EU-India Relations: The Strategic Partnership in the Light of the European Union Global Strategy (Contributions to International Relations) [1st ed. 2021] 303065043X, 9783030650438

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Contributions to International Relations

Philipp Gieg · Timo Lowinger · Manuel Pietzko · Anja Zürn · Ummu Salma Bava · Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet Editors

EU-India Relations The Strategic Partnership in the Light of the European Union Global Strategy

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations and related fields.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16658

Philipp Gieg · Timo Lowinger · Manuel Pietzko · Anja Zürn · Ummu Salma Bava · Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet Editors

EU-India Relations The Strategic Partnership in the Light of the European Union Global Strategy

Editors Philipp Gieg Institute of Political Science and Sociology University of Würzburg Würzburg, Germany

Timo Lowinger Institute of Political Science and Sociology University of Würzburg Würzburg, Germany

Manuel Pietzko Institute of Political Science and Sociology University of Würzburg Würzburg, Germany

Anja Zürn Institute of Political Science and Sociology University of Würzburg Würzburg, Germany

Ummu Salma Bava Centre for European Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India

Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet Institute of Political Science and Sociology University of Würzburg Würzburg, Germany

Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-3-030-65043-8 ISBN 978-3-030-65044-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

International relations are undergoing a profound change. The return of authoritarianism and national egoism as well as the retraction of democratic rule in several parts of the world work together to create a toxic environment for rules-based international politics and the fundamental principles of multilateralism. Instead of convincing the international community of the urgency of cooperation and mutual assistance, the present COVID-19 pandemic seems to further spur division, competition and isolationist tendencies, thus exacerbating the challenges of international order. In this context of global uncertainties, our volume EU-India Relations: The Strategic Partnership in the Light of the European Union Global Strategy comes at the right time to indicate that the quest for closer cooperation and the attempt to join forces on the global scene offers an alternative approach to international relations. Even though the in-depth scrutiny of various dimensions of the EU–India Strategic Partnership uncovers numerous shortcomings and untapped potentials, the volume also documents the determination of both the Indian and European sides to enhance their cooperation—a commitment recently reiterated during the EU–India summit in July 2020, held as a video conference due to the coronavirus pandemic. Needless to say, the project of compiling an up-to-date and comprehensive assessment of the EU–India Strategic Partnership goes some years back. This volume is the result of a long-term and unique collaboration: On the one hand, the longstanding relations between the Jawaharlal Nehru University and the University of Würzburg paved the way for this project; since 2011, initially as part of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) programme A New Passage to India, both have been cooperating very closely. This Indo-German partnership was elevated to a new level in October 2015 by the research and mobility project Foundations of the Europe-India Strategic Partnership: Comparative Perspectives on European and Indian Political Ideas, Policy and International Cooperation, in which the Centre for European Studies of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and the Institute of Political Science and Sociology of the University of Würzburg have been working together. This twin project is part of the Indo-German Partnership in Higher Education programme, which is financed equally by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Indian University Grants Commission (UGC). On the other hand, it is also an outcome of the very fruitful cooperation between the two chairs of v

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Prof. Ummu Salma Bava and Prof. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, who were both awarded a Jean Monnet Chair by the European Commission in 2017 for excellent research and teaching activities. Thus, in this institutionalised Jean Monnet context, too, the joint research on EU–India relations was a central theme. The volume was financed by the German side of the EU–India research and mobility project, i.e. by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) with funds from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), and it was financially supported by the Jean Monnet Chair of Prof. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet with funds from the Erasmus + programme of the European Union and from the Faculty of Human Sciences of the University of Würzburg. We thank all funding organisations and the Faculty of Human Sciences very much for their financial support, which enabled us to plan and realise the volume. The work on this edited volume has taken place within the framework of research and cooperation. The preparatory phase was launched at a workshop in New Delhi on April 10–11, 2017. Under the title “The EU at 60 and its Foreign Policy”, the substantive foundations for our joint project were laid down over two days. The papers assembled in this volume were first presented at an expert workshop at the University of Würzburg on 20–22 November 2019, gathering European and Indian contributors for extensive exchanges. The writing and compilation of an edited volume depend on many hands. The excellent copy-editing was carried out by Catherine Bennewitz, for which we thank her. We would also like to thank our student assistants: Burcak Durmaz and Rebecca Bück did the style check in meticulous detail. Burcak Durmaz and Sebastian Suttner were also involved in the run-up to the workshop, both in terms of research and organisation. Catharina Crasser and Lara Anslik have been a great help regarding research. On the part of Springer Nature, we are grateful for the support and patience of Johannes Glaeser and the final editing by Mohan Mathiazhagan. Thanks to both of you. This publication would not have been possible without the intensive, critical and fruitful discussion of the various papers and contributions at the workshops. Therefore, a heartfelt thanks to all participants for their great work, the time they have invested as contributors or discussants and their engagement in India–EU research. We are happy to hereby present this book as the result of our common endeavour! October 2020

The Editors

Contents

Introduction India and the European Union: A Growing Responsibility to Cooperate in a Changing World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Philipp Gieg, Timo Lowinger, Manuel Pietzko, and Anja Zürn Europe’s Strategic Autonomy and the Partnership Approach . . . . . . . . . . Giovanni Grevi

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Conceptual Approaches to EU-India Relations Norm Contestation in EU Strategic Partnerships: The Cases of Civil Society Involvement and Climate Justice in EU–India Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timo Lowinger, Anja Zürn, Philipp Gieg, and Manuel Pietzko

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What Strategies Can Do for Strategic Partnerships: Lessons from the EU’s Strategy on India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Henrik Chetan Aspengren and Axel Nordenstam

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Putting the Partnership DNA to the Test: Partnerships in the EU Global Strategy and the Consequences for India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Manuel Pietzko

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Dimensions of the Strategic Partnership A Partnership Between Two Large Elephants? Opportunities and Challenges in India–EU Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Pascaline Winand The European Union–India Strategic Partnership: An Examination of the Economic Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Sangeeta Khorana

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Determinants and Impediments of the EU-India Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement: The Proof of This Old Pudding Is in the Eating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Nicolas Köhler-Suzuki Low-Carbon Development: An Idea Whose Time Has Come—Unlocking Climate Cooperation Between India and the EU . . . . 185 Kirsten Jörgensen India’s Climate Diplomacy Towards the EU: From Copenhagen to Paris and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Dhanasree Jayaram India and the EU’s Approach to Development Cooperation: Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 Siddharth Tripathi Future Cooperation and Global Potentials From Destroyer to Preserver? The Evolution of India’s Position Towards the Liberal International Order and Its Significance for the EU–India Strategic Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 Patryk Kugiel Multilateralism in a Changing Global Order: Prospects for India–EU Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 Manasi Singh Between Competition and Cooperation: The EU Global Strategy as Means to Reinvigorate EU-Indian Cooperation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 Neil Winn Policy Recommendations: How to Move Forward? Global Trends to 2030: A European Perspective on Challenges and Choices for the EU-India Strategic Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 Stefania Benaglia Perception of the EU in India: A ‘Europe House’ Is Missing in European Public Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 Patryk Kugiel “The EU Should…!”; “India Needs…!”: Parapublic Underpinnings to Realise Global IR in Policy Analysis of EU–India Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 Timo Lowinger India and the European Union: A Partnership for Joining Forces on the Global Scene—Concluding Remarks and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Ummu Salma Bava

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Philipp Gieg is a postdoctoral researcher and member of faculty at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He has recently completed his Ph.D. on India’s Africa policy. In the last years, he conducted several research stays in India and on the African continent, for example as a visiting scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Timo Lowinger is a researcher and member of faculty at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He is also project coordinator of the project “Foundations of the Indo-European Strategic Partnership”. His research focuses on Critical Theory (recognition of the Global South) and IR; World Order; (Critical) Constructivist Norm Research; Emerging Powers, especially Indian and South African Foreign Policy. He conducted several research stays in India. Manuel Pietzko is a member of faculty and researcher at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He is project coordinator of the Jean Monnet activities at the chair. His research interests include EU Foreign Policy, the EU as an international actor and the EU Global Strategy. Anja Zürn is a member of faculty and researcher at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Würzburg. In her research she focuses on global climate policy, emerging power India and gender in IR. Her Ph.D. project is dedicated to gender aspects in Indian and EU climate change discourses. Ummu Salma Bava is Chairperson and Jean Monnet Chair, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, ix

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India. With three decades of teaching and research, she is one of the leading Indian experts on the European Union, India and German foreign and security policy. Her other areas are regional integration and organisation, emerging powers, international politics, global governance, norms, peace and conflict studies. She has published extensively and is Member, Academic Advisory Board, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, and was Member of the Research Advisory Council of Germany’s leading Think Tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Prof. Bava was conferred in January 2012 with the prestigious Order of Merit by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet is Jean Monnet Professor of European Studies and International Relations at the Institute of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Würzburg. The European Commission has awarded her the Jean Monnet Chair for excellent publications, research and teaching activities which have been devoted mainly to the EU’s foreign and security policy as well as French and German European Policy. She has held numerous guest professorships in India and is a member of the Academic Advisory Board of the Institute for European Politics (IEP) and the European Academy of Bavaria. Since 2017 she has been leader of the project “Foundations of the Indo-European Strategic Partnership” and takes part in the ICAS: MP Centre of Advanced Studies in New Delhi.

Contributors Henrik Chetan Aspengren Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), Stockholm, Sweden Ummu Salma Bava Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Stefania Benaglia CEPS, Brussels, Belgium Philipp Gieg Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany Giovanni Grevi European Policy Centre, Brussels, Belgium Dhanasree Jayaram Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Manipal, India Kirsten Jörgensen Freie Universität of Berlin, Berlin, Germany Sangeeta Khorana Bournemouth University, Bournemouth, UK Nicolas Köhler-Suzuki International Trade Intelligence, Paris, France Patryk Kugiel Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, Poland

Editors and Contributors

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Timo Lowinger Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany Axel Nordenstam Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), Stockholm, Sweden Manuel Pietzko Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany Manasi Singh School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India Siddharth Tripathi International and Security Affairs, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin, Germany Pascaline Winand College of Europe at Natolin, Warsaw, Poland Neil Winn University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Anja Zürn Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany

Introduction

India and the European Union: A Growing Responsibility to Cooperate in a Changing World Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Philipp Gieg, Timo Lowinger, Manuel Pietzko, and Anja Zürn

1 Introduction For more than one-and-a-half decades now, the European Union (EU) and India have been maintaining a strategic partnership. The openly declared objectives of the official documents, signed in 2004, were to promote the rules-based global order and trading system, to improve multilateral organisations like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and G20, and to work together for a more inclusive and equitable world order in general. Today, however, numerous analysts agree that there is not yet any convincing outcome to this relationship (cf. for many Joshi 2017; Gaens and Hakala 2020: 3; Sood 2020). Although both sides regularly emphasise the congruence of their values, their common commitment to rules-based multilateralism and their joint striving for a multipolar world order which takes into account the demands and interests of the developing world, these two largest democracies on earth have so far failed to make their strategic partnership a clear success. Thus, it is a commonplace to talk of the untapped potentials of EU–India relations with some observers even calling the whole partnership a mere “charade” (Jaffrelot 2006: 1). “Likemindedness”, it seems, does not procure a sufficiently solid G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (B) · P. Gieg · T. Lowinger · M. Pietzko · A. Zürn Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] P. Gieg e-mail: [email protected] T. Lowinger e-mail: [email protected] M. Pietzko e-mail: [email protected] A. Zürn e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_1

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foundation for fruitful bilateral cooperation. So far, it appears that all the numerous efforts undertaken to reinvigorate the strategic partnership since it was begun in 2004 have succeeded neither in substantially enhancing the cooperation nor in palpably improving the implementation process. Rather, mutual finger-pointing, blame games and unfulfilled expectations have spurred a growing disillusionment. The stalemate in the EU–India Free Trade Agreement negotiations since 2013 seems emblematic of the creeping erosion of the partnership. The volume we present herewith takes stock of EU–India relations. The overall goal of our research efforts is procuring detailed analysis and evaluation of the conceptual structure, the various dimensions, and the successes and shortcomings of the strategic partnership. As already mentioned, the prevailing perception predicts a rather poor outcome for EU–India relations; all contributors to this volume therefore go to considerable lengths (1) to verify or challenge this judgement, (2) to deliver explanations in cases where this judgement seems appropriate and (3)—most importantly—to identify potentials for closer and more substantial cooperation. Before presenting the volume in more detail, we want to highlight the present international context as a possible catalyst for the EU and India to enhance and improve the bilateral relationship.

2 The Changing World Order as a Catalyst for a Revitalised EU–India Partnership The multiple, profound and deeply frightening transformations of the world order that we witness currently could serve as a strong incentive to try for a reboot of EU–India relations. In recent years, observers note that a growing disorder at the international level has been spreading, due to the worldwide return to and increase in authoritarianism, nationalism, protectionism and populism (Kahler 2018: 241–242; Smith 2018: 541; Tharoor and Saran 2020). Thus, the rules-based multilateral order and democratic rule, including the rule of law, have come under serious pressure in many countries and regions (cf. Reynié 2019a, b; see also: Freedom House 2020). Furthermore, growing commercial and political frictions between—mainly—China and the USA are increasingly guided by the idea of a zero-sum game while also transforming international politics, alongside the return of a mentality of crude power politics. This toxic development substantially endangers the future of international relations and enhances the likelihood of serious conflicts becoming real and more frequent. The cancellation of numerous international treaties and agreements by the USA under the Trump administration further spurs the dismantling of core principles of the current world order. Just to give three examples: The withdrawal of the USA from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran in May 2018 comes as an affront to all the other signatories of the nuclear agreement; the E3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom), China, Iran and Russia. The US decision increases the risk for the whole region of the Middle East to tumble towards nuclear proliferation.

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Furthermore, the cancellation by the USA, in August 2019, of the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty substantially adds to the security threat in Europe, a challenge for all EU member states. Equally, the withdrawal by the USA from the Paris Agreement, announced in June 2017, represents a major challenge for the whole of the international community. To fight climate change effectively has become harder and more demanding for all those who adhere to the agreement. The looming dissolution of the formerly existing world order is therefore real; together with the return and tightening of authoritarian rule in large parts of the world (China, Russia, Turkey, Brazil, etc.) these evolutions seriously undermine the rule-based ‘principled’ multilateral system (Rüland 2018; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann 2020: 1083). India and the European Union alike are under threat of becoming losers within this transformation process. Both are in danger of being sidelined and of lacking any kind of decision-making influence when it comes to the important issues of international politics. Both may become increasingly unable to defend their approaches, interests and values on the global stage. Such an option is clearly unacceptable for the two largest democracies in the world; both would do well to remember a dictum of Javier Solana, first High Representative of the Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy; with regard to the EU’s efforts to strengthen its international role in the early years of the twenty-first century, he once declared: “We don’t have a choice, we must play a role” (Solana cited after Bengtsson and Allen 2011: 112). Amid the rising international disorder, the European Union and India, frequently labelled as “natural partners” (Wagner 2008: 88), should join forces on the global stage with the goal of playing a visible and vocal role in promoting a renewed multilateralism. In order to generate the ability to fulfil such a role together, each side must therefore soberly analyse the opportunities of renewed and closer bilateral relations and reconsider the opportunities of firmly joining forces. The international weight, influence and impact of the two largest democracies would clearly and noticeably grow if both sides were to decide to give their reinvigorated partnership a greater importance on the global stage. A revitalised partnership would signal to others a strong common commitment to defending, saving and improving a rules-based multilateralism and to acting as an example of a strong alliance between north and south. In these times of global disorder and jeopardised multilateralism, the mere demonstration of such an amicable and trustful relationship between highly divergent and diverse partners would open up a promising perspective to all smaller and weaker states or regions and show them not only that common opposition against unilateralism and crude power politics is possible, but even more so, that enhanced cooperation in shaping the world order is also an option. A forceful reinvigoration of the EU–India Strategic Partnership, however, calls for innovative, more flexible, and pragmatic approaches and necessitates as a first step a relentlessly self-critical scrutinisation. India, for instance, with its reflex reaction of coping with the European Union mainly only with regard to economic issues, while preferring to address the USA when it comes to security-sensitive topics will probably have to evaluate the outcome of this choice and answer the question of to what extent the USA, under—and

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also subsequent to—Donald Trump, acts in respect and recognition of Indian interests. India might furthermore reconsider its predilection for dealing with some EU member states individually rather than with the Brussels-based institutions. Such a new approach would imply a deeper and broader knowledge of the European Union and its recent reforms and developments. In short, India, and the officials engaged with the implementation of the strategic partnership need to enhance their familiarity with the real power distribution between the EU and its member states. After all, not least Brexit requires reconsideration on the part of India regarding how to deal with individual European states on a bilateral level. The European Union for its part, too, must reconsider the foreign policy instrument of strategic partnerships in general and its relations with India in particular. When strategic partnerships were introduced and referred to as central elements in the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, they represented a new departure in EU foreign policy, which is also reflected in the ESS as a whole and is characterised in particular by the very positive view on the dissemination of European norms. In the EU Global Strategy “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” (EUGS) of 2016, however, strategic partnerships play a different role (Müller-BrandeckBocquet et al. 2018: 24). With the EUGS, one can presume, the EU adopted a more pragmatic path to foster and defend European norms and interests on the global stage. This can be seen, above all, in the introduction of the principles of resilience—which targets the most diverse aspects of the strategy (Tocci 2020)—and of “principled pragmatism”. The EUGS intends to forge new partnerships in order to foster resilience, but also to deepen or reorganise existing relationships (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2018: 23). The central element can be seen as the principle of “partnering” (European Union 2016: 43–44), which has gained even more importance since the EUGS launch (Tocci 2020: 191). This results from the fact that the EUGS had been drafted and elaborated in a time when the signs of world disorder and dismantlement of the rules-based multilateralism had not yet attained their present level of force and destructiveness. During the years of the EUGS preparation the first signs indicating this direction were already visible, such as the upheavals in the Arab world, Russia’s more aggressive stance—especially in Ukraine—and China’s growing grasp for power. Other central elements, however, that have led to today’s strong perception of uncertainty in international politics were not yet foreseeable. In this regard, the Trump administration’s “America first” policy spurred a new thinking in the European security architecture and induced the EU to develop a new, enhanced and more autonomous foreign policy concept; Brexit, clearly, is of particular importance, too. Therefore, the ongoing implementation of the EUGS and especially the preparatory work on a subsequent EU Foreign Policy Strategy1 should self-critically take into account the shortcomings of EU foreign policy. In general, such self-critique must include the EU’s tendency to adopt highly complex procedural requirements, 1 In

July 2020, Nathalie Tocci, who has been the driving force behind the EUGS 2016 beside High Representative (HR) Federica Mogherini, was appointed Special Advisor to the current HR Josep Borrell on framing the new EU Global Strategy (European Commission 2020).

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for example the predilection for formalism and a certain moral overload. In particular, upgrading the partnership with India should become a priority. Furthermore, a reinvigoration of the EU–India Strategic Partnership thus would call on the EU to become more sympathetic with Indian conditions and realities, for example with regard to labour or environmental standards. A more insightful, less arrogant or condescending behaviour of the EU side thus is urgently needed. Interestingly enough, in very recent times, the EU has been undergoing a learning process which could open up new fields of accord with India, and the EU–India Strategy of 2018 can be used as an important first step in this direction. Not only was the new strategy launched earlier than the one for China, but the description of the two partners from the EU side is very different, too. Whereas the “Council underlines the importance of the Strategic Partnership between the European Union and India, based on shared values of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, commitment to the rules-based global order and effective multilateralism, sustainable development and a common interest to further develop bilateral cooperation in every respect” (Council of the European Union 2018: 2). The EU–China Strategy of 2019 calls China “a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” (EUC/HV 2019: 1). This description, mainly the term of “systemic rival”, comes close to the Indian perceptions of the threats posed by China’s allegedly “peaceful rise”; it might open new fields of congruent common stances and action. In these times of growing world disorder and power politics, we argue that the mere demonstration of amicable relations between India and the European Union comes per se as a statement in favour of trustful international cooperation and partnership. This implies for the EU to recognise that India might be a natural, but not necessarily an ideal partner. Especially during Modi’s terms in office with his government’s Hindu nationalist ideology, India is far from being the dream spouse of the European Union. The same might be true for India, dreaming of an American groom. The truth, however, is that in present times India and the EU do not have much choice and should therefore join forces on the global stage. A first glance, the 15th EU–India Summit of July 15, 2020, held as a videoconference and gathering Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Charles Michel, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, confirms the perception that both sides have become conscious of the necessities of present times. In his closing remarks, Charles Michel declared: Our meeting clearly shows the importance that both the EU and India attach to our relationship. As the world’s two largest democracies, we share common values—freedom, rule of law, and respect for human rights. We have converging interests. Today we focused on 3 important topics: Covid-19 and rebuilding our economic prosperity, our EU-India bilateral relationship and regional and security issues. As power dynamics shift across the globe, the EU wants to play a stronger role in the region, and as a global actor. Today’s substantive dialogue with India will reinforce these strategic goals […] The EU and India are more than economic partners—we are political partners, committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, security and rule of law. Today’s meeting clearly showed that both the EU and India want a stronger strategic relationship for the future. The concrete commitments we

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G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. made today reflect this strong and clear ambition. India can count on the European Union. And we count on India to be a key partner. (European Council 2020)

The summit adopted “A Roadmap to 2025” with a demanding agenda, including health and food security. Thus, both sides will “work together on health security and pandemic crisis preparedness and response, in particular linked to the COVID-19 outbreak” (EU-India 2020: 8). Is it appropriate to read these promises and declarations as a renewed attempt to reinvigorate the EU–India Strategic Partnership in the light of an impending international disorder and severe deteriorations of the rules-based multilateralism? Obviously, it is far too early to take such a judgement. But it seems clear that the Covid-19 pandemic has become a further reason for strengthening the bilateral partnership in the light of other big powers’ irresponsible handling of the crisis. At the time of writing this introduction, new horizons for EU-Indian cooperation as outlined above thus seem to be within reach; this renders an in-depth analysis and evaluation of the outcomes and shortcomings of the existing, 15-year-old EU– India Strategic Partnership all the more indispensable. A possible substantial and serious reinvigoration of EU-India relations definitely calls for such an undertaking, presenting deficits, describing lessons learned and honing in on untapped potentials. The contributions were finalised in spring and early summer of 2020, meaning that the enormous repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the decisions of the 15th EU–India Summit of July 15, 2020, could only be taken into account by some of the authors.

3 The Volume’s Contribution to Research on the Promise of the Relationship This edited volume is a product of a unique Indo-German research and mobility project. In October 2015, the Indo-German Partnerships in Higher Education programme was launched in New Delhi during bilateral government consultations. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) has given grants to projects that see German universities cooperate with partners in India. A comparable amount of funding is dedicated to the Indian project partners by the University Grants Commission Delhi. The programme is characterised by the fact that the research projects are always twin projects; a German project team works together with an Indian project team, but both teams are autonomous due to their own financing and measures. Research on an equal footing is thus guaranteed. This is the origin of the project Foundations of the Europe-India Strategic Partnership: Comparative Perspectives on European and Indian Political Ideas, Policy and International Cooperation in which the Centre for European Studies of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and the Institute of Political Science and Sociology of the University of Würzburg have been cooperating. The goal of the project has been to carve out the underpinnings of political thought, fundamental principles, and current structures of the

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Europe–India partnership which at the political level are embodied by the EU–India Strategic Partnership. The work on this edited volume has taken place within this institutional framework. The preparatory phase was launched at a workshop in New Delhi on April 10–11, 2017. The substantive foundations for our joint project were laid over two days, under the title “The EU at 60 and its Foreign Policy”. The concrete work on the volume started with the gathering together of European and Indian contributors for extensive exchanges at an expert workshop at the University of Würzburg on November 20–22, 2019. Research on EU-India relations has been popular in the aftermath of the formation of the EU–India Strategic Partnership in 2004 (cf. Jaffrelot 2006). Yet, comprehensive, edited volumes covering all dimensions of the partnership were rare in this period. Exceptions include Nadkarni (2010) and Renard and Biscop (2012). However, these edited volumes do not deal exclusively with EU–India relations but also include other aspects of the EU or India, and they are partly outdated due to dynamic current developments. The new and far-reaching developments of the partnership, like the Global Strategy of 2016, and the announcement of the resumption of the free trade negotiations, have to date not been covered by an edited volume. What is missing at this point of research is a comprehensive edited volume covering various dimensions and the new potential of the EU–India partnership. There is only one recent edited volume which seems at first glance to slightly correspond to this book: Chaban and Holland (2019) analyse different aspects of the new Global Strategy and its effects. Nonetheless, they also focus on the perceptions of all the EU’s partners and not specifically on EU–India relations in detail. The only article covering EU–India relations mainly focuses on India’s perceptions of the EU (public opinion, media) with data from a time before the existence of the EU Global Strategy. The same is true for Jain (2019), Hill et al. (2017), Pant (2017), Ragi et al. (2017) and Drechsel (2016). In all these books, which offer in-depth analyses of the two actors, the focus is either on India or the EU, but never both. In contrast, our volume stands out by providing a comprehensive look at the bilateral partnership as such and not only giving a mere overview of the genesis of the relationship. Only the monograph of Winand et al. (2016) and the volume of Jain (2020) thoroughly analyse the EU–India relationship and therefore stand together with our edited volume. Yet, published in 2016, the monograph by Winand et al. does not cover recent developments. Jain (2020), on the other hand, offers a rich overview of EU-India relations, but analyses facets and dimensions of the relationship that are different from those being looked at in this book. Both edited volumes therefore complement each other very well. In addition to this, several contributions in our volume also reflect the recent EU–India Summit and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The overall aim of the book has been to provide an up-to-date, detailed and indepth analysis of the current state and future potential of EU–India relations. Thus, this volume combines theoretical and empirical research with high policy relevance. It will explore conceptual approaches to EU–India relations and analyse key dimensions of the EU–India Strategic Partnership, among them trade, climate policy and development cooperation. On this basis, prospects for future cooperation will also

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be evaluated. Finally, the book will offer policy recommendations; by doing so, this book complements existing research on EU–India relations and tries to provide a holistic perspective on the partnership.

4 Outline of the Volume This volume is divided into five parts. Following the introductory part, the second part presents conceptual approaches to EU–India relations. Its three chapters lay the groundwork for the subsequent analyses of specific dimensions of the strategic partnership. The contributions of the third part thus examine mutual perceptions, the economic dimension of the partnership, EU–India climate relations and India and the EU’s approach to development cooperation. The fourth part of the volume then turns to the prospect of further EU–India relations, future cooperation and global potentials, while the fifth part investigates how to move forward and offers policy recommendations as well as reflections on the production of policy analysis and the role of analysts who formulate it.

4.1 Part I: Introduction Following this introduction, Giovanni Grevi in his foundational essay argues that the EU needs to become more strategic and more autonomous to advance its values and interests on the international stage. He makes the case that fostering Europe’s strategic autonomy would better place the EU to work with others to sustain the multilateral order. In this context, Grevi contends that strategic partnerships between the EU and major international actors, such as India, are an essential platform for dialogue, which can help contain the drift towards a zero-sum world.

4.2 Part II: Conceptual Approaches to EU–India Relations Starting from the widespread perception that cooperation between the EU and India is stuck in a deadlock, Timo Lowinger, Anja Zürn, Philipp Gieg and Manuel Pietzko suggest that reconstructing both actors’ contestation of norms helps to better understand the problems faced by the EU–India Strategic Partnership. In the first chapter on conceptual approaches to EU–India relations, they propose an in-depth systematic and model-driven approach to grasp the EU and India’s discursive practices regarding the seemingly “common” norms—a heuristic that can also serve as a tool to examine the EU’s other strategic partnerships. After laying out their theoretical framework and reconstructing the normative foundation of the EU–India Strategic Partnership, the authors examine two case studies to grasp contestation within and

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beyond the bilateral relationship: the cases of civil society involvement and climate justice. They conclude that mainly responsible for the state of the partnership is the discursive contestation. Yet, this need not be considered a negative process, for it can also yield constructive results such as the disclosure of different perceptions and the launch of institutionalisation processes. Henrik Chetan Aspengren and Axel Nordenstam analyse “What Strategies can do for Strategic Partnerships” in the EU’s external relations. The authors scrutinise the role, function and impact of partnership strategies on EU strategy-making. Drawing on interviews with experts on the EU’s Strategy on India, they argue that a strategy can be a core element for engagement if it manifests both cohesion with the EU’s wider understanding of its global role and convergence with the partner’s preferences— generating the added value of increased levels of predictability of strategic action to the partnership. Aspengren and Nordenstam conclude that an implemented strategy could help build a shared understanding with the strategic partner and thereby boost bilateral cooperation. Yet, they contend that the degree of implementation of the EU’s Strategy on India will be key for future successes. Manuel Pietzko depicts EU–India relations in the light of the EU Global Strategy. In his work he assumes that the European Union conveys perceptions of itself and its environment through the EUGS. Thus the strategy is not analysed as an objective fact, but as a subjective interpretation by the European Union. The focus of the article is on those aspects of the EU Global Strategy that deal with the EU’s partnerships, with a special emphasis on India. The aim is to unite the expressed perceptions with existing discourses on the EU as an international actor. To this end, the author uses concepts of the EU as civilian-, military-, normative- and superpower as well as empire.

4.3 Part III: Dimensions of the Strategic Partnership The third part of the volume turns to specific dimensions of the Strategic Partnership. Pascaline Winand examines “Opportunities and Challenges in India-EU Relations” by first taking a close look at perceptions in India–EU relations. Indian perceptions of the EU, India’s self-perception in relation to the EU, EU officials’ perception of India, and also the EU’s self-perception in relation to India are the building blocks of the analysis of a key challenge to the relationship’s efficiency. Winand then dissects the bureaucratic structures, decision-making processes, meetings and agreements in EU–India relations as further challenges before turning to consider Indian and EU public diplomacy efforts and limitations. She concludes with an appraisal of the prospects for the EU–India partnership in the light of recent developments, such as Brexit and COVID-19. In the field of trade and investment, Sangeeta Khorana’s chapter provides an up-to-date insight into the bilateral economic relations in general and the economic ramifications of the 2018 EU Strategy on India in particular. She discusses the driving forces of the relationship and explores the reasons as to why it has not been possible

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for the EU and India to exploit the economic partnership to its full potential. The author concludes that both the EU and India must firmly commit to re-engaging with each other to build and consolidate the strategic partnership for mutual gains at a time when global growth is slowing. Further illuminating the economic aspect of EU-India relations, Nicolas KöhlerSuzuki in his contribution traces the origins and the negotiations for the EU–India Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), which has been under discussion since the mid-2000s. He argues that the exceedingly long duration of the trade talks can be attributed to the European Union’s external competencies and India’s idiosyncratic trade policy agenda. According to the author, divergent preferences developed and shaped the course of the negotiations for a BTIA between the EU and India. He identifies three distinct phases of negotiations, the last one being an ongoing limbo phase, during which some progress has been made. Yet Köhler-Suzuki concludes that compromise is still not within reach. In his outlook, he weighs up the implications of greater strategic cooperation between the EU and India for a possible successful conclusion of the BTIA negotiations. Kirsten Jörgensen analyses bilateral climate relations between India and the EU. She argues that climate policy as a more recent policy field offers specific opportunities and incentives for Indian–European cooperation in the context of the strategic partnership, including economic win-win potential in the field of green technologies and joint interest in dealing with global warming and climate change impacts. Although progress in the bilateral climate relations has so far been only slightly more significant than in other policy domains of the strategic partnership, Kirsten Jörgensen contends that further progress in this area is becoming more likely, due to a change in India’s perception of climate mitigation. In particular, the author locates a large potential for mutually beneficial collaboration in low carbon governance, in the transition of the energy sector towards renewable energy and energy efficiency, and linked to this, economic, financial and technical cooperation. She characterises the emergence of multi-level governance with interconnected institutions, and involving public and private actors, as an opportunity structure enabling the collaboration on climate relations between the supranational EU and India’s federal state. In her chapter, Dhanasree Jayaram outlines the drivers of and shifts in India–EU climate diplomacy using the conceptual framework of “climate diplomacy” and the “realist constructivism’ approach, with an eye on both ideational and material factors. She characterises India’s climate diplomacy towards the EU as having transitioned from being guided by ideational differences to pragmatic and result-oriented goals. After initial differences had deepened in the run-up to the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, the author maintains that India—while still upholding the principles of equity and climate justice—decided to compromise on its traditionally held positions, which was most evident in the signing of the 2015 Paris Agreement. In parallel, as reflected in the strategic partnership, bilateral relations between India and the EU in the climate change arena—particularly with certain member states—strengthened. Dhanasree Jayaram offers a discussion from an Indian perspective that contextualises India’s climate diplomacy towards the EU, with a focus on the 2009–2015 period and the

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future of the post-2020 international climate regime. She concludes that while differences will continue to exist, recent steps point in the direction of forging collaborative India–EU climate relations, a verdict she derives after taking into account various levels of cooperation, in particular in the realm of bilateral and plurilateral relations. Finally, Siddharth Tripathi examines India and the EU’s approach to development cooperation, a field which—the author argues—has considerable potential for boosting the strategic partnership and providing fertile ground for an enhanced and innovative institutional framework for cooperation. Indeed, as the relationship between the EU and India has evolved in recent years from that of donor and recipient to a partnership with opportunities for mutual benefit, both sides have agreed to move forward with joint initiatives. Yet, the author identifies the guiding principles of development cooperation as a generally under-researched topic when analysing EU–India cooperation in this policy field. His contribution therefore aims to identify various convergences and divergences between the strategies and the guiding principles of development cooperation in the two largest democracies of the world. Tripathi contends that the approaches have not so far truly converged to form a development partnership; at the same time, he sees potential for India and the EU to find more common ground and avenues of cooperation in a pragmatic and mutually beneficial way.

4.4 Part IV: Future Cooperation and Global Potentials The fourth part of the volume asks about the future prospects of the strategic partnership. First, Patryk Kugiel analyses the evolution of India’s position towards the liberal international order, whether India’s understanding of the “rules-based order” is similar to that of the EU, and what possible cooperation on strategic issues would bring for the EU–India partnership. The chapter focuses on India’s shifting position regarding the multilateral trade system, non-proliferation and promotion of democracy. The author concludes that India and the EU will only selectively share the same vision of global order with India remaining a “global swing state”. However, Kugiel notes that despite existing differences there is plenty of potential for cooperation and enough convergence to make India and the EU indispensable partners for a possible transformation of the global status quo. Manasi Singh identifies divergent foreign policy perspectives as roadblocks to the transformation of shared values into convergent interests and priorities, which have got in the way of strengthening India–EU relations. However, she posits that in times of turmoil and uncertainty, both India and the EU should leverage their strategic partnership for advancing multilateralism and reforming global governance. Consequently, Manasi Singh assesses this potential in the light of the changing strategic context and the growing capacities and profiles of the two actors. In the end, she concludes that if India and the EU can overcome mutual misperceptions and infuse the existing strategic partnership with new energy, both partners will be able to

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enhance engagement, synergise their visions for an international order and on this basis address common challenges. In the final contribution of the fourth part, Neil Winn characterises both India and the EU as global powers in search of a strategy and the EU Global strategy as effectively relaunching EU foreign policy. Adopting a European perspective, he asks if the EU Global Strategy could serve as a means to reinvigorate EU–Indian cooperation. Especially pondering the ramifications and the fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic, Neil Winn closes with a sceptical outook and sees less rather than more cooperation between India and the EU.

4.5 Part V: Policy Recommendations: How to Move Forward? Part five opens with Stefania Benaglia outlining a European perspective of challenges and choices for the EU-India Strategic Partnership. Based on an analysis of the “Global Trends to 2030” poised to define the coming decade, the chapter develops two scenarios for the future of EU-India cooperation: one of increased cooperation and one of inaction. Benaglia argues that the benefits of more cooperation vastly outweigh the negative consequences of inertia. She strongly suggests working on the available common ground, rather than focusing on differences, and underlines the necessity of stepping up the strategic partnership. Because of limited resources, she recommends focusing on policy issues where inaction would be most detrimental. Patryk Kugiel sees the EU’s misperception and low visibility in India as major— albeit traditional—irritants standing in the way of a stronger EU-India Strategic Partnership. After analysing the existing tools of public diplomacy, Kugiel suggests the establishment of a “Europe House” in New Delhi which he envisages as a panEuropean culture and information centre. This, the chapter argues, would help change the Union’s image by complementing the vision of the EU as a political union and economic bloc with the strong cultural component of the EU, as one political and civilisational actor and as a reliable partner for India. Adopting a meta-perspective, Timo Lowinger describes the EU–India relationship as a playground for policy analysts. As their constructions of a possible future of the relations exert influence on both policymakers and the public, the chapter examines the fundamental research principles underlying the production of policy analysis, and critically reflects on the role of policy analysts themselves. Adapting the so-called Global IR paradigm, Lowinger proposes the idea of parapublic underpinnings, which could put scientific cooperation in general—and cooperation on policy-oriented research in particular—on a broader basis, thereby establishing a basis for research on an equal footing. Ummu Salma Bava concludes the volume by venturing an outlook on whether India and the European Union will be able to join forces on the global scene. After framing EU–India relations within the current global order, she takes a first look at the EU–India Strategic Roadmap 2025 adopted shortly before the manuscript of this book was finalised. According to the author, the document is a commitment of political will

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with high ambitions and has expanded the scope of political action by overcoming certain reluctances on both sides, for example in the realm of maritime security. Thus, Bava concludes, 2020 could witness the start of a new era in engagement between Brussels and New Delhi as both must rapidly adapt to the changing geopolitics.

References Bengtsson, Rikard, and David Allen. 2011. Exploring a triangular drama: The High Representative, the Council Presidency and the Commission. In The High Representative for the EU Foreign and Security Policy, ed. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Carolin Rüger, 109–130. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (eds.). 2019. Shaping the EU Global Strategy: Partners and Perceptions. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Council of the European Union. 2018. EU Strategy on India: Council conclusions (10 December 2018). 14638/18. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37410/st14638-en18.pdf. Accessed 22 September 2020. Drechsel, Benjamin. 2016. Interregionale Beziehungen und strategische Partnerschaften: die EU, Indien und Brasilien in der internationalen Politik. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, and Stephanie C. Hofmann. 2020. Of the contemporary global order, crisis, and change. Journal of European Public Policy 27 (7): 1077–1089. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13501763.2019.1678665. EU-India. 2020. EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025. https://www.consilium.eur opa.eu/media/45026/eu-india-roadmap-2025.pdf. Accessed 22 September 2020. European Commission. 2020. Special Advisors to the European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/ info/about-european-commission/service-standards-and-principles/transparency/special-advise rs_en. Accessed 4 September 2020. European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy (EUC/HV). 2019. EU-China—A strategic outlook. JOIN(2019) 5 final. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strate gic-outlook.pdf. Accessed 22 September 2020. European Council. 2020. Remarks by President Charles Michel after the EU-India summit via video conference. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-releases/2020/07/15/rem arks-by-president-charles-michel-after-the-eu-india-summit-via-video-conference/. Accessed 22 September 2020. European Union. 2016. Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_r eview_web_0.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2020. Freedom House. 2020. Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in retreat. https://freedomhouse. org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf. Accessed 22 September 2020. Gaens, Bart, and Emma Hakala. 2020. Recalibrating EU-India relations: A shift away from a trade-based partnership? FIIA Briefing Paper 289. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/bp289_recalibrating-eu-india-relations. pdf. Accessed 23 September 2020. Hill, Christopher, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.). 2017. International relations and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2006. Indian and the European Union: The Charade of a Strategic Partnership. Sciences Po, CERI. https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/f5vtl5h9a73d5ls974os14q2h/resources/ art-cj.pdf. Accessed 22 September 2020.

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Jain, Rajendra K. (ed.). 2019. Changing Indian images of the European Union: Perception and misperception. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Jain, Rajendra K. (ed.). 2020. India and the European Union in a Turbulent World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Joshi, Shashank. 2017. The prospects for EU-India Security Cooperation. European View 16 (2): 271–279. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0453-7. Kahler, Miles. 2018. Global Governance: Three futures. International Studies Review 20 (2): 239– 246. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy035. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Gisela, Manuel Pietzko, and Anja Zürn. 2018. Die Zukuft der Europäischen Union: Potenziale besser nutzen. Würzburger Jean Monnet Papers 2018 (1): 1–30. Nadkarni, Vidya. 2010. Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without alliances. London: Routledge. Pant, Harsh V. (ed.). 2017. Indian foreign policy: An overview. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Ragi, Sangst K., Sunil Sondhi, and Vidhan Pathak (eds.). 2017. Imagining India as a global power: Prospects and challenges. New York: Routledge. Renard, Thomas, and Sven Biscop (eds.). 2012. The European Union and emerging powers in the 21st century: How Europe can shape a new global order. Farnham: Ashgate. Reynié, Dominique. 2019a. Democracies under pressure. A Global Survey: Volume I—The Issues. http://www.fondapol.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/DOSSIER_FICHES-THEMES_ GB_2019_06_18_w-dernièreversion.pdf. Accessed 22 September 2020. Reynié, Dominique. 2019b. Democracies under pressure. A Global Survey: Volume II—The countries. http://www.fondapol.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/DOSSIER_FICHES-PAYS_GB_2 019-05-17-w.pdf. Accessed 22 September 2020. Rüland, Jürgen. 2018. “Principled multilateralism” versus “Diminished multilateralism:” Some general reflections. In Multilateralism in a changing world order, ed. Christian Echle, Patrick Rueppel, Megha Sarmah, and Yeo Lay Hwee Lay, 1–12. Singapore: Konrad-Adeneuer-Stiftung. Smith, Mike. 2018. The EU, the US and the crisis of contemporary multilateralism. Journal of European Integration 40 (5): 539–553. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1488836. Sood, Rakesh. 2020. EU-India relations: Time to chart a new course. Commentaries. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/eu-india-relations-time-tochart-a-new-course/. Accessed 23 September 2020. Tharoor, Shasi, and Samir Saran. 2020. The new World disorder and the Indian imperative. New Delhi: Aleph Book Company. Tocci, Nathalie. 2020. Resilience and the role of the European Union in the World. Contemporary Security Policy 41 (2): 176–194. Wagner, Christian. 2008. The EU and India: A deepening partnership. In Partnerships for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia, ed. Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 87–104. Chaillot Papers No. 109. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/partnerships-effective-multilateral ism-eu-relations-brazil-china-india-and-russia. Accessed 14 October 2020. Winand, Pascaline, Marika Vicziany, and Poonam Datar. 2016. The European Union and India: Rhetoric or meaningful partnership?. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet is Jean Monnet Professor of European Studies and International Relations at the Institute of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Würzburg. The European Commission has awarded her the Jean Monnet Chair for excellent publications, research and teaching activities which have been devoted mainly to the EU’s foreign and security policy as well as French and German European Policy. She has held numerous guest professorships in India and is a member of the Academic Advisory Board of the Institute for European Politics (IEP) and the European Academy of Bavaria. Since 2017 she has been leader of the project

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“Foundations of the Indo-European Strategic Partnership” and takes part in the ICAS: MP Centre of Advanced Studies in New Delhi. Philipp Gieg is a postdoctoral researcher and member of faculty at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He has recently completed his Ph.D. on India’s Africa policy. In the last years, he conducted several research stays in India and on the African continent, for example as a visiting scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Timo Lowinger is a researcher and member of faculty at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He is also project coordinator of the project “Foundations of the Indo-European Strategic Partnership”. His research focuses on Critical Theory (recognition of the Global South) and IR; World Order; (Critical) Constructivist Norm Research; Emerging Powers, especially Indian and South African Foreign Policy. He conducted several research stays in India. Manuel Pietzko is a member of faculty and researcher at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He is project coordinator of the Jean Monnet activities at the chair. His research interests include EU Foreign Policy, the EU as an international actor and the EU Global Strategy. Anja Zürn is a member of faculty and researcher at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Würzburg. In her research she focuses on global climate policy, emerging power India and gender in IR. Her Ph.D. project is dedicated to gender aspects in Indian and EU climate change discourses.

Europe’s Strategic Autonomy and the Partnership Approach Giovanni Grevi

1 Introduction The international order is undergoing a far-reaching transformation and the European Union (EU) needs to re-define its role and priorities in a new, more challenging and competitive, strategic landscape. The distribution of power and the prevalent norms are the two basic factors defining any international order, whether at the regional or global level. At this stage, the combination of structural power shifts and of a competition of worldviews and political models is taking the international order to new territory. Of course, power shifts have happened in the past, producing the relative rise and decline of major powers at different stages in history, from Athens and Sparta to France and Spain to Germany and the United Kingdom. However, two features set current trends apart. For one, at least when looking at respective shares of global wealth, economic flows and technological innovation, the redistribution of power from the West to the East, and chiefly China, is happening at a rather fast pace relative to earlier cases. For another, significant power shifts have never occurred in such an highly institutionalised, connected and interdependent international system as today’s, which is the product of decades of globalisation and institutional entrepreneurship, largely led by the US and Europe.

This text is based on the keynote speech delivered by the author at the University of Würzburg on 20 November 2019, on the occasion of the workshop on ‘EU India: joining forces on the global scene?’. Parts of the text have been updated to include relevant developments at the time of drafting, in spring 2020. G. Grevi (B) European Policy Centre, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_2

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Following the end of the Cold War, many felt that the spread of liberal political values on the heels of economic liberalisation would progressively entail a worldwide convergence of norms, values and political systems. Political and economic liberalisation was the only path to modernisation and growth, which was the overriding objective of all countries. However, the twin trends of power shifts and of growing competition between different political-economic models have rocked this basic assumption and driven the emergence of a new set of expectations. In short, the new predominant assumption is that, as the liberal world order recedes, power politics is back. The ‘new normal’ would very much resemble the old normal of great power competition and zero-sum games, leaving little room for rules-based cooperation. While this is not a foregone conclusion, various indicators point to growing multidimensional (political, economic, technological, security, normative) competition for the foreseeable future, with the US-China rivalry becoming a key aspect of current international affairs. This prospect raises a number of difficult questions for Europe’s future and for its role in the world.

2 Europe in a Challenging Strategic Environment The drivers and objectives of European integration appear at odds with the trends that are shaping, and weakening, the international order. What is unique about European integration is the foundational idea of sharing sovereignty through supranational institutions and norms. Today, nationalism is on the rise on the international stage, with countries asserting their sovereignty as a matter of national pride. The EU has been championing multilateralism, but it faces a surge of unilateralism. Albeit inconsistently and with limited results beyond the enlargement process, Europe has sought to promote democracy in its neighbourhood and beyond. However, in recent years authoritarian or illiberal regimes have been gaining ground, consolidating their domestic power while gaining more influence on the international stage. Finally, European integration started and prospered within the larger transatlantic community. This created the political and security space for countries in Western Europe to focus on building a common market and common institutions, while largely delegating their security to the US. Today, the transatlantic partnership is very contested and the US is likely to narrow down its security footprint in the regions surrounding Europe. The EU and its member states need to face this new reality—the world as it is, not just as they would like it to be. That requires a clear-eyed, realistic assessment of multidimensional competition and related challenges, while defining a distinctive approach to cope with them, which is consistent with the roots, features and objectives of the EU. The EU has recognised that shifts in international affairs require it to take a more robust stance to defend its interests. As the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) Josep Borrell often puts it, the EU needs to learn to speak the language of power.

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At the same time, the EU has the opportunity to offer an alternative proposition to the prospect of a world of great power competition and shallow, or disrupted, cooperation. In other words, the EU should seek to define a counter-cyclical strategy directed to at least mitigate, if not help reverse, the drift towards a zero-sum world. Upholding the power of the rules over the rule of power should be central not only to Europe’s strategy, but also to its profile and sense of purpose in international affairs. This is not only a principled stance, but also a matter of enlightened self-interest, since the security and prosperity of Europe, and many other global actors and regions, depends on a stable, open and regulated international order. The emergence and impact of COVID-19 has underscored the importance of this overarching strategic goal. The spread of the pandemic has been the product of multiple governance failures at national and international level. At the same time, the ongoing conflict of narratives around COVID-19 reflects larger rifts and competition between the US, China and other powers, which, in turn, undermine the global cooperation required to deal effectively with transnational challenges. The pandemic, however, is not the first, and will not be the last, challenge that stems from interdependence. While the temptation to withdraw from interdependence is strong, this is a delusional objective. If economic flows can be somehow managed, which is necessary to reduce respective vulnerabilities and operate on a shared level-playing field of rules, interdependence is a fact. This is self-evident when it comes to issues such as climate change and global health: retrenching behind national walls will not help much in preventing or dealing with the massive impact of challenges that ignore borders. The effective management of global public goods, such as a sustainable environment, is the only viable solution.1

3 Europe’s Strategic Autonomy At a time when geopolitical competition is on the rise, and affects the management of interdependence, advancing a positive agenda of rules-based cooperation will require new skills, a better use of available resources, and a more robust approach to deal with assertive powers. In other words, when charting its path between multilateralism and power politics, the EU will need to become more strategic and more autonomous. Strategy is about aligning ends and means, making sure that resources are effectively mobilised to achieve one’s priorities. Autonomy is about self-reliance, meaning the availability of the resources necessary to implement one’s decisions. For Europe, strategic autonomy means therefore the ability to set and achieve priority goals in ways that do not primarily depend on the decisions and assets of others. Of course, full autonomy is neither achievable nor necessarily desirable across all policy fields. Pursuing strategic autonomy, however, entails strengthening Europe’s domestic power base, enhancing its resilience and diminishing its dependence on 1 For EU-India climate cooperation and diplomacy, see the contributions by Jayaram and Jörgensen

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others, so as to put Europe in a stronger position to advance not only its interests but also international cooperation. Strategic autonomy is not about isolation or independence, which can hardly be envisaged in a world of complex interdependence, but about exercising a further degree of control over one’s choices and policy outcomes. This is the definition of sovereignty recently put forward by Mario Draghi, the former President of the European Central Bank. In short, strategic autonomy is about the capacity for the EU to act more effectively in cooperation with others, whenever possible, or on its own, when necessary. At a time when international competition spans across a variety of dimensions, from the economy to security matters, from the information domain to the mastery of new technologies, the scope of strategic autonomy should be understood as equally extended. As such, strategic autonomy goes well beyond traditional foreign policy and defence issues and encompasses a strong economy, a viable ecosystem for technological innovation and adequate capabilities to deal with a large security and defence agenda.

3.1 The Economic Dimension The economic dimension of progress towards strategic autonomy includes three principal lines of action. For one, completing the Single Market (SM), which is the bedrock of Europe’s prosperity and regulatory power. By various estimates, the SM has added about 9% to Europe’s GDP, and it offers essential scale for European companies to grow larger, more competitive, and fit to face international competition. Besides, the size of Europe’s market is the primary enabler of Europe’s regulatory power—the ability to set standards and norms that economic partners have to respect if they wish to do business in Europe. This includes environmental and labour regulations that are critical to EU efforts to support the sustainability agenda within Europe and well beyond. For another, the EU should sharpen its tools to define fair terms of economic engagement with third parties and establish a mutually beneficial level playing field. Trade relations with major economic partners have become more problematic and transactional in recent years. The EU has been facing growing protectionism, obstacles to market access and other measures distorting competition, whether in the form of unilateral tariffs, subsidies, dumping or requirements for technology transfers. There is a need for the EU to better enforce the rules of existing trade deals, adopt instruments to tackle the unfair use of subsidies, apply reciprocity to level the playing field when it comes to market access and public procurement, and establish viable arrangements to screen foreign investment on grounds of public order and security. Many of these measures are in the pipeline, or envisaged, and should be taken forward. Besides, the EU will need to foster the international role of the Euro. This would not only help shelter Europeans from global financial shocks and drastic exchange rates fluctuations, while keeping interest rates low. It would also afford them more

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margin of manoeuvre when facing the weaponisation of financial power through extraterritorial unilateral measures, such as in the case of US sanctions on Iran. Making of the Euro a stronger global currency requires completing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), including the capital markets and banking union, and making available large volumes of Euro-denominated assets, which would contribute to deeper capital markets and a stronger banking sector.

3.2 The Technological Dimension Fostering Europe’s technological leadership and sovereignty will be crucial to advancing strategic autonomy, as technology is, and has always been, the principal ingredient for competitiveness and economic growth. At a time when economic tools are increasingly mobilised for political and strategic goals, the development and deployment of new technologies will also be critical to international influence. The EU and its member states need to join forces to remain at the forefront of the ongoing race for technological primacy. In early 2020, the European Commission has outlined a strategic approach to Europe’s industrial policy, to Artificial Intelligence and to developing a data economy. These policy plans include several milestones to strengthen Europe’s capacity for innovation and, therefore, both Europe’s economy and its normative power in regulating new technologies. Despite the economic impact of the current COVID-19 pandemic, which is expected to lead to a sharp recession in the course of 2020, Europeans will need to mobilise large resources to support innovation. This means focusing large scale investment in key enabling technologies and pooling public and private resources in the so-called Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) to strengthen strategic value chains. It also means taking a long view and dedicate necessary resources to research on future disruptive technologies, while leveraging the untapped potential of the Single Market to deliver venture capital to promising European start-ups. Creating a single market for data will also be essential to give Europe adequate critical mass in the emerging data economy, allowing European companies to pool and share large amounts of data. Using data on an adequate scale will also depend on secure digital connectivity infrastructure and on progress on Artificial Intelligence, to process massive volumes of information. This requires both investment and regulatory frameworks that do not stifle entrepreneurship but define the normative benchmarks of technological innovation, in line with European values, and help ensure the security of critical digital infrastructures, such as 5G and the future 6G.

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3.3 The Security and Defence Dimension In matters of security and defence, the EU faces a large set of threats and challenges, some of which may be exacerbated by the current pandemic. Besides direct military threats and the proliferation of conflicts and instability in the regions surrounding Europe, the digitalisation of critical infrastructure, from communication to finance and energy, introduces new vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks and hybrid strategies that can affect all aspects of life. This means that Europeans must simultaneously address issues of traditional defence and deterrence, domestic resilience and external crisis management. By strengthening their capabilities and resilience, Europeans will also be better able to contribute to joint efforts with partners. That includes the central role of NATO for European defence as well as the engagement with other multilateral organisations, such as the UN, or coalitions, such as the coalition to fight the so-called Islamic State. With a view to the strong pressure on public finances induced by the ongoing recession, it will be crucial for Europeans to make the best use of the frameworks for EU level defence cooperation established in the last two years, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), or to be finalised, notably the European Defence Fund. Europeans need to reduce wasteful duplications and better coordinate their investment in defence research, as well as the development and acquisition of new capabilities. Doing so will both preserve Europe’s own defence technology and industrial base and contribute to fill glaring capability gaps, if member states target ambitious projects to meet the pressing needs that they have jointly identified. The development of adequate capabilities needs to proceed hand in hand with the establishment of integrated force packages, ready for deployment, which can give Europeans a real projection capacity to provide security, and defend their interests, in Europe’s neighbourhood. Progress on EU defence cooperation is regarded by some as potentially weakening transatlantic links and affecting the centrality of NATO for the collective defence of Europe. However, Europeans do not question NATO’s role, while a less capable and self-confident Europe would be a less effective partner for the US and others, at a time when Washington calls for Europeans to carry a bigger share of the burden in terms of, for example, defence expenditure.

4 European Political Cohesion and Strategic Autonomy There is a two-way relationship between preserving and enhancing Europe’s political cohesion, for one, and making progress on the policy agendas outlined here, for another. Concrete policy achievements can help strengthen political cohesion and resilience in Europe. Conversely, however, policy progress will be slow and uneven if not driven by a clear sense of shared purpose and enabled by political convergence among EU member states. This holds particularly true at a time when the

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COVID-19 pandemic is imposing an unprecedented stress test on Europe’s citizens, societies, economies and political systems. While the deep crisis facing Europe is bringing about growing awareness that the future of EU countries is intertwined, at the time of writing it remains an open question whether member states will find enough common ground to bridge their long-standing differences and agree on a large, decisive economic recovery package. Doing so could pave the way not only to economic recovery but also to the consolidation of the EU as a political community and international actor. In other words, the way in which the EU will deal with the COVID-19 crisis will say a lot about the prospects for progress towards strategic autonomy.

5 Strategic Autonomy and the Partnership Approach The current pandemic will likely carry far-reaching implications not only for Europe and other parts of the world but for international affairs at large. While much uncertainty lies ahead and any conclusion would of course be premature, many observers point to an acceleration of some of the trends that pre-existed COVID-19. These include great power competition, with the prospect of US-China tensions turning into structural confrontation, the questioning and downscaling of globalisation, with flows becoming more regionalised, and the crisis of multilateralism and international institutions. In a strategic context likely to become more contested, fragmented and volatile, Europe’s commitment to partnerships and multilateralism will be both more difficult, and more important, to uphold. For the EU, advancing strategic autonomy is not about isolation but about acquiring a stronger critical mass for fostering cooperation in a more challenging world. Mitigating the potentially adverse and destabilising effects of multipolarity through multilateral arrangements and rules has been a central driver of EU foreign policy for the last two decades. In pursuing this goal, Europe’s approach has evolved to adapt to a shifting context. In the course of the first decade of this century, at a time when emerging economies took centre stage in a new phase of globalisation and began to play a larger role in international affairs, the EU invested in bilateral so-called strategic partnerships with a number of key countries. These partnerships range from those launched with China in 2003 and with India in 2004, to the later agreements with Brazil and South Africa (2007) and South Korea (2010), among others. There is no clear definition of what a strategic partnership is, beyond the fact that it is labelled as such in official statements. By and large, however, these partnerships entail a certain level of institutionalisation, including regular summits and a plethora of high-level dialogues and working groups addressing mutual relations across multiple policy fields. Many of these partnerships are also framed by broad-based political agreements, economic partnership agreements, free trade deals or strategic roadmaps.

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During the 2000s, when most strategic partnerships have been established, the EU regarded them as a multipurpose tool. For one, by establishing or institutionalising these relationships with old and new partners, the EU sought to place itself on the map as a major international actor in its own right within a polycentric, or multipolar, world. For another, strategic partnerships offered a structured framework for advancing bilateral ties, in particular on the economic and regulatory front. This was particularly important at a time when, notably after the 2008 financial crisis, much of global growth came from beyond Europe and the West at large. Besides, strategic partnerships were regarded as one of the channels through which to advance convergence around multilateral measures. In other words, they were considered as platforms to build trust and pave the way towards larger, inclusive agreements. These broad goals continue to inform the EU’s bilateral engagement with its partners but the discourse and practice of strategic partnerships has significantly changed over the last ten years, in line with changing international circumstances. First of all, the output of strategic partnerships has been overall quite sobering. While landmark free trade deals and a degree of regulatory convergence have been achieved with Japan, South Korea and Canada, relationships with so-called emerging countries— China, India, Brazil and South Africa—have not delivered major breakthroughs either at the bilateral or at the multilateral level. Secondly, China has progressively emerged as a power in its own league, openly pursuing a leading role on the global stage, taking a more assertive stance and seeking to expand a political-economic model that competes with the liberal democratic values pursued by the EU. While seeking to sustain broad engagement, in 2019 the EU has consequently framed its relationship with China as a complex one, including elements of cooperation, competition and rivalry. Thirdly, China’s rise has sparked a standoff with the US, which increasingly reverberates across all aspects of international affairs. The question is whether a new form of bipolarity will progressively supersede multipolarity, with international actors large and small under growing pressure to strike a difficult balance in their relations with the two heavyweights—the US and China. Fourthly, in a more competitive environment where big powers often pursue unilateral and nationalist agendas, multilateral institutions are put under serious stress. Not only it proves very hard to expand global governance to new domains, from digital economic flows to the regulation of new technologies, but current institutions face gridlock when their major stakeholders use them as yet another arena for competition. The overall poor performance of the multilateral system in responding to the COVID-19 crisis points to the risk of a deeper crisis of global governance. Under these circumstances, while seeking to strengthen its power basis and advance its strategic autonomy, the EU takes a more pragmatic approach to socalled strategic partnerships. Back in 2016, the EU Global Strategy highlighted the importance of partnership as the baseline EU approach to international affairs.2 In this context, bilateral strategic partnerships are one of the possible formats, alongside more flexible arrangements including a variety of state and non-state actors, as relevant to the issues and problems at hand. In other words, the scope and shape 2 For

the EU’s partnerships in the Global Strategy, see Pietzko’s contribution in this volume.

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of partnerships is to be tailored to needs, beyond an excessively institutionalised approach. That goes hand in hand with the effort to compartmentalise complex partnerships, better targeting areas of cooperation while recognising that agenda differ, or diverge, on other important issues. That applies not only to China but also to the US under the Trump administration. While the transatlantic partnership is unique in scope and depth, and remains essential for Europe’s security and prosperity, the transactional approach of President Trump towards the EU and its member states has required a more pragmatic approach on the EU side as well. In short, the EU is introducing more differentiation both between and within partnerships, while seeking to better define its own strategic goals. In this context, the partnership between the EU and India carries a large potential, which has so far not been tapped. Given their own domestic priorities and different strategic context, the EU and India have not invested enough political capital in their relationship. The EU is often perceived in India as essentially an economic bloc, whereas key European powers such as the UK, France and Germany are considered the main interlocutors for political and strategic affairs. From a European standpoint, India is not contributing to global governance on the level that its size and potential would warrant.3 Negotiations on a trade deal between Brussels and Delhi have dragged on for years with little prospects for a breakthrough. Long-standing North– South differences on issues of sustainable development and economic globalisation have affected their dialogue on the global agenda.4 At the same time, both partners looked at 2020 as an important year to renew their partnership and sketch out a roadmap up to 2025. The latter would replace the agenda for action 2020, which was established back in 2016. In late 2018, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a joint communication sketching out an ambitious perspective for an EU strategy on India. The EU emphasised sustainable modernisation, foreign and security policy issues and cooperation to consolidate a rules-based global order, on top of the trade and investment agenda. Work has moved forward to seek to define the next partnership’s priorities but, given the current pandemic, the envisaged March 2020 bilateral summit has been postponed. Key areas for enhanced cooperation may include renewable energy, digitalisation, fostering mutual investment, EU-Asia connectivity and strengthening maritime security. Given the massive impact of COVID-19, cooperation in the health sector, from capacity-building to research and relevant trade issues, could become another important dimension of EU-India cooperation at bilateral and multilateral level.

3 Regarding

mutual perceptions of India and the EU, see Winand’s contribution in this volume. Köhler-Suzuki’s contribution on EU-India trade negotiations and Tripathi’s contribution on development cooperation.

4 See

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6 Conclusion Europe needs to become more strategic and more autonomous in a more competitive and unstable international context, not only to defend its interests but also to advance a positive global agenda. Strategic autonomy encompasses measures across three main dimensions of EU action, namely the economy, technology and security and defence. As Europe is hit by the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, progress towards more strategic autonomy will depend on EU countries converging around a strong economic recovery package, both reflecting and fostering solidarity and political cohesion. Strategic autonomy is not alternative to engaging in partnerships and collective action on the global stage. It is rather a necessary condition for the EU to be a stronger and more credible advocate of rules-based cooperation. Advancing the latter in the post-COVID world is going to be at the same time essential, to cope with the risks of interdependence, and very difficult, requiring a multi-level approach. This will include action at the multilateral level, through smaller coalitions and via bilateral partnerships, working with state and non-state actors, as need be. In this context, strategic partnerships will need to be more directly tailored to meet the priority interests of the parties, while addressing pressing global challenges. As in the past, despite a more targeted and less aspirational approach, partnerships may often underperform. However, in the context of a broader approach to cooperation in turbulent times, they can and should be valued as one important vector of comprehensive dialogue among pivotal global and regional actors. While priorities and agendas may differ, and concrete achievements may prove limited, the culture of partnership and dialogue can and should be supported with a view to not only build convergence but also manage diversity and controversy. Ultimately, partnerships can help contain the drift towards a zero-sum world.

Giovanni Grevi is a Senior Associate Fellow with the European Policy Centre (EPC), where he previously headed the Europe in the World programme. Before joining the EPC in 2016, he was the Director of the Foundation for International Relations and External Dialogue (FRIDE). Previously, Giovanni served as a Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) from 2005 to 2010 and worked at the EPC as Policy Analyst and Associate Director of Studies (1999–2005). Giovanni is also a Senior Associate Fellow of ISPI and teaches European foreign policy and international relations at the College of Europe, Bruges, and at Sciences Po, Paris.

Conceptual Approaches to EU-India Relations

Norm Contestation in EU Strategic Partnerships: The Cases of Civil Society Involvement and Climate Justice in EU–India Relations Timo Lowinger, Anja Zürn, Philipp Gieg, and Manuel Pietzko

1 Introduction The EU-India Strategic Partnership is not in good shape—or at least the unanimously negative evaluation of this relationship seems to suggest so. The ties between the EU and India are deemed “neither very strategic, nor much of a partnership” (Kavalski 2016: 192), India is said to perceive the “EU as a marginal player in most strategic matters” (Sachdeva 2008: 342) and Jaffrelot (2006: 1), in an often-quoted remark, describes the cooperation as a “charade of a strategic partnership”. In 2017, India and the European Union celebrated 55 years of diplomatic relations. After a period of rather loose diplomatic, economic and development cooperation, the relationship was upgraded to a new level by the adoption of a strategic partnership in 2004. Thus, an institutionalised bilateral relationship between the two largest democracies of the world has been set in motion. Within the framework of their strategic partnership, India and the EU have been pursuing their openly declared objectives of promoting the rules-based global order and trading system, improving multilateral organisations like the United Nations (UN), the WTO and the G20, and working together for a more inclusive world order on a general basis. Both partners, however, have constantly been criticised by the media and the scientific community for their reluctance to move forward. Moreover, in the following years of crisis, the EU T. Lowinger (B) · A. Zürn · P. Gieg · M. Pietzko University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] A. Zürn e-mail: [email protected] P. Gieg e-mail: [email protected] M. Pietzko e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_3

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instrument of Strategic Partnerships has become more and more neglected—hence having an utterly negative impact on EU–India relations. Furthermore, negotiations for a free trade agreement between India and the EU, launched in 2007, have been officially suspended since 2013. These new empirical developments within the EUIndia Strategic Partnership, coupled with strong criticism of the venture, justify a different perspective. The deadlock in the cooperation between the EU and India has always been explained by the divergence of their interests, their different views on fundamental norms and their dissimilar conceptions of foreign policy. Paradoxically, by establishing the strategic partnership, both entities have agreed on common norms, with the controversies and argumentative disputes in their diplomatic negotiations simultaneously revealing a “normative disconnect” (Jain 2014: 13) and “normative hurdles” (Grevi 2012: 16). What is missing at this point of research (cf. Blanco 2016) is an indepth systematic and model-driven approach to grasp the discursive practices of the two regarding the “common” norms1 : Does either India or the EU contest the entire validity of the norms of the strategic partnership or does each actor have different understandings of these norms? In what mode and why do India and the EU contest these norms? Reconstructing both actors’ contestation of the norms inherent in the strategic partnership helps to better understand the problems with their cooperation and can reveal different views and perceptions in the various policy fields covered by the relationship. The benefits of such a conception are threefold: (1) Being influenced by the Global International Relations (IR) debate (Acharya 2014) and the new postcolonial awareness (cf. Seth 2013; Epstein 2017), the contestation approach helps prevent a Eurocentric bias in research: The EU with its “normative power” (Manners 2002) appears as a normative actor who “has had a tendency to see SPs [Strategic Partnerships] as a valuable forum to influence partners’ normative standpoints” (Pan and Michalski 2019: 273), whereas the strategic partner is often seen as a non-normative actor (Casier 2013: 1377). Such a view is problematic because it might lead to the assumption—as various policy papers demand both implicitly and explicitly—that India alone must adapt in its norms and points of view. The reconstruction of different contestations prevents the view of India as a “norm-taker rather than a norm-setter” (Jain 2014: 14) and reveals the different normative positions which are socially contingent. Thereby it is the agency of India (Lowinger 2019) (and of the EU) which is emphasised instead of the norm diffusion practice of the European Union being put into focus. (2) The contestation framework can promote a better understanding 1 Pan and Michalski (2019) suggest such a model for analysing strategic partnerships. Their approach

of the logics of strategic partnerships partly focuses on norms too, but it does not help to understand why the actors question specific norms. The respective actor’s perspective on the norms is disregarded and is not systematically integrated into the theoretical model. Blanco (2016: 1), on the other hand, delivers a very convincing ‘language-based approach’, which seems to be appropriate for grasping strategic partnerships (SPs). However, his perspective is a different one: He tries to focus theoretically on the term and concept of the SPs and does not analyse the respective partners within the SPs and their (normative) interactions.

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of the empirical status of the partnership and explain the deadlock without negative assessments. (3) Not only can a systematic model be used to analyse the EU-India Strategic Partnership, it can also provide a framework that serves as a tool to examine the other strategic partnerships of the EU; making comparisons is made possible. To contribute to the debate on the EU-India Strategic Partnership, this study will introduce a heuristic to grasp norm contestation processes in the strategic partnerships of the EU (Sect. 2). This theoretical model will be applied to the case of the EU-India Strategic Partnership: First, the normative foundations of both actors will be reconstructed in order to analyse their norm preferences (Sect. 3). Second, contestation within and beyond the bilateral relationship will be elaborated on in greater detail in two case studies (Sect. 4). With the help of the heuristic, the contestation of two norms will be analysed: The contestation of the norm of civil society involvement, on which both actors agreed in the strategic partnership (Sect. 4.1), and the contestation of the norm of climate justice which is an integral part of the global climate change negotiations where both India and the EU play important roles (Sect. 4.2).

2 Theoretical Framework: Norm Contestation in the EU’s Strategic Partnerships Norms are the basis of every strategic partnership of the EU. They are not only inscribed in the declarations, joint statements and other documents adopted in the framework of these partnerships, but also constitute “collective expectations about proper behaviour” (Jepperson et al. 1996: 54) by the actors involved. These expectations are socially and discursively explosive for the partnerships since each actor has a different view and perception of the respective norms. In this sense, to give just two examples, the EU–China relations are described as “a battle over norms” (Kaya 2014), and a strong “normative divergence” (Jain and Sachdeva 2019: 313) can be identified within the EU-India SP. In order to grasp and understand the dispute over norms as explosive political and diplomatic issues within the context of the partnerships of the EU, this paper suggests a specific norm contestation model. This heuristic is based on the Norm-Dynamics Approach (Müller and Wunderlich 2013) and the theory of contestation by Wiener (2014). The findings of this constructivist norm research will be adapted in order to apply them to the EU’s bilateral strategic partnerships.2

2 The authors

are aware of the fact that the European Union and its partners are not the only ones to have established strategic partnerships. Strategic partnerships in general are a global “phenomenon in the international system” (Pan and Michalski 2019: 265). However, the heuristic is specifically designed for the EU’s strategic partnerships because these are multidimensional and cover a wide range of policy fields, have a high degree of formalisation (compared to other strategic partnerships) and the partnerships in total have a global coverage. Although the structures of the EU Strategic Partnerships are indeed formalised differently (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger 2015: 344), the institutions are similar and hence comparable.

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2.1 Theoretical Background The Norm-Dynamics Approach (Müller and Wunderlich 2013), as the name suggests, emphasises the dynamic that is inherent to norms. The definition of norms used in Wiener’s contestation theory serves as the theoretical foundation. Norms are no longer regarded as stable. What is essential here is the discursive and argumentative dispute of the validity and legitimacy of norms (Wiener 2014: 7); they are ontologised as socially contingent, and are contested. Therefore, the critical element of the theory is the insight that norms cannot be implemented in a top-down process and are not globally valid without being questioned (Müller and Wunderlich 2013: 79). Norms have a dual nature; actions are guided by norms and the norms themselves are constituted through actions. They can be weakened through discrepancies and disputes among the actors, but a strengthening of norms through the argumentative discourse is also possible. Because of their contestation and vagueness, norms are subject to negotiation processes and hence also to change by actors (Müller 2013: 11), in the sense that they must be interpreted by actors in order to be converted into concrete actions and behaviours. Contestation is defined as “the range of social practices, which discursively express disapproval of norms” (Wiener 2014: 1). These contestation practices are contingent on the context in which the contestation takes place and can be distinguished as follows: “[…] interactive social practice contestation may be performed either explicitly (by contention, objection, questioning, or deliberation) or implicitly (through neglect, negation, or disregard)” (Wiener 2014: 1–2). In a nutshell: Contestation always “involves a critical redress of the rules of the game” (Wiener 2014: 2). In doing so, this approach contradicts teleological or circular models, like the LifeCycle model of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) or the Cycles of Change model of Sandholtz and Stiles (2009), in which Norm Entrepreneurs are embedded in specific phases of norm emergence. According to Wunderlich (2013: 28–29), norms can be influenced in every phase of a norm career: they can be weakened or strengthened, or they might even disappear. In the context of strategic partnerships this means that the norms agreed jointly in the negotiations are not firmly fixed in terms of their meaning; although the norms laid down in the agreements, documents and action plans are recorded in writing, their meaning is not static. The partners agree on the norms of democracy and democracy promotion, for instance. Norms like these are floating signifiers because their meaning is vague as they accumulate from different and contradictory meanings between the partners. This is where the contestation begins: Both the European Union and its strategic partner are norm contesters who constantly question the norms through their discursive practices within the partnership. Due to the social contingency of norms, these are interpreted differently by each of the two actors because of their different identities, histories, ideas, world views, interests, etc.

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2.2 Contestation in Strategic Partnerships: A Heuristic With this theoretical background in mind, it is now possible to conceptualise a heuristic to grasp contestation within the strategic partnerships of the EU. The heuristic must depict both the actor and the structural level of the contestation processes between the EU and its partners in order “to understand the intersubjective environment—the bilateral ‘conversation’” (Blanco 2016: 6). At the actor level, the EU as an entity sui generis, and the partner must each be mentioned with its respective discursive practices. Here, the actors are theoretically ontologised as norm contesters who are constantly implicitly and explicitly contesting the norms with which they come into contact. In the context of the strategic partnerships these norm contesters are mostly states and in a few cases international organisations like the UN, the African Union (AU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). At the structural level, the norms are theoretically the centre of attention. They are the reference point of the discursive practices of both norm contesters. Norms are pivotal structural elements of the global system, creating a dense web around the actors and providing them with a framework for action (Rosert 2012: 599). However, norms are also the relevant structure-giving elements in the internal structure of a bilateral partnership. Here, the norms are embedded in the treaties and declarations and are discursively articulated in consultations at the actual level of the strategic partnership, at the level of the member states and at the global level. They structure the institutions of the partnership, guide the actions of the actors and define the objectives as specified in the action plans of the strategic partnerships. The heuristic consists of three main elements which grasp the contestation processes within strategic partnerships. First, due to the special construction of the strategic partnerships, the levels of contestation are focused on theoretically. Second, contestation by the two actors that takes place at these levels can be divided into three different types of contestation. And last, the manner and modes of the contestation practices are theoretically formulated. Figure 1 presents an overview of the heuristic. The elements of the heuristic are explained as follows.

2.2.1

Levels of Contestation

Two peculiarities of the EU’s strategic partnerships which distinguish them from common bilateral relations, are the high degree of formalisation and institutionalisation of the consultation mechanisms, and a commonly agreed normative foundation with the objective of being implemented in an institutionalised way. Thus, discursive contestation takes place in an institutionalised context and is linguistically related to the “multiple written declarations, statements, agreements, and memoranda of understandings” (Jain and Sachdeva 2019: 309). In general, the norms are contested on the (1) actual level of the strategic partnership between the EU and the partner and (2) on the level of the bilateral interactions of the EU member states with the

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Fig. 1 Contestation heuristic (own illustration)

partner. Furthermore, contestation can also take place (3) on a global level where other actors also come into play. The actual level can be distinguished on the following sublevels: (1) The normative practices, in particularly, take place in official Track I intergovernmental interaction formats like summits, joint commissions, ministerial-level meetings and meetings

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between senior officials. (2) Contestation can also be seen in formats like round tables, where non-state actors are included alongside the intergovernmental diplomats of both partners. These non-state actors can be representatives of NGOs, civil society groups, individuals or business actors. (3) Of course, as Nadkarni (2010: 49) reminds us, norms can also be contested in Track II formats, where people-to-people contacts occur within the partnerships. The bilateral interactions of the EU member states with the strategic partner constitute another level on which contestation can take place. In the course of national diplomatic consultations, it is possible that matters which extend beyond bilateral relations and fall into the scope of the EU strategic partnership might be addressed; these interactions can have implications on the contestation within the strategic partnership. In addition to these two levels, contestation can also take place at the global level of world politics—even though it is not at first glance directly related to the strategic partnership—which in turn has an influence on the relationship between the EU and its partner(s). In the multilateral forum of the United Nations, for example, both can cooperate and contest norms. Cooperation and collaboration in these multilateral settings are an integral part of the strategic partnership documents; consequently, contesting of the associated norms also takes place there—and not only in the consultation mechanisms of the partnership.

2.2.2

Types of Contestation

In order to provide the heuristic with theoretical depth, the findings of IR norm research will be integrated. Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (2013: 5) classify contestation discourses into two types: Justificatory and applicatory contestation. As norms are generally contested, they are interpreted differently by the actors and they are part of an argumentative process: Actors can question the norm fully, claim for further modification with stricter rules, or challenge only the application of the norm. Norms become valid through intersubjectively shared acceptance by the involved actors (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2013: 4). Applicatory contestation: Applicatory contestation comprises discourses about the correct application of the rules and obligations embodied in the norm: “Norm applicatory discourses have to clarify whether (1) a norm is appropriate for a given situation and (2) which actions it requires in the specific situation” (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2013: 5). Thus, applicatory contestation by the actors refers to the appropriateness of a certain situation. In this case, the EU and its partner do not question the validity of a norm of the partnership itself, but just the concrete application of the norm. The more precise the norm is, the fewer application contestations will arise (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2013: 5). Therefore, discourses about the application in general result in a strengthening of the validity of a norm because contestation triggers learning processes for the actors which make them adjust their interpretations or develop the norm according to their interests (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2013: 14). The norm is then further specified in order to adapt itself to the given situation.

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Justificatory contestation: In contrast to applicatory contestation, justificatory contestation refers directly to the validity of a norm. Not only is the concrete application of a norm questioned, but a norm of the partnership itself is challenged. Regardless of a concrete situation, the actors ask themselves discursively if a norm can be valid to them at all and what they can expect from each other (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2013: 5). The interaction with other actors might thereby cause a long-term weakening of the norm because it is contested at its core. For example, a norm is written down in a declaration of the strategic partnership, but the partners do not see the relevance of the norm as such anymore. Situational contestation: The third type of contestation is of a more general nature because it does not question a norm itself or its application in a specific situation or context. Instead, contestation takes place even before the actors discuss and question a norm as they argue about which norm to be considered in a first step. The “actors might disagree about which norm(s) to apply in a given situation” (Lantis and Wunderlich 2018: 573). With regard to the heuristic, each of these contestation types is seen as one possible behaviour on the above-mentioned levels of contestation; the EU or its partner question the application of a norm through their discursive expressions and social practices, or they challenge the norm itself, and as such its validity.

2.2.3

Different Modes of Contestation

These types of contestation behaviour, which can be empirically observed, are demonstrated by the two actors of the partnership. According to Wiener (2014: 2) one can distinguish between the explicit and implicit contestation practices of the actors. The norms are explicitly contested by the two partners through contention over, objection to, or constant questioning of the norm’s validity or its application. These explicit actions express the actor’s displeasure with and disapproval of the norms. The implicit behaviour is shown in a less obvious mode, but it is no less momentous for the norm and its effects. The EU and its partner can neglect a norm and its application. A negation or even a disregard of the relevant norms of the partnership might be the outcome.

3 Normative Foundation of the India-EU Strategic Partnership In this and the following section, the contestation heuristic will be applied to the case of the longstanding India-EU Strategic Partnership to examine the contestation processes within this relationship. First, the normative foundations of both India’s and the EU’s foreign policies will be reconstructed (Sects. 3.1 and 3.2). This is necessary,

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as the heuristic turns the spotlight onto the respective intersubjective context and also onto the actors’ views on the meaning of the norms. Based on this analysis, contestation within and beyond the strategic partnership will be assessed through the presentation of two case studies (Sect. 4).

3.1 The Normative Foundation of EU Foreign Policy In the following, the normative foundation of EU foreign policy will be examined from two directions: Firstly, from an internal EU perspective by means of the Treaty of Lisbon; this treaty is the most fundamental normative basis for the European Union’s actions. Secondly, from the perspective of the EU Global Strategy, which shapes the EU’s foreign policy in general, and from a small selection of other relevant documents. Looking at the Treaty of Lisbon, three articles from the Treaty on European Union are crucial for the normative foundation of the EU’s foreign policy. Firstly, Art. 3(5) TEU states that In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests […]. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights […], as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The values referred to at the beginning of the article are found in Art. 2 TEU: The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

These values and the normative basis are supplemented by Art. 21(1) TEU: The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations, which share the principles, referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.

Drawing on these three articles, three types or clusters of values can be summarised, which together build one part of the normative foundation of EU foreign policy. The first cluster is characterised by its focus on human rights and fundamental freedoms. A second cluster is formed by concepts for the relationship and interaction between actors in the international environment and, finally, respect for and promotion of a rules-based global order form the third cluster.

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The European Union has also specified and consolidated this position in other documents: The Council of Ministers adopted a strategic framework and an Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy in 2012 (Council of the European Union 2012), which was updated in 2015. Adding to the first cluster, the documents clearly show that democracy and human rights are not just individual policy areas in the EU’s external relations, but that they must guide all foreign policy activities of the European Union as cross-cutting themes: The EU will promote human rights in all areas of its external action without exception. In particular, it will integrate the promotion of human rights into trade, investment, technology and telecommunications, Internet, energy, environmental, corporate social responsibility and development policy as well as into Common Security and Defence Policy and the external dimensions of employment and social policy and the area of freedom, security and justice, including counter-terrorism policy. (Council of the European Union 2015: 10)

This was reinforced in the EU Global Strategy 2016 which also integrated further normative notions of relations to other international actors (European Union 2016).3 While the strategy explicitly mentions several times the goal of a multilateral world order, it also reiterates other forms of international action, namely bilateralism and interregionalism, which can be associated with the second cluster. On the one hand, interregionalism has been a focus of EU Foreign Policy since the 1990s when the European Union, from the outset deepened its cooperation with other regional organisations like ASEAN or MERCOSUR. On the other hand, the European Union has been fostering strong bilateralisms, e.g. through its strategic partnerships with important established and rising powers. When talking about non-state actors, the European Union in its Global Strategy focuses strongly on economic stakeholders and civil society as partners in successfully implementing cooperation treaties. Thus, the European Union in general wants to interact not only with the governments of third states, but also sees non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society as important stakeholders in its external relations. Regarding security, the European Union sets a clear focus on its immediate neighbourhood, which reaches as far as central Asia and Central Africa. Interestingly, the Indian Ocean is not explicitly a focus of EU interest despite its huge importance for European trade routes (European Union 2016). The normative foundation of the European Union has also been the subject of extensive research for several decades. EU foreign policy is a prime example of the interaction between politics and academia. This can be illustrated by the fact that the European Union, in the formulation of its documents, incorporates images and narratives formed in the field of European Studies. This in turn is taken up by research, which leads to a mutual reinforcement of certain concepts. The most discussed approach is certainly the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE).4 It identifies the five core norms of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, 3 For

a discussion on whether the EU Global Strategy can reinvigorate EU-Indian cooperation, see Winn’s contribution in this volume. 4 For an overview of the main discourses on the EU as an international actor see the contribution of Pietzko in this volume.

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as well as four minor norms, namely social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (Manners 2002: 242–243). Furthermore, it states that the European Union does not only try to uphold these norms for itself, but also tries to transfer them to other international actors by contagion (unintentional diffusion of ideas) and by transference (e.g. the will of the third country to accept EU norms as a prerequisite for trade deals or other treaties) (Manners 2002: 244–245). NPE’s core norms thus depict the central components of the first cluster, while the minor norms can be incorporated into the second cluster. This is not surprising since it has been developed from EU documents. However, NPE has not been formulated in competition to other approaches, but rather explicitly to supplement to the existing concepts of Civilian Power Europe (CPE) and Military Power Europe (MPE) (Manners 2002: 238). This has been necessary as the approaches cover important aspects of—but do not represent the full range of—the European Union’s international action. CPE’s most characteristic proposition is probably that the then European Community (EC) is “long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” (Duche  ne 1973: 20). Its key point is that the EC, unlike other international actors, could not rely on its military strength to influence international events, but had to play out its economic power. Here, international trade as the most powerful instrument is placed at the centre. Thus, CPE represents a part of the second cluster, which is also repeatedly identified in public perception as the core of European influence. The approach of Military Power Europe fundamentally contradicts the view of CPE. MPE basically states that the EC was only able to exert influence through its civilian instruments at that time because the truly powerful states did not make use of their military capabilities. Therefore, the European Community itself would have to build up and use military resources in order to be able to maintain long-term international influence (Bull 1982: 151). Although MPE does not represent any of the clusters drawn up under the Treaty of Lisbon, the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in recent years has given the European Union new opportunities in the military sphere as well, and this has helped to shape the normative foundation of EU foreign policy. However, these approaches have not been uncontested. Some scholars in particular reject the Eurocentric perspectives perpetuated by the three concepts. The perceived discrepancy between the EU’s external norm promotion and actual foreign policy behaviour in particular is at the centre of the criticism. It is further stated that the EU is generally portrayed as a force for good in international relations, but that the European Union is primarily acting in self-interest5 (Cebeci 2019). These more critical approaches once again draw attention to the interdependence of politics and European Studies in the field of EU foreign policy. They point out that ignoring actors other than the European Union can have immense disadvantages for an analysis of the EU as an international actor. Yet the frequent criticism of the European Union’s actions is muffled due to the fact that a harsh dichotomy is being constructed between 5 For

this reason, the approach worked out in Sect. 2 critically reflects this Eurocentrism and gives equal consideration to the contestation of all involved actors.

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values and interests. In this context, values would stand for the fundamental good that is to be promoted, while interests would have negative connotations. This would mean, conversely, that the EU should only act according to its values and is not granted any interests. Instead it should be realised that interests and values can in practice never be observed separately and that, rather, they are intertwined and mutually dependent (Diez 2013: 201–202). Therefore, while a single-sided focus on normbased action by the European Union certainly falls short of the analysis’ requirements, a fundamental denial of normative action solely because of simultaneously existing interests is equally insufficient. As a result, none of the clusters presented here will be supplemented. In summary, the normative foundation of the European Union is based on three clusters that were built on the Treaty of Lisbon and reinforced by further EU documents and selected approaches from European Studies. The first cluster is characterised by its focus on human rights and also on fundamental freedoms that must be applied in every aspect of EU foreign policy. These include respect for human dignity, democracy, rule of law, freedom, peace, security, eradication of poverty and respect for and protection of human rights. The first cluster builds—with its reference to democracy—one part of the first case study (cf. Sect. 4.1). A second cluster is formed by concepts for the relationship and interaction between actors in the international environment, characterised by using primarily civilian means: These are the principles of equality, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, good governance, anti-discrimination and sustainable development of the Earth. Within this cluster it is also mentioned that solutions to emerging difficulties should continue to be found through multilateral means, while the European Union also builds strong relationships on the basis of bilateral or interregional engagement. Furthermore, the cluster targets not only governments as potential partners, but also inherently incorporates non-state actors like civil society, a factor which builds the second part of the case study on Civil Society Involvement. Finally, respect for and promotion of a rules-based global order, and in particular the United Nations Charter, form the third cluster. Therefore, cooperation should be built on a set of mutual rules and norms that the European Union aims to reinforce and promote. Here, the second case study on climate justice—a norm that both the European Union and India seem to share (cf. Sect. 4.2 in chapter “What Strategies can do for Strategic Partnerships: Lessons from the EU’s Strategy on India”)—can be invoked.

3.2 Normative Foundation of Indian Foreign Policy Even before independence in 1947, the Indian National Congress and Jawaharlal Nehru—who would become India’s first Prime Minister—put India’s foreign policy on track towards an internationalist stance (Kalyanaraman 2014: 155–156). This general inclination to work through multilateral international organisations, especially the United Nations, coalesced with the other main “domains and principles”

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of the normative foundation that was laid during the decades before and after independence: non-alignment, support for decolonisation, non-violence and democracy (Sikri 2009: 259; Ramakrishnan 2013: 187; Chitalkar and Malone 2017: 583). India’s UN policy around and after independence provides a case in point: During and after the process of gaining independence from colonial rule, India became an advocate for “anti-colonialism, opposition to racial discrimination and nonalignment” in the UN. Nehruvian foreign policy entailed an “internationalist faith in the UN” and entertained “an extremely active presence in important organs of the UN” (Chaulia 2011: 279–280; also Chandra et al. 2008: 193). Furthermore, India actively helped shape the principles of South-South Cooperation—most prominently enshrined in the ten principles for Afro-Asian cooperation, formulated during the Bandung Conference in 1955—where 29 Asian and African nations met (Gieg 2010: 52). In particular, the principles of “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations”, “abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country” and “abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers” (CVCE 2019), embody the fundamental idea of non-alignment and can be seen as a direct result of having experienced centuries of subjugation and exploitation by an external power. These principles have ramifications for India’s view on how its general support for democracy translates into the norm of democracy promotion, already characterised as a floating signifier in Sect. 2.1. Empirically, “the international promotion of democracy has not been a major strand of India’s foreign policy” (Chitalkar and Malone 2011: 85); despite taking pride in being the world’s largest democracy, this is not surprising because “it must be seen in context with the normative legacy of the historical Afro-Asian relations” whose “principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs forecloses the use of any coercive instruments like sanctions (one of the exceptions being apartheid South Africa)”. India is even “sceptical about positive measures, too, for example, directly rewarding positive developments” (Gieg 2016: 53). Thus, New Delhi employs a “passive approach in promotion of democracy” (Kugiel 2017: 114) and is hesitant to, for instance, engage civil society groups in foreign countries. Conversely, as Sect. 4.1 will show, the Indian government is equally wary of foreign interference in Indian affairs. To varying degrees, India’s foreign policy still carries “the stamp of Jawaharlal Nehru, who conceptualised and executed India’s foreign policy for the first 17 years after India’s independence”; not least because he “trained and inspired a generation of Indian diplomats who shaped India’s foreign policy during the remaining part of the 20th century” (Sikri 2009: 260); the foreign policy fields administered mainly by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) tend to exhibit a stronger Nehruvian imprint. Importantly, this is not to say that the normative foundation decisively shaped every single foreign policy decision. In fact, some observers already question the pervasiveness of non-alignment for the 1960s and 1970s (Solomon 2012: 67), for example citing the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed by India and the Soviet Union in 1971. But in line with an understanding of norms as “expectations about proper behaviour” (Jepperson et al. 1996: 54; cf. chapter 2), reconstructing the

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normative foundation allows the “guardrails” in which actual foreign policy decisions are taken, and the general inclinations that shape the formulating process of foreign policy, to be defined without precluding different decisions in certain instances. Yet norms are not stable, and are therefore dynamic (cf. Sect. 2.1). For instance, actual decisions can affect and change the normative foundation: Several specific foreign policy decisions taken together over a certain period of time may amount to a new established practice which influences, and in the process becomes part of, the normative framework, further narrowing or expanding the constitutive “guardrails”. However, only the constant practice of concurrent actions—not only due to contestation but also after a formative event (Cruz 2000)—might be able in itself to constitute an important part of the constitutive framework which forms the guardrails of a subsequent decision. In the case of India, the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the Indian balance of payment crisis constitutes such a “formative event”. Without a doubt, the subsequent liberalisation of the Indian economy also had a profound impact not only on foreign economic policy in particular but also on foreign policy in general. Number one, after almost three decades, free market values now form an essential part of the normative foundation of India’s foreign policy, as evidenced by the introduction of ever more extensive export-promoting policies, or by India’s decision to become one of the founding members of the WTO in 1995 after having opposed the launch of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round in 1986 (Baru 2015: 332). Two, the realm of security policy also bears witness to the growing influence of economic considerations with a decisively stronger emphasis on the need for securing sea lines of communication, first and foremost in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, number three, the end of the bipolar world rendered the concept of non-alignment less important. Mohan pointedly argues that “the disappearance of the ideological, political and military rivalry between Washington and Moscow” prompted New Delhi “to ask itself, non-alignment between whom?” (Mohan 2004: 30). And finally, four, India’s development cooperation policy saw the introduction of new instruments like lines of credit to developing nations that arguably do not adhere to the principles of South-South Cooperation in the same way as pre-1991 development cooperation (cf. Gieg 2021). Thus, the normative foundation of Indian foreign policy has changed in important ways, most crucially because of economic liberalisation. Today, the norms that guide India’s foreign policy could be described as partly shaped by the process of economisation, in the sense that free market values and neoliberal ideas (Sisodia 2014) found their way into the normative foundation and have in turn weakened hitherto dominating principles like the fundamentals of South-South Cooperation. The Nehruvian legacy consequently forms a smaller part of the normative foundation than it did pre-1991. Yet, important aspects remain as “internationalism continues to inform India’s foreign policy to an extent”—especially in the MEA—as India’s still strong engagement in UN peacekeeping operations especially in Africa or the “continued advocacy of universal nuclear disarmament” demonstrate (Kalyanaraman 2014: 174). Furthermore, India still tries to incorporate the interests of developing countries into important aspects of its multilateral foreign policy, for

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example regarding international trade, UN Security Council reform or global climate change policy. Here, India tries to project itself as a champion of the developing world—first and foremost by advocating the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (cf. Sect. 4.2).

