Die Kunst der philosophischen Exegese bei den spätantiken Platon- und Aristoteles-Kommentatoren 9783110593600, 9783110580648

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Benedikt Strobel (Hg.) Die Kunst der philosophischen Exegese bei den spätantiken Platon- und Aristoteles-Kommentatoren

Philosophie der Antike Veröffentlichungen der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Kullmann in Verbindung mit Jochen Althoff und Georg Wöhrle Band 36

De Gruyter

Benedikt Strobel (Hg.)

Die Kunst der philosophischen Exegese bei den spätantiken Platon- und AristotelesKommentatoren Akten der 15. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 4. bis 6. Oktober 2012 in Trier

De Gruyter

ISBN 978-3-11-058064-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-059360-0 e-ISBN (ePUB) 978-3-11-059205-4 ISSN 0943-5921 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018017454 Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. © 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Satz: Meta Systems Publishing & Printservices GmbH, Wustermark Druck und Bindung: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen www.degruyter.com

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Einleitung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

BENEDIKT STROBEL I. Zu den Leitfragen des Bandes . . . . . . . . . . . II. Zur Gliederung und den einzelnen Beiträgen III. Danksagung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literatur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1 4 7 8

Why Did Porphyry Write Aristotelian Commentaries? . . . . . .

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GEORGE KARAMANOLIS I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. Names, Things, and Concepts: Porphyry on the Categories III. Ontological and Epistemological Implications of Logic . . . IV. Why Commentaries? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9 20 28 35 36 37

Apodeiktische Weisheit. Metaphysik als Seinswissenschaft nach den Neuplatonikern Jamblich und Syrian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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MATTHIAS PERKAMS Einleitung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. Anklänge an die aristotelische Metaphysik bei Iamblichos . . . II. Die Rezeption von Iamblichos’ Weisheitskonzeption bei Syrianos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. Syrianos’ Deutung des Seienden als solchen als Objekt der Metaphysik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Fazit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literatur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45 48 53 58 63 64

Inhaltsverzeichnis

VI

Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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PANTELIS GOLITSIS Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. Aristotle and the Preventive Function of Philosophical Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. Syrianus and the Access to the Doctrines of True Philosophy . III. Simplicius and the Absence of Philosophical Curriculum . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69 76 85 94 96

Reconciling Plato’s and Aristotle’s Cosmologies. Attempts at Harmonization in Simplicius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 MARC-ANTOINE GAVRAY I. An Eternal Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. Proclus on Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. The σκοπός of the Timaeus according to Simplicius . . . . . . . . IV. Eternity or Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. Exposing the Procession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI. Criticism as a Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII. Symbol, Hypothesis and Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII. A Polymorphic Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

101 102 106 108 109 114 119 121 123

‘Language Converts ψυχή’: Reflections on Commentary in Late Ancient Philosophical Research and Education . . . . . . . 127 MICHAEL GRIFFIN I.

Introduction: Reflections on Philosophical Education and Research in Antiquity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commentary in Neoplatonism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. Developing ἔννοιαι: Plotinus and Simplicius . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Plotinus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Simplicius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. Two Attitudes to the Ancients: A Brief Look at Predecessors of Simplicius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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128 132 134 134 138

. 147 . 150

Inhaltsverzeichnis

VII

Simplicius and the Commentator’s Task: Clarifying Exegeses and Exegetical Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 HAN BALTuSSEN Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. The Question of Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. Some Exegetical Principles (not Comprehensive) III. Applying Principles of Exegesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Clarifying Exegeses of Other Commentators . . . V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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159 162 166 171 173 179 180

‘The Soul Never Thinks without a Phantasm’: How Platonic Commentators Interpret a Controversial Aristotelian Thesis . . . 185 CARLOS STEEL I. II.

A Controversial Aristotelian Dictum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Aristotelian Dossier in the Commentators . . . . . . . . . . . 1. The Passive Intellect: Thinking involved in Imagination . . 2. Imagination and Practical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Imagination and Thinking by Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. No Phantasm but not without Phantasm . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. Thinking ‘not without’ Imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

185 189 190 196 198 201 202 211 212 218

From Soul to God? Aristotle and his Commentators on Thales’ Doctrines of the Soul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 ANDREAS SCHWAB I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. Aristotle on Thales (Part One): the Soul as κινητικόν τι . . . . . 1. Ps.-Simplicius on Aristotle and Thales I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Philoponus on Aristotle and Thales I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. First Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Aristotle on Thales (Part Two) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Ps.-Simplicius on Aristotle and Thales II . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Philoponus on Aristotle and Thales II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Second Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

225 226 227 229 231 236 237 238 239 241

Inhaltsverzeichnis

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Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Some Important Features of Philoponus’ Philosophical Exegesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. The Image of Thales and his Doctrine on the Soul . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . 242 . . . 242 . . . 243 . . . 244

Aristotelische Syllogistik und platonische Dialektik: Das Logik-Konzept der alexandrinischen AristotelesKommentatoren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 MICHAEL SCHRAMM Einleitung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I. Die dialektischen Methoden: Dihairese, Definition, Beweis, Analyse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. Die Dihairese der Arten der Syllogismen nach den Seelenteilen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. Die systematische Stellung der Logik: Teil oder Organon der Philosophie? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. Zusammenfassung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literatur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

247 251 258 265 270 270

Die jeweiligen Eigenheiten der Neuplatoniker David und Elias und die umstrittene Autorschaft des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 CHRISTOPH HELMIG I. II. III. IV.

Je später der Abend … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Die jeweiligen Eigenheiten von Elias und David . . . . . . . . . Der letzte neuplatonische Kommentar zur Kategorienschrift Die umstrittene Autorschaft des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. Ein neues Argument für die Autorschaft Davids . . . . . . . . VI. Das Profil des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift . . . . . . . VII. Fazit: David und Elias in der neueren Forschung . . . . . . . . Literatur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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286 290 300 306 308

Index locorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 Index rerum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

Einleitung Benedikt Strobel

I. Zu den Leitfragen des Bandes Die spätantike, durch Porphyrios inaugurierte und insgesamt dem Paradigma des Neuplatonismus zuzurechnende Kommentarliteratur zu Platons Dialogen und Aristoteles’ Pragmatien – aber auch zu Werken anderer Autoren wie Euklid oder Epiktet – ist eines der Felder der antiken Philosophiegeschichte, für das gelten dürfte, dass der Umfang der ihm gewidmeten Sekundärliteratur den der Quellentexte wenn überhaupt, so jedenfalls noch nicht bei weitem übersteigt. Nachdem gegen Ende des 19. und zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts eine erste kritisch-editorische Bearbeitung der Quellen stattfand (namentlich in der monumentalen Reihe Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 1882 bis 1909), sind erst seit wenigen Jahrzehnten auf Vollständigkeit zielende Übersetzungsbemühungen (namentlich in der Reihe Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, 1987 bis heute) unternommen und die Werke der spätantiken Kommentatoren in Monographien und Aufsatzpublikationen in eigenem Recht gewürdigt worden.1 Untersucht werden sie unter verschiedenen Aspekten, als Teil der Überlieferung und Rezeption früherer Denker (allen voran natürlich der Überlieferung und Rezeption Platons und Aristoteles’ selbst), als Ausdruck eigenständigen Philosophierens, als Zeugnisse spätantiker Kultur. Trotz den intensiven Forschungsbemühungen jüngerer Zeit gehören sie freilich noch immer zu den Bereichen der antiken philosophischen Literatur, die nur lückenhaft erforscht sind. Dies gilt bereits für die Grundlagen der Texterschließung in kritischen Editionen und Übersetzungen,2 dies gilt aber auch 1

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Über die neuere Forschung zur antiken Kommentarliteratur zu den aristotelischen Werken orientieren die folgenden Bibliographien: R. Sorabji (Hg.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, London 1990, 485–524; J. Sellars, The Aristotelian Commentators: A Bibliographical Guide, in: P. Adamson – H. Baltussen – M. Stone (Hgg.), Philosophy, Science, and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic, and Latin Commentaries, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Suppl. 83/1 (2004), 239–268; http://www.ancientcommen tators.org.uk/uploads/7/4/4/8/7448112/comm_bibl_2013.pdf [ohne Verfasserangabe]. Einige Kommentare warten noch immer darauf, in eine moderne Sprache übersetzt zu werden, und die meisten Kommentare sind, wenn überhaupt, nur in den Editionen zugänglich, die vor mehr als einem Jahrhundert in der Reihe Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca er-

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für die Rekonstruktion der Positionen, die die Kommentatoren zu exegetischen wie systematischen Fragen einnehmen, und der Begründungen, mit denen sie diese Positionen stützen, sowie für die philosophiehistorische Erklärung der Genese ihrer Theorien im größeren Zusammenhang der antiken Philosophie. Allein die schiere Masse des überlieferten Corpus von Kommentaren wie auch die lange Zeit vorwaltende Neigung, das Werk der Kommentatoren als epigonal und von geringer philosophischer Bedeutung abzutun, erklären zur Genüge, dass noch etliche Felder dieses Werks nahezu unerforscht geblieben sind. War dies schon Grund genug, die spätantiken Kommentatoren ins Zentrum einer Fachtagung zu rücken, so ergab sich die weitere Spezifizierung des Tagungsthemas aus der Beobachtung, dass die Werke der Kommentatoren ein doppeltes Anliegen aufweisen: Als Kommentare sind sie einerseits dazu bestimmt, den gedanklichen Gehalt der zu kommentierenden Texte offenzulegen (dies ist ihr exegetisches Anliegen); andererseits wollen sie unverkennbar auch einen Beitrag zur Klärung philosophischer Sachfragen leisten (dies ist ihr philosophisches Anliegen). Dass diese beiden Anliegen ein durchaus spannungsvolles Verhältnis zueinander unterhalten, lässt sich daran ablesen, dass die klassischen Werke der Philosophiegeschichte ganz überwiegend keine Kommentare sind – offenbar waren ihre Autoren nicht der Auffassung, die Form des Kommentars sei am besten geeignet, ihrem philosophischen Anliegen Genüge zu tun. Und für diese Auffassung lassen sich in der Tat mehrere gute Gründe ins Feld führen, insbesondere aber der, dass die Form des Kommentars den Kommentator dazu nötigt, sich die Disposition der philosophischen Materie von dem zu kommentierenden Text vorgeben zu lassen und seine eigene Verfügungsgewalt über die Entwicklung des Gedankengangs stark einzuschränken. Zur Abgrenzung des exegetischen vom philosophischen Anliegen ist es nützlich, an eine Unterscheidung zu erinnern, die Gottlob Frege im ersten Teil seiner ,Logischen Untersuchungen‘, ,Der Gedanke‘, vornimmt, nämlich die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Fassen eines Gedankens und der Anerkennung der Wahrheits eines Gedankens (dem Urteilen).3 Als Exeget philosophischer Schriften ist man um das Fassen der Gedanken bemüht, die in den interpretierten Schriften ausgedrückt werden; als Philosoph darum, auf der Grundlage hinreichender Gründe dazu zu gelangen, die Wahrheit wahrer phi-

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schienen sind und einer tiefgreifenden Revision auf dem Stand heutiger Editionstechnik bedürfen. G. Frege, Logische Untersuchungen, in: Ders., Kleine Schriften. Zweite Auflage, hrsg. und mit Nachbemerkungen zur Neuauflage versehen von I. Angelelli, Hildesheim 1990, 342– 394, hier 346.

Einleitung

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losophischer Gedanken anzuerkennen. So wird ein Kommentar, der (zumindest auch) vom philosophischen Anliegen getragen ist, (auch) philosophische Urteile, d. i. Stellungnahmen zur Wahr- resp. Falschheit der Gedanken des kommentierten Textes (d. i. zur ,Wahrheitsfrage‘) enthalten. Man macht sich indessen eine allzu simple Vorstellung vom Verhältnis zwischen dem exegetischen und dem philosophischen Anliegen, wenn man das Fassen der Gedanken, welche in den interpretierten Schriften ausgedrückt werden, als Ergebnis von Prozessen versteht, die von der ,Wahrheitsfrage‘ ganz abstrahieren. Denn die Entscheidung darüber, welcher Gedanke an dieser oder jener Stelle des zu interpretierenden Textes ausgedrückt wird, hängt davon ab, welcher Gedanke an der Stelle plausiblerweise zu erwarten ist, und die Plausibilität der entsprechenden Erwartung bestimmt sich nicht nur nach Kriterien der Konsistenz und Kohärenz mit dem, was der zu kommentierende Autor an anderen Stellen sagt, sondern auch danach, welcher Gedanke sich an dieser Stelle in eine Theorie einfügt, die uns Gründe – wiewohl nicht unbedingt hinreichende Gründe – gibt, sie für wahr zu halten. Das Verstehen einer philosophischen Theorie und der Gedanken, die sie konstituieren, schließt ein, Gründe (wie gesagt nicht zwingend hinreichende Gründe) dafür zu haben, die Theorie für wahr zu halten. Somit bekundet sich das philosophische Anliegen in Kommentaren zu philosophischen Texten nicht nur in Stellungnahmen zur Wahr- oder Falschheit der Gedanken des kommentierten Textes, sondern schon vorgängig in der exegetischen Tätigkeit (und ihren Erwartungshaltungen) selber, wenn anders diese gar nicht umhin kommt, die zu explizierenden Gedanken als Teile einer Theorie zu verstehen, die uns Gründe, wenn auch nicht hinreichende Gründe, gibt, sie für wahr zu halten. Auf der Grundlage dieser Überlegungen zum Verhältnis zwischen dem exegetischen und dem philosophischen Anliegen lässt sich nun mit Blick auf die Werke der spätantiken Kommentatoren erstens fragen, welche Erwartungshaltungen (im eben erläuterten Sinne) sie bei der Interpretation einzelner Texte und Textstellen leiten, und zweitens, wie und warum sie zu den Gedanken, die in den von ihnen kommentierten Texten (ihrer Auffassung nach) zum Ausdruck kommen, so Stellung nehmen, wie sie Stellung nehmen. Genau diesen beiden Fragen sind die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes in Form von Untersuchungen zu prominenten Fallbeispielen aus der spätantiken Kommentarliteratur gewidmet. Fast durchgängig kommt dabei die Schwierigkeit zur Sprache, mit denen sich die spätantiken Kommentatoren – als dezidierte Platoniker – bei der Ausbildung ihrer exegetischen Erwartungshaltungen und ihrer eigenen philosophischen Stellungnahmen konfrontiert sahen; sie besteht in der Bestimmung des überaus komplexen Verhältnisses zwischen Platons Theorien und denen seines hervorragendsten Kritikers, Aristoteles’, welches u. a. die folgenden Fragen aufwirft: Inwieweit kann das,

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was Aristoteles zu Fragen sagt, zu denen Platon sein Dialogpersonal sich weniger deutlich (oder gar nicht) äußern lässt, in den Rahmen platonischer Philosophie integriert werden? Wie ist mit (tatsächlichen oder nur vermeintlichen) Konfliktfällen zwischen Platons und Aristoteles’ Theorien umzugehen? Ist eine Entscheidung (für Platon resp. für Aristoteles) überhaupt erforderlich, oder sagen Platon und Aristoteles letztlich nicht doch dasselbe, nur auf (kontextspezifisch) je verschiedene Weise? Und wie lässt sich plausibel machen, dass sie – letztlich – dasselbe sagen? Auch wenn die Frage, welche Ansätze die Kommentatoren entwickelt haben, um das Verhältnis zwischen platonischen und aristotelischen Theorien zu bestimmen, das Leitmotiv des vorliegenden Sammelbandes darstellt – wobei sich zeigt, dass die Rede von einer Harmonisierungstendenz der Kommentatoren zwar aufs Ganze gesehen berechtigt, jedoch allzu undifferenziert ist –, erschöpft sich sein Ertrag nicht in Stellungnahmen zum wohlbekannten Thema ,Harmonisierung von Platon und Aristoteles‘; die Beiträge zeichnen vielmehr ein facettenreiches, einzelne Kommentatoren und Kommentierungstraditionen übergreifendes Bild von der wechselseitigen Durchdringung exegetischer und philosophischer Interessen überhaupt, welche sich im Schaffen der spätantiken Kommentatoren manifestiert.

II. Zur Gliederung und den einzelnen Beiträgen Es war selbstverständlich nicht möglich, die spätantike Kommentarliteratur in ihrer ganzen Breite zu erfassen; eine gewisse Willkür in der Auswahl der Fallbeispiele war unvermeidlich (und so wird mancher vielleicht insbesondere einen eigenen Beitrag zu Proklos vermissen, der freilich, ohne in den Aufsatztiteln erwähnt zu sein, in den Aufsätzen vielfach präsent ist). Selten beschränken sich die einzelnen Beiträge auf die Besprechung eines einzigen Kommentators; vielmehr nähern sie sich ihren Gegenständen überwiegend aus einer diachronen Perspektive, mehrere Kommentatoren und Kommentierungstraditionen miteinander vergleichend. Auch wenn sich somit eine Anordnung der Beiträge nach den Schaffensperioden der in ihnen behandelten Kommentatoren nicht strikt durchhalten ließ, lag es gleichwohl nahe, in der Anlage des Bandes auf chronologische Kohärenz abzustellen. Den Band eröffnet ein Beitrag von G. KARAMANOLIS zum Gründungsvater der neuplatonischen Kommentarliteratur, Porphyrios (3. Jh. n. Chr.), und den Gründen für seine Entscheidung, als Platoniker so viel Mühe darauf zu verwenden, Aristoteles zu kommentieren. In Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Versuchen, Porphyrios’ Hinwendung zu Aristoteles zu erklären, argumentiert Karamanolis für die These, dass hinter dieser Hinwendung die Annahme

Einleitung

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steht, Aristoteles entwickele mit zentralen Philosophemen (z. B. im Bereich der Theorie der Verursachung, speziell der Materiekonzeption, oder der Semantik) Gedanken fort, die in den platonischen Dialogen selbst angedeutet, jedoch nicht völlig deutlich ausgesprochen werden, und sei somit Teil der platonischen Tradition. Das Spannungsverhältnis von platonischer und aristotelischer Theoriebildung steht auch im Hintergrund des folgenden Beitrags von M. PERKAMS, welcher die Integration der aristotelischen Metaphysik ins neuplatonische Wissenschaftssystem bei Iamblichos (dem Zeitgenossen des Porphyrios) sowie, ca. ein Jahrhundert später, in Syrianos’ Kommentar(en) zu Metaphysik Β, Γ, Μ, Ν zum Thema hat. Perkams geht es zum einen darum, die Abhängigkeit der syrianischen Metaphysik-Konzeption von der iamblichischen zu erweisen; zum anderen ist er an der Frage interessiert, wie sich Iamblichos und Syrianos (sowie dessen Schüler Proklos) zu Aristoteles’ Konzeption einer Wissenschaft vom Seienden als Seienden (ὂν ᾗ ὄν) angesichts der Alternative ,allgemeine Seinswissenschaft oder theologische Wissenschaft‘ positionieren. Mit Blick auf Syrianos hält Perkams fest, dass jener die Metaphysik weder implizit noch explizit als Theologie bestimmt, sondern als Wissenschaft, die sich auf alles Seiende (insofern es seiend ist) beziehe, dass er jedoch, an Iamblichos anknüpfend, ein primäres Seiendes als das ὂν ᾗ ὄν identifiziert, das zum übrigen Seienden in einem wirkursächlichen Verhältnis stehe. Damit habe er den Grundstein dafür gelegt, die erste, schöpferische Ursache, i.e. Gott, im Rahmen einer aristotelischen Metaphysik zu behandeln. Die weiteren acht Beiträge des Bandes sind primär den exegetischen Aktivitäten von Ammonios sowie der von ihm unmittelbar oder mittelbar beeinflussten Kommentatoren (insbes. Philoponos, Simplikios, Damaskios, Priskianos, Olympiodoros, Elias, David) zwischen dem ausgehenden 5. Jh. und dem ausgehenden 6. Jh. gewidmet, enthalten jedoch auch vielfältige Hinweise auf Ammonios’ athenische Vorgänger Syrianos und Proklos. Die Beiträge von P. Golitsis, M.-A. Gavray, M. Griffin und H. Baltussen beschäftigen sich in der Hauptsache mit Simplikios und hervorstechenden Charakteristiken seiner philosophischen Exegese, wobei Golitsis und Gavray explizit die oben genannte Leitfrage nach den exegetischen Erwartungshaltungen hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses von platonischen und aristotelischen Theorien aufgreifen. P. GOLITSIS arbeitet heraus, dass Simplikios, eine schon bei seinem Lehrer Ammonios erkennbare Strategie aufgreifend und ihr zugleich eine neue Wendung gebend, Aristoteles’ scheinbar kritische Stellungnahmen zu Theorien seiner Vorgänger nicht nur von der Intention geleitet sieht, Missverständnissen dieser Theorien vorzubeugen (so schon Ammonios), sondern von der philanthropisch-pädagogischen Absicht, ,die Vielen‘ bei ihrem (unzureichenden) Alltagsverständnis ,abzuholen‘, um sie von hier aus an den eigentlichen, tiefer liegenden Gehalt der Theorien heranzuführen. Go-

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litsis grenzt dabei Simplikios’ starke, ,konkordistische‘ Tendenz der Harmonisierung von Platon und Aristoteles (sowie anderen παλαιοί) von der schwächeren, bloß ,komplementaristischen‘ bei Syrianos ab und legt dar, wie sie mit einer dezidierten Abwertung seiner eigenen Epoche, der der Kommentatoren, gegenüber der philosophischen Blütezeit im Zeitalter der παλαιοί, welche die Vorsokratiker, Platon und Aristoteles einschließen, einhergeht. Dass Platon und Aristoteles in Simplikios’ Sicht dort, wo sie einander zu widersprechen scheinen, denselben gedanklichen Gehalt von unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln aus anvisieren – Platon aus der apriorischen Perspektive des der Natur nach Bekannteren, Aristoteles a posteriori, vom für uns Bekannteren ausgehend –, ist auch die Leitthese des Beitrags von M.-A. GAVRAY, der speziell Simplikios’ Versuch gewidmet ist, Platons Timaios und Aristoteles’ De caelo zur Frage, ob die Welt ewig sei oder nicht, in Einklang zu bringen. Dass Simplikios, wie von Golitsis und Gavray dargelegt, der aristotelischen Auseinandersetzung mit Platon eine pädagogische Funktion zuschreibt, erscheint, wenn man den Ausführungen von M. GRIFFIN folgt, als Teil einer umfassenden Theorie von philosophischer Pädagogik und ihren erkenntnistheoretischen, sprachphilosophischen sowie ontologischen Grundlagen, derzufolge ein guter philosophischer Lehrer darum bemüht ist, die anfänglich konfusen Gedanken (ἔννοιαι) zu klären bzw. zu korrigieren und sie aus dem Bereich des Sinnlichen in den Bereich des Intelligiblen zu führen – wofür nicht zuletzt Aristoteles’ Vorgehensweise der aporetischen Prüfung von ἔνδοξα in Simplikios’ Sicht das beste Beispiel darstellt und wovon auch Simplikios’ eigene Kommentierungstätigkeit wesentlich zehrt. Den Block zu Simplikios beschließt der Beitrag von H. BALTuSSEN, welcher unter Berücksichtigung der zuvor zur Sprache gekommenen Aspekte, jedoch auch mit Blick auf weitere wichtige Aspekte eine Art Gesamtschau der Charakteristika der simplikianischen Exegese (welche, wie Baltussen hervorhebt, zugleich auch stets eine Metaexegese, also die Exegese früherer Exegese ist) bietet. Die folgenden beiden Beiträge sind, mit Bezugnahme auf Ammonios, Philoponos und Priskianos (= Ps.-Simplikios), einem speziellen thematischen Feld, nämlich der Kommentierung von Aristoteles’ De anima, gewidmet. C. STEEL zeigt, wie die genannten Kommentatoren die aristotelische These, dass Denken nicht ohne Vorstellung sei, so deuten, dass sie der platonischen Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit der (Denk-)Seele nicht widerspricht. Sie schränken zu diesem Behufe die aristotelische These – sofern in ihr der Ausdruck „nicht ohne Vorstellung“ im starken Sinne von „mit Vorstellung als Instrument“ verstanden wird – auf bestimmte Arten des Denkens ein, praktisches, mathematisches sowie Denken mit Bezug auf sinnliche Einzeldinge. Zum anderen entwickeln sie aber auch andere, abschwächende Interpretationen des Sinns von „nicht ohne Vorstellung“, denen zufolge tatsächlich für jedes Denken behauptet werden kann, es sei nicht ohne Vorstellung – ohne damit der plato-

Einleitung

7

nischen Unsterblichkeitslehre zu widersprechen. Der Beitrag von A. SCHWAB vergleicht die Interpretationen, die Philoponos (Ammonios referierend) und Priskianos zwei Bezugnahmen des Aristoteles auf Thales (De an. I 2.405 a 19–21: ,Die Seele ist ein κινητικόν τι‘ sowie I 5.411 a 7–8: ,Alles ist voll von Göttern‘) angedeihen lassen, und hebt darin die eigentümlichen Züge der Exegese beider Kommentatoren voneinander ab, wobei die Sorgfalt und Quellenkundigkeit, die Philoponos in seiner Interpretation beweist, eine besondere Würdigung erfahren. Ebenfalls mit Bezug auf Ammonios und (in dessen Gefolge) Philoponos – sowie mit Rekurs auf Proklos – geht M. SCHRAMM der Frage nach, wie Ammonios und Philoponos die aristotelische Syllogistik in ihr Konzept von platonischer Dialektik zu integrieren versuchen. Wesentlich für diese Integration ist laut Schramm die Subordination der (aristotelisch verstandenen) Methoden Definition und Beweis unter die (platonisch verstandene) Methode der Dihairese, ferner aber auch die Bestimmung von Logik als Teil und Organon der Philosophie, die sich laut Ammonios nicht nur in Aristoteles’ Ersten Analytiken, sondern auch in Platons Parmenides zu erkennen gibt. Abgerundet wird der Band durch CH. HELMIGS Beitrag zur Schlussphase der spätantiken Platon- und Aristoteles-Kommentierung in der 2. Hälfte des 6. Jh., nämlich zu den eher schattenhaften Gestalten Elias resp. David und genauer zur Frage, wer von den beiden (wenn denn überhaupt einer von ihnen) der Verfasser des Kommentars zu den Kategorien ist, der unter Davids Namen überliefert ist und von A. Busse Elias zugeschrieben worden ist. Helmig zeigt auf der Grundlage einer detaillierten Untersuchung der spezifischen philosophisch-schriftstellerischen Profile, welche Elias und David in anderen, in ihrer Autorschaft unumstrittenen Werken erkennen lassen, dass, anders als Busse dachte, David der Autor des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift ist. Als Ausweis hierfür gilt Helmig insbesondere der Umstand – und damit ist erneut die Leitfrage nach dem Verhältnis von Platon und Aristoteles angesprochen –, dass erstens Elias Divergenzen zwischen Platon und Aristoteles stillschweigend übergeht und eine eher oberflächliche Harmonisierung verfolgt, während David die Divergenzen zunächst herausarbeitet, um dann beider Positionen einander anzunähern, sowie zweitens der Kategorien-Kommentar die für David charakteristische Verfahrensweise im Umgang mit Unstimmigkeiten zwischen platonischer und aristotelischer Lehre erkennen lässt.

III. Danksagung An dieser Stelle verbleibt dem Herausgeber des Bandes, denjenigen seinen Dank auszusprechen, ohne deren εὔνοια, mehr noch: εὐεργεσία dieser Band

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nicht zustande gekommen wäre. Zunächst gilt sein Dank den Autoren der Beiträge für ihre Bereitschaft, an der Trierer Tagung im Oktober 2012 teilzunehmen und ihre Vorträge für diesen Sammelband auszuarbeiten. Sodann erstreckt sich der Dank auf diejenigen, die die Voraussetzungen dafür geschaffen haben, dass die Tagung stattfinden und ihre Akten publiziert werden konnten, namentlich Herrn Prof. Dr. Drs. h.c. Wolfgang Kullmann als Vorsitzenden des Kuratoriums der KARL UND GERTRUD ABEL-STIFTUNG im Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft, welche freundlicherweise sowohl die Tagung als auch die Drucklegung des Bandes finanzierte. Nicht zuletzt sei Herrn Eugen Sonnenberg und Herrn Christoph Hocks für ihre unermüdliche Unterstützung bei der Redaktion des Manuskripts gedankt. Ein ganz besonderer Dank gilt schließlich Herrn Prof. Dr. Georg Wöhrle für vielfältigen Rat (und vielfältige Tat!) in den Jahren der Vorbereitung dieses Bandes und zuvor.

Literatur [Anonymi], URL: http://www.ancientcommentators.org.uk/uploads/7/4/4/ 8/7448112/comm_bibl_2013.pdf. Frege, G., Logische Untersuchungen, in: Ders., Kleine Schriften. Zweite Auflage, hrsg. und mit Nachbemerkungen zur Neuauflage versehen von I. Angelelli, Hildesheim 1990, 342–394. Sorabji, R. (Hg.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, London 1990. Sellars, J., The Aristotelian Commentators: A Bibliographical Guide, in: P. Adamson – H. Baltussen – M. Stone (Hgg.), Philosophy, Science, and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic, and Latin Commentaries, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Suppl. 83/1 (2004), 239–268.

Why Did Porphyry Write Aristotelian Commentaries?* George Karamanolis

I. Introduction Porphyry made a name in antiquity for his commentaries on Aristotle. Boethius, who set out to write a number of such commentaries,1 speaks of him as a great authority in this respect 2 and depends heavily on him. Later Platonists are clearly dependent on Porphyry in their Aristotelian commentaries.3 This is particularly the case with regard to Aristotle’s Categories. The relevant commentaries of Iamblichus, Dexippus, Ammonius, and Simplicius are significantly indebted to Porphyry both in their overall interpretative stance towards Aristotle’s treatise as well as on several individual points of interpretation, although their authors rarely acknowledge their extensive debts. Their dependence on Porphyry, however, does not amount to full agreement with his interpretation. In the case of Iamblichus, for instance, we notice a number of critical divergences from Porphyry’s views.4 Such disagreements, however, *

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The paper has benefited from the questions and the remarks of the participants of the conference. I am particularly grateful to Chris Noble for a set of critical remarks that helped me think some issues over and explain more. I am also indebted to Benedikt Strobel for his editorial care and for organizing a superb conference. See Boethius, In De int. II 79, 9–80, 9 with A. Kappelmacher, Der schriftstellerische Plan des Boethius, Wiener Studien 46, 1928, 215–225, J. Shiel, Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle, in: R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1990, 349–372, S. Ebbesen, Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator, in: Sorabji, Aristotle Transformed (see this note), 373–392, and more recently T. Suto, Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic. A Study of Boethius’ Commentaries on Peri hermeneias (Philosophia antiqua vol. 127), Leiden 2012, esp. 233–236. Porphyry is said to be gravissimus vir auctoritatis (Boethius, De syllogismo categorico 814 C-816 C; Porphyry fr. 113 Smith). On Boethius’ dependence on Porphyry, see P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Bd. 1: Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im 1. Jh. v. Chr., Berlin−New York 1973, 120–130 and more thoroughly Ebbesen, Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator (see note 1). See M. J. Griffin, What Has Aristotelian Dialectic to Offer a Neoplatonist? A Possible Sample of Iamblichus at Simplicius on the Categories 12,10–13,12, The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 6, 2012, 173–185. For an ample discussion of the differences between

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highlight even more the canonical role of Porphyry’s commentary, because it transpires that the latter in one way or another served as the starting point for all subsequent Platonist treatments of the Categories.5 The fortune of the Isagoge on the other hand leaves no room for doubt about Porphyry’s impact as an Aristotelian exegete.6 The Isagoge soon attracted several commentaries by fellow Platonists, which indicates that it had become a standard introductory text to Aristotle’s philosophy.7 It is no surprise, then, that the medieval Arabic tradition knows Porphyry primarily in his capacity as an Aristotelian exegete (see Porphyry, test. 3a-e Smith [Ibn Al-Nadim]). Ancient and medieval philosophers appreciate a side of Porphyry which was clearly important. But the question is why Porphyry invested so much of his philosophical energy in Aristotelian exegesis. This is the question I would like to pursue here. Modern scholarship has not failed to appreciate Porphyry’s importance in the Aristotelian exegetical tradition. It has long been claimed, with good reason, that the tide of interpretation of Aristotle and especially of the Categories changes with Porphyry in the Platonist camp.8 Indeed, Porphyry offers an interpretation that fends off earlier Platonist objections to the effect that the doctrine of the Categories is at odds with Plato’s metaphysical views and especially with Plato’s doctrine of substance. Quite importantly, the tradition of Platonist critics of Aristotle’s Categories includes Plotinus, who discusses Aristotle’s relevant views in Enneads VI 1–3 (42–44). To put it mildly, Porphyry appears to maintain that these Platonist criticisms should not prevent us from appreciating the Categories because these criticisms spring from

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Porphyry and Iamblichus on the understanding of the Categories see D. P. Taormina, Jamblique: Critique de Plotin et de Porphyre. Quatre études (Tradition de la pensée classique), Paris 1999. Iamblichus’ dependence on Porphyry’s exegesis is attested by Simp., In Cat. 2, 9–15. Dexippus follows Iamblichus (Simp., In Cat. 2, 25–29) and Simplicius follows Iamblichus, as the following evidence suggests: Simp., In Cat. 61, 19–62, 6; 99, 4–9; 106, 28–107, 4; 130, 8– 19. See further J. Dillon, Dexippus: On Aristotle Categories (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1990, 12. There is some discussion regarding the subject matter and scope of the Isagoge. See J. Barnes, Porphyry: Introduction (Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers), Oxford 2006 and the review by R. Chiaradonna, What is Porphyry’s Isagoge?, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 19, 2008, 1–30. There are three extant commentaries of Porphyry’s Isagoge, those of Ammonius, Elias, and David. Both Elias and David claim that the Isagoge is useful for understanding philosophy as a whole (see Elias, In Porph. 36, 20–24; David, In Porph. 96, 24–25). See R. Sorabji, The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, in: Sorabji, Aristotle Transformed (see note 1), 2, S. Ebbesen, Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic: A Reconstruction, in: Sorabji, Aristotle Transformed (see note 1), esp. 141–143 and S. K. Strange, Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the ‘Categories’, in: W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II,36,2, Berlin−New York 1987, 955–974.

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a strictly ontological interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories, which in Porphyry’s view does not do justice to its subject matter.9 According to Porphyry, Aristotle’s subject matter in the Categories is words that signify, not kinds of being. As I will explain later, this does not mean that Porphyry denies the ontological implications of the Categories, but he does not think that its character is primarily ontological. Porphyry’s interpretation of the Categories has been debated significantly in the last two decades. I have sided with those who defend the view that Porphyry gently but firmly departs from the earlier Platonist tradition and approaches the Categories from a point of view that is new among Platonists.10 In a paper published in 200411 I have argued in detail that Porphyry was the Platonist who initiated the charitable and systematic exegetical engagement with Aristotle, being the first Platonist to write commentaries on Aristotle’s works, that is commentaries of the kind Peripatetics such as Andronicus, Boethus, and Alexander had written. I have adduced a number of arguments in support of this idea. Crucial as a starting point is the evidence of Simplicius in the preface to his commentary on the Categories.12 Simplicius reviews the exegetical tradition on the 9

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See Strange (see note 8), R. Chiaradonna, L’interpretazione della sostanza aristotelica in Porfirio, Elenchos 17, 1996, 55–94 and R. Chiaradonna, Essence et prédication chez Porphyre et Plotin, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 82, 1998, 577–606. On the other hand the essential identity of Plotinus and Porphyry on the Categories is maintained especially by F. A. J. De Haas, Did Plotinus and Porphyry Disagree on Aristotle’s Categories?, Phronesis 46, 2001, 492–526. See G. E. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford Philosophical Monographs), Oxford 2006, 308–322. G. E. Karamanolis, Porphyry: The First Platonist Commentator on Aristotle, in: P. Adamson – H. Baltussen – M. W. F. Stone (edd.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, vol. 1 (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vol. 83,1), London 2004, 97–120. See Simp., In Cat. 1, 1–2, 9: Πολλοὶ πολλὰς κατεβάλοντο φροντίδας εἰς τὸ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίον, οὐ μόνον ὅτι προοίμιόν ἐστι τῆς ὅλης φιλοσοφίας (εἴπερ αὐτὸ μὲν τῆς λογικῆς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πραγματείας, ἡ δὲ λογικὴ τῆς ὅλης προλαμβάνεται δικαίως φιλοσοφίας), ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ περὶ ἀρχῶν ἐστι τῶν πρώτων, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ μαθησόμεθα λόγοις. ἄλλοι δὲ κατ’ ἄλλην ὁρμὴν τὰς περὶ τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον πραγματείας πεποίηνται, οἱ μὲν αὐτὴν μόνην τὴν λέξιν ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερον μεταθεῖναι προθυμηθέντες, ὥσπερ Θεμίστιός τε ὁ εὐφραδὴς καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτος, οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας μέν, αὐτὰς δὲ μόνας ψιλὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους προτεινομένας συντόμως ἀποκαλύπτειν ἐσπούδασαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν βιβλίῳ πεποίηκεν ὁ Πορφύριος, ἄλλοι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ζητημάτων ἐφήψαντο μετρίως, ὡς ὁ Ἀφροδισιεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Ἑρμῖνος καὶ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι, ὧν καὶ Μάξιμον ἐγὼ τίθημι, τὸν Αἰδεσίου μὲν τοῦ Ἰαμβλιχείου μαθητήν, ἐν δὲ τῷ εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας ὑπομνήματι πάντα σχεδὸν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνᾴσαντα· τινὲς μέντοι καὶ βαθυτέραις περὶ αὐτὸ διανοίαις κατεχρήσαντο, ὥσπερ ὁ θαυμάσιος Βόηθος. ἄλλοις δὲ ἤρεσεν ἀπορίας μόνας γράψαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα, ὅπερ Λούκιός τε πεποίηκε καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν Νικόστρατος τὰ τοῦ Λουκίου ὑποβαλλόμενος, σχεδόν τι πρὸς πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα κατὰ τὸ βιβλίον ἐνστάσεις κομίζειν φιλοτιμούμενοι, καὶ οὐδὲ εὐλαβῶς, ἀλλὰ καταφορικῶς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀπηρυθριακότως· πλὴν καὶ τούτοις χάρις, καὶ ὅτι πραγματειώδεις τὰς πολλὰς τῶν

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Categories and he distinguishes, roughly speaking, three classes of writings: a) exegetical treatises and short commentaries like those of Themistius, Porphyry’s short commentary and the commentaries of Alexander and Herminus; b) questions (ἀπορίαι) and objections (ἐνστάσεις) of Platonists such as Lucius and Nicostratus as well as Plotinus’ critical examinations (ἐξετάσεις), namely Plotinus’ Enneads VI 1–3. Finally, Simplicius singles out c) Porphyry’s ‘complete exegesis’ (Simp., In Cat. 2, 6: ἐξήγησις ἐντελής) by which he refers to Porphyry’s long commentary Ad Gedaleium. The evidence of Simplicius is important in that it suggests that the literary form of one’s engagement with the Categories crucially depends on one’s perception of, and attitude to, the philosophical content of Aristotle’s work. The character of the writings of Lucius, Nicostratus, and Plotinus, for instance, is determined by their critical stance to the doctrine of the Categories, as they understand it. And this, as far as we can tell, is confirmed by the available evidence from their works.13 Τhe writing of commentaries on the part of Peripatetics like Alexander, Herminus, and even Themistius is motivated by their commitment to Aristotle’s doctrine in the Categories. Porphyry’s writing of commentaries, which is of two kinds, short and long, must be, I argued, analogously motivated by a positive evaluation of Aristotle’s doctrine. This is not surprising. As always with philosophers in antiquity, their choice of a literary form is tightly related to philosophical content and is in itself philosophically suggestive. This is the case also with the ancient philosophical commentary; it is not a neutral literary form. It rather is a form that implies a didactic character, which means that the source text was being taught either in a school context or was studied by someone privately and asked for tutorial help. This character is philosophically significant, because it indicates the commentator’s commitment to the major tenets of the source

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ἀποριῶν προεβάλοντο καὶ ὅτι λύσεώς τε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν θεωρημάτων τοῖς μεθ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἐνδεδώκασι. Πλωτῖνος δὲ ὁ μέγας ἐπὶ τούτοις τὰς πραγματειωδεστάτας ἐξετάσεις ἐν τρισὶν ὅλοις βιβλίοις τοῖς Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιγεγραμμένοις τῷ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν βιβλίῳ προσήγαγε. μετὰ δὲ τούτους ὁ πάντων ἡμῖν τῶν καλῶν αἴτιος Πορφύριος ἐξήγησίν τε ἐντελῆ τοῦ βιβλίου καὶ τῶν ἐνστάσεων πασῶν λύσεις οὐκ ἀπόνως ἐν ἑπτὰ βιβλίοις ἐποιήσατο τοῖς Γεδαλείῳ προσφωνηθεῖσι, πολλὰ καὶ τῶν Στωικῶν ἐκεῖ δογμάτων κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τοῦ λόγου προσιστορῶν. The evidence about Lucius and Nicostratus has been collected and discussed by A. Gioè, Filosofi medioplatonici del II secolo D. C. Testimonianze e frammenti. Gaio, Albino, Lucio, Nicostrato, Tauro, Severo, Arpocrazione (Elenchos 36), Napoli 2002. See also the classical article of K. Praechter, Nikostratos der Platoniker, Hermes 57, 1922, 481–517, consulted in the reprint in K. Praechter, Nikostratos der Platoniker, in: H. Dörrie (ed.), Karl Praechter: Kleine Schriften, Hildesheim−New York 1973, 101–137. The critical tradition to Aristotle’s Categories is reviewed also by P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Bd. 2: Der Aristotelismus im 1. und 2. Jh. n. Chr., Berlin−New York 1984, 509–601.

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text and his appreciation of its philosophical value. This of course is the result of a certain interpretation. It is this interpretation that determines the form in which the interpretation will be outlined and not the other way round. The writing of a commentary does not allow for any kind of interpretation but is rather dictated by a certain kind of interpretation, that is, one favorable, at least to a large extent, to the assumed doctrine of the commented text. It is this favorable attitude to a certain philosophical text that dictates the literary form of the commentary. There was still much room for differentiation within this kind of exegesis, as the commentaries of later Platonists show. This, I suggested, is a kind of exegesis of Aristotle that was first launched by Porphyry among Platonists. And this happened as the result of Porphyry’s new, sympathetic, appreciation of Aristotle. Now the available evidence shows that Porphyry invested considerable time and energy on the Aristotelian exegesis. Apart from his two commentaries on the Categories, a short one by question and answer, extant today, and a longer one in seven books, of which we have only testimonies in Simplicius (Porphyry, In Cat., frs. 45–74 Smith), Porphyry also wrote a commentary on the first four books of the Physics, also excerpted by Simplicius, a commentary on On Interpretation, that was used by Boethius in his own commentary, while we have evidence of Porphyry’s engagement with the Prior Analytics, the Sophistical Refutations, the Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics Lambda. Recently Michael Chase, on the basis of evidence from Arabic sources, has made the case that Porphyry also wrote a commentary on the Posterior Analytics.14 Porphyry’s engagement with these works of Aristotle is undeniable. The existing evidence, however, is not conclusive as to the form of Porphyry’s engagement with those works. It is unclear whether Porphyry wrote commentaries on all these works. The writing of commentaries seems more likely to be the case for some of the above-mentioned works of Aristotle. Boethius probably did use a Porphyrian commentary on the Prior Analytics in his De syllogismo categorico15 and also one on De interpretatione.16 Still, though, given the state of the evidence, it is difficult to 14

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M. Chase, Did Porphyry Write a Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics? Albertus Magnus, al-Fārābī, and Porphyry on per se Predication, in: P. Adamson (ed.), Classical Arabic Philosophy. Sources and Reception (Warburg Institute Colloquia 11), London−Turin 2007, 21–38. See Boethius, De syllogismo categorico 814 C-816 C (= Porph., fr. 113 Smith). This is suggested by Boethius’ statement in In De int. II 7, 5–9 (= Porph., test. 75 Smith): Cuius expositionem nos scilicet quam maxime a Porphyrio quamquam etiam a ceteris transferentes Latina oratione digessimus. Hic [sc. Porphyry] enim nobis expositor et intellectus acumine et sententiarum dispositione videtur excellere. Boethius’ commentary on De interpretatione has been recently translated by A. Smith, Boethius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 1–3 (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2010 and A. Smith, Boethius:

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reach definite conclusions about the nature, the extent, and the scope of such Porphyrian commentaries. The crucial question to ask now is why Porphyry wrote all these commentaries on Aristotle’s works. I said earlier that the literary form of the later ancient philosophical commentary is shaped by its didactic purposes. If I am right about that, the question then is why Porphyry wanted to teach Aristotle and what he wanted to teach from Aristotle. We know from Porphyry’s biography of Plotinus that Aristotle’s works were read in Plotinus’ circle together with some Peripatetic commentaries like those of Alexander and this kind of reading was part of a teaching procedure in Plotinus’ school (see Porphyry, Plot. 14, 10–16). This piece of evidence makes my question more pressing. For since there was no shortage of Aristotelian commentaries in circulation at the time of Porphyry and indeed from experts in Peripatetic philosophy such as those of Andronicus, Boethus, Herminus, or Alexander, why did a Platonist like Porphyry not follow Plotinus in merely using them but also want to write his own? Was he dissatisfied with the earlier commentaries and wanted to improve upon the existing exegetical tradition? Although the question has not been explicitly answered in the affirmative in modern scholarship, scholars often assume that Porphyry takes up a Peripatetic point of view in his Aristotelian commentaries, that is, Porphyry agrees with Aristotle on a given issue and defends the Aristotelian position as Porphyry understands it.17 This is quite justified. It is particularly clear in the case of Porphyry’s short commentary on the Categories, which is extant. Partisans of this view point to the heavy use of the Peripatetic tradition that Porphyry makes. Indeed, Porphyry exhibits deep knowledge of the entire Peripatetic exegetical tradition. His predominantly semantic interpretation of the Categories, for instance, has its roots in the Peripatetic exegesis of Boethus, Andronicus, and Herminus. Porphyry is ostensibly indebted to Andronicus also in his exegesis of De Interpretatione, as we can gather from Boethius.18 Porphyry further draws on Aspasius regarding Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (fr. 105 Smith) and on Adrastus on Aristotle’s Physics (fr. 133 Smith). Besides, there is some evidence to suggest that Porphyry commented on Theophrastus’ On Affirmation and Negation.19 Scholars, then,

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On Aristotle On Interpretation 4–6 (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011. Thus, for instance, Ebbesen, Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic (see note 8), who maintains that Porphyry’s logic is Peripatetic. Similarly A. C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford−New York 1990, 36–42. On this matter see Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, Bd. 1 (see note 3) 120–132. See the testimony of Boethius, In De int. II 17, 24–27 (= Porph., test. 167 Smith). Porphyry draws on Theophrastus also in On Abstinence, as he himself indicates (Porph., Abst. II 5, 3; 7, 3; 11, 3; III 20).

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tend to distinguish Porphyry with his more Peripatetic outlook and his more logical interests, which comes out especially in his commentaries on the Categories, the De Interpretatione, and the Isagoge, from the Platonist philosopher Porphyry, or Porphyry’s Platonist outlook that comes out in works like the Sententiae, On the Return of the Soul, Ad Gaurum and so on.20 Does the existing evidence, however, really show that Porphyry assumes a Peripatetic point of view in his Aristotelian commentaries? Does it show that Porphyry is competing with Andronicus, Boethus, and Herminus in expounding Aristotle’s Categories? But why should he have wanted to do that in the first place given his commitment to Plato’s philosophy and to Plotinus’ interpretation of it? Alone the evidence of Porphyry’s dependence on the Peripatetic exegetical tradition cannot shed light on those questions. On the other hand Porphyry was not only interested in Aristotle’s logic. The view that Porphyry assumes a Peripatetic point of view with regard to logic in particular does not do justice to the fact the he extended his exegetical activity also on Aristotle’s physics and ethics, to say the least. Another answer that is sometimes offered to the question of why Porphyry wrote Aristotelian commentaries by means of which he taught Aristotle, is that Porphyry wanted to explain Aristotle specifically to Platonists. According to that suggestion, Porphyry assumes a Platonist point of view in his Aristotelian commentaries, which means that he does agree with Aristotle on a given issue but he does so in a way that is influenced from, and bears on, Platonist philosophy.21 There is some truth in this suggestion too. By the time that Porphyry wrote his commentaries there had been two kinds of approaches to Aristotle in the Platonist camp. The first was that of Platonists like Nicostratus, Atticus, and Plotinus, who were critical of Aristotle in various degrees, especially of his ontology, and instead unanimously favored Plato’s relevant views. The second was the tradition of the Peripatetic commentators like Andronicus, Boethus, and Alexander, who were invariably approving of Aristotle’s views, although they often differed considerably in their understanding of Aristotle, especially of his ontology and psychology. This evidence shows two things. First, that those interested in discussing Aristotle in late antiquity did that from a specific philosophical point of view, namely that of Platonic or Aristotelian philosophy. Second, their engagement with Aristotle in either of the two traditions was motivated by the wish to discuss philosophical questions like that of what qualifies as οὐσία, as principle, or cause, and in their exegetical works, either commentaries (Peripatetics)

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Thus Ebbesen, Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic (see note 8) and Barnes (see note 6), a view that is critically discussed by Chiaradonna, What is Porphyry’s Isagoge? (see note 6). See A. de Libera – A.-P. Segonds, Porphyre: Isagoge (Sic et Non), Paris 1998, xxxviii.

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or critical treatises (Platonists), they advance their own views on precisely these questions. This explains, at least partly, why ancient commentators engage critically with the work of fellow commentators, namely because they take interest in the philosophical views on substance, principles, form, individuals, or the soul, that their fellow commentators outline in their commentaries while interpreting the views of Plato or Aristotle. If this is the case, then the question is what precisely was Porphyry’s philosophical motivation behind his engagement as commentator with Aristotle’s works given his Platonism. An alternative view that is sometimes put forward is that Porphyry was someone who tried to bridge Platonism and Aristotelianism in one way or another.22 And one way in which Porphyry did that was by teaching Aristotle’s logic to Platonists as a preparation for Platonic philosophy and especially Platonic metaphysics.23 This kind of answer, however, is not fully satisfactory either, for the following two reasons. First, Porphyry’s Aristotelian exegesis is both selective and systematic and neither of these two aspects are sufficiently explained in such a theory. One wonders, for instance, how a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics is justified. Why should a Platonist like Porphyry want to expound this work and teach it to fellow Platonists? One answer that the partisans of the above view offer is that Porphyry, like later Platonists, assumed a certain interpretation of Aristotle that aligned his doctrines with the assumed doctrines of the relevant works of Plato.24 But if this is the case, the question is why a Platonist would want to study Aristotle in the first place. What would make Aristotle an attractive course of philosophy for a Platonist at all? Another answer is that Porphyry explores Aristotle’s philosophy with regard to the sensible world, while he turns to Plato with regard to the intelli22

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Thus R. Beutler, Porphyrios, in: K. Ziegler (ed.), Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Bd. XXII,1: Pontarches-Praefectianus, Stuttgart 1953, col. 275– 313, A. Smith, Porphyrian Studies since 1913, in: W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II,36,2, Berlin−New York 1987, 754–755, L. P. Gerson, Neoplatonism, in: C. J. Shields (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy (Blackwell Philosophy Guides 13), Malden, MA 2003, 314–315, L. P. Gerson, The Harmony of Plato and Aristotle according to Neoplatonism, in: H. Tarrant – D. Baltzly (edd.), Reading Plato in Antiquity, London 2006, 196–197 and 201–207. The attempt to bridge Plato and Aristotle may take the form of showing that they agree or that they supplement one another. Thus W. Theiler, Ammonios und Porphyrios, in: O. Reverdin (ed.), Porphyre. Huit Exposés suivis de Discussions par Heinrich Dörrie, Jan-Hendrik Waszink, Willy Theiler, Pierre Hadot, Angelo Raffaele Sodano, Jean Pépin, Richard Walzer (Fondation Hardt pour l’Étude de l’Antiquité classique. Entretiens sur l’Antiquité classique Tome 12), Genève 1966, 112, A. C. Lloyd, The Later Neoplatonists, in: A. H. Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1967, 275–276 and 281 and Sorabji, The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (see note 8) 2–3. Thus Lloyd, The Later Neoplatonists (see note 23).

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gible world.25 But this is not completely true either. As we will see below, Porphyry talks about Aristotle’s principles and causes in his commentary on the Physics, he talks about concepts in his short commentary on the Categories, and he is also inspired by Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul in works like On the Faculties of the Soul.26 Of course, the soul does exist in the sensible world, but it is an intelligible entity for a Platonist, as we know. Besides, Porphyry wrote a commentary also on Plato’s Timaeus, and in this he sets out to explain the nature of the sensible world. It is not then the case that Porphyry turns to Plato when he deals with the intelligible realm and to Aristotle when he focuses on the sensible world. Even with regard to logic, Porphyry’s assumed desire to teach logic to Platonists as a propaideutic to Plato, and to use Aristotle’s treatises for that purpose, leaves unanswered the question of why a Platonist should want to delve into the complexities of Aristotle’s theory of predication and of syllogism in order to be able to understand Plato. If some training in logic was needed for beginners in Plato, a work like the Isagoge would suffice. But we see instead that Porphyry wrote a lot more than that. His exegetical work on the Organon is as voluminous and detailed as the relevant work of a dedicated Peripatetic like Alexander of Aphrodisias. And the question is why. I have an alternative answer to offer. Porphyry, I would like to argue, engages so profoundly with Aristotle’s works because he finds central issues in Platonist philosophy being discussed also by Aristotle in very similar ways in treatises such as the Categories, the De Interpretatione, the Physics, and the Posterior Analytics. Porphyry, I suggest, considers these works to be permeated by similar philosophical commitments that can be detected in central Platonic dialogues, namely commitments about kinds of knowledge, the language-to-reality relation, about essence and definition, form and matter, principles and causes. What is more, Porphyry finds in these works of Aristotle answers that Plato’s dialogues do not give, or at least do not give in a clear way, yet these are answers inspired by Plato’s key philosophical ideas. This means that Porphyry finds in these works of Aristotle the evolution of some Platonic views that he considers an interesting Platonist development. It is for these reasons, I think, that Porphyry writes commentaries on Aristotle’s works. And in doing so, he takes a purely Platonist point of view, that is, he abides by the main tenets of Platonist philosophy as he understands it. There are two principal indications in favor of my suggestion. The first is that in his Aristotelian commentaries, including the Isagoge, Porphyry of-

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Thus Gerson, The Harmony of Plato and Aristotle according to Neoplatonism (see note 22). For a discussion of Porphyry’s psychology and his stance to Aristotle’s relevant doctrine, see Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? (see note 10) 287–303.

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ten brings up relevant views of Plato. In the Isagoge, for instance, he invokes Plato’s theory of division in the Politicus and the Sophist when discussing Aristotle’s ten kinds of predication.27 In his commentary on the Physics on the other hand Porphyry makes references to the Sophist and to the Timaeus.28 More specifically, Porphyry brings in the views that Plato outlines in the Sophist regarding non-being, which apparently Porphyry identifies with matter, that is, the receptacle of the Timaeus, which is without form, as is specified in Timaeus 50 D 7.29 On the other hand, we find references to Aristotle’s works also in Porphyry’s commentaries on Platonic dialogues, such as the Sophist or the Timaeus, as we will see in some detail in the following. Such a practice speaks in favor of the view that Porphyry sees Plato and Aristotle as discussing similar topics, from similar perspectives, and with similar conceptual tools, and this is why, I suggest, he often treats them jointly. This brings me to the second indication. If we look at Porphyry’s Aristotelian commentaries closely, we realize that Porphyry does not merely set out to interpret Aristotle, as is often claimed; he rather sets out to advance and 27

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Cf. Porph., Ιntr. 6, 11–16: δέκα μὲν οὖν τὰ γενικώτατα, τὰ δὲ εἰδικώτατα ἐν ἀριθμῷ μέν τινι, οὐ μὴν ἀπείρῳ· τὰ δὲ ἄτομα, ἅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰ εἰδικώτατα, ἄπειρα. διὸ ἄχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων κατιόντας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι, κατιέναι δὲ διὰ τῶν διὰ μέσου διαιροῦντας ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς· τὰ δὲ ἄπειρά φησιν ἐᾶν, μὴ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήμην. Cf. Porph., In Phys. ap. Simp., In Phys. 134, 14–18: τὸν οὖν Πλάτωνά φασιν ἐνδοῦναι τῇ προτάσει τῇ λεγούσῃ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ὄν (καὶ γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν στάσιν καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον ἐν Σοφιστῇ ἕτερα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναί φησι), τὸ δὲ οὐκ ὂν οὐδὲν οὐκέτι συγχωρεῖν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἕτερα τοῦ ὄντος, κἂν μὴ ὄντα ᾖ, ἀλλ’ ὅμως εἶναί φησι καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἰσάγει. 135, 1–14: Φησὶ δὲ ὁ Πορφύριος τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγειν εἶναι, οὕτως μέντοι εἶναι ὡς μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὄντως ὂν ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ ταύτην ὄντως εἶναι οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνωτάτω πρώτην ἄμορφον καὶ ἀνείδεον ὕλην ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ἐστὶν εἶναι μέν, μηδὲν δὲ εἶναι τῶν ὄντων. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἐπινοουμένη δυνάμει μὲν πάντα ἐστίν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδέν. τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης ἀποτέλεσμα καθ’ ὅσον μὲν εἴδους μετέχει, κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναί τι καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, καθ’ ὅσον δὲ τῆς ὕλης καὶ διὰ ταύτην ἐν συνεχεῖ ῥύσει καὶ μεταβολῇ τυγχάνει, πάλιν μὴ ἁπλῶς μηδὲ βεβαίως εἶναι. ἀντιδιαιρούμενος γοῦν αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ φησί ‘τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενον μέν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε’. καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι ἔφη, οὐ τὸ ὂν μὴ ὂν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι ὄν· οὐ μὴν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀντικείμενα. τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα καὶ μὴ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, μὴ ἵππον δὲ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν. 136, 33–137, 7: Ὁ δέ γε Πορφύριος ὅτι μὲν οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς μὴ ὂν ὁ Πλάτων εἰσάγει, καλῶς ἐθεάσατο, ὅτι δὲ μὴ ὂν τὸ γενητὸν ὂν ἐν Σοφιστῇ φησι παραδιδόναι, περὶ οὗ λέγει ἐν Τιμαίῳ ‘καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενον μέν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε’, τοῦτο ἐπιστάσεως ἄξιον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τῶν νοερῶν εἰδῶν διακρίσει τὸ μὴ ὂν ὁ Πλάτων ἀνευρίσκειν δοκεῖ. πότε γὰρ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ αἰσθητῶν ἔλεγε ταῦτα ‘τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἦ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὼς εἶναι.’ There is a long tradition of describing the receptacle as formless, that goes back to Aristotle who describes the receptacle that he identifies with matter (Phys. I 9.192 a 3–14) as ‘quality-

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justify his own philosophical views, which we find in other works of his and which are characteristic of Porphyry’s Neoplatonist philosophical outlook. One such view, which I discuss later on in this paper, is that sensible individuals are combinations of qualities and that matter is without qualities, a nonbeing. Even when the tone is largely exegetical, the terms involved in Porphyry’s exegesis are far from neutral; they rather betray a certain metaphysical perspective. One such example, as we will see, is Porphyry’s view on concepts, which comes up both in his Aristotelian commentaries and in the rest of his work. This fact suggests that in his Aristotelian commentaries Porphyry does not set out to offer a mere interpretation of Aristotle’s texts but he also channels in them his own philosophical views on logic, epistemology, physics, and metaphysics. And he does so because he finds Aristotle discussing issues inherited by Platonist philosophy from a point of view that he considers, not unjustifiably, as Platonist. Before I illustrate Porphyry’s practice in detail, let me first say that the practice I outline above and the underlying idea is not completely unknown in Platonism. Plutarch, for instance, appears to take the view that Aristotelian works like the Categories and the Topics are essentially Platonist in character, and this is why, I suggest, he set out to comment on the latter.30 A similar attitude can be detected in Alcinous’ Didascalicus.31 Porphyry, however, goes further than that. He agrees on the Platonist character of some of Aristotle’s works, but for Porphyry this does not mean that Aristotle merely recasts Plato’s views, as Plutarch and Alcinous appear to suggest, but also that Aristotle developed philosophical views which go beyond what Plato had articulated but still are in accordance with, and inspired by, Plato’s philosophy. For Porphyry, Aristotle’s works are Platonist in some attenuated sense, and this needs to be explained. But it is because Porphyry considers Aristotle’s works Platonist in a sense, that he treats them in the same way that he treats Plato’s works. For the same reason Porphyry advances in his Aristotelian commentaries his personal philosophical views, as he does in his other works. This is what I try to show in the rest of my paper.

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less and formless’ (De cael. III 8.306 b 17: ἀειδὲς καὶ ἄμορφον). This is taken over by Antiochus (cf. Cicero, Acad. pr. II 27) and Alcinous, Didascalicus VIII 163, 6. See Plutarch, De animae procreatione in Timaeo 1023 E, where Plutarch argues that Plato is the source of the Aristotelian categories. Plutarch wrote a work on Aristotle’s Topics, lost today, which comprised 8 books (Lamprias nr. 56) and he also speaks about that work in Quaestiones convivales 616 D. See further Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? (see note 10) 86–87 and 123–125. Alcinous, Didascalicus VI 159, 43–44 finds Aristotle’s categories implied in Plato’s Parmenides. The Anonymous in Theaetetum detects them instead in the Theaetetus (Anon., In Tht. 68, 7–22). On this tendency among later ancient Platonists see Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? (see note 10) 21–24.

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II. Names, Things, and Concepts: Porphyry on the Categories I will start with Porphyry’s commentaries on the Categories. I will first set out to outline Porphyry’s interpretation of this work. Then on the basis of that I will move to identify the Platonist concerns that motivated Porphyry’s engagement with the Categories and also to show how his interpretation connects with his overall Platonist philosophical position. Porphyry differs from earlier Platonists, including Plotinus, in that he argues for a predominantly semantic interpretation of the Categories, while they assume a strictly ontological one, according to which Aristotle deals in the Categories with kinds of being, like substance, quality, and quantity. On the latter interpretation Aristotle is vulnerable to the Platonist criticism that he leaves out intelligible beings such as the transcendent Forms, which for the Platonists qualify as substance par excellence, while sensible individuals are substances only in a secondary sense, namely to the extent that they participate in the intelligible Forms. On this Platonist interpretation, even if Aristotle in this work confines himself to the sensible world and his kinds of being apply exclusively to it, it is a mistake on his part to leave out intelligible beings such as Forms, since for Platonists the Forms are the causes of sensible individuals. Porphyry on the other hand opts for an interpretation that was popular among Peripatetics, according to which Aristotle’s subject matter in the Categories is not kinds of being but rather words that signify (Porph., In Cat. 58, 5–6). Let me explain this. Porphyry starts his short commentary on the Categories with an argument in favor of the title ‘categories’, as opposed to titles like ‘on the genera of being’ that earlier Platonist critics assumed. The term ‘κατηγορία’, Porphyry argues, is used for simple words that signify something we can point to, like ‘stone’, ‘animal’, ‘white’.32 This means, Porphyry suggests, that in the Categories Aristotle examines a subset of words that signify, namely those that signify sensible things, things we point to, like ‘stone’, ‘animal’, ‘white’, and he does not examine those signifying names like ‘verb’, ‘animal’ (i.e. the word), ‘genus’ (γένος), ‘species’ (εἶδος; 56, 34–58, 20). Porphyry considers the first class of words, those of first imposition (θέσις), more basic than the latter, those of second imposition (58, 1–5), and it is the former, Porphyry

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Cf. Porph., In Cat. 56, 5–13: Τὸ οὖν τῆς κατηγορίας ὄνομα κείμενον ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἐπὶ δικαιολογίας ἐλεγκτικῆς, τῆς διὰ λόγων μηνύσεως, λαβὼν αὐτὸς τὰς τῶν λέξεων τῶν σημαντικῶν κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀγορεύσεις κατηγορίας προσεῖπεν. ὥστε πᾶσα ἁπλῆ λέξις σημαντική, ὅταν καθ᾽ οὖ σημαίνηται πράγματος ἀγορευθῇ τε καὶ λεχθῇ, λέγεται κατηγορία, οἷον ὄντος πράγματος τοῦδε τοῦ δεικνυμένου λίθου, οὗ ἁπτόμεθα ἢ ὃ βλέπομεν, ὅταν εἴπωμεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὅτι τόδε λίθος ἐστίν, ἡ λίθος λέξις κατηγορία ἐστι. σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀγορεύεται κατὰ τοῦ δεικνυμένου πράγματος λίθου.

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argues, that Aristotle examines in the Categories and divides into ten classes of predication (κατηγορίαι), while he focuses on the second class of words, those of second imposition, in De Interpretatione (58, 32–36). Let me note briefly here that the distinction between two classes of words that we find in Porphyry has its roots in the Cratylus, although it was first explicitly formulated by the Stoics, who draw on the Cratylus in this respect.33 It corresponds to the distinction in the Cratylus between the first names (τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα) that signify things we point to, which are primary or more basic in language, and names composed by names or secondary names (Crat. 421 A-422 E). Socrates defends the correctness of both kinds of names, but it is the former kind that matters most, because, as Socrates claims, the rest of names were made by imitation of the primary ones (427 C-D).34 The Platonist origin of this distinction is important for my purposes in the following sense. Porphyry attributes to Aristotle a distinction that originates in, or at least can be projected back onto, Plato. For Porphyry this is important for paying attention to Aristotle’s Categories and discussing his relevant views in some detail, which is quite unlike what Plutarch and Alcinous did. This is not an isolated case; rather Porphyry does this quite often. Let me give another example. In the beginning of his commentary on the Physics Porphyry sets out to explain the kind of inquiry that pertains to the natural philosopher, which, Porphyry claims, is different from that of the metaphysician (ὁ ἀναβεβηκώς; Simp., In Phys. 9, 10–27). Their difference, Porphyry claims, lies in the fact that they rely on different principles (ἀρχαί). This comment is invited by Aristotle’s remark at the beginning of his Physics, where he claims that all branches of knowledge have their own principles, causes, and elements, and there is a need to specify the principles of natural science (Phys. I 1.184 a 10–16). Porphyry, then, goes on to distinguish kinds of principles and kinds of causes.35 These include the four causes of which Aristotle speaks in the 33

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For the formulation see S. E., M. I 143, 4; IX 241–242; Simp., In Cat. 40, 6; 187, 7. See A. A. Long, Stoic Linguistics, Plato’s Cratylus, and Augustine’s De dialectica, in: D. Frede – B. Inwood (edd.), Language and Learning. Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge 2005, 36–55. I owe the references to M. Griffin’s paper, M. J. Griffin, What Does Aristotle Categorize? Semantics and the Early Peripatetic Reading of the Categories, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 55, 2012, 69–108. For a discussion, see F. Ademollo, The Cratylus of Plato. A Commentary, Cambridge−New York 2011, 257–312. Cf. Porph., In Phys. ap. Simp., In Phys. 10, 25–11, 15: Ὁ μέντοι Πορφύριος ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἀρχὴν λέγει, φησίν, ὅθεν ἡ πρώτη κίνησις γίνεται· ἔστι δὲ τοιαύτη ἡ ἀφ’ οὗ ὡς ὁδοῦ τὸ πρῶτον· οὕτω δὲ καὶ νεὼς μὲν τρόπις, οἰκίας δὲ θεμέλιος· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ σημαινομένῳ ἀντίκειται ἡ τελευτή· ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον ὡς τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ, ὡς ἡ φύσις τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ ἡ τέχνη τῶν τεχνητῶν· ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον ἀθλήσεως ἡ νίκη· κατ᾽ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἀρχὴ λέγεται, ἐξ οὗ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχοντος

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Physics. Quite noticeably, though, Porphyry presents Plato as having added two more causes on Aristotle’s four causes, namely the Forms, which operate as the model (παράδειγμα) for everything that comes to be and are thus called paradeigmatic causes, and also the instrumental cause (ὀργανική), that by means of which something comes to be. Porphyry’s presentation implies that Aristotle inherited his principles from Plato and left out two of them. Quite remarkably, one of them is the Forms, that is, the transcendent Forms, since Aristotle’s causal scheme includes immanent Forms. The implication clearly is that that the causal schemes of Plato and Aristotle are complementary and that Plato’s set of principles is richer than that of Aristotle. Now this evidence does not only suggest that Porphyry finds in Aristotle elements of Plato’s philosophy like the distinction between primary and secondary names and kinds of causes I mentioned earlier. Porphyry, I suggest, detects in Aristotle a development of these Platonist views, which is philosophically interesting per se. In Porphyry’s view Aristotle, for instance, appears to develop in the Categories a classification of kinds of significant words that is missing in Plato. And he also applies in an explicit way his scheme of causes in order to explain what comes into being, and this articulated, systematically presented, causal scheme is again missing in Plato. Let me go back to Porphyry’s interpretation of the Categories. Porphyry proceeds to divide the ten classes of significant words or classes of predication into two kinds, substance (οὐσία) and accident (συμβεβηκός; Porph., In Cat. 71, 25–72, 29). Words like ‘man’ and ‘white’ signify substance and accident respectively in statements like ‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘Socrates is white’. Accordingly, Porphyry suggests, there are two kinds of predication, essential and accidental. Accidents like ‘white’ are in a subject (ὑποκείμενον) and cannot exist separately from it, while terms like ‘man’ or ‘animal’ are

γίνεταί τι, ὡς οἰκίας λίθοι καὶ ξύλα ἀρχὴ ὡς ὕλη· ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος. ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ μόνον θεασάμενος εἶδος τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τὸ χωριστὸν ἐννοήσας εἶδος τὴν παραδειγματικὴν ἀρχὴν προσεισήγαγε· τετραχῶς οὖν ἡ ἀρχὴ κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ ὡς ἡ ὕλη ἢ τὸ καθ’ ὃ ὡς τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ ὡς τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ δι ὃ ὡς τὸ τέλος. κατὰ δὲ Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸ πρὸς ὃ ὡς τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸ δι’ οὗ ὡς τὸ ὀργανικόν· ὁσαχῶς δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ τὸ αἴτιον· καὶ τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ ταὐτὸν ἄμφω, τῇ δὲ ἐπινοίᾳ διαφέροντα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχή, φησὶν ὁ Πορφύριος, ἐπινοεῖται καθὸ προηγεῖται, τὸ δὲ αἴτιον καθὸ ποιεῖ τι καὶ ἀποτελεῖ τὸ μεθ’ ἑαυτό, ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αἰτίου δυνάμει ἀρχικοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς δυνάμει τελικῆς· διὸ καὶ προηγεῖται ἡ ἐπίνοια τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς τοῦ αἰτίου ἐπινοίας· τοσαυταχῶς δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν αἰτίων λεγομένων οὐ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλαι μὲν γενέσεως ἀρχαί, ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον ἢ ἕν τι τῶν στοιχείων ὃ ἕκαστοι τῶν φυσικῶν ἐθεάσαντο. ἄλλαι δὲ γνώσεως ἀρχαὶ αἱ ἄμεσοι καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι προτάσεις· καὶ ἄλλαι μὲν οὐσίας ἀρχαὶ ὡς τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον ἔλεγον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἢ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον· πράξεως δὲ ἀρχαὶ ἢ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ τέλος. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? (see note 10) 272–277.

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predicated or said of a particular, like Socrates, and signify substance, as they tell us what Socrates essentially is. For Porphyry, Aristotle’s view, according to which terms that indicate genera or species signify secondary substances while terms indicating individuals like Socrates signify primary substances on the grounds that individuals exist naturally while genera or species exist only insofar as individuals do, is justified on the grounds that in Porphyry’s view Aristotle sets out to deal with predicates that signify things we point to when we speak, and these things are particulars. For, Porphyry suggests, Aristotle speaks of words like ‘animal’ or ‘man’ as predicates of, or as allocated to (κατατεταγμένος), something, not outside predication.36 Moreover, Porphyry argues, by ‘particular substance’ (ἄτομος οὐσία) is not meant an individual but rather a class of individuals; the word ‘man’, for instance, he argues, refers to the entire class of men on the basis of which we come to conceive (ἐνοήσαμεν) man (Porph., In Cat. 90, 31–91, 7). The following passage illustrates Porphyry’s view (Porph., In Cat. 90, 28–91, 7): Q. But why [does the conclusion not follow]? A. Because you are speaking about Socrates alone, who can be eliminated while man and animal both remain, but you ought not to speak merely about a single man: you must recognise that individual substance does not mean just one of the particulars, but rather all of the particular men, from whom we conceive the man that is predicated in common, and all the particular animals, through which we think the animal that is predicated in common. These are the cause of the being of the common predicates. For it is not possible to think of ox or man or horse or animal in general apart from the particulars. But if it is from the perception of particulars that we come to conceive of the common predicate, which we no longer think of as a ‘this’, but as a ‘such’, then if the particular animals are eliminated, what is predicated in common of them will no longer exist either. Also, expressions that signify beings are applied initially to individuals, and it is from them that our thought proceeds to the common items.37 {Ἐ.} Τί δήποτε; {Ἀ.} Ὅτι περὶ Σωκράτους μόνον πεποίησαι τὸν λόγον, οὗ ἀναιρεθέντος ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον μένει, δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ εὖ εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτομος οὐσία ὁ εἷς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀλλ’ οἱ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἄνθρωποι πάντες, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὁ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενος ἄνθρωπος ἐπενοήθη, καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον ζῷα, δι’ ἃ τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἐνοήσαμεν ζῷον. ἃ δὴ καὶ αἴτια τοῖς κοινῇ κατηγορουμένοις ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι·

36 37

See also Porphyry’s comment in his longer commentary in Simp., In Cat. 53, 4–9. Translation S. K. Strange, Porphyry: On Aristotle Categories (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1992.

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George Karamanolis παρὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἄνθρωπον οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ὅλως ἔστι νοῆσαι ζῷον. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον αἰσθήσεως ἐπὶ τὸ κοινῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀφικνούμεθα, ὅπερ οὐκέτι τόδε τι νοοῦμεν ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, εἰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀναιρεθῇ ζῷα, οὐκέτι οὐδὲ τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον κατ’ αὐτῶν ἔσται. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ σημαντικαὶ λέξεις τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ πρότερα τὰ ἄτομα κατωνομασμέναι, εἶτα ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ ἡ διάνοια μετῆλθεν.

This is a remarkable passage for many reasons. Quite importantly, it shows that Porphyry is concerned here not only with predication and with the kind of substance involved in it but also with how we form concepts of things and what role these concepts play in getting to know things. This is not an issue that Aristotle examines in the Categories. Porphyry, however, appears to be privileging this issue in his longer commentary, the Ad Gedaleium. Although our evidence is limited, it gives us reasons to believe that Porphyry talked there about the role that νοήματα, that is, concepts, play in the human cognitive process. In his report about the possible subject matter of the Categories, Simplicius tells us that according to Porphyry’s Ad Gedaleium ‘the aim [of the Categories] is about the simple and most general parts of speech which signify simple things and the simple concepts which exist in conjunction with these simple things’.38 A statement to a similar effect occurs also in Ammonius’ commentary (Ammonius, In Cat. 9, 14–19). This does not make the philosophical outlook of Porphyry’s longer commentary on the Categories substantially different from that of the shorter one, since we find reference to how we form concepts of things in the latter too. Porphyry’s interest in the formation and the role of concepts in cognition is attested also in other parts of his work. There is a very interesting section on exactly this issue in his commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics (In Ptol. Harm. 11, 1–14, 31) that has attracted quite some scholarly attention recently.39 What is open to discussion there is how exactly the process of concept formation that is described should be understood. It is debated whether Porphyry implies the extraction of form from matter and how this enmattered form relates to the relevant transcendent idea. For our purposes, however, it is important to

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Περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ γενικωτάτων τοῦ λόγου μορίων εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν τῶν τὰ ἁπλᾶ πράγματα σημαινόντων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν πραγμάτων ἁπλᾶ νοήματα (Simp., In Cat. 10, 17–19; reporting on Porph., In Cat. ad Gedaleium). Porphyry’s views on concepts and their bearing on his theory of knowledge are discussed by H. Tarrant, Thrassylan Platonism, Ithaca−London 1993, 127–143, M. Chase, Porphyry on the Cognitive Process, Ancient Philosophy 30, 2010, 385–405, C. Helmig, Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina Bd. 5), Berlin−Boston 2012, 171–183 and R. Chiaradonna, Concetti generali, astrazioni e forme in Porfirio (unpublished draft).

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stress that Porphyry finds in Aristotle’s Categories elements that are relevant for his long-standing interest in concepts. This evidence brings up the question I touched upon earlier, namely what attracted Porphyry’s attention to the Categories. What was his motivation to write his commentaries and adopt the interpretation he did? Clearly Porphyry did not undertake such an enterprise only in order to elucidate Aristotle’s treatise to students of philosophy like Chrysaorios or Gedaleios, Porphyry’s addressees of the shorter and longer commentaries on the Categories respectively. Neither did he do it in order to defend Aristotle against Platonist critics or in order to add Aristotle’s logic to the Platonist philosophical curriculum, as is sometimes argued.40 Of course he does all these, but he also does more than that, as the passage I cited earlier on human cognition of universals shows. Porphyry outlines his philosophical views on matters that he considers important, such as the status of universals and the formation of concepts in the human mind. Before I come to these matters, let us first consider whether Porphyry gives us a clue regarding the reasons that attracted him to the Categories. In his discussion of the purpose of Aristotle’s Categories at the beginning of his commentary, Porphyry suggests that Aristotle’s classification of significant terms into ten classes of entities saves us from the infinity of terms that would be necessary for the infinity of entities.41 I agree with Bodéüs that the γὰρ is needed there, for the clause is meant to voice a justification of the Aristotelian classification. Porphyry takes Aristotle to be suggesting an isomorphism between names and things, between language and reality, in the sense that there are as many kinds of significant words as there are kinds of beings. As Porphyry says: ‘Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differences, the words that indicate them have also to be ten in genus and are themselves so classified’ (In Cat. 58, 12–14). But in what sense is this fact important? How is the classification of words interesting for a Platonist like Porphyry? In a nutshell the answer is that Porphyry sees here some connection with Platonist metaphysics. Let me explain this. 40 41

Thus Lloyd, The Later Neoplatonists (see note 23) 321–322. Cf. Porph., In Cat. 58, 3–15: ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἁπλῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαί εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν τῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλήλων διαφερόντων ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ γένος· ἄπειρα μὲν γὰρ* [Bodéüs inseruit] σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμόν. ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰς κατὰ ἀριθμὸν πρόκειται διελθεῖν λέξεις· ἑκάστη γὰρ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων· ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ πολλά ἐστιν ἓν ὄντα τῷ εἴδει ἢ τῷ γένει, καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν σημαινουσῶν αὐτὰ λέξεων εἰς δέκα γένη εὕρηται περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι. εἰς δέκα τοίνυν γενικὰς διαφορὰς περιληφθέντων τῶν ὄντων δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσαι ταῦτα φωναὶ γεγόνασι κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐταὶ περιληφθεῖσαι. δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγορίαι τῷ γένει δηλονότι, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα δέκα τῷ γένει.

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At some point in his commentary Porphyry argues that a definition explains what something is, as names also do (In Cat. 63, 7–9). The idea is that words help us know the world around us. If we know what the words signify, we are in a position to say what kind of thing something is. For when we predicate something of x, we say what x is, but only one kind of possible answer qualifies as definition, namely that which gives the οὐσία of x, while that which gives the accident(s) of x does not. The close connection between definition that needs to make reference to the essence of a thing and the question of how we get to know that thing, is central in Plato and Porphyry naturally inherits it. The problem of the relation between names and things arises in the Phaedo, for instance, where Plato investigates the question of how predicates apply to things, and he suggests that we need to relate names to Forms in order to explain how the former have meaning and how we learn a language, while he also claims that our judgments about sensible entities require reference to Forms (Phd. 102 B 1–3). Phaedo suggests that when a sensible object partakes in (μεταλαμβάνοντα) a Form, it also has the name of that Form (τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν; Phd. 102 B 2; cf. 103 E). This means that names capture the essences of things. The question how exactly Forms are linked to names is further investigated in the Cratylus. Plato applies the method of division in order to determine how names signify. After dividing the letters of the alphabet, Socrates says that we now must divide all beings on which names are to be imposed, that is, divide beings in kinds and impose names on them rather than on individual beings.42 And later on in his career Plato has in the Sophist the eleatic Stranger raise the question of division in kinds from a similar point of view, when he says that kinds of being mix with each other in an analogous way that some letters fit with each other and others not. The knowledge of which kinds of being mix with each other is said to be characteristic of the philosopher/dialectician (Soph. 253 A-E).43 Porphyry appears to have written commentaries both on the Cratylus and the Sophist, which indicates his preoccupation with the kind of questions just mentioned. The commentary on the Cratylus is unfortunately lost without traces, but the commentary on the Sophist was used by Boethius in his

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Cf. Crat. 424 C 9-D 4: καὶ ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα διελώμεθα, τὰ ὄντα εὖ πάντα αὖ οἷς δεῖ ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι, εἰ ἔστιν εἰς ἃ ἀναφέρεται πάντα ὥσπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν αὐτά τε καὶ εἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔνεστιν εἴδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις. Cf. Soph. 253 B 8-C 3: ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταὐτὰ μείξεως ἔχειν ὡμολογήκαμεν, ἆρ᾽ οὐ μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται; καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντ’ ἄττ’ αὔτ’ ἐστιν, ὥστε συμμείγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν, εἰ δι᾽ὅλων ἕτερα τῆς διαιρέσεως αἴτια;

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De divisione, as he himself makes clear (Boethius, De divisione 876 D), and we can catch glimpses of it in Boethius’ work.44 A word of caution is needed here, of course, given the second-hand evidence we have about it. There are, however, a number of striking parallels between Boethius’ rephrasing of Porphyry’s comments on the Sophist and Porphyry’s remarks in his commentaries on the Categories, and such parallels suggest Porphyry as the main source of Boethius’ work. Let me give a couple of examples. In his commentary on the Sophist Porphyry apparently addressed the issue of how a genus is distributed into species. Boethius claims that this happens with respect to quality, that is, we move from animal to man through the addition of the quality of rationality.45 A similar point occurs also in Porphyry’s Isagoge46 and in his short commentary on the Categories (In Cat. 65, 25–28). Porphyry argues that we cannot determine a genus unless we include some essential qualities, rationality for man and blackness for a crow. Both Porphyry and Boethius deal similarly with the use of general and special predication, that is, how we predicate genus and species to something, both of which answer the question ‘what is it?’, as Aristotle specifies in Topics I 5.102 a 31–35 and in Categories 5.2 b 31–34.47 If this is so, it turns out that Porphyry made the same point about general and special predication in his commentary on the Sophist as well as in his Aristotelian exegetical writings. And he did that because he apparently believed that this is a view that Plato and Aristotle share. Similar is the following case. The ontological dependence of species on genus (but not vice versa) occurs both in the De divisione and in Porphyry’s short commentary on the Categories.48 Such parallels do not merely show that Porphyry’s Plato44

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47 48

On Boethius’ De divisione see the new critical edition with prolegomena and commentary by J. Magee, Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii De Divisione Liber (Philosophia antiqua vol. 77), Leiden−Boston−Köln 1998. Cf. Boethius, De divisione 879 B: generis vero distributio qualitate perficitur. Nam cum hominem sub animali locavero tunc qualitate divisio facta est, quale namque animal est homo idcirco quoniam quadam qualitate formatur, unde quale sit animal homo interrogatus aut “rationale” respondebit aut certe “mortale”. Cf. Porph., Intr. 3, 10–20: ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐρωτᾶν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ὅτι λογικόν, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι ὁ κόραξ φαμὲν ὅτι μέλαν· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν διαφορά, τὸ δὲ μέλαν συμβεβηκός· ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἐρωτηθῶμεν, ζῷον ἀποκρινόμεθα· ἦν δὲ ἀνθρώπου γένος τὸ ζῷον. ὥστε τὸ μὲν κατὰ πλειόνων λέγεσθαι τὸ γένος διαστέλλει αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ’ ἑνὸς μόνου τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορουμένων, τὸ δὲ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει διαστέλλει ἀπὸ τῶν ὡς εἰδῶν κατηγορουμένων ἢ ὡς ἰδίων, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι χωρίζει ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμβεβηκότων, ἃ οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον ἐστὶν κατηγορεῖται ἕκαστον ὧν κατηγορεῖται. οὐδὲν ἄρα περιττὸν οὐδὲ ἐλλεῖπον περιέχει ἡ τοῦ γένους ῥηθεῖσα ὑπογραφὴ τῆς ἐννοίας. See Barnes (see note 6) 85–92. Cf. Boethius, De divisione 879 C: Amplius genus omne naturaliter prius est propriis speciebus, totum autem partibus propriis posterius. […] hinc quoque illud vere

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nist and Aristotelian commentaries have common elements, but also show that the commentator is motivated by specific philosophical concerns such as the relations between kinds of beings, like genera, species, and individuals, and that he appreciates the common method of division that in his view both Plato and Aristotle follow in their investigations. What is more, Porphyry apparently finds in Plato and Aristotle some similar philosophical views which emerge in his commentary on the Sophist as well as in the Isagoge and in his short commentary on the Categories. It may be for such reasons that Porphyry paid close attention to Aristotle’s works; not only do these works wrestle with issues that preoccupied Plato but they also develop Platonic ideas in ways that continue Plato’s philosophy.

III. Ontological and Epistemological Implications of Logic A closer look at Porphyry’s commentaries on the Categories and the Physics confirms that for Porphyry Aristotle continues Plato’s inquiry and develops Plato’s line of thought. This is what I will try to illustrate in this section. I have just mentioned the role that quality plays in the distribution of genus into species. But this is a certain kind of quality. Porphyry appears to distinguish between essential and accidental quality, so to speak. The heat in Socrates is an accidental quality, whereas the heat of fire is part of what makes fire what it is. The qualities of the second kind are said to be ‘completing of substance’ (συμπληρωτικαὶ τῆς οὐσίας).49 Porphyry makes this point

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dicitur: si genus interimatur statim species deperire [ἀναιρεῖται], si species interempta sit non peremptum genus in natura consistere; Porph., In Cat. 77, 27–36: ἔστιν ἔν τινι καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐν τῷ γένει τὸ εἶδος καθάπερ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· περιέχεται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος ὑπὸ τὸ γένος. ἔστιν ἔν τινι ὡς γένος ἐν τῷ εἴδει· μετέχει γὰρ τὰ εἴδη τοῦ γένους· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὡς μετεχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἔστιν ἔν τινι ὡς τὸ ἐν τέλει εἶναι· ἐν γὰρ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τέλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὰ πάντα ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἔστι δὲ ἄλλο ἔν τινι τὸ ἐν τῷ κρατοῦντι, ὡς λέγομεν ἐν τῷ βασιλεῖ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα. ἄλλο δὲ πάλιν ἔν τινι τὸ ὡς ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ εἶδος καθάπερ ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος κἀν τῷ σιδήρῳ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς μαχαίρας κἀν τῇ ψυχῇ ἡ ἐπιστήμη κἀν τῷ σώματι τὸ χρῶμα. Porph., In Cat. 90, 3–11: ‘Ἐν οἷς’, φησίν [Cat. 5.2 a 14–16], ‘εἴδεσιν αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη’. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς εἴδεσί πως τὰ ἄτομά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐπὶ πλέον λεγομένοις τὰ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον λεγόμενα περιέχεσθαι λέγεται. ταῦτά τε οὖν τὰ εἴδη τὰ περιέχοντα τὰς ἀτόμους οὐσίας καὶ τὰ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν γένη τὰ περιέχοντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴδη εἴη ἂν δεύτεραι οὐσίαι οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ζῷον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον. δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται οὐσίαι λέγονται οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Cf. Porph., In Cat. ad Gedaleium ap. Simp., In Cat. 48, 1–49, 9 (= fr. 55 Smith): Ἀποροῦσι δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ‘μὴ ὡς μέρος’ [Cat. 2.1 a 24] λέγεσθαι τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. […] ταύτην δὴ τὴν ἀπορίαν λύων ὁ Πορφύριος ‘διττόν, φησίν, ἐστὶν τὸ ὑποκείμενον,

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while commenting on Aristotle’s two kinds of predication, ‘being in a subject’ and ‘being said of a subject’ (cf. Cat. 2.1 a 24–25). At this point Porphyry takes the opportunity to discuss the term ‘subject’ (ὑποκείμενον) and he distinguishes two senses of it; one sense of ‘subject’ is that of qualityless matter (ἄποιος ὕλη), while another sense of ‘subject’ is that illustrated by Socrates. It is with regard to the second kind of subject that Porphyry distinguishes between essential and accidental quality. His suggestion is that not every quality is in a subject, but this depends on whether this is of the first or the second kind. ‘White’ is in a subject in some cloth but is not in a subject in snow; there it rather is part of the substance of snow. Neither of these distinctions occur in Aristotle, however. And neither of them are ontologically neutral. The distinction between essential and accidental quality stems from Porphyry’s view that sensible substances are mere conglomerations of qualities, a view we find earlier in Plotinus.50 Porphyry like Plotinus believes that sensible entities, unlike intelligible ones, do not have essences, but are made up of qualities. Yet some qualities account for

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οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἥ τε γὰρ ἄποιος ὕλη, ἣν δυνάμει καλεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, πρῶτόν ἐστιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σημαινόμενον, καὶ δεύτερον, ὃ κοινῶς ποιὸν ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται· ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκός ἐστιν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις ἢ κατηγορουμένοις κατ’ αὐτῶν. πολλὰ οὖν, φησίν, τῶν ἐγγινομένων ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον πᾶν χρῶμα καὶ πᾶν σχῆμα καὶ πᾶσα ποιότης ἐν ὑποκειμένῃ ἐστὶν τῇ πρώτῃ ὕλῃ, οὐχ ὡς μέρη αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατα χωρὶς αὐτῆς εἶναι· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου ὑποκειμένου οὐ πᾶν χρῶμα οὐδὲ πᾶσα ποιότης ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὴ συμπληρωτικαί εἰσι τῆς οὐσίας. τὸ γοῦν λευκὸν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐρίου ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς χιόνος οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀλλὰ συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς μέρος, καὶ ὑποκείμενον μᾶλλόν ἐστιν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ θερμότης τῆς μὲν τοῦ πυρὸς οὐσίας μέρος ἐστίν, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ γίνεται τῷ σιδήρῳ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται ἐν τῷ σιδήρῳ ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ σιδήρου φθορᾶς. ὁ τοίνυν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ δεύτερον ῥηθὲν ὑποκείμενον ἐνταῦθα λαβὼν τὸ κατὰ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ τὴν ἄτομον οὐσίαν, ὅπερ μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναί φησιν μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεσθαι, εἰκότως πᾶν τὸ μὴ οὐσιωδῶς ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκέναι, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τούτῳ εἶναί φησιν, ὥσπερ τὴν θερμότητα ἐν τῷ σιδήρῳ· τὰ δὲ συμπληρωτικὰ ὡς τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς θερμότητα τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς μέρος ἂν εἴποι, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ τῇ ἀποίῳ ὕλῃ’. πρὸς δὲ ταύτην οἶμαι τὴν λύσιν εἰπεῖν εὔλογον, ὅτι εἰ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τοῦτο μόνον ἐστὶν τὸ γινόμενον καὶ ἀπογινόμενον, οὐκέτι ἐν δύο τούτοις τῷ τε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ περιείληφεν πάσας τὰς κατηγορίας· εἰ γὰρ τὸ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὴ πᾶσαν ποιότητα, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπείσακτον μόνην, οὐ πάντα ἂν εἴη τὰ γένη παρειλημμένα. ἢ χρὴ λέγειν ὅτι αἱ μὴ ἐπείσακτοι ποιότητες, ἀλλὰ συμπληρωτικαὶ τῆς οὐσίας, μέρη τῆς οὐσίας οὖσαι, καὶ αὐταὶ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ συμπεριλαμβάνονται· τὰ γὰρ μέρη τῆς οὐσίας οὐσίαι κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη. καὶ ἴσως διὰ τοῦτο τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ εἶπεν ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἵνα καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας περιλάβῃ ποιότητας. For a discussion of this issue in Plotinus with references to texts and bibliography see G. Karamanolis, Plotinus on Quality and Immanent Form, in: R. Chiaradonna – F. Trabattoni (edd.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. Proceedings of the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop. Il Ciocco, Castelvecchio Pascoli, June 22–24, 2006 (Philosophia antiqua vol. 115), Leiden−Boston 2009, 79–101.

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what something essentially is, while others do not. But this point, as I said, applies to ‘subject’ in the sense of individual substance. Porphyry is surely justified to speak of subject in this sense in his commentary on the Categories. One wonders, though, why Porphyry refers to qualityless matter in such a commentary. This is not an isolated case of a reference to qualityless matter in the context of Porphyry’s commenting on the Categories. We find a similar reference in a scholium of Simplicius that probably derives from Porphyry’s Commentary on the Categories ad Gedaleium and was published in 1987 by Sten Ebbesen.51 There Simplicius jointly describes Alexander’s and Porphyry’s treatment of the relation between the categories of quantity, relation, and quality and goes on to outline Porphyry’s treatment of matter, where the latter distinguishes between prime matter, qualityless body, and qualities. It is not entirely clear what the point of Porphyry’s comment here is. If we look, though, at one of Simplicius’ reports of Porphyry’s position in his longer commentary on the Categories, we notice some interesting similarities with the preserved comment (Simplicius, In Cat. 158, 27–33). Simplicius tells us that Porphyry wanted to justify the order of the categories of quantity, relation, and quality by arguing that the latter results from the combination of quantity and relation. The comment goes on to say, presumably still reflecting Porphyry’s comment, that also Plato’s construction of the soul in the Timaeus (36 A-B) happens through the application of musical quantities which are combined in a certain proportion that results in a certain kind or quality of soul. The upshot is that for both Aristotle and Plato the combination of quantity and relation brings about quality, so the treatment of quality justifiably follows that of quantity and relation in Aristotle. Simplicius’ report does not shed light, however, on Porphyry’s reference to qualityless matter in the scholium mentioned above. A clearer reference to qualityless matter occurs, though, in Porphyry’s commentary on the Physics. Porphyry brings up the issue of non-being and claims that according to Plato 51

Schol. in ms. Laurentianus 72.15 [13th c.], fol. 22: πολλοὶ ἑτέρως πως εἶπον προταγῆναι τὰ πρός τι τοῦ ποιοῦ. ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος δεικνὺς ὅτι φυσικῇ τάξει προετάγησαν τοῦτο πιστοῖ μὲν καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα παριστῶν δοξάζοντα πρώτως μὲν στοιχεῖα δ, ἐν οἷς εὐθὺς τὸ ποσόν· εἶτα συνερχόμενα καὶ εἰρηνεύοντα, ἐν ᾧ ἡ σχέσις ἐν ᾗ τὰ πρός τι, τὸν νοητὸν ἀνελθεῖν [ἀνελθεῖν Ebbesen: ἀνελεῖν cod.] διάκοσμον· νεῖκος δὲ πάλιν σχόντα, ὅπερ κατὰ τὰς ποιότητάς ἐστιν ἐν ᾧ τὸ ποιόν, τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀναφαίνεσθαι [ἀναφαίνεσθαι Ebbesen: ἐμφαίνεσθαι cod.]. ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος τὴν πρώτην καὶ ἀνείδεον ὕλην φησὶν πρώτως [πρώτως Ebbesen: πρῶτον cod.] προβῆναι εἰς ἄποιον σῶμα· καὶ σὺν τούτῳ εὐθὺς ἅμα τριχῇ διαστατόν, μῆκος βάθος καὶ πλάτος, ἐν οἷς τὸ ποσόν. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις συμφυῶς τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἅπερ τῶν πρός τι· καὶ τότε εἰς ποιότητας. See S. Ebbesen, Boethius as an Aristotelian Scholar, in: J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung. Paul Moraux gewidmet. Zweiter Band: Kommentierung, Überlieferung, Nachleben, Berlin−New York 1987, 309–311.

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non-being exists (cf. Simplicius, In Phys. 135, 1–14). And he mentions as an example of such entity shapeless and formless matter (Simp., In Phys. 135, 3–4: ἄμορφον καὶ ἀνείδεον ὕλην), making reference to Tim. 27 D, that is, to the beginning of Timaeus’ speech where he introduces the issue of the coming into being of sensible entities. Apparently Porphyry discusses matter, that is, qualityless matter, in conjunction with the quality that matter, quite importantly, lacks. And as the passage from the commentary on the Physics shows, matter is considered as non-being, and he adds that something comes into being when matter receives qualities or λόγοι in Porphyry’s terms. The latter constitute the formal cause, that is, one of the causes that account for the coming into being of a thing, as Porphyry suggests in his comment on the beginning of Aristotle’s Physics (fr. 120 Smith) that I discussed earlier. Porphyry’s views on matter and quality and the coming into being of sensible entities are tightly related to the view that Porphyry takes on cosmogony, which he expounds primarily in his commentary on the Timaeus.52 In his view, creation consists in the timeless flow of λόγοι from the divine mind.53 For Porphyry, who follows Plotinus in this regard, sensible entities are made up of forms or λόγοι, and only they qualify as being, while matter as such is a non-being. Porphyry denies that matter is the cause of disorder in the world, which is what earlier Platonists like Numenius affirmed,54 and he even denies that matter should be first rendered suitable for acquiring the forms, as perhaps Atticus suggested.55 For Porphyry there is nothing interme52

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Porphyry also wrote a treatise on matter, allegedly in seven books, from which we have one fragment (fr. 236 Smith). Porphyry appears to be taking over from Moderatus on this regard. On Porphyry’s views on matter and cosmogony see Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? (see note 10) 277–284 and A. Smith, The Significance of ‘Physics’ in Porphyry: The Problem of Body and Matter, in: J. Wilberding – C. Horn (edd.): Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature, Oxford 2012, 30–43. Cf. Porph., In Tim. ap. Procl., In Tim. I 395, 18–396, 8 (= fr. LI Sodano 38, 11–29): αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος ἀχρόνως ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης παραγίνεται τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, πάντων ἐξαιρεθέντων τῶν ἐμποδών. καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἦν καὶ τούτοις ἐμπόδιον, τό τε εἶδος ἀθρόως ἂν τῇ ὕλῃ προσῆγον καὶ ὀργάνων οὐδὲν ἂν ὅλως ἐδεήθησαν. […] τί θαυμαστὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν τὸ πᾶν ὑπόστασιν παρέχεσθαι τῷ αἰσθητῷ, ἀύλως μὲν [add. Diehl] τὸ ἔνυλον, ἀναφῶς δὲ ἀπογεννῶντα τὸ ἁπτόν, ἀμερῶς δὲ ἐκτείνοντα τὸ διαστατόν; Cf. Porph., De cultu simulacrorum ap. Eusebius, P.E. III 9, 3–5 (= fr. 345, 43–51 Smith): Ζεὺς δὲ καθὸ νοῦς, ἀφ᾽ οὗ προφέρει πάντα καὶ δημιουργεῖ τοῖς νοήμασιν. […] λόγοις σπερματικοῖς ἀπετέλει τὰ πάντα. Cf. Numenius, fr. 52 Des Places and the discussion in G. Karamanolis, Numenius, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), URL = , section ‘Metaphysics’. Procl., In Tim. I 394, 16–19 (missing from the collection of Atticus fragments by Des Places). See W. Deuse, Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre (Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Einzelveröffentlichung 3), Wiesbaden 1983, 241–242 and Smith, The Significance of ‘Physics’ in Porphyry (see note 52) 36–37.

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diate between forms, λόγοι, and matter. For Porphyry these λόγοι are on the one hand qualities of the sensible things that constitute a sensible entity and on the other thoughts or concepts of the divine mind. They must be identical with the νοήματα of which Porphyry talks in Sententiae 43, when he speaks about the activity of the intellect.56 There Porphyry argues for the identity of the intellect with its thoughts, the νοήματα, which account for the multiplicity of the intellect, and this in turn suggests to Porphyry that the intellect cannot be the first principle, given its plurality. As we have seen earlier on, however, for Porphyry it is not only the divine mind that has νοήματα, but also the human one. Porphyry speaks of what we think of (νοοῦμεν), the objects of our thinking, in a number of passages. In a passage from his short commentary on the Categories that has been much debated in scholarship, Porphyry deals with the way we come to think of common predicates or universals.57 He first claims that it is impossible to think of (νoοῦμεν) ox, man, or horse in general (ὅλως) apart from particulars (καθ᾽ ἕκαστον), and he proceeds to claim that ‘if it is from the perception of particulars that we come to conceive of the common predicate, which we no longer think as a ‘this’, but as a ‘such’ (τοιόνδε), then if the particular animals are eliminated, what is predicated in common with them will no longer exist either’ (Porphyry, In Cat. 91, 2–5). Porphyry talks about concepts also when he argues that words like ‘man’ refer to the entire class of men on the basis of which we come to conceive (ἐνοήσαμεν) man (Porphyry, In Cat. 90, 31–91, 1). And in a fragment from his long commentary on the Categories he distinguishes the concept (ἐπίνοια) of the allocated predicate from that of the non-allocated one (fr. 56 Smith). This evidence brings us back to Porphyry’s theory of concepts. There are apparently different kinds of them and there is a complex issue regarding the relation between universals and concepts. I do not want to enter into the

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Cf. Porph., Sent. 43, 1–13: Ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ πάντων· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς, πρὸ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ ἕν. ὅτι δὲ πολλὰ ὁ νοῦς δῆλον· νοεῖ γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ νοήματα οὐχ ἓν ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα ὄντα παρ’ ἐκεῖνον. εἰ οὖν ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, ἐκεῖνα δὲ πολλά, πολλὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ νοῦς. Ὅτι δὲ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τοῖς νοητοῖς, οὕτως δείκνυται· εἰ γάρ τι ἔστιν ὃ θεωρεῖ, ἤτοι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχων τοῦτο θεωρήσει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ κείμενον. καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεωρεῖ δῆλον· σὺν γὰρ τῷ νοεῖν εἴη ἂν νοῦς, ἀφαιρεθεὶς δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν ἀφῄρηται τῆς οὐσίας. δεῖ τοίνυν ἐπιστήσαντας τοῖς πάθεσιν ἃ συμβαίνει περὶ τὰς γνώσεις ἀνιχνεῦσαι τὴν ἐκείνου θεωρίαν. γνωστικαὶ δὲ δυνάμεις ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθρόον αἴσθησις, φαντασία, νοῦς. Cf. Plot., Enn. V 3 (49) 3. See also the discussion in L. Brisson, Porphyre: Sentences. Études d’introduction, texte grec et traduction française, commentaire, Tome II (Histoire des Doctrines de l’Antiquité classique 33), Paris 2005, 752–755. See M. M. Tweedale, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Views on Universals, Phronesis 29, 1984, 279–303 and R. Bodéüs, Porphyre: Commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote (Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques), Paris 2008, 249–251.

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details of all that. Some aspects of his theory are relatively clear, however. In his commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics Porphyry suggests that it is our faculty of φαντασία that grasps the sense image, that is, the form that is immanent in a thing, and stores it in the soul as concept.58 Further in the same text Porphyry tells us that ‘the intellect comes to be of that of which there is knowledge and concept of the form (εἶδος) that has provided matter its entire shape’. Now, the shapes of μορφή that we grasp and store as concepts are derived from the divine intellect, since, as I said, the coming into being of everything in the world amounts to the flow of the λόγοι from the divine intellect. Porphyry makes this clear in several passages, and he argues that this transmission of λόγοι or forms is not to be thought as a process but as something that happened with no lapse of time (ἀθρόως; cf. Porphyry, In Tim. ap. Proclum, In Tim. I 395, 18–396, 8 [= fr. LI Sodano 38, 11–29], cited above in note 53). A testimony of Simplicius suggests that Porphyry brought up a similar case of coming into being also in his commentary on the Physics (In Phys. 106, 27–107, 25).59 Simplicius may be paraphrasing

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Cf. Porph., In Ptol. Harm. 14, 1–18: οὕτω καὶ αὕτη τοῦ πράγματος ἅπασαν τὴν μορφὴν ἐκλογιζομένη, ὁπόταν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀκριβώσῃ, τότε ἀπέθετο ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ εἶδος. καὶ τοῦτο ἦν ἡ ἔννοια, ἧς ἐγγενομένης τε καὶ βεβαιωθείσης ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐγγίνεται διάθεσις, ἀφ’ ἧς ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς ὁ νοῦς ἀναφαίνεται οἷόν περ ὄψις ἀκριβὴς εἰς τὴν προσβολὴν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ὄντως ὄν. καὶ διὰ μὲν τῆς ἀντιλήψεως ἀρξαμένης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μαθούσης τὸ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἐνυπάρχον εἶδος, διὰ δὲ τῆς ὑπολήψεως, ὅτι τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ταὐτὸ τῷ δείξαντι τὸ δειχθὲν παραδεξαμένης· διὰ δὲ τῆς φαντασίας ὅτι καὶ τοιόνδε προσεξειργασμένης κατὰ τὸν εἰκονισμόν, ὁποῖον ἦν τὸ ἐκτός· διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐννοίας ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου μετελθούσης εἰς τὴν ἄυλον ἀπόθεσιν τοῦ εἴδους, μεθ’ ἣν ἐκ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τὸ βέβαιον προσλαβοῦσα ἡ ἐπιστήμη καθαρὸν τὸν ἔπειτα καθόλου νοῦν ἐπιβλητικὸν λαμβάνει. διὸ καὶ ὁ νοῦς γίνεται ἐκείνου, οὗ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἔννοια τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ παρέχοντος τὴν ὅλην μορφὴν τῇ ὕλῃ. καὶ ἔστι τὸ γινόμενον τοιοῦτον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, ἀπὸ κοίλης γλυφῆς δακτυλίου ἐναποτυπωθέντος καὶ ἐναπομαχθείσης τῆς σφραγῖδος μετεώρου, πάλιν αὖθις ἀπ’ ἐκείνης τυπώσειεν εἰς ἑτέραν ὕλην τὴν σφραγῖδα. γίνεται γὰρ ὁμοία τῇ γλυφῇ τοῦ δακτυλίου κατὰ τὴν σφραγῖδα. Cf. Porph., In Phys. ap. Simp., In Phys. 106, 27–107, 11: ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀλλοιούμενα γίνεσθαι λέγεται καὶ γένεσίς τίς ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις (γίνεται γὰρ λευκὸν ἐκ μέλανος καὶ θερμὸν ἐκ ψυχροῦ), ἐπὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ’ ἔνια καὶ ἀθρόως καθ’ ὅλα τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν ἄρχεται ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ὡς ἔχει τὰ πηγνύμενα, ὧν οὐκ ἀπό τινος μέρους ἡ κατὰ τὴν πῆξιν ἄρχεται μεταβολή, ἀλλ’ ὅλα ἀθρόως ἄρχεται τῆς πήξεως καὶ προκόπτει κατ’ αὐτὴν ἀθρόως πάντα, τοῦ ἀθρόου ὡς οἶμαι οὐ τὸ ἄχρονον δηλοῦντος, ὡς Πορφύριος ἤκουσε, καὶ πειρᾶται ἄχρονον κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὁμοῦ πάντων τῶν μερῶν. ἡ γὰρ πῆξις καὶ ὁ φωτισμὸς τοῦ ἀέρος οὐκ ἄχρονος γίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀρχὴν τόδε τοῦ χρόνου τὸ μέρος, ἀθρόα δὲ πάντα πάσχει τὰ μόρια τὸ πάθος· ἢ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ἀθρόως ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ αὐτὸ ἐπ’ ἄπειρον ὂν διαιρετὸν καὶ οὐ κατὰ μόριόν τι πρῶτον πάσχον, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Ζ ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας δείξει λέγων ‘οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ μεταβεβληκότος ἐστί τι πρότερον ὃ μεταβέβληκεν’ [Phys. VI 5.236 a 27–28]. ἔτι δὲ σαφέστερον ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ βιβλίῳ ταῦτα γέγραφεν ‘ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀλλοιώσεως ὁποιασοῦν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μεριστὸν εἰς ἄπειρον τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ’ ἀθρόα γίνεται πολλάκις ὥσπερ ἡ πῆξις’ [Phys. VIII 3.253 b 23–26].

