Non-Western Global Theories of International Relations (Palgrave Studies in International Relations) 3030849376, 9783030849375

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PSIR · PALGRAVE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Non-Western Global Theories of International Relations

Edited by Samantha Cooke

Palgrave Studies in International Relations

Series Editors Mai’a K. Davis Cross, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA Benjamin de Carvalho, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway Shahar Hameiri, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD, Australia Knud Erik Jørgensen, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark Ole Jacob Sending, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway Ay¸se Zarakol, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Palgrave Studies in International Relations (the EISA book series), published in association with European International Studies Association, provides scholars with the best theoretically-informed scholarship on the global issues of our time. The series includes cuttingedge monographs and edited collections which bridge schools of thought and cross the boundaries of conventional fields of study. EISA members can access a 50% discount to PSIR, the EISA book series, here http://www.eisa-net.org/sitecore/content/be-bruga/mci-registrat ions/eisa/login/landing.aspx. Mai’a K. Davis Cross is the Edward W. Brooke Professor of Political Science at Northeastern University, USA, and Senior Researcher at the ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway. Benjamin de Carvalho is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway. Shahar Hameiri is Associate Professor of International Politics and Associate Director of the Graduate Centre in Governance and International Affairs, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, Australia. Knud Erik Jørgensen is Professor of International Relations at Aarhus University, Denmark, and at Ya¸sar University, Izmir, Turkey. Ole Jacob Sending is the Research Director at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway. Ay¸se Zarakol is Reader in International Relations at the University of Cambridge and a fellow at Emmanuel College, UK.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14619

Samantha Cooke Editor

Non-Western Global Theories of International Relations

Editor Samantha Cooke Natural and Social Sciences University of Gloucestershire Cheltenham, UK

Palgrave Studies in International Relations ISBN 978-3-030-84937-5 ISBN 978-3-030-84938-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84938-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Mina De La O This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This book is something I have wanted to create for quite a while. I would like to thank all the contributors for their efforts, and for the fascinating chapters they have produced. I have learnt so much from putting this book together and for that I am very grateful. I would also like to thank the Palgrave Macmillan team, especially Anca Pusca, for all of their help in guiding me through this process. Finally, I would like to say a huge thank you to my wonderful colleagues who have spent many hours listening to me as I worked through my ideas. You have all been amazing sounding boards, and I am here to return the favour whenever you need.

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Contents

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Introduction: Refocusing International Relations Samantha Cooke

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Part I Internationalising International Relations Theory 2

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Decentralising Europe: Harnessing Alternative Theories of IR Tareq Sydiq and Maria Ketzmerick

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Foreign Policy Analysis: Engagements Outside of the West Chris Featherstone

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Reimagining the Global Order: China in History and Theory Xin Liu

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Part II Decentralising the West: Redefining Key Concepts in IR 5

An East Asian Theory of Democracy Olivia Cheung

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Understanding People and the State: A Liberal and Neo-Confucian Comparison William Barclay

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CONTENTS

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Decolonising Empowerment in Africa: Illustration as a Tool Chesney McOmber and Katharine McNamara

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Part III Changing Frameworks: Re-imagining Political Issues 8

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Theorising Emotions in IR: A Maghrebi Perspective on the Concept of Rivalry Yasmine Zarhloule

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Gendered Activism and Political Participation: A Latin American Perspective Emanuela Buscemi

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Jihadi Wars and Hybrid Security Threats in Asia: Lessons from Pakistan Mudassir Farooqi

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Glossary of Terms

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

William Barclay has written essays which have been published by international organisations and peer-reviewed journals, such as the Aga Khan Foundation and the Journal of Liberty and International Affairs. Moreover, William is often invited to present his work at renowned international institutions and conferences, such as the University of Oxford and the ‘Annual Meeting of the Association for Israel Studies at the Berkeley School of Law’. In addition, William has captained multiple ‘Oxford Debate’ teams to victory, and he has received various awards and grants from celebrated organisations such as the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA). William is currently a political theorist at Carleton University. Emanuela Buscemi holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Aberdeen (Scotland) and teaches at the University of Monterrey (UDEM, Mexico). She previously taught at the American University of Kuwait. Her research interests include alternative social movements, informal activism and resistance, identity and gender politics, performance, agency and belonging in the Arabian Gulf and Latin America. Her work has been featured in the Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, Contemporary Social Science, About Gender-International Journal of Gender Studies, Democratization, as well as in edited volumes published by New York University Press, Routledge and Palgrave Macmillan. She is the coauthor (together with Ildiko Kaposi) of the edited volume Everyday Youth Cultures in the Gulf Peninsula: Changes and Challenges (Routledge, 2021). ix

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Olivia Cheung is a Research Fellow at SOAS China Institute, SOAS University of London. She is currently writing a book on The Political Thought of Xi Jinping with Steve Tsang. She obtained her D.Phil. from St Antony’s College, Oxford (as a Swire Scholar) and taught at the University of Warwick. Samantha Cooke holds a Ph.D. from the University of Surrey and is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Politics at the University of Gloucestershire. Her research explores the relationship between secularism, the individual and the state in the Middle East North Africa region, with a specific focus on gender equality within a postcolonial feminist framework. She also engages in education research, with social media and identity being amongst the areas she explores. Her publications include articles in National Identities, Women’s Studies International Forum and Education Information Technologies. She has also published a chapter with Marie Breen-Smyth in Terrorism and Political Violence: The evolution of contemporary insecurity (SAGE Publications, 2015). Mudassir Farooqi is Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations at Forman Christian College-University, Lahore, Pakistan. He obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Leicester and currently teaches on International Relations, the Politics of Terrorism, International Organisations, and Hybrid Warfare. His research interests primarily cover the fields of interdisciplinary research designs and mixed methods, branding of terrorism and counter-terrorism, warfare and social movements. He also researches new and old schools of terrorism, organisational forms of terrorism, autopoietic communicative conscious organisations, broadening paradigm of marketing and social enterprises. Chris Featherstone is an Early Career Researcher at the London School of Economics. His research focuses on US and UK foreign policy and Foreign Policy Analysis. His doctoral research looks at the US and UK decision-making processes that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He uses FPA models to explain the decision-making processes in the US and UK. Maria Ketzmerick is a Postdoctoral researcher and Lecturer at the Chair for Sociology of Africa at the University of Bayreuth. Her research focuses on topics within post/decolonial security research, Central Africa (especially Cameroon) in a regional, transnational and global context as well as approaches of (sociological) peace and conflict research. In doing so, she

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wants to contribute to an understanding of the ambivalent and complex interrelationships between locally rooted social dynamics, transnational politics and global change, and is particularly interested in the (politically loaded and power shaped) relationship between state and society and the associated dynamics of (in)security. Empirically, she is interested in situations in which (social) orders are subject to constant (re)negotiation and the question of how these orders are embedded in historical and geographical interdependencies in a globalised context. After studying Political Science, International Law, and Global Studies, she worked as a researcher at the collaborative research centre “Dynamics of Security” at the University of Marburg, before joining the chair group in April 2020. Xin Liu is a Senior Lecturer in International Theories and Chinese Studies at Liverpool John Moores University. His research is driven by the question of how non-Western experiences may unsettle the profane and rigid frameworks in mainstream IR theories. Calvin has published articles on China’s premodern state-formation, and the lessons of Chinese industrialisation for both liberal and realist theories. He is now developing new research programmes to investigate how modernity unfolds in both Western and non-Western daily lives in a comparative perspective. Katharine McNamara is a doctoral candidate at the University of Florida in the Department of Environmental and Global Health. Her longstanding involvement in gender and development research through initiatives led by USAID has led her to remain engaged in projects spanning public health, anthropology and international relations that seek to better understand how communities experience development policy and interventions. Katharine holds regional expertise in Latin America, where she has engaged in research in Honduras and Ecuador during her master’s and doctoral studies. As a current McKnight Doctoral Fellow and recipient of the Fulbright Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Award, her ongoing dissertation research addresses questions related to tensions between natural resource extraction, conservation and the Covid-19 pandemic in the province of Loja, Ecuador. Chesney McOmber is a political scientist who specialises in Comparative Politics and International Relations. Her research interests include international development, gender and politics, women’s empowerment, qualitative research methods and social learning. Her research explores the ways in which social inequities shape responses and resilience to

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environmental and public health crises. A central theme in her research is knowledge diffusion, with a particular interest in knowledge coproduction. Her fieldwork experience spans across sub-Saharan Africa, the MENA region, and South Asia. Dr. McOmber is currently a postdoctoral scholar at the University of Connecticut. Tareq Sydiq is a Researcher at the Center for Conflict Studies at PhilippsUniversität Marburg (Germany). He studied political science and sociology and is working on a Ph.D. on Bottom-Up politics in authoritarian systems using Iran as a single-case study. His research interests include Japanese politics, protests and contestations, as well as authoritarianism in Asia. Yasmine Zarhloule is a D.Phil. Candidate in Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Oxford. Her research explores the relationship between everyday life practices, citizenship and claims of political belonging in the borderland spaces in the Maghreb. She previously completed a B.A. (Hons) and M.A. in International Relations at the University of Warwick, as well as an M.Sc. in Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Oxford. She has held positions as a research consultant at the European Council of Foreign Relations (London), a research trainee at the Carnegie Middle East Centre (Beirut) and assistantships at both Warwick and Oxford universities. Her research interests include legacies of colonialism, urban geographies and the politics of space, as well as broader expressions of belonging, unity and micropolitics in the MENA.

Abbreviations

APS AQ AQI ASEAN BN BRI BRICS CA CARE International CCD CCP CGIAR CIA CL CNRP COBRA CPP CPV CTD DPJ FATA FPA GDP GLBM GLCM

Army Public School (Peshawar, Pakistan) Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda in Iraq Association for Southeast Asian Nations Barisan National Belt and Road Initiative Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa Community Affected Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere Community Concept Drawing The Chinese Communist Party Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Central Investigation Agency (USA) Community Leaders Cambodia National Rescue Party Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. Cambodia People’s Party Communist Party of Vietnam Counter Terrorism Department (Pakistan) Democratic Party of Japan Federally Administered Tribal Areas Foreign Policy Analysis Gross Domestic Product Ground Launched Ballistic Missile Ground Launched Cruise Missile xiii

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ABBREVIATIONS

GNP GWoT HES IMF IR KDB KMT KPK LDP MDG NLD OBL OIC PAP PBSC PH PLA PM PPP PRC PRP PSP PVM SAR SDG SP SSG TTP UN U.S.A. UN USAID USSR WEAI WoT WPK

Gross National Product Global War on Terrorism Higher Education Students International Monetary Fund International Relations Korea Democracy Barometer Kuomintang (The Chinese Nationalist Party) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Liberal Democratic Party Millennium Development Goals National League for Democracy Osama Bin Laden Organization of Islamic Countries People’s Action Party Political Bureau of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee Pakatan Harapan People’s Liberation Army Participatory Methods Purchasing Power Parity People’s Republic of China Lao People’s Revolutionary Party Progressive Singapore Party Participatory Visual Methods Special Administrative Regions Sustainable Development Goal Security Agency Personnel Special Services Group (Pakistan Army) Tehreek I Taliban in Pakistan United Nations United States of America United Nations United States Agency for International Development The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index War on Terrorism Worker’s Party of Korea

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Refocusing International Relations Samantha Cooke

Study Questions 1. Why is it important to understand non-Western perspectives? 2. How has the West come to dominate our understandings of international relations? 3. Can international relations theory ever be truly ‘international’? 4. Do we need to focus more on repositioning International Relations Theory or decentralising the West? 5. How do you understand ‘non-Western’? 6. What does a ‘global’ International Relations look like to you?

S. Cooke (B) School of Natural and Social Science, University of Gloucestershire, Cheltenham, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Cooke (ed.), Non-Western Global Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84938-2_1

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International Relations (IR) is a broad and complex field, dominated by Western thought, history and experiences which have been told, predominantly by white men. As we delve into the various facets of world politics, history and state relations in an ever more globalised world, it has become increasingly apparent that the number of voices being recognised and heard is limited, based on intersecting factors such as geographic location, race, sex and class. In order to ensure that the international component of International Relations is in fact, international, the way we engage with the subject needs to change. As the twenty-first century progresses, there has been an increase in calls to liberate, or decolonise, academic curriculums. Such calls reflect problems within the Western dominated field of IR and the lenses we use to understand issues and engagements within the international system. As those engaging in all aspects of the learning and teaching conversation of the broader field of IR try to bridge gaps, it is arguable that an approach similar to ‘add women and stir’, which has been criticised by Mohanty (2003), is being adopted so that perspectives which are not considered to be ‘mainstream’ are ‘included’ in discussions yet are not extensively engaged with. Whilst there are a significant number of textbooks engaging with IR theories (Baylis et al., 2020; Burchill et al., 2013; Dunne et al., 2013), providing regional contexts to IR theory (Fawcett, 2016), exploring nonWestern perspectives (Acharya & Buzan, 2010; Bischoff et al., 2016; Tickner & Smith, 2020), and seeking to explore why this Western centrism has emerged and how perspectives can be combined (Eun, 2019, there remains little engagement with non-Western IR theory without a regional approach being adopted. Moreover, it is important to understand different perspectives across the regions to ensure that when ‘regional perspectives’ are spoken of, they reflect a multitude of voices, rather than just the perspectives espoused by regional hegemons. Therefore, the aim of this book is to pick up some of the various conversations which have been started about shifting the focus from the Western way of understanding the international system and our interactions and moving more towards country specific focuses from across the globe. It does this by asking ‘what is international relations theory all about?’ and sub-questions such as ‘how do we understand?’ and ‘who decides what matters?’. The central aim of this book is to provide a more global understanding of IR (plural), rather than presenting a global understanding (singular).

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The way in which engagements within IR theories have developed over the last century has resulted in Western perspectives being presented as universal and that is something this book seeks to dislocate. Instead, by incorporating perspectives from Asia (see Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 10), the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region (see Chapters 3 and 8), Africa (Chapter 7) and Latin America (see Chapter 9), with some offering cross-regional perspectives (see Chapter 2), the contributors to this book collectively make this work more global in scope. The focus on non-Western perspectives does not however, mean that more traditionally engaged with perspectives, or Western states will be omitted (see Chapters 3 and 7). Instead, this book allows frequently engaged with theories, concepts and issues to be brought into discussions and comparisons rather than non-Western perspectives only being introduced to more traditionally focused debates. It is through this that similarities, differences and omissions can be brought to the fore of discussions and a new way of engaging with theories of IR can begin. This chapter will outline theories and perspectives outside of the normative Western frameworks, setting out the overarching focus of the book which is, what is non-Western theory? What is it all about? To engage with such questions, this chapter will begin by outlining key Western theories in IR and the criticisms which have arisen of them. It will emphasise omissions of history, context, individuals and culture in the theoretical approaches dominating IR, and how this has contributed to greater calls for greater understanding of the international system and the multitude of experiences and perspectives which operate within it. The chapter will then move to outline the detrimental nature of omitting perspectives of non-Western thinkers are illustrated, problematising the Western dominated discipline of IR as we understand it. The omissions of current texts that are engaged with in this introductory chapter thus pave the way for the contributing authors to provide insights into a myriad of different perspectives from across the world.

What Is Non-Western Theory? Non-Western theory, broadly speaking, refers to frameworks developed within the context of states which fall outside of the geographical remit of the ‘West’. This area includes states such as the US, Canada, Australia and Europe, with traditional IR theories being rooted in European history, with a strong emphasis on the Enlightenment period. These

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theories, however, are often omitted from mainstream IR, with theories rooted in Western history being used as frameworks for understanding political systems, conflict and the development of concepts frequently engaged with in the West, such as democracy, which emerged in diverging socio-political, cultural and historic contexts. As Robert Cox (1986, 207) said, ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, but what if these theories are not for everyone and are not as adaptable or applicable to diverging situations as mainstream IR might want you to believe? Criticisms of this nature are prominent throughout academia, reflecting in part, moves to liberate and decolonise the curriculum. The embeddedness of Western, predominantly European theory, in IR for understanding state interactions and behaviours, speaks loudly to Spivak (1999) and Chakrabarty’s (2000) assertion that Europe is everpresent in global history, politics and literature. Moreover, the less flexible theories, such as realism which failed to predict the end of the Cold War, mean that IR’s continued (over)reliance on them significantly restrict the potential of the field and omit localised perspectives. Furthermore, the positioning of the state as the main actor for theories such as realism, liberalism, the English School, arguably determines the identity of IR as being more focused on macro level politics. This presentation of universalising thought as frameworks for understanding state relations and behaviour are detrimental to our understanding of how politics has developed, reinforcing instead colonial and European narratives in some instances, and a lack of acknowledgement and understanding of states which have emerged within different historical contexts to those directing the conversation. More critical perspectives, such as Marxist theories, postcolonialism and feminism, have sought to challenge these homogenised representations through engagements with intersecting identity factors as well as the incorporation of experience into their work. Whilst this refocusing does allow for more nuanced insights to be gained, criticisms of their Western-centric approach, alternative homogenisations and individuals being spoken for; thus, resulting in a larger, but still limited set of voices speaking on behalf of a greater range of identities and experiences. IR as a field, has historically been represented by white men. This move to diversify the discipline has been successful in some respects, but this shift still has a prominent Western identity. This raises questions, such as those posed by Acharya and Buzan (2010, 4) about ‘whether IR theory

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needs to be universal in scope (i.e., applying to the whole system) or can also be exceptionalist (applying to a subsystem on the grounds that it has distinctive characteristics)’. This then raises the question of why can it not be both? International Relations theory should offer models for understanding, as Featherstone (Chapter 3) highlights, which are adaptable to diverging state contexts, whilst maintaining conversations with alternative models; thereby enabling more malleable and context appropriate frameworks, which can inform each other, to emerge for understanding core components of IR, such as identity and power.

Identity Identity is always established through comparison, whether this be with another person or state. IR theory ultimately explores different identity factors, such as state interactions and their behaviours by offering frames of reference. When considering theses identities, actors and engagements however, one of the main questions which needs to be addressed, especially when referring to more traditional theoretical perspectives, is what is the state? Simply put, a state is a geographically defined, whose sovereignty is recognised by other states. This is the first step in identifying a state. Ascribing an identity or recognising one when referring to the state speaks to its position on the regional and international stages, and ultimately, how much power this state is seen to have/has accumulated. Sovereignty refers to the ability of a state to self-govern or govern another state. There are four key criteria which need to be met in order for a state to be recognised as sovereign. These are a clearly defined territory, a government, a population to rule, and the ability to engage in inter-state relations.

It is through understandings and engagements with various forms of power, that state and individual identities become more visible. In his seminal work, Orientialism, Said (1978/2003) speaks to Western dominance and portrayals of the ‘Orient’ and their positioning, predominantly through European colonial interactions, which were later followed by US expansionism, and how they have been used to created and re-create representations of states and their citizens.

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Such representations have been key in justifying foreign policies and imperial engagements, historic and contemporary, and the continued use of traditional theories, such as liberalism and realism, to develop responses to situations in historically, geographically and culturally different states, results in policy failures and inadequate solutions. The rationale behind this book is, that whilst there is a greater level of engagement with theories and approaches which have emerged outside of the West, there is still a long way to go in repositioning Western theory within IR. The phrase ‘repositioning’ is preferred, in this chapter, to ‘decentralising’ due to risks that the latter has for once again positioning Western perspectives at the core of the project. This does not mean that existing works on non-Western theories, or theories from the Global South have done this, nor does it mean that future works engaging with it will do so. Rather, this picks up on something Liu (Chapter 4) refers to, which reinforced ideas that by narrowly focusing on the decentralisation of Western theory, not only does it remain centralised in that work, but it also increases the chance of another perspective replacing it, thus creating something akin to a ‘centrism trap’. By engaging more with the concept of repositioning, this book encourages critical engagements with (non)mainstream Western and nonWestern theories as strengths and weaknesses in both provide more contextually appropriate insights into micro and macro aspects of IR. Moreover, by reflecting on terminology and the power it holds, this chapter argues that repositioning both Western and non-Western theories on the spectrum of International Relations allows for conversations to occur between models and frames of reference across states and regions, as mentioned by Featherstone (Chapter 3), thereby enabling a more global understanding and a more international identity of IR to develop.

Power Power is arguably something every state and everyone seeks, and it is a type of relationship which Foucault (1982, 794) defines as a ‘strategy of struggle’ which results in confrontation. Such power relations can be understood to form around ideas relating to hegemonic masculinity, which informs different models of patriarchal power structures. Similarities between such relationships hinge on notions of the ‘powerful’ and the ‘powerless’, with Scott’s (1985) ‘weapons of the weak’ emerging

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from “hidden transcripts” of resistant action of the apparently powerless’ (Briggs & Sharp, 2004, 666). Power, for radical feminists, impacts all aspects of society and as a consequence of this, the personal is political, and politics equates to power which ‘defines all relationships’ (Bethke Elsthain, 1981, 217). hooks (1984, 84) defines power as being about having domination and control over another person, thus speaking to power structures which are seen at all levels in IR. For states however, it might be considered dangerous to gain too much power, for example, seeking hegemony, with defensive realists prioritising security. Contrastingly, offensive realists focus more on survival within the international system and this results in the most amount of power being sought, with an emphasis on military capabilities. As states engage with the international system and outline their relationship with power, it is here that state identities become increasingly visible. There is the risk however, of generalisations being made about a state based on this behaviour due to the dichotomisation of state relations with power, with there being recognition of states either being powerful or not. The emergence of the BRICS states does challenge this binary understanding, presenting power as a spectrum which they are travelling across. Power has a multitude of meanings. Here it reflects to the ability to affect change through influence and action (and possibly coercion)—this reflects having the power to do something. It also refers to the ability to make others behave in a specific way, this speaks to ideas of power over someone.

Despite this, International Relations in the West, which has grown to represent IR more broadly, especially in relation to theoretical thinking, ‘is informed by Western e.g., the state, power, order, regimes, interdependence, etc., and Western analyses and unsurprisingly, paint pictures of the world that confirm the usefulness of these framing. Too often there is in this work the implicit assumption that Western analytical concepts universally acceptable and unquestionably valid’ (Puchala, 1997, 129). There is no denying of the useful insights which have occurred as a result of using Western theory to frame aspects of IR, but there is also no denying the harm it has done in inadequately recognising different experiences, concepts and culture of states outside of the West.

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The multifarious and subjective nature of concepts like power, are the focal points of the chapters in this book, with McOmber and McNamara (Chapter 7) highlighting the need to reposition understandings at the micro level. Therefore, this chapter not only calls for the repositioning of IR theories rather than just focusing on the decentralisation of the West, but it also argues for the need to accompany it with recognition of the international permeating the national and the local levels.

Conclusion This book is the result of many conversations about the inadequacy of mainstream IR theory to offer a more global understanding of politics, power, state relations and the role of the individual in formulating understandings. What mainstream IR theory offers is a narrative of world politics which cannot be told without the US at its core, or predominantly European theory framing our understandings. Conversations have started about how to change this rhetoric, encourage more diverse lines of inquiry and allow perspectives and understandings emerging from different contexts to be explored and utilised. This is the conversation this book seeks to build on, but with an awareness of the risk of keeping the West as the focal point, even as we seek to dislocate it from the core of IR. Whilst this chapter has highlighted potential risks in labelling this reorientation as a decentralisation and argues for greater recognition of there being a spectrum in IR, this does not mean that Western IR theory should be ignored. Through addressing different experiences with power and acknowledging different identities at all levels, this chapter argues a global IR (singular) is not possible and is not something that we as members of this diverse global community, should seek to achieve. Instead, it argues that a repositioning of theory, and reframing of concepts, is possible, with theoretical variants permitting greater insights into the incomplete-able puzzle of International Relations; therefore, enabling us to further engage with global International Relations (plural).

How to Use This Book The ultimate purpose of this book is to function as a textbook for students and educators in Higher Education. There is no assumed knowledge of IR theories, the concepts explored, or the states being discussed, with

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key concepts being defined in each chapter. Each contribution starts with six study questions, with the intention of encouraging users of the book to critically engage with each chapter from the outset. By placing these study questions at the beginning, they can also serve to guide users as they engage with each chapter. There are two key concept boxes in each chapter too, providing greater context to the chapters and allowing users to reflect on how they may have understood them initially. In addition to this there are two classroom activities at the end of each chapter. Contributors designed these activities with the overarching themes of repositioning the West and critical engagement in mind. These can be used by educators who seek to incorporate these key points of discussion into their lessons. Finally, each chapter provides a list of further readings for users of this book to engage with. Based on the focus of this book, and the need to reposition IR in a more global setting, some of these articles are not in English. Some contributors chose not to include non-English sources due to factors such as their positionality, access and context suitability. The rationale for including such sources is to further bridge the gaps between existing ways of producing knowledge by incorporating research published in another language. Through the incorporation of other language sources, the chapters further contribute to the dislocation of the West, and whilst most languages are European, not all are, and this allows for greater engagement with a broader range of literature for multilingual users of this book.

Book Structure This book is comprised of three parts, each engaging with core components of IR and its associated theories. Part 1, Internationalising International Relations Theory, engages with theoretical lessons and challenges from IR, exploring how reciprocal relationships are required between theoretical and conceptual developments globally. This places emphasis on one of the main objectives of this book which is to present a more global understanding, rather than a global understanding of IR by highlighting the conversations which need to happen to allow theory and understanding to continue developing, rather than stagnating and remaining underdeveloped.

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The first chapter in this part (Chapter 2, Sydiq & Ketzmerick) provides a predominantly methodological contribution to working with and incorporating non-Western theory. Through their engagement with Nahda, Négritude and Nihonjinron spots of literature, they encourage a crossregional, comparative reading of spots of literature to avoid Eurocentrism dominating theoretical frameworks and interpretations. They also speak to spatial and interpersonal connections between authors through the use of ‘spots’ rather than ‘areas’ of literature, thus emphasising the application of non-Western thought beyond their socio-political contexts. This notion of cross-contextual and cross-regional applications and discussions is continued in Chapter 3 (Featherstone), which explores Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Recognising that FPA is well established within the West, Featherstone highlights how it is emerging at different rates across Latin America, and how this is more advanced than the Chinese model. This chapter does 3 key things, firstly it uses the case of Iraq (2003) as an example of how to apply FPA, whilst reflecting on the significance of researcher positionality and training on how this is done and drawing on some aspects brought through in Latin American FPA. The second thing it does, is call for Western models to be more open to adopting and adapting aspects from models which have developed elsewhere, thereby challenging the prominence of Western FPA by reasserting that there is no ‘one-size fits all’. This is where models from the ‘Global South’ are further ahead, meaning that Western FPA must play catch up. Finally, it highlights how aspects of Western model(s) are visible in other models. Recognition of shared elements reinforces this chapter’s argument that more global engagement and context appropriate research is possible if a fluid relationship of sharing, adopting and adapting FPA models at the state and regional level occurs. Chapter 4 (Liu) builds on an emergent theme from the other two chapters, arguing that we cannot be preoccupied with Wester/Eurocentrism, warning that this focus could result in us falling into another ‘centrist’ trap, with another perspective rising to take the stage. Focusing exclusively on China, this chapter argues that the concept of Balance of Power was never able to really develop within the South East Asian context and no ‘balancing’ behaviour against China has been observed by other states in the region. Moreover, Liu highlights how descriptive accounts of history places more focus on hierarchy over anarchy due to the impact of cultural influences on state interactions;

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whilst also outlining challenges to Euro and Sino-centric cultural explanations. Finally, the chapter explores how Chinese historical traditions and modern legacies should be explored as both theories and methods for transcending the problem of Eurocentrism. Part 2 of this book, Decentralising the West: Redefining Key Concepts in IR, builds on these arguments and recommendations by narrowing its attention to four core concepts of IR. This allows for context specific definitions and understandings to emerge, whilst simultaneously critiquing the continued application of Western definitions and models. Moreover, each chapter addresses the issue of homogenised understandings, not only through the application of a Western lens, but also by adopting regionalised lenses rather than state specific ones. In Chapter 5, Cheung speaks to the concept of democracy through an exploration of different regime types and engagements with it throughout Asia. Three core regime types are explored throughout this chapter; democracies, pseudo-democracies and authoritarian regimes, and these are accompanied by sub-models which emerge. By providing a regional overview of democracy and how useful it is to apply modernisation theory to the region, Cheung asks how East Asian’s understand democracy and highlights the limited successes associated with this theoretical application in South East Asia. Chapter 6 (Barclay) continues to challenge Western centrism and the perceived superiority of traditional IR theory by focusing on the concepts of the state and the individual and how contextually diverse frameworks allocate differing levels of significance to them. Throughout this chapter, Barclay engages with a dual comparison. The first explores the differences between Liberalism and Neo-Confucianism and the second is between state engagement with the concepts of objectives and national interest in the US and China. By comparing Western and non-Western theories and states, this chapter provides insights into the divergent nature of each framework and the significance of refocusing our attentions to contextually appropriate lenses which challenge Western centrism. Overall, this chapter serves as a critique of liberalism which has not enabled the US to sustain its global position and highlights how Western-centric/developed perspectives do not necessarily guarantee longevity of successes, therefore more regional and/or state specific frameworks need to be rigorously engaged with and understood. In Chapter 7, McOmber and McNamara engage with power and empowerment, which are prominent themes throughout this book. They

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challenge Western notions and methods of engagement by highlighting the need to engage with micro, instead of macro, level politics and they do this via community level focus groups in Kenya and Morocco. The chapter also reinforces that there are alternatives to Western theoretical understandings and methodological engagements, and this is achieved through the development of Community Concept Drawings (CCD). Finally, they argue that there is no single definition for either of these concepts as they are context specific and socially constructed. From this, the case is made to decentralise the state, with communities becoming the referent object. The final part of this book, Changing Frameworks: Reimagining Political Issues, engages with the three broad categories of political ‘issues’ of conflict, activism and terrorism. By situating these issues outside of the West, it becomes possible to view and engage with them in more critical and insightful ways. Each chapter also challenges the dominance of Western-centric theories of IR, with Chapters 8 and 9 building on earlier calls to decentralise the state and focus more on micro level politics. Chapter 8 (Zarhloule) reiterates earlier calls to decentralise the state as the main focal point of international relations, calling to explore the significance of emotions in state politics, especially in relation to concepts of national pride and the production of space as a national unit. It is because of this that Zarhloule argues in favour of a shift away from theories such as Realism at the macro level is needed. By focusing on emotions’ role in border conflicts, such as those between Morocco and Algeria, we are able to begin moving beyond the fixed ‘categories through which Maghreb/inter-state relations of rivalry are often analysed. Moreover, the chapter argues that emotion is a key determinant in discourses surrounding and shaping (post)colonial state’s identities, whilst also being key to broader state, regional and global pictures. Finally, the chapter advocates a growth in discussion and interdisciplinarity between emotions in IR and non-Western scholarship as most seminal works have been based, so far, on the modern Western state and its production of emotional discourses. The call to move from macro to micro level politics is continued in Chapter 9, with Buscemi focusing on localised narratives and experiences. She challenges and calls for a shift away from the continuation of colonial rhetoric through activism and feminism which it rooted in European concepts. Moreover, the chapter critiques Western/Euro-centric approaches for the continuation of the rhetoric of (colonial) oppression through such political engagements. By engaging with these narratives

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and experiences, the chapter repositions the concept of power, within a Latin American context, in a more localised framework. The book concludes with insights from Pakistan and their experiences with the Global War on Terror (GWoT). In Chapter 10, Farooqi builds on Western understandings of conflict, highlighting alternative lenses which emerge from Pakistan. The success of non-intervention approaches with national militaries is emphasised, accompanying the impact of the GWoT on Pakistan, their response, and civilians. Through this engagement with existing literature, historic contextualisation of the state experiences with Jihadism and, emphasising the role of non-state actors, the chapter explores hybrid security threats. Subsequently, this chapter expands security concepts beyond a Western paradigm, offering alternative perspectives to understand the multifaceted nature of the GWoT.

Classroom Activities Classroom Activity 1 Choose one of the study questions from the beginning of this chapter and get participants to come up with their best answer. Once they have done this, get them into pairs and get them to agree on an answer. Then put two pairs together and repeat this process until you have 2 large groups. Get the groups to present and defend their answers. How did they get to that point? Do they agree with the other groups answer? Why (not)? Classroom Activity 2 Split the class into groups of no more than 4 and allocate each group a core concept from this chapter. Give them some time to brain-write their ideas before bringing them back to their group. They need to think about how they understand the concept and how it relates to IR theory and its repositioning. They should also consider whether their own understanding of the concept has changed since, if so how? Once each group has their ideas, get them to write their ideas on a whiteboard/flipchart paper. Each group will then move around the other groups work. They may add to what the other group has written, but nothing can be removed. By the end of the session, you will have comprehensive understandings and reflections on these concepts. Encourage students to take

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photographs of these or take photos yourself and upload them to a VLE site if you are using one.

Bibliography Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (2010). Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction. In A. Acharya & B. Buzan (Eds.), NonWestern international relations theory (pp. 1–25). Routledge. Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2020). The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations. Oxford University Press. Bethke Elshtain, J. (1981). Public man, private woman: Women in social and political thought. Princeton University Press. Bischoff, P. H., Aning, K., & Acharya, A. (Eds.). (2016). Africa in Global International Relations: Emerging approaches to theory and practice. Briggs, J., & Sharp, J. (2004). Indigenous knowledges and development: A postcolonial caution. Third World Quarterly, 25(4), 661–676. Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Nardin, T., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., & True, J. (2013). Theories of international relations. Macmillan International Higher Education. Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference. Princeton University Press. Cox, R. (1986). Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. In R. O. Keohane (Ed.), Neorealism and its critics (pp. 204– 254). Columbia University Press. Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (Eds.). (2013). International relations theories. Oxford University Press. Eun, Y. S. (2019). Opening up the debate over ‘non-western’ international relations. Politics, 39(1), 4–17. Fawcett, L. (Ed.). (2016). International relations of the Middle East. Oxford University Press. Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. Critical Inquiry, 8(4), 777–795. hooks, b. (1984). Feminist theory: From margin to centre (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: South End Press Classics. Mohanty, C. T. (2003). “Under western eyes” Revisited: Feminist solidarity through anticapitalist struggles. Signs, 2, 499–535. Puchala, D. J. (1997). Some non-Western perspectives on international relations. Journal of Peace Research, 34(2), 129–134. Said, E. (1978/2003). Orientalism. London: Penguin Books. Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. Yale University Press. Spivak. Spivak, G. C. (1999). A critique of postcolonial reason: Toward a history of the vanishing present. London: Harvard University Press.