4 Contestation Within and Beyond the Strategic Partnership At first sight, the normative foundations of Indian and EU foreign policy seemingly exhibit strong commonalities. Adding to that impression, joint statements by India and the EU on the occasion of India-EU summits have repeatedly emphasised common principles. The 2017 joint statement, for instance, references India and the EU “as the world’s largest democracies” who “support a rules-based international order that upholds agreed international norms, global peace and stability”; they stress the need for “inclusive growth and sustainable development in all parts of the interconnected and multipolar world”, and generally claim a “growing convergence on contemporary global issues” (India/EU 2017a: 1). Yet the puzzling observation remains that despite this alleged normative convergence, the cooperation has been stalled for years. As already mentioned in the introduction, this paper argues that an in-depth look at the normative foundations is necessary to gain a better understanding of the current status of the strategic partnership. Only a systematic and model-driven approach is able to provide a deeper analysis of the seemingly “common” norms. Two in-depth case studies will serve as examples of how the theoretical framework laid out above can guide an analysis focusing on norms and contestation—which in turn will shed a light on the dire state of the strategic partnership. Both examine global norms from the emerging field of environmental and climate policy: In the first case, the norm of civil society involvement and the contestations around Greenpeace India are reconstructed, while the second case focuses on the fundamental norm of climate justice in the multilateral setting of climate change negotiations. The case studies thus cover two different and specific levels of the heuristic. The contestation of the norm of civil society involvement takes place mainly on the actual level of the strategic partnership. In contrast, the contestation of climate justice takes place mainly at the higher level of multilateral climate negotiations (cf. Fig. 1).

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4.1 The Contested Norm of Civil Society Involvement The involvement of civil society has been an important component of the EU’s Strategic Partnerships since the launch of the third generation of strategic partnerships with its detailed “Joint Action Plans” (Sautenet 2012: 126–127). As the EUIndia Strategic Partnership pertains to this generation with its third pillar introducing “greater democratic visibility” (emphasis in original; Sautenet 2012: 126), inter alia through the involvement of civil society, this is reflected in the regularly held ‘Round Tables’ which represent one level of contestation (cf. Sect. 2.2.1). The meetings are meant to accompany the discussions of the EU-India Strategic Partnership (EESC 2009: 3) while frequency and format have changed over time. The norm of civil society involvement is therefore relatively softly defined since the participation of civil society can be interpreted differently. Although it is anchored at the highest level within the final documents of the summits, there are no concrete statements on its implementation in the form of the Round Table. This is only addressed later in documents of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC 2009, 2010) where the cooperation is evaluated. However, it should be noted that the norm of civil society involvement was anchored in the central document of the strategic partnership, the joint action plan (India/EU 2008: 5). Summarising these documents, the norm is defined as a set of objectives that should involve civil society in the strategic partnership process in order to place it on a broader, democratic legitimacy (Sautenet 2012: 126). Even though the norm of civil society involvement is firmly anchored within the institutional framework, it is highly contested by the Indian government (Jenkins 2019: 493). Due to the fact that foreign-funded organisations have to register under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) and because of the tightening of requirements by the current Indian government, some NGOs and foundations find themselves under huge pressure. What do these difficulties mean for the norm on the one hand and the EU-India Strategic Partnership on the other? These questions will be analysed employing the norm contestation model introduced in Sect. 2.

4.1.1

Contractual Involvement of Civil Society in the India-EU Strategic Partnership

First mentioned within the 2002 Joint Press Statement in the framework of the EUIndia Strategic Partnership, the partners welcomed the 4th meeting of the Round Table and herewith the mobilisation of much-needed resources to deepen the project (India/EU 2007: 3–4). The Round Table was acknowledged in the following declarations of the annual strategic partnership meetings (India/EU 2005a: 3; 2007: 9) and additional actors such as trade unions were supposed to be integrated (India/EU 2004: 2). In 2009, the Round Table was again accentuated while the question of its future development was raised (India/EU 2009: 9). This was recorded in the joint

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statement following India’s initiative (EESC 2010: 2). In 2010, the Indian government arbitrarily abolished the Round Table,6 citing financial and staff reasons (EESC 2010: 1). However, it seems that after the inactive phase due to controversies within the strategic partnership,7 the exchange with and within civil society has been reactivated when it comes to specific policy fields such as water security (India/EU 2016a), energy or climate change (India/EU 2016b), as the 2016 joint declarations insinuate. Strikingly, mention of any sort of involvement on the part of civil society is missing within the 2017 EU-India Joint Statement on Clean Energy and Climate Change (India/EU 2017b). Even though the recently adopted Roadmap to 2025 speaks of the “launch [of] a platform for a sectoral civil society dialogue” (India/EU 2020: 12), this formulation remains vague. Therefore, a closer look will be taken at Indian climate change NGOs and related actors.

4.1.2

Contested Civil Society in India

It is no new phenomenon that Indian civil society organisations, in particular those financially supported by actors from abroad, are under special observation by the Indian Union. The Lok Sabha adopted the FCRA back in 1967, and since then, “organisation[s] of a political nature” (Government of India 1976: 6) have been forbidden to receive funds from abroad unless they are registered under this Act. In 2010, the Parliament revised and modified the instrument; now, whether an organisation is registered under this Act to receive funds from abroad still depends on the central government (Government of India 2010: 9). However, the responsible authority is equipped with more competencies than they had been in the previous Act. Initially, the FCRA was created “to regulate foreign contributions to political campaigns” (Matejova et al. 2018: 152) and therefore to undermine political interference from abroad—in particular from European countries and the US. Due to India’s strong consciousness of its sovereignty and independence (cf. Sect. 3.2), the goal was to prevent any interference in the country’s internal affairs or foreign policy, as the influence of foreign-supported civil society organisations is considered external political interference. Nowadays it seems that environmental NGOs are perceived as forestalling development projects, as suggested by a report of the Intelligence Bureau (2014; Times of India 2014). Therefore, the government assumes that these NGOs represent values that do not correspond to Indian interests, for example in economic and developmental terms (Times of India 2014). Although this secret report was commissioned by the previous Congress government, the final results were published to the succeeding government led by Narendra Modi. The report is considered controversial as the data

6 Hence

the 2012 Joint Declaration does not address the Round Table or other civil society matters. 2012 and 2016 no consultations took place on the framework of the India-EU Strategic Partnership.

7 Between

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cannot be verified, and—following its leak—caused a tremendous stir among politicians as well as civil society activists. While NGOs criticised the numbers, the government constructed a need for action. Afterwards, the new government very quickly focused on an enormous number of NGOs—especially those critical of economic projects such as planned mines or coal power plants due to environmental reasons. In 2016, all NGOs had to renew their licenses under the FCRA and they now have to repeat the process every five years (Doane 2016). The licenses of more than 20,000 NGOs, previously granted under the FCRA, were removed following checks on their financial flows and actions (Times of India 2016). NGOs which stand for environmental protection, and fight human rights violations were particularly targeted (Doane 2016). To justify the measures taken, within the public discourse these civil society organisations are presented by the government as anti-development. This concerns various NGOs, such as the Ford Foundation8 (Nair and MacAskill 2015), Indian Social Action Forum (Bhalla 2016) and Greenpeace India (GPI). Hence, GPI will be the focus of the analysis of norm contestation within the framework of the strategic partnership. Since the disputes about GPI have been going on for more than five years, different aspects and stages of norm contestation (cf. Sect. 2.2) can already be identified. First, however, the events over time will be reconstructed. The Indian Greenpeace Group is regarded as growth-critical. The NGO works, for example, against coal-fired power stations which are used on a large scale in India. The government monitors those campaigns and actions extremely critically and rigidly (Harneit-Sievers 2015). As the influential Intelligence Bureau (IB) report claims a loss of 2–3% of GDP per year due to environmental activism (Intelligence Bureau 2014: 1), the Indian Union took some action. In April 2015, the bank accounts of Greenpeace India had been frozen by the Ministry of the Interior (Subramanian 2015). After one of numerous court rulings, at least two of the seven accounts were intermittently released in 2015 (Gopal 2015). In addition to the long-standing dispute over the organisation’s bank accounts, at the beginning of 2015, one employee, Priya Pillay, was banned from travelling to the United Kingdom where she should have taken part in various meetings with parliamentarians, among others. Her mission was to show the huge negative effects of a mining project in Mahan (Madhya Pradesh), as several thousand forest-dwelling people would lose their livelihoods if the Indian company Essar Group, which has close ties to the UK, pursued their coal mining project (Subramanian 2015). In March of the same year, the decision taken by the authorities was revoked by the High Court as unlawful. This was justified with the words that: “You cannot muzzle dissent in a democracy… Citizens can have different opinions of development policies”, as the BBC (2015) quoted the High Court.

8 One

organisation received financial support from the Ford Foundation to organise a workshop on the riots against Muslims in Gujarat in 2012. This NGO was criticised by the government in Gujarat within the FCRA framework (Najar 2015).

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The 2014 ban on GPI receiving financial support from abroad was followed by a series of repressive measures, as reconstructed above. The fact that this is accumulating again at the height of the 2019 election campaign can hardly be considered a coincidence. GPI had to part with some of its employees and is currently facing major problems, such as the closure of two regional offices (The Economic Times 2019). Although a prominent example is given here with GPI, experts emphasised that different civil society organisations in India are currently very cautious to avoid being affected themselves by restraints or suppression in the future.9 The difficult situation of civil society activists and organisations in India and the measures of the Government are criticised by different actors, such as the US ambassador10 (Vaughan 2015) and members of the European Parliament (Group of EP members 2018). In 2018, a letter from a group of leftist EU parliamentarians was directed to the High Representative, Federica Mogherini, asking her to intervene in the prosecution of Indian human rights activists (Group of EP members 2018), and another letter by EU parliamentarians followed in 2019 (Group of EP members 2019). This letter by a different group of EP members—representing most of the EP families of parties—was addressed to several ministers of the Indian Union. The parliamentarians asked them to stop the repression of civil society organisations: “We call on you to take urgent steps to change course, release all detained human rights defenders in the country, drop all charges against them, and allow them to carry out their work free from risk or impediment” (Group of EP members 2019). In introducing the letter, the group stresses “shared values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (Group of EP members 2019) and the overall importance of India as a strategic partner of the EU. In the sense of shared norms and values, the group also addresses India as “the largest democracy in the world” (Group of EP members 2019). However, cases of restricted civil society actions are still pointed out: Two environmental rights defenders were arrested, as they campaigned against a highway project, criticising the environmental consequences. Here, it can be observed once again that the government regards environmental protection as an obstacle to development, which leads to the contestation of the norm. The fear expressed in the EP’s report was that “EU-India civil society linkages may come under stress in the coming years” due to the difficult situation of Indian NGOs mentioned in its report on the EU-India Strategic Partnership in 2015 (DG EXPO: 40). These linkages were expressed through the institutionalised Round Table. How the norm of civil society involvement is contested, above all in the form of the Round Table, is examined below.

9 Interviews

conducted in Delhi in September/October 2019.

10 The US ambassador to India, Richard Verma, expressed his concerns about the situation of NGOs

working in India (Najar 2015).

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Form of Contestation

As shown above, the Round Table was regarded as a successful format (Baroowa 2007: 743) which can positively accompany the negotiations and enables the participation of civil society organisations as well as amplifying their voices. Even in 2016, albeit in a new setting, the Round Table was presented as an important aspect of the strategic partnership between India and the EU. However, the common norm on which it is based has not yet been discussed further. Can we attest a meaning of the norm shared by the EU and India in this case if Indian civil society is highly curbed at home and also played off against another norm—that of development?

Modes of Contestation Overall, the case study of Greenpeace India shows that the norm of civil society involvement is highly contested. In order to identify the consequences of this contestation for the strategic partnership, the modes and types of contestation must first be analysed in detail. Coming back to the fact that in 2016 the involvement of civil society was announced in the framework of the joint declaration (India/EU 2016b: 3), but not mentioned any further within the following joint statement in 2017 (India/EU 2017b), an implicit norm contestation can be attested. Disregarding (cf. Sect. 2.1) the norm of civil society involvement in practice means here that the agreement doesn’t even deal with civil society integration at any point. This can be traced back to the overall norm violation of neglecting central environmental NGOs in India. In fact, it can be pointed out here that the Indian government has been trying to dry up GPI financially for years, and furthermore, it has also hindered travel activities. The High Court’s decisions to lift most of the restrictions show that the norm of civil society involvement is highly contested in India—in this case implicitly, as the integration of groups without any financial resources is almost impossible. This is not only the case for Greenpeace India; as more than 20,000 licences under FCRA were withdrawn in 2016 alone, one can speak of a negated norm of civil society involvement to a significant degree. An explicit mode of norm contestation is seen in the contention regarding the government’s treatment of Indian NGOs. Although the two letters from several groups of EP members are different in nature, both criticise the situation of NGOs and also ask directly for action. Here, explicit contestation in form of contention can be attested. Thus, the norm of civil society involvement is the centrepiece of the dispute, as the second letter is addressed to Indian ministers, asking them to react in the cases of jailed civil society activists.

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Types of Contestation The fact that the norm as a whole is strongly contested cannot be overlooked. It is interesting to note that the norm of civil society involvement was implicitly put to the test in the wake of the new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government and is increasingly explicitly and therefore very openly contested. Here we can speak of a new quality of contesting the norm of civil society involvement. At first, the case study showed applicatory contestation (cf. Sect. 2.2.2), as questions of the format or the feasibility of the Round Table were to the fore. Although the financial and staff argument did not call into question the validity of the norm itself, it did contest the norm’s firm anchoring. Thus, the reduction in the number of meetings and discussions weakened the position of civil society involvement within the strategic partnership. Since, however, rigid action was taken against NGOs and the Round Table was almost abolished, the validity of the norm has been thoroughly contested. Since the norm consists of regular exchanges and is also intended to contribute to the broad democratic foundation of the strategic partnership, the withdrawal of the Round Table calls it into question. In addition, as several NGOs do not see any possibility of participating in the various discussions and formats in the long term because they are hindered in their work, the validity of the norm has been further contested. Therefore, it can be observed that initial applicatory contestation is gradually being replaced by justificatory contestation. This finding refers to the norm of involvement of civil society; beyond that, however, this contestation takes place in a set of norms—not least due to the fact that the participation of civil society is only part of the common normative foundation of the strategic partnership. As described above, the involvement of NGOs is part of the strategy to make the strategic partnership more inclusive and thus more democratic (cf. Sect. 4.1). Accordingly, in this case the norm of democracy is also affected. Therefore, a next step would be to analyse the understanding of democracy or the norm of democracy and democratic participation, which may be differently contested by India and the EU. Overall, however, it can be stated that democratic participation apparently ends where it seems to oppose the norm of development.

4.2 The Contested Norm of Climate Justice Discussions on equity and climate justice may be as old as the climate change debates themselves. The questions of who bears how much responsibility and how this should be distributed fairly run through global climate negotiations in general and of course also inform climate talks at the bilateral level, such as the India-EU summits and the strategic partnership itself.

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Indeed, “Climate justice means different things to different people[…]” as Jafry et al. (2019: 3) put it. Insisting on the primacy of poverty eradication, India in particular is well known as an important advocate of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) (Sengupta 2012: 106; Fernandes et al. 2020: 163). This is a fundamental element of the norm of climate justice (Fisher 2015: 76). However, there is an article (Article 8) within the Paris Agreement concerning loss and damage (United Nations 2015: 12) which should be viewed as an additional part of the norm (Huang 2017: 40). Even though the CBDRRC principle may be the core of the norm of climate justice, loss and damage will also be analysed within this case study. Both will be scrutinised in the framework of the EU-India Strategic Partnership and beyond that in relevant contexts of global climate governance. This additional step promises added value. On the one hand, the discussion might sometimes be more explicit, and on the other hand, the EUIndia Strategic Partnership cannot be understood in isolation from its global context. Furthermore, considering loss and damage as part of the norm has the advantage of addressing not only the historical and current responsibility for CO2 emissions, but also the losses already endured and the debate about who should compensate them. An inclusive understanding of the climate justice norm—which may also comprise additional aspects—is therefore useful, especially in order to meet the demands of developing and emerging countries, among them India. However, the case study will show that the norm is embedded in a huge discourse where both India and the EU play important and at the same time very different roles. What is the significance of the contestation of this common and yet differently connoted norm for the strategic partnership?

4.2.1

Climate Justice in the India-EU Strategic Partnership

Climate justice as a concept, as outlined above, is only sporadically mentioned in the documents of the partnership. In concrete terms, CBDR-RC is named in the cases of the 2005 Joint Action Plan (India/EU 2005b: 11), the joint work programme EU-India Co-operation on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change of 2008 (India/EU: 12–13), in the course of annual summit documents in 2007 (India/EU: 6) and 2009 (India/EU: 1), as well as in the framework of the 2016 established Clean Energy and Climate Partnership (India/EU 2016b: 1–2) and the following joint statement on this newly built partnership (India/EU 2017b: 1). It should be noted that the references to CBDR-RC have become stronger over time, as it is mentioned on the very first page in 2009, and highlighted three times in the 2008 joint work programme while it was just one point of many in previous years. In 2016 and 2017 of a new quality is visible, as CBDR-RC serves as a guiding principle which is highlighted before the concrete measures and goals of the clean energy and climate partnership are declared. With regard to loss and damage, the documents are less concrete. While the term is not

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mentioned once, we can find some references to joint efforts through the combination of financial cooperation and adaptation (India/EU 2016a: 2; 2017b: 1).11 Interestingly, the documents from 2007 (India/EU: 7) and 2009 (India/EU: 1–2) evince a hedged combination of some aspects of CBDR-RC as well as adaptation and finance. Without mentioning CBDR-RC and adaptation in connection with finance directly, in 2007 (India/EU: 7) the interplay of adaptation and transfer payments within the framework of a post-Kyoto treaty is emphasised alongside the reduction commitment of solely the developed countries. To reconstruct the contestation of the norm of climate justice with its multifaceted appearances it is worthwhile to factor the global level and the outcomes of the annual negotiations into the analysis. This is done here regarding only the most promising stages of the negotiations to materialise the potential for contestation of the norm.

4.2.2

Controversial Manifestation of Climate Justice—A Reconstruction

Although neither climate change nor climate justice was an issue at the beginning of the strategic partnership,12 the importance and willingness of cooperation on global issues by India and the EU was stressed in the initial communiqué in 2000 (India/EU: 2). Two years later, this was extended to the field of climate policy (India/EU 2002: 4), in particular to the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) (India/EU 2003: 2). At that time, the Kyoto Protocol, which contains a clear commitment to the principle of CBDR13 in Article 10 (United Nations 1998: 9) had already been adopted. Various observers assign India a decisive role in anchoring the principle in the Kyoto Protocol (Dubash et al. 2018: 409). The principle has already been codified in the Framework Convention (United Nations 1992: 1,4,5) and, according to Shue (2014: 292), it can be seen as an expression of the “heart” of the negotiations; the question of a wise share of the burden. At this initial stage, there are several indications that the EU is particularly opposed to the CBDR-RC principle, even though it ultimately agreed to the mitigation obligations based on historical responsibility (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013: 1375). However, with the start of the negotiations of a post-Kyoto protocol it became clear that the EU had already started to interpret climate justice 11 The combination of adaptation and financial support or compensation can in certain cases be seen as a reference to loss and damage, even if the term is not explicitly mentioned. Today we can speak of three pillars of climate policy: Mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. However, loss and damage has come a long way to be seen as a mechanism in its own right and has long been closely associated with adaptation. Even if loss and damage today mainly means the compensation of irreversible damage (Ciplet 2015: 263), such as those caused by natural disasters or rising sea levels, the combination of financial aspects and adaptation can still be regarded as an indication of loss and damage. 12 For a detailed analysis of India-EU cooperation in the field of climate change policy, see the contributions by Jayaram and Jörgensen in this volume. 13 CBDR-RC is sometimes only abbreviated as CBDR in this article if respective capabilities are not added in the specific document. Respected capabilities have become an integral part of common but differentiated responsibility in the course of time.

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differently from other international players. The EU wanted a treaty applicable to all parties with binding reduction targets including for emerging powers such as India (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2018: 12). The total failure to adopt a postKyoto treaty in Copenhagen in 2009 is an expression of this extensive and highly crucial debate of the “who” and “how” of taking responsibility in an almost fair or just manner. The importance assigned by India to CBDR-RC is evident in the joint statement of the strategic partnership.14 Only a few weeks before the 15th COP the principle was mentioned prominently in the India-EU annual summit document (India/EU 2009: 1). The formation process of the toothless Copenhagen Accord is particularly interesting in this context. It goes back to the negotiations between the Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC)15 Group and the US (Qi 2011: 310). The EU—until then known as the climate change leader—(Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008: 36) was left out. It is evident that there was a fundamentally different understanding of shared responsibility and thus of climate justice at this time. The fact that the emerging countries still wanted the industrialised countries to hold on to the primary responsibility of mitigation is reflected in a joint statement of the EU’s talks with the emerging powers within the G8 framework in Heiligendamm in 2007 (German G8 Presidency 2007: 2). However, the EU wanted all hands on deck and therefore a binding agreement for all parties including binding mitigation targets (Böhringer 2008: 238). Taking a closer look at India’s climate policy in preparation for COP15, an ambivalent picture emerges. On the one hand, India adopted an ambitious National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) but, on the other hand, it adheres to the historical responsibility of the industrialised countries and underlines this with its commitment to CBDR-RC (Government of India 2008: 5). The new inner Indian engagement in the field of climate policy thus remains consistent with India’s previous role, as the highly important co-benefits of the NAPCC resulted from the balancing of the historical responsibility and the action taken due to international pressure (Dubash et al. 2018: 411; Torney 2020: 229–230).16 India’s Nationally Determined Contributions in the framework of the Paris Agreement can also be understood in this light. At the international level, after the Copenhagen conference, it can be seen that the groups,17 with their different interests, have come closer together (Dröge 2017: 14 In

addition, Jörgensen and Wagner (2017: 143) stress that the Strategic Partnership on Climate was formed largely in the light of India’s understanding of equity. 15 At this point it sounds quite paradoxical that the EU first initiated and financed a pilot project of the BASIC group (mainly at the level of NGOs of the four states) to help to develop a well-fitting climate change strategy of the BASIC group (Qi 2011: 301). 16 However, it cannot be denied that the new impetus, largely provided by India’s then Environment Minister, certainly caused political disquiet in India. A number of politicians expressed clear concerns that the industrialised countries were being too accommodating and thus India would abandon the line of historical responsibility (see several voices of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha debates in Prabhu 2012). 17 These are different groups with diverse interests: Emerging and developing countries that see the responsibility with the historical emitters and want to prevent or minimise their own goals;

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22). This is made clear, for example, in various documents in preparation for COP17 in Durban. In September 2011, the EU emphasised in a submission dedicated to the subject of “options and ways to increase the level of ambition of global mitigation actions”, that the climate targets must be more ambitious and in line with the CBDRRC (UNFCCC 2011a: 41). However, this is immediately put into perspective as the emphasis on industrialised countries’ lead is followed by the call for greater commitment by developing nations. Nevertheless, the EU, under the Polish presidency of the time, addressed this aspect. India mentioned CBDR-RC four times in another proposal in preparation of the Durban summit, especially in the context of equitable access to sustainable development (UNFCCC 2011b: 4,7). Although the differences remain, it is interesting that both actors respond to CBDR-RC in their own respective understanding. The pertinence of the temporal context should not be underestimated here. India continues to attach more importance to historical emissions than does the EU, which tends to argue in a more future-oriented way. However, less importance was attached to historical responsibility18 in 2011 at COP17 in Durban. Additionally, a bottom-up mechanism for jointly combating climate change had already been promoted in 2010 in Cancun (Gupta 2014: 131). Simultaneously, a new quality of debate developed on loss and damage19 and reached its preliminary culmination in Warsaw 2013 with the adoption of the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage (UNFCCC 2014: 6). The Paris Accord considers this new formula—although it must be emphasised that CBDR-RC is still anchored, albeit in a less detailed form.20 Additionally, loss and damage has its own paragraph. Within the EU-India Strategic Partnership, this initially had only limited impact, as the Paris Agreement fell into the loud silence of the cooperation. However, in the following years, CBDR-RC has been assigned a new meaning in the India-EU Strategic Partnership as well. In the 2016 and 2017 climate change-specific documents, CBDR-RC is anchored in the very beginning industrialised countries that recognise their own responsibilities but wish to involve all states; in addition, there are also groups such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which deem the overall goals to be insufficient while fighting for their own survival. 18 On the one hand, this can be traced back to the fact that the USA, with the well-known statement of a rather informal negotiation round “If equity’s in, we’re out!”, ensured that, CBDR-RC is not mentioned in the text of Durban in 2011 Pickering et al. (2012: 423). On the other hand, however, reference is certainly made to CBDR-RC by pointing out that the agreement is under the Convention (Pickering et al. 2012: 430). 19 See Gupta (2014: 133) for developments in the debate on the anchoring of loss and damage from 2008 until the start of negotiations on a post-Kyoto Protocol. 20 For India, however, the principle continues to have an important meaning. In the Annual Report 2015/2016 of the Indian Ministry of Environment, CBDR-RC is strongly emphasised in the framework of the agreement, for example by referring to Modi’s speech in Paris, in which he particularly stressed CBDR-RC (MoEFCC 2016: 183). The Indian Minister for the Environment Prakash Javadekar also stressed the Indian commitment to CBDR-RC in Paris and that “India is here to ensure that rich countries pay back their debt for overdraft that they have drawn on the carbon space” (Javadekar in Financial Express 2015). However, it is also striking that semantically, the report closely links CBDR-RC to India’s constructive stance and commitment, which is also in line with recent activities, for example in preparation for COP25 in 2019 (Press Information Bureau 2019).

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(India/EU 2016b: 1; 2017b: 1) and as a general “objective” (India/EU 2016b: 2). At least since then, CBDR-RC can thus be understood as a guiding principle, a more preambular norm that precedes all measures. This is a potentially ambiguous evolution: On the one hand, disconnecting CBDRRC from concrete measures could equal a watering down of the norm. On the other hand, it could amount to increased significance—an interpretation that seems more adequate in light of the newly established climate change regime characterised by its actor-specific self-defined targets binding all parties.

4.2.3

Form of Contestation

These findings will now be categorised using the heuristic developed in Sect. 2. What significance does it have for the strategic partnership that India and the EU attach different levels of importance to the norm of climate justice? In what mode is there a contestation of this norm? In the case of climate justice, the analysis of norm contestation must take place at a superordinate level since the mode of contestation is primarily the implicit one. Given that neither the EU nor India has often commented directly on the understanding of the norm, the analysis will be carried out primarily with the help of the statements and final documents from the strategic partnership and the global climate summits.

Modes of Contestation Both actors shy away from direct confrontation. Therefore it is not surprising, that the conflict is on the global level (cf. Sect. 2.2.1), namely the level of global climate negotiations. It becomes apparent in the analysis of the strategic partnership that the development of the naming and also the quality of the principle of CBDR-RC is closely linked to the events and results of the international climate negotiations. This shows that the EU and India have a very different understanding of climate justice. Even if this is not explicitly communicated, it is obvious that India considers historical responsibility to be an important aspect of the norm, whereas the EU, for example by focusing on reduction targets for all, mainly contemplates current and foreseeable emissions. This is materialised in the Copenhagen negotiations (cf. Sect. 4.2.2), when the EU neglected and disregarded the norm during the preparation of the negotiations and also at the summit. It can even be said that the different understandings of climate justice led to the negotiations being stalled and to a very weak compromise. Yet, this finding obviously depends on the perspective. From an Indian perspective the interpretation of the norm has been shared from a broad alliance. By contrast, the EU was unable to achieve its goal and in the course of the following years had to abandon its original plan of a top-down agreement. However, these findings changed after Copenhagen. The push in India’s climate actions and the simultaneous adherence to CBDR-RC demonstrate that the Indian interpretation of the norm has changed. This is also reflected in the joint documents

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with the EU: Initially, the norm was linked with other climate actions, but now it serves rather as a guiding principle within the bilateral agreements. Concerning other aspects of the climate justice norm, especially loss and damage, the changes are only marginal. Although loss and damage has experienced a strong appreciation, it is not mentioned in the EU-India Strategic Partnership. Despite occasional links between financial support and adaptation, it seems that India and the EU share a more common understanding of the climate justice norm with regards to this aspect. With time, India has insisted less on loss and damage as the crucial point within the norm of climate justice. The EU has also been slow to engage with mechanisms such as the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage.

Types of Contestation Does this finding constitute a justificatory contestation? This question can probably not be answered definitively. However, it is obvious that neither the EU nor India have distinguished themselves here as pioneers or advocates; in fact, the loss and damage part of the norm has been neglected and disregarded by both sides for some time. Overall, this case study yields a very mixed picture of contestation. While it was initially a situational contestation concerning the CBDR-RC aspect, today we can speak of an applicatory contestation. This is because the EU regularly questions whether CBDR-RC in its “classical” interpretation is an appropriate means to combat climate change, while India, on the one hand, is sticking to it, but, on the other hand, is itself becoming more active and thus changing the norm. In the period after the initial situational contestation and before the crucial phase of the Paris negotiations the contestation could certainly be characterised as neglect, but this seems to be no longer relevant with the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Here, the mechanism is bottom-up in the sense of a pledge and review process. All in all, however, this—albeit implicit—case study shows that the norm of climate justice is changing in constant struggle at various levels of the India–EU partnership and cooperation: A change that reflects a convergence of interests. But ultimately Roser and Seidel (2017: 100) are still right when they emphasise that CBDR-RC “is open to many different interpretations”. It seems that this is also the case when it comes to the norm of climate justice—at least in the case of the India-EU Strategic Partnership.

5 Conclusion Norms matter when it comes to the EU-India Strategic Partnership. But it is the discursive contestation of these norms in particular that is mainly responsible for the state of the partnership. Importantly, given the research results, contestation should

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not necessarily be considered a negative process. Admittedly, in the case of EU– India relations, there is lots of contestation and the meanings of norms are perceived very differently, which indeed has an utterly negative impact on the status quo of the relationship. However, contestation in general and within the EU-India Strategic Partnership in particular can also have a productive outcome. Such a productive contestation can disclose the different views and perceptions of the actors in different policy fields of the relationship and can launch institutionalisation processes. This can boost the actors’ intention to continue to work together and to gradually approach each other. Such a conceptualisation of contestation as a productive process can prevent a Eurocentric bias. In a normative sense, the struggle for different ideas and views is a good thing per se. The agency of India (and of the EU) is emphasised by the heuristic. Thus, this study has shown how the EU–India relationship is driven by the agency of both actors. The contestation of the norm of civil society involvement is mainly contested at the level of the Indian government and therefore at the summit level. The Indian government weakens the position of the Round Table—and thus the norm of civil society involvement—by questioning its mode of operation and later its raison d’être. Accordingly, this currently constitutes a justificatory contestation, whereas initially an applicatory contestation could be observed. In this process, different modes of contestation are used: to completely neglect the norm and proceed implicitly, NGOs that position themselves with environmental protection—and therefore in opposition to non-sustainable growth—are systematically curbed and hindered from their work. This raises the question of how the Indian and EU understandings of civil society involvement differ. This case study suggests that within the Indian sets of norms a hierarchisation is carried out: Civil society involvement is tolerated and supported if it does not call into question the economic development path and is not diametrically opposed to the interests of the government. The second case differs in the level of analysis. Here, the India-EU Strategic Partnership is not the sole focus. Reconstructing the norm of climate justice, the contestation also takes place at the global level of climate change negotiations. Analysing the discussion and especially the outcomes of the summits, a situational contestation can be attested, which—depending on the political and historical context—has over time developed into an applicatory contestation. Beyond these findings, this paper provides several starting points for further research. Questions arise both at the theoretical and the empirical level: On the theoretical front, it is important to continue working on the foundations of norm research and the further development of the heuristic. Two key points stand out here: (1) As described in Sect. 2, norm research up to now has seen applicatory contestation strengthening the validity of a norm. The research results, however, show a different picture as applicatory contestation has mainly been the pre-stage of justificatory contestation. It appears that a temporary application contestation causes the contestation to increase. This is accompanied by a questioning of the entire norm. It is questionable whether the conceptual division into strengthening (applicatory) vs. weakening (justificatory) is appropriate. Conceptual openness may be better. Further basic theoretical work seems necessary here. (2) As already described in the empirical

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study, contestation occurs not only in relation to one norm, but often in relation to an entire norm set. The heuristic should therefore be theoretically extended with regard to norm sets. How can the contestation of such a norm set be adequately investigated in an empirical way? The heuristic should answer this question in the long run. On the empirical level, there are numerous additional examples of norms that can be examined in order to paint as comprehensive a picture as possible of the norm contestations in the EU-India Strategic Partnership. Some of these norms shall only be briefly outlined here. First, as far as support for multilateralism is concerned, the general agreed upon norm of “supporting a rules-based international order” (India/EU 2017a: 1) also bears potential for contestation when analysed more deeply. In the case of India, a decline of the importance of the UN has been discernible as India’s international engagement has been increasingly channelled via exclusive multilateral “clubs” like BRICS or IBSA. While this does not constitute a departure from India’s general inclination to work through multilateral international organisations, it nevertheless represents a certain departure from the Nehruvian inclusive internationalism and thereby a normative shift. It remains to be seen if both partners are aware of potential different conceptions of what exactly a “rules-based international order” entails and whether they are contesting or will contest the other’s expectations in this regard. Second, as far as support for free market values is concerned, a closer look reveals that India and the EU’s respective conceptions of this norm are not fully congruent. To give just one example: The norm still has to be read in synopsis with the other elements of the normative foundation of India’s foreign policy, mainly the still discernible impact of the principles of South-South Cooperation. As noted earlier, India still regards itself as the champion of the developing world and as such tries at least to a certain extent to incorporate concerns of developing nations in its international trade policy—not least because the country itself still has a poor population “that exceeds that of all African countries combined” (Li and Zhou 2016: 151). In more concrete terms, international trade negotiations have seen Indian activism “on behalf” of the developing world when the Modi administration refused to sign the new WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2014 because of food security concerns. This example suggests that “free market values”, too, is rather a floating signifier with strong potential for contestation. Without any claim to comprehensiveness, the common feature of these issue areas is that “the devil is in the normative details”—and in the synopsis of the different aspects of the normative foundations of Indian and EU foreign policy. Each of these norms bears potential for contestation, and each of them warrants further research which could be guided by the theoretical model presented in this paper along the lines of the in-depth case studies. The “normative hurdles” (Grevi 2012: 16) of EU– India relations as mentioned in the introduction can be grasped by the contestation heuristic developed in this paper. The heuristic helps to point out the highly significant relevance of norm contestation processes: Norms matter in EU strategic partnerships in general—and even more so in the case of the India-EU Strategic Partnership.

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Timo Lowinger is a researcher and member of faculty at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He is also project coordinator of the project “Foundations of the Indo-European

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Strategic Partnership”. His research focuses on Critical Theory (recognition of the Global South) and IR; World Order; (Critical) Constructivist Norm Research; Emerging Powers, especially Indian and South African Foreign Policy. He conducted several research stays in India. Anja Zürn is a member of faculty and researcher at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Würzburg. In her research she focuses on global climate policy, emerging power India and gender in IR. Her Ph.D. project is dedicated to gender aspects in Indian and EU climate change discourses. Philipp Gieg is a postdoctoral researcher and member of faculty at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He has recently completed his Ph.D. on India’s Africa policy. In the last years, he conducted several research stays in India and on the African continent, for example as a visiting scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Manuel Pietzko is a member of faculty and researcher at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He is project coordinator of the Jean Monnet activities at the chair. His research interests include EU Foreign Policy, the EU as an international actor and the EU Global Strategy.

What Strategies Can Do for Strategic Partnerships: Lessons from the EU’s Strategy on India Henrik Chetan Aspengren and Axel Nordenstam

The world will be increasingly multipolar as distribution of power broadens and alliance discipline dilutes. Indian Minister of External Affairs, Dr S. Jaishankar. Washington, DC, October 1, 2019.

1 Introduction Relations between the EU and India have been characterised as being similar to ‘a loveless arranged marriage’ (Khandekar 2011). Yet, the partnership between the two actors entered a new phase when the EU published its strategy on India (EUIS) in November 2018 (European Union 2018a). The new strategy marked a shift in bilateral relations (Aspengren and Nordenstam 2019) and was viewed as a gamechanger (Mohan 2019), according to EU-India watchers. The strategy was published against the backdrop of changes in the international order spurred by China’s growing global footprint, the slow but steady rise of India, the EU’s search for a more active role in global affairs, and revised US policy priorities in Asia. The increased mutual interest in engagement has benefited from the fact that India has signalled a growing The presentation of empirics in this chapter builds on our working paper ‘The Partnership Shift: Analysing the European Union’s strategic engagements with India’, published by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, July, 2019. We are grateful for the comments we received at the workshop ‘In the Light of the EU Global Strategy: India and the European Union Joining Forces on the Global Scene?’, hosted by the University of Würzburg, 20–22 November, 2019. H. C. Aspengren (B) · A. Nordenstam Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), Stockholm, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] A. Nordenstam e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_4

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willingness to engage with EU institutions and member states as a bloc, alongside deepened cooperation with Europe’s major powers in separate bilateral relations; the strategic partnership between the EU and India facilitates bilateral relations. The EU is one of several actors managing bilateral ties through an increasing number of strategic partnerships and has, to date, nine active partnerships underpinned by strategies, joint action plans, or strategic agreements. The unilateral launch of the EU’s strategy on India signals the EU’s motives and intensions for taking the strategic partnership forward and announces its policy preferences for the relationship. India, for its part, is to a large extent managing the transition of its foreign policy from being non-aligned to being multi-aligned, by actively establishing and using strategic partnerships with a variety of actors (Hall 2016). In the light of a possibly altered world order, strategic partnerships have received increased attention as a flexible and pragmatic way to manage international relations (e.g. Michalski 2019). Some observers have questioned the importance attributed to strategic partnerships by stressing a lack of implementation of actions associated with the partnership (Keukeleire and Bruyninckx 2011). However, strategic partnerships are not solely agendas for action, but also forms for diplomatic interaction. We suggest that strategic partnerships should not simply be judged by their effectiveness in implemented collaborative outcomes, but equally importantly, as instruments for diplomatic communication to manage expectations, signal preferences, and if applicable to the nature of the partnership, identify shared strategic visions and concerns. Given this function as an underpinning for the partnership, what can already be assessed at this early stage, we argue, is the extent to which the EU’s strategic formulation clears space for a deepened partnership by conveying coordinated messaging and the identification of shared EU-Indian preferences. Against this backdrop, we ask, using the EUIS as our case: To what extent does the EUIS constitute a policy tool for enhanced engagement in the EU-India strategic partnership? We identify and evaluate two conditions for formulating strategy vis-à-vis a likeminded strategic partner. First, cohesion with the EU’s global foreign policy goals, and, second, convergence with the partner’s foreign policy preferences. Throughout the chapter, we contend that strategy-making can be a smart policy tool since a common understanding of the strategic objectives among the EU institutions and member states is assured. Responsive foreign policy could also strengthen a partner relationship since it enables the EU to adjust its positions and strategic formulations to changes of either the EU’s internal preferences, the Indian side, or global geopolitics. Moreover, since the strategic objectives are articulated, strategic formulation contributes to an additional degree of predictability vis-á-vis both the strategic partner and the international system. This chapter begins by examining the literature on strategic partnerships (e.g. Michalski 2019; Envall and Hall 2016; Wilkins 2012), followed by the EU’s strategic formulation and actions as part of its foreign policy (e.g. Sjöstedt 1977; Biscop 2016; Smith 2017). Through a mixed-method design of qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis of a unique set of expert interviews, it then presents empirical findings from case studies on how the EUIS relates to the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS)

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and India’s foreign policy preferences. Finally comes a concluding discussion about the role of EU strategies in geopolitics and the EUIS.

2 Engagement Through Strategic Partnerships Existing literature discussing strategic partnerships with and between Asian powers has emerged out of security studies. It has, to a large extent, focused on military cooperation between two or more actors. Within this literature, strategic partnerships have been understood as formats for enhanced alignment, stopping short of a formal alliance (Wilkins 2012; Envall and Hall 2016). Yet, the conceptualisation of strategic partnerships in the Asian context has over time expanded to also include economic and political cooperation and integration (Hall 2016; Khandekar and Gaens 2017). In this chapter, we subsequently side with the assessment that the role of strategic partnerships is growing, especially concerning contemporary Asia. However, the interaction between the actors within a strategic partnership has acquired various epithets. The concepts of alliance and alignments have gained much attention in the Asian context of security studies, the latter implying ‘an additional tool on the part of states to manage, understand and interpret the complex nature of international politics’ (Chidley 2014: 148). Yet, alignment and alliance are closely linked with militarycooperation, which is not the main determinant of the EU-India strategic partnership as we illustrate in this chapter with our case study on the EU’s India strategy. In contrast, convergence refers to a broader framework of cooperation reflecting an increasing strategic common ground on a number of issues ranging from climate change and cybersecurity to multilateralism and connectivity. The underlying rationale for an actor’s positioning in relation to the specific issue at hand, and the strategic vision guiding particular policies and activities related to the issue, could range from being merely complementary to fully harmonised. Over the last few decades China, Japan, and India have been notably prolific in forging strategic partnerships. As Khandekar and Gaens (2017) argue, Asian powers seem to value strategic partnerships for their flexibility—compared to alliance treaties—and their focus on cooperation on a diverse, but limited range of issues. Historically, strategic partnerships have been forged between actors who are likeminded. However, as Envall and Hall (2016) point out, strategic partnerships could also connect competitors and even rivals. To capture this duality with reference to East Asia they divide strategic partnerships into two categories: those for ‘mutual benefit’ and those for ‘mutual management’ (Envall and Hall 2016). The EU has also been active in forging strategic partnerships to deepen cooperation with emerging powers (Khandekar and Gaens 2017). In fact, it has nine active and one suspended strategic partnership (Michalski 2019: 18). Using Envall and Hall’s definition, they would mostly fall into the category of strategic partnerships for ‘mutual benefit’. Michalski (2019: 13) seems to share this view when arguing that strategic partnerships for the EU follow a logic of functionality and represent

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‘diplomatic complements to its association agreements than an important element of a strategically oriented foreign policy’. However, this observation is problematic for those strategic partnerships that are not underpinned by strategic partnership agreements (SPA) but rather anchored in joint action plans or strategies. Such strategies are internally negotiated documents, as is an SPA, but unlike an SPA, a strategy does not require agreement by the counterpart. Notably, an EU strategy not only signals shared intentions and aims but also represents the policy preferences among member states and EU institutions.

3 How the EU Conducts Strategic Foreign Policy Concepts such as ‘strategy’ and ‘strategic action’ capture the intent and agency grounded in long-term and planned commitments to achieve professed foreign policy goals. Strategising, therefore, implies an internal dimension to planning and pronunciation, through which ‘a plan to reach objectives’ is formed (Smith 2017: 504). Or, more specifically, strategising has been defined as ‘having the ability to scan the horizon, articulate coherent goals, and develop the means to achieve them’ (Tocci in Dempsey 2017). A strategy seeks to identify and define the ways in which professed foreign policy goals can be achieved. In order to achieve its professed goals, an actor must have the capacity to use policy instruments, such as diplomacy, negotiation, or military means, while engaging with both competitors and partners (Bretherton and Vogler 2005: 30). The first EU foreign policy strategy, the European Security Strategy (ESS), was adopted in 2003.1 The ESS articulated the EU’s ambition to evolve into a strategic actor in world politics (Mälksoo 2016). However, it contained neither priorities nor a plan for the implementation of its strategic objectives (Smith 2017: 508). The 2008 Implementation Report on the ESS therefore stressed that the EU should become ‘more strategic in our thinking and more effective and visible around the world’ (European Union 2008). The Implementation Report was published in the midst of the eurozone crisis and only limited attention was paid to further strategic reflections. The EU’s first global foreign policy strategy, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), was adopted in 2016. The starting point of the EUGS is that: ‘Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy is being questioned’ (European Union 2016: 13). The EUGS reveals how the EU wishes to position itself in the contemporary world (Biscop 2016; Mälksoo 2016). Because the EUGS clearly stresses security and defence cooperation, Karen Smith (2017: 514) suggested that the High Representative was considering transforming the EU into a ‘normal power’ in global politics rather than a ‘normative power’. The EUGS is more comprehensive than the ESS in terms of length and detail. This was as a result of several consultations held in European capitals attended by 1 On

the EU and Strategy, see e.g. Engelbrekt and Hallenberg (2008).

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think tanks, civil servants, and politicians, and of having been negotiated over a much longer period of time. The EUGS also describes concrete actions arising from the strategy’s priorities, something which the previous strategy had neglected to do (Tocci 2017: 86). Another difference is in the singling out of strategic partners. While the ESS labelled Japan, China, Canada, and India as strategic partners, the EUGS confirms Japan and India as strategic partners in Asia while denying China that special status (European Union 2016: 37–38).2 In the 2019 annual review of the implementation of the EUGS, China was described as a ‘systemic competitor’ (European Union 2019: 15), although the EU had reiterated its strategic partnership agreement with China a few months before (European Union 2019). A current debate about whether the new High Representative should revise the EUGS has seen many influential observers arguing for a review (e.g. Biscop 2019; Leonard and Bildt 2019; Puglierin 2019). Leonard and Bildt (2019) and Biscop (2019) seem to agree that a shortened version addressing contemporary challenges is a preferred outcome to improve the EU’s strategic efforts. Similarly, Puglierin (2019: 14) contends that a follow-up document to the EUGS would ensure a shared analysis of contemporary global affairs among the member states. However, the mere formulation of strategy does not translate automatically into actions. In fact, it is a recurring theme in the literature to mention strategic action rather than strategic formulation, as a measure of success of the EU’s foreign policy. To Jörgensen (1998: 90), success implies influence on the strategic environment, and ultimately, the degree of success depends on the extent of response by the external environment. Peters (2016: 28) suggests that success derives from the impact the EU has managed to have on another actor, which he labels as ‘impact effectiveness’. In EU scholarship, by being an external actor through its foreign policy, the capacity of the EU to act has been described as ‘actor behaviour’ by the pioneer of the EU’s ‘actorness’ scholarship Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977: 20). Following Sjöstedt, in light of its actorness, scholars have repeatedly called for more research on EU strategic and global actions (e.g. Smith 2008; Peters 2016; Rhinard and Sjöstedt 2019). Even though the adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy already drew academic interest in the EU’s formulation of strategy (e.g. Becher 2004; Biscop 2005; Biscop and Anderson 2008), the scholarship increased further following the EU’s adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016 (e.g. Biscop 2016; Mälksoo 2016; Smith 2017; Tocci 2017; Larik 2018). The literature on the EU as a strategic actor views the existence of strategic partnerships as vehicles for turning strategic formulation into strategic action. By upgrading a partnership to strategic, the EU is advancing its relationship with an external partner and granting it special status (Schade 2017). A strategic partnership agreement details the shared global interests between the EU and the partner and structures the interaction for realising those interests (Michalski and Pan 2017: 19).

2 For

an analysis of the EUGS’s aspects regarding partnerships see the contribution of Pietzko in this volume.

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Yet although, as Tocci (2019: 1) notes, ‘the Global Strategy was followed by a set of regional and thematic sub-strategies, implementation plans, compacts and action plans’, researchers have to a large extent neglected the tendency of the EU to adopt particular strategies for strategic partnerships in addition to the EUGS. This is despite the fact that such ‘sub-strategies’ signal and reflect how the EU views its global role applied regionally. Thus, regional and thematic sub-strategies reveal how strategic formulations are broken down into concrete actions and deliverables at the level of the diplomatic nitty–gritty. The EUIS provides a crucial example for such a subregional strategy formulation by the EU, although we also refer to it as a country-specific strategy since it does not address the political engagement with all of South Asia. It is an internally negotiated document, to which member states and EU institutions have contributed. Both the broadened scope of the EU–India relationship detailed in the EUIS, and the fact that the EU adopted an India-specific strategy, form the basis for our twofold definition of the EUIS: The EUIS is (a) a recognition that India is a regional power and a partner in a multipolar Asia, as well as (b) an offer by Europe to actively contribute to the modernisation of India. However, the strategy’s role in the implementation and actual carrying out of strategic actions is unclear. This ambiguity between strategic formulation (motivations and justifications for policy preferences) and strategic action (concrete action points) contained within the strategy itself makes the existence, function, and practical consequences of particular partnership strategies intriguing from a scholarly perspective. The ways in which written strategies emerge as key manifestations of the EU’s strategic intent in various fields of its foreign policy (for instance, country-specific or thematic strategies), create a further impetus for analysing the written strategies in the EU’s strategy-making and to what extent these foster the engagements with a partner.

4 A Quest to Further Engagement? The Case of the EU’s Strategy on India In the context of the scholarship on the EU’s efforts and formulations for conducting strategic foreign policy, two overlapping questions emerge, which can be used to structure an analysis of EUIS in order to assess its possible contribution to the EU-India partnership. We identify two core conditions for enhanced engagements between the two partners through the formulation and publication of a strategy. First, cohesion between strategies formulated by the EU: Matching content between the EUGS and a particular sub-strategy, in this case the EUIS, reflects the extent of ‘policy preference cohesion’, i.e. how actors within the EU ‘share preferences regarding the goals of external action in a particular area’ (Rhinard and Sjöstedt 2019: 12). Greater extent of preference cohesion on global and regional foreign policy preferences within the EU implies a stronger message regarding the EU’s position. The second condition is comprised of a convergence between the action

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points in the strategy and India’s professed foreign policy goals. Although there is to date no formal strategic partnership agreement between the EU and India, the possibility for enhanced engagement on the basis of the EUIS will be closely linked to how the actions put forward in the strategy converge with the policy priorities of the strategic partner, India. In other words, the degree of congruence influences the chances of implementing the strategy.

4.1 First Condition: Cohesion Between the EU’s Strategy on India and the EU’s Global Strategy The EUGS outlines five main priorities with various sub-themes for the EU’s external engagement and relations. To assess the EUIS in relation to the EUGS, this inquiry is conducted with qualitative content analysis. Although content analysis is often conducted in quantitative research, the qualitative approach facilitates the identification of themes within the text based on predefined categories (Bryman 2016: 563– 564). The policy implications of the EUGS priorities and respective sub-themes are used as indicators, i.e. predefined categories, and the EUIS is coded in accordance with these indicators. A challenge for the assessment of cohesion between strategies is to determine the degree of alignment; how much alignment is required for full alignment? The assessment of the EUIS vis-á-vis the EUGS builds on our own decision to label a match of 50% between the content of the EUIS and the indicators derived from the EUGS as ‘partial consistency’ whereas ‘consistency’ requires 80% matching content. As no other researchers have systematically compared the EUGS with other strategies, we had to set the standards ourselves instead of turning to previous research. This assessment of the EUIS vis-á-vis the five main priorities of the EUGS shows that the EUIS is mostly but not always aligned with the EU’s grand foreign policy plan. For the EU’s actor-specific strategies to be successful, it is a prerequisite that they must be aligned with the overall strategic vision of the EU. In addition to creating confusion for external actors trying to understand the EU’s position, a lack of internal consistency among the EU’s strategies will make it harder for the EU institutions and member states to set the direction when engaging India. Hence, for the sake of successful diplomatic messaging, acceptance by the EU member states and institutions, and implementation by stakeholders, the strategic documents of the EU, such as the EUIS, should align with the EUGS. As an aside, it should be noted that terminology in the EUGS such as ‘principled pragmatism’ and ‘strategic autonomy’, is also used in Indian foreign policy and the sections on security are similar to how India sees the world (Interview 6; Saran 2017: 2).

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EUGS Priority 1: The Security of the EU

This priority aims to safeguard and enhance the security of all Europeans. Counterterrorism efforts are a key area of EUGS Priority 1, as is also the case in the EUIS. The EUIS mentions terrorism as a ‘major threat’ for both sides and calls for strengthened technical cooperation to tackle radicalisation and terrorist funding. Second, Priority 1 addresses cybersecurity, which is also addressed in the EUIS. The EUIS labels cybersecurity ‘a joint priority’ and supports a multi-stakeholder internet governance model for a free, secure, and peaceful cyberspace. Third, the EUGS stresses energy security. This is addressed in the EUIS through support for a diversification of energy sources, including renewable energy, and support for the International Solar Alliance (ISA). Fourth, Priority 1 addresses relations between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These are not mentioned in the EUIS, but this is to be expected since EU–NATO relations are specifically addressed in other EU documents and India is not a member of NATO. In addition, the EUIS emphasises strengthening the EU’s brand in India as an operationalisation of strategic communications. Thus, there is consistency between the EUGS and the EUIS in the areas mentioned in relation to EUGS Priority 1.

4.1.2

EUGS Priority 2: State and Societal Resilience East and South of the EU

This priority treats enhancing the resilience of societies and states as a tool for fostering prosperity and democracy in the EU’s neighbourhood. The EU’s direct and extended southern and eastern neighbourhoods are shared with India in West Asia and the western Indian Ocean. This is reflected in how the EUIS correlates with EUGS Priority 2. First, the EUIS follows the EUGS with regard to supporting human rights in its neighbourhood. This is detailed in the EUIS in the proposed cooperation with India on human rights within the United Nations (UN) to jointly promote gender equality, women’s empowerment, and the inclusion of young people. Second, EUGS Priority 2 underlines promotion of the rule of law. With reference to this priority, the EUIS suggests working with India in third countries to consolidate democratic processes such as electoral and parliamentary institutions, as well as promoting the rule of law by jointly reaching out to various stakeholders, including civil society. Third, ‘a more effective migration policy’ that addresses the various causes of migration is discussed as part of EUGS Priority 2. The EUIS suggests closer cooperation with India on tackling irregular migration. Fourth, education and health also form part of EUGS Priority 2. The EUIS rather vaguely views health as an area of cooperation to be ‘expanded’. Less cryptic is the suggestion of enhanced cooperation on education, through greater participation by Indian students in Erasmus + programmes, advancing techniques for digital education, and developing ‘transferable skills and competences in degree programs’. Fifth, energy transition and the threat of climate change are also examined in EUGS Priority 2. By mentioning India’s vulnerability to climate change, linked to greater incidence of air and water pollution, drought,

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flooding, water scarcity, heatwaves, and waste management, the EUIS proposes that the EU and India step up their cooperation on environmental challenges in line with the EUGS. Thus, there is consistency between the EUGS and the EUIS in the areas mentioned in relation to EUGS Priority 2.

4.1.3

EUGS Priority 3: An Integrated Approach to Conflicts

This priority demonstrates a broad approach to conflicts and disputes. EUGS Priority 3 refers to multilevel and multilateral approaches to building peace and stability, and highlights engagement on peacebuilding and strengthening human security. The EUIS does not mention human security but proposes to ‘Join forces on post-conflict institution building and reconciliation processes in third countries’. Disputes and conflicts receive only limited coverage in the EUIS, which underlines the importance of the UN and expresses the EU’s wish to enhance cooperation in the G20 and to open up a channel of dialogue on multilateral issues that addresses both security and economic aspects. The only UN Security Council resolution mentioned in the EUGS is resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. India’s all-female peacekeeping unit, which served in Liberia in 2007–2016, is often considered best practice for women’s participation in peacekeeping (United Nations News Service 2016). However, the EUIS misses the opportunity to signal to India that the EU is supportive of the resolution. Thus, there is partial consistency between the EUGS and the EUIS in the areas mentioned in relation to EUGS Priority 3.

4.1.4

EUGS Priority 4: Cooperative Regional Orders

EUGS Priority 4 focuses on regional cooperation on a variety of issues. The EUGS mentions support for regional organisations and this is addressed by the EUIS, which highlights the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The EUIS also addresses the EUGS objective on regional stability in the Middle East by suggesting joint efforts to promote a twostate solution in the Middle East Peace Process. In addition, the EUGS proposes that the EU should scale up its activities in Asia in multiple policy areas, such as infrastructure and digital connectivity. The EUIS proposes further regional cooperation efforts in the areas of maritime transport, infrastructure, aviation, rail and road safety, the blue economy, privacy rights, and space. On connectivity, the EUIS notes that ‘connectivity should be sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based’ and ultimately also ‘environmentally, economically, socially, and fiscally sustainable…while respecting international standards’. This emphasis is aligned with both the EUGS and the EU’s Connectivity Strategy, which underlines transparency and competition as key components of connectivity (European Union 2018b). Under Priority 4, the EUGS emphasises as a priority the requirement to maintain a non-violent Arctic.

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Despite the fact that India has shown an interest in the Arctic and was awarded observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013, the Arctic is not addressed in the EUIS. Whereas the EUGS states that the EU wishes to sign free trade agreements with strategic partners, including India and Japan, and eventually to sign an agreement with ASEAN, the EUIS does not address the potential for a future free trade agreement. There is therefore only partial consistency between the EUGS and the EUIS in the areas mentioned in relation to EUGS Priority 4.

4.1.5

EUGS Priority 5: Global Governance for the Twenty-First Century

EUGS Priority 5 is wide-ranging and concerns multiple aspects of global affairs. First, it puts maintaining the rules-based global order characterised by multilateralism and the United Nations at its core as a key objective, which correlates well with the EUIS. Second, the EUGS reaffirms that reform of the UN and its Security Council is a political objective; the EUIS also reiterates the need for the UN, including the Security Council, to be reformed. Third, the EUGS mentions continuing support for UN peacekeepers. On this point, the EUIS proposes the development of joint projects on training for third parties and that each side should invite the other to its peacekeeping training. Fourth, the EUGS lists implementing Agenda 2030 under Priority 5. The EUIS expresses a wish to identify common priorities on Agenda 2030 with India and to cooperate on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Fifth, EUGS Priority 5 discusses implementing the Paris Agreement, which the EUIS also addresses by proposing knowledge-sharing on strategies to reduce emissions. Sixth, reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO) is mentioned under EUGS Priority 5. According to the EUIS, the EU wishes to modernise the rules-based multilateral trading system centred on the WTO together with India. Seventh, the EU prioritises the promotion of global norms such as non-proliferation and human rights under EUGS Priority 5. While the EUIS outlines a willingness to cooperate on non-proliferation, disarmament, export controls, and nuclear safety, however, no concrete action points are proposed. Eighth, the EUGS discusses strengthening support for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The EUIS confirms that the EU and India are ‘strong supporters’ of UNCLOS and links it with cooperation on maritime security and non-traditional security threats. Ninth, the EUGS stresses cooperation with global partners such as the UN, ASEAN, and the G20. The EUIS proposes action points on all three, and states that the EU wishes to improve coordination within the UN, exchange experience on regional structures with the ASEAN Regional Forum and seek to align EU-India positions within the G20. One EUGS policy that is not addressed in the EUIS, however, is enhancing support for the UN Human Rights Council, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice. Thus, there is consistency between the EUGS and the EUIS in areas mentioned in relation to EUGS Priority 5.

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4.2 Second Condition: Convergence Between the EU’s Strategy on India and India’s Foreign Policy Preferences The EUIS is not an agreement but an internal document endorsed by both the EU institutions and the EU member states. Hence, it is unclear to what extent India has accepted the EU’s action points. Nonetheless, as the EUIS clearly signals the EU’s intention to deepen cooperation with India, it is unlikely to include positions that are entirely contrary to India’s interests. In fact, the EUIS was positively received in India (e.g. PTI 2018a, b; Roy 2018) and India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) welcomed the strategy and acknowledged numerous possible areas of cooperation, as well as the fact that the EU is India’s largest trading partner (Ministry of External Affairs 2018). Even the MEA’s annual review of 2018–2019 positively reiterated the EUIS’s relevance for EU-India ties (Ministry of External Affairs 2019: 19, 177). These reactions exhibit India’s acknowledgement of the EU-India bilateral strategic partnership. One observer consulted suggested that the content ‘resonated quite well with the Indian side’ and that ‘it is clearly political and strategic’ (Interview 5). However, as indicated above, although the EUIS and its reception illustrate a shift in EU–India relations, the effects of this shift will become tangible only after the proposals have been implemented (Interview 10). As also mentioned above, the likelihood of successful implementation of the EUIS is related not only to the level of internal consistency between the EU’s strategic pronunciations, but also to the extent to which the EU’s stated action points align with India’s foreign policy priorities. The analysis of the external dimension of the EUIS, ergo how it converges with India’s foreign policy goals, is based on qualitative research. In December 2018, the authors distributed a survey to India experts affiliated to the Europe India Research and Dialogue Network (EIRDN), which is co-led by one of the authors. After receiving some responses, the authors decided to complement the dataset with semistructured interviews, conducted in March–April 2019. To systematically conduct these interviews, an interview guide was formulated based on the questions in the survey. While there was a risk that the interviewees had already accessed the questions, this approach was applied to establish a coherent dataset. The interviews were comprised of an examination of the three main sections within the EUIS and a few open questions about the implications for the EU-India Strategic Partnership postEUIS allowing additional elaboration. The interviewees were offered anonymity, agreed to be recorded, and received a draft text before publication. The interviews were conducted by phone or Skype, lasted an average of 40 minutes, and were transcribed by the authors afterwards. The analysis of the interviews is based on a discourse analysis of these transcripts. In two cases, the interviewees shared their perspectives in written communications with the authors. The EUIS consists of an introduction, a context description, and three main sections: (i) prosperity through sustainable modernisation; (ii) security and stability through the rules-based global order; and (iii) a more joined-up and streamlined approach to India. The three sections examine various policy areas and propose concrete action points on the EU-India partnership. Following the structure of the

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three main sections, the areas in which the EU’s and India’s interests converge, as well as those areas where Indian acceptance is less likely due to divergent EU and Indian priorities, are analysed below.3

4.2.1

Prosperity Through Sustainable Modernisation

Section 1 of the EUIS signals the EU’s readiness to actively engage with India’s ongoing transformation. Throughout India’s continuing modernisation, infrastructure, and especially the area of urban physical connectivity provide major opportunities for the EU (Interview 6). In addition to technical solutions to the establishment of smart cities, innovation in the energy sector, and climate change adaptation are also providing opportunities for cooperation (Interview 1; Interview 6; Interview 7). There is untapped potential in this regard in sustainable connectivity (Interview 7; Interview 10). This raises the possibility of deepened collaboration between India and the EU on economically and ecologically sustainable infrastructure not only in India but also across the Asia–Pacific (Interview 7). Sustainability has a purchase in India since the country has been a major player in shaping the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which create opportunities for closer cooperation on global challenges (Interview 8). Furthermore, the implementation of the Paris Agreement and support for the International Solar Alliance (ISA), a ‘flagship’ initiative of the Modi government, are key aspects in facilitating India’s energy transition (Interview 5; Interview 8). The French- and Indian-led ISA aims to promote the development and expansion of solar energy worldwide by gathering together 79 countries—at time of writing—that have signed the ISA Framework Agreement. Whereas in the beginning membership was exclusively open to countries with a high degree of potential in solar energy, it has since been expanded to all members of the United Nations. For instance, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have signed the ISA Framework Agreement and become members of the ISA. One expert stated that this global outreach means that the ISA has the potential to enhance India’s soft power in the world (Interview 9). At the same time, India expects European investment to accelerate its energy transition from coal to renewable energy sources (Interview 8). Given the long and successful cooperation on research and innovation, this is bound to be a key area in the years ahead (Interview 2). It could also be extended to include space cooperation, especially as satellites become increasingly important for India (Interview 5). Similarly, the Indian strategic community currently views technology, investment, and financing as the most important foreign contributions to India’s development (D. Jaishankar 2019). In this regard, it should be mentioned that while data protection is a much-discussed topic in India, the EU’s adoption of 3 Some

areas and policy proposals in the EUIS, such as 5G, automatisation, and collaboration between Europol and its Indian counterpart, were not explicitly mentioned by the experts consulted. These are therefore not elaborated on in this chapter, but the EU should not ignore them. In particular, the question of 5G in relation to the geopolitics of technical standards is becoming increasingly important for the EU, see e.g. Fägersten/Rühlig (2019).

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General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has caused confusion in India (Interview 5). There is therefore a need to clarify the GDPR for the corporate sector. However, deepened cooperation faces challenges in the sectors mentioned in section 1 of the EUIS. Although this section contains a European offer to actively engage, India’s history of protectionism could affect the level of engagement. The need for difficult conversations on free trade and access thresholds to particular sectors of the Indian market will inevitably resurface. Observers have noted that: ‘India seems to think that a free trade agreement with the EU is not in its national interest’ since India sees itself as having an economy ‘that still needs to protect itself from being overrun by countries and markets far more developed’ (Interview 8).4 Other observers were more optimistic and viewed a bilateral investment treaty based on ‘protection and promotion’ as an option for stimulating trade (Interview 9). The EU also runs the risk that India might turn to other partners, such as Japan, if it fails to deliver or is difficult to cooperate with (Interview 3). Therefore, the EU’s own bureaucracy and complex decision-making systems could cause confusion and must be considered a challenge too.

4.2.2

Security and Stability Through the Rules-Based Global Order

The EUIS makes clear that the EU views India as a strategic partner, not just a development or trade partner (Interview 5).5 Although both the EU and India promote the rules-based global order, there are some potential difficulties contained within this section of the EUIS. Multilateral coordination is said to be key to taking the strategic partnership further, but there is a lack of institutionalised dialogue on multilateral issues and India has traditionally often sided with Russia and China on global security, particularly on their reluctance to accept resolutions suggested to United Nations Security Council concerning interventions (see e.g. Singh Puri 2016). Even though both India and the EU are in favour of a reformed WTO, long-standing divergent views on market access might hamper any deepened cooperation on global trade reform. WTO reform requires additional dialogue since India wishes to maintain its developing country status, limit access for e-commerce, and focus on labour mobility (Interview 9). Nonetheless, a continuation of joint efforts to reform the WTO Appellate Body, which manages dispute settlement, could be a starting point for full-scale reform (Interview 9). Different provisions on human rights might also prove to be a sticking point for the partnership. First and foremost, cooperation on terrorism is a key issue, particularly since the attack in Pulwama on 14 February 2019, which killed more than 40 Indian security personnel. Joint actions could include countering terrorist financing and technical cooperation to counter violent extremism and radicalisation (Interview 1; Interview 4 For

an overview of the determinants and impediments of an EU-India Trade Agreement see the contribution of Köhler-Suzuki in this volume. 5 See Tripathi’s contribution in this volume for an analysis of the EU and India’s approach to development cooperation.

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5; Interview 7; Interview 8). There is considerable potential to enhance maritime security and joint maritime surveillance operations, particularly in the Indian Ocean with its increasing number of non-traditional and traditional security challenges (Interview 3; Interview 5; Interview 7; Interview 8). The EU could promote regional maritime security through cooperation with India’s new Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) as well as military-to-military cooperation (Interview 7). The EU could scale up its role as a regional maritime security provider to ensure that traditional trade routes are not disrupted. Another security component with great potential is cybersecurity, which could become a key area for the partnership as both the EU and India adapt to the challenges of the digital age (Interview 1; Interview 4; Interview 7; Interview 8). In addition to the existing EUIndia Cyber Dialogue constituting an important forum for deepening cooperation on cybersecurity, increased presence and interactions at cybersecurity conferences, such as the Cyber Security Summit arranged by the Munich Security Conference and the CyFy India Conference on Cyber Security and Internet Governance arranged by Observer Research Foundation, could be avenues in jointly shaping contemporary global norms of cyberspace. Cooperation on third countries could also be enhanced, especially on Afghanistan and the African nations (Interview 2; Interview 4; Interview 5; Interview 6). India has long provided democratic and electoral training for officials in third countries, so there is considerable potential in what the EUIS calls ‘consolidating democracy’ (Interview 5). One issue that is not mentioned in the EUIS is United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. India was the first country to deploy an all-women UN peacekeeping force, which implies that there may be untapped potential for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Interview 5).

4.2.3

A More Joined-Up and Streamlined Approach Towards India

The EUIS confirms the need for more flexible relations as well as increased knowledge of the EU among Indian diplomats and experts. The EU and India should ‘focus more on concrete outcomes from this cooperation to show both Europeans and Indians the benefits of a closer cooperation’ (Interview 6). A key opportunity exists for the EU member states to arrange public diplomacy events together with the EU Delegation in India and thereby minimise the competition for awareness between the EU Delegation and the member states in India. Similarly, India and EU member states sometimes prefer to act bilaterally instead of involving the EU Delegation (Interview 3). As EU member states also have bilateral relations with India, coordination among diplomats from the EU member states and the EU Delegation in New Delhi is essential in order to speak with one voice simultaneously. The existing knowledge gap across India regarding the EU presents a major challenge (Interview 5; Interview 6). Among experts and diplomats, exchanges and track 1.5 dialogues will be crucial tools for increasing understanding of the EU. The

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public and corporate sectors must also be taken into consideration. One risk is insufficient funding for exchanges and information-sharing projects, which would harm the prospects for EU-India ties (Interview 2). At the same time as the knowledge gap about the EU in India presents a challenge, there is also a need for more India-related research in Europe. The knowledge gap must, therefore, be addressed in Europe as well as in India.

5 Conclusion As the EU positions itself during testing times in world affairs, strategic partnerships have become increasingly important to the management of international relations. In this chapter, we have, with reference to the EU-India Strategic Partnership, explored to what extent formulating a partnership strategy can enable increased engagements between strategic partners. In the case of the EU’s strategy on India, the formula is comprised of both cohesion within the EU’s own strategy-making and convergence with India’s preferences. Similarly, an implemented strategy could speed and scale up the cooperation, impact the geopolitical environment, build a shared understanding with the partner, and influence the policy preferences of the object, as in this case, a strategic partner. Our analysis exhibits that the EUIS is formulated closely to India’s professed preferences, implying that the strategy does not seek to influence the partner’s fundamental policy preferences. Instead, the EUIS elucidates the importance of EU-India ties in the multipolar world order and recognises India as an important power in a multipolar Asia. However, a strategy could also seek a much higher degree of impact on the partner. Such underlying motives of the strategic formulation are, however, much more likely in the case of strategies directed towards competitive partners, which is not the case for EU–India relations. The first success of the EUIS was the positive responses from the Indian side, whereas future successes are dependent on the actual actions and the degree of implementation of the EUIS. Strategic actions and visible outcomes from the strategic formulation are key not only for talking strategically but also for acting strategically. The language in the EUIS also confirms the new momentum in EU–India relations. This new momentum coincides with the increased strategic capacity of the EU following on from the publication of the 2016 EUGS and the 2018 EUIS. This study shows that there is a high degree of consistency between the EUIS and the EUGS, which means that the content of the EUIS reflects the EU’s strategic and political objectives in the world. At the same time as India is stepping up its game in global affairs, the EU is willing to engage on multiple fronts ranging from active involvement in India’s modernisation efforts to joint action to enhance security and stability, and coordination in multilateral forums. As the chapter outlines, there are many areas in which Indian and EU interests converge. Even though some areas will require more effort and energy than others to understand each other’s policy preferences, the study illustrates the vast potential for the future of EU–Indian relations. At the same time, the EU must closely monitor that India is conforming to its democratic

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constitution and respecting human rights. The EU must also be realistic in its expectations, as India is an emerging global power that faces many domestic challenges and has multiple partners with which to engage. This benign, yet uncertain, status of contemporary EU–India relations demonstrates the urgency of strategic actions through an ambitious implementation of the EUIS. While this chapter highlights the mindset required for strategic actions for the EU’s engagements with India, future research could apply a comparative design on country-specific strategies, such as the EUIS and EU’s China Strategy, or on thematic strategies, such as the EU’s Connectivity Strategy. In addition, future research could address how existing policy tools held by the EU influence its strategic global actor behaviour. Some of these policy tools are inevitably more effective than others, and so, future research could also evaluate the EU’s strategic formulations in relation to its strategic action with, and in, India. Acknowledgements The authors are grateful for the insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts by Björn Jerdén and August Danielsson. They would also like to thank the consulted experts from the Europe India Research and Dialogue Network (EIRDN) for sharing their expertise. The authors consulted India experts affiliated with the Centre for European Policy Studies, Corvinus University of Budapest, Chatham House, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Friends of Europe, German Marshall Fund, Institut français des relations internationales, Observer Research Foundation, Polish Institute of International Affairs, and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

References Aspengren, Henrik Chetan, and Axel Nordenstam. 2019. The Partnership Shift: Analysing the European Union’s strategic partnership with India. UI Paper No. 9. Swedish Institute of International Affairs. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2019/uipaper-no.-9-2019.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. Becher, Klaus. 2004. Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World after the 2003 European Security Strategy. European Security 13 (4): 345–359. https://doi.org/10.1080/096628 30490500008. Biscop, Sven. 2005. The European Security Strategy. A Global agenda for positive power. London: Routledge. Biscop, Sven. 2016. The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European characteristics. Egmont Security Policy Brief, No. 75. Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations. https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf?type=pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. Biscop, Sven. 2019. The EU Global Strategy 2020. Egmont Security Policy Brief, No. 108. Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations. https://aei.pitt.edu/97384/1/SPB108.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. Biscop, Sven, and Jan Joel Andersson. 2008. The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe. London: Routledge. Bretherton, Charlotte, and John Vogler. 2005. The European Union as a Global Actor. New York: Routledge. Bryman, Alan. 2016. Social research methods, 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chidley, Colleen. 2014. Towards a Framework of Alignment in International Relations. Politikon 41: 141–157. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2014.885682.

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Leonard, Mark, and Carl Bildt. 2019. From Plaything to player: How Europe can stand up for itself in the next five years. Policy Brief, July 2019. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/how_europe_can_stand_up_for_itself_in_the_ next_five_years_eu_foreign_policy. Accessed 17 September 2020. Mälksoo, Maria. 2016. From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: External policy, internal purpose. Contemporary Security Policy 37 (3): 374–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.123 8245. Michalski, Anna, and Zhongqi Pan. 2017. Unlikely partners? China, the European Union and the Forging of a Strategic Partnership. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Michalski, Anna. 2019. Diplomacy in a changing World order: The role of Strategic Partnerships. UI Paper No. 10. Swedish Institute of International Affairs. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.seeng/publications/ui-publications/2019/ui-paper-no.-10-2019.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. Ministry of External Affairs. 2018. Press release, India welcomes Joint Communication by the European Commission on India-EU partnership. Ministry of External Affairs. https://www. mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/30643/India_welcomes_Joint_Communication_by_the_Eur opean_Commission_on_IndiaEU_partnership__A_Partnership_for_Sustainable_Modernisa tion_and_Rulesbased_Globa. Accessed 2 March 2020. Ministry of External Affairs. 2019. Annual Report 2018–19. Ministry of External Affairs. https:// www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/31719_MEA_AR18_19.pdf?fbclid=IwAR33VPR 6gyDJGQLKvSDn-uROnD3ZcXXVWS-2aW8pUNbCqldX2gYub6CHS88. Accessed 2 March 2020. Mohan, Garima. 2019. Prospects for the New EU Strategy on India: Game changer or business as usual? Ifri Asie.Visions 108. French Institute of International Relations. https://www.ifri.org/ sites/default/files/atoms/files/mohan_prospect_new_ue_2019.pdf. Accessed 2 March 2020. Peters, Ingo. 2016. The European Union’s foreign policy ‘actorness and power’: Foundations and challenges for a comparative research design. London and New York: Routledge. PTI. 2018a. EU plans to adopt ’new strategy’ for relations with India: Envoy. Times of India, September 14. PTI. 2018b. European Union unveils strategy paper for ramping up ties with India. Economic Times, November 21. Puglierin, Jana. 2019. Unleashing the Potential of the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Priorities for the EU’s New Foreign Policy Agenda up to 2024. DGAP Analysis No. 5. German Council on Foreign Relations. https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/dgap_anal ysis_nr1-nov2019_web_0.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. Rhinard, Mark, and Gunnar Sjöstedt. 2019. The EU as a Global Actor: A new conceptualisation four decades after ’actorness’. UI Paper No. 6. Swedish Institute of International Affairs. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2019/uipaper-no.-6-2019.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. Roy, Shubhajit. 2018. EU strategy paper to strengthen ties with India. Indian Express, November 22. Saran, Shyam. 2017. How India sees the World. New Delhi: Juggernaut Books. Schade, Daniel. 2017. Of insiders and outsiders: Assessing EU strategic partnerships in their regional context. International Politics 56 (3): 375–394. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0132-y. Sjöstedt, Gunnar. 1977. The external role of the European Community. Westmead: Saxon House. Smith, Karen E. 2008. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press. Smith, Karen E. 2017. A European Union global strategy for a changing world? International Politics 54 (4): 503–518. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0041-0. Tocci, Nathalie. 2017. Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Tocci, Nathalie. 2019. Europe’s “Just Do It” Moment. Istituto Affari Internationali, IAI Commentaries 19:57. Istituto Affari Internazionali. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom1957.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020.

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United Nations News Service. 2016. Hailed as ’role models’, all-female Indian police unite departs UN mission in Liberia. UN News Service Section, February12. https://www.un.org/africaren ewal/news/hailed-%E2%80%98role-models%E2%80%99-all-female-indian-police-unit-dep arts-un-mission-liberia. Accessed 17 September 2020, 2016. Wilkins, Thomas S. 2012. ‘Alignment’, not ‘alliance’—The shifting paradigm of international security cooperation: Toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment. Review of International Studies 38 (1): 53–76. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000209.

Interviews Interview 1. Survey response by India-expert at Institut français des relations internationales. Interview 2. Survey response by India-expert at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Interview 3. Survey response by India-expert at Chatham House. Interview 4. Survey response by India-expert at Corvinus University of Budapest. Interview 5. Telephone interview with India-expert at German Marshall Fund, 45 minutes, March 8, 2019. Interview 6. Telephone interview with India-expert at Polish Institute of International Affairs, 55 minutes, March 8, 2019. Interview 7. Written communications with India-experts at Finnish Institute of International Affairs, March 17, 2019. Interview 8. Skype interview with India-expert at Observer Research Foundation, 55 minutes, March 20, 2019. Interview 9. Telephone interview with India-expert at Friends of Europe, 15 minutes, April 10, 2019. Interview 10. Written communications with India-expert at Centre for European Policy Studies, April 10, 2019.

Dr. Henrik Chetan Aspengren is a Research Fellow and coordinator of the South Asia Initiative at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). He is also co-convener of the EIRDN. Axel Nordenstam is an Analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). Previously, he has served as President for the Swedish Association of International Affairs and worked as an intern at the Swedish Embassy in New Delhi.

Putting the Partnership DNA to the Test: Partnerships in the EU Global Strategy and the Consequences for India Manuel Pietzko

1 Introduction India and the European Union (EU) are the two largest democracies in the world. For this reason, great hopes are placed on these actors, especially with regard to their potential for cooperation in international relations. However, these expectations are repeatedly disappointed, perhaps precisely because the EU and India, for all their similarities, show great differences in their interpretations of international norms and in their mutual perception.1 The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe” is in this regard no exception. It has been the flagship of the European Union’s foreign policy since 2016 and defines the goals the EU is pursuing in its external relations. Furthermore, the strategy shows what the EU wants to achieve and represent internationally, and, above all, with whom it wants to cooperate. This is one of the reasons that key partners were eagerly awaiting the document and also why some were severely disappointed. India expected to play a bigger role in the strategy, but is mentioned only twice in the entire text, always in connection with concluding free trade agreements. Thirteen years after the publication of the first European Security Strategy (ESS) “A Secure Europe in a Better World” in 2003, the EUGS was supposed to prepare the European Union for its enhanced responsibilities in a changing world order. Therefore, the EU adapted its self-image. While in the ESS, the EU still viewed its own capacities of influence very positively, it is much more reserved in the EUGS. This can be seen in the new paradigm of principled pragmatism: It is intended to 1 Regarding the mutual perceptions of India and the European Union see the contribution of Winand in this volume. For two examples on how different interpretations of international norms affect EU–India relations see the contribution of Lowinger et al. in this volume.

M. Pietzko (B) University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_5

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show that the European Union does not only have the well-being of the international community in mind, but also pursues its own goals. At the same time, the EU’s view on the world has changed, even deteriorated. Whereas the introduction of the ESS stated: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (European Union 2003: 3) the EUGS has a different starting point when it says “[t]he purpose, even the existence, of our Union is being questioned” (European Union 2016: 3). While the ESS had been in force for more than a decade, the same does not necessarily apply to the EU Global Strategy. Although it is still relatively young, there are already demands for a new version (Biscop 2019). This is due to the changes within the EU after Brexit as well as to major shifts in international politics. The aim of this chapter is to take a closer look at the perceptions expressed in the EU Global Strategy. The document will be examined with particular attention to those sections dealing with the European Union’s partnerships. This will be undertaken with reference to well-established discourses on the European Union as an international actor. Therefore, the chapter will answer the question of which of these discourses are taken up by the EU in its Global Strategy and which approach best reflects the EU’s perceptions. In order to do so, the chapter is structured as follows: In Sect. 2, the concept of perceptions will be introduced and then linked with the foreign policy strategies of the European Union. For the purposes of this chapter, perceptions represent an international actor’s subjective interpretation of the actions and standpoints of one or more other international actors. It is further argued that strategies include the self-perception of the EU in international relations as well as its perception of its environment. Furthermore, foreign policy strategies are assumed to be discursively produced, but are at the same time also part of the discourse about the EU as an international actor. The following section introduces the EU Foreign Policy Mosaic of Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger (2015) that distinguishes four dimensions of EU foreign policy; one dimension of these four refers to agreements and partnerships, in what is the guiding category of this chapter. Section 3 presents the five main discourses on the EU as an international actor, employed to embed the identified perceptions into these discourses. These are Civilian-, Military-, Normative-, Superpower-, and Empire Europe. Section 4 is dedicated to the analysis of partnerships within the EU Global Strategy. First, the strategy’s structure is examined in order to work out its general intention. Second, the analysis focuses on those aspects of the EUGS dealing with the partnerships of the European Union. For this purpose, the identified category of agreements and partnerships will be scrutinised. Finally, these findings will be utilised to assess their significance with regard to EU–India relations. This chapter is anchored in the reflexive-constructivist school of thought. The international system and foreign policy are regarded as socially constructed. For this reason, political interactions can no longer be thought of without socially mediated ideas (Harnisch 2010), norms (Björkdahl 2002), identities, strategic consequences (Weller 2000), and practices (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Constructivist approaches have also made an essential contribution to European Studies (Christiansen et al. 2001; Jørgensen 1999; Wiener 2008). Hence, material and ideational factors are

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used on an equal footing for the analysis. This is also true for the examination of perceptions described in the EU’s foreign policy strategies, in that they are generated not only due to the material means of actors, but also by various perceived characteristics and factors.

2 Perceptions Are at the Centre of the EU’s Foreign Policy Strategies The foreign policy strategies of the European Union are the prime object of this paper. As with the research field of the European Union’s foreign policy in general, foreign policy strategies in particular are also the focus of research. The first European Security Strategy in particular aroused research interest. The striking disagreement of member states over participation in the Iraq War was such a wake-up call for the heads of state or government that they agreed for the first time to strategise their Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (Duke 2004; Mahncke 2006; Toje 2005). Research shows a concise record of the EU’s understanding of its role as an international actor in the Strategy of 2003 (Becher 2004). The greatest benefit of the ESS was making the EU aware of its global significance and thus enabling it to take on more responsibility (Bendiek 2006). The discourses on the EU being a civilian, normative and peace power or a collective hegemon have been consistently recorded. The same applies to its role in promoting effective multilateralism, democracy and human rights (Laatikainen 2013; Laïdi 2008). The studies on the EU Global Strategy of 2016 first concentrated on its content and the possible consequences for European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. They were subsequently supplemented by more in-depth analyses. The EUGS was supposed to make necessary adjustments due to the changed starting position of the EU as an international actor. It is generally stated that the strategy is no longer exclusively oriented towards security, but takes up most of the EU’s foreign policy fields. At the same time, the EU distances itself from normative ideas and will be characterised rather by pragmatism and realism or, in other words, a more reserved self-image (Mälksoo 2016; Missiroli et al. 2016). What is still missing, is research on the underlying statements of the EUGS. These refer to the perceptions that the European Union is expressing in the Global Strategy. Therefore, the next section is devoted to the connection between the European Union’s foreign policy strategies and the perceptions expressed via these strategies. To this end, first the concept of perceptions is introduced; this is followed by the connection of the strategies with the EU’s perceptions as an international actor, and the establishment of the discursive character of the EU’s foreign policy strategies. In the subsequent section, different approaches on EU foreign policy will be presented and checked as to whether they are fit to be used for analysing the EU’s perceptions. This will lead to the EU Foreign Policy Mosaic of Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger (2015) as the approach that will guide the research in the following sections.

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2.1 The EU’s Foreign Policy Strategies as an Expression of Perceptions Perceptions can be described as a “result of the subjective […] cognition of the observer rather than the objective reflection of the object that is being observed” (Shiming 2010: 269), a definition also used by Chaban and Holland (2014). Applied to international actors they add that perceptions are “complex constellations of meaning shaped by a number of interacting factors, among those the perceived threat/or opportunity represented by that actor, and the perceived culture of that actor”. Furthermore, they are “shaped by the perceived developments within an international actor and outside it” (Chaban and Holland 2014: 8). Therefore, self-perception addresses the question of how an international actor perceives itself as part of the international system and how it thinks it needs to react to changes in its environment. Building upon this, the chapter argues that the EU’s foreign policy strategies are more than mere status descriptions and action plans. More specifically, it assumes the European Union to express its self -perception and the perceptions of its environment or the international system inter alia via official documents (Tristl and Bachmann 2015). Foreign policy strategies are essential parts of these documents and reflect these perceptions accordingly (Chaban and Elgström 2018: 28–29). Thus, the analysis of its foreign policy strategies can reconstruct the EU’s perceptions of itself or of its environment and examine them in terms of continuity and change. Another factor that must be considered is the construction of perceptions. Since international actors like the European Union are generally not uniform entities, their perceptions are assumed to be created discursively. This means that the perceptions expressed in the EU Global Strategy, on the one hand, contribute to the discourse on the EU as an international actor and, on the other hand, are themselves the result of such a discourse. In order to be able to carry out an examination of the EU’s perceptions, it is first necessary to draw on approaches regarding the analysis of EU foreign policy. Some of these approaches are introduced in the following section in order to evaluate whether they are suitable for analysing the perceptions presented in the EUGS.

2.2 Conceptualising EU Foreign Policy The European Union’s foreign policy has been the subject of intensive research for some time. The focus is on the reconstruction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as on numerous efforts to grasp the nature of EU foreign policy (Cameron 2012; Hill et al. 2017; Schubert and Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2000). Most realist scholars deny that the EU has a foreign policy at all, because the member states would never give up their own sovereignty in favour of sovereignty at the EU level (Allen 1998); but, some do recognise that the European Union does have

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a foreign policy. It is even acknowledged that the European Union’s foreign policy is not limited to CFSP and CSDP, but also includes, for example, trade policy. However, the starting point for realistic considerations remains power as a guiding principle (Reichwein 2012: 34–35). In the view presented in this paper this is not evident in every area of EU foreign policy. Institutionalist literature distinguishes European foreign policy from external relations. The former is exclusively reserved for the policy fields of Political Cooperation, CFSP and CSDP, while the latter includes especially trade and other policy fields that have been developing since the Treaties of Rome (Laffan 1992). The strict distinction of both realms of EU foreign policy makes it impractical to apply institutionalist approaches in this case. Brian White (2001) applies classical features of foreign policy analysis to the European Union. He combines the different levels of EU foreign policy into an analytical framework and differentiates three types of EU foreign policy: Community, Union and national foreign policy. White tested these regarding actors and policy-making, capabilities and instruments, and policy context. His approach, however, poses two problems for the investigation carried out here: First, White explicitly includes national foreign policy, which is secondary in this paper due to the focus on the EU’s foreign policy strategies. Second, he retains the linguistic distinction of the institutional scholars, between foreign policy and external relations (White 2001: 47), which is not compatible with the approach chosen here. Keukeleire and Delreux take another step and describe a multifaceted EU foreign policy. This means that the Treaties distinguish between CFSP and CSDP, external action (trade policy, development cooperation, economic and financial cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, sanctions, and international agreements), and the external dimension of internal policy fields. These components define multiple foreign policy methods and different levels of foreign policy (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 11–18). From this starting point, the authors develop their framework of Structural Foreign Policy, defining it as “a foreign policy which, conducted over the longterm, aims at sustainably influencing or shaping political, legal, economic, social, security or other structures in a given space” (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 28). As this approach is aimed at analysing the impact of EU Foreign Policy, it is not suitable for this paper. Nevertheless, an important point was raised by the two authors: EU foreign policy can only be adequately captured in its multidimensionality (Müller-BrandeckBocquet 2002, 2006). The approach takes into account the continuing dynamics of interdependence between the different policy areas of the EU (Jopp and Schlotter 2008: 393) and uses them for the examination of EU foreign policy. The mosaic of EU foreign policy developed by Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger (2015: 9) identifies four genuine dimensions, all based on the EU’s normative foundation. The Intergovernmental Dimension includes CFSP and CSDP while the Community Dimension contains trade policy, development cooperation, economic and financial cooperation with third countries, and humanitarian aid. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger also include a Sui Generis Dimension made up of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and enlargement policy as well as the External Dimension of Internal Policies. A fifth Mixed Dimension is added in this chapter for those policy

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fields rooted in various dimensions, like restrictive measures (intergovernmental and community dimension) or agreements and partnerships (all four dimensions). The EU Global Strategy and the subsequent foreign policy strategies reflect not only the Intergovernmental Dimension, but the entire range of EU foreign policy. Accordingly, the EU Foreign Policy Mosaic forms another foundation of this paper. To be able to use the open framework of Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet/Rüger for the analysis of the discourses on the EU as an international actor, the individual dimensions are combined with the European Union’s perceptions as expressed in its foreign policy strategies. With regard to that, two further distinctions are made to separate the different addressees from each other. The resulting subcategories have their origin in the statements of the EU Global Strategy itself—while the subcategories of the foreign policy dimensions were derived from scientific literature. First of all, the self-perceptions (EU) and the foreign perceptions (World) of the European Union are two subcategories. This means that the category EU reflects the aspects of the EUGS related to the European Union’s perceptions of itself. World, on the other hand, contains those perceptions of the European Union related to its environment and other actors in international relations, like third countries, regional organisations or non-state actors. These are explicitly not perceptions external actors hold towards the EU, but always the view of the European Union. Another subcategory of perceptions is time-related. A distinction is made between current perceptions and perceptions of the future or future action, in which the EU looks to forthcoming developments. An optional distinction can be used in the dimensions category. Instead of looking at the five foreign policy dimensions as a whole, they can be divided into their specific policy areas. This approach is chosen in the present chapter when only the statements on agreements and partnerships are examined within the Mixed Dimension. Here can be found all references in the EU Global Strategy regarding the EU’s dealings with its partners and its plans for future cooperation. Therefore, the paper focuses on the European Union’s sui generis nature in international relations. The multifaceted character of EU foreign policy makes such a design necessary, and therefore, the European Union cannot be sufficiently examined with instruments developed for nation states and vice versa. Instead, with the present concept it is possible to reconstruct the EU foreign policy strategies and to compare them both over time and in terms of their consistency between comprehensive and subsequent strategies. The separation into the five dimensions and four perception categories allows a clear division and attribution of the EUGS’ statements. This allows for an analysis of the aspects of the EUGS with regard to their content, which is the first step of the investigation. Based on the results, conclusions are then to be drawn about the discourses on the EU as an international actor. The five main discourses, which have been most commonly used for evaluation, are presented in the following section. This allows a judgement to take place on the role the EU plays internationally regarding its partnerships.

