Turkey's Asia Relations 9783030935146, 9783030935153

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Turkey’s Asia Relations Edited by

om a i r a n a s

Turkey’s Asia Relations

Omair Anas Editor

Turkey’s Asia Relations

Editor Omair Anas Department of International Relations Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University Ankara, Turkey

ISBN 978-3-030-93514-6 ISBN 978-3-030-93515-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

The Narratives in Transitions Introduction Omair Anas Three Transitions in Turkey’s Foreign Policy Omair Anas Ottoman–Asia Relations: A Study of the Ottoman and Mughal Relations Emre Yürük

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A Post-Cold War Era Context of Turkey’s Asia Relations Omair Anas

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Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Asian Media Opinions Sumaiyah Ahmed

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Strategic Diversification Turkey’s Relationship with Afghanistan and the Pakistan Factor: An Examination of Historical and Geopolitical Factors Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Abdul Basit

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CONTENTS

Turkish-Asian Cooperation in Diversified Strategic Environment Merve Seren

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Turkey’s Policy Towards Crisis Regions in Asia After 2002 Muhammed Huseyin Mercan and Güliz Dinç

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Turkey’s Asia Opening: Problems and Prospects Necati Anaz

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The Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle Corridor and Turkey’s Asia Policy: An Analysis Ejaz Hussain

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The Transactions Between the Two Worlds: Turkey’s Repositioning in the Global Economy Mehmet Babacan

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Turkey’s Balancing Efforts in Its Economic Relations with Asia Altay Atlı

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Energy Security in Turkey’s Asia Relations Javed Zafar

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Appendix

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Conclusion

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Sumaiyah Ahmed is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Hamdard University in New Delhi. She did her M.Phil. and Ph.D. from Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. She has published articles on counter-terrorism, Islamic activism among women, and women’s empowerment in the Gulf States. She is also Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Studies of Plural Societies in New Delhi. Dr. Zahid Shahab Ahmed is a Research Fellow at Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization, Deakin University. Dr. Ahmed is an expert on peace and security in South Asia and the Middle East and works on foreign policy analysis, international organizations, and diplomacy. During 2017–19, he was a non-resident research fellow with the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy. Prior to joining Deakin University in April 2016, he was Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Peace and Stability, National University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan. He has also worked at other Australian Universities like the University of New England and Charles Sturt University. He is the author of Regionalism and Regional Security in South Asia: The Role of SAARC (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). Omair Anas teaches International Relations at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University. He did his Ph.D. and M.Phil. in West Asian Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He worked as Research

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Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi during 2015–2018. He was also Visiting Scholar at Freie University Berlin, Germany, during 2012–2013. He has published research papers and chapters in many journals and edited volumes on Turkish and Indian foreign affairs. He specializes in and teaches Non-Western International Relations, Middle East-Asia Relations, Religion and Politics, and Arab Media Culture. He publishes expert opinions and columns for many prominent organizations. Middle East Eye, Indian Express, First Post and Daily Sabah, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, Al Jazeera Studies, and Al Sharq Foundation are a few among them. Necati Anaz is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of Istanbul University. He completed his Ph.D. in 2012 at the University of Oklahoma, US, with the thesis entitled “Mapping Geopolitical Imaginations: Turkish Audiences and the Valley of the Wolves-Palestine”. His recent publications include a book Diaspora Representation System (2018) and several articles in international and national academic journals such as Turkish Studies, the Arab World Geographer, and Turkish Security Studies. His opinions and commentaries have appeared on Daily Sabah and Star Newspaper. Altay Atlı is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations of Koç University, and the founding director of “Atlı Global”, an Istanbulbased business advisory firm. He has a B.A. degree in Economics at Bo˘gaziçi University, an M.A. degree in International Business at Deak in University in Melbourne, Australia, and obtained his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science and International Relations of Bo˘gaziçi University. Dr. Atlı was chosen a “Global Emerging Voices Fellow” by Torino World Affairs Institute, in partnership with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Australian National University, and Stiftung Mercator; and he was recognized as a “Young Academics Fellow” by the Global Relations Forum. He hosts a weekly TV show, “Rising Asia”, on a Turkish business television channel “Ekotürk”. He also appears regularly on Bloomberg, BBC World, Turkish Radio Television (TRT), TvNet, CGTN, Channel News Asia, China Radio International, commenting on developments to speak on global affairs and Turkey’s international relations. Mehmet Babacan is an Associate Professor at the Department of Economics and Finance at Istanbul Medipol University, Turkey. He is

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also a member of the Auditing Committee of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) since May 2015. He has earned his Ph.D. in Economics from Marmara University in 2011 and completed M.A. in Economics from the John E. Walker Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson, US. His recent publication includes a co-edited volume, Turkish Economy Between Middle Income Trap and High Income Status (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), besides dozens of articles in several journals, including in Afro Eurasian Studies, Insight Turkey, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, and Economics and Politics. Abdul Basit is a Research Fellow and head of the South Asia desk at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore. He specializes in South Asian security issues with a primary focus on terrorism and religious extremism in the Af-Pak region. He is also the Associate Editor of ICPVTR’s open-access quarterly journal Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA). He regularly publishes commentaries and peer-reviewed research articles on the mentioned topics. Güliz Dinç is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Turkey. She did her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, US in 2012. Dinç’s research focuses on religious movements, political parties, and civil society focusing on questions of democratization and human rights in Turkey and the Middle East. Ejaz Hussain is an Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He did Ph.D. in Political Science from Heidelberg University Germany in 2010 and M.A. in Asian Studies from Lund University, Sweden (2006). Besides his forthcoming co-edited volume on Perspectives on Contemporary Pakistan: Governance, Development and Environment (Routledge, 2020), he has authored Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan (New Delhi, 2013). His articles have appeared in journals such as Armed Forces & Society and on media outlets such as BBC, The Express Tribune, The First Post, The Quint, Newsline, The Friday Times, Global Times, Daily Times, and Naya Daur. Hussain has been a Visiting Fellow at Fudan University, China, Postdoc Fulbright Fellow at UC Berkeley, USA.

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Muhammed Huseyin Mercan is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Marmara University, Istanbul. Before joining Marmara University, he was teaching at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Turkey. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from Istanbul University in 2017 and an M.A. degree from Yıldız Technical University in the field of International Relations. He has published two books, Syria: Regime and Foreign Policy (2012, in Turkish) and The Rise and Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: Political Institutionalization Question of the Islamic Movements (2019, in Turkish) and an edited volume Transformation of the Muslim World in the 21st Century in 2016. Merve Seren is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Turkey, and also teaching at the postgraduate school of National Defense University, Ankara. She did Ph.D. from the Turkish Military Academy, where she worked on “Strategic Intelligence and National Security”. She was Erasmus Scholar at Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms Universität Bonn, Germany. Seren is a US Legislative Fellow, Atlantic Council Young Atlanticist Fellow and IISS-Southeast Asian Young Leader. Her commentaries on the defence and military affairs appear on Al Jazeera, Al Arabia, TRT World, CNN Türk, and other portals. She has published several papers in edited volumes and for institutes such as Middle Technical University, CAST, John Hopkins, STM, TASAM, and SETA. Emre Yürük is Assistant Professor at Black Sea Technical University, Trabzon, Turkey. He obtained his Ph.D. from the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He completed his Masters in History from Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon, Turkey (2014). He is a recipient of a YLSY scholarship from the Ministry of National Education of the Turkish Republic for Indian Studies since 2014. He was Erasmus Fellow at Potsdam University, Potsdam, Germany, during 2011–2012. He has published several research articles on historical issues of the Mughal and Ottoman Empires, their military history, and India–Ottoman relations in various journals that include International Journal of Research in Social Sciences, History Studies, AIJRHASS, Pamukkale University Journal of Social Sciences Institute and PESA International Journal of Social Studies in both Turkish and English.

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Javed Zafar is the Research Coordinator and Knowledge Architect at the Centre for Study and Research, Hyderabad and Delhi, India. He earned his Ph.D. in political geography from Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He has published more than twenty research papers in journals that include The Arctic Review and for Centre for Strategic Assessment and Forecasting, Russia. He is an Expert Member on hybrid warfare and hybrid security threats in the panel of the Centre for Strategic Assessment and Forecasting. He has been a member of the editorial board of The Russian Academic Journal between 2015 and 2017.

List of Figures

Between the Two Worlds: Turkey’s Repositioning in the Global Economy Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7 Fig. 8 Fig. 9

Turkey’s total trade (in bn USD) (Source Turkish Statistical Institute [TurkStat]) Turkey’s HH Market Concentration Index (2002–2018) (Source World Bank Group—World Integrated Trade Solution [WITS]) Turkey’s Export Market Penetration Index (2002–2019) (Source World Bank Group—World Integrated Trade Solution [WITS]) Shares from the world trade (exports) of the EU and Asia (2002–2020) (Source WTO, UNCTAD) Shares from the world trade (imports) of the EU and Asia (2002–2020) (Source WTO, UNCTAD) Shares in Turkey’s exports (Europe, Asia and the Middle East) (Source TurkStat, International Trade Centre [ITC]) Shares in Turkey’s imports (Europe, Asia and the Middle East) (Source TurkStat, International Trade Centre [ITC]) Turkey’s Rank in Ease of Doing Business Index (Overall, 2008–2019) (Source World Bank Doing Business [2020]) Industry (including construction), value-added for selected countries (% of GDP) (Source World Development Indicators [WDI]; as of 2019)

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 10 Fig. 11

Employment in industry for selected countries (% of total employment)* (Source World Bank Open Data; as of 2019) Turkey’s FDI stock market value (bn USD) (Source CBRT)

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Turkey’s Balancing Efforts in Its Economic Relations with Asia Chart 1 Chart 2

Chart 3 Chart 4

Turkey’s bilateral trade with the regions of the world in 2019 ($bn) (Source TUIK) Turkey’s bilateral trade volume with Asia (selected countries) ($bn) (Source Calculated by the author using TUIK data) Turkey’s exports and imports with Asia (selected countries) ($bn) (Source Calculated by the author using TUIK data) Regional sources of FDI into the Turkish economy, 2018 ($bn) (Source Turkish Central Bank [TCMB, n.d.])

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List of Tables

Turkey’s Asia Opening: Problems and Prospects Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

Turkey’s diplomatic posts in Asia International students in Turkey from Asia with their country of origin Turkey’s volume of trade with Asian countries (Million US Dollar, 2020) THY flights and frequencies

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Between the Two Worlds: Turkey’s Repositioning in the Global Economy Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

Top Trade Partners of the European Union (Extra-EU Trade) Turkish exports by broad economic categorisation (in mn USD) Turkish imports by broad economic categorisation (in mn USD) Turkey’s target countries for strengthening trade

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Energy Security in Turkey’s Asia Relations Table Table Table Table

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Population, economy and energy in Turkey, 1973–2020 Turkey coal production consumption and import Turkey’s oil consumption (million metric tonnes) Turkey gas consumption

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 5 Table 6

Turkey gas import sources (Figures in %) Shares of different countries in oil supply to Turkey (Figures in %)

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The Narratives in Transitions

Introduction Omair Anas

The history of Turkey’s Asia relations has received more attention in the precarious diplomatic exchanges and competitions among the Ottoman, British, and Russian Empires. The post-empire Turkey–Asia relations evolved in the context of a long process for independence and nationbuilding. By the time Asian countries gained independence in the 1940s and the Cold War had to ensue, Turkey’s foreign policy and strategic choices were made in favour of the West. The existing literature on Turkey’s Asia relations can be broadly divided into three themes: first, a considerable part of literature is related to historical relations between the Ottoman and Asian Empires in India, China, East Asia, and Central Asia. Prof. Salim Cöhce (2008), Prof. Azmi Özcan (2010), Prof. N.R. Farooqi (1988), Prof. Aftab Kamal Pasha (2006), Ismail Hakki Kadi (Kadı & Peacock, 2020), M.N. Qureshi (1978), and other scholars have mainly highlighted the historical relations between Ottoman Turkey and the Asian empires and kingdoms. M.N. Qureshi and Azmi Ozcan had

O. Anas (B) Department of International Relations, Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_1

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focused on Turkey–Asia relations during the later Ottoman time when the Khilafat Movement was unfolded to support the Ottoman Empire. The re-narration of empire-era relations into today’s hyper nationalistic and polarised regional and international politics ignores the historical contexts that do not exist today. For example, in Turkey’s relations with Asia, pan-Islamism, pan-Turanism, and pan-Asianism had made a significant contribution in the Ottoman Empire’s reach to the Asian people in competition with the British and Russian Empires. While British and Russian Empires’ politics rarely recur in today’s international political discourse, the Ottoman-era political narratives, such as neo-Ottomanism, Khilafat, and pan-Islamism, have become more frequent in the contemporary discussions, more often with misplaced contexts, as Cemil Aydin (2006, 2007), Hakan Yavuz, and Behlul Ozkan have pointed out in their works. Historians such as M.N. Farooqi, Azmi Ozcan, Selim Cohce, and Ismail Hakki Kadi have widely covered the Ottoman–Asia relations in which Turkey’s relations with both Asia’s local rulers and their colonial rulers have been discussed (Cöhçe, 2000; Farooqi, 1988; Hameed et al., 2020; Özcan, 1993, 1995). As most of these works are based on Ottoman archives, British colonial officials and individuals, too, have widely discussed the Ottoman affairs in Asia, particularly with regard to the Russian threat to India. George Edward Westmacott (1838) mentions his interactions with Indian traders who had complained that the Russian goods were increasingly dominating the Indian markets. Secret Russian emissaries became more frequent in this period (p. 17). Among many objectives of the Euphrates Valley Railway of the British Government, as stated by Captain W. B. Selby, H.M. Indian Navy, and Surveyor in Mesopotamia wrote to the chairman of Euphrates Valley Railway W.P. Andrew (1871, 1873) that “invasion of India by Russia or any other power would cease even to be speculated one” (Selby, 1864, p. 8). In 1856, when the route of the Railway was proposed, the Turkish government had guaranteed “6 percent, on £1,400,000, the capital necessary for the first section of the Mediterranean to the Euphrates” (The Euphrates Railway, 1858, p. 5). To counter the British plan, Russia had also proposed its Railway (Baker, 1917) via Moscow-Alexandrov GaiKhiva-Bokhara-Termez-Kabul-Peshawar or Moscow-Orenburg-TashkentBokhara-Kushka-Kandarh. Russia also favoured an Indo-European railway network via Berlin and Constantinople, Bushehr, and Karachi, but none of the plans were fully realised as the Great Game had only turned more

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chaotic and consuming. Meanwhile, Turkey would tilt to Germany by the early twentieth century. Local newspapers in Hindi and Urdu covered Turkish affairs more favourably and sympathetically even when Britain Turkey fell out in the early twentieth century. Local Indian rulers started looking at the British government as betraying an ally and friendly nation. The dismemberment of Turkey would gradually appear as the main theme of discussion in these papers as the British government would come more in favour of anti-Turkey Arabian tribes to take over the Holy shrines of Mecca and Medina. The second set of literature has evolved mostly around the bilateral relations of Turkey with Asian countries. As modern Asia–Turkey relations are not that strong, the subject’s literature remains limited compared to the vast body of literature written about Turkey’s relations with the West or the Middle East. On Turkey–China relations (Atlı, 2015; Gong, 2011; Lavi & Lindenstrauss, 2016; Shichor, 2014; Ünal, 2016; Yellinek, 2017; Dellios & Yilmaz, 2008; Yilmaz, 2008; Zan, 2009, 2016) have contributed. On India–Turkey relations (Alam, 2007; Anas, 2017; Çolako˘glu & Güler, 2011; Çolako˘glu, 2012; Dogrol, ˙ i, ˙ 2015; Malkoç, 2017; Moha1951; Duman, 2014; Ersungur & Ekinc patra, 2008; Pasha, 2006) have covered mostly modern relations. One more country on which Turkish scholars particularly have contributed is Japan–Turkey relations (Merthan Dündar, 2003; Merthan Dündar, 2019; Pehlivanturk, 2012) have covered mostly historical perspectives. Prof. Dundar has mainly covered the historical part of Ottoman–Japan relations and briefly the modern period as well. A third theme that has not yet emerged helps to understand Turkey– Asia relations in regional and global perspectives. Anas (2020), Atlı (2020), Aydin (1996, 2004), Balci and Liles (2018), Hasan (1964), Kanat (2012), Kasim (2015), Kassimeris (2010), Kutlay and Dogan (2011), and Vamvakas (2009) have attempted to draw a regional perspective on Turkey’s evolving Asia policy. Kanat argues that the US’s AsiaPacific policy had also provided an opportunity to rejuvenate US–Turkey relations towards cooperating in the Asia-Pacific. Turkey is pursuing “a more multilayered and multidimensional foreign policy” to connect to the different parts of the world, such as Asia. Free Trade talks “can play an indirect role in improving economic ties” to “transform their economic cooperation into political coordination and form partnerships within international organisations.” Turkish foreign policymakers’ efforts to establish relationships in the Asia–Pacific overlap with the US’s attempt

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to rejuvenate its relationship with this region (Kanat, 2012, p. 162). He finds the US and Turkey’s overlapping interests based on increased US– Turkey cooperation in the pacific. He counts the Uyghur issue, promoting shared interests in other parts of the world, the security of energy pipelines in Central Asia, Afghanistan. However, he sees the Turkey–US partnership as “different from the alliance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War” (Kanat, 2012, p. 165). The model partnership between the US and Turkey had never taken off, and Turkey’s Asia policy has to depend much on China. Kadir Temiz has also provided a regional and international perspective of China–Turkey relations and how China has maintained a neutral Cyprus policy to balance its relations with Turkey (Temiz, 2018, p. 90). Yellinek of Israeli think tank BESA points out that Turkey–China relations are fragile and Turkey’s reactions on the Uyghur minority issue often remain a thorny issue. The alliance may well hold up, as neither side has many viable alternatives nevertheless (Yellinek, 2017, p. 4). These works have attempted to draw a regional perspective for Turkey’s Asia relations and have offered various competitive narratives. One of these narratives supports the view that Turkey’s growing relations with Asia should be seen as an alternative to Turkey’s failing relations with the West. However, others attempt to see the merit of diversification or multidimensionalism in Turkey’s “beyond west” foreign relations (Kanat, 2010). A third view emerging in Ankara, as Kanat views, is that Turkey’s growing relations with the West are also supportive to the West’s larger security and economic worldview, and hence Turkey–Asia relations would not advance against the interests or at the cost of the West. Official statements from Ankara have often defended their Asia Anew approach within this narrative. This volume has invested special efforts in understanding these narratives beyond the routine discussion on bilateral developments. A fourth emerging theme is Turkey’s economic relations with Asia, mainly China, and its Belt and Road Initiative. Atli Altay, for example, looks into (Atli, 2011, 2018, 2020; Babacan, 2011; Çolako˘glu, 2019; ˙ Ikiz, 2020; Isik & Zou, 2019; Niu & Li, 2019) have looked at Turkey– China relations from the perspective of Belt and Road Initiative. A study by a think tank close to the Turkish government Siyaset, Ekonomi Ve Toplum Ara¸stirmalari Vakfi, has published a detailed study on Turkey– China relations that cautions the Turkish government of the existing problems in the relationship. They share the concerns of “one-sided,” “unsustainable,” and “asymmetric” relations (Dilek et al., 2019). In other

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articles as well, the lack of balanced trade relations makes a major discussion. However, there are limited works on why Turkey failed to bridge the trade balance with most of the Asian economies and has a better trade balance with the Western countries. This could lead to a new discussion on the political economy of Turkey’s foreign policy and Turkey’s failure to transform its economy for Asian demands. This volume attempts to discuss Turkey’s Asia relations from their historical, strategic, and economic perspective. The volume, instead of evaluating the ongoing bilateral ties, pays more attention to the fourfold problems that Turkey’s Asia relations face, namely, the strategic limitations (West vs. Non-Western relations), the political economy (expansion beyond Europe), Asia’s changing balancing acts (e.g. India vs. China vs. Pakistan), and politics of discourse. The volume covers these discussions starting from imperial and post-imperial perspectives of Turkey–Asia relations to the transition they have undergone aftermath. The contributors have relied on Ottoman and the republican-era archives, documents, and media records to explain what has been driving Turkey’s Asian interests. The strategic diversification which Turkey’s Asia relations aim at has also been evaluated both in terms of its changing relations with Turkey’s Western allies and Turkey’s ability to deal with new Asian realities such as bilateral conflicts or regional rivalries. This volume explains how the Ottoman–Asia relations had historically evolved and ended with the end of empires. It also discusses how Turkey’s economic imperatives are shaping Turkey’s overall quest for a new foreign policy beyond the West-centric relations. It also covers Turkey’s growing geopolitical ambitions in its immediate and distant regions. The volume points out that the basis of reciprocity in Turkey–Asia relations is changing steadily in favour of Asia. Turkey’s relations with its Western allies are becoming less or non-reciprocal. Bruce R. Kuniholm points out it as the basis for assessing Turkey–West relations after the Soviet threat had diminished and security concerns were shifting (Kuniholm, 1991, p. 34). Kuniholm sees reciprocity in Turkey–West relations as an essential factor that has changed since the Cold War. He argued that Turkey’s role aftermath of the Gulf wars (1991) would be seen “in concert with its European allies or without them.” It means that “the EU’s vital interests in the Persian Gulf with a security framework anchored in part in Turkey.” Kuniholm maintained that Turkey’s post-war geopolitical importance depended on its being seen in a European, as well as a Middle Eastern context and aftermath of the Cold War depended on its being seen in a Middle Eastern as

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well as a European context. Kuniholm argues that Turkey’s becoming a member of the EU would have safeguarded the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Kuniholm, 1991, p. 48). With the decline of reciprocity in Turkey’s Western relations, Turkey’s intellectual and political departure from the West is becoming more visible. However, the paper argues that Turkey under Erdogan is not approaching the point of departure from its Western foreign and security relation; instead, it seeks a “diversification” of its relations beyond the West. The second chapter on “Three Transitions in Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” by Omair Anas, discusses a troubled intellectual yet incomplete transition of Turkey’s foreign policy from the Empire to the nation-state. The paper discusses three transformative transitions, starting from an Ottomanist foreign policy to Nationalist/Kemalist foreign policy to a Cold and post-Cold-War politics. Since the rise of the Erdogan-led conservative government, new vocabularies such as zero-problem policy, strategic depth, Eurasianism, multidimensionalism, diversification, or Asia Anew have been floated to fill the gaps in Turkey–Asia relations. In Turkey’s renewing its relations with the non-Western world, keywords like neo-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, pan-Asianism, pan-Turanism, Islamism, and nationalism have frequented the public and academic discussions on Turkey’s foreign policy. These debates remind the Ottoman-era intellectual Yusuf Akcura’s “Three Types of Policies (Uç Terz Siyaset).” In the third chapter on “Ottoman–Asia Relations: A Study of the Ottoman and Mughal Relations,” Emre Yürük argues that the geostrategic division of the three empires, the Ottomans, the Safavids, and the Mughal, has not only stopped the Ottomans from further expansions but also shaped the future of their relations with the upcoming colonial order. The mechanism of legitimacy, ways of cooperation, and competitions that these three empires evolved, this paper argues, still shapes the strategic perception of modern nation-states. As the Mughals never recognised the Ottomans as the Caliphate, the Ottoman–Mughal relations were shaped by a set of geopolitical, religious, and trade competitions. In the fourth chapter, “A Post-Cold War Era Context of Turkey’s Asia Relations,” Omair Anas explains the context of the Cold and postcold foreign policy and the evolution of Turkey’s bilateral and regional perspectives. The article provides a brief survey of Ottoman and the republic-era Turkish archives of its relations with Asian countries. It finally analyses the problems of post-cold war relations with countries like India,

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Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, and other countries. The paper argues that Turkey is yet to find a working balancing act or a post-Cold War template towards these countries. Sumaiyah Ahmed’s article on “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Asian Media Opinions” surveys major English language newspapers’ Op-Eds on Turkish affairs. Based on an analysis of editorials of selected Asian countries, Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, and India, she argues that these countries’ perspectives on Turkey are shaped not only by their bilateral relations with Turkey, but also by Turkey’s politics in other regions. Turkey’s military operations in Syria, its role in the Middle East, its relations with NATO and the European Union have been widely discussed by Asian media. Most of the newspapers appear to be critical of Turkey’s overall foreign policy. The second section begins with Zahid Shadab Ahmed and Abdul Basit’s article (“Turkey’s Relationship with Afghanistan and the Pakistan Factor: An Examination of Historical and Geopolitical Factors”) on Turkey’s changing role in South Asia in the context of the Afghanistan crisis. Turkey is looking for a new role in Afghanistan aftermath of the US withdrawal in August 2021. Turkey may seek to revive its Cold War-era role in the region, with help of a careful balancing between the US and Russia and China. Even though the Taliban have taken over Afghanistan before the much-talked negotiated transition of power, the Taliban would need a long and sustained diplomacy in order to win legitimacy and international recognition. Turkey, like most of the western countries, is encouraging the Taliban to be more inclusive if they want Turkish support. Chapter seven of Merve Seren on “Turkish–Asian Cooperation in Diversified Strategic Environment,” explains how Ankara’s quest for “self-sufficiency” and “strategic autonomy” is bringing Turkey closer to the Asian security environment. With a goal to change its profile of “security consumer” to become a “security provider,” the ruling AK Party’s conservative philosophical foundations have also helped the country to expand and diversify Turkey’s strategic view. However, in her view, Asia still remains a conceptual and operational puzzle for many Turkish policymakers. In her view, Turkey does not have a choice of “either Asia or NATO/EU,” just like many other NATO/EU members such as France, Germany, or the UK don’t have this difficulty in their relations with Asian powers. Muhammed Huseyin Mercan and Güliz Dinç’s chapter (chapter eight) on “Turkey’s Policy Towards Crisis Regions in Asia After 2002” discusses how Turkey responded to at least four Asian problems, mainly, the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the

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Uyghur Muslims of China’s Xinjiang province, the Rohingya Muslims and the Moro–Philippine reconciliation. The ruling AK Party wants to re-establish Turkey as a powerful and influential actor in world politics. Turkey has evolved different approaches for these four conflicts, which show that Turkey’s view of conflicts is shaped by certain determinants and state to state relations as one of the important factors among them. Except on Kashmir, Turkey has secured limited or good success except on Kashmir dispute which, in their view, has involved many stakeholders. In his paper on “Turkey’s Asia Opening: Problems and Prospects,” Necati Anaz (chapter nine) explains Turkey’s use of state and non-state soft power assets. Although Asia comes third in Turkey’s diplomatic circle, after the Balkans and Africa, Asia has come in Turkey’s policy focus as Turkey expands its trade and political and cultural exchanges with the continent. This chapter investigates Turkey’s soft power initiatives in the form of diplomatic missions, educational foundations, entertainment and commercial investments, and how Turkey is resetting its Asia policy under the Asia Anew approach. This paper argues that Turkey’s soft power initiatives and public diplomacy capacity are more constructive on one hand and limited and short-winded on the other, based on economic and societal crises at home and geopolitical conditions in the region. Ejaz Hussain’s chapter (ten) “The Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle Corridor and Turkey’s Asia Policy: An Analysis” looks at how the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative may shape the future direction of Turkey’s Asia relations as well as its trade relations with the region. He tries to answer whether the Belt and Road Initiative has factored into Turkey’s Asia policy and the extent to which the Middle Corridor Initiative can complement the BRI. Concerning complementarity, the study analysed the existing scale of China-Turkey trade and deductively proposed a set of opportunities offered by both the BRI and the MCI. The third section on trade and economy includes four articles. Mehmet Babacan contributed a chapter (eleven) on “Between the Two Worlds: Turkey’s Repositioning in the Global Economy,” in which he explained how Turkey had demonstrated a unique ability to both extend its integration to the global economy in horizontal and vertical axes while taking its path to indigenous industrialisation as a means of navigating the uncharted waters of uncertainty since the latest financial crisis of 2008. However, this journey has entered a new global context where Turkey’s economic and political rise faces the changing global environment driven by disruption and renewed protectionism. By developing more capacity

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to extend its reaches in global production networks and trade routes through specialisation and diversification at the same time, Turkey may overcome this global competition. In his article titled “Turkey’s Balancing Efforts in Its Economic Relations with Asia,” Altay Atlı (chapter twelve) provides an overview of Turkey’s trade relations with the countries of East, South, and Southeast Asia, emphasising the large overall trade deficit that Turkey has with this region. He argues that Turkey makes efforts to have a more balanced relationship with Asia, by drawing more direct investment, especially in the form of large infrastructure projects as well as investments inducing technology transfer, from the region’s economic powerhouses. Javed Zafar’s paper (chapter thirteen) on “Energy Security in Turkey’s Asia Relations” (chapter thirteen) argues that Turkey is reconnecting with Central Asia to achieve two goals, to reunite with the greater Turkic world, and make their energy resources part of Europe’s energy security. However, Iran and Russia closely watch Turkey’s Central Asia policies and have often blocked Caspian Sea projects where Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have tried to connect with Turkey. Moreover, China’s expanding economic reach, particularly the Belt and Road Initiative, is establishing a new China-led economic order. If connected with the European energy market, via Turkey, the Central Asian countries would have a greater strategic economy against their mighty neighbours, Russia and China. I want to thank the Palgrave MacMillan team and especially my editor Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun for her cooperation and support in facilitating the project. The contributors of the book deserve my gratitude for their patience for the prolonged process of producing this collection. My gratitude also goes to many unnamed officials, friends, and colleagues in Turkey whose intellectual inputs and support helped to understand the complexity of Turkey’s Asia relations. My research assistant Almas Ahmed deserves my sincere thanks for helping me in the painstaking process of editing and proofreading the manuscript. The support of my wife, Dr. Sumaiyah Ahmed, was of most importance in successfully managing our family and teaching responsibilities.

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Anas, O. (2017). Modi-Erdogan meeting: Convergence between India and Turkey. Issue Brief: Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, India. Anas, O. (2020). The evolution of Turkey’s Asia policy in historical and contemporary perspectives. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1808379 Andrew, W. (1873). The Euphrates Valley route to India: In connection with the Central Asian question. https://jstor.org/stable/10.2307/60227682 Andrew, W. P. (1871). The Euphrates route to India: Letters addressed to the British and Turkish governments, etc. With introductory remarks and appendix. https://jstor.org/stable/10.2307/60235932 Atli, A. (2011). Businessmen as diplomats: The role of business associations in Turkey’s foreign economic policy. Insight Turkey, 13(1), 109–128. Atlı, A. (2015). A view from Ankara: Turkey’s relations with China in a changing Middle East. Mediterranean Quarterly, 26(1), 117–136. Atlı, A. (2018). Turkey as a Eurasian transport hub: Prospects for inter-regional partnership. Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, 23(2), 117–134. Atlı, A. (2020). The political economy of Turkey’s relations with the Asia-Pacific. Turkey’s Political Economy in the 21st Century (pp. 271–295). Springer. Aydin, M. (1996). Turkey and central Asia: Challenges of change. Central Asian Survey, 15(2), 157–177. Aydin, M. (2004). Foucault’s pendulum: Turkey in central Asia and the caucasus. Turkish Studies, 5(2), 1–22. Aydın, C. (2006). Beyond civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism and the revolt against the west. Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue d’histoire Européenne Contemporaine, 4(2), 204–223. Aydin, C. (2007). The impact of WWI on Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asianist visions of world order. In The politics of anti-Westernism in Asia (pp. 93–126). Columbia University Press. Babacan, M. (2011). Whither an axis shift: A perspective from Turkey’s foreign trade. Insight Turkey, 13(1), 129–157. Baker, H. D. (1917). The proposed connection of the Russian and Indian railway systems. Geographical Review, 4(2), 92–102. https://doi.org/10. 2307/207289 Balci, B., & Liles, T. (2018). Turkey’s comeback to Central Asia. Insight Turkey, 20(4), 11–26. Cöhçe, S. (2000). XIX. Yüzyılın Sonlarında ve XX. Yüzyılın Ba¸slarında Osmanlı Devleti’nde Fikir Hareketleri. Erdem, 12(35), 329–355. https://dergipark. org.tr/en/pub/erdem/548563 Cöhce, S. (2008). Büyük Ortado˘gu Projesi Ba˘glamında Hindistan ile Ortado˘gu ˙ skiler. Gazi Akademik Bakı¸s, 2(3), 65– Arasındaki Tarihi Ba˘glar ve Güncel Ili¸ 80. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/gav/issue/6528/86558

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˙ H., & Peacock, A. C. S. (2020). Ottoman prisoners of war in Burma. Kadı, I. In Ottoman-Southeast Asian relations (2 vols., pp. 958–978). Brill. Kanat, K. B. (2010). Ak Party’s foreign policy: Is Turkey turning away from the West? Insight Turkey, 12(1), 205–225. Kanat, K. B. (2012). America’s Asia-Pacific strategy and Turkish-American partnership. Insight Turkey, 14(2), 157–175. Kasim, K. (2015). Turkey-Taiwan relations in the context of Turkey’s Asia Pacific ˙ skiler / International Relations, 12(45), 83–100. policy. Uluslararası Ili¸ Kassimeris, C. (2010). Turkey’s foreign policy options: Europe, the USA or Central Asia? Contemporary Politics, 16(3), 321–336. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13569775.2010.501653 Kuniholm, B. (1991). Turkey and the West. Foreign Affairs, 70(2), 34–48. Kutlay, M., & Dogan, S. (2011). Turkey and Central Asia: Modern economic linkages along the Silk Road. Journal of Turkish Weekly. Lavi, G., & Lindenstrauss, G. (2016). China and Turkey: Closer relations mixed with suspicion. Strategic Assessment, 19, 119–127. ˙ Malkoç, D. E. (2017). 20. Yüzyilin Ikinci Yarisinda Türkiye ile Hindistan’in Siyasi ˙Ili¸skileri. Avrasya Incelemeleri ˙ Dergisi, 5(1), 109–145. Mohapatra, A. K. (2008). Bridge to Anatolia: An overview of Indo-Turkish relations. The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 39, 159–181. Niu, S., & Li, N. (2019). Sino-Turkish tourism cooperation under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 13(3), 445–461. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019. 1630581 Özcan, A. (1993). The press and Anglo-Ottoman relations, 1876–1909. Middle Eastern Studies, 29(1), 111–117. ˙ Özcan, A. (1995). 1857 Büyük Hind Ayaklanması ve Osmanlı Devleti. Islam Tetkikleri Dergisi, 9, 269–280. ˙ Özcan, A. (2010). 1857 Büyük Hind Ayaklanması ve Osmanlı Devleti. Islam Tetkikleri Dergisi, 9, 269–280. Pasha, A. K. (2006). India and Turkey, past and emerging relations. Academic Excellence. Pehlivanturk, B. (2012). Turkish-Japanese relations: Turning romanticism into rationality. International Journal, 67 (1), 101–117. Qureshi, M. N. (1978). The Indian Khil¯afat Movement (1918–1924). Journal of Asian History, 12(2), 152–168. Selby, W. B. (1864). Letter to W.P. Andrew, esq., chairman of the Euphrates Valley Railway, on the importance and necessity of the establishment of the Euphrates Route. Shichor, Y. (2014). Turkey and China in the post-Cold War world: Great expectations. In B. Gilley & A. O’neil (Eds.), Middle powers and the rise of China

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(pp. 192–212). Georgetown University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/ j.ctt7zswkb.14 Temiz, K. (2018). An illustration of Sino-Turkish relations: The Cyprus question. Insight Turkey, 20(1), 81–98. The Euphrates Railway: The shortest route to India. (1858). https://jstor.org/sta ble/10.2307/60235912 Ünal, E. (2016). A comparative analysis of export growth in Turkey and China through macroeconomic and institutional factors. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 13(1), 57–91. Vamvakas, P. (2009). NATO and Turkey in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Possibilities and blind spots. Turkish Studies, 10(1), 57–74. https://doi.org/10. 1080/14683840802648661 Westmacott, G. E. (1838). Our Indian empire (pp. 1–66) [Pamphlets]. “Free Press” office. Yellinek, R. (2017). Why are relations tightening between China and Turkey? Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/res rep04545 Yilmaz, R. D. N. (2008). China’s middle east policy: A case of Turkey-China relations. Arab World Studies, 5. Zan, T. (2009). Uncertainty and ambiguity: Turkey’s perception on the rise of China. Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), 3(1), 66–79. Zan, T. (2016). “Turkey dream” and the China-Turkish cooperation under “One Belt and One Road” initiative. Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), 10(3), 50–72.

Three Transitions in Turkey’s Foreign Policy Omair Anas

The Pursuit of Nation-ness In 1904, a prominent pan-Turanist intellectual Yusuf Akcura published his famous article Uc Tarz-i Siyaset (Three Policies) in Cairo-based antiOttoman magazine, Turk, in which Akcura had explained three main policy choices for the future of the Ottoman Empire: first, to create an Ottoman Nation through integrating and unifying various nations subject to the Ottoman rule, the second, to unify all Muslims living under the governance of the Ottoman State (Pan-Islamism), or third, to advance a policy of ethnicity-based Turkish nationalism (Turk Milliyeti siyasiyeti). He favoured the third policy, pan-Turkism (tevhid-i Etrak), over the other two approaches of the Ottoman Nation or Pan-Islamism. The article caused major controversy among the Ottoman elites divided into different ideological and intellectual camps. Akcura’s ideas attracted

O. Anas (B) Department of International Relations, Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_2

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the France-based Ottomans, who later sought a Turkish national identity for a modern Turkish state. The publication symbolised Turkey’s struggle to find a new political identity for the Empire. As the post-Ottoman Turkish Republic has inherited both the history as well problems of the Ottoman Empire, Yusuf Akcura’s article continues to remain relevant in Turkey’s quest for modern, post-imperial as well as post-cold war national identity. The defeat and trauma of the Balkan War brought many Ottoman intellectuals to pursue the idea of an Ottoman Vatan by combining the territorial and ethnic solidarities of all Ottoman citizens. This was not much different from one of Akçura’s three alternatives. Ziya Gokalp wrote an article, “Turkification, Islamization, Modernisation,” for Türk Yurdu on 20 March 1913, in which he rejected Ottomanism as a feasible ideology and proposed Turkishness as the dominant ideology against pan-Islamism or Ottomanism. Religious minorities, Armenians, Christians, and Jews were among the key supporters of the Ottoman Vatan (Abu-Manneh, 1980, p. 298).1 Ziya Gokalp was opposed to any such diverse idea of nation-ness and was favouring an exclusive nation for the Turks. Another prominent intellectual, Ömer Seyfeddin, proposed the idea of Vatan be divided into three, (1) a national vatan as Turan; (2) a religious vatan; and (3) physical vatan, “Turkey (Özkan, 2012, p. 74).” With the establishment of the Turkish Nation-State, at least one of the Vatans was achieved, and hence all the strands of the Ottoman Empire had to show pragmatism of accepting the new state. Bhelul Özkan argues that Mustafa Kemal combined all three concepts such as “Ottoman vatan” and “Ottoman society” in its discourse with nationalist terms such as “national borders,” “national pact,” and “national sep” albeit with reconfigured meanings for the newly established territorial Turkish state (Özkan, 2012, p. 90). Ottomanism as a concept was first introduced during the Ottoman reforms or Tanzimat Fermani (1839, the reform edict), and Kanun-iEsasi (1876, the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire) aimed at reshaping the centuries-old Caliphate into a Western-style imperial state system. The millet system, as part of “imperial pluralism” by granting 1 Armenians and Maronites were said to be welcoming to the idea of Ottoman Nationalism and Ottoman Vatan. See (al-Jin¯an 5 [1874], 110). As quoted by Abu-Manneh (1980, p. 298). For a comparison of Bustani’s Ottomanism with that promulgated by the state, see (Makdisi, 2002) and (Eissenstat, 2015, p. 444).

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greater autonomy to religious communities (Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish, for example), attempted to unify the declining Empire. As Kemal Karpat defines, these reforms paved the way for Ottomanism as an idea of citizenship of a centralised state system. The idea was originally brought up “to supersede the ethnic and religious loyalties of various minority groups (Karpat, 1972, p. 261).” As Çolak explains, Ottomanism was an “attempt by the Ottoman government to use one single citizenship as a common political identity to achieve equality and unity among all Ottoman subjects and supersede differences of faith, ethnicity, and language” (Çolak, 2006, p. 589). On the other hand, these reforms also encouraged various identities and aspirations for greater autonomy, which led to an unprecedented intellectual activity among the Ottoman intellectuals in the last decades of the Empire. The result of this process was a “revolution,” which, according to Serif Mardin, was nowhere a revolution because it did not assume any characteristics of a revolution that Alexis de Tocqueville attached with the French revolution. The “Turkish revolution” was first, without social violence, second, “sudden and the violent overthrow of an established political order was not involved, and third, it did not cause a complete replacement or expulsion of the social and political elite” (Mardin, 1971, pp. 198–200). The change of Sultan did not bring a disruption; it only brought the Young Turk at the helm of state, and “the Ottoman tradition that the state counted more than did individuals had remained,” as Mardin pointed out (p. 202). Once the Republic was established, Ottomanism was left instead as a tool to create new “memory” beyond historical accounts and to instrumentalise it for reforms and policies that confirmed the political views of nationalists and conservatives. As a result, it aims not to restore the past itself, rather, “to critique the current position to articulate a new collective goal (Yavuz, 2016, p. 448).” Yavuz argues that, intellectually, neo-Ottomanism was rediscovered in reaction to Kemalist silencing of its opponents and hegemonising the nationalist discourse—poets like Yahya Kemal Beyatli (1884–1958) and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar (1902–1962). “Forced modernisation,” “de-historisation of identity,” and “cleansing the Ottoman sensibilities, art and language” are among few strong accusations that were made by these thinkers against the dominant Kemalism. In their critique, the neo-Ottomanist intellectuals did not appear anti-West rather, they saw Turkish identity as “between tradition and tradition.”

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In their books, the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman Empire was advocated in order to contest Kemalism. Similarly, Nihat Banarli (1907–1974), Süheyl Ünver (1898–1986), Nuerettin Topcu (1909–1975), Dundar Taser (1925–1972), Erol Gungor (1938–1983), and Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi (1932–1988) helped the convergence of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Nationalism in one direction (Yavuz, 2016, p. 450). Although the narrative of Turkey’s return to neo-Ottomanism is seen as a reversal of Kemalism, the intellectual transitions of Turkey’s identity and foreign relations in today’s Turkey are as complex as they were during the time of Yusuf Akcura a hundred years ago. The first group of scholars strongly argues that Mustafa Kemal had indeed broken Turkey from its past and had established an entirely new political identity for Turkey that was modern, Western, and secular. Jones (1926), Toynbee and Kirkwood (1926), Robinson (1965), Vali (1971), Groom (1986), Kürkçüo˘glu (1987), Bahcheli (1990), Oran (1990), Ba¸skaya (1991), and Yavuz and Khan (1992) see the real or imagined, but necessary, discontinuity from Turkey’s Islamic and Ottoman past and greater Westernisation and modernisation. Calis and Bagci (2003, p. 218), for example, argue that “the Kemalist reformation was, in reality, Turkey’s total break with its Islamic, Ottoman and to some extent with its Turkish past on the one hand, and total embrace of Europe through acceptance of its values and institutions.” They argued that Mustafa Kemal adopted Westernisation both as a modernisation and reformation process of Turkish society and economy and to secure Turkey as a newly independent and sovereign state. Calis and Bagcı argued, for Mustafa Kemal, giving a Western image to Turkey was a prerequisite [condition] for Turkey’s security because, for Europe, it would be “similar to itself.” An anti-pan-Islamist and pan-Turanian identity was his careful choice. However, Koroglu (2007, p. 34) argues, pan-Islamism and nationalism evolved within the Turkish nationalist movement. The presence of a vibrant public sphere in the late Ottoman time, with a large number of publicists, Ulema, and political activists besides the Ottoman state officials, had constituted an enormously diverse intellectual community divided in blurred faultlines. In this backdrop, the break-up of the Ottoman Empire was not really a Westphalian moment for the Middle East and Turkey’s region. Unlike what Karpat (1960, p. 252) has likened the birth of the Turkish nation-state with that of national states in Western Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire, Turkey’s emergence as a nation-state followed a far different trajectory of the Westphalian process.

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The Westphalian process was brought by creating a broad consensus on the new state system; the Turkish Republic emerged simply by abandoning the territories that it failed to take back from the colonial or imperial control, who would later free them. A sense of defeat, decline, and disappointment or trauma had prevailed over the large number of Turks and former Ottoman publics. The British imperial academia such as Bury (1919), Lybyer (1922), Earle (1923), and Miller (1923) have in detail discussed Turkey’s future that only confirms Turkey’s degraded place in the upcoming Eurocentric world order. In their description of Turkey, Turkey was hardly different from other colonies. Miller, for example, did not hesitate to describe that the Turks had migrated “out of the darkest part of Asia” to “a far advanced” Europe. “The Turks are not capable of progress.” Turkey’s choice was “either the nineteenth-century formula of a ‘weak Turkey’ or the dismembered Turkey of the Treaty of Sevres (1923, p. 140).” “A Turkey powerful for evil driven in desperation to become the leader of Islam and Western Asia” was a frightening idea for Miller. As in the work of Earle (1923, p. 24), the imperial academia looked to the Ottoman Empire through the eyes of “strategic maneuvers, economic rivalries, religious fanaticism, nationalist fervor, racial prejudices, predatory imperialism” among the most important phenomenon that had rendered “the Ottoman problem seemingly insoluble.” Mustafa Kemal had broken up Turkey from its past to model it after European state systems, yet, his Turkey never had the power of any of the colonial and imperial states in Europe, and hence Turkey’s foreign relations from 1923 to 1943 had nothing to offer to an international system, controlled by imperial countries. The newly born Soviet Union saw an opportunity in the rise of pan-Islamism and engaged with Mustafa Kemal’s pan-Islamist rivals (Fischer, 1930). This made Mustafa Kemal mistrustful of not only panIslamism but also of the Soviet Union, and he then sought a strong relationship with the West.

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Pan-Islamism2 The quest for pan-religious, pan-ethnic, or pan-territorial solidarities was not specific to the Ottoman Empire; the contemporaries of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Germans, and the Arabs were searching similar pan-territorial identities, indeed not because of ideological force; instead, because of realist convenience. Emperor Francis-Joseph and Tsar Nicholas II projected themselves as father figures and as a “Catholic Monarch” or as “the Champion of orthodoxy” (Cloutier, 1955, p. 267). The millions of Slavs scattered from the Black Sea to the White Sea and from the Adriatic to the Pacific were also imagined to have Pan-Slavic solidarity to establish the Third Rome by recapturing the lost Constantinople. The Serbs, Bulgarians, Czechs, Croatians, Slovenians, Slovaks were said to be cultivating the dreams to establish the pan-Slavist Empire once again (Levine, 1914) indeed with the active support of the Russian Empire. At the same time, pan-Germanism also emerged as a movement for Germany’s self-preservation “to create a mighty Empire, by constructing a great confederation of states including Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey, and by depriving England of her possessions in the Mediterranean and Asia” (Usher, 1913; Von Noé, 1914). As Stoddard (1917) argued, “the first half of the nineteenth century saw a still further widening of the European outlook to a continental or even to a world horizon.” At that time, national identities started declining as national identities were becoming expansive. New terminology was required to attend to the problems of declining national identities, and “racialisation” of German, Salav, Latin, English, Turkish, and Islamic identities became quickly popular. The pan-Islamists and Pan-Turanists of the Ottoman Empire were aware of these developments. They must be inspired to find an Ottoman, Turkish, or Muslim version to these narratives not necessarily for ideological struggle but rather to rescue the Empire from an imminent decline. The discussions on these pan-isms appeared in the Ottoman public discussions as the article of pan-Islamist 2 According to Dwight E. Lee (1942), the term Pan-Islamism was probably used first time in the title of an article written by Sir Richard Temple, “Pan-Islamism or Political Muhammadanism”, Evening News, July, I882, reprinted in Oriental ˙ Experience (London, I883), Chapter xiv. Ottoman propaganda papers such as Ictihad, Hikmet, Türk Yurdu, Volkan, Beyanülhak, Sırat-ı Müstakim/[Sebilü’r-Re¸sad, Tearüf-i Müslimin, Hayat Mecmuası had been publishing articles in support and explanation of Pan-Islam and Pan-Turanism.

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˙ leader Abdürre¸sid Ibrahim in Tearüf-i Müslimin journal of 15 April 1326 Hijri issue discusses these pan-isms in detail (Ibrahim, 1910). The six centuries-old strong and cross-continental Ottoman Empire had finally faced a devolution that would result in the decline of its vast territory into the hand of colonial powers. Some of them would rise gradually as independent nation-states. The Empire failed to overwhelm the forces of change at the centre of the Caliphate and its distant peripheries, besides the rapidly changing political economy in which the Empire’s share was on a steady decline. The invoking of cross-national and crossethnic solidarity based on religion, Islam as projected in pan-Islamism, or a continental Turkic ethnicity from Anatolia to East Turkistan, as projected in pan-Turanianism (Stoddard, 1917) was the last resort to regain the cross-continental authority of the Caliphate. Nikki R. Keddie (1969, p. 18), too, finds the rise of pan-Islamism having more “resemblance to modern nationalist movements than to older Islamic feelings,” a feeling that Kedie named “proto-nationalism.” Keddie says, “unity of all believers,” “common action against the nonIslamic world,” or “loyalty to a single caliph” were not the main features of pan-Islamism in the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Rather “Western imperialism,” as both Keddie and Cemil Aydin contend, were main references of pan-Islamism (Baskan, 2019; ICSR, 2019). According to Cemil Aydin, pan-Islamism or pan-Asianism rose to counter Western civilisation, too, with greater intellectual convergence. Their intellectual discussions wanted to question the supposed (universality) of the West. The non-Western discontent was on the rise and these two transnational visions, Pan-Asianism and Pan-Islamism, helped to articulate non-Western discourses on civilisation (s), modernity, and internationalism. Pan-Islamism rose “as a realist policy option available for Muslim societies” by “avoiding military confrontations with the leading Western powers since the 1840s through its famous realist balance-of-power diplomacy,” and hence it ended up declaring a pan-Islamic jihad against the British, French, and Russian Empires during World War-I (Cemil Aydin, 2007, p. 5). Enver Pasha (1881–1922), one of the three Turkish panIslamists and pan-Turanian, joined and influenced the Baku Conference of 1919 (Stolte, 2012, p. 408; White, 1974, pp. 508–510) along with Indian freedom fighters and revolutionaries. In his discussions, Enver Pasha was looking for more immediate political and territorial legitimacy than the popularity of pan-Islamist ideology itself. Pan-Islamism emerged as a racialised, not religious identity for Muslims. Turkish nationalism

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in this sense was not different from pan-Islamism. Soon after the establishment of the Ankara government led by Mustafa Kemal, pan-Islamists and pan-Turanists came together. Among them were Mehmet Akif Ersoy ˙ (1873–1936), Abdürre¸sid Ibrahim (1857–1944), Sehbenderzade ¸ Ahmed Hilmi (1865–1914). They were opposed to Abdulhamid II. Aydin argues that “ideas of pan-Islamism merged with a rising sense of assertive nationalism and turned into a grand vision of an Ottoman state and Turkish nationalism.” Cemil Aydin concludes that there “was no contradiction between the nationalist awakening and the triumph of a pan-Islamic interpretation of world politics on the eve of WWI” (2007, p. 124). Despite the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman elite found the new world trends favourable to their interests. They hoped that the twelfth point in Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” would allow the Ottoman Muslims to establish secure and recognised state boundaries in areas where they were a majority, even if they had to lose the Arab-majority provinces of the Ottoman. (Aydin, 2007, p. 129)

Among early pan-Islamists was Celal Nuri, who became the founder of Wilsonian Principles Society and was joined by leading public intellectuals such as Halide Edib Adivar, Ahmet Emin, and Yunus Nadi (Aydin, 2007, p. 129). In order to find a new identity for the newly established government, Mustafa Kemal had faced two challenges, one from his pan-Islamist rivals, mainly Enver Pasha. Turkey under Mustafa Kemal stopped looking to Asia from a pan-Islamist view and did not aspire to pursue either of pan-Turanian or pan-Islamic territorial gains. He engaged with forces that were not aligning with either of these camps. Halide Edib Adivar explains how the movement of reforms and modernisation in Turkey had started from the early Ottomans to the Tanzimatissts to Young Turks. Most of the reform discourse evolved within the framework of Ottoman identity, yet each generation of reformers lacked certain qualities, most importantly, realism. The reforms that were taken after 1908, she says, should have a new name altogether, for they had overcome the shortcomings of their predecessors, lack of realism. The Tanzimatists were a repetition of the early Ottomans who set out to create a new order of things synthetically and consciously using the elements of culture and civilisation which they had found in the Near East. But the Tanzimatist reformers, although they were superior to the early Ottomans in learning, lacked the virility and the realism of the early

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Ottomans. And the Young Turks of the Union and Progress group, who thought themselves the successors of the Tanzimatists in spirit and set out to complete what the Tanzimatists had started, were not only different in training and in temperament but were also facing a world in which romantic and high sounding literature and ideals had given way to realism, or materialism. In 1908 the world was already getting ready for the gigantic and materialistic upheaval of 1914, which was to mark a new era in human history. Hence the period of change in the Ottoman Empire from 1908 on must have a new name. One might call it the realistic and Turkish period as against the earlier, which was the idealistic and Ottoman period. (Edib, 1930, pp. 98–99)

While Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues initiated a massive Westernisation programme, some of his colleagues revolted against the Western armies. They saw Soviet Russia as the only power with whom friendship and alliance were possible (Edib, 1930, p. 192). Despite being the staunchest supporter of the modernisation offensive undertaken by Mustafa Kemal, Halide Edib’s answer on Turkey’s future was that “if one could solve the sorry riddle of European destiny, one could clearly answer the question,” (Edib, 1930, p. 261).

Kemalism and Its Disjuntures Kemalism as an ideology does not necessarily mean that Mustafa Kemal himself was the source of or subscriber of all ideas referred to as Kemalism. The Young Turks’ intellectual division into radical, conservative, and progressive republicans and their differences over various measures of top-down Westernisation and modernisation had further divided Turkey’s debate of a new national identity. Halide Edib, for example, asserts, “our real roots are in the Ottoman culture. Without them, we will be secondhand Europeans.” Similar thoughts were shared by Hilmi Zia when he said, “I am of Turkish race’ my civilisation is Western. I am Moslem by religion Zia Hilmi” (Edib, 1935, pp. 178–181). Kemalism as an antithesis of Islamism is more of modern and post-colonial construction, rather than an original intellectual rival to each other. Eissenstat (2014, p. 26) argues that “subaltern studies” and, particularly, the “constructivist turn” brought out by Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson in the late 70s and early 80s allowed for a rethinking of Turkish nationalist narratives. As the new critical views are allowed in Turkish studies, one can see how Turkish Islamism is gradually attributed to Arab origins instead of

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its Ottoman origins. The relation between Kemalism and Islamism, as a result, is drawn in binary opposites. Mustafa Kemal, once a member of the reformist Ottomanist group CUP, had indeed developed his differences from key pan-Islamists within the CUP and introduced a modern territorial secular nation-state in Turkey. However, his view of the Turkish Islamic and Muslim past was not different from many of his Pan-Islamists friends when he said, “...our nation, developing from a small tribe, established an independent state in our motherland and later trusted.” Into the hands of the enemy and founded an Empire there with the greatest difficulties. And [our national has administered this Empire with all greatness and majesty for 600 years (as quoted in Kurkcuoglu, 1980, p. 142). Modern Turkey, as he says, “emerged as a result of a break-up of the Ottoman Empire and various nations united themselves around national creeds, and indeed.” Turkey was “kicked out by stick,” insulted and humiliated (as quoted in Kurkcuoglu, 1980, p. 155). The new national conscience and national identity, for Mustafa Kemal, was a choice imposed on Turkey, not the one that Turkey imposed on others. Mustafa Kemal’s main worry from Pan-Islamism was its “success and practicability,” not its ideology per se (as quoted in Kurkcuoglu, 1980, p. 151). Both the delegations of Mustafa Kemal and his rivals had attended the Baku Conference in 1919. Mustafa Kemal’s delegation managed to get a resolution passed in favour of the Turkish revolution, claiming and assuring other international delegations that the Turkish revolution would develop into a social revolution as soon as the struggle against imperialism (Göl, 2013, p. 138). Mustafa Kemal did not hesitate in extending support and sympathising with anti-colonial struggles. However, he also underlined that his Islamic faith is a difference between a Communist and a nationalist “who was respectful for his religion.” He maintained that Turkey wanted “unity and alliance principles of two independent states,” not integration to the Soviet Union (as quoted in Kurkcuoglu, 1980, p. 162). Mustafa Kemal’s relations would grow mistrustful or even hostile after the Soviet Union started appeasing Mustafa Kemal’s pan-Islamist rivals. The Soviet patience for Kemal, too, would become thin, and Kemal would gradually be seen as “a reactionary tyrant and a fascist” under whose rule Turkey had fallen into imperialist domination by the Soviet (Lewis, 1967, p. 284). Hakan Yavuz distinguishes how two versions of Turkish nationalism, secular ethnolinguistic nationalism and communal religious nationalism competed during the formative Kemalist period between 1922 and 1950.

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Mustafa Kemal himself carefully used Islamic references of Jihad in his war against the occupation and demanded the religious identity of Turks and Kurds as Muslims to be respected in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). The Kemalists “Westernizers” presented themselves as religiously secular (Yavuz, 2000, p. 24). In Kemalist secularism, according to Edmund Burke III, “nationalists are inside-out orientalists,” who adopted the orientalist critique of religion and “sought to portray themselves as secular.” The Kemalist secularism not only established a tense relationship with Islam but also made it “internal other.” The women excluded from the public sphere for wearing headscarves became the symbol of the Islamist movement in Turkey (Cindoglu & Zencirci, 2008, p. 798). Kemalism, Aydin (2006, p. 220) argues, “demonstrated the triumph of the Eurocentric concept of a singular and universal civilisation.” The triumph of the Eurocentric concept of a singular and universal civilisation was only shortlived. The Kemalist reforms that had changed the Ottoman script banned religious attires in public, including the headscarf, restriction on the Arabic language, and even the conversion of Hagia Sophia mosque into a museum that remained the centre of Turkeys’ conservative politics. In its first-ever opportunity, the conservatives had to address these traumas in one way or the other. Adnan Menderes (Yavuz, 2003, pp. 61–62; Zürcher, 1992, pp. 243–245) took dramatic steps in easing the Kemalist restrictions on conservative life. The execution of Adnan Menderes by the military court left an indelible mark on conservatives’ memory. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s intellectual inspiration and poet Necip Fazil Kısakürek’s Zeybe˘gin Ölümü poem remain a source of permanent agony and sorrow about the execution of Adnan Menderes. After Menderes, Sulyeman Demiril followed a conservative line and the military used religion to legitimise its 1981 coup. Despite Mustafa Kemal’s radical reforms, Turkey’s Islamic identity remained more embedded and inseparable from its Ottoman past from where the majority of Turkish political sides had originated. Much of Kemalism vs Islamism as two competitive narratives became popular mostly after the multiparty elections were allowed, and Turkey’s political parties sought competitive narratives against each other. The disenchanted Kemalists became the counter-publics. As the Soviet threat perception deepened, Turkey sought a formal alliance with the West, starting from the Saadabad and the Balkan Pacts of 1938. In the coming decades, Turkey found that the Soviet Union is no more different from its predecessor Tsarist Empire in being hostile to Turkey. They saw the “deceiving dreams of the Ottoman Empire” unable to

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deal with Communist Russia’s “insatiable tentacles of conquest” (Erkin, 1952, pp. 124–125). Moreover, Communism was seen primarily as antiIslamic because the primary victims of the Soviet or Chinese demographic changes and expulsions from Soviet and Chinese regions were Turkic Muslim minorities. On the other hand, scholars have also questioned the “Turkey-centric Westernism” in understanding of Turkish politics. Tarik O˘guzlu argues that “Turkey-centric westernism” looks “Turkey a mere tool for the materialisation of western security interests in other locations.” Oguzlu counters the binary of “pro-west vs. anti-west” or “Islamist vs. secular” for example in the works of Göle (2000, pp. 94–95), Zürcher and van der Linden (2004, pp. 147–168), Bora and Çalı¸skan (2007, pp. 140–155), Solomon (2019), Bakshian (2013, pp. 56–64), and O˘gurlu and Öncü (2015, pp. 272–286). He, instead, presents an interest-based, rather than identity-related, approach (O˘guzlu, 2011, p. 981). To O˘guzlu, Turkey is employing a more “self-centric approach” and “simultaneously undertaking a western/European transformation at home and working towards the creation of a new regional environment in its neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East.” Turkey has already become irreversibly Westernised since the first Westernisation drive started through the late Ottoman reforms. Now, O˘guzlu says, “Turkey wants to make sure that it sits in the driver’s seat” and “strategic cooperation with western actors appears to hinge on the existence of common interests (O˘guzlu, 2011, p. 983).” As Turkish military has played in nation-building in Turkey, thanks to their role in the war of independence and then several coups, the military officers were not only the constituents of the republic, they also assumed, gradually, an autonomous role for themselves. Uzgel (2003, p. 179) calls this status of the military “double autonomy” “vis-â-vis society in all of its segments,” and “an autonomous status within the state against civilian politicians and against other.” By becoming at the helm of the most influential National Security Council (MGK) for a long time, and playing a key role in the country’s neighbourhood policy (Iraq, Syria, Greece, Cyprus), the Turkish military’s relations with the West have “changed drastically from compliance to defiance” to the extent that “the Turkish military returned to its original function set out by Atatürk.” It can be argued that Turkey’s pursuit of nation-ness that began with Akcura’s three politics had achieved the Turkish Vatan and reconnected with Ottoman memories during the Ozal’s period, and now, it may be

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pursuing the third Vatan, that was meant for religion. In an exciting TV interview, a conservative member of parliament Ali Shahin explained that Turkey had three borders, first the Anadolu, which is meant for the people living inside Anadolu. The second is the Islamic border, in which Turkey wants to be concerned about all Muslim communities. The third is the humanity border, in which Turkey should address the concerns of the entire humanity.3 Erdogan and his party have been successful in combining Akcura’s all three politics into one. The conservative elites gradually emerged both as norms-builder and policy actors with great stability and success. If politicians like Erdogan and Yasin Aktay revise the historical narratives, the policy-makers like Ibrahim Kalin and Ahmet Davutoglu have re-problematised Turkey’s strategic future. Regardless of Ahmet Davutoglu’s success and failures as a politician, his ideas on Turkey’s international identity and politics have left a profound impact. Like Ottoman intellectuals, Davutoglu, too, drives his worldview from the detailed critique of Western civilisation, which, in his views, is at the core of the contemporary crisis. The crisis constitutes “ontological security vs. ontological alienation,” epistemological crisis, axiological crisis, ecological crisis, and cultural plurality crisis. Subsequently, he argues, “the dynamism of history will continue and grow to search for ways to overcome them.” He, as a result, rejects Fukuyama’s The End of History and rather argues that there would be “a reawakening of worldviews, values, institutions, and structures of authentic civilisations—not only in their traditional spaces but also at the very heart of the Western cities.” In the making of history again, he argues, Chinese, Muslims, Indians, Africans, and Latin Americans are participants. He suggests, in order for civilisations to survive, they have to be inclusive, to have a new epistemological harmonisation; a new harmonious balance between values and social mechanisms; an all-embracing re-assessment/re-interpretation of the human history; a multicultural re-structuring of cities; and participatory global governance (Dallmayr et al., 2014, pp. 8–13). Ibrahim Kalin (2011), the Chief Policy Advisor of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2011, asked the same questions: “Turkey’s newfound interest in the Middle East and the larger Muslim world a result of the ‘Islamization’ of Turkey, as some critics claim? Has Turkey given up on the European Union and thus its traditional alliance with the West?”

