of the report were then indicted for ‘rowdyism’ (a paragraph legacy from the Soviet era) and fined after taking part in a photo shoot to stop stigmatizing sexual education and menstruation (HRW, 2019). Despite the commitment to develop inclusive education, in which children with and without disabilities learn together, children with disabilities are separated from others and sent to special schools or isolated at home. However, there were signs of liberation over the past years. In 2022, Evgenij Jovtis, Director of the Kazakhstan Office for Human Rights, highlighted that it is precisely this struggle of people with disability that led to concrete results. It was unthinkable to talk about members of these minorities, including LGBTIQ by the end of the 1990s, but nowadays it can be

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discussed openly. But as long as there is a general problem with discrimination of minorities of any kind, even ethnic minorities such as Chinese, Russian, there is also a problem for the LGBTIQ. It is not only against one group or community, but against many different groups. Exclusion of its members from professional and social areas, humiliation and violation of any rights on any grounds are the consequences (Novastan, 1 March 2022, novastan.org). Discrimination, racism, and xenophobia have a long history in Kazakhstan, and one of the groups that had to face growing racism and discrimination are members of the Chinese community in the country. Both the governments of the Kazakhs in Nur-Sultan and the Chinese in Beijing lack to respond adequately, none of them feeling a responsibility for improving this situation. Anti-Chinese protests have taken place regularly in Almaty and beyond, often dissolved by policy forces in 2016 and 2019. After the violent protests in January 2022, Chinese President Xi stressed that China firmly opposes the protests that also attempted to harm China-Kazakhstan relations because protesters were blaming China—and thus the Kazakh governments relationship with them for the decrease in social and economic standards in the country. Moreover, these motivating factors were tied to long simmering anger over corruption, nepotism, rising inequality, and economic hardships in the country.11 Not surprisingly, as in all Central Asian countries, violence against women and the systematic discrimination of minorities were an aspect of Kazakhstan’s 2019 UPR report. One allegation was that while a law passed in 2017 to decriminalize domestic violence, the beating and rape of women by her husband were still punishable only as a civil offense and not as a criminal offense. Nor have the women’s shelters that were promised in 2016 been set up for the victims of domestic violence, nor have any accompanying legal, medical, social, and psychological services. After all, the period of protection for victims of violence has been extended from 10 to 30 days, which prohibits the perpetrators from living with the victim during this period, although this is hardly enforced in practice (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019).

11 Kemel Toktomushev: China in Post-Kazakhstan Central Asia: “Beijing, We Have a Problem!” Feb 08, 2022, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-in-postkazakhstan-central-asia-beijing-we-have-a-problem.

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Conclusion

2020 launched the EU/Council of Europe ‘Central Asia Rule of Law Program’ and the 2019 EU-Central Asia Strategy are the two instruments of Europe’s external and foreign policies, to enhance human rights, rule of law, and electoral reforms in the region. The results and impact remain to be seen, however, the fact that these are specific Central Asianrelated human rights programs is novel in the Council’s and EU’s external actions since 2010. They focus on domestic politics and change, such as the strengthening of civil society that in the long run hope to trigger political and legal reforms. If civil society cannot or is not interested in collaborating with European programs, then there is no way for Europe to ‘impose’ human rights on the region. If there is no bottom-up approach by civil society, business, and political elites in the region, there will be no human rights compliance. That said, observations allow us to suggest, that due to the dramatic political and security paradigm shifts in the post-Soviet space since 2021 and in 2022, Central Asian governments may conduct serious structural reforms to withstand the influx of other external and autocratic powers in the region, such as China and Turkey—if they do not want to lose more of their educated youth. Apart from the pandemic and the wars in the region since 2020, overall, the civil war in Afghanistan and the violence in the Ferghana Valley and in Kazakhstan, the plethora of European programs have not only been slowed down by external causes, such as the BRI, wars or the pandemic, but mainly due to the dysfunctional, corrupt and nepotistic political practices at local and national levels. The Program launched in 2021 is a response by Europe’s strongest lead organization, the EU, to these political regimes who only respond to domestic pressure, not to an international one. But it remains challenging, since other investors and players in the region, overall, China, have no concession to make toward human rights compliance. For example, during the 17th EU-Central Asia face-to-face meetings between EU representatives with Central Asian leaders in November 2021 in Tajikistan, none of the above-mentioned human rights issues have been tackled by the Commission during its visits to the region, out of fear that Central Asian governments would turn their back to the EU and toward China. The meeting was hosted by the Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, with the participation of the Foreign Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

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Uzbekistan, and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan. Afterward, the EU Commissioner for International Partnerships highlighted the partnership between the EU and Central Asia and emphasized that the EU is determined to build a green, resilient, inclusive, and sustainable post-COVID-19 recovery together with the Central Asian states. She highlighted that climate justice and the countries’ geopolitical and strategic connectivity between the EU and China will help to facilitate trade and investment, energy, and security. But she avoided to mention human rights as tools to achieve these goals, explicitly. However, she stated that the EU “(…) will engage with civil society and the youth, to develop a closer partnership.”12 Keeping in mind that civil society is key to unlock any human rights treaty that is relevant for changing paradigms in any of the Central Asian countries. The above-listed summary of the human rights situation and its improvement depends heavily on the extent to which civil society can organize and express itself inside these countries—under extremely difficult circumstances. It is, therefore, one of the key steps of the EU, the Council of Europe, and the UN as well as the OSCE-ODIHR to create space for civil society to act. The fact that all five countries had similar starting conditions in 1991, but developed differently, is also linked to the respective role that civil society plays and can play, and to the level of pressure resulting from the brain drain and the large diaspora community abroad. One reason why Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have responded to UN human rights benchmarks since the 2010s, and successfully applied for membership in the UN Human Rights Council, showing a willingness to implement their recommendations, albeit at different speeds, stems from the influence of local NGOs and the increasing transparency and ‘shaming’ through social media, and the continuing exodus of young elites. Debates on social media on the rights of ethnic minorities, religious groups, women, LGBTIQ, children, media freedom by civil society in the country, as well as the issues of internet censorship, torture and lawbending, and others, illustrate the need for political and legal reforms in Central Asia. Nonetheless, the level of hate and dangerous speech and false acclamations have been rising on social media, but that can, as 12 EU ‚ 17th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting, 22 November 2021, https://ec. europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6219.

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anywhere in the world, only be counteracted by other social media. The demand for change and human rights compliance is stronger than ever, the level of frustration among the young high, which is to some extent reflected in the Samarkand Declaration in 2018. The pandemic years 2020–2022 and the Russian war in the Ukraine have led to economic insecurity, rise of poverty, and serious civil and international wars in the post-Soviet space and in Central Asia. Regional autocratic players, such as China, Russia, or Turkey, fueled the political backsliding of democracy, nationalism, and radicalization that led to more suppression by state authorities, and subsequent human rights violations. This downward spiral can only be turned into an upward one, if the human rights programs and policies by the EU and the Council of Europe are seriously implemented and are perceived as beneficial for changemakers in the region, small and medium enterprises, HRD and civil society groups.

References Abdusalyamova, L. (2015). Alliance. https://www.alliancemagazine.org/fea ture/ngos-in-central-asia/. Accessed 3 April 2022. Association, A., & for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights, and Law Program. (2014). Geospatial technologies and human rights project. An evaluation of Ovadan-Depe-Prison using highresolution satellite imagery. Amnesty International (AI). (2019). Country Reports 2019. https://www.amn esty.org/en/countries/. Accessed 3 April 2022. Die Welt. (2018 March 26). Verschleppt wegen einer angeblichen Verschwörung. Politik im Ausland. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article17489 0654/freethemall-Bobomurod-Abdullaev-in-Usbekistan-verschleppt.html Eurasianet. (2016). Kazakhstan: New labor unrest in Zhanaozen. https://eurasi anet.org/kazakhstan-new-labor-unrest-zhanaozen. Accessed 3 March 2022. European Union. (2018). Kyrgyzstan gender study report. Delegation to the Kyrgyz Republic, EEAS. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kyrgyz-rep ublic/49743/kyrgystan-gender-study-report_en. Accessed: 15.03.2022. Fauve, A., Van den Bosch, J., & De Cordier, B. (Eds.). (2021). The European handbook of Central Asian studies. ibidem Publisher. Frankopan, P. (2015). The silk roads, a new history of the world. Bloomsbury. Gumppenberg, M.-C. (2002). Uzbekistan, studies on country-by-country conflict analysis. Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

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Human Rights Committee (HRC). (2019). Human Rights Committee concluding observations on the third periodic report of Tajikistan CCPR/C/TJK/CO/A. Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2019). World Report 2019. https://www.hrw. org/world-report/2019. Accessed 3 April 2022. Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2023, April). Europe and Central Asia, 2023. https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia Kabar. (2019). Ensuring human rights and freedom is one of the main development goals of country; Coordination Council on Human Rights under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. Kabar. http://kabar.kg/eng/news/ ensuring-human-rights-and-freedoms-is-one-of-main-development-goals-ofcountry-kyrgyz-deputy-pm/. Accessed 1 April 2022. Kidnapped for an alleged conspiracy. (2018). https://www.welt.de/politik/aus land/article174890654/freethemall-Bobomurod-Abdullaev-in-Usbekistanverschleppt.html. Accessed 1 April 2022. Lemon, E. (Ed.). (2019). Critical approaches to security in Central Asia, Central Asia Studies. Routledge. Novastan. (2019). Corruption, money laundering and a murder: cumbersome investigation into scandal in Kyrgyzstan. Novastan. https://www.novastan. org/de/kirgistan/korruption-geldwaesche-und-ein-mord-schwerfaellige-erm ittlungen-zu-skandal-in-kirgistan/. Accessed 20 March 2022. Omelicheva, M. Y., & Markowittz, L. P. (2019). Webs of corruption, trafficking and terrorism in Central Asia. Columbia University Press. Omelicheva, M. Y. (2018). Human rights and governance in Central Asia. In D. Burghart, L. Daniel, & T. Sabonis-Helf (Eds.), Central Asia in the era of sovereignty, the return of Tamerlane? (pp. 57–80). Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR). (2018a). OHCHRUN expert welcomes Uzbekistan roadmap to ensure freedom of religion or supplies. https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/Displa yNews.aspx?NewsID=23179&LangID=E. Accessed 12 March 2022.. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR). (2018b, May 7–18). OHCHR Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Thirtieth session, /HRC/WG.6/30/TKM/1. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2018). OHCHR Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, 30. /HRC/WG.6/30/TKM/1. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR). OHCHR Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, 30. Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Kazakhstan. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR). Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. United Nationsa/HRC/WG.6/34/KAZ/3. Accessed 3 April 2022.

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Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR). (2019). United Nations Human Rights Report 2018. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2019). Uzbekistan faces crucial challenges for judicial independence, says UN human rights expert. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. aspx?NewsID=25056&LangID=E. Accessed 15 March 2023. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Treaty data base. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/ENACARegion/Pages/ TJIndex.aspx. Accessed 20 April 2023. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Universal Periodic Reviews (UPR), by country: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/ HRC/Pages/Home.aspx. Accessed 20 April 2023. OSCE. (2018). Elections in Turkmenistan. https://www.osce.org/odihr/electi ons/turkmenistan. Accessed 3 April 2022. OSCE. (2019a). OSCE Media Freedom Representative concerned by closure of TV channel in Kyrgyzstan. https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-ofmedia/427904. Accessed 3 April 2022. OSCE. (2019b). OSCE Media Freedom Representative calls on authorities in Tajikistan to investigate reports of intimidation of journalists’ family and provide accreditation to journalists. https://www.osce.org/representative-onfreedom-of-media/424226. Accessed 20 January 2022. Panagiotidis, E. (2019). Leaked secret documents prove the internment and persecution of Uighurs in China—Five answers to the “China Cables”. Neue Züricher Zeitung. https://www.nzz.ch/international/china-cablesenthuellen-internierung-und-verfolgung-von-uiguren-ld.1524142. Accessed 3 April 2022. Pomfret, R. (2019). The Central Asian economies in the twenty-first century, paving a new silk road. Princeton University Press. Schwarzkopf, L. (2019). Turkmenistan, Isolated and area of interest of various major powers. Deutschlandfunk. https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/turkmenis tan-isoliert-und-interessengebiet-verschiedener.724.de.html?dram:article_id= 448662. Accessed 17 April 2022. Sharifzoda, K. (2019). To Russia or Turkey? A Central Asian migrant worker’s big choice. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/to-russia-orturkey-a-central-asian-migrant-workers-big-choice/. Accessed 4. April 2022. United Nations Digital Library. (2019). Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan to the United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/rec ord/3791928. Accessed 1 April 2022.

CHAPTER 8

European-Central Asian International Election Observation Cooperation and Contestation Rick Fawn

1

Introduction

Even with the monstrosity of war in Ukraine and Russia’s repeated absence from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Permanent Council in the weeks before its attack on 24 February 2022, free and fair elections will remain fundamental to the values system of the OSCE space. Indeed, the relationship of autocracy to the use of unaccountable uses of mass violence will only reinforce the importance of democracy to peace. Elections are considered essential to democracy, and democracy, human rights, minority rights and the rule of law are central to any “European” conception of human security. Hence, international election

R. Fawn (B) School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 157 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_8

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observation missions (IEOMs) also play a vital role in European-Central Asian connectivity efforts, and European states have invested significantly in the OSCE to that end. The language regarding these values is fully and universally agreed among the 57 participating States (pSs) of the world’s largest regional security format, the OSCE formally launched as the substantive successor to its Conference predecessor on 1 January 1995. Those states have committed, and recommitted, to those values in several Charter and Summit declarations. As far back as 1990, with the Soviet Union still in existence and Mikhail Gorbachev in power, the Soviet Union agreed with its fellow participating States that elections and democracy were not, or more accurately, were no longer, a purely domestic matter, but a shared international. That was enshrined in the 1990 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, which contained “the commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as well as their common determination to build democratic societies based on free elections and the rule of law” (CSCE, 1990, 2, citing the English version). The Council of Europe of which every European country, bar Belarus, is a member advocates the same, and often works with the OSCE and/or agrees formally with its statements on the quality of the conduct of the election process (and never of the outcomes themselves).1 The European Union sees itself as a proponent of free elections as a universal value, and engages with the OSCE and CoE to advance this activity practically, by lending personnel and financial support, and ideationally, by using the findings of OSCE elections missions as part of its assessment of the democratic standing of partners. While the EU undertakes its own IEOMs outside of the OSCE area, it recognizes and commends ODIHR for its electoral work (see, e.g., European Commission, 2016, 35). The EU even welcomes when OSCE states proactively invite its election specialists. In its annual human rights reports, the US State Department routinely references OSCE findings. Election practices and indeed basic understandings can and do differ— and profoundly. Every regime conducts elections, to the point of being illiberal democracies—votes in practice, often frequently, but without the 1 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has sent missions since 1974 and has now done over 200, but Central Asian states are not members; PACE, therefore, works with ODIHR and/or employs its findings regarding elections in that region.

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free inputs and free outputs that are elementally expected of elections in this vast Euro-Atlantic-Eurasian region. Instead, the motions of democracy, often with tremendous fanfare, are conducted even with some technical proficiency, but without the basic legal and political environment to permit contested elections. Westernpost-Soviet differences in understandings of elections moved also into the realm of differences over how elections are assessed. That has come to focus on one institution of the OSCE: the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights abbreviated to ODIHR and pronounced, alas, as “Oh Dear”. ODIHR maintains a much larger remit than merely election observation, which is itself but part of the Elections Department of ODIHR, which in turn is only one of the Office’s 11 units and working areas. In all Central Asian countries, ODIHR has undertaken IEOMs over the past 25 year, although as this chapter shows, the type of IEOM and surrounding decisions vary among these states. The 400th ODIHR IEOM took place in Uzbekistan in October 2021. Election observation has become the international practice to evaluate whether and how well elections are conducted, that is, the process of running elections, irrespective of the electoral outcome. That includes not only identifying better practices in existing processes and also when procedures are revised, such as for voter identification of absentee voting and for new technologies. IEOMs have become the established means in many regional inter-governmental structures that recognize democracy as a common endeavour in order to assess electoral standards, from the African Union to the (formerly British) Commonwealth. So too have post-Soviet and authoritarian regional formations undertaken IEOMs, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). IEOMs generally intend not to exclude or substitute for domestic counterparts and often interact with them. But they are often better-resourced, and being international, likely and expected to be removed from internal pressures. In the largest geographic area of global IEOM activity and now with the most elaborate assessment system, visceral contestation over election observation has also flared. From 2003, in an otherwise innocuously entitled “Astana Appeal”, several post-Soviet states banded together to challenge what they saw as the manipulation of OSCE election observation by Western states not only to criticize them, but worse, to foment regime change (some of this history is given, inter alia, in Fawn, 2013).

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What is at stake in election observation, therefore, is elemental: it goes to the heart of political survivability. That election observation is recognized as an international norm is now a given (e.g. esp. Hyde, 2011; Kelley, 2012). This chapter identifies and analyses state engagement with and resistance to OSCE/ODIHR IEOMs as a measure of political-cultural orientation. The concern for this volume remains European-Central Asian relations and connectivity. “European” is taken here as the norm of international election observation. Central Asia is particularly telling because most of its states have, at best, only met minimalist ODHIR criteria to permit a full IEOM. In turn also, leading to our second analytical focus, Central Asian governments have been prolific consumers of alternative IEOMs, ones that this chapter posits serve as competitors to ODIHR. Central Asian behaviour can also be contrasted to that of other post-Soviet states, particularly ones that have either oscillated between Moscow and the West, or have embarked on unambiguous pathways to closer relations, and even efforts at integration: Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. This chapter identifies how ODIHR IEOMs work, not merely as information, but to demonstrate that different types of their IEOMs signal different assessments of the political and democratic standing of states. From that the contribution suggests a typology of ODIHR EOMs and graphs state behaviour on a curved continuum. Doing so presents a conceptual visualization of comparative state placements in terms of engagement with ODIHR and ODIHR’s views on the quality of democratization in the Central Asian states. We can then establish how and why ODIHR’s IEOM practices came to be (and remain) profoundly contested, including by Central Asian states, and how those contrasts to the behaviour of other post-Soviet states towards ODIHR. Thereafter the chapter places Central Asia in terms of the use of what are called “alternative IEOMS”—ones that arose after ODIHR’s, and in several cases, as latent and often very overt means to challenge, displace and subvert ODIHR’s findings.

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2 ODIHR IEOMs: Explanations of the Types of ODIHR Election Missions Before even starting with ODIHR, it is worth reminding ourselves from the introduction that a state’s participation in the OSCE is fundamentally predicated based on shared, common values and commitments. Democracy is a shared value among those states. In that vein, it is essential to note that ODIHR does not impose itself on participating States (pSs),2 but awaits an official invitation from the host government, normally from its Foreign Ministry. The starting point for that engagement is a Needs Assessment Mission, composed often of only two and generally not more than four elections specialists. ODIHR can begin a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) on the basis of expecting that invitation, as it did for Tajikistan’s 2020 parliamentary elections, and the 2021 Russian parliamentary elections,3 but that is done in the context of the long-established norms and familiarity with ODIHR practices. Though small in personnel, with between two and five members, a NAM holds multiple meetings in the host country, the range of its domestic interlocutors being included in its report. The publicly available NAM report also then advises what further type of IEOM should be deployed, offers recommendations based on multiple considerations, including whether domestic laws are even sufficient to present the opportunity for fair and contested elections. This point holds relevant for later comparisons. And as ODIHR reports often remind, all pSs committed themselves at the OSCE’s 1999 Istanbul Summit “to follow up promptly the ODIHR’s election assessment and recommendations” (Istanbul Document, 1999, para 25). Among NAM recommendations can be the deployment of a small IEOM, composed only of experts. These can be an Election Assessment Mission (EAM), and that is assigned when the general political-electoral situation is too deficient even to warrant a full(er) EOM, and/or when no previous ODHIR recommendations have been acted upon (as an

2 The perhaps clumsy abbreviation of pSs is used in literature from and on the OSCE. 3 And the NAM report includes phrasing: “In anticipation of an official invitation from

the authorities of the Russian Federation to observe the State Duma elections … and in accordance with its mandate…” ODIHR conducted a NAM in Russia. (OSCE/ODIHR, 2021b, 3).

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example, see OSCE/ODIHR, Tajikistan, 2020).4 Limited Expert Election Observation Team (EET) can also occur, sometimes as a result of having to change the format due to circumstances preventing fuller recruitment or deployment, as happened in 2021.5 These, however, have come to be deployed in some established democracies where past ODIHR recommendations have not been implemented and/or other concerns arise (see conclusion). Any other ODIHR mission will then have a Core Team, now (but not in early years) staffed through internationally publicized recruitment. The Core Team will typically have a dozen staff, drawn (and a fact now always noted) from a range of OSCE pSs. A larger mission involves Long-Term Observers (LTOs), deployed in pairs (of different nationalities, and where possible also of gender). A mission with LTOs allows for weeks of meetings with elections officials, electoral contestants, civil society and others, and physically across the host country. A mission with only LTOs is typically deployed now in some older democracies, such as and including the United States. A full ODIHR IEOM, suggested in the same way as other missions by a needs assessment, distinguishes itself with the addition of Short-Term Observers (STOs). These can range from dozens to hundreds and who observe over a few days under the guidance of LTOs. Where Core and LTO members assess over a long period, including the entirety of the political campaign period, STOs provide the means to observe, cumulatively, possibly thousands of polling stations across the country through election day, and the electoral tabulations at upwards of hundreds of polling stations, and then regional tabulations from those polling stations at least in dozens of the host country’s district electoral commissions. Where many non-ODIHR election observation missions, especially in the post-Soviet space, come for shorter times and with far fewer observers, ODIHR remains uniquely capable of providing full and detailed analyses of an entire election process. 4 ODIHR tends not to use the term “full” IEOM but it is employed here to differentiate in our analysis the largest missions, always including STOs, from others. ODIHR tends not to use the term “full” for any IEOM. For clarity, however, this contribution uses “full” when STOs are also deployed, and to distinguish among the different types of IEOMs. 5 For the Bulgarian elections, which, as Fig. 1f later illustrates, also presented an anomalous situation when a more recently established democracy received NAM suggesting a full IEOM deployment, including short-term observers, who in that case, could not be recruited (OSCE/ODIHR, Bulgaria, 2021d, 2). Hungary since had a full IEOM.

Fig. 1 ODIHR IEOMs in Central Asia

i e.g.,Canada,Germany

f Bulgaria from NAM to full NAM to full IEOM

g Hungary, from NAM to full IEOM, 2022 d Tajikistan – Presidential election 2016

j Authoritarian pushback–Russia, Azerbaijan

h Kazakhstan post-CiO pushback

a Turkmenistan 1999, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2017, 2018, 2022, 2023

b Uzbekistan Presidential election 2015, limited EOM

d Tajikistan – Presidential election 2020

c Kazakhstan 11 IEOMs

b Uzbekistan – Presidential election 2016, full IEOM, 2019, 2021

e Kyrgyzstan 14 IEOMs

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These details are not offered simply informationally, but because (1) the different types of IEOMs deployed operate very differently from one another, a matter elaborated presently, (2) they demonstrate the scope and intensity of ODIHR’s methods and (3) the decision of what is deployed is indicative of a participating State’s (un)willingness to meet its international electoral commitments. Why contestations have arisen over IEOMs in Central Asia might now be more apparent.