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Tickner, A. B., & Smith, K. (Eds.). (2020). International relations from the global South: Worlds of difference. Routledge.

Further Readings Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (2007). Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7 (3), 287–312. Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (2017). Why is there no non-western international relations theory? Ten years on. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 17 (3), 341–370. Bilgin, P. (2020). Opening up international relations, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love non-Western IR. Edward Elgar Publishing. Blanchard, E. M., & Lin, S. (2016). Gender and non-western “global” IR: Where are the women in Chinese International Relations Theory? International Studies Review, 18(1), 48–61. Eun, Y. S. (2019). Opening up the debate over ‘non-western’ international relations. Politics, 39(1), 4–17. Milner, A., & Kasim, S. M. (2018). Beyond sovereignty: Non-Western international relations in Malaysia’s foreign relations. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 40(3), 371–396. Rengger, N., & Thirkell-White, B. (2007). Introduction: Still critical after all these years? The past, present and future of Critical Theory in International Relations. Review of International Studies, 33(2007), 3–24. Shani, G. (2008). Toward a post-Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and critical international relations theory. International Studies Review, 10(4), 722–734. Shilliam, R. (Ed.). (2010). International relations and non-Western thought: Imperialism, colonialism and investigations of global modernity. Routledge. Tickner, A. B., & Smith, K. (Eds.). (2020). International relations from the global South: Worlds of difference. Routledge.

PART I

Internationalising International Relations Theory

CHAPTER 2

Decentralising Europe: Harnessing Alternative Theories of IR Tareq Sydiq and Maria Ketzmerick

Study Questions 1. How has the current global order affected how we engage with IR? 2. Why is it important to move beyond Europe and the West when developing frameworks for understanding IR? 3. How do we decide what is important? Who decides? 4. What insights do comparative readings provide? 5. What can be considered non-Western theory?

T. Sydiq (B) University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] M. Ketzmerick University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Cooke (ed.), Non-Western Global Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84938-2_2

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6. What similarities and differences do these spots of literature have?

The call to actively read, analyse, and use non-Western theories has been around for some time in most disciplines of social sciences, with many scholars linking knowledge production to the access to power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020; Quijano, 2000). Demand for theories that were not produced in the Global North1 is equally high in the area of peace and conflict research. However, even though literature from non-European contexts does exist and is made available to Western audiences, it is oftentimes not read in academic teaching due to different reasons ranging from access, translation, and comparability and is quoted poorly. Where only specialised academic training provides the kind of access and language capacity to examine non-Western literature, their inclusion in comparative readings is further hindered. In order to alleviate this, we suggest comparative reading of regionalised spots of literature production, highlighting their value for the global International Relations (IR) project (Acharya, 2014; Anderl & Witt, 2020). To incorporate such literature, we identify spots of literature outside of Western literature and relate them first to one another, and then to wider IR literature. This approach builds on contemporary debates, as postcolonial and decolonial research in many disciplines appears to be entering a new stage. It is moving past early critiques of academic writings, disciplines, and syllabi as colonial and racist, and towards showing the potential of these approaches to understand transnational interconnections in world politics (Bhambra, 2014). Whereas it seems evident from a postcolonial or critical perspective that a distinct positionality leads to specific view of the world (DuBois, 2007; Fanon, 2008), this is not entirely reflected in academia. Nevertheless, a West and the Rest dichotomy, precisely one relating to nuanced differences content-wise, has its own challenges, namely one of the distinct categories. For assigning a scholar, a label as “Northern” or “Southern” runs the danger of overemphasising or essentialising these categories, particularly when they do not seem straightforward or salient. If these categories are more than 1 By Global North and Global South we refer to the imaginaries of geographical, political and economic difference that were established in imperial intervention. Out of of these processes, the Global North appears to be the centre whereas the Global South is imagined as periphery (Tafira & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018).

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descriptive containers, we should be able to identify concepts and ideas unique to their non-Western positionality, enabling us to draw them into debates on theory building. This raises two problems: One of positionality, and one of theoretical content which emerges from such positionalities. We focus on self-referential spots of literature rather than dichotomies as our object of comparison, using comparative reading to derive ideas unique to their positionality rather than ideas unique to their socio-political histories. This chapter highlights the need for more cross-regional comparisons of non-Western scholars, as such endeavours can reveal ideas beyond casesensitive debates. We argue that a close reading of non-Western bodies of literature shows that not only do non-Western theories exist, but that they specifically share distinct and relevant questions and ideas which reveal themselves and more importantly their commonalities through such a comparative reading in political philosophy. Therefore, our question is whether or not decidedly non-Western theories on the world order, interrelations, and mobilities exist, and if so, what their commonalities, differences, and references are. In turn, this would contribute to larger debates on decolonialising political theory by providing further evidence that positionality matters content-wise and opens up debates on how to incorporate said content into IR theory. This chapter therefore explores the following research question: How does non-Western theory change the perception of the world order and present it differently? Following both interests, the paper proceeds on two stages: Firstly, we will outline the potential of three spots of non-Western thinking across time and place and their potential for IR research—Nahda, Négritude, and Nihonjinron. Secondly, through our comparative lens, we discuss differences, challenges, and common patterns regarding ideas of their self-positioning within a given order, interrelations and exchange, and modernity. To answer the question, the chapter moves to outline the relevance of reflecting the knowledge production and the practice of teaching it. We then focus on our case selections, which is followed by a discussion of our findings. In the conclusion, we draw links to further research fields and embed our results in the wider frame of global power struggles, calling for more comparative approaches in incorporating non-Western thought.

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What Is Theory in De-/Postcolonial IR? The chapter’s interest in non-Western theory production mirrors several international relations and peace and conflict studies debates. A core question centres around what follows from a need to decolonise the discipline in order to make pluralistic knowledges visible by simultaneously acknowledging the global power relations. Existing critique of Western theories as racist or colonial, implies a second step—conceptualising what actually is a way to decolonise a discipline. Embedded in this is the question of what is considered theory and why some scholars are not part of the canon and represent the Non-West.

Decolonising Academia and Research of International Politics? Using Social Standpoints as Spots of Literature Western/Non-Western Thought and Spots of Literature While debates in IR have emphasised a need to incorporate non-Western thought, methods of doing so and questions of what exactly constitutes non-Western thought prevail. Since biographies oftentimes transcend categories, bodies of self-referential literature are more easily identifiable than individual authors. We call these bodies of literature with specific, non-Western audiences “spots of literature”.

Since their emergence, postcolonial and decolonial theories have had a huge impact on academic disciplines, such as the social sciences, by questioning knowledge production in academia against the background of global power hierarchies. Accordingly, as Go (2013, 2016) points out, the integration of the postcolonial question strengthens and enriches our understanding of the world in which we live; processes of globalisation and the international order could be a postcolonial social science better explained and understood in its dynamics ‘[o]ne might even say, that social sciences is obliged to engage with postcolonial theory’ (Go, 2016, 15). A postcolonial perspective allows a transnational or global historiography and overcomes the territorial demarcations between nations (Go, 2016, 15). Correspondingly postcolonial works are not interested in concepts that are collectively applicable to societies but for moments

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of transition, discontinuities and change, and hybridity within the North– South encounter—a perspective which helps to situate the ideas raised in the spots of literature we compared. Equally, in IR, postcolonial thought and the need to decolonise research were addressed to make research topics more global and plural (Bendix et al., 2020; Jones, 2006; Nayak & Selbin, 2013). This interest led to researchers increasingly focusing on experiences from the Global South and the non-West in their work. Currently, there are many scholars who explicitly work on decolonial and postcolonial research approaches (Bhambra & Santos, 2017; Go, 2016; Quijano, 2000), while others continue to seek mediation between international relations and decolonial concepts (Gilroy, 2004; Sabaratnam, 2017; Shilliam, 2010). These research approaches combine the conceptual inclusion of various historical experiences, including colonial, to reduce the dividing line between North–South relations. The debate is primarily dominated by the notion that current knowledge and theory production is linked to Western thought by considering others as regional or local (Dabashi, 2015). “Western” thought and epistemologies have come up as a major point of critique, considered to be exclusive to Southern thought, prompting agendas of incorporating them into the wider academic debate. To approach this challenge, Sabaratnam (2011, 2) suggested six intellectual strategies to bring in new subjects to IR research, which “aim at reconfiguring our understanding of world politics through subjecting its main perspectives to philosophical and empirical challenges”. These strategies support the development of hands-on strategies to reflect on research being done. Another contribution to exemplify the decolonisation of Western knowledge production is Ndlovu-Gatshenis’ edited volume “Decolonizing the University, Knowledge Systems and Disciplines in Africa” (2016), which discusses the potential of critical analysis for concepts and research questions in several subdisciplines. The essential question of bridging theoretical and practical knowledge production is further discussed in many ways under the headline of decolonising methodologies, with some scholars deliberately integrating indigenous knowledge (Exo, 2018; Smith, 1999). The criticism expressed therein also impacts the nature of research, primarily discussed under the name of collaborative research (Bouka 2018; Lottholz, 2018; Poets 2020). By applying the methodology of decentred comparative reading, we engage in grasping knowledge production in the non-West.

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However, whereas academia made great strides forward in reflecting binaries, concepts, and theories, their incorporation appears to require huge efforts still even when pursued as Shilliam observes, that topoi in postcolonial research have their filaments rooted in the extra-academic intellectual work in the liberation struggles in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Rutazibwa & Shilliam, 2018). He refers to different concepts and respective non-Western authors, such as Suzanne Césaire, to exemplify his observation (Shilliam, 2017). However, to research visions of internationalism as suggested by Shilliam, appears to be a difficult endeavour since there is a tendency that mainly Western authors discuss the critical potential of postcolonial spaces by using theories of Western scholars. By taking up this critique, we follow Shilliam’s method of following non-Western intellectual thought concepts and suggest reading non-Western texts closely. The collection of texts, theories, and perspectives about the nonWest or Global South raised a significant point within the debate on decolonising academic agendas: Who belongs to the Global South and what can be considered non-Western theory? While there may be a core literature associated with "Southern" thought, distinctions between a Northern/Southern dichotomy become tricky at its fringes. For example, while many scholars may be assigned the label of “Southern” or “NonWestern” to share a biographic background situated in the Global South, they may be part of Western academia, publishing in Western languages for Western audiences. This dilemma can be illustrated by thinking of the fluidity of identities. Is a scholar born outside of Europe, but studying and working in Europe, being referenced primarily by European scholars, ultimately a European or a non-European scholar? And crucially, at least in the context of this chapter, can we consider their academic work non-Western? Regarding debates on Western/non-Western theory, identification of scholars’ multiple, shifting positionalities, their audiences and references overlap. As Julian Go (2013) points out, the subaltern standpoint is of importance to include plural and diverse experiences, positionalities, and viewpoints. However, many examples show that focusing solely on positionality can mask crucial and critical potential since it cannot be assumed that including authors based in the “non-West” will necessarily bring an increase in postcolonial perspectives (Tickner & Wæver, 2009). Positionality cannot be easily equated with perspective. Thus, identifying whether

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a different epistemological background, rooted in different power structures, would produce different thought is key. Approximating this, we focus on the existence of commonalities across thoughts that shares these backgrounds, with strong implications that they produce differences in thought. In turn, this would lend further support for approaches encouraging to read more texts that do not originate in the Global North and work out what they entail analytically. Due to constraints on conducting a holistic research, selecting cases becomes necessary, and lacking a distinct identification of Southern thought, case selection is crucial in pursuing our question. The use of the country of residence or the geo-cultural location as an indicator might be misleading and trumping the very basic premise. Yet, even looking at authors’ personal backgrounds and their course of academic training, would reveal that scholars from non-Western backgrounds are successful in Western institutions and vice versa. By this approach the binary structure of West/Non-West is not only highlighted but even emphasised. We address these hybrid structures and conflicts between the author’s positionality and the content of their writing by identifying spots of literature that emerged as self-referential bodies of research and combine both non-Western positionalities of their respective authors and non-Western audiences. These selected cases circumvent such a hybrid structure of West/non-West and show overlap in their distinctly non-Western thought.

Academic Knowledge Production: What is IR Theory? Closely linked to debates on decolonising academia are reflections about the thinking about the thinking in IR and the extended power mechanisms of knowledge production led (and still lead) to the exclusion of ideas. Essentially, the text’s revaluation as of theoretical value concerning nonWestern theories is important since the exclusion is often based on the assumption that it is not theoretical (enough). So, it is necessary to look closer on theory to develop an understanding of premises. According to Berenskoetter (2018, 23), in mainstream IR the purpose and function of theory can be differentiated between three kinds of attitude: “theory as an analytical tool that offers timeless explanations (‘explanatory’); theory as a historically situated and subjective perspective with a normative thrust (‘reflexive’); theory as an ideology intertwined

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with political agendas that need to be deconstructed (‘critical’)”. This reflection on the premise of producing critical academic knowledge, has resulted in postcolonial researchers, such as Sabaratnam (2011) and Bertrand (2018), arguing that this self-positioning has become affirmative. Theory has been mostly discussed as a body of modern academic literature, despite other conceptualisations existing both in academic and activist discourses, with the exclusion of other bodies of thought occurring by default. This process of exclusion is evident in the case of Carolina Maria de Jesus, whose “Quarto de Despejo” was rejected at first, as she remarked: “When I first gave my manuscript to Brazilian editors they laughed […] They told me I should write on toilet paper” (de Jesus et al., 1999, 7). Her book eventually succeeded as an internationally acclaimed bestseller, but only after deletions by her editors which presented a “feisty, opinionated” woman who laid blame on officials for the conditions of the poor as a “docile, wistful, and seemingly reluctant” fatalist (de Jesus et al., 1999, 15). These resulted in two separate publications; “Child of Dark. The Diary of Carolina Maria de Jesus” (de Jesus, 1962), a translation of the original edited version, and “The Unedited Diaries of Carolina Maria de Jesus” (de Jesus et al., 1999), both of which resonated with students of Brazilian politics and activists alike—in particular the Afrobrazilian Niger Circle, who placed de Jesus’ photograph in their magazine cover (de Jesus et al., 1999, 8). Annie Ernaux’s book “The Years” (2017),2 in which she explores her own biography but is read as an anthropological observation of two generations of class struggle, should also be considered. Not meant as a theoretical production, these books stimulated academic research by reflecting on identity and class questions between the collective and personal developments. However, biographical observation, poems, and prosaic texts which can be seen with the contributions by Senghor (1966) and Césaire (1972), who influenced with their writings, stimulated theoretical production immensely. The link between IR theory and knowledge production is made, among others, by Bueger and Gadinger (2018), and Berenskoetter (2018) via the analysis of textbooks, which, according to them, “show IR as a more or less ‘ordered system’ and ‘unified organic whole’, thereby also delineating it as a distinct body of knowledge. More precisely, these collections present an image of IR and an image of its subject matter.

2 Other examples include Eribon (2013), Mau (2019) and Nkrumah (1971).

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They give students a sense of the world as it was, is and may be; they tell stories about where and how international relations take place that influence students’ worldviews and, hence, their orientation as citizens and political actors” (Berenskoetter 2018, 446). Despite the important observation about representation in textbooks, it is up to speculation on how textbooks actually impact teaching and learning. This underlies our perspective pursuing two aims: The first is academic curiosity—What can non-Western theories tell us? The second is, what can a broadened understanding of theoretical production help us to understand? By combining both questions, we aim to understand the extent to which a comparative reading of non-Western textual productions can support an understanding of the authors’ belonging to the world, their orientations, and self-perceptions.

Comparative Reading in IR Theory Decentred Comparative Reading As one strategy to grasp thinking and knowledge production from the non-West, we suggest using a decentred comparative reading of different spots of literature. A close reading of non-Western bodies of literature shows that not only do non-Western theories exist, but that they specifically share distinct and relevant questions and ideas which reveal themselves and more importantly their commonalities through such a comparative reading. Since there is a broad range of regionally and politically different bodies of literature, we suggest to pursuing an approach of dissimilar case design, since similarities in ideas and thinking highlights the positionality in the non-West that determine these commonalities independent from ideas in the Global North.

The ambiguities mentioned above regarding identifying non-Western textual productions pose a major methodological challenge for us when designing our research strategy. We address them by following four guidelines: First, as our research interests lie in commonalities, particularly in ideas and thoughts shared among non-Western thinkers, we needed to look at a broad range of regionally and politically different bodies of literature. Our rationale is that a high degree of dissimilarity in other variables would strengthen our argument regarding similarities in ideas, that is that

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their positionality in the non-West did indeed determine these commonalities (and not other variables they may have in common). We are thus pursuing an approach of dissimilar case design, in line with Mill’s method of agreement3 (Bennett, 2004, 31). Second, despite those dissimilarities, enough similarity is needed to exist to justify a comparison to begin with. Third, as our underlying assumption is that this literature is shaping ideas and localisation of Western theories, we needed to identify larger, well-perceived bodies of literature with proven interaction among authors within its body of literature and the interaction between policymakers and authors. Fourth, the literature we would examine is needed to be intended as independent from Western thought claiming to be, or having an agenda of establishing schools of thought, or being understood by the wider academic audience as being independent enough to be regarded as schools of thought. Following the four guidelines, we came up with three spots of literature to focus on in this chapter: Négritude, Nihonjinron, and Nahda. They are different enough to make their similarities all the more visible: Négritude, a movement that began in Paris and came from the environment of literary Paris in the 1940s (Simo, 2017; Wilder, 2015), Nihonjinron, generally understood as post-war Japanese literature focusing on Japaneseness (Aoki, 1996), and Nahda, a discussion of intellectual modernisation in the Middle East, especially in Arabic areas, dated roughly between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Kassab, 2009, 17), are spots of literature which differ significantly regionally. Attempts to compare political thought in Africa and Asia are rare; generally, such comparisons tend to be via Western thought as an intermediary point of comparison, rather than direct comparison and research on interactions. Furthermore, they are from different periods, stem from different philosophical traditions, with Négritude influenced by literature and Nihonjinron by social sciences, and were conceived in different political situations. However, these dissimilarities do now affect all three of them in the same way; rather, with every dimension of comparison, we have two spots showing greater similarity and the third being dissimilar. Both Négritude

3 Mill’s method of agreement: If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon (Mill, 2006).

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and Nihonjinron were mainly conceived during the era of decolonisation, with Négritude having its early beginnings during WW2 and being largely discussed in the post-war period, and Nihonjinron emerging in the aftermath of WW2 (Aoki, 1996) as an answer to anxieties following the end of the war. Nahda, in contrast, began much earlier, with el-Tahtawis’ work going as far back as 1834 (Kassab, 2009, 22) and much of the works understood as part of Nahda being published towards the end of the nineteenth century. Both Nihonjinron and Nahda, meanwhile, were facing the end of an era of perceived supremacy, with previous imperial ambitions being challenged by a new, Western political dominance (Aoki, 1996, 23; Kassab, 2009, 19; Kurzman, 2002, 6); this break in self-perception as a superior, major power, either as an Islamic or Japanese empire, sets them apart from Négritude, where the imperial system is inherently foreign and oppression endured, rather than practiced. Similarly, the state apparati and loci of power prior to Western dominance were prominent in the countries where Nahda and Nihonjinron were discussed. For Négritudeauthors, those were mostly marginalised through colonisation. Finally, both Nahda and Négritude authors shared an experience of colonisation and struggle against it, and were later read during anti-colonial struggles, while Japan’s history as a colonising power rather than a colonised nation left Nihonjinron authors without similarly anti-colonial ideas. Every one of these spots of literature played a role in domestic politics and shaped the public debate. Négritude authors became prominent political figures and Nahda authors famously founded a multitude of newspapers and journals, reforming both their respective languages and media markets (Hanssen & Weiss, 2016, 15, 24). Nihonjinron comprises a broad genre of literature, both in academia and more popular culture (Aoki, 1996, 22), also being influential on nationalist politicians. We therefore assume that they have a foundation in discourses among their respective, intended audiences and not merely among Western audiences. Finally, much academic work has dealt with determining which authors belong to these respective spots of literature, what their ideas are, and what their historical and political context is. Négritude, as a term intentionally used by its authors, is perhaps the easiest to identify here. Nahda and Nihonjinron, while not necessarily used as terms by all authors assumed to have contributed to them, have been identified by other authors as literature connected by common themes, (research) agendas, and biographic links.

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Having identified our main spots of literature, we were faced with two other methodological challenges. What can be considered to constitute theory? and what genres of text can we analyse? Particularly, when dealing with hierarchies of knowledge (production), this is an important question to ask, as the literary traditions within Négritude and Nahda (Kurzman, 2002, 14), as well as more popular literature within Nihonjinron challenges our understandings of academia and make it hard to disentangle scientific theory from artistic poetry. Secondly, language remains a major barrier; many texts have not been translated, and with such a research design encompassing a multitude of languages, such as French, Japanese, Arabic, Ottoman Turkic, and Turkish, to name the main ones, is a major hurdle; especially as theoretical research requires more than a basic command of the respective languages. This is a problem we cannot completely solve; but making use of secondary literature which takes these problems into account, by incorporating non-academic texts into their analysis, and by using multiple routes of translations, such as Arabic texts translated into French and Japanese texts translated into German, while using original texts where possible, we sought to fill existing gaps. As said in the beginning we aim to identify similarities and investigate what these theories could be potentially interesting for IR. That is why we also asked what links can be made for IR? Prior to the analysis we thought of topics, such as: What is said about the concepts, such as international, independence, and humanism? How is it dealt with the global and the local? How are ambivalences to be understood and how do diffusions occur without emphasising one or the other?

Nahda, Négritude, and Nihonjinron: Points of Comparison With these questions and assumptions in mind, we argue that our identified spots of literature share commonalities, both in the questions they ask and the answers they provide. More specifically, three major themes emerge from such a comparison: Questions of Self-positioning, Arenas of Comparison, and the issue of modernity in relation to particularity and universalism.

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Self-Positioning: Who Are We in the World? While all three spots of literature show degrees of self-referentiality by dealing with questions of Blackness, Arabness, and Japaneseness, they share a desire of self-positioning in the world vis-à-vis a Westerndominated world. This is tied to their historical origins, but emerges independently across widely differing historical and political settings. The writings and ideas of Négritude stemmed from the environment of the black diaspora and caused a stir at an early stage, which intensified when Jean-Paul Sartre positively discussed them in the article “Orphée Noir” (Simo, 2017). Sartre (1972; Eckert, 2007) constructed the Négritude movement as an “anti-racist racism” whose starting point it was “to become aware of his race”. In our reading, the movement was ambivalent in itself and united different goals, images, and utopias, but the point of departure was to overcome colonialism. In particular, Senghor (1967) focused on the French empire and not on the French nation-state and emphasised the premise that neither France could decolonise Africa, nor Africa could liberate itself, but rather decolonise France. Ambivalence is probably one of the first descriptions to grasp the Négritude analytically. Although the three main authors, Césaire, Senghor, and Dumas were positioned in the Global South, they have their biographical origin in the former French colonies. All three met in Paris during their studies and as their access to knowledge production is concerned it was clearly French-oriented. This is significant due to the French-centralist education and school system and their own frame of reference (Wilder, 2015). Furthermore, Senghor and Césaire, became political figures following their studies and the decolonisation period, Senghor as the first president of an independent Senegal and Césaire as a politician and mayor in Martinique. Senghor was also the first African president to resign voluntarily, which is particularly important in the context of debates on term limitation (Eckert, 2007). However, they and thus also their knowledge references, do not fall clearly into the categories non-European and non-Western because of their hybrid mobility. In terms of content, the Negritude authors did not aim for a radical break, but rather take a mediating path between colonial structures and their countries’ political future. This is particularly evident with Senghor, who negotiated the political conflicts over participation and future decolonised structures in the field of culture.

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A point of departure for Nihonjinron authors was, as Aoki (1996) points out, “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture” by Ruth Benedict (1946); it may be impossible to discuss one without the other due to the broad reception of the book in Japan (Kent, 1999, pp. 181–183), which in turn became a critical point of reflection and comparison for authors of Nihonjinron (see for example Doi, 1973; Nakane, 1985). Ruth Benedict, an American anthropologist, was tasked by US authorities to study Japanese society, in order to guide US policy regarding their opponent during WW2. Her book became especially influential during the Occupation and Reconstruction period of Japan (1945–1952) and one of the major academic works on Japanese society published during that time. This, at least in part, explains the reception of “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of a Japanese Culture” as a vantage point of critique for Japaneseness, to later become criticised as not well informed (Aoki, 1996). When Nakane notes that her own work can be compared to an artist using colours, giving her an advantage due to her growing up with those colours and knowing the subtleties (Nakane, 1985, 8), this can easily be read as implicitly questioning the authority of authors such as Benedict to write on Japaneseness as a non-Japanese. Questions of what constitutes Japaneseness may have been asked for a longer period, but they are invariably tied to historical development and Japanese economic and political power over time. This is one of the explanatory elements Aoki (1996) uses to distinguish four periods of Nihonjinron, adding a more recent period to three similar periods identified by Dale (1986). Following their timeline, in answering the questions, authors moved from a modernist understanding of Japaneseness towards being critical of traditional elements, towards a more positive, essentialist understanding which supposedly explains Japanese success; in other words, authors arguing in favour of modernising seemingly inferior traditional elements of Japaneseness coinciding with a period of economic and political weakness in the 1940/50s, where authors arguing towards understanding and even preserving traditional elements of Japaneseness would coincide with the economic boom in the 60/70s. Both share modernist assumptions of what constitutes desirable outcomes: economic development and strong political institutions. Key topics of Nihonjinron authors fall into this category as well—the role and uniqueness of the Japanese language, Japanese social structures, especially with regard to the core family, and Japanese isolationism are used to position Japaneseness.

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Nahda has been described both as a modernisation project and a cultural movement (Kassab, 2009; Kurzmann, 2002). The vantage point is similar to that of Négritude and Nihonjinron—perceived European greatness, combined with a perceived decline of local power, prompts the debate. One problem for literature on Nahda is how to determine who belongs to it and who does not. One may, as Kassab (2009) does, define two phases of Nahda in order to delineate it temporally, but answering geographic and linguistic questions is much harder due to disagreements among Nahda authors on these issues. The importance of Arabic news outlets for Nahda and its emergence in the context of Ottoman decline, and Egyptian and Arabic nationalism (Kassab, 2009), gives credence to the argument that Nahda is primarily an Arabic project. As such, they were standardising the Arabic language in the context of the printing press one a significant side project. Others have called Nahda a project of Islamic modernism (Kurzman, 2002), interpreting as an Islamic rather than an Arabic project, with their positioning being supported by the importance of the Ottoman Empire in the early period of Nahda and the role of Nahda in the Tanzimat reforms conducted within it. This is further confused by authors who are neither Islamic nor Arabic, but contribute regardless. It seems that common topics and cross-references can define Nahda, and this is why both Kurzman (2002) and Kassab (2009) come up with five main themes which Nahda authors explored. These are the rise and fall of civilisations, political justice and reform, science and education, religion, and gender and women’s rights; with all of these topics being explored through a juxtaposition of Europe and the local contexts. While all three of our spots of literature raise this question of a nonEuropean identity, only Négritude develops a “postcolonial” identity by referring to the hybrid relations between coloniser and colonised, with Nahda falling short of an unanimous answer (individual authors however provide a multitude), and Nihonjinron answering by employing an essentialist, traditional Japanese identity. Nevertheless, even Négritude does so vis-a-vis Europe as a point of reference, using European observations on “the colonies”, basing their postcolonial identity on differentiating themselves from Europe rather than developing an identity independently of with reference to other, non-European traditions.

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Arena of Comparison While the questions of local identity are discussed vis-a-vis a Western “other”, we are prompted to examine more closely what dimensions, or arenas, are used for this comparison. One arena emerging from our comparative reading is the reflection on gender relations and dynamics in family and welfare policy to think about society’s composition: The central role of gender and women’s rights results in Nahda authors writing extensively on families. They do so from various viewpoints; families as a unit where women’s rights and liberation are negotiated, families as a religious matter, families as a target for political reform. They also compare family models in Europe and the Middle East, sometimes considering European family models as a vision to move towards, sometimes considering traditional families as something to preserve. Nakane (1985) and Doi (1973), meanwhile, focus on the latter; they look at Japanese families as a unit of research from which insights about Japaneseness can be gathered. They share a common, and often implicit understanding, that families and family structures contain a political component worth examination and questioning. Senghor develops his understanding of African society’s essence while focusing on the family: African societies build on the interdependence of people among themselves and of people with the gods. The individual can only realise themself in and through society, and the basic social unit therein is the family. Furthermore, he elaborates that the family is a democratic community. It is church, administrative unit, production and consumer cooperative, and the head of the family unites all the functions of provision in his person. The family stands under the village, which in turn stands under the tribe. Art and culture are also important arenas for Négritude and Nahda authors, with both spots of literature incorporating poets and novelists— a challenge incorporating them into academic debates. This comes with less academic and more artistic expressions (Kurzman, 2002, 14–16); for Nihonjinron, Nakane (1985), an academic and trained anthropologist, likens herself to an artist and claims not to pursue an academic style. Still, unlike Nihonjinron’s authors, for Nahda and Négritude authors, art and literature are a simile in their expression and a subject to research. Most prominent here are deliberations from Négritude authors, who perceive art as “an approximation technique, better an identification technique. It wants to influence higher powers, to acquire them by identifying with them through gestures and words, through poetry and music, through

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dance and what is said, through sculpture and painting” (Senghor, 1967, 220). Furthermore, Négritude authors point to the premise of civilisation that lies in art, but also in unification. By this, as Gary Wilder (2015) critically examines, the negotiated political subjects under an assumed apolitical frame. Generally, both identified arenas present themselves as “soft” politics in the first glance, yet still as a room of and for contestation. In light of global economic and political hierarchies, cultural comparisons provide more flexibility and a more even ground for comparisons: While an economic comparison may result in a Western-dominated interpretation, art and social dynamics can be used to reinterpret such hierarchies and to criticise both domestic and Western societies. As for Nahda the matter of modernity and progressiveness is the leitmotif for the debate to transversely identify their own position within other ideas. For Nihinjinron, however, the narrow focus and inward-looking perspective tends to indicate a motive of finding one’s role and identity within different conceivabilities. Lastly, the Négritude authors prefer to use culture as a field to investigate different positionalities, power hierarchies, and to suggest to confine an independent concept of identity rather than being identified.

Universalism and Modernity Perhaps the debate which resonates best with contemporary audiences is that of universalist values being discussed with a particularistic identity and how to accommodate the two. All spots of literature provide a wide array of opinions on this and reflect a diverse debate. These range from arguing against universalism as threatening to traditional identity, as in the case of some Nahda authors (Kassab, 2009), as or merely not applicable, as with Nihonjinron authors (Aoki, 1996, 20), to arguing that modernisation and progress means overcoming this particular identity in favour of universal ideals of Africans new humanism, which Negritude authors argue (Diagne, 2010; Garraway, 2010). Within such debates, there is both conflict within each and across spots of literature, yet questions of modernity and universalism shape the questions they each pursue. While neither position within these debates can be attributed the status as ‘dominant’ or ‘winning’, and the question very much remains an open one, the debate achieves something else; it translates debates regarding universalism while actualising them for the local contexts. The localiser

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is mostly intermediaries, like Senghor, that use their hybrid positionality for the translation of ideas and meaning. In its localisation, then, debates around modernism are explored independent of their roots insofar, as they do not advocate a mere translation of modernisation theories, but rather specific, oftentimes alternative points of venture. For example, Senghor considers Négritude as a literary and political strategy to confront Western universalism with the historical richness of the non-Western societies and to proclaim the mixture or hybridity, as the actual wealth of all great cultures, merely borrowing questions of modernity as a vantage point to challenge Western universalism. In a similar vein, Chie’s project of describing Japaneseness independent of Western scholarship seeks to question outside perspectives and counter them with a localised lens on social structures (Nakane, 1985, 8). In particular, she is answering to a dichotomy of modernity and traditionalism, and arguing that in fact, both are separate aspects of the same social system, best understood in unison (Nakane, 1985, 10). Compared to that, modernity for Nahda authors encompasses more of a promise: that of reform and progress. Al-Tahtawi, al-Afghani, and Qasim Amin (Kurzman, 2002; Kassab, 2009) all argue towards reformism, yet they, too, incorporate a call for localisation: It is the applicability of such reforms to their respective societies, and the reinterpretation of Islamic beliefs towards such outcomes which characterises their work, rather than the exact translations of European politics (Kassab, 2009). Yet few authors develop the kind of critical agenda which Négritude authors embellish in later years. A key idea is that of a new humanism in which many ideas of how to think about North–South relations are developed. (Pre-)Postcolonial theorists such as Frantz Fanon (1981), on the other hand, criticised precisely this essentialism of Négritude, which with its proclamation of a “black African” identity only cements into ethnic differences as essentialising and ahistorical. As Senghor points out, the rejection of the other provokes one’s own confirmation, the search for oneself—which still seems of high importance for today’s research in IR. This contribution to a localisation of global debates, and how they play out among policymakers, is a key point for future research.

Conclusion In this chapter we have examined elements of non-Western thought in a decentred comparative reading. We have shown that authors in Francophone Africa, Japan, and the Middle East had common themes

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and approaches, despite their differences in form and content and their geographical and historical range. From there we can gain insights into the more general debates in IR theorising and using non-Western knowledge production. Firstly, the authors we examined were pre-occupied with questions of self-positioning in a Northern/Western-dominated world, varying in strategies of co-opting, challenging, and localising Western politics of modernisation, with variations regarding strategies more salient within cases than between cases. Secondly, they were doing so while positioning themselves vis-a-vis an imagined West. Both of these point to another insight: authors who would dabble in politics as well, such as Senghor, would frequently localise Western theories, employing local ideas and thinking; something Maruyama may call emerging semi- or unconscious thought patterns of traditional thinking (Maruyama, 1996, 16) and explain due to the lack of a historically grown mental axis (Maruyama, 1988, 27). This emphasises the need for research on localised and adapted discourses on Western IR theories. Striking was the lack of interaction between our spots of literature (or maybe the lack of evidence of such); while Nahda authors did compare themselves to Japan in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war, looking into their success (Laffan, 1999; Mishra, 2013), Négritude authors would compare anti-colonial struggles worldwide (Senghor, 1967), and Nihonjinron authors would compare themselves to other countries (see for example Nakane, 1985), these paths of interconnectedness seem less salient due to the positioning vis-a-vis Western counterparts. Some research exists on these already (Kuroda, 2017; Laffan, 1999), yet intellectual connections which mirror centre–periphery dynamics are more prominent, while connections with periphery–periphery dynamics remain comparatively under-researched. Furthermore, the aforementioned similarities open up investigations into whether concrete connections inspired them, or whether it was their condition in the international periphery which created them.