3 Aired on 1 February 2021, on Gaziantep Municipality TV.

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He provided a broader context by saying that Turkish foreign policy and other countries’ foreign policies have also significantly transformed. Turkey’s “new strategic thinking and modes of action” have evolved in the “new geostrategic environment” of the twenty-first century. The new mindset has set new over-reaching goals. A combination of constructivist and realist approaches to global politics shapes Turkey’s foreign policy designs, and in this design, “identity and history” and “a value-based and principled foreign policy” are also being pursued. He gives an interesting reason for how and why Turkey was involved in the Arab uprising issues. After the cold war, Turkey faced the emergence of “new spheres of influence” and a steady movement “from classical Eurocentric modernisation to free-floating, multi-centered globalisation.” He saw “the quest for a genuinely pluralistic, egalitarian, and cosmopolitan order” as shaping global public opinion, including that of Turkey’s. This was accompanied by shifting the axis of the world economy towards Asia. Turkey being one of the much talked “the rising rest” and Brazil and Africa, “economic considerations” came at the centre of Turkey’s foreign policy. These changes had come at the time when in Turkey “state’s securitycentered foreign policy outlook” was challenged by the changing global context. The “new form of conservative modernity” rose against “topdown modernisation.” As a result, rather than focusing on only a single geographical sphere such as Europe, a wider notion of global geography is being addressed. He finds Turkey’s unique geostrategic location not fully used for the simple reason that the ruling elite in the 1930s and 1940s saw Turkey’s history and geography “as a burden and impediment to development, modernisation, and national unity” (Kalin, 2011, pp. 7–21). Kalin’s argument favouring the transformation gives a simplified justification for Turkey’s inflated ambitions and exaggerated geostrategic centrality as technology emerged as an important complement to the geography, if not a replacement. Despite being at the centre of global geography, Turkey failed to influence the future of technology-driven power, and Turkey’s “the quest for a genuinely pluralistic, egalitarian, and cosmopolitan order” did yield neither much success nor diplomatic support among its allies and neighbours. Hence, Turkey’s optimism about people’s aspirations as shaping its strategic thinking might have been supported by Turkey’s ruling party’s ideological world view of its neighbour. However, Kalin’s reference to Turkey’s new strategic thinking is something that has not sufficiently attracted academic and critical attention in contemporary Turkish studies.

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If Erdogan’s speeches in the last few years are analysed, these speeches are also frequently loaded with a sense of disappointment from the West, its NATO allies, the frustration of a delayed or never to happen EU accession. He has internationalised Turkey’s foreign policy by his reactions and over-reactions on all international and regional affairs. Turkey’s official and political reactions on the Arab uprisings in Syria, Tunisia, Libya, Arab–Israeli conflict, and European affairs and then counter-revolutions such as Egypt and Libya established Turkey as a prouprising, pro-revolution, and pro-Arab country follow a careful view of Turkey’s ongoing transition. By maintaining extraordinary activism on the Palestinian problem, Turkey has also rebranded its image as the most proPalestine Muslim country when most Arab regimes are seen as pro-West and pro-Israel. Erdogan’s reactions to Jammu and Kashmir issue, death sentences to Bangladesh’s Islamist leaders, the Rohingya crisis, and the Uyghur issue have also brought him and Turkey in high attention and populism in these countries. The quest for strategic autonomy warrants a new vocabulary for their foreign policy and populist slogans. President Erdogan frequently says, “the world is bigger than five.” At a conceptual level, the Turkish foreign minister says, “the global political and economic order is under strain; the post-cold war short-lived unipolarity is over; multilateralism is pushed back; a multicentric structure may evolve.” By stating so, he seeks “multialigned” or “multidimensional” foreign policy. The realism says as Hugh Pope (2010) pointed out, “Turkey does not fit neatly into anyone’s conception of the world order.” The mismatch or tension in Turkey’s foreign policy choices, its strategic perceptions, geopolitical possibilities, and, most notably, its deeply politicised demography has brought out more mistrust towards the global powers. Headlines like “Turks have no friends” are becoming more common. Turkey’s transitions from the time of late Ottoman foreign policy to this time could be seen defined by Turkey’s strategic, economic, and political limitations, while its ambitions to become an assertive yet reliable regional power have not yet overcome these limitations. The best what Erdogan performs, as Hugh Pope said in 2010, “the ruling party’s (AKP) policies remain essentially nationalist, Turkey-centric, and commercially opportunistic; it is a misconception to think of them as Islamist, or even ideological.”

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Conclusion The modern Turkish foreign policy has seen three major transformative transitions since the late Ottoman Empire. As Yusuf Akcura had suggested, the first was abandoning pan-Islamism and Ottomanism and adopting Turkish nationalism as the basis of a new Turkish identity and its foreign policy. The second and the most transformative transition was to readjust Turkey’s foreign policy with the post-colonial yet Cold Wardetermined world politics. Turkey’s existing foreign and security policy was built around the logic of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has changed the continuity of common threat perception. As “Turkey’s role as one of the largest members of NATO is of less value when Russia no longer poses an existential threat to Europe and the US,” Turkey should have already completed another transition for post-Cold War realities. Many Western countries have already achieved this transition by changing or expanding their relations in all post-colonial geographies, including major non-aligned nations like India. It is just a coincidence that a conservative party is heading the most challenging transition. Even a Kemalist, or ultra-nationalist, or even a socialist party government would have faced similar challenges because the events that led to the end of the Cold War and the rise of Asian powers, and the events of American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Arab uprisings had no Turkish role at all. Turkey’s search for a post-Cold War foreign policy has not yet settled, and its insecurities and economic future and the failure of Turkey’s Western allies to reassure Turkey’s security are shaping the ongoing transition in Turkey’s foreign policy. The Turkish struggle to find alternative assurances of security and economic diversification in today’s changing global strategic environment is at the core of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s transition to a new future is a work in progress that Turkish officials describe in multiple aspirations of “strategic autonomy,” “Multidimensionalism,” “diversification,” or through the newly found “Asia Anew Initiative.”

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Ottoman–Asia Relations: A Study of the Ottoman and Mughal Relations Emre Yürük

Introduction The relations of the Ottoman Empire with the Indian subcontinent have attracted the attention of researchers. However, due to two main reasons, these relations could not be studied with all details. The first reason is the linguistic barrier since the relevant documents in the Ottoman archives are in Ottoman Turkish. It is quite understandable that reading these records requires expertise since it is hard to read for Turks as well. It is also possible that the richness of the Ottoman archival documents has been underestimated by scholars, who study Indian history. Second, the attention was mainly on how the Ottomans challenged against Portuguese in the Indian Ocean starting from the sixteenth century onwards. However, as being a strong land-based empire, the Ottomans put their main efforts on their land security. In this direction, Ottoman statesmen developed politics to handle the Safavid Empire, one of the main rivals of the Ottoman Empire at its eastern border, by establishing relations with Uzbek Khanates and the Mughals. These two reasons created a big hole in understanding the Ottomans’ relations with the Indian subcontinent.

E. Yürük (B) Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon, Turkey

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The beginning of the sixteenth century had witnessed the growth of the two strong empires. On the one hand, the Ottoman Empire proved its superiority by conquering the Middle East and Africa under the command of Selim I in 1516 and 1517, respectively and by defeating the European alliance under the command of Suleiman the Magnificent at the Battle of Mohacs in 1526. On the other hand, Mughal Empire was established by Babur Shah with the decisive victory over Ibrahim Lodi at the Battle of Panipat in Northern India in 1526. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these two powerful empires became rivals to get the upper hand against each other due to the neighbourhood politics, caliphate question (sovereign of the Muslim world), and historical rivalry of ruling dynasties. These occurrences shaped the political approach of the Mughals towards the Ottomans and created an Ottoman–Mughal–Safavid triangle of cooperation and competition.

Effect/Role of Caliphate on the Ottomans’ Relations with Asian Powers The first Islamic Caliphate chosen through public consultation and the mechanism of “Public Allegiance” (Baiyat in Arabic) of Medina was soon turned into a disputable dynastic rule, challenged by rival dynasties. After the Umayyads, the Abbasid Caliphate too lost power in 1258 following the Mongol’s attack on Baghdad. Yet, the title of Caliphate itself maintained its legitimacy among the common Muslims and their local rulers and scholars across the Islamic world. The title was kept by the Sultans of the Mamluk Kingdom until 1517, when the Ottoman Sultan Selim I took over the control of Egypt and claimed the title of Caliph. Then, the Ottoman’s claim of the Caliphate and the leadership of the Muslim world was further legitimised by its being the sovereign protector of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca and Medina. Ottoman–Atche Sultanate Relations Since the Portuguese effect increased in South East Asia, the Sultanate of Atche requested help from the Ottoman Empire, especially in the military aspect to protect trade and pilgrimage routes. Thus, Ottomans sent the region their soldiers, engineers, ships, cannons, iron etc., under

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the command of Kurdoglu Hızır Reis in the sixteenth century (BOA, A.{DVNSMHM.d…7/233; BOA, A.{DVNSMHM.d… 7/234; BOA, A.{DVNSMHM.d… 7/236; BOA, A.{DVNSMHM.d… 7/238).1 In the following years, Atche Sultan sent his envoy to Istanbul to get assistance against the British and Dutch. Upon this request, Ottoman Sultan Abdul Mecid issued a farman that he recognised Sultan Ibrahim as Atche Sultan and promised to help Sultan Ibrahim. In return for this help, Atche Sultan sent some money to the Ottoman Empire during the 1853–1856 Crimean War (Kurtulmu¸s, 1986, p. 27; Sah, ¸ 1967, pp. 386–388). Lastly, the Pan-Islamist policy of Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II promoted relations between two worlds. Ottoman–China Relations The diplomatic relations between Ottoman and China can be traced to Ming Dynasty of China in the sixteenth century. There was limited interaction through envoys, and it was not very regular. According to contemporary Chinese documents, the Ottomans, also recorded as Lu Mi (Rumi) in that documents, visited the Ming dynasty nine times from 1525 to 1618. However, it was not certain that these people were sent by the Sublime Port (Kırilen, 2007, pp. 223–230). Although there was no strong dialogue between China and the Ottoman Empire in the medieval period, the relations improved through the end of the nineteenth century with the Pan-Islamism policy of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. We learnt that from an Ottoman document dated 1892 that the name of Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II was read in the khutbas in China (BOA, Y..PRK.MS.. ¸ 4/91). Besides, the Ottomans sent a committee to Muslims in China to advise them to obey their ruler around 1900 (BOA, Y..PRK.MS.. ¸ 7/19; BOA, Y..PRK.HR.. 29/40). In 1904, the Ottomans decided to open an embassy in China (BOA, Y..PRK.MK.. 19/28).

1 For more detailed works on the Ottomans’ assistance, see Halil Inalcık, “The SocioPolitical Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East”, War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, Ed. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, London 1975, pp. 195–217 and Salih Özbaran, Ottoman Expansion towards the Indian Ocean in the 16th Century, Istanbul 2009.

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Ottoman Relations with South Indian Rulers Ottoman relations with India are generally equated with Mughals, whose rule predominantly encompassed northern parts of the Indian subcontinent. However, Muslim rulers in southern India also tried to pursue diplomatic linkages with Ottoman. The first recorded pursuit of relations dates back to 1481–82 between Bahmani kings Muhammad Shah III and Mahmud Shah II and Ottoman sultan Mehmet the Conqueror and Bayazit II (Özcan, 1997, p. 1). Likewise, in 1777, Sultan of Malabar Ali Raja and afterwards his sister Bibi Sultan in 1780 sought the Ottoman assistance against British expansion in India, a help Ottomans, themselves fighting Russian encroachments, could not extend (Özcan, 1997, p. 11). Similarly, in 1784, Tipu Sultan of Mysore Kingdom sent Osman Khan as an emissary to Sublime Porte to inform Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid I about his ascension to the throne and to convey his intention to send an envoy to Istanbul (C. HR., 673/1255). Subsequently, Tipu Sultan dispatched a mission led by Ghulam Ali Khan and comprising Lutf Ali Khan, Nurullah Khan, Jafar Khan, Sayyid Jafar, and Khwaja Abdul Qadir to the Sublime Porte in 1786 (Pasha, 1999, p. 9). Tipu Sultan pursued Ottoman relations based on three main aims, which included his recognition as legal king of Mysore by the Ottoman Caliph, military assistance, and economic privileges. However, the Ottomans could just offer a letter of investiture to the Mysore king and no military or commercial support as the empire itself was struggling to contain European encroachments in its territories along with deteriorated political and economic situation (Yürük, 2018, pp. 90–91). From these examples, it can be said that the Ottomans developed their relations with Asian states, kingdoms, and the Muslim population through the title of Caliph. The main aim was to protect the trade, pilgrim routes, and pressure of European states on Asian Muslims. In time, the Ottomans used Pan-Islamism as the key factor to take support from these Muslim populations. On the other hand, the Mughals and the Safavids never officially recognised the Ottomans as Caliph. This was not a new incident for the Muslim world since it had its roots in the early periods of Islam. Not only the Ottomans even Umayyads and Abbasids were not recognised as real caliphates as it has been argued that the real Caliphate persisted during the rule of the first four caliphs only. In this contentious issue, Ibn Khaldun and Dawani have given a nuanced explication. According to them:

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there is a distinction between secular kingship and the caliphate, and that it is only the righteous ruler who governs with justice and who enforces the Sharia as the law of the community that is entitled to the style of caliph or Imam. (Gibb, 1982, pp. 144–145)

Through this understanding, it can be observed that the title of the Caliph was not an important issue in itself as was the upholding of Sharia as the source of law. Thus, any Muslim ruler can assume the title as long as they rule with justice and under Islamic laws. However, they maintained pragmatic relations though. Therefore, their relations with the Ottoman Empire had up and downs that were discussed in this paper.

The Dynastic Competition Between the Ottomans and Mughals Apart from the caliphate issue, the rivalry between Ottoman and Mughal dynasties is also another point that should be discussed in their relation. The Mughals considered themselves as the heir of two great Central Asia leaders Chengiz Khan and Timur the Lame, starting from Babur Shah, who assumed the title of padishah for himself instead of the title of Mirza, which was used for princes (Babur Nama, 2014, p. 344). The Mughals took pride in Timur’s victory against the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid in the Battle of Ankara in 1402 (Chandra, 2017, p. 106). The Mughal emperors used ecumenical titles to claim their “world sovereignty” to show their power such as Muhammad Jalaluddin used the title of “Akbar” (the Great), Muhammad Saleem used the title of “Jahangir” (World Conqueror), Khurram used the title of “Shah Jahan” (King of the World), and Aurangzeb used the title of “Alamgir” (Conqueror of the World). At the same, the Mughal emperors called the Ottomans “the Ceaser of Rum” or “the Sultan of Rum” to underestimate them and prove their superiority (Hammer, 1829, p. 480).

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The Ottomans, too, just like the Mughals, had originated from Turkic tribes and called themselves as the sons of “Oghuz”.2 In their conception, they had the right to rule the world in order (Nizam-i-Alem). The Ottomans also saw themselves as the rulers of the world or the shadow of God (Zillu Allah) to protect the nizam (order). They saw the Ottoman Empire as an “Eternal State” (Devlet-i Ebed Müddet ). In this context, it can be argued that the rulers of both empires regarded themselves as the rulers of the world with claims to power from their ancestry and not in terms of being the successor of the prophet, as was the case of the earliest Islamic Caliphate of Medina.

Role of Safavid and Uzbeks in the Ottoman–Mughal Relations Safavids had a very crucial place in both the Asian and European policies of the Ottoman Empire. The establishment of the Shia Safavid dynasty by Shah Ismail in Iran at the beginning of the sixteenth century resulted in a long-time conflict and confrontation with the Sunni Ottoman Empire. These two empires engaged in many battles and campaigns over multiple years due to mainly religious and political reasons. Safavids became a threat for the Ottomans from the beginning by stirring the Ottomans’ Turcoman subjects through Shi’ism. Shahkulu rebellion was one of the consequences of this policy of the Safavids, and it was very hard for the Ottomans to suppress the rebellion. Apart from that, Shah Ismail tried to establish political relations with the European powers against the Ottomans. Most importantly, he defeated Uzbek leader Shaybani Khan, an ally of the Ottomans in Central Asia. Thus, the Ottomans faced

2 The ancestral background of the Ottomans can be learnt from contemporary accounts, but they were not so trustable since they conveyed that information from hearings. Moreover, many of those accounts were written in the age of Mehmet the Conqueror. From this point it can be said that after the Ottomans became a world power and they needed to ascribe themselves to an ancestral background, so the historiography flourished in that era. Cezmi Karasu, “Osmanlı Vekayinamelerindeki Soykütükleri Hakkında Notlar”, Türkler, Vol. 9, Ankara 2002, pp. 89–98; Feridun M. Emecen, “Osmanlı Tarihçili˘ginin Ba¸slangıcı: ˙ Manzum Tarihler”, Türk Tarihçili˘ginin Asırlık Çınarı Halil Inalcık’a ˙ Ilk Arma˘gan, Ed. Mehmet Öz and Serhat Küçük, Ankara 2017, pp. 105–117; Linda T. Darling, “Political Literature and the Development of an Ottoman Imperial Culture in the Fifteenth Century”, Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association, Vol. 1, No. 1–2 (2014), pp. 57–69.

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internal and external difficulties and problems created by Safavids over the centuries. To remove these threats, Ottomans either established political relations with Uzbeks and Mughals (not every time) or fought with Safavids in abortive battles, which exhausted their sources. Because of Safavid presence in the east part of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans could not focus on their European policy (Allouche, 2001; Kütüko˘glu, 1993; Sümer, 1999). The Uzbeks were the natural ally of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning, and the Ottoman Sultans were considered as the Caliph of the Sunni Muslim world by Uzbeks. The emergence of Shia Safavids as a strong empire in Iran strengthened the relations between two Sunni states, the Ottomans and the Uzbeks. The main aim of this political manoeuvre was to suppress Safavids from its east and west borders. Besides, they wanted to protect their regions and territories from any Shia effect. To handle this issue, Safavids established good relations with the Mughals from Babur’s period. Since Mughals and Uzbeks fought for the central Asia dominion, Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavid dynasty in Iran, supported Babur Shah against Uzbeks. When Shah Ismail defeated Uzbek leader Shaybani Khan in 1510, he sent Shaybani’s skull to the Ottoman Empire. After the battle of Merv, Shah Ismail reunited Babur Shah with his sister Khanzada, who was forced to marry Shaybani Khan. The behaviour of Shah Ismail resulted in cooperation between two rulers for the dominion of Central Asia. Thus, the Ottomans not only lost an important ally, but also Safavids secured their eastern borders from the Uzbek threats. However, Ottoman Sultan Selim I’s victory over Shah Ismail in 1514 gave an opportunity to the Uzbeks to recover their power in the region. Ottomans also helped Uzbeks in terms of military technology. Sultan Suleiman sent 300 Janissaries and cannons to Uzbeks. Those soldiers were named Rumi, and they did remarkable action in terms of firearm technology and its use (Togan, 1981, pp. 134–135). Many times Uzbek missions visited the Sublime Port to get Ottomans’ support against Safavids and Russians and to solve problems among Turkestan Khanates. The Ottomans supported Uzbeks against Safavids in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when they are strong enough to deal with any problem. However, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ottomans faced a stronger enemy, which was the Russian Tsar. The Ottomans approached the expansionist policy of

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Russian Tsars towards Central Asia cautiously due to peace agreements with the Russians, so they could not help Uzbeks in military and political arenas as they expected.

Ottoman–Mughal Relations The earliest Ottoman and Mughal relations can be traced back to Babur’s period (1526). Babur ascended the throne at the age of fourteen after the unexpected death of his father in 1494. In a short time, he conquered important cities like Samarkand, Kabul, Delhi, Agra, etc., but he continued roaming around without any land. On the one hand, although he was a Sunni Muslim, he accepted Shah Ismail’s heavy requests, which were the spread of Shia doctrine through the region, substitution of Shah Ismail’s name in the Khutba and stamping it on his coinage, which demolished his charisma in the eyes of the Sunni Muslim in the region (Williams, 1900, p. 102). Babur’s own account suggests that Babur was in access of Ottoman’s battle tactic of “chaining carts”, a tactic that used to posit matchlock men and artillery behind these carts, in the battle of Panipat in 1526 (Babur Nama, 2014, pp. 468–469). The chief commanders like Mustafa Rumi Khan and Ustad Ali Quli in the military service of Babur were also Ottoman Turks, but it is not known when and how they joined Babur’s army. Babur mentions in his memoir that Ustad Ali Quli was in Bajaur in 1519 (Babur Nama, 2014, p. 368). The records of events of 1520 and 1525 were lost. Yet, it is known that the Ottoman sultans used to send their technicians, engineers, and commanders to assist the rulers of Central Asia, Africa, etc. However, it is hard to believe that the Ottomans might have sent Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi to Babur Shah. By this time, the Ottomans had established an alliance with the Uzbeks who were known for their opposition to Babur Shah. The more likely scenario is that Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi might come to Babur’s service by their own choice without informing the Ottoman Sultan. It was the time when the Safavid ruler Shah Ismael had defeated the biggest enemy of Babur, Shaybani Khan, the Uzbek ruler of Khorasan in the battle of Merv in 1510 and the Safavid–Mughal relations, despite being from different sects of Islam, established close relations since then. Shah Ismael put pressure on Babur Shah to wear Shia clothes. Uzbeks had good relations with the Ottomans, and this prevented the Ottoman– Mughal reconciliations from coming soon, let alone the recognition from

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Babur for the new Islamic Caliphate of the Ottomans (Sarkar, 1975, p. 205). Babur carefully styled himself as Padshah in repudiation of the Ottomans as Caliph (Prasad, 1931, p. 295). With the death of Babur, a new power struggle between Babur’s heir Humayun and his rival Afghans and Gujarat Sultanate ensued. Istanbul was informed of the power struggle by various embassies sent by Humayun’s rivals. In their quest to regain their lost territory in India, Burhan Lodi, the son of Sikandar Lodi, fled to Istanbul and sought military aid against Humayun. Suleiman the Magnificent was, however, reluctant in sending any military assistance considering it unnecessary and expensive. Meanwhile, Bahadur Shah, Sultan of Gujarat also sent an ambassador to Istanbul against the activities of Humayun and Portuguese (Hammer, 1829, p. 462). Meanwhile, in 1539 and 1540, Humayun lost the battles of Chausa and Kannauj and Humayun was forced to go into exile by the Afghan ruler Sher Shah Suri. Humayun did not ask for direct help from the Ottomans but kept a close view of their changing dynamics (Farooqi, 1989, p. 14). The Ottoman official Sidi Ali Reis who undertook a visit to the Mughal capital was warmly received by Humayun’s court member Bairam Khan. Sidi Reis was even offered some territories to govern which he politely rejected (Humayun Nama, 1990, p. 52). The first official communication between the Mughals and the Ottomans started with Humayun’s letter to Suleiman, which he handed over to Sidi Ali Reis: The letter reads: It occurred to me on this occasion, that by this opportunity the chains of friendship and union might be linked, and the ties of attachment drawn closer. Therefore, the pearls of good faith have been arranged on the string of friendship, and the rabies of attachment set in the line of true harmony, to be presented in this letter by these servants belonging to the spheres of your majesty. It is hoped and expected, that also on your part the gates of mutual communication will be opened by the keys of attachment, and the channels of correspondence will not be closed; and that in this manner the foundation of the towering fabric of union will be strengthened and kept free from decay. (Hammer, 1829, p. 477)3

3 Hammer references this letter to Akbar the Great, but Seydi Ali Reis mentions that he was given this letter by Humayun a short while before his death. Seydi Ali Reis, Mir’at-ül Memalik Ülkelerin Aynası, Translated by Necdet Akyıldız, Istanbul 1975, pp. 79–81.

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In his conversation with Sidi Ali Reis, Humayun even said, “surely the only man worthy to bear the title of Padishah is the ruler of Turkey, he alone and no one else in all the world”. These words came from Humayun when he was in a weak position, and he died before he could have received a reply from Istanbul (Gascoigne, 1971, pp. 6–70). His changed thoughts about the Ottomans were not carried on by his successors, Akbar and Jahangir. Akbar remained occupied by stability issues of the empire after the sudden demise of Humayun, and he re-established the Mughal Empire in India. Instead of confronting the enemies, he chose to focus on internal issues. Moreover, the Ottomans had yet to send any reply to Humayun’s letter to Sultan Suleyman (Farooqi, 1989, p. 17). However, the famous Hajj incident indicates weak relations between the two empires. The royal Mughal ladies, in their Hajj, stay in Mecca, generously distributed alms among the poor. Yet they were also accused of unlawful activities such as banditry, murder, and robbery and caused security problems among people of Mecca as well. This was followed by an Ottoman farman banning the distribution of alms sent by Emperor Akbar in the city. The royal ladies were forced to return to India (BOA, A.{DVNSMHM.d… 39/349; BOA, A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 39/471; BOA, A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 43/336; BOA, A.{DVNSMHM.d.. 43/107). After three years of Hajj pilgrimage, they arrived at Fatehpur Sikri, the capital, in 1582 (Humayun Nama, 1990, pp. 72–75). Akbar responded to the Ottomans by cutting all alms and relations with the Ottoman Empire. To give a lesson to the Ottomans, Akbar wanted to send a diplomatic mission to Spanish king Philip II in 1582. He also tried an alliance of the Persian and Uzbek against the Ottomans. However, the Uzbek Khan did not accept it due to the traditional Ottoman–Uzbek alliance (Farooqi, 1989, pp. 20–21). According to the Ottoman documents written by Vizier Hasan Pasha, the governor of Yemen to the Sublime Porte, Akbar completed an alliance with the Portuguese to attack the port of Yemen, which was under Ottoman rule. Hasan Pasha had requested thirty galleys (Kadırga) from the Ottoman government to resist any attack of the Mughal and Portuguese alliance (BOA, A.{DVNSMHM.d… 62/457). In 1605, Akbar’s son Jahangir succeeded him to the Mughal throne and inherited the Ottoman–Mughal animosity. Jahangir’s real name was

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Salim, and he was contemporary of the Ottoman Sultan Selim (1515– 1520). To avoid the Ottoman Selim’s parallel, he adopted the title of Jahangir for himself (Tûzuk-ı-Jâhangîrî, 2017, p. 2). The eastern border of the Ottoman Empire was a permanent flashpoint of the Ottoman–Safavid confrontation. During the Ottoman–Safavid war period in 1603–1618, the Ottoman Sultan Ahmet I sent his ambassador to the Mughal court to request not to support the Safavids. The British ambassador to the Mughal Court (1615–1619), Sir Thomas Roe conveys the abasement of the Ottoman ambassador by Jahangir with the following words: “he (Jahangir) gave him very harsh entertainment; made him Salem to the ground; and, as soon as he was dismissed, sent the Persian (Safavids) ten Leckes of Rupias (Lakh of Rupees)” (Foster, 1899, p. 113). Jahangir was the first Mughal Emperor who proudly mentioned in his memoir the battle of Ankara of 1402, in which Timur the Lame had defeated the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid the Thunderbolt (Tûzuk-ı-Jâhangîrî, 2017, pp. 144–145). However, after the end of the Ottoman–Safavid war in 1622, the Safavids turned against the Mughal and captured Qandahar from the Mughals. The furious Jahangir sought the help of Uzbek ruler Imam Quli Khan (Farooqi, 1989, p. 25) and the Ottomans. He promised to send 180,000 soldiers if the Ottomans attacked the Safavids (Gökçek, 2013, p. 161). Before Jahangir could have seen the outcomes, he faced a revolt from his son prince Khurram Shah known as Shah Jahan (King of the World). Before his death in 1627, Jahangir was indeed successful in bringing the Uzbeks and the Ottomans together against the Safavids, and Ottoman–Mughal relations started improving when Shah Jahan took over the power in 1627. A fugitive Mughal prince Baisungur Mirza fled to Istanbul to seek assistance against Shah Jahan. According to the Ottoman chronicler Naima Mustafa Efendi, Sultan Murad IV decided not to help him (Tarih-i Naima, II, 2007, p. 786). Meanwhile, Shah Jahan recaptured Qandahar from the Safavids and then sent an emissary Mir Zarif to the Ottomans in 1638 (Foster, 1912, pp. 101–102). At the same time, the Ottoman Sultan Murad IV recaptured Mosul from the Safavids (Tarih-i Naima, II, 2007, p. 880). As soon as Sultan Murad was informed of the Mughal emissary, he issued a farman to present him as soon as he arrived (Gökçek, 2013, p. 194). The letter sent by Shah Jahan was full of praise for Sultan Murad, and Sultan Murad also asked the ambassador, “how is my brother Sultan of India” (Gökçek, 2013, p. 196). Both sides exchanged and shared their

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views on their political issues, including their conquests in Transoxiana and Iraq (Hammer, 1829, pp. 478–479). Sultan Murad even asked the Mughal ambassador to stay in Mosul and Baghdad until it is fully taken from the Safavids (Gökçek, 2013, p. 197). In 1639, the Ottoman emissary Arslan Agha accompanied the returning Mughal ambassador Mir Zarif (Tarih-i Naima, II, 2007: 904). Despite being in Kashmir, Shah Jahan invited the Ottoman ambassador to Kashmir (Muntakhab Al-Lubâb, I, 1869, p. 575). The letter, however, sent by Sultan Murad did not much please Shah Jahan (Farooqi, 1989: 29). Although Arslan Agha was presented with many rich gifts and 15,000 rupees by Shah Jahan (Padshahnama, II, 2010, p. 78), he was not given any letter from Shah Jahan (Hammer, 1829, pp. 480–482). However, the correspondence continued at the vizier level, in which the visit of Arslan Agha was discussed in detail. In these letters, Shah Jahan was named as “khan of the times”, “shetimser of the world”, and “the shadow of God”. The vizier criticised the letter these following words: When the letter was submitted for inspection of the secretaries of state, it appeared that amongst the servants of your glorious court, and amongst its secretaries, there was nobody acquainted with ceremonials of ancient Sultans, and the modes of cultivating the friendship of great monarchs, particularly of this imperial family. (Hammer, 1829, p. 480)

At the end of the epistle, interestingly, the vizier mentions the inexperienced attitude of the Ottoman delegation and “for the reason above specified, no royal letters have been written, neither was their occasion for presents, nor anyone who should accompany them”. According to an Ottoman traveller, Evliya Chelebi, the Indian ambassador urged Sultan Murad IV to grant permission to cover Holy Kaaba (a cloth material is used to cover the sanctum sanatorium of Mecca). The permission was not granted; instead, the angry Sultan Murad asked Shahjahan to invite homeless Indian people living in the Ottoman Empire borders to India (Evliya Çelebi, IV, 2010, pp. 554–555). The relations remaining low notwithstanding, both sides continued exchanging information on their military advances against the Safavids. But after neutralising the Safavid threat, as Abdul Hamid Lahori mentions in Padshahnama, the Mughals planned to turn against the Uzbeks, the Ottoman’s long-time allies. It says:

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Since the very beginning of his accession, (…) desired to conquer the territories of Balkh and Badakhshan, which were his ancestral territories and had earlier been conquered by Hazrat Sahib-i-Quran as a ruler of Samarqand. (Padshahnama, II, 2010, p. 187)

The campaigns of Shah Jahan towards central Asia, especially on Uzbeks due to the bloody civil war between Nazar Muhammed Khan, the Uzbek Khanate, and his son Abdul Aziz Khan brought a new perspective towards the Ottomans. The Ottoman Sultan Mehmed IV sent Seyyid Muhyiddin as ambassador to Shah Jahan in 1649 (Muntakhab Al-Lubâb, I, 1869, p. 703), and he was accepted by Shah Jahan on 22 September 1651 where he was handed over the Mehmed IV (Muntakhab Al-Lubâb, I, 1869, pp. 707– 708). In his letter, Mehmed IV stated the importance of peace in the Muslim worlds. The clash in Uzbeks land caused by Nazar Muhammed Khan and his son Abdul Aziz Khan created a bloody civil war. Thus he requested Shah Jahan to reconcile the conflict as a mediator. Shah Jahan replied to the letter by informing the Sultan that he had already sent to the Uzbeks his two advisory letters to stop the civil war. Mehmed IV however did not appear to be convinced and urged Shah Jahan to protect Muslims in Central Asia and that “he would officiate his religious duty” if Shah Jahan proceeded with his plans of attacks on the Uzbeks (Feridun Bey, II, 1848–1858, pp. 355–357). In 1654, Mirza Qaim Beg was accompanied by the Ottoman ambassador Zulfikar Agha. The letter handed over by him carried three requests of Shah Jahan from the Sultan; first, a military aid to take Qandahar from Safavids; second, permission to build a mosque in Mecca for Indian pilgrims; and third, an architect for the construction of the Nur Mahal tomb in Ahmedabad. The Ottoman government accepted only the last request, and an architect was sent to India (Hammer, 2010, p. 1591). In 1656, the returning Ottoman envoy was stopped by Murad Baksh of Gujarat, who rebelled against Shah Jahan (Nagar, 1978, p. 10), and he even returned the Ottoman envoy Maanzade and his 20 men from Gujarat without allowing him to meet Shah Jahan (Tarih-i Naima, IV, 2007, pp. 1833–1834). After a prolonged war of succession, Aurangzeb ascended the throne, and ambassadors started arriving to congratulate him. The Uzbek ruler

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Quli Khan, Sheriff of Mecca, king of Yemen, and King of Ethiopia all sent their emissaries (Tavernier, I, 1995, pp. 296–297). However, the Ottoman Empire was the only empire that did not send any mission to Aurangzeb for his coronation. The reason for this was not stated in any Ottoman or Mughal contemporary chroniclers. This was the time when the political and security situation in Central Asia and Iran was rapidly changing, and the Mughal–Ottoman cooperation was much needed, given the backdrop of Shah Jahan–Murad friendly relations. Upset by the absence of the Ottoman delegation to welcome him, Aurangzeb approached the Safavid Empire and sent a returning ambassador for Shah Abbas II, Tarbiyat Khan, the governor of Multan, 2 November 1663. The Mughal ambassador Tarbiyat Khan was humiliated by the Shah of Iran (Manucci, 1957, pp. 84–86). The Safavid King even sent a letter threatening Aurangzeb to invade India (Sarkar, III, 1921, pp. 109–111). Speculating a possible danger of war with Safavids, Aurangzeb intended to send a mission to Constantinople lead by Shah Khwaja (Farooqi, 1989, p. 62). The underline explanation for this decision was to disturb Safavids from their western borders by the Ottomans in case if Safavids attack the Mughal territories. Thus, they could reduce the effect of Safavids in the region. However, the death of Shah Abbas II brought an end to this war possibility and finally, Aurangzeb gave up the idea to dispatch a diplomatic mission to Constantinople (Bayur, 1950, p. 271). The first Ottoman embassy to the Mughal court was dispatched by Sultan Suleiman II who sent Ahmed Agha in 1689, approximately 30 years after the Aurangzeb’s accession to the Peacock Throne. The delay behind the Ottoman’s embassy to India during the Aurangzeb’s time is attributed to the failure of the Ottoman siege of Vienna, the famine in the Ottoman territories and the Russian invasion of the Balkans. As a result, in this letter to Aurangzeb, Suleiman asked for Aurangzeb’s assistance (Bayur, 1950, pp. 276–285). It is possible that Sultan Suleiman II sought financial aid from Aurangzeb instead of military assistance, as the Ottoman firearm technology was superior to that of the Mughals. The European traveller in Mughal court stated this event in his book, Storia do Mogor that:

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In 1689, there came an ambassador from the Grand Seignior to ask help in money from Aurangzeb, explaining to him the danger to which his king was exposed from the Christians. Aurangzeb sent him nine lakhs of rupees, making excuses for no greater help. (Manucci, II, 1907, p. 461)4

Whether it was the same letter or not the Ottoman sultan’s request from Aurangzeb was described by Talboys Wheeler with the following word. the religious zeal of Aurangzeb seems to have reached the ears of the sultan of Turkey. Both were Sunnis. The sultan wrote to Aurangzeb begging him to forbid his subjects from selling saltpetre to Christians as it was often burnt for the destruction of good Mohammedans. Aurangzeb issued necessary prohibition, and the English lost for a while their saltpetre trade at Patna. (Wheeler, 1878, p. 162)

After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the war of succession among his three sons broke out (Richards, 2001, pp. 253–254). Bahadur Shah (1707–1712) succeeded to the throne, but he did not spend much effort to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottomans as his father did (Farooqi, 1989, p. 69).

Conclusion Although the Ottoman–Asia relations can be traced to the fifteenth century, the relations flourished after the sixteenth century. The Ottomans involved the region due to economic and religious reasons, which emerged because of the aggressive policy of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. Upon the requests of the Muslim states of the region and to protect trade and pilgrim routes, the Ottoman commanders were sent to the region. As being Caliph, these efforts made the Ottomans the guardian of the Muslim society in Asia. However, the clashes between the Portuguese and the Ottoman forces reduced their military and economic power and this occurrence helped the British to emerge as a major power in the region. On the other hand, the focus of the Ottoman Empire towards Asia increased with the Safavids. The rise of Safavids in Iran as a Shia state 4 According to Manucci, the name of the Ottoman ambassador was Ahmed Agha. When Aurangzeb was told of the loss of the Ottoman Empire that was recognised as the most powerful Islamic empire, he had to accept the strength of the European Powers.

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became a problem for Sunni states, the Ottoman Empire, and the Uzbek Khanates. Upon Shia threat, the Ottomans and the Uzbeks established an alliance, so diplomatic, cultural, economic, and military interactions developed between two states. Since Safavids were caught between two fires, they aimed to improve their relations with the Mughals. Although the Mughals followed the Sunni sect of Islam, ambitious Mughal rulers did not recognise the Ottoman Empire as the Caliphate. Moreover, the Mughals were not willing to establish close relations with the Ottomans till Safavid attacked the Mughal territories. Basically, in this period their relations were shaped by a set of geopolitical and religious competitions. Thus, in the Asia policy of the Ottoman Empire, the Mughals, Safavids, and Uzbeks became major factors. The clashes among the Ottomans, the Safavids, the Mughals, and the Uzbeks created a power gap in Asia in the following years. This gap was filled up by Russian and British over time. It was not easy for the Ottomans to be a role player in the region, since they were behind the British and Russian Empires in terms of economic and military power. Therefore, the Ottomans established their relation with Asian empires through the Pan-Islamist policy. It can be said that while the military presence of the Ottoman Empire reduced, diplomacy gained importance for the Ottoman Empire.

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Prasad, I. (1931). A short history of Muslim rule in India. The Indian Publications Richards, J. F. (2001). The Mughal Empire (The Cambridge history of India) (Vol. 1–5). Cambridge University Press. Sah, ¸ R. (1967). Açi Padi¸sahı Sultan Alaeddin’in Kanuni Sultan Süleyman’a Mektubu. Tarih Ara¸stırmaları Dergisi, 8(9). Sarkar, J. (1921). History of Aurangzeb Northern India, 1658–1681 (Vol. III). Sri Gouranga Press. Sarkar, J. N. (1975). Asian balance of power in the light of Mughal-Persian rivalry in 16th & 17th centuries. In P. M. Joshi (Ed.), Studies in the foreign relations of India (From the earliest times to 1947). State Archives Government of Andhra Pradesh. Sümer, F. (1999). Safevi Devletinin Kurulu¸su ve Geli¸smesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları. Togan, A. Z. V. (1981). Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan ve yakın tarihi): Batı ve kuzey Türkistan (Vol. 1). Güven Basımevleri. Williams, L. F. R. (1900). An empire builder of the sixteenth century. S. Chand & Co. Yürük, E. (2018, September–November). Seeking an ally against British expansion in India: Tipu Sultan’s mission to the Ottoman Empire. AIJRHASS, 1(24).

A Post-Cold War Era Context of Turkey’s Asia Relations Omair Anas

Pre-Cold War The formal Ottoman–Asia relations date back to the thirteenth century when the Ottomans exchanged embassies with all major empires of the world. From eighteenth century onwards, the British–Ottoman relations entered a formal alliance, mainly in consideration of Russian threats to their Central and South Asian interests (Hanio˘glu, 2017). Sanjay Garg, too, contradicts that “the Turco-Balkan Wars were essentially a European affair” Garg (2017, p. 113), for example, the establishment of Turco-Persian Frontier Commission (1913). However, in terms of formal alliance, it was only the British India with which the Ottomans could enter a formal alliance with any Indian ruler since the Mughal time. The Ottomans were supposed to stop Russia from accessing both the Mediterranean and Central Asia where Turkey was a key player. In the British colonial papers and policy discussions, the Ottomans were seen as a power that could have stopped the Russians from reaching Asia.

O. Anas (B) Department of International Relations, Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_4

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The Russian threat to India had frequently appeared in the writings of George Edward Westmacott (1838), Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury (1854), Reginald Bosworth Smith (1876), James Long (1877), and many other colonial writers. They have discussed how to save the Ottoman Empire and help it withstand Russia’s expansion to Asia. In his speech on March 10, in the House of Lords on “the manifesto of the Emperor of Russia,” Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury heavily came down against the Christians’ Russian treatment and the improvement of Christian rights in Turkey. He said, “we are compelled to make a choice; since we must declare for either one (Russia (or the other (Turkey), whether we have not judged rightly to prefer, as I most heartily do, the Turkish to the Russian autocrat” (Shaftesbury, 1854, p. 6). Francis Marx discussed how important it was to defend Turkey to save India. He quoted the headline of Times Newspaper from 1854, which read, “we have to defend India in the Crimea” (Marx, 1863). In 1877, an Anglo Indian wrote to the British foreign office that if Turkey were allowed to decline, the British Empire would endanger its hold on India because a victorious Russian army would claim the lion’s share in the dismembered Turkey (FCOC, 1877, p. 1). James Long’s paper, which he had read before the East India Association, on Wednesday, 16 May 1877, says, “the Eastern Question is for England a Russo-Indian question—the securing at any cost the neutrality of Constantinople Isthmus of Suez, as they affect the route to India and our relations with Russia in her position in Asia Minor and on our frontier, where Russia has now become our neighbour. Is India to be endangered for Turkey? Are we to sacrifice the substance for the shadow?” (Long, 1877, p. 3). He stated, “the Eastern Question started with Turks and Slavs, but the real question that underlies it is Europe, Russia, and the Central Asia Question.” The main benefit of the Ottoman Empire in his view was not for the benefit of the Turks, “but for the benefit of Europe; not to keep Mahomedans in power, but to save the Christians from the war” (Long, 1877, p. 6). In these colonial observations, Turkey appeared prominently as an important player in the British-Russian rivalry in Asia. Ottoman Foreign minister Keccizade Mehmed Fuad Pasha also preferred to lose some Ottoman provinces than losing the alliance with England (Hanio˘glu, 2017, p. 61). As the Ottoman Empire would start declining imminently by the end of the eighteenth century, and Asian freedom fighters would also start their struggle against the British Empire,

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Moscow, Istanbul, and Berlin would emerge as key transit routes for their international coordination. As Turkey’s interests in Asian affairs increased, the Ottomans were able to build strong relations with local Indian rulers, mainly the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Nawabs of Bhopal, Rampur, Mahmudabad, East Turkistan, Malabar, and other prominent Muslims. The late Ottoman archives on Asian affairs can be broadly divided into five categories, first, exchange of letters with Asian rulers, second, letters of support and financial help from Asian Muslims on several occasions, and especially during the Russian and Balkan wars and the war of independence, and third, documents that are related to personal affairs of Asians in need to go to Mecca and Karbala, or to do business visit in the Ottoman markets. The fourth category of archives is mostly the reports of Turkish diplomatic and intelligence sources on Asian affairs. The fifth category is Turkish reports about international cooperation, as the implementation of the telegraph project or the Bosphorus Railway line. During the Ottoman-Russian war in 1876, Turkey received support and sympathy from most of the British subjects and the local rulers. Other than official letters exchanged between Turkey and Britain, local Indian rulers, mainly the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Nawab of Bhopal, were among the first to have sent financial and medical aid to the Ottoman Empire after the 1876 Ottoman Russian war. In her letter on 29 Muharram 1294 (12 February 1878) to the Ottoman Sultan, the Malika of Bhopal, Shahjahan Begum, called the Russian forces “defeated and humiliated” while praying for the orphans and injured of the war. She sent 150,000 British Pound while her husband Nawab Siddiq Hasan Khan sent 25,000, along with 25,700 from her family members (BOAHR-SYS-01234). The Ottomans received support from Indian rulers, the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Nawab of Bhopal, in developing the residential and transportation infrastructure in Mecca and Madina. For this purpose, the Nizam of Hyderabad had already provided a huge amount to the Ottomans to build Hijaz Railway (BOA-HR-TH-00266-00,019). The Ottoman–Nizam relations can be considered as the most important relationship among all Asian relations. The Ottomans even did not support Tipu Sultan in his war with the Nizam of Hyderabad. The Anglo-Ottoman alliance, too, did not last long; it stopped Russia’s expansion towards South Asia and stopped the Russian invasion of India nevertheless. The development of Holy Mosques of Mecca and Madina, and the support of Indian Muslims for that, scholarly and academic

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exchanges between India and Turkey too figure in these interactions. As the Anglo-Ottoman alliance would come to an end by the first World War, the Ottoman reach out to Indian people would gradually decline, and Turkey would need to engage directly with Muslim rules. By 1914, however, both allies would fall apart to eradicate each other due to their differences in the first World War (Hanio˘glu, 2017, p. 61). As the relatıons between Turkey and Britain broke down, Turkey, too, actively extended support to the freedom fighters from India who wanted to establish an independent Indian government. The visit of Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh to Istanbul Sublime Porte in May 1915 (BOA-HR-ID00087), after his visit to Berlin, was important as he had carried the message of German war officers to Istanbul and had met the Turkish war minister Enver Pasha (Hughes, 2002, p. 450). The British authorities were anxious about these exchanges as they had known that Germany is supporting Turkey and Indian freedom fighters to install a provisional government in Kabul, led by Raja Mahendra Pratap Sıngh. On return from Istanbul, Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh declared the formation of a provisional Indian government in Kabul on 1 December 1915, of which he was the first Prime Minister. Turkey did not stop here, it also started supporting Khilafat Movement in India. The Indian Khilafat Movement focused mainly on the Hajj pilgrim and the status of the two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Madina after the Ottomans had lost control over the Arabian peninsula and the British supported the Al Saud. A large number of Ottoman documents on India are about the problems of Hajj and the issues of Indian pilgrims there. With the end of the Khilafat in 1924, the cooperation between the new Turkish government of Mustafa Kemal and Indian rulers and Indian political groups, especially the Indian National Congress remained unchanged, for the reason that both Turkey and Indian freedom fighters were still confronting a common enemy, the British government. The Mustafa Kemal establishment was, however, careful by not stoking the Khilafat reference and, rather, encouraged Indian Muslims to distance from the Saqit or declined family of the Ottomans. When Mahatma Gandhi undertook to travel to Egypt to attend the conference of the Wafd Party in 1931, his meeting with the family of the Ottomans was on the watch of the Turkish intelligence. The Turkish Charge D’affaire in Cairo reported (on 1 November 1931) that the family met Gandhi at the ship on which Gandhi was travelling to Hyderabad. The reason for the meeting, however, the document says, was the dissatisfaction of the daughters’

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in-laws of the Nizam from their financial condition (BOA-203-385-19). Even though the new government wanted to promote Mustafa Kemal’s revolution among Indian Muslims, and a close aide of Mustafa Kemal Halide Edib was sent to India to study the Gandhian movement as well as promote Turkish culture and movement. At the same time, the Turkish government was worried that her husband, Dr. Adnan’s interactions with the leaders of the Khilafat movement were under watch. The Turkish government was suspicious that Dr. Adnan might be developing some interests and relations with India’s Khilafat movement, according to the intelligence reports that the Turkish foreign ministry had submitted to the interior ministry in that period (BOA-490-1-0–0-578-2299-5). In the period of Mustafa Kemal rule, Turkey had to closely watch the unfolding realities from the Indian sub-continent, China, and East Asia. By the 1940s, the status of Tibet and Sikkim received the attention of Turkey. The expansion of Pan-Asianist ideas, with the expansion of Japan, was also under the watch of Turkey. There were many elements in Turkey who were still interested in Pan-Asianism and wanted to align with Japan in order to save the Turkistan from China’s imminent control. In Japan, a Turkic émigré Abdul Rashid was said to have met with Subash Chandra Bose too. Japan was not alone in supporting an independent Turkistan. Several western nations, Russia, India, and Central Asian nations, as well as Turkey, wanted Turkistan to stay independent from China. The Saadabad Pact, among Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq, had come in the backdrop of changing Asian landscape. On 23 August 1942, Turkish Charge D’affaire noted with keen interest that Indian freedom fighters were inclining towards Japan if the British government did not accept their demands. The idea of a pan-Asian government, the letter notes, has is becoming a bad scenario for the Chinese government, and it wants ˙ Indians to stop them from such prospects (BOA-515–7527).

The Cold War An important discussion in the republican era archives on Asian affairs is Turkey’s participation in the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the ˙ both Asian events, a large first Asia-Africa Conference in New Delhi. In number of Asian leaders had attended. On 29 April 1965, India handed over a memorandum to the Turkish foreign minister in which Turkey and India had explained its reservations over China’s role in the upcoming Asia-Africa Summit in Algeria. China also wanted to evolve Afro-Asian

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Conference as a legal body that would challenge the United Nations in future. Indian memo explained that Afro-Asian Conference did not hold a legal character and nor should it have. Chinese efforts were supported by Indonesia and Pakistan. India, on the other hand, wanted Malaysia and the Soviet Union, too, to be invited to Algeria. The proposal was, however, opposed by China and Indonesia. India and Turkey both had common reservations about China’s attempt to dominate the conference. The Indian memorandum to Turkey was received positively, and Turkey found common ground with other countries like Japan in accepting Indian observations. In return, Turkey expected Malaysia to have a softened stance on Cyprus (BOA-64-395-13). In his speech at the Foreign Minister’s meeting of Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria, C.S. Jha mentioned Turkey along with the Soviet Union as both Russia and Turkey were also Asian countries, Turkey was invited to the first AfroAsian Conference, and so the Soviet Union could also be invited (JHA, 1965). India–Pakistan conflict also received much attention from the Turkish foreign ministry in the Cold War period. Pakistan being a member of CENTO, Turkey and Pakistan had advanced their relations more in military cooperation than in any other area of bilateral cooperation. This was seen as the biggest concern for India, and this was the reason that India had opposed Pakistan’s joining of CENTO. While maintaining strong military ties with Pakistan, Turkey sought equal relations with India. In these exchanges, however, Turkey and Pakistan had different views of India. During the India–China war, Turkey had almost supplied India weapons, had Pakistan not blocked the move at the very last moment. The issue came up in various meetings between Indian and Turkish officials, mainly in the meeting with Prime Minister Ismet Inonu and Indian Ambassador in Ankara, Mr. Kanhiyalal Mehta on 6 March 1963. This was the time when Turkey was mediating between India and Pakistan. Mehta conveyed Prime Minister Nehru’s gratitude to the Turkish PM for his readiness to supplying arms to India during the war (BOA-390-8). It is unclear Turkey played a role in Pakistan’s decision to remain neutral during the India–China war in 1962. The end of the Cold War has changed the entire security doctrine on which the Turkish relations with the West were based on. With the Soviet Union no longer a primary threat to the West, which was the sole basis of Turkey’s strategic relevance for the West, Turkey found itself threatened by the lingering uncertainties regarding its immediate neighbourhood.

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The fear that a future military threat to Turkey may not possibly “evoke the western security umbrella for protection shook the very foundations of Turkish security thinking and policy” (Aydin, 2005, p. 30). Tarik O˘guzlu argues that despite these shifting security perceptions, the A.K. Party of conservatives largely followed a neo-classical realism for both to secure legitimacy that it needs against diehard sceptics in the military and secular opposition, and “to interpret the constitutive norms of the USled western international order” and as a result to follow a pro-western Turkish foreign policy. As Oguzlu argues, the A.K. Party had through three transformative periods in the last fifteen years in the beginning with (i) pro-Western Realism in Turkish Foreign Policy, from 2002–2008, (ii) liberal Optimism in a Search for Strategic Autonomy, 2008–2015 and, (iii) realism redux in the Emerging Multipolar World Order, 2015–2018. In this changing global strategic environment, Turkey had sought “to pursue a more multidimensional and multi-directional foreign approach” (O˘guzlu, 2011, p. 985). As the world sees a rapid and steady decline of the Western leadership, if not Western power, to withstand the rise of illiberal order, Turkey would continue seeking greater strategic autonomy. In this period, the most important transformation is the ascendence of the civilian authority in all state institutions where once the Turkish military used to be the sole decision-maker. In this context, civilian and military leadership have managed to minimise their differences and work in tandem. As Turkey felt a sense of abandonment, with the decline of importance to the Western security view, a deepening sense of being left and even betrayed by the West has gradually occupied Turkey’s strategic perception. With events like the Cyprus crisis and the over-delayed EU accession process, Turkey’s secularists found themselves more isolated. The number of disenchanted Kemalists increased, and they joined the ranks of nationalists, democrats, and conservatives. Conservative politicians like Turgut Ozal and the current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can be seen as the two leaders who have advanced a foreign policy driven by more nationalist and conservative emotions. For example, the expulsion of Turks from the Soviet territories, the failure to become part of Europe, and the failure to regain the imagined glory feed the trauma politics. However, such memories and imagined trauma were not completely new. It was rather a continuity of the earlier memories of trauma from the Ottoman past. The “ordeal” that a Turk had gone through while transiting to a modern republic that would be cut off from its Ottoman

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past (Edib, 1930, p. 258). After a prolonged top-down modernisation and state capitalism, the Ozalian reforms of the market and society led to the deconstruction of rigid state–society relations and incorporated the Ottoman imagined state. For a long, Islamists saw Kemalism as responsible for internal strife between Turks and Kurds, found a new opening reconciling with their Islamic understanding (Yavuz, 2016, pp. 438–465). The neo-Ottomanist narrative succeeded in juxtaposing Kemalism against hegemony, an anti-democratic system in the later eighties and nineties (Yavuz, 2016, p. 459). In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey found Asia also deeply divided into many faultlines. The regional rivalries and disputes among China, India, and Pakistan, Japan, and China, now China and Quad and South China Sea countries, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and other trade, water, and natural resources related disputes, have made Turkey’s road to Asia far more complicated. Unlike its Kemalist and secular predecessors, the AK Party government had to deal with a different Asia. Amitav Acharya (2010a) points out to at least five Asias, one imperialist Asia, second, nationalist Asia, third, universalist Asia, fourth, regional, and fifth, exceptionalist Asia. There does not exist any Asia as a single and uniform political, cultural, or economic community. Instead, Asia is now defined by various competitions, rivalries, and conflicts. The new Asia does neither project itself as an anti-colonial nor anti-West bloc, once emerged in the Bandung Conference in 1955. However, the rise of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Non-Aligned Movement, SAARC, ASEAN, or BIMSTEC gave the impression that Asia now represents a set of new ambitions that “seeks a collective voice on the world stage, or to seek a role in the management of regional and international affairs” as Acharya (2010b, p. 7) pointed out. However, with China’s growing unilateral ambitions and conflicting ways with India leave Asia a divided house. Turkey’s era of “passive neutrality” towards Asia during the republican era started being replaced by an active policy that required Turkey to think beyond its borders, assuming the role of a “regional stabiliser” or “arbiter” as part of its security interests. The economic rise of Turkey, mostly in 2004–2012, has given credence to the conceptual discussions on Turkey’s rise as “Middle Power” status or a country that Fareed Zakaria counts among “the rising rest” countries (Zakaria, 2013, p. 4). In recent analyses, Turkey has also been identified

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as a middle power. Müftüler and Yüksel (1997) argued that Turkey, with personnel, resources, and entrepreneurial capacities, would become midlevel power in the next decade (Müftüler & Yüksel, 1997). What status Turkey aspires in global and regional politics has often been analysed from political and cultural centric approaches instead of a structuralistrealist perspective. With middle power capacities, Turkey was caught by a “double gravity” predicament, as Robins argued in which Turkey “had neither the power nor the strength to sustain a core role” (Robins, 2013, p. 381). Turkey’s strategic evaluation of its Asia relations can be broadly divided into four categories: • Turkey’s relations with China and India have become the most important relation in its Asia relations with a 35 billion dollar trade size. The potential to expand relations is enormous, but there are many vital differences. Workable reciprocity is still absent to reach “reciprocal pragmatism.” • The second most important relationship is with Turkic nations where Turk ethnicity, language, Islam, and land connectivity make a set of common interests. With the incorporation of Pakistan as a key country in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Pakistan is expanding its overall connectivity with the Eurasian landmass. As India–Pakistan relations have left Pakistan isolated, Pakistan aims to emerge as a Eurasian power. • The third most important relationship brings two sets of interests, a free-market economy and a Western alliance. Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines have traditionally maintained warm economic and political ties. This partnership makes Turkey relevant for the new Asia Pacific approach of its western allies. • The fourth important relationship is what Turkey now wants to advance under the Asia Anew Initiative. It focuses on East Asian nations making Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia as the main trade partners. Most of these countries have a republican democratic system with an entirely or predominantly free-market economy with moderate religious values. What divides them is their territorial disputes, strategic competition, and religio-cultural conflicts. Their intra-region trade volume has been on a steady rise. Intra-SCO trade has grown 17 per cent, reaching

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$305 billion, or five per cent of the total foreign trade (SCO, 2019). Intra-ASEAN trade accounts highest among most of the intra-regional trade volumes, with 36.3 per cent. Intra-BRICS trade is 10.61 per cent ($633.81 billion in 2017) of its global trade (PIB, 2019). While intraSAARC trade stands lowest at 5.6 per cent (Shrawan & Kumar, 2019) due to regional conflicts between India and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, intra-Asian rivalries complicate Turkey’s balancing acts in Asia. Below is a brief discussion on Turkey’s relations with each of the above mentioned five groups of Asian countries. 1. Countries of Reciprocal Pragmatism With India and China, Turkey’s political and strategic outlooks remain profoundly dividing. For Turkey, China is a Communist, undemocratic, and anti-US power. Plus, it has a centuries-old Turkic-speaking ethnic minority, Uyghur, whose Chinese state’s treatment is in western news headlines for human rights abuses. Moreover, China’s population and economic and defence clout are too big to bring any parity in their bilateral relations. In regional and global affairs, China and Turkey have very limited shared perspectives. In Syria, Libya, or Egypt, they have completely opposite positions. For many good reasons, both countries have very limited communication to bridge these gaps. Turkey is still struggling to find a pragmatic China policy to address these issues and craft a less ambitious and realistic China policy that may fit its main strategic orientations. Unlike China, India is a democratic country with a liberal economy where a diverse group of languages and ethnicities live together. This profile matches with Turkey’s secular and democratic identity. Yet, Turkey–India relations have many divergences that keep resurfacing now and then. Indian policymakers have developed a strong Pakistani prism to judge all Muslim countries from the same stick. Any slight difference between India and a Muslim country would normally end up with an accusation of being “pro-Pakistani.” Turkey has been criticised many times for playing with Indian sensibilities on the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. India–Turkey relations, however, have more significant problems than Kashmir. India and Turkey are two states whose ambitions and ideological perspectives have seen drastic shifts. Just like Turkey’s conservative tilt, India too has seen a sharp conservative tilt. Turkey’s interests in India have increased when India has started switching

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from its traditional West Asian foreign policy to a more rational and nonreluctant policy. The ideological transformation of the Indian state and its policymakers aims to create a more homogenous, centralised, and ideologically driven worldview, aiming to make India China’s credible competitor on the world stage. Turkey’s perception among India’s and Chinese ruling elite used to be mostly guided by Turkey’s Western security dependency or now Turkey’s return to an ideology of pan-Islamism and neo-Ottomanism. As the Middle East itself has become a deeply divided house, India, too, has found a partnership with Saudi Arabia and the UAE more useful than a long-practised strategic ambiguity. Turkey and Iran can be kept waiting as India’s energy, trade, and security interests in the Gulf region have assumed greater urgency. The bilateral relations and regular political and diplomatic exchanges between India and Turkey have declined significantly. Unlike Turkey–Russia diplomatic and civil society level dialogues, people to people contact, think tank to think tank interactions, and civil society interactions between Turkey and India and Turkey and China are very limited. This is happening when India is seen as switching from its all-time defence partner Russia towards the US, Israel, and Europe; and Turkey too is searching for new partners beyond its western allies. This changing status of both countries has also become a source of uncertainty in their future direction. Even without the Kashmir or Uyghur disputes, Turkey’s relations with India and China have yet to qualify for reciprocal pragmatism. A report of pro-government Turkish think tank The Siyaset, Ekonomi Ve Toplum Ara¸stirmalari Vakfi’s (SETA) on Turkey–China relations highlighted the problems of Turkey–China relations and made a detailed recommendation to overcome what they called an unsustainable relation. The recommendations include, China should increase Turkish import; the areas of comparative advantage should be identified to bridge the trade gap, restrictions on these areas should be removed; the report looks Turkey–China relations as “one-sided,” “unsustainable”, and “asymmetric” that create dependency rather than equality; Turkey and its stakeholders must know China and its region the Asia Pacific and its export market more closely; it recommends to establish social, cultural, and academic networks. In order to make a balanced relationship, the report goes on recommending that China makes Turkey its production hub in order to access the European markets through custom union by assuring the quality of European standards (Dilek et al., 2019, pp. 65–69).