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and summarizing Porphyry here, but several of his phrases look remarkably Porphyrian. We are told, for instance, that some sensible things begin their change in the sense of alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) all at once (ἀθρόως), that is, he explains, all their parts change simultaneously. When light is shed in darkness, for instance, the dark space changes in all its parts simultaneously. Simplicius explains that in this case the term ἀθρόως does not mean ‘without lapse of time’ (ἄχρονον) but rather ‘the simultaneity in the change of all parts together’ (τὸ ὁμοῦ πάντων τῶν μερῶν). Apparently Simplicius is aware of the use of ἀθρόως that Porphyry makes with regard to the world’s coming into being in the Timaeus. We see, then, that Porphyry applies one conceptual tool, the idea of simultaneity, in two different senses: first, the sense of timeless simultaneity that applies to coming into being of the world as described in the Timaeus and, second, the sense of homogeneous simultaneity of change that applies in the alteration of sensible entities (as is the case in the example of light that illuminates darkness). Τhe former applies to change that happens as a result of God’s presence, the latter does not. The former is invoked in Porphyry’s commentary on Timaeus, the latter in his commentary on the Physics. Porphyry, I suggest, wrote commentaries on both these works apparently because he perceived in them a number of similarities that extent from the subject matter, to the method, and to more specific philosophical views that are taken. The issue of simultaneous change is one such example. Now one might still be tempted to think that Porphyry turns to Plato when he speaks about the intelligible world and to Aristotle when the sensible world and its phenomena come to play. This, however, is not quite right. For a Platonist like Porphyry the intelligible world is present in the sensible one and accounts for its existence and the existence of everything in it. As Plotinus shows in treatises like Enneads I 6 (1), III 8 (30), and V 8 (31), the sensible world exists and is of a certain kind because it is informed and illuminated by the intelligible world.60 Sensible entities exist because of the Forms that are immanent in them and give them identity. These are the enmattered divine λόγοι, the thoughts in God’s intellect on the one hand, and also the forms that we, humans, abstract from sensibles, when we perceive them, store in our soul, and by means of which we cognize them. If this is so, it turns out then that Porphyry maintains an ontological relation between perceptibles and intelligibles such that the former can be thought of by humans and further communicated to others. Porphyry actually tells us in his commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics that ‘human reason imitates the demiurgic reason that governs the way forms become instantiated in matter’

60

See further J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, Cambridge 1967, 53–65 and D. J. O’Meara, Plotinus. An Introduction to the Enneads, Oxford 1993, 88–99.

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(In Ptol. Harm. 12, 18–20). And he further tells us that, by articulating a linguistic expression, we come to give shape to a concept. When we use significant words of the first imposition we capture in the form of concepts the λόγοι of the sensible entities, which we further communicate to others by means of language.61 It seems, then, that there is some correspondence between the divine thoughts or concepts and the human concepts. Both are the same λόγοι or forms. The difference is that God generates or produces them, while humans only capture them and cognize them. Of course, men build concepts too, but they are not the authors of them, according to Porphyry. In his view, it is God that brings concepts about. This, however, means that there is according to Porphyry an isomorphism between the way the world is created and organized and the way we conceive it, we understand it, and we talk about it. God is responsible for the Forms of the things that exist and for the concepts by means of which we cognize them as such. Forms and concepts actually amount to the same things, God’s thoughts. This takes us a step further from the isomorphism between words and things, between language and reality, to an isomorphism between the intelligible and the sensible world. It is because Porphyry takes the view that there is an isomorphic relation between intelligibles and perceptibles or sensibles in the way I outlined above that he keeps referring in his two commentaries on the Categories to qualities, concepts, and matter. In them he covers one side of this relation, that between names, things and human concepts. In his commentary on the Sophist on the other hand Porphyry discusses the relation between Forms, that is being, and matter, that is, non-being. This investigation bears heavily on the issue of how things come to be, which he explores in his commentaries on the Physics and the Timaeus. The evidence from Porphyry’s commentaries suggests that in his view Aristotle continues the inquiry into topics that Plato first broached and deals with them in ways that constitute a development of Plato’s thinking.

IV. Why Commentaries? If it is the case that in his Aristotelian commentaries Porphyry takes the opportunity to advance his views on traditional Platonist questions for which he finds Aristotle’s works highly relevant, one may still ask why he did not

61

R. Chiaradonna, Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 18, 2007, 153 makes a similar, albeit more moderate claim, I believe, when he says that ‘Porphyry identified the universal synonymous predicates with the abstractions of immanent incorporeal forms’.

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write treatises on these topics. As we know, Porphyry did write a number of treatises on philosophical topics as well. We know that he wrote treatises on matter, on principles, on incorporeals, on sense perception (op. 26, 27, 28, 35 Smith), and also on the faculties of the soul (frs. 251–255) and on what is up to us (frs. 268–271). Platonists and Peripatetics of this age have two complementary and interconnected tasks to carry out; one is to take positions on crucial philosophical questions, the other is to articulate charitable and sophisticated interpretations of the texts of their school authorities. This, however, is one project rather than two. This is because the philosophical positions of later Platonists and Peripatetics are crystallized in dialogue with the texts of their school authorities. This makes their task difficult, complex and demanding, because their philosophical views must be such that they do justice to the sophistication, the caliber, and the philosophical outlook of their school authorities. One difficulty here is to remain close to the spirit of the classical philosophers. This is the challenge that Plotinus too is facing, when, confronted with the question of how the soul comes in bodies, he sets out to determine the will (βούλημα) of Plato (Enn. IV 8 [6] 1, 28). It is this wish for loyalty to the spirit of the classical texts, I suggest, that drives Porphyry to write commentaries. After all, only if one studies Aristotle’s texts closely enough, one can realize their Platonist background and the Platonist concerns that underly them.

V. Conclusion Let me summarize the argument of this paper. I have argued that Porphyry wrote commentaries on works of Aristotle because he found these works to represent an elaboration on, and a development of, Plato’s philosophy. This is a development in the sense that Aristotle not only wrestles with philosophical issues that Plato first explored and does so in a manner and with a method inspired by Plato, but also that Aristotle often takes views similar to those of Plato. Porphyry does not deny that Aristotle often explores new territory; this is actually one reason why Porphyry devotes so much energy to studying and expounding Aristotle. What Porphyry does deny is that Aristotle contradicts the essence of Plato’s philosophical views when he articulates theories that are not in Plato, since these may be inspired from Plato or continue in some way Plato’s thinking on a given issue. This is not something that Pophyry argues out in his commentaries. This view rather lies in the background and is implicit. I argued, though, that this view motivates Porphyry’s Aristotelian commentaries. That is, Porphyry in his commentaries sets out to substantiate his views on philosophical topics like causation, cos-

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mogony, matter, the nature of linguistic items and their relation to things, concept formation and so on with reference to texts of the Platonist tradition in philosophy. And this tradition, Porphyry thinks, crucially includes Aristotle as well.

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Smith, A., The Significance of ‘Physics’ in Porphyry: The Problem of Body and Matter, in: J. Wilberding – C. Horn (edd.): Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature, Oxford 2012, 30–43. Sorabji, R., The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, in: R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1990, 1–30. Strange, S. K., Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the ‘Categories’, in: W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II,36,2, Berlin−New York 1987, 955–974. Suto, T., Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic. A Study of Boethius’ Commentaries on Peri hermeneias (Philosophia antiqua vol. 127), Leiden 2012. Taormina, D. P., Jamblique: Critique de Plotin et de Porphyre. Quatre études (Tradition de la pensée classique), Paris 1999. Tarrant, H., Thrassylan Platonism, Ithaca−London 1993. Theiler, W., Ammonios und Porphyrios, in: O. Reverdin (ed.), Porphyre. Huit Exposés suivis de Discussions par Heinrich Dörrie, Jan-Hendrik Waszink, Willy Theiler, Pierre Hadot, Angelo Raffaele Sodano, Jean Pépin, Richard Walzer (Fondation Hardt pour l’Étude de l’Antiquité classique. Entretiens sur l’Antiquité classique Tome 12), Genève 1966, 85–123. Tweedale, M. M., Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Views on Universals, Phronesis 29, 1984, 279–303.

Apodeiktische Weisheit. Metaphysik als Seinswissenschaft nach den Neuplatonikern Jamblich und Syrian Matthias Perkams

Einleitung Keine ihrer Teildisziplinen ist mit dem Selbstverständnis der Philosophie so eng verbunden wie die Metaphysik. Nicht nur mit – womöglich transzendenten bzw. übernatürlichen – ersten Ursachen des Seienden soll sie sich beschäftigen, sondern auch die Grundlagen darlegen, auf deren Basis überhaupt ein Nachdenken über die Wirklichkeit bzw. das Seiende möglich ist. Damit kommt ihr schließlich auch die Aufgabe zu, die Einteilung des Seienden und der mit ihm befassten Wissenschaften näher zu begründen. Somit ist sie, im Sinne eines Aristoteles-Zitats, das zumindest für die spätesten, aristotelisierenden Neuplatoniker den Inbegriff von Philosophie ausdrückte,1 eine „Wissenschaft der Wissenschaften“ (ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστημῶν). Insofern ist sowohl für das Verständnis als auch für die Begründung von Philosophie die Frage nach den metaphysischen Annahmen, die ihr zugrunde liegen, von entscheidender Bedeutung. Hinsichtlich der spätantiken Philosophie bedarf es keines Beweises, dass metaphysische Theorieelemente in ihr eine wichtige Rolle spielten; für die Prinzipienlehre des Neuplatonismus ist das vielmehr offensichtlich. Weniger klar ist, inwieweit diese Überlegungen einer metaphysischen Wissenschaft im Sinne des Aristoteles zuzurechnen sind, insofern man diese, auch mit dem Ziel eines leichteren Brückenschlages zu Fragestellungen der Gegenwart, als allgemeine Seinswissenschaft bzw. Ontologie deutet. Nach Theo Kobuschs Artikel „Metaphysik“ im Historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie, der teilweise Forschungsergebnisse von Klaus Kremer vom Ende der 50er Jahre aufgreift,2 haben die spätantiken Mittel- und Neu1 2

Vgl. Ammon., In Porph. 6, 25–9, 6; Elias, Proll. 20, 18–23, 19; David, Proll. 39, 15–41, 36. K. Kremer, Der Metaphysikbegriff in den Aristoteles-Kommentaren der Ammonius-Schule (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 39, 1), Münster 1961. Vgl. auch G. Verbeke, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Viewed by the Ancient Greek Com-

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platoniker diese Vorstellung sämtlich abgelehnt und hingen vielmehr der platonischen Tradition einer theologischen Metaphysik an. Demzufolge setzte für sie eine metaphysische Wissenschaft im eigentlichen Sinne eine Berührung des „göttliche[n] unbedingte[n] Seins“ 3 voraus. Diese Entwicklung beschreibt Kobusch als eine „Entontologisierung“ 4 der Metaphysik, insofern „nicht mehr nach dem Seienden schlechthin und als solchem gefragt wird, sondern immer schon das höchste Seiende und damit ein bestimmtes Seiendes als Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie angenommen wird“.5 Dieser Tendenz habe sich in der Spätantike allein Alexander von Aphrodisias widersetzt, „der Metaphysik im rein aristotelischen Sinne, d. h. als allgemeine Seinswissenschaft, zu rehabilitieren“ 6 versucht habe. Diese Einschätzung ist auch für eine philosophiegeschichtliche Gesamtschau von Bedeutung: Denn Ludger Honnefelders These, es habe im lateinischen Mittelalter einen zweiten Anfang der Metaphysik gegeben, hat zur Voraussetzung, dass vor dieser Zeit die Metaphysik noch nicht als allgemeine Seinswissenschaft verstanden und betrieben wurde.7 Zwar deutet Honnefelder selbst an, dass diese These zumindest hinsichtlich der arabischen Philosophie zu nuancieren ist, in der spätestens al-Fārābī (870–950) eine solche Konzeption in Abgrenzung zu einer theologischen Deutung der Metaphysik entwickelte.8 Doch gerade damit kommt auch die Frage auf, welchen Beitrag die Spätantike, deren Philosophie das arabische wie das lateinische Mittelalter so stark beeinflusste, zur weiteren Ausarbeitung einer aristotelischen Metaphysik leistete. Hierzu hat in jüngerer Zeit Dominic O’Meara, mit ganz anderer Akzentsetzung als Kobusch und Kremer, die These vertreten, dass die Spätantike „die Metaphysik tatsächlich zu einer metaphysischen Wissenschaft machte, während sie zugleich auch die Grenzen einer derartigen Wissenschaft aufzeig-

3 4 5 6 7

8

mentators, in: D. J. O’Meara (Hg.), Studies in Aristotle (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 9), Washington 1981, 126–127. T. Kobusch, Metaphysik III. Antike bis Hochmittelalter, in: J. Ritter – K. Gründer (Hgg.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Bd. 5, Basel−Stuttgart 1980, Sp. 1197. Kobusch (wie Anm. 3) Sp. 1202. Kobusch (wie Anm. 3) Sp. 1202. Kobusch (wie Anm. 3) Sp. 1199. Vgl. L. Honnefelder, Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert, in: L. Honnefelder – J. P. Beckmann – G. Schrimpf – G. Wieland (Hgg.), Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen, Hamburg 1987, 165–186. Vgl. M. Perkams, Die Bedeutung des arabisch-islamischen Denkens in der Geschichte der Philosophie, in: H. Eichner – M. Perkams – C. Schäfer (Hgg.), Islamische Philosophie im Mittelalter. Ein Handbuch, Darmstadt 2013, 13–31.

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te“.9 Platon und Aristoteles seien in dieser Hinsicht über Skizzen nicht hinausgekommen, die erst in der Spätantike voll ausgefüllt worden seien.10 O’Meara stützt seine Einschätzung insbesondere auf eines der originellsten Werke der spätantiken Kommentarliteratur, nämlich die Auseinandersetzung mit der aristotelischen Metaphysik von Proklos’ Lehrer Syrianos (gest. ca. 432). Anders als Kobusch sieht er diesen Kommentar nicht einfachhin als ein Zeugnis der platonischen Tradition, sondern weist darauf hin, dass sich Syrianos in wichtigen Punkten an Alexander von Aphrodisias anschließt. Dazu hebt O’Meara, wie vorher schon Gérard Verbeke und Maddalena Bonelli, weniger die Deutung von Metaphysik als Ontologie denn vielmehr die These hervor, die Metaphysik müsse als apodeiktische Wissenschaft im Sinne von Aristoteles’ Analytica posteriora verstanden werden, die sich besonders auf die ersten Ursachen des Seins richte.11 Die Adaption dieser MetaphysikKonzeption in den platonischen Problemhorizont ist in O’Mearas Augen die Leistung von Syrianos’ Kommentar.12 Ich möchte diesen Ansatz im Folgenden weiter vertiefen, indem ich die historische und systematische Verortung der aristotelischen Metaphysik im Neuplatonismus genauer betrachte. Historisch geht es mir um die Stellung von Syrianos’ Aristoteles-Kommentierung in der Geschichte neuplatonischer Metaphysik. Weniger klar als Syrianos’ Einfluss auf seinen Schüler Proklos13 sind nämlich bisher seine Vorläufer: Zwar wurde verschiedentlich vermutet, dass Syrianos’ Adaption der Metaphysik stark auf Iamblichos aufbaue;14 konkrete Belege, die hierfür bislang fehlen, werde ich im ersten Teil meiner Ausführungen anbieten.

9

10 11

12

13 14

D. J. O’Meara, The Transformation of Metaphysics in Late Antiquity, in: G. T. Doolan (Hg.), The Science of Being as Being. Metaphysical Investigations (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 55), Washington 2012, 36. Vgl. schon D. J. O’Meara, Le problème de la métaphysique dans l’antiquité tardive, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 33, 1986, 4. Vgl. O’Meara, The Transformation of Metaphysics in Late Antiquity (wie Anm. 9) 4–5. Vgl. M. Bonelli, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come scienza dimostrativa (Elenchos 35), Napoli 2001; M. Bonelli, Dialectique et philosophie première: Syrianus et Alexandre d’Aphrodise, in: A. Longo – L. Corti (Hgg.), Syrianus et la métaphysique de l’antiquité tardive: Actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre–1er octobre 2006 (Elenchos 51), Napoli 2009, 425–426. Vgl. O’Meara, The Transformation of Metaphysics in Late Antiquity (wie Anm. 9) 37– 45; Bonelli, Dialectique et philosophie première: Syrianus et Alexandre d’Aphrodise (wie Anm. 11). Sehr aufschlussreich ist hierzu L. Van Campe, Syrianus and Proclus on the Attributes of the One in Plato’s Parmenides, in: Longo – Corti (wie Anm. 11), 271–280. Vgl. O’Meara, The Transformation of Metaphysics in Late Antiquity (wie Anm. 9) 45 Anm. 34; M. Frede, Syrianus on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in: Longo – Corti (wie Anm. 11), 24; vgl. auch schon D. J. O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived. Mathematics and Philosophy in

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Systematisch beschäftigen mich eigentlich zwei, freilich eng miteinander zusammenhängende Fragen: Die eine lautet, welchen Platz die aristotelische Metaphysik im neuplatonischen Wissenschaftssystem einnimmt: Wird sie im Grunde eine andere Bezeichnung für die platonische Dialektik oder kommt ihr eine eigene Stellung zu? Diese Frage werde ich bereits im Zusammenhang mit der Frage untersuchen, inwieweit Syrianos’ Metaphysik-Kommentierung Iamblichos verpflichtet ist. Wichtig ist für sie aber auch das zweite, vielleicht in einer allgemeinen Perspektive noch wichtigere Problem, das ich behandeln möchte, nämlich wie Syrianos die aristotelische Formel vom „Seienden qua Seienden“, dem ὂν ᾗ ὄν, verstanden hat. Hierzu stellt sich nicht nur die Frage, ob er überhaupt an einer allgemeinen Seinswissenschaft interessiert war, sondern auch diejenige, welche Lösung er für die Probleme der aristotelischen Konzeption anzubieten hat, z. B. die sogenannte Gattungsaporie. Ich gehe daher zuerst auf Iamblichos’ Rezeption der Konzeption einer Metaphysik als Seinswissenschaft ein, dann auf Syrianos’ Rezeption des Iamblichos und schließlich drittens auf Syrianos’ Behandlung der Frage nach dem Seienden als Seiendes.

I. Anklänge an die aristotelische Metaphysik bei Iamblichos Ich beginne also mit Iamblichos. Im 4. Kapitel seines Protreptikos wendet er sich den „esoterischen und wissenschaftlichen Ermahnungen (προτροπαί)“ zu, und zwar insbesondere der „ältesten“ dieser Wissenschaften, der Weisheit (σοφία). Die Hauptquelle für deren Erläuterung, auf die Iamblichos sich kommentierend bezieht, ist eine pseudo-pythagoreische, angeblich von Archytas stammende Schrift mit dem Titel „Über die Weisheit“ (Περὶ σοφίας).15 Dies ist nun für unsere Fragestellung relevant, wie Daniela Taormina prägnant auf den Punkt bringt: „Der Archytas, den Iamblichos zitiert […], ist in Wirklichkeit ein Autor, den man im 1./2. Jahrhundert n. Chr. ansetzen muss, beein-

15

Late Antiquity, Oxford−New York 1989, 138–141, wo es aber nicht so sehr um den Aristotelismus geht. Vgl. Iamb., Protr. IV 16, 11–18. Die Fragmente der Schrift sind in der Ausgabe von Pistelli graphisch hervorgehoben, sie finden sich gesammelt bei H. Thesleff, The Pythagorean texts of the Hellenistic period (Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A, Humaniora: humanistiska vetenskaper, socialvetenskaper, teologi 30,1), Åbo 1965, 43–45. Zum gesamten Komplex der pseudo-pythagoreischen Schriften bei Iamblichos vgl. v. a. C. Macris, Jamblique et la literature pseudo-pythagoricienne, in: S. C. Mimouni (Hg.), Apocryphité. Histoire d’un concept transversal aux réligions du livre. En hommage à P. Geoltrain (Bibliothèque de l’École des hautes études. Sciences religieuses 113), Turnhout 2002, 77–129.

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flusst von aristotelischen und stoischen Ideen“.16 So überrascht es nicht, dass man hier auf einige Anklänge an die aristotelische Metaphysik stößt. Pseudo-Archytas geht es in erster Linie darum darzulegen, „woher der Mensch entstanden und zusammengesetzt ist sowie Organe und Fähigkeiten von Gott empfing“.17 Von hier aus wird in der Schrift eine Beschreibung des Aufstiegs des Menschen hin zur Gottesschau entworfen, wie sich aus den Exzerpten des Iamblichos ergibt, der seine Erklärung der Weisheit im engen Anschluss an den Pseudonymus entfaltet. Eine zentrale Rolle spielt für diesen Aufstieg – auch hinsichtlich der Parallelen zu Aristoteles18 – die Feststellung, dass der Mensch ja an allen Arten des Seienden Anteil hat, was eine wesentliche Grundlage für seinen Aufstieg darstellt.19 Von daher kann Pseudo-Archytas den Gegenstand der Weisheit auch so formulieren, als sei sie eine Wissenschaft des gesamten Seienden; siehe Iamb., Protr. IV 21, 16–25: Die Weisheit beschäftigt sich nicht mit einem abgegrenzten der Seienden, sondern schlechthin mit allem Seienden, und sie darf nicht als erstes die Ursachen ihrer selbst erforschen, sondern die allgemeinen des Seienden. So verhält sich die Weisheit zu allem Seienden so wie das Sehvermögen zu allem Sichtbaren. Also ist es der Weisheit eigentümlich, das allgemein allem akzidentell Zukommende zu sehen, und deswegen findet die Weisheit die Ursachen von allem Seienden auf. ἁ σοφία οὐ περί τι ἀφωρισμένον ἐντὶ τῶν ἐόντων, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐόντα, καὶ δεῖ μὴ πρώταν αὐτὰν τὰς ἀρχὰς αὑτᾶς ἀνευρέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰς κοινὰς τῶν ἐόντων· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει σοφία περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐόντα ὡς ὄψις περὶ πάντα τὰ ὁρατά. τὰ ὦν καθόλω πᾶσι συμβεβακότα συνιδὲν καὶ θεωρὲν τᾶς σοφίας οἰκῇον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο σοφία τὰς τῶν ἐόντων ἁπάντων ἀρχὰς ἀνευρίσκει. Diese Formulierung weist einige Anklänge an Aristoteles’ Metaphysik auf, zumal dieser die Erste Philosophie gerade im Buch Α bevorzugt als Weisheit bezeichnet, deren Aufgabe das Aufsuchen der Ursachen des Seienden sei (vgl. Met. Α 1.981 b 27–29; 2.982 a 4–6). Vor diesem Hintergrund lassen PseudoArchytas’ Aussagen auch bereits an Buch Γ und dessen Lehre von Seienden

16

17 18 19

D. P. Taormina, La dialettica come propedeutica, in: D. P. Taormina – R. M. Piccione (Hgg.), Giamblico. I frammenti dalle epistole. Introduzione, testo, traduzione e commento (Elenchos 56), Napoli 2010, 93. Vgl. P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Bd. 2: Der Aristotelismus im 1. und 2. Jh. n. Chr., Berlin−New York 1984, 632–634. Vgl. Iamb., Protr. IV 19, 8–11: ἔργον σοφίας τοῦτο δοκεῖ μοι ἦμεν, ποθ’ ὅπερ καὶ γέγονε καὶ συνέστα ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὄργανα δὲ καὶ δυνάμεις εἴλαφε παρὰ τῶ θεῶ. Vgl. De an. III 8.431 b 20–24. Iamb., Protr. IV 18, 26–19, 2; 20, 18–19.

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qua Seienden denken.20 Noch mehr Gewicht gewinnen die genannten Indizien, wenn man die Interpretationstradition der Metaphysik, wie sie bei Alexander von Aphrodisias vertreten ist, in den Blick nimmt. Alexander entwickelt seine Deutung der Metaphysik im Ausgang vom Anfang von Met. Α. Im Einklang mit dessen Terminologie, aber auch mit Tendenzen seiner Zeit,21 stellt er daher für das Gesamtwerk den Begriff der Weisheit in den Mittelpunkt und bevorzugt dieses Wort vor allen anderen Bezeichnungen der neu zu begründenden Disziplin.22 Ebenso betont er die in Α genannte Aufgabe der Metaphysik, die ersten Ursachen des Seienden zu erkennen, auch bei der Auslegung der anderen Bücher. Daher steht für ihn die Idee einer Wissenschaft vom Seienden als solchen, wie Aristoteles sie in Buch Β problematisiert und in Γ entwickelt, tendenziell deutlich stärker im Kontext der Idee, es gehe hier um eine Weisheit, deren Ziel die Erkenntnis der Ursachen des Seienden sei, als das bei Aristoteles in den genannten Büchern der Fall ist.23 Damit weist Alexanders Konzeption terminologisch und sachlich beachtliche Berührungspunkte mit den Neupythagoräern und Platonikern auf, zumal sich Alexander bereits ganz zu Beginn seines Werkes auf das platonische Lob der Philosophie in Timaios 47 A bezieht.24 Iamblichos konnte also, wie schon Plotin,25 bei Alexander eine Deutung von Aristoteles’ Metaphysik finden, die seinen Interessen entgegenkam. Insofern überrascht es nicht, dass die aristotelischen Anklänge bei seiner Deutung 20

21 22 23

24 25

Dieser Eindruck ließe sich untermauern, wenn man den im Detail komplexen Vergleich mit Periktione, Περὶ σοφίας bei Stob. III 85, 7–87, 13 Wachsmuth – Hense unternimmt. Der Text ist dem Pseudo-Archytas nahe verwandt, aber, mit Henses Worten im kritischen Apparat zu Stob. III 86, 8 Wachsmuth – Hense, „non nihil differt“. Insgesamt scheint er mir noch stärker von einer bestimmten Deutung der aristotelischen Wissenschaftsanordnung geprägt zu sein. Die Ansicht von C. Macris, Périctionè, in: R. Goulet (Hg.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, V a, de Paccius à Plotin, Paris 2012, 233, der Text sei rein platonisch, ist sicherlich zu einseitig. Vgl. bereits Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen (wie Anm. 16) 632: „Es leuchtet ein, daß unsere Autoren [Pseudo-Archytas und Periktione] die σοφία als allgemeine Ontologie verstehen, wie etwa Aristoteles seine ‚erste Philosophie‘“. Zur Rolle der Weisheit für das Selbstverständnis der kaiserzeitlichen Philosophie vgl. M. Perkams, Philosophie. Die Geschichte des Rationalitätsideals der Antike, in Vorbereitung. Vgl. zum Beispiel die Proömien in Alex. Aphr., In Met. zu Buch Β: 171, 5–7 und Buch Γ: 238, 3 und 18. Vgl. zum Beispiel (ohne eindeutige Entsprechung im Text) In Met. 6, 2–4 und (zu Γ 1.1003 a 26–32) In Met. 239, 25–240, 30; P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, Bd. 3: Alexander von Aphrodisias, Berlin−New York 2001, 444–451. Dieser Aspekt scheint bei Bonelli, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come scienza dimostrativa (wie Anm. 11) eher unterbelichtet. Alex. Aphr., In Met. 1, 17–18. Zur Benutzung von Alexanders Kommentar zur Metaphysik durch Plotin vgl. C. D’Ancona, Plotin, in: R. Goulet (Hg.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques. V: de Paccius à Rutilius Rufus, 1re partie – Va: de Paccius à Plotin, Paris 2012, 885–1068, hier 973–975.

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des Pseudo-Archytas noch stärker herausgestellt werden als in der Vorlage. Am augenfälligsten ist eine Erwähnung der aristotelischen Formel vom Seienden als solchen: „Deswegen muss der Mensch wiederum in Bezug auf das gesamte Seiende qua Seiendes (περὶ πᾶν τὸ ὂν, ᾗ ὄν) nach der theoretischen Weisheit streben“.26 Hier tritt nicht nur die angesprochene Verbindung von Seinswissenschaft im aristotelischen Sinn mit dem Begriff der Weisheit klar zutage, sondern auch das Adjektiv „theoretisch“ stellt sowohl eine Verbindung zur aristotelischen Unterscheidung von theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie her als auch zur Fähigkeit, die ersten Ursachen und letztlich Gott zu betrachten. Insofern kann Iamblichos, wenn er die Weisheit auch als θεωρητικὴ καὶ θεολογική bezeichnet,27 an regelmäßig auftretende Formulierungen Alexanders anschließen.28 Diese Verschmelzung aristotelischer und platonischer Elemente prägt auch den Kontext der zitierten Stellen: Grundsätzlich verlange die Weisheit von ihrem Lerner den Erwerb sowohl der apodeiktischen Wissenschaft (ἡ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη) beziehungsweise der gesamten logischen Philosophie (πᾶσα ἡ λογικὴ φιλοσοφία) als auch der mit Klugheit verbundenen Tugend (ἡ κατὰ φρόνησιν ἀρετή) und schließlich, wie zitiert, der theoretischen Weisheit (ἡ θεωρητικὴ σοφία).29 Diese Anordnung schließt zwar an die hellenistische Einteilung der Philosophie in drei Teile an und versteht die Logik dementsprechend als Teil und nicht, wie die meisten Aristoteliker,30 als Werkzeug der Philosophie. Allerdings steht sie nach dieser Darstellung eher am Anfang der philosophischen Arbeit und nicht, wie typischerweise in der platonischen Tradition, als Dialektik an deren Ende. Zudem werden alle drei Bereiche von Iamblichos mit Begriffen umschrieben, die aristotelische Konnotationen aufweisen.31 Bemerkenswert ist insbesondere die Kennzeichnung der Wissenschaft bzw. des Wissens als apodeiktisch. Sie greift ein wichtiges Moment von Alexanders Metaphysik-Konzeption auf, der zufolge die Metaphysik eine apodeiktische Wissenschaft im Sinne der Analytica posteriora ist. Dies setzt wie26 27 28 29 30

31

Iamb., Protr. IV 20, 2–4: διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν περὶ πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ᾗ ὄν, τῆς θεωρητικῆς σοφίας ἐφίεσθαι αὐτὸν χρή. Vgl. Iamb., Protr. IV 19, 13–14. Vgl. Alex. Aphr., In Met. 13, 9–25; 15, 22–25; 17, 9–18, 10; 19, 10–12. Vgl. Iamb., Protr. IV 19, 14–20, 4. Vgl. Alex. Aphr., In Anal. pr. 2, 3–4, 29; Phlp., In Cat. 5, 18–23; Elias, In Cat. 117, 22– 24 in Verbindung mit 118, 20–24. Dazu P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Bd. 1: Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im 1. Jh. v. Chr., Berlin−New York 1973, 78–79; Bd. 3 (wie Anm. 23) 29–33. All dies kann durch einen Vergleich mit der Darstellung bei Alcin., Didascalicus II 152, 30– 153, 3 verdeutlicht werden, bei dem das aristotelische Vokabular viel stärker mit platonischem vermischt ist.

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derum, wie bei Alexander, die Kenntnis der ersten Ursachen bzw. der allgemeinen Einsichten bei ihr voraus.32 Dieses Element der aristotelisch-alexandrinischen Tradition wird jedoch faktisch als ein noetisches Erfassen „in der Form von ganz einfachen Auffassungen, so wie das Sehvermögen die sichtbaren Dinge auffasst“,33 geschildert. Auf genau diese Weise, meint Iamblichos, stellt die Weisheit ein nicht mehr hypothetisches Wissen von den ersten Ursachen dar und kann Rechenschaft über sie ablegen.34 Die Vollendung dieser Wissenschaft besteht aber darin, dass sie zum Einen aufsteigt und von dort aus auch das Viele betrachtet: Hat sich die Weisheit einmal auf dem nicht näher erläuterten Weg der Analyse zum höchsten Einen hin bewegt, kann sie von dort als dihairetische Wissenschaft (διαιρετική) die obersten Gattungen des Seienden unterscheiden, wodurch sie zugleich zur definierenden (ὁριστική) Wissenschaft wird.35 Auch wenn an diesem Punkt mit der Dihärese ein Element der platonischen Dialektik in den Vordergrund tritt,36 bleibt der Einfluss Alexanders erkennbar: Auch bei ihm ist nämlich das Definieren der ersten Ursachen die Voraussetzung dafür, dass die Metaphysik von hier aus apodeiktische Schlüsse ziehen kann.37 Das entspricht der Funktion des definierenden Elements bei Iamblichos, nur dass sich dies dem neuplatonischen Charakter entsprechend nur auf den einen höchsten Punkt der Wirklichkeit bezieht. Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass Iamblichos diese Anklänge an Aristoteles’ Metaphysik in die Beschreibung eines Aufstieges im primär platonisch-pythagoreischen Sinne einarbeitet. Für ihn ist die θεωρία, auf die die Weisheit abzielt, eine Betrachtung der seienden Dinge auf die Weise der unvermittelten noetischen Erkenntnis;38 insofern sie das gesamte Sein umfasst, ist sie zugleich „die gesamte Philosophie“ (ὅλη ἡ φιλοσοφία).39 Vor allem aber ist die Weisheit nicht nur eine Weise der Erkenntnis. Vielmehr ist sie eine eigene ontologische Hypostase, die den gedachten Objekten (τοῖς νοουμένοις), ihre Sichtbar- bzw. Erkennbarkeit vermittelt, so wie es die Idee des Guten, versinnbildlicht durch die Sonne, in Platons Sonnengleichnis oder 32

33 34 35 36 37 38 39

Dieser Punkt wurde besonders von Bonelli, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come scienza dimostrativa (wie Anm. 11) 39–79, herausgearbeitet. Vgl. zum Beispiel Alex. Aphr., In Met. 12, 22–13, 13; 239, 6–12. Iamb., Protr. IV 22, 4–5: κατὰ ἁπλουστάτας ἐπιβολάς, ὥσπερ ἡ ὄψις τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἐπιβάλλει. Vgl. Iamb., Protr. IV 22, 1–10. Vgl. Iamb., Protr. IV 23, 5–22. Iamblichos führt die ἀποδεικτική, ὁριστική und διαιρετικὴ ἐπιστήμη letztlich auf Pythagoras zurück: VP § 161. Alex. Aphr., In Met. 246, 17–21; Bonelli, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come scienza dimostrativa (wie Anm. 11) 73–74. Vgl. Iamb., Protr. IV 18, 1–5. Vgl. Iamb., Protr. IV 20, 12–13.

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der aktive Intellekt in Aristoteles’ De anima III 5 tut. In diesem Sinne „verleiht“ für Iamblichos die Weisheit „den seienden Dingen ihr Sein und wird zur Führerin der Weltschöpfung“.40 Iamblichos’ Konzeption der Weisheit zeigt sich auch hierdurch als in höchstem Maße ontologisch, aber im Sinne einer neuplatonischen Verursachungslehre, und in diesen Hintergrund werden die aristotelischen Elemente eingeordnet. Die Beschreibung der Weisheit im Protreptikos zeigt also besonders im Wissenschaftsbegriff sowie allgemein in der Terminologie – hier konnte ich nicht alle relevanten Begriffe nennen – eine umfassende Integration des aristotelischen Konzepts von Metaphysik, und zwar vermutlich in seiner von Alexander entwickelten Form. Sachlich entspricht das durchaus der herangezogenen neupythagoreischen Vorlage,41 auch wenn deren Anklänge an die Metaphysik weniger eindeutig sind. Allerdings ändern die aristotelischen Elemente relativ wenig am platonischen Grundcharakter der hier geschilderten Aufstiegslehre; ihre Funktion scheint vor allem in einer wissenschaftlichen Formulierung sowie in einer Bezugnahme auf das Sein als Ganzes zu liegen, nicht aber in einer Denkbewegung, die die Struktur der sichtbaren Welt ernstnimmt.

II. Die Rezeption von Iamblichos’ Weisheitskonzeption bei Syrianos Mit diesen Beobachtungen zum Protreptikos ist jedenfalls gezeigt, dass die Athener Neuplatoniker des 5. Jahrhunderts für ihre Integration der aristotelischen Metaphysik in der Tat auf Iamblichos zurückgreifen konnten, dessen Gedanken seinerseits bereits von Alexanders Kommentierung beeinflusst waren. Andererseits muss die große Distanz der platonisierenden Weisheitstheorie des Iamblichos selbst von Alexanders Aristoteles auch für sie offensichtlich gewesen sein. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird verständlich, dass der Athener Neuplatoniker Syrianos sich ausdrücklich der aristotelischen Metaphysik zuwendet und mithilfe einer Kommentierung die sachlichen Grundlagen für die iamblicheische Adaption der hier grundgelegten Wissenschaft weiter klärt. In diesem Kontext sei noch einmal daran erinnert, dass wir von ihm keinen Gesamtkommentar zur Metaphysik besitzen, sondern in erster Linie Abhandlungen über die Bücher, die für eine platonisierende AristotelesRezeption besondere Schwierigkeiten aufwerfen – Β, Μ und Ν –, sowie eine

40 41

Iamb., Protr. IV 18, 12–13: παρέχει […] τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσι, δημιουργίας τε πάσης ἀρχηγὸς γίγνεται. Taormina (wie Anm. 16) 93.

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Deutung von Buch Γ, die Alexanders Ansatz ausdrücklich positiv aufnehmen und punktuell weiterführen will, ihn aber faktisch wesentlich verändert. Zunächst einmal gilt es festzuhalten, dass sich in diesem Kommentar praktisch die gesamte geschilderte Begrifflichkeit von Iamblichos’ Weisheitskonzeption wiederfindet. Sie wird nicht nur punktuell reproduziert, sondern bildet, wie jetzt näher zu zeigen ist, das durchlaufende Gerüst, mit dem Syrianos seine eigene Konzeption einer aristotelisierenden Metaphysik entwickelt. Auch Syrianos verwendet gerne den Begriff „Weisheit“ und versteht diese, wie Iamblichos, als „gesamte Philosophie“ (ἡ ὅλη φιλοσοφία). Bereits zu Beginn seiner Deutung von Β, also ganz am Anfang des erhaltenen Kommentars, führt er diesen Grundgedanken weiter aus: Neben der aristotelischen „ersten Philosophie“ gehört zu dieser Gesamtphilosophie im strengen Sinne die Naturwissenschaft (ἡ φυσική), die sich ebenfalls mit Substanzen (οὐσίαι) beschäftigt, während die Mathematik und andere Disziplinen, die sich nicht mit Substanzen beschäftigen, eigentlich nicht dazugehörten und von geringerem Rang seien.42 Syrianos folgt Iamblichos weiterhin darin, die Weisheit zu hypostasieren: Sie stehe direkt (προσεχῶς) unterhalb des νοῦς, der „diese gleichsam wie eine Monade der Wissenschaften konstituiert, die alle Arten von Erkenntnissen in der Weise eines Prinzips in sich vorab umgreift“.43 Anders ausgedrückt besitzt die Weisheit genannte Metaphysik einen eigenen Rang in der Seinsordnung, insofern sie Ausdruck einer Idee bzw. Hypostase ist, deren Spuren sich in allen hierarchisch geordneten Wissenschaften in höherem oder niederem Maße finden. Wissenschaftseinteilung wird so zu einer Seinseinteilung im neuplatonischen Sinn.44 Neu bei Syrianos ist gegenüber Iamblichos’ Protreptikos vor allem die ausdrückliche Anwendung dieses Konzepts auf die aristotelische Wissenschaftseinteilung, vielleicht auch noch einmal die weitere Hierarchisierung der Weisheit gegenüber dem Geist. Die fundamentale Idee einer hypostasierten Weisheit, zu der der Mensch via einer wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit aufsteigen kann, schließt trotzdem klar an Iamblichos an. Ebenso wie Iamblichos, wenn auch systematischer als dieser, erklärt Syrianos die vier Methoden der Weisheit als „dihairetisch, analytisch, definierend 42

43

44

Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 3, 10–17; 58, 12–19 und dazu K. Ierodiakonou, Syrianus on Scientific Knowledge and Demonstration, in: Longo – Corti (wie Anm. 11), 401–422. – Auch dieser Gedanke wird in der aristotelischen Tradition vorbereitet: Alex. Aphr., In Met. 245, 35– 246, 13; 250, 27–32; 251, 34–38. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 3, 21–24: πασῶν ὁ νοῦς ἐστι πατὴρ ἐξῃρημένος, εἰ καὶ προσεχῶς μὲν τῆς σοφίας, οἱονεὶ μονάδα τινὰ ταύτην ἐπιστημῶν ὑποστησάμενος πάντα τὰ εἴδη τῶν γνώσεων ἐν ἑαυτῇ προειληφυῖαν ἀρχοειδῶς, δι’ αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν μερικωτέρων τὰς ἀρχὰς καταβαλλόμενος. Syrian., In Met. 3, 24–30. Zur Interpretation dieser Stellen vgl. vor allem D. J. O’Meara, Le fondement du principe de non-contradiction chez Syrianus, in: Longo – Corti (wie Anm. 11), 299–308 und 316–317.

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und apodeiktisch“ (διαιρετικὴ καὶ ἀναλυτικὴ καὶ ὁριστικὴ καὶ ἀποδεικτική), wobei er gerade diese vier ausdrücklich als gleichrangig direkt von der Weisheit abhängig einstuft.45 Im Anschluss an Iamblichos und Alexander bestimmt er das Verhältnis von definierender, dihairetischer und apodeiktischer Vorgehensweise: Hat die Wissenschaft erst einmal die höchsten Prinzipien des Seienden erreicht, kann sie die einzelnen Gattungen des Seienden definieren und aufteilen. Von hier ist sie dann in der Lage, auf apodeiktischem Wege die wesenhaften Akzidenzien einer jeden οὐσία zu erkennen.46 Während die definierende und dihairetische Funktion hier genau wie an der eben erklärten Jamblich-Stelle erklärt werden, entspricht die Verbindung von Apodeiktik und den wesenhaften Akzidenzien Alexanders Erklärung, die freilich auch bereits bei Iamblichos und sogar bei Pseudo-Archytas sachliche Entsprechungen hatte.47 Komplizierter ist die Frage, auf welche Weise der Aufstieg zu den Prinzipien des Seienden erfolgt. Hier scheint Syrianos nicht konsistent zu sein: Einerseits behauptet er in sachlicher Übereinstimmung mit Iamblichos’ Platonismus, dass die Weisheit „die Prinzipien des Seienden durch die Analyse (διὰ τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς) erfasst“, und bezeichnet an anderer Stelle die Argumente für die Endlichkeit der Seinsketten im Buch α als „Analyse“ (ἀνάλυσις).48 Andererseits kennt er an zwei anderen Stellen aber auch einen apodeiktisch beweisenden Aufstieg, der über die an sich vorhandenen Eigenschaften der seienden Dinge bzw. Substanzen (τὰ καθ᾿ αὑτὰ τοῖς οὖσι [bzw. ταῖς οὐσίαις] ὑπάρχοντα) hin zur „Eigentlichkeit des Seins“ (ἡ ἰδιότης τοῦ ὄντος) bzw. zur „ersten Ursache und dem Was-es-ist“ (ἡ πρώτη αἰτία καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν) aufsteigt.49 Wie sind diese beiden verschiedenen methodischen Beschreibungen des Aufstiegs zur ersten Ursache zu verstehen? Einer Stelle bei Iamblichos zufolge führt die Analyse in der Mathematik „das Denken zum Einfacheren und Allgemeinen hinauf und unterscheidet die Gattungen und Unterschiede, auf deren Art ein jedes natürlicherweise ist“,50 45 46 47

48 49

50

Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 3, 30–32. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 4, 26–29; 56, 2–4. Vgl. Alex. Aphr., In Met. 239, 6–9; 246, 18–21; Ps.-Archytas bei Iamb., Protr. IV 21, 22 (zitiert oben S. 49). Zum Ganzen ist ferner die im Detail komplexe Darstellung der Dialektik in Alkinoos’ Didascalicus zu vergleichen, die ebenfalls alle genannten Elemente enthält. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 4, 26–27; 37, 28–30. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 22, 23–25; 55, 38–56, 2. An der zweiten Stelle schlägt Bonelli, Dialectique et philosophie première: Syrianus et Alexandre d’Aphrodise (wie Anm. 11) 426 Anm. 7 vor, δι᾿ ἀποδείξεως in δι᾿ ἀναλύσεως zu korrigieren, doch ist dies aufgrund der Parallele abzulehnen. Vgl. Iamb., Comm. Math. XX 65, 16–20: ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἡ ἀνάλυσις ἐπὶ τὰ ἁπλούστερα καὶ κοινότερα ἀναγάγῃ τὴν νόησιν, καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς διακρίνῃ ᾗ πεφύκασιν ἕκαστα, τότε ἡ συναγωγὸς σύνθεσις συνάγουσα εἰς ταὐτὸ τὰ διαφέροντα καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ ἀφορίζεται ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι.

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während sie in der Dialektik sogar „alles auf eine und dieselbe Ursache“ zurückführt.51 Schon zuvor hatte Alkinoos drei Arten der Analyse unterschieden, von denen die erste vom sinnlichen zum geistigen fortschreitet, während die anderen beiden Hypothesen setzen und diese in unterschiedlicher Weise argumentativ entwickeln.52 Damit wird der bei Platon fehlende Begriff ἀνάλυσις, der bei Aristoteles und Alexander vorwiegend für die Zurückführung der Syllogismen auf ihre Grundlage gebraucht wurde,53 in die Ontologie übertragen und dort zu einer allgemeinen Beschreibung des Aufstiegs vom ontologisch Späteren hin zum Höheren und Einfacheren.54 Insofern beschreibt er den Aufstieg zu höheren Prinzipien im Kontext neuplatonischer Methodik, und sein Gebrauch bei Syrianos ist nicht überraschend, selbst wenn das genaue methodische Vorgehen dieser Art Analyse auch bei ihm eher unklar bleibt.55 Erstaunlicher scheint auf den ersten Blick, dass der Aufstieg zum Sein auch als apodeiktischer Weg beschrieben wird; auch hier lohnt aber ein Vergleich zu Alkinoos, der im Rahmen der Analyse bereits „beweisende“ Schritte erwähnt.56 Allerdings geht Syrianos weit über dessen Andeutungen hinaus. Dabei greift er methodisch – im Hinblick auf die Benutzung des Syllogismus – und inhaltlich – im Hinblick auf den Seinsbegriff – auf die aristotelische Tradition zurück. Ihm zufolge steigt die apodeiktische Methode von den an sich vorhandenen Eigenschaften des Seienden zu dessen τί ἐστι auf, d. h. zum wesensmäßigen Gehalt des Seinsbegriffes, der zugleich die erste Ursache dieser Eigenschaften sein soll. Dies ist eine in der aristotelischen Logik und ihrer Kommentierungstradition, allerdings erst später, zu findende Figur, der zufolge die an sich vorhandenen Eigenschaften einer Substanz notwendig mit dieser verbunden sind, so dass aus ihnen syllogistische Schlüsse gezogen werden können.57 In diesem Sinne erläutert Syrianos das Verhältnis der von Aristoteles in Metaphysik Γ 2.1004a 24–31 genannten Grundeigenschaften zur Substanz (In Met. 62, 32–63, 3): Wenn das Identische Unterschiede aufweist, werden alle zum primär Identischen hingeordnet werden, und dies ist das durch seine Substanz Identische. So verhält es sich auch mit dem Verschiedenen, dem Ähnli51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Vgl. Iamb., Protr. IV 23, 8–9: ἀναλύσειν […] ὑπὸ μίαν τε καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν τὰ πάντα. Vgl. Alcin., Didascalicus V 157, 11–43. Dazu J. Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers), Oxford 1993, 74–76. Vgl. Alex. Aphr., In Anal. pr. 7, 11–27; Dillon (wie Anm. 52) 74–75. Vgl. Taormina (wie Anm. 16) 98. Man dürfte wohl z. B. an die ontologische Interpretation der Hypothesen des Parmenides als Beispiel denken können. Vgl. Alcin., Didascalicus V 157, 24: ἀποδεικνύειν; V 157, 30: ἀποδείξας. Vgl. Phlp., In Anal. pr. 280, 20–24; Phlp., In Anal. post. 82, 19–83, 21.

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chen und dem Unähnlichen. Man muss nämlich durch Aufgliederung dem gemäß, auf wie viele Arten jeder dieser Begriffe ausgesagt wird, sei es auf zehn Arten, weil er bei jedem Seienden vorhanden ist, sei es in einer anderen Zahl, das in jeder Kategorie Vorhandene dem in der Substanz Identischen, Ähnlichen, Verschiedenen und Unähnlichen beiordnen. Einiges davon ist nämlich so, weil jenes dies primär besitzt, anderes, weil jenes dies primär produziert (denn die Substanz besitzt und produziert das, wovon man sagt, es sei), einiges davon auf andere Weise. Denn mit Sicherheit hat es eine Relation zur Substanz oder ist ein Erleiden von ihr oder etwas Derartiges. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν εἰ διαφορὰς ἔχει, πᾶσαι πρὸς τὸ πρώτως ταὐτὸν ταχθήσονται, τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ταὐτόν· οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον. δεῖ οὖν διελομένους, ποσαχῶς ἕκαστον τούτων λέγεται, εἴτε δεκαχῶς ἐπειδὴ παντὶ τῷ ὄντι ὑπάρχει εἴτε κατ’ ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ κατηγορίᾳ συντάττειν τῷ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ταὐτῷ καὶ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἀνομοίῳ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἐκεῖνο τὸ πρῶτον ἔχειν αὐτά, τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐκεῖνο τὸ πρῶτον ποιεῖν αὐτά (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ οὐσία καὶ ποιεῖ ταῦτα ἃ λέγεται εἶναι), τὰ δὲ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλους τρόπους· ἤτοι γὰρ σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς οὐσίαν ἢ πάθος αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἤ τι τοιοῦτο. Diese Analyse geht, wie aus dem Ende des Absatzes ersichtlich ist, davon aus, dass alle Wesenseigenschaften von etwas ihre Ursache in dessen Wesenskern haben. Daher kann man auch im Falle des Seins von seinen allgemein vorhandenen Eigenschaften auf seinen Wesenskern schließen, den Syrianos mit Aristoteles „Substanz“ (οὐσία) nennt. Vorausgesetzt werden muss hierbei, dass die Wesenseigenschaften als solche soweit erkennbar sind, dass sie als Prämissen zu Beweisen dienen können, mit denen die Substanz erkannt werden kann, sowie, dass zumindest grundsätzliche Prinzipien des Beweisens wie der Satz vom Widerspruch beim auf diese Weise Erkennenden bereits vorhanden sind. Zu beachten ist allerdings, dass alle syllogistischen Schlüsse nur in einem bestimmten Bereich des Seins Geltung haben können; so sagt Syrianos in In Met. 4, 29–34: Dies gilt nicht bei den einfachsten und in erster Linie denkbaren Substanzen, die ganz das sind, was sie sind […], sondern nur bei den mittleren Substanzen, die auch gemäß ihren Eigenschaften Gegenstände von Beweisen sind. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἐν ταῖς ἁπλουστάταις καὶ κυρίως νοηταῖς οὐσίαις, αἳ πᾶν ὅπερ εἰσὶ τοῦτό εἰσι […], ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς μέσαις οὐσίαις, αἳ καὶ ἀποδεικταί εἰσι κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἑαυταῖς.

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Unter „mittleren Substanzen“ versteht Syrianos die dianoetischen bzw. mathematischen Objekte aus Platons Liniengleichnis, die er auch als Universalien (οἱ καθόλου λόγοι, vgl. In Met. 4, 37) bezeichnet, aber weder die eigentlich intelligiblen Gegenstände, die wegen ihrer Einfachheit gar keine Wesenseigenschaften haben, noch die sinnlich erfassbaren Gegenstände.58 Die Beweisbarkeit dieser mittleren Objekte erklärt sich für Syrianos letztlich durch ihr Vorhandensein in der Seele. Da dort auch, als Wirkung des Geistes in der Seele, die allgemeinen Einsichten (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) – also aristotelisch gesprochen die Axiome des Denkens – vorhanden sind, kann dieser hieraus entsprechende Schlüsse ziehen.59 Unter diesen Voraussetzungen sind die gerade geschilderten Überlegungen wohl folgendermaßen zu verstehen: Der apodeiktische Aufstieg erfolgt durch einen Schluss von den Wesenseigenschaften auf diejenigen Substanzen, die von ihrer differenzierten Struktur her einer solchen Beweisführung zugänglich sind. Damit sind aber auch bereits die Grenzen einer apodeiktischen Argumentation im Hinblick auf eine allgemeine Seinswissenschaft angesprochen: Auf diese Weise lassen sich keineswegs alle Seienden erfassen. Für die sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Gegenstände stellt sich das Problem weniger, denn deren Erkenntnis lässt sich vermittels der Universalien insoweit erklären, als diese das sinnlich Seiende gliedern und prägen und damit seine Erkenntnis auf deduktive Art ermöglichen. Seiend, und zwar im höchsten Maße, sind aber gerade für den Platoniker auch die intelligiblen Gegenstände, von denen sich zumindest die höchsten durch eine beweisende Wissenschaft nach dem Gesagten gar nicht erfassen lassen. Insofern ist bis jetzt nicht zu sehen, wie sie Gegenstände der Metaphysik sein sollen.

III. Syrianos’ Deutung des Seienden als solchen als Objekt der Metaphysik Dass es eine solche Syrianos zufolge geben soll, ergibt sich aber schon daraus, dass das aristotelische ὂν ᾗ ὄν, d. h. das Sein als solches, für ihn eine wichtige Rolle spielt. Syrianos gebraucht diesen Begriff, ebenso wie Iamblichos, in der Formel „das gesamte Sein als solches“ (πᾶν τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν), um extensional den gesamten Bereich des Seienden im Hinblick darauf zu beschreiben, dass es ist.60 Wie aber ist ein wissenschaftlicher Zugriff auf dieses gesamte Seiende

58 59 60

Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 4, 5–11; 4, 34–5, 7. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 18, 7–17; 21, 30–38. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 21, 5; 14; 24.

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möglich? Obwohl Syrianos keine genaue Antwort auf diese Frage gibt, lassen sich aus seinem Kommentar einige Indizien dafür entnehmen, wie er sich ein entsprechendes Vorgehen vorstellt. Denn bei näherer Betrachtung zeigt sich, dass er unter den καθ᾿ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα des Seienden nicht nur Eigenschaften der Substanz im aristotelischen Sinne versteht, das heißt der einzelnen Substanz, die Akzidenzien aufweist.61 Stattdessen sieht er in ihnen Eigenschaften, die letztlich allen Substanzen bzw. allem Seienden bzw. dem Seienden als solchen (ὂν ᾗ ὄν) zukommen, sowohl den sinnlich wahrnehmbaren als auch den rein denkbaren, nicht aber dem überseienden Einen.62 Damit definiert er wesenhafte Eigenschaften des Seienden wesentlich umfassender, als es im Bereich der apodeiktischen Beweise möglich ist; die Weite und Formulierung seiner Definition erinnern bereits an die mittelalterlichen Transzendentalien, die auch als Eigenschaften alles Seienden definiert wurden,63 wenn auch, wie noch zu zeigen ist, zu Syrianos’ Lehre wesentliche Unterschiede bestehen bleiben. Inhaltlich fallen unter die Wesenseigenschaften des Seienden für Syrianos, im Anschluss an Metaphysik Β 1.995 b 20 insbesondere, ‚identisch‘ und ‚verschieden‘ sowie ‚ähnlich‘ und ‚unähnlich‘; hierdurch nähert er die aristotelische Konzeption an Platons Sophistes an, weist aber insbesondere auf die unterschiedliche Wertung des Bewegungsbegriffs hin.64 Die aristotelische Formulierung, die Bewegung und Ruhe nicht berücksichtigt, erleichtert Syrianos aber eine weitere Reduzierung des Begriffsarsenals: Denn aus Aristoteles’ Parallelisierung des Seins und des Einen (Γ 2.1003 b 14–15, 22–26) folgert er, dass nicht nur das Seiende als Seiendes, sondern auch das Eine als Eines (ἓν ᾗ ἕν) ein Gegenstand der philosophischen Untersuchung sein muss. Hieraus ergibt sich nun eine Erweiterung der aristotelischen Seinslehre hin zu einer pythagoreischen Lehre vom Einen, wie die folgende Stelle zeigt (In Met. 58, 35–38): Dass einerseits die an sich vorhandenen Eigenschaften des Seienden einander entgegengesetzt sind und dass alles Entgegengesetzte auf das Eine und das Viele zurückgeführt wird, dass dies zu erkennen aber andererseits Aufgabe einer Wissenschaft ist, ist vielleicht soweit leichter zu akzeptieren.

61 62 63

64

Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 4, 34–36. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 5, 12–14; 6, 1–3; 63, 10. Vgl. z. B. Thomas von Aquin, Summa theologiae I q. 13 a. 2–5; Duns Scotus, Lectura I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 nr. 109 (T. Hoffmann [Hg.], Johannes Duns Scotus: Die Univozität des Seienden. Texte zur Metaphysik [Sammlung Philosophie 1], Göttingen 2002, 172). Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 5, 27–6, 1; 28–34.

60

Matthias Perkams τὸ μὲν τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ ὄντι ἀντικεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πάντα [τὸ] ὑπὸ τὸ ἓν ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ τὰ πολλά, ταῦτα δὲ μιᾶς εἶναι γνωρίζειν ἐπιστήμης, εὐπαραδεκτότερα τέως ἐστί.

Diese Problemverschiebung, die durch Aristoteles’ Erwähnung des Gegensatzes von Einem und Vielem in Γ 2.1004 b 28 veranlasst ist, bedeutet den Übergang zu einer grundlegenderen Umschreibung dessen, was eine Seinswissenschaft ist. Sie wird zur Wissenschaft all dessen, das nicht reine Einheit, sondern mit Vielheit kompatibel ist, wie es für das Sein der Fall ist.65 Diese Überlegung ermöglicht es Syrianos auch, das höchste Axiom der aristotelischen Metaphysik, nämlich den Satz vom Widerspruch, als Charakterisierung alles Seienden zu begreifen: Weil jedes Seiende nicht nur eines ist, sondern zugleich auch vieles, ist es immer von etwas anderem verschieden, das nicht mehr mit ihm identisch ist, und damit einer Klassifizierung mithilfe des Satzes vom Widerspruch zugänglich.66 Das ist für Syrianos auch insofern wichtig, als gerade die Unbeweisbarkeit dieses Satzes auf die nicht-hypothetischen Voraussetzungen der Metaphysik hinweist, die damit den Bereich beweisbarer Zusammenhänge endgültig verlässt und dessen Voraussetzungen in den Blick nimmt.67 In diesem Sinne deutet Syrianos Aristoteles’ Betonung der Unbeweisbarkeit des Satzes vom Widerspruch als Übersteigen des dianoetischen Bereichs hin zum Noetischen, der jedem Beweis vorausliegt. So kann dann auch das gesamte Seiende in den Blick dieser Wissenschaft kommen. Durch diese Aufdeckung der noetischen Voraussetzungen, die in neuplatonischer Vorstellung die Grundlage jeder Ontologie bilden müssen, hat Syrianos die Mittel beisammen, um seine eigene Erklärung vom ὂν ᾗ ὄν als dem eigentlichen Objekt der Metaphysik zu geben. Hierbei ist zu beachten, dass Syrianos diesen Ausdruck nicht nur, wie Iamblichos, im Sinne von „gesamtes Seienden als Seiendes“ gebraucht, sondern meint, dass er sich im strengen Sinne auf die erste Ursache allen Seins bezieht bzw. auf dasjenige Seiende, das durch seine Spuren in allem Seienden präsent ist und, laut Metaphysik α 1.993 b 28–31, auch im höchsten Maße erkennbar sein muss.68 Zwar lässt er es bei der Interpretation des Anfangs von Metaphysik Γ zunächst offen, ob es ein Seiendes gibt, das nur seiend und insofern von allem

65 66

67 68

Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 60, 20–26. Die genauen Bedingungen und Formulierungen, mit denen Syrianos den Satz vom Widerspruch erläutert, sind von A. Longo, Siriano e i principi della scienza (Elenchos 41), Napoli 2005 und O’Meara, Le fondement du principe de non-contradiction chez Syrianus (wie Anm. 44) genauer untersucht worden, worauf der Leser verwiesen sei. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 65, 15–19. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 55, 3–6.

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verschieden sei, was etwas Bestimmtes ist.69 An anderen Stellen ist er hierzu aber sehr eindeutig, z. B. in In Met. 45, 29–31: […] die seienden Dinge als solche gehen von dem Seienden hervor, das kein konkretes Seiendes mehr ist, sondern das Seiende selbst, das Vereinigte aber empfängt seine Einheit von dem Einen, das transzendent gegenüber allen Dingen ist. […] τὰ μὲν ὄντα ᾗ ὄντα πρόεισιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος, ὃ οὐ τόδε ἐστὶ τὸ ὂν ἀλλ’ αὐτοόν, τὰ δ’ ἡνωμένα τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς τοῦ ἐξῃρημένου τῶν ὅλων καταδέχεται. Auch bei Aristoteles setzt er diese Annahme voraus; vgl. In Met. 11, 9–11: Dass es in Anbetracht der vielen gesehenen und gedachten Substanzen notwendig ist, dass alle von einer abhängen, die jemand seiend in erster Linie nennen könnte, das wird er, denke ich, zugeben. ὅτι δὲ πολλῶν οὐσιῶν ὁρωμένων τε καὶ νοουμένων ἀνάγκη πάσας ἐκ μιᾶς ἠρτῆσθαι, ἣν πρώτως ἄν τις ὂν προσαγορεύσειεν, οἶμαι συγχωρήσειν αὐτόν. „Das Seiende als solches“ ist für Syrianos also gleichsam als die Idee des Seins zu verstehen, diejenige Monade, die, wie wir auch aus einigen Stellen bei Proklos lernen können,70 nichts anderes mehr ist als Sein. Sie hat damit auch keine washeitliche Bestimmtheit außer der zu sein, oder, anders – in späterer Terminologie – gesagt, ihr Dasein und ihr Sosein sind nicht voneinander zu trennen. Wie das Zitat zeigt, ist diese Idee des Seins auch vom Einen verschieden, das als transzendenter, aber nicht mehr seiender Ausgangspunkt jenseits aller Wirklichkeit erhalten bleibt. Sachlich stellt sich Syrianos hier wiederum in die Tradition des Iamblichos, der die Lehre entwickelte, dass das höchste Sein (τὸ ἀκρότατον ὄν) direkt, noch vor dem Geist, aus dem Einen hervorgehe.71 Inwieweit ist nun eine überzeugende Deutung der Metaphysik als allgemeiner Seinswissenschaft im aristotelischen Sinne möglich? Einige interessante Punkte lassen sich hierzu immerhin festhalten: Mit der Ansetzung des höchsten Seienden als Objekt der Metaphysik kann Syrianos zumindest in gewisser Hinsicht daran festhalten, dass das gesamte Seiende das Objekt dieser Wissenschaft darstellt, da die Idee des Seienden mit ihren Eigenschaften in allem aus ihm hervorgegangenen Seienden weiter präsent ist.72 Zudem ist 69 70 71 72

Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 55, 7–13. Diese Stellen werden vor allem von Van Campe (wie Anm. 13) ausführlich diskutiert, weswegen ich hier aus Platzgründen darauf verzichte. Vgl. Procl., In Tim. I 232, 4–14. Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 30, 6–12.

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diese Idee selbst nicht, wie von Kobusch behauptet, ein bestimmtes Seiendes, sondern hat in sich noch die Unbestimmtheit einer ursprünglichen, alles Sein umfassenden Einheit. Daher kann Syrianos mit einem der großen Probleme der aristotelischen Metaphysik, der Gattungsaporie, recht unbefangen umgehen: Aristoteles habe, so behauptet er, diese Aporie nur „versuchsweise“ (ἐπιχειρηματικῶς) aufgeworfen, da ihm die nötigen philosophischen Voraussetzungen für die Behandlung der spezifischen Differenzen gefehlt hätten.73 Ganz besonders absurd sei die Meinung Alexanders, die Differenzen gehörten zwar nicht der näheren Gattung an, wohl aber der Substanz im Allgemeinen.74 Syrianos’ eigene Lösung, die er wegen ihrer vermeintlichen Offensichtlichkeit relativ kurz andeutet, geht davon aus, dass sich die einzelnen Arten hierarchisch vermittels ihrer verschiedenen spezifischen Differenzen voneinander unterscheiden.75 Insofern Gattungen ein Ausdruck der geordneten ontologischen Entfaltung einer Weise des Seins in zahlreiche Abbilder unterschiedlicher Stufen sind, sind auch die Differenzen dieser Stufen in der jeweiligen Monade urbildhaft enthalten und gehen abbildhaft aus ihr hervor. Das gilt für das Sein bzw. die Substanz so wie für alle anderen Monaden auch.76 In diesem Sinn hält es auch Syrianos für tolerabel, das Seiende, ebenso wie das Eine und die ἀόριστος δυάς, als eine Gattung zu bezeichnen;77 dabei kann er sich insofern mit Aristoteles einig wissen, als der Gebrauch des Wortes Gattung hier im übertragenen Sinn zu verstehen ist, da das eine Seiende, das in jedem einzelnen Seienden präsent ist, eben in dessen je verschiedener Beziehung zu seiner Ursache besteht. Diese Erklärung der Gattungsaporie lässt aber auch deutlich erkennen, wie sehr sich Syrianos’ Konzeption von Aristoteles’ ursprünglichen Intentionen unterscheidet: Für die universale Präsenz des an sich Seienden in allen seienden Dingen muss man voraussetzen, dass das oberste Seiende nicht nur eine zielursächliche, sondern auch eine wirkursächliche Funktion hat. Gerade hieraus ergibt sich, weil das dermaßen wirkende Seiende in allen Seienden präsent ist, auch der Unterschied zum „überseienden Einen“ (τὸ ὑπερούσιον ἕν), das seine Wirkung ausübt, indem es „gegenüber allem Seienden transzendent“ (ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων ἐξῃρημένον) ist.78 Es ist bemerkenswert, dass Syrianos sich zwar bewusst ist, dass sich seine Konzeption von der aristotelischen unterscheidet, aber zugleich meint, etwas auszusprechen, was notwendig aus 73 74 75 76 77 78

Vgl. Vgl. Vgl. Vgl. Vgl. Vgl.

Syrian., Syrian., Syrian., Syrian., Syrian., Syrian.,

In In In In In In

Met. Met. Met. Met. Met. Met.

32, 32, 36, 37, 30, 11,

3–15. 15–37. 29–35. 3–9. 12–13. 13–28.

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den Annahmen des Stagiriten folge79 – so dass seine Kritik etwas gemäßigter ausfällt als die Ausführungen seines Schülers Proklos, der dasselbe Problem in seinem Timaios-Kommentar diskutiert.80

IV. Fazit Als Ergebnis ist festzuhalten, dass verschiedene Neuplatoniker – neben Iamblichos und Syrianos kann man hier auch Proklos nennen – das aristotelische Konzept einer Wissenschaft vom Seienden als Seienden positiv aufgreifen. Am deutlichsten ist dies bei Syrianos: Er definiert die Metaphysik weder explizit noch implizit als Theologie,81 sondern betont, dass sich die in Aristoteles’ Metaphysik begründete Wissenschaft auf alles Seiende und nur auf das Seiende bezieht, und zwar insofern, als dieses seiend ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund greift er den Gedanken auf, dass sie eine übergreifende Wissenschaft darstellt, die für alle anderen fundamental ist, insofern sie sie letztlich begründet.82 In seiner Kommentierungstätigkeit behandelt er auch explizit die Gattungsaporie als eine Herausforderung an eine solche Wissenschaft. Allerdings gelingt die Integration der aristotelischen Metaphysik in diesen Horizont durch den zutiefst platonischen Gedanken, dass Syrianos, auf der Grundlage Iamblichos’, ein höchstes Seiendes bzw. seiendes Eines als das ὂν ᾗ ὄν aus Metaphysik Γ interpretiert. Die Seinslehre wird damit im Rahmen eines Konzepts von Wirkursächlichkeit interpretiert, das sich so bei Aristoteles nicht findet und auch in einer merklichen Spannung zu den induktiven Momenten der aristotelischen Philosophie steht. An deren Stelle tritt bei Syrianos ein dialektischer Aufstieg, der mit den inhaltlich unaristotelischen Methoden der Dihärese und Analyse arbeitet. Die Ideen der als Weisheit und als Apodeiktik verstandenen Metaphysik, die auf Aristoteles’ Analytik und auf den Aristoteliker Alexander von Aphrodisias zurückgreifen, spielen eine verhältnismäßig geringe Rolle. Im Endeffekt kann man sagen, dass Syrianos die aristotelische Metaphysik als eine umfassende Ontologie innerhalb des Platonismus ausgearbeitet hat. Trotzdem ist seine Konzeption ein wichtiger Schritt in der Geschichte der aristotelischen Metaphysik, der die jahrhundertelange Amalgamierung platonischer und aristotelischer Theorieelemente zu einem vorläufigen Höhepunkt führte und zugleich Grundlagen für die Zukunft legte.

79 80 81 82

Vgl. Syrian., In Met. 11, 11–13. Vgl. Procl., In Tim. I 266, 28–268, 23. Dies geschieht allerdings ausdrücklich bei Ascl., In Met. 1, 3; 2, 9–16. Vgl. dazu genauer Ierodiakonou (wie Anm. 42).

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Letzteres betrifft vor allem die Tatsache, dass Syrianos die Wissenschaft vom Seienden von dessen oberster Ursache her entwickelte und damit gerade die ontologisch obersten Prinzipien des Seins zum zentralen Gegenstand der Metaphysik machte. Durch seine Erörterungen darüber, wie die obersten Ursachen alles Seienden im Rahmen des Seinsbegriffs selbst behandelt werden können, so dass man Ursachen und Verursachtes ‚seiend‘ nennen kann, schuf er wichtige Voraussetzungen dafür, die erste, schöpferische Ursache bzw. Gott im Rahmen einer aristotelischen Metaphysik zu behandeln. Zwar konnte dieser Ansatz innerhalb des spätantiken Neuplatonismus, der das höchste Seiende als überseiendes Eines ansah, nicht voll wirksam werden; in dem Moment aber, in dem diese Voraussetzung im Raum der monotheistischen Religionen entfiel, wurde die platonisch angereicherte aristotelische Metaphysik zu der Disziplin, die die Rationalität des Geglaubten wissenschaftlich darlegen konnte.

Literatur 1. Quellen: Textausgaben und Übersetzungen ALCINOuS (= Alcin.) Didascalicus Whittaker, J. – Louis, P., Alcinoos. Enseignement des doctrines de Platon. Introduction, texte établi et commenté par J. W. et traduit par P. L. (Collection Budé), Paris 1990. Dillon, J., Alcinous. The Handbook of Platonism (Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers), Oxford 1993. ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS (= Alex. Aphr.) In Anal. pr. Wallies, M., Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca II.1), Berlin 1883. In Met. Hayduck, M., Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca I), Berlin 1891. AMMONIuS (= Ammon.) In Porph. Busse, A., Ammonii in Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.3), Berlin 1891.

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ARISTOTELES De an. Förster, A., Aristotelis de anima libri III, Budapest 1912. Met. Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1924 (ND Oxford 1970). ASCLEPIuS (= Ascl.) In Met. Hayduck, M., Asclepii in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros Α–Ζ commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VI.2), Berlin 1888. DAVID Proll. Busse, A., Davidis Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.2), Berlin 1904. DuNS SCOTuS Lectura (Auszüge) Hoffmann, T., Johannes Duns Scotus: Die Univozität des Seienden. Texte zur Metaphysik (Sammlung Philosophie 1), Göttingen 2002. ELIAS In Cat., Proll. Busse, A., Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.1), Berlin 1900. IAMBLICHuS (= Iamb.) Comm. Math. Festa, N., Iamblichi De communi mathematica scientia liber. Edidit N. F. (Leipzig 1891), editionem addendis et corrigendis adiunctis curavit U. Klein, Stuttgart 1975. Protr. Pistelli, H., Iamblichi Protrepticus, Leipzig 1888. VP Deubner, L., Iamblichi De vita Pythagorica liber. Edidit L. D. (Leipzig 1937), editionem addendis et corrigendis adiunctis curavit U. Klein, Stuttgart 1975. PHILOPONuS (= Phlp.) In Anal. pr. Wallies, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica Priora commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.2), Berlin 1905.

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In Anal. post. Wallies, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora commentaria cum Anonymo in librum II (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.3), Berlin 1909. In Cat. Busse, A., Philoponi (olim Ammonii) in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.1), Berlin 1898. PLATO Tim. Burnet, J., Platonis opera. Tomus IV tetralogiam VIII continens, Oxford 1902 (ND Oxford 1972). PROCLuS (= Procl.) In Tim. Diehl, E., Procli diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, Leipzig 1903– 1906. STOBAEuS (= Stob.) Wachsmuth, K. – Hense, O., Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium, Berlin 1884– 1912. SYRIANuS (= Syrian.) In Met. Kroll, W., Syriani in Metaphysica commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VI.1), Berlin 1902. THOMAS AQuINAS Summa theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, Rom 1888–1906. 2. Sekundärliteratur Bonelli, M., Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come scienza dimostrativa (Elenchos 35), Napoli 2001. Bonelli, M., Dialectique et philosophie première: Syrianus et Alexandre d’Aphrodise, in: Longo−Corti, 423–437. D’Ancona, C., Plotin, in: R. Goulet (Hg.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques. V: de Paccius à Rutilius Rufus, 1re partie – Va: de Paccius à Plotin, Paris 2012, 885–1068.

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Doolan, G. T. (Hg.), The Science of Being as Being. Metaphysical Investigations (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy vol. 55), Washington 2012. Frede, M., Syrianus on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in: Longo−Corti, 23–56. Honnefelder, L., Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13./ 14. Jahrhundert, in: L. Honnefelder – J. P. Beckmann – G. Schrimpf – G. Wieland (Hgg.), Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen, Hamburg 1987, 165–186. Ierodiakonou, K., Syrianus on Scientific Knowledge and Demonstration, in: Longo−Corti, 401–422. Kobusch, T., Metaphysik III. Antike bis Hochmittelalter, in: J. Ritter – K. Gründer (Hgg.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Bd. 5, Basel− Stuttgart 1980, Sp. 1196–1217. Kremer, K., Der Metaphysikbegriff in den Aristoteles-Kommentaren der Ammonius-Schule (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 39, 1), Münster 1961. Longo, A., Siriano e i principi della scienza (Elenchos 41), Napoli 2005. Longo, A. – Corti, L. (Hgg.), Syrianus et la métaphysique de l’antiquité tardive: Actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre–1er octobre 2006 (Elenchos 51), Napoli 2009. Macris, C., Jamblique et la literature pseudo-pythagoricienne, in: S. C. Mimouni (Hg.), Apocryphité. Histoire d’un concept transversal aux réligions du livre. En hommage à P. Geoltrain (Bibliothèque de l’École des hautes études. Sciences religieuses vol. 113), Turnhout 2002, 77–129. Macris, C., Périctionè, in: R. Goulet (Hg.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, V a, de Paccius à Plotin, Paris 2012, 231–234. Moraux, P., Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias. Bd. 1. Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im 1. Jh. v. Chr., Berlin−New York 1973. Moraux, P., Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias. Bd. 2. Der Aristotelismus im 1. und 2. Jh. n. Chr., Berlin−New York 1984. Moraux, P., Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias. Bd. 3. Alexander von Aphrodisias, Berlin− New York 2001. O’Meara, D. J., Le problème de la métaphysique dans l’antiquité tardive, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 33, 1986, 3–22. O’Meara, D. J., Pythagoras Revived. Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford−New York 1989. O’Meara, D. J., Le fondement du principe de non-contradiction chez Syrianus, in: Longo−Corti, 299–308.

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O’Meara, D. J., The Transformation of Metaphysics in Late Antiquity, in: G. T. Doolan (Hg.), The Science of Being as Being. Metaphysical Investigations (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy vol. 55), Washington 2012, 36–52. Perkams, M., Die Bedeutung des arabisch-islamischen Denkens in der Geschichte der Philosophie, in: H. Eichner – M. Perkams – C. Schäfer (Hgg.), Islamische Philosophie im Mittelalter. Ein Handbuch, Darmstadt 2013, 13–31. Perkams, M., Philosophie. Die Geschichte des Rationalitätsideals der Antike, in Vorbereitung. Taormina, D. P., La dialettica come propedeutica, in: D. P. Taormina – R. M. Piccione (Hgg.), Giamblico. I frammenti dalle epistole. Introduzione, testo, traduzione e commento (Elenchos 56), Napoli 2010, 89–134. Thesleff, H. (Hg.), The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A, Humaniora: humanistiska vetenskaper, socialvetenskaper, teologi 30,1), Åbo 1965. Van Campe, L., Syrianus and Proclus on the Attributes of the One in Plato’s Parmenides, in: Longo−Corti, 247–280. Verbeke, G., Aristotle’s Metaphysics Viewed by the Ancient Greek Commentators, in: D. J. O’Meara (Hg.), Studies in Aristotle (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 9), Washington 1981, 107– 127.

Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers* Pantelis Golitsis

Introduction Harmonizing philosophical discourse, that is, the discourse which sets out to prove the compatibility of philosophical texts considered to contain incompatible ideas, was not generally or permanently accepted in the philosophical Schools of Late Antiquity – contrary to what is quite often assumed in scholarly literature.1 In late sixth century Alexandria, for instance, Iamblichus is referred to by Elias as a bad example of a commentator who sympathized too much with Plato: ‘Iamblichus was so much devoted to Plato’, he says,2 ‘that he contended that Aristotle did not disagree with Plato on the doctrine of Forms’, a disagreement which was apparently too obvious to Elias. Elias was of course not the first to see a disagreement between the two philosophers. To illustrate this, let us first take a look at the closing paragraph of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: (1) These then are the results and perhaps yet more might be adduced. At any rate, the fact that these men experience many great difficulties in explaining the generation of numbers and can in no way make a system of them is like a proof that the mathematicals are not separable from the perceptibles, as some say, and that they are not the principles.3 * 1

2 3

I am grateful to Stephen Menn for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. It is true that, to some extent and on some range of doctrines, all Neoplatonists harmonized Aristotle’s with Plato’s philosophy. But Neoplatonists do this without acknowledging it, thinking that many of Aristotle’s doctrines were already in Plato. Studying the way they do this, for what purpose and on what range of doctrines, belongs to a paper about Neoplatonic hermeneutics. What I am particularly interested in in this paper is not so much Neoplatonic hermeneutics but the way they themselves account for Aristotle’s polemics and its consequences for their overall approach to Aristotle’s philosophy. Elias, In Cat. 123, 2–3: οὗτος γὰρ προσπάσχων τῷ Πλάτωνι συνδίδωσι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι οὐκ ἀντιλέγει τῷ Πλάτωνι διὰ τὰς ἰδέας. Met. N 6.1093 b 24–29: Tὰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίνοντα ταῦτά τε κἂν ἔτι πλείω συναχθείη· ἔοικε δὲ τεκμήριον εἶναι τὸ πολλὰ κακοπαθεῖν περὶ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ μηδένα τρόπον δύνασθαι συν-

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Let us now take a look at how, four generations earlier than Elias, the Head of the Platonic School at Athens, Syrianus, reacted to that closing paragraph in his commentary on the Metaphysics: (2) Now, I would take as a proof of the fact that these divine men have done philosophy in the finest, best and most irrefutable way that you, , who are the most ingenious and productive of those on record, have experienced such great difficulties in your controversy with them, having said nothing that might even be persuasive, not to say conclusive, or indeed anything relevant to them at all, since in most of what you say you employ alien hypotheses which are in no way appropriate to the doctrines of your elders, while in a number of instances, when proposing to make some point against their true doctrine, you fail to come to grips with them at all.4 Aristotle is here deemed a bad reader of Plato and the Pythagoreans, striving to refute the best philosophy but being eventually trapped in his own irrelevant or incompetent antilogies (shown to be so by Syrianus, of course). Earlier in the commentary, Aristotle’s discourse is said by Syrianus to be φιλεγκλήμων, ‘fond of fault-finding’: (3) However, before dealing with Aristotle’s arguments against this more authentic doctrine, it would be perhaps better to present the true meaning of the ancient philosophy with regard to those matters, so that we be able to understand whether it is the real theory of these divine men that Aristotle’s contentious discourse strives to battle with, or whether he takes what is said in the light of his own assumptions, and then dishonestly sets out to overthrow them.5

4

5

εῖραι τοῦ μὴ χωριστὰ εἶναι τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὡς ἔνιοι λέγουσι, μηδὲ ταύτας εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς. Syrian., In Met. 195, 2–9: Ἐγὼ δὲ τεκμήριον ἂν ποιησαίμην τοῦ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα καὶ ἀνελεγκτότατα πεφιλοσοφηκέναι τοὺς θείους ἐκείνους ἄνδρας τὸ σὲ δεινότατον ὄντα καὶ γονιμώτατον τῶν ἱστορηθέντων [συγγραφέων] οὕτω μὲν κακοπαθῆσαι περὶ τὰς ἀντιλογίας τὰς πρὸς αὐτούς, μηδὲν δὲ οὐχ ὅτι νικητικὸν ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πιθανὸν εἰρηκέναι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα μὲν ἑτέραις ὑποθέσεσι χρήσασθαι μηδὲν προσηκούσαις τῇ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων πραγματείᾳ, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ λέγειν τι πρὸς τἀληθὲς αὐτῶν δόγμα προθέμενον παρὰ θύρας ἀπηντηκέναι. Translation by J. Dillon – D. O’Meara, Syrianus: On Aristotle Metaphysics 13–14 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006, slightly modified. Syrian., In Met. 81, 26–30: πρὶν δὲ αὐτῶν ἅψασθαι τῶν κατὰ τῆς ἀληθεστέρας αὐτοῦ δόξης ἐπιχειρήσεων βέλτιον ἴσως τὴν ἀληθῆ παραδοῦναι περὶ τούτων τῆς ἀρχαίας φιλοσοφίας διάνοιαν, ἵνα καὶ σχῶμεν συνιδεῖν, εἴτε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν θείων ἀνδρῶν ὁ φιλεγκλήμων διαμάχεται λόγος εἴτε πρὸς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις ἱστάμενος τὰ λεχθέντα μοχθηρῶς ἀνατρέπειν ἐπιχειρεῖ. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4), modified.

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Such a statement, of course, does not have to mean that Syrianus completely disregarded Aristotle. In text no. 2, he considers Aristotle to be δεινότατος and γονιμώτατος among other philosophers and the failure of his attack is tantamount to one more proof of the irrefutable philosophy of the venerable ancients. Besides, in the opening paragraph of his commentary,6 Syrianus makes plain that Aristotle’s logic, ethics and physics, as well as a part of his metaphysics, are to be highly esteemed: (4) I am not a natural controversialist, nor yet would I count myself as a disciple of Aristotle on merely a few or trivial topics; rather, I am one of those who admire his logical methodology overall and who would accept with enthusiasm both his ethical and physical treatises. And that I may not make a bore of myself by enumerating in detail all the excellent aspects of this man’s philosophy, let me just ask why every right-minded person might not justly marvel at the apt remarks to be found in this most excellent treatise on the subject of the enmattered forms and definitions, and at the teachings on the divine and unmoved separable causal principles of the whole cosmos, accompanied by suitable demonstrations – although indeed they are beyond the reach of all synthetic treatment or too detailed exposition –, and declare the author of such a philosophical enquiry a benefactor of the life of man. For all this he is owed the warmest thanks both from us and from all those who can appreciate his acuity of mind.7 Does the parallel reading of texts no. 2, 3 and 4 suggest that Syrianus was a somewhat inconsequent philosopher, say, a self-contradicting ‘concordist’? In a recent article about ancient commentary and harmonization, Rachel Barney 6

7

Syrianus’ more focused commentary on Metaphysics M-N has to be dissociated, in my view, from his more scholarly commentary on the Metaphysics, from which only parts seem to have survived, namely on books B and Γ. The qualification of the beginning of M as φροίμια (81, 6: φροιμίων μὲν οὖν ἅλις) as well as the εὐχή at the end of N point to a selfstanding work, which is clearly addressed to readers (cf. 195, 18: τῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων διανοίας). Syrian., In Met. 80, 4–16: Οὔκ εἰμι τῶν φιλαπεχθημόνων, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐν ὀλίγοις ἢ τοῖς τυχοῦσι τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη διδάσκαλον ἐπιγραφομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν τάς τε λογικὰς αὐτοῦ μεθόδους ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν τεθαυμακότων καὶ τῶν τὰς ἠθικάς τε καὶ φυσικὰς πραγματείας ὑπερφυῶς ἀποδεχομένων. καὶ ἵνα μὴ νῦν πάντα διαριθμούμενος, ὅσα κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῷδε πεφιλοσόφηται, μακρὸς εἶναι δόξω, τί οὐ πᾶς τῶν εὖ φρονούντων τὰ ἐν τῇ τελεωτάτῃ πραγματείᾳ ταύτῃ περί τε ἐνύλων εἰδῶν καὶ ὁρισμῶν εὐστόχως εἰρημένα περί τε τῶν θείων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἐξῃρημένων κόσμου τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰτίων σὺν ἀποδείξεσι ταῖς ἐγχωρούσαις παραδοθέντα, καίπερ ὄντα πάσης συνθέσεως καὶ διεξόδου πυκνοτέρας ὑπέρτερα, δικαίως ἂν ἀγασθείη καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα τῆς τοιαύτης θεωρίας εὐεργέτην τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίου κατονομάσειε; τούτων μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ πολλὴ χάρις παρά τε ἡμῶν παρά τε πάντων τῶν συνῃσθημένων αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀγχινοίας ὀφείλεται. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4), slightly modified.

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notes indeed: ‘There is an irremediable tension between, on the one hand, Syrianus’ enormous respect for Aristotle and his general picture of Plato and Aristotle as in accord, and on the other hand the implication that Aristotle is, inexplicably, an incompetent or malicious reader of Plato’.8 This tension disappears, however, if we disambiguate the word ‘accord’. The texts of two philosophers can be in accord by being complementary in a unified system, which is quite different from their being in accord as to the very ideas they contain. Syrianus accepted parts of Aristotle’s philosophy, not the whole of it. He accepted the overall validity of his logic and commended the study of his ethics and physics; he accepted (some sections of) Metaphysics Z-I and Metaphysics Λ;9 but he did not accept any part of Metaphysics M-N. And similarly did the next Head of the Athenian Platonic School, Proclus, who is known to have taught Aristotle’s De interpretatione10 and who amply used Aristotle’s Physics in his Elementatio physica,11 but who also refuted, in his lost treatise An Examination of Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato’s Timaeus,12 the arguments advanced against Plato in Aristotle’s De caelo. There is philosophically no problem with an otherwise esteemed Aristotle vainly contradicting Plato or incompetently disagreeing with Platonic ideas. Aristotle was a good philosopher but not just as good as Plato. Good parts of his philosophy could be read with great profit for aspiring philosophers, whereas bad parts of it had to be rejected. Such was, therefore, the ‘complementarist’ reading of Aristotle at the School of Athens and it was certainly not an innovation. It was Porphyry who established that certain parts of Aristotle’s philosophy were useful and could be profitably included in a philosophic curriculum.13 But this is quite different from claiming in proper harmonizing spirit, as Iamblichus did, that Aristotle shared precisely the same philosophical ideas as Plato, e.g. the doc-

8 9 10 11

12 13

R. Barney, Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority, Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, 112. The content of these two parts of the Metaphysics fits to the description given by Syrianus in passage no. 4. Cf. Ammon., In De int. 1, 6–11. See J. Opsomer, The integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and Divisibility, in: R. Chiaradonna – F. Trabattoni (edd.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. Proceedings of the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop. Il Ciocco, Castelvecchio Pascoli, June 22–24, 2006 (Philosophia antiqua vol. 115), Leiden−Boston 2009, 193–203. Cf. Phlp., De aet. mundi c. Proclum 31, 10–11; Simp., In De cael. 640, 24–26. See G. E. Karamanolis, Porphyry: The First Platonist Commentator on Aristotle, in: P. Adamson – H. Baltussen – M. W. F. Stone (edd.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, vol. 1 (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vol. 83,1), London 2004, 97–120.

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trine of Forms. Are we, then, rightly accustomed to speak without qualification of the harmony between Plato and Aristotle in the philosophy of Late Antiquity? To be sure, Iamblichus was not the only ‘concordist’ among ancient commentators. From Proclus to Elias there have been other ‘concordists’, who tried to account positively for Aristotle’s criticisms and thus make him indirectly agree with Plato. And they tried to do this by altering the target of Aristotle’s criticisms. While discussing Aristotle in his De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, John Philoponus notes indeed that: (5) From these passages we can most certainly see that Aristotle’s refutations of Plato are not directed at people who have wrongly understood Plato, which is a fiction created by some more recent commentators out of embarrassment at the disagreement between the philosophers, but rather constitute a rebuttal of the notions of Plato himself. For, if Aristotle had not been attacking Plato’s own doctrine on the Forms but, as these commentators claim, that of people who have misunderstood him, he would have specified precisely this at the outset and not have refuted the doctrine of the Forms generally and without qualification.14 According to these ‘more recent commentators’, Aristotle did not want to refute Plato but people who did not understand Plato correctly, say, not Plato’s true doctrine of Forms but a false understanding of Plato’s true doctrine of Forms. Philoponus could have in mind Iamblichus, whom we know to have precisely advocated Plato’s and Aristotle’s agreement as to the doctrine of Forms, but it is in Simplicius that we find a similar defence of a criticism addressed by Aristotle to Plato: (6) Why is it then, one might ask, that Aristotle claims that every , save one, has said that time is ungenerated, just making an allusion to this at the beginning of the passage but then saying it by name?

14

Phlp., De aet. mundi c. Proclum 29, 2–13: ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν μάλιστα συνιδεῖν, ὡς οἱ κατὰ Πλάτωνος Ἀριστοτέλους ἔλεγχοι οὐ πρὸς τοὺς κακῶς τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐξειληφότας ἐνίστανται, ὥς τινες τῶν νεωτέρων ἐμυθολόγησαν τὴν τῶν φιλοσόφων διαφωνίαν αἰδεσθέντες, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς Πλάτωνος αὐτοῦ ὑπονοίας τὴν ἀντιλογίαν πεποίηνται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ διεμάχετο τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν Πλάτωνος Ἀριστοτέλης δόγμα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς κακῶς τῶν Πλάτωνος, ὥς φασιν, παρακούσαντας, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο προσδιορίζεσθαι ἤμελλεν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀδιορίστως τὴν περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἀπελέγχειν δόξαν. Translation by M. Share, Philoponus: Against Proclus’ On the Eternity of the World 1–5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2005, slightly modified. Cf. also Phlp., In Anal. post. 243, 9–13: ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς κακῶς, φασίν, ἐκλαμβάνοντας τὰς περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν δόξας καὶ οἰομένους λευκότητα καθ’ αὑτὴν ὑφίστασθαι καὶ μὴ ἐν τῷ δημιουργικῷ λόγῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπότητα ἀσώματον οἱονεὶ ῥῖνας ἔχουσαν καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴωθεν ἀεὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἰδεῶν ἐπιρραπίζειν.

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Pantelis Golitsis For he adds that it is only Plato who claims that time has been generated and he also tells why: “, he says, claims that the time has been generated together with the heaven and that the heaven has been generated”. The reply is that it was an old custom to raise objections against the apparent meaning of a word out of concern for the views of the more superficial people (φειδοῖ τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων). Therefore, since the word ‘generated’ was applied more usually to entities that come to be, it is for this reason that Aristotle seems to accuse Plato, as if the latter had said that time is generated. But, in reality, he does not accuse Plato but those who apply the word ‘generated’ to time and to cosmos according to this very meaning.15

Like Philoponus’ opponents, Simplicius points out that Aristotle considers in his criticism not what Plato really meant but just what can be falsely understood in Plato’s words, namely that Plato’s saying that time has been generated is tantamount to saying that time has come to be. A similar thesis is found in a teaching of Simplicius’ and Philoponus’ common master Ammonius, son of Hermeias, which is reported by his other pupil Asclepius of Tralles: (7) Aristotle says here16 that being and the one follow each other; for everything participates both in being and in one. Other philosophers, however, separate the two from each other and this is also what Aristotle does elsewhere, as our philosopher (i.e. Ammonius) explains. For if matter is both being and not-being, since it is grasped only by bastard reasoning, and participates in the one, it is clear that the one is above being. Now, since the one and being introduce the many (for we speak of the one as related to the many) and since it is the one and the same science that examines the opposites, and since the many are opposite to the one, it is clear that the first philosopher will also take into account the many, and not merely the one. For there is an intelligible manifold, in virtue of which being is present to the many, as there also is an intelligible henad, in virtue of which continuity is present to all sensible things. Therefore,

15

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Simp., In Phys. 1155, 8–1156, 3: διὰ τί οὖν, φαίη τις ἄν, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔξω ἑνὸς πάντας φησὶ τὸν χρόνον ἀγένητον λέγειν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν αἰνιξάμενος, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστὶ προσθείς, ὅτι Πλάτων μόνος γεγονέναι φησὶ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ γεγονέναι προσθείς· “ἅμα γὰρ αὐτὸν τῷ οὐρανῷ γεγονέναι, τὸν δὲ οὐρανὸν γεγονέναι φησίν”; ἢ ὅτι παλαιὸν ἔθος ἦν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀντιλέγειν φειδοῖ τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων τὰς γνώμας. ἐπειδὴ οὖν τὸ γενητὸν συνηθέστερον ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον μὴ ὄντων ὕστερον δὲ ὄντων ἐλέγετο, διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σημασίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀντιλέγων ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δοκεῖ μὲν εὐθύνειν τὸν Πλάτωνα ὡς γενητὸν εἰπόντα, εὐθύνει δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐ τὸν Πλάτωνα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ σημαινομένου τὸ γενητὸν τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ προσάψαντας. Met. Γ 2.1003 b 22–24.

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Empedocles spoke well about love and strife, and the Pythagoreans about numbers, meaning by that the intelligibles, as did the Platonists speaking about forms. And we have shown that Aristotle openly represents the same things. It is thus as to the appearance that Aristotle disputed with these philosophers, so that we do not accept the philosophers’ doctrines by trusting their appearance.17 Like Simplicius, Ammonius claimed that Aristotle did not really dispute with Plato or, for that matter, with any other philosopher. He seemed to refute other philosophers but in reality he refuted the apparent meaning (τὸ φαινόμενον) of other philosophers’ sayings, leaving thus intact, we may assert, the depth of their thought. And he did so in order to prevent that we accept their doctrines according to what these doctrines seem to say; he wanted, for instance, to prevent us understanding that Empedocles spoke of love and strife in an ordinary sense; for, by that, Empedocles meant the intelligibles (say, the intelligibles that Plato in the Sophist calls Sameness and Otherness). We may provisionally name this rationale imputed to Aristotle by Ammonius and his school ‘the preventive function of philosophical criticism’. In the present contribution I intend to examine what this function is supposed to do and how exactly it serves harmonizing purposes. I think that this has not yet been properly understood, especially as to the pedagogical reasoning that it involves.18 I shall focus on Simplicius, since it is in his 17

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Ascl. (Ammon.), In Met. 233, 25–40: καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνταῦθά φησιν ὅτι ἐπακολουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν· πάντα γὰρ μετέχουσι καὶ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· οἱ μέντοι γε ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι διακρίνουσιν αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δέ, ὥς φησιν ὁ ἡμέτερος φιλόσοφος, ἐν ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὄν ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ ἐστι ληπτή, μετέχει δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, φανερὸν ὅτι ὑπερβέβηκε τὸ ἓν τὸ ὄν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν πλῆθος εἰσάγουσι (τὸ γὰρ ἓν πρὸς πλῆθος λέγεται), μιᾶς δὲ καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ πλῆθος, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ περὶ πλήθους διαλέξεται ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος, καὶ οὐ περὶ μόνου τοῦ ἑνός. ἔστι γὰρ νοητὸν πλῆθος, ἐξ οὗ τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχει, ὥσπερ καὶ ἑνὰς νοητή, ἐξ ἧς ἡ συνέχεια πᾶσι τοῖς ἐνταῦθα. ὥστε καλῶς ἔλεγεν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς νεῖκος καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἀριθμούς, τὰ νοητὰ διὰ τούτων αἰνιττόμενοι, καὶ οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα τὰς ἰδέας. ἰδοῦ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐνταῦθα ἄντικρυς ταῦτα πρεσβεύει· ὥστε κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐμάχετο πρὸς αὐτούς, ἵνα μὴ τῷ φαινομένῳ πεισθέντες αὐτὰ δεξώμεθα. Cf. also Phlp. (Ammon.), In De an. 116, 26–28: πλὴν ὡς εἴωθεν ἀεὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης κἀνταῦθα τὸ φαινόμενον ἐλέγχει, ἵνα μή τις τὰ δηλούμενα διὰ τῶν αἰνιγμάτων τούτων συνιδεῖν μὴ δυνάμενος μένῃ μέχρι τοῦ φαινομένου. Simplicius’ harmonization of ancient philosophers has lately received considerable attention; see H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008 passim; H. Baltussen, Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority, Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, 121–136; Baltussen in this volume; Barney (see note 8); M.-A. Gavray, Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation, The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 5, 2011, 85–158. I here develop further the analysis presented briefly in P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. Tradition et Innovation (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina

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commentaries that this interpretive principle mainly survives and has been in all probability further developed.19 Once this is clarified, I will try to construe how this principle shaped Simplicius’ self-understanding as a ‘concordist’ commentator, especially with regard to his Athenian ‘complementarist’ predecessors, and what this allows us to say overall about the scope of his philosophical exegesis.

I. Aristotle and the Preventive Function of Philosophical Criticism One good place to start with is a passage in Simplicius’ commentary on the De caelo, in which Simplicius tries to account for Aristotle’s severe criticism of the two philosophers who seem to have represented a confused monism, that is, Parmenides and Melissus: (8) But what Aristotle accuses them of in investigating the reason for their mistake would be really harsh, only if it were true. For Parmenides and Melissus, he says, on the one hand assumed that there is nothing else in reality apart from the substance of perceptible things and on the other hand they were the first to understand that it is necessary for there to be natures which do not come to be or change if there is to be scientific knowledge (for there is no knowledge of what is always in flux, and Plato’s Parmenides says that a person ‘will have no place to turn his mind’ if the eternal forms are not hypothesized to exist); so, having understood these things, they transferred the accounts which fit the intelligible and unchanging reality to the perceptible reality which comes to be, since they said things which are appropriate to the intelligibles while they proposed to speak about nature. Indeed, if Melissus entitled his work On nature or On being, it is clear that he considered nature to be being

19

Bd. 3), Berlin−New York 2008, 100. For helpful remarks see also the review of Baltussen’s book by R. B. Todd, Review of H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, Aestimatio. Critical Reviews in the History of Science 5, 2008, 210–224. While it was, as it seems, Ammonius’ invention. A similar explanation of Aristotle’s criticisms is also found in Simplicius’ colleague Priscianus (pseudo-Simplicius); cf. In De an. 28, 12–13: Ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ φαινόμενον ἀεὶ εἰωθὼς ἱστορεῖν καὶ ἐλέγχειν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα κατὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν συνήθειαν ἐκδέχεσθαι εἴωθεν. Note that in In Met. 171, 9–13 Syrianus says that Plato contradicts Parmenides only as to the φαινόμενον of the latter’s doctrine, whereas their doctrines are not opposed as to the very truth (κατά γε το ἀληθέστατον) they contain.

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and natural things to be beings. But these are the perceptibles. It is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle said that they assumed that there is nothing else apart from the substance of the perceptibles when they said that being is one; for, if the perceptible reality is thought to evidently be and if being is one, there cannot be anything apart from what is perceptible. […] But, as is his custom, Aristotle here too raises objections against the apparent meaning of what is said, taking care in advance that more superficial people do not be misled by false reasoning (προνοῶν τοῦ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιπολαιοτέρους παραλογίζεσθαι); as to Parmenides and Melissus, they indeed hypothesized a double reality.20 Simplicius wants us to believe that Aristotle’s criticism against the two philosophers is not to be taken at face value. Parmenides and Melissus, he says next, believed in the reality of being as well as in the reality of the apparent being, which is to say the reality of becoming or generation; and he goes on to cite a few passages from Parmenides and Melissus, in which the two philosophers are presented to clearly distinguish between the two levels of reality.21 ‘It is clear’, he wittily says, ‘that, when Parmenides said that being is one, he was completely aware of the fact that he was himself generated and that he had two feet’.22 Why, then, are the two philosophers, especially Parmenides, so harshly criticized by Aristotle for confusing the intelligible with the sensible and for denying generation through their monism? A legitimate answer for Syrianus, we may assert, would be that here too Aristotle ‘employs alien hypotheses which are in no way appropriate to the doctrines of his elders’

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21 22

Simp., In De cael. 557, 1–21 (I have slightly modified the punctuation): ἀλλ’ ὅπερ Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτοῖς ἐγκαλεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς διαμαρτίας ἐξελέγχων σκληρὸν ὄντως ἦν, εἴπερ ἀληθὲς ἦν· ἐκεῖνοι γάρ, φησίν, οὐδὲν μὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐν ὑποστάσει εἶναι, πρῶτοι δὲ ἐννοήσαντες, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τοιαύτας τινὰς ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀκινήτους εἶναι φύσεις, εἴπερ ἔστι γνῶσις ἐπιστημονική (τῶν γὰρ ἀεὶ ῥεόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ λέγει καὶ ὁ παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι Παρμενίδης, ὅτι οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τις τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξει μὴ τῶν ἀιδίων εἰδῶν ὑποτιθεμένων εἶναι), ταῦτα οὖν ἐννοήσαντες μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ γενητὰ τοὺς τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἀκινήτοις ἐφαρμόζοντας λόγους, εἴ γε περὶ φύσεως προτιθέμενοι λέγειν τὰ ἐκείνοις προσήκοντα λέγουσι. καὶ εἰ Περὶ φύσεως ἢ Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἐπέγραψε Μέλισσος, δῆλον, ὅτι τὴν φύσιν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ τὰ ὄντα, ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ αἰσθητά. καὶ ταύτῃ δὲ ἴσως ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης εἶπεν αὐτοὺς μηδὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνειν τῷ ἓν λέγειν τὸ ὄν· τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθητοῦ ἐναργῶς εἶναι δοκοῦντος, εἰ ἓν τὸ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο. […] ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς ἔθος αὐτῷ, πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ νῦν τῶν λόγων ὑπήντησε προνοῶν τοῦ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιπολαιοτέρους παραλογίζεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι διττὴν ὑπόστασιν ὑπετίθεντο. Translation by I. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.1–7 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2009, modified. Cf. Simp., In De cael. 557, 21–559, 27. Simp., In De cael. 559, 27–560, 1: δῆλον δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἠγνόει Παρμενίδης, ὅτι γενητὸς αὐτὸς ἦν, ὥσπερ οὐδέ, ὅτι δύο πόδας εἶχεν, ἓν λέγων τὸ ὄν. Cf. Resp. VII 522 D 6.

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(cf. text no. 2 above). But this is an answer that Simplicius would not endorse. According to him, the reason for Aristotle’s being critical of his predecessors has to be sought elsewhere, namely in his care for the superficial readers, the ἐπιπολαιότεροι, in other words readers who have just a basic understanding of complex notions and can only grasp the apparent meaning of what philosophers say. Simplicius elsewhere calls them ἁπλούστεροι,23 ‘unsophisticated’, and we finally get to see that the readers whom Aristotle cared about are simple common people with ordinary thinking: (9) Now, Aristotle philosophized in a way which is more suited to the majority of people and because he was beware of their misunderstandings, he took guard not to call motion the unchangeable activity of the intellect, which is, as he more grandly said, essence. For he who hears the word ‘motion’ at once thinks of change and suspects that what changes is liable to affection and he immediately associates motion with time.24 Let me exemplify Aristotle’s concern for the majority of people on his earlier criticism against Parmenides and Melissus. Aristotle set out to criticize not Parmenides’ or Melissus’ true doctrine but an understanding of Parmenides’ and Melissus’ doctrine, namely the understanding that ordinary people were supposed to have.25 Now, ordinary people would take Parmenides’ and Melissus’ claim that being is one to mean, roughly, that there is just one nature in the sensible world and that no plurality exists. Thus, in order to prevent such a disturbing reasoning to people who do experience a world of plurality, Aristotle refuted providentially (προνοῶν) the two philosophers’ doctrine taken in its apparent meaning. Such refutations, Simplicius says, are customary of Aristotle: They are an ἔθος to him. Earlier in the commentary, when countering the criticisms of Philoponus, Simplicius adduces the same argument: (10) This man (i.e. Philoponus) next proposes to undermine confidence derived from the shared belief of humans and from perception. Let us 23 24

25

Cf. Simp., In De cael. 377, 26; In Phys. 74, 17–18. Simp., In Phys. 821, 27–32: ὁ δέ γε Ἀριστοτέλης συμμετρότερα φιλοσοφῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰς παρακοὰς αὐτῶν φυλαττόμενος ηὐλαβήθη τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν ἀμετάβλητον οὖσαν, ἢ ὡς αὐτὸς ἔτι σεμνότερον εἶπεν (cf. Met. Λ 7.1072 b 22), οὐσίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ νοῦ κίνησιν εἰπεῖν. ὁ γὰρ ἀκούων κίνησιν εὐθὺς μεταβολὴν ἐννοεῖ καὶ παθητὸν τὸ κινούμενον ὑποπτεύει καὶ χρόνον εὐθὺς τῇ κινήσει συναναφέρει. Translation by J. O. Urmson, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1997, modified. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.1–7 (see note 20) 124 n. 25 comments: ‘Aristotle gives arguments against a text based on a superficial reading of it, but his purpose is to prevent people from reasoning the way the superficial reading suggests is proper.’ It is more plausible to assume that, according to Simplicius, Aristotle argues not against a text but against a reading which is the reading of the collective mind of ‘superficial readers’.

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take a look at his armament against those arguments as well. Aristotle has said that all people, Hellenes as well as barbarians, assign the upper region to the divine because what is immortal is linked with what is immortal, and a little later, recounting the views of his predecessors on the construction of the cosmos, he says, ‘Everyone says that the heaven has come to be, but some say it is everlasting, others that it perishes, and others, for example Empedocles of Acragas and Heraclitus of Ephesus, that there is an alteration with it sometimes being one way and sometimes another, and this goes on forever’. Now, this man has thought that Aristotle’s using the witness of ordinary people and a little later bringing in those renowned in philosophy as providing evidence for the contrary view of heaven offered him a feast. However, if, in the case of the doctrine that being is one Aristotle cited as evidence the common belief according to which there are many things, and proposed to correct the view of Parmenides and Melissus, I think it would be possible for anyone, even late learners, to say that, thinking the common belief to be true, he raised objections against the apparent meaning of those men in order that those who attach themselves in a superficial way to the doctrine of those men and are not able to grasp their depth, not be disturbed with regard to views which are so evident.26 Philoponus’ ‘feast’ (θοίνη, alluding to the late-learners of the Sophist)27 is his alleged finding of contradiction between the common belief in the eternity of the world, shared by Aristotle, and Aristotle’s own account of the contrary belief in the generation of the world, held by all other philosophers. Simplici-

26

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Simp., In De cael. 139, 25–140, 9: οὗτος ἐφεξῆς καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξης καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πίστιν προτίθεται σαλεύειν, ἴδωμεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους παρασκευήν. εἰπόντος τοίνυν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους (cf. De cael. I 3.270 b 5–9), ὅτι πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὸν ἄνω τῷ θείῳ τόπον ἀποδιδόασιν καὶ Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι ὡς τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τὸ ἀθάνατον συνηρτημένον, μετ’ ὀλίγον δὲ τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας ἱστοροῦντος περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου συστάσεως καὶ λέγοντος (cf. De cael. I 10.279 b 12–17), ὅτι γενόμενον ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἀίδιον, οἱ δὲ φθαρτόν, οἱ δὲ ἐναλλὰξ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλως ἔχειν φθειρόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ διατελεῖν οὕτως, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος, θοίνην οὗτος ἑαυτῷ παρεσκευάσθαι νενόμικεν τὸ ταῖς μαρτυρίαις χρώμενον αὐτὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων μετ’ ὀλίγα τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ κλεινοὺς παράγειν τἀναντία μαρτυροῦντας περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. καίτοι γε, εἰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ὂν τήν τε κοινὴν πρόληψιν ἐμαρτύρατο πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα νομίζουσαν καὶ τὴν Παρμενίδου καὶ Μελίσσου δόξαν εὐθύνειν προέθετο, παντὸς ἄν, οἶμαι, καὶ τῶν ὀψιμαθῶν ἦν λέγειν, ὅτι τὴν κοινὴν πρόληψιν ἀληθῆ νομίζων πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων ὑπήντησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιπολαιοτέρως τῇ δόξῃ προσέχοντας τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ βάθος αὐτῶν ἑλεῖν μὴ δυναμένους πρὸς τὰ οὕτως ἐναργῆ τῶν δογμάτων ταράττεσθαι. Translation by I. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.3–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011, slightly modified. Cf. Soph. 251 B 5–6. Cf. also Simp., In Phys. 640, 13.

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us implies that this contradiction is taken by Philoponus to disprove the authority of Aristotle and, more importantly, to highlight the mutual refutation of Hellenic views. To resolve this apparent contradiction, Simplicius appeals to the parallel case of Aristotle’s criticism of Parmenidean and Melissean monism. Just as this criticism is brought about by Aristotle only to protect ordinary people, so that they continue to hold their right common belief in the plurality of the world, so here too Aristotle contradicts not the true doctrine of the other philosophers, who, as Simplicius explains later, by γενητόν mean ‘what receives a (timeless) existence from elsewhere’ (τὸ ἐτέρωθεν τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον), but a version of this doctrine which is precisely adapted to the apparent meaning of γενητόν as ‘that which is generated in a part of time’ (γενητὸν ἀπὸ μέρους χρόνου).28 And he did so in order to prevent that ordinary people, who necessarily take the words of philosophers à la lettre and are unable to grasp the depth of their thought, be shaken up (ταράττεσθαι) by being invited to believe henceforth in the generation of the world in time. Now, it seems that this explanation of Aristotle’s criticisms is up to a certain degree an innovation of Simplicius. We saw in text no. 5 that Philoponus records the ‘more recent commentators’ who claimed that Aristotle’s criticisms are directed not to Plato but to those who misunderstood Plato; but Philoponus does not explain why these commentators claimed that to be so. An explanation is provided nevertheless by Asclepius, who reports in text no. 7 that his teacher Ammonius explained that Aristotle refuted a false understanding of Plato and of other philosophers, namely an understanding which is based on the apparent meaning of what they say; and he did so, Ammonius explained further, in order that we avoid to misleadingly accept their doctrines according to their fallacious appearance. Here is another relevant passage from Ammonius’ commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, published by Philoponus: (11) This is what Timaeus says, and Aristotle attempts to contradict this as if he were to contradict poetic myths for not corresponding to the nature of things. For, as Plato says, to those taking poetic myths at their face value nothing would appear more ridiculous, just as to those who seek the hidden meaning in them nothing would be more inspiring. But here, too, Aristotle, as he always does, refutes the apparent meaning, so that someone who is unable to understand what is being conveyed through these riddles does not stay at the level of the apparent. […]

28

Cf. Simp., In De cael. 140, 9–19.