3

Why Election Observation Matters

In the busy world of election observation, ODHIR’s methodology is certainly one of, if not the most comprehensive. Western governments call ODIHR’s procedures the “gold standard” and the “global standard” (for the latter, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, n.d.). The 2021 OSCE Chairperson in Office, Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde, affirmed that “ODIHR developed the gold standard in election observation, which is also widely used outside of the OSCE space” (government.se, 2021). Many other organizations undertake election observation, but the intensity, even the mere evidence of their methodology is routinely compared to ODIHR’s (with the important exception of the IEOMs operating also in the OSCE space and that provides later comparison). The Carter Center is a leading NGO in election observation (and other activities) and maintains a 280-page manual, which cross-references to ODIHR (Carter Center, n.d.). By contrast, some state-led IEOMs offer little or even no information on how they conduct IEOMs, nor have reports available, or at any length. Such IEOMs necessarily feature in later analysis. The global commendations for election observation that ODHIR earns are not shared even by certain OSCE pSs. Rather, ODIHR came to be accused of being not only as partial and unprofessional, but also as an instigator of regime change. Before we briefly detail those allegations and what they mean for a competition among IEOMs in the post-Soviet space, let us first consider recent official Russian views of ODIHR. Those start with Russia rejecting complementary language towards ODIHR. In 2020, for example, the Russian Permanent Mission to the OSCE tweeted after Belarus’s contested elections that led to ongoing mass protests: “Behavior of #ODIHR confirms the long overdue need to develop uniform consensus criteria of election observation. The so-called ‘gold standard’ of #ODIHR election observation has turned, in fact, into

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an instrument of pressure” (Russian Mission OSCE, 2020). When not “an instrument of pressure” Russia says that a “gold standard” does not even exist, but is a “cheap imitation” (Delegation of the Russian Federation, 2021a), though without explaining of what. Russia also attacks ODIHR’s legitimacy, asserting that it and its fellow pSs “did not give the ODIHR the right to dictate the parameters of international monitoring” (Delegation of the Russian Federation, 2021b). How and what is this pressure? For this we might turn to the Russian nemesis of the United States, and its views of the “Colour Revolutions” of 2003–2005 which brought to the post-Soviet region mass protests resulting in leadership change in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.6 The US CSCE Commission called the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions of 2003 and 2004 a “political earthquake”, which “threaten[ed] to derail Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policy of retaining as much control as possible over the former Soviet empire” (US Helsinki Commission, 2005). One can disagree with the analysis and call it partisan and alarmist. It nevertheless indicates the stakes—and as we read further, how ODIHR was seen to feature in regime change in the post-Soviet space. The US government’s Helsinki Commission warned in 2005: “Russianled observer delegations from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) routinely approved of elections in CIS countries which OSCE monitors criticized or damned with faint praise. In this way and others, Moscow showed other CIS capitals that, unlike the United States, Russia would not question their right to rule by hook or by crook and was a reliable bulwark, unlike the preachy West” (U.S. Helsinki Commission, 2005). IEOMs were important enough that post-Soviet and other states responded to perceived threats from ODIHR by creating their own IEOMs. Consequently, under Russian leadership, the CIS agreed in 2003 to conduct its own IEOMs, and first monitored elections in Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 2004. The SCO also began its own IEOMs in 2004. That timescale coincides with the onset of stated Russian/post-Soviet objections and the increasing influence attributed to ODIHR in effecting “regime change”. The SCO pronounced in its twentieth-anniversary 6 Some post-Soviet states had leadership changes in the early 1990s, such as in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Without debating accounts, these could also be termed coups and certainly, unlike in the revolutions from 2003 onwards, ODIHR had had no presence let alone any arguable contributing role.

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Declaration that its members “attach great importance to the practice of sending SCO missions to monitor presidential and parliamentary elections and referendums” (Dushanbe Declaration, 2021, para 2). By 2021 the SCO had undertaken 57 IEOMs and was employing phraseology that could fit with ODIHR’s, such as that it “positively influences the advancement of democratic transformations in” its region (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2021). A summation from RFE/RL explains the divisions on election observations that were emerging in 2005: “the OSCE says one thing, the CIS the exact opposite. It’s an important problem as the monitors are part of a high-stakes game. Elections have become major catalysts for change in the region. A poor assessment by election monitors can bring down a government” (Baker, 2005). Although that is an untypical, even extreme outcome, the role of ODIHR in providing convincing evidence of falsified elections during those Georgian and Ukrainian elections contributed to the drive of several post-Soviet states to resist ODHIR’s influence. That ODIHR’s findings matter to Western governments is shown in how they cite its findings on elections, and how diplomats state that a government’s cooperation with ODIHR and its assessments can influence other assistance, even development assistance (Fawn, 2013), and countries whose elections are observed, irrespective of how well run, receive twice as much aid as those unobserved (Kelley, 2012, 29). The European Commission for Democracy through Law noted in 2013 “As a sign of respect towards their OSCE commitments, some OSCE participating States have extended the invitation for observation of their elections even before a date has been set, in order to facilitate the OSCE/ODIHR preparation for the respective observation activity” (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2013, 6). Those that work well with ODIHR can be rewarded; others punished. However, CIS and SCO IEOMs’ basic premises are significantly different from ODIHR’s. A sample from a CIS IEOM finding is telling. For Tajikistan’s elections in 2020: “CIS observers proceed from the assumption that elections are an internal affair of the state, and the mission’s task is to assist election organizers in conducting the election campaign in accordance with national legislation” (cited in Asia-Plus, 2020). Again in this example of Tajikistan, which holds widely for CIS practices, the CIS IEOM concluded that the country’s 2020 election campaign was “held in accordance with the country’s legislation” (Interparliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States,

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2020). Unlike for the OSCE, which sees democracy and elections as an international matter, for the CIS and SCO, elections are purely a domestic concern. Those IEOMs judge whether elections are conducted in line with existing domestic laws, laws which the OSCE assess to be short of international commitments. The CIS’s Interparliamentary Union even states that ODIHR’s consideration of the “general political situation” in which an election is held apparently results in “politicizing the monitor” (Interparliamentary Assembly, 2023). By contrast, the OSCE starts by reviewing election laws. If those are considered so deficient, an OSCE/ODIHR IEOM may not even occur. These methodologies, though employing identical language, profoundly diverge in meanings, interpretations and consequences. These developments now permeate Western-Russian relations—with each pronouncing about human rights and democracy, using the same vocabulary, but with different grammars that construct incompatible meanings (Fawn, 2009, 2021). In IEOMs specifically, the differences in post-Soviet methodology and ODHIR’s already give an indication of how the former have responded to the perceived challenge presented by the latter. But this is not semantics— as outlined, they have, or are perceived to possess political significance, again, to the point of accusations of contribution to regime overthrow. Non-democratizing governments issue alternative interpretations of election results. Centralized and state-controlled media in these countries means that ODIHR’s (critical) elections findings can be drummed out, or entirely ignored, while the verdicts of the other IEOMs can be highlighted. This matters, and likely works, because these regimes want the veneer of respectability that IEOMs provide. The existence of alternative IEOMs means that domestic and regional media turn to their findings. The SCO and CIS often run IEOMs in the same (post-Soviet) countries and with remarkably similar findings. The head of the SCO IEOM declared Kyrgyzstan’s 2020 elections to be “open, free and legitimate” and his CIS counterpart called them “open, transparent and competitive” (Xinhua, 2020). The Chinese state news agency gave no attention to ODIHR. The legitimation that alternative non-ODIHR IEOMs provide could be unceasingly illustrated. Use of non-ODIHR IEOMs to sanction government practice is, in but one example, given in Turkmenistan government statements:

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Turkmenistan has created all necessary conditions for the observation of the elections, which indicates openness and transparency of the electoral process. Mission experts carried out analysis of the election legislation of Turkmenistan and noted that it conforms to the recognized norms of international law in the field of democratic elections and serves as sufficient legal basis to ensure free and open expression of the will of voters. (Turkmenistan.gov, 2017) The unspecified “mission experts” were not ODIHR, and the reports on which these findings were purportedly based went unnamed and appear to be unavailable. When the Turkmenistan government has mentioned ODIHR, it is in the same sentence as several of IEOMS, but with only the CIS IEOM being specifically cited (e.g. Turkmenistan.gov, 2012). Non-ODIHR IEOMs challenge what is openly called double standards regarding election observation in the OSCE area (Fawn, 2006). But more substantive is the creation of alternative language and alternative mechanisms for international election observation. The latter has taken on lives of its own: that is, groups of states producing their own observers, foremost the CIS and SCO, and also others, including individual foreign parliamentarians and others. The creation of these effectively competing IEOMs, ones that in some cases successfully superseded ODIHR in terms of the host’s government’s references to international observers, is part of the “authoritarian backlash” and a core regional dimension of the “league of authoritarian gentlemen” (Cooley, 2013). The Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin allowed unfettered ODIHR monitoring in the first four years of his rule, but then undertook intensive criticism of the OSCE, and also teamed up with several other post-Soviet states to limit ODIHR’s activities (see Ghebali, 2006). Already the mere existence of an alternative IEOM within the OSCE caused dismay to principle and practice. Wrote one OSCE activist: “there exists only one OSCE standard agreed to by all OSCE Member States in the Copenhagen Document. Since when do we have 2 OSCE standards? We all agreed on the Copenhagen document, didn’t we?” (Van der Wind, 2011, 267). Post-Soviet objections to ODIHR spilled more widely into the OSCE, to the point that those governments refused to agree the Organization’s budget, and thus its capacity to function. ODIHR was also framed in

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what became the repeated and often florid accusations of the OSCE and Western governments mistreating post-Soviet states, as if, literally, they were in a teacher-pupil relationship and that Western governments exempted themselves from both accountability and wrongdoing (official examples are in Fawn, 2006). CIS (and similar) IEOMs and ODIHR have almost always issued conflicting findings in Central Asia and almost always elsewhere in Eurasia. For Tajikistan in 2005, the CIS Executive Secretary (that is, as functional head of that regional organization, rather than for any IEOM) was referred to as providing “a lukewarm assessment of the poll and failed to declare it free and fair” (Pannier, 2005).7 And, important for other reasons discussed presently, the CIS and ODIHR IEOMs significantly agreed on the conduct of Moldova’s 2021 parliamentary elections. Overwhelmingly, however, ODIHR and CIS missions come to incompatible conclusions, and which themselves can have political consequences. The contestation continues. As tensions between the EU (and the West) and Russia over the Eastern Partnership countries intensified since its launch in 2009 (see among others, Fawn, 2021, and on US support for the EU’s EaP, Bruder, 2021), and possibly even contributing to growing Russian hostility towards Ukraine, election observation also continued as a political battleground. After 2013, and Ukraine’s Maidan brought about by Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovych’s sudden rejection of EU trade and association agreements, the new Ukrainian government went heavily to ODIHR, as detailed below, while also breaking with past practice, refusing CIS/post-Soviet election observers. Having outlined some of the stakes in international election observation, and the efforts to which post-Soviet state have gone to dent if not drown ODIHR’s influence, we now turn to how engagement gives perspective on political change in the post-Soviet space and Central Asia’s place therein.

7 CIS IEOM reports are not all available, whether in English, Russian or other languages, and when there is information it is relatively limited. Kelley characterized CIS election reports as “very short and lack much substance” (2012, 39).

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4

IEOMs and State Behaviour

The shape and form of this contestation say a great deal about how European values are perceived. Central Asia will be contextualized in postSoviet state behaviour towards ODIHR and can be summarized in four facets, namely (1) alternative post-Soviet state behaviours in cooperating with ODIHR; (2) where ODIHR chooses to mount election observation missions and to what extent, that is, whether as NAM, LOM or a full mission, and hoe changes over time show ODIHR’s recognition of domestic political change—both, as the typology here suggests, negatively and positively, and therefore moving on a curved continuum of ODIHRstate engagement for IEOMs; (3) the use of alternative international observers; and (4) when post-Soviets “push back” against ODIHR. 4.1

Alternative Post-Soviet State Behaviours in Cooperating with ODIHR

In principle, all OSCE participating States invite ODIHR, including even the most seemingly non-democratizing. But participating-State behaviour varies, to the point of having what we can call the early-inviters and the over-inviters. An added sign of cooperation could be when governments invite ODIHR also for local elections. Moldova is the post-Soviet leader in inviting ODIHR for local elections: 2003, 2007, 2011. These results potentially offer no indicator, in that both pro-Russian and pro-Western governments issued the invitations. However, more broadly, patterns certainly emerge: no records indicate that any Central Asian government has done so (or, others, such as Belarus or the Russian Federation). By contrast, Georgia and Ukraine began inviting ODIHR for local elections after their “colour revolutions”, even and perhaps especially after, the latter in 2006, which ODIHR even intimated was run in a hasty fashion.8 Nevertheless, post-Orange Revolution Ukraine wanted ODIHR observing those local elections. Both did so in the 2010s, including Ukraine after its Maidan/Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014. One could contend that inviting ODIHR for local/municipal elections is

8 “The 5 October municipal elections were called by a Presidential Decree with the shortest possible legal margin and earlier than prior indications, which placed considerable constraints on election stakeholders” (Final Report).

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going the proverbial extra mile to demonstrate government engagement with ODIHR’s observations processes and what that may represent as commitment to proper electoral processes at all levels. We noted above the European Commission’s applause for participating States that engaged early and often with ODIHR. No Central Asian state has exhibited such behaviour. 4.2

Proactive Post-Soviet Resistance to ODIHR

A second form of state behaviour arises pSs contest and even reject ODIHR’s operating principles. No Central Asian state fits this category— a telling observation. Russia has been the most notable challenger of ODIHR IEOMs, and this has been a process that has evolved, arguably, as the Putin regime consolidate domestic power. ODIHR noted no problems of cooperation in its observation of the 2000 Russian Presidential elections and gave thanks to the country’s Presidential, Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Central Election Commission (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000c, 1). For example, an OSCE/OHDIR assessment team visited Chechnya for its 2003 referendum and concluded that fuller observation would not be possible but recommended a “fact finding visit” (an atypical response for ODIHR IEOMs), which occurred (OSCE/ODIHR 19 March 2003). In that year, tensions over ODIHR between several post-Soviet states and Western governments in the OSCE became evident. Nevertheless, the ODIHR mission for the December 2003 Russian parliamentary elections operated with a full EOM, including 480 STOs, as it did also for the Russian presidential elections in March 2004, the first that President Vladimir Putin contested as the incumbent. The ODHIR report praised electoral organization, but observed fundamental democratic failures, including the absence of “principles necessary for a healthy democratic election” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2004, 1).9 Russian pushback in 2007 and 2008 against ODIHR presented the most serious challenge, such that an analyst summarized that ODIHR

9 While contribution focuses on Central Asia rather than Russian involvement, the latter’s perceptions remain influential on the former. From a post-Soviet viewpoint, these elections were run administratively effectively, as indeed ODIHR noted, and also ODHIR noted the incumbent’s popularity (despite his absence of campaigning).

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“made it clear that, while Moscow is determined to negate the potential of EOMs to destabilize domestic regimes, ODIHR does not accept that host countries can put conditions on its activity” (Marchesano, 2015, p. 271). This Russian practice continued. In 2021, Russia at first invited and indicated that it would host an OSCE IEOM. It then claimed that COVID-19 conditions made that unworkable—irrespective of that decision presumably being one that could be left to ODIHR or discussed with it. Indeed, irrespective of COVID-19, ODIHR’s NAM recommended the secondment of 80 LTOs and 420 STOs. Additionally, ODIHR successfully ran full IEOMs in Armenia and Moldova in advance of what would have been deployed to the Russian Federation. But it need not only be the region’s biggest state that undermines ODIHR’s IEOM ability to function. Azerbaijan should not be neglected as an innovator of international election observation practices (Fawn, 2014). These shot to fame with initiatives of its own in creating new mechanisms of international observations (European Stability Initiative, 2012). Azerbaijan also advanced its own rules for ODIHR to operate in 2015. ODIHR’s NAM report recommended the secondment of 30 LTOs and 350 STOs, but which were not deployed (OSCE/ODIHR, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015e). In that case, ODIHR’s Director responded: “The restriction on the number of observers taking part would make it impossible for the mission to carry out effective and credible election observation”. “Regretfully, we are compelled by these actions to cancel the deployment of ODIHR’s observation mission for the parliamentary elections” (OSCE, 2015 [press release]). Azerbaijan responded by criticizing ODIHR for failing to fulfil its mandate. Said the Deputy Prime Minster “If a country invites the OSCE/ODIHR to monitor an election, then the organization has no reason to refuse to do that” (cited in Azernews, 2015). Azerbaijan is also a beneficiary of remarkably large continents of Russians participating as LTOs and especially as STOs in ODIHR missions. Russian and Azerbaijani reactions to ODIHR are represented in Fig. 1j. In comparison with these measures, Central Asian states exist in a middle position—where they invite ODIHR, but never to the point, as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine do, for more than national elections. Nor have Central Asian governments resisted ODIHR’s decisions on the type of Mission and its size and deployment. Central Asian governments,

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however, actively invite non-ODIHR IEOMs, which presents our third identifiable form of state behaviour towards election observation. 4.3

Who Invites Alternative IEOMs10

An additional consideration to help place Central Asian government behaviour towards the European norms of election observation includes what pSs invite other IEOMs, when and what that indicates of their internal political and geocultural directions. This behaviour benefits from contextualization in wider post-Soviet (dis)engagement with IEOMs. While SCO and CIS EOMS have observed in all Central Asian states, they have not, or not recently, done so in Ukraine or Georgia. Obviously, those two countries have never been SCO members, and their strained relations with Russia relate to and are also indicative of their attitudes to the CIS. Forced into the CIS in December 1993 as part of a Russianbrokered “peace” over its war with Abkhazia, Georgia came out of the CIS after the Russian invasion of 2008. Ukraine had never ratified the CIS agreement, so was never a full member, although its government signed the Astana Appeal that attacked ODIHR. Ukraine had had CIS EOMs, but ceased them after mass demonstrations in 2013 and 2014 forced an end to the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych who had reneged on signing an Association Agreement with the European Union. Further contrast to Central Asia comes from what we can call two outliers in IEOM behaviour: Moldova and, again, Azerbaijan. Moldova initially took one of the earliest and most hostile approaches to CIS EOMs, including in 2005 refusing entry to its observers into the country. Moldova permitted CIS in later years, even having them in the 2021 elections which were already expected to be important, even decisive, in cementing the country’s turn to the EU. It is not clear (or at least no immediate evidence seems to suggest) that Moldovan officials wanted a CIS IEOM also to reinforce the validity of the elections, especially if the outcome meant popular endorsement of an EU-centric government. Moldova also welcomes observers from the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IPA-CIS). That IEOM said that it had enjoyed full cooperation with Moldovan authorities, and that no violations were reported (TASS, 10 This is not to imply a monopoly by ODIHR. By “alternative” we only signal that other IEOMs came later.

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2021a, 2021b. Any CIS-IPA report seemed unavailable at the time of writing). Unusually for post-Soviet elections, in Moldova’s case in 2021, assessments of both the CIS and ODIHR IEOMs were similar. That commonality of view is also historical untypical, as the earlier historical synopses indicated. By contrast to Moldova-wide elections in July 2021, a CIS IEOM was deployed for local elections in the Autonomous Territory of Gagauzia (which in the earlier national elections, voted heavily for the Communist-Socialist bloc). Unlike many CIS IEOMs, this one featured a number of photographs of observers, although no substantive report (IACIS, 2021). Azerbaijan is an outlier in its IEOM behaviour not only because forewent signing the Astana Appeal (which its conflict rival, Armenia, did, and which Turkmenistan later signed). Azerbaijan, like Ukraine and Georgia, has had limited engagement with the CIS (like Georgia, being forced into it as a result of conflict) and was similarly not a SCO member. Indeed, the three, with Moldova, created the substitute formation of the GUAM, and which later adopted the name Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. But in terms of (anti)democracy promotion, Azerbaijan gains benefits from the CIS EOM and engages other observers of its own choice and whose “observations” were funded by the government (see ESI, 2012). By contrast, the Central Asian governments are straightforward in terms of this analysis: they have routinely invited both the SCO and CIS, and more recently the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Parliamentary Assembly, which has begun observing in several Central Asian states. Additionally, the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, which abbreviates itself to the Turkic Council (Turkic Council, n.d.) has a membership of not simply of countries with Turkic heritage, but also ones with multiple indicators of being only partly or not politically free: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan (and Hungary, uniquely, having observer status). The Turkic Council has not observed in OSCE states that have rejected CIS IEOMs, Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova, who are non-members in any case, nor in CIS acquiescent but also non-members Armenia or Belarus. By contrast, Astana Appeal states have begun counting the Turkic Council as among its international observers. The Turkic Council can be even more approving of post-Soviet elections than its CIS counterpart. For the 2019 Uzbekistan elections, Turkic Council observers registered no violations (according to RFE/RL), while the CIS found minor issues, albeit ones that it added had

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no bearing on the overall outcome or electoral performance (RFE/RL Uzbek Service, 2019; the Turkic Council’s website provides no IEOM reports). The robustness of Turkic Council monitoring remains questionable. Its report for Kazakhstan’s elections in 2021 stated that it observed 14 poll stations (nor stating the duration of observation). Its report then concluded that the elections were “open, transparent and complied with the national legislation and internationally recognized election standards” (Organization of Turkic States, 2021). A final means of assessing Central Asian states interplay with the panEuropean norm of election observation is how ODIHR has calibrated and changed its deployment of types of IEOMs.

5

ODIHR’s Calibrated Responses on IEOMs and the Significance for Central Asian State Behaviour The fourth analysis concerns ODIHR’s responses in the forms of IEOMs it deploys. The withholding of larger IEOMs was often stated clearly as an objection to the state of basic democratic readiness. To reiterate, an ODIHR NAM can be (a) recommend against any IEOM, of any size: in other words, it can issue a refusal, (b) operate only a limited IEOM, which can be a tiny Expert Team, or a Core Team with LTOs (it may also do this in established democracies) and (c) deploy a full IEOM, with STOs. Let us consider how ODIHR historically assessed the electoral readiness of Central Asian states, and how that evolved, or not, over time, to establish categories of Central Asian political development. OSCE states can, therefore, move along our putative curved continuum. Bulgaria, which entered the EU in 2007 (which presumed it being an established democracy) shifted from having LEOMs to a full IEOM. Similarly, Hungary went from having NAMs to a full IEOM, with STOs, in 2022 (see Fig. 1f, g). The changes of ODIHR IEOMs are notable in Central Asia. Central Asian states are assessed alphabetically. ODIHR’s earliest consideration of an IEOM in Central Asia was for Kazakhstan, in January 1999. In that case, because of fundamental shortcomings, ODIHR recommended that elections be postponed. ODIHR stated it was: “concerned with the Kazakh authorities’ refusal to register two opposition candidates and other shortcomings of the electoral

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framework”. As a result, OSCE/ODIHR “declined to observe the presidential elections, instead deploying a “limited assessment mission’” (OSCE/ODIHR, 1999b, emphasis added) (see Fig. 1c). Another case of refusal to engage and one of ODIHR’s most clear statements to that effect concerned Tajikistan’s elections of 1995, which the OSCE expressly “refused to observe”. That was not so much for reasons of the elections being amid civil war (and OHDIR does not deploy to conflict or contested zones). In Tajikistan, rather, ODIHR’s refusal was for the lack of fair playing field, namely that one regional clique had sidelined others (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000a, 2000b, p. 3). Tajikistan too, with nevertheless a bad record on political freedoms, was seen to improve and facilitate expanded IEOMs. In 2004, the NAM for Tajikistan’s parliamentary elections in early 2005 recommended a full EOM on the basis “that a plurality of candidates representing different political parties and views may offer voters a choice” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2005c [200411 ], 2). In 2020, however, after stating that it went to Tajikistan to assess whether and what type of election observation, ODIHR’s NAM firmly noted “None of the recent legal amendments appear to address previous ODIHR recommendations. That NAM report systematically itemised previous recommendations that had not been addressed. It then stated that an IEOM with LTOs and STOs would not be purposeful and advised only an EAM” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2021a, 2021c, 2021d, 2021e, 3) (see Fig. 1d). Uniquely among Central Asian states, Turkmenistan is yet to have anything more than a limited ODIHR mission. It once had some prospect of a larger mission in 2007, when ODIHR’s NAM recognized both “signals of improvement” in the electoral laws, and also the shortness of time OSCE/ODIHR, 2007b, 2). As perhaps an overture to this politically closed state, ODIHR’s press statement only mentioned the shortness of time and also cited its Director explain that the Mission was “a first step of a renewed dialogue with the Turkmen authorities on electoral processes and a range of other issues” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2007c, 31 January). That may have been concessions to, or even political appeasement of the Turkmen authorities.