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There are many Asian regional and international groups that Turkey shares with Asian countries. MIKTA is an informal initiative that Turkey formed along with Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, and Australia in 2013 to achieve development-related cooperation. Among other smaller groups are D8 of other than Egypt and Nigeria; all other six members, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, are from Asia. The group has not demonstrated its efficacy in achieving its goals, yet, all member states maintain close cooperation on non-political affairs. Turkey has also joined Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) in 2013 to increase its close cooperation with ASEAN and its member states. The biggest and perhaps the most influential, only politically, though, is the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), with whom Turkey is a member and all Asian and Arab Muslim countries. This gives Turkey much more connectivity and access to all key Asian Muslim countries, including Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and all Central Asian states. However, Turkey’s major trade exchange is still beyond these groups, mainly with India, China, Japan, and South Korea. However, political ties with SCO and BRICS countries with whom Turkey’s economic ties grow significantly have yet to grow further. 2. Eurasia and Turkic Nations Turkic nations of Asia, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, constitute another Asian region of strategic significance for Turkey. However, these relations are overshadowed by two factors: the Soviet Union’s role and Iran’s role. The 1925 SovietTurkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality notwithstanding, Turkey had also signed the Saadabad Pact in 1937 to stop the soviet expansion towards Afghanistan and British India. After the end of British colonial rule in South Asia, Turkey sought closer cooperation with Iran and Pakistan by forming the Central Treaty Organisation in 1955 along with Iraq and the UK. The fall of the Soviet Empire was an opportunity to re-establish closer ties, once attempted by the centrist governments of Turgut Ozal and Necmettin Erbakan (Ataman, 2002). After the Afghan civil war, Turkey’s role in the region had only declined. The economic cooperation within Turkic nations beyond energy trade has been limited. In recent decades, India and China’s role has increased in Central Asia as both powers compete for greater economic and energy cooperation

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in the region. China has unfolded its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, and India wants similar connectivity projects with the help of Iran and Uzbekistan. Central Asian countries are increasingly integrated with the South Asian economy as India unfolded several initiatives in the last decade, including air and land corridor and pipelines (Haidar, 2020; Rajiv & Sharanya, 2019). This could be an opportunity and a challenge for Turkey’s expansion of economic ties with the region. The Economic Cooperation Organization (earlier Regional Council for Development) has been an important regional development group that aimed for greater integration and connectivity among Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The primary reason for ECO’s failure is not only the lack of comparative advantage among these countries but also the lack of necessary political conditions to facilitate more cooperation. For example, an agreement on the Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Pakistan has not yet been reached. The failed mini OIC summit in December 2019 has underlined Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries’ role in Asia’s Muslim nations that tells why Turkey may not yet replace Saudi Arabia from its leadership role in Islamic countries. The differences between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey on Afghanistan, mainly on who should succeed power after the peace process, are still unresolved. The list of Iran–Turkey differences is very long, including the dispute over Azerbijan–Armina territorial dispute, the Syrian crisis, the Afghan crisis, and their rivalry in Central Asia. With Bangladesh too, Turkish relations were affected after Turkey commented on a tribunal’s judgement to convict the leaders of Jamat Islami. These fault lines have always been there in one way or another, and hence the idea of instrumentalising Muslim unity has never taken off. 3. Free Markets of Asia Pacific Japan has been Turkey’s main inspiration since the Ottoman time. The Ottomans studied the Japanese model of industrialisation and tried to bring the Japanese model to Turkey. In the post-World War Two period, Turkey joined NATO and agreed to join the United Nations Command against the North Korean invasion in 1950–1952. It opened an opportunity to establish close relations with other free-market societies, Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia. Turks and Koreans are called “blood brothers” because of 900 soldiers’ sacrifices for Korean independence. However, as Turkey tried to expand its relations with

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China and some time with North Korea, following the peace process, South Korea established diplomatic ties with Cyprus in 1995, and Turkey established diplomatic ties with North Korea in 2001. Turkey remains part of the US efforts for the Korean peninsula’s peace process without going much closer to North Korea as Turkish officials describe the relation as “limited” without resident ambassadors. Both Japan and South Korea remain an essential source of technology investments in Turkey. The Philippines–Turkey relations, too, should be seen within the US alliance solidarity. With Turkey having provided crucial mediation support in the Philippines’ peace process with its Southern rebel groups of Moro Muslims, as a member of the International Contact Group, many in Turkey boast the success as a model of how Turkey could help conflictprone Muslim areas to have a dialogue with their governments. The end of the region’s prolonged conflict has helped Turkey emerge as a confidant Muslim player. However, their relations are, by and large, going to remain bilateral, and their cooperation on regional and international affairs is still limited and less explored. Over the years, Japanese and South Asian investments have started exploring more attractive markets, and Turkey’s share of Japanese and South Korean investment is on the decline. Turkey’s human resource pool does not make it an attractive destination for technology and innovation-related investments, a fact that the conservative elites have realised only lately. 4. Asia Anew Among the least developed Asian relations of Turkey are with countries of BIMSTEC, Bangladesh, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Hanoi, and India. Turkey’s relations with these countries are in the focus of the recently announced Asia Anew policy. Bangladesh is a key connecting point to reach to all these countries. In recent years, Turkey and Bangladesh have mended their fences and have agreed. Turkey– Myanmar relations have not been very well, yet, Turkey undertook a humanitarian approach to ease the conflict. One common problem for Turkey in all these countries is that it is becoming a sphere of competition between India and China. Both big powers have ancient civilisational ties beyond politics and trade in the region. The competition between the two great powers is pushing the region to a difficult choice. India rejected

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the free trade agreement of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for fears that Chinese goods would overwhelm Indian markets. India aspires to emerge as a credible counterforce of an already assertive China, not just in the military domain but also in trade. As a result, India wants to revive its ancient civilisational ties of Buddhist and Hindu religious encounters. For Turkey to deepen its ties with the region, it has to make a good bargain with both great powers by cooperating with them on trade and investment. • India–Turkey Relations After the end of the Cold War, Pakistan lost much of its leverage with the Western world and especially with the US and Pakistan found an “Iron Friend” in China to maintain a “strategic deterrence” against India. As some Arab countries, previously Pakistan’s closest defence partners, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, also gradually replaced Pakistan with India to diversify their defence partnerships beyond Western dependency, in this context, Turkey has become more important for Pakistan to stop its isolation in the Islamic world. Turkey’s gradual tilt to Pakistan has appeared as the biggest concern in New Delhi as Turkey is becoming more vocal on the Jammu and Kashmir issue, leaving its decades-old balancing act between India and Pakistan. However, the Turkey–Pakistan equation may not be the only factor in defining India–Turkey relations. Even after the Cold War, when India joined the neo-liberal global economy, Turkey and India have yet to overcome the Pakistan factor. The earlier India’s policy of balancing between various Islamic world powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey is no longer needed as India recently secured extraordinary relations with the key Islamic nations such as UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, Turkey’s special ties with Pakistan and its Kashmir stance is not the only problem in the two countries relations. In recent years, India has strengthened its ties with Greek, Cyprus and Armenia, Turkey’s two troubled neighbourhoods. This may not be considered a major policy shift, yet, in a crisis between two countries, relations with these countries carry strong political messages. There are also some common perspectives that both countries have missed in their relations, particularly on Afghanistan. Turkey’s dislike of the Taliban is not unknown, and Turkey has maintained close relations with anti-Taliban forces such as the

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Afghani-Uzbek leader, Abdul Rashid Dostum. He had sought refuge in Istanbul in 1997, where the Tajik leader Ahmad Shah Masood also visited in 1998. In 2000, Turkish president Bulent Ecevit had skipped Pakistan in his South Asia tour and had shared Indian concerns on terrorism, which had sparked a backlash in Pakistan. In recent years, Turkish companies, Savronik and Anadolu shipyard, were allowed to be part of two different defence projects, to build a tunnel in Ladakh (The Economic Times, 2020) and build five fleets support ships for the Indian Navy. This shows the level of confidence in both countries’ de-hyphenated foreign relations that do not allow third countries to affect their relations. In economic terms, India and Turkey have shown steady long-term growth in the last decade and have lifted a vast middle class. Turkey is now part of the G20 and has achieved many of the development goals. As a result, India and Turkey have found new avenues of cooperation, including in the defence industry. India is among the new tourism destination for Turkey, with 230,000 Indians visiting Turkey every year (Paul, 2020). In the education sector, too, Indian students have started exploring Turkish universities. In the last few decades, India has changed its geo-economic profile by becoming the fastest growing market in the world, with a 1.3 billion population. As a result, all major economies of the world look keenly to Indian markets. India’s rising geo-economic profile has also helped India emerge as an important geostrategic force to counterbalance China’s economic and defence might. India is pursuing an Indo-Pacific policy that seeks more cooperation with Quad countries (the US, Australia, Japan, and India) to secure the Indian Ocean. This changing role of India in the global order is becoming an important consideration in Turkey’s South Asia policy. Before Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other Middle Eastern countries have already upgraded their relations with India. In cooperation with Western powers, India and Turkey may find new areas of cooperation in South East Asia and Central Asia, where multipolarity can democratise China’s behaviour. Both Turkey and India have similar ambitions and options to advance their interests in the changing world order, a multipolar world where their views are heard in international forums. They may differ in opinions on several international issues, yet their objectives are to diversify their strategic perspective and expand their strategic autonomy beyond their Cold War era dependencies on the West or Russia. Under the Narendra Modi government, India has sought to diversify its relations with Russia beyond defence. Russia is not very happy with India’s gradual tilt towards the West and has started warming its relations with Pakistan,

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which many in New Delhi see as a sign of growing crack between India and Russia (Joshi & Sharma, 2017; Storey, 2021). Similarly, Turkey has been reshaping its relations with Russia, which has angered its NATO allies. Both countries are balancing their relations beyond their traditional defence partners. By entering multilateral and multidimensional relations, India and Turkey are trying to redefine their foreign policies. While shifting their foreign policy approaches, domestic, bilateral, and regional disputes have come under greater international scrutiny. India’s Kashmir and Turkey’s Kurdish issues have not only made international headlines, but they have also caused bilateral problems in their many relations. As Turkey has raised the Kashmir issue in international forums to support Pakistan, India has also criticised Turkey’s military operation in Syria’s Kurdish areas in 2020. Turkey, along with China, is protecting Pakistan from getting blacklisted by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) against Indian efforts to get Pakistan blacklisted for her “terror financing” (Hindustan Times, 2019). Turkey, despite having announced principle support to India’s membership at the Nuclear Supplier Group (Deccan Herald, 2016), has mostly stood with China against India’s membership. Earlier, India was disappointed when it was excluded from Istanbul Process, and this shows the vulnerability of India–Turkey bilateral ties more to external factors than their own bilateral differences. Once both countries find a common perspective in pursuing their interests, they may return to the Cold War era neutrality to each other’s sensitive issues, such as Kashmir or Cyprus.

Pakistan–Turkey During the Cold War, Pakistan was part of Turkey’s West-centric foreign and defence relations to keep an eye on the Soviet expansion in Central and South Asia. This started with Pakistan’s joining CENTO and came to an end with the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This partly benefited China in keeping the Soviet Union away from Chinese-Turkic regions. At the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Pakistan lost much relevance for the West-led world order as the West gradually found China as the new challenge. In the aftermath of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the West’s anti-Soviet Jihad, the Taliban, and Mujahideen allies became the primary enemy and threat to the Western interests. As the West’s anti-Soviet Jihad headquarters, Pakistan had found

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itself divided between the West and the Mujahideen. Pakistan, though reluctantly accepted the US War on terror against the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s main worry was to stop India’s growing proximity with the West and, particularly, their security alliance in Afghanistan. The two-decades-long US War on Terror inflicted massive economic, social, and political damage on Pakistan. Pakistan’s security had deteriorated significantly as many pro-Taliban factions had unleashed a war against the Pakistani military inside Pakistan for their “pro-American” policies. Pakistan’s economy had mostly survived on bailout packages from the US, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. At the social level too, Pakistan observed unrest and discontent against both the civilian government and military establishment. Sectarian violence, regional conflicts, organised crimes, poverty-related problems dramatically rose. As a result, Pakistan’s policy choices have been shrinking, and its influence in global politics and the economy has significantly declined. At least five factors are prominent in Pakistan’s regional and foreign policy. First, from the eastern side, it has the second-largest market, India, of which Pakistan was once part until 1947. Now, Pakistan is completely cut off from India’s growing economy, while Bangladesh is closely linked to India’s economic growth. Pakistan’s isolation from India-led economic growth of the South Asian region has deepened its dependency on China. Second, on the West, its relations with Iran at least three puzzles. First, Pakistan must balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are extremely unhappy over Pakistan’s refusal to join the Saudi-led military operation in Yemen. Second, Iran is also considered “pro-India” as India is Iran’s key energy customer, and third, Iran and Pakistan have disagreements on how to deal with the Afghan crisis. Amid these three factors, Iran’s support to Bashar Al Assad in the Syrian civil war has mostly been seen as Iran’s sectarian war against Sunnis. Third, Pakistan’s weakened or deteriorated relations with the West has been compensated by China’s economic and military support to Pakistan, which also deepened Pakistan’s dependency on China and weakened Pakistan’s strategic autonomy. Fourth, the Afghan civil war has consumed much of Pakistan’s military, economic and strategic resources. As the US is completing its withdrawal from Afghanistan amid an unsuccessful and incomplete power transition, Pakistan has to prepare for another period of instability and strife in Afghanistan. Fifth, the Arabian Sea, the only front where Pakistan was without much pressure, is now turning into a Great maritime Game

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between India and China. Iran’s Chabahar Port and Pakistan’s Gawadar Port are seen mainly as Indian and Chinese strategic assets for a future confrontation. Finally, India and the US are advancing the Quad-led Asia Pacific alliance, of great worry of China. While Pakistan’s economy remains mismanaged, Pakistan lacks the resources to overcome the crisis. With only (USD 30 Billion) export, Pakistan is far behind any other developing nation of Pakistan’s size, such as Indonesia (export-USD 200 Billion) and Bangladesh (USD 46 Billion). Pakistan has also lost much leverage in its dialogue and diplomacy over its differences with India. Most of the Western and Muslim capitals have already acknowledged the changing global politics in India’s favour. In this background, the political statements favouring Pakistan–Turkey relations do not match the reality of both countries’ ability to support each other. Turkey alone may not bear the burden of Pakistan’s economic and political challenges. Aware of these issues, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was not optimistic about Prime Minister Imran Khan’s ability to strengthen Turkey–Pakistan relations in economic and strategic domains. For a post-Cold War South Asia policy, Pakistan’s regional and international isolation remains the biggest problem for Turkey. Rather than a regional approach, Turkey has to continue de-hyphenated countryto-country relations without letting one relation affect the other. Overall, Turkey’s Asia policy is still in its nascent stages, and the ongoing discussions indicate that most of the discussions are driven by Turkey’s urgent need for economic diversification beyond the West and the Middle East. Turkey’s Asia Anew Initiative push has received much attention and interest in the region yet. As the US has been trying to fully activate its Asia Pacific policy, to contain China’s expanding influence, and to strengthen India as a counterbalance of China, the Asia Pacific region is emerging as the new sphere of competition and conflict in the world. As a NATO member, Turkey may not have the freedom to take an anti-US side in the US–China rivalry; it would need a more careful China policy as the US–China confrontation advances. In 2013, Turkey had sought a Chinese defence system which had angered Turkey’s Western allies. In each Asian country, there is competition going on between Indian, Western, and Chinese companies and investments. China already views Turkey’s increasing presence in Central Asia with great suspicion. Turkey’s growing ties with Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, especially for defence and security cooperation, will be carefully watched by China. In the China–Pakistan–Turkey triangle, Turkey’s best role may

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be to bring Pakistan closer to the West and help Pakistan evolve more independent, autonomous, and sustainable international relations. Ideally, Turkey–Pakistan relations would prosper if Pakistan enjoys greater strategic autonomy in its security and foreign policy. For this, Pakistan needs to reprioritise its regional policy according to its urgent need for (1), export market (2), investments to increase local manufacturing output (3), peace and stability in the country to attract international investors and tourism, (4), and good relations with the West. Turkey–Pakistan relations had deepened in the Cold War background; the US–China rivalry may once again similar conditions and bring new opportunities for both nations. For Turkey, Pakistan is an important country for its South Asia policy as well as Central Asia and Eurasia policy (Rafiq, 2021; Roy, 2006), where smaller countries are caught between Russia and China. The ongoing trajectory of Turkey–Pakistan relations has not shown much signs of an elevating relation that might include the promises of economic, security, and regional cooperation. Turkey alone is not in a position to bring Pakistan from international isolation when Turkey itself is facing immense pressure from its Western allies. Turkey’s shrinking economy has also restricted its investments in Pakistan. Even though there are opportunities as both countries have a huge trained and skilled workforce, and Pakistan wants to transform its Gwadar port as an export hub, the absence of predictable and sustainable stability in Pakistan restricts Turkey’s Pakistan policy.

Bangladesh–Turkey Relations Turkey–Bangladesh relations have mostly evolved independently from Turkey’s India or Pakistan relations. The arrival of the AK Party in Turkey and political and economic stability in Bangladesh in the 2000s helped both countries to advance their relations. However, Turkey has not been successful in reaching out to the Asian markets for a long time. There are many reasons, including Turkey’s own West-oriented foreign and trade relations. Turkey did not see a strong imperative in reaching out to the distant market because neither Turkey’s export size was growing nor its economic growth was coming out of a prolonged crisis until 2002. With AK Party in power, Turkey saw continued economic growth and political stability, allowing Turkey to reach out to Asian nations in its initial years of eighteen years rule. In 2013, Turkey supplied the Otokar Cobra

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light armoured vehicle to the Bangladesh Army in 2013. Bangladesh also asked for medium-range guided multiple rocket launchers from a Turkish company. After a brief pause in relations in 2015–2018 due to TurkeyBangladesh disagreement on Bangladesh’s controversial war tribunal cases against Jamat Islami leaders, both countries managed their disagreement from impacting their long-term relations. In the wake of the Rohingya crisis in 2017, Turkey helped Bangladesh mobilise international support for the Rohingya refugees to deal with the biggest humanitarian crisis in the region. Both countries, since then, have seen regular interaction both at the political and diplomatic levels. As India–Turkey relations also improved after Erdogan visited India in 2017, Bangladesh, too, opened a more balanced and cooperative relation with Turkey. In recent years, Bangladesh has expanded its relations with China both in trade and defence. In 2016, during his Bangladesh visit, the Chinese President had promised a $24 billion loan (Billah, 2020). The growing China– Bangladesh ties had raised concerns in India, which is the most important relation of Bangladesh. As India–China relations went down and the talks of a quad against China started in the region, China is trying to keep Bangladesh away from India’s Quad diplomacy (Srinivasan & Krishnan, 2021). In this context, Bangladesh is facing a dilemma of balance between India and China. In this context, Turkey’s growing defence relations with Bangladesh have brought a much-needed diversification in its China vs India competition. According to the Indian Defence Research Wing website, Bangladesh has acquired TRG-300 Kaplan Multiple Launch Rocket System in June 2021 (Indian Defence Research Wing, 2021). In his six-day-long visit to Turkey, from 19 to 25 April 2021, Bangladesh Air Force Commander Masihuzzama was said to have also talked about Turkish drones, according to an anonymous Turkish defence analyst on Twitter. However, Bangladesh officials maintain a low profile on Turkey– Bangladesh defence cooperation, saying that Bangladesh wants to be an “island of peace and stability.” It does not show interest in acquiring extra weapons, as the Bangladeshi foreign minister had explained in one of his interviews with a Turkish news agency. “we do not have to pile up the stockpiles of weapons” when he was asked about defence cooperation between Turkey and Bangladesh (Anadolu Agency, 2020). Turkey–Bangladesh trade relations have not yet progressed well, and for a long time, their total volume is stuck at one billion trade volume. China, India, and the US are Bangladesh’s biggest trade partners. The US, not China, is the largest export market. Among many problems

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in Bangladesh’s economic profile is that its recent growth is primarily concentrated in readymade garments (RMG), with a total $34.1 billion export value or 84.21 per cent of total exports (US$40.53 billion) (Express, 2020b). With an $18.2 billion annual flow to Bangladesh, remittances make the second-largest source of income. Despite massive urbanisation in recent years, 40.6 per cent of the population is dependent on agriculture. According to the World’s Bank’s Poverty and Shared Prosperity, 2018 report, there are 24.1 million extremely poor people who earn less than US$1.90 a day (Express, 2020b). As a result, the poverty and income gap remain key challenges for Bangladesh’s next round of economic transformation. For that, diversifying Bangladesh’s economy, expanding other sectors’ export, and finding investment in underdeveloped areas are critical to make a change. It would need concerted efforts to develop new economic growth areas that should provide better equity in distribution and the benefits of economic reforms. Light manufacturing, energy, power, agribusiness, and infrastructure sectors are already under consideration of Bangladesh, and Bangladesh has great potential in joining hands in pharmaceutical, footwear, agricultural-processing, and shipbuilding industries. As of now, Bangladesh exports to Turkey mainly jute products and ceramic products. ICT, cybersecurity, and research and development are areas where both countries are considering further expansion. In the backdrop of Bangladesh’s rising economic profile, Turkey and Bangladesh have found mutually beneficial opportunities. Turkey’s infrastructure development experience is a key sector where both countries are looking to increase their cooperation. Even in Liquefied Petroleum Gas, a Turkish company has announced to invest US$100 million in Chattogram (Express, 2020a). Turkey and Bangladesh are also members of the Developing Eight group. As Bangladesh takes over the chair of the D8 group in 2021, it combined the D8 Summit with the birth centenary celebrations of Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Until now, Bangladesh has remained a marginal South Asian country. Bangladesh was rarely a stop for Islamic leaders or Western leaders visiting South Asia. The last visit by a US President and UK Prime Minister to Bangladesh was in 2000 and 2002. No Saudi King had so far visited Bangladesh since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Only Chinese and Indian leaders are the main foreign dignitaries that frequently visit

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the country. To achieve its crucial development goals, Bangladesh has to expand its relations, reach new markets, and diversify its security outlook beyond China and India. The US administration’s reluctant approach towards the Sheikh Hasina government is mainly due to Bangladesh’s ever-increasing reliance on China. Turkey–Bangladesh relations may help to improve its relations with Europe and the West. Regionally, despite having been located in one of the world’s most vibrant regions, East Asia, Bangladesh is almost disconnected from its core region. Bangladeshis are becoming sensitive to the unfolding regional hostility between India and Pakistan and India and China. These geopolitical competitions have overshadowed the rise of Bangladesh in the region and the world. Bangladeshi officials are concerned that the Trans-Asian and Railway have not made any headway. The SAARC as regional cooperation is nearly dysfunctional, and the new regional group BIMSTEC is heading to an uncertain future. For example, a former Bangladeshi ambassador suggests that Bangladesh revise the British-era maritime connectivity connected to Bangladesh with the Malaysian, Indonesian coasts, and Singapore. At that time, the Bengal Presidency of British India had become the wealthiest Presidency contributing to over a third of Imperial Britain’s total revenues, according to Ambassador Tariq Karim. The expansion of BIMSTEC, by including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, would be the world’s largest block with 1.78 billion people and US$8000 billion in GDP (Karim, 2021). Bangladesh is serious about taking steps to end its isolation in the region and connect with the global economy to recover the previous development deficits. Turkey and Bangladesh have a similar demographic, cultural, and geostrategic profile in which both countries have to balance between various global powers. Therefore, Bangladesh has shown greater interest in reconnecting with Turkey to attract Turkish investments, for example, in the development of Chittagong Port. Turkish Ambassador to Bangladesh Mustafa Osman Turan was invited to visit Chittagong on January 9–12, 2021, to explore the possibilities for Turkish investment. As part of soft power, Turkey has been providing scholarships to thousands of Bangladeshi students and had been the main supporter of Bangladesh in meeting the Rohingya refugees’ ever-increasing expenses. Turkish NGOs are actively collaborating with Bangladeshi NGOs to help the Rohingya refugees. Other than all-time popular Ertugrul and Magnificent Suleiman, the story of an ordinary woman’s (Bahar) struggle for life in another Turkish drama, Bahar (Kadin in Turkish), won the Bangladeshi

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audience in 2020. In the wake of WhatsApp’s privacy concerns, the Turkish messaging app BiP became popular in Bangladesh, thousands of new users installed the app, according to Turkish media (Anadolu Agency, 2021). Turkish dramas have already made inroads in Bangladeshi households, causing many changes in Bangladesh’s fashion industry. As Turkish and Bangladeshi Muslims follow a moderate Sufi Islamic tradition, women in both countries actively participate in the labour market. According to The World Bank, only 20–22 per cent of the total working-age women (women +15) participate in the labour force in India and Pakistan, while in Turkey and Bangladesh, 34–36 per cent of working-age women are part of the labour force (The World Bank, 2021). This makes a significant cultural change in both countries’ labour markets as more and more women join economic and social transformation. As Turkey knows that Bangladesh needs to diversify its relations beyond China and India and expand its economic profile for sustainable economic growth, relations with Turkey are also important to reach European, Central Asian, and now North African markets where Turkish business is already in good shape.

Conclusion These three sets of South Asian relations of Turkey constitute a riddle that Turkey has yet to solve. The first part of this riddle is Turkey’s historical relations with the sub-continent, which should have been a basis of a shared historical linkage with all South Asian countries. The second part was their post-independence and Cold War era politics when the sub-continent was divided into three different sovereign territories, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Finally, as post-Ottoman Turkey emerged mainly as a member of Western security ally, the sub-continental countries had fought against each other. Thus, the third part of this riddle is that Turkey’s South Asia relations are yet to be rationalised for a postCold War relation even after the Cold War. Thus, the tension between the Cold War era template and post-Cold War changes has been interrupting Turkey’s South Asia relations. This tension is visible in India and Turkey’s quest to change their continuity and find a post-Soviet and post-Western foreign policy. The only sustainable and promising relation at this stage is Bangladesh, where Turkey and Bangladesh have found shared economic interests to advance their relations. On the other hand, Pakistan’s preoccupation with the Afghan crisis, strategic dependency on China, strained

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ties with the West, military conflict with India, and the poor economy have restricted the scope of Turkey–Pakistan relations. These limitations factor in Turkey’s relations with India as Turkey continues supporting Pakistan against India and Bangladesh. Turkey’s newly announced Asia Anew approach has to solve this riddle to reset its relations with South Asia.

Primary Sources Turkish Presidential Archives BOA-HR-SYS-01234. BOA-HR-TH-00266-00019. BOA-HR-ID-00087. BOA-203-385-19. BOA-490-1-0-0-578-2299-5. BOA-515-7527. BOA-390-8. BOA-64-395-13.

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Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Asian Media Opinions Sumaiyah Ahmed

The role of public opinion, editorials, and op-eds is still the most sought after media content to understand and evaluate a country’s perception and relations. Leaders, senior diplomats, opinion makers, policy, and strategic communities, and some academicians also take this medium to express their assessment of the state of bilateral relations or a country’s foreign policy. With its growing economic and military profile over the nearly two decades, Turkey has attracted global media attention, and hence the discussıons on Turkısh affairs are becoming common in the Asian press. In key Asian countries like Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, and India, Turkey’s domestic and regional politics are becoming more frequent. As in many other countries’ academic approaches to bilateral relations, the existing literature on Turkey’s Asia relations does not still consider media opinions as an indicator of a country’s overall perception of the country. This chapter attempts to analyse public opinions, mainly media analysis and editorials of selected Asian countries, Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, and India, to identify media discourses about Turkey’s politics and its

S. Ahmed (B) Jamia Hamdard (Deemed to be University), New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_5

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foreign policies. The analysis is to identify both the issues on which their opinions are critical of Turkey and how the change of opinion occurred chronologically in the last ten to fifteen years. This chapter is based on opinion articles and editorials often written by the respective Asian countries’ top foreign policy experts, diplomats, academicians, and think tanks professionals in newspapers (considered pro-government or centrist newspapers). Selected newspapers from four countries, Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan, have been included in this discussion. Not all countries and their newspapers can be studied here, but on a spectrum of opinion differences (most favourable vs most critical opinions), these four countries’ newspapers offer a general picture. The most favourable opinions can be found in Pakistan, and Bangladesh’s newspapers, and the most critical media opinions can be read in newspapers from India and China. These four countries also represent Turkey’s four different historical, cultural, and political perceptions, namely, the cold war partner (Pakistan), cold war foe (China), non-aligned (India), and countries with Muslim populations like Bangladesh and Pakistan. From Bangladesh, The Daily Star (established in 1991), Bangladesh Tribune (est. 2014), from China’s The People’s Daily (the official newspaper of China’s ruling Communist Party, est. 1948), the Global Times (est. 1993), from India, the Hindu (est. 1878), The Indian Express (est. 1932), New Indian Express (est. 1932), and from Pakistan Dawn (est. 1941), Daily Times (est. 2002), and Daily Pakistan (est. 1997) have been referred to in this article. The selection of the papers has been made on the basis of newspapers’ publications of prominent commentators and the basis of these papers’ popularity among the readers for the subjects of international affairs. The chapter is divided into a country-wise analysis instead of issues wise perspective; thus, some issues that find international resonance can be found repeated by the observers in all countries. Moreover, special attention has been paid to editorials representing a newspaper’s wellconsidered opinion about a particular issue. Sometimes, that comes in agreement with a country’s official statement on the issue, as commonly perceived about Chinese newspapers. Each country’s perspective on Turkey’s foreign policy can be seen transforming in three stages; (i) Erdogan’s initial years of economy-focused governance till 2008; (ii) The post-2008 after the constitutional reform package was approved in 2010 till the Arab uprising; and (iii) the post-failed military coup period,

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which brought Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy affairs into global discussions. Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan have a vibrant media culture discussing international affairs widely and intensively. Thousands of articles and TV debates take place in these countries that shape how the country looks or should look at the world. Turkey appears as one of the most talked countries since the Arab uprising outbreak in 2010 and the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2012. Turkey’s role as a key player in the Middle East started rising in this period and so increased the critical reception of its policies in global and Asian media. Turkey’s foreign policy was perceived by many of the Asian countries and their policy circles to be forming through Middle Eastern turmoil, the protests movements, Arab Israeli conflict, Syrian civil war, the rise and fall of the Islamic State, and most importantly, Turkey’s role in all of these issues. Besides, Turkey’s own economic and foreign policy ambitions, its position of being the key ally of the western security alliance, and its ambitious re-engagement with Russia and China, at the cost of its relations with the West, are among the key issues that often attracted Asian observers. With varying degrees, the coverage of Turkish affairs in these countries and specifically the coverage of Erdogan’s foreign policy can be categorised as either sceptical or very critical. In recent years, particularly since 2013, Turkey’s political moves regarding Middle Eastern politics have been under immense criticism from the GCC and Egyptian quarters. The 2017 Qatar blockade has only deepened the harsh criticism of the Gulf countries and Egypt towards Turkey. The Asian capitals where both Iran and Saudi Arabia are critical for their energy security and remittance have to balance their relations with the Gulf countries and Turkey. Besides regional politics of the Middle East, Turkey’s positions on Asian countries’ internal affairs, mainly about Kashmir in India, Uyghur in China, and war crimes trials in Bangladesh, often determine Turkey’s relations with these countries. For a long time now, some Central Asian countries have maintained apprehensions over Turkey’s potential support to conservative groups in their countries and Turkey’s promotion of Turkic solidarity to which all Central Asian nations belong. Below is a country-wise analysis of how media opinions perceive Turkish politics and foreign policy and how these opinions might have changed from time to time. The Turkish perspective that develops from these commentaries and editorials in these countries’ media constitutes of broadly three elements, first, Turkey’s domestic affairs as a reference of the overturning of

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the Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s secular Turkey; second, Turkey’s troubled foreign relations, and third, Turkey’s exercise of ideology, political Islam, in its domestic and foreign politics. Discussion on bilateral relations is the fourth element that is discussed whenever there is an important bilateral event. However, all three sets of critical observations could be found in most post-Arab uprisings opinions when Turkey’s involvement in the Middle Eastern affairs deepened. However, before the Arab uprising, Turkey’s economic growth and EU accession process were positively discussed.

Bangladesh Turkey recognised Bangladesh in 1974, and the Bangladeshi embassy was opened in Ankara in 1976. Among common things between Turkey and Bangladesh was that both countries had a strong secular military and politics. The rise of political Islam in both countries was away from sight at the time. Even the Islamist led government of Turkey’s Necemttin Erbekan successfully engaged with Bangladesh and brought the country together with the Developing 8 Group 1998. The AK Party government, too, maintained the status quo of the relations until the trial of the 1971 war crimes accused started by a disputed International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh in 2012. The trials found several top leaders of Jamaat Islami guilty, and three of them were hanged to death in 2016. Pakistan’s comments on these trials were understandable for many Bangladeshis, but Turkey’s comments had no locus standi, a period of mistrust ensued. This was when Turkey’s Syria and Middle East policies drew global criticism, mainly from the Communist groups and intellectuals. Bangladesh’s secular elite had strong Marxist inclinations, and hence they found Turkish criticism of war crime trials in Bangladesh as an outcome of Turkey’s Islamic transformation under Erdogan. The rebuttals did not hesitate from calling out Turkey on Turkey’s problems with Armenia, the Kurds and Cyprus, and the Syrian government. A chronological analysis of media opinions shows the trajectory of perception from being pro-Turkey in most of the 2000s and becoming gradually critical in the 2010s. Before Turkey–Bangladesh relations charted in troubled waters, Bangladesh media, specifically the Daily Star, was in full praise of “Turkey’s democratic transformation” in 2005. On 3 January 2005, an

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article in the Daily Star criticised the Western claims about the Armenian “genocide,” the Kurdish problem, and other problems that might have been used as an excuse against Turkey’s inclusion into the Western system, the EU. The author M Abdul Hafiz found Turkey’s EU accession prospects marred by prejudice: Yet the pronouncement of EU leaders meeting on December 16-17 fell far short of expectation that they would signal a go-ahead for membership talks. Instead, they offered a talk with strict new conditions, which may indeed be difficult to meet. For Turks, it is an insult upon injury. Some of the arguments put forward by Turko-sceptics in Europe illustrate an unabashed anti-Islam bias. At times their demands almost border on claiming Turks to purge themselves of past sins -- their conduct of the imperial days with regards to the Slavs or Armenians. (Hafiz, 2005, January 3)

In 2010 when Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Bangladesh, Bangladeshi leaders offered their support for Turkey’s EU membership (The Daily Star, 2010, February 14). An author ABMS Zahur even found that the US wanted Israel at the centre for the Greater Middle East project in which Turkey would have only a unique role. In their impression, Turkey was being punished by the Bush administration for not sending its military in his Iraq invasion (Zahur, 2005, September 30). In December 2010, Turkey introduced its major reform package to weaken military control over civilian institutions, yet, Bangladesh has started seeing the rise of Islamism, and their scepticism in Turkey’s reform package was pronounced carefully. In the editorial of The Daily Star, the globally acclaimed 2010 reforms were welcomed with a careful warning: For Erdogan and Turkey’s Islamist forces, the courts have often been a barrier to governance. The judiciary has, in the past, stepped in to remove a government it thought was undermining the nation’s secular spirit. More recently, it came close to clamping a ban on Erdogan’s party on the suspicion that it was promoting an Islamist agenda in contravention of the fundamental principles of Turkey’s secular constitution. Now, while the courts have their powers clipped, a new point of worry is that from here on, the judiciary could be peopled by judges appointed on the basis of their loyalty to the ruling dispensation. That is a fear Mr. Erdogan will need to dispel without delay. (The Daily Star, 2010, December 15)

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The radical collapse of both countries’ political relations and media perspectives occurred when Erdogan first commented against war crime trials in Bangladesh in late 2013 and then in 2016. Another article underlined the killing of 50,000–70,000 deaths of the Kurds in Turkey as “ethnic cleansing.” “The systematic killings of the country’s Armenian population in 1895,” “the genocide of 3,000,000 Bengalis by the Pakistan army” in 1971 are mentioned in the same sentence to argue how Erdogan find it convenient “to go into a denial of history mode” and the Turkish army itself “undertook military action against Cyprus effectively partitioning the island into two zones in 1974” appeared in the editorial of (The Daily Star, 2013, December 19). A commentator in The Daily Star on 18 May 2016, called Turkish protests on the death sentence executions a “double standard” as Turkey’s actions against the Armenians might be considered an act of genocide (Liton, 2016, May 18). Just two months before the 15 July 2016, failed coup, the leader of Jamaat Islami Bangladesh was hanged after being convicted for war crimes and President Erdogan, and the Turkish foreign ministry openly condemned the hanging and called the Turkish ambassador back to Ankara for consultation (Dolan, 2016, May 12). The Daily Star editorial on 14 May 2016, calls Turkish understanding of the war crime trials “flawed”: The Turks have been since 2012 been mistakenly likening Nizami to an Islamic scholar. We would like to point out that Bangladesh has a rich Islamic culture, and we are very proud of it. However, we are forced to say that Turkey’s understanding of our war of liberation is flawed. And Mr. Erdogan’s recent statement and his predecessor Mr. Abdullah Gul’s request to the Bangladeshi government in 2012, urging it not to pursue the trial of war criminals has put a strain on bilateral relations. It is now time for our government to make efforts to clarify to their Turkish counterpart the historical facts of what these war criminals did in 1971 to avoid any further diplomatic rifts. (The Daily Star, 2016, May 14)

The events of 15 July 2016, were the biggest news of Turkey’s domestic affairs. Bangladeshi media rejected the coup yet recommended for “more democratic and inclusive politics” aftermath. Nevertheless, “It must be stated without ambiguity that the military has no role in politics whatsoever in any country; attempting to overthrow an elected government is no way of protecting democracy,” said the editorial of The Daily Star (2016, July 18). The paper warned that democracy could not work if absolute power was prevalent in one individual’s hands, which Erdogan was trying

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to achieve (The Daily Star, 2016, July 18). The failed coup could be seen as a watershed moment as Turkey started repairing her relations with many of her Asian and Middle Eastern friends, so the Turkish envoy returned to Dhaka. The Dhaka Tribune underlined that despite Turkey’s position against the war crime trials, “Bangladesh nevertheless declared its support for Turkey’s elected government during the failed coup in July.” However, “the Islamist AK Party government has been pushing countries around the world to help it pinpoint Turkish nationals living abroad whom it deems to be supporters of the exiled Turkish cleric and politician, Fethullah Gülen making demands that grossly violated diplomatic norms” (Abedin & Sakhawat, 2017, August 4). An article in The Daily Star quoted the German and Iranian media pointing out the Turkish role in facilitating extremists’ takeover of Idlib and accused Turkey of acting on behalf of the US to overthrow Bashar al Assad. “Such support to jihadists from Turkey at the bidding of Washington may well be ending, given the recent coup attempt in Turkey, alleged by some to have been masterminded by the West, the article said” (Jamal, 2016, August 17). In 2017, when Turkey launched its first operation against the PKK affiliated groups in Syria, an article in the Dhaka Tribune accused Erdogan of “supporting IS in trying to ‘dethrone’ Assad.” The paper said, “Turkey under Erdogan was the biggest buyer of oil that IS pilfered from Mosul’s rich oil-fields in Iraq” (Shahrukh, 2017, April 18). In 2019 when Turkey launched its third military operation against the Kurdish militantcontrolled parts of Syria, another paper expressed its concern that “with a full-blown military campaign comes the unnecessary loss of civilian life and destruction” and that the operation “would strengthen the extremists to re-organise and re-launch their movement” (The Daily Star, 2019, October 16). The latest visit of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has happened in the backdrop of tensions that arose after India’s military operation inside Pakistan administered Kashmir in February 2018 and subsequent India’s scrapping of (its own Kashmir specific constitutional provision) Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. International criticism followed the status change, with the Turkish president taking the strongest positions on Kashmir in his speech during his visit. Despite this, Dawn newspaper cautioned the government that “Pakistan must not become a party to any bilateral dispute involving Damascus and Ankara” (Dawn, 2020, February 16).

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India Turkey’s unique relations with Pakistan and Turkey’s pro-Pakistan Kashmir policies have always been the most frequent reference in Indian media’s Turkey discourse. In official statements, India rebuts every Turkish side’s standard statement on Jammu and Kashmir with standard wording. In recent years, however, the frequency and force of Turkey’s Kashmir statement have increased. This could be seen as a violation of the prolonged reciprocal pause on Kashmir-Cyprus problems agreed by Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Turgut Ozal in 1988. Turkey’s undoing the pause on Kashmir, however, Indian opinions since Turkey’s growing problems with Europe and the Middle East and its ambitions for the Islamic world’s leadership, until now dominated by Saudi Arabia and Iran. While India–Gulf relations have overcome many of their problems, India– Turkey relations have only struggled to manage the status quo in the same period to keep economic and political relations de-hyphenated. India’s centrist newspaper The Hindu, The Indian Express , Pioneer, the New Indian Express, and online portals such as the FirstPost, the Print, the Wire, the Citizen, and Swarajya show keen interests in Middle Eastern affairs. The discussions in these papers suggest that India’s Turkey approach is not necessarily shaped by only what and how Turkey–India relations to advance and how Turkey acts in the neighbouring states, and what role Turkey aspires in the global and regional politics. Turkey’s Middle East policy, its EU and NATO relations, its Syria intervention, the rise of the Islamic State, Turkey’s decline to conservative religiosity, Turkey’s gradual descent to authoritarianism, etc., are among the common issues shaping media discussion on Turkey. The initial acknowledgement of Turkey transforming towards moderation came from the former Indian Army Chief General VP Malik, who returned from his visit to Turkey in December 2004. In his article (Malik, 2005, January 6), he found Turkey divided between sceptics and enthusiasts on Turkey’s EU accession process. Erdogan’s pro-EU stance was seen as a compromise with Turkish sacrifices for Cyprus. In his opinion, Turkey with EU membership would be almost a D-Day for Europe in the war against terror because it would provide real proof that Islam and modernity, Islam and the rule of law are compatible. As a result, “Turkey looks to Europe, not to Asia” was his conclusion on Turkey’s future direction under Erdogan. Discussing the “Europe-type progress,” he stated:

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Geographically, Turkey is more in Asia than in Europe but apparently has a greater attraction for the West; its modernity, higher economic standards, democratic politics, and with that the secular ethos. Will the Clash of Civilisations within Turkey and the Turks’ decision to make Europe-type progress abandoning the outdated ethno-territorial problems in Cyprus have some lessons for the rest of the world? Let us wait and watch. (Malik, 2005)

When the Syrian crisis started in 2011, Erdogan was reluctant to support America’s regime change agenda against Bashar al Assad. This drew adulation from Said Naqvi, a prominent Indian expert of Middle Eastern affairs. In his understanding, “The extraordinary charisma of Erdogan became a huge incentive in the rapidly transforming Arab world. He became a model to emulate. Turkey became the democracy to follow,” as Turkey had not become part of the game of the US against Assad. He found Kemal Ataturk’s secularism “irrelevant” as Erdogan offered “mild, Islamic conservatism.” Erdogan wanted Assad to accommodate moderate Islamism instead of going for conflict (Naqvi, 2011, December 17). However, after six months, Turkey had made its mind against Assad. Said Naqvi, in his article, found “Turkey’s Syria policy more driven by Turkey’s conjuring up images of the Ottoman Empire.” The “mild Islamism,” which he described six months ago as a reformist idea, now became “visceral Islamism.” This raises the hackles of closet Kemalists in Turkey (Naqvi, 2012). Former Ambassador and Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to West Asia Chinmaya R. Gharekhan found “Turkey’s antagonism to Syria” originating from the Shia-Sunni divide. The sectarian angle downplayed notwithstanding, he wrote, was still “very much a fact of the Muslim life, and it is better to recognise it” (Gharekhan, 2012a, February 14). Among other reasons why Turkey joined the anti-Assad coalition are “the anti-Shia campaign, the Syrian support for PKK, the banned Kurdish party in Turkey and Syria’s lack of gratitude for Turkey’s good offices for hosting the negotiations with Israel,” he wrote on 20 February 2012, for The Hindu (Gharekhan, 2012b, February 20). Prem Shankar Jha, an author, and journalist, in his 7 August 2012, commentary in The Hindu, found Turkey and the Gulf intervention in Syria similar to Pakistan’s intervention in India’s Jammu and Kashmir and so New Delhi should be wary of them. He further stated:

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New Delhi needs to bear this in mind because there are striking parallels between what Damascus is facing today and what Delhi faced in Kashmir in the 1990s. In 2011, Syria had been under the autocratic rule of the Ba’ath party for 48 years. In 1990, Kashmir too had been under autocratic rule for all but seven of the previous 40 years. However, in both countries the autocracy was a stable one. Young people in particular chafed under the Ba’ath party’s rule in Syria exactly as they chafed against “Delhi’s rule” in Kashmir. …..In Syria, Turkey and Qatar are funnelling money and battle hardened jihadis to start a sectarian war that will overwhelm the state. (Jha, 2012, August 7)

The Gezi Park protest was discussed in the annual meeting of India’s Communist Party. The party found Erdogan’s neo-liberal policies and the efforts to usher in Islamist values responsible for spreading discontent against him (Communist Party of India [Marxist] Central Committee, 2013, August 18). By 2014 when Erdogan was elected as president, the talk for an executive presidency started. The New Indian Express, an important newspaper interestingly, saw his domestic ambitions tied ideologically with Hamas of Palestine. The paper’s editorial saw Erdogan taking “a page from the standard-despot-playbook and moved to amend the constitution to stay in power with a new title.” The paper recommended that Western leaders call out Erdogan’s turning away from western standards of openness and moderation (The New Indian Express, 2014, August 14). The official website of India’s communist party carried an article by Vijay Prashad, who even questioned the idea of moderate Islamism. According to his view, the ideas of “Islamic reformism” and “Muslim democracy” were merely a showcase of the AK Party’s neo-liberal capitalism. Erdogan’s party enjoyed “Islamic reformism” or “moderate” tags for accepting the IMF reform packages. In his view, “Erdogan had taken Turkey’s Islamist tradition and delivered it to NATO. This is the true definition of “moderate Islamism” (Prashad, 2015). However, the failed military coup of July 15 drew support for the elected authority, regardless of Erdogan and his politics having been sharply criticised. The New Indian Express, in its editorial, praised the “Turks armed with nothing other than flags foil a coup attempt by a section of the armed forces.” The paper called anti-coup mobilisation, “by all means, a victory of democracy” the paper warned against revenge being taken as Erdogan called the failed coup as the “gift of God” (The New Indian Express, 2016, July 17). The Hindu, too, observed that despite the “anti-Erdoganism being a common theme for mobilising

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people,” “they (Turks) do not want the soldiers to ‘solve’ their problem through force.” “Even Mr. Erdogan’s fiercest critics in the opposition denounced the coup.” The paper advised that Erdogan sees this as an “opportunity to reconsider his dictatorial policies” (The Hindu, 2016, July 18). The editorial of The Hindu, however, observed that Erdogan’s “vengefully disproportionate response to the failed coup of July 15 was hardly surprising and feared that he would capitalise on the opportunity to purge his enemies and critics” (The Hindu, 2016, July 25). This shows how these events were shaping Indian media’s perspectives of Turkey’s domestic and foreign politics. As Erdogan started reaching out to the world to repair his relations, a week before his India visit in May 2017, Erdogan made statements about Kashmir and offered his mediation. His statement ignited the sharpest reactions from Indian opinion-makers, and the visit was overshadowed by his controversial offer of mediation between India and Pakistan. A former ambassador Rakesh Sood concluded Erdogan’s visit to New Delhi turned into a “soured Turkish Delight.” He underlined Turkey’s proximity to Pakistan and military to military relations as guiding Turkey’s India policy. “The jihadi highway that Mr. Erdogan opened up on the Turkey-Syria border for radicalised Europeans, Central Asians, Afghans, Arabs, and Africans to enter Syria created a backlash,” he commented on Turkey’s Syria policy. The former ambassador found a “blend of panIslamism and neo-Ottomanism” behind Erdogan’s drifting away from his earlier moderate politics (Sood, 2018, May 8). However, The Hindu editorial held both India and Turkey responsible for taking up “provocative gestures” for meeting only lowered expectations. While Erdogan spoke of Kashmir before his departure to New Delhi, India invited Cyprus President for a week-long visit and sent Vice President Hamid Ansari to Armenia in the same week when Erdogan was visiting Delhi. The editorial mildly criticised the Indian government’s “coincidence” justification. The paper welcomed Mr. Erdogan’s support to India’s UNSC bid and inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (The Hindu, 2017, May 3). On Erdogan’s 2018 election as executive president, The Hindu editorial (26 June 2018) warned, “as things stand, Mr. Erdogan’s victory signals another hyper-nationalist, authoritarian turn.” Turkey’s military operations in Syria received criticism from Indian opinion leaders. The Operation Olive Branch of 2019 even attracted an official reaction from India’s foreign ministry. Some saw it as a reaction against Erdogan’s raising Jammu and Kashmir’s issue in his

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September 2019 UN General Assembly speech. The New Indian Express not only found the reaction “unusual and unwise” but also warned Indian decision-makers against taking “with us or against us” style of diplomacy and divide its world into “Pakistan lovers and Pakistan bashers, and building its foreign relations accordingly” (The Indian Express , 2019, October 12). The reactionary actions following Erdogan’s UNGA speech, as Indian media speculated, could include trade restrictions against Turkey and scraping a contract awarded to Turkey’s Anadolu Shipyard to develop fleet support vessels Indian navy (Pubby, 2019, October 12). According to the former Indian ambassador to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Talmiz Ahmad, the “India-Turkey relations could be shaped on India-Gulf template as India-Turkey relations have their own limits” (Basu, 2019, September 26). At this heightened nationalist feelings, C. Raja Mohan, one of the top strategic minds in India, had a word of advice, “the diplomatic trick for Delhi lies not in trying to prove the virtue of its positions, but in demonstrating the material benefits of a partnership with India” (Mohan, 2017, May 2). These opinions suggest that Turkey– India relations and both countries’ potential to cooperate on regional and international issues would need a prolonged exercise of reconciling their conflicting perspectives on their domestic and foreign politics.

China In China, too, official and media reactions do not make an optimistic picture of Turkey–China relations. Turkey’s drift from the path of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is frequently mentioned as a normative reference in many of opinions and editorials. Issues such as PYD/YPG and the Uyghur issue, Turkey’s NATO affiliation, the Syrian and Libyan crisis, the Egyptian coup, and the Afghan war find both countries opposed to each other. The media opinions in China quite frequently deal with these references and find Turkey’s relations with the West responsible for Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy problems. On 18 February 2011, in The Global Times , an editorial drew China’s Middle East perspective, “China does not involve itself in the Middle East countries.” China sees itself in a different role from that of the US as “China would not be able to shape these at first as the US would due to its steps in the region.” The expanding Chinese economy, the paper acknowledges, will be why China will begin exploring changes to its behaviour. As a result, “pro-China forces in the Middle East should get more benefits, including political

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gains so that future influential figures will adopt a pro-China stance” (The Global Times, 2011, February 18). This is how and where Turkey is supposed to fit itself in its relations with China. In an article on 31 July 2013, Ding Gang outlines Turkey’s Chinese expectations in The Global Times that “Turkey’s success lies in its effective means to keep Islamism and governance separate.” As “Turkey is not going too far away from Islam, how powerful secular forces can be relied on how much control the Islamic conservatives maintain.” The Gezi Park protests in Turkey raised questions as “whether the country’s democracy could be flexible enough to withstand this impact” and “how do Islamic societies transform when democratic systems become mature?” The commentator finds that “Turkey’s young generations imply a much stronger desire for openness and political reform” (Gang, 2013, July 31). In 2013, when Turkey’s President sent strong signals to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Chinese media carefully evaluated the statement and found it less convincing. Sun Zhuangzhi explained in The Global Times that the EU’s tepid attitude towards Turkey is the only reason for such temporary enthusiasm. He explained why Turkey is not yet ready to join SCO. Besides geographic distance between Turkey and SCO borders, politically, Turkey belongs to the Western camp. “Turkey also advocated Pan-Turkism, which alarmed China and Central Asian countries.” From the security point of view too, the SCO opposes NATO’s military intervention and the US, of which Turkey is a strong member (Zhuangzhi, 2014, January 14). China’s wariness of Turkey’s growing influence in Central Asia appears in almost all Turkey related media discussions, yet, with more desperation and without articulation. For example, when the International Turkic Academy held a seminar on a Textbook of Common Turkish History till the fifteenth century on 27 September 2017, in Astana, the Chinese observer in the Global Times objected to why Russia, Mongolia, and China were not invited. However, both nations have significant Turkic communities. However, the objection was not restricted to the invitation, rather to the Turkic solidarity itself, something that most Turkic communities in Central Asia would find offensive. The author Wang Yan observed: “Pan-Turkism” is in its death throes; the ideology has never been withdrawn from the political arena. Once it grasps an opportunity, it will emerge again as a threat that endangers the security of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. There are hard lessons concerning the compilation

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of textbooks used by Uyghur people about Xinjiang which are closely related to “pan-Turkism”. Separatists in Xinjiang have tried every means to introduce “pan-Turkism” into the region’s textbooks, placing parochial and wrongful ethnic identities over and above national identity, which does great harm to the younger generation.

The author, rather than questioning why China, Mongolia, and Russia were not invited, by juxtaposing “Turkic identity” against China’s ideology, questioned the “similarity of language” based on the origin of nations. The author’s recommendation to “strengthen research about Marxism concerning the view of country, history, ethnicity, and culture” “to correct the understanding of the history and reality of Xinjiang according to the ideology of China and to set up the right national identity of Xinjiang people” offered a difficult proposition for the Turkish speaking people. The narrative of “Turkic identity” instead of Chinese identity is offered as a matter of choice for China’s Turkic neighbours (Yan, 2017, October 18). When Erdogan made a statement about the Uyghur people in early 2019, the Chinese reaction resorted to these rigid narratives: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is reshaping the country by placing religion at the heart of national life after decades of secular dominance and wants to position his nation as “the only country that can lead the Muslim world.” However, pointing an accusatory finger at China’s treatment of its Muslim ethnic Uyghur’s in Xinjiang won’t add to Ankara’s credentials as a leader for the world’s estimated 1.8 billion Muslims. (Jincui, 2019, February 12)

By reducing Erdogan’s reaction to the Uyghur problem merely to his ideology of Islamism, China does not offer an alternative narrative for Erdogan’s secular opponents, whose majority sympathise with the Uyghur. Previously, China had even facilitated Turkey’s ultra-nationalist leader Devlet Bahceli to Xinjiang in 2002 and, subsequently, other dignitaries’ visits to Xinjiang (Timur, 2009, June 29). Most of the authors carefully underline Erdogan’s Islamism as the main problem in China’s Middle East perspective, something that pleases China’s Gulf allies. “Turkey wants to return to and lead the Muslim world after being rejected by the West” is also referred to Turkey’s Xinjiang policy (Gang, 2019, February 13). “Ankara is no saint toward the Kurds or in the purge following the 2016 coup attempt if judged by Western standards

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of human rights. It should not follow the Western tune to intervene in China’s Xinjiang affairs,” the editorial in The Global Times (2019, February 11) opined. In another post, it was pointed out how Erdogan’s policies affect China–Turkey relations: Kemalism has had a wide-ranging and long-term impact on Turkish society in terms of the country’s secularisation struggle, the process of which is characterised by the separation of Islamism and governance. But Erdogan’s ascendancy in Turkish political life has steered the wheel in another direction. Given the Islamic root of Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), throughout his tenure as prime minister and now as president, Erdogan has distanced himself from Ataturk and is reintroducing “an overt Islamic discourse” into the country’s public and political life. This identity of Turkey means that it could provide shelter for the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Muslim separatist and terror group founded by militant Uyghurs. (Yi, 2017, April 16)

The 2017 referendum that gives the Turkish president sweeping powers was seen as helpful for “pan-Turkism ideals” to be reinforced, which would pose more challenges to China to counter terrorist groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (Sheng, 2017, April 18). It is also interesting that Turkey raises the Uyghur problem every time it settles with a prolonged pause and normal business resumes. After 2015 and 2019 comments, the Uyghur issue has once again disappeared from China–Turkey discussions as both sides are busy in finalising the Belt and Road Initiative related projects. According to Wang Yan (2019, July 8), “with 1,000 years of friendship based on the Silk Road, the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has infused great potential for cooperation between the two countries.” When it comes to China’s support to Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S400 missile system, it is stated that it does not pose any threat to NATO (Wenlin, 2019, July 21). Like Iran and Syria, China too viewed Turkey’s military operation against Kurdish fighters and Islamic State (IS) forces in northern Syria as Turkey’s growing “ambitions to reshape the order and become a major power in the Middle East.” Chinese media is viewing the resurrection of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey’s looking east policy after its “going west” approach faltered. They see Erdogan’s foreign policy agenda “characterised as neo-Ottomanism.” Turkey’s Syria operations are precisely under

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this strategy to expand Turkey’s influence in the Middle East. “Sending troops to northern Syria is proof that Ankara is seeking dominance in the region.” As the influence of the Arab world declines, the non-Arab countries, such as Turkey, are rising (Wenlin, 2019, October 16).

Pakistan The Turkey–Pakistan relations were indeed cemented in their coldwar military alignment under the American security umbrella CENTO. However, their bilateral relations are still struggling to find a strong economic or post-cold war strategic rationale to corroborate the great brotherly relation. When Erdogan’s AK Party won its first election in 2002, the quick question in an editorial of Pakistan’s Dawn was about Turkey–NATO relations’ future. “Although the new Turkish prime minister had reassured his NATO allies about his government’s future policies, and had sought to focus on Turkey’s membership of the European Union,” the apprehensions about his future directions were high. The editorial advised, “the Gul government would have to tread carefully because Turkey’s well-entrenched secular establishment, especially the army, will be watching him carefully.” Economic crisis, not Islamic agenda, should focus on the new government, the editorial warned Abdulla Gul, the then Prime Minister (Dawn, 2002, November 21). Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Pakistan in his maiden state visit on 18 June 2003; Dawn spoke of Turkey–Pakistan relations by underlining “the fraternal bond between Turkey the Muslims of South Asia” that dates back to the pre-independence days (Dawn, 2003, June 19). The visit focused on economic relations, and the regional issues, mainly of Kashmir, was not publicly discussed. The year 2005 was a year of Turkey’s EU hopes, as the EU accession talks were opened. However, an article in Dawn found these hopes less real as the EU’s conditions are realistic. The paper quoted French President Jacques Chirac, “Turkey will need to undergo a major cultural revolution” to join the EU (Islam, 2005). In June 2006, it became clear that Turkey would not give in to the demands of Cyprus’s access to the ports of Turkish Cyprus, a precondition of proceeding with Turkey’s EU accession dialogue. Dawn’s editorial had an interesting take by drawing a parallel between the EU’s anti-Turkey accession opinions and Turkey’s large anti-secularism section where the

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AK Party had a strong support base. The paper cautioned that the fight between secularism and its opponents must be only through the ballot. A military coup will be tragic (Dawn, 2006, June 21). The Pakistani newspaper’s reaction to Turkey’s anti-PKK operations (2007, 2018, 2019) should be seen in perspective. On 19 October 2007, A Dawn editorial warned that “military forays byTurkey into Iraq’s Kurdish north might boomerang. Instead of subduing the PKK, its actions might increase support for Kurds’ rebel groups in both Turkey and Iraq. Turkey should draw lessons from the US’ Iraq debacle and rather focus on undoing its past wrongs and win the goodwill of ordinary Kurds” (Dawn, 2007, October 19). Despite the misgivings that the rise of Islamism in Turkey has alarmed the international opinions, Pakistan’s most respected liberal newspaper came in defence of Erdogan when he spared a constitutional court ban on his party in October 2008 or a judicial coup. It was stated: Turkey needs Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s leadership. He scored a major triumph when the EU agreed to begin entry negotiations, and even though Brussels has laid down stiff conditions, his government has managed to continue with the reforms needed to meet the Copenhagen criteria. It has also adopted a less rigid attitude on the Cyprus question. One of Erdogan’s even greater achievements has been the AKP’s acceptance of secularism as Turkey’s creed and his renunciation of Necmettin Erbekan’s policies that often led to a confrontation with the army. The choice before the generals is not to interfere with politics and let the Turkish voters decide the kind of polity they want. All that the court decision did was to reduce the funds which every party in Turkey receives. On the whole, the constitutional court’s decision is a victory for Turkish democracy. (Dawn, 2008, August 1)

The Gezi Park protests were perhaps the watershed moment of changing international opinion on Turkey. The Daily Times of Pakistan, in its editorial warned that the protests might not weaken Erdogan’s legitimacy, but he “needs to seriously reassess his policies and consult all stakeholders instead of making unilateral decisions, in order to regain his lost political space” (Daily Times, 2013, June 4). In 2014, the Fethullah Gulen’s network’s crackdown found more critical coverage in Pakistani editorials and OP-Eds. The Daily Times said, “by taking arbitrary measures and showing authoritarian tendencies, Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to be vindicating his critics at home and abroad.” Further, it stated that despite

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having extraordinary achievements to his credit, including the spectacular growth of the economy and the marginalisation of the military’s role in politics, yet Mr. Gulen seems to have got on his nerves, the paper wrote (Daily Times, 2018, December 21). Erdogan’s electoral defeat in June 2015 election was widely welcomed by many papers as “the entry of the more liberal HDP into parliament would help allay the concerns that Turkey’s regime may be becoming too authoritarian.” The victory of the Kurdish party, the paper made an opinion, will not incite insurgents but may promote the dialogue for a political solution to the Kurdish insurgency (Daily Times, 2015, June 8). The Syrian crisis is another example where Turkey and Pakistan have different perspectives. Turkey’s Syria policy is among the most criticised aspects of Turkish foreign policy by Pakistani newspapers. “Turkey has by all accounts been the principal conduit for the flow of arms and other material to the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Council (SNC)” (Shaikh, 2012, August 8). Another commentator in The Daily Times criticised the Turkish-Saudi alliance against Bashar al Assad government for managing the oversight of the whole programme making sure the rebels get enough supply of ammunition to fight Assad’s forces (Yousaf, 2016, April 22). In the entire Syria crisis, Pakistan never broke diplomatic relations with the Bashar Al Assad government and never supported the Western intervention to topple down the Assad regime (Haider, 2015, December 24). In the Yemen crisis, both countries maintained neutrality, and Turkey is seen as a potential mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Dawn, 2015, April 4; 2017, April 1). As Turkey’s Syria policies faltered, Turkey’s projection as a country with a successful relationship between Islam and democracy came under serious questions in many publications. The gradual change of Dawn’s narrative, for example, from 2010 onwards, could be seen getting harsher with every coming year. The closure of Gulen linked newspaper Zaman, and crackdown on Cumhuriyet just a few months before the failed coup attempt was severely criticised for putting “media and judiciary under intense state pressure” (Dawn, 2016, March 27). Another newspaper the Daily Times, expressed concern that Turkey under Erdogan was slowly inching towards radicalisation (Daily Times, 2016, May 31). In its editorial on the failed coup, Dawn called the actions of Erdogan and his party similar to the same putschists who used to overthrow the elected governments in the past.

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Unfortunately, many of the current Turkish administration’s moves bear an eerie resemblance to the iron-fisted policies the country’s military dictators used to enforce. While the populist Erdogan government has indeed managed to check the power of the generals, it has also unleashed a ’democratic authoritarianism’ of its own. (Dawn, 2016, October 6)

The article “Failure of political Islam” by Abdul Majeed Abid in The Nation on 1 August 2016, said, “Turkey has gone through the ascendance phase, it is now in the self-destructive phase of passive revolution. The ideology of ‘Political Islam,’ thought up by Maududi and Hassan Banna after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, has proven to be a failure” (Abid, 2016, August 1). The Turkish president’s visit in November 2016 was overshadowed by the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI)’s decision to boycott the joint session of Pakistan’s parliament specially convened for the address of the visiting Turkish President (Wasim, 2016, November 13). In its editorial, Dawn warned the Pakistani government against giving to any pressure from Turkey on Gulen linked schools and stated that “It is problematic that he (Erdogan) expects Pakistan to fight his battle with them on its turf.” It also further elaborated: Our government must remember that Pakistan’s relations with Turkey are broadly with the state of Turkey; not with the present dispensation alone. It should refrain from actions that may require radical course correction under another Turkish government. Measures such as the recently announced expulsions inhibit people-to-people contacts, the only constant in relations with any nation. (Dawn, 2016, November 19)

Another newspaper, The Daily Times, in its editorial on 19 April 2017, expressed its disappointment in these words, “the future looks precarious for Turkish democracy. And we, here, in Pakistan would be right to be wary of the way in which Erdogan holds both our Prime Minister.” In other editorials in July, Dawn advised the President “Erdogan should initiate a policy of reconciliation that tolerates all shades of political opinion and strengthens the democratic system” (Dawn, 2017, July 14). Turkey–Pakistan trade relations, despite all bonhomie, are far below than the expected level. Dawn criticised the “nearing collapse following seven rounds of dialogue for a free-trade agreement.” The paper accused Turkey of maintaining a very tough line towards Pakistan in its trade dialogues. Turkey refused to reduce additional duties on products that have a high

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export potential in Turkish markets. As a result, Pakistan’s exports to Turkey dropped by 69 pc till 2017 (Dawn, 2018, March 4). In May 2017, Erdogan’s Kashmir mediation proposal was widely welcomed by Pakistani media just before visiting India (Dawn, 2017, May 3). Pakistan’s The Express Tribune saw Turkey’s backing to Pakistan at the FATF meeting in Paris as one of the reasons behind India’s decision to restrict trade with Turkey and Malaysia (The Express Tribune, 2019, October 23). The latest Turkish offensive against PKK affiliated groups in Syria did not go well with the media, although the government had officially supported Operation Olive Branch. The Turkish operation, Dawn underlined, “violated the territory of a sovereign state. The operation lacks legitimacy” (Dawn, 2019, October 14). Whereas, the Daily Times stated that the Turkish attack and the US abandoning of the Kurds was seen as another betrayal and stabbing “in the back by the remnants of the Ottoman Turks” (Daily Times, 2019, October 17).