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Indeed, what has been said symbolically is by its apparent absurdity an incentive for us to seek the truth hidden in it.29 For Ammonius, Aristotle’s criticisms are an incitement for philosophers to go into the hidden meaning of his predecessors’ sayings, to exceed their appearance and understand them correctly. But Simplicius goes further than this. He holds that Aristotle wanted with his criticisms to take care of the readers who were unable to properly understand the depth of Plato’s or other philosophers’ thought: (12) Those who philosophized about the first principles investigated them in as far as they are related to beings; some did this vaguely, without making any distinction between natural and supernatural beings, while others, like the Pythagoreans, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, distinguished between the two, but because of their obscurity they escaped the notice of the multitude. And this is why Aristotle raises objections as to the appearance , so that he helps those who understand them superficially (τοῖς ἐπιπολαίως ἐκλαμβάνουσι βοηθῶν).30 Aristotle’s criticisms were not meant to prevent the few from understanding the ancient doctrines in the way the many would do, as Ammonius implied; they were rather meant to help the many not to be misled by the difficult doctrines of the few. Here is another characteristic passage: (13) Generally, the whole thesis of those who say that being is one is paradoxical and absurd, if one reads it in such a superficial manner; 29

30

Phlp. (Ammon.), In De an. 116, 21–117, 10: ἃ μὲν οὖν φησιν ὁ Τίμαιος, ταῦτά ἐστι, καὶ τούτοις ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ταὐτὸν ποιῶν ὡς εἴ τις καὶ τοῖς ποιητικοῖς μύθοις ἀντιλέγει ὡς οὐ συνᾴδουσι τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων. ὡς γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων φησί, τοῖς κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκλαμβάνουσι τοὺς ποιητικοὺς μύθους οὐδὲν ἂν φανείη καταγελαστότερον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τοῖς τὴν κεκρυμμένην ἐν αὐτοῖς διάνοιαν ζητοῦσιν οὐδὲν ἐνθουσιαστικώτερον (cf. Pl., Epist. II 314 A 2–5). πλὴν ὡς εἴωθεν ἀεὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης κἀνταῦθα τὸ φαινόμενον ἐλέγχει, ἵνα μή τις τὰ δηλούμενα διὰ τῶν αἰνιγμάτων τούτων συνιδεῖν μὴ δυνάμενος μένῃ μέχρι τοῦ φαινομένου. […] καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ συμβολικῶς εἰρημένα διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀτοπίας ἐνάγει ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν κεκρυμμένην ἀλήθειαν. Translation by P. J. van der Eijk, Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.3–5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006, modified. This interpretation depends on a technical sense of σύμβολον, standardized with Iamblichus, in which σύμβολον is contrasted, for instance, with εἰκών; see P. T. Struck, Birth of the Symbol. Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts, Princeton 2004, 204– 226. Simp., In Phys. 21, 15–20: οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς φιλοσοφοῦντες ὡς ὄντων ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀδιορίστως, οὐ διακρίνοντες τὰ φυσικὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν, οἱ δὲ διακρίνοντες μέν, ὥσπερ οἵ τε Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Ξενοφάνης καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας, τῇ δὲ ἀσαφείᾳ λανθάνοντες τοὺς πολλούς. διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὡς πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀντιλέγει, τοῖς ἐπιπολαίως ἐκλαμβάνουσι βοηθῶν.

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In other words, Aristotle’s criticisms as well as Plato’s were not simply preventive but, more profoundly, they were providential. For Simplicius, both philosophers assumed the unseemly task to criticize their predecessors according to notions which were not theirs out of affection for common people. Let us hear it from Simplicius’ mouth: (14) Let no one blame Plato and Aristotle for making their criticisms against foreign notions. For it is out of humanity (φιλανθρώπως) that they forestall the misunderstandings which can come about.32 There is a philanthropic and pedagogical aspect in Simplicius’ reasoning which, I think, has to be rightly understood, if we are to do justice to his argument. It will help us to quote another passage from his commentary on the Physics, in which this very providential aspect is said to be an essential part of ancient philosophical criticism in general: (15) Since we are going to hear Aristotle criticize the doctrines of the previous philosophers and since, before Aristotle, Plato has manifestly done the same thing, as did Parmenides and Xenophanes before them, we must know that these philosophers refute what appears to be absurd in their accounts because they take care (κηδόμενοι) of those who understand the philosophic doctrines more superficially, since the ancients were accustomed to express their views in a riddling way. This is made clear by Plato, who admires to such extent Parmenides, whom he seems to refute, that he says that Parmenides’ thought needs a diver into the deep. And Aristotle manifestly alludes to the depth of Parmenides’ wisdom, when he says that ‘Parmenides seems to speak by being more awake’. So these philosophers sometimes supply what has been left out, sometimes make clear what has been said unclearly, sometimes distinguish what has been said with regard to the intelligibles as being unable to apply to natural things (as in the case of those who said that Being is one and unmoved), sometimes forestall the unsophisticated understanding of more superficial people; and this is how they seem to be refuting.33 31

32

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Simp., In Phys. 74, 15–18: ὅλως δὲ ἡ ὅλη θέσις τῶν ἓν τὸ ὂν λεγόντων εἴ τις οὕτως ἐπιπολαίως αὐτὴν ἐκδέχοιτο, παράδοξός ἐστι καὶ ἀπεμφαίνουσα, καὶ ὅμως φειδοῖ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων ἀντιλογίας ἠξίωται παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους. Simp., In Phys. 148, 11–13: μηδεὶς δὲ τῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει μεμφέσθω πρὸς ἄλλας ἐννοίας ἀντιλεγόντοιν (scripsi : ἀντιλέγοντι D F Diels : ἀντιλέγοντο Ε)· φιλανθρώπως γὰρ τὰς γενησομένας παρακοὰς προαναστέλλουσιν. Simp., In Phys. 36, 25–37, 7: ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐλέγχοντος ἀκουσόμεθα τὰς τῶν προτέρων φιλοσόφων δόξας καὶ πρὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὁ Πλάτων τοῦτο φαίνεται ποιῶν καὶ πρὸ

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This account may seem naïve to a modern scholar but it ceases to seem so, as soon as its pedagogical grounds are realized. If one asked why Xenophanes, Parmenides, Plato or Aristotle were so worried about the misunderstandings of common people, no good answer could be given, as Rachel Barney has rightly pointed out.34 But if one asked why Xenophanes, Parmenides, Plato or Aristotle were so worried about common people that they cared to refute their understanding of philosophic doctrines, a good answer would be that they wished that common people did not lose their common sense by being taught by philosophers to accept ideas that contradict evidence. But why then, it might be objected, should such people have to bother with philosophy at all? Here is a better answer. Xenophanes, Parmenides, Plato or Aristotle cared to refute the common people’s understanding of philosophical doctrines because they wished that such people did not get discouraged in the study of philosophy by being taught to accept ideas that contradict evidence and because they further wished these people to pursue their study of philosophy, so that they would later be able to properly understand not the apparent but the true meaning of philosophical doctrines. And this answer is a pertinent answer in light of the late Platonic conception according to which philosophy is not accessible at once but is progressively instilled into the soul of the novice philosopher.35

34

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ἀμφοῖν ὅ τε Παρμενίδης καὶ Ξενοφάνης, ἰστέον ὅτι τῶν ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀκροωμένων οὗτοι κηδόμενοι τὸ φαινόμενον ἄτοπον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν διελέγχουσιν, αἰνιγματωδῶς εἰωθότων τῶν παλαιῶν τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀποφαίνεσθαι γνώμας. δηλοῖ δὲ ὁ Πλάτων θαυμάζων οὕτως τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃν διελέγχειν δοκεῖ, καὶ βαθέος κολυμβητοῦ δεῖσθαι λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτοῦ. καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὸ βάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς σοφίας ὑπονοῶν φαίνεται, ὅταν λέγῃ “Παρμενίδης δὲ ἔοικέ που βλέπειν (Menn et Barney cum F : ἔοικέ που λέγειν Diels)”. καὶ οὗτοι οὖν ποτὲ μὲν τὸ παραλελειμμένον ἀναπληροῦντες, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ ἀσαφῶς εἰρημένον σαφηνίζοντες, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν εἰρημένον ὡς μὴ δυνάμενον τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἐφαρμόττειν διακρίνοντες ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἓν τὸ ὂν καὶ ἀκίνητον λεγόντων, ποτὲ δὲ τὰς εὐκόλους ἐκδοχὰς τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων προαναστέλλοντες, οὕτως ἐλέγχειν δοκοῦσι. Translation by Barney (see note 8) 111, completed and modified. Barney (see note 8) 113: ‘It has to be admitted that Simplicius’ solution is in the end unsatisfying. There is, after all, every difference between criticising a certain position as false and warning that it risks being misunderstood as false, unless carefully rephrased and explained. And it is very hard to believe that Aristotle was unaware of the distinction, or to read him as always intending to do the latter. If Aristotle is so worried about misunderstandings by the vulgar, why would he frame his clarifications of his predecessors in such a deeply misleading way? So far as I can see, Simplicius has no clear answer to this question.’ According to my interpretation, this is not a question that Simplicius should be concerned to answer. See P. Hoffmann, La fonction des prologues exégétiques dans la pensée pédagogique néoplatonicienne, in: J.-D. Dubois – B. Roussel (edd.), Entrer en matière: Les prologues (Patrimoines. Religions du livre), Paris 1998, 228, who speaks of the Neoplatonists’ concern ‘de ne délivrer aucun savoir qui ne fût strictement adéquat à la capacité de réception de[s] âmes, progressivement restituées à leur automotricité et conduites pas à pas vers des plans

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We need now to correct what has been said earlier, namely that for Simplicius Aristotle’s criticisms are not to be taken at face value. In as far as they are received as such, Aristotle’s criticisms are to be taken at face value, otherwise they would not be beneficial. To put it differently, in Simplicius’ view the criticisms that ancient philosophers seemed committed to were intended to be criticisms only for a class of readers, namely the unsophisticated ones. Accomplished philosophers could easily realize that what constitutes a criticism at one level is a providential discourse at another. Students who had not yet completed their philosophical studies, or who were just at the beginning of them, would only later recall what they once took to be, say, Aristotle’s criticism against Plato’s theory of ideas and realize that such a criticism did not have to do with Plato but had to do with them. It can be legitimately objected that, in spite of this account, Simplicius insists on clarifying at once, by revealing the inner intention of ancient criticisms, what was meant to be understood only progressively, that he is committed to explain synchronically what was normally to be explained in the diachrony of the philosophic curriculum. Simplicius, I think, was convinced that the good student who was to go through the whole curriculum would finally realize that there is no real disagreement between ancient philosophers. However, by the time Simplicius composed his commentaries there was no curriculum. We shall have to return to this point later. For now, let it suffice to say that Simplicius completely shared the old Aristotle’s pedagogical concern. He can be seen himself taking care of his own unsophisticated readers, when he felt that they risked being misled by reading the De caelo with the help of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary: (16) It is my opinion that Alexander of Aphrodisias obviously understands the words of Aristotle well on other occasions – and does so better than the other Peripatetics –, but, in the case of the things which Aristotle says concerning Plato, he does not seem to me to respect the purpose of Aristotle’s antilogies, which are directed at the appearance of Plato’s statements. But, contesting Plato mischievously in a way, he tries not only, as Aristotle certainly did, to refute the apparent meaning of what Plato says out of concern for the simpler people, but he also attacks the ideas of the divine Plato and tries to draw definite conclusions from what Plato says, frequently not even attending to that apparent meaning. Consequently I, putting forward the truth, which is dear to god and to Aristotle, will here add and try to do a careful investigation of the things which Alexander says are the opinions of Plato about the motion of the toujours plus élevés de la réalité.’ For a clear instance of such a concern in Simplicius, see Golitsis (see note 18) 16–17.

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soul. I do this because of those who read Alexander’s words in a more superficial way and are at risk to be misleadingly set against Plato’s doctrines, which is the same as to say against Aristotle’s doctrines and against the divine truth.36 This passage is quite interesting in more than one respect. First, it offers at the end a clear illustration of what the ‘concordist’ conviction consists in: the interchangeability of truth, Platonic truth and Aristotelian truth. Secondly, it enables us to see that a ‘providential’ criticism, in Aristotle’s manner, was to be welcomed; had Alexander made a criticism of that sort, it would have sufficed for Simplicius to alert his readers correspondingly. Alexander’s criticism, however, is mischievous; it fails to meet even the appearance of Plato’s doctrine and can set the readers against Plato. This implies that the apparent criticism of Plato is not supposed to turn the readers against Plato; and this suggests in its turn that it is meant to prepare them for the study of Plato. Finally, Simplicius’ accusations against Alexander of being malicious and committed to a reading which is irrelevant to the true import of Plato’s doctrines, tellingly reminds us of Syrianus’ similar accusations against Aristotle.

II. Syrianus and the Access to the Doctrines of True Philosophy By Simplicius’ own standards, as these are described in the prolegomena to his commentary on the Categories, the worthy exegete of Aristotle must master Aristotle’s custom.37 It was thus essential to his argument against Alexander to have previously noted that Aristotle’s criticism out of concern for 36

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Simp., In De cael. 377, 20–34: Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἐκ τῆς Ἀφροδισιάδος Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις καλῶς, οἶμαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Περιπατητικῶν καλλιόνως τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλους φαίνεται παρακολουθῶν λόγοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς Πλάτωνα τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει λεγομένοις οὐκέτι μοι δοκεῖ φυλάττειν τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους ἀντιλογίας πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον τῶν Πλάτωνος λόγων ἀποτεινόμενον, ἀλλὰ κακοσχόλως πως ὑπαντῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐ τὸ φαινόμενον μόνον ἐλέγχειν καὶ αὐτὸς πειρᾶται φειδοῖ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας διαβάλλει τοῦ θείου Πλάτωνος καὶ πορίσματα συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐπιχειρεῖ οὐδὲ τῷ φαινομένῳ πολλάκις ἀκολουθοῦντα, φέρε κἀνταῦθα τὴν τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει φίλην ἀλήθειαν προστησάμενος τὰ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεως ὡς τῷ Πλάτωνι δοκοῦντα προσθεὶς βασανίσαι πειράσομαι διὰ τοὺς ἐπιπολαιότερον αὐτοῦ τοῖς λόγοις ἐντυγχάνοντας καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ἐξ αὐτῶν διαβεβλημένως ἴσχειν πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόγματα, ταὐτὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἀλήθειαν. Translation by I. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 2.1–9 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2004, modified. Cf. Simp., In Cat. 7, 23–26: Τὸν δὲ ἄξιον τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐξηγητὴν δεῖ μὴ πάντῃ τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλονοίας ἀπολείπεσθαι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν πανταχοῦ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γεγραμμένων ἔμπειρον εἶναι καὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς συνηθείας ἐπιστήμονα.

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unsophisticated readers was customary of him. And, for obvious reasons, it was even more essential to his general harmonizing project to note that this custom was in reality an older custom, shared by other philosophers too: (17) We must know that Aristotle, following an old custom, frequently objects to the apparent meaning , whenever this apparent meaning, taken rashly, does not agree with the truth. And he does this in order to help those who understand the old sayings in a more superficial way.38 Nonetheless, Simplicius’ claim can hardly find any explicit support in any ancient text. No ancient philosopher seems to have clarified his motives to that effect and it is telling that Simplicius does not cite any passage in support of his argument. It is true that Aristotle speaks in his De caelo of the ἁπλούστερον λέγοντες, meaning by that people who advance their arguments without any sophistication, while he nobly recognizes in his Metaphysics the import to the progress of philosophy of those who expressed their opinion in a more superficial way, the ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφηνάμενοι.39 But these passages merely suggest an Aristotelian origin of the vocabulary. If we follow Ammonius, we can actually see Porphyry addressing his Isagoge to the more superficial Chrysaorios: (18) Those who are disposed in a more intelligent way can fix their mind to these from what has been already said. However, since Porphyry writes this book for someone more superficial (πρός τινα τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων) (this is clear from the fact that he addresses to him the superficial theorems), he says these things making a selection out of what has been said already.40

38

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Simp., In De cael. 296, 6–9: ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης κατὰ παλαιὰν συνήθειαν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἐνίσταται πολλάκις, ὅταν τοῦτο προχειρότερον ἐκληφθὲν μὴ συμφωνῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· ποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο βοηθῶν τοῖς ἐπιπολαιότερον τῶν παλαιῶν λόγων ἀκροωμένοις. Cf. De cael. III 5.304 a 9–13: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σχῆμα περιάπτουσι τῷ πυρί, καθάπερ οἱ τὴν πυραμίδα ποιοῦντες, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἁπλουστέρως λέγοντες ὅτι τῶν μὲν σχημάτων τμητικώτατον ἡ πυραμίς, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων τὸ πῦρ, οἱ δὲ κομψοτέρως τῷ λόγῳ προσάγοντες ὅτι […]; Met. α 1.993 b 11–14: οὐ μόνον δὲ χάριν ἔχειν δίκαιον τούτοις ὧν ἄν τις κοινώσαιτο ταῖς δόξαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφηναμένοις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι συνεβάλοντό τι· τὴν γὰρ ἕξιν προήσκησαν ἡμῶν. Ammon., In Porph. 115, 13–16: καὶ δύνανται μὲν οἱ εὐφυεστέρως διακείμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἤδη ῥηθέντων τούτοις ἐπιστῆσαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τὸ βιβλίον πρός τινα τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων γράφει (τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν θεωρημάτων πρὸς αὐτὸν γράφειν), αὐτὸς ἐκ τῶν ῥηθέντων ἐκλεξάμενος ταῦτα λέγει.

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But Porphyry would hardly do as an ancient philosopher.41 It is thus even more surprising that a concern which is similar, not to say identical, to Simplicius’ is found in Syrianus: (19) However, since it is the fact that, for whatever reasons, both in other parts of his theological treatise and especially in the last two books, M and N, Aristotle has indulged in a good deal of criticism of the first principles of the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, while never presenting any adequate justification for his position, and in many instances, if one may state the truth quite frankly, not even meeting them on their own ground, but rather basing his objections on hypotheses propounded by himself, it seemed reasonable, out of concern for the more unsophisticated students (φειδοῖ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων ἀκροατῶν), lest, under the influence of the well-deserved reputation of the man, they be seduced into contempt for divine realities and the inspired philosophy of the ancients, to subject his remarks, to the best of our ability, to a judicious and impartial examination, and to demonstrate that the doctrines of Pythagoras and Plato about the first principles remain free of disproof or refutation.42 It is obvious that, in his criticism against Alexander that we saw in text no. 16, Simplicius tacitly adopts the motive that Syrianus gave himself in writing his commentary on Metaphysics M and N. But it is also obvious that he silently transposes Syrianus’ providential motive to Aristotle. While the first act is totally to be expected from someone who operates in the same Platonic tradition as Syrianus, the second act seems to undermine the credibility of Simplicius’ account of Aristotle as well as his own philosophical integrity. If Syrianus cared about unsophisticated readers and did so in order to protect them from being wrongly led by Aristotle against Plato and the Pythagoreans, then Simplicius’ claim that Aristotle criticized Plato and the Pythagoreans in order to protect the same unsophisticated readers is seriously contradicted.

41 42

Plotinus is clearly classified by Simplicius among the νεώτεροι; cf. In Phys. 790, 30–31: Ἐν δὲ τοῖς νεωτέροις Πλωτῖνος φαίνεται πρῶτος τὸν πρῶτον ἐκεῖνον ἐπιζητήσας χρόνον. Syrian., In Met. 80, 16–27: ἐπειδὴ δὲ συμβέβηκε δι’ ἅς τινάς ποτ’ αἰτίας καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσι τῆς θεολογικῆς πραγματείας, διαφερόντως δὲ ἐν τοῖς τελευταίοις δύο βιβλίοις, τῷ Μ καὶ τῷ Ν, πολλήν τινα καταδρομὴν αὐτὸν ποιήσασθαι κατὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ Πλατωνικῶν ἀρχῶν οὐδὲν μὲν ἐχέγγυον οὐδὲ ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτὰς λέγοντα, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ πρὸς αὐτάς, εἰ χρὴ τἀληθὲς ἀπροφασίστως εἰπεῖν, ἀπαντῶντα, ἰδίαις δὲ ὑποθέσεσι τὰς ἀντιλογίας προσάγοντα, εὔλογον ὤφθη φειδοῖ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων ἀκροατῶν, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῇ δόξῃ τῇ δικαίᾳ κατεχόμενοι τἀνδρὸς εἰς καταφρόνησιν ὑπενεχθῶσι τῶν θείων πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐνθέου τῶν πρεσβυτέρων φιλοσοφίας, βασανίσαι τὰ ῥηθέντα κριτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἀδεκάστως εἰς δύναμιν, καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι τάς τε Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν θεωρίας ἀνελέγκτους καὶ ἀπτώτους διαμεμενηκυίας. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4), slightly modified.

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This may seem so to a modern reader but, again, I do not think that it does any justice to Simplicius’ self-understanding as a commentator. For it overlooks two things: Simplicius’ belief in the infallibility of ancient philosophy and Simplicius’ belief in the fallibility of recent exegesis. Let me clarify this by adducing the conclusion reached by Rachel Barney: ‘Simplicius’ project […] is to vindicate the unity of a certain dominant, broadly Platonic philosophical tradition which importantly includes Aristotle, the Presocratics, and to a lesser extent the Stoics, the better to defend that tradition against Christian attack.’43 This is in a way quite right but it has one serious default. It anachronistically labels Platonic what for Simplicius was only ancient. And this would not have been serious, had it just been a question of naming differently the same set of doctrines, broadly Platonic from our point of view, ancient from Simplicius’ point of view. More than that, it is a question about how Simplicius’ unitary approach to the pluralism of ancient Greek philosophy is to be construed. According to Barney, Simplicius wished to defend the unity of a certain tradition on a doctrinal basis, in other words a tradition which was somehow attached to the doctrines of Plato and of which he was himself part, while he disregarded or was merely indifferent to other philosophical traditions, say, the philosophy of the Epicureans. But Simplicius did not consider Plato to be a really dominant figure in the philosophy of the Hellenes. Here is just a sample passage: (20) It is indeed very likely that Plato said that the One and the Indefinite Dyad are the principles of all things. For this is a Pythagorean doctrine and Plato obviously follows the Pythagoreans at many places.44 Moreover, and more importantly, Simplicius constantly refers throughout his concordist work to the παλαιοί, not to any Pythagoreans or Platonists broadly construed. His concern was clearly to defend not the unity of a transhistorical Platonic tradition, which would also include himself, but the unity of an epoch of philosophy, namely the philosophy of the persons whom he himself

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Barney (see note 8) 117. Simp., In Phys. 151, 12–14: καὶ τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα ἀρχὰς πάντων λέγειν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα πάνυ εἰκός· Πυθαγορείων γὰρ ὁ λόγος, καὶ πολλαχοῦ φαίνεται Πυθαγορείοις ὁ Πλάτων ἀκολουθῶν. Cf. also his commitment to a similar account of the origin of Plato’s metaphysics given by the Neopythagorean Moderatus; Simp., In Phys. 230, 34–231, 2: Ταύτην δὲ περὶ τῆς ὕλης τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἐοίκασιν ἐσχηκέναι πρῶτοι μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, μετὰ δ’ ἐκείνους ὁ Πλάτων, ὡς καὶ Μοδέρατος ἱστορεῖ. οὗτος (i.e. ὁ Πλάτων) γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἕν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητόν, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ψυχικόν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν.

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calls ‘the ancients’. Let it suffice to cite a characteristic passage from the socalled Corollarium de loco: (21) Why, then, should we say that so many great men were mistaken in their doctrines about place, putting forward our difficulties as an unfortunate feast for those who are accustomed to abuse at pleasure the apparent contradictions of the ancients? Shall we not rather follow up each of those who wrote about place and show that none of them missed the truth about it, but, since place has many aspects, each one of them has seen and revealed a different aspect of it?45 Thanks to another passage of the commentary on the Physics, in which the Stoics are described as νεώτεροι,46 we can define with sufficient certainty the class of philosophers whom Simplicius considered to be παλαιοί. It included his ‘canon’ of Preplatonic philosophers (that is, the Pythagoreans, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, whom he constantly advocates in his concordist accounts of the παλαιοί), Plato and Aristotle of course, and presumably ancient Platonists and Peripatetics who were personally acquainted with Plato and Aristotle, such as Speusippus and Xenocrates, Theophrastus and Eudemus.47 But how are these considerations linked to our initial question about Simplicius’ relation to Syrianus? Syrianus says in his preface to his commentary that Aristotle failed to compete with the philosophy of his elders, in other words the Pythagoreans and Plato, who have assimilated their accounts on the first principles to the reality itself.48 This is, in principle, the reason for which their philosophy remains irrefutable despite Aristotle’s claims to the contrary. This implies that the relevant part of Aristotle’s philosophy did not belong to the tradition 45

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Simp., In Phys. 640, 12–18 (I have modified the punctuation): Τί οὖν ἄρα τοσούτους καὶ τηλικούτους ἄνδρας διαμαρτεῖν ἐν τῇ περὶ τόπου δόξῃ φήσαιμεν θοίνην οὐκ εὐτυχῆ προτιθέντες τὰς ἡμετέρας ἀπορίας τοῖς εἰωθόσιν ἐντρυφᾶν ταῖς δοκούσαις τῶν παλαιῶν ἐναντιολογίαις, ἢ μᾶλλον ἑκάστῳ τῶν περὶ τόπου τι γραψάντων παρακολουθοῦντες δείξωμεν μηδένα μὲν τῆς περὶ τόπου διαμαρτεῖν ἀληθείας, πολυειδοῦς δὲ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἄλλον κατ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν εἰδῶν τοῦ τόπου θεάσασθαί τε καὶ ἐκφῆναι; Translation by J. O. Urmson, Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1992, modified. See Simp., In Phys. 333, 2–5 and 356, 34; see Golitsis (see note 18) 109. It is with reference to Pericles of Lydia that the Stoics themselves are described as παλαιοί in In Phys. 227, 25. For a defense of Xenocrates by Simplicius, see In Phys. 142, 19–27; on Speusippus and Xenocrates as authentic conveyers of Plato’s doctrine, see In Phys. 151, 8–11. Theophrastus’ old doctrine on place is advocated in the Corollarium de loco; cf. In Phys. 639, 12– 14. For an account which makes Eudemus sympathetic to Parmenides, see below note 49. On how other Preplatonic philosophers, such as Thales, Anaximander and Heraclitus, fit into Simplicius’ concordist account, see In Phys. 36, 8–14. Syrian., In Met. 81, 3–5: τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγους ἐξομοιοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους καθ᾽ ὅσον προσήκει λόγοις εἶναι κατεστήσαντο.

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of the true philosophy and, consequently, had to be refuted for the benefit of those who could be misled by Aristotle’s arguments. But the very ability to refute Aristotle’s antilogies implies in its turn that Syrianus believed to have a better (that is, better than Aristotle’s) or, at least, an adequate understanding of the doctrines of true philosophy. ‘It would be better’, he says in text no. 3, ‘to present the true meaning of the ancient philosophy’, that is, contrary to Aristotle’s presentation (or understanding) of it. In other words, Syrianus felt to be able to defend Plato and the Pythagoreans against Aristotle because he thought it possible for him to be directly linked to their tradition. It is this belief in the possibility of directly accessing the true meaning of Plato’s doctrine which enabled the ‘complementarist’ reading of Aristotle. Direct knowledge of Platonic doctrines could determine which part of Aristotle’s philosophy was to be retained in terms of its compatibility with Plato’s philosophy and which part of it had inversely to be rejected. Naturally enough, the ‘concordist’ Simplicius had a different approach. Simplicius makes a clear distinction between παλαιοί and νεώτεροι among philosophers and this allows us to say that for him there were two epochs in Greek philosophy. There was on the one hand the epoch of the direct knowledge of the truth about reality. But while this truth was directly known to philosophers, the preciseness of their philosophical discourse and method was still subject to evolution: (22) ‘This’, Aristotle says, ‘Parmenides did not yet see’, namely that it is possible for things that are one in hypostasis to have different accounts and for that reason to be many. And it should not surprise us that the standards of [using] accounts had not yet been sorted out, but were later decided upon from the things themselves, and so brought in to contribute to greater accuracy. And Eudemus bears witness to this when he says: ‘One should not wonder at Parmenides’ following untrustworthy accounts and being deceived by things that had not yet been clarified. For neither did anyone refer to ‘ in many ways’ but Plato was the first to introduce ‘ in two ways’, nor did anyone speak of the ‘in itself’ or ‘the accidental’; and Parmenides seems to have been deceived because of these points. But these, as well as the syllogisms, have been distinguished thanks to the practice of arguments and counter arguments; for there was no agreement to be made, unless the necessity for it was obvious. Our predecessors, however, made claims without proof’.49 49

Simp., In Phys. 120, 1–12 (I have modified the punctuation): ‘τοῦτο δέ’, φησί, ‘Παρμενίδης οὔπω ἑώρα’, ὅτι δυνατὸν τὰ τῇ ὑποστάσει ἓν ὄντα λόγους διαφόρους ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο πολλὰ εἶναι. καὶ οὐδὲν μὲν ἦν θαυμαστὸν τοὺς κανόνας τῶν λόγων μήπω τότε διακεκρίσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον φωραθέντας ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ἐξενεχθῆναι πρὸς πλείονα συντελοῦντας ἀκρίβειαν·

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It is indeed Plato who is explicitly called by Simplicius ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐξηγητής,50 an allusion to the perfect capability of his philosophical language to describe reality. But we may surmise that this is a qualification which Simplicius would not be reluctant to apply also to Aristotle, who is said by him to have made in his Physics the compellingness of demonstrations clearer than Plato did,51 a development which also Eudemus seems to have alluded to in the passage above. Such was then the philosophy of the παλαιοί, those ‘who are superior to us and inhabit closer to gods’, as Socrates says in the Philebus.52 They had direct knowledge of the truth but they only gradually brought its formulation into completion. It is with reference to this that we can properly understand Simplicius’ point, when he says in text no. 16 that the ancient philosophers seem to be refuting, while in reality they were just making clear what has been said unclearly. On the other hand, there was the epoch of the νεώτεροι, who could access the truth primarily through the intermediary of the true philosophy of the ancients. They were meant to do philosophy not about directly knowing the truth or formulating it in an original way, but about understanding it by going through the different formulations of the ancients. In virtue of such a historical reconstruction, it is impossible for a νεώτερος, say, Syrianus, to have a better understanding of truth, or of Plato for that matter, than a παλαιός, say, Aristotle: (23) Indeed, it is not really likely that Aristotle was ignorant of either the meaning of Plato’s text or of Plato’s intention.53 Contrary to the knower of truth, who is immune to gradation in as far as he is directly acquainted with it, the person who strives to understand truth can have a better or a worse understanding of it. In spite of the appearances, Aristotle knew the one and same truth that Plato knew. Syrianus, on the other hand, could not have properly understood the true meaning of Aristotle’s apparent criticisms against Plato. We can see what such an account

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ὡς καὶ ὁ Εὔδημος μαρτυρεῖ λέγων ‘Παρμενίδου μὲν οὐκ ἀγασθείη τις ἀναξιοπίστοις ἀκολουθήσαντος λόγοις καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ἀπατηθέντος ἃ οὔπω τότε διεσαφεῖτο. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πολλαχῶς ἔλεγεν οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ Πλάτων πρῶτος τὸ δισσὸν εἰσήγαγεν, οὔτε τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· φαίνεται δὲ ὑπὸ τούτων διαψευσθῆναι. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἀντιλογιῶν ἐθεωρήθη καὶ τὸ συλλογιστικόν· οὐ γὰρ συνεχωρεῖτο, εἰ μὴ φαίνοιτο ἀναγκαῖον. οἱ δὲ πρότερον ἀναποδείκτως ἀπεφαίνοντο.’ Translation by P. Huby – C. C. W. Taylor, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.3–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011, modified. Cf. Simp., In De cael. 131, 1. Cf. Simp., In Phys. 8, 12–13: προφανεστέρας τίθησι τὰς τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἀνάγκας. Phlb. 16 C 7–8: οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες. Simp., In De cael. 518, 20–21: τῷ γὰρ ὄντι οὔτε τὴν τῆς λέξεως σημασίαν εἰκὸς ἦν ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὸν οὔτε τὸν τοῦ Πλάτωνος νοῦν.

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amounts to, if we compare the prayer that closes Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories with Syrianus’ final prayer in his commentary on Metaphysics M-N. Not surprisingly, Simplicius’ prayer is partially copied on Syrianus’ prayer. But it contains one significant addition: (24) These, then, are the criticisms that Aristotle brings in these books against the theories of Pythagoreans and the Platonists, criticisms contained also in what is said in Book A, as indeed the commentator Alexander has pointed out. For this reason, in dealing with the former, we consider that we have not neglected also the latter, nor even the criticisms levelled against these men in his two books On the Forms. For there also, Aristotle runs through almost the same arguments, so that we can take it that these also might be countered by the same means. We therefore will end our discourse by praying to the gods who are the guardians of philosophy. Of the many arguments that have been presented on either side, let there prevail in the readers’ mind those that are more true and more pleasing to the gods.54 (25) But since this is also as far as the divine Iamblichus reached, I too end here my discourse, praying to the guardians of reason both to put in me a more accurate understanding of these matters and to bestow this on me as a resource for contemplating the higher realities, and to grant me relief from the difficulties of life.55 Like Syrianus, and in genuine pagan spirit, Simplicius prays to the gods guardians of philosophy (or reason). But unlike Syrianus, who lets the Gods of philosophy decide the winner of his debate with Aristotle, Simplicius prays to the same Gods to provide him with a more accurate understanding (ἀκριβεστέρα κατανόησις) of ancient philosophy, represented here by Aristotle’s Categories. He thus differentiates himself from his predecessor in that

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Syrian., In Met. 195, 10–19: Ταῦτά ἐστιν ἃ ἐν τούτοις ἀντιλέγει ταῖς τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ Πλατωνικῶν ἀνδρῶν θεωρίαις ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ἃ δὴ περιέχει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ μείζονι τῶν Α ῥηθέντα, ὡς καὶ ὁ ὑπομνηματιστὴς Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπεσημήνατο· διὸ καὶ ἡμεῖς τούτοις ἐπιστήσαντες οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνα παραλελοιπέναι νομίζομεν· οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς Περὶ εἰδῶν δύο βιβλίοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἴρηκε· σχεδὸν γὰρ κἀκεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀνακυκλοῖ, ὥστε εἰκότως διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀπάντησις. ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἐφόροις τῆς φιλοσοφίας θεοῖς εὐξάμενοι τὸν λόγον καταπαύσομεν· πολλῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα λόγων κρατοίη τῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων διανοίας τὰ ἀληθέστερα καὶ θεοφιλέστερα. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4). Simp., In Cat. 438, 33–36: Ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ μέχρι τοῦδε καὶ ὁ θεῖος προῆλθεν Ἰάμβλιχος, καὶ ἐγὼ καταπαύω τὸν λόγον, εὐχόμενος τοῖς τῶν λόγων ἐφόροις τούτων τε ἀκριβεστέραν ἐνδοῦναι κατανόησιν καὶ ταύτην ἐφόδιόν μοι πρὸς τὰς ὑψηλοτέρας θεωρίας χαρίσασθαι καὶ σχολὴν παρασχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ περιελκόντων. Translation by R. Gaskin, Simplicius: On Aristotle’s Categories 9–15 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2000, modified.

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he sees himself not as an accomplished philosopher but as an interpreter, who by the very epoch to which he belonged was a philosopher constantly in the making. For his epoch was not authoritative. Simplicius accepts the authority of the ancient philosophers but he does not accept any authority from commentators. He criticizes at times those who approach inadequately what the ancient philosophers say: (26) Consequently, Aristotle’s objections affect neither the theologians nor Plato, but rather those who understand the doctrines of the ancients in such a way as to suppose that, while the world was generated at a particular time, it was nonetheless indestructible. This is really absurd and is justly refuted by Aristotle. Alexander of Aphrodisias, however, did not understand Plato’s views as Aristotle understood them, nor did he pay attention to the agreement of the two men as to what they mean, but having been from the outset, so it seems, suspicious towards Plato, just as shortly before our time some people have been with Aristotle (ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὑπόπτως διατεθείς, ὥσπερ ὀλίγον πρὸ ἡμῶν τινες πρὸς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους), he does not think it worthwhile to refute this very view, in the way that Aristotle, who does not mention Plato’s name at all apart from a handful of times, did, but drags Plato himself up for refutation. So it is necessary, and at all events only fair to Aristotle and to those who choose to understand and interpret Aristotle’s doctrines by using Alexander’s commentaries, to examine what Alexander says.56 A later reference helps us to possibly identify one of the philosophers who lived ‘shortly before’ Simplicius and were ‘suspiciously disposed’ towards Aristotle: (27) Different Platonists have responded to these objections brought against what is called the coming to be of bodies from planes,

56

Simp., In De cael. 296, 26–297, 9: ὥστε οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς θεολόγους οὔτε πρὸς Πλάτωνα τείνουσιν αἱ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐνστάσεις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς οὕτως ἐκδεχομένους τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν, ὡς γενητὸν μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου τινὸς νομίζειν τὸν κόσμον, ἄφθαρτον δέ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὄντως ἄτοπον καὶ καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους διελεγχόμενον. Ὁ δὲ Ἀφροδισιεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος οὐχ οὕτως τὰ Πλάτωνος νοήσας, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνόησεν, οὐδὲ παρακολουθήσας τῇ περὶ τὰς ἐννοίας αὐτῶν συμφωνίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὑπόπτως διατεθείς, ὥσπερ ὀλίγον πρὸ ἡμῶν τινες πρὸς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους, οὐκ ἀξιοῖ τὴν δόξαν αὐτὴν εὐθύνειν, ὥσπερ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐδὲ μνημονεύων ὅλως τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὀνόματος πλὴν ὀλιγάκις, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸν εἰς τὰς εὐθύνας ἕλκει τὸν Πλάτωνα. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει πάντως ἀρέσκον καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων αὐτοῦ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους νοεῖν τε καὶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι προαιρουμένοις λυσιτελοῦν τὸ τὰ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα ἐπισκέψασθαι. Translation by R. J. Hankinson, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10–12 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006, modified.

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Pantelis Golitsis and Proclus of Lycia, one of the successors of Plato, who lived shortly before me (ὀλίγον πρὸ ἐμοῦ), wrote a book which dissolves the objections made by Aristotle here. Accordingly, I thought it would be good to append Proclus’ resolutions of the objections as briefly as possible. But it is opportune to say again what I am accustomed to repeating. The disagreement between the philosophers is in any way not substantial, but Aristotle frequently raises objections against the appearance of what Plato says, which can be also understood in a worse way, and he seems to be refuting Plato for the benefit of those who understand Plato superficially.57

Although Simplicius does not spell it out (but how could he?), I think it is reasonable to assume that, through the τινές in text no. 26, also Syrianus is alluded to. Simplicius was well acquainted with his predecessor’s critical commentary on Metaphysics M-N, since it must have been Syrianus’ objective, as is established in the prolegomena to his commentary, which suggested to Simplicius the providential function as real essence of Aristotle’s own criticisms. Against this background, Simplicius’ closing prayer in his commentary on the Categories can be read as discreetly correcting Syrianus’ inadequate one.

III. Simplicius and the Absence of Philosophical Curriculum On last analysis, Simplicius’ account of ancient philosophy and recent exegesis puts the master on the same level with the disciple – not as to the amount of understanding of ancient philosophical doctrines that each one of them has but as to the very attitude they both ought to have when they come to grips with the texts of the ancients: They ought to strive to understand better. By the time Simplicius’ Aristotelian commentaries were composed there was no curriculum. As is well known, Simplicius constantly refers to his readers

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Simp., In De cael. 640, 20–31: ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρὸς ταύτας τὰς ἐνστάσεις τὰς τῇ γενέσει τῶν σωμάτων τῇ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιπέδων λεγομένῃ προσενεχθείσας τινὲς μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀντειρήκασι, Πρόκλος δὲ ὁ ἐκ Λυκίας ὀλίγον πρὸ ἐμοῦ γεγονὼς τοῦ Πλάτωνος διάδοχος βιβλίον ἔγραψε τὰς ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐνστάσεις διαλύον, καλῶς ἔχειν ἔδοξέ μοι συντόμως ὡς δυνατὸν ταῖς ἐνστάσεσι τὰς λύσεις ἐκείνας ὑποτάξαι. ὅπερ δὲ πολλάκις εἴωθα, καὶ νῦν εἰπεῖν καιρός, ὅτι οὐ πραγματική τίς ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἡ διαφωνία, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον τοῦ λόγου καὶ δυνάμενον καὶ χειρόνως νοεῖσθαι πολλάκις ὑπαντῶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φειδοῖ τῶν ἐπιπολαίως ἀκουόντων τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτόν. Translation by I. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.7–4.6 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2009, slightly modified.

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and this is confirmed anew by the account given so far. It is, I think, in this deplorable absence of any philosophical school in which Hellenic doctrines could be properly taught that Simplicius’ biggest exegetical anxiety lies. Athens was history and Alexandria was getting obsessed with a νεαρὸς κόραξ, the counter-example of the φιλομαθεῖς, who insisted on the disagreement of ancient philosophers.58 Simplicius alerts his readers to that fact and he can be seen even calling to intellectual resistance, as in text no. 21. Highlighting the mutual contradiction of Hellenic doctrines, Plato’s or Aristotle’s criticisms against their predecessors, or even Syrianus’ or Proclus’ criticisms against Aristotle, was a means for breaking apart the innate unity of ancient Greek philosophy. The Hellenes should be able to dismiss such malicious criticisms and learn how to read the philanthropic criticisms of the ancients. But there was no place where they could be correspondingly trained. Simplicius invites them to learn by themselves or, if possible, in groups: The disciple must also be sufficiently good and virtuous, and above all he must carry out, both by himself and with other φιλομαθεῖς, the in-depth examination of Aristotelian concepts, while he must guard against disputatious twaddle, into which many of those who frequent Aristotle fall.59 To help the Hellenes, Simplicius had no other choice but to offer an illustrious example of how to do such an in-depth examination.

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Cf. e.g. Phlp., De aet. mundi c. Proclum 32, 8–13: οὕτω καὶ ὁ Πρόκλος λαμπρᾷ τῇ φωνῇ τὴν διαφωνίαν τῶν φιλοσόφων ὡμολόγηκεν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀποδέδειχεν· ἐξ ὧν θαυμάσειέ τις τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἀναιδείας τῶν συμφώνους κἀν τούτῳ δεικνύναι πειραθέντων Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ Πλάτωνα. ‘Thus even Proclus himself has explicitly conceded the disagreement between the two philosophers, or rather, demonstrated it from Aristotle’s own . This being so, one might well be amazed at the gross effrontery of those who have tried to show that Aristotle and Plato are in agreement even on this point.’ Translation by Share (see note 14). Simp., In Cat. 7, 33–8, 2: Καὶ τὸν ἀκροατὴν δεῖν καλόν τε εἶναι καὶ σπουδαῖον ἱκανῶς καὶ προὔργου παντὸς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπὶ πολὺ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν νοημάτων ἐξέτασιν καθ᾽ αὑτόν τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν ὁμοίως φιλομαθῶν. φυλάττεσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν ἐριστικὴν φλυαρίαν, εἰς ἣν πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλει συγγινομένων ἀποπίπτουσιν. Translation by M. Chase, Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2003, slightly modified. Compare Ammonius’ rather indifferent treatment of the same topic; In Cat. 6, 21–24: Ἕκτον ζητήσωμεν πῶς δεῖ παρασκευάσασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ἀκροάσασθαι τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων. καὶ λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ πεπαιδευμένον τὰ ἤθη εἶναι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κεκαθαρμένον· ‘μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι οὐχὶ θεμιτόν’, ὁ Πλάτων ἔφησεν. ‘In the sixth place, let us ask how the person who is going to listen to Aristotle’s writings should prepare oneself. We reply that he must be educated in character and pure of soul. “For the impure is not allowed to attain the pure”, as Plato said (cf. Phd. 67 B 11).’ Translation by S. M. Cohen – G. B. Matthews, Ammonius: On Aristotle Categories (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1991, modified.

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Bibliography 1. Primary Sources: Editions and Translations AMMONIuS (= Ammon.) In Cat. Busse, A., Ammonii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarius (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.4), Berlin 1895. Cohen, S. M. – Matthews, G. B., Ammonius: On Aristotle Categories (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1991. In De int. Busse, A., Ammonii in Aristotelis De interpretatione commentarius (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.5), Berlin 1897. In Porph. Busse, A., Ammonii in Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.3), Berlin 1891. ARISTOTELES De cael. Moraux, P., Aristote. Du ciel. Texte établi et traduit (Collection Budé), Paris 1965. Met. Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1924 (repr. Oxford 1970). ASCLEPIuS (= Ascl.) In Met. Hayduck, M., Asclepii in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros Α–Ζ commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VI.2), Berlin 1888. ELIAS In Cat. Busse, A., Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.1), Berlin 1900. PHILOPONuS (= Phlp.) De aet. mundi c. Proclum Rabe, H., Ioannes Philoponus: De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, Leipzig 1899. Share, M., Philoponus: Against Proclus’ On the Eternity of the World 1–5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2005.

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In Anal. post. Wallies, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora commentaria cum Anonymo in librum II (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.3), Berlin 1909. In De an. Hayduck, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XV), Berlin 1897. Van der Eijk, P. J., Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.3–5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006. PLATO Burnet, J., Platonis opera, Oxford 1900–1907 (repr. Oxford 1967–1968). PS.-SIMPLICIuS (= PRISCIANuS) In De an. Hayduck, M., Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XI), Berlin 1882. SIMPLICIuS (= Simp.) In Cat. Kalbfleisch, K., Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VIII), Berlin 1907. Chase, M., Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2003. Gaskin, R., Simplicius: On Aristotle’s Categories 9–15 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2000. In De cael. Heiberg, J. L., Simplicii in Aristotelis De caelo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VII), Berlin 1894. Hankinson, R. J., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10–12 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006. Mueller, I., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.3–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011. Mueller, I., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 2.1–9 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2004. Mueller, I., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.1–7 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2009. Mueller, I., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.7–4.6 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2009. In Phys. Diels, H., Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros octo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IX–X), Berlin 1882–1895.

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Huby, P. – Taylor, C. C. W., Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.3–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011. Urmson, J. O., Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1997. Urmson, J. O., Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1992. SYRIANuS (= Syrian.) In Met. Kroll, W., Syriani in Metaphysica commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VI.1), Berlin 1902. Dillon, J. – O’Meara, D., Syrianus: On Aristotle Metaphysics 13–14 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006. 2. Secondary Literature Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008. Baltussen, H., Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority, Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, 121–136. Barney, R., Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority, Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, 101–120. Gavray, M.-A., Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation, The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 5, 2011, 85–158. Golitsis, P., Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. Tradition et Innovation (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina Bd. 3), Berlin−New York 2008. Hoffmann, P., La fonction des prologues exégétiques dans la pensée pédagogique néoplatonicienne, in: B. Roussel – J.-D. Dubois (edd.), Entrer en matière: Les prologues (Patrimoines. Religions du livre), Paris 1998, 209–245. Karamanolis, G. E., Porphyry: The First Platonist Commentator on Aristotle, in: P. Adamson – H. Baltussen – M. W. F. Stone (edd.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, vol. 1 (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vol. 83,1), London 2004, 97–120. Opsomer, J., The Integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and Divisibility, in: R. Chiaradonna – F. Trabattoni (edd.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. Proceedings of the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop. Il Ciocco, Castelvecchio Pascoli, June 22–24, 2006 (Philosophia antiqua vol. 115), Leiden−Boston 2009, 189–229.

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Struck, P. T., Birth of the Symbol. Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts, Princeton 2004. Todd, R. B., Review of H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, Aestimatio. Critical Reviews in the History of Science 5, 2008, 210–224.

Reconciling Plato’s and Aristotle’s Cosmologies. Attempts at Harmonization in Simplicius Marc-Antoine Gavray

I. An Eternal Problem For every patient reader, the cosmologies described in Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s On the Heavens, respectively, differ in many respects: generation of the world versus its eternity, intelligent design instead of natural order, the position and movement of the earth, the status and composition of matter, the definition of heaviness, the superiority of what is unnatural over what is natural. Aristotle refers to the Timaeus repeatedly, so as to distance himself explicitly from Plato and to distinguish his own description of heaven and the world from Plato’s.1 In this context, when a commentator assumes the premise of a fundamental harmony between two such opposed philosophical systems, how does he deal with and, more importantly, resolve these discrepancies?2 In this paper, I shall address a particular aspect of the disharmony, more precisely how it is interpreted and resolved by Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens: the question about the being and temporality of the κόσμος.3 Plato’s and Aristotle’s positions appear to be contrary on this point, since the former, in the Timaeus, insists on the creation of the world

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De cael. I 10.280 a 28–32; II 13.293 b 30–32; III 1.299 b 31–300 a 3; III 2.300 b 16–25; III 8.306 b 18–19; IV 2.308 b 3–8. On harmony as a methodological principle in Neoplatonism, see G. E. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford Philosophical Monographs), Oxford 2006, 243–330 and I. Hadot, Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Plato and Aristotle (Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition 18), Leiden 2015. Another interesting case study is given by the nature of the simple bodies and the objections raised by Aristotle against the composition of matter according to Plato, Democritus and the Pythagoreans. Simplicius enters into the details of the controversy, taking over some arguments from Proclus. However, the extensiveness of this issue (Simplicius lists, dissects and refutes fifteen objections) prohibits me from giving a full analysis here (Simp., In De cael. 636, 1–672, 23). It will be sufficient to note that his methodological principles are identical to those used elsewhere – in particular, the idea that Aristotle only criticizes a purely superficial reading of Plato’s text.

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by the Demiurge, whereas the latter, in his On the Heavens, asserts the eternity of the heavens.4 Far from being a triviality, this difference will lead Simplicius to develop hermeneutical strategies designed to restore the harmony between his authorities. From our perspective, the question about the eternity of the world offers a fruitful case study, insofar as it forces Simplicius to mobilize all the strategies he usually uses in this commentary to restore the harmony between Plato and Aristotle. Also I shall lead here a parallel investigation on two separate fronts. First, I will identify the methodological principles implemented through the attempt at harmonising, so as to contribute to our understanding of Simplicius’ way of exegesis. Then, I will investigate the conceptual effect, regarding cosmology, reached by this attempt. In other words, I will explore how Simplicius’ interpretative tools lead him to produce some new philosophical theses.

II. Proclus on Generation Simplicius’ position about the eternity of the world is part of a long and controversial history, opposing several points of view.5 Therefore, to gauge its originality, it could be useful to examine first a former attempt at conciliation, drawn from Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. If Proclus believes that Aristotle globally imitates Plato in natural philosophy, he notes that, from similar premises, the first shows heaven to be ungenerated (ἀγένητος), the second to be generated (γενητός).6 However, far from being satisfied with the disagreement, he questions its reality by considering both positions and by identifying two reasons why the Timaeus mentions the gen-

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Tim. 28 A-29 C; De cael. I 3.269 b 13–270 b 4. As noted by F. Ferrari, Esegesi, commento e sistema nel medioplatonismo, in: A. NeschkeHentschke (ed.), Argumenta in Dialogos Platonis. Teil 1: Platoninterpretation und ihre Hermeneutik von der Antike bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts. Akten des internationalen Symposions vom 27.−29. April 2006 im Instituto Svizzero di Roma (Bibliotheca Helvetica Romana 31), Basel 2010, 52, the problem and its first solution seem to originate in Xenocrates. Cf. H. Dörrie – M. Baltes, Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Platonische Physik (im antiken Verständnis) II. Bausteine 125–150: Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar (Der Platonismus in der Antike Bd. 5), Stuttgart−Bad Cannstatt 1998, 138–145 and 426–535. Procl., In Tim. I 237, 18–238, 5 (on Tim. 28 A-C). Proclus finds in Plotinus II 1 (40) 2 the five following statements: “(1) Simple movement is the movement of a simple body. (2) A simple body has a determinate natural simple movement. (3) There are two simple movements. (4) A contrary has only one contrary. (5) What has no contrary cannot be destroyed by anything.”

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eration of the world: the need for an external cause and the bond with time. Therefore, in what sense should generation be understood? According to Proclus, the Timaeus considers the way the world could have a beginning though lasting forever, rather than its inclusion in being or becoming (Procl., In Tim. 276, 19–30; see Tim. 28 B 7). When questioning the generation of the heavens, it is less important to understand its mode of being than its origin. In view of its composite and perceptible nature, the world cannot possess either an essence or an activity remaining in unity, because composition involves both generation, i.e. the coming to be of a compound from a simple reality; and the action of an external cause, that produces the compound.7 The question of coming to be and of the origin has obviously nothing to do with a temporal beginning. It rather examines the principle of the coming to be and the cause of becoming. In this sense, it fits with the second reason for Proclus to say that a reality is generated:8 The world would be a generated reality because it has a determinate origin (rather than every form of coming to be). However, as the world constitutes the most perfect corporeal being, its external origin must produce the completion he always holds in itself. Also that can be the only external principle par excellence that Proclus identifies with the final cause, the only principle able to confer existence to the world (Procl., In Tim. I 285, 30–286, 3). Therefore, the world has an ἀρχή in the first meaning, that of the final cause: the Good. As for the temporality of this genesis, Proclus holds that the world is generated in the totality of time, for, as Plato says (Tim. 38 B), the genesis of the infinite time is contemporary and coextensive with the generation of the world. The latter cannot have been generated at any moment of time, since there was no moment, in the strict sense, before its coming to be. Thus this particular becoming cannot have come into being in any part of time, only in the whole and infinite time (Procl., In Tim. I 281, 14–20). In other words, if the world has its being in time, its limits coincide with the limits of time, not being included or limited by time. For this reason, the world has an ἀρχή in a second sense: It has a beginning that results from its being in becoming, which is not a temporal beginning, because it extends over the entire length of time. By themselves, neither of these conditions is sufficient to argue that the world is γενητός (I 290, 17–25). On the one hand, causality concerns realities

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Procl., In Tim. I 276, 19–30. On this point, Proclus explicitly agrees with Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus (Procl., In Tim. I 277, 8–13). The history of these interpretations has been studied by A. Lernould, Physique et Théologie. Lecture du Timée de Platon par Proclus (Problématiques philosophiques. Philosophie ancienne), Villeneuve-d’Ascq 2001, 219–246. Procl., In Tim. I 279, 30–280, 20. The four meanings are: (1) What has a beginning in time; (2) what comes from a cause; (3) what is a compound; (4) what has the nature of the generated being.

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that radically exclude becoming as well: If the eternal Being has a cause too, the One, it would be absurd to consider it as being generated or as becoming. On the other hand, the co-extensiveness of the world and time does not imply generation yet. Therefore, Proclus adds a reason arising from these two conditions: The world has become or is generated, as it both always comes into being (ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον) and is already achieved (γεγενημένον). Since its generation extends over the entire length of infinite time, it is in a state of indefinite completion, meaning that its perpetual beginning also includes its completion. Therefore, it always becomes identical to itself, but never is. Paraphrasing Aristotle, Proclus holds that the world, unlike the bodies down on earth, is indefinitely being completed:9 It becomes and has come into being, absolutely, to the extent that its being both comes from an external cause and is inseparable from time. What can we conclude vis-à-vis Aristotle? Considering this mode of γενητός, the world must be said to be both perishable and imperishable, but in different respects (I 293, 14–20). On the one hand, it seems to be imperishable in the temporal sense, since it will never disappear within the limits of time, as, according to Plato, it coincides with time, and as, according to Aristotle, it is indefinitely being completed. On the other hand, it seems to be perishable, since every γενητός involves corruption: As a corporeal being, it is unable to preserve itself. Thence the persistence and continuity of its being require an external moving cause, which ensures its infinite capacity to last, whether it be the Father of the Timaeus or the first and unmoved cause of Aristotle.10 Therefore, Plato and Aristotle can agree that the world is both generated and ungenerated, but in different respects. If the opposition between Plato and Aristotle results only from the λέξις, rather than from the θεωρία, from a difference of words rather than of meaning, is there any nuance remaining? Proclus mentions three, without any attempt to solve them. Firstly, “Plato says that the being of heaven is coextensive with the whole time, while Aristotle simply poses this essence as ‘always being’.”11 Plato holds that there is an essential union between heaven and time, while Aris-

9

10 11

Procl., In Tim. I 282, 13–22. Cf. Meteor. I 2.339 a 26: ἀεὶ ἐν τέλει. Proclus then holds seven objections (286, 20–289, 5) against those who, from an Aristotelian inspiration, think that Plato denies the everlastingness of the world (according to A.-J. Festugière, Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée (Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques), 5 tomes, Paris 1966–1968, he is talking about Plutarch and Atticus; see II, 134, n. 1). Procl., In Tim. I 294, 8–28. Proclus seems to refer to Met. Λ 7.1072 a 21–25. Procl., In Tim. I 294, 29–295, 1: Πλάτων [Tim. 38 B] μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ συμπαρατείνεσθαί φησιν, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀεὶ οὖσαν ἁπλῶς ὑποτίθεται. Proclus refers to De cael. I 9.279 a 25–30.

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totle assigns temporal eternity to heaven, without relating (in return) heaven with time. Consequently, the opposition is between coming to be in the infinite time and being always subsistent, which reveals Aristotle’s inconsistency. Since, because of its corporeality, the world has a finite existence, whereas eternity is infinite, the world cannot be but must continuously become from an infinite power. Therefore, Aristotle is compelled to admit that the world is becoming, in the sense that it becomes infinite concomitantly with time. If Proclus restores the truth of Plato’s thesis, he does it at the expense of Aristotle, by imposing on him a logical constraint. Secondly, if they agree on the numerical unity of the world, Aristotle finds it in being, Plato in becoming (I 295, 13–18). Indeed, Plato assigns an active cause (ποιητικὴ αἰτία) to the world, which is logically prior, without depriving it of its everlastingness, because time is always necessarily bound with heaven. The latter can thus be in time, that is to say, becoming the same over the infinite length of time, because it has a being bound to time. In contrast, Aristotle must say that the world is the same, in the present time that characterizes being. However, considering his definition of time as a number of the movement, time necessarily comes with change and it cannot be associated with numerical identity. Therefore, Proclus argues that Aristotle’s thesis on time prevents him from admitting both that the world has an active cause (i.e. is generated) and that it is numerically identical, as being in time implies changing. Thirdly, Proclus argues that Aristotle systematically devaluates the attributes assigned to the first principles vis-à-vis Plato: what Plato gives to the One, Aristotle attributes to the Intellect; what Plato gives to the demiurgic Intellect, Aristotle attributes to heaven and the heavenly gods; and what Plato gives to the essence of heaven, Aristotle attributes to circular motion. Proclus believes that Aristotle forsakes theological principles and focuses, more than one should, on physical demonstrations. Therefore, unlike Plato, he loses the mode of generation proper to everlastingness, which avoids linking ungenerated and imperishable, generated and perishable (I 295, 19–296, 12). In this regard, Aristotle missed in what sense the generation of the universe is specific, and how it is intimately bound with time. Proclus’ analysis basically relies on a principle of causality, which provides the framework already at work for determining the σκοπός: Basically, the opposition between Plato and Aristotle can be led back to a different use of causality. In the Timaeus, Plato clearly studies the science of nature as a whole. He wants to reach causes, particularly the divine and separate causes of the world.12 Thence he uses all types of cause and, trying to identify the principles 12

Procl., In Tim. I 1, 4–20; 2, 2–8 and 2, 30–4, 5. See I 217, 18–27. On the Timaeus’ σκοπός as Proclus understood it, Lernould (see note 7) 27–38. See C. Steel, Why Should We Prefer

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of nature, distinguishes what is final from what is accessory. Aristotle, for his part, “extended his teaching beyond the due measure”, insisting on many details far removed from the principles and the first causes. Moreover, through his explanations, he preferred material causes to formal ones (I 7, 8–16). If for Plato the world has an active cause by which it comes to be, its ἀρχή (its beginning and principle), i.e. the cause of its generation which also provides its perfection and completion, is a final cause: the Good. For Aristotle, in contrast, the world seems to have only a moving cause. It is imperishable because it depends on a producing cause – an unmoved moving action. The opposition between Plato and Aristotle basically results from a different use of finality and efficiency. For the former, the world must both be born and tend to a sovereign principle, the Good. For the latter, the world is always affected by an eternal movement, which is unstoppable. In a word, Proclus does not propose a genuine attempt at reconciling Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s On the Heavens. If, in reading the Timaeus, he happens to use Aristotelian elements, he rather insists on the difference between their levels of discourse: Plato studies nature from a theological perspective, whereas Aristotle adopts a physical point of view.13 And this seems to have led him sometimes down wrong paths. Therefore, the harmony between these authors cannot exceed the obvious meaning of their texts and the list of the discrepancies they reveal.

III. The σκοπός of the Timaeus according to Simplicius Simplicius is far from casting Proclus’ reading completely aside. Nevertheless, regarding their understandings of Plato’s and Aristotle’s cosmologies, their first and main difference concerns the σκοπός they assign to the De caelo and to the Timaeus, respectively. But assigning a different purpose to the book on which they comment necessarily affects the perspective they adopt vis-àvis the book on which they do not directly comment. Indeed, reading Simplicius, the opposition arises immediately (Simp., In De cael. 3, 16–27):

13

Plato’s Timaeus to Aristotle’s Physics? Proclus’ Critique of Aristotle’s Causal Explanation of the Physical World, in: R. W. Sharples – A. Sheppard (edd.), Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vol. 78), London 2003, 175 and 180–183, about the different conceptions of causality. Proclus reminds that, unlike Aristotle, Plato did not mention that the world was perishable, because of its religious scruples and of its respect toward the world (Procl., In Tim. I 293, 6–9).

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[Aristotle] clearly does not explain the world in this treatise as Plato did in the Timaeus, where he treated both of the principles of natural objects, matter and form, motion and time, and of the general composition of the world, and gave a particular account both of the heavenly bodies and of those below the moon, in the latter case occupying himself both with atmospheric phenomena and with the minerals, plants, and animals on the earth up to and including the composition of man and of his parts. Here, however, very little is said about the world as a whole, and only such things as it has in common with the heaven, i.e. that it is eternal, limited in size, and single, and that it has these features because the heaven is eternal, limited and single. But if anyone wishes to inspect Aristotle’s theory of the world, it must be said that he presents his account of the world in all of his physical treatises taken together.14 Ἔπειτα ὅτι οὐ φαίνεται περὶ τοῦ κόσμου διδάσκων ἐν τούτοις, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τάς τε ἀρχὰς τῶν φυσικῶν, ὕλην τε καὶ εἶδος καὶ κίνησιν καὶ χρόνον, καὶ τὴν κοινὴν σύστασιν τοῦ κόσμου παραδέδωκε καὶ ἰδίᾳ περί τε τῶν οὐρανίων καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ σελήνην ἐδίδαξε καὶ τούτων τά τε μετέωρα πολυπραγμονεῖ καὶ τὰ ἐν γῇ μέταλλα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἀνθρώπου συστάσεως καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ· ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς εἴρηται καὶ ταῦτα, ὅσα κοινὰ πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἦν αὐτῷ, ὅτι ἀίδιος καὶ πεπερασμένος τῷ μεγέθει καὶ εἷς, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχων, ὅτι ἀίδιος οὗτος καὶ πεπερασμένος καὶ εἷς. ἀλλ’ εἰ βούλοιτό τις τὴν περὶ κόσμου θεωρίαν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὁρᾶν, ἐν πάσαις αὐτὸν ἅμα ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἑαυτοῦ πραγματείαις τὸν περὶ κόσμου λόγον ἀποδεδωκέναι ῥητέον. Like Proclus, Simplicius emphasises the contrast between the comprehensive perspective of the Timaeus, which deals with the world as a whole, and the restricted perspective of the De caelo, which is limited to an understanding of the heavens and the elements within.15 But, since he admits the existence of a progressive program, he can justify Aristotle’s decision to limit his treatise to a single topic and to divide his physical doctrine into several works by arguing that Aristotle intended to produce knowledge in an increasing order of difficulty, instead of delivering the most sophisticated doctrine in

14 15

Tr. R. J. Hankinson, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2002. Simp., In De cael. 5, 35–6, 7 and 551, 2–4. As noted by G. Guldentops, Plato’s Timaeus in Simplicius’ In De caelo. A Confrontation with Alexander, in: T. Leinkauf – C. Steel (edd.), Platons Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance. Plato’s Timaeus and the Foundations of Cosmology in Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 34,1), Leuven 2005, 199, Simplicius does not determine precisely the σκοπός of the Timaeus, but mainly its general scope.

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the most sophisticated fashion at once – as Plato did because he wrote for seasoned philosophers.16 With this perspective, Simplicius immediately positions De caelo at a lower level of teaching than the Timaeus, insofar as it would be designed for a less informed audience, rather than reproaching it, as Proclus did, to expand on some points beyond due measure. Instead of charging Aristotle for abounding into undue details, he appeals for benevolence and pedagogical caution. This leads to a more charitable hermeneutic toward Aristotle’s text. This also explains why the emphasis on causality disappears from the analysis of the De caelo: Because he limits the issue to a part of the world, Aristotle does not need to raise the question to the perspective of the higher causes and principles, from which the whole could be deduced and described. He rather produces an analysis of a single level – the highest – and of its properties and components. In this sense, De caelo appears as a propaedeutic to reading the Timaeus, because the former describes on an analytical mode what the latter brings together in a synthetic form. In other words, if causality seems necessary to understand how the universe as a whole can be produced (as in the Timaeus), it becomes secondary when we are to describe the individual beings themselves, rather than their gradual appearance. Such distinct perspectives explain why the forms of harmonization differ according to Proclus or Simplicius. Depending on the point of view, the συμφωνία receives diverse accentuations and appears to be more or less harmonious.

IV. Eternity or Generation In the beginning of his commentary on the De caelo (I 2–3), Simplicius engages in a controversy with Philoponus, namely about whether the world is eternal or generated. While his opponent pretends to agree with Plato against Aristotle, Simplicius keeps affirming the concord between these authorities.17 Ac16

17

Contra Steel (see note 12) 175–176, who asserts that, wanting to explain the world, late commentators preferred the physical argumentation of Aristotle instead of the metaphorical language of Plato. Regarding Simplicius, this preference only applies to the educational context of his Commentary, since he keeps repeating that Plato expressed the truth more accurately than Aristotle, whom he must use in order to help his reader, newborn in philosophy, to understand natural philosophy. In other words, the Timaeus does not constitute in his view “a primitive antecedent of Aristotle’s more developed and articulated views on nature”, but it is the most complete expression of natural philosophy. Simp., In De cael. 80, 24–81, 3; 84, 11–15; 85, 31–86, 28; 91, 7–20. Philoponus had written a Contra Aristotelem, mainly known through the testimony of Simplicius. P. Hoffmann, Sur quelques aspects de la polémique de Simplicius contre Jean Philopon: de l’invec-

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cording to him, when Aristotle emphasises the eternity of heaven and its transcendence from the sublunary bodies, he adopts a position contrary to Plato only in appearance, designed to avoid the “gigantic rebellion of impious persons” (Simp., In De cael. 86, 3–4) – such as that conducted by Philoponus. To dispel the apparent opposition and to reveal the fundamental agreement between Aristotle and Plato, Simplicius uses three kinds of arguments: argument from truth or metaphysical argument, argument by educational progress or literal argument, argument by interpretative method or exegetical argument. In Simplicius’ mind, each argument is sufficient to prove the agreement. However, their juxtaposition, intertwinement, and repeated use help to reinforce the harmony. Therefore, how do they contribute, respectively, to the general thesis?

V. Exposing the Procession In order to resolve Philoponus’ misunderstanding, Simplicius interrupts his commentary of I 3.270 a 12–22, where Aristotle holds that heaven is ungenerated and indestructible, and he begins to digress so as to restore harmony with Plato. This digression is unique in the In De cael. If, like other digressions, even long ones devoted to refuting Philoponus’ objections,18 this one appears in a controversial context, it is unusual because it pursues the positive purpose of exposing the Neoplatonic doctrine, i.e. of becoming perfectly clear by stating the truth itself (instead of opposing to Philoponus’ arguments). Indeed, to solve the alleged contradiction between Plato and Aristotle, Simplicius needs to explain what the terms they use respectively mean within the framework of the general theory, so as to determine which ones Aristotle denies here to heaven, and to understand the real difference (if any) between Aristotle’s and Plato’s positions: Accordingly we should now recall what he said there [Ph. I 7] and, after having first distinguished the meanings of ‘comes to be’, we should clari-

18

tive à la réaffirmation de la transcendance du Ciel, in: I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Actes du colloque international de Paris (28 Sept.–1 Oct. 1985) (Peripatoi. Philologisch-historische Studien zum Aristotelismus Bd. 15), Berlin−New York 1987, 183– 221 has perfectly analysed the rhetorical aspects of the controversy, but also an issue of disagreement, the composition of heaven. Cf. H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008, 176–188. Other examples can be found in Simp., In De cael. 21, 32–38, 5 (on Xenarchus, then on Philoponus); 42, 17–49, 25; 55, 25–59, 23 (on Xenarchus, then on Philoponus); 66, 4–91, 20.

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However, Simplicius will not propose a semantic division and list the possible meanings of the term (as Proclus did). He chooses to begin with the doctrine of principles so as to reveal, by exposing the mechanism of procession, how one should understand the generation of heaven from what precedes. The first meaning of γενητόν stated by Simplicius is the general meaning (κοινῶς), namely what receives its existence from some cause, since every production (or generation) comes from a producer (or generator).20 The commonality of the meaning here does not result from its general frequency in ordinary language, as it was apparently the case in Proclus, but rather from its generality, that is to say from its occurrence in more numerous realities. According to this, only a single entity can be said ungenerated, i.e. the first cause of everything, what is “both one and absolutely simple”. Simplicius invokes the authority of the Phaedrus on this point: A first principle cannot come to be (245 D 1–3). The remainder, however, proceeds from it and participates in its unity (In De cael. 92, 34–93, 5). Following this meaning, being generated appears to be synonymous with being a plural reality, whereas the One itself does not even participate in plurality, but generates it. Then comes a digression, taken from divine men (In De cael. 93, 11–15), which lays out the procession from the One to heaven. This detour through the theological truth is obviously required in an introductory commentary about cosmological truths. It focuses on two features of procession: causality and temporality. On the one hand, each level is defined according to its proper cause and to what it itself causes, so as to reveal the gradual advent of plurality and partition. On the other hand, each step matches with a form of plurality: the whole and simultaneous One, the always eternal being, the always temporal self-mover.

19 20

Tr. I. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.3–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011. Simp., In De cael. 92, 33–34: τὸ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὑπόστασιν ἀπό τινος αἰτίου δεχόμενον. Cf. Cael. I 11. As noted in n. 8, that is the second meaning listed by Proclus.

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Cause of

Temporality

Plurality Existence Extension

Simultaneity Eternity Temporality

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In describing the whole process, Simplicius emphasises the continuity of its causal successions. Each step occurs προσεχῶς (Simp., In De cael. 93, 9; 94, 1–2), and then εὐθύς (94, 12; 29; 95, 10). In other words, the entire procession is associated with immediacy. Thus, referring the generation of heaven to the mechanism of procession highlights its fundamentally non-diachronic dimension. Nonetheless, the use of two distinct adverbs already reflects a difference in the mode of being and temporality. The former, προσεχῶς, denotes immediacy in eternity, the continuity which characterises the way out of Being and of what immediately follows. The latter, εὐθύς, rather qualifies the immediacy in levels where temporality and extension occur. Indeed, the immediacy of procession does not prevent realities from being eternal, while others belong to time. Temporality cannot, however, apply to the process itself. Otherwise it would affect some realities, which by nature are not subject to time. In this respect, the generation of the self-mover and of the heaven is necessarily outside time. The first procession reveals a first form of generation. It comes from the One and processes forth in the unified plurality – the first being, which remains in the One. It can be said to be generated in the narrow sense that it proceeds from the One. However, even if it is derived from a principle, it is itself a principle. Also, as the first principle of beings, it must be said to be non-generated. Generation and temporality will only appear at the level of the self-mover. This latter constitutes the first body and the first plurality outside unity, composed rather than unified, because time and place reveal internal differences within it. But rather, as time flows, it is different at different times, so that it also does not receive its generation from its cause as a whole simultaneously (since if it did it too would be Being), but it receives its generation piece by piece in the way that it can.21 Ἀλλ’ ἄλλοτε ἄλλο τοῦ χρόνου ῥέοντος· ὥστε οὐδὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου γένεσιν ἅμα ὅλην ὑποδέχεται· ἦν γὰρ ἂν ὂν καὶ τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος ὡς δυνατόν (Simp., In De cael. 94, 20–22).

21

Tr. Mueller (see note 19).

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So as a result and because it is composite and is not what it is as a simultaneous whole but has its being in coming to be, what has parts is what comes to be in the strict sense as distinguished from what is in the strict sense, namely what gets its being from itself and is simultaneously as a whole what it is.22 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὖν καὶ ὅτι σύνθετον καὶ ὅτι μὴ ὅλον ἅμα ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, τοῦτο κυρίως ἤδη γενητόν ἐστιν ὡς πρὸς τὸ κυρίως ὂν ἀντιδιῃρημένον, ὃ καὶ τὸ εἶναι παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει καὶ ἅμα ὅλον ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἐστί (Simp., In De cael. 95, 6–9). With the appearance of the body comes a second meaning of generation: to receive one’s reality in becoming and temporality. Far from remaining the same in being and identity, the body undergoes a permanent change toward its previous state. This alteration is accompanied by a temporality that rules and measures its steps, in the same way as place orders the parts of its extendedness and subsistence. Therefore, it is generated in the strict sense (τὸ κυρίως γενητόν; Simp., In De cael. 95, 17), to the extent that it does not only result from a producing cause, as Being does at the immediate higher level, but that its cause also matches spatiotemporal becoming, since the essential property of what is generated corresponds to the need of gradually actualising its power. Heaven occupies this level, because it is the first corporeal thing after Being (95, 24–26). In this regard, it is the most beautiful image in relation to the best paradigm (the intelligible order). By virtue of its infinite progress, it imitates the infinite power of what precedes, which is contained in unity, and it receives its completeness and simultaneity only so far as it is able, that is, in succession and partition. Its mode is not that of the always of eternity (τὸ αἰώνιον ἀεί), but that of the always of time (τὸ χρονικὸν ἀεί; 95, 21): an always that is partitioned and measured. It remains to understand the nature of its movement. Due to its similarity to the identity of Being, it undergoes an unchanging change (ἀμεταβλήτως), a change within similarity that is close to a stay in identity, and an unmoved movement (ἀκινήτως), a local movement that does not go out of its place – a circular motion, closer to rest than to movement because its parts alone are moving, while the body itself remains in the same place. However, it transcends the movement from not being to being, and from being to not being – otherwise its unmoved cause should have moved in a certain way to actualise it at some time (95, 24–96, 12). In other words, it is not subject to what is usually called (καλεῖν ἔθος) generation and destruction, that is to say

22

Tr. Mueller (see note 19).

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generation in a third meaning. Finally, it is also not generated in a last meaning, assuming that it would observe growth and diminution, although it undergoes some alteration (96, 12–20).23 Indeed, all these changes, whether they be substantial or qualitative, only appear in its own products (moved realities that are not self-movers). After these statements, Simplicius finally outlines why and how change occurs within the sublunary world (96, 25–102, 31). Firstly, he intends to strengthen his own ideas and those of his readers:24 He wants to be exhaustive because of his didactic purpose, so as to prove that heaven does not undergo generation as sublunary bodies do. Secondly, he demonstrates the absurdity of a generation or a destruction that would not go from one contrary to the other, i.e. a generation that does proceed from what does not exist in any way and a destruction that does end in what does not exist in any way. In doing so, he denies the notion of generation similar to what Christians invoke, such as Philoponus – a creation ex nihilo or a destruction ad nihilum. With these various meanings of γενητόν he draws from the truth itself, Simplicius asks which one Aristotle denies to heaven that Plato, however, assigns to the κόσμος and heaven. He reminds the reader that Aristotle always follows what is evident to everybody (τὰ πᾶσι πρόδηλα; 103, 18–21), that is, what is most common to us and speaks to everyone. “Now it is clear that Aristotle calls only one thing coming to be: the change in time from not being into being, a change which is always followed by perishing.”25 Unsurprisingly, he talks about the latter kind of generation, i.e. the temporally located change, which occurs in what participates in every form of generation and necessarily undergoes corruption. However, since this kind of generation only appears in the sublunary world, it cannot apply to heaven itself. Plato, who also knows this kind of generation, adopts the perspective of what is most common by itself, to the extent that it applies to the largest number of realities. In this sense, heaven undergoes generation, because it has self-substantiating being as its cause and principle.26 Consequently, the

23 24 25

26

Simplicius here reviews the meanings of generation analysed by Aristotle in De cael. I 3. Simp., In De cael. 102, 15–16. Simp., In De cael. 103, 5–6 (tr. Mueller [see note 19]): ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀριστοτέλης ὅτι γένεσιν ταύτην μόνην καλεῖ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ εἶναι κατὰ χρόνον μεταβολήν, ἣν πάντως φθορὰ διαδέχεται, δῆλον μέν. Simp., In De cael. 103, 28–104, 2 (tr. Mueller [see note 19]): “However, Plato also knows the other kind of coming to be in which what has moved down into corporeal extension and is not further able to give itself existence but is only given existence by some other cause is said to come to be as distinguished from that which genuinely is and which is its immediate cause. For it is necessary that what comes to be and gets its existence from

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disagreement is due neither to ignorance, nor to different perspectives on the truth. The nuance between Plato and Aristotle results only from the focus they respectively place on one aspect of the problem, i.e. from the view they adopt towards the heaven and κόσμος in order to analyse their being.

VI. Criticism as a Confirmation On several occasions, Simplicius argues that Aristotle does not contradict the ideas of Plato themselves, but only a superficial reading of the Timaeus.27 His objections are limited to countering an apparent meaning of the text: As a careful teacher, he pays attention to readers who have only a superficial understanding of his philosophy, because they are not yet able to rise to a higher level of meaning and, therefore, miss the truth of some old (τοῖς ἐπιπολαιότερον τῶν παλαῖων λόγων ἀκροωμένοις) and figurative arguments (μυθικῶς; Simp., In De cael. 296, 8–9). Thence, he outlines and refutes an interpretation of Plato’s text based on the ordinary usage of words, with which his readers are familiar, rather than an interpretation based on technical or archaic usages. For example, when he denies the geometrical composition of elements in the Timaeus, because it is limited to purely mathematical structures and thereby unable to compose three-dimensional bodies, i.e. physical bodies, his objection targets the literal reading, which reduces the triangle to its geometrical nature (i.e. flat and two-dimensional).28 Thus he refutes a reading based only on the ordinary meaning of what is a triangle, while leaving intact the truth of Plato’s thesis about triangles with physical properties. Subtleties of this kind can confuse even a commentator as aware as Alexander of Aphrodisias. Despite the overall quality of his exegesis, he sometimes fails to understand that Aristotle targets only some superficial imports of Plato’s text. So he comes to criticise Plato’s very ideas instead of their first and apparent meaning (377, 20–34).29 However, according to Simplicius, to remove verbal discrepancies involves leading a careful exegesis of Plato’s text as well, insofar as, far from refuting Plato himself, Aristotle’s criticism would

27 28 29

elsewhere get its existence from Being, which is self-substantiating; otherwise one proceeds to infinity, always positing one thing which comes to be prior to another.” Simp., In De cael. 296, 6–12; 301, 8–12; 352, 27–29; 377, 20–27; 518, 21–30; 563, 26– 564, 3; 640, 27–32; 712, 31–731, 7. Simp., In De cael. 563, 26–564, 3; 640, 27–641, 5. Alexander is indeed another case of superficial reader. Because his understanding of Plato’s text is inferior, he happens to believe that Aristotle refutes Plato, when they are in a state of perfect agreement (In De cael. 297, 1–7).

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only target a possible misreading of him. In other words, to understand Plato’s text properly, one must rise to a higher level of meaning, where Plato and Aristotle are basically in agreement. Regarding the question about the generation of the world, in what sense does Aristotle only seem to refute Plato? What is the superficial meaning that Aristotle targets? In the Timaeus (41 A-D), “the Demiurge apparently seems to say, that the world [his product], although dissoluble, mortal and destructible in its own nature, will not be destroyed.”30 In addition, Aristotle objects by emphasizing that it is obviously impossible for something that is, in its own nature, destructible, to never be destroyed. In this case, it would always be both destructible and indestructible, which is impossible.31 In Simplicius’ opinion, the objection implies to make three points clear, which form the three dimensions of the issue raised by Aristotle: the nature, origin, and temporality of the κόσμος. 1) What is the nature of the κόσμος and in what sense does it involve perishing? 2) Where does the κόσμος come from and how does its origin influence its permanence? 3) What temporality belongs to this kind of being? Simplicius’ answer goes through a close exegesis of this passage of the Timaeus. The text, fully quoted by Simplicius, has a special status, since it not only contains Plato’s words, but also the very divine truth expressed by the Demiurge himself. Hence the need to quote it in extenso, since Plato acts as a prophet for the highest authority.32 These are the first words of the speech: Gods, of gods whereof I am the creator and of works the father, those which are my own handiwork are indissoluble save with my will. Now everything which is bound is dissoluble, but to will to dissolve what is well harmonised and in good condition is the work of someone bad. Therefore, also, since you have been generated you are not completely immortal or indissoluble, but you will not be dissolved or meet a fate of death since with my will you have attained a greater and more authoritative bond than those with which you were bound together when you were born.33 Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε ἐθέλοντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν, τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ· διὸ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδὲ ἄλυτοι

30 31 32 33

Simp., In De cael. 351, 18–20: κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι λυτὸς καὶ θνητὸς ὢν ὁ κόσμος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει καὶ φθαρτὸς ὅμως οὐ φθείρεται. De cael. I 12.283 a 24–29. Simp., In De cael. 351, 20–352, 2. Simp., In De cael. 105, 32–106, 6. The quotation goes through 106, 6–25. Tr. Mueller (see note 19).

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Marc-Antoine Gavray τὸ πάμπαν, οὐ μὴν λυθήσεσθέ γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου τυχόντες ἐκείνων, οἷς, ὅτε ἐγίνεσθε, ξυνεδεῖσθε.34

This text demonstrates the agreement with Aristotle on each point previously listed: 1) According to Simplicius, Aristotle agrees with Plato in holding that a body, limited by nature, has a limited power as well.35 However, Plato argues that the κόσμος is an extended body, i.e. visible and tangible. It is rather limited, divided into parts and, therefore, unable to achieve perfect harmony with itself. Also, it can be neither self-substantiating nor indefinitely remain in existence (Simp., In De cael. 140, 12–16). As a compound, the κόσμος can neither coincide with itself nor, thereby, resist alteration. Also, because it belongs to the nature of what is γενητόν, Plato calls it bound and not completely immortal: The cause of its remaining in existence comes from the outside, for it cannot, by itself, remain eternally.36 However, Simplicius says, it would be absurd to think that Aristotle could have missed the scope of Plato’s argument (Simp., In De cael. 140, 9–12): Now then, is Aristotle unaware that Plato did not say that the κόσμος came to be in some part of time, when Plato says that time has come to be with heaven and clearly adds the reason why he says that the κόσμος has come to be, the reason being not that so and so many years ago it came into existence, but that it is visible and tangible and has a body?37 Ἆρα οὖν ἠγνόησεν Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅτι γενητὸν τὸν κόσμον οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους χρόνου τινὸς ὁ Πλάτων εἶπεν, ὅς γε μετ’ οὐρανοῦ γεγονέναι τὸν χρόνον φησὶ καὶ σαφῶς τὴν αἰτίαν προσέθηκε, δι’ ἣν γεγονέναι φησὶν αὐτόν; Plato says the κόσμος was generated, not because of its temporality,38 but because of its corporeality – a point that Aristotle would never challenge. Therefore, heaven seems to be destructible in its own nature, but without coming to be at a certain moment of time. 2) The world must receive its unity and the cause of its generation from the outside. In the Timaeus, the Demiurge emphasizes that the indissolubility 34 35 36 37 38

Tim. 41 A 7-B 6 = Simp., In De cael. 106, 9–14. I quote here the text given by Simplicius, which slightly differs from that edited by Burnet. Simp., In De cael. 143, 9–14; 353, 1–3. Cf. Phys. VIII 10.266 a 24-b 6. Simp., In De cael. 351, 1–3. Simplicius also refers to the Statesman (269 D-E). Tr. Mueller (see note 19). As noted by Simplicius, who refers to the Republic (VIII 546 A), Plato also admits that what is temporally generated must be temporally destructible (Simp., In De cael. 300, 15–20).

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and indestructibility of the world result from his own goodness and will (106, 25–107, 6): The κόσμος remains bound as long as the action of the Demiurge lasts, which is conceived of as eternal. Therefore, the κόσμος is neither completely immortal nor fully subject to destruction, since the destructibility inherent in its nature is counteracted by its superior cause. If as a body it seems to be destructible, it is rather indestructible, because it proceeds from the permanent action of the superior cause. And Aristotle agrees again with Plato on this point, at least if one is to trust what he says in his Physics (VIII 10). According to him, heaven is by nature disposed to receive an uninterrupted movement, since everybody is incapable of such an action in itself.39 It is directly moved by the divine cause, whether it is called Demiurge or unmoved cause, from which it proceeds and to which it reverts, and from which it receives progressively its completion. Therefore, for both authorities, God is responsible for the eternal movement, and he causes what he moves directly to move “neither contingently nor unnaturally, but necessarily and naturally” (360, 23: μὴ ἐνδεχομένως μηδὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαίως καὶ κατὰ φύσιν). Thanks to a parallel text, harmony between Plato and Aristotle is restored. It proves that the destructible body has indeed an indestructible nature, insofar as it is suitable to receive eternal movement, and therefore it undergoes a generation which does not involve any perishing.40 3) A final difficulty remains in Aristotle’s apparent objection: How are we to understand this temporality and indestructibility? Simplicius responds through another excerpt from the Timaeus: What is it which always is and has no coming to be, and what is it which comes to be but never is? The one is apprehended by thought along with reason, and is always thus and in the same condition; the other is conceived by opinion along with irrational perception, and is generated and destroyed, and never really is.41 Τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενον μέν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄν· 39 40

41

Simp., In De cael. 104, 22–28; 353, 3–10; 361, 2–7; 369, 27–32. This solution could have been inspired by Damascius who, in his lessons on the Phaedo, says: “In the same way as the universe is simultaneously coming-to-be and passing away, so it is also being joined together and being dissolved, integration and decomposition exist side by side in it” (Dam., In Phd. I § 331, 6–7; tr. L. G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. II: Damascius (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde nieuwe reeks, deel 93), Amsterdam−Oxford− New York 1977). Tr. Mueller (see note 19).

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Marc-Antoine Gavray τὸ δὲ αὖ δόξῃ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστὸν γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν.42

According to Simplicius, adding οὐδέποτε stresses the particular eternity of this kind of being. Because the κόσμος never really is, it is eternal in some way. Its eternity can be found in its relation to time. In order to assimilate the κόσμος to its intelligible model, which is by nature eternal, the Demiurge bound its production with that of time, making this latter an image of eternity (Tim. 38 B). In this sense, the everlastingness of time is an image of the ceaselessness (the “always”) of eternity. However, the world could not perfectly imitate the eternity of its intelligible model, if it were to occur only in a part of time – moreover a tiny part, as Philoponus holds shamelessly. Also, according to Simplicius, time contributes to the perfection of the κόσμος: It is a complement (πλήρωμα), the most authoritative good thing that fills its being (368, 19–26). Time does not contain the world by existing before or after it, because the κόσμος possesses and contains it as its part. Therefore, the world can neither come to be nor be destroyed at any moment in time, because there cannot be any moment before or after its coming to be. Why indeed would it come to be or disappear at one moment rather than another (105, 6–25)? And Simplicius concludes (107, 19–24): I myself am not unaware that saying this much might be thought to go beyond the measure with respect to explaining what Aristotle says , but because I proposed to dissolve the objections of those who dispute the view that heaven does not come to be or perish and bring forward Plato as someone who provides support for them against Aristotle, I think it is not unsuitable to have recorded Plato’s views on these matters.43 Ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν τοσαῦτα λέγειν πέρα τοῦ μέτρου δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξήγησιν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀγνοῶ, λύειν δὲ τὰς ἐνστάσεις προθέμενος τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μαχομένων καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα κατὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὡς αὐτοῖς συνηγοροῦντα παραφερόντων οὐκ ἀπεικότως, οἶμαι, τὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων ἀνέγραψα. The apparent contradiction between Aristotle and Plato results from Aristotle’s desire to prevent any form of contradiction. Aristotle seems to have known in advance and to have sought to prevent some of his readers from

42 43

Tim. 27 D 6–28 A 4 = Simp., In De cael. 104, 5–8. Simplicius’ quotation slightly differs from the text edited by Burnet. Tr. Mueller (see note 19).

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misunderstanding, insofar as he writes for an audience that is not yet able to read Plato’s text accurately. However, his attempt is missed by those who fail to comply with the order of reading and to agree that Aristotle speaks for a less informed audience, using a tone of caricature and adopting a superficial perspective. In conclusion, Aristotle and Plato disagree only for those who consider them carelessly, but they reveal their own harmony to those readers who know how to be more attentive.44

VII. Symbol, Hypothesis and Concept Simplicius also resolves discrepancies with a third method that attempts to distinguish between discursive levels. If one does not remain at the surface of the Timaeus, which reading should one adopt for this text? Regarding generation, this dialogue raises an additional challenge: If time and κόσμος are simultaneous, how should we consider the succession inherent in a story that places the generation of the universe at a given time, following the will of the Demiurge? Does it not reveal Plato’s need to introduce a temporality in the process of generation, and thereby a temporality of the generated being? Simplicius’ response is to emphasise the mythical nature of the text. He urges the reader to understand the argument on a hypothetical (καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν) or conceptual (τῷ λόγῳ) level. In other words, such a chronology would aim at increasing the respective properties of the components, i.e. the world and Demiurge, and at drawing the consequences that would result from considering their activities as separate. In this sense, temporality constitutes a logical (i.e. narrative or rational) device useful for exposing how the world depends on its cause. However, Aristotle argues, as it seems,45 that this invalid kind of hypothetical reasoning should be distinguished from that valid of mathematicians. In geometry, an assumption by hypothesis involves the coexistence between the components and the compound. However, the cosmological composition implies the pre-existence of the components of the compound, since the disordered world seems to exist before the ordered κόσμος.46 Therefore, the 44 45

46

Simp., In De cael. 143, 15–17; cf. In Phys. 1155, 8–1156, 3. According to Simplicius, the objection is not raised by Aristotle himself, but it follows from its interpretation by Alexander (Simp., In De cael. 297, 1–298, 25). See Guldentops (see note 15) 199–206 on Simplicius’ controversy with Alexander on this point. He writes: “Therefore, a critical analysis of Alexander’s interpretation is not only necessary, but also in accord with Aristotle’s mind and useful for those who want to understand Aristotle’s texts by means of Alexander’s commentaries.” Simp., In De cael. 305, 14–20; cf. De cael. I 10.279 b 32–280 a 11.

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hypothesis would not remove the temporal aspect of the generation. How is it possible to counter and resolve this disagreement? On the one hand, Simplicius welcomes the accuracy of Aristotle’s reading: He has revealed the distinction between two kinds of hypothetical reasoning regarding generation, one valid, the other not (In De cael. 305, 25– 33). This distinction shows that he targets a superficial reading of Plato’s text, which is based on the second meaning. It remains to prove that Plato uses the first meaning. On the other hand, Simplicius calls for a parallel with the Statesman. Plato separates there τῷ λόγῳ, in a conceptual or discursive way, the Demiurge from the world conceived as already existing.47 The separation shows that, deprived of its ordering cause, the world naturally degenerates into a state of disorder. This kind of hypothetical argument proves that, by itself, the corporeal nature lacks order, and that introducing an organisation results only from the providential action of the Demiurge. However, it does not mean, in any way, that the separation was or ever becomes effective. Also, Simplicius concludes, the pre-existence of disorder on order is not temporal, and generation must be understood as an ontological status. As proved by his hylomorphic theory, Aristotle agrees with Plato by admitting by hypothesis that disorder pre-existed order (In De cael. 306, 9–25). As he states elsewhere, disorder always exists in matter, because it belongs to its nature.48 Order comes from the outside, that is to say from the demiurgic and informative action. However, the pre-existence of disorder is not temporal, in the sense that it would be destroyed by the introduction of order, but ontological: In itself, matter remains indeterminate. But, if privation of form belongs to the nature of matter, this latter always participates in a form. It is indeed impossible to experience matter in itself, in its identity. Consequently, if Aristotle admits that disorder always pre-exists order ontologically, he also admits that the coming to be of the world cannot be said otherwise than by hypothesis.49 47 48 49

Simp., In De cael. 143, 20–21; 303, 19–24; 306, 25–307, 11; 360, 29–32. Simplicius refers to Pol. 272 E-273 E. De gen. et corr. II 1.329 a 24-b 6; Met. VIII 6.1045 b 18–19; Phys. IV 2.209 b 6–17. An enlightening parallel for this kind of argument concerns the composition of matter. For Simplicius, when the Pythagoreans and Plato hypothesise triangles, they must not be taken absolutely, but as we do with astronomers, who hold several hypotheses to preserve the phenomena (Simp., In De cael. 565, 26–566, 20; 576, 3–4; 641, 21–25). Because they focus on quantity and figure, instead of quality, they generally reason with respect to symmetry and similarity, two principles that, when conceived on the mode of hypothesis, help to explain the causes of generation, i.e. changes of figures into each other. However, this reasoning must not be taken literally, but symbolically, since other things are also said symbolically in the Timaeus. Moreover, as Simplicius notes, Plato himself reminds that, in

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To conclude with Simplicius, Aristotle and Plato agree on the logical priority of disorder and on the coming to be of order, but they also agree on how these points should be understood. Therefore, the Timaeus only makes obvious a process that actually is always already achieved, whereas the De caelo adopts, in this respect, an a posteriori perspective of actualisation.

VIII. A Polymorphic Method With regard to reconciling Plato and Aristotle on the generation of the κόσμος, Simplicius adopts a solution similar to that of Proclus: Unlike what Aristotle’s objections might suggest, both philosophers think that the κόσμος is eternal. Nevertheless some nuances arise, which result from a difference in contexts and intentions. First, Simplicius intends to face objections raised by Alexander and by Philoponus, who both find in Plato’s Timaeus the temporal generation of the κόσμος, whereas Aristotle holds that it is eternal. Against Alexander who, in the disagreement, is always in favour of Aristotle, and against Philoponus, who, in the same circumstances, claims to follow Plato, Simplicius reveals a truth at the crossroads between Plato and Aristotle. This requires a closer examination of textual details and an increased attention to their meaning. From this attempt at harmonisation arises thus an essential attribute of the κόσμος, on which both authorities agree. As a perceptible reality, the world must be conceived of as generated, and as a compound reality, it proceeds from an external cause. It must therefore be conceived of as potentially mortal and destructible, although the goodness of the demiurgic cause prevents its destruction and preserves its unity. Hence the immortality of the κόσμος does not only result from a logical necessity, arising from its coincidence with time – as it was the case in Proclus –, but it is also related to the permanent good action of the unmoved cause. Second, as a corollary, Simplicius aims to completely harmonise Plato and Aristotle, while Proclus considers some differences insurmountable. Firstly, while Proclus criticises Aristotle because he uses the verb to be to describe the heaven in its eternity, Simplicius explains the is in Aristotle’s text as a reference to ordinary language. However, this does not prohibit Aristotle from being more accurate in other contexts and from conceiving an eternal becoming elsewhere (Simp., In De cael. 301, 8–12). Secondly, Proclus criticis-

this dialogue, he is speaking on the mode of hypothesis (Simplicius quotes Tim. 54 A 1–6, then 53 D 4-E 5, where Plato uses the verb ὑποτιθώμεθα).

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es Aristotle because he places the numerical unity of the world in being, rather than in becoming. By invoking the hypothetical mode, Simplicius explains the permanent action of the unmoved cause, in Plato as well as in Aristotle, which confers to the world a progressive actualisation of its power, even if it is a thing impossible to experience. Finally, Simplicius does not diagnose any degradation of attributes. By exposing the procession, the metaphysical argument shows a community of the theological truth, in terms of which both authors agree. In summary, if Simplicius does not explicitly mention Proclus’ criticisms, at least he resolves them by provision and restores full harmony between Plato and Aristotle. Third, compared to Proclus, Simplicius’ reading inverts the perspective, insofar as he begins with Aristotle’s objections, rather than with the Timaeus. Therefore, the opposition between Plato and Aristotle becomes a problem less related to causality than to a difference in points of view. Aristotle starts with what is obvious to us, following the most ordinary and usual meaning of generation. But Plato follows the most general meaning, that of greater extension. Also the difference between the De caelo and the Timaeus concerns the use of words. Aristotle adopts the perspective of ordinary language, since he argues from an immediate relationship to things, whereas Plato insists on the accuracy of terms and on their suitability to the κόσμος (69, 11–15). Therefore the opposition reflects two ways of doing cosmology: 1) from the point of view of man, who understands the κόσμος with respect to his own categories of thought and from his intellectual scope, i.e. who produces a cosmology grounded in the experience of the sublunary world, insofar as he does not have an immediate and spontaneous access to the unified totality of the κόσμος, but only to an image of it (41, 27–32); 2) from the point of view of the κόσμος itself, as it fits into a scheme of procession and follows the divine and demiurgic cause, that comes from the One. Therefore, between Aristotle and Plato, between the De caelo and the Timaeus, the difference reveals an opposition between doing cosmology according to either conversion or procession. This opposition leads to a different understanding of the modes of discourse. The De caelo appears to be a discourse and a demonstration of a physical kind, which relies on our experiencing the ordinary world and which can receive a syllogistic form, helping the understanding. The Timaeus, on the other hand, follows the mode of hypothesis (the als ob), i.e. a form of discourse that questions cosmology a priori in order to understand (and to make understood) the properties that resist an empirical seizure. It explains the world on an a priori mode, as a model expressing temporally what is necessarily out of time. However, according to Simplicius, these two modes do not exclude each other, but they suggest that the world has a different existence and temporality than its cause or products. Doing so, he subverts Aristotle’s objection, to whom using the hypothetical mode is a defect in

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natural philosophy. However, Simplicius makes it the very way to understand the eternal conditions of realities that relate to becoming. As a conclusion, when Simplicius interprets and resolves Aristotle’s objections, he may invoke a principle according to which these would target a superficial reading of the Timaeus, based on ordinary language (a reading due to Alexander and Philoponus), rather than Plato himself.50 This interpretation fits perfectly into the progressive scheme of the Neoplatonic curriculum: If there is an attunement of the De caelo and the Timaeus, as far as they concern similar realities, the comments on the Timaeus found in the commentary on the De caelo aim at refuting a reading that results from the kind of reading expected for the De caelo. In this sense, Simplicius’ commentary justifies the necessity of postponing Plato’s to Aristotle’s reading, insofar as what is self-evident (the truth of the Timaeus) should not be read on the mode of what is only obvious to us (the contents of De caelo). At most, from this perspective, Aristotle only seems to refute Plato.

Bibliography 1. Primary Sources: Editions and Translations ARISTOTELES De cael. Moraux, P., Aristote. Du ciel. Texte établi et traduit (Collection Budé), Paris 1965. De gen. et corr. Rashed, M., Aristote. De la génération et la corruption. Texte établi et traduit (Collection Budé), Paris 2005. Met. Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1924 (repr. Oxford 1970). Meteor. Louis, P., Aristote. Météorologiques. Texte établi et traduit (Collection Budé), Paris 1982. Phys. Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Physica, Oxford 1950 (repr. Oxford 1973).

50

For example, Simp., In De cael. 296, 6–8; 297, 1–7; 377, 20–33; 640, 27–32.

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DAMASCIuS (= Dam.) In Phd. Westerink, L. G., The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. II: Damascius (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde nieuwe reeks, deel 93), Amsterdam− Oxford−New York 1977. PLATO Burnet, J., Platonis opera, Oxford 1900–1907 (repr. Oxford 1967–1968). PLOTINuS (= Plot.) Henry, P. – Schwyzer, H.-R., Plotini opera, Oxford 1964–1983. PROCLuS (= Procl.) In Tim. Diehl, E., Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, Leipzig 1903– 1906. Festugière, A.-J., Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée (Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques), 5 tomes, Paris 1966–1968. SIMPLICIuS (= Simp.) In De cael. Heiberg, J. L., Simplicii in Aristotelis De caelo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VII), Berlin 1894. Hankinson, R. J., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2002. Mueller, I., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.3–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011. In Phys. Diels, H., Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros octo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IX–X), Berlin 1882–1895. 2. Secondary Literature Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008. Dörrie, H. – Baltes, M., Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Platonische Physik (im antiken Verständnis) II. Bausteine 125–150: Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar (Der Platonismus in der Antike Bd. 5), Stuttgart−Bad Cannstatt 1998. Ferrari, F., Esegesi, commento e sistema nel medioplatonismo, in: A. Neschke-Hentschke (ed.), Argumenta in Dialogos Platonis. Teil 1:

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Platoninterpretation und ihre Hermeneutik von der Antike bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts. Akten des internationalen Symposions vom 27.−29. April 2006 im Instituto Svizzero di Roma (Bibliotheca Helvetica Romana 31), Basel 2010, 51–76. Festugière, A.-J., Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée (Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques), 5 tomes, Paris 1966–1968. Guldentops, G., Plato’s Timaeus in Simplicius’ In De caelo. A Confrontation with Alexander, in: T. Leinkauf – C. Steel (edd.), Platons Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance. Plato’s Timaeus and the Foundations of Cosmology in Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 34,1), Leuven 2005, 195–212. Hadot, I., Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Plato and Aristotle (Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition 18), Leiden 2015. Hoffmann, P., Sur quelques aspects de la polémique de Simplicius contre Jean Philopon: de l’invective à la réaffirmation de la transcendance du Ciel, in: I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Actes du colloque international de Paris (28 Sept.–1 Oct. 1985) (Peripatoi. Philologischhistorische Studien zum Aristotelismus Bd. 15), Berlin−New York 1987, 183–221. Karamanolis, G. E., Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford Philosophical Monographs), Oxford 2006. Lernould, A., Physique et Théologie. Lecture du Timée de Platon par Proclus (Problématiques philosophiques. Philosophie ancienne), Villeneuved’Ascq 2001. Steel, C., Why Should We Prefer Plato’s Timaeus to Aristotle’s Physics? Proclus’ Critique of Aristotle’s Causal Explanation of the Physical World, in: R. W. Sharples – A. Sheppard (edd.), Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vol. 78), London 2003, 175–187.

‘Language Converts ψυχή’: Reflections on Commentary 1 in Late Ancient Philosophical Research and Education Michael Griffin This paper sets out to explore the Sitz im Leben of late ancient philosophical pedagogy and research from a common vantage point, the capacity of a good teacher – or a canonical text, read with a good teacher as ἐξηγητής – to reshape and correct the elementary concepts or ἔννοιαι of the student or philosopher. (I) I begin with a brief reflection on the intersection of pedagogical practice and inquiry in antiquity, then (II) briefly explore the theme of how common notions or ἔννοιαι might be shaped and reshaped by the philosopher who comes into contact with ‘great texts’ of the past, or with a good teacher, in Plotinus and Simplicius, and (III) conclude by considering the historical background of Simplicius’ attitude to past philosophers, and to what extent it might be considered as informed by earlier Aristotelian or Stoic practices. I focus on the interface between philosophical education and research in the commentator Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 490–c. 560 CE). Simplicius is well known as an interpreter (ἐξηγητής) of the formative texts of Hellenic philosophy (a function whose qualifications he outlines at In Cat. 7, 23–29), and he regards the philosophical commentary as an important vehicle for what we might regard as ‘research’ or inquiry into an array of subjects.2 Simplicius 1

2

For comments and advice that have improved earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to express my gratitude especially to my fellow participants in the conference of the Karl und Gertrud Abel Foundation in Trier, Germany, from October 4–6, 2012, and to a number of commentators at the University of Toronto, where I delivered an earlier version of the essay in 2013. I am, of course, fully to blame for its remaining infelicities. A philosopher might progressively uncover the truth about a subject by interpreting a canonical text on that subject with care, or perhaps by synthesizing a detailed doxography of differing but reputable views. To present and analyze a doxography of earlier philosophical views on a subject, as Simplicius often does, is for him a useful way of approaching the truth about the subject; see Simp., In Phys. 640, 12–18: Here Simplicius suggests that each reputable thinker might have a share of the truth, reflecting similar views in Aristotle (E. E. I 6.1216 b 26–32; Met. α 1.993 a 30-b 19) and Plotinus (III 7 [45] 7). Even to copy out and clarify a revered philosopher’s text with understanding is a valuable personal exercise (Simp., In Cat. 3, 2–9; 438, 33–36; In Epict. 194, 57–60; cf. I. Hadot, Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète. Introduction et édition critique du texte grec [Philosophia antiqua vol. 66], Leiden−New York−Köln 1996).

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also treats commentary as a useful tool for pedagogy. A student who reads a book like Epictetus’ Handbook may advance in virtue (Simp., In Epict. pr. 87–90); Simplicius’ interpretation is a useful guide, a facilitator on the way. In both these areas – discovery and pedagogy – I try to outline a common psychological theory underlying the function attributed to the commentator: A pupil who engages in dialectic with a teacher, or with the ‘greats’ of the past, may recover the natural, undistorted concepts (ἔννοιαι) that were her birthright, before they were distorted by the fall of the soul and the rattle and hum of our quotidian experience (illustrated by Simplicius in an evocative passage at In Cat. 12, 10–13, 4).3

I. Introduction: Reflections on Philosophical Education and Research in Antiquity As academics, our teaching is normally evaluated apart from our research: A person might be judged a productive philosopher, but an uninspired educator. In ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, pedagogical and contemplative achievement rarely seem so disentangled. Plato’s Socrates recommended evaluating a person’s claims to moral expertise by testing the alleged expert’s students (La. 186 A), and in exercising his own characteristic method of philosophical research, he variously represented himself as a pupil of his interlocutor (Euthyphr. 5 A), a midwife of ideas (Tht. 149 A), or a subject or object of examination (Apol. 29 D-30 E, Gorg. 486 D-488 B), equally able, in other words, to learn (μανθάνειν), test (πειρᾶσθαι), or conduct an inquiry (σκέψις).4 The broadly Socratic mission of examination (ἐξέτασις), 3

4

See P. Hoffmann, Catégories et langage selon Simplicius – la question du « skopos » du traité aristotélicien des « Catégories », in: I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Actes du colloque international de Paris (28 sept.–1 oct. 1985) (Peripatoi Bd. 15), Berlin−New York 1987, 61–90, C. Helmig, Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina 5), Berlin−Boston 2012, and, for a conceptual background in Plotinus, R. M. van den Berg, As We Are Always Speaking of Them and Using Their Names on Every Occasion. Plotinus, Enn. III.7 [45]: Language, Experience and the Philosophy of Time in Neoplatonism, in: R. Chiaradonna – F. Trabattoni (edd.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. Proceedings of the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop. Il Ciocco, Castelvecchio Pascoli, June 22–24, 2006 (Philosophia antiqua vol. 115), Leiden−Boston 2009, 101–120. For this suite of dialectical practices, see Aristotle, Top. VIII 5.159 a 25–37, with commentary in R. Smith, Aristotle: Topics. Books I and VIII (Clarendon Aristotle series), Oxford 1997. For Socrates as educator, and for varying portrayals of a Socratic ‘method’, see G. A. Scott, Plato’s Socrates as Educator (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy), Albany 2000 and G. A. Scott (ed.), Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond, University Park, PA. 2002; for the influence of his character

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focusing on the advancement and examination of θέσεις for both education and investigation, was subsequently codified and regarded as the philosopher’s province well into the first century BCE.5 First-rate philosophers were rarely portrayed as uninspired teachers.6 To set the scene: Some decades before the beginning of Augustus’ principate, the enterprises of philosophical investigation and education, which previously centered on oral debate in the public squares of Athens, had begun to shift their ground throughout the Mediterranean world.7 The change is effectively summarized by Sedley: The first century BCE is the period in which philosophy loosened its historic moorings in the great philosophical schools of Athens and en-

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and practice on subsequent philosophical activity, see R. Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues, Cambridge 2002. H. Baltussen, Dialectic in Dialogue: The Message of Plato’s Protagoras and Aristotle’s Topics, in: E. A. Mackay (ed.), Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greek and Roman World (Mnemosyne suppl. 298: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece vol. 7), Leiden−Boston 2008, 203–226 explores a link between Socrates’ practice (in Protagoras) and the more codified rules in Aristotle’s Topics. For the Academic tradition, see C. Brittain, Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics (Oxford Classical Monographs), Oxford 2001, 328–342 and T. Reinhardt, Cicero’s Topica (Oxford Classical Monographs), Oxford 2003, 5. (In contrast to Cicero, Quint., Inst. pr. 9–10 resists the idea that general θέσεις are the philosopher’s domain.) Consider also the Stoic effort to articulate definitions of our ἔννοιαι, which is represented as the root of ‘the entire method of learning and teaching’ (totam discendi docendique rationem, Aug., Civ. Dei VIII 7 = SVF 2.106 = 32F ap. A. A. Long – D. Sedley, The Hellenistic philosophers. Vol. I: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary. Vol. II: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography, Cambridge 1987) as well as the basis of the branches of expertise (αἱ τέχναι, Gal., Adv. Lyc. 3.7 = SVF 2.230 = 32G ap. Long – Sedley). This thought might be illustrated by Porphyry’s favorable recording of Plotinus’ refusal to deliver a paper (τοὺς καθόλου λόγους πράττοντος καὶ εἰς βιβλία […] λέγοντος) before he had resolved the relevant puzzles or ἀπορίαι of a student, Porphyry himself (Porph., Plot. 13), or the fact that the encyclopedic erudition of a Strato or Aristophanes could qualify him not only to direct the Ptolemies’ μουσεῖον and to contend with other scholars in public, but also to tutor the prince (compare D. L., 5, 3 and Vitr., De arch. 7, 5–7). There was certainly no shortage of utterly boring teachers (consider, for example, the vivid portrayal of the logic master’s dudgeon at Fronto, De eloquentia 4, 1–5), but I take it that those weren’t considered the best philosophers, either! For the role of philosophy within the broader παιδεία of Graeco-Roman antiquity, see for example E. J. Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage vol. 41), Berkeley−Los Angeles−London 2008, ch. 1; for the image of the intellectual in particular, see P. Zanker, The Mask of Socrates. The Image of the Intellectual in Antiquity (Sather Classical Lectures vol. 59), transl. by A. Shapiro, Berkeley−Los Angeles−Oxford 1995. See M. Frede, Epilogue, in: K. Algra – J. Barnes – J. Mansfeld – M. Schofield (edd.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge 1999, 771–797, G. R. BoysStones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of Its Development from the Stoics to Origen, Oxford 2001, M. Schofield (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC. New Directions for Philosophy, Cambridge 2013.