11 The report is dated January 2004 but should be 2005.

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If so, ODIHR was careful and consistent not to allow that to occur again. Turkmen Elections thereafter have consistently been deemed to fall so short of commitments that no observation missions have been deployed. In 2022, the country saw the first father-son succession in Central Asia. For that election, ODIHR established a NAM, but one due to the strict 14-day quarantine on foreigners entering Turkmenistan, all meetings were conducted remotely. The NAM categorically refused to deploy any type of IEOM. While recognizing Turkmen governments statements of seeking dialogue with ODIHR, the Office instead noted that no follow-up to its past recommendations had been heeded, and that recent legislative changes sidestepped those concerning political pluralism and fundamental human rights (ODIHR, 2022, 3, 10) (see Fig. 1e). As in 2022, so the Office reiterated in December 2018 that “In line with ODIHR methodology, the ODIHR EAM will not carry out systematic or comprehensive observation of the voting, counting, and tabulation on election day”.12 Turkmenistan is the only Central Asian state never to have had any type of ODIHR IEOM beyond a NAM (see Fig. 1a). For Uzbekistan 2015, ODIHR has implied the imposition of a penalty for the country’s failure to meet basic international commitments. In 2014 ODIHR wrote: “The OSCE/ODIHR has never deployed a full election observation mission, as minimum conditions for genuine democratic elections had not yet been entirely met” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2014, 3). Thereafter in 2015, ODHIR provided only a Limited Election Observation Mission, arguably even more than should have been, in view of international condemnations, but one that also included ten LTOs. That, however, was an expansion on ODIHR’s previous engagement, in 2009, where it sent only a Core Team, declaring “deployment of an election observation mission, even of a limited nature, was not considered meaningful”. It further stated, in wording that indicates clearly the withholding of larger missions, that “ODIHR has never deployed a full-fledged election observation mission to Uzbekistan due to a lack of minimum conditions for democratic elections” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2009). Uzbekistan, however, would prove to be the Central Asian state with the most significant change in relations with ODIHR (see Fig. 1b). These patterns of Central Asian engagement/disengagement with OSCE commitments and of ODIHR responses through the types of 12 OSCE/ODIHR website “Parliamentary Elections, 25 March 2018”, https://www. osce.org/odihr/elections/turkmenistan/375736.

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IEOMs deployed, and refused, create what this chapter calls a horseshoe continuum of engagement and disengagement (Fig. 1). In perhaps metaphoric keeping with the unevenness of IEOM engagements, the horseshoe cannot be symmetrical—it has an extension on one end to accommodate cases when ODIHR found domestic political and legal conditions too substandard to warrant any observation beyond a NAM. We had already seen that ODIHR has allowed for expansion of its IEOMs in most Central Asian states. In this regard, Turkmenistan remains the Central Asian state without ever receiving a full mission. Even in 2018 ODIHR noted that in Turkmenistan its EAM was even “prevented from observing vote count in several polling stations” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2018, 2). The NAM for early presidential election in 2022 categorically stated that “all previous ODIHR recommendations” went unaddressed, and irrespective of the 14-day covid quarantine mandated by the Turkmen government, any other type of IEOM would not be recommended (OSCE ODIHR, 2022, 5, 10). The NAM report for the 2023 parliamentary elections noted a desire of domestic interlocuters for an IEOM, but recommended only an Election Assessment Mission; a team of five deployed to Ashgabat. The deployment of only limited missions clearly signals the lack of observe of major international electoral commitments. Turkmenistan uniquely remains in the extended part of the IEOM continuum, with no full missions granted (at Fig. 1a). Uzbekistan began its engagement with ODIHR in 1999 and was heavily criticized for political conditions in the country, one widely recognized then as a fierce dictatorship. That first mission expressly, therefore, was not to be a “regular mission”, having only a Core Team (OSCE/ODIHR, 1999a). Uzbekistan was repeatedly criticized thereafter and until 2016 in ODIHR NAMs, with the result that only limited missions were sent. In 2007, for example, ODIHR’s report noted the absence of response to its past recommendations and also declared that because of “the apparent limited nature of the competition, it is not considered necessary to deploy short term observers” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2007a, 2). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were able to move quickly to full IEOMs, whether in all cases that measure being justified aside. Kyrgyzstan began hosting ODIHR missions with a full deployment in 2000 and that has continued since. Kyrgyzstan seems the most willing to host ODIHR missions, although that is in a region of little democratization, and was framed in the 1990s as Central Asia’s “island of democracy” (Anderson,

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1999, the title contains a question mark). Kyrgyzstan illustrates the capacity for ODIHR to accept even minimal elements of change and to respond in kind with the form of IEOMs. ODIHR wrote in 2005 that since parliamentary elections six years before, the Kyrgyzstan authorities had “taken some steps towards meeting OSCE commitments and other international standards” but that several remained (OSCE/ODIHR, 2005a, 2–3). It also issued a potentially ambiguous note, one that either merely reiterated the need, or was noting the absence of the “political will to ensure an impartial and professionally administrated implementation” to fulfil OSCE commitments. Regardless, ODIHR sent full EOMs to Kyrgyzstan ever since. Despite criticisms not only of process but also of democratic backsliding, it and, once deployed to Kazakhstan, have both retained full missions (Fig. 1c, e). Despite falling short of commitments, Kazakhstan was granted full EOMs since the initial restriction placed in 1999. Even with Kazakhstan’s notable relapse over its general commitment to ODIHR for its OSCE Chairmanship in 2010, which could be called both resistance to OSCE’s values and democratic backsliding (see Fig. 1h), and also observations that several of its recommendations go unheeded (e.g., OSCE/ODIHR 2015d, 4), ODIHR has continued full missions (Fawn, 2013; Isaacs, 2018). Apart from a referendum in 2022, ODIHR has mounted 11 full missions between 2004 and 2021 (the NAM for parliamentary in January 2021 still recommended STOs, but these were not deployed because of covid restrictions). ODIHR has in the case of Kyrgyzstan noted domestic desire for its IEOMs, writing for example of the 2017 elections that “All OSCE/ODIHR NAM interlocutors underscored the utility of a largescale OSCE/ODIHR election observation activity” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2017, Kyr, 2) and specific requests for attention to observations, and with a large presence (OSCE/ODIHR, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015e, 3). ODIHR NAMs referred to the support all interlocuters in Kyrgyzstan indicated for ODIHR missions. That would mean that government and civil society, of which Kyrgyzstan has relatively much, support ODIHR. Kyrgyzstan has consistently had full OSCE/ODIHR missions. Where Tajikistan had been denied full missions before 2005, the ODIHR mission in that year immediately declared the elections to have failed to meet many OSCE commitments and electoral standards (OSCE/ODIHR 28 February 2005b). Despite that, ODIHR again decided on a full IEOM for the presidential elections in 2006. It did

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so, somewhat unusually by stating in the NAM that the “possible absence of such a field of [credible] candidates and/or media environment could be a cause to reconsider the utility of requesting short-term observers” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2006, NAM, 26 September, 2). Later ODIHR IEOMs included full missions. By 2020, however, the NAM for Tajikistan repeatedly noted that no previous ODIHR recommendation had been implemented, and only an Election Assessment Mission should be considered, moving Tajikistan back into the limited IEOM category (see Fig. 1d). The most significant change in ODIHR practice in Central Asia concerns Uzbekistan, where some domestic political adjustments came after the death of President Islam Karimov in 2016, ones also reflected in the European Union’s overall approach to Central Asia, including in its 2019 strategy for the region. ODIHR welcomed the prospects for political change in Uzbekistan by launching full missions, having been previously denied full missions until then. ODIHR’s NAM noted, perhaps unsurprisingly considering the short time since that death, that “despite outstanding issues with regards to the respect of fundamental freedoms” (OSCE/ODHIR, NAM, 2016, 2), it recommended a full EOM, which went ahead (as illustrated in Fig. 1j). Uzbekistan thereafter continued to receive full IEOMs in 2019 and 2021. It is very unlikely that Central Asian governments will move to the left of the IEOM continuum, that is, of receiving limited missions, because of the lack of substantial reform to meet their international electoral commitments. Vast domestic political reform, to the point of unquestionably being democratic, would likely be required. More informative would be if any of them move to the right side of our continuum because of ODIHR determinations of serious backsliding in their electoral commitments. That said, Central Asian states want continued interaction with ODIHR. ODIHR writes, for example, that it is “Considerate of the continued declared interest of the authorities of Turkmenistan to maintain a dialogue with the OSCE/ODIHR on electoral reform” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2016, Turkmenistan, 7). Little may come of that, but any engagement is surely positive. Even small ODIHR teams engage with different stakeholders; larger missions, which involve many national staff, and expansive and intensity engagement across the country, animatedly signal and perhaps in no other comparable way that the international community cares about democracy and about the political dynamics in the host country.

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It may also be, if a cynical view, that Central Asian states can get whatever they want or need from Western governments by allowing ODIHR IEOMs, and then discount their findings, and even ignore their very presence in (state-controlled) media. And of course, most of these countries have greater financial, developmental, trade and military engagement with Russia and China, than with the West (some recent comparisons are in Fawn, 2021). In these and other circumstances, some have become critical enough to speak of a Helsinki counterintuitive effect—and failure of ODIHR IEOMs, asking whether ODIHR should observe at all in Central Asian states and, worse, such wasting taxpayer funds (Foroughi & Mukhtorova, 2017). It may be that ODIHR has an institutional interest in maintaining a cycle of EOMs, but it does not always deploy full missions, and the bulk of those costs are met directly by seconding governments; ODIHR’s own budget does not increase. Furthermore, and of relevance to the intrinsic value of EOMs to democratization, ODIHR reports indicate that interlocutors call for the IEOMs, and that some have “maintained that election day observation can help add transparency” to the vote tabulation process (e.g. from OSCE/ODIHR, 2021a, 2021c, 2021d, 2021e, Kazakhstan, 3). ODIHR thus makes a decision to deploy if the NAM detects the demand from such across (whatever) political spectrum exists, that is another important recognition of and support for civil society in polities with limited rights. If a country or a government wants to apply “European” political norms and standards in the broadest sense within the OSCE space, inviting in and cooperating with IEOMs is essential. But a range of options exist. ODIHR has, it can be said, exercised those options by refusing to mount full IEOMs to several Central Asian states. Not punitive: first observation in Kyrgyzstan noted not only deficiencies (unsurprising considering the early stage of any transition) but also the proactive use of the system against candidates. Hence the final report included that the “pre-election period was marred by a high degree of interference in the process by state officials … [and] selective use of legal sanctions against candidates” (OSCE/ODIHR, Kyrgyzstan 2000a, 2000b, 1). It is possible that ODIHR’s conditional deployment and denial of full EOM deployment have become a modest tool of incentivization or of coercion. It may also be that its observation might instead solidify authoritarianism (as per the argument for Tajikistan, of Foroughi &

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Mukhtorova, 2017), although the use of alternative IEOMs has, in the present view, long served that purpose. Furthermore, the present view is that ODIHR engagement signals transnational concern, including demonstrably on-ground by the large international presence that is full missions, and also the support they offer to beleaguer activists. It is more that both ODIHR’s electoral recommendations can be ignored, its findings drowned out by those of alternative observers, while the inviting governments remain able to say that they abide by OSCE commitments.

6

Conclusion

IEOMs matter—to everyone. But in contradictory ways, those contradictions inform about European-Central Asian relations and indeed values. OSCE/ODIHR has conducted over 400 IEOMs, including ones now in among established democracies where in its early decades on practice its activities were exclusively conducted in post-communist states. Its findings are additionally important because they inform the positions of major individual partners states and inter-governmental organizations. That may not have fundamentally changed policies, but ODIHR’s contributions to determining that elections have been fraudulent have had enormous impact. ODIHR, while a neutral body, nevertheless contributed through its elaborate methodology to the confidence of domestic activists and of Western governments in the need to resist and even see the removal of incumbents in such countries as Georgia and Ukraine. The post-Soviet, especially Russian, reaction to those changes impacted on ever-increased Muscovite insecurity and hostility. Part of that reaction, overshadowed early by geographically contained conflicts and more so after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, was a concerted effort to undermine ODIHR itself and to construct a network of alternative IEOMs. The potency of election observation speaks to those initiatives, which now include a series of regional organizations purporting to do the same as ODIHR, and seeking to offer domestic and regional legitimacy to elections that otherwise (and where ODIHR still reports) would be considered fundamentally illegitimate. In that contestation, Central Asia remains somewhat ambiguous. All five governments show engage with ODIHR, and ODIHR remains keen to do the same, albeit with important qualifications, including and rightly in the present view, towards the least democratic and democratizing polities. As a region, Central Asia has shown also some significant change

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in ODIHR engagement, having gone from many of the states being even refused the most limited ODIHR IEOMs, to in four of the five cases gaining full missions, Uzbekistan being the most recent and notable change since 2016. However, Central Asia also provides the greatest and most consistent geographic concentration in the OSCE space of using alternative IEOMs, including CIS, SCO and more recently the CSTO, and still others, such as the OIC and the Turkic Council. Four of the five Central Asian states attended the meeting that resulted in the Astana Appeal, and Turkmenistan later signed—providing over half the signatories and the greatest and unwavering geographic concentration in this opposition across the post-Soviet space (Ukraine signed the Astana Appeal, but not have later Ukrainian governments stepped away from that, they became keen ODIHR supporters). That said, other than the particular case of Kazakhstan’s OSCE Chairmanship when the country thereafter immediately relented on the de facto conditions of its support for ODIHR and merely reverted to existing practice, Central Asia has not undertaken active authoritarian backlash against the Office. These practices put in wider context show how much Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova differ from Central Asia, and thus of Central Asia also from Western-inclined post-Soviet states. The IEOM competition increases the imperative for all OSCE participating states to live up, fully, to their commitments. It neither helps them nor the efforts to encourage far more recalcitrant states, to meet their commitments if they forego implementing ODIHR’s recommendations (see also Fawn, 2013, on wider obligations on pSs). Many established democracies, such as Germany and Norway (see Fig. 1i), receive comments from ODIHR that some previous recommendations went unaddressed (OSCE/ODIHR Norway, 2021, 1; OSCE/ODIHR, Germany, 2021e, 3). In the former’s case, the lack of attention to previous ODIHR recommendations resulted in the recommendation of a fourperson Election Expert Team for the 2021 federal parliamentary elections. Post-communist EU Member States Bulgaria and Hungary have had full ODIHR IEOMs, moving them in the arch of Fig. 1 untypically from the far end of not having small missions to ones identical to most Central Asian states (see Fig. 1f, g). That all participating States should engage with ODIHR and continue to make their internal electoral processes a matter of common international concern ensures parity across the OSCE space and the upholding

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of the connectivity of these key values (for common obligations, see Fawn, 2013, conclusion). This should be irrespective of the impact of Russia’s lscale invasion of Ukraine. Democracy matters more in the OSCE than before, even and because its encouragement may be more difficult in some parts of the OSCE area. ODIHR’s view is that its “election observation methodology offers participating States authoritative and constructive recommendations based on well-established fact” (OSCE/ODIHR 2007a (LTO handbook), xi). They need too to be reminded that the OSCE’s Istanbul Summit Declaration to which all states signed proclaimed “we agree to follow up promptly ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations” (and this statement is also included in the European Commission’s Compendium of International Standards for Elections [2016, 233]). As but one example of an established democracy not fulfilling its obligations to address ODIHR recommendations, the Office wrote of Germany in 2021: “the lack of implementation of previous recommendations related to campaign finance regulation and oversight, the ODIHR NAM recommends deploying an Election Expert Team (EET) for the 26 September federal elections” (ODIHR, 2021). A final thought might turn us to Stalin’s cynical statement no who really matters in an election: “I consider it completely unimportant who in the party will vote, or how; but what is extraordinarily important is this - who will count the votes, and how”. Even if questionably attributed to the dictator (see, e.g., scholars cited in O’Rourke, 2019), the adage needs modification to reflect the importance now of who observers the vote-counters matters. Central Asian engagement with and ODIHR’s calibrated responses to those governments inform about where these countries stand with respect to a fundamental pan-European norm.

References Anderson, J. (1999). Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of democracy? Harwood Academic. Asia-Plus. (2020, September 22). CIS observers start monitoring election campaign. https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20200922/ cis-observers-start-monitoring-election-campaign. Azernews. (2015, November 4). Azerbaijani official says ODIHR overlooks own duties. https://www.azernews.az/nation/89450.html. Baker, M. (2005, April 12). East: Why do OSCE, CIS observers rarely agree on elections? RFE/RL. https://www.rferl.org/a/1058403.html.

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Bruder, J. (2021). The US and the new Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) since 1991. In R. Fawn (Ed.), Managing security threats (pp. 69–97). Carter Center. (n.d.). Election observations and standards. https://www.cartercen ter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/cc-OES-handbook-10172014.pdf. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. (n.d.). OSCE election https://www.csce.gov/osce-election-observation?amp%3B=& observation. amp%3Bsort_by=field_date_value&%3Bpage=11&page=26. Last accessed 27 September 2021, printout retained. Cooley, A. (2013). The league of authoritarian gentlemen. Foreign Policy (online). https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/30/the-league-of-aut horitarian-gentlemen/. CSCE. (1990). Document of the copenhagen meeting of the conference on the human dimension of the CSCE. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/ 9/c/14304.pdf. Delegation of the Russian Federation. (2021a, January 14). Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashevich … on the presentation of the priorities of the chairpersonin-office of the OSCE and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Ms. Ann Linde. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/b/476098.pdf. Dushanbe Declaration (2021, September 17). Dushanbe declaration on the 20th anniversary of the SCO. http://eng.sectsco.org/news/20210917/782639. html. “Election Observation by the European Parliament”. (n.d.). https://www.eur oparl.europa.eu/cmsdata/212760/Election-observation_EN.pdf. European Commission for Democracy through Law. (2013, November 30). International observers and election officials. https://www.venice.coe.int/web forms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-EL(2013)015-e. European Commission. (2016). Compendium of international standards for elections (4th ed.). Election Observation and Democratic Support. European Stability Initiative. (2012, May 24). Caviar diplomacy: How Azerbaijan silenced the Council of Europe. Berlin. http://caviar-diplomacy.net/aze rbaijan/wp-content/uploads/esi_document_id_131.pdf Fawn, R. (2021). The price and possibilities of going east? The European Union and Wider Europe, the European neighbourhood and the Eastern partnership. In R. Fawn (Ed.), Managing security threats along the EU’s eastern flanks (pp. 1–29). Palgrave Macmillan. Fawn, R. (2014). International commitments to elections and election observation in the Caucasus and Central Asia: The interplay between political identity, foreign policy and regional affiliations. In M. Ayoob & M. Ismayilov (Eds.), Identity & culture in post-Soviet Central Eurasia (pp. 134–157). Routledge. Fawn, R. (2013). International organizations and internal conditionality: Making norms matter. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Fawn, R. (2009, December) “Bashing About Rights”: Russia and the “New” EU states on human rights and democracy promotion. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(10), 1777–1803. Fawn, R. (2006, November). Battle over the box: International election observation missions, political competition and retrenchment in the post-Soviet space. International Affairs, 82(6), 133–153. Foroughi, P. (2012). Politics and human rights in Tajikistan: Squandered opportunities uncertain future. In OSCE yearbook 2011 (pp. 107–122). Nomos. Foroughi, P., & Mukhtorova, U. (2017). Helsinki’s counterintuitive effect? OSCE/ODIHR’s election observation missions and solidification of virtual democracy in post-communist Central Asia: The case of Tajikistan, 2000– 2013. Central Asian Survey, 36(3), 373–390. Ghebali, V.-Y. (2006). Debating election and election monitoring standards at the OSCE: Between technical needs and politicization. In IFSH (Ed.), OSCE yearbook 2005 (pp. 215–229). Nomos. Government.se. (2021, October 18). Opening statement by CiO Linde at ODIHR anniversary. https://www.government.se/speeches/2021/10/ope ning-statement-by-cio-linde-at-odihr-anniversary/. Hyde, S. B. (2011). The pseudo-democrat’s dilemma: Why election observation became an international norm. Cornell University Press. IACIS [Interparliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States]. IPA CIS observers complete monitoring of elections to national assembly of ATO Gagauzia. 21 September. https://iacis.ru/ News/IIMDD_IPA_CIS/IPA_CIS_Observers_Complete_Monitoring_of_E lections_to_National_Assembly_of_ATO_Gagauzia. Last accessed 5 October 2021, printout retained. Interparliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States. (2020) CIS observer mission assessed Tajikistan presidential elections. 12 October, https://iacis.ru/News/IIMDD_IPA_CIS/CIS_Observer_Mis sion_Assessed_Tajikistan_Presidential_Elections. Interparliamentary Assembly. (2023) Experts compare approaches of several missions to election monitoring, 7 April, https://iacis.ru/News/IIMDD_ IPA_CIS/Experts_Compare_Approaches_of_Several_Missions_to_Election_ Monitoring.. Isaacs, R. (2018). The micro-politics of norm contestation between the OSCE and Kazakhstan: Square pegs in round holes. Third World Quarterly, 39(9), 1831–1847. Istanbul Document 1999. (1999). https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/ 6/5/39569.pdf. Kelley, J. (2012). Monitoring democracy: When international election observation works, and why it often fails. Princeton University Press.

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Kuzio, T. (2005, November 9). Azerbaijan-Ukrainian relations deteriorate after stolen elections. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2, 209. https://jamestown.org/pro gram/azerbaijani-ukrainian-relations-deteriorate-after-stolen-elections/. Marchesano, F. (2015). Election observation as a point of contention between the Russian Federation and ODIHR. In IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014 (pp. 263–274). Nomos. Organization of Turkic States. (2021, January 11). Turkic Council Mission monitored elections in Kazakhstan. https://www.turkkon.org/en/haberler/turkiccouncil-mission-monitored-elections-in-kazakhstan_2148. OSCE/ODIHR. (1999a, November 22). ODIHR deploys limited mission to Uzbekistan elections TASHKENT . https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ 52232. OSCE/ODIHR. (1999b, September 2). OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission to be deployed to Kazakhstan. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ 52195. OSCE/ODIHR. (2000a, March 19). OSCE/ODIHR to send fact-finding team to Chechnya. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/55115. OSCE/ODIHR. (2000b). Kyrgyz Republic parliamentary elections 20 February & 12 March 2000, final report. https://www.osce.org/files/f/doc uments/a/9/15803.pdf. OSCE/ODIHR. (2000c). Russian federation presidential election 26 March 2000 final report. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/9/16275.pdf. OSCE/ODIHR. (2004, June 2). Russian federation presidential election 14 March 2004 OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission report. https://www. osce.org/files/f/documents/7/b/33100.pdf. OSCE/ODIHR. (2005a). The Kyrgyz Republic. Parliamentary elections 27 February and 13 March 2005 final report. https://www.osce.org/files/f/doc uments/5/c/14834.pdf. OSCE/ODIHR. (2005b, February 28). Elections in Tajikistan fail to meet key international standards. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/57235. OSCE/ODIHR. (2005c [2004], January 4). Republic of Tajikistan parliamentary elections 27 February 2005 OSCE/ODIHR needs assessment mission report 6–10 December 2004. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/d/39204. pdf. OSCE/ODIHR. (2006, August). Republic of Tajikistan. Presidential elections 6 November 2006 OSCE/ODIHR needs assessment mission report 25–31. https:// www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/d/20727.pdf. OSCE/ODIHR. (2007a). Republic of Uzbekistan presidential election 23 December 2007 OSCE/ODIHR needs assessment mission report 28–30 November 2007 . https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/4/29583.pdf.