Conclusion These discussions suggest that the Asian media is keenly following Turkey’s domestic, regional, and international political developments. The range of issues that are being discussed by their opinion writers is very diverse. In all types of countries, Muslims (Pakistan and Bangladesh), non-Muslims (China, India), diverse religious countries (India, Bangladesh), anti-West countries (China), and pro-West countries (India), the discussion on Turkey’s foreign policy reflect the changing international opinion from being optimist, welcoming in the early 2000s, to sceptical or critical in recent years. When Erdogan’s AK Party won the election on a pro-Western and pro-European Union election agenda in 2002, the AK Party’s victory and then its undertaking of a reformist approach were welcomed by many countries’ media opinions. As the scope of Turkey’s trade and foreign relations expanded, Asian media’s interest in Turkey’s internal and external affairs deepened, and the discussion on Turkish political affairs became more common. The size of Turkish affairs coverage in Asian media is an indicator of these countries’ interests being affected by Turkey’s expanding global profile. These opinions do not necessarily reflect their countries’ official opinions, but many of their opinions match the views that their countries’ officials often express on several issues. Turkey’s position on Kashmir and Uyghur, and the execution of Jamaat leaders in Bangladesh, for example,

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can be seen as a factor in defining their countries’ media opinions in favour or against the Turkish position. The references to these issues can be seen as being used in most articles once or twice to explain their countries’ perspectives on Turkey. Many times these issues have caused significant setbacks in Turkey’s bilateral relations with these countries. Secondary to these issues are Turkey’s Syria policy that supports the American intervention in other countries’ internal affairs. Some countries’ media find Turkey’s Syria policy shaped by the ruling AK party and its leader’s Islamic ideology and their objective to revive the Islamic or Ottoman rule. The Turkish narrative in these media has taken another turn after Erdogan’s opponents in Turkey started challenging his rule and accusing him of becoming an authoritarian ruler. This was often clubbed with the rise of populism in global politics; Turkish populism under Erdogan quickly attracted headlines in Asian media. The Turkish narrative in Asian media cannot be seen without taking these countries special relations with other Middle Eastern heavyweights such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Israel, except Iran, Turkey now has strained relations with all of them. Many of these nations do not welcome Turkey’s ambitions to assume leadership roles in the Islamic world due to the region’s centuries-old relations with Iran and the Arabian Peninsula. The Middle Eastern balancing act was earlier limited to only Saudi-Iranian rivalry; with Turkey joining the regional politics in a big way, the balancing act has become far more complicated. Like all four countries in the discussion here, countries heavily depend on Gulf oil supplies; a sizeable Asian workforce is in the Gulf; with Turkey too in the game, Asia’s balancing act in the Middle East has become a triangle. Even the Israeli factor, too, no longer remains a balancing act because of the growing cooperation between the Gulf States and Israel. Even the best bilateral relation of Pakistan in Asia like Turkey–Pakistan, both the government and media opinions in Pakistan, appear cautious in expressing their Turkish leadership preference over their Gulf friends. Finally, these opinions also suggest that if Turkey is seen as a model, it would not be because of Turkey’s Islamic role; rather, it would be because of its success in maintaining a fine balance between Islam and democracy. Turkey’s secular character, friendly relations with neighbours, western outlook, strong relations with the EU, and democratic reforms in the first decade’s rule of the AK Party can be seen as received with appreciation. While dealing with the Gezi park issue, post-2016 coup mass arrests, and the Syria policy, these all were received critically in the same

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way as they are received in western media opinions. Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan have a strong base of secular yet moderate Muslim base, which had shaped the unique character of politics of the Indian subcontinent; the media perception is changing rapidly as Turkey’s economic and political rise is often projected as the success of political Islam, rather than a success of balance between Islam and democracy.

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Erdogan, and a Changing Turkey. (2016, May 31). Daily Times (editorial). Retrieved from https://dailytimes.com.pk/78906/erdogan-and-a-changingturkey/ Erdogan’s coup. (2016, July 25). The Hindu (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/Erdogan%E2%80%99scoup/article14506287.ece Erdogan’s day: On Turkey polls. (2018, June 26). The Hindu (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/erdoans-day/ article24255998.ece Erdogan’s Kashmir approach. (2017, May 3). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1330706 Erdogan’s visit. (2016, November 19). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1297149 Erdogan’s visit. (2020, February 16). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https:// www.dawn.com/news/1534781/erdogans-visit Erdogan’s war on media. (2016, March 27). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1248136 Gang, D. (2013, July 31). Turkey struggles to balance competing ideas. The Global Times. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/800539. shtml Gang, D. (2019, February 13). Turkey gropes between West and Islam. The Global Times. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1138723.shtml Gharekhan, C. R. (2012a, February 14). A year after Jasmine and Tahrir. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Ayear-after-Jasmine-and-Tahrir/article13368544.ece Gharekhan, C. R. (2012b, February 20). New game on West Asian chessboard. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/newgame-on-west-asian-chessboard/article2910684.ece Hafiz, M. A. (2005, January 3). Perspectives: Turkey’s rocky road to EU. The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://archive.thedailystar.net/2005/01/03/d50 103020325.htm Haider, M. (2015, December 24). Syrian crisis: Pakistan against any attempt to topple Bashar al-Assad. Dawn. Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/ news/1228523 Hitting Out. (2019, October 12). The Indian Express (editorial). Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/hitting-out-india-tur key-military-offence-new-delhi-erdogan-6064951/ Islam, S. (2005, October 9). Turkey and EU: Rough road ahead. Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1068370 Jamal, E. O. (2016, August 17). Why Turkey is so important? The Daily Star. Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/politics/why-turkey-soimportant-1270753

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Jha, P. S. (2012, August 7). India must think before it acts on Syria. The Hindu. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/india-must-thinkbefore-it-acts-on-syria/article3735156.ece Jincui, Y. (2019, February 12). Turkey should shed blinkers on Xinjiang. Global Times. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1138596.shtml Khaleda pulls for Turkey. (2010, February 14). The Daily Star. Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-126191 Kurds in the line of fire. (2019, October 16). The Daily Star (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/editorial/news/kurds-the-linefire-1814167 Liton, S. (2016, May 18). Err-dogan! The Daily Star. Retrieved from https:// www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/err-dogan-1225621 Malik, V. P. (2005, January 6). Islam, Turkey and Cyprus in Europe. ORF . Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/islam-turkey-andcyprus-in-europe/ Military action in Syria unappealing. (2012, June 2). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/723435 Mohan, C. R. (2017, May 2). Raja Mandala: Warming up cold Turkey. The Indian Express. Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/ columns/raja-mandala-warming-up-cold-turkey-erdogan-narendra-modiindia-foreign-policy-4636114/ Mollah hanging, irate Erdogan. (2013, December 19). The Daily Star (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/mollah-hanging-irate-erdogan3008 Naqvi, S. (2011, December 17). Turkey and Syria press the pause button. ORF . Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/turkey-and-syriapress-the-pause-button/ Naqvi, S. (2012, June 29). Syria will drag down Turkey. ORF . Retrieved from http://www.orfonline.org/research/syria-will-drag-down-turkey/ Pakistan, Turkey to work for peaceful resolution of Yemen crisis. (2015, April 4). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1173845 Paradigm shift. (2015, June 8). Daily Times (editorial). Retrieved from https:// dailytimes.com.pk/100407/paradigm-shift/ Prashad, V. (2015). Turkey: In the camp of counter revolution. Marxist, 31(4). Retrieved from http://cpim.org/content/turkey-camp-counter-revolution Pubby, M. (2019, October 12). Turkish shipyard’s Pakistan links may nix its $2.3 billion India deal. The Economic Times. Retrieved from https://econom ictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/turkish-shipyards-pakistan-links-maynix-its-2-3-billion-india-deal/articleshow/71530038.cms?from=mdr Shahrukh, S. M. (2017, April 18). Turkey comes full circle. Dhaka Tribune. Retrieved from https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/op-ed/2017/04/ 18/turkey-comes-full-circle

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Shaikh, N. A. (2012, August 8). Syria and Kurdish Goals. Dawn. Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/740671/syria-and-kurdish-goals Sheng, Y. (2017, April 18). Turkey vote challenges anti-terror drive in China. The Global Times. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/104 2933.shtml Sood, R. (2018, May 8). India-Turkey relations: Turkish delight turned sour. The Hindu. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/tur kish-delight-turned-sour/article18404983.ece Strikes against Kurd rebels. (2007, October 19). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1070570 Timur, S. ¸ (2009, June 29). Local Uighurs skeptical about Gül’s China visit. Hurriyet. Retrieved from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/localuighurs-skeptical-about-gul-s-china-visit-11968267 The Middle East has a place for China. (2011, February 18). The Global Times (editorial). Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/624 291.shtml The tragedy of Turkey’s counter-coup. (2016, July 17). The New Indian Express (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/edi torials/2016/jul/18/The-tragedy-of-Turkeys-counter-coup-882004.html Trade ties with Turkey. (2018, March 4). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1393044 Turkey: challenges ahead. (2002, November 21). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1063867 Turkey in no position to judge Xinjiang. (2019, February 11). The Global Times (editorial). Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/113 8515.shtml Turkey, one year on. (2017, July 14). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https:// www.dawn.com/news/1345179 Turkey Spared Turmoil. (2008, August 1). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1071415 Turkey’s abortive coup. (2016, July 18). The Daily Star (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/editorial/turkeys-abortive-coup-1255126 Turkey’s envoy called home for consultation. (2016, May 14). The Daily Star (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/editorial/tur kish-envoy-called-home-consultation-1223398 Turkey’s EU Prospects. (2006, June 21). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1069118 Turkey’s referendum is a turning point. (2010, December 15). The Daily Star (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-154428 Turkey’s Spring. (2013, June 4). Daily Times (editorial). Retrieved from https:// dailytimes.com.pk/108752/turkeys-spring/

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Turkish detour: Erdogan’s visit highlights the need to refresh ties. (2017, May 3). The Hindu (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/opi nion/editorial/turkish-detour-erdogans-visit-highlights-the-need-to-refreshties/article18358374.ece Turkish incursion. (2019, October 14). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1510739 Turkish Purge. (2016, October 6). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https:// www.dawn.com/news/1288194/_print Turmoil in Turkey. (2016, July 18). The Hindu (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/Turmoil-in-Turkey/art icle14494315.ece Wasim, A. (2016, November 13). PTI to boycott Erdogan’s address to parliament. Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/129 6017 Wenlin, T. (2019a, July 21). Turkey’s purchase of Russian missile defense system won’t strain NATO ties. Global Times. Retrieved from http://www.global times.cn/content/1158621.shtml Wenlin, T. (2019b, October 16). Arab world sitting on powder keg due to rifts. The Global Times. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/116 7105.shtml Yan, W. (2017, October 18). Xinjiang should be wary of pan-Turkic history. The Global Times. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1070903. shtml Yan, W. (2019, July 8). China-Turkey ties revolve around Xinjiang. The Global Times. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1157193.shtml Yemeni Tragedy. (2017, April 1). Dawn (editorial). Retrieved from https:// www.dawn.com/news/1311889 Yi, Z. (2017, April 16). Turkey’s referendum may affect future of Islamic world. The Global Times. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/104 2719.shtml Yet another betrayal of the Kurds. (2019, October 17). Daily Times (editorial). Retrieved from https://dailytimes.com.pk/484513/yet-another-betrayal-ofthe-kurds/ Yousaf, F. (2016, April 22). Saudi-Turkish alliance helping US cause in Syria. Daily Times. Retrieved from https://dailytimes.com.pk/date/2016/ 04/page/280/ Zahur, A. B. M. S. (2005, September 30). US exit from Iraq earlier than anticipated? The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://archive.thedailystar.net/2005/ 09/30/d50930020537.htm Zhuangzhi, S. (2014, January 14). Turkey’s SCO courting largely aimed at sending messages to Europe. The Global Times. Retrieved from http://www. globaltimes.cn/content/837449.shtml

Strategic Diversification

Turkey’s Relationship with Afghanistan and the Pakistan Factor: An Examination of Historical and Geopolitical Factors Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Abdul Basit

Historical Background Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire both had significance during the Great Game between Russia and the British Empire. The latter had approached the Ottomans to seek the support of Afghans against Russia for which the Ottoman Empire had sent a mission to Afghanistan in the late 1800s (Wasti, 1994). Soon after Afghanistan was declared a sovereign state by King Amanullah Khan in 1919, the new leadership began establishing his country’s diplomatic relations. Afghanistan was the second country after the Soviet Union to recognize the sovereignty of Turkey (or then the Ankara government) through the Treaty of Alliance signed in

Z. S. Ahmed (B) Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] A. Basit S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanynag Technological University (NTU), island, Singapore e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_6

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1921 and 1923, and King Amanullah Khan visited Turkey and European countries during 1927–1928 (Ertugrul, 2021). Before visiting Turkey, Khan had hosted a reception in October 1922 on Turkey’s independence war and said, “Turks and Afghans are brothers. Turks’ joy is our joy; their sorrow is our sorrow” (ibid.). These linkages were not merely limited to the state-to-state level as for example, Ertu˘grul Osman, an Ottoman prince, was married to King Amanullah Khan’s niece Zeynep Tarzi Hanim Efendi (Bernstein, 2006). The first-ever diplomatic mission in Kabul was that Turkey for which Kabul had funded the construction of the embassy building and it was inaugurated by Amanullah Khan (MOFA, 2021). While these were the beginnings of the bilateral relations between today’s Afghanistan and Turkey, the relationship between the Afghans and Turks spans several centuries. Both Turkic and Afghan people ruled areas of Central and South Asia. Turkish cultural influence, however, expanded across South Asia by the Mughals of Turkic origin who ruled most of today’s South Asia during 1526–1857. During the Great Game, many prominent Ottoman officials were closely collaborating with Afghan armed forces up until the early 1900s. Turkey’s role in saving Afghanistan from the Russian expansion at that time is a sign of successful collaboration between the British Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Germany (Faiz, 2016). The first modern military college of Afghanistan, Maktab-i Harbiya was established by Mahmud Sami, who was an Ottoman Iraqi (Ahmed, 2017, p. 26). Similarly, the first constitutional commission of Afghanistan was also established by an Ottoman legal expert on deputation in Afghanistan. Schools and colleges were also modernized with the active support of Ottoman officers. The bridge between the Ottomans and the Afghans was Mahmud Tarzi, who himself was a former Ottoman bureaucrat in Syria and father-in-law of King of Afghanistan. In 1919, he became Afghanistan’s first minister of foreign affairs (1924–1927) under King Amanullah Khan. Kemal Atatürk-led secularization and modernization of Turkey became a source of support and inspiration for Afghanistan’s modernization offensive by King Amanullah Khan. Inspired by the Turkish model, he lobbied for modern education in Afghanistan and used his official status as the foreign minister and father-in-law of King Amanullah Khan or Queen Soraya’s father for this purpose. In 1921, the first girls’ high school in Afghanistan was established by Queen Soraya. Following Atatürk’s death in 1938, Amanullah Khan visited Turkey from Rome, where he was living in exile. During the Amani period (1919–1929) under King Amanullah Khan, Kabul

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introduced a scholarship scheme to send its top graduates for modern education abroad. As part of this scheme, 205 Afghan students, including ten girls, were sent to Turkey (Sadat, 2004). During the Cold War, Turkey supported modernization in Afghanistan through cooperation in the areas of defence, culture, education, and health. From 1932 to 1960, Ankara sent 212 teachers, doctors, officers, and other experts to Afghanistan and this level of cooperation continued smoothly until the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 (MOFA, 2021). In the US-supported Jihad against the Soviets, Turkey, and other majority Muslim states, for example, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, sided with Washington to achieve their own “strategic goals” (Kaura, 2017). In this case, Turkey’s key motivation was to increase its cooperation with the US, for which the two countries signed the 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. This agreement was a win–win deal because the US was granted access to 26 military facilities in Turkey, and in return, Turkey was able to modernize its military hardware and received US$450 million (The New York Times, 1979). This close cooperation continued until Afghanistan started descending into a Cold War-driven internal strife which eventually resulted in the longest period of civil war, the Soviet and US invasions. Turkey’s role in Afghanistan also declined as Turkey had little leverage over the Saudi-backed Mujahideen. As Afghanistan faced a civil war in the first half of the 1990s, Turkey, like India, supported the Northern Alliance, particularly the Junbish party of Abdul Rashid Dostum (an Uzbek) (Sharan & Watkins, 2021, p. 2). When the Afghan Taliban established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996, Dostum fled to Turkey. Also, Ankara was not among the majority Muslim states, for example, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, that recognized the new government in Afghanistan. Proving its secular credentials, Turkey had refused to recognize the Taliban regime, and consequently, there was no bilateral cooperation up until the fall of the Taliban in 2001 (Zaman, 2001). Even though the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was not popular in Turkey, Ankara had no choice but to participate in the war being a NATO member (Kaura, 2017). Soon after 9/11, Turkey had opened airspace and provided airbases to the US as a sign of its clear support of the US “war on terror” (Zaman, 2001). This involved the deployment of Turkish troops in Afghanistan, and this will be further examined below. With relative stability and reconstruction after the US-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan, Turkey focused on four key objectives: “maintenance of unity and integrity of

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Afghanistan; providing security and stability in the country; strengthening of broad based political structure in which popular participation is a priority and finally restoration of peace and prosperity by eliminating terrorism and extremism” (MOFA, 2021). Within this strategy, Turkey gradually increased its stakes in Afghanistan by launching the Heart of Asia initiative and mediating between Afghanistan and Pakistan and investing in rebuilding projects.

Turkey’s Engagement in Afghanistan’s Since 9/11 Turkey’s post-9/11 engagement in Afghanistan and Central Asia is different, which was driven by geopolitical and geostrategic considerations of establishing itself as a “hegemon” of the region’s Turkic nations, replacing Russia (Tanrisever, 2013, p. 156). Moreover, Ankara’s pre9/11 engagements were confined to Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun Turkic sections in the north. At any rate, Turkey could not live up to its grand ambitions given its slow economic progress during the 1990s and geographical distance from Afghanistan (ibid.). Ankara’s post-9/11 interventions demonstrated its globalized outlook emphasizing international cooperation focusing on counterterrorism in Afghanistan (Kaya, 2013, p. 24). To achieve these policy goals, Ankara has adopted a combination of more soft and less hard power strategies having its own strengths and weaknesses in Afghanistan’s complex security environment. Turkey still aims to establish itself as a “big brother,” however, mainly through soft power policies as it has invested US$1.1 billion in security, health, education and infrastructure in Afghanistan (Saifullah, 2017; Sharan & Watkins, 2021). Since 2001, Turkey’s Afghan policy is also driven by its desire to bolster its credentials as an important global actor, which may also play a role in terms of its historic desire to obtain the membership of the European Union (EU). However, Turkey’s post-9/11 role in Afghanistan has some serious limitations given the lack of a comprehensive strategy towards South and Central Asia, poor coordination with NATO countries, and the expectation-capability gap. In terms of its military engagement in Afghanistan, several NATO countries viewed Turkey as a “free-rider” in Afghanistan due to its non-combative role. A low number of Turkish troops lost their lives in Afghanistan, and that also in road accidents or helicopter crash (Eksi, 2010, p. 143). Turkey was the only Muslimmajority NATO member taking part in the US-led global war on terror in Afghanistan, allowing it to operate freely throughout the country. In this non-combatant role, Turkey stressed upon a combination of kinetic and

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non-kinetic approaches to transform Afghanistan from a conflict-ridden to a peaceful society and functioning state. Between 2003 and 2006, Ankara facilitated dialogue between Kabul and Brussels as well as between NATO forces and the Afghan people (Erman, 2010a, p. 40). These were the initial years of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, and the deployed forces had very limited or no exposure to local culture and vice versa. Given its historical, cultural linkages with Afghanistan and being a Euro-Asian nation, Turkey acted as a bridge facilitating a to-and-fro dialogue to remove cultural barriers and misunderstandings at the grassroots levels. This dialogue helped the NATO troops in dispensing their duties judiciously. Also, it removed apprehensions of the common Afghan people by providing awareness that the foreign troops were there to help them against religious extremism instead of occupying their country. Turkey opted for a non-combative security role in Afghanistan within the ISAF framework. Turkey twice assumed the ISAF leadership from June to February 2002 and February to August 2005. Around 1800 Turkish soldiers served under the ISF command. During this period, Turkey also protected the Hamid Karzai International Airport (Coskun & Gumrukcu, 2021). Besides, Turkey took over the Kabul regional command on November 1, 2009, and this mandate was extended by a one-year period until 1 November 2013 (Kaya, 2013, p. 24). Furthermore, Ankara also worked on providing security and enhancing the capacity of the Afghan security forces. After 2001, Turkey spent around US$100 million in Afghanistan’s security sector and trained 12,500 Afghan security personnel in Afghanistan and 3300 in Turkey (ibid.). Turkey also contributed to Afghanistan’s security by protecting the two main logistical supply routes—key to the US and NATO’s missions in Afghanistan. There are two such routes: the Northern Distribution Network, which runs through Central Asia and the Southern Distribution Network that runs through Pakistan. Turkey’s close ties with Pakistan and Central Asian states were pivotal in keeping both routes open and secure (Eksi, 2010, p. 141). Diplomatically, Ankara played an important role in terms of coordination between Afghanistan and Pakistan using its fraternal ties with both nations and cultural, historical, and religious linkages (Shah & Li, 2020). Before we talk about Turkey’s focus on Afghanistan and engagement with Pakistan in this matter, it is important to mention that Turkish foreign policy has experienced some changes under Erdogan through a greater focus on national security and “quest for strategic autonomy” (Haugom, 2019, p. 206). The Pakistan-Afghanistan–Turkey trilateral summit and

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the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process constitute the regional dimension of Turkey’s Afghan policy. The Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process has been used by Turkey to enhance its diplomatic reach beyond Afghanistan by establishing itself as a serious actor in global security. This was reflected at the 2021 ministerial meeting in which the US representative stated, “This year’s Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Ministerial Conference comes at a critical moment in the Afghanistan peace process. It demonstrates the strong regional consensus for peace and development and an Afghanistan that contributes to those goals” (Chollet, 2021). Through the trilateral forum involving Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ankara projected its global image as an important global actor in the eyes of the US. Also, Ankara used this opportunity to showcase itself in the “brotherhood role” (Kaya, 2013). Turkey mediated between Islamabad and Kabul to ensure continuity of the US-led global war on terror. Though these interventions did not solve the decade-long entrenched problems pertaining to border disputes and interventionist policies, it ensured a working relationship and keeping the lines of communication open so that the fraught Pak–Afghan bilateral equation did not impinge on the US policy goals in Afghanistan. From 2001 until the collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government, the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad was dominated more by mutual mistrust than cooperation. From 2002 to 2021, successive regimes of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani blamed Pakistan for supporting the Afghan Taliban and therefore being involved in crossborder terrorism in Afghanistan. While Islamabad repeatedly denied such allegations, it also shared its concerns in relation to India’s intelligence agency using Afghan soil for covert operations against Pakistan (Taye & Ahmed, 2021). While the differences between Kabul and Islamabad had reached a new height, Ankara came up with the idea of a trilateral forum to act as a mediator (Aras, 2012). In 2007, Ankara created a Turkey–Pakistan–Afghanistan trilateral summit or joint working group to improve the Pak–Afghan relations. The meetings of this trilateral summit were convened each year with a new agenda. However, the overall goal revolved around dialogues on socio-economic cooperation, devising collaborative frameworks in fighting terrorism involving intelligence sharing, border security, and counterterrorism training. The first meeting of the trilateral summit took place in July 2007 (Kaya, 2013, p. 26). Subsequent meetings were held in 2008, 2009, 2010 (two meetings), 2011 and 2012, respectively. The December 2010 trilateral meeting was most fruitful, culminating in joint military exercises. These exercises

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took place in March 2011, involving special counterterrorism training and drills, intelligence sharing mechanisms, border security and patrolling as well as combating improvised explosive devices (IEDs), among others (ibid.). The spill-over of violence from Afghanistan to Pakistan and the Taliban infiltration from Pakistan to Afghanistan made these trilaterals more relevant and meaningful—at the tactical-operational level. Kabul felt confident on Ankara’s ability to influence Islamabad in those meetings. While attending a meeting in November 2020 in Ankara, Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Abdullah Abdullah “stressed the vital role Ankara can play in improving relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan” (Sharan & Watkins, 2021, p. 3). In recent years however the United Kingdom has assumed this role in terms of facilitating dialogue between Kabul and Islamabad. The trilateral mechanism led by Turkey had its limitations as to make them meaningful, Turkey was required “to focus on advanced mechanisms, such as strategic partnership, flexible consensus, and bilateral crisis management system that could serve to normalize inter-state relations” (Shah & Li, 2020, p. 559). These interactions ended with joint statements lacking substance to pave the way for enhanced cooperation among the three actors for peace and stability in Afghanistan. Arguably, Turkey’s socio-economic and cultural contributions are more important than military contributions. The common Islamic faith is a significant factor in Turkey’s success in winning the hearts and minds in Afghanistan. Hence, it is unsurprising that there is popular support for Turkey’s policies in Afghanistan. For instance, former governor of the Wardak province said in a statement, “The Turkish programs are very significant and acceptable to Afghan because they work with Afghan culture and they are sensitive to the Afghan values. We have a very good strong historical relationship with Turkey” (Erman, 2010b). Keeping in view that military means are insufficient in addressing the root causes of terrorism, Turkey used socio-economic intervention to address the long-term structural causes of religious extremism such as unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, and bad governance. Reconstruction of socioeconomic life is pivotal to eradicating religious extremism and terrorism. Turkey’s socio-economic interventions in Afghanistan are consistent with its soft power approach. Turkey’s annual economic and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan is around US$100 million. Ankara’s main development agency, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), provides one-fourth of its development aid to the Afghan people directly. Turkey’s socio-economic policies have also affected the US approach

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towards Afghanistan as well (Relief Web, 2021). Turkey was also the coordinator of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. Ankara created and ran two PRTS in Wardak and Jawzjan provinces in 2006 and 2010, respectively, the only civilian-run PRTs in Afghanistan. Turkey preferred civilian oversight of PRTs over the military-led ones as it enabled Turkish authorities to directly interact with the local authorities and people enabling them to leverage their cultural ties and common values in fulfilling their missions (Ramezani & Darbandsari, 2021). Since 2010, Turkey has invested around US$30 million in both PRTs through which it trained Afghan local forces, provided education, healthcare facilities, clean water as well as the capacity building of the local administration in Wardak and Jawzjan. The Wardak PRT coordinates directly with the Turkish Development and Cooperation Agency and has completed 200 projects with its 130 employees. The Jawzjan PRT operates in Jawzjan and Sari Pul provinces under the Regional Command North (Çubuk, 2014, p. 103). In addition, the Turkish businessmen operate several schools and hospitals in Afghanistan by investing around US$200 million in foreign direct investment through public and private partnerships. After 9/11, Ankara opened around 80 schools across Afghanistan besides awarding post-graduate scholarships to Afghan students. Tukey also established 10 hospitals, half of which are managed by Turkey (Bishku, 2020, p. 252). In the healthcare sector, Turkey has created healthcare units, clinics, and hospitals and imparts training to Afghan women to be midwives or nurses. It has also built a sports complex at the Kabul University (ibid.). Turkey’s other aim, by helping the US and NATO members through non-combat interventions in Afghanistan, is to project its soft image of a peaceful and moderate Muslim country practising a tolerant and inclusive version of Islam as opposed to its Middle Eastern Wahhabi counterpart, for example, Saudi Arabia which is deemed as a root cause of violent extremism in parts of the Muslim world. During the Afghan–Soviet War in the 1980s, the Saudi support for the Wahhabi element of the erstwhile Afghan mujahidin strengthened the appeal of Wahhabi Islam, which eventually culminated through the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996. The group eventually formed its puritanical theocratic regime, and Saudi Arabia was one of the only three countries alongside Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates that recognized the Taliban regime. Turkey, which on the contrary, is a moderate Muslim country with a secular political

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outlook could not tolerate such degeneration of Afghanistan which was reformed by the forward-looking Afghan ruler Amanullah Khan. Turkey positioned itself discursively to benefit from the opportunities offered by the post-9/11 environment, which several Middle Eastern Sunni Sheikhdoms found as challenges for their image, role, and the form of Salafist Islam they promoted. In doing so, Turkey was strengthening its image as a potential leader of the Muslim world and challenging Saudi Arabia’s hegemony in terms of ummah’s leadership (Venetis, 2014). Turkey follows the Hanafi version of Sunni Islam which has a rich tradition of Sufi mysticism as well. Most of the Afghans are also followers of the Sunni-Hanafi school of thought. So, unlike the Arab nations, Turkey has this distinct advantage of shared socio-cultural, historical, and religious roots with Afghanistan. In a way, Afghanistan became an arena of the Saudi–Turkish intra-Sunni tussle for domination of the Sunni Muslim world with the former championing the Wahhabi Islam and the latter advocating a moderate form of Sunni-Hanafi Islam enshrined in the Sufi mystic tradition. During his May 2012 visit to Afghanistan, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan said, “Turkey will stay in Afghanistan even after all forces have left and will leave only when our Afghan brothers and sisters tell us” (Kaya, 2013, p. 23). Initially, Erdogan’s Afghan policy was driven by his desire to get closer to the EU through partnership in the war on terror and by promoting a moderate version of Islam as an antidote to Islamist extremism and promoting democratic values in Afghanistan. However, with the passage of time, as Turkey’s hopes of entering the EU club dwindled, Erdogan’s Afghan policy focused on finding a dominant place within the Muslim world using his role in Afghanistan, among others, as propaganda vehicle. This is aligned with Erdogan’s pan-Islamic rhetoric which a study viewed as an attempt “to increase the appeal of Turkey’s political stances to Muslims populations across the world” (al-Sarhan, 2019, p. 1). Now, it seems Erdogan’s above statement was not merely rhetorical if seen in the context of the recent US–Turkey engagement aimed at giving the latter the role of securing Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport, critical to the functioning of several Western embassies, and guarding the diplomatic missions is one such role that Ankara could play the withdrawal of foreign troops. For these very reasons, the Biden administration also named Turkey as the alternative venue to Qatar for the Afghan peace talks

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between Kabul and the Taliban (Reuters, 2021). In the context of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Biden administration was leveraging the less controversial and more successful Turkish template in post-9/11 Afghanistan (Donati & Youssef, 2021). The Biden administration tried to give Ankara the mandate to secure the Kabul International Airport and guard the Western diplomatic missions in the Afghan capital (Hacaoglu, 2021). While announcing its withdrawal plan in April 2021, President Joe Biden also changed the venue of Afghan peace talks from Qatar to Turkey. Biden’s move was motivated by the desire to retain NATO’s footprint in Afghanistan with minimal political and military costs. Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan, the only Muslim-majority NATO country, after the withdrawal of international troops could generate a suspicion regarding the continued US role in Afghanistan. This was also an attempt by Biden to fix the strained US–Turkish ties by offering the latter to demonstrate that it is a dependable NATO ally. Arguably, while offering Turkey this role in Afghanistan that the US was hoping for a collaboration between Turkey and Pakistan. The Taliban never really liked the idea of Turkey providing security for the Kabul airport. In a statement, the Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid asked Turkey to withdraw its forces under the 2020 agreement. He said, “If foreign forces want to retain a military presence here in the name of airport security, Afghans will not allow it and will view them as invaders, be it Turkey or any other country” (Gul, 2021). The Turkish proposal to secure the Kabul airport is not out of question. In the way the US troops left the Kabul airport, it was not functional for a few days. Later teams from Qatar and the UAE helped to make the airport fully operational (Ahmad, 2021). Despite not being able to convince the Taliban to provide security to the Kabul airport, Turkey has been working on multiple options for its continued engagement in the Taliban-led Afghanistan. Unlike many NATO member states, Turkey has not closed its diplomatic mission in Kabul and aims to continue its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan (Al Jazeera, 2021a). Here Turkey has aligned its policy with that of other regional actors, for example Pakistan, China, Russia, and Ankara has been favouring an inclusive government in Kabul. While criticizing the Taliban’s initial announcement of interim government that only had three non-Pashtun members, Erdogan stated that Turkey would work with them if they formed an inclusive government (Al Jazeera, 2021b). In October 2021, the Turkish foreign minister met his Afghan counterpart, Amir Khan Muttaqi, and in this meeting issues of Turkey’s support were

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discussed including humanitarian aid and the recognition of the Talibanled government (Ozturk, 2021). Since the Taliban’s takeover, Turkey has been generously providing aid to Afghanistan and, for example in October 2021, provided 33 tons of food through the Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay) (Daily Sabah, 2021). Despite the humanitarian support, diplomatic presence, and engagement with the Taliban, Ankara is cautious and does not want to recognize the Taliban government unilaterally. This approach is consistent with that of its key regional allies like Pakistan.

Turkey’s Engagement with the Taliban and Pakistan Soft power has its limitations; while it creates a goodwill factor and may improve the image of a country, it cannot compensate for hard power. Turkey’s soft power intervention in Afghanistan was confined to nonPashtun areas such as Wardak and Jawzjan. This will blunt Turkey’s perception of emerging as the main player in Afghanistan. Turkey does not have the kind of leverage that Afghan neighbours like Pakistan have with historic links with the Taliban. As during the 1990s, Turkey was supporting the Northern Alliance and then was part of US-led NATO operations against the Taliban, its credentials do not make it a neutral actor in the eyes of the Afghan Taliban. It must do a lot more to gain the Taliban’s trust. Even now, the Taliban’s sworn enemy and the mastermind of the “Sheberghan massacre” Abdul Rashid Dostum, a Tajik warlord, is in Turkey for treatment. Not just that, Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu met Dostum in Ankara in 2020 and then shared on Twitter that, “Had a fruitful meeting w/former Vice President of #Afghanistan Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum. Will continue to stand by our Afghan brothers and sisters during the peace and reconciliation process” (Hamit & Yuzbasioglu, 2020). During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1996–2001), Dostum took refuge in Turkey. This undermines Turkey’s neutrality as a host of Afghan peace talks. Ankara’s willingness to accept the US request to provide security for the Hamid Karzai International Airport has further eroded Turkey’s neutrality in the eyes of the Taliban who have been reluctant to join Turkish-hosted peace talks. Given this, Turkey’s ability to emerge as an influential player in Afghanistan in which the Afghan Taliban are key players is limited. NATO countries viewed Turkey’s non-combatant role in Afghanistan as an opportunism to fuel its image as a global actor. They considered Ankara

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a free rider in Afghanistan. Hence, Turkey’s calculations of enhancing its chances of EU’s membership will be checkmated, notwithstanding its growing closeness with the US. When it comes to improvising relations with the US, there is a convergence of interests between Ankara and Islamabad. Although Pakistan has significantly moved closer to China, it is not able to completely disrupt its relations with the US due to both economic and geopolitical reasons. Good relations with the US and the West will also be a key factor in terms of Pakistan and Turkey removing themselves from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force in terms of terror financing. In this scenario in which Ankara’s role has serious limitations of continued engagement in Afghanistan under the Taliban, Turkey counts on its increasing cooperation with Pakistan. For nearly three decades, Pakistan has maintained its relationship with the Afghan Taliban, which was visible through the presence of the Quetta Shura and how Pakistan was providing refuge to Afghan leaders and their families (Akhtar, 2008). At the same time, Pakistan’s relations with Turkey have expanded through cooperation in trade and investment, cultural affairs, and security matters. Since the start of this century, both countries have signed nearly 60 defence cooperation agreements, and Turkey has gradually become Pakistan’s second-biggest arms supplier after China (Ahval, 2019). In July 2018, the Pakistan navy signed a deal work US$1.5 billion with Turkey to procure four MILGEM-call ships (Hamit & Duz, 2019). As Ankara and Islamabad have been separately involved in Afghanistan and jointly have discussed the Afghanistan issue, it is not surprising that they discussed their approaches towards Afghanistan following the withdrawal of US troops. In this regard, the foreign ministers of both countries met on June 20 as part of the seventh session of the high-level strategic cooperation council in Turkey. At this meeting, the officials discussed emerging developments in Afghanistan, but they did not issue any joint statement (Geo TV, 2021). Despite this high-level and growing bilateral cooperation, Pakistan has limitations in terms of fully backing Turkey in Afghanistan. It is because Islamabad must think of its other key relationships. Considering Pakistan’s economic dependence on and historic relations with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is likely to not take a clear side in what appears to be Turkey challenging Saudi Arabia’s leadership of the ummah. So, Pakistan will never leave Saudi Arabia for Turkey; rather it would balance the ties as a hedging middle-sized power. The Saudis have seen growing Turkish

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ingress in Afghanistan enabled by the US as a threat to its hegemony of the Sunni Muslim world. In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia was a major actor during the Afghan-Soviet War alongside the US and Pakistan. Riyadh was a venue for some important Afghan peace agreements, such as the Mecca Accord. As the Taliban has an office in Doha, Qatar has been playing a leading role in peace negotiations in recent years. In October 2021, Moscow hosted an international meeting on Afghanistan and it seems that idea of Ankara becoming a key player in terms of hosting future peace talks is off the table. Still, Turkey is working closely with Pakistan to ensure that it is able to achieve its national interests in today’s Afghanistan. The Turkish foreign minister met his Pakistan counterpart on the sidelines of the 2021 United National General Assembly session. In this meeting they specifically focused on Afghanistan. As Pakistan is playing a leading role in terms of generating international support in the shape of humanitarian and economic assistance and recognition of the Taliban regime, it has convergence of interests with Turkey. Islamabad realizes that it is not in a position to shoulder the economic burden due to its own economic crisis, therefore, it is relying on its close partners like Turkey to continue providing support to Afghanistan. Even though Turkey has criticized the exclusivity of the Taliban’s interim government for not having enough representation of all ethnic minorities and women, Ankara is closely working with Pakistan to ensure that the Taliban become more inclusive. Pakistan has also said it would not unilaterally recognize the Taliban government and has been pressurizing the Taliban to be more inclusive. If the Taliban act accordingly then it is quite likely that both Pakistan and Turkey will recognize the Taliban-led setup in Afghanistan.

Conclusion As argued in this chapter, there are both historical and geopolitical drivers of Turkey’s ever-increasing interest in Afghanistan. Due to historical links from the Ottoman era onward, bilateral ties continued to grow during the Cold War. In its desire to expand its cooperation with the US, Ankara had supported the US-backed Afghan jihad. Turkey, in return, benefited from defence cooperation with the US to modernize its military hardware. Due to ideological differences being a secular country, Turkey had recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan during 1996– 2001 and therefore had no engagement with Kabul then. As a NATO

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member, Turkey fully backed the new government in Kabul after the fall of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and this was manifested through Turkey’s cooperation in various areas like health and education. Irrespective of being a NATO member, Ankara has expressed keen interest for deeper involvement in Afghan peace processes. This involved cooperation with Pakistan—a key actor facilitating US-Taliban dialogues—and Turkey has done that through bilateral and other mechanisms like the Trilateral Ankara process involving Afghanistan and Pakistan. While Turkey looks for greater engagement in the Taliban-led Afghanistan, it is working closely with its key regional partner Pakistan. Cooperation with Pakistan is central for Turkey to maintain or revive the same level of involvement that it had as a NATO partner during 2001–2021. Moving forward, Ankara will be heavily relying on Pakistan to achieve its geostrategic objectives in South and Central Asia. Despite Pakistan’s closeness towards China, there is a convergence of interest between Ankara and Islamabad as both would like to expand their cooperation with the US. Considering the US’s eagerness to withdraw from Afghanistan, Turkey wants to avail the opportunity to prove itself as a dependable partner for the West in terms of peace and stability in Afghanistan. The likelihood of Turkey achieving Western/US endorsement is also high considering its growing soft power in the Muslim world, especially in Pakistan, and security cooperation with key stakeholders in and outside of South Asia. The viability of Ankara gaining full support of Pakistan to gain the Afghan Taliban’s confidence is low because of historic reasons like Ankara’s support for the Northern Alliance and recently its NATO’s membership. While Pakistan appreciates its cooperation with Turkey, it will also try to balance its relations with other key partners like Saudi Arabia. As it has often demonstrated, Islamabad will also prioritize its national interests in Afghanistan, and they are largely centred on launching a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul to ultimately reduce India’s influence in Afghanistan. For now, Islamabad needs as many international partners as possible to ensure that the Taliban government in Afghanistan achieves international recognition and support. This serves Pakistan’s interests as it views the Taliban as a friendly regime but cannot provide sufficient economic and humanitarian assistance that Afghanistan needs to avoid any serious humanitarian crisis.

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Turkish-Asian Cooperation in Diversified Strategic Environment Merve Seren

Introduction AKP’s Strategic Rethinking At the beginning of the AKP’s rule, Ankara embarked on an ambitious goal of assuming the status of “centre-state”—or, in a more assertive sense, a “global” power. In the inner circle of AKP, a new vocabulary of concepts such as “order-building actor,” “wise country,” “model country,” “peace basin,” “mediator,” “facilitator,” and “trading state” became popular. The “dominant concepts” of new foreign policy of the AKP government reveal insights on the changing discourse, theoretical and methodological approaches, and essential features of power projection such as follows: “new diplomatic style,” “coherent relations with global powers,” “win–win strategy,” active foreign policy,” “maximum cooperation,” “historical responsibility,” “historical legacy,” “soft power,” “multi-dimensional enlarged partnership,” “active involvement in global level,” “zero-problem with neighbors,” “self-confident foreign policy,”

M. Seren (B) Department of International Relations, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_7

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“preemptive diplomacy,” “shuttle diplomacy,” and “proactive diplomacy” (Ye¸silta¸s & Balcı, 2011). As seen, these “dominant concepts” embeddingly constitute “idealism” and “pragmatism” in Turkey’s new foreign policy. In its first General Election Declaration in 2002, the AKP promised to establish stronger relations with the West. However, Turkey’s alleged anti-Western stance soon resurfaced from the old debates of “Orientalism/Occidentalism,” “East/West,” “Christendom/Islam” or “Islamophobia/Westernophobia.” It can be said that anti-Western discourse has grown strong in the last decade with the resurrection of the paradoxical debate over “isolation,” “otherness” and “precious loneliness.” Gradually, Erdogan’s speeches started accusing not only Tel-Aviv but also the West as its “protecting power” with reference to incidents such as “One Minute” and Mavi Marmara. Soon the popular narratives of the so-called axis-shift in the pro-Western character of Turkish foreign policy; and “de-westernisation,” “re-Asianization” or “neo-Ottomanism” flooded the academic and media discussions and “anti-Atlantic” and “anti-Europe” rhetoric of Turkey’s policymakers became a key topic. An alternative reference, however, also started appearing to mark the “absence of a major shift in the axis,” and the “existence of a significant gradual change” towards an ambitious attitude for “multidimensional” and “proactive” foreign policy (Albayrak & Turan, 2016; Ba¸ser, 2015; Kaliber & Kaliber, n.d.; Turan, 2012; Ünay, 2017). For Hoffman, Turkey’s “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy is not a new phenomenon that belongs to AKP as claimed; instead, its defensive nature based on commitments to “territorial saturation” and “non-intervention” changed a long time ago, as Cyprus issue emerged in the early 60s was the first sign of Turkey’s pursuit of “independent interventionist” and “regional activist” policies. Besides, Hoffman asserts that Turkey’s interventions, both before and during the AKP era, are motivated by four key pillars as follows: (i) Western-style securitisation of its geo-political environment; (ii) Eurasianist repositioning due to its energy-hungry growth ambitions, which make Russia and Iran as indispensable partners; (iii) an agenda of competitive regional power projection that follows both historic Ottoman and pan-Turanic lines, reaching all the way from Sarajevo deep into the Red Sea, as revealed in the partnerships with Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar; (iv) the domestic considerations of interventionism such as the impacts of military actions abroad over the populist militarist

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nationalism and parliamentary/presidential elections (Hoffmann, 2019, pp. 302–305). As Ankara’s steady buildup of military bases abroad, mostly to access key energy corridors in the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, the Caucasus, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea, overlap with the geography of the former Ottoman Empire. Hence, Turkey’s increasing military bases, growing military role, and strengthening defence cooperation in Syria, Iraq, Cyprus, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Qatar were considered reflections of AKP’s neo-Ottoman policy. With the establishment of TAKM in 2013 (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Georgia), Turkey’s engagement in Asia is seen as Ankara’s ambition to establish a new Turkic military force, a Turkish version of NATO or Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Akca, 2019; Hacaoglu, 2019; Lin, 2019; Micallef, 2018). In 2012, Erdo˘gan made a bold statement in favour of the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SCO), when Turkey was recognised as a Dialogue Partner at the Summit of the Heads of State of the SCO held in Beijing, on 6–7 June 2012 (MFA Press Release, 2012). This led to a debate if Turkey is drifting away from the transatlantic alliance. In this regard, the ground motives of Turkey’s urge to rediscover Asia during the AKP era can be argued by focusing on the determining factors described as follows: (i) conceptual ambiguity, (ii) belatedness, (iii) limitedness/constraints, (iv) awareness, and (v) comprehensiveness. Asia-Conceptual Ambiguity For a long time, there has been a great deal of confusion in Turkey’s Asia perception stemming from “conceptual ambiguity” towards the region, which created a fragmented and inconsistent political discourse. Initially, Turkey’s strong desire to be fully engaged with the West in the early decades of the Cold War created an Asia vision through the eyes of USled NATO. This vision formed within the context of bipolar geo-political competition and induced Ankara to develop its relations with the Asia region under the influence of ongoing belligerent rivalry between the US and Soviet Union. Although Turkey’s West-oriented Asia perspective has started changing following Özal’s initiatives and more rapidly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ankara’s Asia policy was still identified with Central Asia and then the Caucasus. This Central Asia-focused perception of Turkey’s Asia policy created overlapping discourses and promoted an

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imagination of one single region of shared identity, ethnicity, culture, religion, language and geography. The view remained as the dominant view among Turkish political elites as well as the public itself. However, scholars question these close historical and cultural references as a reason for ambitious geo-political feasibility. Sengupta reminds “Who is Turk?” debate at the beginning of the 2000s while academic circles were questioning Turkey’s achievements in the region for the last ten years and pointed out “Turkic brotherhood” and Central Asia’s selfidentification with Uzbek, Kazakh or Turkmen, rather than Turks. Along with the identity conceptualisation, Sengupta draws attention to Turkey’s changing geo-political narrative, particularly to Central Asia, which was shaped by civilisational heritage and cultural influence, extending from the Adriatic Sea to the borders of China. This rhetorical boundary today is redesigned on the distinction between Western Central Asian Caspian states and the more distant energy-poor states and territories in Eastern Central Asia, revealing a more realistic discourse for geo-political calculations that signifies the Turkic commonwealth of strategic and energy advantages (Sengupta, 2014, p. 984). Belatedness Turkey’s belated strategy and efforts to achieve establishing closer ties with the Asian countries stemmed from both internal and external challenges. The first challenge was related to the mindset, attitudes and behavioural tendencies of the Turkish political elites. For example, before the 1950 elections, Adnan Menderes’s Democrat Party was accusing the Republican People’s Party because of its Western-centred foreign policy disregarding the eastern neighbours. While Menderes was pushing for an active Asia policy and showing a sincere desire to become the “big brother of the region”; his foreign and security policy formulation towards Asia failed due to a lack of foresight for better understanding the dynamics of the region. Many pro-Soviet leading figures of Arab nationalism then called Turkey the “spokesman of the West in the Middle East” or “spokesman of the imperialism” (Ba˘gcı, 2009; Ye¸silbursa, 2010). Unlike Menderes’ big brother approach, Turkish foreign policy during the Özal era was economically centred. In Özal’s understanding, Turkish dependency on the West should have decreased by finding alternative markets and pursuing a multidimensional policy. By opening Turkey up to new

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regions like Central Asia and the Middle East, Özal was acting economically pragmatic instead of constructing regional relationships based on political ideologies, cultural values and beliefs. On the other hand, Özal was considered more pro-Western than previous governments since his multidimensional foreign policy was preferred and supported by the US to limit Russian power in the former Soviet area to fill the vacuum (Albayrak & Turan, 2016, pp. 142–146). The domestic developments in Turkey, such as sufferings through military coups, external debt rises, unemployment, inflation rates and the threat of terrorism, caused Ankara to focus more on overcoming internal challenges. Besides, Turkey’s foreign policy priorities were already shaped by its strong commitments to NATO’s shared political principles and values and its sustained efforts for full accession to the E.U. On the other hand, the Asia region was surrounded by serious domestic problems arising from high population, excessive diversity, poverty, unemployment, territorial disputes, armed conflict, internal displacements, immigration, smuggling and Islamic militancy. In such an environment, it was quite difficult and time-consuming for Ankara to comprehend the dynamics and impacts of problems and future trends in Asia. Therefore, for a long time, Asia failed to appear in Turkey’s strategic focus. Limitedness/Constraints Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Ankara has centred its security priority on the preservation of “national independence,” “sovereignty,” and “territorial integrity,” as officially stated in the document of Turkey’s National Security Council (widely known as the “Red Book”) and in the declarations of the Turkish Armed Forces. In addition to survivability, Turkey’s security notion also relied on protecting the regime. From this perspective, Turkey’s security conceptualisation, even after the Cold War period, maintained its hard security approach favouring military notions of security. Even though the last decade indicates Turkey’s efforts on tackling economic, cultural and humanitarian aspects of security challenges, still the official conceptualisation largely relies on the traditional security perception of hard security. As a result, while mapping the risk and threat landscape, Turkey paid most attention to conventional threats stemming from her region and underestimated the future challenges of non-conventional threats emancipating from Asia.

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The second reason for limitedness was the lack of opportunities and capabilities concerning the political and economic circumstances. Bearing in mind that Turkey, even in a democratic period, had experienced military interventions in politics almost every ten years between 1960–1980; started with the traditional military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and subsequently continued with the post-modern ones in 1997 and 2007 (ememorandum) and the latest coup attempt in July 2016. Even the very brief history of Turkey’s military coups shows how Turkey consumed its energy on dealing with the problems of domestic policy. Moreover, the events of political uncertainty had significantly impacted economic conditions, such as damaging Turkey’s image with a bad reputation, hence preventing Turkey from becoming one of the most attractive destination countries for investors. The third reason for limitedness stemmed from the Cold War divisions that prevented Ankara from deciding and acting independently. As a result, Ankara’s regional perspective and relations with the Asian countries developed mainly in line with US interests. Besides, India, China and Pakistan as the three actors of the strategic triangle.1 They have been intensely involved in a great rivalry in many areas seeking to expand spheres of political influence, boost economic gains and become the military power of the region (Calabrese, 2014–2015; Sinha, 2004). Considering the potential influences and consequences of alternative strategic triangles that involve complex equations like India-US–Pakistan, US– India–China or Russia–India–China, Turkey has faced various constraints owing to the balances and imbalances in the region which hampered its

1 The “strategic triangle” concept has been widely referred to in the literature to analyse the “internal logic” of the relationship of strategic actors; especially started to be used for the U.S., Soviet Union and China relationship after the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s. As Dittmer explains, the strategic triangle is “a sort of transactional game among three players”; the game in which each player “recognises the strategic salience of the principals” and “the relationship between any two will be affected by each player’s relationship to the third.” Therefore, the “strategic triangle” does not simply define the relationship; further demonstrating these countries qualifications to meet the three main criteria to be recognised as a “strategic actor” in the triangle: (i) each country must be an independent actor, (ii) each state should be constantly aware of its behaviour towards any other in the triangle that has implications for the other, and (iii) the tendency for any two countries to “gang-up” against the third. See. Dittmer, L. (1981). The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis. World Politics, 33(4), 485– 515; Sinha, S. (2004). The Strategic Triangle: India–China–Pakistan. China Report, 40(2), 221–225.

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efforts to strengthen political, economic and security cooperation. Likewise, the regional disputes restrained Turkey’s efforts to promote bilateral relations in all areas, for instance, with Kabul and Islamabad (as they fight over transboundary water issues, Islamic militancy and movement of militant groups) pushes Ankara in a difficult position. Similarly, Erdogan’s statements expressing support for Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute and ˙ the growing defence ties between Ankara and Islamabad have been seriously questioned as Turkey seeks to improve economic, commercial and technical cooperation with India. New Delhi decided to call off Modi’s Ankara visit, cutting down exports of military equipment and dual-use items and, calling upon the Turkish leadership to not interfere in India’s internal affairs (Al Jazeera, 2020; Economic Times, 2019; India Today, 2019). Turkey’s limitedness in engaging Asia depends on the policies of two key actors, Iran and Russia. In accordance with the ‘religious ideological’ shift towards ‘pragmatic calculation’ in making and implementing Iran’s foreign policy (Ramazani, 2004), Turkey’s policy formulation for Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Middle East has been challenged by the regime’s Shiite-centric regional policies. Awareness Turkey’s awareness level towards the “rising” Asia can be divided into two time periods. The first period can be defined as basic awareness, which dates back to the Özal era and his “diversified, active, daring, and outward-oriented foreign policy approach.” Contrary to “traditional isolationist Kemalist policy toward the Turks of Central Asia,” Özalist Turkey became the first state that recognised the newly independent Central Asian republics. Turkey then assumed that “Turkish model” of democratisation, free market economy, Westernization as well as its close ethnic and cultural links would contribute to the Turkic states. From this perspective, though the awareness for Asia dimension was arising in Turkish foreign policy through the end of the 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought further opportunities to Turkey to become more engaged with the of Asia, especially the Turkic countries. In this respect, the dissolution of the Soviet Union opened new doors to Turkey for setting up a systematic and multidimensional dialogue mechanism with Central Asian and Caucasus countries in terms of a regional engagement from politics to security, from finance to infrastructure, trade to culture

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and religion to education. Özal’s official visits to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in March 1991, also Kazakhstan President’s first foreign visit to Turkey which followed by the visits of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan presidents in the same year viewed as a way of creating a better atmosphere for subsequent bilateral talks to develop close (Ataman, 2002, pp. 131–135; Özkan & Demirtepe, 2012, p. 648). Considering the power gap, security concerns and wide range of benefits to be gained from the post-Soviet Central Asia and Caucasus countries, Western allies favoured a pragmatic regional engagement that paved the way for NATO to address new threats of international terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, drugs and human trafficking, and to develop new programmes for collaborating with former Warsaw Pact adversaries, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and later the Partnership for Peace-PfP program established in 1994 (Özkan, 2010; Purta¸s, 2005, p. 12). The period from the beginning of 2000 onwards could be described as “developing awareness”; once the AKP came into power in 2002, Ankara’s interest gradually increased towards Asia. The main reason lying behind Ankara’s raising awareness was not related to the decrease in risks and threats but rather the AKP’s motivation and support for any attempt to strengthen political, military, diplomatic and economic ties with the East. While tracing the discourse back to Erdo˘gan’s initial years in office, the then US President, Bush was referring to Turkey as a “model” country; one decade later when Economist announced Turkey as the “Star of Islam” and a “model” particularly for the newly independent former Soviet republics. Once again, Turkey was portrayed as a ‘model’ concerning its democracy, liberal market, Muslim but secular structure, close ties with the West (Kiri¸sci, 2013). Comprehensiveness Turkey’s self-awareness to develop a comprehensive approach towards Asia is based on four main reasons. First, AKP’s maxim of “central country” has revealed the intention of a greater purpose, which cannot be limited to a narrow perspective like relying only on the Turkish soft power or “Turkish model” to strengthen ties with the Turkic republics. To put it more explicitly, despite its revival in the Özal era, it’s a fact that neoPan-Turkism may not work as the most influential instrument to deepen ties with the countries in the Asian century. Hence, common historical,

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linguistic, cultural and religious affinities with the peoples and states may perhaps work for the post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus countries, but not for the entire region. It is possible for the Turkish model or instruments of soft power to underestimate the internal dynamics of domestic politics, so the success might be limited due to change (or stability) in the circumstances over the long term. Moreover, the militant realism of international relations is also challenging for regional policies since other actors having different security interests may confront on the ground. When considering the US, Russian and Chinese military presence in Central Asia, it is apparent that Turkey needs to implement a comprehensive approach involving both instruments of soft power and security and defence engagements via regional organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). That is the reason why the AKP, along with historical and cultural ties, sought to develop its political, diplomatic, economic, military and technological relations with the Asian countries. Second, unlike the previous decades, AKP learned from past mistakes and realised the need to adopt a holistic approach towards Asia, beyond Central Asia and Turkic identity. Third, arguably, in the AKP government, Turkey has adopted a balance-oriented approach to counter-balance with its West-centric foreign relations. Turkey’s Asia Anew Initiative: Speaking at a conference in August 2019 at the 11th Turkish Ambassadors, Foreign Minister Çavu¸so˘glu introduced the Asia Anew initiative by saying that Turkey is a unique country with both European and Asian characters. Thus, while offering a bridge between Asia and Europe with its harmonised peculiarity, Turkey has set the goal to strengthen its relations with the Asian countries and shape the future of its diplomacy (ANews, 2019). In its new roles, Ankara sought to assume some responsibilities of “mediation” or “peacebuilding/keeping.” Despite Indian objections, Turkey asked both India and Pakistan to help the resolution of the Jammu Kashmir issue (Yeni Safak, ¸ 2017). Along with the Kashmir and Uyghur cases, Turkey became more vocal on the Rohingya crisis and actively stabilized the Muslim-majority regions in Thailand and the Philippines (Güler, 2019). With Asia Anew Initiative, Turkey’s ambitions for pursues the goals of self-sufficiency and strategic autonomy. As a result, Turkey needs to increase mutual awareness between Turkey and Asia and strengthen

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Turkey’s political, diplomatic and economic engagements with Asia. This includes new opportunities for strengthening security and defence cooperation. Security and Defence Cooperation Turkey’s growing interests in deepening security and defence ties with Asia are primarily seen as a diversion from its West-centric defence ties. However, the discussion on the West or NATO’s inability to function due to “brain death” has also to be considered first. Many in Turkey have also questioned whether NATO still provides a “security umbrella” for Turkey. The changing military status of Asia owing to “geo-political power shifts” from West to East has also joined the discussion. Turkey’s new ambitions to strengthen the security and defence cooperation with Asia can also be located in the changing perception of the transatlantic alliance. First of all, Turkey-West strained toes notwithstanding; Turkey has never expressed any intention of leaving NATO, even not seeking alternatives to its NATO partnership. Even considering the possibility of the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus being accepted to NATO Wilson (2019), then in the face of such a situation, a Turkey out of NATO would be in a position that “invades” the NATO territories. The recent developments in northwestern Syria suggest that NATO remains in the centre of Turkey’s security and defence formulation. In the wake of airstrikes that killed dozens of Turkish troops on 26 February 2020, Turkey had called on NATO to provide further support, Patriot missiles, AWACS and intelligence sharing (Amerikanın Sesi, 2020). Turkey’s request came even Turkey had almost finalised the purchase of Russian S400s (contract signed in 2017, first delivery started in 2019). Turkey, probably, would want to place within US-led NATO’s defence architecture for longer decades rather than pursuing full membership in Russia’s SCO club. On the other side, despite favouring altering security discourse favouring the SCO according to the situation in fluctuating relationship with the West; when examined the convergent and divergent interests between Turkey and its regional alliances, SCO never appeared as a replacement of NATO in Ankara’s strategic discourse. Turkey’s National Defence Minister Hulusi Akar, stated that Turkey was still at the centre of NATO, and it was not going anywhere. He expressed his confidence that Turkey– NATO partnership was capable of overcoming the challenges of S-400, Patriot, F-35 and Syria. However, he clarified that Turkey might also have

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defence alliances with other countries located in the Asia-Africa region, without considering them an alternative to Turkey’s particular relations with the NATO and E.U. (Milliyet, 2019; Örnek, 2016). Second, Turkey’s security and defence approach towards Asia has been shaped by its NATO membership since it involves pros and cons. Primarily, for a long time, Turkey conducted a foreign and security policy in parallel with NATO and the E.U. There is an argument in Ankara that Turkey’s dependency on NATO and strong attachment to become an E.U. member, had stopped from developing a comprehensive and institutional security approach towards Asia. It failed to achieve successful military cooperation. Even in the early years of the Republican Period, Turkey’s main focus was the Near East; Turkey’s cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan was the leading policy goal, such as the nonaggression Saadabad Pact signed by Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq reveal the limits of Turkey’s security margins. By the 2000s, Turkey had adopted NATO’s New Partnership Policy and followed its approach to Global Partners; this new policy of partnerships based on geographical borders, enabling NATO to establish relations with countries located in different regions of the world to work together, which is actually “an expression of the will of a regional defence organisation to become a global security organisation” (Ba˘gba¸slıo˘glu, 2014, pp. 74–75). Turkey–China relations can be a good example of how Turkey can balance between the West and China. In the face of a strong Alliance of ASEAN, the Chinese policies would be more tough and aggressive. As a result, the US favours the rise of a powerful ASEAN alliance. As the relations between the US and China are becoming more volatile, the countries in Asia have to make their own political choices. In such shifting interests, Turkey aims to appear as a balancing power. Hence, a shift of NATO’s concern to the Far East can create an advantageous position for Turkey in the Middle East. In other words, in a situation where China gained dominance and pivot position in the region, the US can allow NATO’s Turkey to assume a leading role in the Middle East region. Indeed, it is possible to say that after 500 years of Russian presence in Asia, would Chinese hegemony be much more catastrophic than the foreseen result. This is the main reason why the Chinese power should be imminently balanced through other regional and global actors. From this perspective, being a NATO member puts Turkey in both a good and bad position in the Asia region. For instance, Putin’s Kremlin most probably attaches significant importance to Turkey due to its NATO

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membership; in other words, if Turkey was not a member of the transatlantic alliance, its attractiveness in the eyes of Moscow and its other neighbours would negatively change. Admittedly, Ankara’s purchase of S-400s means great prestige for Putin as he can sell Russian high-tech arms to a NATO country. The Russian-Turkey defence deals are seen as ignoring for the NATO allies, in terms of decreased profits in the defence market and the security risks that may lead to vulnerabilities in NATO’s deterrence and operational capabilities. On the contrary, it can be assumed that NATO’s Turkey might be regarded as unreliable since it closely acts with the US within the NATO club. Especially, this can be the case for the former Soviet bloc counties such as Tajikistan, where anti-American perception, to some extent, is still strong or for the Asian states who are forced to choose US or China as a security ally. These shifts should also be seen in the context of diverging Europe– US perspectives. According to French President Macron, NATO is in a state of brain death; though, it is still committed to collective defence, American unilateralism gives harm to organisational functioning, and thus Europe needs more autonomy. Macron even suggested including Russia more in NATO to provide peace and security in the world (New York Times, 2019). In contrast to Macron’s view, the US, England and Germany refused to accept the “brain death” claim; instead, they assumed a more global role for NATO. However, to transform NATO “from regional to global security provider” (Alexander & Prosen, 2015), the US constantly criticises NATO allies for low levels of military spending and reminding them the pledge in Wales Summit 2014 to increase their defence spending to 2 per cent of their respective gross domestic product by 2024 (Business Insider, 2019; Guardian, 2019). Turkey, on the other hand, has serious security concerns due to NATO’s defence policy and strategies in terms of both conventional and non-conventional threats. Turkey has expressed its disappointment and frustration over NATO and E.U.’s approach towards Syria, Libya, YPG terror and migration. The change in Turkey’s security approach, especially during the AKP period, is due to these disappointments. Apart from NATO’s defence policy, Turkey’s security perspective towards Asia has long been lacking a comprehensive and holistic approach. The emergence of new risks and threats in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and the Asia Pacific, paved the way to search for new and dynamic security and defence agenda with Asian countries. Ankara would seek to deepen its security and defence ties with Asia to tackle its security risks and threats. In

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Turkey’s new threat perception, Turkey has been increasingly challenged by the non-conventional security threats rooted from the Asian neighbours, not the Balkans or Europe. These threats are unstable political regimes, natural and environmental disasters, rapid demographic changes, illegal drugs, transboundary crimes, Islamist militant flow and human trafficking. For example, two terror attacks in 2016 and 2017 in Turkey were carried out by the people who came from the former Soviet countries, including Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, revealing the threat of Islamist militants flow coming from Central Asia to Turkey, as well as the urgent need to develop effective counter-terrorism and border security policies (Yalınkılıçlı, 2018, p. 36). Likewise, Iran and Afghanistan pose security challenges to Turkey as migrants and smugglers use Turkey as a transit route. Regarding the high-security risks, Turkey needs to strengthen its security cooperation and intelligence sharing with the countries located in its Eastern side, the Asia part. Fourth, Turkey does not solely seek to overcome its security concerns but urges to solve problems in the Asia continent as being a “security producer,” similar to the aims of transforming NATO from a regional to a global security provider. In this regard, AKP’s Asia initiative not only aspires to become a regional power but also a “great player.” For example, Turkey offered its mediation to solve regional problems and become a “security producer” by organising international conferences. Regarding this issue, the “Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process” serves as a highly beneficial platform in bringing regional and local solutions to the challenges of Asia. Speaking at the Istanbul Process 8th Ministerial Conference, with the theme “Peace, Partnership and Prosperity,” which was held in December 2019, Erdo˘gan said, “the majority of the problems afflicting South Asia originate from outside of the borders. Regional cooperation and solidarity are imperative for South Asia and its immediate environment to overcome the problems they are faced with.” Accordingly, Erdo˘gan called international organisations to provide support to Afghanistan and to prevent the DAESH virus from infecting the region ˙ sim Ba¸skanlı˘gı, 2019). Accordingly, Turkey’s diplomatic network is (Ileti¸ highly crucial for its Asia engagement; by having 142 embassies across the globe (out of 194), Turkish ambassadors in 13 Permanent Representations to international organisations, and 243 missions, Turkey is ranked as the fifth country in the number of worldwide representations.

