Theories of International Relations [1 ed.] 0754627470, 9780754627470

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Theories of International Relations

The Library of Essays in International Relations Series Editor: DavidA. Deese Titles in the Series: Theories of International Relations David A. Baldwin International Political Economy Benjamin J. Cohen Globalization: Causes and Effects David A. Deese International Environmental Governance Peter M. Haas Comparative Regionalism Fred H. Lawson Foreign Policy Robert J. Lieber Civil Societies and Social Movements Ronnie D. Lipschutz Global Governance Lisa Martin International Security and Conflict Bruce Russett International Law and Politics Joel Trachtman

Theories oflntemational Relations

Ediled by

David A. Baldwin Princeton University, USA

First published 2008 by Ashgate Publishing

Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © David A. Baldwin 2008. For copyright of individual articles please refer to the Acknowledgements.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Wherever possible, these reprints are made from a copy of the original printing, but these can themselves be of very variable quality. Whilst the publisher has made every etJort to ensure the quality ofthe reprint, some variability may inevitably remain. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Theories of international relations. - (The library of essays in international relations) I. International relations - Philosophy 2. International relations I. Baldwin, David A. (David Allen), 1936327.1'01

Library of Congress Control Number: 2008921149

ISBN 9780754627470 (hbk)

Contents Acknowledgements Series Preface Introduction

PART I

vii ix xi

APPROACHES

1 Robert G. Gilpin (1996), 'No One Loves a Political Realist', Security Studies 5, pp.3-26. 2 Kenneth N. Waltz (1990), 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', Journal of International Affairs, 44, pp. 21-37. 3 Andrew Moravcsik (1997), 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', International Organization, 51, pp. 513-53. 4 Hedley Bull (1966), 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', World Politics, 18, pp. 361-77. 5 Helen V. Milner (1998), 'Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American and Comparative Politics', International Organization, 52,pp.759-86;786a-f 6 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', International Organization, 52, pp. 887-917; 917a-e. PART II

3 27 45 87

105 139

DOMESTIC POLITICS

7 Peter Gourevitch (1978), 'The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics', International Organization, 32, pp. 881-912. 8 Robert D. Putnam (1988), 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', International Organization, 42, pp. 427-60. 9 James D. Fearon (1994), 'Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes', American Political Science Review, 88, pp. 577-92. 10 Michael W. Doyle (1986), 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80, pp. 1151-69.

177 209 243 259

PART III INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY AND INSTITUTIONS 11 Helen Milner (1991), 'The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique', Review of International Studies, 17, pp. 67-85. 12 Alexander Wendt (1992), 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46, pp. 391--425.

281 301

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13 David Held and Anthony McGrew (1998), 'The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects for World Order', Review of International Studies, pp. 219--43. 14 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.(2000), 'Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)', Foreign Policy, 118, pp. 104-19. 15 John J. Mearsheimer (1994-1995), 'The False Promise oflnternational Institutions', International Security, 19, pp. 5--49. 16 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin (1995), 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory', International Security, 20, pp. 39-51. 17 Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons (1998), 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions' , International Organization, 52, pp. 729-57; 757a--e.

337 363 379 425 439

PART IV POWER

18 Ernst B. Haas (1953), 'The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?' World Politics, 5, pp. 442-77. 19 David A. Baldwin (1979), 'Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies', World Politics, 31, pp. 161-94. 20 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005), 'Power in International Politics', International Organization, 59, pp. 39-75. PART V

475 511 545

WAR, PEACE AND SECURITY

21 Arnold Wolfers (1952), "'National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', Political Science Quarterly, 67, pp. 481-502. 22 Robert Jervis (1978), 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, 30, pp. 167-214. 23 James D. Fearon (1995), 'Rationalist Explanations for War', International Organization, 49, pp. 379--414. 24 Jack S. Levy (1998), 'The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace' ,Annual Review of Political Science, 1, pp. 139--65. Name Index

585 607 655 691 719

Acknowledgements The editor and publishers wish to thank the following for permission to use copyright material. The Academy of Political Science for the essay: Arnold Wolfers (1952), '''National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', Political Science Quarterly, 67, pp. 481-502. Cambridge University Press for the essays: James D. Fearon (1994), 'Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of [nternational Disputes', American Political Science Review, 88, pp. 577-92; Michael W. Doyle (1986), 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80, pp. 1151-69; Helen Milner (1991), 'The Assumption of Anarchy in [nternational Relations Theory: A Critique', Review of International Studies, 17, pp. 67-85; David Held and Anthony McGrew ([ 998), 'The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects for World Order', Review of International Studies, pp. 2 [9--43. Copyright © 1998 British [nternational Studies Association; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005), 'Power in [nternational Politics', International Organization, 59, pp. 39-75. Copyright © 2005 [0 Foundation. Copyright Clearance Center for the essays: Robert G. Gilpin (1996), 'No one Loves a Political Realist', Security Studies 5, pp. 3-26; Jack S. Levy (1998), 'The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace', Annual Review of Political Science, 1, pp. 139-65. Copyright © 1998 Annual Reviews. All rights reserved. Foreign Policy Magazine for the essay: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.(2000), 'Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)', Foreign Policy, 118, pp. 10419. Harvard University for the essay: Peter Gourevitch (1978), 'The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics', International Organization, 32, pp. 881-912. Copyright © 1978 Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. The Johns Hopkins University Press for the essays: Hedley Bull ([ 966), '[nternational Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', World Politics, 18, pp. 361-77; Ernst B. Haas (1953), 'The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?' World Politics, 5, pp. 44277; David A. Baldwin (1979), 'Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies', World Politics, 31, pp. 16 [-94. Copyright © Princeton University Press; Robert Jervis (1978), 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, 30, pp. 167-2[4. Copyright © [978 Princeton University Press. MIT Press Journals for the essays: Andrew Moravcsik (1997), 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', International Organization, 51, pp. 513-53. Copyright © 1997 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Helen V.

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Milner (1998), 'Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American and Comparative Politics', International Organization, 52, pp. 759-86. Copyright © 1998 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', International Organization, 52, pp. 887-917. Copyright © 1998 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert D. Putnam (1988), 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games', International Organization, 42, pp. 427--60. Copyright © 1998 World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Alexander Wendt (1992), 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46, pp. 391--425. Copyright © 1992 World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology; John J. Mearsheimer (1994-95), 'The False Promise oflnternationallnstitutions', International Security, 19, pp. 5--49. Copyright © 1995 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin (1995), 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory', International Security, 20, pp. 39-51. Copyright © 1995 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons (1998), 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions' , International Organization, 52, pp. 729-57. Copyright © 1998 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; James D. Fearon (1995), 'Rationalist Explanations for War', International Organization, 49, pp.379--414. Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportunity.

Series Preface International Relations is one of the most intensely studied and debated areas of intellectual inquiry. This is, in part, due to the distinctive theories and theoretical debates which have enriched research and writing in the field since World War II. Neorealist, neoliberal, constructivist, and structuralist schools of thought all contribute insights which advance the leading research agendas. Despite the occasional frustration and wasted effort created by clearly different theoretical perspectives, International Relations as a whole has benefited profoundly from extensive theoretical deliberation and debate. Consider the scholarly output and understanding triggered by controversy in only two key domains of research, the democratic peace and globalization. International Relations also benefits from a wide range of research approaches. Sharp increases in the quality and availability of data and quantifiable information have triggered improved formal analysis and modeling. The internet has catalyzed standardization of, and access to, data sources, as well as fruitful cross national and transnational research efforts. At the same time, emphasis on the role of ideas, communication, and identity have stimulated invaluable institutional analysis, process tracing, and case studies. Bargaining and game theory, as tested and applied in many different ways, have generated a series of critical insights and fertile research agendas. The field has also grown in salience and prominence by engaging students and scholars from multiple disciplines on key sets of questions. Questions of peace, war and security engage sociologists, psychologists, physicists, physicians, and anthropologists in addition to political scientists. Issues of globalization and political economy are tackled by economists, political scientists, and sociologists, among others. Civil society, transnational issue networks, and cultural identity and change are studied intensively by almost all of these disciplines. International institutions and treaty systems are analyzed by scholars oflaw, political science, and business alike. Finally, International Relations is also contested because it is increasingly important to citizens, immigrants, students, public officials, workers, private sector managers, teachers and scholars in countries worldwide. Many aspects of life inside countries are ever more affected by the decisions and actions taken by people in other countries. In this environment, being an informed voter, student, official or manager requires at least basic and renewed understanding oflnternational Relations and foreign policies. One key tool for developing this understanding is the articles published in scholarly journals. A substantial share of the leading work in International Relations has been published in scholarly journals. The Library of Essays in International Relations captures these crucial articles, organizes them into coherent, structured volumes with each editor's Introduction, and represents the field as a whole with volumes for each of its ten main sub-areas. Students and teachers alike will find The Library to be an invaluable tool for both research and pedagogy. The editor of each volume has carefully reviewed a large literature to select the pieces which substantially advanced thinking in the field at the time of publication and, in tum, proved to

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be of enduring value to students and scholars. The result is a highly accessible, organized, and authoritative Library of the most important articles ever published in International Relations. DAVID A. DEESE Series Editor Boston College, USA

Introduction No single volume could portray the full spectrum of international relations theory. The essays included here represent five of the principal themes in international relations theory. Part I focuses on alternative approaches to the international theory. Although realism is still the most common approach there is no shortage of proposed alternatives. Part II concerns the nature and extent of relations between international and domestic politics. Part III is about theories at the level of the international system, including international anarchy and international institutions. Part IV focuses on power as a variable in international theory. Many theories explain international relations in terms of the nature, magnitude or distribution of power. Finally, Part V concerns attempts to explain international war, peace and security.

Approaches to International Relations Theory Attempts to formulate systematic, coherent theories of international relations can arguably be dated from the Second World War. E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations was first published in 1939 and Hans J. Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace appeared in 1948. Although some would date the rise of international theories from Thucydides, Machiavelli, or Hobbes, most would agree that the post-Second World War period marked a time of great academic interest in the field of international relations. Two major academic journals were founded during the 1940s - World Politics and International Organization while two major graduate schools of international relations date from the same period - the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, both in the USA. Both Carr and Morgenthau contrasted their 'scientific' approach to the study of international relations with allegedly inferior 'utopian' or 'idealist' approaches, and debate over the merits of alternative approaches to international relations theory has continued until the present day (see Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons, 2002). Thus, Part I of this volume presents some of the most important alternative approaches. In its modem incarnation realism grew out of a debate during the inter-war period with respect to the role of the League of Nations and the need for rearmament in order to meet the growing German military threat. Basic elements of realism are as follows:

State as actor. The analytical focal point of realist theorists has traditionally been the state as actor. This need not imply that states are the only actors, but it does imply that they are the most important actors in international politics. It also implies a lack of interest in domestic factors within the state as determinants of foreign policy. Morgenthau (1948) regarded concern with the ideological preferences or the motives of statesmen as a fallacy that realist theory avoided. Most other realists have also paid little attention to domestic factors.

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Anarchy. For realists, international anarchy is of fundamental importance. It is the single most important determinant of state behaviour. Goals. Realists view the pursuit of power or security as the dominant concern of states. As the essay by Kenneth Waltz in this volume shows, some realists emphasize power and others security. Realists do not deny that states pursue other goals, but they see power or security as more important. Means. Realism emphasizes the importance of military force as a means for states to pursue their goals, especially their most important ones. Kenneth Waltz (1979) states the point as follows: '[n politics force is said to be the ultima ratio. [n international politics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one.' Self-help. [n the jungle of international anarchy, each state must look out for itself. [t cannot depend on other states or international organizations to protect its vital interests.

This realist approach has dominated international relations theory at least since the Second World War. As noted above, both Carr and Morgenthau labelled their own theories as 'scientific' attempts to view the world 'as it is' and contrasted them with 'utopian' or 'idealist' theories that viewed the world as it ought to be. Needless to say there was a certain amount of rhetorical manipulation going on. No critics of the realists thought of themselves as utopian or as overly idealistic. The real debate was between realists and those who believed that the world 'as it is' was different from that depicted by the realists. Challenges were mounted to each of the components of realism listed above. Were non-state actors more important than the realists thought? International organizations - both governmental and non-governmental - have multiplied rapidly during the last 50 years. Are the European Union, the World Bank, the United Nations, and NATO really unimportant in international politics? Multinational corporations were also proliferating in number and expanding their reach and roles. The journal World Politics was so named in order to acknowledge the existence of important actors other than states. And in 1971 International Organization devoted its entire summer issue to 'Transnational Relations and World Politics'. Does international anarchy really constrain state behaviour as much as the realists say? Does anarchy imply the complete absence of governance? What factors mitigate the alleged effects of anarchy? These questions are discussed by Helen Milner and Alexander Wendt in Part III ofthis volume (Chapters 11 and 12 respectively). Does security always take priority over other state goals? Does the importance of security vary with time, place and situation? These issues are addressed by Andrew Moravcsik (Chapter 3) and Arnold Wolfers (Chapter 21). Is military force always the most useful and important instrument of statecraft? In 1977 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr challenged the realist view by arguing that some real-world situations approximated 'complex interdependence', characterized by transnational as well as interstate relations, foreign policy agendas with no fixed priority of issues, and a minor role for military force. They were not attempting to describe a utopian world, but rather the world as they believed it actually is. Keohane and Nye also challenged the realist idea that

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self-help is the only thing that states can count on. In a later work, Keohane (1984) argued that international institutions are more important than the realists admit. In Chapter I of this volume Robert Gilpin describes his view of realism and defends its continuing relevance despite growing international economic interdependence. He concludes that even if the nation-state as we know it were to be replaced by regional entities (like the European Union) or by 'micro-ethnic' states, international anarchy would still characterize international relations: 'It would still be a jungle out there' (p. 26). In 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory' (Chapter 2) Kenneth Waltz discusses the differences between the early, or classical, realism of Hans Morgenthau (1948) and Raymond Aron (1966) and his own theory of international politics, often referred to as 'neorealism' or 'structural realism'. He argues that these two authors confused the problem of 'explaining foreign policy with the problem of developing a theory of international politics' (p. 32). Waltz views a sharp focus on the structure ofthe international system as the key to constructing a theory of international politics. There is a vast literature on realism (and neorealism) in international politics. The following three works are offundamental importance: first, Morgenthau's Power Among Nations (1948) which represents classical realism; second, Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979) which is frequently labelled neorealism or structural realism; and, third, John J. Mearsheimer's The Tragedy ofGreat Power Politics (2001) which presents a version of realism often referred to as 'offensive realism'. Critics of realism have been many and varied, but they do not unite under the banner of 'utopianism' or 'idealism'. The concept of 'liberalism' is rarely found in theories of international relations during the last half of the twentieth century. In Chapter 3 Andrew Moravscik challenges the tendency to describe the 'dominant theoretical cleavage' (p. 46) in international relations as that between realism and institutionalism. Although he does not deny the existence of this cleavage, he argues that 'liberallR theory' should also be considered an alternative. Whereas realism emphasizes the distribution of capabilities and institutionalism emphasizes the configuration of information and institutions, liberalism focuses on the configuration of state preferences. He concludes that liberalism should not be dismissed as mere 'utopianism,' as realists often do, but rather should be treated as a 'logically coherent, theoretically distinct, and empirically generalizable social scientific theory' (p. 79). The cleavages in international relations theory also include methodological issues. In Chapter 4 Hedley Bull makes the case for a 'classical approach', based on traditional methods associated with philosophy, history and law. He contrasts this 'classical approach' with a 'scientific' approach, based on rational choice theory and 'strict, empirical procedures of verification' (p. 88V The essays by Helen V. Milner (Chapter 5) and by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (Chapter 6) focus on rationalism and constructivism respectively. Milner argues that 'rationalist institutionalism' can promote understanding of the role of domestic factors in foreign policy and international politics. Finnemore and Sikkink contend

Bull's contrast between the classical and scientific approaches can be confusing, since he cites both E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau as examples of the classical approach even though they themselves described their approaches as 'scientific'. There is no contradiction here. Whereas Bull is contrasting scientific methods of inquiry with traditional methods, Carr and Morgenthau were contrasting the objective, empirical orientation of science with the allegedly normative, wishful thinking of the 'utopians' or 'idealists'.

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that constructivism's focus on ideas and norms revives earlier concerns with legitimacy and ideology.

Domestic Politics For most realists the dominant feature of international relations is the lack of a global sovereign - that is, the existence of international anarchy. The foreign policies of states are viewed as responses to this external environment. The linkage between domestic politics and the international milieu, however, is not a one-way street. In 'The Second Image Reversed' (Chapter 7) Peter Gourevitch argues that the international environment can be an important determinant of domestic politics. The focus of realism on the state as a unitary actor leads to downplaying or ignoring the domestic determinants of foreign policy. In 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games' (Chapter 8) Robert D. Putnam acknowledges earlier attempts to link domestic and international politics, but also asserts a need to move beyond mere description in order to construct theories of the nature ofthe linkage. This seminal essay generated a number of research projects on two-level games in the 1990s, notably Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993) and Helen Milner's Interests, Institutions, and Information (I 997). The traditional view was that democracies were disadvantaged compared with autocracies in international politics. Secrecy, speed, and credible commitments were all believed to be easier for dictators. The traditional view, however, has been increasingly called into question. James D. Fearon (Chapter 9) exemplifies the willingness to challenge the traditional view of democratic foreign policies. He argues that democracies are more able to make clear and credible commitments than authoritarian states. Although liberals have traditionally assumed that democracies are more peaceful than dictatorships, little systematic research was devoted to this topic until the 1980s. Three essays by Michael Doyle (I 983a, 1983b, 1986) were especially important in generating a vast literature on 'the democratic peace'. The thrust ofthis research was that democracies are less likely to fight other democracies than are non-democratic states (Ray, 1995; Oneal and Russett, 1999; Maoz, 1997). In 'Liberalism and World Politics' (Chapter 10) Doyle examines theoretical explanations for the peaceful tendencies of liberal states.

International Anarchy and Institutions The absence of a global' government' is recognized by all, but the meaning and consequences of this condition are disputed. Most realists view international anarchy as similar to Thomas Hobbes' 'state of nature , , in which life is 'nasty, brutish, and short'. In this international jungle each state must depend primarily on self-help in order to survive. Others, however, hold a more benign view of international anarchy similar to John Locke's state of nature, in which life is inconvenient rather than brutal. Both Helen Milner (Chapter 11) and Alexander Wendt (Chapter 12) question the standard realist view with respect to the nature and implications of international anarchy. Precisely what are the similarities and differences between domestic and international politics? Is

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anarchy a matter of degree? If so, how much is there? Does the existence of international anarchy deprive states of choice in the realm offoreign policy? These questions are addressed by both Milner and Wendt. Some scholars suggest that 'globalization' is making depictions of world politics in terms of state sovereignty increasingly obsolete. In Chapter 13 David Held and Anthony McGrew contend that 'globalization is transforming the very foundations of world order by reconstituting traditional forms of sovereign statehood, political community and international political relations' (p. 360). In Chapter 14 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr present their views of the nature and significance of 'globalization' in world politics. Among the factors that mitigate the effects of international anarchy are international and transnational institutions. The nature and magnitude of these mitigating effects, however, are disputed. John Mearsheimer's essay, 'The False Promise ofInternational Institutions' (Chapter 15), presents the realists' sceptical view. In the Summer 1995 issue of International Security a number of scholars responded, including Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin in their essay 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory' (Chapter 16). Although this debate is worth consulting, Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons argue the need to go beyond the debate as to whether institutions matter. In Chapter 17 they survey the rich variety of theories and empirical studies ofthe role of international institutions.

Power There is widespread agreement that power is an important concept in theories of international relations, but the debate over the nature and implications of power is comparable to the debate with respect to international anarchy. The concept of 'balance of power' has been central to many theories of international relations from Thucydides to the present. It is often unclear, however, just what that phrase means. Morgenthau's influential textbook, Politics Among Nations, used the phrase in four different senses (1948, p. 167). In Chapter 18 Ernst B. Haas tries to sort out the many usages of this phrase in world politics. For further analysis of the balance of power in international relations, see Claude (1962) and Baldwin (2002). Although realists acknowledge that power can take many forms, they view military power as the primary or fundamental form of power in international politics. Critics of realism do not dispute the importance ofmilitary power, but they do contend that realism exaggerates its importance relative to other types of power, such as economic, diplomatic or psychological power (Nye, 2004; Baldwin, 2002). The essays by David Baldwin (Chapter 19) and Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Chapter 20) represent different approaches to the study of power; but both challenge the realist obsession with military force.

War, Peace and Security Questions concerning war, peace and security have traditionally represented the primary focus of international relations theory. Arnold Wolfers' '''National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol' (Chapter 2 I) was first published in 1952. At that time the Cold War had just begun, and much attention was being devoted to rethinking the meaning of security, the nature and magnitude of security threats, and alternative policies for pursuing security. In the wake of

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the Cold War and 9/11 these same topics are being revisited today (Allison and Treverton, 1992; Baldwin, 1997; Kolodziej, 2005; Rothschild, 1995). The title can give the misleading impression that Wolfers believed the concept of security to be inherently ambiguous. Yet, although Wolfers believed that 'national security' is often used carelessly, he suggests a number of ways to clarify the concept and specify its meaning in such a way that it would become analytically useful (see Baldwin, 1997). Wolfers depicts security as one foreign policy goal among many, variable in magnitude and relative importance over time and from one state to another. The 'security dilemma' is one of the most important concepts in international relations theory and arises from the fact that efforts by a peaceful state to ensure its own security are often perceived by other states as reducing their security. In 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma' (Chapter 22) Robert Jervis argues that a major variable affecting how 'strongly the security dilemma operates is whether weapons and policies that protect the state also provide the capability for attack' (p. 639) Not all weapons are equally useful for both defence and offence. A 'doomsday machine', for example, is inherently defensive, since it has no offensive utility whatsoever. The 'paradox of rationality' represents another challenge to international relations theorists. It arises from the conception of war as a means of settling disputes. Since wars are always costly to both winners and losers, it would be rational for states to negotiate a settlement, thereby avoiding the costs of going to war. In 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (Chapter 23) James D. Fearon proposes three possible explanations for why this does not happen. First, one side may have information not available to the other side. Second, one or more sides in the dispute may find it difficult to make a credible commitment to abide by a negotiated agreement. And, third, the issues being negotiated may not lend themselves to compromise; they may be indivisible. Fearon views the first two as more defensible than the third. The search for the causes of war has always been a major concern of international relations theorists. Kenneth Waltz's classic Man, the State, and War (1959) surveyed explanations for war centring on human behaviour, state organization and the international system. In 'The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace' (Chapter 24) Jack S. Levy surveys recent research on the causes of war in terms of Waltz's three levels of analysis. At the systemic level Levy examines theories focusing on the distribution of power and theories about the relation between economic interdependence and war. At the level of the society (or state) he discusses 'diversionary' theories, which view the use of force as a way of diverting attention from domestic troubles, and 'coalitional' theories, which explain war in terms of domestic political coalitions. At the individual level Levy examines theories about how foreign policy decision-makers behave under conditions of risk and uncertainty.

Conclusion Modem international relations theory reflects a series of lively debates with respect to methods of inquiry, the nature of the international system, the role of various international and transnational actors, the impact of domestic politics, the nature of power, the causes of international conflict and the conditions of international peace. The lack of consensus among international relations theorists is not surprising, considering the many changes in the milieu of world politics since the Second World War.

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Such changes include tripling the number of nation-states, tripling of the world's population, stupefying increases in the destructive power of modem weaponry, thousands of new international institutions, a revolution in international communication (for example, television and the Internet) and transportation (air and space travel), increased international commercial interaction, the emergence of global environmental problems, and the reemergence of religion as a major source of global confl ict. Even the most stalwart realist, who believes that the essence of international politics remains a struggle for power, must come to terms with such changes in the international milieu. The essays in this volume represent some of the most significant attempts by international relations theorists to make sense of international politics in the context of global realities vastly different from those of 1945.

References Allison, Graham T. and Treverton, Gregory F. (eds) (1992), Rethinking America s Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, New York: W.W. Norton. Aron, Raymond (1966), Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Baldwin, David A. (1997), 'The Concept of Security', Review of International Studies, 23, pp. 5-26. Baldwin, David A. (2002), 'Power and International Relations', in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage Publications. Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas and Simmons, Beth A. (eds) (2002), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage Publications). Carr, Edward Hallett (1939, 1946), The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, New York: St Martin's Press. Claude, Inis L. Jr (1962), Power and International Relations, New York: Random House. Doyle, Michael W. (1983a), 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part 1', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12, pp. 205-35. Doyle, Michael W. (1983b), 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part 2', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12, pp. 323-53. Evans, Peter B., Jacobson, Harold K. and Putnam, Robert D. (eds) (1993), Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press. Keohane, Robert O. (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1977), Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Kolodziej, Edward A. (2005), Security and International Relations, New York: Cambridge University Press. Maoz, Zeev (1997), 'The Debate over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?', International Security, 32, pp. 162-98. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994-95), 'The False Promise of International Institutions', International Security, 19, pp. 5--49. Milner, Helen V. (1997), Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

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Nye, Joseph S., Jr (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs Press. Oneal, John R. and Russett, Bruce (1999), 'The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992', World Politics, 52, pp. 1-37. Ray, James Lee (1995), Democracy and International Conflict, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. Rothschild, Emma (1995), 'What Is Security?', Daedalus, 124, pp. 53-98. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959), Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), Theory o/International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Part I Approaches

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[1] No ONE LOVES A POLITICAL REALIST ROBERT G. GILPIN

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demise of Marxism, political realism has come under increasing attack from many political liberals. It is almost as if, having defeated their opponents on the left, liberals have now turned their assault rightward to the third most important contender for intellectual hegemony in the arena of international affairs. Liberal thinkers have attacked political realists especially for the latter's refusal to believe that, with the defeat of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the liberal millennium of democracy, unfettered markets, and peace is upon us. Whereas political realists (who have never had much hope for the human species to begin with) are, on the whole, a rather tolerant and forgiving lot, liberals (and of course Marxists) tend to be more intolerant of those ideas that appear to stand in the way of human perfectibility; it would seem that liberals and Marxists cannot easily accept the doctrine of intellectual peaceful coexistence. As my colleague Michael Doyle has wisely observed, while liberal societies may not war with one another, liberals are quite aggressive toward their nonliberal opponents. 1 The same liberal intolerance appears to hold in the marketplace of competing ideas. The primary reason for this paradoxical phenomenon, that is, the contrast between liberal profession and liberal behavior, lies I am persuaded in the character of liberal thought itself. Liberals, in decided contrast to both Marxists and realists, believe in the overwhelming power of ideas; ideas in and of themselves are believed to move the world. (How else can one explain the fact that most professors are liberals!) Right thinking leads to right action and, of course, wrong thinking to wrong action. Therefore, the task of the liberal is to convert the benighted and to make the world over in the liberal's image. In the liberal's lexicon, therefore, benevolent "truths" must INCE THE

Robert G. Gilpin is Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University. 1. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosopl!J and PNb/ic Af fairs (summer 1983): 205-35; and (faIl 1983): 3-29.

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be promulgated; malevolent "untruths" such as those held by realists, must be expunged lest they cause mischief. Realists and Marxists, on the other hand, believe that the world is driven primarily by interest; ideas are politically important only in so far as they serve the material and self-centered interests of powerful actors, or at least do not counter important interests. It was, in fact, to demonstrate the folly of this liberal belief in the power of rationality that Hans Morgenthau, the foremost American realist thinker, wrote Scientific Man versus Power Politics after the Second World War. Morgenthau's purpose was to show how the liberal faith in the power of reason failed them in dealing with Nazi Germany.2 Or, as E. H. Carr put it, liberal morality and realist power must accompany one another if the former is to have any effect in this world.3 One of the most unfair and preposterous liberal criticisms of realists is that realists did not predict the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union. 4 Of course, realists did not predict the end of the cold war; nor did anyone else. My own opinion is that the social sciences can not and never will be able to predict major historical discontinuities, or perhaps even minor ones for that matter; like evolutionary biology, ours is at best an explanatory and not a predictive science. Critics are quite unfair to criticize realists and international relations theorists in general because they failed to predict the destruction of the Soviet empire and eventually of the Soviet Union itself; such a standard is an impossibly high one. Insofar as I myself made any predictions regarding these matters, I made three points in my writings which I would like to reiterate here for the record: 1. The cold war, I wrote on at least two occasions long before its welcomed demise, was unlikely to end in a major or hegemonic war because the American-Soviet contest lacked certain essential characteristics that have historically been associated with such wars. I made no predictions, however, about how the struggle might tum out.s 2. Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946). 3. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Stu1Y ojlntemational Relations (London: MacMillan, 1951). 4. An equally absurd criticism is that realists do not believe in the possibility of interstate cooperation and, therefore, if the critic finds an example of international cooperation, realism is ipso facto discredited. This is nonsense. Realists are quite aware of the fact that nationstates do cooperate about many things. Stephen Krasner, for example, a leading realist thinker, is one of the originators of the concept of cooperative regimes. The realist position is that cooperation is difficult, especially in areas affecting national security, and is much more difficult than liberals believe. 5. "Epilogue," in Wor and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and "Peloponnesian War and Cold War," in Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thllrydides to the Nllclear Age, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss (Boulder: Westview, 1991). AI-

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2. The real danger of a major conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, I believed, lay in a Soviet threat to displace the United States as the dominant power in the world. To my knowledge, such a crucial shift in the hierarchical ordering of power in an international system, or what I called the governance of the system, has never occurred peacefully. In the 1970s I began to worry about this possibility when the American economy began to falter and the American polity following Watergate was under great stress at the same time that the Soviet Union, according to intelligence reports (which later turned out to be incorrect), appeared to be taking the lead militarily and economically. I also stated, however, that the long-term prospects for the Soviet Union were not bright, and that one should not overstate the Soviet threat lest a fearful and defeatist American leadership do something rash. 3. Despite the collapse of the Soviet challenge, I must confess that I am still an unreconstructed "declinist," to use Samuel Huntington's term of opprobrium, and continue to worry about the economic, political, and social condition of the United States. Since the early 1970s the United States has experienced a relatively low rate of productivity growth, a huge federal budget deficit and accumulating immense foreign debt, and, most ominously, an alarming decline in the American standard of living, especially for a substantial fraction of the society. Despite an apparent resurgence in productivity growth and international competitiveness in the 1990s, longterm negative developments suggest that the American economy continues to be in serious trouble. The implications of these developments are worrisome. In particular, the lessening of the American commitment to trade liberalization, which has been one of the foundations of postwar peace and prosperity, poses a danger to a prosperous and peaceful world. If this protectionist trend continues, it could have very dangerous consequences for the post-cold war era. In this article I shall be concerned with one particular line of liberal criticism of realism, that contemporary economic and technological developments are transforming the nature of international affairs and thereby invalidating the premises of realist thought. Whatever validity realism may have had in the past, this argument goes, it is decreasingly relevant for a world characterized by increasing economic interdependence. Consequendy, critics allege, changes in national priorities, powerful transnational forces, and new non-state actors are undermining the nation-state and traditional national interests as the organizing principles of international though this article was written and presented to an international conference in the mid1980s, it was unfortunately not published until after the end of the cold war confrontation.

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affairs. This line of argument, I believe, greatly overstates what is actually occurring in the world economy and the implications for the nation-state. Prior to considering these matters and their significance for the relevance of realism, however, I must address the question of what I myself mean by political realism.

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL REALISM

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s I HAVE argued elsewhere, realism, like liberalism and Marxism, is essentially a philosophical position; it is not a scientific theory that is subject to the test of falsifiability and, therefore, can not be proved or disproved. Testable theories, however, can be and have been derived from realist assumptions; among these theories are the balance-of-power theory and the so-called theory of hegemonic stability. I am primarily concerned in this article with the underlying assumptions of realism tl1at are said to have been invalidated by contemporary economic and technological developments. Among th~se challenged realist assumptions is the belief that human beings are self-centered and attentive primarily to their own interests. Society, according to realism, is basically conflictive and the struggle for power among rival groups is a fundamental condition of human existence. Peace is more the result of a power equilibrium than a cessation of conflicting ambitions. A wide range of differing positions, however, exists within this realist tradition. 6 Morgenthau, for example believed that human beings were driven by a lust for power; other realists, including myself, while acknowledging that power can become the primary goal of a Hitler or Stalin, regard power as essentially instrumental to and necessary for me achievement of other goals such as security and even liberal ideals. Because of these differences of opinion within the realist camp, I shall set form my own views of what I personally mean by political realism.

6. Contrary to another frequent criticism of realism, realists have never been united with respect to any particular foreign policy or political line; nor is it correct to accuse them, as some do, of being apologists for American foreign policy. Some realists may rightly have been labelled cold warriors. Leading realist writers, however, were very frequently in opposition to important aspects of American foreign policy. Morgenthau, Walter Lippmann, and George Kennan, for example, were outspoken opponents of the Vietnam War and generally of American interventionism.

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PRIMACY OF CONFLICT GROUPS

The fundamental idea of realism is Aristotle's observation that man is a political animal. Men fInd their being as members of social groups to which they give their loyalty and for which they are willing to die; human beings are not the solitary individuals assumed to exist in liberal theory. The fundamental unit of social and political affairs is the group, or what the distinguished German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf has called the "conflict group."7 The precise nature of these conflict groups, however, has changed over the millennia in response to economic, technological, and other developments. In Aristotle's Greece, for example, the basic unit was the polis or city-state. In the modem world, the principal conflict group has been the territorial state whose foremost manifestation today is the nation-state; the modem state has displaced earlier types of political entities, for example, tribes and empires, because it has been more effIcient in organizing military power, managing economic affairs, and providing security; for these reasons, individuals have transferred their loyalty from other political entities to the state. This exchange of loyalty for benefIts is still taking place, and one can only pity the poor Kurd or Bosnian who lacks a protective state of his or her own. TIlE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL INTERESr

States (or, more generally, conflict groups) are motivated primarily by their national (or group) interests which may be economic, ethnic, or territorial. These interests are determined by dominant elites and may be quite particularistic, for example, maintaining the elite's hold on power or preserving its economic prerogatives. As elites change, the defInition of national or group interest may also change. For this reason, I myself do not fmd credible Morgenthau's assumption of an objective national interest defmed in terms of power.8 In an anarchic international system composed of competing states, however, a governing elite mllst of necessity put a high premium on the security and survival of the state or the group; if a national elite, for example, fails to protect the territorial integrity of the state, the state may cease to exist, or at least could lose its independence. Thus, while the national interests of states do have a large subjective component, the condi7. Ralf Dahrendorf, Closs tI1ld Class Conflict in InriNstrial Sod,!} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959). 8. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: Th, Slmggl, for P01l!lf' tI1ld Peau, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978). The reader should take note that Morgenthau uses the word "peace" not "war" to denote a primary concern in writing his classic text on political realism.

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tions of survival as determined by economic factors, geographical location, and the like do constitute an objective component in the definition of national interest. From this perspective, it is significant to observe that the many different elites that governed England for over three centuries from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, defined the preservation of the independence of "the low lands," that is, today's Benelux nations, as a British national interest for which they fought numerous wars. Thus understood, I would agree with Morgenthau that defending the national interest is the highest priority of the state. THE PRIMACY OF POWER AND POWER RELATIONS

In a world characterized by political anarchy and conflicting interests, power and power relations are a fundamental feature of international affairs and political life more generally. While realists do stress the significance of military force as the ultimate determinant of political affairs, they also recognize other forms of power. E. H. Carr, for example, in his classic work, The Twen!y Years' Crisis 1919-1939, identified three types of power in international affairs: economic, military, and psychological.9 I myself would certainly agree. While this definition of power can be criticized as overly broad, it does exclude moral claims and reasoned persuasion as powerful motive forces in political life, unless they are backed by power; morality functions best within and not among groups. In a world where mankind is still divided into politically distinct groups, economic relations constitute power relations and competing groups will seek to maximize their economic power.