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Mediterranean philosophers, then, gradually fostered a new value for working in text; at the same time, they began to cultivate a new respect for the authority of ancient or ‘classical’ voices. These two developments were not necessarily symbiotic. Take Epictetus, whose school cultivated the close reading of philosophical texts. Epictetus himself found value in philosophical reading, provided that the student was capable of digesting the material and apply it in practice (Diss. I 26, 13–18). Epictetus also recommended writing as a therapeutic exercise,9 a replacement for the cross-examination of one’s own soul when no conversation partners are at hand, as his presumably anachronistic ascription of a kind of ‘writing for oneself’ to Socrates illustrates: What then? Did not Socrates write? – Yes, who wrote as much as he? But how? Since he could not have always at hand someone to test his judgements, or to be tested by him in turn, he was in the habit of testing and examining himself, and was always in a pragmatic way testing out some particular intuition (πρόληψις). That is how a philosopher writes. […] But now […] will you go off and make an exhibition of your compositions, and give a reading from them?10 But Epictetus prided himself on not being a classicist, not a (mere) philologue or antiquarian. He vigorously critiqued philosophers who advertised themselves primarily as exegetes or commentators on the greats (Diss. III 21, 6– 7), and in the passage cited above, he gently corrects an advanced student

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D. Sedley, Introduction, in: D. Sedley (ed.), The Philosophy of Antiochus, Cambridge 2012, 1–2. See P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, Oxford 1995. Diss. II 1, 32–34: Τί οὖν; Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔγραφεν; – Καὶ τίς τοσαῦτα; ἀλλὰ πῶς; ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐδύνατο ἔχειν ἀεὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα αὐτοῦ τὰ δόγματα ἢ ἐλεγχθησόμενον ἐν τῷ μέρει, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤλεγχεν καὶ ἐξήταζεν καὶ ἀεὶ μίαν γέ τινα πρόληψιν ἐγύμναζεν χρηστικῶς. ταῦτα γράφει φιλόσοφος. […] Καὶ νῦν […] ἐκεῖνα δείξεις ἀπελθὼν καὶ ἀναγνώσῃ καὶ ἐμπερπερεύσῃ; Translation by W. A. Oldfather, Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, Books I–II (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge, MA 1925.

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who sets a junior student a passage to absorb just ‘as a reader’ (ὡς ἀναγνώστῃ, Diss. I 26, 14), before evaluating the younger man’s ability to digest its meaning. Criticisms of philosophy as philology are echoed by Seneca (Ep. 108, 23),11 and famously by Plotinus (Porph., Plot. 14). Within a few centuries, however, philosophy had come to consist primarily in commentary on canonical texts in a set curriculum. The primary development – toward a reverent, exegetical attitude to the ‘ancients’ – was, as Boys-Stones argues, already exemplified by the Stoic Cornutus in the later first century CE, building on Posidonius’ notion (cf. Seneca, Ep. 90, 5) that self-conscious sages flourished in the golden age.12 So Cornutus: […] the ancients were no ordinary men, but capable of understanding the nature of the cosmos, and inclined to use symbols and riddles in their philosophical discussions of it.13 As some Platonists increasingly adapted philosophical methods from Stoicism after Antiochus, the concept arguably began to take root that ancient wisdom not only could be reconstructed by a good interpreter, but that it had been so reconstructed, by Plato, whose philosophy – rightly interpreted by a competent ἐξηγητής – could furnish a direct and immediate guide to the wisdom of the golden age.14 Thus development lent momentum to commentary and interpretation in the Platonic tradition. Already in the early empire, Aristotelianism was also beginning to operate primarily as a commentary tradition,15 and by the later third century CE, it is possible to speak of a ‘philosophy of the commentators’.16 This development toward commentary on wise teachers of the past as a primary vehicle of philosophy sets the stage for Simplicius.17 11 12 13

14 15

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Cf. Frede (see note 7) 785. Cf. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (see note 7). De natura deorum c. 35, 76, 2–5: […] οὐχ οἱ τυχόντες ἐγένοντο οἱ παλαιοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνιέναι τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἱκανοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ διὰ συμβόλων καὶ αἰνιγμάτων φιλοσοφῆσαι περὶ αὐτῆς εὐεπίφοροι. Translation by Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (see note 7) 53. Cf. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (see note 7) 115. S. Fazzo, Aristotelianism as a Commentary Tradition, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 47, 2004, 3; cf. R. W. Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC to AD 200. An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation (Cambridge Source Books in PostHellenistic Philosophy), Cambridge 2010. R. Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 AD. A Sourcebook, Vol. I: Psychology (with Ethics and Religion), Vol. II: Physics, Vol. III: Logic and Metaphysics, Ithaca 2005; M. Tuominen, The Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle (Ancient Philosophies 6), Berkeley 2009. See for example D. Sedley, Plato’s Auctoritas and the Rebirth of the Commentary Tradition, in: J. Barnes – M. T. Griffin (edd.), Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome, Oxford 1997 and Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (see note 7) especially 99–150,

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By late antiquity, reading a philosophical classic with a teacher and a commentary could function as a kind of exercise in personal development for the student reader.18 To compose a commentary was a primary vehicle of ‘research’ or academic output, a centerpiece of the professional philosopher’s working day (cf. Marin., Procl. 22), and a spiritual exercise in its own right.19 Even the deceptively simple practice of copying a classical text out could offer educational and spiritual insight. Thus Simplicius counts his an-

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and for the Neoplatonic maturity of the form, J. Mansfeld, Prolegomena. Questions To Be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text (Philosophia antiqua vol. 6), Leiden− New York−Köln 1994; P. Hoffmann, La fonction des prologues exégétiques dans la pensée pédagogique néoplatonicienne, in: J.-D. Dubois – B. Roussel (edd.), Entrer en matière: Les prologues (Patrimoines. Religions du livre), Paris 1998, 228–240; P. Hoffmann, What Was Commentary in Late Antiquity? The Example of the Neoplatonic Commentators, in: M. L. Gill – P. Pellegrin (edd.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy), Oxford 2008, 601–602; H. Baltussen, From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary, Poetics Today 28, 2007, 247–281; H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008. To read Aristotle’s Physics and De caelo with an able teacher invites the student to ‘unite’ (ἕνωσις) with the mind of the world (P. Hoffmann, La triade Chaldaïque ἔρως, ἀλήθεια, πίστις: de Proclus à Simplicius, in: A.-P. Segonds – C. Steel [edd.], Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne: actes du colloque international de Louvain (13–16 mai 1998) en l’honneur de H. D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink [Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Series I 26], Leuven− Paris 2000, 459–489). To read Epictetus’ Handbook with understanding might exercise and rehabituate the soul of a student of innate but untutored talent (φυσικὴ ἀρετή) to achieve what Neoplatonists after Iamblichus dubbed ‘habituative’ excellence (ἠθικὴ ἀρετή) (Simp., In Epict. pr. 87–90). That achievement in turn would prepare the reader to tackle a philosophical scala virtutum (J. Dillon, An Ethic for the Late Antique Sage, in: L. P. Gerson [ed.], The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, Cambridge 1996, 315–335, M. Edwards, Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their Students, Liverpool 2000), climbing from ‘constitutive’ or ‘social’ excellence (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή), available through the close reading of a Platonic text like the Alcibiades I or Gorgias with an instructor, to ‘cleansing’ or ‘purifying’ excellence (καθαρτικὴ ἀρετή) via a dialogue like Phaedo, to ‘contemplative’ (θεωρητική) excellence via a dialogue like Phaedrus, and on to a loftier, ‘emblematic’ (παραδειγματική) excellence achieved through more advanced readings and theurgical practices. Reading an authentic Platonic dialogue, itself a kind of ‘model’ of the cosmos (Procl., In Alc. 10, 3–18), offered the opportunity to foster such excellences through the emulation of central characters (μίμησις: see the anonymous Prolegomena philosophiae Platonicae, §4, 15, 1–19 [ed. L. G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amsterdam 1962]): When we grasp the reasons for Socrates’ actions, for instance, we will be drawn to pursue his knowledge (Procl., In Alc. 21, 5–8), and this applies more broadly to the emulation of all good people (Procl., In Tim. I 16, 6–12). See I. Hadot, Le problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Études Augustiniennes), Paris 1978, 147–65; Hadot, Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète (see note 2) 51–60; Hadot (see note 9).

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notated, condensed revising of Iamblichus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories as a contemplative exercise (In Cat. 3, 2–9; 438, 33–36), an effort to ascertain the truth and to discover Iamblichus’ spirit or meaning (νοῦς) as well as a productive and creative project designed to help students and οἱ πολλοί on their way to more advanced texts and lessons (In Cat. 3, 13–17): As for me, I have even read the commentaries of some of the philosophers I have mentioned; and I have taken as a model the commentary of Iamblichus, with as much care as I was capable of, in following him step for step and in frequently using the very text of this philosopher. My aim, in making this copy (ἀπογραφή), was on the one hand to acquire as far as possible, by the very act of writing, a more exact understanding of what Iamblichus was saying, and on the other to bring to greater clarity and measure this man’s sublimity of thought, which is inaccessible to most people […].20 What can be said of this apparent development towards deference to past authority, especially in a particular doctrinal school or tradition? Criticism has been offered; consider already in the early third century Galen’s frustration with contemporaries who have become ‘slaves of their schools’ (οἱ ταῖς αἱρέσεσι δουλεύοντες, Nat. Fac. 35, 6), or more recently Dodds’ critique of the ‘museum of metaphysical abstractions’ that comprised Proclus’ allegorical exegesis of the gods.21 As Barnes summarizes the charge, late ancient Platonists are sometimes criticized as surrendering ‘reason to trust and proof to authority’, paving the role for a less rational and more religious sensibility in philosophy.22 But the situation is more complex. Simplicius and his predecessors and contemporaries were not merely tralatitious. Ammonius does not consider Platonic authorship as a guarantee of truth in itself (Olymp., In Gorg. 214, 13–215, 11), and Simplicius himself, in a celebrated passage noted above,

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Simp., In Cat. 3, 2–9: ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐνέτυχον μὲν καί τισι τῶν εἰρημένων συγγράμμασιν, ἐπιμελέστερον δὲ ὡς οἷός τε ἦν τοῖς Ἰαμβλίχου παρακολουθῶν ἀπεγραψάμην, καὶ αὐτῇ πολλαχοῦ τῇ λέξει τοῦ φιλοσόφου χρησάμενος. ὁ δὲ σκοπὸς ἦν μοι τῆς ἀπογραφῆς ἅμα μὲν ὡς ἂν δυναίμην ἐκ τοῦ γράφειν ἀκριβεστέραν τῶν εἰρημένων κατανόησιν προσλαβεῖν, ἅμα δὲ τὸν ὑψηλὸν νοῦν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄβατον ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερόν τε καὶ συμμετρότερον καταγαγεῖν […]. Translation by Hoffmann, What Was Commentary in Late Antiquity? (see note 17) 615. E. R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology: A Revised Text with Translation, Introduction, and Commentary, Oxford 1963, 260. J. Barnes, Argument in Ancient Philosophy, in: D. Sedley (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy, Cambridge 2003, 29; compare Gal., De differentia pulsuum 579, 13–17; E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Sather Classical Lectures vol. 25), Berkeley 1951, 40, and J. M. Cooper, Pursuits of Wisdom. Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus, Princeton 2012, 387.

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demands that the best commentator be impartial (ἀδέκαστος) and not loyal to a particular school dogma (In Cat. 7, 23–32).23 He also critiques those who deploy quotations from the ancients as proofs of their arguments (In Phys. 1318, 10–15), arguing that Aristotle, by contrast, only cited or quoted his predecessors to reinforce, or add rhetorical plausibility to, the proofs that he had already articulated. Perhaps Simplicius himself placed more weight on some voices from the past,24 but it seems clear that he himself, like Ammonius, would have denied a claim that any proposition was true because Plato (rightly interpreted) had said it, even if we are sometimes inclined to attribute such a view to Simplicius. Why, then, place such value on interpreting the history of philosophy?

II. Developing ἔννοιαι: Plotinus and Simplicius The interpretation that I would like to develop here connects two general ideas in Simplicius. The first, focusing on the value of commentary and doxography in philosophical discovery, is illustrated by Simplicius’ own practice and the practice of Neoplatonists before him in dealing with commentary. The second, focusing on pedagogy, is illustrated by a narrative about the role of language in philosophical education reported and endorsed by Simplicius in his work on the Categories (Simp., In Cat. 12, 10–13, 4). 1. Plotinus First, consider the following passages from Plotinus. The first passage introduces Plotinus’ doxography of views maintained by predecessors about the nature of time (in which Plotinus keeps fairly close to the general structure of Aristotle’s doxography at Physics IV 10.218 a 30–b 20). Here Plotinus explains why it is necessary to review such prior views on the subject:

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Cf. Barnes (see note 22) 29: ‘Yet if there were some intellectual slaves – and perhaps a few happy slaves – slavery was not a common condition among philosophers’. For Simplicius’ remarks on ‘impartiality’ in the Categories commentary, see also R. Barney, Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority, Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, 108. See H. Baltussen, Philology or Philosophy? Simplicius on the Use of Quotations, in: I. Worthington – J. M. Foley (edd.), Epea and Grammata. Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece (Mnemosyne suppl. 230: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece vol. 4), Leiden−Boston−Köln 2002, 181. Baltussen (see this note) 187 speculates that Simplicius even uses direct quotation as a kind of living ‘voice from the past’.

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Now if the blessed men (μακάριοι) of antiquity had said nothing about time, it would be necessary for us to take eternity as our starting point and connect it with our subsequent account of time, endeavoring to fit (ἐφαρμόζειν) the opinion of it that we state (τὰ δοκοῦντα) with the conception (ἔννοια) of it that we possess. But as it is, it is necessary first to take the most notable statements that have been made about time (τὰ μάλιστα ἀξίως λόγου εἰρημένα), and to consider whether our own account will be in agreement with any of them.25 When we say that eternity and time are different things, and that eternity pertains to the eternal nature, while time pertains to what comes to be and to this universe, we immediately think, as we do in the case of more cursory conceptual apprehensions (ἀθροωτέραις ἐπιβολαῖς), that we possess a clear (ἐναργές) impression of them in our souls, since we are always talking about them and referring to them everywhere. But when we try to go on to examine them and, as it were, get close to them, we once again find ourselves at a loss what to think (ἀποροῦντες): different ones of us fix upon different declarations of the ancient philosophers about them, and perhaps even disagree about how to interpret these statements. So we stop here, and deem it sufficient if when asked we can state their views about them. Content with this, we give up inquiring any further about these matters. Now we must indeed think that some of the ancient and blessed philosophers have found the truth. But who among them most attained to it, and how we might gain an understanding (σύνεσις) of these things for ourselves, needs to be investigated.26

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III 7 (45) 7, 10–17: Εἰ μὲν περὶ χρόνου εἰρημένον μηδὲν ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ μακαρίοις ἀνδράσιν, ἐχρῆν τῷ αἰῶνι ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνείραντας τὸ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, πειρωμένους τῇ ἐννοίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἣν κεκτήμεθα ἐφαρμόζειν τὴν λεγομένην ὑφ’ ἡμῶν δόξαν· νῦν δ’ ἀναγκαῖον πρότερον λαβεῖν τὰ μάλιστα ἀξίως λόγου εἰρημένα σκοποῦντας, εἴ τινι αὐτῶν συμφώνως ὁ παρ’ ἡμῶν ἕξει λόγος. Translation by J. E. McGuire – S. K. Strange, An Annotated Translation of Plotinus Ennead iii 7: On Eternity and Time, Ancient Philosophy 8, 1988, 251–271. III 7 (45) 1, 1–16: Τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἕτερον λέγοντες ἑκάτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν περὶ τὴν ἀίδιον εἶναι φύσιν, τὸν δὲ χρόνον περὶ τὸ γινόμενον καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν, αὐτόθεν μὲν καὶ ὥσπερ ταῖς τῆς ἐννοίας ἀθροωτέραις ἐπιβολαῖς ἐναργές τι παρ’ αὐτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἔχειν πάθος νομίζομεν λέγοντές τε ἀεὶ καὶ παρ’ ἅπαντα ὀνομάζοντες. Πειρώμενοι μὴν εἰς ἐπίστασιν αὐτῶν ἰέναι καὶ οἷον ἐγγὺς προσελθεῖν πάλιν αὖ ταῖς γνώμαις ἀποροῦντες τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀποφάσεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλος ἄλλας, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τὰς αὐτὰς λαβόντες ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναπαυσάμενοι καὶ αὔταρκες νομίσαντες, εἰ ἔχοιμεν ἐρωτηθέντες τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκείνοις λέγειν, ἀγαπήσαντες ἀπαλλαττόμεθα τοῦ ζητεῖν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν. Εὑρηκέναι μὲν οὖν τινας τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ μακαρίων φιλοσόφων τὸ ἀληθὲς δεῖ νομίζειν· τίνες δ’ οἱ τυχόντες μάλιστα, καὶ πῶς ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν σύνεσις περὶ τούτων γένοιτο, ἐπισκέψασθαι προσήκει. Translation by McGuire – Strange (see note 25).

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The methodological implications of these texts, especially so far as they shed light on Plotinus’ broader attitude to the ‘common notions’, have stirred considerable discussion.27 For example McGuire and Strange suggest that: Plotinus accepts as conditions on the adequacy of a philosophical theory (1) that it be consistent with the texts of the most authoritative of the παλαιοί, the ancient philosophers, on the matter in question, (2) that it be in agreement with our common conceptions (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) about the subject […]. But we must ensure that these conceptions are clear (ἐναργές) by careful philosophical examination of them, since our initial unreflective (‘cursory’) formulations of them can be confused and misleading […].28 For the moment, let us start with the first criterion: the supposition that an adequate philosophical theory will be consistent with the thought of the most authoritative among the ‘ancients’. In allowing for some such rule, with Plato as a paradigm case, Plotinus is consistent with earlier generations of Platonists.29 But his supposition in III 7 (45) 7 and III 7 (45) 1 is perhaps not quite a strict ‘criterion’, but a methodological map:30 – – –

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as (Plotinian) philosophers, we begin working with untutored ἔννοιαι or concepts about a thing that is a familiar subject of ordinary talk, like time; we examine these concepts in order to achieve clarity (ἐναργές) about them; we are led to notice and analyze puzzles (ἀπορίαι) about them, leading to diverging conclusions;

With respect to the second of these two criteria, debate has focused on Plotinus’ assumptions about the nature of our ‘prephilosophical’ common notions, and the extent of his debt to earlier Middle Platonic reception of Stoicism. In particular: does he regard the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι as confused and in need of correction (cf. J. F. Phillips, Stoic ‘Common Notions’ in Plotinus, Dionysius 11, 1987, 40–41; McGuire – Strange [see note 25] 266 n. 13)? Might he accept two classes of common notions, (a) those that arise from the physical world, rather like Epicurean προλήψεις, and coincide with the ordinary meaning of words (illustrated by the remark that ‘we possess a clear impression of [eternity and time] in our souls, since are always talking about them and referring to them everywhere’), but capture only accidents; and (b) those that arise from direct contact with the intelligible world, and do in fact offer a grasp of the essential nature of things? (For this bipartition, see van den Berg [see note 3] 120, and compare R. Chiaradonna, Plotinus’ Account of the Cognitive Powers of the Soul: Sense Perception and Discursive Thought, Topoi 31, 2012, 204 n. 51). For the role of concept formation in Middle Platonism more broadly, see also Helmig (see note 3). McGuire – Strange (see note 25) 266 n. 13, commenting on Plot. III 7 (45) 1 and III 7 (45) 7. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (see note 7) 99–150. For the methodology itself, see for example S. K. Strange, Plotinus on the Nature of Eternity and Time, in: L. P. Schrenk (ed.), Aristotle in Late Antiquity (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy vol. 27), Washington 1994, 22–53.

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this aporetic condition necessitates dialectical inquiry, which may include cross-examining the views of a wide array of ancient philosophers, and in each case attempting to match their varying accounts to our inner concept or ἔννοια.

We can find a similar procedure at work in many of Plotinus’ treatises.31 By implementing this process, we are likely to discover that one or several of the ‘ancients’ had the right idea – that we do not need to attempt to ‘fit’ our opinion (τὰ δοκοῦντα) to our ἔννοια by ourselves (III 7 [45] 7, 12–15), but will be able to locate a pre-tailored – and broadly correct – opinion, at any rate once we have capably applied ourselves to the task of interpretation.32 Underwriting this procedure, as III 7 (45) implies, is Plotinus’ psychological position on the nature of certain true ‘concepts’ that lie latent inside us, albeit in need of some correction. Without engaging here too deeply with the debated question of Plotinus’ use of κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, I think van den Berg rightly stresses that he allows for some element of truth in even the fallible, prephilosophical concepts that serve as referents of ordinary language and are stirred by sensation and material phenomena (even if this truth is limited to accurately picking out the accidents of things), and that this basic element of truth facilitates the value in the process of dialectic, ensuring that the different philosophers are at least talking about the same things,33 facilitating discussion, and serving a function comparable to that served by προλήψεις or preconceptions in Epicurean psychology.34 The successful functioning of ordinary 31

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See Strange (see note 30) and G. Stamatellos, Plotinus and the Presocratics. A Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in Plotinus’ Enneads (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy), Albany 2007; for Plotinus’ criticism of Aristotle, see R. Chiaradonna, Plotino e la corrente antiaristotelica del platonismo imperiale. Analogie e differenze, in: M. Bonazzi – V. Celluprica (edd.), L’eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo (Elenchos 45), Napoli 2005, 235–274. Stamatellos (see note 31) 9 points out that Plotinus seems to diverge from Aristotle in allowing such ex hypothesis ‘wisdom’ to his ancient sources, but of course it is important to stress that Plotinus only allows this status to some predecessors. Cf. van den Berg (see note 3) 114; on van den Berg’s view, he may also allow for a separate class of true concepts that derive from direct contact with intelligibles: See also Chiaradonna, Plotinus’ Account of the Cognitive Powers of the Soul (see note 27). For the relationship between προλήψεις and κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι in Stoicism more generally, and an argument that the common conceptions may be a subset of the preconceptions, see C. Brittain, Common Sense: Concepts, Definition and Meaning in and out of the Stoa, in: D. Frede – B. Inwood (edd.), Language and Learning. Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge 2005, 179; but see now H. Dyson, Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa (Sozomena. Studies in the Recovery of Ancient Texts vol. 5), Berlin 2009 on the interchangeability of προλήψεις and common conceptions. ‘In conclusion, it can be said that Plotinus and Proclus distinguish between two types of common notions. On the one hand there are notions that more or less resemble Epicurus’ preconceptions. These notions are the products of our experience with the physical world.

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language, then, plays an important heuristic role in getting started on dialectic, encoding at least a superficial ontology that is not entirely wrong. 2. Simplicius Simplicius, too, holds that the ancients may have a piece of the truth about an important subject like time or place; but his approach is slightly different. For him, none of the ancients was completely wrong – perhaps a development inspired by the importance of demonstrating ‘harmony’ in late antiquity, in defense of the Hellenic tradition as a whole – but every one had a piece of the truth: Why, then, should we say that so many great men were mistaken in their opinions about place, putting forward our problems as an unfortunate feast for those who are accustomed to take pride in the apparent contradictions of the men of old [οἱ παλαιοί]? Should we not rather follow up each of those who wrote about place and show that none of them missed the truth about place? But, since place has many aspects, we should show that each man has seen and revealed a different aspect of it.35 Simplicius is here expressing a view similar, for example, to Aristotle’s methodological remark at the beginning of Metaphysics α 1: The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, no one fails entirely, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually they contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a

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They coincide with the ordinary meaning of words. Since they are common, communication is possible, be it ordinary conversation or philosophical discourse. However, since they are based on our perception of the phenomena, and not on the metaphysical causes of these, these notions cover only certain accidental features of their objects. Therefore, an analysis of these should not be expected to contribute much to determining the essence of things. These common notions should be contrasted with another set of common notions that result from our contact with metaphysical reality. Articulation of these notions may indeed yield insight into the essence of things’ (van den Berg [see note 3] 120). Simp., In Phys. 640, 12–18: Τί οὖν ἄρα τοσούτους καὶ τηλικούτους ἄνδρας διαμαρτεῖν ἐν τῇ περὶ τόπου δόξῃ φήσαιμεν θοίνην οὐκ εὐτυχῆ προτιθέντες τὰς ἡμετέρας ἀπορίας τοῖς εἰωθόσιν ἐντρυφᾶν ταῖς δοκούσαις τῶν παλαιῶν ἐναντιολογίαις, ἢ μᾶλλον ἑκάστῳ τῶν περὶ τόπου τι γραψάντων παρακολουθοῦντες δείξωμεν μηδένα μὲν τῆς περὶ τόπου διαμαρτεῖν ἀληθείας, πολυειδοῦς δὲ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἄλλον κατ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν εἰδῶν τοῦ τόπου θεάσασθαί τε καὶ ἐκφῆναι. Translation by J. O. Urmson, Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time. Annotated by Lucas Siorvanes (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1992.

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considerable amount is amassed. Therefore, since the truth seems to be like the proverbial door, which no one can fail to hit, in this way it is easy, but the fact that we can have a whole truth and not the particular part we aim at shows the difficulty of it.36 Aristotle, on his own view, stood close to the teleological peak of philosophical achievement, from which the partial achievements of the past could be surveyed.37 Simplicius – like Aristotle, and others among his fellow commentators – strives to show that he is endorsing a view that ‘harmonizes’ a number of different partial perspectives, and shows how they all had a piece of the truth (see his own programmatic remarks In Cat. 7, 23–32). The passage excerpted from his ‘corollary on space’, above (In Phys. 640, 12–18), offers an example of this procedure. Another extended example of this kind of effort can be found in a long doxographical passage early in the Categories commentary, where past interpretations of the σκοπός – the goal or target – of the Categories are subdivided into verbal, conceptual, and ontological readings, which are then unified under the more ‘complete’ banner of a semantic understanding that integrates verbal, conceptual, and ontological components.38 Among earlier philosophers, Simplicius says, ‘each one had an incomplete grasp of the goal’ (In Cat. 2, 26). The ‘full’ view is this: 36

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Met. α 1.993 a 30-b 7: Ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία τῇ μὲν χαλεπὴ τῇ δὲ ῥᾳδία. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτ’ ἀξίως μηδένα δύνασθαι θιγεῖν αὐτῆς μήτε πάντας ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον λέγειν τι περὶ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ καθ’ ἕνα μὲν ἢ μηθὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτῇ, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροιζομένων γίγνεσθαί τι μέγεθος· ὥστ’ εἴπερ ἔοικεν ἔχειν καθάπερ τυγχάνομεν παροιμιαζόμενοι, τίς ἂν θύρας ἁμάρτοι; ταύτῃ μὲν ἂν εἴη ῥᾳδία, τὸ δ’ ὅλον τι ἔχειν καὶ μέρος μὴ δύνασθαι δηλοῖ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐτῆς. Fr. 53 Rose (= Cicero, Tusc. III 69); cf. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (see note 7) 26–27. Simp., In Cat. 1, 1–2, 26: ‘Many authors have set forth many speculations on Aristotle’s book of Categories. This is so not only because it is the prologue to the whole of philosophy (since it is the beginning of the study of logic, and logic, in turn, is rightly taken up prior to the whole of philosophy), but also because the Categories is, in a sense, about the first principles (ἀρχαί), as we shall see in our discussion of its target (σκοπός). Different authors have carried out studies of this book from different standpoints […]’, 9, 5–10, 6: ‘Let us first consider what is the goal (σκοπός) [of the book], since this point has obviously been a point of contention even among the most distinguished. It is clear at the outset that it is about some ten simple things […]. (1) Now some say that they are words (φωναί) and that the goal is about simple words […]. (2) Others, however, do not accept this goal. It does not, they say, pertain to the philosopher to theorize about words, but rather to the grammarian, who investigates their modifications […] they say that the goal is about the very beings (ὄντα) which are signified by words […]. (3) Others say that the goal is neither about significant words nor about signified realities, but rather about simple concepts (νοήματα). […] the ten genera […] are posterior and conceptual […] ‘sayables’ (λεκτά) are concepts. These people, however, should have considered that to speak about concepts as such does not pertain to the study of logic, but to psychology. Of these people, each one had an

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Michael Griffin It is thus clear from what has been said that [those who have a more complete conception: Alexander, Porphyry, Iamblichus] do not define the goal as being about mere words, nor about beings themselves in so far as they are beings, nor about concepts alone. Instead, because it is a prelude to the study of logic, [the Categories] is about simple words and expressions qua significant of primary and simple beings […]. It is thus clear from the preceding considerations that the goal (σκοπός) […] is about simple, primary, and generic words (φωναί), in so far as they are significant of beings. Instruction is, at any rate, also given about the realities which are signified by them, and about concepts, in so far as it is realities that are signified by words.39

The question at hand is what kind of thing a category or genus like ‘the relative’ or ‘quality’ might turn out to be – a word, or a concept, or a real being. In Plotinus’ terms, Simplicius has explored the views of thoughtful, past philosophers about the nature of these genera, and explored ἀπορίαι about them, in order to discover which, if any, matches with our ἔννοια, along the way trying to excavate and clarify what that concept is (on this, more below). This discussion of the Categories’ weave of verbal, conceptual, and ontological inquiry leads Simplicius to offer an interesting explanation of the role of language in philosophical education, which also sheds light on the psychological underpinnings of the project of offering differing, past perspectives on a subject of inquiry. Simplicius explains how language, adapted and transformed by a teacher, can help to return the soul to its noetic origins: For neither are significant expressions wholly separate from the nature of beings, nor are beings detached from the names which are naturally suited to signify them. Nor, finally, are intellectual concepts extraneous to the nature of the other two; for these three things were previously one, and became differentiated later. For Intellect (νοῦς), being identical with realities and with intellection (νόησις), possesses as one both beings and the intellectual concepts of them, by virtue of its undifferentiated

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incomplete grasp of the goal […]’. Translation adapted from M. Chase, Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2003. Simp., In Cat. 11, 30–13, 15: δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι οὔτε περὶ φωνῶν ψιλῶν οὔτε περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ὄντων ᾗ ὄντα ἐστὶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν νοημάτων μόνων οἱ ἄνδρες οὗτοι τὸν σκοπὸν ἀφορίζονται, ἀλλὰ περὶ φωνῶν μὲν ἁπλῶν καὶ λέξεων, διότι λογικῆς ἐστι πραγματείας προοίμιον, καθὸ δὲ σημαντικαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἁπλῶν […]. ἔστιν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον, ὅτι ἐστὶν μὲν ὁ σκοπὸς οἰκεῖος τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ γενικῶν φωνῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσίν, συνδιδάσκεται δὲ πάντως καὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα, καθὸ σημαίνεται τὰ πράγματα ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν. Translation adapted from Chase (see note 38).

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unity (ἀδιάκριτος ἕνωσις), and there [sc. in the intelligible world] there is no need for language. […] When, however, the soul has fallen into the realm of becoming, it is filled with forgetfulness, and requires sight and hearing in order to be able to recollect. For [the soul] needs someone who has already beheld the truth, who, by means of verbal expression (φωνή) uttered forth from the ἔννοια, also moves the concept within [the soul of the student] which had until then grown cold. This, then, is how the need for φωνή came about: on the one hand, it strives immediately to assimilate itself to concepts, while, on the other, by means of them it adjusts to realities and becomes of one nature with them, in order that words might not be spoken in vain – as in the case of ‘blituri’ – but might rather set in motion within the listener those [concepts] which are similar to the kinetic concepts. For νοήσεις which proceed forth from other νοήσεις also set in motion immediately, and they join the learner’s concepts to those of the teacher, by becoming intermediaries between the two. When νοήσεις are set in motion in the appropriate way, they adjust themselves to realities, and thus there comes about the knowledge of beings, and the soul’s spontaneous ἔρως is fulfiled.40 The simple, meaningful words treated in the Categories, then, are generated by the soul in the course of its descent from the noetic realm. They are ‘the most authentic core of human language’.41 But they are also, in our ordinary, 40

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Simp., In Cat. 12, 13–13, 4: […] οὔτε τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων πάντῃ κεχωρισμένων τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως οὔτε τῶν ὄντων ἀπηρτημένων τῶν σημαίνειν αὐτὰ πεφυκότων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῶν νοημάτων ἔξω τῆς ἀμφοῖν ὄντων φύσεως· ἓν γὰρ ὄντα πρότερον τὰ τρία ταῦτα διεκρίθησαν ὕστερον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ὢν καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ νόησις ταὐτὸν ἔχει τά τε ὄντα καὶ τὰ τῶν ὄντων νοήματα διὰ τὴν ἀδιάκριτον ἕνωσιν, καὶ φωνῆς ἐκεῖ οὐδὲν χρεία· […] πεσοῦσα δὲ εἰς γένεσιν καὶ λήθης ἀναπλησθεῖσα ἐδεήθη μὲν ὄψεως, ἐδεήθη δὲ ἀκοῆς πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν· δεῖται γὰρ τοῦ ἤδη τεθεαμένου τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ φωνῆς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννοίας προφερομένης κινοῦντος καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ τέως ἀπεψυγμένην ἔννοιαν· καὶ οὕτως ἡ τῆς φωνῆς ἐγένετο χρεία προσεχῶς μὲν τοῖς νοήμασιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι σπευδούσης, δι’ ἐκείνων δὲ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐφαρμοττούσης καὶ συμφυομένης πρὸς αὐτά, ἵνα μὴ μάτην αἱ φωναὶ λέγοιντο ὥσπερ ἡ βλίτυρι, ἀλλὰ κινοῖεν ἐν τῷ ἀκούοντι τὰς ὁμοίας ταῖς κινητικαῖς νοήσεσιν. ἀπὸ γὰρ νοήσεων προϊοῦσαι νοήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ κινοῦσι προσεχῶς καὶ συνάπτουσι τὰς τοῦ μανθάνοντος ταῖς τοῦ διδάσκοντος, μεσότητες ἀμφοῖν γινόμεναι. αἱ δὲ νοήσεις οἰκείως κινηθεῖσαι ἐφαρμόττουσι τοῖς πράγμασιν, καὶ οὕτως γίνεται ἡ τῶν ὄντων γνῶσις καὶ ὁ αὐτοφυὴς ἔρως τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποπίμπλαται. Translation adapted from Chase (see note 38). See also Hoffmann, Catégories et langage selon Simplicius (see note 3). Hoffmann, Catégories et langage selon Simplicius (see note 3) 90 explains that ‘[l]a structure de la signification, telle que nous la percevons dans l’analyse de notre langage, c’est-àdire comme un système liant les mots aux réálités par la médiation des notions, est le produit de la séparation effectuée par l’âme, et tel est l’horizon métaphysique dans lequel est conçue la doctrine des catégories. Pour Simplicius, comme pour les autres commentateurs néoplatoniciens, celles-ci sont les mots les plus génériques de tous, institués dès l’origine pour signifier les genres suprèemes. Ces mots simples et premiers sont le noyau le plus

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pre-philosophical condition, imperfect representations of the ἔννοιαι that have ‘grown cold’ in the ordinary person’s mind. Here are the baser or lower ἔννοιαι of Plotinus, those that are partial and not guaranteed to be accurate, that need dialectical work to make ‘clear’ and usable for philosophical activity. In the context of this passage in the Categories commentary, it is apparent that language, at this level, is the kind of sloppy ‘ordinary language’ that is used by the student who is coming to philosophy for the first time, at the level where Aristotle’s Categories picks up – that is, the level where all words refer to sensible objects of ordinary experience (cf. In Cat. 74, 4; 82, 15–20). Starting from this position, it is possible for a good teacher to ‘stir up’ the concept in the mind of the student, to ‘join the learner’s concepts to those of the teacher’, through dialectical activity, bringing the fallible concept back to its intelligible and true paradigm. The Categories itself is an example of how we might be helped in this project – before we are able to understand a full ‘definition’ of a genus like the relative, Aristotle’s text can offer us a sketch account or ὑπογραφή42 that will ‘stir up’ the appropriate conception: […] it was not feasible to give definitions of the primary genera for the reasons stated earlier. But it was possible, by means of a general description (ὑπογραφῆς), to actuate (ἀνακινεῖν) our conception (ἔννοιαν) that fits (συναρμόζουσαν) with relatives. He does this by following Plato according to the first definition, as Boethus [of Sidon] tells us […].43 The idea that Simplicius is drawing on here resembles Plotinus’ suggestion (III 7 [45] 7, 13–15) that, in lieu of expert or ancient testimony about a subject, we should attempt to fit (ἐφαρμόζειν) our articulated opinion of it with our inner conception (ἔννοια). As for Plotinus, too, our conception might initially be imperfect, answering to a preliminary account of what is under discussion without revealing its essence: Dialectic will be needed to get clear about the essence. But for Simplicius, for whom we can use successful ‘outline accounts’ from the history of philosophy, especially from a classical text like the Categories or Plato, to ‘stir’ our concept, we should do so, and this is what the Categories, and Simplicius’ commentary on it, are perceived

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authentique du langage humain, et leur étude est à juste titre le ‘viatique’ qui conduit l’âme ‘vers de plus hautes connaissances’ dans son cheminement en direction du premier principe. Le σκοπός du traité d’Aristote s’ordonne à cette fin ultime’. See 26H ap. Long – Sedley (see note 5) for Stoic examples of the Hellenistic use of the Aristotelian concept of the ‘outline account’. Simp., In Cat. 159, 10–14: τῶν γὰρ πρώτων γενῶν ὅρους ἀποδιδόναι ἀμήχανον ἦν διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας πρότερον αἰτίας· δι’ ὑπογραφῆς δέ τινος τὴν ἡμετέραν ἔννοιαν ἀνακινεῖν τὴν συναρμόζουσαν τοῖς πρός τι δυνατὸν ἦν. καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ τῷ Πλάτωνι κατὰ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τὴν πρώτην ἀκολουθῶν, ὥς φησιν Βόηθος. Translation by B. Fleet, Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 7–8 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2002.

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as achieving here. Thus the text can function much as Simplicius says a good teacher will function, activating the student’s forgotten inner conceptions and, through dialectical practice, bringing them increasingly closer to their noetic origins, the reality that they image. As van den Berg suggests in discussing Plotinus’ theory of similar concepts, the latent ἔννοιαι in Simplicius’ account seem to operate in a way that is very similar to Epicurean προλήψεις. They are articulated as ‘outline accounts’ or ὑπογραφαί,44 and they begin at the level of ordinary language about sensible or perceptible things: [Aristotle in the Categories] is talking about perceptible things (αἰσθητά), which are also what is investigated by the ordinary person (ὁ πολὺς ἄνθρωπος) […] he seeks the difference in accordance with those meaningful words which were first and most properly assigned to sensible things, and which are familiar to the ordinary person […].45 [Aristotle in this treatise] is not concerned with discussing the intelligible substances […]. This he also made clear by the [word] ‘called’ (λεγομένη, Cat. 5.2 a 12). For in ordinary language (συνήθεια) intelligible substance is not spoken of, nor is it known to the multitude (οἱ πολλοί), but sensible substance is.46 Simplicius explores how this process ought to work in a number of illustrative passages from the Categories commentary, such as this one (in which he endorses an explanation previously offered by Porphyry, who is attempting to defend Aristotle’s apparently conscious choice to delay his account of the many meanings of ‘having’ until late in the treatise, the ‘postpraedicamenta’ that follow the account of the ten categories proper): Some wonder too why Aristotle did not join the account concerning the [category of] having to the simple categories, but talked first about opposition, prior and posterior, the simultaneous, movement and some other things, and only then produced the division of the [category of] having. But others solve [this problem] nicely, [saying] that he arranged having together with where and when, and remarked [there] that there 44 45

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Cf. Long – Sedley (see note 5) sect. 19 (‘Epicurean epistemology: Language’), commentary. Simp., In Cat. 74, 4–17: περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διαλέγεται, περὶ ὧν καὶ ὁ πολὺς ἄνθρωπος τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ποιεῖται […] κατὰ τὰς σημαντικὰς φωνὰς τὴν διαφορὰν μετιών, αἳ πρώτως καὶ κυρίως ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐτάχθησαν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶ γνώριμοι. Translation adapted from Chase (see note 38). Simp., In Cat. 82, 2–6: οὐ πρόκειται αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν οὐσιῶν νῦν εἰπεῖν […], ὅπερ καὶ διὰ τοῦ ‘λεγομένη’ ἐνεδείξατο· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ οὐδὲ ἔγνωσται τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐκείνη, ἀλλ’ αὕτη μᾶλλον ἡ αἰσθητή. Translation by F. A. J. de Haas – B. Fleet, Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 5–6 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2001.

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Michael Griffin was no need – in view of their obviousness – to say anything else about them, but then wishing after the [treatment of the] categories to give a more technical articulation (διαρθρῶσαι τεχνικώτερον) of the matters which he had dealt with according to the popular conceptions of them (κατὰ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἐννοίας) […] he reasonably defined the homonymy of having at the end.47

The ‘work’ that we have to do on our nascent προλήψεις in order to get to a position of clear definition is called διάρθρωσις or ‘articulation’: this is also the Stoic technical term for the kind of work that we must perform to arrive at real definitions of things,48 although it also has an earlier, looser sense in Aristotle and Plato; it was widely adopted and adapted by the Neoplatonists.49 The following passages also offer illustrations of Simplicius’ application of this idea to the reading of the Categories (especially with a teacher who can assist as midwife of Aristotle’s ‘clearing up’ of confused preconceptions): […] among the names which receive mention in the Categories, those which were not anticipated by the common conceptions (κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας προειλημμένα) Aristotle took right at the beginning and articulated them (διήρθρωσεν), as for example in the account concerning homonymous and synonymous things, while those which were indeed anticipated in the common conceptions, but which required further articulation (διαρθρώσεως δὲ πλείονος ἐδεῖτο) – of these Aristotle articulated [in each case] the confused [name] (τὸ συγκεχυμένον) belonging to the preconception (τῆς προλήψεως) after the completion [of the Categories proper] in order not to chop up the continuity of the account by inserting the analysis of these [names] into the midst [of the main account].50 47

48 49

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Simp., In Cat. 300, 31–301, 5: Ἀποροῦσι δέ τινες καὶ διὰ τί οὐ συνῆψεν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον ταῖς ἁπλαῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ περὶ ἀντικειμένου καὶ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου καὶ τοῦ ἅμα καὶ κινήσεως καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν μνημονεύσας, οὕτως τὴν τοῦ ἔχειν διαίρεσιν ἐποιήσατο. ἀλλὰ καὶ λύουσιν ἕτεροι καλῶς, ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν τῷ ποῦ καὶ ποτὲ συντάξας ὡς περὶ προφανῶν εἶπεν μηδὲν ἄλλο δεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας βουληθεὶς ἐκεῖνα οἷς ἐχρήσατο κατὰ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἐννοίας διαρθρῶσαι τεχνικώτερον […] τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν τοῦ ἔχειν εἰκότως ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει διεστείλατο. Translation adapted from R. Gaskin, Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 9–15 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2000. See Brittain, Common Sense: Concepts, Definition and Meaning in and out of the Stoa (see note 33) 180–191. See Dam., In Phd. II § 93, 2, and, with Helmig (see note 3) 278–282, G. R. Boys-Stones, Alcinous, Didaskalikos 4: In Defense of Dogmatism, in: M. Bonazzi – V. Celluprica (edd.), L’eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo (Elenchos 45), Napoli 2005, 201–234 on the Platonic adaptation of the idea in the context of the theory of recollection. Simp., In Cat. 379, 14–20: […] τῶν ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις μνήμης τυχόντων ὀνομάτων, ὅσα μὲν οὐκ ἦν κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας προειλημμένα, ταῦτα ἐν ἀρχῇ προὔλαβεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ διήρθρωσεν, ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων λόγον, ὅσα δὲ ἦν μὲν ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς

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A passage in Porphyry’s commentary on the Categories helps to tease out the idea further and to show how it was already applied by Peripatetics before Porphyry to the study of a text, namely Categories.51 [The second-century Peripatetic] Herminus says that the subject [of the Categories] is not the primary and highest genera in nature, for instruction in these is not suitable for young persons, nor the issue of what the primary and fundamental differentiae of things said are, since in that case the discussion would seem to be about the parts of speech. Rather it is about the sort of predication that will properly belong to what is said in each of the genera of being. Hence it also became necessary to touch in some way upon the genera to which the predications in question correspond, for it is impossible to recognise the kind of signification that is proper to each genus without some preconception (πρόληψις) of it. This also accounts for the title Predication (κατηγορία), which means ‘the proper mode of signification connected with each genus’.52 Plotinus’ and Simplicius’ basic προλήψεις can be improved, hardened, and clarified, through the application of a dialectical process of διάρθρωσις, in oral teaching and especially from a text that encodes a successful teaching procedure, like the Categories. The Categories is a particularly helpful treatise in helping us move from our vaguer notions toward proper, precise, and articulated definitions.

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ἐννοίαις προειλημμένα, διαρθρώσεως δὲ πλείονος ἐδεῖτο, τούτων τὸ συγκεχυμένον τῆς προλήψεως μετὰ τὴν συμπλήρωσιν διήρθρωσεν πρὸς τὸ μὴ διακόπτειν τὸ τοῦ λόγου συνεχὲς μεταξὺ τὴν τούτων διάρθρωσιν παρεμβάλλοντα. Translation adapted from Gaskin (see note 47). This passage suggests that the idea can be traced at least to Alexander’s teacher Herminus; I argue elsewhere (M. J. Griffin, Aristotle’s Categories in the Early Roman Empire [Oxford Classical Monographs], Oxford 2015, esp. 9 n. 22) that there are some grounds for tracing it to the first century BCE and to Andronicus of Rhodes’ foregrounding of the Categories in the curriculum. (Consider for example how Porphyry ‘follows’ Andronicus in ‘articulating’ the concept of unity, In Cat. 154, 3 ff.) Herminus ap. Porph., In Cat. 59, 20–29: Λέγει τοίνυν ὁ Ἑρμῖνος προκεῖσθαι οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει πρώτων καὶ γενικωτάτων γενῶν (οὐ γὰρ νέοις προσήκουσα ἡ τῶν τοιούτων διδασκαλία) οὔτε τίνες αἱ πρῶται καὶ στοιχειώδεις τῶν λεγομένων διαφοραί, ὡς τὸν λόγον εἶναι δοκεῖν περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τῆς καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος τῶν ὄντων οἰκείας ἂν ἐσομένης τῶν λεγομένων κατηγορίας· διὸ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἐγένετο ἀμωσγέπως ἅψασθαι τῶν γενῶν, ἐφ’ ἅπερ ἡ τῶν κατηγορουμένων ἀναφορά· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὴν ἑκάστου οἰκείαν σημασίαν γνώριμον εἶναι μηδεμιᾶς αὐτῷ προλήψεως προυποκειμένης. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφὴ Κατηγορία, δηλωτικὴ οὖσα τῆς ἑκάστῳ γένει συνημμένης οἰκείας σημασίας. Translation by S. K. Strange, Porphyry: On Aristotle Categories (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1992, slightly modified.

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Why turn to Aristotle, and his Categories, as a canonical case-study? Aristotle’s own mode of explanation or interpretation (ἑρμηνεία) is explained by Simplicius at In Cat. 6, 19–26: The mode of Aristotle’s explanation is condensed, intellective, and rapidfire, with regard both to the content (νοῦς) and the expression (λέξις). Either he adduces the solution to a given ἀπορία immediately or else he joins together several ἀπορίαι and resolves them all with a single solution, and a concise one at that. Yet he never intentionally departs from vividness (ἐνάργεια). Vividness used for persuasion is of two kinds: one which comes from the intellect, and one which comes from sensation. Now, since he is conversing with people living on the level of sensation, he prefers that vividness which derives from sensation. That is why his demonstrations have such constraining force, which is such that, even if, because of some unfortunate preconceptions (προλήψεις), one is not persuaded, he is never the less obliged to hold his peace.53 Thus Aristotle is a good teacher, who attempts to take those whose preconceptions are shaped by the sensible world and ordinary language, and draw them ‘upward’, resolving the puzzles raised by our ordinary concepts and excavating a true and ‘vivid’ ἔννοια that represents intelligible being.54 The ascent from the sensible to intelligible realm through this process – from the persuasive vividness of the sensible, which is Aristotle’s speciality, to the persuasive vividness of the intelligible, which is Plato’s speciality – is articulated later in the commentary by Simplicius: Those who have studied this (θεασάμενοι), having taken their startingpoint from perceptible things, have grasped that there are no words for those other things [e.g. intelligible species] (ἄρρητα ἐκεῖνα); therefore, making a slight alteration, they spoke of “humanness” (ἀνθρωπότης) or of ‘Human-in-itself’ (αὐτοάνθρωπος) or of ‘the primary human’ (πρώτως ἄνθρωπος). Thus, someone who enjoys studying reality (φιλοθεάμων)

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Εἶδος δὲ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς ἑρμηνείας τὸ κατά τε τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν λέξιν συνεστραμμένον καὶ νοερὸν καὶ γοργόν. ἢ γὰρ τὴν λύσιν εὐθὺς ἐπάγει τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἢ πολλὰς ἐπισυνάπτων ἀπορίας μιᾷ λύσει καὶ ταύτῃ συντόμῳ διαλύει πάσας, οὐδαμοῦ δὲ ἐθέλει τῆς ἐναργείας ἐξίστασθαι. διττῆς δὲ οὔσης ἐναργείας εἰς πίστιν, τῆς μὲν ἀπὸ νοῦ, τῆς δὲ ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, τοῖς μετὰ αἰσθήσεως ζῶσιν διαλεγόμενος τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως προτιμᾷ· διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαστικὸν αὐτοῦ ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ὑπάρχει, ὡς καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον διά τινας οὐκ εὐτυχεῖς προλήψεις ὅμως ἠναγκασμένον ἐπιστομίζεσθαι. Translation adapted from Chase (see note 38). For the concept of clarity or vividness, ἐνάργεια, here, perhaps cp. Plot. III 7 (45) 1 with McGuire – Strange (see note 25) 266 n. 13.

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could easily pass from these [perceptible] things over to the intelligibles, by making use of analogy.55 The good interpreter (ἐξηγητής) of Plato and Aristotle can aid in this pedagogical ascent (cf. In Cat. 7, 23–29). Indeed, Simplicius himself can benefit by transcribing and reflecting on the work of a good, ‘intellective’ interpreter of Aristotle like Iamblichus (In Cat. 3, 4–11), and although Simplicius is himself already on his way ‘toward the loftier visions’ (πρὸς τὰς ὑψηλοτέρας θεωρίας, In Cat. 438, 35–36: cp. Iamblichus’ ὑψηλὸς νοῦς at In Cat. 3, 6), the study – especially the word-for-word study – of the text facilitates his quest for philosophical discovery: Since this is as far as the divine Iamblichus reached, I too cease here my account, entreating the guardians of my words both to render a more accurate scrutiny of these matters and to bestow this on me as a resource on my journey toward the sublimer theories, and [thereby] to grant me relief from the distractions of life.56 Thus we might discern one and the same process at work for Simplicius as commentator or ἐξηγητής, as ‘researcher’, and as pedagogue: selecting the best from the history of philosophy to help clarify and correct our ἔννοιαι, beginning as mere προλήψεις from sense-perception, solving the ἀπορίαι raised by these impressions, and leading us upward to the truth.

III. Two Attitudes to the Ancients: A Brief Look at Predecessors of Simplicius Here we have a single method of approach that helps to understand how commentary functions ‘as’ philosophical education and research in Simplicius and among the commentators. In concluding, I would like briefly to explore two facets of Simplicius’ posture to his predecessors, which resonate with two temperaments in earlier Greek philosophy. On the one hand, we have noticed Simplicius’ attitude of reverence for at least some of his prede-

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Simp., In Cat. 73, 35–74, 3: καὶ οἱ θεασάμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁρμηθέντες ὅτι ἄρρητα ἐκεῖνα κατέλαβον· διὸ καὶ παρεγκλίνοντες ἔλεγον ἀνθρωπότητα ἢ αὐτοάνθρωπον ἢ πρώτως ἄνθρωπον. ὁ οὖν τῶν ὄντων φιλοθεάμων ἀπὸ τούτων μεταβαίνοι ἂν ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τὰ νοητά, τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ προσχρώμενος. Translation adapted from Chase (see note 38). Simp., In Cat. 438, 33–36: Ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ μέχρι τοῦδε καὶ ὁ θεῖος προῆλθεν Ἰάμβλιχος, καὶ ἐγὼ καταπαύω τὸν λόγον, εὐχόμενος τοῖς τῶν λόγων ἐφόροις τούτων τε ἀκριβεστέραν ἐνδοῦναι κατανόησιν καὶ ταύτην ἐφόδιόν μοι πρὸς τὰς ὑψηλοτέρας θεωρίας χαρίσασθαι καὶ σχολὴν παρασχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ περιελκόντων. Translation adapted from Gaskin (see note 47).

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cessors – drawing on the ability, especially of the ‘ancients’ such as Plato and Aristotle, rightly interpreted, to help us out of our muddled, sensation-bound conceptual framework to a clear and corrected world-view. This attitude might be regarded as somewhat ‘elitist’, insofar as it allows for only a few expert philosophers to have found the truth. On the other hand, we have Simplicius’ allowance that some of those predecessors are just wrong, partial in their view, misleading, yet still worthy of record, so that studying the ἀπορίαι that they raise, even beginning from the language and thought of the ordinary person (Simp., In Cat. 74, 4 ff.), can help in the process of arriving at the truth. This approach seems rather more ‘democratic’. A post-Hellenistic Platonist’s posture to philosophical history is, perhaps, most resonant with the former, reverent attitude in Simplicius. This posture draws on Stoic sources. For the Stoics, on one interpretation, philosophy allows us to reorganize our muddled concepts into a right articulation despite the corrupting influence of our culture, and if we can rediscover what ‘the ancients’ believed in a pure, rational condition before the corrupting influence of our culture affected human beliefs,57 we can make progress toward the truth. The challenge, then, is determining who these ‘ancients’ are and getting clear, exegetically, about their views; Plato in particular represented an ideally clear and precise exposition of the ancient and pure ‘wisdom’ of his earliest and most authentic predecessors,58 but other philosophers such as Aristotle and the Presocratics also qualified, especially so far as they could be brought into ‘harmony’ with Plato.59 This process of exegesis searches among the ancients for a truth (possibly disguised or in need of interpretation) that can be excavated with the toolbox of the good exegete. For the latter attitude, we might turn to Aristotle himself, whose esoteric treatises provide the model for so much of the subsequent commentary tradition.60 While Aristotle certainly allows that fragments of ancient wisdom are preserved as ‘relics’ today in the form of μῦθοι and sayings,61 his general attitude to his predecessors is to regard them as partial anticipators of his own, more coherent and holistic position, which is able to harmonize their apparent differences or ‘partial’ grasps of the truth (cf. Met. α 1.993 a 30–b 7, quoted above n. 36). At its core, Simplicius’ praise of Aristotle’s method of exposition

57 58 59

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Cf. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (see note 7) 26. Cf. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (see note 7) 115. Cf. G. E. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford Philosophical Monographs), Oxford 2006 and Simp., In Cat. 7, 23–29 above. Cf. Fazzo (see note 15). See Met. Λ 8.1074 a 38–b 14; cf. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (see note 7) 28.

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at In Cat. 6, 19–26 reflects Aristotle’s own view of how to come to a more ‘vivid’ or ‘clear’ position by way of exploring multiple plausible positions: About all these matters we must try to get conviction by arguments, using the phenomena as evidence and illustration. It would be best that all men should clearly concur with what we are going to say, but if that is unattainable, then that all should in some way at least concur. And this if converted they will do, for every man has some contribution to make to the truth, and with this as a starting-point we must give some sort of proof about these matters. For by advancing from true but obscure judgments he will arrive at clear ones, always exchanging the usual confused statement for more real knowledge.62 We might see in the commentators’ approach to historical philosophy an emulation of Aristotle’s alleged ‘method’ of studying ἀπορίαι in ἔνδοξα, famously illustrated in the seventh chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics: Here, as in all other cases, we must set down the appearances (φαινόμενα), and, first working through the puzzles (διαπορήσαντας), in this way go on to show, if possible, the truth of all the beliefs we hold (τὰ ἔνδοξα) about these experiences; and, if this is not possible, the truth of the greatest number and the most authoritative. For if the difficulties (ἀπορίαι) are resolved and the beliefs (ἔνδοξα) are left in place, we will have done enough showing.63 The attribution of such a clear and explicit ‘endoxic method’ to Aristotle may have been overly stressed,64 but perhaps something like it can be seen in Simplicius himself as, in an Aristotelian spirit, he – like his fellow Neoplatonist ἐξηγηταί, including Plotinus – offers doxographies of different ‘partial’

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E. E. I 6.1216 b 26–35: πειρατέον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πως περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένως. Translation by J. Solomon, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. II, Princeton 1984. E. N. VII 1.1145 b 2–7: δεῖ δ’, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς. Translation by M. C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge 2001 (revised edition), 240. Cf. D. Frede, The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa Are and What They Are Not, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43, 2012, 185–215.

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views in the history of philosophy and, on the way to clearing up misconceptions in our ‘ordinary’ concepts about reality, attempts to resolve difficulties or ἀπορίαι presented by them. Perhaps there is nothing really dissonant between these respectively ‘elitist’ and ‘democratic’ approaches: the latter represents the first steps on a course of philosophy, where all the material available is used to correct an ordinary and incomplete notion or preconception, while the former represents the goal of the course, where the true concepts are contemplated directly, as (in Simplicius’ psychological terms) the soul achieves a direct insight into being, and becomes a fellow-traveler with the true sages, like Plato. Distinguishing these two concepts, however, helps to recognize the challenge faced by an ‘ecumenical’ later ancient philosopher striving to demonstrate the full unity of the entire Hellenic tradition (cf. Simp., In Phys. 640, 12–18) while supporting some aspects of that tradition as more properly right or true. The distinction also helps us to recognize that pedagogical activity, or ‘teaching’, and contemplation, or ‘research’, are on a continuum for Simplicius, as for so many ancient philosophers: they are both waystations on the soul’s journey to the truth.

Bibliography 1. Primary Sources: Editions and Translations ANONYMuS Prolegomena philosophiae Platonicae Westerink, L. G., Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amsterdam 1962. ARISTOTELES Cat. Minio-Paluello, L., Aristotelis Categoriae et liber De interpretatione, Oxford 1949 (repr. Oxford 1966). E. E. Walzer, R. R. – Mingay, J. M., Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia, Oxford 1991. Solomon, J., Translation of Eudemian Ethics, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. II, Princeton 1984. E. N. Bywater, I., Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, Oxford 1894 (repr. Oxford 1970).

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Fragmenta Rose, V., Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta, Leipzig 1886 (repr. Stuttgart 1967). Met. Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1924 (repr. Oxford 1970). Phys. Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Physica, Oxford 1950 (repr. Oxford 1973). Top. Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Topica et Sophistici Elenchi, Oxford 1958 (repr. Oxford 1970). CORNuTuS De natura deorum Lang, K., Cornuti Theologiae Graecae Compendium, Leipzig 1881. DAMASCIuS (= Dam.) In Phd. Westerink, L. G., The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. II: Damascius (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde nieuwe reeks, deel 93), Amsterdam− Oxford−New York 1977. DIOGENES LAERTIuS (= D. L.) Dorandi, T., Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 50), Cambridge 2013. EPICTETuS (= Epict.) Diss. Oldfather, W. A., Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, Books I– II (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge, MA 1925. FRONTO De eloquentia Van den Hout, M. P. J., M. Cornelii Frontonis Epistulae, Leipzig 1988. GALENuS (= Gal.) Adv. Lyc. Wenkebach, E., Galeni adversus Lycum et adversus Iulianum libelli (Corpus medicorum Graecorum V 10,3), Berlin 1951, 3–29.

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De differentia pulsuum Kühn, K. G., Claudii Galeni opera omnia, Tomus VIII, Leipzig 1824, 493– 765. Nat. Fac. Kühn, K. G., Claudii Galeni opera omnia, Tomus II, Leipzig 1821, 1–214. MARINuS (= Marin.) Procl. Saffrey, H. D. – Segonds, A.-Ph., Marinus: Proclus ou sur le bonheur, Paris 2002. OLYMPIODORuS (= Olymp.) In Gorg. Westerink, L. G., Olympiodori in Platonis Gorgiam commentaria, Leipzig 1970. PLATO Burnet, J., Platonis opera, Oxford 1900–1907 (repr. Oxford 1967–1968). PLOTINuS (= Plot.) Henry, P. – Schwyzer, H.-R., Plotini opera, Oxford 1964–1983. PORPHYRIuS (= Porph.) In Cat. Busse, A., Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.1), Berlin 1887. Strange, S. K., Porphyry: On Aristotle Categories (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1992. Plot. Henry, P. – Schwyzer, H.-R., Plotini opera, Tomus I, Oxford 1964, 1–38. PROCLuS (= Procl.) In Alc. Segonds, A.-Ph., Proclus: Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon, Paris 1985– 1986. In Tim. Diehl, E., Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, Leipzig 1903– 1906.

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QuINTILIANuS (= Quint.) Inst. Winterbottom, M., M. Fabi Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae libri duodecim, Oxford 1970. SENECA Ep. Reynolds, L. D., L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium epistulae morales, Oxford 1965. SIMPLICIuS (= Simp.) In Cat. Kalbfleisch, K., Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VIII), Berlin 1907. Chase, M., Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2003. De Haas, F. A. J. – Fleet, B., Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 5–6 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2001. Fleet, B., Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 7–8 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2002. Gaskin, R., Simplicius: On Aristotle’s Categories 9–15 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2000. In Epict. Hadot, I., Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète. Introduction et édition critique du texte grec (Philosophia antiqua vol. 66), Leiden−New York−Köln 1996. In Phys. Diels, H., Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros octo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IX–X), Berlin 1882–1895. Huby, P. – Taylor, C. C. W., Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.3–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011. Urmson, J. O., Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1997. Urmson, J. O., Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1992. STOICI Fragmenta Von Arnim, H., Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, Stuttgart 1903–1905. Long, A. A. – Sedley, D., The Hellenistic philosophers. Vol. I: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary. Vol. II: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography, Cambridge 1987.

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VITRuVIuS De arch. Krohn, F., Vitruvii De architectura libri decem, Leipzig 1912. 2. Secondary Literature Baltussen, H., Philology or Philosophy? Simplicius on the Use of Quotations, in: I. Worthington – J. M. Foley (edd.), Epea and Grammata. Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece (Mnemosyne suppl. 230: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece vol. 4), Leiden−Boston−Köln 2002, 173–189. Baltussen, H., From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary, Poetics Today 28, 2007, 247–281. Baltussen, H., Dialectic in Dialogue: The Message of Plato’s Protagoras and Aristotle’s Topics, in: E. A. Mackay (ed.), Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greek and Roman World (Mnemosyne suppl. 298: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece vol. 7), Leiden−Boston 2008, 203–226. Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008. Barnes, J., Argument in Ancient Philosophy, in: D. Sedley (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy, Cambridge 2003, 20–41. Barney, R., Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority, Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, 101–120. Blondell, R., The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues, Cambridge 2002. Boys-Stones, G. R., Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of Its Development from the Stoics to Origen, Oxford 2001. Boys-Stones, G. R., Alcinous, Didaskalikos 4: In Defense of Dogmatism, in: M. Bonazzi – V. Celluprica (edd.), L’eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo (Elenchos 45), Napoli 2005, 201–234. Brittain, C., Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics (Oxford classical monographs), Oxford 2001. Brittain, C., Common Sense: Concepts, Definition and Meaning in and out of the Stoa, in: D. Frede – B. Inwood (edd.), Language and Learning. Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge 2005, 164–209. Chiaradonna, R., Plotino e la corrente antiaristotelica del platonismo imperiale. Analogie e differenze, in: M. Bonazzi – V. Celluprica (edd.), L’eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo (Elenchos 45), Napoli 2005, 235–274. Chiaradonna, R., Plotinus’ Account of the Cognitive Powers of the Soul: Sense Perception and Discursive Thought, Topoi 31, 2012, 191–207.

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Cooper, J. M., Pursuits of Wisdom. Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus, Princeton 2012. Dillon, J., An Ethic for the Late Antique Sage, in: L. P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, Cambridge 1996, 315–335. Dodds, E. R., The Greeks and the Irrational (Sather Classical Lectures vol. 25), Berkeley 1951. Dodds, E. R., Proclus: The Elements of Theology: A Revised Text with Translation, Introduction, and Commentary, Oxford 1963. Dyson, H., Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa (Sozomena. Studies in the Recovery of Ancient Texts vol. 5), Berlin 2009. Edwards, M., Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their Students, Liverpool 2000. Fazzo, S., Aristotelianism as a Commentary Tradition, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 47, 2004, 1–19. Frede, D., The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa Are and What They Are Not, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43, 2012, 185–215. Frede, M., Epilogue, in: K. Algra – J. Barnes – J. Mansfeld – M. Schofield (edd.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge 1999, 771–797. Griffin, M. J., Aristotle’s Categories in the Early Roman Empire (Oxford Classical Monographs), Oxford 2015. Hadot, I., Le problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Études Augustiniennes), Paris 1978. Hadot, P., Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, Oxford 1995. Helmig, C., Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina 5), Berlin− Boston 2012. Hoffmann, P., Catégories et langage selon Simplicius – la question du « skopos » du traité aristotélicien des « Catégories », in: I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Actes du colloque international de Paris (28 sept.–1 oct. 1985) (Peripatoi Bd. 15), Berlin−New York 1987, 61–90. Hoffmann, P., La fonction des prologues exégétiques dans la pensée pédagogique néoplatonicienne, in: J.-D. Dubois – B. Roussel (edd.), Entrer en matière: Les prologues (Patrimoines. Religions du livre), Paris 1998, 209–245. Hoffmann, P., La triade Chaldaïque ἔρως, ἀλήθεια, πίστις: de Proclus à Simplicius, in: A.-P. Segonds – C. Steel (edd.), Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne: actes du colloque international de Louvain (13–16 mai 1998) en l’honneur de H. D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Series I 26), Leuven−Paris 2000, 459–489.

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Hoffmann, P., What Was Commentary in Late Antiquity? The Example of the Neoplatonic Commentators, in: M. L. Gill – P. Pellegrin (edd.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy), Oxford 2008, 597–622. Karamanolis, G. E., Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford philosophical monographs), Oxford 2006. Mansfeld, J., Prolegomena. Questions To Be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text (Philosophia antiqua vol. 6), Leiden−New York−Köln 1994. McGuire, J. E. – Strange, S. K., An Annotated Translation of Plotinus Ennead iii 7: On Eternity and Time, Ancient Philosophy 8, 1988, 251–271. Nussbaum, M. C., The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge 2001 (revised edition). Phillips, J. F., Stoic ‘Common Notions’ in Plotinus, Dionysius 11, 1987, 33– 52. Reinhardt, T., Cicero’s Topica (Oxford Classical Monographs), Oxford 2003. Schofield, M. (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC. New Directions for Philosophy, Cambridge 2013. Scott, G. A., Plato’s Socrates as Educator (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy), Albany 2000. Scott, G. A. (ed.), Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond, University Park, PA. 2002. Sedley, D., Plato’s Auctoritas and the Rebirth of the Commentary Tradition, in: J. Barnes – M. T. Griffin (edd.), Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome, Oxford 1997, 110–129. Sedley, D., Introduction, in: D. Sedley (ed.), The Philosophy of Antiochus, Cambridge 2012, 1–8. Sharples, R. W., Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC to AD 200. An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation (Cambridge Source Books in Post-Hellenistic Philosophy), Cambridge 2010. Smith, R., Aristotle: Topics. Books I and VIII (Clarendon Aristotle Series), Oxford 1997. Sorabji, R., The Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 AD. A Sourcebook, Vol. I: Psychology (with Ethics and Religion), Vol. II: Physics, Vol. III: Logic and Metaphysics, Ithaca 2005. Stamatellos, G., Plotinus and the Presocratics. A Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in Plotinus’ Enneads (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy), Albany 2007. Strange, S. K., Plotinus on the Nature of Eternity and Time, in: L. P. Schrenk (ed.), Aristotle in Late Antiquity (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy vol. 27), Washington 1994, 22–53.

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Tuominen, M., The Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle (Ancient Philosophies 6), Berkeley 2009. Van den Berg, R. M., As We Are Always Speaking of Them and Using Their Names on Every Occasion. Plotinus, Enn. III.7 [45]: Language, Experience and the Philosophy of Time in Neoplatonism, in: R. Chiaradonna – F. Trabattoni (edd.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. Proceedings of the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop. Il Ciocco, Castelvecchio Pascoli, June 22–24, 2006 (Philosophia antiqua vol. 115), Leiden−Boston 2009, 101–120. Watts, E. J., City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage vol. 41), Berkeley−Los Angeles−London 2008. Zanker, P., The Mask of Socrates. The Image of the Intellectual in Antiquity (Sather Classical Lectures vol. 59), transl. by A. Shapiro, Berkeley−Los Angeles−Oxford 1995.

Simplicius and the Commentator’s Task: Clarifying Exegeses and Exegetical Techniques Han Baltussen

Introduction After clarifying the grand scheme of the works of Aristotle and the position of Physics in his commentary on that work, Simplicius reveals how he views the history of philosophy and Aristotle’s role in it (In Phys. 6, 31–8, 15). In this ‘manifesto’ we find several significant points to understand his approach in the commentary.1 He first outlines what Aristotle is doing in the Physics, indicating how he signals what his predecessors have done well (In Phys. 6, 31–7, 9). Next he lists what Aristotle thought he was contributing himself, in particular by offering an examination of natural principles, which he considers ‘more fundamental’ (ἀρχοειδέστερον), and by adding the efficient and final cause, and last but not least, by using much clearer language and stricter demonstrations (In Phys. 7, 19–8, 15).2 This opening gambit presents an initial characterisation of Simplicius’ working method which illustrates well how the act of commenting on an author also reveals much about the commentator’s own approach and perspective. But to gain fuller insight into Simplicius’ exegetical strategy and his relation to earlier exegeses, we will need to widen our examination while paying attention to both the details he records and the broad perspective he adopts. When we ask how Simplicius positioned himself in the commentary tradition, we need to find out what his assumed and stated presuppositions were and how he came to use such a wide variety of previous works. In other words, we need to establish a genealogy of his exegetical strategy and techniques. 1

2

On the standard points of discussion in the commentary tradition see also the comments in P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. Tradition et Innovation (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina Bd. 3), Berlin− New York 2008, 83–124 and 207–209. Cf. A. Falcon, Aristotelianism in the First Century BCE. Xenarchus of Seleuca, Cambridge 2012, 173n.: ‘continuity and evolution are emphasized’. See In De cael. 107, 20–24 (transl. I. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.3–4 [Ancient Commentators on Aristotle], London 2011, 48).

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Did Simplicius have a clearly articulated exegetical strategy? An answer to this question proves less straightforward than might be expected. Simplicius certainly offers some clear statements which betray a considerable selfawareness regarding the hermeneutical process. His terminology is a first indicator that he understands his task as interpreter (ἐξηγητής) very well: A range of terms for the types of writings (ὑπόμνημα, σύγγραμμα, σχολαί), for their physical form as manuscript (ἀντιγραφή, ἀπογραφή), the verb forms signifying exegetical activity (ἐξηγεῖσθαι), and last but not least, his fairly consistent use of verbs for quotation (παρατίθεσθαι, παραγράφειν3) – all these show us a scholar-philosopher at work making full use of the accumulated tools of textual interpretation. But a fuller answer to the question of any exegetical strategy requires an analysis of both passing comments and certain broader claims related to his working practices. From these we may extract a strategy which is given justification and applied widely. Simplicius does express views about what he is doing in his commentary, which we may label his ‘programmatic statements’. But to establish the exegetical principles which Simplicius used or de facto considered important for his activity as an exegete of Aristotle, we need to go beyond such statements, because authors do not always practice what they preach. Sometimes we find he does not always follow them, or that they are not comprehensive. Either way we may be able to supplement the explicit and obvious claims he makes about method with others which remain unarticulated. The exegesis of philosophical texts, which in Simplicius constitutes an end-point as well as a new beginning, probably started in the first century BC or AD and was mostly concerned with clarifying texts of authorities such as Aristotle and Plato. Hoffmann and Golitsis have highlighted the traditional element in Simplicius’ approach. They consider commentary an act of recomposition and speak of the ‘demarcations of textual units’ as assumed in the long-standing practice of the Neoplatonic school.4 Some basic exegetical 3

4

On quotations in Simplicius see H. Baltussen, Philology or Philosophy? Simplicius on the Use of Quotations, in: I. Worthington – J. M. Foley (edd.), Epea and Grammata. Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece (Mnemosyne suppl. 230: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece vol. 4), Leiden−Boston−Köln 2002, 173–189; C. Wildberg, Simplicius und das Zitat. Zur Überlieferung des Anführungszeichens, in: F. Berger (ed.), Symbolae Berolinenses. Für Dieter Harlfinger, Amsterdam 1993, 187–199 and below. ‘marqueterie des unités textuelles’, Golitsis (see note 1) 58 quoting P. Hoffmann, Les catégories aristotéliciennes pote et pou d’après le commentaire de Simplicius. Méthode d’exégèse et aspects doctrinaux, in: M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (ed.), Le commentaire entre tradition et innovation: Actes du colloque international de l’Institut des Traditions Textuelles (Paris et Villejuif, 22–25 septembre 1999) (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie. Nouvelle série), Paris 2000, 357.

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principles were indeed established very early on, though they were not always articulated in explicit terms until the formal commentary had crystallised more fully and become a more self-conscious tradition. From Plotinus to Iamblichus to Syrianus and Proclus, several types of techniques were introduced in the classroom which would structure the reading of a text: e.g. the idea of a singular purpose (Iamblichus), the idea that philosophy could be motivated by assumption that Socrates was a saviour (Syrianus), or the notion of a division into clarification of meaning and text (Proclus).5 The exegetical strategies of Simplicius can be analysed in two ways, by unpacking the phrase in my title (‘clarifying exegeses’) in two directions, emphasising the two senses present in it: On the one hand, ‘clarifying exegeses’ aims to characterise Simplicius’ own exegetical activity (i.e., it describes how his exegesis clarifies), on the other, we may read the phrase as describing how he clarifies the exegesis of others, in particular those works written by the scholarchs of the Academy and the Peripatos. Exegesis, if this needed emphasising at all, was a part of Greek philosophy early on, and continued to be a part of it once the authoritative voices of schools died away and all that was left were their writings. Simplicius’ methodology is in a way a synthesis of many, if not all, previous techniques and reading strategies. In the brief summary of the main features below I will seek to identify these and then expand on them by exploring further details of his hermeneutical and philological practice. The particular focus of this paper will be to examine his personal contribution to the exegesis of Aristotle in contradistinction to the tradition. It has remained difficult to extract Simplicius’ own views, both because of the sheer size of his work and because he seems to recede into the background when presenting the views and interpretations of so many others.6 But once we manage to extract the more significant contributions outside of the clearly doctrinal essays he attaches to In Phys. 4 (on ‘place’ and ‘time’), we can use these insights to establish how he positioned himself in relation to the commentary tradition he was a part of. In other words, this paper aims to focus on his hermeneutical principles by analysing what kind of meta-commentary he writes. The complex process that led to this moment in the history of hermeneutics raises particular problems of its own. Some of the chapters in the present volume also present some helpful insights into Simplicius’ extraordinary role in the commentary tradition. In order to avoid overlaps I will be asking two specific questions implied in my title: (1) What does Simplicius teach us about the styles of exegesis of his predecessors and (2) what do we learn about his 5 6

See J. Mansfeld, Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text (Philosophia antiqua vol. 6), Leiden−New York−Köln 1994 and Golitsis (see note 1). Golitsis (see note 1) discusses the excursions in his ch. 4, 83–88.

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own exegetical principles? In other words, I hope to explore further how his commentaries, which contain claims we may identify as hermeneutical, clarify the exegesis of his predecessors and of himself.

I. The Question of Methodology A preliminary question must be considered: Can we identify an exegetical methodology in our author? And if so, is it really his? The term ‘methodology’ is here of course referring to a coherent set of principles for a strategy of exegesis, which rests on a well-considered justification. But any attempt to speak of Simplicius’ methodology has to work from a set of statements which are found spread across his commentaries, since his practice is based on ingrained techniques which arose from his own education within the school. The question whether he articulated a hermeneutics may well be somewhat artificial. So when, in the final analysis, these disparate comments do add up to something we may call a methodology – this will not mean that he himself had a clearly articulated notion of the whole method. Simplicius did have the power to synthesise existing exegetical principles and practices and to produce something quite extraordinary, but his ambition to synthesise does not guarantee coherence.7 In the case of Simplicius, who stands at the end of a long exegetical tradition, we find an almost complete toolkit for explicating texts: His historical position and access to a rich tradition allowed him to place himself selfconsciously in this tradition and construct an exegetical narrative which not only commented on the primary text, but also engage with earlier commentators colleagues. This was by no means an obvious thing to happen. Ancient history teaches us that, more often than not, there is loss of information, knowledge and skills. We may start with a general characterisation based on the Physics commentary. We can extract his methodology in outline including certain general principles for interpreting texts, in addition to more specific philological aspects (some of which are discussed in Steel’s contribution to this volume). While I have given a broad appreciation of Simplicius’ methodology else-

7

Whether it is significant that he did not explain or justify his working method in one convenient place is of course a very different question. I hope to have moved closer to answering these questions by the end of my paper. See also H. Baltussen, Philosophers, Scholars, Exegetes. The Ancient Philosophical Commentary from Plato to Simplicius, in: C. Kraus – C. Stray (edd.), Classical Commentaries (accepted by Oxford University Press).

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where, it will be useful to see if we can add further detail here. My argument, then, draws on and expands my earlier work on Simplicius. In broad terms the scholarly attitude has shifted somewhat in the past decades regarding Simplicius’ style of exegesis.8 The longstanding view was that he was a kind of medium channelling the views of earlier thinkers (from the Presocratics to Damascius), or a ‘mere’ commentator, who wrote a lot in a scholastic manner, thereby looking like an unoriginal reflection of a Platonist school tradition of exegesis starting with Plotinus (c. 204–270 CE). This is no longer accepted, as for instance Hankinson’s comments illustrate: It is startling, as well as stimulating and refreshing, to see Aristotle through such an unfamiliar lens; and it may help serve as a valuable correction to the tendency to suppose that the Aristotle of the modern analytically-trained historian is the only intellectually respectable one.9 This position illustrates how this shift in perception has been happening for at least two decades. Many of the principles Simplicius uses in his Aristotelian commentaries still strike us as quite sound: He combines close reading with explanatory comments, aims to spell out the Aristotelian train of thought in great detail with the help of every possible commentator before him – including Aristotle’s students and immediate successors as well as the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias and the late Platonists up to his own day). He also intersperses his clarifications with frequent philosophical and polemical digressions from a Platonist perspective – a feature that shows his philosophical colour and indicates why the modern term ‘commentary’ does not fully describe his activities adequately. Moreover, he shows great skill in handling the impressive body of existing literature.10 The careful study of texts, coming out of the teacher-pupil interactions, is a typical feature of the late Platonist school tradition. Simplicius may also use his knowledge of the literature to take initiative and justify his own small contribution – an attitude which one could almost call modern if it wasn’t for the fact that originality hardly played a role in antiquity; cf.

8 9 10

I here summarise my account in H. Baltussen, Simplicius of Cilicia, in: L. P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, 711–732. R. J. Hankinson, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2002, 8. This is an aspect which has not yet been looked into properly, except perhaps by P. Hoffmann, What Was Commentary in Late Antiquity? The Example of the Neoplatonic Commentators, in: M. L. Gill – P. Pellegrin (edd.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy), Oxford 2006, 597–622.

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In Phys. 946, 24–26: ‘It occurred to me, indeed, both to pose this puzzle in this way and to solve it, since I have found it in none of the commentators’ 11 (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἀπορῆσαι ταύτην ἐπῆλθεν τὴν ἀπορίαν καὶ διαλῦσαι παρ’ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν αὐτὴν ηὑρηκότι). We may at least give him credit for appreciating the omission of a certain point in the tradition: It illustrates his knowledge of earlier material (even his ambition to know it) and his initiative to add to the ongoing interpretive efforts. But it also includes a great respect for the teachers who went before, and the argument from authority is omnipresent in all his works. As we will see in section 2, there is some differentiation or prioritising of authorities, clear from certain epithets as well as statements of the kind found in the Physics commentary. Simplicius often presents his own contribution with a certain degree of modesty. This is, however, more often than not a case of deliberate understatement, an act of deference to the long and venerable tradition, which he helps to reproduce, maintain and develop. His own views therefore remain hidden in a rather impersonal style, but with some effort we can trace his positions even outside the fierce polemical essays found in book 4 of his commentary on Physics. This may take one of two forms: He either apologises for ‘going on for too long’ (μηκύνειν) or he downplays his own contribution. For instance, he may state that he wants to avoid repeating himself (and thus extend the discussion for too long, In De cael. 143, 29–31), or he will apologetically declare that he was ‘forced to go on for longer on account of the fact that the most genuine of commentators of Aristotle, Alexander, interpreted the views of old in rather dry and careless way’ (In Phys. 80, 15– 17: ἐπὶ πλέον ἠναγκάσθην μηκύναι διὰ τὸ τὸν γνησιώτερον τῶν ᾿Αριστοτέλους ἐξηγητῶν τὸν ᾿Αλέξανδρον ξηρότερον καὶ ἀφερεπόνως τῶν παλαιῶν ἀκούειν δογμάτων).12 A strong antipathy to a particular doctrinal position also makes him extend the comments at one point: ‘an understanding regarding matter which is favoured but not the best’ (cf. In Phys. 233, 2–3: διὰ τὴν κρατοῦσαν περὶ τῆς ὕλης ἔννοιαν οὐκ ἀρεστὴν ἐμοὶ ἐπὶ πλέον μηκύναι προήχθην). Some of these cases are no doubt tropes, ways to say politely that more needs to be said. Whether this turn of phrase anticipated a particular audience or readership is hard to say. A reminder of his thoughtful craftsmanship in writing his commentaries is that, more frequently than most commentators, he acknowledges and

11 12

Transl. D. Konstan, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 6 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1989. But he may also indicate that further extending the discussion is not necessary when quoting Aristotle is more effective (see In De cael. 169, 27–30: καὶ τί δεῖ μηκύνειν […] ὅτε δυνατὸν αὐτὸν παράγειν τὸν ᾿Αριστοτέλην).

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quotes earlier contributions to the debate in the commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (e.g., In Cat. 3, 10–13, see below), a distinguishing feature which also marks a change from the rather cavalier attitude towards source referencing commonly seen in antiquity. He will list some of the more important contributors;13 he will take on board their considerations regarding the titles and arrangement of Aristotle’s works;14 and he comments on the nature of their working method by using qualifying terms.15 We cannot emphasise enough how much Simplicius gives the impression of wanting to preserve much of what previous scholars have contributed to the elucidation of Aristotle: His aim, one is tempted to infer, was to create commentaries which incorporated and thus represented the full range of interpretive attempts up to his time. Whether or not he did attempt to create a kind of summa of Greek philosophy (as I have suggested elsewhere),16 the evidence strongly suggests this. It is also a rather elegant way to explain his inclusive and comprehensive approach to the commentary tradition. This brief summary of some broader points characteristic of Simplicius’ method suggests that at least four aspects of commentary style are important: (1) His analysis is based on close reading of lemmata; (2) he seeks out the tradition and uses a very broad evidence base, working from scores of authors – a deliberate choice; (3) he has a vision of his exegetical task and its objectives (more on this soon); and (4) he seeks a broad cohesion (or harmony) among Greek philosophers, including the interpreters of Plato and Aristotle. In short, we should not regard his commentaries, or σχολαί as he calls them, as poor or biased philosophical treatises, nor as mere means of ‘channelling information’, but rather as comprehensive works which have an overarching agenda and could be used for instructing (‘textbooks’) driven by both pedagogy and ideology.17 13 14

15

16 17

See esp. In Cat. 1, 1–3, 20. See, e.g., In Cat. 16, 1 ff. (Adrastos of Aphrodisias, Porphyry). Admittedly these topics (titles, arrangement) were a standard item in the discussion of the school’s educational practice (Mansfeld [see note 5]), but my point is that Simplicius’ reports are far more elaborate than required. In other words, he chooses to preserve and record as much detail as he can. By the use of terms and phrases such as ‘clarifying’ (ἐξηγεῖσθαι, e.g. In Cat. 17, 3), ‘paraphrasing’ (παραφράζειν, e.g. In Cat. 30, 3; In De cael. 399, 1; In Phys. 1206, 27), ‘changing the text’ (μεταγράφειν, e.g. In Cat. 58, 28; In De cael. 171, 6; In Phys. 302, 22; cf. ‘adding’, προστιθέναι, and ‘adducing’ [~ ‘quoting’], παράγειν), ‘states or shows clearly’ (σαφῶς λέγειν, e.g. In De cael. 91, 6, cf. In De cael. 61, 6: διὰ τῆς λέξεως ἐδήλωσε), ‘unmethodically’ (ἀμεθόδως, e.g. In De cael. 29, 36; In Phys. 521, 5), etc. H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008, ch. 7. This conclusion paraphrases my summative account in Baltussen, Simplicius of Cilicia (see note 8).

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II. Some Exegetical Principles (not Comprehensive) In his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, On the Heavens and the Categories Simplicius offers a range of comments which reveal his thoughts on choosing and interpreting particular passages in Aristotle. His interpretive methods range from the philological to the semantic and from the logical to the metaphysical: Well-versed in Alexandrian scholarly methods, he is very adept at evaluating different manuscripts (familiar with two, he considers Phys. 7 genuine, but superseded by Phys. 8) or (re)defining concepts, while Platonist physical and metaphysical principles are assimilated to other perspectives and vice versa (Aristotelian and earlier ones, In Phys. 7, 6–15).18 I should like to review some of these here, with no claim to completeness. Some are still of a programmatic nature, involving the broader enterprise of his exegesis, others are specific to particular passages. First, we cannot ignore the early pages of his Categories commentary, but I shall be brief. It is probably the most famous passage on the exegetical methodology for the commentators. At the start Simplicius outlines the preceding commentator tradition on the work (In Cat. 1, 3–7): [T1] Many authors have set forth many speculations on Aristotle’s book of Categories. This is so not only because it is the prologue to the whole of philosophy (since it is the beginning of the study of logic, and logic, in turn, is rightly taken up prior to the whole of philosophy), but also because the Categories is, in a sense, about the first principles (ἀρχαί), as we shall see in our discussion of the goal (σκοπός).19 Πολλοὶ πολλὰς κατεβάλοντο φροντίδας εἰς τὸ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίον, οὐ μόνον ὅτι προοίμιόν ἐστι τῆς ὅλης φιλοσοφίας (εἴπερ αὐτὸ μὲν τῆς λογικῆς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πραγματείας, ἡ δὲ λογικὴ τῆς ὅλης προλαμβάνεται δικαίως φιλοσοφίας), ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ περὶ ἀρχῶν ἐστι τῶν πρώτων, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ μαθησόμεθα λόγοις. The first sentence expresses both his awareness of the learned literature and a foreshadowing of his selectivity in discussing these. He continues by sketching the different commentary styles he knows, highlighting the problem-solving skills of Porphyry (In Cat. 2, 6–8) and Iamblichus (In Cat. 2, 9 ff.; 3, 2).20 These perceptive comments may well be based on another commentator, but

18 19 20

B. M. Perry, Simplicius as a Source for and Interpreter of Parmenides, PhD Thesis, University of Washington 1983, 88–92. Transl. M. Chase, Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2003. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) ch. 5.

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they once more show his knowledge of his predecessors, and his attempt to include as many types as is possible into his own work. There is no need to claim originality here, since this approach has of course been recognised as the result of the importance the Platonists attached to the Categories, a view which was probably established in the school more firmly in the first century BC where we hear of the first discussions of the work or parts of it. By adopting this view, Simplicius’ own positioning in the tradition seems to make him rather conformist and unadventurous, yet he shows through his use of the existing contributions that he can detect useful contributions. Another wider principle of exegesis can be found in the same work. Simplicius seems to formulate a ‘principle of charity’, when contrasting the ‘letter’ (λέξις) and ‘spirit’ (νοῦς) of the text (In Cat. 7, 30–32). This method allows authors to produce creative and expansive interpretations, ‘massage’ the meaning of words or statements, and still claim that they have abided by the original intentions of the source text. The notion of ‘letter’ versus ‘spirit’ is of course an old one, already implicit in the allegorising interpretations of Homer and famously parodied via Socrates in Plato’s Protagoras. But so is the principle of the intention of the author, which is also at work in the Protagoras, as I have argued elsewhere.21 The taking of liberties with the text among the later Platonists can perhaps be traced back to a passage in Porphyry’s (lost) collection of Oracles, in which he states an exegetical ‘ground-rule’ which reveals much about the commentators’ attitude to text manipulation22 (Eus., PE IV 7, 1 Mras = Porph., fr. 303 Smith): [T2] I swear by the gods that I have neither [i] added (προστέθεικα) nor [ii] subtracted (ἀφεῖλον) anything from the sentiments (νοήματα) used, except that I have [iii] corrected (διώρθωσα) an occasional erroneous reading (λέξιν ἡμαρτημένην), [iv] altered (μεταβέβληκα) the text in the interest of clarity (πρὸς τὸ σαφέστερον), [v] completed (ἀνεπλήρωσα) a line in which the metre appeared defective, or even on occasion [vi] deleted (διέγραψα) what seemed irrelevant to the present purpose, and that I have [vii] preserved the spirit (νοῦς) of the words.23 ἐπεὶ κἀγὼ τοὺς θεοὺς μαρτύρομαι ὡς οὐδὲν οὔτε προστέθεικα οὔτε ἀφεῖλον τῶν χρησθέντων νοημάτων, εἰ μή που λέξιν ἡμαρτημένην διώρθωσα ἢ πρὸς 21

22 23

See H. Baltussen, Plato Protagoras 340–48: Commentary in the Making? in: P. Adamson – H. Baltussen – M. W. F. Stone (edd.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, vol. 1 (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vol. 83,1), London 2004, 21–35. Briefly discussed in Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) 143. Transl. mine, partly based on Whittaker’s paraphrase (see following note).

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The Greek terms emphasised here show the technical level of the analysis: It refers to different types of text manipulation (esp. addition, subtraction, metre and relevance). Whittaker has rightly emphasised that it is striking that ‘Porphyry does not deny that he has altered the wording of the Oracles but only that he has not changed their νοήματα’.24 Another section from the often quoted definition of a commentator at In Cat. 7, 23–32 reads like an aspirational description, outlining what one may expect from someone undertaking to clarify Aristotle’s text. I will only highlight the main points, since this list may assist in assessing Simplicius against his own criteria, as it were. [T3] The worthy exegete of Aristotle’s writings must not fall wholly short of the latter’s (i) greatness of intellect (μεγαλόνοια). He must also have (ii) experience of everything the Philosopher has written, and must be (iii) a connoisseur (ἐπιστήμων) of Aristotle’s stylistic habits. (iv) His judgement must be impartial (ἀδέκαστον), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, if some point should require attention, should he obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher’s school.25 Τὸν δὲ ἄξιον τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐξηγητὴν δεῖ μὴ πάντῃ τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλονοίας ἀπολείπεσθαι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν πανταχοῦ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γεγραμμένων ἔμπειρον εἶναι καὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς συνηθείας ἐπιστήμονα. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κρίσιν ἀδέκαστον ἔχειν, ὡς μηδὲ τὰ καλῶς λεγόμενα κακοσχόλως ἐκδεχόμενον ἀδόκιμα δεικνύναι μηδὲ εἴ τι δέοιτο ἐπιστάσεως, πάντῃ πάντως ἄπταιστον φιλονεικεῖν ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν ἑαυτὸν ἐγγράψαντα τοῦ φιλοσόφου. Naturally, the worthy exegete needs great intelligence, thorough knowledge of the corpus, stylistic habits. The next requirement, that he be impartial, strikes us as more interesting. The definition of ‘impartial’ gives content to the principle of charity, since he clarifies it as the need to avoid ‘misplaced zeal for quarrelling over something well stated or of being obstinate in trying 24

25

J. Whittaker, The Value of Indirect Tradition in the Establishment of Greek Philosophical Texts or the Art of Misquotation, in: J. N. Grant (ed.), Editing Greek and Latin Texts. Papers Given at the Twenty-Third Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, University of Toronto 6–7 November 1987, New York 1989, 69. Transl. Chase (see note 19).

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prove Aristotle infallible’. The latter would amount to ‘enrolling himself in the Philosopher’s school’. In other words, Simplicius frames the exegetical activity between two extremes: to follow Aristotle at all cost on the one hand, or be querulous without good reason on the other. If we were to apply them to Simplicius himself, the implication would be that he is not ‘enrolled in the Philosopher’s school’ nor intending to show ‘misplaced zeal for quarrelling over something well stated’. Ironically, Simplicius often accuses others of rewriting the text (contra Alexander, In Phys. 526, 16–18) and in his more polemical mood he accuses Philoponus of being verbose (In De cael. 25, 29). But there are good reasons to give him credit for making an attempt to live up to this ideal picture of a commentator.26 As far as awareness of textual issues goes, Simplicius stands his ground like any well-trained scholar. At one point Simplicius talks about a marginal note which he suspects might have migrated into the text (In Phys. 450, 31– 33): ‘For [Aristotle] is manifestly accepting it as the third definition of change, even if the text added in the book as from a marginal note seems to be muddled’ (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ὡς τρίτον ὅρον τῆς κινήσεως ἀποδεχόμενος, κἂν ὡς ἀπὸ παραγραφῆς ἡ λέξις προστεθεῖσα συγκεχύσθαι ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ δοκῇ).27 This kind of marginal note is to be distinguished from the kind of quotations that may have originally been added (παρατίθεσθαι, παραγράφειν) in the margin to clarify by providing the evidence. In other words, the philosopher Simplicius is perfectly capable of the kind of technical textual analysis in the service of interpretation that had been common among grammarians and philosophers alike, illustrating the continuous importance of scholarship.28 He follows Alexander and others in this, if often only for the practical reason that his pursuit of comprehensive coverage creates these potential conflicts between the versions available to him. Thus he regularly reports different readings in Alexander, Porphyry and Themistius ‘and the rest’ (e.g., In Phys. 414, 16– 1929). According to Simplicius Alexander is often the better informed scholar in the evidence and explanation he offers (cf. In Phys. 436, 19–20: ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος οἶδε μὲν καὶ ταύτην τὴν γραφὴν καὶ ἐξηγεῖται προσφόρως αὐτὴν) or

26 27

28 29

I will return to this point in section 2 (contra Chase [see note 19] 7). P. Lautner (J. O. Urmson – P. Lautner, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 3 [Ancient Commentators on Aristotle], London 2002, n. 177) compares In Cat. 88, 25–27; 228, 1–3; see also In Phys. 481, 28–34, where a scribal error (γραφικὸν […] πταῖσμα) is suspected by Simplicius. See ch. 1 above; A. Grafton – M. Williams, Christianity and the Transformation of the Book: Origen, Eusebius, and the Library of Caesarea, Cambridge, MA 2006, ch. 2–3. See 18–19: ‘in some copies they found the text to read […]’ (ἔν τισιν ἀντιγράφοις οὕτως εὑρηκότες τὴν γραφήν […]).

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for giving a clearer reading.30 This judgment is also found at In Phys. 443, 10–11, where Alexander’s reading (ἀναγινώσκειν) is considered clearer and at In Phys. 748, 21 where he interprets (ἀκούει) the reading better than others. On lexical and stylistic issues he may use word analysis, but there does not seem to be a consistent pattern, although attention for the λέξις is mentioned regularly. There are other exegetical ‘tricks’ which give him room to manoeuvre, especially in his quest for ‘harmony’: Whenever it may assist his case, he will consider the views of thinkers under discussion as ‘obscure’ (In Phys. 7, 3) or ‘riddling’ (writing in enigmatic form, In Phys. 36, 30), thus allowing himself to offer his own as the better interpretation. While Presocratic archaic language could generate real linguistic problems, this conceit is also a traditional ploy to take liberties with the text. But his emphasis on the original words is clearly different from his predecessors; on occasion we get a glimpse of his concern for more accurate exegeses, linking this to the ‘primary’ text one reads.31 Finally, Simplicius does in fact live up to the requirement for a thorough knowledge of Aristotle’s work: He shows precise command of the overall plan of the work and its structural coherence.32 For example, the books of his commentary on Physics often begin and end with connecting narratives, clarifying the thematic links as well as the purpose of each book and how it relates to the whole work: At the start of book 2 (In Phys. 259, 3 ff.) he briefly summarises what went before in book 1 (principles and causes, including a review of opinions), ending with a statement partly based on Alexander;33 similarly in the opening lines of book 3 (In Phys. 394, 3–5) he gives a summary statement of book 2 (nature as cause and principle of change), the importance of defining crucial terms and so on. These exegetical elements are both didactic and deliberately systematic.34

30

31 32 33 34

At In Phys. 436, 20 Simplicius disagrees with Alexander, but a little later he praises him for a specific remark (436, 36); at 459, 5–6 Alexander explains ‘so-called’ in another way (ἄλλως); cf. the reference to Eudemus’ second book of the Physics at 459, 25–28 (both noted in Urmson – Lautner [see note 27]). See e.g. In Phys. 111, 15–17: παρακείσθω καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀρχαῖα γράμματα πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἀκριβεστέρους γίνεσθαι κριτὰς τῶν προσφυεστέρων ἐξηγήσεων. This paragraph reiterates points made in Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) ch. 1.2.1. I note that he ends by referring to his own comments as ‘σχολαί to Aristotle’s second book of Physics’ (393, 12–13), not ὑπομνήματα. I have dealt with this in Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) ch. 1.2.1.

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III. Applying Principles of Exegesis These principles of exegesis discussed so far play a significant role in Simplicius’ textual analysis. More specific strategies allow us to put some flesh on this skeletal framework. I shall for now consider three of these. For the sake of brevity I have chosen two aspects of his exegesis: (a) passages where he tries to preserve coherence within the Peripatetic school; (b) passages where the role of Aristotle in the exegetical process is given greater prominence. I shall have to say more about the role of manuscripts in the next section. Although this is a selective discussion, it will hopefully cast some light on a few less standard aspects of Simplicius’ methodology. Simplicius is very much concerned with the cohesion of the Greek philosophical tradition as a whole. Yet on occasion we find him express a concern over the coherence of a sub-group of the Greek philosophers. One such passage, in which his wording and argumentative thrust indicate that he is keen to keep the Aristotelian doctrine coherent, is his discussion of Strato’s treatment of the void (Strato, fr. 30A Sharples, esp. lines 12–25 = Simp., In Phys. 693, 10–29). Not only does he provide us with a useful quotation from the third head of the Peripatos, but he also uses a quite striking procedure to make his point. Simplicius tries to show that the problems arising from Strato’s comments can be resolved on the basis of Peripatetic assumptions. His comments follow on from his summary of Aristotle’s views on the void: [T4] This then is what Aristotle set out about the void. But Strato of Lampsacus tried to show that the void divides the whole of body, so that it is not continuous, saying ‘Neither light nor heat nor any other bodily power would be able to pass right through water or air or another body [if this were not the case]. For how would the rays of light pass right through to the base of a vessel [of water]? For if the liquid did not have pores, but the rays divided it by force, the result would be that full vessels would overflow, and it would not be the case that some of the rays would be reflected upwards, while others pass through below.’ I think however it is possible to resolve these points in accordance with Peripatetic assumptions (Περιπατητικὰς ὑποθέσεις) according to which heat and the other bodily powers and light, being incorporeal, do not need a void interval as the basis for their existing and passing through […]. For nothing prevents bodies which are as rarefied as water and air from making way by condensation for some rays to pass through, while it is all the rays which strike denser parts that are reflected.35 35

Transl. R. W. Sharples, Strato of Lampsacus: The Sources, Texts and Translations, in: M.L. Desclos – W. W. Fortenbaugh (edd.), Strato of Lampsacus: Text, Translation, and Discus-

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Han Baltussen ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ τοῦ κενοῦ διετάξατο· ὁ μέντοι Λαμψακηνὸς Στράτων δεικνύναι πειρᾶται, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ κενὸν διαλαμβάνον τὸ πᾶν σῶμα, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι συνεχές, λέγων ὅτι ‘οὐκ ἂν δι’ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος ἢ ἄλλου σώματος ἐδύνατο διεκπίπτειν τὸ φῶς οὐδὲ ἡ θερμότης οὐδὲ ἄλλη δύναμις οὐδεμία σωματική. πῶς γὰρ ἂν αἱ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀκτῖνες διεξέπιπτον εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀγγείου ἔδαφος; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν μὴ εἶχε πόρους, ἀλλὰ βίᾳ διέστελλον αὐτὸ αἱ αὐγαί, συνέβαινεν ὑπερεκχεῖσθαι τὰ πλήρη τῶν ἀγγείων, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀκτίνων ἀνεκλῶντο πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον, αἱ δὲ κάτω διεξέπιπτον’. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οἶμαι λύειν δυνατὸν κατὰ τὰς Περιπατητικὰς ὑποθέσεις, καθ’ ἃς καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι σωματικαὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τὸ φῶς ἀσώματα ὄντα οὐ χρῄζει κενοῦ διαστήματος ὑποκειμένου πρὸς ὑπόστασιν καὶ δίοδον […]. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὰ οὕτω μανὰ τῶν σωμάτων ὡς ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα πυκνούμενα χώραν διδόναι τισὶ τῶν ἀκτίνων εἰς διέκπτωσιν, ὅσαι δὲ πυκνοτέροις μέρεσι προσπίπτουσιν, αὗται ἀντανακλῶνται.

This passage strongly suggests that Simplicius is keen to avoid the internal tensions of the school with regard to the beliefs about the void. Read in a particular way Strato’s ideas of the void constitute a threat to Aristotle’s view that the body is continuous. Strato’s position is interpreted as preventing heat and light rays to pass through certain bodies. Simplicius counters this with the claim that ‘nothing prevents bodies which are as rarefied as water and air from making way by condensation for some rays to pass through’ (Simp., In Phys. 693, 26–28). Thus he rebuts the presumed ‘attack’ to his own satisfaction, not by explaining Aristotle from Aristotle, but by defending Aristotle from Aristotle. My second example considers the question what Aristotle’s own role is in the exegetical process. Interestingly, Simplicius may on occasion prefer the school founder’s own words over those of the commentators. Moreover, the value of the primary author is emphasised in contrast to what the commentators have to say. Aristotle’s own words can be weighed up against lengthy exegetical expositions of commentators: ‘Why write out (παραγράφοντα) the long comments of the commentators, when it is possible to adduce (παράγειν) his own clear view which reveals all a little after the start of his second book of On generation and corruption?’ (In De cael. 169, 27–30: καὶ τί δεῖ μηκύνειν τῶν ἐξηγητῶν μακρὰς παραγράφοντα ῥήσεις, ὅτε δυνατὸν αὐτὸν παράγειν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην σαφῶς ἀποκαλύπτοντα μετ’ ὀλίγα τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ δευτέρου τῶν Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς βιβλίων;) – a striking observation which includes a cross-reference to another work, thus illustra-

sion (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. XVI), New Brunswick−London 2011, 79.

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ting how well Simplicius knows the writings of Aristotle, i.e. he is a ‘connoisseur’ (cf. above T3: ἐπιστήμων, In Cat. 7, 25–26). I have discussed Simplicius’ use of extensive quotation for particular and well-considered reasons, and would therefore like to revisit one especially interesting passage which illustrates an argumentative principle that involves the use of testimonies (In Phys. 1318, 10–15): [T5] Aristotle’s habit after his demonstrations is to introduce the testimonies of his predecessors as agreeing with his demonstrations, in order on the one hand to teach and compel his readers through his demonstrations, and on the other to make the belief more certain in his hearers through the testimonies; he does not employ the testimony of his predecessors as a demonstration, as is the habit of more recent writers.36 Ἔθος ἐστὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει μετὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ μαρτυρίας ὡς συμφωνούσας αὐτοῦ ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι παράγειν, ἵνα διὰ μὲν τῶν ἀποδείξεων διδάσκῃ καὶ ἀναγκάζῃ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, διὰ δὲ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων μαρτυρίας πειθὼ βεβαιοτέραν ἐμποιῇ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡς ἀποδείξει χρῆται τῇ τῶν προτέρων [προτέρων Diels: νεωτέρων codd.] μαρτυρίᾳ, ὥσπερ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἔθος ἐστί. Rather unexpectedly Simplicius is here suggesting that testimonies of predecessors in Aristotle were intended to function as supporting part of his demonstration. Aristotle would perhaps agree, but note how Simplicius has reversed the order of the roles of demonstrations and testimonies. The additional justification (supposedly Aristotle’s) that this was done for pedagogical and rhetorical reasons – that is, to reinforce the demonstration by the agreement and to persuade better – is clearly meant as a stab at Simplicius’ contemporaries. As we all know, Aristotle’s does believe in the persuasive power of agreement among many or all, but he more often than not would extract such common views from the historical records in order to make progress in a particular field. Now that we have determined the outline and some of the specific details of Simplicius’ hermeneutics, we can consider his response to other commentators.

IV. Clarifying Exegeses of Other Commentators Simplicius’ exegesis is both commentary and ‘meta-commentary’. When Jonathan Barnes used the latter phrase in a review, it was used with characteristic 36

Transl. R. D. McKirahan, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 8.6–10 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2001, slightly modified.

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irony, to the extent that it also questioned the need for an extensive modern commentary on Simplicius commentaries.37 But the term is surely also applicable to the late Platonist himself.38 Meta-commentary has two ‘modes’ in Simplicius: (1) It reflects on exegesis itself; (2) it absorbs and evaluates earlier commentaries on Aristotle. ‘Clarifying exegesis’ thus labels his hermeneutical activities as commentary from hindsight. My focus is, as announced at the start, on the way in which he uses earlier commentaries in order to understand better his attitude towards them. Obviously this is a huge subject and I will not be able to give a comprehensive account here. As a starting point I will offer some preliminary comments on the way in which he incorporates earlier commentators and sometimes offers value judgements on their work. Formal influences on his commentary style reflect the pioneering activities of earlier figures, from Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 C.E.) through to Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus, to his personal teachers Ammonius and Damascius.39 Iamblichus’ influence is noticeable especially in the commentary format as it develops the Porphyrian approach of running commentary on λήμματα, the format Alexander started using consistently. Iamblichus (for whom Simplicius shows great respect, as is evident from the epithet θεῖος and from the fact that more often than not a direct quotation is part of the referencing40) introduced the idea of a singular objective (σκοπός) for each work studied, which could be very restrictive and even misleading, yet at the same time it would streamline the interpretive process and encourage the exegete(s) to think in terms of overall thematic consisten-

37

38 39 40

J. Barnes, Metacommentary, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 10, 1992, 267–281 reviewing the French commentaries on Simplicius by I. Hadot – P. Hoffmann, Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fascicule 1, introduction, première partie (p. 1–9, 3 Kalbfleisch), traduction de P. Hoffmann avec la collaboration de I. et P. Hadot, commentaire et notes à la traduction par I. Hadot avec appendices de P. Hadot et J.-P. Mahé (Philosophia antiqua vol. 50), Leiden−New York− Kopenhagen−Köln 1990 and P. Hoffmann, – C. Luna, Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fascicule III, préambule aux catégories, commentaire au premier chapitre des catégories (p. 21–40, 13 Kalbfleisch), traduction de P. Hoffmann (avec la collaboration d’I. Hadot, P. Hadot et C. Luna), commentaire et notes à la traduction par C. Luna (Philosophia antiqua vol. 51), Leiden− New York−Kopenhagen−Köln 1990. As Barnes was undoubtedly aware of. The crucial role of Proclus is acknowledged at In Phys. 795, 11–13: ‘Those after Proclus up until our time almost all follow Proclus not only on this point, but on all other issues’. In Phys. 60, 7; 639, 23; 642, 18; 702, 19; 767, 20; 786, 11; 787, 4; 787, 11; 787, 27; 792, 20; 793, 22–23 (= R. Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 A.D.: A Sourcebook. Vol. 2: Physics, London 2004, 11 [e] [18]); 795, 3; 795, 5–6; 795, 16. Cf. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) ch. 5, n. 78. See also H. J. Blumenthal, Iamblichus as a Commentator, Syllecta Classica 8, 1997.