Classroom Activities Classroom Activity 1: Voices of the Postcolony Use this activity as an icebreaker for each session’s introduction: At the beginning of each session, 1–2 students briefly (3–5 min) share a

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personal/empirical artefact to the seminar’s topic, which can be drawn from pop culture, literature, film, and television. For example, a short video sequence, a book, an Instagram influencer, or a magazine article, which deal with the seminar’s topic and broadens the perspective. By presenting these artefacts, students start to understand theory production in their everyday social environment and grasp the connection between theory and empirical reality. Furthermore, they can learn from each other besides the academic performance and bring in a personal note to the seminar. Classroom Activity 2: Comparative Approach Use this as a segway from discussing the themes of the chapter to the implications of such comparisons. Students should prepare a short, 5 min presentation on something pop cultural and how this can be related to theoretical debates, ideally bringing a physical object with them. Examples include music, movies, or novels which capture specific debates for the session (e.g. questions of positionality, or the issue of comparison across regions and time). Break them up in groups where they can present their pop-cultural artefacts to one another. Focus on how they are shaped by similar ideas to those of our spots of literature: Did artists get inspired by similar debates? Did they arrive at similar/different answers from our three spots of literature? Wrap this up by moving onto implications of comparisons for IR theory.

Bibliography Acharya, A. (2014). Global international relations (IR) and regional worlds: A New Agenda for international studies. International Studies Quarterly, 58, 647–659. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12171 Anderl, F., & Witt, A. (2020). Problematising the global in global IR. Millennium, 49, 32–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829820971708 Aoki, T. (1996). Der Japandiskurs im historischen Wandel: Zur Kultur und Identität einer Nation. Iudicium-Verlag. Bendix, D., Müller, F., & Ziai, A. (2020). Beyond the master’s tools?: Decolonizing knowledge orders. Rowman & Littlefield. Benedict, R. (1946). The chrysanthemum and the sword: Patterns of Japanese culture. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

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Bennett, A. (2004). Case study methods: Design, use, and comparative advantages. Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations, 19–55. Berenskoetter, F. (2018). E pluribus unum? How textbooks cover theories. In The Sage handbook of the history, philosophy and sociology of international rselations (p. 446). Bertrand, S. (2018). Can the subaltern securitize? Postcolonial perspectives on securitization theory and its critics. European Journal of International Security, 3, 281–299. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2018.3 Bhambra, G. K. (2014). Connected sociologies. Bloomsbury Academic. Bhambra, G. K., & Santos, B. D. S. (2017). Introduction: Global challenges for sociology. Sociology, 51(1), 3–10. https://doi.org/10.1177/003803851667 4665 Bouka, Y. (2018). Collaborative research as structural violence. Political Violence at a Glance, 12. Bueger, C., & Gadinger, F. (2018). From community to practice: International relations as a practical configuration. In The SAGE handbook of the history, philosophy and sociology of international relations (pp. 359–371). Sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526402066. Césaire, A. (1972). Discourse on colonialism. Monthly Review Press. Dabashi, H. (2015). Can non-Europeans think? Zed Books Ltd. Dale, P. N. (1986). The myth of Japanese uniqueness. Taylor & Francis. de Jesus, C. M. (1962). Child of the dark: The diary of Carolina Maria de Jesus (St. Clair, trans.). New Am. Libr. de Jesus, C. M., Levine, R. M., & Meihy, J. C. S. B. (1999). The unedited diaries of Carolina Maria de Jesus. Rutgers University Press. Diagne, S. B. (2010). In praise of the post-racial: Negritude beyond negritude. Third Text, 24, 241–248. Doi, T. (1973). The anatomy of dependence. Kodansha International Tokyo. DuBois, W. E. B. (2007). The souls of black folk. OUP Oxford. Eckert, A. (2007). Das Paris der Afrikaner und die Erfindung der Négritude. Eribon, D. (2013). Returning to reims. MIT Press. Ernaux, A. (2017). The years (Alison L. Strayer, trans.). Exo, M. (2018). Das übergangene Wissen: Eine dekoloniale Kritik des liberalen Peacebuilding durch basispolitische Organisationen in Afghanistan. transcript Verlag. Fanon, F. (2008). Black skin, white masks, Auflage: Revised. ed. Grove/Atlantic Inc. Fanon, F. (1981). Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Auflage: 14. ed. Suhrkamp Verlag. Garraway, D. L. (2010). “What is mine”: Césairean Negritude between the Particular and the Universal. Research in African Literatures, 41, 71–86.

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Gilroy, P. (2004). After empire: Melancholia or convivial culture? Routledge. Go, J. (2013). Postcolonial sociology. Emerald Group Publishing. https://doi. org/10.1108/S0198-8719(2013)24 Go, J. (2016). Postcolonial thought and social theory. Oxford University Press. Hanssen, J., & Weiss, M. (2016). Arabic thought beyond the liberal age: Towards an intellectual history of the Nahda. Cambridge University Press. Jones, B. G. (2006). Decolonizing international relations. Rowman & Littlefield. Kent, P. (1999). Japanese perceptions of “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword". Dialectical Anthropology, 24, 181–192. Kuroda, K. (2017). Pioneering Iranian studies in Meiji Japan: Between modern academia and international strategy. Iranian Studies, 50, 651–670. La Laffan, M. (1999). Mustafa and the Mikado: A Francophile Egyptian’s Turn to Meiji Japan. Japanese Studies, 19(3), 269–286. Lottholz, P. (2018). Post-liberal statebuilding in Central Asia: A decolonial perspective on community security practices and imaginaries of social order in Kyrgyzstan (d_ph). University of Birmingham. Maruyama, M. (1996). Loyalität und Rebellion. Iudicium-Verlag. Maruyama, M. (1988). Denken in Japan. Suhrkamp. Mau, S. (2019). Lütten Klein: Leben in der ostdeutschen Transformationsgesellschaft. Suhrkamp. Mill, J. S. (2006). A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive. Books I–III, The Collec. ed. Mishra, A. (2013). From the ruins of empire: The revolt against the West and the remaking of Asia. Nakane, C. (1985). Die Struktur der Japanischen Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp. Nayak, D. M., & Selbin, P. E. (2013). Decentering International Relations. Zed Books Ltd. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2016). Decolonizing the University, knowledge systems and disciplines in Africa. Carolina Academic Press. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2020). The cognitive empire, politics of knowledge and African intellectual productions: Reflections on struggles for epistemic freedom and resurgence of decolonisation in the twenty-first century. Third World Q. 0, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1775487 Nkrumah, K. (1971). Ghana: The autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. International Publishers. Poets, D. (2020). Failing in the reflexive and collaborative turns: Empire, colonialism, gender and the impossibilities of north-south collaborations. In Fieldwork as failure: Living and knowing in the field of international relations. Quijano, A. (2000). Coloniality of power and eurocentrism in Latin America. International Sociology, 15, 215–232. https://doi.org/10.1177/026858090 0015002005

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Rutazibwa, O. U., & Shilliam, R. (2018). Routledge handbook of postcolonial politics. Routledge. Sabaratnam, M. (2017). Decolonising intervention: International statebuilding in Mozambique. Rowman & Littlefield. Sabaratnam, M. (2011). IR in dialogue… but can we change the subjects? A typology of decolonising strategies for the study of world politics. Millennium, 39, 781–803. Sartre, J.-P. (1972).Orphée noir. Presse Université de France. Senghor, L. S. (1966). Selected poems. Atheneum. Senghor, L .S. (1967). Négritude und Humanismus. Diederichs. Shilliam, R. (2010). International relations and non-Western thought: Imperialism, colonialism and investigations of global modernity. Routledge. Shilliam, R. (2017). The crisis of Europe and colonial amnesia: Freedom struggles in the Atlantic Biotope. In G. Lawson, & J. Go (Eds.), Global historical sociology (pp. 101–123). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10. 1017/9781316711248.006 Simo, D. (2017). Négritude. In D. Göttsche, A. Dunker, & G. Dürbeck, (Eds.), Handbuch Postkolonialismus und Literatur (pp. 191–194). J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05386-2_37 Smith, L. T. (1999). Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples. Tafira, K., & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2018). The invention of the global South and the politics of South-South solidarity. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/ 9781315624495-9 Tickner, A. B., & Wæver, O. (2009). International relations scholarship around the world. Routledge. Wemheuer-Vogelaar, W., Peters, I., Kemmer, L., Kleinn, A., Linke-Behrens, L., & Mokry, S. (2020). The global IR debate in the classroom. In International relations from the global south (pp. 17–37). Routledge. Wilder, G. (2015). Freedom time: Negritude, decolonization, and the future of the world. Duke University Press.

Further Readings Anderl, F., & Witt, A. (2020). Problematising the global in Global IR. Millennium. Bhambra, G. K. (2014). Connected sociologies. Bloomsbury Publishing. De Jesus, C. M., Levine, R. M., & Meihy, J. C. S. B. (1999). The unedited diaries of Carolina Maria de Jesus. Rutgers University Press. Ernaux, A. (2017). The years. Seven Stories Press. Go, J. (2016). Postcolonial thought and social theory. Oxford University Press.

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Grosfoguel, R. (2012). Decolonizing western uni-versalisms: decolonial pluriversalism from Aimé Césaire to the Zapatistas. Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1(3). Kurzman, C. (Ed.). (2002). Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A sourcebook. Oxford University Press. Mishra, A. (2013) From the ruins of empire: The revolt against the West and the remaking of Asia. Nakane, C. (1970). Japanese society. Vol. 74. Univ of California Press. Wilder, G. (2015). Freedom time: negritude, decolonization, and the future of the world. Duke University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Foreign Policy Analysis: Engagements Outside of the West Chris Featherstone

Study Questions 1. What lessons can we draw from the development of FPA in Latin America, for the development of FPA in other Global South contexts? 2. What developments are necessary in Western FPA to match the growth of FPA in the Global South? Why? 3. Why is FPA particularly well-suited to adaptation to contexts in the Global South? 4. How has FPA been adapted to the Chinese context? 5. Why does Western FPA need to genuinely engage with the development of FPA in Global South contexts?

C. Featherstone (B) London School of Economics, London, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Cooke (ed.), Non-Western Global Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84938-2_3

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6. What issues are there for FPA to develop in the Global South? How may these be overcome?

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is a mid-level theoretical field that focuses on the people who formulate and implement the foreign policy, typically although not exclusively, of nation-states (Hudson, 2015). Integral to the field is that the proposed explanations are multifactorial and multilevel. It is this focus on individual people, and the multifactorial and multilevel explanations, that make the field of FPA so apt for application across arenas. Whilst there may be issues with access to decision-makers, the focus on the individuals, groups and organisational decision-making means that FPA is well-suited to adaptation to contexts that are underrepresented in the literature. The field also has a trend of continual development, adaptation, and modification to suit context. Approaches and literatures from outside FPA have been introduced to the field by many scholars, meaning FPA is well-suited to being combined with literature and approaches already established in different regional contexts. As a mid-level theory (Garrison, 2003), the ability of the field of FPA to adapt is compounded, all building to aid its transferability between regional contexts. This chapter argues that this is the opportune moment to be speaking of FPA in relation to non-Western theoretical developments within International Relations (IR). There are two reasons for this. Firstly, FPA is particularly well-suited to adaptation to different contexts because it is a mid-level theory and seeks to be multifactorial and multilevel. In seeking to incorporate a broad range of ideas into explanations, and a range of levels of analysis, FPA is well-suited to adaptation to new contexts. Secondly, whilst the field is still predominantly US-centric, there are significant developments in non-Western FPA. FPA has developed to various degrees in many regions of the “Global South”, with there being clearly identifiable “schools” or trends currently developing in Latin America and China. The Latin American school in particular combines some of the core features of FPA with some regionally distinct ones. In this way, the Latin American FPA school provides a roadmap, giving an example of how the field can develop in the “Global South” in a way that is useful in the context and still identifiable as part of the broader

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field. Similarly, China has begun developing its own field of FPA, thereby placing it several developmental stages behind Latin America. This chapter will engage with these two developing schools to highlight its flexibility in relation to new contexts, with the hope that it will feedback to the more US-centric field. From this, the chapter outlines the “roadmap” that the Latin American school can provide to other non-Western schools that are currently developing an FPA school or may develop a literature in the future. These lessons that can be drawn from the Latin American school provide a means to negate some of the challenges that arise when adapting Western/traditional FPA models to non-Western contexts. Following the outline of the field, and the different schools that are being developed in Latin America and China, this chapter will proceed to an application of an FPA model as an example of how they may be used. Whilst the development of models or approaches within non-Western contexts to be applied in those contexts is crucial, it is equally important that the transfer of ideas and theories is not one-directional. Ideas and theories developed in established FPA literature should be adapted to Global South contexts, and theories developed in the Global South should be applied to Western cases more typically studied in FPA research. This transfer of models between non-Western and Western contexts is a crucial step for scholarship in the field to take in the near future. This is easier stated than carried out, and it must be emphasised that this transfer should not be one-directional. Western FPA models have a sufficient platform, as such scholarship from non-Western scholars must be given equal stage. This chapter applies the conceptual complexity measure, drawn from the leadership style literature, to explain the impact of the low conceptual complexities of President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair on to decision-making process to invade Iraq. This account is not an exhaustive examination of the role of these two leaders in this decision-making process. Rather, the intention is that this is an indication of the types of explanation that FPA can provide. Like many Western-trained FPA scholars, my positionality prevents awareness and understanding of contexts in the Global South. Moreover, through my training, I am acquainted with UK and US focused cases, and it is for this reason that the application of FPA in this chapter focuses on leaders from these states. Whilst my positionality and training as a researcher places me in a better position to provide Western-centric

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analyses, I partner this with insights from literature where FPA has been adapted to non-Western contexts. This allows me to move beyond Western-centrism by highlighting and proposing ways that FPA may be adapted to other contexts. In doing so, I also make the case for why broadening FPA to genuinely engage with scholarship in the Global South is beneficial to this field.

Foreign Policy Analysis Hallmarks of Foreign Policy Analysis (Hudson, 2007). 1. Explanations should be across multiple levels of analysis. 2. Explanations should be Multifactorial and Multilevel. All variables that relate to decision-making are of interest to FPA researchers, regardless of how micro or macro-level they are. 3. FPA research is interdisciplinary, incorporating approaches from other disciplines. 4. FPA is Integrative. 5. FPA is “agent-oriented”; within FPA only Human beings can truly be agents, a State cannot be an agent because states abstractions. An extension of this is that FPA is “actor-specific”, meaning FPA scholarship is unwilling to “black-box” decision-makers (George, 1993).

There have been many attempts to describe the key facets of FPA, the most comprehensive and useful being that provided by Hudson (2005a, 2005b), who outlines five key facets. The first and second are that as a field, FPA aims to propose explanations that are across multiple levels of analysis, and that explanations should be multifactorial and multilevel. Variables that relate to decision-making are all of interest to the FPA researcher, regardless of how micro or macro-level they are. Thirdly, because of the attention on all variables related to decision-making, approaches from other disciplines outside of IR are brought into FPA analysis. This leads to the fourth hallmark of FPA, which is to be integrative. In Hudson’s (2005a, 4, 2005b) view, “FPA is the most radically integrative theoretical enterprise, which is its fourth hallmark, for it integrates a variety of information across levels of analysis and spans numerous disciplines of human knowledge”. The fifth hallmark of FPA is that it is “agent-oriented” theory. Within FPA only human beings can truly be

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agents, a state cannot be an agent because states abstractions. An extension of this is that FPA is “actor-specific” (George, 1993), a term referring to the unwillingness of FPA scholarship to “black-box” decision-makers under examination. The levels of analysis that FPA focuses its attention on include: the personal characteristics and cognitive composition of leaders, small-group dynamics, organisational and bureaucratic processes and politics, national cultural factors, economic considerations, and regional/international systems and forces. Foreign policy analysis scholarship can examine the formulation and execution of foreign policy from a wide variety of perspectives, emphasising choices, processes, outcomes, or implementation. It is this focus on human beings as the source of foreign policy that makes FPA so well-suited to the multidirectional transfer of theoretical approaches between non-Western contexts and the predominantly Western literature. Whilst there have been issues noted in the applicability of certain models to non-Western contexts (see Korany, 1986), the focus on humans means that at least some models will be transferable from non-Western contexts and scholars to Western literature, and vice versa. Equally, the tradition of incorporating new approaches in FPA scholarship means that the field is especially well-suited to broaden the diversity in approaches used within the literature. There is also a trend of comparative work within FPA scholarship. This comparative trend presents the opportunity for explanations of decision-making that makes comparisons between Western and non-Western contexts. This presents the opportunity for theoretical developments in non-Western contexts to be utilised in Western contexts, breaking down the boundaries of a field that retains its US-centrism. Scholars have questioned the lack of FPA scholarship from the Global South earlier in the development of the field. Bahgat Korany (1986) raised questions about the cultural limitations of FPA and methodological issues around FPA research in Global South contexts. He questioned the usefulness of established FPA models in non-Western contexts, and in his words demonstrated “the limited help that established foreign policy theory an offer” (1986, 39). Korany (1986, 41) sets out the issues in the application of the Bureaucratic politics model developed by Allison and Halperin to non-industrialised countries in the period he was writing. He declared, “The model is… culture-bound. In other words, this model of discrete decisions leading to disjointed incrementalism is inspired only

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by, and mainly applicable to, the US decision-making process” (Korany, 1986, 56). Korany (1986, 59) also raised methodological issues, questioning FPA scholar’s assumptions that archival material and accurate news materials would be available to researchers in non-Western contexts. Whilst these are valid critiques, it must be noted that these are not insurmountable. Indeed, in the decades since Korany (1986) authored these critiques, there has been a significant challenge to US-centrism in FPA, albeit with more progress needed. Greater methodological diversity can aid a researcher in confronting the lack of archival records. The effects of globalised news coverage and the internet have reduced the likelihood that a researcher would struggle to access reputable reporting. The breadth and range of models in contemporary FPA scholarship would in part challenge the cultural limitation critique Kornay (1986) raises. Leaders are significant in most contexts for example. Similarly, the development of FPA models in non-Western contexts for application there also challenges this critique of FPA, although it has gained significance since Korany wrote it.

Latin American FPA The Latin American FPA School provides a good insight into how the introduction of FPA ideas may be best achieved in other non-Western arenas. The school has developed their own theoretical approaches, and combined ideas from the Western FPA literature with theoretical ideas developed regionally to assess foreign policy in Latin America (Gamez, 2005, 132, cited by Giacalone, 2012). Despite links with the US, there is a distinctly discernible difference between the Latin American school and the Western literature with its US focus. There are three key themes that can be drawn out of the Latin American FPA literature. Firstly, “autonomy” and the ability of Latin American national governments to exercise autonomy in relation to the Hegemon of the US in North America. This is by far the most persistent theme. Secondly, there is the theme of difficulty imposed by the government in the 1970s and 1980s, which in some cases manifested itself in difficulty accessing government archives for example. Thirdly, there is a theme of examination of bureaucratic politics within Latin American governments. This “independence” of the Latin American school as a whole is noteworthy, but there are also differences between the individual national literatures. Where Brazilian and Argentinian FPA has a strong emphasis on

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“autonomy”, there were differences within this. Brazilian scholars focused on “confrontational” and “national” autonomy (see Saraiva, 2010, cited by Giacalone, 2012), but Argentinian scholars developed the concept of “heterodox” autonomy as a middle-ground between them (Giacalone, 2012). Mexican FPA can also be said to have differentiated itself, in part by getting closest to the external trends in the FPA literature (Giacalone, 2012). Despite this proximity, FPA models were used to achieve unexpected results. For example, Gamez (2001) applied the Bureaucratic Politics model to Mexican NAFTA policy, and showed that the policy was actually the most rational approach (not typically the result of applying the Bureaucratic Politics model) (cited by Giacalone, 2012). In Colombia, FPA has not developed to the same level as it has in Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico. Tickner (2007) has critiqued the scarcity of academic FPA scholarship in Colombia, a sentiment with which Carvajal (2009, cited by Giacalone, 2012) concurs. There is one key lesson that the “Latin American School” of FPA provides for the development of FPA in other non-Western contexts. This lesson is the need to maintain the features of scholarship in the context, whilst also bringing in themes and ideas from the established FPA literature. This must also be combined with the development of FPA models and approaches within the national and regional context itself. This allows for the development of scholarship and literature that is identifiable as FPA work, but that is adaptable to the context within which it is being used and is distinctive to the context within which it has been developed. Giacalone (2012) argues for incorporating the cultural-institutional context when looking at the development of FPA in the Latin American context. By doing so, she argues that three themes emerge: A. Scholars in Latin America prefer their own theoretical debates to mainstream ones. B. Cultural-Institutionalist context—admits national variations. C. Emphasising the role of the academic community—widens the understanding of FPA evolution. From this, an example of how FPA scholarship can be promoted and developed in other non-Western contexts can be drawn. Firstly, combination of FPA concepts and models with theoretical debates from the context in which it is applied should be promoted. Secondly, adaptation

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of FPA to the context in which it is applied should be advocated for. This two-part indication for a means of introduction and development of FPA in the Global South demonstrates both a means of overcoming the challenges to the use of FPA in non-Western contexts, and for how it can be made to be useful for scholars in Latin America.

Chinese Foreign Policy Analysis The field of Chinese FPA is arguably in an earlier stage of growth than the Latin American FPA school. In tacit support of this assertion, there have been several works advocating for the greater expansion of FPA in Chinese scholarship. However, hand-in-hand with these calls for more use of FPA in China are the acknowledgements of the difficulties in studying Chinese foreign policy with the tools that the Western FPA literature provides scholars. Solutions to these issues have been proposed by some Chinese scholars, and this is an area in which lessons drawn from the growth of FPA in Latin America can assist scholarship. The initial challenge that can be identified when looking at the introduction of FPA to the study of Chinese foreign policy is the limited access that scholars have to foreign policy decision-making. As Feng and He (2020, 362) observe, “Due to its unique one-party political system, China’s policy-making especially on foreign policy, is a mystery in the eyes of outsiders”. The closed-box of Chinese foreign policy decision-making relates closely to the challenges that Korany (1984) identified in his examination of the challenges for the introduction of FPA outside Western contexts. There is also a similarity with the problems faced by Brazilian FPA scholars in the 1970s, when Government archives were closed to researchers (Miyamoto, 1999, 86; cited by Giacalone, 2012). A related issue for researchers is that the Chinese government presents a unified message on foreign policy. Whilst there may be discussion and debate within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), once a decision is made there are no expressions of support for alternative policy options as may occur in other contexts. This leaves few opportunities for the study of how the CCP reached this decision on foreign policy. There have been two innovative attempts to circumnavigate these problems for researchers of Chinese foreign policy. The first is the strong theme in Chinese FPA scholarship of examining identity construction. This provides interesting links with European FPA and its strong theme of Constructivist work in that literature. It also allows for the

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focus of research to be on the public statements and actions of the Chinese government, negating the lack of access to the foreign policy decision-making process within the Chinese government. The second innovation in Chinese FPA scholarship is to study Chinese foreign policy scholarship itself. Shambaugh (2013) asserts the reasoning behind studying the Chinses IR community, “the IR discourse in China offers a ‘window’ into official policy thinking, even if it is difficult to decipher”. Glaser and Saunders (2002) scrutinised Chinese civilian research institutions, and demonstrated the influence of Chinese think tank scholars in particular on Chinese foreign policy. A similar research agenda has been adopted by the “He and Feng project” (2015, 2016, 2019). In the same way that some Latin American scholars conceptualised autonomy in international relations, partly in response to the closed nature of decision-making, Chinese FPA scholarship has developed innovative research trends in response to their lack of access to decisionmaking processes (see Glaser & Saunders, 2002; Shambaugh, 2013). This is one of the key ways in which the development of FPA in the Global South should influence “traditional” or Western FPA. This is a crucial component of the development of FPA that has to accompany the development of FPA in the “Global South”, and that as of the time of writing is still lacking. The transfer of themes, models, and practices from Global South contexts to the traditional/Western FPA context is crucial to ensure this development of FPA is truly global and holistic rather than a onedirectional transfer of ideas. Ever since the work of Alexander George, FPA has had a trend of seeking to speak to policymakers (George, 1993). The study of the influence of IR/FPA scholars on foreign policymaking in other contexts (Western and other Global South contexts) would be an interesting and significant contribution to understanding how scholars speak to policymakers. Chinese FPA scholarship is arguably in an earlier stage of development than the Latin American School: there is a combination of regional scholarship with themes or ideas drawn from existing FPA scholarship. As Huiyen Feng (2015, 16) asserts, in Chinese International Studies, there were twenty-seven academic articles with foreign policy analysis in the title between 2000 and 2012, with most of these introducing “different FPA theories, mainly from the United States, to the Chinese academy”. Feng (2017) divides “knowledge dissemination” into three categorisations: introduction, application, and innovation. Based on this

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understanding, FPA in China is evidently in the first categorisation as Feng (2017) asserts; standing in contrast to FPA in Latin America which is in the innovation stage.

Conceptual Complexity Leadership has been studied by FPA scholars since the late 1970s. This is one of the areas of the established FPA literature that has the potential to be transferred to contexts in the Global South. Again, this is not to say that FPA models should be transferred from the established literature to the Global South in only one direction. However, as someone trained in the traditional FPA scholarship, this is the perspective I can outline here. Conceptual complexity has been a measure of leadership style that has been used since the 1980s. The measure examines the capacity of a leader to discern differing levels in the environment when relating to “actors, places, ideas and situations” (Hermann, 1987). To categorise leaders using this measure, the leader being studied must be located between two idealised types on a spectrum. One end of this spectrum is “high conceptual complexity”, a leader categorised as such would be acclimatised to the policy environment, and equally would recognise nuances or shades of grey in a situation (Hermann, 1980; Nydegger, 1975; Preston, 2001; Schroder et al., 1967; Tetlock, 1985; Ziller et al., 1977). A high conceptual complexity leader is more likely to perform a wide information search, and to identify various levels within this information. In stark contrast is the other ideal type “low conceptual complexity” at the other end of the spectrum. A low conceptual complexity leader can be identified by examining three key features: 1. They will typically perceive the world in a black-and-white manner, using dichotomising framing such as “us and them” or “good and evil” (Dyson, 2009; Hermann, 1980; Preston, 2001; Tetlock, 1985). 2. Secondly, in line with the black-and-white view, the leader does not recognise the nuances in a situation. 3. Thirdly, information is processed in line with a limited number of principles or beliefs, which are then imposed on new information as a filter (Dyson, 2009; Glad, 1983; Nydegger, 1975; Vertberger, 1990; Ziller et al., 1977).

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Both Bush and Blair were low conceptual complexity leaders when their leadership styles are examined through the prism of this measure. Neither of them saw nuances or shades of grey in situations, and both of them performed limited information searches. To outline the impact of the low conceptual complexities upon to decision-making process to invade Iraq, both public and private statements and their reported use of information all must be scrutinised. This account is by no means an exhaustive exploration, rather it is intended as an indication. Blair’s low conceptual complexity affected the decisionmaking process that led to the invasion of Iraq in three key areas: how he framed Iraq and the decision-making process, the informing of key decisions, and when Blair ignored the context in which he operated.

Blair’s Low Conceptual Complexity Blair displayed each of the identifiers of low conceptual complexity outlined previously. Blair framed the issue of Iraq in a “black-and-white” manner. This meant that he filtered incoming information in line with previously held views. In turn, this affected how he used information in the decision-making process, leading him to ignore information that contradicted his previously held views. In a similar vein, Blair’s low conceptual complexity meant that he ignored advice offered by people who did not regard the situation in the same way that he did. This low conceptual complexity also gave Blair great confidence in his position, enabling him to disregard domestic opposition from “his” people (Morgan, 2013). “Black-and-White” Worldview The way Blair responded to the 9/11 attacks displayed his “black-andwhite” view and exemplified his low conceptual complexity. Speaking on the day, Blair was emotive and used binary terms, declaring that the UK was “shoulder-to-shoulder” with the US and that terrorism was “evil” (White & Wintour, 2001). This highly moralistic language and the dichotomous divisions were compounded by his stark comments that democratic nations should “eradicate” terrorism. In this situation, his low conceptual complexity was effective, and was generally well-received. However, there were some who expressed concern at the potential extent of the commitment. A backbench MP wrote at the time that Blair

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appeared to be, “writing blank cheques placing us four square behind whatever degree of retribution that George Bush sees fit to organise” (Mullins, 2009, 221). In the COBRA meetings1 that followed, the support for the US appeared to be complete to both Downing Street insiders and outsiders (Campbell, 2012, 5; Mullins, 2009, 221). Missing Nuance This “black-and-white” worldview continued and affected how Blair received advice from those around him, leading Blair to miss nuances in the decision-making process. George Joffe, an Iraq expert who briefed Blair on post-war difficulties that could occur in Iraq, reports that Blair ignored advice on the difficulties and focused completely on Saddam Hussein, saying “The man’s uniquely evil, isn’t he?” (Steele, 2008, 14– 15). Blair’s focus on the “evil” of Saddam Hussein meant that he filtered out other information, such as the potential difficulties that could have been raised by an invasion of Iraq. The way Blair and his inner circle referred to action against Iraq is another example of this disregard of nuance in the decision-making process. They referred to Iraq as a public persuasion issue, implying a complete assumption of the correctness of their own view and of their inability to understand the position of those opposing their view (No. 10 2001). Blair expressed such disregard for those opposing his view when he wrote in a March 2002 memo that the case against Saddam Hussein should be “obvious” (Blair, 2002a). This both indicates dismissal of other viewpoints, and dismissal of any scrutiny of the case or any questioning of the evidence. Referring to Iraq as an issue of public persuasion also implied that Blair and his inner circle were assuming that the UK would be involved in the invasion. The “with you, whatever” memo was a crucial point when Blair demonstrated his low conceptual complexity in his lack of attention to the decision-making context (Rayner & Dominiczak, 2016). In this now infamous note, Blair wrote to Bush of the best means to achieve Casus Belli2 for military action against Iraq. This note reinforced Blair’s lack of engagement with differing views and demonstrated his disregard of the 1 Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms, shorthand for the Civil Contingencies Committee that handles national emergencies. 2 “An act or situation that provokes or justifies a war.” (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2008).

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context in which he was operating. In the weeks prior to him sending the note, Blair had received two expressions of concern at how the government was moving towards military confrontation with Iraq. Firstly, having received a warning from Colin Powell that the US process was escalating in seriousness, the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote to Blair with his concerns (Straw, 2002a). These concerns were that the case against Iraq was weak, and this could result in problems later. Blair responded, saying that the only means to deal with Straw’s concerns would be to not confront Iraq, and that because he believed in confronting Iraq he would proceed. Secondly, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) sent Blair a letter advising Blair “how to get the Security Council to issue some sort of ultimatum ahead of any military action” (McDonald, 2002). Sent days prior to the “with you, whatever” note, this letter from the FCO outlined the “formidable obstacles” to navigating through the UN to permit military action against Iraq, and to persuading the US to agree to this. Each warning to Blair informed him of the concern at the commitments he had appeared to give, and the pace of the decision-making process. It was in this context of expressions of concerns that Blair sent the “with you, whatever” memo that communicated unwavering support to President Bush. Information Filtered A key component of a low conceptual complexity is that incoming information is typically filtered by the leader. Information that concurs with their previously held views is brought in to support their point, whilst information that contradicts these views is dismissed or ignored. In the case of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, Blair filtered or dismissed information that did not align with his perception. Blair continued to disregard the concern some expressed at how the UK was proceeding towards confrontation with Iraq continued through the summer of 2002. In both his communications with staff in Number 10 and his comments in Cabinet meetings, Blair dismissed or ignored opposition into the autumn of 2002 (Blair, 2002b, 2002c; Campbell, 2012). As such, Blair displayed his low conceptual complexity in his disregard for the context he operated in, specifically when he did not accept the difficulties in achieving a second UNSC resolution. When the Iraqi government made their declaration on WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), Blair responded by proclaiming it as “patently false” even before the

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UN inspections assessing this. Similarly, in January 2003, he stated that the “likelihood was war”, despite having no legal justification for military action from the UN or his own legal advisor (Blair, 2003a). Blair filtered information that he received by dismissing views that contradicted his own. When there was a worldwide protest against military action against Iraq, Blair spoke of his puzzlement at people supporting the “continuation of one of the most repressive… regimes in the world” (Blair, 2003b). Describing opposition to military action against Iraq in such a manner mischaracterised opposition to invasion as support for Saddam Hussein, rather than objection to war without UN sanction. Similarly, when Jacques Chirac announced to the media in France that his government would veto any second UNSC resolution that permitted military action, Blair described this as “unreasonable” (Assinder, 2004). Crucially, Chirac had been reiterating the French position, that disarmament by inspection should continue until it could no longer function (Chirac, 2003). Blair’s low conceptual complexity led him to focus on the French veto, rather than the reasoning behind it. There are arguments that Blair attempted to blame Chirac for the failure of the UN route, and that he intentionally misled Parliament when he referenced Chirac’s comments in Parliament (Wall, 2015). Blair continued this dismissive attitude to those he disagreed with in February 2003. When he met privately with the UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix, he disagreed with Blix’s optimistic judgement of the cooperation from Saddam Hussein. This was despite Blix’s position as lead inspector in Iraq, who directly experienced Saddam Hussein’s cooperation (Rycroft, 2003).