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OSCE/ODIHR. (2020). Republic of Tajikistan parliamentary elections 1 March 2020 ODIHR needs assessment mission report 9–12 December 2019. https:// www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/9/443983.pdf. OSCE/ODIHR. (2021a). Norway parliamentary elections 13 September 2021 ODIHR needs assessment mission on report 15–18 June 2021. https://www. osce.org/files/f/documents/6/6/496369.pdf OSCE/ODIHR. (2021b, August 4). No OSCE observers for Russian parliamentary elections following major limitations. Press Release. https://www.osce. org/odihr/elections/russia/494488. OSCE/ODIHR. (2021c). Russian federation state Duma Elections 19 September 2021 ODIHR needs assessment mission report 31 May–4 June 2021. ODIHR. OSCE/ODIHR. (2021d). Limited election observation mission Bulgaria early parliamentary elections, 11 July 2021 interim report 9 June–23 June 2021, 28 June 2021. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/d/491159.pdf. OSCE/ODIHR. (2021e). Federal Republic of Germany elections to the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) 26 September 2021 ODIHR needs assessment mission report 2–5 June 2021. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/a/493 567.pdf OSCE/ODIHR. (2022, March 12). Turkmenistan early presidential election ODIHR assessment mission report 1–3 March 2022. https://www.osce.org/ files/f/documents/3/2/513565.pdf. OSCE/ODIHR. (2023). Turkmenistan parliamentary elections 26 March 2023 ODIHR needs assessment report 29 November–1 December 2022. https://www. osce.org/files/f/documents/c/1/537191.pdf. O’Rourke, C. (2019, March 27). No, Joseph Stalin didn’t say this statement about elections. Politifact. https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2019/mar/27/ viral-image/no-joseph-stalin-didnt-say-statement-about-electio/. Pannier, B. (2005, February 28). OSCE: Tajik elections fall short of standards. RFE/RL. https://www.rferl.org/a/1057727.html. RFE/RL Uzbek Service. (2019, December 23). OSCE: ‘Serious irregularities’ in Uzbek vote, but ‘greater tolerance of independent voices’. https://www.rferl. org/a/osce-serious-irregularities-in-uzbek-vote-but-greater-tolerance-of-ind ependent-voices-/30340210.html. Russian Mission OSCE. (2020, August 28). https://twitter.com/rf_osce/sta tus/1299383596361437185?lang=en. Last accessed 18 September 2021, printout retained. Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2004). Appeal of the CIS member states to the OSCE Partners, Astana, 15 Sep. 2004. Information and Press Department. http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4nsf/ Shanghai Cooperation Organization. (2021, July 8). SCO secretary-general meets with chairman of Uzbekistan’s Central Election Commission. http://eng.sec tsco.org/news/20210708/767662.html, printout retained.

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TASS. (2021a, July 11). CIS observers report no violations at parliamentary elections in Moldova. https://tass.com/world/1312831. TASS. (2021b, July 12). CIS observers affirm no violations at Moldova parliamentary elections. https://tass.com/world/1313007. Turkic Council. (n.d.). About Turkic Council. https://www.turkkon.org/en/ turk-konseyi-hakkinda. Last accessed 6 September 2021. Turkic Council. (n.d.). International election observer mission. https://www.tur kkon.org/en/isbirligi-alanlari/political-cooperation_1/international-electionobserver-missions_8. Last accessed 6 September 2021, printout retained. Turkmenistan.gov. (2012, February 13). In the mirror of the world media. Last accessed 24 September 2021, printout retained. Turkmenistan.gov (2017, February 8). The mission of CIS observers: Election campaign is in the spirit of open competition and at high organizational level. https://tdh.gov.tm/index.php/tk/post/4808/the-mission-of-cis-observers election-campaign-is-in-the-spirit-of-open-competition-and-at-high-organizat ional-level US Helsinki Commission. (2005, January 13). Democracy in the CIS. https:// www.csce.gov/international-impact/press-and-media/press-releases/democr acy-cis?page=75. Van der Wind, O. (2011). The perspective of the head of mission in an OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission. In H. Schmeets (Ed.), International election observation and assessment of elections (pp. 262–270). Statistics Netherlands. Xinhua. (2020, October 5). SCO, CIS praise parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-10/05/c_1394 20648.htm, printout retained.

CHAPTER 9

Implementing Good Governance in the Framework of Europe’s New Strategy for Central Asia: Lessons from the Baltics Ivo Rollis

1

Introduction

The main argument of the article is that stronger systems of policy planning and coordination in the governments of Central Asia and its republics (CAR) will facilitate fostering good governance and building stronger connectivity between Central Asia and European regions and closer connection among the CAR to counterbalance Russia and China. The central research question is the success of the development of the policy planning and coordination of the Baltic states during the EU accession period and membership. Indicators of quality policy planning and coordination framework are (1) a defined national development strategy, which allows for the qualitative planning of national reforms; (2) qualitative, mutually coherent

I. Rollis (B) University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 191 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_9

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national development planning documents with financial commitments that are embedded in line with the budget realism; (3) a policy coordination framework that facilitates harmonious planning and implementation of national reforms. Achievement of these indicators allows (1) policy coordination to become an effective tool for the implementation of national reforms, a driving and shaping force for the development of public administration and national policies at the administrative and political level; (2) establish medium-term planning for national reform processes and successfully integrate into the national development planning system; (3) significantly improve the quality of policy planning and ensure elaboration and implementation of quality sectoral policies. The article aims to revisit some of the key elements of good governance—strategic planning and policy coordination—experience of essential structural reforms on the national level in the Baltic states and share the main lessons for the CAR countries. The system of core strategic planning and implementation documents should be harmonized and aligned with a government’s financial circumstances to ensure the ability to achieve the relevant objectives intended. Lastly, the Centre-ofGovernment (CoG) [viii] institutions should fulfill all critical functions, in particular, to a well-organized, consistent and competent policy-making system and meet key requirements for the strategic planning and policy coordination. The article provides a theoretical background for the role of strategic planning and policy coordination in good governance. Further on, the article identifies an existing framework of long- and medium-term strategic planning documents in the CAR and their potential challenge. Finally, governance reforms experience of the Baltic states, including competitive compliance with OECD SIGMA public administration principles, is analyzed through the operating framework of strategic planning and policy coordination mechanisms.

2

Background

Good governance and the quality of public administration is recognized in the interests of the population to achieve maximum value from the restricted public funds and create a public-private interface that raises employment and growth. The world’s highest productivity and income economies have the most effective and efficient public institutions. Together with appropriate legislation and an independent,

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well-functioning judiciary, an effective public administration constitutes the basis for the operation of the market. The instability of the political and institutional environment, the complexity of administrative processes hinder the economic initiatives of potential foreign and domestic investors, with a negative impact on political stability and employment. Since the adoption of the EU Strategy for Central Asia in 2007, countries of Central Asia have come a long way to strengthening the closer connection between Central Asia and Europe’s regions. In 2017, the Council reconfirmed the “crucial importance of continuing a meaningful dialogue with the Central Asian countries on good governance, the rule of law and human rights. This involves promoting respect for human rights, prioritising even further the rule of law cooperation in the EU Strategy, and supporting the Central Asian countries to fight corruption and promote accountability” (Council of the European Union, 2017). As a result, the countries of the Central Asian region are fostering good governance by reforming their state institutions and public administration and trying to integrate best international practices. Constitutional changes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and declarations by public officials in Uzbekistan on their intention to carry out several reforms in the judiciary, suggest that the authorities would be ready to reconsider the distribution of powers between different institutions and modernize their respective public administrations. These changes are a good opportunity to further promote governance reforms in line with international standards, whereas the recent experience of the Baltic states, (an ex-Soviet sphere of influence) who are current members of the EU and OECD, could be very beneficial. Similarly, OECD SIGMA Principles of Public Administration (OECD SIGMA, 2017) could be useful as a guide for public administration development in future. Experience of the Baltic States highlights that good governance reforms could be successful and sustainable if they are ambitious and multidimensional. One of the core elements for the implementation of these reforms is development and presence of strategic planning and policy coordination mechanisms in the Government. Sustainable political and civil service senior management is needed to manage and promote effective change on all the levels of executive power, implement the common vision and overcome different administrative hurdles. The “first wave” of reforms began with EU accession requirements for establishing professional and depoliticized civil service systems. However, initially,

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limited strategic orientation and ownership of reforms led to mixed results. Nevertheless, the limited internal capacity was compensated by external technical support. The relevance of good administration became particularly evident in the Baltic states during the global financial crisis. The crisis indicated that good governance has a significant role in turning technical and financial assistance into systemic results and outcomes. The experience of the Baltic states could be useful for the Central Asian region, particularly, when planning national and regional level reforms and coordinating implementation policy of the new EU Strategy for Central Asia.

3

Strategic Planning and Policy Coordination

Good governance and a well-functioning public administration are essential in building and sustaining trust in government and creating the necessary structural reforms for increased living standards in society. It is a prerequisite for transparent and effective governance, a foundation for optimizing the effectiveness in the functioning of the state, determining a government’s ability to provide public services and fostering competitiveness and growth. On the contrary, poor governance causes delay, inefficiency, uncertainty, corruption and other negative forms in the public administration, which lead to citizens’ resentment, disappointment, resistance and protest against the state and its institutions. It also undermines the legitimacy of the government and can lead to a failing state. In recent decades, strategic planning and policy coordination to achieve greater policy coherence has become particularly relevant for good governance, mainly due to the emergence of cross-cutting, multidimensional policy challenges and subsequent reform of administrative structures. Strategic planning and policy coordination mechanisms can (a) provide strategic, technical assistance and expertise to line ministries; (b) influence the flow of information between government departments; (c) carry out monitoring and “early warning ” of the overall level of implementation of legislative acts in the country; (d) increase the efficiency of communication mechanisms (e) focus attention, prioritize and promote conflict resolution between different structures of executive power (Dimitrova & Toshkov, 2009). Governments can strengthen the institutional and financial capacities of their CoGs and strategic planning from a whole-of-government perspective to promote coherence for the work across ministries, agencies and other administrative units.

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Today, there is an increasing external and internal pressure on the executive power to plan and coordinate the implementation of various policies by considering both national- and international-level dimensions. Strategic planning and policy coordination are needed for the implementation of country-wide strategic development documents and effective management of national reforms. Metcalfe (1994) has earlier pointed out that national governments that are well-coordinated are more effective, have less conflicting and useless programs and can use resources more rationally to achieve their political goals. Many studies on EU relations with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been developed since the mid-1990s, but they have primarily focused on the EU preaccession phase and the emphasis on “adapting” to the EU requirements. Furthermore, the Europeanization of policy coordination mechanisms in the 2004 EU enlargement countries is studied, but not systematically (Rollis & Ozolina, 2019). The governments should work on evidence-based and outcomeoriented policies development to reach standards of good governance. It should be a transparent process of policy planning that involves all the stakeholders that bring in innovative policy-making tools for all sectoral policies. The OECD SIGMA Principles of Public Administration (OECD SIGMA, 2017) highlight that governments require capacity for policy planning, development, coordination and implementation. Strategic planning is the system by which the Government establishes the objectives it intends to achieve over a longer period, while also setting priorities, scheduling activities and allocating available resources. Strategic planning serves policy management by identifying areas in which policies need to be developed, and is crucial in keeping policy work coherently across time and sectors. Other benefits include clarity over institutional mandates, improved organizational efficiency and internal management, as well as increased transparency in financial management, achieved by linking budgeting to objectives. In modern public administrations, the planning system usually embraces government-level and institutional-level planning, as well as long-/medium-term (strategic) and short-term (more operational) planning. Priority setting in planning documents drives resource allocation: budget documents such as medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) are therefore closely linked to the implementation planning system. Under these basic premises, systems can greatly vary in complexity. Table 1 gives a basic overview of some of the most commonly occurring possibilities.

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Table 1 Examples of typical documents within the national development planning system

Source Corporate & Public Management Consulting Group, Functional Review and Institutional Design of Ministries. Functional Review of Policy Management Systems, 2009

The presence of such a planning system is both important for national development, regional co-operation and implementation of the framework of a settled reform. It should focus on the long- and medium-term goals and priorities of the country and embody measurable benefits to the entire governance system. The comprehensive set-up of policy planning and policy coordination should be identified. Moreover, it should have a direct impact on the progress of national development. A dedicated organizational structure at the CoG or with the President should become the driver of change. Figure 1 demonstrates the typical structure of the strategic planning framework in the EU candidate countries. Mapping of strategic development documents often highlights an increase of their number, lack of strict hierarchy, variable quality and outcome-level indicators. For instance, even if strategies have an implementation plan, only one part is costed and an even less number foresees mid-term evaluation. Some of the main reasons behind the increased number of strategies usually is a weak medium-term government planning and mutual coordination between line ministries that lead to overlapping strategies between institutions. Consequently, decision-makers are not properly equipped to carry out performance assessments and to make informed decisions. Furthermore, the lack of an overarching hierarchy of various generated strategic

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documents becomes a challenge for their mutual relations with a mediumterm budget, implementation planning and political-level priorities. To monitor, the efficiency of the medium-term planning system is measured by (1) legal framework that enables harmonized national development planning; (2) quality of planning documents; (3) national development commitments carried forward and (4) implementation rate (%) of the government’s plans (OECD SIGMA, 2017). For instance, development strategies might not provide a clear medium-term vision of the goals and targets to be achieved. The result-oriented nor the evidence-based approach is sufficiently used in drafting strategies. They might lack performance indicators to make the monitoring of strategies challenging in terms of their possible impact. Neither strategies might adequately be costed nor fully reflect government priorities. These factors inevitably affect the quality and coherence of multiannual, sectoral planning and elaboration of MTEFs. Among the main risks for operation of an effective strategic planning system, one should also highlight: (1) the presence of insufficient resource quantity and capacity to effectively implement such system and coordination with line ministries; (2) broad prioritization of a politically driven agenda by senior officials from the line ministries; (3) ad hoc daily routine issues and lack of effective implementation of a strategic planning system in line ministries and coordination with other institutions; (4) insufficient absorption capacity by involved stakeholders and 5) lack of dedicated persons in charge of the strategic planning process on all levels of the government. Institutions usually are also more comfortable in handling short- than medium- or long-term planning documents. As a consequence, policies risk being elaborated based on short-term priorities and without a clear long-term development perspective. In modern administrations, strategic planning at the government-wide level is essential in framing further planning and policy development within sectorial portfolios, and related resource allocations through the State budget. To achieve this, medium- and long-term prioritized instruments are needed, while short-term plans might be used to define further operational details.

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Governmentwide planning

Government program (full mandate) Political promises of the governing coalition

EU integration programme (3 years rolling) Main priorities and measures to implement the EU integration related commitments

MTEF (3 years, rolling) Policy priorities, fiscal framework and financial allocations

Annual Government Work Plan (annual) For operational purposes only

Institutional level planning

Strategic plans (portfolio) - Institutional level measures - Policy planning - Policy link with budget

Legislative drafting

Policy analysis

Action Plans to Strategic Plans (annual) For operational purposes only

Concept papers

Legislation

Impact assessment

Legislation

Fig. 1 The hierarchy of medium and short-term documents in the strategic planning framework [author’s creation]

4 Long- and Medium-Term Strategic Planning Documents in Central Asia The European region countries have reaffirmed their commitment to developing a strong and durable relationship with Central Asia as it has become an increasingly important partner for the EU due to geographic location, energy and regional security. The relations between both regions have developed significantly over recent years, as illustrated by the newgeneration Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCA)

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signed with Kazakhstan (2016) and under negotiation with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and benefits that the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan enjoy from favorable access to the EU market through the generalized scheme of preferences. The European region countries look for a closer collaboration with the countries in the Central Asia region, stimulating regional co-operation and development on the national level. One of the important elements is progressing development on a national level, where a particular role is for strategic planning framework—national and sustainable mediumand long-term development strategies and their implementation. All the countries in the Central Asian region have taken steps to develop such strategies and programs (Table 2). The Asian Development Bank’s principal economist Shikha Jha considers that “in all countries (CAR), whatever their income status, governance reform should target actionable areas that are not relatively easy to implement quickly but also offer low-hanging fruit in the form of more clearly visible impacts on development ” (Santos, 2013). The majority of Table 2 Key national long- and medium-term development strategies and programs in the countries of Central Asia (Source World Bank, 2020) Country

Title

Period

Kyrgyzstan

– National Development Strategy (NDS) of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2018–2040 – The Government’s Programme “Unity, Trust, Creation” 2018–2022 to the Sustainable Development Goals – “Digital Kyrgyzstan 2019 - 2023” strategy – 2025 Strategic Development Plan – The Strategy for development of the Republic of Kazakhstan until the year 2030 – Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy – NDS of the Republic of Tajikistan for the period 2016–2030 – Programme of social and economic development of the country in 2019–2025 – Programme of development of the foreign economic activity of Turkmenistan in 2020–2025 – Concept of transit to the digital economy in 2019–2025 – Uzbekistan’s Development Strategy for 2017–2021

Long-term Medium-term Medium-term

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Medium-term Long-term Long-term Long-term Medium-term Medium-term Medium-term

Medium-term

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documents among priorities highlight also the development of good governance. For instance, NDS of the Kyrgyz Republic 2018–2040 among priority areas settles the development of strong and stable public administration through a balanced system of state power, fair judicial system and promotion of a digital economy. In Uzbekistan, NDS for 2017–2021 settles the task of reforming public administration and public service, ensuring transparency of government bodies, improving the “egovernment ” system, increasing efficiency, quality and access to public services. Kazakhstan’s mid and long-term development strategies among priorities highlight public sector efficiency, development of professional state and improving system of state planning and forecasting. Finally, the NDS of the Republic of Tajikistan for the 2016–2030 period prioritizes the development of an effective system of public administration and the link between strategic planning and the budget process. The experience of the Baltic states allows the summarizing of relevant lessons and critical challenges for the CAR willing to ensure good governance reforms through organization implementation of major NDSs and complex public policies.

5 Setting and Implementation of Strategic Planning and Policy Coordination Framework The Baltic States entered the Europeanization mode in 1995 after a short period of the state-rebuilding process (1991–1994). The EU accession process was the external driving force for fundamental and rapid reforms during the 1995–2004 period. After accession to the EU in 2004, the Baltic countries finalized their Europeanization by entering the Schengen Agreement (2007) and the eurozone (2011–2015). The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) development statistics (World Bank, 2020) shows a rapid increase in GDP indicators in the Baltic states. This has allowed them to gradually get closer to the average level of other EU Member states. Meanwhile, a gap has increased with the CAR (Fig. 2). The Baltic states demonstrate that governance reforms tend to be the most successful and lasting if they are implemented based on the “operating principles ” governing this process. For instance, sustainable development, political and civil service management-led and promoted effective change at all the levels of executive power and enabled the implementation of a common development vision. The governments

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25000 Estonia 20000

Lithuania Latvia

15000 Kazakhstan 10000

Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

5000

Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan

0

Fig. 2 GDP per capita (USD) development dynamics 1995–2018 (constant 2010 USD), World Bank (2020) (Source World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. Retrieved from https://data.worldb ank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?end=2018&locations=UZ-TM-KZ-LVLT-EE-KG-TJ&start=1995)

developed the ability to implement innovative solutions, overcome traditional administrative barriers to development, implement and evaluate policy delivery. A well-functioning public administration facilitated to drive reforms. For this, governments had to comply also with OECD SIGMA principles of public administration (OECD SIGMA, 2017). Figure 3 highlights that the Baltic states have been the most successful in developing their public administration mechanisms compared to the other EU CEE member states. Particularly, the best performance is achieved in granting access to government information, transparency of government, e-governance, ease of doing business and provision of services to business, trust in government and strategic planning capacity. Meanwhile, development challenges remain with implementation capacity and minimization of barriers to public sector innovations. Initial experience after the Communist era was to adopt a Constitution that dispersed power to individual ministries and kept the CoG comparatively weak. The relative weakness and fluidity of institutions and channels of interest representation prevented the emergence of stronger centers of general systems of support to strategic planning and policy coordination until 2000 or even later. The EU integration became the most

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35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

EE

LV

LT

PL

CZ

SI

HU

SK

BG

RO

Transparency and accountability

Civil Service system and HRM

Service delivery and digitalization

Organization and management of government

Policy-making, coordination and regulaton

Overall government performance

Fig. 3 The efficiency of public administration performance in the CEE countries (Source European Commission, 2017)

important source of external pressure to the government and facilitated the acceptance of needed reforms in public administration. Successful implementation of a PAR strategy largely depended on political will and leadership, effective coordination and application of relevant instruments such as strategic planning, impact assessment, reporting and evaluation. A necessary impetus was ensured and positive results could be expected if the government attached significant importance to reforms and if individual responsibility for the overall success of the reforms was assigned to a particular official responsible on the political level (“champion of the reform”). The functioning of effective policy coordination structures in the CoG raised awareness on the importance of effective implementation and put in place a system of “early warnings ”, effectively resolving cross-sectorial issues and ensuring necessary feedback on needed policy updates and revisions. Effective coordination on the political level also led to higher attention by the government to reforms. It was therefore of utmost importance to facilitate an effective interface between the political and the civil service. Political will, awareness and leadership was a must in practically all areas of PAR. Many objectives of reform directly depended on the dedication of the Prime Minister and ministers. If the political

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level did not insist on strict compliance with the standards and requirements of regulatory quality (evidence-based regulation, impact assessment, whole-of-government coherence, effective public participation, cleansing of unnecessary administrative burden, statements of legal coherence etc.), such standards and requirements would be implemented only partially (if at all). As to strategic planning and major reorganization, there were several major lessons learned. First and foremost, only strategies having strong political support had a chance to succeed. The implication for the Baltic states was to ensure a link to a political agenda on ongoing basis. Secondly, the best strategies were those which involved and incentivized ministries to participate and to be willing to achieve improvements, including through optimization. This called for the development of a system of incentives—for the overarching and sectoral strategies. Thirdly, other related processes, such as PFM reform, and proper donor assistance coordination was also critical to facilitate development. Fourthly, the complexity of the work on the implementation of NDS required institutional change within the administration. As national development reinforced a requirement for stronger overall co-ordination, pressure increased directing subordination to the Prime Minister. In this situation, a key to success was the coordination of respectful national policies both on a central level and in the line ministries as it allowed to harmonize plans, implementation actions and allocation of resources needed. Not only specific departments/units directly dealt with the policy coordination and EU integration but all the other departments in the ministries were involved in implementation work. EU coordination experienced “spilled-over” into general coordination practices in the Government and was integrated with national policy development and respective policy coordination structures in the institutions. Besides strong internal support in favor of EU accession on the comeback road to Europe after the communist era, high external pressure was also viable to access the EU in a narrow time opportunity window. All that justified the building of relevant strategic plans and policy coordination mechanisms in the Government and developing co-operation traditions with the Parliament and civil society. It was required to introduce various tools for strategic planning. The governments had to prioritize issues for

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implementation. The countries used National Programs for Approximation to Acquis 1 (NPAA)/National Programs for European Integration (NPEI) as their main medium-term planning tool. Usually, this tool was among the first comprehensive strategic planning documents used in those countries. However, other frameworks existed, too. But very few of them managed to get close political attention and have a real impact. The existence of parallel unrelated planning documents was among the key reasons for many countries to start policy management reforms as part of general PAR. These reforms aimed at embedding a European agenda into all national policies and various planning frameworks to make the system more simple, transparent and efficient. It was also important to develop policies with a strict division between institutions that develop policy and the ones that control and monitor specific actions. In doing this, institution building plans were designed to be closely coordinated with other policies to allow the most rational optimization of institutions and staff working for them. Comprehensive NPAA/NPEI became an efficient planning and implementation coordination tool in achieving positive results of reforms. The program served as an effective tool in making decisions on the annual State Budget and giving a medium-term financial perspective for the implementation of a range of activities. It was a helpful mechanism for the identification of external assistance and human resource development needs in government institutions working on the implementation of particular priority actions. The Baltic states took early measures to ensure that policy coordination was achieved during the EU accession process, even though this involved sometimes difficult institutional decisions. The institutional models changed over time after EU accession based on their actual needs but in all cases, a coordination body was assigned to the Government on strategic planning and policy coordination. Institutionalized forms of strategic planning included planning units at the CoG and personal advisory cabinets for ministers or the president/prime minister. Line ministries used strategic plans covering a three-year period, which stated the mandate, mission, values, of the institution and objectives in the policy fields under their responsibility. Strategic plans also took care of budget planning in each policy field. Performance indicators and expected results 1 Acquis is the body of common rights and obligations that are binding on all EU countries, as EU Members.

