Boethius. On Topical Differences: A commentary edited by Fiorella Magnano (Textes Et Etudes Du Moyen Age) (English and Latin Edition) 9782503579313, 2503579310

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Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales TEXTES ET ÉTUDES DU MOYEN ÂGE, 89

BOETHIUS ON TOPICAL DIFFERENCES

A commentary edited by Fiorella MAGNANO

FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DES INSTITUTS D’ÉTUDES MÉDIÉVALES

Présidents honoraires : L.E. BOYLE (†) (Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana et Commissio Leonina, 1987-1999) L. HOLTZ (Institut de Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes, Paris, 1999-) Président : J. HAMESSE (Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve) Vice-Président : G. DINKOVA BRUUN (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto) Membres du Comité : A. BAUMGARTEN (Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca) P. CAÑIZARES FERRIZ (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) M. HOENEN (Universität Basel) M.J. MUÑOZ JIMÉNEZ (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) R.H. PICH (Pontificia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre) C. VIRCILLO-FRANKLIN (Columbia University, New York) Secrétaire : M. PAVÓN RAMÍREZ (Centro Español de Estudios Eclesiásticos, Roma) Éditeur responsable : A. GÓMEZ RABAL (Institución Milá y Fontanals, CSIC, Barcelona) Coordinateur du Diplôme Européen d’Études Médiévales : G. SPINOSA (Università degli Studi di Cassino)

Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales TEXTES ET ÉTUDES DU MOYEN ÂGE, 89

BOETHIUS ON TOPICAL DIFFERENCES

A commentary edited by Fiorella MAGNANO

Barcelona - Roma 2017

ISBN: 978-2-503-57931-3 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. © 2017 Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales. Largo Giorgio Manganelli, 3 00142 Roma (Italia)

INDEX

Introduction 1. The aim of the De topicis differentiis 2. The title of the De topicis differentiis 3. The partition of the De topicis differentiis 4. The sources 4.1 Boethius’s source for Themistius’s tópos 4.1.1 Aristotle’s Τοπικά 4.1.2 Theophrastus 4.1.3 Themistius’s tópos 4.1.4 The tópos of Aristotle’s Rhetoric 4.2 Boethius’s sources for Cicero’s locus 4.2.1 The loci of Cicero’s De inventione 4.2.2 The loci of Cicero’s Topica 4.2.3 The Aristotelian origin of the Ciceronian locus 5. Boethius’s reconciliation of the Aristotelian-Themistian tópos with the Ciceronian locus 6. The place of the discipline of topica in the division of logic 7. The literary success of the De topicis differentiis CHAPTER ONE THE FIRST BOOK OF THE DE TOPICIS DIFFERENTIIS 1. The preliminary concepts for learning the discipline of topica 1.1 The ratio disserendi: ars inveniendi et ars iudicandi 1.2 The intentio operis 1.3 The propositio o enuntiatio o proloquium 1.3.1 The quality and quantity of the propositions 1.3.2 The form of the propositions 1.3.3 The propositio per se nota 1.4 The quaestio and its species 1.4.1 The thesis 1.4.2 The hypothesis 1.4.3 The material of the quaestio 1.4.4 The form of the quaestio

IX X XIV XVI XVI XVII XVIII XLIII XLV LVII LIX LIX LXIII LXVIII LXX LXXVI XCI

1 1 1 2 6 10 14 22 33 36 47 53 56

INDEX

VI

1.5 1.6

1.7

The conclusio The argumentum 1.6.1 The definition of the argumentum 1.6.2 The division of the argumentum The intentio ac utilitas topicorum

CHAPTER TWO THE SECOND BOOK OF THE DE TOPICIS DIFFERENTIIS 2. The division of Themistius’s loci 2.1 The didactic goal of the text 2.2 The argumentatio 2.2.1 The syllogismus 2.2.2 The inductio 2.2.3 The enthymema 2.2.4 The exemplum 2.3 Themistiusʼs locus 2.3.1 The maxima propositio 2.3.2 The maximarum differentia propositionum 2.4 The Themistii locorum divisio 2.5 The loci qui in questione sunt positi et qui a terminorum substantia ducuntur 2.5.1 The locus a definitione 2.5.2 The locus a descriptione 2.5.3 The locus a nominis interpretatione 2.6 The loci qui in quaestione sunt positi et qui terminorum substantiam consequuntur 2.6.1 The locus a toto 2.6.2 The locus a partibus 2.6.3 The locus a causis 2.6.4 The locus ab effectibus 2.6.5 The locus a corruptionibus 2.6.6 The locus ab usibus 2.6.7 The locus a communiter accidentibus 2.7 The loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur 2.7.1 The locus a rei iudicio 2.7.2 The locus a similibus 2.7.3 The locus ab eo quod magis est 2.7.4 The locus ab eo quod minus est

57 58 58 68 75

81 81 81 82 84 91 95 97 99 102 111 124 127 127 130 133 135 135 141 147 151 152 152 153 154 154 155 157 158

INDEX

2.7.5 The locus a proportione 2.7.6 The locus ab oppositis 2.7.7 The locus a transumptione 2.8 The loci medii vel mixti 2.8.1 The locus a casu 2.8.2 The locus a coniugatis 2.8.3 The locus a divisione 2.9 Themistius: diligentissimus scriptor Graecus 2.10 The divisio locorum CHAPTER THREE THE THIRD BOOK OF THE DE TOPICIS DIFFERENTIIS 3. The division of Cicero’s loci 3.1 Cicero’s locus 3.2 The divisio locorum 3.3 The loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur 3.3.1 The locus a toto 3.3.2 The locus a partibus 3.3.3 The locus a notatione 3.4 The loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur 3.4.1 The locus a coniugatis 3.4.2 The locus a genere 3.4.3 The locus a forma 3.4.4 The locus a similibus 3.4.5 The locus a differentia 3.4.6 The locus a contrariis 3.4.7 The locus ab adiunctis 3.4.8 The locus ab antecedentibus, a consequentibus e a repugnantibus 3.4.9 The locus ab efficientibus causis 3.4.10 The locus ab effectis 3.4.11 The locus a comparatione 3.5 The loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur 3.5.1 The locus a rei iudicio 3.6 Distinctions among some loci of Cicero’s division 3.7 Themistius’s and Cicero’s divisions compared

VII

160 161 168 170 170 171 172 179 180

187 187 188 196 197 197 202 206 209 210 211 213 219 222 226 229 231 247 250 252 258 258 262 264

VIII

INDEX

CHAPTER FOUR THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE DE TOPICIS DIFFERENTIIS 4. The rhetoric and the loci rhetorici 4.1 The differences between dialectic and rhetoric 4.2 The ars rhetorica 4.2.1 The genus of rhetoric 4.2.2 The species of rhetoric: the genera causarum 4.2.3 The material of rhetoric: the civilis quaestio 4.2.4 The partes of rhetoric 4.2.5 The instrumentum of rhetoric and the partes instrumenti rhetoricae 4.2.6 The opus of rhetoric 4.2.7 The officium actoris 4.2.8 The finis of rhetoric 4.2.9 The partes causarum 4.3 General summary 4.4 The De inventione: the loci rhetorici 4.5 The circumstantiae 4.5.1 The loci continentia cum ipso negotio and in gestione negotii 4.5.2 The loci adiuncta negotio 4.5.3 The consecutio 4.6 The communitates inter dialecticos et rhetoricos locos 4.7 The diversitates inter dialecticos et rhetoricos locos 4.8 Conclusions about the fourth book

314 315 320

Conclusion

323

Appendix Bibliography Index ancient and modern authors Index contemporary authors

325 365 393 397

273 273 274 277 279 280 282 284 287 289 289 290 291 302 304 306 308 310 313

INTRODUCTION1

A few years after writing his commentary on Cicero’s Topica (finished before AD 522), Severinus Boethius (ca. AD 480 to 524) composed his last monograph on logic, the aim of which was to present a definitive work on the discipline of topica. The De topicis differentiis (completed before 523)2 is 1

This volume is an updated version of the manuscript already published in Italian, cf. F. MAGNANO, Il De topicis differentiis di Severino Boezio, Officina di Studi medievali, Palermo 2014 (Machina Philosophorum, 41). The material used in this introduction was partly published earlier in F. MAGNANO, «Boezio e l’assiomatizzazione dei loci ciceroniani», Schola Salernitana. Annales, 15 (2011) 67-99 and EAD., «Boethius: the Division of Logic between Greek and Latin Traditions», in J. BRUMBERG (ed.), Ad notitiam ignoti. L’Organon dans la translatio studiorum à l’époque d’Albert le Grand, Brepols, Turnhout 2013, pp. 141-171 (Studia Artistarum, 37). 2 Cf. Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius [= Boethius], In Topica Ciceronis Commentariorum libri sex, in PL 64, coll. 1039-1174 [= In Top.]; ID., De Topicis differentiis und die byzantinische Rezeption dieses Werkes, Einleitung und textkritische Ausgabe von D. Z. NIKITAS, The Academic of Athens – J. Vrin – Éditions Ousia, Athens – Paris – Bruxelles 1990 (Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi-Philosophi Byzantini, 5) [= De top. diff.]. In the notes, Boethius’s writings will be quoted without indicating the author’s name and always with reference to the numbering of the Latin Patristics and modern critical editions. For the chronology of Boethius’s works on logic: cf. L. M. DE RIJK, «On the Chronology of Boethius’ Work on Logic», Vivarium, 2 (1964) 1-49, 125-162; A. MILANESE, «Saggio di inventario dei manoscritti del De Topicis differentiis di Boezio», Atti dell’Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, 38 (1981) 480504. On Boethius’s works and thought: cf. L. OBERTELLO, Severino Boezio, 2 vols., Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, Genova 1974, vol. I (Collana di Monografie, 1); M. T. GIBSON, Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, Blackwell, Oxford 1981; H. CHADWICK, The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford 1981; G. D’ONOFRIO, «Introduzione», in Storia della Teologia nel Medioevo, 3 vols., dir. da G. D’ONOFRIO, vol. I, I Principi, Piemme, Casale Monferrato 1996, pp. 9-33; J. MARENBON, Boethius, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003; ID., (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009. For a bibliography on Boethius, cf. OBERTELLO, Severino Boezio, vol. II; J. GRUBER, «Boethius 1925-1998», Lustrum. Internationale Forschungsberichte aus deim Bereich des klassischen Altertums, 39 (1997) 307-383 and 40 (1998) 199-259; ID., Kommentar zu Boethius de Consolatione Philosophiae, De Gruyter, Berlin 2006, pp. 409-444; P. E. PHILLIPS, «Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius: A Selected Annotated Bibliography», in P. E. PHILLIPS – N. H. KAYLOR (eds.), A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2012, pp. 551590; J. MAGEE – J. MARENBON, «Appendix: Boethius’ works», in J. MARENBON (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, op. cit., pp. 303-339.