Bush’s Low Conceptual Complexity As outlined in the introduction to this section, Bush had a low conceptual complexity in the decision-making process that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Bush’s low conceptual complexity aligns with the three identifiers outlined in the introduction: a black-and-white worldview, a lack of acknowledgement of nuances, and filtering information to fit with previously held views. Similarly, this application of the conceptual complexity measure to Bush is not intended to be exhaustive, other accounts provide much more in-depth analysis. Bush’s low conceptual complexity led him to limit the examination of different perspectives on issues as they became prescient, and restrained exploration of alternative policies.

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“Black-And-White” Worldview From his early foreign policy comments, Bush demonstrated his low conceptual complexity. In these comments he imposed a dichotomous division, setting out those he regarded as US’ opponents and assigning them a “bad guy” role. Comments such as “the Empire has passed, but evil remains”, and, responding to questions on Saddam Hussein Bush said he wanted “to get him out of there”, were emotive and illustrate this low conceptual complexity (Bush, 1999, 2001). Such emotive language meets precisely with the classification of a low conceptual complexity leader (Dyson, 2006, 2018; Yang, 2010; Siniver & Featherstone, 2020). When Bush used terms such as “evildoer” about Iraq, and referred to the “wonder-working power” of America, he reinforced this classification (Lincoln, 2004). The 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, gave another indication of his “black-and-white” view. The emotive description of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil” was an initial indication. This was followed by a description of the Iraqi regime as one that “leaves the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children” and again publicly associated Iraq with terrorist “allies”, despite lacking evidence for this (Bush, 2002a, 2002b). This dichotomy that Bush set out of the confrontation between the US and Iraq set Iraq as “evil”, therefore helping to cast the US as the “good” actor in the situation, for facing the “evil”. Later, in speeches following the decision to pursue UN approval for military action against Iraq, Bush further displayed this low conceptual complexity. At one point, Bush announced, “You can’t distinguish between Al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror”, and later he again linked Iraq and Al Qaeda (Bush, 2002a, 2002b). The foundation of this link between Iraq and Al Qaeda was built upon used intelligence on a meeting that occurred between Al Qaeda and an Iraqi diplomat. Yet, prior to Bush making this link in his speech, both the CIA and FBI had thoroughly discounted this intelligence (Pincus, 2003). Missing Nuance This emotive, dichotomous framing of the response to 9/11, establishing it as a confrontation between “good and evil”, gave Bush great confidence in his approach. This was to such an extent that when Condoleeza Rice (National Security Advisor) reported that some principals (heads of

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government agencies) had doubts, Bush was belligerent in his response (Woodward, 2002, 255). Bush performed a “gut-check” on Rice, asking her to list the doubting principals, with his low conceptual complexity meaning that he struggled to accommodate other’s doubts. As set out above, Bush rejected intelligence assessments that contradicted his own perceptions in his speeches. However, this rejection of intelligence that did not align with his views also occurred in private. When Tenet presented the CIA case against Iraq to Bush in late 2002, Bush reportedly responded, “Nice try. I don’t think this is quite – it’s not something that Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from this” (Woodward, 2004, 247). Bush was underwhelmed: “I’ve been told all this intelligence about having WMD and this is the best we’ve got?” (Rice, 2011, 200; Woodward, 2004, 247). In so doing, he was both challenging those presenting to provide a stronger case and giving an indication of what he considered reliable intelligence. His low conceptual complexity meant that in this meeting Bush clearly indicated the kind of intelligence that he would be receptive to. Equally, Bush was willing to take the risk of presenting “questionable” intelligence he had been warned by the CIA and FBI was unreputable, to make his case for war in Iraq (Rice, 2011, 200). Filtering Information In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Bush filtered information in line with his previously held views. In a meeting convened on 9/11, Bush gave two examples of this. CIA Director George Tenet briefed the President with close to certainty that Al Qaeda were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, despite this Bush requested his counter-terrorism expert Richard Clarke to examine links between the Iraqi regime and the events of 9/11 (Clarke, 2004; Woodward, 2004). Bush’s low conceptual complexity led him to ignore Tenet’s briefing, because of his previously held views. In the same meeting, Bush fixated on getting air travel to function again within 24 h of the attacks. When Tenet expressed his concerns about security, Bush ignored this, informing Tenet, “I’ll announce more security measures, but we won’t be held hostage. We’ll fly at noon tomorrow.” (Woodward, 2004). As this meeting demonstrates, Bush rejected or dismissed information that did not align with his previously held views of the situation, and acted based on his own views, uninformed by expert advice.

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Conclusion In the above analysis, the impact of the leadership styles of Blair and Bush on the decision to invade Iraq is evident. Whilst this is only intended to be indicative, it does show how an FPA model can be deployed to explain events in foreign policy. This application also serves as an indication that this measure can be applied in different governmental systems, a point significant for the transfer of Western FPA models and measures in other contexts. In this case, the low conceptual complexity of Blair and Bush affected the decision-making process in three key ways. Firstly, they framed the issue of confrontation with Iraq in a binary, dichotomous manner dividing the issue into “good” versus “evil”. Secondly, their low conceptual complexity led both leaders to perceive the issue of confronting Iraq in a very “black-and-white” manner, meaning that neither paid attention to nuances in the situation. Thirdly, their low conceptual complexity meant that they filtered information they were presented with, rejecting information that did not agree with their own preconceived ideas.

Expanding to the Global South As outlined previously in this chapter, I do not seek to advocate for a one-directional transfer of FPA models from Western scholarship to the Global South. The application of the measure of conceptual complexity in the previous section is intended as an indication of the explanations that FPA models could contribute when transferred to other contexts. This section builds on this, outlining suggestions for how FPA models from Western literature could be transferred into non-Western contexts. These proposals are intended as indicative suggestions, rather than a list of instructions. Broadening Conceptual Complexity The application of the conceptual complexity measure here is qualitative, although typically this measure is applied using quantitative methods (see Dyson, 2006). This form of quantitative application of the conceptual complexity measure, being at-a-distance, can help with the challenges for the application of FPA models to non-Western contexts outlined by Korany (1986). Dyson (2006) provides an interesting example of

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this at-a-distance application of conceptual complexity, examining the public comments of Tony Blair. Such an application means that access to government archives is not necessarily required, with speech transcriptions providing a useful alternative. Dyson (2006) also examines impromptu, off-the-cuff answers to questions, alleviating the problem for researchers that speeches are frequently written by speech writers and are the result of a process. Such at-a-distance measures can be utilised in contexts where access to archives may be more challenging than in other contexts. However, in contexts where speeches or public statements on foreign policy may not be prevalent, a more qualitative approach such as the one used in this chapter may be more appropriate. This allows for broader approach to studying a leader’s conceptual complexity (see Hasan & Featherstone, 2020; Siniver & Featherstone, 2020). Taking a quantitative approach to using the conceptual complexity measure also allows the researcher to make comparisons between the conceptual complexity of the leader they are analysing and other leaders who have been scrutinised using this measure. This measure has been used by many researchers, scrutinising leaders from around the globe (see Dyson, 2004; Mastors, 2000; Taysi & Preston, 2001). This enables greater empirical and theoretical comparison between the non-Western and Western contexts. Empirically, comparisons between the conceptual complexities of leaders in Western and non-Western contexts can help inform debates on how leaders process information and how this informs decision-making. For example, if a leader is used to having fewer governmental resources to draw upon, how have they adapted to this decision-making context? The comparison between the applicability of the conceptual complexity measure in Western and non-Western contexts has the potential to develop our understanding of how this measure functions when it is used in different governmental systems, and different cultural contexts. The qualitative approach used in the application of the conceptual complexity measure in this section allows the researcher to provide a more nuanced understanding of the conceptual complexity of the leader being scrutinised. Whilst this approach is less typical than the quantitative approach, there are examples in the literature (Hasan & Featherstone, 2020; Siniver & Featherstone, 2020). By using archive documents from the decision-making process under examination and accounts of others involved in the decision-making process, the researcher can compare how the leader demonstrated their conceptual complexity in private. Similarly,

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this approach allows greater attention to be given to how those around the leader perceived the conceptual complexity the leader displayed. As previously, Korany (1986) raised several criticisms of FPA and the transferability of models to the Global South. He critiqued the “Bureaucratic Politics Model”, saying that it was “culture-bound” and as such only applicable to the US governmental system (Korany, 1986, 41). The same cannot be said of the conceptual complexity measure. All people process information, which is what the conceptual complexity measure scrutinises. How this information is processed will affect how decisions are made based on this information. Whilst there may be cultural differences in how leadership is practised, this can be incorporated into analysis, adapting the measure to the context. This fits with two of the lessons that Giacalone (2012) draws from the Latin American FPA school: that scholars prefer their theoretical debates to mainstream theoretical debates, and that national/contextual variations need to be acknowledged and admitted. Broadening FPA Building on this, there are opportunities to transfer FPA models and measures outside of a Western context. As seen in the Latin American FPA and Chinese FPA section, FPA can be adopted by scholars in the Global South, adapted to the context in which they are researching, and used to provide explanations. This transfer should not be one-directional. As argued previously, ideas and theories should be transferred between the Global South and the established Western literature and vice versa, and these ideas should also be transferred within the Global South. In their editorial for a special issue (SI) on “The Boundedness of Foreign Policy Analysis Theory”, Brummer and Hudson (2017) demonstrate that the scholars in the SI suggest that FPA models do not need to be abandoned and re-established. Rather, they can be adapted to fit national contexts, an argument that aligns with Giacalone (2012) and the argument made in this chapter. In the same special issue, Monroy and Sanchez (2017) apply Janis’ (1972, 1982) Groupthink model in Colombia. In doing so, they challenge Janis’ (1982) assertion that Groupthink negatively affects decision-making, as such they demonstrate that Groupthink can help explain successful foreign policy outcomes. Therefore, this chapter demonstrates the value of applying FPA models outside of contexts in which they have predominantly deployed. This value is

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both to the empirical understanding of the case, and theoretically to the understanding of the uses and strengths of this theory. The broadening of FPA by expanding its applicability to non-Western contexts can sharpen FPA theories (Brummer & Hudson, 2017). Alden and Brummer (2019, 473) advocate for this, “India could unequivocally function as a potential driver and springboard for theory development in FPA”. They argue that the “idiosyncrasies” and “particularities” of the Indian system “would offer the key levers in this respect”. Groupthink Groupthink is not intentionally introduced to a decision-making group. Rather, it is a “social dynamic” that can occur in small groups (Hudson, 2005a, 67, 2005b). Members of the group want to maintain the consensus in the group, even if the group view is not in line with the individual’s own view (Alden & Aran, 2017, 30). When outlining the theory, Janis (1972, 174) laid out eight “symptoms” of groupthink. These symptoms serve as markers of the presence of the groupthink phenomenon in a decision-making group. These symptoms are: • • • • • • •

Illusion of invulnerability, Collective rationalisation, Belief the Group is inherently moral, A stereotyped view of the enemy, Dissenters being put under direct pressure, Individual members self-censoring, Group having the illusion that they are unanimity,

Individuals taking on the role of “mindguards”

Ozdamar (2017) applies the Operational Code model to Political Islamist leaders. Ozdamar (2017, 189) confidently asserts “that the operational code research agenda has great scientific value and is capable of producing insights when applied even to regions and political cultures that are very different from the United States”. The operational code research agenda was developed to study Soviet Politburo members by Leites (1951, 1953), and as with the conceptual complexity measure it examines cognition in decision-making. Özdamar (2017) argues that the operational code analysis model is universally applicable because the foundational principles are based on universal psychological assumptions.

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Özdamar’s (2017) work is an example of the usefulness of using FPA models from the established literature in non-Western contexts. Arguably the more urgent task for FPA scholarship is to engage with FPA scholarship that has developed and continues to develop in the Global South. As shown in the section on FPA in Latin America, the field has been around for decades in the region. Chinese FPA is developing trends and research themes specific to the Chinese context. FPA in India is beginning to emerge and continues to be advocated for (Alden & Brummer, 2017). As can be seen in this section, Global South scholarship is engaging with ideas and models from Western FPA literature. To truly live up to the hallmark of FPA to be “integrative”, FPA must engage with FPA scholarship from the Global South. Beyond diversifying and broadening the field, this engagement with FPA scholarship from the Global South benefits FPA in three significant ways. Firstly, engagement from the Western FPA literature with the Global South and FPA scholarship in the Global South would sharpen and improve FPA theory as a whole. Demonstrating that theories and ideas are applicable to the wider array of cases that the Global South presents will be an important means of demonstrating the usefulness of FPA. On the other hand, understanding how and why some ideas and theories are not applicable to the Global South, would constitute an equally important theoretical development. Secondly, Western FPA engagement with Global South FPA can assist in expanding the audience for FPA work. If FPA scholars want to expand the reach of FPA as a field, it is logical to assert that “the future of FPA is tied to the teaching of FPA” (Hudson & Day, 2019, 227). This is taken further by Day (2019, 541), declaring that “the future of FPA is tied to the teaching of FPA outside the United States” [emphasis in original]. As Day (2019, 539) goes on to outline, “The preponderance of FPA literature written by US scholars and examining US cases can frustrate non-US students”. By expanding the application of FPA models to a broader range of cases, the curriculum that can be used to show the explanations that FPA can provide can be broadened and diversified. Thirdly, by broadening FPA by developing engagement between the established Western FPA literature and FPA in the Global South, the “toolbox” (Morin & Paquin, 2018) of FPA models available to researchers is expanded and developed. This is not just in developing the models in the Western FPA literature by testing and improving them in cases drawn from the Global South. Ideas and models developed in the

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Global South should also be used in Western cases. As this chapter has argued, FPA can be adopted by scholars in the Global South, adapted to the context in which they are researching, and used to provide explanations. In the same vein, ideas drawn from the FPA literature in the Global South may need to be adapted to increase their applicability to other contexts. For example, if theories of the exercise of autonomy in relation to the Hegemon of the US that is a strong research theme in Latin American FPA are taken and used in a European context, the differences in the relationship and history between the US and Europe mean that these theories of autonomy may need to be adapted. Similarly, if the work of He and Feng (2015, 2016, 2019) were to be developed and used in a North American or European context, the different relationship between the academic community and policymakers would necessitate some adaptation. The setting out of challenges for FPA scholarship has been a longestablished trend in the field. There are four readily established challenges for FPA, identifiable from the literature. 1. To 2. To 3. To 4. To

establish links between theories in FPA. highlight comparisons between different national contexts. incorporate the study of new actors into FPA research. establish a genuine dialogue with the policy community.

The broadening of the field of FPA, to genuinely engage with Global South FPA scholarship, will greatly assist the FPA academy in meeting these challenges that the field of FPA has set for itself. By looking at how the ideas and models developed in the Global South and in the west can be combined, FPA scholarship globally can meet the first of the challenges identified above. Similarly, Global South contexts offer a broader range of national contexts against which to compare the applicability and the usefulness of different FPA approaches. Therefore, through a genuine engagement with the Global South, there are more opportunities to develop FPA theory and meet the second challenge outlined above. Equally, by engaging with the Global South, there are more opportunities to examine the roles of actors not typically studied in FPA. This is not to say that the Global South should be regarded as a set of cases for Western scholars to study. Engaging with the work of scholars in these Global South contexts and engaging with how they conceptualise

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the impact of these new actors on foreign policy is crucial. These actors that are not typically studied in FPA could include indigenous groups or independence movements. Whilst indigenous groups and independence movements may be present in Western nations where FPA is more established, a broader range of examples again provides more opportunities to study their role in foreign policy. Lastly, by broadening the applicability of FPA, making the case in favour of the usefulness of FPA to the policy community becomes easier. Being able to say that FPA can provide explanations for foreign policies globally, means that engaging with the FPA community becomes a more attractive proposition.

Conclusion This is a particularly opportune moment to be speaking about broadening FPA, and to advocate for the development of FPA in the Global South. There are two reasons for this, the first being the nature of the field of FPA. The hallmarks of FPA (explanations should be multifactorial and multilevel, all variables on decision-making are of interest, integrative, and agent-oriented), mean that FPA is well-suited to being broadened to the Global South. The second reason is that FPA has expanded into some contexts in the Global South. As shown in this chapter, there is an identifiable Latin American school of FPA, and this may provide an example of how FPA could be adopted and adapted in other contexts. Similarly, there is an emerging field of FPA in China, although this is in a much earlier stage of development than the Latin American school. The “roadmap” that the Latin American school of FPA represents is drawn from Giacalone’s (2012) work. Giacalone (2012) identifies three themes of development of FPA in Latin America, and from these themes, I draw two key lessons for the promotion and development of FPA in other contexts in the Global South. Firstly, that the combination of FPA concepts and ideas with theoretical debates from the context in which it is being applied should be promoted. Crucially, this should include the development of new FPA models in the Global South positioned and contextualised within FPA literature. Secondly, the models from the established FPA literature should be adapted to the context in which they are applied (see for example Monroy & Sanchez, 2017; Ozdamur 2017). As outlined in the discussion on Chinese FPA, He and Feng (2015, 2016, 2019) are doing precisely this. They have developed the means to study Chinese foreign policy, using an approach they have developed

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to circumnavigate the difficulties that the Chinese system presents to researchers using FPA models developed in the West (He & Feng, 2020). The application of the conceptual complexity measure to the leadership styles of President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair in the case of the decision to invade Iraq provides an indication of the type of explanation that FPA can provide. Whilst this is not an exhaustive account, the intention behind including this application was to provide an example of how an FPA measure could be applied. This then served as a precursor to the suggestions of how FPA could be broadened in a way that genuinely engages with Global South scholarship. Finally, this chapter has shown why and how the broadening of FPA to include a genuine engagement with the Global South benefits FPA as a field. Firstly, this broadening process will sharpen and strengthen FPA theories, advancing our understanding of the limitations of the use of particular ideas and concepts in different contexts. As Alden and Brummer (2019) argue when advocating for FPA to be introduced to the study of Indian foreign policy, testing whether FPA theory can adapt to the particularities of different governmental systems can sharpen FPA theory. Secondly, applying FPA to a broader range of cases and incorporating ideas from scholarship in the Global South, can expand the audience for FPA work. Thirdly, this process will expand the toolbox available to FPA researchers. Fourthly, by broadening FPA in genuine engagement with Global South scholarship, FPA as a field will be better able to meet the challenges that FPA scholarship has set down for itself. As this chapter has argued, this is the opportune time to speak of broadening FPA as a field. FPA scholarship is established in Latin America, with both Chinese and Indian FPA scholarship developing too. The field is also developing in arenas of the Global South not covered in this chapter (see for example Brummer & Hudson, 2015). This development of FPA within the Global South must be matched by genuine engagement from scholars in the West. Western scholarship cannot simply use the Global South as a source of case studies to apply FPA models to. Instead, Western FPA scholarship must engage with the theoretical developments of FPA in the Global South, and seek to understand how they may apply to Western contexts. By broadening FPA to genuinely incorporate global scholarship, it can develop theoretically and propose explanations to a more global audience.

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Classroom Exercises Classroom Exercise 1 Discuss in groups – What are the advantages of using FPA? What differentiates FPA from IR? Why should FPA broaden its scholarship to genuinely engage with scholarship from the Global South? Classroom Exercise 2 Divide into groups and discuss the difficulties of adapting FPA to a regional context (Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, etc.). Swap your list of difficulties with another group and try to come up with a list of means to overcome these difficulties. Look for FPA approaches developed in the Global South (see further readings and bibliography), to see how challenges to using FPA in Global South contexts have been met.

Bibliography Alden, C., & Brummer, K. (2017). Foreign policy analysis and the study of Indian foreign policy: A pathway for theoretical innovation? India Review, 18(5). Alden, C., & Brummer, K. (2019). Foreign policy analysis and the study of Indian foreign policy: A pathway for theoretical innovation? India Review, 18(5), 471–484. Assinder, N. (2004). Blair and Chirac’s explosive chemistry. http://news.bbc.co. uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3818551.stm. Accessed November 4, 2020. Brummer, K., & Hudson, V. M. (2015). Foreign policy analysis: Beyond North America. Lynne Reinner. Brummer, K., & Hudson, V. M. (2017). The boundedness of foreign policy analysis theory? Global Society, 31(2), 157–166. Blair, T. (2002a). Minute Blair to Powell, 17 March 2002, ‘Iraq’. Blair, T. (2002b). 30th August 2002 note from Blair. Blair, T. (2002c). House of Commons, Official Report, 24 September 2002, columns 1 23. Blair, T. (2003a). Note Blair [to No. 10 officials], January 4, 2003 [extract ‘Iraq’]. Blair, T. (2003b). House of Commons, Official Report, 15th January 2003, Columns 673–682.

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Bush, G. W. (1999). Debate manuscript: The second Bush-Gore presidential debate. 11 October 2000. www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-112000-debate-transcript. Accessed November 6, 2020. Bush, G. W. (2001). A distinctly American Internationalism. Ronald Reagan Library, November 19, 1999. Accessed January 6, 2020. Bush, G. W. (2002a). State of the union address. https://georgewbush-whi tehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. Accessed November 6, 2020. Bush, G. W. (2002b). President George W. Bush, remarks in a photo opportunity with Colombian President Uribe, Washington, DC, 9/25/02. Accessed November 6, 2020. Campbell, A. (2012). The burden of power: Countdown to Iraq. Hutchinson. Carvajal, L. H. (2009). Postmodernismo y Constructivismo: Su Utilidad Para Analizar la Politica Exterior Colombiana. Oasis, 14, 201–218. Chirac, J. (2003). The Élysée, Interview télévisée de Jacques Chirac, le 10 mars 2003. Translation for HMG in Note, [unattributed and undated], ‘Iraq – Interview given by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, to French TV (10 March 2003)’. Clarke, M. (2004). The diplomacy that led to the war in Iraq. In P. Cornish (Ed.), The conflict in Iraq, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan. Concise Oxford English Dictionary. (2008). Concise Oxford English Dictionary. Ebook. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxyd.bham.ac.uk/lion/doc view/2138025687/B473D84C2A5A42AEPQ/1?accountid=8630. Accessed February 18, 2021. Day, B. (2019). Teaching foreign policy analysis in Australia: On cultivating an ‘FPA disposition.’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, 73(6), 539– 545. Dyson, S. B. (2004). Prime Minister and core executive in British foreign policy: Process, outcome, and quality of decision. Doctoral Dissertation. Washington State University, Pullman, WA. Dyson, S. B. (2006). Personality and foreign policy: Tony Blair’s Iraq decisions. Foreign Policy Analysis, 2(3), 289–306. Dyson, S. B. (2009). The Blair identity: Leadership and foreign policy. Manchester University Press. Dyson, S. B. (2018). Gordon brown, Alistair Darling, and the great financial crisis: Leadership traits and policy responses. British Politics, 13(2), 121–145. Feng, H. (2015). Foreign policy analysis in China. In K. Brummer & V. M. Hudson (Eds.), Foreign policy analysis: Beyond North America. London: Lynne Reinner. Feng, H., & He, K. (2015). America in the eyes of America watchers: Survey research in Beijing in 2012. Journal of Contemporary China, 24(91), 83–100.

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Feng, H., & He, K. (2016). How Chinese scholars think about Chinese foreign policy. Australian Journal of Political Science, 51(4), 694–710. Feng, H., & He, K. (2020). The study of Chinese scholars in foreign policy analysis: An emerging research program. The Pacific Review, 33(3–4), 362– 385. Gamez, A. E. (2001). Politica Inter-burocratica en la Politica Exterior de Mexico, 1988–1994, Foro Internacional XLI (3) (Julio-Septiembre). Gamez, A. E. (2005). Fuentes de Cambio en Politica Exterior: Una Revision de los Modelos de Politica Exterior Para los Paises en Desarrollo. Afers Internacionais (barcelona), 69, 127–215. Garrison, J. A. (2003). Foreign policymaking and group dynamics: Where we’ve been and where we’re going. In J. A. Garrison, J. Kaarbo, D. Foyle, M. Schafer, & E. K. Stern (Eds.), Foreign policy analysis in 20/20: A symposium. International Studies Review, 5, 177–202. George, A. L. (1993). Bridging the gap: Theory and practice in foreign policy. United States Institute of Peace Press. Giacalone, R. (2012). Latin American foreign policy analysis: External influences and internal circumstances. Foreign Policy Analysis, 8, 335–353. Glad, B. (1983). Black and white thinking: Ronald Reagan’s approach to foreign policy. Political Psychology, 4, 33–76. Glaser, B. S., & Saunders, P. C. (2002). Chinese civilian foreign policy research institutes: Evolving roles and increasing influence. The China Quarterly, 171, 597–616. Hassan, O., & Featherstone, C. (2020). Trump’s low conceptual complexity leadership and the vanishing ‘unpredictability doctrine’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1853054 He, K., & Feng, H. (2019). Leadership transition and global governance: Role conception, institutional balancing, and the AIIB. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 12(2), 153–178. Hermann, M. G. (1980). Explaining foreign policy behaviour using personal characteristics of political leaders. International Studies Quarterly, 24, 27–46. Hermann, M. G. (1987). Handbook for assessing personal characteristics and foreign policy orientations of political leaders. The Ohio State University. Hermann, M. G. (2001). How decision units shape foreign policy: A theoretical framework. International Studies Review, 3(2), 47–81. Hudson, V. M. (2005a). Foreign policy analysis: Actor-specific theory and the ground of international relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), 1–30. Hudson, V. M. (2005b). Foreign policy analysis: Classic and contemporary theory. Rowman and Littlefield. Hudson, V. M. (2007). Foreign policy analysis: Classics and contemporary theory. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

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Hudson, V. M. (2015). Foreign policy analysis beyond North America. In K. Brummer & V. M. Hudson (Eds.), Foreign policy analysis: Beyond North America. London: Lynne Reinner. Hudson, V. M., & Day, B. S. (2019). Foreign policy analysis: Classic and contemporary theory (3rd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink. Houghton Mifflin. Janis, I. L. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascos. Houghton Mifflin. Korany, B. (1984). Foreign policy in the third world: An introduction. International Political Science Review, 5(1), 7–20. Korany, B. (1986). Strategic studies and the third world: A critical evaluation. International Social Science Journal, 38(4), 547–556. Leites, N. (1951). The operational code of the Politburo. McGraw-Hill. Leites, N. (1953). A study of Bolshevism. Free Press. Lincoln, B. (2004). Holy terrors: Thinking about religion after September 11. University of Chicago Press. Mastors, E. (2000). Gerry Adams and the Northern Ireland peace process. Political Psychology, 21, 839–846. McDonald, S. (2002). Letter McDonald to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, “Iraq: Ultimatum” attaching paper “Elements which might be incorporated in an SCR embodying an Ultimatum to Iraq”. Miyamoto, S. (1999). O Estudo das Relagoes Internacionais no Brasil: O Estado da Arte, Revista de Sociologia e Politica, 12, 83–98. Monroy, M. C., & Sánchez, F. (2017). Foreign policy analysis and the making of plan Colombia. Global Society, 31(2), 245–271. Morgan, S. (2013). Interviewed on: BBC, 2013. The Iraq War. Episode One: Regime Change. Morin, J. F., & Paquin, J. (2018). Foreign policy analysis: A toolbox. Palgrave Macmillan. Mullins, C. (2009). A view from the foothills: The diaries of Chris Mullins. Profile Books. Number 10. (2001). Responsibility for the terrorist atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001’, Paper No. 10, 4 October 2001. Nydegger, R. V. (1975). Information processing complexity and leadership status. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11, 317–328. Özdamar, O. (2017). Leadership analysis at a “great distance”: Using the operational code construct to analyse Islamist leaders. Global Society, 31(2), 167–198. Pincus, W. (2003, June 22). Report cast doubt on Iraq-Al Qaeda connection. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/ 2003/06/22/report-cast-doubt-on-iraq-al-qaeda-connection/3986247bff04-4fac-a3aa-1f21dcd5aa5c/. Accessed November 5, 2020.

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Preston, T. (2001). The president and his inner circle: Leadership style and the advisory process in foreign affairs. Columbia University Press. Rayner, G., & Dominiczak, P. (2016). Read Tony Blair’s letters to George W Bush promising to back US President ‘whatever’—And his doubts over Iraq war just months after invasion. The Daily Telegraph. https://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/2016/07/06/chilcot-inquiry-tony-blair-george-bush-letters/. Accessed November 6, 2020. Rice, C. (2011). No higher honor: A memoir of my years in Washington. Broadway Books. Rycroft, M. (2003). Letter, Rycroft to Owen, 6 February 2003, “Iraq: Prime Minister’s meetings with Blix and El Baradei, 6 February”. Schroder, H. M., Driver, M. J., & Streufert, S. (1967). Human information processing. Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Shambaugh, D. (2013). China goes global: The partial power (Vol. 111). Oxford University Press. Siniver, A., & Featherstone, C. (2020). Low-conceptual complexity and Trump’s foreign policy. Global Affairs, 6(1), 71–85. Steele, J. (2008) Defeat: Why they Lost Iraq. I.B. Tauris. Straw, J. (2002). Letter (handwritten) Straw to Blair, 26th July 2002, “Iraq”. Taysi, T., & Preston, T. (2001). The personality and leadership style of President Khatami: Implications for the future of Iranian political reform. In O. Feldman & L. Valenty (Eds.), Profiling political leaders. Greenwood Publishing Group. Tetlock, P. E. (1985). Accountability: The neglected social context of judgment and choice. Research in Organisational Behaviour, 7 , 297–332. Tickner, A. B. (2007). Intervention by invitation: Keys to Colombian foreign policy and its main shortcomings. Colombia Internacional, (65), 90–111. Vertberger, Y. I. (1990). The world in their minds: Information processing, cognition, and perception in foreign policy decision-making. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Wall, S. (2015). Interview, Peter Oborne’s Chilcot Report. BBC Radio 4. In P. Oborne (Ed.), (2016). Not the Chilcott Report. Head Zeus. White, M., & Wintour, P. (2001). Blair calls for world fight against terror. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/sep/12/uk.septem ber11. Accessed November 5, 2020. Woodward, B. (2002). Bush at war. Simon and Schuster. Woodward, B. (2004). Plan of attack. Simon and Schuster. Yang, Y. E. (2010). Leader’s conceptual complexity and foreign policy change. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3, 415–446. Ziller, R. C., Jackson, R. M., & Terbovic, N. J. (1977). Self-other orientations and political behaviour. In M. G. Hermann (Ed.), A psychological examination of political leaders (pp. 337–353). Free Press.

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Suggested Further Readings Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2017). Foreign policy analysis: New approaches, 2nd ed. Routledge. Badie, D. (2010). Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on terror: Explaining US policy shift toward Iraq. Foreign Policy Analysis, 6(4), 277–296. Breuning, M. (2007). Foreign policy analysis: A comparative introduction. Palgrave. Brummer, K., & Hudson, V. M. (2015). Foreign policy analysis: Beyond North America. Lynne Reinner. Hassan, O., & Featherstone, C. (2020). Trump’s low conceptual complexity leadership and the vanishing ‘unpredictability doctrine’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Hudson, V. M. (2005). Foreign policy analysis: Actor-specific theory and the ground of international relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), 1–30. Morin, J. F., & Paquin, J. (2018). Foreign policy analysis: A toolbox. Palgrave Macmillan. Porter, P. (2017). Blunder: Britain’s war in Iraq. Oxford University Press. Siniver, A., & Featherstone, C. (2020). Low-conceptual complexity and Trump’s foreign policy. Global Affairs, 6(1), 71–85. Smith, S., Hadfield, A., & Dunne, T. (2017). Foreign policy: Theories, actors. Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 4

Reimagining the Global Order: China in History and Theory Xin Liu

Study Questions 1. Do you think the concept of ‘All under heaven’ may successfully illustrate China’s premodern international relations? 2. Why was the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) significant for China’s state and foreign relations? 3. How similar do you think the 1949 Chinese state was to the Soviet Union model? 4. What did Mao Zedong mean by the ‘Intermediate Zone’, and do you think it is still affecting China’s foreign policy today? 5. Do you agree with David Kang et al. that a China-centred international order would be more peaceful for the Asia–Pacific region?

X. Liu (B) Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Cooke (ed.), Non-Western Global Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84938-2_4

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6. How do you evaluate the conjunctural (middle-range) level of analysis in studying non-western international relations?

The ‘Rise of China’ has long been and remains one of the most heated topics in International Relations (IR) since the 1990s even when China’s military and economic presence were far less prominent than it is nowadays (Bernstein & Munro, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2001, 2010; Segal, 1999). As the debate on China’s geopolitical intentions continues, ambiguities about China’s international positioning are posing greater questions to IR theories. As for both its political system and foreign policy, China has bitterly frustrated Western academia as if they have got ‘everything wrong’ about it (Pei, 2012). Questions remain whether the Communist rule will demise one day, and whether China will shatter the present world order. While the ongoing realities seem to have defied conventional wisdoms, the only thing that IR theories could say about those is still that a ‘clash is coming’, whenever it does (Bernstein & Munro, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2010). This chapter will navigate the historical legacies of China’s international relations to illuminate how it may enrich the theoretical edifice of IR by unfastening its Eurocentric foothold. The nub of the Eurocentric IR theories lies at both the second and third images of analysis (Waltz, 2001),1 which manifest as the liberal peace theory and multifarious realisms. For the former, the analytical priority is placed upon the regime-type, that the exceptionality of the Chinese regime makes it less liable to benevolence (Doyle, 1986, 2005). For the latter, it is the anarchical nature of the international system and the balance of power that ultimately determines the world with a rising China (Waltz, 2010). I will show in this chapter that both assumptions are empirically unviable and theoretical fallible when it comes to China’s case as it comes to many other non-western experiences. It is not to make a political suggestion that China’s rise will unequivocally reshape the global order in a positive way. It is rather to suggest that we will need alternative historical and theoretical understandings to better 1 Kenneth Waltz has calibrated in his 1959 book (reprinted in 2001) Man, the State and War that there are three levels of analysis for international politics. The first image is the level of human nature. The second image refers to regime types (democracy vs. dictatorship) and the third image is the systemic image, namely the structure of international system.