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cy.41 Simplicius treats the topic as a matter of fact in all his extant commentaries on Aristotle, either reporting the range of views when there is a dispute (In Cat. 1, 8 ff.; 8, 15; 9, 5–11, 1; In De cael. 1, 1–3) or simply presenting the purpose as ‘easy to grasp’ (In Phys. 1, 1–3; cf. 3, 13 ff.). First, it is instructive to see how Simplicius refers to his own works. As a rule he labels them σχολαί,42 but uses the more common term ὑπομνήματα for the works of others.43 The former were normally considered less well organised notes (In Cat. 18, 25–26), the latter scholarly writings for an audience (‘publishable’). I would now like to make some final comment on the aspect of Simplicius’ works for which he is rightly famous, the use of references and quotations, but which sets him apart from the traditional practice. This is a significant part of his scholarly approach, even if the word ‘scholarly’ would here be used in a rather general sense. His inclusion of many voices into the commentary on the Categories is one example of this ambition. One may quarrel over the question to what extent he succeeds in being inclusive. Michael Chase’s judgement that his commentary is ‘at least to some extent, a copy of the (lost) commentary of Iamblichus’44 is perhaps too harsh. The comment was made in relation to In Cat. 3, 2–4: [T6] I myself came across some of these writings, and I made a copy, following Iamblichus’ writings with as much care as I was capable of, often using the philosopher’s very words. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐνέτυχον μὲν καί τισι τῶν εἰρημένων συγγράμμασιν, ἐπιμελέστερον δὲ ὡς οἷός τε ἦν τοῖς Ἰαμβλίχου παρακολουθῶν ἀπεγραψάμην, καὶ αὐτῇ πολλαχοῦ τῇ λέξει τοῦ φιλοσόφου χρησάμενος. I suggest we read this comment in the light of a broader interpretation of his use of quotations, which places particular value on the original voice and its authority, appreciates the loss of book copies (In Phys. 144, 25–28) and in

41

42 43

44

This idea is also found in the Protagoras when Socrates discusses the Simonides poem (cf. Baltussen, Plato Protagoras 340–48 [see note 21]). On the isagogical issues see L. G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amsterdam 1962, I. Hadot, Le problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Études Augustiniennes), Paris 1978, Mansfeld (see note 5). ‘learned notes’, In Phys. 393, 13; 461, 15 (which refers back to In Phys. I); 1326, 39; 1328, 11. literally ‘reminder notes’, they have become regarded as ‘commentaries’. E.g., for Porphyry, In Cat. 435, 24; cf. In Phys. 60, 8; 332, 20; In De cael. 168, 18; 530, 16. The term was not used in that sense originally (on their occurrence since the fourth century BC, see Baltussen, Philosophers, Scholars, Exegetes [see note 7] [11–12] with nn. 25–28). Chase (see note 19) 7.

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general has a sense of responsibility to preserve intellectual inheritance in times of change and suppression of Greek religion. In considering who is most important, a certain hierarchy can be inferred based on frequency of names as well as the obvious closeness Simplicius has to the person. His respect for his teachers is obvious, as we already saw by his use of epithets, but also by the engagement with their ideas.45 Those further away in time seem to feature in different roles. Two examples may be mentioned here. The clear influence of Alexander pervades the commentaries, and needs not be laboured here – although much more work is required. In the commentary on On the Heavens he remarks: ‘[It is] profitable for those who choose to understand and explain Aristotle’s thought by way of his [sc. Alexander’s] commentaries, to examine what he [sc. Alexander] said’.46 He fits the pattern found in many commentators in that he refers to Alexander as ‘the commentator’ (e.g. In Phys. 1170, 2; 1170, 13: ὁ ἐξηγητής), but goes even further in calling him the ‘more authentic of Aristotle’s exegetes’ (In Phys. 80, 15–16: τὸν γνησιώτερον τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξηγητῶν) or ‘the most careful of Aristotle’s partisans’ (In De cael. 378, 21–22: τῷ ἐπιμελεστάτῳ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους σπουδαστῇ).47 Alexander was already part of the highly scholarly tradition in which by his own admission doing philosophy meant using lots of books.48 Presumably referring to book rolls, Alexander makes this point in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topics 27, 12–16 when explaining the contrast with the Classical period regarding the dialectical procedure set out in Aristotle’s major mission statement of dialectic (Top. I 2.101 a 26–36): [T7] This kind of speech was customary among the older philosophers, who set up most of their classes in this way – not with reference to books, since at the time there were not yet any books of this kind. After a thesis has been posited, they trained their aptitude at finding argumentative attacks by producing attack arguments about this thesis, establishing and refuting the position through what is approved.49 45 46

47 48 49

At In Cat. 152, 13 he distinguishes more recent exegetes as οἱ νεώτεροι ἐξηγηταί. In De cael. 297, 7–9 (translation R. J. Hankinson, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10–12 [Ancient Commentators on Aristotle], London 2006): τοῖς διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων αὐτοῦ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους νοεῖν τε καὶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι προαιρουμένοις λυσιτελοῦν τὸ τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα ἐπισκέψασθαι. Cf. H. J. Blumenthal, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of the De Anima, Ithaca 1996, 14–15; Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) 111. After J. Barnes, Roman Aristotle, in: J. Barnes – M. T. Griffin (edd.), Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome, Oxford 1997, 45. See Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) 108. Transl. J. M. Van Ophuijsen, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics 1 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle),

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ἦν δὲ σύνηθες τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τῶν λόγων τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, καὶ τὰς συνουσίας τὰς πλείστας τοῦτον ἐποιοῦντο τὸν τρόπον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βιβλίων ὥσπερ νῦν (οὐ γὰρ ἦν πω τότε τοιαῦτα βιβλία), ἀλλὰ θέσεώς τινος τεθείσης εἰς ταύτην γυμνάζοντες αὑτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις εὑρετικὸν ἐπεχείρουν, κατασκευάζοντές τε καὶ ἀνασκευάζοντες δι’ ἐνδόξων τὸ κείμενον. This does not mean Simplicius always agrees; he notoriously engages in polemic, esp. in On the heaven, when, after a long quotation and a number of disagreements with Alexander’s interpretation, he states: ‘I have said these things against Alexander for, while I respect the man and wish him well, I think that honouring the truth the more is dear to him too.’50 Another passage (In Phys. 270, 22–23) shows that he may not be presenting Alexander’s complete exegesis, because it is ‘straining towards that meaning’.51 The important role of Alexander has been receiving more attention lately and will need further scrutiny.52 Porphyry is the second most quoted or referred to among his predecessors, and this should perhaps be expected, given his reputation as a learned and scholarly writer.53 His role is rather varied: He is mentioned a lot in the vicinity of Alexander (e.g. In Phys. 422, 22), and often in connection with thorny textual problems. Simplicius will also engage polemically with Porphyry, or with the views he has reported (In Cat. 303, 30–31). As part of the evaluations of commentators sometimes we find a surprising revelation when for instance the phrase ‘the commentators’ (οἱ δὲ ἐξηγηταί, In Phys. 406, 28) ends up being referenced as ‘Porphyry’s philological interpretation’ (407, 4 = fr. 152 Smith). Porphyry’s focus on questions of logic and nature is clear from the occurrence of his name in the commentaries on Categories and Physics. Simplicius acknowledged Porphyry as the learned scholar that he was and trusted his judgment on many issues.54 Porphyry’s work may

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London 2001, slightly modified. I have translated ἐπὶ βιβλίων as ‘with reference to books’ to keep the phrase more neutral and allow for the ambiguity of the interpretive act the use of such books might entail. For a textual issue see Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) 108 n. 6. In De cael. 301, 19–21 (translation Hankinson, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10–12 [see note 46]): Ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον εἶχον λέγειν αἰδούμενος μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ χάριτας ὀφείλων αὐτῷ, νομίζων δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ φίλον εἶναι τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν προτιμᾶν. διὸ καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐξηγήσεις τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου εἰς τοῦτον τεινούσας τὸν νοῦν παρατρέχω. See also Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) ch. 4 and Golitsis (see note 1) 61–64. His name occurs 123 times in Simplicius: In Cat. (52), In De cael. (2), In Phys. (69). [TLG] He refers to him as ‘the most learned of the philosophers’ twice (ὁ πολυμαθέστατος τῶν φιλοσόφων Πορφύριος, In Phys. 151, 23–24; In Cat. 192, 25), a descriptor only used once for another commentator (Galen, cf. In Phys. 718, 13). He may praise him for appropriate comments, but may also chide him for proposing newfangled ideas (καινοπρεπῶς, In Phys. 92, 26).

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well have been available to Simplicius and offered no doubt useful pointers on hermeneutical and exegetical questions.55 One major consequence of the multitude of voices incorporated into the commentaries is that such an attempt at synthesis can easily lead to clashes and disagreement. Simplicius deals with these in different and flexible ways. Sometimes his concern seems expedience, to keep pushing the agenda of harmony among Greek thinkers, but there are other approaches. I have suggested elsewhere that this claim is in part motivated by his aim to defuse the potentially damaging conflicts found in certain ‘overviews’ (ἀναγραφαῖς, In Phys. 28, 33–34), which according to him overemphasise disagreements (28, 34–29, 5; 29, 14).56 Such tensions also play a part in his own synthesis of the rich tradition (see below). Simplicius may deal with alternative views on certain issues, which can be based on the existence of different readings in various manuscripts.57 The term for manuscripts is ἀντίγραφα (e.g., In Phys. 414, 19; 422, 20; 423, 14; 427, 34; etc.), for a particular reading or textual variant the word γραφή is used (see e.g. In Phys. 414, 19; 423, 21; 436, 19) or λέξις (In Phys. 436, 13). We may also compare In Phys. 207, 7 where a term for ‘passage’, τὸ χωρίον, appears (literally ‘spot’, cognate with ‘place’, χώρα, cf. 273, 15; 308, 12; 329, 19; 374, 32; 472, 8; 563, 29); it must be a late term of art within a culture of reading, linked to a notion of locating text on the ‘page’ (or rather: in a column on a book roll) in written form. The awareness of variety in a text’s constitution brings with it the need for a decision and, if necessary, correction. Of course one exegete’s correction is another’s manipulation. Of the 50 or so mentions of manuscripts, a substantial number is referred to with the phrase ‘in some manuscripts’ (ἐν ἐνίοις / ἔν τισιν ἀντιγράφοις). And it may be worth pointing out that in only ten of these 50 occurrences does he vary this phrase. Consider the following examples: ‘in all manuscripts’ (ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις, In Phys. 44, 28; 1057, 6; In Cat. 29, 30 with Porphyry); ‘the majority of the manuscripts’ (τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀντιγράφων, In Phys. 1214, 34; In De cael. 521, 26; In Cat. 34, 24–25); ‘many of the manuscripts’ ([τὰ] πολλὰ τῶν ἀντιγράφων, In Phys. 399, 33; 495, 8; 728, 10–11; 845, 4; 876, 22); 55

56 57

Direct quotations occur. For Porphyry’s considered view on using the predecessorcommentators see his commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics 4, 22–5, 16, quoted in Golitsis (see note 1) 58 n. 72. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) 39–41. This paragraph draws on Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis (see note 16) ch. 1.

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‘in some manuscripts’ (ἔν τισιν ἀντιγράφοις, 1317, 6 as reported for Alexander); ‘this reading is not thus in all the manuscripts known to me’ (οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ἡ γραφὴ τῶν ἐμοὶ συνεγνωσμένων ἀντιγράφων πάντων, In Phys. 377, 25–26). Significantly a number of these cases contain a more personal element. To plot these cases against other parameters (e.g. other authors) is another desideratum, but the use of the first person singular pronoun ἐγώ is quite striking in a number of these. In one instance, he refers to the readings he has found in manuscripts (‘I found that many of the manuscripts are constituted thus’), in another he distinctly notes that ‘this reading is not thus in all the manuscripts known to me’ (In Phys. 377, 25–26). In a third case he refers to a reading which he seems to have checked in all the manuscripts known to him. Such an interest in ‘versions’ and ‘readings’ illustrates to what lengths Simplicius went in order to establish a viable or convenient reading.

V. Conclusion Simplicius provides unique insight into the commentary culture of late antiquity. The philosophical commentary is unusual in that it managed to combine scholarly techniques with exegetical practices: philology and philosophy united for a higher purpose, the search for the truth. That these became established in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition may be the result of historical events which are not easy to retrace and identify, but it is clear that the existence of a canonical set of writings was a necessary condition for this type of writing to blossom. Plato’s works seem to have played a stable and ongoing role in the Academy’s educational program, while Aristotle’s works made a come-back with the editorial work done by Andronicus in the first century BC. That commentaries would themselves develop into a kind of canonical body of writing may seem unlikely at first blush – if only because of their size – but Simplicius’ works clearly reflect a rich, but largely lost, body of work begun in the first century BC or AD and mostly concerned with clarifying texts of authorities such as Aristotle and Plato.58 Nonetheless, his selection and method of exegesis inform us about this tradition: He has

58

For possible antecedents in Plato’s Protagoras see Baltussen, Plato Protagoras 340–48 (see note 21), and H. Baltussen, Aristotelian Commentary Tradition, in: P. Remes – S. SlavevaGriffin (edd.), The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism, London−New York 2014.

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incorporated much of it in an attempt to both pay respect to and preserve his predecessor-exegetes. Simplicius’ exegetical strategies are explicitly and implicitly formed by what he was reading. What we still have shows him reading Aristotle and his interpreters. His isolation resulting from Justinian’s prohibition on pagan teaching activity may have contributed to the length of his expositions – which makes it plausible, therefore, that both historical and ideological reasons help to explain the size and approach of his works. In broad terms, we can characterise his method as close reading of texts, the use of multiple texts and authors, based on lemmata and an overall mixed agenda (pedagogy, philosophy, ideology). At a more detailed level we saw that he is capable of handling text variations and different manuscripts, speaks in a self-effacing way (a personal voice is rare), and uses advanced exegetical strategies (majority views important; letter vs. spirit; technical terminology). All these features justify the conclusion that his work was a synthesis of both philosophical views and their exegetical clarifications. Overall, Simplicius’ aim to annotate Aristotle’s work and preserve Greek philosophy with its exegetical tradition makes for a truly polymathic program driven by different, and sometimes competing, agendas.

Bibliography 1. Primary Sources: Editions and Translations ARISTOTELES Top. Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Topica et Sophistici Elenchi, Oxford 1958 (repr. Oxford 1970). EuSEBIuS (= Eus.) PE Mras, K., Eusebius Werke VIII. Die Praeparatio evangelica (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 43.1–2), Berlin 1954–1956. PORPHYRIuS (= Porph.) Fragmenta et testimonia Smith, A., Porphyrii philosophi fragmenta, Stuttgart−Leipzig 1993. In Ptol. Harm. Düring, I., Porphyrios: Kommentar zur Harmonielehre des Ptolemaios (Göteborgs Högskolas årsskrift 36,1), Göteborg 1932 (repr. Hildesheim 1978).

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SIMPLICIuS (= Simp.) In Cat. Kalbfleisch, K., Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VIII), Berlin 1907. Chase, M., Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2003. In De cael. Heiberg, J. L., Simplicii in Aristotelis De caelo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VII), Berlin 1894. Hankinson, R. J., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2002. Hankinson, R. J., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10–12 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006. Mueller, I., Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.3–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011. In Phys. Diels, H., Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros octo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IX–X), Berlin 1882–1895. Urmson, J. O. – Lautner, P., Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 3 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2002. STRATO Fragmenta Sharples, R. W., Strato of Lampsacus: The Sources, Texts and Translations, in: M.-L. Desclos – W. W. Fortenbaugh (edd.), Strato of Lampsacus: Text, Translation, and Discussion (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. XVI), New Brunswick−London 2011, 5–230. 2. Secondary Literature Baltussen, H., Philology or Philosophy? Simplicius on the Use of Quotations, in: I. Worthington – J. M. Foley (edd.), Epea and Grammata. Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece (Mnemosyne suppl. 230: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece vol. 4), Leiden−Boston−Köln 2002, 173–189. Baltussen, H., Plato Protagoras 340–48: Commentary in the Making? in: P. Adamson – H. Baltussen – M. W. F. Stone (edd.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, vol. 1 (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vol. 83,1), London 2004, 21–35. Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008.

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Baltussen, H., Simplicius of Cilicia, in: L. P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, 711– 732. Baltussen, H., Aristotelian Commentary Tradition, in: P. Remes – S. SlavevaGriffin (edd.), The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism, London− New York 2014, 106–114. Baltussen, H., Philosophers, Scholars, Exegetes. The Ancient Philosophical Commentary from Plato to Simplicius, in: C. Kraus – C. Stray (edd.), Classical Commentaries (accepted by Oxford University Press). Barnes, J., Metacommentary, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 10, 1992, 267–281. Barnes, J., Roman Aristotle, in: J. Barnes – M. T. Griffin (edd.), Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome, Oxford 1997, 1–69. Blumenthal, H. J., Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of the De Anima, Ithaca 1996. Blumenthal, H. J., Iamblichus as a Commentator, Syllecta Classica 8, 1997, 1–13. Falcon, A., Aristotelianism in the First Century BCE. Xenarchus of Seleuca, Cambridge 2012. Golitsis, P., Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. Tradition et Innovation (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina Bd. 3), Berlin−New York 2008. Grafton, A. – Williams, M., Christianity and the Transformation of the Book: Origen, Eusebius, and the Library of Caesarea, Cambridge, MA. 2006. Hadot, I., Le problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Études Augustiniennes), Paris 1978. Hadot, I. – Hoffmann, P., Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fascicule 1, introduction, première partie (p. 1–9, 3 Kalbfleisch), traduction de P. Hoffmann avec la collaboration de I. et P. Hadot, commentaire et notes à la traduction par I. Hadot avec appendices de P. Hadot et J.-P. Mahé (Philosophia antiqua vol. 50), Leiden−New York−Kopenhagen−Köln 1990. Hoffmann, P. – Luna, C., Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fascicule III, préambule aux catégories, commentaire au premier chapitre des catégories (p. 21–40, 13 Kalbfleisch), traduction de P. Hoffmann (avec la collaboration d’I. Hadot, P. Hadot et C. Luna), commentaire et notes à la traduction par C. Luna (Philosophia antiqua vol. 51), Leiden− New York−Kopenhagen−Köln 1990.

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Hoffmann, P., Les catégories aristotéliciennes pote et pou d’après le commentaire de Simplicius. Méthode d’exégèse et aspects doctrinaux, in: M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (ed.), Le commentaire entre tradition et innovation: Actes du colloque international de l’Institut des Traditions Textuelles (Paris et Villejuif, 22–25 septembre 1999) (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie. Nouvelle série), Paris 2000, 355–376. Hoffmann, P., What Was Commentary in Late Antiquity? The Example of the Neoplatonic Commentators, in: M. L. Gill – P. Pellegrin (edd.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy), Oxford 2006, 597–622. Konstan, D., Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 6 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1989. Mansfeld, J., Prolegomena. Questions To Be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text (Philosophia antiqua vol. 6), Leiden−New York−Köln 1994. McKirahan, R. D., Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 8.6–10 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2001. Perry, B. M., Simplicius as a Source for and Interpreter of Parmenides, PhD Thesis, University of Washington 1983. Sorabji, R., The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 A.D.: A Sourcebook. Vol. 2: Physics, London 2004. Van Ophuijsen, J. M., Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics 1 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2001. Westerink, L. G., Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amsterdam 1962. Whittaker, J., The Value of Indirect Tradition in the Establishment of Greek Philosophical Texts or the Art of Misquotation, in: J. N. Grant (ed.), Editing Greek and Latin Texts. Papers Given at the Twenty-Third Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, University of Toronto 6–7 November 1987, New York 1989. Wildberg, C., Simplicius und das Zitat. Zur Überlieferung des Anführungszeichens, in: F. Berger (ed.), Symbolae Berolinenses. Für Dieter Harlfinger, Amsterdam 1993, 187–199.

‘The Soul Never Thinks without a Phantasm’: How Platonic Commentators Interpret a Controversial Aristotelian Thesis Carlos Steel

Richard Sorabji octogenario

I. A Controversial Aristotelian Dictum When discussing human thought in De anima III 7, Aristotle observes that ‘the soul never thinks (or understands) without a phantasm’ (431 a 16–17: οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή). This short phrase, made as it were in passing, had a huge impact on the development of a theory of knowledge throughout the history of philosophy. It claims that for the human soul no thinking is possible without being accompanied with some object in imagination, though it remains unclear how exactly this connection with imagination is to be understood: as a necessary condition, an instrument, a vehicle or a by-product, unclear also whether the claim is universally valid for all forms of thinking or should be restricted to some forms, practical thought, for instance. Among medieval, modern and contemporary scholars Aristotle’s claim is almost always taken as universally valid. I shall not go through the long list of authorities from Averroes to Hicks and Hamlyn,1 but just refer to the recent commentary on the De anima by Ronald Polansky.2 In Polansky’s interpretation it is the purpose of chapter 7 – which has no evident unity, but seems to be, ‘as Torstrik pointed out, a series of scraps put together by an earlier editor’3 – to demonstrate that ‘Phantasia has a role in all [my

1

2 3

R. D. Hicks, Aristotle: De anima, with Translation, Introduction and Notes, Cambridge 1907; D. W. Hamlyn, Aristotle: De anima: Books II and III (with Passages from Book I) (Clarendon Aristotle series), Oxford 1968. R. Polansky, Aristotle’s De anima, Cambridge 2007. W. D. Ross, Aristotle: De anima, Oxford 1961, 303 with reference to A. Torstrik, Aristotelis De anima libri III, Berlin 1862.

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emphasis, C. S.] thinking’ (as is the title of Polansky’s chapter). ‘Having traced [in III 4–6, C. S.] mind’s essence, operation, and objects, Aristotle needs to give more attention to thinking’s initiation. Possession of knowledge puts universals in the soul that provide for thinking at wish. But what can provoke such wish, and in general how does dispositional knowledge lead to actual thinking? This is the role of phantasmata.’4 Of course, Polansky knows that Aristotle makes his claim regarding practical thinking. But as he explains, ‘Aristotle begins with an obvious case, practical thinking and its initiation by phantasia, and then goes on to other types of intellect’.5 ‘The way Aristotle proceeds to generalize what he has said about practical mind confirms that his intention has been to argue that all [my emphasis, C. S.] mind depends upon phantasmata.’6 Most scholars will probably not go that far as to say that this was the sole purport of chapter 7, but many will share Polansky’s view that Aristotle intended his claim to be taken as universally valid. This was also the dominant view in medieval Aristotelianism due to the massive influence of Averroes and Thomas Aquinas. However, all commentators in late antiquity attempted to restrict the claim Aristotle is making: It is an assertion about certain modalities of thinking, not about thinking in general. One might object that the commentators did so because they feared that the acceptance of the universal validity of this claim was threatening the transcendence of the soul over the body and thus its survival after death. This threat is indeed explicitly formulated by Ammonius (as reported by Philoponus) in his rejection of Alexander’s ‘naturalistic’ interpretation of the intellective soul: Alexander (of Aphrodisias) tries very hard to prove from this passage [III 7.431 a 16–17] that Aristotle thinks our intellect is mortal. If intellect never thinks without a phantasm and imagination depends on sense, then if sense is not immortal, neither is intellect. So it is because Aristotle thinks our (human) intellect is mortal that he says, not simply that ‘intellect’ does not think without a phantasm, but that ‘soul’, wishing to indicate that the intellective power of our soul is destructible.7 4 5 6 7

Polansky (see note 2) 481. Polansky (see note 2) 481. Polansky (see note 2) 491. Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 97, 16–22, preserved only in the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke: In his autem Alexander multum conatur probare quod mortalem putet nostrum intellectum Aristoteles. Si enim nunquam intelligit sine phantasmate intellectus, phantasia autem a sensu, sensus autem non immortalis, neque intellectus. Ergo propter hoc quia mortalem putat nostrum intellectum, non dixit simpliciter quod ‘intellectus’ non intelligit sine phantasmate, sed ‘anima’, significare volens nostrae animae intellectivam potentiam corruptibilem esse. (Edition: G. Verbeke, Jean Philopon: Commentaire sur le de Anima

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Ammonius, however, replies that Aristotle considers our intellect to be indestructible. What Aristotle’s says in this passage (431 a 16–17) must therefore be interpreted in such a way that it does not undermine the philosopher’s doctrine on the immortality of the soul. There is undoubtedly a Platonic motivation in the commentators’ refusal to accept Aristotle’s claim about the connection of thinking with phantasms as universally valid. After all, it is even plausible that Aristotle was himself implicitly reacting against Plato’s view in Republic VI (510 C–511 C) that thinking – νόησις contrary to διάνοια – is without images. However, even if their Platonic perspective is undeniable, the ancient commentators also have, as I hope to show, valuable arguments to restrict Aristotle’s claim to some forms of knowledge. In this contribution I will discuss the views of four commentators of late antiquity: Themistius, Ammonius (as reported by Philoponus), John Philoponus (in his lectures as reported by a student),8 and Priscian of Lydia (Pseudo-

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d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke [Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graeca Tome III], Louvain−Paris 1966; English translation: W. Charlton, Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Intellect (de Anima 3.4–8). Translated with the Assistance of F. Bossier [Ancient Commentators on Aristotle], London 1991.) Ammonius probably refers here to Alexander’s lost commentary on On the Soul, not to Alexander’s own treatise on this subject. In his own treatise Alexander formulates such a view only as a hypothesis: ‘If thinking does not occur without imagination, it too will occur through the body; and if there can be no activity of the soul without a change in the body, clearly the soul is something of the body and inseparable from it’ (Alex. Aphr., De an. 12, 19–22). This is exactly how Aristotle himself formulated the problem at the beginning of his treatise: ‘Thinking seems to be most of all proper to the soul. However, if this too is some form of imagination or not without it, even that may not exist without a body’ (De an. I 1.403 a 7–10: μάλιστα δ’ ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι). The large commentary on the De anima is Ammonius’ course reported by Philoponus (with the addition of some supplementary observations). The third book of Ammonius’ (Philoponus’) commentary got lost in the Greek tradition, but we still have a substantial part of it (III 4–8) thanks to the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke (which will be quoted as De intellectu). The Byzantine scholar Sophonias inserted numerous extracts from this lost commentary in his own treatise On the Soul. The preserved Greek commentary on the third book is very different from the Ammonius (Philoponus) we know through Moerbeke. In recent scholarship it is usually attributed to ‘Pseudo-Philoponus’, to distinguish this author from Philoponus editing Ammonius’ course. On the identity of this Pseudo-Philoponus there has been much controversy among scholars, some (e.g. W. Charlton, ‘Philoponus’: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1–8 [Ancient Commentators on Aristotle], London 2000, 1–10) proposing Stephanus of Alexandria as author. Recently Pantelis Golitsis (John Philoponus’ Commentary on the Third Book of Aristotle’s De Anima wrongly attributed to Stephanus, in: R. Sorabji [ed.], Aristotle Re-interpreted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators, London – New York 2016, 393–412) argued that the Greek commentary of book III is in fact a reportatio of an oral course on the De an. given by Philoponus himself. The difference between the lost Greek commentary on De an. III (but partially preserved in Latin) and the transmitted Greek text on De an. III is that the first mainly gives Ammonius’ course

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Simplicius). But before I turn to the commentators I have to recall briefly Plotinus, who was himself an intensive reader of the Aristotelian treatise On the Soul, but interpreted it in his own manner. Plotinus often insists on the important role of φαντασία, not only in storing and representing to the mind sense objects but also in reflecting our thought, so that we may become conscious of it. This conscious apperception may sometimes fall out because of some harm done to the body, but this does not mean that thinking itself would be touched and interrupted: When that kind of thing in us in which the images of thought and intellect appear is undisturbed, they are then seen in them and known as it were by sensing (οἷον αἰσθητῶς), along with the prior knowledge that it is intellect and thought that are active. But when this is broken because the harmony of the body is upset, thought and intellect think without an image, and then there is thinking without imagination. So one might understand in this way too that ‘thinking occurs with imagination, without thinking itself being imagination’.9 The last sentence seems to be an implicit reference to Aristotle’s celebrated saying, but Plotinus interprets it in an extraordinary way, thus making Aristotle confirm what Plotinus himself wants to say, namely that thinking itself is not imagination, though in normal circumstances it may be accompanied by images reflecting it and making it thus conscious. Though I may be tempted to explore further Plotinus’ views, I move to the commentators, and the way they deal with the Aristotelian assertions on thought and imagination.

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whereas the latter gives us access to Philoponus’ own views, once he took distance from Ammonius (and from Aristotle on some issues). It is thus most unfortunate to call this author ‘Pseudo-Philoponus’. (See also A. Ritups, Aristotle’s De anima III.6: Essays in the History of its Interpretation, Leuven 2010. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation].) To avoid confusion, I shall identify the author of the Greek commentary on De an. I–II and on De an. III 4–8 (De intellectu) as ‘Ammonius (Phlp.)’, i. e. Ammonius as reported by Philoponus, whereas I will attribute the course on De an. III simply to Philoponus. As Moerbeke’s Latin translation is often difficult to understand without reconstructing what may have been the lost Greek original, I have made a reconstruction of some important sections in an Appendix. I am very much indebted to Benedikt Strobel for his careful correction of my retroversion. Plot. I 4 (46) 10, 13–21: ἡσυχίαν μὲν ἄγοντος τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν τοιούτου, ᾧ ἐμφαίνεται τὰ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ νοῦ εἰκονίσματα, ἐνορᾶται ταῦτα καὶ οἷον αἰσθητῶς γινώσκεται μετὰ τῆς προτέρας γνώσεως, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργεῖ. Συγκλασθέντος δὲ τούτου διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ταραττομένην ἁρμονίαν ἄνευ εἰδώλου ἡ διάνοια καὶ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ καὶ ἄνευ φαντασίας ἡ νόησις τότε· ὥστε καὶ τοιοῦτον ἄν τι νοοῖτο μετὰ φαντασίας τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι οὐκ οὔσης τῆς νοήσεως φαντασίας. Translation (modified) by A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, Vol. I: Porphyry on the Life of Plotinus and the Order of his Books. Enneads I. 1–9, Cambridge, Ma. 1966.

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II. The Aristotelian Dossier in the Commentators Aristotelian texts10 (1) De an. I 1.403 a 7–10: μάλιστα δ’ ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι. (2) De an. III 5.430 a 23–25: οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός. καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ. (3) De an. III 7.431 a 14–17: τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει, ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει· διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή. De an. III 7.431 b 2–3: τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν. (4) De an. III 8.432 a 4–9: ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη, ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν. (5) De an. III 8.432 a 12–14: τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τἆλλα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων. (6) De mem. 449 b 30–450 a 1: ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος. The most developed discussion of the connection between φαντασία and thinking is found in On Memory 449 b 30–450 a 21, where Aristotle refers to his treatment in On the Soul (cf. 449 b 30–31). However, as there is no ancient commentary on De Memoria,11 we have to leave this passage out of our discussion, though Priscian refers to it in his commentary (Ps.-Simp. [= Prisc. Lyd.], In De an. 248, 7–8). All other passages come from the treatise On the Soul. Already in the opening chapter (I 1.403 a 8–9) Aristotle raises the question of the connection between φαντασία and thinking, but, as the commentators declare, he formulates the problem in a hypothetical manner, with-

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For a discussion of the cognitive role of imagination according to Aristotle, see D. Frede, The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle, in: M. C. Nussbaum – A. Oksenberg Rorty (edd.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima, Oxford 1992, 279–295, M. V. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, New Haven 1988 and J.-L. Labarrière, ‘Jamais l’âme ne pense sans phantasme’, in: P.-M. Morel (ed.), Aristote et la notion de nature. Enjeux épistémologiques et pratiques (Histoire des pensées), Bordeaux 1997, 149–179. There is a paraphrase of the text by Michael of Ephesus: see In Parv. nat. 8, 22 ff., esp. 12, 12 ff. with note 55 below.

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out formulating his own view.12 We find Aristotle’s view expressed in the famous dictum that the soul does not think without phantasm in III 7.431 a 14–17 (text [3] above) and, less explicit, in three other passages in III 7–8 (texts [4], [5], [6]). To these texts we should add another passage (text [2]), mostly not considered by modern scholars when they examine this issue, namely the cryptic phrase at the end of III 5.430 a 23–25. I shall first examine how the ancient commentators interpret that phrase and then move to the passages in III 7–8. 1. The Passive Intellect: Thinking involved in Imagination De an. III 5.430 a 23–25: οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός. καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ. We do not remember, because this is unaffected and the passive intellect is destructible, and without this it thinks nothing. There has been between scholars an endless controversy on the interpretation of this sentence. Among the ancient commentators, however, there is unanimity that, in the phrase ‘without this’ (ἄνευ τούτου), ‘this’ (τούτου) refers to the ‘passive intellect’ just mentioned before. But what is this ‘passive intellect’? One may be tempted to identify it with the potential intellect, which is compared to matter at the beginning of chapter III 5. However, in III 4 it is said of this intellect, which is capable of becoming all things, when actualised, that it is ‘unaffected’ (429 a 15: ἀπαθές). How, then, could it now be called ‘passive’ and said to be ‘destructible’?13 What is destructible must be a faculty connected with bodily organs, as is imagination. But would Aristotle ever call imagination a ‘passive intellect’? Yet there are texts where Aristotle considers ‘imagining’ as a sort of thinking (νοεῖν).14 Priscian notices that Aristotle often uses the terms νοεῖν or νοῦς in a broader sense so that they may also cover imagining as a form of thinking.15 So there is no reason why the term ‘passive 12 13

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See Ammon. (Phlp.), In De an. 45, 20–21: ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὡς ἐν προβλήμασι, 46, 6: ὡς ἐν ὑποθέσει δὲ ὁ λόγος, Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 17, 2: ἐξ ὑποθέσεως εἰπών. On the interpretation of the παθητικὸς νοῦς cf. Polansky (see note 2) 468–469, who defends a view similar to that of the ancient commentators. Also L. P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists, Ithaca 2005, 160 rejects the identification of the passive intellect with the intellect discussed in chapter 4, but offers a different interpretation. For a survey of the discussion on the passive intellect in late antiquity see H. J. Blumenthal, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of the De anima, London 1996. See above all De an. III 3.427 b 27–28; cf. I 1.403 a 8–9; III 10.433 a 9–10 with Phlp., In De an. 497, 14–16. According to Priscian even imagination can be called νοῦς: see Ps.Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 27, 19–21; 202, 8; 220, 38; 221, 13; 296, 3–11. See Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 286, 27–31 (with n. 301 in C. Steel – A. Ritups, ‘Simplicius’: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6–13 [Ancient Commentators on Aristotle], Lon-

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intellect’ could not be used for the lowest form of thinking, which is involved in the process of imagination. According to Themistius Aristotle means by the ‘passive intellect’ the rationality that is involved in human emotions. As he explains, the affections of the human soul are not entirely non-rational, for when ‘trained and admonished’ they may obey reason.16 And one could say that the passive intellect is the same as the rational affection (i.e. the affection of the human soul).17 This passive intellect is called by Aristotle ‘common’ because it is not a activity of the intellect by itself, but the common activity of the living being, as a unity of body and soul (cf. I 4.408 b 25–29). Without this ‘common intellect’ we could not think of the things here below, which are the objects of our love and hate and other affections.18 Therefore, this passive intellect is required to make it possible for the immortal rational soul to be connected with this mortal body and its needs. Proclus (following Syrianus19) understands the Aristotelian ‘passive intellect’ as referring to imagination, the lowest form of thinking.20 As he shows, one may distinguish six different levels of thinking from the most supreme form, which is intuitive thinking, to the lowest, which is imagining: In the sixth place, if you wish to count this one as well, imaginative knowledge (φανταστικὴ γνῶσις) is named by some ‘thinking’ (νόησις) and imagination is named ‘passive intellect’ (νοῦς παθητικός), because, even though it knows what it knows with the help of marks and shapes, it does take place within.21

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don 2013); 102, 13–20; 200, 7–9; 206, 5–7; 220, 38–39; 274, 19–21; 296, 5–6 and Prisc. Lyd., In Theophr. 29, 3–6. Them., In De an. 107, 6–8: φθαρτὰ δὲ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὸν τούτοις ἐνόντα λόγον, ὃν Ἀριστοτέλης παθητικὸν νοῦν ὀνομάζει. οὐ γὰρ παντάπασιν ἄλογα τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης, ἅ γε καὶ ὑπακούει τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδεύεται καὶ νουθετεῖται. Them., In De an. 107, 18–19: καὶ εἴη ἂν ταὐτὸν εἰπεῖν παθητικόν τε νοῦν καὶ πάθος λογικόν. Them., In De an. 101, 7–9; 107, 6–8; 19–20; 108, 29–30. Syrian., In Met. 110, 32–33: ‘The one (sc. Aristotle) who draws the intellect to imagination, for in another passage he calls even imagination a passive intellect’ (ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν φαντασίαν ἑλκύσας τὸν νοῦν· καλεῖ γὰρ καὶ ταύτην ἐν ἑτέροις παθητικὸν νοῦν). See the indirect reference to Aristotle in Procl., In Remp. II 107, 18–20: ‘Some of the ancients said that imagination and the intellect are the same, others who distinguish both leave no thought without imagination’ (ὥστε καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν τινας τοὺς μὲν φαντασίαν ταὐτὸν εἰπεῖν εἶναι καὶ νοῦν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διακρίναντας ἀφάνταστον νόησιν μηδεμίαν ἀπολείπειν). Procl., In Tim. I 244, 19–22: ἕκτη δέ, εἰ βούλει καὶ ταύτην συναριθμεῖν, ἡ φανταστικὴ γνῶσις ὑπό τινων προσαγορεύεται νόησις καὶ νοῦς ἡ φαντασία παθητικός, ὅτι καὶ ἔνδον καὶ μετὰ τύπων καὶ σχημάτων γινώσκει ὅσα γινώσκει. Translation by D. T. Runia – M. Share, Proclus: Com-

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What makes us consider even imagining as a form of thinking is ‘this very fact of having the object of knowledge within’. This is indeed the common character of all forms of thinking, how different they may be, and it is through this that thinking differs from sense-perception, which always takes its object from outside. The capacity to easily imagine things can thus be seen as the ultimate trace of thinking.22 In his commentary on Euclid Proclus emphasizes the essential role of imagination as passive intellect in the constitution of geometrical objects.23 Proclus’ interpretation of the passive intellect as identical with the thinking involved in imagination was adopted by Ammonius and by all commentators in the Alexandrian school. Explaining in his commentary on the De interpretatione in what sense Aristotle considers ‘thoughts’ (νοήματα) as ‘affections’ (παθήματα) of the soul (see De int. 1.16 a 3–4) Ammonius notices: It must […] be understood that often in On the Soul imagination is called ‘passive intellect’ by the Philosopher: ‘intellect’ since it has within itself the knowable and differs in this way from sense-perception, in that the external things which sense-perception knows but always needs to have present in order to function are the very same things of which the imagination takes an imprint, holds their imprints in itself and is able to apply these [imprints] without need of the external objects [themselves] (for this reason even in our dreams, when our senses remain inactive, we act in imagination); ‘passive’, since imagination knows each thing along with some division and extension, inasmuch as it holds its being and activity inseparable from body and is a principle of the senses.24 And in his commentary on On the Soul, as reported by Philoponus, he formulates the same view:

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mentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Volume II, Book 2: Proclus on the Causes of the Cosmos and its Creation, Cambridge−New York 2008. See also Procl., In Remp. II 107, 17–20. See Procl., In Tim. III 158, 6–10: ἔστι τι καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἴχνος τῆς νοερᾶς ἰδιότητος ἔσχατον, καθόσον εἰσὶν εὐφάνταστοι (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἀπήχημα τοῦ νοῦ τελευταῖον, καὶ νοῦς διὰ τοῦτο παθητικὸς ἡ φαντασία λέγεται καὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλων οὐ κακῶς λεγόντων). See Procl., In Euc. 52, 3–53, 5; 56, 1–12; 186, 6–7. Ammon., In De int. 6, 4–14 : ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι πολλαχοῦ ἐν τῇ Περὶ ψυχῆς ἔχομεν τὴν φαντασίαν παθητικὸν νοῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου καλουμένην, νοῦν μὲν ὡς ἔνδον ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸ γνωστὸν ἔχουσαν καὶ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσαν τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ἅπερ ἡ αἴσθησις ἔξω κείμενα γινώσκει δεομένη πάντως τῆς ἐκείνων παρουσίας πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργῆσαι περὶ αὐτά, τούτων ἡ φαντασία τοὺς τύπους διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀπομαξαμένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχει καὶ μὴ δεομένη τῶν ἔξω κειμένων δύναται προσβάλλειν, διὸ κἀν τοῖς ὕπνοις τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀνενεργήτων μενουσῶν ἐνεργοῦμεν κατὰ φαντασίαν, παθητικὸν δέ, διότι μετὰ μερισμοῦ τινος καὶ διαστάσεως ἕκαστον γινώσκει, ἅτε ἀχώριστον σώματος ἔχουσα τήν τε οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἀρχή τις οὖσα τῶν αἰσθήσεων. Translation by D. Blank, Ammonius: On Aristotle On Interpretation (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1996, modified. See also 7, 8 and 26, 2.

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Imagination receives from sense-perception the impressions of the perceptible objects and re-shapes these within itself, which is why Aristotle also calls it a ‘passive intellect’: ‘intellect’ in so far as it has the object of knowledge within itself and grasps it by a straightforward apprehension, as does the intellect, and not by proofs, and ‘passive’ because its knowing is accompanied by impressions and does not occur without it giving shape [to the objects imagined].25 Therefore imagination is not unqualifiedly called ‘intellect’ but with an added qualification (‘passive’), which is as much as to say that it is not intellect at all. For such an addition destroys the original sense of ‘intellect’.26 But not only in reporting Ammonius, also in his own lectures on On the Soul Philoponus accepted the identification of the passive intellect with imagination27 and so did Damascius28 and Asclepius.29 Priscian shares the same view. He does not, however, distinguish the passive intellect from the ‘material intellect’ discussed in III 4. However, in his interpretation the material intellect is so much downgraded that it becomes almost what the other commentators call the passive intellect, i.e. the rationality involved in the imaginative process.30

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Ammon. (Phlp.), In De an. 5, 38–6, 4: ἡ δὲ φαντασία παρὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως λαβοῦσα τοὺς τύπους τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τούτους ἀναπλάττει· ὅθεν καὶ παθητικὸν νοῦν αὐτὴν καλεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, νοῦν μὲν ὡς ἔνδον ἔχουσαν τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ ἁπλῇ προσβολῇ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιβάλλουσαν καὶ οὐ διὰ κατασκευῆς, παθητικὸν δὲ διότι μετὰ τύπων καὶ οὐκ ἀσχηματίστως γινώσκει. Translation by Ph. J. van der Eijk, Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1–2 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2005. See also 11, 9–10; De intellectu 13, 6; 61, 73; 62, 94–96; 106, 28. See Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 13, 1–5: non enim proprie intellectus est phantasia, neque sine adiectione intellectus, sed cum adiectione passivus intellectus vocatur, idem [Bossier cum CVB: id Verbeke cum T] autem est dicere neque intellectus; adiectiones enim, ut saepe diximus, quod a principio perimunt. ‘Bossier’ refers here and hereafter to Bossier’s textual observations and conjectures quoted by Charlton (see note 7), ‘Verbeke’ to the edition of William’s translation referred to in note 7. See Phlp., In De an. 490, 22–23; 506, 23–25; 523, 29; 542, 2–3; 551, 25–26; 572, 20; 584, 17–18. Cf. Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 17, 4–5: Imagination is not unqualifiedly intellect, but a ‘passive and figurative intellect’ (παθητικὸς καὶ μορφωτικὸς νοῦς). See Dam., In Phd. I § 78 and II § 130, 3–4 with note of L. G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. II: Damascius (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde nieuwe reeks, deel 93), Amsterdam−Oxford−New York 1977. See Ascl., In Met. 280, 15–17. On the identification of the passive intellect with imagination see Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 17, 4–5; 27, 19–21; 109, 4; 202, 8; 220, 38; 221, 13; 296, 3 ff. In 238, 23–24 Priscian identifies the passive intellect with the potential or material intellect, which is the ‘outgoing intellect’ (ἔξω προιών). See also 242, 2–243, 6; 243, 38–244, 1; 247, 27–39; 261, 2 and Steel – Ritups (see note 15) 10–13.

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Coming at the end of a long tradition, Averroes excellently explains in what sense imagination can be seen as ‘passible intellect’. In is not just imagination in the sense of a faculty capable of providing images, but as being reflected upon and somehow rationalized by the ‘cogitative power’: He meant here by ‘passible intellect’ the forms of the imagination insofar as the cogitative power propter to human beings acts upon them. For that power is a kind of reason and its activity is nothing but the placing of the intentions of the form imagined in its individuality in memory or the discerning of it from [the individual] in conception and imagination. And it is evident that the intellect which is called material receives the imagined intentions after this discernment. That passible intellect, therefore, is necessary for conceptualization.31 If, however, the ‘passive intellect’ is taken for the thinking involved in imagination, Aristotle’s cryptic phrase ‘without this it thinks nothing’ becomes the strongest formulation of his claim that without imagination the soul does not think. And it is exactly in connection with this phrase at end of III 5 that all three commentators start an argument on the relation of φαντασία to thinking. Ammonius, as reported by Philoponus, attempts to reduce the universality of Aristotle’s claim: These words ‘without this it thinks nothing’ should be taken with the implicit qualification ‘for the most part’. For the activities of the intellect are for the most part with imagination, but without it they are rare. Rarely indeed, hardly once in the whole life of those who ascend to the highest levels of philosophy, does the intellect act without imagination. Because of this rarity he says as a universal truth that without imagination the intellect thinks nothing.32 Philoponus makes the same qualification: Observe that the statement [without imagination it thinks nothing] is in need of explanation. For it does not always act with imagination, unless

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Averroes, In De an. III 20, 173–182, translation R. C. Taylor – T.-A. Druart, Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba: Long Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle (Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy), New Haven−London 2009, 359. Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 61, 77–82: huic autem ‘sine hac autem nihil intelligit’ subaudiendum ‘ut in pluribus’; ut enim in pluribus cum phantasia sunt intellectus operationes, sine hac autem rarae. Et raro aut semel in tota vita his qui ascenderunt ad summum philosophiae, sine phantasia intellectus operatur. Propter raritatem igitur universaliter pronuntiavit quia sine phantasia nihil intelligit. Translation by Charlton (see note 7), modified. See Greek retroversion in Appendix.

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you should say that it is [always] when it is occupied with particulars. Or say also this other thing, that non-imaginative activities are few. […] So if on the whole its acts with imagination, say that now he uses ‘always’ in place of ‘on the whole’.33 Philoponus offers in fact two explanations of Aristotle’s claim: (1) the connection with imagination should be limited to forms of thinking occupied with particulars; (2) thoughts without imagination are rare, this is what Aristotle means when he says that thoughts are never without imagination. The second explanation is what we find in the report of Ammonius quoted above (61, 77–81). But also the first is found in Ammonius, as an alternative explanation: Some people take ‘without this it understands nothing’ to mean that it understands none of the sensible things here without imagination; they understand as implicit ‘no sensible form’. And that is not alien to Aristotle’s thought.34 Ammonius quotes in support the long passage III 8.432 a 3–9, which, he says, makes clear that what Aristotle says is not about the intellectual activity in general, but about the intellect’s understanding of sensible forms. Priscian too attempts to reduce the universality of this claim, arguing that it always remains possible for the soul, even if this is difficult and only occasional, to engage in thinking without imagination: The ‘nothing’ must not be understood simply as meaning that the impassible intellect thinks nothing without the passible one. For how will it still be separate, how unmixed, how activity in its substance? For even when it is still giving life to this body, the soul sometimes lives and thinks separately. ‘What god is always’, he says in the Metaphysics Λ, ‘that we are sometimes’, clearly as far as possible for us. But god is always separate, and therefore we too are, even if only sometimes. We, who are still living this physical life, [can do this] when our soul, even if only briefly, is in a state without relation with the body and the secondary lives.35 33

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Phlp., In De an. 542, 7–13: ὅρα δὲ ὅτι παραμυθίας δεῖται ὁ λόγος· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ μετὰ φαντασίας, εἰ μὴ ἄρα εἴποις ὅτι ἡνίκα περὶ τὰ μερικὰ καταγένηται. ἢ εἰπὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ὅτι ὀλίγαι εἰσὶν ἀφάνταστοι ἐνέργειαι. […] εἰ οὖν ὡς ἐπίπαν μετὰ φαντασίας ἐνεργεῖ, εἰπὲ ὅτι νῦν τὸ ὡς ἐπίπαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἔλαβεν. Translation by Charlton (see note 8). Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 63, 25–28: Istud ‘sine hoc nihil intelligit’ quidam sic intelligunt quia eorum quae hic sunt sensibilium nihil sine phantasia intelligit, cointelligentes sensibilium specierum, et non est extra Aristotelis intellectum. Translation by Charlton (see note 7). Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 248, 11–17: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁπλῶς ἀκουστέον τὸ ‘οὐδὲν’ ὡς μηδὲν τοῦ ἀπαθοῦς ἄνευ τοῦ παθητικοῦ νοοῦντος. πῶς γὰρ ἔτι χωριστός, πῶς ἀμιγής, πῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἔσται ἐνέργεια; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο ἔτι ζωοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστῶς ποτε ζῇ καὶ νοεῖ. ‘ὃ γὰρ ὁ θεός’, φησιν [Met. Λ 7.1072 b 24–25], ‘ἀεί’ ἐν τῷ Λ τῶν Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ‘τοῦτο ἡμεῖς ποτέ’, κατὰ δύναμιν δηλαδὴ τὴν ἡμετέραν. χωριστὸς δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀεί· καὶ ἡμεῖς οὖν, εἰ καὶ ποτέ. ἡμεῖς δὲ

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Interestingly Priscian refers in this context to the passage in De memoria (449 b 30–450 a 21) where Aristotle says that thinking without imagination is not possible. This statement is clearly only valid about things that can be remembered. For when we think of things that can be remembered, we do need imagination. 2. Imagination and Practical Thinking De an. III 7.431 a 14–17: τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει, ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει. διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή. To the intellective soul phantasms are like perceptions. When the soul says or denies good or evil, it avoids or pursues. That is why the soul never thinks without a phantasm. Aristotle’s celebrated statement comes as a conclusion of an argument on practical thinking. To avoid evil and pursue what is good are manifestly activities of the practical intellect, and in dealing with practical issues knowledge of particular things is required, as all action is about particulars. Therefore Aristotle rightly concludes, Ammonius says, that concerning practical matters the soul never thinks without imagination. This is not, however, a valid conclusion about human thinking in general, as Alexander thought, who, as we have seen above, used this passage as an argument to demonstrate that the intellective power of the human soul is destructible because it is essentially linked to the body. Alexander insisted in particular on the fact that Aristotle talks here about ‘the intellective soul’ (τῇ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ) and not about the intellect.36 The connection with imagination is needed for the soul, not for the intellect as such. To counter this argument, it is important to offer another interpretation of why Aristotle seems to make the claim about ‘the intellective soul’. Priscian offers such an interpretation: The use of the term τῇ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ indicates that the claim should be restricted to practical thinking. What is now said makes this clear [sc. that the argument is about practical thinking]: on the one hand the fact that the [soul] is called ‘discursive’ (διανοητική) and not ‘intellect’ (νοῦς) or ‘contemplation’ (θεωρία), on the other hand the fact that [its thinking] is concerned with good and bad,

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οἱ ἔτι τὸν φυσικὸν τοῦτον διαζῶντες βίον, ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀσχέτως πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰς δευτέρας ζωὰς κἂν ἐπὶ βραχὺ διατεθῇ. Translation by H. J. Blumenthal, ‘Simplicius’: On Aristotle’s “On the Soul 3.1–5” (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2000, modified. See Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 97, 16–98, 27 with note 7 above.

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which are opposites existing in the realm of generation and in ultimate division.37 The last point is evident. Less convincing is the first point based on the use of the term διανοητική. As Priscian explains, this term, which is related to διάνοια, is used for all forms of discursive reasoning: ‘a passing through and resolving around divided beings, not only in practical matters, but also when engaged in theory, namely, when it is no longer intuitively apprehensive of the forms themselves’.38 Here, however, it is clearly about practical discursive thinking. Ammonius makes a similar comment: The argument is here about the dianoetic soul, and as Aristotle explained earlier the capacity of discursive thinking (διανοεῖσθαι) belongs not the soul on its own, but to the living being as a composite of body and soul.39 It is not so evident, however, that Aristotle uses in this passage the term διανοητική in order to distinguishes discursive reason from thinking (νόησις). In fact, somewhat further (431 b 2–3) Aristotle uses νοητικόν instead of διανοητικόν in exactly the same context: ‘The capacity of thinking (τὸ νοητικόν) thinks the forms in phantasms (ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι) and just as in those what is to be avoided or pursued is determined for it’. Here again, however, Priscian explains that Aristotle means by νοητικόν the capacity of practical thinking: By ‘the capacity of thinking’ he clearly means the capacity of practical thinking, for that is what is seeking and avoiding. And it is said that it ‘thinks’ by taking up ‘the forms’ of things to be done ‘in the phantasms’ by looking at them, not as if the phantasms were themselves [practical] thoughts (νοήματα), but [the practical thoughts] are something else that is activated in the thinker itself and awakened according to its contemplation of the phantasms.40

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Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 268, 14–17: δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, τοῦτο μὲν διανοητικὴ εἰρημένη καὶ οὐ νοῦς ἢ θεωρία, τοῦτο δὲ ἡ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς καὶ κακὸν στροφή, ἀντίθετα ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῇ γενέσει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐσχάτῳ μερισμῷ ὑφιστάμενα. Translation by Steel – Ritups (see note 15). See Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 267, 11–13: Διανοητικὴν μὲν λέγει ψυχὴν τὴν διανύουσαν καὶ περὶ τὰ μεριστὰ στρεφομένην οὐ πρακτικῶς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεωρητικῶς τὴν οὐκέτι τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῶν ἀθρόως ἀντιληπτικήν. Translation by Steel – Ritups (see note 15). See Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 97, 24–98, 28. The reference is to De an. I 4.408 b 25– 27; see Ammon. (Phlp.), In De an. 164, 16–24. See also further Ammonius’ comments on διάνοια: De intellectu 104, 98–00. Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 273, 26–30: ‘τὸ’ δὲ ‘νοητικόν’, δηλαδὴ τὸ πρακτικόν· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ διῶκον ἢ φεῦγον. εἴρηται δὲ ὡς ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι τὰ εἴδη τῶν πρακτῶν ἀναλαμβάνον νοεῖ εἰς αὐτὰ ἀποβλέπον, οὐχ ὡς τῶν φανταστῶν ὄντων νοημάτων, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρων καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ νοοῦντι ἐνεργουμένων κατά τε τὴν πρὸς τὰ φαντάσματα θέαν ἐγειρομένων. Translation by Steel – Ritups (see note 15).

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Philoponus, however, defends in his own lectures – in contrast to what he reported from Ammonius – a quite different interpretation of 431 a 14–17. In his view, Aristotle makes here a statement about the theoretical intellect and not just about practical thinking. That in practical matters there is no thinking without imagination is obvious, for in pursuing what is good and avoiding what is evil the intellect has to be informed of what is pleasant and what is distressing, and this is only possible through imagination. What Aristotle, however, intends to show in this passage is that even when the theoretical intellect is connected with imagination, for example in understanding the sensible world, it does not contemplate the sensible things in the way the practical intellect does, which is emotionally involved in what is known and understands things as to be avoided or pursued. The theoretical intellect, however, contemplates without experiencing pleasure or pain and that is why the phantasms are to it ‘just like perceptions’, as Aristotle says. [Aristotle] uses ‘intellective soul’ (διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ) loosely for the theoretical intellect. What is he saying? That it too sometimes uses imagination as does the practical intellect. But even if it uses imagination, he says, to it phantasms are like perceptions, that is, like sense alone without pain and pleasure.41 An original interpretation of which I could find no parallels. 3. Imagination and Thinking by Abstraction De an. III 8.432 a 4–9: ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη, ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν. The intelligible objects are in the sensible forms, both those which are said to be in abstraction and those which are dispositions and affections of sensible objects. And for this reason someone who does not perceive cannot learn or understand anything, and when one contemplates, one must simultaneously contemplate some phantasm. Whereas in the previous two passages Aristotle discussed the connection of imagination to thinking in a practical context, here he considers the condi-

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Phlp., In De an. 559, 26–30 (cf. 561, 23–31): διανοητικὴν ψυχὴν λέγει καταχρησάμενος τὸν θεωρητικὸν νοῦν. καὶ τί φησιν; ὅτι καὶ αὐτός ποτε κέχρηται φαντασίᾳ ὡς καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ κέχρηται, φησί, τῇ φαντασίᾳ, τούτῳ τὰ φαντάσματα, φησίν, οἷον αἰσθήματά ἐστιν, τουτέστιν αἴσθησις μόνον ἄνευ ἀνίας καὶ ἡδονῆς. Translation by Charlton (see note 8), modified.

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tions in which the connection to imagination is required in theoretical thinking. Two cases are distinguished: (1) the thinking of abstracted forms in mathematics; (2) the thinking of ‘dispositions and affections of sensible objects’ in natural science. Already Plato insisted on the essential role of imagination in mathematical knowledge, and this view was developed by Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus, who considered imagination as a vehicle needed to offer a certain extension and intelligible dimensionality wherein the soul expresses and projects its reason principles. Mathematics is not about the idea of the circle or triangle, but about the circle or triangle as a dimensional object. But also when we understand mathematical objects in the Peripatetic way as quantities, magnitudes and figures abstracted from the sensible bodies, the role of imagination in this abstraction process is essential. A second domain where we need the help of imagination is the knowledge of ‘the dispositions and affections of sensible objects’. With ‘dispositions’ (ἕξεις), Priscian explains, Aristotle here means ‘the qualities of the first and fourth type [as distinguished in the Categories], such as health, figures, forms’, with ‘affections’ (πάθη) he means the ‘passive qualities’ (which belong to the third type).42 When the intellect considers these properties, it must use perception and imagination as indispensable collaborators. This does not mean that natural science should remain linked to imagination. Once the soul reaches scientific knowledge and understands in a universal and necessary way sensible things from their causes or essences, it does not need to reflect on the content of imagination. The commentators find in this passage another confirmation of their view that Aristotle never intended to say that the connection with imagination is required for every form of thinking. As Priscian says: What we noticed at every passage where he said that the intellect contemplates the forms in the phantasms, namely that he did not mean simply every intellect, but either the practical intellect or the intellect that is interwoven with perception and imagination, so that it may grasp senseobjects or imagined objects, whatever they may be, he himself now determines with one argument that is common to all cases. And this is the intention of this passage, namely to teach us in what cases the intellect

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See Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 284, 2–4: ὧν τὰ μὲν ἐν ἀφαιρέσει τῶν μαθηματικῶν δηλωτικά, αἱ δὲ ἕξεις τῶν κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τέταρτον εἶδος ποιοτήτων, οἷον ὑγείας σχημάτων μορφῶν, τὰ δὲ πάθη τῶν παθητικῶν ποιοτήτων. Ammonius’ interpretation (see De intellectu 117, 89–99) is slightly different: the ‘affections’ stand for colours (third type of quality), the ‘dispositions’ for health and sickness and the like (first type). He does not include the fourth type.

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Carlos Steel uses imagination as collaborator. For without imagination it cannot, in the case of the knowledge of sense-objects and imagined objects, have knowledge of these things, regardless of whether as objects of action or solely as objects of cognition. For as they are particulars, the intellect necessarily uses the corresponding modes of cognition as collaborators. Therefore we should not believe, as some Peripatetics do, that he wants to say that all intellect is unable to be active without imagination.43

And Ammonius defends exactly the same view: It is plain from what he says here that he is not speaking of every kind of function of the intellect, but only of that which is concerned with sensible and so called abstract things.44 As Ammonius further explains, a distinction must been made between two sorts of intelligible objects. (1) Some things are intelligible by their own nature, such as the separate forms. They must not be made intelligible by the intellective soul, as they are actually intelligible. (2) Some objects are not by nature and actually intelligible, but are by nature sensible, and made intelligible. Such are the objects of the mathematical science that are constituted by abstracting shapes and forms from the sensible objects in which they inhere.45 In his lectures, Philoponus elaborates this distinction further. There are three sorts of intelligible objects: (1) the first intelligible objects are the non-material beings; (2) the second are the mathematical objects; (3) the third are the enmattered forms. In order to know the first no imagination is needed, on the contrary it is a hindrance; to know mathematical objects we need imagination as a substrate (or intelligible matter) to represent the objects in dimensionality and division; to know sensible forms the intellect must use imagination as an instrument.46

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Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 283, 19–29: Ὅπερ ἡμεῖς καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐπεσημηνάμεθα, ὁπότε τὸν νοῦν ἔλεγεν ἐν τοῖς φανταστοῖς τὰ εἴδη θεωρεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς πάντα νοῦν ἐβούλετο, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸν πρακτικὸν ἢ τὸν αἰσθήσει καὶ φαντασίᾳ συμπλεκόμενον, ἵνα τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ φανταστῶν, ἅττα ποτέ ἐστιν, ἀντιλάβηται, οὕτω νῦν αὐτὸς κοινῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίζεται. καὶ οὗτος ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν προκειμένων ῥητῶν διδάξαι, ἐπὶ τίνων ὁ νοῦς τῇ φαντασίᾳ χρῆται συνεργῷ. καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αὐτῆς γὰρ γινώσκει ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ φανταστῶν γνώσεως, εἴτε ὡς πρακτῶν εἴτε καὶ ὡς γνωστῶν μόνως· μερικῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ταῖς συστοίχοις αὐτῶν συνεργοῖς χρῆται γνώσεσιν, ἵνα μὴ ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν Περιπατητικῶν πάντα νοῦν οἰηθῶμεν αὐτὸν λέγειν μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας ἐνεργεῖν. Translation by Steel – Ritups (see note 15). Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 115, 58–60: Palam enim ex his quae hic dicuntur quod non de omni operatione intellectus haec dicuntur, sed de ea quae in sensibilibus et dictis ex abstractione. Translation by Charlton (see note 7). See Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 114, 28–38. See Phlp., In De an. 563, 11–22; 568, 13–25; 569, 30–570, 5.

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4. No Phantasm but not without Phantasm Finally there is the last passage at the end of De an. III 8 which keeps puzzling commentators: De an. III 8.432 a 12–14: τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τἆλλα (ταῦτα Ross) φαντάσματα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων. But what will distinguish the first thoughts from being phantasms? Or is it the case that not even the other thoughts are phantasms, but do not exist without these phantasms. Among modern commentators there is quite a discussion on the interpretation of this passage,47 mainly about the meaning of the ‘other’48 as opposed to the ‘first’ thoughts. Most scholars defend that the primary thoughts are the thoughts of simple essences, and the other thoughts the judgments (mentioned in the text just before), which are composed out of simple thoughts. The argument then would be: If thoughts as judgments are not phantasms, yet not without phantasms, a fortiori are the first thoughts out of which they are composed not phantasms. The ancient commentators defend another interpretation: The first thoughts are thoughts of objects that are by nature intelligible, such as ‘forms separate from matter’, the other thoughts are the inferior thoughts involved in the cognition of objects whereby imagination plays a role, such as are the abstract objects of geometry. Aristotle’s argument is, as Ammonius explains, an a fortiori argument.49 If even the inferior thoughts (such as in mathematics), which cannot exist without phantasms, are not themselves phantasms, how much more are the primary thoughts, which do no need phantasms, not themselves phantasms. However, as Priscian informs us, Alexander had construed a quite different a fortiori argument from this passage. If the secondary thoughts are not phantasms, though not without phantasms, even the first thoughts will not be phantasms, though not without them. He thus finds in this text again an argument to demonstrate that the intellective soul always needs imagination in thinking and is therefore linked with the body. But Priscian rightly rejects this interpretation. The a fortiori argument does not work if the primary thoughts are supposed to be in exactly the same state as the inferior thoughts. What Aristotle in-

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Cf. the long note in Hicks (see note 1) 547–548. All manuscripts have τἆλλα, but Ross (see note 3) adopts in his edition ταῦτα, a reading of Themistius. Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 118, 33: ex circumstante = ἐκ τοῦ περιόντος (cf. Charlton [see note 7] 132, n. 37, following a suggestion of Bossier).

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tends to show is that if even the inferior thoughts, which cannot exist without imagination are not themselves phantasms, how much more thoughts that do not even need imagination, will not be phantasms.

III. Thinking ‘not without’ Imagination As we have seen, following the analysis of the commentators, Aristotle’s claim that thinking is always connected with imagination should be restricted to particular modes of thinking. φαντασία is evidently needed as a necessary co-operator in practical reasoning, because when we have to avoid what is bad and seek what is good, we are dealing with concrete and particular situations, which cannot be known without perception and imagination. In theoretical thinking there are two domains where the role of imagination is essential: mathematical knowledge and the knowledge of sensible objects starting from their accidental shapes and properties. As Ammonius summarizes: ‘In connexion with things intelligible in this way, I mean things which are by nature sensible but are made intelligible, intellect needs imagination and imagination does not exist without sense. But for things which are altogether separate, intellect has no need of sense or imagination; on the contrary, imagination even impedes intellectual acts’.50 However, even in thinking separate forms, which are intelligible by nature, where we do not need imagination as an instrument, the human intellect can never be entirely without imagination as long as it is incarnated in this earthly body. One could therefore still make the general claim that all human thinking is in this life ‘not without imagination’. But it remains to be seen how this connection must be understood. It all depends on what we mean when we use the prepositional expression ‘not without’ (οὐκ ἄνευ). As Ammonius explains, the expression ‘not without’ can be used in three different senses: (1) Either in the sense of causing neither harm nor benefit, as we say that a body in the sunlight is not without shade (for shade neither benefits nor harms a body) or (2) in the sense of necessity as an instrument or something like that, as we say that Achilles excelled in battle, but not

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Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 115, 59–116, 65: Circa sic quidem igitur intelligibilia, dico autem quae natura quidem sensibilia et fiunt intelligibilia, indiget intellectus phantasia, phantasia autem non sine sensu. Ad omnino autem separata nihil opus est intellectui sensu aut phantasia; econtra enim et impedit ad intellectuales operationes phantasia. Translation by Charlton (see note 7), modified.

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without his ashen spear […], or (3) in the sense of what is an impediment, as we say that someone sailing in a storm was saved, but not without danger.51 A similar threefold distinction is made by Damascius in his commentary on the Phaedo, when discussing the danger of imagination for thinking. The expression ‘not without’ can indicate: (1) a risk of harm; (2) a necessary contributing to something as is the case of matter; (3) what is neither beneficial neither harmful.52 Ammonius uses the same distinction again in his commentary on III 8 (to which he refers in the first passage in In De an. 45, 22– 46, 3), but here he makes it fourfold, because he distinguishes in what is ‘necessary’ (and therefore ‘beneficial) two cases: (2a) what is beneficial ‘as matter’, as when we say that ‘a reckoning-board is not without wood’ and (2b) what is beneficial as instrument, as ‘in fighting not without a sword’.53 The case of ‘matter’ was also in the threefold list of Damascius, but he did not mention the ‘instrument’. The distinction between ‘true cause’ and ‘that without which a cause cannot be a cause’ (as is an instrument, or matter) is common in the philosophical tradition since Plato presented it in Phd. 99 A 4-B 6, followed by Aristotle in Phys. II 9.200 a 5–6. But there are no parallels of this threefold explanation of ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ. The examples show that the distinction was originally not made to explain the role of φαντασία in thinking. The fact, however, that both Damascius and Ammonius apply it to the problem of φαντασία may indicate that they both have it from a common source, maybe Proclus. Let us now adapt this threefold distinction to the relation thinking-imagination: (1) Imagination can be a necessary instrument for thinking; (2) it can

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Ammon. (Phlp.), In De an. 45, 25–31: ἢ γὰρ τὸ μήτε βλάπτον μήτε ὠφελοῦν, ὡς λέγομεν οὐκ ἄνευ σκιᾶς τὸ ἐν φωτὶ σῶμα (οὔτε γὰρ ὠφελεῖ τι σῶμα οὔτε βλάπτει ἡ σκιά) ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς ὄργανον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ὡς λέγομεν ὅτι ἠρίστευσεν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς μελίας […] ἢ τὸ παρεμποδίζον, ὥσπερ λέγομεν ὅτι ἐν χειμῶνι πλεύσας ἐσώθη, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ κινδύνου. Translation by van der Eijk (see note 25). Cf. Psellus, Op. psych. theol. daem., 36, 30–33; Suda, lemma sub omicron. Cf. Dam., In Phd. I § 113: Πῶς οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας νοοῦμεν; – Ἢ ὅτι παρέπεται καὶ φαντασία, οὐ συμπληροῦσα τὴν νόησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιθολοῦσα, ὡς πλέοντα χειμών. τῶν γὰρ οὐκ ἄνευ τριττὸν τὸ γένος· ἢ γὰρ ὡς βλάπτον, ὡς ἡ φαντασία, ἢ ὥς τι συνεισφέρον, ὡς ἡ ὕλη, ἢ ὡς οὐδέτερον, οὔτε βλάπτον οὔτε συνεισφέρον, οἷον ἡ σκιά. Cf. Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 119, 42–49: hoc autem non sine quadrupliciter: aut enim ut materia, sicut dicimus non sine ligno vehiculum: aut ut nocivum, sicut dicimus non sine periculo navigationem in hieme fieri; aut ut neque conferens aliquid neque nocens sed assequens, ut dicimus non sine umbra eum qui in lumine ambulare; aut ut organum, ut non sine gladio pugnare. See Greek retroversion in Appendix. On the translation of vehiculum see n. 55 below.

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be a danger and hindrance of thinking; (3) it can be an innocent accompaniment, an overflow of the activity of thinking in the inferior faculties. (1) As we have seen, φαντασία is a necessary condition of thinking, a sine qua non, in the case of practical thought, in mathematical reasoning and in our understanding of the sensible world. Φαντασία is in all three cases not a danger, an impediment or hindrance of thinking, but is cooperating with (συνεργοῦσα) the intellect and contributing to its knowledge.54 Thus, in mathematics, the thought that ‘every triangle has its angels equal to two right angles’ is not itself a phantasm, but it is ‘not without a phantasm’ (see 432 a 13–14). The intellect uses in fact imagination as an instrument: It functions as a kind of reckoning-board (ἀβάκιον) for geometrical reasoning.55 (2) The phrase ‘not without imagination’ can also be used in the sense of ‘not without danger’, as when someone starts a journey in a winter storm and may risk perishing. The storm is certainly not an instrument for the journey, as a ship is, but a dangerous hindrance. We are confronted with such a danger when we attempt to think, in a metaphysical theory, the first causes and the separate forms. Here imagination is of no help but a hindrance that must be overcome. For when we attempt to think what is imma-

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The vocabulary of ‘cooperation’ is often used by Priscian: see Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 16, 25; 45, 38; 283, 24–26; 284, 5; 285, 38; 306, 23; 309, 31; 320, 13; 321, 19. See also Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 61, 75; 61, 82; 61, 84; Phlp., In De an. 551, 26. See Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 119, 47–49: secundum hoc igitur dicitur non sine phantasmate quae in abstractione intelligere intellectum; ut enim vehiculo phantasia utitur; 61, 83: velut enim vehiculum in his intellectus est phantasia; 62, 3–4: sicut vehiculo utens phantasia. Thanks to an extract of Philoponus’ lost Greek text in Michael of Ephesus (In Parv. nat. 12, 16–22) it is possible to reconstruct the original text corresponding to William’s velut enim vehiculum in his intellectus est phantasia in 61, 83: οἷον γὰρ ἀβάκιον τοῦ νοῦ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τούτων ἡ φαντασία (= In Parv. nat. 12, 18–19); see for a Greek retroversion the appendix. Moerbeke did not understand the term ἀβάκιον and freely translated it as vehiculum. That ἀβάκιον (or ἄβαξ) is the right reading corresponding to vehiculum is also confirmed by parallel texts in Ammon. (Phlp.), In De an. 58, 12–13; Phlp., In Anal. post. 156, 9; Syrian., In Met. 91, 35; Ascl., In Met. 410, 8; Elias, In Porph. 28, 4. Even in the example in De intellectu 119, 43 (non sine ligno vehiculum) the term vehiculum stands for ἄβαξ: see for a similar example Ammon., In Porph. 101, 15; Phlp., In Phys. 162, 25–26; In Nicom. Ar. 32, 13. Ammonius refers in In De an. 45, 31–46, 2 to the same passage (432 a 13–14), but explains it differently: ‘Not without’ would indicate here ‘what may hinder’ thinking as an impediment. This is plainly in contradiction with the commentary offered ad locum in De intellectu 119, 47–49 (cf. Charlton [see note 7] 132, n. 4). Moreover such an interpretation of the text is incompatible with the a fortiori argument (see above p. 201). It seems as if a copyist made an error in 46, 1–2 and repeated wrongly ὡς ἐμποδιστικὸν (from 45, 32) in 46, 1. The textual basis is very limited as we have only manuscript R in this passage.

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terial, imagination forces us to represent it taking shapes, dimensionality, and divisibility from sensible things. ‘In its contemplation of these [forms] the intellect is dragged down by imagination, which forms images of shapes and magnitudes and will not allow them to be grasped as they truly are.’56 Imagination is thus experienced as ‘the worst hindrance’ of thinking. When discussing the need to remove imagination as the ultimate impediment of thinking the commentators like to refer to a passage in the Phaedo (66 D-E) wherein Socrates describes how difficult it is for the soul, when being in this earthly body, to grasp the truth. There are first the many desires related to needs of the body which make us too busy to practice philosophy. But the last hindrance to be taken (τὸ δ’ ἔσχατον πάντων Phd. 66 D 3)57 is the fact that at the moment when we have taken some leisure (σχολή Phd. 66 D 4) from the body’s claims and may turn to some investigation, ‘the body intrudes once more into our investigations and causes confusion and trouble and distraction, so that it prevents us from seeing the truth’. Socrates’ conclusion is thus obvious: ‘if we are ever to have pure knowledge we must escape from the body and observe things in themselves with the soul’. As we can learn from Damascius and Olympiodorus, the commentators on the Phaedo understood this ‘final hindrance’ as the presence of φαντασία in the soul when thinking, though the term φαντασία is not used. To come to pure thought, Damascius says, many obstacles must be taken. The last and the most difficult to cast off is, on the appetitive level, ambition (φιλοτιμία), and, on the cognitive level, imagination. Therefore, as he observes, ‘even the majority of the philosophers are hampered by these, and especially by imagination’.58 Olympiodorus echoes this comment and notices how difficult it is to escape from this affect. Imagination, he says, obstructs reason like a cloud (κάλυμμα) impeding the sun. He presents an allegorical interpretation of the Odyssey where Circe stand for sense-perception and Calypso for imagination. ‘Odysseus needed the moly, the magical plant, of Hermes, that is, right reason, to escape from Calypso, who is imagination’. 59 56

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Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 61, 85–62, 87: in speculatione enim horum detrahitur intellectus a phantasia, figuras et magnitudines phantasiante et non concedente sincere illa percipi. Translation by Charlton (see note 7), modified. See Greek retroversion in Appendix. See also Phd. 82 C 2–3: ἀλλ’ ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι. See also the quotation from Ammon. (Phlp.) note 60 below. See Dam., In Phd. I § 111 (Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. II [see note 28] 70–71). See Olymp., In Phd. 6 § 2 (L. G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. I: Olympiodorus (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde nieuwe reeks, deel 92), Amsterdam−Oxford−New York 1976, 96–97 with excellent notes). According to Homer, Hermes gave the magical plant moly to Odysseus to protect him from the spell of Circe (not Calypso as is said here); see Od. 10,

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And Philoponus makes in his own lectures the same reference to the Phaedo: Non-imaginative activities are rare. For even when its acts concerning divine things, imaginations runs out beside it, making an imprint of things for which there can be no imprints, and on that account Plato says it is the final evil.61 One might, however, object against this too negative view of the role of imagination. Do we not need imagination even to reach the contemplation of the divine and intelligible forms? Plato in the Timaeus praises ‘the supremely benefit’ of the power of sight that the demiurge gave our eyes. If we had not seen the regular movements of planets and stars, we would not have discov-

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302 ff.). On the gift of Hermes applied to mathematics see Procl., In Euc. 30, 5; 55, 21. The example is also found in Simp., In Cat. 8, 14; Elias, In Cat. 119, 20. Ammon. (Phlp.), In De an. 2, 29–3, 5: ὃ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι λέγει ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ χαλεπώτατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι ὅταν καὶ σχολὴν ἀπὸ τῶν περιολκῶν τοῦ σώματος μικρὸν ἀγάγωμεν καὶ θελήσωμεν τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν θείων σχολάσαι, παρεμπίπτουσα ἡ φαντασία θόρυβον ἡμῖν κινεῖ, ὑπονοεῖν διδοῦσα ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, καὶ μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ σχῆμα, καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ ἡμᾶς ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀσχηματίστως περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐννοεῖν. Translation by van der Eijk (see note 25), modified. A similar view is expressed by Sophon., In De an. 120, 9–15, a section probably taken from the lost part (on III 3) of Ammonius’ (Philoponus’) commentary: ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος συμβαινόντων ἡμῖν κακῶν τὴν φαντασίαν ὁ Πλάτων ἐτίθετο, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μετὰ τὸ σχολάσαι ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος φροντίδων αὕτη παρενοχλοῦσα οὐκ ἐᾷ καθαρὰς τὰς νοήσεις ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ δὴ ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχῃ, κἀκείνῳ συνεργοῦσα τὰ ἐκεῖθεν ἀμερῶς νοούμενα μορφοῦσα καὶ σχηματίζουσα μεριστὰ ποιεῖ καὶ διαστατά, τοῦ νοῦ ἀμερίστως νοοῦντος τὰ μεριστὰ καὶ τὰ ἐσχηματισμένα ἀσχηματίστως (‘Hence Plato too in the Phaedo put imagination as ‘the last of evils’ that befall us from the body; for even when the soul gets leisure from the cares of the body, imagination causes annoyance and does not allow it to have pure thoughts; and even when it takes its principles from reason, when collaborating with imagination, it gives form to what it thinks indivisibly from these principles in an indivisible way, and in giving shape it make these thoughts divided and dimensional, wheras the intellect thinks in an indivisible way what is divided and without shape what is shaped’). Phlp., In De an. 542, 9–12: ὀλίγαι εἰσὶν ἀφάνταστοι ἐνέργειαι· καὶ ὅτε γὰρ περὶ τὰ θεῖα ἐνεργεῖ, παρειστρέχει ἡ φαντασία, τύπον ἐντιθεῖσα τοῖς ἀτυπώτοις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Πλάτων ἔσχατον αὐτὴν λέγει κακόν. Translation by Charlton (see note 8), modified.

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ered the divine demiurge of this world. Our sense perceptions and imaginations consequent upon them thus opened the path to an inquiry into the nature of the universe and into philosophy (Tim. 47 A). Why, then, saying that sense perception and imagination is a hindrance, if in fact it contributes to philosophy?62 In reply to this objection Ammonius first points out that perception and imagination are essential components of human nature. Without their proper functioning we would be handicapped animals. Nevertheless they do not, properly speaking, ‘cause or produce’ our thoughts, as radical empiristic philosophers assume. They only offer an ‘occasional causality’ by arousing the intellect to discover its thought inside. But if by looking with the senses at the universe we come to an understanding of god, sense may be said to contribute to this only as one who wakes a sleeping geometer or who removes rheum from the eyes or the wax in the ears of Odysseus’ companions contributes to their proper functioning. An impediment is removed only; they do not of themselves contribute to the functioning.63 Three examples are given to illustrate the limited role of perception and imagination. (i) The geometer,64 who has acquired a dispositional knowledge of geometry, does not lose it when he is sleeping and not practising it in act. When someone awakens him, he somehow causes him to think again and practise geometry, but this awakening is not producing the knowledge in his mind, but only removing the sleep which impedes its actualisation. (ii) When a physician removes from someone’s eyes rheum,65 he does not make him 62

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Cf. Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 116, 66–70: Sed forte dicet aliquis: cur igitur per sensibilia ad illorum reducuntur speculationem? Sine autem auditu et visu per quae, ut Plato ait, philosophiae genus acquirimus, est omnino ad intellectum divinorum devenire; quomodo igitur non ad haec dicimus conferre intellectui sensum? See Greek retroversion in Appendix. Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 116, 75–80: Si autem per sensum ad universum aspicientes ad intellectum dei venimus, sic dicimus sensus ad hoc conferre, sicut et somniantem dormientem geometram, aut eum qui operturas oculorum amiserit, aut ceram in auribus sociorum Ulyssis, ad proprias conferre operationes; impedimentum enim solum remotum est; non enim ex se ad operationes conferunt. Translation by Charlton (see note 7), modified. See Greek retroversion in Appendix. The example of the ‘sleeping geometer’ comes from De gen. an. II 1.735 a 10 and is often used by Ammonius (Phlp.). See In De an. 110, 29; 204, 11; 205, 4; De intellectu 3, 57–58; 14, 41; 33, 85; 39, 12–13; 40, 39; 40, 42; 116, 77; Sophonias (who depends on the lost commentary of Ammonius-Philoponus), In De an. 67, 17; 69, 19; 132, 31; 134, 20; 135, 16; 135, 19; 135, 20. See also Elias, In Cat. 244, 29. Moerbeke translates eum qui operturas oculorum amiserit (De intellectu 116, 77). Charlton (see note 7) understands this as ‘one who removes a blindfold’. Parallels, however, show that Moerbeke translates by operturas τὰς λήμας, i.e. rheum or sleeping sand in the eyes. See Herm., In Phdr. 67, 14–17, quoted in the next footnote, Olymp., In Alc. 12, 10–11: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς τὰς λήμας ἀφαιρεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν μόνον καὶ τὰ ἐμπόδια τῆς ὀπτικῆς

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see, but only removes what hinders seeing. The capacity to see comes from the patient himself. A teacher is similar to such a doctor: he removes what impedes thinking, but does not cause the thinking himself. Hermias uses the same image to explains Plato’s doctrine that all learning is reminiscence: ‘Since ‘the eye of the soul’ is as it were obscured by some rheum coming from the realm of generation, for that reason Socrates only removes impediments, in order that the young man may from himself bring forward the truth.’66 (iii) The removal of the wax from the ears of Odysseus’ companions is somewhat surprising, because the story is mostly used to illustrate how we can obstruct the fascination of the Sirenes (who stand for imagination). There is also a fourth example, not in this list, but used by Ammonius (Phlp.) in a similar sense: ‘the spark (σπινθήρ) hidden in the ashes’, which ‘lights up when someone pokes a little in the ashes’.67 All these examples are used to explain in what sense perception and imagination can make us think the forms: They only awake our mind, trigger the reasons inside it and thus provoke us into thought, without being its instrument or vehicle. Different is the role of imagination in understanding mathematical objects, as Ammonius explains. For in this case, we start by seeing the things themselves in their outward appearances, magnitudes and figures, and send them to imagination, and from there the intellect forms the mathematical objects in abstraction. But when we look at the world and come from the consideration of its ordered structure to the understanding of a divine creator and the paradigmatic forms, what we understand does not correspond to what we intuit in perception or imagination. In this case, perceptions are not causes of our knowledge, but just ‘provoke the intellect into bringing out the reasons (λόγοι) which are [already] in it’.68 Ammonius defends a similar view in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, as reported by Philoponus:

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ἐνεργείας and Proclus, In Alc. 281, 5–8 (cf. note by A.-Ph. Segonds, Proclus: Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon. Tome II [Collection des Universités de France. Série grecque], Paris 1986, 436 with list of parallels). Herm., In Phdr. 67, 14–17: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὰς μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις βούλεται εἶναι, οἷον δὲ ὑπό τινων λημ[μ]ῶν ἐπεσκιάσθαι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα ὑπὸ τῆς γενέσεως, τούτου χάριν τὰ ἐμπόδια μόνον ὑπεξαιρεῖ, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἀφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ προβάλῃ τἀληθὲς ὁ νέος. Cf. Ammon. (Phlp.), In De an. 4, 32–5, 4: ὥσπερ οὖν ὅταν τις μικρὸν τὴν τέφραν διορύξῃ, ὁ σπινθὴρ εὐθὺς ἀναλάμπει, καὶ οὐχ ὁ διορύξας τὸν σπινθῆρα ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἔπαυσεν, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ δόξα ἐρεθιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως προβάλλει τοὺς λόγους τῶν ὄντων. Translation by van der Eijk (see note 25). See also In Anal. post. 214, 25 and Olymp., In Gorg. 25, 16–22. Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 116, 84–85: quasi provocat intellectum per apparentia eas quae in ipso emittere rationes. Translation by Charlton (see note 7), modified. See Greek retroversion in appendix.

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Perceptions are not the causes of knowledge (for it is not right that the inferior is cause of the superior), but our souls, which are, as it were, possessed by the drowsiness or sleep of birth, need perceptions to waken them and rouse up the spark of knowledge hidden in them. And just as a person who has deeply forgotten one of his friends might perhaps never come to think of that person without some external prompting, but when someone shows him a coat or something else that belongs to his friend 69 he is immediately moved to think of his acquaintance and he rouses up the impressions in himself, so too sensibles stimulate the soul to project the reasons of the paradigms which are present in its essence.70 In this manner, Ammonius explains, we may by seeing the beauty and order of this sensible world and hearing the harmony come to think of the incorporeal paradigmatic forms. This is, as we have seen, the highest contribution of the senses given to us by the demiurge, as we learn from the Timaeus (47 A). But that does not mean that the soul ‘acquires knowledge from the sensibles, as has been sufficiently proved in the commentary on the Phaedo’. The reference here is probably to Ammonius’ lost commentary on the Phaedo. Olympiodorus defends a similar view, probably himself depending on Ammonius, in his own commentary of the dialogue, making also the connection with the Timaeus passus.71 Whatever the restriction put on the role of imagination, it seems as if it is given a role that is not covered in the threefold distinction. For imagination is in this case neither a hindrance nor an instrument nor a neutral by-product of thinking (on which below). It offers, as Ammonius (Phlp.) says, the ‘external occasion’ (In Anal. post. 214, 27: ἔξωθεν ἀφορμῆς γενομένης) for the actualisation of thought that comes from inside.72

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The example of the garment reminding me of my friend comes from the Phaedo (see 73 D 5–6). Ammon. (Phlp.), In Anal. post. 214, 21–31: καὶ οὐ δήπου διὰ τούτων τοῦτό φαμεν, ὅτι αἱ αἰσθήσεις αἴτιαί εἰσι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν (οὐ γὰρ θέμις τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ κρείττονος αἴτιον εἶναι), ἀλλ’ ὅτι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ὡς ὑπὸ κάρου ἢ ὕπνου τῆς γενέσεως κατεχόμεναι δέονται τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐξυπνιζουσῶν καὶ ἀνακινουσῶν τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς γνώσεως σπινθῆρα κρυπτόμενον. καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν λήθῃ τινὸς τῶν φίλων βαθείᾳ γενόμενος οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἴσως ἔλθοι εἰς ἔννοιαν ἐκείνου μηδεμιᾶς αὐτῷ ἔξωθεν ἀφορμῆς γενομένης, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἱμάτιόν τις τοῦ φίλου δείξῃ ἢ ἕτερόν τι, εὐθὺς κινεῖται εἰς ἔννοιαν τοῦ γνωρίμου καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τύπους ἀνακινεῖ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἐρεθίζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν προβάλλεσθαι τοὺς συνουσιωμένους αὐτῇ τῶν παραδειγμάτων λόγους. See Olymp., In Phd. 4 § 7–8 ed. Westerink (see note 59). Polansky (see note 2) 470 attributes a similar role of φαντασία in causing actual thinking: ‘Dispositional knowledge is always ready to illumine, and the intelligible objects are always available for thought, but actual thinking occurs when dispositional knowledge joins with phantasia. Phantasia is the occasion or the ‘proximity’ of agent and patient that enables agent mind to have the intelligible objects get us thinking’.

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(3) There remains to consider the third meaning of ‘not without’: Imagination will always accompany thinking, even if it does not positively contribute to it, as a shadow always accompanies an enlightened object, without causing any harm or positive effect. In fact, when the rational soul is connected with this body, it is unavoidable that there is also some activity in the imagination corresponding to the activity of thinking in the intellect. Priscian explains this as follows: When the intellect cognizes the separate forms, it will not use the body as an instrument, even if imagination attends such an intellect, not as a co-operator, but it (i.e. imagination) follows precisely as an accompaniment (παρακολούθημα), like the shadow follows a solid body in light and the contraction of the eyes the intense contemplation of the soul.73 Interesting is Priscian’s reference to bodily movements, in which the activity of thinking is reflected, as the contraction of our eyes or the frowning of eye browns or some gesticulations. This does not mean that the body or imagination is an instrument of the rational activities: it is only affected by a sort of overflow coming from the rational activities. In another passage Priscian insists that not only our pneumatic body is affected by our intellectual activities – a view commonly accepted by Neoplatonists since Porphyry –, but also this solid fleshly body: It is not surprising if the same vehicle is set below different faculties; indeed it underlies even the rational faculty. Not only the pneuma, but also the solid instrument is affected by our rational activities.74 This is the ideal situation of life (εὐζωΐα): the intellect contemplating without being hindered by imagination, but having imagination, as Ammonius says, ‘attending upon it like a sensible servant’.75 Such a state, however, is not easy to attain and it requires from the philosopher a difficult ἄσκησις to make

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Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 45, 37–46, 1: ὅτε γε τὰ χωριστὰ γινώσκει εἴδη ὁ νοῦς, οὔτε ὡς ὀργάνῳ τῷ σώματι χρήσεται, καὶ εἰ καὶ τῷ τοιῷδε νῷ ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ φαντασία, οὐχ ὡς συνεργοῦσα ἀλλ’ ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτο παρακολούθημα ἕπεται, καθάπερ ἡ σκιὰ τῷ ἐν φωτὶ στερεῷ ἢ καθάπερ τῇ συντόνῳ τῆς ψυχῆς θεωρίᾳ ἡ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν συστροφή. See also 17, 13; 18, 23– 28; 60, 26–28; 77, 33–34. Ps.-Simp. (= Prisc. Lyd.), In De an. 213, 37–214, 2: καὶ οὐ θαυμαστὸν εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄχημα ταῖς διαφόροις ἡμῶν ὑπέστρωται ζωαῖς, ὅπου γε καὶ τῇ λογικῇ ἡμῶν ζωῇ· συνδιατίθεται γοῦν ταῖς λογικαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνεργείαις οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στερεὸν τοῦτο ὄργανον. Translation by Blumenthal (see note 35). Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 63, 20: sicut opadon bene scientem sequi ad illum. Translation by Charlton (see note 7). See Greek retroversion in appendix.

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sure that ‘the non-rational life no longer pulls against the intellect’,76 but follows the proper movements of the intellect as an attendant.

IV. Conclusion Even Platonists, it seems, have to accept that the intellective soul, when connected to this earthy body, can never be entirely without imagination, not only in (1) practical thought or in (2) understanding sensible objects or in (3) mathematics, but even in its most excellent thought, (4) the contemplation of the intelligible forms. The role of imagination is, however, different in the four cases, as we have seen. Therefore, a good philosophical teacher will not only warn his students of the danger of imaginations, which may distort their thoughts, but also helps them to train and discipline their imagination so that it may be an obedient servant of the intellect. For that reason, he will use images and phantastic stories besides rational arguments. As Proclus explains in his introduction to his commentary of the myth of Er: The souls, which are by essence intellectual and full of incorporeal and intellectual reasons, have put on (ἐνδυσαμέναις) the imaginative intellect and cannot live without it in this place of generation […] – for these souls, which have become impassible passible and without figures figurative (γενομέναις ἀπαθέσι παθητικαῖς, ἀμορφώτοις μορφωτικαῖς) this teaching through myths [as here in the myth of Er] is appropriate.77 Myths are particularly needed for those who only live according to imagination and only have practised the passive intellect, as is the case with the vulgar masses, who are incapable of following a purely rational argument. By contrast, some exceptional souls, which have set their mind on pure intellections, will be content with the intellectual light of the truth without needing the imaginary mise-en-scène of myths. But for us, Proclus says, who are ‘both together and have a twofold intellect’, the one which we really are and the one we have put on and projected outwards (i.e. the passive intellect

76

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Ammon. (Phlp.), De intellectu 63, 18–19: ut non adhuc irrationalis vita contratrahat [Bossier cum T: contrahat Verbeke] intellectum. Translation by Charlton (see note 7). The Latin term contratrahere corresponds to ἀνθέλκειν (not ἀντισπᾶν or κατασπᾶν, as Charlton [see note 7] 78 n. 85 suggests); see Greek retroversion in Appendix. Procl., In Remp. II 107, 14–23: ταῖς ψυχαῖς νοεραῖς μὲν οὔσαις κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ὕπαρξιν καὶ λόγων πλήρεσιν ἀσωμάτων καὶ νοερῶν, ἐνδυσαμέναις [δὲ] τὸν φανταστικὸν νοῦν καὶ ζῆν ἄνευ τούτου μὴ δυναμέναις ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ τῆς γενέσεως […] – ταύταις δ’ οὖν, ὡς εἴπομεν, γενομέναις ἀπαθέσι παθητικαῖς, ἀμορφώτοις μορφωτικαῖς, πρέπων ἐστὶν τρόπος διδασκαλίας εἰκότως ὁ διὰ τῶν τοιῶνδε μύθων.

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linked to imagination), we find pleasures both in the fictive clothing of the story and in its deeper truth. Whereas the imaginative intellect ‘is stroken by the external and becomes thus ready for the path towards of science’, our true intellect ‘is nourished by what is inside the stories and becomes the contemplator of truth’.78

Appendix

Ammonius (Philoponus), De intellectu 61, 65–63, 36; 116, 66–88; 118, 20–119, 57 A Greek Retroversion 79 De intellectu 61, 65–63, 36 [61, 65] Non memoramur autem quia hoc quidem impassibile; passivus autem intellectus corruptibilis, et sine hoc nihil intelligit.

οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός· καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ. [De an. III 5.430 a 23–25]

Dubitationis quam superius dubitavit solutionem hic induxit. Dixit enim eius autem quod est non semper intelligere causa consideranda, et diximus quod non praetermisit solutio-

Τῆς ἀπορίας ἣν ἀνωτέρω ἠπόρησε τὴν λύσιν ἐνταῦθα ἐπήγαγεν. εἶπε γὰρ τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ εἴπομεν ὅτι οὐ παρέλιπεν τὴν λύσιν, ὥς τινες ᾠήθησαν, ἀλλὰ

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See Procl., In Remp. II 108, 7–10: εὐφραίνεται γὰρ ὁ διττὸς ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, καὶ ὃ μέν τις ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔνδον τραφεὶς ἐγένετο θεατὴς τῶν ἀληθῶν, ὃ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξω καταπλαγεὶς ἐπιτήδειος κατέστη πρὸς τὴν εἰς ἐπιστήμην ὁδόν. For underlined texts there are parallels in Sophonias, In De an. 134, 33–37; 137, 27–30 and Michael of Ephesos, In Parv. nat. 12, 16–22. I have corrected the edition of Verbeke (see note 7) in the following passages: 62, 12 se] ipsam addidi // 62, 93 utique] autem utique cum CVB // 63, 15 talibus] et praemisi cum TCV // 63, 17 ipsi] ipsum cum CV (deest in B) // 62, 91 contrahentem] contratrahentem coni. Bossier // 63, 19 contrahat] contratrahat Bossier cum T // 116, 69 non] non et cum BT // 116, 66 reducuntur] reducimur cum C // 116, 69 haec] hoc scripsi (cf. 116, 76) // 116, 72 utique magis] magis neque coni. Bossier // 116, 76 et somniantem] exsomniantem coni. Verbeke // 118, 23 assumatis] coassumatis cum CV // 118, 38 supermaiora] semper maiora coni. Bossier // 119, 56 et3] est scripsi. – After the submission of my contribution I discovered in a Greek manuscript, Laurentianus 87.20 (dated around 1300), scholia from Philoponus’ lost Greek text on De anima III. See C. Steel, Newly discovered Scholia from Philoponus’ lost Commentary on De anima III, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 84, 2017, 223–224. I could find two sections that correspond to De intellectu 61, 71–82 (published in my article [see this note] on pp. 239–240) and 119, 42–49 (not yet published), respectively. The retroversion of both passages has been revised in light of the scholia.

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nem, ut aliqui [61, 70] putaverunt, sed post multa ipsam assignat. Ecce igitur hic solutio illius dubitationis dicta est. Propter quid igitur, ait, non semper memoramur? Quia, ait, etsi impassibilis intellectus, et hac deberet non oblivisci, sed phantasia corruptibilis; hanc enim ait passivum intellectum, ut saepe dictum est. Quoniam igitur corruptibilis est [61, 75] phantasia, sine ipsa autem intellectus non intelligit, aut cooperante aut impediente, merito non semper intelligimus.

μετὰ πολλὰ αὐτὴν ἀποδίδωσιν. ἰδοὺ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἡ λύσις ἐκείνης τῆς ἀπορίας εἴρηται. Διὰ τί οὖν, φησίν, οὐκ ἀεὶ μνημονεύομεν; ὅτι, φησίν, εἰ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀπαθὴς καὶ ταύτῃ ἔμελλεν οὐκ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἡ φαντασία φθαρτή· ταύτην γάρ φησι τὸν παθητικὸν νοῦν, ὡς πολλάκις εἴρηται. ἐπεὶ οὖν φθαρτή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία, χωρὶς δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ νοῦς οὐ νοεῖ ἢ συνεργούσης ἢ ἐμποδιζούσης, εἰκότως οὐκ ἀεὶ νοοῦμεν.

Huic autem sine hac autem nihil intelligit subaudiendum ‘ut in pluribus’; ut enim in pluribus cum phantasia sunt intellectus operationes, sine hac autem rarae. Et raro aut semel in tota vita his qui [61, 80] ascenderunt ad summum philosophiae, sine phantasia intellectus operatur. Propter raritatem igitur universaliter pronuntiavit quia sine phantasia nihil intelligit, haec quidem ut cooperante, ut in mathematibus, – velut enim vehiculum in his intellectus est phantasia, et ad alia autem multa cooperatur –, haec autem et ut impediente, [61, 85] ut in intelligibilibus et divinis theoriae; in speculatione enim horum detrahitur intellectus a phantasia, figuras et magnitudines phantasiante et non concedente sincere illa percipi. Quoniam igitur sine phantasia nihil intelligit, corruptibilis autem est haec, et propter hoc transmutabilis, et alias aliter se habens, propter hoc non semper [62, 90] intellectus intelligit, huic quidem coniugatus, non habens autem semper ipsam propriis motibus assequentem, sed contratrahentem et impedientem.

Τῷ δὲ ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης οὐδὲν νοεῖ προσυπακουστέον τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μετὰ φαντασίας εἰσὶν αἱ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαι, αἱ δὲ χωρὶς ταύτης σπάνιαι. Καὶ ὀλιγάκις ἢ ἅπαξ80 ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ τῶν εἰς ἄκρον φιλοσοφίας ἀναβεβηκότων ἀφαντάστως ὁ νοῦς ἐνεργεῖ. διὰ οὖν τὸ σπάνιον καθόλου ἀπεφήνατο ὅτι ἄνευ φαντασίας οὐδὲν νοεῖ, τὰ μὲν ὡς συνεργούσης, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν μαθημάτων – οἷον γὰρ ἀβάκιον τοῦ νοῦ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τούτων ἡ φαντασία, καὶ εἰς ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ συνεργεῖ –, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὡς ἐμποδιζούσης, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν νοητῶν τε καὶ θείων θεωρίας. ἐν γὰρ τῇ τούτων θεωρίᾳ περιέλκεται ὁ νοῦς ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη φανταζομένης καὶ μὴ συγχωρούσης ἐκείνων εἰλικρινῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. Ἐπειδὴ οὖν χωρὶς φαντασίας οὐδὲν νοεῖ, φθαρτὴ δέ ἐστιν αὕτη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεταβλητὴ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχουσα, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀεὶ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ, ταύτῃ μὲν συνεζευγμένος, οὐκ ἔχων δὲ ἀεὶ αὐτὴν ταῖς οἰκείαις κινήσεσιν ἀκολουθοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ ἀνθέλκουσαν καὶ ἐμποδίζουσαν.

Dubitabit autem utique quis merito quia si propter hoc non semper memoratur intellectus, quia intelligentia ipsi cum phantasia passibili [62, 95] ente, et hac patiente et abiiciente impressiones, quod oblivione fit, hoc quidem in quibus ut organo utitur intellectus phantasia, merito utique dicetur, velut mathematicorum aut sensibilium aut in sensibilibus habentium esse; in omnimode vero sepa-

Ἀπορήσειεν δ’ ἄν τις εἰκότως ὅτι, εἰ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀεὶ μνημονεύει ὁ νοῦς, ὅτι τῆς νοήσεως αὐτῷ μετὰ φαντασίας παθητικῆς οὔσης καὶ ταύτῃ πασχούσης καὶ ἀποβαλλούσης τοὺς τύπους τὸ τῆς λήθης γίνεται, τοῦτο μὲν ἐφ’ ὧν ὡς ὀργάνῳ χρῆται ὁ νοῦς τῇ φαντασίᾳ, εἰκότως ἂν λέγοιτο, οἷον τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἢ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐχόντων τὸ εἶναι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν παντελῶς χωριστῶν διὰ τί

80

Cf. my article (see note 79), 239–240.

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ratis propter quid assequitur oblivio? Si enim quae circa illa operationes ipsius secundum [62, 00] se sunt intellectus, phantasia non solum non conferente sibi sed et impediente, oportebit videlicet, semel acceptis speciebus illis ab intellectu, et in susceptione ipsorum facto, indelebilem habere notitiam, cum sit impassibilis. In sensibilibus vero speciebus, sicut vehiculo utens phantasia, ita sensibilium species cognoscebat; merito igitur [62, 5] impressionibus ex phantasia apparentibus, propter passibilem esse ipsam, oblivio circa intellectum fit. In receptione autem separatarum specierum, ipso secundum se cognitionem ipsorum accipiente et ente impassibili, unde ipsi oblivio fit?

λήθη παρακολουθεῖ; εἰ γὰρ αἱ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ καθ’ αὑτόν εἰσι τοῦ νοῦ, τῆς φαντασίας οὐ μόνον μὴ συντελούσης αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμποδιζούσης, δεήσει δήπου ἅπαξ ληφθέντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐκείνων ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιλήψει αὐτῶν γενομένου ἀνεξάλειπτον ἔχειν τὴν γνῶσιν, ἀπαθῆ ὄντα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν, ὡς ἀβακίῳ χρώμενος τῇ φαντασίᾳ, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐγίνωσκεν. Εἰκότως οὖν τῶν τύπων ἐκ φαντασίας φανέντων διὰ τὸ παθητικὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν λήθη περὶ τὸν νοῦν γίνεται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑποδοχῇ τῶν χωριστῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸν τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτῶν λαβόντος καὶ ὄντος ἀπαθοῦς, πόθεν αὐτῷ λήθη γίνεται;

Forte igitur et huius altero modo phantasia causa; sicut enim [62, 10] et descendenti complexio irrationalis vitae, sicut somnum ipsi et alienationem imponens, oblivionis universalis sibi facta est causa, ita nihil mirum et hic circumtrahens in se ipsum phantasiam, et universaliter ad vitam in corpore particularem sibi oblivionem efficere, offuscantem ipsius puritatem et claritatem substantiae, [63, 15] quod quidem et in ebrietatibus accidit et circumstantiis et talibus. Quare et hic phantasia huius causa fit; figurata enim aliene ex sensibilibus et sic ipsum obnubilans, a propria illocatione et cognitione exstare facit. Ne forte autem omnino in talem mitram venientibus ut non adhuc irrationalis vita contratrahat intellectum; immo e contrario, [63, 20] hanc sicut opadon bene scientem sequi ad illum; et propter hoc etiam non phantastice intelligibilibus adhaerere potentibus iam neque assequi oblivionem intelligibilium receptionem, nusquam adhuc intellectu ab irrationali vita et phantasia patiente.

Μήποτε οὖν καὶ τούτου ἑτέρως ἡ φαντασία αἰτία· ὡς γὰρ καὶ κατιόντι [sc. τῷ νῷ] ἡ τῆς ἀλόγου ζωῆς συμπλοκή, ὡς ὕπνον αὐτῷ καὶ κάρον ἐπιθεῖσα, τῆς καθόλου λήθης αὐτῷ ἐγένετο αἰτία, οὕτως οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα περιέλκουσαν81 εἰς ἑαυτὴν τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ ὅλως πρὸς τὴν ἐν σώματι ζωὴν τὴν μερικὴν αὐτῷ λήθην ἐμποιεῖν, ἀμυδροῦσαν τὴν αὐτοῦ καθαρότητα καὶ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν μέθαις συμβαίνει καὶ κάροις82 καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ φαντασία τούτου αἰτία γίνεται· σχηματιζομένη γὰρ ἄλλοθεν ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀφανίζουσα τῆς οἰκείας ἕδρας καὶ γνώσεως ἐξίστησιν. μήποτε δὲ τοῖς παντελῶς εἰς τοιαύτην μοῖραν83 ἐρχόμενοις ὡς μήκετι τὴν ἄλογον ζωὴν ἀνθέλκειν τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ταύτην ὡς ὀπαδὸν εὐγνώμονα ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀφαντάστως τοῖς νοητοῖς προσέχειν δυνάμενοις λοιπὸν οὐδ’ ἕπεσθαι λήθην τῇ τῶν νοητῶν ἀντιλήψει, μηδαμοῦ ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλογου ζωῆς καὶ φαντασίας πάσχοντος.

Non memoramur autem quia hoc quidem impassibile; passivus [63, 25] autem intellectus corruptibilis, et sine hoc nihil intelligit. Istud sine hoc nihil intelligit quidam sic intelli-

Οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός· καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ. τοῦτο τὸ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ τινες οὕτως ἀκούουσιν ὅτι τῶν ἐνταῦθα

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περιέλκουσαν scripsi pro περιέλκουσα (circumtrahens). κάροις conieci pro καιροῖς (circumstantibus). μοῖραν conieci pro μίτραν (mitram).

‘The Soul Never Thinks without a Phantasm’ gunt quia eorum quae hic sunt sensibilium nihil sine phantasia intelligit, cointelligentes sensibilium specierum, et non est extra Aristotelis intellectum; in sequentibus enim, de operatione intellectus disputans quae fit circa sensibiles species, haec [63, 30] ait: Quoniam autem nihil est praeter magnitudines ut videtur sensibiles separatum, in aquis sensibilibus intelligibilia sunt, quae in abstractione dicuntur, et quaecumque sensibilium habitus et passiones. Et propter hoc non sentiens aliquid, nihil utique addiscet neque intelliget. Quando etiam speculatur, necesse simul phantasma aliquod speculari. [63, 35] Manifeste igitur et in his intellectus circa sensibiles species theoriam cum phantasia dixit fieri; non enim simpliciter operationem intellectus.

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αἰσθητῶν οὐδὲν ἄνευ φαντασίας νοεῖ, συνεπινοοῦντες τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους διανοίας· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἑξῆς περὶ τῆς τοῦ νοῦ ἐνεργείας διαλεγόμενος τῆς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἴδη γινομένης ταῦτά φησι· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐθὲν ἔστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι84 τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν, οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη. ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν. Σαφῶς οὖν καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὴν τοῦ νοῦ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἴδη θεωρίαν μετὰ φαντασίας ἔλεγε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν.

De intellectu 116, 66–88 Sed forte dicet aliquis: cur igitur per sensibilia ad illorum reducimur speculationem? Sine autem auditu et visu per quae, ut Plato ait, philosophiae genus acquirimus, est omnino ad intellectum divinorum devenire; quomodo igitur non et ad hoc dicimus conferre intellectui [116, 70] sensum?

Ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἐρεῖ τις· τί οὖν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἀναγόμεθα θεωρίαν, ἄνευ δὲ ἀκοῆς καὶ ὄψεως, δι’ ὧν, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησί, τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπορισάμεθα γένος, 85 ἔστιν ὅλως εἰς ἔννοιαν γίνεσθαι τῶν θείων; πῶς οὖν οὐ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο λέγομεν συμβάλλεσθαι τῷ νῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν;

Dico igitur quia privatum quidem esse visu et auditu sponte est non autem animal esse, multo magis neque hominem, propter monstra magis quae talia et non homines. Unumquodque autem iudicatur ex summo et perfecto quod in natura, non ex imperfecto aut orbato. [116, 75] Si autem per sensum ad universum aspicientes ad intellectum dei venimus, sic dicimus sensus ad hoc conferre, sicut exsomniantem dormientem geometram, aut eum qui operturas oculorum amiserit, aut ceram in auribus sociorum Ulyssis, ad proprias conferre operationes; impedimen-

Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐστερῆσθαι ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ μηδὲ86 ζῷον εἶναι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἄνθρωπον· διὸ87 τέρατα μᾶλλον τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωποι· ἕκαστον δὲ κρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ ἀκροτάτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ φύσει τελείου, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἢ πεπηρωμένου. Εἰ δὲ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἀποβλέποντες πρὸς τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἔννοιαν ἔρχομεθα, οὕτω λέγομεν τὰς αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τοῦτο συμβάλλεσθαι ὡς τὸν ἐξυπνίσαντα τὸν καθεύδοντα γεωμέτρην ἢ τὸν ἐξελόντα τὰς λήμας τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἢ τὸν κηρὸν ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν τῶν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἑταίρων πρὸς τὰς οἰκείας συμβάλλεσθαι ἐνεργείας· τὸ

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Moerbeke legit ὕδασι (aquis) pro εἴδεσι (De Corte apud Verbeke). addidit Charlton. μηδὲ scripsi: non autem Moerbeke. διὸ coniecit Strobel pro διὰ (propter).