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divided into four books, and the text is remarkable for the systematic nature in which the subject is put forth, a clear sign of Boethius’s desire to achieve completeness and of the didactic motivations for his writing the text.

1. The aim of the De topicis differentiis The aim of the treatise is to present a method for solving every kind of quaestio through the use of the tópoi (Latin loci), the operational locations or principles of the mind capable of producing the argumenta that are subsequently developed into argumentationes3. The intentio operis therefore is to illustrate the instruments established by this method, explaining first of all what the loci are, the differences among them, and the syllogisms to which the different kinds of loci are connected4. This discipline was systematized for the first time by Aristotle in his Topica as an art of argumentation in the service of Socratic dialectic5. At 3

De top. diff., I, VII, 21, 1182A, p. 19, 4-21. Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.2 and § 1.7. Cf. De top. diff., I, I, 2, 1173BC, pp. 1, 9-2, 2: «Nunc vero aperire consilium est qui sint loci, quae horum differentiae, qui etiam quibus apti sint syllogismis». Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.2. 5 On Aristotle’s works: cf. Aristotelis Opera, 5 vols., G. Reimer, Academia Regia Borussica, Berlin1960-1961 (1831-18701), vols. I-II, Aristoteles Graece; all the citations of Aristotle’s works in English translation are taken from The Complete works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vol., ed. by J. BARNES, Princeton University Press, Oxford 1991 (Bollingen Series). Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I 100a18-22 (Engl. transl. p. 167): «Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from reputable opinions about any subject presented to us, and also shall ourselves, when putting forward an argument, avoid saying anything contrary to it». For a study and a complete bibliography on Aristotle’s Topica, cf. P. SLOMKOWSKI, Aristotle’s Topics, Brill, Leiden – New York – Köln 1997; cf. also C. Perelman, «La Méthode dialectique et le rôle de l’interlocuteur dans le dialogue», in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 60 (1955) 26-31; W. D. ROSS, «The Text of Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistici Elenchi», in Mélanges de philosophie grecque offerts à Mgr. Diès, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 1956; G. E. L. OWEN (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum, Clarendon, Oxford 1968; E. THIONVILLE, De la théorie des lieux communs dans les Topiques d’Aristote, O. Zeller, Osnabruck 1965; W. A. DE PATER, Les Topiques d’Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne: la méthodologie de la définition, St. Paul, Fribourg 1965 (Études thomistiques, 10); ID., «La fonction du lieu et de l’instrument dans les Topiques», in G. E. L. OWEN (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic, op. cit., pp. 164-188; C. A. VIANO, «La Dialettica in Aristotele», in N. ABBAGNANO (ed.), 4

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the beginning of his treatise, however, Boethius immediately informs the reader about the difficulty encountered in transmitting this teaching, which arises from the existence of two lists of loci originating from the two different traditions, Greek and Latin. Unfortunately, the sources available today are insufficient for a clear reconstruction of the reception of Aristotle’s text in the Greek, Arabic, and Latin traditions, or even the Byzantine tradition, in either the dialectical or rhetorical fields6. However, Boethius translated from Greek all the treaties of Aristotle’s Organon, including the Topica (not before AD 520) and commented on them (before 523)7, but he possessed also a valuable document from the Greek tradition Studi sulla dialettica, Taylor, Torino 1969, pp. 38-62; J. PINBORG, «Topik un Syllogistik im Mittealter», in Sapienter Ordinare: Festgabe für Erich Kleineidam, St. Benno Verlag, Leipzig 1969, pp. 157-178 (Erfurter theologische Studien, 24); E. BERTI, «La Dialettica in Aristotele», in L’Attualità della problematica aristotelica, Atti del convegno francoitaliano su Aristotele (Padova 6-8 apr. 1967), Antenore, Padova 1970, pp. 33-80; ID., Le ragioni in Aristotele, Laterza, Bari 1989; ID., Dalla dialettica alla filosofia prima con saggi integrativi, Bompiani, Milano 2004; ID., Nuovi studi aristotelici. Epistemologia, logica e dialettica, Morcelliana, Brescia 2005; R. BOLTON, «The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic», in D. DEVEREUX – P. PELLEGRIN (eds.), Biologie, logique et métaphysique chez Aristote, Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris 1990, pp. 185-236; ID., «The Problem of Dialectical Reasoning (Sullogismos) in Aristotle», Ancient Philosophy, 14 (1994) 99-132; J. M. VAN OPHUIJSEN, «Where Have the Topics Gone?», in W. W. FORTENBAUGH – D. C. MIRHADY (eds.), Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle, Transaction Publishers, New Brunschwig 1993, pp. 131-173; L. SEMINARA, Carattere e funzione degli endoxa in Aristotele, La città del sole, Napoli 2002. 6 On the tradition of Aristotle’s and Boethius’s Topica in the Latin West, cf. N. J. GREEN-PEDERSEN, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages. The Commentaries on Aristotle’s and Boethius’ ‘Topics’, Philosophia, München – Wien 1984; J. BIARD – F. MARIANI ZINI (eds.), Les lieux de l’argumentation. Histoire du syllogisme topique d’Aristote à Leibniz, Brepols, Turnhout 2009 (Studia Artistarum, 22). For the Byzantine tradition regarding the De topicis differentiis, cf. D. Z. NIKITAS, «Παπίας Ὁλόβωλος», Βυζαντιακὰ, 1 (1981) 59-66; ID., Eine byzantinische Übersetzung von Boethius «De hypotheticis syllogismis», Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen 1982 (Hypomnemata H., 69); ID., «Ὴ Βυζαντινὴ μετάφρασὴ τοῦ ἔργου του Βοηθίου De differentiis topicis ἀπὸ τὸν Πρόχορο Κυδώνη», Ἑλληνικὰ, 35 (1984) 275-315; ID., «“De differentiis topicis”: Eine Pachymeres-Weiterbearbeitung der HolobolosÜbersetzung», Classica et Mediaevalia, 38 (1987) 267-286; ID., «Eἰσαγωγή», in Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, De Topicis differentiis und die byzantinische Rezeption dieses Werkes, pp. XI-XLIX. 7 For Boethius’s Latin translation of Aristotle’s Topica, cf. Topica. Translatio Boethii, Fragmentum Recensionis Alterius et Translatio Anonyma, ed. L. MINIO-

XII

INTRODUCTION

(unfortunately now lost), namely Themistius’s paraphrase of Aristotle’s Topica, in which about three hundred Aristotelian tópoi, presented in the second to the seventh books, seem to have been subjected to classification in order to produce a smaller list and thereby facilitate memorization. On the other hand, this discipline was part of the Latin tradition, and was in particular explored by Cicero (106 to 43 BC), who wrote a treatise entitled Topica that contains a list of nineteen loci very similar to that of Themistius, though his method appears profoundly altered in comparison with Aristotle and is used almost exclusively in the rhetorical field8. Late ancient Latin authors, then, based on what Cicero declares in the preface to his treatise, had already embraced in their manuals Cicero’s own teaching as a summary of Aristotle’s Topica, which teaching was referred to by the term topica (used as a neuter plural noun). This term referred to a specific disciplinary area of competence within dialectica (one of the three arts of the trivium, along with grammar and rhetoric) that included the entire formal heritage of the rules of logic inherited from the ancient world9. PALUELLO (Aristoteles Latinus, V/1-3), Bruges 1969 [= Topica. Translatio Boethii]. Cf. L. MINIO-PALUELLO, «The Text of Aristotle’s Topics and Elenchi: the Latin Tradition», in ID. (ed.), Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle, Adolf M. Hakkert, Amsterdam 1972, pp. 299-309; ID., «Note sull’Aristotele latino medievale. X. I Topica nel X-XI secolo: due fogli del testo perduto della redazione boeziana definitiva; altri frammenti dei libri I-VI e VIII della medesima redazione», in ID., (ed.), Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 357-376; ID., «Nuovi impulsi allo studio della logica: la seconda fase della riscoperta di Aristotele e di Boezio», in E. SESTAN (ed.), La scuola nell’Occidente Latino nell’Alto Medioevo, 2 vols., Centro Italiano di studi sull’alto Medioevo, Spoleto 1973, pp. 743-766 (Settimane di Studio del CISAM, 19). Boethius translated all the treatises of Aristotle’s Organon (Categoriae, De interpretatione, Analytica Priora, Analytica Posteriora, Topica, Sophistici Elenchi) together with Porphyry’s Isagoge; with regard to Boethius’s commentaries on Aristotle’s treatises on logic, today we have only the two commentaries on the Isagoge, the one on the Categories and the two on the De interpretatione. 8 Cicero wrote the Topica around 44 BC. Cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero [= Cicero], Topica, ed. an introduction, translation and commentary by T. REINHARDT, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003; B. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica di Cicerone, Vita e pensiero, Milano 1947; S. RUBINELLI, Ars topica. The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero, Springer, Lugano 2009. For an updated bibliography on Cicero’s Topica: cf. T. REINHARDT, «Bibliography», in Cicero, Topica, op. cit., pp. 371-412. 9 In this regard, an important change takes place in the understanding of this art in Latin. Martianus Capella, a North African rhetorician of the fifth century, in fact demonstrates the instruments of the topica in the fourth book of