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make sense of the historical event by transcending the profane frameworks provided by current IR theories. The chapter will consist of three sections. The first part presents a brief historical survey that contextualises China’s tributary system as a unique historical experience. It will debunk the Eurocentric mythology that the tributary system was a premodern international system transformed under the impact of Western modernity, while it also scrutinises the Sinocentric story that the tributary system was dictated by a culturally specific pattern of international order. It proposes a rather dynamic view on the multiple forms of polities and foreign relations throughout premodern Chinese history. The second part will highlight some key aspects for understanding modern China since 1949. I will reject the two major misperceptions of modern China as either a continuation of historical China or a novel communist state. The 1949 state and its self-positioning in world politics should be viewed as a complex response to questions left unresolved by historical baggage. The last part will highlight contemporary IR theories from China’s perspective. I will highlight that to transcend Eurocentrism should we always beware of other forms of ethnocentrism such as Sinocentrism. What is required is a perspective that centralises the connections, interactions and co-constitutions between China and the West.

The Historical China: From All-Under Heaven to the Tributary System Patterns of the premodern Chinese world have featured both myths and ambiguities. Max Weber’s view on premodern China has long dominated the public’s imagination, which has depicted China as a political system governed by religions and ideas that were so lacking ‘transcendental tensions’ to the quest for universalism. The predominant ideology Confucianism, which in Weber’s words was a system of thoughts aspiring to order and harmony, rather than truth and deity. As a result, Chinese culture struggles to ‘rationalise’ everyday life which has in turn rejected industrial capitalism (Van Der Sprenkel, 1964; Weber, 1951; Zhao, 2015). As the Confucian ideology seeks no absolute truth and could not be falsified, it tended towards an indoctrination practice that justified state repression (Anderson, 1979, 546). The inability of rationalisation has also resulted in the famous ‘Needham Question’ that China with early

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industrial and technological sprouting has eventually failed to achieve experiment-warranted industrialisation (Needham, 1954). Criticism of Weber’s argument has been extensive, and it is mainly argued that Weber has failed to understand China’s tradition in context, and his comparison between China and the West is simplistic (Zhao, 2015). Chinese scholars have also mounted arguments based upon closer reading of Confucian classics, contending that Confucianism itself does bear the potential of transcendence as it places emphasis on self-inflicted moral crusade, which does justice to resistance against the emperor if he fails to honour the ‘Mandate of Heaven’2 (Liu, 2007). Max Weber was certainly not able to read the Chinese classics closely enough as his focus was a western society at the height of industrial capitalism. However, the degree of abstraction of Confucian texts bears the danger of multifarious interpretations, leading to decontextualised, politically wishful explanation subject to temporal circumstances. To understand China’s role in world history, it is significant to transcend the dichotomy of either seeing contemporary China as a continuation of its premodern tradition, or completely cutting it off from the past (Cohen, 2003, 2010). As Paul Cohen has powerfully highlighted in his thesis of ‘discovering history in China’, the internal diversity of the Chinese civilisation centres upon the enterprise of explaining the nature of the Chinese polity, and it was the regional, ethnic and cultural differences within China that engendered a particular ‘Chinese consciousness’ as opposed to the western perspective (Cohen, 2010, 42). It is certainly a rejection of the conventional understanding that China was a passive receiver of western modernity in an ‘impact-response’ model (Teng & Fairbank, 1979). The significance of ‘discovering history in China’ suggests the need to understand the historical circumstances under which China began to engage the European international system. Historical details have been watered down by contemporary reinterpretations which are usually politicised. Records have shown that China was never isolated in its own cultural bubble. It was, instead, in very active contact with major civilisations on all fronts (Waley-Cohen, 2000). It is however important to

2 The Chinese scholar Liu Xiaofeng emphasises the pursue of gentlemanship via selfperfection in the Confucian tradition, which may well justify political upheavals of all kinds if the ruler failed to honour the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. See Liu Xiaofeng’s essay of ‘Examining the Genesis of Revolutionary Spirit in Confucianism’ in Confucianism and Nation State, 2007 (Chinese edition).

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emphasise that China was in a very unique period of its own history, the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), when it was shattered by the Opium War (1840) and ensnared by British free-trade imperialism (Ho, 1967). The Qing Dynasty was so peculiar in the sense that it was a multiethnic empire with various forms of identity and society integrated to a singular imperial system. Central to the complex societal and ethnic subset of the Qing Empire was the enduring interaction between the nomadic tribes and the sedentary agrarian society. Such an enduring historical engagement had not only determined the size of the Chinese empire, but also prefigured the structure of the imperial administration in order to encompass the sophisticated ethnic composition and weather the periodic geopolitical decomposition on the frontier (Barfield, 1992; Liu, 2016; Matin, 2007). Nomadic and agrarian societies enabled the provision of essential technology, as well as organisational skills with which a continental empire was achievable (Elvin, 1973). The Mongol cavalries, for example, relied heavily on the ironmaking techniques imported from central China as a way to harness their war machines and mobility. Moreover, the resources and technical sophistication of the settled agriculture attracted more military thunderstorms from the nomadic frontier, thus making the neighbouring agricultural residences ‘the centre of warfare’ (Marx, 2005, 490). In the long run, what the nomadic tribes benefited the most from the agricultural settlement was not only the material advantages, but more importantly the organisational capacity essential for governing the empire. The Qing Empire was from the very outset conscious that it was essential to learn, borrow and emulate from the agrarian China the essential cultural and aesthetic elements and to integrate the Confucian governing structure to the imperial project. The Confucian tradition in China, which emphasises heavily on familial values, filial piety, social stability and self-perfection is not merely an intellectual tradition, but more importantly a set of principles for organising the bureaucratic administration which the nomadic conquerors eagerly sought. The maturity of the Chinese bureaucratic system has dramatically outpaced its economic development. As early as the third century B.C., the Qin Dynasty as the first unified empire was founded on a well-fledged, resilient bureaucratic apparatus capable of mobilising the population for military exigencies. While the nomadic conquerors prided themselves on military prowess and mobility, their flattened and decentralised social organisations had made it impossible for them to govern a continent-sized empire. In assimilating

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the Confucian bureaucracy and cultural system, the nomads, especially the Qing Emperors had found themselves entering a prolonged, selfinflicted struggle with its own identity with wider social and political crisis looming. The traditional Confucian bureaucracy was first designed to integrate the vastly diverse geographical range of the empire when Qin and Han emperors first conquered the territory (Lewis & Brook, 2009, 11). The maintenance and sustainability of the bureaucracy were predicated on both philosophical idealism and realist calculus. The Confucian tenets suggest that the prince over the people should be selfless and continuously engaged in self-perfection, through which he achieves a moral position in which the people are persuaded, not coerced into compliance. The prince, who is morally and intellectually perceived as a sage, presided over the ‘all-under-heaven’ realm by its civilisation superiority, possessing the authority to transform hostility between heterogenous polities into hospitality without homogenising effects. Thus the ‘all-under-heaven’ is inherently ‘all-inclusive’ (Zhao, 2006). It has been some bureaucrats’ lifelong pursuit to serve a morally decent sage in order to quest for an orderly and harmonious imperial order. Historically, bureaucrats were Confucian scholars who fervently looked to ‘save the world’ by honouring an orderly society under a sage-prince (Rowe, 2001), by consciously embedding their life-orientation in preserving the imperial hierarchy (Evasdottir, 2007). All-Under-Heaven (Tian-Xia) refers to the classic Chinese cosmology for imagining world order. The Confucian scholars believe that there is an all-inclusive law of heaven underlying the order among nations and families which were govern by the Confucian principles such as filial piety, harmony and rituals. These principles were all manifest in the recognition of cultural superiority of the Middle Kingdom. Modern scholar Zhao Tingyang argues that Tian-xia is the philosophical foundation of Chinese foreign relations seeing all units convertible to subjects of the civilisation, which contrasts the Western IR theories founded upon the division between Self and Others.

The Confucian bureaucratic administration operated rather smoothly when the empire’s domain encompassed a relatively small territory and population, which was the successful case of the Song Dynasty (960– 1279). To retreat from the northern frontier dominated by the bordered

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nomads, Song concentrated its resources and political structure mainly in the southern territory where agriculture and commercial activities were most preponderant. The maturation of copper minting and printing technology during the Song era had accelerated a monetary economy, enabling the state administration broader basis of taxation (Hartwell, 1962, 1966). A rather dialogic, and cooperative relationship was thus able to be fostered between the imperial court and the literati officials, which was coupled with an affluent civil life. With a relatively smaller population and a prototypical sovereign state, the Song Dynasty was characterised by the scene of luxurious urban life with a vibrant commercial economy. This was never a case for the Qing Dynasty whose boundaries and ethnic complexities had substantially multiplied. The Qing Empire, which originated from the Manchu hunter-gatherer bands from the Northeast, faced a particular task of vindicating the civilisation with Uighur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhism, the Mongols and the Han-Confucians all placed under the overlordship of the Manchu Emperors. In the Qing Emperors’ grand design, bordered ethnicities were not only conquered populations that helped to enlarge the empire, but more importantly complementary cultural entities that held the civilisational empire together. For example, by annexing the Mongol tribes through intermarriage, the Qing emperors had consolidated their military predominance over the Han commercial society. By converting the Mongols to Tibetan Lama Buddhism, the empire had not only settled its southern frontier, but also managed to transform the mobile Mongol nomads to rather settled populations (Hevia, 1995, 29–30). Moreover, by conquering the western Uighur Muslims, the empire had decomposed the geopolitical threats arising from the northern frontier (Perdue, 2005). As the Qing Empire found itself strengthened and stabilised amid the reciprocal relationships among bordered ethnicities, a rather abstract conception of sovereignty that the imperial overlord was defended and recognised by a multitude of local lords began to emerge, which had transformed the rather restrictive sovereignty of Song Dynasty premised upon Han primacy into a universal imagination of the cosmos. The Qing cosmology thus managed the diplomatic relationships beyond the Chinese heartland through ritual practices embedded in the tributary system (Bell, 1992; Hevia, 1995, 21). The Qing cosmology vindicated the political idealism of traditional Confucians who imagined the world order as an ‘all-under-heaven’ universe. Modern IR theorists may read it as a hierarchical system which tells very little about China’s philosophy and realities (Kang, 2020;

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Zhang, 2009). It needs to be differentiated between domains under the Qing imperial order, and also the philosophical, functional and practical aspects of the tributary system. First of all, there was always a tension between the cosmological order bounded by rituals and the actual state control, particularly in the agrarian heartland exercised through state administration (Schrecker, 2004). The Qing Empire, very much like its predecessors over the last two millennia, had attempted to penetrate the local communities with its state machinery as deeply as possible. Part of the consequences, however, was that the imperial state increasingly struggled to weather the financial pressures as the state administration expanded. Barrington Moore’s (1967) sociological inquiry into the Chinese countryside has revealed that the Empire allowed the Confucian bureaucratic officials to accrue petty interests from the system, especially when the system expanded to the size that the emperors could hardly monitor it. The Chinese officials, who were both Confucian scholars and members of the local gentry began to see the imperial office as a vehicle for accumulating personal wealth, while the imperial court tolerated corruption to a certain extent as a way to relieve the pressures for financing the officialdom (Moore, 1967). Towards the late Qing period, the imperial court even tolerated local notables to hoard arms and govern their own spheres of influence, and such a crisis of political fragmentation was exacerbated by the Taiping Rebellion, a remarkable peasant rebellions engulfing almost the whole southern territory, whence the ‘mandate of heaven’ eclipsed (Kuhn, 1970). Although the Qing emperors understood ethnic diversities and played with them adroitly, they had nevertheless failed to have a full account of regional differentials with much closer ethnographic understanding of the vast communities the empire ruled over. In some cases, the imperial court failed to recognise the identities of certain communities and assimilated them to the state administration by eliminating the cultural differences (Perdue, 2009). From the late nineteenth century to the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1861), less military threats had been posed from the frontiers than had rebellions arising from the Han community. In response to the endless havoc wreaked across the agrarian heartland, the Qing emperors relied heavily on the local militarists to tackle waves of rebellions, which had further resulted in a vortex of political decentralisation leading to the demise of the dynasty (1911). Therefore, China has posed questions about both idealism and reality. The successful cohabitation and assimilation of ethnic diversities as a way

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to tame large-scale geopolitical upheaval have enabled wider imagination about a potential China-centred international order, not to mention the richness of Confucian wisdom and cultural subjectivity. The grave reality and civilisational crisis mounting towards the late imperial period, however, raised more questions about China’s self-perception and positioning in world politics, which is nevertheless the central theme for the twentieth-century revolutionaries as they gradually emerged from the nineteenth-century apocalypse (Lin, 2012).

The World-Historical Significance of 1949 There is a prevailing misunderstanding in both early western sinology and IR that the 1949 revolution was a sharp break in Chinese history. Communism is broadly understood as an imported ideology and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded by modelling on the USSR (Bernstein & Li, 2010; Skocpol, 1979, 19–23). Although the Chinese revolution was inextricably connected to the Russian revolution, there are historical riddles why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) struggled bitterly under the Soviet tutelage, and eventually fell out with its revolutionary mentor in the 1960s (Hess, 2007, 160; Lüthi, 2008), and more importantly, why sharply contrasting paths of development have unfolded in the two national experiences (Anderson, 2010). The 1949 Revolution is enigmatic for both theory and history, while it is also tantalising to people across the whole western political spectrum. The foremost challenge by 1949 to our understanding of the world comes from its profound impact on the contemporary international order, projecting China as the largest industrial country to the world economy, while the non-democratic advocate of globalisation in the time of ‘slowablisation’.3 From the onset, the PRC’s rationale was no different from the general theme for other Asian nations in pursuit of both modernisation and national development (Berger, 2004, 39), whereas its trajectory has drastically diverged from the classic model of the liberal market economy. The puzzle could only be answered by resorting to China’s own question on the eve of its modern revolution, which requires a more historically 3 It is rather ironic that Xi Jinping, leader of the Chinese Communist Party promised to robustly defend globalisation and free trade in Davos. See ‘Xi Jinping Delivers Robust Defence of Globalization at Davos’ in Financial Times (https://www.ft.com/content/67e c2ec0-dca2-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce, last access 2020-6-6).

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specific understanding beyond the Eurocentric logic of capitalism and liberalism. China’s problems first arose when the nation was coerced into an international competition and comparison after the demise of the Qing Dynasty. As the Republic of China (1911–1949) came forth to reorganise the state, China did not have a ripened capitalist society from which a modern democracy usually emerged. The Qing Dynasty’s collapse, not its transformation into a republic, left the latter particularly vulnerable having to rely on the regional political forces of the dynasty with tenuous national consensus on the central authority (Lin, 2012).4 The prototypical republic soon devolved into a series of local–regional warlords each parasitic on foreign influence, while attempts to reinstate the monarch were made twice during the first decade of the republic indicating the elites’ scepticism about the modern order (Zheng, 2006). The unsettling encounter between China and the West through the collapse of the imperial order had brought up a deep question of national unity to the Chinese elites, which prioritised the survival of the nation over other values. To emulate Western modernity was thus a much narrower agenda, while to bolster up socio-political cohesion of the Chinese society became the more predominant theme (Schoppa, 2000). This logic applies to China’s engagement with Enlightenment (Fitzgerald, 1996; Mitter, 2005; Schwarcz, 1986), as well as Marxism (Dirlik, 2018, 2). It was therefore inevitable that Western socio-political thinking, such as Marxism, was internalised to China’s modern revolutionary endeavour by being partly tweaked into a Social-Darwinist rhetoric promising to steer the Chinese nation through the jungle of international competition (Spence, 1990, 300–309). It was in the most frenetic and radical aura that the May Fourth Movement (1919)5 set the benchmark for China’s enduring revolutionary

4 Historians have largely agreed that the 1911 Revolution that created the Republic of China was not effectively the creation of a democratic republic. It was instead the collapse of the old regime with socio-political order delving into a chaotic abyss. 5 The May Fourth Movement was a student protest that took place on 4th May 1919,

when China as a winning side of the First World War was forced to lease the Shandong Peninsula to Japan after the German exit as the Versailles Treaty had required. It rippled into a broader cultural movement to systematically reflect upon China’s own intellectual tradition. For a full account of the movement, see Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightment, 1986, and Rana Mitter, Bitter Revolution, 2004.

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struggle by which the Communist Party emerged in 1921. Retrospectively, one would be tantalised by the drama of the rise of the CCP, especially considering that it was only a very loosely organised clusters of urban intellectuals from the beginning. Early leaders of the CCP, such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were all prominent scholars who were more idealist than politically adept. Mao Zedong was among the founders of the CCP, while he was never at the power centre until the CCP transformed into a more robust and militant commissionary party. Early communist movements in China were largely naïve, while the ideology of the party and its revolutionary outlook were both heavily influenced by the Soviet Union’s pristine vision of Marx-Leninism, centring the whole revolution on desperate and adventurous revolts in urban industrial areas which were proved to be futile (Ch’en, 1986; Deutscher & Tate, 1967; Isaacs, 2010). The early bloodshed and casualties, including the bitter relationship with the ruling Nationalist-Kuomintang (KMT) Party have prompted the CCP to reflect upon its revolutionary strategy as well as the definition of nationhood in the context of the Chinese revolution. While the KMT seized control over China’s major industrial centres and coastal cities, the CCP was cornered to the northern frontier and rural area of the country by intensive military actions of the KMT. In the 1930s, it was then unthinkable that the CCP would take over the country in less than two decades as the KMT’s besiege took a heavy toll of the CCP’s armies, leaving less than 50,000 soldiers fleeing to the northern borderland in Shaanxi province. From 1927 onwards, the elitist KMT had also established modern state administration in Chinese cities, with Shanghai and Nanjing reconstructed into scenes of quintessential modern municipality (Bergère, 1989, 2009; Kirby, 2000). The KMT also had a wider international recognition as its key members were mostly educated in the West, holding a western vision for the country’s modernisation. All these positive signs of the KMT had however left one fatal loophole—that the highly westernised KMT elites had little understanding and penetration of China’s vast rural community, where the majority of the population were formed by peasants who had merited no involvement in the fast-tracking modernisation projects in the cities. This omission, or inability to rule had planted in the KMT’s regime an inherent vulnerability, whereas it had enabled the CCP the essential autonomy with which they could manoeuvre (Eastman, 1984; Skocpol, 1979, 147). As the CCP retreated to the northern frontier, which was, in its own language,

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called the ‘base area’, a chance to reimagining the national space and its relationship with the world began to arise. The struggle in the base area has first prompted the transformation in state administration and the state-society relations. There has always been a debate in China studies about whether the CCP’s wartime state was a real progress towards democracy or it was a darker oppression of the rural society (Keating, 1997). The main pretext for the CCP and Mao Zedong’s rural endeavour, however, was that they were constantly engaged in a ‘asymmetric warfare’ (Kennedy, 2008). The KMT’s besiege, and the subsequent Japanese invasion both took the form of highly advanced modern military operations, which the CCP had no chance of survival in set-piece battles. Mao Zedong was conscious of his party’s vulnerabilities and resorted to a strategy of guerrilla struggle, which in Carl Schmitt’s words featured a ‘telluric’ character borne by the revolutionary peasants (Zheng, 2015). As Mao rose to power in the party by expelling his Soviet-informed opponents, he developed his modus operandi of survival and resistance in the most disadvantageous position, which entailed a decentralised and protracted strategy aiming to embed and implant the CCP’s organisations in the peasant community, and to submerge the enemies in the ‘vast ocean of people’s war’ (Mao, 1954, 62). The CCP’s organisational change in the base area was markedly known as propelled by exercising the ‘mass line’, which by integrating the CCP’s cadres to the rural community and by integrating the peasants to the revolutionary project, has generated a unique political subjectivity of Chinese peasants as the ‘master of nation’. It was indeed illusionary to believe that the peasants had full access to state power under the revolutionary government, but it was also obvious that the CCP’s senior leaders were much more deeply immersed with the peasants’ daily life facing the material and military hardship in the borderland which had in some way, rebuilt the state as a vehicle for peasants’ coping, instead of a financial burden superimposed on the local society (Schurmann, 1971; Selden, 1971, 1995). The dark side of the regime notwithstanding, the CCP’s officials had not only laboured together with the peasants, but also infiltrated the peasants with the Marxist-Leninist worldview derived from which a strong sense of involvement that the peasants had never experienced throughout history. The Marxist-Leninist worldview upheld by the revolutionised peasants, however, was fundamentally Sinicised and localised into the peasants’

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own revolutionary romance. It is problematised by historians that state authorities eroded in traditional rural communities as the state power was deeply enmeshed in the nexus of familial power and cultural practices, which had led to the state having to delegate its power to a network of local brokerage for essential functionalities (Duara, 1991). Having integrated the peasants to the organisational structure of the state, Mao had also presented to them a national imagination about the role they would possibly play on the world stage. Mao was vigorously depicting the rural revolution and daily struggle as an integral part of a transformative world revolution. Throughout 1930s and 1940s, Mao instilled within the CCP and the peasants the notion that ‘a single spark could start a prairie fire’ (Mao, 1953, 1). Like Marx, who argues that socialism could only succeed in the chorus of world revolution, Mao believed that the daily resistance, however trivial, would survive imperialism and reactionism with contradictions of the latter two mounting, and a ‘united front’ of world proletarian revolution eventually achieved. Mao seemed to weather the KMT’s onslaught and the Japanese invasion in the same spirit, which has imparted to the Chinese rural life a sacred, transcendental vision of political belonging beyond the traditional culture-power nexus. Derived from Mao’s revolutionary imagination is a dialectics of universalism and autonomy, which is the persistent perception that has played into the contemporary Chinese aussenpolitik. One may be flustered by the contradictory languages the CCP nowadays deploys, which relentlessly dangle between openness and orthodox-realist standpoint of sovereignty. A prolonged debate in American foreign policy is whether the US was to lose its chance in 1949 China (Chen, 1997; Cohen, 2002), and the conventional belief that the lost chance was inevitable has obviously played up the role of Soviet tutelage on China. While China was keen to acquire economic aids and security reassurance from the Soviet Union in the 1950s, Mao and Stalin have never reached any consensus on the meaning of socialism neither did they ever trust each other (Shen, 2012, 47). By committing to the Korean War, Mao never convinced Stalin that his version of Communism would fit into the economic and geopolitical design of Stalin’s Eastern bloc. Soviet aids in the early 1950s had no doubt strengthened China’s industrialisation and defence, while the Soviet model China used to look up to has never proved compatible with China’s revolutionary legacies. Peasantry was certainly a significant factor in Mao’s outlook of socialism. Through the 1950s and 1960s, Mao was

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extremely cautious about that any form of Soviet contribution to China’s defence and industrialisation might either minimise the role of peasants in China’s political life or defy the romance of the peasant-based revolution inherited from the base area. Mao’s ambitions were twofold. He aspired to an independent economic modernisation sufficient to position China between the Soviet Union and the West, and he also wanted a romantic approach to such modernisation in China’s own way, with peasants and the masses instead of technocrats driving the progress (Wang, 2011). Mao thus introduced the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) to mobilise the peasants to produce steel in their backyards, which was indeed economically disastrous, while politically effective in decoupling China from the Soviet penetration. Regardless of all the economic hardships, China’s success in the nuclear test in 1964 had completely disillusioned the Soviet nuclear umbrella, which Mao had long been dubious about. The two so-called ‘communist regimes’ soon fell out in armed conflicts over the territorial dispute on the north-eastern border. If the split with the Soviet was inevitable as it was rooted in the genes of Maoism, the CCP’s idealism derived from the centrality of peasants have also been in other occasions translated into the aspiration for a ‘world revolution’ in which China played a leading role. A grand narrative that the CCP pursued was to reconstruct China’s revolution not only as a communist revolution, but a nationalist revolution in the spotlight of the vast liberation movement of the third world. By using the language of the ‘third world’, Mao has undermined the fact of class-struggle in China’s perception of Marxism, while he saw the peasants as a member of the wider population of the world who were under multiple forces of suppression (Chen, 2008). Mao brought up his seminal idea of ‘Intermediate Zone’ during the civil war in 1946, and the idea was later coined as the ‘Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ by Zhou Enlai in the Bandung Conference in 1955. Intermediate Zone suggests that there was a vast zoom of manoeuvring for China between the USSR and the US, where nations, especially the third-world nations were under pressures from both superpowers, bearing the potential of anti-hegemonic resistance regardless of their memberships in respective blocs (Chen, 2001, 2008). The vast space between the poles involved not only newly liberated nations and their state-governments, but also exploited classes in the developed states and whomever prone to challenge the imperialist establishment. China thus justified with less difficulties in the 1970s its rapprochement

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to the US, which was perceived by the CCP’s leaders as an effort of resistance against the Soviet hegemony which aimed to deprive China of its independent path of development. Intermediate Zone is a vision of international relations the Chinese leader Mao Zedong described to the American journalist Anne Louise Strong in a talk in 1943. Mao further defined that there were two intermediate zones between the ‘camp of socialist nations’ and the United States in 1962 which meant the zone of newly liberated Asian and African nations and the European nations struggling with the US hegemony. Mao believed that both ‘intermediate zones’ could be made friends of China and he had further extended the concept to mean even the China-friendly political forces within the US after China split with the Soviet Union since 1960s.

Overall, the 1949 revolution is of world-historical significance in the sense that it has defined China’s unique self-positioning in world politics (Lin, 2012). The unique peasant-based revolutionary experience has set China apart from the Soviet Union, making the communist discourse a very vague reference in China’s foreign policy practices. A strong nationalist dimension underpinned the politicised peasants has in turn centralised the discourse of independence in China’s relations with the world, which has been profound not only in the struggle against the Soviet Union, but also in the economic reform since 1970s (Gallagher, 2011). The CCP has always been firm on its autonomous status while actively embracing different forms of universalism and openness in different historical periods. This self-positioning is also the CCP’s response to China’s question of ‘centenary humiliation’ recurrent in the CCP’s foreign policy languages.

Conclusion: Transcending Both Eurocentrism and Sinocentrism With our survey of China’s historical experiences, some pitfalls of mainstream IR theories have become notable. It is of philosophical significance to determine, however, whether China’s exceptionality could falsify theories in the simplest fashion, and whether IR theories have room to self-modify to address the growing empirical anomalies from the East. Notably, a prolonged discussion of the topic of Eurocentrism has been

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floating in the IR academia for over a decade, and there have been significant interventions made by critical scholars to address the historical narrowness of IR theories facing profound non-Western challenges (Bhambra, 2014; Liu, 2016; Matin, 2012; Rosenberg, 2007; Shilliam, 2010). Regardless of the prominence of Eurocentrism, there has always been a grave danger in the field of non-western IR thinking of sliding from one form of ethnocentrism to another. Essentially, not only the problems of Eurocentrism need to be interrogated, but also other potential sources of Sinocentrism requires discretion. To debunk Eurocentrism, two decades ago, thinkers with great historical awareness took to task the concept of ‘balance of power’. It is noted that the ‘balance of power’ as a systemic outcome of neorealism has hardly ever matured in the China-centred international order. David Kang’s (2003) seminal thesis, ‘Getting Asia Wrong’, outlined that China’s primacy in the region had never incurred any balancing behaviours from the secondary states until the modern Western international norms began to penetrate and erode Asia–Pacific. This peace-prone tendency was not only omnipresent in the premodern era, but also in the modern time when most secondary states chose to align, accommodate and bandwagon China’s growing power (Ross, 2006). The current Belt and Road Initiative which the West is keen to rebuke, is generally well-received by China’s neighbouring states in Southeast Asia, where very little imperialist implications have been noted. Kang’s (2003) explanation is a highly empirical one, and he traces the roots of the China-centred region to a premodern socio-cultural structure that the western IR was inapt to understand. As the Chinese historical legacies are profound but somehow unintelligible, some other scholars tend to attribute those to the variable of culture (Lapid & Kratochwil, 1996). A rather descriptive account has defined China’s historical international relations as premised upon a structure of hierarchy instead of anarchy. Although anarchical moments have been identified at times, the hierarchical nature of the international system was more prominent in East Asia (Zhang, 2014). China maintained a varying degree of hierarchy and anarchy towards different players in the region, the scale of which was largely determined by cultural perception and historical modes of interaction. Culture remains the only deployable explanation for the historical existence of hierarchy, which is further furnished as a concept of ‘Confucian Long Peace’ or ‘All-underHeaven system’ (Tianxia) (Kelly, 2012; Zhang, 2009; Zhao, 2006). Such

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a cultural understanding broadly suggests that China’s traditional worldview was characterised by inclusiveness, harmony and reciprocity, which is still at play to underlie the contemporary practices of Chinese foreign policy (Zheng, 2006). However, culture is a self-enclosed explanation which itself cannot be further unpacked. The fact that China’s political thinking has a hunch of Confucianism does not mean that Confucianism could constitute an independent mode of explanation. Otherwise it runs the risk of essentialising the cultural variable and reducing it to an ‘unmoved mover’. A culturalist explanation may facilitate thinking of Sino-exceptionalism which could reject theoretical dialogues with other theoretical alternatives (Zhang, 2011). It is important to note that cultural reductionism is never the cure for Eurocentrism as it is the exact cause of the syndrome itself. Max Weber has deployed the exact cultural variable to illustrate premodern China as inertial and mundane. To transcend Eurocentrism, one is also to transcend Sinocentrism. The point of departure for reimagining China’s international relations is to identify the exact questions that concerned the Chinese elites, society and states on each historical stage by putting China back into context. This approach echoes Paul Cohen’s (2010) thesis of ‘discovering history in China’, while it emphasises more on China’s interaction with historically situated agents on the global scale. As for premodern China, the nomad-sedentary interaction should always be placed at the centre of analysis, as the co-constitution of the two forms of society was central to both China’s international outlook and the evolution of Chinese states. By doing so, the myth of Confucianism could be separated from the actual fact of political struggle, while the so-called tributary system could be reinterpreted as an evolutionary category as the topology of ethnic and geographic engagements complicated over time. The nomad-sedentary interaction could also help identifying multiple sources of China’s traditional state-formation. The northern steppe and the Inner Asian frontiers could all be brought back to light from the periphery to the centre of history (Di Cosmo, 1994, 2002; Lattimore, 1940). People from different periods of history have faced different ‘question of their time’. It is particularly important to understand that most Chinese elites became increasingly conscious of the need of modernisation and industrialisation since the Opium War, whereas the perceived approaches dramatically vary. Alexander Gerschenkron has noted that most late-developing nations may pursue radical, state-led development

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as they attempted to catch up with the advanced societies (Gerschenkron, 1962; Veblen, 1915). Leon Trotsky has further suggested that backward nations were under greater pressures when they attempted to directly import ready-to-use development, which would in turn substantially limit the late-developers’ options (Trotsky, 2008). This observation is particularly relevant to China’s twentieth- century revolution, as China could not only borrow Western technology and institutions freely, but also had to rebuild its state infrastructure and reposition itself in world politics to bear mounting pressures from advanced societies. In China’s case, while elites were keen to assimilate Western influences, most others still found western capitalism of ‘alien character’ as it wreaked havoc across the country (Meisner, 1999, 3–6). An undertone could be found in Maoism that China aspired to achieve all ‘functional equivalents’ of western modernity while insisting on pursuing those in alternative ways. This characterises both the Zeitgeist and Zeitdiagnose of all revolutions and reforms of the twentieth century. This spirit could be found in contemporary foreign policy discourses, such as ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ and ‘non-interference of domestic affairs’. Moreover, to avoid ethnocentrism shall we also be aware of the dimension of historical time in understanding China. French historian Fernando Braudel has outlined the longue durée framework of historical time. He argues that there are three forms of time for measuring historical change according to the variegated social meanings that history entails (Braudel, 1960; Braudel & Wallerstein, 2009). We can expect fundamental, structural transformation only in the timeframe of longue durée. However, to understand structural change shall we closely observe the accumulation and variation of daily life, which is usually slow and mundane but constitutive of the long-term duration. That is called the incremental or every day timeframe (Ruggie, 2002, 155). Also in most cases, worldhistorical events took place over conjunctures, the mid-term changes that combine uneven social forces to produce low-probability, but re-orienting moments with significant impact (Rosenberg, 2005, 29). Considering historical time, there will be an agenda that focuses on different levels of analysis in order to approach Chinese international relations in different timeframes. A primary backdrop that any Chinese studies should stand against is China’s agrarian society which has lasted for millennia. China’s international relations is in a way very much subject to this condition. The sophisticated bureaucratic administration invented during the Qin Dynasty from 221 B.C. was the overarching mechanism

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developed to maintain order and stability of the vast agrarian community. This has constituted not only the backbone of Confucian teaching, which is about how to self-cultivate into a gentleman to join the officialdom headed by a sage, but also the key political projects of the contemporary Chinese state (Liu, 2004).6 It is also worth noting that the longue durée of the agrarian society has determined the relative stagnation of productivity throughout Chinese history with a political implication that the contradiction between the maintenance of state administration and the local livelihood remained tense. The longue agrarian durée has in a way foregrounded the relative stable nature of the Chinese state as the centrality of regional order in David Kang’s account, but it is also the source of cumulative effects which had eventually led to China’s disadvantage to the West. A rather interesting observation of premodern Chinese economy suggests that China’s economic development par was on a par with that of England on the eve of the Industrial Revolution around 1750, and China’s productivity and economic sustainability might even be higher (Pomeranz, 2002, 2009, 69). China’s vast domestic market as well as the stable intraregional trade of East Asia had underpinned a continuous growth in the rural economy despite the relative backwardness in technology (Hamashita, 2003). However, there has also been scepticism about China’s premodern market economy and its endogenous political crisis. The enduring condition of overpopulation was abortive to China’s technological innovation, and peasants tended to invest more manual labour instead of technology to lands, leading to a continuous decline in marginal growth per unit of land (Huang, 1985, 2002). It is the longue durée accumulation of landed contradictions in premodern China that has resulted in periodic rebellions ripping the peasant communities (Perry, 1980, 2015). Combined with modern Western intrusion, it has given rise to the conjunctures of the revolutionary period of the twentieth century. The massive societal breakdown, great famines, and the pressures from western capitalism presented the problem of social cohesion, while it was decisive in the revolutionary process whether the ruling elites were able to integrate the peasants to

6 For example, the CCP’s senior leader Liu Shaoqi published an article on ‘How to be a Good Communist’ (1939) that emphasised heavily on a Communist’s effort to self-cultivate through learning and practising, and actively applying readings of Marx and Lenin to revolutionary practice. Liu’s perception of a good communist is very similar to the Confucian perception of a gentleman.