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were presented and approved by the Government. The same documents were used both in ministerial policy planning and in the regular budgetary process. The Government Office (GO) coordinated the strategic planning process also from a methodological viewpoint. As to a particular country’s experience, when Latvia carried out overall policy planning reform in 2008, the policy planning system was reviewed. The conclusion was that since the regaining of independence in 1991, 653 planning documents were approved by CoM, including, 12 strategies and 75 programs. It also proved a lack of a systemic approach. As a result, a special new regulation was developed to define documents used for policy-making and their roles and hierarchy. The GO was strengthened to impose policy-making “discipline” online ministries in accordance with the new law. The old inventory of documents was gradually replaced with a smaller number and higher quality documents. A system of regular reviews was introduced (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). In December 2011, Latvia established a central government planning unit, the CrossSectoral Coordination Centre (CSCC). The CSCC mandate was to develop a long-term strategic approach to public policy-making, while also monitoring decision-making to ensure that public policies are effective. The CSCC also monitors ministries’ progress toward meeting the government’s stated goals, as outlined in the government’s declaration. To date, the CSCC has coordinated the drafting of NDP for 2021–2027 (medium-term strategic planning document), monitors progress toward the Latvia 2030 long-term development strategy implementation framework and undertakes an active role in decision-making, contributing to policy debates on a range of cross-sectoral issues such as demographics and income disparities. The effectiveness of the CSCC is measured by the ability to provide quality analysis and evidence-based arguments and the ability to carve out a position of authority and influence within a decision-making process. According to Bertelsmann Stiftung (2019) report on Lithuania “Lithuania’s strategic-planning system was introduced in 2000 and has been updated several times since. At the central level of government, the planning system involves all stages (planning, monitoring and evaluation) of managing strategic and operational performance. The main strategic documents include the long-term Lithuania 2030 strategy and the medium-term National Progress Program, which is in turn linked to shortterm strategic-performance plans and budget programs. The planning

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system, in general, is well-institutionalized; its functioning is supported by a network of strategic-planning units within each ministry and a governmental Strategic Committee that was re-introduced in 2013 by the 2012 to 2016 government. However, the strategic planning system suffered from unnecessary complexity. About 250 strategic documents existed, while strategic action plans include 1,800 monitoring indicators. The government from 2016 to 2020 developed guidelines and an action plan for restructuring strategic planning and the budget formulation system to focus more on results and ensure fiscal sustainability. The current government also introduced so-called change baskets, channeling more financial resources to the implementation of government priorities and other significant legislative commitments… A State Progress Council composed of politicians, public and civil servants, academics, business leaders, and other representatives of Lithuanian society was established to help design the Lithuania 2030 strategy and monitor its implementation”.

Nevertheless, there is a certain gap between the long-term policy aims contained in various strategic documents and the actual practices of individual public sector organizations. In addition, politically important decisions are sometimes made without due consideration of strategic priorities and performance monitoring, with strategic-planning documents and performance reports often playing little role in daily decisionmaking processes or the activities of street-level bureaucrats (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). Supporting structures of the government in Estonia are mainly located in the line ministries. The GO is quite limited in this respect, though there is a Strategy Unit within the GO, which mainly has a consulting function. Its main tasks are to support the composition of strategicdevelopment plans, to coordinate and draw up the government’s action plan and to monitor the implementation of the abovementioned policy documents. The Strategy Unit of the Estonian GO is also responsible for two horizontal strategies: Estonia 2020 (Competitiveness Strategy) and the Sustainable Development Strategy 2030. In turn, the third horizontal strategy related to national security is coordinated by the National Security and Defense Coordination Unit. The most popular government-led policy initiatives include digital, public administration, sustainable development and migration initiatives. In addition to the Strategy Unit, there is also a Prime Minister’s Bureau, comprised of experts in various policy areas who advise the Prime Minister. Differently from the Strategy Unit,

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this body is closely linked to the Prime Minister’s political party and its members change with each new Prime Minister. The government also is required to be consistent and well-coordinated with the competent institution(s) responsible for overall support to strategic planning and policy coordination in public administration. Coordination structures on the national level were built up considering previous legacies, traditions and capacities of the administration. Simple copying of models had never led to good results. “Super-power centre” systems were not considered as sustainable in the long run since they did not facilitate the development of relevant skills, knowledge and results on the level of line ministries. Clear agreement on the competencies of all key stakeholders about the main components was required to avoid duplication and institutional rivalry. A coordination mechanism that was spread too widely between various central executive authorities sometimes produced confusion and lack of clarity in the distribution of responsibility. Equally, there was a need for a process and capacity to agree on the delimitation of competencies between the line ministries, and specifically new ones that emerged from Europeanization. The coordination mechanism had to be with non-conflicting functions (e.g., not offending the core responsibilities of the line ministries) and designed to avoid “bottle neck” or dilution of communication and command. Effective information flows, regular and structured information exchange are necessary on all the main aspects of the coordination process. The role of a policy coordination system was important in bringing together all the relevant stakeholders. It was supported by an administrative mechanism of specialized inter-ministerial coordination bodies on political, operational (senior civil service) and at specialist level in the Government with a regular frequency of coordination meetings. It was especially important in the areas where central political guidance (direction) is required or in cases of disaccord and conflicts between ministries (e.g., cross-sectoral policies). The line ministries, the Cabinet of Ministers and government committees served to channel work into the national administration. The overall aim was to ensure that the national development issues were comprehensively dealt with at the appropriate level of the hierarchy and with the involvement of the national parliament and civil society. The domestic processes were governed by a mixture of formal rules, guidelines and informal conventions that evolved in combination with informal communication in the system.

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6

Conclusion

Good governance stimulates both national reform, economic development and better integration and competitiveness regionally and globally. The post-Soviet development path of the Baltic states in building their systems of good governance might serve as a lesson for the Central Asian countries on their domestic reform path, stimulating also closer connectivity with the European region. The Baltic states have been successful in developing their public administration mechanisms even in comparison to the other EU CEE member states. The widening scope of EU integration brought them to develop a hierarchy of properly inter-linked government-wide long-, medium- and short-term planning documents, cutting across all sectors. The edge of this widening of the EU integration agenda can be observed in the Western Balkan countries now. Overlapping work, internal competition between institutions, has been transferred into a precise distribution of responsibilities among the key institutions and operational collaboration networks. The countries have learned that institutionalized strategic planning and central policy coordination function in the CoG is relevant to ensure a good governance reform process, especially for more complex and cross-sectoral public policies. Institutions tend better to see the overall strategic framework when developing policies from their narrow institutional perspective. Therefore, institution-building plans are increasingly developed in a way where they are coordinated with other policies to allow the most rational optimization of policy-making and collaboration between different institutions. At the same time, it is important to ensure a strict division between institutions that develop policy and the ones controlling and monitoring specific actions. Despite the importance of strategic planning and policy coordination, its role must not be overestimated. A balance is needed between strengthening strategic planning, policy coordination mechanisms and the individual responsibility of institutions. These mechanisms are not always an answer to government challenges, especially in situations where more flexible or informal solutions are needed. Excessive coordination can jeopardize benefits of action by specialized bodies that have a narrow policy focus. Efforts to coordinate may limit the government’s ability to promote the development of certain sectors, where greater freedom is needed, which is contrary to a more linear and coordinated approach to innovation. Excessive policy coordination can become a threat to privacy

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and citizens’ freedom at the micro-level. This is particularly the case in the field of public services, where the collection of successful and integrated citizens’ privacy information can become both a government’s opportunity for citizens to offer better services and a threat to their individual rights. Lastly, competition between institutions and minimization of coordination can be used to stimulate intra-institutional competition and strengthen the individual responsibility of institutions.

References Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2020). Sustainable governance indicators. https://www. sgi-network.org/2019/Downloads Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2019). Sustainable governance indicators 2019 (Lithuania Report). https://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2019/country/SGI2019_Lith uania.pdf Corporate & Public Management Consulting Group. (2009). Functional review and institutional design of ministries. Functional review of policy management systems (UK DFID funded Project Report, Kosovo). Council of the European Union. (2017). Council conclusion on the EU strategy for Central Asia. Brussels. Dimitrova, A., & Toshkov, D. (2009). Post-accession compliance between administrative co-ordination and political bargaining. In F. Schimmelfennig & F. Trauner (Eds.), Post-accession compliance in the EU’s new member states. European Integration Online Papers, 2(13). European Commission. (2017). A comparative overview of public administration. Characteristics and performance in EU 28. Brussels. Metcalfe, L. (1994). International policy co-ordination and public management reform. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 60, 271–290. OECD SIGMA. (2017). The principles of public administration. http://www. sigmaweb.org/publications/Principles-of-Public-Administration_Edition2017_ENG.pdf. Rollis, I., & Ozolina, Z. (2019). Europeanization of Ukraine’s executive power. Lessons of the Central and Eastern Europe’s EU member states. Actual Problems of International Relations, 140, 15–28. Santos, L. A. (2013). How Central Asia can improve governance for development? https://www.devex.com/news/how-central-asia-can-improve-govern ance-for-development-82046. World Bank. (2020). GDP per person in constant 2010 USD in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan during 1995–2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP. KD?end=2018&locations=UZ-TM-KZ-LV-LTEE-KG-TJ&start=1995

PART III

Old Games in New Frameworks: Regional and Geopolitical Perspectives

CHAPTER 10

Great Game vs Small Game: Europe, India and Japan in Central Asia Raj Kumar Sharma

1

Introduction

Connectivity has become an important feature in the foreign policy of major and regional powers. Given their divergent geopolitical interests, these countries often tend to compete over initiatives to build infrastructure. Parag Khanna says that in the twenty-first century, the arms race is not over weapons but connectivity (Khanna, 2016). Asia is emerging as the epicentre of an increasingly globalised world economy but would need massive investments in infrastructure. According to a report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asia would require an annual investment of $1.7 trillion in its infrastructure sector until 2030 to address climate change, poverty and to maintain economic growth. The report further adds that Central Asia would need investment of $33 billion per year to address the huge infrastructure gap in the region (Asian Development Bank, 2017). Within Asia, there are many variations in models

R. K. Sharma (B) Institution of Eminence, University of Delhi, Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 213 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_10

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of connectivity—on one hand, there is highly connected example of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) while on the other hand, there are regions like South and Central Asia where regional problems hinder connectivity. A report by the International Transport Forum argues that there is a huge connectivity gap between Central Asia and the countries which are logistically advanced. For instance, in terms of world gross domestic product, the Central Asian countries access 50% less economic opportunities than Germany. There is lack of regional cooperation and intra-regional trade in Central Asia which is around 5% of total trade (International Transport Forum, 2019). The region is landlocked (Uzbekistan is double landlocked) and cut off from main trade and population centres in Asia and Europe. Apart from physical barriers, regulatory obstacles also hinder trade and connectivity in Central Asia. 1.1

Connectivity Bottlenecks in Central Asia

Connectivity bottlenecks in Central Asia have a history, although it was not always the case, Central Asia was at the heart of the ancient Silk Road that connected Asia and Europe (Fengler & Vallely, 2019). Hence, Central Asia was at the centre of one of the first waves of globalisation. The region was well integrated with the outside world and known as a hub of innovation and commerce until the sixteenth century. However, land routes fell into disuse later as sea routes became popular and were more profitable (Turkstra, 2018). In the second half of the nineteenth century, Central Asia became part of Tsarist Russian Empire and later on, Soviet Union. During Soviet times, the development of Central Asia was done as per the economic and geographical needs of Moscow. The connectivity links in the region were directed towards Moscow while regional connectivity was given less priority. In the nineteenth century, there was an intense rivalry between the British and Czarist Russia as they tried to outwit each other in what is called the “Great Game” to control Afghanistan, which could have opened the gates for them to penetrate in each other colonial areas. Later the British did not want the Soviet Union to secure an access to the Indian Ocean which could have raised maritime security concerns for them. During this period, connectivity between Central and South Asia was hampered. It was further exacerbated after the rise of new nation-states, India and Pakistan in South Asia after 1947. Pakistan has refused to let India access Central Asian markets through its territory. Central Asian countries have had their own

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regional issues after becoming independent in 1991 which have spoiled the chances of regional connectivity. External powers like the US, Russia, China, Japan, European Union and India have their own policies for Central Asia. This chapter will shed light on some of these initiatives with particular focus on policies of India, Japan and the EU towards Central Asia. It will also bring out the areas in which these three powers can cooperate in Central Asia. The chapter is based on a qualitative and descriptive methodology with the usage of both primary and secondary sources. Government documents, official and private media reports, reports and articles by think tanks affiliated to a government, reports by international non-governmental organisations and articles by experts on Central Asia have been used to write this chapter.

2 Central Asia and the Big Three---The US, Russia and China Given its strategic location at the centre of the Eurasian landmass, Central Asia has been vital for trade and energy corridors. It is often described as a land bridge that connects Asia and Europe. However, such a conception is passive as a bridge, by its very nature it is a static entity and is not an active participant in any environment. Hence, it is important to highlight that connectivity initiatives in Central Asia should take care of local impact and maximise economic benefits for the people in the region. In this regard, a complex interplay of interests is visible between the US, Russia and China in the Central Asian region. 2.1

New Silk Road

It can be argued that Central Asia is not a priority area for the US now that it has withdrawn from Afghanistan while there is no clarity over its New Silk Road (NSR) initiative launched in 2011. Earlier in 1999, the US had passed the Silk Road Strategy Act covering Caucasus and Central Asia including areas like democracy, human rights, trade, development, health and energy, etc. The aim of the NSR is to economically integrate Central and South Asia in areas like energy and trade. The US has been supportive of initiatives like the TAPI gas pipeline and CASA-1000 hydropower project but progress has been slow. The future of such initiatives remains uncertain as the Taliban have taken power in Afghanistan.

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2.2

Eurasian Economic Union

Russia, on the other hand, is working to integrate the post - Soviet space through its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) but problems persist. The EAEU is a regional organisation with a regulatory and legal framework as well as membership criteria. From Central Asia, only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of EAEU. The EAEU is a customs union which forbids bilateral trade agreements with third countries. Further, after the outbreak of Russia-Ukraine crisis, some of the Central Asian countries are likely to be wary of Russia’s motives in the region and are likely to cooperate with other countries in order to balance Russia. 2.3

Belt and Road Initiative

“Due to security reasons, Russia treats Central Asia as its sphere of influence while for China, Central Asia is critical for its trade, energy and the security of its Uighur-dominated secession prone Xinjiang Province. Under its March West policy, China is moving into Eurasia to break out of its encirclement by the US and its allies on its eastern front. China has now made massive inroads in the region. Russia dominates the security, cultural and historical memory of Central Asia while China’s massive economy allows Beijing to build leverage in the region, especially through its Belt and Road initiative (BRI)” (Sharma, 2019). Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the BRI at Nazarbayev University in 2013 during his state visit to Kazakhstan. He included five areas of cooperation—policy communication, road connectivity, trade facilitation, monetary circulation and people-to-people exchanges. Xi also highlighted China’s more than 2,000 years’ old relations with Central Asia through the ancient transcontinental Silk Road (Jiao & Yunbi, 2013). Geopolitically, China is well placed to achieve its interests in the region as Russia is distracted due to the Ukraine crisis while the US has not been able to give due importance to Central Asia. However, Experts believe that the BRI is surrounded in ambiguity as it lacks clarity and it is an umbrella term in which old and new projects have been included; like the KazakhstanChina oil pipeline that predates announcement of BRI to weave a positive narrative around the BRI (Fallon, 2017). Despite the grandness of the BRI, a number of issues have been identified within it. The BRI projects are implemented and financed by China’s state-owned companies which disregard transparency and fair competition (European Parliament, 2019).

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In Kyrgyzstan, public anger has been expressed against companies owned by China over labour and environmental standards. There were protests in Kazakhstan over a proposed land reform that could have allowed China to lease agricultural land in Kazakhstan (Turkstra, 2018). There is also a risk that the smaller economies of Central Asia would be over reliant on China and hence, end up having a debt burden (European Parliament, 2019 & Turkstra, 2018). Some experts have highlighted that China is in Central Asia for its own interests, not for those of the Central Asians. China’s interest in Central Asia is based on resources and its potential as a transit hub between China and Europe. China is concerned about its own growth potential and boosting domestic consumption to ensure domestic political stability (Kruessmann, 2019). There is also a growing contention that Chinese investments serve only the elites in Central Asia, not the people (Blockmans & Sahajpal, 2019). 2.4

Policies of the EU, India and Japan Towards Central Asia

To begin with, it is hard to club the European Union (EU) and the Central Asian countries into the same category. The EU is a promoter of democracy and human rights while the Central Asian countries are not democracies in Western sense. Central Asia did not have high priority in the foreign policy of the EU in the beginning. The EU’s Central Asia policy has been divided in three phases by Cornell and Starr (2019). In the first phase in 1990s, the focus was on the development of EU assistance programmes towards Central Asia. The EU initiated efforts for land connectivity with Central Asia in 1993 through the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) initiative. In the second phase, the EU’s interest grew rapidly in the region in the 2000s as there was presence of the NATO forces in Afghanistan that began in 2001. Countries like Germany and France had a military presence in Central Asia. EU enlargement between 2004 and 2007 shifted the gravity towards Eastern Europe which brought focus on Central Asia as well. Europe was also trying to diversify its sources of energy away from Russia and in this regard, there was growing interest in countries like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The third phase during 2010s came with new challenges in Afghanistan like rise of Islamic State. However, in this phase, the EU began to see Central Asia through its relationship with China. Concerns were seen in Europe over China’s Silk Road Economic Belt initiative and its extension in European countries. This prompted the EU to launch an EU-Asia Connectivity

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Strategy in 2018. China’s rising footprint and Russia’s attempts to regain lost influence in the region make Central Asia important for EU (Blockmans & Sahajpal, 2019). The European Union has three broad interests in Central Asia, according to Boonstra and Panella (2018). First, the EU is an alternative to Russia and China but has an approach to the region which is driven by values of democracy and human rights. The response has been mixed for the EU in this regard as states like Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have shown interest to engage the EU on these issues. Second, economic and social cooperation with the EU would help Central Asia in diversifying their economies away from energy exports and mass labour migration to Russia. Lastly, the EU can work on regional issues like education, climate change, border and water management in Central Asia. The EU had issued its Central Asia strategy in 2007 which was replaced by a new strategy in 2019. The core areas covered in both the strategies include sustainable economic development, human rights, connectivity, environmental protection, transport and energy links, etc. The EU adopted its Central Asia strategy in 2019 in Bishkek while India had also announced its Connect Central Asia policy in Bishkek in 2012. The EU’s strategy seems in response to China’s BRI, highlighting a European way on the basis of rules-based approach (Gotev, 2019). It should be highlighted that China may have stolen the limelight over the concept of Silk Road through its massive BRI, however, it was the European Union which was instrumental in revival of the idea of Silk Road through its Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) initiative launched in 1993 (Turkstra, 2018). In 2018, the EU had also published its strategy to connect Europe and Asia which highlights sustainability, reducing carbon emissions, enhancing transparency and public consultation and not to shift debt-burden onto partner states. The EU also gives importance to digital connectivity and people to people links in its Central Asia policy. It should be mentioned that within the EU, Germany has been particular in engaging the Central Asian countries, both through the EU platform and also bilaterally. Germany is the only EU member to have embassies in all the five Central Asian countries. India and Germany have had foreign office consultations covering regional issues that also include Central Asia. Germany’s recent initiative, Green Central Asia to tackle climate change in the region has a good potential to cooperate with International Solar Alliance (ISA). Another

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European partner of India, France is an important partner in ISA while Germany has already joined ISA in 2021. India has been connected with Central Asia since centuries. The ancient Silk Road is one such example, highlighting geo-cultural ties between both sides. The Silk Road not only facilitated trade but also the exchange of ideas, religion and philosophy between India and Central Asia. Buddhism travelled from India to Central Asia while Sufi ideas came to India from Central Asia. India lost direct connectivity to the region after 1947. Pakistan illegally captured part of Indian territory called Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), through which India could have accessed the Central Asian markets. Islamabad has consistently refused to give India transit rights to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia via its territory. Given this critical problem, India has been forced to look at alternate options and India’s efforts to develop the Chabahar port in Iran bypassing Pakistan holds a lot of promise for New Delhi to reach Central Asia. In October 2017, India sent the first consignment of wheat to Afghanistan through Chabahar showcasing India’s commitment to sustainable regional connectivity and development. Experts have highlighted that India eventually needs to integrate the Chabahar port with International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) for efficient connectivity in Eurasia (Stobdan, 2017). By connecting South and Central Asia, Chabahar could lessen the economic dependence of Central Asia on Russia and China which suits their multi-vector foreign policy. However, the Taliban’s attitude to these projects would play an important role in India’s connectivity efforts towards Central Asia. India has also joined Ashgabat agreement in 2018 which establishes a multimodal transport and trade agreement between Persian Gulf and Central Asia. The other members of the agreement are Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Oman, Kazakhstan and Pakistan. For the success of the Chabahar agreement, it was important for India to join a transport system led by Central Asian countries. The Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan (ITK) is the main rail link in this agreement and has been included in India’s INSTC. The Ashgabat agreement seeks to deepen connectivity in Central Asia and would synchronise it with other regional transport initiatives like the INSTC. The agreement complements India’s efforts for regional integration through Chabahar and INSTC. The double-landlocked state of Uzbekistan plays a key role in India’s connectivity efforts in Central Asia. Under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, India trains human resource from Central Asia in areas

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like IT, rural development, agriculture, banking and English language training. Tajikistan is one of the largest beneficiaries of India’s ITEC programme with 200 slots per year. Two private universities from India, Amity and Sharda, have opened their campuses in Uzbekistan that helps the education sector in the Central Asian country but also further strengthens people to people links between India and Uzbekistan. Central Asia has a lot of potential to play a part in India’s energy security but given the connectivity issues, the energy ties have been below par. There are question marks over the future of TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) gas pipeline. Climate change is a serious concern in Central Asia and India has invited the Central Asian countries to be part of the International Solar Alliance. In 2012, India’s former Minister of State for External Affairs, E Ahamed had announced India’s official policy for the region called Connect Central Asia Policy at Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. Academics also call it India’s Look North policy. The policy envisages strong political links between India and Central Asia through high-level visits. It also promises India increased focus in areas like health, digital, education, security, connectivity and tourism in the Central Asian region. At the first India-Central Asia dialogue in January 2019, India proposed to set up an India-Central Asia Development Group to carry forward the development partnership between the two sides. New Delhi also suggested establishing air corridors between India and Central Asia to have efficient and swift trade route to overcome connectivity problems. India had also announced a line of credit worth $1 billion for Central Asian countries in 2020. Japan, a Pacific power and an ally of the US has certain interests in Central Asia. People in Central Asia and Japan have a long history of trade, cultural and human interaction through the ancient Silk Road. Buddhism travelled to Japan from Central Asia via China and South Korea in the sixth century (Rakhimov, 2014). Japan, being an American ally, did not have much interest in Central Asia during the Cold War. However, after the collapse of Soviet Union, Japan showed an active interest in engaging the newly independent states of Central Asia. Tokyo soon emerged as the top provider of bilateral aid to Central Asia and dispatched advisers for the new governments to help in capacity building, especially in economic areas (Japan Times, 2019). Under PM Hashimoto, Japan had launched a Silk Road or Eurasian diplomacy in 1997. It was followed by a Silk Road Action Plan initiated under PM Keizo Obuchi in 1998.