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Boethius therefore knew both lists of loci and, having realized the significant divergence between the approach that derived from the Greek tradition of Aristotle and Themistius on the one hand and the Ciceronian approach from the Latin tradition on the other, the former primarily of a dialectical nature, the latter primarily of a rhetorical nature, he wrote the De topicis differentiis in order to show a possible way to reconcile the two10. In this way, Boethius successfully communicated a unified vision of the subject, bequeathing to the Latin world the discipline of the

his De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, which is dedicated to rhetoric, rather than the fifth, in which the dialectic is presented. Cassiodorus (ca. 490-583) in his Institutiones and Isidore of Seville (around 560-636) in his Etymologiae present instead a schematic summary of Cicero’s treatise among the teachings of dialectic immediately after the presentation of the fifteen definitions of Victorinus. This transfer of the discussion of the topica is in all probability due to the dialectical interpretation that Boethius provided in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, an operation that is set within a larger project. Cf. Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, ed. J. Willis, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig 1983 [= De nuptiis]; Cassiodorus Senator [= Cassiodorus], Institutiones, ed. R. A. B. Mynors, Clarendon, Oxford 1937, in PL 70, coll. 1149-1220, III, 14, p. 124, 20-22: «Nunc ad topica veniamus, quae sunt argumentorum sedes, fontes sensuum, et origines dictionum»; Isidorus Hispalensis [= Isidore], Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX, ed. W. M. Lindsay, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1911, in PL 82, coll. 140-150 [= Etymologiae], II, xxx; G. D’ONOFRIO, Fons scientiae. La dialettica nell’Occidente tardo-antico, Liguori, Napoli 1986, pp. 3-21 (Nuovo Medioevo, 30); ID., «Topica e sapere teologico nell’alto medioevo», in J. BIARD – F. MARIANI ZINI (eds.), Les lieux de l’argumentation, op. cit., p. 141: «L’uso del sostantivo plurale topica per indicare una sezione di tale insegnamento è caratteristico dell’impostazione classificatoria dei compendi che lo trasmettono al Medioevo, che hanno esteso l’uso aristotelico del femminile plurale categoriae alla dottrina dei cinque predicabili esposta nell’Isagoge di Porfirio, universalmente designata nell’alto Medioevo con l’improbabile plurale femminile isagogae (o ysagogae), e alle norme relative a nome, verbo e composizione del discorso nel Peri hermeneias o De interpretatione di Aristotele, genericamente indicate con l’altrettanto artificioso perihermeneiae». 10 Cf. De top. diff., I, I, 2-3, 1173BC, pp. 1, 9-2, 7: «Nunc vero aperire consilium est qui sint loci, quae horum differentiae, qui etiam quibus apti sint syllogismis. Nec id simpliciter atque uniformiter videtur esse faciendum, verum duplex est tradenda partitio, una quidem ex Graecis voluminibus eruta, altera vero ex M. Tullii Topicis sumpta. Atque in his illud ad perfectionem speculationis est astruendum, ut quibus utraque divisio differat quibusque conveniat explicetur quoque modo altera alteram vicissim possit includere». Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.2.

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topica restored to its most noble and highest function, the investigatio veritatis11.

2. The title of the De topicis differentiis On the basis of the research conducted by Dimitrios Nikitas, the scholar responsible for the first critical edition of Boethius’s monograph, who investigated the internal and external witnesses for the book (that is, respectively, the titles quoted in the manuscripts and the citations of the title by ancient authors), the original title would seem to have been De topicis differentiis, in contrast with the first printed editions, which inverted the order of the terms topicus and differentia (De differentiis topicis)12. 11

Cf. De top. diff., I, VII, 26, 1182C, pp. 19, 22-20, 3: «Quocirca topicorum pariter utilitas intentioque patefacta est. His enim et dicendi facultas et investigatio veritatis augetur. Nam quod dialecticos atque oratores locorum iuvat agnitio, orationi per inventionem copiam praestat; quod vero necessariorum doctrinam locorum philosophis tradit, viam quodammodo veritatis illustrat». Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.7. 12 Cf. NIKITAS, «Eἰσαγωγή», in Boethius, De Topicis differentiis und die byzantinische Rezeption dieses Werkes, pp. XXXIII-XXXVII; OBERTELLO, Severino Boezio, vol. II, p. 21; S. BRANDT, «Entsthehungszeit und zeitliche Folge der Werke von Boethius», Philologus, 62 (1903) [pp. 141-154, 234-275], p. 263, n. 16; DE RIJK, On the Chronology of Boethius’ Work on Logic, p. 152, n. 3; E. STUMP, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, Cornell University Press, Ithaca – London 1978 (19892), p. 14, n. 5; A. MILANESE, Saggio di inventario dei manoscritti, p. 482, n. 5; ID., «Il De rerum natura, i Topica e Boezio: Due note alla Consolatio Philosophiae», Maia, 35 (1983) [pp. 137-156], p. 148, n. 54; M. B. LOZANO, Contribución al estudio de la terminología lógica de Boezio, 2 vols., Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca 1965, p. 38. In the course of treating Boethius, he refers to the title of the work twice; cf. De top. diff., II, I, 1-2, 1182D, pp. 20, 11-21, 3: «Omnia quidem, quae superioris serie voluminis expedita sunt, minus quibusdam forsitan eruditis supervacanea quodammodo et quasi dependentia videantur. Nam cum ‘de Topicis differentiis’ librorum titulus legerint, omissis doctrinae gradibus statim ad finem operis tendent». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.1; De top. diff., IV, I, 1-2, 1205C, p. 71, 6-14: «Si quis operis titulum diligens examinator inspiciat, cum ‘de Topicis differentiis’ conscribamus, non id a nobis tantum exspectare debebit, ut locorum inter se dialecticorum, vel etiam rhetoricorum differentias demus, verum id multo magis, ut dialecticos locos a rhetoricis segregemus, quod nos efficacius aggredi posse arbitramur, si ab ipsa facultatum natura disputandi sumamus exordium. Ostensa enim dialecticae ac rhetoricae similitudine ac dissimilitudine, ab ipsarum facultatum necesse est formis etiam locorum, qui eisdem facultatibus deserviunt, communitates discrepantiasque ducamus». Cf. infra, Chap. 4, § 4.1. In his commentary on the Cicero’s Topica are three references to the treatise; cf. In Top., I, 1048D: «Quot autem

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Boethius, however, never offers a precise explanation for the title; but he does use the term topica, as a neuter plural noun, exclusively with reference to either Aristotle’s or Cicero’s texts. Therefore, the title De topicis differentiis is directly linked with neither the area of competence within the dialectica that Latin writers called topica, nor with the works of Aristotle and Cicero both entitled Topica. In the case of Boethius’s text, on the other hand, topicus is used as an adjective modifying the noun differentia, which indicates clearly a transferring of the theme, so that it 13 is now centred on the differentiae . The literal translation, «On topical differences» or «On the differences related to places», might suggest that the title refers indiscriminately to the differentiae among various loci dialectici as well as to the differentiae among various loci rhetorici, to the differentia between loci dialectici and loci rhetorici, or even to the differentiae between the loci, understood as maximae propositiones (Themistius’s loci), the (constitutive) differentiae of which are, however, loci. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be excluded that Boethius with his title is inviting a two-fold interpretation, especially considering the fact that the intentio operis is to clarify precisely these aspects14. modis quaestio dividatur, nunc explicandis locus non videtur accommodus, sed in iis libris dicemus quos de topicis differentiis formare molimur» (Engl. transl. p. 30: «This does not seem a suitable place to set forth the many ways in which a question is divided, but we will discuss it in those books on the differentiae of Topics which we are endeavoring to compose») ivi, I, 1050B: «Ergo illa per propositiones prolatio ac dispositio argumenti, argumentatio nuncupatur, quae dicitur enthymema vel syllogismus, cuius definitionem in Topicis differentiis apertius explanabimus» (Engl. transl. p. 31: «The expression and arrangement of an argument by means of propositions is called an argumentation, and this is said to be an enthymeme or a syllogism. [We will explain the definitions of these more fully in connection with the Differentiae of Topics]»); ivi, II, 1068C: «Qui vero eorum naturalis ordo sit, vel quae differentia, vel quae sit alia locorum partitio, licet in topicis differentiis opportunius expediendum sit, tamen cum exempla Ciceronis quae in his explicandis attulit exposuero, subiungam» (Engl. transl. p. 55: «Although it can be explained more opportunely in the differentiae of Topics, I will append a description of the natural ordering of the Topics, their differentiae, and a different division among them when I set forth the examples Cicero adduced to explain these things»). In none of these cases does the author bother to provide an explanation for the title. 13 Boethius uses the adjective topicus also in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica in reference to the noun facultas; cf. ivi, I, 1041D-1042A: «Sed antequam de topicae facultatis ratione pertractem, prooemium, quo ad Trebatium Marcus Tullius utitur, paucis absolvam». 14 Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.2.

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3. The partition of the De topicis differentiis15 The first book presents a compendium of basic knowledge on logic that a student must possess in order to embark on the study of this discipline. Boethius explains the meaning of the terms propositio, quaestio, conclusio, maxima propositio, and argumentum – it is to be noted that these last concepts recall the elements of which a syllogism is composed. In the second book, the concept of argumentatio is introduced, along with two species of loci that can be linked directly to Themistius, the maxima propositio and maximarum propositionum differentiae, while the following portion of the second book is dedicated to a presentation of the list of Themistius’s maximae propositiones and their differentiae. In the third book, Cicero’s division of the loci is introduced, so that the first objective announced in the intentio operis is achieved, namely to show the ways in which the divisions of the Themistian and Ciceronian loci are different and similar, and in what way each can in turn contain the other. The fourth and last book is entirely dedicated to rhetoric and the exhibition of the loci rhetorici, so that the second objective announced in the intentio operis is accomplished, namely to show how the loci rhetorici are distinguished from each other and from the loci dialectici.

4. The sources As a perusal of the contents of the book makes clear, the study and understanding of Boethius’s text require dual competence in the fields of dialectic and rhetoric. Regarding the use of the sources, it is therefore necessary to distinguish the second and the third books, in which the loci dialectici are presented, from the fourth book, in which the loci rhetorici are presented. However, the purpose of this introduction is not to reconstruct the history of the transmission of the discipline of topica from Aristotle to Boethius, but to show how the stratification of multiple traditions has contributed to the formation of the complex theory about the loci presented in the De topicis differentiis. 15

The composition in chapters and paragraphs of the present study, following closely the subdivision of single sections of which Boethius’s treatise is composed, is designed to highlight the extremely systematic nature in which the subject was dealt with by the author. Cf. supra, index.

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Regarding the loci dialectici, it will be useful to begin with a discussion of the various sources used by Boethius for the Greek and Latin traditions. It is especially important, with regard to the Ciceronian locus, to make a further distinction between the concept of locus transmitted by Cicero in the De inventione (and presented by Boethius in the fourth book of the De topicis differentiis as a rhetorical locus) on the one hand and the locus of the Topica (presented in the third book as a dialectical locus) on the other. This distinction will enable a fuller understanding of the ways in which Boethius intended to reconcile Themistius’s tópos and Cicero’s locus.