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Shortly after coming to power, the AKP had launched a new defence industry policy which has adopted a three-pronged strategy; localisation, nationalisation, and self-sufficiency. The aim of this strategy was to consolidate Turkey’s rising power profile by getting rid of the foreign dependency on military needs. In the wake of fragile relations with the US, Ankara realised the need to meet the self-sufficiency requirement. As Turkey was in a better position to explain its defence cooperation with the Asian countries, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) were also in need to have better war-fighting capabilities for improving operational performances (such as large quantities of equipment and sophisticated technologies). For this, a new approach for the Turkish defence industry that includes both domestic and international demands was commercially useful and strategically promising. The rapid economic growth trends from 2005 to 2010 have helped the AKP government to invest in the defence industry. Eventually, the government AKP has facilitated defence industry reform towards gaining strategic autonomy. By consolidating its place in the trade of global arms and improving its defence-based technological exports, Turkey also seeks to enhance its own status as a regional and international player. In this objective, Turkey carefully watches the Asian countries’ growing demands for defence supplies and aims to develop long-term strategic perspective in order to expand its reach to Asian markets and diversify its over all defence export. With this comes a qualitative change in Turkey’s bilateral engagement with this region. The regional geo-political complexities notwithstanding, Turkey’s policies on the defence sector are not directly guided by the regional geopolitical choices. Instead, Turkey seeks to strengthen its technological autonomy by collaborating with different countries as much as possible in the region. Hence, the arms trade remains its position as the most vital aspect of Turkey’s defence policies. In this context, the country began to export armoured vehicles, air defence systems, rocket systems, simulators, coast guard ships and military communication systems, as well as command and control systems and software to the region. There are four different sub-regional military-industrial geo-political regions in Turkey’s defence export strategy. Central Asia is one of the crucial regions for Turkey not only because of the historical and sociopolitical connection between the countries in the region and Turkey but also Turkey’s direct security interests in the region. Turkmenistan in Central Asia is one of the significant clients for Turkish defence industry products. In 2018, Turkmenistan became the 2nd country in Turkey’s

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arms export list, in which the UAE ranked first and Saudi Arabia as the third main client (Wezeman, 2018). Other Central Asian countries have also established a wide range of defence cooperation in the region. However, in terms of Turkey’s export number, it is not too much compared to Turkmenistan. Although Turkmenistan has the biggest share, Turkey has expanded its cooperation with other Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan. For instance, Turkey’s ASELSAN is promoting with Kazakhstan ASELSAN Engineering (KAE) after Turkey and Kazakhstan co-founded the company in 2011 and became operational in 2013 to modernise the helicopters and armoured vehicles of the Kazakh Army and developed various production projects including weapon systems and command control systems (C4ISR). The KAE company plays a crucial role, not only in contributing to the domestic market but also to the military preparedness of Kazakhstan’s armed forces (Astana Times, 2019). South and Southeast Asian countries are the second important region closely pursued by Turkey’s defence industry. Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines are among the first clients where Turkish defence exports are heading in the region. Pakistan, a traditional ally of Turkey, is emerging as one of the most important countries which plans to buy T129 attack helicopters of 1.5 billion dollars value. Pakistan is also planning to acquire four corvettes (MILGEM) from Turkey. Pakistan also has many modernisation projects with Turkey over its Agosta 90Bclass diesel-electric fast-attack submarines. Turkey also delivered a navy fleet tanker to Pakistan, which was built and outfitted in Karachi (Asian Review, 2018). Malaysia is one of the most important partner in East Asia with whom Turkey has advanced its relations. For example, Turkey announced the delivery of remote-controlled turrets gun to the Malaysian coast guard. More importantly, Turkey and Malaysia have signed the agreement on the defence industry in 2018 and 2019. While Turkey remains Malaysia as an opportunity to calibrate its defence industry in the region, especially over the autonomous system and drone technology, the Malaysian government seeks to consolidate its tie with a NATO-member country (Riyaz ul Khaliq, 2019). As a part of the increasing cooperation between Turkey and Malaysia, the two countries have signed 15 agreements in various fields, including cooperation in defence, science and technology, in 2019 (Kaplan, 2019). In this regard, Malaysian and Turkish companies exchanged thirteen instruments of cooperation between the defence companies, including a memorandum of agreement between Sapura

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Secured Technologies and Aselsan on military communication; a memorandum of understanding between Havelsan and AMP Corporation on coastal radar surveillance and between Tijan Galaxy Aerospace Consortium and Baykar on “cooperation, partnership, knowledge sharing, and technology transfer of unmanned aerial vehicle and services.” With reference to this comprehensive defence agreement, Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad emphasised the expectation of taking advantage of Ankara’s offers of technology transfers in the defence and aerospace industries (Daily Sabah, 2019; Parameswaran, 2019). In South Asia, the Philippines is another country that assumes a significant role in Turkey’s defence portfolio. In 2016, for instance, Turkish defence company Aselsan delivered 5000 night-vision devices to the Philippines army. More strategically, Turkey and the Philippines signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the defence cooperation in 2018 in order to sell Turkish-made indigenous ATAK battle helicopters, unmanned aircraft and vessels (Daily Sabah, 2018). The MOU focuses on also government-to-government acquisition, as well as the development, production, co-production and transfer of technology between two countries (Mangosing, 2018). There was also the same rational motivation behind the cooperation between the Philippines Department of National Defense (DND) and the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), which signed the agreement. While Turkey was looking for a new status in Asian markets and the region, the Philippines was seeking a long list of partners in its defence capabilities (Parameswaran, 2018). In a similar manner in South Asia, Turkey–Bangladesh defence cooperation has also been deepening since the early 2000s, first started with signing the military training agreement in 2004 and then expanded with training programs, joint exercises and procurement projects. In 2013, for example, Otokar Cobra light-armoured vehicles were supplied to the Bangladesh Army. In 2015, Turkey offered guided-missile frigates in a major government-to-government deal. In 2017, Turkish company Delta Defence was awarded a 1 billion dollar contract for 680 light-armoured vehicles, and recently, in 2019, Roketsan was contracted to supply a regiment of medium-range guided multiple rocket launchers (Colako˘glu, 2019). Although there is slow progress in bilateral cooperation, Brunei is another country in Southeast Asia that Turkey gives importance to developing the partnership. Indeed, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah’s Turkey visit

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in 2012 was the first visit at the level of Head of State between the two countries. While the Sultan highlighted Turkey’s economic and technological development is highly appreciated by Brunei, the two countries signed agreements to lift visa procedures and boost economic, commercial and technical cooperation (Anadolu Agnecy, 2012). Besides bilateral defence cooperation, Turkey is also seeking new status in the Asian military-industrial complex through participation in defence and security fairs. In 2017, Turkey rented one of the largest national pavilions at the Thailand Defense and Security fair, including 18 Turkish defence sector companies. Furthermore, in the context of its own indigenous defence product, Turkey has contracted with Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines to sell a T129 attack helicopter and a medium altitude long endurance class unmanned aerial vehicle.

Conclusion Under AK Party’s rule, Turkey’s foreign and security policy has undergone both philosophical and structural changes towards integrating Asia in Turkey’s strategic perception. The policy of non-approachment was replaced with a proactive approach. The objective of “self-sufficiency” was worked out to achieve strategic autonomy that has brought out a blueprint for Turkey’s future security and defence policy towards Asia. A.K. Party mainly relied on four factors, first, to acknowledge Turkey’s mistakes and experiences in the past; such as seeing Asia as a single unit, focusing on specific countries, prioritising economic-oriented policies rather than developing security partnerships, trusting the power of Turkic and Muslim heritage to strengthen relations. Second, Turkey’s NATO membership and never-ending E.U. aspiration and candidacy prevented Ankara to act “independently” and develop a ‘comprehensive’ and ‘holistic’ approach towards Asia; this created a blind spot in Turkey to analyse the regional security structures in Asia. Besides, NATO and E.U.-centred policies prevented Turkey from determining and defining its security risks and threats that are quite different from other NATO allies’ threat perceptions. Admittedly, Turkey has been increasingly facing the challenges of non-conventional threats such as migration, smuggling, trafficking, transboundary crimes, Islamist militant flow stemming from the (in)security environment of Asia. Many of these threats are of secondary nature to many of the NATO and E.U. members. Third, the geo-political power

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shift from West to East paved the way to search for a new and dynamic agenda for Asia, including a wide range of issues from economics to culture, diplomacy to Military. Though Turkey has never been forced to choose US or China throughout this ongoing power shift, Ankara has realised the significance of developing closer ties with China meanwhile balancing it by giving support to US-led NATO’s “partner” policies. Fourth, AKP’s aim to transform Turkey into a centre-state and greater player induced Ankara to develop particular relations with Asia in a more diversified spectrum than in limited bilateral trade and political relations. Ankara has become more aware of the rise of Asian powers and the opportunities that the rise offers to Turkey in terms of political and diplomatic initiatives, economic development, collaboration in military and civil domains, scientific and technological cooperation, civil society, academia and private sector. This realisation reflects Turkey’s Asia Anew initiative introduced in 2019 that displayed Turkey’s ambitions to engage with Asia in far broader aspects than the existing limits, including political, security, economic, diplomatic, cultural, social and technological cooperation. If the initiative overcomes a three-level engagement strategy, awareness, prioritisation, and scaling, in order to expand cooperation and partnership from political to military domains, Asia may soon replace Europe both in strategic cooperation and transactional relations. As discussed in the chapter, Turkey does not have a choice of “either Asia or NATO/EU,” just like many other NATO/EU members such as France, Germany or UK do not have this difficulty in their relations with Asian powers. As these NATO members are expanding their military and strategic relations with major Asian powers, Turkey too should have left behind much ago its “Western prism” in looking towards its natural neighbourhood. Much of Turkish initiative is driven, not just by defence and security expansion approach, but also by acknowledgement of a vast range of common threats, such as non-traditional security challenges, illegal migration or militants’ flow, in which Turkey wants to engage directly with Asia rather than re-routing its engagement via Brussels or Washington.

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Turkey’s Policy Towards Crisis Regions in Asia After 2002 Muhammed Huseyin Mercan and Güliz Dinç

Introduction The Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi— hereafter the AKP) rise to power with its victory in the November 3, 2002 elections brought a new vision for Turkey’s international position and internal dynamics. The AKP declared its resolve to find solutions to the country’s fundamental political, social, and economic problems. Regarding foreign policy, the party emphasised the necessity for a rational and realistic vision to reflect a new perspective on international relations and foster relations with a broader set of countries and regions (The AKP Program, n.d.).

M. H. Mercan (B) Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey G. Dinç Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_8

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Both domestic and global actors paid close attention to the foreign policy approach to be adopted by the new government that had come to power at a time when world politics was undergoing major structural changes following the 9/11 attacks with the U.S. emphasis on “War on Terror” as the driving force reshaping threat perceptions and security concerns of countries around the world. Within this new context, the AKP leadership argued that it was necessary to take radical decisions and transform Turkey’s foreign policy since the traditional foreign policy paradigm no longer provided sufficient effective action opportunities. The fact that the program of the 58th government, which had received a vote of confidence on November 28, 2002, included in its foreign policy section the phrase “… worthy of Turkey’s history and geographical location, free from prejudices and obsessions …” (58th Government Program, 2002) indicated a severe critique of the foreign policy of its predecessors and a strong will for change. The foreign policy goals, instruments, and discourse of the AKP era have been widely studied and debated since the party’s rise to power and the structural and ideational factors motivating them. Although there have been divergent views on all, one common element has been the idea that since 2002 Turkey has strengthened its resolve to establish itself as a powerful and influential actor in world politics and increased its efforts to diversify its foreign policy with new instruments (Akpınar, 2013; Aras, 2014; Kiri¸sci, 2012). This was based on the party’s critique of the traditional Turkish foreign policy as status-quoist, reactive, and defensive. As the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan stated in 2004, “By following a foreign policy that is not unidimensional and submissive, we [the AKP] have succeeded in having Turkey acknowledged as the guarantor of regional peace and security” (Erdo˘gan: Tek boyutlu dı¸s politika izlemedik, t.y.). In pursuing Turkey’s main foreign policy aim in the 2000s, i.e. becoming a leading player regionally and globally, new methodologies have been pursued by the AKP along with a rethinking Turkey’s identity and unique position in world politics (Aras & Gorener, 2010). During this decade, “to develop a globally consistent, pro-active foreign policy,” the AKP defined Turkey’s role as an actor that is able “to contribute to the peace, security, and prosperity” in the Middle East as well as in Asia and Africa by virtue of its historical, cultural, and geostrategic strengths (Davuto˘glu, 2008). Thus, Turkey expanded diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with countries heretofore

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neglected in Turkish foreign policy, along with increasing its engagement with those affected by crises. In this context, “humanitarian diplomacy” was introduced not only referring to humanitarian aid but also encompassing peacekeeping and mediation through collaboration (Akpınar, 2013; Bayer & Keyman, 2012). This chapter interrogates Turkey’s policy practices towards four different conflicts in various parts of Asia involving Muslim populations; the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Muslim-majority region of Kashmir; the Uighur problem, the Turkic-Muslim minority living in East Turkistan (Xinjiang) Region of China; the Rohingya, the Muslim minority population living in the Rakhine State of Myanmar and lastly the Muslim Moro living in Mindanao/Southern Philippines. Turkey’s role in seeking a resolution of these conflicts involving Muslim minorities is analyzed within the context of Turkey’s new foreign policy activism that concurrently aims to secure national security and economic interest and to engage in humanitarianism. The policy discourse analysis through official statements and the state’s policy practices, as well as the involvement of the non-state actors in these four cases, provide a set of motivations, objectives, and instruments that Turkey has used in addressing these conflicts. While the recent policy positions in Kashmir and East Turkestan (Xinjiang) emphasize Turkey’s economic, strategic and security interests, in the cases of the Rohingyas and the Moro Muslims, the new foreign policy role of Turkey as a mediator and a protector state highlighting moral responsibility and global activism is more prominent.

Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002 The AKP came to power in 2002 in the wake of the political instability of the 1990s and the deep financial crises of 2000 and 2001 in Turkey at a time when world politics was being reshaped by newly defined challenges of, global terrorism, the rise of non-state violent actors and failed states. In response to the changing international context, the AKP government emphasized the neccessity for a new vision for Turkish foreign policy. While not indicating a complete break from Turkey’s traditional foreign policy approach that prioritizes Western interests, focuses on state security and embraces the status quo, the new direction have included both reconceptualizing Turkey’s position and identity in the international system and utilizing new foreign policy instruments (Oran, 2008, pp. 46–53).

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Westernisation policies inherited from the Ottoman State and implemented by the Republican governments more in cultural and political terms, and Turkey’s geographical, cultural and historical position between the East–West had given rise to duality in the state’s decision-making process and especially led to a constant quest to balance between actors in foreign policy (Yavuz, 2004, p. 236). This had inevitably hindered Turkey’s implementation of an independent and ambitious foreign policy and had limited the country within its immediate surroundings dominated by global powers of the international system. Western-centric approach to foreign policy in Turkey was strengthened further in the 1950s. During the Cold War, when the United States and Soviet Union dominated the international system. Turkey constructed its foreign policy goals according to American interests without questioning (Ahmad, 1977, p. 395). Furthermore, Turkish foreign policy was overly cautious even about handling problems directly affecting the country if there was insufficient support from the West and searched for long-term resolutions (Davuto˘glu, 2004, p. 184). Turkish foreign policy started to expand beyond its Western orientation following the end of the Cold War, as Turgut Özal assumed power in Ankara in the 1990s (Balcı, 2017, pp. 209–212). Increasing emphasis on Turkish and Muslim identity has brought Turkey the need to re-position the country on the international stage. The period of the 1990s can be seen as a period of tensions between the secularists and Islamists in Turkey that had implications for the country’s foreign policy. The rise of Islamist identity in the country in the 1990s and the emphasis on increasing cooperation with the Muslim world resulted in establishing the Developing 8 (D-8) organisation in 1996 (Özcan, 2008, p. 87). Although the search for alternatives failed relatively due to the country’s domestic political developments, Turkey’s foreign policy kept transforming and taking a strong position in engaging with the international system in the 2000s. Ahmet Davuto˘glu, then an international relations scholar, had a profound intellectual influence on Turkey’s conservative elites, was chosen to serve as the Chief advisor to Prime Minister Erdo˘gan until 2009, then as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. Before he assumed any official role, he had already gained much fame and admiration from Turkey’s conservative politicians for his ideas in his conception of “Strategic Depth.” Davuto˘glu advised that Turkey should re-evaluate its geopolitical position in the post-Cold War period (Davuto˘glu, 2004, p. 118). Thus, it

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was essential for Turkey to develop new strategies first towards its region and then Africa, Central, and East Asia. Davuto˘glu identified five operational principles of the “new” Turkish foreign policy shaped by the emphasis on geography, identity, history, culture, and civilisation: (i) the balance between security and democracy, (ii) zero problems with neighbouring countries, (iii) developing relations with neighbouring regions and beyond, (iv) multidimensional foreign policy, and (v) rhythmic diplomacy (Davuto˘glu, 2008, pp. 79–83). Based on these principles, Turkey’s post-2002 foreign policy aimed to be a global actor in the international system (Davuto˘glu, 2008, p. 83) with a strategy of engagement with different regions and crises involvement. In Davuto˘glu’s understanding, the Asian’s transforming international status during the post-Cold War period needed to be acknowledged by Turkey, and hence Turkey needed to rethink its engagement with the region (Davuto˘glu, 2004, p. 202). Ozkan (2011, p. 125) argued that the AKP’s Asia policy since it came to power subscribed to many of Davutoglu’s ideas and Turkey started strengthening its existing political and economic relations with the Turkic Republics, focusing on cooperation with China and India and deepening relations with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, and Malaysia. The references to religious, historical, and cultural identity became frequent to reconnect with the profoundly religious, traditional, and many Muslim societies of the continent. This was unusual for a secular state, yet the AKP’s domestic critics did not take much notice of the shift. Especially in this period, when relations with Muslim states have developed further, Turkey has not refrained from taking various initiatives to find solutions to crises on the continent and has put continuous effort to make its presence felt in the region as a rising power. Although foreign policymakers claim that they aim to maximise trade relations and economic benefit by using soft power tools effectively, it is impossible to say that the aim is limited to this area. The growing influence of the emphasis on religious, historical, and cultural identity in determining the direction of foreign policy has played a key role in changing the Muslim world’s perspective towards Turkey. The predominantly conservative/Islamist elements in power, the government’s discourse about the Palestinian issue were carefully changed as “pro-Palestine” without downgrading Israel’s relations. By becoming pro-Palestine, Turkey improved its image in Muslim-majority countries (Ek¸si, 2018, pp. 264–266). The strategy of providing humanitarian aid

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and development support carried out by government agencies along with the support of civil society organisations in order to increase the country’s influence in a different part of the world has enabled Turkey to become a new donor state in the international system (Ozkan, 2013, p. 142). By assuming the role of protector of Muslim and destitute communities, Turkey has become an influential actor in regions hitherto neglected or dealt with only traditional diplomatic relations for decades. This new foreign policy stance has indeed expanded Turkey’s political and economic clout to no small extent. However, it also led to taking on the responsibility for resolving structural, political, or economic problems of countries it started to engage with. Although Turkey’s mission of being a protector and a role model has not been fully and consistently implemented due to regional and global developments, its influence on the international stage has no doubt proliferated. In particular, it is worth noting that due to the radical political developments in the Middle East and in Africa, Turkey’s foreign policy had to face serious crises and in some cases failed; but relations with Asia have been more stable and strategic. Asia regained a significant place for Ankara with historical, cultural ties already intact, and expanding economic ties convinced the ruling party of seeing Asia both as a counterbalance to Turkey’s overly West oriented foreign policy, a way to reduce its dependence on the European economy, an asset for diversified global security architecture. Turkey has developed relations with Central Asian countries based on ethnic and historical ties on the one hand and with economic and cultural ties with the Indian subcontinent and Asia Pacific countries. As a result, Turkey’s approach to Asian conflicts was determined by more strategic interests, and hence Turkey’s reaction to crises in Asia has been more carefully devised. In this regard, the four crises focused in this chapter, namely the conflict in Kashmir, the repression of the Uyghur in East Turkestan (Xinjiang), the sectarian violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, and the conflict between the Moro Liberation Front and the Philippines, helps to identify Turkey’s instruments in expanding its Asia policy beyond traditional spheres.

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Kashmir: Status Quo Oriented Approach For over 70 years, both Pakistan and India continued to claim sovereignty over the state of Jammu & Kashmir, where the majority of the population is Muslim, causing the people of the region to experience severe trauma and to be caught in the middle of a struggle between these countries (Bose, 2007, p. 154). The U.N. Security Council Resolution 47, adopted in April 1948, called on both states to strive to resolve the Kashmir conflict by holding a “free and impartial plebiscite” (Security Council Resolution of 47, 1948). Although the UNSC made similar decisions in the following years, not much progress was made. As the problem evolved into an armed conflict with paramilitary groups’ emergence, India’s human rights violations in Kashmir increased. India’s rejection of the Kashmiris’ demand for a plebiscite and its harsh treatment of pro-independence groups in the region has been criticised extensively by the international community (Schofield, 2003, p. 190). The tensions in Jammu & Kashmir will likely continue to rise as India does not want to lose this valuable piece of land. The changing nature of international relations, especially in recent years, has led to the emergence of security-based policies by both sides to the problem, rather than pursuing multilateral means to resolve this crisis. Turkey’s approach to the Kashmir problem is directly correlated with the depth of the Turkey–Pakistan relations. Turkey supports the main elements of the Pakistani state’s official position and the UNSC’s resolution to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir (Ahmad, 2002, p. 2). The relations between Turkey and Pakistan date back to the time of Pakistan’s independence in 1947, and have expanded since then regardless of changes in governments of both countries. It can also be said that humanitarian and religious considerations are among the reasons Turkey has a particular concern on Kashmir Issue. The following statement by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s first prime minister after independence, on March 4, 1948, addressing Turkey’s first ambassador to Pakistan, provides important clues to the foundation of bilateral relations and underlines the depth of this relation: Turkey has been in our thoughts always and has drawn our admiration for the valour of your people and how your statesmen and leaders have struggled and fought almost single-handed amid Europe for your freedom and sovereignty, which have been happily maintained ... I can, therefore,

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assure your Excellency that the Muslims of Pakistan entertain sentiments of affection and esteem for your country, and now Turkey and Pakistan both as free, sovereign and independent countries can strengthen their ties more and more for the good of both. We hope that with your Excellency’s assistance and cooperation, we may be able to build up closer political and cultural ties with your state, and thus contribute our share to the attainment of peace and prosperity throughout the world. (Quoted in N. Ahmad, 1981, pp. 108–109)

As this statement points out, Pakistan’s approach towards Turkey suggests the country’s search for an ally to stand by her on all matters. The treaty of friendship and cooperation signed between Pakistan and Turkey on April 2, 1954, and the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (renamed as CENTO in 1959 after Iraq left) played an important role in the development of the relations between these two countries. The main motivation for both countries to become a party to these agreements was the Middle East policy of the United States against Soviet expansionism (Fırat & Kürkçüo˘glu, 2008, pp. 620–622); this, however, also shows the strategic perception of Pakistan for Turkey. Since then, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) was founded in 1964, and Turkey supported Pakistan in the 1965 and 1971 wars between Pakistan-India. In return, Pakistan, too, stood with Turkey on the Cyprus problem (Ahmad, 1981, pp. 116–121). In most of the Turkish leaders’ official statements, Turkey has been proposing two suggestions, one to implement the UNSC resolution and to engage in multilateral dialogue to achieve peace. These two key elements of Turkey’s Kashmir policy have remained unchanged for decades. As a result, Turkey keeps raising the issue at higher forums, in the U.N. General Assembly, the OIC, and other forums. In 2019, at a high-level round table conference on “Countering Hate Speech” on the margin of the 74th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan had called Jammu and Kashmir region “an open-air prison” (Erdo˘gan, 2019). President Erdo˘gan also spoke of Kashmir during his speech at the U.N. General Assembly: The international community still does not show enough attention to the Kashmir conflict, which has not been resolved for 72 years. The stability and prosperity of South Asia cannot be considered separately from the Kashmir problem. Currently, despite the decision of the United Nations Security Council, Kashmir is all but under blockade, and unfortunately,

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eight million people cannot get out of Kashmir. In order for Kashmiris to have a safe future with their Pakistani and Indian neighbours, the problem should be solved not through confrontation but through dialogue based on principles of justice and fairness. (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey: Speech at the 74th General Assembly of the United Nations, 2019)

The statement by Sardar Masood Khan, the President of the Pakistani administered Azad Jammu-Kashmir, pointing out Turkey “as the only country that understands the Kashmir problem in all aspects” (Turkey is the one country that understands Kashmir issue to the fullest extent, 2019) indicates that Pakistan appreciates Turkey’s position on the matter. Similarly, Mustafa Sentop, ¸ the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, has mentioned the Kashmir problem during his speech at the opening of the legislative year in parliament, expressing Turkey’s support for Pakistan clearly: It is because our nation did not forget the friendship of the Indian Muslims who did not leave us alone when we stood up for our independence 100 years ago; we deem it our duty to stand beside Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. (TGNA Speaker Mustafa S¸ entop, 2019)

Besides deep Turkish–Pakistani relations and Turkey’s pro-Pakistani stance on Kashmir Issue, Erdogan also tried to undertake a mission in April 2017 for a permanent solution in Kashmir through his mediation calling upon the Indian government for dialogue. Erdogan, in his statement, underlined that Turkey wants both countries to engage in dialogue to resolve the crisis. India-Pakistan relations are improving, which makes me happy, but it saddens me that Jammu and Kashmir’s issue has not been settled for 70 years. India and Pakistan are our friends. Faith has contributed to our ancient relations. We have followers of Islam in Pakistan. We are for strengthening dialogue between stakeholders. We should not allow more casualties to occur, and by strengthening multilateral dialogue, we can be involved, and through multilateral dialogue, I think we have to seek out ways to settle this question once and for all, which will benefit both countries. I have been discussing these issues at length with my dear friend, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif. I know he is a good-intentioned man. I personally heard him speak about settling this issue once and for all. So if we keep dialogue channels open, we can settle it once and for

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all. There is no better option than keeping dialogue channels open and contributing to global peace. I want this mentality to prevail among the leaders. (Erdogan: India, Pak both have the right to aspire to NSG, 2017)

Although Erdogan searched a way for mediation between two countries in 2017, Turkey preserved the status quo in its approach to Kashmir issue in the following years. As can be understood from the leaders’ statements and the historical background provided here, Turkey’s support for Pakistan on the Kashmir problem is not just limited to foreign policy after 2002. On the contrary, Turkey’s position in support of Pakistan since the start of Kashmir problem can be regarded as an extension of the foreign policy approach of the AKP’s predecessors. However, Turkey has historical and cultural ties with both Pakistan and India. If we take into account the support of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent during Turkey’s struggle for independence, it is in a good position to play the mediator’s role between these two countries. In this regard, it would be beneficial for Turkey’s regional policy effectiveness to develop a common language with India and display its critical stance on the Indian government’s actions towards Kashmir. Turkey’s ability to play an active role in the conflict is limited as India is firm in its position that Kashmir issue is a domestic one to be solved bilaterally and Turkey’s calls on the UN’s involvement is unfounded. Unless India demonstrates flexibility on the issue, the Turkish approach to Kashmir is more likely to remain unchanged.

Turkey’s Uyghur Dilemma: Solidarity Versus Pragmatism After 2002, Turkey has expanded its relations with East Asian countries; deepening bilateral and multilateral engagements by active diplomacy, expanding economic links and volume of trade and increasing humanitarian aid through state and civil society organizations. As China emerged as a global power over the last decades, it started to gain more strategic importance in Turkish foreign policy. After initiating diplomatic relations with China in the 1970s, Turkish leaders had sought to develop ties with China in the 1980’s as both countries’ economies were undergoing liberalization. However, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Turkey focused on reaching out to the newly independent Central Asian Republics based on shared ethnicity as well as Uyghurs, China’s its Turkic-Muslim community in Xinjiang region. In the 2000s, the AKP

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shifted from emotions to engagement by shifting from the identity-based, emotionally charged foreign policy of the 1990s towards a more pragmatic approach (Öni¸s & Yılmaz, 2009, p. 18). Although some traditional approach elements remain, radical changes in foreign policy practices towards China can be observed compared to the previous decades. The change in Turkey’s China policy since 2002 is closely linked with changing the global balance of power in favour of China. During the Cold War, Turkey’s relationship with China was mostly determined by the progression of Western countries’ relations with China. Chinese view of Turkey was also shaped by the fact that Turkey has been accepted Uyghur refugees fleeing China since the 1950s (Ergenc, 2015, pp. 295– 296). Turkey’s support for the Uyghurs has since been a thorny issue that has impeded the development of strong bilateral relations and even continued to cause crises periodically between the two countries as they have been expanding and deepening relations over the last decade. Since the 2000s, Turkey started reprioritising its relations with China based on mutual interests in the changing global environment. Chinese investments in the country and economic cooperation appeared on top of the agenda. Twenty-eight investment agreements worth $4.3 billion signed between Turkey and China in 2012 is a clear example of the importance Ankara attributes to the development of economic relations between the two countries (Atlı, 2015, p. 124). One of the important milestones impacting Turkey’s China policy and thus its strategy towards Uyghurs occurred in 2009. The then President Abdullah Gül visited Urumqi, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region’s capital, on June 28, 2009 (President Gül in Urumqi, 2019). Turkey did not refrain from using powerful language while lending support to Uyghurs during this period of growing Chinese government pressure on the community. Erdo˘gan made a statement in response to the violent suppression of demonstrations in the Xinjiang Region in July 2009 describing the events as almost genocide (Erdo˘gan: It is almost a genocide, 2009). This was an emotional reaction against the loss of life caused by China soon after Gül’s visit. Nevertheless, his statement made less global appeal as world politics and the Middle Eastern politics were rapidly changing in favour of China. Turkey has expanded its strategy of support for the Uyghurs from the level of the state to civil society due to the development of closer commercial and political relations with China in the last few years and the desire to further consolidate them because of problems in relations

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with the United States. Erdo˘gan’s emphasis on deepening bilateral relations during his China visit in July 2019 indicates Turkey’s willingness to downplay issues that might create tensions between the two countries. The most important policy statement on Uyghurs came from Erdogan himself after his China visit, in which he differentiated between Turkish state’s recognition of Uyghurs’ rights and actions that are detrimental to economic interests of Turkey and offered Turkey’s assistance for resolving the issue. He said: We also discussed the issue of East Turkestan and Uyghur during our meeting. I believe that we can find a solution that takes into consideration the sensibilities of both sides on this issue. However, there are also those who exploit this issue. And these exploitations negatively reflect on Turkish-Chinese relations. We should not allow these. Those who are trying to achieve some sort of political gain, who are acting emotionally without considering on a large scale the relations of the Turkish Republic with another state, are unfortunately making both their own kin as well as the state of the Turkish Republic pay the price. There are further actions we will take. He said he was open if necessary for a delegation to be sent from Turkey to East Turkestan. He said, ‘let them come, tour, take a look’. (President Erdogan answered journalists’ questions in China, 2019)

The President’s words indicate that Turkey does not want this issue alone to determine Turkey–China relations’ direction. The relative vulnerability of the economy and the country’s political crises in recent years have prevented the oppositional voices from emerging from Ankara regarding China. Indeed, Turkey was not part of a statement signed by 22 of the world’s strongest economies against China’s unlawful practices towards Uyghurs, the Turkic-Muslim minority, and their placement in concentration camps (Joint statement from 22 countries for East Turkistan … Among the signatories, there are no Islamic countries, 2019). When asked by a young Uyghur man about Turkey’s position on the Uyghur problem, Erdogan had said, “… we will determine more precisely our attitude on this issue based on the assessment of the delegation there” (President Erdo˘gan answered the question of a young person from East Turkistan in New York, 2019). It indicates that Turkey wants direct communication with China instead of joining Western forums to condemn China. As China allows Turkish delegations to Xinjiang and speaks with the Turkish side, Erdogan skipped the issue in his speech at the U.N. General Assembly. While civil society organisations display anti-Chinese reactions,

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state officials have carefully avoided confrontation and pursued a conciliatory strategy. On the one hand, ethnic bonds with the Uyghur Turkic community, and on the other hand, deepening relations with a global actor such as China is at the root of the dilemma Ankara faces in its approach to the East Turkistan problem. Unlike the Kashmir problem, Turkish and Chinese authorities have been exchanging information on Uyghur Muslims, the AKP and Erdogan himself remain more pragmatic and engaged with China.

The Rohingya Crisis: A Protectionist Approach One of the important instruments of the activist and multidimensional foreign policy of Turkey in the post-2002 period that has been identified by the AKP leaders as “humanitarian diplomacy.” Turkey’s response to the humanitarian crisis to caused by the government of Myanmar’s crackdown of the Rohingya, the Muslim minority population in the largely Buddhist country is a reflection of its new foreign policy philosophy that emphasizes the country’s role as a humanitarian actor aiming at reducing poverty in the world and reaching sustainable global development goals through development cooperation. Turkey has framed its engagement with regions undergoing a humanitarian crisis (Ha¸simi, 2014, p. 140) as human-centered approach. Although studies point out that middle powers’ humanitarian diplomacy and development assistance serve to expand their influence,1 it would not be sufficient to explain Turkey’s approach to humanitarian diplomacy to become an effective actor in the international system. In his speech at the 5th Ambassadors Conference held in 2013, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davuto˘glu defined humanitarian diplomacy as protecting universal values and did not limit it to aid. We don’t just say it in terms of humanitarian aid. Diplomacy that does not touch human beings, does not carry the human essence, and does not appeal to human conscience will no longer be permanent. As important as having the strongest armies in the world, it is now important to belong to the conscience of humanity and to address that conscience. (Speech by 1 See Gilley (2015) as an example.

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the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Ahmet Davuto˘glu at the V. Ambassadors Conference, 2013)

Davuto˘glu further reiterated Turkey’s intention to launch active humanitarian diplomacy in Myanmar just like it did for Somalia in 2011 when this country was hit by its worst famine. Initially, Turkey had tried its approach to the Uyghur diplomacy for the Rohingya problem by directly discussing the problem with Myanmar’s authorities. Turkish Embassy was opened in Myanmar only in 2012, so Turkey was able to reach the people affected by the crisis and provided them with necessary humanitarian aid both through state and civil society organisations. Ahmet Davuto˘glu became the first Turkish foreign minister and perhaps from any Muslim country to visit the Rakhine state of Myanmar to meet with both Myanmar officials and Muslims in the Rakhine State (Speech by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu at the 5. Ambassadors Conference, 2013). However, in 2017, when the mass exodus of Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh began, the crisis became internationalised. In Turkey too, a campaign “Arakan is bleeding, Turkey extends a helping hand” (Arakan aid campaign is launched, 2017) was lauched. At this juncture, Turkey started taking a protectionist approach to prevent the loss of lives and livelihood. Erdo˘gan made an unusually strong statement about the issue at the 74th U.N. General Assembly. One of the issues that the world has remained indifferent is the human tragedy facing the Muslim Rohingya. The Independent Research Commission, established under the United Nations, has recorded an intention of genocide behind the events in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. Turkey has continued, since day one, the initiatives for ensuring the security and fundamental rights of Rohingyas and will continue its humanitarian activities. (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey: the speech at the 74th General Assembly of the United Nations, 2019)

As Erdo˘gan pointed out, Turkey has recognised what has taken place in the Rakhine State as genocide and has responded to the Myanmar government accordingly. In this context, we can say that the Rohingya issue is special in Turkey’s policy towards Asia’s crises. Besides this, Erdo˘gan dispatched his officials to Bangladesh to coordinate efforts to reduce the suffering of displaced Rohingyas who fled Myanmar to this country. In a series of visits to Bangladesh, the First Lady of Turkey,

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Emine Erdo˘gan, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu, and other officials Turkish government aimed to oversee the humanitarian assistance as well as to draw global attention to the crisis. Turkey has displayed an evident stance speaking and acting against the repression and policy of genocide against the minority Muslim community in Myanmar based on principles of protecting human dignity and appealing to humanity’s conscience. This protectionist approach towards the Rohingya contrasts with its policies towards Kashmir and East Turkestan discussed earlier.

The Moro Conflict: A Mediator Role One of Turkish foreign policy’s earliest successes acknowledged globally was Turkey’s mediation mechanism, a foreign policy instruement used to resolve conflicts by bringing warring sides to the table of dialogue (Akpınar, 2013). Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu has taken an active interest in promoting Turkey’s role as a mediator (Davuto˘glu, 2013). To this end, Turkey has launched Istanbul Conferences on Mediation in 2012 and has held the sixth one in 2019 (No. 317 October 30, 2019, On the Conferences to be held in Istanbul on Mediation, 2019). One of the most important successes that Turkish officials refer to in their mediation diplomacy is Turkey’s role in ending the Moro conflict between the Philippine government and Moro armed resistance groups representing the Muslims living in Mindanao island group in southern Philippines. The crisis lasted for over half a century and cost hundreds of thousands of lives. There had been several peace talks between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and one of its most prominent splinter groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from the 1970s to the 2000s.2 The peace negotiations, which had started in 2001, successfully ended the conflict when the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (hereafter MILF) and the Philippine government reached an agreement in 2014 with Malaysia as the facilitator. However, Turkey’s involvement played a critical role in the negotiations as a member of the International Contact Group since it was established in 2009 alongside the UK, Japan 2 See, for example (Buendia, 2005) and (Tuminez, 2007) for detailed analysis of the Moro Conflict.

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and Saudi Arabia. The call by both the Government of the Philippines and the MILF for Turkey to assume this role (A new mediating role for Turkey, 2009) was an important reflection of the government’s new foreign policy initiatives. In addition to the official government involvement, Turkish NGOs have been mobilized to provide humanitarian aid in a non-discriminatory manner and to maintain the trust between the parties (Aras, 2012, p. 3). In 2014, a comprehensive peace accord was signed in Manila between the Philippine government and the MILF officials detailing the Bangsamoro peace process following the agreement reached by the two sides through negotiations in which Turkey has played an important mediator role (Turkey, an architect of the Philippines peace process, 2014). Through the participation of the Deputy Foreign Minister at the signing ceremony of the peace agreement, Turkey was able to show how closely it was involved in the process (Deputy Minister Koru was present at the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF , 2014). Following the referendum held on January 21, 2019, as laid out by the peace talks, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region officially was formed (“Yes” vote win Moro referendum, 2019). Turkey emerged as a credible mediator for both the Philippine government and the Muslims in Moro. This brought new hopes for other long-standing crises in Asia and opened up Turkey’s diplomatic reach opportunities. The assumption of a mediator role in other crises would help Turkey seriously improve its foreign policy capabilities beyond its traditional foreign policy practice.

Conclusion The transformation of Turkish foreign policy from a one-dimensional and Western-centric to an activist and multidimensional one from 2002 onwards has allowed Turkey to act beyond the Western ambit and expand its relations with many Asian countries to strategic levels. The more Turkey engages with the world and Asia, particularly its vulnerability to many conflicts and regional rivalries increases. As a close ally of Western countries and a NATO member, the Turkish approach to these conflicts had to take into account the West’s response, especially during the Cold War. However, the changing global power balance allowed Turkey to

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shift its foreign policy priorities and adopt new instruments to defend its broader foreign policy interests. The use of soft power, mediation, peace building, development and humanitarian aid were all part of Turkey’s new activism in Asia as well as expanding political and economic engagement. Furthermore, the AKP’s re-conceptualization of Turkish state identity as a central power by an emphasis on Turkey’s complex historical, cultural and religious connections to Asia in addition to the traditional foreign policy emphasis on the West and its moral responsibility as a Muslimmajority country has shaped Turkey’s relations with the countries of the continent. One of the challenges for the AKP in balancing national security and economic interests along with humanitarianism aspect of the new foreign policy doctrine has been how to respond to the conflicts in which two countries or Muslim populations may be involved. Rather than taking sides, Turkey started introducing mechanisms to resolve the conflicts or facilitate dialogue for their resolution. Turkey has been working towards developing Asia’s relations through its political, economic, and cultural ties to the continent. Turkey’s policies towards Asia, especially in Kashmir, East Turkistan, the Rakhine State, and Bangsamoro, offer clues on the new Turkish foreign policy paradigm’s potentialities. While Turkey’s approach to the Kashmir issue is in line with Pakistan’s official position, we can observe a more pragmatic attitude on the problems in East Turkestan corresponding to relations with China. Despite the desire to improve India’s political and economic relations, the Kashmir problem poses a major obstacle in Turkey–India relations. On the one hand, Ankara does not want to change its status quo position of standing traditionally with Pakistan to approach the Kashmir problem. On the other hand, Turkey approaches East Turkistan’s problem more cautiously to avoid disrupting relations with China and refrains from giving confrontational responses to the Chinese government. In these respects, we can state that Turkey’s policy decisions on the problems of Kashmir and East Turkestan are based on the preservation and enhancement of Turkey’s economic or traditional relationships. Turkey’s approach towards the Rohingya and the Moro crises differs from its policies towards the other two regions. Turkey has displayed a credible example of humanitarian diplomacy and aid in response to the Myanmar government’s unlawful practices towards the Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State and taken a protectionist role. As for the Moro conflict in the Philippines going on over half a century, Turkey has played a mediating role between the two parties and contributed significantly

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to the peaceful resolution of the crisis. Thus, we can say that Turkey’s strategy in these two cases has exhibited all aspects of the new foreign policy paradigm that has emerged since 2002. Moreover, they point to Turkey’s potential to play an active role in shaping global politics in the years to come.

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Turkey’s Asia Opening: Problems and Prospects Necati Anaz

Introduction Since the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) took control of the government in 2002, Turkey initiated more agile diplomatic investments than at any time in the history of Turkish diplomacy and foreign relations (Benhaim & Öktem, 2015; Özkan, 2011). Diplomatic missions (embassies, consulates, foreign aid offices, educational services, etc.) expanded both numerically, geographically, and qualitatively in capital cities that brought soft power into action in public diplomacy. Although Asia and South Asia, in particular, have received the least attention from the Turkish diplomatic circle compared to the Balkans and the African continent, recent initiatives in the forms of education, entertainment, and commerce have shown that Turkey has come to the point where Asian geography has started getting a central place. The paper makes two main arguments; first, given the volume of Turkish drama’s popularity, its fashion industry, and now education institutions, a new element of Turkish soft power is on the rise which is not directly linked to the

N. Anaz (B) Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul University, Istanbul, Turkey

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_9

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state. I argue that soft power literature mainly focuses on Turkey’s statemanaged forms of soft power capacity while undermining the non-state actors advancing Turkey’s soft power. Turkey’s old historical relations with Asia and its religious networks, Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist religious traditions have been very strong and have contributed in many ways to building people-to-people interactions beyond state purview. The reason that non-state soft power1 is not much included in the literature on soft power is because the concept of soft power itself is introduced mainly as a supporting instrument for the state. The kind of soft power that is making Turkey an attractive state and society for the world audience is not necessarily linked to the state or its political power. The concept of the power of state actors has already been accepted beyond the hard power of military, economy, or sanctions (Edwards, 2006; Gray, 2011; Lukes, 2004; Meiser, 2018; Nye, 2002; Schmidt, 2005; Wilson, 2008). In reference to Nye’s analysis of soft power, we recognize a nation’s cultural and political assets to accomplish a job that can’t be done through the use of force or threat (Nye, 2006). In this sense, scholars of soft power put more emphasis on the attractiveness of culture, education, and entertainment as being able to affect international relations and public diplomacy. Furthermore, Nye underlines the importance of commerce as a way of transmitting culture through personal contacts, visits, and deepened exchanges (Nye, 2004, p. 13). Thus, scholars of soft power emphasize public diplomacy and recognize that 1 Non-state constituents: The popularity of Turkish women (through drama characters). The women characters of Turkish dramas have indeed mobilized social and political discussions in many Asian and Islamic countries. There are those who consider Turkish women ultra-modern or un-Islamic for their appearance in the modern society of Turkish life. On the other hand, several traditional characters have presented as modern yet Islamic woman as well who have appealed to a large section of Muslim societies. At the same time, Turkish dramas have shown the women of complex modernity where their role in a complex industrial society and its problems. For example, the popularity of Turkish psychological dramas among international audiences show the diversity of Turkish soft power beyond Islamic modern appeal. Halide Edip Adıvar, for example, has still been the most popular Turkish woman figure in South Asia. She had stayed in India from 1938 and had met several leaders of India’s freedom struggle. She was seen as an icon of a ˙ modern Turkish woman. In a recent Turkish drama, Ya Istiklal ya Ölüm, her character has once again been revived to strengthen the role of Turkish women in Turkish society. Rarely any Muslim country incorporates her, women, as part of her soft power as Turkey does. Among other, some of the non-state soft power sources that this chapter does not include remain to be Turkish romance, Sufism, food, tourism, history, diaspora, sport, and science.

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soft power uses every available instrument to win the hearts and minds of people in different geographies (Berenskoetter, 2007; Gallarotti, 2011; Lebow, 2007). It is worthy to note that state and non-state soft power resources aid and are often used as justification for public diplomacy, although the two are used interchangeably (Çevik, 2019, p. 4). In this theoretical discussion, it can also be added that non-state elements of soft power be included in the subject. Also, non-state elements of soft power are not much strong in the western states’ power. Even the networks of international NGOs are not considered as nonstate soft power as they receive directly or indirectly state support. A direct society to society interaction between the West and the world is not yet in the fashion. However, in the case of Turkey, a large number of social groups from across the religious and political fault lines have shown greater interests in reaching to distant places of the world with their charities, books, cultural traditions, or educational programs. Sometimes, they come in direct or indirect conflict with state policies. This study highlights that in order to “win the hearts and minds of foreign publics”, the Turkish foreign policy has carefully incorporated soft power assets both from state and state actors from the country. In the case of Turkey, it is not only states that are being noticed, the nonstate actors are instrumentalized through non-state actors (Trunkos & Cerny, 2019). Literature on soft power that is produced mostly in the context of Western soft power2 such as the US (Gallarotti, 2011, p. 27) includes “mass media, the film industry, internet, cultural events, mode of life, exchange programs, education, music, literature, sports, fast food, national languages, and public diplomacy” as well as international cultural and commercial exchanges (Çevik, 2019; Thussu, 2016). Through these instruments, the US successfully presented itself to the world audiences as a model modern country and a hub of entertainment production. Nye, in his short article in Foreign Policy, underlines that much of the US’s soft power has been produced outside of the state ambit besides what the US invests and uses cultural, communications, and diplomatic resources to 2 Also here, value-laden concepts including democracy, the rule of law, human rights, liberal values, freedom of expression, feminism, free market, social welfare, and technology constituent the Western soft power. In this context, western diplomacy divides the world, projecting most of the non-western world less democratic, etc. However, from 2003 to 2011, Turkey successfully projected itself in these values and was projected as a model Muslim country. Many of these values are still part of the Turkish public sphere; however, their international context is changing.

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produce soft power (Nye, 2006). According to a much-contested theory of the Golden Arch conflict resolution, Thomas Friedman came up with the argument that no two countries that had a McDonald’s restaurant would go to war with each other (Luce, 2015). The idea in this theory is the assumption that the liberal doctrines shaping the current geopolitical world order would not allow conflict between two nations that believed in the liberal order. So, the essence of the argument becomes that one nation’s international image and its acceptance in the liberal world order becomes much more visible when the nation is equipped with globally preferred qualities of non-state soft power facilitators, such as multinational corporations, NGOs, high-tech software, engineering, and entertainment industries. In this regard, soft power is not a substantial alternative to hard military power, but instead, it is a game-changer with mobilizing and persuading power in a liberal and globalized world. As argued by Vuving, “power does not have its own legs to go, it has to ride on some vehicle” (Vuving, 2009, p. 4); it is the capacity and the potential to change the behaviours of others in a world that is shaped and reshaped by activities of non-state actors operating on every level of economic, political, and cultural life. On how soft power works, Vuving highlights that three instruments need to be present as what he calls “beauty, brilliance, and benignity” (Vuving, 2009, p. 7). As he understands “beauty” in world politics is “the resonance that draws actors closer to each other through shared ideas, values, causes, or visions” (p. 10). By using the trio of beauty, brilliance, and benignity, state actors cultivate credibility, legitimacy, and moral authority over other state actors. According to Vuving, “shared values and causes provide a push toward the perception that the other regime is beautiful, which in turn will encourage confidence, friendship, and cooperation” (p. 10). “Brilliance” comes in the form of advanced science and technology that can be translated into the establishment of great military and a successful economy. Vuving interprets this as “success is the strong proof of capability” that attracts other actors for the idea that if one is successful in solving a problem or overcoming a challenge, then there is a form of admiration, respect, and acquiescence. Vuving also argues that brilliance leads to imitation and creates myths of invincibility and inevitability (p. 10). To Vuving, “benignity” “produces gratitude and sympathy” (p. 9). Harmfulness, aggressiveness, and egoism repel others and are the opposite of benignity. He argues that “cultural events, exchange programs, broadcasting, or teaching a country’s

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language and promoting the study of a country’s culture and society” may not be enough (p. 9) to advance the soft power of a state. It is important to highlight here that as part of the soft power of a state, “hard power as soft power” needs to be mentioned. For example, when the US used hard power to save the Kurdish population from Saddam Hussain’s persecution, this was largely very positive and had helped the American soft power. This means that sometimes, the hard power of a state can become soft power in its diplomacy. One such example of Turkish hard power is the use of Turkish drones in saving Libya and liberating Nagorno-Karabakh. These images have made Turkey more popular in many Arab and Muslim audiences.

‘Turkish Soft Power’ from Sufi Networks to AK Party Era Interestingly, ancient Indian and Chinese references refer to Turk tribes’ regular movement and contacts in the region and their interactions with all religious groups, particularly with the Buddhist religion to which some of these Turks belonged. The Orkhon inscriptions are said to be the oldest reference to Turks (eighth century) as Oguz. According to Alberuni, Turks are of Tibetan origin who ruled Kabul under the title of Shahiya of Kabul. Alberuni calls them the ruler of the Hindu Shahiya dynasty (or Turk Shahi) and the “that the north and the part of the east of Kashmir belonged to the Turks of Khotan and Tibet”. Of course, these are the days prior to the arrival of Islam in the region. But this establishes that Turk tribes at that time were part of Hindu and Buddhist religious traditions just before Islam came to the region (Prasad, 1994). In historical records, several archival and ancient recourses evidence that many of earlier Uyghur Turks had accepted Buddhism and had studied Buddhist scriptures. Many scholars, Zieme (p. 50), Prasad (1994, p. 171), say that scholars of Uyghur Turk origin had translated the Buddhist work Nirvanasutra. Prasad gives the detail of Hindu ancient references of Turks being part of Buddhist and Hindu religious scholarship before Islam arrived in the region. By this, it is no surprise if many of the Turks who, after learning Islamic teaching, became actively engaged with Indian Hindu and Buddhist religious traditions and translated numbers of Hindu scriptures to Persian or Arabic languages. As Kurin (2002, p. 24) explains, the Silk Road created a transnational scape ranging from Asia to Anatolia to the Arab world where not just business caravans but also Sufis, Hindu

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and Buddhist monks, Hajj pilgrims, scholars, historians, and chroniclers had trafficked. Compared to the current western Orientalist knowledge production, the Silk Route transnational network was completely owned by the people and non-State actors. It is no surprise that the biggest wave of translation of Hindu and Buddhist scriptures from Asian languages to Persian and Arabic was seen in this period. Pancatantra by Ibn alMuqaffa (in Arabis: Kalila wa Dimna), Hindu Yoga book Patanjali’s Yogasutra by Al Biruni (in Arabic: Kitabu Batencali’l-Hindi fi al-Khalasi mina al-Askal). Al Biruni’s own book on Indian society, one of the most important and authentic sources of Indology in the eleventh century famously known as Kitab al-Hind, and Amrtakunda by Kamrup (in Arabic: Hawd al Hayat ), or Vedanta-Sara was translated in Persian as tasawwuf o suluk, the main Hindu scriptures of Vedas were also translated in this period with the help of several Turk origin Persian scholars of in the Mughal court (Ernst, 2010). An Iranian merchant Ali Ekberg is said to have submitted his monograph Khitay-name (Book of China) to Sultan Süleyman in 1520. Similarly, another Turkish traveller to India Seyi Çelebi also submitted his India Travelogue to Sultan Murad III (Faroqhi & Fleet, 2013). Another Ottoman Admiral, Sidi Ali Reis (d. 1562), while his ship met with a fatal storm, accidentally landed in Gujarat where he was hosted by the local King and, on his return to Istanbul, was brought back from Lahore to Delhi again to see Humayun. He stayed for months and wrote his fascinating travelogue of 1553–1556, giving the details of Indian art, culture, and politics at that time (Reis, 1975). The translation of Asian religious and philosophical works into Persian and Ottoman Turkish continued, and after the establishment of the republic, Turkish scholars’ fascination with Asia did not stop. The late Ottoman newspapers such as Anadolu Mecmuası, Hayat Mecmuası, Ictihad, Dergah, Sebilu’r Read, Milli Mecmua, and Caglayan in which journalists like Hasan Cemil, Kenan Halit, Nezad Mehmud, Elizabeth Hawking, Safiye Sami had extensively published about Tagore’s philosophy and his literary works. In republican time too, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit (1925–2006) translated Tagore’s Gitanjali in 1941. The Naqshbandi Sufi scholarly traditions of Ahmad Faruq Sirhindi (d. 1624) had arrived in Turkey, and its Turkish translation is quite popular in conservative circles. Just like Sufi traditions arrived in Anatolia and spread all over the region, the Sufi lodges, then known as Tekke were established for Indian Sufis and were known as Hindiler Tekkesi as discussed in detail by Aybek (1977, p. 96). In Istanbul’s Uskudar, an

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Indian Suffi Tekke is still presented and is attributed to Sayyid Faydullah Hindi, who had founded it in 1738, according to Tanman (1998, p. 68). With this size of Turkey-Asia cultural interaction during the time of empires, the exchange of people to people contact, scholarly and cultural exchange between Turkey and Asian countries were brought under nation-state regulations where not just state to state relations but also people to people contacts were largely dependent on states’ bilateral relations. Turkey-Asia relations after the end of the cold war have indeed improved yet have not returned to their historical level. Much of the talk on Turkey’s soft power then returned in the policy discourse since the AK Party came to power which has a different world view from Turkey’s secular elite. Religion and culture were not seen with disapproval, and the scope of cultural diplomacy was expanded.

Turkey’s Role Model as a Soft Power Resource In the last two decades, Turkey has been talked as a model of development, democracy, and reforms. The Turkish model is said to be one of the inspirations behind the Arab uprisings. Anas argues Turkey’s new Arab vision is built through “current reform initiatives in Turkish politics and economy and along with the emergence of independent civil society and media” (Anas, 2011, p. 1). Turkey’s soft power potentials at least discoursively was recognized by political decision makers as Turkey’s role in attracting Turkic republics under the Soviet rule in Central Asia with President Turgut Özal’s policy in the scope of the “big brother” model was realized (Mohapatra, 2001; Wheeler, 2013). When Turkey economically hit bottom in the 1990s, this role-model articulation evaporated but did not disappear completely. Turkey’s role model rhetoric as a secular and Islamic nation for the Middle East appeared again when the world began discussing Islam’s compatibility with democracy immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York City. The same “role model” discourse appeared during the Arab Spring when authoritarian leaders began losing their decade-long power in their country one after another. Turkey, with its strong electoral tradition and economic prosperity, showed the world that Islam and capitalism could co-exist when western liberal ideals can truly be introduced and absorbed in an Asian nation. This period marked the height of Turkey’s attractiveness and reputation not only in the capital cities of developed nations but also in the streets of undeveloped nations in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (Co¸skun, 2015; Özkan, 2011).

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The social and economic changes in Turkish society, under the AK Party rule, have helped the expansion of the middle-class and their purchasing power in Turkey.3 Turkey saw significant improvement in the Human Development Index and worked closely with the EU on financial and other development projects. These political, economic, and psychological boosts during the AK Party government increased non-state actors’ international engagements and capacities. Turkey’s soft power potential increased when domestic improvements occurred. In turn, this brought Turkey the needed confidence to invest in state-managed apparatuses while paving the way for a non-state take on soft power. However, this does not guarantee any sort of soft power since soft power in its very nature remains a resource and vehicle to create power. As in the case of the Gulen Movement, one-time Turkey-backed Gulen schools and human resources can turn into something to harm the country’s global image and reputation. Or, as in the case of some TV series, a global image that is shaped by Turkish TV series may not be the image that the current Turkish government would wish to see globally. For example, a Turkish historical fiction TV series, The Magnificent Century (Muhte¸sem Süleyman) became popular throughout the world, reorienting the reputation of Hürrem Sultan (a slave girl who became Sultana) and recreating the life of one of the Greatest Sultans of the Ottoman Empire (Sınav, 2011). Thus, this paper makes a point that non-state (and state-managed) soft power instruments do not necessarily follow state-formed grand-national narratives and their soft power capacity. It is a risk that states take by relying on non-state soft power instruments. Another risk to point out here is that Turkey’s soft power investments, especially state-managed instruments, are mainly backed with either Islamic-oriented rhetoric or civilizational narratives. Looking deeper into

3 The Turkish women as an element of soft power is another matter to discuss which remains to be beyond this study; however, it is worth mentioning that its roots have begun in Turkey’s secular history as well as economic success. The biggest example of this is Erdogan’s promotion of Turkish women in international diplomacy as well as domestic political positions. The AK Party has often boasted of having the largest membership of women. Erdogan has carefully built his image by taking his wife on his side in all his international travel and diplomatic events, a tradition which is not much common among Muslim and Arab statesmen. This has made Erdogan popular among those moderate Muslims who are not necessarily religious by practice, but they feel happy to see their identity respected in public life.

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the “Strategic Depth” of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu, one notices that Turkey’s relationships beyond its borders are ornamented with cultural, historical, and geographic discourses highlighting that geographies such as the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and North Africa reserve a special place in the minds of Turkish people and foreign policy elites (Davuto˘glu, 2012). However, this rhetoric may not be shared equally by the entire population as it is tied to the AK Party and its leadership. Although this rhetoric allies with the “new Turkey” discourse (Fernandes & Carvalhais, 2018) which resulted in changing Turkey’s foreign policy paradigm tremendously since the beginning of the AK Party rule, it will remain exposed and risky whenever the country’s soft power capacity is analysed. Knowing the risks mentioned above, Turkey’s soft power capacity became noticeable when its ties with developing countries in Africa began, with specific activities (trading, student exchanges, humanitarian aid, etc.) undertaken by civil societies and their niche expertise (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). Turkish civil societies became influential in capacity building, connectivity, and transportation projects in Africa. As many African states, especially Somalia, faced an acute food crisis amid a prolonged famine, Turkish state and non-state establishments such as the Humanitarian ˙ Relief Foundation (IHH), some religiously motivated civil foundations (Hakyol Vakfı, Deniz Feneri, Sadakata¸sı Derne˘gi, Cansuyu, etc.), and state-organized agencies like the Turkish Cooperation and Coordina˙ tion Agency (TIKA), Türk Kızılay, Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) reached out to Africa. After the introduction of non-state soft power, Turkey started opening up new diplomatic missions in Africa. There were many countries with whom Turkey established or reached out for the first time. For instance, the Turkish Prime Minister visited Ethiopia and South Africa in 2005 for the first time in Turkey’s history signalling new Turkey’s active foreign relations in the continent. Benhaim and Öktem argue that the discourse on Turkish soft power “has gone through cycles of transformation according to the uses and interpretations of actors investing in this narrative during different political episodes, not only during AK Party rule but also in the period previous to this, following the end of the Cold War” (Benhaim & Öktem, 2015, p. 1). Following the Gezi Movement, Turkey’s capacity

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to attract international audiences, especially western audiences, diminished and continues to decline. Once considered a rising power and role model in the Middle East, Turkey, through its downslide in democratic freedoms, has lost its positive impact, reputation, and attractiveness for international audiences (Çevik, 2019, p. 16). But this negative trend did not affect Turkey’s state and non-state soft power in the same direction. This chapter attempts to identify both soft power players differently and argues that despite the decline of the state’s soft power capability, Turkey still maintains the capacity to convert its soft power resources to attract world audiences, especially in the non-western hemisphere. As a result, Turkish soft power can be seen as evolving independently from Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy actions. For instance, Turkey’s entertainment sector expanded its million-dollar film and soap opera industries from Latin America to the Middle East and Asia. Turkey’s visibility around the world increased, particularly after the Arab uprisings. Parallel to this, the number of tourists coming to Turkey immediately increased as the number of Turkish soap operas expanded in the world market from Colombia to Malaysia. Wherever Turkish soaps became popular, the number of tourists from those countries to Turkey increased. Turkish soap operas now are exported to more than 150 countries and viewed by more than 700 million people around the world (Ministry of Culture, 2018). For example, the soap opera Nour’ s finale was viewed by about 85 million people in the Arab world, as experts indicate (Williams, 2013). This increases Turkey’s visibility on the world stage (Anaz & Özcan, 2016).

Reengaging with Asia Turkey’s relationship with Asia, however, has been more historical and complex than that of Africa (MFA, 2019). Especially in the south, United India’s and its political parties, led by its non-Muslim leaders, supported Turkey’s war of independence which set the century-long relationship between the nations and political elites. Turkey, as a part of NATO, was part of an anti-Soviet alliance and sided with South Korea (Lee & Kim, 2016). Turkey’s humanitarian aid in Asia in the 2000s left a goodwill legacy for its future South Asia relations (MFA, 2005). Despite these efforts, Turkey’s relations with many Asian countries have not been very easy. Turkey and India’s relationship was stuck in Cold War obsessions, and its South Asia approach has been

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Pakistan-centric since 1947 (Mehta, 2019, p. 2). During the AK Party era, Turkey aimed to diversify its South Asia policy beyond Pakistan and started de-hyphenizing Turkey-India relations (MFA, 2011). With the Asia Anew approach,4 Turkey’s recent diplomatic, cultural, and humanitarian attention to its east made the “far east” much closer geographically than previously conceptualized. This was the same period during which the AK Party government started using soft power resources beyond its traditional circle of friends in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East (Kalın, 2011). Özkan underlines that Turkey during the AK Party government overcame the image of two separate Africas conceptualizing a “new Africa” while initiating a normalization policy with countries like China and India (Özkan, 2011). However, according to Özkan, South Asia still remained neglected even though Turkey’s Asia policies gained attention in the Turkish foreign affairs circle during the AK Party time with the Asia Anew approach. Compared to Turkey’s recent Africa opening during the AK Party government, Asia never received priority in Ankara. Thus, the remaining part of this paper investigates Turkey’s recent engagement with Asia in the Asia Anew approach and its capacity to make changes through both state and non-state soft power instruments.

Turkey’s Opening to Asia Initially, Turkey’s state soft power started with Turkish language promotion programs, cultural centres, and limited charity and social welfare activities through agencies such as Yunus Emre Institution (YEE), ˙ Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and the recently introduced educational foundations such as Turkish Maarif Foundation (Maarif, 2019).5 By now, as seen in Table 1, Turkey has established diplomatic relations with most of the Asian nations and has opened one or more than one of its socio-cultural agencies. Turkey has the potential to connect and touch audiences in Asia, but Turkey remains stuck with Cold War psychology and does not find ways of communicating with one-fifth 4 See Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘ glu’s speech at Asia Anew Workshop on 26 December 2019 in Ankara for details. 5 Here it is necessary to mention that many other countries have not yet allowed the opening of these centres. And those who are allowed to open were not eager to allow them to perform well.