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the vast project of state-formation. The Communist Revolution addressed exactly this problem, and the unique peasant-based approach of the revolution has then become the modus operandi of the Chinese modernisation, underlying the fervent emphasis on ‘national independence’ and sovereignty in China’s engagement with the modern world. For international relations, the conjunctural analysis is particularly important for understanding China’s protean foreign policy stances of the twentieth century. Especially when traditional intraregional networks of trade were dismantled by the US Cold War embargo, China actively sought economic ties with both the Soviet Union and the West regardless of ideological positions. The above dimensions would pose serious challenge to both the Eurocentric IR theories and the Sinocentric culturalist explanations, as it calls forth a comprehensive framework for recalibrating China’s positioning in world politics. For mainstream IR, most theories are too keen to establish the status as ‘systemic theories’ while the system could only capture the most deep-seated and epochal structures at best (Waltz, 2001, 2010). That anarchy preludes balancing is a generalisation based upon very narrow European experiences of the nineteenth century, while replacing anarchy with Confucian hierarchy is equally unconstructive. If we adopt the most basic, generic definition of anarchy to call it the fact of the absence of an ‘overarching authority’ above the states,7 its existence is largely transhistorical with very little explanatory power in its own right (Bull, 2012). It was, however, the interaction between the nomads and the agrarian villages in the premodern time, and the engagement between the backward China and the advanced industrial powers in the modern time that shaped China’s states and foreign outlook. For constructivism, the concept of ‘systemic culture’ that defines friends and enemies is no more than another version of pervasive structure. It could describe the fact that hostility and amicability rose and receded between China and the world, while it does not succeed in explaining why that was the case. In fact, China’s case does not only yearn for an explanation of itself, but also calls forth a reflection upon how IR theories may apply to Western experiences as well. The lack of longue durée/conjuncture differentiation, and the missing interactive dimension on the unit level will both 7 This is largely the English School’s definition of anarchy, while the English School relies heavily on historical description for understanding potential order under anarchy. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 1977/2012.

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be extremely important for understanding how and why IR theories have frozen historical realities when it spreads away from Europe (Burawoy, 1989; Schroeder, 1994, 769–772).

Classroom Activities 1. Debate: Do you think Mao Zedong’s legacies have been positive or negative for contemporary China? 2. Imagine that you were a diplomat from your native/residential country, write a letter to the Chinese leader to tell him what role you would expect China to play in current world affairs.

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Gerschenkron, A. (1962). Economic backwardness in historical perspective: A book of essays. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Hamashita, T. (2003). Tribute and treaties: Maritime Asia and treaty port networks in the era of negotiation, 1800–1900. The resurgence of East Asia, 500, 150 and 50 years perspectives (pp. 17–50). Routledge. Hartwell, R. (1962). A revolution in the Chinese iron and coal industries during the Northern Sung, 960–1126 A.D. The Journal of Asian Studies, 21(2), 153–162. Hartwell, R. (1966). Markets, technology, and the structure of enterprise in the development of the eleventh-century Chinese iron and steel industry*. The Journal of Economic History, 26(1), 29–58. Hess, C. A. (2007). Big brother is watching: Local Sino-Soviet relations and the building of New Dalian, 1945–55. In Dilemmas of victory: The early years of the People’s Republic of China (pp. 160–183). Harvard University Press. Hevia, J. L. (1995). Cherishing men from Afar: Qing guest ritual and the Macartney embassy of 1793. Duke University Press. Ho, P. (1967). The significance of the Ch’ing period in Chinese history. The Journal of Asian Studies, 26(2), 189–195. Huang, P. (1985). The peasant economy and social change in North China. Stanford University Press. Huang, P. C. C. (2002). Development or involution in eighteenth-century Britain and China? A review of Kenneth Pomeranz’s ‘The great divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the modern world economy.’ The Journal of Asian Studies, 61(2), 501–538. Isaacs, H. R. (2010). The tragedy of the Chinese revolution. Haymarket Books. Kang, D. C. (2003). Getting Asia wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks. International Security, 27 (4), 57–85. Kang, D. C. (2020). International order in historical East Asia: Tribute and hierarchy beyond sinocentrism and eurocentrism. International Organization, 74(1), 65–93. Keating, P. B. (1997). Two revolutions: Village reconstruction and the cooperative movement in Northern Shaanxi, 1934–1945. Stanford University Press. Kelly, R. E. (2012). A ‘Confucian long peace’ in pre-Western East Asia? European Journal of International Relations, 18(3), 407–430. Kennedy, A. B. (2008). Can the weak defeat the strong? Mao’s evolving approach to asymmetric warfare in Yan’an. The China Quarterly, 196, 884–899. Kirby, W. C. (2000). Engineering China: Birth of the developmental state. In Becoming Chinese: Passages to modernity and beyond (p. 138). University of California Press. Kuhn, P. A. (1970). Rebellion and its enemies in late imperial China: Militarization and social structure, 1796–1864. Harvard University Press.

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Lapid, Y., & Kratochwil, F. V. (1996). The return of culture and identity in IR theory. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Lattimore, O. (1940). Inner Asian frontiers of China. Oxford University Press. Lewis, M. E., & Brook, T. (2009). The early Chinese empires. Harvard University Press. Lin, C. (2012). Marxism and the politics of positioning China in world history. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 13(3), 438–466. Liu, S. (2004). How to be a good communist. In Selected works of Liu Shaoqi. Foreign Languages Press. Liu, X. (2007). Confucianism and nation state. Huaxia Publisher. Liu, X. (2016). Anarchy in the East: Eurocentrism, China-centred geopolitics and uneven and combined development. International Politics, 53(5), 574–595. Lüthi, L. M. (2008). The Sino-Soviet split: Cold war in the communist world. Princeton University Press. Mao, Z. (1953). A single spark can start a prairie fire. Foreign Languages Press. Mao, Z. (1954). On the protracted war. Foreign Languages Press. Marx, K. (2005). Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy. Penguin UK. Matin, K. (2007). Uneven and combined development in world history: The international relations of state-formation in premodern Iran. European Journal of International Relations, 13(3), 419–447. Matin, K. (2012). Redeeming the universal: Postcolonialism and the inner life of Eurocentrism. European Journal of International Relations. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. W. W. Norton & Company. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2010). The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia†. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(4), 381–396. Meisner, M. (1999). Mao’s China and after: A history of the People’s Republic. Simon and Schuster. Mitter, R. (2005). A bitter revolution: China’s struggle with the modern world. Oxford University Press. Moore, B. (1967). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. Beacon Press. Needham, J. (1954). Science and civilisation in China: Volume 1, Introductory orientations. Cambridge University Press. Pei, M. (2012). Everything you think you know about China is wrong’. Foreign Policy, 29. Perdue, P. C. (2005). China marches west. Harvard University Press. Perdue, P. C. (2009). Nature and nurture on imperial China’s frontiers. Modern Asian Studies, 43(1), 245–267. Perry, E. J. (1980). Rebels and revolutionaries in North China, 1845–1945. Stanford University Press.

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Perry, E. J. (2015). Challenging the mandate of heaven: Social protest and state power in China: Social protest and state power in China. Routledge. Pomeranz, K. (2002). Beyond the East-West binary: Resituating development paths in the eighteenth-century world. The Journal of Asian Studies, 61(2), 539–590. Pomeranz, K. (2009). The great divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the modern world economy. Princeton University Press. Roberts, J. A. G. (1989). Warlordism in China. Review of African Political Economy, (45/46), 26–33. Rosenberg, J. (2005). Globalization theory: A post mortem. International Politics, 42(1), 2–74. Rosenberg, J. (2007). International relations—The ‘Higher Bullshit’: A reply to the globalization theory debate. International Politics, 44(4), 450–482. Ross, R. S. (2006). Balance of power politics and the rise of China: Accommodation and balancing in East Asia. Security Studies, 15(3), 355–395. Rowe, W. T. (2001). Saving the world: Chen Hongmou and elite consciousness in eighteenth-century China. Stanford University Press. Ruggie, J. G. (2002). Constructing the world polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation. Routledge. Schoppa, K. B. (2000). The search for social Cohesion in China, 1921–1958. In Historical perspectives on contemporary East Asia. Harvard University Press. Schrecker, J. E. (2004). The Chinese revolution in historical perspective. Greenwood Publishing Group. Schroeder, P. (1994). Historical reality vs. neo-realist theory. International Security, 19(1), 108–148. Schurmann, F. (1971). Ideology and organization in communist China. University of California Press. Schwarcz, V. (1986). The Chinese enlightenment: Intellectuals and the legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919. University of California Press. Segal, G. (1999). Does China matter? Foreign Affairs, 78(5), 24–36. Selden, M. (1971). The Yenan way in revolutionary China. Harvard University Press. Selden, M. (1995). Yan’an communism reconsidered. Modern China, 21(1), 8– 44. Shen, Z. (2012). Mao, Stalin and the Korean war: Trilateral communist relations in the 1950s. Routledge. Sheridan, J. E. (1983). The warlord era: Politics and militarism under the Peking government, 1916–28. The Cambridge History of China, 12, 1912–1949. Shilliam, R. (2010). International relations and non-Western thought: Imperialism. Routledge. Skocpol, T. (1979). States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France. Cambridge University Press.

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Spence, J. D. (1990). The search for modern China. Norton. Teng, S., & Fairbank, J. K. (1979). China’s response to the west: A documentary survey, 1839–1923. Harvard University Press. Trotsky, L. (2008). History of the Russian Revolution. Haymarket Books. Van Der Sprenkel, O. B. (1964). Max Weber on China. History and Theory, 3(3), 348–370. Veblen, T. (1915). Imperial Germany and the industrial revolution. Macmillan. Waldron, A. (1991). The warlord: Twentieth-century Chinese understandings of violence, militarism, and imperialism. The American Historical Review, 96(4), 1073–1100. Waley-Cohen, J. (2000). The sextants of Beijing: Global currents in Chinese history. WW Norton & Company. Waltz, K. N. (2001). Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis. Columbia University Press. Waltz, K. N. (2010). Theory of international politics. Waveland Press. Wang, H. (2011). The dialectics of autonomy and opening. Critical Asian Studies, 43(2), 237–260. Weber, M. (1951). The religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism. Free Press. Young, E. P. (1980). Politics in the aftermath of revolution: The era of Yuan Shih-k’ai, 1912–1916. The Cambridge History of China, 12, 1912–1949. Zhang, F. (2009). Rethinking the ‘tribute system’: Broadening the conceptual horizon of historical East Asian politics. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2(4), 545–574. Zhang, F. (2011). The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations: European Journal of International Relations. Zhang, F. (2014). How hierarchic was the historical East Asian system? International Politics, 51(1), 1–22. Zhao, D. (2015). Max Weber and patterns of Chinese history. Chinese Journal of Sociology, 1(2), 201–230. Zhao, T. (2006). Rethinking Empire from a Chinese concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia). Social Identities, 12(1), 29–41. Zheng, B. (2006). China’s peaceful rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997–2005. Brookings Institution Press. Zheng, Q. (2015). Mao, Schmitt and the politics of transition. In Q. Zheng (Ed.), Carl Schmitt, Mao Zedong and the politics of transition (pp. 111–128). Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Suggested Further Reading Cohen, P. A. (2010). Discovering history in China: American historical writing on the recent Chinese past. Columbia University Press.

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Duara, P. (1991). Culture, power, and the state: Rural North China, 1900–1942. Stanford University Press. Hevia, J. L. (1995). Cherishing men from Afar: Qing guest ritual and the Macartney embassy of 1793. Duke University Press. Fairbank, J. K., & Goldman, M. (2006). China: A new history. Harvard University Press. Meisner, M. (1999). Mao’s China and after: A history of the People’s Republic. Simon and Schuster. Mitter, R. (2009) Modern China. Sterling Publishing Company, Inc. Shambaugh, D., & Yahuda, M. (Eds.). (2014). International relations of Asia. Rowman & Littlefield. Spence, J. D. (1990). The search for modern China. WW Norton & Company. Waley-Cohen, J. (2000). The sextants of Beijing: Global currents in Chinese history. WW Norton & Company. Zhao, T. (2005). Tian-xia system: A philosophical introduction to world institutions. Jiangsu Education Press (赵汀阳. 天下体系: 世界制度哲学导论. 江蘇教 育出版社, 2005).

PART II

Decentralising the West: Redefining Key Concepts in IR

CHAPTER 5

An East Asian Theory of Democracy Olivia Cheung

Study Questions 1. What are the similarities and differences of the political systems in East Asian countries? 2. What are the conditions for democratic consolidation and are these conditions present in East Asia? 3. To what extent are Western theories of democracy applicable to East Asian countries? 4. How do East Asians understand the concept of democracy and why do they understand democracy the ways they do? 5. Should we speak of a single East Asian Theory of Democracy or are there multiple theories of democracy in East Asia? 6. Why do authoritarian regimes persist in East Asia?

O. Cheung (B) SOAS China Institute, SOAS University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Cooke (ed.), Non-Western Global Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84938-2_5

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East Asia, which proudly self-identifies as the “non-West,” offers rich empirical evidence to test the validity of Western theories of democracy and to generate new theories on the contested subject. The region, which comprises of 18 countries/territories,1 hosts consolidated democracies, pseudo-democracies (or electoral democracies) and resilient authoritarian regimes. Compared to Western countries, the historical root for democracy in East Asia is shallow: the Philippines, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia underwent democratic transition relatively recently: in the 1980s–1990s, a period which Huntington (1991) described as the global “third wave of democratisation.” Four decades down the road, their democracies are in distress: some are discredited by national corruption scandals, some still struggle to consolidate, others have retrograded to populist authoritarianism or military-led government. Of course, it is plausible to generalise the low democratic legitimacy in East Asia as part of the global democratic recession in the past decade (Diamond, 2015). But this is only a part of the story. The entrenched conservative and pragmatist value system across the region, which is reinforced by a patriarchal style of governance and popular authoritarian nostalgia and legitimated by the enviable economic success of Singapore and China—both make no secret of their disdain of political liberalism— may provide useful clues for why democracy, as in the Western sense of free elections and rights protection, has yet to gain unquestionable acceptance in much of the region. In addition to asking why the political realities in East Asia do not conform neatly to the expectations of Western theories of democracy, students of international politics should also enquire if there is an East Asian framework of democracy, both in theory and practice. Researching these questions has the potential to shed light on the possible biases, implicit assumptions, and explanatory boundaries of Western theories of democracy. Furthermore, it could contribute vocabularies to make sense of the perplexing politics in a region that is not only the world’s fastest growing, but also geopolitically salient. Adopting a cultural analytical framework, this chapter maintains that there is an East Asian Theory of Democracy, which is embraced by 1 In this chapter, East Asia includes 18 polities: 8 in Northeast Asia—Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, China, Hong Kong and Macao in Northeast Asia; 10 in Southeast Asia—Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

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regional elites and ordinary citizens attitudinally. This argument is developed over four sections. The first section provides a historically informed and contemporary overview of the condition of democracy (or the lack thereof) in every East Asian polity. The second section assesses the explanatory purchase of Western theories of democracy in the region. The third section presents the East Asian Theory of Democracy based on analysing the results of public opinion surveys and the regional elitist and societal discourse on democracy. The fourth section examines leading theories of authoritarian resilience—which were all formulated in a nonWestern context—as institutional and structural explanations of persistent democratic deficit in East Asia.

Democracies, Pseudo-democracies and Authoritarian Regimes in East Asia East Asia is a region of political heterogeneity. It is home to democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia), pseudo-democracies (Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar) and various types of authoritarian regimes, including: absolute monarchy (Brunei), strong-man dictatorship (Cambodia) and Communist one-party states (China, North Korea, Laos and Vietnam). The categorisation of regime types here follows the relevant conventions in political science (Dahl, 2000; Schumpeter, 1976). Democracies are polities with free, fair and regular elections, accompanied by a deep respect for civil and political liberties. Pseudo-democracies have a democratic form but are lacking in democratic substance. There are elections but no meaningful political competition. Major human rights violations exist alongside the protection of rights that are deemed non-threatening to the regime. Authoritarian regimes feature power monopoly by the political incumbent: there are no popular elections at the national level, opposition political parties are outlawed, and grave human rights violation are commonplace. The 2019 Freedom House rankings of East Asian polities are listed in Table 5.1. Democracies The only four East Asian countries rated “free” by Freedom House in 2019 were Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia. They have significant records of popular elections that lead to peaceful power transfer, as

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Table 5.1 The 2019 Freedom House rankings of East Asian polities Countries/territories

Democracies Japan Taiwan Mongolia South Korea Pseudo-democracies Indonesia Philippines Hong Kong Malaysia Singapore Thailand Myanmar Macao Authoritarian regimes Brunei Cambodia Vietnam Laos China

Political rights score (0–40 points)

Civil liberties score (0–60 points)

Total score (0–100 points)

40 37 36 33

56 56 48 50

96 93 84 83

30 25 16 21 19 6 14 –

31 34 39 31 31 26 16 –

61 59 55 52 50 32 30 –

7 5 3 2 -1

21 20 17 12 11

28 25 20 14 10

Status

Free

Partly free

– Not free

Source Freedom in the world 2019, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedomworld/scores

well as a comparatively strong protection of political and civil liberties. However, there is also evidence of democratic deficit. In the Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit in the same year, the four polities were classified as “flawed democracies.” Japan, the oldest democracy in East Asia, experienced centuries of militarism before being defeated in the Second World War in 1945, which ensured the external imposition of democracy. During the post-war period of US occupation (1949–1952), General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, implemented a joint-programme of demilitarisation-cum-democratisation in the hope of forestalling future Japanese aggression (Williams, 1988). The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has ruled the country largely continuously since

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it was founded under US support in 1955. The only feasible political opposition—Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)—won a parliamentary majority in 2009, breaking the LDP’s political monopoly. Yet, popularity for the DPJ plummeted in the next four years due to its many serious blunders. Political power returned to the LDP in the parliamentary election in 2012, where it won a landslide victory, leaving the DPJ with a meagre 12% of seats. Other than the relative lack of checks and balances over the LDP, recent challenges to Japanese democracy included “ethnic and gender-based discriminations and claims of improperly close relations between government and business sector” (Freedom House, 2020a). Prior to democratic transition in 1987, South Korea and Taiwan were heavy-handed autocracies that were under the rule of, respectively, the military and the Kuomintang (KMT or the Nationalist Party), for nearly three decades, following independence from repressive Japanese colonialism. Elections in democratic South Korea and Taiwan were always hotly contested, which resulted in regular rotation of powers between rivalrous political parties. The outstanding challenges to their democracies were corruption and cronyism. The severity of these problems was exposed in the scandals that disgraced Park Geun-hye, former South Korean president (2010–2017), and Chen Shui-bian, former Taiwan President (2000–2008), bringing the elected institutions of these polities into disrepute (Chang & Chu, 2017). Democracy in Taiwan is under the shadow of extensive anxiety over perceived mainland Chinese attempts of political subversion. The Sunflower Movement in 2014 saw protestors, mostly students, occupying the legislature to demand a full committee review for a trade agreement with mainland China (Rowen, 2015). Mongolia, a client state of the Soviet Union for seven decades, had its first free, multiparty elections after a peaceful democratic revolution in 1990, a time where the Soviet Union was preoccupied with internal turmoil. Corruption has flourished alongside the discovery of natural resources since the early 2000s, which created a lucrative mining industry. The credibility of the 2016 parliamentary election was tainted by accusations of irregularities. The latest major signal of political tightening was the passage of a controversial law granting some national leaders, including the president, power to dismiss the prosecutor general and head of the anti-corruption agency without justification in 2019 (Sambuu & Menarndt, 2019).

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Pseudo-Democracies The political systems of Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar can be described as “pseudo-democracies,” “electoral democracies,” “competitive authoritarianism” or “hybrid regimes.” Hong Kong, a former British colony, and Macao, a former Portuguese colony, reverted to Chinese rule in 1997 and 1999, respectively, becoming China’s only two “special administrative regions” (SARs). Both were promised a high degree of autonomy for at least 50 years under the constitutional principle of “One Country, Two Systems.” Yet, political rights in the SARs deteriorated over the years as the local governments actively pursued a policy of economic integration with authoritarian China. The erosion of freedom was especially obvious in Hong Kong, where local sellers of books critical of the mainland Chinese regime were disappeared, pro-democracy politicians were stripped of their elected office in 2016 and prominent dissidents were disqualified from contesting in elections ever since. The recent large-scale pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong—Umbrella Movement (aka the “Occupy Central Movement”) in 2014 and Anti-Extradition Bill Protest in 2019–2020—were met with violent police repression (Hale, 2019; Lam & Cooper, 2018). Compared to Hong Kong, the political opposition in Macao is significantly more docile. The Macao government has been able to co-opt society with the bustling casino industry, which employed 30% of the population (as of 2019) and contributed significantly to the annual cash redistribution scheme for permanent residents, the value of which in 2019 was $1253, being over half the median monthly income of the local workforce (Kwong, 2017). Singapore, which declared independence from Malaysia in 1965, has been governed by the People’s Action Party (PAP) founded by Lee Kuan Yew, who was Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990. The space for political mobilisation is severely restricted not only by laws and regulations but also by the legal activism of the PAP, which routinely sues its political opponents, causing some to bankrupt. Political opposition surged following the death of Lee Kuan Yew in 2015. The parliamentary election held six months afterwards saw every seat contested for the first time in the city-state’s history. Despite intense political competition, the PAP won a landslide victory, losing only six seats. In 2017, the sons of Lee Kuan Yew openly criticised their brother, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, for power abuse, and the PAP for “losing its way” (Koh, 2020). One

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of them even endorsed an opposition party—Progressive Singapore Party (PSP)—which was formed by PAP defector, Tan Cheng Bock. The PSP was expected to form a united opposition coalition to challenge the PAP in the next general election (Koh, 2020). In Malaysia, the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, which had ruled the country since its independence in 1957, and maintained political monopoly by “manipulating electoral districts, appealing to ethnic nationalism, and suppressing criticism,” lost to Pakatan Harapan (PH)—an opposition alliance led by Mahathir Mohamad, BN’s long-time leader and Prime Minister (1981–2003) in the 2018 general election (Freedom House, 2020b). Voters hoped that PH would democratise Malaysian politics, but it soon succumbed to factionalism. The alliance collapsed in 2020, with Mohamad being ousted, the future of Malaysia’s democracy has been shrouded in uncertainty. In the Philippines, the People’s Power Movement—an uprising involving over 500,000 Filipinos—toppled President Ferdinand Marco’s corrupt and brutal dictatorship in 1986. However, democracy in the Philippines has never been consolidated. The government was weak, corrupt and manipulated elections. Violent crimes were commonplace; terrorist attacks were on the surge. Rodrigo Duterte, an illiberal populist who promised to provide public safety through a violent anti-drug campaign, was elected president in 2014, winning support from the elites and middle class. The campaign resorted to extrajudicial means, killing 12,000 Filipinos, mostly poor, to date (Thompson, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2019). Democratic transition in Indonesia was triggered by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, which led to massive unemployment. Six months into the crisis, the Indonesian rupiah was already devalued by 80%. The economic troubles culminated in a serious split in the leadership and the May 1998 riots, which ended the three-decade dictatorship of President Suharto, who, by some estimate, set the record of the world’s most corrupt political leader. Post-Suharto Indonesia is a classic example of “oligarchic democracy”: entrepreneurs entered politics through election manipulation and crony ties, which allowed them to bypass bureaucratic elites to tap into state resources directly (Fukuoka, 2012). Thailand has been trapped in a “vicious election/coup cycle,” alternating between “weak democracy and dictatorship,” since shortly after it transitioned from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy in 1932 (Tonsakulrungruang, 2019). The 2014 coup—which, by some

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estimate, is the 20th of the country—ousted the democratically elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Back in 2006, her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was also democratically elected to be Prime Minister, was likewise displaced by a coup. They were both convicted of corruption and were in self-imposed exile. After the 2014 coup, the military delayed general election, which was finally held in 2019 in accordance with the amended constitution in 2017, institutionalised significant military participation in Thai politics. Hence, pundits referred to the elected government as a “parliamentary dictatorship” (Tonsakulrungruang, 2019). The military has dominated Myanmar’s politics since 1962, and begun political liberalisation in 2010: releasing Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) after 15 years of house arrest, granting amnesties for over 200 political prisoners and liberalising media control. The NLD won the 2015 general election, being the first openly contested election of the country since 1990. Aung San Suu Kyi became the State Counsellor as a result. Widely celebrated as an icon for democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi was a huge disappointment to the international community. She defended regime-sponsored atrocities towards ethnic and religious minorities in the Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states. The brutality against the Rohingya minorities in the Rakhine state led to more than 300,000 refugees fleeing to neighbouring Bangladesh. It was condemned by the United Nations as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (UN News, 2017). Authoritarian Regimes Absolute Monarchy Brunei, a small oil-dependent nation with a population of only 459,500 (according to official estimates for 2019), is an absolute monarchy that dates to 1363. No elections have been held since 1984. It is often said that “the sultan is the state and the state is the sultan.” The hereditary sultan, who rules by sharia law, is the prime minister, defence minister, finance minister and minister of foreign affairs. He also appoints legislators (Dosch & Sidhu, 2019, 204–205). Strong-Man Dictatorship In Cambodia, a UN intervention in 1993 resulted in multiparty elections, funding for civil society organisations, and a liberal constitution. However, democracy has gained little traction. It has, as Un (2019,

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1) observed, “perpetuated a state dominated by clientelism and rentseeking, producing a government with weak administrative capacity but strong in coercive capacity.” Political power has been monopolised by the Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) since 1993. In 2017, Cambodia’s “electoral authoritarianism” deteriorated to what Un (2019) referred to as “hegemonic electoral authoritarianism” as the CPP outlawed the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), its principal political rival, ensuring a complete victory in the parliamentary election in the subsequent year. Communist One-Party States The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has governed China since founding the country as a communist people’s republic and forcing the KMT to flee Taiwan in 1949. There are eight “democratic parties” in China, all pledge support to the leadership of the CCP, and serve an advisory function in government policymaking. Since the adoption of market reforms in the early 1980s, periodic direct elections have been held at the grassroots level—village committee elections in villages and residents’ committee elections in cities. These elections should not be mistaken for transfer of power, as the elected were responsible for implementing the CCP’s policies, and for community surveillance (Guan & Cai, 2019). Xi Jinping, CCP General Secretary and State Chairperson, has revived heavy-handed authoritarian tactics to govern China since 2012. These included the launching of an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, mass detention of Uyghurs minorities in Xinjiang, mass arrest of human rights lawyers and the demolition of Christian churches (Economy, 2018). North Korea, which is notorious for its missiles, has been ruled by the communist Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) since the mid-1940s. It is a dynastic totalitarian dictatorship monopolised by the family of Kim II-sung, the first leader of the country. There has been some limited economic liberalisation under Kim Jong-un, grandson of Kim II-sung, since 2011. However, citizens are still denied of basic freedom, placed under mass surveillance, and are forced to worship Kim II-sung, who is propagated as a demi-god (Buzo, 2018). Laos has been under the communist Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) since 1975, which is the sole legal political party in the country. Growing economic freedom since the 1980s has not translated to political freedom. The political strength of the LPRP government was buttressed by “the lack of credible opposition; the virtual absence of student, labour

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or other forms of grassroots activism; the close connections between business and party elites; and government control of information. While grievances over corruption are growing and the public is sceptical of state pronouncements, the absence of alternative political organizations and attendant political constraints has prevented the translation of grievances into social protests” (Hlaing, 2006, 114, cited in Creak & Barney, 2018, 698). Compared to Laos, there is a much greater degree of political pluralism in Vietnam, which threatens to challenge the hegemony of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), the country’s only authorised party that has been in charge since 1945. In his book about contentious politics in Vietnam, Kerkvliet (2019, 93–94) argued that market reform in Vietnam has “reduced authorities’ hold over people’s lives and contributed to an increasingly varied civil society;” moreover, in recent years, popular perception that the CPV is conceding to China’s interests has become “a huge aggravation to numerous dissidents.” 1. Democracies, pseudo-democracies and authoritarian regimes are the three regime types in East Asia, according to the level of political rights and freedoms citizens enjoy, from most to least. The subtypes of authoritarian regimes in East Asia are absolute monarchy, strong-man dictatorship and communist one-party states. They reflect various levels of concentration of political powers in the hands of one, several or a small group of individuals. One-party states have the highest level of power-sharing among political elites in the regime. 2. Democratic transition refers to the process in which former authoritarian regimes liberalise their political system to allow for organised political competition. Increases in human rights protection accompanies this process. Democratic consolidation refers to the entrenchment of democracy as the only legitimate form of government. Despite popular dissatisfaction towards government performance in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, their democracies are consolidated to the point that authoritarian reversal is unlikely.

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Western Theories, Eastern Realities? The review of the political situation of East Asian countries above demonstrates that democracy has yet to become the dominant political system in the region. This section shows that the most influential Western theory of democracy—modernisation theory—has limited success in explaining East Asian democratisation. It begins with an examination of the evidence supporting and challenging the applicability of the modernisation theory in the region. It is demonstrated that the income inequality model, an outgrowth of the modernisation theory, provides plausible explanations for why many East Asian countries failed to achieve democratic transition or consolidation. Other explanations of why East Asian countries defy the expectations of the modernisation theory, including oil abundance, ethnic and religious divisions, consumerism and state-led economic growth, are also considered. Modernisation theory expects a strong positive correlation between economic development and democracy. As stated by Lipset (1959, 75), “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” Economic growth alters the social structure from the shape of a pyramid—in which the lower class is the majority—to that a diamond—in which the middle class forms the majority (Muller, 1997, 134, cited in Chen, 2013, 151). The middle class is expected to be democracy supporters, either out of a pursuit of postmaterialist values—which is made possible because their survival needs have been satisfied (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987), and out of a desire to defend their collective self-interest, such as taxation and property rights, through influencing the government (Moore, 1966). There are also other reasons why the middle class is considered to be uniquely placed to be torchbearers of democracy: compared to the lower class, they have significantly more resources—money, time, knowledge and social capital—to participate in politics. Unlike the upper class, they seldom have direct benefit from collusive ties with the regime, hence pre-empting a potential conflict of personal interest. So, the question becomes, can modernisation theory explain democratic transition or the lack thereof in East Asia? Let’s begin with an examination of the supporting evidence. First, three of the four democracies in the region—Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—are high-income countries. Second, four of the six East Asian countries that became democratic during the “third wave of democratisation”—Thailand, Indonesia,

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South Korea and Taiwan—enjoyed unprecedented economic growth since the 1960s, which saw a significant expansion of the size of their middle class (World Bank, 1993). Third, nearly all East Asian countries, except Japan, have experienced GDP growth in the past decade, the majority of which hold popular national elections regularly, though some are more competitive than others. Brunei, China, Vietnam, Laos and North Korea are the only exceptions to this pattern. All these seem to demonstrate a positive relationship between economic growth and democratisation. Yet, modernisation theory fails to explain the enduring political anomalies in the region. First, high-income Brunei and upper-middle-income China and Vietnam are authoritarian. Arguably, the lack of democratic transition in Brunei and the democratic reversal in Mongolia can be explained by their oil abundance—something that displayed strong, negative correlations with democratisation throughout the Middle East and Africa (Ross, 2001). However, this explanation does not apply to China and Vietnam, which are not oil-rich countries. Second, democracy in Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao—all high-income economies— is not consolidated. As pointed out by Diamond (2012, 7), Singapore is the “most economically developed non-democracy in the history of the world.” Third, the authoritarian regimes are robust in East Asian countries that have reached Huntington’s (1984) “democratic transition zone,” where the GDP per capita lay between $1000 and $7000. China, which entered the zone back in the 1980s, remains to be an authoritarian regime. Regarding the Chinese anomaly, Pei (2006, 19) commented: “contrary to the assumption that high economic growth can generate more favourable conditions for political opening, rising prosperity can actually remove the pressure for democratization.” Currently, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are in the transition zone. One might argue that Myanmar is a supporting case for modernisation theory because of the political liberalisation it carried out in the past decade. However, how can we explain the grave human rights violations under Aung San Suu Kyi, which invited an outpour of international criticisms, but did not seem to have bothered the middle class there much? It was likely that the Burmese middle class’ apathy towards the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya minorities had to do with deep-seated ethnic and religious divisions in the country, which are proven to obstruct democratic consolidation as much as state-building (Horowitz, 1993). However, even if there is a satisfactory explanation for the attitude of the

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Burmese middle class, how can we account for the democratic apathy of the middle class in the vast majority of East Asian countries? There are two general explanations of why the middle class fails to defend democracy. First, Chua (2010) finds that the middle class tends to stay loyal to the state, whether it is democratic, insofar as their “consumption desire can be satisfied.” The East Asian middle class perceives their ability to consume to be dependent on the state’s ability to generate growth, given the presence of one or more of the following features in the national economy: the implementation of a national industrial policy, the use of state subsidies to build up major conglomerates as internationally competitive “national champions” in strategic sectors, and a substantial state sector. These features are largely legacies of the developmental state model adopted by the high-growing East Asian economies during the Cold War, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (Stubbs, 2009). A large state sector and centralised economic planning are the hallmarks of socialist and post-socialist regimes, including China, North Korea, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar (Eaton, 2016). Given the predominance of the state in the economy of these countries, it is truly the case that their middle class depends on the state to satisfy their consumption desire. In other words, the East Asian middle class has traded political freedom for economic well-being. Second, the attitude of the middle class towards democracy is “contingent upon some salient socio-economic conditions…such as dependence on the state, perceived socioeconomic wellbeing, political alliance with other classes, internal fragmentation, etc.” (Chen, 2013, 6). Another Western theory of democracy, which updates the modernisation theory with a game-theoretic model to study the effect of multiple decisionmakers interacting strategically, may offer the answer. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), democratisation is more likely only if the expansion of the middle class does not take place alongside a massive increase in social inequality. If society is highly unequal, the prospect of democracy can look extremely threatening to the middle class, who are likely to fear that mass enfranchisement will empower the poor, thus threatening their privileged position. For example, the Thai middle class has acquired a reputation of an “anti-democratic force” in the Western press. In 2006, the middleclass residents of Bangkok, the country’s richest city, overwhelmingly supported the military coup that displaced the elected government of

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Thaksin Shinawatra, who was well-loved by the poor not only for his charisma, but also his redistributive policies. Once again, in 2014, the Thai middle class supported the military coup to oust Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister who pursued the political agenda of her exiled brother (Chachavalpongpun, 2017). In the case of China, Wright (2010) found that its socialist legacies, which privileged citizens with an urban residence registration over those with rural residence registration, engendered deep-seated and institutionalised class divisions. Since the beginning of the post-Mao economic reforms in 1978, the majority of rural-registered citizens have mass-migrated from villages to cities to take up low-skilled jobs. While they have provided the much-needed labour to support China’s export-oriented growth, their presence has also contributed to the overcongestion of cities. Governments in cities have denied rural migrant workers to access public resources there. It is no wonder why the Chinese middle class, whose residence registration is urban, views the potential expansion of the rights and freedoms of their rural counterparts with scepticism. These sentiments help explain why the middle class in China is extremely unlikely to unite with the lower class to fight for democratic change.