4.1 Boethius’s sources for Themistius’s tópos At the beginning of the first book, Boethius informs the reader about the sources from which he has drawn the two lists of loci: «Nec id simpliciter atque uniformiter videtur esse faciendum, verum duplex est tradenda partitio, una quidem Graecis voluminibus eruta altera vera ex M. Tullii Topicis sumpta»16. Today many questions remain unresolved regarding the Greek tradition on the tópoi, indicated here by the expression Graecis volumina, and many are likely to remain so, especially considering the fact that the most important of Boethius’s sources, Themistius’s paraphrase of Aristotle’s Topica, has been lost. To appreciate the specific form in which Boethius inherited the concept of tópos that derived from the Greek tradition, it is necessary to begin by examining Aristotle’s Topica, a book that, as alluded to above, Boethius himself translated and for which he created a commentary (unfortunately also lost). I will then illustrate briefly, on the basis of the few remaining witnesses and the interpretative hypotheses made by experts on the subject, the transformations that the Aristotelian tópos underwent within the Greek tradition in order to arrive at an understanding of Themistius’ specific understanding of the concept.

16

De top. diff., I, I, 3, 1173B, pp. 2, 2-4. Besides Aristotle’s Topica and Themistius’s paraphrase, Boethius used for the draft of the De topicis differentiis also other logic treatises of Aristotle’s Organon, such as the Categories and the Prior and Posterior Analytics; cf. NIKITAS, «Eἰσαγωγή», pp. XLIII-XLIX.

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4.1.1 Aristotle’s Τοπικά In the Academy founded by Plato, the most important skill to be acquired by any student was that of besting an interlocutor using only the power of reasoning. The dialectical debate had, therefore, its own specific feature, in that it consisted of the skill of arguing for or against a thesis arising from a question. Aristotle was the first to address the need for a method that would enable the dialectician to identify as quickly as possible the solution for each kind of question17. This method is fully developed in the Topica, the fifth treatise of the Organon (based on the order subsequently assigned to Aristotle’s treatises), which is considered by scholars to have belonged originally to the sixth and last treatise on logic, the Sophistici Elenchi. The term τοπικά, in the absence of the article that would make it a substantival adjective (τὰ τοπικά), is a neuter adjective making a plural name that derives from the noun τόποι; the literal meaning, therefore, is, as mentioned, «things related to places», or even «that which concerns the places», where for Aristotle the τόποι are intended to denote dialectical places. If, then, the adjective τοπικά was meant to refer implicitly to an unspecified noun, one possibility would be τὰ βιβλία; in this case the title would mean «the topical books», which is to say, «the books about things concerning the dialectical places», especially if we consider that Aristotle aspired to present, precisely through the use of the τόποι, as systematic and complete a vision of dialectic as possible18. 17

About the dialectical debate that emerges in Aristotle’s Topica, cf. J. DE BLIC, «Un aspect remarquable de la dialectique aristotélicienne», Gregorianum, 11 (1930) 567-577; R. ROBINSON, «The Historical Background of Aristotle’s Topics VIII», in G. RYLE (ed.), Proceedings of the 7th International Congress of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford – London 1931, pp. 437-442; P. MORAUX, «La joute d’aprés la huitième livre des Topiques», in G. E. L. OWEN (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic, op. cit., pp. 277-311; G. RYLE, «Dialectic in the Academy», in G. E. L. OWEN (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic, op. cit., pp. 69-79; É. WEIL, «La place de la logique dans la pensée aristotelicienne», Revue de metaphysique et morale, 56 (1988) 27-34; P. SLOMKOWSKI, Aristotle’s Topics, pp. 9-42. 18 In this regard, the translation of the term τοπικά in Italian by Giorgio Colli is Topici, or by Attilio Zadro I Topici; these choices, by failing to specify to which noun the adjective topici refers, and keeping the number of the adjective in the plural, are clearly meant to render τοπικά as an adjective functioning substantivally. The term τοπικά was also translated as a plural adjective by Jean Tricot and Jacques

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It was not, however, Aristotle’s intention to form a discipline, if what he himself affirms at the end of Sophistici Elenchi is accurate: «Of the present inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all»19. In all probability, therefore, the term τοπικά refers simultaneously to the instruments of the method of which dialectic is now constituted, to the credit for the discovery that is attributed to Aristotle himself, and to the instruments indicated by Aristotle in the tópoi, these latter being understood as universal schemes of argumentation from which the dialectician can develop his own defence or attack20.

Brunschwig in their French translations; cf. Aristote: Les Topiques, nouvelle traduction et notes par J. TRICOT, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 1939; Aristote: Topiques, texte etabli et traduit par J. BRUNSCHWIG, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1967. A different choice is made by Eduard Seymour Forster in his English translation, opting for the simple transliteration of the Greek term; cf. Aristotle: Topica, translated by E. S. FORSTER, Harvard University Press, Cambridge – London 1960. However, the use of the English term Topics to indicate the subject in this treatise is well established among scholars. Finally, J.H. von Kirchmann, Eugen Rolfes and Paul Gohlke in their respective German translations also consider the term τοπικά a substantive adjective; cf. Die Topik des Aristoteles, übersetzt und erlautert von J. H. VON KIRCHMANN, Georg Weiss, Heidelberg 1882; Aristoteles: Topik, übersetzt von E. ROLFES, Meiner, Leipzig 1919; Aristoteles: Topik, übersetzt von P. GOHLKE, Ferdinand Schoningh, Panderborn 1952. 19 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 34, 183b34-36 (Engl. transl. p. 314). Cf. also ivi, 34, 184a8-184b8 (Engl. transl. p. 314): «Moreover, on the subject of rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject of deduction we had absolutely nothing else of an earlier date to mention, but were kept at work for a long time in experimental researches. If, then, it seems to you after inspection that, such being the situation as it existed at the start, our investigation is in a satisfactory condition compared with the other inquiries that have been developed by tradition, there must remain for all of you, our students, the task of extending us your pardon for the shortcomings of the inquiry, and for the discoveries thereof your warm thanks». 20 According to scholars, Aristotle began to write the Topica in order to refute his teacher Plato, for whom the dialectic corresponded substantially to the method of division of ideas, while for Aristotle this method was not able to express the predicative relation between genus and species. Cf. VIANO, «La dialettica in Aristotele», in N. ABBAGNANO (ed.), Studi sulla dialettica, op. cit.; M. ZANATTA, «Introduzione», in Aristotle, Le Categorie, trad. it. a cura di M. ZANATTA, Rizzoli BUR, Milano 2007 (19891), pp. 15-46.

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The rules of dialectical debate In his work of systematization, Aristotle does not merely demonstrate the method of dialectic; he was also the first to define the rules that both interlocutors must follow21. The eighth and last book of the Topica is entirely dedicated to such rules, knowledge of which is also assumed in the other seven books. Given that many scholars today agree that the eighth book was the first to be composed, it is easy to imagine that it was attached later by Aristotle or by someone else after the first seven books had been completed22. It therefore makes sense to begin from the description of the dialogical context, which requires mastery of the art of dialectical «places» in order for the function that each performs in the service of dialectic to be understood. First of all, each interlocutor has a specific role: the questioner asks questions to which the answerer responds. Respect for the rules – according to which, from the perspective of logic, the questioner must formulate questions properly, and the answerer must agree to the premises – is necessary for the achievement of the common goal toward which the two interlocutors strive, that of distinguishing truth from falsehood with regard to a particular thesis. Two individuals may engage in a discussion for educational purposes (so that one teaches and the other learns), for competitive purposes (where each tries to compel the other to accept his arguments), or for dialectical purposes (when a mutually agreed-upon inquiry is conducted)23. Dialectic is 21

Cf. Aristotle, Topica, VIII 5, 159a32-37 (Engl. transl. p. 268): «On the other hand, in dialectical meetings held in the spirit not of a competition but of an examination and inquiry, there are as yet no articulated rules about what the answerer should aim at, and what kind of things he should and should not grant for the correct or incorrect defence of his position—inasmuch, then, as we have no tradition bequeathed to us by others, let us try to say something upon the matter for ourselves». 22 Cf. SLOMKOWSKI, Aristotle’s Topics, pp. 9-11. 23 Cf. Aristotle, Topica, VIII 5, 159a25-32 (Engl. transl. p. 268): «Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the sake of training and of examination— for the aim of those engaged in teaching or learning is quite different from that of those engaged in a competition; as is the latter from that of those who discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry; for a learner should always state what he thinks (for no one tries to teach what is false); whereas in a competition the business of the questioner is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon the other, while that of the answerer is to appear unaffected by him .

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then the only kind of discussion that is taken up in the Aristotelian treatise, since «debate» is seen as a genus, the specific difference of which (the agreed-upon purpose of the debate) identifies the species, namely «dialectical debate». If, in the course of a debate undertaken for educational purposes, the learner always gives consent to the teacher who questions him (because the goal of the learner is to learn, and because no one who teaches intentionally teaches what is false), and if, on the contrary, in the competitive debate, the one who defends his thesis often does not give his consent (since this debate is only for competitive purposes), then in dialectical debates the answerer will grant his consent every time that the questioner has formulated his premises properly: «for it is not in the power of the one side only to effect properly a result that depends on both alike»24. Dialectic thus conceived can be a very strategic game, with many rules to follow for both interlocutors. On the other hand, the playful and at the same time competitive aspect of the «dialectical game» serves to reflect better the dynamic that should animate the debate from within. The dialectical game begins when the questioner poses a question in the form of a disjunctive interrogative, such as «is A the same as B, or is it not?». The answerer must choose to defend one of the two mutually exclusive theses, either «A is B» or «A is not B». In response to the answerer’s choice, the questioner marshals two possible arguments. One of these arguments is destructive, for cases in which the proposition chosen by the answerer is affirmative («A is B») and the questioner’s task is to assert the opposite («A is not B»). The other argument is constructive, for cases in which the proposition chosen by the answerer is a negation («A is not B») and the questioner’s task is to argue in the affirmative («A is B»). This procedure is called confutation (ἔλεγχος), an instrument used mainly by the questioner and that takes the form of a dialectical syllogism designed to deduce the falsity of a proposition by establishing the truth of the contradictory proposition25. 24