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3 Discourses on the EU as an International Actor An important part of the research into EU foreign policy has dealt with discourses on its international actorness. Since 1972, five main discourses have emerged perceiving the EC/EU as Civilian-, Military-, Normative-, Superpower- as well as Empire Europe. It was these discourses that attracted the most interest from European Studies scholars. This is the reason why they are distinguished from the 14 less popular secondary discourses2 that developed from the main discourses. The rich literature on the identified discourses reflects the most diverse conceptions of EU foreign policy. The five main discourses are briefly introduced here, before they are used in Sect. 4 to feed back the perceptions expressed in the EUGS on the discourse on the EU as an international actor.

3.1 Civilian, Military and Superpower Europe The earliest and one of the most influential main discourses is Civilian Power Europe. Duchêne (1972) was the first to shape this picture with the well-known statement of the European Community (EC) being “long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” (Duchêne 1973: 20). The EC’s aim must be to show how much influence a state coalition can exert using mainly civilian power. This had to be the case, since the EC could only be successful if it reflected on its internal strengths. “These are primarily: civilian ends and means, and a built-in sense of collective action, which […] express […] social values of equality, justice and tolerance” (Duchêne 1973: 20). Hanns Maull’s concept developed civilian power significantly further in the context of Japan and Germany. He defines civilian power as an entity concentrating its foreign policy actions on non-military and economic instruments, while having military power as a further means. In addition, there is the will to create supranational institutions to better solve critical issues of international relations (Maull 1990). This positive view of the common market was centrally challenged by Galtung (1973), who simultaneously introduced the discourse on Superpower Europe. He describes the European Community as being a superpower in the making, aiming to restore both a Eurocentric world and a unicentric Europe. Therefore, the common market was part of the power struggle for a world power Europe, which acts in a neocolonial manner in its relations with African states. The goal was to continue controlling these countries. Galtung’s concept was subsequently received far less often than that of Military Power Europe, coined by Hedley Bull. In his view, the EC was only able to use its civilian instruments profitably because “the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was 2 The

14 concepts are: trade, market, realist, global, liberal, ethical, idiot, peace, transformative, integrative, pragmatic and ideal power as well as the capabilities–expectations gap. These will not be part of this paper, because the main discourses offer a better explanation of the EU’s perceptions on its agreements and partnerships.

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conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control” (Bull 1982: 151). Therefore, in Bull’s view, the European Community must also build up substantial military resources to secure its influence in the long term. The progressive European integration since the Single European Act, caused the concept of civilian power to be challenged time and again. With the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy two leading views emerged. The predominant view was that the military capabilities of the new policy fields complement or defend the concept of civilian power. The EU could thus change from a civilian power “by default” to one “by design” (Stavridis 2001). However, a competing view has repeatedly argued that the EU can only be a civilian power if it neither has nor develops military capabilities (Orbie 2006). Smith (2005), for example, argues that calling the European Union a civilian power overstretches the concept and denies the critical aspects of EU foreign policy. But the rejection of the Civilian Power Europe approach does not mean that the European Union is behaving in the international arena as a military power. Although it might have the necessary instruments to become militarily active, in its foreign policy, it mostly makes use only of civilian power (Blauberger 2005). One reason for this is, in addition to the appropriate instruments, the need for a common strategy implemented by the member states (Ramadani 2015). While the reception of military power Europe was fully supported by only a few authors and more attention was instead paid to the EU’s lack of opportunities, the concept of Superpower Europe was revived in the early 2000s, albeit with a much more positive connotation than in the 1970s. Andrew Moravcsik (2002) was one of the most influential authors in this respect, describing the European Union first as a quiet—and later as a second superpower. In doing so, he assumed the EU was just as effective in its foreign policy as the United States of America (USA), only by other means. Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy, trade policy, development aid, peacekeeping, support for multilateral institutions and international law, as well as European values combined with its new military capabilities all lead to the EU having similar opportunities as the USA for exerting influence (Moravcsik 2010). The mainly US-American authors focused on the strengths of the EU’s foreign policy approach, but there are also more critical voices who see the EU at most as a potential superpower. This is due to the fact that the European Union rarely succeeds in transforming its potential into real global influence (Meunier and Vachudova 2018).

3.2 Normative Power and Empire Europe Certainly, the most widely received discourse of the EU as an international actor is Normative Power Europe (NPE) (Manners 2002). In international relations the European Union is a promoter of international standards. However, these have not found expression in debates on Civilian and Military Power Europe so far. Therefore, the ideological influence in international relations via normative power must be

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brought into the spotlight (Manners 2002: 238). This means the study of EU foreign policy should not be concerned with what the EU does or says, but with what the EU is, namely a “changer of norms” (Manners 2002: 252). Three aspects characterise the EU’s presumed normative difference from nation states: First, the historical context after the Second World War; second, the multilevel system of the European Union and, third, the political-legal constitution of the EU. This leads to a commitment to universal norms and principles, which is at the heart of the EU’s actions (Manners 2002: 240–241). Manners supports this with five core and four minor norms, extracted from EU-internal developments, for example the Treaties and the case law of the European Court of Justice. The five core norms are the centrality of peace, the idea of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. These form the undisputed normative basis of EU foreign policy, while the four minor norms of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance are more controversial (Manners 2002: 242–243). However, it is not only the normative basis in general that constitutes a normative power, but in particular the ability to shape concepts of normal. In the case of the European Union, this is done by means of six factors: contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filter (Manners 2002: 244–245). In the process of the discourse on Normative Power Europe, Manners was quite critical of the universal applicability of the concept and open to further developments.3 In his first essay he already opposed the assumption that military capabilities are necessary to enforce normative power (Manners 2002: 241–242). He later expressed concern about the growing militarisation of the European Union since 2003. Although the introduction of military capabilities does not necessarily speak against a normative power, how they are implemented is important (Manners 2006a: 194). It is entirely plausible that the EU can engage […] under a UN mandate as part of a wider peace-building solution. However, […] the military tasks should only be attempted in a critically reflexive context, on a clear, normative basis. Without such fundamental reflection on militarization it is likely that […] the normative power of the EU will be lost. (Manners 2006a: 195)

Nevertheless, a development of the EU away from a normative power towards a hard power is unlikely, according to Laïdi (2009: 135). This would require a federalisation of EU foreign policy, which he considers unlikely. The biggest point of criticism on the Normative Power Europe approach is the discrepancy between the EU’s clearly normative rhetoric and its actions, which in cases of doubt are guided by its own interests. This is highlighted in the EU policy in the Middle East and North Africa (Pace 2009) or in international gender policy (Guerrina and Wright 2016). Ian Manners also examines the extent of the European 3 For

example, this can be seen in his discussion with Thomas Diez, who questions the singularity of the EU as a normative power and calls for greater attention to “othering” and self-reflexivity Diez (2005). Although Manners (2006b) initially contradicts him on many points, he sees the importance of reflexivity for his approach. Over time, both authors were able to bring their views together Manners and Diez (2008).

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Union’s ability to assert its normative views in a globalised world. In the areas of development aid, labour standards and EU crisis management, while the EU is willing to promote its standards, it has difficulties in actually doing so (Manners 2008). But this interpretation of the EU’s inconsistent foreign policy is challenged; Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007: 453) state that the identity of the EU as a normative power has been shaped in sharp contrast to that of the USA. They use two case studies, on climate policy, and the International Criminal Court, to show that the principles the EU wishes to institutionalise have universal scope and validity; this is why the European Union can be considered a normative power in this respect. Furthermore, the authors note that while the commitment to normative power strengthens some international actors, it weakens others. Precisely this kind of changed perspective offers the link between normative power and external perceptions of the European Union. In an overview article Larsen examines the results of the three main research projects on the EU’s external perceptions and comes to an unflattering conclusion. The international view of the EU is dominated by the image of economic power. Globally, the European Union is seen as an international actor, but it is not perceived as a great power. And although it is viewed more positively than the USA, it is perceived as less powerful. Western states do not ascribe to it any special role as a normative power. African elites recognise the universality of the norms represented by the EU, but perceive them as a disguise to assert the EU’s neocolonial interests. A third view fundamentally denies the EU the universality of its norms and interprets them as an attempt to strengthen Eurocentrism. Only in parts of its immediate eastern and southern neighbourhood is the EU is recognised as a legitimate normative power (Larsen 2014: 902–905). More positively connoted is Diez’s approach of resolving the difficulties of normative power through an application of the concept of hegemony. In this way, four problem areas of the discourse on Normative Power Europe may be resolved. First, the NPE approach is repeatedly accused of the fact that the EU does not primarily act according to its own norms, but rather follows its interests. Accordingly, Diez’s approach brings together norms and interests, which resolves this problematic opposition of normative power (Diez 2013: 194). Thus, norms and interests are ontological categories that can never be completely empirically separated. They are intertwined, whereby norms shape interests and vice versa (Diez 2013: 201–202). Secondly, hegemony explains apparently inconsistent behaviour with competing and contested norms. Diez’s approach is not based on a fixed set of norms with clear attributions. It rather sets out norms as constantly contested. For this reason, the observed differences in norms are not a contradiction, but an inherent part of norms and of Normative Power Europe (Diez 2013: 194). Third, Diez addresses the role of state and non-state actors in EU foreign policy. While Manners’ NPE approach ignores the latter, Diez takes them up in order to be able to conduct a more comprehensive analysis. Finally, Diez focuses on the problematic development affecting the NPE approach. His paper has been an attempt to return the debate to its critical point of departure, namely taking into account when analysing EU foreign policy not only material factors, but also ideational ones. In Diez’s view, this origin has been increasingly lost in the complex

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debates about a Normative Power Europe, both in academia as well as in politics and society (Diez 2013: 194). Diez positions his approach between the poles of a neorealist and a Gramscian interpretation of hegemony. The former assumes that a regional hegemon maintains order either through the construction of institutions or through norms. Accordingly, the EU would act like a hegemon, if it wanted to enforce its norms through military or economic means. The latter interpretation is based on relations and not on an actor’s perspective (Diez 2013: 199). Hegemony is then “a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership” (Simon 1982: 21). Hegemonic subjects agree with and adhere to the same concepts of society or broad problem definitions and fundamental solutions of the hegemon. This interpretation is relatively similar to Ian Manners’ idea of a Normative Power Europe being capable of shaping conceptions of the normal. This means that hegemony combines material and discursive elements, whereby the exact weighting is not fixed and can vary from case to case (Diez 2013: 200). “From this perspective taken here, there is no unambiguous foundation in material structures […], but the material is mediated by the discursive, and the discursive is shaped by the material” (Diez 2013: 200). Furthermore, social forces are the core agents in the hegemonic struggles. The most important contributions of Diez’s approach are, on the one hand, that he dissolves the aspect of the EU acting against its own interests, and on the other, that he brings the discussion about Normative Power Europe back to its origins. The asymmetric conduct of negotiations is central to the last, albeit smallest, main discourse on Empire Europe. The European Union is categorised as an empire on the basis of six indicators (Bieling 2017: 51–52): (1) the EU has “fuzzy” borders due to the possibility of accession and withdrawal from membership. It (2) does not have a monopoly on the use of force and taxation or (3) a uniform legal and social order. There are (4) different local, regional and national political cultures, which are encouraged within the European Union. Furthermore, the EU (5) has a power and integration imbalance between central and peripheral states and (6) feels politically, economically and culturally superior to its neighbours. This aspect of empires is mainly conducted through the ENP and the emphasis on its normative and civilian power. However, attention must be paid to normative, negatively connoted references, such as “war-making”. These are traditionally attributed to empires, but are not part of the empire categorisation (Dimitrovova 2012). Various points are raised regarding acute action by the European Union. While Dimitrovova (2012) speaks of an imperial intent in the ENP, Pänke (2015: 350) assumes an imperial logic by which the neighbourhood must be civilised. Vis-à-vis the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries for example, the EU pursued a clear “imperial policy” by establishing a centre–periphery hierarchy in the policy fields of trade, agriculture, energy and security in order to enforce its own ideas. This was done through coercion, mobilisation of bias, manipulation and exploitation as well as through attraction (Sepos 2013). The variety of approaches to the EU as an international actor shows that a clear, widely shared interpretation is difficult to establish. The following chapter examines the perceptions expressed in the EUGS. For this purpose the aspects of the EUGS

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that deal with the partnerships of the European Union will be scrutinised. Based on this, it will be determined whether the perceptions allow a clear assignment to one of the discourses presented in Chap. 3, or whether the EUGS includes partial elements of different discourses.

4 Agreements and Partnerships in the EU Global Strategy This chapter examines perceptions within the EU Global Strategy. First, a general overview of the EUGS’ structure will be given, thus explaining the document’s character. In this section, there will be no recourse yet to the perceptions and discourses on the EU as an international actor; this will be addressed in the following chapter, dealing with aspects of the EUGS related to the category agreements and partnerships. The EU Global Strategy is the main point of reference for the European Union’s foreign policy. It is not just a document focusing on security aspects of the EU or dealing exclusively with one policy area. Rather, it demonstrates the complex understanding the EU has of its role as an international actor. It takes into account all dimensions of EU foreign policy, describes the current situation from the European Union’s perspective and gives indications of how it will position itself in the future. Therefore, the Foreign Policy Mosaic of Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger, which also covers all dimensions, is particularly useful for this analysis. The EUGS is also complex because it reflects the multifaceted character of EU foreign policy. This can be seen in the fact that the EUGS is not clearly separated into the foreign policy dimensions. Instead, the various policy areas are repeatedly addressed and applied in combination with the individual fields of action. This shows that modern foreign policy, as conducted by the EU, is not carried out on the basis of one instrument alone, but makes use of different means. However, the aim of a structured analysis of the perceptions of the EU Global Strategy must be to make separable statements on the individual foreign policy dimensions, and therefore this paper will study those perceptions that can be specifically attributed to the partnerships of the European Union. In further work this approach should also be followed for the other dimensions. In a subsequent step, effects will be drawn from this, with regard to EU–India relations in general and the EU-India Strategic Partnership in particular.

4.1 Priorities in the Structure of the EU Global Strategy Besides the aspect of the EUGS determining the international profile of the European Union, it is a deeply self-referential document. In this way, the European Union, its security and international success are established as the most important elements. Only then are activities for and with other international actors mentioned—mostly against the background of protecting and promoting the EU and its citizens.

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This is evident from the structure of the strategy. The first chapter is titled “A Global Strategy to Promote our Citizens’ Interests”, already articulating the most important mandate for the EUGS. Prioritisation can also be seen within this chapter. So, “Peace and Security” is named before “Prosperity”, “Democracy” and “A RulesBased Global Order”. This means, only when the European Union and its citizens prosper and are considered basically secure should democratic standards outside the EU or an engagement for a multilateral world order be taken into account. The situation is similar with the main chapter of the Global Strategy, the European Union’s foreign policy priorities. The first and most important priority is “The Security of Our Union”, which in turn is subdivided according to importance into “Security and Defence” and “Counter-terrorism” through to “Strategic Communications”. The European Union’s most important foreign policy area is then its own environment, extending as far as Central Asia and Central Africa. Here, “State and Societal Resilience” is given special consideration. This aspect has been taken up by many scientists as one of the most important innovations of the EUGS (Juncos 2017; Tocci 2020). Therefore, the European Union sees its biggest capacity for action in the enlargement policy, followed by the states of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the other surrounding states. Only then will other world regions follow, to be addressed through “An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises”, “Cooperative Regional Orders” and “Global Governance for the 21st Century”. The prioritisation of the different world regions is once again evident in this penultimate chapter. First, the EUGS deals with “The European Security Order”, followed by “A Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa”— in other words, precisely those states that the EU defines as its environment. This is followed, in decreasing importance, by transatlantic relations, Asia and the Arctic. The impression of prioritisation is reinforced by the fact that the most far-reaching initiatives are to be launched in the EU’s neighbourhood in particular. This is where the European Union would like to intervene and change the environment for its own benefit. This also explains the strong focus of the strategy on Russia, apparently being seen as the biggest opponent in the region. In this respect, the EU Global Strategy reflects the geopolitical approach of the European Union (Biscop 2016). At its heart is the European Union itself, with its immediate surroundings as the most important sphere of influence. The more distant regions are then only addressed in specific policy areas and according to the needs of the European Union. Although the EU repeatedly speaks of global responsibility and multilateral global governance, its strategic priorities tend to paint the picture of a regional power primarily wanting to influence its immediate surroundings. This approach is not new; the Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) of 2014 was drafted similarly. Following the security of the EU, its member states and their citizens, the MSS focuses on the European Union’s ability to influence the seas and oceans directly bordering its territory. Other maritime basins like the Indian Ocean are only mentioned in passing (Council of the European Union 2014), although these, too, are of central importance for the EU and its prosperity. Protecting and promoting its own population seems to be the logical goal of national strategies. However, in the present case this focus is noteworthy, because in

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particular those scholars who adopt or criticise the normative power approach also deny the existence of this feature within the European Union (Cebeci 2018).4 It is then claimed that the EU’s foreign policy actions should be primarily value-driven and that, in case of doubt, it needs to put its own interests second in order to promote the big picture. The EU is thus more likely to be denied its own interests, which then leads to (understandable) criticism of the European Union’s apparently inconsistent actions.

4.2 Partnership Priorities in the Content of the EU Global Strategy Moving away from the structure of the EUGS and turning more systematically to the descriptions of the European Union’s international action, the above-mentioned tendencies become even more visible. As already stated, the focus of this part will be on the agreements and partnerships of the European Union as described in the EUGS. Of the four perception categories presented in Sect. 2.2, it has been possible to assign entries only to three of them, since no entries could be allocated to the subcategory Future Perceptions-World. Of the remaining three categories, the Future PerceptionsEU subcategory is particularly interesting, because it contains a high number of items. Little information can be drawn from the subcategories Current Perceptions-EU and Current Perceptions-World. In the category Current Perceptions-EU, the European Union describes itself as a “prime mover in global trade and investment” (European Union 2016: 40–41). At the same time, the EU shows that the resulting prosperity depends on the EU and its partners maintaining an open and rules-based economic system. From the EU’s point of view, the promotion of rules in the international system is not only important for economic reasons, but also for international relations in general. The European Union, therefore, sees itself as the actor that needs to strengthen resilience in its neighbourhood in order to protect its own interests. The same applies to the relationship with Russia, which the EU would like to manage by taking a positive stance with its partners against “power politics and contribut[ing] to a peaceful, fair and prosperous world” (European Union 2016: 15). Even from these few sentences, it is possible to analyse the first indications of the discourses taken up by the EU Global Strategy. The civilian power approach is addressed by referring to the economic strength of the EU. Rules-based systems are part of normative power and the attempt to strengthen resilience in the neighbourhood can be applied to the empire approach. Military power is omitted, as there are no references to CFSP, CSDP or other military means in the subcategory Current Perceptions-EU. Furthermore, since dominance does not play a role, the superpower approach is not applicable here. 4 This

is also true for some of the secondary discourses that are not included in this contribution.

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The interpretation in the subcategory Current Perceptions-World is even more vague. While with regard to the normative power approach the reference regarding “a rules-based global order unlocks the full potential of a prosperous Union” (European Union 2016: 16) can be found, the other conceptions are less clear. This is because they refer to security, but show no concrete reference to military means. Therefore, the concepts of military power or superpower might be only partly applicable. This applies to “Russia’s violation of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine” (European Union 2016: 33) as well as to the fact that “[t]he Mediterranean, Middle East and parts of sub-Saharan Africa are in turmoil” (European Union 2016: 34) or that “[t]here is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian security” (European Union 2016: 37). Turning towards the Future Perceptions-EU category, the picture becomes more diverse. “We will pursue our priorities by mobilising our unparalleled networks, our economic weight and all the tools at our disposal in a coherent and coordinated way” (European Union 2016: 44). This sentence shows the strategy’s focus of action on its own territory and population. Later, it is followed by detailed indications of the European Union wanting to act globally to combat the causes of poverty and violence. The most important means of doing so are the strengthening of international norms, regimes and institutions, the involvement of a large number of international actors, and the aim of highlighting win–win situations, making it easier to support these international norms. Furthermore, the strategy states that “[i]n different world regions, the EU will be driven by specific goals” (European Union 2016: 32). This is contrary to a pure norm orientation of EU foreign policy action. In general, the EUGS makes it clear that the European Union builds on partnerships and international cooperation and does not want to act alone on an international level. Nevertheless, although the EU emphasises its intent to lead the way, it cannot create a positive development of international relations on its own. This is why partnerships are then described as the core of the European Union’s international efforts (European Union 2016: 43). On the one hand, the EU would like to turn to new partner states, regional and international organisations. On the other hand, it wants to further develop existing (strategic) partnerships (European Union 2016: 4). Accordingly, the credo of former High Representative Federica Mogherini remains valid, namely that building partnerships is in the DNA of the European Union (Mogherini 2015). As shown in Sect. 4.1, the European Union considers its neighbourhood to be the most important region. It is not only an important region for the EU; the Union also wants to influence its neighbourhood in its own sense. This can be seen from the fact that a whole range of initiatives is to be launched alongside the established policy areas like the Enlargement Policy and the ENP. These range from measures “to stimulate growth and jobs”, “development efforts with work in migration, education, energy and climate, science and technology” or “cross-border dynamics” to “issues such as border security, trafficking, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, water and food safety” (European Union 2016: 34). Besides this, the European Union is aware of its relatively limited possibilities for exerting influence, especially in those states that are part of neither enlargement nor neighbourhood policy.

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In addition to the EU neighbourhood, special attention is paid to Russia, the EU’s transatlantic relations and the United Nations (UN). In the case of Russia, the EU does not accept the annexation of the Crimea and the attempts at destabilisation in Ukraine. Furthermore, it wants to ensure the freedom of choice of the former Soviet states. At the same time, it emphasises that Russia and the European Union are interdependent and, despite their differences, must continue to communicate and cooperate with each other (European Union 2016: 33). Cooperation with two other partners is at least as important for the European Union—the USA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO is the most important building block of European security, and this is not called into question by the EUGS. The capacities and mechanisms are to be better adjusted in order to be able to support each other. The other states on the American continent are only of secondary importance for the European Union. Special attention is being paid to inter-regional cooperation and the possibility of free trade agreements (European Union 2016: 37). By far the European Union’s most important partner organisation when it comes to matters other than military security is the United Nations. For the EU, the UN is the basis of global multilateral action and a repository of international standards promoted by the European Union. It is important for the EU to further strengthen and support these standards in the future (European Union 2016: 39). Asia is not, in this view, one of the European Union’s top priorities. Rather, with regard to Asian states, the EU is concentrating on its own areas of interest and less on the potential needs of the partner states. China is still the most prominent example of this. In addition to the obligatory references to respect for the rule of law and human rights, trade with China is one of the most important issues. A crucial difference in the descriptions of the trade partnerships with China compared with other states is that the EU is taking a very critical view on the market power of the Asian partner. It is not without reason that the EU speaks of wanting to achieve a “level playing field” (European Union 2016: 38). No other state achieves such a formulation, underlining the importance of China. All other Asian states are addressed to a much lesser extent. The examples range from Myanmar/Burma, which is mentioned with regard to the human rights situation, to Japan with regard to security and trade, Afghanistan because of the state-building process and internal reconciliation through to Indonesia with regard to security. India is only included in the area of free trade agreements. This once again makes it clear that the European Union is positioning itself outside its immediate field of action in and around Europe only with regard to selected policy fields. It does not choose a global, all-encompassing approach to its external policy. Rather, it is a combination of value- and interest-driven policies, which in the EUGS is described with the term “principled pragmatism” (European Union 2016: 16). The category Future Perceptions-EU shows differing manifestations of all main discourses on the EU as an international actor. The civilian power approach, for example, is addressed by reference to its own economic weight in international relations. The approach can also be used in relations with Russia, since the responses to Russian aggression were not of military but of civilian nature. Moreover, relations with the countries across the Atlantic and Asia are clearly economically driven, strengthening Duchêne’s concept. The military power approach is evident in the

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statement that in the case of doubt, all available means should be used, including military intervention. However, the EUGS does not explicitly refer to military means to enforce the EU’s interests. This becomes particularly clear with respect to Russia. Instead, NATO is often referred to as the most important partner organisation in the field of security, which indirectly illustrates the military component. The superpower approach can be observed, according to Galtung, considering statements dealing with a strong common market and an exerted influence especially on the African continent. There are also indications of a more positive approach according to Moravcsik, like the fight against poverty and violence or the strengthening of multilateral organisations. Similarly, when the EU looks at its Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policy, the superpower approach is applicable, because these two policy areas are part of the concept. Another aspect is cooperation with international organisations, playing a role both in relation to the United Nations and in relations with South America and Asia. The most frequently identified approach is Normative Power Europe. Thus, in all areas, reference is made to the enforcement of international standards as read in the sense of the EU. The importance of partnerships is repeatedly emphasised. These are fundamental components of the normative power approach and a central element of the EU Global Strategy. This also applies to transatlantic relations, which are to be strengthened by interregional cooperation and free trade agreements. Furthermore, norm enforcement and regional cooperation are reflected in relations with Asia. But it must be critically assessed whether the original concept of Manners is the best point of reference. For it is not only through reference to principled pragmatism that the interests of the European Union play an important role in the EUGS, but also through the cooperation with non-state actors, which rather speaks for an application of Thomas Diez’s normative power as hegemony approach. Rarely or possibly never can the approach to Empire Europe be proven; the only exception is when it comes to initiatives concerning the neighbourhood of the European Union, when this approach might possibly be argued. Here, the attempt of civilising stands out, with which the EU tries to develop the states in its environment according to its own ideas. But even the EU itself sees difficulties in implementation, making it difficult to apply the concept.

4.3 EU–India Relations in the EU Global Strategy Is it a major problem that India is only mentioned in relation to trade? From an Indian point of view, there is certainly a deficit, because its big rival China is mentioned in far greater detail. However, the Indian perspective is somewhat misleading, as the EUGS is not a document aiming to present the EU’s relations as comprehensively as possible. It rather sets out the EU’s strategic orientation in the world. In the case of the EU–India relations, trade is the most prominent issue. The EUGS is deeply self-referential. This can be illustrated with the example of piracy. China, Indonesia and Malaysia are named as key players in the Indian Ocean

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with whom the EU has to deal. They are located directly on the Strait of Malacca and can immediately combat the problem of piracy themselves. India, who is certainly an important security actor in the Indian Ocean, could—as a non-riparian state—only provide secondary help in this case and is, therefore, not mentioned. Nor is India the European Union’s main partner or opponent in the field of climate protection, which includes the USA, Canada and China. This reflects what has been mentioned in Sect. 4.2. If the region in question is further away from the EU than its immediate surroundings, the European Union chooses selectively where it wants to get involved or which aspects it addresses in the EUGS. The European Union’s main interest with regard to India is trade. The free trade agreement has been stagnating for years (Sachdeva 2019), but is of paramount importance to the European Union in its relations with India. As long as no progress is being made in this area, India is unlikely to be given greater weight in a comprehensive foreign policy strategy. This is consistent with the previous findings. When it comes to principled pragmatism, the European Union wants to stick to the norms it promotes and also needs to see advancements in the context of the partnership. This is regrettable from India’s point of view. But the low number of references in the EUGS does not mean that India is not an important partner of the European Union. This can be seen from the subsequent EU-India Strategy (European Union 2018) that has several objectives. First of all, it aims to strengthen India’s strategic partnership with the European Union in general. The most important aspect of this is economic cooperation. The strategic partnership is to be a central component of sustainable modernisation from which both partners will benefit. Furthermore, the EU sees in India an important player in the field of international multilateralism, with whom it would like to cooperate, particularly with regard to the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. This should then be advanced to a common approach making global challenges jointly addressable. After all, India is for the EU the key to solving regional problems in South Asia and is supposed to be interlocutor for joint responses to global security issues (European Union 2018). On these foundations, the EU-India Summit in July 2020 was also intended to provide further impetus for a renewed, close partnership between the two players. The personal talks at the highest level ought also to have been of particular importance because Germany, one of the most influential EU Member States, held the Council Presidency in the second half of 2020. These high hopes have been severely impaired by the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only has the focus of the summit shifted, but the personal exchange outside of the official meetings, which are immensely important for mutual understanding, could not be fully reproduced via video calls. Nevertheless, with the “Roadmap to 2025” (European External Action Service 2020) an important step for the EU-India Strategic Partnership was made. The document will guide the relations between the two largest democracies in the upcoming years. The EU Global Strategy is a document intended to set out the priorities of EU foreign and security policy. It cannot fulfil all the expectations placed on it from both inside and outside the EU. Therefore, expectations on the side of India were inevitably disappointed, assuming that the entire range of EU–India relations would be covered in the EUGS. In fact, India must content itself with only two mentions,

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both in the area of free trade agreements. However, apart from the fact that India was one of the first countries to be considered worthy of a country-specific strategy in 2018, many other countries that are central to the EU, like South Africa or the strategic partner Mexico, have not been mentioned at all in the EUGS. This underlines that India has a certain importance after all. The new EU-India Strategy is largely based on the EUGS and is consistent with it in terms of its values and goals.5 This can be seen regarding the economic sector. As shown above, it is the only point of reference in the EU Global Strategy and, consequently, the most important aspect in the EU-India Strategy. It covers several political fields, starting from “Trade and Investment, Business & Economy” and “Sustainable Modern Partnership”—which is the heart and soul of the roadmap—through “Global Governance” and “Peopleto-People” relations up to “Foreign Policy and Security Cooperation”. Admittedly, only the implementation of the paper will show whether it is more than mere lip service. But it illustrates that India and the European Union are again showing a greater willingness to make progress in their partnership at the highest level.

5 Conclusion The aim of the paper was to determine those discourses on the EU as an international actor best describing the specifications of the EUGS in terms of the EU’s agreements and partnerships. The analysis has shown that all five main discourses partially fit the perceptions expressed by the EU in its Global Strategy. The most important reference point was the category Future Perceptions-EU, in which most references to the partnerships of the European Union were found. The different approaches have not all been equally applicable. In particular, the concept of Empire Europe is hardly reflected in the perceptions that were examined, in that only a civilising approach can be found, and even then only in some cases. This is supported by the fact that the EU sees itself as a central reference point within Europe and wants to shape the region according to its own ideas. The other components of the approach are not applicable. The situation is similar with the military power approach. Although NATO and CFSP/CSDP are referred to frequently, the use of military means is never directly considered an option. As a third approach, the superpower concept is rejected. Neither the reading according to Galtung, nor to Moravcsik is hardly ever found in the descriptions of the EUGS and is even then not applied comprehensively. A more positive assessment can be made of the civilian power approach. The recurrent and prominent references to the significant market power of the European Union and the primary objective of strengthening trade in several regions address the central element of the concept. The same applies to the emphasis on civilian means to achieve the European Union’s objectives. Yet, civilian power cannot be seen as the concept that best describes the EUGS perceptions of agreements and partnerships. 5 Regarding

the consistency of EU Global Strategy and EU–India Strategy see the contributions of Aspengren and Nordenstam and Winn in this volume.

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The approach that best fits the project presented in the EUGS with regard to agreements and partnerships is that of Normative Power Europe. However, it must be pointed out that the original approach of Ian Manners cannot be used here; although it provides important elements like norm orientation, it excludes non-state actors from the analysis. Furthermore, Manners’ approach includes the aspect that the EU would have to act against its own interests, for example in the area of trade. This is both theoretically problematic and empirically untenable. Therefore, the further development by Thomas Diez to normative power as hegemony is considered the most appropriate concept. One reason for this is that Diez sees foreign policy action as fundamentally norm- and interest-driven and shows that both motives for action can only be separated from each other in theory. Moreover, he does not conceptualise fixed norms, but rather fundamentally contested ones, explicitly allowing competing norm interpretations. In the EU Global Strategy, the European Union outlines the areas in which it would like to engage internationally. This includes the establishment of a multilateral world order based on international standards. These norms are promoted by the EU, which fits in with the fact that it tries to influence the conceptions of the normal, according to the concept of Diez. Neither does the EU’s concentration on selected policy areas in the more distant regions of the world speak against the hegemony approach. The essential point is the will to change conditions towards a relationship that is more favourable for the EU. This is precisely the aim of the EU when it picks out very specific fields of action outside its own surroundings. The crucial question is whether the European Union can translate this will into action.

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Manuel Pietzko is a member of faculty and researcher at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He is project coordinator of the Jean Monnet activities at the chair. His research interests include EU Foreign Policy, the EU as an international actor, and the EU Global Strategy.

Dimensions of the Strategic Partnership

A Partnership Between Two Large Elephants? Opportunities and Challenges in India–EU Relations Pascaline Winand

1 Introduction Not too long ago, the EU–India relationship was described as “a loveless arranged marriage” (Khandekar 2011). It seemed to have almost come to a standstill, with no summit meetings being held for four years. Yet by 2016, following the warming up of relations after the agreement on how to handle the Enrica Lexie case,1 mutual interests and commitment appeared to have rekindled the relationship. Summits resumed. In March 2016, the 13th EU–India summit took place in the wake of a terrorist attack in Brussels, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi paying tribute to the victims. India and the EU agreed on an EU–India Agenda for Action-2020 to reinforce the India–EU strategic partnership. Even though the 2016 new EU Global Strategy only mentioned India twice (EEAS 2016: 38, 41), by November 2018, the European Commission (EC) and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) adopted an ambitious Joint Communication on an EU Strategy on India (hereafter EUIS) (European Commission 2018a). The Council of the EU promptly endorsed it the following month and called for the Commission and the HR to “reflect on the opportunity of a Strategic Partnership Agreement” (Council of the European Union 2018: 5). In 2019, an Indian general election as well as EU parliamentary elections in the Spring put the partnership on hold. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a landslide victory, bringing Modi back to power P. Winand (B) College of Europe at Natolin, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] 1 In 2012 two Italian marines stationed aboard the Enrica Lexie oil tanker to protect it against piracy

were accused by Indian authorities of having killed two Indian fishermen on board a fishing boat, the “St Antony”. While the marines were detained in India, the dispute festered, with both India and Italy claiming to have jurisdiction over the case, and it affected India–EU relations. In June 2015, India and Italy agreed to refer the dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_6

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in May. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, a career diplomat and former Foreign Secretary with substantial experience in European affairs, was appointed as External Affairs Minister. He made clear his intention to reinvigorate India–EU relations. Were the EU and India on a “dialectical quest to rediscover each other”? (Mukherjee 2018: 7). In spite of recent positive developments, we may ask whether the India–EU relationship is delivering significant results. If there are achievements, are they making their way into perceptions in both India and the EU and if not, why? What are the mutual perceptions of India and the EU? How visible are they to one another’s elites and publics, and to what extent does this visibility vary over time and in certain fields? Which implementation impediments stand in the way of more meaningful and practical EU–India cooperation? In a recent interview, the Ambassador of India in Brussels reflected that there “was a feeling that the EU is all about dialogues with little capacity to implement things on the ground” (Interview with Indian Ambassador, Brussels, 13 March 2018). There are similar frustrations on the EU side with regard to India. In the following, we first look at EU–India perceptions as a key challenge to the efficiency of the relationship. We then examine the bureaucratic structures, decisionmaking processes, meetings and agreements in EU–India relations. We next turn to consider Indian and EU public diplomacy efforts and challenges. We conclude with an appraisal of the prospects for the EU–India partnership in the light of recent developments, such as Brexit and COVID-19.

2 The Challenge of EU–India Perceptions Studying mutual perceptions and self-reflections can help to uncover misperceptions and underlying tensions in EU–India relations which may undermine the effectiveness of their cooperation efforts. A former Indian Joint Secretary for West Europe during the 1998–2004 period was “struck by the myths and misperceptions on both sides regarding the relationship” (Mukherjee 2018: xiii). Likewise, the Indian Ambassador in Brussels thought that “the major challenge” in EU–India relations was “perceptions” (Interview with Indian Ambassador, Brussels, 13 March 2018). We will here combine the results of several studies conducted over the 2010–2019 period2 2 The

data for some of the interviews from India quoted in this chapter were generated by the transnational comparative project entitled “EU Global Perceptions” (EUGP) led by Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland from the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), University of Canterbury, New Zealand (https://www.canterbury.ac.nz/ncre/research/euperceptions/). Supported by the European Commission Jean Monnet funding and the Asia–Europe Foundation (ASEF), the project has been undertaken in more than 30 locations beginning in 2002. Thirty-six interviews were conducted under this project in India in the 2010 leg of the project with business, political, civil society and media elites. In addition, a total of 33 interviews were undertaken for another project, supported by the Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration and International Relations of Pascaline Winand, and leading to the publication of a co-authored book (Winand et al. 2015): nine in Brussels (Pascaline Winand, February and November 2011), 21 in Delhi (Pascaline Winand, October 2011 and Marika Vicziany, July 2012) and three in Patna (Marika Vicziany, July 2012).

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to analyse Indian perceptions of the EU and the self-reflection of India in relation to the EU, while also examining the perceptions of India by EU officials and the self-perceptions of the EU in relation to India.

2.1 Indian Perceptions of the EU During the 2010s Indian elites often saw the EU first as the world’s largest trading bloc (EU Global Perceptions project–hereafter EUGP–media elite respondent), with the Indian public considering it as one of the “most influential” global actors “in terms of global economic affairs” but ranking it “behind the USA, India and Japan” (PPMI et al. 2015: 122). Elites considered the EU as a large market for India whose importance was declining, however, as India increasingly traded more with Asia and Africa (EUGP civil society elite respondent). The picture was more nuanced for the wider Indian public. A survey by the Pew Research Centre conducted over the December 2013–January 2014 period which polled “15 of the 17 [Indian] most populous states … and the Union Territory of Delhi” and was “based on 2,464 faceto-face interviews with adults 18 and older”, saw the EU ranking well below the US in terms of economic power. Indeed, 47% of the interviewees viewed the US as the leading economic power in the world, “rather than China (12%), Japan (9%)” or EU countries (2%). The EU was “viewed positively by just a third of Indians (34%), with a quarter (25%) having an unfavorable perception and four-in-ten (40%) voicing no opinion”. This was significantly behind the US, which was seen favourably by 56%, with Japan (49%), Russia (45%), the UN (40%) and China (35%) all being ahead of the EU (Pew Research Center 2014: 2, 17, 21). In addition, the European financial crisis was perceived as a “major crisis” for India by political elites as the EU was its “biggest trading partner” (EUGP political elite respondent), with the Greek debt crisis and the Eurozone being among the most visible topics associated with the EU in the Indian media (PPMI et al. 2015: 122). Importantly, even though some Indian officials acknowledged EU success in economic cooperation (EUGP political elite respondent), they regretted that it had not emerged as “an alternate center of economic power in the world” to counterbalance the US and China (EUGP civil society elite respondent). With the European sovereign debt crisis and Brexit, “India’s public opinion and media” saw “Europe in accelerating decline” (Mukherjee 2018: 69). An interesting recent development in the context of the 2016 and 2017 EU–India summits and the Brexit saga has been a “dramatic shift” in the description of the EU as a political rather than an economic actor in the Indian media. The EU was “described as a political actor in more than 60 percent of articles” that Babalova and Goddeeris analysed, “whereas only 21 percent of news pieces portrayed the EU as Additional interviews were conducted by Pascaline Winand in Brussels with European Commission and EEAS officials and the Indian Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union in March, April, September 2018 and March 2019. Some interviewees have agreed to be identified, while others have expressed the wish to remain anonymous. This section builds on Winand (2015).

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an economic actor” (Babalova and Goddeeris 2019). However, the EU still appears disunited in politics and security, and this is seen to impact its political collective action power on the world scene. In 2010 an Indian Economic Editor saw the EU as “a very nebulous entity, […] which is not able to have the kind of political clout which its economic size should have actually allowed it to have” or “a group of nations that are constantly at each other’s throats” which still had not “fully realize[d] the potential of their collective action strength” (EUGP media elite respondent). More recently, a former Indian diplomat criticised the EU for not making a unified response to “critical international crises” and for its difficulties in agreeing on “what its external actions should be”. She saw the European Commission as a “highly fragmented administrative structure” lacking “coordination and transparency in operation”. As for the European Parliament (EP), it impacted negatively the “international credibility” of the EU, with some MEPs “often manipulated to issue statements on foreign policy which run counter to mainstream European thinking” (Mukherjee 2018: 28–32, 37, 65, 69). Until recently, the EU’s importance as a security actor mostly flew under the radar in India, including in the Indian Ministry of Defence, with a lack of convergence and perceived lack of relevance on key issues. Indian elites viewed EU influence “in security policy in South Asia … as rather minimal” with the EU being “too weak and not unified enough to develop a coherent strategy in and for Asia” (Stumbaum et al. 2015: 19). They regretted the EU’s apparent willingness to act as the “poodle” of the US in security policy, with little or no power of its own in the security field, as there was “no European policy as such” (EUGP political elite respondent). Indian analysts underscored that the EU did “not have a strong stand on any of the issues” India is interested in, such as “Kashmir, a seat at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and nuclear cooperation”. To get support for a seat at the UNSC, India could “go to France and Germany individually but not to the EU” (EUGP civil society elite respondents). On hard security issues Indian elites mostly saw the EU as a collection of nation states which disagreed with one another, as exemplified during the Iraq war. The impression was that some member states were more visible than the EU and appeared reluctant to “share the limelight” with the EU (Interview with journalist, Hindustan Times, Delhi, October 2011) while they also contradicted one another. As for the media, it pictured the EU positively in relation to the Iranian nuclear agreement, but negatively for EU–Russia relations (PPMI et al. 2015: 124). Indian public opinion ranked the performance of the EU in enhancing global peace and stability behind that of India, the US, Japan and Russia, and deemed EU leadership in world affairs as less desirable and less likely than that of India, the US, Russia and Japan but more desirable and more likely than China and Brazil (PPMI et al. 2015: 123–124). In terms of the EU as a model of regionalism to be emulated, the EU is seen by Indian elites as a “fascinating experiment” (EUGP business elite respondent) with a division of competences between the EU and its member states which has “not yet been successfully attempted by any other regional grouping” (Mukherjee 2018: 22). This experiment has led to the “pacification of violence on a continental scale” (EUGP political elite respondent) by contrast with India which has not been able to

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“resolve [its] issues with Pakistan, let alone create a large sense of a South Asian or an Asian identity” (EUGP political elite respondent). Some Indian media and political elites aspire to organise Asian regional cooperation based on the EU model or “somewhat like the EU” (Interview with journalist, Hindustan Times, Delhi, October 2011; EUGP political elite respondents). Others, however, emphasise that “Asian regionalism has taken nothing from the EU” as its “postmodern […] security structure […] based on the idea of dissolving sovereignty and on transparency between nations” is “foreign to Asian countries” such as India, which see “sovereignty … as the primary base of their foreign policy” (Interview with journalist, Hindustan Times, Delhi, October 2011). A former Indian Ambassador to the EU explained that as “an ancient civilization with a relatively young republic” India was not prepared to let go of sovereignty. “We are at a stage where we are trying to build ourselves so we will never be colonial again”, he said. He thought that India should “emulate the EU in terms of how proficient your processes are, your universities, your research institutions” but not the European project “because there is confusion and we have enough confusion in India already” (Interview with Indian Ambassador, Brussels, November 2011). Another former Indian Ambassador points to the “imperfect understanding”—even within the EU—of “the dynamics between ‘exclusive’ and ‘shared’ competencies”, with these dynamics not being “understood at all” by external partners such as India. This creates difficulties in developing “strong ties with the Commission along with bilateral relations with individual EU Member States” (Mukherjee 2018: 22). This lack of understanding may help explain observations on the Indian side that the unification of Europe has proved to be a lacklustre affair, is happening too slowly and “summons a big yawn for us” (Godemont 2015: 11). This said, the EU is seen as a model to be emulated in certain fields, while it lacks visibility in others. In international development, although the EU views itself as the foremost development player in the world, Indian elites have little awareness of its contribution (Chaban et al. 2015). Despite the high contribution of the EU and its member states to development aid in the world, Indian public opinion views the EU contribution to developing countries as “less important than India, the USA and Japan”, but more important than the World Bank, the UN, China, Brazil and Russia. The EU as an international development actor is “virtually invisible” in Indian news (PPMI et al. 2015: 125). By contrast, in social internal development, Indian elites see EU “social engineering”, the EU welfare state and, in particular, the social model of the Scandinavian countries, as sending a positive message of reaching out to the underprivileged, which can be emulated in India (EUGP civil society elite respondent). The Indian general public likewise sees the “EU as performing fairly well” in terms of social rights and the public welfare system and rates the overall quality of life in the EU positively, with a high appreciation for the level of education, the creation of employment opportunities, gender equality and the eradication of poverty (PPMI et al. 2015: 125). The EU is also seen as a model for human rights, international law and democracy, with “a powerful moral appeal around the world”, for example, in its support for the International Court of Justice. Indian public opinion sees the EU as “performing better than the UN, Russia, Brazil or China” in defending and promoting human

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rights in the world while ranking India, the US and Japan as the “most important actors” (PPMI et al. 2015: 126, 131). However, Indian political elites also deplore the EU tendency to neglect India in comparison to China as India possesses democratic credentials and China does not (EUGP political elite respondent). India further criticises the EU for its handling of migrants and refugees (PPMI et al. 2015: 126). A former Indian Ambassador sees the EU as being plagued by “anti-migration sentiments”, while “illiberal and undemocratic trends” in “Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland” “pose a grave threat to European values” and with populism growing in southern Europe. These forces challenge “the dream of a borderless Europe with shared competencies” with the Schengen Agreement being “at risk of total collapse”, which “would undermine the very foundations” of the EU. Brexit and “newly reintroduced border controls now symbolise ‘Fortress Europe’ rather than the ‘Free Europe’ that symbolised the ‘European Dream’” (Mukherjee 2018: 20, 38, 42). India has also long disliked the EU promotion of human rights in India, with political and media elites seeing the EU as “a nuisance and lecturing us” (cited in Grant 2006) or “arrogant on the issue of human rights” (EUGP media elite respondent). Delhi has been frustrated with the EU and in particular EP criticism of human rights violations in Kashmir, and EU attempts to include provisions on human rights in EU–India agreements, such as the proposed broad-based Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) (Jain 2017: 411–429; Mukherjee 2018: 37). Notwithstanding the priority accorded to this area by both India and the EU, with India seeing the EU “as the biggest repository of advanced science and technology” (Interview with Indian Ambassador, Brussels, 23 March 2018) and the many collaboration initiatives, the visibility in India of EU–India scientific and technological collaboration is low (Jain and Pandey 2012: 340). There is very little reference to the EU role in this field in the media, with a preference for a “‘Europe’ frame of reference”. Indian public opinion ranks the EU “as lagging behind India, the USA and Japan” and considers its “importance in innovation and technological progress similarly to that of Russia” (PPMI et al. 2015: 128). On environmental issues, the EU’s role, in spite of its important profile in environmental negotiations, is underreported in the media while the Indian public ranks the EU “below India, the USA, Japan and Russia” but above the UN. By contrast, Indian elites see prospects for “further engagement” with the EU with a focus on nuclear safety, climate change, smart cities and renewable energy (PPMI et al. 2015: 127–128). Lastly, in education and culture, the EU is seen by Indian elites as a “beautiful place”, “a place for Indian students to go, far cheaper than Britain and America and Australia”, “a cultural hub” with “beautiful women [and] clean cities” (EUAPP media elite respondents and business elite respondent). The Indian public appreciates European luxury clothes and goods, sports, the European lifestyle and modern architecture and design. On the other hand, EU member states are seen as lagging “behind India, the USA and Japan” in terms of lifestyle and culture (PPMI et al. 2015: 129).

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2.2 Self-Perception of India in Relation to the EU In terms of the self-perception of India in relation to the EU, Indian elites are frustrated with the EU emphasis on India as a big market or a travel destination and its lack of appreciation of India as a significant economic, security and development actor. They deplore that the EU still sees India as “an exotic destination, not a meaningful 21st Century partner” (EUGP political elite respondent) and ask for India not to be treated “merely as a benign 5,000-year-old civilization” (Godemont 2015: 11). To this European vision of India, they contrast the “fast-moving India” with high growth, “a vibrant stock market [and …] financial system”, a “huge middle class”, increasing purchasing power and a “growing number of educated Indians”, including the “world’s cheapest engineers”. “Indian companies”, they add, are now “buying European companies” (EUGP business elite respondent; interviews with Indian Ambassador and journalist, Hindustan Times, Delhi, October 2011). India’s future as an “emerging superpower” is seen as brighter than that of the EU (EUGP business elite respondent) and India’s nuclear deal with the US is seen as making international players take India much more seriously. Indian political elites furthermore see India as “one of the major aid-givers to developing countries […] in financial terms” and “technical expertise” (Interview with former Indian Ambassador, Delhi, October 2011). But they also point to the downside of India’s fast economic development with “Incredible India […] being done on the backs of the most disposable low caste girls and boys”, thereby making India an unreliable trade partner (EUGP civil society elite respondent). Finally, rivalries between India’s major political parties are seen as affecting India’s dealings with the EU. Additionally, Indian leaders see common points between the EU and India in terms of the stage of development of their economic and political systems. India and the EU are seen as “emerging economies” (EUGP business elite respondent) affected by similar divisive internal pressures stemming from the very federal nature of their political systems which undermine their “ability to apply the force that is theoretically at their disposal”. The EU accordingly has the “influence but not [the] direct power of the US”. Similarly, India has influence but does not “have [the] direct economic clout that China has today”, because it cannot match its “ability to centralize power” (EUAEPP political elite respondent). Interestingly, an Indian diplomat sees India’s experience of establishing a democracy as an example for the EU to follow to address its identity and values crisis. In the wake of “the loss of [European] empire and colonies”, and the concomitant need to adjust to a “different, more equal and multicultural world order” the EU, she suggests, should “evolve into a multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic continent where unity and diversity, the Indian way, is the binding culture” (Mukherjee 2018: 55, 64).

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2.3 EU Officials’ Perception of India We can now contrast this self-perception of India relative to the EU to how EU officials in Brussels and those from the Delegation of the European Union to India and Bhutan (EUD) in New Delhi view India and the EU in relation to India. We also include perceptions of India and self-perceptions of the EU, as evidenced in the 2018 EUIS, which was the result of a consultation process involving among others the EUD, EC services, Council working groups, the EP, in addition to experts, NGOs, and citizens (European Commission 2018b). We show some constants and changes in perceptions over the 2010–2019 period. On the positive side, back in 2011, India was seen as a country “several times larger than the rest of South Asia put together” which, although it used to be insular because of its post-1947 history, had “now started to open up a bit more” (Interview with EC official, Delhi, October 2011). EU officials marvelled at the durability of its democracy which held “together in spite of all the problems” India had and considered it as a “very strong emerging economy”, “seeking great power status”, in which things changed rapidly and where optimism about the future prevailed. It made “great efforts in research and innovation, and industrial development to overcome its problems” and now delivered its own humanitarian aid to other countries (Interview with EUD official, Delhi, October 2011). Likewise, EU officials later saw India as “one of the key players in Asia and in the world with impressive growth perspectives” and “an extremely young and dynamic population”, “full of ideas”. India was perceived as having “gained a lot of traction”, “becoming more and more competitive” and presenting “a lot of potential”, especially as “the trade relation” was “fairly limited” (Interview with EC officials, Brussels, 26 April 2018). The EUIS echoes such perceptions, with India being described as “an emerging global power” set to “become the most populous country in the world”, “engaging on global issues” and with “an increasingly proactive foreign policy”. It is “an important development player in its own region and beyond” with a sharp rise in its development assistance since the beginning of the 2010s. On the economic side, it is “one of the world’s largest economies” and is engaged in “an ambitious drive for modernization”. The EU has every interest in having India play a “greater role in a multipolar world, which requires a multipolar Asia”, as India is “a heavyweight on the Asian continent” with a key role “in a complex geo-strategic space”. Additionally, the EUIS sees a “general convergence” of the EU’s and India’s interests in their extended and overlapping neighbourhoods to ensure stability and security in these regions. India is also perceived as sharing common values with the EU which could lead to more cooperation in promoting “common agendas on human rights and democracy”, an “EU-India partnership on humanitarian assistance” and engagement with India “to ensure food security world-wide”. A recognition of the importance of India in security matters, the EUIS and the Council see India as cooperating with the EU on “common security interests” (Council of the European Union 2018: 5; European Commission 2018a: 1–3, 6, 10, 11, 12).

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This positive vision of India is tempered by other perceptions. In 2011, regarding human rights, democracy and security, some EU officials were frustrated by India’s policy of non-interference and its tendency to deal with regimes the EU deemed oppressive. They found India “obsessed by hard power” and resented its “eitherPakistan-or-us” attitude (Interviews with EUD officials, Delhi, October 2011). More diplomatically, the EUIS now refers to the need for an improvement in India–Pakistan relations which “would help unlock the potential of both countries” and of “their region” (European Commission 2018a: 11). In 2018, when referring to the dialogue with India on the BTIA, Commission officials pointed to extreme difficulties in discussing with India sustainable development and labour rights issues which were part of the broad agenda the EU was introducing in all its FTAs but which did not match Indian self-interests (Interview with EC officials, Brussels, 26 April 2018). The language of the EUIS echoes this and helps to further uncover EU frustrations and wishes in dealing with India on trade and investment and sustainable development. The EUIS speaks of hopes for a “meaningful agreement, delivering real market openings in all sectors on both sides” which will “have to include a comprehensive trade and sustainable development chapter, notably in order to deal with social and environmental impacts”. It refers to India’s “reluctance to open up to imports”. It also underlines the need “to work towards a sound, transparent, open, non-discriminatory and predictable regulatory and business environment for European companies trading or investing in India, including protection of their investments and the protection and enforcement of intellectual property”, suggesting that all of this is currently lacking. There follows a detailed list of existing obstacles to be removed and of future obstacles whose emergence must be prevented to enhance “market access for EU companies” (European Commission 2018a: 7). India is also seen as a country of contrasts, which still has challenges to overcome in addressing the basic needs of a significant part of its population. While an EU official pointed out in 2011 that India was a recipient of EU development aid (Interview with EUD official, Delhi, October 2011) and although India has since graduated from bilateral development assistance from the EU in 2014, the perception of India as a developing country endures. This is so even though the EUIS recognises the important role of India as a provider of development assistance. Graduation from bilateral aid “does not mean that it is no longer a developing country”, said a Commission official (Interview with EC official, Brussels, 26 April 2018). The EUIS sees India as “facing significant challenges to unlock its economic and demographic potential”, including “underdeveloped infrastructure”, inadequate connectivity, 270 million Indians in “extreme poverty”, 12 million new job seekers and “increasing income inequality”. On education, although the EUIS refers to India’s many “world class centres for education”, it underscores the need for the “modernisation, innovation and internationalization of the overall Indian higher education system” (European Commission 2018a: 2). On environmental issues, the EUIS describes India as “currently the world’s fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases”, although “this stands for only a tenth of the US per capita CO2 emissions”. However, the EUIS also points to India’s implementation of “one of the world’s largest clean energy transition programmes” in renewable energy (European Commission 2018a: 2, 3).

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India is further seen as a “huge” and “complex” country with a complicated organisation of relations between the central government—whose power is limited in certain areas—and the states which possess a lot of autonomy (Interview with EC official, Brussels, 26 April 2018). It is also seen as suffering from red-tape bureaucracy and from being “under-administered” with “extraordinarily limited staffing”, particularly in its external relations. While EU officials recognise the “intelligence, goodwill and skills/capabilities” of Indian officials, they complain of their “never having time to work” with EU officials (Interview with EEAS official, 18 September 2018). The situation is compounded by a “very hierarchical” administration which makes it difficult for agreements in principle at a lower level to receive positive evaluations at a higher level, while agreements at the political level do not preclude difficult discussions at the technical level. Although Indian negotiators are perceived as “very nice people to discuss, to talk with”, as “not aggressive”, they are also considered as “very difficult negotiators”, who are “masters on backtracking” and are sometimes “too polite” so that European negotiators get the mistaken impression that “everything goes in the right direction when in fact it is not moving”. EU officials further refer to the reluctance of their Indian counterparts to being compared with the fast-moving Chinese “tiger” or “dragon” and their self-perception of India as a “huge elephant” which goes in the right direction, but slowly (Interview by with EC officials, Brussels, 26 April 2018).

2.4 Self-Perception of the EU in Relation to India In self-reflexive mode, back in 2011, there was irritation with the Indian tendency to see the EU “as an economic and trade bloc and nothing else” (Interview with EC official, Brussels, November 2011) and to think of the EU as the few member states India was familiar with (Interview with EUD official, Delhi, October 2011). In the midst of the EU financial crisis and rising unemployment, EUD officials also contrasted the sense of optimism found in India with European pessimism (Interview with EUD official, Delhi, October 2011). On the political side, EU officials then saw the EU as an emerging global political power which had just been granted enhanced observer status at the UN. They emphasised its leading role in development cooperation and noted that India was starting to see the EU as a “normal global actor with a bit of hard power” which could partner with India beyond economic issues. They further highlighted EU democratic credentials and the legitimacy of exporting and projecting democracy in the world as a normative power. But some officials also pointed to the credibility gap of the EU at the highest levels in the Indian government, where the history of the troubles of the Euro was well known. An EUD official spoke of the “self-centered outlook” of the EU as seen from Delhi, where the EU was perceived as focusing on its own problems and not those of the wider world (Interview with EUD officials, Delhi, October 2011; Chaban et al. 2015). Other EU officials pointed to a high awareness of EU legislation by some Indian officials and to the near ignorance of others, including

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some “with very important rank” (Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011). Some complained that Indians preferred “government-to-government relations between sovereign powers” and did not understand the complexity of the EU and to what extent it differed from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Interview with EUD official, Delhi, October 2011). From a business angle, European business analysts critically reflected that Europeans were “often quite arrogant” in arguing that as they have the best technology in the world, a premium had to be paid to buy it. This, argued an official at the European Business and Technology Centre (EBTC) in New Delhi in 2011, was “not going to work in India” as it was “very, very price conscious”; the challenge for Europeans was to learn to sell products “in low-price markets” (Interview with EBTC official, Delhi, 2011). Another challenge was for the EU and its member states to “speak with one voice” in dealing with India and to project themselves as a coherent group with concrete knowledge of on-the-ground realities in India. There was a need for more coherence and coordination between the different national and EU programmes to reach the critical mass to compete in the Indian market. As an EUD official put it: “India is being courted by many industrialized countries and emerging countries. We have to act united, strong and fast”. He added “we need to have Europeans who know India from the inside, so that there is not this image, this dream of India. They need to know the difficulties, to have the contacts” (Interview with EUD official, Delhi, October 2011). By the end of the 2010s, there were subtle changes in the self-perception of the EU in relation to India. An EEAS official still pointed to the “huge knowledge gap” in India, with people not knowing what the EU was and if they knew, their knowledge was restricted to “the trade and tourism part” (Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 22 March 2019). Another official emphasised that Indians had a more negative vision of the EU than it deserved, in part because India mostly saw the EU “through British lenses” and did not “know the rest of Europe very well” (Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 18 September 2018). This was in keeping with an earlier self-perception of the EU. However, the impression was also that although India used to have a preference for dealing with individual EU member states, it now had “started to know us [the EU] better”. As a Commission official put it, Indian “interlocutors understand perfectly who we are and how we work”. Global changes had made the EU “more interesting” and India saw it as “a potential partner to counterbalance other partners” who were “either difficult or failing” (Interview with EC official, Brussels, 26 April 2018.) An EEAS official concurred that in the “current geopolitical context”, India and the EU considered one another “more like natural partners than five years ago” and as partners who could “naturally count on one another”. In a context where US policy was unstable and China was on its way to becoming “a very great superpower”, India looked to diversify its external partners beyond traditional partners such as Russia, to partners such as the EU that “represented a form of stability” (Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 18 September 2018). This self-appreciation of the EU is reflected in the EUIS which sees the EU as “the world’s most developed regional integration project

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and a stabilizing, normative power”, “increasingly a security provider” which “has made major steps in its common European defence policy” (European Commission 2018a: 1, 12). The EU is also perceived as having “in recent years, underpinned its role as an important economic and political actor in Asia”, and as “stepping up its security policy engagement” there (European Commission 2018a: 1). With its “experience in tackling environmental issues” and “cutting edge technology”, it is “a natural partner” in supporting India’s efforts to modernise “in a sustainable manner” (European Commission 2018a: 3, 2). Interestingly, there has been a shift in the way the EU portrays its role in development cooperation with regard to India. In 2011, EUD officials emphasised the leading role of the EU in development cooperation. The EUIS still refers to the EU and its member states as the “world’s leading donors of development assistance”. However, it also acknowledges that the “EU’s relationship with India on development is changing to a partnership between development actors” (European Commission 2018a: 6). There is thus less talk of EU leadership and more of “EU-India’s partnership on development cooperation” to “effectively tackle global challenges, including the Sustainable Development Goals, which India played an important role in shaping” (European Commission 2018a: 6). India’s role as a development actor is thus being recognised, next to that of the EU.3 There has also been a shift in the self-perception of the EU as playing a role in security and defence cooperation. The EUIS acknowledges that concrete initiatives are needed to “promote a better understanding of EU policies” and that “it is essential to further develop military-to-military relations with India, including between leaders of the Indian armed forces and the EU military structures, as well as joint exercises” (European Commission 2018a: 12). This points to a need to reinforce the perception of the EU in India as an increasingly relevant security and defence actor sharing common interests with India in Asia and beyond.

3 The Challenges of Indian and EU Bureaucratic Structures and Decision-Making Processes Besides perception challenges, comparing the bureaucratic structures and decisionmaking processes of the EU and the Indian sides in dealing with one another yields a fascinating picture of very similar challenges on both sides. Examining the structure of common meetings is equally informative. We first turn to an examination of the organisational challenges on the Indian side in dealing with the EU.

3 See

the contribution of Tripathi in this volume for an analysis of the EU’s and India’s approach to development cooperation.

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3.1 Indian Bureaucracy Dealing with the EU India is well organised to deal with the EU. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) acts as the main coordinator of other Indian ministries in dealing with the EU. Many MEA officials working in Europe have had previous postings there and have been well briefed by their predecessors. The EU is now a key priority under the supervision of the External Affairs Minister, while it is also under the responsibility of Secretary (West). Confusingly, however, under the Secretary (West), Central Europe (which includes some EU member states) and Europe West (which includes some other EU member states and the EU) are in separate divisions (Ministry of External Affairs India 2020) instead of being together in a single division for Europe, which would also include the EU. Indian ambassadors to the EU, as well as staff working at the embassy, often possess a high degree of expertise on the EU. However, the Embassy of India to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union is small, relative to European embassies and some Indian embassies. This reflects the more general problem that the MEA suffers from the “crippling affliction of severe understaffing” (Tharoor 2012: 319). Indian expertise on the EU is also concentrated in specific groups of officials, ministers and diplomats, while it is very limited in others, including in the Indian Parliament. A wide array of think tanks based in India and the EU, former Indian ambassadors to the EU, academics and selected specialist journalists complement the knowledge base of the MEA and the Indian Embassy to the EU, and compensate for their low level of staffing. The Embassy also relies on EU seminars targeted at a non-specialist Indian audience. Yet the “very limited resources” of Indian officials in the MEA translate into a lack of time to “interact on substance” with their EU partners (Interview with EUD official, October 2011). This said, Indian officials engage with many EU institutions. The Indian embassy has a broad range of contacts in the Commission, the EEAS and the EP. It seeks to broaden India–EU bilateral cooperation beyond economic issues to include political issues and to involve a larger number of actors on both sides in the future (Interview with Indian Ambassador, Brussels, 13 March 2018). Identifying Indian counterparts in the various ministries and bureaux is relatively easy for EU officials, with the names and functions of officials being listed on the website of the Government of India (GOI). Yet this transparency is undermined by the complexity of the Indian administration, with overlapping and competing ministries dealing with particular issues, and “an accumulation of technical groups” with an output of little relevance to real needs (Bonnafont and Bazard 2010: 173– 174). European diplomats, officials, journalists and businesspeople are also frustrated by the improvised way of organising meetings in India and long delays in response time. EU officials point to the imperative need to modernise the Indian administration and make it more efficient, while also mobilising more resources for cooperation with the EU (Interview with EC official, Brussels, 26 April 2018). Notwithstanding the high quality of the speakers, and the usually satisfying results, meetings take a very long time to be confirmed, with schedules often being agreed only at the last minute

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(Interviews with EUD officials, Delhi, October 2011; Interview with EC official, Brussels, 26 April 2018).

3.2 EU Bureaucracy Dealing with India Interestingly, EU officials encounter similar challenges in dealing with India. Although Indian ambassadors find EU officials and diplomats mostly easy to access, including at the highest level, they are also seen as being frequently unavailable due to travel or other commitments. In turn, the EU and its institutions are perceived as “complex in their structure and functioning” (Interview with Indian Ambassador, 13 March 2018). Yet the EU is well organised to interact with India, with the HR, the EEAS Managing Director and Deputy Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific, as well as the Head of Division for South Asia and Regional Affairs all taking a keen interest in India. In terms of coordination, a small Team India meets regularly within that division, while large country team meetings on India, bringing together experts from the EEAS and from relevant European Commission DGs, take place at least once a year. There are also regular discussions with the member states on India in the Asia-Oceania Working Party (COASI) and through the Heads of Mission meetings in Delhi (Interview with EEAS official, 22 March 2019). However, coordination between the member states and EU institutions in India is still less than optimal (see below). This is recognised in the EUIS and the Council conclusions, with the Council encouraging “a stronger joint approach” between EU institutions and member states towards India (Council of the European Union 2018: 5). In addition, similarly to the Indian side, only a small circle of European experts in Brussels know about India although the EUD has enlarged its team and its dynamism and on-the-ground expertise are much respected by its EU colleagues in Brussels. The EUD has tried to compensate for the limited resources of its Indian counterparts and their difficulties in finding time to interact on substance, through contacts with think tanks which mostly articulate the official position of the Government of India (GOI), as well as non-official think tanks (Interview with EUD official, October 2011). Since 2015, the EU India Think Tank Twinning Initiative launched by the EUD has been a way of fostering interaction on substance, which fits in well with India’s emphasis on the use of think tanks to compensate for the small number of its foreign policy officials. Another welcome development to further encourage it is the organisation by the EEAS of track 1.5 and 2 seminars in September 2018 in preparation for the EUIS. The involvement of Indian and EU officials and non-governmental experts, whose recommendations fed into the EUIS, may have contributed to its positive reception by the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs India 2018) ahead of its adoption by the Council. The deployment of “an EU military advisor” at the EUD would also be a welcome development. Interaction of substance on security and defence could be further developed by encouraging India–EU training sessions and exchanges of personnel at the military level (European Commission 2018a: 13).

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Here the EU hit the ground running with a delegation of EU military representatives visiting Indian authorities in New Delhi and Mumbai in January 2019, shortly after the release of the EUIS. The visit was well received in the Indian media and did much to highlight the growing EU role in defence and its relevance to Indian interests, including in providing maritime security in the Indian Ocean (Chaudhury 2019). We now turn to a discussion of the limitations of EU–India meetings and agreements.

4 Challenges in EU–India Meetings and Agreements The institutional architecture of EU–India relations is still defined by the 1994 Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on Partnership and Development, the 1993 Joint Political Statement (which led to annual ministerial meetings), and the India–EU summits. At the bottom of the pyramid, are the annual meetings of the EU–India Joint Commission, led on the Indian side by the Department of Commerce at the Joint Secretary level, and on the EU side by the EEAS at the Managing Director level. The coverage of the Joint Commission has increased over the years since its creation in 1974.4 It has three sub-commissions on trade, economic cooperation and development cooperation.5 The permanent subcommissions are handled well by the respective Commission Directorates General and Ministries on the Indian side. Cancelled meetings have, however, been a common occurrence due to what India has felt was an inadequate level of EU representation. In addition, India and the EU have organised various working groups, committees, panels and dialogues. Yet, while some are still active, others have not met in years, which points to the necessity of trimming down this plethora of meeting formats to lead to more action. Since the upgrade of EU–India relations to the level of strategic partnership in 2004, a Joint Action Plan was agreed at the 2005 New Delhi summit and reviewed in 2008. However, the original plan and its revision were “long on shared fundamentals and abstract political objectives but short on specifics and deliverables, and devoid of timelines” (von Muenchow-Pohl 2012: 13). The result was a process that remained at the level of dialogue, information-sharing or consultation, and resulted in little action. The BTIA negotiations, which were first proposed in 2006, have also remained an irritant. Interestingly, issues in tariffs and technical barriers to trade were not the only stumbling blocks; mutual misunderstandings about the dynamics of Indian and EU bureaucratic and decision-making processes, such as agreeing on the appropriate

4 In

1962, to protect its trade interests during the first EEC negotiations for British entry, India sent one of its best diplomats to Brussels as the first Head of Mission of India to the EEC. Delhi proposed negotiating a trade agreement. But only in 1974 did a Commercial Cooperation Agreement (CCA) between India and the EEC eventuate. 5 Its last meeting was in June 2014 in Delhi.

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participants in creating regular trade meetings at the ministerial level, also played a role (Mukherjee 2018: 244–246). Annual EU–India summits are the most visible part of the pyramid. Starting in 2000, they used to be held alternately in India and in the EU country holding the Presidency of the Council. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, they take place alternately in Brussels and New Delhi. The Indian Prime Minister represents India, while the Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission represent the EU. The EU and India have also held regular meetings at the Foreign Minister level and, since November 2011, foreign policy consultations at the level of Secretaries. Senior officials’ meetings are regular occurrences. Since May 2006, a Security Dialogue, now merged with the Foreign Policy consultations since 2016, is held every year (Indian Embassy 2016; Indian Embassy 2018). While the regime of summit meetings has increased the visibility of EU–India relations, its detractors are many. Before Lisbon, the EU country holding the rotating presidency of the Council influenced the quality of the summits, with India complaining in certain cases of inadequate preparation and representation or diplomatic tact on the EU side (Jain 2007: 75–76). Since Lisbon, the competition between the presidents of the European Commission and of the European Council during the summits has undermined the EU’s image as a coherent strategic partner. A further problem is the annual summits held by France and Germany with India which “overshadow the India EU Summits” (Mukherjee 2018: 69). More importantly, the process of summit preparation is time-consuming and commandeers already over-stretched EU and Indian staff resources. A 2012 joint report by the EUISS and the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) found summits too formal and “not small and flexible enough to go beyond a generic consensus which does not facilitate decision-making” (Peral and Sakhuja 2012: 22). The EUIS now recognises that the use of think tank twinning and track 1.5 and 2 meetings ahead of the preparation of important documents may make a helpful contribution to fruitful interaction on substance. More generally, it emphasises the need to “streamline” the governance of the EU–India partnership “on the basis of mutual interests and a flexible and result-oriented approach” (European Commission 2018a: 14). The Council echoes this and “underlines the importance of modernizing the institutional architecture of the 1994 EU-India cooperation agreement”. This includes more high-level dialogues between EU–India summits “to provide strategic steer and oversee cooperation between Summits” including at the ministerial level (Council of the European Union 2018: 5; European Commission 2018a: 14). High-level strategic dialogues would work well with Indian colleagues, who are very conscious of hierarchy and, in the words of an EU official “always prefer to speak to a more superior level” (Interview with EC official, 10 September 2018). Inasmuch as possible, the EU and India should also strive to avoid a mismatch in the levels of the participants in these dialogues. On the whole, the impression is of complex, cumbersome, internally divided and under-resourced bureaucracies, on both the Indian and the EU sides, staffed with competent officials and diplomats but lacking both regular interaction at the highest level and a sufficiently widespread knowledge of each other. In both the EU and India, complex bureaucracies with a wide range of actors and overlapping

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responsibilities, coupled with limited financial and human resources make it difficult to find time to interact on substance. Not surprisingly, the result is that mutually agreed commitments and declarations at India–EU meetings and summits, while covering a wide range of areas, are difficult to translate into concrete actions. The formality of the summits and the low level of commitment in some of the bilateral agreements, compound the problem. All in all, it takes time to develop cooperation between heavy bureaucratic structures such as those of the EU and India, which an EEAS official compared to “supertankers” which were difficult to move (Interview with EEAS official, 18 September 2018). Recent steps to implement the EUIS, including earmarking EUR 2,500,000 to create a “policy dialogue support facility India” to support key priority EU–India sectoral policy dialogues while identifying new areas of mutual interest and fostering more “follow-up actions”, are positive developments towards achieving more concrete results (European Commission 2019).

5 The Challenges of India–EU Public Diplomacy 5.1 Public Diplomacy Efforts and Limitations In spite of staffing limitations, the Indian Embassy in Brussels puts a premium on public diplomacy. Indian Ambassadors maintain contacts with a range of prominent journalists from several EU countries working both directly in television or print media, and also in agencies. They also maintain close relations with MEPs and participate in meetings of the EP Delegation for Relations with India, providing “information and insights into subjects of their focus to help shape the perceptions of various aspects of India” (Interview with Indian Ambassadors, Brussels, November 2011 and March 2018). The embassy’s public diplomacy and lobbying efforts towards the EP are dwarfed, however, by the activities of much larger embassies, including the Chinese embassy, with China being active in universities through partnerships via the Confucius institutes. The perception from EU officials is that the Chinese are better organised and “have the resources”. There are also “not many events on India in Europe” and some of those come “with very low attendance” (Interview with EC officials, 26 April 2018). In terms of visibility, the Indian embassy is well aware that “India-specific events in many of the think tanks are comparatively low for a country of our size” and focuses on increasing India’s “presence in think tanks and universities”. India is also planning to step up “its outreach with journalists to ensure that more positive news is reported on India” (Interview with Indian Ambassador, Brussels, March 2018). The EU likewise encounters challenges in its public diplomacy towards India and the visibility of EU programmes. A Commission official recently commented that “the communication aspect is one of our worst”, even though progress had been made in ranking up the EU in the social media (Interview with EC officials, 26 April 2018). The EUIS shows acute awareness of the problem and calls for “a more dynamic EU

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public diplomacy…with initiatives targeting decision makers, influencers, opinion shapers, civil society and academic circles” (European Commission 2018a: 14). This is not to belittle past EU efforts to develop a wide range of instruments to improve its visibility in India and to adapt its communication strategy to Indian specificities. To make the best of its limited resources, the EUD focuses on a target group of policymakers, journalists and students, who are seen as future decisionmakers and sends staff to speak at conferences in Indian cities. It organises press conferences and media seminars to brief journalists and issues publications with information on the EU. In Brussels, the EEAS invites both Indian national papers and the regional press to its events. It organises press conferences ahead of annual EU–India summits in Brussels and London and hosts Indian journalists identified by the EUD for week-long visits on specialised topics. To further promote India– EU cooperation, the EC, the EP and the EEAS have visitors from business institutes, governmental and non-governmental organisations coming to India and Europe under various visitor programmes.6 On the academic side, the EU sponsors Jean Monnet Chairs in New Delhi and EU–India Study Centres in India and the EU. A Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in European Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, and another in India–EU Interdisciplinary Studies at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education are further recent additions to the EU academic repertoire. In general, however, academic expertise on India and the EU is not much called upon either in Brussels or in Delhi. The excellent EU India Think Tanks Twinning Initiative launched by the EUD in 2015 shows the EU preference for a fruitful dialogue between Indian and EU think tanks which “bridge the gap between the daily, quick, short and factual reporting of newspapers and voluminous academic production” (AETS 2017). As a country of many languages, India requires a strategy that fits in with its linguistic diversity. While the English-language press in India must be targeted, and the Press Trust of India ensures that all papers tap into the same information, the larger group of papers publishing in Hindi and other Indian languages can nevertheless not be neglected. To adjust to this situation, the EUD produces publications in Hindi, in addition to English. Yet EU communication efforts are not always appreciated by Indian journalists. Some complain of EU public relation courses which focus on the administrative structure of the EU “which is very boring and complicated” rather than seeking to “explain the philosophy behind it” so that there might be more sympathy for the project at the highest levels in the Indian government (Interview with journalist, Hindustan Times, Delhi, October 2011). An additional difficulty in making the EU more visible in India relates to differences in vocabulary. While with the Lisbon Treaty, the Delegation of the European Commission in Delhi has now been transformed into an EU Delegation, the very word “Delegation” causes problems, as it is not identified in Delhi as being akin to an embassy or a High Commission. The EU also talks about directives and regulations; it does not talk about laws. This EU-specific language causes misunderstandings in Delhi. The Indian tendency to 6 See

also Kugiel’s contribution in this volume which suggests establishing a “Europe House” in New Delhi as a new tool of public diplomacy.

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single out the Commission as the main interlocutor, while neglecting other important EU institutions, is another irritant in the relationship. Putting the EU on the map in India is all the more difficult as the Indian media industry, with the “largest number of newspapers in the world” (Jain and Pandey 2012: 334), has few foreign correspondents compared to other countries (Baru 2009: 282) and tends to cover Europe from Paris, Berlin, Rome and London. The British media plays an important role in shaping perceptions about Europe and the EU in India, and, more broadly, Asia (Interview with EC officials, 26 April 2018). A former Indian Ambassador to the Netherlands laments that a lack of informed coverage from Brussels leads to a negative portrayal of the EU with an emphasis on its decline and an underestimation of its significance as a global actor (Mukherjee 2018: 278). An additional problem is that the EUD is not very visible to the Indian business community, some of whom are unaware of its activities. The EUIS now recommends that the EU “promote European Economic Diplomacy by linking EU–India policy dialogues and discussions with business and technological cooperation” (European Commission 2018a: 8). The Delegation works with the embassies of EU member states in Delhi to enhance EU visibility. The Heads of Mission meet every month at the Delegation and specialist counsellor groups meet regularly, with the Delegation chairing all meetings. In cultural matters, which are more the preserve of the member states, the Delegation relies on the cooperation of their cultural counsellors and cultural centres, some of which cooperate via the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC), to organise lecture series and festivals such as the EUNIC film festival. In other matters, where the EU has more competences, the Delegation is in the driving seat, for example in organising innovation roadshows in Indian cities with partners from EU member states. Another example of cooperation between the member states and the EUD is the operationalisation of the EBTC in 2009, which originated in the EP and was co-funded by the EU until 2016, when it became an independent organisation (Winand 2015: 186–188; EBTC 2020). However, the cooperation between the member states and the EUD is not always optimal. Instead of cooperating with the Delegation in its new role of representation, coordination and negotiation on behalf of the EU, some member states—in particular the larger ones—work at cross-purposes to it. From the point of view of protocol, the EU Ambassador is on the same level as other European Ambassadors and is, according to the Lisbon Treaty, the “first among equals” as he represents the EU (Interviews with Indian journalist and EUD official, Delhi, October 2011). Yet European member states’ embassies or visitors sometimes flatly contradict statements of the Head of the Delegation to their Indian colleagues. This reinforces the image in India of powerful EU member state embassies and a weak delegation with the role of the EU being “largely reduced to supplemental diplomacy” (Mukherjee 2018: 108). The importance of pre-existing bilateral ties, with some EU countries and groups of countries which get special briefings, compounds the problem. The EUIS

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does not mince words in its assessment of this situation.7 It recognises the need “for joint approaches with EU Member States in defining common messages, identifying communication opportunities and delivering as one”. It asks for the development of “a clear EU–branding in India with more targeted public and digital diplomacy initiatives, including by systematically reaching out jointly with EU Member States at national and regional levels” (European Commission 2018a: 14). More joint cultural initiatives by the EU and its member states would also go a long way in fostering a clearer, more unified image of the EU in India. In addition, it is essential to continue to foster intercultural exchanges, dialogues, cooperation and joint activities between the EU and India. A better coordination between the EU and its member states and more cooperation with India in the cultural and creative sectors, including in the preservation of cultural heritage and through the encouragement of artist mobility, would help promote the image of the EU as a more unified, dynamic actor, engaged in concrete activities, thereby also enhancing its visibility in India. This would go a long way in “enhancing understanding of the EU in India” through concrete and visible actions (European Commission 2018a: 13).

5.2 EU Low Visibility in Specific Fields More visible actions may also be needed in specific fields such as development cooperation and security where the EU lacks visibility. Even though the EU has traditionally considered itself as the foremost development cooperation player in the world and spends almost 90% of its external relations budget on Official Development Assistance (ODA), it has lacked visibility in that field in India. This in spite of the long history of the EEC/EU contribution to important programmes such as Operation Flood for the production of milk in rural areas, to poverty alleviation, health and state partnership programmes, and EU involvement in civil society projects on sustainable development and vocational training in India, to name a few (Datar 2015). India’s graduation from bilateral development assistance from the EU in 2014 helps explain this state of affairs, with the EU having significantly reduced its presence on the ground since that time (Interview with EC Official, 26 April 2018). However, the EU as an international development actor already lacked visibility to the Indian public even prior to 2014, compared to the higher visibility of some of the national European programmes and of third countries such as the US (Jain and Pandey 2012: 339). In addition, thematic and regional funds remain available to India and ongoing projects are being funded until completion, which should make the EU somewhat visible in development cooperation. A first explanation of the low EU profile is the higher visibility of other donors, including those EU member states that have continued their development cooperation with India and whose programmes are better understood by

7 Regarding

the role, function and impact of partnership strategies on EU strategy-making see the contribution by Aspengren and Nordenstam in this volume.

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Indian actors than are the EU programmes. A second explanation is the lack of cohesion in development cooperation within the EUD, with difficulties in coordinating the efforts of the cooperation section of the EUD with those of EU member states because of different funding mechanisms and priorities. A third reason is the lack of sufficient recognition by the EU of the role of India as a provider of development assistance to South Asia and Africa. Last but not least, is the perception of the EU as including “former colonial powers” and as “part of an international development regime that is criticized in India” as harking back to the “post-1945 Western-led international order”. India finds it difficult to engage with Northern partners as this could undermine the visibility of its “South-South solidarity” (Mawdsley 2014: 6, 7). A welcome sign, however, is the recognition of some of these underlying dynamics and realities in the EUIS with an acknowledgement of India as a development actor which can partner with the EU in development cooperation. Another welcome development is the tendency for the EU and some of its member states to move away from traditional assistance and increasingly adopt elements of the South–South model of cooperation, which increases the likelihood of partnering with India on development. We have also seen that the EU’s importance as a security actor mostly goes under the radar in India. What, then, are the challenges to EU visibility and India–EU cooperation on security issues? A first challenge for increased cooperation in security is the different views that India and the EU—as respectively, a sovereign state and a supranational institution—hold on multilateralism, multipolarity, sovereignty, human rights and democracy. For example, the EU harbours a view of multilateralism based on the pooling of sovereignty and rules rooted in multilateral institutions, which includes the responsibility to protect, and to intervene in the internal affairs of another state when human rights are violated. It prefers a multilateral approach to security. By contrast, India sees multilateralism as sovereignty-based and dislikes interfering in the affairs of other states. Delhi mostly dislikes multilateral security interventions “preferring bilateral approaches to security” especially in its own backyard (Vicziany 2015: 276). On democracy, while the EU speaks of democracy promotion and conditionalities, India is reluctant to force democracy on other states and prefers to foster it “through its own example” (Devare et al. 2009: 3). These different conceptions help explain different behaviours in tackling global issues such as climate change, the reform of the UN, terrorism, human rights and nuclear questions (Bonnafont and Bazard 2010: 172–176). They also explain the difficulties India has in understanding what kind of political and security animal the EU is as well as Delhi’s tendency to view EU member states as the main political and security actors, with the EU barely coming into the picture. The EU’s own difficulties in becoming a more coherent actor in security and defence compound the problem. Notwithstanding recent efforts to improve defence cooperation in the EU, India sees the member states themselves—and not the EU as a whole—as the main defence actors. Member states such as the UK, France and Germany, have long sold defence equipment to India, with Central European countries also getting a share of this lucrative market (Patil et al. 2017: 123). Another challenge for the visibility of the EU in security is the different strategic and security interests of India and the EU, stemming from their respective geopolitical situations.

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Traditionally, the US, compared to the EU, which does not appear to India to have a coherent military policy, has seemed more credible and reliable in helping to guarantee India’s security (Winand et al. 2015: 348). India also views the EU as operating in the US shadow in important security areas, such as nuclear cooperation. However, the advent of the Trump administration has seen a rapprochement between India and the EU in key areas. Similarly, recent moves by China in Eurasia such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which affect the neighbourhoods of both India and the EU, have led to a higher degree of strategic convergence between the two. EU and Indian strategic interests would also seem to converge in maintaining maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region to protect their energy supplies and trade interests, cooperate on migration, and prevent “the outbreak of an armed conflict” (Chopra 2017: 46).

6 Prospects for EU–India Relations To conclude, while India is sometimes compared to a slow-moving elephant, the EU exhibits some of the same features as India in terms of heavy bureaucracy and slow and complicated decision-making. Much has already been achieved but there is potential for a more ambitious cooperation through more quality interaction on substance, a more realistic definition of priorities in the relationship and the slimming down of bureaucratic processes. In brief, what is needed is less rhetoric and more action. This may be achieved by moving step-by-step to patiently build concrete and durable solidarities based on a realistic appraisal of mutual interests. Notwithstanding current efforts on both sides, however, EU–India relations are in a state of flux. Controversies on the state of Indian democracy, opportunities and challenges thrown up by Brexit and the difficulties in handling the COVID-19 pandemic, all contribute to a climate of uncertainty and may be important factors in future India–EU relations. Indeed, controversies have marked Modi’s second term and undermined the image of Indian democracy in Europe. In August 2019, a presidential decree revoked Article 370 of the Indian Constitution which guaranteed a special status and partial autonomy for Kashmir with a lockdown ensuing in the region. In late October a delegation of 27 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), mostly from the far-right Identity and Democracy group (Saeed 2019), was invited to meet Modi in Delhi in an unofficial audience, before a majority of the MEPs set off for a supervised visit to Jammu and Kashmir. The visit was organised by the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Security Adviser through an NGO with shady credentials. Some commentators saw this as “nothing more than a PR stunt” (BBC 2019). The European Parliament soon specified that the controversial visit was “organized in [a] private capacity” and did “not represent the House” (Saeed 2019) while the Delegation of the European Union to India and Bhutan distanced itself from the visit as well (Choudhury and Dhawan 2019). In 2020 discussions on the introduction of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the ensuing debates, protests and violent attacks against Muslims in Delhi further darkened the waters of India–EU relations. In January 2020, MEPs introduced

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a joint motion for a resolution against the CAA, which they viewed as discriminatory, only to postpone a vote to the end of March, after the planned EU–India summit, due to be held on 13 March 2020. Some Indian commentators saw this as a significant diplomatic victory for India. The External Affairs Minister had come to Brussels in mid-February to bolster EU–India relations in preparation for the next India–EU summit and had met with the Foreign Affairs Council, senior EU officials and MEPs. The Indian Embassy in Brussels had done much to prepare the high-level visit by contacting MEPs to discuss the CAA. At the same time, critics pointed out that the postponing of the vote sent a signal that the EU was only too keen to overlook human rights issues for the prospect of economic gains from progress on investment and trade negotiations. Because of the spread of COVID-19 to Belgium, the India–EU summit was postponed, however.8 In the wake of horrific violence in North East Delhi in late February and early March, sparked by protests against the CAA, a journalist commented that the cancellation of the summit and other foreign visits had “in some ways, been fortuitous” because of the likelihood of protests against the Indian government during these visits (Chaudhury 2020). In addition, negotiations for a BTIA have not resumed even though there are “efforts on both sides to re-engage actively” towards relaunching them (India–EU Joint Statement 2017: paragraph 32) through ongoing dialogue. Looming in any resumption of negotiations for a BTIA is the impact of Brexit. On the one hand, India may lose the UK as an advocate in the EU for some of its positions and, more broadly, for stronger attention to be accorded to Asia within the EU. For example, when Britain joined the European Communities in 1973, this had a major impact on bringing the negotiation of a Commercial Cooperation Agreement (CCA) between India and the EEC to a successful conclusion (Winand et al. 2015: 14–140). The position of the UK also influenced the evolution of the EEC away from an essentially Africa-focused policy towards developing countries and towards a policy that gradually took more interest in Asia. This was reflected in the level of EEC aid to India. After the UK joined the EEC, “India received more aid in one year than the previous five put together with $ 49.43 million” (Datar 2015: 320). On the other hand, however, the UK has also been one of the stumbling blocks for the BTIA with its insistence on Delhi dropping its high tariffs on Scotch whisky and its reluctance to grant a more liberal visa regime for Indian workers for fear that they would primarily end up in the UK. Brexit may thus remove some important hurdles. The UK tendency to monopolise relations with India, to the exclusion of other EU member states, may also have stultified relations between India and the rest of the EU in the past (Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 18 September 2018). Brexit may intensify such relations. The French President made it clear that he would like France to become the “entry point” of India in Europe and the EU (Reuters 2018) while the German President sees Germany, together with France as “India’s new strategic anchor on the European Continent and in the European Single Market” (Steinmeier 2018). The Secretary-General of the Europe-India Chamber of Commerce in Brussels recently stated that Indian companies used to see the UK as India’s “point of entry into 8 The

summit was held via video conference on 15 July 2020.

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Europe” but “now look to Germany, France, to Belgium” in hopes “for a trade deal to facilitate investment and trade flows” (von der Burchard 2018). Even though some Indian analysts see Brexit as “an opportunity to expand India’s trade and economic relations with the UK” (Sinha 2019), increasingly, in spite of the UK’s efforts to court India for a future trade deal, India seems to be putting the EU ahead of the UK in trade negotiations. Although Brexit may make the EU a less formidable trade and investment partner, it is still a much larger trading partner for India than “a middle level economy” such as the UK and the latter will need to “make concessions” for a deal “to be attractive to India” (Mukherjee 2019). How India, the EU and their partners handle the current Coronavirus crisis will also be decisive in how the EU and India choose to chart their future relationship. Modi’s recent initiative in mid-March to build an emergency fund for South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations to counter the Covid-19 pandemic in South Asia while “setting an example for the world” will be watched with interest in the EU (The Economic Times 2020). New Delhi will likewise be attentive to EU efforts to tackle the pandemic.

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Winand, Pascaline, Marika Vicziany, and Poonam Datar. 2015. The European Union and India: Rhetoric or meaningful partnership? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Winand, Pascaline. 2015. EU-India current perceptions and implementation challenges. In The European Union and India: Rhetoric or meaningful partnership? Pascaline Winand, Marika Vicziany, and Poonam Datar, 166–202. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Pascaline Winand is Director of Studies at the College of Europe, Natolin. She also lectures at the Institut d’Etudes européennes of the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB). She was previously Professor and Director of the Monash European and EU Centre at Monash University, Melbourne and Professor of Contemporary History at the European University Institute in Florence. Her areas of specialization include international history, EU external relations, transatlantic relations, EUAsia relations and comparative regionalism.

The European Union–India Strategic Partnership: An Examination of the Economic Aspects Sangeeta Khorana

1 Introduction The European Union (EU) and India have a long relationship history that can be traced back to the Cooperation Agreement in 1994, subsequently cemented with the 2004 strategic partnership and the 2018 EU strategy on India. The EU–India partnership has evolved over the last decade and ambitious free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations were launched in 2007. This was followed by an Agenda for Action that was adopted at the EU–India summit in 2016. But it was not until the EU–India summit in October 2017 that both the partners agreed on a common vision of global governance, shared values and principles that led to the 2018 “EU Strategy on India” (European Commission 2018a, c).1 Of late, strategic partnerships have become an important foreign policy instrument and are increasingly being used by countries in the multipolar world to indicate their commitment to engage on policy issues. Despite the lack of a concrete definition of what a strategic partnership is, it is observed that such a partnership provides “a useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests” (European Council 2010: 3), and serves as a means to find “a balance of mutual advantages and commitments” (van Rompuy 2010), of which trade is an increasingly important component (Jain and Sachdeva 2019: 1). The EU–India Strategic Partnership is no exception, and reaches beyond the formal agreement between the EU and India to form a network partnership to share finance, skills, information and/or other resources in the pursuit of common goals.