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In 2004, under PM Koizumi, Japan initiated the Central Asia plus Japan dialogue in 2004 to discuss regional and bilateral issues in Central Asia and it had five key components—regional cooperation, business promotion, intellectual dialogue, cultural and people to people exchanges. Under PM Shinzo Abe, Japan had a practical and goal-oriented approach towards Central Asia instead of a value-based approach. The Japanese leadership felt that democratisation was a long-term aim for Central Asia and in the meantime, there was a need to address the economic problems of the region (Dadabaev, 2018). Central Asia has expectations from Japan as it is a hub of science and technology while it is associated with low corruption (Kitade, 2019). On the other hand, some BRI projects in Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan have been associated with corruption. Even before the BRI, it was the Asian Development Bank inspired Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) that started to work on regional connectivity in Central Asia in 1997. It has also been pointed out that the BRI promotes regional integration with its sponsor (China) but CAREC seeks to remove bottlenecks in trade and customs among Central Asian countries to increase regional cooperation. Secondary networks are needed to join the local and small economic centres with the bigger ones for a trickle-down effect of mega economic initiatives. In line with India’s policy, CAREC has also supported greater connectivity between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan (Murashkin, 2019).

3

Potential for EU, India and Japan Cooperation in Central Asia

Central Asia, in contemporary times, seems to be witnessing a new Great Game where a number of powers have their own visions of regional economic integration. The US, China and Russia are the big three great powers who have maximum impact on the region. However, one can also argue that against this conception of the Great Game, a small game could also be witnessed in Central Asia in two ways. One, relatively smaller powers like India, Japan, EU and South Korea have certain interests and respective policies for Central Asia but they cannot compete with the big three. In the second sense, a small game also means that the regional countries are vying for their own space and are yet to cooperate at the regional level. Hence, there is ample scope for India, the EU and Japan to align and cooperate in their policies towards Central Asia.

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The three sides have similar policies in Central Asia that focus on capacity building and human security areas. None of them has a history of colonialism in Central Asia, no border disputes and hence, aligning their people-oriented policies would give more importance to developmental needs of a region which has generally been defined in geopolitical terms. This would save their economic resources and enhance the local impact for maximum benefit for people in Central Asia. Their view on connectivity also echoes a similarity. The EU strategy on Central Asia highlights sustainable, comprehensive and a rules-based connectivity. The EU focuses on sustainable development in Central Asia with regional and local ownership without a hidden geopolitical agenda (Burian, 2019). Japan along with the Asian Development Bank has emphasised the need for quality infrastructure under its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure initiative in Asia. India’s vision for connectivity could stem from its strategic location as a land and maritime power. India’s connectivity vision goes beyond infrastructure and physical connectivity. At the inaugural address of the Raisina Dialogue in 2017, Indian PM Narendra Modi said that India would like to spread benefits of India’s civilisational legacies like Yoga and Ayurveda as global goods. A year before in 2016, while speaking at the Chabahar connectivity event in Iran, PM Modi had highlighted a full spectrum of connectivity between India, Iran and Afghanistan that spans from culture to commerce; from traditions to technology; from investments to IT; from services to strategy; and from people to politics. He had also highlighted India’s connectivity vision for Central Asia at the SCO platform in 2018. He used the acronym, SECURE, which stands for Security for citizens, Economic development, Connectivity in the region, Unity, Respect for sovereignty and integrity, and Environmental protection. He added that physical and digital connectivity is changing the definition of geography. For India, connectivity is not only about geographical links but also people-topeople contacts. Connectivity should be inclusive, transparent, sustainable and should respect sovereignty of the host nations. For India, peoplecentric connectivity has a history, for example, the ancient Silk Road and Spice Route. Given these similarities in their approach to Central Asia, there is a lot of potential for India, EU and Japan to cooperate in the region. In 2018, Japan and the EU have established a partnership on sustainable connectivity and quality infrastructure covering areas like digital, transport, energy and people-to-people exchanges. The partnership would pay

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utmost attention to fiscal capacity and debt-sustainability of partner countries. It covers regions like Africa, Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, India and Japan have already agreed to cooperate in capacity building and human security areas like health, agriculture, education under the Asia Africa Growth Corridor. The EU has also invited India to participate for joint connectivity projects under its e60 billion ($65 billion) connectivity plan in Asia and Europe. India and the EU have also announced a connectivity partnership in June 2021 which aims to enhance cooperation over sustainable connectivity in other regions including Central Asia. Hence, the trilateral cooperation between the three sides cannot be ruled out especially when they are cooperating with one or the other at bilateral level.

4

Conclusion

Following areas of cooperation emerge between India, EU and Japan in Central Asia. The three sides could coordinate their connectivity initiatives, INSTC and Chabahar (India), CAREC (Japan and ADB) and the EU’s Europe Asia connectivity plan. Chabahar is not under US sanctions and EU and Japan joining the initiative could add value to the initiative. Japan, in the past, has expressed willingness to join Chabahar project with India. This initiative would connect Central and South Asian economies and to an extent, lessen dependence of the Central Asian economies on Russia and China. This would also help in stabilising Afghanistan as its economy needs sources of revenue. China is developing infrastructure in the region (hardware). There is ample scope for India, Japan and EU to develop the capacity building areas (software) in the region which would further enhance their soft power. In education, India has plans to start a Central Asian university in Bishkek while two of its private universities, Amity and Sharda, have opened their branches in Uzbekistan. During his 2015 visit to Turkmenistan, the Japanese PM Abe agreed to support construction of a Japanese university in Turkmenistan. The EU supports education in Central Asia through European Education Initiative for Central Asia. The three initiatives could cooperate to maximise local ownership of education and reflect the aspiration of youth in the region. Joint training of human resource could be another potential area of cooperation.

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Climate change is another area for trilateral cooperation. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the temperature in Central Asia and Caucasus region will rise by 3.7 °C till 2100, which is significantly higher than the global average of 2.8 °C. Around 32 per cent of glaciers could melt by 2050 while some glaciers would completely disappear by 2050. Climate change is already introducing anomalies in Central Asia—high temperatures, droughts, harsh winters, food and energy insecurity. Geography and climate conditions in Central Asia favour green energy solutions. The development of renewable energy industry in these countries would wean their economies away from their dependence on fossil fuels and diversify their energy sources towards sustainable development. India’s International Solar Alliance (ISA) has the potential to help Central Asia and PM Modi has already invited the Central Asian countries to join ISA. In December 2018, the EU and ISA signed a joint declaration for cooperation in solar energy in India and beyond. In October 2018, Japan had joined ISA. This creates space for sustainable development cooperation between these three sides in Central Asia. India and Japan are members of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) in order to conduct research and increase knowledge in the areas of infrastructure risk management, financing and recovery. The EU’s participation in this initiative would be welcomed by both India and Japan and extending it to Central Asia would bring benefits to the region. According to a World Bank study, Tajikistan lost $1.8 billion in various types of natural disasters from 1992 to 2016 which affected 7 million people. Central Asian countries need sustainable infrastructure since some of them have a mountainous topography and knowledge sharing through CDRI would help them in this regard. Central Asia can further figure as an important region if Germany’s Green Central Asia initiative can work in sync with the India-France initiative— International Solar Alliance and India-UK’s recent initiative of One Sun One World One Grid. Food insecurity remains a problem in Central Asian countries, especially in the winter. The three sides could help in research and development for high yielding and better quality seeds, green house cultivation of vegetables, drip irrigation, agricultural implements and storage technology. Another area for trilateral cooperation in Central Asia could be digital connectivity. The world today may be talking of artificial intelligence but Central Asian countries need basic internet connectivity which is low in all

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countries except Kazakhstan. Japan and EU could join hands with India in providing e-connectivity in the region which would also help in emedicine and e-education. On the lines of South Asia satellite, India could partner with the EU and Japan for a Central Asia satellite as well. Central Asia is generally perceived in geopolitical terms overlooking the developmental needs of the region and this also undermines them as sovereign states. The legacy of Silk Road seems to have become associated with China’s BRI which has its set of limitations. India, the EU and Japan need to cooperate in Central Asia to reflect upon local developmental needs and showcase another version of the Silk Road that is people-centric and gives due response to the sustainable development needs of the region. The potential areas for cooperation include the fight against climate change, clean and renewable energy, food security, education, people-to-people contacts, digital connectivity and space cooperation. Connectivity should also address threats to human security and should address those challenges that would threaten human existence in future.

References Asian Development Bank. (2017). Meeting Asia’s infrastructure needs. https:// www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227496/special-report-infras tructure.pdf. Blockmans, S., &Sahajpal, M. (2019). The new EU strategy on Central Asia: Collateral benefit?. https://www.ceps.eu/the-new-eu-strategy-on-cen tral-asia/. Boonstra, J., & Panella, R. (2018). Three reasons why the EU matters to Central Asia. https://voicesoncentralasia.org/three-reasons-why-the-eu-mat ters-to-central-asia/. Burian. P. (2019, September 9). European Union and Central Asia: New Partnership in Action. Astana Times. https://astanatimes.com/2019/09/europeanunion-and-central-asia-new-partnership-in-action/. Cornell, Svante E., & Frederick, S. S. (2019). A steady hand: The EU 2019 strategy and policy toward Central Asia. http://silkroadstudies.org/resour ces/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/1911EU-CA.pdf Dadabaev, T. (2018). Silk road as foreign policy discourse: The construction of Chinese, Japanese and Korean engagement strategies in Central Asia. Journal of Eurasian Studies., 9(1), 30–41.

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European Parliament. (2019). Connectivity in Central Asia: Reconnecting the silk road. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/ 637891/EPRS_BRI(2019)637891_EN.pdf Fallon. T. (2017). Interview: Theresa Fallon on understanding China’s OBOR plan. RFERL. https://www.rferl.org/a/interrview-china-silk-road-theresa-fal lon/28489793.html. Fengler. W., &Vallely. P. (2019). Connecting Central Asia to the world. https:// www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/09/09/connectingcentral-asia-to-the-world/ Gotev. G. (2019). Central Asia Ministerial Welcomes the EU’s New Strategy for the Region. Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/news/ central-asia-ministerial-welcomes-the-eus-new-strategy-for-the-region/. International Transport Forum. (2019). Enhancing connectivity and Freight in Central Asia. https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/connec tivity-freight-central-asia_2.pdf. Japan Times. (2019). Steady as it goes in Central Asia. Japan Times. May 22. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/05/22/editorials/steadygoes-central-asia/#.Xi0XDjIzapo. Jiao, W., & Yunbi, Z. (2013). Xi proposes a new Silk Road with Central Asia. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcentera sia/2013-09/08/content_16952228.htm. Kitade. D. (2019). Central Asia undergoing a remarkable transformation: BRI and intra regional cooperation. https://www.mitsui.com/mgssi/en/report/ detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2019/08/27/1908e_kitade_e_1.pdf. Khanna, P. (2016). The new arms race: Connectivity and competition. Foreign Affairs. https://www.paragkhanna.com/home/2016/2/16/the-new-armsrace. Kruessmann. T. (2019). Tiptoeing around the two elephants in the room? Assessing the EU’s new Central Asia strategy. LSE Blogs. https://blogs.lse. ac.uk/europpblog/2019/06/26/tiptoeing-around-the-two-elephants-in-theroom-assessing-the-eus-new-central-asia-strategy/ Murashkin. N. (2019). Not-so-new silk roads: Japan’s foreign policies on Asian connectivity infrastructure under the radar. Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianou tlook/not-so-new-silk-roads-japans-foreign-policies-on-asian-connectivity-inf rastructure-under-the-radar/ Rakhimov, M. (2014). Central Asia and Japan: Bilateral and multilateral relations. Journal of Eurasian Studies., 5(1), 77–87. Sharma. R. (2019). US pullout from Afghanistan could deepen Russia-China competition in Central Asia. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orf online.org/expert-speak/us-pullout-from-afghanistan-could-deepen-russiachina-competition-in-central-asia-54685/

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Stobdan. P. (2017). To make Chabahar a Game Changer, Central Asian states need to be roped in. IDSA Comment. URL:https://idsa.in/idsacomments/ to-make-chabahar-a-game-changer-central-asian-states_pstobdan_121217 Turkstra. A. (2018). Central Asia in the age of connectivity. Europe Now Journal.

CHAPTER 11

Regional Connectivity and the China Factor Bipul Biplav Mukherjee

1

Introduction

The long-standing transatlantic economic cooperation between Europe and the USA has come under the scanner, as noted in the magazine Foreign Policy in its April 5th, 2019 issue. It argued that the United States’ series of trade tariffs on the European Union (apart from differences in the WTO-led trade regimes) could seriously undermine the transatlantic economic cooperation, which has been a cornerstone of the global economic order since the Bretton Woods system established in 1944. In other words, this might be the beginning of the end of transatlantic cooperation and the rise of an “Asian” pivot to a global economic order led by China. This shifting geo-strategic environment marked by growing Chinese engagement has led to a realignment of regional influences and interests in the Central Asia Republics. Historically, Central Asia has played an essential role in bringing together Europe and Asia for centuries. It serves as an economic

B. B. Mukherjee (B) Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 229 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_11

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bridge between Europe and China and harbours immeasurable, untapped economic potential. The common objective of achieving stability and prosperity through cooperation has made Europe and Central Asia close partners. There is a growing sense of collaboration between the two regions in tackling the challenges: from sustainable development to economic diversification, strengthening civil society and human rights, to providing expert assistance and financial support for reform processes. Europe’s proactive and responsible regional engagement with other powers like Russia and China has also necessitated the call for Eurasian integration. It is, therefore, one of the central planks of the EU’s foreign policy. With an overall objective of sustainable, holistic and peaceful growth of the Central Asian region, Europe has taken significant steps in upgrading its relations at “both the regional level and through bilateral relations” (Melvin, 2008). As evident in the EU’s current policies, Europe has signalled a departure from maintaining a passive presence to seeking active participation. Given this contextual framework and the region’s resurgent geopolitical importance, this paper sets out to address the current state of economic development within Central Asia and the emerging importance of Europe for Central Asia. The paper argues that European presence in Central Asia has been limited when compared to China’s involvement in the region. The major catapult in this picture is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, announced in 2013. In response, the strategic documents unveiled by the EU in the last couple of years could put forward a strong case before China in favour of regional development in Central Asia in a more holistic sense than the contemporary “transport-led development” model.

2 Priorities and Challenges for Regional Connectivity in Central Asia Central Asian countries are among the least connected economies in the world. Several factors explain this poor connectivity. All five countries are landlocked, with a harsh climate and population centres that are separated from one another by huge distances. The unstable Afghanistan politics constitute a significant hindrance to South Asian markets. It is noteworthy that during Soviet times, the region was utterly cut off from the rest of the world by a hermetic border. The region was made subservient to Soviet needs rather than modern needs. Another major obstacle across

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the region has been the presence of traditional isolationist regimes that have tended to view the rest of the world with suspicion (European Commission Report on Central Asia, 2021). A stable political environment is the “sine qua non” for national and regional development. Despite a prolonged crisis following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, progress has been made, and significant political and economic changes have occurred, particularly in the two largest countries in the region, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The primary catalyst in the regional development is the “connectivity” paradigm, where major powers such as Russia and China are significant partners of Central Asian republics. All Central Asian countries conduct a “multi-vector” foreign policy and try to keep themselves as active agent in regional development projects. In the last decade, Europe has emerged as a prominent actor in regional connectivity projects. Following a decade of recession and difficulty, the region experienced a significant improvement in economic performance. During this period, “Central Asia’s trade and investment links with neighbouring economic centers increased significantly. China, Russia, and the EU became their leading export markets as well as sources of imports, foreign direct investment, and remittances” (Sachdeva & Vergeron, 2019). However, Central Asian nations faced challenges owing to the slowdown in oil, gas, and commodity prices. This has called for diversification in exportable products and services (Kanbur & Capannelli, 2019). “Sustainable regional development” in the region has been the point of convergence for many scholars. The region is marred with multiple challenges and threats at all levels. Threats arise from the water crisis and transboundary water problems (Guo et al., 2016). Studies suggest that the drying Aral Sea, reduction in flow rate of two rivers—“Amu Darya” and “Syr Darya”—soil salinisation problem, receding snow cover, and glacial melt are some of the primary concerns for the economies of the region (Qi & Kulmatov, 2008), and climate change impacts, are likely to further aggravate the region’s short- and long-term future. It is expected that the factors outlined above, coupled with rapid population growth and the impact of climate change, will further deteriorate the region’s short- and long-term growth and development prospects. This emphasises the importance of the two most significant powers in this region, the EU and China, in supporting and complementing the efforts made by the nations of the region in order to achieve long-term

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economic prosperity and sustainable development. Inarguably, their policies will have a direct impact on the overall sustainability of the region. Moreover, it is a particularly advantageous time for the EU and China to strengthen their engagement with Central Asia, as countries in the region are actively pursuing regional integration as well as aiming to create the conditions necessary for the stable and prosperous development of the region.

3

Central Asian States’ Cooperation and Integration with Europe

Relations between Europe and the Republics of Central Asia date back to the first years of the independence of the five “stans”. Within Europe, interests and actions can be well gauged by the policies of the EU—which is a prominent political part of the European region and has the dominant approach to Central Asian connectivity and is supported by strategic documents. Following are the significant determinants of connectivity. Trade analysis: One Asian Development Bank (ADB) report notes that “trade connectivity plays a critical role in the region’s economic development”. The region has limited direct access to the sea. They have low population densities over long distances. Therefore, “the development of multiple transit routes and the contribution of Central Asian economies to these routes are important enablers of enhancing the region’s trade potential” (Kalyuzhnova & Holzhacker, 2021). As a result of increased trade and business relations, links between the Central Asian republics and the rest of the world have been strengthened. Among the critical initiatives that have been undertaken in this regard are Kazakhstan’s “Nurly Zhol”, the “Western China-Western Europe Corridor”, and the “New Silk Road” as part of China’s BRI. Exports from Central Asia to the rest of the world have been growing positively for the past few years. It has been reported that exports, except for Tajikistan, have increased at least three times between 2000 and 2018 (Karymshakov & Sulaimanova, 2021, p. 2). Data suggests that Europe has been a favourite destination for Central Asian countries. According to the Statistics Committee of the Ministry of National Economy in Kazakhstan (2019, cited in Karymshakov & Sulaimanova, 2021, p. 2), “the top export destinations of Kazakhstan are Italy ($11,734.3 million) followed by the Russian Federation”. For Kyrgyz Republic, the United Kingdom has been the country’s largest export partner ($669.9 million)

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thus far, followed by the Russian Federation, which has been the second largest. Regarding commodity composition, Central Asian exports to the European market as a whole and the EU, in particular, are primarily centred around just a few commodities, including crude oil, gas, metals, and cotton fibre (Central Asia—Trade—European Commission, n.d.)—a cause of concern for the region’s trade sustainability. Sustainable supply chain management: The development of sustainable supply chain management complements the benefits of trade inflows and outflows for the Central Asian region. Being a part of the Global Value Chain has a potentially favourable implication for economic development. Except for Kazakhstan, all the other republics have a poor record on the Logistics index developed by World Bank. Consequently, it is suggested that developing a digital trade platform would contribute to more excellent connectivity between all stakeholders, resulting in a significant increase in speed, traceability, and sustainability of cargo flows (OSCE, 2020). More recently, Austrian Rail Cargo announced the start of a partnership with the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) to promote digitalisation and address bottlenecks in cargo operations within the region. It is anticipated that this project, which includes some concrete developments in the field of digitising trade, will contribute substantially to promoting sustainable connectivity between Central Asia and Europe (OSCE, 2020). Labour migration and connectivity: Europe and the Central Asian region have a long history of interregional labour migration. Scholars suggest that labour mobility is another critical factor in building a robust “regional connectivity”. Labour migration has enabled countries with weak export capacities in goods and services to sustain domestic consumption and offset deficits elsewhere in the balance of payments. Reports by the OECD (2018) suggest that it has been partially true for the Central Asian Region—the region’s low-cost labour “could not move quickly to occupy niches as exporters of labour-intensive goods”. Again, during the ruble crisis (2013–14) the remittance inflows to respective Central Asian Republics declined due to lower demand of labour (OECD, 2018). Therefore, policies that encourage migration can play a vital role in helping to boost economic growth in countries across Europe and Central Asia and improving citizens’ quality of life by providing better employment opportunities for them. Energy security and connectivity: Three nations “Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan possess approximately 13.3% of the world’s

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proven natural gas reserves” (Raimondi, 2019). Consequently, as per International Energy Agency (IEA), “It is expected that production will increase from 143 billion cubic meters in 2009 to 265 billion cubic meters in 2035” (Teleuyev et al., 2017). However, despite such substantial production functions, the region’s economy depends heavily on an uninterrupted supply of energy resources to Europe, Russia, and China. Similarly, for Europe, the need for an alternative gas pipeline and the development of an energy security infrastructure to maintain critical supplies of natural gas became a widely discussed matter and a new priority among European policymakers. “Securing a new energy source Post the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and the possibility of interruptions with gas supplies to Europe has led to the resumption of appeals for the diversification of European gas supplies and the reduction of Russian imports” (Ibrayeva et al., 2018, p. 2). In this regard, the “Caspian region is of central interest for European energy security”. To circumvent Russia is a challenging task, both strategically and economically. Ibrayeva (2018) presents that “there exist two possible routes—to build trans-Caspian pipelines, pipelines for the transport of gas and oil, from the Eastern sea beds of the Caspian, to the Western sea beds of the Caspian, to ship onwards to Europe and the ‘southern route’, piping Eastern Caspian natural gas and oil through overland pipelines, via Iran, to Turkey and onwards to Europe”. This “southern route” is considered to be the path of least resistance (Ibrayeva et al., 2018, p. 157). European outreach in the Caspian region can be seen in the active presence of major European giants like “Eni, Shell Development B.V., British Petroleum and Total, which resulted in the development of the Karachaganak and Kashagan fields” (Cohen, 2008). The region has vast oil and natural gas resources, which can be challenging for Europe to compete with other “great power” of the region like Iran and Russia (Bayramov, 2020). Collins and Bekenova (2017) argue that this “great game” also represents a chance for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to leverage their control over energy resources, their geographical location, and other advantages to playing off the outside states for their benefit. Denison (2012) points out that “newly independent regional states rapidly moved from being consumers of externally constructed geopolitical players to a position of agency”, thereby ending the “West’s protectionist work” in the region. The ability of states like Kazakhstan to control external alternatives like China, Russia, and the West has been well indicated by many

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scholars who find that “power has shifted from outside actors to Kazakhstan itself as the government handles effectively external alternatives (China, Russia and the West) and uses interest in its petroleum resources to bolster its international role” (Kennedy, 2010). Therefore, the countries in the region are trying to maintain a balance between the external forces to suit their own economic and political interests. Clearly, both Europe and Central Asia are in a “win–win” situation given the objective of diversification of natural gas and an oil pipeline. In the background of the above concern, the regional integration of Europe and Central Asia became an utmost priority. Europe took the first step towards an “integrational” approach towards Central Asia in 2007, as evident with the publication of the document “European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership”, where the EU adopted a “comprehensive and long-vision approach” towards Central Asia. Abdulhamidova (2009) believes that “It marked a real breakthrough which opened a new stage in the relations between European and Central Asian countries”. In the 2007 document, greater emphasis was given to “human rights, the rule of law, good governance and democratisation, youth and education, economic development, trade and investment, improving energy and transport links, environmental sustainability and water, combating common threats and challenges, and intercultural dialogue” (Abdulhamidova, 2009, p. 40). While mapping the common concerns and interests between the EU and the Central Asian States, it was seen that progress in some of the goals like human rights dialogues, a democracy agenda, the empowerment of civil society has been modest. On the other hand, the interest of both sides coincide on issues related to “common threats and challenges” (Bossuyt, 2019), i.e. hard security issues and on other projects in region, such as “environment and water initiative” which faced many challenges due to the high degree of conflict relating to it (Plenta & Warkotsch, 2011). However, despite its bold ambitions on the institutional level, Europe remained an actor with limited capabilities on the ground. Its involvement in the region is not comparable to that of the Eastern partnership between Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the three South Caucasus countries. In addition, the recurrent divergence between EU policies and those of its member states fosters an image of Europe as a complex entity without a well-defined agenda (Fox & Godement, 2009).