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Table 1

Turkey’s diplomatic posts in Asia

Embassies

Country

Date to open

Afghanistan Bangladesh Azerbaijan China Indonesia Philippines Georgia India Iran Japan Cambodia Kazakhstan Kirgizstan South Kore Laos Malesia Mongolia Myanmar Uzbekistan Pakistan Singapore Sri Lanka Tajikistan Thailand Turkmenistan Vietnam Total

1922 1976 1992 1972 1957 1990 1992 1948 1835 1925 2012 1992 1957 2017 1976 1996 2012 1992 1948 1985 2013 1992 1958 1992 1997

˙ TIKA

Yunus Emre Institute

Turkish Maarif Foundation

3 Offices Office Office

Office (2013)

37 Institutions

Office Office

Office (2013)

Office (2012)

8 Institutions

Office (2012)

Office Office

Office (2010)

Office Office

Office (2019) Office (2015) Office Office Office 2 Offices

Office

2 Offices (2016)

Office 76 Institutions

Office Office Office 16

9

Office 127

Source Table created by the author using data available to the public

of the world population living in the region, and consequently, Turkey’s capacity to influence diverse cultures and to create attractiveness remains limited. Aid programs: Turkey’s global aid spending, ranked twice as the most generous country in the world, gives Turkey significant soft power across Asia. Turkey spends 0.95% of its national income on international development programs, which exceeds the amount the UN projected (0.70%)

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˙ (TIKA, 2018). In 2017, Turkey’s development assistance amounted to 9.33 billion dollars. Turkey’s development assistance is provided through two channels; official assistance and private flows. Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan are important receivers of Turkish aid in Asia. However, Syria and Syrian refugees in Turkey are the biggest receivers of Turkish aid, with nearly 7.2 billion spent on more than 4 million Syrians living in Turkey. As Çevik highlights, Turkey’s foreign policy in the forms of development and humanitarian aid are indicators of the country’s capacity building in name-branding and public diplomacy (Çevik, 2019). Through these strategic deployments, Turkey has managed to increase its capacity to communicate globally and be a constituent in the international humanitarian community. Turkey’s state-managed AFAD, for instance, is well known for its emergency aid for communities who are affected by natural disasters from Haiti to Myanmar. Turkey invests in sustainable development in diverse sectors in underdeveloped regions, including security, infrastructure, agriculture, and energy. Education Programs: Under the AK Party government, Turkey has emerged as an international education hub. The number of universities increased from 76 in 2002 to 206 in 2018, both state and private (Çevik, 2019), and the quota of foreign students in each university has also been increased to fifty per cent, except in medical sciences. As of the 2018–2019 education year, 154,446 international students have enrolled in one university program in Turkey. Among them, 54,268 are female students, while one-third of international students preferred private universities (YÖK, 2019). Turkey only competes with China and outruns many developing countries (WCCF, 2018), attracting foreign students. There were more than 5.3 million internationally mobile students as of 2017 to pursue a tertiary degree or higher in the destination country (IOM_GMDAC, 2018). Among the 154,446 international students, excluding paid, Erasmus, Mevlana, and Farabi exchange programs, 4660 students received scholarships. The number of applicants for Turkish scholarships through YTB has increased to 145,700 students from 167 countries (YTB, 2019). The Turkish Maarif Institution has established coordination with 65 countries and has its own educational institutions in 42 countries. However, Maarif has a feeble presence in Asia beyond the Afghan-Pakistan line. However, Asian students, especially from South and East Asia, are yet to join Turkish education in large number. Why there have been fewer students from

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those countries is mainly because of the English language. Turkey is still in need of upgrading its international education in the English language as well. As shown in Table 2, the number of students from Asian countries seems relatively high, but their distribution among nations shows unevenness. The distribution of incoming international students and scholarship holders does not reflect Turkey’s diversified Asia Anew approach towards Asia. Central Asian countries have a higher number, but population-wise, Central Asia represents only a fraction of Asian demography. Turkey hosts only 250 students from India, a country with a population of 1.3 billion and remains unattractive to Indian students. Thus, as Çevik states, “the existence of soft power resources does not justify the existence of soft power” (Çevik, 2019, p. 4) for its own sake. Trade and Investment: Excluding Central Asia and Afghan-Pakistan line, Turkey’s Asia policies are mostly based on international trade, economic partnership, and security cooperation (Ullah et al., 2018). Turkey’s bilateral relationship with India and China are the main blocks of Asian geopolitical actors. Still among the two, Turkey’s focus pivots to China in Asia (Mehta, 2019, p. 7). Turkey’s kinship with the Uyghur Table 2 International students in Turkey from Asia with their country of origin

Country

Number of students

Afghanistan Bangladesh Azerbaijan China Indonesia Philippines Georgia India Iran Japan Cambodia Kazakhstan Kirgizstan

6804 585 19,384 2275 1217 145 702 250 7158 55 35 2180 1931

Total

65,412

Country South Korea Laos Malesia Mongolia Myanmar Nepal Uzbekistan Pakistan Singapore Sri Lanka Tajikistan Thailand Turkmenistan Vietnam

Number of students 213 1 215 695 97 36 1062 2109 21 56 647 218 17,295 36

Source Table created by the author using data available on YÖK’s website

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region seems to not disturb Turkey-China economic relations despite China’s inhumane and violent policies towards Uyghur ethnic groups. As Table 3 shows, Turkey’s largest trading partners in Asia, despite declined numbers due to the Covid-19 Pandemic, remain to be China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Malesia. However, the largest trade deficit in Asia belongs to China and India. Turkey, similar to other nations in the world, obeys the largest trade deficits to Asian rising powers, namely China and India. But this commercial engagement does not convert to any sort of soft power source at all. Even Turkey’s trade deficit with South Asian nations become Turkey’s soft belly towards China and India relations. On the other hand, Turkey’s defence and intelligence technology exportation to Central Asian states and particularly Pakistan indicates that Turkey is a NATO country that can be a source of attraction and admiration. As Vuving highlights, a country with advanced science and technology or economic success generates “brilliance” which is understood as a proof of capacity and success for Turkey (Vuving, 2009). As discussed in this paper, Turkey’s military aid to the Azerbaijan-Armenian war with its SIHAs, took worldwide attention towards Turkey’s war technology and hard power capacity. Table 3 2020)

Turkey’s volume of trade with Asian countries (Million US Dollar,

Country Afghanistan Bangladesh Azerbaijan China Indonesia Philippines Georgia India Iran Japan Cambodia Kazakhstan Kirgizstan South Korea

Export

Import

207,778 207,778 2,085,332 2,865,866 213,799 100,310 1,461,268 889,743 2,253,124 441,242 25,018 985,666 417,533 1,103,849

27,299 569,883 410,710 23,041,507 1,184,801 129,981 348,884 4,830,124 1,192,718 3,743,374 63,784 1,180,549 91,159 5,734,249

Country Laos Malaysia Mongolia Myanmar Nepal Uzbekistan Pakistan Singapore Sri Lanka Tajikistan Thailand Turkmenistan Vietnam

˙ Source Table created by the author using data available at TÜIK

Export

Import

1922 381,913 31,827 52,060 38,836 1,154,132 620,162 343,498 77,476 173,676 184,011 786,952 244,322

3832 1,990,602 2107 48,429 14,389 969,981 268,751 299,748 89,890 149,040 1,210,609 319,387 1,368,555

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When Turkey opened up for foreign investments, Asian investment in Turkey rose. Although the majority of Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey comes from European and Gulf states, Russia and Azerbaijan have been the top two foreign investors from Asia for the last 16 years. This figure partially correlates with foreign citizen property purchases and the number of tourists coming to Turkey. According to Turkey’s land registry cadastre office records, more than 40 thousand homes were purchased in 2019 by foreign citizens. Iraq, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan are the top five buying countries, respectively. Turkey attracts peoples from other nations for their residential destination, which in turn makes Turkey an attractive and competitive country. In 2018, the total entrance to Turkey from Asian countries (including Iran) was 6,598,385 people. Among them, 54,953 people chose to stay in Turkey (KTB, 2018). The rise of Turkish Airlines also became Turkish tourism’s motor and Turkey’s brand-name on air. The airline carried a total of 61.57 million passengers between January and October 2019. THY moved about five million passengers from Far East countries during the same period with a six per cent increase from the previous year (THY, 2018). THY also carried 381,223 tons of cargo and mail from the Far East from January to October in 2019. This volume of movement of people and goods between Asian cities and the world via Turkish Airlines is creating a major space for Turkey to become part of people’s memories (Table 4). Entertainment Industry: Turkish entertainment productions, especially soap operas,6 have captured the attention of diverse audiences around the world (Paschalidou, 2014). Turkish soap operas are exported to more than a hundred fifty countries collecting 500 million in export revenue annually (Ministry of Culture, 2018), and watched from Latin America to South Asia. Many of these Turkish entertainment productions are similar to Hollywoodesque political-action films and TV series that re-write geopolitical reasoning in the Middle East and beyond. Dirili¸s Ertu˘grul (Resurrection: Ertu˘grul), Payitaht Abdülhamid (The Last Emperor), Mehmetçik Kut’ül Amare (Soldiers Kut al-Amara), and Kurulu¸s Osman (The Ottoman) are the products of recently produced TV series that can be categorized in this sense. As I wrote for the newspaper, these productions:

6 Although there are slight differences in meaning, soap operas and TV series are used interchangeably in this paper.

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Table 4

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THY flights and frequencies

Country

Number of cities

Flight Frequency

Country

Number of cities

Flight Frequency

Afghanistan Bangladesh Azerbaijan China Indonesia Philippines Georgia India Iran Japan Cambodia Kazakhstan Kirgizstan South Korea Total

2 1 3 5 2 1 2 2 7 2 – 2 2 1

10 7 39 24 7 7 35 35 62 8 – 28 13 14

Laos Malesia Mongolia Myanmar Nepal Uzbekistan Pakistan Singapore Sri Lanka Tajikistan Thailand Turkmenistan Vietnam

– 1 1 – 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 2

– 7 3 – 5 7 14 11 7 6 21 7 11

32

Source Table created by the author using data available online (before the Covid-19 pandemics)

are some of the historical productions that not only recreate past glories but also formalize new geopolitical imaginations and perpetuate national narratives for the public. These TV series present domestic and international audiences constructive new stories that align with narratives of the new Turkey of the last decade. Thus, their constructive ability in the geopolitics of entertainment differs from the earlier period of productions. (Anaz, 2019, p. ¶ 7) For example, the series Payitaht Abdülhamid re-narrates the controversial time of the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid to chronicle his struggles to keep the empire alive for decades despite all kinds of imperialist intervention from the West. In Turkey’s current state of relations with the West, the series often produces a deja vu effect for the audience and become a source of re-imagination of the past. (ibid., ¶ 8)

The Turkish series sector is still infiltrating big markets such as India’s Bollywood. On this matter, the Turkish Minister of Culture and Tourism initiated a program in which TV series such as Dirili¸s Ertu˘grul, Payitaht Abdulahamid, Bir Zamanlar Çukurova (Bitter Lands), and Çukur (The

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Pit) meet directly with sectoral professions from China, India, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand (Ministry of Culture, 2018). Film-induced tourism, as a result of filmic marketing, creates affection and attraction for locations where productions are filmed according to film-induced tourism literature (Lopez et al., 2015). Praise from celebrities such as the queen of Malaysia, Azizah Aminah Maimunah Iskandariah (AnadoluAjansı, 2019), is what, as Vuving says, produce beauty, brilliance, and benignity in Turkey’s international relations and public diplomacy. Among non-state soft power instruments, Turkish writers, novelists, and Sufis have become globally recognized too. Turkish authors such as Orhan Pamuk and Elif Safak, Sufi networks in the western hemisphere, international conferences, foreign direct investments, house sales by foreigners are all equally important soft power.

The Challenges Before Soft Power As the literature on soft power theoretically indicates, these state and nonstate soft power dynamics enable states to lead to acquiescence by creating changes in the behaviours of others towards a country’s image abroad. However, Turkey’s soft power assets do not directly contribute to its soft power capacity for various reasons, especially those that are imposed by state institutions and diplomatic missions. Expanding diplomatic points in Asia is still limited in creating soft power capacity contingent with Turkey’s foreign policy implementations in the region. In other words, Turkey’s capacity to affect millions in India or China depends on its bilateral relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan and also depends on India’s Middle Eastern interests and foreign policies towards Turkey. With deepening relations in the Gulf States, India remains less likely to open its cultural borders to Turkey. Turkey’s position on Jammu and Kashmir, the Uyghur problem, the Rohingya crisis as well as Turkey’s difficult balancing act between different Asian rivals pose a challenge to Turkey’s soft power in the region. Media and public opinion-makers in many Asian countries are dominated by anti-Turkey or anti-Erdogan headlines that project Turkey as a country that is descending to radical Islamism, supporting extremists in Syria, intervening in internal affairs of the Arab countries, or aiming to take back Turkey to the Ottoman era Caliphate, or neo-Ottomanism. The negativity in Asian countries’ media coverage of Turkey is not different from what the Gulf countries’ media have

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been publishing since the Qatar crisis started. More interestingly, Turkish policymakers are little aware of these negativities, and hence their soft power assets, both media and pro-Islamic sentiments, are proving to be counter-productive in many cases. This is a situation that is totally different from what Turkey does in countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tunisia, Somalia, or Algiers, where the majority Muslim population receive Turkey’s pro-Palestine, pro-Rohingya, and pro-Kashmir positions more positively. The continued negative public opinion and popular perception of Turkey in countries like India, China and even in Pakistan weaken the popularity and acceptance of Turkey’s soft power. This is a situation in which the universal models of soft power normally do not work, and countries use a differentiated approach in using soft power evolved in different forms for different countries. The US, for example, had faced extreme negative perception in Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan and in many other countries. However, the size and reach of the US soft power are so huge that negative perceptions normally fall flat. The only place where Turkey’s soft power remains popular despite strained bilateral relations or negative public opinion can be Bangladesh, where Turkey’s Rohingya diplomacy appears to be a more important factor than bilateral relations in keeping Turkey’s acceptability unaffected by weak bilateral relations. Turkey’s soft power reach in Asia is also limited as its soft power discourse is contingent on the foreign policies of the current AK Party administration. Islamic-oriented rhetoric or civilizational narratives that shape Turkey’s foreign policies are strongly tied to the AK Party and its leadership. Therefore, Turkey’s opening in the developing world through its diplomatic missions and educational posts are limited in their nature because alternatives to the AK Party government are less likely to continue similar AK Party policies. This gives us another reason to argue that Turkey’s soft power capacity is stronger and more sustainable when implemented through non-state and organic instruments in the case of trade, education, and culture. Turkey still lags behind in foreign language learning. Turks are still far behind their Indian, Pakistanis, Chinese, and Indonesian counterparts in reaching out to the world because of the language barrier. This restricts Turkey’s access to Asian nations. Imagine an embassy in Beijing where no one speaks Chinese other than local employees. This limits Turkey’s formal and informal network of diplomacy with the rest of its eastern border.

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In another example, Turks are good at getting international literature translated into Turkish, but they fail to get their literature known to the world. Turkish stories, fiction, and nonfiction literature are not often translated into Hindi, Urdu, Chinese, Bhasha, or Persian. This limits Turkey’s cultural interactions at the non-state level with these Asian nations. In the same sense, Turkey remains less connected with Asia and the world through sports as China and India have already improved their sports performances. The film industry in Turkey, despite having emerged powerfully in TV soaps, has yet to cover much film production. Since the film industry is very advanced and very popular in Asia, Turkey needs to take note of Asian film culture as well. For example, Bollywood is explored by the Turkish film industry and other populated nations in the region. Asia is the most diverse continent in terms of religious practices. If Turkey wants to become a soft power for all (for example, Jewish-Hindu summits, Buddhist cultural centres, Pakistan opened a Sikh pilgrimage, UAE also has opened several cultural centres in last two years), Turkey should acknowledge these diversities and engage in open dialogue with these diverse groups. Can Turkey also become a religious attraction as well? Without a doubt, such initiation can help Turkey’s visibility in Asia and (re)shape its image in the eyes of millions. Indian weddings that take place in prestigious hotels in Turkey, for sure, contribute to the country’s positive image in India. Turkey does not have a sufficient mechanism for preventing the spillover of Asian conflicts from casting a shadow on its soft power. Issues such as Kashmir, Rohnigiya, Uyghur, South China Sea, Nagorno Karabakh, the Syrian crisis, etc., keep testing Turkish soft power and easily get Turkey involved in other country’s bilateral discussions. Turkey needs to find a better dialogue environment and platform if it wants to translate its energy and effort into a global reputation, regional respect, and positive attitude independent of regional conflicts and discussions. This is the purpose of state-managed diplomatic posts. Despite the potentials highlighted in this study, Turkey’s overall capacity to influence people and international actors partially depend on its track record in democracy, governance, implementing liberal programs, human rights, and integration with the free world, because in the end, these are the tools that truly utilize admiration, imitation, emulation, respect, and create myths of invincibility and inevitability for Turkey. This paper underlines that Turkey’s soft power initiatives and public diplomatic capacity are more constructive and promising on the one

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hand but limited and short-winded on the other, based on the assessment of the geopolitical conditions in the region and Turkey’s political, economic, and bureaucratic capacity to translate its soft power resources into acquiescence.

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The Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle Corridor and Turkey’s Asia Policy: An Analysis Ejaz Hussain

Introduction China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has received regional and global attention since its launch in 2013. Although China has presented the BRI in purely economic terms, it has been viewed strategically by the U.S. and its Quadrilateral partners such as India (Hussain, 2019; Wolf, 2020). Turkey, however, has maintained a policy and political restraint in so far as the character and conduct of the BRI is concerned. In fact, as a connector of Asia with Europe, Turkey has, on the one hand, marked its interest in the Chinese initiative for rational reasons and, on the other hand, proposed its own initiative, generally known as the Middle Corridor. The latter though overlaps with the BRI infrastructurally, yet it has the potential to be a bridge among Turkey, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and China (Zan, 2016). In addition, as part of its Asia policy, Ankara

An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Insight Turkey (23)3. E. Hussain (B) Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_10

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has projected the Middle Corridor Initiative (MCI) as a means to pursue commercial and strategic goals amid shifting geopolitical alignments (Dal, 2015). For instance, the United States (U.S.) is gradually rebalancing its policy in the Middle East, where the former seems to have avoided military confrontation with Russia and accorded tacit approval to the Turkish military operation in Northern Syria recently. In Central and South Asia, the Pacific and Northeast Asia, the U.S. is still maintaining its military presence along with enhancing defence cooperation with the Quad countries (Martin, 2019). Importantly, during the Trump Administration, China has been conceptualised as a “strategic rival” and “economic competitor” that needs to be contained (Allison, 2017; Xiying, 2019). Unsurprisingly, the “trade war” between the U.S. and China has affected not only bilateral (trade) relations but also carried negative implications for Asian countries such as Pakistan (Jian, 2019). China, on its part, acted rationally. Under President Xi Jinping, it is pursuing a policy of regional stability and economic cooperation as emphatically laid out in the Belt and Road Initiative and its related institutions such as the Silk Road Fund (SRF). Keeping in mind the extraregional geopolitical complexities, the Communist Party of China (CPC), under the leadership of Xi Jinping has seemingly realised the American aims to encircle China commercially and strategically (Wuthnow, 2019). Though the Chinese government has officially refrained from adopting a confrontational policy towards the U.S. in military-strategic terms, it has, however, acted in the same fashion as far as high tariffs under the “trade war” were concerned. In addition, China is also pursuing solid commercial relations with Japan, South Korea, Turkmenistan and India in order to prevent, on the one hand, complete control of regional markets to American corporations and, on the other, develop economic interdependence with key markets in a manner that does not affect the Chinese interests economically and strategically (Korolev & Wu, 2019). Besides, Beijing has contemporaneously focused to enhance strategic and economic ties with Ankara. In this respect, the Belt and Road Initiative has been projected as win–win cooperation for the two countries that conventionally adopted a very complicated foreign policy discourse— this would be explained later in the chapter. Currently, however, both China and Turkey have committed to strengthen “strategic cooperation” through bilaterally agreed-upon principles in order to neutralise

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traditionally held mistrust and misgivings particularly relating to counterterrorism, and ethnic separatism for Turkey has, historically and nationally, taken a divergent stance on the Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang Autonomous Region whom the Chinese state views from an integrationist perspective (Isik & Zou, 2019). In view of the foregoing, this study attempts to explain whether the Belt and Road Initiative factors into Turkey’s Asia policy and to what extent Turkey and China are willing to converge their choices and interests under the Belt and Road framework. To explain it, the study conducts an empirical investigation of Turkey’s Middle Corridor Initiative by underscoring its commercial and connectivity role vis-à-via the BRI. Besides, one of the secondary objectives of this chapter is to analyse the scale of the BRI and MCI operability in order to ensure mutual gains. The overall aim of this study is to contextualise Turkey’s Asia policy vis-à-vis the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor Initiative in order to assess the degree and scale of the former’s role in Asian affairs in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, before these questions are probed empirically, it seems prudent to provide a historical overview of China-Turkey relations.

Overview The regions that comprise modern Turkey and China were connected, commercially and culturally, through the ancient Silk Road, which connected not only East and West Asia but also Asia, Europe and Africa from the second century BCE till the eighteenth century C.E. (Frankopan, 2017). Thus, the Turks traded with other regions, including China, through the ancient Silk Road from the medieval to the modern period. With the advent of nation-states in Europe‚ and in Asia after the end of colonialism, the empire-state system such as the Ottoman morphed into the Westphalian statecraft based on the principles of territorial sovereignty and nationalism (Rothermund, 2006). Hence, the Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923, cognised the nation-state features and commenced a new journey in international affairs. With regard to foreign policy, Turkey under Ataturk pursued warm relations with its European and Asian neighbours. In fact, the then Turkish leadership contacted its Chinese counterpart in 1934 to resume diplomatic relations that were ruptured due to socio-political transformation in both countries in the context of the First World War (Kwong,

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2017). Nevertheless, domestic politics took a revolutionary turn in China in the following years and, due to the non-determination of political authority in China, the latter could not establish formal relations with Turkey, which after the Second World War, embraced the American version of European security in terms of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), that was founded in 1949 (Kalin, 2012). The ensuing Cold War prevented Turkey and China to interact with each other diplomatically (Dellios & Yilmaz, 2008). Nevertheless, the opportunity came in 1971 due to the Sino-American détente which was logistically coordinated by Pakistan (Small, 2015). Hence, the same year Turkey and China established diplomatic ties. However, the scale of bilateral relations remained low in the 1970s on account of mutual mistrust, bureaucratic misgivings, Turkey being proUS/NATO and, importantly, China’s introvert mindset under Mao. By the late 1970s, however, under Deng Xiaoping, China started “opening up” with the Western world, especially the U.S. Subsequently, American enterprises marked its interest in the Chinese market (Yongming, 2007). Unsurprisingly, during the 1980s, China’s trade volume increased in size with the U.S. and European countries; the former also explored regional markets for exports consumption and energy supply. In such a context, Turkey-China bilateral relations improved diplomatically, commercially and militarily, as highlighted in the following: Since the state visit of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces of Turkey in 1983, Sino-Turkish military cooperation began to develop rapidly. Thereafter, Chinese Chief of General Staff Yang Dezhi visited Turkey in October 1985, and in November 1986 the Turkish Chief of General Staff Necdet Urug visited the People’s Republic of China. In November 1992, China’s Defense Minister, General Qin Jiwei led a military delegation to visit Turkey…[Moreover] in April 1993, Turkish Chief of General Staff General Dogan Gures¸ and the Minister of National Defense Nevzat Ayaz paid a visit to China and achieved a protocol. In return, Chinese Chief of General Staff Zhang Wannian paid a visit to Turkey in 1995. (Isik & Zou, 2019)

As the above-mentioned depicts, China-Turkey relations remained stable though the level of engagement was confined mostly to military exchanges and defence cooperation because both the states had a commonality of interests as far as terrorism and ethnic separatism were concerned. China has viewed the Muslim Uighurs of Xinjiang—who are

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ethnically Turks with cross-cultural affinities with the Turkish people— from a security lens in terms of linking them with incidences of ethnic separatism and terrorism in that autonomous region post-9/11 (Purbrick, 2017). Turkey, on its part, has conventionally viewed this ethnic Muslim minority in China from a religio-civilizational angle (Isik & Zou, 2019). Such differences in views marred the development of official and societal relations between the two governments and their people till the early 2000s. Nonetheless, the post-9/11 context accorded an enabling environment to the leadership of both the countries where they could explore avenues and areas for mutual cooperation, which in turn, could help reduce mistrust and misgivings. Consequently, as a result of multiple reciprocal state visits of prime ministers, presidents and military chiefs from 2001 to 2019, China-Turkey relations improved significantly to the extent that bilateral engagement was characterised in terms of “strategic cooperation”. In addition, recent presidential visits from Beijing to Ankara and vice versa have added another very important component to the bilateral relationship (Kumar, 2013). This is elaborated in detail in the following sections.

The BRI and Turkey The advancements in communication and transportation technology after the Second World War, though diminished the operational relevance of the Silk Road, the latter re-gained attention with the start of the new millennium. While underscoring its long-term strategic and economic objectives (extra) regionally, the U.S. vowed to rejuvenate the abandoned Silk Road ideationally and infrastructurally. However, due to its preoccupation with the Middle Eastern quagmire and prolonged war in Afghanistan, the U.S. could not materialise its connectivity ideas into reality (Kucera, 2011). Interestingly, China led by President Xi Jinping paid extraordinary attention to the notion of economic globalisation in terms of building rail and road infrastructure within and outside China (NDRC, 2015). The latter intended to explore the regional and global market for energy, investment and exports. Little wonder, within no time, the CPC, led by General Secretary Xi Jinping, announced a multi-billion mega project of market connectivity and economic cooperation generally known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. With an estimated worth of 1 trillion US$, the BRI has been grounded in Wu Tong (five

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connectivities), namely, (a) policy coordination, (b) trade and investment facilitation, (c) infrastructure connectivity, (d) financial integration and (e) cultural exchange (Kulaksız, 2019). Thus, under the cooperative framework of the BRI, six economic corridors have been planned by the Chinese government, which would connect China with Central Asia, Russia, Magnolia, Indochina, South Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa. Out of the proposed six corridors, four—China-Indochina Economic Corridor, China-MyanmarBangladesh-India Corridor (BCIM), China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor—are fundamentally a part of the Maritime Silk Route, whereas the China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor and the New Eurasian Land Bridge constitute the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt. Importantly, Xinjiang Autonomous Region has assumed immense importance due to the fact that it hosts three of the six corridors: the New Eurasian Land Bridge, CPEC and China-Central AsiaWest Asia Corridor. The latter corridor carries commercial and strategic significance for China-Turkey relations as it originates from Xinjiang (Northwest China) and, having crossed the Central Asian States, it passes through Iran, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and ultimately reaches Turkey (Hoh, 2018). Institutionally, the Chinese government has established, in collaboration with other stakeholders, the AIIB, New Development Bank and the Silk Road Fund. The cumulative financial worth of these institutions is around 240 billion US$ (Kulaksız, 2019). It becomes pertinent to mention the fact that Turkey is the founding member of the AIIB and “dialogue partner” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Moreover, Turkey is also the founding member of the NATO, an accession member of the European Union (E.U.), a dynamic member of the G-20 and D-8, besides being an active stakeholder in many other regional organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). What can be concluded from the preceding is that China-Turkey relations have achieved a factor of stability since 2010. In addition, the two sides are striving to realise a solid institutional collaboration in the contemporary context. Economically, even before the inception of the BRI in 2013, China-Turkey bilateral trade remained a crucial component of “strategic partnership”. For instance, the volume of bilateral trade was 193 million US$ in 1986, and it stood at 18,700 million in 2011 (Kumar, 2013). In the post-BRI period, China-Turkey trade volume was registered at 27.27 billion US$ in 2015, 27.76 billion US$ in 2016, 26.30 billion

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US$ in 2017 and 23.63 billion US$ in 2018. Nevertheless, Turkey faced a trade deficit though that declined in the following years. For instance, it recorded 21.08 billion US$ in 2013 and reduced to 17.80 US$ in 2018. However, it impacted Turkey’s trade negatively. Consequently, in 2019 (January–September), China-Turkey bilateral trade volume declined to the extent that it stood at 15.1 billion US$. Turkey’s exports to China, in this period, amounted to merely $1.9 billion US$, whereas its imports from China were recorded to the tune of 13.2 billion US$ (TUIK, 2021). Nonetheless, “according to the provisional data, produced with the cooperation of the Turkish Statistical Institute and the Ministry of Trade, in December 2020; exports were 17 billion [and] 850 million dollars with a 16.0% increase and imports were 22 billion [and] 381 million dollars with an 11.6% increase compared with December 2019”. During this period, Germany and China remained Turkey’s top exports (worth 1 billion and 572 million US$) and imports (worth 2 billion and 482 million US$) partners, respectively (TUIK, 2021). Besides, Turkey has formally joined the BRI by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Chinese government during Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s state visit to Beijing in 2015. Hence, in the past five years, the two governments have collaborated under the BRI framework in terms of implementing certain infrastructure projects in and around Turkey. This will be discussed later in the chapter. Now, it seems prudent to analyse Turkey’s Middle Corridor Initiative in order to assess its connectivity and economic worth for China and other regional markets, which in turn may enhance the former’s role in Asian affairs.

The Middle Corridor and China In the contemporary context, Turkey has, by and large, stabilised its economy. For example, its foreign trade in September 2019 was recorded at 32.1 billion US$, which included a positive trade balance of 29 billion US$. Despite the economic crunch due to the U.S.‘s tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration, Turkey’s exports grew in scale by 0.08 per cent compared to September 2018. During January–September 2019, Turkey’s grand trade volume registered at 286.4 billion US$ whereas in 2020, its foreign trade volume was recorded at 388 billion and 879 million US$ with a slight decline of 0.59 percent caused by Covid-19 (MoT, 2021).

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What the foregoing reflects is that the Turkish economy has become resilient despite intermittent market shocks. Socially and politically, Turkey did not witness chaos which has become a hallmark of many other Asian countries. Hence, Turkey has adopted a consolidated economic policy regionally and globally. In order to expand its exports base and attract transregional investment and trade opportunities, Turkey has joined the BRI while viewing it as an opportunity to seek economic dividends while not compromising on its foreign policy aims in Asia. In this respect, taking due advantage of the connectivity core of the BRI, the Turkish government, along with its regional partners, has presented the Middle Corridor Initiative regionally and even internationally (Calabrese, 2019). [The] Trans-Caspian East-West-Middle Corridor Initiative, shortly named as “The Middle Corridor…passes by rail and road respectively through Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea (crossing the Caspian transit corridor) and reaches China by following Turkmenistan-UzbekistanKyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan route. On this route, ports of Baku/Alat (in Azerbaijan), Aktau/Kuryk (in Kazakhstan) and Turkmenbashi are the main points of multimodal transport on the Caspian transit corridor. In addition to these countries, the Middle Corridor Initiative is also supported by Afghanistan and Tajikistan. (MFA, 2019)

As the above-mentioned depicts, the MCI gained further currency in the wake of the BRI. Importantly, the two proposed multilateral initiatives have coincided as far as historicity and connectivity are concerned. Little surprise, if the BRI was launched in 2013, the antecedents of the MCI were grounded the same year in terms of the proposition of Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TIRT). Initially, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed “the Establishment of a Coordination Committee for the Development of Trans-Caspian International Transportation Route” on 7 November 2013. Under the framework of the aforesaid agreement— to which China subsequently became a stakeholder—the pilot shipment was successfully concluded in July 2015. In addition, a container train termed as “the Nomad Express” started its cargo journey from Xinjiang (Northwest China) and made it to Baku (Azerbaijan) through Aktau and the Caspian Sea within a short duration of just six days (Shahbazov, 2018). Moreover, under the Caravanserai Project—which seeks collaboration among the customs bureaucracy in the region vis-à-vis the

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MCI—major infrastructure projects such as the Marmaray Undersea Rail Project, the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge in Istanbul (inaugurated in August 2016), the Eurasia Tunnel Project (inaugurated in December 2016) and the Istanbul Airport (inaugurated in October 2018) have been completed within the stipulated timeframe. These projects have been designed to expand connectivity between Asia and Europe. Moreover, as a key component of the MCI, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway was inaugurated in October 2017 (Mammadov, 2020). The BTK, very much like any BRI corridor, envisions market connectivity between Asia and Europe. In fact, owing to its overlapping character with the Eurasian Landbridge and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor of the BRI, the BTK can act as a catalyst in the promotion of transregional trade and economic collaboration, particularly between Ankara and Beijing. Last but not least, the member countries of the Middle Corridor intended to enhance the connectivity outreach of the initiative by establishing institutional and commercial linkages with, for example, South and Central Asian countries. In this regard, Turkey-Georgia-AzerbaijanTurkmenistan-Afghanistan Transit Corridor Agreement, which is generally known as the Lapis Lazuli Agreement (2017), can play an important role in ensuring not only mutual economic cooperation but also stabilising war-ravaged Afghanistan—which would access the Central Asin and Caspian market conveniently (Rahim, 2017). In addition, the MCI has, with its interconnected nodal points, earmarked a unique development model—sharing some common characteristics with the BRI—which is centred around rail and road connectivity. The MCI offers more space for mutual cooperation, particularly between Turkey and China, which are two leading Asian economies. Nonetheless, whether these parallel but autonomous and, at places, overlapping Initiatives encourage complementarity in terms of inter-Initiative market connectivity and economic cooperation or stir market, and in the long run strategic, competition is analysed in the next section.

BRI and the Middle Corridor: Complementarity or Competition? To begin with, the BRI and the MCI can serve as the catalyst to either realise market connectivity and commercial cooperation or encourage competition to grab markets. Much depends on the key stakeholders, especially China and Turkey—which are currently engaged constructively.

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Institutionally, China and Turkey have signed various MoUs such as the establishment of a Joint Working Group for the New Silk Road Connection, Railway Cooperation Agreement and Transport Infrastructure and Maritime Cooperation (Kumar, 2013). Infrastructurally, mutual understanding and commitment have resulted in the completion of various projects such as the Eurasia Tunnel, Marmaray submarine railway and the Canakkale 1915 Bridge. Moreover, high-tech projects that include the GK-2 Earth observation satellite, the Salt Lake Gas Storage Facility, the CSUN solar power plant as well as the 660-Megawatt coal-based power plant are in the pipeline. As an indication of bilateral cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese companies are working on infrastructure development projects in Turkey. For instance, Ankara–Istanbul High-Speed Railway Line, which was completed in 2014 with Chinese money worth 750 million US$, is a case in point. This railway project is unique in the sense that it is the first high-speed railway project done by a Chinese company overseas (Akcay, 2017). As already discussed, the focal point of the Belt and Road Initiative is the construction and maintenance of uninterrupted freight transportation from China to other regions, i.e. Asia, Africa and Europe. Regarding Europe, the Chinese government has planned to connect with England through Turkey via Edirne–Kars High-Speed Railway Line at the cost of 30 billion US$. In addition, the BTK has assumed centrality insofar as complementarity is concerned. Indeed, the BTK is a core component of the European–Caucasus–Asian Transport Corridor (TRACECA) project that factors into China’s connectivity plans under the BRI vis-à-vis the MCI. The BKT, stretching over 7000 km, would shorten the space and time between China and Europe from 30 to 45 days to around two weeks (Mammadov, 2020). As far as the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) project is concerned, Chinese corporations have invested in Turkey’s ports since 2015. In this regard, a consortium of COSCO, China Merchants Holdings International and China Investment Corporation spent around 940 million US$ on the Kumport Terminal. In addition, two more ports, namely, Çandarlı Port and Mersin Port, are likely to be placed under the MSR. Once these ports become operational, Turkey would have an enhanced capacity to not only host container ships across the Suez Canal but also access the North African market. As a viable means of transportation, this would ultimately benefit China too (Atlı, 2017).

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Moreover, China and Turkey are collaborating in the energy sector under the Belt and Road Initiative. Since Turkey is dependent on petroleum imports, it requires extension in gas storage facilities along with ensuring the safety of supply lines. Thus, it is enhancing the Salt Lake Gas Storage Facility. In this respect, with the financial support of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, of which Turkey is a founding member, Islamic Development Bank and the World Bank, work on the Gas Storage Expansion Project has been initiated. The project is expected to upgrade the capacity of the Tuz Golu Gas Storage Facility by 4.2–5.4 bcm, and that of Turkey to 9.7 bcm by 2023 (AIIB, 2018). Not only this, to meet its growing energy needs, the Turkish government in collaboration with its Chinese counterpart has planned to construct nuclear power plants for civilian purposes (Anadolu Agency, 2018). Besides, the two governments have signed agreements to enhance collaboration in the financial sector. To this end, the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) have already offered its services in Turkey. This carries positive overtones in terms of encouraging bilateral trade, investment and currency exchange (Cermen, 2019). Culturally, the BRI aspires to facilitate people-to-people contact in order to promote cultural understanding within the BRI community if not beyond. Since over seventy countries and scores of organisations have formally joined the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese government seems very concerned insofar as multiculturalism and political pluralism are concerned. To further understand each other at the state and societal level, Turkey and China are collaborating institutionally and culturally. For example, China observed 2013 as the Turkish Culture Year, and 2018 was celebrated as the Turkish Tourism Year in China. Subsequently, the number of Chinese tourists to Turkey reached 292,322 during January-August 2019 (Cermen, 2019). Moreover, Turkish National Day was observed in Beijing at the platform of Expo 2019. On the occasion, the Turkish officials empathised with the cultural exchange for developing a better understanding of each other’s political system, social norms and market values. In reciprocity, Chinese officials participated in the 88th Izmir International Fair (IIF, 2019). To further promote its cultural capital extra-regionally, the Chinese government is establishing Confucius Institutes in Turkey, whereas the latter has vowed to set up Yunus Emre Cultural Centers in China (Zan, 2016).

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The preceding analysis marked the existing institutional, infrastructural, financial and cultural cooperation between China and Turkey under the inter-Initiative cooperative framework. It is, thus, posited that the current scale of cooperation between China and Turkey does not denote economic competition. Rather, the way the two governments are consolidating bilateral relations since 2010 in a very candid and coherent manner. It seems very tangible that the two initiatives can help Turkey and China to realise infrastructural and commercial complementarity, which is discussed in the following. Potential Opportunities Owing to its unique geostrategic location, Turkey has the advantage to act as a connector and facilitator of transregional trade and investment between Europe and Asia. With a GDP growth rate of 5.35 per cent over the last decade, Ankara can expand its exports linkages with the BRI markets, especially that of China in the foreseeable future because its trade deficit with the latter registered a downward trend (TUIK, 2020). Beijing, on its part, can avail transportation means made available by the BRI and the MCI in order to expand its trade ties with the Central Asian states, the Trans-Caspian region, the Middle East and the Mediterranean region, of which Turkey is a key stakeholder. China’s trade volume with Europe exceeded 700 billion US$, and it can go up if the two initiatives, namely, Belt and Road and the Middle Corridor, are materialised effectively (BBC, 2021). Besides Turkey and China, other BRI countries such as Turkmenistan (Central Asia) and Pakistan (South Asia) can benefit in terms of infrastructure development, foreign direct investment (FDI) and transregional trade (Hussain, 2017). Moreover, European countries especially the European Union can also maximise its interests by establishing institutional liaison with its Chinese counterpart under the China International Import Expo (CIIE)—which, by design, encourages exports of other countries (CIIE, 2019). In addition, the Belt and Road Initiative offers incentives, particularly, to Turkey to negotiate financial arrangements such as facilitated currency exchange—that may gradually reduce reliance on the dollar. Last but not least, due to its geostrategic location, Turkey has the potential to become a centre of energy storage, consumption and transition particularly to Europe through inter-Initiative connectivity in the

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years to come. The expansion and consolidation of the energy market could enhance Turkey’s position as guarantor of the transregional supply chain (Öge, 2019; Winrow, 2011). This would also encourage security cooperation not only between China and Turkey but also among Turkey and the BRI/MCI world. Importantly, being a regional military power, Ankara can play a crucial role in protecting the physical infrastructure of BRI and that of MCI. Thus, the latter can complement each other through mutual will which needs to be furthered in policy coordination and political cooperation in order to promote sustained economic cooperation along with encourging cultural‚ educational and media exchanges. Key Challenges The aforesaid opportunities are not without its challenges which, if not tacked candidly, can hamper inter-Initiative complementarity. To begin with, a major challenge that the Belt and Road Initiative may severally face relates to regional instability in, for example, the Middle East. In fact, both China and Turkey are placed in the unstable and hostile neighbourhood (Svensson, 2013). Regional political and strategic instability, if not tackled through mutual means, can ignite civil wars and other armed conflicts in these already war-ravaged and terror-stricken regions—where non-state terrorist outfits are not totally dismantled (Giustozzi, 2018). Moreover, some countries from the BRI/MCI world‚ that include China and Turkey‚ have territorial disputes. China’s recent spat with India is a case in point. Non-resolution of territorial disputes would amount to strategic uncertainty—with detrimental implications for economic development (Avan, 2019). Thus, the Chinese and the Turkish government, in collaboration with other BRI/MCI partners, would have to devise a mutually agreed-upon framework to resolve territorial disputes. Besides security challenges, political and socio-economic instability seems a common feature of most of the BRI/MCI countries in Asia‚ Africa and Latin America. The Central Asian states, for instance, are unstable in political and socio-economic terms (Kudaibergenova & Shin, 2018). Similarly, the majority of Middle Eastern and South Asian countries are not dissimilar from the aforesaid region (Maya, 2000; Volpi, 2013). Interestingly, however, within Asia, Turkey and China have achieved political stability and socio-economic cohesion owing to the efficacy of their respective party system (Aslan-Akman, 2012; Chai, 1980).

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However, political and socio-economic challenges that beset most of BRI/MCI countries needs to be converted into capabilities if economic cooperation and development are top priorities of the inter-Initiative cooperative framework. This is easier said than done. Additionally, issues relating to “loans” given to some key BRI countries such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka need to be addressed in a manner that generates transparency (Dawn, 2015). Culturally, inter-Initiative social mobility along with sustained academic exchange is to be encouraged at the higher level of policy formulation. It is pertinent to mention that despite the Chinese and Turkish government efforts to delink nationalistic narratives regarding, for instance, the Uighurs, both the Chinese and the Turks, by and large, still have a very skewed understanding of each other’s culture and politics (Isik & Zou, 2019). Even at the state level, chronic mistrust and misperception still persist, which is expressed through bureaucratic biases that, in turn, affect policy implementation. This could probably be a common phenomenon among the BRI/MCI community since each member has its own political and economic system as well as social ethos and cultural values. The solution lies in long-term collective measures—such as cultural diversity, political pluralism, socio-economic egalitarianism and ideological nontotalisation—that have to be adopted at the state and societal level if key challenges are to be addressed in order to accrue optimal benefits from the potential opportunities.

Conclusion This chapter attempted to explain whether China’s Belt and Road Initiative factored into Turkey’s Asia policy and, to what extent, the Middle Corridor Initiative—that Turkey has projected through its foreign policy—impacts Turkey’s relations with not just China but also other countries of the Belt and Road Initiative. Empirically, it is concluded that though Turkey and China lacked cordial ties during much of the twentieth century, yet bilateral engagement gained currency by the end of the century. In the post-9/11 period, bilateral relations have reached the level of “strategic cooperation”. Importantly, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Turkey’s Middle Corridor Initiative, both launched in 2013, have opened new vistas for economic‚ strategic and cultural cooperation. Turkey, as a regional military and economic power, approached the BRI rationally. Facing a trade deficit with China in the preceding years,

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Turkey has expedited its exports to China, and the latter has become a leading trade partner of Turkey in the current context. In order to expand its export base, ensure energy supply and transregional access market in Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia and China, Ankara has supported the BRI in the spirit of win–win cooperation. Importantly, among the Asian countries, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Turkey is the only Muslim-majority country that has negotiated the BRI from a position of strength in economic terms. In this respect, Turkey has initiated the Middle Corridor Initiative that, at points, overlaps with the BRI operationally. Ankara has instrumentalised the MCI to not only complement the BRI in terms of market connectivity and commercial cooperation but also enhance its economic and strategic influence in Asia in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the prospects of BRI-MCI complementarity in terms of infrastructural development, fulfilment of energy needs and transregional market access are challenged by regional instability, political turmoil and socio-economic upheavals. With respect to solutions to these daunting challenges, the BRI/MCI governments ought to work in tandem in order to evolve a mutually agreed-upon framework grounded in multiculturalism, political pluralism, religious harmony, social tolerance and scientific research.

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The Transactions

Between the Two Worlds: Turkey’s Repositioning in the Global Economy Mehmet Babacan

Introduction The much-stereotyped political discussion of Turkey, i.e. between East and West, has been overwhelmingly shallow in many ways. Contrary to its portrayal in Western or rather Orientalist imagination, therefore, it demonstrates multiple inconsistencies, especially regarding its international positioning. Widely recognised as an emerging market economy; however, Turkey’s at least four-decade-old liberalisation path is often questioned on the grounds of its political and/or macroeconomic policy (re)formulation. Almost a decade ago, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the country again came under the spotlight for its so-called ‘axis shift’. Rather than a specific choice over its Eastern vs Western partners or alliances, for much of the trends in its recent history, Turkey’s policy choices and orientation mostly reflect a necessity due to the evolving nature of the world’s political and economic makeup (Babacan, 2011, p. 154).

M. Babacan (B) Department of Economics and Finance, Istanbul Medipol University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_11

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Turkey has become among the upper-middle-income group countries and tripled the per capita gross-domestic product (GDP) since 2005. Much of the criticism related to this period of economic success, however, comes on the grounds of non-addressed structural issues. Among many suspicious of the evident rise of Turkey, Subasat (2020), for instance, calls the economic growth in two periods (2002–2008 and 2010–2017) as fake or rather manufactured miracles. While pointing out the relative appreciation of the Turkish Lira within the first miracle period as the main source of the fake success story, Subasat (2020) seems to underestimate the relative depreciation of the Lira as the main cause of Turkey’s recent stalemate regarding its per capita GDP growth. What many sceptics of Turkish sustained economic growth at a pace of 5 per cent per annum during the first decade (2003–2012) of AK Party rule miss is that other figures such as foreign direct investment inflows or trade figures also posted significant increases, as much as 5–10 folds compared to prior periods. Among many scholars, Jeffrey Sachs (2013), for instance, acknowledged the success story, referring to the rapid growth environment between 2002 and 2012, declining inequality and rising innovation while pointing the main challenges such as sustainable growth, unstable neighbourhood and raising equality among social classes given the current economic model in Turkey. Added to all, Sachs (2013) was also giving credit to Turkey’s what he called ‘smart diplomacy’. Meantime, the fundamental question regarding Turkey’s economic success story was how to make it sustainable, given the impediment on key institutions for long-run success due to political misgovernment, argued KalemliOzcan (2013), for instance. Others, such as Yilmaz and Sazak (2018) were critical on the grounds of AK Party’s economy team and President Erdogan’s policies that replaced the brightest with the dimmest. All in all, it is not the exchange of gun fires regarding the methodology change or computational manipulations as argued by some but rather the essential foundations of long-term success in a sustainable way. Here in this chapter, quite in line with the current world disorder and rising uncertainty, I would argue that Turkey’s old institutional setting was not capable of navigating through the uncharted waters. While Turkey’s rise within the last couple of decades could well be understood from various points of view, this chapter adopts a more political-economy oriented perspective, including the following dimensions:

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i. Turkey’s opening to new destinations, fostered by increased trade and other complementary elements (such as FTAs, visa-free travel regimes, and direct flights) ii. Emergence of a new donor country, as Turkey became more of a net benefactor in contrast with its net recipient country status back in the 1990s iii. A functional and pragmatic review of the country’s prolonged conflicts and issues with its neighbours, the so-called ‘zeroproblem’ framework in foreign policy initiatives iv. More vocal and actively engaged members of all international platforms and increased questioning of current global governance structures as well as institutions v. A renewed top-down state organisation has given the newly adapted presidential system of governance which enables a comparatively more coordinated action when needed vi. Turkey’s slowly evolving efforts of re-industrialisation which pave the way for further economic engagement and create new rooms of political influence, mostly evident in the defence industry vii. Late addressing of country’s prolonged structural weaknesses (i.e. lowering the current account deficit, increasing the efficiency in and returns to education) that is to yield significant effects in the medium or long-run The following parts will try to discuss these various standpoints in a detailed fashion, observing the relevant timeline in Turkey’s experience. The first section will focus on the rise of the country, mostly as a ’trading state’, given the increased influence over its neighbourhood and region in broader terms through an energised private investor and entrepreneur appetite. In the second section, a series of domestic and external challenges that forced the country to change its course of policy formulation and institutional setting come under the spotlight. Policy reactions and reforms that were undertaken in a contentious period are argued to pave the way of Turkey’s recent manoeuvre towards readjustment and finetuning in all fronts, including governance, industrial development, trade and other incentives, changes in business environment, legal and legislative changes, etc. In the third section, Turkey’s attempt to revive the long-neglected industrialisation efforts in a more orchestrated way will be key to contextualise the last section, which highlights possible scenarios of the country’s future alignment between the two worlds, namely a free

232

M. BABACAN

and orderly global economic system and a chaotic unbalanced protectionist environment. In the last section, Turkey’s likely engagement to the Asia–Pacific region will be questioned on real economic, financial and institutional grounds.

Episode I: Turkey’s Rise as a Balanced ‘Trading State’ in a Multi-Polar World During the short recent history of Turkish transformation on the political economy grounds, it is often debated whether domestic changes triggered the country’s way of engagement with the rest of the world or vice versa. There is, however, an increasing consensus that the latter has been very much causal relationship. Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the Cold War policy framework shaped Turkey’s engagement to its close neighbourhood and region, needless to say, its positioning at the global level. At geographical, institutional and social dimensions, the country’s political-military engagements came first, which were largely defined under its alliance with the West as the importance of trade was realised during the Özal era. Much has progressed towards that direction, as Kiri¸sçi (2009) and Kiri¸sçi and Kaptano˘glu (2011) refer to the leading factor in driving Turkish foreign policy aspirations towards its region, which is described as the ‘trading state’. Term coined by Rosecrance (1986), trading state describes best the replacement of military-political hard power dominance with that of trade and commercial ties (or soft power) in pursuing international relations under the nation-state order. The main intuition is that relations that rely on mutual interdependence rather than preferences over self-sufficiency could become sustainable and more successful. Yet, the interdependence via trade-conflict relationship might not guarantee a complete resolution due to the so-called political ‘ceiling’, as referred by Tsarouhas and Yazgan (2018, p. 18) within the context of Turkish-Greek rapprochement. Turkey has maintained a constant rise in its share of world total merchandise trade over the course of the last two decades. According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) figures, the Turkish share of world merchandise exports and imports by the year 2018 is 0.86 per cent and 1.12 percent, respectively. When commercial services are considered, the country’s share in the world total exports and imports is 0.83 per cent and 0.40 per cent, again, respectively (Fig. 1).

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Turkey's Total Trade Volume 450 376

400

225

250

391

391

391

389

341

243

190

200

161

150 100

400

299

277

300

403

351

334

350

389

117 87

50 0

Fig. 1 Turkey’s total trade (in bn USD) (Source Turkish Statistical Institute [TurkStat])

Despite significant challenges at the domestic, regional and global levels, Turkey has managed to navigate through the world trade, thanks to its rising capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the so-called ‘Anatolian tigers’ to become exporters and a continuous effort for diversification of markets (Atlı, 2011; Babacan, 2011; Kutlay, 2011). Since the early 2000s, Turkey has increased the number of countries as its trading partners, as well as mutual investors, significantly. Meantime an increasing number of companies in southern and eastern Turkey helped the economic growth and development become more even over the course of the last decade. Hirschman Herfindahl (HH) index is a measure of diversification of markets, thus the dispersion of trade value across an exporter’s partners. A country with trade (export or import) that is concentrated in very few markets gets an index value close to 1. Similarly, a country with a perfectly diversified trade portfolio will have an index close to zero (World Bank WITS, 2020). According to the World Bank integrated trade solutions database, Turkey has witnessed a continuous improvement in its diversification of trade destinations, as seen in Fig. 2.

234

M. BABACAN Turkey- HH Market concentration index

0.070 0.065

0.060 0.050 0.040 0.030

0.060

0.057 0.053

0.051 0.044 0.037 0.038 0.036 0.038 0.036

0.033 0.034

0.036 0.037 0.034 0.033

0.020 0.010 0.000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fig. 2 Turkey’s HH Market Concentration Index (2002–2018) (Source World Bank Group—World Integrated Trade Solution [WITS])

Meantime, the Index of Market Penetration measures the extent to which the origin country’s exports reach proven importers of those products worldwide. A higher index indicates that a country already exports to a greater percentage of existing markets for its products; a low value indicates potential for expansion. It is calculated as the number of countries to which the origin country exports a particular product divided by the number of countries that report importing the product that year (World Bank WITS, 2020). Figure 3, therefore, indicates Turkey’s constant rise in terms of further penetration to world markets over the years. Since the early 2000s, along with the global rise of the Eastern AsianPacific region both in terms of real economic activity, i.e. trade and investment, and financial intermediation, Turkey’s relations with its East have improved significantly. This process is, however, totally in line with the global phenomena, as shown in Figs. 4 and 5. Comparing and contrasting the two major trade partners of Turkey, the EU and Asia, it is evident that the share of the first is at a gradual but constant decline while the latter’s is on the constant rise, especially following the global financial crisis in 2008. Overall, Turkey’s evolving nature of commodity trade is a clear reflection of the turn of the tide at a global scale. This phenomenon is also confirming the rapid positive decoupling of emerging market economies

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235

Turkey- Export Market Penetration Index 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0

13.9

15.2

17.5 16.2 16.9

18.8 19.4 19.4

21.6 20.6 21.0

24.0 22.7 23.3

26.2 25.1 25.7

23.8

10.0 5.0 0.0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Fig. 3 Turkey’s Export Market Penetration Index (2002–2019) (Source World Bank Group—World Integrated Trade Solution [WITS]) World Merchandise Trade, Exports 0.50

0.44

0.45 0.38

0.40 0.35

0.37

0.30 0.25

0.28

EU (%)

0.20 0.15

Asia (%)

0.10 0.05 0.00

Fig. 4 Shares from the world trade (exports) of the EU and Asia (2002–2020) (Source WTO, UNCTAD)

236

M. BABACAN

World Merchandise Trade, Imports 0.50 0.45

0.42

0.40

0.36

0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20

0.34 0.25

EU (%) Asia (%)

0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00

Fig. 5 Shares from the world trade (imports) of the EU and Asia (2002–2020) (Source WTO, UNCTAD)

(mostly in Asia) compared to their advanced competitors, again right after the crisis up until the US Federal Reserve Bank’s (FED) tapering announcement. The direction of both trade and capital flows has been in favour of the Asia–Pacific, mostly led by the Chinese economy since the last couple of decades. Both Figs. 6 and 7 are confirmatory with regards to the rise of Asian economies’ share from Turkey’s exports and imports, making some 25 and 31 per cent of the total by 2018, respectively. Meantime, however, the share of the country’s main trading partner, the EU’s share in Turkey’s exports and imports witnessed a steady fall down from 57 per cent in 2002 to 50 per cent; and 50 per cent to 36 per cent as of 2018, respectively. Table 1, on the other hand, points that Turkey has maintained its importance for the European economies from 2010 to 2018, as it ranks from 5 to 7th in terms of total trade volume among the EU’s trading partners. Since the old ’axis shift’ debate around Turkey took place in 2008– 2009, developments and recent turn of the tide for the world trade continue to finger the rise of Asian economies, mostly characterised by emerging markets at the expense of a steady decline in advanced or industrialised Western economies. Turkey, therefore, remains fully in line with

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237

Turkey's Exports by Regions 0.70

0.64

0.60 0.56

0.50 0.40

0.26

0.30 0.20

0.14 0.18

0.10 0.09 0.00

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Europe (%)

Asia (%)

Middle East (%)

Fig. 6 Shares in Turkey’s exports (Europe, Asia and the Middle East) (Source TurkStat, International Trade Centre [ITC]) Turkey's Imports by Regions 0.70

0.64

0.60

0.50

0.50 0.40 0.30

0.32 0.19

0.20 0.10

0.10 0.06

0.00 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Europe (%)

Asia (%)

Middle East (%)

Fig. 7 Shares in Turkey’s imports (Europe, Asia and the Middle East) (Source TurkStat, International Trade Centre [ITC])

the global trends over the course of the last couple of decades in terms of its foreign trade dynamics. Turkey’s rise as a ’trading state’ of course, has multiple domestic dimensions, including the rise of SMEs in promoting exports further and bolstering state–business relations. Chambers of

2011

1 2 4 3 6 7 5 10 8 11 19 9 12 14 15 21 13 18 17 20 16 22

United States China (excl. Hong Kong) Switzerland Russia Turkey Japan Norway South Korea India Canada Mexico Brazil Saudi Arabia Singapore Australia Vietnam South Africa Hong Kong United Arab Emirates Malaysia Algeria Libya

458,439,7 431,160,1 235,563,7 309,993,3 122,152,8 119,526,1 142,480,3 68,307,9 80,575,3 60,554 40,918,2 75,701,3 54,860,6 46,494,4 46,126,2 18,185,9 47,992,4 41,745,8 42,374,8 31,513 45,161,3 12,565,9

1 2 4 3 6 7 5 10 9 12 16 8 11 14 15 22 17 19 18 21 13 20

2012 502,945,8 436,230,4 239,508,2 338,624,2 124,315,1 120,661,7 150,203,8 74,626,2 76,123,7 61,699,8 47,500,7 77,695,1 64,731,5 51,974,9 48,465,5 23,954,3 46,093,9 44,222,3 45,498,4 33,338 53,889 39,201,5

1 2 4 3 6 7 5 8 10 12 17 9 11 15 18 22 19 16 14 20 13 21

2013 488,911,6 428,028,6 263,670 326,483,2 128,281,1 110,627 139,997,3 75,007,9 72,801,2 58,719,9 44,915,5 73,191,1 63,782 46,737,3 42,223 27,001,2 40,041,1 45,877,9 53,851,3 32,650,4 54,306,3 31,048,9

Top Trade Partners of the European Union (Extra-EU Trade)

Total trade w/the EU e (thousands)

Table 1

1 2 4 3 6 7 5 8 9 12 15 10 11 17 19 21 18 16 14 20 13 22

2014 520,587,1 466,973,8 236,778 285,445,7 129,165,1 109,789 135,202 80,847,8 72,827,5 59,083,8 46,416,4 68,245,7 63,801,2 45,249,8 38,760,2 28,371,6 41,869,3 45,549,9 50,914,2 33,626,6 52,899,2 17,789,3

1 2 3 4 5 7 6 8 9 11 14 10 12 16 19 20 17 15 13 21 18 22

2015 620,479,1 521,432 252,868,1 210,228 140,601,1 116,227,9 123,123,7 89,037,6 77,615,7 63,158,2 53,107,5 65,566,5 61,603,5 48,810,8 41,078,4 38,427,9 44,849,8 49,582,3 57,760,4 36,119,1 43,160,5 11,691,2

238 M. BABACAN

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 11 14 15 18 19 17 16 13 21 20 22

United States China (excl. Hong Kong) Switzerland Russia Turkey Japan Norway South Korea India Canada Mexico Brazil Saudi Arabia Singapore Australia Vietnam South Africa Hong Kong United Arab Emirates Malaysia Algeria Libya

612,348 521,866,3 263,586,8 191,330,2 144,509,6 123,906,4 111,835,6 84,162,6 77,020,9 64,241,7 54,612,1 60,625,8 52,704,6 50,257,4 45,512,3 42,453 45,963,6 48,610,3 54,544,1 35,168,2 36,908,3 8327,9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 11 13 14 17 18 19 16 15 20 21 22

2017

Source International Trade Centre (ITC) and the European Commission (EC)

2016

Total trade w/the EU e (thousands) 633,485,8 572,993,3 260,338,3 230,676 154,574,1 129,031,5 124,421 98,944,8 85,667,9 69,211,3 61,831,7 63,362,2 54,728,4 53,336,6 47,710,8 47,599,8 47,157,7 47,855,7 52,557,6 39,280,7 37,351,6 15,248,1

1 2 3 4 5 7 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 18 15 17 19 16 20 21 22

2018 676,688,3 607,273,5 265,501,2 254,028,2 153,333,9 134,942,6 136,729,5 100,914,4 91,576,5 72,594,8 65,468,5 65,325,4 61,050,9 58,186 47,543,9 49,372,2 48,021,8 46,558 48,823,6 39,850,1 39,795,1 21,341,8

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

2019 746,756,3 646,800,8 292,582,5 248,576,1 154,137,1 143,848,1 127,735,2 99,601,2 91,523,4 79,690,4 66,480,9 64,236,7 58,915,2 55,373,7 53,650,1 51,772,5 51,543,4 47,998,7 47,922,4 41,606,8 35,767,2 20,809

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

239

240

M. BABACAN

commerce, export promotion agency, increased role of Turkish Eximbank in providing funds for exporters and Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM) together with other business groups such as DEIK, TUSKON (later broke the ranks with the AK Party government and banned due to its Gulenist label and ties), MUSIAD and TUSIAD all harmonised efforts to enhance Turkey’s capacity as a commercial and production hub within the 2003–2013 period. Last, one should also acknowledge the role of Turkish unconventional monetary policy between 2010 and 2015, which made a more balanced while sustainable growth in exports possible through moderate credit conditions, stable exchange rates and other financial elements in the country. Considering the country’s attractiveness in terms of financial capital flows, Heinemann (2016), for instance, argues that framing of Turkey in the aftermath of the global financial crisis was more on the ‘decoupling’ axis rather than ‘convergence’, compared to its Central and Eastern European (CEE) peers. That was largely due to the financial safe zone shape of Turkey’s less integrated financial industry to the European markets. Overall, the macro-prudential policies helped Turkey to weather the crisis relatively in a better shape. Taking the lessons right from the 2001 financial crisis, both the Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) and Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) paved the way for monetary and financial stability. The banking system was restructured and recapitalised, regulation and monitoring in the industry were strengthened via tight implementation without any compromise since 2002. The CBRT, on the other hand, adopted an explicit roadmap to financial stability in 2011 as no institution had a clear mandate or explicit objective on policy responses to potential instability in the financial sector by the end of 2010. Thus, the Bank incorporated the financial stability objective into its inflation targeting (IT) framework as it redesigned its toolkit to respond to the macro-financial risks (reserve requirements and interest rates were jointly used). Three key elements used to enhance both growth and stability at the same time were monetary, fiscal and financial prudence. Thanks to such measures, since then, Turkey has managed to constraint household indebtedness (its ratio to the GDP), for instance, which is among the lowest across its peers (i.e. EMs) as well as the advanced economies. Even doing so, the country’s structural problems, such as unsustainable current account deficit and relatively high volumes of short-term private sector debt, continued to pressurise external balances, added on other risk

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

241

elements, which in turn ended with the latest currency shock in August 2018.