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tum enim solum remotum est; non enim ex se [116, 80] ad operationes conferunt. In his quidem enim quae ex abstractione, ipsis illis sensus adiacet et remittit phantasiae ex qua et intellectus scientias colligit. Quando vero ad mundum respicientes in intellectum dei venimus, non ipsi intellecto sensus aut phantasia adiecit, sed quasi provocat intellectum per apparentia eas quae in ipso emit-[116, 85] tere rationes. Impossibile enim erat non inexistentibus sibi rationibus de divinis ex sensibilibus ad illa recurrere, ut saepe dictum est. Cuius enim aliquis nunquam intellectum habuit aut quem nunquam vidit, etsi occurrat ipsi, nunquam ipsum cognoscet.

ἐμπόδιον γὰρ μόνον ἀφῄρηται· οὐ γὰρ αὐτόθεν πρὸς τὰς ἐνεργείας συμβάλλονται. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐκ ἀφαιρέσεως αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπιβάλλει καὶ ἀναπέμπει τῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ὁ νοῦς τὰς ἐπιστήμας συνάγει. Ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἀποβλέποντες εἰς ἔννοιαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἔλθωμεν, οὐκ αὐτῷ τῷ νοουμένῳ ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἐπέβαλε, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἐρεθίζει τὸν νοῦν διὰ τῶν φαινομένων τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ προβάλλεσθαι λόγους. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἦν μὴ ἐνυπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα λόγων ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀνατρέχειν, ὡς πολλάκις εἴρηται. Οὗ γάρ τις οὐδέποτε ἔννοιαν ἔσχεν ἢ ὃν οὐδέποτε εἶδε, κἂν ὑπαντήσῃ αὐτῷ, οὐδέποτε αὐτὸν γνώσεται.

De intellectu 118, 20–119, 57 [118, 20] Prima autem noemata, id est conceptus, quid differrent a non phantasmata esse? Aut neque alia phantasmata sunt, sed non sine phantasmatibus.

τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τἆλλα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων [De an. III 8.432 a 12–14]

Coassumatis quae de anima dicta sunt et dicto quod anima omnia entia aliqualiter est (aut enim intelligibiles aut sensibiles sunt res, [118, 25] omnia autem intelligit anima; quoniam duplex intelligibile, ut diximus: haec quidem enim secundum se et natura intelligibilia sunt, ut separata a materia, haec autem facta intelligibilia, ut materiales species), cum dixisset de non entibus quidem intelligibilibus, factis autem intelligibilibus, nunc de reliquis ait proprie intelligibilibus, [118, 30] quae dicit prima intelligibilia.

Συγκεφαλαιωσάμενος τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρημένα καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα (ἢ γὰρ νοητὰ ἢ αἰσθητὰ τὰ πράγματά ἐστι· πάντα δὲ νοεῖ ἡ ψυχή, ἐπειδὴ διττὸν τὸ νοητόν, ὡς εἴπομεν· τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ’ ἑαυτὰ καὶ φύσει νοητά ἐστι, ὡς τὰ χωριστὰ τῆς ὕλης, τὰ δὲ νοητὰ γενόμενα, ὡς τὰ ἔνυλα εἴδη), ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν περὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων μὲν νοητῶν, γενομένων δὲ νοητῶν, νῦν περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν φησι τῶν κυρίως νοητῶν ἃ λέγει πρῶτα νοητά.

Quoniam enim dixit non sine phantasmate illa intelligere, quaerit de primis intelligibilibus, ne forte et ipsa phantasmata sint. Deinde ex circumstante solvit. Quid enim oportet, ait, de primis noematibus si phantasmata sunt, quando neque alia sunt phantasmata – dico [118, 35] autem de his quae in abstractione –, sed non sine phantas-

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἶπεν οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἐκεῖνα νοεῖν, ζητεῖ περὶ τῶν πρώτων νοητῶν μή ποτε καὶ αὐτὰ φαντάσματά ἐστιν· εἶτα ἐκ περιουσίας λύει· τί γὰρ δεῖ, φησί, )ζητεῖν*88 περὶ τῶν πρώτων νοημάτων εἰ φαντάσματά ἐστιν, ὅτε οὐδὲ τἆλλά ἐστι φαντάσματα – λέγω δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφαιρέσει – ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων. Τὸ γὰρ νόημα περὶ τοῦ πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχειν τρεῖς

88

addidit Bossier.

‘The Soul Never Thinks without a Phantasm’ matibus? Noema enim de hoc quod omne trigonum habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, quomodo utique erit phantasma, aut quia duo latera reliquo semper maiora, aut quia circuli quae a centro peripheriae sunt aequales, aut quaecumque alia demonstrantur? Nullum enim horum [118, 40] typificari phantasia potest, sed non sunt sine phantasmate talia noemata. Oportet enim phantasma trigoni esse, deinde intellectum huic assequentia colligere. Hoc autem ‘non sine’ quadrupliciter: aut enim ut materia, sicut dicimus non sine ligno vehiculum; aut ut nocivum, sicut dicimus non sine periculo navigationem in hieme [119, 45] fieri; aut ut neque conferens aliquid neque nocens sed < … > assequens, ut dicimus non sine umbra eum qui in lumine ambulare; aut ut organum, ut non sine gladio pugnare. Secundum hoc igitur dicitur non sine phantasmate quae in abstractione intelligere intellectum; ut enim vehiculo phantasia utitur. [119, 50] Et oportet scire quod unum et eundem intellectum ait eum qui primas species intelligit, et eum qui ea quae in abstractionibus, qui quidem non sine phantasmate intelligit. Animam enim dixit esse aliqualiter entia, sensu enim sensibilia intelligere, intellectu autem intelligibilia. Intelligibilia autem, haec quidem prima, haec autem [119, 55] secunda et non sine phantasmatibus. Quare si unus et idem est intellectus qui animae, qui et separata cognoscit, separatus ens et ipse, est non alter a nostro, ut aliquibus videbatur.

89 90

217

γωνίας δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας πῶς ἂν εἴη φάντασμα, ἢ ὅτι αἱ δύο πλευραὶ τῆς λοιπῆς ἀεὶ μείζους εἰσὶν ἢ ὅτι τοῦ κύκλου αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου )πρὸς τὴν* περιφέρειάν89 [sc. εὐθεῖαι] εἰσιν ἴσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα δείκνυται. Οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων τυπῶσαι ἡ φαντασία δύναται· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι ἄνευ φαντάσματος τὰ τοιαῦτα νοήματα. δεῖ γὰρ φάντασμα τριγώνου εἶναι, εἶτα τὸν νοὺν τὰ τούτῳ παρακολουθοῦντα συνάγειν. Tὸ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ὕλη, ὡς λέγομεν οὐκ ἄνευ ξύλου ἄβαξ, ἢ ὡς βλαβερόν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν μὴ ἄνευ κινδύνου ἐν χειμῶνι πλοῦν γίνεσθαι, ἢ ὡς μήτε σύντελοῦν τι μήτε βλάπτον, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλλως90 παρεπόμενον, ὡς λέγομεν μὴ ἄνευ σκιᾶς τὸν ἐν φωτὶ βαδίζειν, ἢ ὡς ὄργανον, ὡς οὐκ ἄνευ ξίφους πολεμοῦσθαι· κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν λέγεται οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματος τὰ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει νοεῖν τὸν νοῦν· ὡς γὰρ ἄβακι τῇ φαντασίᾳ χρῆται.

Καὶ ἐπιστῆσαι χρὴ ὅτι ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νοῦν φησι τόν τε τὰ πρῶτα εἴδη νοοῦντα καὶ τὸν τὰ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει, ὅσπερ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματος νοεῖ. Τὴν γὰρ ψυχήν φησιν εἶναί πως τὰ ὄντα· τῇ γὰρ αἰσθήσει τὰ αἰσθητὰ νοεῖν, τῷ δὲ νῷ τὰ νοητά· τὰ δὲ νοητὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων. ὥστε εἰ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς, ὁ καὶ τὰ χωριστὰ γινώσκων, χωριστὸς ὢν καὶ αὐτός, ἐστὶ οὐχ ἕτερος τοῦ ἡμετέρου, ὥς τισι [sc. Alexandro] ἐδόκει.

)πρὸς τὴν* περιφέρειαν correxi (cf. In Anal. post. 8, 25–26; 34, 15–16; 128, 28–29): peripheriae Moerbeke. τηναλως Laur. 87.20 cod. lat. T mg (spat. vacuum in TCV ipsum B).

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Bibliography 1. Primary Sources: Editions and Translations ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS (= Alex. Aphr.) De an. Bruns, I., Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca suppl. 2.1), Berlin 1887. AMMONIuS (= Ammon.) In De int. Busse, A., Ammonii in Aristotelis De interpretatione commentarius (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.5), Berlin 1897. Blank, D., Ammonius: On Aristotle On Interpretation (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1996. In Porph. Busse, A., Ammonii in Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.3), Berlin 1891. AMMONIuS (= Ammon.) apud PHILOPONuM (= Phlp.) (cf. supra, note 8) In Anal. post. Wallies, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora commentaria cum Anonymo in librum ii (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.3), Berlin 1909. De intellectu (= In De an. III 4–8) Verbeke, G., Jean Philopon. Commentaire sur le de Anima d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum III), Louvain−Paris 1966. Charlton, W., Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Intellect (de Anima 3.4–8). Translated with the Assistance of F. Bossier (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1991. In De an. I–II Hayduck, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XV), Berlin 1897. Van der Eijk, Ph. J., Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1–2 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2005. ARISTOTELES De an. Ross, W. D., Aristotle: De anima, Oxford 1961. Hicks, R. D., Aristotle: De anima, with Translation, Introduction and Notes, Cambridge 1907.

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Hamlyn, D. W., Aristotle: De anima: Books II and III (with Passages from Book I) (Clarendon Aristotle series), Oxford 1968. Torstrik, A., Aristotelis De anima libri III, Berlin 1862. De gen. an. Drossaart Lulofs, H. J., Aristotelis De generatione animalium, Oxford 1965 (repr. Oxford 1972). De int. Minio-Paluello, L., Aristotelis Categoriae et liber De interpretatione, Oxford 1949 (repr. Oxford 1966). De mem. Ross, W. D., Aristotle. Parva naturalia. Oxford 1955 (repr. Oxford 1970). Met. Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1924 (ND Oxford 1970). Phys. Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Physica, Oxford 1950 (repr. Oxford 1973). ASCLEPIuS (= Ascl.) In Met. Hayduck, M., Asclepii in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros Α–Ζ commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VI.2), Berlin 1888. AVERROES In De an. Taylor, R. C. – Druart, T.-A., Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba: Long Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle (Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy), New Haven−London 2009. DAMASCIuS (= Dam.) In Phd. Westerink, L. G., The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. II: Damascius (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe reeks, deel 93), Amsterdam− Oxford−New York 1977. ELIAS In Cat., In Porph. Busse, A., Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.1), Berlin 1900.

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HERMIAS (= Herm.) In Phdr. Lucarini, C. M. – Moreschini, C., Hermeias Alexandrinus: In Platonis Phaedrum scholia, Berlin−Boston 2012. HOMERuS Od. Von der Mühll, P., Homeri Odyssea, Basel 1962. MICHAEL EPHESIuS In Parv. nat. Wendland, P., Michaelis Ephesii in Parva Naturalia commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XXII.1), Berlin 1903. OLYMPIODORuS (= Olymp.) In Alc. Westerink, L. G., Olympiodorus. Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato. Amsterdam 1956. In Gorg. Westerink, L. G., Olympiodori in Platonis Gorgiam commentaria, Leipzig 1970. In Phd. Westerink, L. G., The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Vol. I: Olympiodorus (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe reeks, deel 92), Amsterdam−Oxford−New York 1976. PHILOPONuS (cf. supra, s. v. ‘AMMONIuS’) In De an. III Hayduck, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XV), Berlin 1897. Charlton, W., ‘Philoponus’: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1–8 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2000. In Nicom. Ar. Giardina, G., Giovanni Filopono matematico tra neopitagorismo e neoplatonismo, Catania 1999. In Phys. Vitelli, H., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Physicorum libros octo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVI-XVII), Berlin 1887–1888. PLATO Burnet, J., Platonis opera, Oxford 1900–1907 (repr. Oxford 1967–1968).

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PLOTINuS (= Plot.) Henry, P. – Schwyzer, H.-R., Plotini opera, Oxford 1964–1983. Armstrong, A. H., Plotinus, Vol. I: Porphyry on the Life of Plotinus and the Order of his Books. Enneads I. 1–9, Cambridge, Ma. 1966. PRISCIANuS LYDuS (= Prisc. Lyd.) (cf. infra, s. v. ‘PS.-SIMPLICIuS’) In Theophr. Bywater, I., Prisciani Lydi quae extant (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca suppl. 1.2), Berlin 1886. PROCLuS (= Procl.) In Alc. Segonds, A.-Ph., Proclus: Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon (Collection des Universités de France. Série grecque), Paris 1985–1986. In Euc. Friedlein, G., Procli Diadochi in primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii, Leipzig 1873. In Remp. Kroll, W., Procli Diadochi in Platonis Rem publicam commentarii, Leipzig 1899–1901. In Tim. Diehl, E., Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, Leipzig 1903– 1906. Runia, D. T. – Share, M., Proclus: Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Volume II, Book 2: Proclus on the Causes of the Cosmos and its Creation, Cambridge−New York 2008. PSELLuS Op. psych. theol. daem. O’Meara, D. J., Michaelis Pselli philosophica minora, Vol. II: Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, Leipzig 1989. PS.-SIMPLICIuS (= Ps.-Simp.), i.e. PRISCIANuS LYDuS (= Prisc. Lyd.) In De an. Hayduck, M., Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XI), Berlin 1882. Blumenthal, H. J., ‘Simplicius’: On Aristotle’s “On the Soul 3.1–5” (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2000. Steel, C. – Ritups, A., ‘Simplicius’: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6–13 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2013.

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SIMPLICIuS (= Simp.) In Cat. Kalbfleisch, K., Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VIII), Berlin 1907. SOPHONIAS (= Sophon.) In De an. Hayduck, M., Sophoniae in libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XXIII.1), Berlin 1883. SYRIANuS (= Syrian.) In Met. Kroll, W., Syriani in Metaphysica commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VI.1), Berlin 1902. THEMISTIuS (= Them.) In De an. Heinze, R., Themistii in libros Aristotelis De Anima paraphrasis (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca V.3), Berlin 1899. 2. Secondary Literature Blumenthal, H. J., Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of the De anima, London 1996. Frede, D., The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle, in: M. C. Nussbaum – A. Oksenberg Rorty (edd.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima, Oxford 1992, 279–295. Gerson, L. P., Aristotle and Other Platonists, Ithaca 2005. Golitsis, P., John Philoponus’ Commentary on the Third Book of Aristotle’s De Anima wrongly attributed to Stephanus, in: R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Re-interpreted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators, London – New York 2016, 393–412. Labarrière, J.-L., ‘Jamais l’âme ne pense sans phantasme’, in: P.-M. Morel (ed.), Aristote et la notion de nature. Enjeux épistémologiques et pratiques (Histoire des pensées), Bordeaux 1997, 149–179. Polansky, R., Aristotle’s De anima, Cambridge 2007. Ritups, A., Aristotle’s De anima III.6: Essays in the History of its Interpretation, Leuven 2010. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation] Segonds, A.-Ph., Proclus: Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon. Tome II (Collection des Universités de France. Série grecque), Paris 1986. Steel, C. – Ritups, A., ‘Simplicius’: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6–13 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2013.

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Steel, C., Newly discovered Scholia from Philoponus’ lost Commentary on De anima III, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 84, 2017, 223–243. Torstrik, A., Aristotelis De anima libri III, Berlin 1862. Wedin, M. V., Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, New Haven 1988.

From Soul to God? Aristotle and his Commentators on Thales’ Doctrines of the Soul Andreas Schwab

I. Introduction Recent scholarship on early Greek philosophy and science has particularly focused on the transmission and the complex history of reception.1 The tradition of testimonies on the first of the early Greek Philosophers, Thales of Miletus, is indeed varied and rich, especially with respect to the enormous amount of references to his persona and his ideas in a lot of Greek and Latin texts from the Imperial Age, Late Antiquity and Mediaeval times.2 In particular one group of testimonies still deserves deeper study: the numerous texts of the ancient ‘commentators’ on Aristotle.3 This textual corpus contains – from Alexander to Albert the Great – about seventy explicit references to Thales. From a hermeneutical point of view, which is also interested in the history of reception, these references are above all particularly complex. The starting point of my study is Aristotle’s first book of his treatise On the

1

2

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See e.g. K. Luchner – O. Primavesi (edd.), The Presocratics from the Latin Middle Ages to Hermann Diels. Akten der 9. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 5.−7. Oktober 2006 in München (Philosophie der Antike Bd. 26), Stuttgart 2011. The testimonies on Thales are documented in the new edition with German translation by G. Wöhrle, Die Milesier: Thales (Traditio Praesocratica Bd. 1), Berlin 2009; an English translation of this volume by Richard McKirahan was published 2014: G. Wöhrle, The Milesians: Thales. Translation and Additional Material by R. McKirahan (Traditio Praesocratica vol. 1[e]), Berlin−Boston 2014. For the great number of testimonies on Thales in the writings of early Christian authors see A. Schwab, Thales von Milet in der frühen christlichen Literatur: Darstellungen seiner Figur und seiner Ideen in den griechischen und lateinischen Textzeugnissen christlicher Autoren der Kaiserzeit und Spätantike (Studia Praesocratica Bd. 3), Berlin−Boston 2012. For a fruitful investigation of the methodology of a commentator see H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008. For a commentary on these testimonies see M. Marcinkowska-Rosół, Die Prinzipienlehre der Milesier. Kommentar zu den Textzeugnissen bei Aristoteles und seinen Kommentatoren (Studia Praesocratica Bd. 6), Berlin−Boston 2014.

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Soul (De anima), where two short, but quite significant references to Thales and his supposed thought on the soul are found. However, instead of considering in detail Aristotle’s report on Thales, I would like to examine primarily the art of the philosophical exegesis of two important ‘commentators’, namely Pseudo-Simplicius4 and John Philoponus, both commenting on the De anima.5 On the one hand, in order to study the method and strategies of their philosophical exegesis, it will be valuable to consider the following questions:6 First, which aspects seem worthwhile or problematic for these commentators to comment on? How do they understand, react to and comment on Aristotle’s remarks on Thales? Upon which aspects do they agree or disagree? Which differences and similarities can be distinguished in their exegeses? On the other hand, being interested in the history of reception, I hope to illuminate by these questions also some specific views on Thales and his supposed doctrine on the soul, that is how the persona and his doctrines were imagined and shaped by these commentators and their understanding of the soul.

II. Structure Thanks to Aristotle there are two significant testimonies on Thales in the first book of Aristotle’s treatise on the soul. First I would like to focus (1) on the well-known testimony from chapter 2 of De anima about the

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F. Bossier – C. Steel, Priscianus Lydus en de In De anima van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34, 1972, 761–822 and M. Perkams, Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the De anima in the Tradition of Iamblichus, Mnemosyne 58, 2005, 510–530 as well as C. Steel in his article of this volume argue for the authorship of Priscian of Lydia, while I. Hadot has argued for the authorship of Simplicius. See I. Hadot, Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima (CAG XI): A Methodological Study, Mnemosyne 55, 2002, 159–199. For a brief and balanced discussion see H. J. Blumenthal, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of the De anima, London 1996, 65–71. Both treatises should likely be dated before 529 A.D. For the series of questions to be settled out before studying a text of Aristotle in a Neoplatonic school-context see S. Gäb – A. Schwab, Der Kommentar als Medium der Philosophie? Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu den Philosophen Ammonios, Philoponos und Zhu Xi, in: K.-H. Pohl – G. Wöhrle (edd.), Form und Gehalt in Texten der griechischen und chinesischen Philosophie. Akten der 11. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 18.− 19. Juli 2008 an der Universität Trier (Philosophie der Antike Bd. 29), Stuttgart 2011, esp. 117–122, and J. Mansfeld, Prolegomena. Questions To Be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text (Philosophia antiqua vol. 6), Leiden−New York−Köln 1994.

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soul as a κινητικόν τι (something capable of causing movement). Then, both exegeses (1.1) of Ps.-Simplicius and (1.2) of Philoponus, corresponding to this passage will be presented, analysed and (1.3) compared with each other. In the second part I will introduce (2) Aristotle’s second testimony on Thales from chapter 5 of De anima: that is, that some supposed the soul to be interfused throughout the universe, combined with the saying ascribed to Thales that ‘all things are full of gods’. Once more, the different understanding and interpretation of this passage by (2.1) Ps.-Simplicius and (2.2) Philoponus will be examined and (2.3) compared. In conclusion I will on the one hand (3.1) point out some important features of the philosophical exegesis of both authors, in particular Philoponus in his references to Thales; on the other hand, (3.2) the image of Thales and his ideas, particularly his supposed doctrine of the soul presented in both commentaries, will at last be reconsidered.

III. Aristotle on Thales (Part One): the Soul as κινητικόν τι In the first book of his treatise on the soul Aristotle presents in chapter two the opinions and views of his early Greek predecessors (τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας) on the soul.7 The purpose of this collection of opinions is according to his own words ‘that we may adopt what is right in their conclusions and guard against their mistakes’ (ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰρημένα λάβωμεν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ καλῶς, τοῦτ’ εὐλαβηθῶμεν).8 Aristotle explains that there are two characteristics of the soul, motion (κίνησις) and sensation (αἰσθάνεσθαι), which were handed down to him by his predecessors:9 ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως προθέσθαι τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ’ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυσὶ μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. παρειλήφαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς· φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν, οἰηθέντες δὲ τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον, τῶν κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι.10 Our enquiry will begin by presenting what are commonly held to be in a special degree the natural attributes of soul. Now there are two points

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De an. I 2.403 b 21–22. De an. I 2.403 b 23–24. De an. I 2.403 b 25–28. De an. I 2.403 b 24–31. Greek Text of W. D. Ross, Aristotle: De anima, Oxford 1961, repr. 1967.

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Andreas Schwab especially wherein that which is animate is held to differ from the inanimate, namely motion and the act of sensation: and these are approximately the two characteristics of soul handed down to us by our predecessors. There are some who maintain that soul is preeminently and primarily the cause of movement. But they imagined that that which is not itself in motion cannot move anything else, and thus they regarded the soul as a thing which is in motion.11

In the following Aristotle starts his review with this first group of thinkers who – according to him – seem to regard motion as the most distinctive characteristic of the soul,12 referring explicitly to Democritus and Leucippus, the Pythagoreans and Anaxagoras. Then, Aristotle moves further on to the next group of thinkers, those who laid stress on its knowledge and perception of all that exists [and] identified the soul with the ultimate principles, whether they recognised a plurality of these or only one.13 ὅσοι δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, ταύτας, οἱ δὲ μίαν, ταύτην […]. Hereafter he refers to Empedocles and Plato before moving on and pointing out some problems and differences concerning the nature (corporeal or incorporeal) and the number of the ultimate principles (τὰς ἀρχάς).14 In this context Aristotle refers again to Democritus and Anaxagoras before he mentions Thales as follows (De an. I 2.405 a 19–21 = Th15 31 = DK 11 A 22): ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὴν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ. And it seems, that also Thales, from what people record, supposed the soul to be something that is capable of causing movement, if he really said that the stone possesses soul because it attracts iron. In the following section, I would like to consider and examine both commentaries on this passage: at first the remarks of Ps.-Simplicius (= Th 422), then those of Philoponus (Th 442).16 11 12 13 14

15 16

Translation by R. D. Hicks, Aristotle: De anima, Amsterdam 1965, 11. Cf. De an. I 2.404 a 21–23. De an. I 2.404 b 8–11. Translation by Hicks (see note 11) 13. Cf. De an. I 2.404 b 30–405 a 4: διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ σωματικὰς ποιοῦντες τοῖς ἀσωμάτους, τούτοις δ’ οἱ μίξαντες καὶ ἀπ’ ἀμφοῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποφηνάμενοι. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πλήθους· οἱ μὲν γὰρ μίαν οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγουσιν. ἑπομένως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδιδόασιν. Th = Testimony on Thales from the collection of Wöhrle (see note 2). The form of the lemmata in both commentaries will not be taken too much into account, because as I. Hadot pointed out ‘the form of the lemmata, especially in the currently avail-

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1. Ps.-Simplicius on Aristotle and Thales I 405 a 19 Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι. Ὅτι μηδὲν αὐτοῦ ἐφέρετο σύγγραμμα. τοσοῦτον δὲ περὶ Θαλοῦ ἱστορήσας, καὶ τοῦτο μετά τινος ἐπιτιμήσεως, ὅτι τῇ μαγνήτιδι λίθῳ ψυχὴν ἐδίδου ὡς κινητικῇ τοῦ σιδήρου, ἵνα κατ’ ἐκεῖνον κινητικὴν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πιστώσηται, οὐκέτι τὸ ὕδωρ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνέπεμψεν, καίτοι στοιχεῖον τὸ ὕδωρ τιθέμενον, ἐπειδὴ τῶν σωμάτων τὸ ὕδωρ ἔλεγε στοιχεῖον, εἰκὸς δὲ ἀσώματον αὐτὴν ἐκεῖνον ὑποτίθεσθαι. σαφῆ δὲ τὰ περὶ Διογένους ἱστορημένα.17 405 a 19 From what people report, it seems that Thales, too. Because no treatise was attributed to Thales. He [Aristotle] reported only this much about Thales, and in fact with a touch of criticism, that he assigned a soul to the magnet since it causes iron to move, in order to confirm that according to him the soul causes motion. He did not attribute to him the view that soul is water, although he posited water as the element, since he said that water is the element of bodies; but it is likely that he [Thales] supposed it [the soul] to be incorporeal. What he says about Diogenes is clear.18 Analysis (1) At first Ps.-Simplicius comments directly on both expressions ἔοικε (‘it seems’) and ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι (‘according to what people record’ or ‘what people say’) used by Aristotle. He claims as shortly as well as definitely, why Aristotle expressed himself like this: because no written work (σύγγραμμα) of Thales has been handed down. Although Ps.-Simplicius gives this short reason, we note that the commentator does not raise the question of the

17 18

able editions, is only infrequently capable of informing us about an ancient commentator’s modus operandi;’ Hadot (see note 4) 167. Themistius (Th 301) paraphrases this passage of Aristotle as follows: ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ διὰ τοῦτο ἔφη τὸν σίδηρον ἕλκεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς λίθου τῆς ἡρακλείας, ὅτι ἔμψυχος ἐκείνη ἡ λίθος. Greek text of R. Heinze, Themistii in libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca V.3), Berlin 1899, 13, 21–23 [De an. I 2.405 a 19–21]. It seems that Thales, too, supposed the soul to be capable of causing movement, if indeed it was for this reason that he said that iron was attracted by the Heraclean stone just because that stone has a soul. Greek text of M. Hayduck, Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XI), Berlin 1882, 31, 21–27 (= Th 422). Translation of Th 422 by McKirahan (see note 2).

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possible sources, from which Aristotle precisely could have obtained the given information about Thales.19 (2) In the following he paraphrases the thesis concerning the lodestone and he points out that Aristotle exposes this thesis with a certain ἐπιτίμησις, that is criticism or censure.20 By mentioning Thales, so Ps.-Simplicius, Aristotle would like to provide evidence (πιστώσηται) that also according to Thales the soul was capable of causing movement. (3) However, as the commentator observes, Aristotle does not go further (οὐκέτι) and attribute to Thales the thesis (εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνέπεμψεν) that the soul consists of water (τὸ ὕδωρ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν); and this, as he notes, although (καίτοι) Thales placed water as the element (στοιχεῖον τὸ ὕδωρ τιθέμενον), since he said that water was the element of the bodies (τῶν σωμάτων τὸ ὕδωρ ἔλεγε στοιχεῖον). (4) Nevertheless, the commentator concludes: It is likely (εἰκὸς δέ) that Thales would have supposed the soul to be incorporeal (εἰκὸς δὲ ἀσώματον αὐτὴν ἐκεῖνον ὑποτίθεσθαι). It is worth paying attention to this final statement and in particular how Ps.-Simplicius achieves it. Because at least in this context his conclusion is established not very explicitly. In his argument he draws the following important distinction: Although Thales made water the element (στοιχεῖον τὸ ὕδωρ τιθέμενον), he nonetheless supposed water to be the basicelement of bodies (τῶν σωμάτων τὸ ὕδωρ ἔλεγε στοιχεῖον). One could read and interpret: the basic-element only of bodies. By this distinction Ps.-Simplicius arrives at his conclusion that it is likely, that Thales supposed the soul to be incorporeal. That is, Ps.-Simplicius thinks that Thales did not assume water as the principle of soul. In contrast Ps.-Simplicius seems to be explicitly interested in the doctrine that Thales supposed the soul to be incorporeal. His assumption concerning Thales’ opinion on the soul as being incorporeal is more explicitly repeated two lemmata later, when Ps.-Simplicius comments on the Aristotelian passage on the thinkers of a more vulgar type who argue that the soul was water, namely such as Hippon (τῶν δὲ φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ Ἵππων).21 In this context Ps.-Simplicius reaf-

19

20 21

For the thesis that Aristotle was informed by Hippias, see B. Snell, Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales und die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte, Philologus 96, 1944, 170–182. ἐπιτίμησις could mean (i) in a positive sense: valuation (Wertschätzung), but here probably (ii) in a negative and more common sense: criticism, censure. De an. I 2.405 b 1–2 (= Th 423).

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firms more explicitly his thesis mentioned above how Thales established the following distinction: Thales also made water the basic-element, but of bodies, and he did not believe the soul to be in any way body. Ἐτίθετο μὲν καὶ Θαλῆς ὕδωρ τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ σωμάτων, καὶ οὐχὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάντως σῶμα ᾤετο.22 This slight, but decisive distinction between water as a basic-element for everything or only for bodies, here more explicit, allows Ps.-Simplicius to assume as likely, that Thales supposed the soul to be incorporeal. With regard to the image of Thales we notice in few words that Ps.-Simplicius presents the first philosopher of the Milesians in this context explicitly not as a pure ‘materialist’. Moving on from this first interpretation of Aristotle’s text it will be valuable to consider a second commentary and pass on to the remarks of Philoponus (= Th 442). 2. Philoponus on Aristotle and Thales I 405 a 18 Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν. Δοκεῖ μὴ προσφυῶς τῆς Θαλοῦ δόξης μεμνῆσθαι· προκειμένου γὰρ τοῦ δεῖξαι ὅτι οἱ ἀποβλέψαντες εἰς τὸ γνωστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐξ ὧν τὰ πράγματα ὑπετίθεντο εἶναι καὶ αὐτήν φασι, διότι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου γινώσκεται, ἱστορῶν τὴν περὶ Θαλοῦ δόξαν οὐδὲν εἶπε τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὴν λίθον τὴν ἕλκουσαν τὸν σίδηρον ἔμψυχον ἔλεγε τῆς ψυχῆς ἰδίαν λέγων τὴν κίνησιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸ κινητικὸν ἀπιδόντων ἱστορῶν τὰς δόξας, ἕκαστον ἔλεγε τὸ κινητικώτατον αὐτῷ δόξαν τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς εἰπεῖν στοιχεῖον, Δημόκριτον μὲν τὰς σφαιρικὰς ἀτόμους, τοὺς δὲ Πυθαγορείους τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, ἄλλον τὸ πῦρ, ἄλλον τὸν ἀέρα ἐπὶ μέντοι τῆς τοῦ Θαλοῦ δόξης ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων τὸ ὕδωρ τιθεμένου οὐδὲν τοιοῦτόν φησιν. οὐ γὰρ εἶπε φέρ’ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Θαλῆς τὸ ὕδωρ ψυχὴν τίθεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἕλκειν φησὶ τὸν σίδηρον τὴν λίθον ὡς ἔμψυχον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐξ ὕδατος οὖσαν. ταὐτὸ οὖν οὐκ εἶπεν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μόνον ἔμψυχον ἔλεγε τὴν λίθον. τίνος ἕνεκα; ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἐφέροντο αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα ἀλλ’ ἀπομνημονεύματα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔφυγε τὸ φορτικὸν τοῦ λόγου ἀγράφως κατηγορῆσαι τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἢ ὅτι καὶ αἰδῶ τινα τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἀπένειμε διὰ τὸ πολλὰ αὐτοῦ ἀξιόλογα δόγματα ἀπομνημονεύεσθαι. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἔλεγεν ὡς ἡ πρόνοια μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων διήκει καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτὴν λανθάνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον. διὰ

22

Ps.-Simp., In De an. 32, 16–17.

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Andreas Schwab ταῦτα τούτου μὲν οὐ λέγει εἶναι τὴν δόξαν ταύτην ὅτι ἐξ ὕδατος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν κίνησιν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπένειμεν. ἐφεξῆς δὲ Ἵππωνά φησι τοῦτο δοξάσαι ὅτι ἐξ ὕδατος ἡ ψυχή· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πάντων ἀρχὴν καὶ αὐτὸς ἔλεγε τὸ ὕδωρ.23 405 a 19 From what people report, it seems that Thales, too, supposed the soul to be something that is capable of causing movement [when he said that the stone possesses soul because it attracts iron.] It seems not suitable that he mentions the doctrine of Thales here; for it being his present to show that those who concentrated on the cognitive aspect of the soul said that it is composed of the principles from which they posited things were made, because like is known by like, he now reports the doctrine of Thales without saying something similar to what he said about the others, but rather that Thales called the stone that attracts iron ensouled, thereby saying that movement was peculiar to the soul. Yet, while reporting the doctrines of those that concentrate on the soul’s kinetic aspect, he has said that each of them said that what he felt the most kinetic element in the soul was, with Democritus suggesting spherical atoms, the Pythagoreans the motes in the air, another fire, and yet another air; however, in the case of the doctrine of Thales, who posited water as the principle of things, he does not say something like that. For example, he does not say that Thales posits the soul to be water and says that for this reason the stone attracts iron, because it is something ensouled and therefore consisting of water. He does not say this, but solely that he called the stone ensouled. For what purpose? (a) Either because no writings of Thales have been handed down but only his sayings, and for this reason he shied away from criticising the vulgarity of what he had said without writing it down, or (b) because he has a certain respect for him , because many valuable doctrines of his are being reported. They say that he said that Providence extends to the extremes and nothing escapes it, not even the slightest thing. For this reason, therefore, he does not say this doctrine of the soul being from water was his, but only that he, too, attributed movement to the soul. In what comes next, he says that Hippon was of this opinion, i.e. that the soul was made of water; for he, too, said that water was the principle of everything.24

23 24

Phlp., In De an. 86, 13–35. Greek text of M. Hayduck, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XV), Berlin 1897. Translation by P. J. van der Eijk, Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1–2 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2005, 107, slightly changed.

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Analysis (1) In his commentary Philoponus observes first that Aristotle does not mention the doctrine of Thales being suitable (μὴ προσφυῶς) in this context. In what follows Philoponus presents first two arguments and then a reductio ad absurdum to justify this observation: (1) On the one hand, given Aristotle’s present concern to show that those who concentrated on the cognitive aspect of the soul said that it is composed of the principles from which they posited things were made, because like is known by like, Aristotle now reports the doctrine of Thales without saying something similar to what he said about the others, but rather that Thales called the stone that attracts iron ensouled, thereby saying that movement was peculiar to the soul. (2) On the other hand, while Aristotle reports the doctrines of those that concentrate on the soul’s kinetic aspect, he has said that each of them said that what he felt was the most kinetic element in the soul, with Democritus suggesting spherical atoms, the Pythagoreans the motes in the air, another fire, and yet another air; however about Thales who posited water as the principle of things he does not say something like that. (3) In a short reductio ad absurdum Philoponus remarks that Aristotle, for example, does not say that Thales posits the soul to be water and says that for this reason the stone attracts iron, because it is something ensouled and therefore consists of water. Philoponus moreover points out that Aristotle does not say this, but solely that Thales called the stone ensouled. (4) By these arguments Philoponus shows first how special and unusual in this context the reference to Thales seems to be. For that reason he raises the stimulating question for what purpose (τίνος ἕνεκα) Aristotle only says that Thales called the stone ensouled. Then, Philoponus deals with two alternative explanations (ἢ ὅτι […] ἢ ὅτι) which are both worth consideration: (a) His first explanation contains in the first part a certain similarity with the first sentence of Ps.-Simplicius’ commentary: ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἐφέροντο αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα ἀλλ’ ἀπομνημονεύματα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔφυγε τὸ φορτικὸν τοῦ λόγου ἀγράφως κατηγορῆσαι τοῦ ἀνδρός.25 either because no writings of Thales have been handed down but only his sayings, and for this reason Aristotle shied away from criticising the vulgarity of what Thales had said without writing it down.

25

Phlp., In De an. 86, 26–28.

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Philoponus pays more attention to the specific way in which Aristotle may have been informed about Thales’ thought on the soul. He does not only – as Ps.-Simplicius did – notices that ‘no writings (of Thales) have been handed down’, but carefully directs our attention to Aristotle’s use of the verb ἀπομνημονεύουσι, pointing out that Thales’ thought was only transmitted by ἀπομνημονεύματα, that is sayings or memoirs. He explains further that Aristotle may have taken this into account and hence shied away from criticising the vulgarity of what Thales had said without writing it down. (b) Philoponus’ second, alternative explanation seems to be quite original: Aristotle could have had a certain respect (αἰδῶ τινα) for Thales, because many valuable doctrines of his were being reported (διὰ τὸ πολλὰ αὐτοῦ ἀξιόλογα δόγματα ἀπομνημονεύεσθαι). In this explanation Philoponus again pays significant attention to the verb ἀπομνημονεύουσι used by Aristotle. In his explanation our commentator seems to be well informed about many valuable doctrines ascribed to Thales. Therefore he combines a possible respect by Aristotle for Thales with the remembrance of many valuable doctrines. Furthermore, in support of this consideration, Philoponus also offers an example: φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἔλεγεν ὡς ἡ πρόνοια μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων διήκει καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτὴν λανθάνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον.26 They say that he said that Providence extends to the extremes and nothing escapes it, not even the slightest thing. For this reason Philoponus concludes that Aristotle does not say this doctrine of the soul’s being made of water originated with Thales, but only that he, too, attributed movement to the soul. In addition he remarks that Hippon as well was of the opinion that the soul was made of water. Because he, too, said that water was the principle of everything.27 (5) One fascinating aspect of Philoponus’ exegeses of this passage is, that he not only declares that there are many valuable doctrines being reported of Thales, he even illustrates his knowledge by giving an example of one saying ascribed to Thales on the range of providence. This final remark not only shows that Philoponus was well informed about Thales and the specific way his thought was transmitted. It also shows that Philoponus was remarkably interested in theological topics and that he could also make use of other sources and texts in commenting on Aristotle.

26 27

Phlp., In De an. 86, 28–30. Cf. Phlp., In De an. 86, 33–35.

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Regarding the theological statement on the range of providence ascribed to Thales, there are no pieces of textual evidence corresponding precisely to this saying. However it might be appropriate to quote just a few selected testimonies on Thales which bear a certain similarity to this theological topic, e.g. on god as νοῦς of the world in the Placita-tradition, for instance in Ps.Plutarch (Th 149) on the question (1.7) ‘Who/what is God?’ (ζʹ. Τίς ὁ θεός): Θαλῆς νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου θεόν (Thales [said that] god is the mind of the cosmos) or in the anthology of Stobaios (Th 340) ‘on God’ (Περὶ θεοῦ.): Θαλῆς νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν θεόν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἅμα καὶ δαιμόνων πλῆρες· διήκειν δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ στοιχειώδους ὑγροῦ δύναμιν θείαν κινητικὴν αὐτοῦ. Thales [said that] god is the mind of the cosmos, that the universe is ensouled and also full of daimons, and that there pervades the elementary moisture a divine power that causes it to move.28 In addition some typical ‘sayings’ (ἀποφθέγματα) ascribed to Thales are offered by Diogenes Laertius (Th 237, I 35):29 The following sayings too are attributed to him. The oldest of existing things is god, for he is unbegotten. The most beautiful thing is the cosmos, for it is the creation of god. The largest thing is place, for it contains all things. The swiftest thing is intelligence, for it quickly moves through everything.

28 29

For the ‘Gott-ist-Geist-These’ see Schwab (see note 2). For similar textual evidence in a quite different context see Plutarch (Th 121). See also Diogenes Laertius (Th 237 [= I 36]): ἠρώτησέ τις αὐτὸν εἰ λάθοι θεοὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀδικῶν· ‘ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ διανοούμενος,’ ἔφη. Someone asked him if a man could do wrong without the gods knowing. He answered, ‘Not even if he is only thinking [of it].’ Translation of Th 237 by McKirahan (see note 2). Comparable to this passage is also Clemens of Alexandria’s report on Thales and the divine in his Stromateis (Th 207 [= Strom. 5.15.96.4]): Τί δ’; οὐχὶ κἀκεῖνα τοῦ Θάλητος ἐκ τῶνδε ἤρτηται; τὸ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων δοξάζεσθαι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸ ‘καρδιογνώστην’ λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἡμῶν ἄντικρυς ἑρμηνεύει. ἐρωτηθεὶς γέ τοι ὁ Θάλης, τί ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, ‘τὸ μήτε ἀρχήν,’ ἔφη, ‘μήτε τέλος ἔχον.’ πυθομένου δὲ ἑτέρου, εἰ λανθάνει τὸ θεῖον πράσσων τι ἄνθρωπος, ‘καὶ πῶς,’ εἶπεν, ‘ὅς γε οὐδὲ διανοούμενος;’ What is this? Don’t also those views of Thales depend on this [namely, on the insight that a person attains the goal if he brings his thought into agreement with the object of thought]? That god is glorified to eternity and is called by us the ‘knower of hearts’ (NT, Act. Ap. 1.24; 15.8) expresses this clearly. Indeed, when asked what is divine, Thales said (cf. Th 210 [= Hipp., Haer. 1.1]; Th 237 [= D. L. I 46]; Th 564 [= Gnomologium Vaticanum 321d]) ‘that which has neither beginning nor end.’ When someone else asked if anyone does anything without the divine knowing, he said ‘How could he, since he cannot even [do so] even if he is just thinking [of doing anything]’. Translation of Th 207 by McKirahan (see note 2).

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Andreas Schwab The strongest thing is necessity, for it rules all things. The wisest thing is time, for it finds out everything.30 Φέρεται δὲ καὶ ἀποφθέγματα αὐτοῦ τάδε· πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων θεός· ἀγένητον γάρ. κάλλιστον κόσμος· ποίημα γὰρ θεοῦ. μέγιστον τόπος· ἅπαντα γὰρ χωρεῖ. τάχιστον νοῦς· διὰ παντὸς γὰρ τρέχει. ἰσχυρότατον ἀνάγκη· κρατεῖ γὰρ πάντων. σοφώτατον χρόνος· ἀνευρίσκει γὰρ πάντα.

3. First Comparison It is valuable to see now, how similarly, but also how differently both commentators comment on this first passage of Aristotle. (1) First of all both commentators find it worthy to comment on this passage in Aristotle, however the length of their commentaries is quite different. The commentary of Philoponus is apparently more extensive than that of Ps.-Simplicius. (2) Both pay attention to Aristotle’s expression ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι. However, while Ps.-Simplicius gives a short and definite answer (‘because no written work of Thales has been handed down’), Philoponus interprets the expressions of Aristotle more carefully and attentively. In his subsequent interpretation Philoponus is also more explicit concerning his two explanations of Aristotle’s possible reasons. Although his explanations at first glance seem creative and perhaps also somewhat speculative, Philoponus remains close to the exact wording of Aristotle’s text and argument. It is remarkable that both of his explanations depart from the verb ἀπομνημονεύουσι in Aristotle’s text and try to take this concept into account. (3) It is furthermore obvious that both philosophers commenting on the text express a certain judgement by their interpretation of the procedure and the argument of Aristotle. Evidence for this is the expression ‘it is not suitable’ (μὴ προσφυῶς) by Philoponus as well as the claim of Ps.-Simplicius that Aristotle exposes the magnetic-stone-thesis to a certain amount of criticism (ἐπιτίμησις).

30

Translation of Th 237 by McKirahan (see note 2).

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(4) Both authors demonstrate by their explicit comments that they are well acquainted with the so called water-as-principle-thesis ascribed to Thales in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Th 29) and in many later texts.31 (5) From a systematic point of view both commentators seem to be convinced that Thales supposed the soul to be incorporeal. This aspect is quite important and explicitly mentioned by Ps.-Simplicius, who does not present Thales as a pure ‘materialist’. But while he develops his explanation by a logical distinction, that is, Thales indeed supposed water to be the basic-element, but only the element of bodies, Philoponus argues otherwise. Surprised by the reference of Aristotle on Thales in this context of the De anima he argues first with a short reductio ad absurdum against the opinion that Thales might have held the soul to be water, then he offers two alternative explanations. (6) By these explanations Philoponus clearly holds both Aristotle and Thales in high esteem. In particular his second explanation seems to illustrate his knowledge of Thales and the specific manner of transmission of his sayings. His high-esteem for Thales is also indicated by the qualification of his doctrines as ‘valuable’ (ἀξιόλογα). Furthermore the given example of a valuable doctrine of Thales on the range of providence indicates the theological interest of the commentator, but also how his knowledge originates not only from Aristotle, but also from other sources. Finally one astonishing feature of Philoponus’ commentary is his attention to the possible hermeneutical situation of Aristotle – how carefully Philoponus tries to imagine the reasons why Aristotle expressed himself like this. We will now proceed to the next reference of Aristotle to Thales in the De anima.

IV. Aristotle on Thales (Part Two) The second reference to Thales occurs in chapter five of De anima, in which Aristotle discusses several problems associated with the thesis that the soul consists of elements; for instance, he notices that, if the soul is to be constructed out of the elements, there is no need to employ all of them (De an. I 5.411 a 2–3). In this context he also has the following to say in reference to Thales (I 5.411 a 7–8 = Th 32).

31

For further testimonies see Wöhrle (see note 2), 48 und 50.

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Andreas Schwab καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δή32 τινες αὐτὴν μεμῖχθαί33 φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι.34 Some say that it [soul] is intermingled in the universe, and it is perhaps for that reason that Thales believed that all things are full of gods.35 1. Ps.-Simplicius on Aristotle and Thales II

I start again with the commentary of Ps.-Simplicus who has the following brief comment on the passage (= Th 424): 411 a 8 Ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. Ὅτι μὲν πλήρη πάντα θεοῦ, δημιουργοῦντος, ἀγαθύνοντος, συνέχοντος αὐτά, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειεν. οὐ δὴ τοῦτο ἐπισημαίνεται, οὐδὲ τὸ ἴσως διὰ τοῦτο εἴρηκεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μεμῖχθαι. οὕτω γὰρ ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι, τῷ μεμῖχθαι αὐτούς· καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. 411 a 8 Perhaps that is why Thales also thought that all things were full of gods. No one would doubt that all things are filled with god, who creates, perfects and sustains them. But that is not what is meant, nor did he say ‘perhaps’ for this reason but with reference to being mixed. For perhaps that is how ‘Thales thought that all things are full of gods,’ by being mixed with them. And that is absurd.36 Analysis In this short comment we distinguish two main arguments: (1) Probably the most intriguing aspect of Ps.-Simplicius’ reaction consists in his first sentence. Here, at first glance he seems to paraphrase Aristotle, however when we look more closely we see that he transforms the sentence replacing the plural-expression ‘gods’ (θεῶν) with the singular ‘god’ (θεοῦ); then he declares further that nobody would seriously dispute the following three activities of god: creating, making good and holding together.

32 33 34 35 36

δέ Hicks (see note 11) 42. μεμεῖχθαί Hicks (see note 11) 42. De an. I 5.411 a 7–8. Translation of Th 32 by McKirahan (see note 2). Translation of Th 424 by McKirahan (see note 2).

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(2) In the following exegeses he understands the ‘perhaps’ (ἴσως) of Aristotle with reference to ‘being mixed’ (τὸ μεμῖχθαι), that is he assumes that – perhaps according to Thales – all things were being mixed with the gods. But then he states that this would be absurd. 2. Philoponus on Aristotle and Thales II I will now deal with Philoponus’ commentary which contains some significant features. In my comment however I will focus on those few aspects which concern particularly the representation of Thales as well as some special features of the philosophical exegeses of Philoponus. Let us start with the text (= Th 443): 411 a 7 Καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες αὐτὴν μεμῖχθαι φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾠήθη πλήρη πάντα θεῶν εἶναι. Ἑτέραν δόξαν ἐκτίθεται περὶ ψυχῆς. ὑπενόησαν, φησί, τινὲς ψυχὴν ἐν παντὶ σώματι μεμῖχθαι, ὡς πᾶν εἶναι σῶμα ἔμψυχον· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης καὶ τὸν Θαλῆν νομίσαι πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι, τοπικῶς ὑπονοοῦντος τοῦ Θαλοῦ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, ἢ τῷ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεὸν ὑπονοεῖν, ἢ θείας μοίρας αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ Ἀράτου ‘μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί, πᾶσαι δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα καὶ λιμένες.’ φασὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς τοιαύτης εἶναι δόξης· σῶμα γὰρ τὸ θεῖον ἐνόμιζον. τοπικῶς μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ὑπονοεῖν ἄτοπον καὶ παράλογον, εἴ γε μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οἷόν τε, ὁπότε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἀσώματος ἀποδέδεικται, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ἡ ἔνστασις· ταῖς μέντοι ἐνεργείαις πανταχοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη, εἴ γε πάντων αἴτιος εἶναι ἀποδείκνυται. οὕτω γοῦν νοοῦμεν τὸ ‘πάντα θεοῦ πλήρη, πάντῃ δέ οἵ εἰσιν ἀκουαὶ καὶ διὰ πετράων καὶ ἀνὰ χθόνα καί τε δι’ αὐτοῦ ἀνέρος ὅττι κέκευθεν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι νόημα.’ πρὸς ταύτην οὖν τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἐν παντὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγουσαν πρῶτον μὲν ἀπορεῖ, τί δήποτε ἐν παντὶ σώματι ψυχῆς οὔσης, τὰ μέν ἐστι ζῷα, τὰ δὲ οὔ. 411 a 7 Some also say that is mixed within the whole, which is perhaps the basis for Thales’ opinion that everything is full of gods. He now sets out another doctrine about the soul. Some, he says, suspected that the soul was mixed within all body, in the sense that the universe was an ensouled body; and that such a doctrine provided also the basis for Thales’ opinion that everything is full of gods, since Thales supposed that the divine was everywhere in a spatial sense, either by supposing that the soul itself was God, or that it was part of a divine share. Similar to this is also Aratus’ ‘All the streets are full of Zeus, all the squares of people , full is the sea and the harbours’. They say that the Stoics were also of this opinion; for they thought that the divine was corporeal. Now to suppose that God is everywhere in a spatial sense is absurd and contrary to reason, since God is incapable of being corporeal, when even sense perception has been demonstrated to be incorporeal, and this is what Aristotle’s objection is directed against; but it is necessary for the activities to be everywhere, since it has been demonstrated that he is the cause of everything. This way, at any rate, we understand the words ‘all is full of God, and throughout are his listenings, through rocks and above the earth and through man himself whatever thought is hidden in his heart’. With regard to this doctrine, then, that says that soul is in the universe he first raises the question how it is that, when soul is in all body, some bodies are living beings and others are not.37 Analysis

(1) At first, Philoponus explains with regard to the argument of Aristotle’s text that another doctrine on the soul is presented (ἐκτίθεται). Then he reformulates this doctrine in his own words (τινὲς ψυχὴν ἐν παντὶ σώματι μεμῖχθαι) before pointing out the reason for this view of the soul, namely, that the universe is an ensouled body (ὡς πᾶν εἶναι σῶμα ἔμψυχον). (2) After that he recapitulates how, basing himself on such a doctrine Thales also believed that everything is full of gods. The intriguing point of Philoponus’ subsequent argument is that it illuminates two possible ways in which Thales might have thought this. For that reason Philoponus first interprets the phrase πάντα πλήρη θεῶν and points out that Thales supposed that ‘the divine’ (τὸ θεῖον) was everywhere (πανταχοῦ) with respect to ‘space’ (τοπικῶς). Philoponus seems to broaden the issue replacing the plural-expression ‘gods’ (θεῶν) used by Aristotle with the neuter singular (τὸ θεῖον), the divine. Secondly he applies the adverb τοπικῶς (‘spatially’, ‘with respect to space’ or ‘in a spatial sense’) to make the meaning of this doctrine more explicit, that is that the divine is omnipresent in a spatial sense. (3) Then, Philoponus offers two alternative understandings for the thesis ascribed to Thales, each of them dealing with different interpretations of the soul and its relation to the divine: 37

Translation by P. J. van der Eijk, Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.3–5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006, 113.

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ἢ τῷ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεὸν ὑπονοεῖν, ἢ θείας μοίρας αὐτὴν εἶναι.38 (a) either by supposing that the soul itself was God, (b) or that it (sc. the soul) was part of a divine share. While the first understanding of the soul (a) claims the identity of soul and God, the second (b) suggests that the soul is only part of the divine. (4) It is remarkable that Philoponus hereafter delivers further texts for the reported doctrine (‘that everything is full of gods’) quoting (i) not only two verses of the Hellenistic didactic poem ‘phainomena’ of Aratus,39 but also (ii) some stoic philosophers who held the same doctrine, as well as (iii) some hexameter verses from an unknown poet. (5) Then however, Philoponus explains that it is absurd and contrary to reason (ἄτοπον καὶ παράλογον) to suppose that God is everywhere in a spatial sense, since God is incapable of being corporeal, and when even sense perception has been demonstrated to be incorporeal. His argument continues, but for the present purpose this shall be sufficient. 3. Second Comparison A short and formal comparison of both commentaries on this Aristotelian passage shows again some remarkable differences in the philosophical exegeses of both philosophers. (1) Although both commentators find it worthwhile to comment on this passage, the account of Philoponus is again considerably longer than that of Ps.-Simplicius. (2) Both commentators reformulate the thesis πάντα πλήρη θεῶν differently: While Ps.-Simplicius transforms the plural ‘gods’ into the singular ‘the god’, Philoponus first reformulates the thesis with the neuter-singular τὸ θεῖον, the divine. (3) Philoponus also tries to illuminate seriously the argument of Aristotle with his reference to Thales. For this purpose he distinguishes two different understandings of the relation between soul and the divine to reconstruct the possible thought of Thales. (4) Both commentators have in common that they do not ask explicitly, where the knowledge of Aristotle about Thales’ thesis originates.

38 39

Phlp., In De an. 188, 17–18. Cf. Arat. 2 ff.

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(5) It is remarkable that Philoponus provides still further texts for his comment on the thesis of Thales; he quotes in particular two verses of the Hellenistic didactic poem ‘phainomena’ of Aratus, but also some stoic philosophers and hereafter again some hexametric verses of an unknown poet. In this respect Philoponus gives a good example of a very learned commentator.

V. Conclusion Apart from the comparison between both commentators already mentioned before I would like to emphasize finally (1) some remarkable features of Philoponus’ exegesis.40 Finally (2) I will reconsider the image of Thales presented in these passages.

1. Some Important Features of Philoponus’ Philosophical Exegesis With regard to the methods in examining sense-perception Peter Lautner has pointed out that Philoponus ‘reflects problems raised by medical authors and uses empirical material extensively, either to illustrate the point he is about to make, either to employ it as an independent argument’ and by contrast ‘his Athenian contemporary Pseudo-Simplicius passes up every chance for including medical findings in the discussion of Aristotle’s theory’.41 As our comparative study of both commentators on the two references to Thales has shown, we may also assert that Philoponus not only makes use of material in his philosophical exegeses collected from the writings of Aristotle on biology and on medical ideas to be found in later authors, but that he also makes careful use of other texts in commenting on Aristotle, either texts from the Placita–tradition or also poetic texts such as Aratus’ Phainomena.

40

41

For a more comprehensive understanding of the strategy and method of Ps.-Simplicius it is valuable to take into account the preface of his commentary, where he explains the primary goal and the twofold aim of his commentary. Furthermore he clarifies that he will avoid polemics against others and states his position (In De an. 1, 18–20): ‘Everywhere I shall strive to the uttermost for the truth about things in accordance with the teaching of Iamblichus in his own writings about the soul. That is my sole concern.’ Translation by J. O. Urmson, Simplicius: On Aristotle’s On the Soul 1.1–2.4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1995, 15. P. Lautner, Methods in Examining Sense-Perception: John Philoponus and Ps.-Simplicius, Laval théologique et philosophique 64, 2008, 661.

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In addition Philoponus commenting on the De anima of Aristotle seems to be particularly interested in topics concerning theology. Both examples where he commented upon the reference to Thales have demonstrated his great interest in and his mastering of questions regarding god and his relation to the human soul and the world. Both passages illustrate as well Philoponus’ hermeneutical effort and care in his philosophical exegeses of Aristotle with respect to Thales. One fruit of this effort are his fine remarks on Thales.42

2. The Image of Thales and his Doctrine on the Soul With regard to the image of Thales presented in these texts we say in summary that Thales is characterised by the following attributes: Next to the lodestonethesis mentioned by Aristotle both commentators pay attention to the specific problem of his writings (σύγγραμμα). They note that no written work of Thales has been handed down. In his account however Philoponus remarkably not only refers to the ‘sayings’ (ἀπομνημονεύματα) of Thales, but he also mentions one of these sayings in his second explanation (for why Aristotle was so cautious in his remarks on Thales). Philoponus’ own comment also expresses respect for Thales and his thought, when he qualifies his doctrines as ‘valuable’ (ἀξιόλογα). Although both Philoponus and Ps.-Simplicius know Thales’ wateras-principle-thesis they do not consider seriously that Thales supposed the soul to be from water (like Hippon). Furthermore Ps.-Simplicius explicitly assumes as likely (εἰκός) that Thales did not suppose the soul to be from water; he argues that Thales assumed the soul to be incorporeal. With regard to the saying that ‘everything is full of gods’ Ps.-Simplicius at first confirms the general content with his monotheistic transformation. But then he refuses to accept that the gods are being mixed with all things. Philoponus firstly interprets the thesis ascribed to Thales with two different understandings of the relationship between the divine and the soul. Although he finally declares that this kind of ‘panpsychism’ is not possible because God is incapable of being corporeal, Philoponus’ learned comment deals with other similar texts and Aristotle’s expression. There is still a great field of texts with references to early Greek philosophers to be discovered and to be analysed by future research if we take seriously into account the views and interests of these later philosophers and commentators. Their different approaches to Aristotle and their various in-

42

For further testimonies on Thales by Philoponus (Th 434–453) see Wöhrle (see note 2).

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terests and backgrounds in commenting on Aristotelian texts offer philosophical exegeses which are in themselves worth studying in detail.43

Bibliography 1. Primary Sources: Editions and Translations ARATuS (= Arat.) Kidd, D., Aratus: Phaenomena. Edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 34), Cambridge 1997. ARISTOTELES De an. Ross, W. D., Aristotle: De anima. Edited with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1961, repr. 1967. Hicks, R. D., Aristotle: De anima, Amsterdam 1965. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINuS Strom. Stählin, O. – Treu, U., Clemens Alexandrinus II, III (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 52 [15], 17), Berlin 3 1960 (II), 2 1970 (III). DIOGENES LAERTIuS (= D. L.) Dorandi, T., Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 50), Cambridge 2013. GNOMOLOGIuM VATICANuM Sternbach, L., Gnomologium Vaticanum e codice vaticano graeco 743 (Texte und Kommentare 2), Berlin 1963.

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I am grateful to the participants of the stimulating international Conference on ‘the Philosophical Exegeses of the Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle’ in Trier, also to those of the IAPS-Conference in Edinburgh (2010) and the ‘Ancient-Science-Conference‘ in London (2012) as well as to my colleagues William D. Furley (Heidelberg), Oliver Hellmann (Trier), Tom Robinson (Toronto) and Georg Wöhrle (Trier) for their valuable comments. In particular I would like to thank Richard McKirahan (California) for his generous offer to use his English translation (now also published) of some testimonies on Thales.

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HIPPOLYTuS (= Hipp.) Haer. Marcovich, M., Hippolytus: Refutatio omnium haeresium, Berlin 1986. NOVuM TESTAMENTuM (= NT) Act. Ap. Aland, B. und K. u. a., Nestle-Aland. Novum Testamentum Graece, Stuttgart 28 2012. PHILOPONuS (= Phlp.) In De an. Hayduck, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XV), Berlin 1897. Van der Eijk, P. J., Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1–2 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2005. Van der Eijk, P. J., Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.3–5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006. PS.-SIMPLICIuS (= Ps.-Simp.) In De an. Hayduck, M., Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XI), Berlin 1882. Urmson, J. O., Simplicius: On Aristotle’s On the Soul 1.1–2.4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1995. THALES Diels, H., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutsch. Sechste verbesserte Auflage von W. Kranz, Berlin 1951. Wöhrle, G., Die Milesier: Thales (Traditio Praesocratica Bd. 1), Berlin 2009. Wöhrle, G., The Milesians: Thales. Translation and additional material by R. McKirahan (Traditio Praesocratica vol. 1[e]), Berlin−Boston 2014. THEMISTIuS In De an. Heinze, R., Themistii in libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca V.3), Berlin 1899. 2. Secondary Literature Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, London 2008.

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Blumenthal, H. J., Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations of the De anima, London 1996. Bossier, F. – Steel, C., Priscianus Lydus en de In De anima van Pseudo(?)Simplicius, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34, 1972, 761–822. Gäb, S. – Schwab, A., Der Kommentar als Medium der Philosophie? Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu den Philosophen Ammonios, Philoponos und Zhu Xi, in: K.-H. Pohl – G. Wöhrle (edd.), Form und Gehalt in Texten der griechischen und chinesischen Philosophie. Akten der 11. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 18.−19. Juli 2008 an der Universität Trier (Philosophie der Antike Bd. 29), Stuttgart 2011, 113–131. Hadot, I., Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima (CAG XI): A Methodological Study, Mnemosyne 55, 2002, 159–199. Lautner, P., Methods in Examining Sense-Perception: John Philoponus and Ps.-Simplicius, Laval théologique et philosophique 64, 2008, 651–661. Luchner, K. – Primavesi, O. (edd.), The Presocratics from the Latin Middle Ages to Hermann Diels. Akten der 9. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud AbelStiftung vom 5.−7. Oktober 2006 in München (Philosophie der Antike Bd. 26), Stuttgart 2011. Mansfeld, J., Prolegomena. Questions To Be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text (Philosophia antiqua vol. 6), Leiden−New York−Köln 1994. Marcinkowska-Rosół, M., Die Prinzipienlehre der Milesier. Kommentar zu den Textzeugnissen bei Aristoteles und seinen Kommentatoren (Studia Praesocratica Bd. 6), Berlin−Boston 2014. Perkams, M., Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the De anima in the Tradition of Iamblichus, Mnemosyne, 2005, 510–530. Schwab, A., Thales von Milet in der frühen christlichen Literatur: Darstellungen seiner Figur und seiner Ideen in den griechischen und lateinischen Textzeugnissen christlicher Autoren der Kaiserzeit und Spätantike (Studia Praesocratica Bd. 3), Berlin−Boston 2012. Snell, B., Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales und die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte, Philologus 96, 1944, 170–182.

Aristotelische Syllogistik und platonische Dialektik: Das Logik-Konzept der alexandrinischen Aristoteles-Kommentatoren Michael Schramm

Einleitung Die Neuplatoniker kennen zwei Formen von Logik: die aristotelische Syllogistik als Logik des formalen Schließens und die platonische Dialektik als Logik der Dihairese von Ideen, wie sie im Sophistes oder im Politikos vorgeführt wird, oder im Sinne des Liniengleichnisses der Politeia als Übergang von Hypothesen zur ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή und zurück zu den Ideenverhältnissen (Resp. VI 511 B–C). Gewöhnlich ordnen die Neuplatoniker die aristotelische Logik der platonischen Dialektik unter. Das bekannteste Beispiel hierfür ist Plotin, I 3 (20) Περὶ διαλεκτικῆς. Nach Plotin ist die platonische Dialektik ein Vermögen, durch Dihairese die Ideen jeweils für sich und im Verhältnis zueinander zu bestimmen und durch Analyse der Ideen bis zum ersten Prinzip zu gelangen (vgl. Plot., I 3 [20] 4, 12–16). Die „sogenannte logische Abhandlung über Prämissen und Schlüsse“ (τὴν λεγομένην λογικὴν πραγματείαν περὶ προτάσεων καὶ συλλογισμῶν) weist er „einer anderen Kunst“ (ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ) zu (I 3 [20] 4, 18–20). Während die platonische Dialektik „der wertvolle Teil der Philosophie“ (φιλοσοφίας μέρος τὸ τίμιον) ist, weil sie von den Sachen selbst als ihrer Materie handelt, ist die formale Logik nur ein Organon, denn sie spricht nur von leeren Theoremen und Regeln (vgl. I 3 [20] 5, 9–12). Was heute als Vorzug der formalen Logik angesehen wird, allein aufgrund der logischen Form von Sätzen und Schlüssen auf deren Gültigkeit schließen zu können, macht für Plotin eher ihren derivativen Charakter aus. Auch wenn Plotins Nachfolger für eine Integration der Schriften des aristotelischen Organon in das neuplatonische Schul-Curriculum sorgten, dürften sie Plotins Subordination der aristotelischen Syllogistik unter die platonische Dialektik durchaus geteilt haben. Dafür spricht, dass das aristotelische Organon zu Anfang des Curriculums gelesen und kommentiert wurde, die für die platonische Logik relevanten Dialoge Sophistes, Politikos und Parmenides zum Schluss; allerdings wurden die ersten beiden zum Unterricht in der

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platonischen Physik, der letzte in der platonischen Theologie verwendet.1 Häufig sind auch Bemerkungen, die eine solche Subordination vermuten lassen: Iamblichos’ Schüler Dexippos behauptet etwa in seinem KategorienKommentar, dass ein Beweis der Kategorien durch Syllogismus nicht möglich sei, durch Dihairese hingegen schon (vgl. Dexipp., In Cat. 53, 8–14). Oder Proklos stellt in seinem Kratylos-Kommentar ähnlich wie Plotin die platonische Dialektik der aristotelischen Logik gegenüber: Während jene nur von denen betrieben werden könne, die ihren Verstand durch die Mathematik vollständig gereinigt hätten und somit zum Guten, der einzigen Ursache von allem, gelangen könnten, sei diese „leer an Gegenständen“ und leicht von jedermann zu lernen, der eine gewisse Intelligenz und ein gutes Gedächtnis besitze (vgl. Procl., In Crat. II 1, 10–2, 4). Man müsste nun annehmen, dass es sich bei den alexandrinischen Aristoteles-Kommentatoren anders verhält, da die einzigen beiden erhaltenen Kommentare zu den Analytica priora von Ammonios Hermeiou und seinem Schüler Iohannes Philoponos stammen.2 Dabei ist der des Ammonios nur bis zur Mitte des 2. Kapitels des ersten Buchs der Analytica priora erhalten. Der des Philoponos zum ersten Buch ist ganz erhalten und der erhaltene Kommentar zum zweiten Buch vermutlich unecht.3 Philoponos’ Kommentar kann man als Quelle für Ammonios heranziehen, da es sich hierbei genauso wie bei dem unter Ammonios’ Namen überlieferten Kommentar um eine Nachschrift von dessen Vorlesung handelt und, soweit ein Vergleich möglich ist, kaum inhaltliche Unterschiede zu diesem aufweist. Die Existenz dieses Kommentars könnte zu der Vermutung verleiten, dass Ammonios und seine Nachfolger eher der aristotelischen Logik den Vorzug vor der platonischen Dialektik gegeben haben.

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2

3

Zum Aristoteles- und Platon-Curriculum seit Iamblich vgl. A. J. Festugière, L’ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux Ve/VIe siècles, Museum Helveticum 26, 1969, 281–296 (ND in: Ders., Études des philosophie grecque [Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie], Paris 1971, 535–550) und L. G. Westerink , Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon (Collection des Universités de France. Série grecque), Paris 1990, LXVII-LXXIII; D. J. O’Meara, Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford−New York 2003, 61–68. Von dem Kommentar des Philoponos-Schülers Elias ist ein Fragment erhalten, das sich auf die ersten beiden Vorlesungen bezieht und nur einleitende Überlegungen bietet (ediert von L. G. Westerink, Elias on the Prior Analytics, Mnemosyne 14, 1961, 126–139). Von Davids Kommentar gibt es nur eine armenische Übersetzung (vgl. T. Ebert – U. Nortmann, Aristoteles: Analytica priora. Buch 1 [Aristoteles: Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. 3, Teil 1], Berlin 2007, 131). Vgl. M. Wallies, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica Priora commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.2), Berlin 1905, VI-VII; M. Wallies, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora commentaria cum Anonymo in librum II (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.3), Berlin 1909, V−VI.

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Jedoch dürfte es auch von Porphyrios, Iamblichos und Proklos Kommentare zu den Analytica priora gegeben haben, ohne dass von diesen etwas erhalten wäre.4 Außerdem war Ammonios Schüler des Proklos. Die neuere Forschung nimmt seit Ilsetraut Hadots Arbeiten5 eine methodische und doktrinale Übereinstimmung zwischen der Athener und der Alexandrinischen Schule an. Die auffälligen Unterschiede der beiden Schulen – hier eine an Hierarchien reiche Theologie mit einer komplizierten Triadenlehre, dort eine einfachere Metaphysik mit einem mehr oder weniger differenzierten demiurgischen höchsten Prinzip an der Spitze und eine starke Ausrichtung auf Logik und Naturphilosophie – wird nun zumeist mit dem Charakter der kommentierten Texte erklärt: hier die Platon-Kommentierung, dort die AristotelesErklärung. Der Eindruck, dass in Alexandria Aristoteles gegenüber Platon bevorzugt wurde, dürfte der Überlieferung geschuldet sein: Wenn von Proklos nur die Platon-Kommentare und von Ammonios und seiner Schule nur die Aristoteles-Kommentare erhalten sind, liegt das vermutlich daran, dass Ammonios’ Platon-Interpretationen von späteren Interpreten als weniger wichtig angesehen wurden als die der Schule von Athen.6 Ähnlich dürfte es sich mit Proklos’ Aristoteles-Kommentaren verhalten haben.7 Vermutlich 4

5

6 7

Von Porphyrios gab es eine von Boethius benutzte Einleitung in den kategorischen Syllogismus (vgl. Boethius, In Porphyrium Dialogi [J.-P. Migne, Manlii Severini Boetii opera omnia. Tomus posterior (Patrologia Latina 64), Paris 1847], 14D). Ein eigener Kommentar zu den Analytica priora ist ungewiss, ähnlich bei Iamblichos (vgl. T.-S. Lee, Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike. Eine Untersuchung über die Kommentare zu den analytica priora von Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Ammonius und Philoponus [Hypomnemata Heft 79], Göttingen 1984, 11–12). Durch eine Bemerkung seines Schülers Ammonios ist ein Kommentar des Proklos zu den Analytica priora bezeugt (vgl. Ammon., In Anal. pr. 43, 30–31). I. Hadot, Le problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Études Augustiniennes), Paris 1978; I. Hadot – P. Hoffmann, Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fascicule 1, introduction, première partie (p. 1–9, 3 Kalbfleisch), traduction de P. Hoffmann avec la collaboration de I. et P. Hadot, commentaire et notes à la traduction par I. Hadot avec appendices de P. Hadot et J.-P. Mahé (Philosophia antiqua vol. 50), Leiden−New York−Kopenhagen−Köln 1990; P. Hoffmann – C. Luna, Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote, chapitres 2–4, traduction par P. Hoffmann, avec la collaboration de I. Hadot et P. Hadot, commentaire par C. Luna (Anagôgê 1), Paris 2001; I. Hadot, The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories, in: H. J. Blumenthal – H. Robinson (Hgg.), Aristotle and the Later Tradition (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. 1991), Oxford 1991, 175–189; I. Hadot, Aristote dans l’enseignement philosophique neoplatonicien: Les préfaces des commentaires sur les Catégories, Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 124, 1992, 407–425. Immerhin sind von Ammonios Vorlesungen zum Gorgias (Olymp., In Gorg. 199, 8–10) und zum Theaitetos (Ascl., In Met. 70, 31) bezeugt, allerdings keine Kommentare. Vgl. L. G. Westerink, The Alexandrian Commentators and the Introductions to Their Commentaries, in: R. Sorabji (Hg.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1990, 327.

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dürfte sich darin aber auch eine gewisse Vorliebe der Kommentatoren selbst ausdrücken. Die neuere Forschung zu Ammonios hat sich hauptsächlich mit den Übereinstimmungen mit und Unterschieden zu der Athener Schule hinsichtlich Physik und Theologie beschäftigt. Die Rezeption des athenischen Neuplatonismus in Ammonios’ Logikkonzeption ist bislang kaum untersucht.8 Dass es eine solche Rezeption gegeben hat, ist zu vermuten, wenn man bereits in der Einleitung zu Ammonios’ Kategorien-Kommentar liest, das Ziel der Aristoteles-Interpretation bestehe darin, „zum gemeinsamen Ursprung von allem (τὴν κοινὴν ἁπάντων ἀρχήν) hinaufgeführt zu werden und zu erkennen, dass dieser eins ist, unkörperlich, unteilbar, unbeschränkt, unbegrenzt, unendlich mächtig (ἀπειροδύναμος), das Gute an sich (αὐτοαγαθότης)“ (Ammon., In Cat. 6, 9–16).9 Das Ziel der Aristoteles-Interpretation ist demnach das neuplatonische transzendente Eine und Gute. Fraglich ist nun, ob und inwiefern es über diese allgemeine Zielsetzung hinaus eine Einwirkung neuplatonischer Theoreme auf die Logik-Interpretation im Einzelnen gegeben hat. So lässt sich vermuten, dass bei der Kommentierung der aristotelischen Analytiken neuplatonische Vorstellungen kaum eine Rolle gespielt haben, da sich diese hauptsächlich auf Metaphysik und Physik, nicht aber auf die formale Logik beziehen dürften. Doch gibt es sol-

8

9

In dem ansonsten sehr verdienstvollen Werk von Lee (wie Anm. 4) werden die neuplatonischen Quellen weitestgehend ausgeklammert. Lee vermutet, dass die neuplatonischen Elemente bei den alexandrinischen Kommentatoren von Iamblichos stammen könnten, wobei es sich um eine „verwässerte Wiedergabe“ handele, da beide Alexandriner „keine Neuplatoniker von strikter Observanz“ gewesen seien (11). Ein Bezug auf Ammonios’ Lehrer Proklos wird nicht hergestellt, eher zu Plotin (vgl. 46–53). Dies wird aber von A. C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford−New York 1990, 20 richtig widerlegt mit der Begründung, dass kein Bezug auf die Enneaden nachweisbar sei. Lloyd seinerseits widmet sich in seiner Darstellung der „Alexandrian conception of logic“ (17–21) fast ausschließlich der Frage, ob die Logik Teil oder Organon der Philosophie sei. Im Anschluss ist das Homer-Zitat (Il. 2, 204) überliefert, das vom Herausgeber des Textes A. Busse allerdings getilgt ist, mit dem Aristoteles seine Ausführungen in Metaphysik Λ (10.1076 a 4) abschließt (οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη, εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω) und das Simplikios, Olympiodoros und David (Elias) in ihrem Kategorien-Kommentar nach der Anführung derselben Attribute wie bei Ammonios angefügt haben. Philoponos definiert das Ziel der Philosophie anders als Ammonios und die anderen Kommentatoren: Dies bestehe darin, „den Ursprung von allem“ zu erkennen, „die demiurgische Ursache von allem, die sich immer auf die gleiche Weise verhält“ (Phlp., In Cat. 5, 35–36). Als weitere Attribute werden ihr lediglich Einheit und Unkörperlichkeit zugesprochen. Er scheint weniger das neuplatonische Eine als den platonischen Demiurgen bzw. den aristotelischen Unbewegten Beweger als „Ursprung von allem“ im Blick zu haben. Ob allerdings Philoponos mit Rücksicht auf seinen christlichen Glauben die neoplatonische Zielbestimmung des Aristoteles-Studiums modifiziert hat, wie I. Hadot in Hadot – Hoffmann (wie Anm. 5) 103 meint, oder ob es sich um eine didaktisch bedingte Kürze handelt, kann nur anhand dieser Stelle nicht entschieden werden.

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che neuplatonischen Anleihen tatsächlich auch in der Interpretation der aristotelischen Syllogistik. Diese finden sich vor allem in der Einleitung zu den Kommentaren und beziehen sich auf das Verhältnis der Syllogistik zu anderen Wissenschaften, offenbar in der Absicht, die Analytiken in den neuplatonischen Schulunterricht einzubetten und die Studenten auf das Platon-Studium vorzubereiten. Im Folgenden sollen drei neuplatonische Rezeptionsspuren in den alexandrinischen Analytiken-Kommentaren vorgestellt werden, nämlich 1. die Diskussion der sogenannten „dialektischen Methoden“ (Dihairese, Definition, Beweis, Analyse), 2. die Dihairese der verschiedenen Arten von Syllogismen nach den verschiedenen Seelenteilen und 3. die Frage nach dem systematischen Ort der Logik, ob sie nun Teil oder Organon der Philosophie ist.

I. Die dialektischen Methoden: Dihairese, Definition, Beweis, Analyse Nach Proklos gibt es vier „dialektische Methoden, durch die wir das Seiende erkennen“ (Procl., In Parm. V 982, 26–27): Dihairese, Definition, Beweis und Analyse. Sie sind die vier „Momente von Dialektik“ und bilden deren Einheit.10 Die proklische Dialektik ist erste Wissenschaft oder „Abschluss der Wissenschaften“ (θριγκὸς […] τῶν μαθημάτων, Procl., In Euc. 43, 10), aber, wie W. Beierwaltes sagt,11 „nicht als fixierte Spitze oder statuarischer Abschluss der Wissenschaften, sondern als die in jeder Wissenschaft gegenwärtige, einigende […] und in ihren Grund zurückführende Mächtigkeit des (Ideen-)Denkens“ oder als „Wissenschaft des Grundes und Grund der Wissenschaft zugleich“. Die Dialektik gibt jeder Wissenschaft die Form ihrer Wissenschaftlichkeit und durchdringt alle Seinsbereiche: Der Geist „umfasst die dialektischen Methoden einheitlich in sich […] und führt ihre Vielheit durch seine Einheit zusammen“ (Procl., In Euc. 44, 15–19: ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς ὁ πάσας τὰς διαλεκτικὰς δυνάμεις ἐν ἑαυτῷ μονοειδῶς περιέχων […] καὶ τὸ πλῆθος διὰ τῆς ἑνώσεως συνάγων). Der Geist ist der „Hervorbringer der Dialektik“ (Procl., In Crat. III 2, 5: ὁ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς προβολεύς); er „als ganzer zeugt sie als ganze“ (ebd. III 2, 5–6: ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὅλου ὅλην αὐτὴν ἀπογεννῶν): die Dihairese nach dem Vorbild der πρόοδος von allem aus dem Einen, die Definition als συναγωγή

10 11

W. Beierwaltes, Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik (Philosophische Abhandlungen Bd. 24), Frankfurt/Main 1965, 248. Beierwaltes (wie Anm. 10) 246–247.

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einer Sache zum Erfassen ihrer spezifischen Wesenseinheit, den Beweis durch die Ideengemeinschaft, durch die jede Idee sie selbst ist und an anderen teilhat, und die Analyse gemäß der Epistrophe, die alles zurück zur Einheit führt, und gemäß dem jeweiligen Prinzip einer Sache (ebd. III 2, 5–12). Ihren eigentlichen Ort haben die dialektischen Methoden im diskursiven Denken (διάνοια). In seinem Kommentar zu einer Stelle des Parmenides, an der behauptet wird, dass es ohne Ideen kein διαλέγεσθαι gibt (Parm. 135 B 5-C 3), beweist Proklos, dass alle dialektischen Methoden der Ebene der „seinshaften Logoi der Seele“ (οὐσιώδεις λόγοι τῶν ψυχῶν) zukommen, denn ohne diese würden sie aufgehoben (Procl., In Parm. V 982, 16–19). Hier werden die dialektischen Methoden ausführlich definiert. Die dialektischen Methoden entfalten sich genauso wie die Logoi der Seele im diskursiven Denken und bilden die Form der Rationalität, indem sie von der Einheit des Geistes, den Ideen und ihrer Gemeinschaft sowie von Prohodos und Epistrophe im geistigen Denken abhängen. Bei Ammonios ist eine Diskussion der dialektischen Methoden in der Einleitung zu seinem Analytica priora-Kommentar eingefügt, und zwar an einer Stelle, da es um die Einteilung der Logik als Ganzes geht (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 7, 26–8, 14).12 A. C. Lloyd, der als erster auf die Parallele dieser Stelle zu Proklos’ Parmenides-Kommentar aufmerksam gemacht hat, moniert bei Ammonios die fehlende Relevanz der dialektischen Methoden, weil sie aus dem ursprünglichen Kontext herausgerissen und eher assoziativ in ihren neuen Kontext eingebettet seien. Ihr einziger Zweck sei folgender: „It does nothing but illustrate how the well-oiled cogs of the genre ‚commentary‘ turn out material from a stockpile while the author, if such he can be called, has no means of stopping the machinery“.13 Zwar ist es richtig, dass die Definition der dialektischen Methoden sich an die Frage nach dem Titel der Analytiken eher assoziativ anschließt, insofern es beide Male um ἀνάλυσις geht. Doch der Kontext von Ammonios’ Analytiken-Einleitung zeigt, dass die Anspielung auf Proklos’ ParmenidesKommentar durchaus relevant ist für die Bestimmung der Logik als Ganze. Analog zu den Einleitungsfragen zu den Kategorien-Kommentaren, die auf Proklos zurückgehen sollen,14 beantwortet die Einleitung zu Ammonios’ Analytiken-Kommentar die Fragen nach: 1. der Ordnung (τάξις) der logischen Schriften des Aristoteles und der Stellung der Analytiken darin (Am12

13 14

Außerdem in Ammonios’ Kommentar zu Porphyrios’ Isagoge (Ammon., In Porph. 34, 19– 25; 35, 4–38, 4) und in Elias’ Einleitung zu seinem Kommentar zu derselben Schrift (Elias, In Porph. 37, 13–38, 15). Lloyd (wie Anm. 8) 9. Vgl. Westerink, The Alexandrian Commentators (wie Anm. 7), Hadot, The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle (wie Anm. 5), vor allem Hadot – Hoffmann (wie Anm. 5) 169–177.

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mon., In Anal. pr. 1, 2–4, 7); 1a. ihre Einteilung in zwei Bücher, die Analytica priora und posteriora (ebd. 4, 8–35); darin sind implizit 1b. die Fragen nach dem σκοπός, dem Nutzen (χρήσιμον) der Analytiken und ihrer Echtheit beantwortet (ebd. 4, 35–5, 3); 2. ihrem Titel (ἐπιγραφή) und damit verbunden eine Diskussion der Begriffe ἀνάλυσις vs. σύνθεσις (ebd. 5, 5–7, 25); 3. daran angeschlossen, die Frage nach den dialektischen Methoden und dem Verhältnis der Analytik zu den drei anderen Methoden (ebd. 7, 25–8, 14); 4. die Frage, ob die Logik ein Organon oder ein Teil der Philosophie ist (ebd. 8, 15–11, 21); 5. die Stellung der aristotelischen Rhetorik und Poetik innerhalb der logischen Schriften des Aristoteles (ebd. 11, 22–38). Die Frage nach den dialektischen Methoden ist also nicht nur lose in diese Darstellung eingefügt, sondern ist, indem zwei ihrer Methoden Analytik und Apodeiktik sind, als die Frage nach ihrem Verhältnis und nach dem Verhältnis zu Dihairetik und Definitionslehre zentral, um die Logik als Ganze und den Platz der Analytiken darin zu bestimmen.15 Die deutlichste Parallele zu Proklos ist zunächst, dass die vier Methoden gerade Dihairese, Definition, Beweis und Analyse sind. Proklos hatte, anders als etwa noch Iamblichos,16 den Beweis oder apodeiktischen Syllogismus statt der Synthese unter die dialektischen Methoden eingereiht, vermutlich um die aristotelische Syllogistik und die Analytiken in das neuplatonische Schulcurriculum aufzunehmen und diese den Methoden der platonischen Dialektik, Dihairese und Definition, unterzuordnen. Außerdem ist die Definition der einzelnen Methoden bei Ammonios zwar kürzer und schematischer, aber im Wesentlichen genauso wie bei Proklos bestimmt: nämlich durch das Verhältnis von Ursache und Verursachtem (Beweis), Allgemeinem und Einzelnem (Definition), Gattung und Differenzen (Dihairese), Einfachem und Zusammengesetztem (Analyse): „Die Dihairese zerteilt die Gattungen in Arten, […] die Definition macht aus Teilen etwas Ganzes, […] der Beweis beweist das Verursachte von den Ursachen aus“, die Analyse ist jeweils als deren Um-

15

16

Bereits ein oberflächlicher Vergleich mit Alexanders oder Philoponos’ Einleitung zu ihren Analytica priora-Kommentaren zeigt, dass Ammonios eine umfassendere Definition der Logik gegeben hat als diese und dass dafür die dialektischen Methoden eine nicht unwesentliche Rolle gespielt haben. Denn deren Einteilung beschäftigt sich nur mit der Frage nach dem Verhältnis der Logik zur Philosophie und zu den anderen logischen Schriften sowie mit Titel und Inhalt der Schrift. Vgl. Iamb., Comm. Math. XX 65, 11–20. Zu den dialektischen Methoden bei Iamblichos vgl. G. Bechtle, Die wissenschaftlichen Methoden und ihre Grundlegung in Iamblichus’ De communi mathematica scientia, in: Ders., Iamblichus. Aspekte seiner Philosophie und Wissenschaftskonzeption. Studien zum späteren Platonismus, Sankt Augustin 2006, 61–90 und D. P. Taormina – R. M. Piccione, Giamblico. I frammenti dalle epistole. Introduzione, testo, traduzione e commento (Elenchos 56), Neapel 2010, 89–115.

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kehrprozedur verstanden.17 Alternativ definiert Ammonios, ähnlich wie Iamblichos,18 Dihairese und Definition durch das Verhältnis von Einheit und Vielheit: „Die Dihairese zerteilt das Eine in Vieles; die Definition grenzt etwas von allen andern ab, indem sie vieles ihm Zukommende zusammenführt; der Beweis beweist, dass etwas einem andern zukommt; die Analyse führt vom Zusammengesetzten zum Einfachen zurück“.19 Eine weitere Parallele zu Proklos ist die Rangordnung der dialektischen Methoden Dihairese – Definition – Apodeixis und dass diese drei der Analyse entgegengesetzt sind. Proklos bestimmt die Rangordnung in dieser Weise, weil die Dihairese der Definition ihre Prinzipien gibt, nämlich Gattung und Differenzen, und die Definitionen die Prinzipien des Beweises sind (Procl., In Parm. V 982, 9–15). Auch bei Ammonios gibt es diese Reihenfolge (Ammon., In Porph. 35, 23–36, 1; 36, 9–10; 36, 15–19) und ebenso die Entgegensetzung der Analyse zu allen anderen Methoden (36, 19–37, 5). Insbesondere ist die Apodeixis der Dihairese untergeordnet – und damit die aristotelische Syllogistik der platonischen Dialektik, wie sich bei der Kommentierung von Anal. pr. I 31 zeigt, wo Aristoteles die Dihairesis als „einen kleinen Teil der besagten Methode“ (46 a 31–32: μικρόν τι μόριόν […] τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου),

17

18

19

Vgl. Ammon., In Anal. pr. 8, 4–9: συντόμως δὲ εἰπεῖν ἡ μὲν διαιρετικὴ τὰ γένη εἰς τὰ εἴδη τέμνει, ἡ δὲ ἀναλυτικὴ τὰ εἴδη συνάγει εἰς τὰ γένη. πάλιν ἡ μὲν ὁριστικὴ ἐκ μερῶν ὅλον τι ποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ ἀναλυτικὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ὅλων εἰς τὰ μέρη μεταβαίνει ἐξ ὧν τὸ ὅλον γέγονεν. πάλιν ἡ μὲν ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτιῶν τὰ αἰτιατὰ δείκνυσιν, ἡ δὲ ἀναλυτικὴ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτιατῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αἴτια μεταβαίνει. πάσαις ἄρα ἀντίκειται. Vgl. Procl., In Parm. V 980, 14–17 (Beweis): ἐκ γὰρ τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις, ἃ καὶ αἴτια τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν ἐστι, καὶ πρότερα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ τιμιώτερα τῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν δεικνυμένων· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐξ ὧν αἱ ἀποδείξεις, ταῦτά ἐστι καθόλου, ἀλλ’ οὐ μερικά ἐστι; 980, 23–25 (Definition): καὶ γὰρ ὁ ὁρισμὸς διὰ τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ πρόεισι λόγου· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα κοινὸν ὁρίζομεν, τὴν πρώτην ἔνδον ἔχοντες τὸ εἶδος, οὗ τὸ ἐν τούτοις εἴδωλον; 981, 24–29 (Dihairese): αἱ γὰρ διαιρέσεις οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν ἢ διακρίνουσι τὰ πολλὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τὰ ἑνιαίως ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ προϋπάρχοντα {ἐν} ταῖς οἰκείαις χωρίζουσι διαφοραῖς, οὐκ ἔξωθεν προστιθεῖσαι τὰς διαφοράς, ἀλλ’ ἔνδον ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσας τοῖς γένεσι καὶ τὰ εἴδη διαιρούσας ἀπ’ἀλλήλων θεωροῦσαι; 982, 19–23 (Analyse): ἀντίκειται […] τῇ μὲν ἀποδεικτικῇ [sc. ἡ ἀναλυτική], ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτιατῶν ἀναλύουσα εἰς τὰ αἴτια, τῇ δὲ ὁριστικῇ, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν συνθέτων εἰς τὰ ἁπλούστερα, τῇ δὲ διαιρετικῇ, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν μερικωτέρων ἐπὶ τὰ καθολικώτερα· τοσαυταχῶς γὰρ ἡ ἀνάλυσις. Nach Iamblichos unterteilt die Dihairese von einer Einheit, einer Gattung, ausgehend in eine Vielheit von Arten (ἀφ’ ἑνὸς […] ἐπὶ πλείονα εἴδη, Iamb., Comm. Math. 8, 10–11), und „die Definition führt die aus der Dihairese hervorgegangenen Differenzen auf dasselbe zusammen, versammelt alle zu einem gemeinsamen Logos“ (Iamb., Comm. Math. XX 65, 13–15: τὰς διαφορὰς τὰς ἐκ τῆς διαιρέσεως εἰς ταὐτὸ συνάγει ἡ ὁριστική, λόγον τε ἕνα κοινὸν ἐκ πάντων συναθροίζει). Dihairese macht aus einem ἕν die πολλά, die Definition aus πολλά ein ἕν (ebd., 65, 23–24). Ammon., In Anal. pr. 7, 31–34: ἡ διαιρετικὴ τὸ ἓν εἰς πολλὰ διαιρεῖ· ἡ ὁριστικὴ τὰ πολλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τινι συναγαγοῦσα ἀποκλείει αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· ἡ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἄλλῳ ἄλλο ὑπάρχον ἀποδείκνυσιν· ἡ δὲ ἀναλυτικὴ ἀπὸ τῶν συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ ἀνατρέχει.

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der Syllogistik, und als „gleichsam einen schwachen Syllogismus“ (46 a 33: οἷον ἀσθενὴς συλλογισμός) bezeichnet. Aristoteles begründet das damit, dass das Ziel der Dihairese, die Definition zu einem Ausgangsbegriff, durch sukzessive Unterteilung eines umfassenderen Gattungsbegriffs in seine Unterarten und die Angabe aus der nächsthöheren Gattung und einer artbildenden Differenz erreicht werde; damit werde das, was nachzuweisen ist, nämlich der Ausgangsbegriff, vorausgesetzt, da das, was wirklich ‚deduziert‘ wird, allgemeiner als das Gesuchte sei (z. B. die Einteilung „sterblich oder unsterblich“ an der Gattung „Lebewesen“ im Verhältnis zum gesuchten Begriff „sterbliches Lebewesen“, 46 a 33-b 12).20 Der alexandrinische Kommentar zur Stelle betont zunächst, dass Platon die dihairetische Methode nicht für apodeiktisch gehalten habe: „Klarerweise kennt er den Unterschied zwischen Dihairese und Beweis, denn er sagt, dass die vier Methoden in der Philosophie die Organa der Dialektik sind, Dihairese, Definition, Beweise und Analyse“ (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 307, 5–8: σαφῶς γὰρ οἶδε διαφορὰν διαιρετικῆς καὶ ἀποδεικτικῆς· τέσσαρας γάρ φησι μεθόδους εἶναι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ὄργανα τῆς διαλεκτικῆς, διαιρετικήν, ὁριστικήν, ἀποδεικτικὴν καὶ ἀναλυτικήν); die Dihairese hätten vielleicht andere für apodeiktisch gehalten, auf die Aristoteles hier anspiele (ebd. 307, 8–9). Diese Gegenüberstellung ist offensichtlich anachronistisch, da ja erst Aristoteles die Syllogistik formulierte und Platon die Dihairese durchaus für ein Begründungsverfahren hielt. In der Rekonstruktion der aristotelischen Argumentation folgt der Kommentar dann dem Text: Durch die Dihairese sei kein Beweis möglich, und wenn es im Zusammenhang einer Dihairese einen Syllogismus gebe, dann nur, wenn man diesen als Nebenüberlegung zu Hilfe nehme, z. B. im Syllogismus: „Der Mensch ist ein Lebewesen, jedes Lebewesen ist rational oder nicht, der Mensch ist also rational oder nicht; nun ist er aber nicht irrational, also ist er rational“ (ebd. 307, 18–20: ἐπειδὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, πᾶν δὲ ζῷον ἢ λογικὸν ἢ ἄλογον, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα ἢ λογικὸς ἢ ἄλογος· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἄλογος· λογικὸς ἄρα); das, was nachzuweisen ist, dass der Mensch rational ist, ist gerade nicht syllogistisch bewiesen, sondern als Voraussetzung angenommen worden (ebd. 307, 9–25). Allerdings geht der Kommentar über Aristoteles hinaus, indem er die Behauptung, die Dihairetik sei ein Teil der Syllogistik, damit erklärt, dass „der Beweis im strengen Sinne durch die Definitionen und die Definitionen nicht ohne die Dihairese zustande kommen“ (ebd. 307, 33–34: κυρίως ἀπόδειξις γίνεται διὰ τῶν ὁρισμῶν, οἱ δὲ ὁρισμοὶ γίνονται οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς διαιρετικῆς). Der Kommentar zieht also die von Proklos bekannte Reihenfolge der dialektischen Methoden zur Erklärung der Stelle heran, offensichtlich gegen die Intention des kommentierten Textes. 20

Vgl. Ebert – Nortmann (wie Anm. 2) 794–795 zur Erklärung.

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Was den Begriff der Analyse betrifft, fällt auf, dass Ammonios als ihren Gegenbegriff implizit die Synthese wieder unter die dialektischen Methoden einführt. Proklos hatte die Analyse kontradiktorisch zu den drei anderen Methoden bestimmt: Die Analyse sei dem Beweis entgegengesetzt, weil sie analytisch vom Verursachten zur Ursache zurückgeht; der Definition, weil sie vom Zusammengesetzten zum Einfacheren, und der Dihairese, weil sie von dem mehr Besonderen zum Allgemeineren zurückgeht (Procl., In Parm. V 982, 19–23). Dem folgt Ammonios (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 8, 4–9) und bestimmt zumindest zwei der Analyse entgegengesetzten Methoden, nämlich Definition und Beweis, explizit als Synthese: Die Definition macht aus Gattung und Differenzen einen „zusammengesetzten Term“ (ebd. 7, 38: σύνθετον ὅρον), sie ist „gleichsam eine Art Synthesis“ (ebd. 7, 39: οἷον σύνθεσίς τις οὖσα); und der Beweis beweist das Zukommen eines Prädikats zu einem Subjekt, indem er „einen Syllogismus zusammensetzt“ (ebd. 8, 3: συντιθεῖσα συλλογισμόν). Der Syllogismus selbst ist eine „Zusammenlese von Logoi“ (ebd. 2, 7: συλλογὴ λόγων), sogar „gleichsam eine Einung“ (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 2, 16: οἷον ἕνωσιν), indem der Schließende aus einigen Logoi einen Schluss „zusammenliest“ (ebd. 2, 14–17). Hinsichtlich der Dihairese scheint man kaum von einer Synthese sprechen zu können. Doch ist auch die Dihairese der Analyse entgegengesetzt: Die Dihairese zerteilt das Eine in das Viele, während die Analyse „die Vielen zu einer Einheit zusammenführt (συνάγει)“ (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 7, 35– 36).21 In einer anderen Formulierung ist die Dihairese hingegen auf die Synthese bezogen: Die Dihairese schreitet vom Einfachen zum Zusammengesetzten fort, während die Analyse vom Zusammengesetzten zum Einfacheren geht (Ammon. In Porph. 36, 24–25). Die Dihairese ist das Zerteilen einer Gattung in Arten oder von Einem in Vieles. Doch ihr Ziel und Ergebnis ist eine Synthese, nämlich die Definition des gesuchten Artbegriffs. Damit sind Definition und Beweis an sich selbst Synthesen: die Definition als Synthese aus Gattungen und Differenzen in einem Term und der Beweis als Synthese verschiedener Terme in einem Syllogismus. Die Dihairese ist zumindest final auf die Synthese verschiedener Teilungsergebnisse zu dem gesuchten Term in der Definition des Artbegriffs bezogen. Hinsichtlich des Begriffs von Analyse und Synthese in der Syllogistik folgt Ammonios ganz Alexander. Dieser gibt zunächst eine allgemeine Definition dieser beiden Begriffe, dann Beispiele ihres Gebrauchs in verschiedenen Wissenschaften, nämlich Geometrie, Physik und Grammatik (Alex. Aphr., In

21

Da scheint der platonische Sprachgebrauch des Phaidros (265 D-266 B) durch, der als die beiden Arten von Dialektik Dihairese und Synagoge herausstellt. Die Analyse würde demnach die Stelle der Synagoge einnehmen.

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Anal. pr. 7, 11–22). In der Syllogistik unterscheidet er die Analyse 1. eines aus mehreren Syllogismen zusammengesetzten Syllogismus in die einzelnen Syllogismen, 2. eines einfachen Syllogismus in seine Prämissen, 3. die Rückführung (ἀναγωγή) eines unvollkommenen Syllogismus auf einen vollkommenen Syllogismus und 4. die Rückführung eines gegebenen Syllogismus auf eine bestimmte syllogistische Figur (22–27). Ammonios führt weitere Wissenschaften als Beispiele an, nämlich Medizin, Metaphysik und Astronomie (In Anal. pr. 5, 10–32). Hinsichtlich der Syllogistik konzentriert er Analyse und Synthese auf eine Hauptbedeutung: Synthese ist die „Synagoge der Prämissen“ (ebd. 5, 32–33: σύνθεσις μέν ἐστιν ἡ συναγωγὴ τῶν λημμάτων), und die Analyse führt einen Syllogismus auf seine Prämissen und diese auf ihre Begriffe zurück (ebd. 6, 2–11; In Porph. 36, 7–9). Allgemein ist Synthese definiert als Hervorgang von einem Einfachen zum Zusammengesetzten22 und Analyse als Rückgang vom Zusammengesetzten zum Einfachen.23 Für Ammonios sind also letztlich Analyse und Synthese die beiden komplementären dialektischen Methoden. Die proklischen Methoden werden diesen beiden Methoden zugeordnet. Die Unterordnung der aristotelischen Syllogistik unter die platonische Dihairetik wird bewahrt, indem die Beweise und Syllogismen Terme und Definitionen benötigen und diese durch die Dihairese gewonnen werden; die Dihairese wiederum arbeitet nicht-syllogistisch, führt aber dennoch eine Vielheit von Begriffen im Hinblick auf die Einheit eines zu definierenden Begriffs zusammen. Auf diese Weise bilden die Methoden die Form des diskursiven Denkens des Verstandes.24 Einen Hinweis auf die Abkünftigkeit des Verstandes vom Geist bildet bei Ammonios das – bei Alexander nicht erwähnte – Beispiel für den Gebrauch von Analyse und Synthese in der Metaphysik (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 5, 19–25): Die Synthese bestehe darin, von einfachen Ideen zu zusammengesetzten zu gehen,

22

23

24

Vgl. In Anal. pr. 5, 15–16: σύνθεσις μὲν ἡ γένεσις καθ’ ἣν ἀπὸ τῶν ἁπλῶν ἐπὶ τὰ σύνθετα ἔρχονται; In Porph. 37, 10–11: ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἄνωθεν πρόεισιν καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσχατα, σύνθεσίς ἐστιν. Vgl. In Anal. pr. 5, 17–18: ἀνάλυσις δὲ καθ’ ἣν ἀπὸ τῶν συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ ἔρχονται; In Porph. 36, 1–2: ἀναλυτικῆς δὲ ἔργον τὸ τὰ σύνθετα ἀναλύειν εἰς τὰ ἁπλᾶ, ἐξ ὧν σύγκεινται; 37, 11–12: ὅταν δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπὶ τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς ἀναβαίνῃ, ἀνάλυσις. Das diskursive Denken des Verstandes ist gekennzeichnet durch die Synthesis von einfachen zu komplexen Gegenständen oder Gedanken (De an. III 6.430 b 26–28), was auch der Ebene der Logik der Synthesis von einfachen Termen zu Aussagen und von diesen zu Syllogismen entspricht (vgl. Phlp., De intellectu 64, 51–65, 57). Wahrheit und Falschheit dieser Aussagen oder Syllogismen liegt, wie Aristoteles (De int. 1.16 a 12–13) sagt, an der Dihairese oder Synthese von Gedanken oder Termen (vgl. Phlp., De intellectu 86, 33–87, 44). Diese Dihairese meint nicht eigentlich die Dihairese von Begriffsunterteilungen, sondern die in ihr angewandte Negation, die die Grundlage für die verneinten Aussagen bildet. Analyse wäre bei Aussagen, ob bejaht oder verneint, unabhängig davon die Rückführung der Aussage auf ihre Terme.

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z. B. vom an sich Schönen zum Schönen im Geist, dann zum Schönen in der Seele und schließlich zum Schönen in den Körpern. Die sogenannte „erotische Analyse“, wie sie im Symposion vorgeführt wird, sei wiederum dann gegeben, wenn man von den sensiblen Formen zu den intelligiblen Ideen, z. B. von der wahrnehmbaren Schönheit zur intelligiblen Schönheit zurückgeführt wird. Dieses Beispiel zeigt, dass der Begriff von Analyse und Synthese in der Metaphysik nicht einfach unverbunden neben dem Begriffsgebrauch in der Syllogistik steht.25 Vielmehr ist er das inhaltliche Paradigma für den logischen Analyse- und Synthese-Begriff, der die Struktur des diskursiven Denkens als Hervorgang aus dem Geist und Rückkehr zum Geist darstellt. Denn die Synthese entspricht – ähnlich wie bei Proklos die Dihairese – der πρόοδος und die Analyse der ἐπιστροφή.

II. Die Dihairese der Arten der Syllogismen nach den Seelenteilen Diese Entsprechung zwischen Logik und Psychologie ist das neuplatonische Erbe, das Ammonios von Proklos erhalten und in die Philosophie der Logik eingeführt hat. Dieses zeigt sich nicht nur bei der Übernahme der dialektischen Methoden, sondern auch bei der Interpretation einer dieser Methoden, der Apodeiktik bzw. Syllogistik, und zwar in der Dihairese der verschiedenen Arten der Syllogismen bei Ammonios (In Anal. pr. 2, 29–3, 30) und Philoponos (In Anal. pr. 1, 10–4, 12). Diese soll nun kurz dargestellt werden. Die Dihairese der verschiedenen Arten der Syllogismen geht nach drei Hinsichten vor: nach Erkenntnissubjekt (γιγνῶσκον), Erkenntnis (γνῶσις), Erkenntnisobjekt (γιγνωσκόμενον, γνωστόν). Die Arten der Syllogismen lassen sich dihairetisch nach jeder dieser Hinsichten gewinnen (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 2, 29– 31; Phlp., In Anal. pr. 1, 16–18). Den größten Raum erhält die Dihairese nach dem Erkenntnissubjekt (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 2, 31–3, 19; Phlp., In Anal. pr. 1, 18–4, 4); die Dihairese für das Erkenntnisobjekt und für die Erkenntnis wird kürzer abgehandelt, und zwar mit demselben Ergebnis: a) nach dem Erkenntnisobjekt, da der apodeiktische Syllogismus über seiende, sich immer auf dieselbe Weise verhaltende Gegenstände geht, der sophistische Syllogismus über nicht-seiende, sich niemals auf dieselbe Weise verhaltende Gegenstände und der dialektische Syllogismus über Gegenstände, die sich mal so, mal anders verhalten (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 3, 19–25; Phlp., In Anal. pr. 4, 4–9); b) nach der Erkenntnis, da der apodeiktische Syllogismus notwendig und immer wahr,

25

So Lloyd (wie Anm. 8) 11.

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der sophistische immer falsch und der dialektische mal wahr, mal falsch ist (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 3, 26–30; Phlp., In Anal. pr. 4, 4–12). Die Dihairesis nach dem Erkenntnissubjekt rekurriert auf verschiedene Einteilungen der Seele. Dabei finden sich bei Philoponos, dem vermutlichen Hauptherausgeber der Vorlesungen des Ammonios, in seiner Einleitung zum Analytica priora-Kommentar hierzu umfangreiche Überlegungen, die bei Ammonios ähnlich erst später bei der Kommentierung der Definition des Syllogismus vorkommen (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 24, 31–25, 11). Ammonios unterscheidet an Seelenvermögen nur das διανοητικόν, das δοξαστικόν und das φανταστικόν und ordnet sie den verschiedenen Syllogismen zu (ebd. 2, 32–3, 2). Philoponos nennt fünf: νοῦς, διάνοια, δόξα, φαντασία und αἴσθησις (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 1, 19–20), wobei νοῦς und διάνοια bzw. φαντασία und αἴσθησις zusammengefasst werden und die drei Arten von Syllogismen entsprechend wie bei Ammonios dem διανοητικόν, dem δοξαστικόν und dem φανταστικόν zugeordnet werden. Das „in uns Schließende“ kann nach Ammonios (In Anal. pr. 24, 31–25, 11; 23–25) nur der diskursive Verstand, die διάνοια sein, denn der Geist oder νοῦς erkenne seine Gegenstände „durch einfachen Zugriff“ (ἁπλαῖς ἐπιβολαῖς) und die Meinung oder δόξα sei eine „Konklusion“ (συμπέρασμα) aus dem diskursiven Verstand ohne den dazugehörigen Beweis und die Prämissen, aus denen sie als Konklusion hervorgegangen ist; der Verstand erkenne hingegen διανυστικῶς καὶ διεξοδικῶς, also indem er diskursiv von einem zum andern geht, alles durchgeht und so das dianoetisch Erkennbare ganz erkennt. Ähnlich begründet Philoponos den Verstand als das Seelenvermögen, das syllogistisch schließt (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 1, 20–2, 13): Geist und Sinneswahrnehmung scheiden aus, weil der Geist „stärker“ (ebd. 1, 21: κρείττων), die Sinneswahrnehmung „schwächer“ (ebd. 2, 1: χειρόνως ἔχουσα) als das syllogistische Schließen seien; die Vorstellung oder φαντασία, weil sie ein „Feststehen und Aufbewahren von Wahrnehmungseindrücken“ (2, 2–3: τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως φανέντων στάσις […] καὶ τήρησις; vgl. 2, 6–7: μονή τε καὶ τήρησίς ἐστι τῶν τύπων τῶν αἰσθητῶν) und das Schließen eine „Bewegung“ (ebd. 2, 5: κίνησις) von den Prämissen zur Konklusion sei; schließlich die Meinung, weil sie eine „Konklusion des Verstandes“ (ebd. 2, 11: συμπέρασμα […] τῆς διανοίας) sei. Dass einzig der Verstand syllogistisch schließen kann, ist so per Ausschlussverfahren gezeigt. Aber bereits in der Bestimmung des Syllogismus als „Erkenntnis“ (ebd. 1, 15: γνῶσίς τις), als „Bewegung“ (ebd. 2, 5: κίνησις) von Prämissen zur Konklusion oder als synthetische Erkenntnisleistung der Seele hinsichtlich der Logoi, συλλογή τινων λόγων26 bzw. als deren ἕνωσις

26

Vgl. auch Ammon., In Anal. pr. 2, 7–8.