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Another possible limitation on Europe-Central Asia “Connectivity” is modest and limited political engagement with Central Asia. The political engagement was determined by the rotating EU Presidency. Apart from a few bilateral visits, for example during the Kyrgyzstan crisis in 2005, few summit-level talks and diplomatic tie-ups occurred. The main initiative was the EU Troika “regional dialogue” intended to act as a “confidencebuilding mechanism and to create a format required for the Commission’s regional programming” (Matveeva, 2006, p. 91). Nonetheless, the EU played a more significant role in politics with the appointment of a Special Representative in July 2005 with a mandate to enhance relations with the five Central Asian states. However, it also had many challenges after the Andijan events, which consequently drove Kyrgyzstan away from the EU on geopolitical affairs. Many experts have pointed out the limitations within the framework design of the strategy. The EU faces a conundrum concerning prioritising interest-based and value-based approaches towards the Central Asian Region. Pierre Morel, the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, pointed out in 2009 that “the EU prioritised energy and security, while other issues have been downgraded” (Abdulhamidova, 2009, p. 41). The EU, therefore, marginalised the traditional concerns (value-based) about democracy and human rights in the region and adopted a “realpolitik” vision towards the region. As a result of adopting a state-centric concept of security in the region, the EU ultimately weakened its position in the region. This unidirectional and blindfolded approach by the EU has been mentioned by scholars like Shishkin (2012), who notes that the security and regional stability of the region has been marred by a “corrupt and authoritarian” regime and prolonged human rights abuses. Melvin and Boonstra (2008) also claim that the EU’s response to these internal issues has been mild, and some random “human rights dialogues do not offer enough incentives to the Central Asian leadership”. Another shortcoming of the strategy was its all exclusive and elite-driven process. The formulation of the strategy involved expert institutions in Germany, but wider European civil society and the expert community, and national and the European parliaments, civil society organisations, and think tanks were neglected either by the EU or by their respective governments. There is also the issue of the EU’s underrepresentation in Central Asian countries. Additionally, the strategy did not analyse the interests and actions of other external actors such as

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China involved in the region within a geopolitical context, which raises doubts regarding its viability (Melvin & Boonstra, 2008).

4

The Implications for Europe

China’s relationship with Central Asia goes back to the ancient Silk Road. In modern times, China was one of the first to establish diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian republics. It recognised the independence of the five countries on December 27, 1991(Walsh, 1993). Since 2000, the Chinese role in the region expanded exponentially, where its bilateral relationship with individual countries improved significantly. “In less than two decades, Beijing has achieved a massive and multi-layered entry into Central Asian space. It has taken a role as a loyal partner at the level of bilateral diplomacy, has managed to turn the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) into a regional body that its members appreciate, and has become a leading economic partner in the commercial sector” (Peyrouse, 2017). It also views the Central Asian Region as an area which has enormous hydrocarbon reserves, therefore an area for making critical investments. Notably, Central Asia also provides new market opportunities beyond the region in the Middle East. Since 2013, China has significantly diversified its approach towards the regional space-based primarily on a “geo-economic strategy for promoting trade, securing energy supplies, and building cross-border infrastructure” along with people-to-people connectivity (Chen & Fazilov, 2018). China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its Eurasian part—the Silk Road Economic Belt—emphasises “policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, and people-to-people connectivity”. According to the 13th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development, the broader objective of the BRI is to “increase trade and investment through bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms, developing Free Trade Zones along the silk road, enhance financial co-operation in the region to fund infrastructure, strengthening international cooperation on energy and resources and production chains, increase local processing and conversion, strengthen transport infrastructure in the BRI corridors and deepen cultural exchanges in the region” (OECD, 2018, p. 10). As noted earlier, the BRI views Central Asia as the region having “hydrocarbon and mineral resources”, which “Beijing perceives as integral to sustain its economic growth” (Aminjonov & Sim, 2022). Data

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from Kitade (2019) suggests that the new pipelines built in recent times under the newly developed BRI framework prove the evolving nature of energy cooperation between the two regions on the earth. For example, “About 85% of China’s total natural gas imports in 2017 came from Central Asia, with Turkmenistan accounting for 76% of its total imports” (Kitade, 2019, p. 2). Similarly, for China to develop its BRI network, careful development of Xinjiang is required. The region continues to be marred with ethnic violence caused by economic and cultural factors. Given the proximity of Xinjiang to Central Asia, it is seen by China as a “bridge to Central Asia and the Middle East”, “making it imperative for China to review regional-security strategies designed to protect its BRI investments and ensure Xinjiang’s stability” (Hoh, 2018). In contrast, a major pertinent question is “how have Central Asian actors come to view China since the BRI was launched?”. It is pointed out that perception of China ever since the formation of the BRI is a critical factor in China-Central Asia relationship. On this, within the region, there exists mixed perception of China, which ranges from negative to positive. There is widespread agreement among scholars that “elites are pro-China, whereas the general public is skeptical of Chinese economic and cultural expansion” (Vakulchuk & Overland, 2019). Several China-related surveys conducted in Central Asia suggest that China remains a challenge for the region. Sinophobia is seen as a stumbling block for the Belt and Road Initiative. More broadly, Vakulchuk & Overland (2019) outline four critical factors in the rising Sinophobic attitudes towards China. These are: “First, China was presented and perceived as a threat during the Soviet period”, and these ideas linger on to this day; Secondly, “the Central Asian population remains under-informed about China’s activities in general and the Belt and Road Initiative in particular”. In turn, this feeds into the notion that “China should be seen as a threat”; Third, the influx of “Chinese immigrants has become a significant concern” for the population; Fourth, “religious considerations play an important role in Central Asian attitudes towards China, as Central Asia’s Muslim population is concerned about Chinese government policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China”. More recently, many experts have blamed China for its “debt trap” and “debt diplomacy” policies in African and Asian countries. A similar argument against the BRI has been extended in the Central Asian region.

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A study report by Hurley et al. (2018) underlines that “two Central Asian Countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are in the highest risk category”. The report also notes that “In the period 2007–2016, China has accounted for almost 80 percent of the total increase in Tajikistan’s external debt. As with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is also very prone to a rise in debt issues with China due to a large depreciation in the exchange rate in combination with a significant increase in public investments that have brought about a surge in debt”. Therefore, the Chinese-led BRI projects will be successful only if a vast majority of BRI stakeholders (nations, citizens, financial partners, businesses) feel that there is a sustainable value-added to their own economies. In contrast, a number of Central Asian economies have received economic aid from Europe indicating that the EU is intensifying its “soft power” approach in this area. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) report (2019) points out that in the first place, the EU has contributed significantly to regional development in Central Asia through grants from the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which have increased over the years. Furthermore, “loans from the EBRD and European Investment Bank (EIB) have invested e11.3 billion in the region”, which has led to the development of “municipal water supply and waste water systems, the construction of solar and wind farms, as well as the financing of SME expansion and the development of energy infrastructure”. A major emphasis here should be given to the role of “EU’s Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), which in between 2010 and 2016 has leveraged around e970 million of loans” (EBRD, 2019). The IFCA facility is unique in the sense that it can be used as a loan guarantee as well as in the form of investment grants. This would, in turn, reduce the amount of capital that partner countries need to raise among themselves. In Central Asia, Europe also acknowledges the importance of China to the region, especially after its BRI projects connecting global economies in Asia and Europe (Harada, 2018). Therefore, despite differences in several political and economic issues, it is important to understand that European and Chinese approaches to “connectivity are complementary rather than competing” (Russell, 2019). These complementary interests laid the framework of cooperation on connectivity in Central Asia through the establishment of the EU-China Connectivity Platform in 2015. As part of the platform, a greater synergy is sought between the BRI and

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the EU’s connectivity initiatives. An objective of the Platform is to “facilitate the implementation of infrastructure development in the countries and regions located along the corridors between China and Europe”. One important feature has been the agreement to include “market-based principles and international norms” to gauge the effectiveness of the platform. Norms like openness, transparency, and a level playing field will only help China, especially its BRI project to improve its image in international affairs. For the EU, it will imply sustained cooperation with China as the European system is well-known for its high standard of a moral and rule-based system. The Connectivity Platform and synergetic cooperation between China and the EU will reduce associated risks, such as unsustainable debt or new trade barriers within the Central Asian region. The regional partnership between the two regions was further strengthened at the 20th EU-China Summit in July 2018. The Summit saw a joint statement made by the two sides in relation to the ongoing efforts to forge synergies between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s initiatives such as the “EU Investment Plan” and an extended trans-European transport network. Both sides agreed to expand their networks which include maritime, air and land connectivities. One significant aspect was the cooperation in the development of digital networks which would promote cooperation in hardware and software connectivity. Both also agreed to “undertake joint efforts to implement the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda” (Joint Statement of the 20th EU-China Summit, cited in Bossuyt, 2019). The synergies between the two regions, however, suffer from concerns regarding the nature of development and a diverse understanding of the connectivity objectives. For Cohen and Grant (2019), “European Union involvement in the region is multidimensional in economic terms, it seeks to foster cooperation in improving the investment environment; development of the private sector; promotion of regional trade, cooperation, and connectivity; and enhancement of Central Asia as an energy supplier to the EU”. The focus here is on soft infrastructure which is against the “Chinese understanding of development where the major focus is on building hard infrastructure” (Ibid.) The EU launched a new strategy by the end of 2019 to further streamline the issues between the EU and China and to contribute holistically to the development of Central Asia. A central objective of the 2019 strategy is to put “the EU in a stronger position to contribute to the development of Central Asian countries and to better represent the EU’s interests in the region”, in accordance with

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the “rapidly changing geopolitical and domestic contexts in and around Central Asia” (Putz, 2019). The Central Asian region is undergoing through complex transition, where great power like the US is seeking to divert its attention away from the region, on the other hand, regional and economic giant country like China is preparing to extend its hegemony in the region. Bossuyt (2019) argues that the 2019 strategy “becomes important as it remains the main Western power with an outspoken interest in the region,” given the Russian re-assertive stance in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine. She also asserts that “Central Asian leadership requires EU to counterbalance the influence of Russia and China”. The domestic population in these regions have become more “assertive in expressing their dissatisfaction with their countries’ ‘leaders’, which “creates a historic momentum for the EU to put its weight behind a reform agenda for the region.”

5

Conclusion

The EU can play a significant role in the development of the Central Asian states. It has presented its soft power approach since its 2007 strategy towards the region. Though many experts believe that the EU plays a very timid role as compared to China, this chapter argues that the EU’s egalitarian approach is critical for the holistic development for the Central Asian region. Central Asia gained significant importance in the backdrop of various internal and external developments. Important external developments are China’s resurgence in the region after its accession to the WTO and its BRI, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and Russia’s declining supremacy in the region. Simultaneously, internal issues plague the region—foremost being the barrier to internal connectivity due to inter border issues, ethnic tensions, and dominance of national priorities over regional concerns. In foreign policy parlance, these developments provide both opportunities and challenges for the region. Being a closed economy with underdeveloped markets, China’s BRI provides Central Asia with a wonderful opportunity to be part of the global market where its natural resources could be transported to other parts of the world, especially the EU and China. The BRI promises transport-led infrastructure in the region with many projects already operating. In recent years, China has made significant investments in developing local infrastructure, such as the

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development of roads and railways, which could ease inter- and intra-state movements of goods and people as well as alleviate the burden placed upon the local governments to fund much-needed domestic projects that are much needed. Though the BRI brings much-needed capital and finance to the region with its assurance of “rule-based” business, its credibility as a promising partner is questionable in Central Asia and in other parts of the world for example India, and the South-East Asian region. There are also negative externalities associated with the project, such as the erosion of economic independence as a result of “debt” diplomacy by China and the degradation of the environment due to the passage of unsustainable projects through critical ecological landscapes. Additionally, the perception of Chinese involvement in the region has received a mixed response. If one considers the BRI as a pure commercial project, it may not help the holistic development of the region. Regional trade and “hard” infrastructure play a critical role in regional development but in the case of the BRI, it seems that it has ignored sustainable regional development. Sustainable regional development in Central Asia could be brought about by creating capacities and capabilities of the countries for both interregional and intra-regional connectivity. In the context of inter-regional connectivity, both China and the EU have positioned themselves as the leading actors. The “EU-China Connectivity Platform” strived for greater connectivity through cooperation in Central Asia. However, when it comes to intra-regional connectivity issues, both the external players have failed to acknowledge and act upon the deep division among the Central Asian states which could jeopardise the very objective of “Asia–Europe Connection” in the near future. The EU can play a comprehensive role in this area. Though very limited in terms of capital flows as compared to China, its positive perception in the region is seen in the areas of the world trading system, a source of quality investment and state-of-the-art technologies. Undeniably, the EU has an upper hand in dealing with issues of limited connectivity, regional border issues, and development of human resources through proper education and training. It is the right time for the EU to broaden the dimension of cooperation as the five states are now more consolidated than they were two decades ago. It should be noted that the resource-dependent economies of Central Asia are highly susceptible to external economic shocks, as they faced the case after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and even more recently

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with the economic slowdown in Russia that resulted in lower remittances flowing to the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. It is therefore imperative that they identify new factors that will drive growth in a sustainable and long-term manner. One such factor could be the liberalisation of trade in goods and services. In this regard, the EU’s single market project could be an inspiring model. This would require sectoral liberalisation programmes especially those related to public utilities. The region could benefit from EU policy aid and recommendations which would benefit the region’s market diversion. Data from individual countries support the notion that the EU has greatly contributed to the economic development of the region as a whole. Five Central Asian republics and the EU are at different stages of their bilateral relationship. Most notable are the GSP and GSP+ frameworks, which facilitate access to large European markets. Besides Tajikistan, which meets the standard GSP criteria, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have also joined the EU’s GSP+ arrangement, which grants additional preferences to these countries over and above the standard GSP criteria. Having high-income levels, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are no longer eligible for this programme because they are upper-middleincome countries. Nonetheless, the EU remains a key actor in trade and economic aspects. The key point here is that the relationship is continuously growing, taking into consideration, the evolving China factor and Russian supremacy in the region. The EPCA (Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements) signed with Krygyzstan in 2019 and the most recent, the EPCA with Uzbekistan in July 2022 which includes factors like “Enhanced cooperation in foreign and security policy, with a focus on regional stability and international cooperation, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conflict prevention and crisis management”, is a significant step in recognising the changing geopolitics of the region by EU (European Union External Action, 2022). Furthermore, as one of the most prominent and important partners of the BRI, the EU has the opportunity to act as a strong negotiator on behalf of a better regulatory environment, respect for human rights, the environment, and other matters of social significance. China is likely to cooperate with a strong player and stakeholder, such as the EU. In conclusion, there is great potential for closer regional engagement between Europe and Central Asia, particularly within the framework of China’s BRI. Collaboration between China and Europe will have a significant impact on European outreach to other parts of Asia as well. As

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evident through its recent policies, the EU is becoming more geopolitical. Moreover, Central Asian republics should strive to present themselves as a unified force in the region. As a result of the BRI, the region has a novel opportunity to come together in a way that is unprecedented. The EU’s new multi-faceted role in this framework can help the region benefitting from the BRI. This could offer a possibility of a win–win situation to Central Asian Republics to become self-sustainable in the near future.

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CHAPTER 12

EU-Central Asian Cooperation on Border Management, Migration and Mobility Ildar Daminov

1

Introduction

In the past decade, the topic of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Central Asia in the areas of security and immigration has been becoming increasingly relevant—both politically and academically for the whole Eurasian region. The EU has been actively involved in the formation of migration and border management policymaking in Central Asia since the early 2000s. Due to its strategic geographical location at the crossroads of Eurasia, Central Asia is seen as an increasingly important region for the EU in which cooperation between the two contributes to a better connectivity between the Central Asian and European regions. Specifically, this applies in several fields—combating internationally organised crime, migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, and illicit drug trade. This significance is amplified by the region involvement with the Afghan political process, where political instability remains a

I. Daminov (B) Central European University, Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 249 Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. H. Khan and A. Mihr (eds.), Europe-Central Asia Relations, Europe-Asia Connectivity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8707-6_12

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serious security challenge for the EU after the military withdrawal of the West and fall of Ashraf Ghani’s government. Thus, countering religious extremism has become an important pre-emptive policy field for the EU. Moreover, Brussels’s attempts to establish itself as a geopolitical player in the region are understandable since the Chinese, Russian, and American geopolitical presence in Central Asia have become more and more evident throughout the late 2010s. As Central Asian stability and resilience has become increasingly important for the EU, it put even more emphasis on such issues as promoting the integrated border management concept; combating illegal migration and trafficking; as well as highlighting the importance of abiding by international human rights law in combating international crime. Work on these issues, largely seen as relatively non-political by the Central Asian governments, has created a field of cooperation between the EU and Central Asia with a lot of tangible results. As the 2019 Strategy on Central Asia was expanded in comparison to the previous document (Council of the European Union 2007), more opportunities arose to strengthen the existing linkages between the EU and Central Asia in this area. The research question will focus on identifying the challenges and risks facing the partnership and on outlining potential solutions to them in the broader European and Eurasian context (i.e. this is a descriptive study). The chapter’s central argument is that despite some progress, both the EU and Central Asia have not realised the full potential of interregional cooperation in border management and migration governance. The chapter bases its key arguments both on an extensive literature review and analysis of the available legal texts and policy documents. The concluding part of the chapter also provides policy recommendations that could help the EU to improve its policymaking efforts. This, consequently, may contribute to the EU’s geopolitical goals of counterbalancing the Chinese and Russian influence in the region and help to better involve other important players (e.g. United States, Turkey) into the Central Asian security architecture. To answer the question posed for this chapter, I will use the comparative historical analysis method. Analysis will be conducted through the so-called impact factors—endogenous or exogenous factors that have relevance for determining the potential policy options in ex-ante assessments as defined by the European Commission (EC) in its Better Regulation

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Toolbox (EC, 2019a). This approach allows one to assess the existing baseline, on the one hand, and identify other viable policy options, on the other hand. Seeing these policy lines in a comparative perspective also gives a better understanding of their consequences. In terms of sources, this chapter will focus on reviewing both contemporary literature and the most relevant policy documents and legal texts on the topic. After finalising the descriptive part, the chapter will pinpoint the main challenges by comparing the results of the assessment performed by the European Parliament (EP) as well as by independent assessors (e.g. publications by non-governmental think tanks and independent academics). Having identified the challenges, the chapter will conduct a brief assessment and outline feasible policy lines for the EU.

2

Background

This section identifies the descriptive context of the existing cooperation between Central Asia and the EU Member States as well as other European countries. First, it outlines other available platforms for regional cooperation between the European (incl. EU) and Central Asian macroregions. Then it proceeds to define the official policy goals set out in the EU’s Central Asia strategies as well as by both Central Asia and EU in bilateral cooperation agreements. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and especially its Regional Office in Vienna, which coordinates the work of smaller IOM offices in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, is the broadest institutional (or global) framework for that cooperation. Specifically, the Regional Office “provides technical support to governments to develop national migration frameworks and strengthen migration management systems; coordinates IOM activities and maintains liaison and partnerships with governments, development partners and civil society within the region and represents IOM at the Regional UN System Meeting for Europe and Central Asia” (IOM, 2021). Its institutional framework also connects the Central Asian region not only with the EU Member States, but with the broader region of Europe in general as well as a variety of other relevant international organisation such as United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). Overall, the IOM performs

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the function of a specialised coordinator on migration issues and one of the main capacity builders in the Central Asian region, when supported by the EU and other donors. Naturally, the organisation also serves as a specialised platform for information and best practice exchanges for all its Member States. Another institutional framework at a lower level of multilateral cooperation (i.e. regional or intra-regional) is the OSCE, which is not specifically migration-focused. The OSCE remains the largest security-oriented international organisation as of today, with migration and migration-related issues being one of its many mandates under the security and human rights dimensions. The OSCE offers a variety of opportunities for technical and thematic cooperation—esp. in the areas of border management, security, and trafficking through its Border Management Staff College or the Office of the Special Representatives on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. The OSCE is also instrumental to harmonising the migration-related legislation across the region, capacity building, as well as exchanging good practices between the participating states (OSCE, 2021a). At the regional level of multilateral cooperation, there are also two additional cooperation platforms, which are less institutionalised though. Specifically, those are Prague and Budapest processes that are intended to help the participating states (including the Central Asian countries) to improve their national migration governance regimes using the tools of multilateral cooperation. Both serve as political platforms for discussing sensitive issues in the field of migration, and in both cases the documents adopted in the framework of the process are non-binding. Both are currently managed by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and promoted and funded by the EU. While there are some functional differences, they are not very significant. The Prague process is focused on creating knowledge bases for national expertise, revolving around such projects as ‘Migration Observatory’ and ‘Training Academy’ (Prague Process, 2019a, 2019b), while the Budapest process also serves as an instrument for networking. The Budapest process is broader in its geographic scope, for such countries as the United States, China, and Australia have an observer status. The details and scope of cooperation are most specific at the level of ‘bilateral’ relations between the EU and the region of Central Asia. In that respect, the 2019 EU strategy on Central Asia, which is by far the most comprehensive and detailed strategic document outlining the