Episode II: Turkey Challenged and Emerged as a Developmental State Between the 2014 and 2019 period, Turkey’s rise as an emerging market economy and middle-power state with big-power assertions was challenged both at domestic and international levels. A decade-long economic performance was under question, in a comparative way with those of BRIC countries (Öni¸s & Kutlay, 2013). The country’s outreach through the ‘trading state’ apparatus also came to its limits, where even the ’rise and demise of Turkish trading state’ was argued (Yinanç, 2015). Accompanied with major domestic political challenges such as Gezi protests and the standoff between the AK Party government and Gulenist movement, ending with a military coup attempt on the 15th of July, 2016 that still have repercussions today, Turkey’s economic success story was losing momentum. Key developments that led to the decline of the Turkish rapid economic growth period and thus causing the trading state’s reach its limits during the period of 2014–2029 could be summarised as follows: i. Change in the favourable global financial conditions, led by the FED’s announcement of the end of the quantitative easing (QE), i.e. tapering ii. Increased risk perception in the investors’ eyes, mostly cultivated by geostrategic issues around the country, which brought intensified terrorist acts as well as a military coup attempt (on the 15th of July 2016) during July 2015 and December 2016 iii. Turkey’s failing prospects of being a full member of the EU and rising tensions in Cyprus issue and the Mediterranean iv. Deteriorating macroeconomic outlook with a major currency shock in August 2018, which took more than a year to recover and balance the exchange rate, domestic price level(s) and other macro indicators before it deteriorated once again in 2020 In order to tackle all the above-mentioned issues, the Turkish government has taken significant steps towards addressing the long-awaiting sources of lower investor confidence—though with some mixed signals in different

242

M. BABACAN

areas due to the very nature of the current economic situation. The establishment of the Turkey Sovereign Wealth Fund (Türkiye Varlık Fonu) right after the coup attempt to stabilise the investment environment in the country, for instance, was an example of such mixed signals in terms of its timing. In the meantime, Turkey was undertaking various measures to maintain economic and financial stability as one could enumerate the quickly adopted ones as follows: i. Improved investment climate via new incentives, changes in the tax regime and reduced red tape ii. Reduction of formalities on firm liquidations and establishing firms iii. Institution of the court of appeals (in 7 regions) to eliminate the workload iv. Opening of the doors to the ‘qualified foreigners’ to have unlimited work permits and rights of residence to their spouses and/or children v. New economic and social incentives unfolded for Turkey’s Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia regions to enhance more balanced welfare distribution across the country vi. Establishment of a new soft-power toolkit, named Turkey Education Foundation (Türkiye Maarif Vakfı) to bolster educational and other social relations with the rest of the world With an increasing emphasis on Turkey’s domestic production capacity as well as creating more favourable investment conditions especially in the manufacturing industry, the Ministry of Treasury and Finance (after the merger of the two ministries with the adaption of the new presidential system) played a major role in coordinating the efforts. Thanks to such developments, Turkey now ranks 33rd among some 190 nations in the year 2019, based on the overall ease of doing business index, according to the latest World Bank’s Doing Business report, published in 2020. The rapid improvement in these grounds is significant, as seen in the below chart (Fig. 8). The state-led developmentalist approach that became more visible after the end of 2013 also paved the way for the consolidation of institutional settings, as referred above. Adaption of the new presidential system that facilitated policy coordination which was clearly a need for alignment and management of economic policies, however, is under criticism

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

243

Turkey-Ease of Doing Business Rank 80

73

73

70 60

72 71

69

69

63

63

60

51

50

43

40 30

33

33

20 10 0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Fig. 8 Turkey’s Rank in Ease of Doing Business Index (Overall, 2008–2019) (Source World Bank Doing Business [2020])

of its linearity and proximity to the Russian-Chinese type of centralisation of power (Öni¸s, 2019, p. 14). The sustainability of the new state-led capitalist model is questioned, and Öni¸s (2019), in that regard, predicts the AK Party government’s ability to remain in power is closely associated with its success in evading any near crisis. To this date, it seems that it has been successful in avoiding the late currency crisis turning into a full-blown economic crisis. To some critics, however, ‘dependent financialisation’ led to an economic structure that made economic activity increasingly dependent on financial/capital outflows (Akçay & Güngen, 2019, p. 18).

Episode III: Breaking the Stalemate Through the Rise of Industrial State Since the early 1980s, mostly driven by the country’s opening to external markets and promotion of exports, industrial production in Turkey enjoyed a relatively favourable domestic environment. Based on previous industrialisation efforts back in the 1960s and 1970s, industrial capacity in Turkey was quite in good shape with a stable share from the GDP, despite the increased share of services in economic activity over the years. Nevertheless, a gradual shift from manufacturing to services industry over the last couple of decades—with the exception of the construction industry is evident. Easier and less costly access to finance during the 2000s in that

244

M. BABACAN

regard could be counted among other factors leading to the currently stagnant industrial capacity. Increases in industrial output were based on dramatic increases in imports, thereby yielding a deteriorating current account balance (Babacan, 2018, p. 363). Figures 9 and 10 clearly depict the relatively strong role of (manufacturing and services) industry in creating value-added as well as employment in Turkey. Compared to its Asian peers like China, India and Korea, however, it lacks even a higher contribution from the manufacturing side. Heavy reliance on a highly concentrated industrial structure or rather services industry only increases economic risks while inhibiting the potential industrial upgrades relevant for overcoming the middle-income trap. Ya˘gcı (2017), for instance, asserts that Turkey must prioritise industrialisation as a key policy to achieve the status of a developing state while proposing re-industrialisation as a remedy to the middle-income trap. Investing in high-end technologies has been one of the top priorities of the country even since 2014. Ministry of Industry and Technology, in that regard, grants significant support for the SMEs, especially to technology start-ups, through various institutions such as TUBITAK or KOSGEB.

40.0

38.9

38.6 32.8

35.0

30.9

30.0

29.1

28.6

27.2

26.7

25.0

24.8

25.0 20.0

18.6

17.9

USA*

BRA

15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 IDN

CHN

KOR

MEX

JPN*

POL

TUR

DEU

HUN

IND

Fig. 9 Industry (including construction), value-added for selected countries (% of GDP) (Source World Development Indicators [WDI]; as of 2019)

245

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

35.0

32.1

32.1

30.0

27.4

27.2

25.5

25.3

25.1

25.0

24.6

24.2

22.4 20.0

19.9

20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0

POL

HUN

CHN

DEU

MEX

TUR

IND

KOR

JPN

IDN

BRA

USA

Fig. 10 Employment in industry for selected countries (% of total employment)* (Source World Bank Open Data; as of 2019)

Producing higher value-added items and exporting more high-technology products are key in sustainable development. Often regarded as stuck in the middle-income trap, Turkey exhibits the characteristics of a relatively low share of high-technology ingredients in its exports while facing a significant share of intermediate and capital goods imports, especially in strong growth periods. Tables 2 and 3 are on the structural composition of Turkish exports and imports, respectively. Highlighted numbers are indicating (i) the impact of the global financial crisis in 2009; (ii) the peak levels (if any) of exports and imports volumes regarding the specific product groups; and (iii) the latest provisional numbers in 2019. According to the figures, the intermediate goods trade deficit becomes dramatic in good times, thanks to the spurred demand for imported items. Even though domestic production and thus exports of such items posted a significant rise during the last decade, imports gained a stronger momentum meantime. Both exports and imports of capital and consumption goods, on the other hand, indicate a moderate increase over the same time period. Thus, Turkey should utilise and diversify its intermediate goods production capacity in the short run. Earning a competitive advantage in those

49,711

2637

35,162

102

2923

67,734

3206

47,184

82

3713

5304

9842

Intermediate goods Unprocessed materials incidental to industry Processed materials incidental to industry Unprocessed fuels and oils Parts of investment goods

11,118 5814

16,725 6884

Capital goods Capital goods (Except transportations equipment) Transportation vehicles incidental to industry

2009**

2008

34,471

107

38,416

3663

56,381

536

11,771 6414

2010

4432

132

45,718

4031

67,942

6447

14,192 7745

2011

4508

237

59,141

4204

82,656

5608

13,734 8125

2012

5028

252

49,773

5058

74,817

6653

15,592 8939

2013

5253

235

50,214

4719

75,171

6878

16,107 9229

2014

Turkish exports by broad economic categorisation (in mn USD)

Breakdown of exports by BEC (*)

Table 2

4535

182

47,347

3761

68,433

6893

15,392 8499

2015

4299

139

46,449

3665

66,890

7706

15,891 8186

2016

4662

162

49,869

4579

73,063

9356

18,352 8996

2017

5406

185

53,878

4701

79,264

9713

19,843 10,130

2018

5734

232

52,641

4195

80,171

9556

20,434 10,879

2019***

246 M. BABACAN

Consumption goods Automobiles Durable consumption goods Semi-durable consumption goods

Parts of transportation vehicles Unprocessed materials of food and beverages Processed materials of food and beverages Processed fuels and oils

Breakdown of exports by BEC (*)

6087 7864

10,654

12,519

2538

5144

7474 8948

1144

1324

40,740

255

138

47,077

4951

2009**

6943

2008

11,794

6210 8916

45,321

2800

1165

447

6336

2010

13,069

6485 10,465

52,219

3601

1832

209

7988

2011

13,434

6069 12,460

55,556

4282

1831

289

8164

2012

14,775

6856 13,318

60,732

3454

1891

352

9009

2013

15,946

7255 14,984

65,088

3473

1696

294

9288

2014

14,626

6899 13,130

59,146

2155

1618

239

8595

2015

14,650

8355 12,807

58,877

1236

1791

384

8927

2016

15,024

11,814 13,821

64,878

1961

1809

301

9719

2017

16,194

11,898 16,085

69,781

4292

1888

432

10,757

2019***

(continued)

15,919

12,441 14,927

68,031

2129

1833

372

10,761

2018

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

247

1513 252

2616 301

5893

6486

5390

7501

5784

9344

2013

661 151,803

1234 276

2253 312

4511

5512

8406

2012

491 559 411 555 516 132,027 102,128 113,883 134,907 152,462

3880

4210

4971

7878

2011

2837 317

4389

4226

7155

2010

3026 284

6355

7135

2009**

Source TurkStat *Table based on World Trade Organization (WTO)/BEC definition **Impact of global financial crisis ***Provisional figures

Non-durable consumption goods Unprocessed of food and beverages Processed of food and beverages Gasoline Transportation vehicles not incidental to industry Others Total

2008

(continued)

Breakdown of exports by BEC (*)

Table 2

2058 147

7407

6185

8694

2015

1721 166

6925

5690

8564

2016

2065 176

7384

5954

8640

2017

1922 209

7716

6164

8732

2018

2081 379

7873

6236

9036

2019***

1243 869 871 700 783 1144 157,610 143,839 142,530 156,993 167,921 171,531

2300 183

8125

6297

9998

2014

248 M. BABACAN

99,482

7985

43,483

17,772

8292

151,747

13,692

65,680

32,259

9445

3078

4765

Intermediate goods Unprocessed materials incidental to industry Processed materials incidental to industry Unprocessed fuels and oils Parts of investment goods

21,462 18,384

28,021 23,256

Capital goods Capital goods (Except transportations equipment) Transportation vehicles incidental to industry

2009**

2008

9064

1176

58,733

12,259

131,445

5569

28,818 23,250

2010

10,861

1304

75,482

16,160

173,140

7665

37,271 29,605

2011

10,949

1162

73,612

15,344

174,930

5800

33,925 28,125

2012

12,412

923

85,896

13,926

183,811

4737

36,771 32,034

2013

12,152

847

78,850

13,299

176,722

5558

35,996 30,438

2014

Turkish imports by broad economic categorisation (in mn USD)

Breakdown of imports by BEC (*)

Table 3

11,421

2975

67,930

9328

143,317

6388

34,905 28,517

2015

13,873

2646

66,622

8711

134,315

6153

35,919 29,766

2016

15,647

3929

85,667

12,542

171,462

4835

33,116 28,281

2017

10,804

3616

74,259

11,818

157,896

3704

25,765 22,061

2019***

(continued)

12,090

4402

80,908

13,337

170,048

3456

29,304 25,848

2018

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

249

4265 2619

4090

4552 3531

4808

10,831

14,511

19,288

1206

1742

21,489

2074

3154

Consumption goods Automobiles Durable consumption goods Semi-durable consumption goods

7839

11,264

Parts of transportation vehicles Unprocessed materials of food and beverages Processed materials of food and beverages Processed fuels and oils

2009**

2008

(continued)

Breakdown of imports by BEC (*)

Table 3

5303

6820 3499

24,735

12,223

1113

2794

10,581

2010

6453

8475 4337

29,692

16,434

1794

4379

12,334

2011

5893

7248 4353

26,699

17,424

2137

3703

11,129

2012

6795

9127 4962

30,416

17,426

2244

3414

11,890

2013

6913

7718 4664

29,006

17,702

2628

4290

12,187

2014

6279

9223 3766

28,587

10,279

2389

3456

12,115

2015

5710

9840 3268

27,947

8333

2299

3349

13,197

2016

5021

8606 3379

28,488

11,307

2090

4248

15,335

2017

4230

5904 3140

22,878

14,112

1736

5121

15,432

2018

3380

3381 3492

18,493

10,128

1711

5325

13,651

2019***

250 M. BABACAN

4949

595

1003

1190 577

666 140,899

753

1121

1306 117

707 201,964

2009**

5301

2008

546 185,544

1343 197

1366

676

5531

2010

739 240,842

1662 240

1816

814

5895

2011

990 236,545

1675 157

1387

809

5177

2012

Source TurkStat *Table based on World Trade Organization (WTO)/BEC definition **Impact of global financial crisis ***Provisional figures

Non-durable consumption goods Unprocessed of food and beverages Processed of food and beverages Gasoline Transportation vehicles not incidental to industry Others Total

Breakdown of imports by BEC (*)

663 251,661

1415 261

1619

845

5392

2013

453 242,177

1049 264

1778

979

5642

2014

426 207,234

814 309

1903

1025

5267

2015

437 198,618

717 345

1728

1107

5232

2016

734 233,800

904 1990

1977

1263

5348

2017

817 223,047

1009 662

1978

1085

4872

2018

550 202,705

570 384

1702

930

4654

2019***

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

251

252

M. BABACAN

sectors would then pave the way for industrial upgrading. For that, quality upgrading is essential, as observed in the case of six fast-growing Asian economies, namely China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand. Studying the six important emerging markets, Papageorgiou et al. (2019) find that quality upgrading they witnessed since the 1970s has played a key role in changing the sectoral shares in countries’ exports. The technological sophistication of Turkey’s export composition remains low, partly due to the lack of necessary capital formation for intermediate goods diversification while largely due to the private sector’s lack of investment appetite and overly risk-avert attitude. Change in the composition and relative weights of exports and imports since the 1980s has contributed to Turkey’s industrial production capacity and growth indirectly, while global patterns continued to play a determinant role in defining a country’s export orientation both in terms of its geography and sector. Saygılı and Saygılı (2011, p. 358) confirm the increased dependency to intermediate goods imports, underlining the importance of global trends towards vertical integration: ‘The change in the composition of Turkish exports in favour of low exchange rate elastic nontraditional commodities, may explain the seemingly puzzling coincidence of high growth of total exports and the real appreciation of the Turkish Lira. On the other hand, high import dependence together with high income elasticity of exports implies that the global growth pattern has a significant role in determining the exports of Turkey and developing countries in general’ (bold are mine). Making the Turkish economy more resilient to internal and external shocks, re-industrialisation efforts aiming at increased capacity as well as productivity in the real sector, a new reform agenda should be designed and announced. Adapting an ’industrialist state’ as a means of what Yülek (2018) refers to as the ’industrial layer’ is a priority along with other influencer factors. From the design of the entrepreneurial environment up to public procurements, public policies should be instrumental to industrial upgrading and reaching an innovation-based nature of industrialisation. That roadmap should include key elements such as strengthening the risk management mechanisms of the real sector, developing financial alternatives that enable SMEs to move more towards capital markets rather than the banking system for access to finance, and reducing the reliance on medium- and high-tech imported intermediate goods in manufacturing (Gür et al., 2019).

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

253

Quo Vadis? Turkey’s ‘Axis Shift’ Revisited A new track on Turkey’s economic rise story would also need a review of its current situation regarding the foreign trade agreements, most importantly the customs union agreement with the EU. Necessary modifications, extensions where needed, and even cancellation of the futile ones should be made. Re-assessment of the variety of a country’s softpower assets and the productivity of its tools is essential where the need for optimisation comes first as resources become increasingly limited in times of uncertainty across the globe. Parlar Dal and Kur¸sun (2020, p. 175), for instance, state Turkey’s capability of playing the role of bridge-builder role between advanced and emerging market economies as a middle power with relevant instruments of multiple dialogues and mediation mechanisms within the G-20 context. Turkey has so far inked 36 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) as 11 of them with the Central and Eastern European countries were annulled due to those partners’ EU membership. Among the remaining 25 FTAs, ones with the EFTA countries, Israel, Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria (temporarily suspended in 2011), Egypt, Albania, Georgia, Montenegro, Serbia, Chile, Mauritius, Korea, Malaysia, Moldova, Faroe Islands, Venezuela and Singapore are currently in force. Added to the list is the Investment Agreement and the Services Trade Agreement under the FTA with Korea, which are all in effect by August 2018. Meantime, FTAs with Lebanon, Kosovo, Sudan, Ghana and Qatar is expected to be in force once ratified by those countries’ domestic authorities. Current FTAs with the EFTA countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro have also been reviewed for updates and extension of their scopes while renewed agreements are already signed with the EFTA countries and Serbia. Negotiations with Georgia, Malaysia and Moldova in the same line are soon to be finalised. The FTA signed in 2009 that became effective by 2011 with Jordan however was annulled in 2018. Turkey puts a significant effort to extend the geographies of its FTAs as currently in negotiation with 17 country and/or country groups. Among them, 11 (Ukraine, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Pakistan, Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, Djibouti and the Congo DR) are actively pursued, while the remaining six with Cameroon, Chad, Seychelles, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Libya and the MERCOSUR are moving at a slower

254

M. BABACAN

pace. Negotiations with Ukraine include services trade; with Peru and Mexico include services trade and investments while with Japan, include services trade, investment and public procurements. Following the Brexit, once the UK becomes fully apart from the EU, FTA negotiations and further bilateral relations are expected to come to life as well. Only looking at the above list of countries that Turkey engages actively with regards to its trade relations, one could easily notice that geographical penetration follows a balanced pattern. According to the list of target and priority countries Turkish Ministry of Trade announces for each couple of years since 2010 could be classified in two broad categories: (i) geographical dispersion and (ii) relative development level of the countries’ economies. In the first, it is evident that there is a great emphasis on balancing the geographical centres of gravity; North America, Europe, Latin and South America and East Asia– Pacific. Africa, Mideast and Southeast Europe, however, could be said to have a limited gravity. In the second, one would easily find out that relative economic sizes and relative levels of development together with the structures of their economies, targeted and prioritised countries are again designated carefully (Table 4). A decade-long argument around the so-called axis shift should therefore be questioned thoroughly, with an emphasis on Turkey’s relative position and performance to major European, Asian and/or Latin American competitors as well as both sides’ complementarities. Doing so, in this section, one should expect a brief discussion of Turkey’s repositioning itself with regards to geographical, industrial and trade characteristics of different alternatives. Introduction of MIKTA (2013) in that regard, a platform built by Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia is none of a coincidence given all the members’ unique position in their region in terms of economic and diplomatic capacity. Aiming at pursuing a vast agenda of reforms on global governance, trade and economy, sustainable development attached to the rising standards of democracy, human rights and equality, this platform has not achieved much yet given its significant potential. Together with other MIKTA members, Turkey is characterised as a soft-revisionist and reformist in terms of its attitude towards international order while promoting a more humanitarian agenda, attaching importance to multilateralism as well as development assistance (Gök & Karadeniz, 2020, pp. 149–150). The Asian-Pacific region is just one and the most important example of Turkey’s must-develop alternatives, given its total share of 47.2 per cent

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

Table 4

255

Turkey’s target countries for strengthening trade

2010–2011

2012–2013

2014–2015

2016–2017

2018–2019

2020–2021

US China Russia India Brazil Canada Poland Nigeria Egypt Iran Saudi Arabia Algeria Libya Jordan Qatar

China Russia India US Poland Brazil Iran Nigeria Egypt Libya Indonesia Saudi Arabia Iraq Kazakhstan Ukraine Japan South Africa

China Russia India US Poland Romania Brazil Saudi Arabia Nigeria Libya Algeria Iraq Kazakhstan Ukraine Japan Korea Iran

US UAE China Ethiopia Korea India Iraq Iran Japan Mexico Nigeria Poland Romania Russia Saudi Arabia

Germany US China Ethiopia Korea India Iraq Iran Japan Qatar Kenya Mexico Romania Russia Ukraine

US Brazil China Ethiopia Morocco South Africa Korea India Iraq UK Japan Kenya Malaysia Uzbekistan Russia Chile Senegal Serbia Tanzania Ukraine Vietnam

Source Turkish Ministry of Trade (2020)

from world GDP as of 2019, compared to its 31.7 per cent share by 1999 (Atlı, 2019). Meantime, it seems to have greater significance for Turkey to develop increased bilateral and multilateral relations with the Asia–Pacific region on the grounds of technology, know-how, and FDI flows, rather than yielding the bilateral trade figures in balance (Atlı, 2020, p. 273). One should include the financial investments and investment funding channels as well as other monetary stabilising cooperative steps in Turkey’s recent attempts to prioritise the region. This dimension has quite become more evident with the two giant Chinese banks obtaining banking licences to operate in Turkey in the past decade. Turkey’s participation in the Asian Development Bank as a non-regional member dates back to 1991 while becoming a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, led by China in 2015. Nevertheless, Turkey has so far developed stronger ties to Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) by 2012 in which it stands as a dialogue

256

M. BABACAN

partner, ASEAN in which it earned access to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (2010) and became sectoral dialogue partner (2017), MIKTA, BRICS and other groups of countries along with its traditional partners such as the EU, OIC, CIS or ECO countries, all at different levels. Observer or partner country status has already been granted in many of such organisations that Turkey is not a full member. Turkey’s relations with the Asia–Pacific region in that regard have also improved, with special emphasis on six countries: China, Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. Between 2004 and 2017, for instance, Turkey’s bilateral trade with the Asia–Pacific countries posted a tremendous increase from 17 billion USD up to 71 billion USD. This figure is now standing around 80 billion USD, though making the country’s most of the current account deficit alone (over 30 billion USD as of 2018). Total investment stock from the regional countries in Turkey has exceeded some 8.5 billion USD by 2017. Despite the recent improvements, however, Asia’s share in Turkey’s total FDI stock is far below the EU countries (see Fig. 11), indicating that long-term technology and productivity gains through trade spillovers would not be enough if not accompanied with a rise in Asia’s share in FDI inflows to Turkey. As of 2018, China was the 2nd biggest import partner for Turkey while being only 16th biggest export partner. The trade deficit amounted to nearly 18 billion USD. India, on the other hand, was the 6th biggest Turkey's Stock of Direct Investment (Market Value) 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Europe

Fig. 11

Asia

Middle East

Turkey’s FDI stock market value (bn USD) (Source CBRT)

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

257

import partner for Turkey while being the 36th biggest export partner. The trade deficit with was about 6.5 billion USD (Alperen & Ersoy, 2019). A new foreign policy initiative taken by Turkey, called Asia Anew, was also announced in early August 2019. According to Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu, this new initiative was also a part of Turkey’s new holistic approach towards Asia, implying a very diversified set of targeted goals, i.e. from trade to defence and cultural interaction to technology development (Alperen & Ersoy, 2019). Meantime, Turkey should follow a balancing act in its bilateral engagements in the region. At the country level, it should observe a balanced path between political/economic rivals, while at the industry level, it should take the status of both domestic and the partner country’s relevant industrial structures (i.e. in terms of substitution and complementarity or backward/forward linkages). Utilising the potential static gains from trade should be an interim goal while utilising the dynamic gains from trade with the region being the ultimate one. Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)— which is to some estimates expected to increase trade flows among partner countries up to 4.1 per cent (Baniya et al., 2019)—and the Japanese-led Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, for instance, might well become complementary in terms of acquiring the most benefit from the spillovers through trade, finance and investment. A strategically oriented diplomacy must be adapted to navigate in the region’s challenging political environment, having learnt quite much from Turkey’s previous quests in Balkan, Caucasian and the Middle East regions.

Conclusion Turkey’s recent rise as an emerging middle power with big-power shade on its rhetoric which became influential and even to the extent of being a role model for many neighbouring countries is now two decades old. In its first phase (Episode I), based on existing pre-settings, meaning the state capacity and institutional structures altogether, the country witnessed a fast-track integration to the world trade and financial markets. Marking a significant rise in its share from world trade and capital inflows, Turkey has managed to triple per capita income while increasing its total trade volume even by six-folds. More importantly, the total amount of foreign direct investments increased by almost 5–10 folds on a yearly

258

M. BABACAN

average. Between 2003 and 2013, Turkey has also played the role of intermediator towards regional and even global (see the Iranian nuclear power crisis and deal) conflicts with a more trade/business-oriented approach. The balancing act of the tradesmen via inter-governmental relations and their navigation through a state-led world of opportunities made the Turkish state rise on the shoulders of inter-state and inter-business economic interests. In the second phase (Episode II), the country has witnessed major challenges between 2014 and 2019 due to the lack of increased ability to sustain such a prolonged period of growth in each dimension. Given the lack of proper mechanisms at home to address the structural weaknesses of the country, a significant time lag occurred to bolster and solidify the achievements. Meantime, however, both the state capacity and international conditions worsened simultaneously. This experience nevertheless proved that providing a vast amount of resources to non-state actors while leaving most of the soft-power tools at their disposal might be too risky, as happened to be the case in the socalled FETO (the Gulenist) organisation. Therefore, the state turned to be a more developmental one, raising the amount of regulation meantime. A gradual change in the tone of the regulative state towards a once-again state-led developmental state could well summarise the basic characteristic of this episode. After going through different stages of its re-emergence as a regional power, Turkey will need a new period of—this time—vertical integration in terms of its state-business and non-governmental actors. A new form of division of labour and cooperation at these levels will require strengthening the country’s industrial base with relevant institutional settings in place. Strategic planning at the city-level should also guide the country’s efforts to focus on critical sectors which are expected to have the highest payoffs in the near future. This chapter asserts that, given the country’s recent track of pursuit and maintenance of a sharp balance between a free world of trade, movements, an even co-production and a world of protectionism and security concerns in every front, Turkey should now embrace the opportunities in such a world we had never before, while cautiously handling the potential risks. In order to do so, re-industrialisation in vital sectors while lowering the import and foreign capital dependencies will be of utmost importance in an age of uncertainty. By doing so, Turkey will reinforce its position as an indispensable actor, from being a regional trade, transportation and

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLDS …

259

energy hub to a production powerhouse with key industries in a diversified range. The EU is expected to remain as one strategic element in maintaining the country’s anchor for the steady climb on the quality ladder while emerging market economies in Asia and other regions with dynamic demography and growing middle classes ensuring capitalisation on scale economies. Sound institutional and physical infrastructures such as a qualified and more efficient educational system in that regard would be key to success. Having passed through major challenges of cross-border migration, domestic political and economic risks, the emergence of international protectionism and other sideline risks such as climate change, natural disasters and worldwide diseases; Turkey should now focus on its prolonged structural weaknesses, including a high-quality educational infrastructure while rebuilding social/economic trust that would enhance long-term sustained productivity. Possible engagements with other emerging powers such as the Asian economies to find out remedies to the current crises in global economic governance and declining policy coordination, if not provide a full-fledged new international order at the macro level, should be accompanied to President Erdogan’s motto for quite some time, ’the world is larger than five’ which is instrumental for other key areas. Under such a renewed macro approach, however, Turkey should also be ready for the awaiting challenges to address possible pitfalls stemming from the current external imbalances with much of the emerging market economies, especially those in Asia. A promising yet cautious set of underutilised opportunities has been looming since Turkey, and Asia might present a balanced partnership on the grounds of mutual interests.

Annex: Turkey’s free trade agreements and regional trade agreements Countries

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) EFTA EU

Type

Agreement

Date of signature

Date of entry into force

CU CU

1991 1995

1992 1996 (continued)

260

M. BABACAN

(continued) Countries

Type

Agreement

Date of signature

Date of entry into force

Israel Bosnia and Herzegovina Tunisia Palestine Morocco Egypt Korea, Republic of Malaysia Mauritius Moldova, Republic of North Macedonia Singapore Syria Albania Georgia Montenegro Serbia Chile Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)* *Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN) and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Bangladesh-Brazil-Chile-Egypt-IsraelKorea-Mexico-Pakistan-ParaguayPeru-Philippines-Serbia-TunisiaUruguay Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistan-Tajikistan

Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral

FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA

1996 2002 2004 2004 2004 2005 2012 2014 2011 2014 1999 2015 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009

1997 2003 2005 2005 2006 2007 2013 2015 2013 2016 2000 2017 2007 2008 2008 2010 2010 2011

Plurilateral RTA

1971

1973

Plurilateral RTA

1992

1992

Source World Trade Organization (WTO) and Turkish Ministry of Trade (2020)

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Turkey’s Balancing Efforts in Its Economic Relations with Asia Altay Atlı

Introduction “Once again the pendulum of history is swinging towards Asia. The twenty-first century will be an era shaped by the developments in Asia. In other words, Asia is rising again, and we need to consider, us being Asians, how to position ourselves in the face of this development. We need to focus on Asia, not for the first time but once again, through the lens of our entrepreneurial and humanitarian foreign diplomacy. This is why we titled our new initiative as ‘Asia Anew’” (Milliyet, 2019). These were the words of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu, at a workshop in Ankara held on 26 December 2019, where scholars and diplomats held extensive brainstorming on the newly minted Asia pivot in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. Turkey has a renewed emphasis on Asia, a renewed energy and focus, “not for the first time but once again”, for a rapprochement with Asia. Turkey’s ‘Asia Anew’ is a multidimensional initiative, and there are indeed sixty components stated in the action plan, ranging from improved

A. Atlı (B) Asian Studies Center, Bo˘gaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_12

263

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political dialogue to increased people-to-people exchanges. However, as is also evident in Çavu¸so˘glu’s speech mentioned above, where he emphasized Asia “becoming the world’s center of economic gravity” (ibid.), there is an explicit focus on economic relations with Asia within the initiative’s framework, as “Turkey intends to capitalize on the glittering emergence of Asia as a new center of productivity and prosperity in the global economy” (Alperen & Ersoy, 2019). Turkey’s prioritization of economic and commercial relations with Asia should not come as a surprise. The Asian region has certainly reached a central position in the global geopolitical and economic order thanks to a major transformation it has undergone in the post-Cold War period. On the one hand, strong industrialization and economic growth performance achieved by the major economies of the region, especially China, shifted the gravity centre of the global economy from the West to the East, and on the other hand, the position of Asian countries in global political and security balances came to become more pronounced, in tandem with their strong economic growth. According to a study by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the share of Asia in the global gross product (GDP) is expected to increase from its current level of 27–52 per cent by 2050 and nevertheless reach 4 billion by the mentioned year (ADB, 2011). It is estimated that the projected population of the region can reach income levels up to six times compared to today. Despite the high economic growth and the increasing political influence in the international arena, the heterogeneous structure of the Asian continent, the lack of common denominators that could bring together the countries of the region, and the continuation of the hostilities arising from historical grievances have led to an increase in competition and conflict in the region. These factors prevent Asia from reaching a level equivalent to the West as a monolithic powerhouse, at least for the time being. However, from Turkey’s perspective, it is nevertheless imperative to establish closer, more constructive and more productive relationships with the countries of the region, which is a dominant actor in the globalized world of today defined by growing economic interdependence and connectedness between countries. This is not a matter of choice but a requirement arising from the conjunctural realities of the global economy. Turkey’s activism aimed at improving economic relations with Asian countries is profound and predates the recent ‘Asia Anew’ initiative. Besides its economic rationale, it is also in line with the Turkish policymakers’ efforts for greater overall foreign policy proactivism, which

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“did not detach Turkey from its historical and strategic ties but aimed to develop a more multi-faceted and global outlook via increasing Turkey’s outreach to the Middle East, Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America” (Baba, 2017, p. 574). As Turkey makes efforts to transform itself into a global actor on the international stage, being well-positioned to do as one of the world’s twenty largest economies, it makes greater overtures into the Asian continent along a firm economic axis. Despite these strong efforts, however, there remains a problem troubling Turkey’s not only politicians and bureaucrats but also businesspeople and the public opinion in general. Turkey’s economic relations with Asia are largely defined by a substantial trade deficit, which is not shrinking but further widening as trade volumes continue to grow. Turkey does not only need to increase its economic relations with Asia but also and more crucially to have a greater balance in this relationship. At the moment, merchandise trade with Asian countries is one of the main sources of Turkey’s overall deficit, whereas foreign direct investment (FDI) from the economic powerhouses of Asia into the Turkish economy is still low compared to investment coming to Turkey from European countries. This chapter aims to investigate Turkey’s balancing efforts in its economic relations with Asia. It will commence with an overview of Turkey’s merchandise trade with Asian countries, revealing the extent of the deficit that Turkey is facing. The chapter will then move to the discussion of balancing efforts, which materialize through attempts to facilitate Asian FDI flows into Turkey and to maintain a surplus in the trade of services with these countries. The chapter will also look at Turkey’s economic interaction with Asia at the multilateral level before concluding with a summary of the main arguments.

The Deficit: Turkey’s Merchandise Trade with Asia As a result of globalization, countries’ economic interests, including those of Turkey, have become increasingly decisive in their external relations. Development of economic and trade relations with different regions of the world, exploring markets for Turkish exports and ensuring the flow of capital investment projects into the Turkish market are not only beneficial for Turkey’s economy, but they also provide an advantage in terms of the country’s foreign policy by securing increasing influence of Turkey regions where it is economically involved. This is why economic linkages

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Chart 1 Turkey’s bilateral trade with the regions of the world in 2019 ($bn) (Source TUIK)

should and do form the backbone of the “Asia Anew” initiative launched by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey’s trade volume has increased substantially over the past few decades. In 2001, the country’s total foreign trade volume amounted to $72.7 billion, with $31.3 billion in exports and $41.4 billion in imports.1 In 2019, Turkey’s exports totalled $180.9 billion, and imports amounted to $210.3 billion, with a total merchandise foreign trade volume of $391.2 billion for the year. Turkey’s trade deficit increased in nominal terms over the said period, yet in relative terms, there is a narrowing of the deficit, with the export-to-import ratio in Turkey’s foreign trade improving from 75.7 per cent in 2001 to 86.0 per cent in 2019. Chart 1 visually illustrates the composition of Turkey’s merchandise trade in terms of partner regions around the world as of the year 2019. The most significant feature of Turkey’s foreign trade, as shown in this chart, is that the European Union (EU) is the most significant trade partner for Turkey, both as an export destination and an import source.

1 All figures related to Turkey’s total bilateral merchandise trade with other countries are either directly taken or calculated by the author using the data from the website of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK, n.d.) unless stated otherwise.

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There are various reasons for the key position of the EU in Turkey’s foreign trade, such as the geographical proximity, strong business links through the Turkish diaspora living in Western Europe and the customs union in effect between Turkey and the EU since January 1, 1996, allowing tariff-free movement of goods between the two entities. In 2019, Turkey’s exports to the 28 countries of the EU amounted to $88.0 billion, corresponding to 48.7 per cent of Turkey’s total exports to the world. In the same year, Turkey’s imports from the EU totalled $73.6 billion, corresponding to 35.0 per cent of Turkey’s total imports from the entire world. Another important feature clearly visible in Chart 1 is the importance of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, which was home to $45.8 billion of Turkish exports and $20.1 billion of Turkish imports in the year 2019. Turkey has a trade surplus with both the EU and MENA, while the trade deficit mainly originates from Turkey’s trade with the Asia–Pacific, non-EU Europe, and what is termed as ‘Others’ in Chart 1, which includes Russia, the main source of energy imports for Turkey. In 2019, Turkey’s exports to the Asia–Pacific amounted to $14.2 billion, corresponding to 7.9 per cent of Turkey’s total exports to the world, while Turkey’s imports from the same region totalled $48.4 billion, corresponding to 23.0 per cent of Turkey’s total imports from the world. In the same year, Turkey’s exports to Russia totalled $4.1 billion while imports from this country were valued at a massive $23.1 billion, in other words, 11.0 per cent of Turkey’s total imports. As of 2019, Turkey’s largest export destinations were Germany, United Kingdom, Iraq, Italy and the United States, and its main imports sources were Russia, Germany, China, the United States and Italy. It is important to point out at this point; there have been changes in the weights of each region in Turkey’s foreign trade portfolio over time. Over the period between 2001 and 2019, the EU’s share in Turkey’s foreign trade went down from 51.4 to 41.3 per cent, the share of MENA moved up from to 16.9 per cent, while the share of the Asia–Pacific increased from 9.0 to 16.0 per cent. In other words, Turkey’s foreign trade patterns reflected the global shift of the centre of economic gravity in the world towards Asia, with still ample room for further growth. Chart 2 shows Turkey’s total bilateral merchandise trade volume with four large Asian economies, i.e. China, Japan, South Korea and India. It is evident in this chart that China is by far the largest trading partner for Turkey in Asia, despite the continuous decline in the total quantity traded

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Chart 2 Turkey’s bilateral trade volume with Asia (selected countries) ($bn) (Source Calculated by the author using TUIK data)

since 2016. There has been a remarkable increase in the volumes traded between Turkey and India over the past few years, and while there has recently been a similar increase in the trade between Turkey and South Korea, trade volumes are on the decline between Turkey and Japan for the last two years. Chart 3 takes on Turkey’s trade with the same Asian countries as in Chart 2 but makes a distinction between exports and imports, hence revealing the real issue that Turkey is facing in its economic relations with the countries of Asia. In each case, there is a large trade deficit for Turkey. In 2019, Turkey had a trade deficit of $16.4 billion with China, $5.47 with India, $4.83 billion with South Korea and $3.14 billion with Japan. As another metric illustrating the extent of the issue, in 2019, while the export-to-import was 86.0 per cent for Turkey’s overall merchandise trade with the entire world, this ratio was only 14.3 per cent for Turkey’s trade with China, 17.6 per cent for India, 16.3 per cent for South Korea and 14.0 per cent for Japan. While the above-mentioned figures reveal the numerical extent of Turkey’s trade deficit with Asian countries, one has to look at the commodity-wise composition of Turkey’s exports and imports as well in

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Chart 3 Turkey’s exports and imports with Asia (selected countries) ($bn) (Source Calculated by the author using TUIK data)

order to understand the dynamics of the countries’ trade linkages with Asia. Turkish exports to Asia have, in general, a lower degree of product diversification compared with imports from Asia, and will be shown in detail below; Turkey mainly exports low value-added manufacturing products and raw materials to Asia, it imports in return higher value-added, capital and technology-intensive products. Turkey’s trade with China is illustrative of the above-made point. In 2018,2 the leading item in Turkey’s exports to China was marble, with Turkey supplying 3.9 million tonnes of marble covering 50.1 per cent of China’s total purchases from the world throughout the year, for a revenue of $776.9 million. Marble, which is exported to China in raw form, i.e. with little or no value-added from the Turkish side, alone contributed to 26.5 per cent of all the exports Turkey made to China in a single year,

2 2018 is the last year for which commodity-wise trade data was available at the time of writing. In this section of the chapter, all figures related to Turkey’s bilateral merchandise trade with other countries at the commodity level are either directly taken from or calculated by the author using the data from Trade Map (ITC, n.d.) unless stated otherwise.

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followed in this case by chromium ores (7.6 per cent), borates (4.8 per cent), lead ores and precious metal ores (both 4.3 per cent), and, as an example of relatively higher value-added manufacturing item, non-electric central heating boilers (1.7 per cent). The first ten items in the list of Turkish exports to China make up a massive 67.3 per cent of the country’s export portfolio to China, which reveals the fact that Turkey has a relatively limited range of products to export to the Chinese market, and it is mostly made of primary commodities and low value-added products. In contrast, what Turkey imports back from China in return is more diversified and relatively higher in value-added. In the same year, the top-ranking item in Turkey’s imports from China was phone sets with a total volume of $2.1 billion, followed by automatic data-processing machines and units thereof valued at $1 billion, both items related to Turkey’s purchases of the products of international mobile phone set makers assembled in China as well as the products of large Chinese telecommunication companies like Huawei and ZTE that are active in Turkey since the early 2000s providing infrastructure services for both landline and mobile communication service providers. These products are followed by synthetic filament yarn, parts of transmission devices and motor vehicles, and air vacuum pumps, with the top ten items in the list-making up only 27.6 per cent of Turkey’s whole import portfolio from China, indicating a greater diversity at the commodity level compared with Turkish exports. There is a similar pattern with respect to Turkey’s trade with Japan. In 2018, Turkey’s largest export item to Japan was parts and accessories for tractors and motor vehicles for passenger transport, with 9506 tonnes sold during the year for a sum of $68.3 billion. This product, which made up 12.2 per cent of Turkey’s total exports to Japan, is related to the manufacturing activities of the Turkish-Japanese joint ventures that have a dominant position in the Turkish automotive sector. While most of their production is sold domestically or exported to third countries such as the countries of the EU with which Turkey has a customs union, part is shipped to Japan, thus included in Turkey’s exports to this country. The rest of the list of Turkey’s top exports to Japan reveals a pattern emphasizing low value-added products and raw materials, just like it is the case with Turkish exports to China. After automotive parts, Turkey’s main exports to Japan are fish (9.5 per cent of all exports), pasta (7.9 per cent), zinc ores (4.7 per cent), ferro-alloys (3.7 per cent), grapes (2.8 per cent), olive oils (2.8 per cent), and tomatoes (2.0 per cent). The top ten items in the list make up 49.5 of all exports from Turkey to Japan.

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In the meantime, Turkey’s imports from Japan are much higher in valueadded and technology-intensive rather than labour-intensive in terms of production. At the top of the list are tractor and motor vehicle parts corresponding to 16.5 per cent of all imports (in this case, those parts shipped from Japan to Turkey to be used in production by the above-mentioned Turkish-Japanese joint ventures), motor vehicles themselves, bulldozers, piston engines, electrical accumulators and transformers, and pumps. The top ten items in the list make up 44.1 per cent of all the imports by Turkey from Japan, meaning that Turkey’s trade with Japan is more diversified in terms of commodities compared with Turkey’s trade with China. Turkey’s exports to South Korea are led by blood products (both human and animal), of which 24 tonnes were exported in 2017, making up less than one per cent of Korea’s total purchases of the product during the year, which amounted to 2488 tonnes. This product, which is extraordinary in every sense, made up 23.1 per cent of all of Turkey’s exports to this country, followed by lead ores (8.5 per cent), engine parts (4.8 per cent), molybdenum ores, tractor and motor vehicle parts (2.5 per cent), and zinc ores (2.3 per cent). In return, Turkey imports from Korea automotive parts, steel products, polymers, cruise ships, motor vehicles themselves, and certain chemicals. Turkey’s trade with Korea is similar to its trade with Japan in terms of both volume and the range of products traded. Turkey’s exports to South Korea are driven by blood products (both human and animal), of which 67 tonnes were exported in 2018 for a sum of $352 million, making up 37.9 per cent of all Turkish exports to this country in dollar terms. Other major Turkish export products to South Korea are motor cars (mostly through Turkish-Korean joint ventures manufacturing in Turkey), zinc ores, lead ores, washing machines and copper scrap. In return, Turkey imports from Korea again human blood, automotive parts, steel products, polymers, cruise ships, motor vehicles themselves and certain chemicals. Turkey’s trade with Korea can be said to be exhibiting similar traits with the trade with Japan, in terms of both the trade volume and the range of products that are subject to trade. Turkey’s trade with the countries of South and Southeast Asian countries is remarkably different from the trade with the powerful economies of China, Japan and South Korea. Basically, Turkey sells to these countries low value-added products in areas such as raw materials, agricultural produce, and light industry products, buying back similar items. In 2018, Turkey’s leading export items to India were petroleum oils and oils

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obtained from bituminous minerals (excluding crude oil), marble, ferrous waste, oilseeds and carbonates, while Turkey’s imports from this country were led again by petroleum oils ($2.9 billion imported from India in contrast with the exports of the same product to the same country valued at $115 million), aluminium, synthetic filament yarn, tractor and motor vehicle parts, jewellery and colouring matter. In the same year, the main export items to Indonesia were tobacco, carpets, cotton, wheat and carbonates, while Turkey’s imports from this country were led by natural rubber, yarns, palm oil and paper. Turkey exported iron and steel, gold, copper, and carpets to Malaysia, and ginger, saffron, animal parts, carbonates, medicaments and fabrics to Vietnam, while buying back palm oil, aluminium, textiles, coconuts from the former, and telephone sets (manufactured by multinational companies), shoes, monitors, cotton, natural rubber from the latter. Turkey’s merchandise trade with the countries of Asia is imbalanced in every sense. Turkey’s imports from the region far outweigh its exports to the region; Turkey exports mainly low value-added products and raw materials while buying back more complicated, higher value-added, technology-intensive products. In other words, there is an imbalance with regard to both quantity and quality in Turkey’s trade with the countries of Asia.

The Balancing Act: Investments from Asia and Services Trade A more balanced trade relationship on the quantity side can theoretically be aimed at by increasing exports and/or reducing imports. There is limited room for reducing imports from Asia because Turkey is still highly dependent on imported intermediary products for its own production, and high-technology, high-value-added imports of such products from Asian countries do provide significant benefits for Turkey’s producers (Atlı, 2020, p. 280). On the other hand, in order to increase the exports to Asia, a number of initiatives are taken by the Turkish state, mostly in cooperation with the business community, such as the China and India action plans launched by the Ministry of Trade, the “e-Export Mobilization” by the Ministry of Trade in partnership with the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), and the establishment of five Turkey Trade Centers around the globe, of which the number is planned to be increased to 35 in the near future as underlined in the

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action plan released by the President’s Office (TCCB, 2018). Moreover, Turkey has free trade agreements with South Korea (signed in 2013), Malaysia (2015, currently under revision) and Singapore (2017) and actively negotiating new free trade agreements with Japan, Thailand and Indonesia. These measures can be expected to help to close the trade deficit in terms of quantity; however, in order to achieve progress on the quality side, Turkish exports need to climb up the value-added chain on the supply side. At this point, cooperation with Asian countries is expected to make a significant contribution. In this respect, balancing the economic relationship with Asia in a sustainable manner requires the Turkish economy to make the best of its export potential (balancing on the quantity side) while at the same time securing increased amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Asian countries that will contribute to the Turkish economy not only through their effect on the balance of payments but also, and perhaps more importantly, by facilitating the flows of technology, know-how and infrastructure into the Turkish economy (balancing on the quality side) (Atlı, 2020, p. 273). Starting as early as the 1980s, Japanese and Korean investment flowing into Turkey have benefited the Turkish economy in this way, and more recently, although still at early stages, Chinese investment is following the same path, with rising expectations on Turkey’s behalf due to the newly launched Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has the potential to contribute significantly to Turkey’s objective of becoming a transit hub between Europe and Asia. All of these investment relations form parts of Turkey’s balancing act in its economic relations with Asia. According to data released by the Turkish Central Bank, the total amount of FDI in the Turkish economy as of the end of 2018 was $133.2 billion.3 As seen in Chart 4, the EU remains as the main source of FDI into Turkey with a stock of $80.1 billion, meaning that around 60 per cent of all the FDI in the Turkish economy is from the EU. As of the same period, FDI into Turkey from Asia amounted to $5.8 billion, with Japan leading the list as the largest source of Asian FDI into Turkey with an investment stock of $1.8 billion as of the end of 2018, followed by China ($1.1 billion), Singapore ($927 million), South Korea ($853 million) and 3 All figures related to foreign direct investment are either directly taken from or calculated by the author using the data from the Turkish Central Bank (TCMB, n.d.) unless stated otherwise.

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Chart 4 Regional sources of FDI into the Turkish economy, 2018 ($bn) (Source Turkish Central Bank [TCMB, n.d.])

Malaysia ($623 million). At this point, a word of caution of order is necessary; FDI statistics released by official authorities such as the Central Bank might not fully reflect the amount invested, as they only cover officially exported capital and do not take into consideration reinvested earnings and investments through third countries or third parties. These number, however, nevertheless provide an idea of how Asian countries stand within Turkey’s larger portfolio of received FDI. Japan is not only the largest Asian investor in Turkey; it is also one of the early comers, with Japanese involvement in Turkish industry dating back to the 1980s. Since then, several Japanese corporations such as Toyota, Honda, Isuzu, Bridgestone, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Marubeni, entered the Turkish market, predominantly in the form of joint ventures with Turkish partners, which established production facilities in Turkey, servicing not only the Turkish domestic market but also exporting to third countries. These investments have played a key role in utilizing Japanese technology in Turkey, particularly in electronics and the automotive industry. Although in the early 2000s, the flow of Japanese FDI has slowed down due to adverse economic conditions in both countries, there has recently been a renewed momentum in the relationship. The Türksat-4A satellite, which was launched into orbit in February 2014, was a joint project that was undertaken by a Japanese company with the

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participation of Turkish engineers trained in Japan. Japanese companies have also actively taken part in several major infrastructure projects in Turkey, including the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge over the Bosphorus, the Golden Horn Bridge, the Marmaray subway system crossing underneath the Bosphorus, and the Osmangazi Bridge spanning the Izmit Bay. All these projects have brought to Turkey Japanese technology and know-how as well as Japanese finance. In the meantime, The Turkish government’s decision in May 2013 to appoint a Japanese-led consortium including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Itochu Corporation, together with the French company GDF Suez, to build a nuclear plant in Sinop, Turkey is also remarkable in this respect, as the Japanese side will be required to train Turkish personnel, which will open the way for the transfer of technology and skills. The contract with the Japanese side also implies the establishment of a Turkish-Japanese Technology University that will include a nuclear physics program to train experts for the Sinop plant.4 As the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taro Kono, remarked at a press conference with his Turkish counterpart, there is a consensus on both sides that the establishment of the university will ensure that “Japanese technology will prove useful for the future of Turkey” (MFA, 2017). South Korean companies like Hyundai, Daewoo, LG, Samsung and Korea Tobacco have followed a similar pattern and formed joint ventures with Turkish partners in industries such as the automotive sector, electrical appliances, electronics, and energy. These companies manufactured in Turkey in order to serve both the domestic market and export markets, and they have also brought in technology, know-how and expertise into Turkey. In a similar fashion with the Japanese companies, Korean corporations have participated in large infrastructure projects such as the Eurasia Tunnel connecting the European and Asian sides of Istanbul and Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge over the Bosphorus, while new projects such as the 1915 Çanakkale Bridge connecting the two sides of the Dardanelles strait and Turkey’s largest solar power facility, a 1000 mW plant to be built near Konya by the Korean firm Hanwha with its Turkish partner are on the pipeline. All these investment projects facilitate a transfer of know-how, technology and skills from Korea to Turkey. In addition to these projects, it needs to be mentioned that one of the largest investment initiatives by a 4 The decree for the establishment of the university was published in Turkey’s Official Gazette on June 24, 2017.

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Korean company in Turkey is in the entertainment sector, with CJ CGV having purchased Mars Entertainment Group, Turkey’s largest chain of movie theatres. Considering Southeast Asian investment into Turkey, Singapore and Malaysia stand out as the main sources of FDI. Singaporean investment into Turkey is concentrated in port management (PSA International Pte Ltd has partnered with a Turkish company to establish Mersin International Port Management Inc, running Turkey’s largest port on the Mediterranean), shopping centres, food, real estate, apparel, and finance, whereas Istanbul’s Sabiha Gökçen Airport is owned and managed by Malaysia Airports Holdings Bhd, and another Malaysian corporation, IHH Healthcare Bhd has a 90 per cent stake at Acıbadem Sa˘glık Hizmetleri, which is the world’s second-largest healthcare chain, based in Turkey. Chinese investment into Turkey has been drawing significant attention in recent years. A priority area in this respect refers to large-scale infrastructure projects. China’s pioneer in this field has been the state-owned China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC), which entered the Turkish market as early as the 1980s, undertaking a number of hydroenergy and coal mine infrastructure projects. In the field of energy, together with solar energy, hydro-energy, coal and renewables, nuclear energy is now also emerging as an area of cooperation between the two countries. The Turkish-Chinese Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that has entered into effect in June 2016 covers a whole range of joint activities, including designing, constructing and operating nuclear plants, joint research and development, mining and waste management. In 2015, a consortium of Chinese companies, namely COSCO Pacific, China Merchants Group and China Investment Corporation, purchased a 65 per cent stake at Kumport near Istanbul, Turkey’s third-largest seaport in terms of container processing capacity. Chinese companies have also taken part in various projects related to Turkey’s railroad network, including segments of the Istanbul-Ankara high-speed railway line. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is expected to open up new opportunities for Chinese involvement and investment in Turkey’s infrastructure and connectivity projects. As stated by this author elsewhere, “Turkey wants to improve its transportation infrastructure, and this idea fits very well with the objectives of the BRI, which offers significant prospects for developing Turkey’s domestic transportation network,

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enhancing Turkish economy’s linkages with foreign markets, and consolidating Turkey’s position as an economic hub between Europe and Asia” (Atlı, 2020, p. 290). The BRI is so far more about expectations than actual outcomes for Turkey; concrete projects within this framework are yet to take off. However, there is ample ground for optimism in this respect because both sides have repeatedly expressed their interest in cooperation within the context of BRI at the level of both governments and the business sectors, and the two sides have signed a number of agreements to define the contents of this cooperation. Two agreements concluded by the two governments during the G20 Summit in Antalya on November 14, 2015, the Agreement on Harmonizing the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road with the Middle Corridor Initiative, which connects Turkey with the Caucasus, Central Asia and China, and the Rail Transport Cooperation Agreement, which implies a total investment of $40 billion, including a proposed high-speed railway line that will span the country’s entire width connecting Turkey’s easternmost point in Kars with its border to Europe at Edirne. Telecommunication is another priority field where Chinese companies have an increasing investment appetite in Turkey. Huawei is active in Turkey since 2002, and in addition to supplying telecommunication infrastructure equipment and services for Turkish operators, it is also running technology and research centres in Turkey, where new technologies are developed with the participation of Turkish engineers. Another Chinese telecommunications company, ZTE, has purchased a 48 per cent stake in Turkey’s Neta¸s, and is currently pursuing projects with serious research and development component. All these investment projects are undertaken by Asian companies in Turkey bring value-added into the Turkish economy through the transfer of technology, skills and know-how. In order to ensure a path of sustainable economic development, Turkey needs to achieve greater selfsufficiency in terms of technological capabilities, physical infrastructure development, and energy security. In all of these areas, direct investment from Asian countries makes a significant contribution, and such investment is also a vital component for a more balanced economic relationship between Turkey and the Asian countries, focused on the “quality” rather than the “quantity” side of the relationship. Going back to the “quantity” side of the equation, it should be mentioned that a deficit in merchandise trade can possibly, and even if only partially, be upset with a surplus in services trade. Despite being a

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deficit country in terms of merchandise trade, Turkey has a surplus in services trade, driven by revenues in the tourism sector. Turkey’s government agencies and professional associations view Asia as a growth market. “Turkey 2023 Tourism Strategy”, published by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in September 2019 does not only emphasize greater products diversity for the improvement of Turkey’s tourism potential but also singles out China, India, South Korea and India as target markets (Turizm ˙ Günlü˘gü, 2019). Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD) held a workshop on tourism development in October 2019, and although the event was aimed at the Chinese markets, its findings which have worth quoting at length here, do apply for the entire Asian region: “The Ministry of Culture and Tourism plans to increase the number of tourists from China to four million a year in the long term. To achieve this goal, the first thing that needs to be done is to establish the infrastructure necessary to serve so many tourists. The Chinese market presents a huge potential for the Turkish tourism sector; however, to tap into this potential requires communication with Chinese tourists in their own language and improvement in the capacity to address them. It further requires the development of the means of transportation and the formulation of longterm strategies on which to shape the activities of tour operators and other relevant organizations. Products ranging from culture and arts tourism to sports tourism need to be diversified, and Turkey must be more efficiently ˙ promoted among Chinese tourists” (TÜSIAD, 2019). Finally, it needs to be noted that while Turkey’s trade and investment relations with the Asian countries predominantly take shape and develop along the bilateral axis, there has been increased activism on behalf of Turkish policymakers at the multilateral level as well. In this respect, Turkey’s status as a sectoral dialogue partner of the ASEAN provides a firm basis for further improving economic relations with this part of Asia. In July 2019, at the ASEAN-Turkey Joint Sectoral Cooperation Committee meeting held in Jakarta, Indonesia, Turkey and ASEAN confirmed a roadmap for the period between 2019 and 2023 in order to achieve “practical cooperation outcomes” in areas including trade, investment, electronic commerce, public–private partnerships, tourism, renewable energy technology and finance (Hürriyet, 2019).

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Conclusion In an era when the centre of economic gravity in the world is shifting from the West to the East, Turkey is making efforts to improve its relations with the countries of the Asian continent, with the motivation here being mostly economic in nature. This is, however, also a region with which Turkey is running large deficits in bilateral merchandise trade, a fact contributing adversely to the chronic current deficit problem of the Turkish economy. Facing this situation, Turkey aims to balance its economic relations with the countries of Asia by attracting more investment from them, to secure not only the inflow of financial capital but also to generate value-added for the economy by sourcing technology, skills and know-how from partners in Asia through foreign direct investment. Japanese and Korean investment coming into Turkey starting with the 1980s has served the Turkish economy in this way; more recently, Chinese investment is following the same path, while direct investment from other Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia can be seen from the same prism as well. Asia is not Turkey’s main economic partner in the world, and it is not likely to become as such in the foreseeable future. As seen in the charts above, the EU is the destination for half of the Turkish exports, and it is the source of 60 per cent of all the foreign direct investment in Turkey. This does not, however, mean that a more balanced economic relationship with Asia should not be a priority, because while Europe remains the main anchor of the Turkish economy, a more balanced economic relationship with Asia in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world is a sine qua non-condition for Turkey in order to support its sustainable economic development process and to position itself as a truly global player in the world economy.

References Alperen, Ü., & Ersoy, E. (2019, October 18). Turkey and Asia anew: A foreign policy initiative in passing. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2019/ 10/turkey-and-asia-anew-a-foreign-policy-initiative-in-passing ASEAN ile Türkiye Arasında 5 Yıllık Yol Haritası Kabul Edildi. (2019, July 21). Hürriyet. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/asean-ile-turkiyearasinda-5-yillik-yol-haritasi-kabul-edildi-41279994 Asian Development Bank. (2011). Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian century. https://www.adb.org/publications/asia-2050-realizing-asian-century

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Atlı, A. (2020). The political economy of Turkey’s relations with the Asia-Pacific. In E. Parlar (Ed.), Turkey’s political economy in the 21st century (pp. 271– 295). Palgrave Macmillan. Baba, G. (2017). The waves of Turkey’s proactive foreign policy hitting SouthAsian coasts: Turkey–Bangladesh relations. Journal of Administrative Sciences, 15(30), 573–584. Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (TCMB). (n.d.). Ödemeler Dengesi ˙ Istatistikleri. https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TR/TCMB+ TR/Main+Menu/Istatistikler/Odemeler+Dengesi+ve+Ilgili+Istatistikler International Trade Centre (ITC). (n.d.). Trade map. https://trademap.org ˙ ste Türkiye’nin 2023 Turizm Stratejisi Master Planı. (2019, October 7). I¸ Turizm Günlü˘gü. https://www.turizmgunlugu.com/2019/10/07/iste-tur kiyenin-2023-turizm-stratejisi-master-plani Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). (2017, December 28). Dı¸si¸sleri Bakanı Sayın Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu’nun Japonya Dı¸si¸sleri Bakanı Taro Kono ile Ortak Basın Toplantısı. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavuso glu_nun-japonya-disisleri-bakani-taro-kono-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi.tr.mfa Office of the President of the Republic of Turkey (TCCB). (2018). 100 ˙ Günlük Icraat Programı. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/assets/dosya/100_GUN LUK_ICRAAT_PROGRAMI.pdf ˙ Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD). (2019). Economic relations between Turkey and China—sectoral round table meetings. https:// tusiad.org/en/reports/item/10550-economic-relations-between-turkey-and china-sectoral-round-table-meetings ˙ Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). (n.d.). Dı¸s Ticaret Istatistikleri. http://tuik. gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046 Yeniden Asya Açılımı. Milliyet. (2019, December 27). https://www.milliyet.com. tr/siyaset/yeniden-asya-acilimi-6109984

Energy Security in Turkey’s Asia Relations Javed Zafar

Over the past decade (2008–2018), the Turkish economy has grown at an average rate of 5 per cent, which in turn has been a major driver of energy demand and investment in the country’s energy market. The demand has largely been met by Energy imports from Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. Being a net import-dependent country, Turkey’s energy security depends on its conduct of foreign policy that ensures affordable and uninterruptible energy supplies. For that, Turkey has been working on different options. The paper starts with a brief introduction of Turkey’s energy scenario in the context of its economic growth and increasing domestic demands; the second part contextualises Turkey’s foreign relations to meet its energy demands; the third part discusses how energy security is shaping Turkey’s Central Asian relations. In this context, Turkey faces tough competition from Russia, China and Iran, who look at Turkey’s expanding ties with Central Asia beyond energy politics. As the Turkish economy has grown with an average of 5–6 per cent from 2000 to 2010 and has increased its export volume substantially,

J. Zafar (B) Centre for Social Research, New Delhi, India

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3_13

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Turkey’s energy demand has gone up substantially to maintain the industrial growth as well as strong domestic demands (Eken & Schadler, 2013). In 2021 also Turkey expects its gross domestic product (GDP) to grow more than 5 per cent (Reuters, 2021). Most import-dependent nations seek to diversify both the energy mix as well as energy suppliers to maintain their energy security. However, Turkey has another third element in its energy security, to become a “transit hub” thanks to Turkey’s unique geostrategic location where it is surrounded by energy-rich immediate neighbours like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Azerbaijan, and extended neighbours like Russia, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. On the western border, Turkey has a completely energy-scarce European market. Turkey started using this unique situation to its favour by evolving herself as a transit hub or energy transit between its energy-rich neighbours and European markets. This resulted in a massive buildup of gas pipelines transiting from Turkey to the European markets. The new literature on Turkey’s energy security and its relations with Asian neighbours has mostly evolved in consideration of this new model of energy security. Gennady Chufrin (2001) discussed the security environment of the Caspian region with changing dynamics and scenarios, as Russia was asserting its role in the region. The study saw the Caspian Sea as a possible area of competition and cooperation for energy supplies and pipeline routes. This has brought up a host of legal issues pertaining to the use of the Caspian Sea by the Caspian Sea nations, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Iran, and Turkmenistan. The rising military expenditure and arms acquisition pattern in the Caspian region was not completely isolated from its energy politics. Chufrin focused on the Turkish objective in the Caspian region, particularly on Energy and economic objectives. According to him, Turkey’s main objectives are to exploit the region’s energy resources to fulfil its increasing energy requirement. One of the main strategic targets in this regard is to lay down a trans-Caspian pipeline to transport Central Asian and Caspian energy for its consumption and the European market. In addition, Turkey seeks ethno-linguistic, cultural and historical ties with the region. Turkey also wants to increase its political influence in the region. As Central Asia emerged as an independent region with huge hydrocarbon resources, Turkey tried to engage with different dimensions, including culture, economy and energy. In the RAND Corporation report, Ian O. Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee (2003) pointed out how Turkey’s standing in the regional geopolitical could be relevant to Europe. This report also sees China and Russia as the

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two main challengers for Turkey’s expanding role in Central Asia. While Christos Kassimeris (2010) argues that Turkish expanding relations with Central Asia nations give Turkey an alternative space of the EU where it is waiting for accession for decades. Muhittin Ataman (2018) discussed how Turkey is coming back in Central Asian geopolitical space and the importance of Uzbekistan for Turkey’s overall Central Asian policy. He also points out that Turkey’s main competition in Central Asia is with China and Russia. Zeeshan Fida (2018) underlines the pan Turkic ideas in Turkey’s Central Asian discourses and the sceptical and cautious response of Central Asian States. Sabanci University Istanbul’s International Centre for Energy and Climate (IIEC) has published Turkey Energy Outlook (2020), in which it presents Turkey energy scenario up to 2040. This study also confirms the steady increase in Turkey’s energy demands in the next two decades. The report proposes not only geopolitical approaches but also technological innovations in meeting the increasing demands. Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan’s retaking of Nagorno Karabakh from Armenian control in the 2020 war has once again revived the discussions on Turkey’s Central Asian ambitions. At the core of these discussions is the agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia to allow a bridge road between Azerbaijan and its isolated autonomous region Nakhchivan. If the bridge is really constructed, it will connect Turkey and Central Asia regions, bypassing Iran. In this context, Emil Avdaliani (2021) sees the Turkey-Azerbaijan relation as a springboard to reach out in the Caspian and Central Asian Region. Emil especially points out Turkey’s offer to transit the Caspian region and Central Asia’s energy to Europe. A report of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS, 2021) argues that Russia and Iran are unitedly making Turkey’s access to the Caspian more difficult and complicated. The report also finds China’s expansive energy ties with Central Asian countries another challenge for Turkey.