S. Khorana (B) Bournemouth University, Bournemouth, UK e-mail: [email protected] 1 For

an analysis of the role, function and impact of partnership strategies on EU strategy-making, see the contribution by Aspengren and Nordenstam in this volume.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_7

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The 2018 strategy focuses on appraising the current EU–India ties, and sets out the EU’s vision for a strategy to strengthen partnership with India (European Commission 2018a). The factsheet released by the European External Agency Service (2018) stated that “The European Union and India upgraded their long-standing relationship to a strategic partnership in 2004, acknowledging their common goals and principles. Nowadays, in a challenging international environment, the EU and India share the same values of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and support the rules-based global order centred on multilateralism”. The Joint Communication explicitly recognises India’s economic power as a rapidly growing economy and acknowledges its geopolitical role in the region. In order to strengthen the economic partnership between the EU and India, the strategic partnership focuses on sustainable modernisation and developing common responses to global and regional issues (European Council 2018).2 A key aim of this chapter is to unravel the economic aspects of the EU–India Strategic Partnership by discussing the driving forces of the EU–India relationship as a whole and how this might provide an opportunity for both sides to re-engage in discussions on how to further the EU–India Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) negotiations (De Nederlense Grondwet 2019). In addition, this chapter fleshes out why it has not been possible for the EU and India to exploit their economic partnership to its full potential and provides insights into how and with what effect the strategic partnership may be an important milestone for both partners.

2 The Timing for This Partnership Is Appropriate Both the EU and India are important partners for each other, for economic, political and strategic reasons. From the EU’s perspective, the declaration of an EU strategy on India can be attributed to seismic shifts in the EU’s landscape—including Brexit, and Eurozone and migration crises—that are likely to have profound implications for the EU as a bloc. An important factor driving the partnership is the need to find new markets for EU businesses at a time when the EU–US relationship is suffering from the imposition by the Trump administration of tariffs on EU exports. The strategic partnership with India is an opportunity and offers potential for the EU to revitalise its economy, especially in light of the recent political developments such as the UK’s departure from the EU on 31 January 2020, which has inflicted a blow to the credibility of the EU’s integration project. These developments, complemented by growing nationalistic approaches in EU member states such as Hungary and Poland, lend credence to the importance of strengthening strategic partnerships for geopolitical reasons. From an economic perspective, the faltering of the Eurozone economy due to uncertainty and declining global trade compounded by the slowing down of the Chinese economy, is having a negative impact on EU trade. Further, trade 2 Regarding the normative foundation of EU Foreign Policy as well as norm contestation within and

beyond the EU–India Strategic Partnership, see the contribution by Lowinger et al. in this volume.

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tensions between the EU and USA, as well as between India and the USA—following Trump’s pursuit of a protectionist agenda—have serious implications compelling the EU to look for new trade partners. Both the EU and India are big influencers—the EU as a global power and India as a rising power—and the strategic partnership is an acknowledgement of this reality (Jain and Sachdeva 2019). Current realities make the EU–India strategic relationship synergetic; India has until recently been the world’s fastest-growing large economy (Khorana 2019). It represents a sizable and dynamic market, with an annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of around 7% in 2018 with over 1.3 billion in population (EEAS 2018). Despite a dip in the growth rate in 2019, India remains an attractive economic partner and has tremendous potential as an export market for EU businesses. The Belgian European Council Representative (ECR) deputy Geert Bourgois stated that “the market remains largely untapped as India accounts for only 2.3 percent of EU trade and only ranks ninth in EU trading partners”, which explains the economic rationale for the strategic partnership. Further, the importance of India as a trade and investment partner for the EU reflects that through the EU–India Strategic Partnership, India is likely to seek to capitalise on its growing economic status. The EU’s perception is that in light of growing global trade tensions restarting the languishing EU–India trade negotiations might be useful, and all the more so as this would also lead to a separate Investment Protection Agreement which could be a step towards an ambitious FTA in the long term. From the perspective of India, the strategic partnership with the EU could well be a blessing in disguise given that having been the fastest-growing developing country in the world, India has experienced broad-based growth deceleration; India’s growth rate has slumped from 9% in 2018 to 4.5% in the third quarter of 2019, the slowest pace in six years (Financial Times 2019). The Indian economy has lost momentum with unmistakable signs of slowing down characterised by a decline in consumption, investment and exports (Khorana 2020). Further, the automotive, real estate and aviation sectors have suffered a slowdown in demand. To address the signs of the faltering Indian economic engine, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi initiated reforms to boost the economy. Corporate tax rates were lowered from 30 to 22% and taxes for greenfield manufacturing plants were reduced from 25 to 15%; foreign direct investment (FDI) limits were raised in a range of sectors; a nationwide goods and services tax (GST) and bankruptcy legislation have been enacted (Economic Times 2019). But these reforms have failed to invigorate the stalling economy; so much so that the South Asia Economic Focus report (2019) states “India’s cyclical slowdown is severe”. The political situation in India is far from comfortable for PM Modi, who despite leading the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to an unprecedented victory in the Lok Sabha election, is floundering. This explains why India might be willing to invest in the strategic partnership with the EU. From as early as the 2004 partnership India has looked at the strategic partnership with the EU as a key element of its foreign policy. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (2004) identified key elements of the 2004 EU–India Strategic Partnership: First, that the primary objective of this relationship was to increase the potential for trade and investment, and ensure enhanced market access for Indian goods in the

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EU into the European market. Second, the partnership was perceived as a means to enhance India’s strategic autonomy and there was enthusiasm for independent foreign and security policies with other countries. Third, the strategic partnership was to be based on sovereign equality and on “comparative advantage and a mutuality of interests and benefits” (2004: 4, para 2).

3 The EU–India Strategic Partnership Is Driven by Economics Trade flows between the EU and India are important. These have the ability to influence and shape the contours of the 2018 strategic relationship, and are likely to be the “propellant and lubricant” of the partnership. An examination of EU–India annual trade confirms that trade is a major driving force (Jain and Sachdeva 2019; Khorana 2019). Data shows that the EU is India’s largest trading partner, accounting for EUR 92 billion worth of trade in goods in 2018 or 12.9% of total Indian trade, ahead of China (10.9%) and the USA (10.1%) (European Commission 2018b). In turn India is the EU’s 9th largest trading partner, accounting for 2.3% of the EU’s total trade in goods in 2018, which is far behind the USA (16.9%) and China (15.3%) (European Commission 2018b). Trade in goods between the EU and India presents an upward trend in the last decade and has increased by over 8.8% since 2003. Trade between the EU and India grew by as much as three times over the period 2002–2018, from EUR 28 billion to EUR 91 billion. The main items of export between the EU and India include chemical products (EUR 6.6 billion) and machinery and transport equipment (EUR 6.4 billion). Among trading partners, Germany leads (EUR 19.6 billion), followed by the UK (EUR 13.6 billion), Belgium (EUR 12.8 billion), France (EUR 10.9 billion) and Italy (EUR 9.5 billion). Given that trade has been rising between the partners, and in light of India’s high growth, the strategic partnership can be a driver to enable both countries to exploit trade potential to the fullest extent. Data confirms that services are an increasingly important component of EU–India trade. At present, India is the fourth largest service exporter to the EU and the sixth largest destination for EU services exports. Trade in services between the EU and India increased from EUR 23 billion in 2010 to EUR 29 billion in 2016. In percentage terms, bilateral trade in services registered a 10% increase between 2016 and 2017, and in value terms the increase was from EUR 30 billion in 2016 to EUR 33.6 billion in 2017. Detailed analysis of flows shows that Indian services exports to the EU were EUR 16.6 billion in 2018, while imports were EUR 17.073 billion (European Commission 2018b; Khorana 2019). The EU’s share in foreign investment inflows to India more than doubled from 8 to 18% in the last decade, making the EU the largest foreign investor in India. EU FDI stocks in India amounted to EUR 73 billion in 2016, which is significant but still below the EU’s foreign investment stocks in China (EUR 178 billion). By

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2015, total EU FDI stock in India was at EUR 52 billion and Indian companies had invested nearly EUR 16 billion in the EU (Eurostat Database). The Europe India Chamber of Commerce (EICC) commissioned a study which showed that the European companies invested more than EUR 180 billion in India from 2008 to 2017 (Charlie 2014). In terms of FDI from the EU, the services sector in particular has attracted investment from the UK, Germany, Netherlands, France, Italy and Belgium. Further, nearly 6000 EU companies are present in India, providing 1.7 million direct jobs and 5 million indirect jobs in a broad range of sectors (European Commission 2018b).

4 What Drives the Strategic Partnership? Two aspects of the strategic relationship are relevant from an economic perspective and need attention. Firstly, the EU’s efforts towards a comprehensive and balanced agreement with partners on trade and investment with a view to driving forward a rules-based global trade regime have been deadlocked, as the EU-FTA talks have stalled.3 Second, the Joint Communication lays out the road map for strengthening the EU–India Strategic Partnership. In this manner, the Joint Communication seeks to maximise the opportunities in terms of trade and investment, and to seize the full potential of the EU–India Strategic Partnership. In particular, the EU’s Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change and India’s Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas (“Collective Efforts, Inclusive Growth”) initiatives create new opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between people and businesses on both sides. From a rules-based perspective, the EU and India are partners, with a mutual interest in trade, but they also have a shared commitment to the rule of law, global norms and free and open markets. This has been articulated by both the EU and India at the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this light, a strong EU–India partnership is vital to both countries’ interests in protecting and promoting a rules-based international order. The ambition of the EU–India FTA was to set the benchmark but, unfortunately, the FTA talks have been lost momentum since 2013. If the FTA talks were to progress, this would be an opportunity for the EU to lead the reform process in the WTO, and support the multilateral system in safeguarding and ensuring the effective functioning of trade liberalisation, monitoring and enforcement, which constitute the key pillars of the WTO system. Within the context of EU policy, Hardacre and Smith (2009) eloquently argue that the EU has pursued an active interregional relations strategy that is linked with trade initiatives. The Union has developed a complex architecture of interregional agreements, varying from agreements at an intercontinental level to those with restricted scope. Often these relationships result in “complex inter-regionalism” (Hardacre and 3 For

an overview of the determinants and impediments of an EU–India Trade Agreement also see the contribution of Köhler-Suzuki in this volume.

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Smith 2009, 2014), in which multiple actors at a variety of levels and scales of operation in different regions come into collision or collaboration with each other. Trade policy plays a significant role given that this allows the EU’s companies market access on favourable terms to groups of countries and in this manner is a significant incentive to the building of interregional ties (Smith 2018). Strategic relations with India are no exception. There is evidence that FTAs concluded by the EU with third countries are a step forward in the direction of overcoming the shortcomings of the WTO, in that the FTAs include commitments from partner countries to provide market access and remove barriers to trade at a bilateral level, and these commitments in most cases go beyond the level of WTO provisions. An analysis of FTA commitments between the EU and its partners reveals that these agreements are comprehensive, and allow additional market access to goods, services, investment and public procurement, as well as including rules that improve the broader framework to conduct trade and facilitate investment. Further, there are specific commitments by partners on the rules of origin, competition, intellectual property rights and cross-border data flows. In this manner, the EU employs FTAs as a means to “promote consensus among like-minded partners and to develop a network of relations that can promote not only economic but also political goals, including in the social and environmental areas” (Business Europe 2019). The strategic partnership is an important step in reiterating the importance of the economic aspects of the EU–India relationship. Kick-starting the languishing EU–India FTA talks—formally termed BTIA—which commenced in 2007 but lost momentum after 16 rounds of negotiations, has been a non-mover given the uncompromising stance and unwillingness of partners to narrow down to a manageable set of strategic priorities (Khorana 2019); the priorities vary widely between partners, and the EU focus on deep partnership, which is not on India’s agenda, has led to divergent priorities. The obstacles to FTA talks include the lack of an agreement between the EU and India on tariff reductions, the extent of market access in a range of sectors, the extent of procurement and services liberalisation, and the demand for inclusion of social, environment and human rights clauses. While the EU attributes the lack of progress to the inflexibility of Indian negotiators in providing market access in dairy, wine and automotive sectors, India holds the EU’s unwillingness to provide access to the services market, data security and transparency laws as the main stumbling block to FTA discussions (Khorana and Garcia 2013). These challenges continue to exist and more demands for liberalisation have been added to the EU and Indian negotiating list. Studies examining the economic outcome of the EU–India FTA have not suggested any promising scenario (see Decreux and Mitaritonna 2007; Achterbosch et al. 2008; Powell 2008; Ecorys 2009; Khorana and Perdikis 2010; Khorana et al. 2011; Khorana and Garcia 2013; Khorana and Asthana 2014; Wouters et al. 2014). The analysis of the economic impacts of the EU–India FTA, which identifies sectors likely to gain and lose, shows that where services constitute over half of GDP, the potential impact of the proposed FTA goes well beyond tariff reductions on goods.

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From the EU’s perspective, the main sticking points in the talks are drug patents, tariffs for second-hand cars, agriculture, services, rules of origin and an unacceptable Indian list of 99 sensitive items and domestic pressures in sectors such as agriculture, where the risk from European imports is marginal. The EU perceives India’s reluctance to open up its market to imports and inward investment as impediments to future talks. While the EU has specifically asked India for an Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) within the FTA setting, India has not been willing to accept this (Jain and Sachdeva 2019). On the contrary, India has adopted an enterprise-based approach and expressed a desire to narrow the scope of protected investments by reducing the potential liability of the state under ISDS claims. Further, India has dropped the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause making it mandatory for foreign investors to seek domestic judicial and administrative remedies for a period of five years before pursuing a claim under international law. India proposes that investors be able to appeal to an arbitration tribunal only after they have addressed the issue in an ordinary court, which is to ensure that domestic interests are protected. To add even more to the misery of the non-progress of the FTA, India firmly believes that tax rulings should not fall under the jurisdiction of investment protection. Simultaneously as the EU requested detailed provisions on ISDS in 2016, India cancelled 20 bilateral investment protection treaties with individual EU countries. Another obstacle is that the EU is seeking to negotiate a strong intellectual property regime (IPR) and a sustainable development chapter with social and environmental clauses, both of which India is reluctant to negotiate in the FTA context (Khorana 2019). India has its own expectations from the proposed FTA, and now the EU–India Strategic Partnership could be an opportunity to address those issues not yet settled by the FTA talks. India has consistently demanded a liberal visa regime in the EU, which has been denied and over time become an obstacle to deepening India–EU economic relations. The Indian demand for the relaxation of EU visa restrictions is likely to remain a sticking-point, which could be addressed through the strategic partnership. Another issue is that India has been demanding the status of data-secure nation as this would reduce compliance costs for Indian software providers in the EU. However, given the EU’s concerns over regulatory norms and data-privacy standards it is unlikely that the EU will agree to this demand under the FTA ambit, and the strategic partnership might just be a forum to address this issue. However, in light of the differences between the EU and India, the prospects of breathing life into the EU–India FTA talks are slim, given that the EU and India continue to have divergent negotiating positions. A word of caution—the divergence in partners’ priorities and unwillingness to concede to each other’s request is likely to restrict the benefits from the EU–India Strategic Partnership. The current political developments make the prospect of an EU–India trade deal unlikely, which explains why an aspiration of a relationship is best expressed through a strategic partnership.

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5 Conclusion India is a growing economic powerhouse, likely to be the third largest economy by 2030. The time has passed when the EU was an economic powerhouse that held sway at the international level. This has since been replaced by FTAs and developing partnerships with strategically relevant countries. As things stand, there is no simple linear relationship between the EU’s trade power and its capacity to translate that into foreign policy action (Smith 2018). India, as a rising economy, could, if it plays the relationship well, hold the reins of the EU–India Strategic Partnership. For the EU to ensure that the partnership delivers, it is important to maintain momentum in the long term as both countries continue to carve out their place in what is the beginning of defining their role in an open and inclusive multipolar world order. In light of the economic and political realities, the 2018 EU–India Strategic Partnership can be a vehicle for both the EU and India. This can be used to sensitise each other’s expectations and understanding of perspectives towards bilateral, regional and global issues at a time when both the EU and India need each other.4 India needs support to boost its declining economic and political clout in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); failure to demonstrate engagement with FTAs, as demonstrated by pulling out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) at the last minute, and growing animosity with Pakistan, are key issues to consider. Hence, both India and the EU need a strategic partnership for geopolitical and economic reasons. What both partners could realistically do is to re-engage with each other and have a firm commitment to build and consolidate the strategic partnership for mutual gain at a time when multilateralism is under threat and global growth is slowing.

References Achterbosch, Thom, Marijke Kuiper, and Pim Roza. 2008. EU-India Free Trade Agreement: A quantitative assessment. The Hague: LEI Wageningen. Adith, Charlie. 2014. European companies in India: reigniting economic growth. EICC/EBTC. https://www.europeindia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/EICC_Study_report_2014.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020. Business Europe. 2019. A trade strategy fit for the 21st century. https://www.businesseurope.eu/ sites/buseur/files/media/reports_and_studies/april_2019_-_a_trade_strategy_fit_for_the_21st_c entury_light_0.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020. Decreux, Y., and Mitaritonna, C. 2007. Economic impact of a potential Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union and India, CEPII—CIREM. Report for Economic Analysis in Support of Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Negotiation. Brussels: DG Trade. De Nederlense Grondwet. 2019. EU-India summit: A new momentum for the EU-India strategic partnership. https://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/id/vk2ts63cl3z1/nieuws/eu_india_summit_ a_new_momentum_for_the?ctx=vgaxlcr1jzjq. Accessed 22 February 2020. 4 On

the development of India’s view on the liberal world order see the contribution of Kugiel in this volume.

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Economic Times. 2019. World Bank cuts India’s growth projection to 6 per cent. https://economict imes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/world-bank-cuts-indias-growth-projection-to-6per-cent/articleshow/71562469.cms?from=mdr. Accessed 22 February 2020. ECORYS. 2009. Trade sustainability impact assessment for the FTA between the EU and the Republic of India, TRADE07/C1/C01. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/june/tradoc_ 143372.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020. EEAS. 2018. EU-India factsheet: A new EU strategy on India. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ india/4010/eu-india-factsheet-new-eu-strategy-india_en. Accessed 22 February 2020. European Commission. 2018a. Explaining the European Union’s partnership with India. https://eur opa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-6483_en.htm. Accessed 13 July 2020. European Commission. 2018b. Trade and regions: India. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countr ies-and-regions/countries/india/index_en.htm. Accessed 13 July 2020. European Commission. 2018c. EU shapes its ambitious strategy on India. https://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_IP-18-6481_en.htm. Accessed 22 February 2020. European Council. 2010. General Secretariat of the Council Delegations, Conclusions, 16 September, EUCO 21/10. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ ec/116547.pdf. European Council. 2018. India: Council adopts conclusions on a new EU strategy. https://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/10/india-council-adopts-conclusions-ona-new-eu-strategy/. Accessed 22 February 2020. Financial Times. 2019. India and globalisation—Special report. https://www.ft.com/reports/indiaand-globalisation. Accessed 22 February 2020. Hardacre, Alan, and Michael Smith. 2009. The EU and the diplomacy of complex interregionalism. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 4 (2): 167–188. Hardacre, Alan, and Michael Smith. 2014. The European Union and the contradictions of complex interregionalism. In Intersecting interregionalism: Regions, global governance and the EU, ed. F. Baert, T. Scaramagli, and F. Söderbaum, 91–106. Dordrecht: Springer. Jain, Rajendra K., and Gulshan Sachdeva. 2019. India-EU strategic partnership: A new roadmap. Asia Europe Journal 17 (3): 309–325. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-019-00556-0. Khorana, Sangeeta. 2019. Is Brexit an opportunity to revive the EU-India trade deal? The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/is-brexit-an-opportunity-to-revive-the-eu-indiatrade-deal-113780. Accessed 22 February 2020. Khorana, Sangeeta. 2020. India’s economy: How the world’s fastest growing nation went off the rails. The Conversation, 13 January. https://www.bournemouth.ac.uk/news/2020-01-13/opinionindias-economy-how-worlds-fastest-growing-nation-went-rails. Accessed 15 December 2020. Khorana, Sangeeta, and Anand N. Asthana. 2014. EU FTA negotiations with India: The question of liberalization of public procurement. Asia Europe Journal 12 (3): 251–263. Khorana, Sangeeta, and Maria Garcia. 2013. European Union-India FTA: One step forward, one back? Journal of Common Market Studies 51 (4): 684–700. Khorana, Sangeeta, and Nicholas Perdikis. 2010. EU-India Free Trade Agreement: Deal or no deal? South Asia Economic Journal 11 (2): 181–206. Khorana, Sangeeta, Nicholas Perdikis, William A. Kerr, and May T. Yueng. 2011. The era of bilateral agreements: The EU and India in search of a partnership. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. Powell, Sophie. 2008. The EU-FTA: Initial observations from development perspective. Traidcraft. http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/EU-IndiaFTAInitialObservations.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020. Smith, Michael. 2018. Trade policy and foreign policy in the European Union. In Handbook on the EU and international trade, eds. Sangeeta Khorana, and Maria Garcia, 171–187. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs. 2004. Joint Declaration. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/7462. Accessed 15 December 2020. Van Rompuy, H. 2010. Introductory remarks of the President of the European Commission, J.M. Barroso, at the joint press conference with the President of the European Council, H. Van Rompuy,

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ahead of the G8 and G20 summits. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/pre sscorner/detail/fr/MEMO_10_276. Accessed 13 July 2020. Wouters, Jan, Idesbald Goddeeeris, Bregt Natens, and Filip Ciortuz. 2014. Some critical issues in the EU-India Free Trade Agreement negotiations. European Law Journal 20 (6): 848–869.

Professor Sangeeta Khorana is an international trade expert and leads research and teaching on EU trade policy, focusing in particular on EU’s economic relations with India and Vietnam. She has authored several books and journal articles on EU-India trade issues as well as provided written and oral evidence on trade issues to the European and Scottish Parliaments on EU-India relations.

Determinants and Impediments of the EU-India Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement: The Proof of This Old Pudding Is in the Eating Nicolas Köhler-Suzuki

1 Introduction1 In November 2004, the newly elected Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited The Hague for the launch of the EU-India Strategic Partnership with European Commission President Romano Prodi and European Council President Jan Peter Balkenende. Economic issues were high on the agenda and both sides agreed to ‘facilitate and expand bilateral trade and investment flows’ (European Commission 2004: 3). In the fifteen years since, trade and investment flows have grown considerably, with an increase of more than 72% in goods trade in the last decade alone. Moreover, the share of total European outward foreign investment going to India more than doubled from 8 to 18% during this period (European Commission 2019).2 But this growth happened in the absence of a bilateral trade and investment agreement which both the EU and India had proclaimed to be the next step in the bilateral relationship. It was not for lack of trying. Trade talks for a comprehensive bilateral economic agreement between the EU and India started in earnest in June 2007 and went through twelve formal rounds of negotiations, as well as numerous technical meetings (Nataraj 2016). Yet by mid-2013, both sides had run into seemingly irreconcilable differences. Negotiations ground to a halt and no formal negotiations have 1 This chapter is adapted from the author’s forthcoming doctoral dissertation on India’s trade agreements at the University of Cambridge. The author thanks Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Ignacio García-Bercero, Philipp Gieg, Pallavi Kalita, Timo Lowinger, Manuel Pietzko, Anja Zürn and the participants of a workshop on EU-India relations at the University of Würzburg in November 2019 for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any errors that remain are the author’s sole responsibility. 2 For an up to date insight into the bilateral economic relations also see Sangeeta Khorana’s chapter in this volume.

N. Köhler-Suzuki (B) International Trade Intelligence, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_8

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taken place since, in spite of occasional signals that indicate an interest in resuming discussions.3 What could explain the long duration of these negotiations, unusually drawn out even when measured against the protracted nature of other bilateral trade negotiations? And in view of the differences that previously ended formal talks, why does the prospect of restarting negotiations keep on returning, like a zombie that refuses to die? This contribution will recapitulate the genesis and development of the negotiations for the EU-India Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) to answer these questions. It will present an argument grounded in the sui generis character of the EU’s external relations and India’s idiosyncratic trade policy agenda. Unlike the governments of most nation states, the European Union has exclusive competences for international trade, but lacks capabilities to meaningfully link trade with other strategic objectives. For example, in spite of increased cooperation and coordination under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, large member states continue to conduct foreign policy bilaterally (sometimes even at odds with each other). Negotiations for the EU’s bilateral trade agreements have thus been largely driven by commercial objectives that are closely in line with the market access agenda of the European export industry. India’s drive for trade agreements, on the other hand, involves a mix of foreign policy objectives and an abstract set of commercial interests—in the absence of substantial market access demands by Indian industry these are frequently defined by the government. This chapter argues that the divergent approaches to trade agreements taken by the EU and India have made it more difficult for both sides to come to a zone of possible agreement in their negotiations. From the very beginning, it has put the European Union into an offensive position, to which the Indian side responded with lacklustre demands from its exporting industries and a strong defensive position in many other sectors to which the EU requested market access. In contrast to other Indian trade agreements, where the Indian government has been willing to make trade-offs and bring negotiations to a conclusion in order to achieve other objectives, the lack of a strategic nexus with the EU meant that negotiation roadblocks couldn’t be overcome. The chapter will proceed as follows: First, it will look at the determinants of the BTIA by providing context for the opening phase of the negotiations in the mid-2000s, in particular in regard to the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral market access strategies pursued by the European Union and India during this period. Second, it will look at the impediments that were encountered by both sides during the negotiations. Third, it will conclude and provide an outlook for the future prospects of BTIA negotiations.

3 See,

for example, the Joint Statement from the EU-India Summit on 6 October 2017, which promised to “to re-engage actively towards timely relaunching negotiations [sic] for a comprehensive and mutually beneficial Free Trade Agreement” (European Commission 2017).

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2 Background to the Start of the BTIA Negotiations When the EU and India started exploring the possibility of a bilateral trade agreement in the mid-2000s, both sides came to the table with somewhat contrasting experiences of regional economic integration. The Indian government had started to enter into a series of bilateral and minilateral trade agreements in the late 1990s. This was a significant turn away from previous government policy, in which India had primarily negotiated international trade commitments in the multilateral setting.4 India signed agreements with Sri Lanka in 1998, Afghanistan in 2003, the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in 2004, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) also in 2004, Singapore in 2005 and Chile in 2006.5 The agreement with Sri Lanka was India’s first bilateral trade agreement in fortyeight years. But within the Indian government, the shift to signing a bilateral trade agreement was controversial. According to senior government officials who took part in the discussions in the mid-1990s, opinions between and within government ministries on whether or not to pursue bilateral trade agreements over minilateral integration in South Asia and multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) were strongly divided from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.6 On the one hand, it had been a key foreign policy objective of various Indian governments since the 1980s to more closely integrate South Asia through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) process in order for Indian industry to compete in a world perceived to be fragmenting into regions, and to establish Indian hegemony in its own neighbourhood. But regional economic integration in South Asia was held up by the simmering conflict between India and Pakistan (Batra 2012). Minilateral trade talks that started in 1991 under the SAARC’s Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) liberalised as little as ten percent of intraregional trade flows by the late 1990s (Weerakoon 2010: 918). For some within the Indian government, bypassing Pakistan with a network of bilateral agreements was an opportunity to take a step towards integrating India more closely with its neighbours.7 Against this backdrop, the Indian government entered talks in June 1997 to establish closer economic ties

4 India

had been one of the founding signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. According to the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements Database, the only other trade agreements India signed under GATT Article XXIV until the late 1990 s were with Bhutan in 1949, Nepal in 1950, the United Nations (UN)-led Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) in 1975 and the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) in 1993. India was also a signatory of the Global System of Trade Preferences amongst Developing Countries (GSTP) in 1988 under the GATT’s enabling clause. All of these agreements are shallow by contemporary standards and liberalised only a limited number of tariff lines. 5 The India-MERCOSUR agreement only came into force in June 2009. 6 Muchkund Dubey (former Indian Foreign Secretary) in discussion with the author, 27 March 2017. 7 Leela K. Ponappa (former Indian Ambassador to Sri Lanka and Deputy National Security Advisor) in discussion with the author, 21 April 2017.

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with the BIST-EC group (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand—Economic Cooperation), albeit at that point without negotiations for a minilateral trade agreement.8 For many Indian officials, regional economic integration with India’s immediate neighbours was still the only legitimate reason to deviate from a multilateral framework; a further fragmentation of the international trading system, they argued, would only benefit more powerful countries—to the detriment of India.9 The debate was ultimately resolved in a somewhat haphazard manner. At a political summit for the 10th anniversary of SAARC in July 1998, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee reiterated India’s interest in concluding a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), but at the same time offered still to move forward with bilateral trade agreements so as to integrate more quickly with willing partners in South Asia.10 This offer came much to the surprise of officials in the Ministry of Commerce in Delhi, who had been unaware of the last-minute initiative by Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) officials.11 Sri Lanka was the first country to accept the offer, not least because it did not benefit from the additional trade preferences that India had granted under the SAPTA agreement to Least Developed Countries.12 Within just five months, Prime Minister Vajpayee signed a bilateral trade agreement at a summit meeting in Colombo in December 1998 with Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga. The Indian objective for this agreement had been primarily strategic, rather than commercial.13 Following years of civil war, including the contentious involvement of Indian troops, India had tried to bring a Sri Lankan government already welldisposed towards Delhi closer into its orbit. Although a number of think tank studies at the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) and under the auspices of the prominent Sri Lankan economist Lal Jayawardene had advocated closer economic integration throughout the 1990s, the agreement signed in Colombo did not at this stage include any concrete commitments. Negotiations between Indian and Sri Lankan trade officials only began after the announcement by Vajpayee and Kumaratunga. Political lobbies for apparel, tea, rubber and spices mobilised resistance in the following months, but the geopolitical impetus from the Vajpayee administration to come to an agreement overrode these concerns by March 1999 (Ponappa 2011).

8 Former

advisor to the Indian Prime Minister (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 1 December 2014; BIST-EC was later renamed BIMSTEC and now also includes Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan. 9 Former member of the Planning Commission (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 27 May 2013. 10 Address by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India, Tenth SAARC Summit, Colombo, 29 July 1998. 11 Leela K Ponappa (former Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka and Deputy National Security Advisor) in discussion with the author, 21 April 2017. 12 In July 1998, all members of SAARC, except for Pakistan and Sri Lanka, were classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by the United Nations. 13 Former Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 13 November 2015.

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The India-Sri Lanka agreement served as a blueprint for many of India’s trade negotiations in subsequent years. It included an early harvest scheme, a comparatively long timetable for the phase-in of tariff reductions, a long sensitive list and restrictive rules of origin (Seshadri 2009). Negotiations for SAFTA continued in the years following the bilateral agreement with Sri Lanka, but were only concluded in 2004.14 The bilateral agreement with Sri Lanka opened the door for the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements outside of South Asia. This process also tended to be first and foremost driven by foreign policy objectives and only later included commercial export interests (although these were mostly identified from the top down and lacked meaningful input from domestic industry). Following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the United States, India signed an agreement with Afghanistan in 2003 to provide preferential market access to the fledgling new government. The agreement can be seen in the light of India’s commitment to counterterrorism, regional stability and its rivalry with Pakistan (Pant 2012).15 Similarly, the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) is a political platform that followed the participation of the three countries as observers of the G8 summit in Evian, France (1–3 June 2003), during which Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Thabo Mbeki felt slighted by not having a full seat at the high table of international relations, which fuelled their desire to create an anti-hegemonic bloc (Stuenkel 2015). In the trade domain, this contributed to the formation of the G20 developing nations group in the lead-up to the September 2003 WTO ministerial conference in Cancún, which was the first significant roadblock in the multilateral Doha Development Round (Narlikar and Tussie 2004).16 It furthermore led to the start of minilateral negotiations with MERCOSUR (17 June 2003) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (17 July 2003), as both Brazil and South Africa were members of customs unions in their home regions (cf. All Africa 2001).17 While the supporters of an exclusively multilateral trade policy (outside of South Asia) had a strong position within the Indian government prior to 2003, the reluctance from developed countries at the Cancún ministerial conference to make significant market access concessions brought back fraught memories from the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, in which developing country coalitions fractured.18 Bilateral trade agreements had first and foremost been advocated throughout the 1990s by government officials in the MEA and affiliated institutions like the RIS, keen to deepen

14 SAFTA

entered into force in 2006. later successfully campaigned to include Afghanistan in SAARC and SAFTA. 16 South Africa had been seeking trade agreements with India (and other large developing countries) as early as February 2000, amidst rumours that this would serve as a negotiating device to create outside options and therefore leverage during negotiations for a trade agreement with the European Union, and also for multilateral trade negotiations (Reuters 2000; The Hindu 2000). 17 In the case of SACU, tentative discussions started with South Africa in July 2001 and were only later expanded to include other SACU members; former Ambassador of India to the WTO (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 10 December 2014. 18 Former member of the Indian Planning Commission (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 27 May 2013. 15 India

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Indian foreign policy agendas like the ‘Look East’ policy and ‘South-South Cooperation’.19 On the other hand, more and more countries, including New Zealand, Oman and Singapore began to approach India with demands for bilateral trade negotiations in the early 2000s. India, with much higher bound tariffs than most of the prospective partners, was reluctant to respond (The Economic Times 2000). But by 2002/2003 a bilateral trade agenda had become the official position of the MEA, as indicated by a note from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Commerce Minister and the Finance Minister on the merit of bilateral trade agreements.20 This position won out henceforth, as the government began to enter a number of bilateral and minilateral trade negotiations. In May 2003, the Indian government accepted Singaporean overtures to begin bilateral trade negotiations. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, especially Singapore, had throughout the 1990s been seeking to balance China’s growing economic strength with closer ties to other countries in the region, including India. This was illustrated by former Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s analogy of India and China as the two wings that lift an Asian jumbo jet.21 China had proposed a Free Trade Area with ASEAN in November 2000 and ASEAN cautiously responded to the offer to begin negotiations (New York Times 2000). India, on the other hand, had also been trying to become more closely integrated into the ASEAN framework. Brajesh Mishra, the powerful National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Vajpayee was instrumental in India’s positive response to Singapore. He argued internally for the potential of investments from the financial hub and the possibility of leveraging the relationship with Singapore for closer ties with the rest of ASEAN.22 Against this backdrop, and in the immediate aftermath of the failed September 2003 Cancún WTO ministerial conference, India entered bilateral and minilateral trade negotiations with Thailand and ASEAN in October 2003 (Financial Times 2003a). Moreover, India also held preliminary talks with Australia and Chile in the spring of 2004. By the time the EU and India launched the EU-India Strategic Partnership in late 2004 and announced their intention to deepen economic integration, India had thus already embarked on a course of signing bilateral trade agreements. After taking office in 2004, the new Manmohan Singh government established a Trade and Economic Relations Committee (TERC) to keep track of all the different incoming demands. Although the government of India remained largely passive, the main impetus for India engaging in negotiations continued to be foreign policy objectives. Trade agreements worked as a convenient diplomatic signalling device, but there was still reluctance from the Ministry of Commerce to engage in the agenda 19 Nagesh Kumar (former Director-General of RIS) in discussion with the author, 5 December 2014. 20 Former Indian Minister of External Affairs (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 10 September 2015. 21 Keynote Address by Goh Chok Tong at the Singapore Conference, London, 15 March 2005, https://www.mci.gov.sg/pressroom/news-and-stories/pressroom/2005/3/singapore-is-the-glo bal-city-of-opportunity?page=206; for ASEAN counterbalancing strategies cf. Storey (2000). 22 Former Ambassador of India to the WTO (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 10 December 2014.

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and perhaps even more importantly a lack of commercial export interest from Indian firms.23 This resulted in agreements that were either shallow (e.g. Sri Lanka, SAFTA, MERCOSUR) or with small trading partners (Singapore, Chile) and can also help to explain India’s complicated and long bilateral negotiations with ASEAN (lasting until 2014 for the signature of the services part of the agreement) and with SACU (still ongoing). In contrast, the motivation for engaging in trade agreements was strikingly different for the European Union during the mid-2000s. In the 1990s, 12 EU member states integrated their economies and policies more closely than ever before. Moreover, the EU continued to expand, with two waves of accessions in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden) and 2004 (Eastern Europe). While the establishment of the Single Market was at least in part the result of economic competition between North America and Europe during the 1980s, it also created new competitive pressures for the rest of the world (Mansfield and Milner 1999). At the same time, the end of the Cold War and the ‘unipolar moment’ for the United States and its allies in the mid-1990s catalysed the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO in 1995 (VanGrasstek 2013). Developed countries, including the EU, tried to include the so-called Singapore issues (government procurement, trade facilitation, investment, competition) in multilateral negotiations from 1996 onwards, but ultimately failed against the resistance of a coalition of developing countries, most notably during the 2003 Cancún ministerial meeting (Woolcock 2003). The EU had previously issued a moratorium on negotiating new RTAs in 1999—which was intended to facilitate negotiations at the multilateral level—but between 2003 and 2007 slowly shifted its policy position to allow for new agreements (Woolcock 2007).24 Most of the EU’s earlier trade agreements were primarily motivated by political logic, such as the Euro-Med Association Agreements (with Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia) for checking migration flows and creating political stability as well as agreements with former European colonies of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)—Lome, Cotonou, South Africa and CARIFORUM—for the promotion of economic development (Woolcock 2007). As late as November 2003, the European Commission was still publicly expressing doubt about the possibility of a trade agreement between the EU and India (Press Trust of India 2003; Financial Times 2003b). But with the outcome of the multilateral Doha Round looking increasingly dire and with the United States and Japan beginning to engage in a bilateral trade agenda, the European Commission started signalling openness to the idea of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with India in mid-2004 (Press Trust of India 2004a). At the same time, the Commission also began pursuing the Global Europe Strategy, published in 2006, which in contrast to the EU’s earlier trade agreement 23 The exception to this is the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), which was an early advocate of bilateral trade agreements for market access, in particular for textiles (Press Trust of India 2002; The Hindu Business Line 2002). 24 Although the EU did not enter into any new RTAs between 1999 and 2007, it did conclude bilateral negotiations that were started before the moratorium with Mexico (July 2000), South Africa (January 2000), the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) (2003), Tunisia (1998), Morocco (2000), Israel (2000), Jordan (2002), Lebanon (2003), Egypt (2004), and Algeria (2005).

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asked the EU to look for FTAs based on economic criteria, in particular ‘market potential measured in terms of size and economic growth [and] the level of protection vis-à-vis exports from the EU’ (European Commission 2006).25 Based on these criteria, the Global Europe Strategy specifically identified ASEAN, South Korea, India, MERCOSUR, Russia, the Gulf Cooperation Council and China as priorities for new trade agreements. The failure to resolve disagreements on agricultural subsidies in the June 2006 ‘Green Room’ meeting in Geneva between Australia, Brazil, the European Union, India, Japan and the United States, led to the suspension of the multilateral Doha Round (Blustein 2009: 223–234). It was no coincidence that the Global Europe Strategy was published only shortly thereafter in October 2006 (Financial Times 2006a).26 Moreover, by this time interest from other OECD countries in beginning negotiations on a trade agreement with India had also come into focus. In particular Japan, an economic competitor of the EU in key industries such as automobile exports, was one step ahead of the European Union in gaining access to the Indian market and had set up a bilateral Joint Study Group for economic partnership as early as November 2004. The start of negotiations for a bilateral trade and investment agreement between the EU and India in June 2007 should therefore also be seen against this backdrop.

3 The Inception of the BTIA Negotiations (2005–2010) The September 2005 EU-India summit in Delhi operationalised a number of commitments that were made during the EU-India Strategic Partnership the prior year. The EU and India agreed on a joint action plan, which mandated the launch of a High Level Trade Group (HLTG) to explore the potential for negotiations. The experts of the HLTG met five times in 2006 and presented a final report to political leaders at the October 2006 EU-India summit in Helsinki.27 Both sides underlined their commitment to multilateralism and the successful conclusion of the Doha Round, even though at this point its dire straits had become obvious. The HLTG report noted that the EU was India’s largest trading partner and 25 The Global Europe Strategy emerged at least in part due to a political pressure campaign from business groups, in particular by the European business association Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne (UNICE) and the European Services Forum (ESF) (cf. Corporate Europe Observatory 2008). 26 Even though the 2006 suspension of the multilateral Doha Round was mostly due to disagreements between the United States and India, the EU and India had in prior years frequently found themselves on opposite sides in multilateral negotiations, including on environmental and labour standards in trade, the so-called Singapore issues, agricultural subsidies, NAMA and TRIPS. Any bilateral negotiation on these issues would therefore be difficult from the outset. 27 Report of the EU-India High Level Trade Group to the EU-India Summit, 13 October 2006; the European Parliament during this time also voiced its support for a bilateral trade agreement (Financial Times 2006b).

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emphasised the large number of English speakers in India that enable services exports and facilitate investment in India, in particular for outsourcing, linking cross-border value chains and accessing India’s substantial consumer market. It also pointed to a potential problem that did indeed arise later in the negotiations, namely that 77% of India’s exports to the EU in 2004 were already granted duty-free or preferential treatment under the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Any bilateral trade agreement would therefore have to address the remaining 23% to set strong incentives for India or make substantial concessions in the services sector.28 Conversely, in spite of India’s deep economic reforms during the prior two decades, its average bound most favoured nation (MFN) tariff rate of 30% was then still amongst the highest in the world, which would generally make a WTO-compatible RTA (freeing ‘substantially all trade’) a lopsided exercise in favour of EU exports.29 Bilateral trade in goods at the time was growing at 20% per annum and had reached EUR 40 billion. The analysis of the HLTG showed that EU goods exports to India were predominantly in intermediate products, in particular precious stones and gems, machinery and electrical equipment, base metals, chemical products and vehicles. India’s most important exports to the EU, on the other hand, were both primary products and finished goods, in particular textiles and clothing, precious stones and gems, machinery, agricultural products and leather materials.30 Not mentioned in the report was that despite the extensive preferences already granted to India by the EU, one incentive for India to come to an agreement was particularly strong: India had already graduated in 2001 from GSP preferences for some of its most important exports to the EU, such as textiles and clothing. Moreover, by the end of 2004 there were significant pressures from the phase-out of the successor to the multi-fibre arrangement (MFA), the transitional Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) (The Hindu Business Line 2000).31 Indian exports of textiles to the EU dropped substantially in the mid2000s and lost market share (Hoda and Prakash 2011). Competitors like Bangladesh were granted duty-free treatment under the Everything But Arms preferences for Least Developed Countries, which created strong competitive pressures for Indian textile and clothing exports to the EU.32 In the services sector the HLTG report also foreshadowed some of the key concerns that were to appear in negotiations in the 28 This was behind the dismissal by key economic policy makers of a 2000 proposal by the Confederation of Indian Industry for a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and India (Press Trust of India 2000; The Hindu Business Line 2004). 29 The World Bank warned in December 2004 that India had a ‘penetrating interest’ for exports in business process outsourcing, services, textile and auto components, for which market access could best be achieved in multilateral negotiations (Press Trust of India 2004b). 30 The intra-industry trade for precious stones and gems is mostly related to cross-border value chains in jewellery manufacturing. This also corresponds to a September 2005 survey by the industry body ASSOCHAM, which found interest for an FTA with the EU from the Business Process Outsourcing and IT Industry, as well as amongst biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms (The Hindu Business Line 2005). 31 60–70% of Indian textile exports at this point were to the EU and US, and in the EU these faced duties from 4.5 to 13% (The Hindu Business Line 2007a; The Hindu 2007b). 32 Former Head of International Trade Policy at the Confederation of Indian Industry (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 9 December 2014.

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following years. It outlined the growth in India’s information technology services, and the EU’s leadership in accounting, legal and financial services, both areas that would become sticking points. Bilateral trade in services was growing at 10% per annum, with a slightly greater share for Indian services exports. Lastly, the report showed that the investment relationship between the two sides was lopsided. While the EU was India’s main source of foreign direct investment (FDI) with EUR 1.1 billion of investments in 2004 and EUR 600 million of Indian FDI in the EU in 2003, the latter made up less than 1% of overall investment in the EU. Based on this analysis, the HLTG suggested several potential fields of cooperation for deepening the relationship through a BTIA. It proposed the removal of 90% of duties (both for tariff lines and trade volume) within seven years of an agreement coming into force.33 However, the report already anticipated the need for sensitive lists and the possibility of a later review. Also targeted were regulatory transparency for both goods and services, and the removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Analogous to trade in goods, to be compliant with the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), any potential RTA also needed to ‘ensure substantial coverage’ for both the number of sectors included and the modes of supply. The report suggested that this should be explored, for example, by mutual recognition of professional qualifications. However, it also already noted the potential sensitivities of some services sectors, which would also become problematic later in the negotiations. In comparison to these ambitious proposals, the HLTG suggestions for the socalled ‘Singapore issues’ (government procurement, investment, trade facilitation, competition) were much weaker. This reflected Delhi’s reluctance to limit domestic policy space and was related to significant contemporary opposition to ongoing economic reforms. The EU had already clashed with India numerous times at the multilateral level but envisaged deeper integration in a bilateral agreement. While there were some HLTG proposals that went beyond, the majority only mirrored multilateral commitments. On investment, it proposed national treatment of FDI. While acknowledging the need to maintain policy space for domestic regulation, it still suggested an agreement on transparent regulatory frameworks. The HLTG recommendations on investment also highlighted linkages with services trade, such as free movement of professionals related to investment. This too would become a difficult area of the negotiations at a later point. On the topic of government procurement, the report included only a remark that both sides should am for a ‘better understanding’ of procurement practices, put in place measures to enhance transparency, and examine opportunities for market access.34 On intellectual property, the report already highlighted the difficulty of finding a common denominator in the subsequent negotiations, on the one hand proposing to include it in bilateral talks, on the other citing the need to ‘respect national sovereignty’.35 For competition policy, the HLTG had only relatively weak suggestions, such as the exchange of non-confidential information 33 This corresponds to the EU’s interpretation of the GATT requirement that RTAs free ‘substantially all trade’. 34 Report of the EU-India High Level Trade Group to the EU-India Summit, 13 October 2006, p. 8. 35 Ibid., p. 9.

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between competition authorities and coordination of enforcement. Lastly, the HLTG proposed negotiations for a binding State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism. Based on the recommendations of the HLTG, India and the EU officially agreed to begin negotiations for a Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement in October 2006 at the seventh EU-India Summit in Helsinki with a proclaimed aim to finish negotiations within two years. The EU remained hesitant and emphasised the potential negative impact on multilateral negotiations. The Indian side, on the other hand, insisted on keeping references to labour and environmental standards out of the initial negotiating mandate (The Hindu 2006). On the sidelines of the meeting, Indian Commerce Minister Kamal Nath specifically emphasised the export potential of agricultural products, textiles, leather, gems and jewellery, inorganic chemicals, iron and steel as well as the opportunities for investment, trade facilitation, transparency in regulatory frameworks, and investment-related movement of natural persons (Press Trust of India 2006a; The Hindu 2006). The EU side emphasised its demand to open Indian agricultural markets outside of the politically sensitive subsistence farming sector (Press Trust of India 2006b). Given the perceived economic complementarities that were identified, Commerce Minister Kamal Nath stated in January 2007 that ‘one of the easiest trade agreements would be with the EU’ (Press Trust of India 2007a). The European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) Trade started its consultation process in February 2007 with a questionnaire for industry on market access for European goods and services in the Indian market (European Commission 2007). That negotiation dynamics would later become particularly thorny around Indian demands to obtain short-term visas for its services providers was predicted at the time by the EU’s Director-General for Trade David O’Sullivan: ‘We appreciate that the issue of free movement of professionals is critical for India and will also feature in negotiations for FTA. […] However, there are some sensitives in Europe on Mode 4 which we will have to manage’ (Press Trust of India 2007b). By March 2007, the two sides started stumbling over the EU’s insistence on linking human rights and democracy into the bilateral agreement. Similar ‘essential elements’ clauses had been in all bilateral EU trade agreements since 1995, but from the very beginning of the BTIA negotiations India categorically ruled out such a commitment. This was in line with its prior refusal in other international arenas to link these issues to trade for fear of developed countries using linkages as hidden forms of protectionism. European negotiators at that point in time indicated they could move ahead in the negotiations without including the issue, given India’s economic importance (Financial Times 2007). The same month, EU Agriculture Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel led a delegation of 28 food and drink companies from the EU to India. In particular the producers of alcoholic beverages had been closely watching the quickly growing but highly protected Indian consumer market. The Scotch Whisky Association, for example, estimated Indian duties on whisky were at a prohibitively high 525% (The Hindu Business Line 2006).36 EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson quipped: ‘There are potentially as many incipient 36 As would soon become evident, whisky producers play an important role in the political economy of the UK. They are not only the third biggest industry in Scotland (behind energy and financial

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alcoholics in India as anywhere else in the world and our job is to encourage them to take the final step’ (Financial Times 2006c). EU Agriculture Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel summed up the trip with the observation that ‘the Indian middle class is hungry for exciting food and drink experiences that go beyond Indian cuisine. And this middle class is growing at the rate of 35 million people per year in other words, by the population of a medium-sized European country’ (Press Trust of India 2007c). Preparations in the capitals was also getting into gear. In May 2007 Commission officials in Brussels would have their first meetings with business representatives to discuss market access demands (Corporate Europe Observatory 2010: 12). Negotiations for the BTIA were officially launched by Indian Commerce Secretary G K Pillai and the EU’s DG for Trade David O’Sullivan in Brussels on 28 June 2007. At this point, the EU had not yet given up on the future of the multilateral Doha Round and was framing the potential outcomes of an agreement in this light. EU Agriculture Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel, for example, cautioned: ‘Don’t expect that the substantial concessions rejected in the multilateral framework can be won back in a bilateral deal. The European Union will never be able to offer as much in a bilateral deal as we were prepared to offer in the Doha Round’ (Press Trust of India 2007c). On 1 October 2007, the second round of negotiations took place over six days in Delhi. Prior to the talks, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) India, on behalf of the Indian Ministry of Commerce, had held a round of six workshops across India consulting with industry to gauge export interests, and initially identified 203 products for the sensitive list, which in the following months increased to 340 (The Hindu Business Line 2007a; Press Trust of India 2007d). Key items on the initial list were low-tech machinery (especially for textile production) as well as rubber and articles thereof, vegetables, fruits and nuts (The Hindu Business Line 2007b). Following demands from Kerala’s fishing sector, the government also added sardine, mackerel, anchovy, cod, sole, skid-jack tuna and yellow-fin tuna (The Hindu 2007a). In spite of earlier comments, EU negotiators now demanded the inclusions of labour standards, which was rejected by the Indian side (Press Trust of India 2007e). Both sides agreed to have long phase-in periods for some products over ten years (Press Trust of India 2007f). A key demand from the Indian side was a Mutual Recognition Agreement for professional certification, flexible Rules of Origin and movement of people (Press Trust of India 2007g). The EU focused on presenting demands on intellectual property rights, geographical indications, dispute settlement and competition policy (Press Trust of India 2007h). A third round of negotiations took place 6–12 December 2007 in Brussels. In the weeks prior, the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Ministry of Commerce had held further stakeholder consultations, and its negative list continued growing to 401 items, now also including more varieties of fish, tea and coffee (Press Trust of India 2007i). The EU, on the other hand, expanded its market access demands on government procurement beyond the relatively narrow definition that had been services), but are especially important for rural areas and would thus become a core UK demand for market access in the negotiations (The Guardian 2015).

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included in the HLTG (Press Trust of India 2007j). While the EU was still not willing to compromise on non-tariff barriers and technical standards for agriculture imports, or the inclusion of labour and the environment, Indian chief negotiator Rahul Khullar nevertheless concluded that discussions had taken place with ‘seriousness, gravitas and a forward movement’ (Press Trust of India 2007k). In February 2008, negotiators met for a fourth round of negotiations in Delhi. The discussions centred on the EU’s demand for the inclusion of government procurement, intellectual property rights and competition policy. India insisted on sticking to the weak provisions that were in the initial HLTG report instead of making any hard commitments (The Hindu 2008). At the same time, the EU remained unwilling to make commitments on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), in particular on easing requirements for the certification of imported fruit (Press Trust of India 2008a; The Hindu Business Line 2008). Both the EU and India were still aiming for a conclusion of multilateral trade negotiations. Leading up to the July 2008 WTO ministerial conference in Geneva, this tied up considerable resources in the bureaucracies. The Indian Ministry of Commerce, in particular, was paying close attention to the latest proposals by developed countries, which added considerable restrictions to existing special safeguards mechanisms. Given the limited number of trade experts available in Delhi, this slowed the pace of the BTIA negotiations (Press Trust of India 2008b). Following the unsuccessful WTO ministerial meeting, a fifth round of negotiations was held in Brussels in September 2008. At this point, the Indian side had finalised the consultations on its sensitivities and posted a list of 643 products on the website of the Ministry of Commerce (Corporate Europe Observatory: 20). The two sides thus exchanged their market access offers and began the process of ‘horse trading’ demands for trade in goods and narrowing down difficulties. At the same time, there was still no foreseeable agreement on services trade, competition policy, intellectual property rights, public procurement, sustainable development, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and non-tariff barriers (Press Trust of India 2008c). In March 2009, a sixth round of negotiations took place over a period of three days in Delhi. India continued to insist on the removal of technical barriers to trade, especially in light of hidden protectionism following the global financial crisis. Indian negotiators continued to vehemently oppose the inclusion of intellectual property rights, especially on the grounds of biodiversity and the protection of traditional knowledge (Press Trust of India 2009a). Moreover, the Indian side asked for asymmetrical concessions on trade in goods with 95% duty-free market access to the EU in return for 90% duty-free market access in the Indian market (Press Trust of India 2009b). A seventh round of negotiations was held in Delhi in July 2009. Both sides bracketed earlier discussions about labour and environmental standards and instead focused their talks on tariff and non-tariff barriers. This likely happened because of an earlier resolution by the European Parliament in March 2009 that demanded the FTA would address child and bonded labour by requiring India to sign on to key conventions of the International Labour Organization. The European Parliament also demanded that India conform to WTO standards on packaging, marking and

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labelling, and ensure the protection of human and animal welfare as well as plant life (European Parliament 2009). At this point, the European Parliament was flexing a new muscle; as the Lisbon Treaty was entering into force on 1 December 2009, the parliament was about to gain jurisdiction over EU trade agreements under the co-decision procedure. The BTIA would therefore have to be ratified not only by all EU Member States in the Council, but also by a majority of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). European negotiators thus became even more cautious of publicity surrounding the BTIA talks, such as the call in April 2009 by European civil society actors to immediately halt the negotiations and the June 2009 campaign by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) condemning restrictive intellectual property rights that could hinder the production of Indian generic medicines. Instead of wading into the politically treacherous territory at home, bilateral negotiations at this point were instead focused on market access for EU wine and spirit exports to India— which faced state-level taxes on imports—and dairy products. On the Indian side, in spite of the earlier consultation rounds with domestic stakeholders, there was still great uncertainty and lack of awareness amongst the Indian business community. In a survey of Indian firms by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), more than 60% of respondents remained unsure about the impact of the BTIA (The Hindu Business Line 2009a) On 6 September 2009, EU Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton and Indian Minister for Commerce and Industry Anand Sharma reviewed the state of the negotiations in Delhi. The EU had commissioned a new study that emphasised complementarities in agricultural trade and identified the potential for EUR 2 billion of Indian agricultural exports and EUR 200 million of EU agricultural exports into the respective other market (The Hindu 2009a). Indeed, unlike in previous agreements, India was for the very first time willing to include agriculture in the agreement with a developed country.37 At the same time, EU Ambassador Danièle Smadja commented that ‘even after seven rounds of talks, […] we have not yet started real negotiation on tariff and services’ (The Hindu Business Line 2009b). The EU at this point was publicly expressing its interest in market access for automobiles and services, in particular financial services, insurance, postal services, architecture, telecom, retail and professional services (ibid.). In October 2009, the European Parliament discussed linkages between the BTIA and climate change as well as the potential social impact of the BTIA, after more than 70 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) raised concerns (The Hindu 2009b). While the Indian Ministry of Commerce once again firmly rejected any discussion of non-trade issues, EU negotiators also continued to insist on the inclusion of environmental and social issues, in particular child labour, citing equivalent arrangements in the recently concluded EU-South Korea FTA (Press Trust of India 2009c). Moreover, civil society activists, both in the EU and in India, were raising their voices about the transparency of the negotiation process and democratic accountability (ibid.).

37 Former

Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 3 September 2015.

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Research by Indian NGOs also questioned the impact of the liberalisation of the Indian banking sector on the poor (ibid.). At the government-to-government level, a significant roadblock to the negotiation was introduced following the seizure of generic Indian pharmaceuticals in transit to Brazil via the EU. While the EU claimed this was enforcement of counterfeit regulations in some EU member states, the actions caused concern in Delhi with respect to arbitrary targeting of Indian generic medicines and they demanded resolution (Financial Times 2009; The Hindu Business Line 2016a). The EU, on the other hand, continued to voice concern about discriminatory taxation of wines and spirits at the state level in India (The Hindu 2009c). At the 10th India-EU Summit in November 2009, the EU also maintained its stance on more transparent public procurement policies (The Hindu Business Line 2009c). At the same time, the EU was reluctant to ease product testing for regulatory compliance or sign mutual recognition agreements for services providers (ibid.). While many positions therefore remained hardened after more than two years of negotiations, EU negotiators were beginning to signal that they could find a compromise that would address Indian concerns for agricultural trade (The Hindu Business Line 2009d). By the eighth round of negotiations in January 2010, the two sides had entered text-based discussions on all chapters (although none had been concluded at this point). There was now agreement on a 90% tariff reduction for trade in goods after a seven-year phase-in period (The Hindu Business Line 2009e). Negotiators also announced that they have made progress on services but could still not agree on environmental and social linkages (The Hindu Business Line 2010a). In addition, there was new political impetus from Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who implied that negotiations could be wrapped up by the end of 2010 (Financial Times 2010). In March 2010, the new EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht and his Indian counterpart Anand Sharma announced an intensification of negotiations ahead of the 11th EU-India summit in October 2010. However, De Gucht made it clear in Delhi that the European Parliament would not sign off any agreement that did not address child labour and climate change, while still expressing hope that this could be solved through ‘appropriate language’ (The Hindu Business Line 2010b). De Gucht also signalled openness on granting more access to the EU market for Indian professionals (The Hindu 2010a). India’s chief negotiator Rahul Khullar remained unwavering on the former issue: ‘If they [the EU] don’t accept free trade agreements without social clauses, then I’d say tough luck’ (The Hindu Business Line 2010c). Significant progress was made during the ninth round of negotiations in April 2010. The EU granted concessions on intellectual property rights for the production and export of life-saving medicines (The Hindu Business Line 2010d). Moreover, EU negotiators supposedly acknowledged that differences over child labour and environmental standards would not hinder the conclusion of the agreement (The Hindu 2010b). A delegation of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) had visited India earlier in 2010 and seemed eager to find mutually acceptable language on these issues. Perhaps most importantly, the EU announced a ‘labour mobility

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pact’ for orderly immigration that addressed most of the Indian concerns around the cross-border movement of Indian professionals (Press Trust of India 2010a). At this point, the conclusion of an agreement seemed closer than ever before. Considerable competitive pressures persisted for some sectors of the Indian economy in particular to come to an agreement as quickly as possible; shortly before Karel de Gucht and Anand Sharma met in July 2010 to review the state of negotiations, the Indian Apparel Export Promotion Council had urged the Indian Commerce Secretary to conclude the negotiations to offset disadvantages in the Indian apparel industry’s main market, citing competition from Bangladesh. While 55% of all Indian apparel exports at the time (worth USD 5.68 billion) were destined for the EU, their market share had been either plateauing or declining in recent years (The Hindu Business Line 2010e; Press Trust of India 2010b). The 10th round of negotiations that took place August 2010 in Brussels thus had considerable momentum. But discussions at this point were focused on the bilateral investment regime. The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December 2009, had created new competences for the EU to negotiate international investment treaties. Consequently, the EU was making greater demands for investment protections in the BTIA negotiations. The counter-offer from the Indian side was a weaker Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement to secure investments and settle disputes (The Hindu Business Line 2010f). In spite of these disagreements, India’s chief negotiator Rahul Khullar indicated that ‘“very clear” understanding has been reached on large number of issues’ (The Hindu Business Line 2010g). This sentiment was echoed by the Head of the Delegation of the EU to India, Danièle Smadja: ‘We are making extremely good progress. We have all the elements for a good result. We have a very strong commitment at the highest political level, both in India and in the European Union, to go fast now and try to conclude the negotiation by the next India-EU Summit in Brussels in December’ (The Hindu Business Line 2010h). In retrospect, however, the tenth round of negotiations was an early high point that was followed by a string of setbacks.

4 On the Road to Suspension (2010–2013) A key issue emerged during the 11th round of negotiations in October 2010. The EU, especially Germany France and Italy, insisted on significant duty reductions for the automobile sector, which was facing 60% import tariffs for completely built units and 10% for components (The Hindu Business Line 2010i). The Indian government remained fundamentally opposed. Since 2006, India’s Ministry of Heavy Industries had been championing the Automotive Mission Plan, under which high tariff walls served as incentives to attract FDI. The issue seemed to be only coming to a head at this point, as India’s Chief negotiator Khullar had previously implied that protections could be slowly phased out over 10 years (The Hindu Business Line 2010j). The interministerial discord on the level of protection for automobiles became a significant roadblock in subsequent negotiations.

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A second important fracture emerged on services trade. The EU’s prior commitments for freedom of movement for Indian professionals had created a domestic political conflict in the United Kingdom. The cabinet of the coalition between Liberal Democrats and Conservatives was deeply divided. On the one hand, Prime Minister David Cameron and the Home Secretary opposed non-EU immigration in line with their prior political pledges to lower overall net migration from 176,000 to 21,700 (The Telegraph 2010; Press Trust of India 2010c). India had demanded up to 50,000 visas a year for highly skilled professionals to the EU, with quotas of up to 20,000 for the UK, 7,000 for German and 3,000 for France, which were clearly not aligned with the UK’s proposed limits. On the other hand, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills Vince Cable managed to get exemption from the immigration cap for Indians (Press Trust of India 2011a). Still, the UK started to introduce additional requirements, such as minimum salaries and visa fees, which became a recurrent issue in BTIA negotiations. In November 2010, Anand Sharma and Karel de Gucht reviewed the state of negotiations in Brussels ahead of the December 2010 EU-India Summit meeting. The EU was continuing to insist on including public procurement and investment provisions. EU negotiators were also re-stating demands for environmental and social standards. Moreover, they pushed for a wide definition of investment including FDI, shares, debentures, loans, interests, business concessions, movable and immovable property, intellectual property rights, technical processes and know-how. These demands were modelled on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and went significantly beyond India’s existing commitments (The Hindu Business Line 2011a). In public, Indian negotiators at that time did not address their stance on investment, but maintained that the red lines on which they would not be willing to compromise were the inclusion of agriculture, restrictions on generic drugs, automobile as well as labour and environmental standards (The Hindu Business Line 2010k). At the EU-India Summit, political leaders gave negotiators the mandate to end negotiations within half a year. Public resistance came from a number of EU and Indian civil society groups. In an open letter, 240 NGOs voiced concern that the agreement would exacerbate poverty in India, in particular data exclusivity provisions that hinder the production of generic pharmaceuticals (The Hindu 2010c; Press Trust of India 2010d). In January 2011, the EU made a major step towards meeting Indian demands for labour mobility by introducing the draft for a ‘Blue Card’ programme that built on the earlier labour mobility pact. The Blue Card would allow skilled professionals to work across all member states of the EU—except Denmark, Ireland and the UK. In spite of this progress, the same month, when India’s chief negotiator, P. K. Chaudhary, and the EU’s Chief Negotiator, Ignacio García-Bercero, met in Kerala, the discussions appeared to be stuck. The EU continued to insist on data exclusivity for medicines, as well as the inclusion of social and environmental standards (in spite of slightly changed wording that would not explicitly mention the contentious issue of child labour) (Press Trust of India 2011b). On the other side, Indian negotiators would not budge on generic medicines or automobiles. The position on generic medicines was underlined by a ruling of India’s patent office in the Aluvia decision, according

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to which pharmaceutical companies cannot block production of generic medicines (The Hindu Business Line 2011b). Moreover, Indian car manufacturers, with the support of the Indian Ministry of Heavy Industries, continued to vehemently insist on excluding cars from the agreement and keeping the tariff structure equivalent to what had been agreed in the FTAs with Korea and Japan, i.e. only allowing tariff reductions on automobile parts and components. It was therefore little surprise that EU demands for further tariff reductions for completely built units (CBUs) and completely knocked down units (CKDs) were once again rejected by the Indian side during the 12th round of BTIA negotiations in April 2011 in Brussels (Press Trust of India 2011c). In fact, the Indian government indicated that it would soon launch a National Manufacturing Policy to attract FDI and build a skilled workforce, and to increase the size of the sector from 16 to 26% of the Indian economy (Press Trust of India 2011d; The Hindu 2011a). According to India’s Minister of Commerce, Anand Sharma, this would also protect the automobile sector from FTA concessions (Press Trust of India 2011e). Still, in the negotiations the EU continued to offer agricultural market access for India in return for automobile exports by the EU, while India indicated willingness only to move on automobile components (Press Trust of India 2011f). Anand Sharma also reaffirmed that India would not accept data exclusivity provisions for pharmaceuticals in any FTA, which was later also confirmed by Prime Minister Singh after a meeting of the Trade and Economic Relations Committee (TERC) (Press Trust of India 2011g, h). The summer of 2010 saw little movement on either side, in spite of meetings between the chief negotiators in May and a 13th round of negotiations in June. By September 2010, Karel De Gucht declared there were still ‘substantial problems’, including on India’s tariffs for the European wine and spirits industry, the services sector, as well as on energy and public procurement, and noted that ‘at a certain point negotiations require pragmatism’ (The Hindu Business Line 2011c). By November 2011, Germany signalled that negotiations were stagnating and the deadline of coming to an agreement by the EU Summit in February 2012 in Delhi could not be kept. A senior German official commented that he was ‘not hopeful of signing the FTA anywhere in the near future’ (The Hindu 2011b). However, the EU had offered market access for agriculture and textile exports from India in return for EU car exports and there was now some movement on automobile tariffs (The Hindu 2011c). India was offering to cut tariffs for luxury cars from 60 to 30% and to phase them down to 20% after five years. Similarly, tariffs for smaller cars could be cut from 60 to 50% with a phase-down to 40% after five years. Yet the offer was not acceptable to the EU (The Hindu 2011b). In January 2011, India presented a new maximal offer, i.e. tariff rate quotas on luxury cars with a minimum engine capacity of up to 1500 cubic centimetres to 10–15% (Press Trust of India 2012a). Influential car associations such as the German VDA and the European ACEA lobbied strongly against these proposals, arguing that including value-added taxes and other costs (such as conformity assessment of components), would make their prices in the Indian market almost double that of other markets (Financial Times 2012). They also cited an imbalance regarding existing automobile trade, where 223,000 cars were exported from India to Europe in 2011 and only 4,000 cars were exported from

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the EU to India (ibid.). At the same time, the Indian car industry also resisted the Indian offer from the other direction. Tata Motors publicly came out against tariff cuts on automobiles in the agreement, saying it would unlevel the playing field in India between importers and producers (Press Trust of India 2012b). The Society of Indian Automobile Manufactures (SIAM) considerably increased its lobbying activity, and moreover, Japanese and Korean car manufacturers in India who were exporting cars, opposed the deal to protect their investments in Indian factories (The Hindu Business Line 2012a). To increase the pressure on the EU, in March 2012 India increased its MFN duties on luxury cars from 60 to 75% as a bargaining tactic (The Hindu Business Line 2012b). The EU in turn sought an exemption from the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) homologation and testing requirements for car imports (The Hindu Business Line 2012c). Through most of 2011 and early 2012, negotiations therefore remained deadlocked over cars. Disagreement even persisted about the overall level of goods liberalisation. While the EU demanded that 98% of tariff lines would be freed, India asked for asymmetric commitments (The Hindu 2011c). However, the two sides made some small steps towards agreement in other areas, such as wording for intellectual property rights acceptable to both sides (ibid.). The EU was, moreover, trying to trade visa quotas for the ‘Blue Card’ programme in return for commitments on government procurement (ibid.). The EU also continued to push for the liberalisation of financial services in India, especially the removal of all restrictions related to branch licences and foreign ownership, and the removal of priority sector lending requirements (The Hindu 2012). Disagreements also persisted on geographical indications for agricultural products, which the EU wanted automatically recognised, whereas India requested a registration under domestic rules (The Hindu Business Line 2011d, 2012d). In May 2012, two developments in India signalled to the EU that new forward movement in the negotiations might be possible. First, there was an intra-ministerial showdown between the Minister for Heavy Industries, Praful Patel and the Minster of Commerce, Anand Sharma, in which Patel appeared to acknowledge that there would be room for duty reductions on cars (Press Trust of India 2012c).38 Second, a draft bill on a more transparent and integrous public procurement system was introduced into the Indian Parliament, which appeared to be a concession to a key demand from the EU (The Economic Times 2012). When the 15th round of negotiations took place in Brussels in June 2012, a number of controversial developments around European investments were looming. The EU was particularly worried about preferential treatment for domestic manufacturers of telecommunications equipment in the procurement of India’s telecommunications networks, which concerned European manufacturers like Ericsson, NokiaSiemens and Alcatel-Lucent (The Hindu Business Line 2012e). Moreover, there was unease about apparent Indian backpedalling on concessions for FDI in retail. Anand Sharma announced that the government had ‘paused’ a unilateral decision to allow 38 Later in the year Patel also indicated willingness for concessions on luxury cars in exchange for market access for the export of small Indian cars to the EU (Press Trust of India 2012d).

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51% foreign direct investment (FDI) in multi-brand retail because of a domestic backlash. Although Sharma insisted that the decisions on FDI in retail trade were sovereign government policy and not part of negotiations with EU, the move was clearly counter to the interests of major European companies such as Carrefour, Metro and Tesco that had sought liberalisation in this area. There were also new issues on the agenda. Following ongoing discussions about the European privacy regime (which would later result in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legislation), the Indian government now sought to obtain a ‘data-secure’ status in the BTIA negotiation, which would allow Indian companies to process and store data from European customers on servers located in India (The Hindu Business Line 2012f). In fact, by the time of a meeting of Chief Negotiators in March 2013 in Brussels, Anand Sharma proclaimed that ‘data-secure’ status had become a key demand (Press Trust of India 2013a). Because India was introducing various legislative initiatives in 2012 and 2013 in order to comply with EU demands such as public procurement and the lifting of various FDI restrictions (e.g. multi-brand and single-brand retail, insurance, finance), the EU entered a holding pattern. However, it was unclear exactly when these commitments would come into force and whether they should be unilateral or become part of a binding agreement under BTIA (The Hindu Business Line 2013a).39 But legislative progress was slow and in February 2013 EU representatives noted that the window of opportunity for an agreement was closing because India was starting to enter campaign mode for its 2014 general elections. Moreover, the EU was increasingly investing its energy in trade negotiations with the United States and Japan (Press Trust of India 2013b, c; Financial Times 2013). Indeed, the domestic political climate in India was becoming increasingly partisan throughout 2013. The Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation (GCMMF), for example, was vocal in its demands that the Commerce Ministry would exclude dairy imports from BTIA negotiations (The Hindu Business Line 2013b). In April 2013, the opposition, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), positioned itself against the FTA, citing a potential flooding of the Indian market with ‘dairy, poultry, sugar, wheat, confectionary, oilseeds, plantation products and fisheries’ (Press Trust of India 2013d). The BJP demanded scrutiny and consent by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce, as well as FDI restrictions on retail, which would appease its key constituency of small traders (The Hindu Business Line 2013c). Moreover, the Standing Committee on Commerce of the Indian Parliament demanded that the Indian government would put further FTA negotiations on hold until the report of its review into existing FTAs was discussed in parliament (The Hindu 2013a). Another parliamentary panel requested that the government ensure the protection of the dairy sector (Press Trust of India 2013e). In July 2013, the BJP’s lead candidate Narendra Modi addressed the Gujarat Cooperative Congress claiming that EU dairy would harm domestic agriculture (Press Trust of India 2013f). The increasingly antagonistic Indian electoral politics eventually contributed to a suspension of BTIA negotiations in the summer of 2013. At first, the politicisation 39 The

insurance bill was passed in 2015.

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restricted the public positions open to the EU. For example, in April 2013, after frequent criticism in the Indian Parliament and by the wider Indian public, the EU confirmed that data exclusivity and patent extension would not be part of a final deal (The Hindu 2013b). But a wide gap between the two sides remained and as time passed it seemed increasingly unlikely to be closed. The remaining key issues at this point were FDI caps, market access for wines and spirits, and the ‘data-secure’ status (Press Trust of India 2013g). Moreover, major Indian industry association came to a defensive position on automobiles, which hardened another key front in the negotiations. The EU also remained adamant that the draft Public Procurement Bill would need to be passed before BTIA could be signed.40 Furthermore, the EU (especially the UK) wanted to see the draft Insurance bill, which would lift FDI caps, passed before the conclusion of an agreement, and was unwilling to agree to an alternative transition arrangement proposed by India (The Hindu Business Line 2013e). Lastly, the Indian side was dismayed that the EU’s DG Justice and Consumer Affairs (DG JUST) had assessed India not to be offering adequate data protections and Indian officials proclaimed that the decision would delay FTA talks (The Hindu Business Line 2013f). The EU responded that data adequacy was on a separate track from BTIA (although it later agreed to set up a Joint Working Group) (Press Trust of India 2013h). Due to these wide gaps and the upcoming Indian elections, further negotiation rounds were suspended in the summer of 2013 (Press Trust of India 2014).

5 Negotiations in Limbo (2013–) With Indian elections from April until May 2014 and the formation of a new government, negotiations for the BTIA did not proceed any further. However, in a twist that some Indian negotiators saw as a subtle snub due to its timing, the EU announced a ban on mangoes and other vegetables from India in March 2014, supposedly because of contamination with ‘non-European fruitflies’ (BBC 2015).41 The ball slowly started rolling again after the formation of the new BJP government. Indian negotiators indicated in March 2015 that it might now be more flexible in negotiating tariffs on wines and spirits and auto components. New proposals were floated, which would impose higher duties on low-cost wines, lower duties on high-cost wines, and lower duty on spirits bottled in India (The Economic Times 2015a). There were, moreover, some major shifts underway in the political economy in the Indian alcohol industry. Until this point, the industry had been dominated by Vijay Mallya, the former controlling shareholder of United Spirits, who was 40 The

ability to bid for public procurement remained a major prize for European companies, as it would allow them participation in India’s annual procurement market of USD 160 billion, in particular for the telecom, railways, energy, roads, industry and health sectors (with exceptions for national security and public order) (The Hindu Business Line 2013d). 41 While the ban was initially announced to last until December 2015, it was lifted in January 2015.

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holding a dominant 45% market share in India. But the British multinational company Diageo acquired a controlling stake of 25% of United Spirits, which some observers expected to dampen demands for protection (Financial Times 2014). At the same time, new legislative moves in the EU to include sectoral safeguards clauses of 20% in the Blue Card regime, reopened demands from the Indian side regarding reliable market access under Mode 4 (The Economic Times 2015a). However, relations between the EU and the Modi government were not off to a good start. After Modi’s signature Make in India campaign launched in September 2014, the Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) once again started rallying strongly against including cars in the BTIA by claiming it would contradict the goals of the manufacturing policy (Press Trust of India 2015a). Moreover, a cancellation of the 2015 India-EU summit, overtly for ‘logistical reasons’, was perceived in India as a negative signal, although the summit was later moved to November (The Hindu 2015a). In May 2015, the first stocktaking of negotiations took place between the new Indian Minister of Commerce, Nirmala Sitharaman and the EU trade commissioner, Cecilia Malmström (Press Trust of India 2015b). There were positive signs that further EU demands would be met by new unilateral reforms, such as the liberalisation of the Indian legal services sector, which likely followed pressure from the United States (The Hindu 2015b). India and the EU thus appeared ready to resume negotiations. The two sides scheduled a meeting between India’s chief negotiator J S Deepak and the EU’s Ignacio García-Bercero for late August 2015. While India indicated this would be a full new negotiation round, the EU framed the meetings more cautiously as exploratory discussions (Press Trust of India 2015c). However, instead of closer engagement, the following weeks and months suggested a further deterioration of relations. At the beginning of August 2015, the European Medicines Agency banned the sale of 700 Indian pharmaceuticals products due to concerns about data manipulation in medical trials. This led to estimated financial losses for Indian pharmaceutical companies of up to USD 1.2 billion. The Indian side perceived the European investigation as protectionist action against its generic pharmaceutical exports (The Hindu 2015c). Consequently, India called off the scheduled BTIA talks, expressing that it is ‘disappointed and concerned’ (Press Trust of India 2015d; Financial Times 2015). In October 2015, on a state visit by German chancellor Angela Merkel, the EU asked for a resumption of talks. India, however, remained firm that the pharmaceutical issue would need to be resolved first (The Hindu Business Line 2015a). The EU offered to discuss the issue outside of BTIA talks, which India accepted, and the two sides agreed to re-start negotiations in early 2016 (The Economic Times 2015b; The Hindu Business Line 2015b). The continued stalling of negotiations in the fall of 2015 took place in a climate of growing Indian reluctance to enter new FTAs. The Ministry of Commerce, for example, had recently commissioned a study that showed the negative impact of FTAs on India. At the same time, India’s gaze was shifting East, as there was more and more concern about being frozen out of new regional economic architecture in the AsiaPacific (The Economic Times 2015c). The cooling of feelings towards the EU was not aided when in January 2016 the UK Home Office’s Migration Advisory Committee

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proposed fees on companies hiring non-EU workers as an incentive for companies to upskill their workforce. This policy initiative primarily concerned ICT professionals, who received 90% of India’s Tier 2 visas to the UK (The Hindu Business Line 2016b). It raised red flags with Indian negotiators, who wanted to ensure that new visas were not facing additional requirements such as fees or minimum income (The Hindu Business Line 2016c; The Hindu 2016a). Amidst these negative developments, the new chief negotiators, India’s Commerce Secretary Rita Teaotia and the EU’s Director-General of Trade Jean-Luc Demarty, met on 18 January 2016 for a stocktaking exercise. India emphasised the unilateral measures it had implemented in the previous years (Press Trust of India 2016a). This included reforms of FDI in insurance (49%), telecommunications (100%), singlebrand retail (100%), e-commerce platforms (100%), banking, defence and railways, and of the public procurement system. But since many of the unilateral reforms were already benefiting European companies, this may actually have contributed to the EU feeling less inclined to give into other demands. In fact, EU negotiators were now insisting on agreements for tariff cuts as a precondition for talks. This was echoed at the March 2016 India-EU summit. While Modi insisted that data-secure status was now a prerequisite for India (The Hindu Business Line 2016d), there was also no agreement between the two sides to resume talks (Press Trust of India 2016b). Following the summit, Trade Commissioner Malmström responded to a letter from the Indian Commerce Minister Sitharaman that talks would only be resumed after ‘something meaningful’ can be delivered (Press Trust of India 2016c). In lieu of new market access offers, however, the Indian government started to increase the pressure on the EU in the investment domain. Shortly before a May 2016 meeting between Indian Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and European Union Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström, India unilaterally withdrew from 57 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), including those with EU member states, in order to create regime based on a model BIT (Financial Times 2016). Malmström characterised India’s new model BIT as a ‘radical policy shift’ (The Hindu 2016b). Amongst other measures that are less restrictive than India’s previous BITs, the model BIT foresees litigation by claimants in national courts for five years before resorting to an international tribunal. India’s decision created immediate pressures for EU member states. The first BIT to lapse was with the Netherlands in November 2016, shortly followed by most other member states in the spring of 2017. Germany, the EU’s greatest investor in India, was soon requesting the inclusion of investment protections in BTIA negotiations (The Hindu Business Line 2016e). Moreover, by November the EU wanted to fast-track discussions on a new bilateral investment treaty, even suggesting doing so outside of the BTIA framework (The Hindu Business Line 2016f). India continued to insist that the EU accept its model BIT template. The June 2016 Brexit Referendum further complicated the relationship. Then Indian Commerce Secretary Rita Teaotia announced that India would need to reassess its market access offers with the EU in light of Brexit (Press Trust of India 2016d). Furthermore, India and the UK started holding bilateral trade talks in July (The Hindu 2016c). However, in spite of the new pressures from potential losses of investor protections and fundamental changes to the basis of reciprocal market access offers,

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the negotiations did not move forward. At a meeting between chief negotiators on 15 July 2016, the EU announced that in spite of the Brexit referendum its negotiation position hadn’t changed, since the UK was legally still a member of the EU (The Hindu Business Line 2016g). India and the EU were now stuck in a holding pattern over the final Brexit outcome. Almost a year later, several developments gave new impetus to restart BTIA negotiations. In April 2017, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, visited Delhi and delivered a firm push to resume discussions. In May 2017, during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Berlin, Germany provided a strong geostrategic motive for an economic agreement between the EU and India, namely to offset China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, which India (deliberately) did not join earlier that month (Press Trust of India 2017a). Modi echoed the sentiment, saying that ‘our strategic partnership is based on democratic values and commitment to an open, inclusive and rules-based global order’ (The Hindu 2017). Furthermore, in June 2017, the European Court of Justice ruled that Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a mixed competence between the European Union and its member states. Direct EU negotiations of ISDS would therefore require the consent of all EU member states or be by default State-to-State Dispute Settlement (SSDS). Since the former option might be difficult to achieve, a SSDS mechanism between the EU and India has become somewhat more likely, as SSDS also corresponds to India’s model BIT.42 The European Commission’s new approach to pursue separate negotiating tracks for investment and trade with Singapore and Vietnam will likely also become applicable. Lastly, in spite of the ups and downs in the negotiations, economic linkages between the EU and India have continued to grow. A study in June 2017 showed the potential gains for Indian business services (USD 6.4 billion) and textiles/apparel (USD 6.6 billion), which compared favourably to losses for automobiles (USD 1.6 billion), minerals (USD 1.1 billion), and machinery (USD 500 million). Given the overall size of the Indian automobile industry (USD 74 billion in 2017), any losses could furthermore be offset by integration into global value chains (The Hindu Business Line 2017a). In this light, the EU once again took concrete steps to bring the agreement to conclusion. At the 14th EU-India Summit in October 2017 in Delhi, the EU indicated that it would be willing to work together with India on data protection (Press Trust of India 2017b). The EU had recently signed into law the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which would come into force in May 2018. However, the EU also signalled that GDPR adequacy needed a separate legal framework from BTIA (The Hindu Business Line 2017b). The development of such a framework was aided by an August 2017 Indian Supreme Court decision, which found privacy to be a fundamental right under the Indian constitution. The Indian government is implementing this decision with a Personal Data Protection Bill that is in many respects modelled on the GDPR and is currently in the legislative process. If EU authorities (DG JUST) grant data adequacy status to India, a key demand from India in the BTIA negotiations will have been addressed. It is notable, however, that in 42 European

Court of Justice Opinion 2/15 of the Court.

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spite of these positive developments there was nevertheless no explicit decision at the October 2017 summit to resume trade negotiations or start a separate investment track to fill the gap of investor protection when existing BITs expired (Press Trust of India 2017c). However, in the trade domain there were finally some new developments. In November 2017, the new Chief Negotiators Anup Wadhawan from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Helena König from EU’s DG TRADE met to take stock of the negotiations. For the first time since 2015, India was indicating willingness to show flexibility on automobiles and wines and spirits in return for data adequacy status (The Hindu Business Line 2017c). It was thus of even greater dismay to German investors, when India began increasing duty on automobile parts in February 2018 (The Economic Times 2018). Nevertheless, the situation in 2018 appeared unchanged. Chief negotiators met in March 2018, followed by working-level meetings in April and May. As the EU maintains its preconditions to resuming talks, the Indian flexibility on automobiles and wines and spirits seems not yet to have resulted in any concrete market access offers. However, India has continued to look for data-secure status, which the EU would only provide once an adequate domestic legal framework is in place (Press Trust of India 2018a). It is therfore perhaps notable that India set up an inter-ministerial working group on e-commerce shortly after the March 2018 talks with the EU (Press Trust of India 2018b).

6 Conclusion As this chapter has shown, entering negotiations for a trade and investment agreement was an unusual step for both India and the EU when seen against the backdrop of their previous trade agreements. For the EU, it was the first negotiation with a large emerging market under its 2006 Global Europe Strategy, which emphasised commercial gain over using trade agreements as a tool for political leverage. The EU was looking for new export markets and was not granting access to its market for strategic foreign policy objectives. The EU’s larger member states have, moreover, by and large continued to have their own foreign policy priorities vis-à-vis India. India, on the other hand, previously entered into trade agreements in Asia with strategic foreign policy goals in mind, often willing to make trade-offs in the endgame of a negotiation to come to an agreement. While India has important bilateral political relationships with major European powers, diplomatic channels were at the nationstate level, not with the EU as a whole. The BTIA negotiations were therefore not embedded in a process that facilitated the linking of foreign policy objectives with trade. This diminished the scope for a grand strategic bargain. In the inception phase of the negotiations, it became clear that the EU’s objectives were driven by the market access demands of European export industries, in particular the car industry, wines and spirits, as well as retail, insurance and financial services. The EU also pushed for the inclusion of the ‘Singapore issues’ (government procurement, investment, trade facilitation, competition) which had proven

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contentious in multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time, India had a clear interest in exporting textiles and clothing to the EU as previous preferential quotas for this sector were phasing out. Beyond this, it was difficult for Indian negotiators to identify further export interests in the European market due to a lack of demand from domestic industry. Indian demands then focused on short-term visas for its IT professionals, which proved to be a politically sensitive topic in the United Kingdom. Leading up to the suspension of the negotiations in 2013, the new co-decision powers of the European Parliament under the Lisbon Treaty increased pressure from within the EU to include labour and environmental standards in its trade agreements. However, given a deeply engrained post-colonial identity that places a strong emphasis on sovereignty, this was a red line for India. Moreover, unwillingness by German industry to accept a deal on cars and car parts that was equivalent to the market access granted to South Korea and Japan, in combination with a new Indian industrial policy on car manufacturing, ground the negotiations to a halt. In combination with India’s slow progress on implementing domestic reforms on government procurement, investment caps, as well as the multi-brand retail, insurance and financial services sector, the negotiations were suspended in the summer of 2013. Since 2013, negotiations have entered the ongoing limbo phase, which has seen a gradual narrowing of some outstanding issues, no progress on others, and also the emergence of new difficulties. India has been implementing domestic reforms on public procurement, insurance, investment caps and data governance, but in spite of some earlier signs of progress, the multi-brand retail sector and the financial sectors largely remain closed to firms from the EU. Most importantly, there will likely not be any progress in the negotiations until there is more clarity about the United Kingdom’s future relationship with the European Union, since the UK’s export interests for financial and legal services as well as its visa regime for Indian services professionals were key ingredients of the negotiations. The EU’s new trade and investment architecture, under which trade and investment agreements have to be separately negotiated, and India’s new investment regime add further complications for the negotiations. Moreover, until key draft legislation for India’s future digital framework, including the e-commerce policy, the Personal Data Protection Bill and amendments for the Information Technology Act, are in force (likely by the end of 2020) India will have to wait to obtain ‘data adequacy’ status under EU GDPR rules. A number of recent developments have added pressure on India to come to a conclusion. In June 2019, the United States withdrew India’s preferences under its GSP and threatened to cancel H1B visas if India failed to provide guarantees on open cross-border data flows. While some of the moves by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) were strong-arm negotiating tactics, they were still able to convince officials in Delhi that it would be wise to guarantee more market access outside of the United States as soon as possible. Moreover, since August 2019, Indian farmed shrimp exports are under pressure following the signing of an EU-Vietnam FTA in June this year, which requires far less regulatory testing at import than imports from India (50% sampling for compliance, possibly used as a subtle instrument of pressure) (The Hindu Business Line 2019a). Export competition from Vietnam could add to the competitive pressures that Indian apparel exports face from Bangladesh (The Hindu

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Business Line 2019b). There also appears to be scope to compromise on core labour and environmental standards as well as greater willingness by the EU to make some concessions on human rights references in the trade agreement (The Hindu 2019).43 Most importantly, there have recently been calls from the MEA-affiliated think tank RIS to approach the EU-India BTIA from a geostrategic perspective, especially in light of concerns about Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the ongoing crisis of the multilateral trading system. In fact, according to Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal, India’s most recent decision not to join the RCEP has given new impetus to finally conclude the agreement with the EU (Press Trust of India 2019). The increasingly strategic nexus between India and the EU, as well as deeper coordination on foreign policy between EU member states, could mean that both sides may be more willing to compromise on outstanding issues in the future.44

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negotiator (de-identified) in discussion with the author, 13 March 2020. scenarios for the future of EU-India cooperation, see Stefania Benaglia’s contribution in this volume. 44 Regarding

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Press Trust of India. 2011g. India against inclusion of data exclusivity in any FTA. Press Trust of India, April 6. Press Trust of India. 2011h. India not for IPR beyond domestic law in FTA with EU. Press Trust of India, April 30. Press Trust of India. 2012a. SIAM flays move for more tax on diesel cars, duty cuts for EU. Press Trust of India, March 2. Press Trust of India. 2012b. Import duty cut to hinder domestic industry growth: Tata Motors. Press Trust of India, February 3. Press Trust of India. 2012c. Calibrated duty cut on cars from EU can be considered. Press Trust of India, June 3. Press Trust of India. 2012d. Patel hints at import duty concessions on luxury cars from EU. Press Trust of India, 26 November. Press Trust of India. 2013a. Investment protection pact in India-EU free trade agreement. Press Trust of India, 11 April. Press Trust of India. 2013b. We’ve closing window of opportunity to finalise talks. Press Trust of India, February 7. Press Trust of India. 2013c. India, EU need to operationalise political will for FTA. Press Trust of India, February 24. Press Trust of India. 2013d. BJP opposes FTA with EU. Press Trust of India, April 10. Press Trust of India. 2013e. Par panel asks govt to protect dairy sector under India-EU FTA. Press Trust of India, April 23. Press Trust of India. 2013f. Free trade agreement with EU to hit Indian dairy sector. Press Trust of India, July 30. Press Trust of India. 2013g. India, EU talks on FTA expected to make headway. Press Trust of India, April 15. Press Trust of India. 2013h. FTA: EU members willing to work out ‘balanced outcome’. Press Trust of India, April 29. Press Trust of India. 2014. EU-India FTA pact not to be finalised in near future. Press Trust of India, February 21. Press Trust of India. 2015a. Auto sector inclusion in India-EU FTA against ‘Make in India’. Press Trust of India, April 13. Press Trust of India. 2015b. Sitharaman-EU trade commissioner meeting next week on FTA. Press Trust of India, May 26. Press Trust of India. 2015c. India, EU likely to restart FTA talks on Aug 28. Press Trust of India, July 21. Press Trust of India. 2015d. India defers FTA talks with EU over ban of 700 pharma products. Press Trust of India, August 5. Press Trust of India. 2016a. India, EU officials to meet on Feb 22 in Brussels. Press Trust of India, February 16. Press Trust of India. 2016b. India, EU fail to make headway on FTA talks. Press Trust of India, March 31. Press Trust of India. 2016c. India, EU should hold talks only after substantial progress. Press Trust of India, April 26. Press Trust of India. 2016d. India to rework FTA with EU after Brexit. Press Trust of India, June 4. Press Trust of India. 2017a. India and EU should firm up FTA to offset concerns over OBOR. Press Trust of India, May 23. Press Trust of India. 2017b. India-EU FTA talks expected to move forward in next few days. Press Trust of India, October 6. Press Trust of India. 2017c. No decision on resumption of talks on India-EU FTA. Press Trust of India, October 9. Press Trust of India. 2018a. India-EU FTA negotiations likely to resume soon. Press Trust of India, March 26.