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(ebd. 2, 14–17), ist implizit gezeigt, dass nur das diskursive Denken verschiedene Bestimmungen durchgehen und syllogistisch synthetisieren kann. Eine vergleichbare Überlegung findet sich in Alexanders Kommentar nicht. Alexander beginnt sofort mit der Erklärung der aristotelischen Definition des συλλογισμός als λόγος (Alex. Aphr., In Anal. pr. 16, 23; In Top. 7, 12–20) und untersucht nicht, wie Ammonios formuliert, „vor der Exegese der Definition des Syllogismus, was das in uns Schließende ist und wovon die Syllogismen handeln“ (vgl. Ammon., In Anal. pr. 24, 29–31: πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐξηγήσεως τοῦ ὅρου τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ζητεῖται ἐνταῦθα τί ἐστιν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν συλλογιζόμενον καὶ περὶ τίνων οἱ συλλογισμοί). Ebenso gibt Alexander keine weitere Begründung der Arten von Syllogismen und begnügt sich mit der bloßen Erklärung aus dem Aristoteles-Text. Offenbar handelt es sich bei der Frage nach dem „in uns Schließenden“ vor der eigentlichen Exegese, also der psychologischen Verortung der Logik, um ein neuplatonisches Theorem. Vielleicht hat bereits in Proklos’ Analytiken-Kommentar eine solche Überlegung als Grundlage der Dihairese der verschiedenen Arten von Syllogismen und der dazugehörenden Schriften des Aristoteles gedient – was sich freilich nicht beweisen lässt. Zumindest lassen sich drei Ähnlichkeiten der skizzierten Argumentation des Ammonios und Philoponos mit Überlegungen des Proklos ausmachen, nämlich 1. zur Anlage, 2. zum Inhalt und 3. zum Ergebnis der Argumentation. 1. Bei Proklos gibt es relativ häufig Aussagen über die Korrelation von Erkenntnis, Erkenntnissubjekt und -objekt; man kann annehmen, dass diese die unmittelbare Grundlage für Ammonios’ bzw. Philoponos’ Überlegungen sind. Immer wieder findet sich bei ihm wie ein Axiom die Aussage, dass die Art der Erkenntnis nicht aus dem Wesen des Erkenntnisgegenstands resultiert, sondern aus der Natur des Erkenntnissubjekts.27 Das könnte den relativ breiten Raum erklären, den die Dihairese der Syllogismen nach dem Erkenntnissubjekt bei Ammonios und Philoponos einnimmt. 2. Nach Proklos begründen die verschiedenen Arten der Seelenvermögen die Unterschiede hinsichtlich der Erkenntnis; der Erkenntnisgegenstand kann „auf stärkere“ (κρειττόνως) oder „auf schwächere Weise“ (χειρόνως) erkannt werden, je nachdem, welcher Seelenteil das Erkenntnissubjekt ist.28 Das ontologisch Niedrigere, das ‚Schwächere‘, wird vom ontologisch Höheren, dem ‚Stärkeren‘ auf stärkere Weise erkannt; so erkennen z. B. die Götter, da sie selbst immateriell, ewig, unkörperlich sind, das Materielle, Zeitliche und

27 28

Vgl. z. B. Procl., In Parm. IV 957, 11–13; Prov. 64, 1–3; Dub. 22, 9–10. Vgl. Procl., In Parm. IV 957, 13–15; In Tim. I, 352, 11–19; Prov. 64, 6–7.

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Körperliche auf immaterielle, ewige, unkörperliche Art und Weise (Procl., Prov. 64, 6–11).29 Zwischen den Erkenntnisvermögen und den Erkenntnisgegenständen gibt es eine analoge Ableitungsreihe (συστοιχία): Geist und Verstand sind auf die immateriellen Ideen bzw. das Allgemeine gerichtet, die Wahrnehmung auf das Materielle, Partikulare (Procl., In Parm. V 978, 19– 25). ‚Stärker‘ ist nun die Erkenntnis durch Verstand und Geist als die durch Sinneswahrnehmung (ebd. 978, 16–18), auch wenn die menschliche Erkenntnis Sinneswahrnehmung und Vorstellung braucht (Procl., In Tim. I 352, 31). Diese Aussage erscheint bei Philoponos wieder, wenn er sagt, dass der Geist „stärker“ (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 1, 21: κρείττων) und die Sinneswahrnehmung „schwächer“ (ebd. 2,1: χειρόνως ἔχουσα) als das syllogistische Schließen seien. Zwar finden sich in der alexandrinischen Logik keine Aussagen über das ewige göttliche Denken oder dessen Bezug auf die zeitlichen, körperlichen Gegenstände, aber doch sind solche Verhältnisbestimmungen in den Aussagen über das Verhältnis von Geist und Verstand beim Syllogismus enthalten: Nach Ammonios kann der Theologe – er steht analog zum göttlichen Denken – die intelligiblen Gegenstände nicht mit Hilfe von Syllogismen erkennen; doch die apodeiktischen Syllogismen schließen immerhin von den Ursachen und dem Allgemeineren auf das Verursachte und das Partikularere, und die Ursachen und das Allgemeinere sind die intelligiblen Gegenstände bzw. die ersten Definitionen (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 25, 14–20). Bis hin zu den verwandten Termini ist hier die Ähnlichkeit zu Proklos zu greifen. Nach Philoponos ist der apodeiktische Syllogismus immer wahr und niemals falsch, weil der schließende Verstand die immer wahren, selbstevidenten Prinzipien aus dem Geist aufgenommen hat, die er als „gemeinsame Gedanken“ (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) bezeichnet (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 2, 24–27); darunter versteht er die aristotelischen „Axiome“ (Phlp., In Anal. post. 3, 23–24; 24, 22–24; 34, 10– 11), z. B. den Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten (ebd. 315, 31–32).30 Auch Proklos bestimmt das Axiom ganz aristotelisch (Procl., In Euc. 76, 9–12) und lässt die ersten Beweise aus Prämissen hervorgehen, welche die wenigsten, einfachsten und am meisten evidenten Ideen enthalten und „gemeinsame Gedanken“ genannt werden (Procl., Theol. Plat. I 10, 45, 19–22). Die apodeiktischen Syllogismen schließen nach Philoponos und Ammonios vom Allgemeinen (Phlp., In Anal. post. 29, 1–14), worunter sie die Formen in den einzelnen Dingen (τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς) oder universalia in re verstehen, die

29 30

Vgl. Procl., Dub. 7, 14–20; In Tim. I, 352, 19–32. Zur Beweistheorie bei Philoponos vgl. M. Tuominen, Ancient Philosophers on Principles of Knowledge and Argumentation (Reports from the Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki 2/2001), Helsinki 2001, 179.

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im Ausgang von den Einzelwahrnehmungen über Erinnerung und Erfahrung allmählich erkannt werden (ebd. 435, 12–35).31 Bei dialektischen und sophistischen Schlüssen wird nicht aus Allgemeinem geschlossen, sondern aus Meinung und Vorstellung, die aber beide in gewisser Weise auf den Verstand und das Allgemeine bezogen sind: Die Meinung erkennt nach Ammonios einerseits das „Allgemeine an den Wahrnehmungsgegenständen“, andererseits weiß sie bei den diskursiven Denkgegenständen, wie gesehen, die „Konklusion“ (συμπέρασμα) ohne den dazugehörigen Beweis und die Prämissen, aus denen sie als Konklusion hervorgegangen ist (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 25, 5–10; Phlp., In Anal. pr. 1, 15–2, 2). Ähnlich hat Proklos die Meinung als erstes Erkenntnisvermögen bestimmt; seine Erkenntnis umfasst die sensiblen Logoi, hat aber nur Kenntnis des Dass, nicht der Ursache (Procl., Prov. 27; In Tim. I 248, 7–22; 249, 2– 3). Ammonios’ Beschreibung scheint nur eine Übersetzung dieser proklischen Bestimmung in die Terminologie der Analytiken zu sein und hat dabei offenbar die dialektische Unterrichtspraxis im Blick: Dialektische Syllogismen würden in Gesprächen und Seminaren benutzt (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 2, 28– 31), etwa im Unterrichtsgespräch zwischen Lehrer und Schüler. Dabei sind – zumindest von Seiten des Schülers – nicht immer die vollständigen Beweise bekannt, oft aber die Lehrsätze, die nichts anderes als Konklusionen aus solchen Beweisen sind. Ein Lehrsatz ohne Beweis ist aber nur richtige Meinung und kein Wissen und kann daher falsch sein. Darüber hinaus nimmt bei Ammonios wie auch schon bei Proklos die Meinung eine Mittelstellung zwischen den Logoi der Wahrnehmung und den Logoi des diskursiven Denkens ein. Bei den sophistischen Syllogismen ist der schließende Verstand mit der Vorstellung verbunden, d. h. die Prämissen des Syllogismus stammen aus der Vorstellung, und da diese immer falsch sind, sind auch die daraus gebildeten Syllogismen immer falsch (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 2, 33–35). Nun kann kein Vorstellungsbild die Prämisse eines Syllogismus sein, auch sind nicht alle Vorstellungen von Wahrnehmungsgegenständen falsch, sondern nur die, die mit der rationalen Erkenntnis diskursiv oder intellektuell erkennbarer Gegenstände verflochten sind; daher ist die Prämisse eines Syllogismus nur die falsche Meinung, die falsch ist aufgrund der Verflechtung mit der Vorstellung (ebd. 3, 14–18).32 So wird ein sophistischer Syllogismus aus der Homonymie mit der 31 32

Vgl. Tuominen (wie Anm. 30) 121–123. Die These des Aristoteles in De anima, dass dem diskursiven Denken die Vorstellungsbilder „wie Wahrnehmungseindrücke gegeben seien und „die Seele niemals ohne ein Vorstellungsbild denkt“ (III 7.431 a 14–17), wird auf das praktische Denken eingeschränkt (Phlp., De intellectu 97, 8–15; 98, 28–36). Das theoretische Denken oder der aktive Geist benötigen hingegen kein Vorstellungsbild, weil sie entweder „durch einfachen Zugriff ohne Beweis“ oder „durch Beweis“ erkennen (Phlp., De intellectu 98, 36–43). Das erste ist das Erkennen des Geistes, das zweite das des Verstands. Die Beispiele für ein rationales Erkennen ‚durch

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Verflechtung der rationalen Erkenntnis mit einer Vorstellung erklärt: In dem Syllogismus „Das Gemüse überragt die Erde; das Überragende ist größer als das Überragte, also ist das Gemüse größer als die Erde“ stammt der Obersatz „das Überragende ist größer als das Überragte“ aus der Vorstellung, ohne die entsprechenden Gegenstände näher unterscheiden zu können, und benutzt eine partikulare Vorstellung als Allgemeines (ebd. 3, 21–27).33 Die Vorstellung ist ein nicht-rationales Erkenntnisvermögen, das seinen Gegenstand nicht wie die Sinneswahrnehmung von außen hernimmt, sondern die von der Wahrnehmung abgeformten Eindrücke (τύποι) im Innern reproduziert, weshalb sie von Philoponos und Ammonios mit dem sogenannten νοῦς παθητικός identifiziert wird, wobei sowohl Wahrnehmung als auch Vorstellung nur etwas Partikulares erkennen (Phlp., In De an. 5, 34–6, 8).34 Bereits Proklos hat die Vorstellung zu den Erkenntnisvermögen gezählt und mit dem νοῦς παθητικός identifiziert, weil sie die Eindrücke im Innern produziert (Procl., In Tim. I 244, 19–24; III 286, 24–29; In Euc. 51, 20–52, 4).35 3. Schließlich wird von Ammonios und Philoponos – als Ergebnis dieser Überlegungen – die Syllogistik im Verstand verortet. Auch nach Proklos sind, wie oben gesehen, die Dialektik und alle dialektischen Methoden, also auch der apodeiktische Syllogismus und der Syllogismus überhaupt, abhängig von den „seinshaften Logoi der Seele“ (οὐσιώδεις λόγοι τῶν ψυχῶν), ohne die sie aufgehoben würden (Procl., In Parm. V 982, 16–19). Auch die enge Verbindung des Verstands mit der Mathematik, die es bei Proklos in gut platonischer Tradition gibt – man denke an das Liniengleichnis der Politeia –, erscheint bei Ammonios wieder: Nach Proklos ist der Verstand das mittlere Erkenntnisvermögen zwischen Wahrnehmung und Geist, das die „mittleren Formen“ erkennt (Procl., In Tim. I, 249, 4–5); diese sind insbesondere die mathematischen Gegenstände, die eine Mittelstellung zwischen den unteilbaren intelligiblen und den teilbaren materiellen Gegenständen einnehmen (vgl. Procl., In Euc. 3, 2–4, 18). Die mathematischen Formen sind konstitutiv

33 34

35

Beweis‘ stammen bezeichnenderweise aus der Logik, nämlich der Beweis, dass es drei Figuren des kategorischen Syllogismus gibt, wie viele schlüssige Modi es in jeder Figur gibt oder wie die Konversion von Prämissen vonstattengeht. Vgl. Phlp., In De an. 4, 16–19. Zu Philoponos’ Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens vgl. M. Perkams, Selbstbewusstsein in der Spätantike. Die neuplatonischen Kommentare zu Aristoteles’ De anima (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie Bd. 85), Berlin−New York 2008, 48–49. Zu Proklos’ Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens vgl. H. J. Blumenthal, Νοῦς παθητικός in Later Greek Philosophy, in: Blumenthal – Robinson (wie Anm. 5), 192–205 und P. Lautner, The Distinction between φαντασία and δόξα in Proclus’ In Timaeum, Classical Quarterly 52, 2002, 257–269.

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für das Wesen der Seele und ihre Selbsterkenntnis, denn indem die Seele die mathematischen Formen erkennt, erkennt sie sich selbst.36 Auch nach Ammonios erkennt der Verstand die „mittleren Gegenstände“, welche unsere Seele und ihre Selbsterkenntnis ausmachen, insbesondere die mathematischen Gegenstände, da sie ein immaterielles Wesen, aber keine immaterielle Existenz haben und so auf den Weg zu den vollständig immateriellen, göttlichen Gegenständen vorbereiten (Phlp., In De an. 3, 5–11). So gewinnt der Geometer die „allgemeine Form“ (καθόλου εἶδος) des Drei- oder Vierecks – ganz aristotelisch – via Abstraktion der Materie ihrer wahrnehmbaren Instanzen (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 25, 23–30).37 In einer aristotelischen Wissenschaftsaufteilung steht die Mathematik zwischen Physik und Theologie und muss genauso wie diese auf dem Weg zur Erkenntnis des ersten Prinzips studiert werden (Ammon., In Cat. 6, 17–20) – auch Proklos verwendet übrigens gelegentlich die aristotelische Wissenschaftsaufteilung, etwa bei der Interpretation des platonischen Liniengleichnisses (Procl., In Tim. I 350, 8– 20). Diese Dihairese der verschiedenen Arten von Syllogismen nach den verschiedenen Seelenteilen bedeutet nicht, dass die Logik eine Wissenschaft vom Denken wäre, die die Regeln der Logik als Manifestationen psychischer Funktionen deutet.38 Vielmehr gibt es eine Homologie zwischen den Strukturen der Logik, der Psychologie und der Metaphysik, wobei die metaphysische Ordnung die Ordnung in Psychologie und Logik fundiert. Die Reihenfolge von Dihairese, Definition, apodeiktischem, dialektischem und sophistischem Syllogismus entspricht also der Reihenfolge der Seelenvermögen Geist, Verstand, Meinung und Vorstellung – wobei Dihairese, Definition und Apodeixis jeweils aus der Synergie von Geist und Verstand hervorgehen – bzw. der Reihenfolge Idee, rationale Logoi (oder universalia in re), sensible Logoi (oder universalia der Wahrnehmung) und eines Partikularen, das für ein universale oder einen Logos gehalten wird.

36 37

38

Vgl. A. Lernould, La dialectique comme science première chez Proclus, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 71, 1987, 512. In den Vorlesungen kommen immer wieder Beispiele aus der Mathematik. Ammonios unterrichtete auch Geometrie und Astronomie, u. a. über die Astronomie des Ptolemaios (Dam., Isid. fr. 57C Athanassiadi; Ep. 79 u. Fr. 128 Zintzen). Erhalten sind von Asklepios und Philoponos Nachschriften seiner Vorlesung zur „Einführung in die Arithmetik“ von Nikomachos v. Gerasa. Eine solche Position wird als „Psychologismus“ bezeichnet. Diese Richtung in der Philosophie der Logik ist im 19. Jahrhundert entstanden und z. B. von W. Wundt, Psychologismus und Logizismus, in: Ders., Kleine Schriften, Bd. 1, Leipzig 1910 vertreten worden. Dagegen hat v. a. E. Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur 1, 1910/1911, 289–341 und E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Bd. 1: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Hamburg 1992, bes. §§ 17–24 argumentiert.

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III. Die systematische Stellung der Logik: Teil oder Organon der Philosophie? Ammonios’ Intention, die platonische Dialektik und die aristotelische Syllogistik harmonisch in ein System zu integrieren, hat zu einer von vielen Interpreten kritisierten Antwort auf die vielbehandelte Frage geführt, ob die Logik ein Teil oder ein Organon der Philosophie sei. Ammonios sagt nämlich, die Logik sei sowohl Teil als auch Organon der Philosophie, insofern als sie manchmal über konkrete Gegenstände Schlüsse anstellt und manchmal bloß über logische Regeln ohne inhaltlichen Bezug handelt. A. C. Lloyd 39 nennt diese Antwort „disappointing“ und Tae-Soo Lee40 eine „im Grunde nichtssagende Kompromisslösung“. Gleichgültig, ob man diese Wertungen für angebracht hält oder nicht, muss man annehmen, dass Ammonios mit dieser These versuchen wollte, Proklos’ Bestimmung der Dialektik – in den Worten von Werner Beierwaltes41 – als „Wissenschaft des Grundes und Grund der Wissenschaft zugleich“ gerecht zu werden und auf die Logik insgesamt anzuwenden, wie im Folgenden näher gezeigt werden soll. Ammonios hat Fragestellung und Argument von Alexander (Alex. Aphr., In Anal. pr. 1, 3–4, 29) übernommen.42 Nach der Widerlegung der vermeintlich stoischen Position und „einiger Platoniker“ (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 9, 36–10, 34) – gemeint ist vermutlich Plotin – formuliert Ammonios seine eigene Position: „Nach Platon und seiner wahren Lehre ist die Logik weder ein Teil, wie die Stoiker und einige der Platoniker sagen, noch allein ein Organon, wie die aus dem Peripatos sagen, sondern sowohl Teil als auch Organon der Philosophie. Denn wenn man die Reden mit den Gegenständen (μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων) nimmt, also die Syllogismen selbst mit den ihnen zugrundeliegenden Gegenständen, ist sie ein Teil, wenn aber als leere Regeln ohne die Gegenstände (ψιλοὺς τοὺς κανόνας ἄνευ τῶν πραγμάτων), dann nur Organon“.43 Der Ausdruck πρᾶγμα meint das auf einen außersprachlichen Gegenstand bezogene Wort oder den entsprechenden Begriff; mit diesem Ausdruck ersetzt Ammonios den von Alexander gebrauchten Ausdruck ὕλη, mit dem dieser die verschiedenen Anwendungsgebiete der syllogistischen Figuren bezeichnet, die

39 40 41 42 43

Lloyd (wie Anm. 8) 20. Lee (wie Anm. 4) 52. Beierwaltes (wie Anm. 10) 247. Vgl. Lee (wie Anm. 4) 44–54. Ammon., In Anal. pr. 10, 36–11, 3: κατὰ γὰρ Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον οὔτε μέρος ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ Στωικοί φασιν καὶ τινὲς τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, οὔτε μόνως ὄργανον, ὡς οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου φασίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος ἐστὶν καὶ ὄργανον φιλοσοφίας· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων λάβῃς τοὺς λόγους, οἷον αὐτοὺς τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτοῖς, μέρος ἐστίν, ἐὰν δὲ ψιλοὺς τοὺς κανόνας ἄνευ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὄργανον.

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er wiederum als εἶδος versteht (Alex. Aphr., In Anal. pr. 6, 16–21).44 Der Ausdruck πρᾶγμα kommt genauso bereits bei Plotin vor wie der Ausdruck ψιλοὶ κανόνες – Plotin spricht genauer von ψιλὰ θεωρήματα […] καὶ κανόνες (I 3 [20] 5, 11) –, wobei nicht klar ist, ob Ammonios wirklich mit den Enneaden vertraut war oder es sich bei seinen gelegentlichen Plotin-Zitaten nur um sekundäre Kenntnisse handelte.45 Ammonios fährt fort: Die Peripatetiker würden ihre Logik zurecht als Organon bezeichnen, da Aristoteles nur „leere Regeln“ angebe und diese nicht den zugrundeliegenden Gegenständen, sondern Buchstaben zuordne (z. B. „wenn A jedem B zukommt und B jedem C, so kommt A jedem C zu“); Platon hingegen gebrauche die Logik mal als Teil der Philosophie, wenn er die logischen Regeln auf konkrete Gegenstände anwendet (z. B. in dem Schluss: „Die Seele ist selbstbewegt, das letztere ist immer bewegt, dieses wiederum unsterblich, also ist die Seele unsterblich“), mal als Organon, wenn er nur die „leeren Regeln ohne die Gegenstände“ bespricht (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 11, 3– 14). Die entsprechenden Texte, in denen Platon so verfahren sein soll, liefert Philoponos nach: „Im Phaidros und Phaidon nimmt er die Dialektik mit der Materie und als Teil, im Parmenides als Organon ohne Materie“ (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 9, 18–19: ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ Φαίδρῳ καὶ Φαίδωνι μεθ’ ὕλης αὐτὴν ὡς μέρος λαμβάνει, ἐν δὲ τῷ Παρμενίδῃ ὡς ὄργανον ἄνευ ὕλης). Diese Aufteilung folgt offenbar dem neuplatonischen Curriculum, wie es Ammonios durch Proklos kennengelernt hatte. Das aristotelische Organon wurde in den „kleineren Mysterien“ unterrichtet, die auf die Platon-Lektüre vorbereiteten. Phaidros und Phaidon gehörten im darauffolgenden Platon-Curriculum zum ersten Zyklus von zehn Dialogen: Der Phaidon, an dritter Stelle stehend, wurde der Ethik zugewiesen, und der Phaidros, an achter Stelle stehend, wurde der Theologie zugeordnet. Der Parmenides ist schließlich der zweite Dialog des zweiten Zyklus und war ebenfalls für Theologie zuständig.46 Mit seiner eigenen Lösung, die Logik sowohl als Organon wie auch als Teil der Philosophie zu sehen, folgt Ammonios dem vermeintlich platonischen Vorbild und subordiniert die aristotelische Syllogistik der platonischen Dialektik. Der platonische Logikbegriff verdient nach Ammonios gegenüber dem peripatetischen den Vorzug, weil er die Logik nicht nur als Organon, sondern als Organon und als Teil der Philosophie versteht; er dürfte ihn von daher für reicher und vollständiger gehalten haben. In Wirklichkeit ist Ammonios, insofern er die Logik an sich selbst, also als formale Logik und als

44 45 46

Vgl. Lee (wie Anm. 4) 41. Lloyd (wie Anm. 8) 20 bestreitet – gegen Lee (wie Anm. 4) 53 gerichtet, der als Quelle hier Plotin annimmt – die authentischen Plotin-Kenntnisse der Alexandriner. Vgl. oben Anm. 1.

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bloßes Organon, versteht, über ihre peripatetische Bestimmung nicht hinausgekommen.47 Die Bestimmung der Logik als Teil der Philosophie wird weder der stoischen Logik gerecht, die sich ebenso wie die aristotelische Logik mit der Theorie von Prämissen und Schlüssen beschäftigt hat,48 noch ist sie wirklich platonisch, da gemeinhin – man denke an Plotin – damit nicht die formale Logik, sondern die platonische Dialektik gemeint ist, die die Einsicht in die Ideen und das erste Prinzip vermittelt. Ammonios’ Konzept, die Anwendung der formalen Logik auf konkrete Gegenstände als Teil der Philosophie zu verstehen, ist eigentlich keine Logik.49 Vielmehr überträgt Ammonios den Ausdruck „Teil der Philosophie“, der für ein gewisses Gegenstandsgebiet, z. B. Ethik oder Psychologie, zurecht verwendet wird, auf die darin verwendeten Beweise und Schlüsse, z. B. den Beweis der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, und nennt diese Form von inhaltlicher Konkretion Logik, was sachlich nicht recht passt. Dass für Ammonios beides „Logik“ ist, dürfte dadurch motiviert sein, dass zum Wesen eines Gegenstands nicht nur die das Wesen bestimmende Form, sondern auch die „Form in der Materie“ gehört, insofern beides Manifestationen der Form sind. Irritierend ist nun, dass Ammonios nicht nur die aristotelische Syllogistik, sondern auch die Logik des Parmenides als „Organon ohne Materie“ oder „leere Regeln ohne Gegenstände“ bezeichnet und damit beide gleichzusetzen scheint. Hierin scheint Ammonios seinem Lehrer Proklos zu widersprechen, denn nach Proklos habe Platon im Parmenides die „ganze Dialektik nicht leer, sondern zusammen mit der Theorie des Seienden übergeben“ (Procl., In Crat. VII 2, 28–29). Und wenn man den Parmenides, wie im neuplatonischen Schulcurriculum üblich, als Darlegung der platonischen Theologie liest, erschiene es eigentlich angemessener, ihn – in der Terminologie des Ammonios – als „Anwendung logischer Regeln auf die zugrundeliegenden Gegenstände“ oder „Teil der Philosophie“ zu bezeichnen. Dennoch ist Ammonios’ aristotelisierende Klassifikation durchaus konsistent: Proklos selbst betont, dass man das Untersuchungsverfahren des Parmenides, durch die Hypothese eines Begriffs („das Eine ist“) und seiner Negation („das Eine ist nicht“) die Folgerungen „für sich“ und „in Bezug auf anderes“ zu ziehen sowie auch für die „anderen“ die dazu umgekehrten Folgerungen „für sich“ und „für anderes“ zu untersuchen, auf Dihairese und

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49

Vgl. Lee (wie Anm. 4) 52. Lloyd (wie Anm. 8) 18 weist zu Recht darauf hin, dass es fraglich ist, ob die alexandrinischen Kommentatoren einen direkten Zugang zu den Schriften der Stoiker über Logik und zu ihrer logischen Theorie gehabt haben: Zumindest scheinen sie „Teil der Philosophie“ für die Logik, ähnlich wie bereits Alexander, lediglich als Gegenbegriff zum Begriff „Organon“ verstanden zu haben. Vgl. Lee (wie Anm. 4) 52.

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Definition zurückführen könne (Procl., In Parm. I 650, 10–651, 9). Indem der Parmenides die Dihairese von Einheit und Vielheit bzw. deren Sein und Nicht-Sein vornimmt und diese die Grundlage entsprechender Hypothesen bildet, ist er theologisch und logisch-dialektisch zugleich: theologisch, da Einheit und Vielheit, Sein und Nicht-Sein keine beliebigen, aus Form und Materie zusammengesetzten Gegenstände, sondern die grundlegenden Ideen der neuplatonischen Theologie sind, und logisch, da diese die Grundlage der platonischen Dialektik und des Denkens überhaupt sind. Der Parmenides expliziert also die Grundstrukturen des Seins und zugleich des Denkens; er ist methodische Begründung und zugleich Begründung der Methode – oder „Organon ohne Materie“, weil die ihm zugrundeliegenden Gegenstände nicht materiell, sondern Ideen sind und weil die in ihm grundgelegte Methode das Instrument zur Dihairese und Definition beliebiger Gegenstände darstellt. Ähnlich ist die aristotelische Syllogistik „Organon ohne Materie“, da sie an sich bloß die Form des diskursiv schließenden Denkens darlegt, die auf alle Gegenstände als möglicher Materie anwendbar ist, über die wissenschaftlich-apodeiktisch geschlossen werden soll. Die Logik des Parmenides wird von Platon oder Proklos nicht in gleicher Weise wie die aristotelische Syllogistik formal formuliert, sie operiert also nicht wie diese mit Buchstaben als Variablen für Gegenstände. Aber trotzdem können und dürfen die Hypothesen des Parmenides unabhängig von ihren konkreten Beispielen als „abstract framework“ gelesen werden, in dem die konkreten Ausdrücke durch Variablen ersetzt werden können.50 Tatsächlich bestimmen sie jeden beliebigen Gegenstand abstrakt ohne inhaltliche Konkretion als „Etwas“ oder „Eines Seiendes“,51 so dass auch die Logik des Parmenides in gewisser Weise formal ist. Schließlich sind die aristotelische Syllogistik und die dihairetisch-hypothetische Logik des Parmenides eine selbstreflexive Methode, indem sie ihren Gegenstand, Logik, mit logischen Mitteln begründen: Wie der Parmenides mittels Dihairese die Grundlagen der Dihairese begründet, begründen auch die Analytiken mit Hilfe von Syllogismen, wenngleich nicht kategorischen Syllogismen, ihre eigenen Theoreme.52 50 51 52

Vgl. Lloyd (wie Anm. 8) 15. Dies ist nach Soph. 237 D die Grundbestimmung von allem. Allgemein sprechen die Alexandriner von „Beweis“, z. B. in Philoponos’ De intellectu: […] rationales artes demonstrat [Hervorhebung M. S.], puta quod tres figurae sunt categorici syllogismi et quod in unoquoque modo demonstrativi (Konjektur Charlton: quot in unaquaque modi demonstrativi), aut de conversione propositionum […] (Phlp., De intellectu 98, 40–42). Der Beweis dafür, dass es drei Figuren des kategorischen Syllogismus gibt und wie viele schlüssige Modi es in jeder Figur gibt, wird bei Aristoteles durch die reductio oder Vervollkommnung der unvollkommenen zweiten und dritten Figuren des kategorischen Syllogismus auf die vollkommene erste Figur erbracht. Ammonios führt mit Aristoteles für diese Vervollkommnung als Beweismethoden, die er jedoch nur „Hilfen“ (βοήθειαι) nennt,

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Auch wenn sich bei Ammonios keine weiteren Spuren einer eigenen oder der proklischen Parmenides-Interpretation finden, hat er wohl doch dessen Logik sowie die platonische Dialektik insgesamt nach dem Vorbild des Proklos als integralen Bestandteil seiner Logik-Konzeption betrachtet. Zwar wird der Parmenides mit einem aristotelischen Begriff als „Organon“ und nicht etwa als „höchster Teil der Philosophie“ verstanden, wie man bei einer streng neuplatonischen Konzeption vielleicht erwarten könnte. Aber sachlich lässt sich diese Terminologie durchaus rechtfertigen und muss nicht dazu führen, die Analytiken und den Parmenides gleichzustellen, sondern man kann weiterhin jene als Anfang und Propädeutikum des Curriculums und diesen als dessen Abschluss verstehen, da dessen zugrundeliegende Methode, die Dihairese, der syllogistischen Methode der Analytiken ja auch nach Ammonios vorgeordnet ist. die Konversion, den Ekthesisbeweis und den apagogischen Beweis bzw. reductio ad impossibile an (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 31, 5–7; 34, 25–28). Er selbst hält – wie die meisten Neuplatoniker, z. B. Boethos, Porphyrios, Iamblichos, Maximos, Kaiser Julian, Proklos und Ammonios’ Vater Hermeias, und im Gegensatz zu Alexander und Themistios – alle Syllogismen, auch der zweiten und dritten Figur, gleichermaßen für vollkommen und darum weder eines Beweises noch einer Vervollkommnung bedürftig (31, 11–25). Aristoteles’ Rede von vollkommenen und unvollkommenen Syllogismen deutet er nur als Ausdruck unterschiedlicher Evidenzgrade (32, 30–35). D. h., an sich braucht es für die drei Figuren der Syllogismen gerade keinen Beweis, die reductio dient also nur dazu, einem logisch weniger Kundigen die Gültigkeit der Syllogismen der zweiten und dritten Figur deutlich zu machen (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 36, 19–37, 2, vgl. hierzu ausführlich Lee [wie Anm. 4] 127–132). Die dazu möglichen „Hilfen“ verfahren syllogistisch, aber nicht mit kategorischen Prämissen: Der apagogische Beweis ist ein hypothetischer Syllogismus (Anal. pr. I 44.50 a 29–38; Ammon., In Anal. pr. 34, 35–35, 2); die Ekthesis schließt ebenfalls auf der Grundlage einer hypothetischen Prämisse, indem sie ein Beispiel herausgreift (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 35, 2–7). Und die Konversion der Prämissen – von den Kommentatoren wird auch eine der Terme und der Syllogismen vorgeführt (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 35, 10–36, 10; Phlp., In Anal. pr. 39, 27– 4) – wird durch eine Dihairese gefunden (Ammon., In Anal. pr. 35, 34–36, 2; Phlp., In Anal. pr. 40, 27–35), wobei diese mehr der systematischen Darstellung als der Begründung dient (vgl. Lee (wie Anm. 4) 84–86, 92); zu den Paaren konvertibler Prämissen kommen die Kommentatoren über den dihairetischen Ausschluss von nicht-konvertiblen Prämissen (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 40, 35–42, 34). Schließlich zur Zahl der schlüssigen Modi in jeder syllogistischen Figur: Diese beweist Philoponos, indem er allgemeine Regeln für die Konklusion und für die Prämisse (z. B. „die Konklusion folgt der schwächeren Prämisse“, wobei „schwächer“ das Partikulare gegenüber dem Allgemeinen oder das Verneinende gegenüber dem Bejahenden ist) sowie für die letztere wiederum spezielle, nach den verschiedenen Figuren differenzierte Regeln angibt (z. B. „die praemissa maior ist allgemein, die praemissa minor bejahend“) und so gültige Syllogismen von nicht-syllogistischen Aussage-Kombinationen unterscheidet (Phlp., In Anal. pr. 69, 35–71, 17, vgl. Lee (wie Anm. 4) 117–120). Zusammenfassend kann man für die im anfänglichen Zitat genannten drei Beispiele sagen, dass sie nicht durch einen apodeiktischen oder kategorischen Syllogismus, aber durch hypothetische Syllogismen und Dihairesen und daran anschließende Überlegungen, also indirekt bewiesen werden, da die Regeln des formalen Schließens nicht direkt zu beweisen sind.

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IV. Zusammenfassung Die platonische Dialektik als Einheit der vier dialektischen Methoden Dihairese, Definition, Beweis und Analyse ist der formalen Logik der aristotelischen Syllogistik vorgeordnet. Aber die formale Syllogistik ist über den Beweis oder apodeiktischen Syllogismus in die Dialektik integriert, und – darauf weist Ammonios mit seiner Parmenides-Interpretation vermutlich hin – auch die Dihairese als solche kann formallogisch erklärt werden, während Definition und Beweis stets inhaltsgebunden sind. Daher gibt es für Ammonios nicht zwei voneinander getrennte Formen von Logik, formale Syllogistik und gegenstandsgebundene Dihairetik, sondern in seinem integrativen Logik-Modell sind beide aufeinander bezogen und in gewisser Weise formale Logik. Sie bilden die Struktur des diskursiven Denkens, das von der Einheit des Geistes, der in ihm enthaltenen Ideen und ihrer Verbindung und Trennung abhängt. Entsprechend ist das Denken und die Logik als dessen begründete Methode sowohl Synthese als auch Analyse im Sinne des Wegs von der Einheit zur Vielheit und ihrem Rückweg. Die angewandte Logik, die die formale Struktur des Denkens auf konkrete Gegenstände anwendet, ist eigentlich die Vielzahl der einzelnen Wissenschaften und keine Logik im engeren Sinne. Dennoch wird sie von Ammonios auch zur Logik gezählt, da jedes Denken auch das Denkende und das Gedachte umfasst. Die alexandrinische Logik ist zugleich selbstbegründete Methode und das methodisch Begründete, das nicht nur die Regeln der formalen Logik, sondern auch deren Anwendung meint. Logik und Dialektik sind also die Wissenschaft des Denkens und zugleich das Denken der Wissenschaft. Hierin – wie auch in manchem Detail – zeigt sich die Signatur der athenischen Schule des Proklos in der alexandrinischen Logik.

Literatur 1. Quellen: Textausgaben und Übersetzungen ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS (= Alex. Aphr.) In Anal. pr. Wallies, M., Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca II.1), Berlin 1883. In Top. Wallies, M., Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca II.2), Berlin 1891.

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AMMONIuS (= Ammon.) In Anal. pr. Wallies, M., Ammonii in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.6), Berlin 1899. In Cat. Busse, A., Ammonii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarius (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.4), Berlin 1895. In Porph. Busse, A., Ammonii in Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.3), Berlin 1891. ANONYMuS Westerink, G. – Trouillard, J. – Segonds, A. Ph., Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon (Collection des Universités de France. Série grecque), Paris 1990. ARISTOTELES Anal. pr. Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Analytica Priora et Posteriora, Oxford 1964 (ND Oxford 1968). De an. Ross, W. D., Aristotelis De anima, Oxford 1956 (ND Oxford 1963). De int. Minio-Paluello, L., Aristotelis Categoriae et liber De interpretatione, Oxford 1949 (ND Oxford 1966). Met. Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1924 (ND Oxford 1970). ASCLEPIuS (= Ascl.) In Met. Hayduck, M., Asclepii in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros Α–Ζ commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VI.2), Berlin 1888. BOETHIuS In Porphyrium Dialogi Migne, J.-P., Manlii Severini Boetii opera omnia. Tomus posterior (Patrologia Latina 64), Paris 1847. DAMASCIuS (= Dam.) Isid. Zintzen, C., Damascii Vitae Isidori reliquiae, Hildesheim 1967. Athanassiadi, P., Damascius: The Philosophical History. Text with Translation and Notes, Athen 1999.

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DEXIPPuS (= Dexipp.) In Cat. Busse, A., Dexippi in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.2), Berlin 1888. ELIAS In Porph. Busse, A., Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.1), Berlin 1900. Westerink, L. G., Elias on the Prior Analytics, Mnemosyne 14, 1961, 126– 139. HOMERuS Ilias West, M. L., Homeri Ilias, Stuttgart−Leipzig 1998 (Bd. 1), Leipzig−München 2000 (Bd. 2). IAMBLICHuS (= Iamb.) Comm. Math. Festa, N., Iamblichi De communi mathematica scientia liber. Edidit N. F. (Leipzig 1891), editionem addendis et corrigendis adiunctis curavit U. Klein, Stuttgart 1975. Taormina, D. P. – Piccione, R. M., Giamblico. I frammenti dalle epistole. Introduzione, testo, traduzione e commento (Elenchos 56), Neapel 2010. OLYMPIODORuS (= Olymp.) In Gorg. Westerink, L. G., Olympiodori in Platonis Gorgiam commentaria, Leipzig 1970. PHILOPONuS (= Phlp.) De intellectu Verbeke, G., Jean Philopon. Commentaire sur le de Anima d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graeca III), Louvain−Paris 1966. Charlton, W., Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Intellect (de Anima 3.4–8). Translated with the Assistence of F. Bossier (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1991. In Anal. post. Wallies, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora commentaria cum Anonymo in librum II (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.3), Berlin 1909.

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In Anal. pr. Wallies, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica Priora commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.2), Berlin 1905. In Cat. Busse, A., Philoponi (olim Ammonii) in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.1), Berlin 1898. In De an. Hayduck, M., Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XV), Berlin 1897. PLATO Burnet, J., Platonis opera, Oxford 1900–1907 (ND 1967–1968). PLOTINuS (= Plot.) Henry, P. – Schwyzer, H.-R., Plotini opera, Oxford 1964–1983. PROCLuS (= Procl.) Dub. Boese, H., Procli Diadochi tria opuscula (De Providentia, Libertate, Malo) Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta, Berlin 1960. In Crat. Pasquali, G., Procli Diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria, Leipzig 1908. In Euc. Friedlein, G., Procli Diadochi in primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii, Leipzig 1873. In Parm. Steel, C., Procli in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, Oxford 2007–2009. In Tim. Diehl, E., Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, Leipzig 1903– 1906. Prov. Boese, H., Procli Diadochi tria opuscula (De Providentia, Libertate, Malo) Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta, Berlin 1960. Theol. Plat. Saffrey, H. D. – Westerink, L. G., Proclus: Théologie platonicienne, Paris 1968–1997.

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Bechtle, G., Die wissenschaftlichen Methoden und ihre Grundlegung in Iamblichus’ De communi mathematica scientia, in: Ders., Iamblichus. Aspekte seiner Philosophie und Wissenschaftskonzeption. Studien zum späteren Platonismus, Sankt Augustin 2006, 61–90. Beierwaltes, W., Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik (Philosophische Abhandlungen Bd. 24), Frankfurt/Main 1965. Blumenthal, H. J., Νοῦς παθητικός in Later Greek Philosophy, in: H. J. Blumenthal – H. Robinson (Hgg.), Aristotle and the Later Tradition (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. 1991), Oxford 1991, 192–205. Ebert, T. – Nortmann, U., Aristoteles: Analytica priora. Buch 1 (Aristoteles: Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. 3, Teil 1), Berlin 2007. Festugière, A. J., L’ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux Ve/VIe siècles, Museum Helveticum 26, 1969, 281–296. (ND in: Ders., Études des philosophie grecque (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie), Paris 1971, 535–550.) Hadot, I., Le problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Études Augustiniennes), Paris 1978. Hadot, I., The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories, in: H. J. Blumenthal – H. Robinson (Hgg.), Aristotle and the Later Tradition (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. 1991), Oxford 1991, 175–189. Hadot, I., Aristote dans l’enseignement philosophique neoplatonicien: Les préfaces des commentaires sur les Catégories, Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 124, 1992, 407–425. Hadot, I. – Hoffmann, P., Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fascicule 1, introduction, première partie (p. 1–9, 3 Kalbfleisch), traduction de P. Hoffmann avec la collaboration de I. et P. Hadot, commentaire et notes à la traduction par I. Hadot avec appendices de P. Hadot et J.-P. Mahé (Philosophia antiqua vol. 50), Leiden−New York− Kopenhagen−Köln 1990. Hoffmann, P. – Luna, C., Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote, chapitres 2–4, traduction par P. Hoffmann, avec la collaboration de I. Hadot et P. Hadot, commentaire par C. Luna (Anagôgê 1), Paris 2001. Husserl, E., Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur 1, 1910/1911, 289–341.

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Husserl, E., Logische Untersuchungen. Bd. 1: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Hamburg 1992. Lautner, P., The Distinction between φαντασία and δόξα in Proclus’ In Timaeum, Classical Quarterly 52, 2002, 257–269. Lee, T.-S., Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike. Eine Untersuchung über die Kommentare zu den analytica priora von Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Ammonius und Philoponus (Hypomnemata Heft 79), Göttingen 1984. Lernould, A., La dialectique comme science première chez Proclus, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 71, 1987, 509–536. Lloyd, A. C., The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford−New York 1990. O’Meara, D. J., Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford−New York 2003. Perkams, M., Selbstbewusstsein in der Spätantike. Die neuplatonischen Kommentare zu Aristoteles’ De anima (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie Bd. 85), Berlin−New York 2008. Tuominen, M., Ancient Philosophers on Principles of Knowledge and Argumentation (Reports from the Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki 2/2001), Helsinki 2001. Westerink, L. G., The Alexandrian Commentators and the Introductions to Their Commentaries, in: R. Sorabji (Hg.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1990, 325–348. Wundt, W., Psychologismus und Logizismus, in: Ders., Kleine Schriften, Bd. 1, Leipzig 1910, 511–634.

Die jeweiligen Eigenheiten der Neuplatoniker David und Elias und die umstrittene Autorschaft 1 des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift Christoph Helmig

I. Je später der Abend … Obgleich ein bekanntes deutsches Sprichwort besagt, „Je später der Abend, desto illustrer die Gäste“, ist es im ausgehenden griechischen Neuplatonismus anscheinend gerade umgekehrt. Erfahren wir über Plotin durch die hagiographisch stilisierte Vita seines Schülers Porphyrios, der sich so auch selbst ein Denkmal gesetzt hat, eine ganze Reihe wichtiger Dinge über seine Persönlichkeit, sein Werk und seine Schule, bietet uns Marinos’ Biographie seines Lehrers und Vorgängers mit dem Titel Proklos oder von der Eudaimonie interessante Einblicke in die philosophische und politische Situation der Athener Neuplatoniker des 6. Jahrhunderts,2 und eröffnet die Geschichte der Philosophie (Philosophos Historia) des Damaskios bei all ihrer unbestreitbaren Anekdotenhaftigkeit ansonsten fehlende Einblicke in die nachproklische Zeit der Athener Neuplatoniker, insbesondere in Leben und Werk seines Lehrers Isidor,3 so wissen wir von David und Elias nicht viel mehr als ihre bloßen

1

2

3

Eine Gesamtdarstellung der Werke und der Philosophie von Elias und David findet sich in C. Helmig. § 163. Elias und David, in: Ch. Riedweg – Ch. Horn – D. Wyrwa (Hgg.), Die Philosophie der Antike 5: Philosophie der Kaiserzeit und der Spätantike (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, begründet von Friedrich Ueberweg, völlig neu bearbeitete Ausgabe), Basel 2018. Dort sind zahlreiche Probleme der Forschung, die im Folgenden nur gestreift werden können, mit größerer Ausführlichkeit behandelt. Es gibt gute Gründe anzunehmen, dass Marinos seinen Text als Antwort auf, mindestens aber in der Tradition von Porphyrios’ Vita Plotini verfasst hat. Die beiden Werke weisen zahlreiche Gemeinsamkeiten und Bezüge auf. Auch Damaskios’ Text weist Bezüge zu Porphyrios und Marinos auf. Zur Struktur der Vita, der wie bei Marinos das neuplatonische Tugendschema zugrunde liegt, s. D. J. O’Meara, Patterns of Perfection in Damascius’ Life of Isidore, Phronesis 51, 2006, 74–90 und P. Athanassiadi, Damascius: The Philosophical History. Text with Translation and Notes, Athen 1999, besonders 71: „The theme of the book, announced in (frg.) 5, is the descent of the soul from heaven to earth, from being to becoming. Because of its awareness of its

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Namen, und selbst deren Authentizität ist in der Forschung angezweifelt worden.4 Of the three known representatives of what is usually called the school of Olympiodorus, viz. Elias, David and Stephanus, only the last is a little more than a name.5 Nicht selten sind die ihnen heute zugeschriebenen Werke anonym überliefert, d. h. die Namen „David“ und, häufiger, „Elias“ fehlen in den Handschriften. Dazu kommt, dass im sechsten Jahrhundert in Alexandria Philosophen mit diesen Namen nicht bezeugt sind. Das gilt auch für die einschlägigen Nachschlagewerke wie Photios, Suda und Hesych. Deutlich ist dagegen, dass die David und Elias zugeschriebenen Werke in einem inhaltlichen Zusammenhang stehen. Im Einzelnen handelt es sich jeweils um einen Kommentar zu Porphyrios’ Isagoge mit einer vorangestellten allgemeinen Einleitung in die Philosophie (Prolegomena Philosophiae),6 einen Kommentar zur aristotelischen Kategorienschrift, der in den Handschriften unter Davids Namen kursiert, dessen Zuschreibung aber umstritten ist,7 einen Kommentar zu den aristotelischen Ers-

4

5 6

7

destiny, Isidore’s soul is associated with the first rank of humans, that of philosophers; it also has the gift of prophecy.“ C. Wildberg, Three Neoplatonic Introductions to Philosophy: Ammonius, David and Elias, Hermathena 149, 1990, 43. Der Autor nimmt an, dass die (typisch christlichen) Namen „Elias“ und „David“ erst später den Werken, die ursprünglich als anonyme Vorlesungsmitschriften zirkulierten, hinzugefügt wurden, um ihnen mehr Autorität zu verleihen. Vgl. C. Wildberg, David, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition), URL = : „It is quite possible that the texts we have now under the name of David first circulated as anonymous lecture notes and were only later attributed to an author with a good Christian name so as to enhance its importance and authority among Christian readers.“ – Die Frage, ob es sich um christliche Texte bzw. ursprünglich christliche Autoren handelte, verneint Wildberg dementsprechend vehement: „Christianity was confined strictly to the auditorium“ (Wildberg, Three Neoplatonic Introductions [wie diese Anm.] 45). Bei Wildberg, Three Neoplatonic Introductions (wie diese Anm.) 42 heißt es sogar mit Blick auf die bisherige Forschungsdiskussion provokant: „[I]n comparison with Ammonius, the introductions by Elias and David are, if anything, products of an increasingly confident and magniloquent pagan Neoplatonism“. L. G. Westerink, Elias on the Prior Analytics, Mnemosyne 14, 1961, 126. Die maßgeblichen Editionen sind A. Busse, Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.1), Berlin 1900 und A. Busse, Davidis Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.2), Berlin 1904. Ein dritter Kommentar ist wegen zahlreicher inhaltlicher Parallelen unter dem Namen Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David) herausgegeben worden (L. G. Westerink, Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David): Lectures on Porphyry’s Isagoge. Introduction, Text and Indices, Amsterdam 1967). Mehr zur Autorschaft dieses Kommentars weiter unten in den Abschnitten 3–6.

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ten Analytiken (nur in altarmenischer Sprache erhalten, auch hier wird die Zuschreibung diskutiert, obwohl die meisten Handschriften David als Autor nennen) und ein kurzes Exzerpt aus einem recht ähnlichen Kommentar (der in der handschriftlichen Überlieferung Elias’ Namen trägt).8 Dazu kommen Hinweise (vor allem in Selbstzitaten) auf verlorene Werke. Im Falle des Elias ergibt ein Blick auf die handschriftliche Überlieferung einen überraschenden Befund. Keiner der in Busses Berliner Edition der Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca dem Elias zugeschriebenen Schriften trägt in den Handschriften tatsächlich seinen Namen.9 Die Prolegomena Philosophiae („Einleitung in die Philosophie“) und der Kommentar (mit Einleitung) zur Isagoge sind anonym überliefert. Hier hat Busse die Autorschaft aus Zitaten bei späteren Autoren erschlossen.10 Bezüglich des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift, der unter dem Namen Davids auf uns gekommen ist, hat Busse durch Textvergleiche versucht nachzuweisen, dass Elias in Wahrheit sein Autor sei.11 Im Falle Davids gibt es eine umfangreiche altarmenische Tradition (philosophische und theologische Werke, Übersetzungen aristotelischer Schriften und Übersetzungen von Werken des Neuplatonikers David), die mit der wichtigen Stellung Davids in der armenischen Kultur, dort genannt der Unbesiegbare, zusammenhängt. Aus chronologischen Gründen können der griechische und der armenische David aber nicht identisch sein.12 Die altarmenische Tradition ist vor allem aus zwei Gründen für die Erforschung des ausgehenden griechischen Neuplatonismus interessant. Zunächst

8 9

10 11 12

Zum ersten Mal ediert von Westerink, Elias on the Prior Analytics (wie Anm. 5). Wildberg, Three Neoplatonic Introductions (wie Anm. 4) 43 mit Bezug auf Busse, Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias (wie Anm. 6) V-IX. Die wohl einzige Ausnahme wird von A. Busse, Die neuplatonischen Ausleger der Isagoge des Porphyrius. Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Programm des Friedrichs-Gymnasiums zu Berlin, Programm 54, Berlin 1892, 7 Anm. 3 benannt. Siehe auch Westerink, Elias on the Prior Analytics (wie Anm. 5) 126 für ein unter Elias’ Namen überliefertes Exzerpt aus einem Kommentar zu den Ersten Analytiken, das Busse noch nicht bekannt war. Busse, Die neuplatonischen Ausleger (wie Anm. 9) 8–10. Siehe dazu weiter unten die Abschnitte 3–6. Zur altarmenischen Tradition Davids und zur Chronologie s. J.-P. Mahé, David l’Invincible dans la tradition arménienne, in: I. Hadot – P. Hoffmann, Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fascicule 1, introduction, première partie (p. 1–9, 3 Kalbfleisch), traduction de P. Hoffmann avec la collaboration de I. et P. Hadot, commentaire et notes à la traduction par I. Hadot avec appendices de P. Hadot et J.-P. Mahé (Philosophia antiqua vol. 50), Leiden−New York−Kopenhagen−Köln 1990, 189–207 und V. Calzolari – J. Barnes (Hgg.), L’œuvre de David l’Invincible et la transmission de la pensée grecque dans la tradition arménienne et syriaque (Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca – Davidis Opera vol. 1; Philosophia antiqua vol. 116), Leiden− Boston 2009.

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haben wir mit Davids Kommentar oder Kommentarfragment zu den Ersten Analytiken einen Text, der nur auf Altarmenisch erhalten ist.13 Dann haben neuere Forschungen zeigen können, dass für neuplatonische Texte, die sowohl auf Altgriechisch als auch auf Altarmenisch vorliegen, die altarmenische Tradition der altgriechischen Tradition häufig überlegen ist.14 Inhaltlich beziehen sich die überlieferten Hauptwerke beider Autoren auf das aristotelische Organon. Porphyrios’ Isagoge wurde im spätantiken Lektürekanon als Einführung in die aristotelische Kategorienschrift gelesen. Da die Aristoteles-Lektüre als Vorbereitung auf die Lektüre der platonischen Schriften diente und also am Anfang des Philosophiestudiums stand, wurde der Lektüre der Isagoge eine allgemeine Einführung in die Philosophie vorangestellt. In der Forschung geht man aufgrund zahlreicher doktrinaler Gemeinsamkeiten und einiger Zitate aus seinem Werk allgemein davon aus, dass Elias und David Schüler des Olympiodoros (wohl Schulhaupt von etwa 530 bis 565) waren, der seinerseits als ein Schüler des Ammonios gilt (sogenannte Ammoniosschule).15 Wegen der Beziehung zu Olympiodoros und Ammonios ist es wahrscheinlich, die Tätigkeit von Elias und David in der zweiten Hälfte des 6. Jahrhunderts in Alexandria zu vermuten. Einiges deutet darauf hin, dass Elias vor David geschrieben hat bzw. David sich auf Elias bezieht; allerdings findet diese Bezugnahme nie namentlich statt.16 Trotz der zahlreichen Parallelen, die bezogen auf die überlieferten Werke und die Schultradition (Ammoniosschule, Abhängigkeit von Olympiodoros), in der beide Autoren vermutlich stehen, zu konstatieren sind, ergibt bereits der Vergleich der dem Elias und David in der Forschung seit Busse unzweifelhaft zugeschriebenen Werke, d. h. der Kommentare zu Porphyrios’ Isagoge und der ihnen vorangestellten allgemeinen Einführungen in die Philosophie, zahlreiche charakteristische Unterschiede von erheblicher Bedeutung; ein

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15 16

Kürzlich ist dieser Text von A. Topchyan neu ediert und ins Englische übersetzt worden: David the Invincible: Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Old Armenian Text with an English Translation, Introduction and Notes (Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca – Davidis Opera vol. 2; Philosophia antiqua vol. 122), Leiden−Boston 2010. S. dazu z. B. den Beitrag von V. Calzolari, Aux origines de la formation du corpus philosophique en Arménie: quelques remarques sur les versions arméniennes des commentaires grecs de David, in: C. D’Ancona (Hg.), The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network ‘Late Antiquity and Arabic Thought’. Patterns in the Constitution of European Culture, Strasbourg, March 12–14, 2004 (Philosophia antiqua vol. 107), Leiden−Boston 2007, 259–278 und den Sammelband von Calzolari – Barnes (wie Anm. 12). L. G. Westerink – J. Trouillard, Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon (Collection des Universités de France. Série grecque), Paris 1990, xxxiii-xxxv. S. unten Anm. 28.

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Umstand, der von der Forschung bisher nur unzureichend gewürdigt bzw. in der Regel gänzlich übersehen wurde.17

II. Die jeweiligen Eigenheiten von Elias und David Im Folgenden möchte ich mich zunächst auf den Kommentar zur Isagoge und die zugehörigen Prolegomena Philosophiae beschränken. Das hat den methodischen Grund, dass bei beiden Werken die Zuschreibung an Elias und David allgemein zugestanden ist. Daher bieten in diesem Fall ein Stilvergleich und ein Vergleich des Inhalts eine sicherere methodische Basis als bei Werken, deren Zuschreibung, wie bei dem Kommentar zu den aristotelischen Kategorien, umstritten ist. Und aus diesem Grund sind der Kommentar zu Porphyrios und die Prolegomena besonders geeignet, ihre Autoren in möglichst objektiver Art und Weise voneinander zu unterscheiden und ihr Profil und ihre jeweiligen Eigenheiten erkennen zu lassen. Im neuplatonischen curriculum kommt den verschiedenen Arten der ‚Vorbemerkungen‘ oder Proömien (gr. προλεγόμενα, auch: προτέλεια oder προτεχνολογούμενα)18 die Aufgabe zu, den Studenten in die Philosophie insgesamt, in das Studium eines Autors (Aristoteles, Platon) oder in das Studium eines Werkes einzuführen. Elias’ und Davids Einführungen in die Philosophie (Prolegomena philosophiae) sind wie ihre anderen Werke nach πράξεις (‚Unterrichtseinheiten‘, dabei entspricht eine πρᾶξις einer Vorlesungseinheit) strukturiert (12 πράξεις bei Elias und 24 bei David).19 Damit ist, und das ist bemerkenswert, Davids Einleitung gut doppelt so lang wie die des Elias. 17

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Eine wichtige Ausnahme stellt der reiche Artikel von Wildberg, Three Neoplatonic Introductions (wie Anm. 4) dar (besonders 38–41), dem das Folgende viel zu verdanken hat. Siehe auch C. Wildberg, Elias, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003 Edition), URL = und Wildberg, David (wie Anm. 4). Zu diesen Vorbemerkungen allgemein s. Hadot – Hoffmann (wie Anm. 12) 21–160, Westerink – Trouillard (wie Anm. 15) xlviii-lv und L. G. Westerink, The Alexandrian Commentators and the Introductions to Their Commentaries, in: R. Sorabji (Hg.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence (The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1990, 344–347. Davids Prolegomena sind die mit Abstand längste Einleitung in die Philosophie, die aus der Spätantike auf uns gekommen ist (79 Seiten in der Edition von Busse). Im Vergleich dazu sind die dem Elias zugeschriebenen Prolegomena weniger als halb so umfangreich (34 Seiten; Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David) 49 Seiten [der Anfang, der allerdings nicht überliefert ist, entspricht etwa 18 Seiten]; Ammonios 21 Seiten). Dabei zeigt Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David) zahlreiche Parallelen zu Elias’ und Davids Werken (s. Westerink, Pseudo-Elias [wie Anm. 6] xi-xvi) und war ursprünglich nur etwa gut 1/8 kürzer als der Kommentar Davids.

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Wie die Einführung in die Philosophie so ist auch die Einführung und der Kommentar zur Isagoge des Porphyrios von zahlreichen Autoren, die der sogenannten Ammoniosschule zugerechnet werden, überliefert.20 Und wie die Einführung in die Philosophie ist die Einführung in die Isagoge und der zugehörige Kommentar nach Unterrichtseinheiten (gr. πράξεις) strukturiert.21 Vergleicht man Elias’ und Davids Einführung in die Isagoge und den zugehörigen Kommentar, ergibt sich, wie bereits bei den Einführungen in die Philosophie, dass Elias’ Schrift nur etwa halb so lang ist wie diejenige Davids. Elias’ Werk umfasst 65 Seiten in der Edition von Busse (entspricht 25 πράξεις oder Unterrichtseinheiten), während Davids Kommentar 125 Seiten bei Busse einnimmt (entspricht 32 πράξεις); die Einführungen nehmen 3 πράξεις bei Elias bzw. 4 πράξεις bei David ein.22 Diese formalen Gegebenheiten mit der auffälligen Ungleichheit im Umfang der jeweiligen Werke unserer Autoren finden zu einem guten Teil ihre Erklärung in deren unterschiedlichen Profilen als Schriftsteller und Philosophen. Im Gegensatz zu Elias stellt man bei David ein wesentlich größeres Interesse an philosophischen Fragen und Problemen fest. Er behandelt in der Regel philosophisch interessante Sachverhalte ausführlicher und, vorsichtig gesprochen, mit mehr Sachverstand. Ein gutes Beispiel ist seine Argumentation gegen skeptische Positionen, die darum bemüht sind, den Wert bzw. die Existenz(berechtigung) der dogmatischen Philosophie infrage zu stellen (2. und 3. πρᾶξις der Prolegomena).23 Christian Wildberg beschreibt David dementsprechend sehr treffend als „ernsthafte / ernstzunehmende Person, die eine große Leidenschaft für Philosophie hat“.24 Er scheut sich nicht, eigene Positionen einzunehmen. Ein Hinweis darauf ist der Gebrauch des Personalpronomens in der ersten Person Singular bzw. Plural 25 und die Tatsache, dass er regelmäßig den zu kommen-

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Hier ergibt sich bei den Einleitungen in den Kommentar jeweils folgender Umfang: Ammonios schreibt zwei Seiten; Olympiodoros’ Kommentar ist verloren; Elias schreibt 5 Seiten; David schreibt 15 Seiten; Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David) schreibt 13 Seiten. S. dazu weiter unten. Ein Vergleich mit anderen Autoren der Ammoniosschule ergibt folgendes Bild. Während der Kommentar des Olympiodoros verloren ist, hat Ammonios’ eigene Schrift einen Umfang von 128 Seiten in der Edition von A. Busse, Ammonius in Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.3), Berlin 1891. Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David) kommt auf insgesamt 75 Seiten in der Edition von Westerink, Pseudo-Elias (wie Anm. 6). Diese Argumente finden sich weder bei Ammonios noch bei Elias. Der Ausdruck „dogmatische Philosophie“ ist hier gebraucht im Sinne des Sextos Empeirikos, der alle Philosophen, die keine Skeptiker sind, als Dogmatiker bezeichnet. Wildberg, David (wie Anm. 4): „serious man passionate about philosophy“; vgl. Wildberg, Three Neoplatonic Introductions (wie Anm. 4) 39. Z. B. In Porph. 171, 22; 189, 17 und 208, 25–27.

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tierenden Autor (also Porphyrios) kritisiert.26 Sein Kommentar ist, obwohl erheblich länger als der des Elias, besser strukturiert,27 und die Darstellung ist insgesamt ausgewogener. Es ist schließlich wahrscheinlich, dass er Elias’ Werk kennt und darauf kritisch Bezug nimmt.28 Bei Elias ergibt sich ein vollkommen anderes Bild. Ihm ist offenbar mehr daran gelegen, seine studentischen Zuhörer zu unterhalten, nicht immer mit großem Tiefgang, ohne interessante philosophische Fragen mit der gebotenen Ausführlichkeit zu diskutieren, häufig bedacht auf einzelne Worterklärungen, bisweilen auch Wortspiele bzw. Erklärungen von Details, die nicht immer zum Verständnis des zu kommentierenden Textes beitragen. Seine Sprache weist insgesamt einen sehr formelhaften Charakter auf, und es ist schon seit längerem bekannt, dass er im Vergleich zu David viel unflexibler ist, was das Verhältnis zu seinen Vorgängern (bes. zu Olympiodoros) angeht.29 Wie im Falle Davids ist auch für Elias eine insgesamt recht treffende Beschreibung in den Arbeiten von Christian Wildberg formuliert. Demnach sei er „kein hervorragender Philosoph“, sondern eher ein „Intellektueller mit einem gewissen Unterhaltungswert“, „ein sehr lebhafter Redner, der seine Zuhörer mit Zitaten, Anspielungen, Etymologien und gelehrten Bemerkungen aller Art blende“, und so „ein Feuerwerk an Gelehrsamkeit“ abbrenne.30 Ein gutes Beispiel für Elias’ nicht immer angemessene Art der Kommentarpraxis findet sich gleich zu Anfang seines Kommentars zur Isagoge (42, 13–43, 31). Porphyrios’ einleitende Bemerkung, es sei notwendig (Intr. 1, 26

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Charakteristisch für diese Kritik ist u. a. die Wendung κακῶς εἶπε – „er [sc. Porphyrios] hat es fehlerhaft gesagt“ (z. B. In Porph. 170, 24; 170, 27; 179, 13). S. auch In Porph. 168, 20–21; 194, 20 ff. und 208, 25–27. Ein formales Element der Strukturierung des Kommentars ist die häufiger auftauchende Formulierung κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἐπαγγελίαν („nach meiner Ankündigung“/„wie angekündigt“, In Porph. 142, 11; 151, 19; 174, 28; 204, 7; 208, 2) und die gleichbedeutende Verwendung des Verbs ἐπαγγέλλειν („ankündigen“, In Porph. 130, 19; 133, 5; 144, 6; 147, 32). Damit markiert der Autor Themen oder Probleme, deren Behandlung in einer bestimmten πρᾶξις er zunächst dem Leser ankündigt, um diese Ankündigung dann später im Text in die Tat umzusetzen. Sehr wahrscheinlich ist die Bezugnahme auf Elias an folgenden Stellen: In Porph. 100, 13– 101, 23; 188, 22–189, 4; 193, 20–194, 18. Wie bereits gesagt, findet die Auseinandersetzung nicht namentlich statt, sondern David verweist regelmäßig auf „einige Interpreten“ (gr. τινές). S. dazu R. Beutler, Olympiodorus (13), in: W. Kroll – K. Mittelhaus (Hgg.), Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Bd. XVIII,1: Olympia – Orpheus, Stuttgart 1939, 220 mit Verweis auf A. Busse, Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.1), Berlin 1887, XLII und XLIV. Wildberg, Three Neoplatonic Introductions (wie Anm. 4) 38–39: „not a brilliant philosopher“, „displays a firework of learning, impressing his students with quotations of all kinds“ (38), „entertaining intellectual“ (39); „a very lively lecturer who dazzled his students with quotations and allusions of many kinds“, Wildberg, Elias (wie Anm. 17).

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1: ὄντος ἀναγκαίου), zu wissen, was nach Aristoteles die fünf Prädikabilien (Gattung, Art, (artbildende) Differenz, Proprium und Akzidenz) seien, nimmt er zum Anlass, recht weitschweifig über die Bedeutung und den Unterschied von „gut“ (ἀγαθόν), „notwendig“ (ἀναγκαῖον) und „nützlich“ (χρήσιμον) zu schreiben. Demnach gebe es zwei Bedeutungen von ἀναγκαῖον, von denen die zweite an unserer Stelle die richtige sei: [a] um seiner selbst willen zu meiden, um einer anderen Sache willen wählenswert (z. B. eine bittere Medizin oder eine schmerzvolle Therapie, die man um der Gesundheit willen auf sich nimmt) [b] sowohl um seiner selbst willen als auch um einer anderen Sache willen wählenswert (z. B. die Gesundheit des Körpers, die sowohl an sich, als auch für die Seele gut ist) Denn die Kenntnis der Prädikabilien sei, qua Wissen, sowohl um seiner selbst wählenswert (wie jede Art von Wissen), als auch dafür, die Dinge in der Welt (πράγματα) zu erkennen.31 Eine vergleichbare Diskussion findet sich auch bei David. Allerdings ist sie dort kürzer gehalten und wesentlich besser eingebettet, d. h. bevor er seine Exegese des Wortes ἀναγκαίου gibt, finden wir eine Reihe von nützlichen Informationen zum Aufbau der Isagoge und zur Bedeutung der fünf Prädikabilien, die bei Elias fast vollständig fehlen. Außerdem gibt es Grund anzunehmen, dass David auf Elias’ Diskussion reagiert und deshalb seinerseits dem ἀναγκαίου-Problem einigen Raum widmet.32

III. Der letzte neuplatonische Kommentar zur Kategorienschrift In der griechischen neuplatonischen Tradition sind eine ganze Reihe von Kommentaren zur aristotelischen Kategorienschrift erhalten. Der bei weitem ausführlichste ist dabei Simplikios’ in der griechischen Edition von Kalbfleisch beeindruckende 438 Seiten umfassende Exegese, die, wie bereits der simplikianische Kommentar zur Physik, als Dialog mit der Tradition konzipiert ist und eine unschätzbare Quelle an Informationen über die Beschäfti-

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Ein weiteres Beispiel für eine unangemessene Exegese ist In Porph. 45, 3–11, wo Elias die Bemerkung des Porphyrios, er wolle in seiner Isagoge kurz in einführender Weise (πειράσομαι διὰ βραχέων ὥσπερ ἐν εἰσαγωγῆς τρόπῳ [Intr. 1, 7–8]) über die fünf Prädikabilien sprechen, zum Anlass nimmt, um über die Unstetheit der τύχη und die Tatsache, dass das menschliche Erkenntnisvermögen getäuscht werden könne, zu sprechen. In Porph. 99, 30–101, 23.

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gung mit den Kategorien nach Aristoteles bietet.33 Auch innerhalb der sogenannten Ammoniosschule hat man der aristotelischen Schrift große Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet.34 Der chronologisch letzte Kommentar innerhalb dieser Tradition ist in den Handschriften einstimmig unter dem Namen Davids überliefert. Auch in der altarmenischen Tradition findet sich eine Übersetzung dieses Werkes, das ebenfalls unter dem Namen Davids kursiert. Der Kommentar als solcher präsentiert sich in der gewohnten Einteilung in Unterrichtseinheiten (πράξεις), die wiederum in θεωρία und λέξις unterteilt sind.35 Die Struktur des Kommentars ist naheliegender Weise durch eine Analyse der 10 Kategorien bestimmt.36 Wie allgemein üblich geht dem Kommentar eine Einleitung voraus. 33

34 35

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So kann der verlorene große Kommentar des Porphyrios zu einem beträchtlichen Teil aus direkten Zitaten bei Simplikios rekonstruiert werden (s. M. Chase, Études sur le commentaire de Porphyre sur les ‘Categories’ d’Aristote adressé à Gédalios. Thèse inédite de la V Section de l’École pratique des Hautes Études, Paris 2000 [nicht veröffentlicht] und die entsprechenden Seiten in der Fragmentsammlung von A. Smith, Porphyrii Philosophi fragmenta (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), Stuttgart−Leipzig 1993, 35–59. – Auch Iamblichos’ origineller Interpretationsansatz (genannt νοερὰ θεωρία, s. R. Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD. A Sourcebook. Volume 3. Logic and Metaphysics, London 2004, 67–72 und 74–76), demgemäß die aristotelischen Kategorien auch auf die intelligible Welt angewandt werden können resp. sich auch auf die intelligible Welt beziehen – etwas, das Plotin noch mit Bestimmtheit geleugnet hatte (VI 1– 3 [42–44]: „Über die Gattungen des Seienden“) –, ist bei Simplikios überliefert. Zur Tradition der Kategorienkommentare allgemein s. Hadot – Hoffmann (wie Anm. 12), P. Hoffmann – C. Luna, Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fascicule III, préambule aux catégories, commentaire au premier chapitre des catégories (p. 21–40, 13 Kalbfleisch), traduction de P. Hoffmann (avec la collaboration d’I. Hadot, P. Hadot et C. Luna), commentaire et notes à la traduction par C. Luna (Philosophia antiqua vol. 51), Leiden−New York−Kopenhagen−Köln 1990, P. Hoffmann – C. Luna, Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote, chapitres 2– 4, traduction par P. Hoffmann, avec la collaboration de I. Hadot et P. Hadot, commentaire par C. Luna (Anagôgê 1), Paris 2001 sowie R. Thiel, Aristoteles’ Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung (Philosophische Untersuchungen 11), Tübingen 2004. Kommentare sind von Ammonios selbst, Johannes Philoponos (als Nachschrift einer Vorlesung von Ammonios, mit eigenen Zusätzen) und Olympiodoros erhalten. Pace R. Goulet, Élias, in: Ders. (Hg.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques III: d’Eccélos à Juvénal, Paris 2000, 58: „Ce commentaire […] n’est pas découpé en leçons (πράξεις)“. Im Text finden sich eine Reihe von Hinweisen auf diese typische Struktur (zu erkennen an der regelmäßigen Erwähnung der Termini πρᾶξις (In Cat. 115, 13; 117, 14; 123, 11; 129, 3; 132, 4; 136, 20; 141, 16; 158, 15; 161, 15 etc.) und θεωρία (In Cat. 108, 14; 124, 23–24; 178, 12; 190, 23; 195, 25 etc.), wobei λέξις nicht vorkommt, obgleich λέξις-Passagen deutlich zu identifizieren sind (z. B. In Cat. 171, 3–6; 174, 25–26; 225, 16–24 etc.) und θεωρία bisweilen für πρᾶξις verwendet wird. Dabei stellt sich freilich die Frage, ob diese Einteilungen nachträglich vorgenommen wurden; s. K. Praechter, Besprechung von Busse, Davidis Prolegomena (wie Anm. 6), Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 170, 1908, 222–226. Bei Busse, Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias (wie Anm. 6) ist jeder Kategorie dementsprechend eine eigene Überschrift gewidmet.

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In dieser Einleitung werden insgesamt 10 Hauptpunkte (κεφάλαια) als Einführung in die aristotelische Philosophie abgehandelt,37 weil die Kategorien die erste Schrift im neuplatonischen Lektürekanon der Werke des Aristoteles waren (In Cat. 109, 7–23): (1) Warum wird Aristoteles’ Philosophie peripatetisch genannt? (2) Wie soll man die aristotelischen Schriften einteilen? (3) Bei welcher Schrift soll die Aristoteleslektüre beginnen? (4) Womit soll die Lektüre enden? (5) Welche Schriften sollen dazwischen behandelt werden? (6) Wie soll der gute Hörer beschaffen sein? (7) Wie soll der gute Kommentator beschaffen sein? (8) Welchen Charakter haben die aristotelischen Schriften? (9) Warum hat Aristoteles regelmäßig von der Undeutlichkeit (ἀσάφεια) Gebrauch gemacht? (10) Welche und wieviele Punkte (κεφάλαια) müssen vor der Lektüre jeder aristotelischen Schrift beantwortet werden? Nach dieser allgemeinen Einleitung in die aristotelische Philosophie beginnt der Autor mit einer spezifischen Einleitung in die Kategorienschrift. Diese umfasst insgesamt sechs κεφάλαια (127, 4–5, vgl. das zehnte κεφάλαιον von oben): (1) das Thema der Schrift (σκοπός), (2) der Nutzen der Schrift (τὸ χρήσιμον), (3) die Erklärung des Titels (αἰτία τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς), (4) die Frage nach der Echtheit (τὸ γνήσιον), (5) die Stellung der Schrift in der Aristoteleslektüre (τάξις), (6) die Gliederung der Schrift (εἰς τὰ μόρια διαίρεσις).

IV. Die umstrittene Autorschaft des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift Obwohl unser Kommentar (im folgenden AK) in den Handschriften einstimmig David zugeschrieben wird, ist seit der maßgeblichen Edition von Adolf Busse (Berlin 1900), der dafür argumentiert hat, dass Elias in Wahrheit der Autor sei, eine langanhaltende und bis heute nicht endgültig entschiedene Diskussion um die Autorschaft des letzten neuplatonischen Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift des Aristoteles im Gange. 37

Unser Autor benutzt das Wort κεφάλαιον auch regelmäßig innerhalb der Exegese einer einzelnen Kategorie (z. B. In Cat. 161, 18; gemeint sind damit verschiedene Aspekte oder Probleme bzw. Fragestellungen, die der Kommentator behandelt). – Wie allgemein bekannt, wird die Ordnung und Anzahl der κεφάλαια in unserem Text auf den Neuplatoniker Proklos zurückgeführt (In Cat. 107, 24–26). Diese Stelle ist damit eines der wichtigsten Zeugnisse für Proklos’ zweifellos sehr gründliche Beschäftigung mit der aristotelischen Philosophie, obwohl seine Kommentare zu Aristoteles nicht erhalten sind. S. auch oben Anm. 18.

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Mit der Publikation des Kommentars in den Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca glaubte Busse genug Material gesammelt zu haben, um die Zuschreibung an Elias endgültig entscheiden zu können.38 So heißt es bereits im Titel seiner Edition „Elias’ (einst Davids) Kommentar zu den Kategorien des Aristoteles“ (Eliae [olim Davidis] in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium). Auch diejenigen Forscher, die sich mit der armenischen Tradition Davids beschäftigen, sind von den Argumenten Busses nicht unbeeinflusst geblieben.39 Lange Zeit hindurch war Busses Diktum, die Autorschaft des Kategorienkommentares betreffend, von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, unwidersprochen. Die Debatte wurde erst wiederbelebt, als in den neunziger Jahren in Genf eine Gruppe von Forschern unter der Leitung von Valentina Calzolari und Jonathan Barnes begann, die altarmenische Tradition neu aufzuarbeiten und die entsprechenden Texte kritisch zu edieren.40 Die ersten Ergebnisse dieser Kollaboration wurden zunächst in einem Sammelband zusammengefasst, der 2009 mit dem Titel „L’œuvre de David l’Invincible et la transmission de la pensée grecque dans la tradition arménienne et syriaque“ in der Brillschen Reihe Philosophia antiqua als Band 116 publiziert wurde (s. oben Anm. 12). Gleichzeitig inaugurierte dieser Sammelband die Reihe „Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca – Davidis Opera“. Aber auch diese Publikation bot keine endgültige Antwort auf die Frage nach der Autorschaft. Was hatte Busse dazu bewogen, den Kommentar Elias zuzuschreiben? Da ist zunächst die Ankündigung Davids (In Porph. 94, 8–9), dass wir im Kommentar zu den Kategorien (ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις) erfahren werden (μαθησόμεθα), ob die Logik Teil (μέρος) oder Instrument (ὄργανον) der Philo-

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Busse, Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias (wie Anm. 6) vii-ix; s. auch die einige Jahre zuvor erschienene, ausführliche Studie desselben Autors: Die neuplatonischen Ausleger (wie Anm. 9). So hat sich z. B. der Herausgeber der armenischen Übersetzung des Kommentars zu den Kategorien, Y. Y. Manandian, Die hellenisierende Schule und die Phasen ihrer Entwicklung (L’École hellénisante et les phases de son développement), Wien 1928 Busses These angeschlossen. Es handelt sich um das internationale Forschungsprojekt „Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca – Davidis Opera“, welches kritische Editionen (mit englischer Übersetzung und Anmerkungen) der altarmenischen Überlieferung Davids vorbereitet. Bisher liegt ein Band vor (Topchyan [wie Anm. 13]), der sich dem nur in armenischer Übersetzung erhaltenen Kommentar zu den Ersten Analytiken widmet und die u. a. erste Übersetzung in eine moderne Sprache liefert. Erschienen ist zudem eine Neuausgabe von Davids Kommentar zu Porphyrios’ Isagoge von G. Muradyan (David the Invincible: Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge. Old Armenian Text with the Greek Original, an English Translation, Introduction and Notes [Philosophia antiqua vol. 137], Leiden 2014). Weitere Bände sind in Vorbereitung. – Bisher gab es zwar einige Editionen der altarmenischen Übersetzungen. Diese genügen allerdings nicht den modernen Ansprüchen an eine kritische Edition, unter anderem weil die Editoren nur eine kleine Auswahl von Handschriften berücksichtigt haben.

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sophie sei. 41 Allerdings werde dieses seit Alexander notorische Problem, so Busse, nirgends in dem überlieferten Kommentar diskutiert.42 Dazu ist zu sagen, dass ein Verweis der Art „in den Kategorien“ sich nicht notwendig auf einen Kommentar zu den Kategorien beziehen muss. Der Wortlaut könnte sich sowohl auf einen Kommentar als auch auf die Kategorienschrift selbst beziehen. Dennoch bliebe es natürlich merkwürdig, dass David dazu in seinem eigenen Kommentar zu den Kategorien schweigen würde, zumal Aristoteles selbst in den Kategorien diese Frage offensichtlich nicht anspricht. Allerdings zeigt eine genaue Lektüre des Kommentars selbst, dass Busses gesamte Annahme unbegründet ist; ein Umstand, der bisher übersehen wurde. Aus mehreren Stellen des Proömiums des Kommentares geht nämlich klar hervor, dass sein Autor die Logik für ein Instrument der Philosophie hält.43 Busses wohl gewichtigstes Argument für die Autorschaft des Elias besteht in einer längeren wörtlichen Parallele zwischen In Cat. 116, 23–28 und Elias’ Prolegomena 33, 2–7, wobei der Autor des Kategorienkommentares auf seine eigenen Prolegomena Philosophiae zurückverweist.44 Aber auch dieses Argument ist in neuerer Zeit angezweifelt worden; denn da die Passage in der altarmenischen Übersetzung fehlt, die altarmenische Tradition in der Regel jedoch für besser gehalten wird als die erhaltenen griechischen Handschriften von David und Elias, liegt der Verdacht nahe, es könne sich um eine spätere Interpolation handeln.45 41

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David, In Porph. 94, 7–9: Ἔλθωμεν δὲ καὶ εἴπωμεν τὴν ὑπὸ τί μέρος ἀναφοράν. ἰστέον ὅτι τὸ παρὸν σύγγραμμα ὑπὸ τὴν λογικὴν ἀνακτέον, ἡ δὲ λογικὴ εἴτε μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἴτε ὄργανον ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις μαθησόμεθα. Zur antiken und spätantiken Diskussion s. Sorabji (wie Anm. 33) 32–36 mit weiterführender Literatur. In Cat. 115, 14–15 (τοῦ λογικοῦ ἤτοι ὀργανικοῦ); In Cat. 117, 11 (ἡ λογικὴ ὄργανον οὖσα τῆς φιλοσοφίας); In Cat. 118, 20–119, 25 (Es handelt sich um eine längere Diskussion darüber, mit welchem Teil der Philosophie man das Studium beginnen solle; vorausgesetzt ist dabei durchgängig, dass die Logik ein Instrument der Philosophie ist). – Ausgehend von Busses fälschlicher Annahme, dass der Verweis im Kommentar zur Isagoge im Kommentar zu den Kategorien keine Entsprechung finde, haben einige Forscher argumentiert, dass Elias das Problem des Status der Logik in seinem Kommentar zu den Ersten Analytiken (134, 4– 137, 3 in Westerink, Elias on the Prior Analytics [wie Anm. 5], vgl. 137, 4–138, 13) diskutiere (s. Goulet [wie Anm. 35] 61), angekündigt in seinen Prolegomena 26, 35–27, 1. Während Goulet das für eine „confirmation décisive“ (ebd.) von Busses These hält, ist dennoch fraglich, warum gerade eine Behandlung dieser Frage im Kommentar zu den Ersten Analytiken ausschlaggebend sein soll. Zudem findet sich dieselbe Diskussion auch in Davids nur in armenischer Sprache erhaltenem Kommentar zu den Ersten Analytiken (zu Beginn der dritten Praxis, 47, 22–49, 4 bei Topchyan [wie Anm. 13]); Goulet (wie Anm. 35) 61 erwägt fälschlicherweise, dass beide Texte identisch sein könnten. Vgl. Goulet (wie Anm. 35) 62: „l’argument peut-être le plus impressionnant avancé par Busse“. S. die ausführliche Diskussion bei Calzolari (wie Anm. 14) 275–277.

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Was von Busses These zur Autorschaft bleibt, sind eine Reihe von Parallelen zwischen den Werken des Elias und dem Kommentar zu den Kategorien. Diese Parallelen könnten ihre Erklärung aber auch in einer gemeinsamen Quelle (Olympiodoros?) finden, vermögen es also nicht, die Frage nach dem Autor zu entscheiden. Schließlich glaubt Busse ein weiteres Indiz ex negativo für die Autorschaft des Elias aus der Tatsache ableiten zu können, dass David und der Autor des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift in ihren Einleitungen verschiedene Argumente dafür nennen, warum ein Werk nicht authentisch (οὐ γνήσιος oder νόθος) sei.46 Ergo könne der Kommentar zu den Kategorien nicht von David stammen. Busse ist darin Recht zu geben, dass David vier Gründe liefert, der AK fünf. Man muss allerdings bedenken, dass es sich um Einleitungen zu Kommentaren von Schriften verschiedener Verfasser und daher auch um verschiedene Kommentartraditionen handelt. David kommentiert die Isagoge des Porphyrios und der AK Aristoteles’ Kategorienschrift. Damit ist durchaus erklärbar, warum ein und derselbe Autor in einem Kontext vier und in dem anderen Kontext fünf Argumente bietet und dass diese Argumente sich voneinander unterscheiden. Busses Argumentation wird ausschließlich ex negativo geführt, bietet aber kein positives Indiz für die Autorschaft des Elias. Busses These zur Zuschreibung des Kommentars ist in der Forschung nicht unwidersprochen geblieben. Wiederholt unternahmen Forscher den Versuch, die Autorschaft Davids zu verteidigen.47 Dennoch kann die Autorschaft des Elias nach wie vor als communis opinio gelten. Im Folgenden möchte ich ein, soweit ich sehe, neues Argument in die Diskussion einbrin-

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Busse, Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias (wie Anm. 6) viii. Die entsprechenden Stellen, die er vergleicht, sind In Cat. 128, 1–22 und David In Porph. 81, 18–82, 24. Zum Problem der Pseudepigraphie s. den Artikel von C. W. Müller, Die neuplatonischen Aristoteleskommentatoren über die Ursachen der Pseudepigraphie, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 112, 1969, 120–126 und Hadot – Hoffmann (wie Anm. 12) 144–155, in dem Hadot kritisch auf Müller Bezug nimmt. Siehe S. S. Arevšatjan, L’héritage de David l’Invincible sous une lumière nouvelle, Banber Matendarani 9, 1969, 7–22 und Mahé (wie Anm. 12) 197–203. Vor dem Hintergrund neuerer Forschungen zum Vergleich der armenischen und griechischen Version des Kommentares zu den Kategorien von A. Ouzounian und E. M. Shirinian urteilt auch Calzolari (wie Anm. 14) 271–278, dass eine Autorschaft Davids nicht ausgeschlossen sei. Während Goulet (wie Anm. 35) 60–65 aufgrund von neuen auf dem Stil des Kommentares basierenden Argumenten eher zu Busses Position zu tendieren scheint, obgleich er zugibt, dass das letzte Wort in der Diskussion noch nicht gesprochen ist (vgl. sein ausgewogenes Resümee [wie Anm. 35] 65), votiert M. E. Shirinian, The Armenian Version of David the Invincible’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, in: Calzolari – Barnes (wie Anm. 12) 91 wieder entschieden gegen eine Autorschaft Davids, ohne ihre Einschätzung allerdings im Einzelnen zu begründen.

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gen, das zusätzlich zu dem eindeutigen handschriftlichen Befund die Autorschaft Davids bekräftigen könnte.

V. Ein neues Argument für die Autorschaft Davids Der philosophische Stil- und Profilvergleich, der durch die Arbeiten von Christian Wildberg angestoßen, oben referiert und um einige Aspekte erweitert wurde, hat ergeben, dass die späten Neuplatoniker David und Elias, die in der Forschung in der Regel zusammen behandelt werden, sehr unterschiedliche Eigenheiten aufweisen und somit, was ihren Stil als Autoren und ihr philosophisches Profil betrifft, deutlich voneinander unterschieden werden können. Im Folgenden soll dieser Befund für eine inhaltliche und stilistische Analyse des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift (AK) fruchtbar gemacht werden. Besonderes Augenmerk wird dabei der Frage gewidmet, wie der AK das Verhältnis von Platon und Aristoteles, von platonischen und aristotelischen Positionen beschreibt und bewertet. Hier gab es bekanntlich im Neuplatonismus mehrere, untereinander stark divergierende Ansichten, die bereits im Mittelplatonismus zu einem Teil vorgeprägt waren.48 Auf der einen Seite stehen Autoren, die zwar in gewissen Kontexten eine Vereinbarkeit beider Autoren konstatieren, jedoch Aristoteles wiederholt in zentralen Punkten seiner Philosophie deutlich und mit offenen Worten kritisieren. Zu dieser Gruppe gehören Syrianos und sein Schüler Proklos.49 Auf der anderen Seite finden wir Autoren wie Ammonios, Iamblichos, Plutarch von Athen, Simplikios, Asklepios oder Priskianos Lydos, für welche die Harmonisierung Platons und des Aristoteles Teil ihres Programms als

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Zur Interpretation des Verhältnisses von Platon und Aristoteles im Mittel- und Neuplatonismus allgemein s. das Standardwerk von G. E. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford Philosophical Monographs), Oxford 2006 sowie C. Helmig, Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina Bd. 5), Berlin−Boston 2012. Während Karamanolis vor allem an harmonisierenden Strategien interessiert ist, versucht Helmig anhand von epistemologischen Kontexten zu zeigen, dass es trotz eines gewissen Konsenses in der Forschung für zahlreiche Autoren wie Alkinoos, Porphyrios, Syrian, Proklos und Hermeias verfehlt ist, von harmonisierenden Tendenzen innerhalb ihrer Epistemologie oder spezieller innerhalb dessen, was heutzutage als „concept formation“ (Begriffsbildung) bezeichnet wird, zu sprechen. Zu Syrian s. C. Helmig, »The Truth Can Never Be Refuted« – Syrianus’ View(s) on Aristotle Reconsidered, in: A. Longo – L. Corti (Hgg.), Syrianus et la métaphysique de l’antiquité tardive: Actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre – 1er octobre 2006 (Elenchos 51), Napoli 2009, 347–380 und zu Syrian und Proklos Helmig (wie Anm. 48) 205–221 mit weiterer Literatur.

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Kommentatoren ist und die, was besonders im Fall des Simplikios bisher von der Forschung aufgearbeitet wurde, verschiedene Harmonisierungsstrategien auch methodisch reflektieren. Bei Simplikios geschieht dies bereits in den Proömien zu seinen Kommentaren.50 Das bedeutet nicht, dass Autoren wie Simplikios Aristoteles nicht kritisieren könnten.51 Die Harmonisierung betrifft eher, wie bereits im Falles des Iamblichos, die allgemeine Perspektive auf Platon und Aristoteles, ohne dass offensichtliche Unterschiede übersehen oder sozusagen weginterpretiert würden. Simplikios’ Strategie beruht eher auf einer Harmonisierung unterschiedlicher Ansätze und Herangehensweisen, unterschiedlicher Perspektiven oder unterschiedlicher Schwerpunktsetzungen.52 Neuralgische Punkte zur Verhältnisbestimmung der beiden Denker sind bekanntlich Aristoteles’ Kritik an der platonischen Prinzipienlehre und Ontologie (Sein als Gattung) und der Ideenlehre oder, damit einhergehend, der Status der Universalien und die grundverschiedenen Ansätze in der Epistemologie, aber auch unterschiedliche Ansätze im Bereich der Naturwissenschaft (Timaios vs. Physik) und der Theorie der Sprache (Kratylos vs. De interpretatione).53 Charakteristisch ist allerdings für alle Neuplatoniker, dass Platon in der Hierarchie vor Aristoteles steht. Letzterer wird als Einleitung in und Vorbereitung zur Platon-Lektüre gelesen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es zunächst interessant zu beobachten, wie das Verhältnis von Platon und Aristoteles bei Elias und David in den jeweili50

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Dasselbe gilt für den De anima-Kommentar, der heute in der Regel nicht Simplikios selbst, sondern entweder Pseudo-Simplikios oder Priskian von Lydien zugeschrieben wird; s. dazu M. Perkams, Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the De anima in the Tradition of Iamblichus, Mnemosyne 58, 2005, 510–530, C. Steel, Il Sé che cambia. L’anima nel tardo neoplatonismo: Giamblico, Damascio e Prisciano, edizione italiana a cura di L. I. Martone (Biblioteca filosofica di Quaestio), Bari 2006, 261–286 und F. A. J. de Haas, Priscian of Lydia and Pseudo-Simplicius on the Soul, in: L. P. Gerson (Hg.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, 756–764. Gute Beispiele für eine Kritik aus neuplatonischer Perspektive sind die beiden großen Korollarien zum Ort und zur Zeit, die zum ersten Mal ausführlicher von P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote. Tradition et Innovation (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina Bd. 3), Berlin−New York 2008 untersucht worden sind. So ist Aristoteles bei Simplikios eher der physicus, der sich mit der sublunaren Welt beschäftigt, während Platon exemplarisch für den metaphysicus oder Theologen, im spätantiken Verständnis, steht. Vgl. C. Steel, Why Should We Prefer Plato’s Timaeus to Aristotle’s Physics? Proclus’ Critique of Aristotle’s Causal Explanation of the Physical World, in: R. W. Sharples – A. Sheppard (Hgg.), Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vol. 78), London 2003, 175–187 und R. M. van den Berg, Proclus’ Commentary on the Cratylus in Context. Ancient Theories of Language and Naming (Philosophia antiqua vol. 112), Leiden−Boston 2008.

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gen Kommentaren zur Isagoge seinen Ausdruck findet. Während Elias, häufig formelhaft, die Harmonie der beiden Denker betont, ohne näher auf offensichtliche Unterschiede einzugehen,54 ist David darum bemüht, die verschiedenen Auffassungen beider Denker in eine präzise philosophische Sprache zu fassen. Dabei gleicht seine Art und Weise, die Beziehung von Platon und Aristoteles zu charakterisieren, stark der des Simplikios. Denn auch Simplikios ist sich der Unterschiede beider Denker bewusst, versucht aber dennoch zu argumentieren, dass sie sich in vielen Bereichen näher stünden, als es der bloße Wortlaut ihrer Texte zunächst suggeriere.55 Wir haben es also mit einer Art der Harmonisierung zu tun, die sehr reflektiert vorgeht, wenn sie auch zuweilen, nach unserem modernen Verständnis, eine zu große Nähe platonischer und aristotelischer Positionen vorspiegeln mag. Das, was für Simplikios zutrifft und in seinem Werk vielfach nachzuweisen ist, gilt auch für David. Obwohl er sich darüber im Klaren ist, dass es typische philosophische Positionen Platons und des Aristoteles gibt, dass bestimmte Lehrmeinungen besonders charakteristisch für die Platoniker und Peripatetiker sind, ist er doch bemüht, in den meisten Kontexten eine Vereinbarkeit (συμφωνία) herzustellen. Dabei ist er offenbar neuplatonischen Vorgängern wie Ammonios, Olympiodoros (und möglicherweise Simplikios) verpflichtet. Besonders augenfällig ist der Unterschied der beiden Neuplatoniker David und Elias im Kontext der Frage nach dem ontologischen Status von Gattungen und Arten (im Mittelalter als Universalienstreit bekannt) und der Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Gattungen und (spezifischen) Differenzen. Am Anfang der Isagoge findet sich ein bemerkenswerter Text (Intr. 1, 9–14), der das Problem des Status von Universalien (genauer: von Gattungen und Arten) kurz anreißt, aber selbst keine Position bezieht, da die Frage für eine Einführung und damit für Anfänger zu schwierig sei (Intr. 1, 12–14). Folgende Möglichkeiten stellt Porphyrios dabei zur Diskussion: Gattungen und Arten subsistieren (Realismus) oder sind bloße Konzepte / Begriffe (Konzeptualismus). Wenn sie subsistieren, sind sie entweder körperlich oder unkörperlich, und sind entweder getrennt (χωριστά) von den Dingen oder in den Dingen / in der Materie und um die Dinge (περὶ ταῦτα).56 54

55 56

So geht aus Elias, In Porph. 47, 12–14 hervor, dass Platon und Aristoteles beide annähmen, dass Gattungen und Arten subsistierten. Elias weist an dieser Stelle im Gegensatz zu David nicht auf die offensichtlichen Unterschiede zwischen den beiden hin (vgl. dazu auch weiter unten). Die folgenden drei Stellen enthalten die formelhafte Forderung nach Harmonisierung: In Porph. 70, 15–18; 86, 2; 86, 20–22. In diesem Sinne spricht Simplikios häufig von scheinbaren Widersprüchen oder einer nur scheinbaren διαφωνία zwischen beiden Philosophen. Die letzte Formulierung („um die Dinge“, gr. περὶ ταῦτα) ist erklärungsbedürftig und dürfte eine Stelle in Platons Timaios aufgreifen, wo es heißt, dass die Seele eine gemischte Wesenheit (οὐσία) sei, gemischt aus der unteilbaren und der um die Körper (περὶ τὰ σώματα)

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Soweit Porphyrios. Es ist auf den ersten Blick deutlich, dass seine Einteilung eine ganze Reihe von Fragen unbeantwortet lässt. Es ist z. B. nicht einfach zu sehen, wie man in Porphyrios’ Schema die aristotelische Position einpassen könnte. Einiges spricht dafür, dass Gattungen und Arten für letzteren Begriffe sind; aber sind sie tatsächlich bloße Begriffe (ψιλαὶ ἐπίνοιαι, vgl. Intr. 1, 11), ohne Bezug zur Wirklichkeit?57 Das scheint zumindest einer Theorie zu widersprechen, nach der die aristotelischen Universalbegriffe in einem Prozess der Abstraktion bzw. Induktion aus den Sinnendingen gewonnen werden. Auch wäre es möglich, Aristoteles eine Position zuzuschreiben, nach der die Universalien (Gattungen und Arten) in den Dingen sind. Unmöglich erscheint es aber, jedenfalls nach der Struktur, die Porphyrios’ Schema vorgibt, anzunehmen, dass Gattungen und Arten sowohl in den Dingen sind als auch eine begriffliche Existenzweise haben. Es sei denn, man versteht die verschiedenen Möglichkeiten, die suggeriert werden, als primäre Existenzweisen von Gattungen und Arten. Das würde nicht ausschließen, dass sie primär in den Dingen existieren und sekundär (also abgeleitet) Begriffe sind. Der umgekehrte Fall (primär Begriffe und nur sekundär in den Dingen) wäre dann allerdings nicht vorstellbar.

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geteilten Wesenheit (Tim. 35 A; s. die Analyse und den ausführlichen Kommentar in H. Dörrie – M. Baltes, Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Einige grundlegende Axiome / Platonische Physik (im antiken Verständnis) I. Bausteine 101–124: Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar (Der Platonismus in der Antike. Grundlagen – System – Entwicklung, Bd. 4), Stuttgart−Bad Cannstatt 1996, „Baustein“ 104.0 a (I)). Die „um die Körper geteilte Wesenheit“ wird in der platonischen Tradition häufig mit Formen in der Materie oder Qualitäten gleichgesetzt; siehe C. Helmig, Die atmende Form in der Materie. Einige Überlegungen zum ENYΛON EIΔΟΣ in der Philosophie des Proklos, in: M. Perkams – R. M. Piccione (Hgg.), Proklos. Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik. Akten der Konferenz in Jena am 18.−20. September 2003 (Philosophia antiqua vol. 98), Leiden−Boston 2006, 259–278. Wenn Porphyrios bei der Wahl der Präposition „περὶ“ die Stelle aus dem Timaios vor Augen gehabt hat, dürften ἐν und περὶ für ihn synonyme Ausdrücke sein. Elias und David hingegen unterscheiden beide Ausdrücke (s. das Folgende). So wird der Zusatz „bloß“ (ψιλαῖς Intr. 1, 11) zumindest von den antiken Erklärern aufgefasst, s. J. Barnes, Porphyry: Introduction (Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers), Oxford 2003, ad loc. Beispiele für solche „bloßen Begriffe“ wären reine Gedankendinge wie Chimären oder goldene Berge (im Deutschen etwa „Phantasieprodukte“). Eine andere Möglichkeit, das Adjektiv zu verstehen, wäre die folgende: Gattungen und Arten sind bloße Begriffe, insofern sie ausschließlich begriffliche Realität haben, d. h. in den Dingen oder in der Welt gibt es (noch) keine Gattungen und Arten. Diese Position ist z. B. bei Alexander von Aphrodisias nachzuweisen, der annimmt, die Formen in der Materie (ἔνυλα εἴδη) seien nur der Möglichkeit nach Universalien. Sie würden erst in einem Prozess der Abstraktion zu begrifflichen Universalien / Allgemeinbegriffen. Eine solche Position, die Alexander innerhalb seiner Aristotelesexegese entwickelt, käme Aristoteles’ eigener Position vermutlich näher, als dieses in der ersten Deutung von ψιλαῖς der Fall ist. Barnes (wie diese Anm.) 43 erwägt, dass Porphyrios’ Formulierung beide hier vorgeschlagenen Deutungen umfassen könne.

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Deutlich ist wiederum, wo Platon und die Stoiker in Porphyrios’ Einteilung stehen. Für ersteren subsistieren Gattungen und Arten, und zwar getrennt von den Einzeldingen.58 Für die Stoiker seien Gattungen und Arten dagegen körperlich, zumindest nach Elias und David.59 Es ist bezeichnend, wie unterschiedlich Elias und David mit Porphyrios’ Einteilung umgehen. Einig sind sich beide zunächst darin, dass nur die Stoiker eine Position vertreten, nach der Gattungen und Arten körperlich seien. Nach Elias subsistieren Gattungen und Arten sowohl für Platon als auch für Aristoteles (In Porph. 47, 12–14). Eine solche pauschale Aussage überrascht besonders dann, wenn sie nicht weiter qualifiziert wird, was Elias tatsächlich im Folgenden unterlässt. Für ihn bietet Porphyrios’ Text den Ausgangpunkt für eine Gegenüberstellung der Stoiker mit den Platonikern und Aristotelikern. Obwohl David es unterlässt, explizit zu sagen, dass Gattungen und Arten sowohl für Platon als auch für Aristoteles subsistieren, ist diese Aussage gleichwohl in seinem Kommentar impliziert. Im Gegensatz zu Elias macht er allerdings auf zahlreiche Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Denkern aufmerksam. Wie Elias kontrastiert auch er Platon und Aristoteles einerseits und die Stoiker andererseits. Dieser Umstand liegt unter anderem darin begründet, dass beide Porphyrios’ Dihairese auf eine bestimmte Weise lesen. Die erste Alternative („Subsistieren Gattungen und Arten oder sind sie nur Gedankendinge?“) beziehen sie nicht, wie man zunächst annehmen könnte, auf Universalienrealisten und Konzeptualisten, sondern auf Philosophen, die die wie auch immer geartete Existenz von Gattungen und Arten annehmen, und solchen, wie Antisthenes, die sie für reine Produkte der menschlichen Phantasie (reine Gedankendinge) halten. Vergleichbar ist ebenfalls ihr Umgang mit dem zweiten Teil der Dihairese („[Wenn Gattungen und Arten unkörperlich sind], existieren sie dann getrennt von den Dingen oder in den Dingen und ,um die Dinge‘?“). In dieser, wie es zumindest auf den ersten Blick scheint, Alternative sehen beide einen Hinweis auf die seit Syrianos, Proklos und Ammonios nachzuweisende sogenannte dreifache Existenzweise des Allgemeinen, nämlich vor den Dingen (gr. πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, lat. ante res), in den Dingen (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, in rebus) und über oder nach den Dingen (ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς, post res). Der letzte Ausdruck steht seit Platons Parmenides (132 A-B) für eine konzeptualistische Auffassung von Ideen oder Universalien.60 58 59

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Das schließt strenggenommen nicht aus, dass Gattungen und Arten im sekundären und also abgeleiteten Sinne auch Begriffe sind. Es ist allerdings wahrscheinlicher, dass die Stoiker die Universalien weder für körperlich noch für unkörperlich hielten (s. A. A. Long – D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 2: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography, Cambridge 1987, frg. 30A und 30D). Helmig (wie Anm. 48) 45–52. – Zu den drei Arten des Universale s. Helmig (wie Anm. 48) 209–210 und E. Tempelis, The School of Ammonius, Son of Hermias, on Knowledge of the Divine, Athen 1998, 63–96.

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Gemeinsam ist beiden Autoren auch, dass sie den letzten Teil von Porphyrios’ Dihairese (die drei Arten der Universalien) nicht als sich gegenseitig ausschließende Möglichkeiten, sondern als verschiedene Aspekte des Universale auffassen.61 Das ist im ersten Teil der Dihairese anders. Dort schließen sich die Alternativen gegenseitig aus: Gattungen und Arten existieren entweder oder sind reine Phantasieprodukte, sie sind entweder körperlich oder unkörperlich. Die drei Aspekte werden von beiden Autoren anhand desselben Beispiels verdeutlicht.62 Wenn man mit einem Siegelring verschiedene Wachsstücke stempelt, dann entspricht der Siegelring dem Universale „vor den Einzeldingen“, die Abdrücke im Wachs dem Universale „in den Einzeldingen“, und schließlich das Universale „über den Einzeldingen“ dem Begriff in der Seele. Diese Dinge bilden die gemeinsame Basis für die Exegese von David und Elias. Oder anders gesagt, damit ist Elias’ Erklärung der porphyrianischen Dihairese bereits erschöpft. David geht das Thema des ontologischen Status von Gattungen und Arten wesentlich differenzierter an und bemüht sich, seine Analyse um nützliche philosophische Zusatzinformationen zu ergänzen.63 Er konstatiert, wie aus heutiger Perspektive zu erwarten, deutliche Unterschiede zwischen Platon und Aristoteles in der Frage nach dem ontologischen Status von Gattungen und Arten. Diese Unterschiede illustriert er anhand von einschlägigen Textstellen, an denen Aristoteles entweder die platonische Ideenlehre kritisiert oder die Existenzweise von Universalien aus seiner Perspektive charakterisiert.64 61

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Darauf macht David, In Porph. 114, 9–18 explizit aufmerksam: θαυμαστὸν δέ τι συνέβη ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς διαιρέσεως· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα ψεῦδος εἶναι καὶ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἠδύνατο· οὐ γὰρ ἐδύνω ψεύσασθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὔτε ὑφέστηκεν οὔτε ἐν ψιλῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ὑπάρχει, οὔτε πάλιν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ ὑφέστηκε καὶ ἐν ψιλῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ὑπάρχει, οὔτε ὁμοίως ψεῦδος εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὔτε σώματά ἐστιν οὔτε ἀσώματα, οὐδὲ πάλιν ἀληθεῦσαι ὅτι καὶ σώματά ἐστι καὶ ἀσώματα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς προκειμένης διαιρέσεως δύναται ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀληθοῦς δεικνυμένου τὰ ἕτερα ψεύδει καθυποβάλλονται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων συνέβη· δυνατὸν γὰρ λέγειν ὅτι καὶ πρὸ πολλῶν ἐστι καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς. Die Metapher geht auf Platon zurück (vgl. Tht. 191 C ff., Tim. 48 E ff.) und wird spätestens von Proklos im Sinne von Elias und David ausgestaltet (In Parm. IV 839.21 ff. ed. Steel). Dazu gehört etwa die von ihm gebotene (ontologische) Definition des Universale (καθόλου) als „eines der Zahl und der Art nach, von vielen partizipiert“ (In Porph. 109, 27–28 und 110, 10–11). Im Gegensatz zu Aristoteles, der das Universale dadurch definiert, dass es von vielen ausgesagt werde (De int. 7.17 a 38–40), setzt Davids Definition offenbar die platonische Methexislehre voraus. David, In Porph. 116, 30–117, 5: πρὸς τὸ τρίτον φασὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, εἴ γε μαρτυρεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων ‘τὰ γὰρ εἴδη χαιρέτω· τερετίσματα γάρ ἐστι’· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔλεγόν τινες ἰδέας εἶναι αὐθυποστάτους, ἃς ψέγει ὁ φιλόσοφος. ἔτι δέ φησι ‘τὸ γὰρ καθόλου ζῷον οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ὕστερόν ἐστι’. τοῦτο δὲ ἐμφαίνει ὅτι πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἔστι καθόλου ὅλως (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀμφέβαλεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης), ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διανοίᾳ ἐστί, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ ‘ὕστερόν ἐστιν’.

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Damit ist eine grundlegende Differenz aufgezeigt, die auch in der modernen Platon- und Aristotelesliteratur notiert wird, die Elias aber nicht einmal einer Erwähnung für nötig befindet. Überhaupt unterlässt es Elias an besagter Stelle gänzlich, auf mögliche Unterschiede zwischen Platon und Aristoteles hinzuweisen.65 Davids Strategie ist deutlich dadurch geprägt, dass er vor dem Hintergrund der von ihm festgestellten Unterschiede zwischen beiden Denkern einen differenzierten Versuch unternimmt, diese Unterschiede zu relativieren. Das geschieht in Form einer Annäherung von Platon und Aristoteles, d. h. weder wird Platon vollständig aristotelisiert noch wird Aristoteles vollständig platonisiert. Beide Denker werden einander angenähert. Wie aber funktioniert diese Annäherung im Einzelnen? Zunächst erkennen wir gewissermaßen eine Vereinigung des aristotelischen Unbewegten Bewegers mit dem platonischen Demiurgen, die wohl auf Ammonios zurückgeht. Noch bei Proklos, Ammonios’ Lehrer, finden wir die gegenüber Aristoteles bzw. dem Peripatos kritische Auffassung, der Unbewegte Beweger sei unfruchtbar (ἄγονος, In Parm. IV 842, 20–27 ed. Steel, bes. 842, 26),66 er bringe nichts hervor. Ammonios hatte dagegen gelehrt, der Unbewegte Beweger sei sowohl causa finalis als auch causa efficiens.67 Dann beobachten wir eine Platonexegese, die darum bemüht ist, von Aristoteles allzusehr abweichende Elemente zu eliminieren. Dazu gehört ohne Zweifel die vom Demiurgen unabhängige Existenz der Ideen.68 Diese Deutung Platons wird als verfehlt zurückgewiesen. Damit ist der Weg frei, um die Universalien ante res (also die platonischen Ideen) in Aristoteles’ Denken sozusagen zu importieren. Denn die Ideen werden zu den λόγοι δημιουργικοί, mit denen der aristotelische Gott als causa efficiens operiert.69 Motiviert ist die Argumentation Davids vermutlich, wie das auch bei Simplikios der Fall ist, vor allem durch externe Vorwürfe gegen gravierende 65

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Hier könnte man einzig darauf hinweisen, dass er zweimal erwähnt, dass Platon die Universalien vor den Einzeldingen (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν) Ideen (ἰδέαι) nenne (Elias, In Porph. 48, 27). Aber das ist nichts, was spezifisch für Elias wäre. Er nimmt es aus der Tradition vor ihm. S. dazu die umfassende Analyse von C. Steel, Proclus et Aristote sur la causalité efficiente de l’intellect divin, in: J. Pépin – H. D. Saffrey (Hgg.), Proclus. Lecteur et inteprète des anciens. Actes du colloque international du CNRS Paris (2–4 octobre 1985), Paris 1987, 213–225. Simp., In De cael. 271, 11–27 und In Phys. 1360, 24–1363, 24. Vgl. Tempelis (wie Anm. 60) 134 Anm. 609 mit weiteren Belegen und Sekundärliteratur. Diese Diskussion geht bis in die Alte Akademie zurück und ist u. a. in der Vita Plotini des Porphyrios in Gestalt der Debatte, dass die geistigen Gegenstände (i.e., die Ideen) nicht außerhalb des Geistes seien (Plot. 18, s. auch die gleichnamige Schrift V 5 [32] „Dass die geistigen Gegenstände nicht außerhalb des Geistes sind, und über das Gute“), dokumentiert. Wir erkennen hier die vermutlich bereits altakademische, mindestens aber mittelplatonische Lehre der Ideen als Gedanken Gottes (s. Tempelis [wie Anm. 60] 77–89).