Ivi, VIII 11, 161a20-21 (Engl. transl. p. 271). Regarding the concept of ‘confutation’ (ἔλεγχος) in Aristotle, cf. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, II 20, 66b6-11; ID., Sophistical Refutations, 1, 165a3-4. Cf. Id., Topica, VIII 4, 159a18-22 (Engl. transl. p. 268): «The business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make the answerer utter the most implausible of the necessary consequences of his thesis; while that of the answerer is to make it appear that it is not he who is responsible for the impossibility or paradox, but only his thesis». 25

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In the absence of an interlocutor, Aristotle suggests that the dialectician practise by himself by formulating mentally both the questions and the answers; in fact, the specific skill of the dialectician is based on the capacity to discern the consequences that result from both theses26. Dialectic reflects thus a form of rationality that ideally can be practised only within the context of a dialogue, i.e. in the presence of an interlocutor, though without an interlocutor it can be practised alone by reproducing mentally the interlocutory form. On the other hand, Aristotle notes that, depending on the kind of interlocutor, it will not always be possible to begin a fruitful conversation. In this regard, he recommends: «Do not argue with everyone, nor practise upon the man in the street; for there are some people with whom any argument is bound to degenerate. For against anyone who is ready to try all means in order to seem not to be beaten, it is indeed fair to try all means of bringing about one's conclusion; but it is not good form. Therefore the best rule is, not lightly to engage with the man in the street, or bad argument is Cf. J. LEMAIRE, «Contradiction et topos dans le syllogisme dialectique», in J. BIARD – F. MARIANI ZINI (eds.), Les lieux de l’argumentation, op. cit., pp. 33-52. 26 Aristotle, Topica, VIII 14, 164b3-4 (Engl. transl. p. 277): «For it is the skilled propounder and objector who is, speaking generally, a dialectician». This exercise is, in addition, useful for recognizing true theses, since in fact all the arguments would be explained in regard to both the contrary theses, it would be easier to distinguish these truths; overall, following Aristotle, the capacity to recognize what is true applies only to men endowed with a noble nature, that is, those who instinctively embrace the true and avoid the false». Cf. ivi, VIII 14, 163a36-163b16 (Engl. transl. p. 276): «In dealing with any thesis, be on the look-out for a line of argument both pro and con; and on discovering it at once set about looking for the solution of it; for in this way you will soon find that you have trained yourself at the same time in both asking questions and answering them. If we cannot find any one else to argue with, we should argue with ourselves. Select, moreover, arguments relating to the same thesis and range them side by side; for this produces a plentiful supply of arguments for carrying a point by force, and in refutation also it is of great service, whenever one is well stocked with arguments pro and con—for then you find yourself on your guard against contrary statements. Moreover, as contributing to knowledge and to philosophic wisdom the power of discerning and holding in one view the results of either of two hypotheses is no mean instrument; for it then only remains to make a right choice of one of them. For a task of this kind a certain natural ability is required: in fact real natural ability just is the power rightly to choose the true and shun the false. Men of natural ability can do this; for by a right liking or disliking for whatever is proposed to them they rightly select what is best».

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sure to result. For you see how in practising together people cannot refrain from contentious argument»27. Dialectic is thus conceived as a practice reserved only for people who are inspired by a sincere, authentic, and shared search for the truth; put another way, it implies the principle that this truth is not the result of an individual search, but it is instead the result of a shared, so to speak, dialogical truth. At the same time, the aim of dialectic can be understood and reached only by those who possess an innate predisposition toward the research for truth. Finally, dialectical debate is like any strategic game in which there must be a winner and a loser: Aristotle’s eighth book, in fact, illustrates possible ways in which a dialectical discussion can be concluded once the opponent is defeated. The content of the Topica As mentioned, Aristotle’s crucial contribution to dialectic certainly includes describing a method capable of raising it to the rank of a science. The exordium that opens the Topica is a clear reference to this aspect of Aristotle’s project: «Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from reputable opinions about any subject presented to us, and also shall ourselves, when putting forward an argument, avoid saying anything contrary to it.»28. The treatise has the aim of providing a method for dialectic, so what is presented is a useful strategy for solving every kind of question. From the text it is clear how this method is to benefit both the questioner, who has to formulate questions with the intention of making his opponent fall into contradiction, and the answerer, who for his part has to deny his consent to premises inconsistent with his thesis. The only instruments of which the interlocutors can make use are syllogisms premised on opinion; in fact, this is what distinguishes a dialectical syllogism from a scientific syllogism29. The task of the questioner, then, is not to reveal 27

Aristotle, Topica, VIII 14, 164b8-15 (Engl transl. p. 277). Ivi, I 1, 100a18-21 (Eng. transl. p. 167). For Boethius’s Latin translation, cf. Topica. Translatio Boethii, I 1, 100a18-21: «Propositum quidem negotii est methodum invenire a qua poterimus syllogizare de omni problemate ex probabilibus, et ipsi disputationem sustinens nihil dicemus repugnans». 29 The difference between dialectical and scientific syllogism exists only at the material level, i.e. with regard to the content of their respective premises; based 28

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the truth, but to refute the opponent’s thesis. In the debate, in fact, the questioner has the advantage of knowing in advance the conclusion of his syllogism, namely whatever thesis («A is not B») contradicts the one chosen by his opponent («A is B»). Of course, if he were asked, the opponent would never directly consent to the contradictory thesis («A is not B»), for which reason the questioner’s skill is to find quickly a more universal premise based on opinion («C is D») that the answerer is willing to accept, and from which it is possible to deduce the contradictory thesis («A is not B»), without ever applying either thesis to the one chosen by the opponent («A is B») or to the one to be established («A is not B»). Therefore, the method described in the Topica is to trace and quickly find the most universal premises that a questioner can use to launch his attack on a given thesis that has been chosen by the answerer; thus, again, by demonstrating the truth of the contradictory thesis, the questioner will have simultaneously demonstrated the falsity of the answerer’s thesis. The subject of Aristotle’s Topica is, then, the dialectical syllogism, the characteristics of which, as noted above, are to be premised on opinion (ἐξ ἐνδόξων)30. The ἔνδοξα, the premises of the dialectical syllogism, are defined by Aristotle as follows: «On the other hand, those opinions on opinion in the case of a dialectical syllogism, the premises are in the case of a scientific syllogism true and necessary; from a formal point of view, however, there is no difference between the two species of syllogism. Cf. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I 1, 24b18-20 (Engl. transl. p. 40): «A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so»; Id., Topica, I 1, 100a25-27 (Engl. transl. p. 167): «Now a deduction is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them». About the concept of syllogism in Aristotle, cf. J. BARNES, «Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration», Phronesis, 14 (1969) 123-152; ID., «Proof and Syllogism», in E. BERTI (ed.), Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics. Proceedings of the 8th Symposium Aristotelicum, Editrice Antenore, Padova 1981, pp. 17-59; BERTI, «La Dialettica in Aristotele», in N. ABBAGNANO (ed.), Studi sulla dialettica, op. cit.; ID., Le ragioni in Aristotele; ID., Dalla dialettica alla filosofia prima con saggi integrativi; ID., Nuovi studi aristotelici; W. CAVINI, «Modalità dialettiche nei Topici di Aristotele», in G. CORSI – C. MANGIONE – M. MUGNAI (eds.), Le teorie della modalità. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Storia della Logica, CLUEB, Bologna 1989, pp. 15-46. 30 Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I 1, 100a21-24 (Engl. transl. p. 167): «First, then, we must say what deduction is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical deduction; for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us»; cf. also ivi, I 1, 100a30 (Engl. transl. p. 167): «it is a dialectical deduction, if it reasons from reputable opinions».

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are reputable which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the wise—i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them»31. It is easy to understand how the scientific status of Aristotelian dialectic depends entirely on the epistemological value to be assigned to such premises. At the same time, to question the epistemological value of endoxa is after all to examine the value of truth, and with it the criterion of truth in the context of dialectic itself. Scholars have yet to agree on the meaning of the concept; yet the outcome of the present study still depends on a «true» understanding of, and possible revaluation of, Aristotelian dialectic, which for a long time was in fact downgraded to mere logic of the probable. The word endoxos is an adjective composed of the preposition ἐν («in») and the noun δόξα («fame», «reputation», «opinion»), giving it the literal meaning of «in fame» or «in reputation»; and since Aristotle, when he refers to the premises of a dialectical syllogism, always uses the neuter substantive, the expression ta endoxa literally means «things [deemed] in fame»32. The «endoxical» opinion reflects, then, a specific process of thought with its own epistemological status and therefore its own cognitive value. This epistemological status represents, in turn, what distinguishes endoxical opinions from all others, because they are so similar to the truth, the plausible, as to be granted the immediate consent of the audience33. 31

Ivi, I 1, 100b21-23 (Engl. transl. p. 167). For Boethius’s Latin translation, cf. Topica. Translatio Boethii, I 1, 100b21-23: «Probabilia autem quae videntur omnibus aut pluribus aut sapientibus, et his vel omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime notis et probabilibus [praecipuis]». Eduard Forster translated in this way the same text: «Generally accepted opinions, on the other hand, are those which commend themselves to all or to the majority or to the wise - that is, to all of the wise or to the majority or to the most famous and distinguished of them» (Aristotle: Topica, translated by E. S. Forster, op. cit., pp. 273-275). 32 Giorgio Colli translates in Italian the word endoxos as what is «fondato sull’opinione»; this choice has the merit of making more evident the link that Aristotle wanted to maintain between the large field of opinions (ta dokounta) and a particular species of thereof, the endoxa; cf. Aristotele, Organon, a c. di G. COLLI, Laterza, Milano 2003, p. 407. 33 The most complete and recent study dedicated to the epistemological value of the endoxa is by SEMINARA, Carattere e funzione, which includes an updated bibliography on the subject. Seminara has collected all the Italian and foreign interpretations and translations of the term endoxon. Cf. ivi, pp. 23-47. On the idea of «opinion» in Aristotle, cf. L. M. RÉGIS, L’opinion selon Aristote, Vrin, Paris 1935.