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Press Trust of India. 2018b. Inter-ministerial group to study E-commerce issues. Press Trust of India, April 13. Press Trust of India. 2019. India open for engagement with RCEP nations again if our concerns are addressed. Press Trust of India, November 5. Reuters. 2000. S. Africa, Brazil begin free trade talks. Reuters, March 2. Seshadri, Villur S. 2009. Evolution in India’s regional trading arrangements. Journal of World Trade 43 (5): 903–926. Storey, Ian James. 2000. Living with the Colossus: How Southeast Asian countries cope with China. Parameters 29 (4): 111–125. Stuenkel, Oliver. 2015. India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA): The rise of the Global South?. Abingdon: Routledge. The Economic Times. 2000. Free trade pacts no favourite of goverment’s Indrani Bagchi. The Economic Times, September 11. The Economic Times. 2012. Government introduces public procurement bill 2012 in Parliament. The Economic Times, May 15. The Economic Times. 2015a. Free-trade agreement with European Union: India may relax tariffs on spirits, auto parts. The Economic Times, March 19. The Economic Times. 2015b. Don’t Mix Talks on Drugs & Trade Pact: EU to India. The Economic Times, November 17. The Economic Times. 2015c. The coming trade storm: Tides are shifting, India must decide fast on a strategy to cope with post-TPP era. The Economic Times, November 21. The Economic Times. 2018. Germany Wary of India Hiking duty on auto parts. The Economic Times, February 14. The Guardian. 2015. Scotch whisky industry ‘bigger than UK iron and steel or computers’. The Guardian, January 27. The Hindu. 2000. South Africa seeks to negotiate free trade pact with India. The Hindu, February 16. The Hindu. 2006. India, EU to push for big trade, investment deal. The Hindu, October 14. The Hindu. 2007a. Indo-EU pact a threat to fishing sector. The Hindu, August 31. The Hindu. 2007b. Proposed FTA will benefit textile sector. The Hindu, November 29. The Hindu. 2008. EU-India Free Trade Agreement hits roadblock. The Hindu, March 4. The Hindu. 2009a. EU favours FTA with India. The Hindu, September 12. The Hindu. 2009b. Lack of transparency and debate in India-EU free trade agreement. The Hindu, October 22. The Hindu. 2009c. Let India-EU openly discuss child labour, environment. The Hindu, October 21. The Hindu. 2010a. Free trade agreement talks with EU to be stepped up. The Hindu, March 5. The Hindu. 2010b. FTA will hurt livelihoods in India, Europe. The Hindu, December 10. The Hindu. 2010c. Non-trade issues not to hamper trade talks with EU. The Hindu, May 5. The Hindu. 2011a. Manmohan to clear draft manufacturing policy soon. The Hindu, April 9. The Hindu. 2011b. Logjam in India-EU FTA talks. The Hindu, November 17. The Hindu. 2011c. India-EU FTA talks set to gather pace. The Hindu, November 19. The Hindu. 2012. For a fair, free trade pact with Europe. The Hindu, February 9. The Hindu. 2013a. Knitwear exporters upset over panel caution on signing trade pact with EU. The Hindu, April 13. The Hindu. 2013b. Not insisting on patent extension, says EU. The Hindu, April 13. The Hindu. 2015a. Go forward on India-EU talks. The Hindu, May 20. The Hindu. 2015b. Foreign law firms will soon operate in India. The Hindu, June 30. The Hindu. 2015c. India may drag EU to WTO if drugs ban is not lifted. The Hindu, August 7. The Hindu. 2016a. India-EU free trade impasse may end: CII. The Hindu, April 11. The Hindu. 2016b. India, EU aim to break FTA impasse. The Hindu, June 2. The Hindu. 2016c. India, U.K. to start free trade talks. The Hindu, July 9. The Hindu. 2017. Modi in Berlin today, says ‘new chapter’ in ties. The Hindu, May 29. The Hindu. 2019. Talking trade with the EU. The Hindu, August 27.

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The Hindu Business Line. 2000. Assocham wary of post-MFA garment exports. The Hindu Business Line, July 7. The Hindu Business Line. 2002. CII, Europe body plan joint working group—To boost textile trade, remove barriers. The Hindu Business Line, November 18. The Hindu Business Line. 2004. FICCI moots panel to study free trade pact with EU. The Hindu Business Line, June 29. The Hindu Business Line. 2005. India Inc wants FTA in services with EU, says Assocham survey. The Hindu Business Line, September 6. The Hindu Business Line. 2006. India-EU Bacchanalian cup runneth over. The Hindu Business Line, October 13. The Hindu Business Line. 2007a. Work on to compile list of products for India-EU FTA. The Hindu Business Line, August 29. The Hindu Business Line. 2007b. High-tech machines may be off sensitive list for India-EU trade. The Hindu Business Line, September 29. The Hindu Business Line. 2008. FICCI for removal of trade barriers with EU. The Hindu Business Line, February 4. The Hindu Business Line. 2009a, Protectionist policies of EU hitting Indian cos, says FICCI. The Hindu Business Line, August 3. The Hindu Business Line. 2009b. EU expects progress in FTA talks next year. The Hindu Business Line, September 12. The Hindu Business Line. 2009c. India, EU hope to close talks on FTA in a year. The Hindu Business Line, November 7. The Hindu Business Line. 2009d. EU hopeful of free trade pact with India next year. The Hindu Business Line, 14 October. The Hindu Business Line. 2009e. India-EU trade down 18% in first half. The Hindu Business Line, October 17. The Hindu Business Line. 2010a. Weed out the differences. The Hindu Business Line, March 8. The Hindu Business Line. 2010b. EU free trade pact with India wants to address social issues. The Hindu Business Line, March 5. The Hindu Business Line. 2010c, India rejects EU demand on social clauses in trade pact. The Hindu Business Line, March 12. The Hindu Business Line. 2010d. Free trade pact will not limit India making life-saving drugs. The Hindu Business Line, May 4. The Hindu Business Line. 2010e. Garment exports in 2009–10 decline 2.64%. The Hindu Business Line, July 10. The Hindu Business Line. 2010f. India against ‘TRIPs-plus’ clauses in bilateral trade pacts. The Hindu Business Line, August 17. The Hindu Business Line. 2010g. Free trade pact with Malaysia likely by year-end, says Khullar. The Hindu Business Line, August 27. The Hindu Business Line. 2010h. India-EU trade talks may be concluded by Dec. The Hindu Business Line, September 16. The Hindu Business Line. 2010i. Retain imported car tariff structure post India-EU FTA. The Hindu Business Line, November 28. The Hindu Business Line. 2010j. EU to push for auto duty cuts under free trade pact. The Hindu Business Line, October 13. The Hindu Business Line. 2010k. Trade talks with EU to conclude by Spring 2011. The Hindu Business Line, December 10. The Hindu Business Line. 2011a. Problems in trade talks with EU. The Hindu Business Line, February 18. The Hindu Business Line. 2011b. EU’s pharma trade hoax. The Hindu Business Line, February 25. The Hindu Business Line. 2011c. India, EU free trade pact not likely before next year. The Hindu Business Line, September 27. The Hindu Business Line. 2011d. India can’t say ‘cheese’. The Hindu Business Line, February 11.

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The Hindu Business Line. 2012a. Auto-makers’ body strongly opposes lower import duty on European cars. The Hindu Business Line, February 4. The Hindu Business Line. 2012b. Import duty hike on luxury cars gives India a bargaining chip. The Hindu Business Line, March 20. The Hindu Business Line. 2012c. EU wants testing requirements for car imports removed in FTA. The Hindu Business Line, April 27. The Hindu Business Line. 2012d. EU, India hold talks on free trade pact ahead of summit. The Hindu Business Line, February 10. The Hindu Business Line. 2012e. EU takes up India’s ‘protectionist’ measures with the Centre. The Hindu Business Line, June 22. The Hindu Business Line. 2012f. Commitment to open retail trade not due to EU’s demand. The Hindu Business Line, June 26. The Hindu Business Line. 2013a. EU waits for Budget sops to finalise free trade pact with India. The Hindu Business Line, January 24. The Hindu Business Line. 2013b. Amul wants protection for dairy farmers. The Hindu Business Line, March 27. The Hindu Business Line. 2013c. BJP demands House scrutiny. The Hindu Business Line, April 11. The Hindu Business Line. 2013d. No trade pact without assurance on Govt procurements. The Hindu Business Line, June 20. The Hindu Business Line. 2013e. India may offer compromise plan for insurance. The Hindu Business Line, August 8. The Hindu Business Line. 2013f. EU not ready to give India ‘data secure’ status. The Hindu Business Line, June 16. The Hindu Business Line. 2015a. India firm on resolution to GVK Bio’s drug issue before re-opening FTA talks with EU. The Hindu Business Line, October 19. The Hindu Business Line. 2015b. India, EU agree to re-start talks on free trade pact early next year. The Hindu Business Line, November 23. The Hindu Business Line. 2016a. Unfair Trade. The Hindu Business Line, February 6. The Hindu Business Line. 2016b. Proposed work visa curbs by UK, new irritant for India-EU FTA talks. The Hindu Business Line, January 22. The Hindu Business Line. 2016c. India offers EU compromise formula to break deadlock in trade talks. The Hindu Business Line, March 30. The Hindu Business Line. 2016d. PM to raise FTA, pharma exports issue with EU. The Hindu Business Line, March 17. The Hindu Business Line. 2016e. Germany pushes for investment protection pact under India-EU free trade agreement. The Hindu Business Line, September 21. The Hindu Business Line. 2016f. EU wants to start talks with India on a bilateral investment treaty. The Hindu Business Line, November 17. The Hindu Business Line. 2016g. EU wants ‘realistic prospect’ for resuming FTA talks. The Hindu Business Line, July 15. The Hindu Business Line. 2017a. Why India should set store by its FTA with EU. The Hindu Business Line, June 14. The Hindu Business Line. 2017b. Germany, UK will gain the most from an India-EU free trade deal. The Hindu Business Line, October 26. The Hindu Business Line. 2017c. India, EU to take another shot at reviving FTA talks. The Hindu Business Line, November 9. The Hindu Business Line. 2019a. EU-Vietnam FTA may see India’s seafood exports to bloc dry up. The Hindu Business Line, August 16. The Hindu Business Line. 2019b. EU’s free trade pacts hurting Indian apparel exports. The Hindu Business Line, September 25. The Telegraph. 2010. India trade deal with EU will allow thousands of immigrants into Britain. The Telegraph, October 8.

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VanGrasstek, Craig. 2013. The history and future of the World Trade Organization. Geneva: World Trade Organization. Weerakoon, Dushni. 2010. The political economy of trade integration in South Asia: The role of India. The World Economy 33 (7): 916–927. Woolcock, Stephen. 2003. The Singapore issues in Cancun: A failed negotiation ploy or a litmus test for global governance? Intereconomics 38 (5): 249–255. Woolcock, Stephen. 2007. European Union policy towards free trade agreements. ECIPE working paper 03. European Centre for International Political Economy, Brussels. https://www.econstor. eu/handle/10419/174818. Accessed 23 September 2020.

Nicolas Köhler-Suzuki is a policy advisor on international trade at International Trade Intelligence in Paris. He has worked on trade policy issues with international organisations and national governments and provided expertise on the negotiation and implementation of multilateral and regional trade agreements. Prior to his advisory work, Nicolas was a doctoral researcher at the University of Cambridge, with a focus on Indian trade agreements.

Low-Carbon Development: An Idea Whose Time Has Come—Unlocking Climate Cooperation Between India and the EU Kirsten Jörgensen

1 Introduction This chapter deals with the bilateral climate relations between India and the EU as they have emerged in the context of the EU-initiated strategic partnership. It is a relationship between two different partners, one a national state, the other a supranational regional organisation with member states. Relations between India and the European Community date back to the early 1960s, when the two different political entities approached each other for the first time, and have developed slowly since then. In 1994, three years after India’s economic liberalisation, and one year after the Community was incorporated into the European Union in 1993, the primary bilateral cooperation agreement was adopted. An ambitious Joint Action Plan (JAP) for the EU-India strategic partnership was agreed upon in 2005. The increasing importance of India as a trading partner for the EU was one of the central motives for the strategic partnership—the other being the fact that both India and the EU were striving to increase their global importance (Gröning 2012). The EU was India’s largest trading partner in 2019, and India is the EU’s 10th largest trading partner (European Commission 2020). However, as discussed in various chapters of this book, the Indian-European relations did not flourish and failed to meet expectations in the major policy areas of economy, security and development/welfare, which are usually regarded as core state functions. Progress has been made only in a number of other policy issue areas, such as technology transfer, science collaboration and environment. A supportive condition provided by the EU was the 7th EU Framework Programme for science and technological development, under which India became the EU’s fourth largest international partner. The number of technology transfer

K. Jörgensen (B) Freie Universität of Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_9

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projects involving European technology and financial support outstripped respective US-Indian collaborations (Gröning 2012). As will be argued here, climate policy as a more recent policy field offers specific opportunities and incentives for Indian-European bilateral cooperation. This includes economic win-win potential in the field of green technologies and joint interest in dealing with global warming and climate change impacts. The energy sector, particularly energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energy, which are critical for any climate mitigation policy, has a high potential for bilateral Indian European cooperation (Upadhyay 2012). India is facing chronic energy deficits and is highly dependent on oil, gas and coal imports. To increase its energy security, India aims to diversify its energy mix and is already one of the leading countries in the global renewable energy sector. The state plays an important role in promoting the diffusion of photovoltaic and wind power (Jänicke 2012), and India ranks fourth in the world in total installed capacity (REN21 2020). In 2007, the European Commission set the agenda for low-carbon development, aiming at stimulating the development and commercialisation of energy-efficient technologies by developing lead markets and creating incentives for frontrunners (Jänicke and Quitzow 2017). The European greenhouse gas emission trading system was introduced in 2005. Climate relations between India and the EU have unfolded against the background of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) climate negotiation process and have been institutionalised in the context of the strategic partnership since 2005. In the early 2000s, when the international climate negotiations had stalled, the EU tried to stimulate progress through bilateral relations with rapidly developing countries in Asia (Keukeleire and Bruyninckx 2011). Since 2003, the EU has developed strategic partnerships with each of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), consisting of primary cooperation agreements and various separate agreements establishing ministerial and expert forums for cooperation and strategic political agreements (Keukeleire and Bruyninckx 2011). In the context of strategic partnerships, the EU aimed at climate policy capacity-building and the stimulation of green markets as well as the pursuit of best-practice examples in partner-countries so that they might adopt domestic climate frameworks which are, in turn, crucial for a global agreement (Jörgensen and Wagner 2017). Regarding the strategic cooperation with India, the EU has, since 2005, increasingly endeavoured to shift climate policy higher up the political agenda and to apply EU leadership in international climate protection to the bilateral cooperation with India (Torney 2015). Progress in the bilateral climate relations has so far been only slightly more significant than in other policy domains of the strategic partnership, yet this is becoming more likely due to a change in India’s perception of climate mitigation. As will be discussed below, a large potential for mutually beneficial collaboration lies in low-carbon governance; in the transition of the energy sector towards renewable energy and energy efficiency and linked to this, economic, financial and technical cooperation. Ideas, knowledge and science are all key factors for climate policymaking and policy-oriented learning, but the major change that has improved the conditions for collaboration concerns the shift in India’s domestic climate policy

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debate. The concept of low-carbon development has now arrived, and gradually the conditions for enhanced cooperation on climate mitigation have improved. India’s climate policy paradigm has shifted, and the firewall, which had for a long time stood in the way of climate mitigation policies, has been breached. The co-benefits of climate mitigation have gained a foothold and have since 2008 been institutionalised in transformative policy frameworks structured towards low-carbon development. The European Union, for her part, has offered structural collaboration, which fits into India’s low-carbon approach to renewable energy, and energy efficiency in infrastructure development. An opportunity structure enabling the collaboration between the supranational EU and India’s federal state is the emergence of multilevel governance with interconnected institutions and involving public and private actors working at different governmental levels in climate relations and in various low-carbon projects.

2 Indian-European Climate Relations in the 2000s: Downtime and Unfulfilled Expectations The political outcomes from the overall strategic partnership between India and the EU, in particular regarding the priority areas of security and trade policy, were disappointing and the political relations did not correspond to the level of economic cooperation (Wülbers 2011; Gröning 2012; von Muenchow-Pohl 2012). Compared with the partnerships of the EU with Russia and China, EU relations with India seemed to be less developed (Keukeleire and Bruyninckx 2011; Torney 2015). Until the 2015 UN Climate Conference COP21 in Paris 2015, the outcomes of the climate relations between India and the EU also fell short of expectations. Between 2005 and 2015 the two partners particularly disagreed about the role the BRICS countries should play in a future binding greenhouse gas mitigation agreement (Torney 2015). Signs of divergence appeared after 2007, when the EU asked rapidly developing countries such as China and India to enter into emission reduction measures and contribute to mitigating global warming. This call for action was prompted by increasing concerns about the sharp increase of greenhouse gas emissions in the BRICS countries. Accordingly, the EU tried to set the agenda for emission reduction objectives for developing countries during the run-up to the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009. A sharp disconnect between India and the EU was then visible at the UNFCCC climate summit in Copenhagen. While India had joined strategy consultations between the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries and the US—under the erstwhile Obama administration—the EU on the other hand was politically sidelined in Copenhagen. The climate relations between India and the EU did not make any significant progress between 2005 and 2015 (Torney 2020). Expectations regarding the potential EU influence on setting a climate policy agenda and the framing of domestic and international climate policy in India were not met (Jörgensen and Wagner 2017; Torney 2020). According to EU

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experts, it was difficult to make climate policy explicitly subject to bilateral cooperation as long as political backing remained absent from India’s dominant domestic discourse (Jörgensen and Wagner 2017). Climate relations between the EU and India emerged from within the context of India’s equity imperative, which drew a red line regarding obligatory emission reductions and a cap on CO2 emissions for developing countries. Until 2013 the growth in bilateral energy and environmental cooperation between the EU and India, had not fostered an atmosphere in international forums that was any more conducive to addressing climate change governance. Disagreements in the climate relations between India and the EU have, however, never been insurmountable, because there is no irreconcilable divergence of political interests and objectives. Quite the contrary, the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation is high regarding low-carbon development (Jörgensen and Wagner 2017). Collaboration on technological innovation, environmental leapfrogging technologies in the energy and building sectors, and the creation of ecologically sustainable urban and transportation infrastructures has great potential and provides win-win options.

3 2016 Onwards: A New Course of Action After a decade in idle pursuit, the climate relations between India and the EU have received new stimulus and impetus; according to various commentators, new initiatives and financing incentives have been set up in 2018 and 2019, which may significantly stimulate climate relations between India and the EU. In an Economic Times commentary Aspengren and Nordenstam (2019) argue that “More than ever before, there is a will in Brussels and New Delhi to deepen the ties and strengthen cooperation on concrete issues”. According to observers, common interests between the EU and India lie in the transition towards renewable energy, pointing in particular to the International Solar Alliance launched by India and France at the climate summit in Paris in 2015. “Through the European Investment Bank, the EU should increase its financial support to India’s clean energy. The key is the International Solar Alliance since its activities could facilitate both the EU’s and India’s energy transition to renewable energy” (Aspengren and Nordenstam 2019). Aspengren and Nordenstam also point to the potential lying in collaboration with European member states; for instance, Germany with its pronounced energy transition offers many opportunities for mutual cooperation. Another example is Khandekar (2018), a scholar from the Institute of European Studies at the Vrije University Brussels, who once depicted the EU-India relationship as “A Loveless Arranged Marriage”.Seven years later, she points to the fact that the EU-India strategic partnership has turned into one of the most wellfunctioning of the EU’s strategic partnerships, “even far ahead of the faltering EU-US strategic partnership under US President Trump” (Khandekar 2018). In fact, Khandekar presently highlights the steps taken to intensify climate and energy cooperation and a partnership on sustainable urbanisation.

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Since the 2017 renewal of the Indian-European partnership, the partners launched various funding schemes and projects to mitigate global warming and foster the implementation of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement 2015, which has the goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C. In 2017 the EIB committed to EUR 800 million backing for small-scale renewable energy projects across India, representing the EIB’s largest ever support for energy investment in Asia (European Investment Bank 2017). This includes renewable energy financing in partnership with the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA) and the India Infrastructure Finance Company approved in 2020. In October 2019, the European Commission and the Department of Science and Technology (DST) of the Government of India launched a programme to develop smart and integrated local energy systems, with funding at EUR 18 million. The European Investment Bank has committed to spending 30% of its multilateral financing in developing countries on climate change mitigation and adaptation by 2020 (European Investment Bank 2020).

4 Low-Carbon Development: An Idea Whose Time Has Come One of the approaches put forth in the EU is the framing of climate policy as a winwin opportunity (Wurzel and Connelly 2011b). The EU has pioneered climate policy measures and demonstrated that renewable energy policy and energy-efficiency measures offer economic win-win opportunities, perceiving climate mitigation not as a threat to economic growth but as an economic and ecological opportunity (Oberthür and Kelly 2008; Wurzel et al. 2017). Although at times contested by several member states, the EU climate policy is significantly based on an actor constellation supportive of increasing mitigation goals and investment in low-carbon technologies (Geden et al. 2018). In 2007, the EU set itself targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction, the increase of renewable energy and improvements in energy efficiency in the context of the 20–20–20 climate and energy package. A regulatory framework for the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency was enacted in 2009. In 2011, the Commission of the EU presented a roadmap for a competitive, low-carbon economy strategy which strives for an 80% decarbonised economy by 2050 (Vogler 2013). The Commission adopted the 2030 climate and energy framework in 2014. The EU introduced the first Emission Trading System which, although continuously in need of rectification, still serves as a model and has inspired experimentation with emission trading systems across the globe. Furthermore, a number of member states experiment with innovative approaches to improving low-carbon governance (Jänicke 2012). Since the 1990s, a durable and largely undisputed policy paradigm shared by government officials and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has played a critical role in India’s climate policy, global “climate equity” which implies that climate

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change was a problem created by industrialised countries which therefore should be the first held to account (Dubash 2013; Isaksen and Stokke 2014). The related “development first”, or “growth first” theory holds that India’s first priority as a former colony and developing country should be development and poverty reduction and that these aims should not be hampered by emission reduction goals. However, India’s climate policy paradigm shifted, gradually modifying the definition of this problem. The co-benefit idea perforated the firewall against mitigation measures and added a new dimension to India’s climate policy paradigm (Raghunandan 2020). Just as the EU has improved low-carbon development at home, India’s domestic political scene has increasingly accepted low-carbon development as a remedy to climate change, with the energy sector at the centre of the transition (Roy et al. 2019). Since 2007, domestic climate policy has gained currency in India and interest in the idea of low-carbon development has come to life. In 2008 the co-benefit principle was introduced into India’s first National Action Plan on Climate Change, and the political agenda setting for low-carbon development began. In 2009, driven by increasing demands from the international community and developing country coalitions, India pledged to voluntarily decrease its 2005 levels of emission intensity by 20–25% by 2020 (Fernandes et al. 2020: 164). In 2010, India’s Planning Commission created an expert group for low-carbon development (Planning Commission 2014). Titled “Faster, more inclusive and sustainable growth”, India’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012–2017) outlined the need for a low-carbon strategy for inclusive growth “in order to improve the sustainability of its growth process, while carbon mitigation will be an important co-benefit” (Planning Commission of India 2013: 117). An important trigger for the change in India’s domestic debate was the “co-benefits of climate change” argument (Dubash et al. 2018). This powerful new idea came from the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and elicited new discussions and research about the potential win-wins; the economic, ecological and social co-benefits of climate mitigation measures. The beginnings of domestic advocacy for climate mitigation were first seen in 2007 and new actor constellations have since emerged challenging the dominant climate policy paradigm (Isaksen and Stokke 2014; Fernandes et al. 2020). Indian climate researchers and think tanks engaged the co-benefit argument in their research (Dubash et al. 2013) and nudged a shift in the domestic debate, shedding light on the potential opportunities of lowcarbon development. The co-benefits of the climate mitigation argument also helped to loosen India’s climate policy gridlock and modified the domestic debate which was until then fixated on “equity-only” framing (Dubash 2020). The more flexible bottom-up architecture of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change facilitated the formulation of India’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), permitting it to define its own low-carbon pathway (Gosh 2019). India’s development and climate policy is still torn between the growth-first paradigm and green growth, and so far the co-benefit principle is “less of a guide to shape and prioritise future action and more of a harvesting of past ones” (Dubash and Gosh 2019: 336), yet there are considerable transformational moves towards a low-carbon development (Dubash and Gosh 2019). India’s missions under the

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national climate action plan offer linkages for closer collaboration with low-carbon and climate policies in the European Union. This concerns structural cooperation in the area of climate financing and entrepreneurial cooperation in the area of technological innovation and diffusion. Insufficient coordination among the involved actors and institutions and insufficient integration of funding for India’s climate missions, along with a constraint of current domestic and international climate financing is hindering low-carbon transformation in India (Mandal 2019: 391; Sagar 2019). The different moves towards low-carbon development include linkages created by the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) (2008) between existing policies and climate policy. This concerns existing renewable energy and energyefficiency policy frameworks, which fit into climate policy. These policies were initially rooted in energy security, as India is highly import-dependent on coal and oil for its energy needs. India’s climate action plan from 2008 includes a range of sectorbased mitigation policies (Sant and Gambhir 2012) and builds on the long-established renewable energy policy institutions. Newly developed policies include various policy “missions”, such as for example India’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNSSM) (2010) and the National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency (NMEEE) (2010). The solar mission does not bind India to substantial emission reductions but sets out ambitious goals for the installation of solar capacity of 20 GW by 2022, using both photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power, and it aims at reaching grid parity with coal-based thermal power by 2020 (Behuria 2020: 5). With this strategy, India has turned itself around from its being a solar energy laggard and formulated the explicit goal of becoming a leader in the development of solar energy. The solar mission created an opportunity structure and incentive system for solar capacity installation (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2020); the goals for installed solar power capacity were continuously revised and, in 2017, solar installations accounted for 45% of total capacity additions in India (Behuria 2020: 6). The upgrading of energy efficiency and renewable energy goals was facilitated through positive experiences with the diffusion of low-carbon technologies in India. The market and price development of light-emitting diode (LED) and PV-based solar electricity between 2012 and 2015 have increased stakeholder support for “low- and zero-carbon options”, which is particularly important in the context of India’s need for enormous future investment in the building sector and infrastructure (Mathur 2019: 225). For the international climate conference in Paris in October 2015, India submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), which formulated the ambitious goals of achieving a target of 60 GW of wind power installed capacity by 2022 and of enhancing solar power installed capacity to 100 GW by 2022 (Government of India 2015). This strategy is comparable to the European approach to a policy-induced market system for the promotion of climate-friendly technological innovations. Moreover, India took the lead and launched, together with France, the International Solar Alliance (ISA), an initiative targeted at developing countries.

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Synergies concern climate mitigation as mentioned above but also climate adaptation. Regarding the focus on vulnerability to climate impacts and on climate adaptation, commonalities between India and the EU are increasing. Since 2008 the EU has securitised climate policy with high political priority and has increasingly framed climate change impacts as a threat to food security, poverty eradication and stability of developing countries (Dupont 2019). Such a securitisation fits with India’s interests: the country is highly vulnerable to climate change impacts and shifts in India’s climate strategy are related to growing recognition of this vulnerability (Dubash et al. 2018). An interesting point which will not be discussed in this context is the question of whether India and the EU could work more closely together in the international climate process and whether a sustained interaction between the EU and India could even trigger the virtuous cycle (Falkner 2016) of enhanced pledges in future climate negotiations. The vibrant academic debate about EU climate leadership points to the outstanding role the EU has played in global climate governance during different phases of the emergence of the international system of climate governance through an ambitious internal climate policy, international engagement in multi- and bilateral constellations and the ability to attract followers (Wurzel et al. 2017). In different phases of the international climate process the EU has performed well regarding one or more of these criteria (Oberthür and Kelly 2008). India on the other hand has long been perceived as a nay-sayer, unwilling to commit to climate mitigation goals and persuading fellow developing countries to do the same (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012). Still, India’s energy and climate policy trajectory proves that it has shown leadership both in the international context and also regarding the development of internal climate policy.1 First, India has taken remarkable steps in developing domestic green energy, second, it strives to attract followers, for example, with solar energy investment policies through the International Solar Alliance (ISA), and third, it has engaged in the climate negotiation process, striving to integrate the perspective of developing countries into the climate regime, and to keep that process going during the Paris Conference 2015 (Sengupta 2019). India’s climate diplomacy has changed since 2009 it began to “project itself not as a part of the problem, but as a country keen to be part of a solution” (Lavasa 2019: 175). A strategic leadership role materialised in a meeting of 25 Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), hosted by India in 2015, where a negotiating text was formulated (Lavasa 2019: 176). Low-carbon development is a policy field which offers multiple entry points and opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between India, the EU and the EU member states. India and the EU have confirmed they’ll enforce their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) developed in the context of the Paris Climate Agreement.

1 Regarding

India’s climate diplomacy towards the EU see Jayaram’s contribution in this volume.

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5 Unlocking Climate Cooperation—Multi-Level Governance as an Opportunity Structure Multi-level governance structures are evolving in various areas that concern environmental degradation and climate change, in particular with respect to cross-border problems. The effectiveness and possible benefits of these governance structures are discussed not only with respect to the internalisation of externalities but also with regard to their capacities for innovation (Wälti 2010). Multi-level governance structures are expected to facilitate policy experimentation and diffusion of best practices, and also, as the EU multi-level reinforcement debate shows, to offer multiple access points for leadership (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2010). Comparative climate politics shows that multi-level governance structures can: create a dynamic of change, provide an opportunity structure, activate peer-to-peer learning between countries, cities and regions and facilitate vertical up-scaling of best practice (Saerbeck et al. 2017). Along with multi-level approaches, cross-sectoral approaches to climate protection have become important both in mobilising economic interests (e.g. in the construction sector), and in the use of co-benefits. In the EU, the multi-level governance structure was beneficial to the development of ambitious environmental and climate policies offering opportunities for leadership from EU member states, the EU Council and supranational actors such as the EU Commission and the EU Parliament, as well as actors from the private sector (Zito 2000; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2010). However, the EU’s complex governance structure has also complicated European integration and delayed political decisionmaking in various policy areas. But, environmental and climate protection seemed to be policy fields in which a “decisional stalemate [could often] be overcome” (Wurzel and Connelly 2011a: 8). The energy and climate relations of the EU and India are affected by the multilevel governance structures of both the EU and of India’s federal system. In the fields of internal and external environmental policy, the competencies of the EU and the member states overlap, because environment and climate policies are shared competencies within the EU. This leaves room for supranational and member state action. Since the Lisbon Treaty (European Union 2007), climate change is specifically mentioned in Article 174 of the EU treaties, giving the EU the power to promote measures at the international level to deal with climate change. Moreover, energy policy—vital for the mainstreaming of climate mitigation goals—also belongs to the policy areas shared by both the EU and the member states since the Lisbon Treaty. In India, the responsibility for climate policy and international agreement belongs to the central government. According to the constitution, the national government has exclusive powers over several issues relevant to climate policy, such as foreign trade, nuclear power, mineral and oil resources and the control of industries. The governance structure at the national level is horizontally fragmented and climate actions spread across many ministries and agencies, making coordination capacity and knowledge-sharing insufficient (Dubash and Gosh 2019: 342).

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Energy, a highly important policy field for the mainstreaming of climate mitigation goals and the transition to a sustainable energy supply, falls under concurrent legislation shared between the central government and the states. India’s states have competence in various areas that are relevant to climate policy; for instance, water, land use and agriculture. Similar to the EU member states, the implementation of environmental and climate policy relies on the subnational states in India, which have distinctive political and economic configurations. As a still relatively centralised federal country, India’s states and cities rely tremendously on the national government both politically and financially and are constrained by financial bottlenecks and also by governance deficits (Kohli and Singh 2013). However, since the economic liberalisation in 1991, India’s states have gained more importance and have emerged as important players. Apart from implementing national policies, they can—and partially do, as for example in the promotion of renewable energy—promote their own priorities through independent initiatives (Jörgensen et al. 2015; Jörgensen 2020). India’s states offer additional venues for bilateral cooperation between the EU and India. India’s rapidly growing cities also lend themselves to bilateral and transnational collaboration, stimulating climate initiation and learning (Beermann et al. 2016; Singhal and Jain 2020). Although constrained by institutional, jurisdictional, fiscal and other factors, cities are becoming involved in various intra-city networks and are entering into bilateral collaborations. The EU is engaged in various urban projects in Mumbai, New Delhi, Nagpur, Kochi and Ahmadabad, and the states of Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan, which address sustainable development and transportation issues (Amin 2019). India’s rapid urbanisation processes and related increasing energy demand in the expanding building sector offer huge potential for low-carbon development. The implementation of India’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) (2015) to deal with climate change depends on commitments and actions taken to mitigate future energy demand in the building sector. Without further measures, energy demand in this important segment of India’s urbanisation process could increase by 700% (Khosla and Bhardwaj 2019: 4). The greenhouse gas mitigation potential of India’s building sector makes up 8% of the total greenhouse gas mitigation potential of the global building sector and is addressed in India’s NDC (Graham and Rawal 2019: 109). Environmental leapfrogging through the development and rapid diffusion of energy-efficient, low-carbon and affordable technologies in India’s cities offers a favourable solution for curbing pollution, increasing energy security and implementing India’s climate mitigation commitments. India has ambitious regulatory frameworks that address energy efficiency in buildings. Implementation is hampered, however, by horizontal institutional fragmentation and insufficient vertical cooperation. Multi-level governance, entailing the improved “engagement and collaboration between national, subnational and local governments, together with private-sector and civil-society organizations could therefore substantially increase the effectiveness and efficiency of building sector climate actions” in India (Graham and Rawal 2019: 110). Comparative research shows that multi-level climate governance offers an opportunity structure for stimulating climate initiatives in cities and that the

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international climate process also has economic interests to that end especially in the building sector (30% of the activities) and in local energy production (Jänicke and Quitzow 2017: 125). International cooperation and exchange are considered as enabling conditions of India’s technical innovation processes, facilitating the synergies between climate and development and improving capabilities for managing technological change (Sagar 2019). Financing and the building of capacities for research and technology development and implementation can thus be fostered in the context of bilateral collaboration, for example, within the EU and among member states, and can be an important component of the strategic partnership between India and the EU. Horizontal and vertical interactions of different governmental levels in India with EU actors and member states offer opportunities for peer-to-peer policy learning and cooperation.

6 Summary The EU’s influence in climate change politics relies to a large extent on its pioneering behaviour and is based on the development and diffusion of innovative ideas. After a decade of stagnation, in which the EU’s capacity to enhance collaboration on lowcarbon policies with India was substantial in the energy sector but less so in climate relations, since 2017 Indian-European climate relations have seen surprisingly fresh impetus. Different factors contributed to the upswing in the Indian-European climate relations. A systematic case study applying causal process tracing could probably show which causal mechanisms enabled more effective collaboration. One constant and stabilising factor in these relations is the potential for collaboration lying in the parties’ mutual interest in low-carbon governance, renewable energy and energy efficiency. A changing factor was the shift in India’s policy paradigm. That India’s climate policy paradigm shifted after 2007 and that the climate policy output also changed, setting the course more significantly towards climate mitigation, is almost uncontested in comparative climate politics. A third stable condition and opportunity structure aiding the collaboration between the EU and India is the potential for multi-level governance. Supranational actors and member states from the EU, as well as public and private actors in India’s multi-layered federal system, can reinforce bilateral climate action and mobilise economic and political interests in low-carbon development.

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Oberthür, Sebastian, and Claire Roche Kelly. 2008. EU leadership in international climate policy: Achievements and challenges. The International Spectator 43 (3): 35–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 03932720802280594. Planning Commission. 2014. The final report of the expert group on low carbon strategies for inclusive growth. Planning Commission Government of India. https://cstep.in/drupal/sites/def ault/files/201902/CSTEP_Low_Carbon_Strategies_for_Inclusive_Growth_Report_2014.pdf. Accessed 3 July 2020. Planning Commission of India. 2013. Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017) faster, more inclusive and sustainable growth. Planning Commission Government of India. http://planningcommission. gov.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/12fyp_vol1.pdf. Accessed 6 March 2018. Raghunandan, D. 2020. Factors shaping India’s international climate policy. In Environmental policy in India, eds. Natalia Ciecierska-Holmes, Kirsten Jörgensen, Lana Laura Ollier, and D. Raghunandan, 203–224. Routledge studies in environmental policy. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. REN21. 2020. Renewables 2020 global status report. REN21: Secretariat. https://www.ren21.net/ wp-content/uploads/2019/05/gsr_2020_full_report_en.pdf. Accessed 21 June 2020. Roy, Ashim, Benny Kuruvilla, and Ankit Bhardwaj. 2019. Energy and climate change: A just transition for Indian labour. In India in a Warming World: Integrating climate change and development, ed. Navroz K. Dubash, 284–300. New Delhi: Oxford University Press India. Saerbeck, Barbara, Kirsten Jörgensen, and Martin Jänicke. 2017. Multi-level climate governance: The global system and selected sub-systems. Environmental Policy and Governance 27 (2): 105–107. https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1746. Sagar, Ambuj. 2019. Managing the climate technology transition. In India in a Warming World: Integrating climate change and development, ed. Navroz K. Dubash, 399–426. New Delhi: Oxford University Press India. Sant, Girish, and Ashwin Gambhir. 2012. Energy, development and climate change. In Handbook of climate change and India: Development, politics, and governance, ed. Navroz K. Dubash, 289–302. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Earthscan. Schreurs, Miranda, and Yves Tiberghien. 2010. European Union leadership in climate change: Mitigation through multilevel reinforcement. In Global commons, domestic decisions: The comparative politics of climate change, eds. Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, 23–66. Cambridge: MIT Press. Sengupta, Sandeep. 2019. India’s engagement in global climate negotiations from Rio to Paris. In India in a Warming World: Integrating climate change and development, ed. Navroz K. Dubash, 114–140. New Delhi: Oxford University Press India. Singhal, S., and Sourabh Jain. 2020. Smart sustainable cities. In Environmental policy in India, ed. Natalia Ciecierska-Holmes, Kirsten Jörgensen, Lana Laura Ollier, and D. Raghunandan, 174–200. Routledge studies in environmental policy. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. Torney, Diarmuid. 2015. Bilateral climate cooperation: The EU’s relations with China and India. Global Environmental Politics 15 (1): 105–122. Torney, Diarmuid. 2020. India’s relations with the EU on environmental policy. In Environmental policy in India, eds. Natalia Ciecierska-Holmes, Kirsten Jörgensen, Lana Laura Ollier, and D. Raghunandan, 225–240. Routledge studies in environmental policy. Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge. Upadhyay, Dinoj Kumar. 2012. EU–India energy cooperation: Promoting renewable sources and widening commitments. In The EU–India partnership: Time to go strategic, ed. Luis Peral and Vijay Sakhuja, 75–86. Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies. Vogler, John. 2013. Changing conceptions of climate and energy security in Europe. Environmental Politics 22 (4): 627–645. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.806634. von Muenchow-Pohl, Bernd. 2012. India and Europe in a multipolar world. The Carnegie Papers South Asia. https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/10/india-and-europe-in-multipolar-worldpub-48038. Accessed 3 July 2020.

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Wälti, Sonja. 2010. Multi-level environmental governance. In Handbook on multi-level governance, ed. Henrik Enderlein, Michael Zürn, and Sonja Wälti, 411–422. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar. Wülbers, Shazia Aziz. 2011. The paradox of EU-India relations: Missed opportunities in politics, economics, development cooperation, and culture. Lanham: Lexington Books. Wurzel, Rüdiger, and James Connelly. 2011a. The European Union as a leader in international climate change politics. London, New York: Routledge. Wurzel, Rüdiger, and James Connelly. 2011b. Introduction: European Union political leadership in international climate change politics. In The European Union as a leader in international climate change politics, ed. Rüdiger Wurzel and James Connelly, 3–20. London and New York: Routledge. Wurzel, Rüdiger, James Connelly, and Duncan Liefferink. 2017. The European Union in international climate change politics: Still taking a lead? London and New York: Routledge and Taylor & Francis Group. Zito, Anthony R. 2000. Creating environmental policy in the European Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Kirsten Jörgensen is senior lecturer at the Department of Political and Social Sciences at Freie Universität Berlin. She received her Ph.D. in 1996 at Freie Universität Berlin. Her primary fields of interest include European and Indian environmental and climate policy as well as the role of subnational climate governance. She initiated the German-Indian Sustainability and Climate Change Dialogue and the Indian-European Multi-level Climate Governance Research Network.

India’s Climate Diplomacy Towards the EU: From Copenhagen to Paris and Beyond Dhanasree Jayaram

1 Introduction1 Climate diplomacy is at the heart of the strategic partnership between India and the European Union (EU). Both India and the EU played a leading role in reaching the 2015 Paris Agreement and have committed themselves to implement it despite uncertainties in the global arena, triggered by the United States’ (US) President Trumps announcement to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement. Both parties have adopted a pragmatic and result-oriented approach towards their partnership to give it more substance and to sustain it. Climate diplomacy between the two partners has progressed on various fronts, especially since the establishment of the European Union-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership in 2016 (European Commission 2016). At the bilateral level, from off-shore wind energy development to grid integration of renewable energy to rooftop solar programmes, cooperation between the EU and India has grown manifold in recent years. More so, cooperation between individual countries of the EU such as Germany and France, and India has been on the rise and these predate the launch of the 2016 partnership. These bilateral relations between India and EU member countries has significantly influenced the former’s relations with the EU as a whole—also paving the way for greater engagement on other issues as well. However, at the multilateral level, particularly when it comes to the international climate change negotiations, there continue to be thorny issues that impede leapfrogging of India-EU cooperation on climate change. The period 1 This study was facilitated through the author’s postdoctoral research on ‘Climate Diplomacy of the Emerging Economies from Copenhagen to Paris and Beyond: India as a Case Study’, pursued during 2018–2019, under the Swiss Government Excellence Scholarship, at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland.

D. Jayaram (B) Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Manipal, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_10

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between the 2009 Copenhagen Summit and the 2015 Paris Summit was particularly marred by discordant views on most aspects of climate action and the international climate regime. In a way, these differences have also encumbered the progress of the international climate change negotiations themselves. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to identify the drivers of and shifts in India-EU climate diplomacy, mainly from an Indian perspective. For a long time, the faultlines between them remained unbridgeable on the climate negotiations front, an important, but not sole, element of climate diplomacy. At the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, these fissures were most evident when they took stands that were poles apart. Since then, there has been a conscious effort to concentrate on workable solutions that go beyond targets-and-timetables-based mitigation efforts and whose impacts trickle down to the ground level. How cooperation thus far has strengthened India-EU climate diplomacy, on bilateral and multilateral forums, requires further analysis. The objective of this chapter is therefore, to stimulate an ‘applied’ discussion on climate issues through analysis of policies, cases and tools that could best contextualise India’s climate diplomacy towards the EU, with a specific focus on the 2009–2015 period and the future of the post-2020 international climate regime. By mainly emphasising the Indian perspective on this important relationship, the chapter provides a more in-depth understanding of how the shifts in India’s overall climate diplomacy over the years have also had an impact on its climate diplomacy towards the EU. In this chapter, three levels of analysis are used from a conceptual point of view. First, the concept of ‘climate diplomacy’ is used to delineate various aspects of India-EU relations in the climate arena, geared more towards cooperation (without taking cooperation as a given). The chapter, therefore, describes the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘who’ questions pertaining to climate diplomacy, dealing with the practice of climate diplomacy. An attempt is made at defining the relevance and dimensions of climate diplomacy as well as describing the different steps in the practice of climate diplomacy, which helps provide an analytical framework for India-EU climate change relations. Second, a more nuanced perspective on the concept of climate diplomacy is provided to delve deeper into the shifts and drivers of this practice between two or more parties. Herein, the approach of ‘realist constructivism’ is used to analyse the interplay between ideas and material interests (influencing each other) in the sphere of climate diplomacy—linking it to the practice of climate diplomacy. This again, is crucial for contextualising the attitudinal shifts and behavioural dynamics in IndiaEU climate diplomacy, especially during the period between the 2009 Copenhagen Summit and the 2015 Paris Summit. Third, an applied discussion expounds the ongoing cooperation between India and the EU in the climate change domain, with reference to both mitigation and adaptation. The focus here is on designing an analytical framework to draw out the current strategy of pragmatic and results-oriented climate diplomacy between the two parties, which has had an impact on the negotiations for the post-2020 climate regime as well as actions under it, which may not necessarily be restricted to the sphere of climate change negotiations alone. This is adequately addressed in the way in which India-EU climate diplomacy has evolved over the past decade, including

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at bilateral and plurilateral forums, in light of the intermingling of ideational and material factors. It is also essential to mention here that the chapter mainly looks at the Indian perspective and approach towards the EU in climate diplomacy, with a few references to EU’s approach that have a direct bearing on India’s overall climate diplomacy. The chapter draws mainly on official documents and statements as well as interviews conducted by the researcher with policy and academic experts. The policy experts are mainly the ones who have engaged in climate change negotiations in different roles, while the academic ones are those with an experience of participating in the climate change negotiations and/or analysing the process. At the same time, secondary sources such as peer-reviewed literature are also used, mainly to establish the conceptual framework of climate diplomacy through the lens of realist constructivism, bringing in the combination of ideational and material aspects that influence a country’s climate diplomacy. In this way, a great deal of attention has been paid to the theoretical aspects associated with climate diplomacy, as much as to the practice of it, which is at the centre of this chapter. Although the study is tilted towards a state-centred approach and takes cognisance of the structural imperatives (that of the international system), it takes account of the role of non-state actors, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transitional organisations and development cooperation agencies (that may or may not be directly affiliated with the government) in India-EU climate diplomacy. The study adopts a qualitative, interpretative (also based on framing of the issue of climate change and other related ideas), fundamental (linking theory to empirics) and deductive approach (using the frameworks of realist constructivism and climate diplomacy).

2 Climate Diplomacy: Relevance and Dimensions Climate diplomacy in International Relations, especially foreign policy, is defined and practised in multiple ways. The narratives on climate diplomacy are commonly seen through the lens of potential foreign policy approaches to address the challenges posed by climate change. It therefore, invariably draws heavily upon concepts such as ‘cooperation’ and ‘multilateralism’ in order to identify entry points for diplomatic initiatives, targeted at the most affected sectors such as water, food, land use, cities and so on. On the one hand, the underlying principle and goal of climate diplomacy (Carius et al. 2017) can be summarised as: multi-faceted and characterised by a variety of implications and interpretations depending on region, culture, discipline or socio-economic background. Different narratives on the diplomatic challenges and opportunities climate change presents resonate with different audiences. Therefore, framing the issue in various ways can help achieve foreign policy responses tailored to the specific needs of different geographies and sectors. These narratives facilitate informal and continuous engagement on climate change, notably by respective diplomatic networks. The narratives aim at providing concise lines of argumentation linking climate change challenges to wider or sectorial entry points and opportunities.

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On the other hand, climate diplomacy can be viewed as a reflection of the evolving geopolitics and the international security environment, with the three intermingling and influencing one another at multiple levels. In essence, climate diplomacy is as much an analytical framework to study geopolitics and international relations, including North-South and South-South relations, as it is a tool for advocacy to cater to pressing requirements through dialogue, negotiations, public engagement, policy integration, risk analysis, etc. One of the examples of interplay between climate diplomacy and geopolitical realities is the Copenhagen Summit (2009), at which the changing geopolitical scenario led to the emergence of developing countries, mainly emerging economies, as key agenda-setters, or even agenda-disruptors, as some would put it (Rapp et al. 2010). India, China, Brazil and South Africa, key players from Asia, South America and Africa, asserted themselves in the face of opposition and demands from industrialised countries. Since then, the emerging economies, collectively and/or individually, have also occupied the centre-stage of decision-making on international climate policy, such as through the ‘Brazil, South Africa, India China’ (BASIC) grouping, comprising the four countries (Qi 2011; Hurrel and Sengupta 2012). Although countries such as India, China and Brazil have positioned themselves as norm-providers and institution-builders since the beginning of the negotiations, their enhanced material capacities provided fillip to a change in the ‘structure of the international system’ and ‘the future dynamics of global climate governance’ (Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2015). One of the most oft-quoted definitions of climate diplomacy (Mabey et al. 2013: 14) is the following: Climate diplomacy is the interface between national interest debates and international cooperation. It is the process through which nation states – and increasingly non-governmental and sub-state actors – determine and work to deliver their international objectives.

This definition sums up the nature and goal of climate diplomacy to some extent, by highlighting its contribution to designing, implementing and operationalising a climate regime; the influence of international and national interest objectives in shaping it and the increasing role of a variety of actors beyond the traditional notions of ‘diplomacy’. If one goes deeper into the practice of climate diplomacy, there are three principles that guide it: ‘know yourself’, ‘know the other’ and ‘capacity to influence’. Mabey et al. (2013: 35) interpret these principles in such a way that these take the form of capabilities that are required in order to practise climate diplomacy. While ‘know yourself’ is contingent on ‘framing’ of climate change by domestic constituencies, alignment of climate change with broader national interests and integration of climate change with the larger political decision-making mechanisms (such as through inter-ministerial coordination); ‘know the other’, as the phrase straightforwardly puts it, is in relation to understanding and assessing the climate interests of other countries. The ‘capacity to influence’ is delineated in terms of ‘capability to effectively integrate national priorities into political and diplomatic channels’. The ‘influencing strategy’ of a nation state or sub-state/non-state actors, based on the knowledge of oneself and the other, consists of a variety of elements such as ideas,

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resources, alliances, organisation and legitimacy among others. Although the influencing strategy is geared to cooperation, it is mostly concerned about ‘specific areas of cooperation’ (Mabey et al. 2013: 53) that are in the concerned actor’s interest. Although climate diplomacy is largely conflated with the multilateral/global climate negotiations at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it has assumed significance in other diplomatic platforms that are plurilateral, bilateral and regional in nature, over the years. These platforms such as G-20, the EU and bilateral meetings have incorporated climate change within their processes and discussions. They are also increasingly acting as political and operational entities that nurture conditions for climate action by building confidence/trust and generating consensus among countries, boost climate ambition based on ‘aligned’ interests, and implement international climate agreements through national and regional initiatives. The interrelationship between international and other levels of climate diplomacy is not one way. The international processes and agreements also guide regional, plurilateral and bilateral climate diplomacy. The Paris Agreement reached in 2015 has become the centrepiece of climate diplomacy between the countries that are members of these groupings and organisations (Houser 2010; Torney and Davis Cross 2017). Other forms of climate diplomacy have also begun to be discussed from an analytical as well as an empirical point of view. For instance, the evolution of multiple bilateralism, defined as ‘a strategy that entails the maintenance of several – cooperative or confrontational – bilateral diplomatic relationships in parallel as a subset of a multilateral negotiation setting in order to reach policy objectives at that multilateral level’ (Belis et al. 2018: 86) is one such analytical framework. Within this framework, a nation state is seen to be employing the strategy of multiple bilateralism to secure its interests in such a way that in its bilateral relations with one player, it takes into account its bilateral relations with another actor—a behaviour which may be cooperative or confrontational. Belis et al. (2015) attribute the proactive momentum on climate action between the Copenhagen Summit and the Paris Summit to some extent to growing multiple bilateralism among players like the US, China and the EU. This could be in the form of the joint announcement reached by the US and China to reach an agreement at Paris or the growing China-EU understanding on climate issues through discussions on energy or emissions trading or the shift of climate leadership from the EU to the US-China duo. Climate diplomacy is as much about climate politics as it is about climate action. It is not only a reflection of geopolitics, but also is shaped by and shapes geopolitics. This can be seen in the manner in which ideas, power, alliances, investments, economic opportunities and other geopolitical and geoeconomic factors are embedded within climate diplomacy, both in theory and practice. Even though cooperation has been adopted as a norm to ‘save’ the climate, the politics of climate cooperation has been a defining feature of diplomatic efforts to do so. Countries have formed alliances based on ideas, vulnerabilities, capabilities and so on. The small island states that are considered to be the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world have formed the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), while the emerging economies that have been rallying around the principle of Common but

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Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) and the idea of climate justice2 formed the BASIC grouping. Countries like the US, Australia, Canada and Japan among others that have been pressing for greater commitments from the emerging economies like China and India and opposing strict differentiation between the developed and developing countries, formed the Umbrella Group after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (Roberts 2011). If one looks at the actors involved in climate diplomacy, they are many, especially with greater climate mainstreaming, which implies that climate change is mainstreamed into policy areas other than environment. Traditionally, the environment ministries are thought to be the most appropriate agency to deal with climate diplomacy. However, at multilateral negotiations, professional negotiators, either from foreign/external affairs ministries, or specially appointed climate envoys lead negotiating teams. In addition, the role of other ministries such as finance has also risen in recent years. Yet climate diplomacy practised by a particular country usually has the imprints of the head of the state all over it, as seen in India’s case (Dubash and Joseph 2016). With the increasing participation of sub-state and non-state actors in multilateral meetings, especially at the UNFCCC, their contribution to setting the agenda and influencing countries’ positions has significantly grown in recent years. Nonstate actors, for instance are not only engaged in ‘activist efforts’ aimed at gaining attention, but also in ‘climate governance’ in the form of ‘transnational networks, epistemic communities, public–private partnerships (PPPs), and multi-stakeholder partnerships’ (Kuyper et al. 2017). In effect, the international climate order or regime is a monolith; it is rather an archetype of network(ed) governance, involving multiple actors with varied interests, ideas and capacities.

3 Climate Diplomacy: Ideality and Materiality The drivers of climate diplomacy are many and among them are ideational and material forces that are known to conform to the theoretical strands of constructivism and realism, respectively. While some would consider ideas more important, others would contend that power politics is at the heart of climate diplomacy. Even though the two are considered to be diametrically opposed in most schools of thought, constructivism gives space for the material and ideational to be ‘complexly interwoven and interdependent’ (Pettenger 2007: 6). In fact, ‘realist constructivism’ is an approach that finds mainstream constructivism compatible with classical realism. According to Barkin (2003: 337), ‘realist constructivism would look at the way in which power structures affect patterns of normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way in which a particular set of norms affect power structures’. He argues that ‘political change’ cannot be addressed by either ‘pure realism’ or ‘pure idealism’; and therefore, only a combination or in his words, ‘interplay of the two’ 2 For an analysis of the norm of climate justice in the framework of the India-EU Strategic Partnership

see Lowinger et al. in this volume.

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can account for it (Barkin 2003: 337). (Barkin 2010: 3), while propounding realist constructivism, calls for a synthesis of realism and constructivism in order to better explain the ‘relationship between the study of power politics and the study of ideals in international relations on the one hand, and the study of the social construction of international politics on the other’. Perceptions of climate change are shaped by material or physical forces and vice versa. The behavioural patterns of nation states in the international climate order are governed, to a great extent, by attitudes towards issues concerning global climate governance, which are in turn shaped by perceptions and ideas such as climate justice, national interest, vulnerability/danger, opportunity, historical responsibility, leadership, sustainable development and so on. Hence, the gradual shifts in the climate diplomacy positions of emerging economies such as India, are clearly a reflection of a change in their perceptions of issues surrounding these ideas, coupled with the influence of material forces that emanate from an expansion of their ‘green’ capabilities and power positioning in the international system. For instance, the principle of ‘fairness’, an integral part of international climate politics, is in part based on the ideas of ‘historical responsibility’ of developed countries towards creating climate change and the ‘relative vulnerability’ of developing countries on the one hand; and the material interests of environmental space for ‘development’ and ‘financial and technological assistance’ on the other (Paavola and Adger 2006; Parks and Roberts 2006; Anderson et al. 2017). While it can be argued that the ideas of ‘historical responsibility’ and ‘relative vulnerability’ are driven by ‘financial and technological assistance’ and ‘development’, respectively these ideational positions do not operate in vacuum. In fact, they constantly intermingle with power in an international order that is characterised by a hierarchical relationship between the developed and developing countries on the one hand’ and material forces they possess domestically in order to adapt their material/physical assets and meet physical (tangible) targets (mitigation/greenhouse gas or GHG emissions reduction) on the other. Climate diplomacy, as Elliott (2013) puts it, ‘is not divorced from the competing political interests that underpin it’. These competing political interests are shaped by both domestic and geopolitical factors. On the one hand, countries tend to stick to their ‘historical and national positions’; and on the other, they use climate diplomacy in order to position/project themselves geopolitically—for instance, as a leader, which is often explicated through the idea of leadership (Karlsson et al. 2011). What act as interface between these factors and positions are ideational and material forces, which are not necessarily delinked from one another or share hierarchical relationship with each other. Without materiality, the ideational aspects cannot evolve; and without ideality, the material forces that are intrinsically linked to it cannot attain a meaning that renders them potent. Climate diplomacy facilitates the opening up of economic opportunities, financial and technological investments, strategic partnerships and other forms of instruments through which material progress can be ensured (Hsu et al. 2015; Renner 2015). At the same time, climate diplomacy is intertwined with power hierarchies and balance of power. As seen in the period between the Copenhagen Summit and Paris Summit, the emergence of G-2—the US and China—can be seen as a geopolitical realignment in an anarchical international system (Garrett 2010;

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Marcu 2014). Climate diplomacy is also used as a tool for soft power projection, with countries that possess more capabilities transferring their resources selectively to resource-poor countries in order to win their goodwill and confidence for strategic purposes (Council of the European Union 2016; A¸skar Karakir 2018).

4 Contours and Drivers of Shifts in India’s Climate Diplomacy: Where Does the EU Figure? India’s climate diplomacy has been shaped by both ideality and materiality, which can be analysed further through the framework of realist constructivism. Material and ideational factors correspond with each other as realist notions of power and insecurity go hand in hand with constructivist ideas of morality and justice. From being non-aligned during the Cold War to aspiring to be a revisionist power in the post-Cold War era, India has played several roles in the global geopolitical order, most often championing the case of ‘strategic autonomy’. At the same time, it has continuously used its cultural, civilizational and historical narratives and ideologies related to environment in order to push its climate diplomacy agenda at the international level. In the run-up to the Paris Summit (2015), India was being viewed as a ‘bridging’ nation at two levels—to bridge ‘the many nations across the world’ as well as to bridge ‘development with climate action’ (Jayaram 2018: 184). This cannot be seen as a radical shift from its longstanding foreign policy positioning with respect to climate diplomacy, but at the same time, it also cannot be denied that there has been a visible change in India’s climate diplomacy over the past decade. India’s climate diplomacy has therefore, evolved over a period of time, which has also had an impact on its relations with the EU.

4.1 Influence of Changes in India’s Identities and Geopolitical Pressures Although with the launch of the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008 (Government of India 2008) and a slew of other regulations, also linked to climate action, India declared its willingness and readiness to change this formula and acknowledge the developmental aspects of climate change; yet, its move to delink these domestic actions from international commitments, effectively resulted in India being labelled ‘obdurate’, ‘renegade’, ‘intransigent’, ‘stumbling block’, ‘bottleneck’ and so on in the process to reach a grand, robust climate regime. Jairam Ramesh, former Minister of State (Independent Charge) at the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), called this unfortunate and unfair, for two reasons: First, that India’s per capita emissions are way below that of all developed countries as well as that of other emerging economies, and will never exceed that of the developed

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world; this he called the ‘Singh principle’ (Ramesh 2009), named after former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who stated categorically this fact/pledge while releasing the NAPCC (Ghosh 2008). Second, India was ready to adopt emissions reduction targets (even if binding), if the developed countries reduced their emissions by 40% by 2020, as per 1990 levels (under the Kyoto Protocol). Hence, the onus lies on the industrialised countries and not developing ones such as India to act first (Ramesh 2009). This in itself was a nuanced shift in India’s climate diplomacy, as on the one hand, India began to focus on domestic actions to tackle climate change, and on the other hand, the Indian Government started to realise the necessity of being considered a part of the solution rather than that of the problem, in light of the tags it received from the rest of the international community (as mentioned above).3 At the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, India was instrumental in bringing together the BASIC countries; and ‘spoiling’ the industrialised bloc’s attempts to water down the strict demarcation between Annex I and non-Annex I parties; and in effect adopt a treaty that would bind the emerging countries to adopt a legally binding emissions reduction target based on ‘shared responsibility’. It is on these issues that India has found itself at loggerheads with the EU in the past. However, having not reneged on any international agreement and claiming the moral high ground on most issues of global importance, the Indian establishment began to see climate change as an opportunity to advance its foreign policy agenda—that of gaining more influence in the international system—for which it had to compromise on certain positions (Dubash and Rajamani 2015; Vihma 2011; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012). There emerged a feeling that it had to move beyond issues of morality and adopt pragmatic positions, which would fetch India more dividends—both material and ideational. This visibly influenced India-EU climate diplomacy too, as explained further later in the chapter. India’s positions resonate with those of other developing and emerging economies on various principles like CBDR, emissions reduction targets and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions, with some differences, and are largely opposed to that of industrialised countries and blocs such as the EU (Sengupta 2012). At the same time, India has found itself teetering on several occasions when it comes to setting the agenda for the climate change negotiations. At the Copenhagen Summit, it was in charge of the proceedings along with China and its IBSA partners (Brazil and South Africa). Thereafter, divergences with its BASIC partners due to China’s emergence as an integral part of G-2 (with the US), South Africa’s return to their traditional continental/regional partners and Brazil’s pursuit of own global agenda, forced India to change its strategy at the negotiations (Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2015; Stokes et al. 2016). The period between Copenhagen and Paris is considered crucial in the timeline of climate change negotiations as a myriad of factors (geopolitical, material and ideological) shaped the manner in which major players like the US, China and the EU positioned themselves, wherein India found itself largely isolated. From India’s perspective, it would also not want to be equated with China, which is 3 The

author’s interview with Jairam Ramesh, former Minister of State (MoS), Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), Government of India, in New Delhi on 21 September 2016.

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the largest GHG emitter (in aggregate terms) and whose per capita emissions are far higher than its own (Mohan and Bagchi 2014; Jayaram 2015). Nevertheless, the geopolitical shifts led India to making certain fundamental compromises at the Paris Summit; also in light of the joint announcement by China and the US in Landler 2014. India’s longstanding commitment to the notion of ‘historical responsibility’ of the West in causing climate change had to be watered down as the Paris Agreement, although it reiterates differentiation through CBDR-RC, does not refer to historical responsibility. Yet it was a diplomatic coup undertaken by India that brought several aspects of differentiation and climate justice into the text of the Paris Agreement in the end, despite developed countries’ opposition (Rajamani 2016). However, it reiterated that developing countries such as itself are ready to walk on the road of ambitious climate action, if the rich countries provide adequate climate finance and technology, which the developing countries are entitled to (Gupta 2016). India has had longstanding differences with the developed countries such as the EU over the preoccupation of the climate regime with mitigation, without giving due importance to adaptation and climate finance (including loss and damage mechanism4 ). Herein, one of the primary differences between the two becomes evident—which is the framing of climate change as a (sustainable) development issue in India’s case, and more of an environmental problem in the EU’s case, with significant implications for their respective policies and governance mechanisms that deal with climate change. For India, mitigation efforts cannot be adopted in direct contravention to its developmental prospects; neither can it underemphasise adaptation as climate change undermines developmental gains. Nevertheless, the Western technological tradition has brought India and the EU together in exploring varied options to tackle climate change. One of the ideological strands in Indian environmentalism is ‘Appropriate Technologists’, who call for a healthy and practical combination of agriculture and industry, big and small industry, and Western and Eastern technological tradition, and also look for socio-technical alternatives rather than discarding technology completely (Gadgil and Guha 2004: 107–110).

4.2 India’s Climate Diplomacy Under Modi Under Prime Minister Modi, the vision of India as a part of the solution began to materialise more than ever before in terms of streamlining of climate diplomacy through greater bilateral and multilateral engagement (mostly expressed in joint statements, agreements and other forms of diplomatic outcomes). Furthermore, he also started to shift the narrative from not just being part of the solution, but also a potential global climate leader that is capable of setting the agenda on climate-related issues, as evidenced by his proclamations in the run-up to the 2015 Paris Summit, even while 4 The

loss and damage mechanism is considered the third pillar of the UNFCCC (apart from mitigation and adaptation). More details are available on the website of the UNFCCC, https://unfccc. int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/the-big-picture/introduction-to-loss-and-damage.

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reminding the developed countries that ‘treating the nature well comes naturally for Indians and they (developed nations) are teaching us’ (PTI 2015), reinforcing India’s civilizational ideas of harmony with nature (a part of its worldview). He has therefore, paved the way for, what many would consider, a pragmatic and result-oriented approach towards climate diplomacy, which recognises the need for being flexible and being aware of trade-offs, without compromising on India’s core interests (Vijayaraghavan 2015). In addition, India has always attempted to champion the cause of the developing world’s interests. In this respect, it strives to supplement its story of ‘rising’ India or ‘risen’ India with the leadership tag (Vihma 2011). China’s ability to influence other developing and least developed countries—particularly among the G77—has been substantially enhanced by its rapid advancements in renewable energy and its soft power push by pouring money into them. It is the country with resources—in this case, renewable and clean resources—that will have an edge in leading the global climate change governance machinery than those without them; India lags well behind China (Ramesh 2009).5 The EU therefore, emerged as a partner in India’s climate diplomacy, in terms of developing its capacities in low-carbon transition. In the meantime, India progressively built up its position in the global climate order through the International Solar Alliance (ISA), jointly launched with France at the 2015 Paris Summit, and unwavering support to the Paris Agreement. As commented by Paul Watkinson,6 the ISA was an important initiative, ‘strongly moved forward by Prime Minister Modi’, based on ‘concrete outputs’ and ‘identifying the real need in the tropics and sub-tropics for access to technology’. It gave India a place at the global high table on the climate diplomacy front. The ISA, as some analysts put it, ‘encapsulates the spirit of the Paris Agreement: what every country can do, and how we can do better together’ (Goswami 2018). The new inter-state agency is yet another feather in the cap of the international climate regime, but more specifically, it concentrates on only one sector: solar. This is what makes it more concrete and perhaps more implementable in comparison to all-encompassing climate treaties or agreements. Therefore, there are great expectations that the coalition would bring about constructive outcomes, with its mandate to go beyond climate action (as conceived under the UNFCCC) to also cover Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG-7 on energy (Bhattacharya et al. 2018), which is congruent with India’s new formula of tying climate action with SDGs. India’s conceptualisation of its overall national interest has been a significant driver of its climate diplomacy positions—guided by different identities, including ‘rural’, ‘energy security’, ‘industrial’, ‘entrepreneurial’, ‘developing nation’ and ‘emerging nation’ (Saran and Jones 2017: 66–88). Hence, Prime Minister Modi,

5 Author’s

interview with Jairam Ramesh. author’s interview with Paul Watkinson, one of the EU’s lead negotiators at the conferences of Copenhagen, Cancún, Durban, Doha and Warsaw; and chief negotiator and head of the climate negotiations team for the French ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, via Skype on 17 January 2019.

6 The

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despite authoring two books on climate change7 and elevating the necessity of acting on this issue, has been conservative in his approach as far as climate change mitigation is concerned. India, at this stage, is keeping its options wide open as energy security, self-reliance and poverty reduction remain its top priorities. However, it is also important to note that several internal drivers have been influential in triggering shifts in India’s climate diplomacy positions. These include—increasing signs of vulnerabilities due to climate change in the country; the need felt by the government to generate unbiased and regionally focused scientific knowledge about climate change; certain personalities like Jairam Ramesh who ensured that India takes the moral high ground through voluntary emissions reduction targets, discarding India’s traditional strategy of hiding behind the low-per capita emissions argument to some extent and recognition of co-benefits of mitigation efforts among others (Dubash 2009). In addition to India’s positions at the climate change negotiations, its climate diplomacy at bilateral, multilateral and regional levels is of equal importance. India has been proactively attempting to build channels with different countries, both collectively and individually, to conduct its climate diplomacy and play a decisive role in negotiating the post-2020 treaty and its implementation, as well as clinching clean energy and other green technology-related deals. The centrality of Prime Minister Modi’s foreign visits to India’s climate diplomacy initiatives, especially in the run-up to the Paris Summit, is of special consequence. India’s outreach towards Africa and the Pacific Island nations, informal and formal talks on the ISA prior to its launch (MNRE 2015), are indeed a part of its larger goal of carrying out diplomacy at multiple levels and to not be restricted to the subcontinent alone. India also continues to maintain and develop its bilateral engagements with major powers, including the EU, outside the purview of the negotiations, which may have a positive effect on its multilateral dealings at the climate change negotiations as well (Narlikar 2017).

4.3 India’s Climate Diplomacy Towards the EU: A Policy Perspective India-EU climate diplomacy is currently one of the most essential components of India-EU cooperation,8 guided by a combination of material and ideational factors that influence each other. With a focus on sustainable development, clean energy and climate action, India and the EU have entered into several partnerships, such as India-EU Water Partnership (2016), India-EU Clean Energy and Climate Partnership (2016) and Joint Declaration on Partnership for Smart and Sustainable Urban Development (2017) (EEAS 2019a). These developments are however, recent and 7 His

books are ‘Convenient Action: Gujarat’s response to Challenges of Climate Change’ (2010) and ‘Convenient Action – Continuity for Change’ (2015). 8 For an analysis of climate cooperation within the India-EU Strategic Partnership and its future possibilities regarding low carbon development, see Jörgensen’s contribution in this volume.

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are reflective of a more pragmatic and results-oriented form of climate diplomacy being practised by both sides, as explained in the earlier section. Both India and the EU have adopted rigid positions in their climate diplomacy towards the rest of the world in the past, especially when it comes to the climate change negotiations. These positions tapered off gradually, especially after the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, which also paved the way for greater bilateral engagement between the two parties. The launch of the ISA by India and France on the sidelines of the 2015 Paris Summit also symbolises this shift. For a long time, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)9 has played an important role in strengthening India-EU climate diplomacy. It has been one of the focus areas of the EU-India initiative on clean development and climate change. At the 2008 India-EU summit, a joint work programme on energy, clean development and climate change was reached by the two sides, in which they pledged to work towards ‘upscaling’ financial support for climate change action-related activities, surveying the potential of research and development (R&D) in areas such as clean technology as well as exploring options for transfer of technology (ToT). The work programme also makes an explicit reference to CDM and the need to enhance cooperation in the development and deployment of climate-friendly technologies (European Commission 2008). India has always been keen on the continuation of the CDM, both as it was following the conclusion of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and also as it is in the post-2020 regime (under the Paris Agreement). However, the situation has changed since the EU vociferously opposes the carry-over of various Kyoto Protocol-based certification emission reductions (CERs) as it would dilute climate action. The EU is backed by several island and African countries. If the CDM is discarded, many Indian companies with unused CERs would be hit (Gulati 2019). Although initially the CDM was criticised by environmental groups within India as they saw it as a vindication of developed countries’ continued and unabated emissions (CSE 2005), the Indian Government and industry viewed this as a profitable opportunity to transition into a low-carbon economy (by neutralising emissions), and as a contributor to socio-economic development by generating jobs, building capacities and creating ‘green’ infrastructure (GIZ 2014). The work programme also highlights the relevance of the private sector in advancing cooperation in the field of climate change using platforms such as the European Business and Technology Centre. The EU has financed several projects in India, including FOWIND (‘facilitating off-shore wind development’) and ‘CDSC (clean development and sustainable cities) to integrate low-carbon strategies into urban development’.10 In fact, in 2014 The European Investment Bank (EIB) sanctioned a Line of Credit (LoC) of Euro 200 million to the Indian Renewable Energy 9 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), ‘defined in Article 12 of the Protocol, allows a country

with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries’. More information is available on the website of the United Nations, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-kyotoprotocol/mechanisms-under-the-kyoto-protocol/the-clean-development-mechanism. 10 More details of these projects are available on the website of the European Commission, https:// ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/cooperation/india_en.

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Development Agency Ltd. (IREDA) ‘to be utilised for financing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency projects in India’ (Press Information Bureau 2014). India floated the idea of international technology cooperation through public–private partnership (PPP), which was a reflection of growing PPPs in India and its realisation that demand for exclusive public finance from the developed countries had started to become outdated. Since technology sharing had not materialised to the extent it should have by mid-2000s, even with the CDM, India foresaw the role of clean energy in its own economic growth, which was also echoed by its 2008 NAPCC that mentioned solar, wind, clean coal and biomass among others. Although the NAPCC is more adaptation-centric, its mitigation-focused parts mostly deal with clean energy in sectors such as power (electricity) and transport (Ramesh 2009). The EU’s multilateral and bilateral partnerships with India have mushroomed in light of these developments, particularly in promoting sustainable development through climate action and clean energy cooperation, based primarily on the ideas of cobenefits of climate action and the perceived vulnerabilities associated with climate change for India. As pressure began to mount further on India and the other emerging economies to adopt targets, a series of bilateral meetings took place before the Copenhagen Summit, including between Jairam Ramesh and former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, who put US’ demands on the table for an agreement at Copenhagen. These demands were also backed by other developed countries, including the hosts, Denmark and other member countries of the EU. The pressure was on China and India to take on binding targets, and if targets were not possible, at least to declare a cap on emissions instead; and if that was also difficult, these countries should indicate a peaking year for emissions. India remained opposed to all the three demands (Rosenberg 2009). At the same time, there emerged a trend that slowly began to shift the climate regime’s orientation from a top-down model to a bottom-up one, as observed by Ramesh (2009) in a speech, in which he endorsed an approach that would make actions accountable instead of targets. Under this approach, every country would be expected to report a pool of actions aimed at climate change mitigation and adaptation to the UNFCCC rather than pledging or declaring a target. This kind of bottom-up approach was being pushed by several countries, including China and some countries of the Umbrella Group,11 as an alternative to the targets-and-timetables approach that was primarily advocated by the EU. After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, which essentially followed a top-down model, the seeds of this major shift were first sown at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit in the form of the Copenhagen Accord, signed only by a few parties to the UNFCCC. Later, it was officially incorporated in the UNFCCC process at the 2010 Cancun Summit. Many experts saw this as the future of the international climate regime—a ‘non-prescriptive regime, based on self-selected nationally determined targets and 11 The Umbrella Group is a loose coalition of countries, consisting of Australia, Belarus, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, Russia, Ukraine and the US. It was formed following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. More information is available on the website of the UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/ party-groupings.

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actions, applicable in a broadly symmetrical fashion across countries, and backed not by a treaty-based compliance system, but by a robust reporting and (possibly) a review system’ (Brunnée et al. 2012: 9). After the Copenhagen Summit, the EU had also come to accept the fundamentally changed nature of negotiations that ended up shaping the future climate regime, based on a bottom-up approach. This implied that the EU had to compromise on its demand for a strictly top-down legally binding treaty, even while continuing to push for a dilution of differentiation between the developed and developing countries. This also meant that the EU began to redefine its climate diplomacy strategically by altering its one-size-fits-all policy towards the developing world, and even the emerging countries (Belis et al. 2018). Herein, the EU’s climate diplomacy towards countries such as India and China became more nuanced, based on the differing approaches and interests of these countries. The EU’s bilateral engagements with these countries played a crucial role in its acceptance of a bottom-up international climate governance model in terms of the post-2020 climate regime. At the same time, the Modi administration moved further away from the traditional perspective of treating climate action and development as competing objectives. For instance, Prime Minister Modi talks about seeing humankind and nature as one (as an Indian worldview) and transition from ‘carbon credit’ to ‘green credit’ (Jayaram 2015). This attains more credibility and legitimacy in the light of India’s announcements to achieve 175 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy by 2022 (out of which solar energy would account for 100 GW; (Nagarajan 2015) and a series of other commitments such as coal tax, advancement of the national clean energy and environment fund and so on (Republic of India 2015). With the international community agreeing upon the bottom-up model of climate action (at the UNFCCC), India also declared that it would come up with an ‘ambitious’ declaration of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), which had by then become the new catchword in international climate change negotiations (Aggarwal 2015). Hence, this shift in the international climate order witnessed the merging of ideational and material interests of India and the EU to a great extent—promotion of international climate action and acknowledgement of national/socio-economic contexts based on the co-constitution of identities and interests. Importantly, the tone and tenor of the negotiation tactics began to change further as the Paris Summit neared. One such statement that encapsulates India’s changing positions is provided by the former Indian Ambassador to the US, Arun K. Singh. According to him, despite the fact that India is not a contributor to either historical or current emissions (on account of its low-per capita emissions), in view of the consequences of climate change which are being felt by the country and the global situation as India develops at the rates of 8–10% (necessary to deal with poverty), the Indian Government is determined to develop its economy, ‘to the maximum extent possible’, based on renewable energy. The stress on energy security is further emphasised by him through the instance of ‘more than 300 million Indians’ without ‘access to commercial energy’ or electricity (Singh 2016). From this statement, it is clear that the Indian position on action based on historical responsibility further softened and that its position on commitments would be defined by action on the front of

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expansion of renewable energy, and not so much on reduction of GHG emissions. Yet, the Indian negotiating teams have not been entirely united. For instance, Pascal Delisle comments, ‘Some are more attached to a strong version of CBDR and historical responsibilities and/or are extremely sensitive in the way they perceive national sovereignty etc., others are more pragmatic and try to find solutions. I understand that some key interlocutors are rigid and prevent stronger cooperation between India and the EU against the will and interest of most’.12 What is important to note here is that while upholding its traditional positions on climate change, India began to build channels with different (groups of) countries to conduct its climate diplomacy and play a more proactive role in negotiating the post-2020 treaty. Prime Minister Modi in particular took charge of setting the diplomatic agenda, leading to further centralisation of India’s climate diplomacy (Dubash and Joseph 2016). With clean energy at the centre of India’s climate diplomacy, it has also expanded its collaboration with countries such as China (Bhowmick 2019). With the EU too, and especially some member states, hands-on cooperation has been on the rise. An example is the case of Germany, exemplified by the launch of various initiatives such as the Indo-German Working Group on Climate Change under the Indo-German Environment Forum. In the Indo-German Joint Statement on Climate Change and Energy Technology Cooperation (MEA 2015), reached just before the Paris Summit, both countries recognised the need for forging an IndoGerman Climate and Renewable Alliance—‘a comprehensive partnership to harness technology, innovation and finance in order to make affordable, clean and renewable energy accessible to all and to foster climate change mitigation efforts in both countries’. The statement importantly highlights the merging of both parties’ interests in climate change mitigation, which can be best achieved through renewable energy expansion and energy efficiency—two tenets that India has been pushing for, especially since the 2009 Copenhagen Summit. It also underscores the relevance of prioritising adaptation (at par with mitigation) and climate finance in instilling a sense of confidence in the negotiations process, thereby enhancing international cooperation. More importantly, as pointed out by Pascal Delisle, ‘We have moved from a very diplomatic type of interaction needed to get to a universal agreement/Paris Agreement to a more concrete and more balanced position where a big part of our interaction is about solutions, International Solar Alliance, peer to peer cooperation and so on’.13 Interestingly, Pascal Delisle also acknowledged that despite growing convergences between India and the EU, it cannot be compared to EU-China climate diplomacy, which is developing much faster with greater cooperation in carbon and energy markets.14 This perhaps points towards the possibility of securing better outcomes

12 The author’s interview with Pascal Delisle, Adviser on Climate Change at the European External Action Service and Coordinator of EU Climate Diplomacy Action Plan, in Brussels on 15 February 2019. 13 Author’s interview with Pascal Delisle. 14 Author’s interview with Pascal Delisle.

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between countries that may not share similar values (such as democracy and transparency) due to material convergences (in this case, China and the EU). On the other hand, while India has been cooperating more with China in the climate change negotiations than the EU or the US (through the BASIC and G-77), India has always preferred bilateral hands-on cooperation with the US and the EU, as it felt that it had a better chance of building its own capacities by following the West’s leadership in cutting-edge technology15 (owing also to shared values such as democracy and freedom of expression between the EU and India). The country’s climate diplomacy, especially towards the EU, can therefore be said to have evolved from a rather confrontational stance in the Copenhagen period to that of a more cooperative player in the run-up to the Paris Summit. Prime Minister Modi’s second book on climate change—‘Convenient Action: Continuity for Change’—was released during the Paris Summit alongside the ISA’s launch. The book outlines his proposal of ‘building on a model of positive partnership between people, businesses, scientific community, government and NGOs’ with a focus on ‘delivering clean energy and prosperity through site-dependent initiatives and scaling up efforts to make rapid transformation’ (Modi 2015). Internationally, Indian leaders have repeatedly drawn attention to India’s willingness to ‘take the lead on climate change’ on the basis that environmental protection, conservation and preservation are not new to Indian ethos (PTI 2018). Climate diplomacy, in effect, has become an integral part of India’s reinvigorated foreign policy (Mohan 2017a). Ideationally, India is now balancing between its vision of ‘strategic autonomy’ and allegiance to a ‘rules-based global order’, driven by mutual interests and promotion of ‘security, stability and sustainability’, as reinforced by Prime Minister Modi during his bilateral visit to Germany in 2017 (MEA 2017). Since the US President Donald Trump’s announcement of withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, India has been seen as a responsible player, repeatedly concurring with the agreement (in fact, vowing to ‘go above and beyond the Paris accord to combat climate change’), and ready to form collective leadership with other major players like the EU and China in advancing the Paris Agreement’s goals. When Prime Minister Modi travelled to Germany, both Chancellor Angela Merkel and he reiterated their support of the Paris Agreement, in the wake of President Trump’s wavering stance on it, by giving their full-fledged support to the Indo-German Climate and Renewables Alliance. At the same time, some analysts believe that through partnerships and collaborations, India seeks to replace the Western model of zerosum to a win-win model, which is a necessity in global climate governance based on climate ethics and climate justice.16 However, others argue that there continues to be a great amount of uncertainty and a lack of direction in India’s climate diplomacy strategy. India continues to use the vulnerability card and project its ‘emerging power’ 15 The author’s interview with Ambassador Shyam Saran, former Special Envoy of the Indian Prime

Minister on Climate Change (SEPM), in New Delhi on 15 June 2011. 16 The author’s interview with M. D. Nalapat, Editorial Director of Itv network (India) & The Sunday Guardian and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Peace Chair, in Manipal on 4 April 2016.

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or ‘rising power’ identity. India’s displays and exhibitions at the conference of parties (COPs) are usually the most ostentatious but when it comes to asserting itself in the negotiations, its powerlessness is stark, as was the case during the 2011 Durban summit, when India had to make compromise on the principle of differentiation. The West (including the EU and its member states) understood that it lost a lot under the Kyoto regime and hence, they united for the Paris Agreement, while the South is still totally divided.17

5 An Applied Discussion on India-EU Climate Diplomacy Based on the ideational and material understandings of India-EU climate diplomacy, in this section, an applied discussion—with a greater focus on policy interventions—is undertaken from an Indian perspective. Herein, the three practical principles of climate diplomacy—‘know yourself’, ‘know the other’ and ‘capacity to influence’—are used to analyse a set of policies, cases and tools that have been or could be operationalised to boost India-EU climate diplomacy in the post-2020 climate regime. India’s climate policy is contingent on the effective implementation of its NAPCC, which consists of many missions, including solar, enhanced energy efficiency, sustainable habitat, water, sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem, green India, sustainable agriculture, strategic knowledge for climate change as well as newer additions such as health, waste-to-energy and wind (Sinha 2015). Therefore, it has been argued that India-EU climate diplomacy needs to target these specific areas of cooperation ‘that would help not only in coping with climate change, but also in enhancing India’s economic relations as well as development partnership with the EU’ (Upadhyay 2014). Before going into the specifics of these cases, it must be noted that even though India’s cooperation with the EU, in general, in this field is on the rise, it is cooperation with certain member countries of the EU that is driving India-EU climate diplomacy. Both India and France have expressed their keenness to set the ball rolling to achieve the ISA’s 1000 GW target by 2030 globally, despite the fact that many have expressed scepticism regarding the coalition’s ability to mobilise the required funds to the tune of USD 1 trillion (Kumar 2018). India and some member states of the EU are also looking to expand their cooperation in other countries to further heighten international climate change cooperation. Having recognised the importance of cobenefits of climate action for sustainable development and low-carbon transition, India and Germany have proposed to undertake trilateral assistance programmes that engender collaborations between the India-German duo and another country (possibly a developing country) requiring assistance in climate and solar technology 17 The

author’s interview with Sandeep Sengupta, global coordinator for climate change at the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in Switzerland, in Gland on 27 July 2019. He has previously worked on a wide range of environment and development issues, both within and outside the government in India.

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application under the Indo-German Climate and Renewables Alliance (MEA 2015). This could be seen as a consequence of India’s ‘know yourself’ strategy through which the country’s leadership has identified a set of goals and policies that could best serve its development agenda. It takes into account issues such as energy security and renewable energy expansion (tied to India’s climate goals) and low-carbon economic growth (with an eye on cost efficiency, sustainable growth and other co-benefits) on the one hand, and environmental and foreign policy benefits (as a soft power tool) on the other hand. It also involves India’s ‘know the other’ strategy through which India proposes to compromise on its previously held somewhat rigid positions in climate diplomacy at the same time, as tapping into the technological advances that Europe has made in ‘green’ and ‘low-carbon’ solutions over the past couple of decades. Not just foreign policy stakeholders, other actors (working in tandem with the state ones) have been responsible for spurring climate diplomacy between the two parties. For instance, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), a German development agency targeted at international development cooperation, has been involved in numerous projects related to renewable energy, energy efficiency, climate change adaptation, biodiversity protection and conservation, sustainable urban and industrial development and so on. The fact that international development cooperation has also extended to climate change adaptation is a welcome step, considering that the international climate regime continues to be mitigation-centric. GIZ is coordinating a series of adaptation-related projects, commissioned by German state agencies, such as the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, with Indian state agencies such as the Indian Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC). One of them is aimed at enhancing adaptation in rural areas of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. This project has helped develop a ‘cross-sectoral, integrated approach’ towards assessing climate vulnerabilities and risks, developing and gauging the effectiveness of adaptation measures, adapting ‘public investments and rural development programmes’ as well as capacity development to integrate adaptation into development planning (GIZ 2019). Such projects are an indication of the EU’s attempts to ‘know the other’ and understand India’s requirements on the climate change front, keeping in view India’s vulnerabilities, including livelihood insecurities, natural resource management and developmental requirements among others. India has been able to sufficiently integrate its national priorities into diplomatic channels by giving special status to climate change cooperation in specific areas in its bilateral engagements. Apart from the above-mentioned examples, yet another agreement reached between India and the Netherlands includes ‘supporting sustainable and climate resilient agriculture to mitigate water shortages and end the practice of stubble burning’ (MEA 2018). Stubble burning in Haryana and Punjab, for instance, has been in the limelight in recent years, in view of the dangerously high pollution levels in the capital city of Delhi. Stubble burning by farmers of these two states has been considered a major contributor (44% in 2019) to smog and air pollution in Delhi, leading to an emergency situation (health, livelihoods, etc.), particularly in winters, over the years (PTI 2019). In yet another example, India and the EU recently

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(in 2019) agreed to jointly fund seven research and innovation projects, amounting to EUR 40 million, aimed at addressing growing water insecurities in India. Collaborations in research, development and innovation continue to be the strengths of the EU and India. In fact, when the projects under this joint venture were announced, the EU ambassador to India (EEAS 2019b) stated: Many of these water challenges are common to India and the EU. India and Europe have, in the past, collaborated intensively on water, enriching each other’s technological and scientific knowledge and management capacities to cope with stress on water resources. The selected research and innovation projects will aim at further addressing these key water issues together with India and in doing so, will contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals to which both Europe and India are committed.

From this statement, it is clear that India-EU climate diplomacy is geared towards building synergies, integration and surpassing hierarchical relationships. The integration is not just at the domestic and international levels, but also sectoral levels. These projects take into consideration, both climate action as well as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), thereby linking and integrating different levels of policymaking and implementation. Hence, efforts to streamline these national priorities into the diplomatic exchanges, wherein both parties could advance cooperation, are on the rise. Here again, the worsening water insecurity in India and the role of climate change in aggravating the situation have gained a lot of attention from the Indian authorities of late, as numerous studies portend a catastrophic scenario (NITI Aayog 2019) with cities going dry and rural areas being parched—influencing demographic, migratory and socio-economic patterns. In effect, these cooperative and collaborative mechanisms signify both ‘know yourself’ and ‘know the other’, with a clear understanding of the EU’s commitment to fulfilling the SDGs and advancing international climate action. The ‘Make in India’ programme, launched by Prime Minister Modi in 2014, is an initiative aimed at transforming India into a global manufacturing hub through investments and innovation.18 Despite its focus on the manufacturing sector, which may be seen as antithetical to climate action, the government has taken a few steps to incorporate green elements within this programme, whether it is through invitation to investments in clean technology production (Mohan 2017b) or including the principle of ‘zero defect, zero effect’ (on the environment; Venugopal 2016). Similarly, the Smart Cities Mission is yet another flagship programme of the Indian Government that aims to renew and retrofit Indian cities in such a manner that they become people-friendly, inclusive, clean and sustainable—all important elements of climate action and SDGs. In both these programmes, many member countries of the EU are partnering with India. For example, India is looking to leverage Sweden’s leadership in ‘urban mobility solutions, smart parking systems, air filtration, waste management solutions and real time information systems’. To this effect, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two countries on Sustainable Urban Development was signed in 2015. Some of the proposed innovative interventions 18 More

details about the ‘Make in India’ initiative are available on its website, http://www.makein india.com/home.

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include Cale parking solutions, Scania’s ethanol-run ‘Green Bus’, Volvo’s hybrid buses, ABB Solution Network Manager SCADA’s energy efficiency solutions and Fortum’s clean energy solutions (Make in India 2018). This is a yet another example of the growing level of cooperation between India and member states of the EU in view of the post-2020 international climate regime that is based on pragmatism; also attempting to overcome ideational differences associated with the framings of climate change.

6 Conclusion Over the years, India and the EU have moved towards bridging their differences over ideational elements of differentiation, equity, CBDR-RC and other similar norms. The more recent steps in the direction of forging collaborative and cooperative steps are a testimony to this fact. Also, these developments have helped assuage the disagreements between them over the nature and operationalisation of the post-2020 treaty to a great extent. At the same time, it must be understood that these differences will continue to exist despite these cooperative developments. India, having set foot on the path of gradually transitioning into low-carbon solutions, requires partners. The EU recognises India’s growing geopolitical and geoeconomic clout; and India acknowledges the enormous benefits it could attain through developmental and technical cooperation with the EU. The field of climate change presents a major opportunity for both to strengthen their strategic partnership as well as stabilise the rules-based global/multilateral order. Hence, India-EU cooperation will serve as a major determinant of the future of the post-2020 international climate regime. This chapter is novel in its approach of contextualising India’s climate diplomacy towards the EU at various levels, through which an inference can be made that climate diplomacy needs to be studied/analysed further particularly in the realm of bilateral and plurilateral relations, instead of focusing largely on the climate change negotiations. This can essentially provide a different set of results, especially in light of a different set of dynamics at play on these platforms. As this paper has shown, India-EU climate diplomacy (also in terms of cooperation with EU’s individual member countries) has moved in the direction of greater cooperation and partnership in the past few years due to these platforms. How and to what extent these cooperative mechanisms have had an influence on India-EU cooperation in the negotiations are questions that could be researched. The framework/approach of climate diplomacy and realist constructivism also provides a foundation on which the theoretical, conceptual and practical aspects of India-EU climate diplomacy could be investigated. In a way, the chapter also expands the scope of realist constructivism into the realm of climate change politics—bringing in both ideational and material aspects that condition and/or even shape relations in this domain. One of the best examples of this is India’s growing emphasis on renewable energy development and deployment, an area in which the EU is clearly now one of its largest partners.

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The ISA and various other ventures of the Indian Government also present avenues for cooperation between it and the EU, as explicated in this chapter. India could promote the ISA, which is founded on rules-based global order and values of mutual cooperation, as the new ‘belt’ of development justice that combines reliable access to affordable energy, climate, and environment action and socio-economic stability. This could then serve as a tool for establishing other such alliances that build momentum towards ‘climate-responsible’ international development cooperation. However, there are challenges to India-EU climate diplomacy as many of these flagship programmes are progressing slowly at a time when India and EU member countries’ economies are sluggish (as of 2019–2020). The slow pace at which the India-EU Strategic Partnership has moved forward, depending on trade-related differences and other domestic concerns such as regulatory hurdles, has also influenced India-EU climate diplomacy. This could be a topic of discussion and analysis for another paper, in which the interplay between the domestic and the international could be dealt with in a much deeper way. Nevertheless, this relationship has come a long way—from ideational contestation to pragmatic cooperation.