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cooperation structure between such a high number of European and Central Asian countries. The strategy was drafted in rather unique political circumstances as several countries in the region—namely, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—underwent socio-political transformations (Baisalov, 2019). Political liberalisation in Tashkent was a particularly encouraging sign for EU policymakers, since Uzbekistan is the most populated nation in Central Asia with unexplored socio-economic potential. The EU, being largely preoccupied with its Eastern and Southern neighbours for the past 20 years, did not pay much attention to Central Asia until the second half of the 2010s (Blockmans & Sahajpal, 2019). China had not then yet announced its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) and Russia’s influence was not seen as potentially destructive. It is exactly for these reasons that despite the idea of creating its first Central Asia strategy, the EU’s approach to the region was flawed with undefined strategic goals—or simply put, the EU did not know what it really wanted. This, in turn, brought about a serious lack of coordination between its regional projects. Since the size of the funds allocated for project implementation was also not as impressive in the early 2000s, the processes of policy formulation and harmonisation were long and tortuous. After the Council and the EP approved the 2007 Central Asia strategy, the document was universally criticised as vague and uncomprehensive. Those criticisms targeted both the entire strategy, in general, and parts of it dedicated to the issues of border management and migration, in particular. Authors in academia were especially sceptical. For example, Korneev in his paper on EU migration governance in the region states that the results of that strategy are at best ‘ambiguous’, and some of the projects can be described as ‘failures’ (2013, p. 302). Lang, on the other hand, argues that despite all the EU efforts to improve the existing Central Asian migration model, it is undergoing a major crisis (Lang, 2017, pp. 8–9). However, criticisms were voiced not only by academia but even in the European political framework. The assessment published by the European Parliamentary Research Service admits that the progress on implementing the 2007 strategy ‘has been uneven’ (Russell, 2019, p. 10), especially in such areas as the rule of law. Trying to respond to those criticisms, the EC and EEAs expanded the 2019 Strategy and made it more specific in showing a willingness to learn from past mistakes. Therefore, the 2019 strategy has put even more emphasis on Central Asian resilience and importance of combating international threats together. In the field of border management and migration governance,

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the EU identifies three major goals and proposes various political and legal instruments to achieve those. The first key goal that the EU has defined in its 2019 Strategy is to: step up cooperation with Central Asia on modern integrated border management… [and] … to intensify cooperation with the region in the fight against organised crime, migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and trafficking in illicit drugs…. (EC, 2019a, 2019b, p. 5)

For that reason, the EC has extended funding for several initiatives including its biggest and most successful EU flagship-projects—‘Border Management in Central Asia’ (BOMCA) and ‘Central Asia Drug Action Programme’ (CADAP). While both projects were launched in early 2000s, the EU has been continuously extending their funding and expanding their scope. The last extension was made by the Juncker Commission until the end of 2020 (BOMCA, 2019; CADAP, 2019). The Von der Leyen Commission decided to keep supporting the BOMCA programme, but discontinued CADAP in 2020. Using these programmes, the EU has been promoting the concept of European ‘integrated border management’ (IBM) in the region, which fits into a broader European/Eurasian security architecture framework as outlined by other regional organisations such as the OSCE (OSCE, 2021a, 2021b). According to the 2010 IBM handbook for Central Asia, that concept supports coordination within and between border services as well as international cooperation ‘establish effective, efficient, and coordinated border management systems, to reach the objective of open, but well controlled and secure borders’ (BOMCA 2010a, p. 14). Even though the concept might have suffered some reputational damage during the 2015 European migration crisis, the Central Asian countries still actively participate in these inter-regional projects on border management and migration governance. This way they can benefit from comprehensive training, sharing of best practices, and access relevant information and data bases. Despite the thematic, content-related differences between BOMCA and CADAP both programmes also have certain conceptual and structural similarities. For example, both programmes focus on capacity building by providing training for national experts and officials, raising public awareness, and fostering regional cooperation. Their results have been tangible and generally positive judging by the slow improvement in

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Central Asia’s performance in World Bank’s border Logistics Performance Index [viii] (World Bank, 2019). Practical handbooks (for example, on European IBM) and policy recommendations published in the framework of these projects created a practically applicable knowledge base for the Central Asian border agencies that they can utilise (BOMCA, 2016). Finally, investments in a national border infrastructure in coordination with a different EU project ‘Border Management in Northern Afghanistan’ (BOMNAF) have helped to improve the security situation in the region, especially on the Tajik-Afghan, Turkmen-Afghan, and UzbekAfghan borders (BOMCA, 2019; Korneev, 2013). Apart from that, due to the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, BOMCA has undertaken some humanitarian functions, which included procurement and distribution of sanitising equipment and PPE sets for the Central Asian border services. Both projects ultimately correspond to the goal outlined in the 2019 Strategy of encouraging Central Asian countries to develop national migration policies and cooperating both bilaterally and multilaterally. The final goal that the EU set out its 2019 Strategy is to focus strengthened cooperation ‘on addressing irregular migration in full respect of human rights’ [bold added by the author]. This part of the strategy is more humanitarian and was, most likely, negotiated with reference to the EU values. The document further elaborates that in that framework, both the EU and Central Asia should also focus on such issues as ‘readmission of irregular migrants and the reintegration of the returnees’, addressing the root causes of irregular migration through promoting vocational training, decent working conditions and quality jobs at home, supporting the legal channels of migration, and establishing effective legislation and systems to assist the victims of trafficking in human beings and the persons in need of international protection. This intersects with other chapters of the Strategy such as enhancing social and economic resilience, strengthening democracy and rule of law. The only process that has been launched in the framework of this goal, however, is the so-called Almaty Process on Refugee Protection and International Migration (IOM, 2013). The process, however, has been largely inactive for the past 7 years. No evidence of any other major projects has been found. Apart from the instruments (projects and processes) corresponding to each of the goals of the 2019 Strategy, there is a complimentary legal instrument that is more comprehensive—PCA or Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EU Monitor, 2019). The substance of

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these agreements varies depending on the country. For example, while Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan [viii] do not have any exact migration and border management-related provisions in their treaties, there are some specifics Articles in the cases of Tajikistan (Article 70), Uzbekistan (Article 72), and Kazakhstan (Article 238). All these agreements envisage possible provision of technical and administrative assistance to the Central Asian republics in different spheres but mostly in the sphere of combating illegal activities. Kazakhstan, however, is the only republic that has a separate title (VII, Articles 261–267) in its EPCA that meticulously describes how the country can receive financial and administrative assistance. Tajikistan’s PCA presents an interesting case with respect to the research question posed in this chapter since it is the only PCA, which specifically stresses that cooperation between the parties will be based on a future needs assessment (Article 70). Finally, there is another complementary legal instrument used in planning, monitoring, and assessing its programmes effectively. Since the Strategy is a very broad document with a long-term vision, there are the so-called Regional Multiannual Indicative Programmes that serve as the administrative foundation of the EU project management in a certain region. They are normally developed by the EEAS and EC. The Multiannual Indicative Programme for Central Asia 2014–2020 covers a wide variety of topics ranging from the issues of financial planning to the impact assessment criteria for project implementation (EEAS & EC, 2014, pp. 9–10) (Table 1). To sum up, throughout the last 25 years of its political presence in the region, the EU has successfully contributed to the development several political and legal instruments that help it in strengthening its ties with Central Asia. However, to determine whether these instruments are fit for the purpose of strengthening the EU’s position in the region, the research needs to identify the impact factors that affect their practical application and implementation.

3

Identifying Challenges Through Impact Factors

This section identifies the key challenges that the EU-Central Asian partnership on migration governance and combating internal crime faces in the broader European and Eurasian framework. The identification is essential to the testing of the hypothesis on whether the current form of

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Table 1 Summary of the existing instruments of cooperation on migration, border management, and mobility between the EU (Source Compiled by the author based on desk research) Institutional framework

Political instruments

Legal instruments

International Organisation for Migration/United Nations (global) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe EU-Central Asia Annual Ministerial Meetings

Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA)

Prague process

Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP)

Budapest process

EU flagship projects in Political processes Central Asia

Almaty process

2019 Strategy on Central Asia (preceded by the 2007 Strategy) (Extended) Partnership and Cooperation Agreements Regional Multiannual Indicative Programmes

the partnership is fit for purpose. When assessing the EU policy implementation challenges, this section examines endogenous and exogenous impact factors. While endogenous factors are something that the EU can theoretically influence, exogenous factors are out of the EU’s control. This section will, therefore, identify the impact factors and then group them to see how their potential consequences look like for EU policymaking. This will help the author to identify better policy adjustment options in the concluding section of the chapter. Poor external coordination is the first and the biggest endogenous impact factor that has been a major issue in the EU’s foreign policy in Central Asia for a long time (Korneev, 2013, pp. 307–315; Russell, 2019). Poor external coordination can be defined as the EU’s inability to efficiently coordinate its project management efforts with other regional stakeholders, which results in project overlaps and ineffective budget spending. For example, the EU often runs its border management and migration governance projects simultaneously with the local OSCE field missions and its Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe (Boonstra, 2011, pp. 13–14). Apart from the OSCE, there is several other organisations active in the region working on the same projects including the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International

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Labour Organisation (ILO). When it comes to bilateral cooperation with other regional players (i.e. China, Russia, the United States), the situation is not that clear either. Even though the EU is occasionally successful at complementing Washington’s regional efforts (Korneev, 2013, pp. 313– 314), that cannot be said about other regional actors—especially Moscow and Beijing. Judging by the official EC documents, the EU does not want to involve them into its projects even for the purpose of burden-sharing. The 2019 Strategy is silent on the Sino-European and Russo-European cooperation in Central Asian migration governance. It does not mention Russia whatsoever and mentions China only three times in the context of the BRI (EC, 2019a, 2019b). The second factor, poor internal coordination, reflects the EU’s inability to quickly respond to internal project management issues. One of the most illustrative examples of how poor internal coordination can reach dramatic scales was an EU-sponsored labour migration project in 2011. While the official EU contractor, IOM, secured funding from the EC delegation in Almaty, the ILO received funding for a very similar regional project from Brussels through its successful application to the EC’s open call for proposals (Korneev, 2013, p. 308). This obviously resulted in a major financial waste and policy overlap. A different but in practical terms similar case is when a Member State and/or its NGOs fund similar projects without any coordination with the EC or its focal points. For example, both the United Kingdom and Sweden have financed such projects from public funds without coordinating that with the EC. Apart from direct policy hazards, this approach creates a lot of confusion within the region itself, as the Central Asian officials fail to understand which projects they should focus on and what the EU really wants from them (ibid., pp. 311–32). The third factor is the level of expertise of the EU diplomats working in the region. Not to say that the EEAS sends unqualified ambassadors to Central Asia—most of the EU ambassadors working in Central Asia speak fluent Russian including Sven-Olov Carlsson, Eduard Stiprais, and Eduard Auer (EEAS, 2019). The same goes for the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Peter Burian. The problem has a different dimension. What the EU delegations in Central Asia lack is a centralised pool of European experts, who not only speak the local languages apart from Russian but also have a deep professional understanding of the region. The lack of well-educated experts on Central Asia prevents both the EEAS and EC from fully using the potential of their regional programmes as the EU is

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forced to rely on local recruitment instead, which is seen as an easier and a cheaper option. Finally, the legal basis of the bilateral relations between the EU and the five Central Asian republics is in many ways uneven. While Kazakhstan enjoys the benefits of an ECPA (Makszimov, 2019), Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have only enjoyed partnership and cooperation agreements (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1999a; Official Journal of the European Communities, 1999b, European Communities 2007). Turkmenistan is still stuck with a mere trade agreement serving as framework for the EU-Turkmenistan relations (EEAS, 2023). Other republics have been working with the EU using normal CPAs. After a lot of encouragement both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan finally started negotiations on their own ECPAs in the late 2010s (Baisalov, 2019), but the situation does not look as promising for Tajikistan even though it expressed interest in starting negotiations. The situation looks rather uneven from the economic perspective too, since Kazakhstan is the only major trading partner for the EU in the region (Makszimov, 2019). In order to ensure the ability of Central Asian countries to resist external pressure from other regional players (i.e. Russia, China), the EU should encourage further steps towards Central Asian cooperation and integration. Institutionalisation of the High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the EU and Central Asian countries as a group is an important first step. Institutionalisation of the Senior Officials’ Meetings should also proceed as a logical continuation step, helping to ensure the integrity of the European approach to the region. Otherwise, the existing unevenness might interfere with the regional cohesiveness of the EU projects in different Central Asian countries. Apart from the endogenous factors, there are exogenous factors that are outside of the EU’s scope of influence. Nevertheless, they still affect its strategy and, thus, are more problematic because of their inherent nature—it is practically impossible to eliminate them. Therefore, the EU can only take them into consideration when making its final decisions for the sake of damage control. The most crucial exogenous factor is the political nature of the Central Asian governments. It is very different when compared to that of the EU Member States or even to that of the other post-Soviet counties. All five nations are, in structural political terms, clan-based presidential republics with various degrees of political oppressiveness with Turkmenistan being the most undemocratic and oppressive and Kyrgyzstan

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landing on the other end of the spectrum (Freedom House, 2019; The Economist, 2019). Therefore, it is obvious that they may intentionally hinder some EU projects, especially in such fields as rule of law and human rights. Moreover, it is exactly because of their political nature that there are still some simmering diplomatic conflicts between some of these states (ref, especially between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). That makes project implementation relatively incohesive (Boonstra, 2011, p. 17; Korneev, 2013, p. 302). Instability of the regional integration processes is the second factor that sometimes can benefit the EU in its policymaking or occasionally obstruct it. Regional integration in Central Asia has been rather volatile since the very first days of post-Soviet independence (Linn, 2012). Even though most of the countries are members to the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS), Council of Turkic States (CTS), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), OSCE, SCO, and CSTO, they do not have their own institutionalised regional platform. That is why, dealing with the region is often tricky for the EU. While there have been some efforts to unify the countries under the umbrella of the so-called Central Asian (Economic) Union, they stalled by the late 2000s with the ever-increasing Uzbek and Turkmen isolationism (ibid., pp. 112–114). However, the EU benefits from the most recent positive trends in this field too. The recent change in political leadership of Uzbekistan and the deepening economic crisis in Turkmenistan encouraged both countries to be open for more proactive regional integration efforts (Blockmans & Panfilova, 2019; Sahajpal, 2019). Furthermore, there is a factor of the unhealthy competition between different international organisations and other EU contractors when it comes to implementing migration and border management-related programmes in the region. Central Asia hosts a great number of field missions and regional offices of various international organisations working on these topics—including the UN, OSCE, IOM, ILO, ICMPD among others. One of the most notorious cases were the contract races between the IOM and ILO, as well as between the OSCE and IOM (Korneev, 2013). Their work in the field is what financially justifies the existence of these organisations. Therefore, however proactive the EU coordination efforts might be, there will always be a risk of unnecessary overlaps in its policymaking efforts. Theoretically, even if a similar project does not receive EU funding, it does not mean that it will not be implemented when there are other donors (e.g. China).

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Finally, the last emerging exogenous impact factor is the COVID19 pandemic, which has largely diverted the EU political focus from foreign policy, especially in the region of Central Asia, to more immediate needs of economic recovery. The EC, as of 2020, has largely focused on domestic issues, trying to ensure an effective financial and economic response to the damage the COVID-19 pandemic has caused to the EU’s economy. A concise summary of the impact factors analysis can be found in Table 2. To conclude, this section has effectively demonstrated that both endogenous and exogenous factors still largely impact the EU policy in Central Asia—quite often negatively. This, consequently, confirms the hypothesis that has been formulated in the introductory subsection. It is exactly those endogenous factors that create more space for improvement Table 2 Identification of endogenous and exogenous impact factors of the EU policies in Central Asia (Source Compiled by the author based on desk research) Impact factors

Endogenous

Exogenous

Poor internal coordination Poor external coordination Insufficient level of local expertise Uneven partnership

Likelihood of occurrence

Potential consequences (hazards)

Rate of influence

Low

Financial losses; overlaps Financial losses; overlaps Financial losses; policy setbacks Policy setbacks; lack of cohesiveness Financial losses; policy setbacks; lack of cohesiveness Policy setbacks; lack of cohesiveness Financial losses; overlap

Short-term

Financial losses; potential loss of political focus

Medium-term

Medium Medium Medium

Political nature of Very high Central Asia

Instability of regional integration Competition between contractors Economic and financial fallout of COVID-19

Medium

High

Very high

Short-term Medium-term Long-term

Short-term

Medium-term

Short-term

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in the EU-Central Asian relations and EU policymaking in the region. This is well illustrated by the recurring problems in the policy efforts analysed above (such as the lack of cohesiveness, policy overlaps, and financial losses among others). Although the impact of exogenous factors cannot be negated, the EU can make policy adjustments to ensure greater policy efficiency. This, however, is discussed in the next subsection.

4

Using Opportunities and Managing Risks

This section will now outline and compare relevant policy adjustment options based on the results of the analysis conducted in the previous sections. To see how the EU can improve its policymaking efforts, this section will analyse the measures targeting endogenous impact factors. First, it will examine the baseline option—that is, whether it would be a viable strategy to maintain the status quo. Then the section suggests two alternative policy lines. It will also elaborate on the possible costs and benefits of every policy option. Methodologically, there is no immediate mutual exclusion when it comes to implementing these policy lines, so they can be seen as separate options or stages of a comprehensive recommendation. 4.1

Policy Line 1/Baseline—Maintaining Status-Quo

The option of adhering to the identified policy line is always on the table. The obvious benefit is the absence of any administrative or financial cost. There is also some political rationale in not changing the course since both EU flagship projects are relatively successful and positively perceived in the region. Moreover, since the EU, like many other regions of the world, is undergoing a process of economic recovery from the 2020 coronavirus recession, the Central Asian policy direction is likely to be halted for some time. The question is, however, whether the EU wants to do achieve more results for less money when the question is back on the table. The current approach is not ideal, and it creates long-term costs for the EU, which could be especially serious considering the 2021 political crisis in Afghanistan. The fact that its policy suffers from the lack of internal and external coordination causes the EU to spend more money than it should by financing overlapping projects or initiatives. When there is an international organisation (e.g. OSCE) or a country (e.g. UK) that

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is already funding a similar project and the EC is unaware of it, unnecessary policy overlaps occur. The same goes for the political processes, Prague and Budapest processes, that overlap regionally and thematically and both receive a major part of their budget from the EU, while not even being actively attended by the Central Asian diplomats. The low political profile of these institutions decreases their overall effectiveness and raises questions about their practicality. On top of all that, there is a problem of public perception of the EU policy efforts. Oftentimes, the EU projects go largely unnoticed by the general populace and even by relevant stakeholders in the field (Laumulin, 2019). 4.2

Policy Line 2—Reassessing Coordination Modalities

Since both external and internal coordination are identified as relevant influence factors in the field, the EU could potentially reassess its coordination modalities to improve its policy implementation. First, this implies reassessment—the EU must get rid of financially irrelevant projects and processes. For example, the Budapest and Prague processes can be merged into one because there is an obvious thematic and functional overlap between them, both are administered by the ICMPD and GIZ, and both suffer from the same problem of low-level political interest on the side of Central Asian republics. Merging these processes will make it easier to administer them, raise their political profile, and decrease expenditures needed for their implementation. There are also some questions about why the EU funds such poorly administered initiatives like the Almaty process and how carefully it sets its regional funding priorities (IOM, 2013). Reassessment will result in a small short-term increase in administrative costs but will bring about a major long-term decrease in financial costs and improve policy cohesiveness. Secondly, the EU needs focal points responsible for liaising with other relevant stakeholders in the field. Expanding the mandate of the EU Special Representative in Central Asia to oversee project implementation and connect focal points in Brussels with the EU delegations in Central Asia should be considered. Institutionalising the form of Senior Officials’ Meetings between the EU and Central Asian countries is another recommended measure. These measures will prevent policy overlaps, potentially save some EU funding, and help to identify new cooperation frameworks. For example, BOMCA could improve coordination with other border management assistance sponsors such as the OSCE and its Border

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Management Staff College in Dushanbe (Boonstra, 2011, pp. 13–14). The EU could also involve FRONTEX in its migration governance and IBM initiatives in Central Asia since FRONTEX does not even have working arrangements with any of the five republics (FRONTEX, 2019) [viii]. Finally, the EU should occasionally cooperate with Russia, China, SCO, and CSTO in some of its regional efforts for the purpose of burdensharing, such as combating religious extremism and strengthening borders is a common goal for the regional stakeholders. 4.3

Policy Line 3—Investing More in Human Potential

As the EU struggles to establish itself in Central Asia as a major geopolitical player, it needs to invest more into its human potential. This policy line concerns not only the spheres of migration governance and border management but the whole strategy in its entirety. This means that the EU needs to search for specialists with a Central Asian studies background and establish interconnected networking platforms in the European research centres and universities where these (future) experts may study and/or work. There are Central Asia studies programmes at various respectable universities—the University of Stockholm, Free University of Berlin, Leiden University, to name a few [viii]. Finding focal points at these institutions and establishing networking platforms with them would ensure that the trainees and interns, who assist the EU delegations in Central Asia today, are more likely to become highly qualified policy experts working for the EEAS and EC in the future. The EU diplomats and experts, who speak not only Russian but also Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik Farsi, or Turkmen, will contribute to the strengthening of positive perception that the European efforts receive in the region. It will also increase the degree of human-to-human contacts, making the EU projects more publicly visible and tangible for both the general populace and professional stakeholders. Since this policy line requires medium financial costs and insignificant administrative costs, the idea of hiring local staff for the purpose of translation might be more attractive (baseline). That may be true for administrative personnel such as, for example, secretaries or administrative clerks. Hiring qualified political experts with academic/professional background in Central Asian studies is more complicated. However, it would ensure the high quality of their research and guarantees that when they return from a field mission, the EU institutions will have a reliable pool of

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Table 3 Summary of policy options for the EU in reassessing its cooperation with Central Asia (risk management perspective) (Source Compiled by the author based on desk research) Policy lines Baseline

Maintaining status-quo

Alternative policy lines

Reassessing coordination modalities

Investing in human potential

Potential benefits

Implementation costs

Rate of influence

-No immediate administrative and financial expenditures required -Gives Brussels some time for EC readjustments -Prevents existing and potential policy overlaps -Prevents medium and long-term financial losses -Ensures regional cohesiveness -Improves the quality of EEAS expertise -Expands the EEAS network of experts on Central Asia or other EU institutions -Boosts the positive perception of the EU projects in the region

-Medium-term policy overlaps -Medium-term financial losses

Medium-term

-Moderate immediate administrative costs -Minimum medium-term financial costs

Medium-term

-Minimum Long-term long-term financial costs -Moderate long-term administrative costs

experts to employ or consult with. Moreover, a diplomatic (professional) profile with the knowledge of local languages and cultures attracts a lot of positive public attention in Central Asia [viii] (Table 3).

5

Conclusion

With the successful implementation of most of its regional programmes crowned by the adoption of its new 2019 strategy, the EU has made a big step forward in cumulatively strengthening the regional criminal

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justice framework and the Central Asian border management systems. Cooperation between the regions has also led to some positive effects at the national level in some specific Central Asian governments. For example, the cumulative effect of the EU-led initiatives has led to a significant improvement of some of the border management strategies in terms of legislative quality in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan (BOMCA, 2010a; BOMCA, 2010b). These positive developments also contribute to more stable regional and intra-regional migration flows in Europe/Central Asia or broader Eurasia, which is becoming politically relevant in the light of the 2021 collapse of the Afghan government and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, if the EU further expands its presence in Central Asia, it faces many challenges of both endogenous and exogenous nature. As the supranational European institutions struggle to coordinate their actions with both the EU member states and other regional stakeholders, it is very likely that European projects will continue to suffer from policy overlaps and consequent financial losses. There is an acute need to better coordinate its efforts with other stakeholders in the region—be it IGOs (e.g. OSCE, ILO) or national governments (e.g. China, Russia, Turkey). The EU should also consider how it could use the existing institutional framework and political instruments in the broader European and Eurasian contexts more effectively. Reassessing coordination modalities, therefore, becomes essential in that respect. If the EU wants to improve the quality of its policymaking, strengthen its image in Central Asia, and create a more visible public profile, it should focus on developing an internal pool of its own experts by cooperating with major European universities and research centres on Central Asia. Moreover, it should further encourage cooperation between Central Asian republics as well as regional integration. While doing that, it is essential to bear in mind that there are other influence factors that can potentially affect the EU policy in a negative way—not only the political nature of Central Asian republics, but also the instability of their regional integration, and the ongoing unhealthy competition between various IOs. That said, a well-defined strategy with clear goals can help to partially mitigate such negative externalities and further strengthen the EU-CA partnership.

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