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An opinion, however, is not considered endoxical simply because it is shared by all, or because of the consent that it receives; otherwise one would say that the truth of a proposition is always equivalent to what the majority of people believe and/or on which they have reached agreement. On the contrary, an opinion is shared by all because it is endoxical, and it is therefore the endoxicality that forms the criterion. The criterion, in this case, is not what is used to prove a theory, but that from which a theory is inferred, for which reason the act of wondering why or when an opinion is endoxical is simultaneously an investigation into the way in which it was learned, which lends it an epistemological dimension. In any case, the significant point here is that the endoxical opinion reflects a specific process of thought that is expressed through a judgment, which judgment is in turn activated by the observation of a fact. Contemporary difficulties in recognizing cognitive value through a similar thought process are mainly attributable to the fact that we, who must rely on the opinions of others, have forgotten how opinion, at least for Aristotle, was deeply connected to the experience and observation of facts. Now, however, the facts are neither true nor false but simply are; therefore they are always and only real. As for opinions, since they are judgments based on observation of the facts, they can be true as much as false, and endoxical opinions are those that are maximally probable because they are maximally plausible34. In his definition of endoxa quoted above, Aristotle, at least according to the interpretation of Jacques Brunschwig, seems to have indicated also the hierarchy by which opinions can be classified, namely on the basis 34 Louis Régis interprets the Aristotelian endoxon as a probable, specific aspect of an opinion; the probable in fact is what appears to be and satisfies the intellect with regard to what seems true, and therefore is said to be plausible; likelihood therefore is to dialectic what reality is to science. Régis also argues that opinion, as understood by Aristotle, is an existential judgment concerning all sensible things that fall under human knowledge; however, since the reality of sensible things is changeable, it does not offer the stability necessary for the acquisition of the certain and stable knowledge that is classified as scientific. An opinion, in fact, always has to do with the contingent, i.e. with what is unstable. Therefore, a judgment expressed by an opinion differs from a scientific judgment in that the former is an existential judgment, while the latter is of an abstract and universal nature. Cf. RÉGIS, L’opinion selon Aristote, p. 85. If the endoxical opinion corresponds to probable knowledge, then Boethius has correctly interpreted Aristotle in translating the Greek word endoxa with Latin probabilia, literally «things that are probable».

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of their greater or lesser degree of endoxicality35. This hierarchy can be represented according to Diagram no. 1 (Appendix, p. 325). With regard to a given thesis, the highest authority, and therefore the highest degree of endoxicality, is conferred on an opinion shared by all men (1a); however, if, as can readily be assumed, it is impossible to establish a unanimous agreement, then the opinion shared by the majority of the people will be considered endoxical (1b). Endoxicality in this case is expressed on the basis of a quantitative criterion: an opinion is considered «endoxical» to the extent that it is shared by all men or by most of them. If, however, not even the majority of the people can reach agreement, then, on the basis of a qualitative criterion, the opinions to be considered will be those of the sophoi, the wise men; through a similar kind of division, the opinions shared by all the wise men have the greatest authority (2a), followed by opinions shared by a majority of the wise (2b), introducing again a quantitative criterion. If, finally, agreement among the majority of the wise men also proves elusive, once more returning to a qualitative criterion, the opinion of the most famous (i.e. notable and reputable) wise men is considered endoxical (2c)36. Lastly, if the discussion concerns a specific field of inquiry, then the opinion of the experts in the subject will be considered endoxical (3), such as the doctor in medicine, or the geometrician in geometry37. 35

Cf. J. BRUNSCHWIG, «Introduction», in Aristote: Topiques, op. cit. For an explanation of the ways in which Aristotle uses the term sophoi, cf. SEMINARA, Carattere e funzione, pp. 56-62. After a careful examination, Seminara concludes: «Per Aristotele, quindi il σοφός è, propriamente, colui che si occupa delle cose divine, il sapiente ὅλως descritto nell’Etica» (ivi, p. 62). 37 Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I 10, 104a33-37 (Engl. transl. p. 173): «Clearly also, all opinions that are in accordance with the arts are dialectical propositions; for people are likely to assent to the views held by those who have made a study of these things, e.g. on a question of medicine they will agree with the doctor, and on a question of geometry with the geometrician; and likewise also in other cases». As is clear, the opinions belonging to the three categories (all men, the wise men, the experts in the subject) are not to be considered unconditionally as endoxical but, as Seminara says: «le opinioni dei gruppi successivi al primo saranno anch’essi endoxa fino al punto in cui sono compatibili con la prima [categoria]. Va tuttavia precisato che la “gerarchia” va rispettata solo qualora si ritenga che i più possano avere un’opinione su ciò che costituisce l’oggetto della discussione» (SEMINARA, Carattere e funzione, p. 69). She has shown how the endoxicality is a characteristic that can be extended not only to the shared opinions of fact, but also to the endoxa of right, i.e. to the opinions that, though not currently shared, can still be shared. Therefore, the potential to be shared is one aspect of endoxical opinions; indeed, 36

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Far from being considered an exclusively formal technique, then, the method given by Aristotle in the Topica can be employed only in the presence of an interlocutor, real or imaginary, who accepts or rejects the premises considered «in fame» and formulated by the questioner. To remove from the method, so to speak, its endoxical nature, in order to focus on the formal aspect, means eliminating at the same time the interlocutory context in which the method was developed. Endoxicality is, in fact, the bond that keeps Aristotle’s method firmly anchored in reality, and at the same time ensures its permanent validity. If, from a material point of view, the content of dialectic is the probable (which is by its very nature a dialogical demand), then its form was designed to guarantee its validity, in imitation of the process of scientific thought, i.e. in syllogistic form. Inconsistency arises from the fact that Aristotle wanted to give to the endoxa the role played by premises in a dialectical syllogism; in other words, the endoxical premises, although possessing content classifiable as probable, are, from a formal point of view, necessary causes of probable knowledge. The method of the Topica Since the specific subject of the Topica is the dialectical syllogism, the first book is entirely dedicated to the instruments needed to create such argumentation. The elements that form the method are as follows: First, then, we must see of what parts our inquiry consists. Now if we were to grasp with reference to how many, and what kind of, things arguments take place, and with what materials they start, and how we are to become well supplied with these, we should have sufficiently won our goal38.

endoxicality for its status always requires, as noted, the presence of an interlocutor. She has also shown that not only the opinions but also the inferences are endoxical: «un’inferenza endossale non ha necessariamente proposizioni endossali come premesse e conclusioni; essa si caratterizza piuttosto perché ha come una delle premesse un asserto condizionale in cui il nesso tra antecedente e conseguente è di natura endossale» (ivi, p. 126). 38 Aristotle, Topica, I 4, 101b11-13 (Engl. transl. p. 181).

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The dialectician, therefore, must know in depth the objects at which dialectical syllogisms aim39, the elements from which they derive40, and, finally, the instruments by which these syllogisms are created41. The objects at which syllogisms aim Every syllogism consists of propositions, and every proposition, in the final analysis, expresses the extent to which a predicate does or does not apply to a subject. The objects of the syllogisms, whether dialectical or scientific, are then four, because there are four possible ways in which a predicate can be inherent or not inherent in a subject, namely by definition, genus, property, or accident42. These are the relationships that will later be called «predicables»; either: (1) the predicate is greater than the subject and is inherent in its substance, and is therefore a genus; thus, for example, «animal» is the genus of «man» («man is an animal»); (2) the predicate is greater than the subject but is not inherent in its substance, thus being an accident, as «white» is an accident of «man» («the man is white»); (3) the predicate is equal to the subject and is inherent in its substance, being its definition, as «mortal, rational animal» is a definition of «man» («man is a mortal, rational animal»); (4) or, finally, the predicate is equal to the subject but is separated from its substance, and so it corresponds to a property, such as «able to laugh» can be a characteristic of «man» («the man is able to laugh»)43. The predicables are always immanent in 39

Cf. ivi, I 5-9, 102a1-104a2. Cf. ivi, I 10-11, 104a3-105a9. 41 Cf. ivi, I 12, 105a10-19. 42 Cf. ivi, I 5, 101b38 (Eng. transl. p. 169): «A definition is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence»; ivi, I 5, 102a18-19 (Eng. transl. p. 5): «A property is something which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it»; ivi, I 5, 102a31-32 (Eng. transl. p. 170): «A genus is what is predicated in what a thing is of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind»; ivi, I 5, 102b4-7 (Eng. transl. p. 170): «An accident is something which, though it is none of the foregoing—i.e. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus—yet belongs to the thing; and something which may either belong or not belong to any one and the selfsame thing, as (e.g.) being seated may belong or not belong to some self-same thing». 43 This quadripartite classification seems at first sight to exclude the predicables of species and difference. In fact, in light of the theory of predicables presented subsequently by Porphyry in his Isagoge, and later on by Boethius himself, it is enough that the predicate be greater than the subject and inherent in its substance, so that the 40

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a substance, quantity, quality, relationship, place, time, position, state, activity, or passivity. Therefore, the dialectician must also know the ten categories, which are the genera into which all things can be classified and therefore can also be expressed44. The elements from which syllogisms derive To know the elements from which the dialectical syllogisms derive essentially means understanding the nature of the dialectical proposition (the premises of the dialectical syllogism) and the nature of the dialectical question, namely the formulation of the inquiry that marks the point of departure for the debate. The dialectical proposition is defined as follows:

difference is assimilated to the genus. The same can be said of the species, because each species is greater than an inferior species and therefore becomes its genus (except for the most special species, which are predicated only of individuals, but logic in general does not deal with individuals and does not include this kind of predication). Any matter that has to do with the species is therefore comparable to a matter having to do with the genus. 44 Cf. ivi, I 9, 103b20-25 (Engl. transl p. 172): «Next, then, we must distinguish between the categories of predication in which the four above-mentioned are found. These are ten in number: What a thing is, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Activity, Passivity. For the accident and genus and property and definition of anything will always be in one of these predications». The investigation of predicables is important because Aristotle organizes the material of his treatise by distinguishing the concrete application of the method for each of the predicables. Apart from the first book, in which the elements of the method in general are exhibited, and the eighth, in which the rules of dialectical debate are exhibited, the material of the treatise is in fact divided as follows: in the second and third books, the schemes of attack and defence relating to the accident are shown, in the fourth those relating to the property, in the fifth those relating to the genus, and in the sixth and seventh those relating to the definition. Aristotle affirms that such a subdivision seems necessary because, even if it were possible to find a universal method capable of summarizing the strategies of application relating to all four predicables, the result would undoubtedly be obscure and difficult to understand. Cf. ivi, I 6, 102b35-103a1 (Engl. transl. p. 171): «But we must not on this account expect to find a single line of inquiry which will apply universally to them all; for this is not an easy thing to find, and, even were one found, it would be very obscure indeed, and of little service for the treatise before us. Rather, a special plan of inquiry must be laid down for each of the classes we have distinguished, and then, starting from what is appropriate in each case, it will be easier to make our way right through the task before us».