References Aggarwal, Mayank. 2015. Replace carbon credit with green credit: Narendra Modi. Livemint, December 2. https://www.livemint.com/Politics/V7FI8fMqpRVywH5RS2pl6M/Rep lace-carbon-credit-with-green-credit-Narendra-Modi.html. Accessed 20 February 2020. Anderson, Brilé, Thomas Bernauer, and Stefano Balietti. 2017. Effects of fairness principles on willingness to pay for climate change mitigation. Climatic Change 142 (3–4): 447–461. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-1959-3. A¸skar Karakir, Irem. 2018. Environmental foreign policy as a soft power instrument: Cases of China and India. Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia 17 (1): 5–26. https://dx.doi.org/10.17477/jcea. 2018.17.1.005. Barkin, Samuel J. 2003. Realist constructivism. International Studies Review 5 (3): 325–342. https:// doi.org/10.1046/j.1079-1760.2003.00503002.x. Barkin, Samuel J. 2010. Realist constructivism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Belis, David, Paul Joffe, Bart Kerremans, and Ye Qi. 2015. China, the United States and the European Union: Multiple bilateralism and prospects for a new climate change diplomacy. Carbon & Climate Law Review 9 (3): 203–218. Belis, David, Simon Schunz, Tao Wang, and Dhanasree Jayaram. 2018. Climate diplomacy and the rise of ‘multiple bilateralism’ between China, India and the EU. Carbon & Climate Law Review 12 (2): 85–97. Bhattacharya, Shreya, Ekta Niranjan, and Chithra Purushothaman. 2018. India and the international solar alliance. IDSA Backgrounder. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. https://idsa.in/system/files/backgrounder/b-india-international-solar-alliance_shr eya.ekta_.chithra_160318.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2020. Bhowmick, Soumya. 2019. Sino-Indian partnership for SDG 7: Affordable and clean energy. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/sino-indian-partnershipfor-sdg-7-affordable-and-clean-energy-51470/. Accessed 20 February 2020. Brunnée, Jutta, Meinhard Doelle, and Lavanya Rajamani. 2012. Introduction: The role of compliance in an evolving climate regime. In Promoting compliance in an evolving climate regime, ed.

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Dr. Dhanasree Jayaram is Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, and Co-coordinator, Centre for Climate Studies, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Karnataka, India. She is also Research Fellow, Earth System Governance Project, and Project Manager, “Climate Diplomacy”, signed between adelphi, a Berlin-based think tank and public policy consultancy and MAHE. She is the author of “Breaking out of the Green House: Indian Leadership in Times of Environmental Change” (2012).

India and the EU’s Approach to Development Cooperation: Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk? Siddharth Tripathi

1 Introduction The changing global order, marked by the rise of populist and inward-looking governments, economic and social instability and unrest around the world, has necessitated enhanced cooperation between states in the strengthening of their democratic frameworks. The European Union (EU) and India, with their strong emphasis on democratic values, have worked together to reduce poverty, prevent disasters, expand trade and enhance security all over the world. Aspiring to play a more significant global role, they have jointly worked to promote research in health, agriculture, energy and many other fields of mutual interest. The relationship between the EU and India has evolved in recent years from that of donor and recipient to a partnership with opportunities for mutual benefit. India-EU relations have seen a substantial expansion beyond the economic realm, covering a broader scope of political and security issues (Bava 2010). The EU’s interest in enhancing the strategic partnership with India has been reinforced through its international cooperation within the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda context. India and the EU have agreed to cooperate on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda to reinvigorate the EU-India Development Dialogue and to create synergies in their respective cooperation with other countries. Both sides have agreed to move forward with joint initiatives, especially in the areas of sustainable development, connectivity, resilient infrastructure in third countries, and triangular cooperation in Africa. To transform their relationship as development partners, there is also an emphasis on new issue-specific partnerships focusing on

S. Tripathi (B) International and Security Affairs, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_11

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climate change and energy, urbanisation, water, and resource efficiency (Paulo 2019: 4).1 However, the literature on EU-India cooperation has often been limited to exploring their economic and political ties in general and focusing on their strategic partnership in particular (Kavalski 2008; Wagner 2012; Schmidt 2013; Jain 2014; Sachdeva 2015). There is not much emphasis in the literature on theoretically and empirically examining the EU’s and India’s approach to development cooperation. Most of the studies are factual and they often ignore the guiding principles of development cooperation, a field which has considerable potential for boosting the strategic partnership and providing fertile ground for an enhanced and innovative institutional framework for cooperation between India and the EU. This chapter primarily aims at identifying various convergences and divergences between the strategies and the guiding principles of development cooperation in the two largest democracies of the world. It argues that with the shift in their strategies and policies on development cooperation, a greater degree of convergence can be identified between these two partners, and the often underrated and sidelined development cooperation can be a significant pillar for strengthening the EU-India partnership. The chapter has been divided into three broad sections in addition to the introduction and conclusion: The first section examines the EU’s development cooperation and the underlying principles and values guiding it, along with its evolution and the set of instruments at its disposal. The second section looks at India’s role in development cooperation, how it has changed from being a beneficiary to a provider, and the values guiding India’s development cooperation, especially in the light of South–South Cooperation (SSC). The final section examines the convergences and divergences along with existing cooperation, in particular by focusing on the shift of the basic ideas of ‘North-South cooperation’ which can be found between these two actors, and makes some recommendations for deepening their partnership in this cooperation.

2 The EU’s Development Cooperation Policy The EU is a unique entity in international relations and stands out as an essential regional/global organisation, albeit different from others, including the UN, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union. It has paved the way for many other regional organisations. However, it is special in terms of its structure and the way it has been constituted. There have been many debates and discussions on its internal integration and its distinctive character, which often lead it to be an isolated entity. It has, however, expressed the desire and ambition to take up a prominent place as a global player and a significant actor in international relations (Ginsberg 2001; Holland 2002; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Thomas 2010). In addition to the general goal of forging 1 For EU-India cooperation in climate policy, see the contributions by Jörgensen and Jayaram in this

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good relations with (potential) political and economic partners across the globe, the Union also wishes to use its place in international relations as a vehicle for advocating some of the values it considers relevant. Among these values are democracy, social welfare, human rights and liberalism (Arts and Dickson 2010).2 The EU’s development cooperation policy acts as an important tool to serve both its missions of fostering its values and emerging as a serious global player. Accordingly, an impressive and unique record of development cooperation activities and a structural and comprehensive policy has been built over time, and the EU has been a key player in regard to international development aid, which is one of the four main strands of its external policies (EUR-Lex 2019). The EU development policy pursues the objectives of EU external action, in particular those set out in Article 21(2)(d) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (2012), of fostering the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty, targeting countries in greatest need and focusing on aspects such as social protection, health, education, jobs, business development, sustainable agriculture and energy (ibid.). In line with the objectives set out in Article 21(2) TEU, development policy also contributes, among other things, to supporting democracy and the rule of law and human rights, to preserving peace and preventing conflict, to improving the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, to assisting populations, countries and regions confronting natural or human-made disasters and to ‘promoting an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ (European Council 2017).

2.1 Evolution of the EU’s Development Policy The EU’s development policy has evolved gradually and has undergone significant changes from the Lomé Convention to present day. At the outset, it covered only overseas countries and territories associated with the EU, but it was later extended to include all developing countries. Until the 1990s, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) were unequivocally Europe’s preferred developing-country partners, with ACP-EU relations being the most visible and important component of the EU development cooperation programme (Arts and Dickson 2010). ACP-EU relations started right at the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 and were first enunciated in the Yaoundé and later in the Lomé Convention and the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. For many scholars, the Lomé Convention symbolised EU’s development cooperation more so than any other agreement (Grilli 1993), since it was held up as a model for the future of North–South relations in general and EU development policy in particular. The Lomé Convention linked the EU with a large group of developing countries, most of them among the poorest, in an innovative 2 Regarding the normative foundation of EU Foreign Policy as well as norm contestation within and

beyond the EU-India Strategic Partnership, see the contribution by Lowinger et al. in this volume.

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agreement operating on the basis of equality of partners. The Convention embodied the EU’s preparedness to accept some of the arguments put forward by the Third World on international development in its quest for a New International Economic Order (Arts 2000: 127–134). However, the mixed results of the Lomé Convention led to a rethinking of the concepts underlying ACP-EU relations and the instruments available to shape them. Consequently, the most recent ACP-EU general cooperation treaty—the Cotonou Agreement of June 2000—breaks rather drastically with the Lomé past, both in terms of content and approach. Since then the EU development cooperation policy has shifted away from making substantive and innovative attempts to contribute to the North–South dialogue, which had typified the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, since the 1990s, the EU development cooperation policy has appeared to follow global trends much more than previously (Arts and Dickson 2010). In line with the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), the EU in its New European Consensus on Development (2017) sets out the principles for EU institutions and EU countries in their cooperation with developing countries. It aims to contribute to the achievement of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, agreed by the UN in 2015 and the Paris Agreement on climate change (EUR-Lex 2019). The consensus defines its shared vision and its action framework for development cooperation, and is structured around the ‘5 Ps’ framing the 2030 Agenda: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership (European Commission 2017). The consensus, like the TEU, reaffirms poverty eradication as its primary development objective, but it also integrates the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Furthermore, it underlines the links between development and other European policies, including peace and security, and humanitarian aid. The consensus therefore marks a significant transition in the EU’s development cooperation from the traditional donor-recipient role to that based on mutual interest and gain. The EU is party to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, an agreement reached by a partnership of 193 UN member countries at the UN Third International Conference on Financing for Development; it is an integral part of the 2030 agenda and sets a new paradigm for the implementation of its development programmes through effective use of financial and non-financial means and by placing domestic actions and sound policies at the forefront. Its action areas include: • • • • • • •

Domestic public resources Domestic and international private business and finance International development cooperation International trade as an engine for development Debt and debt sustainability Systemic issues Science, technology, innovation and capacity-building (EUR-Lex 2019).

The evolution of the EU’s development policy from Lomé to the European Consensus on Development shows that the EU has been trying to portray itself as a relevant actor in international politics and has been investing more in development cooperation by

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widening the range of countries with whom it seeks to engage. However, in the end, the EU has not been entirely successful in all of its spheres of activity. The EU is aware of this criticism and has sought to remedy it through structural reforms of its decision-making structures, as well as undergoing a thorough rethinking of the norms and methods by which it seeks to encourage development. It has also expanded the sectors of its development cooperation and has moved from focusing on Human Rights and democratic governance to incorporating issues like environmental change and migration, as the Table 1 illustrates. The following Table 1 highlights the main sectors of the EU’s development cooperation.

2.2 Set of Instruments To implement its development policy within the principles outlined above, the EU has a set of instruments. The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) is one of six EU budgetary instruments for financing external action that are governed by Regulation (EU) No 236/2014, laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union’s instruments for financing external action. The other five instruments are: the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI); the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP); the Partnership Instrument (PI) and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) (European Council 2014). The Table 2 gives an overview of the EU’s external action financing instruments (MFF 2014–2020). As can be seen from the table, the DCI is one of the largest sources of development funding in the EU budget, covering development cooperation with Latin America, selected countries in the Middle East, South Africa and Central, East, South and South-East Asia. The main objective of the DCI and of EU development policy in general is to alleviate poverty (European Parliament 2020). The DCI is also meant to contribute to fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development, and supporting democracy, good governance, human rights and international law in recipient countries. More specifically, the DCI facilitates the meeting of the EU’s obligations to developing countries arising from the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and post-2015 development agenda. However, the eligibility of beneficiary countries for overseas development aid (ODA) is decided according to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) criteria and this has been a major bone of contention between the North and the South (a point discussed later). The DCI is one of two EU funds for aid to developing countries, the other one being the European Development Fund. The EDF, while significantly larger than the DCI, with a 2014–2020 budget of EUR 30.5 billion, is intergovernmental in nature and outside the EU budget, and is aimed mainly at the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) of

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Table 1 Sectors of the EU’s development cooperation Sectors

Details

1

Human Rights and Democratic Governance

Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) Approach EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (2014–2020) Illicit weapons and ammunition—global reporting mechanism Towards more responsible arms transfers: the EU and the Arms Trade Treaty Report on impact of EU funding to stop torture and the death penalty

2

Food and Agriculture

Food Assistance Convention The International Coffee Agreement 2007

3

Human Development

Export of generic medicines to developing countries: compulsory licences Certain key medicines for developing countries—avoiding trade diversion into the EU Children as a focus of EU external action Corporate social responsibility in the EU International cultural relations—an EU strategy Eradicating poverty and achieving sustainable development

4

Environmental and Climate Change

Tackling threats posed by chemicals (Stockholm Convention) Licencing system for imports of timber to the EU Financial cooperation with non-EU countries on nuclear safety (2014–2020) Combating illegal logging Building up resilience in developing countries Emergency humanitarian support within the EU United Nations Convention to combat desertification in countries seriously affected by drought Convention on Biological Diversity Risk reduction—natural and human-made disasters Prevention of natural or human-made disasters in the EU International trade in hazardous chemicals Combating deforestation Basel Convention on the control of trans-boundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal

5

Migration and Asylum Issues in Origin Countries

Migration and development External EU action to address the refugee crisis

Source Author compilation based on EUR-Lex (n.d.)

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Table 2 EU’s external action financing instruments Instrument

Focus

Format

Budget

Development Cooperation Latin America, Geographic + Thematic Instrument (DCI) Asia, Central Asia, Gulf region, South Africa + global thematic support

EUR 19.7 billion

European Neighbourhood Sixteen European Instrument (ENI) Neighbourhood countries, Russia (regional and cross-border cooperation)

Geographic

EUR 15.4 billion

Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)

Balkans and Turkey

Geographic

EUR 11.7 billion

Partnership Instrument (PI)

Industrialised countries

Geographic

EUR 955 million

Instrument for Greenland

Greenland

Geographic

EUR 184 million

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

Democracy and human rights promotion

Thematic

EUR 1.3 billion

Instrument contributing to Political stability Thematic Stability and Peace (IcSP) and peace-building

EUR 2.3 billion

Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)

Nuclear Safety

Thematic

EUR 225 million

ACP and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)

Geographic

EUR 29.1 billion

Off-budget European Development Fund (EDF)

Source European Parliament 2020

the EU. It is the EU’s oldest and largest development instrument and is not part of the EU budget (European Parliament 2020). It operates within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, and covers cooperation with the ACP and the Union’s overseas countries and territories (OCTs). Its key areas are economic development, social and human development, and regional cooperation and integration. The DCI is aimed chiefly at all other developing countries, with the DCI geographic programmes— the largest part of the DCI budget—unavailable to EDF recipient countries or to countries eligible for funding under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) or the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). However, a portion of the DCI budget is also reserved for thematic programmes for fostering global public goods such as good governance, and supporting civil society organisations and local authorities (ibid.).

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3 India’s Development Cooperation Policy As compared to the EU, which has been considered a traditional provider for development cooperation, India’s role in the international development cooperation community has undergone significant transformation in the recent years. India’s once struggling economy, that needed massive external inputs to meet even the survival needs of its people, has transformed into a booming economy creating a ‘paradox of plenty’. This has impacted positively upon India’s outlook towards international development cooperation. For over a decade, the narrative has been that India, as a rising power, has become a major provider rather than a mere recipient of development aid. In fact, provision of development assistance abroad is considered to be an important part of Indian foreign policy (Sachdeva 2020). While Indian development cooperation has historically always been linked to foreign policy objectives, it is now increasingly linked directly to India’s own national development (Roychoudhury et al. 2015). India has gone from being a chronic beneficiary to becoming a provider of development cooperation. However, it is pertinent to point out that India has been a provider of development assistance since its independence. Its role and contribution have gained momentum more recently as a result of its growing economic and political influence in the global community (Katti et al. 2009). The expansion in India’s development cooperation since the turn of the century, both in terms of geographic spread and volume, has been exponential. India has been at the forefront of the creation of policy coalitions such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) that provide a forum and platform for countries of the ‘Global South’ to cooperate with one another on multiple fronts. This kind of development cooperation has come to be recognised as ‘South-South Cooperation’ (Sudarshan and Dias 2017). Development cooperation may therefore be said to have assumed considerable significance as a policy imperative for India. India’s approach of fostering ‘development partnerships’ is based on mutual benefit, underlining India’s exclusive stance as being different from traditional approaches (Mayilvaganan 2017). The principles of India’s cooperation and partnership are predicated on the vision of independence and capability of nations, driven by the values of justice, equality among nations and individuals, solidarity, sovereignty and respect (Chakrabarty 2019). India directs its role in SSC through the two main principles of mutual benefit and demand-driven approach. This helps further strengthen India’s negotiating position in international forums, diversifies its partnerships, and strengthens regional security, while also furthering its own development trajectory. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar emphasised that India’s development cooperation with partner countries is based on equality, mutual respect for sovereignty as well as freedom of choice, and not on competition, conditionalities or prescriptions. Addressing a gathering marking 55 years of India’s development partnership programme, Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), he said the countries of the global south are important partners for India. ‘India’s relations with partner countries are based on the principles of equality, mutual respect

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for sovereignty and freedom of action and choice. It is not based on competition, conditionalities or prescriptions’ (Economic Times 2019).

3.1 Evolution of India’s Development Policy India’s development policy is shaped by its own postcolonial experience as a recipient of development assistance and its specific role in the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). Hence, India’s development cooperation was initially strongly ideological and political. Since then, India’s reform towards economic liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation, and the country’s foreign policy has also become increasingly influenced by geo-economic considerations (Sudarshan and Dias 2017). Panchsheel Principles (Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, Mutual non-aggression, Mutual non-interference, Equality and mutual benefit, and Peaceful co-existence), which have been guiding principles of India’s foreign policy since the 1950s, have provided some of the major foundations for India’s development cooperation (MEA 2004). These principles were later extended and developed into the Bandung Principles (Katti et al. 2009).3 Against this background India strengthened its economic activities by supporting regional integration arrangements and economic relations with numerous African countries on the basis of the following principles: Non-Conditionality: The development partnerships India entered into have been on mutually agreed terms and not to degenerate into conditionalities for partner countries. This principle was reiterated in later conferences on SSC including in the Yamoussoukro Consensus on SSC (2008) and the Nairobi Outcome Document (2016). Promoting a ‘Partnership among Equals’ based on SSC: India has endeavoured to make a conscious effort to ensure that all its development partnerships (between the Indian Government and a partner country) must essentially be a partnership where each partner is on an equal footing and there is no one partner is able to exercise domination or undue influence over another. SSC, since its inception, has been conceived of as a partnership among equals, based on solidarity. Article 3 of ‘Declaration on the Right to Development’, adopted in the UN General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986, which India voted in favour of, visualises a new international economic order based on sovereign equality (UN General Assembly 1986). A number of subsequent conferences/documents have emphasised that equality among partners is central to the concept of SSC (Bhasin 2013). Mutual Accountability: Since the development partnership is based on the principle of equality, India and its development partners have to be accountable to each

3 Regarding the normative foundation of India’s Foreign Policy as well as norm contestation within

and beyond the EU-India Strategic Partnership, see the contribution by Lowinger et al. in this volume.

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other equally based on the Nairobi Outcome Document 2016 (Sudarshan and Dias 2017). As can be seen above, India’s development cooperation and support for the cause of multilateralism flow from the philosophy of interconnectedness and interdependence, which reflects commitment to Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam (the world is one family). The Indian approach treats recipients of aid as development partners and at the same time acts in solidarity with them, by supporting developing countries’ needs and demands through providing advanced but relatively low-cost technology and dealing with them on the basis of equal partnership and mutual benefit instead of acting in the traditional donor-recipient approach (Katti et al. 2009). In March 2017, General V. K. Singh, the Minister of State for External Affairs, asserted in the Lok Sabha that ‘India is currently a net donor of foreign aid. In the last three years, India has provided more aid to foreign countries, than it has received’ (MEA 2017a). The figures, provided were about grants-in-aid rather than soft loans, but still, from 2005 onwards, the Indian development profile has been moving more towards being a provider of development cooperation (Sachdeva 2020).

3.2 Sets of Instruments It has been 70 years since Indian Independence and the start of India’s role as a development partner. However, India still does not have a clearly defined policy approach or clarity in its definitions towards development cooperation. While attempts have been made to institutionalise India’s efforts, the lack of a coherent policy and guiding definitions is often viewed as a major loophole in its development policy. India’s development assistance, over the past few years, has started to cover a large number of countries including its immediate neighbourhood and also countries in Africa such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Ghana, etc. through its Focus Africa Programme (Wagner 2019). Consequently, the projects being implemented by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) have increased substantially (MEA 2017b). Indian development activities abroad consist of broadly three instruments including lines of credit (LOCs), capacity-building, particularly the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme and bilateral grant-assistance projects (Sachdeva 2020). Recognising the increased involvement of India in development projects, the Development Partnership Administration (DPA) was created in the MEA in January 2012 to effectively handle India’s aid projects through the stages of concept, launch, execution and completion (ibid.). The MEA plays an instrumental role in the delivery of India’s Development Cooperation and has various institutional arrangements under its wings, for example, the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme, Aid to African countries through Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme (SCAAP), Bilateral Aid to neighbouring and other developing countries (MEA 2017b). In 2007 India proposed the setting up of the India International Development Cooperation Agency (IIDCA); however, to this day the IIDCA

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has not been established. This has resulted in the fragmentation of India’s development cooperation policy across various ministries. There is not yet any nodal agency for IDC, and only rough estimates exist regarding the magnitude of India’s development cooperation.

4 EU-India Development Cooperation: Divergences and Convergences Prospects for a global development partnership between the EU and India often meet with scepticism given differences in their respective approaches to development cooperation (‘Northern aid versus South-South cooperation’) and in their levels of cooperation. While the EU is the largest donor of development assistance, India has been a late entrant on account of its changing economy. The differences in India’s and the EU’s approach as development actors often point to a more diverging approach between the two actors. However, a closer analysis and understanding of the current northern and southern approaches to development cooperation reveals more convergences, resulting in increased visibility of cooperation and collaboration between the EU and India as this section illustrates.

4.1 EU-India Development Cooperation: Divergence in Approaches The EU’s definition of development cooperation is centred on the concept of ODA as defined by the OECD-DAC and is often considered as top-down and asymmetrical. ODA is defined by OECD-DAC as aid that ‘flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA recipients and to multilateral institutions’ provided by official agencies (e.g. state and local governments) that are aimed at promoting the economic development and welfare of the developing countries and that are concessional (with a grant element of at least 25%). Eligibility for ODA expenditure is restricted in some areas, such as military aid, peacekeeping, nuclear energy, and anti-terrorism activities (OECD 2020). ODA is defined by its degree of concessionality and the objective of promoting the ‘economic development and welfare of developing countries’ (OECD 2018). Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the legal basis for the EU’s development cooperation, further specifies that “Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty”. The fact that the EU and its member states provide over half of global ODA to developing countries is often mentioned as a main feature of the EU’s role as a ‘global actor’ (Orbie 2012).

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In contrast to the EU and in the absence of an explicit policy framework, the principles of SSC provide the main reference point for India’s development cooperation (i.e. respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs, and mutual benefit). Unlike the OECD-DAC countries, India does not believe in the donor-recipient relationship, and believes in partnership for mutual benefit. Thus, although there is a recognition of self-interest in India’s development cooperation, benefits must accrue to both countries. Based on these principles, India has shaped an identity as a development partner different from the OECD-DAC model (Mohanty 2016). The Indian discourse emphasising SSC often directly compares ‘India’s role as a demand-orientated partner with criticism of traditional donors, seen as imposing top-down, asymmetric relationships with conditionalities on developing countries’ (Paulo 2019: 18), or the so-called difference between North–South and South–South cooperation. However, over the years, this narrative of SSC has become more refined, working in parallel to the traditional methods of North–South Cooperation led by the OECDDAC. India has been on the receiving end of assistance from OECD-DAC while, at the same time forming partnerships for cooperation under SSC (Sudarshan and Dias 2017). For India, in the beginning development cooperation was a measure of alternatives, an attempt to create an equitable world with NAM and give the Third World a say in their development. This has not often been a consideration in North– South cooperation, especially in the light of conditionality, which the EU has imposed on its cooperation with recipient countries. This has been a major impediment in fostering stronger EU-India relations with regard to development cooperation. Today, although this still stands true, development cooperation has evolved to become more mutually beneficial for India as well as for its partner countries.

4.2 EU-India Development Cooperation: Convergence in Approaches To understand the trends in the EU-India development partnership, a deeper understanding of the ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ approaches to development cooperation becomes significant. In line with current developments in international politics, there is a greater convergence, rather than divergence, in the EU-India development cooperation partnership. Horner and Hulme (2017) suggest that ‘the contemporary global map of development appears increasingly incommensurable with any notion of a clear spatial demarcation between First and Third Worlds, ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, or rich and poor, countries’ (Kanbur and Sumner 2012; Sidaway 2012; Roy and Crane 2015). Novel collaborations are growing, and there are signs of convergence around particular agendas and modalities between some actors, in certain sites, and around particular interests (Curtis 2013; Kragelund 2015; Mawdsley 2017a). Mawdsley (2018: 173) examines three areas where there appears to have been a ‘Southernisation’ of global development over the last decade. These are in: (i) ‘discursive

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framings of a ‘win-win’ ethics of development, insisting that (supposedly) ‘national’ interests are compatible with partner benefits and development effectiveness more broadly; (ii) the (re)turn from ‘poverty reduction’ to ‘economic growth’ as the ‘central analytic’ of development; and (iii) related to both, the explicit and deepening blurring and blending of development finances and agendas with trade and investment’. Mawdsley argues that this discernible shift to a stronger assertion of national selfinterest (claimed to be mutually beneficial) by Northern donors currently sounds more like Southern development partners in some of their discursive positioning around aid and global development than the other way around. Whatever the particular confluence of drivers for individual donors, they have embraced a more assertive, explicit and openly articulated set of claims about how foreign aid works in ‘the national interest’ and is mutually beneficial to partner countries (Breman 2011; Mawdsley 2017b) as outlined in SSC. Moreover, in the formation and early years of the MDG period, much of the emphasis and energy of DAC donors was in eradicating poverty and in the ‘software’ of development—capacity-building, governance and institutions. They also incorporated social and economic programmes that focused on individuals and families—health, education, microcredit. However, building roads, ports and other major infrastructural investments became emblematic of Chinese development cooperation as well as Indian and Brazilian development cooperation. Moreover, there has been an explicit and deepening, blurring and blending of development finances and agendas with trade and investments. With the changing realities of Southern powers, driving rising commodity prices, emerging markets, and new frontiers of profitmaking, the Northern Discourse has changed from poverty eradication and reduction to ‘economic growth’ as the ‘central analytic’ of development, foreign aid and development policies (Mawdsley 2018: 180). Therefore, an analysis of the contemporary discourses on development cooperation outlines the fact that ‘Northern’ donors like the EU have been moving closer towards certain characteristics of SSC, not shying away from stressing mutual interests, economic growth, infrastructure, the role of the private sector, and the use of blended finance (Mawdsley 2018). This is a sharp contrast to the MDG era which was characterised by a particularly strong projection of the moral imperative of poverty reduction and associated improvements in hunger, health, mortality, empowerment and so on. Overlooking the realpolitik of development aid and assistance, the official discourse and dominant public understanding of aid in Northern countries were strongly moralistic. It was articulated by politicians, policymakers, bureaucrats and human rights advocates as that of ‘doing good’ for the ‘less fortunate’ (Gallagher 2009; Brockington 2014; Richey 2016). This discourse was bound to encounter problems, with most of the developing world having histories of colonialism and being subjected to the ‘civilising mission’. These discourses were supported and strategically advanced by many NGO campaigns which have sought to cajole Northern publics and politicians into funding and action based on images of desperate need, despair, hunger and hopelessness (Mawdsley 2018).

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Similar to Northern donors, most Southern providers of development cooperation have been adopting institutional architectures for the delivery of their development cooperation (Sidiropoulos et al. 2015). Classically, they have made much use of various forms of state-subsidised funding and/or risk reduction instruments to promote trade and investment abroad. This is enrolled within their definition of ‘development cooperation’, and defended as a mutually beneficial set of flows and outcomes. An example can be found in India’s Lines of Credit (LOC), which is managed by India’s Export-Import (EXIM) Bank and Ministry of External Affairs, and which is framed as a key part of India’s development assistance to poorer countries in the region, in Africa, and beyond (Sinha 2011). In theory, partner countries (and sub- and non-state actors therein) propose specific projects (e.g. port rehabilitation). India has been providing cheap funding through an LOC, in return for which, 70% must be spent on Indian goods and services. Proponents argue that this approach exemplifies Southern development principles; it is (supposedly) partner-led, mutually beneficial and does not come with heavy-handed donor conditionalities that interfere with sovereign matters, something for which the EU is often criticised. The benefits and problems associated with LOCs can be explored (Saxena 2016), but the point to underline here is that ‘Northern donors have moved from (mostly) criticism to (considerable) emulation of these Southern practices’ (Mawdsley 2018: 182).

5 EU-India Development Partnership: Broadening Toolboxes and Areas of Cooperation An examination of EU-India development cooperation in the light of the above discussion points to the increasing potential of convergence in practice as both players are open to redefining and revisiting their development cooperation agenda. In the Joint Statement of the 14th India-EU Summit, New Delhi (European Union and the Republic of India 2017a), the EU welcomed India’s contribution to peace and development in Africa, including its participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions. The EU and India both expressed their commitment to enhancing their consultations and cooperation regarding Africa, with a view to optimising possible synergies between their respective initiatives (European Council 2017). In November 2018, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy adopted a joint communication on elements for an EU strategy on India (European Commission 2018). The document recommends the negotiation of a broader Strategic Partnership Agreement through which India and the EU promote ‘sustainable modernisation, consolidate the rules-based global order based on a strong commitment to multilateralism, and address global challenges together’ (European Commission 2018). The communication clearly emphasises sustainable development as a pillar of India-EU relations. India has lately also been more open to the idea of North–South cooperation. The Indo-Japanese Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) and the International Solar Alliance (ISA), co-launched by

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India and France, embody this significant shift in India’s global engagement (Paulo 2019: 9). The current transition of India-EU cooperation coincides with a changing geopolitical context which enunciates India’s openness to fostering new types of partnerships beyond its traditional focus on SSC, and its readiness to move beyond its immediate neighbourhood.

5.1 EU-India Development Partnership: The Toolbox for Cooperation On the implementation side, there is a transition of the India-EU development partnership away from the traditional donor-recipient relationship. This has resulted in a broadening of the toolbox for cooperation, which also includes the following: a. Blending: The EU uses blending (EU grants are combined with loans or equity from public and private financiers, thereby contributing to SDG 17, strengthening the means of implementation and partnerships for the goals) through the Asian Investment Facility (AIF) the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) and the Electrification Financing Initiative (ElectriFi) (EURLex 2019). The main aim is to leverage additional funding for projects in green housing, urban mobility and other areas supporting India’s Smart Cities flagship initiative. b. European Investment Bank (EIB) lending: The European Investment Bank has provided more than EUR 1.34 billion for long-term investment in India since the first operation in 1993 (EIB 2016). It opened its regional office in New Delhi in March 2017. EIB loans support urban development projects, such as the Lucknow and Bangalore Metro, and clean energy projects, especially in solar energy (EIB 2016). c. The EU Partnership Instrument (PI): The PI as discussed above provides flexible funding for cooperation on global challenges of mutual interest. In India, the PI has been financing projects in areas such as information and communication technology (ICT), energy, climate change, urbanisation, water and resource efficiency. d. Science and technology cooperation: the India-EU development partnership has a long history of cooperation in science, research and higher education. Indian research institutes have been among the most active participants in EU research programmes (currently Horizon 2020), student exchange programmes (Erasmus+) and scholarships (Paulo 2019: 17). India, on the other hand has also aligned its main flagship initiatives to promote domestic development with the SDGs (e.g. Smart Cities Mission and SDG 11, Skill India and SDG 4). It has associated the SDGs closely with its domestic development motto of ‘Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas’ (‘collective effort, inclusive development’). India has presented a Voluntary National Review (VNR) at the UN’s High-Level Forum (HLPF) 2017, emphasising that ‘the country’s national development goals are

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mirrored in the SDGs’ (Government of India 2017). NITI Aayog (National Institute for Transforming India), the development think tank of the Indian Government, has produced a three-year plan (2017/2018–2019/2020) based on a 15-year vision in close alignment with the SDGs (NITI Aayog 2017), stressing the importance of international cooperation based on solidarity, equity and sharing (Paulo 2019: 23).

5.2 EU-India Development Partnership: Areas of Cooperation The convergences highlighted above can already be delineated in areas like climate change and energy, urbanisation, and resource efficiency, where India and the EU have been engaging in a process to transform their relationship as development partners. The Table 3 outlines the major sectoral cooperation happening between the EU and India to deal with common issues of interest and also the existing platforms for action between the two partners. Regarding Climate change, the EU and India are committed to lead and work together with all stakeholders to combat climate change, implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and encourage global low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient and sustainable development. They underline their resolve to combat climate change and promote the global clean and low greenhouse gas emission energy transition, towards sustainable, affordable, reliable and modern energy services (European Council 2017). In 2017, India and the EU launched their Clean Energy and Climate Change Partnership (European Council 2017). The partnership stresses the ISA as a forum for intensified India-EU cooperation where concrete activities on training, affordable finance, and dissemination of best practices for solar deployment can be initiated. In this framework, India and the EU aim to jointly implement projects that promote access to clean energy and climate-friendly technologies, and support research and innovation. The smart integration of renewable energy in the electricity system is a central aspect of the partnership. Cooperation on the clean energy transition creates fruitful overlaps with other policy goals, including energy security. The EU prioritises the energy sector, through blending activities through the Asia Investment Facility, the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) and the Electrification Financing Initiative (ElectriFi), strengthening national capacities and diversifying the use of renewable energies. Other priority sectors for cooperation between the two actors include the green economy, disaster risk management, trade, public finance management and education (European Commission n.d.). The EU and India have reiterated their commitment to cooperation and coordination in international forums and organisations in the area of energy, such as the International Energy Agency, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the G20 (European Union and the Republic of India 2017b).

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Table 3 Sectoral cooperation between India and the EU Major Issues

Platforms for Action

1 Clean Energy and Climate Change

Sectors

Cooperation on Clean technology Clean Development Mechanism Adapting to climate change Integrating adaptation into sustainable development strategies

EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership Euratom Cooperation Agreement on Fusion Energy Research International Solar Alliance (ISA)

2 Environment

Cooperation on Biodiversity conservation Forest protection Chemicals policy Waste and water management

Joint Working Group on Environment EU-India Environment Forum India-EU Water Partnership

3 Sustainable Urbanisation and Transition towards a green Development economy Leveraging green investment funding from European financial institutions Reducing the environmental impact of industrial activities Enhancing the competitiveness of local micro, small, and medium sized enterprises, Changing consumption practices

India-EU Partnership for Smart and Sustainable urbanisation The EU-Mumbai Partnership Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT) Smart Cities Mission and the Housing for All initiative CDSC (clean development and sustainable cities) to integrate low-carbon strategies into urban development.

4 Research and Innovation

Developing concrete solutions to common ‘societal challenges’ such as health, ICT, climate change, and energy

EU-India Science & Technology Cooperation Agreement Erasmus Programmes EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation ‘Horizon 2020’

5 Migration and mobility

Better organised regular migration and the fostering of well-managed mobility Prevention of irregular migration and trafficking in human beings Maximising the development impact of migration and mobility

EU-India Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM)

Source Compiled by Author

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The ambition of both India and the EU, as laid down in the Joint Statement adopted at the EU-India Summit on 30 March 2016, and the EU-India Agenda for Action 2020, is to ‘enhance EU-India cooperation on Urban Development with increasing involvement of Indian States and cities, EU Member States and regions/cities, building on regular dialogue on issues such as infrastructure, energy, sanitation and water management, to promote dialogue and partnership/twinning between local, regional and state entities’ (European Council 2016: 3). The EU-Mumbai Partnership was established as early as 2013 to build a long-term cooperation platform to address the challenges of urbanisation in mega-cities. Moreover, the EU’s successful World Cities Programme has brought together experts from Indian and European cities to develop sustainable projects (European Union and the Republic of India 2017c: 2). The EU also supports the urban local authorities (ULAs) in India to promote integrated action at municipal level addressing basic services such as water, sanitation and solid waste management, empowering the local authorities to effectively execute government programmes; improving institutional capacities and accountability and enabling inclusive and sustainable development (ibid.). This clearly outlines the engagement and interest of the EU Member States in India’s Urban Agenda. Both sides are endeavouring to establish an India-EU dialogue on smart and sustainable urban development, led by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, India and by the Delegation of the EU as mentioned in the EU-India Agenda for Action 2020 (Paulo 2019: 39). This becomes essential for India, since, as of 2015, 39% of the Indian population lived in urban areas. The number of people living in Indian cities by the year 2050, is estimated at 843 million and it is also estimated that 60% of the world’s population will be living in towns and cities within the next 10 years (European Union and the Republic of India 2017c). Policy initiatives under India’s Urban Rejuvenation Mission (URM), including the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT), the Smart Cities Mission and the Housing for All initiative, provide large scope for cooperation with external partners (European Union and the Republic of India 2017c: 1). The EU is already an important partner in addressing urban challenges, making SDG11 another main focus of the India-EU development partnership. In addition, the EU is backing other initiatives, such as the Ecocities project, which promotes the use of renewable energy in cities, and the EU-Mumbai Partnership, which addresses the challenges of mega-cities. Moreover, EIB loans support sustainable urban mobility, such as the Lucknow and Bangalore Metro. Several EU member states cooperate in India’s smart cities initiative and are partners for selected smart cities in India (European Union and the Republic of India 2017c). The EU also continues to promote regional cooperation in its connectivity strategy with Asia published in the autumn of 2018. It will focus on constructing transport, energy and digital networks. The EU and India could deepen their development partnership through closer cooperation within multilateral forums such as the BIMSTEC framework, as India is now willing to work with other countries on projects both in and beyond its own neighbourhood (Wagner and Tripathi 2018). The programmes mentioned above delineate the growing potential of development cooperation as an important pillar for EU-India cooperation. However, this

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can achieve success only if both actors can move past their historical baggage. The last few decades have exposed major weaknesses in the EU’s development cooperation. This has been partly related to the passivity towards novel and complex forms of cooperation and partnerships with emerging actors (especially engagement in South–South and triangular cooperation), partly to lack of actual coherence between policy areas limiting the effectiveness of development aid and the ability of the Union to speak with one voice and partly to lack of ability to ensure coordination between member states and exploit their shared competencies (Fejerskov 2013: 10– 11). But, the EU, since the 1990s has moved beyond a traditional assistance-type agenda towards blending their grants with loans from international financial institutions, leveraging additional funding for jointly identified development needs. India has also showcased its willingness to take up a more proactive role in development cooperation and to align its domestic development goals with SDGs moving on from its traditional focus on only SSC. At the 14th EU-India Summit held in October 2017, both sides acknowledged their interest in exploring ways to re-initiate the Sub-Commission on Development Cooperation that was set up in the 1990s to oversee EU Cooperation in India. The EU’s New Consensus on Development and India’s growing role as a development actor increases the scope for jointly developing new types of long-term sustaining partnerships and paves the way to explore the vast potential of the India-EU development partnership.

6 Conclusion India and the EU have a decades-long history of political and economic engagement, and both of them are increasingly drawing on new forms of partnership that reflect fundamental principles of mutual benefit and equality. Development cooperation between both actors offers new opportunities and will have implications for how they will engage with each other in future. Addressing regional and global issues, including thorough cooperation with other partner countries, especially in South Asia and Africa, can provide stepping stones for forging a stronger alliance between the two. The EU’s New Consensus on Development and India’s growing role as a development actor increases the scope for jointly developing new types of long-term sustaining partnerships and paves the way to explore the vast untapped potential of the EU-India development partnership. Cooperation between the two will depend on honest assessment and realistic understanding of opportunities and limitations and their expectations from each other. Any development in this regard will depend on how these actors move beyond their historical baggage and their mutual scepticism to identify their individual and shared roles in international politics by emphasising their convergences. India is a rising power, but its capability for entering into and forging increasing global development partnerships is often obstructed by its domestic constraints. The EU may be relatively advanced in its capacity (albeit with its internal challenges); however, it has under-utilised its overall potential by not focusing on its visibility and credibility as an actor. Consequently, both partners

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seemingly fall short of achieving their ambitions to converge their approaches to form a development partnership. If India and the EU are to navigate these challenges, amidst the complex global landscape, they must be more innovative in their actions and interactions. The EU must acuminate its profile as a bilateral partner and delineate the value of its partnership with India, which in turn needs to come up with a concrete and clearly defined development cooperation agenda. The EU, with its unique supranational identity, could offer added value by being a focal point of establishing common synergies between its member states and India (in a complementary rather than competitive way). This is a difficult task given the diversity within the member states; however, India and the EU can find more common ground and avenues of cooperation in a pragmatic and mutually beneficial way. Both the partners have come a long way in their privileged partnership, and it is time to elevate their development cooperation to another level by not only talking the talk but also walking the walk.

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Siddharth Tripathi is an EIZ Research Fellow at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Berlin. He completed his postdoctoral research on ‘Legitimacy of Peace Missions’ at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt and his doctoral research from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His areas of interest include non-western perspectives in IR, peace and conflict studies and Foreign Policy, particularly focusing on the European Union and India.

Future Cooperation and Global Potentials

From Destroyer to Preserver? The Evolution of India’s Position Towards the Liberal International Order and Its Significance for the EU–India Strategic Partnership Patryk Kugiel

1 Introduction On 20 November 2018, the European Commission presented its first-ever “Strategy on India”, with the purpose of building “a partnership for sustainable modernisation and the rules-based global order” (European Commission 2018: 1). Since being adopted by the Council of the European Union on 10 December 2018, it has become an official policy of the Union and its member states for the following 10–15 years. The document aims at strengthening the EU’s cooperation with India on bilateral, regional and global levels, and goes beyond the traditional focus on the economy. It recognises that the EU has for too long prioritised its relations with China by suggesting that “a strong partnership with India is a key for a balanced EU policy towards Asia as a whole” (European Commission 2018: 1). Though the renewed European interest in India is partly driven by economic interests (rapidly on the rise, India offers one of the world’s biggest markets), it seems—as the subtitle of the strategy indicates—that for the first time geopolitical considerations played an equally important role. In these times of growing challenges from authoritarian China and Russia and uncertainty regarding the US foreign policy under President Donald Trump, the liberal international order seems to be in unprecedented and existential crisis (see for instance: Kundnani 2017; Ikenberry 2018; International 1 This text refers to a specific kind of international system; the liberal international order (LIO) is understood here as proposed by John Ikenberry, one of the leading authors and promotors of the concept, as an “open and rules-based international order” that is “enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism” (Ikenberry 2011: 56). It is seen as a hegemonic system established by the US as liberal leading power and its Western allies after the Second World War and expanded to global level following the end of the Cold War.

P. Kugiel (B) Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_12

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Affairs 2018; Colombo and Magri 2019; Mearsheimer 2019; Patrick 2019).1 These circumstances prompted the EU to search for credible, like-minded partners, interested and capable of defending the liberal and rules-based international order. And the EU hopes that India is one of them. The Commission calls India “an emerging global power” and declares that it “has an interest in India playing greater role in a multipolar world, which requires a multipolar Asia” (European Commission 2018: 2, 11). Finally, the strategy states: The EU and India share the values of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and support the rules-based global order centered on multilateralism[…] This Joint Communication proposes to[…]:‘Join forces to consolidate the rules-based global order, based on multilateralism with the UN and the WTO at its core’. (European Commission 2018: 1)

But is this assumption correct? Historically speaking, during the Cold War, India with its post-colonial identity and idealistic foreign policy was one of the most vocal critics (apart from the Communist block) of Western powers and the US-led liberal order. As a state-planned economy with import substitution policy, it had weak linkages with the global economy and promoted an alternative vision of the international system. As a leader of developing countries it helped to establish the Non-Aligned Movement and promoted the radical New International Economic Order (NIEO) to form a more just and fair global society. Since the Cold War ended India has gradually been integrating with the existing liberal order. Yet, it has not stopped contesting its basic premises and regulations and has continued to seek major reforms in global governance and the rules of international cooperation. Together with other rising powers, like China or Russia, it has occasionally been seen as a revisionist power, challenging the existing world’s systems. However, in recent years, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has become more active internationally, speaking in favour of globalisation and the rulesbased order while also engaging in closer cooperation with the US and Europe. Does this mean that India under Modi can be regarded as a country willing and able to defend the liberal international order? In the mythology of Hinduism two of the principal deities are Shiva and Vishnu: While the first is known as “the Destroyer” of the universe, the latter is “the Preserver” within the Trimurti, the Hindu trinity that also includes Brahma. If India’s attitude towards the liberal order could previously have been depicted symbolically by the icon of Shiva, is it possible that it could now be better illustrated by that of Vishnu? To translate this hyperbole one can ask whether India has changed its approach from being a main challenger and transformer of liberal international order to being a stabilising and protective force today. In other words, has India’s approach shifted from challenging the global status quo to becoming the status quo power? The affirmative answer would have fundamental and highly positive consequences for EU global interests and also for the prospects of EU–India cooperation. This chapter tries to shed some light on the issue by analysing India’s recent foreign policy trends towards key elements of the liberal international order known also as “partial functional orders” (Maull 2018: 8–9). Three such “partial functional orders” have been selected for analysis—trade regime, democracy promotion and

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human rights, and the non-proliferation regime—as they are all central to the liberal international order and reveal interesting patterns in changes to Indian foreign policy. The analysis goes beyond the official Indian rhetoric and declarations to examine the main interests shown and actions taken in these areas by India in recent years. The chapter studies Indian foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and pays special attention to the most recent years under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi to see whether a fundamental change in approach can be detected. Presentation of these case studies is preceded by a short overview of evolution of India’s general perspective on the liberal order. Concluding observations and recommendations for the EU are presented in the final section of the chapter.

2 India and the Post-Cold War Liberal Order Following the end of the Cold War, India started a journey of growing integration and adaptation to the liberal international order. It gradually liberalised its economy and opened up to international trade and investments. It also sought closer relations with Western powers, including with the EU.2 Yet until 2014 its attitude towards this post-Cold War order was regarded as somehow ambivalent or even contradictory. The main goal of Indian foreign policy in that period continued to be “the desire to achieve major power status”, in what constituted a “systemic” source of the conflict between India and the major power system (Nayar and Paul 2003: 1). This “status inconsistency” for India—a discrepancy between its rising aspirations and ascribed status—often put India in the opposite camp from the West on important global issues. India’s inconsistent behaviour fuelled an ongoing debate on whether a rising India is a revisionist or a status quo power and whether or not it is a “responsible power” (Dormandy 2007). For some, India has been a “hesitant rules shaper”, shifting its position between being a norms-taker, norms-breaker, norms-maker and normsshaper (Sindhu et al. 2013: 3). Its aspiration to influence international rules and institutions grew as it left behind the “universalism of the weak” practised in the Cold War to pursue “internationalism of the strong” (Sindhu et al. 2013: 4). As an emerging power, India strived for greater influence and a louder voice in the international institutions constituting the pillars of US-led liberal order, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN). To that end, it occasionally joined other non-Western powers, like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) on specific issues or sided with the West when this suited its interests. Given the West’s reluctance to reform multilateral organisations like the IMF, India supported the establishment of BRICS institutions such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which were sometimes viewed as alternatives to the World Bank and the IMF respectively. India disagreed with the EU on crucial international trade and 2 Regarding

the economic relationship between India and the EU see the contributions of Khorana and Köhler-Suzuki in this volume.

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climate negotiations, and also played a part in the failures of the Doha Development Round in 2008 and the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change (COP15) in 2009. India, together with fellow BRICS members, has been a staunch opponent of any sanctions or foreign interventions without a UN mandate. Therefore, it has also been critical of Western humanitarian interventions or the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Puri 2016). According to Hall (2018: 173) “India’s position has not shifted much, if at all, despite major changes in other areas over the past twenty years. India remains sceptical about embracing R2P, especially its so-called ‘third pillar’”. India has also held a position closer to other BRICS countries than to the EU Member States with regards to voting in the UN General Assembly. This approach is sometimes seen as indicative of India’s quest “to carve out a leading position amongst countries, including Russia, that seek to challenge Western dominance of the liberal world order” (Das 2017: 5). Alongside these stances, since 1989 India has also gradually been integrating into the Western-led liberal order. Though India continued its criticism of some elements of the global governance and rules (like nuclear and trade regimes), it accepted many of the basic premises of international relations. Following the Cold War India developed a more “positive attitude toward liberalisation, globalisation, and multilateral engagement” (Sindhu et al. 2013: 14). The fast economic growth that has followed its major liberalisation since 1991 made India a major beneficiary not only of globalisation but also of existing multilateral institutions and the liberal international order as such. During this period “India has started to reflect a more pragmatic, realpolitik approach to multilateralism and multipolarity—which is evident in its multiple-alignment policy” (Sindhu et al. 2013: 5). It was accepted into the G-20 and formed numerous platforms of multilateral cooperation (apart from BRICS, also IBSA [India Brazil, South Africa] or IORA [Indian Ocean Rim Association]). The change from a policy of “non-alignment” to “multi-alignment” and its shifting position on many international issues prompted some to refer to India as a “global swing state”—a player with the potential to shape global systems but which has not yet decided which way to go and with whom to side (Fontaine and Kliman 2013). Has India’s position towards the world order changed since Narendra Modi took over as Prime Minister in May 2014? His unprecedented activism in the international arena stirred considerable interest among Indian and foreign scholars and strategic thinkers prompting some to declare the emergence of a new doctrine of Indian foreign policy (see Mohan 2015; Ganguly et al. 2016). There is some agreement at least that “the country’s foreign policy has undergone remarkable transformation in the short span of five years” (Pant and Taneja 2019: 5). Modi started new phase of Indian economic liberalisation domestically and also strengthened cooperation with Western powers, especially the US and Europe but also with Israel and Japan. He claimed a more important role for India on the international stage. India, according to Foreign Secretary Jaishankar, now seeks to play a “leading” role and not only a “balancing” role in Asia (Jaishankar 2015). Modi also started speaking more favourably about the international system. Though Indian leaders do not explicitly use the term “liberal international order”,

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they often refer to the “democratic and rules-based order”, which sounds synonymous. In June 2018 for instance, at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, Modi stated: We will promote a democratic and rules-based international order, in which all nations, small and large, thrive as equal and sovereign. We will work with others to keep our seas, space and airways free and open; our nations secure from terrorism; and our cyber space free from disruption and conflict. We will keep our economy open and our engagement transparent. We will share our resources, markets and prosperity with our friends and partners. (Modi 2018a)

In January 2019, Minister of External Affairs, Shushma Swaraj speaking at the Rasina Dialogue in New Delhi also reaffirmed India’s support for a “democratic and rules-based order” (Swaraj 2019). At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2018, Modi reiterated India’s support for globalisation and an economic rules-based order. He termed protectionism as one of the three biggest threats to global peace along with climate change and terrorism. In these turbulent times, “adherence to the international system based on rules”, he stated, had “become more important than ever” (Modi 2018b). India’s democracy, he added, is “the fundamental base of our country’s stability, certainty and sustainable development. For an India which is full of immense variety of religion, culture, language, costumes and food habits, democracy is not just a political system, it is a way of life, it is the philosophy of life” (Modi 2018b). India also started to more openly and willingly use liberal terminology in documents it signed with Western partners. For instance, India’s pledge to “work closely together and with all relevant players to support a rules-based international order” is clearly expressed in a Joint Statement from the EU–India summit in October 2017: India and the EU, as the world’s largest democracies, share a desire to work closely together and with all relevant players to support a rules-based international order that upholds agreed international norms, global peace and stability, and encourages inclusive growth and sustainable development in all parts of the inter-connected and multipolar world. They welcomed the growing convergence on contemporary global issues and agreed to enhance India-EU cooperation in all multilateral fora. They also recognized their common responsibility towards ensuring international peace and security, and an open and inclusive international order. (European Commission 2017: Paragraph 7)

Similar strong commitments to the international order are also incorporated in a number of other declarations and agreements concluded by India with other democracies in recent years, including: the India–US Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean of January 2015, two joint declarations signed with Japan in December 2015 and October 2018, and the press release from the third meeting of “the Quad” (includes India, Japan, US, Australia) in November 2018. India’s support of multilateralism gains more prominence when seen in the context of growing nationalist and isolationist sentiments in many countries. This makes it a valuable partner for European countries which still favour the multilateral system. As a result, in September 2019 at the UN General Assembly, India, along with about

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50 other countries, joined the Franco-German initiative supported by the EU to form a new initiative called the Alliance for Multilateralism.3 These new elements in foreign policy made some Indian observers argue that India under Modi is now an important pillar of the liberal international order, both willing and able to uphold it. For instance, Samir Saran argues that India is a leading supporter of and a crucial player in the liberal world order. In his words: “There is only one legitimate heir to the global liberal order of any consequence: India” (Saran 2018a: 106). Other Indian analysts such as C. Raja Mohan and Harsh V. Pant concur and present India as a valuable partner of Western democracies (Mohan 2010; Pant 2018). In the recent book of Indian politician and thinker, Shashi Tharoor and Samir Saran (2020), authors promote the “New Delhi Consensus” with a special role for India in saving and reforming the liberal order. If these assertions are correct, one can point at three major reasons as to why India now seems more interested in preserving the current system. First, it has recognised itself to be a beneficiary of globalisation and the rules-based order led by the US. Second, it shares some of the fears of Western democracies regarding the rising power of China. Third, the transactional and unilateral policy of Donald Trump poses a risk for bilateral relations with the US, and also for the stability of the global system on which India’s growth is based. These arguments substantiate the claims regarding India’s shift towards liberal order and support its role as a defender of the status quo. However, on the other hand, one should note that not every observer agrees that India is a power both willing and able to uphold and defend the current liberal order. Many scholars have pointed out that India does not fully share the Western view of liberal international order and can hardly be seen as a natural partner for the US or Europe, for a number of ideological, economic or strategic reasons (see: Gilboy and Heginbotham 2013; Wojczewski 2016; Haass 2017; Ollapally 2018). In order to add more concrete arguments to this discussion the following sections will present three case studies of India’s policy towards crucial elements of the liberal global order.

3 India and Trade Regimes A free, open and rules-based trade system based on multilateralism with the WTO at its core is often seen as a centrepiece of the liberal order. India’s support and adherence to this system is of utmost importance for the EU and the whole system. With exchange in goods valued at EUR 91.5 billion in 2018, India was the ninth biggest trade partner of the EU, responsible for 2.3% of its external trade (European Commission 2019a). For India, the EU is still the largest trading partner, accounting for 13.3% of its trade. Trade is fairly balanced. India was a founding member of both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO, and has been one of the most active members of both organisations. As India’s economy has taken off—since the 1990s—and it has 3 Regarding

multilateralism also see the chapter of Singh in this volume.

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integrated more openly with the global economy, it has become more committed to the international trading system. Though India has experienced very high growth rates in the last two decades, it still faces huge domestic economic and social challenges, with high levels of poverty, millions of young people entering the labour market every year and soaring trade deficits, to name just a few. As a late-comer to globalisation, India would not like to see changes to the rules of the game during play, especially just as it has started winning. Therefore, it is increasingly worried by the protectionist tendencies of developed countries and any unilateral actions that may destabilise the global economy or the international trade system. Yet, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi criticised protectionism at Davos in early 2018, the international media pointed out the hypocrisy in his speech (Bradsher 2018). Indeed, India has not embraced globalisation with open arms. It is still a relatively closed market and protectionist economy. Trade plays a much lesser role in the Indian economy than in the case of the EU. The share of trade in goods and services in India’s gross domestic product (GDP) was 43.1% in 2018; though this was much higher than the 15% it was in 1990, it is still lower than the global average (57.8%), and the EU (86.6%) and even less than in 2013 (56.8%) (World Bank 2019). The 2015 WTO review of India observed that “the tariff structure remains complex and the simple average most-favoured nation (MFN) tariff rate increased during the review period”— from 12% in 2010–11 to 13% in 2014–2015 (World Trade Organization 2015: 8–9). On Modi’s watch, India’s tariff rates have gone up, not down, to 17.1% in 2018 (World Trade Organization 2019a). Besides custom duties, there are even more problems with non-trade barriers, numerous licenses and a fluid tariff system. As some Indian scholars observed, there is “no denying that high bound rates, relatively higher applied rates, greater incidence of nonbinding tariff lines and high binding overhang, are features that point to India being the most protectionist economy among large emerging markets (Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia)” (Palit and Mukherjee 2019). American observers also acknowledge that despite strong US pressure to open its market, “there appears to be neither the vision nor the appetite in New Delhi to liberalize trade” (Blackwill and Tellis 2019: 181). In addition to restrictions in trade, in 2016 India also cancelled its bilateral investment treaties with about 60 countries, which stripped foreign companies of future legal protection. This is despite further economic reforms and liberalisation pursued by Modi since 2014. Although India improved its position remarkably in the Doing Business ranking, from 132 in 2014 to 77 in 2018, it continues to be a difficult market for foreign companies. India also has a mixed record at the WTO forum. It has often been described as being defensive in trade negotiations at the WTO and as being one of the main actors responsible for the failure of the Doha Development Round. This was despite early studies showing major potential gains for India upon conclusion (Mattoo and Stern 2003). India often presents itself as a representative of the developing world, but it also acts in its own interests. This was evident in 2014 when India stood isolated in blocking the Trade Facilitation Agreement from coming into force. Though Modi withdrew his veto in the months following, after securing its goals on food security

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issues, it has reminded the West of India’s reputation as a destructive force in trade negotiations. With the global trade talks having reached an impasse, India, unlike the EU, has not pushed to negotiate meaningful bilateral or regional trade agreements. It has only 15 agreements in force (which are not very ambitious in scope) and has not signed any new Free Trade Agreements (FTA) since 2012. It has also withdrawn at the very last moment, in October 2019, from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), due to be signed in 2020 to form a mega free trade zone of 15 Asian countries. Also, talks on the Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), having been under negotiation between the EU and India since in 2007, stalled in 2013 and have gone nowhere in recent years, despite Modi’s agreement at the 2017 bilateral summit to renew them. Some of the sticking points include divergent views regarding duties on certain categories of products (such as automobiles in the case of the EU and wine and spirits on the Indian side), public procurement, intellectual property rights, and labour and environmental standards. Despite the narrowing of differences in some issues and arguments in favour of signing the deal for economic and strategic reasons (Kumar and Xavier 2019), there is little hope for a BTIA to be signed any time soon. One of the most important reasons is the mismatch in the level of ambition between the two parties, being at very different levels of development. India is, like the EU, one of the most active users of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. By mid-2019 it had brought 24 cases as a complainant, was a respondent in 32 cases, and acted as a third party in 160 cases. In addition, it is also one of the most active users of anti-dumping measures among WTO members; it initiated more than 80 anti-dumping investigations against 23 trading partners between 2010 and 2014 (World Trade Organization 2015: 10). The recent rise of trade tensions between the US and India, including the withdrawal of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) status to India in June 2019, illustrates to some extent growing international frustration with India’s trade practices. Though President Trump, who calls India the “king of tariffs”, prefers to address the grievances bilaterally, outside the WTO system, India found itself under pressure in the WTO as well. In 2018 India was referred to the WTO by Australia over sugarcane subsidies (17 November 2018), by the US over cotton subsidies (12 November 2018) and had lost a steel duty case to Japan on 7 November 2018. The EU and 11 other countries backed a US complaint against India’s export subsidies at the WTO on 20 August 2018. This was not the only time that India and the EU dragged each other to WTO arbitration. By mid-2019, the EU brought in total 11 cases against India at the WTO (second only to the US with 35 cases), and was sued by India in seven cases (fewer only than the US with 11 cases) (World Trade Organization 2019b). By the end of 2018 India was the target of three out of all 120 EU anti-dumping measures in force, and four out of 12 EU anti-subsidy measures. India is the second biggest user of trade defence investigations (TDI) against the EU, with 21 measures in force (21 in 2017), second after the US (33 measures in force in 2018) and followed by China, with 18 measures in force in 2018 (20 in 2017). In terms of new investigations in

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Table 1 EU and India Trade disputes in the WTO as complainant

as respondent

India

24 cases Including 11 cases against the United States, seven against the EU

32 cases (including 11 161 cases brought by the EU, 8 by the US)

as third party

European Union (formerly EC)

102 cases Including 35 cases against United States, 11 against India, nine—against China

85 cases (including 20 brought by United States, seven by India, five by China)

202 cases

Sources WTO Dispute Settlement; World Trade Organisation 2019a

2018, India initiated four, the US three and China two new investigations against the EU4 (European Commission 2019b: 20) (Table 1). Even though both the EU and India support the central role of the WTO in global trade regimes and agree on the general need for reform of the WTO, they visualise the reform differently. They are both committed to reforming the Appellate Body, and to that end they jointly issued a reform proposal in 2018. However, on other aspects of WTO reform, the EU has more similarities with the US than with India. As the EU expects to limit the privileges of developing countries, for India “trade is not the end in itself”, but must serve larger goals of development and narrowing asymmetries between developing and developed countries. While the EU shares with industrialised countries the goal of adjusting the WTO to a changed economic global landscape, India prefers to defend the status quo, upholding Special and Differential Treatment to developing countries, and addressing traditional trade issues before moving into new areas (Kugiel 2019). Therefore, in the WTO reform proposal prepared by India and supported by eight other developing and least-developed countries in July 2019, it called for the immediate resolution of the impasse at the highest adjudicating body for global trade disputes but also asked for “development-centric” reforms of the WTO and expressed sharp concern over “a one-sided narrative” being advanced by major developed countries, especially the US, that disregards “issues of importance and concern to developing countries” (Kanth 2019). It is symptomatic, that while most of the EU 2018 Strategy on India is written in a friendly and diplomatic way, the language tends to become more critical when it deals with trade issues. The document proclaims that the EU will continue “to encourage India to open up its economy” and set as the main objective “to work towards a sound, transparent, open, non-discriminatory and predictable regulatory and business environment for European companies trading with or investing in India, 4 On

a more positive note one needs to acknowledged that the same EU report also observed some positive actions taken by the Indian government in this regard: “In the course of 2018, India streamlined its internal procedures in trade remedies and amended its anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules, making them stricter and more in line with WTO and EU rules. At the request of the Indian authority, the Commission provided comments on the draft and welcomed the proposed amendments” (European Commission 2019b).

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including the protection of their investments and the protection and enforcement of intellectual property” (European Commission 2018: 7). Also when it comes to multilateral negotiations, the EU seems visibly irritated with the Indian attitude: “The EU expects India to play a more constructive role in the WTO in order to identify long-lasting solutions, to contribute to addressing the deep causes of existing trade tensions and to help restore balance in the international trading system” (European Commission 2018: 12). New areas of disagreements over digital technology, data localisation, etc., may add to the tensions. All recent decisions (such as its reluctance to enter RCEP or BTIA, or its position on WTO reform) and trends indicate that despite its rhetorical support of free trade, India remains unready to wholly open up and to compete with others on a free global market. This is fully understandable in the context of its structural and domestic economic constraints; its low manufacturing share of GDP, rising unemployment, lack of capital and new technologies, and recent slowdown in GDP growth are just some of the challenges that India confronts internally. Therefore, the aim of the flagship programme Make in India, which seeks to transform India into a global manufacturing hub, is to make India more open to foreign investments but not to exports. One can expect that India will seek to continue to protect its market, encourage foreign direct investment (FDI), and defend its trade privileges. Thus, different approaches and perspectives on the trade regime may prove to be one of the most contentious issues in EU–India relations. This does not leave India and the EU on the same page concerning the reforms and future direction of the multilateral trading system; paradoxically, however, in this aspect India seems to be a status quo power, while the EU and US now appear more as revisionist powers, as they are no longer satisfied with the functioning of the system they created.

4 India and Human Rights and Democracy Promotion Adherence to shared values of democracy and human rights is regularly underlined by the EU and India as a solid foundation for their “natural” strategic partnership, while promotion of democratic governance is actually one of the defining elements of the liberal order. As observed by Mearsheimer, the “most important requirement” for building a liberal order is “to spread democracy far and wide” (Mearsheimer 2019: 31). Hence, one could assume that promotion of human rights would be an area of close cooperation between the two largest democracies. However, in practice, instead of being a shared interest, it is more often a source of disagreements and misperceptions. For India, discussions on democracy and human rights are sensitive issues. The Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue that started in 2004 took place for the last time in 2013 (Jain 2017: 414) and there is little chance it will restart anytime soon. Due to deficiencies of democracy in India the country itself has often been criticised by European non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and politicians. The European Parliament in particular has been critical of violations of human rights

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both in Kashmir and elsewhere in many of its resolutions in the past. With growing pressure on minority groups in India and a recent spike in tensions in Kashmir following the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution (August 2019) which used to guarantee autonomy to Kashmir, human rights issues may again have become an irritant in India–EU relations. This has become even more likely as reforms to citizenship laws (Citizenship Amendment Act, CAA) caused massive protests across India over fears of anti-Muslim discrimination, augmented by the intercommunal clashes in Delhi in February 2020 in which over 40 people were killed (Biswas 2020). Growing apprehensions about the state of democracy in India prompted Members of the European Parliament to once more prepare a resolution expressing concern about the internal affairs in India, a resolution which in the end was postponed (Parashar 2020) so as not to derail the EU–India summit in March 2020 (which in the event was itself postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic). Apart from these internal motivations, there is also a difference in approach to democracy in foreign policy between the EU and India. The case of democracy promotion shows a big gap between self-perceptions of the European reality and how “outsiders” perceive it (Jain and Pandey 2010, 2012). Indian experts point to the “selectivity and ‘incoherence’ in the ‘EU’s domestic and external human rights policy” (Jain 2017: 419). India finds many priorities of the EU’s foreign policy to infringe on the sovereignty of other states. As Jain (2017: 423) explains: the European Union—a postmodern entity which is not responsible for the law-and-order situation in its member states—fails to understand the complexities and economic, societal and cultural challenges of Indian society. Thus, even if India was to continue human rights dialogue with the EU, human rights will continue “to be ranked rather low in New Delhi’s policy agenda and interaction with the EU”. The EU’s “staunchly upright stance” on human rights poses problems in its relations with India. Therefore, the EU would “need to develop a new approach, less confrontational and more constructive”, and to leave improvements in human rights implementation “to Indians themselves” (Jain 2017: 424). As a result, though the commitment to cooperation on democracy has been included in the first of several joint statements from EU–India summits this element disappeared after 2005 (Jain 2015: 63), and only a few actual examples of cooperation can be mentioned. India cooperated with Europe in establishing the Community of Democracies in 2000 and United Nations Democracy Fund in 2005 to support civil society organisations in developing countries. It joined the Western powers in voting against Sri Lanka at the Human Rights Commission in 2013. There has been limited cooperation between the EU and India in democracy training in South Asia, especially in Nepal (Jain 2009). Most recently, pressure from European countries and India helped to defuse the constitutional crisis in Sri Lanka in 2018 as well as in the Maldives in 2019. Though both the EU and India would like to see more democratic and stable countries in their respective neighbourhoods, they differ in the methods and tools used to pursue that goal (Kugiel 2012; Hall 2017b). India’s general stance is that “democracy cannot be imposed from abroad”. “Societies”,—Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pointed out in 2011 UN General Assembly speech—“cannot be reordered from

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outside through military force” (Singh 2011). Though India is willing to share its experiences and institutional knowledge on democratic governance with other countries, it has not made the promotion of democracy an important part of its foreign policy. It has provided training to officials from developing countries under its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, supported democratic institutions in Afghanistan since 2001 and engaged in democratic transition in Nepal in 2005. In general, India takes a more pragmatic and less ideological approach in this regard—it provides democratic assistance when this suits its interests and engages with dictators when it has no better alternative. This position does not seem to have changed much under the Modi leadership, as the country’s muted response to Myanmar’s prosecution of Rohingya Muslims since 2017 indicates. As India tries to combine its commitment to liberal values with realpolitik, its policy on human rights and democracy takes a “middle path” approach. As one author explained: Normatively, New Delhi strikes a middle path. India is committed to genocide prevention, R2P, Human rights and liberal democracy in principle, but has serious reservations regarding their practical implementation. The commitment is born out of its own national values. The reservations are borne out by its experience too. (Pai 2013: 317)

Unlike the EU, which in South Asia “preferred a bottom-up approach by essentially concentrating on civil society and non-governmental organization” (Jain 2016: 70) often even despite or against the countries’ governments, India, on the other hand, works at the request of and in cooperation with foreign governments. Indian elites have been critical of Western intrusive and offensive promotion of democracy (like support for the past “colourful revolutions”), which are viewed as interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. India pursues a more “defensive” approach (Jain 2016: 64). This can be partly explained by India’s attachment to the strong notion of sovereignty and principles of non-interference and non-intervention. This naturally leads to some misperception and tensions in EU–India relations. On the one side, the EU has been critical of India’s continued cooperation with the military junta in Myanmar and its lack of condemnation of human rights violations in other countries. On the other, India accuses the European Union of double standards when it comes to its profile as a normative power. Europe is often perceived as presenting “a normative agenda in a way that seeks to undermine the competitive advantage of developing countries” (Jain and Pandey 2013: 120). Thus, it is perceived as a form “of regulatory imperialism” through “unilateral regulatory globalisation” (Bradford in Jain and Pandey 2013: 121). The EU seems to “propagate and reflexively impose social, economic and ideological norms as global public goods that have been so successful in Europe at the global level, irrespective of other countries’ stage of development, historical background, and social and cultural peculiarities” (Jain and Pandey 2013: 121). Not surprisingly Indian elites call for more equal treatment. Europe, according to Jain, “should recognize that it has to listen more and lecture less, for very often most Indians tend to regard Europe as being intrusive and preachy” (Jain 2014, 2016: 2).

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Moreover, the EU normative approach to international affairs may lead to irritation with Indian exceptionalism in future. India has, like Europe, traditionally viewed itself as a “moral” or “normative” power (see Sullivan 2014). The notion of Indian idealism was especially strong in the first years of its independence, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. During the Cold War, India projected itself as a representative of developing countries and sought the establishment of a new just and fair international system. Though idealism in Indian foreign policy declined by the end of the Cold War, it has again gained traction in recent years as India develops its own model of “soft power” (Kugiel 2017). This is especially visible under Prime Minister Modi. The manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 called India “Vishwaguru”—universal leader, global leader or a reformer and teacher to the entire world. The document observed that India “can use its ancient wisdom through its soft power and proactive diplomacy” (BJP 2014: 40). Modi is trying to make use of Hindu ancient traditions as a source of Indian exceptionalism (Hall 2017a). Far from subscribing to a European vision of world affairs, India may soon be more vocal in suggesting its own solutions and models of global governance. Some Indian authors propose a “New Delhi Consensus”, as distinct from both the “Washington Consensus” and the “Beijing Consensus” as a more legitimate proposal of an international system (Saran 2017). After the reelection for a second term in 2019, Prime Minister Modi stated: “I see the next five years as crucial and important time not only for Gujarat but also for the entire world. This is an opportunity for another renaissance that will make India a vishwa guru (global leader)” (Times of India 2019). Though India may not yet have the resources and capacities to play that role (Hall 2017a), its past traditions and ambitions of current leadership should not be ignored. Therefore, though the clash of European and Indian exceptionalisms is not inevitable, it is still a possibility. Much will depend on a better understanding of Indian proposals and on the willingness of Europeans to respond positively to their ambitions. Finally, it is important to underline that India and the EU differ in their understandings of the very sense of democratisation. When Indian leaders speak about a “democratic international order”, they mean the democratisation of the international system, not democratisation of individual states. The global order, according to New Delhi, lacks legitimacy and is not representative of current-day realities. This is best illustrated at the UN Security Council, a major institution of global governance, which without India lacks the voice of one-sixth of humanity. In conclusion, one can expect India to remain suspicious of the European practice of democracy promotion and reluctant to cooperate in this field. Though the fact that India is a democracy helps in building mutual trust and understanding, India will not join the EU in strengthening this element of the liberal order. India seems to be closer in this regard to other non-Western powers than to the EU.

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5 India and the Non-Proliferation Regime The EU is a strong supporter of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Two EU member states (until recently), France and the United Kingdom, are nuclear states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1967 and co-founders of non-proliferation regime. The European Union is keen to promote the existing system. All EU members have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and strongly support the early start and conclusion of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Most of them are also members of four non-proliferation regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group (AG). India, on the other hand, had long been an outcast and a challenger to the existing non-proliferation regime. It did not sign the NPT and termed the system “discriminatory” and a form of “nuclear apartheid” (Singh 1998). Staying outside the regime, it developed its own nuclear capabilities and eventually tested nuclear weapons in May 1998. It is also a non-signatory to the CTBT and rejects the FMCT. Despite that, over the decades, New Delhi has stated that it is a responsible nuclear power, upholding clean records on non-proliferation, and slowly but steadily integrating into the non-proliferation regime. In fact, since going nuclear, India has accepted the norms of non-proliferation and has worked “to maintain the global nuclear order” (Nayan 2018: 232). Thanks to the historic Indo–US nuclear deal in 2008, it has been recognised as a de facto nuclear power outside the NPT system and partially reintegrated with the non-proliferation regime. It has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and joined the West in sanctioning Iran numerous times. After years of effort India has been admitted to the MTCR (2016), the Wassanaar Agreement (2017), and the Australia Group (2018). Therefore, India has transformed from being a “pariah nuclear state” state into a de facto nuclear weapon state (Pant and Biswas 2018: 2240). The nuclear regime is an interesting case study in EU–India relations, showing how India’s integration with liberal order removed one of the major irritants in bilateral relations. In the 1990s the EU exerted strong pressure on India to give up its nuclear programme and join the NPT, CTBT and FMCT. India’s nuclear test in 1998 shocked the EU and became a major irritant in bilateral relations, causing both sides to rethink their cooperation. Yet, in the following years, as India’s reintegration proceeded, non-proliferation ceased to be a problem on the bilateral agenda (Bava 2017). Today, the European Union and India have similar approaches when it comes to Iran or North Korea. India has voted together with European partners against Iran in the IAEA, supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2015 and today, despite the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, both the EU and India continue to support it. In summary, European countries have eventually supported India’s accession to becoming a key player in non-proliferation treaties and the non-proliferation system as a whole.

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The 2018 EU–India strategy proposes to “continue the positive engagement with India on non-proliferation and disarmament, export control, and nuclear safety and security” (European Commission 2018: 13) and that the EU will “continue to encourage India to participate constructively in international export control regimes and initiatives, and to join the Arms Trade Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction” (European Commission 2018: 13). As this statement shows, some possible areas of disagreement are not yet fully resolved. Still, the two sides managed to downplay their differences and accept a pragmatic status quo to focus on possible cooperation. This case might suggest an effective way for India and the EU to deal with each other and to move their partnership forward despite some remaining divergences.

6 Conclusion This chapter shows a more nuanced picture of India’s attitude towards the liberal international order than one could assume based only on official declarations from Indian leaders. Though the country has made remarkable progress in accommodating itself into the current world system, it has not embraced it fully and without reservation. The aforementioned three case studies reveal varying degrees of convergence with the liberal order by India depending on the particular characteristics of each case. With regard to the trade regime, India is now the most integrated it has been in modern history. Yet despite rhetorical criticism of protectionism, and support for free trade, India under Modi remains one of the most protected and closed economies in the world. Interestingly, India discovered the benefits of the multilateral trade system just at the moment of history that developed countries realised that it does not serve them well anymore. This led to paradoxical trading of places between the EU and India—while India used to criticise the system in the past and the EU used to promote it, now India seems to be more of a status quo power, while the EU is a more revisionist one. Therefore, while the potential for cooperation between the two in this area is rather low, the potential for disputes is high. In the democracy and human rights regime there is no strong evidence to support any claim that India has changed its position over the last two decades and adjusted to the dominating principles of the liberal order. India traditionally remains sceptical about exporting democracy and about a foreign interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Its approach differs to that of the EU regarding both the purpose of democracy promotion (and whether it can be exported in the first place) and methodology (viz. working with governments or with civil society). Whether Modi would like to use the “democratic card” more strategically in his second term (for instance in positioning India in relation to autocratic China) is yet to be seen. At the same time, a more pragmatic approach to democracy in EU external relations, as

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suggested in the EU Global Strategy, may pave the way for better understanding with India. Though the potential for cooperation on this dimension is rather low, it does not need to be a major problem either. Still, observers must watch out for the looming risk of a clash of two exceptionalisms—or two “normative powers”—together with the worrying trend of worsening democratic standards in India.5 In the non-proliferation order India has made the most remarkable transformation from a challenger of the regime to a credible stakeholder, from pariah nuclear state to responsible nuclear power outside the NPT. Though this integration is not yet fully complete, it has removed one of the key historical obstacles for closer EU–India cooperation. One must acknowledge, however, that India’s transition did not happen because India agreed to give up nuclear weapons and accept inferior status. It was possible only because others understood this was not a realistic option and accepted India into the non-proliferation regime with its special position. This analysis allows the drawing of some more general conclusions and suggestions for the EU. First, as a rational, pragmatic actor, India wants both to defend the current liberal order (when this suits its interests) and to change it (to adjust to its growing major power aspirations). It seems that despite some progress and reintegration with the Western-led system, India is still midway between its two roles of destroyer (challenger) and preserver of liberal international order. It is not unknown to the Hindu mythology, indeed, to be both Shiva and Vishnu at the same time, as represented, for instance, by the god Harihara (half-Shiva, half-Vishnu). As one of the leading Indian diplomats recently observed: “the search for strategic autonomy is a constant theme in Indian foreign policy” (Saran 2018b: 2). This holds true even despite changes introduced by Modi; as a global swing state, it is willing to cooperate and support Brussels on certain issues but will act against EU interests on others. In general New Delhi will seek to reform the existing liberal order to safeguard its national interests. Second, India’s attitude towards the global system is dependent on two crucial factors: its place within the system and its domestic capabilities of playing a bigger international role. As the non-proliferation case study shows, India is more willing to uphold the given regime once it is integrated with it, its position is strengthened and its core national interests are accommodated. Interestingly, researchers reached a similar conclusion regarding the transformation of India’s climate change policy (Mohan 2017; Narlikar 2017); as India’s wealth and capabilities grow, it is willing to take more part in burden-sharing. As one scholar concludes: “Modi’s growth strategy may make India better able to take on new international responsibilities, while his reliance on Indian cultural traditions may make the country more willing to develop new ideas on alternative global public goods, come up with a clear grand strategy, and contribute to the building of a shared vision of global order” (Narlikar 2017: 111).

5 Regarding the Global Strategy and its impact on the relationship between India and the EU see the

chapter of Pietzko in this volume.

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Third, for the EU, India remains a difficult partner within the liberal international order. Even while drifting closer to the West under Modi, India still has certain key national interests that are the opposite of those within the EU. It still strives for the reform of global institutions, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and IMF, where Europeans are overrepresented and may not be willing to give up their privileged positions. It wants to defend the status quo in the WTO including special treatment of developing countries and the development focus of the organisation, which is increasingly different from what the EU seeks. It disagrees with the EU on the policy of active promotion of democracy and human rights and remains sceptical about any revival of the idea of humanitarian interventions or R2P doctrine. India and the EU share the general goals of upholding a rules-based international order and multilateralism, and both support an open and free trade regime. However, while they agree in principle, there are differences in the details. As these differences are often structural—between developed and developing economy and between established and rising power—they may be hard to narrow. Forth, despite the existing differences there is a lot of potential for cooperation between the EU and India at the global level. India is closest to the EU’s position on the world order among other emerging powers like China or Russia. On some aspects—like the promotion of multilateralism and the fight with climate change— the European Union has more common interests with India than with the Trump Administration. In areas where their interests diverge, such as trade, they can still find niches for cooperation (like on reform of Appellate Body at WTO) and they seek a compromise in delicate issues—a compromise that would pay more attention to constraints of the other side. The similarities should enable the two to work together to promote the freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Indian Ocean, and to promote Europe-Asia connectivity, or Sustainable Development Goals—all of which would contribute to a more stable global order. They can jointly fight climate change, nuclear proliferation or terrorism. Through joint initiatives they can contribute more to regional stabilisation in the Middle East, Afghanistan or Myanmar, and play a more active role in salvaging the JCPOA. Finally, they can contribute in partnership with others to shape new norms and build nascent regimes—for example, on climate, maritime security, and cyber-security or space. Joining the Alliance on Multilateralism may be one positive example of cooperation at multilateral level. Finally, the two may also play a crucial role in the reform of global governance. There is a growing recognition by International Relations scholars that the liberal international order must not be simply reinstated, but rather reformed (Colgan and Keohane 2017; Deudney and Ikenberry 2018; Duncombe and Dunne 2018) and the West would need to “actively court and co-opt the wider world of developing democracies” (Ikenberry 2018: 23). It must be noted here, that the EU also recognises that the time for global reform has come. As the EU Global Strategy states, commitment to a rules-based order “translates into an aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system”, and this commitment “must translate in the determination to reform the UN, including the Security Council, and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Resisting change risks triggering the erosion of such

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institutions and the emergence of alternative groupings to the detriment of all EU Member States” (European External Action Service 2016: 39). To conclude, even though the convergence between the EU and India may not be enough to save the international liberal order, it is enough to reform it. While the two are not ideal partners in preserving the global status quo, they are still indispensable for its gradual transformation. They can work together towards a new post-Western order, which would still be “rules-based” but not necessarily ‘liberal’.

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Patryk Kugiel is the Senior Researcher at the Asia-Pacific Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Specialist on South Asia and international development co-operation. His research focuses on India’s and Pakistan’s foreign policies, security situation in South Asia, U.S. and EU policies towards the region; implications of India’s rise on global order as well as development co-operation policy of Poland and the EU. He is an author of a book: India’s Soft Power: New Foreign Policy Strategy, Routledge 2017.

Multilateralism in a Changing Global Order: Prospects for India–EU Cooperation Manasi Singh

1 Introduction Global politics is witnessing profound changes, and as a result, uncertainty looms large over the future of the existing world order. The trade wars, the retreat of the US from the Paris Climate Agreement, from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and from the Human Rights Council, China’s assertiveness, and a rising tide of nationalist tendencies across the globe have put multilateralism and traditional forms of cooperation under strain. The post-1945 institutional architecture anchored in security cooperation, economic liberalisation and democratic solidarity is facing a crisis (Creutz et al. 2019). While global challenges rise unabated in number, scope and intensity, there has been a deadlock over developing a collective response to these ‘pathologies of globalization’ (Rüland 2018: 1). Combating pandemics such as COVID-19 has exacerbated the urgency to manage and address some of the long-neglected but pressing problems that threaten posterity. The crisis has further dented the multilateral architecture with institutions like the World Health Organization (WHO) coming under scrutiny. Rather than putting up a coordinated response, the COVID-19 crisis has intensified US–China rivalry and therefore impeded any collective response through forums like the United Nations (UN) Security Council, G7 or G20. As an organising principle to regulate state interactions, the conventional form of multilateralism stands outmoded, as new forces cut across state boundaries and reconfigure the global landscape. Rapid proliferation of transnational actors has raised questions related to the legitimacy and accountability of formal institutionalised multilateralism. New forms of governance have emerged in the form of international alliances and multi-stakeholder partnerships, catering to diverse functional needs and requiring domain knowledge. This new form of multilateralism can be M. Singh (B) School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_13

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understood as a locus of interactions to transform the existing order (Cox 1992), and as a site of resistance and protest (Acharya 2014). Thus, to reflect these new realities and make the concept relevant to the current context, the framing of a new, more people-centred narrative is required. The benefits that the post-war architecture was intended to usher in have not been distributed evenly, and power politics and geostrategic competition have adversely affected the credibility of multilateral negotiations. The poor handling of the novel coronavirus pandemic has generated further scepticism for the multilateral setup. For it to be able to act as a cushion for citizens across the globe in times of hardship, the system needs to be revitalised; a reformed multilateralism must be centred around civil society and individuals for provision of global public goods. Owing to the changing geopolitical context, the concept needs to evolve and adapt to the demands of a multipolar world. The emerging powers have a crucial role in reshaping the existing multilateral architecture, using it strategically to align their interests and preferences and making the institutions more legitimate. The rule-challengers are contesting the current global governance architecture by pursuing alternative multilateralism; China has already invested in the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. Thus, today there exists a plethora of multilateral platforms and institutions for states to pick and choose from, and with which to forum-shop. India is gradually ascending onto the world stage, aspiring to influence and leadership. In pursuit of a much-needed economic reform agenda, it has embarked on an ambitious project of redesigning its foreign policy, to expand its markets and attract investment. Despite social, institutional and infrastructural constraints, it is leaving no stone unturned to reposition itself in world politics. India, since the 1990s, has adopted a more pragmatic view of international relations; that policy shift is reflected in the post-1990s economic reforms, followed by the 1998 nuclear tests, the signing of strategic partnerships with over a dozen countries, and the leadership role taken on the international stage. India’s resilience in the wake of the global financial crisis consolidated its position in the G20. However, as it integrates more and more into the world economy, the country’s economic management remains vulnerable to volatile capital movement. Therefore, it lies in India’s strong interest to support a rules-based international order and international trade with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and sustainable development at its core. A strengthened global trading system will be much needed to deal with disruptions and dislocations caused by the inevitable post-COVID 19 economic crisis. The changing nature of international trade and commerce, with technology also playing a significant role, makes it imperative to make the process fair and transparent and safeguard against trade protectionism. Europe meanwhile is in a state of flux and the integration project of the EU stands at a crossroads. Dealing with financial crisis, loss of competitiveness and declining demographic assets, the EU is struggling to make itself a visible actor in the international arena. In the minds of Indian leaders, the US offers leadership that can not be easily dismissed, while Europe, caught in its own internal divisions, struggles to find a credible way of projecting its power (Jaffrelot 2006). Events like Brexit and the refugee crisis have fuelled strong anti-EU sentiments and the popularity of conservative parties across Europe. All of this threatens to undermine

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the achievements of decades of economic and political integration, making Europe more inward-looking (Muenchow-Pohl 2012: 4). Therefore, in order to tackle internal challenges and project itself as a relevant player in a polycentric world, the EU has come up with the idea of strategic partnerships to build bridges with different regional poles of political, economic and commercial power (Ferreira-Pereira and Guedes Vieira 2016). In an increasingly contested and connected world, the EU, over the years, has sought to define a more meaningful role for itself. The European Security Strategy (2003) and the EU Global Strategy (2016) attest to that ambition. Recognising the multifarious challenges at large, the EU has invested significantly in augmenting its defense and security capabilities and also intensified its cooperation with other countries and regional bodies to strengthen a rules-based order. In an ever fragile international landscape, the EU wants to be perceived as a ‘trusted, reliable and cooperative power: an indispensable partner’ (European Commission 2019: 16).1 India and Europe share a lot of commonalities, both being diverse constellations of states that are linguistically, culturally and ethnically different. Despite these similarities, because of different geographical and geopolitical priorities, they have so far not been able to transform shared values into convergent interests and priorities, due to a big disconnect in world views, mindsets and practical agendas (Jain 2014a: 9). Divergent foreign policy perspectives have got in the way of strengthening IndiaEU relations. The EU’s focus is on building a rules-based global order anchored in multilateralism and respect for human rights norms. India has had a long tradition of multilateralism but zealously guards its sovereignty and strategic autonomy. It is trying hard to play a leadership role in a precarious regional environment. Despite the rhetoric of their Joint Action Plans, neither India nor the EU has made any significant headway beyond trade and commerce, owing to lack of coherence on both sides with regard to their terms of engagement. Thus, the India–EU Strategic Partnership is often described as ‘lacklustre’, ‘lukewarm’ and ‘reluctant’, and is characterised by ‘mutual neglect’ (Kavalski 2016: 193). However, with the resurgence of Asia and the region being home to some of the fastest growing economies of the world, the EU too has stepped up its engagement with Asia. Countries like China and India are challenging the status quo and shaping the contours of a new world order. Europe, grappling with multiple crises unfolding at home and in the neighbourhood, is therefore keen to augment its engagement in Asia, looking beyond conventional areas of economic cooperation. In its attempt to enhance its political and security profile in the region, the EU, therefore, cannot ignore India’s rise or its strategic role in fast-changing Asia. Similarly, with Brexit creating more fissures in Europe, it is all the more imperative for New Delhi to strengthen strategic partnerships with both Britain and Europe. A multipolar world requires India ‘to build bilateral relationships with all major players’ (Jaishankar 2015). In its quest to diversify its potential partners amidst the uncertainty in the current international order and shifting distribution of power, India has carefully chosen multi-alignment in its foreign policy. Rejuvenating ties against the backdrop of growing proximity between Russia and China, an enduring European liaison has become an urgent 1 For

an in-depth analysis of the EU Global Strategy see Winn and Pietzko in this volume.

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Indian priority (Raja Mohan 2017). ‘Indo-Pacific’ as the new geostrategic construct holds much attention as the theatre of action where economic, security and maritime interests of the world’s major powers are intricately linked. It also holds a potential avenue for India and Europe to align their interests and strengthen the multilateral frameworks for cooperation. Channelling India’s diplomatic efforts to follow a trajectory converging with Europe’s will be useful for making the country’s presence in Eurasia and Asia-Pacific. The chapter thus explores prospects and avenues for India–EU cooperation in an increasingly multipolar world. The global power transition has created a window of opportunity for players like China and Russia to challenge the American hegemony. Therefore, multilateralism has been put to the test amidst a rising tide of geopolitics as new actors (both state and non-state) reconfigure global politics. In such a scenario of competition for power, and contested leadership, any normative consensus on global norms and rules-based order eludes the international community. The EU too, as the most ardent proponent of the idea of multilateralism, faces a fundamental strategic dilemma—whether to defend the multilateral architecture or invest in building up geopolitical muscle to pursue its own strategic self-interest (Farrell 2020). Similarly, India too is reorienting its multilateralism. From leading the non-aligned camp to forming the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) alliance and now embracing the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), India has demonstrated growing pragmatism in terms of reshaping its foreign policy. And in its quest to redefine its role and global presence, it sees Europe as a crucial partner in rearranging the global order (Raja Mohan 2020). The chapter argues that in times of turmoil and uncertainty, both India and the EU can work together to set a normative context for discussion and negotiation on key issues related to global governance. The India–EU Strategic Partnership also needs to be leveraged for advancing multilateralism, reforming global governance and provision of global public goods. The two sides have considerable avenues for engagement on climate change, counterterrorism, connectivity and technology, disaster management and crisis response. The potential of their bilateral relationship therefore needs to be assessed in the light of the changing strategic context and the growing capacities and profiles of the two actors.

2 An Evolving Relationship During the 1960s, India was one of the first countries to set up diplomatic relations with the then European Economic Community (EEC) (MEA 2016). It was also the largest recipient of development aid from the European Community (EC). The bilateral relations focused primarily on economic cooperation and that continued into the 1990s. The EC signed an Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation with India in 1981 and later in 1994, after the EU came into existence, the two sides

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signed the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development.2 The ideological differences during the Cold War with India supporting the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Europe being part of the transatlantic alliance constrained relations. The end of the Cold War however, altered the context of engagement between India and Europe. With the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the EU emerged as a more coherent entity to play a role in the international arena. This was also reflected in its focus shifting onto Asia as the region witnessed growing economic dynamism and offered investment opportunities. The European Commission’s Towards a New Strategy for Asia (1994) sought to forge closer political relations with Asian countries. The objective was to improve European economic presence in the region as well as to pursue the goal of good governance, democracy promotion and respect for human rights. The attention was heavily tilted towards China while India was only mentioned in the context of poverty alleviation (European Commission 1994). In the 1990s, when India embarked on their liberalisation drive and witnessed burgeoning economic advancement, it set a context for a renewed approach to its foreign policy. Despite differences with developed countries over nuclear issues and conditionality criteria attached to development assistance, India started investing in efforts to enhance its diplomatic relations with Europe, and the EU became New Delhi’s most important trading partner (Wagner 2008). India, due to its structural reforms began expanding exports and attracting foreign investment. As a result, movement of skilled professionals also acquired momentum. What is significant is that the rapid economic growth of Southeast Asia caught the attention of both the EU and India. The launch of India’s Look East policy in 1991 coincided with Europe’s focus towards the region (Bava 2010). With rapid advancement in Information Communications Technologies (ICTs) and growing markets, India began to be recognised as a rising power in international politics. Since 2000, India and the EU started holding annual summits and ministerial meetings to intensify talks and consultation processes for increased cooperation and partnerships. The European Security Strategy (ESS), formulated in 2003 in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, emphasised the building of ‘strategic partnerships’ with countries like India, Canada, Japan, Russia and many others. This was seen as imperative to address multifarious global challenges and reinforce the spirit of multilateralism as the underlying principle of global governance. Thus, Europe’s relations with the world which earlier had heavily stressed on the economic aspect, now began to emphasise the security dimension in order to tackle global threats. The ESS identified India as a ‘strategic partner’. The idea was further endorsed at the India–EU Summit in The Hague in 2004. A year later, in 2005, a Joint Action Plan was adopted, and later revised in 2008. This paved the way for deepening dialogue and cooperation in political, economic and cultural spheres. In 2006, India was also invited to become a member of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), highlighting the EU’s recognition of India’s potential role in shaping Asian security architecture. In

2 For

India and the EU’s approach to development cooperation, see the contribution by Tripathi in this volume.