An East Asian Theory of Democracy As we have seen in the first two sections, democracy faces outstanding challenges in East Asia. Given that democracy is a contested concept, it is wise to take a step back to ask how East Asians understand democracy in the first place. After all, if their perceptions of democracy deviate from that of the West significantly, it would make little sense to expect Western theories of democracy to have much analytical utility, if at all, in the region. This line of reasoning is within the rubrics of politicalcultural studies, which expects cross-cultural variations in beliefs, values and attitudes as the norm, rather than exceptions (Almond & Verba, 1963). Based on analysing the results of public opinion surveys and local discourse on democracy, this chapter presents an East Asian Theory of Democracy. It finds that an East Asian Theory of Democracy prioritises public goods provision over representative institutions and rights protection, and is underpinned by conservative cultural values supported by state patriarchalism, authoritarian nostalgia, and the economic success of Singapore and China.

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Instrumental support for democracy Asian Barometer is the most comprehensive public opinion survey that focuses on East Asia to date. Four waves of surveys, which interviewed East Asian nationals in 14 different East Asian countries— including democracies, pseudo-democracies and authoritarian regimes— were conducted in 2002–2003, 2005–2007, 2010–2011 and 2014– 2016. A puzzling finding was consistently discovered: Respondents from authoritarian regimes—that is, polities without election and with grave human rights violation—rated the democratic performance of their autocratic regimes highly. By contrast, respondents from democracies—that is, polities with free, fair and regular elections, and robust rights protection—expressed disappointment at the quality of democracy in their home countries. Some may reconcile this apparent contradiction by pointing out that citizens from an authoritarian setting were socialised into expressing regime-supporting attitudes, while citizens from democracies were able to speak their minds freely. However, since these biases were rigorously addressed in the design and implementation of Asian Barometer, their impact on the survey findings was mitigated to a large extent in reality. This shows that the perceptions of democracy among East Asians indeed varied according to regime types. Notwithstanding this divergence, it was found that there were also significant similarities in how East Asians, from all regime types and age groups, understood democracy. Based on open-ended questions, Asian Barometer researchers discovered four components in the East Asian conception of democracy, being: good governance, social equality, norms and procedures, and freedom and liberty. “Good governance” refers to the provision of political goods, such as quality public services and public order efficiently and without corruption. “Social equality” stands for the narrowing of the wealth gap between the rich and poor, and the protection of the disadvantaged and lower social class, such as unemployment benefits, a minimum wage, etc. “Norms and procedures” align closely to the procedural definition of democracy proposed by Schumpeter (1976), which features free and fair elections for government leaders, competitive multiparty elections, a legislature that has oversight powers over the government, etc. “Freedom and liberty” reflect the substantive definition of democracy summarised by Dahl (2000), which emphasises robust protection of human rights, the rights of minority groups in particular.

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11.1 14.9 12.2 14.6 21.5 16.8 12.4 12.5 24 26.6 20.7 18.8 25.3 14.5 18 21.1 20.9 29.7 23.6 20.5 27.4 18.1 19.8 21.4 30 18.7 24.9 22.8 26.7 36.4 30.7 18.9 27.6 24.7 36.8 30.3 32.2 20.4 31.2 37.2 30.4 26.9 31.5 33.4 33.4 33.5 34.7 35.2 35.5 42.8 19 21.6 22.4 25.7 28.9 29.3

Good Governance

Social Equity

Norms and Procedures

Freedom and Liberty

Graph 5.1 How do East Asians understand the meaning of democracy (Source Asian Barometer Survey, http://www.asianbarometer.org/survey/sur vey-timetable)

The democracy indexes that are compiled by Western organisations, such as Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit and the Polity IV project, focus almost exclusively on “norms and procedures” and “freedom of liberty,” implying an intrinsic/normative commitment to democracy, where democracy is seen as desirable as an end in itself. The Asian Barometer surveys found that this Western perspective of democracy is shallow in East Asia, where an instrumentalist perspective of democracy focusing on good governance and social equality prevailed. The support of East Asians for democracy was conditional on the delivery of desirable public goods. This was demonstrated very clearly in the fourth wave of Asian Barometer. As presented in Graph 5.1, with the exception of Cambodia, over 50% of respondents from all countries in East Asia believed “good governance” or “social equality” were more important than “norms and procedures” and “freedom and liberty” when asked what they thought the “essential characteristics of democracy” were. Conservative Cultural Values The instrumentalist support for democracy in East Asia has its roots in conservative cultural values, which were bolstered by state patriarchalism, authoritarian nostalgia, as well as the success stories of Singapore and

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China. To begin with, the prevailing cultural system in East Asia originates from Confucianism, “an ethical system and humanistic worldview that places great emphasis on forms of conduct within relations, and on personal virtue, obedience to authority, family loyalty, social harmony and education” (Barr, 2014, 5). Confucianism refers to the hierarchical moral doctrines expounded by Confucius (551–479 BC), the revered ancient philosopher. It views state and society as one harmonious entity, in contrast to the Western liberal notion of state-society relationship, which conceives of society as a “bulwark against the state” (Breslin, 2003, 172). Roderick MacFarquhar (1980, 72) wrote that Confucianism is “essentially a philosophic justification of government by benevolent bureaucracy under a virtuous ruler.” He called East Asians “heirs to Confucianism,” and compared their reliance on Confucianism as an “inner moral compass” to the “admonitions of the Sermon of the Mount” in the West. Examples of Confucianism being put in practice are commonplace in East Asian society and can include three generations of a family living under one roof, the family (rather than the state or market) being the chief source of welfare provision, a high level of household saving, a strong respect for knowledge and intellectuals and harmonious corporate relations. Drawing heavily on Confucianism, East Asian leaders—beginning with Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohammad, the long-lasting Prime Ministers of, respectively, Singapore and Malaysia—advocated the concept of “Asian values.” Lee stated: “…we were an Asian-Oriental-type society, hardworking, thrifty and discipline, a people with Asian values, strong family ties and responsibility for the extended family which is a common feature of Asian cultures, whether Chinese, Malay or Indian” (cited in Barr, 2014, 3). While the political manipulation of “Asian values” was not without its critics (famously, Sen, 1997), it is hard to dispute that East Asian leaders were adept at using “Asian values” to inculcate a strong sense of civic duties and to sugar-coat their non-democratic governance as meritocratic managerialism that is non-partisan and strive for the greatest benefit for all. State Patriarchalism Callahan (2006, 75) reasons that pursuing democracy according to “Asian values” amounts to a “grand decolonial project of imagining Asia as a community separate from the West.” The nationalistic imperative was essential for building national unity, which was essential as most East Asian

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countries were faced with a difficult period of state-building in the postwar period, after enduring prolonged Western colonialism. Ironically, the attitudes of patriarchy embedded in how colonial governments ruled their colonies were sustained in the East Asian Theory of Democracy, which was used by the East Asian elites as a “cultural governance device” to “buttress a patriarchal state that feminizes and youth-izes society: transforming citizens into capricious ‘women-and-children’ who cannot be responsible for their actions” (Callahan, 2006, 75). It was under the influence of this patriarchal attitude, whether selfconsciously, that many East Asian governments and citizens rejected liberal democracy. It was criticised for its “degenerative effects,” being the precursor of moral decay, political infighting and chaos—all could compromise economic growth and public goods provision, which East Asians valued very highly, as revealed by the Asian Barometer surveys. Therefore, it was unsurprising that the Laotian government contrasted Laos’ political stability with the contentious politics of neighbouring Thailand and Myanmar (Creak & Barney, 2018, 698). Amidst protracted political gridlock between the pro-Thaksin “red shirts” and anti-Thaksin “yellow shirts,” Thai General Prayut Chan-o-cha said in 2014 that his military coup was necessary “for the country to return to normality quickly, and for society to love and be at peace again” (Hodal, 2016). Also couched in a language of stability and order was the Chinese Party-state’s massive propaganda campaign to discredit Hong Kong’s large-scale pro-democracy protests in 2014 and 2019–2020, which were smeared as irrational, counter-productive and poisonous to the society and economy. Their message resonated with many mainland Chinese citizens. An outpour of condemnation against the Hong Kong protestors, and self-righteous critiques of Western liberal democracy, dominated the content of Chinese social media websites throughout the entire duration of the protests. Between September and December in 2019, in an apparently spontaneous and self-mobilised fashion, mainland Chinese students studying in Europe, the United States and Oceania organised counterprotests to demonstrate support for the Hong Kong police for restoring law and order to the politically restless city (Power, 2019). It is noteworthy that the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong alienated not only mainland Chinese, but also Singaporeans, who were likewise weary of chaos, and questioned the wisdom of confronting the government (Lok, 2019). All these seemed to hark back to an influential remark made by Lee Kuan Yew more than two decades ago: “In the East the main object is to

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have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms. The freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy” (Zakaria, 1994, 111). Authoritarian Nostalgia Besides a strong preference for stability and order under the influence of Confucianism/Asian values, conservative cultural values in East Asia were also sustained by widespread authoritarian nostalgia (Chu et al., 2007). In East Asian countries, citizens recall the rapid industrialisation in the region from the mid-1960s to early 1990s, a period of authoritarianism, with fondness, especially in view of the deficiencies of their post-authoritarian governments, whether pseudo-democracies or democracies. The latest Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB), a public opinion survey conducted in 2010, reported solid support for Park Chunghee’s military dictatorship (1944–1963) in South Korea. Park nurtured a group of family-run business conglomerates, including the world-famous Samsung, Hyundai, LG and Lotte, by limiting the number of companies per industry, using state subsidies to reward high-performers, and imposing stringent conditions to control capital flight (Amsden, 1992). More than one-third of the KDB 2010 respondents said Park’s government was the best government in South Korea after the 1960s. Nearly 95% of respondents believed that he played a positive role in South Korea’s economic growth, a figure placing him well ahead of the scores of the elected governments of Kim Dae-jung (57%) and Roh Moo-hyun (59%). The Park Chung-hee nostalgia helped the election of his daughter, Park Geun-hye, as the first female president of South Korea in 2012 (Kang, 2016, 51–53). In Southeast Asia, nostalgia for military strong-men, Suharto and Marcos, were strong in Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively. In the run-up to the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, tycoon Aburizal Bakrie, presidential nominee of Suharto’s old Golkar party, launched a campaign on the basis of Suharto nostalgia, petitioning emphatically for a rehabilitation of Suharto’s legacy, including granting him the “national hero” status posthumously (Strangio, 2017). Bongbong Marcos, son of the Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos, successfully won local elections from 1992–1995, and again from 2007–2010. He lost only by 0.6% in the 2016 national vice-presidential election. When demanded by his political rivals to apologise for the political abuses of his father’s regime, which put the country under martial law from 1972–1982, he replied: “Will I

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say sorry for the thousands and thousands of kilometres [of roads] that were built? Will I say sorry for the agricultural policy that brought us to self-sufficiency in rice? Will I say sorry for the [facilitates that Marcos built for] power generation? Will I say sorry for the highest literacy rate in Asia? What am I to say sorry about?” (Macraig, 2016). While authoritarian nostalgia does not lead to democratic reversal automatically, the prevalence of these anti-democratic sentiments is certainly obstructive for democratic consolidation. Success of Singapore and China To many, whether from East Asia or not, the economic success of Singapore and China shows that a meritocratic and paternalistic oneparty system can be preferable over democracy as a governance model for achieving political stability, economic growth, efficient policymaking, quality public goods and global prestige (Ortmann & Thompson, 2016). Despite being a small city-state, Singapore is able to play a hugely influential role in the regional organisation, the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), largely because regional states have a deep respect for its remarkable development, which is recognised as crucial for promoting regional economic integration. The harmonious co-existence of multiple ethnic and religious communities in Singapore is worldfamous, distinguishing it from numerous culturally diverse democracies. Singapore’s public housing scheme, a flagship policy of the long-ruling PAP, was highly regarded as “phenomenally successful,” contributing to home ownership for more than 90% of its residents (Phang, 2007). All these characteristics earn Singapore, which sets strict limits on political and civil liberties, the title of an extraordinarily well-governed technocratic state. The China Model refers to a pragmatic and depoliticised approach of development that emphasises on “constant innovation and experimentation,” “sustainable growth and even wealth distribution,” as well as “self-determination,” all under the unquestionable authority of the CCP, a staunchly nationalistic party that claims to represent the Chinese nation (Ramo, 2004). When its human rights performance came under scrutiny, the CCP often drew attention to its poverty alleviation record, which has won international acclaim. According to Kwakwa (2019) from the World Bank, poverty alleviation under the CCP, which pulled 850 million Chinese citizens out of poverty since the early 1980s, was “unprecedented in its speed and sale.” She said, it also had global significance, given

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that “China alone accounts for three-quarters of the reduction in global poverty from the 1980s to today.” In a commentary widely circulated by the Chinese state media, Xiaohong Wang, a CCP-affiliated academic, wrote: Western democratic systems had brought “endless power transitions and social chaos” in the former Soviet Union, Africa and the Middle East, while China’s political system “has overcome all sorts of problems” (cited in Huang, 2018). 1. In East Asia, an instrumental support for democracy suggests that citizens do not support democracy per se, but as a means towards good governance and social equality, which they value more highly than democratic procedures and human rights protection. The high level of instrumental support for democracy in the region reflects a weak democratic culture. 2. Deep-rooted cultural conservatism in East Asia is a main reason for the instrumental support for democracy in the region. It reflects the Confucian heritage of Northeast Asian countries and the legacy of late state-building and development under nationalistic and authoritarian governments after the Second World War. Cultural conservatism has also been bolstered by regional states’ attraction to the prosperity of Singapore and China, both of which promote the idea that meritocracy is a superior alternative to democracy.

Theories of Authoritarian Resilience While the weak performance of liberal democracy in East Asia defies the expectations of Western theories of democracy, it seems normal in the vast non-Western context. Of the 210 countries and territories rated by the Freedom House in 2019, over 60% were either pseudo-democracies or authoritarian regimes. The endurance of authoritarianism was also evident from the modest harvest of the Arab Spring. Of the 21 authoritarian Arab League member states, only six (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and Syria) experienced concerted challenges; in only four of them (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya) were the autocrats overthrown (Brownlee, 2013). In view of the global context of democratic recession, this section examines the main theories of authoritarian resilience that were generated based on non-Western political realities, including the theory on authoritarian parties and Western influence, both enjoy a

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far higher explanatory leverage in East Asia than do Western theories of democracy. Comparative political scientists have argued that the party machinery has a positive effect on regime resilience. Brownlee (2007) demonstrated that ruling parties facilitate political co-optation, generate incentives for long-term loyalty and marginalise the opposition by, firstly, anchoring in an institutional setting that dispenses benefits for members of the coalition, and, secondly, regulating the pursuit of individual ambition within comprehensible rules. Svolik (2012) maintained that ruling parties are “effective instruments of authoritarian control” due to their three core institutional features: hierarchical assignment of service and benefits, political control over appointments and selective recruitment and repression. Within ruling parties, the benefits of party membership concentrate at the senior ranks. To access these benefits, junior party members must first prove their political loyalty by performing costly and often lengthy service for the party. Svolik (2012, 163) argued that this serves to exploit the “opportunism and career aspirations of party members to create a stake in the perpetuation of the regime among the most productive and ideologically agreeable segments of the population.” This effect is clearly discernible from China’s CCP, Vietnam’s CPV, Laos’ LDRP, North Korea’s WPK, Japan’s LDP and Singapore’s PAP, all being one-party systems. For example, the CCP machinery in China is often considered crucial to regime resilience for two main reasons. First, the Party exercises complete control over leadership appointment at all bureaucratic levels through the nomenklatura system of personnel management. Svolik’s comparative analysis of authoritarian regimes suggests that the CCP’s nomenklatura system represents “the most systematic form of administrative formalisation of benefits to party membership and service” (2012, 169). Specifically writing of the post-Mao context, Landry (2011) maintains that the nomenklatura system allows the Party centre to retain tight political control despite extensive fiscal and administrative decentralisation. Until the abolition of term limit for the State Chairperson in March 2018, leadership succession in the CCP-state was perceived to have become increasingly norm-bound. It started with Deng Xiaoping imposing a term limit for the State Chairperson and an age limit for members of the Political Bureau of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee (PBSC), the elitist organisation at the apex of political power in China. Nathan (2003) found these rules to have

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bolstered regime resilience by increasing the importance of meritocracy (as distinguished from factional considerations) in leadership succession. Svolik (2012, 194) argued that the observance of these rules under State Chairpersons Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao evinced the institutionalisation of collective leadership in the Party, which was conducive to credible power-sharing. The theory of Western linkage and leverage, introduced by Levitsky and Way (2010), suggested that “competitive authoritarian” or “hybrid” regimes—that is, pseudo-democracies—are much more likely to transition into democracies if they maintain dense ties to the West, and that the West has strong leverage over them. This theory helped explain the democratic transition and consolidation of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, all being American allies. It also suggested that the rise of China, which offers an alternative source of political patronage, foreign investment, market access and financial assistance to the pseudo-democracies in East Asia, many capital thirsty, would undermine their receptivity to Western leverage, thus impedes their democratic consolidation. This is a highly plausible explanation for the lack of democratic consolidation in Hong Kong, Macao, Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Myanmar. It also helped explain why Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen pursued the “New Southbound Policy” to promote trade with Southeast Asia, South Asia and Australia, in order to dilute Taiwan’s economic dependence on China (Marston & Bush, 2018).

Conclusion Democratic consolidation requires “broad and deep legitimation,” such that “all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine” (Diamond, 1999, 65). Despite the high hopes on East Asia, which witnessed six authoritarian regimes embracing democratic institutions during the global “third wave of democratisation” in the 1980s to 1990s, the region remains to be a stronghold for authoritarianism, where democracy is far from the “only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, 15). In the region, the four democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia) struggle with democratic legitimation, alongside the eight pseudo-democracies (Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar), which display signs of

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democratic fragility. It does not seem like the six authoritarian regimes in the region (Brunei, Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos and Vietnam) will democratise in the near future. As a leading Western theory of democracy, modernisation theory has limited ability in explaining the democratic performance in East Asia. Yet, this by no means suggests that all Western theories of democracy are useless in the region. In particular, the Western democratic theory which maintains a strong negative relationship between income inequality and democratisation seems to be well-suited in explaining East Asian political realities. Having said that, in order to gain a more rounded understanding of the lack of democratic transition and consolidation in East Asia, it is necessary to go beyond Western theories of democracy by looking within East Asia and by considering theories of authoritarian resilience, which are generated in a non-Western context. The former exercise reveals that East Asians have an instrumentalist view of democracy, which is underpinned by a set of conservative cultural values bolstered by state patriarchalism, authoritarian nostalgia and jealousy at the success of Singapore and China. The latter exercise suggests that the ruling parties in East Asia are durable machines to sustain authoritarianism; furthermore, the rise of China weakens Western democratic influence on East Asian countries, therefore undermining their prospect of democratic consolidation.

Classroom Activities Activity 1: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Different Regime Types in Handling the Covid-19 Pandemic The Covid-19 pandemic is a litmus test to government effectiveness in crisis management. In light of the instrumental support for democracy in East Asia, it is possible that perceptions of government mismanagement of the pandemic will undermine public support for democracy, while perceptions of effective government management will lead to the opposite effect. The same can also be said for support for the relationship between perceptions of government management of the pandemic and support for authoritarianism in authoritarian regimes. Divide the class into groups, in which each group “adopts” a country representing different regime types and subtypes across East Asia. Each group researches (1) how each country responds to the Covid-19 pandemic, (2) evaluates the extent to which their response was an

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outcome of their regime type and (3) how the pandemic may lead to stronger/weaker support for their regime type. Each group reports their findings and takes questions from other groups. The class then develops an overall evaluation of the performance of different regime types and subtypes in the pandemic and how East Asian politics may look like in the post-Covid-19 world. Activity 2: Contentious Politics in East Asia Although there is strong support for pseudo-democratic and authoritarian forms of government in East Asia, it is also home to mass protests calling for political reforms. Some prominent examples in recent years include the mass protests in Taiwan (2014), Hong Kong (2014; 2019–2020), Indonesia (2019), Thailand (2020) and South Korea (2014–2017), all revealing gaps in public support for the government and perhaps even the regime types. Divide the class into groups, in which each group “adopts” the mass protests of a particular polity for in-depth study. Each group researches (1) the demands of the protestors, the causes of protests, how they ended and how the government responded, (2) evaluates the extent to which the protests challenged or confirmed the East Asian Theory of Democracy. Each group reports their findings and takes questions from other groups. The class then evaluates the similarities and differences in the causes and outcomes of these protests at a regional level and their possible implications to the East Asian Theory of Democracy.

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Hale, E. (2019, September 19). Hong Kong police showing ‘alarming pattern’ of violence at protests. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2019/sep/19/hong-kong-protests-police-violence-anti-governmenthuman-rights-amnesty. Hlaing, K. Y. (2006). Laos: The state of the state. Southeast Asian Affairs, 129– 147. Hodal, K. (2016, May 23). Coup needed for Thailand ‘to love and be at peace again’—army chief. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2014/may/22/military-coup-thailand-peace-general-prayuth-chan-ocha. Horowitz, D. L. (1993). The challenge of ethnic conflict: Democracy in divided societies. Journal of Democracy, 4(4), 18–38. Huang, Z. (2018, March 9). Xi Jinping says China’s authoritarian system can be a model for the world. Quartz. https://qz.com/1225347/xi-jinping-says-chi nas-one-party-authoritarian-system-can-be-a-model-for-the-world/. Human Rights Watch. (2019). Philippines: Events of 2018. https://www.hrw. org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/philippines. Huntington, S. P. (1984). Will more countries become democratic? Political Science Quarterly, 99(2), 193–218. Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy’s third wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12–34. Kang, W.-J. (2016). Democratic performance and Park Chung-hee nostalgia in Korean democracy. Asian Perspective, 40(1), 51–78. Inglehart, R., & Flanagan, S. C. (1987). Value change in industrial societies. The American Political Science Review, 81(4), 1289–1319. Koh, F. (2020, January 19). Proposed opposition alliance hoping Tan Cheng Bock’s progress Singapore party will split PAP vote in election. Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/new-opposition-grouphoping-dr-tan-cheng-bocks-progress-singapore-party-will-split-ruling. Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (2019). Speaking out in Vietnam: Public political criticism in a communist party-ruled nation. Cornell University Press, e-book. Kwakwa, V. (2019, October 16). Opening speech at the China poverty reduction international forum. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2019/ 10/16/victoria-kwakwas-pening-speech-at-the-china-poverty-reduction-int ernational-forum. Kwong, Y.-H. (2017). Ruling coalition restructuring under Macao’s hybrid regime. China Review, 17 (3), 111–139. Lam, W.-M., & Cooper, L. (2018). Citizenship, identity and social movements in the new Hong Kong: Localism after the umbrella movement. Routledge. Landry, P. F. (2011). Decentralized authoritarianism in China: The communist party’s control of local elites in the post-Mao era. Cambridge University Press. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war. Cambridge University Press.

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Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. C. (1996). Towards consolidated democracies. Journal of Democracy, 7 (2), 14–33. Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites for democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. Lok, J. (2019). Why Singaporeans don’t back Hong Kong protests. Hong Kong Free Press, 10 November, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/11/10/sin gaporeans-dont-back-hong-kong-protests/. MacFarquhar, R. (1980, February 6). The post-Confucian challenge. The Economist (p. 72). Marcaig, A. (2016, August 26). Marcos on dad’s regime: What am I to apologize for? Rappler. https://www.rappler.com/nation/103772-bongbong-mar cos-regime-no-apologies. Marston, H., & Bush, R. C. (2018, July 30). Taiwan’s engagement with Southeast Asia is making progress under the new southbound policy. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-engagement-withsoutheast-asia-is-making-progress-under-the-new-southbound-policy/. Moore, B. Jr. (1966). The social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. Beacon Press. Muller, E. N. (1997). Economic determinants of democracy. In M. I. Midlarsky (Ed.), Inequality, democracy, and economic development (pp. 133–155). Cambridge University Press. Nathan, A. J. (2003). Authoritarian resilience. Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 6– 17. Ortmann, S., & Thompson, M. R. (2016). China and the ‘Singapore model.’ Journal of Democracy, 27 (1), 39–48. Pei, M. (2006). China’s trapped transition: The limits of developmental autocracy. Harvard University Press. Phang, S.-Y. (2007). The Singapore model of housing and the welfare state. In R. Groves, A. Murie, & C. J. Watson (Eds.), Housing and the new welfare state: Perspectives from East Asia and Europe (pp. 15–44). Ashgate. Power, J. (2019, July 24). Hong Kong and mainland China students clash at rally at Australian university. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp. com/news/asia/australasia/article/3019888/hong-kong-and-mainlandchina-students-clash-rally-australian. Ramo, J. (2004). The Beijing consensus. The Foreign Policy Centre, 18 March, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/the-beijing-consensus/. Ross, M. L. (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 55(3), 325–361. Rowen, I. (2015). Inside Taiwan’s sunflower movement: Twenty-four days in a student-occupied parliament, and the future of the region. The Journal of Asian Studies, 74(1), 5–21.

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Sambuu, B., & Menarndt, A. (2019, April 3). Here’s how democracy is eroding in Mongolia. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 2019/04/03/heres-how-democracy-is-eroding-mongolia/. Schumpeter, J. (1976). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Allen and Unwin. Sen, A. (1997). Human rights and Asian values. Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. Strangio, S. (2017, August 13). Suharto museum celebrates dictator’s life, omitting dark chapters. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 08/13/world/asia/suharto-museum-indonesia.html. Stubbs, R. (2009). What ever happened to the East Asian developmental state? The unfolding debate. The Pacific Review, 22(1), 1–22. Svolik, M. W. (2012). The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge University Press. Thompson, M. R. (2016). Bloodied democracy: Duterte and the death of liberal reformism in the Philippines. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 35(3), 39–68. Tonsakulrungruang, K. (2019). Constitutional amendment in Thailand: Amending in the spectre of parliamentary dictatorship. Journal of Comparative Law, 14(1), 173–187. UN News. (2017). UN human rights chief points to ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar, 11 September, https://news.un.org/en/ story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-eth nic-cleansing-myanmar. Un, K. (2019). Cambodia: Return to authoritarianism. Cambridge University Press. Williams, J. (1988). American democratization policy for occupied Japan: Correcting the revisionist version. Pacific Historical Review, 57 (2), 179–202. World Bank. (1993). The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public policy. Oxford University Press. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/975 081468244550798/Main-report. Wright, T. (2010). Accepting authoritarianism: State-society relations in China’s reform era. Stanford University Press. Zakaria, F. (1994). A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. Foreign Affairs, March/April, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1994-03-01/ conversation-lee-kuan-yew-0.

Further Readings Bowie, J. G. (2021). Party watch annual report 2020: Covid-19 and Chinese communist party resilience. Centre for Advanced China Research. https:// www.ccpwatch.org/annual-report.

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Curato, N., & Fossati, D. (2020). Authoritarian innovations: Crafting support for a less democratic southeast Asia. Democratization, 27 (6), 1006–1020. Economy, E. (2019). The third revolution: Xi Jinping and the new Chinese state (2nd Ed.). Oxford University Press. Ferdinand, P. (2012). Governance in Pacific Asia: Political economy and development from Japan to Burma. Continuum. Mobrand, E. (2020). More than anti-communism: The cold war and the meanings of democracy in Taiwan. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 50(4), 618–634. Morgenbesser, L. (2020). The rise of sophisticated authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Pekkanen, R. (2018). Critical readings on the liberal democratic party in Japan. Brill. Perry, J. C. (2017). Singapore: Unlikely power. Oxford University Press. Rodan, G. (2018). Participation without democracy: Containing conflict in Southeast Asia. Cornell University Press. West, J. (2018). Asian century…on a knife-edge: A 360 degree analysis of Asia’s recent economic development. Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 6

Understanding People and the State: A Liberal and Neo-Confucian Comparison William Barclay

Study Questions: 1. What are the elemental axioms of liberalism? 2. What are the fundamental principles of neo-Confucian ideology? 3. Contrast the essential differences that exist between liberalism and neo-Confucian ideology? Do any similarities exist? 4. Have any modern states surpassed either the PRC or the United States of America? If so, what are their ideological foundations? 5. Do any other neo-Confucian or liberal states exist within the international political system? If so, have these states been internationally successful? 6. Is America ideologically homogenous? How about the PRC?

W. Barclay (B) Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Cooke (ed.), Non-Western Global Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84938-2_6

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Since the 1950s, America has been persistently praised as the epitome of national success within the international political system (Liasson, 2017). Moreover, throughout the modern era, the liberal ideology that predicates the United States of America has become vigorously entrenched as the predominant political ideology and ethos within the international political system (Russett, 2013, 94–95). For example, Harrison and Boyd (2003, 196) argue that “In many ways liberalism is the dominant ideology of Western society. It could be claimed that [liberalism] is not just an ideology but is the ideology for all mankind, a fundamental truth that is not culturally specific to the West but is of global value. Indeed, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the adoption of elements of liberal capitalism in most countries, some liberals were moved to declare that liberalism and liberal values were now the only future for mankind’s development.” However, despite the fact that liberal political thought has certainly permeated throughout the international community and supplanted realism as the dominant ideology within the modern international political system, it is incontrovertible that liberalism has remained stubbornly unable to effectively penetrate the Chinese state and to diffuse itself throughout Chinese society. Instead, it is readily apparent that, throughout the modern era, a ‘traditionalist,’ neo-Confucian, ideology has inexorably become re-entrenched as the dominant political ideology and ethos within the Chinese state and its citizenry (Xuetong, 2018, 8). Furthermore, although the United States of America has been emphatically coronated as the modern era’s foremost political enterprise, it is clear that America has not remained alone at the pinnacle of the international political system. Rather, it is manifestly evident that, throughout the modern era, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has necessarily experienced an ineffable national progress and success that easily rivals, if not altogether eclipses, any national success or triumph that the United States of America has contemporaneously produced. In fact, countless contemporary political pundits argue that, if the modern American state is contrasted against the veneer of its previous international successes and past accomplishments, then it rapidly becomes impossible to deny that the United States of America has, unfortunately, endured a precipitous national decline and collapse throughout the modern era (Barclay, 2016, 70). More importantly, if the United States of America and the PRC are carefully compared and contrasted, then it immediately becomes apparent

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that the People’s Republic of China has unequivocally surpassed the United States of America during the modern era, specifically because the Chinese state’s foundational, traditionalist, neo-Confucian ideology has inevitably compelled the PRC to consistently cultivate a virtuous citizenry, as well as a harmonious society, and, moreover, has emphatically allocated the Chinese state with the ability, as well as the impetus, to proactively impel and reorient Chinese society as a whole towards its own respective national interests and socio-political objectives.

America’s Liberal Gestalt Free Markets: In a ‘free market’ economy, ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ interact freely, in order to determine which products or goods should be produced, sold, and bought, as well as how various resources such as ‘labour’ and ‘capital’ should be used and allocated (OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, 2004). Natural Rights and Liberty: According to liberal political thought, all people inherently possess certain inalienable natural rights, such as life, liberty, happiness, and property (Locke, 1980). Idealism: An ideology that seeks to promote and pursue certain specific ‘ideals’ or moral objectives. Idealism is predicated upon one essential premise: Humans, and perhaps the world itself, are intrinsically good, and, as a result, every person will always overwhelmingly endeavour towards the good, if it is at all possible (Wilson, 2019). Democracy: A political system wherein all citizens are allocated with the ability and the right to participate, either directly or indirectly, in any socio-political decisions that affect them (Parliament of Canada, 2021).Power has a multitude of meanings. Here it reflects to the ability to affect change through influence and action (and possibly coercion)—this reflects having the power to do something. It also refers to the ability to make others behave in a specific way, this speaks to ideas of power over someone.