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dogmatische Widersprüche innerhalb der platonisch-aristotelischen Tradition. Was bei David fehlt, andere Autoren wie Simplikios aber bieten, ist eine explizite Antwort auf die Frage, warum Aristoteles Platons Ideenlehre kritisiere, wenn beide Philosophien doch vereinbar seien. Kritisiert er etwa, wie in der Tradition gemutmaßt wurde, nur falsche Deutungen der platonischen Lehre oder einen Vulgärplatonismus? Implizit macht David allerdings deutlich, wogegen sich Aristoteles ausspricht: gegen eine Platoninterpretation, die behauptet, den Ideen komme eine unabhängige Existenz zu. Wir haben es im Falle Davids mit einer sehr differenzierten Harmonisierungsstrategie zu tun, die an Autoren wie Simplikios erinnert und offensichtlich in der Tradition des Ammonios steht. Im Folgenden wird deutlich, dass die von David intendierte Harmonisierung auch Auswirkungen auf seine epistemologische Position hat. Besonders problematisch bleibt die Frage, wie man Aristoteles eine Position zuschreiben könne, nach der die Universalien auch vor den Einzeldingen existieren (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, universale ante rem), obwohl er doch gesagt hatte, das „allgemeine Lebewesen (τὸ καθόλου ζῷον) existiere entweder gar nicht oder, wenn es existiere, sei es später (ὕστερον)“ (De an. I 1.402 b 8).70 Wie kann man also vor diesem Hintergrund noch behaupten, auch für Aristoteles existiere das universale ante rem? Vorher hatte David bereits festgestellt, dass die Ideen keinen unabhängigen Seinsstatus hätten (sie seien keine αὐθυπόστατα, In Porph. 117, 1). Sie existierten nur, insofern sie λόγοι des Demiurgen seien, also als Objekte des Wissens im göttlichen Geist. In diesem Zusammenhang ist bemerkenswert, dass David an unserer Stelle nicht sagt, dass die Menschen die göttlichen λόγοι erkennen. Menschliche Erkenntnis bzw. menschliche Erkenntnis von Universalien entsteht ganz empirisch ausgehend von den Einzeldingen.71 Auch erwähnt David in diesem Zusammenhang mit keinem Wort die platonische Anamnesislehre.72 Er argumentiert aus aristotelischer Perspektive in einem Kontext, in dem er Platon und Aristoteles soweit wie möglich annähert. Gleichwohl sind Universalien, und dies betont er ausdrücklich, als menschliche Erkenntnisinhalte ewig, und zwar in einer Bedeutung von ewig, in der wir sagen können, dass auch der Mensch ewig ist, insofern es immer Menschen gibt (Ewigkeit der Art).73

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Der erklärende Zusatz „wenn es existiere“ kommt von David selbst (In Porph. 117, 2). Bei Aristoteles heißt es lediglich: τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον. David, In Porph. 117, 24–27. Zur Wichtigkeit der Anamnesislehre noch bei Proklos s. Helmig (wie Anm. 48) 223–333. David, In Porph. 117, 29–33: τὸ γὰρ ἀίδιον διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ εἴδει· ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἀίδιόν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὰ θεῖα (ταῦτα γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔστιν), εἴδει δὲ ἀίδιόν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· κἂν γὰρ φθαρῇ Σωκράτης, περιλείπεται Ἀλκιβιάδης.

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Auf diese Weise kann man Aristoteles insofern eine Theorie von ante rem-Universalien zuschreiben, als diese Universalien im göttlichen Denken existieren. Dabei gelten die Universalien im göttlichen Denken nicht als selbstständig existierend und nicht als Erkenntnisobjekte des menschlichen Denkens. Letzteres wird zumindest im Text mit keinem Wort angedeutet. Ein weiterer Beleg für Davids differenzierten Umgang mit Platon und Aristoteles sind seine Bemerkungen zum ontologischen Status von Gattung (γένος) und Art (εἶδος) und das Verhältnis beider zu den Differenzen (διαφοραί). Hier wird ebenfalls gut deutlich, wie sehr die Unterschiede zwischen beiden Denkern, allem Streben nach συμφωνία zum Trotz, bestehen bleiben. D. h. die Harmonisierung Davids ist keineswegs ein Gleichmachen von Platon und Aristoteles. Es ist vielmehr eine Annäherung (frz. rapprochement), in gewisser Weise auch eine Aussöhnung beider Denker, die für bestimmte Aspekte ihrer Philosophie gilt und unter anderem die Funktion erfüllt, Aristoteles’ Kritik an der platonischen Ideenlehre zu entschärfen. Denn gerade diese Kritik konnte als gewichtiges Argument gegen die Einheit der platonischaristotelischen Tradition gelten. Dabei ist die Spannung zwischen Platon und Aristoteles nach David bereits in Porphyrios’ Kommentar, oder besser gesagt, in der Person des Porphyrios selbst angelegt. Denn Porphyrios sei von Haus aus Platoniker, Platon sei sein eigentlicher Lehrer, aber er folge im Kommentar zur Isagoge in der Regel Aristoteles. Obwohl er das tue, vergesse er dabei seinen Lehrer Platon nicht.74 Ferner ist es naheliegend, die Aussage so zu deuten, dass David sagen möchte, dass es in Porphyrios’ Werk sowohl platonische als auch aristotelische Elemente gibt. Denn Porphyrios kommentiert ja in erster Linie Aristoteles, vergesse dabei aber seinen Lehrer Platon nicht. Damit ist ein Umstand zur Sprache gebracht, zu dem sich im Grunde alle neuplatonischen Erklärer des Aristoteles in der Spätantike positionieren mussten: Wie verhalte ich mich als (neu)platonischer Kommentator bei der Erklärung von Passagen, in denen Aristoteles entweder Platon offen kritisiert oder Auffassungen vertritt, die denjenigen Platons widersprechen? Dazu im Folgenden noch einige Beispiele. Ein grundlegender Unterschied zwischen Platon und Aristoteles betrifft selbstverständlich die Ontologie. Nach Platon ist das Sein eine Gattung, und 74

David, In Porph. 160, 17–19: Εἰ καὶ παρακολουθεῖν τῷ Σταγειρίτῃ προαιρεῖται ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὐ πάντῃ ἀμνημονεῖ τῆς τοῦ οἰκείου διδασκάλου παραγγελίας, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ Πλάτωνος. – Eine andere instruktive Passage in diesem Zusammenhang ist In Porph. 152, 21–24 (Καλῶς εἶπε γένος· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἐπαναβεβηκὸς τῆς οὐσίας, ἥτις γενικώτατον λέγεται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι γένος, ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης. Ἀριστοτέλει οὖν πειθαρχῶν ὁ Πορφύριος οὐ λέγει τὸ ὂν γένος, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα βούλεται ὁ Πλάτων αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος.), an der David sagt, dass in der Frage ob das Sein eine Gattung sei, Porphyrios Aristoteles zustimme, der das bekanntermaßen, besonders in seiner Metaphysik, mit Nachdruck verneint hatte, obwohl Platon „am meisten wolle“ (τὰ μάλιστα βούλεται), dass das Sein eine Gattung sei.

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der Sophistes zählt es explizit zu den höchsten Gattungen (μέγιστα γένη), zusammen mit Bewegung, Ruhe, Gleichheit und Verschiedenheit. Das bedeutet, dass das Sein selbst Prinzip alles Seienden ist und dass alles, was ist, am Sein partizipiert. Demgegenüber betont Aristoteles in seiner Metaphysik mehrfach, dass Sein und Eines keine Prinzipien des Seins, sondern nur konvertible Seinsattribute seien (besonders in Met. Ι). Für ihn ist das Seiende (d. h., alles, was ist) durch eine πρὸς ἕν-Relation verbunden. Mit anderen Worten, alles, was ist, ist hingeordnet auf die/eine οὐσία bzw. ontologisch abhängig von ihr. David konstatiert diesen Unterschied und stellt beide Positionen in insgesamt zwei πράξεις ausführlich dar.75 Dabei stellt er die Frage, ob die beiden Philosophen sich in dieser Frage uneinig seien (In Porph. 158, 21–22). Interessanterweise wird das von ihm verneint, und er bemüht sich demgemäß zu zeigen, dass beide lediglich aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven das Seiende einteilten oder klassifizierten.76 Ein weiterer grundlegender Unterschied zwischen platonischen und aristotelischen Philosophen war das Verhältnis der Gattung (γένος) zu den spezifischen Differenzen. Beide Gruppen gehen davon aus, dass die Differenzen in den Gattungen enthalten seien, allerdings in verschiedener Art und Weise. Die platonische Position besagt, dass sie der Wirklichkeit nach (ἐνεργείᾳ),77 die aristotelische, dass sie lediglich der Möglichkeit nach (δυνάμει) in der Gattung enthalten seien.78 Zudem sei für Aristoteles das Einzelding höherwertig als die Art und die Art höherwertig als die Gattung, aber für Platon sei es genau umgekehrt. Elias konstatiert zwar den Unterschied beider Positionen, versucht ihn aber sogleich zu neutralisieren, indem er darauf hinweist, dass bisweilen die Bedeutung von δύναμις und ἐνέργεια zusammenfalle.79 Es ist jedoch auf den 75

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Die 19. πρᾶξις ist dem aristotelischen Standpunkt gewidmet („Das Sein ist keine Gattung“), der Anfang der 20. πρᾶξις hat die platonische Auffassung („Das Sein ist eine Gattung“) zum Inhalt. Der Unterschied wird bereits vorher von David klar formuliert (In Porph. 152, 21–24: Καλῶς εἶπε γένος· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἐπαναβεβηκὸς τῆς οὐσίας, ἥτις γενικώτατον λέγεται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι γένος, ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης. Ἀριστοτέλει οὖν πειθαρχῶν ὁ Πορφύριος οὐ λέγει τὸ ὂν γένος, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα βούλεται ὁ Πλάτων αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος.). David sagt, dass in der Frage, ob das Sein eine Gattung sei, Porphyrios Aristoteles zustimme, obwohl Platon „am meisten wolle“ (τὰ μάλιστα βούλεται), dass das Sein eine Gattung sei. Auch Elias diskutiert dasselbe Problem (In Porph. 70, 1–71, 23), seine Argumentation ist aber wesentlich kürzer. Zu belegen ist diese Position z. B. bei Syrianos und Proklos; s. C. Helmig, Proclus and Other Neoplatonists on Universals and Predication, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 19, 2008, 48–49. David, In Porph. 190, 17–192, 8 (s. auch 192, 9–194, 18) stellt die Debatte anhand einer Reihe von Argumenten dar und versucht, die platonische Kritik an den Peripatetikern abzuschwächen, ohne freilich beide Positionen versöhnen zu wollen. Elias, In Porph. 86, 2 ff. Das Beispiel kommt aus Aristoteles’ De anima (II 5.417 a 21–b 28). Jemand, der schreiben gelernt hat, das Gelernte aber nicht praktiziert, hat die Möglich-

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ersten Blick deutlich, dass diese Gleichsetzung im Kontext des Verhältnisses von Gattungen und Arten nicht zutrifft. Entsprechend kritisiert David die harmonisierende Argumentation des Elias und weist sie zurück.80 Ein letzter von David betonter Unterschied zwischen Platon und Aristoteles, den ich hier nennen möchte, betrifft den Stil beider Philosophen. Beide unterschieden sich, insofern die aristotelischen Schriften zwar gut zu verstehen, aber mit einer gewissen Dunkelheit (ἀσάφεια) verfasst seien, während es sich bei Platon gerade umgekehrt verhalte. Er schreibe gut verständlich, aber seine Lehren seien schwer zu verstehen (In Porph. 105, 5–107, 19).81

VI. Das Profil des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift Wie interpretiert der Autor des Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift (AK) das Verhältnis von Platon und Aristoteles, und wie kann seine Beziehung zu David und Elias im Allgemeinen charakterisiert werden? Um diese Fragen beantworten zu können, möchte ich im Folgenden einige ausgewählte Passagen aus diesem Werk präsentieren. Bereits im Vorwort (gr. προοίμιον) gibt uns der AK einen kostbaren Einblick in diejenigen methodischen Prämissen, die er bei der Kommentierung eines Textes zugrunde legt. Demnach müsse der gute Kommentator auch ein Wissender (ἐπιστήμων) sein, d. h. er muss sich mit dem, was er kommentiert, gut auskennen. Denn, so ist der Text wohl gemeint, die Tätigkeit des Kommentatoren beschränkt sich nicht lediglich auf Sacherklärungen, sondern er müsse zwischen Wahrem und Falschen unterscheiden können (d. h., er muss den zu kommentierenden Text auf seinen Wahrheitsgehalt hin beurteilen können). Er dürfe nicht Aristoteliker sein, wenn er Aristoteles auslege, nicht Platoniker, wenn er Platon auslege. Die Wahrheit müsse sein Maßstab sein, nicht

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keit zu schreiben, weil er die entsprechende Fähigkeit erworben hat bzw. besitzt. Damit fällt bei dieser Person die δύναμις des Schreibenkönnens mit der ἐνέργεια des Besitzes der Fähigkeit zusammen. In Porph. 193, 20–194, 18. Mit „einige“ ist hier wie auch sonst häufig bei David Elias gemeint. Vgl. oben Anm. 28. – Elias’ Argument wird bei Tempelis (wie Anm. 60) 91 Anm. 331 referiert (ohne Hinweis, soweit ich sehe, auf Davids Kritik). Nach Tempelis (wie Anm. 60) löst Ammonios (In Porph. 104, 27–105, 14) das Problem des Verhältnisses von Gattung, Art und Differenzen auf andere Weise als Elias, nimmt aber bereits eine Harmonisierung der platonischen und peripatetischen Position vor. Während bei Elias die ἀσάφεια des Aristoteles keine Erwähnung findet, wird sie vom AK wiederholt erwähnt (In Cat. 107, 20; 108, 11–14; 114, 9). Zum Topos der obscuritas in griechischen Wissenschaftstexten s. A.-M. Kanthak, Obscuritas – eine Strategie griechischer Wissenschaftsliteratur?, in: U. Schmitzer (Hg.), Enzyklopädie der Philologie. Themen und Methoden der Klassischen Philologie heute (Vertumnus Bd. 11), Göttingen 2013, 157–185.

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die Autorität eines Philosophen oder einer Philosophenschule. Er müsse zwar dem Philosophen, welchen er gerade kommentiere, freundlich gesinnt sein, aber immer gelte magis amica veritas.82 Auch dürfe man Unterschiede zwischen Platon und Aristoteles nicht leugnen, wie Iamblichos das bezüglich der Ideenlehre getan habe. Der (gute) Kommentator soll zugleich Kommentator (ἐξηγητής) und Wissender (ἐπιστήμων) sein. Es ist die Aufgabe des Kommentators, die undeutlichen Stellen im Text zu erklären, des Wissenden, zu beurteilen, ob etwas wahr oder falsch ist, ein Windei oder brauchbar (vgl. Tht. 150 B151 D). Er darf nicht, nach Art der Schauspieler, die in verschiedene Rollen schlüpfen, weil sie verschiedene Charaktere nachahmen wollen, ständig, je nachdem, welche Texte er kommentiert, seinen Sinn ändern, und Aristoteliker werden, wenn er die Schriften des Aristoteles auslegt, und behaupten, es habe nie einen solch außergewöhnlichen Philosophen gegeben, oder Platoniker werden, wenn der die platonischen Schriften auslegt, und behaupten, es habe nie einen Philosophen gegeben, der Platon das Wasser reichen könne. Er darf auch nicht auf alle Art und Weise dem Text Gewalt antun und sagen, der ehrwürdige Denker, den er gerade kommentiert, habe in jeder Hinsicht recht, sondern soll überall den Satz bedenken ‚Dieser Mann ist mir lieb, lieb ist mir aber auch die Wahrheit, obgleich mir beide lieb sind, bevorzuge ich doch die Wahrheit (magis amica veritas)‘. Er darf nicht mit einer bestimmten philosophischen Schule sympathisieren, wie es Iamblichos passiert ist. Denn er hat aus Sympathie für Platon dem Aristoteles zugeschrieben, dass er Platon bezogen auf die Ideenlehre nicht widerspreche. Er darf auch einer philosophischen Schule nicht ablehnend gegenüberstehen wie Alexander von Aphrodisias. Denn weil dieser die Unsterblichkeit der rationalen Seele ablehnt, versucht er die Passagen im dritten Buch über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, welche beweisen, dass die Seele unsterblich ist, mit aller Gewalt in ihr Gegenteil umzukehren. Er soll alle Schriften des Aristoteles kennen, damit er, indem er aufzeigt, dass Aristoteles mit sich selbst übereinstimmt, die Schriften des Aristoteles durch das, was Aristoteles geschrieben hat, auslegen kann. Auch muss er alle platonischen Schriften kennen, damit er aufzeigen

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Vgl. E. N. I 4 (im Kontext einer Kritik an der platonischen Idee des Guten) und L. Tarán, Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas. From Plato and Aristotle to Cervantes, Antike und Abendland 30, 1984, 93–124.

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Es ist sehr instruktiv, diesen Text mit einer parallelen Passage aus Simplikios’ Einleitung (gr. προοίμιον) zu vergleichen. Der den aristotelischen Schriften würdige Kommentator darf in keiner Weise hinter dem hohen Niveau des aristotelischen Denkens (μεγαλόνοια) zurückbleiben. Er muss sich sowohl sehr gut überall in den Werken des Philosophen auskennen, als auch um seinen Sprachgebrauch (συνήθεια) wissen. Er muss ferner ein unparteiisches Urteil besitzen, so dass er weder das, was richtig gesagt wurde, böswillig versteht und als unplausibel hinstellt, noch, wenn eine Kritik notwendig wäre, alles daran setzt, Aristoteles als in jeder Hinsicht unfehlbar zu erweisen, so als habe er sich selbst in der Schule des Philosophen eingeschrieben. Er darf m. E. auch bezogen auf seine gegen Platon gerichteten Argumente nicht nur auf den Wortlaut schauen und auf diese Weise einen Dissens (διαφωνία) konstatieren, sondern indem er auf den Gehalt (εἰς τὸν νοῦν) des Geschriebenen schaut, der in den meisten Fällen vorhandenen Übereinstimmung (συμφωνία) der beiden nachspüren.84

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In Cat. 122, 25–123, 11: Ὁ δὲ ἐξηγητὴς ἔστω ἅμα ἐξηγητὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμων. ἔστι δὲ ἐξηγητοῦ μὲν ἔργον ἡ ἀνάπτυξις τῶν ἀσαφῶν ἐν τῇ λέξει, ἐπιστήμονος δὲ ἡ κρίσις τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους, ἤτοι ἀνεμίων καὶ γονίμων. δεῖ αὐτὸν μὴ συμμεταβάλλεσθαι οἷς ἂν ἐξηγῆται δίκην τῶν ἐν σκηνῇ ὄντων καὶ διάφορα πρόσωπα ὑποδυομένων διὰ τὸ μιμεῖσθαι διάφορα ἤθη, καὶ Ἀριστοτελικὸν μὲν γίνεσθαι τὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξηγούμενον καὶ λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ ἐγένετο φιλόσοφος τοιοῦτος, Πλατωνικὰ δὲ ἐξηγούμενον Πλατωνικὸν γίνεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ ἐγένετο κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλόσοφος. δεῖ αὐτὸν μὴ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου βιάζεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὅτι πάντως ἀληθεύει ὁ ἀρχαῖος ὃν ἐξηγεῖται, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ ἐπιλέγειν ‘φίλος ὁ ἀνήρ, φίλη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἀμφοῖν δὲ φίλοιν προκειμένοιν φιλαιτέρα ἡ ἀλήθεια’. δεῖ αὐτὸν μὴ συμπάσχειν αἱρέσει τινί, ὃ πέπονθεν Ἰάμβλιχος· οὗτος γὰρ προσπάσχων τῷ Πλάτωνι συνδίδωσι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι οὐκ ἀντιλέγει τῷ Πλάτωνι διὰ τὰς ἰδέας. δεῖ αὐτὸν μὴ ἀντιπάσχειν αἱρέσει, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος· οὗτος γὰρ ἀντιπάσχων τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς λογικῆς τὰς εἰρημένας ῥήσεις ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ λόγῳ τῆς Περὶ ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἀποδεικνυούσας ὅτι ἔστιν ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ πειρᾶται πᾶσαν στροφὴν περιστρέφειν. δεῖ αὐτὸν πάντα εἰδέναι τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους, ἵνα σύμφωνον δείξας τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην ἑαυτῷ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους διὰ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξηγήσηται. δεῖ αὐτὸν πάντα εἰδέναι τὰ Πλάτωνος, ἵνα σύμφωνον ἑαυτῷ τὸν Πλάτωνα ἀποδείξῃ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους τῶν Πλάτωνος εἰσαγωγὴν ποιούμενος. Simp., In Cat. 7, 23–32: Τὸν δὲ ἄξιον τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐξηγητὴν δεῖ μὴ πάντῃ τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλονοίας ἀπολείπεσθαι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν πανταχοῦ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γεγραμμένων ἔμπειρον εἶναι καὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς συνηθείας ἐπιστήμονα. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κρίσιν ἀδέκαστον ἔχειν, ὡς μηδὲ τὰ καλῶς λεγόμενα κακοσχόλως ἐκδεχόμενον ἀδόκιμα δεικνύναι μηδὲ εἴ τι δέοιτο ἐπιστάσεως, πάντῃ πάντως ἄπταιστον φιλονεικεῖν ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν ἑαυτὸν ἐγγράψαντα τοῦ φιλοσόφου. δεῖ δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα λεγομένων αὐτῷ μὴ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ἀποβλέποντα μόνον διαφωνίαν τῶν φιλοσόφων καταψηφίζεσθαι, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸν νοῦν ἀφορῶντα τὴν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις συμφωνίαν αὐτῶν ἀνιχνεύειν.

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Neben zahlreichen Parallelen zeigen sich wichtige Unterschiede in der Akzentuierung zwischen dem AK und Simplikios. Beide betonen, dass der Kommentator eine gute Kenntnis des zu kommentierenden Autors aufweisen und keine Parteilichkeit zeigen dürfe. Während Simplikios den guten Aristoteleskommentator charakterisiert, bestimmt der AK den Kommentator Platons und des Aristoteles. Während Simplikios es insbesondere darauf ankommt, dass der Ausleger des Aristoteles der Harmonie zwischen Platon und Aristoteles nachspüre, betont AK, dass man es wie im Fall des Iamblichos mit der Harmonisierung auch übertreiben könne. Die Notwendigkeit einer συμφωνία wird vom ihm nicht eigens hervorgehoben, die Annäherung Platons und des Aristoteles ist aber, wie sein Kommentar zeigt, durchaus erwünscht.85 Gemeinsam ist wiederum beiden, dass die Wahrheit und nicht die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Philosophenschule wichtigstes Kriterium für die Beurteilung eines Sachverhaltes sein müsse. Wenn wir die Art und Weise, wie der AK den guten Kommentator darstellt, damit vergleichen, was David und Elias in ihren Kommentaren zur Isagoge tun, ist leicht zu sehen, dass die differenzierte Annäherung an einen Autor und die Forderung nach einer philosophischen Überprüfung seiner Aussagen wesentlich besser zu David passen. Bei Elias überwiegt dagegen der formelhafte, nicht immer gut durchdachte Wille zur Harmonisierung. Auch finden wir bei ihm, soweit ich sehe, keine Passage, in der er seinen Autor (also Porphyrios) oder Platon oder Aristoteles kritisiert bzw. korrigiert. Bei David hingegen sehen wir eine differenzierte Art der Analyse des Verhältnisses von Platon und Aristoteles, die bereits Simplikios charakterisiert. Diese differenzierte Art der Vorgehensweise zeichnet auch sonst den AK aus. Das möchte ich an zwei weiteren Beispielen illustrieren. In einer längeren Digression innerhalb des Kommentars (In Cat. 150, 30–153, 2) diskutiert AK, inwiefern Eigenschaften (συμβεβηκότα), die an einen Träger (ὑποκείμενον) gebunden seien, nach ihrer Trennung von diesem Träger dennoch (zumindest eine Zeitlang) weiterbestehen können (z. B. bestimmte Gerüche), und resümiert, dass weder Platon noch Aristoteles (noch Plotin) die Wahrheit vollständig erfasst hätten (In Cat. 152, 15–16). Die gesamte Diskussion ergibt sich anlässlich der Kommentierung einer Stelle aus der Kategorienschrift, an der Aristoteles definiert, was es heißt, in einem Zugrundeliegenden (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ) zu sein. Mit „In-einem-Zugrundeliegenden-sein“ meine ich etwas, das nicht als ein Teil in einem anderen ist, und nicht unabhängig von dem existieren kann, in dem es ist.86 85 86

Das zeigt sich exemplarisch in seinen Bemerkungen zum höchsten Prinzip bei Platon und Aristoteles (In Cat. 120, 23–121, 4). Cat. 2.1 a 24–25: ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν.

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Außer der οὐσία, die selbstständig existiert, sind alle anderen neun Kategorien als Eigenschaften (συμβεβηκότα) in einem Zugrundeliegenden. Aus der Kommentartradition erwähnt AK insgesamt sechs Einwände gegen diese Bestimmung (ὑπογραφή), wovon drei bemängeln, sie sei zu weit (πλεονεξίαν / πλεονασμὸν κατηγορεῖν), drei, sie sei zu eng (μειονεξίαν / ἔλλειψιν κατηγορεῖν) gefasst. Innerhalb dieser Einwände beklagt der fünfte Einwand, die Bestimmung treffe nicht auf alle Eigenschaften (συμβεβηκότα) zu, denn es gäbe Eigenschaften, die sehr wohl trennbar seien, z. B. im Falle von Gerüchen wie der Duft eines Apfels, der von uns wahrgenommen werden könne (also in unserer Wahrnehmung), und auch am Kerngehäuse (κιβώτιον) noch spürbar sei. Für diese Schwierigkeit zitiert AK drei Lösungen (nach Platon, nach Aristoteles und nach Plotin), aber keine der drei sei für sich genommen wahr, sondern alle drei seien jeweils nur unter bestimmten Rahmenbedingungen zutreffend. Alle drei zusammen deckten aber alle denkbaren Fälle ab, verhielten sich also komplementär zueinander. Ein solches Resultat entspricht den methodischen Grundsätzen, die AK in seiner Einleitung für den guten Kommentator festgelegt hatte (die Wahrheit solle Maßstab der Kommentierung sein und nicht die Prominenz des zu kommentierenden Philosophen), ist aber, wie gesagt, ganz untypisch für Elias’ Art der Kommentierung. Letzterer gibt nämlich entweder dem zu kommentierenden Autor Recht oder versucht, platonische und aristotelische Positionen dergestalt zu harmonisieren, dass beide Philosophen richtig lägen. Die zweite Passage findet sich innerhalb von AKs Analyse der Kategorie der Relation (gr. πρός τι, In Cat. 200, 30–219, 31 [Kapitel 7 der Kategorienschrift]). Auch hier werden zunächst die platonische und die peripatetische Position dargestellt und ein Unterschied zwischen beiden Auffassungen konstatiert. AK beginnt seine Darlegung mit Aristoteles’ Kritik an der platonischen Definition des πρός τι, mit der er bemängele, dass Platon auch Substanzen zur Gruppe der Relativa gezählt habe, obgleich dieser Status nur den Eigenschaften (συμβεβηκότα) zukomme.87 Aristoteles selbst erwähnt zwar Platon in den Kategorien nicht namentlich, aber vermutlich hatte man in der Kommentartradition bereits sehr früh den Verdacht, Aristoteles’ Kritik an der ersten Definition von Relation wende sich in Wahrheit gegen Platon.88

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Zumindest folge das aus der platonischen Definition des πρός τι. Das geht z. B. aus einer Parallelstelle bei Simplikios hervor (In Cat. 159, 9–22; s. bereits Porph., In Cat. 111, 27–29), wo auch platonische Belegstellen für die Definition zitiert werden: Resp. IV 438 A und Soph. 255 D (die Identifizierung nimmt Kalbfleisch [Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VIII), Berlin 1907] im textkritischen Apparat zur Stelle vor; Simplikios arbeitet selbstverständlich nicht mit Stellenangaben, sondern gibt nur die bloßen Zitate).

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Die erste, von AK als platonisch identifizierte Bestimmung besagt, dass etwas dann ein relativum sei, wenn es, „insofern es es selbst ist, in einer Beziehung zu einem anderen steht“ (Cat. 7.6 a 36–37: Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται). Problematisch an dieser Bestimmung ist, dass nicht genau festgelegt ist, was „in einer Beziehung zu einem anderen stehen“ bedeutet. So stehen beispielsweise Lebewesen und Kopf, Schiff und Ruder, Flügel und Vogel in einer bestimmten Beziehung zueinander, ohne strenggenommen relativa zu sein.89 Denn nach Aristoteles sind (erste) Substanzen, also in unserem Fall Lebewesen, Vogel und Schiff keine relativa (Cat. VII), weil sie ontologisch unabhängig oder selbstständig sind.90 Daher gibt er eine zweite Definition, die Substanzen aus der Menge der Relativa ausschließen soll. Sie lautet: Etwas ist relativ, wenn „sein Sein identisch damit ist (d. h., wenn Sein für es gleichbedeutend ist), zu einem anderen in einer Beziehung zu stehen“ (Cat. 7.8 a 31–32: ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν). Mit anderen Worten: Etwas ist genau dann ein relativum, wenn es nicht (selbstständig) existieren kann, ohne zu einem anderen in einer Beziehung zu stehen. Nachdem der Unterschied der beiden Bestimmungen von AK erläutert wurde, argumentiert er, indem er den Philosophen Syrian zitiert, dass sich beide Definitionen nicht notwendig widersprächen. Die aristotelische Bestimmung sei vielmehr eine Erklärung der platonischen und umgekehrt. Beide verhielten sich zueinander komplementär. Der Philosoph mit dem besten Urteil (κριτικώτατος),91 Syrian, sagt, dass sich die erste Bestimmung (ὑπογραφή) von der zweiten nicht unterscheide, sondern die eine sei die Erklärung für die andere. Denn warum werden relativa (τὰ πρός τι) bezeichnet als die Dinge, die das, was sie sind, von anderen (ἑτέρων) sind? Weil ihr Sein darin besteht, dass sie zu einem anderen in einer Beziehung stehen. Und warum besteht ihr Sein darin,

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AK, In Cat. 217, 1–2. Die Beispiele finden sich bereits bei Aristoteles selbst. Im Sinne des χωριστόν-Kriteriums der aristotelischen Metaphysik (Met. Δ 8.1017 b 23–26). Das Epitheton Syrians ist vom AK sicher nicht zufällig gewählt worden. Hieß es doch im Proömium des Kommentares (In Cat. 122, 26–27), der gute Kommentator als jemand, der sich mit der Materie auskennt (ἐπιστήμων), müsse urteilen, was wahr und was falsch sei (ἐπιστήμονος δὲ ἡ κρίσις τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους). – Es ist allerdings zu beachten, dass das Adjektiv κριτικώτατος durch Konjektur hergestellt ist: Überliefert ist μὲν διακριτικώτατος, wofür Busse μέντοι κριτικώτατος konjiziert. Diese Konjektur ist möglicherweise durch eine Parallelstelle mit identischem Kontext bei Simplikios motiviert (In Cat. 199, 17). Als Beiwort von Syrian taucht διακριτικώτατος sonst nicht auf, überhaupt ist es, wie auch im Positiv (διακριτικός), in neuplatonischen Texten im Zusammenhang mit Personen ungebräuchlich.

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Obwohl Zweifel bleiben, wie überzeugend dieses Argument ist, ist deutlich, dass AK nach einer ausführlichen Darstellung der Unterschiede zwischen beiden Philosophen bemüht ist, eine Harmonisierung beider Positionen herbeizuführen. Wieder erkennen wir in der differenzierten Methode eher die Handschrift Davids als die des Elias.93

VII. Fazit: David und Elias in der neueren Forschung Es ist allgemein bekannt, dass wir von einem umfassenden Verständnis der letzten greifbaren Phase des griechischen Neuplatonismus noch immer weit entfernt sind. Das liegt einerseits daran, dass die erhaltenen Texte nur zu einem kleinen Teil übersetzt und kommentiert sind. Andererseits ist die handschriftliche Überlieferung nicht gründlich aufgearbeitet.94 Im Falle der unter den Namen „David“ und „Elias“ kursierenden Texte haben wir es zudem mit Schultexten zu tun, die auf Vorlesungsmitschriften basieren. Über ihre Autoren ist weiter nichts bekannt. Während Adolf Busse noch der Ansicht war, dass in den Werken Davids seine „gedankenarme Weitschweifigkeit“ ihren Ausdruck finde,95 urteilt Jonathan Barnes, sein Kommentar zur Isagoge „seems to me to be one of the

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In Cat. 218, 32–219, 2: Ὁ μέντοι κριτικώτατος Συριανός φησιν ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἡ πρώτη ὑπογραφὴ δευτέρας, ἀλλ’ ἡ [Busses ἢ ist wohl ein Druckfehler] ἐξήγησίς ἐστιν ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας· διὰ τί γὰρ τὰ πρός τι ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται; ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσει. καὶ διὰ τί οἷς [mss. : ἃ coniecit Busse] τὸ εἶναι ἔστι [conieci : ἔχει mss.] ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσει; ἐπειδὴ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται. Der parallele Text bei Simplikios (In Cat. 199, 17–200, 3, möglicherweise eine von AKs Vorlagen), suggeriert, dass bereits Porphyrios, der von AK in diesem Zusammenhang nicht erwähnt wird, die beiden Definitionen des πρός τι miteinander in Einklang gebracht habe. Simplikios verweist zwar ebenfalls auf Syrian und zitiert einen längeren Text von ihm (In Cat. 199, 17–35), aber er verweist auf ihn m. E. nicht als denjenigen, der vermittelt habe, sondern als denjenigen, der auf Porphyrios’ Vermittlungsversuch hinweist. Die Gründe für diesen Unterschied sind nicht leicht auszumachen (vielleicht hat AK nur stark gekürzt und dabei den Namen des Porphyrios unterschlagen?), zumal das Verhältnis von Simplikios und dem AK (oder zu David und Elias) in der Forschung bisher nicht eigens untersucht wurde. Diesem großen Desiderat widmet sich nun das Langzeit-Akademieprojekt „Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina“ (CAGB), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, das unter der wissenschaftlichen Leitung von Dieter Harlfinger 2012 seine Arbeit aufgenommen hat. Busse, Die neuplatonischen Ausleger (wie Anm. 9) 13, vgl. Wildberg, Three Neoplatonic Introductions (wie Anm. 4) 40.

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two best commentaries written on that much commented work“.96 Barnes’ Einschätzung wiegt schwer, da er selbst einen Kommentar zur Isagoge verfasst und sich daher sozusagen in direkter Konkurrenz zu David befindet. Einschätzungen wie diejenige von Busse sind symptomatisch für Autoren, die nur unzureichend erforscht sind. Neben der Auseinandersetzung mit der handschriftlichen Überlieferung ist es daher mindestens genauso wichtig, die Texte inhaltlich zu erschließen. Dabei ergeben sich im Falle von David und Elias trotz der Ähnlichkeit der Texte (Einleitung in die Philosophie, Prolegomena und Kommentar zu Porphyrios’ Isagoge) so deutliche inhaltliche Differenzen, dass man, wie Christian Wildberg vorgeschlagen hat, auf zwei verschiedene philosophisch-schriftstellerische Profile schließen kann. Dieser Eindruck wird bestätigt, wenn wir die beiden Autoren in Hinsicht auf ihre je unterschiedliche Art und Weise, mit dem Verhältnis von Platon und Aristoteles umzugehen, vergleichen. Während Elias wichtige Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Philosophen stillschweigend übergeht und, insgesamt gesehen, die Harmonisierung der platonischen und aristotelischen Positionen auf eine sehr formelhafte Weise betreibt, ist es Eigenart Davids, zunächst die Unterschiede beider Denker zu einem bestimmten Problem (Status der Universalien, Charakter der Ontologie etc.) herauszuarbeiten, um in einem zweiten Schritt sich darum zu bemühen, beide Positionen weitestgehend einander anzunähern. Vor dem Hintergrund dieses Befundes ist es interessant zu sehen, wie der Autor des letzten überlieferten Kommentars zur Kategorienschrift (AK) charakterisiert werden kann. Obwohl in den Handschriften unter Davids Namen überliefert, hatte der Editor innerhalb der Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Adolf Busse, argumentiert, dass in Wahrheit Elias der Autor des Kommentars sei. Eine Prüfung seiner Argumente zeigt allerdings, dass sie nicht überzeugen können. Interessant ist darüber hinaus, dass der AK im Hinblick auf das Verhältnis von Platon und Aristoteles wesentlich mehr Gemeinsamkeiten mit David als mit Elias zeigt. Seine gesamte philosophische Methode und Art zu argumentieren steht derjenigen Davids näher und passt wesentlich besser zu ihm als zu Elias. Natürlich ist damit nicht unzweifelhaft bewiesen, dass David der Autor des Kategorienkommentares ist. Aber zumindest lässt sich eine bestimmte, die Werke durchziehende Tendenz der Übereinstimmung erkennen, die es, wollen wir also als Autor nicht einen weiteren Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David) ins Spiel bringen, schwer macht, an der handschriftlichen Überlieferung zu zweifeln, die David einstimmig als Autor des Kommentars bestätigt.

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Literatur 1. Quellen: Textausgaben und Übersetzungen ANONYMuS In Cat. (oben im Text = AK) Busse, A., Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.1), Berlin 1900. ARISTOTELES Cat. Minio-Paluello, L., Aristotelis Categoriae et liber De interpretatione, Oxford 1949 (ND Oxford 1966). De an. Ross, W. D., Aristotelis De anima, Oxford 1956 (ND Oxford 1963). De int. Minio-Paluello, L., Aristotelis Categoriae et liber De interpretatione, Oxford 1949 (ND Oxford 1966). E. N. Bywater, I., Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, Oxford 1894 (ND 1970). Met. Ross, W. D., Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1924 (ND Oxford 1970). DAVID In Porph. Busse, A., Davidis Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.2), Berlin 1904. ELIAS Proll., In Porph. Busse, A., Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.1), Berlin 1900. PLATO Burnet, J., Platonis opera, Oxford 1900–1907 (ND 1967–1968). PLOTINuS (= Plot.) Henry, P. – Schwyzer, H.-R., Plotini opera, Oxford 1964–1983.

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PORPHYRIuS (= Porph.) Intr. Busse, A., Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.1), Berlin 1887. Plot. Henry, P. – Schwyzer, H.-R., Plotini opera, Tomus I, Oxford 1964, 1–38. PROCLuS (= Procl.) In Parm. Steel, C., Procli in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, Oxford 2007–2009. SIMPLICIuS (= Simp.) In Cat. Kalbfleisch, K., Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VIII), Berlin 1907. In De cael. Heiberg, J. L., Simplicii in Aristotelis De caelo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VII), Berlin 1894. In Phys. Diels, H., Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros octo commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IX–X), Berlin 1882–1895. 2. Sekundärliteratur Arevšatjan, S. S., L’héritage de David l’Invincible sous une lumière nouvelle, Banber Matendarani 9, 1969, 7–22. Athanassiadi, P., Damascius: The Philosophical History. Text with Translation and Notes, Athen 1999. Barnes, J., Porphyry: Introduction (Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers), Oxford 2003. Beutler, R., Olympiodorus (13), in: W. Kroll – K. Mittelhaus (Hgg.), Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Bd. XVIII,1: Olympia – Orpheus, Stuttgart 1939, Sp. 207–227. Busse, A., Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.1), Berlin 1887. Busse, A., Ammonius in Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.3), Berlin 1891. Busse, A., Die neuplatonischen Ausleger der Isagoge des Porphyrius. Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Programm des Friedrichs-Gymnasiums zu Berlin, Programm 54, Berlin 1892. Busse, A., Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVIII.1), Berlin 1900.

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Helmig, C., Proclus and Other Neoplatonists on Universals and Predication, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 19, 2008, 31– 52. Helmig, C., »The Truth Can Never Be Refuted« – Syrianus’ View(s) on Aristotle Reconsidered, in: A. Longo – L. Corti (Hgg.), Syrianus et la métaphysique de l’antiquité tardive: Actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre – 1er octobre 2006 (Elenchos 51), Napoli 2009, 347–380. Helmig, C., Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina Bd. 5), Berlin−Boston 2012. Helmig, C., § 163. Elias und David, in: Ch. Riedweg – Ch. Horn – D. Wyrwa (Hgg.), Die Philosophie der Antike 5: Philosophie der Kaiserzeit und der Spätantike (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, begründet von Friedrich Ueberweg, völlig neu bearbeitete Ausgabe), Basel 2018. Hoffmann, P. – Luna, C., Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories, traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fascicule III, préambule aux catégories, commentaire au premier chapitre des catégories (p. 21–40, 13 Kalbfleisch), traduction de P. Hoffmann (avec la collaboration d’I. Hadot, P. Hadot et C. Luna), commentaire et notes à la traduction par C. Luna (Philosophia antiqua vol. 51), Leiden− New York−Kopenhagen−Köln 1990. Hoffmann, P. – Luna, C., Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote, chapitres 2–4, traduction par P. Hoffmann, avec la collaboration de I. Hadot et P. Hadot, commentaire par C. Luna (Anagôgê 1), Paris 2001. Kalbfleisch, C., Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VIII), Berlin 1907. Kanthak, A.-M., Obscuritas – eine Strategie griechischer Wissenschaftsliteratur?, in: U. Schmitzer (Hg.), Enzyklopädie der Philologie. Themen und Methoden der Klassischen Philologie heute (Vertumnus Bd. 11), Göttingen 2013, 157–185. Karamanolis, G. E., Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford Philosophical Monographs), Oxford 2006. Long, A. A. – Sedley, D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 2: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography, Cambridge 1987. Mahé, J. P., David l’Invincible dans la tradition arménienne, in: Hadot – Hoffmann, 189–207. Manandian, Y. Y., Die hellenisierende Schule und die Phasen ihrer Entwicklung (L’École hellénisante et les phases de son développement), Wien 1928.

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Index locorum Alcinous Didaskalikos 152, 30–153, 3 51 157, 11–43 56 157, 24 56 157, 30 56 159, 43–44 19 163, 6 19 Alexander Aphrodisiensis De an. 12, 19–22 187 In Anal. pr. 1, 3–4, 29 265 2, 3–4, 29 51 6, 16–21 266 7, 11–22 256–257 7, 11–27 56 7, 22–27 257 16, 23 260 In Met. 1, 17–18 50 6, 2–4 50 12, 22–13, 13 52 13, 9–25 51 15, 22–25 51 17, 9–18, 10 51 19, 10–12 51 171, 5–7 50 238, 3 50 238, 18 50 239, 6–9 55 239, 6–12 52 239, 25–240, 30 50 245, 35–246, 13 54 246, 17–21 52 246, 18–21 55 250, 27–32 54 251, 34–38 54 In Top. 7, 12–20 260 27, 12–16 176

Ammonius In Anal. pr. 1, 2–4, 7 252–253 2, 7 256 2, 7–8 259 2, 29–3, 30 258 2, 29–31 258 2, 31–3, 19 258 2, 32–3, 2 259 3, 19–25 258 3, 26–30 259 4, 8–35 253 4, 35–5, 3 253 5, 5–7, 25 253 5, 10–32 257 5, 15–16 257 5, 17–18 257 5, 19–25 257 5, 32–33 257 6, 2–11 257 7, 25–8, 14 253 7, 26–8, 14 252 7, 31–34 254 7, 35–36 256 7, 38 256 7, 39 256 8, 3 256 8, 4–9 254, 256 8, 15–11, 21 253 9, 36–10, 34 265 10, 36–11, 3 265 11, 3–14 266 11, 22–38 253 24, 29–31 260 24, 31–25, 11 259 25, 5–10 262 25, 14–20 261 25, 23–25 259 25, 23–30 264 31, 5–7 269 31, 11–25 269 32, 30–35 269 34, 25–28 269 34, 35–35, 2 269 35, 2–7 269 35, 10–36, 10 269 35, 34–36, 2 269 43, 30–31 249

316

In Cat. 6, 9–16 250 6, 17–20 264 6, 21–24 95 9, 14–19 24 In De int. 1, 6–11 72 6, 4–14 192 7, 8 192 26, 2 192 In Porph. 6, 25–9, 6 45 34, 19–25 252 35, 4–38, 4 252 35, 23–36, 1 254 36, 1–2 257 36, 7–9 257 36, 9–10 254 36, 15–19 254 36, 19–37, 5 254 36, 24–25 256 37, 10–11 257 37, 11–12 257 101, 15 204 104, 27–105, 14 300 115, 13–16 86 Anonymus In Cat. 107, 20 300 107, 24–26 286 108, 11–14 300 108, 14 285 109, 7–23 286 114, 9 300 115, 13 285 115, 14–15 288 116, 23–28 288 117, 11 288 117, 14 285 118, 20–119, 25 288 120, 23–121, 4 303 122, 25–123, 11 302 122, 26–27 305 123, 11 285 124, 23–24 285 127, 4–5 286 128, 1–22 289 129, 3 285 132, 4 285 136, 20 285

Index locorum 141, 150, 152, 158, 161, 161, 171, 174, 178, 190, 195, 200, 217, 218, 225,

16 285 30–153, 2 303 15–16 303 15 285 15 285 18 286 3–6 285 25–26 285 12 285 23 285 25 285 30–219, 31 304 1–2 305 32–219, 2 306 16–24 285

In Tht. 68, 7–22

19

Prolegomena philosophiae Platonicae § 4, 15, 1–19 132 Aratus Phainomena 2 ff. 241 Aristoteles Fragmenta (ed. Rose) 53 139 Anal. pr. I 31.46 a I 31.46 a I 31.46 a I 44.50 a

31–32 254 33 255 33–b 12 255 29–38 269

Cat. 2.1 a 24 28 2.1 a 24–25 29, 303 5.2 a 12 143 5.2 a 14–16 28 5.2 b 31–34 27 7 304 7.6 a 36–37 305 7.8 a 31–32 305 De an. I 1.402 I 1.403 I 1.403 I 2.403 I 2.403 I 2.403

b 8 297 a 7–10 187, 189 a 8–9 189, 190 b 21–22 227 b 23–24 227 b 24–31 227

Index locorum I 2.403 b 25–28 227 I 2.404 a 21–23 228 I 2.404 b 8–11 228 I 2.404 b 30–405 a 4 228 I 2.405 a 19 229, 232 I 2.405 a 19–21 7, 228, 229 I 2.405 b 1–2 230 I 4.408 b 25–27 197 I 4.408 b 25–29 191 I 5.411 a 2–3 237 I 5.411 a 7 239 I 5.411 a 7–8 7, 237, 238 I 5.411 a 8 238 II 5.417 a 21–b 28 299 III 3 206 III 3.427 b 27–28 190 III 4 190, 193 III 4–6 186 III 4–8 188 III 4.429 a 15 190 III 5 190 III 5.430 a 23–25 189, 190, 212 III 6.430 b 26–28 257 III 7–8 190 III 7.431 a 14–17 189, 190, 198 III 7.431 a 16–17 185, 186 III 7.431 b 2–3 189, 197 III 8 201, 203 III 8.431 b 20–24 49 III 8.432 a 3–9 195 III 8.432 a 4–9 189, 198 III 8.432 a 12–14 189, 201, 216 III 8.432 a 13–14 204 III 10.433 a 9–10 190 De cael. I 2–3 108 I 3 113 I 3.269 b 13–270 b 4 102 I 3.270 a 12–22 109 I 3.270 b 5–9 79 I 9.279 a 25–30 104 I 10.279 b 12–17 79 I 10.279 b 32–280 a 11 119 I 10.280 a 28–32 101 I 11 110 I 12.283 a 24–29 115 II 13.293 b 30–32 101 III 1.299 b 31–300 a 3 101 III 2.300 b 16–25 101 III 5.304 a 9–13 86 III 8.306 b 17 19 III 8.306 b 18–19 101 IV 2.308 a 3–8 101

De gen. an. II 1.735 a 10

317

207

De gen. et corr. II 1.329 a 24–b 6

120

De int. 1.16 a 3–4 192 1.16 a 12–13 257 7.17 a 38–40 295 De mem. 449 b 30–31 189 449 b 30–450 a 1 189 449 b 30–450 a 21 189, 196 E. E. I 6.1216 b 26–32 I 6.1216 b 26–35

127 149

E. N. I 4 301 VII 1.1145 b 2–7

149

Met. Α 1.981 b 27–29 49 Α 2.982 a 4–6 49 α 1.993 a 30–b 7 139, 148 α 1.993 a 30–b 19 127 α 1.993 b 11–14 86 α 1.993 b 28–31 60 Β 1.995 b 20 59 Γ 1.1003 a 26–32 50 Γ 2.1003 b 14–15 59 Γ 2.1003 b 22–24 74 Γ 2.1003 b 22–26 59 Γ 2.1004 a 24–31 56 Γ 2.1004 b 28 60 Δ 8.1017 b 23–26 305 Η 6.1045 b 18–19 120 Λ 7.1072 a 21–25 104 Λ 7.1072 b 22 78 Λ 7.1072 b 24–25 195 Λ 8.1074 a 38–b 14 148 Λ 10.1076 a 4 250 Ν 6.1093 b 24–29 69 Meteor. I 2.339 a 26

104

Phys. I 1.184 a 10–16 21 I 7 109 I 9.192 a 3–14 18

Index locorum

318

II 9.200 a 5–6 203 IV 2.209 b 6–17 120 IV 10.218 a 30–b 20 134 VI 5.236 a 27–28 33 VII 166 VIII 166 VIII 3.253 b 23–26 33 VIII 10 117 VIII 10.266 a 24–b 6 116 Top. I 2.101 a 26–36 176 I 5.102 a 31–35 27 VIII 5.159 a 25–37 128 Asclepius In Met. 1, 3 63 2, 9–16 63 70, 31 249 233, 25–40 75 280, 15–17 193 410, 8 204

Clemens Alexandrinus Strom. 5.15.96.4 235 Cornutus De natura deorum c. 35, 76, 2–5 131 Damascius In Phd. I § 78 193 I § 111 205 I § 113 203 I § 331, 6–7 117 II § 93, 2 144 II § 130, 3–4 193

David In Anal. pr. 47, 22–49, 4

194

Boethius De divisione 876 D 27 879 B 27 879 C 27 De syllogismo categorico 814 C–816 C 9 In De int. II 7, 5–9 13 II 17, 24–27 14 II 79, 9–80, 9 9 In Porphyrium Dialogi 14 D 249 Cicero Acad. pr. II 27 19

139

Isid. Fr. 57C Athanassiadi 264 Ep. 79 Zintzen 264 Fr. 128 Zintzen 264

Augustinus Civ. Dei VIII, 7 129 Averroes In De an. III 20, 173–182

Tusc. III 69

288

In Porph. 81, 18–82, 24 289 94, 7–9 288 94, 8–9 287 96, 24–25 10 99, 30–101, 23 284 100, 13–101, 23 283 105, 5–107, 19 300 109, 27–28 295 110, 10–11 295 114, 9–18 295 116, 30–117, 5 295 117, 1 297 117, 2 297 117, 24–27 297 117, 29–33 297 130, 19 283 133, 5 283 142, 11 283 144, 6 283 147, 32 283 151, 19 283 152, 21–24 298, 299 158, 21–22 299

Index locorum 160, 168, 170, 170, 171, 174, 179, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 204, 208, 208,

17–19 298 20–21 283 24 283 27 283 22 282 28 283 13 283 22–189, 4 283 17 282 17–192, 8 299 9–194, 18 299 20–194, 18 283, 300 20 ff. 283 7 283 2 283 25–27 282, 283

Proll. 39, 15–41, 36

70, 70, 86, 86, 86,

319

1–71, 23 299 15–18 292 2 292 2 ff. 299 20–22 292

Proll. 20, 18–23, 19 45 26, 35–27, 1 288 33, 2–7 288 Epictetus Diss. I 26, 13–18 130 I 26, 14 131 II 1, 32–34 130 III 21, 6–7 130

45

Dexippus In Cat. 53, 8–14 248 Diogenes Laertius 1, 35 235 1, 36 235 1, 46 235 Duns Scotus Lectura I d. 8 p. 1 q. 3 nr. 109 59 Elias In Anal. pr. 134, 4–137, 3 288 137, 4–138, 13 288 In Cat. 117, 22–24 51 118, 20–24 51 119, 20 206 123, 2–3 69 244, 29 207 In Porph. 28, 4 204 36, 20–24 10 37, 13–38, 15 252 42, 13–43, 31 283 45, 3–11 284 47, 12–14 292 48, 27 296

Eusebius Caesariensis PE III 9, 3–5 31 IV 7, 1 167 Fronto De eloquentia 4, 1–5 129 Galenus Adv. Lyc. 3, 7 129 De differentia pulsuum 8, 579, 13–17 133 Nat. Fac. 35, 6 133 Hermias Alexandrinus In Phdr. 67, 14–17 207 f. Hippolytus Haer. 1.1 235 Homerus Il. 2, 204 250 Od. 10, 302 ff.

205–206

Index locorum

320

Iamblichus Comm. Math. 8, 10–11 254 XX 65, 11–20 XX 65, 13–15 XX 65, 16–20 XX 65, 23–24 Protr. IV 16, IV 18, IV 18, IV 18, IV 19, IV 19, IV 19, IV 20, IV 20, IV 20, IV 21, IV 21, IV 22, IV 22, IV 23, IV 23, VP § 161

In Phd. 4 § 7–8 209 6 § 2 205 253 255 55 254

11–18 48 1–5 52 12–13 53 26–19, 2 49 8–11 49 13–14 51 14–20, 4 51 2–4 51 12–13 52 18–19 49 16–25 49 22 55 1–10 52 4–5 52 5–22 52 8–9 56

52

Marinus Procl. 22 132 Michael Ephesius In Parv. nat. 8, 22 ff. 189 12, 12 ff. 189 12, 16–22 204, 212 12, 18–19 204 Numenius Apamensis Fragmente (Des Places) 52 31 Olympiodorus In Alc. 12, 10–11 207 In Gorg. 25, 16–22 208 199, 8–10 249 214, 13–215, 11

133

Philoponus De aet. mundi c. Proclum 29, 2–13 73 31, 10–11 72 32, 8–13 95 De intellectu 3, 57–58 207 13, 1–5 193 13, 6 193 14, 41 207 33, 85 207 39, 12–13 207 40, 39 207 40, 42 207 61, 65–63, 36 212 61, 71–82 212 61, 73 193 61, 75 204 61, 77–81 195 61, 77–82 194 61, 82 204 61, 83 204 61, 84 204 61, 85–62, 87 205 62, 3–4 204 62, 12 212 62, 91 212 62, 93 212 62, 94–96 193 63, 15 212 63, 17 212 63, 18–19 211 63, 19 212 63, 20 210 63, 25–28 195 64, 51–65, 57 257 86, 33–87, 44 257 97, 8–15 262 97, 16–22 186 97, 16–98, 27 196 97, 24–98, 28 197 98, 28–36 262 98, 36–43 262 98, 40–42 268 104, 98–100 197 106, 28 193 114, 28–38 200 115, 58–60 200

Index locorum 115, 116, 116, 116, 116, 116, 116, 116, 116, 116, 117, 118, 118, 118, 118, 119, 119, 119, 119,

59–116, 65 66 212 66–88 212, 66–70 207 69 212 72 212 75–80 207 76 212 77 207 84–85 208 89–99 199 20–119, 57 23 212 33 201 38 212 42–49 203, 43 204 47–49 204 56 212

202 215

212, 216

212

In Anal. post. 3, 23–24 261 8, 25–26 217 24, 22–24 261 29, 1–14 261 34, 10–11 261 34, 15–16 217 82, 19–83, 21 56 128, 28–29 217 156, 9 204 214, 21–31 209 214, 25 208 214, 27 209 243, 9–13 73 315, 31–32 261 435, 12–35 262 In Anal. pr. 1, 10–4, 12 258 1, 15 259 1, 15–2, 2 262 1, 16–18 258 1, 18–4, 4 258 1, 19–20 259 1, 20–2, 13 259 1, 21 261 2, 1 259 2, 2–3 259 2, 5 259 2, 6–7 259 2, 11 259 2, 14–17 256 2, 16 257 2, 24–27 261

321

2, 28–31 262 2, 33–35 262 3, 14–18 262 3, 21–27 263 4, 4–9 258 4, 4–12 259 9, 18–19 266 36, 19–37, 2 269 40, 27–35 269 40, 35–42, 34 269 69, 35–71, 17 269 280, 20–24 56 307, 5–8 255 307, 8–9 255 307, 9–25 255 307, 18–20 255 307, 33–34 255 In Cat. 5, 18–23 5, 35–36

51 250

In De an. 2, 29–3, 5 206 3, 5–11 264 4, 16–19 263 4, 32–5, 4 208 5, 34–6, 8 263 5, 38–6, 4 193 11, 9–10 193 45, 20–21 190 45, 22–46, 3 203 45, 25–31 204 45, 31–46, 2 204 45, 32 204 46, 1 204 46, 1–2 190 46, 6 204 58, 12–13 204 86, 13–25 232 86, 26–28 233 86, 28–30 234 86, 33–35 234 110, 29 207 116, 21–117, 10 81 116, 26–28 75 164, 16–24 197 188, 17–18 241 204, 11 207 205, 4 207 490, 22–23 193 497, 14–16 190 506, 23–25 193 523, 29 193

Index locorum

322

542, 542, 542, 551, 551, 559, 561, 563, 568, 569, 572, 584,

2–3 193 7–13 195 9–12 206 25–26 193 26 204 26–30 198 23–31 198 11–22 200 13–25 200 30–570, 5 200 20 193 17–18 193

In Nicom. Ar. 32, 13 204 In Phys. 162, 25–26

204

Plato Apol. 29 D–30 E

128

Crat. 421 A–422 E 21 424 D 1–4 26 427 C–D 21 Epist. II 314 A 2–5

81

Euthyphr. 5 A 128 Gorg. 486 D–488 B La. 186 A

128

128

Parm. 132 A–B 294 135 B 5–C 3 252 Phd. 66 D 3 205 66 D 4 205 66 D–E 205 67 B 11 95 73 D 5–6 209 82 C 2–3 205 99 A 4–B 6 203 102 B 1–3 26 102 B 2 26

Phdr. 245 D 1–3 110 265 D–266 B 256 Phlb. 16 C 7–8

91

Pol. 269 D–E 116 272 E–273 E 120 Resp. IV 438 A 304 VI 510 C–511 C 187 VI 511 B–C 247 VIII 546 A 116 Soph. 237 D 268 251 B 5–6 79 253 A–E 26 253 B 9–C 3 26 255 D 304 Tim. 27 D 31 27 D 6–28 A 4 118 28 A–C 102 28 A–29 C 102 28 B 7 103 35 A 293 36 A–B 30 38 B 103, 104, 118 41 A 7–B 6 116 41 A–D 115 47 A 207 48 E ff. 295 50 D 7 18 53 D 4–E 5 121 54 A 1–6 121 Tht. 149 A 128 150 B–151 D 301 191 C ff. 295 Plotinus Enn. I 3 (20) 247 I 3 (20) 4, 12–16 247 I 3 (20) 4, 18–20 247 I 3 (20) 5, 9–12 247 I 3 (20) 5, 11 266 I 4 (46) 10, 13–21 188

Index locorum I 6 (1) 34 II 1 (40) 2 102 III 7 (45) 137 III 7 (45) 1 136, 146 III 7 (45) 1, 1–16 135 III 7 (45) 7 127, 136 III 7 (45) 7, 10–17 135 III 7 (45) 7, 12–15 137 III 7 (45) 7, 13–15 142 III 8 (30) 34 IV 8 (6) 1, 28 36 V 3 (49) 3 32 V 5 (32) 296 V 8 (31) 34 VI 1–3 (42–44) 10, 12, 285 Plutarchus De animae procreatione in Timaeo 1023 E 19 Quaestiones Convivales 616 D 19 Porphyrius Tyrius Fragmente (ed. Smith) 26 36 27 36 28 36 35 36 45–74 13 55 28 56 32 105 14 113 9, 13 120 31 133 14 152 177 236 31 251–255 36 268–271 36 303 167 345, 43–51 31 Testimonien (ed. Smith) 3a–e 10 75 13 167 14 Abst. II 5, 3 14 II 7, 3 14 II 11, 3 14 III 20 14

323

In Cat. 56, 5–13 20 56, 34–58, 20 20 58, 1–5 20 58, 3–15 25 58, 5–6 20 58, 12–14 25 58, 32–36 21 59, 20–29 145 63, 7–9 26 65, 25–28 27 71, 25–72, 29 22 77, 27–36 28 90, 3–11 28 90, 28–91, 7 23 90, 31–91, 1 32 90, 31–91, 7 23 91, 2–5 32 111, 27–29 304 154, 3 ff. 145 In Ptol. Harm. 11, 1–14, 31 24 12, 18–20 35 14, 1–18 33 Intr. 1, 1 283–284 1, 7–8 284 1, 9–14 292 1, 11 293 1, 12–14 292 3, 10–20 27 6, 11–16 18 Plot. 13 129 14 131 14, 10–16 18 296 Sent. 43, 1–13

14

32

Priscianus Lydus In Theophr. 29, 3–6 191 Proclus Dub. 7, 14–20 22, 9–10

261 260

324

In Alc. 10, 3–18 132 21, 5–8 132 281, 5–8 208 In Crat. II 1, 10–2, 4 248 III 2, 5 251 III 2, 5–6 251 III 2, 5–12 252 VII 2, 28–29 267 In Euc. 3, 2–4, 18 263 30, 5 206 43, 10 251 44, 15–19 251 51, 20–52, 4 263 52, 3–53, 5 192 55, 21 206 56, 1–12 192 76, 9–12 261 186, 6–7 192 In Parm. I 650, 10–651, 9 268 IV 839, 21 ff. 295 IV 842, 20–27 296 IV 842, 26 296 IV 957, 11–13 260 IV 957, 13–15 260 V 978, 16–18 261 V 978, 19–25 261 V 980, 14–17 254 V 980, 23–25 254 V 981, 24–29 254 V 982, 9–15 254 V 982, 16–19 252, 263 V 982, 19–23 254, 256 V 982, 26–27 251 In Remp. II 107, 14–23 211 II 107, 17–20 192 II 107, 18–20 191 II 108, 7–10 192 In Tim. I 1, 4–20 105 I 2, 2–8 105 I 2, 30–4, 5 105 I 7, 8–16 106 I 16, 6–12 132 I 217, 18–27 105

Index locorum I 232, 4–14 61 I 237, 18–238, 5 102 I 244, 19–22 191 I 244, 19–24 263 I 248, 7–22 262 I 249, 2–3 262 I 249, 4–5 263 I 266, 28–268, 23 63 I 276, 19–30 103 I 277, 8–13 103 I 279, 30–280, 20 103 I 281, 14–20 103 I 282, 13–22 104 I 285, 30–286, 3 103 I 286, 20–289, 5 104 I 290, 17–25 103 I 293, 6–9 106 I 293, 14–20 104 I 294, 8–28 104 I 294, 29–295, 1 104 I 295, 13–18 105 I 295, 19–296, 12 105 I 350, 8–20 264 I 352, 11–19 260 I 352, 19–32 261 I 352, 31 261 I 394, 16–19 31 I 395, 18–396, 8 31, 33 III 158, 6–10 192 III 286, 24–29 263 Prov. 27 262 64, 1–3 260 64, 6–7 260 64, 6–11 261 Theol. Plat. I 10, 45, 19–22

261

Psellus Op. psych. theol. daem. 36, 30–33 203 Ps.-Simplicius (= Prisc. Lyd.) In De an. 1, 18–20 242 16, 25 204 17, 2 190 17, 4–5 193 17, 13 210 18, 23–28 210 27, 19–21 190, 193

Index locorum 32, 16–17 231 45, 37–46, 1 210 45, 38 204 60, 26–28 210 77, 33–34 210 102, 13–20 191 109, 4 193 200, 7–9 191 202, 8 190, 193 206, 5–7 191 213, 37–214, 2 210 220, 38 190, 193 220, 38–39 191 221, 13 190, 193 238, 23–24 193 242, 2–243, 6 193 243, 38–244, 1 193 247, 27–39 193 248, 7–8 189 248, 11–17 195 261, 2 193 267, 11–13 197 268, 14–17 197 273, 26–30 197 274, 19–21 191 283, 19–29 200 283, 24–26 204 284, 2–4 199 284, 5 204 285, 38 204 286, 27–31 190 296, 3 ff. 193 296, 3–11 190 296, 5–6 191 306, 23 204 309, 31 204 320, 13 204 321, 19 204 Ptolemaeus Harm. 4, 22–5, 16

178

Quintilianus Inst. pr. 9–10 129 Seneca ep. 90, 5 131 108, 23 131

Sextus Empiricus M. I 143, 4 21 IX 241–242 21 Simplicius In Cat. 1, 1–2, 9 11 1, 1–2, 26 139 1, 1–3, 20 165 1, 3–7 166 1, 8 ff. 175 2, 6 12 2, 6–8 166 2, 9 ff. 166 2, 9–15 10 2, 25–29 10 2, 26 139 3, 2 166 3, 2–4 175 3, 2–9 127, 133 3, 4–11 147 3, 6 147 3, 10–13 165 3, 13–17 133 6, 19–26 146, 149 7, 23–26 85 7, 23–29 127, 147, 148 7, 23–32 134, 139, 168, 302 7, 25–26 173 7, 30–32 167 7, 33–8, 2 95 8, 14 206 8, 15 175 9, 5–10, 6 139 9, 5–11, 1 175 10, 17–19 24 11, 30–13, 15 140 12, 10–13, 4 128, 134 12, 13–13, 4 141 16, 1 ff. 165 17, 3 165 18, 25–26 175 29, 30 178 30, 3 165 34, 24–25 178 40, 6 21 48, 1–49, 9 28 53, 4–9 23 58, 28 165 61, 19–62, 6 10 73, 35–74, 3 147 74, 4 142 74, 4 ff. 148

325

326

74, 4–17 143 82, 2–6 143 82, 15–20 142 88, 25–27 169 99, 4–9 10 106, 28–107, 4 176 130, 8–19 10 152, 13 176 158, 27–33 30 159, 9–22 304 159, 10–14 142 187, 7 21 192, 25 177 199, 17 305 199, 17–35 306 199, 17–200, 3 306 228, 1–3 169 300, 31–301, 5 144 303, 30 147 379, 14–20 144 435, 24 175 438, 33–36 92, 127, 133 438, 35–36 147 In De cael. 1, 1–3 175 3, 16–27 106 5, 35–6, 7 107 21, 32–38, 5 109 25, 29 169 29, 36 165 41, 27–32 122 42, 17–49, 25 109 55, 25–59, 23 109 61, 6 165 66, 4–91, 20 109 69, 11–15 122 80, 24–81, 3 108 84, 11–15 108 85, 31–86, 28 108 86, 3–4 109 91, 6 165 91, 7–20 108 92, 27–32 110 92, 33–34 110 92, 34–93, 5 110 93, 9 111 93, 11–15 110 94, 1–2 111 94, 12 111 94, 20–22 111 95, 6–9 112 95, 10 111 95, 17 112

Index locorum 95, 21 112 95, 24–26 112 95, 24–96, 12 112 96, 12–20 113 96, 25–102, 31 113 102, 15–16 113 103, 5–6 113 103, 18–21 113 103, 28–104, 2 113 104, 5–8 118 104, 22–28 117 105, 6–25 118 105, 32–106, 6 115 106, 6–25 115 106, 9–14 116 106, 25–107, 6 117 107, 19–24 118 107, 20–24 159 131, 1 91 139, 25–140, 9 79 140, 9–12 116 140, 9–19 80 140, 12–16 116 143, 9–14 116 143, 15–17 119 143, 20–21 120 143, 29–31 164 168, 18 175 169, 27–30 164 171, 6 165 271, 11–27 296 296, 6–8 123 296, 6–9 86 296, 6–12 114 296, 8–9 114 296, 26–297, 9 93 297, 1–7 114 297, 1–298, 25 119 297, 7–9 176 300, 15–20 116 301, 8–12 114 301, 19–21 177 303, 19–24 120 305, 14–20 119 305, 25–33 120 306, 9–25 120 306, 25–307, 11 120 351, 1–3 116 351, 18–20 115 351, 20–352, 2 115 352, 27–29 114 353, 1–3 116 353, 3–10 117 360, 23 117

Index locorum 360, 361, 368, 369, 377, 377, 377, 377, 378, 399, 518, 518, 521, 530, 551, 557, 557, 559, 563, 565, 576, 636, 640, 640, 640, 640, 641, 712,

29–32 120 2–7 117 19–26 118 27–32 117 20–27 114 20–33 123 20–34 85, 114 26 78 21–22 176 1 165 20–21 91 21–30 114 26 178 16 175 2–4 107 1–21 77 21–559, 27 77 27–560, 1 77 26–564, 3 114 26–566, 20 120 3–4 120 1–672, 23 101 20–31 94 24–26 72 27–32 123 27–641, 5 114 21–25 120 31–731, 7 114

In Epict. pr. 87–90 128, 132 194, 57–60 127 In Phys. 1, 1–3 175 3, 13 ff. 175 4 161 6, 31–7, 19 159 6, 31–8, 15 159 7, 3 170 7, 6–15 166 7, 19–8, 15 159 8, 12–13 91 9, 10–27 21 10, 25–11, 15 21 21, 15–20 81 28, 33–34 178 28, 34–29, 5 178 29, 14 178 36, 8–14 89 36, 25–37, 7 82 36, 30 170 44, 28 178 60, 7 174

60, 8 175 74, 15–18 82 74, 17–18 78 80, 15–16 176 80, 15–17 164 92, 26 177 106, 27–107, 11 33 106, 27–107, 25 33 111, 15–17 170 120, 1–12 90 134, 14–18 18 135, 1–14 31 135, 3–4 31 136, 33–137, 7 18 142, 19–27 89 144, 25–28 175 148, 11–13 82 151, 8–11 89 151, 12–14 88 151, 23–24 177 207, 7 178 227, 25 89 230, 34–231, 2 88 233, 2–3 164 259, 3 ff. 170 270, 22–23 177 273, 15 178 302, 22 165 308, 12 178 329, 19 178 332, 20 175 333, 2–5 89 356, 34 89 374, 32 178 377, 25–26 179 393, 12–13 170 393, 13 175 394, 3–5 170 399, 33 178 406, 28 177 407, 4 177 414, 16–19 169 414, 19 178 422, 20 178 422, 22 177 423, 14 178 423, 21 178 427, 34 178 436, 13 178 436, 19 178 436, 19–20 169 436, 20 170 436, 36 170 443, 10–11 170

327

328

450, 31–33 169 459, 5–6 170 459, 25–28 170 461, 15 175 472, 8 178 481, 28–34 169 495, 8 178 521, 5 165 526, 16–18 169 563, 29 178 639, 12–14 89 639, 23 174 640, 12–18 89, 127, 138, 139, 150 640, 13 79 642, 18 174 693, 10–29 171 693, 26–28 172 702, 19 174 718, 13 177 728, 10–11 178 748, 21 170 767, 20 174 786, 11 174 787, 4 174 787, 11 174 787, 27 174 790, 30–31 87 792, 20 174 793, 22–23 174 795, 3 174 795, 5–6 174 795, 11–13 174 795, 16 174 821, 27–32 78 845, 4 178 876, 22 178 946, 24–26 164 1057, 6 178 1155, 8–1156, 3 74 1206, 27 165 1214, 34 178 1317, 6 179 1318, 10–15 134 1326, 39 175 1328, 11 175 1360, 24–1363, 24 296 Sophonias In De an. 67, 17 207 69, 19 207 120, 9–15 206 132, 31 207

Index locorum 134, 134, 135, 135, 135, 137,

20 207 33–37 212 16 207 19 207 20 207 27–30 212

Stobaeus III 85, 7–87, 13 III 86, 8 50

50

Stoiker Fragmente (ed. Long-Sedley) 26H 142 30A 294 30D 294 32F 129 32G 129 Strato Fragmente (ed. Sharples) 30A 171 Syrianus In Met. 3, 10–17 54 3, 21–24 54 3, 24–30 54 3, 30–32 55 4, 5–11 58 4, 26–27 55 4, 26–29 55 4, 29–34 57 4, 34–36 59 4, 34–5, 7 58 4, 37 58 5, 12–14 59 5, 27–6, 1 59 6, 1–3 59 6, 28–34 59 11, 9–11 61 11, 11–13 63 11, 13–28 62 18, 7–17 58 21, 5 58 21, 14 58 21, 24 58 21, 30–38 58 22, 23–25 55 30, 6–12 61 30, 12–13 62 32, 3–15 62 32, 15–37 62

Index locorum 36, 29–35 62 37, 3–9 62 37, 28–30 55 45, 29–31 61 55, 3–6 60 55, 7–13 61 55, 38–56, 2 55 56, 2–4 55 58, 12–19 54 58, 35–38 59 60, 20–26 60 62, 32–63, 3 56 63, 10 59 65, 15–19 60 80, 4–16 71 80, 16–27 87 81, 3–5 89 81, 6 71 81, 26–30 70 91, 35 204 110, 32–33 191 171, 9–13 76 195, 2–9 70 195, 10–19 92 195, 18 71 Thales Fragmente (ed. Diels/Kranz) 11 A 22 228 Testimonien (ed. Wöhrle) 29 237 31 228

32 237, 238 121 235 149 235 207 235 210 235 237 235, 236 301 229 340 235 422 228, 229 423 230 424 238 434–453 243 442 228, 231 443 239 564 235 Themistius In De an. 101, 7–9 191 107, 6–8 191 107, 18–19 191 107, 19–20 191 108, 29–30 191 Thomas Aquinas Summa theologiae I q. 13 a. 2–5 59 Vitruvius De arch. 7, 5–7 129

329

Index rerum Abstieg der Seele 128, 141, 277 Abstraktion 35, 133, 198 f., 208, 264, 293 ähnlich/unähnlich (siehe „Wesenseigenschaften des Seienden“) Aktualität, Aktualisierung, aktual 112, 121 f., 186, 190, 200, 207, 209, 299 Akzidenz, akzidentell 22, 26, 28 f., 49, 55, 59, 90, 136–138, 202, 284 Alexandrinische Schule 69, 95, 166, 192, 249 (das) All 105, 108, 110, 117, 119, 135, 207, 227, 235, 238–240 Allgemeines/Einzelnes (siehe auch ,Universalien‘) 55 f., 58, 253 f., 256 f., 261–263, 269, 294 Alltagssprache (siehe ,Sprache‘) Ammoniosschule 75, 280, 282, 285 Analogie 147 Analyse, Analytik, analytisch 52, 54–57, 63, 114, 144, 163, 247, 251–258, 270 Anamnesislehre (siehe auch ,Erinnerung‘) 144, 208, 297 Antike (siehe auch ,Spätantike‘) 9, 12, 127, 135, 163, 165 apagogisch 269 Apodeiktik, Apodeixis, apodeiktisch 51 f., 55 f., 58 f., 63, 253–255, 258, 261, 263 f., 268–270 Aporie, aporetisch 6, 12, 62, 129, 136, 140, 146–150, 164 arabisch 10, 13, 46 Arten 11, 18, 20–22, 25 f., 28 f., 49, 57, 62, 145, 253 f., 256, 284, 292–295, 297–300; (A. der Prädikation) 18, 21 f., 29, 57, 145; (A. des Seienden) 11, 20, 25 f., 28, 49 Artikulation (διάρθρωσις) 138, 144, 148 Astronomie 257, 264 Athener Schule 53, 72, 129, 249 f., 277 Atom 232 f. Aufstieg 49, 52 f., 55 f., 58, 63, 146 f., 194 Ausdruck (siehe ,Wort, Wörter‘) Bedeutung (eines Ausdrucks/Texts) 26, 70, 74 f., 77–81, 83 f., 86, 90 f., 104, 106, 109 f., 112–115, 120–122, 131, 133, 136, 143, 146 f., 161, 167, 177, 201, 210, 240, 257, 284, 297, 299, 302; (gewöhnliche B.)

75, 110, 114, 122; (scheinbare B.) 74–80, 84, 86, 114; (wirkliche B.) 70, 83, 90 f., 167 begrenzt/unbegrenzt 88, 103–105, 112, 116, 250 Begriffe (siehe auch ,Gedanken‘) 17, 19 f., 24 f., 32–35, 37, 58, 73, 78, 82, 95, 119, 127–129, 134–150, 166, 257, 261, 265, 267, 292–294; (gemeinsame B.) 58, 127, 136–138, 144, 261; (Vor-B.) 137, 144–146, 150 Begriffsbildung 24 f., 37, 136, 194, 290 beschränkt/unbeschränkt 250 Bewegung/Ruhe 59, 78, 84, 101 f., 105–107, 112, 117, 143, 206, 210 f., 227–234, 259, 299 Beweis 7, 57–60, 133 f., 149, 248, 251–257, 259, 261–263, 267–270 Christen, Christentum, christlich 88, 113, 225, 250, 278 Curriculum 25, 72, 84, 94, 123, 131, 145, 247 f., 253, 266 f., 269, 281 Definition 7, 17, 26, 71, 142, 144 f., 251– 257, 261, 264, 268, 270 Demiurg 102, 115–121, 206–209, 250, 296 f. Denken (siehe auch ,Intellekt‘) 6, 32, 55, 58, 140, 185–211, 251 f., 257 f., 260–262, 264, 268, 270, 298; (diskursives D.) 197, 252, 257 f., 260, 262, 268, 270; (göttliches/ menschliches D.) 196 f., 202, 261, 298; (praktisches/theoretisches D.) 186, 196– 199, 202, 262 Dialektik, Dialektiker, dialektisch 7, 26, 48, 51 f., 55 f., 63, 128, 137 f., 142 f., 145, 176, 247 f., 251–259, 262–270; (dial. Methoden) 251–258, 263, 270; (platonische Dial.) 7, 48, 52, 247 f., 253 f., 265–270; (proklische Dial.) 251, 263, 265 dianoetisch (siehe auch ,diskursiv‘) 58, 60, 197, 259 didaktisch 12, 14, 113, 170, 241 f., 250 Dihairese, Dihairetik, dihairetisch 7, 18, 26, 28, 52, 54 f., 247 f., 251, 253–260, 264, 267–270, 294 f.

332

Index rerum

diskursiv (siehe auch ,dianoetisch‘) 197, 252, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 268, 270 Dyade 62; (unbegrenzte D. als Prinzip aller Dinge) 88

200 f., 205, 264, 267 f., 293; (F. und Vorstellung) 194, 197, 199 früher/später 105, 114, 134, 139, 143, 166, 188

Eines/Vieles 52, 59–62, 64, 74, 88, 104 f., 110 f., 122, 250–252, 254, 256, 267 f., 270, 299; (E. als Eines / ἓν ᾗ ἕν) 59; (höchstes E.) 52; (das E. als Prinzip aller Dinge) 111; (pythagoreische Lehre vom E.) 59; (E. als Seinsattribut) 299; (das überseiende E.) 59, 64, 74; (das V. als Gegensatz des E.) 60, 74 Einfaches/Zusammengesetztes 253 f., 256 f. Elemente 21, 107, 114, 237 Ekthesis 269 ἔνδοξα, endoxisch 6, 149 Epikureer, epikureisch 88, 136 f., 143 Epistemologie, epistemologisch 19, 290 f., 297 ἐπιστροφή 258 Erfahrung 137, 142, 149, 168, 262 Erinnerung 141, 189, 194, 208, 262 Erkenntnis 50, 52, 54, 58, 258–264, 284, 297 (E.-Inhalt, -Objekt 258, 260 f., 297 f.); (E.-Subjekt) 258–260; (E.-Vermögen) 261–263, 284 Erste Philosophie 46, 49 f., 54 Essenz, essenziell 17, 22 f., 26–30, 78, 103– 105, 112, 121, 136, 138, 186, 196, 199, 201, 207, 209, 211 Ethik 15, 71 f. Ewigkeit 79, 101–105, 111 f., 118, 121, 135 f., 235, 297 Exegese, exegetisch 2–7, 10–19, 27, 76, 88, 94 f., 102, 109, 114 f., 131, 133, 148, 159– 180, 226 f., 234, 239, 241–244, 260, 284, 286, 293, 295 f.; (Meta-E.) 6 Exeget (siehe ‚Kommentator’)

Gattung/Differenzen 20, 23, 25, 27 f., 52, 55, 62, 139 f., 142, 145, 253–256, 284 f., 291–295, 298–300; (höchste/oberste G.) 52, 145, 299 Gattungsaporie 48, 62, 63 Gedanken (siehe auch ,Begriffe‘) 2 f., 6, 17, 19 f., 24 f., 32–35, 37, 58, 73, 78, 82, 95, 113, 119, 127–129, 131, 134–150, 164, 166 f., 178, 187 f., 192, 195, 197, 201, 257, 261, 265, 267, 290–295; (G. als Affektionen der Seele) 192; (einfache G.) 24, 139, 201, 204–207, 209, 211, 257; (göttliche G.) 32, 35, 296; (menschliche G.) 25, 35; (primäre G.) 201 Geist (siehe auch ,Intellekt‘) 54, 58, 61, 235, 251 f., 257–259, 261–264, 270 Geometrie, geometrisch 114, 119, 192, 201, 204, 207, 256, 264 Gleichheit/Verschiedenheit 75, 299 Gott, Götter, göttlich 31–35, 46, 49, 51, 64, 70 f., 79, 84 f., 87, 91 f., 105, 110, 115, 117, 122, 133, 147, 167, 174, 195, 206– 208, 227, 235, 238–241, 243, 260 f., 264, 296–298 Gottesschau 49 Grammatik, Grammatiker 169, 256 (das) Gute, gut 52, 72, 84, 88, 95, 103, 106, 117, 121, 127, 131 f., 142 f., 146–148, 196, 198, 202, 211, 238, 248, 250, 284, 286, 296, 300 f., 303–305

Feuer 28, 232 f. Form (siehe auch ,Idee‘) 16–18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 31–35, 69, 71–73, 75 f., 107, 120, 194– 211, 258, 261, 263 f., 267 f., 293; (abstrahierte F.) 199 f., 264; (F. als Modell/ παράδειγμα) 22, 208 f.; (F. als λόγος) 31–35; (immanente F.) 22, 33–35, 261; (intelligible F.) 20, 206, 211; (mathematische F.) 263 f.; (Platons Lehre von den F.en) 69, 72 f.; (separate F.) 200–202, 204, 208, 210; (sinnlich wahrnehmbare F.) 195, 198, 200, 258; (transzendente F.) 20, 22; (F. und Materie) 17 f., 24, 31–35, 71, 107, 120,

Harmonie, Harmonisierung, harmonisieren 4, 6 f., 69, 71–73, 75, 86, 101 f., 106, 108 f., 110, 115–117, 119, 121 f., 138 f., 148, 165, 170, 178, 188, 209, 265, 290–292, 297 f., 300, 303 f., 306 f. Hellenismus, hellenistisch 51, 142, 148, 241 f.; (post-h.) 148 Hermeneutik, hermeneutisch 69, 102, 108, 160–162, 173 f., 178, 225, 237, 243 ἕξις 198 f. Himmel 74, 79, 101–105, 107, 109–114, 116–118, 121, 277; (H. entstanden) 74, 79, 103, 110 f., 113 f., 116; (H. ewig) 79, 102, 104, 105, 107, 109, 121; (H. nicht entstanden) 102, 109, 110, 113, 118; (H. unzerstörbar) 109; (H. zugrundegehend) 79, 116, 118 Hylemorphismus 120

Index rerum ὑπομνήματα

160, 170, 175

Idee (siehe auch ,Form‘) 24, 52, 54, 61, 72, 199, 247, 251 f., 257 f., 261, 264, 267 f., 270, 294, 296 f., 301 Idee des Guten 52, 301 Idee des Seins 61 Ideengemeinschaft 252 Ideenlehre 84, 291, 295, 297 f., 301 identisch/verschieden (siehe ‚Wesenseigenschaften des Seienden’) Ideologie 165, 180 Induktion 293 Intellekt (siehe auch ,Denken‘ und ,Geist‘) 32–34, 53, 78, 105, 140, 146 f., 168, 186– 212; 235 f.; (aktiver I.) 53, 78, 188, 193– 196, 198 f., 210–212; (demiurgischer I.) 105; (göttlicher I.) 33 f.; (materieller I.) 193 f.; (passiver I.) 190–194, 211; (praktischer I.) 196, 198 f.; (I. sterblich) 186; (theoretischer I.) 198; (I. unzerstörbar) 187; (vorstellender I.) 211 f. intelligent design 101 intelligibel 6, 17, 20, 29, 34 f., 58, 74–77, 82, 112, 118, 136 f., 140–143, 146 f., 198–202, 206, 209, 211, 258, 261, 263, 285 Interpretation (siehe auch ,Oberflächlichkeit (des Verstehens)‘) 3, 6 f., 9–11, 13–16, 19 f., 22, 25, 36, 50, 56, 60, 72 f., 78, 80– 86, 90–94, 101, 103, 114, 119 f., 123, 128, 130–132, 134, 137, 139, 144, 146, 148, 160 f., 163, 165, 167–170, 175, 177, 180, 185 f., 190, 192 f., 196, 198 f., 201, 204 f., 227, 231, 236, 240, 249–251, 258, 264, 269 f., 285, 290, 297; (buchstäbliche I.) 114, 120; (ontologische I.) 11, 56; (Prinzip der wohlwollenden I.) 167 f.; (semantische I.) 14, 20 Kaiserzeit 50, 129–131, 225 Kategorien 19 f., 30, 57, 122, 140, 143 f., 248, 285–288, 304 Kategorienlehre 10, 12 Kausalität 5, 103, 105 f., 108, 110, 122, 207 Kausalprinzip 71, 105 Klugheit (φρόνησις) 51 Kommentator (ἐξηγητής) 1–7, 10, 12, 15 f., 28, 69, 73, 76, 80, 85, 88, 91–93, 101, 114, 127 f., 130 f., 134, 139, 147–149, 159 f., 162–169, 172–180, 186–194, 199, 201 f., 205, 225 f., 229 f., 234, 236 f., 241–243, 248–250, 265, 267, 269, 286, 291, 298, 300–305; (Aristoteles-K.) 10, 147, 160,

333

163–165, 168, 176, 180, 248, 303; (guter K.) 131, 134, 147 f., 286, 300 f., 303–305; (guter Lehrer als K.) 127; (peripatetischer K.) 15; (Platon-/platonischer K.) 165, 298; (spätantiker K.) 186 f.; (würdiger K.) 85, 168, 302 Komplementaristen, komplementaristisch 6, 72, 76 90, 257 Konkordisten, konkordistisch 6, 71, 73, 76, 85, 88–90 Kontemplation (θεωρία) 150, 196 f., 205 f., 210 f.; (K. von Göttlichem) 206 Konversion 122, 263, 269 Konzeptualismus, Konzeptualisten 292, 294 Körper 30, 36, 93, 101 f., 104, 107, 109, 111–114, 116 f., 171 f., 186–188, 191 f., 195–197, 199, 201 f., 205 f., 210 f., 229– 231, 237, 239 f., 258, 284, 292 f. körperlich/unkörperlich 35 f., 103–105, 112 f., 116, 120, 171, 209, 211, 228–231, 237, 240 f., 243, 250, 260 f., 292, 294 f. Kosmologie, kosmologisch 101 f., 106, 110, 119, 122 Kosmos 26, 31, 33–35, 53, 71, 74, 78–80, 93, 101–109, 113–122, 131 f., 207 f., 235, 239, 243, 284, 293; (K. entstanden/ unentstanden) 34 f., 74, 79 f., 93, 101–108, 115 f., 118, 120 f.; (Ewigkeit des K.) 79, 101–105, 109; (numerische Einheit des K.) 105, 122; (Ordnung des K.) 35, 119, 120, 208; (K. vergänglich/unvergänglich) 104, 106, 115, 117 f.; (Ursprung des K.) 103, 106; (Zeitlichkeit des K.) 80, 93, 103 Lebewesen 191, 197, 240, 255, 297, 305; (allgemeines L. / τὸ καθόλου ζῷον) 297 Leere 171 f. Leser 70–72, 78, 81 f., 84–88, 92, 94 f., 101, 108, 113 f., 118 f., 131 f., 164, 173, 188, 278, 283; (oberflächlichere / ἐπιπολαιότεροι L.) 78, 114; (einfältige L.) 82, 84, 86 f. λέξις 104, 146, 167, 169 f., 178, 285 Liebe/Streit 75, 141, 191 Liniengleichnis 58, 247, 263 f. Logik, logisch 7, 14–17, 19, 25, 51, 56, 71 f., 105, 119, 121, 129, 139 f., 166, 177, 237, 247–253, 257 f., 260 f., 263–270, 287 f.; (alexandrinische L.) 250, 261, 270; (angewandte L.) 270; (aristotelische L.) 15– 17, 25, 56, 71, 247 f., 267; (aristotelische L. als Vorbereitung auf platonische Philosophie) 17; (dihairetische L.) 268; (Einteilung der L.) 252; (formale L.) 247, 250, 266–

334

Index rerum

270; (L. als Organon der Philosophie) 7, 250 f., 253, 265 f., 287 f.; (platonische L.) 247, 266; (stoische L.) 265, 267; (L. als Teil der Philosophie) 7, 51, 250 f., 253, 265– 267, 287; (L. als Wissenschaft vom Denken) 264, 270 Luft 171 f., 232 f. magis amica veritas 301 Magnetstein 229 f., 236, 243 Manuskript 160, 166, 171, 178 f., 180 Materialismus, Materialist 231, 237 Materie (ὕλη) 5, 17–19, 24 f., 29–37, 74, 101, 107, 120, 164, 190, 200 f., 203, 264, 266–268, 292 f., 305; (erste M.) 30 materiell/immateriell 24, 34, 71, 106, 137, 193 f., 200, 260 f., 263 f., 268 Mathematik, Mathematiker, mathematisch 54 f., 58, 69, 114, 119, 199–202, 204, 206, 208, 211, 248, 263 f. Medizin 257, 284 Meinung (δόξα) 259, 262, 264 Mensch, Menschlichkeit, menschlich 24 f., 32, 34 f., 49, 51, 54, 78, 82, 141, 146, 148, 185 f., 191, 194, 196, 202, 207, 243, 255, 261, 278, 284, 294, 297 f. Metaphysiker, Metaphysik, metaphysisch 5, 10, 16, 19, 21, 25, 45–48, 51–54, 58, 60– 64, 71, 88, 109, 122, 133, 138, 166, 204, 249, 250, 257 f., 264 Methexislehre 295 Mittelalter 10, 46, 59, 185 f., 292 Mittelplatonismus 31, 290, 296 (der) Möglichkeit (nach) (siehe auch ,Potentialität/potentiell‘ und ,Vermögen‘) 293, 299 Monismus 76 f., 80 (Eigen-)Namen (ὀνόματα) 20–22, 25 f., 35, 140, 144 Naturphilosophie, Naturphilosoph 21, 102, 108, 123, 249 Naturwissenschaft (φυσική) 21, 54, 105, 199, 291 νεώτεροι/παλαιοί 87–91, 138, 173, 176 Neuplatoniker 45, 53, 63, 69, 83, 132, 134, 144, 149, 210, 247, 277, 279, 286, 290– 292; (Athener N.) 53, 277 Neuplatonismus, neuplatonisch 1, 4, 19, 45, 47 f., 52–54, 56, 64, 69, 109, 123, 132, 160, 226, 247, 250 f., 253, 258, 260, 266– 269, 277–281, 284, 286, 290–292, 298, 305 f.; (athenischer N.) 250; (n. Curri-

culum) 123, 247, 253, 266 f., 281; (n. Lektürekanon) 286; (Prinzipienlehre des N.) 45 νοερὰ θεωρία 285 noetisch (siehe auch ,intelligibel‘) 52, 60, 140, 141, 143 Notwendigkeit, notwendig 202, 236, 284 nützlich (χρήσιμον) 253, 284 Oberflächlichkeit (des Verstehens) 7, 74, 77– 79, 81 f., 85 f., 94, 114 f., 119 f., 123, 138 Ontologie, ontologisch 6, 11, 15, 20, 27, 29, 34, 45–47, 50, 52 f., 56, 60, 62–64, 120, 138–140, 260, 291 f., 295, 298 f., 305, 307 Ordnung/Unordnung 30 f., 101, 107, 112, 119, 120 f., 208 f., 252, 254, 264, 286 Pädagoge, Pädagogik, pädagogisch 6, 75, 82–84, 108, 127 f., 134, 147, 150, 165, 173, 180 Panpsychismus 243 Peripatetiker, Peripatos, peripatetisch 11 f., 14 f., 17, 20, 36, 84, 89, 145, 161, 171, 199 f., 265–267, 286, 292, 296, 299 f., 304 Phantasma 185–187, 190, 196–199, 201 f., 204 Philologe, Philologie, philologisch 130 f., 161 f., 166, 177, 179 Philosophie, philosophisch 1–7, 10, 12–17, 19, 24 f., 28, 34, 36 f., 45 f., 50–52, 54, 59, 62 f., 69–73, 75 f., 79, 82–84, 86–92, 94 f., 101 f., 108, 114, 123, 127–142, 147–150, 159–161, 163, 165 f., 171, 176, 179 f., 185, 194, 203, 205, 207, 211, 225–227, 239, 241–244, 247, 249–251, 253, 255, 258, 264–267, 269, 277–283, 286, 288, 290, 292, 295, 297 f., 301, 303, 307; (antike Ph.) 1 f., 12, 14, 69–71, 82, 87 f., 90, 92, 94 f., 128; (arabische Ph.) 46; (aristotelische Ph.) 10, 14 f., 16, 36, 63, 69, 72, 89, 90, 102, 114, 286, 292; (ph. Curriculum) 25, 72, 84, 131; (dogmatische Ph.) 282; (Einführung in die Ph.) 278–280, 307; (epikureische Ph.) 88; (gesamte Ph.) 10, 52, 54, 139, 166; (Geschichte der Ph.) 1 f., 46, 134, 142, 147 f., 150, 159, 185; (griechische Ph.) 88, 90, 95, 127 f., 147, 161, 165, 171, 180, 225; (kaiserzeitliche Ph.) 50; (Ph. als Philologie) 131; (römische Ph.) 128, 130; (stoische Ph.) 148; (Ph.studium) 83 f., 142, 150, 280; (theoretische/praktische Ph.) 51; (die wahre Ph.) 90 f.; (Ziel der Ph.) 179, 250 physicus/metaphysicus 291

Index rerum Physik 15, 19, 71 f., 248, 250, 256, 264 Platonismus, Platoniker, platonisch 3–7, 9– 17, 19–22, 25, 28, 31, 34–37, 46–48, 50– 53, 55, 63 f., 69, 72, 75, 87–90, 92 f., 102, 114, 131, 133, 136, 148, 163, 166 f., 174, 211, 247 f., 250, 253 f., 256 f., 263–270, 280, 290–293, 295–302, 304 f., 307 Pluralität 32, 78, 80, 88, 110 f., 228 Potentialität, potentiell 121, 190, 193 Prädikabilien 284 Prädikat 23, 26 f., 32, 35, 256 Prädikation 17 f., 21–24, 27, 29, 145; (aristotelische Theorie der P.) 17; (zehn Klassen der P.) 18, 21 πρᾶξις (Unterrichtseinheit) 281–283, 285, 299 Prinzip, Prinzipien 15–17, 21 f., 32, 36, 54– 57, 64, 69, 71, 76, 81, 87–89, 101–103, 105–108, 110 f., 113, 120, 123, 139, 142, 159–163, 166 f., 170 f., 173, 192, 199, 206, 228, 230, 232–234, 237, 243, 247, 249, 252, 254, 261, 264, 267, 299, 303; (aristotelische P.) 17, 22; (Arten von P.) 21; (erste P.) 32, 69, 81, 87, 89, 105, 110 f., 139, 142, 166, 247, 264, 267; (exegetische P.) 76, 160–163, 167, 171; (hermeneutische P.) 161, 163; (höchstes P.) 55, 64, 249, 303; (metaphysische P.) 166; (methodologische P.) 101 f.; (P. der Natur) 105, 107, 159, 166; (P. der Seele) 230; (P. des Seienden) 55, 64, 88, 111, 232–234, 299; (theologische P.) 105; (P. des Werdens) 103 Prinzipienlehre 45, 110, 291 πρόοδος 251, 258 Proprium 284 Psychologie 15, 17, 128, 137, 139 f., 150, 258, 260, 264, 267; (aristotelische Ps.) 15; (epikureische Ps.) 137 Pythagoreer, pythagoreisch 48, 52, 59, 69 f., 75, 81, 87–90, 92, 101, 120, 228, 232 f. Qualität 18–20, 27–32, 35, 113, 120, 140, 199, 293 Quantität 20, 30, 120, 199 Raum 89, 111 f., 114, 138, 161, 178, 235 Realismus 292 Realität (siehe ,Wirklichkeit‘) Reihenfolge der Aristoteles-Schriften 252, 286 Relation 17, 26, 30, 32, 34 f., 37, 57, 118, 122, 137, 194 f., 203, 240 f., 243, 299, 304; (R. zwischen Denken und Vorstellen) 194,

335

203; (R. zwischen Sinnendingen und intelligiblen Dingen) 34 f.; (platonische Definition von R.) 304; (R. zwischen Namen und Dingen) 26, 35; (R. zwischen Seinsarten) 28, 35 Religion, religiös 64, 106, 133, 176 Rhetorik, rhetorisch 90, 109, 134, 173 Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten 261 Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Widerspruch 57, 60 Schluss, schlüssig 13, 23, 52, 56–58, 70, 196, 205, 247, 256, 262 f., 265–269 σχολαί 160, 165, 170, 175 Scholastik, scholastisch 163 (das) Schöne 258 Seele 6 f., 16 f., 30, 33 f., 36, 58, 83, 85, 95, 128, 130, 132, 135 f., 140 f., 150, 185–187, 190 f., 194–201, 205–211, 226–234, 237– 243, 251 f., 258–260, 262–264, 266 f., 277, 284, 292, 295, 301; (Bewegung der S.) 85, 232–234, 266; (S. aus Elementen bestehend) 237; (Fall der S.) 128, 141, 277; (S. gemischte Wesenheit) 292; (S. mit Gott identisch) 239, 241; (S. intelligibel) 17; (S. körperlich) 187; (S.lehre) 17, 226 f., 239 f.; (Selbsterkenntnis der S.) 264; (S. als Teil des Göttlichen) 239, 241; (Teile der S.) 251, 259 f., 264; (S. unkörperlich) 229–231, 237, 243; (Unsterblichkeit der S.) 6, 187, 191, 266 f., 301; (S. als Ursache von Bewegung) 227–230, 232 f.; (S.vermögen) 36, 259 f., 264; (dianoetische S.) 186, 196– 198, 200 f., 211; (S. aus Wasser bestehend) 229 f., 232–234, 237, 243; (Wesen der S.) 264 Seiendes, Sein 5, 11, 18–20, 23, 25 f., 28, 30 f., 35, 45–64, 74, 77–82, 101, 103–105, 108, 110–115, 118 f., 122, 139–141, 145 f., 150, 192, 197, 200, 234, 251, 258, 267 f., 285, 291, 297–299, 303, 305; (Aufstieg zum S.) 49, 56; (Eigentlichkeit des S.) 55; (S. als Eines) 61, 77–82; (ewiges S.) 103 f., 110, 118; (S. als Gattung) 62, 291, 298 f.; (göttliches S.) 46; (Grundstrukturen des S.) 268; (höchstes S.) 46, 61–64; (Idee des S.) 61; (intelligibles S.) 20, 146, 200; (Nicht-S.) 30; (Prinzipien des S.) 55, 64, 111, 299; (das S. selbst Prinzip alles Seienden) 299; (S. schlechthin) 46, 61; (S. qua Seiendes / ὂν ᾗ ὄν) 48–51, 58–61, 63; (,S.‘ bloßes Seinsattribut) 299; (S. unbewegt) 82 Semantik, semantisch 5, 14, 20, 110, 139, 166

336

Index rerum

sensible λόγοι 262, 264 Simultaneität, simultan 34, 110–112, 117, 119, 143, 198 Sinn (siehe ,Bedeutung [eines Ausdrucks/ Texts]‘) Sinnendinge 19 f., 26, 29, 31 f., 34 f., 69, 74, 77, 142 f., 146, 195, 198–200, 202, 205, 209, 211, 258, 293 Sinnenwelt/intelligible Welt 16 f., 20, 34 f., 53, 78, 136 f., 141, 146, 198, 204, 209, 285 Sitz im Leben 127 Skepsis, Skeptiker, skeptisch 282 σκοπός 105–107, 139 f., 142, 166, 174, 253, 286 Sonnengleichnis 52 Spätantike, spätantik 1–4, 7, 15, 45–47, 64, 69, 73, 132, 138, 179, 186 f., 190, 225, 281, 288, 291, 298 Spezifische Differenz (siehe ,Gattung/Differenzen‘) Sprache 17, 21, 24–26, 35, 91, 108, 110, 121–123, 134, 137 f., 140–143, 146, 148, 159, 170, 279, 283, 287 f., 291 f.; (Alltagss.) 110, 114, 121–123, 137 f., 142 f., 146; (archaische S. der Vorsokratiker) 170; (metaphorische S.) 108; (philosophische S.) 91, 292; (Rolle der S. für philosophische Erziehung) 134, 140; (Theorie der S.) 291; (Verhältnis von S. zur Realität) 17, 25, 35, 91 Stoizismus, Stoiker, stoisch 21, 49, 88 f., 127, 129, 131, 136 f., 142, 144, 148, 240–242, 265, 267, 294 sublunar 109, 113, 122, 291 Subsistenz, subsistent 105, 112, 292, 294 Substanz (οὐσία) 10, 15 f., 20, 22–24, 26, 28–30, 36, 54–59, 61 f., 76 f., 143, 195, 292, 299, 304 f.; (denkbare S.) 57; (einfachste S.) 57; (intelligible S.) 143; (S.lehre) 10; (mittlere S.) 57 f.; (partikulare S.) 23; (primäre S.) 20, 23, 305; (S. als Relativum) 304 f.; (sekundäre S.) 23; (S. wahrnehmbarer Dinge) 29, 76 f., 143 Synthese 161, 178, 180, 253, 256–258, 270 Syllogismus, Syllogistik, syllogistisch 7, 17, 56 f., 90, 122, 247–270; (apodeiktischer S.) 253, 258, 261, 263 f., 270; (aristotelische S.) 247, 249, 251, 253 f., 257, 265–268, 270; (dialektischer S.) 258, 262, 264; (einfacher/zusammengesetzter S.) 256 f.; (s. Figuren) 257, 265, 269; (hypothetischer S.) 269; (kategorischer S.) 249, 263, 268 f.; (sophistischer S.) 258 f., 262, 264; (vollkommener/unvollkommener S.) 257, 268 f.

teilbar/unteilbar 250, 263, 292 Theologie, Theologen, theologisch 5, 46, 63, 87, 93, 105 f., 110, 122, 234 f., 237, 243, 248–250, 261, 266–268, 279, 291; (platonische Th.) 46, 106, 248, 267 Tod 115, 186 τόδε τι 23 f. τοιόνδε 23 f., 32 Transzendentalien 59 Transzendenz, transzendent 20, 22, 24, 45, 61 f., 186, 250; (t. Eines/Gutes) 61 f., 250 Triadenlehre 249 Tugend (ἀρετή) 51, 128, 132, 277; (neuplatonisches T.schema) 277 τύχη 284 Unbewegter Beweger 171 f., 229–234, 237, 243, 250, 296 Undeutlichkeit (ἀσάφεια) 81, 170, 286, 300 universalia ante rem/res 294, 296–298 universalia in re/rebus 261, 294 universalia post rem/res 294 Universalien 25, 32, 35, 58, 186, 261, 264, 291–298, 307; (U.streit) 292; (Wissen von U.) 25 Ursache 5, 15, 17, 20–23, 31, 45, 47, 49–52, 55–57, 60, 62–64, 103–122, 138, 159, 170, 199, 203 f., 208 f., 228, 240, 248, 250, 253, 256, 261 f.; (Arten von U.) 21 f.; (Bewegungs-U.) 104, 106, 228; (erste U.) 5, 45, 47, 50–52, 55 f., 60, 106, 110, 204; (externe U.) 103 f., 121; (Form-U.) 31, 106; (göttliche U.) 64, 105, 117, 121 f., 250; (instrumentale U.) 22; (Material-U.) 106; (paradigmatische U.) 22; (U. des Seienden) 23, 45, 47, 49 f., 60, 62, 64; (unbewegte U.) 104, 112, 117, 121 f.; (U./Verursachtes) 64, 253, 256, 261; (U. des Werdens) 103; (Wirk-U.) 62 f., 105 f., 112, 159; (Ziel-U.) 62, 103, 106, 159 Ursprung 103, 106, 250 (Text-)Varianten 167, 169, 178 f. Veränderung 34, 76, 78, 105, 112 f., 120, 169 f., 187 Vereinbarkeit (συμφωνία) 85, 93, 108, 290, 292, 298, 302 f., 307 Vermögen (δύναμις) (siehe auch ,Potentialität/ potentiell‘) 49, 52, 104 f., 112, 116, 122, 127, 171, 173, 186, 192, 194, 196 f., 206, 208, 235, 247, 259–264, 284; (persuasives V.) 173; (unendliches V.) 105, 112 Verstand 248, 257, 259, 261 f., 263 f.

Index rerum Vorsehung 232, 234 f., 237 Vorsokratiker 6, 88, 148, 163, 170 Vorstellung (φαντασία)/vorstellen 6, 185– 211, 259, 261–264; (V. als Form des Denkens) 190–192, 199; (V. als nichtrationales Erkenntnisvermögen) 263; (V. als passiver Intellekt) 191–194 Wahrheit/Falschheit 2 f., 76, 81, 84–91, 105, 108–110, 113–115, 121–123, 127, 133, 135, 137–139, 141, 147 f., 149 f., 177, 179, 194, 205, 208, 211 f., 242, 257, 300 f., 303 f.; (göttliche W.) 85, 115; (kosmologische W.); 110 (theologische W.) 110, 122 Wahrnehmung 23, 32, 36, 78, 117, 137 f., 146–148, 188, 192 f., 196, 198 f., 202, 205, 207–209, 227 f., 240–242, 259, 261–264, 304 Wasser 171 f., 229–234, 237, 243; (W. als Element) 229–231, 237; (W. als Prinzip) 230–234, 237, 243 Weisheit 48–55, 63, 82, 131, 137, 148 Welt (siehe ‚Kosmos‘) Werden 31, 33–35, 74, 76 f., 79, 93, 103– 105, 110, 112 f., 116–118, 120–123, 141, 190, 277; (ewiges W.) 121; (W. von Körpern aus Ebenen) 93; (W. einer zusammengesetzten Realität) 103 Wesenseigenschaften des Seienden 56–61, 299, 305 Wirklichkeit 17, 25, 35, 45, 52, 61, 76 f., 84, 87, 89–92, 102 f., 110–113, 121, 123, 138– 141, 143, 146, 150, 293, 299; (göttliche W.) 87; (höhere W.) 92; (W. des Seins) 77; (wahrnehmbare W.) 76 f., 121; (W. des Werdens) 77; (zweifache W.) 77 Wissen 17, 21, 24–26, 33, 51 f., 76, 90 f., 107, 132, 141, 149, 162, 185–188, 191– 193, 196, 199 f., 202, 204 f., 207–209, 228,

337

262, 284, 297; (Arten des W.) 17, 187; (hypothetisches W.) 52; (W. der Vorstellung) 191; (mathematisches W.) 199, 202; (reines W.) 205; (W. von Sinnendingen) 200, 202; (Theorie des W.) 24, 185; (W. von Universalien) 25; (wissenschaftliches W.) 76, 199 Wissenschaft 45–55, 58–61, 63 f., 74, 212, 225, 251, 256 f., 264 f., 270; (aristotelische Einteilung von W.) 50, 54, 264; (apodeiktische W.) 47, 51; (definierende W.) 52; (dihairetische W.) 52; (W. des Grundes) 251, 265; (metaphysische W.) 45 f., 48, 63; (W. des Seienden/Seins) 45 f., 48–51, 55, 58, 60 f., 63 f. Wort, Wörter 11, 20–26, 32, 35, 104, 109, 114, 122, 136, 138–143, 147, 160, 165, 167, 170, 190; (W. der ersten Benennung) 20; (W. der zweiten Benennung) 20 f.; (bedeutungstragende W.) 22, 25, 35, 139; (zehn Klassen von bedeutungstragenden W.) 22, 25 Wortlaut (λέξις) 11, 20, 24 f., 104, 133, 140 f., 146, 167, 169 f., 174, 178, 180, 285, 288, 292, 301 f. Zahl 69, 75, 105 Zeit, Zeitlichkeit 33 f., 73 f., 78, 80, 93, 101, 103–105, 107, 110–113, 115–119, 121 f., 134–136, 138, 161, 236, 260, 291; (Z. als Zahl der Bewegung) 105; (Ewigkeit der Z.) 112, 118; (Z. mit dem Himmel entstanden) 74; (Z. nicht entstanden) 73 zeitlich/ewig 260 f. Zitat, Zitation 134, 160, 169, 173–175, 178, 279, 283; (Z. der Alten als Beweis angeführt) 134; (Selbst-Z.) 279 (das) Zugrundeliegende (ὑποκείμενον) 22, 29 f., 303 f.