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2007, both sides began negotiations on a Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA). However, since 2009 the relationship has lost momentum owing to a global economic slowdown and also to the Eurozone crisis (Sachdeva 2015). Relations also suffered a setback in 2012 when Italian marines allegedly killed two Indian fishermen off the coast of Kerala. Events like the Arab Spring, the rise of Islamic State (IS), and the refugee influx caused further distraction and took away the focus from the India–Europe bilateral relations. After a four-year impasse, the resumption of the India–EU Summit in 2016 revived the momentum between what were described as ‘natural partners’ (Juncker 2017). Meanwhile, the EU too, in an attempt to overhaul itself, came out with the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016. The document outlines a path for the EU to plug the gap between rhetoric and reality and to adopt a more pragmatic position while engaging with diverse players. The ‘normative actor’ tag has become outmoded as new actors emerge and contest the dominant Eurocentric perspectives with their own world views. The EUGS 2016 re-emphasises a full spectrum approach for addressing some of the pressing security challenges, and attempts to take a more pragmatic approach to balancing its normative agenda with commercial and strategic interests (Singh 2019). Moreover, the dwindling fate of transatlantic relations and the expanding footprint of China in Eurasia creates serious concern for Europe’s economic and security interests. This became a clarion call for the EU to put up a coordinated strategy for Asia, to focus on connectivity and infrastructure development. Consequently, the EU announced its Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia (2018) which emphasises a rules-based, transparent and sustainable connectivity model. This also marked an attempt to step up the EU’s engagement in Asia by deepening economic diplomacy and strengthening cooperative regional orders through bilateral and multilateral partnerships and involving multiple stakeholder groups including government officials, the private sector and civil society (Gaens 2019). The emphasis on ‘sustainable connectivity’ reinforces the EU’s commitment to international norms and standards. In this context, India comes across as an important regional and global partner for shaping new norms related to connectivity projects. There is a growing reckoning in Brussels that India can be a valuable partner in reconfiguring the world order and can forge cooperation on issues like trade, connectivity and climate change.3 The EU’s Global Strategy and Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia were attempts to carve out a new strategic framework for the EU to consolidate its global position and profile through reaching out to new partners and stitching new alliances. In November 2018, the EU came out with a dedicated strategy on India, calling for the intensification of coordination on geostrategic issues. In the current geopolitical context, potential synergies can be developed by India and the EU on common concerns. The post-Brexit EU is desperately looking to find potential new partners and also to reinvigorate existing relations. Indian companies used to look upon the UK as the point of entry to Europe, and, while it makes much sense to continue focusing 3 For

EU–India cooperation in climate policy, see the contributions by Jörgensen and Jayaram in this volume.

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on the India–UK ties owing to their historical nature, India’s strengthening bilateral partnerships with member states like France and Germany could be instrumental in coordinating New Delhi’s ties with Brussels. This is an opportune time for India to make careful strategic moves to facilitate investment and trade flows. India stands at 11th position among the EU’s trading partners and was the 10th largest destination for EU imports in 2019 (Eurostat 2020). Major EU exports to India include engineering goods, gems and jewellery, and chemical and allied products. The primary EU imports include textiles and clothing, chemical and allied products and engineering goods. India was also among the top 10 recipients of Foreign Direct Investment in 2019 (Suneja 2020). The EU and India remain close partners in the G20 context and have developed a regular macroeconomic dialogue to exchange experience on economic policies and structural reforms. Since the EU–India Summit held in Brussels in 2016, the two sides have spearheaded cooperation on areas like climate change, energy cooperation, counterterrorism, trade and commerce, science and technology, cultural linkage, migration, mobility and global affairs (Khandekar 2017). To meet its growing energy needs, India has devoted considerable attention to strengthening the EU–India energy cooperation over the years. The launch of the EU–India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership aims to promote access to clean technologies and undertake collaboration in sectors like smart grids, energy efficiency, offshore wind and solar infrastructure. Similarly, the EU–India Water Partnership launched at the bilateral summit in 2016 has led to close cooperation between the two sides on the Clean Ganga initiative. The India–EU Partnership for Smart and Sustainable urbanisation will support Indian cities with their transport, industry, water and waste management. India’s membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is likely to open up new avenues for investment. Rapid urbanisation and infrastructure development offer plenty of opportunities for the EU and India to engage especially with initiatives like ‘Make in India’ and ‘Smart City’ (Mohan 2016: 9). A Startup Europe India Network initiative was launched in 2016 to tap into opportunities through increased cooperation between companies and investors. Further, the EU–India Cyber Security Dialogue aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation on cyber-security and resilience. The EU is grappling with the Indian federal system and gradually learning from its member states how to engage directly with the state governments. The Agenda for Action, 2020, becomes a case in point which emphasises subnational and business to business linkages (Lakshman 2016). For India, Europe matters in terms of cooperation in crucial sectors like science and technology, energy, environment, trade, infrastructure and urban development, research and innovation. It is a lucrative destination for exports and also a source of funding. The European Investment Bank has provided loans to urban development projects such as Lucknow and Bangalore Metro, and also to clean energy projects (renewable energy such as solar power plants) (European External Action Service 2018). To derive maximum benefit from their bilateral strategic partnership, there is a need for more frequent high-level exchanges and meetings at an official level; greater interaction can deepen engagement through promoting joint understanding of expectations and priorities in defense matters, as well as enabling a practical network

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of technical and procedural exchanges. India and the EU can also streamline their efforts in areas like collective maritime surveillance, joint exercises and training especially with regard to civilian crisis management and interoperability in antipiracy missions, undertaking multinational research and collaboration (Lisbonne de Vergeron 2015).

3 Bottlenecks in Cooperation For India, despite some highs in the bilateral ties especially with regard to boosting economic cooperation, the EU remains a marginal actor in international politics. In the echelons of Indian foreign policy, the EU is perceived as a hesitant security actor on the global stage owing to its reluctance in using military capabilities. While the ‘brand’ EU rather takes pride in projecting its ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002) for promoting certain core values such as multilateralism, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance, India, on the other hand has refashioned its foreign policy to become anchored in an ‘enlightened national interest’ (Haider 2014), conducting more joint military exercises and leveraging economic diplomacy. Therefore, India’s strategic interests with regard to China and West Asia are not in tune with those of Europe (Lisbonne de Vergeron 2006: 7) and the shared objectives talks remain rhetorical with seemingly no concrete actions to follow. This is also because both sides are primarily preoccupied with their respective neighbourhoods, with a lack of coherent strategy, and limitations and complexities from their respective domestic institutions preventing meaningful engagement between the two sides. This is further exacerbated by competition and disunity between EU member states (Schmidt 2015). The bilateral summits have long reiterated shared ideas and commonalities such as democracy and diversity that bind India and Europe into a closer cooperation in a multipolar world. However, what falls short of expectations is the concrete outcomes of this partnership. The documents remain largely vague, which is also attributed to the practical difficulty in formulating and committing to specific goals and deliverables. Facing very different strategic contexts, there seems to be a lack of reciprocity between India and Europe especially beyond trade and economics. India treads carefully on its foreign policy roadmap so as not to be seen as pro-West. It aspires to an enhanced global role but wants to retain some flexibility in matters concerning national interests. The EU on the other hand struggles to define its role, especially in political and security affairs given the gap between its expectations and actual capability (Hill 1993). The national foreign policies of EU member states competing with the Brussels agenda highlight tensions in the search for collective solutions to global challenges. The EU for example, faces several hurdles in articulating a coherent position on Asia. Also, given its cumbersome decision-making process and coordinating individual member states’ priorities, the EU finds it hard to chalk out a concrete action plan with regards to India, and so the Indo-European cooperation gets caught in the EU’s complex matrix of governance with some supra-nationally administered

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portfolios, national prerogatives and large areas covered by different forms of mixed competence (Muenchow-Pohl 2012: 22). The ‘Brusselisation’ of policymaking and governance has caused India to drift towards individual member states like France and Germany as it sounds plausible for New Delhi to engage on a parallel basis with Brussels as well as national governments. Thus, India–EU relations have yet not realised their full potential due to misplaced expectations and perceptions. However, New Delhi needs to make more efforts towards understanding the EU and at the same time Europe needs to get past its stereotypes and clichés. Regional crises like those in Ukraine, Libya, and Syria have further widened the rift between India and Europe. The European and Indian narratives on key issues like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states have been at variance with one another. The EU adds ‘very little value’ to India’s efforts to overcome its principal security challenges (Tharoor 2012). Given the mismatch of security context, concerns and goals, most practical cooperation in terms of surveillance technology, military equipment, intelligence sharing, etc., has been on a bilateral basis (Jain 2014a). Thus, the workings of both India and the European Union are multifaceted and difficult to grasp, and therefore, enhanced bilateral cooperation has to start from acknowledging the political and institutional realities on the ground (Stanzel and Wagner 2015: 111). One of the critical areas where India and the EU have not made any significant headway with regard to enhanced economic cooperation is their bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It remains a distant dream as trade negotiations have been stalled since 2013 due to lack of agreement on an array of issues. The EU calls for lower tariff barriers, increased access to public procurement and stronger protection of intellectual property rights in India (Islam 2016). Indian exports to the European market suffer from stringent requirements like eco-labelling and trademark norms. At the bilateral summit held in October 2017, there was a fresh attempt to restart negotiations but nothing concrete has followed since. Both India and the EU felt the need to revive talks in light of the changing geopolitical context due to developments such as Brexit, American protectionism under the Trump administration and China’s connectivity drive. There remain substantial gaps with regard to movement of professionals, intellectual property rights and duty cuts over certain items. India also wants the EU to recognise it as a data-secure nation. Meanwhile, the EU has inked a massive free trade deal with Japan, bringing together the two industrial heavyweights in an ever-closer partnership (Petroff and Kottasová 2018). It has also started negotiations with other countries such as Australia, New Zealand and the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). On the issue of development cooperation, India and the EU face opposite directions. India is acutely sensitive to the discourse on sovereignty and has therefore refrained from associating with the traditional western donors. It is rather keen to selectively engage with those multilateral frameworks that appear to be more genuinely open to Southern representation and leadership (Mawdsley 2014: 7). There also remains a glaring gap with regards to India and the EU’s respective positions on crucial multilateral issues like global governance, trade liberalisation, humanitarian intervention and climate change. India’s perception of the EU

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is rooted in colonial discourse and Brussels is seen as rather patronising on the human rights issue. The EU was all set to vote in January 2020 on a resolution criticising India’s Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and abrogation of Article 370 that granted special status to Jammu & Kashmir. However, citing this issue as an internal matter, India scored a diplomatic victory by lobbying for the deferment of this vote in light of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Brussels in March 2020 (Sharma 2020). The visit got postponed owing to the COVID-19 pandemic; the crisis, however, has opened up new windows of opportunity for both sides to align their efforts, such as in fields of medical supplies, research and development (R&D), and also in planning for socio-economic recovery. India has also supported the EU resolution on a transparent investigation into the WHO’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic (New Indian Express 2020). The aftershocks of the pandemic will require both India and the EU to come on board to reshape the international discourse around global commons and public goods. There is considerable untapped potential in collaborating on research and building sustainable innovations.

4 Multilateralism in a Changing Global Order: Finding a Common Ground Global order is a dynamic construct and can be subject to contestation and renegotiation and consequently, can adapt and transform itself through a more multifacted and inclusive global governance (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann 2020). While on one hand, the growing significance of regional orders, and rise of non-state governance can be seen as a challenge to a coherent multilateral architecture, on the other hand, it can also be seen as reinforcing the existing paraphernalia of global institutions. The emergence of parallel structures such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) reflects rise of new forces in the global arena, and though their emergence causes institutional cluttering, these new institutions also strengthen the very edifice of multilateralism by bringing increased diversity, inclusivity and legitimacy. What really threatens multilateralism is the rising tide of nationalist populism (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann 2020) in the form of Brexit and America First. However, this also generates the ‘multipolar governance dilemma’, bringing with it larger numbers of players, different sets of interests, preferences and beliefs that together make cooperation more difficult to achieve and sustain (Wade 2011: 353). As emerging powers contribute to the diversity of actors and stakeholders in international politics, it will be interesting to note new constellations, alliances and groupings competing to strike a balance of power. The inexorable shift in the international power structure is quite apparent as many developing economies have witnessed rapid growth and stand in tough competition to the developed block. Constructs like ‘Indopacific’ and ‘Eurasia’ are gaining traction, reflecting the growing significance of Asia as the new centre of gravity, where China has steadily increased its foothold and is

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using its financial leverage to broaden strategic relations. This has propelled India to seek closer strategic ties with Japan and the US and to explore platforms like the Quad and the Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) to balance Chinese ambitions. Calling it a ‘southwestern power’, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar defines India as a perfect blend of the developed and developing world (Jaishankar 2019). With an ever-expanding market and offering an attractive destination for investment, India is pursuing pragmatic multilateralism, reaching out to all possible partners. Unlike previously, India today has the economic clout to negotiate and bargain a win-win situation that is in tune with its national interest as well as with global public good (Raja Mohan 2015). Amidst the growing American ambivalence with regard to the future of a transatlantic partnership, Europe faces uncertainty over its role and influence in global affairs. As the EU grapples with a sluggish economic growth, migration woes and increasing disenchantment with the idea of a European identity, it needs a roadmap for course correction and reasserting itself on the international stage. The EU, known for its soft power diplomacy, now needs to craft a security role for itself especially in the context of the rapidly changing power game in Asia. The Union needs to be more practical and not reticent in becoming more transactional—especially when it confronts the perennial challenge of value addition beyond trade (Jain 2014b). To uphold the liberal international order the EU needs to carefully craft a strategy for engaging with non-Western powers. Currently, much of the discussion focuses on issues concerning trade and security but what is missing are tangible initiatives and concrete commitments on how to reform the multilateral order anchored in democratic values. On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2019, Germany and France launched the ‘Alliance for Multilateralism’, a loose grouping of nations coming together to expand international cooperation on issues such as climate change, etc. This initiative comes at a time when there is growing American scepticism of multilateral institutions and a rising tide of nationalism across the world. India too joined the initiative and supported its resolution to strengthen international organisations like the WHO in anchoring a coordinated response to deal with a crisis like COVID-19. In this context, upholding multilateralism both as a method and a goal becomes all the more imperative (Le Drian 2019). The emerging Sino-American bipolarity offers room for the EU to manoeuvre and influence other states committed to a rules-based order. The continued American reluctance could well lead to a new pattern of future multilateral engagement across policy areas, with the EU and non-Western powers sharing leadership (Gowan and Dworkin 2019). The Asian region, given its geographic, demographic and economic size, is also witnessing some pressing questions related to environment and energy. Moreover, the region also becomes the locus of some of the world’s most critical potential flashpoints such as the South China Sea, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Myanmar. The security threats related to terrorism, transnational crime and insurgency affect a broader set of stakeholders outside the region. Developments in West Asia concern India and the EU alike. Securing the migrant population, and energy needs remain critical interests for India. Similarly, instability in West Asia has resulted in a huge refugee influx, presenting huge economic and sociopolitical challenges to Europe (Saran and

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Gupta 2016: 12). Similarly, China’s assertion in the realm of multilateral economic diplomacy through projects like the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has made the other global players anxious. The EU is cautiously watching China’s moves to intensify its international presence across the world. China’s growing presence through local regional initiatives, such as the 16 + 1 platform,4 a grouping of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) is one such example; Brussels sees it as an attempt to undermine EU unity. The geopolitical implications of China’s mega connectivity drive traversing the Eurasian heartland and vital sea routes pose a serious challenge for Europe and India alike, especially in their respective neighbourhoods. As both actors have stakes in Asia due to common security challenges, the EU could have India on board to craft a meaningful role for itself in engaging beyond the issues of trade and investment in Asia. In this context, India and the EU have an opportunity to steer multilateral discussions in a fair and democratic manner. As the world witnesses growing polarisation, it is imperative for both sides to align their views and positions on critical issues concerning global governance such as pandemics, UN reforms, climate change, rules-based multilateral trading system and new challenges in the field of cyberspace and data protection. To reaffirm its commitment to multilateralism, the EU needs to leverage its strategic partnerships as an innovative policy tool and advance its interests through issue-based engagement. Another element of this strategy is to promote cross-regional cooperation, particularly with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States (OAS), African Union (AU), the League of Arab States and other subregional forums and regional development banks (European Council 2019). In a networked web of players (European Commission 2016), there needs to be an accommodation of alternative approaches and strategies, and the EU through its multilevel governance model has the experience to use it while reorienting multilateralism in a multipolar world.

5 Conclusion Managing the conundrum in this transforming global order will be a protracted task. Who will eventually lead and set the rules of the game, and how the future world will look are questions that elude a definite response, especially as the current crisis of COVID-19 weakens leadership and capacities at a global level. In a densely interconnected world, such crises provide the challenge of a lifetime, that of collectively managing large-scale global problems and investing in social, economic and political resilience to cope with adversity. The global economic dislocations caused by this crisis will be felt for a long time and will invite stricter measures. This presents an opportunity for India to take a leadership role in reviving multilateralism (Saran 2020). The world desperately needs a more coordinated international policy response to deal with future trans-boundary challenges, a more dedicated and organised effort 4 The

16 + 1 became 17 + 1, with Greece joining the group in April 2019.

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towards the exchange of information, sharing of best practices and strengthening multilateral collaboration. As the US gears up to reorient its foreign policy under the new administration and China battles a growing backlash, India must devise a meaningful engagement with partners like the EU to shape the multilateral world order. Europe’s growing interests in geopolitical developments in Asia are guided by the need to safeguard its economic interests. The increasing trade volume with other countries and the lucrative Asian markets necessitate Europe’s political and security engagement with the region. The strategic partnership between India and Europe has largely been lacklustre despite the fact that the EU is India’s biggest trading partner and also a huge market. Europeans complain about difficulty in doing business with India and the latter too prefers to engage on a bilateral basis with European countries. In an increasingly globalised world, there are plenty of avenues for India and the EU to engage, and both sides need to move beyond trade to realise these prospects. The two sides share convergent security interests such as Afghanistan, West Asia and the Indian Ocean. Securing trade routes and other maritime interests, exploring new investment destinations and tapping the rich potential of the blue economy call for a synchronisation of efforts between India and the EU. This requires getting past prevalent misperceptions and stalemates and infusing the existing strategic partnership with new energy to address common challenges. The rapidly changing geopolitical landscape provides a muchneeded context for both India and the EU to leverage the potential of soft power. The two sides can learn a lot from each others’ experiences of managing diversity, and can enhance engagement and synergise their visions for an international order.

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Schmidt, Johannes. D. 2015. India and the European Union. A precarious relationship. Asia Europe Journal 13(4): 443–457. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-015-0430-1. Sharma, Gouri. 2020. Why did European Parliament delay a vote on India’s CAA, Kashmir? Al Jazeera, January 31. Singh, Manasi. 2019. The European Union and Asian security order. Normative aspirations and strategic interests. In Challenges in Europe: Indian perspectives, ed. Gulshan Sachdeva, 127–145. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Stanzel, Angela, and Christian Wagner. 2015. Conclusion: A fresh start for Europe and India. In What does India think?, ed. François Godement, 108–111. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Suneja, Kirtika. 2020. India attracted $49 billion FDI in 2019, among top 10 recipients of overseas investment: UNCTAD. The Economic Times, January 20. Tharoor, Shashi. 2012. Reconsider relations with the European Union. India Today, May 18. Wade, Robert H. 2011. Emerging world order? From multipolarity to multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF. Politics and Society 39 (3): 347–378. https://doi.org/10.1177/003 2329211415503. Wagner, Christian. 2008. The EU and India: A deepening Partnership. In Partnership for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia, ed. Giovanni Grevi and Alvaro de Vasconcelos, 87–103. Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/ files/EUISSFiles/cp109_01.pdf. Accessed 18 June 2020.

Manasi Singh is Assistant Professor at Central University of Gujarat, India. She holds a PhD in European Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and was a Visiting Researcher at ULB, Brussels, Freie University, Berlin, and University of Bonn. She has previously taught International Relations at University of Delhi and has work experience in print journalism. Her research interests include global governance and multilateralism, EU as a global actor, securitydevelopment linkage and India’s foreign policy

Between Competition and Cooperation: The EU Global Strategy as Means to Reinvigorate EU-Indian Cooperation? Neil Winn

1 Introduction The European Union (EU) is a journey in search of a destination, as Andrew Schonfield stated in his Reith Lectures of 1972. As such, the EU is seeking a workable strategy towards the wider world and within Europe. The EU is traditionally seen as a civilian power in international relations, which emphasises economic incentives and soft power values (Duchêne 1972). The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 emphasised good governance, human rights and multilateralism in EU external relations. The tone was expansive and idealistic and clearly understood the EU as a power that would seek to influence the course of world events via its norms, values and good governance aspirations at home and overseas. This approach has been found wanting in terms of impact and results. The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) of 2016 has responded to criticisms of the Union by abandoning the EU’s self-centric approach to external action purely based on normative values. Instead, the EU seeks to blend its traditional normative approach to policy with pragmatism. The internal resilience of extra-European states in international relations and principled pragmatism in EU foreign and security policy are the new watchwords of EU external action. Democracy promotion, good governance and human rights are still important in EU external policies, but they exist within a more pragmatic way of making policy in the EU governance structures. First and foremost, the EU is a great economic power. It possesses massive economic leverage in international relations An earlier version of this chapter was presented to the workshop “In the Light of the EU’s Global Strategy: Joining Forces on the Global Scene?”, 20th–22nd November 2019, Akademie Frankenwarte, Würzburg. The author would like to thank the organisers and participants of the workshop for their incisive comments. All errors or otherwise remain the authors. N. Winn (B) University of Leeds, Leeds, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_14

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and the global economy. In the end, the EUGS (2016) is about Europe’s global reach (Jain and Pandey 2019). In terms of analysing the broader context of EU–India relations, it is necessary to consider EU–India relations in the context of EU strategy in the post-Cold War world. As is stated above, the ESS (2003) was a strategy document that is largely driven by reference to EU normative power (European Council 2003). The ESS represented a first attempt by the EU to generate a post-Cold War security strategy for Europe at a time when Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) were starting to rise in the world order. The ESS emphasised good governance at home and abroad, democracy promotion, Europe as a bastion of human rights and the need for human rights abroad as well as the need to protect minorities. The ESS was a declaratory document by the EU at a time when it was looking to enhance its role in the wider world. It is ambitious, normative in intent and tries to set Europe aside in the world as a particularistic actor that is predicated on multilateralism, diplomacy, economic integration and human rights. This was a document to change the world, that never really gained traction in the wider security environment as it coincided with an era after 2010 of a renewed Russian threat, rising nationalisms in Europe, an America that was behaving in a quasi-unilateral fashion under George Bush Jr. post-9/11 but pre-Trump, as well as the impact of the UK distancing itself from the EU in the years running up to the Brexit vote in 2016. As is also mentioned above, the EUGS 2016 is based around the core ideas of “principled pragmatism”—together with the idea of “resilience”. In a nutshell, it prioritises the need for stable state institutions and structures over concerns of democracy promotion. In the vast literature on European foreign policy the EU is often portrayed as being a reflexive multilateral actor that is sui generis in international relations (Winn and Gänzle 2017). Furthermore, the EU has famously been conceptualised as being an exemplar of civilian power (Duchêne 1972) if not normative power (Manners 2002) derived from soft power characteristics. Indeed, this has also led to criticism that the EU was overly focused on the projection of its values at the expense of material interests. Conversely, there is a burgeoning literature which argues that the EU does not follow its norms through at point of delivery and instead promotes Commission and member state interests that are usually related to economic gain, energy security, securing Europe’s borders and the like. Nevertheless, the EU is publicly committed to its reflexive multilateral strategy and, therefore, should be judged against this yardstick. The EUGS (2016) is an attempt to mainstream more geopolitically focused thinking into EU strategy to work alongside the traditional normative approaches (Conley 2016). To project this new identity the EU came up with the notion of “principled pragmatism” in its foreign policy (Tocci 2016; Winn and Gänzle 2017). In the EU context, “principled pragmatism” is based on the respect of democratic values within EU institutions and its member states as the primary instrument of their international promotion; more flexible partnerships between the EU and other international actors and a renovated multilateralism to allow the EU to reach its full potential on the international scene (Winn and Gänzle 2017). The EUGS also seeks to increase the EU’s strategic autonomy from other international security providers

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such as the United States (US) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (European Union 2016). It further seeks to make the EU a leading player in diplomacy and in managing international security issues both inside and outside Europe (Davis Cross 2016). Nevertheless, a central focus of the EUGS is how international actors impact on European security (Mälksoo 2016). Additionally, the EU aims to become more “pragmatically realist” in its dealings with the outside world rather than being governed solely by liberal internationalist principles (Smith 2016). It is also worth noting that the impact of Brexit is likely to be significant in EU foreign and security policy (Dassù and Menotti 2016), given the UK’s global reach in security, intelligence and defence. In June 2019 the EU marked the third anniversary of the EUGS, adopted as a response both to the increasingly complex, contested and conflict-prone external environment and to internal divisions that threaten the coherence of the EU’s external action (Rabinovych and Reptova 2019). Indeed, as Rabinovych and Reptova report: As opposed to the ESS, the EUGS has been ‘more conscious of the limits, imposed by our own capabilities and by others’ intractability’, and more specific about the EU’s strategic priorities (‘Security and Defence’, ‘Building State and Societal Resilience’, ‘Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises’, ‘Cooperative Regional Orders’, ‘A Rules-Based Governance’ and ‘Public Diplomacy’). (Rabinovych and Reptova 2019: 1)

According to the recent report on the implementation of the EUGS (EEAS 2019), a sharp focus on the EU’s vital interests and strategic priorities, listed above, helped the Union achieve considerable progress in a number of foreign policy domains, ranging from defence to countering external crises (Rabinovych and Reptova 2019). The ESS (2003) focused on attempting to project EU values into the wider world, whereas, “the EUGS and the recent progress report [2019] portray democracy, the rule of law and human rights not as values in themselves but as components of the EU’s peace-, resilience—and multilateralism-building agenda” (Rabinovych and Reptova 2019). The updating report of 2019 identified self-interest and values as working together in tandem. They are not isolated from each other and are mutually exclusive, being inextricably linked. This is the starting point for the present analysis of EU–India relations in the contemporary period. EU policies towards India are governed by a mixture of interests, pragmatism and values. As we will see below, Indian policy, perhaps, seems even more pragmatic/realist when compared to the EU, but this is debatable. The EU’s relationship with India takes place in multiple institutional siloes within the EU and between the EU and India. That makes the EU’s approach to India relatively uncoordinated between different policy areas, national/EU institutions and policy ideas, thereby introducing a relative lack of coherence in EU external action. Additionally, India’s penchant for bilateral relations with individual EU member states also potentially undermines EU actorness in India and the broader coherence of EU–India relations. This is the background to the new EU-India strategy (European Commission 2018a) and point of departure.1 The aim of the new EU strategy on 1 Regarding

the role, function and impact of partnership strategies on EU strategy-making see the contribution by Aspengren/Nordenstam in this volume.

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India is to regularise relations between the EU and India in a more coherent and rational fashion, but as we will see below there are significant obstacles to reaching this objective. The new EU-India strategy is innovative in three ways. First, the EU no longer views India from a solely trade viewpoint. To the EU, India has an important role in the geopolitics of a multipolar Asia and beyond. Second, the new EU-India strategy frames the relationship between the EU and India in terms of geopolitical developments, such as the rise of China and the balance of power in Asia. Third, the new EU-India strategy links European security and prosperity to the relationship with India. The strategy also broadens out the EU foreign and security policy agenda in Asia more generally. This also represents a broadening of the scope of EU foreign and security policy more generally (Mohan 2019).

2 The Road to Strategic Significance for the EU and India? Having said that, some authors contend that the EU and India have aspirations to strategic power beyond their respective neighbourhoods (Kavalski 2016). Others have argued that India has not fully engaged itself with the EU as China has through trade and other avenues of dialogue and influence, implying that the EU–India relationship is historically low-key and predicated on trade (Sachdeva 2014). In key areas of non-economic policymaking the coordination of external policies—such as climate change—between the EU and India is loose and can hardly be described as strategic in nature (Compston and Bailey 2016). Some authors have argued that the EU and India have not traditionally recognised each other as strategic partners (Khandekar 2013). As a corollary to this, there are indications that the EU and India have worked together in strategically important areas such as those in the area of biomass with cooperation in bio-based products such as: food, feed and chemicals (Pant et al. 2019). India and the EU also cooperate significantly in joint science initiatives under the auspices of EU framework research programmes such as FP 6, FP 7 and Horizon 2020 (Must 2007). Rather like the EU, the Indian aspiration to strategic autonomy in the wider world has been pursued mainly through economic means to a great degree by a foreign policy that is predicated on geoeconomics (Ahuja and Kapur 2018).2 This chimes in with the fact that International Relations (IR) scholarship in India has tended to focus on the borders, territory and sovereignty of the Indian state (Naik 2014) and less on international cooperation and partnerships. However, since the 1990s the actual trajectory of Indian engagement with the wider world has been defined by strategic internationalisation predicated on economics to engage more forcefully with the world economy (Sinha 2019). The course of Indian strategic actorness in economic terms is a compromise, on the one hand, between endogenous and exogenous factors in Indian globalisation and, on the other hand, between secular internationalism and a deeply engrained economic nationalism (Mitra 2019). India 2 Regarding

the strategic autonomy of the European Union see Grevi’s contribution in this volume.

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has largely embedded itself into the global economy whilst maintaining high tariffs to enter its internal market from outside. As Mukherji presciently states on Indian globalised embeddedness and associated strategy: First, India’s liberal democracy has embraced globalization and globally influenced institutional change in an embedded liberal way. Second, this is a saga of gradual and largely endogenous change. India is deeply affected by the demonstration effect of global best practices but builds rather more after its own internal consensus. Finally, even though India is not a classic developmental state, the state is an important factor in promoting change. (Mukherji 2019: 1)

Indian foreign policy is informed by the conviction that the future world order will be polycentric, in which multiple powerful actors with different political systems, cultural traditions and interests are interlocked in interdependent relations. India thereby views the outside world as a series of regions (such as that of the EU/Europe) to be engaged with in an embedded and multilateral fashion. India’s priorities are its foreign policy autonomy, socio-economic development and the overcoming of political and economic discrimination in the world order (Chandra 2018: 420). Like the EU, India diffuses a form of normative power in world politics, which emphasises moral leadership and, specifically in the Indian case, leadership aspirations in the wider world (Sullivan 2014). This is also tied up with Indian aspirations in becoming a high-tech, creative and ideas-based economy (Khandwalla 2014), defined by worldleading innovations in technology and intellectual property. India also has a strong realist-pragmatic strain in its strategic culture which filters into Indian grand strategy more broadly (Pant 2013). This chimes in with the EUGS (2016) emphasis on pragmatism in EU external action policies and strategy. Indian foreign policy is also influenced by business interests, but only at the margins of policy (Kumar 2016). This is paradoxical given India’s attachment to embedding itself into the structures of globalisation, which suggests that foreign policy is indeed controlled largely by the Indian political class in the government of the day. Indeed, whilst in favour of trade liberalisation in services abroad, India is also in favour of the protection of agriculture and other industries at home (D’Costa 2009; Hopewell 2018). This is at odds with the EU’s liberalised approach to international trade though multilateralism and perhaps lessens the impact of EU normative power in India (Orbie and Khorana 2015). Then, there are those who question the administrative capacity of Indian foreign policy structures to deliver effective outcomes both politically and economically (Bajpai and Chong 2019). Since the 1990s India has been pursuing a policy of engaging with globalisation and world markets. This is particularly the case under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which emphasises Indian development priorities, multilateral interconnectivities between different world regions, and a soft power which expresses Modi’s version of Indian exceptionalism (Bajpaee 2016). Indeed, Indian exceptionalism projects Indian power into the wider world by presenting the country as being a universal entity in global politics and world order (Wojczewski 2019).3 3 On

the development of India’s view on the liberal world order see Kugiel’s contribution in this volume.

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Others have argued that Prime Minister Modi pursues a Gujurat model of politics that is driven by economics and realpolitik in equal measure (Chaulia 2017). India also makes use of cultural diplomacy to project policy priorities abroad (Isar 2017). Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, India has also positioned itself as an Asia-Pacific power (Singh 2014). Furthermore, India is pursuing a policy of environmental mitigation at home to limit fossil fuel use in energy production, but this still has a long way to go and is linked to India’s need to develop its economy (Mohan and Wehnert 2019). India also projects degrees of soft and military power in South Asia and further afield to propagate the “Modi effect” in the wider world (Hall 2019: 17). Indian normative power is concerned with the projection of great power status in South Asia and further afield (Hall 2017). Nevertheless, another narrative exists on India in the wider world, which reads as follows. India is to an extent still on the sidelines of global governance (West 2018). It is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Asia-Pacific Cooperation Forum (APEC) or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (West 2018). However, India has great economic potential with a young and increasingly educated population; even though the complexity of the economic situation in India is not always fully understood in the West—ranging from absolute rural poverty to world-leading high-tech in Bangalore (West 2018; Ayres 2019). Indian foreign policy is guided by the principle of multi-alignment towards polycentric centres of world power, notably the United States, EU/Europe, Japan, China, Latin America and Australasia. There is a belief in the Indian foreign policy elite that the world is multi-polar, polycentric and that India has a significant global governance role to play in the world order. The continued bogeyman for Indian foreign policy is Pakistan on multiple political, military and strategic levels (Ayres 2019). India is also economically aligned with China in a strategic sense, being a member of the Chineseled Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the BRICS group. Relations between China and India are competitive economically, politically and strategically. New Delhi and Beijing clashed over Bhutan in 2017 and have other border disputes which flare up intermittently, temporarily souring relations. Additionally, New Delhi is running a USD 26 billion trade deficit with Beijing and has issues with market access for Indian goods and services into the Chinese market (West 2018; Ayres 2019). US–India relations are comprehensive and cover trade, security and technology. From an Indian perspective, the Trump administration is overly protectionist and has, for example, hit the Indian steel industry with tariffs in recent times. In security terms, New Delhi is reasonably in line with Washington’s policies on Afghanistan and Pakistan and the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, India expects the USA to support its campaign to become a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, APEC and the OECD (West 2018; Ayres 2019). India wants to be seen to be an innovative global environmental actor to fit in with current global trends in this area. Indeed, there is perhaps no more important an issue than this in the current political environment. Having focused on Indian foreign policy strategies towards the outside world, the analysis will now turn its attention to EU strategy towards India.

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3 The New EU Strategy on India Relations between the EU and India are governed by the EU-India Cooperation Agreement of 1994 covering a wide range of key areas of social, economic, security and political activities in a structured dialogue of regular meetings (European Commission 1994). The EU and India signed a Strategic Partnership in 2004, which was implemented in 2005 and updated in 2008 (EEAS 2017). On 20 November 2018, the EU adopted a Joint Communication that sets out the EU’s vision for a strategy to strengthen cooperation and the partnership with India (European Commission 2018a; EEAS 2018a). The Joint Communication aims to replace the previous EU strategy on India from 2004 with a comprehensive EU-India Strategic Partnership to reflect the growing importance of India to the world economy. Additionally, the new strategy is designed to enhance the EU’s external action in line with the principles of the EUGS (2016). The EU and India committed to a range of cooperation in key areas of activity in the 2018 strategy. The Strategy has a section on security, which emphasises working though the rules-based global order via bilateral and multilateral avenues of communication in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the G20. The document also has a section on modernisation of economies and how the EU aids economic and sustainable development in India. Finally, the document stresses a coordinated approach to EU policy towards India between the EU institutions, EU member states and external policies (European Commission 2018a; EEAS 2018a). The EU-India strategy aims to promote common global agendas on human rights and democracy, data protection, gender equality and women’s empowerment and the inclusion of young people (European Commission 2018a; EEAS 2018a). Nevertheless, human rights regimes in India can only be changed by Indians in the end and not necessarily via EU pressure in trade agreements and so forth (Jain 2017). The EU also speaks of enhancing humanitarian coordination with India and developing joint actions on food security and disaster relief (European Commission 2018a; EEAS 2018a). It further seeks to deepen cooperation in areas related to foreign, security and defence policies to potentially act together vis-à-vis terrorism, cyber security, hybrid threats and maritime security. Crisis management ties, including military-to-military relations, will also be developed (European Commission 2018a; EEAS 2018a). The new EU strategy on India aims to go beyond these areas, though, to include cooperation in sustainable infrastructure development, transport regulatory frameworks, circular economy, environmental protection and in digitalisation will further support India’s ongoing transition to a resource-efficient economy and will increase global connectivity (European Commission 2018a; EEAS 2018a). Indeed, as many experts believe, “As geo-economics is increasingly becoming the norm, EU-Indian relations should go beyond traditional government-to-government and business-tobusiness relationships to that of strategic economic cooperation” (Okano-Heijmans and Sundar 2018: 1). The EU strategy also foresees the EU and India cooperating in areas such as climate change, environment protection, sustainable development,

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ocean governance, and working together on the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement (European Commission 2018a; EEAS 2018a). The EU and India are also committed to work in the areas of trade and investment to support a rules-based global trade regime. The EU also wants reciprocal fair market access and predictable investment conditions in order to enhance trade and investment and unlock the potential of the two economies (European Commission 2018a; EEAS 2018a). EU-India trade in terms of volume amounted to over USD 100 billion in 2018/2019 (European Commission 2019a). In 2018, the EU accounted for 12.9% of total Indian trade, ahead of China (10.9%) and the USA (10.1%). The EU is the leading destination for Indian exports (almost 18% of the total). India is the EU’s 9th largest trading partner, accounting for 2.3% of EU’s total trade in goods in 2018, well behind the USA (16.9%) and China (15.3%). Trade in goods between the EU and India increased by 72% in the last decade. Trade in services between the EU and India increased from EUR 23 billion in 2010 to EUR 29 billion in 2016. India is now the 4th largest service exporter to the EU and the 6th largest destination for EU services exports. The EU’s share in foreign investment inflows to India more than doubled from 8 to 18% in the last decade, making the EU the first foreign investor in India. EU foreign direct investment stocks in India amounted to EUR 73 billion in 2016, which is significant but way below EU foreign investment stocks in China (EUR 178 billion). Some 6,000 EU companies are present in India, providing directly 1.7 million jobs and indirectly 5 million jobs in a broad range of sectors. Indian companies invested over EUR 50 billion in Europe since 2000 (European Commission 2019b). Additionally, the EU would like to foster the reciprocal mobility of students and researchers, and to consolidate networks of innovators and start-ups as well as cooperating on both legal and irregular migration (European Commission 2018a; EEAS 2018a). This is all to be achieved by enhancing connections between the great powers. Indeed, “Connectivity initiatives are the latest geopolitical tool for advancing influence in international relations and diplomacy” (Panda and Okano-Heijmans 2018). A key connectivity issue is how the EU and India will deal with the intrusion of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in their spheres of influence in Europe and South Asia, respectively (Cottey 2019). The EU has also launched a strategy for Asia on global connectivity around EU-Asian issues (EEAS 2018b), which supplements the new EU-India strategy. In terms of defence cooperation between India and the EU, this is mainly in the areas of counterterrorism and industrial cooperation, the latter being underdeveloped and in need of rejuvenation to increase EU defence exports to India. However, the protected nature of the Indian market to EU goods and services—especially in the sensitive national security/defence fields, which are extra-protected from foreign trade liberalisation—is an issue for the potential expansion of EU-India defence and security cooperation (Benaglia and Ungaro 2016). The EU and India are also looking to expand cooperation in cybersecurity, outer space (Aliberti and Prasad 2019), and maritime security (Casarini et al. 2017).

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4 EU–India Relations and the Way Forward: Opportunities and Constraints The EU–India relationship is multifaceted and is developing new connectivities in security, trade, intellectual property, student mobility, industrial policy and a range of other areas of mutual interest. EU foreign and security policy has identified India as a priority region in Asia for trade. The EU-India strategy of 2018 emphasised not only shared global challenges but also the need for sustainable modernisation in India. This is part of the EU’s move towards a more principled pragmatic approach towards the outside world in the EUGS (2016), which evaluates foreign policy issues in a more realist fashion compared to the ESS (2003). The EU strategy on India also emphasises the need for the Indian economy and society to become more resilient and less dependent on aid. Indeed, the Indian state considers itself to be an economy in transition rather than one that is a recipient of aid (Kaltenborn 2019). India has a number of development-related issues that require a solution: (a) energy sustainability is key with the gigawatt capacity of Indian industry rising exponentially each year, which is being offset (as in China) by the rise of renewable energy sources, (b) over 20 cities in India currently face clean water shortages. The EU is helping India to solve the problem of clean water in conjunction with a new Ministry in New Delhi devoted to clean water called Jal Shakti. (c) Indian cities have a problem with pollution, and this is connected to mobility as well as industry. The Ministry of Transport is considering banning petroleum-driven cars and introducing electricpowered vehicles by 2030 as a target to aim for. India and the EU are further developing links in security, particularly maritime security. Cooperation initially concentrated on anti-piracy but has more recently focused on trade as well. Over one-third of all European exports travel through the Indian Ocean, and almost 90% of Indian energy passes through the Indian Ocean. EU expertise in piracy, the rule of law, international institutions and regional security are all sought after by the Indian government in a maritime context (Mohan 2018). As is mentioned above, the EU and India will further develop new links in terms of the interconnectivity of the two regions to improve trade, investment, transport and other related infrastructures (European Commission 2018b). The budget for EU external action is correspondingly being expanded to over EUR 127 by 2026 (European Commission 2018b). In terms of trade, the pursuit of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and India is problematic. The EU seeks assurances on the protection of intellectual property in the Indian market, whereas India is interested in mobility for its scientists, technologists and computer programmers in the EU internal market (Mohan 2018). This is also delicate given the Indian proclivity to protect its markets at home and not open them to wholescale liberalisation. Additionally, the negative experiences of India with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) FTA (Khurana and Nauriyal 2017), has also impacted on Indian thinking on market liberalisation for EU goods in the Indian market. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by European states in India is also significant. As Iwanek states, “Across the April 2000-March 2018 period,

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the United Kingdom remained India’s biggest European source of FDI…British companies invested USD 25.43 billion in India (ranking fourth among all FDI sources and providing 6.75% of India’s total FDI). The other important European sources were: the Netherlands: USD 23.48 billion, 6.23 percent of total FDI; Germany: USD 10.84 billion, 2.88 percent; Cyprus: USD 9.57 billion, 2.54 percent; and France: USD 7.23 billion, 1.65 percent” (Iwanek 2019: 5; Government of India 2018). EU member states’ national trade policies impact on EU priorities (Delreux and Kerremans 2010) in India in trade terms. Post-Brexit there is evidence of more competition between the EU’s member states for market share in India, as well as a relative decline in UK economic activity in the Indian market (von der Burchard 2018). This could create new opportunities for France, Germany and Italy individually to press their economic preferences in India, but this also undermines the prospects for an EU-India FTA (von der Burchard 2018). In the meantime, the EU and India are focusing less on achieving a comprehensive FTA as opposed to projects around security, resilience, climate change and related areas. As Jain and Sachdeva argue, “…in a more volatile world, India is re-engaging Europe with greater vigour and that both sides seek to build and consolidate the strategic partnership [based] on commonalities” (Jain and Sachdeva 2019: 309). However, Howorth maintains that the EU/Europe has little purchase from the outside on emerging powers such as India given a lack of coherent strategy in Europe itself on EU external action and due to a lack of understanding of the EU from outside powers (Howorth 2016). In terms of security cooperation, India and the EU share little in terms of the priorities for their immediate respective regional environments. Indeed, it is worth quoting Joshi at length on this: For Europe, four security challenges predominate: Russian revanchism, Islamist terrorism, the migrant crisis, and the associated problems of civil war and state collapse in the Middle East and North Africa. For India, the environment looks very different. Its two most important security challenges are cross-border terrorism from Pakistan-based militant groups, often sponsored by the Pakistani intelligence services, and the steady growth of China’s economic and military presence along India’s land and maritime borders, including as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. These differing priorities risk pushing Europe and India in different directions. (Joshi 2017a: 271)

However, this does not imply that India and the EU can never share strategic alignment on important issues to both sides such as maritime security, Afghanistan and counterterrorism. Additionally, India is seeking to develop security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood and the EU/Europe could be a useful ally in security, trade and related areas for helping to achieve this—such as development/stabilisation policy in Africa (Lidén 2020). Indian strategic actorness in the wider world is improving all the time and is aided by investment in improved military assets (Joshi 2017b) as well as by the growth of the Indian economy in recent years. However, Indian military doctrine is underdeveloped. There are issues of to be dealt with in New Delhi’s security thinking such as an overconcentration on nuclear doctrine, whilst force projection is underdeveloped. Rivalries between the tri-services also undermine Indian military power, particularly in the crucial area of force projection, which is needed for crisis management and managing security regionally and globally (Rej and Joshi 2018:

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29–31). Indian civil-military relations are also in constant development, changing to meet new demands such as counterterrorism as well as traditional military threats such as Pakistan (Mukherjee 2019). Yet, India is keen to cooperate militarily with key EU member states such as France and Germany to facilitate joint actions in the Indian Ocean and eventually beyond India’s sphere of influence further afield (Dempsey 2019). Indeed, the security posturing of China globally and regionally in Asia, as well as Trumpian nationalism, have driven the EU and India closer together in strategic terms beyond the traditional economic remit of their relationship (Sachdeva 2019). Both sides see the benefit in a rules-based global order through international institutions. This chimes with the EUGS (2016) and the EU’s desire to be a strategic actor globally, as well as with Indian global ambitions to be a norm-setter globally through international institutions (Dutta 2019: 3–4).

5 Conclusion The EUGS (2016) is an attempt by the EU to gain traction in world affairs. The new EU-India Strategy aims to reinvigorate the relationship between the two parties, but also recognises the rising power of India as a global political and economic power (perhaps in the future as a key global military power). From an EU perspective, the relationship with India is a political makeweight in times when the relationship with America is rocky under Trump and when China is on the rise with its Belt and Road initiative in Europe, Central and South Asia. This is part of the broader diet of EU strategic partnership strategies being launched in Asia more generally, with India and China the priority ones for the Union (Park 2019). Within Asian states—including India and China—the EU’s strategic partnerships are seen to be more than just trade and are comprehensive in nature. There is also a perception that after a period of introspection, the EUGS (2016) is an attempt to provide strategic actorness for the EU in its relations with Asia and other regions of the world based on reciprocity and cooperation. However, Asian states rank the EU behind the USA and their nearest neighbours as important strategic actors. Finally, the EU is not always seen in a positive light by Asian states (Lai et al. 2019: 341); the EU professes normative power, but often behaves in a self-interested way. The EU has positioned itself as being a liberalised multilateral trade actor, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, as an ethical and normative power in global politics (Poletti and Sicurelli 2018). The EU relationship with India is, overall, in practice governed more by mutual economic and security reciprocity between the two sides than it is by the pursuit of normative power for its own sake. Pragmatism, trade and security are the order of the day for both sides, even though the EU mainstreams its norms and values through its external policies, including trade. India is interested in maintaining and growing its influence in South Asia and interregionally outside Asia in North America and Europe and in other regions of the world such as ASEAN and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) via structured dialogues, trade agreements and a broad diet of economic/security cooperation. The EU relationship

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with India is no exception in that regard with a higher level of strategic logic on both sides than most bilateral partnerships (Peral and Skhuja 2012). From an Indian perspective, the relationship with Europe is a pragmatic move to develop new and established interconnectivities in economic, security and military policies at the global level as it moves towards Great Power status. The elements of strategic partnership between the EU and India are part of a broader trend in interregional connections between regions such as the EU/Europe and Asia (Pan and Michalski 2019). In the end, the relationship between the two parties is based on these interdependent connectivities, with the prospect of developing associated sunk costs for each side over time predicated on pragmatism and respective values in the wider world (Aspengren and Nordenstam 2019). This tells us much about the EU’s fear of marginalisation in global politics and its gradual shift from norms to pragmatism in its external action. This also tells us much about India’s desire to develop intimate pragmatic relationships with key players in the world to confirm its developing Great Power status as well as to balance China in international politics. The EU recognises India in its wider strategy as a key global player, especially in managing multilateralism in Asia. The EU also seeks to frame its relations with India within the broader geopolitical context of its relationship with China, as the two are inextricably linked from a European perspective. The strategy also broadens the scope of EU foreign policy and external action in relations with India and in Asia more generally. The new EU-India strategy is a recognition that if the EU is to develop its presence and have greater influence in the wider world it needs to develop bilateral and multilateral contacts with key players around the world in a strategic manner. As such, the India strategy of the EU tells as us much about the ambitions of EU foreign policy and the search for autonomy as it does about the relationship between the EU and India in itself. In the final analysis, the EU and India have developed important sectoral connectivities in science, technology, trade and security in the context of their broader relationship in recent years. In the future, the EU and India will need to act in a concerted manner to come up with a coordinated response to Covid-19 and other important areas of policy. This should encompass enhanced cooperation in science, research and development policies as well as in economic cooperation (Astuto 2020). However, there might be areas of policy where pre-Covid-19 cooperation between the EU and India—such as in economic cooperation—might not return to business as usual, given subsequent global competition between the great powers and the challenges this poses to multilateralism (Zuleeg 2020). Indeed, the Covid-19 pandemic has to a degree exposed the EU’s inability to demonstrate sufficient solidarity internally and externally in the heat of the crisis (Verma 2020), as well as India’s vulnerability to the global order, which has influenced New Delhi to become more self-reliant in its external policies (Pant 2020). This means less rather than more global cooperation between the great powers, and in EU-India cooperation, which is a worrying development in a more diffuse global security environment.

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Jain, Rajendra K., and Shreya Pandey. 2019. The EU global strategy and EU-India relations: A Perceptions Study. In Shaping the EU global strategy: Partners and perceptions, ed. Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, 101–126. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Jain, Rajendra K., and Gulshan Sachdeva. 2019. India-EU strategic partnership: A new roadmap. Asia Europe Journal 17 (3): 309–325. Joshi, Shashank. 2017a. The prospects for EU-India security cooperation. European View 16 (2): 271–279. Joshi, Shashank. 2017b. Indian power projection: Ambition, arms and influence. London: Routledge. Kaltenborn, Martin. 2019. The EU-India development partnership: Legal framework and political perspectives. In Open markets, free trade and sustainable development, ed. Mahendra Pal Singh, Wolfram Cremer, and Niraj Kumar, 157–170. Singapore: Springer. Kavalski, Emilian. 2016. The EU–India strategic partnership: Neither very strategic, nor much of a partnership. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29 (1): 192–208. Khandekar, Gauri. 2013. The EU: India strategic partnership: From blind acknowledgement towards recognition. European Foreign Affairs Review 18 (4): 487–509. Khandwalla, Pradip. 2014. Designing a creative and innovative India. The International Journal of Human Resource Management 25 (10): 1417–1433. Khurana, Richa, and D.K. Nauriyal. 2017. ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement: Evaluating trade creation and trade diversion effects. Journal of East-West Business 23 (3): 283–307. Kumar, Rajiv. 2016. Role of business in India’s foreign policy. India Review 15 (1): 98–111. Lai, Suetyi, Martin Holland, and Serena Kelly. 2019. The Emperor’s new clothes? Perceptions of the EU’s strategic partnerships in Asia. Asia Europe Journal 17 (3): 341–360. Lidén, Emil. 2020. Security a shared neighbourhood: The EU and India as partners for security in Africa. Ui Brief 1. Swedish Institute for International Affairs. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui. se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2020/ui-brief-no.-1-2020.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. Mälksoo, Maria. 2016. From the ESS to the EU global strategy: External policy, internal purpose. Contemporary Security Policy 37 (3): 374–388. Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 235–258. Mitra, Subrata K. 2019. Uncertain India? Deepening globalization, unanticipated consequences and the challenge of sustainability. India Review 18 (1): 112–123. Mohan, Aniruddh, and Timon Wehnert. 2019. Is India pulling its weight? India’s nationally determined contribution and future energy plans in global climate policy. Climate Policy 19 (3): 275–282. Mohan, Garima. 2018. Politik vor Handel. Internationale Politik. https://internationalepolitik.de/ de/politik-vor-handel. Accessed 17 September 2020. Mohan, Garima. 2019. Prospects for the new EU strategy on India: Game changer or business as usual? Asie.Visions, No. 108. French Institute of International Relations. https://www.ifri.org/ sites/default/files/atoms/files/mohan_prospect_new_ue_2019.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. Mukherjee, Amit. 2019. The absent dialogue: Politicians, bureaucrats, and the military in India. New York: Oxford University Press. Mukherji, Rahul. 2019. Introduction: Globalization and change in India. India Review 18 (1): 1–7. Must, Ülle. 2007. International collaboration in EU 6th framework programme: The case of India and China. COLLNET Journal of Scientometrics and Information Management 1 (2): 15–19. Naik, Priya. 2014. The case of the “other India” and Indian IR scholarship. Third World Quarterly 35 (8): 1496–1508. Okano-Heijmans, Maaike, and Vishwesh Sundar. 2018. Bridging the gap: Sustainable connectivity in EU-India Relations. Clingandael Policy Brief. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/PB_Bridging_the_gap.pdf. Accessed 4 February 2020. Orbie, Jan, and Sangeeta Khorana. 2015. Normative versus market power Europe? The EU-India trade agreement. Asia Europe Journal 13 (3): 253–264.

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Winn, Neil, and Stefan Gänzle. 2017. Die Globale Strategie für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union – Zentralasien und der Südkaukasus: vom normativen Ansatz zum „prinzipiengeleiteten Pragmatismus”. Integration 40 (4): 308–318. Wojczewski, Thorsten. 2019. Identity and world order in India’s post-Cold War foreign policy discourse. Third World Quarterly 40 (1): 180–198. Zuleeg, Fabian. 2020. Quoted in European External Action Service (EEAS) (2020). Webinar on EU-India cooperation in the post-Covid-19 international environment. https://eeas.europa.eu/del egations/india_ga/78360/Webinar%20on%20EU-India%20cooperation%20in%20the%20postCOVID-19%20international%20environment. Accessed 23 June 2020.

Neil Winn is a senior lecturer in European Studies at the University of Leeds. His work lies at the intersection of international relations and European politics. His research in the past has particularly focused on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and the international relations of Europe in general. He has also published work on EU conflict resolution, EU global strategy, EU security and development policy, and foreign policy analysis. He teaches undergraduate modules in ‚Europe and the World‘, and postgraduate modules in ,European Defence and Security Analysis’.

Policy Recommendations: How to Move Forward?

Global Trends to 2030: A European Perspective on Challenges and Choices for the EU-India Strategic Partnership Stefania Benaglia

1 Introduction The decade of the 2020s will be one of the decision-compression; decisions taken in this period will set the course well beyond 2030 and will have ripple effects which are not easily undone. In the coming years, the way we work, fight, age, communicate, solve problems, travel, trade, exchange information, live in cities, solve crimes, do business, vote, and connect with our loved ones will all change (Gaub 2019a). These are not developments either Europe or India can stop, but they can shape them. Indeed, if they choose not to, others will do it for them. As the COVID-19 pandemic teaches us, no single state can tackle major global challenges alone. As a result, a state’s importance will increasingly depend on its capacity to deploy a variety of mechanisms to influence the policy decisions of other states, rather than simply on the raw capabilities it has at its disposal. The key determinants for this will be the number and quality of bi- and multilateral relationships. In a similar vein, membership of international organisations and alliances will constitute capital, as will connectivity—especially in the form of new technologies (Gaub 2019a). In this context, if the EU-India Strategic Partnership is capable of elevating itself to an active and forward-looking partnership, it could lead the way. The EU and India share an interest in sustaining democracy and a rules-based multilateral trading system and also in maintaining multilateral world order. A heightened EU-India Strategic Partnership is instrumental in achieving global goals, such as effectively tackling climate change, as well as individual goals like the EU’s geopolitical ambition to raise its standing as a global actor and India’s new foreign policy ambitions.

S. Benaglia (B) CEPS, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_15

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The 15th EU-India summit—which was scheduled to take place on 13 March 2020 in Brussels—has been postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. When the summit does take place, a new Agenda for Action 2025 will be adopted.1 This chapter aims at supporting policy- and decision-makers in the run-up to the adoption of the Agenda for Action 2025. Given the overall goals of effectively tackling climate change, raising the profile of the EU as a global actor and of meeting India’s foreign policy ambitions, this contribution identifies areas where the EU-India Strategic Partnership could maximise its impact, aiming at propelling policymakers into action through showing the risks of inaction. This contribution is based on ‘Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe’, a foresight report published by the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) in April 2019. Following a literature review of other EU foresight reports written from 2015 onwards, I chose to apply the methodology used in Gaub’s report focusing on structural trends. That report identifies three categories: mega-trends, catalysts, and game-changers. This contribution consistently applies the global structural trends identified in the ESPAS report to issues that the EU and India can mutually impact. By contextualising global structural trends within the context of the EU and India, priorities are identified for how to move the strategic partnership forward. Finally, based on the actions identified for addressing mega-trends, catalysts, and game-changers, this chapter will develop two scenarios; one of inaction where the EU and India did not manage to elevate the strategic partnership by 2030, and one of increased cooperation between the EU and India by 2030. These scenarios can then be used to set goals on how to prepare for the upcoming decade and design strategies to achieve such goals and therefore actively shape developments.

2 Mega-Trends Mega-trends are those developments already underway and nearly impossible to change over the coming decade. Inevitably, all subsequent possible futures will be framed by these trends. These are irreversible certainties (Gaub 2019a). The megatrends on which the EU-India Strategic Partnership should focus are: Connectivity In 2030 the world will be increasingly connected; not only virtually and digitally, but also physically. Connectivity “acts as a multiplier of human behaviour”; “any human pattern, whether detrimental or beneficial, will be strengthened by connectivity”. “Because humans are connected not only online but also through improved infrastructure, they and the goods they trade will move more than today”. “And as humans travel, so do the diseases they carry, increasing the risk of pandemics”. (Gaub 2019a: 18) 1 Building

on the 2020 Agenda for Action European Council (2016a). This paper has been drafted before the 15th Summit.

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In Asia in particular, physical connectivity will be boosted with high-carbon infrastructures through the impact of the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative. The EU and India could maximise the impact of their strategic partnership by focusing on the implementation of the EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia, which is based on different principles, therefore representing an alternative model (European Commission 2018). This policy framework promotes a sustainable, comprehensive, and rulesbased European approach. In addition to efforts aimed at building connections and mutual understanding through enhanced people-to-people exchanges, the strategy supports the construction of an electricity transmission system, infrastructure data transfers, and community integration in India (Benaglia 2018). The global spread of COVID-19 has proved that enhanced connectivity also increases the risk of pandemics. At the time of writing the world is just entering the initial phase of a pandemic, with most countries imposing lockdowns. A debate is currently ongoing both in the EU as well as in India on the need to reinforce strategic autonomy by diversifying the strategic value chain as both economies face strong dependence on supplies from third countries—notably China. While it is too early to foresee how the pandemic will develop, and what its impact will be, it is clear that connectivity should also include better connection with and sharing of best practices in the public health domain. In the context of an EUIndia Strategic Partnership, this could also translate into enhanced people-to-people connectivity in the health domain, including by establishing joint training, mutual recognition of degrees, and sharing of medical best practice. However, due to the questioning of globalisation and the rethinking of people-topeople connectivity, COVID-19 has transformed connectivity into a game-changer, as political leaders now have unprecedented power to influence and restructure the future of global connectivity. Geopolitics The world will exit the unipolar system and enter one comprised of influence nodes, where “no single state will be able to tackle major global challenges alone”. (Gaub 2019a: 19)

Global burden-sharing between like-minded middle powers, where multilateralism prevails, ensures that the weak will not suffer at the hands of the strong. In other words, if middle powers such as the EU and India join forces, they have a higher degree of success when dealing with larger powers such as the USA and China.2 While multilateralism as a tool needs reforms, it is ever more-needed to boost the resilience of smaller countries against coercion from more influential powers. By strengthening a multipolar power balance, countries are less constrained into a binary scenario, making it easier to make their own choices, safeguard their independence, and exercise their rights. An EU-India Strategic Partnership could maximise its impact by strengthening multilateralism through exploring plurilateral arrangements on issues of common 2 For a discussion on multilateralism, the changing global order, and related prospects for India-EU

cooperation, see Singh’s as well as Bava’s contribution in this volume.

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interest, such as connectivity, climate change, maritime cooperation, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and technology. Cooperation in strengthening the World Trade Organization (WTO), as suggested by HR/VP Borrell (Singh January 27), should also be explored. Climate Change Due to an increase in temperature of 1.5 degrees compared to pre-industrial times, we will incur economic and environmental damage. (Gaub 2019b)

Humanity needs to bend the curve on global emissions, and climate change can only be tackled through a practical multilateral approach. On one hand India is among some 60 countries in the bottom half of the world scale defined as ‘acutely’ vulnerable, the highest of five levels of vulnerability to climate change and environmental degradation. On the other hand, the EU is implementing a new and sustainable industrial policy, the Green Deal. The EU and India share a number of common objectives when it comes to climate change, as outlined by the adopted Joint Statement on Clean Energy and Climate Change, which demonstrates their shared responsibility and determination to take the lead in global efforts to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change. Both sides confirmed their commitments under the Paris Agreement and agreed on cooperation on the ensuing implementation of climate action commitments, green cooling, solar pumping, energy storage, electric mobility, and renewables (European External Action Service 2018a). To ensure that climate change will be effectively addressed, environmental diplomacy will have to become an integral part of diplomatic relations. Given that the EU and India share a common global objective, can they cooperate during international climate negotiations, for example by putting their diplomatic and economic weight together to reach ambitious targets or preparing a meaningful ‘Global Stock take’ under the Paris Agreement?3 Urbanisation Two-thirds of people will live in small- to medium-sized cities of under one or one to five million people respectively – where this is not managed properly, it will lead to crime, pollution and violence. (cf. Gaub 2019a: 12)

Smart and sustainable urbanisation is one of the most successful areas of engagement between the partners, as demonstrated by the recently adopted Joint Action Plan on Urban Development.4 Considering that the current rate of Indian urbanisation is as 3 For EU-India cooperation in climate policy, see the contributions by Jörgensen and Jayaram in this

volume. 4 In September 2019, the EU and India agreed on a Joint Action Plan on Urban Development 2019–

2020, to step up their cooperation in the area of Smart and Sustainable Urbanisation, which will also be supported by additional investments from the European Investment Bank (EIB) (European External Action Service (2019a).

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low as 34% (almost 1 billion people are still living in rural areas), compared to 75% in the EU, such cooperation should be further enhanced. Energy Consumption Energy consumption will increase globally by 1.7% per year—most of this will take place in rising economies, and therefore contribute to even more emissions. (Gaub 2019a: 17)

India is currently home to 17.7% of the world population but is responsible for less than 6% of the global primary energy demand. Lessons from the EU experience could help in rationalising energy pricing in India and in integrating solar and wind energy into the grid, therefore mitigating the impact of increased emissions due to increased energy consumption.

The other mega-trends identified by the ESPAS report are: Demography In 2030, 25.5% of the European population will be over 65 (Gaub 2019a), while India will have the largest working-age population of the world (Gros et al. 2013). Economic Growth China will be the first global economy, and the EU will be the second—but with a purchasing power per head almost four times higher than that of China (Gaub 2019a). India is expected to be the fourth economy behind the USA, and possibly ahead of Japan.5

3 Catalysts Catalysts are trends that, while identifiable, have higher degrees of uncertainty because they move faster than mega-trends. Like their namesakes in chemistry, these trends are agents of change which can accelerate or decelerate other trends. They are uncertain certainties (Gaub 2019a). Priority catalysts for EU–India relations are: Conflict Conflict will become hybrid and highly technological. “The real danger emanates from all those types of attack which we do not immediately recognise as such, be it infiltration, media and political manipulation or cyber-attacks”. (Gaub 2019a: 26)

Increased connectivity also means that cyberspace will be a crucial front in any conflict. The EU-India Strategic Partnership could maximise its impact by increasing cooperation on cybersecurity. In addition to benefiting the partners in the fight against 5 Estimates

concluded pre-COVID-19.

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cybercrime, such increased cooperation would also reduce polarisation from Russia, China, and the USA. Technology As technology leaps forward, machine intelligence will begin to rival human intelligence. “Leadership in technological innovation is now, even more than in the past, a key ingredient in global power projection – if Europe wants to be part of this, it will have to invest more in R&D, education and skill development”. (Gaub 2019a: 28)

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been instrumental in setting a global standard for data protection—so much so, that India has taken inspiration from some of its principles in its proposed new Data Protection Law. Learning from this experience, the EU and India could work towards jointly agreeing on common rules for responsible artificial intelligence (AI), an overall framework for enhanced trust in the digital infrastructure, and meaningful aid to developing countries on how to leverage the outstanding potential of digital transformation (Renda 2020). Moreover, an EU-India joint working group on AI could also be established to work out which of the various other ideas/focal points offer the greatest traction for EUIndia engagement (Price et al. 2019). Developing pioneering technologies, such as 6G and cloud technology, would also limit the dependency on third countries. Migration The lessons from the 2015–2016 migration crisis is clear: action matters. The EU regained control only when it started trying to define the future on its own terms rather than secondguess where the next flow of people would come from. (Gaub 2019a: 30)

By 2030, India’s working-age population will be the largest in the world—about 10% larger than that of China, with a big impact on the labour supply (Gros et al. 2013). At the same time, the EU will continue to have a shortage of skilled labour. While the Indian diaspora is well established in the UK, USA, and Canada, constituting the largest and one of the wealthiest immigrant communities in the world,6 its presence in the EU is limited. The Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM)7 needs to be updated, as it was adopted in 2016 when the UK was still part of the EU (European Council 2016b). The UK was indeed the biggest recipient of the Indian diaspora among the EU member states, hosting about 65%, followed by the Netherlands (about 8%), Italy, and Germany (both around 6%) (International Centre for Migration Policy Development n.d.). As the majority stakeholder is no longer part of the EU, the agreement should therefore be updated to reflect the potential change in prospects and market offers. Moreover, for highly skilled Indian workers, the attraction of moving to the EU could diminish. The 27 EU member states should therefore actively increase their 6 The

Indian diaspora contributes nearly USD 70 billion per year in remittances and billions more in foreign direct investment (FDI), making India the largest recipient of private money transfers. 7 Additional information on CAMM is available via the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2020).

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attractiveness for Indian talents, possibly by easing the process for obtaining a Schengen VISA for skilled Indian workers and their immediate family members. The concept of circular and temporary migrations for both the EU and India should also be further explored. Additionally, it would also help to shift the focus of the European migration narrative towards a more constructive approach geared at attracting global talents and contributing to a boost in the EU economy. International Trade International trade will increase. (cf. Gaub 2019a: 23)

The EU is India’s largest trading partner, accounting for e80 billion worth of trade in goods in 2019 or 11.1% of total Indian trade, on par with the USA and ahead of China (10.7%). The EU is the second-largest destination for Indian exports (over 14% of the total) after the USA, while India is the EU’s 10th largest trading partner, accounting for 1.9% of EU total trade in goods in 2019, well behind the USA (15.2%), China (13.8%), and the UK (12.6%). The EU’s share in foreign investment inflows to India more than doubled from 8 to 18% in the last decade, making the EU the first foreign investor in India. EU foreign direct investment stocks in India amounted to e68 billion in 2018, which is significant but way below EU foreign investment stocks in China (e175 billion) or Brazil (e312 billion). Trade in goods between the EU and India increased by 72% in the last decade, while trade in services between the EU and India increased rapidly from e22.3 billion in 2015 to e29.6 billion in 2018 (European Commission 2020). “Trade in services and data flows will be crucial in the years to come” (Gaub 2019a); this is especially true in the context of EU–India trade relations, taking into account the potential impact of Brexit. The EU-India partnership already benefits from several official coordination channels. However, the reopening of negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement would send a strong signal to the world on Indian readiness to open up its markets. Moreover, because of the broad nature of the latest generation of EU Trade agreements, trade is not just about exporting goods; it is also about setting standards, be it in the domain of labour, environment, or data protection (Gaub 2019a), therefore further deepening the strategic partnership.8 However, trust between the partners needs a boost. A first step towards rebuilding trust could be the establishment of track 1.5 dialogue among trade experts, negotiators, and Think Tankers, to explore potential avenues for bringing the negotiations forward. Food and Water Food and water scarcity will not cause wars themselves but where they appear, they indicate that there is a governance issue. (cf. Gaub 2019a: 25)

8 For an in-depth analysis of India–EU trade relations see Khorana and Köhler-Suzuki in this volume.

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With nearly 70% of water contaminated, India ranks 120th out of 122 countries in the water quality index (NITI Aayog 2018). Water management is also a recurrent issue in Indo-Pakistan and Sino-Indian bilateral relations, underlining the importance of the matter. The Memorandum of Understanding on the India-EU Water Partnership, and its EU implementing initiative, the EU-India Water Partnership (IEWP 2020), are commendable actions addressing some of these challenges—for example by supporting the Clean Ganga programme of the Government of India, and by improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of water management in India. Terrorism Terrorism will continue to be an issue as recruitment has not ceased and ideological motivations remain (cf. Gaub 2019a: 27). The EU-India cooperation on combating terrorism should continue to grow.

4 Game-Changers Taken together, mega-trends and catalysts drive the future in a certain direction. But ultimately, 2030 will depend on the decision humans take in the present. These are the game-changers that will determine the future, and yet they have the lowest degree of certainty (Gaub 2019a: 6). In foresight, a game-changer is, as its name indicates, a decision-making point. This is where human decisions will make the difference and determine the future(s) to come […]. The focus of decision-makers should be those elements of the future they can shape. (Gaub 2019a: 34) The game-changers that the EU-India should focus on are: Saving the Planet If we do not keep temperature increases below 1.5 degrees, we risk heading towards extinction later this century. (cf. Gaub 2019a: 8–9)

The success of the European Green Deal will only be measured by how much of it the EU has been able to implement in its internal market, and its attractiveness for external actors. Only by successfully exporting the model, and hence applying its principles beyond the continent, will the Green Deal be successful. Given the nature and composition of India and its internal economy, the EU-India Strategic Partnership provides an excellent platform to export the Green Deal industrial model, which is also in line with the principles included in the EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia. Positioning Europe in the World Europe can be bold about its vision for humanity (Gaub 2019a: 36). If the EU wants to be an influential player in the poly-nodal world, it will have to change the way it thinks about defence, diplomacy and itself. (cf. Gaub 2019a: 19)

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To raise its standing as a global actor, the EU should be present and active in the most relevant areas of the world.9 With the rise of China, the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly becoming a theatre for displaying the geopolitical order for the years to come. However, the EU’s presence in the region is currently represented mainly through a French presence (counting 1.5 million inhabitants and more than 8,000 soldiers stationed in the region). Strengthening the EU-India Strategic Partnership is instrumental also to strengthening the EU’s position in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU-India Strategic Partnership could also maximise its impact by stepping up the recently established track 1.5 dialogue on maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean (European External Action Service 2019b). In this context, the EU should also consider its potential role and contribution to initiatives promoted by likeminded actors in the region such as the Indian-led Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI) (Chaudhury 2019), a ‘cooperative’ and ‘consultative’ strategic forum of engagement, or the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group (QUAD). The EU could initially view its role in such initiatives as facilitating coordination with other multilateral initiatives. Manage Conflict In both types of conflict, at home or abroad, defence will not be the only tool but will be the main tool. (Gaub 2019a: 37)

Now that the EU has been investing in indigenous capacity building, industrial defence cooperation with strategic partners must also be on the table. India is the biggest arms importer in the world, while the biggest arms supplier is the EU’s geopolitical competitor, Russia. Moreover, Delhi is about to receive its first EU security attaché, with a job description that will expand rapidly when the EU ups its game in the region. The EU could decide to allow Indian companies to participate in European Defence Fund projects. Granting access to the European defence market should be matched by equal access to the Indian defence market, whose procurement rules—despite reform efforts—remain challenging to implement (Benaglia 2019). The new European Commission Directorate-General (DG) for Defence Industry and Space should investigate how to ensure appropriate political support for defence cooperation, including the arms export regime. Moreover, the EU needs to further assert itself as a global hard power and security provider. The strategic partnership could maximise its impact by conducting joint military excises, learning from EU-led joint operations—such as EU NAVFOR Atalanta,10 to which India has also contributed—and building from successful bilateral initiatives such as the Indo-French military cooperation, which has successfully conducted several joint exercises. 9 For

a discussion of Europe’s strategic autonomy, see Giovanni Grevi’s chapter in this volume. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to counter Piracy off the coast of Somalia European External Action Service (2018b). 10 A successful European

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Protect Democracy Once in government, populists are often tempted to hollow out the rule of law and certain basic freedoms (e.g. press), gradually eroding democracy. Strengthening the rule of law will, therefore, protect us from such populist erosion. (Gaub 2019a: 37)

Increasingly large portions of the electorate in democracies are fascinated by the narrative of authoritarian regimes, to the point that some questionable undemocratic practices are also being implemented in consolidated democracies. The EU-India Strategic Partnership could maximise its impact by exchanging best practice in social advances, and by establishing a culture of mutual inspiration and support of democratic values.

The other game-changer identified in the ESPAS report is: Manage New Technologies If the EU does not develop a European approach, China and the US will do it without them. (cf. Gaub 2019a: 28)

When it comes to research and patents for new technologies, China and the United States are in the process of defining the future of not just the digital market—but of the future market altogether, and indeed geopolitics and warfare, too (Gaub 2019a: 35).

5 Scenario Building The following section will develop one scenario of inaction (level of cooperation substantially unchanged) and one scenario of action (increased cooperation). These scenarios are based on the analysis of mega-trends, catalysts, and game-changers from previous sections.

5.1 EU-India Strategic Partnership Unable to Take Action In this scenario, the EU and India did not manage to elevate the strategic partnership by 2030. Climate change has not been effectively challenged. In 2030, global climate negotiations have repeatedly failed, and states have not honoured their commitments, meaning that the temperature has risen over two degrees (Gaub 2019a). The EU, and India, have faced multiple environmental disasters, inflicting heavy economic and human losses. The rise in temperature, combined with water scarcity in southern Europe as well as throughout India, has imposed agriculture transformation and the abandonment of certain crops. Poverty levels

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have risen in both continents, but especially in India, which has been the hardest hit by climate change. India’s economic growth has been hampered by the impact of climate change, and heavy losses in its agricultural sector, which employs almost 50% of its labour force. The EU Green Deal has been abandoned following the massive economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which reshaped priorities for the EU 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). At the same time, Indian efforts to integrate renewable energy into the grid, supported by and large by Chinese investments, have proved inefficient and suboptimal. Unregulated urbanisation, affecting both continents, but India in particular, has led to increased levels of water and air pollution, urban poverty, and higher inequalities. Inequalities have also led to social unrest, especially in Europe, where home-grown terrorism has continued to inflict instability. Negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement have never resumed. As attention from the media and policymakers has focused on this missed opportunity, the achievements of the partnership in other areas have been overshadowed, and trust has been seriously undermined. Inability on the part of the EU to drive growth through exporting products outside the Union, has led to a gradual reduction of R&D investments, and rendered the European Defence industry obsolete. India, for its part, has not proved capable of sensibly reducing its dependency on Russian defence imports. Insufficient progress on cybersecurity cooperation has left democracies vulnerable to cyberattacks, undermining the free will of their citizens, and paving the way for polarising populism. Growing populism in Europe has prevented the migration narrative in Europe from progress in attracting talent from India. Considering the difficulties of obtaining a family-wide Schengen VISA, coupled with the aggressive policy of talent attraction on the part of China, Indian skilled labour has instead moved there, further contributing to global Chinese economic influence through enhancing R&D and patent creations, including in the medical sector. This has led to a gradual erosion of the EU-India Strategic Partnership, which eventually became irrelevant. Unable to impact rulemaking, both the EU and India have been forced to play by the rules imposed by the USA and China. This is the case in a variety of fields, including cybersecurity, digital infrastructure, and technology. Chinese investments in Europe and also in India, have risen significantly, together with Chinese influence—and interference—in both regions. ‘Rule of Law’-based multilateralism has turned into a ‘Might is Right’ power balance. As the voices of the European Union and India are gradually diluted on the international stage, values such as human rights and peaceful resolution of conflict are eroded globally (Gaub 2019a).

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5.2 Increased Effective EU-India Cooperation by 2030 In this scenario, the EU and India DO manage to step up their strategic partnership by 2030. This has contributed to the effective tackling of climate change. In 2030, climate change has been tackled seriously and effectively, largely thanks to the joint efforts of the EU and India during climate negotiations. Mitigating climate change has proved beneficial for the Indian economy too, as it has been confronted with relatively fewer climate emergencies than it would have been without these efforts. Environmental diplomacy has become an integral part of diplomatic relations. Moreover, the EU Green Deal industrial model has been successfully exported and implemented in India, leading to both economic growth and the bending of the carbon emissions curve. To support its economic growth, India is consuming more energy. EU-India business cooperation has successfully enabled the integration of solar and wind energy into the grid, therefore mitigating the increased emissions linked to higher energy consumption. Urbanisation, which has particularly affected India, has been successfully managed through the creation of a sufficient number of medium-sized cities, also thanks to the support and exchange of best practice from European cities and regions. The EU-India Water Partnership has further developed actions to improve water management and infrastructure in India, and the number of people impacted by water scarcity has been sensibly reduced. Agricultural technologies, allowing for the drastic reduction of water usage, developed through cooperation and mutual learning between European and Indian businesses have impacted agricultural sectors favourably. A heightened EU-India Strategic Partnership has also contributed to a higher profile for the EU as a global actor, and the achievement of India’s foreign policy objectives. By stepping up the recently established track 1.5 dialogue on maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean (Pejsova 2019), contributing to the Indian-led IndoPacific Ocean Initiative (Chaudhury 2019), and through its limited participation to the QUAD, the EU has established a credible position as a security actor in the IndoPacific, therefore raising its stand as a global power. This has also been achieved through coordinated European Defence Export support as well as industrial defence cooperation with India. Increased defence cooperation between the partners has also allowed India to differentiate further and develop its capabilities, achieving a more vigorous and independent voice as a global actor. The signing of a Free Trade Agreement unleashed the potential of the strategic partnership. Through coordinated VISA liberalisation, with special emphasis on circular migration, continental Europe increasingly attracts Indian talent, which contributes to boosting both economies, including through patent creation. A well-integrated Indian diaspora in the EU countries has also helped mitigate the attraction of populism. Moreover, building on the increased multilateral approach in tackling pandemics,

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the EU and India established a temporary VISA facilitation system, allowing doctors and health practitioners to spend training periods in the EU/India. The EU Strategy for Connectivity in Asia has been implemented through successful public–private partnerships, paving the way for a new model of EU-Asian business engagement and sustainably boosting Eurasian physical connectivity. Increased cooperation on cybersecurity benefited the partners in the fight against cybercrime, and reduced polarisation from Russia, China, and the USA. The EU and India have agreed on common rules for responsible AI, an overall framework for enhanced trust in the digital infrastructure, and meaningful aid to developing countries regarding how to leverage the outstanding potential of digital transformation, and therefore enhancing the positive impact of digitalisation while mitigating its negative impacts. A multipolar global order based on the rule of law and multilateralism allows for China, the USA, the EU, India, Japan, Russia, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to tackle issues of content peacefully, enabling all voices to be heard. Multilateralism based on the rule of law has reinforced the case for rule-of-law democracies. Democracy based on strong institutions prevails globally. Furthermore, values such as freedom of the press, independent judiciary systems, and respect towards minorities are globally widespread and broadly respected.

6 Conclusions The analysis carried out in this chapter aims to show the necessity of stepping up the EU-India Strategic Partnership, as benefits from increased cooperation vastly outweigh the negative consequences of inaction. While the positive scenario pictures progress on all fronts, the adverse scenario describes a situation of inaction on all fronts. Given that resources are limited, the most likely scenario is probably a combination of action in some areas and inaction in others. The purpose of this chapter is to propel action on issues where losses are the greatest in the case of inaction. To do so, the EU and India should build their scenarios, compare their assessments, and identify shared priorities. By knowing what is at stake in case of failure, policymakers will be keener to work on the open common ground, rather than focusing on differences. This chapter has been drafted while the pandemic was still unfolding in its early stages, and before the 15th Summit. The adopted Roadmap to 2025 (European External Action Service 2020) addresses a number of the issues highlighted in this chapter, setting the relations on the right track to realise the full potential of the strategic partnership. Change is unavoidable. As COVID-19 also proves, there are many developments that neither Europe nor India can stop, but that they can shape. Indeed, if they choose not to, others will do it for them. It is up to the EU and India to decide whether they want to be decision-makers or decision-takers at any level, but only through a strong

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partnership will they become decision-makers in the global picture. The EU and India share an interest in sustaining democracy and a rules-based multilateral trading system and also in maintaining multilateral world order. An enhanced EU-India Strategic Partnership is instrumental in achieving global goals, such as effectively meeting the challenge of climate change, as well as the EU’s geopolitical ambition to raise its standing as a global actor and India’s new foreign policy ambitions. Commonalities between the EU and India are many, while the price for inaction is high. Should differences prevail on commonalities, it will be all to the benefit of the USA and China.

References Benaglia, Stefania. 2018. EU strategy for connectivity in Asia presented at the 12th ASEM Summit. Expert Speak. Observer Researcher Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/eustrategy-for-connectivity-in-asia-presented-at-the-12th-asem-summit-45080/. Accessed 30 May 2020. Benaglia, Stefania. 2019. EU-India: A renewed strategic partnership or business as usual? CEPS in Brief. Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/eu-india-a-renewed-strategicpartnership-or-business-as-usual/. Accessed 15 April 2020. Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. 2019. India’s Indo-Pacific Ocean’s initiative aims maritime security pillar for inclusive region. Economic Times, November 21. European Commission. 2018. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank: Connecting Europe and Asia—Building blocks for an EU Strategy. JOIN (2018) 31 final. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_-_connecting_europe_and_ asia_-_building_blocks_for_an_eu_strategy_2018-09-19.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. European Commission. 2020. Countries and regions: India. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/cou ntries-andregions/countries/india/#:~:text=Trade%20picture&text=The%20EU%20is%20the% 20second,and%20the%20UK%20(12.6%25). Accessed 14 October 2020. European Council. 2016a. EU-India agenda for action 2020. Press Release. https://www.consilium. europa.eu/media/23671/20160330-agenda-action-eu-india.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. European Council. 2016b. Joint declaration on a common agenda on migration and mobility. Press Release. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23674/20160329-joint-declaration-camm.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. European External Action Service. 2018a. EU-India factsheet: A new EU strategy on India. https:// eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-india_factsheet_february_2020.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. European External Action Service. 2018b. EU NAVFOR Atalanta: 10 years of fighting piracy in Somalia. Press Release. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/55058/eunavfor-atalanta-10-years-fighting-piracy-somalia_en. Accessed 15 April 2020. European External Action Service. 2019a. EU India to intensify cooperation on smart and sustainable urbanization. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/67566/eu-indiaintensify-cooperation-smart-and-sustainable-urbanization_hu. Accessed 15 April 2020. European External Action Service. 2019b. EU-India to discuss maritime security in the Indian Ocean region. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india_en/57689/EU-India%20to%20discuss%20mari time%20security%20in%20the%20Indian%20Ocean%20region. Accessed 15 April 2020. European External Action Service. 2020. EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-india_strategic_partnership_a_roadmap_to_ 2025.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2020.

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Gaub, Florence. 2019a. Global trends to 2030: Challenges and choices for Europe. The European strategy and policy analysis system. https://ec.europa.eu/assets/epsc/pages/espas/ESPAS_Report 2019.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. Gaub, Florence. 2019b. Global trends to 2030: Challenges and choices for Europe. Executive Summary. The European Strategy and Policy Analysis System. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/ default/files/EUISSFiles/espas_report2019-summary.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. Gros, Daniel, Cinzia Alcidi, and Arno Behrens. 2013. The global economy in 2030: Trends and strategies for Europe. Centre for European Policy Studies. http://europa.eu/espas/pdf/espas-rep ort-economy.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. IEWP. 2020. The India-EU Water Partnership. https://www.iewp.eu/. Accessed 15 April 2020. International Centre for Migration Policy Development. 2020. India-EU cooperation and dialogue on migration and mobility. https://www.icmpd.org/our-work/capacity-building/regions/silk-rou tes/ongoing-projects/india-eu-cooperation-and-dialogue-on-migration-and-mobility/. Accessed 15 April 2020. NITI Aayog. 2018. Composite water resources management index for Indian States. Conducted by Dalberg Global Development Advisors Pvt. Ltd. http://164.100.94.191/niti/writereaddata/files/ document_publication/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20Research%20Study%20on%20% 20Composite%20Water%20Resources%20Management%20Index%20for%20Indian%20S tates%20conducted%20by%20Dalberg%20Global%20Development%20Advisors%20Pvt.% 20Ltd_New%20Delhi.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. Pejsova, Eva. 2019. The EU as a maritime security provider. EUISS Briefs. EU Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2013%20Mari time_0.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. Price, Gareth, Mihir Sharma, and John-Joseph Wilkins. 2019. Emerging technologies: What areas for EU-India cooperation? EU-India Think Tanks Twinning Initiative. https://euindiathinktanks. com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/0304-Final-summary-EU-India-and-AI-CH-ORF-EUISS_min.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2020. Renda, Andrea. 2020. Europe’s digital independence day. CEPS in Brief. Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/europes-digital-independence-day/. Accessed 15 April 2020. Singh, Rajnish. January 27. The future of EU-India relations. The Parliament Magazine, January 27.

Stefania Benaglia is Associate Researcher at CEPS. She is also a Senior Expert in charge of the Think Tanks Twinning Initiative in the Public Diplomacy and Outreach Project of the European Union Delegation to India, and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Her research focuses on EU Foreign and Security Policy, with specialisation on EU-India relations and more broadly on Asia.

Perception of the EU in India: A ‘Europe House’ Is Missing in European Public Diplomacy Patryk Kugiel

1 Introduction Information deficit, misperceptions and low visibility of the European Union in India are regularly singled out as major impediments to a more meaningful strategic partnership between the two (Jain and Pandey 2010, 2019; Winand 2015a; Sachdeva 2019). Though official bilateral diplomatic relations started as early as 1962, the EU remains to this day a little-known entity in India. Despite constant growth in size, prosperity and political integration over the decades, Indian politicians still value cooperation with individual EU member states (especially the bigger ones), over cooperation with the Union as a whole. As Indian Minister for External Affairs, S. Jaishankar admitted at the Raisina Dialogue conference in Delhi in January 2020, India is ‘under-performing’ in its collective relationship with Europe: ‘We still deal a lot with individual states on a national basis […] but collectively with Europe and also a lot with not so large European nations […] there is enormous scope to grow [for our relationship]’ (Jaishankar 2020). Naturally, the underestimation of the EU by Indian counterparts had a lot to do with its supranational internal nature—complicated decision-making processes, limited competences in areas of security and defence, and lack of coherence on important foreign policy issues. Yet, it may also be true that the low visibility of the EU is a result of insufficient public diplomacy efforts in the past. Despite growing recognition of this challenge and increasing investment in its image buildup, the EU still lacks some of the basic instruments of cultural and public diplomacy used by other nation states. Therefore, though the Indian perception of the EU is mostly shaped by concrete decisions and policies pursued by Brussels bilaterally towards India and also at the global level, there is a lot the EU can do to boost its image by new actions in areas of P. Kugiel (B) Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_16

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information, promotion and cultural cooperation; new European and global contexts create new opportunities and also challenges for EU-India relations and require more robust engagement in the exchange of people, information and ideas.

2 New Bilateral and Global Context Though the 15th EU-India Summit planned for March 2020 was postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak, one can assume that the partnership is entering a new, more vibrant phase. Several regional and global developments have moved the EU to consider India more seriously in recent years: More assertive policies from nondemocratic powers—e.g. Russia and China—and increased fragility of the international system caused Europe to seek like-minded partners. Simultaneously, the election of Donald Trump as the President of the US in 2017 and his subsequent unilateral and transactional policies have undermined the historical transatlantic alliance and made the EU think of itself as the last liberal power interested in the preservation of the rules-based international order. This has naturally increased the value of democratic India—the fifth-largest economy sharing Western values and norms—as an important global partner. Moreover, growing tensions in European relations with China, strengthened the need for a more balanced EU policy towards Asia. In this context the EU took on an exercise to rethink its strategic ties with India. As a result, on 20 November 2018, the European Commission presented its first strategy on India, indicating the need to build ‘a partnership for sustainable modernisation and rules-based global order’ (European Commission 2018a). Once adopted by the Council of the European Union on 10 December 2018, the strategy became an official policy of the EU and its member states, and will presumably remain so for the next 10–15 years. The document aims to strengthen EU cooperation with India on bilateral, regional and global issues, and goes beyond the traditional focus on the economy. It recognises that the EU has for too long prioritised its relations with China, and suggests that ‘a strong partnership with India is a key for a balanced EU policy towards Asia as a whole’ (European Commission 2018a: 1). The document sees India clearly as an emerging global player and a potential likeminded partner in stabilising the liberal international order. The Commission calls India an ‘emerging global power’ and declares it ‘has an interest in India playing a greater role in a multipolar world, which requires a multipolar Asia’ (European Commission 2018a: 2, 11). The European approach is also driven by economic considerations. India’s rapid economic growth (exceeding seven% of gross domestic product (GDP) per year over the last few years), and the liberal economic reforms undertaken by Prime Minister Narendra Modi offer new untapped potential for bilateral commerce and investments. The EU’s trade in goods with India (the world’s fifth-largest economy by nominal GDP) stood at EUR 91.5 billion in 2018, but this was still only 2.3% of total EU external trade and several times less than its trade with China (EUR 604 billion) (European Commission 2019).

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Apart from the strategic and developmental dimensions of the partnership, the strategy seeks more cooperation in the fields of culture, science, education and people-to-people links. It presents a set of tools and practical steps that should be taken if the EU is to deepen engagement with India. Though the strategy has remained on paper thus far—its implementation being delayed mostly due to 2019 elections in India and the EU (Kugiel 2020)—and it may require revision to reflect the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, it nevertheless signals strong European will for a more meaningful global partnership with India. This commitment has been confirmed by the new European leadership that took the helm of the EU in December 2019, as seen in the visit of new High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Josep Borell, to India in January 2020. The fact that the new European Commission wants the EU to become more of a ‘geopolitical’ actor increases its attractiveness for India. This confirms the trend already expressed in the EU Global Strategy 2016, which introduced the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ of the Union. Yet the EU will need to address its perception problem if it wants India to take it more seriously. Though New Delhi initially welcomed the 2018 strategy, and the new Indian government is keen to strengthen partnership with a ‘geopolitical EU’ there remains a need to invest in mutual understanding and knowledge.