Prior to ‘The Enlightenment,’ classical philosophers and political thought considered all people to be essentially different, diverse, and unequal. Within The Republic, for instance, Plato unambiguously argues that humans are not at all equal in excellence, and that one person is unequivocally better than another (Plato, 1968, 135). According to Plato, “…one man is better and another worse…The simple moderate desires,

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pleasures, and pains, those led by calculation, accompanied by intelligence and right opinion, you will come upon in few, and those the ones born with the best natures and best educated” (ibid., 109–135). Furthermore, even Aristotle, Plato’s eternal antagonist, adamantly reaffirms that a “…city is made up not only of a number of human beings, but of human beings differing in kind…” (Aristotle, 1984, 56) and that “…a city does not arise from persons who are similar” (ibid., 90). In addition, the progenitors of classical political thought ardently declared that the autonomy of any citizen, as well as their ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms,’ were all necessarily derived from their home state, as well as categorically secondary and subject to the ‘needs’ and ‘ends’ of the state itself. In fact, the venerable Pericles reiterates that the ‘needs’ and ‘ends’ of any state must always supersede the liberty of its citizenry, and that the ‘rights’ of any citizen may invariably be violated and sacrificed, in order to secure the ‘needs’ of the state and accomplish its ‘ends’ (Thucydides, 1998, 105). Verily, Pericles explicitly states that “…It is right and proper for you to support the imperial dignity of Athens. This is something in which you all take pride, and you cannot continue to enjoy the privileges unless you also shoulder the burdens of empire. And do not imagine that what we are fighting for is simply the question of freedom…there is also involved the loss of our empire… Nor is it any longer possible for you to give up this empire… Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go” (ibid.). However, as political thought departed from the ‘Classical Era’ and commandeered its tumultuous passage through ‘The Enlightenment’ and into the modern epoch, it began to endure a fundamental, liberal, transformation. Moreover, as liberalism diffused itself within the international political system and unfailingly penetrated throughout various states, it rapidly culminated in the Genesis of the United States of America. Therefore, since the most nascent stages of the United States of America’s national existence and development, a quintessentially liberal political ideology has elementally informed and overwhelmingly determined the politics of the American state. For example, since liberalism is an ideology that is completely predicated upon the inherent equality and freedom of all people (Locke, 1980, 50–51), every liberal ideology inevitably insists that a democratic political system is, unequivocally, the ideal and only ethical–political modality. In fact, the ‘father of liberalism’ himself (Bailey et al., 2008, 495), John Locke, states that, since all people are, by nature, “…free, equal and

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independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions” (Locke, 1980, 9), and the monolithic proto-liberal parexcellence, Thomas Hobbes, emphatically contends that “Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that…when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he” (Hobbes, 1994, 74). Consequently, since the advent of the American nation, the United States of America has consistently adhered to a quintessentially democratic political apparatus, as well as countless effusively liberal principles and processes, such as ‘freedom of speech,’ the ‘right to private property,’ and ‘free, fair, and transparent popular elections’ (Bailey et al., 2008, 495). In fact, the ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ itself overtly states that “Around the world, nations and individuals admire what America stands for. We treat people equally and value and uphold the rule of law. We have a democratic system that allows the best ideas to flourish” (White House, 2017) and that “Democracy and respect for human rights have long been central components of [the U.S.A.’s domestic and] foreign policy” (White House, 2017), due to the fact that “Supporting democracy not only promotes such fundamental American values as religious freedom and worker rights, but also helps create a more secure, stable, and prosperous global arena in which the United States can advance its national interests” (U.S. Department of State: Archive, 2009). Remarkably, even Noam Chomsky argues, that “In this possibly terminal phase of [American] existence, democracy and freedom are more than just ideals to be valued-they may be essential to [America’s] survival” (Johnston et al., 2019, xi). Furthermore, liberalism rigorously enshrines personal autonomy as sacrosanct and unequivocally considers the natural rights of every citizen to inevitably supersede the ‘needs’ and ‘ends’ of any state. As a result, all liberal political thought categorically insists that ‘free markets’ and capitalism are necessarily the ultimate system of economic organisation within any and every state (Russett, 2013, 102). For instance, throughout An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith, liberalism’s patron saint, ardently reiterates that “Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice: all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things” (Smith, 1904, 536) and that “The natural effort of every individual to better his own

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condition…is so powerful, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its operations” (ibid.). Therefore, since its gestalt within the international political system, the United States of America has constantly endeavoured to re-entrench ‘free markets’ and foster individual economic self-determination within its own respective society, as well as throughout the international political community as a whole (New York Times, 1981). Moreover, the United States of America is not merely an advocate for all of the myriad benefits and positive externalities of free markets and capitalism, as well as the liberal economic system. Rather, the United States of America has, for decades, been firmly ensconced and overwhelmingly venerated as the pinnacle of a free-market economy and capitalism within the international political system. In fact, Arundhati Roy (2004, 51) states, “When you live in the United States, with the roar of the free market, the roar of this huge military power, the roar of being at the heart of empire, it’s hard to hear the whispering of the rest of the world” (Roy, 2004, 51). Finally, liberalism is, unquestionably, a vigorously idealistic ideology (Smith, 1904, 536). Consequently, every liberal ideology inevitably adopts an emphatically optimistic paradigm and espouses the perspective that all humans are quintessentially social, cohesive, and cooperative (Russett, 2013, 95). Specifically, liberal political thought overwhelmingly argues that every individual person and political society unequivocally prefers and endeavours to cooperate with its cohort, rather than engage in overtly violent conflict or contests of force, in order to accomplish its ‘ends.’ For example, even liberalism’s tireless champion, Immanuel Kant, adamantly insists that “…humans, despite their self-interest, are able to cooperate and construct a more peaceful and harmonious society” (Russett, 2013, 95) and that “…peace among republican states does not depend upon a moral transformation of humanity if even devils understand how to promote their own ends in cooperation” (ibid.). In addition, Kant categorically statesthat “…war and conflict can be overcome, or mitigated, through concerted changes in both the domestic and international structures of governance” (ibid.). Therefore, since the advent of American society, the American state has consistently reaffirmed that any effective socio-political strategy and enduring solution must incontrovertibly be predicated upon an ethos of rigorous socio-political dialogue and discourse, and, as a result,

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throughout the modern era, the United States of America has consistently pursued a national policy of human and inter-state cooperation, both domestically, as well as internationally, in order to accomplish its socio-political objectives and national interests. For instance, since the nascent years of the United States of America’s existence and sudden appearance upon the international stage as a ‘Great Power,’ America has constantly remained an eager proponent of countless international institutions and organisations, such as the United Nations (U.N.) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that unceasingly endeavour to cultivate socio- political discourse and reinforce international cooperation, in order to pacifically resolve any international problems or crises that arise within the international political system. Furthermore, the ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ itself explicitly states that America is “…a vibrant and confident Nation, welcoming of disagreement and differences, but united by the bonds of history, culture, beliefs, and principles that define who we are” (White House, 2017) and that “An America First National Security Strategy is based on American principles, a clear- eyed assessment of U.S. interests, and a determination to tackle the challenges that we face. It is a strategy…based upon the view that peace, security, and prosperity depend on strong, sovereign nations that respect their citizens at home and cooperate to advance peace abroad” (ibid.). Verily, America’s ‘National Security Strategy’ emphatically confirms that the United States of America is “…proud of our history, optimistic about America’s future, and confident of the positive example the United States offers to the world. We are also realistic and understand that the American way of life cannot be imposed upon others, nor is it the inevitable culmination of progress. Together with our allies, partners, and aspiring partners, the United States will pursue cooperation with reciprocity” (ibid.).

Neo-Confucian Thought in the People’s Republic of China Li and Qi: The supreme ‘rational principle,’ Li, is the primeval structure and fundamental order that underlies the universe. Qi, in contrast, is the ‘vital physical force’ and essential energy that animates and arouses all of existence. According to traditionalist,

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neo-Confucian, ideology, Li and Qi constitute the fundamental rudiments of the universe, and all of the natural world is necessarily both subject to, as well as situated upon, their cosmic hierarchy and harmony (Chan, 2008). Harmony: A phenomena that occurs when disparate components come together in order to produce a ‘flourishing unity.’ According to neo-Confucian theorists, a ‘flourishing unity,’ or harmony, is wholly contingent upon the various relationships that exist between different elements, and, as a result, completely dependent upon their constitution or ‘nature.’ Therefore, harmony is never external or imposed; in fact, harmony is the realisation of nature (Simionato, 2020). ‘Three Guidelines’ and ‘Five Constants’: The ‘Three Guidelines’ are the guidelines that the ruler sets for the subject; the husband sets for the wife; and the father sets for the son. The ‘Five Constants’ represent the ‘five constant relationships’ that exist between ruler and subject; father and son; husband and wife; elder brother and younger brother; and friend and friend, as well as their counterparts ‘the five constant virtues’: benevolence, rightness, ritual, wisdom, and faithfulness (Huaihong, 2015). Meritocracy: A meritocracy is a system of government wherein people are allocated with positions of power and influence specifically because of their demonstrated abilities, skill, and merit (MerriamWebster’s Dictionary, 2021).

Despite the fact that liberalism has certainly permeated throughout the international political system and achieved its zenith within the United States of America, it is incontrovertible that liberalism has remained unable to effectively penetrate the Chinese state and diffuse itself throughout Chinese society. Rather, throughout the modern era, a ‘traditionalist’, neo-Confucian, ideology has inexorably become reentrenched as the predominant political ideology and ethos within the Chinese state and its citizenry (Xuetong, 2018, 8). As the illustrious Yan Xuetong eloquently confirms, “Although traditionalism is not the Chinese government’s official ideology, scholars of traditionalism and the Chinese government are agreed that foreign policy should be guided by Chinese traditional political wisdom rather than any ideology rooted in Western culture…” (ibid.). Moreover, it is readily apparent that the traditionalist, neo-Confucian, ideology that currently predicates the actions and politics of the Chinese state is diametrically opposed to the liberal

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ideology that has so persistently enshrined itself throughout the international political system as a whole and within countless western states, such as the United States of America and Germany. Firstly, traditionalist, neo-Confucian, ideology is completely predicated upon the premise that the political sphere, and, indeed, all of Creation, is a result of two primordial forces: ‘Li’ and ‘Qi.’ The supreme ‘rational principle,’ Li, is the primeval structure and fundamental order that underlies the universe (Chan, 2008, 636–643). Qi, in contrast, is the ‘vital physical force’ and essential energy that animates and arouses all of existence (ibid.). In fact, according to traditionalist, neo-Confucian, ideology, Li and Qi constitute the fundamental rudiments of the universe, and all of the natural world is necessarily both subject to, as well as situated upon, their cosmic hierarchy and harmony. For example, Zhu Xi proclaims that “Heaven produces the teeming multitude. As there are things, there are their specific principles” (ibid., 613) and that “…both man’s nature and material force flow down from above… Therefore if I investigate principle to the utmost and fully develop my nature, then what I have received is wholly Heaven’s moral character, and what Heaven has endowed in me is wholly Heaven’s principle” (Chan, 2008, 613). Moreover, Zhu Xi contends that “While seemingly dualistic, principle [Li] and material force [Qi] are never separate. Principle needs material force in order to have something to adhere to, and material force needs principle as its own law of being” (ibid., 590). Furthermore, traditionalist, neo-Confucian, ideology argues that every state literally embodies the fundamental order of the universe and the eternal harmony of Li and Qi (ibid., 618–620). In fact, traditionalist, neo-Confucian, ideology is predicated upon the premise that every state must be organised and coordinated according to a meritocracy and inevitably pursue fundamental truth, earnest moral learning, and an unimpeachable harmony within its society (ibid.). Consequently, the People’s Republic of China constantly strives to cultivate an ideal social order and perfectly harmonious relationships within the Chinese nation, as well as the international political system, via countless national and international endeavours, such as the incredibly successful ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),’ whereby the Chinese state has heavily invested in nearly seventy countries and international organisations, in order to develop a global infrastructure and foster cooperation within the international political system, as well as with the Chinese state itself (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2019). As Slovakia’s Ambassador,

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Milan Lajˇciak, explains “Generally, China´s main concept of dealing with outside world stemmed from the philosophical framework of the harmonious and hierarchical Universe…This concept has prevailed as major stream of Confucian interpretations, with heavily ethical perspective until today, focusing on upholding harmonious relations of intra-society as well as in inter- state world” (Lajˇciak, 2017, 10). Secondly, traditionalist, neo-Confucian, ideology contends that all people are intrinsically good, due to the fact that every person’s supreme rational principle, or Li, is quintessentially virtuous. In fact, according to traditionalist, neo-Confucian, ideology, humans only ever become deviant or subversive and act badly, because their Qi, or vital physical energy, has overwhelmed their Li, and, as a result, they have been compelled to controvert their own respective good nature and fundamentally virtuous cosmic structure. Chang Tsai, for instance, famously reiterates that “…Man’s strength, weakness, slowness, quickness, and talent or lack of talent are due to the one-sidedness of the material force. Heaven (Nature) is originally harmonious and not one-sided” (Chan, 2008, 512) and that “Nature in man is always good. It depends on whether man can skillfully return to it or not. To exceed the transforming operation of Heaven and Earth (such as food and sex) means not to return skillfully. Destiny in man is always correct. It depends on whether or not one obeys it. If one takes to dangerous courses and hopes for good luck, he is not obeying his destiny” (ibid., 511). Furthermore, the incandescent Zhu Xi ardently reaffirms that “Generally speaking, in defining the Nature you must remember that in its origin it is the Decree received from Heaven…We are able to assert that the Nature [Li] is good because we observe the goodness of the Four Terminals. From these we infer the goodness of the Nature, just as we know the purity of the stream from the purity of its source” (Hsi, 1922, 232) and that “…nature is the same as principle. Now if weregard it as principle, then surely it has neither physical form nor shadow. It is nothing but this very principle. In man, humanity, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are his nature…” (Chan, 2008, 615). As a result, the People’s Republic of China constantly endeavours to safeguard the Li of its populace against any unforeseen eruptions of Qi and to imbue its citizens with the various virtuous qualities and ‘upright modes of conduct’ that will allow them to exist as a comprehensive, worthy, and virtuous human being within the Created Universe and Chinese society (ibid., 615–616). For example, in 2005, the Chinese

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President, Hu Jintao, initiated a tectonic national campaign, in order to help guide and cultivate the Chinese people towards their ideal iteration and promote a more harmonious society within the Chinese state (Hu, 2007, 142). Moreover, at ‘The People’s University of China,’ one of the Chinese state’s most acclaimed universities, an entirely separate, novel, college has been established specifically in order to foster ‘guoxue,’ or national learning, throughout Chinese society (Hu, 2007, 142). In fact, any person who aspires to serve the Chinese state and within the political sphere must always first successfully undergo and complete various expansive ‘processes of character formation,’ as well as a plethora of historic, hallowed, rituals and trials, in order to develop their own respective virtuous nature,1 and reinforce their Li against any potential fluctuations of Qi (Huaihong, 2015, 148). Finally, traditionalist, neo-Confucian ideology is predicated upon the principle that the pursuit of morality, ‘right conduct,’ and virtue, or ‘The Good,’ is, unequivocally, the quintessential ‘end’ or purpose of all human existence, as well as the fundamental function of every state (Chan, 2008, 618–620). Moreover, traditionalist, neo-Confucian ideology contends that any person who strives to be moral or virtuous must not merely attempt to improve themselves and to ameliorate their own individual existence. Instead, traditionalist, neo-Confucian ideology argues that any person who aspires to live a moral life and to conduct themselves virtuously towards ‘The Good’ must also unfailingly endeavour to cultivate rigorous, cohesive, and harmonious social relationships with their fellow human beings, and strive to live in harmony with every aspect of Creation. For instance, He Huaihong, one of the most revered ethicists within the modern Chinese state, explains that “The Confucian tradition praised a wang (a king) who relied on moral force and disparaged a ba (a hegemon) who relied on physical force” (Hu, 2007, 149) and that “For thousands of years, the five Confucian relationships have endured as one of the most powerful traditional concepts shaping the moral lives of Chinese people. These relationships lie at the core of our ethical code; they constitute the regulatory framework for the Chinese ethnicity” (Huaihong, 2015, 6). Furthermore, Huaihong explicitly reiterates that, within any Confucian state or society, “The most important task is to develop a set of fundamental moral principles…or ‘three guidelines

1 And supreme rational principle.

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and five constants’…The ‘three guidelines’ are those that the ruler sets for the subject; the husband sets for the wife; and the father sets for the son. The ‘five constants’ [represent the] ‘five constant relationships’…between ruler and subject; father and son; husband and wife; elder brother and younger brother; and friend and friend…[as well as] their counterparts ‘the five constant virtues’…benevolence, rightness, ritual, wisdom, and faithfulness” (Huaihong, 2015, 7). As a result, the Chinese state constantly endeavours to cultivate a paramount, pre-eminent, virtue and an expansive morality throughout its society, as well as within the international political system, and to reinforce rigorous, harmonious, social relationships between each of its individual citizens and vis-à-vis the Chinese state itself. For example, during the ‘World Peace Forum,’ Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, unequivocally declared that “The unique features of China’s diplomacy originate in the rich and profound Chinese civilisation. Throughout its five thousandyear history, the Chinese nation has developed the humanistic-oriented concept of loving all creatures as if they were of your species and all people as if they were your brothers, the political philosophy of valuing virtue and balance, the peaceful approach of love, non-aggression and good-neighbourliness, the idea of peace as of paramount importance and harmony without uniformity, as well as the personal conduct of treating others in a way that you would like to be treated, and helping others succeed in the same spirit as you would want to succeed yourself. These traditional values with a unique oriental touch provide an endless source of invaluable cultural asset for China’s diplomacy” (Xuetong, 2018, 9). Moreover, the PRC recently released a ‘white paper’ that establishes a Chinese national strategy which is firmly predicated upon peaceful national and international development, and wherein ‘Harmony’ was unambiguously described as “…the building of a peaceful and prosperous world as the ultimate goal of China’s development” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Botswana, 2021).Verily, as the august Shaohua Hu vigorously explains, for aeons innumerable, “The call for a government to act benevolently [has represented] an important part of Confucian doctrine…This approach…set imperial China apart from Europe, India, and Japan….[and] in the contemporary world, these values…are widely accepted and have proven beneficial to both political democratization and economic modernization” (Hu, 2007, 148).

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America and China in the Modern Era America’s emphatically liberal foundational ideology and political apparatus have certainly propelled the American state towards incredible national success and prosperity post World War Two and throughout the modern era. For example, from 1940 to 1960, the incontrovertible effects of America’s categorically liberal, free-market economy and foundational political structures coaxed the United States of America’s Gross National Product (GNP) to enthusiastically and contingently surge from $200 billion dollars in 1940, to in excess of $500 billion dollars in 1960 (U.S. Department of State, 2017), and, during the 1950s, homicides in America were constrained to an infinitesimal ‘4.0 homicides per 100 000 people, per year’ (Pinker, 1981). Furthermore, throughout the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium, the United States of America’s economy excelled, America’s national security was monolithic, and U.S. society remained comprehensively progressive, productive, and prosperous (Library of Congress, 2017). However, despite the fact that various romantic political pundits and actors have eagerly coronated the United States of America as the modern era’s foremost political enterprise, it is clear that the American state has not remained alone astride the zenith of the international political system. Rather, it is evident that, throughout the modern era, the People’s Republic of China has experienced an ineffable national progress and success that emphatically rivals, if not altogether eclipses, any national success or triumph that the United States of America has contemporaneously produced. Moreover, if the modern American state is carefully analysed and contrasted against the veneer of its previous international successes and past accomplishments, then it immediately becomes apparent that the United States of America has, unfortunately, endured a precipitous national decline and collapse throughout the modern era. For example, although the American state and its liberal political apparatus have been persistently lauded as the epitome of economic success since the 1950s, numerous steadfast socio-economic indicators and august organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, overwhelmingly indicate that the economy of the PRC has already categorically surpassed America’s economy, and that the Chinese economy has necessarily become the foremost economy within the international political system. For instance, in 2021, the revered Japanese financial firm, ‘Nomura Holdings,’ vigorously reaffirmed that “In PPP

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terms, China’s GDP overtook the U.S.’s in 2017…” (Elegant, 2021) and that, due to its unparalleled economic growth and development, “…China will overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest economy to as early as 2026” (ibid.). Furthermore, even America’s steadfast ally and proponent, the World Bank, has been forced to unambiguously concede that, even as early as 2017, the Chinese state’s carefully manicured economy had already started to exceed the American free market. In fact, the World Bank’s 2017 Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) Report itself explicitly delineates that “China’s PPP-based gross domestic product (GDP) stood at US$19.617 trillion in 2017, while the United States’ GDP was US$19.519 trillion” (Tang, 2020). In addition, despite the fact that every other economy, GDP, and state within the international political system, including the United States of America, was severely damaged by the onset of the COVID19 virus and its associated pandemic, China’s GDP actually increased by 2.3% throughout the course of 2020, which firmly ensconced the People’s Republic of China as the only major world economy to record any economic gains or experience any positive growth at all over the past year (Cheng, 2021). For instance, ‘Nomura Holdings’ reports that “…China reported a year-on-year increase of 6.5% for the fourth quarter of 2020 and a 2.3% increase for all of 2020, surpassing analysts’ forecasts and making China the only major economy to log positive growth in 2020” (Elegant, 2021). In fact, ‘Nomura Holdings’ explains that the Chinese state’s incredible economic growth within the context of 2020’s pandemic-fraught global economy has been so incontrovertibly remarkable that countless august socio- political analysts and pre-eminent economists have been forced to update their previous financial predictions and sanguinely declare that the People’s Republic of China will inevitably overtake the United States of America as the world’s largest economy by 2026 (ibid.). Moreover, although the United States of America and its liberal political structures have been, for decades, vigorously extolled as the exemplar of national success and security within the international political system, it is institutions and indicators, such as the ‘Fund for Peace’ and the ‘Fragile States Index,’ that every aspect of security within the United States of America has deteriorated dramatically throughout the modern era (The Fund for Peace, 2021). In contrast, national security within the Chinese state, as well as the economic security, ‘life chances’ and human security of the Chinese people have all incontrovertibly improved dramatically

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throughout the modern era (ibid.). For instance, according to the ‘World Bank,’ the Chinese state has successfully saved more than 850 000 000 Chinese people from extreme poverty throughout the modern era (The World Bank Group 2020). In contrast, poverty rose in the United States of America from 11 to 15% between 2000 and 2010, and rape crime within the United States of America almost doubled from 2012 to 2016 (The Disaster Center, 2016). In addition, within its own Annual Report to Congress, the United States of America’s Department of Defense itself laments that “Under the national strategy pressed by Chinese President Xi Jinping…China is already ahead of the United States in certain areas [that are] essential to its overall aim of progressing from homeland and periphery defense to global power projection…” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020) and that “China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has already surpassed the U.S. in missile development and its number of warships and air defense systems under the Chinese Communist Party’s plan to achieve dominance by 2049…” (Sisk, 2020). In fact, the Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress explicitly confirms that “The PRC now has the largest navy in the world, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines, including over 130 major surface combatants…” (ibid.) and that the People’s Republic of China currently possesses “…more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, [whereas] the U.S. currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 km and no GLCMs…[and] the U.S. Navy’s current battle force [consists] of only 295 ships” (ibid.). Remarkably, the Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress concedes that “In some respects, China is also [already] ahead on integrated air defense systems with a mix of Russian-built and homegrown systems…” (ibid.). More importantly, if the United States of America and the PRC are at all directly contrasted or compared, then it becomes readily apparent that the People’s Republic of China has unequivocally surpassed the United States of America throughout the modern era, due to the fact that the Chinese state’s foundational, traditionalist, neo-Confucian ideology has inevitably compelled the PRC to consistently cultivate a virtuous citizenry, as well as a harmonious society, and, moreover, has emphatically allocated the Chinese state with the ability, as well as the impetus, to proactively impel and reorient Chinese society as a whole towards its

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own respective national interests and socio-political objectives. Therefore, throughout the modern era, the Chinese state has been able to progress and develop itself with an unparalleled niveau of efficiency towards any and all of its national interests and endeavours, such as national security, economic prosperity, and social progress. For example, in order to decisively mitigate against the ramifications of its own effervescent industrial sector and economy, as well as immediately improve its manifestly lapsed environmental regulations and relationships, in 2012, the Chinese state’s governing regime emphatically declared that “…all major industrial projects [would be forced to] pass a ‘social risk assessment’ before they [were allowed to] begin…” (Bradsher, 2012) and that “No major projects [would] be launched [within the Chinese state] without social risk evaluations” (ibid.). Furthermore, in 1978, the People’s Republic of China ardently committed itself to the eradication of poverty within Chinese society, and, as a result, the entire Chinese nation was summarily forcibly reoriented in order to inevitably maximise its economic growth and socio-political progress. Consequently, China’s poverty rate has contingently plummeted from 88% in 1981 to 0.7% in 2015 (World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, 2013). Additionally, throughout the modern era, the People’s Republic of China has been able to fundamentally transform and successfully improve its economy, specifically because “The Chinese government has made innovation a top priority in its economic planning through a number of high-profile initiatives, such as ‘Made in China 2025’, a plan announced in 2015 to upgrade and modernize China’s manufacturing in 10 key sectors through extensive government assistance in order to make China a major global player in these sectors” (China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States, 2006). In fact, the Chinese state’s ‘Made in China 2025’ economic initiative has proven to be so formidable and, ostensibly, insurmountable that numerous states within the international community have already started to complain that “China intends to use its industrial policies to decrease the country’s reliance on foreign technology…and eventually dominate global markets” (ibid.). Furthermore, during the nascent years of the new millennium, the Chinese state embarked upon its now infamous national campaign to summit the international stage and transform the People’s Liberation

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Army into the foremost military power within the international political system by the year 2049. Consequently, throughout the modern era, “…the PRC has marshalled resources, technology, and political will [in order to] strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect” (Sisk, 2020), and, as a result, the People’s Republic of China has already unceremoniously eclipsed the United States of America, in various crucial military fields and aspects of national security, such as “…Shipbuilding… Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles…and Integrated air defense systems” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020). In fact, the United States of America’s Department of Defense itself has been forced to admit that the military progress of the Chinese state has been incredible, as well as far from superficial, and that China’s modern campaign to forcibly reorient its society in order to become a’Great Power,’ and one of the modern era’s foremost military forces has, unequivocally, succeeded. Verily, in its 2020 report to the U.S. Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of , the United States of America’s Department of Defense was compelled to explicitly declare that “China has already achieved parity with—or even exceeded—the United States in several military modernization areas” (ibid.) and that “[Even more] striking than the PLA’s staggering amounts of new military hardware are the recent sweeping efforts taken by CCP leaders that include completely restructuring the PLA into a force better suited for joint operations, improving the PLA’s overall combat readiness, encouraging the PLA to embrace new operational concepts, and expanding the PRC’s overseas military footprint” (ibid.). In contrast, the United States of America has remained completely preoccupied with the personal liberty and autonomy of its citizens during the modern era, and, as a result, the American state has utterly eschewed any legitimate effort to cultivate social cohesion within its society or impose a stringent social order and virtue upon the American citizenry. In fact, the American state has never aspired to promote harmony within its society, or to at all impose a national structure upon its citizenry and impel them towards its own respective national interests. Instead, the United States of America has endeavoured to pursue and enshrine an abject liberality and personal freedom within its society, and, as a result, throughout the modern era, the American state, as well as its citizens and society, have all inevitably pursued disparate goals and objectives. Consequently, the American state and its society have functioned inefficiently, as well as ineffectively, and, as a result, various aspects of American society and

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the American state, such as the American economy and the United States of America.’s national security, have precipitously declined and collapsed throughout the modern era. For example, during the early 1960s and the late 1970s, the American state, at the behest of its citizenry, comprehensively liberalised its fundamental political apparatus and emphatically repudiated any attempt to impose an iterative social order upon its society (Berry et al., 1998, 327– 348). As a result, America’s national security predictably collapsed and crime within the United States of America increased dramatically (ibid.). In fact, from 1960 to 1980, ‘total crime,’ ‘rape crime,’ ‘violent crime,’ and ‘property crime’ all increased by more than 200% within the United States of America (The Disaster Center, 2016). Furthermore, although the United States of America evinced the strongest economy within the international political system throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, by the 1970s, the U.S. economy had deteriorated dramatically and America was wracked by a murderous economic recession, unbridled energy shortage, vast inflation, and extensive unemployment as a result of the United States of America’s incessant liberalisation (Free 2010, 350). Moreover, throughout the 1990s, the United States of America continued to comprehensively liberalise its foundational political apparatus and to overwhelmingly reject any endeavour to impose an iterative social order upon its citizenry and society. As a result, virulent insecurity, anarchy, and poverty all horrifically subsumed and brutally eviscerated myriad sanguine communities within the United States of America, such as the city of Detroit and the entire Mississippi Delta region (Gordon, 2016, 608–635). Furthermore, despite the fact that the United States of America’s national degeneration was already eminently apparent to various members of the international community and America’s own respective political sphere (Barclay, 2016, 70), from 2008–2016, the American state still steadfastly continued to rigorously liberalise its fundamental political structures and, consequently, chronic economic recession, extensive unemployment, and violent insecurity decimated the United States of America during the Obama presidency (The Economist, 2013).

Conclusion Despite the fact that a plethora of political pundits and actors have eagerly coronated the United States of America as the modern era’s foremost political enterprise, it is unequivocally evident that the American state

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has not remained alone astride the zenith of the international political system. Instead, it is readily apparent throughout the modern era, that the People’s Republic of China has necessarily experienced an ineffable national progress and success that easily rivals, if not altogether eclipses, any national success or triumph that the United States of America has contemporaneously produced. Firstly, although the American state and its liberal political apparatus have been persistently lauded as a veritable avatar of economic success since the 1950s, countless steadfast international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, overwhelmingly indicate that the economy of the PRC has already categorically surpassed America’s economy, and that the Chinese economy has, in fact, has become the foremost economy within the international political system (Tang, 2020). Moreover, despite the fact that the United States of America and its liberal political apparatus have been, for decades, vigorously extolled as the epitome of national success and security within the international political system, it is clear that every aspect of security within the United States of America has deteriorated dramatically throughout the modern era (The Fund for Peace, 2021). In contrast, national security within the Chinese state, as well as the economic security, ‘life chances’ and human security of the Chinese people have all substantially improved throughout the modern era (ibid). Furthermore, if the United States of America and the PRC are carefully compared then it becomes apparent that the People’s Republic of China unequivocally surpassed the United States of America during the modern era, due to the fact that the Chinese state’s foundational, traditionalist, neo-Confucian ideology has inevitably compelled the PRC to consistently cultivate a virtuous citizenry, as well as a harmonious society, and, moreover, has emphatically allocated the Chinese state with the ability, as well as the impetus, to proactively impel and reorient Chinese society as a whole towards its own respective national interests and socio-political objectives. In contrast, the United States of America has remained completely preoccupied with the personal liberty and autonomy of its citizens during the modern era, and, as a result, the American state has utterly eschewed any legitimate attempt to cultivate social cohesion within its society or impose a stringent social order upon the American citizenry. Consequently, the American state and its society have functioned inefficiently, as well as ineffectively, and, as a result, various

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aspects of American society and the American state, such as the American economy and the United States of America’s national security, have precipitously declined and collapsed throughout the modern era. In addition, although liberal political thought has certainly permeated throughout the international community and supplanted realism as the dominant ideology within the modern international political system, it is incontrovertible that liberalism has remained stubbornly unable to effectively penetrate the Chinese state and to diffuse itself throughout Chinese society. Instead, it is overwhelmingly evident that, throughout the modern era, a ‘traditionalist’, neo-Confucian, ideology has inexorably become re-entrenched as the dominant political ideology and ethos within the Chinese state and its citizenry (Xuetong, 2018, 8). For example, since traditionalist, neo-Confucian, ideology is predicated upon the premise that every state must be organised and coordinated according to a meritocracy and inevitably pursue fundamental truth, earnest moral learning, and an unimpeachable harmony within its society (ibid.), the People’s Republic of China constantly strives to cultivate an ideal social order and perfectly harmonious relationships within the Chinese nation, as well as the international political system, via countless national and international endeavours, such as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2019). Moreover, the People’s Republic of China constantly endeavours to safeguard the Li of its populace against any unforeseen eruptions of Qi and to imbue its citizens with the various virtuous qualities and ‘upright modes of conduct’ that will allow them to exist as a comprehensive, worthy, and virtuous human being within the Created Universe and Chinese society (Chan, 2008, 615–616). Finally, the Chinese state constantly endeavours to cultivate profound virtue and an expansive morality throughout its society, as well as the international political system, and to reinforce rigorous, harmonious, social relationships between each of its individual citizens and vis-à-vis the Chinese state itself (Xuetong, 2018, 9). Therefore, it is readily apparent that any earnest endeavour to accurately understand the trajectory of the modern international political system must not merely attempt to comprehend the American state and to scrutinise the rudiments of its foundational liberal ideology. Rather, it is incontrovertible that any coherent analysis of the contemporary political epoch must also categorically strive to decipher the ‘traditionalist’, neoConfucian, ideology that predicates the modern Chinese state, as well as endeavour to faithfully interpret the manifestly discrepant results and

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affects that liberalism and traditionalist, neo-Confucian, political ideology each, respectively, produce when they become inaugurated within states (ibid., 8). Furthermore, it is unequivocally evident that any honest analysis of the politics of the modern era must earnestly account for the fact that, even according to the American state and its own proponent organisations, the PRC has certainly contemporaneously eclipsed America, and specifically because of its traditionalist, neo-Confucian, ideology and political structures.

Classroom Activities Activity 1 Break into groups and brainstorm how(if?) America’s foundational liberal ideology and China’s neo-Confucian model can at all be reconciled. Attempt to determine if the two political ideologies are predicated upon any common values or political principles that could potentially allow them to work synergistically and co-exist within one state. Share your models and any notable conclusions or discoveries. Activity 2 As a class, create a list of 10 + important fundamental rights and freedoms. After a suitable list of essential rights and freedoms is compiled, choose 5 fundamental human rights/freedoms by voting on them as a class; you must achieve a 70% consensus. Vote once blindly and then once overtly; note any discrepancies between the two results. If the two votes differ by more than 10%, then the results of the vote are deemed altogether invalid, and you must begin the voting process over again. Reflect: Was it difficult to achieve a consensus? Would it have been easier to achieve a consensus in a non-democratic society/classroom?

Bibliography Aristotle. (1984). The Politics. (Carnes Lord, trans.). University of Chicago Press. Bailey, A. et al. (ed.). (2008). John Locke. In The Broadview anthology of social and political thought: From Plato to Nietzsche. Broadview Press. Barclay, W. (2016). Liberty, security, and the degenerative cycle of democracy. Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, 2(1), 60–74.

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Berry, W. D., Ringquist, E. J., Fording, R. C., & Hanson, R. L. (1998). Measuring citizen and government ideology in the American States, 1960–93. American Journal of Political Science, 327–348 Bradsher, K. (2012). Social risk’ test ordered by China for big projects. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/world/asia/china-man dates-social-risk-reviews-for-big-projects.html. 19 January 2021. Chan, W. (trans.). (2008). The great synthesis in Chu Hsi. In A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton University Press. Chan, W. (trans.). (2008). Chang Hsai’s philosophy of material force. In A source book in Chinese philosophy. (Wing- Tsit Chan, trans.). Princeton University Press. Cheng, J. China still grew and fueled its rise as Covid-19 shook the global economy. The Wall Street Journal. 2021.