THE STATE IN A HIGHLY INTERDEPENDENT GLOBAL ECONOMY

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s NOTED earlier, an important critique of realism is that the nation-state has become an economic anachronism. However well-suited the nation-state may have been in the past for the creation of wealth and the management of economic affairs, it is argued, contemporary economic and technological developments have passed it by. In particular, three developments are said to have undermined the nation-state and produced the first true revolution in international affairs. The first development that is alleged to have taken place is a shift in social priorities from narrowly-defined national interests to an emphasis on economic welfare. The second develop9. Carr, The Twenty YearJ'CrisiJ 1919-1939.

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ment is said to be the increasing importance of transnational forces that are decreasing the autonomy of states and integrating them into a highly interdependent global economy. The third development that many believe is transforming international affairs is the advent of powerful regional and non-state actors such as the European Community and multinational corporations that are alleged to be displacing (or at least weakening) the state as the primary unit in international affairs. THE STATE AND ECONOMIC WELFARE

Since the end of the Second World War, the international economy has been characterized by a profound and significant tension. On the one hand, the sacrifices imposed on society by the War and the massive intervention of the state in the economy during the War transformed the relationship of state and economy in the Western world. Stated briefly, the result was an expansion of the modern welfare state which, following the advent of Keynesian economics, meant extensive state intervention in the economy to promote social welfare and full employment. On the other hand, the terrible experience of the 1930s, with its extreme economic nationalism and the resulting fragmentation of the global economy into rival blocs, convinced the economic and political leaders who met at Bretton Woods (1944) of the need for international institutions to manage the international economy and prevent a repetition of the prewar experience of economic conflict. The inherent tension between the commitment of the state to promote domestic economic welfare and the ideal of an impersonal set of international rules that would govern state behavior was built into the Bretton Woods institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Underlying the GA1T trade regime was the liberal assumption that free trade would promote domestic welfare and contribute to world peace. The great advantage of liberalized trade and an international division of labor based on the principle of comparative advantage is that every society can gain through free trade and the opening of its borders to international commerce. This liberal idea of an underlying harmony in international economic affairs is an important and powerful one. As Nobel laureate in economics Paul Samuelson has argued, the principle of comparative advantage is the most beautiful idea in economics; this principle supports the crucial liberal belief in a harmony of interest uniting all peoples. If every nation were to organize its economic affairs according to this principle, as liberals

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quite correctly point out, the result would be a maXlII11Zation of global wealth and, in time, improved economic welfare for every society. The problem with the liberal theory of free trade and the principle of comparative advantage is that these ideas neglect the economic costs of free trade and are based on a liberal image of society, that is, a society composed of individuals. In the real world of states and conflict groups, free trade has other effects that frequently override or counter its universal benefits. In the first place, a powerful tendency exists for states and groups to free ride as when states seek to take advantage of open markets in other countries while keeping their own economy closed. Second, free trade and changes in the international division of labor impose heavy adjustment costs on individual nations and groups; as a result, states have a powerful incentive to resist these costs through trade protection and shifting the costs to other countries. Third, while everyone may gain absolutely through free trade, states are very concerned over relative gains and who produces what; for security and domestic reasons, whether an economy produces computer chips or potato chips is a major concern of every state. As a consequence of these factors, a powerful tendency exists for states to experience conflict over the rules and nature of the international trading system. The conflicting interests among states over the trading system have led a number of both realist and liberal writers to conclude that a regime of free trade can exist only if it is led and supported by a dominant economic power whose own interests lie with free trade. Beginning with the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of GAlT negotiations and continuing through the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which were completed in December 1993, the United States assumed this leadership role in reducing trade barriers. It is equally important to note, however, that this American leadership role in promoting a liberal, multilateral trade regime significantly slackened as the American economy declined relative to its major competitors and the perceived costs of free trade to the American economy increased. Since the mid-1970s, Americans have become more concerned over what they consider to be the free-riding behavior of other economies, the accelerating costs of adjustment due to the rapid industrial rise of Japan and other East Asian economies, and the loss of high wage jobs which many Americans (and West Europeans) believe is due to increasing competition from low wage economies. While liberals may be correct in arguing that the ability of China and other developing economies to combine low wage labor and imported high technology poses only an adjustment problem and does not constitute a long-term competitive threat to the United States and other advanced economies, the magnitude of the adjustment required is his tori-

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cally unprecedented. The resulting pressure for protection is understandable even if misguided. These concerns over international competitiveness, however, are closely tied to another important development in the international political economy. Contrary to the liberal belief in the declining importance of the state, the growth of economic interdependence among national economies has brought to the fore the problems posed by contrasting national systems of political economy. The GATT and the Bretton Woods institutions were based on the assumption of a low level of economic interdependence among national economies. National economies were regarded essentially as a set of empty boxes connected by exchange rates; what took place inside the boxes was of minor consequence for trade flows and the like. The fall of formal barriers as a consequence of successive rounds of trade negotiations and the resulting integration of national economies, however, have dramatically changed this situation. What takes place inside the nation has become of increasing significance. In particular, the role of the state in the economy and its economic policies such as tax policy, competition policy, and industrial policy as well as domestic economic structures have become increasingly important barriers to trade and determinants of trade patterns. Moreover, Western critics believe that the Japanese and other East Asian governments pursue aggressive trade policies that give their firms a decisive advantage in local and international competition. These nationalistic economic policies, in the opinion of Western critics, account for the fact that Japan and other East Asian economies import a relatively small percentage of the manufactured goods that they consume. As a result of these differences in national economies, and especially the greater role of the state in the East Asian economy relative to its role in the West, the issue posed by differences in national systems of political economy has become especially important in the trade conflicts between the United States and Western Europe on the one hand and Japan and the East Asian economies on the other. One result of this economic clash has been a decisive shift in American trade policy from a strong commitment to multilateral trade liberalization to a greater reliance on unilateral actions and bilateral negotiations. As Canadian trade negotiator and trade expert Sylvia Ostry has observed, this shift of American policy from a total commitment to trade liberalization to what she calls a multitrack approach occurred in September 1985, a day after the so-called Plaza Accord. The purpose of the Plaza Accord was to force an appreciation of the yen that would decrease America's huge and persistent trade deficit with Japan. This move on the monetary front was followed the next day by President Ronald Reagan's announcement that the

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United States would henceforth pursue a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral policies to force open foreign markets and improve America's bargaining position in global trading negotiations. Among the new initiatives that would follow from this policy shift was the American-Canadian Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that led to the creation in 1993 of the North American Free Trade Area (NAfTA). In addition, beginning with the Semiconductor Agreement of 1986, the United States has moved toward a results-oriented trade policy or what the Japanese denounce as managed trade. In effect, in order to reverse its perceived decline as a manufacturing power, the United States, beginning as early as the Reagan administration, decided to use its economic power and other sources of political leverage to promote what American leaders regard as American economic welfare rather than rely on free trade and the principle of comparative advantage to determine the international division of labor. The Clinton administration has gone even further and made this de facto policy shift a de jure component of its overall economic and foreign policy. The rallying cry of this decisive shift in American policy away from the almost total commitment of the United States in the early postwar era to trade liberalization and multilateral negotiations has been "jobs, jobs, jobs"! The purpose of American trade policy is thus being redefined to provide employment for American workers and businesses rather than, as liberal economic theory holds, to improve consumer choice and maximize global wealth. Similarly, in Western Europe, the huge and sustained level of unemployment has led to a variety of policy initiatives such as stringent local content rules and aggressive antidumping actions whose purpose has been to limit imports and encourage foreign direct investment in the Community. West Europeans in particular fear that the expensive European welfare state and a more open European economy are incompatible. As a consequence, in response to Japanese and increasingly to other East Asian exports as well, Western Europe under the banner of greater reciprocity has also moved significantly toward a policy of managed trade. In the opinion of business guru Peter Drucker, the movement in North America and Western Europe toward economic regionalism is a response to what he calls the "adversarial" trading behavior of Japan and the other East Asian economies. These rising economic powers, I should add, are no less guilty than their Western counterparts in putting national economic welfare over international welfare. The foremost liberal solution to the growing divergence among national economic policies is the international coordination of national macroeconomic policies. In brief, nations should cooperate to ensure that their

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combined macroeconOffi1C policies result in noninflationary economic growth in the global economy. The fact that the world economy, with the exception of the early Reagan years has been sluggish since the early 1970s would suggest that interstate cooperation and policy coordination is not working. Policy coordination, as practiced by the G-7 countries, has in large part become a rhetorical device by which each country attempts to convince other states to take policy actions that would be to the former's benefit. Despite many liberal writings to the contrary, very few important examples of international policy coordination, in fact, can be cited. The cooperation that has occurred such as the Plaza and Louvre Agreements leading to revaluations of the yen have been mainly the result of American political pressures on Japan to take actions that the United States believed to be in the American national economic interests or due to an unusual conjuncture of national interests. On the whole, the United States has had litde success in getting either Japan or Gennany to stimulate their economies. Nor have these countries had much success in getting the United States to take the necessary measures to eliminate American budget and trade deficits. The moral of the movement away from the postwar emphasis on trade liberalization and the failure of international policy cooperation is that economic welfare has indeed become a more important goal and that welfare is increasingly being defined in highly nationalistic terms. While liberals are correct that economic openness has a beneficial effect on domestic welfare, economic interdependence has costs as well and has not meant a withering away of the state. These costs have led to increasing resistance to greater openness, especially in the United States and Western Europe. In the name of promoting domestic welfare, American and Western European states are intervening more and more in the market through the use of protectionist devices and industrial policies. Moreover, all three major economic powers are moving toward a greater emphasis on economic regionalism. States and the societies whose interests they represent continue to be very concerned with the issue of who produces what and, as Susan Strange pointed out, with their share of global markets. These nations are increasingly unwilling to leave matters of industrial and market shares up to the principle of comparative advantage and the free play of the market. The result of these concerns has been a significant lessening of the postwar tendency for the growth of global trade to exceed the growth of global GNP. Whether the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations will reinvigorate the postwar movement toward trade liberalization has yet to be seen. A pessimist, however, would note that the Uruguay Round was suc-

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cessfully concluded only because many of the most divisive issues were left out of the agreement, and that the actual implementation of important agreements in such areas as services and intellectual property rights will be very difficult indeed.

THE STATE AND ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

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developments that are said to be decreasing the autonomy of the state and undermining the realist conception of the state, one of the most important is. the process of economic globalization. Globalization in fact refers to two distinct but closely related developments that are believed to be transforming international affairs. The first development is the social, economic, and technological unification of the globe. As a consequence of the technological revolution in communications and transportation, cultural and other barriers that divide societies are said to be falling; social, economic, and other activities for the first time in history are becoming worldwide in scope. The second development is that transnational economic and other forces are alleged to be breaking down national boundaries and integrating national societies; trade, financial, and other flows are creating a highly interdependent global economy and creating in effect an international society. This process of globalization is believed to be requiring increased interstate cooperation. The international community is thus being forced to establish international regimes to manage this highly interdependent global system. Prior to considering the issue raised by economic globalization, a serious misunderstanding of realist thought must be addressed. Contrary to liberal attacks on realism, it has never been the case (nor has it ever been argued by realists) that national economies in the modern era have been autonomous and isolated from one another; realists may be guilty of many things, but they are not this obtuse! The modern state and its economy today and in the past have always been enmeshed in a web of market forces. For example, during the alleged high tide of the realist state in the late nineteenth century (which is said now to be disappearing because of integrating forces), national economies were in fact held tightly together by the international gold standard. As Karl Polanyi (with some exaggeration) argues in his classic The Great TransjoT7J1ation, the gold standard had a powerful restraining influence on states; the tight integration of national monetary systems, Polanyi argues, was one of the four pillars of a stable and peaceful MONG THE

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world. to In contrast, today, with the collapse of the postwar monetary system based on ftxed rates, nations (or at least the most powerful ones) have been more free to go their own way. This falling away of the restraints of fixed rates has been a major contributor to international economic instability. What then about the argument that interdependence has increased and thereby diminished national autonomy? One of the most important transnational forces alleged to be integrating national economies is that of international finance. Throughout the postwar era and accelerating in the 1970s, a number of developments-modern telecommunications, the deregulation of financial markets, and the sheer magnitude of ftnancial flows-have produced a revolution in international finance and the world economy more generally. As a result of these developments, international financial movements now dwarf trade flows and have become a principal determinant of exchange rates and hence international competitiveness, at least in the short run; these financial flows have become a major cause of exchange volatility and a disruptive element in the international economy. At the domestic level, these huge ftnancial flows have reduced the autonomy of domestic macroeconomic policy. Thus, if a state reduces its interest rate to stimulate economic activity, the resulting outflow of capital tends to counter the effect of this shift in monetary policy. In brief, the state is held to be at the mercy of transnational market forces and has lost its traditional autonomy. This argument, its strengths, and its limitations, may be illustrated from recent experience. On 16 September 1992, an important and disturbing event in the international economy unexpectedly occurred. Hundreds of independent currency traders around the world suddenly shifted massive amounts of funds out of the British pound and the Italian lire into German marks. The resulting financial crisis was one of the most significant economic events of the post-cold war world. This financial upheaval was the economic equivalent of an earthquake in that it profoundly reshaped the economic, political, and perhaps even the strategic environment of Western Europe and the entire world. This dramatic realignment of major currencies caused Italy and Great Britain to withdraw from the European Monetary System (EMS) and, in conjunction with the defeat of the Maastricht Treaty by Danish voters, derailed or at least set back the movement toward European unity. While American economic offtcials declared that financial events in far-off Western Europe were none of their concern, and might

10. Karl Polanyi, The Greal Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Ollr Times (Boston: Beacon, 1972).

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even benefit American exports, the currency crisis revealed the powerful role of market forces in world affairs and in the post-cold war international economic order more generally. Since the mid-1970s, the size of international financial flows has grown to hundreds of billions of dollars a day. As liberals correctly point out, these immense fmancial flows can easily overwhelm national economies, as they did with Italy and Great Britain. As a result of the increasing integration of global financial markets, many observers argue, national governments have lost to global market forces a considerable part of their autonomy and control over their domestic economies. Although, this position points out, a government may resist these market forces for a brief while, as Italy and Great Britain attempted to do, in time they must succumb to powerful market forces. The events of September 1992, which were repeated the following June, gave credence to the liberal thesis that in the contemporary era transnational economic actors and forces are undermining the realist conception of international affairs. Thus, this experience would appear to bear out the argument that in the contemporary period, the state is at the mercy of powerful transnational forces over which it has lost control. This interpretation of what happened, however, is only half the story. The other and equally inlportant half of tlle story shows us that state actors are still of great importance in international economic affairs. The immense fmancial flows that devastated the lira and the pound and greatly weakened the movement toward European unity were the result of actions taken by powerful national actors in pursuit of perceived national interests. More specifically, the fmancial crisis was triggered by the huge gap between America's excessively low and Germany's excessively high interest rates. Whereas the American Federal Reserve had lowered rates to stimulate the stagnant American economy (and cynics might say to reelect George Bush), the German Bundesbank had raised rates to counter the inflationary consequences of German reunification. With nowhere else to go, financial traders (and speculators) fled to the mark. Thus, even though it is correct to say that Italy and Great Britain were overwhelmed by market forces, it was the state-centric actions taken by American and German financial authorities that generated these market forces in the first place. Both impersonal market forces generated by the actions of hundreds, if not thousands, of individual actors and the deliberate actions of a few powerful states were responsible for what happened. Parenthetically, French officials, realists to the core, attributed the fmancial crisis to an Anglo-Saxon plot to undermine the movement toward European unity.

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Despite the so-called process of globalization, the extent and significance of economic interdependence are greatly overstated. As Paul Krugman has effectively argued, national economies still characterize the world economy.1I Although some aspects of economic interdependence have increased in absolute terms, interdependence is still modest and in some respects has actually decreased in relative terms. While the foreign sector of the American economy has increased from about 4 percent in 1960 to about 10 percent in 1990, this percentage is still small and the health of the American economy continues to be determined primarily by domestic factors; moreover, the growth of the foreign sector took place in the 1970s and appears to have leveled off in the 1990s. In the area of international finance, capital flows in the nineteenth century as a percent of global economic product were far greater than today. Perhaps most significant of all, international migration, which reached its zenith in the period prior to the First World War, has declined substantially; try telling a poor Haitian or a refugee from devastated Yugoslavia that we live in a more open and integrated global economy! In short, one can argue with considerable justification that the nineteenth century under the influence of British leadership was the high point of economic globalization. The contemporary era is, in fact, witnessing paradoxical phenomena. As liberal thinkers emphasize, the process of economic globalization along with novel transnational forces are indeed having a profound impact on the world economy just as similar forces did in the nineteenth century. At the same time that this development is taking place, however, the modem state is adapting to these changes just as the state adapted to similar changes in the nineteenth century. In response to economic globalization and increasing interdependence, the state has developed new means to enhance its economic autonomy and maintain its political independence. One of the principal means to increase state control over these market forces is economic regionalism. In concluding this discussion of economic globalization, it is vitally important to distinguish between economic globalization as a description of the real world and as an ideology which, like any ideology, is used to support and rationalize particular economic and political interests. As I wrote on another occasion, economic interdependence is a phenomenon to be studied and analyzed rather than a ready-made description of economic reality. The same is true of economic globalization; it too is a phenomenon

11. Paul Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Efonomif Sense and Nonsense in the Age Expedations (New York: Norton, 1994).

of Diminished

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to be studied. As a description of the world, the concept of economic globalization is quite misleading and distorts economic reality. For this reason, as Winfried Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder convincingly demonstrate in their impressive The Ide%J!:! of Interdependence, globalization is best understood as an ideology used to rationalize the expansion of international capitalism and, in particular, Japanese capitalism. 12 Referring to the writings of Japanese business consultant Kenichi Ohmae, Ruigrok and Tulder write, "Ohmae's globalization thesis serves to rationalize the internationalization of Japanese ftrms, just like [Raymond] Vernon's product cycle model rationalized u.s. multinationalisation."13 In the next section, more will be said about this subject.

THE STATE AND NEW ACTORS

T

critique of political realism to be considered in this article is that the nation-state has become an anachronism and is being displaced by non-state entities as the primary actor in the international economy. The nation-state is said to be both too small and too large to serve contemporary mankind. On the one hand, the nation-state is too large and ethnically diffuse to command the loyalties of the many ethnic groups that comprise many modern nation-states; as a consequence, these states are fragmenting into smaller ethnic states. On the other hand, the scale of production and the management of the economy require a reorganization of global economic and political affairs on a regional basis; the formation of the European Union (EU) and, to a lesser extent, NAFfA, which were both created in 1993, are held up as signiftcant moves away from the nation-state and toward the region as the fundamental unit of economic affairs. The other major challenge to the contemporary nation-state is the multinational corporation; these huge ftrms are said to be displacing the state as the most important economic actors in an increasingly integrated world economy. The international networks of subsidiaries and alliances of these corporate giants are held to be more efftcient than states in managing a highly complex and integrated global economy; the large resources of these corporations, in fact, dwarf those of most states. These global [trms are said to have shed their national identities and to have become the primary economic actors in the contemporary global economy. HE nURD

12. Winfried Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder, The Iikology of Intmlepeniknce: The Unk Between Restf1lctllring, Internationalism and International Trade (London: Routledge, 1995). 13. Ibid., 26.

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The end of the cold war has witnessed the collapse of several ethnically diverse nation-states and the threatened dissolution of other states. A number of ethnic states have been created and terrible struggles have ensued over the assets of the prior nation-states as in former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. This development is of great significance, but it does not mean the end of the state. Just as the absolute state of the early modern period was displaced in the nineteenth century by the nation-state, so today the nation-state, at least in some places, is being displaced by the ethnic state. Serbia, Croatia, and the like are as wretchedly self-centered or even worse than the nation-states that they supplanted. The movement toward regional organizations and economic arrangements such as the EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is one of the most significant developments in the late twentieth century. Contrary to the opinion of many liberals that regionalism represents an eclipse of the state, however, I would argue that these regional arrangements are essentially inter-state alliances whose primary purpose is to strengthen the position of individual states in an interdependent and highly competitive global economy. While the member-states of the European Union have transferred some decision-making responsibility to regional bodies, these states have retained the three essential components of state sovereignty: coinage, taxation, and defense. Of equal significance, they have reserved the right to veto any decision that they consider to be contrary to their national interests. Yet, it could be argued that these states have embarked on a process of integration whose outcome will be the subordination of individual states into a larger regional entity. This could occur if Western Europe or North America were to unifY politically; however, this development would give rise to competition among these regional-states in defense of what they perceive to be their regional interests. The prima facie case for the argument that the multinational corporation has become a new and powerful actor on the world scene is certainly a strong one. Although a number of technical definitions of multinational corporation exist, I shall use the term to refer to the establishment by a corporation of one nationality of a subsidiary or a long-term relationship in another country. This corporate activity may involve the acquisition of a local firm, the building of an entirely new facility ("greenfield" investment ), or a corporate alliance of some kind. The subsidiary or intercorporate alliance may be of many kinds such as services or manufacturing. The crucial point is that through foreign direct investment (FDI), the acquisition of ownership rights, and intercorporate alliances, these corporations seek to establish a permanent position in another economy.

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REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL

According to one authoritative study, the huge expansion of foreign direct investments throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s has reached a level where "a qualitatively different set of linkages" has been created among advanced economies and certain developing economies. 14 This transformation of the world economy is said to be at a take-off point comparable to the changes wrought by the great expansion of international trade in the late 1940s that resulted in a highly interdependent international economy. All indications suggest that foreign direct investment will continue to expand just as rapidly as it has in the past. As a consequence, the expansion of global ftrms has had and will continue to have a number of significant effects on world trade, exchange rates, and balance sheets. In the opinion of many observers, the result of this corporate expansionism will be an increasingly integrated world economy that is dominated and managed by relatively few gigantic corporations. While American multinationals continue to lead in total foreign direct investment, European, Japanese, and even LDC multinationals have greatly expanded their overseas investments, especially in the second half of the 1980s. From 1983-89, FDI by ftrms of all nationalities increased by an average of 34 percent a year. This was almost quadruple the 9 percent annual increase in merchandise trade. By the end of 1987, the world stock of I'DI reached approximately $1 trillion which is many times the 1980 level. 15 The preponderant share of this investment surge belonged to the world's five largest industrialized countries, whose I'D! increased seven-fold between 1983 and 1989. 16 The growth of Japanese foreign direct investment has become especially important and has increased six-fold during the 1980s.17 Thus, at the same time that the globalization of the world economy has been taking place through trade expansion and financial flows, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the globalization of production by the multinational corporations of the dominant industrial economies. More than 80 percent of this surge of FD! was within the triad of the United States, Western Europe and Japan, with Western Europe receiving the largest amount in recent years. Although the FD! in LDCs also rose significantly, their overall share of the total dropped from 25 percent in the ftrst half of 1980s to 18 percent in the second. Three quarters of this I'D! in the LDCs, however, has gone to just ten countries of which five are in Asia 14. DeAnne Julian, Global Companies and Pllblic Policy: The Growing Challenge Investment (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs; Pinter, 1990.). 15. IMF SlIrvey, December 1990, 376. 16. London Financial Times, 14 January 1991,4. 17. Reported in the Financial Times, 29 July 1991, 13.

of Foreign Direct

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(China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand), four in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Columbia and Mexico), and Egypt. Only 0.7 percent of FDI went to the least developed countries in the second half of the 1980s. At the same time that the United States has lost its status as the most important source of foreign direct investment and has became a principal recipient of FDI, the MNC of the European Community have increased their share to 34 percent of the total or roughly equivalent to that of the United States. While the stock of Japanese FDI still lags behind that of the other major economies, Japanese FDI will probably catch up with American and European FDis sometime in the 1990s. The most important point to note, as I shall argue in more detail below, is that whereas the Japanese invested abroad in the past to support exports, they are now building "regionally-integrated, independently sustainable networks" of production and marketing in Western Europe, the United States, and East Asia. As already noted, the internationalization of services and industrial production has profound but not yet clear implications for the trading system. It means that a substantial proportion of world trade takes place as intraftrm transfers at prices set by the firms and in terms of a global corporate strategy that does not conform to conventional trade theory based on the law of comparative advantage. About one half of American imports, for example, are intrafirm transfers and are determined by the investment strategies of multinational corporations. This type of trade will undoubtedly gain in importance and momentum, especially if regional trading blocs in North America, the Pacific, and Western Europe become of increasing significance. One major implication of this development is that the existence of investment barriers imposed by one nation or region on outside firms has become an increasingly important issue in international economic relations. Yet, there are hardly any rules in existence to govern these trade and investment activities. The importance of the multinational corporation is not really at issue. Few realists would deny their importance. Powerful corporations, their farflung subsidiaries, and their overseas alliances have become a predominant feature of contemporary international affairs. The significance of the expansion of these corporate giants for the nature and organization of the international political economy, however, is a matter of intense controversy. While the multinational corporation represents for some observers a powerful challenge to the realist, state-centric view of international affairs, for other observers including those realists who have written on the subject, nation-states (or I should say, the dominant economic powers) continue to

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reign over international affairs. The liberal argument not only fails to understand what is actually happening, but it is based on an ahistorical understanding of the subject. The dominant position regarding the multinational corporation role and the one to which most liberals would subscribe is that the MNC has become an independent and powerful actor rivaling in importance the nation-state. r shall call this position the global corporation thesis. Kenichi Ohmae in his book World Without Borders is representative of this position in arguing that the global or stateless [trm is a natural response to a borderless world economy composed of homogenized consumer tastes and in which economic activities are increasingly being organized on a global basis. 18 The ongoing process of economic globalization is said to have transformed the very nature of what was earlier called the multinational corporation. The fading era of the multinational corporation, which was dominated by American [trms, considered foreign operations as distinct appendages for producing products that were essentially designed and engineered back home. The chain of command and nationality of the firm were clear. The global corporation, on the other hand, is said to think in truly global rather than national terms. According to this thesis, corporate ownership has become unclear as joint ventures, corporate alliances, and the like have united firms across national borders. These global corporations are, it is alleged, becoming stateless and independent of their original nationalities. \'{1hereas the typical MNC of the past was comprised of a parent [trm with an array of stand-alone subsidiaries in each overseas market, it is being replaced by global [trms that locate research, product development, and production on a global basis and organize their activities in term of an integrated global market. Thus, the world's corporations are shedding their national identities and becoming citizens of a world in which they make their production and other decisions without reference to the nation of their origin. According to this position, a fundamental change in the world economy is taking place because of the increasing linkages among these global corporations. The home economy, whether it is Germany, the United States or Japan, is of decreasing significance for competitive success. %at Ohmae calls the "triad" is now dominant. If a [trm is to be competitive, it must have a strong base in all three of the major economies of North America, Western Europe and Japan. This requirement in turn has increased the importance of corporate alliances across national borders as a means to

18. Kenichi Ohmae, Triad Powers: The Coming Shape Press, 1985).

of Gfqbal Competition

(New York: Free

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achieve market access, to share the increasing costs of research and product development, and the like. The increasing importance of scale economies and the escalating cost of R&D as well as the rapid pace, scope, and cost of modern technology are thus encouraging the growth of corporate alliances within and across national borders. The world economy, as characterized by former Harvard University lecturer and Clinton administration secretary of labor Robert Reich, has become a seamless web in which national economies, national corporations, and national products no longer exist. In a world where components may be made in several countries, assembled in another, and sold in yet another, one can no longer identify the nationality of a good. For this reason, it is argued, traditional measurements of trade and payments balances are decreasingly meaningful in a global economy. Although the United States as a national economy has a substantial trade and payments deficit, this otherwise disturbing fact is canceled out by the fact that American multinational corporations enjoy a surplus of world sales. The winners and losers from this reinterpretation of international economic affairs are individual firms and workers rather than nation-states as was assumed to be the situation in the past. In opposition to this image of the global corporation in a global economy painted by Ohmae, Reich, and others is the alternative, and more convincing to me, view that the nation-state and its policies continue to be the most important feature of international economic affairs. This position has been put forth quite effectively by Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter. In his book, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter demonstrates that the national economy continues to be the predominant economic entity in the global economy.19 The national home-base of a multinational finn, he argues, is the crucial determinant of the inventiveness and the international competitiveness of a fum. Multinational firms are and must continue to be national fums because their comparative advantage is created and must be maintained in the nation of their origin. In opposition to Ohmae's emphasis on global corporations and the triad, Porter argues that the world economy is ultimately organized in terms of clusters of industrial excellence that are nationally-based. These national clusters and their competitiveness are affected mostly by local factors and national policies. For Porter, increased national specialization, strong national fums in particular industries, and differentials in national wealth indicate the continued importance of national economies. 19. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage ojNations (New York: Free Press, 1990).

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REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL

The evidence for Porter's state-centric position is, I believe, overwhelming. Global, multinational, or transnational business corporations are still essentially national firms with foreign operations. Corporate leadership is still national. Very few firms have foreign nationals as top managers and certainly not as corporate directors. Sony, for example, is the only Japanese firm with a non-Japanese on its Board of Directors. The global strategy of the firm and the control over corporate finances are retained in the home country. Research and production still tend to be located in the home economy. Not least in importance, all governments promote the interests of their own national firms. In short, the world has a long way to go before it achieves the liberal ideal of a truly stateless corporation. "While American academics, American corporate leaders, and Japanese consultants may propagandize the idea of the global corporation, this concept is most certainly not accepted by Japanese business and the Japanese state. The giant Japanese electronics conglomerate Matsushita is and always will be Japanese; the task of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MIT!) is and always will be to promote the interests of Matsushita and other Japanese corporations. The well-being of these corporations is considered to be identical with the well-being of Japanese society. \X1hile Americans may ridicule the remark of then-Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson that "what is good for General Motors is good for the country", the Japanese really do believe that what is good for Matsushita or Toyota is good for the country. What is important to Japanese society is the expansion of Japanese corporations and the sale of Japanese products whether as finished exports or as components in the overseas production and marketing activities of their corporations. Nor are the concepts of the global corporation and seamless world economy very appealing to the West Europeans who are trying to create strong European corporations and a unified European economy. My point may perhaps best be made by considering the recent overseas expansion of Japanese corporations. Following the Plaza Agreement (25 September 1985), which led to a substantial appreciation of the yen, the trade and investment strategies of Japanese corporations underwent a dramatic shift. In contrast to American f!rms, Japanese fttms have traditionally favored producing goods at home and exporting fmished products. With yen appreciation, many of Japan's exports, especially at the low end of the technological spectrum, suddenly become noncompetitive in world markets. In response to this development, Japanese firms began to invest heavily in southeast Asia and eventually China to take advantage of their low-wage labor supply. The components or fmished goods made by Japanese subsidiaries in these countries

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25

have mainly been exported to third markets (read the United States) or exported back to Japan as ftnished goods or component parts. Of equal importance, Japanese ftrms keep the high value-added and most profttable phases of their manufacturing in Japan itself; they import from low cost, less-skilled East Asian producers the component parts that are assembled into fmished goods for the Japanese and world market. In effect, Japanese ftrms, backed by the Japanese government, have begun to create an East Asian division of labor, or what Japanese specialist Michael Mochizuki calls "network capitalism," managed by Japanese corporations and centered on the Japanese economy. Through the trade and investment policies of Japanese ftrms and the official development assistance of the Japanese government, the East Asian economies are being integrated as subcontractors and component suppliers into a Japanese-led regional economic system. While Japanese investment has been a major benefit to the economic development of the region, East Asians worry about becoming overly dependent on Japan, and Westerners worry about the formation of a new Japanese-led East Asian coprosperity sphere from which the West would be excluded. Before concluding this discussion of the realist position regarding the continuing important role of the state in international affairs, a corrective of the liberal position needs to be made. The liberal argument that the MNC or global corporation is a novel development and has eclipsed the nation-state misrepresents the realist position; moreover, this liberal argument misrepresents the past. Realists have never argued, at least to my knowledge, that the state has or ever has had a monopoly of power in the international system; the state has always had to contend with other powerful actors, witness its centuries-long rivalry with the Vatican. The realist argument is rather that the state is the primary and most important actor. With respect to the MNC, the power and importance of today's MNC pale in comparison to multinationals of the past such as the Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company. These companies of merchant-adventures had their own foreign policies, fielded their own military forces, and ruled vast empires across the globe. Yet, when Westminster determined, following the Sepoy Mutiny (1857-59), that the English East India Company was endangering British national interests, the British government asserted its authority over the Company. Then, as now, the state set the rules within which business functioned. In summary, there is a simple test to determine whether or not the nation-state has been displaced by other actors as the primary actor in international affairs. This is the test of loyalty and self-sacrifice. While men and

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REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL

women continue to give their utmost loyalty to the nation-state and are willing to die for it, very few individuals have made an equivalent sacrifice for the European Community or a business enterprise. Despite Lee Iaccocca's ranting against his Japanese rivals, I seriously doubt that even he would have laid down his life for the greater glory of Chrysler Motors. For better or worse, the state still holds a virtual monopoly over human loyalty.

THE STATE ENDURES

well be the case, as many observers have come to believe, I that under contemporary conditions the nation-state has become an T MAY VERY

anachronism and in time will be displaced by micro-ethnic states and larger regional entities. If these developments were to occur, the result would not be the end of political affairs as understood by realists; it would still be a jungle out there. As witnessed in former Yugoslavia, the collapse of this particular nation-state has resulted in rival conflict groups and an internecine struggle. Just as in the nineteenth century the nation-state displaced the territorial state, in certain parts of the world today the ethnic state is displacing the multiethnic nation-state. I am not convinced that this change is an improvement. The fundamental point I wish to make is that human beings organize themselves into political groups and are loyal to groups that inevitably conflict with one another. This political process will cease only when individuals fasten their loyalties on mankind as a whole. Except for saints and certain scholars with a more vivid imagination than the rest of us, this transformation in human consciousness has not yet occurred.

[2] REALIST THOUGHT AND NEOREALIST THEORY by Kenneth N. Waltz! Exploring various ways to forward the study of international politics was one of William T.R. Fox's many interests. In 1957, he organized a series of seminars that brought together a number of established scholars, among them Paul Nitze, Hans Morgenthau and Charles Kindleberger, along with such younger scholars as Robert W. Tucker, Morton Kaplan and Martin Wight, to discuss problems in the study of internationalpolitical theory and its relation to the behavior of states. A volume edited and co-authored by Bill was the tangible product of the colloquium.2 As one of the many students and colleagues who benefitted from Bill's ideas, encouragement, and support, I offer this essay as a small contribution toward clarifying some problems in the framing and applying of international political theory. I begin by lOOking at a theoretical breakthrough in a related field: economics. Realists and neorealists represent two ofthe major theoretical approaches followed by students of international politics in the past half century or so. They encountered problems similar to those the Physiocrats began to solve in France in the middle of the eighteenth century. Students of international politics have had an extraordinarily difficult time casting their subject in theoretical tenns. Looking first at an example of comparable difficulties sunnounted in a related field may be instructive.

How Economic Theory Became Possible Difficulties common to earlier economists and twentieth-century political scientists are revealed by examining Sir Josiah Child's A New Discourse, written mainly in the years 1668 to 1670.3 Child dealt with a striking question. Why, he wondered. did the prosperity of the Dutch surpass that of the English? In casting about for an answer, he seized on what seemed to be a compelling fact: namely. that the Dutch rate of interest had been lower than the English rate. The reasoning used to 1. 2. 3.

I should like to thank David Schleicher for his help on thiJ paper

William T.R. Fox, co-author and ed., Theoreticai Aspect' tif["tematioMi RelatiOflS (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 19S9). Josiah Oilld, A New Discourse ofTToM, 4th ed. (London: J. Hodges, 1740). See also William Letwin, Sir Josiah Child, Merchant Eccmomist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 19S9).

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KennethN. Waltz

establish the causal role of the rate of interest is correlative and sequential. Child tried to show that the prosperity of various countries varies inversely with prevailing rates of interest. He then established the causal direction by arguing that the expected changes in the level of prosperity followed upon changes in rates of interest. Child' s work is the kind of pre-theoretical effort that provides stimulus to, and material for, later theories. That is its merit. It is, however, the kind of work: that can neither provide satisfactory explanations nor lead to the construction of theory. We can profit by noticing why this is so. Child tried to establish a necessary relation between the rate of interest and the level of prosperity. Other economists picked different factors as their favorite causes--the accumulation of bullion, the fertility of the population or the soil, the industry of the people, the level of rents, or whatever. But none was able to show why the relation between the chosen factor or factors and the condition to be accounted for necessarily held. Child, for example, could not supply an answer to this now obvious question: Why doesn't a rise in interest rates attract capital, ultimately lowering its price as with commodities? He could not say whether the association he claimed to have found was causal or coincidental. He could not say whether other factors in play may have caused interest rates and national prosperity to move in opposite directions. Innumerable explanations for the observed relation were available. Pre-physiocratic economists could only cast about for sequences and associations that seemed to pertain within or across countries. They could at best hope to formulate plausible explanations of particular outcomes. They had no way of relating the parts of an economy to one another and to the economy as a whole. The first step forward was, as it had to be, to invent the concept of an economy as distinct from the society and the polity in which it is embedded. Some will always complain that it is artificial to think of an economy separate from its society and polity. Such critics are right. Yet the critics miss the point. Theory is artifice. A theory is an intellectual construction by which we select facts and interpret them. The challenge is to bring theory to bear on facts in ways that permit explanation and prediction. That can only be accomplished by distinguishing between theory and fact. Only if this distinction is made can theory be used to examine and interpret facts. In the pre-theoretic era of economics, more and more information became available in the form of reported, or purported, facts. and more and more attempts were made to account for them. But differences of explanation remained unreconciled and explanations of particular processes and outcomes did not add up to an understanding of how a 22

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national economy works. In a remarkable survey in which the historical development. the sociological setting. and the scientific qualities of economic thought are brought together. Joseph Schumpeter described the best economic literature of that earlier time as having "all the freshness and fruitfulness of direct observation." But. he added, it also "shows all the helplessness of mere observation by itself.'''' Information accumulated. but arguments, even perceptive ones about propositions that tnight have been developed as theories. did not add up to anything more than ideas about particulars occasioned by current controversies. Child was better than most economists of his day. although not as good as the best The most creative economists were frustrated by the condition that Schumpeter described. The seventeenth-century economist Sir William Petty, for example, felt the frustration. Schumpeter described him as creating "for himself theoretical tools with which he tried to force a way through the undergrowth of facts. ,,5 To eliminate useless and misleading "facts" was an important endeavor. but not a sufficient one. What blocked the progress of economic understanding was neither too little nor too much knowledge but rather the lack of a certain kind of knowledge. The answers to factual questions pose puzzles that theory may hope to solve and provide materials for theorists to work with. But the work begins only when theoretical questions are posed. Theory cannot be fashioned from the answers to such factual questions as: What follows upon, or is associated with, what. Instead, answers have to be sought to such theoretical questions as these: How does this thing work? How does it all hang together? These questions cannot usefully be asked unless one has some idea of what the "thing" or the "it" might be. Theory becomes possible only if various objects and processes, movements and events, acts and interactions, are viewed as forming a domain that can be studied in its own right. Oearing away useless facts was not enough; something new had to be created. An invention was needed that would permit economic phenomena to be seen as distinct processes, that would permit an economy to be viewed as a realm of affairs marked off from social and political life. This the Physiocrats first achieved. Francois Quesnay's famous economic table is a picture depicting the circulation of wealth among the productive and unproductive classes of SOCiety, but it is a picture of the 4.

s.

Joseph Schumpeter, Economic Doctrin. and M.thod: All Hi.Jtorica/ Sutch, R. ArlI, Ilan•• (New Yark: Oxford University Press, 1967) p.24. Ibid., p.30.

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Kenneth N. Waltz

unseen and the unseeable. 6 Certain cycles are well-known facts of economic life- -a/t') and is distributed according to Fi' truncated at -aj(t').

PROPOSITION 3. In any equilibrium of r in which escala-

tion may occur, the equilibrium distribution on outcomes before the horizon time t' implied by proposition 2 is unique.

584

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An Informal Description of Equilibrium Behavior. Equilibrium behavior in the incomplete information game has the essential features of a war of nerves. At the outset, one side is expected to prefer to make concessions quietly, without a public contest. This state concedes with some probability (k,/v) at t = O. If it does not make concessions, then its adversary immediately raises its estimate of the state's willingness to fight, and the war of nerves begins. Neither side knows whether or exactly when the other might be locked in by increasing audience costs, but beliefs that the other prefers war to making concessions steadily increase as audience costs accumulate. The reason is that states with low resolve are increasingly likely to have backed down, the more the crisis escalates. Ultimately, in crises that reach the horizon, the only sorts of states remaining have relatively high values for war on the issue. At this point, both sides prefer conflict to backing down, and both know this: attack thus becomes a rational choice. At a price, then, audience costs enable the states to learn about each other's true willingness to fight over the interests involved in the dispute. 2 ' The price is paid in two ways. First, a state may escalate or delay for a time and then quit when its adversary matches it. Though the state is still unsure if the adversary really would be willing to fight rather than make concessions, its belief that this is possible has increased and it finds it worthwhile to cut its losses. Second, two states may escalate up to the horizon and then fight, even though one or both would have preferred making immediate concessions rather than this outcome. The dilemma created by private information and incentives to misrepresent is that neither can reliably learn that the other would be willing to go this far without taking actions that have the effect of committing both sides to a military settlement. One further feature of equilibrium in the model deserves comment before I turn to more specific comparative statics results. The more a crisis escalates, the less likely is either side to back down (regardless of precrisis beliefs). In technical terms, the hazard rate is decreasing: the probability that one's opponent will quit after (say) five escalatory moves is less than the probability that the state will quit after four moves. Thus, as escalation proceeds, states in the model gradually become more pessimistic about the likelihood that the adversary will concede after the next round, and outside observers become increasingly concerned that war may be "inevitable."

nience, I discuss the case of linearly increasing audience costs, ai(t) = ail. Audience Costs A striking feature of the equilibrium behavior just described is that the state less able to generate audience costs (lower ail is always more likely to back down in disputes that become public contests. This holds regardless of the value of the prize to either side and regardless of the states' initial beliefs about the other's resolve. Thus if actions such as mobilization generate greater audience costs for democratic than for nondemocratic leaders, we should find the democracies backing down significantly less often in crises with authoritarian states.>z By itself, intuition can justify the opposite prediction quite easily. One might think that the side less sensitive to its domestic audience would fear escalation less. Knowing this and fearing large costs of retreat, the side with a stronger domestic audience might then be more inclined to back down. But this argument misses the signaling value of escalation for a state with a powerful domestic audience. While such a state may be reluctant to escalate a dispute into a public confrontation, if it does choose to do so this is a relatively informative and credible signal of willingness to fight over the issue. That is, the greater the costs created by escalation for a leader, the more likely the leader is to be willing to go to war conditional on having escalated a dispute. Conversely, escalation by a state that will suffer little domestically for backing down sals less about the state's actual willingness to fight. 2 This dynamic has several further implications. First, the signaling and commitment value of a stronger domestic audience helps a state on average, by making potential opponents more likely to shy away from contests and more likely to back down once in them. In the model, a state's ex ante expected payoff increases with its audience-cost rate ai' This result provides a rationale for why, ex ante, both democratic and authoritarian leaders would want to be able to generate significant audience costs in international contests. Second, if democratic leaders tend to face more powerful domestic audiences, they will be significantly more reluctant than authoritarians to initiate "limited probes" in foreign policy. Showing this formally requires that we add structure to the model analyzed here, which does not represent an initial choice of one state to challenge or threaten the other. When such an option is added-say, state 1 chooses whether to accept the status quo or to challenge state 2--it is easily shown that the less sensitive state 1 is to audience costs, the greater the equilibrium probability that the state will try a limited probe. 24 Third, when large audience costs are generated by escalation, fewer escalatory steps are needed credibly to communicate one's preferences. (Formally, the expected level of escalation decreases with a, and a2 .) Thus crises between democracies should see signifi-

AUDIENCE COSTS, CAPABILITIES, AND INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES Comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium yields theoretical insights into how three variables affect state behavior and crisis outcomes. I consider in turn the impact of audience costs, relative military capabilities, and relative interests. For expositional conve-

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cantly fewer escalatory steps than crises between authoritarian states-an empirically supported prediction (Russett 1993, 21). Finally, the equilibrium results bear on the question of how regime type influences the risk that a crisis will escalate to war. When two states in the model have the same audience cost rates a = a, = a2 , the risk of war conditional on a crisis occurring proves to be independent of a, other things being equal (d. Nalebuff 1986).25 As audience-cost rates diverge, the high-audience-cost state becomes more likely to escalate, while the lower-audience-cost state becomes more likely to back down. The net effect on the risk of war may be positive or negative, although it is positive for a broad range of plausible parameter values. For example, whenever the distribution of W, is uniform, the risk of war (given a crisis) strictly increases as a, increases above a2 • 26 The model thus suggests a theoretical mechanism that could conceivably help explain the observation that crises between democracies and nondemocracies are more warprone than are crises between democracies (Chan 1984; Russett 1993). In the model, democratic leaders have a structural incentive to pursue more escalatory, committing strategies when they face authoritarians than when they face fellow democrats, and this can generate a greater overall chance of war. Relative Capabilities and Interests Two of the most common informal claims about state behavior in international crises are that (1) the militarily weaker state is more likely to back down and (2) the side with fewer "intrinsic interests" at stake is more likely to back down. These arguments are problematic. If relative capabilities or interests can be assessed by leaders prior to a crisis and if they also determine the outcome, then we should not observe crises between rational opponents: if rational, the weaker or observably less interested state should simply concede the issues without offering public, costly resistance. Crises would occur only when the disadvantaged side irrationally forgets its inferiority before challenging or choosing to resist a challenge (Fearon 1992, chap. 2). A second striking result from the equilibrium analysis is that observable measures of the balance of capabilities and balance of interests should be unrelated to the relative likelihood that one state or the other backs down in crises where both sides choose to escalate. In formal terms, observable capabilities and interests influence the distribution of the states' values for going to war and thus the states' initial beliefs about each other's willingness to fight ([, and f2). For example, the more the balance of military power favors state 1, the more state 1-and the less state 2--is ini tiall y expected to be willing to use force. Regarding interests, the more the issues in dispute are initially thought to be important for, say, state 1, the more state 1 is initially expected to be willing to fight rather than back down.

In equilibrium, the initial distributions of the states' values for war have a direct influence on the probability that one state or the other will concede without creating a crisis. In accord with intuition, the weaker state 2 is militarily or the less its perceived stake, the more likely it is to cede the prize without offering visible resistance?7 However, if it does choose to escalate, then the odds that state 2 rather than state 1 will back down in the ensuing contest,

a,v + a,azt' + alazt* '

a2V

are not directly influenced by relative capabilities or interests. For example, when the states have the same audience cost rates (a, = a2 ), they are equally likely to back down in a crisis and equally likely to go to war, regardless of ex ante indices of relative power or interests. Less formally, the result suggests that rational states will "select themselves" into crises on the basis of observable measures of relative capabilities and interests and will do so in a way that neutralizes any subsequent impact of these measures. Possessing military strength or a manifestly strong foreign policy interest does deter challenges, in the model. But if a challenge occurs nonetheless, the challenger has signaled that it is more strongly resolved than initially expected and so is no more or less likely to back down for the fact that it is militarily weaker or was initially thought less interested.

CONCLUSION International crises are a response to a dilemma posed by two facts about international politics: (1) state leaders have private information about their willingness to use force rather than compromise, and (2) they can have incentives to misrepresent this information in order to gain a better deal. In consequence, quiet diplomatic exchanges may be insufficient to allow states to learn what concessions an adversary would in truth be willing to make. I have argued that states resolve this dilemma by "going public" -by taking actions such as troop mobilizations and public threats that focus the attention of relevant political audiences and create costs that leaders would suffer if they backed down. Though there are exceptions, the historical norm seems to have domestic audiences punishing or criticizing leaders more for escalating a confrontation and then backing down than for choosing not to escalate at all. A game-theoretic analysis showed that such audience costs allow states to learn about each other's willingness to fight in a crisis, despite incentives to misrepresent. When escalation creates audience costs for both sides, states revise upward their prior beliefs that the other is willing to use force as the crisis proceeds. If escalation reaches a certain level (the "horizon"), both states prefer fighting to backing

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down, and both know this. At this point, attack becomes a rational choice. 28 Equilibrium analysis yielded several novel propositions about how audience costs, relative capabilities, and relative interests influence the outcomes of international confrontations. Some broader implications follow. A substantial literature in international relations argues that international anarchy, combined with states' uncertainty about each other's motivations, is a powerful cause of international conflict (Glaser 1992; Herz 1950; Jervis 1978; Waltz 1959, 1979). Unsure of each other's intentions, states arm and take actions that may make others less secure, leading them to respond in kind. States' inability to commit themselves to nonaggressive policies under anarchy may exacerbate, or even make possible, such "security dilemmas."29 The results of my analysis suggest that domestic political structure may powerfully influence a state's ability to signal its intentions and to make credible commitments regarding foreign policy. If democratic leaders can more credibly jeopardize their tenure before domestic audiences than authoritarian leaders, they will be favored in this regard. For example, in the model examined here, high-audience-cost states require less military escalation in disputes to signal their preferences, and are better able to commit themselves to a course of action in a dispute. This observation provides a theoretical rationale that might help explain why the quality of international relations between democracies seems to differ from that between other sorts of states. If democracies are better able to communicate their intentions and to make international commitments, then the security dilemma may be somewhat moderated between them. For example, the leaders of a democratic state that is growing in power may be better able to commit themselves not to exploit military advantages that they will have in future, so reducing other states' incentives for preventive attack.30 Likewise, alliance relations between democracies may be less subject to distrust and suspicion if leaders would pay a domestic cost for reneging on the terms of the alliance, so "violating the national honor" in the eyes of domestic critics.31 One tradition within realism argues that democratic leaders are at a disadvantage in the game of realpolitik: domestic constraints reduce their freedom to maneuver and so may prevent them from playing the game as hard or as subtly as it may require (e.g., Morgenthau 1956, 512-26). However, as Schelling (1960) observes, in bargaining a player can benefit from having fewer options and less room to maneuver. I have shown how the presence of a politically significant domestic audience can improve a democratic leader's ability to commit to a course of action and to signal privately known preferences and intentions in a clear, credible fashion. These are advantages that could help in the game of realpolitik and might also make democracies better able to cope with the security dilemma.

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APPENDIX A formal statement of the solution concept used for the incomplete information game follows. Because r has a continuum of information sets, standard definitions of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) and sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982) do not apply. I propose an adaptation of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adding a refinement criterion that rules out some optimistic interpretations of out-of-equilibrium play. To avoid measuretheoretic complications, attention is restricted to pure strategy equilibria. Throughout, i = 1, 2 and j '" i. I begin by defining a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the normal form version of r. Here, a pure strategy for state i is a map Sj: Wj .... IR+ x {quit, attack}, where IR+ is the set of nonnegative reals. Using Fj, every Sj induces a unique pair of cumulative distributions Qj(l) and Aj(t), which are the probabilities that state i quits or attacks by I if i follows Sj. By the properties of cumulative distribution functions, Qj(l) and Aj(l) are increasing, right-continuous, and have well-defined left-hand limits for all I (Billingsley 1986, 189). Let Qj- (t) '" lim Qj(s). "State wis" expected payoff for {I, quit}, given then

Sj,

is

Ujq(l, Wj) '" QJ- (I)v + (QP) - Qj- (t»«v - aj(t»)/2)

+ AN)w; + (1

- Q/I) - AP))( -a;(I»

or, if Q/I) is nonatomic at I, U81, Wi)

=

QP)v + A/t)w;

+ (1

- Q/I) - A/I))( -a;(t».

Similarly, type wis expected payoff for {I, attack} given Sj is Ui(t, w;) '" Qj- (I)v

+ A/I)w; + (1 -

= Qj- (I)v

+ (1

Qj- (I) - A/I))w;

- Qj- (I))w;.

{t', quil} ({t', attack}) is a best reply for given Sj if

DEFINITION.

type

Wi

t' E argmaxt U((t, w) and U((t', (t' E argmaxt Uf(t,

Wi)

Wi) 2:

and U~(t', w)

2:

maxt Uf(t,

maxt U((t,

Wi)

Wi».

(s,' sz) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Ihe normal form version of r if (1) {Fi' sJ =? {Q/t), A/t)}, and (2) under s" every Iype Wi chooses a besl reply, given Sj.

DEFINITION.

Just as the normal form version of the complete information game G has multiple Nash eqUilibria, so are there multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria for r. However, many of these require states to choose strategies that do not seem optimal or sensible in the dynamic (extensive form) setting. These are ruled out by the "perfection" requirements I shall give.

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In the extensive form, a complete pure strategy in r is a map Si: u;!+ X Wi ---> u;!+ x {quit, attack}, with the restriction that if Si(t', Wi) = {t, quit} or {t, attack}, then t' ,;; t. For all I' ~ 0, define the "continuation game" f(t') as follows: (1) payoffs are as in r, except beginning at t'; and (2) "initial beliefs" are given by a cumulative distribution function Fi(·; t') on Wi' A strategy Si implies a strategy for state i in every continuation game f(1'); call this silt'. Further, using F;(-; 1'), sill' induces a pair of unique" conditional" cumulative probability distributions Qi(tlt') and Ai(tlt'), analogous to Qi(l) and A;(t) already defined. From these, expected payoff functions for f(t'), U7(t1t', Wi) and Uf(tlt', Wi) follow as before. We can now define a weak extensive form solution concept requiring that (1) s, and S2 induce Bayesian Nash equilibria in every continuation game f(t), and (2) beliefs f;('; t) are formed whenever possible using Bayes' Rule and Si' while F;(-; I) can be anything when Bayes' Rule does not apply. DEFINITION. {(s" s~, F,(·;·), F2(';')} is a perfect Bayesian eqUilibrium for r if

+ A,(t)

Qj- (I')v + (QP') - Qj- (t'))«v - ai(I'»)/2) + AP')Wi

+ (1 - QP') - A/t'))( -ai(I')). By right continuity of Qil) and Ail), the deviation {I' + B, quit}, B > 0, yields an expected payoff arbitrarily close to

QP')v + AP')Wi + (1 - QP') - AP'))( -ai(I'» as B approaches 0, which is strictly greater than the payoff for {I', quit}. Thus {I', quit} cannot be a best reply for any type Wi' An identical argument applies for {I', attack}. Q.E.D.

U81, Wi) = QP)v + A/t)Wi + (1 - Q/I) - AP»( -ai(I» and state wi s equilibrium ex ante expected payoff for {I, attack} as Uf(l, Wi) = Qil)v + (1 - Qil»Wi'

This solution concept is weak in the sense that it imposes no restrictions on how states would interpret completely unexpected behavior by the adversary. For instance, if state 1 escalates unexpectedly at time t, the concept allows state 2 to conclude that state 1 is without doubt the leasl resolved type 'llI.,. Further, it would allow state 2 to maintain this belief even as state 1 continued to escalate. Seemingly implausible "optimistic beliefs" of this sort can be used to support a continuum of perfect Bayesian equilibria in r for most initial parameter values (with I' as the maximum possible horizon). The following criterion rules out such optimistic off-equilibrium-,gath inferences and so refines the set of equilibria. 2 It is stronger than is needed for the proofs that follow, but it has the advantage of a very simple definition:

= O.

Proof. Suppose to the contrary that in some equilibrium type Wi chooses {I', quit} where QP') > QT (1'). State Wi then receives an ex ante expected payoff of

Observation 1 implies that if in some equilibrium Ih is the horizon, it cannot be that both states choose to quit with positive probability at Ih' Further, we can now write state wi s equilibrium ex ante expected payoff for {I, quit} as

(A) (S" s~ induces a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in rand for all t ~ 0, (s,lt, s2lt) induces a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in ret), using F, ('; t) and F,('; t); and (B) for all t such that t is reached with positive probability under Si (i.e., Q,(t) + A,(t) < 1), F,(-; t) is Fi(·) updated using Bayes' Rule and Si'

(C) For all t > 0 such Ihal Q,(t)

never besl replies for slale i for any Wi and are chosen wilh zero probability in equilibrium.

OBSERVATION 2. U~(t, wJ increases with Qlt) for all Wi' Thus in any equilibrium of r no type of slale i will choose {t, attack} (and A,(t) = 0) whenever there exisls a t' > t such Ihal Qlt') > Qlt). OBSERVATION 3. Suppose th > 0 is a horizon in some equilibrium of r in which escalation may occur. Then for all B > 0 slale i quils wilh posilive probabilily in Ihe inlerval [th - B, tJ for i = 1, 2.

Proof. If Ih is a horizon, then by definition at least one state (say, i) must quit with positive probability in the interval [Ih - B, thl for all B > O. I first show that this implies that the same must hold for j. If the contrary is true, then in some equilibrium, there must exist a I' < Ih such that for all I ~ I', cq~l) = QP'). By observation 2, AP) = 0 for I < I h , so U7(1, .) = Q/I)v + (1 - QP»(-ai(I» for I < Ih' U?(I, .) is stnctly decreasing in I whenever Qil) is constant and less than 1, so if the contrary is true and Qil') < 1, then no type of i would be willing to choose {I, quit} for any I > I', contradicting the hypothesis that Ih is the horizon. If Qil' < Ih) = 1, then {I < I', quit} is not a best reply for any Wi' implying that Qi(I') = O. It follows that I' must equal O-{I, quit} with 0 < I ,;; I' never being a best reply for any WI-SO escalation does not occur with positive probabIlity, contradicting the hypothesis. Thus both states must quit with positive probability in the interval [Ih - B, Ihl for all B> O. By observation 1, there can be no equilibrium in which both states choose {Ih , quit} with positive

= 1, F,( -a,(t); t)

This says that if state i escalates beyond I when it was expected to have quit or attacked prior to time I, then state j believes that i's value for war Wi is at least as great as i's value for backing down at time t. In the text and in what follows, I refer to a pair of strategies (s" S2) and a system of updated beliefs F,(-; I) that satisfy A, B, and C as an equilibrium of r. I now proceed to proofs of lemmas and propositions in the text, starting with several observations (proofs for observations 2 and 4 are straightforward and are omitted). OBSERVATION 1. Suppose Ihal in an equilibrium of C Qlt) is alomic al t'. Then {t', quil} and {t', attack} are

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Also from observation 4, type w;'s ex ante expected payoff for {I > I h , attack} is

probability. Thus in any equilibrium with Ih as the horizon, at least one state (say, I) quits with positive probability in the interval [Ih - 13, Ih) for all 13 > O. If observation 3 is false, then it must be possible to have an equilibrium in which Q{I) is atomic at Ih but j does not quit with positive probability in an interval [th 8, I h ) for small-enough 8 > O. But then Q/I) will be constant and less than 1 for I E [th - 8, th), so by the same logic as in the last paragraph, i will not be willing to choose {I, quit} with t E [Ih - 8, Ih), Q.E.D contradicting the hypothesis.

which is at least as great as 11i(t/v w;l. There are now two cases to consider. First, if Qj-(th ) = Q.(lh ), then i's ex ante expected payoff for {t < th, quit}, I E Tv is QNh)V + (1 - QNh»(-ai(lh)), which implies that i does better to choose {I 2: th , attack} if Wi> -ai(lh) and only if Wi 2: -ai(lh). Second, if Qj-(th) < Q/lh)' then there exists a Wi < -ai(lh) such that type Wi is indifferent (ex ante) between {I > Ih , attack} and {t < th , quit} and thus a measurable set of types Wi '" (Wi' -ai(lh» that strictly prefer {I > Ih' attack} to {I < Ih, quit}. But this is impossible. The action {I > I h , attack} yields Qi!h)V + (1 - Q/lh»Wi' while {Ih + 13, qUit} yields Qj(lh)v + A.(lh + e)wi + (1 - Qilh) - Ailh + ,,»)( -ai(lh + e». If ANh) ,. 1 - Qj(lh), then for small enough 13 > 0, the quit strategy does strictly better for all Wi E Wi. If Ailh) = 1 - QNh)' then all I > Ih are off the equilibrium path. Condition C implies that for I > Ih' F/-a/l); I) = 0, so Q/illh) = 0 in all r(1) for I> Ih' But If j will not quit after Ih' then {I > Ih' attack} cannot be a best reply in the continuation games r(1 > Ih ) for types in Wi. Thus QT(th) < Q/lh) is impossible in any equilibrium with Ih > 0 as the horizon, and the first case must hold. Q.E.D.

4. Suppose Ihal th is Ihe horizon in some equilibrium of r. By observations 2 and 3, for j = 1, 2, ~(t) = 0 for t < tho Thus {t > tlv attack} yields an ex anle expecled payoff of 11i(1, Wi) = Q/I~v + (1 'b(t~)wv while {I < l/v quit} yields U~(t, .) = Qlt)v + (1 - Qlt»( -a,(t». Since U~(t, .) is independenl of w" for all t such Ihal {t, quil} is a besl reply for slale w" U~(t, .) must equal a conslanl (call il k;).

OBSERVATION

Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium of r in which escalation may occur and in which Qi(l) is strictly increasing for all I for some state i. By observation 2, Aj(l) = 0 for all I 2: o(since for all I 2: 0 there exists at'> I such that Qi(t') > Qi(t». And, by observation 4, i's equilibrium expected payoff for {I, quit} is Uf(t, . ) = QP)v + (1 - Q/t))( - am) = ki,

Proof of Proposition 1. From lemma 2, it follows that in any equilibrium with horizon Ih > 0, the ex ante probability that state j chooses {I 2: l/v attack} is 1 Fi -aph»' Thus, using observation 3, Ui(lh - 13,') can be made arbitrarily close to Fi -aNh»v + (1 Fj(-a/lh»)(-ai(lh», which, by consequence, must equal ki• Choose labels such that I; :;; I;. I show first that Ih cannot be strictly greater than I; in any equilibrium. If it were, then state 2' s payoff for {Ih - 13, quit} would be k2 = FI(-al(lh))v + (1 - F1(-al(lh)))(-a2(lh)) < 0, which is impossible. Because A 1(0) = 0, state 2 can assure itself at least 0 by the strategy {O, quit}, and so state 2 would not be willing to choose {I, quit} for any I > 0, contradicting observation 3. Nor can Ih be strictly less than I;. If it were, then both states must expect an eqUilibrium payoff kj = Fi -aNh»v + (1 - Fj( -aNh»)( -ai(lh » > 0 for {I < Ih' quit}. Since for I E Ti, I < Ih, ki = QN)v + (1 Q/I»)( -ai(I», ki > 0 implies that for both states there must exist a I~ 2: 0 such that QN) is atomic at I; and such that Q{I) = 0 for all I < I;. If this were not the case, then fur one state, QP) would require types of j to play {I, quit} when thiS yielded a payoff of 0 or less, which could not be a best reply for any type. Moreover, it must be the case that /1 = I;; if not, then for state i with Ii < Ij, {Ii, quit} yields a payoff less than or equal to zero. But this contradicts observation 1, since in no equilibrium can both states quit with positive probability at the same time. Thus Ih must equal I; in any equilibrium of r and thus, I' > 0 is unique. Q.E.D

implying that Q/I)

ki + a;(t)

= v + a;(t)

(').

However, because AN) = 0 for all I, it must be that lim Qi I", if I" exists) accord with condition C. Proof of Proposition 3 (Skelch). By proposition 1, the horizon must be I' in any equilibrium in which escalation may occur. The only question, then, is whether there are equilibrium distributions on outcomes up to I' that differ from ~(I) and 2Lz(I). Arguments similar to those for observations 1 and 3 establish that any equilibrium quit distributions must be nonatornic and strictly increasing on [0, t'). But ~ (I) and 2Lz(I) are the only nonatomic strictly increasing distributions that make types Wi < -ai(I') willing to quit at any t E [0, I') and also support t' as the horizon.

Notes Presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 1993. Thanks to Atsushi Ishida, Andy Kydd, Robert Powell, Jim Morrow, Matthew Rabin, and Barry Weingast for comments. 1. Studying the "diplomacy of insults," Barry O'Neill (n.d.) independently developed an attrition model of international contests that focuses on this same second feature. 2. For the original discussion of costly signaling in economics, see Spence 1973. On cheap talk (which may be infonnative in some contexts), see Farrell 1988; Crawford and Sobel 1982; Rabin 1990. The crisis signals discussed herein are atypical in that they create costs that are paid only if the signaler takes a certain future action ("backing down") rather than regardless of what the signaler does in the future (as in Spence's classical case). One implication is that these signals can have a commitment (or "bridge-burning") effect. For a discussion of costly signaling in crises, see Fearon 1992, chaps. 3 and 4, and for the seminal treatment of signaling in international relations, see Jervis 1970. 3. For example, the financial costs of sustained mobilization do not appear as a significant factor in the case studies

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18. I assume also that II and /2 are independent, which is most naturally interpreted to mean that uncertainty is about the opponent's cost-benefit ratio for war rather than about military capability. For a discussion of this issue" see Fearon 1993. 19. This interpretation of ulth ) as i's expected utility for {th , quit} is valid only if j neither quits nor attacks with positive probability at th , but the proofs do not depend on the interpretation. 20. If they cannot (e.g., if a,(I) = a,(I) = 0 for all I), then there may not exist an equilibrium in which learning occurs. 21. In the linear case, as the audience-cost rates a l and a2 approach zero, the horizon time t* approaches infinity, meaning that an arbitrarily large amount of delay or escalation is required to credibly signal willingness to fight. 22. In formal terms? the probability that state 1 will back down prior to the horizon time is a2 t*/(v + azt*). The probability that state 2 will do the same? conditional on the crisis occurring (i.e.? lasting longer than t = D)? is aIt*/(v + aIt*). Thus if a1 > ay state 2 is more likely to back down than state I? and vice versa. This result holds for any precrisis beliefs? fl andf,· 23. The probability that state i will fight conditional on a crisis occurring is v/(v + a/ t )? j ~ i, and t* proves to rise as a i falls, implying the result in the text. 24. In the Cold War period the Soviet Union appeared generally more willing than the United States to threaten the use of military force and then back off or moderate on meeting resistance. This, at any rate, is a reading consistent with standard interpretations of the set of major Cold War crises (e.g., Betts 1987; George and Smoke 1974; and Snyder and Diesing 1977). Certainly the United States has used force on many occasions in Latin America and elsewhere, but military probes to gauge other parties' willingness to resist appear uncommon. Maoz and Russett (1992, 253) report that 62% of 271 post-1945 crises between democracies and "autocracies" were initiated by the autocracy-a number that would extremely unlikely to occur if democracies were just as likely to try military probes. 25. Relevant other things will not be equal if democratic leaders tend to have higher (audience) costs for fighting wars than do nondemocratic regimes. Indeed? the same argument that suggests that democratic leaders will suffer more politically for backing down after escalating a crisis suggests that they will be more sensitive to potential war costs. In the model? crises are less likely to escalate to war the greater are the states' costs for fighting (or, equivalently? the lower v). 26. When the distribution of WI is logistic up to WI = O? the probability of war given a crisis (Pr(warlcrisis» increases as at increases above a2 whenever the median value of W t is sufficiently low. For example, let Ft(z) = (1 + exp(-z - m»-l for z < O? and FI(O) = 1. If v = 1, then the result holds whenever m > t which means that the typical state 1 is not willing to run 50% risk of war for the prize. Ultimately? for highly asymmetric situations (very large a1? very small a2 ), Pr(warlcrisis) begins to decrease with a1 in the logistic case. For instance, if v = 1 and m = 5, Pr(warlcrisis) is .045 when a1 = a2 ? and reaches a maximum at.11 when a1 is about 50 times greater than a2 • 27. The probability that state 2 backs down at 1 = 0 is k,lv. A shift in the balance of power (understood as the probability that 1 would win a war) shifts fl to the right and f2 to the left; this has the consequence of increasing k l . An increase in the intensity of state l's interests at stake shifts fl to the right (without affecting f2)' which also has the consequence of increasing k 1 • 28. An important limitation of the attrition model of crises (a limitation common to most other models of" crisis bargaining") is that it gives states only two ways to resolve a dispute peacefully: one side or the other must "back down." While some evidence suggests that many crises in fact have this aspect (Snyder and Diesing 1977? 248), we would like to know why. A natural next step is to consider models with cantin· uous·offer bargaining (e.g. Fearon 1993j Powe111993). 29. There is in fact a large set of different arguments

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lumped under the "security dilemma" heading? but this criticism cannot be pursued here. For a critique of standard "security dilemma" reasoning? see Kydd 1993. 30. Schweller (1992) provides some evidence suggesting that democracies neither engage in nor are the targets of preventive war. Fearon (1993) shows that between rationally led states, preventive war arises from the rising power's inability to commit not to exploit the future bargaining advantage it will have. 31. A similar argument about alliances is developed by Gaubatz (1992), who presents evidence indicating that alliances between democracies last longer than alliances involving nondemocracies. See also Fearon 1992, 355. 32. The refinement is in the spirit of Cho and Kreps (1987) D1 criterion. Even without the refinement, comparative statics results are only marginally weakened for the set of perfect Baysian equilibria of r.

References Banks, Jeffrey. 1990. "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games." American Journal of Political Science 34:579-614. Betts? Richard. 1987. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington: Brookings Institution. Billingsley? Patrick. 1986. Probability and Measure. 2d ed. New York: Wiley & Sons. Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. The Causes of War. New York: Free Press. Blight, James, and David Welch. 1990. On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Noonday. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce? and David Lalman. 1992. War and Reason. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chan, Steve. 1984. "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, ... Are Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 28:617-48. Cho, In-Koo, and David Kreps. 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria." Quarterly Journal of Economics 102:179222. Crawford? Vince, and Joel Sobel. 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission." Econometrica 50:1431-52. Farrell? Joseph. 1988. "Communication, Coordination, and Nash Equilibrium." Economic Letters 27:209-14. Fearon, James. 1990. "Deterrence and the Spiral Model: The Role of Costly Signals in Crisis Bargaining." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association? San FranCisco. Fearon, James. 1992. "Threats to Use Force: The Role of Costly Signals in International Crises." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley. Fearon? James. 1993. "Rationalist Explanations for War." Presented at the 1993 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association? Washington. Fudenberg? Drew? and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Gaubautz, Kurt Taylor. 1992. "Democratic States and Com· mitment in International Relations." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago. Gelb, Leslie, and Richard Betts. 1979. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington: Brookings Institution. George? Alexander L.? and Richard Smoke. 1974. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press. Glaser? Charles. 1992. "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models." World Polilics 44:497-538. Herz, John. 1950. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma." World Politics 2:157-74. Higonnet, P. L. R. 1968. "The Origins of the Seven Years' War." Journal of Modern Hislory 40:57-90. Howard, Michael. 1983. The Causes of Wars. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Norris, j. M. 1955. "The Policy of the British Cabinet in the Nootka Crisis." English Historical Reoiew 7G:562-S0. O'Neill, Barry. N.d. "The Diplomacy of Insulls." In Signals, Symbols, and War. Forthcoming.

jervis, Robert. 1970. The Logic of ImJJges in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. jervis, Robert. 1971. "Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics." In Nomos: Coercion, ed. j. Roland Pennock and j. Chapman. Chicago: Aldine.

Powell" Robert. 1985. "The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence." Political Science Quarterly 100:75-%.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. "'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30:167-214.

Powell, Robert. 1990. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Problem of Credibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Powell, Robert. 1993. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power." University of California at Berkeley. Typescript.

Jervis, Robert, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: johns Hopkins University Press.

Katz, Michael. 1991. "Game Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments." Rand Journal oj Economics

Rabin, Matthew. 1990. "Communication between Rational Agents." Journal of Economic Theory 51:144-70. Russett" Bruce. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles fen' a Post-Cold War World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schweller, Randolph. 1992. "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics 44:235-69. Shimshoni, Jonathan. 1988. Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Smoke, Richard. 1977. War: Controlling Escalation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Snyder, Glenn, and Paul Diesing. 1977. Conflict among Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Spence, A. MichaeL 1973. "job Market Signalling." Quarterly Journal of Economics 87:355-74. Tirole, jean. 1989. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Trachtenberg, Marc. 1991. History and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wagner" R. Harrison. 1989. "Uncertainty" Rational Learning, and Bargaining in the Cuban Missile Crisis." In Models of

22:307-28.

Kilgour, D. Marc. 1991. "Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior: A Game-theoretic Approach." Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:266-M. Kreps, David, and Robert Wilson. 1982. "Sequential Equilibrium." Econometrica 50:863-94. Kydd, Andrew. 1993. "The Security Dilemma, Game Theory, and World War I." Presented at the 1993 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington. Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. Between Peace and War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Manning, William Ray. 1904. "The Nootka Sound Controversy." Annual Report of the American Historical Association. Washington: GPO. Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. 1992. "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict among Democracies a Statistical Artifactf' International Interactions 17:245-67. Martin" Lisa. 1993. "Credibility" Costs" and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions." World Politics 45:406-32. Maxwell, Stephen. 1968. Riltionality in Deterrence. Adelphi

Paper No. SO. London: Institute for Strategic Studies. Maynard Smith, john. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Morgenthau" Hans. 1956. Politics among Nations" 2d ed. New York: Knopf.

Strategic Choice in Politics, ed. Peter Ordeshook. Ann Arbor:

University of Michigan Press. Wagner" R. Harrison. 1991. "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies" and the Incentive to Strike First." American Political Science Reoiew 85:727-49. Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading,

Morrow" James D. 1989. "Capabilities" Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining." American Journal of Political Science 33:941-72. Nalebuff, Barry. 1956. "Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deter-

rence: The Neutrality of Escalation." Conflict Management and Peace Science 9:19--30.

MA: Addison-Wesley.

James D_ Fearon is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637.

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[10] LIBERALISM AND WORLD POLITICS MICHAEL W. DOYLE Johns Hopkins University Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their foreign policy. I look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter, a democratic capitalist whose explanation of liberal pacifism we often invoke; Machiavelli, a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism we often practice; and Kant, a liberal republican whose theory of internationalism best accounts for what we are. Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find, with Kant and other democratic republicans, that liberalism does leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. They are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant's internationalism are not arbitrary. They are rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the state.

Promoting freedom will produce peace, we have often been told. In a speech before the British Parliament in June of 1982, President Reagan proclaimed that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their foreign policy. He then announced a "crusade for freedom" and a "campaign for democratic development" (Reagan, June 9, 1982). In making these claims the president joined a long list of liberal theorists (and propagandists) and echoed an old argument: the aggressive instincts of authoritarian leaders and totalitarian ruling parties make for war. Liberal states, founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war this argument asserts. When the citizens who bear the burdens of war

elect their governments, wars become impossible. Furthermore, citizens appreciate that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed only under conditions of peace. Thus the very existence of liberal states, such as the U.S., Japan, and our European allies, makes for peace. Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine the liberal claim President Reagan reiterated for us. I look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter, a brilliant explicator of the liberal pacifism the president invoked; Machiavelli, a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism we often practice; and Kant. Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find, with Kant and other liberal republicans, that liberalism does leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80 different. They are indeed peaceful, yet they are also prone to make war, as the u.s. and our "freedom fighters" are now doing, not so covertly, against Nicaragua. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant's liberal internationalism are not arbitrary but rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the state.

liberal Pacifism There is no canonical description of liberalism. What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics-for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunitythat most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all. Joseph Schumpeter clearly fits within this family when he considers the international effects of capitalism and democracy. Schum peter's "Sociology of Imperialisms," published in 1919, made a coherent and sustained argument concerning the pacifying (in the sense of nonaggressive) effects of liberal institutions and principles (Schumpeter, 1955; see also Doyle, 1986, pp. 155-59). Unlike some of the earlier liberal theorists who focused on a single feature such as trade (Montesquieu, 1949, vol. 1, bk. 20, chap. 1) or failed to examine critically the arguments they were advancing, Schumpeter saw the interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation of liberal pacifism, and he tested his arguments in a sociology of historical imperialisms. He defines imperialism as "an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion"

(Schumpeter, 1955, p. 6). Excluding imperialisms that were mere "catchwords" and those that were "object-ful" (e.g., defensive imperialism), he traces the roots of objectless imperialism to three sources, each an atavism. Modern imperialism, according to Schumpeter, resulted from the combined impact of a "war machine," warlike instincts, and export monopolism. Once necessary, the war machine later developed a life of its own and took control of a state's foreign policy: "Created by the wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required" (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 25). Thus, Schumpeter tells us that the army of ancient Egypt, created to drive the Hyksos out of Egypt, took over the state and pursued militaristic imperialism. Like the later armies of the courts of absolutist Europe, it fought wars for the sake of glory and booty, for the sake of warriors and monarchs-wars gratia warriors. A warlike disposition, elsewhere called "instinctual elements of bloody primitivism," is the natural ideology of a war machine. It also exists independently; the Persians, says Schumpeter (1955, pp. 25-32), were a warrior nation from the outset. Under modern capitalism, export monopolists, the third source of modern imperialism, push for imperialist expansion as a way to expand their closed markets. The absolute monarchies were the last clear-cut imperialisms. Nineteenth-century imperialisms merely represent the vestiges of the imperialisms created by Louis XIV and Catherine the Great. Thus, the export monopolists are an atavism of the absolute monarchies, for they depend completely .on the tariffs imposed by the monarchs and their militaristic successors for revenue (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 82-83). Without tariffs, monopolies would be eliminated by foreign competition. Modern (nineteenth century) imperi-

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1986 Liberalism and World Politics alism, therefore, rests on an atavistic war machine, militaristic attitudes left over from the days of monarchical wars, and export monopolism, which is nothing more than the economic residue of monarchical finance. In the modern era, imperialists gratify their private interests. From the national perspective, their imperialistic wars are objectless. Schumpeter's theme now emerges. Capitalism and democracy are forces for peace. Indeed, they are antithetical to imperialism. For Schumpeter, the further development of capitalism and democracy means that imperialism will inevitably disappear. He mainr.i1ns that capitalism produces an unwarlike disposition; its populace is "democratized, individualized, rationalized" (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 68). The people's energies are daily absorbed in production. The disciplines of industry and the market train people in "economic rationalism"; the instability of industrial life necessitates calculation. Capitalism also "individualizes"; "subjective opportunities" replace the "immutable factors" of traditional, hierarchical society. Rational individuals demand democratic governance. Democratic capitalism leads to peace. As evidence, Schumpeter claims that throughout the capitalist world an opposition has arisen to "war, expansion, cabinet diplomacy"; that contemporary capitalism is associated with peace parties; and that the industrial worker of capitalism is "vigorously anti-imperialist." In addition, he points out that the capitalist world has developed means of preventing war, such as the Hague Court and that the least feudal, most capitalist societythe United States-has demonstrated the least imperialistic tendencies (SchumpeteJ; 1955, pp. 95-96). An example of the lack of imperialistic tendencies in the U.S., Schumpeter thought, was our leaving over half of Mexico unconquered in the war of 1846-48. 1153

Schumpeter's explanation for liberal pacifism is quite simple: Only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from wars. No democracy would pursue a minority interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism. When free trade prevails, fIno class" gains from forcible expansion because foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as accessible to each nation as though they were in its own territory. Where the cultural backwardness of a region makes normal economic intercourse dependent on colonization it does not matter, assuming free trade, which of the "civilized" nations undertakes the task of colonization. (Schumpeter, 1955, pp. 75-76)

Schumpeter's arguments are difficult to evaluate. In partial tests of quasiSchumpeterian propositions, Michael Haas (1974, pp. 464-65) discovered a cluster that associates democracy, development, and sustained modernization with peaceful conditions. However, M. Small and J. D. Singer (1976) have discovered that there is no clearly negative correlation between democracy and war in the period 1816-1965-the period that would be central to Schumpeter's argument (see also Wilkenfeld, 1968, Wright, 1942, p. 841). Later in his career, in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter, (1950, pp. 127-28) acknowledged that "almost purely bourgeois commonwealths were often aggressive when it seemed to pay-like the Athenian or the Venetian commonwealths." Yet he stuck to his pacifistic guns, restating the view that capitalist democracy "steadily tells . . . against the use of military force and for peaceful arrangements, even when the balance of pecuniary advantage is clearly on the side of war which, under modern circumstances, is not in general very likely" (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 128).1 A recent study by R. J. Rummel (1983) of '1ibertarianism" and international violence is the closest test Schumpeterian pacifism has received. "Free" states (those enjoying

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80 political and economic freedom) were shown to have considerably less conflict at or above the level of economic sanctions than "nonfree" states. The free states, the partly free states (including the democratic socialist countries such as Sweden), and the nonfree states accounted for 24 %, 26%, and 61 %, respectively, of the international violence during the period examined. These effects are impressive but not conclusive for the Schumpeterian thesis. The data are limited, in this test, to the period 1976 to 1980. It includes, for example, the Russo-Afghan War, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China's invasion of Vietnam, and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda but just misses the U.S., quasi-covert intervention in Angola (1975) and our not so covert war against Nicaragua (1981-). More importantly, it excludes the cold war period, with its numerous interventions, and the long history of colonial wars (the Boer War, the Spanish-American War, the Mexican Intervention, etc.) that marked the history of liberal, including democratic capitalist, states (Doyle, 1983b; Chan, 1984; Weede, 1984). The discrepancy between the warlike history of liberal states and Schumpeter's pacifistic expectations highlights three extreme assumptions. First, his "materialistic monism" leaves little room for noneconomic objectives, whether espoused by states or individuals. Neither glory, nor prestige, nor ideological justification, nor the pure power of ruling shapes policy. These nonmaterial goals leave little room for positive-sum gains, such as the comparative advantages of trade. Second, and relatedly, the same is true for his states. The political life of individuals seems to have been homogenized at the same time as the individuals were "rationalized, individualized, and democratized." Citizens-capitalists and workers, rural and urban-seek material welfare. Schumpeter seems to presume

that ruling makes no difference. He also presumes that no one is prepared to take those measures (such as stirring up foreign quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling coalition) that enhance one's political power, despite deterimental effects on mass welfare. Third, like domestic politics, world politics are homogenized. Materially monistic and democratically capitalist, all states evolve toward free trade and liberty together. Countries differently constituted seem to disappear from Schumpeter's analysis. "Civilized" nations govern "culturally backward" regions. These assumptions are not shared by Machiavelli's theory of liberalism.

Liberal Imperialism Machiavelli argues, not only that republics are not pacifistic, but that they are the best form of state for imperial expansion. Establishing a republic fit for imperial expansion is, moreover, the best way to guarantee the survival of a state. Machiavelli's republic is a classical mixed republic. It is not a democracywhich he thought would quickly degenerate into a tyranny-but is characterized by social equality, popular liberty, and political participation (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 112; see also Huliung, , 1983, chap. 2; Mansfield, 1970; Pocock, 1975, pp. 198-99; Skinner, 1981, chap. 3). The consuls serve as "kings," the senate as an aristocracy managing the state, and the people in the assembly as the source of strength. Liberty results from "disunion" -the competition and necessity for compromise required by the division of powers among senate, consuls, and tribunes (the last representing the common people). Liberty also results from the popular veto. The powerful few threaten the rest with tyranny, Machiavelli says, because they seek to dominate. The mass demands not to be dominated, and their

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1986 Liberalism and World Politics veto thus preserves the liberties of the state (Machiavelli, 1950, bk.l, chap. 5, p. 122). However, since the people and the rulers have different social characters, the people need to be "managed" by the few to avoid having their recklessness overturn or their fecklessness undermine the ability of the state to expand (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 53, pp. 249-50). Thus the senate and the consuls plan expansion, consult oracles, and employ religion to manage the resources that the energy of the people supplies. Strength, and then imperial expansion, results from the way liberty encourages increased population and property, which grow when the citizens know their lives and goods are secure from arbitrary seizure. Free citizens equip large armies and provide soldiers who fight for public glory and the common good because these are, in fact, their own (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 2, chap. 2, pp. 287-90). If you seek the honor of having your state expand, Machiavelli advises, you should organize it as a free and popular republic like Rome, rather than as an aristocratic republic like Sparta or Venice. Expansion thus calls for a free republic. "Necessity" -political survival-calls for expansion. If a stable aristocratic republic is forced by foreign conflict "to extend her territory, in such a case we shall see her foundations give way and herself quickly brought to ruin"; if, on the other hand, domestic security prevails, "the continued tranquility would enervate her, or provoke internal disensions, which together, or either of them seperately, will apt to prove her ruin" (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 6, p. 129). Machiavelli therefore believes it is necessary to take the constitution of Rome, rather than that of Sparta or Venice, as our model. Hence, this belief leads to liberal imperialism. We are lovers of glory, Machiavelli announces. We seek to rule or, at least, to avoid being oppressed. In

either case, we want more for ourselves and our states than just material welfare (materialistic monism). Because other states with similar aims thereby threaten us, we prepare ourselves for expansion. Because our fellow citizens threaten us if we do not allow them either to satisfy their ambition or to release their political energies through imperial expansion, we expand. There is considerable historical evidence for liberal imperialism. Machiavelli's (Polybius's) Rome and Thucydides' Athens both were imperial republics in the Machiavellian sense (Thucydides, 1954, bk. 6). The historical record of numerous U.S. interventions in the postwar period supports Machiavelli's argument (Aron, 1973, chaps. 3-4; Barnet, 1968, chap. 11), but the current record of liberal pacifism, weak as it is, calls some of his insights into question. To the extent that the modem populace actually controls (and thus unbalances) the mixed republic, its diffidence may outweigh elite ("senatorial") aggressiveness. We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism-pacifism and imperialismindicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics. Before we accept either conclusion, however, we must consider a third apparent regularity of modem world politics.

Liberal Internationalism Modem liberalism carries with it two legacies. They do not affect liberal states separately, according to whether they are pacifistic or imperialistic, but simultaneously. The first of these legacies is the pacification of foreign relations among liberal

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80 states. 2 During the nineteenth century, the United States and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife; however, after the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual representation as the formal source of the sovereignty of the British parliament, Britain and the United States negotiated their disputes. They negotiated despite, for example, British grievances during the Civil War against the North's blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties. Despite severe AngloFrench colonial rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain formed an entente against illiberal Germany before World War I. And from 1914 to 1915, Italy, the liberal member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its obligations under that treaty to support its allies. Instead, Italy joined in an alliance with Britain and France, which prevented it from having to fight other liberal states and then declared war on Germany and Austria. Despite generations of Anglo-American tension and Britain's wartime restrictions on American trade with Germany, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917 before entering World War Ion their side. Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the "pacific federation" or "pacific union," has begun to be established among liberal societies. More than 40 liberal states currently make up the union. Most are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on every continent, as Appendix 1 indicates. Here the predictions of liberal pacifists (and President Reagan) are borne out: liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint, and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a solid foundation for the United States' crucial alliances with the liberal powers, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and our Japanese alliance. This foundation appears to be impervious

to the quarrels with our allies that bedeviled the Carter and Reagan administrations. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states, and as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest. Of course, the probability of the outbreak of war in any given year between any two given states is low. The occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, would be more probable. The apparent absence of war between liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost 200 years thus may have significance. Similar claims cannot be made for feudal, fascist, communist, authoritarian, or totalitarian forms of rule (Doyle, 1983a, pp. 222), nor for pluralistic or merely similar societies. More significant perhaps is that when states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states all wind up on the same side despite the complexity of the paths that take them there. These characteristics do not prove that the peace among liberals is statistically significant nor that liberalism is the sole valid explanation for the peace. 3 They do suggest that we consider the possibility that liberals have indeed established a separate peace-but only among themselves. Liberalism also carries with it a 'second legacy: international "imprudence" (Hume, 1963, pp. 346-47). Peaceful restraint only seems to work in liberals' relations with other liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with nonliberal states. (For a list of international wars since 1816 see Appendix 2.) Many of these wars have been defensive and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have been attacked and threatened by nonliberal states that do not exercise any special restraint in their dealings with the liberal states.

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1986 Liberalism and World Politics Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, interest, and pure fear of what other states might do all lead states toward war. War and conquest have thus characterized the careers of many authoritarian rulers and ruling parties, from Louis XIV and Napoleon to Mussolini's fascists, Hitler's Nazis, and Stalin's communists. Yet we cannot simply blame warfare on the authoritarians or totalitarians, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us do. 4 Most wars arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of World War I. However, aggression by the liberal state has also characterized a large number of wars. Both France and Britain fought expansionist colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought a similar war with Mexico from 1846 to 1848, waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign states many times before and after World War II. Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display striking distrust in dealings with powerful nonliberal states (Doyle, 1983b). Neither realist (statist) nor Marxist theory accounts well for these two legacies. While they can account for aspects of certain periods of international stability (Aron, 1968, pp. 151-54; Russett, 1985), neither the logic of the balance of power nor the logic of international hegemony explains the separate peace maintained for more than 150 years among states sharing one particular form of governance-liberal principles and institutions. Balance-of-power theory expects-indeed is premised upon-flexible arrangements of geostrategic rivalry that include preventive war. Hegemonies wax and wane, but the liberal peace holds. Marxist "ultra-imperialists" expect a form 1157

of peaceful rivalry among capitalists, but only liberal capitalists maintain peace. Leninists expect liberal capitalists to be aggressive toward nonliberal states, but they also (and especially) expect them to be imperialistic toward fellow liberal capitalists. Kant's theory of liberal internationalism helps us understand these two legacies. The importance of Immanuel Kant as a theorist of international ethics has been well appreciated (Armstrong, 1931; Friedrich, 1948; Gallie, 1978, chap. 1; Galston, 1975; Hassner, 1972; Hinsley, 1967, chap. 4; Hoffmann, 1965; Waltz, 1962; Williams, 1983), but Kant also has an important analytical theory of international politics. Perpetual Peace, written in 1795 (Kant, 1970, pp. 93-130), helps us understand the interactive nature of international relations. Kant tries to teach us methodologically that we can study neither the systemic relations of states nor the varieties of state behavior in isolation from each other. Substantively, he anticipates for us the ever-widening pacification of a liberal pacific union, explains this pacification, and at the same time suggests why liberal states are not pacific in their relations with nonliberal states. Kant argues that perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of three "definitive articles" of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles in a metaphorical "treaty" of perpetual peace he asks them to sign, perpetual peace will have been established. The First Definitive Article requires the civil constitution of the state to be republican. By republican Kant means a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. A private property and market-oriented economy partially addressed that dilemma in the private sphere. The public, or political, sphere was more troubling. His answer was a republic that preserved juridical

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80 freedom-the legal equality of citizens as subjects-on the basis of a representative government with a separation of powers. Juridical freedom is preserved because the morally autonomous individual is by means of representation a self-legislator making laws that apply to all citizens equally, including himself· or herself. Tyranny is avoided because the individual is subject to laws he or she does not also administer (Kant, PP, pp. 99102; Riley, 1985, chap. 5).5 Liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation, or union (foedus pacificum), described in Kant's Second Definitive Article. The pacific union will establish peace within a federation of free states and securely maintain the rights of each state. The world will not have achieved the "perpetual peace" that provides the ultimate guarantor of republican freedom until "a late stage and after many unsuccessful attempts" (Kant, UH, p. 47). At that time, all nations will have learned the lessons of peace through right conceptions of the appropriate constitution, great and sad experience, and good will. Only then will individuals enjoy perfect republican rights or the full guarantee of a global and just peace. In the meantime, the "pacific federation" of liberal republics-"an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war" -brings within it more and more republics-despite republican collapses, backsliding, and disastrous warscreating an ever-expanding separate peace (Kant, PP, p. 105).6 Kant emphasizes that it can be shown that this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality. For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by nature inclined to seek peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually

spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind. (Kant, PP p. 104)

The pacific union is not a single peace treaty ending one war, a world state, nor a state of nations. Kant finds the first insufficient. The second and third are impossible or potentially tyrannical. National sovereignty precludes reliable subservience to a state of nations; a world state destroys the civic freedom on which the development of human capacities rests (Kant, UH, p. 50). Although Kant obliquely refers to various classical interstate confederations and modern diplomatic congresses, he develops no systematic organizational embodiment of this treaty and presumably does not find institutionalization necessary (Riley, 1983, chap. 5;. Schwarz, 1962, p. 77). He appears to have in mind a mutual nonaggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement, and the cosmopolitan law set forth in the Third Definitive Article. 7 The Third Definitive Article establishes a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. The cosmopolitan law "shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality." In this Kant calls for the recognition of the "right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory." This "does not extend beyond those conditions which make it possible for them [foreigners) to attempt to enter into relations [commerce) with the native inhabitants" (Kant, PP, p. 106). Hospitality does not require extending to foreigners either the right to citizenship or the right to settlement, unless the foreign visitors would perish if they were expelled. Foreign conquest and plunder also find no justification under this right. Hospitality does appear to include the right of access and the obligation of maintaining the opportunity for citizens to exchange goods and ideas without imposing the obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all cases under liberal constitutions).

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1986 Liberalism and World Politics Perpetual peace, for Kant, is an epistemology, a condition for ethical action, and, most importantly, an explanation of how the "mechanical process of nature visibly exhibits the purposive plan of producing concord among men, even against their will and indeed by means of their very discord" (Kant, PP, p. 108; UR, pp. 44-45). Understanding history requires an epistemological foundation, for without a teleology, such as the promise of perpetual peace, the complexity of history would overwhelm human understanding (Kant, UR, pp. 51-53). Perpetual peace, however, is not merely a heuristic device with which to interpret history. It is guaranteed, Kant explains in the "First Addition" to Perpetual Peace ("On the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace"), to result from men fulfilling their ethical duty or, failing that, from a hidden plan. 8 Peace is an ethical duty because it is only under conditions of peace that all men can treat each other as ends, rather than means to an end (Kant, UR, p. 50; Murphy, 1970, chap. 3). In order for this duty to be practical, Kant needs, of course, to show that peace is in fact possible. The widespread sentiment of approbation that he saw aroused by the early success of the French revolutionaries showed him that we can indeed be moved by ethical sentiments with a cosmopolitan reach (Kant, CF, pp. 181-82; Yovel, 1980, pp. 153-54). This does not mean, however, that perpetual peace is certain ("prophesiable"). Even the scientifically regular course of the planets could be changed by a wayward comet striking them out of orbit. Human freedom requires that we allow for much greater reversals in the course of history. We must, in fact, anticipate the possibility of backsliding and destructive warsthough these will serve to educate nations to the importance of peace (Kant, UR, pp.

47-48).

In the end, however, our guarantee of perpetual peace does not rest on ethical conduct. As Kant emphasizes, 1159

we now come to the essential question regarding the prospect of perpetual peace. What does nature do in relation to the end which man's own reason prescribes to him as a duty, i.e. how does nature help to promote his moral purpose? And how does nature guarantee that what man ought to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not do) will in fact be done through nature's compulsion, without prejudice to the free agency of man? ... This does not mean that nature imposes on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be imposed by practical reason. On the contrary, nature does it herself, whether we are willing or not: facta volentem ducunt, nolentem tradunt. (PP, p.112)

The guarantee thus rests, Kant argues, not on the probable behavior of moral angels, but on that of "devils, so long as they possess understanding" (PP, p. 112). In explaining the sources of each of the three definitive articles of the perpetual peace, Kant then tells us how we (as free and intelligent devils) could be motivated by fear, force, and calculated advantage to undertake a course of action whose outcome we could reasonably anticipate to be perpetual peace. Yet while it is possible to conceive of the Kantian road to peace in these terms, Kant himself recognizes and argues that social evolution also makes the conditions of moral behavior less onerous and hence more likely (CF, pp. 187-89; Kelly, 1969, pp. 106-13). In tracing the effects of both political and moral development, he builds an account of why liberal states do maintain peace among themselves and of how it will (by implication, has) come about that the pacific union will expand. He also explains how these republics would engage in wars with nonrepublics and therefore suffer the "sad experience" of wars that an ethical policy might have avoided. The first source of the three definitive articles derives from a political evolution-from a constitutional law. Nature (providence) has seen to it that human beings can live in all the regions where they have been driven to settle by wars. (Kant, who once taught geography, reports on the Lapps, the Samoyeds, the Pescheras.)

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80 "Asocial sociability" draws men together to fulfill needs for security and material welfare as it drives them into conflicts over the distribution and control of social products (Kant, UH, p. 44-45; PP, pp. 110-11). This violent natural evolution tends towards the liberal peace because "asocial sociability" inevitably leads toward republican governments, and republican governments are a source of the liberal peace. Republican representation and separatiop. of powers are produced because they are the means by which the state is "organized well" to prepare for and meet foreign threats (by unity) and to tame the ambitions of selfish and aggressive individuals (by authority derived from representation, by general laws, and by nondespotic administration) (Kant, PP, pp. 112-13). States that are not organized in this fashion fail. Monarchs thus encourage commerce and private property in order to increase national wealth. They cede rights of representation to their subjects in order to strengthen their political support or to obtain willing grants of tax revenue (Hassner, 1972, pp. 583-86). Kant shows how republics, once established, lead to peaceful relations. he argues that once the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies are tamed and the habit of respect for individual rights engrained by republican government, wars would appear as the disaster to the people's welfare that he and the other liberals thought them to be. The fundamental reason is this: If, as is inevitability the case under this constitution, the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war should be declared, it is very natural that they will have a great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting themselves, supplying the costs of the war from their own resources, painfully making good the ensuing devastation, and, as the crowning evil, having to take upon themselves a burden of debts which will embitter peace itself and which can never be paid off on account of the COnstant

threat of new wars. But under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the head of state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, and war will not force him to make the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned. He can thus decide on war, without any significant reason, as a kind of amusement, and unconcernedly leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are always ready for such pruposes) to justify the war for the sake of propriety. (Kant, pp, p. 100)

Yet these domestic republican restraints do not end war. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case. They do introduce republican caution-Kant's "hesitation" -in place of monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes. The historical liberal legacy is laden with popular wars fought to promote freedom, to protect private property, or to support liberal allies against nonliberal enemies. Kant's position is ambiguous. He regards these wars as unjust and warns liberals of their susceptibility to them (Kant, PP, p. 106). At the same time, Kant argues that each nation "can and ought to" demand that its neighboring nations enter into the pacific union of liberal states (PP, p. 102). Thus to see how the pacific union removes the occasion of wars among liberal states and not wars between liberal and nonliberal' states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law, Kant's second source. Complementing the consfitutional guarantee of caution, international law adds a second source for the definitive articles: a guarantee of respect. The separation of nations that asocial sociability encourages is reinforced by the development of separate languages and religions. These further guarantee a world of separate states-an essential condition needed to avoid a "global, soul-less despotism." Yet, at the same time, they also morally integrate liberal states: "as culture grows and men gradually move .towards greater agreement over their

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1986 Liberalism and World Politics principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace" (Kant, PP, p. 114). As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the electors they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples is essential to establishing and preserving the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends. Domestically just republics, which rest on consent, then presume foreign republics also to be consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial. At the same time, liberal states assume that nonliberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because nonliberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate; each, however, may also be self-confirming. Lastly, cosmopolitan law adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the "spirit of commerce" sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus impelling states to promote peace and to try to avert war. Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a 1161

cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would have been under autarky; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the other to break these economic ties. Because keeping open markets rests upon the assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid securitymotivated searches for economic autarky. Thus, avoiding a challenge to another liberal state's security or even enhancing each other's security by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence. A further cosmopolitan source of liberal peace is the international market's removal of difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes, and states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. The interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of state officials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. According to modem liberal scholars, international financiers and transnational and transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of accommodation. Moreover, their variety has ensured that no single conflict sours an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation (Brzezinski and Huntington, 1963, chap. 9; Keohane and Nye, 1977, chap. 7; Neustadt, 1970; Polanyi, 1944, chaps. 1-2). Conversely, a sense of suspicion, such as that characterizing relations between liberal and nonliberal governments, can lead to restrictions on the range of contacts between societies, and this can increase the prospect that a single conflict will deter-

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80 mine an entire relationship. No single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient, but together (and only together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace. Alliances founded on mutual strategic interest among liberal and nonliberal states have been broken; economic ties between liberal and nonliberal states have proven fragile; but the political bonds of liberal rights and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual nonaggression. A separate peace exists among liberal states. In their relations with nonliberal states, however, liberal states have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole. Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies.

Conclusion Kant's liberal internationalism, Machiavelli's liberal imperialism, and Schumpeter's liberal pacifism rest on fundamentally different views of the nature of the human being, the state, and international relations. 9 Schumpeter's humans are rationalized, individualized, and democratized. They are also homogenized, pursuing material interests "monistically." Because their material interests lie in peaceful trade, they and the democratic state that these fellow citizens control are pacifistic. Machiavelli's citizens are splendidly diverse in their goals but fundamentally unequal in them as well, seeking to rule or fearing being dominated. Extending the rule of the dominant elite or avoiding the political collapse of their state, each calls for imperial expansion. 1162

Kant's citizens, too, are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means. The Kantian state thus is governed publicly according to law, as a republic. Kant's is the state that solves the problem of governing individualized equals, whether they are the "rational devils" he says we often find ourselves to be or the ethical agents we can and should become. Republics tell us that in order to organize a group of rational beings who together require universal laws for their survival, but of whom each separate individual is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, the constitution must be so designed so that, although the citizens are opposed to one another in their private attitudes, these opposing views may inhibit one another in such a way that the public conduct of the citizens will be the same as if they did not have such evil attitudes. (Kant, pp, p. 113)

Unlike Machiavelli's republics, Kant's republics are capable of achieving peace among themselves because they exercise democratic caution and are capable of appreciating the international rights of foreign republics. These international rights of republics derive from the representation of foreign individuals, who are our moral equals. Unlike Schumpeter's capitalist democracies, Kant's republics-including our own-remain in a state of war with nonrepublics. Liberal republics see themselves as threatened by aggression from nonrepublics that are not constrained by representation. Even though wars often cost more than the economic return they generate, liberal republics also are prepared to protect and promote-sometimes forcibly-democracy, private property, and the rights of individuals overseas against nonrepublics, which, because they do not authentically represent the rights of individuals, have no rights to noninterference. These wars may liberate oppressed individuals

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1986 Liberalism and World Politics overseas; they also can generate enormous suffering. Preserving the legacy of the liberal peace without succumbing to the legacy of liberal imprudence is both a moral and a strategic challenge. The bipolar stability of the international system, and the near certainty of mutual devastation resulting from a nuclear war between the superpowers, have created a "crystal ball effect" that has helped to constrain the tendency toward miscalculation present at the outbreak of so many wars in the past (Carnesale, Doty, Hoffmann, Huntington, Nye, and Sagan, 1983, p. 44; Waltz, 1964). However, this "nuclear peace" appears to be limited to the superpowers. It has not curbed military interventions in the Third World. Moreover, it is subject to a desperate technological race designed to overcome its constraints and to crises that have pushed even the superpowers to the brink of war. We must still reckon with the war fevers and moods of appeasement that have almost alternately swept liberal democracies. Yet restraining liberal imprudence, whether aggressive or passive, may not be possible without threatening liberal pacification. Improving the strategic acumen of our foreign policy calls for in-

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troducing steadier strategic calculations of the national interest in the long run and more flexible responses to changes in the international political environment. Constraining the indiscriminate meddling of our foreign interventions calls for a deeper appreciation of the "particularism of history, culture, and membership" (Walzer, 1983, p. 5), but both the improvement in strategy and the constraint on intervention seem, in turn, to require an executive freed from the restraints of a representative legislature in the management of foreign policy and a political culture indifferent to the universal rights of individuals. These conditions. in their turn, could break the chain of constitutional guarantees, the respect for representative government, and the web of transnational contact that have sustained the pacific union of liberal states. Perpetual peace, Kant says, is the end point of the hard journey his republics will take. The promise of perpetual peace, the violent lessons of war, and the experience of a partial peace are proof of the need for and the possibility of world peace. They are also the grounds for moral citizens and statesmen to assume the duty of striving for peace.

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80 Appendix 1. Liberal Regimes and the Pacific Union, 1700-1982 Period

Period

Period

18th Century Swiss Cantons' French Republic, 1790-1795 United States,' 1776Total = 3

1900-1945 (cont.) Italy, -1922 Belgium, -1940 Netherlands, -1940 Argentina, -1943 France, -1940 Chile, -1924, 1932Australia, 1901 Norway, 1905-1940 New Zealand, 1907Colombia, 1910-1949 Denmark, 1914-1940 Poland, 1917-1935 Latvia, 1922-1934 Germany, 1918-1932 Austria, 1918-1934 Estonia, 1919-1934 Finland,1919Uruguay, 1919Costa Rica, 1919Czechoslovakia, 1920-1939 Ireland, 1920Mexico, 1928Lebanon, 1944Total = 29

1945- (cont.) Costa Rica, -1948; 1953Iceland, 1944France, 1945Denmark,1945 Norway, 1945 Austria, 1945Brazil, 1945-1954; 1955-1964 Belgium, 1946Luxemburg, 1946Netherlands, 1946Italy, 1946Philippines, 1946-1972 India, 1947-1975, 1977Sri Lanka, 1948-1961; 1963-1971; 1978Ecuador, 1948-1963; 1979Israel, 1949West Germany, 1949Greece, 1950-1967; 1975Peru, 1950-1962; 1963-1968; 1980EI Salvador, 1950-1961 Turkey, 1950-1960; 1966-1971 Japan, 1951Bolivia, 1956-1969; 1982Colombia, 1958Venezuela, 1959Nigeria, 1961-1964; 1979-1984 Jamaica, 1962Trinidad and Tobago, 1962Senegal,1963Malaysia, 1963Botswana, 1966Singapore, 1965Portugal, 1976Spain, 1978Dominican Republic, 1978Honduras, 1981Papua New Guinea, 1982Total = 50

1800-1850 Swiss Confederation United States France, 1830-1849 Belgium, 1830Great Britain, 1832Netherlands, 1848Piedmont, 1848Denmark, 1849Total = 8 1850-1900 Switzerland United States Belgium Great Britain Netherlands Piedmont, -1861 Italy, 1861Denmark, -1866 Sweden, 1864Greece, 1864Canada, 1867France, 1871Argentina, 1880Chile, 1891Total = 13 1900-1945 Switzerland United States Great Britain Sweden Canada Greece, -1911; 1928-1936

1945-b Switzerland United States Great Britain Sweden Canada Australia New Zealand Finland Ireland Mexico Uruguay, -1973 Chile, -1973 Lebanon, -1975

Note: I have drawn up this approximate list of "Liberal Regimes" according to the four institutions Kant described as essential: market and private property economies; polities that are externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical rights; and "republican" (whether republican or parliamentary monarchy), representative government. This latter includes the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy and be formally and competitively (either inter- or intra-party) elected. Furthermore, I have taken into account whether male suffrage is wide (i.e., 30%) or, as Kant (MM, p. 139) would have had it, open by "achievement" to inhabitants of the national or metropolitan territory (e.g., to poll-tax payers or householders). This list of liberal regimes is thus more inclusive than a list of democratic regimes, or polyarchies (Powell, 1982, p. 5). Other conditions taken into account here are that female suffrage is granted within a generation of its being demanded by an extensive female suffrage movement and that representative government is internally sovereign (e.g., including, and especially over military and foreign affairs) as well as stable (in existence for at least three years). Sources for these data are Banks and Overstreet (1983), Gastil (1985), The Europa Yearbook, 1985 (1985), Langer (1968), U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1980), and U.S.

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1986 Liberalism and World Politics Department of State (1981). Finally, these lists exclude ancient and medieval "republics," since none appears to fit Kant's commitment to liberal individualism (Holmes, 1979). "There are domestic variations within these liberal regimes: Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout. bSelected list, excludes liberal regimes with populations less than one million. These include all states categorized as "free" by Gastil and those "partly free" (four-fifths or more free) states with a more pronounced capitalist orientation.

Appendix 2. International Wars Usted Chronologically British-Maharattan (1817-1818) Greek (1821-1828) Franco-Spanish (1823) First Anglo-Burmese (1823-1826) Javanese (1825-1830) Russo-Persian (1826-1828) Russo-Turkish (1828-1829) First Polish (1831) First Syrian (1831-1832) Texas (1835-1836) First British-Afghan (1838-1842) Second Syrian (1839-1940) Franco-Algerian (1839-1847) Peruvian-Bolivian (1841) First British-Sikh (1845-1846) Mexican-American (1846-1848) Austro-Sardinian (1848-1849) First Schleswig-Holstein (1848-1849) Hungarian (1848-1849) Second British-Sikh (1848-1849) Roman Republic (1849) La Plata (1851-1852) First Turco-Montenegran (1852-1853) Crimean (1853-1856) Anglo-Persian (1856-1857) Sepoy (1857-1859) Second Turco-Montenegran (1858-1859) Italian Unification (1859) Spanish-Moroccan (1859-1860) Italo-Roman (1860) Italo-Sicilian (1860-1861) Franco-Mexican (1862-1867) Ecuadorian-Colombian (1863) Second Polish (1863-1864) Spanish-Santo Dominican (1863-1865) Second Schleswig-Holstein (1864) Lopez (1864-1870) Spanish-Chilean (1865-1866) Seven Weeks (1866) Ten Years (1868-1878) Franco-Prussian (1870-1871) Dutch-Achinese (1873-1878) Balkan (1875-1877) Russo-Turkish (1877-1878) Bosnian (1878) Second British-Afghan (1878-1880)

Pacific (1879-1883) British-Zulu (1879) Franco-Indochinese (1882-1884) Mahdist (1882-1885) Sino-French (1884-1885) Central American (1885) Serbo-Bulgarian (1885) Sino-Japanese (1894-1895) Franco-Madagascan (1894-1895) Cuban (1895-1898) Italo-Ethipian (1895-1896) First Philippine (1896-1898) Greco-Turkish (1897) Spanish-American (1898) Second Phlippine (1899-1902) Boer (1899-1902) Boxer Rebellion (1900) Ilinden (1903) Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) Central American (1906) Central American (1907) Spanish-Moroccan (1909-1910) Italo-Turkish (1911-1912) First Balkan (1912-1913) Second Balkan (1913) World War I (1914-1918) Russian Nationalities (1917-1921) Russo-Polish (1919-1920) Hungarian-Allies (1919) Greco-Turkish (1919-1922) Riffian (1921-1926) Druze (1925-1927) Sino-Soviet (1929) Manchurian (1931-1933) Chaco (1932-1935) Italo-Ethiopian (1935-1936) Sino-Japanese (1937-1941) Russo-Hungarian (1956) Sinai (1956) Tibetan (1956-1959) Sino-Indian (1962) Vietnamese (1965-1975) Second Kashmir (1965) Six Day (1967) Israeli-Egyptian (1969-1970) Football (1969)

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80 Bangladesh (1971) Philippine-MNLF (1972-) Yom Kippur (1973) Turco-Cypriot (1974) Ethiopian-Eritrean (1974-) Vietnamese-Cambodian (1975-) Timor (1975-) Saharan (1975-) Ogaden (1976-) Ugandan-Tanzanian (1978-1979) Sino-Vietnamese (1979) Russo-Afghan (1979-) Iran-Iraqi (1980-)

Changkufeng (1938) Nomohan (1939) World War II (1939-1945) Russo-Finnish (1939-1940) Franco-Thai (1940-1941) Indonesian (1945-1946) Indochinese (1945-1954) Madagascan (1947-1948) First Kashmir (1947-1949) Palestine (1948-1949) Hyderabad (1948) Korean (1950-1953) Algerian (1954-1962)

Note: This table is taken from Melvin Small and J. David Singer (1982, pp. 79-80). This is a partial list of international wars fought between 1816 and 1980. In Appendices A and B, Small and Singer identify a total of 575 wars during this period, but approximately 159 of them appear to be largely domestic, or civil wars. This list excludes covert interventions, some of which have been directed by liberal regimes against other liberal regimes-for example, the United States' effort to destabilize the Chilean election and AIIende's government. Nonetheless, it is significant that such interventions are not pursued publicly as acknowledged policy. The covert destabilization campaign against Chile is recounted by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to InteIligence Activities (1975, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-73). Following the argument of this article, this list also excludes civil wars. Civil wars differ from international wars, not in the ferocity of combat, but in the issues that engender them. Two nations that could abide one another as independent neighbors separated by a border might weIl be the fiercest of enemies if forced to live together in one state, jointly deciding how to raise and spend taxes, choose leaders, and legislate fundamental questions of value. Notwithstanding these differences, no civil wars that I recaIl upset the argument of liberal pacification.

Notes I would like to thank Marshall Cohen, Amy Gutmann, Ferdinand Hermens, Bonnie Honig, Paschalis Kitromilides, Klaus Knorr, Diana Meyers, Kenneth Oye, Jerome Schneewind, and Richard Ullman for their helpful suggestions. One version of this paper was presented at the American Section of the International Society for Social and Legal Philosophy, Notre Dame, Indiana, November 2-4,1984, and will appear in Realism and Morality, edited by Kenneth Kipnis and Diana Meyers. Another version was presented on March 19,1986, to the Avoiding Nuclear War Project, Center for Science and International Affairs, The John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. This essay draws on research assisted by a MacArthur FeIlowship in International Security awarded by the Social Science Research Council. 1. He notes that testing this proposition is likely to be very difficult, requiring "detailed historical analysis." However, the bourgeois attitude toward the military, the spirit and manner by which bourgeois societies wage war, and the readiness with which they submit to military rule during a prolonged war are "conclusive in themselves" (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 129). 2. Clarence Streit (1938, pp. 88, 90-92) seems to have been the first to point out (in contemporary

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foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and he made this the foundation of his proposal for a (nonKantian) federal union of the 15 leading democracies of the 1930s. In a very interesting book, Ferdinand Hermens (1944) explored some of the policy implications of Streit's analysis. D. V. Babst (1972, pp. 55-58) performed a quantitative study of this phenomenon of "democratic peace," and R. J. Rummel (1983) did a similar study of "libertarianism" (in the sense of laissez faire) focusing on the postwar period that drew on an unpublished study (Project No. 48) noted in Appendix 1 of his Understanding Conflict and War (1979, p. 386). I use the term liberal in a wider, Kantian sense in my discussion of this issue (Doyle, 1983a). In that essay, I survey the period from 1790 to the present and find no war among liberal states. 3. Babst (1972) did make a preliminary test of the significance of the distribution of alliance partners in World War l. He found that the possibility that the actual distribution of alliance partners could have occurred by chance was less than 1 % (Babst, 1972, p. 56). However, this assumes that there was an equal possibility that any two nations could have gone to war with each other, and this is a strong assumption. Rummel (1983) has a further discussion

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1986 Liberalism and World Politics of the issue of statistical significance as it applies to his libertarian thesis. 4. There are serious studies showing that Marxist regimes have higher military spending per capita than non-Marxist regimes (Payne, n.d.), but this should not be interpreted as a sign of the inherent aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian governments or of the inherent and global peacefulness of liberal regimes. Marxist regimes, in particular, represent a minority in the current international system; they are strategically encircled, and due to their lack of domestic legitimacy, they might be said to "suffer" the twin burden of needing defenses against both external and internal enemies. Andreski (1980), moreover, argues that (purely) military dictatorships, due to their domestic fragility, have little incentive to engage in foreign military adventures. According to Walter Oemens (1982, pp. 117-18), the United States intervened in the Third World more than twice as often during the period 1946-1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946-79. Relatedly, Posen and VanEvera (1980, p. 105; 1983, pp. 86-89) found that the United States devoted one quarter and the Soviet Union one tenth of their defense budgets to forces designed for Third World interventions (where responding to perceived threats would presumably have a less than purely defensive character). 5. All citations from Kant are from Kant's Political Writings (Kant, 1970), the H. B. Nisbet translation edited by Hans Reiss. The works discussed and the abbreviations by which they are identified in the text are as follows: PP Perpetual Peace (1795) UH The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784) CF The Contest of Faculties (1798) MM The Metaphysics of Morals (1797)

6. I think Kant meant that the peace would be established among liberal regimes and would expand by ordinary political and legal means as new liberal regimes appeared. By a process of gradual extension the peace would become global and then perpetual; the occasion for wars with nonliberals would disappear as nonliberal regimes disappeared. 7. Kant's foedus pacificum is thus neither a pactum pacis (a single peace treaty) nor a civitas gentium (a world state). He appears to have anticipated something like a less formally institutionalized League of Nations or United Nations. One could argue that in practice, these two institutions worked for liberal states and only for liberal states, but no specifically liberal "pacific union" was institutionalized. Instead, liberal states have behaved for the past 180 years as if such a Kantian pacific union and treaty of perpetual peace had been signed. 8. In the Metaphysics of Morals (the Rechtslehre) Kant seems to write as if perpetual peace is only an epistemological device and, while an ethical duty, is

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empirically merely a "pious hope" (MM, pp. 164-75)-though even here he finds that the pacific union is not "impracticable" (MM, p. 171). In the Universal History (UH), Kant writes as if the brute force of physical nature drives men toward inevitable peace. Yovel (1980, pp. 168 H.) argues that from a post-critical (post-Critique of Judgment) perspective, Perpetual Peace reconciles the two views of history. "Nature" is human-created nature (culture or civilization). Perpetual peace is the "a priori of the a posterion"'-a critical perspective that then enables us to discern causal, probabilistic patterns in history. Law and the "political technology" of republican constitutionalism are separate from ethical development, but both interdependently lead to perpetual peace-the first through force, fear, and self-interest; the second through progressive enlightenment-and both together lead to perpetual peace through the widening of the circumstances in which engaging in right conduct poses smaller and smaller burdens. 9. For a comparative discussion of the political foundations of Kant's ideas, see Shklar (1984, pp. 232-38).

References Andreski, Stanislav. 1980. On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships. Tournai of Strategic Studies, 3:3-10. Armstrong, A. C. 1931. Kant's Philosophy of Peace and War. The Tournai of Philosophy, 28:197-204. Aron, Raymond. 1966. Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, trans. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Aron, Raymond. 1974. The Imperial Republic. Frank Jellinek, trans. Englewood Oiffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Babst, Dean V. 1972. A Force for Peace. Industrial Research. 14 (April): 55-58. Banks, Arthur, and William Overstreet, eds. 1983. A Political Handbook of the World; 1982-1983. New York: McGraw Hill. Barnet, Richard. 1968. Intervention and Revolution. Cleveland: World Publishing Co. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Samuel Huntington. 1963. Political Power: USA/USSR. New York: Viking Press. Carnesale, Albert, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel Huntington, Joseph Nye, and Scott Sagan. 1983. Living With Nuclear Weapons. New York. Bantam. Chan, Steve. 1984. Mirror, Mirror on the Wall. .. : Are Freer Countries More Pacific? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28:617-48. Clemens, Walter C. 1982. The Superpowers and the Third World. In Charles Kegley and Pat

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80 McGowan, eds., Foreign Policy; USA/USSR. Beverly Hills: Sage. pp. 111-35 Doyle, Michael W. 1983a. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part 1. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:205-35. Doyle, Michael W. 1983b. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part 2. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:323-53. Doyle, Michael W. 1986. Empires. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. The Europa Yearbook for 1985. 1985. 2 vols. London. Europa Publications. Friedrich, Karl. 1948. Inevitable Peace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. GaJlie, W. B. 1978. Philosophers of Peace and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Galston, William. 1975. Kant and the Problem of History. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Gastil, Raymond. 1985. The Comparative Survey of Freedom 1985. Freedom at Issue, 82:3-16. Haas, Michael. 1974. International Conflict. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. Hassner, Pierre. 1972. Immanuel Kant. In Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: Rand McNally. pp.554-93. Hermens, Ferdinand A. 1944. The Tyrants' War and the People's Peace. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Hinsley, F. H. 1967. Power and the Pursuit of Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoffmann, Stanley. 1965. Rousseau on War and Peace. In Stanley Hoffmann, ed. The State of War. New York: Praeger. pp. 45-87. Holmes, Stephen. 1979. Aristippus in and out of Athens. American Political Science Review, 73:113-28. Huliung, Mark. 1983. Citizen Machiavelli. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hume, David. 1963. Of the Balance of Power. Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1970. Kant's Political Writings. Hans Reiss, ed. H. B. Nisbet, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kelly, George A. 1969. Idealism, Politics, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keohane, Robert, and Joseph Nye. 1977. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little Brown. Langer, William L., ed. 1968. The Encylopedia of World History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1950. The Prince and the Discourses. Max Lerner, ed. Luigi Ricci and Christian Detmold, trans. New York: Modem Library. Mansfield, Harvey C. 1970. Machiavelli's New Regime. Italian Quarterly, 13:63-95. Montesquieu, Charles de. 1949 Spirit of the Laws. New York: Hafner. (Originally published in 1748.)

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Murphy, Jeffrie. 1970. Kant: The Philosophy of Right. New York: St. Martins. Neustadt, Richard. 1970. Alliance Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Payne, James 1. n.d. Marxism and Militarism. Polity. Forthcoming. Pocock, J. G. A. 1975. The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. Posen, Barry, and Stephen VanEvera. 1980. Overarming and Underwhelming. Foreign Policy, 40:99-118. Posen, Barry, and Stephen VanEvera. 1983. Reagan Administration Defense Policy. In Kenneth Oye, Robert Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., Eagle Defiant. Boston: Little Brown. pp. 67-104. Powell, G. Bingham. 1982. Contemporary Democracies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Reagan, Ronald. June 9, 1982. Address to Parliament. New York Times. Riley, Patrick. 1983. Kant's Political Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. Rummel, Rudolph J. 1979. Understanding Conflict and War, 5 vols. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Rummel. Rudolph J. 1983. Libertarianism and International Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27:27-71. Russett, Bruce. 1985. The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony. International Organization, 39:207-31. Schumpeter, Joseph. 1950. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper Torchbooks. Schumpeter, Joseph. 1955. The Sociology of Imperialism. In Imperialism and Social Classes. Cleveland: World Publishing Co. (Essay originally published in 1919.) Schwarz, Wolfgang. 1962. Kant's Philosophy of Law and International Peace. Philosophy and Phenomenonological Research, 23:71-80. Shell, Susan. 1980. The Rights of Reason. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ' Shklar,· Judith. 1984. Ordinary Vices. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Skinner, Quentin. 1981. Machiavelli. New York: Hill and Wang. Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1976. The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes. The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1(4):50-69. Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1982. Resort to Arms. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Streit, Clarence. 1938. Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Leading Democracies. New York: Harpers. Thucydides. 1954. The Peloponnesian War. Rex Warner, ed. and trans. Baltimore: Penguin.

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1986 Liberalism and World Politics U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 1980. A Yearbook of the Commonwealth 1980. London: HMSO. U.S. Congress. Sena"te. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. 1975. Covert Action in Chile, 1963-74. 94th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of State. 1981. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Waltz, Kenneth. 1962. Kant, Liberalism, and War. American Political Science Review, 56:331-40. Waltz, Kenneth. 1964. The Stability of a Bipolar

World. Daedalus, 93:881-909. Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books. Weede, Erich. 1984. Democracy and War Involvement. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28:649-64. Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. 1968. Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations. Journal of Peace Research, 5:56-69. Williams, Howard. 1983. Kant's Political Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wright, Quincy. 1942. A Study of History. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Yovel, Yirmiahu. 1980. Kant and the Philosophy of History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Michael Doyle is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218.

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Part III International Anarchy and Institutions

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[11] The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique* HELEN MILNER

'Anarchy is one of the most vague and ambiguous words in language.' George CornewaJl Lewis, 1832.1

In much current theorizing, anarchy has once again been declared to be the fundamental assumption about international politics. Over the last decade, numerous scholars, especially those in the neo-realist tradition, have posited anarchy as the single most important characteristic underlying international relations. This article explores implications of such an assumption. In doing so, it reopens older debates about the nature of international politics. First, I examine various concepts of 'anarchy' employed in the international relations literature. Second, I probe the sharp dichotomy between domestic and international politics that is associated with this assumption. As others have, I question the validity and utility of such a dichotomy. Finally, this article suggests that a more fruitful way to understand the international system is one that combines anarchy and interdependence. Many of the points made in this article have been made individually by other scholars, especially those in the early 1960s such as Inis Claude and James Rosenau. But today these points need to be reiterated, as recent theorizing focuses ever more on anarchy and divorces international politics and domestic ones. It is once again time for a reminder that anarchy is an ambiguous concept and that dangers exist when it is exaggeratedly seen as the central fact of world politics. Critiques of the assumption that international politics is anarchic are not lacking. John Ruggie has argued against Kenneth Waltz's neo-realist theory of the anarchic international system, claiming that it cannot explain change and that it must incorporate other variables-such as 'dynamic density'-to do this.2 Richard Ashley has charged that Waltz's structural model based on anarchy loses sight of politics and of the original insights of the realists; he has also attacked Waltz's epistemology.3 For Hayward Alker, the conception of international politics as anarchic presents a • I would like to thank David Baldwin. James Caporaso. Alexander George, Joanne Gowa, Stephan Haggard, Ted Hopf. Robert Jems. Robert Keohane. Fritz Kratochwil, Kathleen McNamara, Henry Nau. Susan Peterson, Kamal Shehadi. and Jack Snyder for their helpful comments. I George Cornewall Lewis, Remarks 011 the Use alld Abuse of Some Political Terms, Facsimile of 1832 text (Columbia. 1970), p. 226. 2 John Ruggie. 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis'. World Politics. 35 (Jan .• 1982). pp. 261-85. 3 Richard Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', IllIematiollal Organization, 38 (Spring 1984). pp. 225-86.

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value-laden interpretation of the system. 4 Despite the criticisms made by these authors, all of them have assumed that anarchy is a well-understood concept. Their attacks have not focused on what IR scholars mean when using the term. Moreover, while these authors have criticized the positivist epistemology used by neo-realists, they have not challenged the claim that the anarchy assumption is fruitful within a positivist research design. This article addresses both of these points. It argues that the notion of anarchy is not so well understood as is commonly implied. It suggests that an emphasis on the assumption of anarchy can be misleading and may have heuristic disadvantages. Even within a positivist framework, this assumption may be degenerative, posing anomalies and inhibiting new insights by separating international politics too radically from other politics.s Clarification of this central concept in international relations is important since such a key term should not be used without knowing what is meant by it.

Concepts of anarchy Anarchy has been accorded a central role in international politics, especially in recent theoretical writings. Robert Art and Robert Jervis, for instance, assert that 'anarchy is the fundamental fact of international relations.'6 For them, any understanding of international politics must flow from an understanding of this fact. Robert Gilpin defines the fundamental nature of international politics as 'a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy:7 For Kenneth Waltz, anarchy is the first element of structure in the international system.s It is for him the structural feature from which all other consequences derive. Recent studies of international cooperation have also started from the assumption that the international system is anarchic. Robert Axelrod defines his central question as being 'under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?,9 He believes anarchy is especially relevant to international politics since 'today nations interact without central authority'.to The condition of anarchy provides the baseline for his game-theoretic analysis. As he concludes, Today, the most important problems facing humanity are in the area of international relations, where independent, egoistic nations face each other in a state of near anarchy. Many of the problems take the form of an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. 1I Other scholars have used this analogy between anarchy and the Prisoners' Dilemma as well. In After Hegemo1lY, Robert Keohane begins his effort to explain international cooperation by assuming that anarchy is the fundamental fact about • Hayward Alker, 'The Presumption of Anarchy in International Politics', ms .• 3 Aug. 1986. 5 The assumption is not progressive in the sense that Lakatos proposes. The propositions it generates do not lead to new questions and their answers. See Imre Lakatos. 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs". in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), Criticism alld tile Growtlt 0/ KIIOlrledg£' (London. 1970}. o Robert Art and Robert Jervis.lll/ematiollal Politics. 2nd edition (Boston. 1986). p. 7. 7. Robert Gilpin, IIDr and Change in World Politics (Cambridge. University Press, 1981). p. 7. • Kenneth Waltz. Theory o/ll1lematiollol Politics (Reading. Mass. 1979). p. 88. • Robert Axelrod. The Ero/llliol1 o/Cooperatioll (NY, 1984), p. 3. 10 Axelrod. Em/miOiI. p. 4. II Axelrod. EmlllliOiI. p. 190.

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international politics. He describes the initial international environment as one peopled by egoistic, anomic states, pursuing their self·interests in a self·help system without any centralized authority. He shows that even in this environment, which resembles single-play Prisoners' Dilemma, states can find cooperation to be in their narrow self-interest. 12 This view of anarchy as the central condition of international politics is also apparent in the explanation of cooperation that emerges in Kenneth Oye's edited volume, Cooperation Under Anarchy. As the title suggests, this volume's fundamental premise about international politics is that it is anarchic. The first sentence of the volume asserts that 'Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests'.ll Moreover, the authors view their central question as being 'what circumstances favor the emergence of cooperation under anarchy' and see the structure of the international system as resembling Prisoners' Dilemma. Assuming anarchy to be primary, they then proceed to diagnose what factors make cooperation possible in such an environment. For all of these authors then-although less so for Keohane-anarchy is taken to be the central background condition of international politics. All their analyses flow from this assumption. But what do these authors mean by anarchy? Anarchy has at least two meanings. The first meaning that anarchy carries is a lack of order. It implies chaos or disorder. The Oxford English Dictionary, for instance, lists political disorder as its primary definition. Such lack of order is often associated with the existence of a state of war. It is thus linked to the Hobbesian analogy of politics in the absence of a sovereign, which realists use as a model of international politics. As Hedley Bull describes the realist view, The Hobbesian tradition describes international relations as a state of war of all against all, an arena of struggle in which each state is pitted against every other. International relations, on the Hobbesian view, represent pure conflict between states and resemble a game that is wholly distributive or zero-sum ... The particular international activity that, on the Hobbesian view, is most typical of international activity as a whole ... is war itself.14 In this view then, the international system is a chaotic arena of war of all against all. But are chaos, lack of order, and constant threat of war what scholars mean by the anarchic nature of the system? It does not seem to be. Persistent elements of order in international politics have been noted by many. International order, defined in a strong sense as 'a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of a society of states, or international society'IS is not lacking in international relations. Such order implies the existence of a common framework of rules and institutions guiding international practices, and some such framework has existed among states at many times. 16 For Hedley Bull, order in the form of 'international society has always been present in the modern international system because at no stage can it be said that the conception of the common interests of states, of common rules accepted and common institutions worked by them, has ceased to exert an influence'.17 Robert Keohane. After Hegemol/)'. ehs. 5.6 esp. pp. 73. 85, 88. He later relaxes this restriclive assumption. citing various fonns of interdependence which may mitigate this anarchy. See ch. 7, esp. pp.I22-23. 13 'Cooperation Under Anarchy". World Politics. 38 (OCL 1985). p. I. I~ Hedley Bull, Tlu! AI/arc/lica! Sodet)' (NY, 1977), pp. 24--25. IS Bull, Anarchim! Society. p. 8. I. Bull, Anarchical Society, pp. 15--16 and ch. 2. 17 Bull. AI/archiml Society, p. 42. I~

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Others as well have noted the elements of order and society that mark international politics. Much of the recent literature on international regimes makes this point. Regimes serve to constrain and guide states' behaviour according to common norms and rules, thereby making possible patterned, or orderly, behaviour. Indeed, the authors of Cooperation Under Anarchy seek to explain such order. While initially seeing international politics in the Hobbesian image of a system marked by persistent war and lacking limits on states' behaviour, they eventually note that an international society-albeit a fragmented one-exists ... To say that world politics is anarchic does not imply that it entirely lacks organization. Relationships among actors may be carefully structured in some issue-areas, even though they remain loose in others. 18

In this strong sense of a set of patterned behaviour promoting various goals or norms, order is not what the international system lacks. In a weaker sense, order is also apparent. Discovery of the orderly features of world politics amidst its seeming chaos is perhaps the central achievement of neo-realists. For example, Gilpin points out that 'the relationships among states have a high degree of order and that although the international system is one of anarchy (i.e., absence of formal governmental authority), the system does exercise an element of control over the behavior of states'.19 Waltz also finds order in the regularized patterns of state behaviour that he observes. The timeless and recurrent formation of balances of power constitutes such a pattern. Balancing gives order to the system in two ways. First, if effected properly, it may prevent war. Here power is used to create a structure that inhibits war and thus provides a means for organizing the international system. Other realists also see power and its distribution as providing for order in international politics. Robert W. Tucker, for example, sees power differentials among Northern and Southern states creating a hierarchy of relations that make for an orderly system. 20 Unlike Waltz who focuses on balances of power,Tucker emphasizes the inequalities in power. But both see the distribution of power as creating the means for producing order-i.e., regularized, predictable patterns of behaviour-among states. Second, recurrent balancing by states suggests the order lurking in the seeming chaos of international politics. While states themselves may not realize it, like firms in a perfect market, their behaviour is being constrained into an orderly outcome. Again, the behaviour of states is being influenced to produce unintended order. In this case, however, states' behaviour is not guided by their norms or goals, but rather by structures beyond their control. In this weaker sense, then, as well, lack of order does not seem to be the distinguishing feature associated with the system's anarchy. Thus although anarchy may refer to a lack of order in international politics, such a conception is not what most IR scholars mean by it. The second definition of anarchy is the lack of government. It is the first meaning of anarchy given in the Oxford English Dictionary and is common among political scientists. Among the many uses Waltz makes of anarchy, the notion of an absence of government is centraPI In the Cooperation Under Anarchy volume, anarchy is also defined as a 'lack of common government'.22 Earlier writers concur in this; for 18

19 20 21

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Oye. 'Cooperation Under Anarchy'. p. 226. Gilpin, War and Change, p. 28. Robert W. Tucker. The Inequality o(Natiolls (NY, 1977). Waltz, Theory, p. 102. See Axelrod and Keohane in Oye, 'Cooperation Under Anarchy', p. 226.

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instance, Martin Wight sees 'the international system [as] properly described as an anarchy-a multiplicity of powers without a government'.23 Frederick Dunn in 1948 also writes that 'international politics is concerned with the special kind of power relationships that exist in a community lacking an overriding authority'.24 Again, the analogy to Hobbes' state of nature is evoked. States in the international system are seen as being in a state of nature, in a state prior to the creation of Leviathan-Le., without a common authority keeping them in awe. This meaning of anarchy then relates to the lack of something, this time to a common government or authority. But what exactly is lacking? What is meant by government or authority? Many discussions in international politics fail to define government and/or authority or define them in very different ways. They tend also to use government and authority interchangeably. But the two are distinct concepts. Waltz, for instance, associates anarchy with lack of government, which deals with the means used to organize how and when force can be employed. Government, for him, has a Weberian cast to it; it implies a monopoly on the legitimate use of force: The difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it. A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the right to use force ... A government has no monopoly on the use of force, as is al1 too evident. An effective government, however, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and legitimate means here that the public agents are organized to prevent and to counter the private use of force. 2s

For others, government denotes something different. It is less associated with force than with the existence of institutions and laws to maintain order. Lack of government means the absence of laws, a legislature to write them, a judiciary to enforce them, and an executive to administer them. For example, Martin Wight notes, Anarchy is the characteristic that distinguishes international politics from ordinary politics. The study of international politics presupposes absence of a system of government, as the study of domestic politics presupposes the existence of one ... But it is roughly the case that, while in domestic politics the struggle for power is governed and circumscribed by the framework of law and institutions, in international politics law and institutions are governed and circumscribed by the struggle for power.26

Others suggest that it is a particular function of government that the international system lacks. For the authors of 'Cooperation Under Anarchy', anarchy means the absence of a central authority to enforce states' adherence to promises or agreements.27 The means for hierarchical rule enforcement are missing. The emphasis in this volume is on institutions and authority, rather than force, as central to governance. Different definitions of government are thus used in the literature. These three notions of government offer different visions of what is lacking in international politics. Which of these best fits standard notions of government? The definition of government as a monopoly over the legitimate use of force has three problems. The first involves the issue of monopoly. How much of a monopoly of 13 24

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Martin Wight, POlrer Politics (Harmondsworth, 1978), p. 101. The essays here were originally written in 1946. Frederick Dunn, ·Research Note: The Scope of International Relations'. World Politics. I (Oct. 1948), p.I44. Waltz. Theory, pp. 103-4. Wight. POII·a Polilics, p. 102. Oye. 'Cooperation Under Anarchy". pp. 1-2.

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force must a government have to exist? Most governments do not possess an absolute monopoly over the legitimate use of force. For instance, the US government does not; citizens have the right to self-defence and they have the constitutional right to bear arms. When the right to use force legitimately (under certain circumstances) is diffused to 240 million people, can a government in Waltz's terms be said to exist? The difficulties with this definition are also apparent since it would not allow us to recognize even Hobbes' Leviathan as a government. While individuals give up nearly all of their rights to it, even Leviathan does not possess a monopoly over the use of force. As Hobbes states emphatically••A covenant not to defend myself from force by force is always void'.28 The right to self-defence through the legitimate use of force weakens any monopoly over legitimate coercion possessed by a government. A monopoly over the use of force then is probably not the distinguishing feature of a government. 29 Perhaps the defining feature of government in this definition is the legitimacy of using force. This, though. raises the issue of what legitimacy means and how it is determined. A sense of legitimacy allows a government to use force without prompting the resistance of (or use of force by) society. Lack of such a sense is conducive to civil war. But does not the issue of the legitimacy of force arise internationally as well? The use of force in international politics is not always considered illegitimate; some uses seem legitimate to a majority of states. Even Morgenthau notes the range of legitimate and illegitimate uses of force in international politics: legitimate power, that is power whose exercise is morally or legally justified, must be distinguished from illegitimate power ... The distinction is not only philosophically valid but also relevant for the conduct of foreign policy. Legitimate power, which can invoke a moral or legal justification for its exercise, is likely to be more effective than equivalent illegitimate power, which cannot be justified. That is to say, legitimate power has a better chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent illegitimate power. Power exercised in self-defense or in the name of the United Nations has a better chance to succeed than equivalent power exercised by an 'aggressor' nation or in violation of international law. Political ideologies ... serve the purpose of endowing foreign policies with the appearance of legitimacy.3o

The use of force internationally then can be legitimate-or more or less legitimatejust as can its use domestically. This conception of what international politics lacks-a monopoly on the legitimate use of force-is not as clear as it seems, since governments lack such monopolies and since the legitimacy issue arises in international as well as domestic politics. Third, this conception of government reveals a narrow notion of politics. It reduces both international and domestic politics to the use of force. Government ultimately depends on the threat of force, as does international politics.Jl This is implicit in the Weberian definition of government. As Weber himself notes, 'the threat of force. and in the case of need its actual use, is the method which is specific to political

=.

Thomas Hobbes. Lnialhall (Indianapolis. 1958). ch. 14. p. 117. Robert Dahl deals with this issue of monopoly by adding a new dimension to the definition of monopoly. He sees government as having a monopoly over the regulation of what constitutes the legitimate use of force. See his /IIodall Polilim/ tflla(rsis. 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs. NJ. 1984). p. 17. ~l Hans Morgenthau. Po/ilks Amollg Naliolls. 6th edition (NY. 1985). p. 34. )1 Waltz. Theory. p. 88.

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organization and is always the last resort when others have failed'.32 It is difficult in terms of this definition to see much distinction between international and domestic politics. Other notions of government stress the existence of institutions and laws that maintain order. Government is based on more than coercion; it rests on institutionalised practices and well-accepted norms. Governments legislate, adjudicate, resolve Prisoners' Dilemmas, and provide public goods, for example-all of which require more than mere coercion to accomplish. This broader institutional definition conforms more to standard notions of government than does the conception linked to force. The Encyclopedia (!f lire Social Sciences defines government as a system of social control which has 'acquired a definite institutional organization and operate[s] by means of legal mandates enforced by definite penalties'.,3 As a clarification, the entry states that 'Whenever a group of human beings actuated by common interests and desires creates an organized institutional mechanism for the furtherance of these ends and for the adjustment and control of their relationships, there is government'.34 Similarly, in discussing why politics is not coterminous with government, Harry Eckstein defines government as 'those formally organized structures of societies that specialize in the exercise of "sovereignty", as that term has been understood since, roughly, the early seventeenth century: specialized organizations that make laws, implement them, and resolve conflicts arising under them, and have a uniquely "legitimate" right to do SO'.35 Government in this standard definition centres on three notions: institutions, law, and legitimacy. Institutions are valued in this definition not for themselves but for the functions they perform and the way in which they perform them. Governing institutions provide social order through their legal institutions and sense of legitimacy. But, as noted earlier, the provision of order is not unique to governments. Order exists in the international system; it is simply provided through different means. David Easton makes this point: The fact that policies recognized as authoritative for the whole society must exist does not imply or assume that a central governmental organization is required in order to make decisions and effectuate them. Institutional devices for making and executing policy may take an infinite variety of forms. The clarity and precision with which the statuses and roles of legislators and administrators are defined will depend upon the level of development of a particular society. Societies could be placed on a continuum with regard to the degree of definition of such roles. Well-defined organizations, which we call government, exist in the national societies of western Europe; scarcely discern able statuses and roles of which a governmental organization is constituted exist in international society and in non-literate societies ... not all [international] disputes are automatically settled through the efforts of individual nations along customary lines. As in the domestic sphere, the solution of differences is in large measure left to the individual national units through bilateral or wider Max Weber. £collomy alld Socier)". ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, 1978). I. p. 54. Weber, unlike Waltz, emphasizes elsewhere institutions and legitimacy as well as force to explain politics. ;.l EII(')'c/opedia oj Ihe SO"iol S(·il!lIces. p. 13. The Dicliol1ory oj Political Sd('l/('(.'. ed. Joseph Dunner (NY, 1964), p. 217, provides a similar definition: gO\'ernment is 'the agency which reflects the organization of the statal (politically organized) group. It normally consists of an executive branch, a legislative branch, and a judicial branch' . .... EI1(:n'lopedia (!( Social Sciel1(·"s. p. 8. .lS Harry Eckstein, 'Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry". APSR. 67 (Dec. 1973). p.I,142.

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negotiations ... the general atmosphere or set of relations within which the individual national units are able to conduct then private negotiations about the distribution of values is dominated and supervised by the great powers. In the last resort, if any specific pattern of distribution of values, or if the general pattern emerging from individual private negotiations over time, does not accord with their conception of a desirable distribution of resources internationally, it has been normal for the great powers to step into speak with the voice of international society.36

The provision of order may not require formal institutions or laws. But supposedly the manner in which order is provided is what distinguishes the two areas. Within the state, law and hierarchy prevail; within the international system, power without legitimate authority dominates. Anarchy is equated with lawlessness. But international governing institutions and a body of international laws do exist. It seems not to be their existence that matters, but their capacity for commanding obedience. This capacity depends much on their perceived legitimacy, as it does for domestic institutions. These institutions will have little influence internationally or domestically if they lack legitimacy. It is an actor's belief that an institution's commands or a Jaw are binding or valid that gives them much of their force. As Weber recognized, an order that is seen as legitimate is far more likely to be obeyed than one that appeals only to self-interest or habit. 'But custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination. In addition, there is normally a further element, the belief in legitimacy.3? Many studying domestic politics have realized this. Dahl and Lindblom, for instance, note that there are many goals that cannot be achieved by command (i.e., threatening deprivation to get someone to do something) and that command is not the primary mechanism used to achieve almost any goal in politics. 38 A sense of legitimacy is essential to the maintenance of any order. Legitimacy then appears to be the linchpin upon which conceptions of government rest. It, more than institutions or laws, is what distinguishes domestic and international politics. Lack of legitimacy seems in the end to be what many IR scholars have in mind when they talk about anarchy. Anarchy as a lack of government is for them transformed into a discussion of lack of authority, or legitimacy. Both Waltz and the 'Cooperation Under Anarchy' authors end up here. But government and authority should not be conflated. Not all governments have de facIo authority over their subjects. Authority is often tied to the notion oflegitimacy; it implies a belief in the validity or bindingness of an order. 39 It is not just laws or governing institutions that international politics may lack, but most importantly a sense of legitimacy. But does the absence of authority provide a firm basis for the distinction between domestic and international politics? May not some domestic systems lack centralized authority and legitimacy, while certain international systems-e.g., the Concert of Europe40-enjoy high levels of legitimacy? Can and should we draw a rigid dichotomy between the two on the basis of anarchy defined this way?

David Easlon, The Political System (NY, 1965), pp. 137-8. Weber, Economy aJ7d Society, I, p. 231; see also I, pp. 31. 3$ Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics. Economics, and Welfare (NY, 1953), pp. 99-123. 39 See, for example, Eckstein, 'Authority Patterns'; Easton, Political System, pp. 132-3 . .., See Robert Jervis, 'Security Regimes', III/ernational Organization, 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-78 for a discussion of the legitimate order fonned under this system. 36

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Anarchy and the dichotomy between domestic and international politics The renewed focus on anarchy in international politics has led to the creation of a sharp distinction between domestic and international politics. Politics internationally is seen as characterized primarily by anarchy, while domestically centralized authority prevails. One of the most explicit statements of this position is in Waltz's Theory of International Politics. His powerful articulation of this dichotomy is interesting to examine closely since it is the clearest logical statement of the consequences of the anarchy assumption. Waltz makes three separate claims about the distinction between the two areas. First, anarchy as a lack of central authority implies that international politics is a decentralized competition among sovereign equals. As he says, The parts of domestic political systems stand in relations of super- and subordination. Some are entitled to command; others are required to obey. Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. The parts of international political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic.41

A second distinction flows from the assumption of anarchy. As a lack of centralized control over force, anarchy implies that world politics is a self-help system reliant primarily on force. This also distinguishes international from national politics. Nationally, the force of a government is exercised in the name of right and justice. Internationally, the force of a state is employed for the sake of its own protection and advantage ... Nationally, relations of authority are established. Internationally, only relations of strength result.42

Finally, international politics is seen as the only true 'politics': National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation. The international realm is preeminently a political one. The national realm is variously described as being hierarchic, vertical, centralized, heterogeneous, directed, and contrived; and international realm, as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogeneous, undirected, and mutually adaptive. 43

A very sharp distinction is drawn between the two political arenas on a number of different grounds, all of which flow from the assumption of anarchy. While some societies may possess elements of both ordering principles-anarchy and hierarchy, the conclusion of many is that such a rigid dichotomy is empirically feasible and theoretically useful.4~ In this section the utility of such a distinction is examined. Is it empirically and heuristically helpful? To answer this question, it is important to examine Waltz's three distinctions because they represent the logical outcome of adopting the assumption of anarchy as the basis of international politics. While his views are the most explicit and perhaps extreme statement of this dichotomy, they do reflect the implicit understanding of neo-realist theory in generaL The first line of demarcation between domestic and international politics is the claim that centralization prevails in the former and decentralization in the latter. What is meant by centralization or its opposite? Centralization seems related to Waltz. Waltz. 43 Waltz. .... Waltz, 41

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Theory, Theory, Theory, Theory,

p. 88. p. 112. p. 113 . pp. 1IS-:16.

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hierarchy. As Waltz notes, The units-institutions and agencies-stand I'is-il-l'is each other in relations of super- and subordination'.45 Apparently, it refers to the number of, and relationship among, recognized centres of authority in a system. Domestic politics has fewer, more well-defined centres that are hierarchically ordered, while in international politics many centres exist and they are not so ordered. What counts as a centre of authority, however? Waltz resorts to the legalistic notion of sovereignty to make his count internationally. He also assumes that domestically a well-defined hierarchy of authority exists. While qualifying his point, he asserts that Domestic politics is hierarchically ordered ... In a polity the hierarchy of offices is by no means completely articulated. nor me all ambiguities lIbout relations of supcr- and subordination removed. Nevertheless, political actors are formally differentiated according to the degrees of their authority, and their distinct functions are specified.46

Such a view of domestic politics is hard to maintain. Who is the highest authority in the US? The people, the states, the Constitution, the executive, the Supreme Court, or even Congress. Dejllre, the Constitution is; but, defacto, it depends upon the issue. There is no single hierarchy of authority, as in some ideal military organization. Authority for deciding different issues rests with different groups in society. Authority is not highly concentrated; it is diffused. This was the intention of the writers of the Constitution, who wanted a system where power was not concentrated but rather dispersed. It was dispersed not only functionally through a structure of countervailing 'checks and balances', but also geographically through federalismY Moreover, this decentralization is not unique to the US. One of the main concerns in comparative politics has been to locate the centres of authority in different nations and relate their different degrees of political centralization and decentralization along some continuum. Authority in some states may be fairly centralized, while in others it is highly decentralized, as in the debate over 'strong' and 'weak' states.48 But the central point is that states exhibit a very broad range of values along this continuum, and not all of them-or perhaps even the majority-may be more centralized than the international system. A second issue is to what extent the international system is decentralized. The point made above that the concentration of authority in any system is best gauged along a continuum, and not a dichotomy, is relevant. Where along the continuum does the international system fit? The answer to this depends on two factors: what issue we are discussing (e.g., fishing rights, the use of nuclear weapons, or control of the seas) and what time period we have in mind. The first factor raises the issue of the fungibility of power. Curiously, Waltz assumes it is highly fungible: force dominates and a hierarchy of power exists internationally-i.e., 'great powers' are identifiable. This view centralizes power much more than does assuming it is infungible. The issue of change over time is also important. The international system may evince different levels of centralization and decentralization-e.g., the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe versus the post-World War II system. 49 '5 Waltz. Theory, p. 81. ., Waltz. Thcory. p. 81. '7 Waltz recognizes this: see Thcory. pp. 81-82. But it never influences his very sharp distinction between the ordering of domestic and international politics. ., See, for example. Peter Katzenstein (ed). Bcnl"l'('II POI\"(?T Gild Plelll)" (Ithaca. 1978) . ., Waltz does note the differences in systems in tenns of the number of great powers. or poles. He suggests the consequences of this are different levels of stability in the system. Ruggie in 'Continuity and Transfonnation' also sees differences in systems over time. But his focus is on the divide between the medieyal and the modem (post-seventeenth century) systems.

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To deal with these issues, Waltz has to relinquish his more legalistic notion of the international system as one of sovereign equals. At times, he indeed does this. In discussing anarchy, he posits that all states are equal and thus that authority internationally is highly decentralized. But when talking of the distribution of capabilities he recognizes that states are not equal and that only a few great powers count. In this latter discussion, he implies that capabilities are highly centralized in the international system. Waltz himself then does /lot find the assumption that all states are equal and thus that power is highly decentralized to be either empirically true or heuristically useful. As a 'good' realist, he focuses upon the few strong powers in the system. John Ruggie argues that this apparent contradiction between the system's anarchic structure and the distribution of capabilities is not real. He attributes to Waltz a 'generative model' in which the 'deep structure' of anarchy influences the more superficial structure of the power distribution.so But Ruggie concludes that Waltz has failed to develop such a generat,ive model, and Waltz agrees. 51 It is unclear how Waltz intends to reconcile anarchy with its metaphor of a decentralized, perfectly competitive market and hierarchy established through the distribution of capabilities with its metaphor of an oligopolistic market. 52As the conflicting metaphors reveal, the two structural principles work against each other, and their impact on each other and their causal priority are unclear. The issue of the centralization of power internationally touches on another distinction between domestic and international politics. Waltz, for instance, claims that In anarchic realms, like units coact. In hierarchic realms, unlike units interact. In an anarchic realm, the units are functionally similar and tend to remain so. Like units work to maintain a measure of independence and may even strive for autarky. In a hierarchic realm, the units are differentiated, and they tend to increase the extent of their specialization. Differentiated units become closely interdependent.53

The argument is that states are sovereign, implying that they are functionally equal and hence not interdependent. They are duplicates, who do not need one another. Domestically, the units within states are differentiated, each filling some niche in the chain of command. For many domestic systems, this is not accurate. For instance, in federal systems each state is functionally equal and no generally agreed upon chain of command between the states and the national government exists. On some issues at some times, states have the final say; on others, the central government. On the other hand, there is the question of whether all nation-states are functionally equivalent. If states are all 'like units', why only examine the great powers? Waltz realizes this is a problem. He admits that 'internationally, like units sometimes perform different tasks'. Moreover, 'the likelihood of their doing so, varies with their capabilities'.54 Thus he acknowledges that states with different capabilities perform different functions; hence, they are not all 'like' units. Later he takes the point further: Although states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities. Out of such ~ 51 52 53 $I

Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation', p. 266. . See Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation', pp. 148-52, and Waltz, 'Reflections on Theory of Ill/emational Politics, p. 328, in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism Glld Its Critics (NY, 1986). Waltz, Theory, pp. 89-90, 129-36. Waltz, Theory, p. 104. Waltz, Theory, p. 47.

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differences something of a division of labor develops ... The division of labor across nations, however, is slight in comparison with the highly articulated division of labor within them. 55

His position is that states do not perform the same tasks, that some international division of labour exists, but that this differentiation is empirically unimportant relative to that domestically. The dilemma is that two of Waltz's three central assumptions/ordering principles conflict. It is difficult to assume both that all states are equal (principles 1 and 2) alld that all states are not equal as a result of the distribution of their capabilities (principle 3). Waltz might claim that they are equal in function but not in capabilities; however, as he himself states, one's capabilities shape one's functions. The point is, as others have noted before, the distribution of resources internationally creates a division of labour among states; differentiation and hierarchy exist and provide governing mechanisms for states, just as they do for individuals within states. Most importantly, the distinction among different international systems and within nation-states over the degree of centralization of authority as well as over the degree of differentiation among their units is variable and should be viewed along a continuum, rather than as a dichotomy.56 A second means of separating domestic and international politics is to differentiate the role and importance of force in the two arenas. For Waltz, domestically force is less important as a means of control and is used to serve justice; internationally, force is widespread and serves no higher goal than to help the state using it. But is the importance of force so different in the two realms? As noted before for theorists like Waltz, Carr, and Weber, the threat of the use of force-in effect, deterrence-is ultimately the means of social control domestically. Threats of sanctions are the state's means of enforcement, as they are internationally. When norms and institutions fail to maintain social control, states internally and externally resort to threats of.force. It may be that norms and institutions are more prevalent forms of control domestically than internationally. But this depends on the state in question. In some countries, belief in the legitimacy of government and institutions, being widespread and well-developed, might suffice to maintain control. However, the fact that more civil wars have been fought in this century than international ones and that since 1945 more have died in the former should make one pause when declaiming about the relative use of force in the two realms.57 Since at times the frequency of violence domestically is acknowledged, perhaps the point is that force is legitimate and serves justice domestically and not internationally.58 Again, this depends upon the perceived legitimacy of the government and the particular instance of use. Have the majority of people in the Soviet Union, Poland, Ethiopia, South Africa, Iran, or the Philippines-to name just a few-felt that the state's use of force serves justice (all of the time? some of the time?)? Whether force serves justice domestically is an issue to be studied, not a given to be assumed. On the other hand, is it never the case that force serves justice internationally? Is it always, or most of the time, 'for the sake of [the state's] own protection and advantage'? States have been known to intervene forcefully for larger purposes. The 55 S

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Waltz. Theor)" p. 105. Waltz admits that anarchy and hierarchy are ideal types. But he rejects their use as a continuum, preferring for theoretical simplicity to see them as dichotomies. See Theory, p. 115. Moreover, he simply posits that the an anarchic ideal is associated with international politics more than it is \\ith domestic politics. Small and J. D. Singer, E:'(plaillillg liar (Beverly Hills. 1979). pp. 63, 65, 68--69. Waltz, Theory, p. 103.

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fight against Germany in World War II by the US, for example, helped serve justice regardless of whether America's own protection was a factor. The distinction between international and domestic politics on this issue does not appear as clear as is claimed. A third dichotomy between the two arenas asserts that power and politics operate internationally. Domestically, authority, administration, and law prevail; internationally, it is power, struggle, and accommodation. For some, the latter alone is politics. This distinction is the hardest to maintain. Disputes among political parties, local and national officials, the executive and the legislature, different geographic regions, different races, capital and labor, industry and finance, organized and unorganized groups, etc. over who gets how much and when occur constantly within the nation. Morgenthau recognizes this: The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart. Both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power, modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and in the international spheres. The tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political organizations, to the state ... Finally, the whole political life of a nation, particularly of a democratic nation, from the local to the national level, is a continuous struggle for power. 59

E. H. Carr, another realist, also disagrees with Waltz. Like Morgenthau, he sees the national and world arenas as being based on the same principles and processes: power politics. In talking of domestic politics, he echoes Thucydides' MeIian dialogue: The majority rules because it is stronger, the minority submits because it is weaker'.w He maintains that the factors which supposedly distinguish domestic politics-e.g., legitimacy, morality, ideology, and law-are just as political nationally as internationally. Theories of social morality are always the product of a dominant group which identifies itself with the community as a whole, and which possesses facilities denied to subordinate groups or individuals for imposing its view of life on the community. Theories of international morality are, for the same reason and in virtue of the same process, the product of dominant nations or groups of nations. b )

As an example of this, Carr notes that 'laissez-faire, in international relations as in those between capital and labour, is the paradise of the economically strong'.61 He points out that even law, another factor that is supposed to make politics within the nation different, is merely a manifestation of power: 'Behind all law there is this necessary political background. The ultimate authority oflaw derives from politics' .6.1 Others would reject Carr's insistence that law and morality spring from power, but would none the less agree that politics within nations and among them are similar. These authors see authority, law, and morality being as important to international relations as to domestic ones, For instance, Inis Claude holds that international order is maintained by a balance of power among opposing forces,just as it is domestically. In allacking the notion that governments maintain peace through some monopoly of force, Claude returns to Morgenthau to make his point: 59 60 6)

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Morgenthau, Politics Among Natiolls, pp. 39-40. E. H, Carr, The TII'elll), Years' Crisis (NY, 1964), p. 41. Carr, TlI'ellty Years' Crisis, p. 79, Carr, TII'CIlzl' Years' Crisis, p. 60. Carr, Tlwlly Years' Crisis, p. 180.

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Morgenthau's espousal of the concept of the state's 'monopoly of organized violence' is contradicted by his general conception of politics: 'Domestic and international politics are but two different manifestations of the same phenomenon: the struggle for power: In his terms. 'The balance of power ... is indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies. '(,4

For him, as for Morgenthau, societies are pluralistic, and thus the role of government is 'the delicate task of promoting and presiding over a constantly shifting equilibrium'.6s Politics domestically and internationally is about balancing power. To assume that a state has a monopoly of power and that this is 'the key to the effectiveness of lit] as an order-keeping institution may lead to an exaggerated notion of the degree to which actual states can and do rely upon coercion'.66 Unlike Morgenthau and other realists, Claude sees factors other than coercion-such as, norms and institutions-as being more important both domestically and internationally to the maintenance of order, but like them he views the balance of power as fundamental to the two realms. Unlike Waltz, all of these authors find relations within nations and among them to be political and to be based on similar political processes. Overall, the sharp distinctions between the two realms arc difficult to maintain empirically. More importantly, any dichotomous treatment of domestic and international politics may have heuristic disadvantages. 67 Two heuristic problems exist with the radical separation of international and domestic politics. First, the isolation of international politics as a realm of anarchy with nothing in common with other types of politics is a step backward conceptually. Throughout the 1950s and 19605, political scientists worked to incorporate international relations into the main body of political science literature. They strove to end the prevailing conception of international relations as a sui generis field of study and to apply methods of analysis to it from other branches of political science, mainly domestic politics.68 Writing in the early 1960s, James Rosenau decried the tendency to treat IR as a sui gelleris branch of inquiry: We must avoid the widespread tendency to assume rather than to conceptualize the nature of the politics which occur at the international level. One reason for the lack of conceptual links is that most students in the international field have not treated their subject as local politics writiarge. Instead, like advocates of bipartisanship in foreign policy, most students tend to view politics as "stopping at the water's edge" and consider that something different, international politics and foreign policy, takes place beyond national boundaries. Consequently, so much emphasis has been placed on the dissimilarities between international and other types of politics that the similarities have been overlooked and the achievement of conceptual unity has been made much more difficult. For example, because of their stress upon the fact that international political systems are lacking in authoritative decision-making structures, many analysts have largely overlooked unifying concepts developed in areas where the focus is upon sovereign actors. 69

Heeding the advice of these and other writers, scholars began applying techniques and ideas from other fields of political inquiry and asking new questions about In is Claude, Power and illlernational RelatiollS (NY, 1962). p. 231. Claude, Power and fR, p. 23l. ~ Claude, Power and fR, p. 234. 67 For Waltz this is the ultimate test of an assumption, see Waltz, Theory, p. 96 . .s See, for example, Herbert Spiro, n0r1d Politics: The Global System (Homewood, II, 1966), esp. ch. I. 69 lames Rosenau, 'Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept in the Study of International Politics and Foreign Policy'. Princeton, Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 1963, pp. 2-3. l

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international relations. The problem with reverting back to a situation where international politics is seen as unique is that one is less likely to use the hypotheses, concepts, and questions about politics developed elsewhere. International politics must then reinvent the wheel, not being able to draw on other political science scholarship. The radical dichotomy between international and domestic politics seems to represent a conceptual and theoretical step backwards. A second and related heuristic problem is the tendency implicit in this separation of the two fields to view all states as being the same. Waltz, for one, wants us to conceive of states as like units and to avoid looking within them at their internal arrangements. His is a systemic level theory. But the issue is whether it is possible and/or fruitful to abstract from all of domestic politics. All states are not the same; and their internal characteristics, including their goals and capabilities, affect international politics importantly, as Waltz is forced to admit. This is reflected in the tension between his ordering principles, the first two of which give primacy to structural pressures while the third makes certain agents key. Using systemic theory, he wants to 'tell us about the forces the units are subject to', but he also notes that 'in international politics, as in any self-help system, the units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves' .70 The units do matter. Moreover, the differences among states-even the strongest-are not trivial and may be useful to conceptualize for understanding international relations better. Developing continuums along which all politics-domestic and international-are understable can be fruitfuL Some, such as Roger Masters, Ernest Gellner, and Chadwick Alger have compared international politics with primitive political systems and developing countries and have produced interesting insights about the international system from this comparison. 71 Using hypotheses and concepts from comparative politics can enrich international relations theory, while limiting this cross-fertilization is likely to hurt the field. As argued, politics in the two arenas are similar. William T. R. Fox stated long ago that Putting 'power' rather than 'the state' at the center of political science makes it easier to view international relations as one of the political sciences. So conceived, it is possible for some scholars to move effortlessly along the seamless web which connects world politics and the politics of such less inclusive units as the state or the locality, and to emphasize the political process, group behaviour, communications studies, conflict resolution, and decision-making. 72

The argument here concurs with those who would add to this focus on power a concern with nonns and institutions, which also may play similar roles in the domestic and international arenas. Conceptions unifying, and not separating, these two arenas are heuristically fruitful. The assumption of interdependence The current tendency to over-emphasize the centrality of anarchy to world politics may not be the most useful way to conceptualize international politics. As other 10 11

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Waltz, Theory, p. 72. Roger Masters. 'World Politics as a Primitive Political System'. lI'tJrld Politics. 16 (July 1964), pp. 595-619; Ernest GeUner. 'How to Live in Anarchy', Tire LiSTener. 3 April. 1958, pp. 579-83; Chadwick Alger, 'Comparison of Intranational and International Politics', APSR, 62 (June 1963). pp. 406-19. W. T. R. Fox, The AmericaJl Study of [mernatiollal Relatiolls (Columbia. Sc. 1968). p. 20.

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scholars have pointed out, such reductionism overlooks another central fact about international politics;namely the interdependence of the actors. This section explores the notion of interdependence, suggests why it is also a key strucllIral feature of the international system, and notes some of its implications for world politics. Other scholars have made some of these points before, but in this time when anarchy reigns supreme in the discipline a reminder of the importance of other aspects of the international system can be valuable. What do we mean by interdependence? There are two related notions of interdependence. First, the notion of 'strategic interdependence' implies, as Schelling puts it, a situation in which 'the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make'.73 In this situation, an actor cannot get what s/he wants without the cooperation of other actors. This notion fits the conventional definition of the term, which refers to a situation in which the actors face mutual costs from ending their relationship.7~ In other words, breaking a relationship means that each actor that was party to it can no longer obtain some value s/he wanted. Interdependence implies nothing about the degree of equality among the actors; it merely denotes a situation where all the actors suffer costs from terminating their relationship. Interdependence also implies that satisfaction of the actors' utilities is /101 independent. The actors are still sovereign-that is, able to make decisions or choices autonomously. But to realize their goals they must be concerned with the choices other actors make. Interdependence is not the opposite of anarchy as we have defined it-i.e., an absence of central authority. The two concepts represent different aspects of the international system. As with anarchy, the definition of interdependence says nothing about the degree of order, the likelihood of war, the inherency of conflicting interests, or the primary means used to achieve one's goals in the international system. Links between these latter variables and either anarchy or interdependence are empirical, /101 conceptual, statements. Anarchy and interdependence do not conflict on these dimensions, as is often supposed, since neither concept says anything about them a priori. The two concepts are not opposite ends of some single continuum. The extent of hierarchical authority relations-i.e., of anarchy-does not necessarily affect the degree of interdependence present. Two coequal actors can be in a situation of strategic interdependence-Le., can be unable to attain their goals without the cooperation of the other-just as easily as can two actors in a hierarchical relationship. A priori one cannot determine the extent of their interdependence from the degree of hierarchy/anarchy present in their relationship, and vice versa. The two concepts are logically independent. 7s This definition of interdependence also does 1101 imply either that the actors' interests are in harmony or that power relations are unimportant. The assumption n Thomas Schelling. Strategy o/Conilict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 5. See David Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis', illfematiollal Organi:alion, 34 (Aut. 1980), pp. 471-506. This conception of interdependence does not include the notion of sensitivity, as employed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in Power and llllertiepelltience (Boston, 1977). The notion of vulnerability is the most well·accepted definition. 75 Waltz is confusing on this point. He sees the two as opposed but linked: however, he cannot decide which way the linkage runs. Anarchy for him implies equality, sameness, and hence independence of actors, on the one hand. On the other, he claims interdependence is highest when states are equal. If this is true, then anarchy may well be characterized by very high levels of interdependence, since all slates are equal.

7.

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The assllmption of anarchy ill illternational relatiolls

83

that interdependence implies harmony or cooperation is widespread. 76 In part this is a consequence of the links between international trade theory and interdependence. An interdependent situation is seen as one where an extensive division oflabour exists so that each party performs a different role and thus has complementary interests. Everyone gains from such a situation; it is a positive-sum game. But, as Schelling, among others, has pointed out, interdependent situations are really mixed-motive games. Both conflicting and harmonious interests are evident. Each gains from continuing the relationship, but the distribution of these gains involves struggle. Harmony is not the result of interdependence; rather, a mix of conflict and cooperation is. A priori it is impossible to tell which will prevail. Interdependence does not imply that power is unimportant. Indeed, as analysts like Hirschman, Keohane and Nye, Schelling and Baldwin have shown. power is an intrinsic element of interdependence.77 An actor involved in such relations can manipulate them in order to prompt the other actors involved to do what sJhe wants. For instance, relations involving asymmetric interdependence provide an essential means of exercising influence; the less vulnerable side can threaten, however subtly. to end the relationship in order to induce changes in the other side's behaviour. Relative gains and losses from ending the relationship are here the central means of exercising leverage. But interdependence need not refer only to asymmetric relations. A symmetric relationship between two actors may also be interdependent and allow each to exercise power over the other, often through anticipated reactions as the US-Soviet nuclear deterrence relationship since the 19505 has shown.7x Power. in fact, is much more evident in interdependent relations than in situations where actors are independent or autarkic. To return to our market metaphor. power is a constant in oligopolistic or monopolistic markets, while it can be depicted as absent from purely competitive ones. Reasons why interdependence is a central feature of the international system arc connected with its implications for the system. Empirically, the international system has structural features that imply interdependence is important; moreover, viewing the system as interdependent may generate useful theoretical insights. Two important points can be made. First. interdependence means that the actors are linked. While states remain sovereign, their actions and attainment of their goals are conditioned by other actors' behaviour and their expectations and perceptions about this. In a situation of strategic interdependence, one's best choice depends on the choice others make. Thus the game is about anticipating others' behaviour. One's expectations and perceptions of their behaviour shape one's own choices. Scholars using game theoretic models of international politics recognize this. For instance, authors in 'Cooperation Under Anarchy' use the image of an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma to explore international interactions, but they tend not to note that this implies that strategic interdependence is as fundamental to the actors as is anarchy. 7. See Carr, T1H'llIy Years' Crisis, for example; also see the discussion of neoliberal institutionalism in Joseph Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation'. III tema tiollaI Orgalli:alioll, 42 no. 33 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-508. n Albert Hirschman, Nalional POll'er alld Ilze Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, 1980); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Pvw('r lIud IlIIert/epend£'llce (Boston. 1977): Schelling. Strategy "fCOltjlic/: Baldwin. ·Interdependence and Power'. " Richard Little makes this point about symmetric relations and suggests that this is an understudied area; see 'Power and Interdependence: A Realist Critique', in R. B. Barry Jones and Peter Willetts (eds.), llllerdepelldence all Trial (London. 1984). pp. 121-6. Waltz claims that only symmetric relations can be interdependent. but this position seems untenable; see Theory, pp. 143-6.

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Much of international relations involves this type of strategic game. One's best choice of how to spend one's resources-e.g., on guns or on butter-- Ps + CB> or Pt - Ps > CA + CB, no self-enforcing peaceful outcomes exist. This does not mean that no bargains exist that both sides would prefer to war. Since by definition both states cannot enjoy the advantage of going first, agreements that both sides prefer to fighting are always available in principle. The problem is that under anarchy, large enough first-strike incentives (relative to cost-benefit ratios) can make all of these agreements unenforceable and incredible as bargains. Does this prisoners' dilemma logic provide an empirically plausible explanation for war? Though I lack the space to develop the point, I would argue that first-strike and offensive advantages probably are an important factor making war more likely in a few cases, but not because they make mobilization and attack a dominant strategy, as in the extreme case above. In the pure preemptive war scenario leaders reason as follows: "The first-strike advantage is so great that regardless of how we resolve any diplomatic issues between us, one side will always want to attack the other in an effort to gain the (huge) advantage of going first." But even in July 1914, a case in which European 53. This argument about military variance runs counter to the usual hypothesis that offensive advantages foster war. For a discussion and an empirical assessment, see James D. Fearon, "Offensive Advantages and War since 1648," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 21-25 February 1995. On the offense-defense balance and war, see Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"; and Van Evera, "Causes of War," chap. 3.

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leaders apparently held extreme views about the advantage of striking first, we do not find leaders thinking in these terms. 54 It would be rather surprising if they did, since they had all lived at peace but with the same military technology prior to July 1914. Moreover, in the crisis itself military first-strike advantages did not become a concern until quite late, and right to the end competed with significant political (and so strategic) disadvantages to striking first. 55 Rather than completely eliminating enforceable bargains and so causing war, it seems more plausible that first-strike and offensive advantages exacerbate other causes of war by narrowing the bargaining range. If for whatever reason the issues in dispute are hard to divide up, then war will be more likely the smaller the set of enforceable agreements both sides prefer to a fight. Alternatively, the problems posed by private information and incentives to misrepresent may be more intractable when the de facto bargaining range is smalp6 For example, in 1914 large perceived first-strike advantages meant that relatively few costly signals of intent were sufficient to commit both sides to war (chiefly, for Germany/Austria and Russia). Had leaders thought defense had the advantage, the set of enforceable agreements both would have preferred would have been larger, and this may have made costly signaling less likely to have destroyed the bargaining range. I should note that scholars have sometimes portrayed the preemptive war problem differently, assuming that neither state would want to attack unilaterally but that each would want to attack if the other was expected to also. This is a coordination problem known as "stag hunt" that would seem easily resolved by communication. At any rate, it seems farfetched to think that small numbers of states (typically dyads) would have trouble reaching the efficient solution here, if coordination were really the only problem. 57

Preventive war as a commitment problem Empirically, preventive motivations seem more prevalent and important than preemptive concerns. In his diplomatic history of Europe from 1848 to 1918, A.J.P. Taylor argued that "every war between the Great Powers [in this period] started as a preventive war, not a war of conquest."58 In this subsection 54. For the argument about leaders' views on first-strike advantages in 1914, see Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. 55. See, for example, Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 90. 56. This is suggested by results in Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory 29 (April 1983), pp. 265-81. 57. Schelling suggested that efficient coordination in stag hunt-like preemption problems might be prevented by a rational dynamic of "reciprocal fear of surprise attack." See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 9. Powell has argued that no such dynamic exists between rational adversaries. See Robert Powell, "Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age," American Political Science Review 83 (March 1989), pp. 61-76. 58. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 166. Carr held a similar view: "The most serious wars are fought in order to make one's

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War 405 I argue that within a rationalist framework, preventive war is properly understood as arising from a commitment problem occasioned by anarchy and briefly discuss some empirical implications of this view. 59 The theoretical framework used above is readily adapted for an analysis of the preventive war problem. Whatever their details, preventive war arguments are necessarily dynamic-they picture state leaders who think about what may happen in the future. So, we must modify the bargaining model to make it dynamic as well. Suppose state A will have the opportunity to choose the resolution of the issues in each of an infinite number of successive periods. For periods t = 1, 2, ... , state A can attempt a fait accompli to revise the status quo, choosing a demand Xt. On seeing the demand Xt, state B can either acquiesce or go to war, which state A is assumed to win with probability Pt. For simplicity, assume the states are risk-neutral; that the winner of a war gets to implement its favorite issue resolution for all subsequent periods; and that the states discount future payoffs by a per-period factor 8 E (0, 1). This model extends the one-period bargaining game considered above to an infinite-horizon case in which military power can vary over time. An important observation about the multiperiod model is that war remains a strictly inefficient outcome. If the states go to war in period t, expected payoffs from period t on are (Pt/(1 - 8)) - CA for state A and «1 - pt)/(1 - 8)) - CB for state B. It is straightforward to show that there will always exist peaceful settlements in X such that both states would prefer to see one of these settlements implemented in every period from t forward rather than go to war. The strategic dilemma is that without some third party capable of guaranteeing agreements, state A may not be able to commit itself to future foreign policy behavior that makes B prefer not to attack at some point. Consider the simple case in which A's chance of winning a war begins at PI and then will increase to P2 > PI in the next period, where it will remain for all subsequent periods. Under anarchy, state A cannot commit itself not to exploit the greater bargaining leverage it will have starting in the second period. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, A will demandxt = P2 + CB (1 - 8) in the second period and in all subsequent periods t. That is, it will choose a resolution of the issues that makes state B just willing to acquiesce, given the new distribution of military power. This means that in the first period, when state B is still relatively strong, B is choosing between going to war and acquiescing to the demand Xl> which would yield it a total payoff of 1 - Xl + 8(1 - x2)/(1 - 8). The most state own country militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent another country from becoming militarily stronger." See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp.111-12. 59. To my knowledge, Van Evera is the only scholar whose treatment of preventive war analyzes at some length how issues of credible commitment intervene. The issue is raised by both Snyder and Levy. See Van Evera, "Causes of War," pp. 62-64; Jack Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 160; and Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987), p. 96.

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A can do for B is to set Xl to zero, so the largest possible payoff to state B for acquiescing in the first period is 1 + B(l - x2)/(1 - B). But this can be less than B's payoff for attacking in the first period, and indeed it will be whenever the following condition holds: Bp2 - PI > CB(1 - B)2. In words (roughly), if B's expected decline in military power is too large relative to B's costs for war, then state A's inability to commit to restrain its foreign policy demands after it gains power makes preventive attack rational for state B. Note also that A's commitment problem meshes with a parallel problem facing B. If B could commit to fight in the second period rather than accept the rising state's increased demands, then B's bargaining power would not fall in the second period, so that preventive war would be unnecessary in the first. Several points about this rationalist analysis of preventive war are worth stressing. First, preventive war occurs here despite (and in fact partially because of) the states' agreement about relative power. Preventive war is thus another area where Blainey's argument misleads. Second, contrary to the standard formulation, the declining state attacks not because it fears being attacked in the future but because it fears the peace it will have to accept after the rival has grown stronger. To illustrate, even if Iraq had moved from Kuwait to the conquest of Saudi Arabia, invasion of the United States would not have followed. Instead, the war for Kuwait aimed to prevent the development of an oil hegemon that would have had considerable bargaining leverage due to U.S. reliance on oil. 60 Third, while preventive war arises here from states' inability to trust each other to keep to a bargain, the lack of trust is not due to states' uncertainty about present or future motivations, as in typical security-dilemma and spiral-model accounts. In my argument, states understand each other's motivations perfectly well-there is no private information-and they further understand that each would like to avoid the costs of war-they are not ineluctably greedy. Lack of trust arises here from the situation, a structure of preferences and opportunities, that gives one party an incentive to renege. For example, regardless of expectations about Saddam Hussein's future motivation or intentions, one could predict with some confidence that decreased competition among sellers of oil would have led to higher prices. My claim is not that uncertainty about intentions is unimportant in such situations-it surely is-but that commitment and informational problems are distinct mechanisms and that a rationalist preventive war argument turns crucially on a commitment problem. Finally, the commitment problem behind preventive war may be undermined if the determinants of military power can reliably be transferred between states. In the model, the rising state can actually have an incentive to transfer away or 60. According to Hiro, President Bush's main concern at the first National Security Council meeting following the invasion of Kuwait was the potential increase in Iraq's economic leverage and its likely influence on an "already gloomy" U.S. economy. See Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Stonn: The Second Gulf War (London: Harper-Collins, 1992), p. 108.

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War 407 otherwise limit the sources of its new strength, since by doing so it may avoid being attacked. While such transfers might seem implausible from a realist perspective, the practice of "compensation" in classical balance-of-power politics may be understood in exactly these terms: states that gained territory by war or other means were expected to (and sometimes did) allow compensating gains in order to reduce the incentive for preventive war against them. 61 Preventive motivations figured in the origins of World War I and are useful to illustrate these points. One of the reasons that German leaders were willing to run serious risks of global conflict in 1914 was that they feared the consequences of further growth of Russian military power, which appeared to them to be on a dangerous upward trajectory.62 Even if the increase in Russian power had not led Russia to attack Austria and Germany at some point in the future-war still being a costly option-greater Russian power would have allowed St. Petersburg to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans and the Near East, where Austria and Russia had conflicting interests. Austrian and German leaders greatly feared the consequences of such a (pro-Slav) Russian foreign policy for the domestic stability of the AustroHungarian Empire, thus giving them incentives for a preventive attack on Russia. 63 By the argument made above, the states should in principle have had incentives to cut a multiperiod deal both sides would have preferred to preventive war. For example, fearing preventive attack by Austria and Germany, Russian leaders might have wished to have committed themselves not to push so hard in the Balkans as to endanger the Dual Monarchy. But such a deal would be so obviously unenforceable as to not be worth proposing. Leaving aside the serious monitoring difficulties, once Russia had become stronger militarily, Austria would have no choice but to acquiesce to a somewhat more aggressive Russian policy in the Balkans. And so Russia would be drawn to pursue it, regardless of its overall motivation or desire for conquest of Austria-Hungary. While German leaders in July 1914 were willing to accept a very serious risk that Russia might go to war in support of Serbia, they seem to have hoped at the start of the crisis that Russia would accept the Austrian demarche. 64 Thus, it is hard to argue that the preventive logic itself produced the war. Rather, as is 61. On compensation, see Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955), pp. 70--72; and Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, pp. 6-7. 62. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 56-59; Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2, pp. 129-30; Turner, Origins of the First World War, chap. 4; James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (London: Longman, 1984), p. 87; and Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," pp. 79-85. 63. Samuel Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History (Spring 1988), pp. 795-818 and pp. 797-805 in particular; and D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martins, 1983), pp. 38-49. 64. Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914," International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 234-36.

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probably true for other cases in which these concerns appear, the preventive logic may have made war more likely in combination with other causes, such as private information, by making Berlin much more willing to risk war. 65 How preventive concerns impinge on international bargaining with private information is an important topic for future research.

Commitment, strategic territory, and the problem of appeasement The objects over which states bargain frequently are themselves sources of military power. Territory is the most important example, since it may provide economic resources that can be used for the military or be strategically located, meaning that its control greatly increases a state's chances for successful attack or defense. Territory is probably also the main issue over which states fight wars.66 In international bargaining on issues with this property, a commitment problem can operate that makes mutually preferable negotiated solutions unattainable. The problem is similar to that underlying preventive war. Here, both sides might prefer some package of territorial concessions to a fight, but if the territory in question is strategically vital or economically important, its transfer could radically increase one side's future bargaining leverage (think of the Golan Heights). In principle, one state might prefer war to the status quo but be unable to commit not to exploit the large increase in bargaining leverage it would gain from limited territorial concessions. Thus the other state might prefer war to limited concessions (appeasement), so it might appear that the issues in dispute were indivisible. But the underlying cause of war in this instance is not indivisibility per se but rather the inability of states to make credible commitments under anarchy.67 As an example, the 1939 Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union followed on the refusal of the Finnish government to cede some tiny islands in the Gulf of Finland that Stalin seems to have viewed as necessary for the defense of Leningrad in the event of a European war. One of the main reasons the Finns were so reluctant to grant these concessions was that they believed they could not trust Stalin not to use these advantages to pressure Finland for 65. Levy argues that preventive considerations are rarely themselves sufficient to cause war. See Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War." 66. See for example Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Anned Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 67. The argument is formalized in work in progress by the author, where it is shown that the conditions under which war will occur are restrictive: the states must be unable to continuously adjust the odds of victory by dividing up and trading the land. In other words, the smallest feasible territorial transfer must produce a discontinuously large change in a state's military chances for war to be possible. See also Wagner, "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power," p. 598, on this commitment problem.

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War 409 more in the future. So it is possible that Stalin's inability to commit himself not to attempt to carry out in Finland the program he had just applied in the Baltic states may have led or contributed to a costly war both sides clearly wished to avoid. 68

Conclusion The article has developed two major claims. First, under broad conditions the fact that fighting is costly and risky implies that there should exist negotiated agreements that rationally led states in dispute would prefer to war. This claim runs directly counter to the conventional view that rational states can and often do face a situation of deadlock, in which war occurs because no mutually preferable bargain exists. Second, essentially two mechanisms, or causal logics, explain why rationally led states are sometimes unable to locate or agree on such a bargain: (1) the combination of private information about resolve or capability and incentives to misrepresent these, and (2) states' inability, in specific circumstances, to commit to uphold a deal. Historical examples were intended to suggest that both mechanisms can claim empirical relevance. I conclude by anticipating two criticisms. First, I am not saying that explanations for war based on irrationality or "pathological" domestic politics are less empirically relevant. Doubtless they are important, but we cannot say how so or in what measure if we have not clearly specified the causal mechanisms making for war in the "ideal" case of rational unitary states. In fact, a better understanding of what the assumption of rationality really implies for explaining war may actually raise our estimate of the importance of particular irrational and second-image factors. For example, once the distinction is made clear, bounded rationality may appear a more important cause of disagreements about relative power than private information about military capabilities. If private information about capabilities was often a major factor influencing the odds of victory, then we would expect rational leaders to update their war estimates during international crises; a tough bargaining stand by an adversary would signal that the adversary was militarily stronger than expected. Diplomatic records should then contain evidence of leaders reasoning as follows: "The fact that the other side is not backing down means that we are probably less likely to win at war than we initially thought." I do not know of a single clear instance of this sort of updating in any international crisis, even though updating about an opponent's resolve, or willingness to fight, is very common. 68. See Max lakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939-1940 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 135-39; and Van Evera, "Causes of War," p. 63. Private information and incentives to misrepresent also caused problems in the bargaining here. See Fearon, "Threats to Use Force," chap. 3.

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Second, one might argue that since both anarchy and private information plus incentives to misrepresent are constant features of international politics, neither can explain why states fail to strike a bargain preferable to war in one instance but not another. This argument is correct. But the task of specifying the causal mechanisms that explain the occurrence of war must precede the identification of factors that lead the mechanisms to produce one outcome rather than another in particular settings. That is, specific models in which commitment or information problems operate allow one to analyze how different variables (such as power shifts and cost-benefit ratios in the preventive war model) make for war in some cases rather than others. This is the sense in which these two general mechanisms provide the foundations for a coherent rationalist or neorealist theory of war. A neorealist explanation for war shows how war could occur given the assumption of rational and unitary ("billiard ball") states, the assumption made throughout this article. Consider any particular factor argued in the literature to be a cause of war under this assumption-for example, a failure to balance power, offensive advantages, multipolarity, or shifts in relative power. My claim is that showing how any such factor could cause war between rational states requires showing how the factor can occasion an unresolvable commitment or information problem in specific empirical circumstances. Short of this, the central puzzle posed by war, its costs, has not been addressed.

Appendix Proofs of several claims made in the text are provided here. Throughout, "equilibrium" refers to the solution concept "perfect Bayesian equilibrium."69 CLAIM 1. Under the conditions on UA() and UB() given in the text, there will exist a set of issue resolutions such that both states prefer anyone of these resolutions to a war.

°

Proof It is sufficient to show that there exists an interval [a, b] ~ [0, 1] such that for all x E [a, b], uAx) ;::: p - CA and UB(1 - x) ;::: 1 - P - CB' Choose an E such that < E < min{cA' CB} and define a = max{O,p - E} and b = min{p + E, I}. Consider anyx' E [a, b]. By weak concavity, uAx') ;::: x' for all x' E [0, 1]. Further, x' > p - CA, since x' ;::: a ;::: p - E > p - CA, by definitions. Thus UA(X') > P - CA' A similar argument shows that uB(1 - x') > 1 - P - CB for all x' E [a, b]. 0

Take-it-or-leave-it international bargaining The take-it-or-leave-it game is structured as follows. Nature draws a cost of war for state B, CIJ, from a cumulative distribution H(z) on the nonnegative real numbers with a 69. See Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tiroie, Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), chap. 8.

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strictly positive density function h(z) and a nondecreasing hazard rate h(z)1 (1 - H(z».7o State B observes CB but A does not. State A moves first, choosing a demand x E [0, 1]. B observes the demand and chooses whether to fight or not. As discussed in the text, payoffs are (p - CA, 1 - P - CB) if B fights and (x, 1 - x) if B does not fight. CLAIM 2. The take-it-or-leave-it game has a generically unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which A demands x* and B fights if and only if CB < X - p. The demand x* is defined as follows: (i)x* = pifh(O) > IlcA; (ii)x* = lif

h(1 - p)

-:-::----,-=-:-.,.=--,...,.

(1 - H(1 - p))


p, we can conclude that (i) if h(O) > l/cA then x* = p maximizes uAx); (ii) if

h(1 - p) 1 < ...,.---...,.-...,.-...,. (1 - H(1 - p» (1 - P + cA )

...,.-...,.-~...,.-~...,.

thenx* = 1 maximizes UA(X); (3) any x* E [p, 1] that solves h(x-p) (1 - H(x - p»

1

(x - p + CA)

will be a unique maximum of UA(X). Since the ex ante probability of war is H(x* - p), it follows that only in case (i) can this equal zero, and for small enough CA case (i) cannot 0 obtain. 70. This condition is satisfied for a broad range of distributions. See Fudenberg and Tirole, Game Theory, p. 267. 71. The assumption that type CB = x - p chooses not to fight is immaterial.

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Take-it-or-leave-it international bargaining with communication (cheap talk) I now modify the take-it-or-leave-it game by allowing state B to choose (after observing its costs for war) an announcement f from a large but finite set of possible speeches, F. After the announcement, the game proceeds exactly as before with identical payoffs. To avoid some measure-theoretic complications, I will consider a finite approximation of the game analyzed above. Nature chooses state B's type from the set T = {co, Cb Cz, ... , Ci, ... , cn}, n » 0, according to a discrete prior distribution h(·), where h(c;) = Pr (CB = Ci) and h(ci) > 0 for all Ci E T. The elements of T satisfy Co = 0 and (by convention) Ci < Cj for all i < j, where~j EN == 10, 1,2, ... , n}. LetH(Ci) == Lj:Ah(Cj) denote the prior probability that B's cost is strictly less than Ci, letting H(co) = O. In the game with talk, state B has a message strategy that gives a probability distribution on all possible messages in F for each type in the set T. Let m(f, Cj) be the probability that type Ci announces speech f in a given equilibrium. State A's demand strategy now associates with each f a probability distribution over [0, 1]. Let x(!) be the demand made by A on hearingf whenever A does not mix given the announcement. In a given equilibrium of the game with talk, state A will form posterior beliefs about B's type for each message f Let these be denoted h(cj,!) == Pr(cB = cd!), with H(Ci,!) == L}:A h(cj,f). For convenience, I will assume that if B is indifferent between rejecting and accepting a demand x, B accepts for sure. PROPOSITION. Ifx* is the unique equilibrium demand in the game without talk, then in any equilibrium of the game with talk in which state A uses a pure strategy, (1) state A demands x* regardless of the announcement; and (2) the ex ante risk of war is the same as in the game without talk.

The proof follows from several lemmas. LEMMA 1. In any equilibrium A's payoff is at least p, and in no equilibrium will A respond to any message with a demand that is sure to yield war.

Proof of Lemma 1. If A setsx = p, all types ofB accept for sure in any equilibrium (by subgame perfection), so A can assure itself p in this way. If in some equilibrium, A chooses x following a messagefsuch that war certainly follows, then A receivesp - CA, but then A could deviate to x' = p and do strictly better. 0 LEMMA 2. In any equilibrium, the demand x is in the support ofA's demand strategy given a message f only if there exists a Ci E T such that x = p + Cj.

Proof of Lemma 2. If not, then A might on hearingf choose a demand x' such that p + Ci < x' < P + Ci+ 1 for some i. But then A could increase its payoff on hearing f by deviating tox" = p + Ci+b since doing so has no effect on the risk of war. 0 LEMMA 3. In any equilibrium in which A does not mix, x(f) = k, a constant, for all messages f E F', where F' is the set of messages sent with positive probability in the given equilibrium.

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War 413 Proof of Lemma 3. Let Tf == {Cj: !c;: m(J, m(f, C;) Cj) > OJ. Suppose to the contrary that in some messagesf and!, such thatx(f) < x(f'). By Lemma equilibrium there exist two distinct messagesfand!, 1, both demands must be accepted with positive probability, implying that there are types C; Cj E Tfsuch that 1 - x(!) x(f) :2: ;e: 1 - P - C; Cj and types Cj E Tf' such that 1 - x(f') :2: ;e: 1 P - Cj. cj- But then any such Cj E E Tf' can do strictly better by deviating to I,f, which gives it 1 - x(!) x(f) > 1 - x(f'). x(!'). But this implies that x(f') is certainly rejected, contradicting Lemma 1. 0D Proof of the proposition. Supposex* == p + Ck is the unique equilibrium demand in the game without talk. Then Ck is the only element of T such that for allj E EN, N, H(Ck)(P - CA) + (1 - H(Ck»(P + Ck) :2: H(cj)(p - CA) + (1 - H(c)(p + Cj).

(1)

Suppose to the contrary of the proposition that in the game with talk there is some other demand x' == p + C/, c/, I ~ '" k, such that A demands x' on hearing any message f E F' (by Lemma 3, any equilibrium without mixing by A must have this form). Then it must be that for each f E E F' and for all j E EN, N,

H(c/,f)(p - cA) + (1 - H(c/,f»(p + c/) :2: c). H(cj,f)(p - cA) + (1 - H(cj,f»(p + cJ

(2)

By Bayes's rule, h(cj,f) = = h(cj)m(f, cj)/Pr(!) (l/Pr(!) Ii:J ~:A h(cj,!), cj)/Pr(f) and H(cj,f) = (l/Pr(f» h(c;, f), where Pre!) Pr(f) == LcETh(c)m(f, c» is the probability that B choosesfin the equilibrium. Substitution into equation (2) and multiplication of both sides by Pre!) Pr(f) yields, for allj E N,

[

/-1

]

[

/-1

]

~ h(cj)m(f, h(c;)m(f, c;) (p - CA) + Pre!) Pr(f) - ~ h(cj)m(f, h(c;)m(f, Cj) c;) (p + c/)

:2: ;e:

[% [~h(C;)m(f,

h(c;)m(f, C;)] Cj)] (p - CA) + [pr(f) -

% ~

h(c;)m(f, C;)] (p + Cj). h(cj)m(f,

(3)

Since equation (3) holds for eachf E F', we can sum both sides over allf E F' and the inequalities still hold. Thus, for allj EN,

[~h(Cj) f~' m(f, Cj)] (p - CA) + [f~' Pre!) - ~ h(c j) f~' m(f, C;)] (p + c/) :2:

[~h(Cj) f~' m(f, C;)] (p -

CA) +

l~, Pre!) - ~ h(cj) f~' m(f, C;)] (p + Cj).

(4)

Since LfEF' Pre!) Pr(f) == 1 and LfEF' m(f, Cj) c;) == 1, equation (4) simplifies to yield, for allj E EN, N,

H(c/)(p - cA) + (1 - H(c/»(p + c/) :2: H(c)(p - CA) + (1 - H(c)(p + cJ

(5)

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International Organization

But this contradicts equation (1), the hypothesis that the game without talk has a unique equilibrium, x* = p + C/o where Ck ;" Ct. This proves the first part of the proposition. To see the second part, notice that if A demandsx* after any message sent with positive probability, then all types Cj < x* - p will fight and all types Cj ~ x* - p will accept the demand, so the ex ante risk of war is just H(x* - p), as in the game without Wk 0 Remarks. (1) I conjecture that if there is unique equilibrium demand x* in the game without talk, then in no equilibrium of the game with talk will A ever mix over demands, so that the proposition should extend to all equilibria of the game with talk. While I have found no counterexamples, I have not been able to demonstrate conclusively that A cannot mix in some equilibrium. (2) Cheap talk can indeed matter in this game in a very limited way-equilibria may exist in which both A's beliefs and the risk of war differ depending on the message sent. However, as shown in the proposition, in any such equilibrium the variation in A's beliefs with different messages affects neither A's behavior nor the ex ante (i.e., premessage) risk of war.

[24] THE CAUSES OF WAR AND THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE JackS. Levy Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Bmnswick, New Jersey 08901-1568; e-mail: [email protected] KEY WORDS: levels of analysis, balance of power theory, power transition theory, interdependence and war, diversionary theory

ABSTRACT

I organize this review and assessment of the literature on the causes of war around a levels-of-analysis framework and focus primarily on balance of power theories, power transition theories, the relationship between economic interdependence and war, diversionary theories of conflict, domestic coalitional theories, and the nature of decision-making under risk and uncertainty. I analyze several trends in the study of war that cut across different theoretical perspectives. Although the field is characterized by enonnous diversity and few lawlike propositions, it has made significant progress in the past decade or two: Its theories are more rigorously formulated and more attentive to the causal mechanisms that drive behavior, its research designs are more carefully constmcted to match the tested theories, and its scholars are more methodologically self-conscious in the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods.

INTRODUCTION The nuclear revolution, the end of the Cold War, the rise of ethnonational conflicts, and the spread of global capitalism and democracy have led to considerable speculation about a turning point in the history of warfare. Some foresee an "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992) and gradual obsolescence of war, or at least of great power war (Mueller 1989), whereas others see an explosion of low-intensity warfare and "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996). Each of these perspectives rests on some critical assumptions and theoretical proposi-

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140 LEVY tions about the causes of war. My aim in this review is to assess the state of the art in our understanding of the causes of war. Nearly 20 years ago two leading international relations scholars argued, from different perspectives, that our systematic knowledge of international conflict had progressed very little since Thucydides wrote his History of the Peioponnesian War (Gilpin 1981, p. 227; Bueno de Mesquita 1981, p. 2). That view was somewhat overstated at the time, because the field of international relations had made significant progress since its emergence by the end of World War II as an autonomous field of study, and it is certainly incorrect today. Weare more explicitly theoretical in our general orientation, more rigorous in theory construction, more attentive to the match between theory and research design, more sophisticated in the use of statistical methods, and more methodologically self-conscious in the use of qualitative methods. l However, we have few lawlike propositions, limited predictive capacities, and enormous divisions within the field. 2 There is no consensus as to what the causes of war are, what methodologies are most useful for discovering and validating those causes, what general theories of world politics and human behavior a theory of war might be subsumed within, what criteria are appropriate for evaluating competing theories, or even whether it is possible to generalize about anything as complex and contextually dependent as war. This enormous diversity of theoretical, methodological, and epistemological perspectives on the study of war complicates the task of providing a concise assessment of the field. Because of the extensive coverage of my earlier review (Levy 1989b), I focus here primarily on significant developments in the last decade. This chapter begins with a theoretical overview, continues with a selective review and critique of some of the leading theories of the causes of war, and ends with a discussion of some general trends in the field. The chapter's space limitations prevent discussion of several important new developments in the study of war and peace. I give limited attention to applications of game theoretic models (Powell 1990, Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992, Morrow 1994, Fearon 1995) and say relatively little about cultural, constructivist, postmodern, and feminist approaches to the study of war and peace (Huntington 1996, Katzenstein 1996, Elshtain 1987). My citation of the literature is also selective. For more complete reviews and citations see Levy

lThis is a more optimistic assessment than the one I advanced in an earlier review (Levy I 989b). I suspect that the two abovementioned scholars are also more optimistic today. 2Gaddis (1992) charges that the failure of theorists to predict the end of the Cold War raises qucstions as to thc utility of social scicntific modcls of intcrnational behavior, although promising new methodologies for prediction have been developed (Bueno de Mesquita 1996).

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(1989b), Kugler (1993), and Vasquez (1993). Some of the following builds on Levy (1997b).

THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

The Dependent Variable International relations theorists generally define war as large-scale organized violence between political units (Levy 1983, pp. 50-53; Vasquez 1993, pp. 21-29). To differentiate war from lesser levels of violence, they generally follow the Correlates of War Project's operational requirement of a minimum (and an annual minimum) of 1000 battle-related fatalities (Singer & Small 1972). Peace, which is analytically distinct from justice, is usually defined as the absence of war. Analysts traditionally distinguish international wars from civil wars, and interstate wars from imperial, colonial, and other international wars that involve non-state actors. Until recently they devoted a disproportionate amount of attention to great power wars, including "hegemonic wars."3 This great power and Eurocentric bias in the study of war is decreasing, however, in response to the end of the Cold War, the shift in warfare away from the great powers, and the rise of "low-intensity wars" and "identity wars" (Holsti 1996).4 Despite this consensus on what we are trying to explain, the question of what causes war can mean several different things (Suganami 1996). It can refer, first of all, to the question of what makes war possible, to the permissive or logically necessary conditions for war. These fundamental or primary causes of war explain why war repeatedly occurs in international politics, why war can occur at any moment. Thus scholars trace war to human nature, biological instincts, frustration, fear and greed, the existence of weapons, and similar factors. Peace, however, is far more common than war, though as a "non-event" peace is difficult to measure. At the systemic level there may be more years characterized by war than by peace, but in nearly all war years most states are at peace, and at the dyadic level war is rare (Bremer 1992). This makes it hard

3Also known as "general" or "global" wars, these are long, destructive wars that have a disproportionate impact on the structure and evolution of the international system (Levy 1985, Rasler & Thompson 1994). This has led to a debate on whether we need separate theories to explain big wars and small wars (Midlarsky 1990). 4ldentity wars between ethnically or religiously defined communal groups that cut across state boundaries raise questions about the traditional distinction between international and civil wars (Small & Singer 1982), and also about the contemporary relevance of some traditional theories of war.

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to argue that human nature and related factors are causes of war. The point is that these factors are constants and cannot explain the variations in war and peace over time and space (Waltz 1959, Cashman 1993). If human nature varies, as some argue, then it is the sources of that variation, not human nature itself, that explain behavior. Moreover, even if human nature or biologically based instincts could explain aggressive behavior at the individual level, they cannot explain when such aggression leads to domestic violence, when it leads to scapegoating or other outlets, when it is resolved, and when it leads to international war. The question of how to explain variations in war and peace is the second meaning of the broader question of what causes war. Why does war occur at some times rather than other times, between some states rather than other states, under some political leaders rather than others, in some historical and cultural contexts rather than others, and so on? This differs from still a third question: How do we explain the origins of a particular war? Most international relations scholars (and particularly those in North America) focus primarily on the second question, explaining variations in war and peace. They leave the question of why war occurs at all to philosophers and biologists and leave the question of why a particular war occurs to historians. This is not to pass judgment on the relative importance of the three questions, only to say that they are different and that their investigation may require different theoretical orientations, different conceptions of causation and explanation, and different methodologies. One important exception to this focus on variations in war and peace is the argument by Waltz (1979) and other neorealists that the fundamental cause of war is the anarchic structure of the international system. Anarchy, defined as the absence of a legitimate governmental authority to regulate disputes and enforce agreements between states, "causes" war in the sense that there is no governmental enforcement mechanism in the international system to prevent wars. s Although anarchy may provide one persuasive answer to the question of the permissive causes of war, it is generally treated as a structural constant and consequently it cannot account for variations in war and peace. Waltz (1988, p. 620) seems to concede this point and argues, "Although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war's dismal recurrence through the millennia." Other neorealists also recognize this limitation and have begun to incorporate other variables-including the polarity of the system and the offensive/defensive balance-in order to explain variations of war and peace in anarchic systems. 5This anarchic structure differentiates international politics from domestic politics in realist thought. The existence of chaos and violence does not define anarchy but is instead the hypothesized causal consequence of anarchy.

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Another exception to the focus on variations in war and peace can be found in some feminist theorizing about the outbreak of war, although most feminist work on war focuses on the consequences of war, particularly for women, rather than on the outbreak of war (Elshtain 1987, Enloe 1990, Peterson 1992, Tickner 1992, Sylvester 1994). The argument is that the gendered nature of states, cultures, and the world system contributes to the persistence of war in world politics. This might provide an alternative (or supplement) to anarchy as an answer to the first question of why violence and war repeatedly occur in international politics, although the fact that peace is more common than war makes it difficult to argue that patriarchy (or anarchy) causes war. Theories of patriarchy might also help answer the second question of variations in war and peace, if they identified differences in the patriarchal structures and gender relations in different international and domestic political systems in different historical contexts, and if they incorporated these differences into empirically testable hypotheses about the outbreak of war. This is a promising research agenda, and one that has engaged some anthropologists. Most current feminist thinking in political science about the outbreak of war, however, treats gendered systems and patriarchal structures in the same way that neorealists treat anarchy-as a constant-and consequently it cannot explain variations in war and peace.

The Levels-aI-Analysis Framework Ever since Waltz (1959) classified the causes of war in terms of their origins in the individual, the nation-state, and the international system (which he labeled first-, second-, and third-image explanations, respectively), international relations theorists have agreed on the utility of the levels-of-analysis framework as an organizing device for the study of war and international behavior more generally. Some scholars have modified Waltz's framework by collapsing the individual and nation-state levels to create a simplified dichotomy of nation (or unit) level and system level (Singer 1961, Waltz 1979), while others have disaggregated the nation-state level into distinct governmental and societal-level factors (Jervis 1976, Rosenau 1980), a practice that I follow here. Following Waltz (1959), most scholars use the levels of analysis as a framework for classifying independent variables. This leads to such questions as whether the causes of war derive primarily from the level of the international system, national societies or bureaucracies, or individual decision-makers. Although the question of which level is most important has stimulated useful debate, until recently it distracted attention from the equally important issue of how variables from different levels interact in the foreign policy process. The levels-of-analysis concept is sometimes used differently, to refer to the dependent variable, or to the type of entity whose behavior is to be explained.

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In this sense the systemic level of analysis refers to explanations of patterns and outcomes in the international system; the dyadic level refers to explanations of the strategic interactions between two states; the national level refers to explanations of state foreign policy behavior; the organizational level refers to explanations of the behavior of organizations; and the individual level refers to explanations of the preferences, beliefs, or choices of individuals. The failure of scholars to be explicit about exactly how they are using the levels-of-analysis concept is a source of confusion in the field. Some have erroneously interpreted Singer's (1961, p. 92) comment that the various levels "defy theoretical integration ... [and] are not immediately combinable" to suggest that analysts should not combine variables from different levels of analysis to explain foreign policy decisions or international outcomes. But Singer's statement makes sense only if the levels of analysis are conceptualized in terms of the dependent variable. This is the familiar micro-macro problem of aggregation across levels. We cannot assume that correlations or causal connections at one level of analysis are necessarily valid at another level. It is conceivable, for example, that concentrations of power may promote peace at the dyadic level but war at the system level. This has important implications for theories of war and peace. Although it is possible that individual- or national-level variables could be the primary causes of war, these variables do not constitute a logically complete explanation because they do not explain how individual beliefs and preferences are translated into state decisions and actions or how the strategies or behaviors of states interact to lead to war as a dyadic or systemic outcome. To the extent that most wars involve the mutual and interactive decisions of two or more adversaries, an explanation for the outbreak of war logically requires the inclusion of dyadic- or systemic-level variables. This does not necessarily mean, however, that these variables are the most important in terms of amount of variation explained. The levels-of-analysis framework is not the only way to organize the literature on the causes of war or on international politics more generally. It has long been fashionable for international relations theorists to frame debates in terms of the so-called paradigm wars between realism and liberalism (Baldwin 1993). In contrast to the realist focus on the struggle for power and security in an anarchic and conflictual Hobbesian world, the liberal tradition sees a more benign Grotian international society or Lockean state of nature where anarchy does not imply disorder. States have common as well as conflictual interests, aim to maximize economic welfare as well as provide for security, and create international institutions that help regulate conflict and promote cooperation (Keohane 1989). Although the paradigmatic debate between realism and liberalism has imposed some order on a chaotic field, it distracts attention from significant variations within each paradigm, variations that often lead to conflict-

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ing hypotheses. It also detracts from the important task of systematically integrating key components from each approach into a more complete and powerful theory. Furthermore, the "paradigm wars" ignore important hypotheses associated with the Marxist-Leninist tradition and saddle liberalism with charges of the neglect of power that are better associated with the utopianism of Thomas Paine and others (Walker 1998). As a field, international relations needs to shift its attention from the level of paradigms to the level of theories, focus on constructing theories and testing them against the empirical evidence, and leave the question of whether a particular approach fits into a liberal or realist framework to the intellectual histonans.

THEORIES OF THE CAUSES OF WAR

Systemic-Level Theories The realist tradition has dominated the study of war since Thucydides, and includes Machiavellians, Hobbesians, classical balance of power theorists, Waltzian neorealists, and hegemonic transition theorists. 6 Although different realist theories often generate conflicting predictions, they share a core of common assumptions: The key actors in world politics are sovereign states that act rationally to advance their security, power, and wealth in a conflictual international system that lacks a legitimate governmental authority to regulate conflicts or enforce agreements. For realists, wars can occur not only because some states prefer war to peace, but also because of unintended consequences of actions by those who prefer peace to war and are more interested in preserving their position than in enhancing it'? Even defensively motivated efforts by states to provide for their own security through armaments, alliances, and deterrent threats are often perceived as threatening and lead to counteractions and conflict spirals that are difficult to reverse. This is the "security dilemma"-the possibility that a state's actions to provide for its security may result in a decrease in the security of all states, including itself (Jervis 1978). Realists do not assume that international relations are always conflictual, and they have recently focused on the question of the conditions for cooperation under anarchy, often through the use of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma mod60n the variations in realist theory sec Keohane (1986) , Brown et al (1995), Baldwin (1993), and Doyle (1997). 7This parallels the distinction between "aggressive realists," who believe that the international system induces conflict and aggression, and "defensive realists," who argue that the system is more forgiving and that defensive strategies arc adequate to provide security (Snyder 1991, pp. 11-12; Grieco 1990, pp. 36-40).

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e1s (Jervis 1978, Axelrod 1984, Grieco 1990). The iterated models are more appropriate for most situations than single-play Prisoner's Dilemma models, and the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma framework has generated some useful hypotheses regarding the rather restrictive conditions under which cooperation is likely. The assumption that the same game is repeated over and over is often problematic, however, particularly for security issues, because one play of the game (preemption, for example) can significantly change power relationships and affect payoffs in the next iteration. Nor is it clear that unilateral defection is always preferred to mutual cooperation; stag hunt models, in which mutual cooperation is both sides' first preference, may be more applicable in many situations (e.g. where each side fears both war and preemption by the other). There has been a tendency to apply Prisoner's Dilemma models to many situations in which the assumptions of the model are not satisfied. The core proposition of realist theory is that the distribution of power, throughout the system or within a dyad, is the primary factor shaping international outcomes. But different versions of realist theory generate different, sometimes contradictory explanations and predictions of foreign policy choices and international outcomes, based on different assumptions about the motivations of states, the nature of power, and the identity and boundaries of the system. Given the variety of realist propositions and predictions, it is possible to interpret nearly any foreign policy behavior or international outcome as consistent with some version of realism. This is not particularly helpful, for if theories are not falsifiable they have little explanatory power. We should treat realism as a paradigm rather than as a theory, and focus instead on specific theories that generate more determinant, testable propositions. The key division in the realist literature on war is not the standard one between classical realism and neorea1ism 8, but rather between balance of power theory and hegemonic theory. Balance of power theory includes numerous variations on the classical realism ofMorgenthau (1967) and the more systemic structural realism of Waltz. Hegemonic theory is a structural theory that in8These two realist traditions differ in their underlying assumptions regarding the fundamental source of international conflict. Classical realists emphasize both the inherently aggressive propensities of human nature and the absence of a higher authority in the international system. Waltz (1979) and his followcrs eliminatc human naturc as an cxplanatory conccpt, givc primacy to the anarchic structure of the international system, and attempt to construct a structural-systemic thcory of intcrnational politics. Waltz (1979) retains the classical realists' assumption of the primacy of states, reinforces their assumption of rationality, shifts from Morgenthau 's (1967) idca that states try to maximizc power as an end in itself to the notion that power is a means to the maximization of security, abandons the traditionalists' concerns to develop a theory of statecraft or foreign policy, and argues emphatically for a purely systcmic thcory of international politics that explains intcrnational outcomes and not thc strategies or actions of states. Most neorealists, however, conceive of realism as incorporating theories of both foreign policy and international politics (Posen 1984, Walt 1987).

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corp orates power transition theory and hegemonic stability theory and that downp1ays the importance of anarchy. Balance of power theory posits the avoidance of hegemony as the primary goal of states and the maintenance of an equilibrium of power in the system as the primary instrumental goal. The theory predicts that states, and particularly great powers, will balance against those states that constitute the primary threats to their interests and particularly against any state that threatens to secure a hegemonic position. 9 Balance of power theorists argue that the balancing mechanism-which includes both external alliances and internal military buildups-almost always successfully avoids hegemony, either because potential hegemons are deterred by their anticipation of a military coalition forming against them or because they are defeated in war after deterrence fails. In balance of power theory, serious threats of hegemony are a sufficient condition for the formation of a blocking coalition, which leads either to the withdrawal of the threatening power or to a hegemonic war. Balance of power theory is more concerned with explaining national strategies, the formation of blocking coalitions, the avoidance of hegemony, and the stability of the system than the origins of wars, which are underdetermined. All balance of power theorists agree that some form of equilibrium of military capabilities increases the stability of the system (generally defined as the relative absence of major wars), and that movements toward unipolarity are destabilizing because they trigger blocking coalitions and (usually) a hegemonic war to restore equilibrium. There is a major debate, however, between classical realists, who argue that stability is further supported by the presence of a multipolar distribution of power and a "flexible" alliance system (Morgenthau 1967, Gulick 1955), and neorea1ists, who argue that bipolarity is more stable than mu1tipo1arity (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 1990). Although neorealists rely heavily on polarity as a key explanatory variable, they do so with very little supporting evidence. They overgeneralize from the Cold War experience, where bipolarity is confounded with the existence ofnuclear weapons and other key variables, and fail to demonstrate the validity of their arguments with respect to earlier historical eras. Although bipolarity is less common than multipo1arity, it has occurred before, as illustrated by the Athens-Sparta rivalry in the fifth century BC and the Habsburg-Valois rivalry in the early sixteenth century, both of which witnessed numerous wars. Neorea1ists also ignore a number of quantitative studies that suggest that bipolarity is no less war-prone than multipo1arity, that wars occur under a variety of struc9Walt (1987) emphasizes balancing against threats rather than the traditional view of balancing against power. There is a large literature on the question of whether states bandwagon with threats or balance against them, and the conditions under which various kinds of states do each (Vasquez 1997).

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tural conditions, and that polarity is not a primary causal factor in the outbreak of war (Sabrosky 1985). An important alternative to balance of power theory is power transition theory, a form of hegemonic theory that shares realist assumptions but emphasizes the existence of order within a hierarchical system (Organski & Kugler 1980, Gilpin 1981, Thompson 1988). Hegemons commonly arise and use their strength to create a set of political and economic structures and norms of behavior that enhance the stability of the system while advancing their own security. Differential rates of growth, the costs of imperial overextension, and the development of vested domestic interests lead to the rise and fall ofhegemons, and the probability of a major war is greatest at the point when the declining leader is being overtaken by the rising challenger. Either the challenger initiates a war to bring its benefits from the system into line with its rising military power or the declining leader initiates a "preventive war" to block the rising challenger while the chance is still available (Levy 1989b, pp. 253-54). The resulting hegemonic war usually generates a new hegemonic power, and the irregular hegemonic cycle begins anew. Power transition theorists disagree somewhat on the precise identity of hegemonic wars and the particular causal dynamics from which they arise; for comparisons of the wars and critiques of the theories see Levy (1985) and Vasquez (1993). Although many of the theoretical analyses of power transition theory focus on transitions between the dominant state in the system and a challenger, and include conceptions of a broader international system and hierarchy, some applications of power transition theory are dyadic in nature and apply in principle to any two states in the system. The dyadic-level "power preponderance" hypothesis, which holds that war is least likely when one state has a preponderance of power over another and is most likely when there is an equality of power, has received widespread support in the empirical literature (Kugler & Lemke 1996). Balance of power theory and power transition theory appear to be diametrically opposed; the former argues that hegemony never occurs and that concentrations of power are destabilizing, and the latter argues the opposite. It is important to note that traditional balance of power theory has a strong Eurocentric bias and implicitly conceives of power in terms of land-based military power, whereas most applications ofpower/hegemonic transition theory focus on global power and wealth (Levy 1985). These different conceptualizations suggest the possibility that these two theories are not necessarily inconsistent; it is conceivable, for example, that the European system has been most stable under a balance of military power whereas the global system is most stable in the presence of a single dominant military and economic power. This raises the relatively unexplored question of interaction effects between international systems at different levels. Rasler & Thompson (1994), for ex-

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ample, found that an increasing concentration of military power at the regional level often contributes to large-scale regional wars, but that these regional wars escalate to global wars only under conditions ofa deconcentration ofnaval power and economic wealth at the global level. A similar question concerns the interaction effects between dyadic relationships and their systemic context. Geller (1993) found that dyadic power transitions are correlated with war under conditions of decreasing systemic concentration but not under conditions of increasing systemic concentration, where no dyadic transition war has occurred. These results suggest that the investigation ofthe interactive dynamics of nested systems is an important question for further research. The relationship between economic interdependence and war is an old question that has attracted new attention in the past few years. Montesquieu [1977 (1748)] stated that "peace is the natural effect of trade," and liberal economic theorists since Smith [1937 (1776)] and Ricardo [1977 (1817)] have argued that capitalist economic systems and the free exchange of goods in an international market economy are the best guarantors of peace. Proponents advance a number of interrelated theoretical arguments in support of this proposition. The most compelling argument is that trade generates economic advantages for both parties, and the anticipation that war will disrupt trade and result in a loss or reduction of the welfare gains from trade or a deterioration in the terms of trade deters political leaders from war against key trading partners (Polachek 1980).10 Realists, including mercantilists and economic nationalists, advance a number of objections to the liberal economic theory of war. They often argue that the effect oftrade on war is small relative to that of military and diplomatic considerations. They also question the liberal assumption that trade is always more efficient than military coercion in expanding markets and investment opportunities and in promoting state wealth. Although this assumption may be true in the contemporary system, at least for advanced industrial states, it is not universal; mercantilists correctly argue that military force has been an instrument to promote state wealth as well as power in certain historical eras (Viner 1948, Rosecrance 1986). Realists downplay or reject the hypothesized deterrent and pacifying effects ofthe anticipated loss of welfare gains from trade. They argue that political leaders are less influenced by the possibility of absolute gains from trade than by concerns about relative gains, by the fear that the adversary will gain

IOTheories of "hegemonic stability" focus on the stability of the world political economy, but the implicit assumption is that a stable, liberal world economy promotes prosperity and peace. Kindlcbcrger (1973) discusses thc role of the depression and closed trading blocs in thc processes leading to World War II, and Gilpin (1981) develops some of the thcorctieallinkages between a stable world economy and international peace.

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more from trade and convert those gains into further gains, political influence, and military power (Waltz 1979, Grieco 1990, Huntington 1993). Concerns over relative gains, bolstered by resource scarcities and domestic pressures, can lead to economic competitions and rivalries that under certain conditions can escalate to war (Choucri & North 1975). In addition, gains from trade create dependence on one's trading partner. This dependence is often asymmetrical, and one party may be tempted to use economic coercion to exploit the adversary's vulnerabilities and influence its behavior regarding security as well as economic issues. These tendencies are reinforced by demands for protectionist measures from domestic economic groups that are especially vulnerable to external developments, particularly in bad economic times, and by leaders' temptations to bolster their domestic support through hardline foreign policies. These can lead to retaliatory actions, conflict spirals, and war. Whether the incentives for the gains from trade dominate the incentives for coercion or protection based on economic asymmetries, and whether the latter escalate to trade wars and militarized conflicts, are empirical questions that analysts have only recently begun to analyze systematically. Although many find that trade is associated with peace (Polachek 1980, Oneal & Russett 1997), the relationship is modest in strength and is sensitive to measurement techniques and time periods analyzed. Some find that trade is associated with conflict (Barbieri 1996).11 Although liberals and realists disagree on the effects of trade on war, they appear to agree that trade and other forms of economic interchange between societies will cease or be drastically reduced once states are at war with each other. The liberal argument that trade advances peace is based on the premise that war eliminates or seriously reduces trade, and the realist emphasis on relative gains suggests that once war breaks out at least one of the belligerents will terminate trade in order to prevent its adversary from using the gains from trade to increase its relative military or economic power. Contrary to both liberal and realist expectations, however, there are numerous historical cases of trade between enemies during wartime, and a preliminary quantitative study suggests that war frequently does little to depress the volume of trade between adversaries (Barbieri & Levy 1997). If validated by further research, this finding suggests a need for revisions in theories of interdependence, war, and peace. These theories are framed almost entirely at the systemic level and ignore the potentially important role of domestic variables. Self-interested domestic groups often press for the continua11 Scholars on both sides of the debate recognize, however, that these tests of the trade-conflict relationship are technically misspeeified; conflict can also affect trade, and the simultaneous and reciprocal effects of trade on war and war on trade need to be incorporated into a single model.

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tion of trade with the enemy, and governments often need tax revenues from trade and the general support of business groups in order to finance the war effort. Theories of interdependence and peace need to incorporate domestic variables into their hypotheses, refine their arguments regarding the deterrent effects of trade, and demonstrate these effects empirically. They also need to conceptualize relative gains at the systemic as well as the dyadic level; states often hesitate to terminate trade with the enemy for fear that they will lose that trade to a third party, who may be a greater economic or military rival. The preceding reference to domestic variables applies to systemic-level theories more generally. Although the incorporation of domestic variables is certainly consistent with a broadened conception of liberal theory, it is less compatible with realist theories, which trace the sources of state behavior and international patterns to systemic-level structures of power. Although structural realist theories properly emphasize the constraints on action provided by the distribution of power at the systemic and dyadic levels, they fail to give adequate attention to state preferences and to the impact of domestic institutions, cultures, and informational considerations on both the preferences and the constraints of states. These omissions have led all but the most committed neorealists to conclude that systemic-level theories are theoretically incomplete and empirically inadequate, in that they leave too much of the variation in the outbreak and expansion of war unexplained. These conclusions have brought on increasing challenges to realism and other systemic-level theories, as well as a shift to the societal level of analysis.

Societal-Level Theories After decades of giving less attention to domestic sources of international conflict than to systemic or individual factors, much of the action in the study of war is now taking place at the domestic level. Although interest in MarxistLeninist theories has waned, there has been a tremendous growth of research on the relationships between regime type, particularly democratic regimes, and war (analyzed by Ray in this volume). Scholars have also devoted attention to the "diversionary" use of force for domestic political purposes, to the impact of ethnonationalism on international conflict, and to other domestic sources of international conflict. Although the literature on societal sources of international conflict is currently characterized more by collections oflooselyconnected hypotheses than by well-developed theories, this work marks a significant advance in the study of war. This section focuses on diversionary theories of war and on theories of logrolling and coalition formation. Liberal and Marxist theorists suggest that mass public opinion is inherently peaceful; if a state initiates a war it is usually because political leaders or the capitalist class choose war over the desires and interests ofthe public, or per-

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haps because of "false consciousness" on the part of the people. For example, the institutionalist explanation for the democratic peace-which suggests that the division of power within democratic states imposes institutional constraints on the use of force by political leaders-assumes that mass publics in any regime are less inclined than are political leaders to use military force. This may be true, but little empirical research has been directed to this question. There are numerous historical cases in which the public appears all too eager for war, from the American Civil War to the eve of World War I in Europe to contemporary "identity wars." In some cases this popular enthusiasm for war may push political leaders into adopting more aggressive and risky policies than they would have preferred. President McKinley, facing an escalating crisis with Spain in the 1890s, "led his country unhesitatingly toward a war which he did not want for a cause in which he did not believe" because of pressures from the public and the press (May 1973). There is substantial evidence that the outbreak of war, particularly victorious war, generally leads to a "rally 'round the flag" effect (Mueller 1973) that enhances popular support for political leaders. Leaders often anticipate this "rally" effect and are sometimes tempted to undertake risky foreign ventures or hardline foreign policies in an attempt to bolster their internal political support. This is the age-old "scapegoat hypothesis" or "diversionary theory of war" (Levy 1989a). It is theoretically grounded in social identity theory and the in-group/out-group hypothesis, which suggests that conflict with an outgroup increases the cohesion of a well-defined in-group (Coser 1956, J Stein 1996). Group leaders are aware of the cohesive effects of external conflict and sometimes deliberately create or maintain external conflict to serve their internal purposes. As Bodin argued, "the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to ... find an enemy against whom [the subjects] can make common cause" (quoted in Levy 1989a, p.259). Empirical research on the scapegoat hypothesis has progressed through several stages. Early work by Rummel and others used factor analysis to determine empirical associations between the incidence of internal conflict and the incidence of external conflict. The finding that "foreign conflict behavior is generally completely unrelated to domestic conflict behavior" (Rummel 1963, p. 24) led to efforts to control for regime type and other variables that might affect the relationship between internal and external conflict (Wilkenfeld 1973). Although these controlled studies generated some positive findings, few of the correlations indicated strong relationships and there was little consistency across studies. The absence of significant findings regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict contrasts sharply with evidence of external scapegoating from historical and journalistic accounts and from a growing body of

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case-study evidence. This discrepancy, together with the perceived inadequacies of the Rummel paradigm (Levy 1989a), 12 has led to a number of major research projects over the last decade on the politically motivated use of force. These studies have attempted to specify theoretical models that link domestic politics with the external use of force and to identify empirically the internal conditions under which the use of force is most likely. Scholars have devoted particular attention to the timing of economic cycles and electoral cycles (in democratic states) and to existing levels of political leaders' domestic political support. The basic hypothesis is that the political insecurity of elites, and hence their propensity to use military force abroad, should be greatest during periods before elections, during periods of poor economic performance, or at other times when domestic political support is 10w. 13 These hypotheses find some confirmation in empirical tests over the Cold War period based on levels of inflation and unemployment (often combined into a "misery index") to tap poor economic performance (Ostrom & Job 1986, Russett 1989), although the effects of the electoral cycle have been questioned (Gaubatz 1991). There has also been extensive empirical support for the hypothesis that external conflict does trigger a substantial rally effect, which generally diminishes over time (Russett 1990). Most of these studies have focused on democratic regimes, partly because of the ease of measuring elite support levels but also because ofthe assumption that the greater political accountability of leaders in democratic states makes them more likely than authoritarian leaders to engage in external scapegoating. Autocrats too must maintain their basis of support, however, even if among more narrowly defined groups such as the military and economic leaders. Thus some argue that scapegoating may be as common among autocratic as among democratic leaders, and indeed some classic examples of scapegoating involve nondemocratic regimes (Argentina in the Malvinas, Germany in World War I, and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, for example). Whether the diversionary use of force is more common (or more effective) in democratic or authoritarian regimes depends on the potential benefits of

12The limitation of these studies to the mid-Cold War period (and in many cases to the 1955-1960 pcriod) raiscs scrious problems as to external validity. More important, the research designs on which these studies were based were not guided by a well-defined theoretical framework that might facilitate the interpretation of the empirical findings. They did not clearly specify the direction of the relationship or control for alternative explanations; consequently any positive findings would be consistent with either the externalization of internal conflict or the internalization of external conflict-including the possibility that internal conflict generates conditions of weakness that create a tempting target for external adversaries. 13Some scholars suggest that moderate levels of political support are most conducive to scapegoating, on the assumption that if support is low, scapegoating will either exacerbate internal divisions or not create a large enough rally effect to makc a differcnce.

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scapegoating, the probability of a diplomatic or military victory, the domestic costs and risks, and the availability of alternative means of dealing with domestic opposition. Democratic leaders who initiate unsuccessful wars are thrown out of power much more frequently than are nondemocratic leaders (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson 1995), but the personal costs of being removed from office may be greater for authoritarian leaders. Gelpi (1997) hypothesizes that the option of domestic repression is less available to democratic leaders and finds that democratic states were more likely than authoritarian regimes to initiate the use of force between 1946 and 1982. Another possible strategy for dealing with domestic oppositions is to secure additional resources from external allies, either to distribute among the disaffected members of society (or at least among key support groups) or to enhance the means of repression (see Barnett & Levy 1991 and Bronson 1997). Gelpi's (1997) finding raises interesting questions for the democratic peace and for international conflict more generally (Ray 1995, 1998). It challenges the hypothesis that democracies are more peaceful than are nondemocratic states and the assumption that wars between the two are generally initiated by the latter. This finding also leads to the dyadic-level questions of how frequently democratic scapegoating is directed at other democracies, and why the ensuing militarized dispute almost never escalates to war. The more general question, which has been neglected in the literature, is what kinds of adversaries make good targets for diversionary action. 14 Scapegoating might be a particularly useful strategy for leaders of states engaged in enduring rivalries, and its use might help explain the intensification of rivalries, but the literature on enduring rivalries says little about this (Diehl 1998). Ethnic adversaries also make excellent scapegoats. Although students of ethnonationalism recognize the use of scapegoating by "ethnic entrepreneurs" to maintain and increase their own domestic support, theorists of diversionary behavior and theorists of ethnonationalism have made few attempts to build systematically on one another's conceptual frameworks or empirical knowledge. Most theoretical and empirical studies of the diversionary use of force assume the existence of a unified political elite attempting to increase its support among a mass public that is susceptible to symbolic appeals to the interests and honor of the nation. Neither elites nor masses are necessarily unified, however, and some research explores the consequences of these divisions. Politicalleaders have different kinds of constituencies in different types of political systems, and in their diversionary use of force they may be more concerned about their support among some groups than among the public as a whole. 14The little work that has been done on images of the enemy (Holsti 1967) has not been linked to scapcgoating.

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Morgan & Bickers (1992), for example, find that the use offorce by the United States is more related to levels of partisan support than to overall levels of support. Elites are also divided, and one faction may support a policy of external scapegoating as a means of advancing its own interests in intra-elite bargaining and struggle for power (Lebow 1981). Alternatively, external scapegoating may be a means of unifying a divided elite. The Argentine plan to seize the Malvinas by force, for example, was designed not only to recover public support for the junta but also to give a divided regime a mission around which it could coalesce. There is an interesting divergence between explanations of why political elites engage in external scapegoating and explanations of why scapegoating works to enhance or maintain their domestic support. The literature suggests that leaders adopt scapegoating as a rational instrument of policy to advance their interests, while publics respond on the basis of symbolic and emotional appeals, as explained by the in-group/out-group hypothesis. While the psychological rather than interest-based response of publics is certainly plausible, it is also possible to construct an interest-based or integrated explanation for the response of the public to the external use of force. Recent research has attempted to integrate the behaviors of both leaders and publics into principal-agent and other rational choice models. In the basic model, the public and other key social groups are the constituents or principal, which has a choice as to whether to retain its agent, the political leadership. This choice is a function of the extent to which the principal's interests are advanced by the agent, which is often measured in terms of the success of both economic policy and the use of force in foreign policy (though other measures are possible). Constituents' choices are made in the context of uncertainty, given information asymmetries favoring the agent, and they must infer the agent's "type" (competent or not) from a combination of current foreign policy outcomes and their own prior probability estimates based on past economic performance. Agents understand this "signaling game," so that even incompetent leaders may have the incentive to engage in risky foreign policy behavior in order to give the impression of competence. Analysts solve for the equilibrium and test it against the evidence (Richards et a11993, Smith 1996). These models help to explain "gambling for resurrection" through risky foreign policies by poor leaders who expect to be removed by their constituents (Downs & Rocke 1995). Although some of the assumptions of these models are rather strong, and although the classification of agents as either competent or not regardless of issue area is troubling, these attempts to model diversionary processes in terms of self-interested behavior of leaders and constituencies are a promising area for future research.

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It is important to note that these models of diversionary processes (both formal and non formal) are all models of foreign policy, not strategic interaction (and thus are not technically models of war). This raises the question of how external actors perceive and respond to diversionary actions. Do states recognize when another's behavior is driven by diversionary motives? Ifso, do they treat these actions differently than they do other actions and respond to them in different ways? In addition, do they anticipate when the adversary's domestic conditions make it particularly likely to engage in external scapegoating or other hardline foreign policies, and do they adjust their own behavior accordingly? Do they anticipate domestically induced preferences for conciliatory behavior by their adversaries, and do they attempt to exploit the adversary under such conditions? There is little attention in the literature to the strategic dimension of diversionary behavior or of domestic sources of foreign policy more generally, though Morrow's (1991) model of arms control negotiations and Smith's (1995) model of diversionary theory are important exceptions. The incorporation of a strategic component into diversionary theory is an important task for future research. These rationalist models of aggressive foreign policies by self-interested elites faced with rational publics are also reflected in the traditional literature. Lenin's (1916) explanation of World War I as an attempt by the imperialist classes "to divert the attention of the laboring masses from the domestic political crisis," for example, assumed rationality on the part of key domestic constituencies as well as the ruling class. Imperialist expansion works, for a time at least, by propping up the falling rate of profit and providing the ruling class with extra resources that they can use to secure the support of the leadership of key labor groups (in Levy 1989a, pp. 259,280). Marxist-Leninist models of imperialism, like models of scapegoating, implicitly assume that external expansion and the use of force serve the interests of the ruling class or elite but not those of society as a whole. If society benefited from expansionist foreign policies then a rational unitary model of the national interest would suffice to explain behavior and a distinctive societal component would not be necessary. The basic argument is that the benefits of expansion go to the ruling elite (whether Lenin's monopoly capitalists or Schumpeter's military-feudal elites), who have concentrated interests, while the costs of expansion are diffused throughout society in the form of taxation. If the costs of aggressive foreign policies are too high-and we have enough examples of "imperial overstretch" to suggest that they sometimes are-it is not clear how elites maintain their power. As Snyder (1991) argued, groups concentrated enough to benefit from overexpansion are too narrow to control state policy, while those broad enough to control policy are too diffuse to reap benefits from overexpansionist policies. Snyder (1991) developed an alternative model in which key internal groups have parochial interests that favor

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different but limited forms of imperial expansion or military buildups. They secure and share power through logrolled coalitions and pursue the foreign policy interests advocated by each, so that the resulting policy is more aggressive or expansionist than that desired by any single group and cannot be supported by existing societal resources. The coalition of iron and rye in Germany a century ago is a classic example: The industrialists sought a more active role for Germany in the world economy and an expansion of the navy to back it up, while agrarian interests sought protection against Russian grain exports. The former alienated Britain and the latter alienated Russia, and Germany lacked the resources to deal simultaneously with both of these adversaries. For Snyder, this rationalist model of logrolling is not sufficient to explain overexpansion or the stability of the ruling coalition. He argues that coalitions reinforce their positions of power and rationalize their policies by exploiting their control over information through the propagation of self-serving myths about their nation, its adversaries, and their history (Van Evera 1990-91). They then present these myths as lessons of history. These dynamics of overexpansion are most likely to arise in cartelized political systems and least likely to occur in democratic systems, where diffuse interests and the absence of information monopolies work against strategic myth-making. 15

Individual-Level Theories Individual-level theories assume (a) that external and internal structures and social forces are not translated directly into foreign policy choices; (b) that key decision-makers vary in their definitions of state interests, assessments of threats to those interests, and/or beliefs as to the optimum strategies to achieve those interests; and (c) that differences in the content of actors' belief systems, in the psychological processes through which they acquire information and make judgments and decisions, and in their personalities and emotional states are important intervening variables in explaining observed variation in state behaviors with respect to issues of war and peace. There is a substantial literature on political leaders ' "operational codes" and belief systems, on the influence of "lessons of history" on their beliefs and policy preferences, and on the role of misperceptions and biases in informationprocessing that affect crisis decision-making (George 1969; Jervis 1976, 1988; Lebow 1981; Holsti 1967, 1989; Levy 1994). A central theme in many of these models is that, because of cognitive limitations, decision-making is characterized by "bounded rationality" rather than the ideal-type rationality posited by 15Snyder (1991) tested his model through comparative case studies of overexpansion by many of the great powers over the last century and a half. Some have criticized his research design for "selecting on the dependent variable," although his combined cross-sectional and longitudinal design does provide substantial variation on both dependent and independent variables.

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formal decision theory. I limit my attention here to prospect theory, which is one of the most recent attempts to apply a social-psychological model to international relations but which shares some elements of more formal rational choice models. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) developed this theory of individual choice under conditions of risk to explain experimental anomalies in expected utility theory. Prospect theory assumes that people evaluate outcomes in terms of deviations from a reference point or aspiration level rather than in terms of net-asset levels. They generally overweight goods in their possession relative to comparable goods they do not own (the endowment effect), overweight losses from that reference point relative to equivalent gains (loss aversion), and make riskaverse choices among gains but risk-acceptant choices among losses. People also overweight certain outcomes relative to merely probable ones and 10wprobability outcomes relative to other outcomes. This asymmetry of behavior with respect to gains and losses means that the way people frame their reference point in any given choice problem is critical. It is also subjective, although people tend to adjust psychologically to gains much more quickly than to losses and thus to frame around new acquisitions but not around recent losses. These assumptions lead to a number of hypotheses about behavior with respect to international relations (Levy 1997a). (a) There is a "reference point bias" in behavior, a greater tendency to move toward the reference point than one would predict on the basis of standard expected-value calculations. When the reference point is the status quo, as it commonly is, there is a status quo bias in decision-making. (b) State leaders take more risks to maintain their international positions, reputations, and domestic political support than they do to enhance those positions. (c) After suffering losses (in territory, reputation, domestic political support, etc), po1itica11eaders do not adapt to those losses and renonna1ize their reference points but instead take excessive risks (relative to expected value calculations) to recover those losses. After making gains, political leaders adapt to them, renorma1ize their reference points, and take excessive risks to defend those gains against subsequent losses. Thus if A loses territory to B, A will take excessive risks to maintain her gains while B will take excessive risks to recover her losses. (d) Because adaptation to losses tends to be slow, sunk costs frequently influence decision-makers' calculations and state behavlOr.

With respect to strategic interaction, (e) the endowment effect leads actors to overvalue the concessions they give relative to those they get in return, leading to a "concession aversion" or a bias against agreements (relative to an expected-value calculus). (j) It is easier to deter an adversary from taking an action than to compel him to terminate an action or to undo what he has already done, and it is easier to deter an adversary from making gains than to deter her

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from recovering losses. (g) It is easier for states to cooperate in the distribution of gains than in the distribution of losses. These are intriguing hypotheses that appear to resonate in the world of international relations, but several conceptual and methodological problems complicate the task of testing these hypotheses empirically. The problem of identifying the actor's reference point, particularly in the absence of a theory of framing, makes it very difficult to rule out the alternative and more parsimonious hypothesis that behavior is driven not by framing, loss aversion, and the reflection effect in risk orientation, but rather by a standard expected-value calculation (Levy 1997a).

CONCLUSIONS: GENERAL TRENDS IN THE STUDY OF WAR There are general trends in the study of the causes of war that cut across different theoretical perspectives, some in response to real-world trends and others to autonomous shifts in intellectual paradigms. One is a partial move away from a long-standing great power focus toward a greater emphasis on small state conflicts, particularly on civil wars and ethnonational conflicts. There has also been a pronounced shift away from the systemic level (in terms of both independent and dependent variables), in part because of growing dissatisfaction with the failure of structural systemic models to explain enough of the variance in war and peace. This shift has led to rising interest in both dyadic-level behavior and societal-level explanatory variables. At the dyadic level, in addition to long-standing research on dyadic power relationships and power transitions, there are new research programs on enduring rivalries, bargaining, territorial contiguity, trade, and other relationships. Some of these have generated much stronger empirical findings than those for systemic patterns or national-level behavior. Bremer (1992), for example, demonstrates that the probability of war is 35 times higher for contiguous dyads than for noncontiguous dyads for the 1816-1965 period, and Vasquez (1996) shows that when war occurs, a strong tendency exists for contiguous states to fight dyadic wars and for noncontiguous states to fight multilateral wars.16 Whatever the relationship between concentrations of military and economic capabilities at the systemic level, there is substantial evidence that at the dyadic level an equality of capabilities is significantly more likely to lead to war than is than is a preponderance of power (Kugler & Lemke 1996); bargain16Kal Holsti (1991) demonstrates that territorial issues have been at stake in most wars since 1648, although it is not clear whether this reflects the physical opportunity for war between contiguous states or incentives for war such as disputes over resources or disputes involving ethnonational groups (Goertz & Diehl 1992, Vasquez 1993).

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ing strategies based on reciprocity are more likely to lead to peaceful outcomes than those based exclusively on coercive threats (Leng 1993); and "asymmetries of motivation" are at least as important as power differentials in determining outcomes of international disputes (George & Smoke 1974). The shift to societal-level explanatory variables is a response to their long neglect in the literature; to the decline of systemic imperatives arising from the bipolar Cold War structure; to the increasing salience of smaller, politically unstable states and ethnonational conflicts in the post-Cold War world; and to the availability of good quantitative data on key variables (Gurr 1989). Interest in the societal level has also been spurred by the striking finding that democratic states rarely if ever go to war against each other, which "comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" (Levy 1989b, p. 270). There has also been an increasing recognition of the complexity of the causes of war and an increasing willingness to attempt to model that complexity. This recent interest in complexity, exemplified by Jervis' System Effects: Complexity in Social and Political Life (1997) and by Axelrod's Complexity of Cooperation (1997), involves more attention to multilevel explanatory frameworks, dynamic processes, reciprocal causation, endogeneity problems, and selection effects. In the past decade most international relations theorists have moved beyond their earlier preoccupation with explanations at a single level of analysis and debates about which level provides the most powerful explanations. They now give much more attention to interaction effects among variables at different levels in the processes leading to war. Game-theoretic models, for example, which six or seven years ago were applied almost exclusively to problems of strategic interaction between states, now incorporate domestic structures and processes as well. Applications of game-theoretic models have themselves become more sophisticated and more complex. 17 Prisoner's Dilemma and related 2 x 2 games were useful for the analysis of simple strategic situations, but the move to extensive-form games, particularly sequential games with incomplete information, marks a profound theoretical advance. The greater realism of the new models has contributed to a strong revival of interest in game-theoretic approaches in recent years. These games incorporate the uncertainty that decision-makers routinely face, the sequence of choices and counter-choices that generally characterize the outbreak of war, the problem of the credibility of commitments in an anarchic world, and the dynamics of signaling. 17Moreover, the shift in formal rational choice analysis from decision-theoretic models (Bueno de Mesquita 1981) to game-theoretic models (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992) represents a major paradigm shift.

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The conceptualization of international relations and war as a sequence of choices, which has long been common in the qualitative literature, is also reflected in much of the quantitative empirical literature. Early studies in the "correlates of war" tradition looked for simple empirical associations between systemic structures and the frequency and severity of war, reflecting the rather static ba1ance-of-power propositions that they were designed to test. This research tradition has evolved such that it now conceptualizes international conflict as a process or series of steps (Vasquez 1993) from background conditions to the occurrence and evolution of militarized disputes to the outbreak and evolution of international war, which in turn affect background conditions (Bremer 1992, Cusack 1996). This more dynamic conceptualization led to the development of new data sets on militarized interstate disputes (Jones et a1 1996), the Behavioral Correlates of War (Leng 1993), and international crisis behavior (Brecher et a11988). These data sets have further facilitated analyses of the sources, dynamics, and consequences of international dispute and crisis behavior. The more dynamic character of theorizing about war is also reflected in the literatures on long cycles, power transitions, enduring rivalries, learning, and evolutionary processes. The increasing complexity of theories of war and peace is reflected in the recognition of the importance of unintended consequences, endogeneity effects, and selection effects, as well as in the construction of rational choice and systems models that facilitate the analysis of such effects. In addition to placing greater emphasis on strategic behavior and interconnectedness of systems, scholars increasingly acknowledge that earlier modeling of actors' responses to exogenous events, institutions, and other external shocks neglected the possibility that those events or institutions were themselves the endogenous result of conscious strategic behavior. Many studies of deterrence, for example, conclude that the impact of military power differentials on crisis outcomes is often modest, but ignore the fact that such power considerations may have determined whether an actor initiated the crisis in the first place (Levy 1989b, p. 243). Extensive-form games facilitate the modeling of these dynamics (Fearon 1994, Bueno de Mesquita 1996). There has been significant progress in the empirical study of the causes of war. Most empirical research is more theoretically driven than it was two decades ago. It is also characterized by a better match between theory and research design. We find fewer "barefoot empiricist" fishing expeditions and fewer idiographic single-country case studies. Large-n statistical studies now regularly employ such methods as event-count models, logistic regression, survival models, and interrupted time series, the assumptions of which better match the underlying theory and the nature of the data. Case-study research is also more methodologically sophisticated. Influenced by George (1982) and King et a1 (1994), qualitatively oriented scholars

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have made increasing efforts to deal with standard problems of scientific inference. Case selection is more likely to be driven by theoretical considerations and by the need to maximize control over extraneous variables than by substantive interest alone. Case-study research has become more historical, but it has also become more analytical and comparative. Graduate training programs have increasingly begun to include courses on qualitative methods as well as quantitative methods. Another positive trend is toward the adoption of multi-method research designs, either in a single study or in a broader research program. Two decades ago, relatively few studies combined decision or game-theoretic models with statistical tests, but this is the norm today. There are also more and more studies that combine case studies with statistical analyses. Although some regard rational choice and case studies as antithetical, the combination of quantitative and qualitative research designs in the testing of rational choice theories allows each method to compensate for the limitations of the other. The combination of large-n statistical studies, case studies, and game-theoretic models by numerous scholars studying the interdemocratic peace and the diversionary theory of war provide examples of the potential of a multi-method approach, and the cumulative results have been far more convincing than those produced by any single method. Whatever one's assessment of the state of the art in the study of war one or two decades ago, there are considerable grounds for optimism today. Although theoretical and empirical research in the field is more diverse and contentious, almost everything has improved. Our theories are more imaginative, rigorous, and relevant; our research designs are more closely matched to our theoretical propositions and more sensitive to potential problems of inference; our data sets are more numerous and more refined. Whether we have approached a turning point in the history of warfare is still a matter of debate, but we have clearly improved our understanding of the motivations, conditions, and processes that contribute to war or peace. Visit the Annual Reviews home page at http://www.AnnuaIReviews.org.

Literature Cited Axelrod R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 241 pp. Axelrod R. 1997. The Complexity ofCooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 232 pp.

Baldwin DA. 1993. Neorealism and Neoliberalism. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 377 pp. Barbieri K. 1996. Economic interdependence: a path to peace or source of interstate conflict? J. Peace Res. 33: 29-49

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Name Index Acheson, Dean 621-2 passim Alfonsin, Raul 222 Alger, Chadwick 295 Alker, Hayward 281,443,544 Allison, Graham T. xvi, 115, 121, 177, 188, 197, 213 Alt, James E. 215 Ancillon, Johann P.P. 505 Anderson, Perry 194, 204 Angell, Norman 66, 617 Anthony, Susan B. 149 Aristotle 7,141,165 Armstrong, A.c. 265 Aron, Raymond xiii, 30-31 passim, 32, 33, 34-5 passim, 39, 87, 101,263,265 Art, Robert 282 Ashley, Richard 281,412,416-17 Austin-Smith, David 124 Axelrod,Robert 71,115,117,155,216,220, 282,429,430,698,712 Bacevich, Andrew 570 Bachrach, Peter 556 Baldwin, David A. xv, xvi, 297, 511-44, 550, 696 Balfour, Lord Arthur 609, 634 Banks, Jeffrey 250 Baran, Paul 190, 197 Baratz, Morton 556 Barbieri, K. 702 Barnet, Richard 263 Barnett, Michael N. xv, 165, 545-81, 706 Beard, Charles 585, 586 Berger, Peter 308, 320 Bernheim, B. Douglas 162 Bethmann Hollweg, Theobold von 673,674 Betts, Richard 410 Bickers, K. 707 Billingsley, Patrick 253 Bhaskar, Roy 553 Bismarck, Otto von 59, 191,201,208,619,629, 630 Black, Max 217 Blainey, Geoffrey 245, 667-8 passim, 670

Blau, Peter M. 526, 555 Blight, James 246 Bodin, Jean 195, 704 Boli, John 561 Bolingbroke, Lord Henry St John 480,484,492 Boulding, Kenneth 88, 92 Bourdieu, Pierre 556 Brecher, Michael 197,713 Bremer, S.A. 693,711,713 Bright, John 484 Brodie, Bernard 634, 645 Bronson, R. 706 Brougham, Lord 504,505-6,509,510 Bruck, H.w. 112 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 269 Bucher, L. 477 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce 117, 125, 245, 662, 663,692,706,713 Bull, Hedley 87-103,283 Burke, Edmund 87 Burley, Anne-Marie 157,434 Bush, George 16, 246 Bush, George W. 568, 569, 570, 571 Buzan, Barry 36 Byrd, Robert 235 Cady Stanton, Elizabeth 149 Caporaso, James 573 Cardoso, Ferdinand E. 187 Carlsnaes, Walter xi Carnesale, Albert 271 Carr, Edward Hallett xi, xii, 4, 8, 46, 87, 141, 292,293,337,338,339,356,357,360, 361,511,546,569,574-5 passim Carter, Jimmy 202, 210, 221, 232, 235 Carus, W.S. 344 Cashman, G. 694 Castlereagh, Lord 503 Catherine the Great 260, 626 Chamberlain, Neville 208, 640 Chammah, Al bert 117 Chan, Steve 252, 262 Charles I, King 480

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Theories of International Relations

Checkel, Jeffrey 573 Child, Sir Josiah 27-8 passim, 29 Choucri, N.C. 702 Christopher, Warren 379-80 Churchill, Winston 616,642 Claude, Tnis L. Jr xv, 89, 141, 155, 281, 293, 294, 400-403 passim, 425, 443 Cline, Ray S. 521-3 passim, 530 Clinton, Bill 12,379,566 Cobden, Richard 87,476,484 Connally, Tom 621-2passim Coser, L.A. 704 Coulter, Jeff 316 Cox, Robert 412,414,417,444,445,560 Craig, Gordon 205 Crawford, J. 351 Crawford, Neta 159,165 Crick, Bernard 102 Cusack, T.R. 713 Dahl, RobertA. 75, 128,288,444,511,512,519, 528, 529-30 passim, 534, 537, 542, 553, 556 Dahrendort~ Ralf 7 de Gaulle, Charles 199, 618 de Pradt, Abbe D. 484 Deudney, Daniel 68 Deutsch, Karl W 66, 72, 88, 99, 100, 10 I, 213 Dewey, John 78 Diehl, p.F. 706 Diesing, Paul 115, 124,217,234,235,244,245 Disraeli, Benjamin 201 Donnadieu 500, 509 Doty, Paul 271 Downs, George W 127,707 Doyle, Michael W xiv, 3, 47, 259-77 Drucker, Peter 12 Druckman, Daniel 216 Duffield, John 435 Dunant, Henry 149 Dunn, Frederick 109 Duplessis-Mornay, Philippe 481 Dupont, Cedric 124 Dupuis, C. 490, 509 Durch, William 408 Durkheim, Emile 186 Duvall, Raymond xv, 545-81 Easton, David 287-8 Eckstein, Harry 287, 536

Edward VII, King 610 Elshtain, .LB. 692,695 Emerson, Richard M. 526 Emerson, Rupert 443 Enloe, C. 695 Evans, Peter B. xiv, 215 Evans, Tony 456 Eyre, Dana 158 Falk, Richard 358 Fay, S.B. 509 Fearon, James D. xiv, xvi, xvi, 115, 117, 124, 144, 154, 155,243-58,655-90,713 Fenelon, Fran