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Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is reputable to all men or to most men or to the wise, i.e. either to all, or to most, or to the most notable of these, provided it is not paradoxical; for a man would probably assent to the view of the wise, if it be not contrary to the opinions of most men. Dialectical propositions also include views which are like those which are reputable; also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be reputable, and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts45.

Here the definition of endoxa, presented at the beginning of the treatise, is taken up again. From a formal point of view, a dialectical proposition is a question asked by the questioner (for example, «is ‘terrestrial twofooted animal’ the definition of man?»). Before the questioner may deploy the dialectical proposition as the premise of a syllogism, the answerer must give his consent. According to this second definition of endoxa, the criterion is further specified according to the ranking of endoxical opinions: the opinions of the wise can be used as dialectical propositions to the extent that they are not in contrast with the opinions of the majority, and so on46. A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and does that either by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem. It must, moreover, be something on which either people hold no opinion either way, or most people hold a contrary opinion to the wise, or the wise to most people, or each of them among themselves47.

From a formal point of view, a dialectical question is different from a dialectical proposition in that it is disjunctive: «is ‘terrestrial, bipedal animal’ the definition of man, or not?» Such a question therefore neither 45

Ivi, I 10, 104a8-15 (Engl. transl. p. 173). Aristotle states specifically that the dialectician must moreover practise in order to find and to list also all of the similar opinions that are founded on opinion (for example, an endoxical opinion is this: «grammar is numerically one»); the similar opinion, (for example, «the art of playing the flute is numerically one»), the respective contraries (for example, «one must do well by one’s friends» – «one must do evil to one’s enemies»), the contraries posed in contradictory form (for example, «one must do well by one’s friends» – «one must not do evil to one’s friends»), and finally the opinions of the experts on the matter. Cf. ivi, I 10, 104a15-37. 47 Ivi, I 11, 104b1-5 (Engl. transl. pp. 173-174). 46

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affirms nor denies anything; rather, it asks whether a definition, genus, property, or accident does or does not belong to a certain subject; for these reasons it poses an alternative, reflecting that specific process of thinking that represents the starting point of the inquiry, i.e. doubt48. On the other hand, from the material point of view, the content of the question reflects all that is not endoxical, i.e. everything on which an agreement among the majority of people or among the majority of the wise cannot be reached. As is clear, the criterion of endoxicality has served to establish valid dialectical propositions as premises for a dialectical syllogism. The orderly cataloguing of endoxical opinions is carried out mainly based on the shared precept that, with regard to a given thesis, it is possible to establish agreement within a certain category of people (men in general, the wise, the most illustrious wise men, experts). The dialectical question arises, therefore, in all cases in which opinions conflict, as may occur when: (1) within the same category, no one has opinions about both of the alternatives posed by the question; (2) within the same category, people have different opinions, none of which commands a majority; or, finally, (3) when the opinions of one group are in conflict with those of another, as when the opinions of the majority differ from those of the wise or vice versa. It is therefore necessary to keep in mind that the inquiry begins in the absence of agreement, though of course it could not be otherwise, since it is disagreement, not agreement, that allows for the comparison of opinions. A dialectical question can also be a thesis (θέσις); that is «A thesis is a paradoxical belief of some eminent philosopher»49. The judgement of the majority is at this point the criterion according to which the greater or 48 Cf. ivi, I 4, 101b29-36 (Engl. transl. pp. 4-5): «The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. For if it be put in this way, ‘Is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition of man?’ or ‘Is animal the genus of man?’ the result is a proposition; but if thus, ‘Is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition of man or not?’ and ‘Is animal the genus of man or not?’ the result is a problem. Similarly too in other cases. Naturally, then, problems and propositions are equal in number; for out of every proposition you will make a problem if you change the turn of phrase». Aristotle affirms that the difference between a proposition and a dialectical problem concerns only the form in which each is enunciated; many scholars, however, specify that there must be instead a difference with regard to the content as well. Cf. SEMINARA, Carattere e funzione, pp. 63-70; cf. also D. J. HADGOUPOULOS, «Πρότασις and πρόβλημα in the Topics», Phronesis, 31 (1976) 268-273. 49 Aristotle, Topica, I 11, 104b19-20 (Engl. transl. p. 174).

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lesser degree of likelihood of a proposition is to be considered. However, if a person distinguished in the field of philosophy supports something that conflicts with the judgment of the majority, this point of contention may be the object of inquiry and may therefore be considered a dialectical question. Finally, dialectical questions may concern also «a view contrary to men’s usual opinions about which we have an argument, e.g. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come to be or be eternal»50. In sum, dialectical debate proceeds from questions on which there is no evident agreement among the majority in either of the two directions («A is B» or «A is not B»); however, once the answerer has chosen one of the two theses to defend (e.g. «A is B»), the questioner’s goal is to identify endoxical premises («C is D») from which to advance the thesis contrary to that chosen by the opponent («A is not B»). In other words, according to Aristotle, all disagreements can be resolved based on premises on which there is agreement. The distinction between a dialectical problem and a dialectical proposition is in fact made on the basis of what is or is not shared by a certain category of people (all men, the wise, the experts), and in this regard Aristotle emphasizes that: For it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that is to be set down as dialectical; for no one in his senses would make a proposition of what no one holds, nor yet make a problem of what is obvious to everybody; for the latter admits of no doubt, while to the former no one would assent51.

On the other hand, the hierarchical criterion by which the endoxical opinions are to be ranked was established precisely in order to resolve these conflicts, for which reason there can be no real opposition between the endoxical opinions. It may then be observed how, in the end, even the dialectical premises do not offer a guarantee of truth, since what is contained within them remains always and only probable, albeit accepted as true by the majority of people. The need for debate thus arises only when there is disagreement, and the essence and aim of the debate lies in finding a point of agreement on the thesis that, although we may continue to doubt its veracity, nevertheless remains the most plausible alternative; 50 51

Ivi, I 11, 104b24-26 (Engl. transl. p. 174). Ivi, I 10, 104a3-8 (Engl. transl. p. 173).

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on the other hand, if the thesis were universally accepted as true, there would be no need for discussion. Finally, Aristotle declares that there can be only two kinds of dialectical arguments, those based on syllogism or induction, where «induction is a passage from particulars to universals»52. Having syllogisms at the ready The object of the Topica is the dialectical syllogism, but each piece of argumentation is made up of propositions, and every proposition is in turn composed of terms. Therefore, the first element in the method of the Topica involves analysis of the four meanings that every proposition can express (definition, genus, property, and accident); the second aspect requires the study of the elements from which the syllogism derives (dialectical proposition and dialectical question). The third and final element of the method concerns the instruments with which the premises of the syllogisms may be identified: «The instruments whereby we are to become well supplied with deductions are four: one, the securing of propositions; second, the power to distinguish in how many ways an expression is used; third, the discovery of the differences of things; fourth, the investigation of likeness»53. Aristotle states that all four instruments involve the formation of propositions, because, apart from the first, which prescribes the collection of the endoxical propositions, the other three also, in order to be operational, need to be expressed through propositions. The first instrument therefore consists of the orderly cataloguing of endoxical opinions. For the third time in the first book, the hierarchical 52 Ivi, I 12, 105a13-14 (Engl. transl. p. 175). Aristotle emphasizes that induction is something more persuasive, clearer, and more knowable in the sphere of sensation. Cf. ivi, I 12, 105a16-19. 53 Ivi, I 13, 105a21-25 (Engl. transl. p. 175); cf. ivi, I 13-14, 105a20-105b37; ivi, I 15, 1 106a -107b37; ivi, I 16, 107b38-108a6; ivi, I 17, 108a7-17; ivi, I 13, 105a25-33 (Engl. transl. p. 175): «The last three, as well, are in a certain sense propositions; for it is possible to make a proposition corresponding to each of them, e.g. that the desirable is either the honourable or the pleasant or the expedient; and that sensation differs from knowledge in that the latter may be recovered again after it has been lost, while the former cannot; and that the relation of the healthy to health is like that of the vigorous to vigour. The first proposition depends upon the use of one term in several ways, the second upon the differences of things, the third upon their likenesses».

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criterion is articulated in terms of how the endoxical opinions must be put in order. With regard to each thesis, in fact, it will be necessary to note: - the opinion shared by all people - the opinion shared by the majority of people - the opinion shared by all the wise that does not, however, contradict that shared by the majority of people - the opinion of the majority of the wise - the opinion of the most famous wise men - the opinion of the experts on the subject About each of these opinions it will be necessary to formulate: - the opposite proposition - the opposite proposition expressed in contradictory terms - similar propositions It will also be necessary to catalogue: - what seems to be present in all or in almost all cases - written speeches - the opinions of well-known people54 The propositions and the dialectical questions can also be further classified according to their subject: some will concern ethics, some nature, and others logic55. Having concluded his presentation of the criteria by which the dialectical propositions are to be catalogued, Aristotle makes an important point: «For purposes of philosophy we must treat of these things according to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to opinion»56. The method described in the Topica is, therefore, directed not only to the dialectician but also to the philosopher, i.e. to the one who works in the realm of science; in fact, the latter must also list the first propositions and those incapable of proof in order more easily to formulate the syllogisms specific to his field. Finally, Aristotle recommends that the propositions always be collected 54

Cf. ivi, I 14, 105a34-105b18. Cf. ivi, I 14, 105b19-21 (Engl. transl. pp. 175-176): «Of propositions and problems there are—to comprehend the matter in outline—three divisions; for some are ethical propositions, some are on natural science, while some are logical». 56 Ivi, I 14, 105b30-31 (Engl. transl. p. 176). 55