3 The Perception Problem of the EU in India The problem of perception is as old as the EU-India relations themselves. As early as 1977 the first joint study commissioned by the European Commission (EC) and Government of India (the so-called Smallman Report), with the purpose of mapping out potential for stronger economic cooperation, observed that the ‘biggest obstacle to increased trade between the EC and India is perhaps mutual ignorance. Most European businessmen know relatively little about the economic conditions in India; their Indian counterparts are equally unaware of the possibilities offered by large areas of EC’ (Winand 2015b: 120).1 Though European-Indian relations have grown in both depth and scope since then, the problem of mutual ignorance has remained. The EU is seen in India today primarily as a regional economic organisation and trade partner. Its competences in the political, strategic and security dimensions are often ignored. Seen mostly as a soft power, it is not considered in the same category as other major powers—the US, Russia or China—and its global role has been regularly underestimated. Therefore, it has hardly been present in Indian political, expert or academic debates, and general monographs on Indian foreign policy written by domestic authors rarely dedicate any attention to the EU. Similarly, it attracts limited attention in Indian media. One study carried out in 2015 found that ‘by way of comparison, the volume of EU coverage was more modest than that found in the other countries’ (these being strategic partners of the EU) (PPMI 2015: 117). Another analysis observed that the EU Institutions are by far less visible in the Indian Press 1 Also

see Winand’s contribution in this volume.

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than EU member states (Jain and Pandey 2019). Indians are more likely to hear about the biggest European countries rather than the EU as a whole. Limited knowledge also fuels misperceptions and misunderstanding. Indian experts point at a big gap between self-perceptions of the European reality and how ‘outsiders’ perceive it (Jain and Pandey 2012: 343). The notion of the EU as normative power is often contested in India (Jain and Pandey 2013) and the distinctive activity of the Union in the field of human rights and promoting democracy is rather a source of irritation than appreciation among Indian partners (Jain 2017).2 The EU has often been seen as ‘arrogant’, ‘preaching’ and ‘inward-looking’. The image problem is not restricted to Indian elites but also pervades general public opinion. One poll from 2015 showed that ‘there was relatively limited recognition of the EU, with the survey respondents ranking the EU below all of the countries used for comparison’ (the US, Russia, China, Japan and Brazil) (PPMI 2015: 110). However, ‘the EU was generally viewed positively (although less so than the US and Japan), and rarely negatively (particularly in comparison with attitudes towards China)’ (PPMI 2015: 11). Approximately two-thirds of sample respondents held mostly positive attitudes towards the EU. However, the study concludes that ‘Indians understand EU Member States better than the EU. People are aware of the EU as a holiday destination but not as a political entity. Simply, EU public diplomacy in India needs to be spruced up’ (PPMI 2015: 132). This reflects the bloc’s low priority in the Indian world view. The prolonged focus on economic cooperation in EU-India relations has also meant that the Union is not seen as one civilisational bloc. Limited cultural cooperation or people-to-people exchanges at supranational level might have contributed to this situation.3 While Indians may know the culture of individual European countries well, they do not perceive the EU as a single cultural area with a common identity and a historical legacy. Hence, though both partners are ‘political unions’ sharing many similarities, including the motto of ‘unity in diversity’, Indians look at the EU, first and foremost, through the prism of its nation states. As a result, India prefers to develop political and strategic cooperation with the main member states (mostly Germany, France and the UK) over the EU as a whole. The perception of the EU as a divided, weak, uninfluential international actor, or even a declining power, has been strengthened in recent years as the Union has faced a series of crises since 2008 (Sachdeva 2019: 2). These have been characterised by financial and economic issues, migration, the rise of populism and nationalism, divisions between Eastern and Western Europe (Sibal 2019), and, most importantly, Brexit. Therefore, recently, positive developments such as the recovery of European economies, new initiatives in closer defence cooperation, and Europe’s growing interest in the security of the Asia-Pacific region have been largely overshadowed by discussion in India on ongoing challenges in Europe. Even though major conferences on international relations in India (like the Rasina Dialogue in New Delhi) have paid

2 See 3 See

Pietzko’s contribution in this volume. more in Lowinger’s contribution in this volume.

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increasing attention to European affairs, it is most often analysed in the context of its struggles with multiple crises and as a source of instability. The withdrawal of the UK will not only reduce the economic and political attractiveness of the EU but will also limit the main information channel through which Indians have been learning about European affairs. Balancing this, however, the fact that the British have often painted the EU in rather grey colours means that Brexit also offers an opportunity to promote a more adequate and positive view of the EU. The fact that the EU’s challenge to improve its image in India is still growing, at a time when the bloc has recognised the growing importance of this potential partner and decided to intensify bilateral dialogue, poses a serious risk to the implementation of EU strategy.

4 EU Public Diplomacy in India Early recognition of the ‘information deficit’ problem led Europeans to call for stronger public diplomacy and information campaigns targeting the Indian audience. As long as there has been no physical representation of the European Economic Communities (EEC) in India, the task of EEC promotion has been the responsibility of the embassies of EU member states, especially the British High Commission. In the 1970s they organised a number of public seminars and issued publications on the European Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) system to explain customs procedures in the EEC, and also their general policies. As early as 1975, information counsellors in the embassies of member states in New Delhi suggested the creation of a European Commission Press and Information Office in Delhi to further improve information on the EEC in India (Winand 2015b: 122). Working from Brussels, EEC officials started organising more promotional and cultural events. In 1977, the EEC financed a festival of European films in India and financed a series—‘Images of Europe’ on recent events in Europe, to be distributed by Indian TV channels. Public diplomacy events also included study visits to Brussels for Indian journalists, public seminars and lectures. Finally, by the late ’70s, the EEC Press and Information Office were established in New Delhi. In June 1983 it was transformed and upgraded into the Delegation of the EEC in New Delhi—twenty years after the Indian Embassy opened in Brussels. Permanent diplomatic EEC representation in the Indian capital took over the task of more regular public diplomacy and cultural cooperation. The EEC also found more external European partners engaged in the promotion of European Communities, and Europe-India cooperation. Among them, one can point to the creation in 1982 of the Council of European Communities (EC) Chambers of Commerce in India. EU public diplomacy gained momentum with the establishment of more regular highlevel contacts in 2000 and the formation of the EU-India Strategic Partnership in 2004 with ever-expanding areas of cooperation. Today the major tasks of EU public diplomacy are handled by the EU Delegation in New Delhi, in particular its small Press and Information Section (three-four people).

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It tries to coordinate the policies of EU Member States in New Delhi, including on public diplomacy and cultural cooperation, to enhance EU visibility and coherence. The heads of missions meet regularly every month and specialist counsellor groups meet regularly, with the Delegation chairing all the meetings (Winand 2015a: 186). There is regular contact between cultural counsellors on cultural matters, and coordination of actions between the culture institutes present in India. The EU Delegation, among other issues, coordinates cooperation between nine EU member state cultural institutes associated through the network of European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC). It also prepares European education fairs, organises public diplomacy events (such as lectures by the EU Ambassador, European Day celebrations, European Climate Diplomacy Day, etc.) and prepares cultural activities such as the recent meeting of European and Indian authors as part of week-long exchanges with three winners of the EU Prize for Literature (EUPL) (Cultural Diplomacy Forum 2019). One of the most successful undertakings is the annual European Union Film Festival (EUFF), which has been run in cooperation with the member states for more than 20 years. In the most recent bid to engage Indian and European opinion leaders during the pandemic-related lockdowns, the Delegation launched a Webinar Series—online seminars to discuss issues of mutual interest (EU Delegation 2020). In addition to its own initiatives, the Delegation coordinates and cooperates with certain ad hoc EU-funded projects outsourced to external operators. There are dozens of such programmes funded under different instruments, but some are specifically within the scope of public diplomacy. These, financed by the Partnership Instrument, aim at enhanced dialogue and mutual understanding between experts, academicians, business people and civil society. In 2015, for instance, the Partnership Instrument funded a three-year project: the EU-India Twinning Initiative, as part of the EU Public Diplomacy and Outreach Project (EUPOP) to India, which brought several research institutions together with dozens of experts from the EU and India to produce highquality, policy-oriented analysis projects in diverse areas of EU-India cooperation.4 Currently, two other projects merit special attention: Business Support to the EUIndia Policy Dialogues Project, and the Policy Dialogue Support Facility. The first one supports the implementation of the 2018 EU Strategy on India with an aim to increase business involvement in strategic areas of bilateral cooperation (such as Environment, Energy, Climate, ICT and Urbanisation), in order to open up relevant and real-time opportunities for EU businesses interested in entering the Indian market.5 Launched in February 2019, the project is led by GFA Consulting Group GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) in consortium with the European Business and Technology Centre (EBTC) (New Delhi, India), implementation partner India and EUROCHAMBRES (Brussels, Belgium), and also implementation partner Europe. The second project ‘is designed to become one of the core mechanisms to facilitate implementation of the EU Strategy on India’ (EuropeAid 2019: 2) and to contribute to strengthening and expanding the EU-India Strategic Partnership and many sectoral 4 See 5 See

more at https://euindiathinktanks.com/. more at https://euindiabusinesssupport.eu/.

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dialogues (EuropeAid 2019: 2). The Facility is to provide expertise for different areas of cooperation, enhance convergences of EU-India policy approaches and support interventions in areas in which targeted actions do not exist. This EUR 2.5 million programme is to start in September 2020 and will work with officials on both sides at different levels, but among the main target groups are Indian and European think-tanks, civil society, academia, the private sector, local governments and the media. As such it can be viewed as a key instrument in European public diplomacy aimed at improving EU perception and mutual understanding. Finally, a mention for the other projects instrumental in promotion of the EU in the fields of business, science and education: In 2008 the EU supported the establishment in New Delhi of the European Business and Technology Centre (EBTC) to promote the EU as a source of modern technologies and to support cooperation between European and Indian companies in four sectors. Although the EU grant ended in 2016, the EBTC continues its operations with the original mission but as an independent, self-sustainable company, coordinated by the EUROCHAMBRES, the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Crucial for the understanding and perception of the EU is European support of cooperation in the higher education sector, through the Horizon 2020 programme and mobility schemes. European Institutions have supported European studies centres at Indian universities. In total, 14 Jean Monnet projects had been realised in India by 2019 (mostly funding Jean Monnet Chairs). In addition, since 2018 the first two Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence for European Union Studies have opened in India with financial support from the EU: at Manipal Academy for Higher Education and at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (EEAS 2019). It is important also to underline that the Indians are the most numerous beneficiaries of the Erasmus Mundus/Erasmus + students’ and researchers’ mobility programme. Since 2004, when the Erasmus Mundus programme opened up for partners outside Europe, it has benefited more than 5000 Indian alumni. In 2019 alone, 450 Indian students have been awarded Erasmus + scholarship and mobility grants (the third biggest group internationally), including 89 for Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree programmes (Venugopalan 2019). Yet despite these initiatives, the EU recognises the problem of how it is perceived in India and seeks new ways to strengthen public diplomacy. That is why the Strategy towards India acknowledged that ‘the EU and India would benefit from enhanced intercultural dialogue and people-to-people exchanges, building upon cultural diversity and multilingualism’, and set a goal of ‘enhancing understanding of the EU in India’ (European Commission 2018a: 8, 11). The document observes that ‘more dynamic EU public diplomacy is needed, with initiatives targeting decision-makers, influencers, opinion shapers, civil society and academic circles’ (European Commission 2018a: 11). It calls for ‘clear EU branding in India, with more targeted public and digital diplomacy initiatives, including by systematically reaching out jointly with EU Member States at national and regional levels’ (European Commission 2018a: 16). The strategy also proposes the establishment of ‘a European Innovation Centre to promote European science, technology and innovation interests in India’ (European Commission 2018a: 6). This last proposal suggests that the EC is willing to

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build on the positive example of EBTC and considers a new institutional setting to promote the EU in new areas.

5 What About Europe House in India? The persisting information deficit, and mushrooming public diplomacy initiatives amid the push for stronger EU-India ties point towards the need for a new strong and permanent European institution in India that could comprehensively coordinate public and cultural EU diplomacy. Actually, an idea of establishing the European cultural institute in New Delhi (here called Europe House, or EU House), in addition to the Cultural Institutes of the EU member states, needs serious consideration. In fact, the EU is the only major power that has no specific setting in India focused on promotion of cultural, scientific or educational cooperation and that could build on its soft power. For instance, the US runs a big American Centre and Library in the very centre of New Delhi, along with five more centres in major Indian cities. Russia has a huge Centre of Science and Culture in New Delhi, together with four smaller ones in other cities. If Europe wants to be considered on a par with other ‘big players’ it may also need to be more present in these areas of cooperation. Actually, the European cultural diplomacy pales even in comparison with that of its own member states. Eight of 27 EU countries have Culture Institutes (CI) in New Delhi, and the biggest of them (for example, Germany, France) have offices in several cities across India (European Parliament 2016). Though these institutes contribute to promotion of joint European culture, and cooperate with each other more often to pursue pan-European projects, their main focus is on their national promotion. As a recent study for the European Parliament has confirmed, their ‘main mission is to represent national interests, and European issues and diplomatic priorities are rarely integrated into the overall strategies and work programmes of each individual CI’ (European Commission 2020: 12). As a result, pan-European themes are promoted only through ad hoc and project-based activities scattered among many different institutions and dependent on collaboration with individual member states. In addition, coordination of cooperation on cultural matters often proves problematic. Actually, observers pointed out much competition from member states, both between themselves and also with the European External Action Service (EEAS), undermining a coherent cultural and public diplomacy (Winand 2015a: 196) and making member states more visible than the collective EU. This suggests that if the EU wants to promote its image in India more effectively, it would need to do this itself. Establishing its own Cultural Institute would be an important step towards improving the EU’s visibility in India and bridging the gap in people-to-people contacts. Such an institution could deal with the overall promotion of the EU and deepen cooperation in the fields of culture, the creative industries, science and education. It could also financially support the exchange of artists, scientists, students, others in civil society, and so on.

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Unlike national institutes of culture, a Europe House would focus on showing the richness and diversity of the pan-European cultural heritage, and on developing the European dimension of cooperation. It could promote dialogue between European and Indian civilisations, highlighting European values, technological and social achievements. It could also help to disseminate knowledge about national culture of individual member states, provided the pan-European dimension is maintained. Importantly, the EU institution should have a double task, unlike traditional cultural centres. In addition to cultural promotion, Europe House should also serve as a source of information on the EU itself, about its history, functioning, regional integration and political and economic role in the world. This would also be a primary source of knowledge for Indian citizens about relations between the EU and India, and programmes and funding opportunities for cooperation in various areas. It could serve a role similar to that of Europe Direct Information Points, which are part of a network across member states designed to answer all citizens’ needs concerning the European Union.

6 Will It Fly? Setting up an additional Europe House in New Delhi, when the EU has no cultural institutions in its current toolbox and when cultural diplomacy is seen as the prerogative of member states, will not be an easy task and will require difficult consultations with member states. Yet, the growing European ambitions to act as a major power means it also needs more active public and cultural diplomacy in countries like India. This may encourage many to empower the EU with a new instrument. A Europe House in Delhi could be considered as a pilot project which can then be replicated in other countries around the world. The structure, financing, management and aims of the new European institution in New Delhi would need to be agreed together by the European Commission and the member states. It should work in close cooperation with member states’ national institutes and embassies, which could participate in financing and planning activities. It must be seen as an additional and complementary mechanism supplementing the cultural cooperation of member states, with a more pan-European focus. In the creation and management of the new body, one could draw from different models already tested in India like EBTC or the European Union Film Festival. Funds to finance permanent operations could be redirected from the EU budget as the Union reduces development assistance to India. Most importantly, the idea of a new EU cultural and information institute in Delhi fits well with recent European trends of prioritising culture in foreign relations and taking a more strategic approach to cultural cooperation with third countries. On 8 June 2016, Frederica Mogherini, the EU high representative and vice-president, and Commissioner Tibor Navracsics put forward a proposal to develop an EU strategy of international cultural relations, in order to put cultural cooperation at the centre of the EU’s diplomatic relations with countries around the world (European Commission

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2016). Interestingly, the document has already proposed the establishment of European Culture Houses in partner countries (European Commission 2016).6 Moreover, the European Commission called for enhanced cooperation with member states’ Cultural Institutes to nurture pan-European cooperation and increase the visibility and impact of joint actions. In February 2016, the Cultural Diplomacy Platform was launched (funded by the Partnership Instrument and operated by a consortium of member states’ Cultural Institutes and other partners) to foster the EU’s international cultural relations.7 On 22 May 2018, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a New European Agenda for Culture. Among its goals was the intention to ‘strengthen international cultural relations, by making the most of the potential of culture to foster sustainable development and peace’ (European Commission 2018b). Finally, on 8 April 2019, the European Council approved conclusions on the strategic approach to cultural relations (Council of the European Union 2019). These conclusions indicate the need to better include this dimension in the scope of foreign policy instruments and in closer cooperation between member states and EU institutions. The European Council also noted preparation of a pilot initiative to establish European Houses of Culture. The pilot project of European Houses of Culture was launched in January 2019 by EUNIC Global—part of the Association of European institutes of culture. In June 2019, the first ten project ideas (out of 44 applications) were selected and on 17 January 2020, the international jury approved five initiatives to be implemented between March and October 2020 with a budget of EUR 50,000 each. The overall budget of the project is EUR 833,419 over two years, and it is co-funded by the European Commission (90%) and EUNIC Global (10%). This pilot project is designed to test new ways of working together among EU Delegations, EU National Institutes of Culture and the local cultural sector, to help deliver the European Union’s strategy on cultural relations (European Commission 2020). None of the proposed actions is to be implemented in India. Though the initiative must be appreciated, its name may be misleading. Europe House, in this case, does not mean any EU permanent institution modelled around the national institutes of culture. Due to its limited budget, geographic scope and limited time-framework, it cannot be seen as an important public or cultural diplomacy tool of the EU. In fact, there has only been one Europe House in the world—understood as a physical space with a focus on EU cultural cooperation with third country—in Auckland, New Zealand. The facilities are at the Auckland University of Technology (AUT) city campus and provide a venue for visiting EU Diplomats, officials, cultural and business associations, as well as academics, to present outreach seminars, hold roundtable discussions, meetings and press conferences. The space is jointly managed by the 6 These

would be: “…based on a partnership between the EU and the partner country in question and would enable cultural institutes and other stakeholders to come together and provide services to the local population, engage in joint projects and offer scholarships, cultural and educational exchanges” (European Commission 2016: 13–14). 7 See more about CDP at https://www.cultureinexternalrelations.eu/.

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EUCN and the European Union Delegation to New Zealand. Yet, it seems it is not very active as its Facebook page features latest news from October 2018 and has 234 followers and 225 likes as of June 2020. Though it might be useful to learn from these unique experiences in Auckland, the Europe House in New Delhi must be part of a broader reform of the EU diplomacy instruments.

7 Conclusions and the Way Forward EU-India relations may be entering a new period of more intense and broad strategic cooperation. Yet, in order to achieve the objectives of the EU strategy towards India, it is important to address the problem of information deficit and misunderstandings about the EU among India’s elites and society at large. While increasing the visibility and appreciation of the EU’s international role will depend mainly on concrete decisions and actions undertaken at the political level (such as leadership meetings and project support in India), intensified public diplomacy efforts and the promotion of the EU as India’s partner may play an important supporting role. A Europe House could be a valuable tool to fill the existing gap in the system of disseminating knowledge about the EU in India. With all information on the EU and its policies in one place, located in the heart of New Delhi and easily accessible to the local population, the centre would become an important cultural and public diplomacy tool of the EU. As an established institution with a physical presence in India, a stable budget and dedicated staff, it would be an opportunity to break from the ad hoc and project-based model of European public diplomacy and prepare a long-term and more systemic approach to promote the EU and foster cultural cooperation within India. The activities of Europe House should go beyond those of national Institutes of Culture and the proposed European Houses of Culture. Europe House should also serve as an information point about the European Union, its functioning, its international role and its position as a partner of India. Over time, it would be worth considering expanding its reach to other cities and regions in India. This would allow information about the EU to reach Indians living in different parts of this vast country. If this pilot project proved successful in India, similar centres could be opened in other strategic partner countries. Ultimately, Europe House could become a new instrument of EU external policy, supporting the bloc’s role as a global player. The creation of this institution is in the interests of all member states willing to strengthen relations with India and build the image of the EU as a unified global power. It would complement the vision of the EU as a political union and economic bloc with the strong cultural component of the EU—as one European civilisation with a shared pan-European identity. As such, the EU would be a more appropriate partner for dialogue with Indian civilisation. It must be seen by member states as additional and supplementary to cultural cooperation at a national level, offering new funding opportunities and strengthening the European perspective in India.

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References Council of the European Union. 2019. Council conclusions on an EU strategic approach to international cultural relations and a framework for action. Press Release. https://data.consilium.eur opa.eu/doc/document/ST-7749-2019-INIT/en/pdf. Accessed 3 July 2020. Cultural Diplomacy Forum. 2019. EU-India cultural relations: Wide European literature in India. https://www.cultureinexternalrelations.eu/2019/09/12/eu-india-cultural-relations-wideeuropean-literature-in-india/. Accessed 3 July 2020. EEAS. 2019. Launch of the Jean Monnet Center of excellence in European studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University: Ambassador Kozlowski’s opening remarks. https://eeas.europa.eu/delega tions/india/59456/launch-jean-monnet-center-excellence-european-studies-jawaharlal-nehruuniversity-ambassador_en. Accessed 3 July 2020. EU Delegation. 2020. Official website of EU delegation in New Delhi. https://eeas.europa.eu/del egations/india_en. Accessed 20 June 2020. EuropeAid. 2019. Belgium-Brussels: Policy dialogue support facility India, 2019/S 237-580469, New Delhi, India, Annex II: Terms of Reference. EuropeAid/140586/DH/SER/IN. https://ted.eur opa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:580469-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML. Accessed 3 July 2020. European Commission. 2016. Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, JOIN(2016) final. https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0029&from=EN. Accessed 3 July 2020. European Commission. 2018a. Elements for an EU strategy on India. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-hom epage/54057/joint-communication-elements-eu-strategy-india_en. Accessed 3 July 2020. European Commission. 2018b. New European agenda for culture. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region, COM(2018) 267 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0267& from=EN. Accessed 3 July 2020. European Commission. 2019. DG trade statistical guide. July. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2013/may/tradoc_151348.pdf. Accessed 3 July 2020. European Commission. 2020. European houses of culture: 5 pilot projects selected. https://ec. europa.eu/culture/news/european-houses-culture-5-pilot-projects-selected_en. Accessed 3 July 2020. European Parliament. 2016. Research for cult committee—European cultural institutes abroad. Study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education. Executive Summary. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/563418/IPOL_S TU(2016)563418(SUM01)_EN.pdf. Accessed 3 July 2020. Jain, Rajendra K. 2017. India, the European Union and Human Rights. India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 73 (4): 411–429. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928417731640. Jain, Rajendra K., and Shreya Pandey. 2010. The European Union in the eyes of India. Asia Europe Journal 8 (2): 193–209. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-010-0258-7. Jain, Rajendra K., and Shreya Pandey. 2012. The public attitudes and images of the European Union in India. India Quarterly 68 (4): 331–343. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928412467247. Jain, Rajendra K., and Shreya Pandey. 2013. Indian elites and the EU as a normative power. Baltic Journal of European Studies 3 (3): 105–126. https://doi.org/10.2478/bjes-2013-0023. Jain, Rajendra K., and Shreya Pandey. 2019. The EU global strategy and EU–India relations: A perceptions study. In Shaping the EU Global strategy: The European Union in International Affairs, ed. Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, 101–126. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Jaishankar, Subramaniam. 2020. External affairs minister in conversation at Raisina dialogue 2020: The India way. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, January 16. https://mea.gov.in/interviews.htm?dtl/32305/External_Affairs_Minister_in_Convers ation_at_Raisina_Dialogue_2020__The_India_Way. Accessed 16 September 2020.

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Kugiel, Patryk. 2020. Beyond trade: Prospects and challenges of the EU-India global strategic partnership. Bulletin PISM 67(1497). Polish Institute of International Affairs. https://pism.pl/ publications/Beyond_Trade_Prospects_and_Challenges__of_the_EUIndia_Global_Strategic_ Partnership. Accessed 29 June 2020. PPMI. 2015. Analysis of the perception of the EU and EU‘s policies abroad. Final Report. Public Policy and Management Institute. https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/sites/fpi/files/eu_perceptions_study_ final_report.pdf. Accessed 9 June 2020. Sachdeva, Gulshan. 2019. Challenges in Europe: Indian perspectives. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Sibal, Kanwal. 2019. India and the European Union: Perceptions and misperceptions. In Changing Indian images of the European Union: Perception and Misperception, ed. Rajendra K. Jain, 61–79. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Venugopalan, Anjali. 2019. Number of Indian students, varsities among recipients of EU-funds this year shoots up. The Economic Times, August 2. Winand, Pascaline. 2015a. EU-India current perceptions and implementation challenges. In The European Union and India: Rhetoric or meaningful partnership, ed. Pascaline Winand, Marika Vicziany, and Poonam Datar, 166–202. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Winand, Pascaline. 2015b. The arrival of Indian pragmatism. In The European Union and India: Rhetoric or meaningful partnership? ed. Pascaline Winand, Marika Vicziany, and Poonam Datar, 111–140. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Patryk Kugiel is a Senior Researcher at the Asia-Pacific Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, a specialist on South Asia and international development co-operation. His research focuses on India’s and Pakistan’s foreign policies; security situation in South Asia; U.S. and EU policies towards the region; implications of India’s rise on global order as well as development co-operation policy of Poland and the EU. He is the author of the book: India’s Soft Power: New Foreign Policy Strategy, Routledge 2017.

“The EU Should…!”; “India Needs…!”: Parapublic Underpinnings to Realise Global IR in Policy Analysis of EU–India Relations Timo Lowinger

1 Introduction “The EU should…!”; “India needs…!”; “the EU-India Strategic Partnership should…!”;—numerous policy recommendations are addressed to both India and the EU on a regular basis by policy-oriented academia and think tanks, with a view to improving and revitalising EU–India relations. The proposals are sometimes very precise and concrete, but from time to time extremely general and fundamental in nature, as the following examples prove: the European Union “should revitalise its strategic partnerships as the centrepiece of a new Asia strategy” (Cameron 2017: 8), or India should “[…] undertake certain structural reforms [and] cooperation would greatly benefit” (Benaglia and Ungaro 2016: 14). Godement (2015: 18) urges the EU to “[…] pursue the EU-India free trade agreement (FTA) as a priority”, while Sachdeva (2015) demands: “EU-India ties should not be held hostage to developments at BTIA level”. However demands are not only articulated in relation to the general relationship, but are also expressed at policy level: For example Pawlak (2016: 11) declares that both actors that they “should invest in network diplomacy” to cooperate on cyber issues, and Aliberti (2018: 310) maintains that “both partners need to develop a coherent strategy concerning their future space relations that can contribute to mutual political, economic and security interests”. Not only do policy analysts have a direct normative impetus to improve EU–India relations, but indirect policy recommendations can also be identified in scientific analyses. All of these want to “cut[.] the Gordian knot” (Frontini and Mocker 2016) of the EU–India Strategic Partnership in their own way, sometimes with very superficial or general hints and often with concrete suggestions.

T. Lowinger (B) University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_17

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The so-called argumentative turn of policy research reminds us that these policy analyses in general are neither “value-free” (Fischer and Gottweis 2012: 2) nor a pure “technical project”—policy analysts construct realities through their analyses. Thus, it is important to “understand just what policy analysts and planners do, how language and modes of representation both enable and constrain their work, how their practical rhetoric depicts and selects, describes and characterizes, includes and excludes” (Fischer and Forester 1993b: 2). This is equally true for the analysis around the EU–India relations, especially because the strategic partnership is characterised by a “bewildering cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity” (Muenchow-Pohl 2012: 1) and on the other hand by an “information deficit, lack of knowledge and misunderstanding” (Kugiel 2019: 2). The policy analysts and scientists themselves are not detached from these processes; on the contrary, they influence the European and Indian political practitioners and the public with their constructions of a possible future of the relations. Because the scientists’ impact carries such weight, it is necessary to engage with the fundamental research principles that underlie the production of policy analysis. How can one ensure that both actors are given equal consideration in research and that Indian and European ideas are placed on an equal footing within the joint analysis of EU–India relations? How can we prevent Eurocentric policy-oriented research and policy recommendations, especially against the background of the higher visibility of European think tanks as compared to the Indian side? In order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to raise the awareness of these challenges in the research of EU–India relations. The assumption of this chapter is that an examination of supposedly abstract theoretical debates using the disciplines of International Relations (IR) and policy research helps to critically reflect on the role of policy analysts and to identify the challenges that must be considered in order to advance research on the relationship between the two largest democracies in the world (Sect. 2). On the basis of the critical hints identified in the theoretical discussions, a possible way forward will be proposed (Sect. 3). By adapting the so-called Global International Relations (Global IR) paradigm, basic principles can be derived for the research of EU–India relations (Sect. 3.1). Based on these principles, a practical proposal will be developed for putting the scientific cooperation regarding EU–India relations in general, and the cooperation on policy-oriented research in particular, on a broader basis: The idea of parapublic underpinnings (Krotz 2007) can help to substantially improve relations between India and the EU by constructing a “social purpose” which establishes the basis for research on an equal footing (Sects. 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4).

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2 What Policy Analysts Can Learn from Current Theory Debates Very prominently, Nye (2009) criticised political science, especially the International Relations community, for remaining in the ivory tower of science. IR theory, particularly, is judged by him to be remote from policy relevance: “[…] new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers” (Nye 2009). Maliniak et al. (2020: 1) similarly summarises the importance of international relations for everyday politics: “In recent years, commentators have bemoaned the uselessness of academic IR to policymakers and practitioners”. This corresponds with the core of the so-called “Theorist-Practitioner Gap” (cf. Lepgold 1998: 44), discussed within IR for many years now. This perpetual discussion is gaining momentum once more: Some see a “Tyranny of Policy Relevance” (Jones 2009), whereas others predict “the end of the Great Debates” (Lake 2013) on fundamental epistemological and ontological questions, and even wonder about “The end of International Relations Theory”.1 This debate also seems to apply to EU–India relations. In fact, in research on the EU-India partnership, a certain lack of theory can be observed.2 The bilateral relationship is primarily addressed through policy or purely empirical analyses, while substantially theory-based studies are few and far between. Furthermore, analyses with a meta-theoretical approach are rare.3 It seems that especially in such a policy-oriented field as the Strategic Partnership between the EU and India, theories play a marginal role in understanding and explaining the relationship processes. (Meta)-Theoretical debates with a perceived “inward-looking obsession” (Eriksson and Giacomello 2006: 223) are of no importance in the empirical investigation of this field of research. Therein lies lost potential. Despite the criticism and the discussions taking place, a mutual exchange can, as argued here below, be very profitable for both sides. It should not be the goal to develop theories that are completely usable in practice and to take “[t]he route to policy-relevant theory” (Lepgold 1998: 44). Rather metatheoretical and initially abstract debates can also provide insights for practitioners and policy recommendations. They set the foundations for research. Such theoretical debates can help to question how research can be done and how empirical results can and should be obtained. It is only through theoretical deliberation that one can question the usual empirical approach and critically reflect on research.

1 This question was raised in panels at ISA 2012 and BISA 2012. A special issue in the European Journal of International Relations on this topic summarises the different positions taken in this debate, see Dunne et al. (2013). 2 Exceptions among others are Malhotra (2015) exploring the EU–India with a soft power approach. 3 A very well-used and profound exception inspired by poststructuralism is Moraes y Blanco (2015).

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2.1 The Third Debate in IR and the Argumentative Turn in Policy Research The first discussions to be addressed here—since these discussions are used above all to critically question the role and influence of researchers and policy analysts—are the so-called Third Debate4 in IR and the corresponding discussion of an argumentative turn in the discipline of policy research. With advent of the Third Debate, the discipline of International Relations has started to reflect more intensively on its knowledge-theoretical foundations; the linguistic turn that started with Wittgenstein in philosophy and social sciences had finally arrived in IR (Fierke 2002: 331–332). This meta-theoretical discussion, which only started late in the 1980s, addressed the basic epistemological and ontological questions and was above all a discussion of the predominant “positivist bias” (Frost 1986: 13) in the research of global phenomena and the question of the transition to a supposed “post-positivist era” (Lapid 1989: 235; critically Biersteker 1989). One position in this discussion was taken by the positivists, who at that point represented the mainstream in IR. Representatives of this research in social sciences in general and in IR specifically can be defined as follows: [Positivists] implicitly or explicitly assume that theoretical or empirical propositions are testable, make causal claims, seek to explain and predict phenomena, assume that research is supported by empirical means, and aspire to the use of a scientific method. […] Generally, positivist articles present a theory, derive testable hypotheses from that theory, and evaluate it using data (that is, empirical observations). (Maliniak et al. 2011: 455)

Consequently, it is assumed that such an understanding of science separates the researcher from the object of research. The researchers look from outside at the global system they want to explore—they are not part of it. Supposedly, this enables them to look at global phenomena objectively and without value judgement. The bias mentioned above lies in the predominance of this view: The “positivist epistemology dominates journal publications” (Maliniak et al. 2011: 455). The emergence of post-positivism or the reflexive critique in the wake of the Third Debate calls these premises into question. It challenges this previously prevailing and fundamental positivist epistemology: The main targets of the ‘reflexive critique’ are positivism’s adherence to ‘truth as correspondence’, its understanding of knowledge as ‘representation’ and its separation of subject and object, and of facts and values. (Hamati-Ataya 2013: 671)

From this epistemological perspective knowledge cannot be objectively true because it is always subjective (Lapid 1989: 250). The scientists are never outside the world to be researched; they thus co-construct the world through their research results and are influenced by their socialisation, their world views, their internalised norms and 4 There is a sequence of debates commonly used within IR: The so-called First Debate of IR emerged

in the 1930s and 1940s and was described as the controversy between realists and idealists. The Second Debate was the academic discussion between traditionalists and behaviouralists in the 1950s and 1960s. However, there is also criticism of this sequence of debates (cf. Navon 2001).

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values, etc.: “Truth is an intersubjective phenomenon” (Fluck 2017: 11). Logically then, research and policy advices are socially contingent and cannot be value-free. This lapidary insight has a momentous theoretical impact: It calls into question the objective and neutral view of empirical objects. Accordingly, the same insights have been generated in the discipline of policy research as a consequence of the general linguistic turn in social sciences. The general realisation that language is the basis of political and scientific knowledge has led to a discussion about an argumentative turn in policy research. In this context, language is assigned a central importance in the social construction of the world: Language “[…] profoundly shapes our view of it [the world, TL] in the first place” (Fischer and Forester 1993a: 1). If this is the case, then again the role of scientists and policy analysts comes into focus. Three points from this discussion should be noted, for a critical look at policy analysis in EU–India relations: 1. Analysts who devote themselves (maybe without being even aware of it) to an explanatory (positivist) epistemology are consequently committed to the scientistic, natural science ideal and, as researchers, pretend to be able to examine empirical objects without judgement. This view is also questioned in policy research by the argumentative turn; Language is not neutral and therefore the analyses of EU-India relations are not objective. They do not examine empirical facts and global political processes in a purely objective way. The central problem, which Saretzki (2014: 497) rightly points out, is that policy recommendations are often objectified as scientifically proven “truth”. However, such a hegemonic truth about how to solve the problems and challenges of the EU– India relations is sold to policymakers and practitioners. It is suggested that there are no alternatives. But research is multidimensional and multiperspective; this is the essence of science. 2. If language has such an important and intersubjective meaning, then policy analysts become proactive co-constructors of EU–India relations. They subjectively contribute to the linguistic construction of world politics and in this case, they become agents of the EU–India relations. Analysts actively produce reality through their active input into the discourse on the strategic partnership; accordingly, they have an impact on politics, which must be critically reflected. Büger and Gadinger (2007: 94) summarise this concisely: “scholars enforce and justify global politics”. Three types of influence exerted by researchers and analysts can be distinguished, according to Green and Hale (2020: 57): First, one can observe the causal influence. This most direct form of influence “[…] occurs when scholars alter the behaviour of practitioners through their ideas and actions” (Green and Hale 2020: 57). This would be possible, for example, by providing direct advice to the diplomatic corps during an EU–India Summit. Second, one can distinguish the engagement influence. Bilateral and multilateral settings allow policy analysts “to participate through official submissions, ‘side events’ at multilateral meetings, and other mechanisms” (Green and Hale 2020: 57). In addition, engagement influence happens when analysts exert influence through officially ordered reviews (Green and Hale 2020: 58). Such an influence can very often

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be observed in EU–India relations. However, the greatest type of influence of policy analysts is probably indirect: Through their analyses and ideas they fuel the discourse on EU–India relations, which Green and Hale (2020: 58) describe as diffuse influence, which is the third type. The discursive power is decisive here: “concepts and ideas […] are reflected in policy outcomes, not because of scholars’ efforts but because academic work simply ‘out there’ in the world is used to craft or implement policy” (Green and Hale 2020: 58). Policy analysts exert a variety of influences, which is neither only good nor only bad. But the theoretical reflection of the effects of analysts promotes the critical review of their practices and their active role in constructing the EU–India Strategic Partnership. In order to be aware of this influence, it is important always to keep the role of analysts in mind and to question them critically. 3. Furthermore, the “argumentative turn” scrutinises the process of political consulting. The normal procedure in terms of “[…] advice from experts for elites [Translation, TL]” (Saretzki 2014: 496) is criticised as insufficient. Especially in democracies such as India and the European Union, the argumentative process of policy advice should resemble a “democratic talk” (Fischer and Forester 1993a: 7). Ideally, the policy recommendations should be the result of a process of ideas that includes the public of both countries. This would enhance the legitimacy of these recommendations. In summary, from these debates one can learn that the “one truth” in research on the EU–India Strategic Partnership does not actually exist and that researchers and policy analysts are consciously and above all unconsciously always influenced by norms, values, i.e. their social environment in general—policy analysts are also embedded in their social environment, which is socially contingent. Moreover, both debates in IR and policy research taken together critically reflect the production of general knowledge in research and therefore draw attention to the influence of the policy analysts. Because of this discursive power and due to the mostly objectified proposed recommendations, the critical reflection of policy recommendations in general is required and self-reflection by policy analysts is also essential. It is neither only good nor only bad that researchers can have such an influence and discursive power. Similarly, it is quite normal that policy-relevant research is subjective. Keeping the debates in mind, it is important to be aware of the dangers involved and to try minimise them since the argumentative turn wants to “uncover the hidden standards and unexamined assumptions that shape, and often distort, the production and application of knowledge” (Fischer and Forester 1993b: 14) of the policy analysts.

2.2 The Postcolonial Critique of Mainstream IR Such potential dangers can be reconstructed on the basis of the virulent discussion about the postcolonial critique of International Relations. A brief reconstruction of this debate is important with regard to the special constellation of the research subject:

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The EU–India relationship is a bilateral partnership between India—with a “postcolonial identity” (Chacko 2012)—and the EU as an entity sui generis, whose member states not only share a colonial past, but where a former key member state—the United Kingdom—even represents the former colonial power of India itself. When conducting research in general, and even moreso when scientifically investigating such a historically charged and burdened partnership, analysts must reflect on the immanent Eurocentrism. If, for example, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), a European institute ranked among the TOP 10 think tanks worldwide,5 recommends the EU “to leverage its economic power […] to become serious as a global influencer of human rights enforcement” (CEPS 2019) on a very sensitive issue of EU–India relations, then this is not just an objective and neutral analysis of the relationship. The proposal is based on a realistic hard politics approach, which is accompanied by a one-sided diffusion of norms. The norms of the EU are made the standard without reconstructing Indian conditions and justifications in the report. This is not to say that Indian or European human rights policies should not be criticised. However, due to the influence of policy analyses argued in Chapter 2.1, it is necessary to point out the complexity of political processes, especially for practitioners. Another example of the lack of neutrality is the CEPS recommendation to the EU to become more attractive to the young Indian generation and to bring them closer to EU values (CEPS 2019). Such proposals “produce” reality in their one-sidedness. Why is it not suggested that young Europeans should be introduced to Indian values? This question is symptomatic; the two examples briefly outlined here point to a larger problem in research on global phenomena, one which has been addressed by the postcolonial critique of mainstream International Relations (IR). The central concern of the postcolonial criticism is to “systematically ‘provincialise Europe’” (Seth 2011: 168). Or as Chakrabarty (2009: xiii), one of the postcolonial pioneers puts it: To ‘provincialize’ Europe was precisely to find out how and in what sense European ideas that were universal were also, at one and the same time, drawn from very particular intellectual and historical traditions that could not claim any universal validity. It was to ask a question about how thought was related to place.

Postcolonial theory is therefore not about developing a theory on world politics from the perspective of the Global South (Seth 2013: 1–2). It goes much further: “it questions the epistemological privilege accorded to an understanding of knowledge which is blind to the constitutive, and not merely representational, role of knowledge” (Seth 2011: 168). This epistemological critique of the foundations of IR makes it connectable to the debates reconstructed above in Sect. 1.1 and continues these debates at the level of the concrete problems linked to them. The reasons for the criticism lie in the examination of the theoretical and empirical premises of the discipline of International Relations, especially in the lack of awareness of the knowledge base of the Global South. IR is repeatedly confronted with the 5 Based

on Global Go To Think Tank Index Report of the year 2019, see McGann (2020: 59).

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accusation of West- and Eurocentrism and the one-sided foundation of theory and empiricism (see for many: Sabaratnam 2011; Gruffydd Jones 2010; Nayak and Selbin 2013). “Why always refer only to Kant?” asks Siddarth Mallavarapu in an interview with Lätt et al. (2010: 9) in a provocative and exemplary manner, in order to point out—correctly—that knowledge of the Global South is not sufficiently integrated into theory work. According to Stuenkel (2016: 41), the model of “Western diffusionism” is dominantly anchored in the subject of International Relations: History as a process led by the West is the predominant view. The “narrative” of IR begins almost exclusively with the post-war order of the Second World War; non-Western historical references have received little attention (Stuenkel 2016: 41). Using the example of the theoretical study of regionalism and regional integration, Söderbaum (2013: 2) shows that “Eurocentric generalizations continue to influence and shape the research field”. Europe and the European Union are elevated to a starting point and benchmark for other regional entities without sufficiently appreciating the historical and social conditions of the objects of analysis (cf. Söderbaum 2013: 2). Even though research, for example with critical-constructivist and poststructuralist approaches, has clearly changed and become more sensitive (cf. Epstein 2012; Engelkamp et al. 2012; Hofius et al. 2014), a large section of research still remains caught up in old paradigms. Grovogui (2006: 5) summarises this dilemma for the entire discipline: “The result is that no disciplinary thought is possible without the filters of the Western gaze and its historical, anthropological, and aesthetic apparatuses”. Moreover, postcolonial theorists point out that European or “Western” categories, such as state, national interest or even sovereignty and others, have been used to understand one, occidental, history. Critically, the IR (and other disciplines like policy research) has universalised and essentialised these concepts and applied them one-to-one to other regions (Seth 2013: 2). Although non-Western regions were used as case studies for testing theories, ideas and approaches from these regions were hardly ever put forward (Acharya 2014: 648; cf. Nkiwane 2001: 279). Universal theories thus marginalise the agency of actors from the Global South: That the study of International Relations - its main theories, its dominant centres of teaching and research, its leading publications - neglects or marginalises the world beyond the West is no longer a novel argument that re-quires proof or elaboration. (Acharya 2011: 620)

Although according to Acharya proof is actually no longer necessary, the data of the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey among IR researchers in 32 countries confirm this argument in an exemplary manner, and hence, IR’s field of expertise includes not one name from the Global South among its ten most influential scientists (Risse and Wemheuer-Vogelaar 2016: 160). According to Risse and Wemheuer-Vogelaar (2016: 160), IR thus continues to be an “American social science”. This theoretical situation is accompanied by empirical marginalisation with far-reaching consequences. Therefore, occidental standards are applied to actors of the Global South without including the specific and above all the historically grown conditions in the research. These problems are aggravated by the way the actors perceive each other, especially in a relationship like the one between India and the European Union. The

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discipline-inherent West centrism of IR can become even stronger when the epistemic communities of both partners have developed little knowledge and understanding of each other. Despite the long scientific tradition of Indology, especially in Germany, knowledge of India is generally poor in Europe. That is why Wiessala (2011: 107) speaks of “centuries of European ‘cultural amnesia’ in regards to Indian cultures, religions, philosophies and societies”. This, of course, also has an impact on the scientific work, and according to Jain (2015: 225), it results in a specific perception within India regarding European think tanks: Most stakeholders in India feel that India’s democratic polity and shared values does not necessarily earn it any brownie points in Europe, that the EU, including the European think tank community, continues to have a fixation with China, and that most senior EU officials feel India is getting there, but not quite arrived.

It clearly shows the imbalance between the two epistemic communities, India and EU. This is a gateway to Eurocentrism, as there is no in-depth knowledge base and the recognition and the feeling of being recognised are missing. However, the same applies to the perception of the EU in India. Kugiel (2019: 2) gives the level of knowledge of the EU in India a very poor report: “The Union is hardly present in Indian political, expert or academic debates, and books on Indian foreign policy written by domestic authors rarely dedicate any attention to the EU”. This is further accompanied by marginal media coverage of the EU.6 Olivier and Fioramonti (2010: 114) come to the following conclusion in their study on the perception of the EU in India: “The EU is not a really ‘hot’ topic in the public domain” in India. Overall the mutual knowledge of each other is suboptimal for conducting policy-related research on an equal basis and there is certainly room for expansion. In a nutshell, the overarching structures of research on international relations continue to be characterised by West- and Eurocentric universalisations. Westand Eurocentrism still prevails in the production of knowledge of global political processes. Accordingly, policy recommendations that build on this knowledge base and/or refer to it are not immune to it; the often not-reflected and partly not even consciously epistemological foundations can affect EU–India analysts, like all the others, especially those from European or US think tanks. The consequences are substantial: The normative proposals and recommendations are not value-free, and with the possible discursive influence on political practice (see 2.1), they must be critically reflected upon.

3 A Way Forward: Fostering Global IR Through Parapublic Underpinnings Policy analysts have discursive power; they are active agents of the EU–India partnership and are in danger of falling into the Eurocentric trap—the above theoretical 6 Regarding

the perception of the EU, see the contribution by Kugiel in this volume.

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discussions can be summarised using this simple formula. But, policy thinkers are also important for the bilateral relationship between India and the EU as they can “contribute to an informal network of ‘social checks and balances’ within the civil society” (Wiessala 2011: 107) of both partners. One possible way to avoid or at least minimise the challenges mentioned above may be to adopt the new programmatic proposal of Global IR on the policy research of EU–India relations. Actually, the research programme, which is currently the subject of debate, was designed for research in IR. This proposal takes into account on the one hand the critical lessons from the postcolonial critique as well as, the post-positivist insights of knowledge production; it allows the formulation of general guidelines for the production of policy recommendations in the area of EU–India relations (Sect. 3.1). The proposal of the parapublic underpinnings described hereafter aims to implement this programme in EU–India relations (Sects. 3.2 and 3.3) and indicates a way forward in the partnership of the two democracies (Sect. 3.4).

3.1 The Global IR Paradigm In his Presidential Address to the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA) in 2014, Amitav Acharya called for a paradigmatic turnaround of IR, which he labelled Global IR. The core of the appeal is the striving for “[…] greater inclusiveness and diversity in our discipline” (Acharya 2014: 649). Global IR ties in with the theoretical groundwork of postcolonialism, postcolonial feminism, poststructuralism and other critical theories. Acharya (2014) therefore views them as pioneering theories that have already made great efforts to free IR of Western Centrism. Nevertheless, Global IR does not favour a particular theory concept nor see itself as a theory, but rather as a programme that attempts to promote theoretical and empirical pluralism and provide guidelines for theoretical and empirical research in IR. This is intended to avoid West—and Eurocentric research and thus “the marginalization of the non-Western and Global South’s ideas, history, voices, and agency” (Acharya 2016). Global IR therefore attempts to implement the longing for a truly globally located IR (Buzan and Lawson 2016: 514). Since Global IR is a programme, i.e. a guideline for research, without prejudging theory and empiricism in any way at the ontological level, it can also be applied to the making of policy recommendations. Global IR is divided into six dimensions, which provide a guideline for research on global phenomena: 1. It is founded upon a pluralistic universalism: not “applying to all,” but recognizing and respecting the diversity in us. 2. It is grounded in world history, not just Greco-Roman, European, or US history. 3. It subsumes, rather than supplants, existing IR theories and methods. 4. It integrates the study of regions, regionalisms, and area studies. 5. It eschews exceptionalism.

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6. It recognizes multiple forms of agency beyond material power, including resistance, normative action, and local constructions of global order. (Acharya 2014: 649)

When applied to policy research, these six points initially provide one simple guideline: Even normative and policy-relevant proposals must always be critically scrutinised with regard to their knowledge production. Is the research that led to the policy recommendations grounded in world history? Are the recommendations based on lessons from Western history only? Which actors were involved in the production of knowledge? Were alternative forms of agency and local ideas from the Global South also considered? These questions are unnecessary if the analyses are based on a pluralistic universalism, which is the nucleus of Global IR. Acharya rightly rejects the so-called monistic universalism, the universalism of the European Enlightenment. In recourse to Ann Tickner, he demands not a search for universal truth but rather a revealing of the forgotten spaces and narratives of world politics (Acharya 2014: 650). The great challenge in this undertaking, however, is not to fall into a spiral of epistemological relativism (Inoue and Tickner 2016; also Jabri 2017: 47). Therefore, the demand for pluralistic universalism cannot mean making normative proposals for politics in general. Of course, policy recommendations are still possible from a global IR perspective, however, these must be globally anchored and based on research that attempts to implement the guidelines of Global IR. In addition to these general principles, which serve as a compass for research into global phenomena, concrete guidelines for EU–India research can also be derived from these insights. Six guidelines can be developed here from the discussions on Global IR and the theoretical debates about the argumentative turn, the Third Debate of IR and the postcolonial critique discussed above: 1. Policy proposals should be grounded in both Indian and European history. Furthermore, one should be open to ideas from other regions, states or local contexts, especially from the Global South. 2. Proposals should take the social and political complexity of India and Europe seriously. 3. The diffusion of norms is not one-sided, but always applies to both partners. 4. In the best case, the policy recommendations should be developed by analysts from both sides working together on an equal footing. 5. Recommendations should always address both entities and not just comprise demands on one actor. 6. Policy analysts should always critically be aware of the effects of their recommendations. By making these points the maxim of research, Eurocentrism can be avoided and a critical approach to the role of policy analysis can be cultivated. These six points can only be implemented if the policy research is placed on a broader knowledge base. Moreover, policy-oriented research must become more diverse and intercultural. From theory to the ground: How to implement Global IR in research on EU–India relations? How could this be realised in practice? The following sections will propose a promising solution.

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3.2 Parapublic Underpinnings as Implementation of the Global IR Principles In order to promote the transfer of knowledge between analysts in the European Union and India and to put knowledge production on a broader basis in line with Global IR, it is proposed to strengthen the strategic partnership with so-called parapublic underpinnings.

3.2.1

Parapublic Underpinnings as a New Kind of International Interaction

The concept of parapublic underpinnings originates from Krotz (2007, 2011). In his seminal study on Franco–German relations and their influence on the European Union, Krotz (2007: 386) introduces a new “third kind of international interaction”. The dominant view so far has been a binary classification of international interaction: Either “state-society or public-private” (Krotz 2011: 34). However, there is empirical cross-border interaction between actors that cannot be grasped by these binary concepts; the new type parapublic breaks up this dichotomous division. There are actors “belonging neither to the public world of states nor to the private world of societies” (Krotz 2011: 34). Parapublic practices are defined as follows: Unlike transnational relations among private individuals or collective societal actors, parapublic activity is to a significant or decisive degree publicly funded, organized, or coorganized. Although only loosely tied to the state and its bureaucracy as financiers, parapublic interaction would barely exist without state funding or public organizational support. (Krotz 2007: 391)

Examples of such relationships are town-twinning between two or more cities in different countries, or cooperation between scientists across borders. In most cases, such science networks are neither a purely private affair nor are the scientists representatives of their respective nations. But scientific exchange is publicly funded and would not exist without public funding. It therefore goes beyond mere cross-border people-to-people individual contacts. The parapublic activities are thus initiated and financed by the states, but the implementation is the responsibility of the individuals or groups, which are also autonomous in their actions. In order to grasp these activities theoretically as well as empirically, Krotz (2007) introduces a new level in IR with the term parapublic. This new level complements the analytical view of the global system. Typically, there is interaction between two or more state actors (international), which can be further specified at an intergovernmental and transgovernmental level. The supranational level goes beyond this, where power is delegated to a higher authority and the interaction is channelled in a process of political integration. Much cross-border interaction takes place at the transnational level, which includes the relations and interactions of private actors like individuals but also NGOs, etc. World politics is thus conceptually extended by a further level: The parapublic.

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Beyond these overall conceptual clarifications, the theoretical argument of Krotz (2007) goes further and is therefore particularly interesting for the concern pursued here. The concept is linked to an implicit normative thrust: using the example of Franco–German relations, Krotz makes clear the positive achievements of such parapublic activities. Through a unique network of institutionalisation, the parapublic underpinnings helped to set in motion a process of Europeanisation and to improve relations between France and Germany, which were marked as hereditary enmity (Erbfeindschaft) a few decades before and can now be labelled as a special, privileged friendship. What effects do parapublic underpinnings have? A major difference between parapublic actors and other actors operating at the transnational level—such as NGOs—is political influence (see Sect. 2.1): The extensive research on global civil society shows that while NGOs try to gain direct influence on state action, parapublic actors “affect international dealings more indirectly and in a more elongated fashion” (Krotz 2007: 391). In this sense parapublic activities between two entities “underpin relations among specific states and construct social purpose in the international realm” (Krotz 2007: 385). Such an underpinning of official state-level relationships has a specific effect on the construction of the partnership itself, but also on the international community as such: Parapublic underpinnings […] provide resources for joint undertakings most broadly conceived; they socialize their participants, thus cultivating a certain kind of personnel to later practice international affairs by staffing public (and private) offices; and they generate and perpetuate social meaning, by shaping standards of normal expectations, helping to define political success and failure, defining legitimate political ends, and contributing to the formation of rudiments of international collective identity. (Krotz 2007: 386–387)

The effects described above are therefore to be seen in the long term and go beyond the political actions within bilateral partnerships that are normally taken into account by research.

3.2.2

Parapublic Underpinnings, Global IR and EU–India Relations

If these thoughts are taken further, the described effects and measures can help to implement the principles of the Global IR paradigm in the analysis of EU–India relations. Krotz (2007: 387) mentions three possibilities of how a bilateral relationship can be underpinned by parapublic activities: (1) extensive youth and educational exchanges, (2) jointly managed and operated institutions and (3) joint mass media institutions and prizes. EU–India relations could be approached at all three of these levels. In order to promote Global IR in policy-related research, it is necessary in a first step to strengthen parapublic measures in the area of scientific cooperation within the strategic partnership. A large-scale exchange programme must be institutionalised within the strategic partnership. In addition, research cooperation must be expanded and institutionalised (see in more detail Sect. 3.4). By institutionalising joint parapublic activities in this area of the framework of the strategic partnership, it is possible to create opportunities to work within both

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parties against the poor perception outlined above to create a common knowledge base. Parapublic underpinnings of the EU–India Strategic Partnership will support the exchange of opinions and build a common understanding without neglecting the peculiarities and particularities of India and the European Union. Through publicly funded exchange opportunities, joint research projects and further cooperation, it is possible to discuss Indian and European ideas and policy proposals together in an institutionalised and long-term setting. With the help of such parapublic underpinnings, Indian and European analysts who would not work together in the strategic partnership without such funding are brought together. This will create opportunities to put policy analysis on a broader knowledge base and, in particular, to integrate more ideas from India into analyses regarding the future of the EU–India Partnership. It becomes possible, as Acharya rightly demands, to uncover the forgotten spaces and narratives of India, of the European Union and its unique construction, and of the partnership itself. The aim is to create structures that enable an intensive exchange of ideas in the long term between the epistemic communities of India and Europe. This is intended to stimulate the discussion and contesting of values and norms, proposals and ideas, etc. without, however, prejudicing or marginalising the respective other knowledge constructs. The consequence of this can be a more inclusive and intercultural view of each other. As Krotz (2007: 386) states, this can lead to mutual socialisation effects, which in the long run also have an impact on mutual expectations. True, parapublic underpinnings are not a panacea, but West- and Eurocentric pitfalls can thus be minimised: Joint research and policy evaluations avoid a onesided occidental view, as Indian scientists are actively and directly involved in the research process. The attempt to avoid exceptionalism, as Global IR demands, can be implemented this way. Why should these measures be formalised in the documents of the strategic partnership and be integrated into EU–India relations as parapublic underpinnings? Wouldn’t research cooperation between two policy institutes at a transnational level also lead to the same effects? That is within the realms of possibility. However, promoting joint research through a contractually agreed objective in the strategic partnership gives the impulse for the European and Indian research communities to deal with each other scientifically. In addition, public funding makes long-term cooperation possible. This is all the more important “[a]s these practices evolve, the social meaning and purpose that they embody becomes autonomous” (Krotz 2007: 392). A possible financial imbalance can also be circumvented; cooperation on an equal basis can be guaranteed by mutual public financing. Due to the institutionalisation within the strategic partnership there is no donor–client relationship; the parapublic activities must be financed and managed equally by the EU and India.

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3.3 Building on Established Structures In order to use the effects described above, parapublic underpinnings must be integrated into the EU–India Strategic Partnership. The advantage is that on the one hand, it is possible to build on a formalised bilateral structure and, on the other hand, it is not necessary to start the implementation from scratch. Activities on the parapublic level of the EU–India Strategic Partnership in the field of joint research and production of policy ideas already exist. In the following, three existing measures will be briefly and critically reflected upon in order to identify starting points:

3.3.1

EU–India Think Tank Network—EU–India Think Tanks Twinning Initiative

One objective of the Agenda for Action of the 2000 Joint Declaration was the “Launching of the EU-India Think Tank Network” (EU-India 2000: 8). This objective was implemented 15 years later with the EU India Think Tanks Twinning Initiative. The aim is “to foster interaction between leading Indian and European think tanks through a series of joint projects involving research publications and events” (Delegation EU to India 2020). The idea is that the “brightest minds from the EU and India” (Delegation EU to India 2020) work together to develop ideas for the future of EU–India relations. This is a step in the right direction to implement Global IR. In this sense, Joint Research Projects from Consortiums of EU and Indian think tanks, which work on various topics of EU–India relations, were formed. Although at first glance this is a good initiative in terms of implementing the Global IR paradigm, it can only be a first step. Although the aim of the measure is to promote joint exchange, it is nevertheless a unilateral measure by the EU because this initiative is supported by the EU Delegation to India, that is itself financially supported by the European Union. This is also reflected in the resulting goals which, of course and legitimately, are EU-centric: “The goal is also to support a more continued and visible presence of European think tanks in India” (Delegation EU to India 2020). This is precisely the problem with such a construction. A diffusion of European ideas via India is thus strengthened, a transfer of ideas from India towards the EU is only indirectly achieved and is not a priority; it undermines the shared level between the two partners. An exchange and cooperation on an equal footing also requires the same goals, about which both partners are equally concerned. Both sides should be open to learn from each other: Europe’s economic and technological lead should not result in fending off ideas from India. In this context, the visible presence of Indian think tanks in Europe should also be promoted—not only European think tanks in India. For this reason, such measures should be anchored in the strategic partnership and institutionalised on the formal basis of the partnership. This will ensure that both partners are equally involved and that the objectives go both ways, in the direction of India and also, especially, in the direction of the EU.

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EU–India Agreement on Scientific and Technological (S&T) Cooperation

Even more ambitious and distinctive in its coverage is the EU-India Agreement on scientific and technological cooperation signed in 2001. At first glance, one can speak of an ideal type of parapublic underpinning, however, it suffers from similar problems to those of the EU–India Think Tanks Twinning Initiative. In fact, the agreement was concluded in 2001 as part of the strategic partnership and renewed again in 2007. In the Roadmap to 2025, agreed between the two partners at the EU–India Summit in July 2020, a renewal of the agreement was decided upon agreed “in time” (EU-India 2020: 8). The measures initiated by the agreement are thus formally anchored in the partnership. The overall objective is to “encourage and facilitate cooperative research and development activities in science and technology fields of common interest between the Community and India” (EU-India 2002: Art. 1). Of particular importance are the principles of the agreement which concretise the implementation. Article 2 defines the meaning of “joint research”, which means “collaboration between participants from both the Community and India” (EU-India 2002: Art. 2). Articles 3a and 3b make it even clearer: The overall principles are the “mutual benefit based on an overall balance” and “reciprocal access to the activities” (EU-India 2002: Art. 3a–b). The proof of the pudding is in the implementation. In the Joint Declaration from 2012, the successful cooperation is recorded up to that point: The successful implementation since 2007 of regular coordinated calls for proposals between the EU and India in the fields of computational materials science, food and nutrition research, solar energy research and water related challenges, with a total budget of Me60 co-funded by India and the EU, as well as the active participation of Indian research organisations in the EU Research Framework Programmes. (EU-India 2012: 4)

The European Commission’s Roadmap for EU-India S&T cooperation from 2018 takes a closer look at Indian participation in the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7): In FP7 collaborative projects, there were 289 participations of entities from India. Indian participants, who were still funded under FP7, have received e39.14 million from the European Commission. (European Commission 2018b: 4)

Since 2007 the financial volume has amounted to a total of “EUR 60 million under FP7 and EUR 60 million under Horizon 2020 co funded by India and the EU” (European Commission 2020). It must be positively acknowledged that cooperation in the field of science worked within the strategic partnership, even in the period of the partnership’s general stagnation. However, even this as status quo can only be a first step. Again, the construction of parapublic underpinnings causes problems. The reciprocity and equality principles described above and enshrined in the Agreement have not yet been implemented. The main problem is the financing of activities under the joint agreement and the resulting concentration on the EU. It is not relevant whether one partner contributes to a greater or lesser financial extent, especially due to historical burdens, but the institutional

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framework must be aligned on an equal footing. In their review of the S&T cooperation at the request of the European Commission, Basile and Régnier (2012: 3) complain that the joint research projects are running within the framework of the FP programme or the Horizon programme, which are “EU-driven programme[s]”. This is based on a construction fault: Although the EU–India Agreement on S&T Cooperation sets an ambitious agenda of parapublic underpinnings, it does not involve joint financing within the framework of the strategic partnership. No joint fund has been set up to finance the measures (EU-India 2002: Art. 7), although joint financing “on a cost-sharing basis” (EU-India 2002: Art. 5c) was envisaged. In order to ensure the financing of the activities, therefore, recourse was mainly made to EU programmes. However, this has had to be renegotiated from one research call to the next. Overall, this results in a perception of the joint programmes on the Indian side “as an initiative de facto outside the Agreement itself” (Basile and Régnier 2012: 3). As a result, “the Indian participation is rather limited. The vast majority of the projects involve only one Indian institution, and only in 20 projects Indian participation weights more than 1/3 of the total number of partners” (Basile and Régnier 2012: 4). With recourse to the above-mentioned principles from the Global IR paradigm, there is great potential here to advance relations with parapublic underpinnings. Furthermore, there is no discernible link between research and policy analysis. While research in a variety of areas, such as computational material science, food and nutrition research, solar energy research, water-related challenges and vaccines has been funded under this framework, no link to the above-mentioned think tank network is identifiable. It appears that research in the natural sciences, and technological research in particular, is separated from the policy recommendations of the social sciences. From a Global IR perspective, this is a mistake since the policy recommendations in particular require interdisciplinary cooperation. Multiperspectivity is also important with regard to the above-mentioned theoretical debates and nor can basic research be excluded from policy analysis.

3.3.3

Exchange and mobility of students and faculty

Exchanges of students or researchers from the EU to India and vice versa are not explicitly provided for in the strategic partnership. Nevertheless, there are many exchanges within the framework of internal university programmes, exchange programmes of EU member states, Indian programmes or the EU’s Erasmus+ programme. Since 2015, Indian citizens have also had the chance to study in Europe through the Erasmus programme. Despite the large number of exchange programmes on offer, there is great potential here. Between 2015 and 2018, for instance, 1404 students and staff went to India through the Erasmus+ programme. In the other direction, from Europe to India, only 814 students and staff participated in an exchange (European Commission 2018a: 1). What is missing is an exchange programme that directly addresses Indian and European students and promotes a true exchange.

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3.4 Take It to a New Level Taking the parapublic underpinnings to a new level must be the aim. This can build on existing structures, while at the same time eliminating the construction flaws. For their concrete implementation, a successive institutionalisation process in different phases is proposed: Phase 1: First of all, the formal foundations should be revised and fundamentally realigned. The EU–India Agreement on S&T Cooperation and related measures should be reviewed once again. Both partners should then renegotiate the agreement. In particular, equal and shared responsibility for the projects should be the maxim. A joint fund could be the solution here. It would also be possible for the EU to provide more funding in individual cases. However, a jointly managed fund under the framework of the Agreement and thus of the strategic partnership would minimise the problems mentioned above. This (re-)formalisation process should be supported by involving the scientific communities of both partners. An idea workshop could generate further ideas and bring the scientific communities of both entities on board. Phase 2: The EU–India Think Tanks Twinning Initiative should be integrated into the agreement. This would achieve an interlocking of research measures and policy analyses in order to facilitate interdisciplinary, cross-disciplinary, policy-relevant research. Building on this, a programme should be set up to facilitate research cooperation between European and Indian research institutes, policy institutes and universities in different research areas. In parallel, the exchange of students, young researchers and academics should be institutionalised in a joint exchange programme under the banner of the strategic partnership. A separate programme alongside the existing programmes would help to further promote the exchange. Since the primary target group will be students, the foundations for raising awareness for the coming generations of researchers can already be laid here. Phase 3: In the third phase, the parapublic underpinnings should be further expanded. On the basis of the research consortia that emerged in phase 2, flagship projects are to be identified and evaluated. These flagship research projects should be institutionalised in the long term and joint research institutes should be established; these should act autonomously within the strategic partnership. Jointly financed and managed, these institutes should guarantee long-term joint research.

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4 Conclusion “The EU should…!”; “India needs…!” It became clear that such statements can only be well-founded if the conditions are appropriate. Theoretical debates provide valuable advice on how policy-related research in general and in EU–India relations in particular should proceed, where one should be sensitive and what one should reflect critically. The insights from the theoretical discussions around the argumentative turn and the Third Debate, as well as the postcolonial critique reconstructed in Sect. 2, indicate that a closer look at the structures of knowledge production would be fruitful. With the adaptation of the Global IR paradigm for policy research in the field of EU– India relations, concrete guidelines could be developed that integrate the insights of the theoretical discussions. With the proposal to support the principles of Global IR with parapublic underpinnings in the strategic partnership, Sect. 3 outlined a concrete and feasible path for the future—in a sense, a policy recommendation to improve the policy recommendations in the research area of the bilateral partnership between India and the EU. Yet the idea of parapublic underpinnings has even more potential. Parapublic cooperation in the field of science should only be the beginning. In order to generate mutual social meaning, thus bringing the two partners even closer together, there is a need to extend such cooperation to other areas too. However, there is still a long way to go.

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Timo Lowinger is a researcher and member of faculty at the Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and International Relations, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Würzburg. He is also project coordinator of the project “Foundations of the Indo-European Strategic Partnership”. His research focuses on Critical Theory (recognition of the Global South) and IR; World Order; (Critical) Constructivist Norm Research; Emerging Powers, especially Indian and South African Foreign Policy. He conducted several research stays in India.

India and the European Union: A Partnership for Joining Forces on the Global Scene—Concluding Remarks and Outlook Ummu Salma Bava

1 Introduction The long-standing relations between the European Union (EU) and India stem back to 1963 and were re-contextualised with the transformation of both actors following the end of the Cold War. Since 1992, the EU has developed a new political and global identity for itself that has sought to project collective action in foreign and security policy, thus expanding beyond trade the ambit of joint action among the Member States. This new identity also demonstrated how states could apply political will to achieve collective action through pooling sovereignty by strengthening regional integration. On the other hand, India at the time faced tough economic conditions and a new international scenario that led to its transformation, enabled by the economic liberalisation which started in 1991 and the nuclear test in 1998 that propelled it to the forefront of the emerging powers. However, a relationship reaching beyond trade into a political engagement of two actors sharing common values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights has taken time to evolve and mature. It is in this context that the research project ‘Foundations of the Indo-European Strategic Partnership’ launched its preparatory phase with a workshop in New Delhi in April 2017. The two day workshop held in Würzburg in November 2019 then provided an opportunity to examine the state of play in the EU–India relations from multiple vantage points: Two decades of summit meetings, not only viewed through the prism of Strategic Partnerships, but from the perspective of two significant developments; the EU Global Strategy 2016, and the EU-India Strategy 2018. The 2018 India Strategy is the framing document from which Brussels sought a new road map for itself and its relationship with India. Added to these factors is a further development following the workshop: Against the backdrop of the pandemic, the EU-India U. S. Bava (B) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Gieg et al. (eds.), EU-India Relations, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_18

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Strategic Partnership Roadmap to 2025 (European External Action Service 2020) was adopted on 15 July 2020 at a virtual Summit. This offers the opportunity to review how some of the critical discussions in the workshop have actually already been realised within this new document. The opening chapter drew the outline for examining the key issues in the relation between the European Union (EU) and India in the context of the EU’s Global Strategy of 2016. This chapter draws upon the discussions in the workshop to present the main arguments and findings of the research work and to offer further understanding to the EU–India relationship in the context of the recently concluded 15th Summit. Both actors have evolved and developed capabilities and capacities that can to varying degrees influence some of the global issues. In essence the international environment, namely multilateralism and multipolarity, has been the context for the interaction between the EU and India, as underlined by the researchers. Significantly, the EU stated in its European Security Strategy (ESS) 2003 that ‘effective multilateralism’ is the frame it endorses for political participation and building partnerships. New Delhi, which has also long endorsed multilateralism, found additional impetus for action after the EU named it as a partner of choice in the ESS. This relation and impact upon the partnership between both actors has also been influenced by growing multipolarity. It is in this context that this last chapter examines how multilateralism and multipolarity have been the larger frameworks for the transformation of the EU-India partnership. The ESS 2003 was the first attempt by the EU to spell out its security concerns, nearly a decade after it came into existence under the Maastricht Treaty. Against the backdrop of the crisis in Iraq and the need for coherence and collective action, the ESS also paved the way for other actors who engaged with the EU to understand its foreign policy concerns. The 2004 EU enlargement expanded the borders of the Union creating new neighbourhoods and also new challenges and opportunities. Simultaneously, at the global level, the rise of the emerging powers all pointed towards the changing terrain of international politics and the nascent polycentric world in the making. In this context, flagging partnership as a way to address the challenges in the ESS opened the doorway for the launch of Strategic Partnerships with select states, including India in 2004.

2 Framing the EU–India Relations Within the Current Global Order Most of the discussions on analysing the EU-India bilateral relation were framed within three important questions. First, how does one locate the study of foreign policy change, especially that of an unprecedented actor, in international politics? Second, what kind of model/models should one apply to examine strategic partnerships within the framework of foreign policy? Third, how does the scholarship

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engage with the concepts, ideas and issues related to the EU-India Strategic Partnership? A reading of the preceding chapters gives a detailed, nuanced analysis of these questions, with each contribution seeking to connect this with a set of specific overarching issues in the light of the EU’s Global Strategy. How do both actors engage each other when the very international structure of which they are a part of is fundamentally changing and creating dissonance? The absence of predictability, which is a product of the order embedded in the relations between states from 1945 to 1990 has also challenged the assumptions based on which the EU and India interact with each other. While the enlargement of the EU post-Cold War brought new fault lines and a changing neighbourhood profile into the European discourse, it also highlighted policy challenges for Brussels. For India, the end of the Cold War brought both costs and opportunities—loss of the partnership with the Soviet Union and a redesign of the relation with Russia and ‘crossing the Rubicon’ (Mohan 2004) in building a strategic partnership with the United States that would pay rich dividends. Thus any discussion on the equation and relations between the EU and India must be underpinned by the discussions on multilateralism and multipolarity and a polycentric world, as this is the context for both actors, and their respective value preferences impinge on how both engage to address global issues. Both the EU and India have strongly endorsed multilateralism as their preferred mode of engagement to address global issues ranging from trade to climate change, and peace and security. However, multilateralism is more than just coordinated action between groups of states, it is increasingly about the formal institutions and norms that regulate and govern collective action and behaviour,1 how the asymmetric power differential between states impacts on how negotiations take place, and how the status quo of the more powerful actors can be sustained (Keohane 1990; Ruggie 1992). In 2003, the EU laid out its approach to foreign policy through the European Security Strategy that also affirmed its commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ (ESS 2003). This was reiterated within the EUGS in 2016,2 ‘The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core’ (EUGS 2016). So while the ESS endorses ‘effective multilateralism’, the preferred mode of delivery is through bilateral relations. The EU reiterated in 2003 that partnerships with select countries would be at the core of implementing effective multilateralism, and this drove it to enhance strategic partnerships with pivotal countries including India (Bava 2008). Renard (2016) further argues that strategic partnerships could be useful for the EU to strengthen multilateral efforts in an incremental manner. India too has evolved as an actor when it comes to issues of multilateralism and views it as a means of engaging other actors for achieving shared or common good. India has grown from taking a passive approach to multilateralism during the Cold War period, to strongly advocating it today and pushing for restructuring 1 Regarding

contested norms in the framework of the India-EU Strategic Partnership see Lowinger et al. in this volume. 2 For an analysis of EU-India relations in the light of the Global Strategy see Winn or Pietzko in this Volume.

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of institutions so that they are far more inclusive and represent the broad array of interests (Rohan and Malone 2011; Sidhu 2013). As institutions of global governance face a crisis with the rise of nationalist sentiments, especially with the United States pulling out of many global commitments and questioning even the Bretton Woods arrangements, it has brought into sharp focus how the EU and India might work together, and their assumptions regarding the system. In this context, it is interesting to note that more recently, in 2020, Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar cautioned that ‘Multilateralism is one of the casualties as big powers disregard rules in pursuit of national objectives’ (Ministry of External Affairs 2020). In its campaign for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent seat, India strongly committed itself to multilateralism, rule of law and a fair and equitable international system. This endorsement of multilateralism provides the platform for the EU and India to cooperate on global issues; however, it also opens up important questions of where both these actors are located within the international multilateral architecture (Keohane 1990). The EU received an Observer status in the General Assembly in 1974 and has had enhanced participation rights since 2011. India is a founding member of the United Nations (UN), but its attempts to secure the reform of the UNSC to expand the permanent members beyond its current strength of five (P5) has not been successful and underscores that despite the support of some UNSC members, there has been no move to change the status quo and dilute the power of the P5 states. While neither the EU nor India are in the driving position within the UN, the special status granted to the EU privileges the 27 Member States by giving it an extra voice within the UN. Interestingly, both the EU and India endorse the UN because such an institutionalised multilateralism reduces not only transaction costs but also uncertainty for all actors in the process. While India has contributed to 49 UN Peacekeeping missions (being the largest participant in terms of people and missions), and the EU has also participated in military and civilian missions, they have so far not been able undertake such activities in third countries together. Here is an opportunity for the EU and India to expand the kind of political cooperation that brings peace and stability in a conflict area, to claim a joint response and to display a political will for new leadership. Although this can be a point of departure for both, one can draw the conclusion that while there is no norm contestation between the EU and India on this, they are configured very differently regarding the global power hierarchy and how they engage the global institutions. Since the workshop, a larger, international framing issue has been the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has meant that both parties are preoccupied with domestic issues and changing regional geopolitics. The Russia factor in Europe and the China factor on India’s border have reduced the appetite for venturing further afield. Closely connected to the idea of multilateralism is the issue of how the academic literature talks about actors as having power in a multipolar or polycentric world. The workshop deliberated at length about this since it also reveals how perceptions regarding actors and their capabilities are formed and what expectations this creates about them at different levels. If the 1990s was the time of American hegemony and the unipolar moment (Krauthammer 1990), today’s ‘multiplex’ world offers challenges and opportunities for global and regional cooperation (Acharya 2018).

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The fact that the EU and India interact within this multipolar, polycentric or multiplex world, is also influenced to a large extent by their own standing, ambitions, policy choices and performances. This interaction further indicates how the location of power between states is changing due to factors such as globalisation and the rise of non-state actors creating a complex matrix whereby the idea of a Western-driven world order is increasingly being contested from both within and without. In this context, how the literature describes and labels or categorises the EU and India as actors gives an insight into their varied nature and its influence on the perception and expectation held by different global audiences. Labels are shorthand for lengthier descriptions; being loaded with meanings, they can create or distort and even change the expectation in other actors. India has been called an emerging power (Cohen 2004; Ganguly 2004; Mistry 2004; Bava 2007, 2010), ‘rising power’, a ‘regional power’, and a ‘would be great power’ (Hurrell 2006; Nolte 2006). On the other hand, the adjectives that are used to describe the European Union are even more diverse, ranging from a ‘civilian power’ (Duchêne 1972; Telò 2006), to a ‘post-modern power’ (Cooper 2003) and ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002). These descriptive labels carry the characteristics of the actor and signal how the authors engage with the idea. One question that arises as a consequence of these labels is that if one cannot identify a certain actor within the existing categories, does that challenge how we engage with concepts? The short answer is yes, because labels and categories help to identify patterns of engagement between the actors. Labels carry meanings and provide a frame of reference within which the identity of the actor is revealed, which in turn helps the understanding of the perception of actors towards each other. Many academic writings reflect concern regarding the category of emerging or rising powers, and the dominant question deals with whether such countries would sustain or pose challenges to the existing global order3 (Castañeda 2010; Mawdsley 2012). Despite the big political and economic differences between India and China, both are labelled as emerging powers, which also draws attention to the fact that the newer actors are subject to much political scrutiny by the established powers. Some authors (Ikenberry 2011; Breslin 2013; Kahler 2013) suggest that since these countries have benefited from the system they would therefore maintain the order. It may be far-fetched, but it is worth exploring the consequences of applying the label of ‘emerging power’ to the European Union given that it has also evolved as an economic, political and security actor from 1992 to the present day. While the EU may not challenge the power status quo, it definitely challenges the assumptions about how sovereignty can be shared between states within a regional framework thereby giving rise to a new actor. Since the end of the Cold War, the growth of the EU and India reveals two very different kinds of actors, although both affirm the same political values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. In the case of Europe, the project of regional integration launched in 1952 with the European Coal and Steel 3 For

an in-depth discussion of India’s position towards the liberal international order and its significance for the EU-India Strategic Partnership, see Kugiel in this volume.

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Community culminated in the creation of the post-modern entity, the EU, in 1992. This post-Westphalian moment of the transcending of national borders and a greater pooling of sovereignty beyond the economic to political and justice and home affairs, and more significantly foreign and security affairs, signalled the ability to reconstitute the idea of sovereignty and power between states and to manage conflict and build cooperation, entering the post-modern era. India, in contrast to the EU, which is made up of many states, is a singular state wedded to the classical Westphalian concept of power, sovereignty and identity. The drive towards greater economic liberalisation in the early 1990s and the nuclear capability it acquired in 1998 propelled it not only to the forefront of nations but also added a new robustness to its foreign policy that sought to enhance its strategic autonomy (Bava 2007). This has led to India also being labelled in various ways with respect to its role within the current international order. The acquiring of nuclear capability and the strong push to advocate UNSC reform to get a permanent seat has resulted in India being labelled as a revisionist power. In, fact, the assertiveness in Indian foreign policy in recent decades has drawn attention to how New Delhi seeks to acquire a growing international footprint, thereby raising issues of whether it is a status quoist power and further a ‘responsible power’ (Bava 2017). In juxtaposition, the EU also presents challenges to how one defines a ‘sui generis’ regional actor in international politics, given that it is still individual states that are members of the international organisations and bodies that produce the norms that in turn regulate the patterns of interactions between states. The workshop discussions also showed the dichotomy produced by labels. While the EU and its Member States adopt a regional approach to addressing issues, India as a singular actor has a marked preference for bilateral relations with each of the states. Especially in climate issues, as the respective chapters elucidate,4 India on the one hand was not only negotiating with the EU on standards at the global level, but on the other hand, also had a different level of cooperation bilaterally with individual Member States. India’s own shift from being an aid receiver to being labelled as one of the new ‘donors’ outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) framework produced convergence but also divergence in the field of development cooperation.5 These differences between the EU and India are also evident in the economic area, where the negotiation of a bilateral trade and investment agreement has not yet materialised.6 An important takeaway is that the EU and India can never be described as politically alike as actors despite sharing common values, nor can one apply a similar description of power to both as the organising political units are not alike. The discussions reinforced that the socialisation of states in the prevalent international system,

4 Regarding

the EU-India Cooperation in the field of climate change see Jayaram or Jörgensen in this volume. 5 See Tripathi’s contribution on India and the EU’s approach to development cooperation. 6 For an in depth analysis of India-EU trade policy see Khorana and Köhler-Suzuki in this volume.

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with its specific construction of order and power, has created a hierarchy that privileges the idea of the powerful state due to the convening power it enjoys within the international system. Although being different kinds of actors, the EU and India have both been enhancing their hard and soft power, technological capability and political capacity at different levels so as to have a larger footprint at both the regional and global levels. There is plenty of literature talking about the diffusion of EU norms and values in the region and beyond ‘the transformative power of Europe’ (Börzel and Risse 2009), which can be seen as the soft power of the Union. India’s strong credentials as a democracy in the global south have not translated into the political dividend of securing a seat in the UNSC, but have led to the building of a positive image in the South Asian region (Wagner 2010; Kugiel 2012). In the absence of a strong global military presence, both the EU and India—with their emphasis on soft power, political values and culture—have different kinds of convening power; how this can address the new challenges of global governance today bears systematic research.

3 Partnerships and Perceptions in a Changing World It is important to reiterate that it is not only the external perceptions held by other actors, but the mutual perceptions of the EU and India on both sides that have shaped much of the understanding—and lack of it—and that often the loss of the idea of partnership in translation is not only due to ‘a difference in vocabulary’ but also to the fact that the EU and India are qualitatively different kinds of actors, with different capabilities and capacities, as discussed. As the workshop showed, it is for this reason that the political development of the EU and India as leaders has to be contextualised to the local, regional and global developments. The growth of the EU and India as actors not only reflects the difference of historical experience, but also how the political preferences were shaped by surrounding global and regional developments. While the Cold War facilitated the movement for regional integration and the idea of pooling sovereignty in Western Europe after World War II, for India this period resulted in its emergence as an independent and fully sovereign country after the end of colonial rule. The Cold War undoubtedly had a profound impact on both the European Economic Community (EEC) and India, on how each would engage with sovereignty to develop their respective identities and foreign policies, and how they connected with the rest of the world. However, in the post-Cold War period both underwent major transformations as actors and this is now visible in their external relations. Ideational proximity (with their shared values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights) apart, both the EU and India find themselves in very different geographies that shape their interests and influence their policy priorities at both the regional and international levels. Consequently, the building of policy convergences for global issues has been slow to materialise between Brussels and New Delhi.

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That notwithstanding, the changing strategic and geopolitical landscape of the 1990s offered the EU and India the opportunity—that became more evident after 9/11—to scale up their relations. In 2000, the Summit meetings between the EU and India began, launching a new era of engagement and culminating in the signing of the EU-India Strategic Partnership in 2004. Within the workshop, there was a considerable consensus that it is worth exploring whether the post-Cold War period produced a particular moment wherein the instrument of strategic partnerships came into more widespread use, perhaps to signify enhanced relations between states. There are few clear definitions of the concept of strategic partnerships—on whether they constitute a tool employed by powerful states to enhance their domination in the international system across the political, economic and security domain or perhaps a rhetorical device used by policy makers (Kay 2000:16). Kay (2000:16) caustically calls it a ‘window dressing to justify bilateral alliances arising out of pragmatic necessity and balance-of-power security dynamics of an ad hoc world system’. In the absence of definitional clarity, as the use of the instrument of strategic partnership has proliferated among countries, it opens up many questions in assessing the impact and meaning of the strategic partnerships as an effective tool for enhancing bilateral relationships in a targeted manner. Even if strategic partnerships are viewed as privileging bilateral relations, it is observed that this is not exclusive to the EU and India but rather a growing trend that has gained popularity among major countries. It therefore comes as no surprise that both the EU and India have diverse strategic partnerships with many countries. Within the foreign policy framework, strategic partnerships between two states including the EU and India can be viewed as an opportunity to recalibrate the existing relations and scale up the economic, political and security engagement such that some elements on both sides find a greater degree of convergence of interest.7 More importantly engagement in such a partnership indicates the political willingness to expand and enhance the level of cooperation through consultation, action plans and implementation through institutionalisation, and can be considered as a signalling device of the recalibrated equation. In this context, it is worth emphasising that the EU has a strategic partnership with both the rising Asian powers: China and India. In 2010 at the discussion on the future of the EU’s ‘Strategic Partnerships’, President of the European Council van Rompuy had indicated that the EU had partners but needed more strategy and emphasised the need to identify ‘mutual interests’. In other words he was pushing the Council to address how the strategic partnerships served the EU foreign policy. That raises questions on how the EU, with its value based preference, engages China and India given that the former is not a democracy and the latter is the world’s largest democratic state. So how does one analyse this foreign policy preference on the part of the EU (Renard 2010, 2012)? Does it indicate that despite the endorsement of values and norms by Brussels, it is, as Kay (2000) states, ‘pragmatic necessity’ that makes it engage Beijing in this format? Although this interest-based approach sits at variance with how the EU presents itself to the world as a normative actor, it is still 7 For

the EU and India’s mutual perceptions see Winand’s contribution in this volume.

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well understood from a realist perspective, as the engagement is based on interest and power. On the other hand, neither does applying the lens of strategic partnerships to India produce a coherent image, given that it has more than 30 such partnerships that vary from all the P5 countries to smaller countries like Vietnam. For a country that followed a policy of non-alignment for five decades from the time it became independent in 1947, this indicates that New Delhi has not only jettisoned the old policy it followed during the Cold War, but has rapidly tried to adapt to a changing geopolitical environment. The adoption of strategic partnerships can be seen as a radical departure, as it is clearly indicative, in unambiguous terms, of the high level of political engagement by New Delhi and of a prioritisation of foreign policy goals and partners in a polycentric world. Through this mechanism India has sought to address diverse objectives and finetune the balance between interests and ideas/values. Undoubtedly, interest drives its strategic partnerships, and through this it seeks to offset the uncertainties in the current order. Even if the strategic partnership is seen as a signalling device of the recalibrated equation driven by intentionality, the development speaks volumes of the transformation in Indian foreign policy political and bureaucratic establishment in reconfiguring and building external relations. Renard argues that strategic partnership could become an important tool to shape the multilateral order (Renard 2010). A growing security component in the strategic partnership between EU and India also indicates the broadening of the spectrum of cooperation. Along with cooperation and engagement, it should be emphasised that this mechanism also offers an avenue for the diffusion of ideas between both actors, given the intensity of the relation. Despite drawing out these positive aspects of an enhanced partnership the challenge remains, in that neither the EU nor India clearly articulate what drives them towards strategic partnerships with some select countries. Consequently, decoding these policy preferences and instruments is left to the analysts. The EU is after all India’s largest trading partner and this partnership adds another layer of enhanced interaction. As the discussion showed, there is a need to delve deeper into the concept, meaning and political value of ‘Strategic Partnership’ and to determine whether in the current context of a changing global order the idea of strategic partnerships has outlived its usefulness as a category of interaction or whether the inherent backdrop of the idea has changed to engaging at the level of partnering. Pursuing the idea of partnering also liberates the actors from the heavy valueladen mix of the idea of strategic partnership. Perhaps it recognises that it is interest that drives states to engage with each other. Norms are a part of the identity of an actor, but states definitely go beyond their norms when interacting with other states. Norms at the global level are created to regulate behaviour between states and—as the current context of the discussions also shows—the power hierarchy of the ordering of political values as created by the Bretton Woods institutions, which got recast with the end of the Cold War to be labelled as the liberal international order.

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4 The Changing Global Order and the EU-India Strategic Roadmap to 2025 The liberal international order has strong assumptions but does not account for the fact that the multilateral order so produced by the system is confronted by a dissonance created by the existing actors (Trump and the United States) and the rise of other actors such as the EU and the emerging powers of India and China. This produces multimultilaterals, creating simultaneous multiple orders and poly-lateralism, the linking of state and non-state actors also signifying that states are not the absolute locus of power, and shaping the order. In fact, globalisation and complex interdependence have produced the challenge to norm setting, guiding the behaviour of states and how the international order grows. In the context of the EU-India relation, the discussions highlighted not only the problem areas of the cooperation, which has been loaded with potential since 2004 but has also missed opportunities for bringing to fruition some aspects of collaboration.8 A trade-laden focus in the relationship put other aspects of the EU-India strategic partnership into the background even resulting in the lapse of three summit meetings. A concerted effort on both sides led to the resumption of summit meetings which took place in March 2016, just a few months before the EUGS was unveiled in the wake of catastrophic Brexit decision of the United Kingdom. While the EU-India relations are back on track, the context of their relationship— the liberal international order—is fast eroding, leaving a vacuum of leadership and giving rise to new political challenges.9 In this context the EUGS has become important in laying out the Union’s external relations and charting a role for itself while bringing about the convergence of values and interests. The EUGS clearly identified the growing multipolarity, and states that the EU finds itself in a polycentric world and so it advocated an approach for having greater ‘strategic autonomy’. While both the EU and India use the term ‘strategic autonomy’, it resonates differently for each partner. For India it was always part of its foreign policy goal; for the EU, it is a new idea, perhaps reflecting the changing context. As the workshop papers were being completed, two important developments took place that need to be part of this closing discussion: The outbreak and global spread of the COVID-19 virus is producing long-lasting political, economic, social, health and security issues which have impacted the capacities and capabilities of both the EU and India as actors. It has brought focus into the definition of global public goods, and public health has become a major point of engagement. It is in this context that the 15th EU-India Summit moved from a physical meeting to a virtual Summit and was a watershed moment as both sides completed 20 years of high-level bilateral engagement through summits. Before the 15th EU-India Summit, one question that loomed large was how each party would cooperate in a more differentiated world. 8 Regarding different possible scenarios of future cooperation between India and the EU see Benaglia

in this volume. a discussion of the prospects for India-EU cooperation in the framework of multilateralism and the changing global order see Singh in this volume.

9 For

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Undoubtedly, the EU-India Strategic Roadmap to 2025 expands the cooperation footprint of both actors, and looks at collaboration beyond the surface to strengthening the political dimension of the partnership in addressing global issues. It is about ‘partnering’ in leadership and recognising that there are now common threats and that geopolitics is realigning the engagement. While the bilateral trade and investment agreement was not concluded, it gave direction to taking it forward by giving a political commitment. More importantly, the Strategic Roadmap to 2025 has expanded the scope of political action by overcoming certain reluctances on both sides. The growing role of maritime security is a case in point as India seeks to work with the EU in redefining security cooperation and enhancing military-to-military cooperation. It is important to underline here that the partnership has evolved from its early days. Transforming political perception on both sides has also been key to impacting policy. This can be a defining moment and the start of a new decade of engagement between Brussels and New Delhi as they must rapidly adapt to the changing geopolitics also in the light of China’s role in the transmission of the pandemic disease The new roadmap is a commitment of political will with high ambitions and both sides have emphasised delivery in a time-bound manner in order to advance the partnership. For the analysts of EU-India relations, this new Strategic Roadmap offers diverse research opportunities to examine how both actors bring to the table a combination of leadership and resources to address their joint vision.

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Ummu Salma Bava is the Chairperson and a Jean Monnet Chair, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. With three decades of teaching and research, she is one of the leading Indian experts on the European Union, India and German foreign and security policy. Her other areas are regional integration and organisation, emerging powers, international politics, global governance, norms, peace and conflict studies. She has published extensively and is Member, Academic Advisory Board, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, and was Member of the Research Advisory Council of Germany’s leading think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Prof. Bava was conferred in January 2012 with the prestigious Order of Merit by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany.