Perceptions and Politics: The Foreign Relations of the European Union with Latin America 9783964565686

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Klaas Dykmann

Perceptions and Politics. The Foreign Relations of the European Union with Latin America

Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Iberoamerika-Kunde - Hamburg Band 63

Klaas Dykmann

Perceptions and Politics. The Foreign Relations of the European Union with Latin America

Vervuert Verlag

Frankfurt am Main 2006

Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde • Hamburg

GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien Das Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde bildet zusammen mit dem Institut für Asienkunde, dem Institut für Afrika-Kunde und dem Deutschen Orient-Institut die Stiftung GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies / Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien in Hamburg. Aufgabe des Instituts für Iberoamerika-Kunde ist die gegenwartsbezogene Beobachtung und wissenschaftliche Untersuchung der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen in Lateinamerika. Das Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde ist bemüht, in seinen Publikationen verschiedene Meinungen zu Wort kommen zu lassen, die jedoch grundsätzlich die Auffassung des jeweiligen Autors und nicht unbedingt die des Instituts darstellen.

Gedruckt mit freundlicher Unterstützung der Fritz Thyssen Stiftung für Wissenschaftsförderung.

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Angaben sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar. (Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Iberoamerika-Kunde, Hamburg; Band 63) ISBN 3-86527-261-4 (Vervuert) ISBN 84-8489-262-X (Iberoamericana) Deposito Legal: B-22.710-2006 © Vervuert Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2006 Alle Rechte vorbehalten Umschlaggestaltung: Konstantin Buchholz Gedruckt auf säure- und chlorfrei gebleichtem, alterungsbeständigem Papier Printed in Spain

Content 1. 2.

3.

Introduction The Evolution and Structure of CFSP 2.1. A brief history of European foreign policy 2.2. The budget of CFSP 2.3. The actors of CFSP, their functions and procedures 2.3.1. The Member States 2.3.2. The European Council 2.3.3. The presidency of the Council 2.3.4. The Council of the European Union 2.3.5. The High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 2.3.6. The Policy Unit of the High Representative 2.3.7. The European Commission 2.3.8. The European Parliament 2.4. The instruments of CFSP 2.5. Analysis of CFSP The development of relations between the European Union and Latin America 3.1. The evolution of political relations between Europe and Latin America 3.1.1. The Central American conflicts as starting point for strengthened political relations 3.1.2. The EU's partner in Latin America: The Group of Rio 3.1.3. New impetus for biregional relations in the 1990s: The trade agenda 3.1.4. Civil society in the EU and Latin America 3.2. The European Union and Latin American subregions and individual countries 3.2.1. The European Union and Central America 3.2.2. The European Union and the Andean Community of Nations 3.2.3. The European Union and Mexico 3.2.4. The European Union and Chile 3.2.5. The European Union and Mercosur 3.3. Conclusions

9 13 14 17 18 18 19 20 21 26 27 29 31 32 36

39 40 42 43 45 46 47 47 49 50 51 52 54

4.

A Foreign Policy Analysis of the CFSP towards Latin America 4.1. The actors of CFSP towards Latin America, their interests, goals and procedures 4.1.1. The Member States of the EU 4.1.2. The Presidency 4.1.3. The Council of the European Union 4.1.4. The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the High Representative for CFSP 4.1.5. The European Commission 4.1.6. The European Parliament 4.1.7. The national embassies in Latin America 4.1.8. The Delegations of the European Commission 4.1.9. The Latin American Missions in Brussels 4.1.10. Civil society 4.2. Measures to implement the CFSP 4.2.1. The Common Position and Joint Actions 4.2.2. The clauses 4.2.3. Declarations 4.2.4. Communication and procedures 4.3. The consequences of CFSP in Latin America 4.4. An Analysis of CFSP towards Latin America

55 56 56 56 57 59 60 64 66 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 74 76 76

5.

The role of Spain - A bridge between Europe and Latin America? ....79 5.1. Spanish Foreign Policy 79 5.2. Spain, Latin America and Ibero-Americanism 85 5.3. Spain and the EU policy towards Latin America 87 5.3.1. The effect of Spain's entry into the European Community: "Latin America is on the map" 88 5.3.2. The Spanish impact on the political relations of the EU towards Latin America 89 5.3.3. Spain and European Development Cooperation with Latin America 92 5.4. Spain and CFSP towards Latin America 93 5.5. Spain and the biregional political relations 96 5.6. An Analysis of the Spanish policy towards Latin America 98

6.

Two case studies (Argentina and Venezuela) 6.1. The political crisis in Argentina 2001/2002 and the reaction of the EU 6.1.1. Background 6.1.2. The role of the European Union 6.1.3. The follow-up of the crisis 6.1.4. Evaluation of the European reaction to the Argentine crisis

101 101 101 102 106 107

6.1.5. The Argentine crisis from a CFSP perspective 6.1.6. Conclusions 6.2. The coup attempt of April 2002 in Venezuela and the European Union 6.2.1. Background 6.2.2. The coup attempt 6.2.3. The reaction of the European Union 6.2.4. The reaction of the United States and the Organisation of American States 6.2.5. The follow-up and consequences of the coup and the EU's performance 6.2.6. Conclusions 7.

8.

108 109 Ill 112 112 114 116 116 119

The US role in the EU's foreign relations with Latin America 7.1. The relations between the United States and Latin America 7.2. The political relations between the EU and the US 7.2.1. Is there a CFSP toward the US? 7.2.2. The New Transatlantic Dialogue 7.2.3. The US Mission in Brussels 7.2.4. The Delegation of the European Commission to the United States and national embassies 7.2.5. The function of DG Relex C. 1 7.2.6. The positions of the EU and the US on Latin America 7.3. Perceptions of the three regions 7.3.1. US American perceptions of the EU as a political player 7.3.2. The US view on EU-Latin American relations 7.3.3. Latin American and European perceptions of the US 7.3.4. Latin American perceptions of the US and the EU 7.4. An Analysis of the position of the US for the biregional relations 7.4.1. Strong inter-American relations 7.4.2. US-European work-sharing in Latin America 7.4.3. The Asian alternative 7.4.4. A European-Latin American counterweight 7.4.5. The triangle vision 7.5. Prospects

123 123 125 127 128 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 145

The political relations between Europe and Latin America: A strategic partnership? 8.1. The biregional relations 8.2. Perceptions of the European and Latin American actors 8.2.1. Latin American and European worldviews 8.2.2. Latin America's image in Europe 8.2.3. The image of the EU in Latin America

147 149 151 152 153 154

8.2.4. Asymmetrical relations 155 8.3. The summits between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union 157 8.3.1. The first EU-Latin American summit in Rio (1999): Creating a strategic partnership 158 8.3.2. The second biregional summit in Madrid 2002: Some achievements or a failure? 158 8.3.3. The 2004 Summit in Guadalajara: A step back? 160 8.4. Is there a strategic partnership between the EU and Latin America?. 165 8.5. Prospects 169 9.

Conclusions 9.1. The CFSP of the European Union towards Latin America 9.2. Political relations between the EU and Latin America

175 175 182

10. Proposals 187 10.1. The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy 187 10.2. Political relations: Cooperation at the political level, in trade matters, and with regard to development cooperation and social cohesion 190 10.3. International cooperation beyond the biregional level 194 11. Bibliography

197

1. Introduction The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) has been the subject of numerous scholarly debates. However, the academic and public discussion has largely focused on the attempts to let the European Union speak with the famous "one voice" with regard to international politics, while the common foreign policy of the European Union towards developing regions has not been the subject of prolific research. Thus, the present study shall help to clarify the decision-making processes within and outside the European Union with regard to the foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean. 1 Besides the internal processes within the EU institutions, the role of the former colonial power Spain, as well as the position of the powerful United States of America for both the EU and Latin America, is of interest. Through numerous interviews and informal conversations, I could detect different perceptions, positions and perspectives within the EU institutions as well as views towards the Union from the outside. 2 One condition for the interviews was that the sources would be kept anonymous. This type of "unofficial source" certainly contributes to new insights. In accordance, this study is mainly empiric. The absence of a theoretical embedding shall provide a more pragmatic analysis, which may be more useful in practice. Thus, the question of whether the European Union is an international actor according to international law, or to what extent the EU can actually carry out its "own" foreign policy will not be theoretically discussed. Another peculiarity of this analysis is its somewhat fragmentary character, due to the information gathered through the interviews, the result being that some sections are very detailed whilst other parts provide an overview of existing research. This analysis mainly presents perceptions of the EU's concrete CFSP and biregional relations. It focuses on the official relations, although the civil society has pjayed an increasingly important role for the biregional relations. In accordance, my study shall serve to complement existing research efforts and does not claim to be a textbook for relations between the European Union and Latin America.

'

In order to simplify the reading, in the following the notion "Latin America" also includes the Caribbean states. Between August 2003 and May 2005, I conducted qualitative expert interviews and organised discussions with more than hundred persons, including officials o f the European Commission, the Council of the EU, the Policy Planning Unit, members of several Permanent Representations, the US Mission to the EU, members of the European Parliament, national officials, academics, Latin American, US and European ambassadors in Brussels, Berlin, Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires, Washington D C., London and Madrid.

9

The present study is divided into two categories: first, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) approach towards Latin America; and second, the political relationship between Latin America and the European Union. In this context, the perception, strategic concept and effects of CFSP also influence the present and potential extent of political collaboration between the EU and Latin America in international politics. Furthermore, the separation between CFSP and political (and economic) relations between the two regions is sometimes difficult, since for CFSP matters, economics plays a role, and the shape of concrete CFSP actions affects political-economic relations. However, neither the economic and trade policies nor the development cooperation of the EU towards Latin America is a main theme of my investigation. This study focuses on the perceptions of EU and national decision-makers and does not concentrate on a methodological foreign policy analysis of the Union's actions in specific countries. For analysis of the specific CFSP towards Latin American countries, it should be taken into account that European foreign policy is determined as a result of the interplay between local developments and projections in other world regions and domestic policies (including personnel policies) in the EU member states. In this context, it would be of particular interest to inquire about the CFSP toward Venezuela, Colombia and Cuba. Unfortunately, an analysis of the concrete CFSP towards these countries would be beyond the scope of this study, but is an important topic for future research. In general, two sets of questions help analyse the EU's CFSP towards Latin America and the political relations between the two regions. 1) The CFSP towards Latin America a) Who are the major players in the EU and what are their interests and goals with regard to CFSP towards Latin America? b) Which measures do the actors use to achieve their goals, and what are the consequences? c) What role does the relationship between European institutions in Brussels play in the concrete CFSP towards Latin America? How do informal intra- and inter-institutional communication flows influence the Union's CFSP positions and decisions? d) Is Spain, as a former colonial power in the region, a decisive CFSP player with regard to Latin America? e) How should the CFSP towards Latin America be evaluated? 2) The Political Relations between the EU and Latin America a) What are the mutual perceptions of the actors in Latin America and Europe and how do these influence biregional relations? b) To which extent have biregional summits advanced political relations? c) Is there actually a strategic partnership, particularly with regard to political relations? 10

d) What is the role of the US, and how does it influence European-Latin American relations? To what degree would a closer Latin AmericanEuropean partnership be a counterweight to the perceived unilateralism of the superpower United States? e) What are the prospects of political relations between the European Union and Latin America - particularly in view of the EU enlargement, the Free Trade Area of the Americas project and renewed South-South cooperation (Group of 20)? For the examination of the European CFSP towards Latin America I employed the approach of foreign policy analysis (AIPMA) of Tetzlaff. 3 The AIPMA approach investigates the actors, interests, perceptions, measures and goals as well as consequences of foreign (and development) policies. However, as the European Common Foreign and Security Policy is not a typical national foreign policy, the application of the AIPMA model has been modified. First, I will provide a brief background of the general evolution of CFSP as well as an explanation of its concrete functioning, along with judgments on achievements and shortcomings, followed by a short history of institutionalisation of European-Latin American political and economic relations since the early 1980s. Third, the study provides a foreign policy analysis of the CFSP towards Latin America in general. Then, I will investigate Spain's foreign policy toward the region, as well as its influence on the EU policy towards Latin America. Two case studies on the European Union's reactions shall exemplify the concrete Common Foreign and Security Policy: the CFSP process in view of the outbreak of political and economic crisis in Argentina in 2001/2002; and the EU's reaction to the coup attempt against Venezuelan president Chavez in April 2002. Furthermore, I will investigate the role of the United States in EuropeanLatin American relations. Finally, this study provides an analysis of the political relations between the European Union and Latin America and outlines the prospects of a "strategic partnership" as well as some concrete proposals.

3

See Rainer Tetzlaff, '"Ghana - Fehlgeschlagene Versuche der Befreiung" - dreißig Jahre später: Vom Glanz und Elend politikwissenschaftlicher Methodik bei der Analyse gesellschaftlicher Prozesse in der Dritten Welt'. In: Dieter Neubert (eds ), Postkoloniale Transformation in Afrika. Zur Neubestimmung der Soziologie der Dekolonisalion. Mainzer Beiträge zur Afrika-Forschung, 6, Hamburg/London 2002, pp. 45-62.

11

2. The Evolution and Structure of CFSP Necesitamos más flexibilidad e innovación, menos teoria y más práctica. Eso es cierto para la función del alto representante, cuya descripción convencional como "intergubernamental" es, en mi opinión, simplista e incorrecta 4 Javier Solana

2003

At present, most Europeans (71 percent, according to a poll) want the EU to become a superpower similar to the United States. 5 Furthermore, EU citizens seek more independence from the US. 6 However, if this goal is connected to greater defence spending, Europeans are divided. 7 To increase the EU's international clout, European foreign, security and defence policy must be strengthened. The function of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the development of CFSP as well as a criticism of its work without exploring theoretical considerations in detail. First of all, I should clarify that I believe that there js a European foreign policy, even a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), though I still detect many shortcomings. 8 The European Union feels it is necessary to develop a European foreign and security policy in light of the international changes since the late 1980s and the wish to match the EU's existing strengths in international economics and development cooperation. The goal shall be to respond rapidly to international crises and to prevent conflicts. The former aim was not achieved at all in the case of the civil war in former Yugoslavia 9 , while the latter mostly seems to be wishful thinking for the future.

4

Javier Solana, 'Tres años como Alto Representante'. In: Política febrero 2003, p. 66.

5

Transatlantic Trends 2004. A Project o f the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di Sao Paolo with Additional Support from the Luso-American Foundation, Fundación BBVA, and the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), p. 6.

6

Transatlantic

Trends 2004, pp. 6, 7.

7

Transatlantic

Trends 2004, p. 16.

g

9

Exterior,

91, enero-

Some o f the interviewees I spoke with stated that there was no real CFSP as such, rather many different foreign policies. Interviews, Brussels, November-December 2003, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. Von Habsburg scolds the failure o f CFSP in the Yugoslavian case, since the Council had apparently got used to acting only as fast as the slowest national government. Otto von Habsburg, 'Plädoyer fur eine europäische Außenpolitik'. In: Günter Rinsche/Ingo Friedrich (eds.), Weichenstellung für das 21. Jahrhundert. Erfordernisse und Perspektiven der europäischen Integration. Köln/Weimar/Wien 1998, p. 86. 13

2.1. A brief history of European foreign policy Since 1957, if not earlier, there have been visions and attempts to create a common European foreign policy, although the concepts ranged from a strictly intergovernmental approach to more communitarian advances.' 0 In this context, it is necessary to mention the Fouchet Plan (1961), which followed France's General de Gaulle's "Europe of nations" and proposed an organisation for Europe without supranational elements and with the intergovernmental structure of classical international organisations. However, the lack of supranational elements provoked criticism, and the proposal was revised several times until negotiations on the plan were finally suspended. 1 ' Similarly, the Luxemburg Report of 1969 intended purely intergovernmental cooperation, not legally binding, with no transfer of sovereignty rights of nation states, and thus was more a sort of "gentlemen's agreement". 1 2 This was followed by the Copenhagen Report in 1973 (which agreed on improved intergovernmental cooperation but was still a political rather than legal commitment), and the summit in Paris in 1974. The Tindemans Report (1976), and the London Report (1981) dealt with modifications of European Political Cooperation (EPC). While the practical development of European integration had been motivated by economic interests' 3 , "European Political Cooperation", introduced in 1970, sought to create a common foreign policy approach' 4 , which also served as a "self-defence" reaction of the European Community against US endeavours to "expropriate western foreign policy". 15 Since the early 1970s, the EPC had attempted to coordinate the national foreign policies of the member states of the European Community. In 1986, the Single European Act formalised the EPC but did not change its nature or methods in essence. 16 The historical shift, at least 10

See Johannes Burkhard, Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und ihre Berührungspunkte mit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Schriften zum Europäischen Recht, 80, Berlin 2001 (Diss. Mainz 2000), pp. 23-33.

1

' Burkhard, Die Gemeinsame 12 Burkhard, Die Gemeinsame

Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik,

pp. 24, 25.

Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik,

pp. 25-27.

13

The pragmatic evolution o f European integration was rather motivated by economic interests and trade concerns, although the origin of the Coal and Steel Union also based on the necessity of European cooperation as a historic result o f the experience of the atrocious Nazi crimes and World War II.

14

See First report o f the Foreign Ministers to the Heads o f State and Government o f the member states of the European Community (The Davignon or Luxembourg Report), Luxembourg, 27 October 1970. In: Christopher Hill/Karen E. Smith (eds ), European Foreign Policy. Key Documents. London/New York 2002, pp. 75-80.

15

John Peterson/Elizabeth Bömberg, Decision-Making London 1999, p. 229.

16

Michael Smith, 'The EU as an international actor'. In: Jeremy Richardson (ed.), European Union. Power and policy-making. Second edition. London/New York 2001, p 287.

14

in the European

Union

Houndsmills/

with regard to the treaty framework, took place in 1993, when the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force and established not only a European "Union" but also coined the term "Common Foreign and Security Policy" as a goal for the EU. According to Peterson and Bömberg, the CFSP was "unveiled in 1991 as an entirely new policy" in important respects. 17 For Burkhard, however, the creation of CFSP was nothing more than a prudent development of the EPC, its major achievement being joint action as a form of common activity. While EPC was limited to the economic aspects of security policy, the CFSP now covers all sectors of foreign and security policy. 18 Since the entry-into-force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, the European Union consists of three "pillars": the first pillar is composed of the European Communities; the second covers the CFSP; and the third deals with Justice and Home Affairs. It is important to reiterate that the first pillar functions using communitarian decision-processes (with the Commission practically serving as executive), while the other two pillars possess a genuinely intergovernmental character. With regard to the shaping of CFSP, however, it cannot be said that the policy-making and decision-making processes are exclusively intergovernmental. 19 What is seen from the outside is a clear distinction of the two pillars: the Commission is in charge of first pillar subjects, and the presidency, with support of the Council and the member states, has the authority for issues of the second pillar. What is less apparent from the outside is how the institutions interact outside this formal framework. The officials of different European institutions seek consensus as much as they can to avoid incoherent external affairs. 20 In contrast to EPC, the Common Foreign and Security Policy strives for a more active role and seeks to define common positions and strategies. Some changes were made through the treaties of Amsterdam (entry-into-force in 1999) and of Nice (signed in 2000). The most important novelty of the Amsterdam Treaty was that it established the position of a High Representative for CFSP, nicknamed "Monsieur PESC" 21 or "Mr. CFSP". The post was filled for five years starting in October 1999 by former N A T O Secretary General Javier Solana. The new treaty also introduced the "common strategy" as a concept to guide the EU's foreign policy, although several experts consider it an inefficient foreign policy tool of the Union. 22 The Amsterdam Treaty further regularised the budget of CFSP, and created a Policy Planning Unit to support "M. PESC". 17

Peterson/Bomberg, Decision-Making

in the European

Union, p. 229.

18 Burkhard, Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 19

20

21

pp. 42, 43.

However, in conformity with international law, the mentioning o f the intergovernmental character of the CFSP in the TEU excludes an independent performance o f the European Union. Burkhard, Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, p. 52. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

PESC is the French and Spanish abbreviation o f CFSP: Politique étrangère et de sécurité 22 commune, or Politica exterior y de seguridad comûn, respectively. Interviews, Brussels, September 2003. 15

Smith's judgment is that the Amsterdam Treaty "did make some significant revisions to the CFSP". 23 Nevertheless, although the Treaty of Amsterdam improved the decision-making procedure by not requiring unanimous voting in some cases, this was contradicted by a de facto veto right. In general, the intergovernmental character of CFSP persisted. 24 Legal Provisions Wessel correctly remarks that the majority of studies on CFSP derive from political science or international relations experts, but not from jurists. The legal perspective, thus, should not be ignored. 25 According to the legal fundaments, the CFSP shall "safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter", "strengthen the security of the Union in all ways", "preserve peace and strengthen international security", "promote international cooperation" and "develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." 26 Furthermore, the treaty on the EU calls upon the member states to support the "external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity." The basic problem in coordinating different national foreign policies is disguised by the idealistic formula - typical for EU language - that the member states "shall work together and develop their mutual political solidarity..." and "...refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations." 27 According to the Nice Treaty, there are the following five basic goals of CFSP • Defining the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, which is done by the European Council; • Deciding on common strategies. These instruments were introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty and set out overall policy guidelines for activities with individual countries. Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the EU and the member states. So far there are common strategies on Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean and the Middle East Peace Process. They are decided by the European Council as well.

23

Michael Smith, 'The EU as an international actor', p. 284.

24

Burkhard, Die Gemeinsame

25

26 27

16

Außen- undSicherheitspolitik,

pp. 45, 46.

Ramses A. Wessel, The European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. A Legal Institutional Perspective. The Hague/Cambridge/Dordrecht 1999, pp. 11, 12. See Tilmann M. Gütt, Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und ihre Bedeutung für die Europäische Union: Rechtspersönlichkeit und Rechtsnatur der EU. München 2003. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Title V, Article 11 (I). Ibid., Title V, Article 11 (2).

•

•

Adopting joint actions and common positions. These commit the member states to adopting a certain position and a certain course of action. They are decided by the General Affairs Council. Strengthening systematic cooperation between member states in the conduct of policy. 28

CFSP will also be subject to change if the Constitutional Treaty for the EU enters into force. In the draft on a Constitutional Treaty for Europe, the CFSP is mentioned in Title III, Article 15: 1. The Union's competence in matters o f common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing o f a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence. 2. Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.

29

Winn and Lord conclude that within the EU's pillarisation framework, CFSP has features of intergovernmentalism, transgovernmentalism and supranationalism. 30

2.2. The budget of CFSP Article 28 of the Treaty on European Union states that the expenditure for CFSP "shall be charged to the budget of the European Community", except for such expenditures arising from operations with military or defence implications, and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. A specific subsection of the Community budget is earmarked for CFSP operations. The initial CFSP budget for 2003 totalled € 47.5 million 3 ', and an additional € 6.2 million were made available throughout the year. 32 The Commission implements the 28

29

30

31

32

Ibid., Title V, Article 12. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Conference of the Representatives o f the Governments of the member states. Brussels, 29 October 2004 (OR.fr), CIG 87/2/04 REV 2, Article 1-16. Neil Winn/Christopher Lord, EU Foreign Policy beyond the Nation-State. Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Houndsmills/New York 2001, pp. 48, 49. For the financing o f civilian crisis management operations, see annex II o f the Commission's Communication of 28 November 2001. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Financing of Civilian Crisis Management Operations. Brussels, 28 November 2001, COM (2001) 647 final. European Union, The Implementation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy Actions (CFSP). 18th report covering the period 1 October - 31 December 2003, p. 9.

17

CFSP budget autonomously, with regard for the principles of sound financial management (Article 274 of the Treaty establishing the European Community). However, only joint actions are considered as administrative and operational expenditures. 33 If the CFSP budget is not sufficient, appropriations will be carried out through a transfer of appropriations, or a supplementary and/or amended budget. 34 In order to review the functioning of CFSP, first of all the actors in the European institutions shall be reviewed.

2.3. The actors of CFSP, their functions and procedures The main actors of CFSP are the member states, the European Council, the presidency, the Council of the EU, the High Representative for CFSP (at the same time Secretary-General of the Council) and his Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, the European Commission, and special representatives. The European Parliament has a subordinated role. Naturally, there are more "unofficial" individual actors who function as "inter-institutional bridges": NGOs, lobbyists or "issue brokers" who try to coordinate opinions and/or organise support for particular areas or topics within or outside the EU institutions. 2.3.1. The Member States The member states have committed themselves to supporting CFSP actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. Each member state is entitled to deal with CSFP matters and to put forward initiatives. The member states are in charge of coordinating their national policies consistently with common positions. In international forums, the member states support these common positions, which are usually presented by the presidency. The EU members are committed to sustaining joint actions. Diplomatic missions in third countries work together in order to comply and implement common positions and joint actions. The Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and the capitals of the member states are frequently in contact through the Coreu (Correspondance européenne) telex network, which allows for an ongoing exchange of encrypted messages. Naturally, all the member states of the European Union have different priorities, but also different foreign policy styles and traditions with regard to their foreign relations. There are regional and thematic preferences, such as the postcolonial Africa policy of the French, the British interest in Asia, the German orientation towards Eastern Europe, and the human rights advocacy and environ33

See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/fin/, 14 December 2004.

34

Ibid. "In both cases on a proposal from the Commission and the European Parliament having the last word. This procedure may take 10 to 12 weeks."

18

mental concerns of the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. France and Great Britain claim to be natural global players due to their colonial past and their permanent seats in the UN Security Council. In contrast, Germany has generally felt uneasy about its international role due to its history, but in recent years there have been remarkable changes - including participation in the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999 to force Serbian troops out of Kosovo, and clear aspirations to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Besides these different regional and thematic preferences, the member states also hold diverging views on the EU's relations with the United States and on a common foreign policy of the Union in general. While the United Kingdom has traditionally been transatlanticist, France, still seeing itself as the grande nation, has maintained certain reservations towards the United States. The new Eastern European member states are expected to be politically closer to the US, rather than being enthusiastic to engage in a more "Europeanised" common foreign policy. It is important to emphasise that many Eastern Europeans appear to share the United States' view on the end of the Soviet empire. Unlike many Western Europeans who interpret the collapse of the USSR as a natural result of internal economic and political failures, the new democracies see it as a US victory in the East-West confrontation, and thus stick loyally to the winners.35 According to a French diplomat, however, the close relations of the eight new Eastern European member states to the US will change and they will develop a European identity. There will be an adaptation and adjustment process within the EU. The pro-American position of the new members is expected to change gradually, through common meetings such as the so-called Gymnich, the informal meetings of foreign ministers, which serve to coordinate positions36, and other familiar reunions of the EU members. 37 2.3.2. The European Council The European Council consists of regular meetings of the heads of state or government with the president of the European Commission, and sets the general guidelines of CFSP. Although its meetings have been unofficial praxis since the early 1960s, the Single European Act (1986) officially recognised the European Council as a Community body that should gather at least twice, and usually four times a year, in the country holding the presidency or in Brussels. Since 1986 it has been customary for foreign ministers to attend as well. The European Coun-

35

Commentators in the United States hold that US president Reagan pursued to provoke an arms race since 1981 to accelerate the Soviet Union's collapse as the USSR had been identified as internally weak.

36

Jean Michel Dumond/Philippe Setton, La politique étrangère et de sécurité (PESC). La Documentation Française, Paris 1999, pp. 33, 34. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004; Washington D C., May 2004.

37

commune

19

cil has two major tasks: it provides the overall political direction for the EU and serves as a "clearing house" to resolve problems that had been too difficult for the Council of the EU. The European Council usually makes decisions by consensus, expressed in statements of the respective presidency of the Council of the EU, labelled "Conclusions of the presidency". Nevertheless, all these functions will be subject to a certain degree of change if the Treaty of a Constitution for Europe finally enters into force. While White deems the European Council to be possibly the most influential institution for European integration 38 , it is not the leading one with regard to the concrete CFSP policy issues. 2.3.3. The presidency of the Council Based on a six-month rotating mandate, the presidency of the Council represents the European Union to third countries, takes charge of the Council agenda and chairs all the meetings. The country that holds the presidency represents the EU internationally and manages the activities of pillar two (CFSP) and three (Justice and Home Affairs). 39 The Treaty on the European Union states in its Title V, Article 18: 1. The presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy. 2. The presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions made under this title; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organisations and international conferences. 3. The presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy. 4. The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. The presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next member state to hold the presidency. 5. The Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. 40 The presidency is the "joker" in the Troika (composed of the representative of the presidency, the External Relations Commissioner and "Monsieur PESC") because of the rotating model. A presidency has two characteristics: it has to develop EU policy, and it has only six months to do it, so it has objectives outside of the institutions because it wants to achieve short- to middle-term goals. 38

Brian White, Understanding

39

Ibid., p. 13.

40

Consolidated

20

European Foreign Policy. Houndsmills/New York 2001, p. II.

Version of the Treaty on the European

Union, Title V, Article 18.

The preparation o f Presidencies takes a lot o f time and manpower. 41 However, in foreign relations many problems and issues come up unexpectedly. The scope o f action is mostly dictated by international developments that a national government cannot influence in the same way as it does domestic policy. 4 2 2.3.4. T h e Council o f the European Union Although the European Council outlines the major guidelines, it is the Council o f the European Union, whose councils are vested with extensive legislative and executive powers, which represents the most important decision-making body o f the EU. The members o f the Council - who occupy a huge building in Brussels, where they meet several times a month - are the government ministers o f the member states who represent their governments' opinions. In fact, the name "Council" is somewhat misleading, as there is no single Council, but an assembly o f different councils for various subjects. The Council is a body, which meets, in different "configurations" attended by the ministers from the member states and the European Commissioners in charge o f different areas. 43 Altogether there are nine different Council configurations at present. 44 Each minister in the Council is authorised to commit his/her government; thus, his/her signature is binding. Moreover, all ministers in the Council answer to their national parliaments and to the citizens that the parliament represents in order to guarantee the democratic legitimacy o f the Council's decisions. When decisions are made, however, no mention is made o f the particular configuration. Rather, decisions are viewed as being made by the Council as a whole. Some 2 5 0 working parties and committees with delegates from the member states prepare the decisions o f the Council, which then are forwarded to the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper, Comité de Représentants Permanents) that consists o f the member states' ambassadors to the European Union. The final decisions of the Council are usually made by a vote o f the corresponding ministers from the member states. Three types o f vote exist: simple majority (for procedural decisions), qualified majority (a weighted voting system based on the populations o f member states; used for many decisions concerning the internal market, economic affairs and trade) and unanimity (for foreign policy, defence, judicial and police cooperation, and taxation). Frequently, the

41

42 43

44

Therefore, the U S government did not accept the presidencies held by smaller EU member states, such as Luxemburg, as appropriate interlocutors. Interviews, Brussels, November 2 0 0 3 . In the 1990s there were 2 2 different configurations; reduced to 16 in June 2 0 0 0 and then to 9 in June 2 0 0 2 . T h e General Affairs and External Relations; Economic and Financial Affairs ( " E C O F I N " ) ; Justice and Home Affairs; Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry and Research); Transport, Telecommunications and Energy; Agriculture and Fisheries; Environment: Education, Youth and Culture.

21

Council makes decisions based on proposals from the Commission and the European Parliament. The General Affairs and External Relations Council The General Affairs Council, which is in charge of the Union's external relations and meets monthly, is one of the oldest configurations of the Council. Since June 2002, as the General Affairs and External Relations Council, it holds separate meetings on general affairs and on external relations. 45 The Council handles all of the external actions of the EU, including CFSP, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), foreign trade and development cooperation. In the past the Council, in cooperation with the Commission, has been eager to ensure coherent external actions of the Union. 46 The Council adopts joint actions and common positions, and usually makes unanimous decisions. The Council also approves conclusions on the main issues in discussion and is responsible for the ESDP. The Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP participates in General Affairs and External Relations Council meetings. 47 Since the Single European Act of 1986, the use of the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) on some issues has helped reach resolutions more rapidly, although the unanimous vote remains common procedure for CFSP issues. Before the enlargement on 1 May 2004, the QMV meant 62 votes in favour with a total of 87 votes, thus 26 votes constituting a "blocking minority. 48 According to Article 23 of the Treaty on European Union CFSP decisions shall be made unanimously, except for specific cases such as implementing decisions. Although unanimous decisions mean that member states have veto powers, abstentions 49 shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions. 50 Since 1 November 2004, a qualified majority is reached if two conditions are met: a majority of member states (in some cases a two-thirds majority) must approve; and a minimum of votes is cast in favour (ca. 72.3% of the total). Additionally, each member state can ask for verification that the votes in favour represent at least 62% of the total population of the EU. If this is not the case, the decision will not be adopted.

45 46

47 48

49

50

22

http://ue.eu.mt/cms3 fo/showPage.asp?id=388&!ang=en&mode=g, 14 December 2004. http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=388&lang=en&mode=g, 14 December 2004. http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=388&!ang=en&mode=g, 14 December 2004. White, Understanding

European Foreign Policy, p. 12.

Since the Amsterdam Treaty, there "is the possibility o f 'constructive abstention', to allow one or more member states to opt out o f a common position without preventing the whole policy going ahead". The Treaty of Amsterdam, Brussels, 19 June 1997, Chapter 12, Article .1.13. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/fin/, 14 December 2004.

In the end, the Council has the responsibility for the authorisation, supervision and conclusion of negotiations and agreements with non-EU countries and international organisations. 51 The member states are responsible for the development of CFSP and the Council is the main forum in which this "inter-governmental co-operation" takes place. The General Secretariat The presidency is assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council, which prepares and ensures the smooth functioning of the Council's work at all levels. The Council's Directorate General for External Relations (DG E) covers three greater areas: external economic relations, the geographical areas of CFSP and the political-military structure of the security and defence policy. In addition to supporting all discussions of the Council and its committees, it is the task of this Directorate General to prepare and participate in the political dialogue as well as to organise follow-up measures and coordinate working relations between the EU and international organisations. At present, relations with the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Council of Europe are particularly extended. The structure of the DG: • The Committee of Permanent Representatives (known as 'Coreper': Comité des Représentants Permanents) - ambassadors of the EU member states and the Commission Deputy Secretary General meet at least once a week to prepare Council meetings and decisions, including those related to the General Affairs Council and CFSP. 52 Whereas the Council is considered the most powerful of all institutions of the Community, many of its resolutions "are structured by decisions made at the lower level of Coreper I and II and various working groups." 53 Coreper I handles subjects such as the single market, fishing, industry, research, telecommunication, environment, education, health and culture. Coreper II deals with institutional subjects, foreign policy issues, justice and home affairs, financial and general European Union is54

•

51

52 53

54

sues. The Political and Security Committee (PSC, or COPS as it is known by its French acronym) is the linchpin of the CFSP and the ESDP. COPS has a central role to play in the definition of and follow-up to

White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, p. 13. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/, 15 January 2005. White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, p. 13. http://www.eu4journalists.com/topic.asp?TID=29&langID=l, 14 December 2004.

23

•

•

•

•

the EU's response to a crisis. It is composed of national representatives at senior/ambassador level, placed within the framework of member states' Permanent Representations. The Commission is fully associated with the work of COPS, through its own representative. 55 COPS prepares recommendations on the future functioning of the CFSP, including CESDP and deals with the day-to-day running of these issues, including preparation of CFSP aspects of the deliberations of the General Affairs Councils. Furthermore, in the event of a crisis, COPS is the Council body, which examines all the possible responses within the single institutional framework, independent of the decision-making and implementation procedures of each pillar. 56 A network of European Correspondents in all EU member states and the Commission coordinate daily CFSP business and prepare the meetings of COPS and the CFSP points for the General Affairs Council and the European Council. They maintain day-to-day contact on CFSP issues via the Coreu network with the member states, the Secretariat and the Commission. 5 7 The group of External Relations Counsellors examines institutional, legal and financial aspects of proposals made within the CFSP. It prepares the work of Coreper on joint actions and it ensures inter-pillar consistency. The European Commission is an active member of this group. 58 CFSP working groups are composed of experts from EU member states and the Commission meeting along geographical (e.g. Asia, Africa, Latin America) and functional (UN issues, drugs, terrorism) lines to elaborate policy documents and options for the consideration of CFSP bodies. 59 The decisions are prepared within the working groups, which include all economic and political aspects of an issue in their debates. 60 Reportedly, these Working Groups have an enormous autonomy: If the participants come from the European capitals (director level), they practically generate proposals for themselves. 61 Working Groups are very influential with regard to policies towards Latin America.

55

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/, 15 January 2005.

56

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/, 15 January 2005.

57

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/, 15 January 2005.

58

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/, 15 January 2005.

59

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/, 15 January 2005. 60

Dumond/Setton, La politique étrangère, p. 22.

61

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

24

In Brussels, each EU member state has a Permanent Representation that defends its national interest at EU level. The EU ambassadors (known as Permanent Representatives) meet weekly within the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper). The role of this committee is to prepare the work of the Council, with the exception of agricultural issues, which are handled by the Special Committee on Agriculture. Coreper is assisted by a number of working groups, made up of officials from national administrations. For some, the now 25 Permanent Representatives are the most decisive players in Brussels, as they are seen as the most intimate and powerful club in the world (at least regarding world trade). Furthermore, these "EU ambassadors" have a complete overview of the interests of their countries in all areas. This turns the respective representatives into brokers as this information privilege provides them the might to negotiate so-called "package deals".62 All Permanent Representatives know each other very well through various meetings and numerous receptions: Thus, they are aware of the margins of their colleagues almost perfectly. There is even a camaraderie, an esprit de corps, which is said to be necessary to prevent damage if there is need to agree on compromises while facing the most difficult situations. Although there are also some "clashes" between these powerful envoys, usually they have to get along to guarantee an effective functioning of the Council. 63 Coreper and COPS are concerned with political matters such as the discussion of the political dialogue of an Association Agreement. 64 Furthermore, the EU Treaty entitles the Council to appoint special representatives for particular political questions. They report directly to the High Representative. Usually, these special representatives deal with individual countries (Macedonia), regions (Middle East or the Great Lakes region in Africa) or particular issues (coordination of the stability pact for South Eastern Europe). The following new committees have been established within the Council to enhance the implementation of the CFSP: The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the PoliticoMilitary Group, and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. In addition, the EUMS, the military unit of the European Union, shall provide early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in crisis situations. It 62

63 64

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. These "package deals" are not arranged within Coreper. Since these agreements are of unofficial nature, the representatives conclude these quid pro quo deals on the phone or through personal conversations. Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. There is reportedly a tense relationship between the institutions shaped by jealousies, as Coreper is entitled to prepare the Council meetings and takes advantage of this situation. COPS is said to be less effective than it could be, in part because the ambassadors in Coreper are reluctant to give away their privileged position. COPS, however, is important because Coreper cannot handle all issues due to time constraints. Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

25

is composed of military experts from the member states, which are sent to the General Secretariat of the Council. The EUMS is under direct supervision of the High Representative of CFSP. 65 2.3.5. The High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy The Secretary General of the Council, Javier Solana Madariaga, and the Vice Secretary General, Pierre de Boissieu, chair the General Secretariat of the Council, which supports the presidency and is in charge of preparation and operations at all levels of the Council. Mr. Solana received his mandate in October 1999 and was reappointed in 2004. The Secretary General of the Council is also the High Representative of the CFSP. Reportedly, these multiple responsibilities, including managing the foreign policy of the EU, are too burdensome for one person, although Javier Solana is supported by the Council, the Policy Unit and SITCEN. 66 SITCEN is the Situation Centre, a comparatively new agency that produces confidential country reports, including national intelligence information. 67 Its work is said to be useful, but is has a rather short-term intelligence perspective, limited to a six-month projection at best. 68 An EU Foreign Minister If the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe eventually enters into force, "Monsieur PESC" or "Mr. CFSP" will become the first "Foreign Minister" of the European Union, combining the competence of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations. According to the Draft on a Constitutional Treaty, the Foreign Minister Council shall "flesh out the Union's external policies, and ensure that its actions are consistent." It will further be chaired by the EU foreign minister. 69 Moreover, this "double hat" position requires that the minister become one of the Commission's vice presidents. This "Union Minister for Foreign Affairs" would be appointed by the European Council by qualified majority and with the agreement of the Commission's President. The European Council could also end his/her term by the same procedure. 70 The draft constitutional treaty speaks somewhat ambiguously of the Foreign Minister's responsibility "for handling external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external ac65

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/, 14 December 2004.

66

To access this Centre, officials o f the Commission have to pass a security check, which takes up to eight months (for Germans). The reports o f SITCEN are classified as confidential. Interviews, Brussels, September 2003.

67

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

68

Interviews, Brussels, December 2004.

69

The European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing

a Constitution

for Europe. Title IV,

a Constitution

for Europe. Title IV,

Article 23 (2). 70

26

The European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing Article 27 (I) and (2).

tion." 7 ' Does this include the horizontal coordination of foreign policy, trade, development cooperation and international finance, for instance, as practically all actions outside the EU are considered "external relations"? Correspondingly, European officials and external CFSP experts criticise that the mandate of the EU's foreign minister is not well-defined. 72 Within European institutions there are voices that reject the notion of a Union foreign minister becoming part of the Commission, as the latter is obliged to transparency towards the European Parliament and his/her work would be thwarted by the internal struggles of the Commission. Some advocate that the EU foreign minister be independent and represent the General Affairs Council. A risk is that a compromise could lead to the nomination of a weak candidate to the position, as seen before in European institutions. 73 The current High Representative, Javier Solana, who is the most likely and convincing candidate for the post of European foreign minister, is supported by a strategic planning division. 2.3.6. The Policy Unit of the High Representative The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit), created by a declaration in the appendices of the Treaty of Amsterdam, is under direct control of the High Representative. The personnel of the Policy Unit come from the General Secretariat of the Council, the member states, the Commission and the Western European Union (WEU). In the declaration to the Treaty 74 , the following main tasks are outlined: 1. Supervision and analysis of developments with regard to CFSP matters. 2. Assessment of the EU's interests and determination of possible future main focus areas of CFSP. 3. Timely judgement of events or situations, which might have important consequences, including potential political crisis and early warning of such events or situations. 4. Preparation of detailed and well-founded assessments of political options (by request of the Council, the presidency or on its own initiative) that must be presented under the responsibility of the presidency as contribution to the formulation of the Council's policy.

71

72 73 74

The European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Title IV, Article 27 (3). Interviews, Brussels, December 2003-January 2004. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Declaration to the Final Act on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit.

27

Twenty-eight experts work in the Policy Unit on regional and thematic topics. They are mainly national officials from the member states with particularly outstanding expertise in their field and experience in foreign affairs. Fifteen diplomats from the member states plus some officials from the Council and the Commission work for the Policy Unit. Principally, these officials come to work for Solana on a temporary basis and usually return to their foreign ministries afterward. Accordingly, the cooperation between national foreign ministries and the Policy Unit works smoothly, as the counsellors or coordinators of Solana or in the Council still maintain relations with capitals and ministries. 75 There is also direct contact with the respective colleagues in the Commission, with which the members of the Policy Unit hold numerous meetings to work on the requested papers. The Policy Unit has been increasingly penetrated by the European Commission as cooperation has grown. It is the motivation of all participants to work together, particularly in view of the possible establishment of a European Foreign Service. 76 Furthermore, the Unit has direct contacts with the Permanent Representations in Brussels, as well as with the embassies of the countries on which the respective experts work. All these contacts with the foreign ministries, the Permanent Representations, the other European institutions and the embassies are informal. The only formal relations are the meetings with the Commission, the Working Groups, Coreper, and COPS, but the work between the institutions is very informal and flexible. 77 The Policy Unit, acting on behalf of Solana, is said to have become more and more important and ambitious, which apparently made the Secretariat of the Council resentful. Now, the Secretariat of the Council has the ambition to be an important player, as well. Earlier, the Policy Unit was above the Secretariat, but recently this has been changing. 78 Reportedly, there is now a tendency to work together with the Council's Secretariat, 79 despite inter-institutional jealousies. How does the Policy Unit work? An example: the Council asks Solana to prepare a European Security Strategy. His collaborators at the Policy Unit start to work and maintain contacts with the Commission, including the supply of ideas. Each one of the Policy Unit experts addresses his/her national foreign ministry and asks for contributions and commentaries. This way, the governments of the member states contribute to the preparation of these papers through the diplomats who work in the Policy Unit. 80 Before a political document is presented in an important meeting, the Policy Unit, the Council and the Commission agree on it. The Policy Unit prepares po75

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

76

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

77

78 79

80

28

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. Interviews, Brussels, September 2004. Interviews, Brussels, September 2004. Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

licy papers on the request o f the presidency and presents these before the Political and Security Committee (and exclusively to this committee, not to the working groups). If the Commission opposes the suggestions of the paper, however, it is useless to insist on it.81 For some, the Policy Unit works as a sort o f think tank for Javier Solana, though others dispute this characterisation as not fitting.82 Some experts hold that in the Policy Unit, there are no policy planners like those in US think tanks, with experienced political and diplomatic senior fellows who have the time to think strategically over years, and still work academically. The work o f these experts, reportedly, is not bad, but they are not permitted to provide extremely confidential information either. The Policy Unit provides situation analysis rather than the typical CFSP. It has quite a good input concerning Africa. 83 If the security provisions of the various European institutions and s u b s t i t u tional units reflect the available information, the Policy Unit rates very high, together with the Commission's Conflict Prevention Unit 84 , as well as the SITCEN. 2.3.7. The European Commission The Commission is considered the most controversial institution within the EU, but it is obviously at the very heart o f the policy process o f the Union. Some people in Brussels called it - before the enlargement - the 16lh member state, but a big one. This view is justified by its diplomatic representations in third countries, the Commission's cooperation programs, and its competence in trade matters and humanitarian aid. The Commission, however, has not shown real activism in developing CFSP policies because it is fighting on all fronts in the areas of the first, second and third pillars. 85 The Commission has been subdivided into 24 departments labelled "Directorate-Generals" (DGs). 8 6 After the enlargement and appointment o f a new Commission in 2004, this organ now consists o f 25 Commissioners, one from each member state. In the Commission, there is a three-level hierarchy: the director's level, the heads of unit, and the desk officers. 81

82

83

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

Supposedly, the French government believes it still has an influence on Solana, but in actuality, he develops his policy independently, through the policy unit. Interviews, Brussels, 84 December 2003. A comparatively high standard o f security is obligatory since the Conflict Prevention Unit shares information with NATO and thus has to apply the same security standards. Interviews, Brussels. Several years ago, two interns from the US and Israel in the General Secretariat o f the Council were accused o f espionage. Since then no stagiaires/intems were allowed to work in the Secretariat. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 85 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 86

White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, pp. 14, 15.

29

In order to handle the Commission's growing role in CFSP, in 1993 a new directorate-general (DG) for external political affairs was created.87 The 19992004 Directorate-General "External Relations", was headed by Commissioner Christopher Patten. In late 2004, the former Austrian foreign minister, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, succeeded her British colleague. According to Cameron, the European Commission has different functions in the external relations of the EU: it works as participant, initiator, executor, negotiator and arbitrator. Furthermore, "it shares representational responsibilities through the bicephalous presidency/Commission and Troika formulas." 88 Unlike its exclusive initiative right in first pillar matters, the Commission shares the initiative with the presidency, the member states and the High Representative of CFSP with regard to foreign policy issues. It is completely associated with all stages of the decision-making process and facilitates the implementation of decisions by leveraging its expertise in communitarian problems - at least in theory. 89 One national diplomat holds that although according to the strict provisions CFSP excludes economics, in fact it certainly does encompass economic matters. 90 Nevertheless, one EU official confesses that the problems of a technical approach of the Commission are the result of a lack of political agenda: According to an interview in December 2003, there was no enthusiasm in the DG Relex with regard to CFSP; the motivation was allegedly doomed, partially as a result of the European divisions in the Iraq crisis.91 Within the DG Relex, Relex A deals with CFSP matters, which is divided into DG Relex A.l (European Correspondent), Relex A.2 (Legal and institutional matters for external relations. Sanctions), Relex A.3 (Security Policy), and Relex A.4 (Conflict prevention; crisis management and ACP countries). The General Directorate Relex A. 1, European Correspondence, consists of national diplomats (also pursuing national interests) and officials from the Commission. Its tasks are to inform and coordinate large amounts of information, particularly from the Commission, the delegations in third countries, the cabinet of the External Relations Commissioner and foreign ministries of the member states. The unit coordinates informally in the periods between the official meetings of heads of state and government. Moreover, it has to coordinate briefings and provide external presentations. The main contacts are the Director

87

Fraser Cameron, 'Where the European Commission Comes In: From the Single European Act to Maastricht'. In: Elfriede Regelsberger/Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent/Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Be88 yond. Boulder/London 1997, p. 101. Cameron, 'Where the European Commission Comes In', p. 100. 89 90 91

30

Dumond/Setton, La politique

étrangère,

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

p. 22.

of Relex A and COPS. 9 2 Thanks to abundant information, the officials of Relex A. 1 have global oversight on CFSP matters. The intensive workload, however, also constitutes a limitation. 93 Some desks in the DG Relex A.l are said to have clear political visions; they want to get them implemented and adjust previous 94

papers. Generally, the European Commission does not always consult other institutions on informal communications; neither do the Council and the presidency. Both are commonly viewed as acting increasingly as executives. This is certainly a problem for the foreign policy of the EU since the Commission is somewhat left out. Also, the sometimes-difficult relationship between the presidency and the Council Secretariat does not help the situation. 95 2.3.8. The European Parliament Officially,'the European Parliament (EP) is completely informed and consulted with regard to the definition of CFSP orientation, which allows for the influence of public opinion. 96 However, the EP has the right only to consult the presidency concerning the fundamental questions of the CFSP, and is informed on its development. The absence of any parliamentary control mechanism or active power to form concrete CFSP measures has periodically been criticised as a lack of CFSP's democratic legitimacy. 97 Although the European Parliament has little say in the CFSP process and policy-making, the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe provides it with more powers. Title V, Article 21 of the TEU states: The presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy. 98

92 93 94 95 96 97 98

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. Dumond/Setton, La politique étrangère, p. 22. TEU, Title V, Article 21. See Esther Barbé, 'The Evolution of CFSP Institutions: Where does Democratic Accountability Stand?'. In: The i International Spectator, 2/2004, pp. 47-60.

T E ( J

T j t l e

v

A r t j c l e 2

31

There is a view that parliamentary involvement in CFSP would hamper its efficiency and coherence - a stand that "reproduces the traditional realist belief that the need for secrecy, speed, coherence and efficiency in foreign policy contrasts with parliamentary involvement." 99 The principal task of the Parliament is to exercise democratic examination and to control EU policy. For some observers, however, the EP is completely "out of the game" with regard to CFSP. 1 0 0 In concrete terms, this is true. Nevertheless, as the Parliament possesses the competence to approve the EU's budget, it has indirect influence on the general planning of CFSP as well. Every year, the EP receives a report on the most important activities with regard to foreign policy, followed by a hearing. This is the power of the Parliament: The Commission's budget depends on the allowance from the EP. The Parliament has used this "weapon" since 1979 with great success. In addition, the EP is granted certain information on CFSP, sometimes including confidential meetings between Solana, the presidency and almost all chairpersons of the EP factions. In these unofficial talks, specific details, which must remain undisclosed, are the subject of conversation. Unofficially, something has improved from the EP's perspective, as many information exchanges and decisions take place "in the corridors".' 01

2.4. The instruments of CFSP In Title V, Article 12, the TEU mentions general guidelines, common strategies, joint actions, and common positions as CFSP instruments. 102 Besides these instruments, the EU uses declarations and demarches to announce its position on specific matters or situations. The use of the Coreu network can be an important advantage with regard to the coordination of positions on CFSP matters. Furthermore, "silent diplomacy" and informal arrangement should be mentioned, although due to their character, these instruments are difficult to detect at present, and instead constitute subjects of research for historians in the future.

99

Esther Barbé, 'The Evolution of CFSP Institutions', p. 54.

I oo

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

101

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

102

Consolidated

32

Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Title V, Article 12.

Article 13 sets up how CFSP shall be put into practice: Instrument

Who proposes

Who decides

Who implements

General guidelines

The Member States and the Commission

The European Council

The presidency (*)

Common strategies

The Member States and the Commission

The European Council

„, ., The presidency (*)

Joint actions

The Member States and the Commission (**)

The Council

The Commission (***)

Common positions

The Member States and the Commission

The Council

The Member States

(*)

Assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who exercises the function of High Representative for CFSP.

(**)

The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals to ensure the implementation of joint actions.

(***)

The Commission is responsible for the financial implementation of joint actions when they imply operational expenditure charged to the Community budget, otherwise the presidency is responsible for the implementation.

Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/fin/, 14 December 2004.

The European Council shall outline the principles and general guidelines of CFSP and decide on common strategies. These are, together with joint actions and common positions, the main instruments of CFSP, which shall facilitate the formulation and implementation of European external actions. The Council of Ministers proposes common strategies to the European Council to set up a general framework to a particular region, country or on a specific topic. Joint actions, adopted by the Council, shall help to ease the EU's action in specific situations. 103 In general, each of the 25 member states, the Commission, and the presidency can launch initiatives for CFSP actions. To evaluate the situation in third countries, the so-called HoM reports (heads of mission) from the respective countries are very important. These are prepared by the European ambassadors in capitals of third countries and distributed via the Coreu network. Furthermore, there are the reports from Solana's Policy Unit

,03

Dumond/Setton, La politique étrangère: Title V, Articles 12-14.

33

and the Commission. The Commission's delegations also report directly to the High Representative for C F S P . In this context, the Coreu telex network, which includes a technologically special procedure and is supposed to be secret, has proved to be a very efficient method o f communication between different institutions. "Coreus" should only be used for C F S P information 104 , which means that they are a privileged instrument o f the second pillar, employed in order to reach a decision within fortyeight hours or less. 105 This network, which is open to the 25 member states, connects the presidency, the EU member states, the Commission, the Council, the national embassies, and the delegations o f the European Commission abroad. Confidential communications are subject to change or commentary until a specific deadline (usually too narrowly set), and are adopted in a "silent procedure" as commonly accepted. 106 Within a certain deadline, the others must provide comments on the proposal. Before a Coreu is issued, many phone calls are made, but no emails are used because they are not safe. The member states send out multilateral Coreus. Bilateral Coreus are also possible but these are not often used. The behavioural culture o f the C F S P pillar determines that if there is no comment on an issue, the party is not against it. After the deadline, the presidency, often in consultation with the Commission, the General Secretariat or the initiator prepares a draft. This text can also be subject to a process o f modifications. Sometimes, this includes a silent procedure - another deadline is set, and if no remarks are made, this text will be presented as the official position o f the EU by the presidency. The European Parliament neither actively nor passively participates in the Coreu network. 107 It is not obligatory to distribute national information. There are no formal rules, apparently not even a rule o f conduct o f how to distribute which kind o f information, not even for the acting presidency, though it has to be careful. So, there is an implicit risk o f misinformation or suppression o f decisive facts. Furthermore, the somewhat artificial separation o f subjects in the 1st and 2 n d pillar arrangement does not always match the organisational structure in the corre-

104 Dumond/Setton, La politique étrangère, p. 73. The Coreu network was established in 1973, following the Copenhagen report. Winn/Lord, ELI Foreign Policy beyond the Nation-State, p. 24. l 0 5 Elfriede Regelsberger, 'The Institutional Setup and Functioning o f EPC/CFSP'. In: Elfriede Regelsberger/Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent/Wolfgang Wessels (eds ), Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Boulder/London 1997, p. 69. l 0 6 These pink papers are sent to the Security Tract (12th floor, Commission building Charlemagne), where they are deciphered. The CFSP department is located at that floor as well, which is a restricted area in the Commission building. Interviews, Brussels, September 2003. 1

i n t e r v i e w s , Brussels, October 2003.

34

sponding national foreign ministries. This internal "coordination deficit" sometimes leads to contradicting statements from national foreign ministries. 108 Although Coreu communication has proved helpful, member states rarely meet the deadlines. As one EU official puts it: "as CFSP is a recent phenomenon, we learn every day!" 109 Now, the 15 member states of the old EU have gotten used to the Coreu system, but the new members will need to get accustomed to it as well. Furthermore, at times the Coreu network is marginalized if important issues are dealt with through less formal channels like telephone conversations or personal gatherings, especially when official meetings take place. In general, the Commission uses this network rather passively and seldom distributes its positions via Coreu." 0 Sanctions111 EU Sanctions target third countries and certain non-state entities and individuals of non-EU countries such as terrorist groups and terrorists. These restrictive measures include arms embargoes, other specific or general trade sanctions, financial restrictions and restrictions on admission (visa or travel bans). In the CFSP framework, sanctions also encompass the interruption or reduction of economic relations with third countries, and include the interruption or reduction of diplomatic relations, restrictions on admission and other measures, which do not affect economic relations with third countries. The Union applies sanctions or restrictive measures to reach the specific objectives of CFSP (Article 11 o f t h e T E U ) . " 2 The legal basis for sanctions may differ from case to case. In all instances where a specific regulation is used to impose restrictive measures to help attain the objectives of the CFSP, this requires the adoption of a Common Position under Article 15 of the Treaty establishing the European Union. As an instrument of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, a Common Position on new sanctions is adopted by the Council and requires unanimity." 3 Thus, to reach a coherent and credible European foreign policy, the CFSP (pillar two) must be able to use instruments of the first, communitarian pillar as well. A strong declaration condemning massive human rights violations will be 108 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 109

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. ' ^Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. ' 1 ' See Council o f the European Union, Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 15579/03, PESC 757, FIN 568, Brussels, 3 December 2003. ' l 2 These measures are applied by the EU either in implementation of sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Chapter VII o f the UN Charter) but the Union also applies autonomous sanctions, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/, 14 December 2004. " 3 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/, 14 December 2004.

35

heard only if it is accompanied by (at least the threat of) economic sanctions or other financial measures to underline the political will of the EU. As the primary goal of the TEU was to improve the EU's effectiveness and coherence with regard to its external affairs, the Treaty tried to link the EC trade capabilities and external economic affairs also to the CFSP pillar. 114 As Smith puts it: The SEA, the TEU, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Nice had all focused on the need for 'consistency' between the economic and the foreign policy activities of the Community and then the Union - a logical consequence of the increasing linkages between economics and security and the politicisation of economic issues." 5

2.5. Analysis of CFSP The Common Foreign and Security Policy has essentially suffered from basic problems of identity, interests and institutions. Thus, it has not had legitimacy deriving from a common "European identity" among ordinary Europeans, which certainly constitutes a problem for foreign policy decision-makers in the EU in raising "European "interests". Accordingly, Peterson/Bomberg conclude that "[i]n institutional terms, the Monnet method simply did not w o r k . " " 6 Furthermore, the E U ' s Common Foreign and Security Policy is in fact still underf u n d e d " 7 , occasionally poorly coordinated and lacking an adequate parliamentary control. In addition, national interests are still powerful factors that influence the form of concrete CFSP measures, as are inter-institutional communication or competence problems. According to White, there are three different types of European foreign policy: "Community foreign policy", "Union foreign policy" and "national (Member State) foreign policy". European foreign policy all in all should be imagined as "...an interacting foreign policy 'system' but these three types of policy are regarded as the 'sub-systems' that constitute and possibly dominate it."" 8 Peterson/Bomberg ask whether a "Brusselisation" of foreign

" 4 Michael E. Smith, 'The Question for Coherence: Institutional Dilemmas of External Action from Maastricht to Amsterdam'. In: Alec Stone Sweet/Wayne Sandholtz/Nei! Fligstein (eds), The Institutionalization of Europe. Oxford/New York 2001, p. 171. " 5 Michael Smith, 'The EU as an international actor', p. 289. " 6 Peterson/Bomberg, Decision-Making in the European Union, p. 240. The "Monnet method", named after one of the founding fathers of European integration, promoted communitarised institutions with collective bureaucratic governance. " 7 Javier Solana described the 2002 budget for the CFSP, € 35 million, as "ridiculous". Solana, 'Très arios como Alto Représentante', p. 65. 118 White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, p. 24. White divides three different types of European foreign policy: Community foreign policy (since 1957, based on Treaties of Rome that codify the external consequences of the common commercial policy and cover trade and development relations); EU foreign policy (SEA, EPC, CFSP) and national foreign policies of the member states. Ibid., pp. 40, 41.

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policy through policy networks takes place in the E U . " 9 The CFSP has purportedly not attained many achievements: The criticism on the EU's passivity regarding the civil war in former Yugoslavia was followed by the sometimes harsh disputes of some EU members and the US during the prelude to the Iraq war in 2003. According to Article 11 (2) TEU, the performance of the European permanent and non-permanent members in the UN Security Council debate on Iraq in 2003 certainly constituted "actions contrary to the E U ' s interests" or at least an impairment of its effectiveness, but who was to blame? Hill detected the development of the famous gap between expectation and capability as the EU began to be seen as a new "superpower" after 1989, due to the rapid decline of the Soviet Union, although this was inaccurate regarding the Union's tangible influence on international politics. 120 Nevertheless, there were also accomplishments (advancements in European Defence and Security Policy) and even a first security strategy paper in 2003. 121 The European Union's CFSP, however, still lacks a general orientation, which determines hard facts and "regional interests" that go beyond general statements on democracy, human rights, rule of law, free trade and protection of the environment. With regard to the general positions on European foreign politics, there are at least three different views, as pointed out by White: 1) European foreign policy exists although the term may not be used. It is part of the European integration, the SEA and TEU have also a foreign policy dimension; 2) It does not exist yet but it should; 3) It does not exist, never will and never should! 122 After the diplomatic turmoil in the course of the Iraq crisis, I would differentiate the second position: there are those that still have hope to shape a real CFSP and those that would like to do the same but are pessimistic about achieving it.

119 "If the EU often appears to lack single-mindedness or unity o f purpose at the 'political' levels of decision-making, there is evidence o f increasing harmony at the sub-systemic level. The CFSP has induced policy networks, generally very loose and sometimes only nascent during the EPC era, to become more cohesive. Crucially, however, most remain dominated by mainly national actors, with the EU's supranational institutions mostly marginalized." Peterson/Bomberg, Decision-Making in the European Union, p. 246. l20 Christopher Hill, 'Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?'. In: John Peterson/Helene Sjursen (eds ), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? London/New York 1998, pp. 27, 28; Peterson/Bomberg, Decision-Making in the European Union, p. 232. 121 See Sven Biscop/Rik Coolsaet, 'Une stratégie de l'UE pour la sécurité: définir la voie euroe 122péenne'. In: Défense Nationale, 59 année, octobre 2003, pp. 125-133.

"Proponents o f this view are wedded to the idea that the ability to control foreign and defence policy is a fundamental, defining characteristic of the nation-state. Accepting both the concept and the reality o f a European foreign policy would mean nothing less than member states giving up both independence and sovereignty and must lead inexorably to the early demise o f the nation-state." The last view has a theoretical link to the "statecentric realist" perspective, while ECP/CFSP represents 'real' European foreign policy for institutionalists. White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, pp. 37, 38.

37

In reality, the CFSP still seems to consist mainly of diplomatic symbolism or economic measures, in part because the EU misses a substantial combat-ready military force to pursue its political aims. In this context, a fundamental problem of the EU's self-conception becomes obvious: Is the EU obliged to build military capacities to complement its claim to becoming an international power or should it focus instead on its alternative role as a "peace force", with the hope of moderating the power of the US? In early 2003, Javier Solana wrote that he learned seven lessons from his experience as "M. PESC": 1) The CFSP highly depends on the political will of the member states; 2) the continuity of the people in charge is important since personal relationships are extremely crucial in the handling of a crisis; 3) it is essential to be able to react quickly; 4) it is necessary to clearly divide the work between the decision-making and its application (In this context, Solana advocates the separation of powers presently attributed to the Council and the Commission, although admittedly the strong teamwork under Solana depended on the personal ties between him and Patten.); 5) coherence and solidarity is important; 6) the will to address politically and historically "sensitive" issues within the EU; and 7) good coordination with international partners and actors (US, Russia, NATO, OSCEetc.). 1 2 3 Solana's sixth lesson, to address politically and historically sensitive topics, can also be understood as the necessary questioning of foreign policy traditions of individual member states - such as French Africa policy, British transatlanticism, or in general, the special relationship of past European empires to their former colonies. In this context, the role of Spain for the EU foreign relations towards Latin America shall be reviewed in chapter 5. In sum, the European Union, undisputedly an international player, has not (yet) become a political global power. A strengthened CFSP plus enlarged military capacities might serve as instruments to achieve the latter goal.

123

Solana, 'Tres ailos como Alto Representante', pp. 62, 63.

38

3. The development of relations between the European Union and Latin America Latin America and Europe are linked by numerous historical, cultural, and political factors and shared values. The Iberian colonisation in South and Central America, beginning in the late 15th century, decisively influenced the political, economic and social development in the region. The close trade relations between the regions since then are conspicuous. Modern Latin American history is not comprehensible without taking into account Europe's influence, and the impact of the so-called "encounter of two worlds"124 on European history must also be considered. Political ideas from Europe have also influenced Latin America, including the Enlightenment, religious and class concepts, nationalism, socialism, communism, fascism, social democratic reformism, social-Christian reformism and neoliberalism.125 Progressive social scientific models elaborated in Latin America - the most famous being the theory of dependencia - also found considerable feedback, at least in the European academic community, in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, investments from European enterprises made in recent decades also have an impact in the region. Some authors even hold that Europe has been for Latin America "another one's own self' ("autre soi-même").126 This is a widely shared view, although it is necessary to distinguish between educated Europhile elites and the majority of the population, especially in rural areas, to whom the concept of Europe itself is unknown. Despite the aforementioned links, Whitehead states that the connection between both regions has changed in the 20th century: two World Wars dimmed the European presence in Latin America; the 'Mexican Revolution' provoked a great country to look inward and then to the north; Argentina under Peronism broke with Great Britain and established a regime that was inspired by interwar Europe and despised by the Old World.127

l24

S e e Laurence Whitehead, 'Europe/Amérique latine: la longue durée'. In: Daniel van Eeuwen (dir), L'Amérique latine et l'Europe à l'heure de la mondialisation. Dimension des relations internationales. Paris/Aix en Provence 2002, pp. 21-28.

125

Alberto van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas europeo-latinoamericanas. La necesidad de una sintonía más fina'. In: Nueva Sociedad, 189, enero-febrero 2004, p. 55. l26 Carlos A. Romero, 'La politique extérieure de Chávez et l'Union européenne'. In: Daniel van Eeuwen (dir ), L'Amérique latine et l'Europe à l'heure de la mondialisation, p. 112. l27 Laurence Whitehead, 'La relación birregional'. In: Nueva Sociedad, 189, enero-febrero 2004, p. 70.

39

3.1. The evolution of political relations between Europe and Latin America Even though there have been strong ties between the two regions, the relationship of the European Community (EC) and the EU with Latin America at the political level was rather meagre in the first decades after World War II. Since the 1960s, European interest in Latin America has increased because of growing European prosperity and ambitions to become a more important international actor, and also because Latin America wanted to "diversify its dependence" on the United States. 128 However, Brussels initially refused Latin American wishes to establish a counterweight to the superpower US. Eurocrats only offered niches (development aid, integration assistance, refugee and food aid etc.) to Latin American countries. 129 For Carranza, Latin America's connection with Europe began in the 1960s when the Latin American middle powers, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela, started to develop more self-confident, independent foreign policies. US president Kennedy's Alliance for Progress virtually ended in the late 1960s and the EC became a more significant donor of economic development aid to Latin America than the United States. 130 Nevertheless, the conditions of the East-West conflict placed considerable restrictions on the European Community's capability to dedicate itself wholeheartedly to the region. During that time, security issues dominated relations between Latin America and Northern countries. 131 In 1970, the Latin American countries which were members o f the Special Committee for Latin American coordination (CECLA) issued the Declaration o f Buenos Aires calling for an institutionalization o f their political dialogue, and closer economic cooperation between both regions. This time, the Council [of the EC] responded positively and a regular dialogue between the group o f Latin American ambassadors to the Community (GRULA) and officials of the Commission was initiated. 132

128 Howard J. Wiarda, Iberia and Latin America. dels. Lanham/London 1996, p. 66. ! 29

New Democracies,

New Policies,

New Mo-

Hazel Smith, 'Actually existing foreign policy - or not? The EU in Latin and Central America'. In: John Peterson/Helene Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? London/New York 1998, pp. 158, 159. Gerhard Drekonja-Komat, 'Der Wandel des lateinamerikanischen Verständnisses von Außenpolitik'. In: Klaus Bodemer/Susanne Gratius (eds.), Lateinamerika im internationalen System. Zwischen Regionalismus und Globalisierung. From the series Fokus Lateinamerika, Vol. 1, Opladen (Germany) 2003, p. 16. 130 Mario E. Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership? The European Union and Latin America in the post-September 11 era'. In: Nueva Sociedad, Website Forum Foro Euro-Latino, May 2004, p. 9. l31 Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership?', p. 9. 132

Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, The foreign policy behaviour of the European Union towards the Latin American Southern Cone States (1980-2000): Has it become more cooperative7 The cases of foreign direct investment and agricultural trade. Diss., Tübingen 2003, p. 8.

40

The European Community protested against Pinochet's coup in Chile in 1973 and its subsequent human rights violations, but it was more an "occasional diplomatic demarche" than an extensive policy against the Chilean regime. The second incident was the sanctions imposed by the EC against Argentina as a result of the 1982 Falkland/Malvinas war launched by the Argentine military dictatorship. However, the united front against the Argentine junta only lasted about two months. 133 Nevertheless, the first institutionalised political dialogue began in 1974 between the European Parliament and the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino). 134 Until the first ministerial meetings in the mid-eighties, these inter-parliamentarian dialogues were the only forums of political dialogue between the two regions.' 3 5 In 1980, during its Presidency, Italy pursued a "Lomé agreement with Latin America" but failed. Nevertheless, the Council established two instruments to refresh the dialogue: 1) meetings between GRULA, Coreper and the Commission, and 2) meetings between GRULA and the Commission. However, the affiliation of Cuba with GRULA in 1980, and the Falklands/Malvinas war (1982) led to a suspension of the dialogue. 136 The interest of the European Community in Latin America began in the early 1980s, even before Spain accessed the EC. The specific reasons for this were the Nicaraguan revolution (1979), the debt crisis (1982), the Salvadoran civil war (1980-92), dictatorships in the Southern Cone and the Falkland war (1982): "From the EC perspective, Latin America was visualized as a potential terrain for revitalizing the Community as a world player and an escape from the paralysis of'eurosclerosis' threatening its external role." 137 With regard to political relations, since the 1980s respect for democracy, political pluralism and human rights have represented the basic consensus for strengthening the political dialogue between Europe and Latin America. 138 The eighties also witnessed the second generation of agreements with Brazil and other individual countries (1980), with subregions such as the Andean Pact (1983) and the Central American Common Market (1986). In 1984, the Commission prepared a paper on "Orientations for a strengthening of the relations l33

Smith, 'Actually existing foreign policy - or not?', pp. 158, 159.

l34

Gonzalo Arenas, 'El Proceso entre Cumbres'. In: Centro Latinoamericano para las Relaciones con Europa (ed.), II Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe-Union Europea. En un mundo global. Santiago de Chile, abril 2002, p. 25; see: José Antonio Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural'. In: Nueva Sociedad, 189, enero-febrero 2004, pp. 86, 87. ' 35 Ribeiro Hoffmann, The foreign policy behaviour, p. 9. l36 Ribeiro Hoffmann, The foreign policy behaviour, p. 9. l37

Jean Grugel, 'Spain: Latin America as an ambiguous topic'. In: Franco Algieri/Elfriede Regelsberger (eds ), Synergy at Work. Spain and Portugal in European Foreign Policy. Bonn 1996, p. 75. l38 Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 62. 41

between the Communities and Latin America" - the same year when the dialogue between the EC and the Contadora Group on the Central American crisis started. Also in 1984, the Institute of European-Latin American Relations (IRELA) was established in Madrid. 139 3.1.1. The Central American conflicts as starting point for strengthened political relations During the Central American conflicts of the 1980s, the Europeans, organised in the EC-San José Group meetings, were able to design a relatively coherent policy toward the region, as an alternative to the staunch anti-communist attitude of the US government. 140 The European Community's policy towards Central America in the 1980s, initiated by the German and French governments, obviously contradicted Reagan's battle against "Communism" in the isthmus; even the U K ' s Margaret Thatcher opposed the aggressive US stand on the conflicts in that region. In accordance, one of the results of the European involvement in Central America was the launch of new institutionalised relations with Latin American sub-regional groups, 141 which also served to get rid of the "bad taste in the mouth left by the Malvinas conflict" and to improve European-Latin American relations in general. 142 Thus, cooperation with the Contadora Group, which aimed to reach a negotiated solution for the Central American conflicts, and was set up by Central and South American countries in 1983, initiated the EU's strategic reactions. 143 Likewise, Lagos holds that the European Community carried out a common foreign policy at the first biregional conference in San José in 1984 - different from the US and Soviet policies towards Central America because the EC advocated negotiations to end the armed conflicts in the region. This was the starting point for relations between the later EU and the Rio Group. 144 The development of the EC-Latin American engagement in the Central American civil wars was accelerated by the Spanish accession to the Community in 1986. Based on the San José Dialogue, a Cooperation Agreement was finally concluded. At first, it had little to do with economic/trade matters, because the directorates of the EC in charge of it were said to have been an "untouchable caste". In 1987, cooperation with Latin America took place, above all,

l39

Ribeiro Hoffmann, The foreign policy behaviour,

140

p. 10.

Smith, 'Actually existing foreign policy-or not?', p. 152.

141

Smith, 'Actually existing foreign policy-or not?', p. 160.

142

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

l43

Gerhard Drekonja-Kornat, 'Latin American Foreign Policies in the Twentyfirst Century: A European Perspective'. In: Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques, Genève, vol. 81 (I), janvier-avril 2003, pp. 107, 108.

144

Ricardo Lagos Andino, 'Perspectivas y expectativas en las relaciones entre Centroamérica y la Unión Europea'. In: Nueva Sociedad, 190, marzo-abril 2004, p. 103.

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in the rural sector (Bolivia, Peru, parts of Central America) because the engineers of the DG Development had experience with that sector in Africa. According to a former EU official in Brussels, it was necessary to generate ideas and, continuing French-German endeavours towards the region, a Spanish initiative in the Commission led to the idea of an accord. 145 When the Cooperation Agreement with Central America was signed, it was reportedly a leap in the dark because: 1) the Central American countries were caught in armed conflicts, 2) the oligarchic elite was still ruling those countries or, at least, remained powerful, 3) the region was part of the Cold War focus of the Reagan administration. 146 In sum, the European Community's involvement in Central American crisis diplomacy was both the first independent CFSP forerunner and the beginning of political relations with Latin American countries. 3.1.2. The EU's partner in Latin America: The Group of Rio The Group of Rio originated in 1986 from Latin American efforts to resolve Central American conflicts peacefully. 147 The Rio Group, with an initial membership of six countries, at present includes all Latin American as well as one rotating member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and is managed by a rotating and temporary secretariat. Since the Rio Group has no rigid institutionalised organisational structure, no organic dialogue with the EU evolved and no real negotiations took place. Its function was to create an atmosphere of trust, which should lead to common positions and harmony between the regions. The Rio Group, however, hardly represents all regions: in 2004, there were no Central American and no Caribbean states in the rotating Troika. Although the Rio Group strengthened the position of Latin American countries relative to third parties, there still exists the problem of representation: "Si Kissinger tenía razón al preguntar quién hablaba por la Comunidad Europea hace dos décadas, hoy tendría más razón para preguntar lo mismo respecto a América Latina o el Caribe." 148 Accordingly, there is no unified spokesperson. 145

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

146

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. Furthermore, it was difficult to design this as a global policy, since Great Britain, for instance, was uneasy about supporting the left-wing government of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. ,47 The Rio Group came out of the Group o f Eight, which had merged the Contadora Group and the Group o f Support. In 2000, all Central Americans became incorporated. Today, the Rio Group consists of 19 members. The Caribbean countries have one rotating representative. Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 87. ,48 lnforme PROCOPI (1 de octubre de 1999), 'Construyendo una asociación estratégica birregional: La primera cumbre de jefes de estado y de gobierno de la Unión Europea y de América Latina y el Caribe'. In: Tomás Mallo (ed.), España e Iberoamérica: Fortaleciendo la relación en tiempos de incertidumbre. Asociación de Investigación y Especialización sobre Temas Iberoamericanos (A1ETI), Madrid 2001, p. 98.

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All 33 Latin American and Caribbean leaders represent their often diverging national interests and priorities, for instance: Mexico looks towards the US, whilst Brazil/Mercosur establishes new alliances, as seen at the WTO conference in Cancún in 2003, with newly-industrialised countries such as China and India. 149 However, as a Latin American ambassador remarks, the region has other urgent troubles such as hunger, poverty and social problems, which are likely to be a higher priority rather than reaching a common foreign policy. 150 Since 1987, the informal political dialogue of Latin American countries, the Rio Group, composed of the respective foreign ministers, has annually met with the European foreign ministers: "The European Union is especially happy about the Grupo de Rio because it enables dialogue among four dozen entities but requires only two voices." 15 ' This comment seems optimistic but it hints at the improvement of biregional coordination. Usually, these informal gatherings have taken place during the annual UN General Assemblies between the " G R U L A " (Grupo Latinoamericano) and the European delegation. 152 The Group of Rio and the European Community institutionalised their annual meetings into a forum in 1990 through the Declaration of Rome, excluding Panama (due to the political crisis in 1989/90) but with the participation of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay. 153 In 1990, there was the Declaration with the US (Transatlantic Declaration) and the Italian Presidency wanted another declaration with the Group of Rio. When the political change in Chile took place, the Chilean Ambassador in Brussels, Mariano Fernández, tried to convince the Latin American Ministers to ask for a common declaration. Finally, the Chilean foreign minister officially asked for it: the Declaration of Rome was the result. The Declaration of Rome 1990 was very important at that time - the merit reportedly goes exclusively to Italy, which held the Presidency at that time. 154 With the Rome agreement on December 20, 1990, the EC recognized the Group of Rio as its major dialogue partner in Latin America. 155 That accord tried to put into reality the ambitious proposal included in the conclusions of the Council of the European Community, with the aim of letting the European Community and Latin America "jointly play an active role in the international society of the future". 156 Since 1990, institutionalised ministerial meetings of 149

Whitehead, 'La relación birregional', p. 73.

150

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

151

Drekonja-Kornat, 'Latin American Foreign Policies', p. 103. Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 87.

152

Darío Valcárcel, 'Cumbre eurolatinoamericana, 17 de mayo. Posibilidades, imposibilidades'. In: Política Exterior, 87, mayo-junio 2002, pp. 27, 28. 153

Smith, 'Actually existing foreign policy-or not?', p. 160.

I54

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

155

Jean-Pierre Derisbourg, 'L'Amérique latine entre Etats-Unis et Union européenne'. In: Politique

156

Étrangère,

2, avril-juin 2002, pp. 430, 431.

Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 60.

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foreign ministers of the Rio Group countries and the European Union have taken place in both regions once a year. In short, European engagement in the Central American civil wars brought the European Community closer to Latin America, especially the Rio Group, and enabled the EC, later the EU, to establish improved relations with the continent in the 1990s. By the end of the century, every Latin American country except Cuba was involved in some type of institutionalised partnership arrangement with the European Union.' 57 Finally, it remains to be seen whether the Community of South American Nations, proclaimed in December 2004, will actually improve regional integration or become just another over-ambitious project without practical impact. 3.1.3. New impetus for biregional relations in the 1990s: The trade agenda In the 1990s, the Europeans came to the conclusion that the emerging markets in Latin America would be of interest - a late reaction to the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and George W. Bush's "Enterprise of the Americas". In accordance with this tendency of the early nineties, and thanks to Spanish diplomacy and endeavours of the Commission's Vice-president Manuel Marin 158 , the General Affairs Council of the EU acknowledged in October 1994 the now extensive EU interest in Latin America, and approved the "Basic Document on relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean". In December 1994, the European Council (Essen) accepted the document and called upon the Council and the Commission to reach an interregional agreement with Mercosur as well as to concretise relations with Mexico and Chile. 159 In sum, a new EU "strategy" towards Latin America was established in 1994, recognising the primacy of economic interests, largely due to the fear that the US would absorb the region.' 60 As a consequence, the EU signed a Framework Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur (1996) and began negotiating a Global Agreement with Mexico, as the Europeans were afraid of losing a major part of trade exchange with Mexico through the establishment of NAFTA. To distinguish itself from the US approach to the region, the EU designed all-embracing agreements. This process led to different "generations" of agreements, culminating in the so-called fourth generation of "association agreements". These agreements of association include an FTA, "Political Dialogue", and development cooperation, and suggest an ex-

l57

Smith, 'Actually existing foreign policy-or not?', pp. 152-157.

158

José Antonio Sanahuja, 'De Rio a Madrid: limites y posibilidades de las relaciones Unión Europea-América Latina'. In: Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 2, 6, Uni159versity of Miami, April 2003, p. 6. Smith, 'Actually existing foreign policy-or not?', p. 161. l60

Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 90.

45

change of ideas between equal partners. Today, Mexico and Chile have already concluded and Mercosur seems not far from completing an agreement of association, or a so-called agreement of the fourth generation, with the European Union. Worthy of mention is that these agreements represent treaties not only with the EU but also with the EU member states. 161 3.1.4. Civil society in the EU and Latin America 162 Following constructivism in international relations, interregional ism is based on shared values and identities - thus, civil society must be involved, too.' 6 3 The groups in question are not that institutionalised, but in recent years, parallel to the biregional summits, the European Commission has encouraged meetings of civil society. European non-governmental organisations have become very influential actors and are decisively important in determining European development cooperation with Latin America.' 6 4 Unlike the Rio Summit, the 2002 meeting in Madrid was accompanied by a variety of parallel reunions, ministerial meetings, and seminars, intended to open new spaces. However, beyond the "opening of spaces" the actual impact of these meetings is uncertain, as the NGOs could not use authentic mechanisms of participation, not even with regard to the preparation of the agenda. 165 Specific-issue related actors in civil society, such as human rights groups, are said to be more influential than others.' 6 6 Success in accessing European institutions and influencing the outcome of policies also depends on the organisational structure and professionalism of NGOs. In addition to the actors of civil society, Sanahuja speaks of 'paradiplomacy' in reference to the influence of local and regional governments. 167

161

Anna Ayuso Pozo, 'La cooperación para el desarrollo de la Unión Europea en América Latina. La acción española ante un pasado umbrío y un futuro incierto'. In: Revista CI DOB d'Afers Internacionals, 54, 55, noviembre 2001, p. 97. l62 Alemany provides an inquiry of traditional state diplomacy and informal diplomacy of civil society. Cecilia Alemany, 'Diplomacia de cumbres y diplomacia ciudadana en la asociación birregional desde la perspectiva del Mercosur'. In: Nueva Sociedad, 190, marzo-abril 2004, pp. 138-152. 163

On nonstate actors (NGOs, business organisations, parties etc.) see Christian Freres, La cooperación de las sociedades civiles de la Unión Europea con América Latina. Aieti, Madrid 1998. 164 Drekonja-Kornat, 'Latin American Foreign Policies', pp. 107, 108.

l65

Christian Freres, '¿De las declaraciones a la asociación birregional? Perspectivas de las cumbres entre la Unión Europea y América Latina y el Caribe', ln: Nueva Sociedad, 189, enero-febrero 2004, p. 120. I66 lnterviews, Brussels, December 2003. '67Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 90.

46

3.2. The European Union and Latin American subregions and individual countries In general terms, the EU policy towards the region uses a tripartite approach: 1) aid/economic development assistance for poorer states in Central America and Bolivia; 2) more extended cooperation agreements for middle-income developing states o f Andean Community; 3) strengthened relations with Mexico, Chile and the Mercosur. The "real change", took place in the EU's relations with these partners: it intended an associated status for these, hitherto only applicable to historically close countries. With stronger ties to Mexico, the EU hoped to broaden its influence towards other trade associations (NAFTA, APEC, Group o f 3). 1 6 8 In addition to traditional topics such as trade, foreign direct investments, human rights, and regional integration issues like conflict prevention and strengthening o f international confidence, the fight against drug trafficking and the protection of the environment were added. 169 Although the trade elements are more concrete and visible in the association agreements, it is significant that the political components and those concerning development cooperation include the potential for a much deepened relationship between EU and Latin American countries. 170 These agreements speak not only of political dialogue, but also of concord in international forums, and open the possibility that Latin American countries could, if they wish, associate themselves with actions in the CFSP framework. 171 However, although the new generation o f agreements also include political dialogues, what really counts for Latin America, as a national European diplomat puts it, are free trade agreements. 172 Reportedly, the political dimension of association agreements is seen as a challenge to US trade plans in the Americas: European diplomats hold that the political and cooperation part o f the treaties is very important and interesting for Latin Americans. However, the association agreements "are not war instruments o f the EU against the United States". 173 3.2.1. The European Union and Central America The relationship between the European Community and Central America, which began with the San Jose Dialogue, was initiated in 1984 in the context o f regional conflict, as mentioned earlier. The Dialogue of San José was structured

l68

S m i t h , 'Actually existing foreign policy-or not?', pp. 161, 162.

I69

0 n the different European-Latin American agreements, see, for instance, Derisbourg, ' L ' A m é r i q u e latine', pp. 4 1 5 - 4 3 4 .

l70 171

V a n Klaveren, ' L a s relaciones políticas', p. 67. Van Klaveren, ' L a s relaciones políticas', p. 68.

172

Interviews, Brussels, January 2 0 0 4 .

' ^ I n t e r v i e w s , Washington D C., May 2 0 0 4 .

47

like the annual ministerial meetings, with the participation of the Contadora Group as an observer. At present, the cooperation between the EU and Central America is based on the Framework Cooperation Agreement of 1993, which focuses on sustainable development and regional integration. At the XII San José meeting in Florence in 1996, the participants decided to modify the format of reunions (which took place every two years). This was due to the increasing size of the E U ' s conference agenda, but also reflects a rising disinterest for Central America in Europe due to the end of civil wars in 1996. In the 1990s, the agenda changed and became more pragmatic: regional integration, support for reconstruction after natural disasters and maintenance of the General System of Preferences (GSP) 1 7 4 for drugs (1991). Since 1999, the San José Dialogue has taken place simultaneously with the EU-Latin American summits. There are also special meetings on trade and cooperation, but the EU has avoided key decisions on trade and economic aid. 175 In December 2003, a new Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement was signed in Rome. It widens existing political dialogue and cooperation and strives to promote cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy in Article 5: "The Parties shall, as far as possible and in accordance with their interests, coordinate their positions and take joint initiatives in the appropriate international forums and cooperate in the field of foreign and security policy." 176 At the Summit in Guadalajara in May 2004, the Union agreed to advance the negotiations of an association agreement with Central America with a joint assessment of Central American regional integration, carried out by an ad hoc working group in 2005. The official launching of the joint assessment took place at the Xlllth meeting of the EU-Central America Joint Committee on 19 January 2005 in Brussels. 177 As one observer in Brussels remarks, Central Americans strive for an association agreement like the one between the EU and Chile, just because of a "grotesque obsession of imitation". 178

174

The Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) was designed to allow industrialised countries to grant non-reciprocal tariff reductions to developing countries. The underlying idea was to help the developing world industrialise. l75 Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 88.

176

Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its member states, o f the one part, and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, o f the other part, December 2003. l77 XlIIth meeting o f the European Union - Central America Joint Committee, Brussels, Conclusions. 19 January 2005. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/ ip05_19-01-05.htm, 27 January 2005. 178 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

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3.2.2. The European Union and the Andean Community of Nations Since the creation of the Andean Pact (today Andean Community) in 1969, the EC and the EU have supported the process of Andean regional integration. In recent years, however, the existence of the Andean Community has been fundamentally challenged due to various crises within its member states and between participating countries. Institutionalised relations between both regions started in 1983, when a second generation agreement was signed (Cooperation Agreement). However, the institutionalised political dialogue did not begin until 1996, based on a European initiative. The dialogue includes regional and international questions of common interest, particularly concerning the fight against drugs. This initiative responds to the Andean integration and to the strengthening of mutual cooperation, which includes the GSP-drugs, and agreements for the joint control of chemical substances used as precursors for the production of illicit drugs. In addition to the ministerial conferences, the EU-Andean Community dialogue also holds specialised meetings on drugs, trade and industry, and science and technology. These reunions are held parallel to the sessions of the UN General Assembly and the EU-Latin American biregional summits, taking advantage of the coincidence of foreign ministers and heads of government. 179 The Rome declaration of 1996 provides the basis for regular political dialogue between the two regions. Regional integration, democracy/human rights, and the fight against drugs' 8 0 are the main topics of this dialogue. The European Commission, on behalf of the EU member states and the Andean Community, concluded the negotiations on a new Political and Cooperation Agreement in October 2003. Along with the EU-Central American accord, this agreement was finally signed in Rome on 15 December 2003. The new agreement enhances the degree of political dialogue between the two regions, including topics such as conflict prevention, good governance, migration and the fight against terrorism. 18 ' This new Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement is seen as an important step forward in the relations between the EU and the Andean Community, although many Latin Americans and some Europeans, particularly some pro-

179 Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 89. 180

The fight against drugs is a special issue in the relationship between the EU and the Andean Community, demonstrated by a high level dialogue on drugs and Agreements on Precursors between the Commission and each Andean State. These are instruments to prevent the use o f precursor products in the production o f drugs (signed in 1995, in force since 1997). Regular Precursor meetings between the European Commission and the Andean countries were created in the framework of these five Agreements in order to monitor their implementation by both regions, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/andean/intro/ 181index.htm, 22 December 2004. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/andean/intro/index.htm, 22 December 2004.

49

Latin American Spanish members of the EP, are not satisfied with the EU's engagement, and demand an association agreement as soon as possible. At the Mexico Summit in 2004, both regions agreed on the joint goal of an association agreement, including a free trade area, but this should happen in accordance with the results of the Doha round and the improvement of regional integration - a particularly difficult scenario in the crisis-shaken Andean Community. 182 3.2.3. The European Union and Mexico 183 The Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination and Co-operation Agreement, or "Global Agreement" with Mexico (signed in 1997, in force since 2000) was the first accord of this sort with a partner outside the EU's immediate geoeconomic sphere of influence. Reasons for this were the creation of NAFTA and the subsequent discrimination against EU export products. The other motive was the trade agenda, which has been relatively non-conflictive (compared to Mercosur negotiations, for instance). 184 Article 1, "Basis of the Agreement" refers to the necessity for respect for democratic principles and human rights in the domestic and external policies. 185 This led to difficulties with Mexico, as the political conditions of this democracy clause were seen as disrespecting the country's national sovereignty, which has long been a particularly sensitive issue, because of several direct and indirect US interventions in the past. The Political Dialogue is detailed in the brief Title II of the agreement: It shall be institutionalised, based on democratic principles and fundamental human rights and covering all bilateral and international subjects of mutual interest. It shall lead to a closer consultation between Mexico and the EU member states "within the context of the international institutions to which they both belong."' 86 Sanahuja remarks that in practice, the institutionalised dialogue of heads of government, at the level of ministers and high officials, and the inter-parliamen182 They also agreed that any future free trade area shall be built on the outcome of the Doha Development Agenda and the realisation of a sufficient level of regional integration. 183 For the relations between Mexico and the EU, see, for instance, IRELA, La Unión Europea y México: una nueva relación política y económica/Instituto de Relaciones Europeo-Latinoamericanas. Madrid 1997. 184 Roberto Bouzas, 'Las negociaciones Unión Europea-Mercosur. Entre la lentitud y la indefinición'. In: Nueva Sociedad, 190, marzo-abril 2004, pp. 132, 133. 185 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its member states, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part. Official Journal of the European Communities, 28 October 2000, L 276/45, Title 1, Article 1. ,86 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its member states, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, Title II, Article 3(1).

50

tarian dialogue have not been used often, possibly because the main concern was trade. During the Iraq crisis in the UN Security Council, it was not possible to use the dialogue between Mexico and the EU because of European divisions; classic bilateral channels were used instead. 187 3.2.4. The European Union and Chile EU negotiations on an association agreement with Chile were much faster than those with Mexico and were signed in November 2002. 188 Originally, sticking to its goal of promotion of regional integration, the EU wanted to simultaneously reach agreements with Chile and Mercosur. When the negotiations with the latter turned out to be much more difficult than expected, the agreement with Chile came in handy, particularly because Chile's comparatively small (but healthy) economy did not present an authentic threat to Europe's agricultural protectionism. The rapid advancement of the negotiations with Chile was also due to the Europeans' observation of the progress in the trade talks between the US and Chile (as in the Mexican case). 189 As sources in the Chilean foreign ministry confirm, although the agreement includes an ambitious part on political dialogue, it is the trade part, which is widely perceived as the most important component of the treaty. 190 Reportedly, many people do not even know that the Association Agreement includes chapters on political matters and cooperation. 191 Part II of the agreement outlines the political dialogue with the main objective being the "promotion, dissemination, further development and common defence of democratic values, such as the respect for human rights, the freedom of the individual and the principles of the rule of law as the foundation of a democratic society." For this purpose, the parties are required to discuss and exchange information on joint initiatives of both parties' interest in order to follow common goals (security, stability, democracy, regional development). 192 The mechanisms of political dialogue are regular meetings between heads of state and government, periodic meetings between foreign ministers, reunions of other ministers to deal with subjects of common interest, as well as annual meetings between senior officials. 193 Article 14 of the agreement points out the cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy: "The Parties shall, as far as l87 Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 89. 188 Bouzas, 'Las negociaciones Unión Europea-Mercosur', p. 133. ] 89 Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 190 Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 191 Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 192 Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and its member states, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part. Part II, Article 12. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_352/l_35220021230en00031439.pdf, 22 December 2004. ,93 Ibid„ Part II, Article 13(1).

51

possible, coordinate their positions and undertake joint initiatives in the appropriate international forums, and cooperate in the field of foreign and security policy." 194 Cooperation against terrorism is detailed in Article 15.195 There is a Committee meeting (EU-Chile) once a year. The parties agreed on a Political Dialogue - apparently without knowing what the outcome would be. The Chileans had a long list of political issues to discuss. There was an ultimatum to agree on common positions with Chile. The Europeans did not react to that enthusiastically. For the EU, the political level is lower and political dialogue seems to mean the exchange of information, rather than the quest for a consensus. 196 Accordingly, the political dialogue aims to maintain close contact, an exchange of opinions, and good atmosphere for cooperation between the parties. An example of this cooperation is the voting behaviour of Latin Americans and Europeans on the resolution condemning Cuba in the UN human rights commission. 197 3.2.5. The European Union and Mercosur A successful EU-Mercosur free trade area would demonstrate that the European Union can have a common foreign policy as a global player.198

The Mercosur, the "Southern Market" (Mercado del Sur), was established in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. At present, Bolivia, Chile and Peru are associated members. Although Brazil and Argentina serve, not unlike France and Germany for the EU in the past, as "motors" of Mercosur, unofficial voices speak of different positions between Argentina/Brazil under the presidents Lula da Silva and Kirchner on the one hand, and Paraguay /Uruguay as "small countries" on the other hand. 199 Undoubtedly, Brazil is the leader of Mercosur, due to its size and markets. Similar to European integration, a Latin American ambassador in Brussels describes Mercosur as more than the sum of its member states. 200 European foreign policy initially evolved in the framework of EU-Latin American policy, but was decisively pushed by the consideration of Mercosur as an emerging market and the perception of it as the most promising integration project in the region "...with a special appeal to the European Union, who sees it as a receptive region in which to implement its "integration model"." 201 In Oc-

l94

Ibid., Part II, Article 14.

' 9 5 Ibid., Part II, Article 15.

196

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 197 Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004.

198 Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership?', p. 25 (Emphasis in the original). 199 200

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 201

52

Ribeiro Hoffmann, The foreign policy behaviour, p. 19.

tober 1994, the European Commission prepared a document "For a Strengthening of the EU Policy towards Mercosur", which was approved by the 1994 European Council meeting in Essen. Accordingly, Mercosur received support from the EU from the beginning, which led to an Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement in 1996. 202 Bouzas names the entry of Spain and Portugal into the European Community, the creation of NAFTA, and the negotiations on an FTAA as more immediate reasons leading to the agreements between Mercosur and the EU. 203 The sensitive topic of agriculture subventions shall be discussed within the W T O process. Internal divisions in Mercosur and the failure of WTO negotiations in Cancün in 2003 affected the talks between the EU and Mercosur negatively. In Guadalajara in May 2004, the EU agreed on a broad opening of its agriculture sector, whilst Mercosur will principally open its markets in the service and public assignment sectors. 204 Nevertheless, the talks failed in autumn 2004 and the prospect of future negotiations remains uncertain. The Doha Round will be the major scene of activity. According to an expert in the US, Brazil would "be nuts" if it gives up everything for the EU that it wouldn't give to the US with little benefit for itself. With regard to the problem issue of trade talks (services/protectionist matters) some observers hold that Brazil engages with the EU just because it wants to anger the US. 203 The formal bilateral conversations between Mercosur and the EU have a political and symbolic importance to Mercosur: they represent its recognition as an actor in the international trade system and also as an international political player. Further, Mercosur identifies with the sense of "community" with which the EU handles integration, in contrast to other integration models, which focus on the market, such as NAFTA or the FTAA. The South American Market is apparently the most important area in Latin America for European interests (trade and investment) and as a region with a common cultural and political heritage. 206 However, as Alemany points out, the entry-into-force of a hemispheric free trade agreement in the Americas without previous agreement between Mercosur and the EU would benefit US exports to the South American states to the detriment of European interests. 207 An EU-Mercosur Association Agreement would also include a "transfer of integration". Thus, the offer of the EU goes beyond the hemispheric free trade

202 203

Ribeiro Hoffmann, The foreign policy behaviour, p. 20.

Bouzas, 'Las negociaciones Unión Europea-Mercosur', p. 131.

204

Susanne Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika: zwischen Rückzug und Annäherung. Ergebnisse des Gipfeltreffens in Mexiko'. In: SWP-Aktuell, 26, Juni 2004, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Berlin, p. 3. 205 Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004. 206 Bouzas, 'Las negociaciones Unión Europea-Mercosur', pp. 128, 129. 207

Alemany, 'Diplomacia de cumbres', p. 143.

53

project advocated by the US and is described as an "FTAA with soul" among European Parliamentarians. Even if the agreement is signed in 2005 after the failed negotiations in October 2004 208 , the ratification process will take longer than usual since all 25 EU member states will need to ratify the document. 209 Though it will, above all, be an economic accord, it also will be a symbolic treaty between two regions. In the history of treaties with Latin America, it differs from previous generations in that it deals with a region. 210

3.3. Conclusions In general, biregional relations have evolved impressively throughout the past two decades, although now there seems to be a period of (perceived) stagnation. Two agreements of association and the prospect of global agreements with Mercosur, the Andean Community, and Central Americans, are certainly laudable advancements. However, critics want more, and demand a biregional accord between the EU and the entire subcontinent as soon as possible.

208

See The Economist,

London, 28 October 2004.

209

Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 3. 21

i n t e r v i e w s , Washington D C., May 2004.

54

4. A Foreign Policy Analysis of the CFSP towards Latin America Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important.2" European Security Strategy, 2003

This chapter shall provide an analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU towards Latin America according to the foreign policy analysis concept of Rainer Tetzlaff. The so-called AIPMA model analyses the actors, their interests and goals, and their perceptions, as well as the measures and consequences of foreign policies. However, it is important to note that the AIPMA analysis is designed for the inquiry of national foreign and development policies; thus this model does not entirely match the multi-faceted foreign affairs approach of the European Union, based on different national and institutional policies. A 1992 report supplementing the provisions of the Treaty of the European Union provided a guide for joint action in the post-Cold War situation. It identified the following factors, which were considered important prerequisites for the EU's involvement: the geographical proximity of a given region or country, a strong interest in the political and economic stability of a region or country, and the existence of threats to the security interests of the Union. Accordingly, the areas of priority for rapid reactions have been Central and Eastern Europe, in particular the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Balkans, the Mediterranean (particularly the Maghreb), and the Middle East. 212 In this context, an official of the European Commission correctly states "Cuando se piensa en las prioridades se toma en cuenta siempre la cuestión de amenaza. América Latina no es una amenaza." 2 1 3 This is somewhat ironic because the Central American conflicts were among the constitutive elements of CFSP, but now the region is not one of the priorities of common foreign policy. 214

211

A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 7.

212

Simon J. Nuttall, European Foreign Policy. Oxford/New York 2000, pp. 236, 237. 21 'interviews, 214

Brussels, November 2004. Jean-Jacques Kourliandsky, 'Union européenne et Amérique latine: mécanismes d'élaboration d'une politique'. In: Daniel van Eeuwen (dir.), L'Amérique latine et l'Europe à

55

4.1. The actors of CFSP towards Latin America, their interests, goals and procedures The actors of C F S P were presented and briefly discussed in chapter 2. According to Gratius and several interview partners in Brussels, there are two main actors with respect to EU foreign policy towards Latin America: the European Commission and Spain, 2 1 5 although the details of FTAs are set by the EU member states, e.g. France and Italy with regard to the agricultural policy. 2 1 6 Grabendorff identifies Spain, Germany and France as the most important EU actors, and Brazil, Argentina and Mexico as the important Latin American players for biregional relations. 2 1 7 However, as a high-ranking official of the DG Relex points out, C F S P actors always depend on the particular subject where concrete foreign policy issues are c o n c e r n e d 2 1 8 Therefore, it is also important to look at the other CFSP actors and their interests, actions and impact on the EU foreign policy on Latin America. 4.1.1. The M e m b e r States of the EU European countries' interest in Latin America varies, but Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Portugal have been influential actors in recent decades. As the former colonial ruler in Latin America, Spain has always been keen to become a middle power in Europe, according to its size and population, and because of its Ibero-American ties and its relationship to other Mediterranean countries. It is Spain, primarily, that seizes the initiative in the EU if a crisis in Latin America comes up. Nonetheless, Spain's activism in the EU does not call into question the bilateral approach of Spanish foreign policy to the countries in the region. In general, no m e m b e r state of the EU, not even Spain, seems to be especially interested in a long-term C F S P strategy. Spanish foreign policy and its role in the E U ' s Latin America policy are discussed in chapter 5. 4.1.2. The Presidency In general, the presidencies set up agendas for their six-month terms. These agendas are usually dominated by pending questions such as the enlargement process, the constitutional treaty or the possible entry of Turkey into the EU. Long-term visions that go beyond these challenging topics are not plentiful, less so with regard to Latin America. India, China and even Russia will more likely

l'heure de Ia mondialisation. Dimension des relations internationales. Paris/Aix en Provence 2002, p. 41. 215 Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 7. 2 ^Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 217 Wolf Grabendorff, 'La estrategia birregional y sus limitaciones en un mundo unipolar'. In: Nueva Sociedad, 189, p. 100. 2 ^Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 56

become important for long-term strategic planning of the European Council as the governments strive for economically and politically powerful international partners. Latin America, with the exception of Brazil (and possibly Mexico) seems not to count in this regard. The impact of the presidencies on CFSP towards Latin America is limited to reactions to crises in the region, such as the Venezuelan coup in April 2002, the social unrest in Bolivia in 2003 or the revolt in Haiti that led President JeanBertrand Aristide to flee the country in 2004. Occasional statements on events in the region suggest that there are no long-term CFSP strategies towards Latin America that go beyond the rather technical Regional Strategy Papers. It would exceed the scope of this study to review the impact of all the presidencies of recent years. Nevertheless, compared with other presidencies, the impact of the Spanish presidency under conservative Prime Minister José Maria Aznar (first six months of 2002) on the political dimension was meagre. If the amount of Coreu illustrates the degree of Spanish interest in dealing with Latin America within the EU, it is minimal compared to those of the succeeding Danish presidency, for instance. The role of the Spanish presidency in 2002 is also discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 4.1.3. The Council of the European Union The new director of the General Directorate E, External Economic Relations, and CFSP has brought a different approach: the Secretariat of the Council has become more active, beyond simply complying with administrative tasks. However, the director of the Council has just four staff members working on the Americas and the UN, and only two officials on Latin American matters, which seems to reflect the status of the region. 219 Within the Council, there were further two working groups handling Latin American issues: AMLAT and COLAT. While AMLAT worked on economic, trade and cooperation matters (l s l pillar topics), COLAT dealt with political issues in Latin America. By a decision of Coreper, these two working groups merged, motivated by financial concerns, but also in order to provide the committee with a broader approach to the oversight of economic and political developments. Nevertheless, the periodic meetings of COLAT still have exclusively economic or exclusively political agendas, so in a way the separation contin220

ues. Each of these groups has a particular mode de fonctionnement. Issues concerning CFSP are dealt with once per month, when the representatives from the capitals meet in Brussels. The other meetings on trade and economic matters are communitarian. There is a lot of oral communication on political matters during

219

220

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003, January 2004. Interviews, Brussels, January/September 2004. 57

the COLAT meetings. 221 For some countries, such as Guatemala and Colombia, there are Consultative Committees. In these, the donor states coordinate their positions. 222 The national experts communicate frequently outside of the three regular monthly meetings. There are reportedly not many confrontations; this smooth functioning is presumably due to the good personal relationships between the experts. 223 The big decisions on topics in the region are made in the Latin America working group. 224 Major parts of the Cuba policy, for instance, did not reach COPS through Coreu, but were instead virtually decided in the working group. In the case of Latin America, the foreign ministers trust in their regional directors and don't get involved the subjects themselves. Thus, the general directors are, in essence, the people who make the decisions. This also happens with the working groups on Africa and Asia, where the experts of the Permanent Representations essentially make the decisions. 225 As the Permanent Representations of the EU Member States are quite busy with their day-to-day work and the preparation of the Coreper meetings, it is usually not the Permanent Representative him/herself who participates in the decision-making processes on Latin American topics in the Council. 226 It is very rare for a Latin American issue to go to Coreper, except for some topics that deal with the situation in Colombia. 227 This makes the working groups, in which the national counsellors for Latin America gather, more influential. The advantage of this is that these officials are experts in the region and thus more knowledgeable 228 However, there might be a lack of political backing for far-reaching proposals, since the counsellors of the Permanent Representations depend more on instructions from their respective capitals than do the Permanent Representatives themselves, and do usually not have the political clearance to develop and put forward more original long-term visions. 229 For example, Plan Colombia was not discussed at the ministerial level although the complex situation in that country should have commanded an all-encompassing, broad

221

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003, September 2004.

222

Interviews, Brussels, October 2004.

223

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003, January 2004. 224

AS one national advisor in Brussels remarks, "With regard to Latin America, not much

225

goes above the Working Group level". Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

226

227Interviews, Brussels, December 2003, January 2004. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 228

229 S e e 230

58

Winn/Lord, EU Foreign Policy beyond the Nation-Stale, Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

pp. 58-60.

In the decision-making phase during which national experts seek compromises, the Council's Secretariat determines and coordinates the margins of the respective member states' positions in order to facilitate a solution. 231 In this, the coordination support from the Council's Secretariat for decision-making is limited to formulation assistance. With regard to the negotiation mandate and conference agendas, the Secretariat of the Council has a larger role. 232 4.1.4. The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the High Representative for CFSP According to several interviewees, Latin America is either not a top priority for Javier Solana, or he is not able to put the region on the agenda by himself. 233 His Policy Unit, however, reportedly has the "intellectual leadership" in foreign policy toward Latin America. 234 The new person in charge of the task force "United Nations, Latin America" is the Spaniard Nicolás Pascual de la Parte. He succeeded José Javier Gómez Llera, a Spanish foreign official who had worked in the policy unit since its beginning in 1999 until 2004. The main duty of this position is to prepare reports on countries (or specific issues) in the region, often together with the secret agency SITCEN, which is outside the Council's DG E and handles military information as well. Moreover, this expert reports to Javier Solana. His function is not to launch initiatives, but to prepare reports on likely scenarios and to provide possible strategies on how to respond. Thus, his task is to react immediately to upcoming crisis with concrete proposals. 235 Usually, this official from the Policy Unit has permanent contacts with the Latin American embassies in Brussels. All these consultations are very flexible and informal. This means that the contact person depends on the country and the issue at hand. The exchange of information, opinions and consultations takes place by telephone or via email if no strictly confidential content is concerned. 236 Until 2002, if a strategy paper, or policy paper, was to be prepared, the Policy Unit elaborated it and spoke with the corresponding colleagues in the Commission. However, this was an exclusive task for the Policy Unit. Since 2002, the Policy Unit typically prepares the policy papers in cooperation with the respective desk officer or specialist in the European Commission, with the support of the DG E IV of the Council's Secretariat, working as a team - apparently without any problems with regard to the Latin American reports. As mentioned earlier, this collaboration between experts of the Commission with members of So23

'interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

232

233 234

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004, October/December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

235

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

236

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

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lana's Policy Unit is already seen as forerunner of a likely European foreign service supporting a future Union foreign minister. 237 4.1.5. The European Commission Due to the Council's lack of initiative with regard to Latin America, the Commission is said to design the EU policy towards the region. In this situation, the Spaniards dominate the corresponding units. However, is this also true with regard to the intergovernmental CFSP pillar? Concerning CFSP, the Commission is said to be very reluctant to act because it has a comparatively limited mandate in this regard, and seems eager to avoid any blame. 238 In fact, the Commission, as unofficial "executive" of the EU, at least regarding first pillar subjects, also contains a variety of CFSP actors. The shared responsibility of several directorates within the Commission (let alone the influence of the member states, the presidency and Solana's office) demonstrates part of the problem of the three-pillar-structure of the European Union and its consequences for CFSP. The General Directorates (DGs) Relex (External Relations), DG Development and the DG Trade are the most influential directorates handling Latin American issues. In addition, Europe Aid, 239 ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office) and the Conflict Prevention Unit are actors. In the 1999 Commission, Sberro observed two opposing currents, personified by Leon Brittan, who strove for multilateral trade liberalisation, and Manuel Marin, who sought to defend a regionalist policy for Latin America, similar to the ACP countries approach. Further, there was the traditional linkage of the United Kingdom with Asian countries, "represented" by the Commissioner Brittan, and the relations with Latin America, championed by Spain and its "representative" Marin. 240 In the Commission between 1999 and 2004, however, there was no "champion" for Latin America: the Briton Christopher Patten replaced the Spanish Commissioner in charge of External Relations and thus reduced any expectation of a more vigorous European Latin America policy. Patten was a friend of "Monsieur PESC", Javier Solana, but did not show particular interest in strengthened relations with Latin America beyond rhetorical statements. Spanish diplomats particularly stress the disinterest of former Commissioner 237

Interviews, Brussels, December 2004, January 2005. 238

239Interviews, Brussels, December 2003, September 2004. EuropeAid Co-operation Office is a department of the Commission, and is subject to the normal operating procedures of the Institution. It is supervised by a Board comprising Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relations (Chairman), Poul Nielson, Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid (Chief Executive), Gunther Verheugen, Commissioner for Enlargement, Pascal Lamy, Commissioner for Trade, and Pedro Solbes Mira, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs. 240 Stefan Sberro, 'Une alliance stratégique entre Europe et Amérique latine'. In: Problèmes d'Amérique latine, numéro double 46/47, automne-hiver 2002, pp. 7-18.

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Patten in the region. 241 While Patten, the former British governor in Hong Kong, was in charge of Asia and Latin America, Pascal Lamy, Trade Commissioner, gave priority to multilateral negotiations, in which the EU and Latin America are certainly no strategic allies (especially with regard to the agrarian sector). 242 The new Commission of 2004 might dare to attempt a more courageous approach, as the Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner from Austria, is married to a Spaniard and Honorary Chairperson of the Latin America Institute in Vienna. In view of her closeness to Hispanic culture, and the fact that the next EU-Latin America summit will take place in Vienna in 2006, she may be able to advance the relationship with the Latin America and also foster a more ambitious CFSP approach. 243 DG Relex Within the General Directorate External Relations (DG Relex, according to its French acronym), the DG Relex G is principally in charge of economic and political foreign affairs with Latin America and the Caribbean. DG Relex A Concerning CFSP matters, the DG Relex A, which manages general common foreign policy issues, also deals with Latin American matters. However, DG Relex A meets with the Latin American ambassadors only once a year, compared with, for instance, its monthly lunch with the Russian ambassador. 244 This appears to confirm that the Latin Americans have little interest in CFSP, although recently, interest seems to be a growing. 245 DG Relex G Within the Directorate External Relations, the DG Relex G seeks to safeguard relations with Latin America and its subregions, as enshrined in corresponding treaties. The work of DG Relex G is the conclusion of agreements, development cooperation, and trade matters — all issues of the first pillar. Although Relex G also deals with political subjects, its main tasks and expertise are located within the Community pillar. The DG Relex G is subdivided into four units: Mercosur/Chile, Andean Community, Mexico and Central America, and the Unit for Horizontal Matters, which deals with regional issues and topics such as the EU-Latin American summits or the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This subdivision of 241

Interviews, Brussels, November/December 2004. Sberro, 'Une alliance stratégique', pp. 14, 15. 243 A1SO the new Commissioner of the DG Development, the former Belgian foreign minister Louis Michel, has already demonstrated his interest in Latin America. 244 lnterviews, Brussels, December 2003. 245 Interviews, Brussels, September 2004. 242

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DG Relex G appears to mirror the integrationist approach. At present the position of Deputy Director General for Asia and Latin America is filled by Hervé Jouanjean, who was formerly working in the DG Trade. The director of the DG Relex G reports to the Deputy Director General. Tomás Dupla del Moral, director since 2003, had previously been head of unit for Horizontal Matters in the DG Relex G and thus is acquainted with its functioning. In examining the DG Relex G and other units that deal with Latin American issues the dominance of Spaniards at the director's or head of unit's level is striking. In 2005, the director and two heads of unit (Mexico/Central America, and the Andean Community) were Spaniards. A Belgian woman headed the Horizontal unit and a French woman the unit for Mercosur and Chile. Spanish candidates, who understandably have an interest in working on Latin American issues due to shared cultural and linguistic ties, clearly dominate the corresponding concours related to positions dealing with Latin American topics. 246 Considering this, it is almost surprising that at the desk officer level there are not many Spaniards working for the DG Relex G. DG Relex B: Multilateral Relations and Human Rights DG Relex B is in charge of human rights and democracy issues in third countries. With regard to Latin America, it deals with horizontal matters and specific countries as well. The key countries for the human rights unit are Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala. 247 The DG follows the Initiative for the Promotion of Democracy. Horizontal matters are, for example, the death penalty and torture. Furthermore, in all DG Relex country reports, the topics of human rights and democracy are addressed. If the DG Relex G prepares a report on Argentina, for instance, the DG Relex Human Rights provides recommendations. Accordingly, this unit operates as a complement to regional directions. Its offices are located in close proximity to the DG Relex G (on the 11th floor of the Charlemagne building of the Commission) that facilitates communication between the two directorates. 248 DG Relex and other General Directorates Coordination problems between DG Relex and DG Cooperation are detected by some observers. 249 One observer points out that DG Relex and DG Trade mirror the relationship in Europe between the communitarian and the intergovernmental sector:250 DG Trade does not care about CFSP and is said to be more efficient

246

lnterviews, Brussels, December 2003. Reportedly, from ten candidates for a job in the DG Relex G, approximately eight are Spaniards.

247

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

248

249

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. Interviews, Brussels, October 2003/January 2004.

250

Interviews, Berlin, February 2004.

62

without the political dimension. 25 ' Likewise, one national diplomat remarks that DG Trade tends to monopolise relations with Latin America because of the importance of commerce, which also explains why the CFSP lacks strength. 252 Moreover, the DG Trade plays a competitive role and is less enthusiastic to sign association agreements with the Andean Community and Central America for rather technical reasons. Here, the difficulty of the system becomes obvious: for some EU officials, to sign this kind of agreement is a political decision, for others, mainly in the DG Trade, the lack of reasonable convenience hinders them in supporting another FTA with the Central Americans and the Andean Region. Accordingly, an observer in Brussels states that the DG Trade lacks a broader, possibly historical, perspective. 253 In this rivalry on authority, the DG Trade certainly has the advantage with its decision-making powers as part of the first, supranational pillar. Moreover, within the European institutions, there are rumours that DG Trade has actually taken over control of external relations towards Latin America. 254 Others hold that the DG Relex G already stands for a similar trade/economy-oriented policy approach towards the region, comparable to the one of the DG Trade. 255 For a national diplomat, this antagonism can only be overcome by the establishment of a Union foreign minister. 256 However, there are also observers outside the Commission who find the assumed "antagonism" between both DGs exaggerated. 257 According to interviews, the competition or rivalry between the Commissioners Patten (External Relations) and Lamy (Trade) damaged the position of the Latin American missions and sometimes led to surprising incidents. 258 I would suggest that the truth lies in the middle, and that the respective impact of DG Relex and DG Trade always depends on the specific issue. Nevertheless, I agree with many observers who criticise a lack of vision within the Commission regarding its approach towards Latin America, 259 including the CFSP view.

25

'interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

252 253 254

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

One observer said that the DG Trade had "usurped" the policy towards Latin America. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. While the DG Trade is certainly influential with regard to the Latin America approach of the Commission, many officials of the DG Relex G also have a commercial or economic background or even have worked for the DG Trade before, which might explain the more economic/trade-focussed view in the Commission with regard to Latin America. 256 Interviews, Berlin, February 2004. 257 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004, Buenos Aires, March 2004. 255

258

259

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews in Brussels, December 2003. See Klaas Dykmann, 'Las relaciones entre América Latina y la Unión Europea: Desafíos y perspectivas ante la Cumbre de Guadalajara'. Foro Euro-Latino. Internet forum of Nueva Sociedad, Caracas, May 2004, http://www.nuevasoc.org.ve/upload/anexos/foro_217.doc, 5 January 2005; Klaas Dykmann,

63

A possible result of the alleged struggles of the DG Relex - internally and with other DGs - on economic relations with Latin America could be an even more reduced political and CFSP approach towards the region. 4.1.6. The European Parliament There are two main committees that deal with Latin American issues: the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Human Rights and the Committee on Latin America. Unlike in the US Congress, there is apparently no hierarchy in the EP, which means that other committees are not openly subordinated to the Foreign Affairs committee. However, there are reportedly coordination problems between the two committees. 260 Although the general impact of the European Parliament is rather limited with regard to CFSP, some EP members could certainly advance the political dialogue with Latin American colleagues. As an experienced national diplomat remarks, there has always been a lobby for Latin America in the European Parliament. 261 Many Spanish Parliamentarians have an understandable interest in strengthening and even extending the EU's ties with the region. As a result, in 2001 the EP proposed that the Council adopt a "Common Strategy" on Latin America in order to facilitate relations between the EU and the region and to set up a Fund of Biregional Solidarity. Although many governments welcomed the text, nobody promoted concrete initiatives for reaching its goals. 262 One observer in Brussels remarks that it might have been possible that people in the Commission encouraged or even "used" the EP to push forward the issue in view of the forthcoming Madrid summit of the EU and Latin America in May 2002. 263 The EP draft for a Common Strategy of 2001 puts forward proposals for the political sphere, the economic/financial sector and the social and cultural area. With regard to the political sphere, the Parliament suggested a broader biregional political agenda, the modernisation of the political dialogue at ministers' level, the modernisation of the interparliamentary dialogue and the creation of an EU-Latin American Transatlantic Assembly, the adoption of an EU-Latin American peace charter, and finally the launching of a biregional political and security partnership. Furthermore, the EP resolution proposed association agree-

260

'Les relations politiques entre l'Union européenne et l'Amérique latine: Une Union politique birégionale?'. In: Regards sur l'Europe, Bruxelles, vol. 1, février 2004, pp. 25, 26. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

261

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 262 Freres, '¿De las declaraciones a la asociación birregional?', p. 119. 263 lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003. "...whereas the second summit, to be staged in May 2002, will provide an excellent opportunity to forge a comprehensive strategy framework that endows the European Union's foreign policy vis-à-vis Latin America with real substance and structure...", European Parliament resolution on a global partnership and a common strategy for relations between the European Union and Latin America (2000/ 2249(IN)), A5-0336/200I, PV 15 November 2001.

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ments with all Latin American countries or trade blocks, the maintenance of GSP, the establishment of a global interregional partnership agreement to institutionalise the strategic partnership, and shared prosperity by strengthening the regional markets. A biregional free trade area was scheduled for 2010. 264 Furthermore, it is revealing that embattled debates took place in the European Parliament on the separation of Asia and Latin America in the legislative field. In 1998, the EP had already separated the geographical budgetary sections for Asia and Latin America. During these harsh discussions, Spanish Parliamentarians in particular fought for a separation. As a former member of the EP remarks, this contested separation of the budget was pushed by the Spanish lobby in the EP, and supported by the parliamentarian left. 265 On 6 November 2003, the EP decided to divide the legislative procedures for cooperation into two: one for Asia, another one for Latin America. 266 One EU official, however, points out that while the separation was perhaps an important issue for Spain, in general it was not significant. 267 Strong Latin American promoters in European institutions like EP member José Ignacio Salafranca Sänchez-Neyre are frustrated because the EU does not consider the region a priority. Thus, he insists on a Biregional Solidarity Fund, although the Commission made clear on various occasions that there are neither the necessary resources nor the institutional and judicial framework to implement such a programme. 268 Some European parliamentarians who are fond of Latin America see a closer economic association with the region not as result of tough negotiations but as the overcoming of historical injustice. 269 As the possibilities of the EP are limited, a Latin American diplomat critically concludes: "The European Parliament has no influence, they just talk." 270 However, according to another Latin American ambassador in Brussels, lobbying in the European Parliament is quite worthwhile for the advancement of Latin American interests. 27 '

264,, . . Ibid.

265

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

266

José Javier J. Fernández Fernández, 'Un grito en favor del refuerzo de la asociación política y social birregional en vísperas de la III Cumbre Unión Europea-América Latina'. In: Juan Pablo Soriano/Jordi Bacaria/Stephan Sberro/Erika Ruiz (coord ), La Unión Europea y América Latina: la cohesion social y la consolidación de la paz. Guadalajara 2004. México D.F. 2004, pp. 74, 75. 267 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 268 Freres, '¿De las declaraciones a la asociación birregional?', p. 121.

269 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 270

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

271

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

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4.1.7. The national embassies in Latin America 272 The embassies of the EU member states in Latin America can be of an economic-commercial nature (in Chile, for example), development-oriented (in some Andean countries, for instance) or more political (in Venezuela or Colombia, e.g.). The embassy of the country holding the Presidency represents the Union, takes care of organisational tasks, organises and coordinates an informal exchange of information. 273 However, as a European ambassador remarks, if it is a small country's embassy that represents the Presidency, it is not more influential than the embassies of the big member states. 274 If a smaller country does not have an embassy in a country, it is a rule that the ambassador of the next EU presidency hosts these monthly meetings. 275 As the EU doesn't want a Troika consisting of three small countries, they changed the composition of the Troika (only present and following presidency, not the foregoing). 276 The Presidency represents the Union in third countries, but it is better to involve others as well, particularly the Commission, in order "to avoid ugly faces". 277 In Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires (and apparently in all other Latin American capitals), all EU ambassadors, including the ambassador of the Commission's Delegation, gather regularly once a month in the meetings of the heads of missions (HoM). Usually, the reunions consist of a matinee, lunch, and a presentation by an invited personality of the host country - mostly political figures, but also academics, journalists, priests, unionists or, in Santiago, the head of the armed forces. 278 The agenda of the monthly meetings is set by the embassy holding the Presidency. A standard topic is the political and economic development of the host country. 279 However, decisions are not made in these 272

The findings presented here derive to a large extent from my research and interviews in Buenos Aires and Santiago. Therefore, the generalisations made do not cover particularities in other Latin American countries. 273 Interviews, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 274 lnterviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 275

In Chile, there was a peculiar situation: As neither Ireland (presiding the EU in the first half-year o f 2004) nor Luxemburg (presiding the EU in the first half-year of 2005) possess an embassy in Santiago de Chile, the Dutch ambassador will have held the EU presidency in that country for 18 months because the Netherlands held the Presidency themselves in the second half o f 2004. This provides a long-term benefit in terms of continuity. Further, the Dutch diplomats are known to be professional and reliable, thus this 18-month engagement provides the EU representation in Chile a big advantage - particularly if compared to the rather disastrous Italian presidency, for example. Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 276 Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 277

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 278

Interviews, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. In March 2004, even Argentine

279

foreign minister Bielsa joined the EU ambassadors, for instance. In Santiago, under the Italian Presidency, these meetings were followed by a lunch with a guest of honour who spoke to the ambassadors. This was not entirely satisfactory since the

66

meetings of EU ambassadors. The HoM reunions occasionally draw papers on common positions regarding economic issues. 280 There are particular meetings in specific situations, most likely crisis situations (in Colombia, Venezuela or Bolivia, for instance). The gatherings are headed by the representative whose country hosts the EU Presidency. During these meetings, the ambassador of the Commission's delegation sits next to the ambassador representing the Presidency. Before the HoM meetings, there is no coordination with Brussels as these gatherings usually handle local topics. 281 Nevertheless, the ambassador of the respective Presidency receives instructions from the capitals to undertake a formal demarche, if necessary, then the Presidency puts it forward. 282 On politically sensitive issues (Cuba, Haiti, for instance) there are instructions from the capitals, which do not pass through the Coreu network. 283 There were also initiatives below ambassador level in Buenos Aires to establish a smaller group of the "important five" embassies (Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain, Italy). Although it was deemed necessary in view of the enlargement, this proposal - possibly a French idea - was rejected because it was thought that such a structure shouldn't be institutionalised. 284 However, the new Eastern European member states are apparently represented in Latin American capitals with very knowledgeable diplomats - certainly a legacy of the regional focus of Socialist diplomatic careers. 285 For one ambassador, meetings with 15 ambassadors were already somewhat pointless, but with 25 members it will be "horror". 286 Similarly, other diplomats see these meetings as "boring", "useless", or "unbearable". If anything new comes up, it seems to be certain that it is a deliberate action. 287 Other ambassadors, however, find that these meetings can be very important, depending on the issue. 288 They are certainly beneficial for the embassies of

meetings had a definite end - because the guest had to be heard. As a result, the ambassadors could not deal with some items properly. Under the Dutch Presidency, there have been two lunches with a visiting speaker and monthly working meetings, which is considered more useful. Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004.

280

Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

281

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 282

283Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004.

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 284

285Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 286

lnterviews, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 287 Interviews, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. Unlike the Greek Embassy, the Dutch Ambassador, representing the Presidency, has reduced the meetings of the heads o f missions in Santiago to a minimum - a step that was cheered by many colleagues who 288were critical of these events. Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

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smaller member states. 289 Furthermore, there are also meetings between the economic counsellors of the embassies and "reduced" meetings with the delegate from the Commission. 290 4.1.8. The Delegations of the European Commission In the mid-eighties, there was just one representative of the EC in Latin America (Caracas) for the entire region. Portugal and Spain tried to open another mission in Brazil, but did not succeed. A branch of the mission in Caracas was opened in Santiago. The officials were locals and had no understanding of the EC. Their status in Brussels was nonexistent and their reports were more like press reviews. In fact, there was no impact from the mission in Caracas. 291 A few years later, the EC opened a mission in Central America, going back to a Spanish initiative. Then, delegations in Argentina, Uruguay and Peru were inaugurated. The member states, however, were not very interested. Their interest focused on ACP countries. Besides the ACP, there were few delegations in developing countries (only in industrialised third countries) and the heads of these delegations were not ambassadors. 292 In general, recent years have witnessed a successive upgrading of the EU's representation in Latin American countries (through the Delegations of the European Commission). The delegations of the European Commission are vested with ambassadors to the respective host countries. However, these envoys only represent the first pillar of the EU and thus are not "EU ambassadors", although there are some discussions as to whether to transform the delegation of the Commission in Washington into the first "EU delegation". 293 It is remarkable that by 2004 there was only one Spanish head of delegation in Latin American countries. The meetings of Europeans in Buenos Aires are institutionalised through the EU. 294 There are also "regular" meetings with the foreign ministry. In Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile, the delegations of the Commission are important and reportedly have very good access and a strong impact. 295 The functions of the ambassadors of the delegations go further than coordination. They get in contact with a wider range of people, including regular contact with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economy of the host country. There is no real confusion between the role of the Presidency and the delegation in Buenos Aires, which is involved in the Mercosur negotiations, so the people of the 289

Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

290 291 292 293

Interviews, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. Interviews, Brussels, March 2004. Interviews, Brussels, March 2004.

" Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004; Washington D C., May 2004. 294

295lnterviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

Interviews, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, March 2004.

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delegation are extremely well-informed. 296 In Argentina, there is reportedly good cooperation between the Delegation and the Presidency. The delegation stands out with its expertise, statistics, and data material. Furthermore, it embodies an important source of information on what is going on in Brussels. 297 According to a European diplomat, however, Latin Americans turn to national embassies in the region where political issues are concerned, not to the Delegation of the European Commission. 298 As a result, relations are still to a large extent bilateral, through the national embassies in Latin American countries. 299 4.1.9. The Latin American Missions in Brussels Besides the governments and their respective foreign ministries, the Latin American missions to the European Union in Brussels are of utmost importance to political relations with the EU. This is not only with regard to the presentation of national interests before the EU, but also in relation to common Latin American concerns, such as the negotiations of agreements. The establishment of Latin American missions particularly accredited to the EU certainly advanced the diplomatic relations between the EU and Latin American countries. The endowment of these missions has improved in recent years. Small countries are now represented, and bigger states have strengthened their missions. The focal point of these representations is their political influence on economic matters. 300 In most cases, the Latin American missions are geographically located in three areas. The missions of Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay are on the ambassadorial square in Bruxelles-Ixelles, called Avenue Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), along with several Arab embassies. The second group of missions is located nearby, on the boulevard Avenue Louise (Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador) and the third is close to the Avenue Tervueren (Peru, El Salvador, Chile). Mexico's diplomatic representation to the EU is just next door to Colombia's Embassy. The close proximity of the embassies/missions of certain states, especially those on the Avenue FDR, facilitates the informal exchange of information. Some Latin American 'EU ambassadors' were sent to Brussels - with a pleasant residence and a coaxing title - as a reward for their honours in domestic or international politics. Others have proven their in-depth knowledge of the processes in the European Union and a capability to deal with the EU institutions effectively. In this regard, the diplomatic traditions of the particular Latin American countries also come into play. 2%

Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

297 298 299 300

Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003, January 2004.

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Latin American ambassadors from smaller countries are possibly not as closely connected with internal EU procedures, or as well-acquainted with how to influence the European institutions. This might also be explained by the fact that countries of the Andean region or from Central America have traditionally fewer connections with Europe, compared with countries like Argentina, Chile or Brazil. Reportedly, there are no major disagreements between Latin Americans, though their priorities vary, of course. For instance, European development cooperation is less important to Mexico but of fundamental significance for Central America. The relations between the Latin American missions in Brussels are said to be very intense but at the same time very formal. 301 There are two channels of communication: 1) the meetings to prepare summits (usually once a week; before the gathering in Mexico in May 2004 twice weekly), and 2) the GRULA meetings (Grupo Latinoamericano), a coordination group "light", designed for lobbying on specific issues. 302 The dialogue between Latin American missions and European institutions is reportedly intense and supported by a very positive climate, likely due to their similar cultural backgrounds. 303 The missions mostly turn to the DGs Relex, Trade and Development. Furthermore, there are direct contacts with the members of Coreper, in particular the representatives from Spain, Portugal and Italy. 304 In addition, there are also informal conversations, of course, such as informal talks. Commission officials or the Latin American missions invite to private parties, but mostly only Spaniards and Latin Americans attend. 305 In general, Latin American ambassadors (except the Chilean) seem to show no interest in CFSP and there appears to be no initiative in Latin America to use CFSP to reach common positions or anything similar. 306 4.1.10. Civil society There are frequent and regularised contacts with human rights or environmental groups and other types of NGOs. NGOs and lobbyists turn to the geographical (or issue-related) DGs or units. 307 It is worthy of mention that Spanish NGOs

301

302

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003, December 2004. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

303

304lnterviews, Brussels, November/December 2003.

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 305

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

306

Interviews, Brussels, October/December 2003.

307

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

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and civil society supported and co-sponsored projects particularly in Latin America due to corresponding interests, contacts and capacities. 308 With regard to CFSP, the Council increasingly receives messages expressing the wish to "get into action", especially from NGOs. Reportedly, it is baffling how much this lobbying has changed in the past three or four years. Ten years ago, the Council rarely received communications from NGOs, and considered them even less often. Today there are daily communiqués from these groups ("we almost 'drown' in all this information"), including regular contact with the European institutions. Sometimes it seems necessary to say "don't exaggerate, we cannot do everything!" Nonetheless N G O representatives from groups such as Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, Peace Brigades International etc. have become quite serious interlocutors. The influence of these NGOs is also reflected in the exchange of Coreu as notions and sensibilities hint at their impact. 309 While NGOs used to turn mainly to the Commission and member states, now these groups lobby at all levels of the European Union. In this, the N G O s have certainly improved and professionalised their work decisively. 310 There are also formalised connections, for example: NGOs inviting officials of the European institutions to a meeting with the Colombian representative of the Peruvian Truth Commission. 3 "

4.2. Measures to implement the CFSP According to the instruments of Title V of the TEU, (general guidelines, common strategies, joint actions, and common positions) there are general guidelines only if the "strategic partnership" and the Union's political dialogue with the Rio Group and the subregions are seen as the corresponding framework. Nevertheless, the European Council has not adopted a common strategy on Latin America, as proposed by the EP in 2001. This appears to be symptomatic since there is no general strategy within the EU towards the region as a whole. Furthermore, the only CFSP legislative acts between 1993 and 2004 concerning Latin America were the Common Position on Cuba (adopted in December 1996) and the reduction of economic relations with Haiti as a reaction to the coup in May 1994 3 ' 2 (lifted in October 1994). 313 Furthermore, there were no negative

308

Christian Freres/Antonio Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina desde la transición. Una visión crítica'. In: Javier Tusell/Juan Avilés/Rosa Pardo (eds ), La política exterior de España en el siglo XX. Madrid 2000, pp. 564-567.

309

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. 31

interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

•"'interviews, Brussels, October 2003. 312 Council Regulation (EC) No 1264/94 of 30 May 1994 prohibiting the satisfying of claims by the Haitian authorities with regard to contracts and transactions the performance of 71

measures taken against Latin American countries between 1993 and 2003 (not including the measures of trade defence of the EC). 314 As for joint actions, there is a programme on small arms in particular Latin American countries. 315 The most frequent CFSP instruments applied in relation to Latin American countries have been declarations and demarches on specific situations or events. 4.2.1. The Common Position and Joint Actions In December 1996, the EU adopted a Common Position on Cuba "to encourage a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as sustainable recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people." 316 The next sentence of this document explains that the EU does not want to push change on Cuba through "coercive measures", which would intensify the "economic hardship" of the people - an indirect reference to the US embargo against the Socialist regime. Generally, the Common Position advocates dialogue with the Cuban authorities and other sectors of Cuba's society, while human rights, particularly political and civil rights, are emphasised. The Common Position has been the subject of regular evaluations every six months, although some years it has taken place just once, if the Cuban situation had not changed substantially. 317 The Common Position on Cuba has been viewed as an extreme measure, as this instrument hardly refers to a single country. The promotion of democracy was interpreted more restrictively in this case than in others. Gratius suggests three conditions that led to the adoption of the Common position: the change of the Spanish Cuba policy under Aznar, the end of liberalisation in Cuba and the adoption of the Helms-Burton law in the US. 318 Furthermore, there seems to be

which was affected by the measures imposed by or pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions 917 (1994), 841 (1993), 873 (1993) and 875 (1993). Official Journal L 139, 02/06/1994 p. 0004 - 0006. 3l3 Conseil de l'Union Européenne, Secrétariat générale E, unité "Coordination", Actes Juridiques P ESC, Liste Thématique. Bruxelles, le 18 juin 2004. 3l4 Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, Directorate E, Coordination Unit, Liste des mesures négatives appliqués par l'Union a l'égard de pays tiers, le 18 juin 2004. 3l5 .loint Action 1999/34/CFSP on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons: 0.1 L 9, 15.1.1999; Bull. 12-1998, point 1.3.5. 3l6 96/697/CFSP: COMMON POSITION of 2 December 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J .2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba. OFFICIAL JOURNAL NO. L 322, 12/12/1996 P. 1 (español). 3l7 lnterviews, Brussels, January 2004. 318 Susanne Gratius, Kuba unter Castro - Das Dilemma der dreifachen Blockade. Die kontraproduktive Politik der „Demokratieförderung" seitens der USA und der EU. From the series Fokus Lateinamerika, Vol. 2, Opladen (Germany) 2003, pp. 258-261.

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no post-Castro strategy, 319 and the country reportedly should not expect solidarity from the new Eastern European member states, quite the opposite. 320 A joint action of 1999 was intended to combat "the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean", financed with € 345,000 (2001-2002) and € 700,000 in 2003. This programme is carried out by UN-LiREC in Lima (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean) on behalf of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA). The Commission has signed a grant agreement with UN-LiREC/DDA, which ended on 31 July 2003. Another grant agreement was concluded on 30 October 2003. 321 The programme was set up 1) to train the instructors in law enforcement academies by special courses and simulation exercises, 2) to develop equipment in order to improve the control of legal firearms trade and to fight illegal trafficking in the region, 3) to ease the destruction of surplus arms, and 4) to assist parliament members in improving, harmonising and standardising legislation and control mechanisms in this regard (firearms, ammunition, explosives etc.). 322 4.2.2. The clauses Although these are not explicit CFSP instruments, the clauses included in EULatin American accords also play a role: An EU official describes the five clauses as the Council's "hobbyhorse" for the agreements with Latin America. 323 These encompass human rights and democracy, good governance/the fight against corruption, the fight against terrorism, migration/readmission, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The clauses for the agreements perhaps appear as a dictate to Latin Americans, as the texts aren't changeable. In general, these requirements are seen by EU officials less as a trade policy or an obstacle for others, than as a philosophy of the EU to insist on democracy, human rights, etc. 324 Beyond the perception of these clauses as "imposed" conditionalities, there is another difficulty: Latin American governments tend to demand fiirther concessions on behalf of the EU

319

A proposal from the Policy Unit was put forward in 2001 under the Belgian Presidency but the Belgians reportedly rejected it, possibly because the publicity of such a strategy would probably have caused more problems than those it aimed to prevent. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 320 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003; Washington D.C., May 2004. 321

322

European Union, The Implementation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy Actions (CFSP). 18th report covering the period 1 October - 31 December 2003, pp. 4, 5, 11.

See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/fin/actions/limsa.htm, 15 December 2004. 323 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

324

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

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for the acceptance of these clauses. 325 With regard to the democratic clause, it is only applied in grave cases such as a coup d'état. 326 4.2.3. Declarations Furthermore, there are declarations that express concern. In these instances the EU tends to modify its language to avoid offending the government in question. In this way, the EU is better positioned to serve as an interlocutor, highlighting critical points in order to improve the situation. 327 As is typical in international organisations, negotiations on the text of the final version sometimes take too much time to be able to respond quickly to a matter of concern, or the language becomes too neutral to have an impact. It is striking that a large part of today's CFSP declarations mention that candidate countries share the expressed views. Smith, however, deems demarches or press statements of the EU not as "passive" joint declarations of 15, and now 25 countries, but as an influential tool, if combined with the threat of economic sanctions. 328 In chapter 6, the potential impact of a declaration reacting to a political crisis will be analysed. 4.2.4. Communication and procedures As the CFSP has its own mechanism, not bound to communitarian procedures, the sharing of information and coordination among European institutions and member states often takes place in an informal manner. 329 The atmosphere is almost "Anglo-Saxon" in this regard - people call each other by their first name, though if French is spoken the more formal "vous" is used. 330 The "Latin American community" within and outside the European institutions in Brussels is

325

lnterviews, Brussels, October 2003.

326

Furthermore, another aspect affects CFSP although it is not an explicit instrument o f it: Foreign policy decisions or strategies of the EU are at times also the result o f so-called 'package deals'. This means the typical practice in Brussels to trade voting rights for economic concessions, or a more generous interpretation of, to give a notional example, the Stabilisation and Growth Pact, for the maintenance o f an unanimous vote in foreign policy (which means a veto right, in fact). Unfortunately, it is not easy to inquire which have been or will be the stakes of these 'deals' that are agreed on by telephone conversations or in private meetings between the Permanent Representatives. Latin American topics are said to have occasionally been subject o f these deals, too, but the concrete CFSP towards the region is hardly affected by this. However, these deals do not constitute CFSP instruments towards third countries, rather EU-internal negotiation options. Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. 327 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 328 Hazel Smith, European Union Foreign Policy. What it is and what it does. London/Sterling 329(VA) 2002, p. 116. Interviews, Brussels, November/December 2003. 330

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

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rather small and thus "people know each other". Furthermore, members of this community know the corresponding persons in the European capitals.331 In case of a crisis, first the information of the people who are in the country is gathered. The EU institutions receive detailed information from the national embassies and the delegation of the Commission. This information is distributed through the Coreu network. The Commission holds a steady contact with the corresponding working groups and the Presidency of the Commission on relevant issues or conflictive situations.332 If a crisis comes up in a Latin American country, the Commission as well as the Presidency contact the mission of the respective state in Brussels.333 There are informal contacts at the beginning of a crisis, of course, to discuss and analyse the subjects before making a decision. The next step is a joint declaration, something official. 334 What can be the outcome of this? A simple public declaration (before this, there can be a "private handling" with the concerned government) or a report from the heads of mission in the country, which can lead to a declaration or demarche issued by the Presidency. In grave situations, CFSP further provides the instrument of sanctions but these have not been applied to Latin American countries, except the aforementioned examples. The Coreu network, introduced in chapter 2, can be seen as the culmination and "pre-official" outcome of previous informal communication. Information on political topics regarding Latin America is distributed through the Coreu system. In the case of an EU prime minister's visit to a Latin American country or a Latin American head of state's visit to an EU country, the reports on the respective visits are disseminated through the Coreu network. The same happens with information from the Commission or the Solana meetings.335 Furthermore, before a donors' conference takes place, the member states exchange information and views to coordinate common positions, although deviating opinions cannot always be prevented. 336 In general, before the EU gets to the final declaration, there is a lot of informal travaux préparatoire, a lot of Coreu communication. 337 However, if sensitive issues are concerned, the Coreu network occasionally remains unused, as informal diplomatic talks, bilaterally or within bigger groups, take place instead.

33

'interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

332

lnterviews, Brussels, November/December 2003.

333

lnterviews, Brussels, December 2003.

334

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. "'interviews, Brussels, October/December 2003. 336

lnterviews, Brussels, October 2003.

337

lnterviews, Brussels, October/December 2003.

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4.3. The consequences of CFSP in Latin America The concrete consequences of CFSP in Latin America should be evaluated using a country-by-country approach. Generally, the success of CFSP in concrete situations in the region has been limited. In Venezuela, I detect a failure of CFSP, and in Colombia there was no CFSP approach that corresponded with the complexity of the situation. In Bolivia, the CFSP declarations on the political and social crises have not had much impact, and with regard to Cuba more flexibility would possibly be a savvier tactic. The Joint Action against Small Arms in the region has been successful so far, though much is left to be done in this regard. The employment of the democratic clause as a political instrument (not necessarily of CFSP as such) led to the suspension of negotiations between the EU and Mexico between 1995 and 1997 because Mexico has traditionally had problems with limitations of the non-intervention principle. 338 The Common Position has imperilled European-Cuban relations, as Cuba's regime was not pleased that the EU took a tough stand on the lack of democratic freedoms and civil rights on the Caribbean island. Some observers applauded the rigid European position, with which the EU "abandoned" a romanticised view of the Cuban socialist rule. 339 For others, the Common Position is obsolete and was launched as a gesture of the Aznar government in Spain to please the United States. 340 Nevertheless, as a result of its ineffectiveness, the element of political conditionality, which was emphasised in the Common Position, has become a subordinated factor in practice. 341 In my view, the Common Position on Cuba has not helped much since it deprived the EU external sector of more flexibility. Although the content of this instrument seems indisputable, it hinders the EU from presenting an alternative to the confrontational US approach. Nevertheless, as EU officials suggest, Havana would certainly perceive a change of the Common Position as a weakness of the EU's approach. 342

4.4. An Analysis of CFSP towards Latin America In 1998, Fernández Fernández wrote that the relations between the EU and Latin America had not been put in a coherent strategic CFSP frame. 343 This assess338 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. See Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 93. 339 Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 340 Interviews, Brussels, January/December 2004. 341 Gratius, Kuba unter Castro, p. 263. 342

Interviews, Brussels, November 2004. 343 José Javier J. Fernández Fernández, 'El fortalecimiento de las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y América latina: Nuevas perspectivas para una PESC global, coherente y autónoma'. In: Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Epoca), 99, enero-marzo 1998, p. 219.

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ment is still true, although there have been some remarkable achievements since the 1999 summit, proclaiming a "strategic partnership" between Latin America and the EU - but not in CFSP terms. Likewise, Sanahuja analyses the lack of status of the European CFSP perspective. 344 Correspondingly, Latin America is the region on which there are the fewest proposals in CFSP terms submitted from the EU member states. Symptomatica!ly, there are hardly any proposals that have been rejected. 345 Latin America is not a relevant region for European strategic concerns, at least not in the short-term perspective, because there are no weapons of mass destruction, no immediate threat to Europe, no immigration problems, and only local terrorism. Drug traffic constitutes the only exception to the general lack of direct European security concerns in the region. Latin America further has no failed states (as in Africa) 346 and thus does not qualify as a risk to global peace and stability. In addition, the fact that the Organisation of American States (OAS) deals with security matters in the region and possesses the necessary military resources is another explanation for the subordinated role of Latin America in CFSP considerations, as is the influence of the United States on the region. 347 As a result, Latin America is not mentioned prominently in the EU Security Strategy. 348 In conclusion, there is no encompassing common CFSP strategy for Latin America. The CFSP of the EU towards Latin America stems only from specific situations. This might be explained by the fact that both regions, more concretely the Rio Group and the EU, agreed on the famous "strategic partnership", and thus the EU does not deem it necessary to develop such a CFSP strategy for a remote region which is, in any case, a low priority. 349

344

"En el marco de la PESC, la posición subordinada de Latinoamérica es muy clara: la UE no ha respaldado la asociación estratégica con el instrumento PESC adecuado, la "estrategia común del Consejo", que sin embargo sí ha aprobado para Rusia, Ucraina y el Mediterráneo." Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 93. 345 Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. 346

347

For some, the situation in Colombia could be interpreted as a failed state, though. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

348

349Alberto van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas europeo-latinoamericanas', pp. 56, 57.

Interviews, Berlin, February 2004.

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5. The role of Spain - A bridge between Europe and Latin America? In general, the historic, cultural and linguistic links between Latin America and Spain as a former colonial power are very obvious: no other EU member state, not even Portugal, holds comparably close relations to the region. Spain's political class, including both leading political parties (the centre-right Popular Party, PP, and the Socialists PSOE), carefully maintains these connections. In addition to considerable Spanish investments in Latin American countries350, the IberoAmerican summits are worthy of mention. They take place once per year in Latin America, the Spanish-speaking Caribbean or on the Iberian Peninsula. 35 '

5.1. Spanish Foreign Policy It is important to remember that Spain experienced the processes of démocratisation, decentralisation of autonomy and incorporation into NATO and the European Community in a breathtakingly short period of time, between 1976 and 1986.352 From a genuinely unambitious governmental foreign policy during the Franco regime, a new era of Spanish foreign affairs emerged during this period of democratic transition, witnessing the creation of new institutional actors (Courts, Autonomous Communities, Constitutional Tribunal, jurisdiction) and non-institutional actors (political parties, interest groups and NGOs). In this process, the Santa Cruz (Foreign Ministry)353, formerly the most important ministry, lost influence, 354 in part because the Autonomous Communities had been

35

°When Spain became the principal investor in the region, the Spanish newspaper El Pais ironically spoke o f the "second conquest". Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', pp. 568, 569; see Mary Farrell, Spain in the EU. The Road to Economic Convergence. Houndsmills/New York 2001, p. 31.

351

On the lbero-American summits, see Celestino del Arenal Moyúa, 'La política exterior de España hacia Iberoamérica y las cumbres Iberoamericanas'. In: Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, Iberoamérica, un reto para España y la Unión Europea en la próxima década. Monografías del CESEDEN, IX Jornadas Universidad ComplutensesCESEDEN, Madrid 1999, pp. 69-85.

352

S e e Angel Viñas, 'Breaking the shackles from the past: Spanish foreign policy from Franco to Felipe González'. In: Sebastian Balfour/Paul Preston (eds ), Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century. London/New York 1999, pp. 245-267.

353

Santa Cruz is the name of the palace, which has hosted the foreign ministry in Madrid. Ignacio Molina A. de Cienfuegos/Fernando Rodrigo Rodriguez, 'Las transformaciones organizativas de la política exterior española'. In: Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), 117, julio-septiembre 2002, p. 175.

354

Molina/Rodríguez, 'Las transformaciones organizativas', pp. 174, 175.

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carrying out their own foreign policies and thus established a form of decentralisation. 355 In the context of Spain's accession to the European Community in 1986 356 , "[i]t has to be stressed that Spanish foreign policy administration was weak and problematic before accession. It was the process of adaptation and the commitment of Spain to achieve a modern and Europeanised administration, during the first years of membership, that developed the Spanish effectiveness." 357 But the Spaniards later could also rely on continuity, as their diplomatic personnel in Madrid and in Brussels had gained considerable experience, in spite of governmental change. This contributed to the "maturing" of Spanish familiarity with European institutions' procedures. 358 The "Europeanisation" of Spanish foreign policy also led to a counter-balancing of EU priorities, which had been led by the German interest in Central and Eastern Europe. 359 Throughout recent decades, Europe, Latin America, and the Mediterranean were the main priorities of Spain's national foreign policy: 360 "In both, Spain has cast the EU as paymaster and supplier of the political clout needed to back up Spanish-designed strategies or concepts." 361 As one of Spain's goals has been to consolidate its position in the international system, Spanish participation in UN missions in Latin America was intended to help Spain emerge from the margins of international politics. Spain also sought the support of Latin American countries to achieve multilateral goals, such as getting the necessary votes to become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. 362 After a forceful Europeanisation, the end of the East-West confrontation caused a "redefinition of Spanish foreign policy", also described as "normalisation". Closa and Heywood remark that this "normalisation" referred more to Spain's own interests than to mainstream EU goals. Spain started to suffer from "periphery syndrome" in the context of the EU enlargement to Eastern Europe,

355

Dimitrios Kavakas, Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy. The influence of southern member states in common foreign and security policy. Aldershot/Burlington, Vermont 2001, p. 107; Molina/Rodriguez, 'Las transformaciones organizativas', p. 185. See Intervención de la Sra. Ministra en el Foro Nueva Economía, La nueva posición de España en el Mundo. Madrid, 19 de febrero de 2003, http://www.mae.eS/documento/0/000/000/ 604/hdr7014.pdf, 5 January 2005, p. 13. 356 Generally on the effects of Spain's accesión to the EC, see Carmela Martín, España en la nueva Europa. Prólogo de Luis Ángel Rojo. Madrid 1997. 357

Kavakas, Greece and Spain, p. 147.

358 359

Kavakas, Greece and Spain, p. 147. Kavakas, Greece and Spain, p. 149.

360

See Abel Matutes y Juan, 'Spain's Priorities: Europe, Latin America, the Mediterranean'. In:

361

Carlos Closa/Paul M. Heywood, Spain and the European

Review of Internationa! Affairs, Vol. XLVI1, 15 October-15 November 1996, Belgrade p. 4. Union. Houndsmills/New York

2004, p. 220. 362

Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', pp. 560, 561.

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with two results: "Spain began to assert her own priorities more stridently (for instance, with regard to the Maghreb). Secondly, Spain adopted a more pragmatic approach to security policy and paid more attention to the economic aspects of foreign relations (related to growing overseas investment in areas such as Latin America). In the new context, Spain shifted from a 'bilateral' (or, at best, 'regional') concept of foreign relations to a global and multidisciplinary one, combining bilateral and multilateral instruments." 363 Traditionally, as Powell correctly remarks, Spanish governments have always been supporters of a European Union as a global player of the first order, an ambition that basically is rooted in the desire to use Europe as an instrument for overcoming decades of international insignificance. During the administration of prime minister José María Aznar (1996-2004), Spain saw itself as a middle weight in international politics, with priority interests but also willing to play a global role, and increasing leadership in all international forums and organisations. 364 According to Grasa Hernández, the new Spanish foreign policy has been determined by three different concepts and characteristics: normalisation, Europeanisation and a growing pragmatism and realism in foreign affairs. 365 Closa and Heywood conclude that EU membership as such represents the Spanish national project as it also aims at enlarging Spain's clout in world politics. 366 Recently, relations between the US and Spain have been generally good, but "many undercurrents of resentment" have existed in Spanish society: The US was seen as "crass, materialistic and pushy", while Spain was supposed to be "humanist, idealist and spiritualist". Furthermore, as Wiarda points out, Spaniards often resent the US for its "political values of liberalism and almost anarchic individualism". 367 Last but not least, the Spanish loss of its last American colony (Cuba) to the US after the American-Spanish war still provokes resentment. The Spanish Left spoke up against the US during the Franco regime, which allowed US bases in Spain. Moreover, the so-called progressives in Spain protested against N A T O and suspected the CIA of infiltrating political institu-

363

Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European Union, p. 218.

364

Intervención de la Sra. Ministra en el Foro Nueva Economía, La nueva posición de España en el Mundo. Madrid, 19 de febrero de 2003, p. 19; http://www.mae.eS/documento/0/000/ 000/604/hdr7014.pdf, 29 December 2004. 365 Rafael Grasa Hernández, 'La política exterior española hacia América Latina: tendencias recientes y proyección hacia el futuro'. In: Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, 54-55, 366 noviembre 2001, p. 67. Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European Union, p. 245. On the European and transatlantic dimension of Spain's foreign policy, see Antje Helmerich, Die Außenpolitik Spaniens: Vom Konsens zum Bruch - und wieder zurück. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, International Policy Analysis Unit, April 2004, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/01942.pdf, 29 December 2004. 367 Howard Wiarda, Politics in Iberia. The Political Systems of Spain and Portugal New York 1993, p. 230.

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tions in the country. 368 Anti-American resentments have not been limited to the left: "Anti-Americanism in Spain thus comes from both the Left and the Right, it is pervasive, and it is widespread." However, through démocratisation and a process of maturation (getting rid of historic complexes), these resentments have been fading in recent decades. 369 When the Popular Party took power in 1996, the Foreign Ministry followed the principles of normalisation, Europeanisation and realism in the Barcelona process (with the Mediterranean) and concerning its relations with Latin America. However, Prime Minister Aznar also opted for strengthened relations with the US. At the transatlantic summit in May 2002 in Washington, US President George W. Bush and Aznar showed up as best friends. 370 Although Latin America (and the Mediterranean) still counted as important historical concerns, Spain warmed to new strategic priorities: transatlantic relations with the US, the European Defence Policy and the fight against terrorism. 371 Aznar's approach, of building tighter relations between Spain and the United States, seemed to contrast with the goal of a strengthened European Union in terms of common foreign policy positions. Closa and Heywood name three main reasons for the cross-Atlanticism of Prime Minister Aznar. First, Aznar was a strong defender of Bush's global antiterrorist campaign. Second, he saw support for the United States as part of a wider strategic goal of aligning Spain with Great Britain and Italy as part of the "new Europe", which would act as a counterweight to the traditional FrancoGerman axis. Aznar's objective was to avoid the development of a "fortress Europe" as a rival pole of power to the US, and also to ensure that Spain's interests in Latin America were defended. Third, Aznar wanted Spain to become a key player at the international level. 372 In Brussels, many interviewees believe that because of President Aznar's strategic positioning, Spain came closer to the US and continued to be the leading force in the EU with regard to Latin America. Several observers reject the idea that Spain under the Aznar administration defended the US position in the region, while others hold the rapprochement of Spain and the US as a circumstantial phenomenon, since Spain's relations with Latin America have traditionally been seen as stronger. In this context, it seems necessary to distinguish between the Spanish state and the Aznar government: close relations with the US were 368

Wiarda, Politics in Iberia, p. 230.

369

Wiarda, Politics in Iberia, p. 230. 370

Charles Powell, 'Un balance de la presidencia española de la Unión Europea de 2002'. In: Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Epoca), 119, enero-marzo 2003, pp. 552, 553. 37, Laia Mestres, 'La agenda española en la política exterior para la Presidencia de 2002'. In: Esther Barbé (coord ), España y la política exterior de la UE. Entre las prioridades españolas y los desafíos del contexto internacional. Quaderns de treball, Institut Universitari 372 d'Estudis Europeus, 40, octubre 2002, p. 22. Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European Union, p. 219.

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incidental and depended largely on the person of the conservative prime minister. 373 Nowadays, Spain and the US are the most influential extra-regional players in Latin America, though in trade issues they are competitors. 374 The Socialist Party (PSOE) of José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero won the elections of March 2004 under the shadow of the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004. The new PSOE government withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq and thus responded to the reported anti-American resentment in the population. Furthermore, Zapatero announced a closer relationship within the EU and towards Latin America. The Spanish Foreign Ministry and Latin America Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, there are three State Secretariats: the first for Foreign Affairs and Ibero-America; the second for the European Union; and the third for International Cooperation. Of these three new Secretaries, one kept the same mandate (European affairs) and the other two were new inventions, established after 1986. While the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has an economic and trade profile, the one in charge of Cooperation and Ibero-America specialises in cultural subjects and is closer to the president of government. 375 In addition, the ministry includes an Under-Secretariat for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs and Ibero-America also contains the General Direction of Foreign Policy. The new State Secretariat for International Cooperation and Ibero-America shall promote the Castilian language and the Spanish culture internationally. Until the 1980s, efforts in this regard had been uncoordinated. 376 Through shared language and culture, Spain intends to become a "cultural power" 377 , although this also serves to increase its political influence. The Secretariat of External Affairs and Ibero-America is subdivided into different General Directions: • Coordination Unit for Spain in the UN Security Council • General Direction of Foreign Policy • General Direction of Foreign Policy for Europe and North America • General Direction of Foreign Policy for the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa • General Direction of Foreign Policy for Ibero-America • General Direction of Foreign Policy for Asia and the Pacific 373

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

374

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. However, in Washington D C. there is a US-Spanish dialogue established on Latin America. Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004.

375

Grasa Hernández, 'La política exterior española', pp. 72, 73. 376

377Molina/Rodríguez,'Las transformaciones organizativas', pp. 198, 199. Grasa Hernández, 'La política exterior española', p. 73. Intervención de la Sra. Ministra en el Foro Nueva Economía, pp. 17, 18.

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•

General Direction for International Economic Relations

•

General Direction for International Matters, Terrorism, United Nations and Multilateral Organisations

Furthermore, the Secretariat of International Cooperation is connected with the Spanish Agency o f International Cooperation (AECI), whose General Secretariat includes four sub-units, including the General Direction o f Cooperation with Ibero-America. This General Direction includes two subdirections, one for Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, and the other for South America. The General Direction Cooperation with Ibero-America shall promote, strengthen and develop the Spanish policy o f development cooperation with the IberoAmerican countries. In addition, there are particular country programmes: in Central America for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; in the Caribbean for the Dominican Republic; and in South America for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay. Furthermore, a specialised programme shall accompany the process o f conflict resolution in Colombia and another one is designed to facilitate the internal evolution and the improvement o f the people's living conditions in Cuba. In addition, there is a unit for Horizontal Ibero-American Programmes and a Unit o f Support ascribed to the General Direction. Moreover, according to Articles 15 and 16 o f the AECI Statute, this agency further has institutions abroad, such as technical bureaus o f cooperation, cultural centres and education centres. 20 technical bureaus o f cooperation and three education centres depend on the G D Cooperation with Ibero-America in the region. In the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels, a political advisor is in charge exclusively o f Ibero-America - unlike his colleagues in other Permanent Representations who commonly deal with other regions or topics as well. In Brussels, there is also a permanent contact frequency between the Permanent Mission o f Spain and Latin American officials and embassy members. 378 Furthermore, while Ibero-American institutions in Spain like the Casa de Américas or the Institute o f Ibero-American Cooperation (ICI) still attempt to improve Spanish-Latin American relations, the renowned Madrid-based Institute o f European-Latin American Relations ( I R E L A ) was closed for several reasons some years ago. 379 However, as a Spanish official points out, IRELA practically did not help with regard to the essential issues. 380

378 Interviews, Brussels, December 2 0 0 3 . 379

Officially fraudulent budgetary practices led to the shutdown o f IRELA. According to rumours, however, I R E L A was closed because the Spanish government did not want a German director to head such an influential institution in charge o f relations with Latin America. Another explanation was the change o f government in Germany. Interviews, Brussels, 380December 2 0 0 4 . Interviews, Brussels, January 2 0 0 4 .

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During the third biregional summit in Mexico (2004), Brazilian president Lula da Silva proposed the establishment of a permanent Secretariat of the EULatin American summits in Madrid. This will certainly strengthen the Spanish role in relations beyond the Ibero-American links381, and could possibly serve as an instrument fostering Spanish influence in European foreign policy towards Latin America. According to several Spanish interviewees, the work of the Secretariat in charge of Ibero-American matters does not interfere with CFSP toward the region and the Ibero-American summits are also intended to advance the relations between Latin America and the European Union. 382

5.2. Spain, Latin America and Ibero-Americanism La UE abandonó América Latina, por eso España retoma el Iberoamericanismo.383

Tradition and culture are important components for the formation of Spain's foreign policy: "For this reason Latin America has been and will continue to be a very special case for Spanish policy." 384 Franco tried to export his concept of Hispanismo/Hispanidad to Latin America, based on his dictatorship's principles: authoritarianism, Catholicism, discipline, corporatism. 385 Subsequent to the Spanish transition after Franco's death in 1975, trade, investment, and cultural exchange took place between Spain and its former colonies. Later Prime Minister José María Aznar pronounced in 1995, that Spain had been and would be the natural tie between Europe and Latin America. 386 Likewise, King Juan Carlos declared before the Bolivian Parliament in July 2000 that Spain was at once a European and an American nation.387 Further, for Sabbagh, King Juan Carlos' visit to Paraguay and Chile in 1990 and 1991 somehow consecrated the démocratisation process in those countries and at the same time sort of finished the Spanish transition.388 Former Foreign Minister Josep Piqué 381 382 383 384

Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 7. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003; Washington D.C., May 2004. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

Kavakas, Greece andSpain,

385

p. 107.

Wiarda, Politics in Iberia, p. 231 ; del Arenal, ' La política exterior de España', p. 60. Daniel Sabbagh, 'Les facteurs externes de la démocratisation: le cas des relations entre l'Espagne et les pays d'Amérique latine (1975-2000)'. In: Daniel van Eeuwen (dir.), L'Amérique latine et l'Europe à l'heure de la mondialisation. Dimension des relations internationales. Paris/Aix en Provence 2002, p. 69 (Interview with Aznar, Politique interna387 tionale, 71, printemps 1995, p. 143). Alberto Carnero Fernández, 'Razones españolas para el éxito de una alianza estratégica entre la UE y los países de América Latina y el Caribe'. In: Revista CIDOB d'Afers Inter388nacional, 54-55, noviembre 2001, p. 12. Sabbagh, 'Les facteurs externes', p. 67.

386

85

used a revealing choice of words when he spoke of "our European and transatlantic partners and allies" while he referred to the "Ibero-American family". 389 Piqué even coined the term "Ibero-American vocation" when he clarified that Spain had always had a double vocation: in Europe and in Latin America. 390 The former foreign minister laid further emphasis on the economic dimension of foreign policy. A Latin American ambassador, however, explains Spain's activism towards the region as "el dolor del haber pecado" (the pain of having sinned) in Latin America and thus as a "historical commitment". 391 Kavakas points out that "Spain perceived Latin America not as an area of risk but of prestige". Spain's relations with the region do not influence its security, rather, its involvement stems from shared identity and values. 392 Grasa Hernández observes new relations between Spain and Latin America with a rather pragmatic approach on the part of the Spaniards, abandoning the emotionnal links: En síntesis, se insiste en el discurso en superar el enfoque basado simplemente en los sentimientos compartidos fruto del acervo histórico y cultural común, en situar por ende los intereses nacionales en América latina - y por extensión los Iberoamericanos, a 21, en una dimensión predominantemente económica y financiera.393

After the transition period, democracy and human rights became the basic elements for Spain's relations with Latin America. 394 The "Ibero-American project" underwent different stages: A somewhat contradictory project with the first democratic prime minister, Adolfo Suárez, followed by a more structured and moderate approach under Felipe González and a considerably more ideological project under José María Aznar. 395 The Ibero-American summits, organized annually since 1991, now have a permanent body and more ministerial coordination. The main topic is cooperation, but it is constantly evolving. It seems that it will not replace the OAS or biregional relations. 396 According to interviews with Spanish diplomats and academics, Ibero-Americanism does not get in the way of the EU's foreign policy,

389

Josep Piqué, 'España en el mundo: la modernización del servicio exterior'. In: Política Exterior, vol. XV, 83, septiembre-octubre 2001, p. 82. 390 Josep Piqué, 'Nuevas fronteras de la política exterior de España'. In: Política Exterior, vol. 391 XV, 79, enero-febrero 2001, pp. 57-70. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 392 Kavakas, Greece andSpain, p. 152. 393 " Grasa Hernández, 'La política exterior española', p. 76. 394

395Del Arenal, 'La política exterior de España', p. 63. Del Arenal, 'La política exterior de España', p. 65. 396

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003; Washington D.C., May 2004.

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as the summits shall defend EU policy. In comparison with the British Commonwealth, Ibero-Americanism is less a political than a cultural project. 397 As a cultural project, Spanish Ibero-Americanism seems at first glance not to be a challenge to the European Union's CFSP towards Latin America, though it is implicitly aimed at gaining political influence as well. However, in combination with its bilateral political relations with Latin American countries, IberoAmericanism implies that Spain does not expressly support CFSP of the EU towards the region.

5.3. Spain and the EU policy towards Latin America When Spain became a Member of the European Community, the EC had no Latin America policy besides the San José Dialogue. In terms of biregional relations, there was no cooperation in the 1st pillar and merely some reflections on the second, foreign policy pillar. 398 While some may hold that Spain's admittance into the EC, on 1 January 1986, was because of its relationship to Latin America, this is not exactly the case, "...por no citar el escaso éxito de la propuesta española de intermediación entre Europa y Latinoamérica." 399 In the beginning of its membership, Spain attempted without success to get "special status" for Latin American countries similar to British and French actions for their former colonies. However, Spain enforced the attachment of a document to the Treaty of Adhesion in 1986 that provided for deepened relations between the EC and Latin America, 400 titled a "Common Declaration regarding the development and strengthening of the relationship with Latin American countries." 401 Since 1986, the Spaniards have sought to improve European relations with Latin America - within and outside European institutions. During the European Community's initial endeavours to promote a negotiated solution for the Central American crisis, starting in 1984, Spain was not a member of the EC yet, but was already involved in the negotiating process of the San José Dialogue, and participated as an observer in the initiatives toward Central America. Much of this dialogue policy was effected through the embassies of France, Germany and

397

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003; Madrid, May 2005. Correspondingly, a 2000 plan on Spain's foreign policy, which included the creation o f an Ibero-American space, was also criticised for outlining a "mission" or "intentions" rather than strategic goals, since there was no chronology of concrete tasks. Grasa Hernández, 'La política exterior española', pp 73, 74. 398 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 399 Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', p. 558. 400

Grugel, 'Spain: Latin America as an ambiguous topic', p. 78.

40]

Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European

Union, pp. 226, 227.

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Spain in the region. 402 A new book on the EU's foreign relations by Angel Viñas also sheds light on hitherto unknown details regarding intra-institutional developments in this regard. 403 Although Spain forced the European Community to relocate and transfer more funds to the region, it "...kept the Europeanisation of it in the EC pillar only." 404 After Spain's entry into the EC, its endeavours to become a "bridge" between Europe and Latin America were viewed with uneasiness by France and Great Britain because they saw their influence areas, Africa and Asia, in danger. 405 Furthermore, there was also some discomfort in possible leading countries in the region, namely Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 406 5.3.1. The effect of Spain's entry into the European Community: "Latin America is on the map" Spain's and Portugal's accession to the European Community in 1986/87 increased the sensitivity for the region in Brussels. After several agreements and the Declaration of Rome, a former Spanish diplomat summarises the Spanish activism of that period: "¡América Latina está en el mapa!" in part due to ten years of Spanish Commissioners. 407 When Spain became a member of the EC, President Felipe González wanted to engage with Latin America. The Ministry of Foreign Relations at that time was still carrying a structural and mental heritage of the Franco period. A problem was that the Latinamericanists knew little about the European Community, and the European experts did not know much about Latin America. At that time, the EC was apparently not accustomed to extensions - the previous one in 1973 had already been forgotten. So, the entry of Portugal and Spain meant a change. 408 The European rules of conduct were unknown to Spanish officials. So, the Spaniards were gathering together, rather than mingling with the others. Mentally, it was an important change for the Spaniards, as the procedures in the EC were so different. The European Political Cooperation was inefficient, Latin America was no man's land, and the officials were not very enthusiastic. There was even hostility within the Direction on Latin America. In addition, the Latin American ambassadors did not know how the EC worked. 409

402

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

403

Angel Viñas, Al servicio de Europa. Innovación y crisis en la Comisión Europea. Prólogo de Enrique Barón. Madrid 2005, particularly the first seven chapters deal with the European relations with Latin America. 404 Kavakas, Greece and Spain, p. 152. 405 406

See Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', p. 558. Ayuso Pozo, 'La cooperación para el desarrollo', p. 88.

407

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 408

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

409

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

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There was no proclivity toward extending relations with Latin America in the Commission. The External Relations Commissioner Claude Cheysson reportedly had no interest in Latin America. He was a North-South Commissioner and engaged with Central America, but apparently, only with the intention of making things difficult for the US, explained by a latent French anti-American resentment. 410 Nonetheless, the first Director for Latin America in the Commission, Angel Viñas, found fortunate conditions in Brussels: the Commission's president, Jacques Delors, was visionary, always intellectually active and open to big ideas. He was happy with the idea of broadening the European presence in the world. 4 " Viñas' aim was to strengthen the institutional dimension, to create an institutional link in order to reach a certain permanency. After assuring Delors' interest, Viñas tried hard to arrange a meeting between Felipe González and Claude Cheysson. 412 After that meeting, which was seemingly unpleasant for González, the Spanish Prime Minister eventually got his message out: "Nos interesa América Latina." Since then, Cheysson began to show interest in Latin America. 413 At the same time, the agreement of Rio was planned. This was a big step because until then, the ACP countries had monopolized the E C ' s thirdcountry attention. Now, despite British anxiety about Spain's activism, Latin America was on the map. 414 In short, the Commission was the forerunner for European-Latin American cooperation and through the Commission, Spain played a dynamic role in this process. A Spanish diplomat does not believe that it would have been possible to do more, largely due to the slowness of responses from Latin America. 415 5.3.2. The Spanish impact on the political relations of the GU towards Latin America Spain's present foreign policy approach towards Latin America is threefold: 1) bilateral; 2) specific Euro-Latin American; and 3) strictly Ibero-American (multilateral and radial). 416 This categorisation somewhat differs from the EU posi-

410 Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 411 Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 412 Reportedly, Cheysson only considered a head of government to a congenial interlocutor. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 4l3

414Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. Interviews, Brussels, November/December 2003, January 2004. 415

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. Reportedly, to attend a GRULA meeting in the

416 1980s was always an "exercise o f masochism".

Grasa Hernández, 'La política exterior española', p. 71. Del Arenal identifies a four-level approach: 1) Bilateral relations; 2) multilateral subregional relations (Spain and the Andean Community/Mercosur/Central America); 3) multilateral regional relations (Spain's relations to the whole of all Ibero-American countries as a project o f lbero-American

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tion (bilateral, subregional, biregional) by its emphasis on Ibero-Americanism, although the EU concept was actually proposed by the Spanish Presidency in 2002. 4 ' 7 So, is there a conflict of interests if we consider Spain the main promoter of EU relations with Latin America? As an expert at a US think tank states, Spain has a different approach than the EU: Spain's concept is broader and more active. But because of its limited financial and economic resources, it cannot accomplish everything it would like. Spain has influence as an important investor in the region, which can turn into more political power. Although Spain is not Britain, France or Germany, it sometimes takes the leadership - for good or for bad. 418 Ayuso Pozo points out that for Spain, as a middle power, it seems convenient to seek agreement with the positions of the other EU member states in order to increase its clout. This approach is applied, in particular, to relations with Latin America, where discrepancies in the interests of the member states is not remarkable, facilitating the broader agreement. Nevertheless, seeking a disproportionate leadership role might arouse suspicions in both Europe and in Latin America. 4 1 9 Accordingly, Latin Americans are very sensitive about Spanish paternalism. 420 The EU's Latin America policy is strongly dominated by Spanish representatives, but there are doubts as to whether this "personal domination" necessarily translates into a decisive influence on thematic issues and inflammatory topics. Unofficially, this "inefficiency" was attributed to the behaviour of "Aznar's people" and their diplomatic style. 421 A Latin American ambassador holds a different view on the relation between Spain and the Commission: "Los latinoamericanos perciben una lección preparada por la Comisión y transmitida por España: La Comisión da la posición a los españoles para que nos dieran, es un

fait accompli."422

A strengthened relationship between the European Union and Latin America, with Spain as the driving force, might also have served Spain's interest in improving its standing within the EU. Certainly, Spain's activity in the Union, aimed at intensifying and improving relations between the EU and Latin Amer-

community); and 4) relations between the EU and Latin America. Del Arenal, 'La política exterior de España', pp. 65-67. 4l7 Juan Pablo Soriano, 'América Latina: Entre la esperanza y la desilusión'. In: Esther Barbé (coord ), España y la política exterior de la UE. Entre las prioridades españolas y los desafíos deI contexto internacional. Quaderns de treball, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus, 40, octubre 2002, p. 80. "''interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004. 419

Ayuso Pozo, 'La cooperación para el desarrollo', p. 105. 420

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

421 422

Interviews, Brussels, September/December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

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ica, has served to strengthen and improve Spain's own Ibero-American policy. 4 2 3 It would be an exaggeration to claim that Spain has been the only force within the EU to launch initiatives towards Latin America, but it has certainly played the most relevant role. In addition, through the EU Spain is able to reinforce its presence in Latin America, which would be very complicated if the Spaniards relied solely on their own national human and economic resources. 424 Since its entry into the EC, Spain has seemed to be in complete solidarity with Latin America, which, according to a Latin American ambassador, sometimes is even frightening 4 2 5 Spain is said to support everything proposed by Latin Americans, including the most absurd requests, as long as Spanish national interests are not concerned. 426 In general, the Spaniards reportedly do not let anybody forget that Latin America exists: " W e should go further with Latin America" is the message. Spanish officials remind other EU executives to coordinate positions with Latin Americans before international conferences. 427 In sum, Spain is the principal actor in the EU with regard to relations with Latin America, but it also pursues its own interests. 428 Nowadays, the Spaniards are very critical o f the European Commission's approach to Latin America and denounce its inactivity, disregard and lack o f vision for the region. 4 2 9 One Spanish observer remarks, in relation to the topic o f social cohesion (2004 summit in Mexico), that the behaviour o f the EU becomes ever more imperial and paternalistic. In this context, the five clauses introduced in the FTAs for Latin America have also been said to be perceived by Latin Americans as humiliating. 430 Some observers anticipate that traditional links to former colonies will disappear in the EU o f 25 member states, but this started even before the enlargement discussions, with the fall o f the Berlin Wall in 1989. 4 3 1

423

Del Arenal, 'La política exterior de España', p. 67. "Spain has also used its position in the EEC to build up both a greater European and especially Spain's own presence in Latin

424

America", Wiarda, Iberia and Latin America, p. 108.

Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', pp. 559, 560. 425

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

426

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

427

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

429lnterviews, 428

Brussels, November 2003.

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003, January 2004, December 2004. 430

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

431

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

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5.3.3. Spain and European Development Cooperation with Latin America After its transition to democracy and the economic recovery, Spain became engaged in development cooperation, which was mainly directed toward its former American colonies. First, the Institute of Ibero-American Cooperation (ICI) was founded in 1979, and in the mid-eighties was incorporated into the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation (AECI). From the first moment, Latin America was an incontestable geographic priority of this organisation: between 1991 and 1997,44 percent of the Spanish cooperation budget was designated for Ibero-America. However, a major problem of Spain's development cooperation with Latin America was the lack of a general strategy. 432 Spain argues that even though Latin America is not the poorest region internationally - one Latin American ambassador described the region as the "international middle class" - it still has big centres of extreme poverty. 433 Here, it is necessary to draw attention to the highly unequal distribution of wealth in Latin America, which does not find expression when comparing GDPs. Spain's insistence on development cooperation with the region is a way of justifying its actions towards Latin America as well as animating other donors, mainly the EU, to maintain their presence in the region. However, for Freres/Sanz Trillo the fight against poverty has not been a real priority of Spanish cooperation with the 434

region. While Spain's official policy understandably endorses close ties between the EU and Latin America, it also endeavours to dominate the shaping of the EU's development cooperation programmes there. 435 It is evident that the peninsular authorities and their representatives are very present in institutions concerned with European policy toward Latin America as "[1]'Amérique latine occupe dans la politique espagnole de coopération une place tout aussi centrale que celle occupée en France par l'Afrique." 436 However, some spectators remarked that Spain cannot take all the credit for the latest increments in cooperation: "Rather, Spain became part of a bloc of countries interested in extending the EU presence in Latin America and, supported by Portugal, made clear her aspiration to lead that bloc." 437 432

Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', pp. 564-567.

433

Interviews, Brussels, December 2004; Madrid, May 2005; Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', p. 566.

434

Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', p. 566.

435

"... Espagne, et ses opérateurs publics comme privés, occupent pourtant une place majeure dans la définition des politiques communes en direction de l'Amérique latine ainsi que dans la captation des programmes de coopération." Kourliandsky, 'Union européenne et Amérique latine', p. 42.

436

Kourliandsky, 'Union européenne et Amérique latine', p. 42.

437

Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European

92

Union, pp. 226, 227.

Torreblanca emphasises that Spain tried to use the EU, above all its economic resources, to serve its own foreign policy interests in Latin America and to convert itself into the interpreter and speaker for EU interests in the region. 438 Additionally, some critics say that Spain indeed determines the development cooperation of the EU with Latin America to a large extent, but does not provide proportional contributions to respective EU funds. 439 Furthermore, a Madrid-based think tank demands an honest analyses and the EU's development cooperation as disastrous and serving only the usual suspects. 440

5.4. Spain and CFSP towards Latin America From an EU viewpoint, Spain's accession did not alter any important existing trends, or open up any new areas for consideration under the EPC framework or, subsequently, the CFSP.441

For Spain, interest in CFSP was even greater than for other EU member states, as it had long been internationally isolated. 442 Spain has backed a progressive development of a common foreign policy of the EU, but linked this to national priorities. 443 With regard to the voting modus of CFSP, Spain had proposed a more integrationist approach, although it did not share the early Dutch vision of a totally communitarian EU foreign policy. Madrid argued that the priority areas which generate policy must be decided unanimously, while the decision-making based on these general guidelines (declarations, common positions and joint actions) could be decided by qualified majority voting. 444 The Spanish position is ambiguous with regard to sensitive areas, such as national interests in North Africa or Latin America, although it generally shares the mainstream attitude in the EU. 445

438

J. I. Torreblanca, 'La Europeización de la Política Exterior Española'. In: C. Closa, La Europeización deI sistema político español. Madrid 2001, p. 484. Quoted in: Mestres, 'La agenda española', p. 23. 439 Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. 440 lnterviews, Madrid, May 2005. 441

U. Diedrichs/Wolfgang Wessels, 'From newcomers to mainstreamers: Lessons from Spain and Portugal'. In: Franco Algieri/Elfriede Regelsberger (eds.), Synergy at Work. Spain and Portugal in European Foreign Policy. Bonn 1996, p. 324. 442 Esther Barbé, 'Spain: Realist Integrationism'. In: Franco Algieri/Elfriede Regelsberger (eds ), Synergy at Work. Spain and Portugal in European Foreign Policy. Bonn 1996, p. 259. On the Spanish stand on the Maastricht/CFSP positions see ibid., pp. 265-271.

443

Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European Union, p. 215. Kavakas, Greece and Spain, pp. 135, 136; Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European pp. 229, 127. 445 Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European Union, p. 229. 444

Union,

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For Kavakas, Latin America is still a region with which Spain maintains bilateral relations with regard to C F S P matters: "It has never formed an area for C F S P joint action o f the EU and most o f the EU agreements with Latin American States or groups, like Mercosur, are described as lacking substance, i f compared with States such as Central and Eastern European or even Southern Mediterranean States." Spaniards express an interest in cooperation and aid but finally, "they do not provide any structure for the realisation o f them". T h e official Spanish explanation points out that Latin America is insignificant to European security, which practically excludes the region from C F S P considerations. "However, there is another explanation that wants Latin America to be an exclusive privileged domain for Spanish foreign policy because o f the close cultural links."446 Consequently, the question arises whether Spain cherishes interest in an enhanced C F S P approach to Latin America and more political cooperation with the region. Apparently, Spain is uneasy about this topic, as it could endanger its leading role in the European-Latin American relationship. The big member states would not easily accept the Spaniards as dominant protagonists with regard to these very political and diplomatic affairs. Thus, Spain maintains a divided approach: economic, trade and cooperation matters are dealt with through the EU (first pillar issues) and political relations with Latin America (originally 2 n d pillar matters in the EU structure) are still handled bilaterally. Spain does not want to "Europeanise" its political relations with Latin America since it seems to fear that this would automatically lead to a weakening o f its political standing in the region. T h e big countries (primarily Germany, France, and Great Britain) do not see Latin America as a priority, but they have an interest in controlling what is happening there as well. 4 4 7 Furthermore, the tight cultural ties with their Latin American counterparts help Spanish statespersons and diplomats maintain a certain "special relationship", which - due to its informal character - often translates into few transparent procedures. A "Europeanised" foreign policy would require a higher degree o f transparency and equality among European countries with regard to relations with Latin America. 4 4 8 Another factor is that Spanish diplomacy, at least under the Aznar administration, tended toward rather traditional diplomatic behaviour, often criticised as "patriarchal". Such a foreign policy culture would be challenged fundamentally by "Europeanisation" - due to Spain's smaller weight within the EU this would 446

Kavakas, Greece and Spain, pp. 152, 153.

447 448

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. In Buenos Aires, for instance, the Spanish representatives are seen as the "old bulls" among the European Embassies, although one ambassador deems the Italian embassy as more important. Spaniards in Argentina penetrate the Argentine society and elites better than others. The relations between Argentineans and Spaniards impinge on the transfer o f information. However, there haven't been any concrete inconsistencies in the transfer o f relevant information to other EU ambassadors. Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

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be more substantial than the threat CFSP poses to France's policy in Africa or the British position in Asia. The change of Spain's position regarding the Cuba policy The change in Spain's approach to Socialist Cuba after the Popular Party (PP) won the elections in 1996 was described as "less carrot, more stick". Initially the PP government suspended much cooperation with the Castro regime, though not completely. Besides some rhetoric sparring matches between Madrid and Havana, Freres/Sanz Trillo hold that in practice, the PP policy became increasingly similar to the one carried out by former Spanish governments. 449 However, Aznar is said to have received substantial financial support for his election campaign from Más Canosa, former leader of the exiled Cubans in Miami.450 The Spaniards worked hard to get through the first Common Position on Cuba, which also partially contradicts the statement that the relations have not changed fundamentally. In late December 1996, Spain finally succeeded: the EU adopted a Common Position on Cuba with an unprecedented firmness.451 This diplomatic manoeuvre was one of the first foreign policy initiatives of the new conservative Spanish government, pushed through despite the opposition of the PSOE and even against the Spanish Commissioner Abel Matutes, himself a Popular Party member.452 However, the new hostility of the Popular Party government towards the Castro regime was later replaced by a softened approach. 453 Today, more than a few individuals in the Spanish foreign affairs sector seem to regret the adoption of the Common Position, as it impedes the flexibility of measures and reactions towards the Cuban government: According to an interviewee, it is a real limitation of CFSP towards Cuba.454 "[Paradoxically, while the EU's policy on Cuba is wholly of Spanish origin, the very fact that it is now a European policy has constrained the Spanish government's freedom of manoeuvre." 455 The very first Common Position for Latin America thus demonstrates CFSP's "teething troubles". The harsh repression of Cuban dissidents in spring 2003 provoked a stronger approach from the EU. However, the EU and the US still hold a different view of the highly politicised case of Cuba. 456 As a US American expert points out, the Spanish Cuba initiative did not achieve the intended consequences. It is 449 450 45l

Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', pp. 563, 564. Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. 'Les facteurs externes', p. 69.

452Sabbagh,

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 453

454See Molina/Rodríguez, 'Las transformaciones organizativas', p. 187. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 455 Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European Union, p. 227 (Emphasis in the original). 456

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

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likely that with the new Socialist government in Madrid, EU policy towards Cuba will change and get back to the "original back-and-forth approach". 457 The new Socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has recently smoothed the Spanish policy and also the EU approach towards the Caribbean island. Nevertheless, this development remains to be seen, because it is mainly the Castro regime that determines the degree of rapprochement, by diminishing repression.

5.5. Spain and the biregional political relations Spain's Presidency of the European Union in 2002 In the first six months of 2002, Spain again held the EU Presidency. 458 Within this half-year, the Spaniards organised the second Euro-Latin American summit in Madrid in May 2002, which had been postponed for a year since Spain wanted to host it. While the first four years of the Aznar government (1996-2000) were said to be stamped by the slogan "Más España", the Spanish EU Presidency's topic became "Más Europa en el mundo". 4 5 9 Soriano holds that the Spanish Presidency did achieve its goals, but asks whether the summit actually advanced biregional relations. He concludes that with regard to the political and cooperation areas, it might be possible to say so, but in the economic and commercial sector, the meeting could not be positively evaluated. 460 In contrast to Soriano, I think that although trade agreements were launched during the Spanish Presidency in 2002, the political dimension was comparatively low-key. 461 A Spanish official corroborates this assumption by confirming that for the Spanish Presidency, the first pillar, i.e. the accords with the Andean Community and Central America, were priorities, not political relations. 462

The European-Latin American Summit in Madrid, 2002 During the first Euro-Latin American summit, Spain seemed to have more worries in reaching particular goals than to make operative proposals, which Ayuso Pozo interprets as a likely confirmation of the fears of its European partners. 463

457

Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004. 0 n the 1995 summit, see Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European Union, pp. 118, 119.

458

459

Grasa Hernández, 'La política exterior española', p. 71; Mestres, 'La agenda española', p. 17. 460

Soriano, 'América Latina', p. 92. 461 With regard to the Coreu on Latin America, the Danish Presidency launched more communications on the region (about 1800) than the Spanish (approximately 1780). As Denmark has not been famous for its strong ties to the region, it is surprising that the Spaniards did not take more political initiative with regard to Latin American topics. 462 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 463 Ayuso Pozo, 'La cooperación para el desarrollo', p. 105.

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After the EU-Latin America summit in Madrid, del Arenal finds that despite its "important diplomatic work", Spain did not come out of it in a better light. Except for the association agreement reached with Chile and the resolution on terrorism, which was perceived as the major topic of the meeting, the goals weren't achieved. In this sense, it was evident that the EU's loss of influence in the region weakened Spain's Latin America policy to a great extent. According to del Arenal, the summit demonstrated Spain's difficulties in developing an active policy towards Latin America without the support of the EU and with support from the US only. The same became evident at the XII Ibero-American Summit in Playa Bavaro (Dominican Republic) in November 2002: Spain faced big difficulties in overcoming the contradictions generated by its simultaneous Europeanism, Ibero-Americanism and Atlanticism. 464 On the other hand, with regard to the political dialogue, Soriano says that the European and Latin American leaders reached agreement on a new solidarity, or "common front" against what were perceived as political excesses of the Bush administration. The outcome was a common position on the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court - two topics without US support - as well as on the fight against terrorism, an important issue for Washington 4 6 5 In my opinion, the summit actually brought some results, but a substantial advancement of the "strategic partnership" did not happen, as it is always more difficult to agree on detailed and concrete steps, which qualify as authentic progress. In sum, Spain did not advance the partnership decisively and has not presented a coherent strategy for an EU approach towards the region. It merely claimed on every possible occasion that Latin America is good for the European Union. This approach, however, does not convince other Europeans, because sometimes Spanish initiatives are perceived as "overactive" 4 6 6 In sum, although the Spanish presidency promoted the strengthening of biregional relations in the area of development cooperation, from the Latin American view it was unsatisfactory with regard to economic and commercial relations (especially for the Andean Community and Central America). Powell correctly explains that as it is the country, which profits the second-most highly (after France) from the controversial Common Agriculture Policy, Spain cannot be the most trustworthy defender of Latin American interests in this regard. 467 For Powell, the meagre results nurtured already-existing doubts about Spain's capacity to convince its European partners of the region's importance to the EU, above all in a context dominated by the enlargement process. Possibly the obvi-

464

Celestino del Arenal Moyúa, 'EE UU y la política latinoamericana de España'. In: Política Exterior, 93, mayo-junio 2003, p. 189. 465 Soriano, 'América Latina', p. 93. 466 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 467 Powell, 'Un balance de la presidencia española', pp. 556, 557. See Closa/Heywood, Spain and the European Union, pp. 136-150.

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ous endeavour of the Spanish government not to contrast the US position contributed to this, as well as the small capacity of leeway and initiative demonstrated in relation to the Argentine and Venezuelan crisis. 468

5.6. An Analysis of the Spanish policy towards Latin America Grasa Hernández identifies a tendency that began with Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez (1985-92) and was followed by his successor, Javier Solana (1992-1995): both pursued bringing the rest of Europe in line with the Spanish Latin America policy. This was an attempt (from coincidence and convergence) to establish positions of leadership in the European policy towards the region, although sometimes this was called a "bridge function". Moreover, Grasa Hernández holds that much of the Latin America policy still remains rhetoric; an authentic policy is still to be established. 469 Likewise, Freres and Sanz Trillo consider the Spanish Latin America policy in general as rather weak, primarily because of a general lack of global vision of Spanish foreign policy as such. 470 According to Celestino del Arenal's somewhat provocative article, the diminishing strategic and security importance of Latin America for the United States as well as the unconditional support from the Aznar government for the Iraq war changed the Spanish foreign policy towards the region. For him, this apparently allowed Spain to consider the region a better area to "dominate" but also to act there as a sort of "instrument" and "speaker" of the United States, which included the risk of worsening Spain's reputation in the region. 471 As examples for this thesis, del Arenal lists the Spanish ambassador's visit to the coup leaders in Venezuela in April 2002, and Spain's attempt to convince Mexico and Chile to reconsider their negative view regarding the US resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council. This attempt certainly served to impair relations with Mexico as well as with the Spanish opposition since Aznar was seen as acting like Washington's spokesman. 472 In the discussion on Iraq, the Spaniards were put in the lead. The US Defence Assistant Secretary and his Spanish counterpart then 468

Powell, 'Un balance de la presidencia española', pp. 556, 557.

469

Grasa Hernández, 'La política exterior española', p. 79.

470

471

472

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Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Política exterior de España hacia America Latina', p. 548. Klom points out: "[w]hereas foreign policy priorities in Spain were focused on Europe for political and economic reasons and on Latin America for cultural and historical reasons, the first EUMercosur agreement meshed these strains of Spanish policy together", Andy Klom, 'Mercosur and Brazil: a European perspective'. In: International Affairs 79, 2 (2003), p. 353. Del Arenal, 'EE UU y la política latinoamericana de España', p. 187. See Detlef Nolte, 'Fortschritte auf dem Weg zu einer strategischen Partnerschaft? Der III. Gipfel zwischen der EU und Lateinamerika in Guadalajara'. In: Brennpunkt Lateinamerika. Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde Hamburg, 11,3. Juni 2004, p. 118. Del Arenal, 'EE UU y la política latinoamericana de España', pp. 188, 189.

came to Chile to convince the government to support the US position in the Security Council. 473 Reportedly, Spanish-US endeavours to push Mexico and Chile in the Security Council were not as aggressive as assumed. 474 A Latin American ambassador holds that Spain under Aznar did not carry out Washington's policy in the region at all. 475 A European ambassador points out that the Spanish rapprochement to the United States under the Aznar government only effected a rather superficial modification of the relations between Spain and Latin America. 476 Likewise, Freres and Sanz Trillo conclude that the government of the Popular Party did not change much with regard to the Spanish foreign policy approach towards Latin America. 477 Other observers in Brussels, however, held that the post-dictatorial emphasis of Spanish foreign policy in Latin America on democracy and human rights under the Aznar government focused on Cuba and Venezuela, which provokes the suspicion of a political motivation in the administration of the Popular Party. 478 It is problematic for Spain to act as the famous "bridge" between Europe and Latin America in economic and trade matters, but not to promote a European foreign policy towards Latin America (beyond rhetorical statements). At first glance, Spain's Latin America approach seems similar to Britain's supremacy in Asia and the French predominance in Africa. But as Spain is not as big and influential and lacks comparable resources in contrast to the two other former colonial powers, the relations are quite different, largely due to Spain's isolation during the Franco regime. The fact that the Spanish influence on EU foreign policy toward Latin America is not as weighty as France's stand on positions concerning Africa is a result of Spain managing its foreign policy (in CFSP terms) through Madrid rather than Brussels. It is telling that France can mobilise other European partners for its policies in Africa, while Spain apparently sees itself limited to acting bilaterally with Latin American countries, which indirectly nurtures the atrophy of CFSP towards the region. In sum, the Spanish bilateral (or Ibero-American) foreign policy orientation seems to contrast with a CFSP of the European Union towards the region, since the main ally of the region in Europe appears reluctant to "Europeanise" its political relations with Latin America. Here, we can note a discrepancy between European and Spanish foreign policy, since Spain's strong interests in the region do not translate into a strengthened CFSP. The policies are parallel, though sometimes complementary.

473

lnterviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004.

474 475

476

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

477

Freres/Sanz Trillo, 'Politica exterior de Espafia hacia America Latina', pp. 556, 557.

478

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

99

Shortly after taking office, new prime minister Zapatero announced that Latin America would become the centre of Spanish foreign policy. 479 For the new Spanish leader, the 2004 summit in Mexico was a perfect occasion to distinguish his foreign policy from that of his predecessor, José Maria Aznar. The vision presented by Zapatero was highly multilateral and European, and in its IberoAmerican dimension, it emphasised political aspects, contrasting with the almost exclusively economic focus of Aznar. 480 However, since other priorities seem to prevail for the Spaniards as well (Europe, the Mediterranean, the fight against terrorism), no general strategy on EU relations with Latin American is expected. Furthermore, a report of the Madrid based think tank Real Institute Elcano considers the biregional strategic partnership only as a long-term goal and proposes to strengthen rather the bilateral relations between Spain, the EU and IberoAmerican countries than to deal with Latin American subregions. 481 In short, Spain has been a bridge between Europe and Latin America, but less so between the European Union and the region with regard to the CFSP approach and political relations. There is a gap between Spanish activism in EU economic, trade and development cooperation with Latin America, and Spain's reluctance to enhance CFSP and the political dimension of biregional relations. Whether this gap will be closed during the government of Mr. Zapatero remains questionable.

479

Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 7. 480

Christian Freres, La III Cumbre Unión Europea-América Latina y el Caribe: ¿A ¡a tercera va la vencida? (ARI). Análisis del Rea! Instituto Elcano, 19 May 2004. 481 Carlos Malamud (coord ), La política española hacia America Latina; Primar lo bilateral para ganar en lo global. Una propuesta ante tos bicentenarios de la independencia. Informes Elcano, 3, mayo 2005, Madrid.

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6. Two case studies (Argentina and Venezuela) 6.1. The political crisis in Argentina 2001/2002 and the reaction of the EU 6.1.1. Background On 21 December 2001, Argentine president Fernando de la Rúa fled via helicopter from the government palace in the heart o f Buenos Aires, symbolising his cabinet's inability to deal with the economic, financial, and, last but not least, political crisis in Argentina. De la Rúa's escape followed several demonstrations and violent protests against the government's policy. The authorities were said to have been in control, although there were uprisings before De la Rua's flight, which claimed 32-38 lives. Somewhat surprisingly, everything happened within the constitutional framework, respecting democratic rules. 482 In the aftermath o f de la Rúa's resignation, Argentina had several presidents within two weeks. After de la Rúa's escape, Federico Ramón Puerta took over executive duties as provisional president between 21 December and 23 December 2001. Between 23 and 31 December 2001, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, a Peronist, acted as president. After his resignation, Eduardo Oscar Camaño became first "acting" executive (31 December 2001-1 January 2002) and then "interim" president (1-2 January 2002), before Eduardo Alberto Duhalde Maldonado, another Peronist, was chosen as interim president. In all, Duhalde held the presidency from 2 February 2002 to 25 May 2003, when Néstor Carlos Kirchner, also from the Peronist party, was elected president in a regular election. 483 The Argentine crisis is said to have begun in 1998 when the economy began to fall, and the situation exploded in December 2001, 4 8 4 The 1990s was a decade 482 483

Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2 0 0 4 .

A c c o r d i n g to the Argentine law (Ley de Acefala), in case o f death or resignation o f the president, the vice-president is to be charged president. Nonetheless, neither De la Rua nor Rodriguez S a a had vice-presidents at the time. In that case, (always according to Argentine law), the provisional president o f the Senate, or i f he or she resigns or dies, the president o f the Lower House has to provisionally assume the executive power. But these two did not become "president", they acted as "Provisional President o f the Senate, in exercise o f the Executive Power", and the law orders them to call for general elections as soon as possible. Therefore, Puerta and Camafio were never presidents o f the country, and their inclusion in the Argentine presidents list is mistaken. http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Listof-Presidents-of-Argentina, 15 December 2 0 0 4 .

484

Interviews, Brussels, January 2 0 0 4 .

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of privatisation and neo-liberal reforms under the government of Peronist president Carlos Saúl Menem. One monetary instrument was the currency board, which tied the Argentine peso to the dollar. In the beginning, this measure helped to combat inflation, but it is said to have become one of the main causes for the crisis in 2001/2002. Widespread corruption among politicians, as well as in the general Argentine population, also contributed to the outbreak of the crisis. Many other reasons and direct triggers of the crisis are still controversial. In this, we should note the rigid stand of the International Monetary Fund, which vigorously supported its "poster child" even when it became obvious that the currency board was co-responsible for the deterioration of the economic situation. Thus, it is inaccurate to blame only Menem for the crisis, as there was a poor management of the government at the federal, provincial and municipal level in all, a widespread irresponsibility of the political class. De la Rúa, the currency board, and the IMF all contributed to the crisis. In the DG Relex it had long been clear that the currency board had become an obstacle to economic recovery. 485 Without analysing in depth the extremely complex and hitherto controversial reasons for the outbreak of the Argentine crisis in 2001/2002, I will look at the European Union's reaction to the events in that shaken South American country between December 2001 and early 2002 from a CFSP perspective. The following questions will serve as a guide: 1) Was it a CFSP case? 2) Did the EU's CFSP react appropriately to the crisis in Argentina in 2001/2002? 3) What was the role of the European Union in relation to the crisis? 4) What deficiencies of the EU can be identified in this case? 5) What was the Spanish position? 6) Was the Mercosur as such involved?

6.1.2. The role of the European Union At the EU-US meeting of consultation on 6 December 2001, the United States and the European Union expressed shared concerns about the difficult situation in Argentina. Further, the possible effect of the contamination of neighbouring countries was discussed. In general, the meeting served to exchange situation reports on Argentina. 486 On 16 December 2001, the Belgian Presidency prepared an analysis of the crisis. From the European capitals, officials asked what would happen. 487

485

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

486

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

487

lnterviews, Buenos Aires, March 2003

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After de la Rua's escape from the Casa Rosada, the government palace in Buenos Aires, Spain reported on the situation via press release on 21 December 2001, and suggested that the Belgian Presidency, the member states and the Commission publish a declaration based upon it. This fed the assumption among other EU member states that Spain felt "in charge" of Latin America. 488 On the same day, several capitals communicated their positions on the Spanish text. Rome supported the Spanish proposal and suggested that the Commission and the Presidency prepare concrete measures to deal with the Argentine crisis. Paris and Brussels also agreed with the Spanish paper. From that point, the Belgian Presidency took responsibility. 489 In the report of the Commissioners for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Trade, and External Relations, Solbes, Lamy and Patten, the Commission acknowledged the huge crisis and pledged to do what it could to help. 490 After the end of the deadline (24 December, noon), the French government also consented, but at the same time it pleaded for a new version of the text, as Argentina had a new president, the Peronist Adolfo Rodriguez Saa. Interestingly, the proposal did not include any promise of support for Argentina 4 9 1 On 25 December, the Presidency issued a new text, which was distributed the next day. On the same day, Berlin proposed modifying the document. The Germans wanted to include a passage that mentioned the Argentine co-responsibility for the financial crisis. Berlin's insistence on the partial guilt of the Argentines may have been motivated by the strong interests of shareholders in Germany who had invested in Argentine bonds and thus feared losing large amounts of their share values. However, Germany insisted on Argentina's co-responsibility also because it committed itself to the philosophy of accountability. 492 Spain is said to have provided almost unconditional support to Argentina. Others, like Germany, reportedly wanted to punish the country for its faults. 493 Spain sent another message, which sought to smooth the German proposal to a 494

certain extent. On 26 December, the Belgian Presidency distributed a new, final version of the text, which expressed condolences for the victims of the crisis but also referred to the Argentine responsibility for the situation, thus meeting German wishes. Generally, the Belgian Presidency was sympathetic towards Argentina, although not as much as the Spanish Presidency which followed. 495 After 26 De488

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 489

490Interviews, 491 492 493

Brussels, November 2003. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

494

495Interviews,

Brussels, December 2003; Buenos Aires, March 2004. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

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cember, there were no exchanges on the Argentine situation through the Coreu network. Apparently, many officials went on vacation and any further conversations on the topic were conducted by phone. 496 On 2 January 2002, the new Spanish Presidency took the initiative and proposed providing institutional assistance to Argentina. It set an extremely short deadline (three hours) for its new declaration. 497 The next day, 3 January, Madrid provided another message. It became obvious that the member states supported finding a solution, which fell within Argentina's constitutional framework. In the afternoon, the Presidency distributed the final version of the declaration, which already had been issued in Madrid on 2 January. The delay might be explained by the fact that many translators were on holiday, slowing down the process of translating the text and its many subsequent modifications into all the official languages. 498 At the meeting of the Council's working group dealing with trade and economic issues in Latin America (AMLAT) on 8 January 2002, Argentina was on the agenda. The meeting requested that the heads of missions prepare a report on the situation, with a particular focus on the economic interests of the EU. This was seen as way of establishing a process for future assistance measures. The participants also consented to following up on the consequences of the Argentine crisis in the Mercosur and other Latin American countries. In contrast, the A M L A T session of 15 January did not deal with the Argentine crisis at all. This was clearly a sign of lessening interest in the situation, which by that point had apparently decreased in urgency. At the same time, the 2002 European-Latin American Summit in Madrid became a priority, which resulted in a different evaluation of the topic as well. 499 On 22 January 2002, the Council for Economic and Financial Affairs of the EU, known as ECOFIN, gathered. The Ministers discussed the Argentine crisis at lunch and concluded that the "key areas of focus should be the monetary and fiscal policy framework, the banking system and the exchange rate regime." 500 No mention of the political component of the crisis was made in ECOFIN's conclusions, but discrimination against foreign direct investors and creditors was considered a major risk. ECOFIN described the debt problem as a priority, but also noted the social consequences of the crisis. However, the issue was to be handled by the World Bank, the IDB and the IMF - the EU did not see itself as the appropriate organisation for dealing with it. The Council offered "technical co-operation" to improve monetary, exchange rate and financial policies. The political roots of the outbreak of political turmoil were not analysed and thus did 496 497

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

498

499lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 500

ECOFIN, 2405th Council Meeting, 5523/02 (Presse 12), Brussels, 22 January 2002, p. 20.

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not play a role in the ECO FIN findings.501 The General Affairs Council, which met at the same time, did not discuss the Argentine situation at all. In general, the Argentine crisis was discussed in ECOFIN and the IMF. The dilemma for the member states in CFSP terms was whether to consider it a constitutional change, or regret the interruption of the constitutional process. 502 On 28 January, the General Affairs and External Relations Council also debated the Argentine crisis - when the political-constitutional part of the crisis had already settled. Some national positions A national counsellor in Brussels explains that Argentina got support from Latin countries. Above all Spain and Portugal were the closest ones. 503 As regards Italy's role, there was reportedly also a personal element, a personal stamp on the perspective. Seemingly, in Italy there were people to keep the door open for Argentina, as it was clear that the government in Buenos Aires had very limited options. 504 Some observers hold that Italy helped Argentina in the IMF. Purportedly, Italy's support was not as much about money as psychological encourage. 505 ment. In view of Germany's strong position on the government's co-responsibility, a national diplomat suggests that the situation was one of Latin solidarity versus North European Calvinism. 506 However, this image is not shared by all - a Latin American ambassador calls the European Catholics "Calvinists" as well, since they reacted as harshly as others to Argentina's default and did not do so when Turkey faced calamities with the IMF. 507 In the Argentine foreign ministry, a diplomat holds that both Spain and Italy helped the country. The EU, however, is said not to have had a position, but rather concerns about the investments of European companies in Argentina. 508 Accordingly, a diplomat in Buenos Aires remarks: "En la valoración política en Argentina, la actuación de la UE es reducida." 509 Moreover, a diplomat in Chile judges that in the end, Argentina received more support from the United States than from the EU. 510

501

Ibid., pp. 2 0 , 2 1 .

502

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 503

504Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004. 505

On 15 January 2002, the president o f the Italian House of Representatives, Cassini, came to

506

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

507

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003; January 2004.

Argentina and thus gave a political sign. Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

508

509lnterviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004. Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004. 5l0

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004.

105

In February, the Russians - themselves shaken by a financial predicament in 1998 - presented at the EU-Russia summit concrete proposals of how to deal with the financial crisis in Argentina. 5 " Russia's position on the IMF in Argentina was problematic, since Russia does not provide much money to the IMF, and thus seemed to be in an unlikely position to ask for policy changes. 512 In sum, the EU member states held differing positions, which also explains why the situation was not considered relevant in CFSP terms and the crisis "outsourced" to the international finance institutions. 6.1.3. The follow-up of the crisis Comparatively late, on 4 February 2002, the Spanish authorities reported on the visit of Argentine foreign minister Carlos Ruckauf, who had visited Madrid between 31 December 2001 and 1 January 2002 (as well as Italy and the United States). The report was very detailed. Ruckauf was very critical of the former economy minister Domingo Cavallo and the international finance institutions for having tolerated and even supported Argentina's economic and finance performance for so long. 513 On 5 February, the Latin America Working Group (AMLAT) spoke about Argentina, reminding of the decisions of ECOFIN and the General Affairs Council. Likewise, the Commission provided a detailed report on the situation in Argentina. 514 At the AMLAT sessions on 2 and 12 February, 1 and 4 March, Argentina was not on the agenda. 515 On 5 March, Madrid received the report of the heads of missions (date of issuance: 22 February), which now included an evaluation of the Argentine government's economic measures. This report presented different proposals and also revealed diverging opinions among the ambassadors in relation to the finance measures. There were different stands on the position of the IMF and on the conditions of supporting measures. The report further called for improved coordination of international finance organisations and suggested a social programme in cooperation with them. Moreover, the ambassadors recommended

5

"lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

512

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 513 51

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

i n t e r v i e w s , Brussels, November 2003. O n February 19, 2002, a subject o f the AMLAT agenda that is usually treated with routine, somewhat turned into a political issue: As the Argentine fishing sector enjoyed the benefits o f the General Preference System with the EU, it would have been the standard practice to lift this preferential treatment as the Argentines surpassed a certain percentage for the third time in a row (after a so-called graduation procedure). Normally, this is a technical process: Argentina would have been expelled from the GPS, but in this case, the delegates agreed on taking the difficult situation in the country into consideration and thus postponed the decision on this issue. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

5,5

106

rapid examination into any signs that the import of Argentine products might be favoured. 516 Furthermore, the report advised the Argentine institutions to boldly reduce their expenditures and fight vigorously against corruption. The excessive bureaucracy, especially in certain provinces, was the main target of the document's criticism in this regard. Another subject of the report was the repercussions of the Argentine crisis on other Mercosur members. In sum, the report included: 1) strong support for a new agreement with the IMF; 2) the offer of technical assistance concerning policy-making; 3) implementation of an international aid programme, as well as international coordination of assistance; 4) the continuation of negotiations with Mercosur; 5) promotion of imports from Argentina; and 6) speeding up of an agreement on SPS (a test procedure on certain substances, which tends to slow down imports of several products). 517 These recommendations confirm that the consideration of the Argentine situation did not take place in CFSP terms. On 14 March, the Spanish Presidency proposed working toward a joint declaration with Mercosur, Chile and Bolivia (associated with Mercosur) on the situation in Argentina, to be adopted at the approaching Summit of Monterrey. This provoked reactions from London, Paris and Berlin. Madrid picked up these comments and presented a new version of the declaration on 15 March. The Spaniards had pushed for agreement on a joint declaration before the summit took place to seek a further consensus with Mercosur and its associated members. 5 ' 8 6.1.4. Evaluation of the European reaction to the Argentine crisis According to a Spanish diplomat, the crisis was basically political and then resulted in an economic and financial crisis. This diplomat assesses that the EU reaction was simply for the member states supporting Argentina to throw the country a life vest. 519 The EU is not particularly concerned about this type of crisis, but more about problems regarding human rights. 520 Reportedly, the EU's interest focused on the activity of European companies in Argentina. The Union could not do anything officially, since the member states, not the EU, are voting members of the IMF. 521

516 5l7

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

518 Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 519 Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004. 520 Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

521

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. N o w , EU officials seize every opportunity to express support for European companies towards the Argentineans - but orally, not officially. 107

The role of the Commission and the High Representative for CFSP was rather negligible, at least regarding the visible reactions on behalf of the EU. Here, the extended competence and instruments of a Union foreign minister are expected to make a noticeable difference. 6.1.5. The Argentine crisis from a CFSP perspective Why was there no Coreu between December 26 and January 2? First of all Argentina is only one country among many. 522 In 2001, as a national advisor points out, the Belgian Presidency was possibly concentrating on Cuba instead. 523 In addition, things happened quickly in 2001/2002, too fast for reaction: As one EU official states, it was a "holiday crisis". 524 According to interviews, a CFSP reaction would have been paternalistic and premature since the situation was changing on a daily basis. 525 Furthermore, as the economic and financial aspects were considered more important, the situation in Argentina was not discussed from the CFSP perspective. This is illustrated by reviewing and comparing the conclusions and resolutions of ECOFIN and the General Affairs Council. 526 While the General Affairs Council, charged with political affairs, was rather muted with regard to the Argentine crisis, ECOFIN presented detailed reports on the situation. 527 Similarly, another EU official admits that the crisis was not seen as a CFSP priority but an economic-financial question, and thus the EU felt limited: "The other question, which might explain this lack of initiative in the Argentine case, is: What could we say? And would a declaration on the situation be helpful?" 528 Likewise, one sceptical national advisor in Brussels asks principally what kind of impact EU declarations can have on crises. 529 Another national diplomat states that people in Brussels were astonished. The lack of more action, above all at the CFSP level, came out of prudence. The EU did not want to interfere in foreign affairs. Would it have been necessary to intervene? To adopt a declaration? This would have been very delicate. The Europeans made the decision to wait and observe events. 510

522 523

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

524

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

525

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003; Buenos Aires, March 2004.

526

527Interviews,

Brussels, January 2004. Symptomatically, the ECOFIN conclusions of January 2002 were much longer than those of the General Affairs Council. This seems to suggest the impracticability of the separation between pillar I and 2. 528 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 529

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 5

^'interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

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Europe's reaction was not unanimous. The EU did not offer help to Argentina, since there is a lack of integral concepts, as a Latin American diplomat points out. Every European country acts individually in times of crisis. The EU did not open a trial; this was a task delegated to the IMF. The Union did not say anything on the crisis, but it also abstained from mentioning the profits of European firms in Argentina, a Latin American ambassador remarks. 531 Another Latin American diplomat criticises the Commission for not taking a clear position when the crisis broke out, while there was more solidarity on behalf of the European Parliament. 532 As a European ambassador points out: "The EU did not participate in a beauty contest then." Instead, the crisis was seen in the IMF context, where the EU member states were more likely to act as separate nations. The IMF is not communitarised at all - thus there was no reaction from the EU. However, the EU facilitated some trade matters and gave a positive treatment to Argentina in SPG terms. Within the European Union, the problem of the separation into communitarian and inter-governmental pillars has been identified as a potential obstacle to reacting to situations like the one in Argentina: "We have to deal with this reflex." 533 As a European ambassador emphasises, there was no room for a more decided EU position. 534 6.1.6. Conclusions The example of the European Union's first reactions to the political and financial crisis in Argentina leads to the following conclusions: 1) Was it a CFSP case? Although many observers and EU officials in Brussels and Buenos Aires claim that the Argentine crisis in 2001/2002 was not a case for CFSP, they also admit that it was also a political crisis. The mere fact that the economic and finance institutions and the respective entities in Europe and the US dealt with the situation does not disprove the fact that potentially it was a CFSP case - not only because of the riots and victims on the streets. In the end, the decision of whether to consider the Argentine situation between December 2001-January 2002 a case for the EU's common foreign and security policy largely depends on its definition and of the present endowment and ambition of European foreign policy in CFSP terms. I suggest that the events in December 2001/January 2002 were a CFSP case, but not the aftermath, when the riots stopped and Duhalde became president. 531

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

532

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 533

534Interviews,

Buenos Aires, March 2004; Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

109

2) Did the CFSP react appropriately to the crisis in Argentina in 2001/2002? For the European Union's CFSP, the events were taking place too fast. Although the Spaniards reacted quickly, through the difficult decision-making process via Coreu the member states had just agreed on a draft declaration when they had to change the text again because there was a new president in Buenos Aires. Furthermore, this example shows that the Coreu deadlines are seldom respected by all EU member states. In addition, it is certainly a problem that this "holiday crisis" occurred when several European ambassadors in Buenos Aires and officials of the European institutions in Brussels were on vacation. The delay of the text of the Spanish declaration might be explained by the small early-January translation staff. In sum, the E U ' s CFSP struggled with the typical problems of a conventional national or municipal administration - not necessarily the performance expected from an international player. 3) What was the role of the EU as such in relation to the crisis? The EU was rather a spectator of the crisis. It was more the IMF or individual European states that dealt with the Argentine situation. The reaction to the crisis was concentrated on economics and finance and thus not considered a CFSP case. CFSP could also have reacted to the crisis since many observers see its root as political, resulting in a financial and economic collapse. However, as some observers mention, the EU apparently feared becoming involved in this type of international crisis where differing national interests of the member states further complicated a coherent and fast reaction. 4) What deficiencies of the EU can be identified in this case? The Argentine crisis serves as a case study for the mingling of political, economic, financial and even social causes that led to the crisis, and exposes the pillarisation of the EU as a substantial problem for an effective CFSP. This case is a good example of the occasional impracticability of the separation of 1st and 2 nd pillar issues. The latent discrepancy between DG Trade and DG Relex further hampers a fast reaction to crises of this sort. The DG Relex is in charge of representation and coordination. The DG Trade is more autonomous (communitarian), while Relex must consult the member states. As seen in the Argentine case, the inability of the Union to play any role in the management of financial crises constitutes a considerable limitation in any EU bargaining position. 535 5) What was the Spanish position? The Spanish government has a particular interest in the region and tends to act as a sort of "neo-patrimonial" power. In the Argentine case, however, this inter535

http://www. cris. unu.edu/Online%20papers/EU-fin-gov.pdf, 15 December 2004.

110

est, disguised as culturally and historically motivated, also reflects the considerable domestic impact of Spanish business involvement in Latin American, particularly in Argentina. The other member states do not like this patronising behaviour, particularly if it is combined with "macho" diplomacy, as if the Spaniards were asking: "Who else in Europe is in charge of Latin America?" However, one must ask, who else in Europe cares about the region? It is remarkable in this regard that the Spanish Presidency promoted a joint declaration of the EU with the Mercosur, Chile and Bolivia on the situation in Argentina. 6) Was the Mercosur as such involved? Another conclusion is that the European Union turned to the Argentine government instead of the Council of Mercosur. This is completely reasonable, as the Mercosur has not established as deep an integration as the EU. On the other hand, Mercosur would not have turned to the European Union if there were a problem, but would have addressed the respective national European government. In sum, the approach, determined by the nation-state mentality, is challenged, but is not likely to be changed.

6.2. The coup attempt of April 2002 in Venezuela and the European Union The Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez Frias, army officer, former coup leader, but also democratically elected head of state since 1998, was temporarily ousted between 12 and 14 April 2002. Mr. Chavez's administration had been harshly criticised for turning to populist and authoritarian measures, and his government was accused of having abandoned democratic standards. 536 The opposition, mainly of middle- or upper class origin, could neither deprive the president of his support among the poor majority of population nor agree on a convincing personal alternative for Hugo Chavez. The United States, which had been not very happy about Chavez's leftist populism, partly directed against the US, 537 did not openly support the coup but abstained from directly condemning it either. In the aftermath of the coup, many spoke of confidential meetings between the coup leaders and representatives of the Bush administration before 11 April 536

ln this regard, see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1ACHR), Report on the situation of human rights in Venezuela, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.118 doc. 4 rev. 2, 29 December 2003 (Original: Spanish), pp. 36-44; as well as the sections on Venezuela in the IACHR annual reports.

537

ln Washington, observers deem the existence of a State Department memorandum to destabilise Venezuela as almost certain. Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

Ill

2002, including a meeting between the coup-leading interim-president and US Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich. 538 The performance of the European Union, at this time under a Spanish Presidency, is interesting in view of the constitutional crisis in Venezuela. The following questions shall be explored: Did the European Union, and in particular its Presidency, react appropriately to the temporary ouster of president Hugo Chávez? And what were the effects of CFSP in this case? 6.2.1. Background For several observers, the coup attempt in April and the general strike in December 2002 539 must be viewed in connection with attempts of the opposition to topple the Chávez government. 540 In August 2004, the government of Hugo Chávez finally won a referendum, initiated by the opposition, on whether he had to resign. 541 Although there are many criticisms of the conduct of the Chávez administration and its lack of respect for the principles of good governance and democratic rule, it must be stated that despite its populism and polarisation, the "Bolivarian" leader and his executives did act within the constitutional framework, although questions remain about whether general democratic rules were followed. 6.2.2. The coup attempt The day of 11 April 2002 began with a demonstration of tens of thousands of people against the government of Hugo Chávez. During clashes in which the Metropolitan Police, the National Guard, pro-government and anti-government protesters were involved, and 17-19 people were killed. It remains unclear who caused the fatalities. 542 Military officials held the government responsible for the violence. President Hugo Chávez was detained in the dawn of 12 April by members of the military. The next morning, on 12 April 2002, the message of Chávez's voluntary resignation was distributed and then repeatedly transmitted by General Lucas Rincón via television. In the broadcast, he held that "the President's resignation was requested and he acceded". 543 Pedro Carmona Estanga, an influential businessman who led the coup, dissolved the Parliament and all elected committees 538

See, for instance, EI Pais, Madrid, 17 de abril de 2002; La Jornada, México D.F., 17 de de 2002; Le Monde diplomatique, Paris, le 17 may 2002. On the national strike, see IACHR, Report on the situation of human rights in Venezuela, pp. 44, 45. 540 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 541 539 abril

See The Economist, London, 12 August 2004. IACHR, Report on the situation of human rights in Venezuela, pp. 34, 35. 543 lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003. IACHR, Report on the situation of human rights in Venezuela, p. 36. 542

112

and dismissed all democratically elected governors. 544 Attorney General Isaias Rodriguez declaimed the lack o f proof o f Chavez's resignation and spoke o f a "constitutional coup d'état". 5 4 5 During the days o f the coup, there was no reliable information available in Venezuela on the events. In Caracas the people reportedly learned about the coup because a journalist from the Colombian radio station Radio Caraco 1 had access to the place where Chavez was held captive. This information was made public at dawn on 12 April. 546 Sources within the Organisation o f American States confirm that on 12 April 2002, it became evident that a coup had taken place, although the confusion about Chavez's "resignation" continued. 547 Several demonstrations were staged by civilians who protested against the institutional breakdown, which led to further acts o f violence, in the course o f which more than 4 0 people died. In view o f increasing popular protest, Carmona resigned on the night o f 13 April. On 14 April 2002, Hugo Chavez returned to power. 548 Reportedly, the EU was informed o f the situation by a phone call from the Venezuelan Ambassador in Brussels, Luis-Xavier Grisanti, allegedly not a pronounced supporter o f the Chavez government, who said that Chavez had resigned. Likewise, Venezuela's ambassador in Canada is said to have reported the president's resignation. The head o f delegation o f the European Commission in Caracas is told to have supported this view. 5 4 9 According to other rumours, Chavez announced his resignation on an airplane. 550 According to an EU official, the reports o f Chavez's resignation were expressions o f desire rather than fact. It is difficult to prove what actually happened. 551 In Caracas and in Brussels, there was no further information on the situation in Venezuela, which made it hard to verify the reports. This might also have contributed to the surprisingly muted international reactions. 552 The lack o f information was also a result o f the practically defunct media in Venezuela; the coup leaders had tight relations with this sector. In any case, during the two days when the coup attempt was taking place, journalists, intellectuals, heads o f state and government in the US, Europe and Latin America did not immediately condemn the coup d'état. In a joint statement, Spain and the United States did not 544 545 546

Le Monde diplomatique, Paris, le 17 may 2002. 1ACHR, Report on the situation of human rights in Venezuela, p. 36. IACHR, Report on the situation of human rights in Venezuela, p. 36. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

547

548

lnterviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

IACHR, Report on the situation of human rights in Venezuela, p. 37.

549

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. lnterviews, Brussels, January 2004.

550

551

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

Le Monde diplomatique, Paris, le 3 juin 2002.

552

113

expressly condemn the interruption of the democratic process. 553 Days after the failed Putsch, Spanish newspapers changed their tone without explaining the turnaround. 554 In November 2004, the debates on the coup d'état witnessed a revival due to the assassination of state prosecutor Danilo Anderson, who also dealt with cases related to the coup attempt of 2002. 555 6.2.3. The reaction of the European Union Just few hours after the coup attempt in Venezuela on April 12, 2002, Spain, holding the EU Presidency, issued the draft of a declaration. This declaration expressed concerns about the situation in Venezuela, lamented the loss of lives, expressed support and solidarity with the Venezuelan people, and called for a halt to all violence. Furthermore, the Presidency proposed that the EU express its trust in the transitional government to respect democratic values and institutions in order to surpass the crisis united, while respecting fundamental rights and freedoms. 556 This could be seen as a clear message of support for the temporary new executive in Caracas, as the declaration did not insist on Chavez's reappointment as President. In addition to breaking the rule against backing those who interrupt the democratic process, the Spanish presidency committed a further diplomatic affront by issuing this draft declaration somewhat high-handedly and without consultation with the other member states. The Treaty on the European Union, Title V, Article 22 holds: In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, o f its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period. 557

According to the EU Treaty, the Presidency shall speak for and represent the EU and its member states with regard to CFSP. The High Representative was apparently not involved in this action by the Spanish Presidency. After the Coreu communication, which proposed that the declaration be adopted, there were surprisingly few Coreu messages on the coup - apparently the Foreign Ministries and Permanent Representatives communicated on the phone and even personally. 558 Furthermore, this famous draft declaration of the Spanish Presidency mysteriously disappeared during the Easter break. When the

553 554

US-Spain Joint Statement

on the Situation in Venezuela. Washington D C., 12 April 2002.

José Antonio Fernández, 'El fallido golpe contra Chávez. Un test de reflejos democráticos'. In: Política exterior,

555

The Economist,

87, mayo-junio 2002, p. 7.

London, 25 November 2004.

556

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

557

TEU, Title V, Article 22 (2).

558

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

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coup failed and Chavez was back in charge, the Spaniards apparently buried their draft because they recognised that the statement could be embarrassing. 5 5 9 In contrast, an official o f the European Commission claims that throughout the coup and in its aftermath the Commission had a clear position in support o f dialogue and in favour o f neither the government nor the opposition. 5 6 0 At the head o f missions ( H o M ) meeting in Caracas on 12 April 2 0 0 4 , the ambassadors concluded that the EU had to adopt a declaration on the situation in Venezuela. 5 6 1 T h e ambassadors o f Spain and the United States, Manuel Viturro and Charles Shapiro, met with the "president" Pedro Carmona on 13 April 2 0 0 2 and expressed their concerns. José Maria Aznar also phoned the interim president insisting that Venezuela return to normality and achieve institutional consolidation. Apparently, there was no insistence on Chavez's return to power, neither from the ambassadors in Caracas, nor from Aznar. 5 6 2 The speed with which both ambassadors went to see Carmona was quite surprising. 563 Undoubtedly, the visit o f the two ambassadors to the coup leader was seen as the recognition o f the new interim-president, although a Spanish diplomat suggests that Viturro's meeting with Carmona might have been his personal decision. 5 6 4 On 14 April, there was an informal talk "at lunch" in the course o f the General Affairs Council meeting, where - according to some reports - the Spanish representative was censured by colleagues for the actions o f the Spanish Presidency. It was also considered unacceptable among other Permanent Representatives, some o f whom most likely were annoyed by this behaviour. However, other interviewees state that the reaction among the European colleagues was not harsh at all, as internal criticism is usually mitigated. 5 6 5 T h e other member states abstained from openly condemning the Spanish conduct, since it is preferable not to broadly critique the Presidency, even more so four weeks before the European-Latin American summit gathered in Madrid. However, France did criticise the Spanish performance. 5 6 6 Overall, EU officials agree that the Spanish conduct during the coup attempt was not ideal. 5 6 7

559

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003/January 2004. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 561 Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 5 6 2 See EE UU y España muestran su preocupación por Venezuela. E! Pais, Madrid, 14 de abril de 2002. 563Fernández, 'El fallido golpe', p. 20. 564 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 565Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 566Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 567Interviews, Brussels, November/December 2003; January 2004. 115 560

6.2.4. The reaction of the United States and the Organisation of American States On 13 April, the Group of Rio requested that the Organisation of American States (OAS) investigate the situation in Venezuela, and condemned the "interruption of the constitutional order". There was reluctance to call the incidents in Venezuela a "coup d'état", although Argentine president Eduardo Duhalde proposed that the OAS issue sanctions against the new rulers. 568 Apparently, the OAS was informed by Pedro Carmona himself. 569 Thus, the delayed reaction from the OAS appeared more straightforward and appropriate than the EU's premature response. Unlike the EU, the OAS Permanent Council issued a communication, which condemned the "alteration" of the constitutional order in Venezuela. 570 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) condemned the coup of April 2002. 57 ' It undertook an on-site observation between 6 and 10 May 2002 in Venezuela, and expressly "repudiated the coup d'état", stating: "Nothing justifies a break with the constitutional order or an effort to impede the operation of key institutions such as the various branches of government." 572 However, some say that the position of the OAS was not as straightforward as it seems at first glance. Seemingly, Brazil, Mexico and Chile pushed to condemn the coup, and it is possible that without them the OAS would not have taken a strong position. 573 Another Latin American diplomat suggests that in situations like this, sometimes particular individuals do make the difference in interna. . . 574 tional organisations. 6.2.5. The follow-up and consequences of the coup and the EU's performance When Chavez returned to power, the Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Piqué welcomed this turn as a new opportunity for democracy. He stated that the Spanish government abstained from qualifying the events in Venezuela as a "coup", but it neither supported the takeover of power by Carmona nor aligned with the 568

La caída de Chávez. El Grupo de Rio condena la interrupción del orden constitucional. El País, Madrid, 14 de abril de 2002. 569 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003; Washington D.C., May 2004. 570 E E UU espera que el mandatario 'entienda el mensaje' mientras Cuba celebra su retomo. El País, Madrid, 15 de abril de 2002; El Nuevo Herald, Miami, 19 de abril de 2002. Press Release No. 14/02 on the events in Venezuela, Washington DC., 13 April 2002.

57iIACHR,

572

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Venezuela. 573 S e e El Nuevo Herald, Miami, 29 de noviembre de 2004. According to this newspaper, the US, Spain, Colombia and El Salvador supported the removal o f president Chávez, while Mexico and Chile prevented the success o f the coup. 574 lnterviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

116

United States by holding Chávez responsible for the coup. The Spanish opposition, the Socialist Party, criticised the government's stand on Chávez and accused the administration of having treated him too indulgently. Felipe González, the Socialist leader and former prime minister, called Hugo Chávez a "dictator, although democratically elected", as he behaved like a dictator. In contrast, the left-wing Izquierda Unida (IU) and the Communist Party (PCE) criticised the government for having aligned with the US and pressured the EU not to condemn the coup.575 Likewise, the European United Left/Nordic Green Left of the European Parliament criticised the EU because -unlike the Group of Rio - it did not clearly condemn the coup. 576 Recently, the foreign minister of the Socialist government in Spain again accused the Aznar government of having supported the Chávez ouster in 2002. 577 In its Country Strategy Paper on Venezuela, the European Commission concludes that after the events in April 2002, "the number of reports of human rights violations, acts of intimidation, and of vandalism and looting as well as the number of deaths and injured increased." Furthermore, the scope of action of NGOs has decreased since then. 578 After the US performance during these days in April, the image of the United States suffered badly within the OAS: all member states had immediately applied the Inter-American Democratic Charter579 except the US.580 As a result, since then the US seems to have abstained from getting directly involved in Venezuela.581 Additionally, Spanish-Venezuelan relations seemed to be damaged, as the Spanish ambassador's visit to Pedro Carmona was perceived as a tacit recognition of his de facto presidency. Although both ambassadors asked the new leaders to respect democratic institutions, they did not request the reinstatement of president Chávez, which some official Venezuelan sources lament. The Spanish daily El Pais supposed that it was a case of incorrect or lacking in575

Piqué califica la vuelta de Chávez de 'oportunidad para la democracia'. El País, Madrid, 15 de abril de 2002.

576

Communiqué du groupe GUE/NGL, au sujet de la tentative de coup d'état au Venezuela. Bruxelles, le 17 avril 2002. 511 El Universal, Caracas, 24 de noviembre de 2004; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Zürich, 25. November 2004; El País, Madrid, 2 de diciembre de 2004; Latin American Weekly Report, London, 30 November 2004. Furthermore, the discussion on the coup attempt o f 2002 has seen a revival after the murder of a state prosecutor who worked on the case. The Economist, London, 25 November 2004. 578 579

European Commission, Country Strategy Paper Venezuela, 2003, p. 7.

In 2001, the Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted by the OAS General Assembly. This instrument, which represents the culmination of the democratisation in the Americas hitherto, strengthens democracy, human rights and the rule o f law in the Western hemisphere and also includes sanction mechanism in case of interruption o f the democratic process. See Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted in Lima, 11 September 2001. 580 £/ Pais, Madrid, 17 de abril de 2002. 581 Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004; Brussels, December 2003.

117

formation. However, the Spanish argument that Ambassador Viturro met with Carmona just to gather information was not convincing. 582 A week after the coup, President Aznar called Chavez, urging him to maintain an open and flexible attitude and seek the unity of the country. 583 In the meantime, the session of the Latin America working group in the Council of the EU (COLAT) on April 19 did not put the issue on the agenda the forthcoming EU-Latin American summit in May enjoyed priority. 584 On May 2, the Spanish Presidency proposed a demarche and received comments on its draft from Vienna, Brussels, Rome, London, Lisbon, and The Hague within the Coreu time limit. In response to the manifold comments, Madrid issued another draft declaration, including new consultations and a new deadline for this document. 585 Apparently, Madrid was somewhat surprised by the reactions of the member states. Perhaps it had been the wrong approach to attempt to push through a general declaration on the coup attempt so quickly. 586 However, it is interesting that the whole issue apparently was handled outside of official meetings. All the communication must have taken place via phone or by personal encounters. Neither the plenary sessions of the regular meetings nor the Coreu network were prominent. On May 17, more than a month after the events, the heads of mission in Venezuela sent a report on the situation in the country to the Spanish Presidency. 587 The demarche dealing with the events in April was finally issued on May 21, 2002 - almost six weeks after the coup attempt and Chavez's return to power. It expressed the EU's good wishes on the reestablishment of democratic institutions in Venezuela. Compared with the first Spanish text it was a face-saving attempt with no impact at all. On that day, the Spaniards informed that the Venezuelan President had refused to personally receive this EU demarche, even though it was considered not unfriendly to Chavez. Officially, of course, the government in Caracas attributed this to the President's full agenda, which did not allow for receiving the EU envoy, but in fact it was an open refusal. 588 Seemingly, President Chavez had learned of the inner-European troubles and thus refused the demarche. This action was particularly directed at the Spanish Presidency. This is not surprising, as the Spanish and US ambassadors were the first to meet with (and were viewed as having recognised) the coup leaders. So, Chavez settled the score with

582

Malestar en Venezuela por la visita del embajador de España al presidente golpista. El País, Madrid, 19 de abril de 2002.

583

El Nacional, Caracas, 22 de abril de 2002. 584

585Interviews, Brüssels, November 2003.

Interviews, Brüssels, January 2004. 586

587lnterviews,

Brüssels, November 2003. Interviews, Brüssels, November 2003.

588

Interviews, Brüssels, November 2003. 118

the Spanish government, but implicitly repudiated the EU. Reportedly, he was able to further his goals by leveraging the Spanish presidency's incorrect handling of the case. 589 At the subsequent EU-Latin American summit in May 2002 in Madrid, the mood between the Spanish and Venezuelan delegations was chilly. In addition, President Chávez refused to participate in the dinner given by Spanish King Juan Carlos - a clear symbolic gesture of disapproval. Instead of participating in the meetings, Chávez preferred to hold a prolonged press conference. 590 Nevertheless, Chávez is said to have always had two attitudes toward Spain: strong criticism, but also sympathy, as he seems to recognise that the maintenance of a dialogue with the Spaniards is necessary. 591 Among Latin American ambassadors in Brussels, reportedly no one brings up the issue because there is still much speculation and little proof. 592 Along with the general strike in December 2002/January 2003, the coup attempt contributed to the economic decline of the country. 593 Accordingly, in the aftermath of the coup, the benevolent goal of the EU of propping up civil society in Latin America has forced the question: "Whom do we support in Venezuela?" 594 6.2.6. Conclusions

Did the European Union, and in particular its Presidency, react appropriately to the temporary ouster ofpresident Hugo Chávez? In several conversations, officials of the EU stated that the handling of the coup attempt was certainly a mistake by the Spanish presidency. However, there are doubts about whether there was a planned Spanish policy to support the unconstitutional ousting of president Chávez 595 , although recently these allegations resurfaced in Spain. Although the inappropriate reaction of the EU was mainly caused by misinformation, the European Union demonstrated its lack of unity and efficiency as well as the failure to react quickly and appropriately to situations of political crisis. The "intentona" further showed that neither the EU nor the US - which was considered to be sympathetic toward the coup leaders and even suspected to be their sponsor - did what Latin American countries did (within the OAS and outside): to straightforwardly condemn the interruption of the democratic process. 589 590 591 592 593

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003/January 2004. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

Béatrice Auzouy/Carlos Quenan, 'Le déclin économique du Venezuela se poursuit'. In: Problèmes économiques, 2.830, le 5 novembre 2003, pp. 28-32. See Ignacio Ramonet, 'Un crime parfait'. In: Le Monde diplomatique, Paris, le 3 juin 2002. 595 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

594

119

However, as mentioned before, there was no clear-cut unity on this topic among Latin Americans either. A Commission official offers three possible scenarios to explain the Presidency's behaviour: either the EU (and in particular the Presidency) was tricked, not sufficiently informed or simply naive 596 (though the first and third option somewhat seem to be mutually dependent). Another EU representative holds that the Presidency reacted too fast. 597 Furthermore, it sounds like a conspiracy theory to say that Spain actively supported the undemocratic ouster o f the Chavez presidency in order to please Washington. It would be too awkward and risky for Spain's reputation in both Europe and Latin America to indirectly support a Putsch in Venezuela. Could it actually have been that the Spaniards willingly accepted an undemocratic change of government to strengthen their alliance with the US and pursue its somewhat unorthodox Latin America policy? This is an intriguing question, as it deals with some o f the essentials o f Spanish and European foreign policy: credibility and belief in democratic procedures. However, the close ties between the US and Spain under José Maria Aznar need to be taken into consideration. At the time of the coup, the US Secretary o f State was in Madrid (9-11 April, 2002) and on 3 May, 2002 Prime Minister Aznar met with US president George W. Bush in Washington. Even if the European Union didn't know that Chavez did not voluntarily step back from power, US intelligence services must have. Due to previous contacts to the Venezuelan opposition and the coup leaders, the CIA was likely aware o f what was really going on in Caracas. 598 Apparently, US officials even tried to persuade Chavez's opponents shortly before 11 April not to stage a coup. 599 Accordingly, the US may have convinced the Spaniards to support Chavez's "resignation" by having both countries' ambassadors pay a visit to the interim president. Again, could the Aznar government have been that naive, or was it dazzled by the opportunity o f becoming Washington's biggest ally in Europe besides the Britons? Much remains to be investigated in this regard. To put forth the declaration on Venezuela without cross-checking information on the situation was certainly a premature, and thus, failed action o f the Presidency. There seemed to be no prepared policy, however. In Brussels, there was no knowledge of what was happening in Venezuela. It was not necessarily a Spanish plot against the Venezuelan president, but it served Chavez to use this diplomatic failure o f the Spanish Presidency for his intentions. This is confirmed by a Commission official, as it is noticeable that while there was opposition to

596

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

597

598

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. El Nuevo Herald,

Miami, 25 de noviembre de 2004. See The Economist,

599 2002.

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

120

London, 25 April

the US, Venezuela never had any objections against the participation of Portugal and Spain in the Group of Friends. 600 According to one interviewee, Spain was even poised to offer Chavez a haven for exile. 601 In the end, there remain many unknown variables that may have somehow been the real determinants of the incident. Below is my analysis. If the US intelligence community was aware of the possibility that a coup could be staged in Venezuela, it was naive to accept Chavez's resignation immediately and without deeper investigation. Knowing Chavez's passionate vision for the country's future, to believe an unproved message of his voluntary withdrawal seems even more unlikely. Thus, I suppose, the US administration knew the facts, but what about Spain? Although much remains to be investigated, I do not think that Spain deliberately supported the ouster of an elected head of government, even though it obviously disliked Hugo Chavez's administration. What were the effects of CFSP in this case? From the perspective of CFSP, the reaction of the EU to the Venezuelan coup was certainly all but praiseworthy. Interestingly, the Spanish presidency tried to deal with an imminent crisis as quickly as possible and seemed eager to act, neglecting the customary consultations with the other member states. This type of action might be acceptable if the information on which such a declaration is based is crosschecked and proven. The case demonstrated the limits of fastreacting policy declarations within the consultation process. According to EU officials, this weak point shall be partly eradicated if a European foreign minister vested with far-reaching authority actually takes office. According to one Commission official, the CFSP in response to the coup attempt was just another demonstration of the necessity of coordinating policies in the EU. 602 An EU official argues that it is not so much a question of consultation and information but more a political problem. 603 The difficulties of coordinating CFSP are exposed in this case, although it does not represent a typical incident. However, it is symptomatic that the member states were struggling with a demarche/declaration weeks after the situation had already changed fundamentally. A major problem of CFSP declarations in general and of the one on Venezuela in particular is that each word is potentially controversial and its interpretations the object of diplomatic battles. For this reason, the adoption and publication of EU declarations occurs only after considerable delay. 604 600

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

601

Interviews, Brussels, November 2004.

602

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

603

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

604

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

Reportedly, the failure of CFSP in this case was also attributed to the Spanish government's paternalistic foreign policy under Aznar, which is said to have considered Latin America its inherited region of influence and authority, and the need for consultation a rather unpractical and time-consuming exercise. 605 Another aspect was the support of the EU for civil society. It is difficult to differentiate between those groups and movements that actually strive for more public participation, and those seeking to exploit the media for their own ends or to usurp power by undemocratic means. The Venezuelan opposition claimed to be representative of civil society. Since the coup the EU seems to be more aware of this peculiar problem in Venezuela's polarised society. 606 In sum, this case is not an encouraging example of a forceful and rapid response from the EU's common foreign policy apparatus.

605

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

606

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

122

7. The US role in the EU's foreign relations with Latin America This chapter will outline the role of the United States in the relations between the EU and Latin America. First of all, a brief description of the inter-American and EU-US relations provides an overview. This chapter is based primarily on information gathered from interviews and panels with national and EU officials, experts, and academics in Brussels and Washington D.C. In the end, five scenarios of interaction between the US, the EU and Latin America are presented.

7.1. The relations between the United States and Latin America The relations between the US and Latin America have long been conflictive. Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 607 , the US has been accused of paternalism and imperialism in Latin America. Several military, economic, counterinsurgency and intelligence interventions by the US in Latin American countries, as well as Washington's backing of dubious regimes with poor human rights records, has certainly not improved the image of the northern giant in the region. 608 The creation of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1948 fostered interAmerican relations but was quickly reduced to an instrument of the Cold War. Even after the end of the East-West conflict, the OAS, headquartered in Washington D.C., could hardly overcome the dominance of the US. Today, the image of the US in Latin America is shaped by its rigid stance against Fidel Castro's regime, the militarization of the Colombian conflict, drugtrafficking (particularly in the Andean region) and opposition to Hugo Chavez's populist Bolivarian project in Venezuela. Some observers critically state that the United States' Cuba policy has long been the main focus of its Latin American policies: "The problem of the US Latin America policy is that the focus on Cuba demonstrates a loss of perspective for the region. It is almost a fetish (obsession). Cuba dominates the US foreign policy towards Latin America, which is seen by many as a conceptual mistake." 609 However, since the 1990s, ever-closer trade relations - especially with Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - helped improve 607

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 declared the Western Hemisphere, including the newly independent Latin American countries, as an area not open to European colonisation. The doctrine has largely been referred to as the first document of US imperialism in the hemisphere, although there are serious doubts about this view.

608

A s mentioned in chapter 3, it was the Central America policy of the US administration under President Ronald Reagan, which led to the Latin American-European rapprochement.

609

lnterviews, Brussels, December 2003; Washington D C., May 2004.

123

the perception of the US. Although "anti-Yankee" resentments still persist in parts of the population, this is less prevalent among political and business elites who are, increasingly, educated at US colleges. 610 Since the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) has been the ambitious goal, intended to lead to a free trade zone from South America to Alaska until 2005. However, more recent developments seem to suggest an FTAA "light" instead, consisting of several bilateral agreements. Today, Hispanic immigration to the US is changing both the US view on the region as well as Latin America's perceptions of its northern neighbour. 611 Hispanic votes (particularly Mexican) will also influence US policy. There has hardly been a coherent position on Latin American issues among Hispanics in the US up to this point. 612 Nevertheless, according to experts of a major Washington think tank, Latin American influence in the US will change significantly. 6 ' 3 When the Hispanic population of the United States reaches 20 percent, predicts a Spanish diplomat, US-Latin American relations will also change. 614 After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, the US psyche changed. In the aftermath of the attacks, some Latin America analysts initially hoped that Latin America's position would be strengthened since no terrorist threat came from the continent. However, this was a mistake: Now Latin America is not on the new international agenda on security at all - "for good and for bad". 615 Latin Americans have felt ignored after Bush had announced the deepening of US-Latin American (and particularly US-Mexican) affairs before US policy shifted to the fight against international terrorism. Through the security issue, the US now seeks to re-strengthen ties with Latin America, as well as through a renewal of the security component of the OAS (Treaty of Military Assistance, 1947). Reportedly, the US National Security Council wants the interna-

6

'"Nevertheless, Drekonja-Kornat holds that the political and economic elites are rather europhile than looking towards the US. Drekonja-Kornat, 'Der Wandel des lateinamerikanischen Verständnisses von Außenpolitik', p. 16.

6

" After the terrorist attacks o f September 2001, many Central American immigrants in Washington decorated their cars and homes with US flags and patriotic symbols. This "overcompensation" by Latin American immigrants - sometimes seeming awkward to "enlightened" Europeans - might stem from the need to identify with the host country in order to be accepted as citizens.

6l2

61

S e e Rodolfo O. de la Garza/Harry P. Pachón (eds.), Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: presenting the "Homeland"? Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford 2000.

Re-

i n t e r v i e w s , Washington D C., May 2004.

6l4

lnterviews, Washington D C., May 2004. See Rodolfo O. de la Garza/Louis de Sipio, Muted Voices: Latinos and the 2000 Election. Lanham 2004; Robert Suro, 'Los latinos de Estados Unidos y la elección de 2004'. In: Foreign Affairs en Español 4 (4), 2004, pp. 1526; Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Hispanic Challenge'. In: Foreign Policy, 2004 (www.foreignpolicy.com).

6l5

Manuel Marín, 'América Latina en la nueva agenda internacional'. In: Política septiembre 2002, pp. 87, 93, 94.

124

Exterior,

tional community and the EU to be involved in Latin America - but, one must ask, to what extent? 616

The US State Department: The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is now the second largest in the State Department. It used to be the largest, but now the European Office is, due to the creation of many new states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 617 According to interviews, it is difficult to balance the reality with strategic thinking: Is there a vision or at least a coherent long-term strategy for Latin America in US foreign policy, which goes beyond the fading FTAA project? In view of all the day-to-day work and challenges to be done and dealt with, it seems hard to develop this kind of strategic concept. 618 The US Department of State generally focuses on specific issues or countries rather than on EU-Latin American relations. In the US foreign service, as in the EU, there is no official explicitly (let alone exclusively) in charge of EU-Latin American relations, neither in Washington nor in Brussels. Reportedly, this is because US policy towards Latin America has nothing to do with the EU. 619 There is no inter-American perspective on transatlantic relations or vice versa. At the most there is observation of trade issues, and of the ways in which the development of the FTAA and negotiations with Mercosur mutually influence each other. 620 The installation of a desk officer for European-Latin American relations constitutes a budget problem as well; the Department of State would have "a hard time to justify a new position". 621

7.2. The political relations between the E U and the U S Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world/' 22

The US and the EU have a common interest in the principles of democratic government, human rights, market economics, and security. As a result, both seek consistent strategies to advance peace and stability in order to construct conditions for economic development in the world and to endorse the stability of in-

6l6

Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004. interviews, Brussels, November 2003; Santiago de Chile, March 2004; Washington D C., May 2004. 61 interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004. 61

619

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003; Washington D C., May 2004. 620

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

621

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004. A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 13.

622

125

ternational trade and the financial and monetary systems, as well as the economic integration of countries in transition and developing countries. The United States has maintained diplomatic relations with the European Union and its predecessors since 1953, when the first US Observers to the European Defence Community and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were nominated. In the post-war period, the United States promoted European integration not only as an attempt to overcome nationalist frictions, but also in order to establish reliable European partners in the emerging East-West confrontation. Though the European Community and later the EU became serious competitors to the US in trade, it became less of a political opponent. Since the Bush administration launched its fight against international terrorism as a reaction to the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001, this has changed, the most visible climax occurring before and during the Iraq war in 2003. Some of the disagreements on foreign policy matters between the EU and the US include the role of the United Nations, the Kyoto Protocol, the death penalty, the imprisonment of alleged Al-Qaeda and Taliban members in Guantanamo Bay, and the function of the International Criminal Court. Instinctively, the US is suspicious of the EU, as the idea of European integration contains a nucleus of political Utopia. 623 US Americans may perceive the EU to be a threat, as they are generally distrustful of "ideological Utopias", and they may view the EU as a movement directed against the United States. 624 Furthermore, there is scepticism about a European project based on "peace and happiness" and "dialogue, dialogue, dialogue", as a US official points out. Europeans are said to tend to talk or negotiate until the opposite side gives up exhausted. 625 In general, the US is said to always oppose anything contradicting its interests until it deems it unavoidable. 626 Until recently, as far as the US was concerned, there was no EU. For the Pentagon and the Department of State, it is still awkward to deal with "those Europeans". The US Secretary of State and Javier Solana speak constantly on the phone, but the former also speaks regularly with the British, German, French, Italian and Spanish foreign ministers. 627 On the other hand, the US Trade Department is already acquainted with dealing with the EU

623

A t reading the Federal Papers it becomes clear that the American Revolution was conservative, putting the individual in the centre. In contrast, the Treaty o f a Constitution for Europe follows the tradition of the French Revolution, claiming a "new society". Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

624

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

625

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

626

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

627

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

126

- thanks to the clear authority of the European Commission as actual executive in first pillar matters. 628 One article identifies a "quint" that actually determines the general orientation of the EU, including the US. 629 Thus, it should be asked whether the US also functions as an unofficial decision-maker for the EU. The US has reportedly always been somewhat annoyed not being a full member of the EU with all the accompanying rights.630 The EU member states obviously hold different positions towards the US. According to the report "Transatlantic Trends", all political parties in the US support stronger EU leadership in international politics, while Democrats and Independents are more sympathetic than Republicans to the idea of the EU taking a stronger international role, even if it diverges from US positions. 63 ' The US Americans have tried to play a "divide and rule" game by going to the European capitals and trying to influence national positions on various topics, not only foreign policy issues. If the US gets some capitals on its side, it is difficult to reach a consensus in the Council.632 The US embassies in EU capitals are used to influence the positions of the member states. Weak points are detected and advantages sought. The expanded EU of 25 countries makes it more difficult for the US in this regard. Lobbying is normal, but increasingly the US needs a lot of influence at many different levels to influence the EU.633 Nonetheless, with regard to political questions, the US has often been successful with an active or passive divide et impera approach towards Europe.634 From the point of view of the US, it is still unclear whether a common foreign policy of the EU would be desirable. If CFSP becomes a strong instrument and makes the EU more independent, the US and the EU will stay friends and allies, but how tempestuous might this friendship become? A trend poll suggests that Europeans and US citizens are drifting further apart in political views.635 7.2.1. Is there a CFSP toward the US? Officials of the EU hold that there is no set strategy towards the US; policy is "driven by events". Recent highlights were the September 11 attacks, the war in 628

lnterviews, Brussels, January 2004.

629

Catherine Gegout, 'The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US

Directoire

at the Heart of the European Union's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process'. In: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, 2, June 2002, pp. 331-344. 630

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

63

' Transatlantic

Trends 2004. A Project o f the German Marshall Fund o f the United States

and the Compagnia di Sao Paolo with Additional Support from the Luso-American Foundation, Fundación B B V A , and the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO). 632

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

633

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

634

lnterviews, Brussels, December 2003.

635

S e e Transatlantic

Trends

2004.

127

Afghanistan, the condition in the Balkans, and the invasion and the post-war situation in Iraq. Accordingly, the EU's foreign policy approach is rather motivated by the "environment". The EU should first decide on the policy and then determine events, but in the US case it is different. While it is difficult to speak of a strategy of the EU towards the US, it is possible to see strategies of the EU and US towards third countries. In this sense, from the EU perspective there is no need to formulate a strategy towards the US. 636 A US diplomat agrees that there is no active CFSP towards the United States. 637 In addition, the 2003 Security Strategy of the EU stresses transatlantic partnership to make clear that the paper is not aimed against the United States. From the transatlantic view, there is no strategic doctrine toward the US and no foreign policy doctrine exists at all. 638 In my view, it is fair to say that there is a tentative CFSP, but no CFSP towards the United States, because the EU simply cannot afford to establish rigid goals or strategies based on inflexible provisions towards the world's remaining superpower. Unlike Russia and Canada, with which the EU also maintains consultation meetings where views on third countries are discussed, the United States is simultaneously an incomparably powerful and indispensable political partner and trade rival, a potential ally, and an opponent in some international forums. This prevents the establishment of common positions or even a common strategy toward the US, since despite its ambition to be an international actor, the EU does not possess the political power to confront the US on all political (and economic) fronts. 7.2.2. The New Transatlantic Dialogue On 3 December 1995 at the EU-US Summit in Madrid, European Commission President Santer, Spanish Prime Minister González, as President of the European Council, and then-US President Clinton signed the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), which has since provided a new framework for transatlantic relations, advancing it from consultation to joint actions in four major fields: a) to promote peace and stability, democracy and development around the world; b) to respond to global challenges; c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; d) to build bridges across the Atlantic.

636

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

637

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

638

Although for some the Security Strategy Paper (2003) already constitutes a sort of foreign policy doctrine. Interviews, Brussels, November-December 2003.

128

As global powers, the EU and the US have a responsibility to collaborate to provide leadership internationally. This is true for foreign affairs and development but also for the more traditional area of trade. Global issues such as international organised crime and the illegal drug trade are also topics for transatlantic cooperation. There are different levels of US-EU meetings: the NTA dialogue (highest level), which takes place once a year between Presidents (before the Bush administration took office, there were two yearly gatherings), and the Minister's level, meeting twice a year. There are also Senior Officials, and NTA Task Force .•

619

meetings. Discussions with the US Americans become very detailed, in large part due to the information gathered by US intelligence agencies, which benefits the Europeans indirectly. 640 The language used is sometimes surprisingly open. People know one another and one another's positions. In the State Department, officials comment that the exchange with their EU colleagues takes place in a relaxed manner with a surprising convergence of views among Europeans and US Americans. 641 Nevertheless, the declarations of the US are said to be rather undiplomatic and blunt compared with the EU style, determined by manifold national voices. According to interviews, US representatives tend to carry out a black-and-white policy. 642 Since US and European representatives do not necessarily hold similar positions, some consider the exchange of assessments and planned actions as rather marginal. Others deem it quite useful as common positions can be strengthened, and in cases of diverging opinions, damage can be reduced. The results of these consultations are distributed via Coreu. 643 For more than seven years, there have been consultations between the EU and the United States on Latin America on a frequent basis. 644 US and EU officials compare notes on Latin America. This exchange of information has become increasingly more concrete and more operational. 645 The NTA process is the same

639

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 640 Through US intelligence channels presented in these meetings, the EU learns much about 641 the situation in Colombia or Venezuela, for instance. Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004. 642 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 643 Interviews, Brussels, November 2003; Interviews, Berlin, February 2004. 644 NOW there are also exchanges on Latin America with Canada and Russia. The EU leaders usually meet with their Canadian and US counterparts twice yearly, and with the Russians once. Nevertheless, the meetings with Canada on Latin America are seen as rather useless. With Russia it had been promising at first, but apparently this has changed. During the Argentine crisis in 2002, Russia expected too much from the EU when it proposed common actions towards Argentina and the International Monetary Fund. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 645 Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

129

for Latin America as for other regions. The major countries of concern are Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina. 646 7.2.3. The US Mission in Brussels The US Mission to the European Community was established in 1961. Today, the Mission is a big complex of several buildings. At present, it needs to be protected by barriers and police tanks due to the immanent threat of a terrorist attack. The US Mission is less structured than the corresponding department within the Bureau of Europe and Eurasian Affairs in the Department of State. This subdivision in the State Department actually does NTA work: it plans and carries out all NTA meetings at all levels. The Mission must represent the US to the EU in general and thus handles all the different topics and regions. 647 It communicates with almost every unit of the EU (in the Commission with the DGs Relex, Trade, Development, Enlargement, etc.). US representatives speak with all members of the Council (Solana, Policy Planning Unit, COLAT, other units) and maintain good contacts with the European Parliament. There are extended contacts with all European institutions at all levels. Furthermore, the Mission looks after visitors from Washington. 648 In the event that the US administration in Washington has an important matter to discuss and wants this to be conveyed, the government sends a report to Brussels, which is distributed by the Mission. There are no regular contacts between the US Mission in Brussels and the Commission's delegation in Washington although the respective officials know each other - because it is better to contact the corresponding officials in the US State Department or in the Commission directly. 649 However, the interlocutor for the US Mission, the European Commission's Delegation in Washington, the EU institutions, and the State Department always depends on the issue. If the Delegation in the US, for instance, communicates with the State Department, the US Mission in Brussels is also informed. 650 There is one political advisor at the US Mission in charge of the European Parliament, OSCE, UN, and Latin America. If he receives relevant information on the EU position concerning a Latin American issue, possibly through an informal conversation with EU officials or a member of the EP, a report is prepared and sent to both the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs as well as to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. If there is interest in Washington in following up on the issue, the Mission in Brussels might be instructed to set up 646

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

647

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 648

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

649

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003; Washington D C., May 2004.

650

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

130

further contacts or even to prepare a visit by a high-ranking US official to the corresponding EU institutions. 651 7.2.4. The Delegation of the European Commission to the United States and national embassies The Delegation of the European Commission to the US in Washington was established in 1954 in large part due to the endeavours of the former president of the ECSC, Jean Monnet. 652 It was granted full diplomatic privileges and immunities in 1971, represents the Commission in its dealings with the US government for all matters within the EU's purview. 653 The Commission's delegation in Washington D.C., located on M Street since 1995, is bigger than its delegations elsewhere in the world, but then, the European embassies in Washington are generally larger than those in other countries. France and Germany, for instance, have their biggest embassies in Washington as well. It is difficult to say whether the Delegation to the United States is more important than others. Perhaps a delegation of the Commission in Africa with a lot of impact regarding development aid has more local power or influence. 654 As mentioned earlier, observers expect the Commission's Delegation to the United States to become the first actual EU Delegation, but in Washington there are doubts that this will happen before 2008/2009. 655 In addition to having an official in charge of Latin America at the delegation, there is another trade expert who covers the FTAA process. For the desk officer on Latin America, the State Department is the main interlocutor (from the Western Hemisphere Bureau top to the desk officers), but also the OAS and recently, the National Security Council, are reference institutions. 656 The European ambassadors in the US are the stars of European diplomacy; they won't be told what to do by Coreper. 657 Once a month, like in other capitals, there is a meeting of all European delegates. The country holding the Presidency puts forward the programme of these gatherings. The political counsellors of the embassies gather several times a month; under the Irish Presidency they did so at least twice every four weeks. Although there are regular reunions, these meetings are not formal. If sensitive topics come up (such as the war in Iraq), there are smaller or bilateral meetings instead. However, small meetings are the 651

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

652

In 1964, another delegation of the Commission, as observer to the UN, was established in N e w York.

653

http://www.eurunion.org/delegati/DCDelHistory.htm, 20 December 2004.

654

lnterviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

655

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

656

In mid-2004, the NSC and the Delegation apparently discussed the effect o f the indigenous uprisings in Latin America on democracies in the region. Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004. 657 lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

131

norm in Washington as more than 150 embassies compete with each other for the favour of the US administration. 658 Furthermore, all ambassadors meet each other once in a while in Washington. There are meetings, but these are not formalised. Even after the Association Agreement is finally signed, the Mercosur Member States and the European embassies have no intention to formalise these (occasional) meetings. 659 The officials in the delegation dealing with Latin American topics are connected with the DG Relex G, to a certain extent also with Relex C . l . 7.2.5. The function of DG Relex C. 1 The European Commission deals with the United States through the DG Relex C.l 6 6 0 (USA, Canada). Between 1986 and 1990, reportedly there were bad relations between the units responsible for Latin America and the United States. 661 Now an energetic German, Gunnar Wiegand, heads the DG Relex C. Wiegand worked for years at the Institute for Latin American-European relations (IRELA) in Madrid, which seems to guarantee a better understanding of the region in the unit C.l. The DG Relex C.l (USA/Canada) also has contacts with the DG Relex G for Latin America regarding the coordination of policies towards particular countries in the region, Colombia for instance, or inter-American (mainly US-Latin American) affairs, particularly regarding the FTAA process. In general, the DG Relex tries to pursue an integrated approach. Reportedly, within Relex C.l there is no transatlantic perspective on Latin America. The DG Relex C.l relays its perspective to the DG Relex G but it does not determine the policy of the Commission towards the US or towards Latin America. It has the role of an observer and advisor and helps to reach consensus on certain issues. 662 A desk officer of the DG Relex C.l prepares the US-EU consultation meetings, which deal with Latin America, in cooperation with the Horizontal Unit of DG Relex G. Each time there is an issue involving the US, the DG Relex C.l and G get together. As the DG Relex C.l covers all US-EU issues, this unit does not possess expert knowledge on all issues. The Colombian desk officer of the DG Relex G, for instance, is better informed on US policy in that country than 658

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

659

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004. 660

Relex C is for industrialised countries and has 16 employees. 66l T h e US unit was said to deal exclusively with economic and trade issues, without any knowledge of Latin America. According to a former EU official, in the EC there was a sense of devoted respect towards the US. Many Germans who worked in that section were seemingly dazzled by its power. These officials apparently did everything possible to avoid problems between Europe and the United States. This servile attitude has changed in recent years. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 662 lnterviews, Brussels, October 2003.

132

the people of DG Relex C.l 6 6 3 , which requires much cooperation and coordination of information. The DG Relex C.l, which consults the member states but makes decisions internally, has a sort of horizontal function, as it covers all issues related to US foreign affairs. 664 These intra-Commission meetings reach common positions on important topics. The Presidency and the Council find agreement with the Commission, then a proposal goes to the US. 665 Nevertheless, there is no desk officer specifically in charge of inter-American relations and their effect on the European Union's approach towards Latin America or the individual countries in the region. Instead, the inter-American perspective is developed by the Commission's delegation in Washington. 666 Seemingly, there is inadequate observation of the inter-American relations beyond the FTAA process, both in DG Relex C and in DG Relex G - reportedly due to the understaffing of these units. 667 7.2.6. The positions of the EU and the US on Latin America The US and the EU have, for the most part, shared points of view, goals and similar strategies where third countries are concerned. But, as a US official points out, because they are so close, it can be tricky. 668 Furthermore, there are obviously different foreign policy approaches; while the US is more pragmatic, practical and able to act quickly, the EU, as a US diplomat mockingly puts it, stresses cooperation and the aforementioned tendency to worship a sort of "dialoguism". 669 Carranza points out that both the EU and the US are interested in regional stability and democratic consolidation in Latin America, although their reasons are different: The European Union wants to project its values as a "civilian power" and has a noncoercive approach to the region. The United States, despite the revival of the "Western Hemisphere Idea" after the 1994 Miami summit, is not actively interested in the region. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States has become more securityfixated than after the Quebec summit, when President Bush proclaimed achieving an FTAA in 2005 as an absolute U.S. priority. Whether the European Union will have the political courage to take advantage of the difference between the "US approach" and the "EU approach" is an open question/' 70

663

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

664 665

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003; Washington D C., May 2004.

666

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. 667

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

668

A diplomat compares it with the keys o f a piano: so close together, but if played together, a dissonance is the outcome. Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

669

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

670

Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership?', pp. 13, 14.

133

Another difference is that the EU, as a multilateral organisation, wants to act multilaterally at the international level as well, on principle. In contrast, the US insists that its relations with Brazil, for instance, be bilateral. This is consciously not the EU approach. Another example of the more pragmatic US approach is the way it handles the weak Andean Community: since it does not work efficiently, the US turns to Peru or Colombia individually (bilaterally). The EU, in contrast, maintains the bi-regional dialogue as a matter of principle, because it seeks to strengthen the integration of the Andean community (though there are many doubts in the EU about it, as there are in the Andean Community itself). The EU even seemed to be shocked when Peru (officially) and Colombia (rather confidentially) asked for bilateral FTAs, though the Andean Community was already considered defunct. 671 However, as State Department officials point out, although the EU thinks in block categories in an idealistic attempt to strengthen Latin American integration, they also become pragmatic if it doesn't work. 672 The main differences between the EU and the US are their policies on Cuba 673 and Colombia. In Colombia, the EU provides development aid in drug-cultivating areas, while the US has an active, military-based approach dominated by force, and fumigates in areas of coca plantations, which are close to regions that receive EU support. 674 To prevent negative effects, an intensive dialogue is necessary - in Brussels, in Washington and on-the-spot in Bogotá. However, the Group of Friends tends to exclude CFSP and Commission's role. 675 The US is annoyed by the EU's actions in Colombia. 676 In sum, there are similarities between the EU and US analyses of problems in Latin America, even if the focal points for measures are sometimes different. Although there are differences in the two entities' approaches to Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia and Cuba, by and large the EU and the US tend to agree on Latin America. 677

7.3. Perceptions of the three regions Here, some mutual perceptions shall be outlined in order to provide an overview for potential degrees of cooperation between two or all three regions. The views presented here mostly come from experts on the three regions.

671 67

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. "lnterviews, Washington D.C., May 2004.

673

See Gratius, Kuba unter Castro.

674

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. 675

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

676

lnterviews, Washington D.C., May 2004.

677

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

134

7.3.1. US American perceptions of the EU as a political player At the political level, the US is quite well informed about the EU, as the State Department has its own European Affairs section. At the director level, the US officials frequently contact the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, the desk officers less so. Higher-level US officials know the EU structure and its proceedings. Nevertheless, among members of Congress, there is a lack of knowledge on the workings and procedures of the EU, and the delegation to the US in particular. The US is used to dealing with nation-states rather than with the hybrid EU. 678 Accordingly, the EU as political actor is ignored by US government officials, nor is there much interest in the EU among US citizens. Besides some East Coast cities (Boston, New York City and Washington D.C.), there is almost no knowledge of the EU in the United States. The tendency of the US government to turn to the embassies of France, Germany or Great Britain rather than the EU is traditional and does not necessarily mean that the EU is intentionally bypassed. However, in the think tanks located in the capital, there is an increasing interest in the EU. 679 Some think tanks do an excellent work on the EU; furthermore there are EU Centres across the US to provide information on the Union's functioning and policies. Moreover, Georgetown, Berkeley, and Harvard universities have excellent departments of German and European Studies, initially sponsored by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and have achieved an outstanding reputation beyond their academic research. Regarding not only trade and economic matters but also political stabilisation and crisis management, the EU is by all means appreciated as important player; that is where the Union has political weight. The US administration harbours great worries that CFSP could become competitive with NATO. Europeans are routinely criticised by the US for their low military budgets, but simultaneously Washington fears a "European block" within NATO. In this regard, the US government seems to have an "allergic" reaction to everything that looks like emancipation from the US. Correspondingly, the United States has numerous doubts about the CFSP of the EU. It is important for the US to maintain institutional and political-administrative access to the European states via NATO. Regarding the European Security and Defence Policy, one national diplomat recommends a division of labour: the EU takes care of Africa, while the US observes the situation in Latin America. 680

678

Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004.

679

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004. 680

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

135

7.3.2. The US view on EU-Latin American relations The US doesn't take EU involvement in Latin America very serious

681

A renowned observer of inter-American relations illustratively remarks that it is quite possible to write a book on US-Latin American affairs without mentioning Europe. However, it is absolutely impossible to prepare a study on EuropeanLatin American relations without referring to the US role. 682 This expert unequivocally holds: "The EU is not becoming a regional power in Latin America as the US." 683 Furthermore, while the EU and CFSP increasingly gain attention in US think tanks and at US colleges, it is striking that in academic and political discussions on Latin America, the issue of a EU foreign policy approach never comes up, except on trade issues and in particular moments of crisis. Especially these days, there seem to be more policies from the EU member states than from the EU as such. 684 As another political analyst clarifies, the US is much more influential in Latin America than the EU (migration, border issues etc.). The political influence of the US in Latin America is overwhelming, also because the US has such a decisive role in the international finance institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the IMF. 685 The US looks at European-Latin American relations, but probably regards these rather as a "playground". 686 The question US representatives ask is whether the mood in Latin America might be used to set the US and the EU against each other. 687 EU-Latin American summits are not followed with great interest in the US. These gatherings are often seen as occasions for EU politicians to criticise the United States and propagate the message that Latin America is better off walking along with the EU than with the US. This is certainly not appreciated in the United States. 688 However, in trade terms, the European association agreements with Latin America put pressure on the US, as there is a triangular interaction. While a postponement of the FTAA is seen as the most likely development (also due to small Caribbean countries' deficiencies in negotiation manpower), the EU approach is appreciated because it is "more in a partnership". 689

681

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

682

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

683

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

684

lnterviews, Washington D.C., May 2004.

685

lnterviews, Washington D.C., May 2004.

686

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

687

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

688

lnterviews, Brussels, January 2004.

689

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

136

7.3.3. Latin American and European perceptions of the US As Sberro correctly comments, at the meetings between the European Union and Latin America, there is always an "invité de pierre": the United States.690 Likewise, Grabendorff correctly holds that the hegemony and importance of the United States as unilateral actor urges the EU to take into consideration Western Hemispheric perceptions and interests of the US.691 Interestingly, perceptions of the US both separate and unify Europeans and Latin Americans across the Atlantic. While some countries traditionally rely on Washington's goodwill, others categorically or occasionally see the US as an opponent. Both views have led to internal divisions in Latin America and Europe, and sometimes strengthen ties between countries from the two regions. For instance Mexico, Chile, France and Germany held similar positions opposing the Iraq war, while Poland, Great Britain, El Salvador and Colombia sent troops to that country, along with the leading US forces. The US occasionally employs a policy of divide et impera in Latin America and Europe, and many countries, particularly the new EU Member States in Eastern Europe, are actually more confident with Washington than with their new Western European partners regarding foreign and security policies. Eastern European Atlanticism, as well as some Latin American countries' closeness to the US, often stems from political tradition and conviction, not necessarily from opportunism (at least from the ruling elites). There is more flexibility in the EU towards Latin America, whilst in the US, Latin America is part of the day-to-day political life, due to Hispanic migration and geographic proximity. This in some ways pre-defines the US approach towards the region.692 7.3.4. Latin American perceptions of the US and the EU For Brazilian diplomats, the EU is like a hippopotamus and the US is like a tiger: the tiger needs to be fast, pragmatic and adaptive to survive, while the hippopotamus takes his time, is big and slow, but if it turns against the enemy, the latter has no chance. 693 According to a Latin American ambassador in Brussels, the US position on Latin America is clearer than the EU's: Europeans emphasise human rights, po-

690

Sberro, 'Une alliance stratégique entre Europe et Amérique latine', p. 8. In this regard, as well as in positions on international topics, relations between the EU and Latin America are very similar to those between the Union and Canada. Interviews, Brussels, December 2004.

691

Grabendorff, 'La estrategia birregional', p. 107.

692 693

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. Alfredo G. A. Valladâo, Le triangle atlantique. L'émergence de l'Amérique latine dans les relations Europe-Etats-Unis. Institut français de relations internationales. Les notes de l'ifri, 16, Série transatlantique, Paris 1999, p. 28. 137

litical dialogue and trade, but it never seems clear what the concrete policies are. 694 A Latin American ambassador in Washington responds that the EU is more balanced internationally than the US. 695 As another Latin American ambassador remarks, the main difference between the two entities is that the US is powerful, but the EU is more reliable. Furthermore, the EU does not make decisions for exclusively political reasons, unlike the US, with policies such as the Helms-Burton law that seeks to punish foreign companies doing business in Cuba. 696 However, in the perception of Latin Americans, the "politically correct" European Union also strives to impose its values and political convictions, for instance through the clauses which are part of any FTA. This has sometimes been seen as a sort of "diktat", as mentioned earlier 697 , but differs from the US style of issue-related political pressure. Instead, it is the binding commitment to general European convictions (democracy, human rights, fight against terrorism), which are nominally also shared by Latin Americans. Fernández emphasises the impact of US policy on the European approach toward Latin America: La falta de un planteamiento global y coherente de las relaciones con América Latina pone a su vez de manifiesto otra grave carencia de la PESC en relación con dicha zona: una preocupante falta de autonomía y una cierta subordinación a la mayor importancia estratégica de las relaciones de la Unión Europea con los Estados Unidos, lo que se evidencia al comparar la inactividad o timidez de las acciones de la Unión Europea en relación con América Latina en ciertos campos, con los grandes esfuerzos desarrollados para reforzar e intensificar todos los aspectos del "diálogo transatlántico" con los Estados Unidos/'""

7.4. An Analysis of the position of the US for the biregional relations In general, I detect five major currents of interpretations regarding the position of the United States for the Latin American-European relations. While the first three scenarios are analyses of the current situation, the fourth and fifth are visions. I) Strong inter-American relations: The United States and Latin America are very close, not only historically but also due to increasing Hispanic immigration to the US.

694

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

695

Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004. 696

lnterviews, Brussels, January 2004.

697

698lnterviews, Brussels, December 2003.

Fernández Fernández, 'El fortalecimiento de las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y América latina', p. 219.

138

2) US-European work-sharing in Latin America: The European Union and the United States are not rivals in Latin America, but have established an informal division of labour in the region. 3) The Asian alternative: The influence of Asian countries, particularly China, in Latin America, has dramatically increased in recent years, and thus also affects the position of the US and the EU in the region. 4) The likelihood of a European-Latin American counterweight: The EU and Latin America are closely linked and potentially opposed to the US. There are at least two currents within this group; the first wants both regions to cooperate equally as partners at the international level, while the second holds that Latin Americans rather pragmatically use the EU to counterbalance the dominance of the US in their region. 5) The triangle vision: Idealists see a transatlantic triangle as a promising vision for US (and Canadian), Latin American, and European cooperation based on "Western values" such as democracy, human rights and rule of law. This view is also favoured in light of increasing terrorism (a tendency that seems to corroborate Huntington's thesis of Latin America as a subcategory of the "West").

7.4.1. Strong inter-American relations If the question is brought up to whom Latin Americans are closer, a US diplomat says that nowadays it is the US because of geographical proximity and Latino immigration to the United States. 699 In addition, inter-American relations have been institutionalised within the Organisation of American States and beyond. There are other contemporary and geographical ties. Many Latin American elites receive their academic degrees from US universities, which effects the spread of the US mentality. Furthermore, the powerful media industry has brought US culture to Latin America: television and movies are dominated by the US and are very influential. 700 Lastly, the religious factor: according to some polls, the United States is the most religious country among industrialised nations. In contrast, in Europe religiousness is decreasing and European Muslims seem more religious than European Christians. Latin America is strongly Catholic, which fits well with the primarily Christian religious beliefs in the US, even if US Protestants and Latin American Catholics do not share exactly the same traditions. This serves as another link between the US and Latin America, especially in view of the growing secularism in Europe. Consequently, democracy in 699 Interviews, Brüssels, November 2003. 700 S e e Klaus Bodemer, 'Zwischen benign neglect und hegemonic presumption - Die interamerikanischen Beziehungen von Clinton zu Bush'. In: Mathias Albert/Bernhard Moltmann/Bruno Schoch (eds.), Die Entgrenzung der Politik. Internationale Beziehungen und Friedensforschung. Festschrift für Lothar Brock. Frankfurt/New York 2004, pp. 307, 308.

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the U S is understood partly through religious beliefs; in Europe the understanding o f democracy has gradually distanced itself from religion. 7 0 1 Nevertheless, within this current, it is necessary to differentiate between those who idealistically see an equal partnership, particularly with regard to the planned F T A A (in this, the EU plays a marginal role), and those who see a U S hegemony over Latin America or close inter-American relations built on U S paternalism (bilaterally and through the O A S ) in the hemisphere. 7.4.2. U S - E u r o p e a n work-sharing in Latin A m e r i c a Gratius holds the second position and argues that the EU is in charge o f development aid and political dialogue, while the U S serves as the most relevant trade partner and important host to Latin American migrants. Within the region, the U S allows the EU to deal with Mercosur countries and takes care o f the rest o f the region itself. T h e Caribbean, Central America and M e x i c o focus their economic relations on the U S (more than 5 0 % o f their foreign trade, for Mexico even 9 0 % ) . According to Gratius, the wider North American region from Mexico to Colombia has a link with the U S , which has never before been so close. 7 0 2 Likewise, Carranza points out the possible scenario o f a U S - E U "Condominium" to " m a n a g e " Latin American problems such as North Atlantic cooperation to deal with Latin American issues. 7 0 3 Similarly, a European diplomat points out that the positions o f the U S and the EU are not necessarily contradictory in Latin America. 7 0 4 A U S official stresses that the European Union is less involved in Latin America than in other regions because it deems problems in Latin America comparatively small. Furthermore, the role o f the U S in Latin America is certainly a reason for the EU not to engage more in the region - not necessarily because the EU is afraid o f stepping on the toes o f the U S , but because the EU strives for similar objectives in Latin America. As the U S is already pursuing its goals, Europe can concentrate on other regions. 7 0 5 Illustratively, the ambassador o f one large Latin American country complained that the EU was forgetting the region. T h e E U ' s response was that it has other priorities, in particular its enlargement and relations with neighbouring countries. The ambassador replied that Latin Americans had an important neighbour as well. 7 0 6

701

702

Interviews, Brüssels, November 2003; Washington D.C., May 2004.

Gratius, 'Spielt Europa in Lateinamerika noch eine Rolle?'. In: Aus Politik und schichte, 38/39, 15. September 2003, pp. 38-46. 703 Carranza, 'Toward a Strategie partnership?', p. 19. 704 Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004.

705

lnterviews, Brüssels, November 2003.

706

Interviews, Brüssels, January 2004.

140

Zeitge-

7.4.3. The Asian alternative As part of the diversification of its external relations, Latin American countries rely on China, which needs resources that Latin America can provide. Shixue sums up: Latin America is important for China in at least three areas. Politically, China needs Latin America and other developing countries to maintain the momentum of its struggle against imperialism and hegemonic powers. Economically, China considers Latin America to be a source of trade and investment opportunities, and a potential supplier of natural resources. Diplomatically, mainland China considers Latin America to be a place where it needs to contain Taiwan's 'dollar diplomacy'. 707

If China becomes more integrated in the world economy, it is likely that the raw material exporters will be the beneficiaries. Chinese investments in Latin America will result in decreased importance of Europe in the region. 708 In late 2004, China announced investments in some South American countries amounting to US$ 30 billion. Latin America, in return, recognised China as a market economy. 709 Venezuelan president Chavez' three visits to China between 1999 and 2004 underlined the Latin American interest in Chinese investments. The visits were also a measure to gain more independence from the US and the EU. 710 In addition, Brazil strives to advance the "strategic partnership" with Beijing to balance its relationship with both the United States and the EU. Accordingly, a European ambassador in Chile holds: "In the future, Latin America will get more interest from China and Japan than from Europe." 7 " This scenario has loomed for some years, but now seems to reach a new dimension, as trade interests are accompanied by political concerns. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law seem no longer serve as natural ties between Latin America, the US and Europe, as hard geo-strategic and economic goals in a globalised world increasingly gain influence. Nevertheless, Spanish academics consider the Chinese-Latin American rapprochement merely as a temporary phenomenon. 712 In this regard, the so-called Group of 20 (G-20), consisting of China, India, South Africa, Brazil and several other Latin American countries needs to be mentioned as well. In this group, which was responsible for the failure of the W T O trade negotiations in Cancün in September 2003, closer collaboration be707

Jiang Shixue, 'China, Latin America, and the Developing World'. In: Peter H. Smith/K.otaro Horisaka/Shoji Nishijima (eds ), East Asia and Latin America. The Unlikely Alliance. Lanham/Oxford 2003, p. 328.

708

Thomas Pohl, 'Fokus: Perspektiven Lateinamerika-China'. In: Dresdner Bank LateinamePerspektiven 12/2004, pp. 6, 7. The Economist, London, 29 December 2004. 1,0 El Nuevo Herald, Miami, 22 de diciembre de 2004; El Universal, Caracas, 23 de diciembre 2004. 711 Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 712 Interviews, Madrid, May 2005. 709 rika,

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tween developing and newly industrialised countries became very practical and less ideological than in past decades. Observers, however, deem it unlikely that the G20 will become an enduring phenomenon, because in the long run the participating countries have diverging interests and preferences. 7 ' 3 7.4.4. A European-Latin American counterweight A European-Latin American counterweight could reduce the omnipotence of the powerful US that is seen as materialistic and criticised for pursuing a unilateral foreign policy, which contradicts multilateralism and respect for international law. These are exactly the issues that serve as binding link for the European Union and Latin American in world politics, at least rhetorically. For Carranza, the US has two goals in Latin America: 1) to exclude extracontinental rivals from the hemisphere; and 2) to secure and maintain a dominant political and economic presence in the region. 714 Thus, he asks whether Europe can be a counterweight to US hegemony in Latin America. Unilateral US policy caused some EU and Latin American countries to reconsider their foreign policy and to increase the "diplomatic space for a bi-regional association between the European Union and Mercosur." 715 One Latin American ambassador in Brussels endorses the idea of a strengthened biregional relationship and remarks that it would be laudable to build a balance to the US. 716 In this regard, a British diplomat points out that "the EU is not a country and no counterweight to the US" concerning traditional foreign policy. 717 For a Spanish diplomat, it would be a mistake to design a EuropeanLatin American alliance as a counterweight to the United States. 718 Whitehead remarks that despite the somewhat negative Latin American perception of the present EU, a strengthened biregionalism could become more attractive as potential counterweight to the "arrogant presence" of the US, as well as a positive model. However, he deems the possibility of a "counterweight" unlikely in the EU's present condition. 719 Furthermore, Carranza holds: The conventional wisdom in the literature is that historically Latin America has only sought a complementary, pragmatic relationship with Europe, which could serve as a

7l3

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004, Washington D.C., May 2004.

7l4

Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership?', p. 2.

7l5

Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership?', p. 9.

71

i n t e r v i e w s , Brussels, November 2003.

7l7

lnterviews, Brussels, January 2004.

718 Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004. 719 Whitehead, 'Larelación birregional', p. 74.

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"counterweight," rather than as an alternative, to the "special relationship" with the United States. 72 "

Similarly, many Latin American countries are said to use negotiations with the EU to put pressure on the US and thus strengthen their positions in the FTAA process. The Mercosur members, in particular, see the EU as a counterweight to US influence and desire to maintain parallel negotiations with both partners. In this regard, experts in US think tanks believe if the US achieves a free trade agreement with all Latin American countries except the Southern Cone states (in the case that the Mercosur forms an agreement with the EU) this would be very unhealthy for both the US and EU. There should not be such a detrimental division between the US and the EU in Latin America. 721 Nolte remarks that at the summit in Guadalajara it became obvious that Europe and Latin America have more common positions with one another than either have with the US. He further states that Huntington's categorisation of civilisations might be modified: Perhaps Europe and Latin America represent a common civilisation today, while the US (under the Bush administration) abandoned "Western civilisation" by choosing a special way. 722 However, it should be taken into consideration that the moment in which the meeting in Mexico took place, with the absence of the British prime minister and the Italian President, decisively nurtured this impression. Many Latin Americans and Europeans were still uneasy about the US military intervention in Iraq, the subsequent Iraqi prison torture scandal and the general bullying rhetoric of the Bush administration with the likely consequence that steady (and perhaps natural) interests were temporarily neglected - a trend that could be reversed in the near future. However, it is evident that the Bush administration's unilateralism has drawn Europe and Latin America closer together to defend multilateralism and international law 723 , even if there is discord within both regions. 7.4.5. The triangle vision The close links between the US and the EU within the transatlantic dialogue and between the United States and Latin American countries in the inter-American system, as well as the biregional ties between the European Union and Latin America have nurtured debates and speculations on the possibility of an emergence of a transatlantic triangle for decades now. 724 720 721 722

Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership?', p. 11. Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004. Nolte, 'Fortschritte auf dem Weg zu einer strategischen Partnerschaft?', p. 118.

723 724

Carranza, 'Toward a Strategie partnership?', p. 14. See Wolf Grabendorff/Riordan Roett (comps.), Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States: A New Atlantic Triangle? New York 1985; José Bricefio Ruiz, 'Strategic Regionalism and the Remaking of the Triangular Relation Between the USA, the European Union and Latin America'. In: Journal of European Integration 23, 2 (2001), pp. 105-137;

143

This idealistic concept suggests a balanced trilateral relationship based on "Western consciousness" and "the existence o f multiple historic, religious, political, economic, military, and cultural ties linking the three poles o f the triangle." 7 2 5 Such a "New Atlantic Triangle" could be established if the Doha Round on international trade negotiations is concluded successfully, because a resolution o f the seemingly anachronistic "agricultural subsidies would break the stalemate in both the EU-Mercosur and the FTAA market access negotiations." 726 The perception o f shared values and close economic ties between the two partners dominated the agenda o f the 1990s. At the ministerial meeting between the EU and the Rio Group in Noordwijk in 1997, the former German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel proposed the creation o f a Transatlantic Free Trade Area, comprised o f the three major trade blocks (EU, N A F T A and Mercosur) as well as a possible South American Free Trade Area ( S A F T A , combining Mercosur and the Andean Community) in order to strengthen the economic potential o f the three regions: A través del ALCT [Transatlantic Free Trade Area, K.D.], América del Sur podría convertirse en el tercer pilar político de un diálogo trasatlántico más equilibrado, en la medida en que se mueve la vieja línea divisoria entre el Norte y el Sur. Además, semejante alianza podría ayudar a despejar la histórica suspicacia que ha marcado las relaciones interamericanas.727

According to Valladào, Latin America seems to be tempted by this "ménage a trois". 728 For Grabendorff, the reduction o f asymmetry in the triangle relations would benefit the respective regions as well as the international system. 729 Thus, he proposes that the three regions jointly establish a "community o f law" to be used

725

Wolf Grabendorff, 'El Triángulo Atlántico: ¿una versión realista?'. In: Klaus Bodemer et al. (eds.), El Triángulo Atlántico: América Latina, Europa y los Estados Unidos en el sistema internacional cambiante. Sankt Augustin (Germany) 2002, pp. 375-392. All cited in Grabendorff, 'América Latina y la Unión Europea: ¿Una asociación estratégica?'. In: Guadalupe Paz/Riordan Roett (comp), América Latina en un Entorno Global en Proceso de Cambio, Buenos Aires 2003. Taken from the Foro Euro-Latino, Nueva Sociedad, Website Forum Foro Euro-Latino, May 2004, http://www.nuevasoc.org.ve/upload/anexos/foro_195.doc, 5 January 2005, p. II. See Ribeiro Hoffmann, The EU foreign policy towards Latin American Southern Cone States, p. 3, footnote 11.

Joseph W. Reidy, 'Latin America and the Atlantic Triangle'. In: Or bis: A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 8, 1, spring 1964, p. 52. Quoted in Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership?', p. 15. 726 Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership?', p. 19. 7"'7 "" Grabendorff, 'América Latina y la Unión Europea', p. 11. See Consenso de Guayaquil sobre Integración, Seguridad e Infraestructura para el Desarrollo. Segunda Reunión de los Presidentes de América del Sur, Guayaquil, Ecuador, 26-27 de julio de 2002. See 728 www.summit-americas.org. Valladao, Le triangle atlantique, p. 28. 729 Grabendorff, 'El Triángulo Atlántico', p. 377.

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for the globalisation of legal concepts, particularly in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.730 In addition, such a triangle should restructure the international economic order and strengthen the capacity of integration (obviously a problem, as the US tends to act bilaterally).731

7.5. Prospects Closer cooperation between the Americas and Europe could be the motor of globalisation.732 The European Union should strengthen its partnership with Latin America and further cooperate with the US in the region where possible. The exchange of information with the US on Latin American topics has already developed through the EU-US summits as well as informal networks. In 2004 and 2005 the think tank Inter-American Dialogue and the Spanish embassy in Washington D.C. organised meetings with European sub-secretaries of state in charge of Latin American affairs, other officials from the US, Japan and Canada, and many other political figures (representatives of the international finance institutions, business leaders and analysts from Europe, the United States and Latin America, including former presidents). National officials discussed positions on Latin America mainly from the European and US perspective and planned future meetings. Participating officials and experts concurred that the United States and European governments should work together more regarding the development and execution of policies toward Latin America.733 Considerable differences were identified among European national positions, occasionally as significant as the differences between the US and Europe as a whole. This triggered the call for more collaboration, particularly on specific issues such as the fight against drugs or social cohesion.734 This type of transatlantic dialogue on Latin America policy is essential and might lead to a more pragmatic US-European cooperation with the participation of Latin America to address chronic problems such as drugs, social inequality, the fight against delinquency within the rule of law, combating poverty etc. In sum, the United States will likely establish tighter and more complex relations with Latin America than Europe will - in no small part due to geographic proximity and Hispanic migration in the US. But closer ties with the US could also encourage Latin America to seek a stronger relationship with the Europeans 730

"Sin el establecimiento de una comunidad de derecho es poco probable que la comunidad de valores tenga oportunidades de ser implementada en la forma que todos los gobiernos de los paises del Triángulo Atlántico dicen que debería efectuarse." Grabendorff, 'El Triángulo Atlántico', p. 379.

731

Grabendorff, 'El Triángulo Atlántico', pp. 379, 380.

732

Valladâo, Le triangle atlantique, p. 45. 733

734lnter-American

Dialogue, Dialogue/Diálogo, Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004.

Vol. 13, 1, May 2005, p. 5. 145

- not as a counterweight, but as a balance. The US and the EU strive for similar goals in Latin America, although the approaches and methods may differ. There seems to be a work-sharing between the US and the EU at present, which appears to be overcome by both the FTAA project and the idea of a biregional FTA between Latin America and the European Union. In the end, both might lead to a triangle agreement, in accordance with the Doha round and the UN system. In my view, a transatlantic free trade area (US-EU) - a proposal that repeatedly comes up - would send the wrong message to the WTO talks. In contrast, biregional trade agreements between the US and Latin America, and between Latin American and the EU could possibly lead to an open transatlantic triangle, which might serve as an impulse not only for international trade negotiations but also for increased political multilateralism, if the FTA is accompanied by strengthened political cooperation.

146

8. The political relations between Europe and Latin America: A strategic partnership? Acaba de nacer la relación birregionai, es muy en pañales aún. 735 A Latin American Ambassador

in Brussels, January

2004

This chapter reviews the political relations between Latin America and the European Union at the biregional level. Mutual perceptions will identify whether the goal of a strategic partnership has actually been reached, or if it is even realistic at all as a project for the future. The summits between Latin American and EU countries since 1999 are important in this regard, as the Rio summit first formulated the ambitious goal of reaching a "strategic partnership" between the two regions. In order to follow up on the biregional achievements since 1999, the political items of the eleven priorities set up in Tuusula, shortly after the momentous Rio Summit, shall serve as indicator. These points consist of 1) cooperation in international forums, 2) protection of human rights, 3) promotion of the role of women, 4) cooperation with respect to the environment and natural disasters, 5) combating drugs and illicit arms traffic, 6) promotion of a stable and dynamic global economic and financial system, 7) encouragement of business forums, 8) cooperation in the fields of education, university studies, research and new technologies, 9) protection of cultural heritage, 10) establishment of a joint initiative on the information society, and 11) support for research, postgraduate studies and training in the field of integration processes. Priorities 1, 2, 3, and 5 are of interest with regard to political relations, although all affect the biregional atmosphere. Besides démocratisation and increasing respect for the rule of law, Latin American countries unequivocally supported the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and have incorporated the main international human rights treaties into their domestic laws. This means more cooperation potential with the EU. 736 In general, Latin America has become a particularly reliable partner for

735

lnterviews, Brussels, January 2004.

736

However, some Latin American countries have divergent opinions, as seen in the voting behaviour in Geneva (UN Human Rights Commission) and at the UN General Assembly. Some vote with the Europeans, others (occasionally depending on the short-term/domestic interests of the present government) stress the principle of non-intervention and thus im-

147

Europe in terms of international security because the region does not pose any serious problems for Europe in sensitive areas such as new weapon technologies, migration or international terrorism. 737

The Latin America strategy paper of the European Commission of2002 In April 2002, the European Commission issued a strategy paper on its 20022006 programs involving Latin America. The document first subdivides EULatin American cooperation into regional, subregional and bilateral levels, and further, into four spheres of activity: the strengthening of civil society networks, social initiatives to help to reduce inequality, aid in situations of natural disasters, and action to accompany the strategic partnership. 738 Furthermore, the Commission outlines three dimensions for biregional relations: politics, economy and society. 739 It is the third paper of its kind (preceded by the 1995 and 1999 documents) and it is striking that it does not present a real strategy, but rather a road map outlining concrete measures to be taken, including their financing. There are two types of EU strategy papers in this regard: the lengthy ones, which provide information on tangible steps, and short four- to six-page papers which are confidential and deal with the overall situation in a country, proposing possible alternatives for EU action. 740 As an official of the DG Relex G points out, these regional strategy papers deal with concrete steps, and are not attempting to present an overall strategy for Latin America. 741 So why not call those documents "schedule of measures 20042006" or "Working Plan", to be more modest? The European Union often employs the expressions "strategy" or "strategic partnership" in an exaggerated manner, which ultimately rids the terms of their meaning. 742 In addition, the Latin America Strategy Paper - officially presented in April 2002 - tellingly does not refer to the changed international situation after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and its impact on transatlantic and inpede the sanctioning of human-rights-violating regimes. Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 63. 737 Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 63. See Jesper Tvevad, 'La agenda de seguridad en las relaciones Europa-América Latina'. In: Bodemer, Klaus et al. (eds.), El Triángulo Atlántico: América Latina, Europa y Estados Unidos en un sistema internacional cambiante. Sankt Augustin (Germany) 2002, pp. 112-123. 738 European Commission, Latin America Regional Strategy Document 2002-2006 Programming, April 2002, p. 5. 739

European Commission, Latin America Regional Strategy Document 2002-2006 Programming, p. 6. 740 lnterviews, Brussels, September 2003. A future EU foreign ministry should combine both papers: the macro perspective, the financing of concrete measures and the discussion of future steps. 741 Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. 742

Spanish experts do not deem the "regional strategy" to be strategic either. Interviews, Madrid, May 2005.

148

ter-American relations. This surprising fact further undermines the paper's claim of being "strategic". I focused on this Regional Strategy Paper as it reflects the European Commission's approach to biregional relations with Latin America: It seems symptomatic, as the Commission has rather a mid-term and mainly technical approach and no vision for the region. 743

8.1. The biregional relations The dialogue with the Rio Group was the main political forum of the interregional relationship, thus consolidating diverse and smaller dialogues. 744 Several cooperation agreements have been completed, which are based on the three pillars, encompassing economic cooperation, an institutionalised political dialogue, and strengthened trade. The strategic orientation of biregional relations is generally set by an institutionalised political dialogue, including two main forums: the meetings between the Group of Rio and the EU, as well as the summits, which take place at regular two-year intervals. Countries attending the Madrid Summit Europe

Latin America (geographic)

Caribbean (geographic)

European Union

Rio C r o u p

Cariforum ^^:^^! fffiji

* dmtamk lijgl M * Honduras

» , ftarsgus » Crocita* * Puan»

'v -

• •

Belize Guyana (represents the € \ R K ' O M camine!. in the Rio Group)

Cuba Dominican Republic

Haiti Bahamas Jamaica St. Kilts & Nevis St. Vincent & the Grenadines Antigua & Barbuda Dominica St. Lucia Barbados Grenada Trinidad & Tobago

Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/lac/map_en.htm, 21 December 2004.

743

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003.

744

Ayuso Pozo, 'La cooperación para el desarrollo', p. 94.

149

Until May 2005, twelve meetings between the EU and the Rio Group took place in Latin American and European countries, plus three biregional summits. The regular meetings between the EU and the Rio Group are said to be rather ineffective. 745 Although South America has recently experienced an integrationist revival due to a political impulse of the current presidents of Brazil and Argentina, from a socioeconomic and short-term view, the outlook is not as optimistic as it is in the discourses: "the regional construction continues being a pending task". 746 In this context, the Community of Nations of South America, proclaimed in December 2004, is noteworthy. 747 The EU's policy toward Latin America became more coherent in the early 1990s. The Union's first improvised, then gradually systemised policies for dealing with the Central American conflicts provided the structure of the EU's policy towards Latin America. 748 These structures were the basis for EU-Latin American relations after the East-West confrontation ended. These structures were institutionalised in several multilateral and bilateral agreements (see chapter 3). 749 There are also contacts and relations between the EU and the Organisation of American States (OAS), of which not only Latin American and Caribbean countries, but also the US and Canada, are member states. However, meetings with the OAS are rather perfunctory contacts. 750 Sometimes the EU supports electoral observation missions in Latin America. The OAS provides the manpower and the EU the financial resources. 751 Economic agreements between the EU and Latin American countries have developed to include other areas. Besides economic, industrial, scientific, technical and environmental cooperation, as well as EU support for the fight against drugs, all agreements now include the famous democracy clause, which calls for collaboration and respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Furthermore, a decentralised collaboration began in the past decade, supplying a progressively more significant role for civil society in the execution of EU projects. 752

745

Interviews, Brussels, November-December 2003.

746

Alemany, 'Diplomacia de cumbres', pp. 140.

741

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Zürich, 9. Dezember 2004; El País, Madrid, 16 de diciembre de 2004. The proposal o f Venezuela's president Chávez to eliminate the Mercosur and the Andean Community in favour of the new Community of Nations, was rejected by Uruguay's leaving president Batlle as quixotic. El Universa!, Caracas, 18 de diciembre de 2004; El País, Madrid, 18 de diciembre de 2004. A Latin American ambassador sees a problem in the exclusion of Mexico. Interviews, Brussels, December 2004.

748 749

Smith, 'Actually existing foreign policy-or not?', pp. 162, 163. Smith, 'Actually existing foreign policy-or not?', pp. 162, 163.

750 751

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

752 Interviews,

Brussels, November 2003. Since the early 1990s, several programmes have been set up to advance biregional networks: ALFA (academic programme), AlßAN (cooperation at university and postgraduate

150

Furthermore, the EU sticks to its belief in promoting regional integration and only conducts negotiations with Central America or the Andean Community as a whole, not with individual countries. This behaviour is remarkable because EU officials admit that regional integration in Latin America is not an explicit goal of the EU approach. The Europeans certainly promote regional integration, particularly in Latin America, 753 but they do it rather passively so that they cannot be accused of paternalism. Furthermore, the EU seems to link all future free trade agreements to the results of the Doha trade round, although there are differences on this subject in the EU, especially within the Commission. 754 For Sanahuja, the Commissioners Patten and Lamy were not proactive with regard to preferential trade relations with Latin America, in contrast to the Santer Commission and the Delors cabinet. 755 With regard to political cooperation, there is a significant detail, which distinguishes the language of the EU-Latin American summits from the new Association Agreements: In the summit context, it is a "political dialogue", whilst the new agreements (Mexico/Chile) even speak of the "concertation of common positions". 756

8.2. Perceptions of the European and Latin American actors Here, it is not possible to list all European and Latin American countries and detail their respective perceptions of Latin America and the EU. Instead I will provide a general outline of the European perceptions of Latin America and vice versa, although with this approach comes the risk of very broad generalisations. The assumption is that Latin America - in contrast to the EU - does not really exist and does not represent anything more than a geographical area and a cultural tradition lacking a political union. However, former Mexican EU Ambassador Porfirio Munoz Ledo points out that while the European Union has a political union but lacks a common identity, Latin America possesses a common identity but has not reached a political union yet. 757 Particularly since the enlargement in May 2004, the European Union is striving for a "European identity" to complement the contractual and institutional integration process. Whatlevel), AL-INVEST (cooperation of SMEs), URB-AL (cooperation of cities), ATLAS (cooperation of Chambers of Commerce), and @LIS (Alliance for the Information Society). European Commission, Latin America Regional Strategy Document 2002-2006, p. 15. 753

Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

754

S o m e officials o f the Commission favour strengthened regional trade cooperation as pragmatic alternative to the still unclear outcome of the Doha free trade negotiations. Interviews, Brussels, October/December 2003.

755

José Antonio Sanahuja, 'De Rio a Madrid', p. 10.

756

Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 60.

757

Willy Stevens, 'América Latina y la UE. Segunda cumbre entre regiones', ln: Política terior, 87, mayo-junio 2002, pp. 39, 40.

ex-

151

ever such a European identity will look like, what role "non-European" immigrants would have, and what relationship the European identity would have to national identities, some of its problems and unanswered questions are similar to those in Latin America. However, the references to "national" values in the region appear to be stronger than in Europe, and the problems of the indigenous population in Latin America are not comparable to any situation in the EU, although Europe also has problems in dealing with its minorities. 8.2.1. Latin American and European worldviews The worldview of both regions is largely dominated by multilateralism, although there are exceptions where sensitive national interests are concerned. Accordingly, Latin Americans and Europeans often agree on cooperation in international forums and declare multilateralism as a higher goal. Nevertheless, these declarations of intent may be obsolete in concrete situations, when it becomes obvious that national governments make their own foreign policy decisions on conflictive issues. Regional Integration In Europe, but also in Latin America, regional integration has ascended to a sort of official vow. In practice this idea has been increasingly challenged in both Latin America and Europe in view of the serious difficulties of the Andean Community and the risk of "overstretching" the enlarged European Union. In Latin America, as mentioned earlier, the process of European integration has often served as model for Latin American integration. Latin American integration processes do certainly serve as a link between the European Union and the region. However, concrete attainment of Latin American supranational integration appears rather unlikely, as national priorities clearly dominate political external relations and the rhetoric of regionalism or Pan-Latin-Americanism (bolivarismo) often serves merely as a convenient political instrument. In this context, the Argentine-Brazilian tandem of presidents Lula and Kirchner is viewed with uneasiness because its direction is unclear 758 , although the official EU discourse lauds their efforts to advance regional integration of the Mercosur project. 759

758

In October 2003, Brazilian and Argentine presidents Lula and Kirchner agreed on the socalled "Buenos Aires Consensus" (as an alternative concept to the neoliberal "Washington Consensus"), which meant a commitment to social and development agendas, and a vision o f Mercosur as the privileged instrument of negotiation to transcend trade matters. Accordingly, both public and private actors consider the social agenda as important, which should not be neglected if integration is discussed. Alemany, 'Diplomacia de cumbres', p. 152. 759 Interviews in Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires, Washington D C., March/May 2004.

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8.2.2. Latin America's image in Europe Latin America's image in Europe and the EU has changed since the 1970s and 1980s. While South American dictatorships and Central American conflicts drew political attention to the region during these decades, European interest has remarkably decreased since the Latin American démocratisation process in the mid-1980s and 1990s. The civil wars in Central America also were the first issue to lead to a "serious" foreign policy approach of the European Community in the 1980s, and not only because the Europeans dissented from the powerful United States during a hot phase of the East-West confrontation. Nevertheless, the European perception of the region changed during the 1990s, as liberalisation processes took place in Latin America, accompanied by an increasing interest in direct investments from European companies in the emerging markets of the continent. Also motivated by US activism towards a hemispheric free trade area, the European Union developed several agreements with Latin American subrogions and countries and seemed to accept the region as a potential partner in international affairs as well, thus reflecting the European view that Latin America is culturally and politically close to it. Nowadays, Latin America is not a priority for the EU. This is the case because of more urgent international demands. As Latin America is a zone free of nuclear weapons, thanks to the Tlatelolco Treaty 760 , and as it does not harbour international terrorism ("merely" local terrorists 761 ), it has generally lost influence in international politics. With regard to the prevention of conflicts, much could be done in the region, but the smouldering crises in the region are perceived as less urgent than acute conflicts in other world regions. 762 Further, the economies of Latin America cannot compare with the trade prospects of China or India. Some Latin American countries are notoriously marred by corruption, inefficiency, an unreliable political and justice system and local riots (to say nothing of the civil war situations in Colombia or social polarisation in Venezuela). Unfortunately, the démocratisation process of the 1980s and 1990s did not effect sustainable economic development in Latin America. Although the majority favours democracy, the process provoked popular discontent, according to the poll Latinobarömetro, 55 per cent of Latin Americans "wouldn't mind a non-democratic government if it solved the economic problems". 763 In short, the perception of weak and corrupt political systems in some Latin American countries has too easily become a generalisation and thus, the region has been identified with "bad governance", accelerated by the Argentine politico-financial-eco760

Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 64.

761

Particularly in Latin America, the distinction between "terrorists" and "guerrillas" is a highly political question. 762 lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003. 763

See http://www.latinobarometro.org/Upload/lnforme%20LB%202004%20Final.pdf, 23 December 2004; The Economist, London, 12 August 2004.

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nomic crisis in 2001/2002. 764 Accordingly, the region is not seen by all as a reliable political partner of the EU in the international sphere, although official statements suggest the opposite: Mexico, Chile and some member states of Mercosur are considered more reliable than the Central American and Andean countries. 765 The lack of (political) integration in Latin America has also been named an obstacle to closer cooperation. Certainly the official speeches on integration do not match the sometimes stubborn emphasis on national sovereignty. However, according to rumours and in view of the agonising conflict in Colombia, there seems to be a change with regard to the Latin American insistence on the nonintervention principle. 766 One national diplomat said that before becoming a major international actor (in approximately ten to twenty years), Latin America needs to get its house in order. 767 Without sarcasm, however, the same advice might be addressed to the EU with regard to its ambitious endeavour to develop a strong CFSP worthy of an authentic international player. 8.2.3. The image of the EU in Latin America The European Union's image in Latin America is on the whole a good one, though this generally positive picture is basically generated by comparing it with the US approach, and is tarnished by the EU's agricultural protectionism and its subsidies policy for European farmers. As a Brazilian diplomat remarks: "The population in Brazil perceives Europe positively and the US negatively", although the EU is said to aim for goals similar to those of the US. 768 However, in Latin America (save the Mercosur) the EU is not viewed as being as important as the US, due to the latter's geographic proximity. Similar to the US view of the EU, Latin Americans perceive the EU only as an economic and trade power, not at all as an international political actor: 769 A European diplomat points out that for Latin Americans, the EU is far from representing a similar entity to the US. 770 This can be explained by two factors: 1) the Latin American states, themselves jealously insisting on national sovereignty, perceive the European nations and not the EU as regional body sui generis as the powerful players (also as a matter of state-centred political culture 771 ) and 2) the perhaps symptomatic performance of the four divided European countries in the UN Security Council

764

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

765

Interviews, Brussels, October/December 2003.

766

Interviews, Brussels, September 2004.

767

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

768

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

769

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003-January 2004; Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 770 Interviews, Washington D.C., May 2004. 771 See Whitehead, 'La relación birregional', p. 73.

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during the Iraq crisis. 772 Regarding this, Sanahuja asks whether this means that Latin America cannot take the EU seriously as interlocutor. 773 This helps explain that Latin Americans, normally not hesitant to employ lofty visionary statements (at least in the past), see the EU from a realpolitik perspective and thus judge that there won't be a true "common" foreign policy of the Europeans in the near future. However, the EU's foreign policy, as well as ESDP, including its multiple channels of dialogue, negotiation and decision-making, is rather difficult for Latin Americans (and non-Europeans, or rather non-experts) to comprehend. 774 With regard to the Latin American perception of the common foreign and security policy, van Klaveren finds that due to the CFSP's complexity, it does not facilitate interregional dialogue. When Latin Americans negotiate with the Union on trade, the interlocutor is obvious (the Commission), but this is not the case with the EU's foreign policy. 775 Concerning the repeatedly stressed "strategic partnership" and its actual impact (especially concerning the sensitive agricultural question), a Latin American ambassador clearly says: "The discourse of the EU must be coherent with the actions." 776 Another Latin American ambassador observes that there is gradually less ideology and more pragmatism, and a lack of vision; it's necessary not to lose perspective. 777 In accordance, the statements from Latin American government officials and elites contradict the EU's intention of being perceived as an international actor, not only in trade and development matters, but also in world politics. 8.2.4. Asymmetrical relations The comparatively good image of the EU in Latin America (compared to the US, that is) is affected by a perceived (and actual) asymmetry. The European idea of a dialogue between two regions speaking with just two voices seemed to be illusory: The partnership is formally equal, but factually asymmetrical, 778 since Europe is considered to be more important to the subcontinent than vice versa. 779 A Latin American ambassador points out that even though Latin Amer772 773

S e e van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 62.

Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 84.

774

Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 85. 775

Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 62.

776

lnterviews, Brussels, December 2003.

777

778Interviews, Brussels, November 2003. Diego Cardona C., 'Las relaciones Unión Europea-Comunidad Andina: tareas inmediatas'. In: Nueva Sociedad, 190, marzo-abril 2004, p. 118. 779

See, for instance, Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, The foreign policy behaviour of the European Union towards the Latin American Southern Cone States (1980-2000): Has it become more cooperative? The cases of foreign direct investment and agricultural trade. Diss. Tübingen 2003, p. 5; Kirsten Westphal, 'Die strategische Partnerschaft zwischen der Europäischen Union und Lateinamerika: Konkretes Handlungsmodell oder nur Vision?'. In: Klaus

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ica is only the seventh priority for the European Union, the EU is also merely the third or fourth priority of Latin America's foreign relations. 780 In the long run, however, van Klaveren sees the growth possibilities in Latin America in a better light than in Europe, even though this is the case only due to the different demographic development in both regions. 781 The EU has apparently accepted this asymmetry and thus advances its relations with Latin America with different speeds: advanced economic and close political dialogue with Mercosur, Mexico and Chile; development cooperation with the Andean Community, Central America and the Caribbean. 782 Unlike the fourth-generation agreements, for Sanahuja earlier agreements were "empty" because no concrete commitments were included. But this generates two different types of biregional relations: the agreements of the fourth generation and the association model are reserved for the most advanced countries, while Central America and the Andean Community see themselves obliged to accept the "classic" agreements as well as a subordinate relationship with the EU. 783 The relationship between the EU and Latin America has also suffered because of the different ranks of negotiators: the EU sent technical specialists, while the Latin Americans were represented by distinguished diplomats - a matter of different negotiation culture. 784 For two Latin American ambassadors, this discrepancy mirrors the asymmetry of biregional relations. 785 Another observer holds that the Commission, which is the institution most deeply involved in the negotiations, lacks the necessary diplomatic sensitivity in this sense - a highly important aspect for the dialogue with Latin Americans. 786 The author has established a tentative categorisation of Latin American views on political cooperation with the EU. As it is an attempt to subdivide different approaches in Latin America to political cooperation with the EU, comments and criticisms are welcome. 1) The pragmatists This group consists of Latin American ambassadors, diplomats and government officials who see the EU as a lucrative market for domestic (mainly agricultural) products and hope to diversify their export structures and to stimulate the naBodemer/Susanne Gratius (eds.), Lateinamerika im internationalen System. Zwischen Regionalismus und Globalisierung. From the series Fokus Lateinamerika, Vol. 1, Opladen (Germany) 2003, p. 178; Nolte, 'Fortschritte auf dem Weg zu einer strategischen Partnerschaft?', p. 118. 780

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

781 782

Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 56.

Sanahuja, 'De Rio a Madrid', p. 2.

783

Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 91. 784

785See

Klom, 'Mercosur and Brazil', p. 361.

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003, January 2004. 786

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

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tional economy by free trade with the Europeans. Pragmatists neglect the political component and ally with the Europeans and the US on the basis of case-tocase decisions, virtually according to the motto of a "coalition of convenience". 2) The orators The representatives of this group say that stronger relations with the EU are necessary to counterbalance the dominance of the US in Latin America (and internationally). Rhetorical references to historical and cultural ties with the old continent are common; the main interest, however, seems to be the same as that of the pragmatists. In contrast to the latter, the orators actually pursue political linkage with the EU, but economic and trade relations are unequivocally the priority. Nevertheless, they do not stress political relations only to please a European audience, but an intensification of them is actually a goal, if only a subordinated one. 3) The idealists For all groups, but for this one in particular, European integration represents an exemplary model. Though idealists also see an anachronistic injustice in European agricultural subsidies, they otherwise advocate a stronger linkage of Latin America with the EU - even with regard to deepened political cooperation. Political collaboration with the European Union differs from Latin American relations to the United States because Latin Americans seem to have the impression of being treated more equally and congenially by Europeans. Often, idealists see a stronger relationship with the EU as a precondition for the advancement of regional integration. Generally, idealists demonstrate Europhile tendencies, but are not sufficiently influential in any Latin American country that they could decisively determine foreign policy orientation.

8.3. The summits between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union As mentioned above, since 1999 summits of the heads of state and government of Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU have been established. So, 1999 marks the starting point of biregional relations in terms of a "strategic partnership". The first summit took place in Rio de Janeiro (1999), the second in Madrid (2002), the third in Guadalajara (Mexico) in May 2004, and the next will be organised in Vienna in 2006. These summits must be seen in the context of the Ibero-American Summits, which have taken place since 1991 (Spain, Portugal and Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries in the Western Hemisphere) and the Summits of the Americas (North and South America plus the Caribbean). So, the existence of Ibero-American meetings and the summits of the

157

Western Hemisphere seemed to force the EU to act in order not to lose influence in the continent. 8.3.1. The first EU-Latin American summit in Rio (1999): Creating a strategic partnership The 1999 summit in Rio, the so-called "Cimeira" was attended by 48 heads of state and government of both regions and declared a goal of developing a "strategic partnership" in all areas, 787 based on democratic consolidation, trade liberalisation and concertation of positions on international issues. 788 Accordingly, the general goal of these gatherings is to "strengthen the political, economic and cultural understanding" between the EU and Latin America with the aim of reaching such a "strategic partnership". There is still some disagreement between France and Spain on the intellectual origin of the initiative that led to the 1999 summit. In the end, the officially recognised formula speaks of a "Franco-Spanish" initiative. 789 During the Rio Meeting, 55 rather randomly seeming "priorities of action", were set up. The fact that there are no precedents outlined in this "shopping list" made these points rather useless. As a result, the eleven priorities of Tuusula (1999), established under the Finnish presidency in November 1999, were singled out to be of major importance. 790 These eleven priorities included consultation mechanisms, human rights, the position of women, environment, drugs, financial aid, the small and medium sized enterprises, education, culture, information and the "education" society. 791 8.3.2. The second biregional summit in Madrid 2002: Some achievements or a failure? The circumstances of the meeting were not the most promising, since the Summit of Madrid took place shortly after the Argentine crisis and during the insecurity resulting from the possible electoral victory of left-wing candidate "Lula" da Silva in Brazil, as well as the deterioration of the political situation in Venezuela. In general, the majority of Latin American countries found themselves in political, economic and social crisis, except Chile and Mexico. In addition, it was not the best time to convene the succeeding meeting in Madrid (2002), since international politics were pressured by terrorism, the war in Afghanistan and 787

Drekonja-Kornat, 'Latin American Foreign Policies', p. 109. 788

Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 91. 789 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003/January 2004. See Freres, '¿De las declaraciones a la asociación birregional?', p. 118. One interviewee claims that the Commissioner Manuel Marin from Spain convinced the French president Chirac to initiate the first summit. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 790 Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 93. 791 Derisbourg, 'L'Amérique latine', p. 431. See European Commission, Latin America Regional Strategy Document, ANNEX VII: The 11 priorities selected in Tuusula, p. 36.

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the violence in the Middle East, rather than cheering a new step towards a strengthened partnership between Europe and Latin America. 792 Furthermore, the two political "heavyweights" in Europe, France and Germany, were in the midst of an electoral campaign when the 2002 EU-Latin American summit took place. Christopher Patten predicted that the biregional meeting in Madrid would not be "just another summit", but turn out to be "exceptional". This proved to be the typically exaggerated EU rhetoric and certainly did not come true.793 As major issues, he identified the continued assistance for democratic consolidation in the region, clearer and broader support for regional and subregional initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean, the strengthening of political and economic relations, as well as cooperation and social equity. In addition, Patten argued, a broad dialogue must be set up that would include civil society.794 However, Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar was able to reach an inclusion of the Colombian guerrilla forces FARC on the terrorist list - this was judged his personal success.795 Other than Colombia, Latin American countries were not satisfied that terrorism was a priority of the summit, as they struggled with economic, political and social crisis.796 With regard to the mood between political leaders of both regions, there was the peculiar behaviour of the Venezuelan president, enfant terrible Hugo Chavez, and Argentine foreign minister Carlos Ruckauf s open accusation of European protectionism. The latter's Spanish colleague Josep Piqué responded that the EU would consider the problem, which provoked Heinz Moeller, foreign minister to Ecuador, to add that the Europeans had been considering the problem for twenty years now.797 As the outcome of the reunion was not seen as a substantial advance of biregional relations, Mestres properly states that the distance between European and Spanish priorities in Latin America became obvious in the course of the Madrid Summit. 798 For the Spanish member of the European Parliament, Ignacio Salafranca Sànchez-Neyra, the summit was a test of the EU's will to deepen relations with Latin America, and whether the regions would build a common space

792 793

Sberro, 'Une alliance stratégique', p. 14.

Christopher Patten, 'De Rio de Janeiro a Madrid'. In: Centro Latinoamericano para las Relaciones con Europa (éd.), II Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe-Unión Europea. En un mundo global. Santiago de Chile, abril 2002, p. 63. 794 Patten, 'De Rio de Janeiro a Madrid', pp. 66-72.

795

Soriano, 'América Latina', p. 85. 796

797Freres, 798

'¿De las declaraciones a la asociación birregional?', p. 120. Soriano, 'América Latina', p. 87. Mestres, 'La agenda española', p. 26. 159

for relations. 799 For him, the final outcome of the meeting was certainly disappointing. For Freres, the big achievement of the second summit took place outside the original agenda: the association agreement with Chile. The conclusion of this accord prevented a rather conflictive meeting because of the postponement of the negotiations with Mercosur and the unrealistic expectations of the Andean and Central American states to advance trade talks. 800 Likewise, Sanahuja states that in economic terms, many Latin American countries were disappointed. 801 In the aftermath of the Madrid summit, Sberro soberly states that three years after the meeting in 1999, Rio appeared rather as a "lucky accident" than a sign of a long-term tendency of increasing interregional cooperation. For him, the only success of the EU-Latin American summit in Madrid was that it took place at all, with only one absentee, Fidel Castro. Besides the agreement with Chile, the document on terrorism is worthy of mention, in that it corresponded more to Spain's domestic policy than to a Latin American priority (with the partial exception of Colombia). Latin Americans criticised the shift in priorities - from developing the emerging economies of Latin America to fighting terrorism. Latin American countries were upset that the European Union did not substantially advance trade cooperation. In fact, as Sberro points out, the EU contradicted its policy of endorsing the political integration of the region by signing agreements with the only two countries (Mexico, Chile) which chose to act by themselves, in order to get closer to the United States. 802 Observers in Brussels did not share this view, and held that Mexico constitutes a regional unit in itself and Chile has always been a special case. 803 8.3.3. The 2004 Summit in Guadalajara: A step back? Similar to the unfavourable circumstances of the meeting in Madrid, the preconditions for the third biregional summit in late May 2004 were not the best, as there were more important issues on the international agenda (development of EU defence and security policy, post-war Iraq, elections in many countries, including Spain and the US, for instance) and a changing institutional framework due to the EU enlargement on 1 May and the prospect of the new European Commission, which finally took office on 22 November 2004. 804 Before the 799 800

80!

Soriano, 'América Latina', p. 80. Freres, '¿De las declaraciones a la asociación birregional?', p. 120. Sanahuja, 'De Rio a Madrid', p. 15.

802

Sberro, 'Une alliance stratégique', pp. 15, 16. Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 94. " Interviews, Brussels, October 2003.

803 804

Klaas Dykmann, 'Dans l'attente du sommet entre l'Union européenne et l'Amérique latine au Mexique: Des défis et perspectives pour les relations birégionales'. In: Nord-Siid Aktuell, Vol. XVIII, 1 (2004), pp. 75-80 and Dykmann, 'Las relaciones entre América Latina y la Unión Europea".

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meeting in Guadalajara, several Latin American and European officials privately stated that, if possible, it would have been better to postpone the summit due to the unfavourable circumstances. 805 While the Commission was represented by its president and the Commissioners for External Relations, Trade, Agriculture and Development, the absentees were the political leaders from Argentina, Great Britain, Italy, Peru and Cuba. 806 According to Gratius, the summit - organised by the host country, Mexico, the pro-tempore presidency of the Rio Group, Brazil, and the EU presidency, Ireland - was badly prepared, particularly on the behalf of the Latin Americans. 807 Similar to the summit in 2002, Latin American participants did not agree on a joint position and did not prepare in advance a document stating their common interests. 808 Symptomatica!ly, the European Commission prepared the meetings' content, which was passively accepted by Latin Americans. 809 Though there were some preparatory meetings, Freres is not pleased and holds that although central topics on the agenda are desirable, a strategic relation is not built piece by piece but, as some argue, by great and ambitious initiatives. 810 One of the main problems was the drifting apart of Latin America: The rivalry between Mexico and Brazil as well as apparent development gaps and different sizes of countries in the region did not permit an intraregional consensus. 8 " Accordingly, the Final Declaration of the summit in Mexico was rather general. One participant of the summit concludes that, at least, the meeting served to help Latin America learn that there are two negotiation and administrative cultures in the EU: as much as possible is handled at the lower level and the EU Ministers only take prepared decisions. In Latin America, the procedure is completely the opposite: higher-ranking officials, particularly ministers, tend to modify consensus agreed to at a lower level. 812 Latin American wishes to prioritise free trade agreements with Central America and the Andean Community were not fulfilled. The two main topics of the gathering became social cohesion and multilateralism. In addition, a nonbinding declaration was adopted to sign the association agreement between the EU and Mercosur in October 2004, before the new Commission was expected to take office. In accordance, the results of the summit were judged as not spectacular, but on the whole satisfying. In view of the dominant role of the US in 805 806

807 808

809

8l0

Interviews, Brussels, November 2003, January 2004.

Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika' pp. 2, 7. Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika' p. 2. Interviews, Brussels, September 2004. Reportedly, only two percent o f initiatives for the biregional relations come from Latin America. Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

Freres, '¿De las declaraciones a la asociación birregiona!?', p. 121.

811 Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika' p. 2. 812 Interviews, Brussels, September 2004.

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the Americas, it does not seem surprising that the main topics (social cohesion, multilateralism, association with Mercosur) dominated the summit - as these are the areas in which Europeans have an advantage in the region in comparison with the US. 8 1 3 The usual topics such as non-proliferation of A B C weapons, condemnation of terrorism, support for the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol were completed by a pledge against corruption and for transparency, as well as a condemnation of torture and inhumane treatment of people, including "war prisoners" 8 1 4 - a clear reference to the abuse scandal of US-run prisons in Iraq and the detention camps on Guantanamo. After a controversial debate on the torture scandal, put forward by the Cuban and Venezuelan delegations, the Europeans was able to push through a softened version, which did not mention the United States by name. 8 1 5 Social Cohesion Social cohesion is a catchphrase, which contains everything and nothing. 8 1 6 Europeans want to offer the European model of social justice in Latin America. As it is a controversial topic, it seems not to represent a fitting element for the "strategic partnership" and correspondingly, the final declaration dealt with the issue rather generally; aside from the so-called E U R O s o c i A L programme, the summit participants did not agree on concrete measures in this regard. 8 1 7 Interestingly (and for Gratius positive), the concept of social cohesion includes the re-discovery of the state in Latin America, contrasting with the neoliberal period, advocated particularly by the International Monetary Fund. 8 1 8 A Latin American ambassador holds that "in fact, the poverty in Latin America can be battled by a better access to EU markets" and j u d g e s the official proclamation of a strategic partnership and the maintenance of strict import rules for Latin American products as contradictory. 8 1 9 Furthermore, among Latin Americans, the manner in which the topic of social cohesion was put forward by the Commission provoked criticism as it was seen by some as "paternalistic". 8 2 0

813 Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', pp. 1, 2. 814 Declaración de Guadalajara. III Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe - Unión Europea, 815Guadalajara, México, 29 de mayo de 2004, paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19, 30, 31. Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 2. 8l6 Thus, it is not really understood in the US. Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004. 817 Before the summit, the European Commission and the Inter-American Development Bank organised a seminar on social cohesion in Brussels in June 2003. In October 2003 a meeting of the Biregional Group in Mexico sought to concretise the specific elements of the biregional dialogue on that matter. 818 Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 4. 819 Interviews, Brussels, October 2003. 820 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

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Accordingly, some observers saw a sort of automatism and antagonism between the European demand for social cohesion and Latin American requests to open EU agricultural markets for their products. 821 Multilateralism The confirmed biregional "western values community" was reiterated to promote multilateralism instead of unilateralism. Internationally, both regions pursued global governance, which was aimed to lead to a strategic alliance of interests in the political area. European-Latin American interests included the upgrading of the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation. 822 Both regions were further interested in solving conflicts through diplomacy and cooperation within the UN system rather than using military force. Likewise, both regions believed that US unilateralist actions should be contained by setting up international rules. In the fight against terrorism, international law must be respected, as well as the non-intervention principle, national sovereignty, self-determination of peoples, rule of law and equality between states. The result of the working table on multilateralism (A) was to advance global governance, reach a reform of the UN system, including a better connection between the UN Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and between ECOSOC and the international finance institutions as peace, security and sustainable development are closely linked and thus should be promoted together. Furthermore, a reference was made to the Millennium Development Goals. 823 The other working group on multilateralism (B) called for a reform of the UN system and the UN Security Council, supported the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court, and provided another interesting aspect: Que si bien el elemento de la soberanía de los Estados está vigente, es necesario tomar acciones conjuntas para prevenir crisis humanitarias, pero que sin embargo, es necesario que se adopten lineamientos claros para su instrumentación y que no se sujeten a interpretaciones particulares.*24

This comment hints at the growing recognition among Latin American leaders that the traditional insistence on indisputable national sovereignty even in situations of crisis has to be overcome. According to comments in Brussels, the Co-

821

822 823

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 5.

Informe de la mesa de trabajo A sobre multilatéralisme. Patio 19, III Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe - Unión Europea, Guadalajara, México, 28 de mayo de 2004. 824 Informe de la mesa de trabajo B sobre mullilaíeralismo. Capilla Tolsá, III Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe - Unión Europea, Guadalajara, México, 28 de mayo de 2004.

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lombian conflict in particular has served to initiate this change of thinking 825 , although the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter by Latin American countries in 2001 already meant a significant limitation of the once sacrosanct non-intervention principle. More collaboration in the UN Security Council with France/Germany (and Great Britain) and Chile/Brazil as members, the peace keeping forces in Haiti, the reform of Security Council with the long-term perspective of permanent seats for Germany and Brazil were identified as areas of cooperation. 826 However, the coordination of positions before international conferences did not work in Cancun, Doha (WTO meetings) or in Johannesburg (UN Conference against Racism), for instance. It is still difficult to organise coordination reunions with heads of state of two regions, though it is easier at the UN level. 827 Mexican Ambassador Munoz Ledo pointed to the lack of follow-up mechanisms, particularly at the ministerial level. In this context, the proposal of the Brazilian president to establish a permanent secretariat in Madrid has provoked divisions among Latin Americans themselves. 828 Gratius correctly mentions the main problem of the biregional summits: conflict ve issues tend to be excluded, such as the situation in problematic countries (Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela), European agriculture subventions, external debt, or migration. Common interests between the two regions, with a Latin America noticeably divided, are almost impossible to define. 829 Another general problem of the summits could be described as follows: the further the relations between the two regions advance, the less concreteness there is in their proposals. 830 Here, it would be helpful to learn from the sometimes exceptionally frank dialogues between US and EU officials on all international topics. In short, despite the strengthening of multilateralism as an important goal and the (futile) intention to sign the agreement with Mercosur as a significant impulse, the summit did not bring - as expected - many new initiatives for the relations between the EU and Latin America. 831 Despite some positive developments, the summit of Guadalajara was certainly not a major step towards the "strategic partnership" and corroborated the view that the Summit of Rio in 1999 was exceptional due to a very different international situation. However, it could also be interpreted as a positive event, as the summit resulted neither in a complete failure nor in a step back, as feared by many. 825

Interviews, Brüssels, September 2004. 826

827Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 6. 828

829 830 831

Interviews, Berlin, February 2004. Freres, La III Cumbre

Unión Europea-América

Latina y el

Caribe.

Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 7. Interviews, Brüssels, November 2003. Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 6; Interviews, Brüssels, January 2004.

164

8.4. Is there a strategic partnership between the EU and Latin America?

El problema es que no parece que haya ni voluntad ni capacidad para ir mucho más allá de las ideas que ya conocemos. 832 No se puede hacer mucho más ya. (A Spanish diplomat) 833

Another Spanish official denies that there is a strategic partnership between the two regions. 834 A European ambassador remarks that the strategic partnership is merely lip service, as the Union has always only reacted to the US ambitions in the region: European-Latin American cooperation as a mere reaction to US hegemony. 8 3 5 As a reaction first to the establishment o f N A F T A and now to the planned FTAA, the European Union has not offered a true alternative for Latin American countries since, according to several observers, it has made free trade agreements with Mexico and Chile - exactly those countries that are closest to US plans for a hemispheric trade area - and because o f its difficulties in finishing the negotiations on an association agreement with the Mercosur. 8 3 6 Furthermore, Valladâo correctly states that, especially regarding the relations with Latin America, the E U ' s "...processus de décision interne est tellement lourd et complexe qu'il est chaque fois condamné simplement à réagir face au rythme soutenu des initiatives nord-américains." 8 3 7 Grabendorff presents four cases, which explain Latin American disillusionment with relations with the EU: 1) During the Argentina crisis, the Mercosur could not agree on an appropriate reaction. Instead o f providing substantial political support, some EU member states such as Spain, Germany and Italy only defended the interests o f their companies in Argentina; 2) The EU supported the Colombian peace process during the Pastrana government but failed to help when this process stopped. Furthermore, there is no EU programme to resolve the conflict; 3) There is no EU strategy to promote dialogue between parties and to contribute to stabilisation in Venezuela; 4 ) The EU position in the W T O negotiations was not only economically but also politically frustrating for Latin

832

Freres, '¿De las declaraciones a la asociación birregional?', p. 121.

833

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003.

834

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

835 836

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004.

Sanahuja, 'Un diálogo estructurado y plural', p. 94.

837

Valladâo, Le triangle atlantique, p. 25. 165

Americans since the EU and the US jointly defended agricultural subsidies and opposed poor countries' demands. 8 3 8 Furthermore, different positions in the Pinochet case (Great Britain and Spain vs. Chile) and strong criticism of the Rio Group against N A T O attacks in Kosovo demonstrated diverging comprehensions of sovereignty in Latin America and Europe. 839 Nowadays, it has become more difficult to find a "cement" for making biregional relations as strong as they once were, due to the Central American crisis. In addition, the North-South dialogue did not fulfil the expectations of either region, and has since lost impact. Furthermore, in Latin American countries, a differentiation of interests (regarding objective realities as well as their positions in international forums) has taken place. Although Latin American and European parties still maintain ties, these have become more habitual due to the low urgency of the situation in the region. 840 There are interests in both regions in working closer together, but the economic, social and political crises in many parts of Latin America (affecting the regional integration projects), the EU enlargement and the FTAA project might be estranging factors, which can threaten the projects of the Rio Summit. 841 As one national diplomat states, it is not sufficient to stress common values between Europe and Latin America. 842 One subject of political cooperation is the shared goal of multilateralism. A common list of international issues exists, including joint positions on the ICC, the Kyoto Protocol or the strengthening of the United Nations, for example. 843 However, a Latin American diplomat complains that for the Europeans, political dialogue and the list of common positions already count as achievements, which he considers unambitious and ridiculous. 844 After the EU enlargement, Latin America was expected to become less important to the external relations of the European Union, since the new member states have almost no historical or economic relations with Latin America 845 , although some countries actually have some bonds with the region due to migration (Poland, for instance). Among officials and ambassadors of the European Union and its member states, the official discourse seems to be that the enlargement would not affect the Union's relations with Latin America, as the EU, in its

838 839

Grabendorff, 'La estrategia birregional', pp. 107, 108. Grabendorff, 'América Latina y la Unión Europea', p. 3.

840 84l

Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 59.

Sberro, 'Une alliance stratégique', p. 16; Dykmann, 'Dans l'attente du sommet', pp. 75, 76.

842

Interviews, Berlin, February 2004.

843

Alberto Navarro, 'UE-América Latina: la cumbre de Guadalajara'. In: Política vol. XVIII, 99, mayo-junio 2004, pp. 142. 844 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 845 Gratius, 'Europa und Lateinamerika', p. 6.

166

exterior,

self-image as international actor, should be able to act in all world regions. However, some observers clearly state that a downgrading will take place, particularly because Latin America as a region has been subordinated in the E U ' s foreign relations and will only be more so after the enlargement. 846 Recently, EU development aid for Latin America in particular has been identified as an area for reasonable reductions. At the Latin American-EU meetings, Latin Americans want to speak about the opening of EU markets, commercial preferences, their foreign debt, the prevention of financial crises and development cooperation between the EU and Latin America. According to a Latin American ambassador, they have two main wishes of the EU: to solve the debt problem and to grant market access for agricultural products. 847 For the European Commission, the views are similar, as it looks at the region mainly from an economic and development cooperation angle, rather than from a political perspective. Latin America expects from the EU a modification of the Common Agriculture Policy, market access, a stable preferential regime possibly within the association agreements, broader cooperation resources, a more intense flow of investments, special treatment for the most indebted countries, support for the modification of the international finance system, and some other demands mainly of an economic nature. As the economic subjects largely dominate the interregional dialogue, the political topics become rather declaratory and symbolic. 848 One observer in Brussels remarks that Latin Americans looked down on the proposal to be the political partner of the EU. But this is changing: Now they are interested in more political cooperation but still focus largely on economic and trade areas. 849 Since 1999, the real development of EU-Latin American relations has sobered many people, because in the past years, the international context changed not only the perceptions, political and economic interests, but also the agendas of actors in both regions. 850 Mutual reliability between two international actors could not be generated, nor the planned coordination of biregional and multilateral policies in the framework of international forums. 851 For many observers, the "strategic partnership" with Latin America (and even with other third parties, such as Russia) remains nothing more than an empty promise. 852 Accordingly, several Latin American ambassadors in Brussels (but

846

Interviews, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, Washington D C., November 2003May 2004.

847 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 848 Van Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', pp. 66, 67. 849 Interviews, Brussels, December 2003; September 2004. 850 851Grabendorff, 'La estrategia birregional', p. 98. Grabendorff, 'La estrategia birregional', p. 99.

852

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 167

also Commission officials themselves) diagnose the lack of vision for both regions; one Latin American ambassador critically states "the Commission has instructions and no visions". 853 In contrast, a high-ranking official of the Commission identifies the lack of an institutional structure of the Latin American partners as a major obstacle to the advancement of biregional relations: The Group of Rio lacks the authority to negotiate. Although the EU and the Rio Group maintain a dialogue, the latter has no executive body resembling the European Commission or the Presidency. 854 Another European diplomat holds that there are people with ideas in the Commission but they have been reluctant to come forward with initiatives on Latin America while Patten still was Commissioner. 855 Though there are people in the Commission with visions for Latin America, apparently there has not been the right moment to put these forward. In sum, the often stressed historical, political, cultural and economic ties between Europe and Latin America ceased to be decisive for the mutual perceptions and interests and thus do not necessarily benefit present biregional relations. These are shaped by some political but mainly economic interests, as observed during the negotiations between EU and Mercosur on an association agreement. In conclusion, in view of what has been achieved until now and according to several interviews, I do not detect an authentic strategic partnership between the European Union and Latin America at present. To put it optimistically, this ambitious project still needs to be filled with life. If we regard compliance with the Tuusula priorities as indicator for the progress of the strategic partnership, the outcome is rather sobering: Cooperation in international forums has been meagre, for instance in the UN Security Council on the Iraq question (autumn 2002), in Cancun (WTO, September 2003), Johannesburg (UN Conference against Racism, 2003), or Geneva (UN Human Rights Commission). The protection of human rights has been satisfying at the declaratory level (support for ICC, condemnation of abuses) but concretely, no substantial and coherent biregional measures can be confirmed in relation to the human rights problems in the Colombian conflict or in Guatemala and Cuba, or, at the international level with regard to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan (Darfur region), or in Uganda. Likewise, the promotion of the role of women has rather been rhetorical, not concrete, neither in biregional relations nor internationally. The fight against drugs and illicit arms traffic has probably been the area in which the achievements are the most measurable. Joint actions against small arms were helpful, though they did certainly not solve the problem in the region. The fight against drugs suffers from the contrasting approaches of the US and the EU, particularly in Colombia.

853

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 854

855Interviews,

Brussels, November 2003.

Interviews, Brussels, November/December 2003.

168

In sum, if we look at the advancement o f the four political priorities singled out from the Tuusula agenda, the results are disappointing, especially considering their potential.

8.5. Prospects First o f all, it is o f utmost importance to discern whether Europe's external orientation eastwards (and away from Latin America) and Latin A m e r i c a ' s diversification o f international trade relations are short-term interests or patterns o f a long-term course, away from the rhetorical strategic partnership between the two regions. There are reasons to support both views. One should ask, who is actually interested in Latin America? There is a division between emotional/cultural and strategic/foreign trade interests in the E U . The former are emphasised by Spain, Portugal and Italy, and the latter by Germany, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, but neither group is necessarily motivating political relations towards Latin America. 8 5 6 Van Klaveren asks what the motivation is for both regions to collaborate internationally. He concludes that the potential o f this alliance is certainly big in terms o f acting as a moderating and constructive force to advance a new multilateralism. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ask what kind o f multilateralism both regions pursue: defensive or pro-active. At the s a m e time, many Latin American countries are still bound to nonalignment, the Group o f 77 (and the new Group o f 20), which emphasise different interests in North-South relations. 8 5 7 A s regional integration in Latin America is often seen as a precondition for a deepened political dialogue with the E U , Grabendorff deems it almost impossible that Latin America will be able to create a pendant to the European C o m m i s sion, the Council or the EP; " . . . s e r í a preferible abandonar esta ficción de una relación birregional institucionalizada que ha creado, primero, esperanzas infundadas, y después desilusiones dañinas precisamente de esas relaciones que intentaban fortalecer." 8 5 8 One o f the main problems o f Latin American countries is that they officially have good intentions, which are not implemented, at the operational level. 8 5 9 Nonetheless, the political dialogue between the EU and Latin America, institutionalised in various forums such as the joint council, joint committees and summits, is reportedly taken seriously in Brussels. 8 6 0 For van Klaveren, the goal o f a "European-Latin American role in international society" is still valid but until today it s e e m s to be an exaggeration to speak o f an authentic biregional strategic alliance, expressed in the principal in856

Interviews, Brussels, September 2003.

857

858 859 860

Van Klaveren, ' L a s relaciones políticas', p. 61. Grabendorff, ' L a estrategia birregional', p. 103. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. 169

ternational forums. There were some joint actions at big conferences but they had a cyclical character, without describing those as a special relation compared with other regions. On the other hand, out of quite comprehensible reasons, the biregional political dialogue has focused more on subjects concerning the two regions than on international topics. In the long run, the alignment of Latin America and an enlarged EU (together 58 countries) will potentially give the biregional partnership considerable weight in UN institutions and at big international conferences. 8 6 ' The South American "Community of Nations" aims at becoming a Latin American version of the EU. As mentioned earlier, there is muted approval and widespread scepticism toward this optimistic scenario. 862 A Latin American ambassador in Brussels expresses doubts about what this new "Union" will actually be good for. 863 A biregional FT A? The prospect of a biregional free trade area, which would merge the existing FTAs of the EU with Mexico, Chile, Mercosur and future agreements with Central American and the Andean region, is supported by many Latin American and European officials and ambassadors as a new vision, able to inspire relations between the two regions. In the Chilean foreign ministry, some voices advocate an association framework between the EU and Latin America. 864 It will be decisive whether the new Commission perceives Latin America as a true "partner" at the international level or as a negligible region, compared to other global "hot spots". In sum, I doubt that all of Latin America is seen as qualified to be a strategic partner of the EU beyond rhetorical statements. Only Mexico, Chile and Mercosur (Brazil) are possible candidates for an equal partnership. Aside from its relations with Mexico and Chile, the EU pursues strengthened ties with Mercosur. Mercosur's members are not only attractive for economic and trade cooperation, but also said to be more stable and reliable than other countries of the Andean region, or countries which see themselves culturally and politically (and of course, economically) closer to the US than to Europe. Furthermore, a European ambassador emphasises the importance of regional poles: In Europe, the poles have long been Germany and France; for Latin America, a successfully integrated Mercosur could serve as the point of departure for the Latin American integration. 865 Freres continues by saying that an advancement of European-

86,

V a n Klaveren, 'Las relaciones políticas', p. 60.

i62

The

863

Economist,

London, 9 December 2004.

lnterviews, Brussels, December 2004.

864

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004.

865

Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

170

Latin American relations seems doomed, but there is a glimmer of hope, if the successful conclusion of the EU-Mercosur agreement serves as an example. 866 A national diplomat in Brussels identifies one general tendency: Latin Americans want to institutionalise relations with the EU but the Union wants efficient relations, not awkward institutions without impact. One of the main problems is that the EU concentrates on the national or subregional level, but a "global vision" would be necessary for Latin America. 867 A European ambassador proposes the closer cooperation of an "inner group" consisting of Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile plus the "big five" of the EU in the region: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain. This pioneer group already occasionally gathers on in various Latin American capitals. 868

A political union between Latin America and the European Union? A Utopian "political union" is mostly rejected as too ambitious, unnecessary and questionable with regard to the diverging interests of both regions. Some interviewees sympathise with this idea to stimulate the debate, which has become too bureaucratic and stale. 869 A national official of Spain argues that before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a biregional union between Latin America and Europe would have been possible. Now it is highly unlikely, given the priorities of the EU. 870 For one representative of the European Commission in Latin America, a biregional union between a more integrated Latin America and a more united EU would be desirable. Likewise, a European ambassador deems such a political union attractive, but not very realistic because Latin American integration will take more than a generation due to the lack of a crucial experience, like World War II was for Europe, as catalyst for integration. Although a diplomat in the Chilean foreign ministry doesn't foresee a political union, he considers a deepened political association desirable and realistic. For this, Spain must be a driving force. Another Latin American ambassador sees a biregional political union as desirable, but first Latin Americans must be more united. 871 A political union is not on the agenda, a European representative in Buenos Aires points out, "not today and not tomorrow." Another European ambassador in Argentina favours a customs union but rejects the idea of a political union because mediation by Europe would be difficult and costly. Another EU diplo866

Freres, '¿De las declaraciones a la asociación birregional?', p. 123.

867

Interviews, Brussels, January 2004.

868

Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004.

869

Interviews, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, Washington D C., October 2003May 2004. See Dykmann, 'Les relations politiques entre PUnion européenne et l'Amérique latine', pp. 25, 26. 870 Interviews, Brussels, January 2004. 871

Interviews, Brussels, Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires, Washington D C., December 2003May 2004.

171

mat in Buenos Aires simply states: "Not in my lifetime", and adds that such a union is not necessarily desirable. A European ambassador in Buenos Aires remarks that instead of a political union, the EU should focus on Mercosur rather than Latin America as a region, as anything will become possible through an improved and strengthened Mercosur. In the Argentine foreign ministry, the idea is currently considered to be unrealistic, in part because the EU is expected to need time to get accustomed to the enlargement. A Latin American diplomat in Argentina deems a political union highly unlikely, but acknowledges closer links between the two regions as necessary. For a political advisor to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, such a biregional political union between the EU and Latin America would be just another UN. 872 Likewise, an ambassador from Europe in Santiago is pessimistic about the potential political union, but if Brazil and Chile become more involved in Europe, there will be space for closer cooperation. In the future, Latin America will get more attention from China and Japan than from Europe. The Chinese will need to turn to the US or Latin America; this ambassador thinks they will choose Latin America. Another European ambassador in Chile doesn't foresee a political union because Latin America politically belongs to the Third World, and thus wouldn't move too close to First World positions. A US diplomat holds that such a political union will not be established "in our time" ("both of us will be long dead") because it is unrealistic to see in a natural perspective a EU-Latin American union since it is driven by trade interests. Although such a Political Union would be good for the EU as it would mean a more integrated Latin America (stronger and more stable), an EU ambassador holds a political union impossible by any means, as there is no agreement in Latin America and there are countries without any motivation for integration. 873 A Spanish diplomat does not believe in a political union between the two regions, but trusts in a biregional FTA if the agreements of the EU with Mexico, Chile and the Mercosur are merged as an irreversible process. A German diplomat stresses the potential between Latin America, North America and Europe, which requires them to agree on more issues. For him, however, a political union between the EU and Latin America seems impossible. Furthermore, with regard to a biregional FTA, he asks whether Latin America is important enough for the EU in trade terms to build such a free trade area and concludes that the current approach of the EU (agreements with the subregions) seems more appropriate. 874 With regard to a political transatlantic triangle, it seems difficult for officials in the US State Department to see the EU as an equal partner in building a trian-

'Interviews, Buenos Aires, March 2004.

87^

" Interviews, Santiago de Chile, March 2004. 874

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004.

172

gular partnership. 875 Another US official holds that there will never be a transatlantic triangle as a political union because each one of the three regions is so different from the other two. 876

875

Interviews, Washington D C., May 2004. 876

lnterviews, Brussels, November 2003.

173

9. Conclusions Generally, both Latin America and Europe see relations with each other in a much more pragmatic light than in 1999 at the momentous summit in Rio. The importance of hemispheric trade relations with the United States to Latin America, and the EU's shift in perspective towards the East, seem to hint at changing priorities. In European Union-Latin American relations since the 1980s, the economic/trade aspect has maintained a dominant position compared to political relations - including the EU's CFSP perspective. In the following, I will address the two sets of questions mentioned in the introduction concerning the CFSP of the EU towards Latin America, as well as the general political relations between the regions.

9.1. The CFSP of the European Union towards Latin America There are no strategies.877 EU official on the regional analyses in the European institutions concerning Latin America.

a) Who are the major actors and what are their interests and goals with regard to CFSP towards Latin America? The major actors in the CFSP towards Latin America are the member states, the Council, and the Commission, but the Policy Unit is also potentially a key player. The member states, and, correspondingly, the Council, have particular interests and goals, which are still mostly shaped by national foreign policy discourses and traditions. No EU member state sees Latin America as a priority region for CFSP, as other regions and countries present more immediate problems. It is difficult to identify the CFSP goals the member states have for Latin America. Rather, foreign policy seems to consist of either country-based reactions, or strategies related to specific issues, which are more urgent for some member states (such as the fight against drugs). Long-term goals in the region can only be detected in Spain, although these considerations do not fit into a typical CFSP framework either. The Commission generally seems to be reluctant to get too involved in CFSP matters and concentrates on problematic countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba etc.). As its authority over CFSP is not exclusive, the Commission appears eager to avoid conflicts with the member states that are in charge of de877

Interviews, Brussels, December 2004.

175

cision-making in the second pillar. As a likely consequence, the Commission is seen as rather trade-focused, including the DG Relex, possibly as an indirect result of the alleged competition between the General Directorates of external relations and trade on who should take the initiative with regard to Latin America. The Policy Unit of the High Representative for CFSP is the body with the most convincing approach. Nevertheless, the Policy Unit is hardly involved in the day-to-day CFSP business. It prepares analytical reports on countries, or more likely, on the region as a whole. The long-term perspective, however, is not necessarily the Policy Unit's main focus, as it concentrates on short-term crisis prevention scenarios. Although the Latin American missions in Brussels, for example, occasionally turn to the "Latin America lobby" in the European Parliament to push the Commission, typically on trade matters, the EP's impact on CFSP tends to be nothing beyond budgetary matters. b) Which measures do the actors use to achieve their goals, and what are the consequences? The European Council has not elaborated general guidelines for CFSP towards Latin America as other regions of international conflict are more disquieting. This also explains why there is no common strategy, although the European Parliament put forward a draft in 2001. Accordingly, the main (official) instruments of CFSP regarding Latin America are the Common Position on Cuba (1996) as well as joint actions and declarations on the situation in that region. The five clauses of the FTAs are an indirect CFSP instrument, as they nominally guarantee certain rules of conduct - the real impact of these, however, must be reviewed in times of crisis. It is mainly the political atmosphere that seems to be affected by CFSP, exemplified by some diplomatic dissonances after critical CFSP declarations were published. The consequences of limited instruments are destined to be limited as well. As CFSP essentially suffers from the member states' reluctance to transfer more national authority to the EU, and governments still possess the quasi-exclusive power to make decisions in the second pillar, the differing long-term perspectives of national foreign policies are difficult to fuse into a global CFSP strategy for Latin America. c) What role does the relationship between the European institutions in Brussels play in the concrete CFSP towards Latin America? How do the informal intra- and inter-institutional communication flows influence the Union's CFSP positions and decisions? Generally, human relations are an essential element for the functioning of bureaucratic bodies and international institutions. The informal exchange of information could be regarded as a "soft" measure as well, as it provides information 176

on the margins of the corresponding institutions' positions and thus co-determines other strategies influencing the outcome of policies. The relationship between the European institutions is important, as the insufficient transfer of relevant information might, externally, lead to incorrect perceptions that are externally seen as incoherent actions, and internally, lead to a negative atmosphere or even lasting distrust between or within different institutions. In this regard, the personal relations between the individual actors of the institutions are of utmost importance. As the size of the "Latin America community" in Brussels is manageable, there are frequent contacts between officials of the Commission, the Council, the Permanent Representations, the Policy Unit and the Commission's delegations in Latin American capitals. The information is transmitted via personal encounters, either in official meetings or individually, via email or phone calls, or, more officially, through the Coreu network. Much of the information exchanged by interpersonal contacts is not necessarily relevant for inclusion in official reports; rather, it is needed to maintain a good working atmosphere among the different actors. For instance, the cooperation between the Policy Unit and the corresponding desk officers of the DG Relex G (plus the DG E IV of the Council in the background) in elaborating country strategy papers is remarkable, and has not only improved the reports, but also inter-institutional cooperation, as a prelude to the establishment of a European diplomatic corps (officially "European External Action Service"). Personal relationships in Brussels sometimes have helped to overcome inter-institutional jealousies, but are also reported to have been used to convey interests and desired actions from one institution to another. These are not new insights, but with regard to the EU officials dealing with Latin America, the connections are closer due to the small circle of people involved. The work of several European institutions and different competences often seem to promote over-information in some and a lack of information in due time in other cases. In addition, there seems to be a certain (institutional) reluctance to go beyond the day-to-day work. Overcoming this constraint will eventually become possible by providing more explicit provisions for the CFSP, a Union foreign minister with a seat in the Council and the Commission, an EU diplomatic corps and a more integrated European Union after the integration of the 25-28 member states. d) Is Spain, as a former colonial power in the region, a decisive player with regard to CFSP towards Latin America? Spain has become an essential link between the EU and Latin America. At the same time, Spain is losing influence within the enlarged EU, whose geographic centre has moved to the east. Spain does not play a dominant role in CFSP terms, compared with its impact on the EU's economic/trade and development approach towards Latin America. It seems that Spain's interest is in maintaining bilateral political relations, while "communitarising" EU development coopera177

tion and European trade through European institutions (and pursuing its own interests simultaneously). Spain could become an important actor in the CFSP towards Latin America, but at present it is not, mainly due to the following: 1) Spanish political relations with the region are mostly bilateral due to Spain's limited resources; 2) the "Europeanisation" of CFSP towards Latin America would certainly modify the specific "Ibero-American" relationship and implicitly diminish Spain's political position in the region; and 3) Spain might be concerned that the "big" member states, namely Great Britain, France and Germany, would not easily accept straightforward Spanish ambition in this regard. In sum, although it is often Spain that seizes the initiative in the EU if a crisis in Latin America arises, Spanish activism in the EU does not call into question the bilateral approach of Spanish foreign policy to the countries in the region. Like other member states, Spain seems less than eager to develop a regional CFSP concept. It reacts to crises only within the CFSP framework based on the insufficient case-by-case and country-related CFSP crisis mechanism that, by its very nature, makes obvious the need for a prevention strategy and a mid- or even long-term CFSP strategy for the region (see below). e) How should the CFSP towards Latin America be evaluated? Latin America is not a priority for CFSP, which reflects the rather reactive character of European foreign policy. While third and fourth generation agreements with Latin American countries and subregions advocate both political dialogue and, more subtly, regional integration in the region, the CFSP approach is rather disappointing. However, on particular issues, such as the fight against illicit drugs and drug trafficking, or the potential threat to democracy by indigenous uprisings, the EU has become more sensitive to regional, rather than just local, views. In first pillar matters, there are Regional Strategy Papers elaborated by the Commission with assistance of the member states, which reflect political concerns and possibly even a strategic approach. The problem of the EU's CFSP towards the region (and likely a problem of CFSP as such) is that the people in charge do not have the time or the necessary resources. Presumably, they also cannot count on the political will to develop long-lasting strategies, which would include the elaboration of possible long-term scenarios (and how they are to be dealt with) in order to be prepared to implement a thoughtful and timely response in the case of a crisis. The work of the Policy Unit is exemplary in this regard, and the personal dedication of the Spaniard Javier Solana should not be underestimated, but as there are other urgent tasks for "M. PESC", he is bound to the foreign policy priorities of the EU. Not surprisingly, then, the perception of CFSP in Latin America mainly seems to be stamped with the still existing state-centred view of national foreign policy, and the European disagreements on the Iraq question in 2002/2003. The

178

general realpolitik assessment in Latin America appears to be that the EU will never speak with one voice in its foreign policy. There are the following deficiencies, some of which are linked to general problems of CFSP, others of which are particularly valid for the EU's foreign policy towards Latin America: 1) Limited resources: The CFSP budget is too small, and there is no space to elaborate a thorough CFSP strategy for Latin America as other tasks are more urgent. One diplomat in charge of the entire continent (and now the United Nations as well!) cannot achieve much in light of the potential for multiple crises in the region, combined with the political disinterest in Latin America on behalf of the overwhelming majority of member states. A single expert can hardly develop a generally accepted strategy, while others are too busy with all-consuming day-to-day tasks. 2) Lack of a driving force: The Commission, usually the EU's executive, cannot and dares not play a more prominent role regarding CFSP. The European Council, the Council of the EU, and the member states tend to pursue national or group interests in long-term perspectives. In this regard, even Spain's ambitions to establish a stronger relationship with Latin America are not helpful for the CFSP towards the continent, as a "communitarised" EU foreign policy approach towards the entire region would be perceived as a potential counter-model to national or "Ibero-American" goals. 3) Slow reaction mechanisms: In general, the exchange of information works commendably. However, due to the lack of common positions, let alone a common strategy for Latin America and its subregions, there are situations in which CFSP mechanisms hardly help as the member states struggle over the proper language for a declaration. The EU as an ambitious international player should respond to international crises and developments within an appropriate period of time according to predetermined rules flexible enough for minor modifications depending on the context of a crisis. More common positions and a common strategy for the region would provide the foundations for these rules. 4) Insufficient measures: There are sanctions in the CFSP framework, but these are aimed at what the US government would term "rogue states" and not at democratically ruled "strategic partners" in Latin America. Joint actions in relation to the fight against small arms have been successful, but should constitute the beginning of CFSP engagement in the region. Declarations, usually balanced to express the will of all member states, do not make a difference in the behaviour of a third country and often come out too late. The clauses of the FTAs - though generally praiseworthy - are often perceived in Latin America as an expression of patrimonial bearing of the EU. Here, a problem of different political cultures 179

becomes evident, because Latin American governments reportedly tend to request a return service for accepting the clauses. 5) Unsatisfying consequences: If we look at the major CFSP focal points of the region, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia or Guatemala, the impact of CFSP has rather been meagre. 878 The scant results of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy in Latin America are certainly comprehensible if we regard CFSP as a new instrument, but its aim should be more ambitious. In Colombia, groups of European states, rather than the EU, have been engaged and struggle with the military approach of the heavily involved US. The Common Position on Cuba has been disputed among Europeans, and the declarations on social riots in the Andean Community did not have much impact. An alternative regional approach to drug-trafficking, for instance, would also touch the US policy in the region, especially in Colombia. This is another reason why the EU's CFSP seems to meander around solutions for the big problems of Latin America, as there is not only a trade competition with the US in the continent, but also a contest of political ideas. Some member states would not like to see Latin America as a region where the "hyperpuissance" United States (Hubert Védrine) and the aspiring-superpower EU spar over their civilian-focused or military-oriented approaches. A useful concept? The CFSP toward Latin America One purpose of CFSP should be to avert political crises, and consequently it needs to develop, at the very least, prevention strategies for the various subrogions, if not for the continent. Certainly, some scenarios have already been dealt with by the Policy Unit or SITCEN (and these are confidential): For instance in 2004, a confidential policy paper was prepared on Colombia; another one was planned for Venezuela in 2005. Furthermore, a European plan for Cuba after Fidel Castro's death has been subject to some consideration, but this topic is obviously too controversial to be discussed in public. As the security dimension must include social unrest, which can lead to destabilising situations that threaten a state's integrity, the social tensions (to use a rather euphemistic expression) in some parts of Latin America are alarming and do already concern the Conflict Prevention Unit. Accordingly, the security dimension of a world player's foreign policy must include the stability of the international system in general and also include the prediction and prevention of social crises. 879 A 878

879

However, the less visible impact of CFSP might also be explained by the E U ' s greater emphasis and capacities regarding a "rather carrot than stick" approach, compared with the US. " A la suite de la mondialisation, il n'existe aujourd'hui plus de lien direct entre la distance géographique d ' u n événement et l'impact potentiel de celui-ci sur la sécurité de l ' U E . Désormais cette sécurité dépend des interactions mondiales et donc de la stabilité du système international lui-même, en toutes ses dimensions." Biscop/Coolsaet, ' U n e stratégie de l ' U E pour la sécurité', p. 130.

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worsening political situation in the region would also affect the EU more immediately than expected: immigration to the EU might increase considerably. In addition, an efficient fight against organised crime in the European Union, particularly in connection with drug-trafficking, seems impossible without struggling with the problem and its roots in Latin America. If compared with the US, however, the EU has a more convincing approach that takes into account the causes of these problems as well. 880 In the Conflict Prevention Unit of the European Commission, it is generally agreed that there is a large potential for crisis in Latin America, especially in the Andean region. Likewise, the situation in Argentina, once a rich country even by European standards, also gives reason for concern, as rural poverty could provoke violent riots. 881 Is the lack of a global CFSP concept or a common strategy for Latin America also evidence that the EU does not deem it necessary to develop an all-encompassing approach as the region is considered a "strategic partner" anyway? This appears to be the case. On the other hand, Latin Americans could perceive the lack of such a strategy as proof of the diminishing interest of Europeans in their region. 882 In sum, a strengthened, more efficient and visible CFSP plan for the entire region would also make the EU a more serious and attractive partner for Latin Americans to develop comprehensive political relations at the biregional level. The more that CFSP is applied in general (Iraq question, ESDP, Union foreign minister, better consistency, and the overcoming of pillarisation), and the more that concrete CFSP towards the continent gains coherence, continuity and political backing from the EU member states, the more likely the Union will be accepted as a political actor in Latin America. This also affects biregional relations as such and provides space to extend the partnership from trade/development cooperation to more and more political areas. The stronger the CFSP approach towards the region, the more Latin America will be compelled to agree on common positions and thus encourage regional political integration.

880

These two examples were brought forward at the conference GlobalEurope 2020 on the EU-Latin American relations in Belem, Portugal on 9 July 2004 to exemplify the interde881 pendence of both regions. Interviews, Brussels, December 2004. 882

In contrast, Russia is also a strategic partner of the EU and still there is a common strategy (although it is rather useless), as well as annual summits with the Russian government. See Samantha de Bendern/Fraser Cameron, Prospects for EU-Russia Relations. The European Policy Centre, Issue Paper 19, November 2004.

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9.2. Political relations between the E U and Latin America a) What are the mutual perceptions in Latin America and Europe and how do these influence biregional relations? The Europeans perceive Latin America as still far from acting as a united international player, which explains why the EU recognises only Mexico, Chile and the Mercosur (Brazil) as reliable political partners. Furthermore, the European perception of Latin America as a subordinated foreign policy priority has also led to a certain disenchantment on behalf of the Latin Americans who are increasingly keen to establish other international partnerships. 883 Both developments strain the historical-cultural bonds between the two regions and cause the "strategic partnership" proclaimed in 1999 to seem an empty phrase. In Latin America, the EU is seldom seen as an international political actor, rather as a welcome economic and trade partner that is stubbornly insisting on its controversial agricultural subsidies. In this context, the commonly used notion in Latin America for the EU as "European Community" is thus telling. In political matters, Latin American governments turn to individual European nation states, since in spite of its role as major provider of development assistance the EU is not seen as a genuine political actor in Latin America. This is also a result of neglect by the media in the region. A global agreement with Mercosur shall serve as an example, a model and a nucleus for other subregions to integrate, and possibly serve as a stimulus for the establishment of a South American free trade area. Latin Americans like the encompassing EU approach (particularly if compared to the negotiations with the US on FTAs), which includes European values such as democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, etc. Nevertheless, although there is sympathy on behalf of Latin Americans for the EU concept, they sometimes perceive sophisticated procedures in Brussels as opaque, and the lack of a permanent interlocutor (Union Foreign Minister, EU President), and the almost idealistic European approach expressed in the language of agreements and declarations, cause Latin American leaders to consider the Union at best a unique and hybrid player in international relations. In sum, the mutual perceptions in Europe and Latin America suggest that there are more than two entities at work, which is seen as an obstacle for the development of closer biregional relations.

883

"In a world o f intensified multipolarity the "Pacific connection" would be an alternative to the "European connection" to prevent the United States from regaining hegemony in Latin America." Carranza, 'Toward a strategic partnership?', p. 27.

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b) To which extent have the biregional summits advanced political relations? The first summit took place in exceptional circumstances: the mood amid 48 heads of state and governments united in 1999 helped to construct the myth of Rio. One observer correctly remarks that the summit was a success because it took place at all. 884 The second meeting in 2002 was more sober. The Guadalajara summit seemed to confirm this trend, although it was not a complete failure, as feared by some. The EU usually stresses the good condition of current political relations. Nonetheless, the actual results are less convincing, as Latin Americans seem to be more interested in trade and cooperation issues, and the really sensitive topics of the 1st or 3 rd pillar (debt, agriculture, migration) are not on the agenda. Furthermore, there are basic problems of biregional coordination mainly due to a lack of integration and harmonisation of national interests among Latin Americans: not only is the planned consultation and coordination in international organisations and before international conferences dissatisfying, even the preparations for biregional summits are inadequate. The summits have certainly increased awareness of the biregional potential of common issues, but now more concrete steps, reflecting their ambitious vision, must follow.

c) Is there actually a strategic partnership, particularly with regard to political relations? As a neutral observer, I would reason that there is no partnership yet between the EU and Latin America that merits the attribute "strategic". However, as an optimist, I conclude that there is a strategic partnership, which still needs to be filled with life. Furthermore, the inflationary use of this term leaves the E U ' s orientation somewhat unintelligible. What drives the external relations of the Union? Is it its interest in Eastern Europe (with Russia and Ukraine as "strategic partners", plus the neighbourhood initiative), transatlantic relations, or the prospect of becoming a military or economic superpower? The European Security Strategy of December 2003 mentions a "strategic partnership" between the EU and N A T O - the transatlantic relationship is described as "irreplaceable" - and further, the document calls for the establishment of key partnerships with Russia, Japan, China, Canada, and India. Latin America is not explicitly mentioned, only indirectly alluded to when reference is made to strategic partnerships "...with all those who share our goals and values and are prepared to act in their

884

Alberto Antón Cortés, 'Las relaciones políticas de la Unión Europea con América Latina tras la primera conferencia intergubernamental'. In: Revista CIDOB d'Afers Inlernacionals, 54-55, noviembre 2001, p. 26. 183

support." 8 8 5 While Latin America is referred to once, very generally, the words "partner", "partnership" or "strategic partner" appear eleven times. Recently reported efforts by the Policy Unit, as well as a new active Relex Commissioner with interest in the region, however, could stimulate the evolution of such a new alliance. d) What is the role of the US, and how does it influence European-Latin American relations? To what degree would a closer Latin American-European partnership lead to a sort of counterweight to the perceived unilateralism of the superpower United States? The US does not take the EU seriously as an equal rival in Latin America. C o m pared with the Europeans, the U S is both disliked (politically, culturally) and preferred by many as negotiation partner in Latin America as, unlike the EU, it speaks with one voice and is very pragmatic, although this short-term, issuefocused pragmatism is also seen as ignorant and bullying by some. As I observe an increasing diversification of Latin American external trade and foreign relations, I would speak neither of a solid inter-American relationship nor of US-EU work-sharing in the continent. The impact of the US is important in Latin America, but obviously more for Central America, Mexico and Colombia than for the Mercosur members. The EU and the United States collaborate on problems in Latin America, but are simultaneously involved in a competition of trade and political concepts in the region. At present, the EU is not an equal competitor, but it could become more influential, especially with a successful EU-Mercosur agreement that serves as a model for further biregional association. An authentic "strategic partnership" would also be an alliance with the aim of balancing the predominance of the United States in Latin America and at the international level. A closer biregional partnership explicitly directed against the US, however, would neither be possible - due to numerous opponents in both Europe and Latin America - nor would it be desirable. A closer transatlantic triangular cooperation with stronger and more reliable Latin American partners should be the goal of a strengthened EU-Latin American affiliation, as the U S is an indispensable partner. In this sense, stronger EU-Latin American cooperation would serve to encounter the superpower US f r o m an improved position, based on a competitive rather than conflictive partnership. Furthermore, the demographic factor will affect the relations between the US, Latin America and Europe: in a mid- to long-term scenario the Hispanic population in the United States will have increasing influence on US foreign policy towards Latin America, while simultaneously, the European demographic decline is also expected to weaken the position of the EU in international politics.

885

/i Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 12-14.

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In short, the EU and the US mostly share the same interests in Latin America and develop similar analyses of its problems, but compete on trade and on the political approaches to addressing the difficulties in the region.

e) What are the prospects of political relations between the European Union and Latin America - particularly in view of the EU enlargement, the Free Trade of the Americas project and renewed South-South cooperation (Group of 20)? Although Latin America might not be the main focus of EU foreign policy, there are three major arguments that justify a more active and strategic connection with the region: 1) as the EU aspires to become a real world player/power, it is necessary to strengthen ties with all international actors, especially with those who are very close politically; 2) within the North-South context, a strengthened biregional relationship could have the potential to smooth tensions on delicate issues and provide the EU with more credibility in the developing world; 3) as mentioned above, pessimistic forecasts predict that the demographic decline will decrease the EU's standing in the world, especially since highly populated regional powers such as India, China and Brazil are already developing international ambitions. The lack of young people in Europe and the problem of increasing pension costs might be compensated for with a long-term immigration policy, which could also become part of the strategic partnership with Latin America. Directly speaking, Latin Americans wish that the EU would waive Latin American external debts to a large extent, reduce its agriculture subventions, and increase development aid to the region. These steps are seen as external preconditions for social reforms in the region, which finally would allow Latin American states to increase social spending. However, it would also be myopic to focus exclusively on this, as corruption and bad governance in the region have long been identified as serious problems. In this context, social cohesion should become more feasible and binding for Latin American governments. The European Union expects Latin America, or at least its subregions, to become more integrated and deal with social and economic inequalities in an honest, concrete and sustainable manner. The European wish to see Latin Americans "do their homework" and create more "social cohesion" is not paternalistic, but a comprehensible expectation from the major donor in the region, which has accomplished the same goal more or less successfully (although starting under different conditions). It is not this request as such, but rather the way in which it is put forward at biregional gatherings, which might give Latin Americans reason to complain. From an economic/trade perspective, Latin America is certainly not as intriguing as Asia. In terms of conflict prevention, crisis management, and the fight against poverty, the region is not as "attractive" as Africa as a place to demonstrate Europe's military capacities. Nevertheless, the region labeled the "interna-

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tional middle class" 8 8 6 should be particularly interesting for Europe since it is both a region largely marked by "Western culture" and nominal basic values such as democracy, human rights and the rule o f law, and a nuclear-weaponfree, developing continent in touch with other "Third World" regions. 887 A true "strategic partnership" could foster common interests more actively: for instance the strengthening o f the UN, multilateralism, specific issues such as the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, biregional agreement on some issues at the international level, combined with the repeated rhetorical support for multilateralism seems to be scanty in view o f highly political issues - again, the Iraq crisis or European and US American agricultural subsidies serve as illustrating examples. 888 To reach a true political partnership, Latin America and the EU should be able to define common positions on conflictive topics such as a joint position on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the Middle East conflict, civil wars and hunger crises in Africa, the conflict in Chechnya, or the reform o f the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, it is difficult for the EU member states alone to agree on a common position on these issues, much less agree with a third party. An authentic "strategic partnership" might also be an opportunity, as the regions are linked and, at the same time, so different: the EU as international player with traditional relations to the superpower US, Russia and other world regions; Latin America with the US as its neighbour but also with increasing trade connections in Asia and traditional ties to the developing world. Integration and intraregional solidarity in Europe and Latin America might serve as models for others.

8 8 6 lnterviews,

887

Santiago de Chile, March 2 0 0 4 .

Recent reports on alleged Brazilian endeavours to produce uranium fit for nuclear weapons, 888

supposedly either to build own arms or to export it, have created uneasiness in this regard. Russia finally agreed on ratifying the Kyoto Protocol because the Kreml wanted the EU to be satisfied after some disputes on the war in Chechnya and autocratic tendencies in Russia. This realpolitik game is more likely than to expect idealist advances at the international level.

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10. Proposals Here, I will present some general and concrete proposals to improve the CFSP towards Latin America, political biregional relations, and the impact of both regions in world politics.

10.1. The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy 1) To prepare an operational CFSP strategy paper on risks, challenges and developments in Latin America from a regional and hemispheric perspective by taking into account potential areas of cooperation with the United States and the OAS. This paper shall outline scenarios and prevention measures as well as plans of action, by taking into consideration improved European cooperation in international finance institutions (IFIs)889 and between IFIs and other organisations (IDB, World Bank, WTO, UN, OAS etc.), and also bearing in mind first and third pillar issues (debt, development cooperation, trade, migration). Certainly, there are Policy Unit papers on these topics, but there needs to be a plan, which considers the regional perspective from an all-encompassing and strategic view, including long-term developments. 2) To institutionalise contact with the OAS while considering its potential administrative and political weaknesses and the strong national interests within that organisation and its member states.*90 Electoral observatory missions as an area of occasional cooperation are just the beginning. The parties involved should consider pooling the expertise of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Military Assistance (TIAR), ESDP and the "strategic partnership" into a coherent programmatic security concept pursuing these goals:

889

Europeans must discuss the pros and cons of a more unified coordination of European voting behaviours in the IFIs. The necessity of this request has been highlighted by the inertness o f CFSP without a financial/economic component and the inability of ECOFIN to be a decision-maker within the IFIs. Here, an enriching collaboration between European stakeholders and Latin American countries, having considerable experience with structural adjustment programmes and chronic debt problems, can provide perspective.

890

Allegedly it has been said that the OAS is too quick to ask the EU for money. Taking into account the economic and military power of the United States, US membership in the OAS must translate into more financial responsibility. An optimised collective handling of common topics such as the transnational fight against terrorism or drug trafficking could be convincing arguments for the United States and the OAS in this regard.

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For the advancement of the Declaration of Guadalajara 891 , to improve the international capacity to prevent and respond collectively to humanitarian crises, joint peace forces and joint military rapid reaction forces of both regions shall be established. 892 This could also strengthen the ties between Latin America, the EU and the United States.893 • To establish a functioning regional crisis reaction mechanism (OAS with manpower, EU with advisors), in cooperation with the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security. Release mechanisms for action would be the violation of the respective provisions contained in the Association Agreements between the EU, Chile, Mexico, Mercosur and other subregions, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 894 • A biregional public security policy: Joint police task forces shall set up exchange programmes of security forces to improve mutual understanding and increase the effectiveness of the police in both regions by learning from each other.895 •

3) To fight terrorism. Closer triangular cooperation is desirable as both Latin America and European countries have considerable experience with terrorism. A more balanced approach could be reached with the use of the OAS expertise, commendably demonstrated by the 2002 report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights896, together with US intelligence information and Latin American and European experience, in compliance with domestic rule of law and in accordance with international law. Rather than fighting wars against nation-states, which occasionally seems necessary but likely increases the recruitment of new fanatics, the focus would be more on transnational covert operations against terrorist networks and addressing the socio-economic roots of terrorism. Here, the reported reluctance of the US intelligence sectors to share information with the Europeans and the supposed lack of confidentiality in some 891

Declaración de Guadalajara. III Cumbre América Latina y el Caribe - Unión Europea, Guadalajara, México, 29 de mayo de 2004, paragraph 98. 892 See Fernández Fernández, 'Un grito en favor del refuerzo de la asociación política y social 893 birregional', p. 56. The European Security and Defence Policy shall include Latin American countries to use their specific political relations, for instance Brazil's ties with lusophone states in Africa Brazil was the only non-member of NATO in the Operation Artemis in Congo. Navarro, 'UE-América Latina', p. 151. 894 Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted in Lima, 11 September 2001, Articles 19-22. 895

Europeans could demonstrate administrative achievements and technological equipment, as well as how to fight crime within the rule of law, while Latin Americans could bring in their experience fighting organised crime, widespread violence, drug-related offences and gang delinquency. 896 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights/Organisation of American States, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., 22 October 2002 (Original: English).

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Latin American countries are serious obstacles for more intense cooperation regarding the exchange of sensitive information. 4) To adopt a Common Strategy for Latin America that takes trade and political matters as well as development cooperation into consideration. The adoption of a progressive and ambitious common strategy897 would certainly lay some pressure on the Latin American countries and the Rio Group to design a "Latin American" strategy towards the EU as well, and thereby strengthening regional integration. This would also help improve the political relations between the two regions. The 2001 proposal of the European Parliament and its update from Puebla (2004) 898 serve as drafts but should be revised and possibly extended, particularly with regard to defence/security and development cooperation. 899 5) To set up an EU foreign service with an all-encompassing worldview. Concretely, the participants of the possibly forthcoming European External Action Service (better termed as European diplomatic service) should be trained not only in diplomacy and related fields. A major focus must be trade and development expertise to assure a thorough approach in line with the DGs Trade, Development, Enlargement, Europe Aid (Commission), DG E, Policy Unit and SITCEN (Council). 900 In particular, the trade, development and humanitarian perspectives should have sufficient personnel to guarantee a genuine EU foreign relations structure with third countries and regions. Although the establishment of the new EU diplomatic service already considers an all-encompassing viewpoint, one concrete step which would broaden new foreign officials' minds would be to establish "European foreign policy and development cooperation" as an overall theme for the yearly European Diplomatic Programmes, where young diplomats from the EU member states, the Commission and the Secretariat of the Council are trained. This would be an excellent opportunity to extend the perspective of future European diplomats from the be-

897 898

In contrast to proposal I), a common strategy shall be the official instrument, while a CFSP strategy paper unofficially outlines goals and expected scenarios.

Propuestas de los Parlamentos de Integración para dotar de contenido concreto a la Asociación Estratégica Birregional UE-ALC. FdR 529965 ES/PE 341.275, Puebla, 19 de marzo de 2004. 899 For instance, I do not consider a "Transatlantic Parliamentarian Assembly" helpful at present because for this, the EP is still not powerful enough, and its Latin American pendant, the Parlatino, even less so. See Fernández Fernández, 'Un grito en favor del refuerzo de la asociación política', pp. 64, 65. 900

See Fräser Cameron, Towards an EU diplomatic service. EPC Commentary on "The Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy", 23 July 2004, http://www.theepc.net/en/ default.asp?TYP=TEWN&LV=187&see=y&t=&PG=TEWN/EN/detail&l=9&AI=393, 15 December 2004.

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ginning, in order to reflect that development cooperation is an essential element of the Union's external actions. 901 The main goal of this proposal is to provide the future diplomatic service a more comprehensive view of Latin America (and other world regions) by linking CFSP and development cooperation in order to prevent exclusively shortterm perspectives.

10.2. Political relations: Cooperation at the political level, in trade matters, and with regard to development cooperation and social cohesion 1) Acceptance of pioneer groups in the EU and Latin America in order to further integration in the regions. In Europe, there will be (different) peer groups, including Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain, Italy and Poland. These will change in composition depending on the issue and the orientation of governments. In Latin America an advancing ABCM-Group (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico), for instance, would promote regional integration and biregional relations with the EU. This group should see Mercosur as a potential nucleus of Latin American integration, and further, follow a mixture of the Monnet and the Kohl method: to build lasting institutions and to respect and consider the positions of smaller countries as well (a major obstacle during the CEPAL approach to creating a Latin American trade area in the 1960s). 2) To reduce political dialogues to a manageable size with the aim of forcing Latin American countries to first agree on common positions (main problem at the summits in 2002/2004), which indirectly will promote regional integration (or lead to the possibly inevitable collapse of the Andean Community). The senior official level should be strengthened and Rio Group-EU summits be convened if anything substantial is on the agenda by maintaining a regular highlevel meeting every two years (presently meetings happen once per year). With a functioning framework (Political and Security Partnership or biregional Association Agreement), the collaboration should shift more to the senior and desk officer level, while ministers and heads of state and government shall make actual political decisions. 902

901

In the 2004/2005 European Diplomatic Programme, the topic "European Security Strat902 e g y " also aimed to discuss the elemental linkage between security and development.

Furthermore, Navarro proposes to establish a yearly Mercosur-EU summit, similar to existing gatherings with the US, Canada or Russia (and Japan and India). This is certainly a helpful consideration, as these meetings might evoke competition with the Rio Group-EU meetings: If these Mercosur-EU gatherings prove to be more effective (which is likely), this would possibly stimulate the EU-Rio Group summits as well and lead to more constructive meetings. Navarro, ' U E - A m e r i c a Latina', p. 151.

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3) To further institutionalise biregional relations. The institutionalisation of relations is an appealing concept, but more institutions or biregional forums (from some despised as mere "show events") should only be established with the perspective of an actual impact. A Latin American ambassador proposes the following schedule until 2012 for deeper institutionalisation of EU-Latin American relations: 1) an agreement with Mercosur; 2) similar agreements with the Andean Community; Central America and the Caribbean countries within the ACP framework; 3) the creation of a Free Trade Area between the EU and Latin America, plus an intelligent political association. 903 This plan is an ambitious proposal for possible institutionalisation, but the details remain to be outlined. I suggest taking advantage of a Latin American-EU Association Agreement or a Political and Security Partnership to provide such an alliance with more ambitious goals. More than simply a merged version of several subregional FTAs, it shall outline both a biregional model and a concrete and binding common international approach, which goes beyond the routine rhetoric on multilateralism. A problem in the establishment of such an authentic biregional association, however, is that the subregions (Mercosur, Andean Community and Central America) are eager to agree on FTAs before considering an accord between the EU and the entire continent. The subregional negotiations also bind considerable human resources within the EU, which complicates parallel endeavours in the Union to establish a global agreement with Latin America as a whole. 4) To establish working groups on interregional relations in general and a desk for inter-American relations (and their impact on EU-Latin American affairs) in the European Commission (respectively in the forthcoming EU diplomatic service) in particular. The interregional working groups shall analyse the effects of developments in Asia, for instance, on European-Latin American relations, and outline corresponding strategies.904 The "inter-American desk" shall be located between the Horizontal Unit of DG Relex G and Relex C.I., or within a forthcoming European diplomatic service. It shall operate in cooperation with DG Trade, DG Development, and the delegation in Washington and maintain informal contacts with the official of the US Mission in charge of Latin American affairs in Brussels and with Latin American ambassadors.

903 904

Interviews, Brussels, December 2003. For instance, the connections between Russia, India and China also affect the EU-Latin American partnership: Russia is close to Europe and an important supplier o f resources, India is democratic and has an emerging economy, but is also a prominent speaker o f the developing world, while China provides the most impressive economic growth - and invests billions of dollars in Latin American countries - but maintains an authoritarian political system.

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•

General description: The desk serves as horizontal link between the European diplomatic service (and today the DG Relex G/C), the DGs Trade and Development. • Tasks: The desk observes positions in different EU institutions, in Latin American and European governments as well as in the US Trade and State Department in order to outline horizontal problems and detect neglected communities. A regular survey on the triangle relations (poll on perceptions in cooperation with Transatlantic Trends of the German Marshall Fund, Eurobarometer and the Latinobarometro) would be helpful, as would the elaboration of papers based on analysis of media, academic studies, and economic data, plus informal information from personal conversations. Main questions relevant for the new desk are: 1) How can the EU improve EULatin American relations without worrying the US? 2) How can the EU, together with the US, prevent Latin Americans from using the FTAA negotiations and the trade talks with the EU to improve their position at the expense of the EU/US? 3) How can the EU gather confidential information on inter-American trade talks without displeasing Latin Americans and the US? 4) To which extent do other international actors, particularly in Asia (at present mainly China), influence EU-Latin American relations? 5) To establish biregional education and university programmes. Although some cooperation mechanisms in this field already exist905, biregional school programmes and college courses should be developed, such as a regularised Latin American Studies master's degree in Europe or a European master's degree in Latin America or even a biregional programme for both (Latin American-European M.A.), which shall lead to a more active and continuous exchange of students and academics. In addition, a Latin American-European history project (as well as a transatlantic history), possibly as a basis for biregional textbooks, would help advance relations and mutual understanding.

905

The main programmes are ALFA and Alßan. ALFA (América Latina - Formación Académica) is a programme o f co-operation between higher education institutions of the European Union and Latin America. The Programme Alßan aims for the reinforcement o f EULatin American co-operation in the area o f Higher Education and covers studies for postgraduates (in the context of Master and Doctorate degrees) as well as higher training for Latin American professionals and future decision-makers, in institutions or centres in the European Union.

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6) To consider establishing social cohesion (using the Gini Index906 and/or the Human Development Index as indicator) as another (binding) clause for a future biregional agreement with Latin America. Flexible handling should be guaranteed, but government agencies and other relevant partners must commit themselves to progressive development in this regard. The sustainable eradication of deep social inequality - a major problem in Latin America - shall become another basis for agreement, possibly as obligatory as democratic principles and fundamental human rights. At the same time, the existing aid programmes in the development cooperation should be reconsidered and the controversial CAP be pragmatically reformed 907 in order to demonstrate a quid-proquo attitude on behalf of the EU. Furthermore, a clause on the prevention of corruption related to social cohesion might be considered. Possible clauses on social cohesion and against corruption shall be reviewed by a social cohesion unit set up by the future External Service in cooperation with their corresponding counterparts in Latin America in order to prevent criticisms of neo-colonial behaviour. In this, the proposed Interregional Solidarity Fund might have a new role: It could reward countries with remarkable advancements in the field of social cohesion. The collaboration with NGOs such as Transparency International and development groups could serve as an additional control mechanism. Here, I propose an amendment to the Association Agreements: "The promotion of sustainable economic and social development and the equitable distribution of the benefits of the Association are guiding principles for the implementation of this Agreement. a) The parties agree on a detailed schedule not exceeding 15 years, and a binding index (Gini coefficient) 908 as a determined goal to reach social cohesion in the respective societies. The parties must set up the schedule and the index goal within 90 days after this Agreement enters into force.

906

The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution o f income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number o f recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line o f absolute equality, expressed as a percentage o f the maximum area under the line. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value o f 1 perfect inequality. See http://www.undp.org/ hdr2003/indicator/indic_l 26 1 1 html, 15 December 2004. 907 See Fernández Fernández, 'Un grito en favor del refuerzo de la asociación política', pp. 66-69. 908

The goal should be not less ambitious than to reach a Gini coefficient o f 0.45. At present, Europe has an average Gini coefficient of about 0.3, while many Latin American countries lag behind other world regions with 0.6. 193

b) All parties of this Agreement must guarantee observance of the compliance with the provisions set in paragraph a) in cooperation with the International Labour Organisation and the respective civil society." Generally, though, such a social cohesion clause runs the risk of provoking more demands for return services on behalf of the Latin Americans. Furthermore, such rigid norms might prove ineffective in view of the typical dialectic between theoretical claim and factual impact in the real world (consider the fate of the Stability and Growth Pact) and the numerous opportunities to manipulate or misinterpret statistics.

10.3. International cooperation beyond the biregional level 1 ) To strengthen the multilateral system. A pragmatic solution would also combine a strengthened biregional alliance within an enforced multilateralist system (both, politically and economically). While Latin Americans should try to promote the démocratisation and international involvement of Arab and African countries and India, Europeans should foster relations with North America and Russia to create improved, equal and more reliable transatlantic relations between the Western Hemisphere and Europe, if not Eurasia. With a shared strong interest in Asia, the EU, Latin America and the United States should not only increase trade relations but also promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in that region, as these values are meaningless if every international trade partner interested in the excessively growing Chinese markets disregards them. 2) To promote reform of the UN Security Council. The EU should strategically discuss the pros and cons of a joint EU seat in the UN Security Council or whether to support Germany's candidature 909 . Brazil must convince other Latin American countries, including Mexico, why and how it can speak for the entire region - besides its economic importance and geographic size.910 Mutual assistance from both regions for the respective seats must be the consequential action. Even a biregional debate on how to strive for a more balanced UN Security Council and on how to broaden Europe's and Latin America's voice within the latter might be considered, although there is the likely risk of litigation motivated by national interests and jealousies, particularly with regard to the G4 group (India, Germany, Japan, Brazil) and the opposition coalition (Italy, Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan etc.). 909

See Transatlantic Trends 2005, Key Findings. A Project of the German Marshall Fund o f the United States and the Compagnia di Sao Paolo with additional support from the Luso910American Foundation and the Fundación BBVA, pp. 4, 9, 10. A debate among Latin Americans on a permanent seat for the Rio Group as such would certainly be laudable, but presently is quite unrealistic.

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A very practical advancement has been the working coordination mechanism in the UN Security Council, a Group of European (five in 2004) and Latin American countries (two in 2004), as proposed by Javier Solana. 9 " 3) To encourage democracy and human rights in China, together with the United States and Latin America. The US and the EU should strengthen their efforts and improve their offers in the ongoing negotiations, as Latin America is tempted by China as an emerging trade (and political) power. Here, shared values should not only represent rhetorical statements; rather, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law must be determinants - not only for Latin America and the United States but also the Europeans who strive for lucrative deals with China. While maintaining general support for the economic development of the emerging new power, it would be more effective to insistently and constantly encourage the Chinese government in a joint effort to adopt democratic reforms and improve the respect for basic rights.912 4) To assume biregional responsibility for the developing world. A strengthened EU-Latin American partnership should promote the UN Millennium Development Goals, emphasising gender issues, the external debt problem and environmental questions. These objectives are targets on which the international community has already agreed, and they need strong supporters if they are to be implemented. Certainly, an overall foreign policy approach of the European Union would be helpful. 913 In times of economic and political globalisation, increasing world trade and international terrorism, foreign policies must provide global and interregional views, including long-term perspectives.

911 See Fernández Fernández, 'Un grito en favor del refuerzo de la asociación política', p. 63. 912

See Transatlantic Trends 2005, Key Findings, pp. 4, 12, 19. 913 See Stefan Brüne's proposal of a Common Foreign, Security and Development Policy (CFSDP). Stefan Brüne, Europas Außenbeziehungen und die Zukunft der Entwicklungspolitik. Opladen (Germany) 2005. 195

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Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Iberoamerika-Kunde, zuletzt erschienen: Bd. 56: G. Calcagnotto/ D. Nolte (Hrsg.): Südamerika zwischen US-amerikanischer Hegemonie und brasilianischem Führungsanspruch. Konkurrenz und Kongruenz der Integrationsprozesse in den Amerikas, 2002 Bd. 57: P. Bendel/ M. Krennerich (Hrsg.): Soziale Ungerechtigkeit. Analysen zu Lateinamerika, 2002 Bd. 58: B. Schwerin: Politische Kultur in Lateinamerika - Ein Beitrag zur Dezentrierung der Demokratietheorie, 2003 Bd. 59: S. Kurtenbach/ M. Minkner-Bünjer/ A. Steinhauf (Hrsg.): Die Andenregion - Neuer Krisenbogen in Lateinamerika, 2004 Bd. 60: A. Oettler: Erinnerungsarbeit und Vergangenheitspolitik in Guatemala, 2004 Bd. 61: O. Diehl/ W. Muno: Venezuela unter Chävez. Aufbruch oder Niedergang?, 2005 Bd. 62: B. Fritz/ K. Hujo (Hrsg.): Ökonomie unter den Bedingungen Lateinamerikas: Erkundungen zu Geld und Kredit, Sozialpolitik und Umwelt, 2005 Vervuert Verlagsgesellschaft Wielandstr. 40 - 60318 Frankfurt am Main [email protected] www.ibero-americana.net