Turkey’s Energy Scenario Turkey is being called a middle power since it has entered the powerful G20 economies. It is already part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the EU Custom Union. Despite many challenges which country has faced in the last two decades, it has maintained good economic growth (more than 5 per cent till 2017) and an upper-middle-income country status. The currency crisis from 2018 onwards notwithstanding, it has maintained a stable economy and

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growing export size. Many agencies observe that the economic base of the country will remain stable and strong, and in future, its economy is more likely to grow once again. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), till 2041, Turkey will be the 12th largest economy in the world. Therefore, to maintain stable economic growth, energy security would be the most important precondition should Turkey want to achieve these goals. As Table 1 shows, part of energy demand has increased due to population growth and resultant household demand. Much of the demand has been created by economic development and expanding industrial sector. As the data indicate, Turkey’s per capita GDP rises after 1990, and so increased energy consumption. A comparison of the per capita increase in GDP and the corresponding figure in energy consumption for the period of 1990 and 2020 shows that the former has increased at the rate of 43.55 per cent while the latter has increased by 55.35 per cent. But, these figures mask the fact that the growth rate of the per capita GDP has been much more stable. These figures also show that it took seventeen years to double the consumption of energy resources from 20.04 to 40.55 Mtoe between 1973 and 1990. But, from 1990 to 2000, within one decade, the total consumption became more than double from 40.55 to 82.20 Mtoe. Between 2005 and 2010, there was recorded marginal Table 1

Population, economy and energy in Turkey, 1973–2020

Year Population Population (1000) increase in %

1973 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2018

38,073 55,120 59,756 64,259 67,903 72,698 81,257

20.7 17.0 15.4 13.8 13.0 11.0 8.8

GDP per capita in US$

2369.00 3859.52 6693.43 8149.60 11,005.80 15,392.16 28,068.85*

Increase Total energy Per in the consumption capita (Mtoe) increase size of GDP in in % GDP in % – 62.92 73.43 21.75 35.05 39.85 54.83*

– 62.92 182.54 244.01 364.57 549.73 733.62*

20.04 40.55 63.21 82.20 92.50 97.31 153.0*

Increase in energy consumption in %

– 102.35 55.88 30.04 12.53 5.20 63.60*

Source Bölük, G., & Koç, A. A. (2011, May 8–13). Dynamics of energy consumption patterns in Turkey: Its drivers and consequences (Conference Paper: World Energy Renewable Congress 2011Sweden). Linkoping Sweden *based on BP data

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growth in the consumption of energy resources while the increase in per capita GDP remained above 35 per cent during the same period (Table 1). According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, in 2018, Turkey’s total primary energy consumption was 153.5 Mtoe, which was much lower than the estimated figure of 220 Mtoe. This slowdown is due to sudden economic crises ensuing after 2016. However, regardless of these crises, studies show that till 2040 Turkey’s energy demand will continue to increase with an average growth rate of 4.20 per cent per year.

Turkey’s Energy Mix Though the country has always tried to diversify its energy mix, still, it heavily depends on primary energy resources, i.e. coal, oil and gas. These primary sources constitute nearly 90 per cent of Turkey’s energy supply. Almost 78 per cent of electricity is produced from fossil fuel (EIA, 2017). Nuclear, hydro and renewable (solar and wind) energy sources have a low share in Turkey’s energy consumption. Since 2014, coal has contributed around 28 per cent of the total energy consumption of the country (EIA, 2017). The share of coal in Turkey’s energy mix is increasing gradually from 29.6 million tonnes (oil equivalent) in 2008 to 42.3 million tonnes in 2018 (Table 2). Around 58 per cent of the coal demand was met from imports in the last decade (2010–2018). Comparatively, Turkey’s proven coal reserves are modest with 11,353 million tonnes—and these are enough to last 115 years at the current consumption rate for the year of 2017 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2017). In a short period of 2009 to 2011, total coal import was below 50 per cent of the total demand, but, after that, it crossed the critical limit of 50 per cent, and in 2017–2018 it touched an all-time high level of 60 per cent (Table 2). According to Turkey’s 2023 energy agenda, the country is planning to double the capacity of its coal power plant from 15.0 to 30.0 MW (Melikoglu, 2017). Colombia and Russia are top exporters of coal to Turkey, with 50 and 35 per cent export share, respectively. The USA and South Africa also export coal to Turkey, accounting for 6 and 5 per cent share (Euracoal, 2020). Oil contributes 28–30 per cent of the total energy mix. With only 312 million barrels of proven oil reserves, Turkey hugely depends on oil imports. It has been reported that in 2019 total production of oil

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is expected to cross 57.83 thousand barrels per day while consumption is estimated to remain at 1007.0 barrels per day (Table 3). The gap between domestic oil production and its consumption is also widening. According to the EIA report of 2017, Turkey was nearly 90 per cent dependent on imported liquid fuels. Table 2

Turkey coal production consumption and import

Years

Production in (million tonnes oil equivalent)

Consumption (million tonnes oil equivalent)

Import (million tonnes oil equivalent)

Percentage of import coal in total consumption

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

16.7 17.4 17.5 17.9 17.0 15.5 16.4 12.8 15.5 15.1 17.0

29.6 30.9 31.4 33.9 36.5 31.6 36.1 34.7 38.5 39.5 42.3

12.9 13.5 13.9 16.0 19.5 16.1 19.7 21.9 23.0 24.4 25.3

43.58 43.68 44.26 47.19 53.27 50.94 54.57 63.11 59.74 61.17 59.81

Source Based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy ( 2019|68th edition)

Table 3

Turkey’s oil consumption (million metric tonnes)

Year

Consumption thousand barrel per day

Year

Consumption thousand barrel per day

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

687 619 658 645 661 659 678 672 655 678

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

673 656 696 763 765 911 977 1013 1002 –

Source BP Statistical Review, 2010, 2018, 19

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Gas In 1992, Turkey was consuming 4.5 billion cubic metres of gas; in 2002, the consumption reached up to 17.4 billion cubic metres, and in 2012, it was recorded as high as 43.3 billion cubic metres meaning thereby a 10-time increase in gas consumption in 20 years. After 2012 with some fluctuations, gas consumption in the country indicates an increasing trend (Table 4). Turkey is an energy resource deficient country, and it is true in the case of natural gas also. As per 2018 data, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Algeria are the main suppliers of Turkey’s energy demands, with Russia supplying more than 50 per cent of total gas and Iran and Azerbaijan supplying 16 and 15 per cent, respectively. The remaining supply comes from different other countries (Table 5). Turkey is also focusing more on LNG to fulfil its energy requirements. The increasing share of LNG in total gas supply is an indicator of this fact only. In 2012, LNG contributed 16 per cent of total gas import, and in 2018, its share was 22 per cent; Algeria and Nigeria are the main LNG suppliers (Table 5). The US also supplied 12 per cent of the total gas import to Turkey. But this figure is unlikely to sustain in future due to geographic, economic and political reasons.

Turkey’s Asia Relations Turkey is located in between the energy-rich Middle Eastern and Central Asian neighbours and energy-scant Europe. It connects Iran, Caucasia and Central Asia to Europe. Turkey’s land connectivity with Egypt and Israel offers an opportunity to these two countries to use Turkey as a transit. Turkey’s Asian neighbourhood, Central Asian countries, mainly Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have significant energy resources that estimated between 60 and 200 billion barrels (Global Business Reports, 2012, p. 1). The Caspian basin alone is considered to be having reserves of up to 200 billion barrels which is sufficient to change the existing energy market dynamics of the Gulf or elsewhere. In 1990 the IEA suggested that the proven central Asian reserve with Caspian and Azerbaijan are nearly 40 billion barrels while possible reserves are between 70 and 1178 billion barrels (Kuniholm, 2000). In Central Asia, Kazakhstan is not only the largest country in Central Asia but also has the largest hydrocarbon reserves and oil producers

4.5

Consumption (billion cubic metre)

Source Based on BP energy statistics 2019

1992

Turkey gas consumption

Year

Table 4

17.4

2002 35.9

2010 41.9

2011 43.3

2012 44.0

2013

46.6

2014

46.0

2015

44.5

2016

51.6

2017

47.3

2018

288 J. ZAFAR

1.00

0.00

Source Based on the EIA data (2011–2018)

56.00 18.00 8.00 16.00

58.00 19.00 9.00 14.00

Russia Iran Azerbaijan Algeria + Nigeria (LNG) Others

2012

2011

0.00

57.00 20.00 10.00 12.00

2013

–

54.79 18.14 12.23 13.50

2014

Turkey gas import sources (Figures in %)

Country/Year

Table 5

2.00

56.00 16.00 11.00 14.00 + Qatar 3.0 = 17.00

2015

53.00 17.00 14.00 11.00 + Qatar 3.0 = 14 2.00

2016

–

51.00 16.74 11.85 19.43

2017

2

47.00 16.00 15.00 20.00

2018

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289

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J. ZAFAR

in the region. Reserves of crude oil with proven deposits amount to 30 billion barrels (EIA, 2019). These reserves are more than the oil reserves of Kuwait. There is not much data about estimated oil reserves in CAR. According to some experts, the estimated oil reserves may be up to 110 billion barrels. Among the important oil reserves of Kazakhstan, Tengiz has 9 billion barrels of oil; Kurmangazay has 7.33 billion barrels; Karanchag-Anak has 6 billion barrels; Aktob has more than 1 billion barrels of estimated; Buzachiwith 1.5 billion barrels, and Zhambyl 800 million barrels. Besides oil and gas, Kazakhstan is also housing a range of minerals such as lead, wolfram and 25 per cent of the world’s uranium reserve (EIA, 2019). This has gradually brought Kazakhstan to the centre of Turkey’s energy security. Turkey is one of the top investors in Kazakhstan with 2 billion USD, according to the Turkish Chamber of Commerce (DEiK , 2017). Turkmenistan has the second-largest gas reserves in the CIS region after Russia and contains the fourth-largest gas reserves in the world. Though there are many claims about Turkmenistan gas reserves, proven gas reserves of Turkmenistan are about 265 trillion cubic feet (EIA, 2016). The main gas reserves and producing region lies in the eastern part of the country, including the Amu Darya basin. Only in this region, more than 1000 oil and gas wells are in operation, which is about onethird of the total hydrocarbon drilling facilities of the country. Yashlar is a giant reserves area with 27tcf of gas reserves (Rashid, 2000). Only the Daultabad-Donmez field contains 60Tcf of gas (Hydrocarbon Technologies, 2013). In November 2006, a new giant gas field in Galkynysh Gas Field (formerly South Yoloten) was discovered with estimated 14 trillion cubic metres of gas (Hydrocarbon Technologies, 2013). Turkmenistan has proven 600 million barrels of oil reserve (EIA, 2016). In January 2021, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan agreed to resolve their differences over the export of Turkmenistan gas via the Caspian Sea. The agreement was considered to have removed the last obstacle in the realisation of the Trans-Caspian pipeline (Daily Sabah, 2021, January 22). Soon after this agreement, Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu offered Turkish help “to bring Turkmenistan’s natural gas through Turkish soil to Europe” (Daily Sabah, 2021, February 23). Uzbekistan has the third-largest reserve of hydrocarbon resources in Central Asia and the eighth largest gas producer in the world. According to EIA, Uzbekistan has 60–90 tcf, and according to Uzbek official data 65 tcf gas reserve. Uzbekistan also has a small number of oil reserves,

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291

around 594 million tonnes. More than 60 per cent of Uzbekistan hydrocarbon resources are located in the Bukhara-Khiva region and 70 per cent of the country’s oil production (EIA, 2016). There are 101 oil fields and 147 natural gas fields in Uzbekistan. Gazi is considered to be the largest Uzbek gas field with 30 per cent of total Uzbekistan gas reserves (Raimondi, 2019). In recent years, Turkey and Uzbekistan have improved their relations. In February 2021, the Turkish foreign minister visited Uzbekistan and told his Uzbek counterpart that Turkey could help Uzbekistan in upgrading the transportation infrastructure to bring Uzbek gas and oil to international markets and Turkey (Duru & Yuzbasioglu, 2021). Turkish companies, TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Corporation) and BOTAS (Turkey’s petroleum pipeline corporation) are potential candidates to invest in Uzbekistan’s energy sector. As the most populous Central Asian country, Uzbekistan always figures in Turkey’s overall Turkic and Central Asian relations. Uzbekistan has long battled against several extremist and terrorist groups, including Al Qaida and Hizb al Tahrir. Uzbekistan had struggled to balance its relations with the West and Russia. Its relations with Turkey have advanced only slowly and carefully, in balance to China and Russia. Turkey’s reunion with its Turkic world has to face Russian and Chinese pressure and their competition for influence in Central Asia. As Morena Skalamer argues, the Central Asian states are “squeezed between two behemoths, Russia and China” (Skalamera, 2017).

Middle East and Turkish Energy Security The Middle East is the main energy supplier of the world, the largest energy region of the world, with 48.3 per cent of total proven oil reserves in the world (NS Energy, 2019). Yet, both the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East represent two different sets of problems for Turkey. In the Caspian and Central Asia region, Turkey faces an immediate geographical and historical rivalry from powerful third-party states like Iran and Russia. But in the Middle East, Turkey has deep historical differences with major oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia has the largest oil reserves in the region and the second-largest in the world, with approximate 297.7 billion barrels, which constitutes 17.2 per cent of the world reserve (NS Energy, 2019). Saudi Arabia is also the world’s largest oil producer, with 10.3 million barrels per day (Reuters, 2019). Turkey and Saudi Arabia were enjoying good relations in the 90s, and

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J. ZAFAR

Turkey was importing 16–22 per cent oil of its total demand (Table 6). Since the Arab uprisings in 2011, the relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia became more unpredictable; Turkish oil imports went down from 18 per cent in the 90s to 5 per cent in 2019. As a defence deal between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is being talked about (Eyal, 2021), this could bring the uncertainties in Turkey-Saudi relations to an end. An improved Saudi–Turkey relation may change Turkey’s energy security outlook. Iraq has the third-largest oil reserve in the region, with 145 billion barrels of oil (EIA, 2021). Its 90 per cent of oil reserves are located onshore in the southern part of the country. Iraq and Turkey have been traditionally very strong since 1974. With a 970 km pipeline in operation (Bowlus, 2017), Turkish imports 17.8 per cent of oil from Iraq (Table 6). Currently, Turkey and Iraq are operating two pipelines, one from Kirkuk and the second from Kurdish Regional Government headquarter, Erbil (EIA, 2017). Both pipelines join the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline. Iran has the second-largest oil reserves in the region, with 155.6 billion barrels of oil, which is 9 per cent of the world’s total oil reserves (Nada & Matthew, 2019). Iran has been one of the largest energy suppliers to Turkey. TabrizAnkara Pipeline is the main pipeline to bring Iran gas to Turkey. However, terror attacks by PKK related groups on this pipeline have created security concerns, and Turkey and Iran have considered using the Trans-Caspian route to bring both Iranian and Turkmenistan gas supplies to Turkey. In 2011 Iran (51 per cent), Iraq (17 per cent), Saudi Arabia (11 per cent), Russia (12 per cent), and Kazakhstan (7 per cent) were the main exporters of Turkey’s oil supplies (Table 6). In 2012, as the Iranian nuclear dispute deepened, Iranian supplies to Turkey started declining from 51 to 44 per cent. Iraq increased its supplies as a replacement of 17 per cent of Iranian supplies from 15 per cent in 2012 to 32 per cent in 2013. The share of Saudi Arabia also increased from 11 to 14 per cent during the same period. Other small suppliers had contributed only 8 per cent of the total supply. By 2013, Saudi Arabia’s share remained almost static at 14.4 per cent while Kazakhstan and Russia had supplied 8.3 and 7.9 per cent, respectively. Turkey’s efforts for diversification of oil supply showed some results in 2014 when the country had significantly reduced its oil import from Iran, coming down to 26 per cent only. Import from Nigeria also increased to 8 per cent, and the Russian share dropped to 3 per cent. By 2015, Iraq became the top supplier with a share of 45.6 per cent. Iran’s share came down to 22 per cent, still fulfilling almost the sufficient need of the country. Russian share has been fluctuating, and in

19.0 13.1 22.8 3.8 – – – – 13.9 9.3 18.1

19.3 21.7 16.6 11.8 – – – – 16.0 10.4 4.8

44.0 15.0 14.0 10.0 7.0 – – –

8.0

51.0 17.0 11.0 12.0 7.0 – – –

2.0

2012

8.4

28.4 32.3 14.4 7.9 8.3 2.6

2013

5.0

26.0 27.0 10.0 3.0 8.0 8.0 – –

2014

3.5

22.0 45.6 9.6 12.0 2.6 2.1 – –

2015

11.6

6.3 9.1

17.1 28.8 6.0 19.3 –

2016

20.84

26.94 16.55 5.34 18.87 1.8 – 4.04 8.23

2017

14.39

18.37 17.80 5.0 25.21 3.14 1.26 3.71 11.12

2018

Source Based on data provided by EIA, EMRA and TUPRAS, 2001 (includes crude oil + refinery product like diesel, aeroplane fuel and marine fuel)

17.4 33.8 14.4 10.0 – – – – 12.9 1.5 11.5

2011

Iran Iraq Saudi Arabia Russia Kazakhstan Nigeria Kuwait India Libya Syria Other

2000

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

1998

Country /Year

S. no

1990

Shares of different countries in oil supply to Turkey (Figures in %)

Table 6

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293

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J. ZAFAR

2015 also it recorded a spike and reached a level of 12 per cent. In 2016, surprisingly, India entered Turkey’s oil market, supplying 9.1 per cent of refined oil. As Iran–West relations improved following the nuclear negotiation, Iran once again became the top supplier with 26.94 per cent of total oil supply to Turkey in 2017. Iraqi share declined from 28.8 to 16.55 per cent and Russian supplies to 18.87 per cent of total oil. Among other suppliers, India continued to remain as an important source of energy with 8.23 per cent supplies of oil. These changing sources and volume of energy imports indicate that Turkey remains vulnerable to the dynamics of Iran–West, Russia–West, and Turkey–Gulf relations. In 2018, Russia emerged as the top supplier of oil to Turkey with a share of 25.21 per cent, including refinery products. Neighbouring countries and long partners like Iran and Iraq contributed 18.37 and 17.8 per cent of the oil supply, respectively (Table 6). Though the import of oil has been unsteady with all the partner countries, supply from Iran has been much volatile and uncertain due to US sanctions and political instability for a very long period of time. Presently when European powers are giving positive gestures to Iran, therefore, it may be inferred that in the near future situation may become normal. In that case, Iran may again become the foremost supplier of oil to Turkey.

A Sustainable Energy Security Turkey’s energy security comprises three key elements, import, transit, and joint production. Besides, Turkey continues the exploration of energy sources within Turkish undergrounds and waters and has found some limited gas reserves in 2020 (Cohen, 2020). As Turkey’s energy security had faced uncertainty amid Iran’s nuclear crisis, Russia–West ties, and the recent Gulf-Qatar crisis, Turkey sought to overcome these vulnerabilities. The pipeline diplomacy and the goal to become a transit hub, has paid off good results.

The Pipeline Diplomacy Turkey’s location between the energy-rich Middle East, Eurasia and the major energy consumers of Europe provide Turkey leverage to play a role not less than that of an energy supplier. Turkey has established itself as a transit hub of six gas and two oil pipelines connecting Asian suppliers to European markets. Turkey itself imports 83 per cent of

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natural gas through these pipelines. One of the oil pipelines comes from Iraq, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık Crude Oil Pipeline, and second comes from Azerbaijan to Turkey, Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The KirkukYumurtalık Crude Oil Pipeline is in operation since 1976 (Rasheed, 2000). From 2003 to 2006, this pipeline was attacked many times by militants of PKK terrorist group (IAGS, 2008). To protect the pipeline from future attacks, the Iraqi and Turkish governments announced a new parallel pipeline up to Ceyhan (Daily Sabah, 2019, September 5). In 2017, when the Kurdish Regional Government declared a referendum for greater autonomy, including in Iraq’s Kirkuk region that KRG had liberated from the ISIS, Iraqi military had intervened and took back the control of the city (ICG, 2020). As Iraq now in control of the region, it objected to an oil deal signed between Turkey and the KRG as it violated the 1976 agreement. The dispute is now under the arbitration of the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) (Kraemer, 2019), the supply continues, nevertheless. The BTC was initiated by eleven international energy companies, including British Petroleum, with a 30 per cent share (BP, 2018). In the beginning, this pipeline was designed to supply Central Asian and Caspian Sea oil from Turkmenistan port, but due to Russian and Iranian opposition, it could not be materialised (Indeo, 2018). Among the six gas pipelines that bring energy supplies to Turkey and beyond, two pipelines come from Russia, Western Route (Russia-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline) and Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline. With these two pipelines, Russia has become the biggest gas supplier to Turkey supplying nearly 50 per cent of total gas demand. These two pipelines have gradually changed the transactional bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia into a strategic relation, paving the way for cooperation in other areas of mutual interests. After Russian pipelines, the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline is the second-largest gas supplier to Turkey with a full capacity of 16 bcm/annually. Like Iraq–Turkey pipeline, parts of Iran–Turkey pipeline has also been attacked many times by the PKK militants. As a result, both countries wanted to build two more alternative pipelines, however, due to the US sanctions, the work on new pipelines has been delayed. Turkey–Austria or Nabucco-West Pipeline, jointly initiated by Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria in 2009, was supposed to bring gas from Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz Gas Field) to Europe. However, in 2013, Azerbaijan left this project and joined the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), a rival project of Nabucco announced by a Swiss energy company

296

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EGL Group in 2013. This pipeline also aimed at importing gas from the Shah Deniz 2. As major European energy companies are part of this project, and Turkey as a transit route, the project eases Europe’s dependency on Russian energy. On 12 June 2018, the Turkish part of this pipeline Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) was opened. The initial capacity of the pipeline would be 16 bcm/year, out of which Turkey will use 6 bcm/year, and the rest will be transported to European countries (Anadolu Agency, 2020).

Collaborations, Investments, Joint Ventures Turkey has shown interest in collaborating with international companies to explore and produce energy in third countries. Recently, Turkey and Azerbaijan, for example, have announced a joint venture to enter Libya’s energy market (The Libyan Observer, 20 June 2021). Turkey is not only importing oil and gas but also Turkish energy companies are engaged in the region. Turkish companies have huge potential, but because of economic sanctions on Iran, there is a limitation of investment and activities. Turkey was the most important trade partner of Iran, but because of sanctions, its trade reduces from 28 billion dollars in 2012 to 14 billion dollars in 2013 (Dost & Taner, 2014). In 2015 Turkish company Yukselir Group invested $5.7 billion to construct 4 oil refineries in Iran (Yildiz, 2015). Next year in 2016, Turkish energy company Unit International signed a $4.2 billion deal with Iran’s Energy Ministry to build seven natural gas power plants. The project will also meet 10 per cent of Iranian electricity demand (Hurriyat Daily News, 2016, June 5). Once international sanctions are lifted, after the implementation of the nuclear deal, Turkish companies will have extra leverage in working with international partners. Pakistan is dependent on imported energy. Central Asia can provide a sustainable energy supply to Pakistan. Pakistan and Turkmenistan are working on Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) since 1990, but because of instability in Afghanistan, the project could not begin despite many agreements and promises. As the Afghanistan situation is becoming more unpredictable, all parties are mulling over finding out new possibilities to complete the project. As Turkey has assumed a new

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security role, to safeguard the Kabul airport aftermath of the NATO withdrawal, Turkey would aim to emerge as a new partner in different energy projects of Central and South Asia. Turkmenistan is a landlocked country with a long coast at the Caspian, totally dependent on Russia for the transportation of its energy to the International market, nevertheless. China is the main direct international importer of Turkmenistan gas, which also exploits the situation in its favour. Currently, China is importing 50 per cent of its total gas demand from Turkmenistan. The accomplishment of a new pipeline project in Turkmenistan would open the door for other projects like Trans-Caspian Pipeline. Russia and Pakistan have already initiated work on multibillion 1100 kms “North–South” pipeline “Pak Stream”. Turkey’s expanding role in Central Asia, Afghanistan and South Asia will pressurise Iran and Russia to cooperate with Turkey in the Caspian region also. Malaysian national oil corporation Petronas has a good presence in Central Asian Energy, especially in Turkmenistan’s Caspian region. Currently, Petronas along with China’s “Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)”, is handling one-quarter of the total gas output of Turkmenistan gas (Pirani Simon, 2019). Petronas is operating in the Caspian region as Turkey also wants to engage in the same region. Petronas’ Malaysian energy companies are also involved in Kazakhstan. In 2016, Malaysian Energy Company “Reach Energy” acquired 60 per cent stake in Kazakhstan’s North Kariman and Yessen Block and announced to invest $155 M. In 2020 “Reach Energy” Secured a production Agreement (PSA) for 16 and 25 years for both blocks (Reach Energy, 2020). Petronas has also participated in many oil and gas studies and signed many MoUs with Kazakhstan. The president of Kazakhstan has offered Petronas to engage in the Kazakh oil and gas sector. Turkish-Malaysian energy companies may be working together in Central Asia’s energy sector, in order to balance with dominating Russian and Chinese companies. In Uzbekistan also, Petronas has a long history of engagement in numbers of projects. In 2005 and 2007 company signed many MoUs for different projects (NS Energy, 2007). Petronas began its operation in Uzbekistan in 2008 when it signed an agreement to develop the Surkhan block in the Surkhandarya region. In 2010, the company signed a deal with the Uzbekistan government to develop Boysun block for the next 35 years. However, due to economic and political reasons in

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2011, the company started withdrawing from some projects. It withdrew from the international consortium for exploration and development in the Aral Sea region and in the next month, June 2011, it reduced its share up to 11 per cent from 33 per cent in the fuel production unit in South Uzbekistan. In 2013, Petronas stopped exploration work on the block in the Surkhandarya region in the south of Uzbekistan. In 2014, Petronas withdrew from two production share agreements in Uzbekistan, the Baysun block and Ustyurt block (Trend, 2018). After some renegotiation, Petronas announced its return in the Uzbekistan energy market.

The Caspian Sea Conundrum The Caspian Sea is a 370,000 sq km (143,000 sq mile) body of landlocked water bordering key energy-rich countries of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Iran. Until 1991, it was divided between USSR and Iran, both countries had signed many treaties (1813, 1828, 1921, 1935, 1940, and 1956) (Janusz et al., 2005). After the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, five littoral states, Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan have their claims on the Sea. The Caspian Sea region, and especially the Caspian Sea area of Central Asia, houses huge reserves of oil and gas. As of now, the main customer of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are Russia and China. If supplied to Turkey via the Caspian Sea, their energy exports will reduce European dependency on Russian Energy and help Turkey’s energy security. As Russia exploits the situation and controls Central Asian Energy (CAE) flow, with its diplomatic and military influence in the region, no country except China has so far succeeded in challenging Russia’s hegemony in this region. In the long dispute over the Caspian Sea’s status of sea or lake, in international law, all stakeholders have tried to interpret the law according to their interests. For Turkey to tap the energy sources of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, there are two viable options; one is to transport oil and gas tankers up to Baku, Azerbaijan and from there, and then use pipeline or roads to Turkey. This option, however, is not very cost effective. The most viable option is to spread pipelines through the Caspian or by transCaspian pipelines (TCP). These pipelines can also be connected with Uzbekistan. Trans-Caspian Oil Transport System or Kazakhstan Caspian

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Transportation System (KCTS) is the first project that aimed to establish a 700 km long pipeline from Kazakhstan to Baku. Another project is the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP), which proposed to connect Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan via a 300 km pipeline. While the KCTS aims to bring Kazakhstan’s oil to Turkey, TCP aims to connect with European markets. Both projects, if implemented, will connect the Central Asian and European markets without the help of Russia and Iran. Until now, Russia and Iran have maintained their strong opposition to these two projects. Even the 2018 agreement among the five littoral states had made the case more complex. The agreement declared the Caspian Sea, as a sea, which allowed all five countries to draw their water boundaries from their shores to the midway point with littoral neighbours. This also entitles these states for economic claims as approved by the United Nations Convention on Law of Sea (UNCLA). In this agreement, Iran will get only 13 per cent of the Caspian Sea, that too mostly saline water. Kazakhstan is considered the biggest winner with near 50 per cent of the Caspian Sea hydrocarbon wealth would be lying in the Kazakhstan sector (Putz, 2018). There is not much change in the existing claims of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. One of the important features of this agreement is “not to allow the military presence of any non-Caspian country” in the sea. This provision helped Russia to maintain its unchallenged dominant position (Putz, 2018). The Trans-Caspian Pipeline is likely to gain from this agreement as Kazakhstan Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan can build pipelines in their territorial waters and connect with each other in the sea. However, Iran and Russia still oppose these projects using the clauses of the environmental problem as specified in the “The Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea” (Tehran Convention) signed in November 2003. According to this document, before any project, any Caspian country can veto if there is any threat to the environment of the Caspian Sea (Karle, 2018). The strong opposition from Russia and Iran for these two pipelines are mainly to protect their special status in the Caspian Sea energy security (Breyza, 2020), not the protection of the environment. As the Caspian region wants to connect with European markets, with help of Turkey, Russia and Iran see this expansion of market as a threat to their hegemony on the energy market of the region. Both Turkey and European Union are very keen on both projects and ready to finance the project and provide technological support. However, until now, Turkey has not taken practical steps to invest and build pipelines.

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Russia is the main competitor of the EU and NATO in world affairs, and at the same time, Russia is the main supplier of oil, gas and coal to the EU. 30 per cent of the European oil supplies come from Russia. In coal demand also, 39 per cent of European coal supply come from Russia. This European dependency on Russian energy supplies allows Russia to use its energy supplies as a strategic asset and influence the foreign policy of the EU and its members. The US wants to emerge as an alternative source of energy supplies to Europe but the geographical distance makes the supply less competitive than the Russian supplies. As a result, the EU is still in search of reliable alternatives, from the Middle East, Africa or elsewhere. Turkey’s Pipeline Diplomacy and the ambition to become a transit hub is partly guided by its hope to help the EU in return for more support to Turkey’s membership process and support for Turkey’s new ambitions in Central Asia, North Africa, and Asia.

Conclusion Turkey is an import-dependent country for its energy security whose major supplies come from countries like Iran, Iraq, Russia, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Nigeria. With economic growth in the last decade, the energy demands have gone up, and so its energy security has been remodelled. Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan are the new players that assumed greater importance in Turkey’s energy security. But the remodelling of its energy security has been done from a new perspective. The new energy security model of Turkey is based on three elements, first, to assume a role of energy transit between Eurasian and Middle Eastern suppliers to European markets; second, to diversify its supply sources, more from secured pipelines and third, to find more alternative and renewable energy resources. In the last decade, the changing energy scenario has been guiding Turkey’s foreign policy choices towards Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. Turkey’s relations with Russia have simultaneously helped Turkey’s energy security as well as Turkey’s Syria policy of conflict deescalation and counter-terrorism operations. This trend has continued in Libya and Azerbaijan and may continue in other conflict zones such as Afghanistan after the US withdrawal. Middle Eastern supplies are gradually becoming vulnerable to regional conflicts, and rivalries such as the imports from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and Iraq have seen several

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ups and downs. By looking to Asian energy resources, Turkey is gradually looking to diversify its energy import and reduce the dependency on Middle Eastern and Russian supplies. As a result, Turkey looks to achieve greater strategic autonomy in its Middle Eastern relations. Cooperation with other players in Central Asia and Caspian may be crucial. As Turkey and Malaysia have a scope of cooperation in the Central Asian and Caspian Sea region, they appear as potential candidates for joint ventures in third countries like in Central Asia. In post-US withdrawal, Turkey is returning with an important international role in Afghanistan. With this enhanced role, Turkey looks to increase its South and Central Asia profile, both in their regional security and energy market. The third element in Turkey’s energy policy is rather more political and strategic, which is to reconnect from its distant Turkic countries, Kazakhstan, for example. The growing interdependency between Turkey and Kazakhstan, with nearly $25 billion Turkish investments in Kazakhstan, in approximately 487 projects, suggests that this relationship is going to assume greater importance in Turkey’s Asia Anew policy. With this, the possibility of competition between Turkey and Iran for influence in Kazakhstan may further increase as Kazakhstan hosts both Turkic speaking and Persian speaking populations. In the changing Central Asian and South Asian security equilibrium, Turkey is projecting itself as a powerful actor, which can influence and win the confidence of actors across the rivalries and conflicts. By finding a balancing act between Russia, China, and the United States, Turkey aims to maximise its own reach and economic gains. Turkey’s energy companies are expanding their business and finding new partnerships. A trio of the military, investment and strategic alliance has helped Turkey to emerge as an important player in Central Asia relations.

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Appendix

Select Chronology of Turkey–Asia Relations Year

Event

Country

751

The battle of Talas between Abbasid Caliphate and Tang Dynasty, the introduction of Islam among Turks The ruler of Kara-Khanid Khanate, Satuq Bughra Khan converted to Islam (the First Turkic ruler converted to Islam) The establishment of the Ghaznavid Dynasty by Alp Tigin The establishment of the Great Seljuk Empire established by Tugrul Beg The Battle of Manzikert between the Great Seljuk Empire and Byzantine Empire, decisive Turkish victory opened the gates of Anatolia to the Turks The foundation of Khwarazmian Dynasty by Anush Tigin Gharchai, a Turkic slave of the Seljuk Sultans The foundation of Delhi Sultanate by Qutb al-Din Aibak, a Turkic slave of Muhammad Ghori The foundation of Mongol Empire. Turkic tribes migrated through west due to Mongol attacks, so the Turk population in Anatolia rose The battle of Köseda˘g between Anatolian Seljuk Sultanate and Mongol Empire. The decisive victory of Mongols The establishment of the Ottoman Empire by Osman Beg The Battle of Chaldiran, the defeat of Safavid ruler Shah Ismail by the Ottomans

China

934 963 1037 1071

1077 1206 1206

1243 1299 1514

China Central Asia Central Asia Turkey

Central Asia India India

India Turkey Iran (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3

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APPENDIX

(continued) Year

Event

Country

1534

Uzbek leader Ubeydullah Khan’s letter to Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent Uzbek leader Abdul Latif Khan’s letter to Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent Ottoman Commander Sidi Ali Reis arrived in India to assist Gujarat ruler to fight against the Protégées in Goa and Diu The treaty of Amasya between Ottoman and Safavids. Ottoman captured Azerbaijan and Baghdad Ache ambassador arrived to Istanbul Akbar’s attempt to send a mission to Spanish king Philip II against the Ottomans The treaty of Istanbul between Ottoman and Safavids Aqam Haji, an Ottoman ambassador visited Mughal court For example, in 1615 a Turkish envoy was sent to India to try to persuade the Great Moghul to deny assistance to the Persians, the great enemies of the Ottomans in the east, The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Moghul, 1615–1619, as narrated in his Journal and Correspondence, ed. William Foster (Hakluyt Society, 1899; repr. by Kraus: Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1967), 113. He failed The treaty of Serav, the end of Ottoman–Safavid Wars The capture of Kandahar from the Mughals by Safavids The mission of Mughal ambassador Mir Zarif to the Ottoman Empire The Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin between Ottoman and Safavids Ottoman envoy Arslan Agha’s visit to Mughal court The Ottoman Sultan Mehmed IV sent Seyyid Muhyiddin as ambassador to Shah Jahan and he was accepted by Shah Jahan on 22 September 1651 The Mughal ambassador Sayyid Haji Mehmed was sent to Sublime Port Zulfiqar Agha in the Mughal court as being an Ottoman ambassador Mughal ambassador Qaim Beg reached Istanbul Maanzade Huseyin Agha arrived India as Ottoman ambassador Tarbiyat Khan, the governor of Multan, was sent to Safavids as ambassador and the broken relations between Mughal and Safavids Ottoman envoy Ahmed Agha’s visit for the Mughal court to get help against Europeans The battle of Karnal between Nader Shah, the founder of Afshar Dynasty, and the Mughals. Decisive Persian victory over Mughals

Central Asia

1540 1554 1555 1566 1582 1590 1608 1615

1618 1622 1638 1639 1640 1649

1653 1654 1656 1657 1663

1689 1739

Central Asia India Iran Indonesia India Iran India India

Iran Iran India Iran India India

India India India India India

India India

(continued)

APPENDIX

309

(continued) Year

Event

Country

1786

Tipu Sultan, the ruler of Kingdom of Mysore sent a mission to the Ottoman Empire Emir Haydar, the Khan of Bukhara Khanate sent envoy to the Ottoman Emir Haydar, the Khan of Bukhara Khanate sent envoy to the Ottoman Emir Haydar, the Khan of Bukhara Khanate sent envoy to the Ottoman Muhammed Omer, the Khan of Kokand Khanate sent envoy to the Ottoman Muhammed Ali, the Khan of Kokand Khanate sent envoy to the Ottoman Hudayar Khan, the Khan of Kokand Khanate sent envoy to the Ottoman Allah Qulu Khan, the Khan of Khiva Khanate sent envoy to the Ottoman The Ottomans opened their first two consulates in Bombay and Calcutta Alimkul Beg, the Khan of Kokand Khanate sent envoy to the Ottoman The first Ottoman Consulate was opened in Singapore Muaffereddin, the Khan of Bukhara Khanate sent envoy to the Ottomans Sultan of Aceh in Southeast Asia, Mahmud Syah, sent a delegation to Sultan Abdulaziz in Istanbul, requesting Ottoman Empire’s protection and military aid against the Dutch military attacks The Khan of Khiva Khanate sent envoy to the Ottoman Empire Ottoman Sultan sought help of Afghanistan during Ottoman-Russia war but Afghanistan could not accept the request Japan prince and princes visited Istanbul Osman Pasha, the captain of Ertu˘grul frigate was accepted by Japan emperor Abdullah Padishah Khan was appointed as the first honorary consul at Madras Malay Sultan Abu Bakar visited Istanbul Ottoman-German secret mission against the British rule in South Asia sent to Afghanistan The Khilafat Movement supported Mustafa Kemal led Ankara government Turkey-Afghanistan Alliance Agreement was signed in Moscow Japanese embassy was opened in Istanbul Afghan King Amanullah Khan visited Ankara

India

1800 1810 1813 1820 1839 1845 1848 1849 1863 1864 1867 1873

1873 1877

1887 1888 1890 1890 1914 1921 1921 1925 1928

Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekistan India Uzbekistan Singapore Uzbekistan Indonesia

Uzbekistan Afghanistan

Japan Japan India Malaysia Afghanistan India Afghanistan Japan Afghanistan (continued)

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(continued) Year

Event

Country

1931

The brother of Japanese King, Noboyoto Takamatsu arrived in Istanbul on an official visit The Treaty of Saadabad comprising Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey is signed Turkey entered East Asian politics by sending troops under UN command to the Korean War India’s Education Minister Maulana Abul Kalam Azad signed an agreement on Indian Cultural Centre to be established in Istanbul during his visit to Turkey The Korean war Turkey was admitted in NATO Indian Ambassador Chandra Shekhar Jha and Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Koprulu signed a Friendship Agreement Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement for friendly relations Iran, Turkey, Pakistan signed the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) Turkish delegation headed by Fatin Rü¸stü Zorlu attended the Bandung Conference in Indonesia Prime Minister Adnan Menderes visited the ROC Prime Minister Iskander Mirza arrived in Ankara on an official visit Prime Minister Adnan Menderes visited Asian countries, Japan, Pakistan, India, and Thailand President Ayyub Khan arrived in Ankara on a visit First Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru visited Turkey The Sri Lankan permanent representative of the UN visited Ankara on 4th January and met with Turkish to discuss Cyprus issue Turkey refused to join US war in Vietnam Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan agreed to establish Regional Development Council (RCD) President Ayyub Khan visited Ankara RCD countries decided to end visa requirement among them President Ayyub Khan visited Ankara Turkey attended Eighth Asia Africa People’s Solidarity Meeting at Nikosia (Cyprus) Foreign Minister Ça˘glayangil visited India A trade delegation from ROC visited Istanbul in November 1966 and a trade agreement both with Communist and Nationalist China at the same time in December 1969 Turkish delegation led by FM Ça˘glayangil visited Tokyo The Japanese mission arrived in Turkey Turkey started withdrawal from UN command in South Korea, as the normalisation with PRC started

Japan

1937 1950 1951

1952 1952 1954 1955 1955 1956 1956 1958 1959 1960 1961

1964 1964 1964 1964 1965 1967 1968 1969

1969 1970 1970

Afghanistan Korea India

Korea India Pakistan Asia Asia Taiwan Pakistan

Pakistan India Sri Lanka

Vietnam Asia Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Asia India Taiwan China

Japan Japan South Korea (continued)

APPENDIX

311

(continued) Year

Event

Country

1971

As Sino-American normalisation starts, steps for diplomatic relations between Turkey and PRC were initiated. Turkey recognised the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal representative of China and pursued a “One China” policy FM Bayülken visited Indonesia FM Bayülken visited India on 21–23 August 1973 during Indian–Pakistani talks Turkey faced arms embargo from the US Congress following the Cyprus crisis, Ankara explored better relations with non-Western countries FM Güne¸s visited PRC, Thailand, and Malaysia in July 1974 FM Ça˘glayangil visited to Kabul Official visit by Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rahman to Turkey Foreign trade protocol was signed between Turkey and North Korea Foreign Minister Gündüz Ökçün visited India, seeking guest status at the Non-Aligned Movement Chinese Foreign Minister visited Turkey FM Ökçün visited Japan his five-day visit to Japan The military regime in Turkey sought further expansion of relations in East Asia. President Kenan Evren paid a visit to South Korea Trade Minister Kemal Cantürk and Foreign Minister Ilter Türkmen visited China in May and December, respectively President Evren and PM Özal visited Pakistan President Evren visited Indonesia Evren became the first president visiting People’s Republic of China since establishment of diplomatic relations in 1971 PM Özal exchanged visits with his Malaysian counterpart PM Özal visited Pakistan Turkey hosted Malaysian King Foreign Minister Vahit Halefo˘glu went on a tour of Pakistan, Thailand, and China President Suharto visited Turkey Bangladeshi President Ershad visited Ankara Özal became the first PM to ever visit China Prime Minister Özal visited Japan in May to mobilise Japanese investment to Turkey Turkey evacuated Japanese diplomatic staff from Tehran following the Iraq–Iran War PM Turgut Özal visited Bangladesh in November 1986 Özal visited India to rejuvenate bilateral relations PM Turgut Özal visited South Korea, Hong Kong, and Malaysia

China

1973 1973 1974

1974 1976 1976 1977 1978 1978 1979 1981

1981 1981 1982 1982 1983 1984 1984 1984 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1986 1986 1986

Indonesia India

Afghanistan Bangladesh North Korea India China Japan South Korea

China Pakistan Indonesia China Malaysia Pakistan Malaysia Pakistan Indonesia Bangladesh China Japan Japan Bangladesh India

(continued)

312

APPENDIX

(continued) Year

Event

Country

1986 1986 1986

Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang visited Turkey in July 1986 Prince Mikasa Takahoito’s visit to Turkey in May A commercial counsellor of the PRC embassy in Ankara, Muhammed Niyazi, who had Uyghur descent, sought asylum in Turkey FM Halefo˘glu visited Japan, which “possessed advanced technology, immense economic and financial potential” Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Ankara President General Kenan Evren visited India on 22–26 February 1989 Pakistan PM Benazir Bhutto visited Turkey 18 May 1990 Soviet Union was dissolved and five Turkish speaking republics emerged Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan named a park after Isa Yusuf Alptekin, a Uyghur origin Turk in Istanbul, the move protested by the Chinese embassy President Süleyman Demirel visited China, Hong Kong, India and Indonesia President Suleyman Demirel joined silver jubilee celebrations of Bangladesh’s independence along with Yasser Arafat and Nelson Mandela Indian President Narayanan visited Turkey Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit visited China Developing Eight group was founded Uzbek President Islam Karimov visited Turkey President Demirel became the first Turkish president to visit Philippines Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz issued a secret circular about Xinjiang, which created a serious problem between Turkey and China. In the circular, it was pointed out that the region should be considered within the framework of the China’s territorial PM Bulent Ecevit visited India to speak at Vishva Bharti Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin visited Turkey Turkey entered into the process of normalising relations with North Korea in June 2000, after the historic Pyongyang summit between North Korean President Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Kim Dae-Sung. In 2001, Turkey established diplomatic relations with North Korea Turkey joined ISAF NATO Mission in Afghanistan for non-combatant support President Hamid Karzai visited Ankara The leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, visited China

China Japan China

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1995

1995 1997

1998 1998 1998 1999 1999 1999

2000 2000 2000

2001 2002 2003

Japan India India Pakistan Central Asia China

Asia Tour Bangladesh

India China Asia Uzbekistan Philippines China

India China North Korea

Afghanistan Afghanistan China (continued)

APPENDIX

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(continued) Year

Event

Country

2003

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Turkey on September 2003 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Afghanistan Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan visited the tsunami hit Banda Aceh region of Indonesia on 6–7 February 2005 Trilateral Summit of Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan was instituted to bring peace and stability November 2008 Prime Minister Erdogan visits New Delhi 2008 President Abdullah Gül also visited Japan with a large delegation of businessmen in June 2008 The chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference Jia Qinglin visited Ankara on 28 November 2008 2009 Turkish–Chinese military cooperation, including technology transfers China established diplomatic relations Iraqi Kurdistan, Cyprus, opposed Turkey’s position on Nagorno Karabakh, China opposed Turkey’s anti-PKK operations in Iraq, opposed Turkey’s observer membership in SCO Turkish president Abdullah Gul visited China and the Xinjiang region President Hamid Karzai visited Ankara in November “Year of Japan in Turkey” in 2010 China and Turkey agreed on working for a common strategic cooperation agreement on issues such as Afghanistan, the Middle East, Iraq, the global economic crisis and climate change, as well as giving their consent for more extensive work on economic issues Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Turkey in September 2010 and upgraded the relations to “strategic partnership” level Ahmet Davuto˘glu visited the Xinjiang’s cities of Urumqi and Kashgar Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan paid a visit to Dhaka President Abdullah Gül visited Indonesia and signed the joint declaration “Turkey and Indonesia: Towards an Enhanced Partnership in a New World Setting” in April 2011 Vice President of China Xi Jinping’s visit to Turkey Prime Minister Erdo˘gan’s China visit in April 2012 Turkey became Dialogue Partner of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina paid an official visit to Ankara

India

2004 2005 2007 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009

2009 2009 2010 2010

2010 2010 2010 2011

2012 2012 2012 2012

Afghanistan Indonesia Afghanistan India Japan China China China

China

Japan China

China China Bangladesh Indonesia

China China Asia Bangladesh (continued)

314

APPENDIX

(continued) Year

Event

Country

2013

Turkey and Japan signed “Joint Declaration of the Establishment of Strategic Partnership” during the visit of the Japanese PM Shinzo Abe to Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Afghanistan Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan and the Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak signed Turkey-Malaysia Strategic Partnership The Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Malaysia, signed in 2014, came into force on 1 August 2015 President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan visited China on 29–30 July 2015 External Affairs Minister of India Sushma Swaraj visited Turkey Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the G20 Summit and held bilateral talks with President Erdogan on 15–16 November 2015 Turkey recalls ambassador after execution of Jamat Islami leaders Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev visited Turkey Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Akda˘g, paid a visit on 27 September 2017 to Bangladesh to inquire the Rohingya problems Turkish First Lady Emine Erdo˘gan, together with Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu, visited Bangladesh on 6–7 September to inspect Rohingiya refugees’ problems Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım visited Bangladesh on 18–20 December 2017 to inspect Rohingya refugees’ problems Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo visited Turkey Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended the Belt and Road Summit on 4–15 May 2017 President Erdogan paid a state visit to India Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim arrived in Mongolia for a two-day visit on 6 April 2018. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended the annual summit of BRICS countries in Johannesburg, South Africa on July 27, 2018 President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Uzbekistan on 25 October and signed to establish High Level Strategic Cooperation Council Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan visited Turkey on January 4, 2019 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Malaysia President Erdo˘gan paid an official visit to China

Japan

2014 2014

2015 2015 2015 2015

2016 2017 2017

2017

2017 2017 2017 2017 2018 2018

2018

2019 2019 2019

Malaysia

Malaysia China India India

Bangladesh Uzbekistan Myanmar

Myanmar

Myanmar Indonesia China India Mongolia South Afriica

Uzbekistan

Pakistan Malaysia China (continued)

APPENDIX

(continued) Year

Event

2019

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended the Kuala Lumpur Malaysia Summit on December 19, 2019 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia along with leaders from Malaysia, Qatar and Iran Turkish Foreign Minister announces Asia Anew initiative at 1th Turkey Ambassadors’ Meeting in Ankara President Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Pakistan on 14 Pakistan February 2020

2019 2020

Country

315

Conclusion

The volume has covered three main aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy in general and their Asia perspectives, the evolution of Turkey’s Asia perspectives, the strategic limitations, and the political economy of Turkey’s foreign policy. The contributions share some common observations about these three aspects. The foreign policy discourses in Turkey’s domestic political debates have largely remained unchanged for a long time since the introduction of the first legal reform of the Ottoman Empire in 1939 that attempted to modernise the empire on the European model. The reforms were mainly crafted to make Turkey acceptable in the league of modernising European empires, mainly the United Kingdom, with whom the Ottoman Empire shared imperial borders in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. The Russian Empire was seen as the main threat to their territories and interests, mainly in Central and South Asia. The defeat of Turkey in the Russo–Turkish War received greater attention and sympathy from South Asia’s British and Indian rulers. The perception of Russia as a threat, an enemy, or a competitor of Turkey, has little changed from the OttomanRussian wars to the end of the Cold war. In this sense, Turkey’s foreign policy discourses from the late Ottoman to the post-Cold War period have not seen much discontinuity in perceiving Russia as the main challenge. The repression of the Turkic minorities by the Soviet Union and China in the 1930s and 1940s had further otherised communism and socialism and

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3

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CONCLUSION

their main advocates, the Soviet Union and China. Within this geopolitical reality, Turks barely saw the scope of any pro-Soviet politics at home and abroad. Moreover, the early modernisers of the Ottoman state from 1839 onwards were inspired by European transformations when the Russian Empire was the main threat to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman intellectuals and reformers then aspired either for a “United Ottoman Vatan” or “Pan-Turkic/Pan-Islamic nation” until Mustafa Kemal moved off all Ottoman-era delusions to set up a West-centric nation-state based on strong territorial Turkish nationalism. Since then, nationalism has continued to be the main reference of Turkish politics that also determines its foreign policy. The official and cultural Kemalism brought out a generation of nationalist parties of different shades and colours, including Islamic nationalists. Almost all political parties have pursued an agenda of reconnecting with Turkish communities globally, especially in the Balkans, Central Asia, Cyprus, Europe, Russia, Central Asia and China. Thus, Turkey’s West-centric foreign relations had little contradiction with Turkey’s Ottoman past, Kemalist reforms, and nationalist-conservative politics. None of Turkey’s military coups has attempted to break this continuity despite their severe differences in domestic politics. In some cases, Turkey’s secular military rulers, such as Kenan Evren, connected Turkey with the Islamic world. While Turkey’s West-centric foreign and defence relations were not challenged by any of Turkey’s mainstream political parties, including the conservative parties, the reconnection with Islamic and Asian countries was justified and considered as a compliment to Turkey’s West-centric relations. From 2002 to 2012, the AK Party has won most of the elections with the help of a strong pro-Western and pro-European agenda. They were aware that Turkey was a member of a western security alliance and may not be allowed to establish close defence relations with countries of anti-Western orientations, such as China and Russia. HOWEVER, the AK Party represents the most diverse political camp in Turkey’s political landscape, which was joined by politicians from across the spectrum of right-wing nationalism to the republicans, the Islamists, and the Sufi followers. Until the Arab uprisings, the AK Party steered “Market Islamism” with support of several pro-European Union reforms. Amid an uncertain EU accession process, regardless of strong economic growth and pro-EU reforms, the Western response to the Arab uprising and particularly the Syrian crisis left Turkey vulnerable and alone to face the

CONCLUSION

319

might of Russia and Russia-supported Iranian and Syrian militants on its borders. Disappointed and angry with the Western response, the nationalist and Islamist camp in the AK Party government saw the US in want of withdrawing from the Middle East and abandoning her NATO allies. The limitations of Turkey’s West-centric foreign policy were never so evident than now when Turkey was denied the American air defence system, while Turkey saw the PKK-linked militant groups in Syria receiving heavy American arms and training. By 2016, Turkey started a massive diplomatic offensive to secure a deconfliction mechanism, the Astana Peace Process, with the help of Russia and Iran. By 2020, Turkey purchased and activated the Russian air defence system S400, ignoring all Western pressures. Turkey, confident and emboldened by increasingly confident relations with Russia, has launched three military operations inside Syria to neutralise the statelet established by the US-backed Kurdish groups. Turkey also overturned the West-backed march of Khalifa Haftar on the UN-recognised Libyan government. The Nagorno-Karabakh war of Azerbaijan was another major show of Turkey’s newly acquired strategic autonomy in dealing with major security challenges. Although Turkey’s defiance of the West bore heavy economic prices, Turkey has secured a much-needed autonomy in controlling its foreign and defence relations. Turkey is not alone in being a NATO member with greater strategic autonomy. France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and other smaller nations of Europe have already maintained a balance between their NATO commitments and strategic autonomy. Turkey has to explain and convince its allies where it will head with its upgraded status in regional and international politics. Turkey’s push to renew its relations with Asian countries came in the changing context of Turkey’s foreign and economic relations. Two competitive narratives, “Turkey is drifting away from the West” vs. “the West is betraying Turkey”, are dominating the debate of Turkey’s changing foreign policy direction. In between lies the long journey of Turkey’s relations with the West and Russia and Turkey’s ambitions to carve out a place for itself. In Asia, for example, Turkey sees solidarity with Turkic communities as necessary to renew its relations in Central Asia, Russia, China, and South Asia. In Afghanistan, for example, Turkey stood against the Taliban to support the Uzbek, Turkmens, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Hazara minorities. Similarly, Islamic bonds with Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Muslims of India and other Asian countries play an important role in

320

CONCLUSION

Turkey’s Asia perspectives. Such religion and ethnicity-centric sentiments have, however, sometimes backfired. China sees Turkey’s sympathetic view of the Uyghur Muslims with great suspicion. Over the years, Turkey has increased its understanding of issues like the Uyghur’s of China, Kashmir, and the Moro Muslims of the Philippines. Similarly, Turkey has gradually learned how to iron out differences with Pakistan in Afghanistan and balance the competitive space of ruling elites in Bangladesh or elsewhere. Turkey’s successful balancing act between India and Pakistan during 2005–2013 ended in 2014. As Turkey aims to deepen its relations with East Asian nations, Turkey may not avoid the conflict over the South China Sea and China’s economic and military ambitions. Turkey’s Western allies and the emerging anti-China alliance of QUAD would eventually expect Turkey to form a strong resistance against China. Meanwhile, Turkey–China relations have made little progress beyond one-sided trade relations. The political economy of Turkey’s foreign relations, to find new export destinations, to receive new tourist arrivals, and to attract international investments for Turkey’s technology and innovation scarce economy, desperately need the advancement of Turkey’s Asia relations. As the Asian economy is gradually taking over the West, Turkey’s economic growth is becoming more connected with Asian markets in terms of growth and investments. The contributions have concluded that Turkey’s diversification and expansion of trade ties with Asia is a key element in redefining Turkey’s foreign policy and its contemporary Turkey–Asia relations. In the past, Turkey had strong cultural and political ties, but they were without economic underpinning. As the political economy of Turkey– Asia relations has offered greater opportunities and promises, Turkey’s foreign policy is working to commensurate them with political, cultural and strategic ties by using a set of cultural and soft power diplomacy. Turkey aggressively seeks free trade agreements, comprehensive economic partnerships, or special economic ties with many Asian countries. Turkey deals more realistically with China’s Belt and Road Initiative to bridge the trade deficit between Turkey and China. Energy, defence, and cultural cooperation have also received more attention in the current Asia Anew initiative. Turkey is a new player in Central Asia’s energy market; it carefully balances key competitors like Iran, China, and Russia. Turkey’s energy politics underlines that Turkey’s ambitions in Central Asia are not going to be unchallenged. Despite all limitations, Turkey’s soft power has managed to go deep with people’s emotions through

CONCLUSION

321

television screens, humanitarian diplomacy, educational scholarships, and tourism. Over the years, the concept of soft power has been seen only as part of state power, and non-state actors such as Sufi networks, or NGOs, educational institutes etc. too have become part of Turkish soft power. Once the non-state soft power had become independent and more popular, the state felt threatened, and a conflict between state and nonstate soft power ensued. Turkish soft power has recently seen many such conflicts and competition across the world and in Asian countries. At the strategic level, Turkey does not have many choices to make a sustainable push to Asia. The limitations include Turkey’s formal membership of the transatlantic alliance that China and Russia see against their visions of global order. China, along with Russia, India, and other countries has been promoting alternative international forums such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Turkey has yet to decide how to be part of these initiatives. The ongoing tension between India and China notwithstanding, this anti-Western or non-Western camp of global politics is there to stay for a long time. The Western and non-Western camps have serious disagreements on a host of issues of international orders, including the reforms in the United Nations Security Council, International Court of Justice, Disarmament, World Trade Organization, Cyber Security, and human rights. These disagreements can be seen in Asian countries’ approaches towards Syrian and Libyan crises vis-à-vis Turkey’s initial human rights-centric position. Turkey would need a long and sustained dialogue with Asian countries and bridge the gaps in their understanding of these issues. Another example of this limitation is Turkey’s engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, while India maintains strong objections against the initiative. Another limitation that Turkey faces and has gradually become vulnerable to is multiple Asian rivalries. In the wake of heightened tensions and competitions in India vs. China, India vs. Pakistan, Bangladesh vs. Pakistan, and China vs. Japan, or China vs. the US, Turkey may temporarily seek neutrality or balance in the long run; however, these rivalries will also cast a shadow on Turkey’s relations. For example, Turkey–Pakistan relations receive greater attention in Ankara despite India being Turkey’s second-largest trade partner in Asia. At the bilateral level, Turkey successfully renews its ties with Bangladesh, Pakistan and maintains its old ties with Japan and South Korea. Nevertheless, it is occasionally caught in difficult balancing acts, such as India vs. Pakistan. As media coverage of Turkish affairs in selected Asian countries suggests,

322

CONCLUSION

Turkey is already facing extremely negative media attention in most Asian countries, including in Muslim countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh. The chapters in the book have attempted to connect the dots in Turkey’s Asia relations and draw a perspective in which Turkey’s ambitious Asia Anew approach is going to work. These chapters show that Turkey has maintained strong historical relations with many Asian nations. However, these relations have primarily remained transactional, bilateral, and unsupported by a strong economic and security rationale. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the end of colonialism, the beginning of the Cold War, and the end of the Cold War have largely shaped Turkey’s choices in Asia. Even after the end of the Cold War, Turkey failed to evolve a post-Cold War approach towards the continent. As the world powers have also started looking beyond the Cold War fault lines and have sought new partnerships and alliances, Turkey has felt neglected, abandoned, and isolated in its transatlantic alliance. Turkish foreign policy is going through a long process of steady and predictable transformation in which Turkey seeks to change its status within the Western alliance by enhancing its economic and strategic profile across the geographies. As a result, Turkey’s Asia relations do not necessarily contradict Turkey’s commitments to her Western alliance, but they seek to change their role from a passive ally to an active ally. This ambition is well expressed in strategic autonomy, multidimensionalism, diversification, and expansion of its economic relations.

Index

A AIIB, 214, 219 al Assad, Bashar, 74, 91, 93, 102 ASEAN, 64, 68, 141, 256, 278 Asia Anew, 8, 10, 32, 65, 70, 75, 81, 139, 148, 195, 198, 257, 263, 264, 266, 301, 320, 322 Asia-Pacific, 5, 232, 236, 254–256, 265, 267 Atche Sultanate, 38 B Baisungur Mirza, 47 Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC), 295 Bandung, 61, 64 Bangladesh, 9, 31, 64–66, 68–70, 74–81, 85–90, 104, 106, 146, 176, 203, 319, 321, 322 Battle of Panipat, 38, 44 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 6, 10, 11, 65, 69, 99, 209–211, 213–223, 257, 273, 276, 277, 320, 321 BIMSTEC, 64, 70, 79

Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline, 295

C China, 3, 6, 9–11, 39, 61, 62, 64–68, 70–77, 79, 80, 85–87, 96–99, 104, 122, 124, 126, 134, 136, 141, 142, 148, 165, 167, 172–175, 179, 190, 195, 197–199, 202–204, 209–213, 215–223, 244, 252, 255, 256, 264, 267–273, 276–278, 281, 282, 291, 297, 298, 301, 317–321 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 133 Communist Party of China (CPC), 210, 213 COSCO Pacific, 276

D Daily Star, 86, 88–91 Davuto˘glu, Ahmet, 164, 166, 167, 175–177, 193

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anas (ed.), Turkey’s Asia Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93515-3

323

324

INDEX

DEIK, 240, 290 Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 72, 115, 123

E Erdogan, Emine, 177 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 27, 29, 31, 63, 75, 90, 91, 98, 100, 101, 170, 174, 215, 230, 259 Ertugrul, O., 79, 114

F Federal Reserve Bank’s (FED), 236, 241

G Gezi Park, 94, 97, 101, 105 Gitanjali, 190 Global Times , 86, 96, 97, 99 Gulen, 101–103, 192, 240, 241, 258

H Heart of Asia, 116, 118 Huawei, 270, 277

I India, 3–5, 8, 9, 32, 40, 45, 46, 48–50, 58, 60–62, 64–68, 70–77, 79–81, 85–87, 91–93, 95, 96, 104, 106, 115, 118, 126, 136, 137, 139, 165, 167, 169–172, 179, 186, 194, 195, 198, 199, 201–204, 209, 210, 221, 244, 252, 256, 267, 268, 271, 272, 278, 294, 319, 321 Indian Express , 86, 92, 96 Indonesia, 62, 65, 68, 75, 79, 145, 147, 202, 203, 252–254, 256, 272, 273, 278, 319

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 115, 120, 125 Islamic State (IS), 87, 91, 92, 99 Islamism, 8, 20, 25–27, 89, 93, 94, 97–99, 101, 165, 202 K Kashmir, 9, 10, 31, 48, 66, 67, 71, 73, 87, 91–95, 100, 104, 137, 139, 165, 168–172, 175, 177, 179, 189, 204, 320 Khan, Amanullah, 113, 114, 121 Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, 292 Kirkuk-Yumurtalık Crude Oil Pipeline, 295 M Middle Corridor Initiative (MCI), 10, 210, 211, 215–218, 220–223, 277 Mindanao, 165 MUSIAD, 240 Myanmar, 64, 70, 165, 175–177, 179, 197 N Nagorno Karabakh, 204, 283 Neo-Ottomanism, 4, 8, 19, 20, 67, 95, 99, 132, 202 Nizam-i-Alem, 42 Northern Alliance, 115, 123, 126 O Ottomanism, 18–20, 32 P Pan-Asianism, 4, 8, 23, 61 Pan-Islamism, 4, 8, 17, 18, 20–23, 26, 32, 39, 40, 67, 95

INDEX

Philippines, 65, 69, 70, 139, 145–147, 165, 168, 177, 179, 202, 320 PKK, 91, 93, 101, 104, 292, 295, 319 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 120 Q Quad, 64, 72, 77, 210 R Reis, Sidi Ali, 45, 46, 190 Rohingya, 31, 77, 79, 139, 165, 168, 176, 177, 179, 202, 203 S Saadabad Pact, 61, 68, 141 SAARC, 64, 79 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 66, 68, 97, 133, 139, 140, 214, 255 Silk Road Fund (SRF), 210, 214 South Korea, 65, 68, 70, 75, 147, 167, 194, 199, 202, 210, 267, 268, 271, 273, 278, 321 T Tabriz-Ankara Pipeline, 292

325

Thailand, 65, 70, 139, 147, 202, 252, 253, 273 The Dawn, 86, 91, 100–104 The Hindu, 86, 92–95 Tipu Sultan, 40, 59 Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TIRT), 216 Transition, 8, 9, 20, 31, 32, 74, 220 Trilateral summit, 117, 118 TUBITAK, 244 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), 119, 193, 195 Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM), 240 TUSIAD, 240 TUSKON, 240

U Uç Terz-i Siyaset Uyghur, 6, 31, 66, 67, 87, 96, 98, 99, 104, 139, 165, 168, 173, 174, 176, 198, 202, 204, 211, 222, 320

X Xinjiang, 10, 98, 99, 165, 168, 172–174, 212, 214, 216