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in the form of universals, since such propositions contain implicitly the particular propositions; for example, the universal proposition that «the knowledge of contraries is the same» contains within it the particular proposition that «the knowledge of good and evil is the same»57. The second instrument concerns homonyms. The same term can, in fact, indicate different things; for example, the word calcio in Italian can refer to a sports team, a harsh kick with the foot or a chemical element. The investigation of homonyms is then useful, first of all, for purposes of clarity, since it is of primary importance for a successful debate that the interlocutors use the same terms in the same way58. The third instrument is the search for differences, i.e. the analysis of species that belong to the same genus or of the differences between genera. This investigation is especially useful for the formation of syllogisms concerning sameness and difference. Once the differences are made known, otherness is demonstrated concomitantly and identity is refuted; if, on the contrary, the differences are disproved, identity is demonstrated and otherness refuted59. The fourth and final instrument concerns the observation of similarity, which is useful for arguments that proceed from induction, for it will be easier to prove the universal thesis if the dialectician knows the similarities among the res. An inquiry into similarity is also particularly suited to the form taken by hypothetical syllogisms. Lastly, a finding of similarity is useful for the construction of a definition, since it is easier to know the genus of terms when similarities among them are known60. The tópoi The discussion thus far has served to introduce the dialectician-intraining to the study of dialectical syllogisms: beginning with the four possible meanings that every proposition can express and the elements from which dialectical syllogisms derive, Aristotle proceeds to orderly cataloguing of dialectical premises. Therefore, after having completed 57

Cf. ivi, I 14, 105b31-37 (Engl. transl. p. 176). Homonymy is a theme strictly connected with the doctrine of categories, and is in fact the first argument presented by Aristotle in a treatise on logic specifically dedicated to this theme. Cf. ivi, I 15, 106a-107b31-37. 59 Cf. ivi, I 15-16, 107b38-108a6. 60 Cf. ivi, I 16, 108a7-17. 58

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his study of the first book, the dialectician has at his disposal a complete list of endoxical premises. Nothing, however, has yet been said about the meaning, role, or function of a tópos, despite the fact that the choice of the tópos is the first task for the questioner according to Aristotle’s own assertion at the beginning of the eighth book61. What, then, is a tópos for Aristotle? The literal meaning of the Greek masculine noun tópos is «place», speaking figuratively, «a place of the mind». Aristotle nowhere in his treatise supplies a precise definition of the term tópos, presumably because his readers already knew the meaning. He does write, in the second book of the Rhetoric: «By an element I mean the same thing as a commonplace; for an element is a commonplace embracing a large number of particular kinds of enthymeme»62. The rhetorical tópos is thus assimilated to the element (στοιχεῖον), as a principle capable of containing within itself any number of rhetorical enthymemes, which may be defined as syllogisms that have been based on one premise considered probable (ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων). This is apparently possible because a universal tópos is the principle of all the particular enthymemes that it encompasses. The same reasoning could therefore apply to a dialectical tópos that is universal because it represents a principle under which all particular dialectical syllogisms fall. The dialectical tópoi can thus be described as universal argumentation schemes, of which Aristotle in the Topica desired to provide a list, as complete as possible (about three hundred are catalogued), representing all those that may contain the entirety of dialectic within them. 61

Cf. ivi, VIII 1, 155b4-10 (Engl. transl. p. 261): «Any one who intends to frame questions must, first of all, select the ground from which he should make his attack; secondly, he must frame them and arrange them one by one to himself; thirdly and lastly, he must proceed actually to put them to the other party. Now so far as the selection of his ground is concerned the problem is one alike for the philosopher and the dialectician; but how to go on to arrange his points and frame his questions concerns the dialectician only». Similar affirmations confirm once again that Aristotle’s lessons in this book, and the entire method of the Topica as a whole, are directed not only to those who engage in dialectical demonstrations, that is, starting from premises that are plausible, but also to those who demonstrate scientifically, that is, starting from true premises. Thus, in the context of a reality-based demonstrative process, both the dialectician and the philosopher must first of all identify the tópos, i.e. choose the strategy by which to conduct their respective demonstrations. 62 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II 26, 1403a17-18 (Engl. transl. p. 2225). The most recent and complete studies dedicated to the concept of Aristotelian tópos are SLOMKOWSKI, Aristotle’s Topics, and RUBINELLI, Ars topica.

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Jacques Brunschwig, who has translated the Topica into French, defines tópos as «une machine à faire des premises à partir d’une conclusion donée».63 The questioner’s purpose is, again, not so much to prove the truth, but to show the falsity of the opponent’s thesis, which means that the questioner already knows the conclusion of his syllogism, because it is the opposite of the thesis chosen by the answerer. The questioner must therefore find a dialectical proposition that his opponent is willing to accept and from which he can deduce the conclusion. The dialectician who has slavishly followed Aristotle’s instructions in the first book will have at his disposal a complete list of potential premises contained within a given dialectical syllogism; at this point, however, he does not yet know how to identify the dialectical proposition that suits him, or how to connect this proposition to the thesis that he will either establish or attack. The tópos addresses the dual aspect of his potential lines of argumentation. On the basis of what Alexander of Aphrodisias says in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica about Theophrastus’s conception of the tópos, it is possible to distinguish in the Aristotelian tópos two elements (though Aristotle does not make this distinction): instruction (παράγγελμα) and the real tópos that constitutes a logical law64. To understand how these elements work within the context of a specific dialectical question, Aristotle adduces the following example: In order to prove that contrary attributes belong to the same thing, look at its genus; e.g. if we want to prove that rightness and wrongness are possible in regard to perception: to perceive is to judge, and it is possible to judge rightly or wrongly; thus in regard to perception as well rightness and wrongness must be possible. In the present instance the demonstration proceeds from the genus and relates to the species; for judging is the genus of perceiving; for the man who perceives judges in a certain way. Again, it may proceed from the species to the genus; for all the attributes that belong to the species belong to the genus as well; e.g. if there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good disposition; for disposition is the genus of knowledge. Now the former commonplace argument is false for purposes of establishing a view, while the second is true. For there is no necessity that all the attributes that belong to the genus should belong also to the species; for animal is winged and 63

BRUNSCHWIG, «Introduction», p. XXXIX. Cf. THIONVILLE, De la théorie; DE PATER, Les Topiques d’Aristote; ID., «La fonction du lieu». 64

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quadruped, but not so man. All the attributes, on the other hand, that belong to the species must of necessity belong also to the genus; for if man is good, then animal also is good. On the other hand, for purposes of overthrowing a view, the former argument is true while the latter is false; for all the attributes which do not belong to the genus do not belong to the species either; whereas all those that are wanting to the species are not of necessity wanting to the genus65.

The subdivision of the elements is illustrated in Diagram no. 2 (Appendix, p. 325). Aristotle found it appropriate to distinguish the tópoi relating to the proposition in terms of the accident from those relating to genus, property, and definition. The preliminary inquiry should therefore concern verification of the nature of the question. In the text quoted above, the question is, «in perception, are rightness and wrongness found or are they not?» («A is B, or not?»), and it concerns the accident; in fact, the aim is to determine whether the accidents that are opposites («rightness» and «wrongness») do or do not belong to the concept of «perception». The answerer defends the thesis that «in perception, rightness and wrongness are not found» («A is not B»); the conclusion of the questioner’s syllogism, therefore, will be the contradictory proposition, «in perception, rightness and wrongness are found» («A is B»). Aristotle first of all suggests that the questioner take into consideration the genus to which the subject «to perceive» belongs, that is, «to judge», because by considering the genus he can simultaneously identify the dialectical proposition: «is to perceive to judge?» («is A equivalent to C?»), as well as the proposition, «in judgment, are rightness and wrongness found?» («is C equivalent to B?»). Therefore, the instruction, the first aspect of which a tópos is constituted (according to Theophrastus’s interpretation), suggests the direction (in the above example, the genus) in which to proceed in order to identify the dialectical propositions that are to be submitted to the answerer («In order to prove that contrary attributes belong to the same thing, look at its genus»)66. If the opponent consents, the questioner is entitled to use the propositions in the capacity of premises. At this point, remaining rooted in 65

Aristotle, Topica, II 4, 111a14-32 (Engl. transl. p. 185). As noted by Sara Rubinelli, instruction is often introduced with a descriptive expression such as «it can be considered», «we must also observe», «we must then examine», or through an infinitive. Cf. RUBINELLI, Ars topica, p. 14; cf. also O. PRIMAVESI, Die Aristotelische Topik: ein Interpretationsmodell und seine Erprobung am Beispiel von Topik B, C. H. Beck, München 1996, pp. 97-98. 66

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Theophrastus’s interpretation as reported by Alexander of Aphrodisias, there is the second aspect of a tópos, namely the law, which makes explicit the logical relationship through which the chosen premise («C is B») and the thesis that is to be established («A is B») are connected: «that which belongs to the genus may also belong to the species».67 Therefore, the opposites « rightness» and «wrongness» that belong to «judge» may also belong to the species that is «perceive». Instruction and logical law are thus two inseparable aspects of the same logical strategy and cannot exist separately since one recalls always the other. A tópos, then, possesses the double function of indicating the path toward one or more premises and of guaranteeing the validity of the inference that connects the premise to the conclusion. Scholars have also recognized how, at the formal level, the mechanism of logical implication that most of the tópoi (which combine instruction and logical law) take the form of a hypothetical syllogism in its two forms of modus ponens and modus tollens, depending on whether the proposition to be established is an affirmation (with a constructive goal) or a negation (with a destructive goal)68. In the above text, Aristotle also illustrates valid schemes, depending on whether the goal is to establish or to refute a proposition, in both of the directions «from genus to species» and «from species to genus» (cf. Diagram no. 3, p. 326). The information contained in the first book is, then, useful for the dialectician, who will want to have at the ready a complete list of all the premises of a dialectical syllogism. The first book thus presents the material aspect of the method; from the second to the seventh books, by contrast, the actual tópoi are displayed, constituting the formal aspect of the method, i.e. the multiple logical strategies that can lead to refutation. Two important considerations remain to be considered in this context. First, since the tópoi are universal in nature, Aristotle has not indicated which tópos is more suitable for establishing or refuting particular theses, evidently because the selection of tópoi is a skill to be acquired by the questioner, which he therefore must practise. Second, Aristotle has not 67 Note that this scheme is false when articulated in the affirmative as the general proposition that «that which belongs to the genus belongs also to the species»; however, there may be specific instances in which this is true, which is why it was decided to express the logical law in probabilistic terms: «that which pertains to the genus may also belong to the species», as Aristotle presently affirms. 68 Cf. SLOMKOWSKI, Aristotle’s Topics.

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presented both aspects identified afterwards by Theophrastus, i.e. the instruction and the logical law, for all of the tópoi, though if one aspect is missing, the other can easily be identified, since both are essential in mounting the dialectician’s attack or defense. The purpose of the Topica Aristotle early in the first book discusses the purpose of his treatise: Next in order after the foregoing, we must say for how many and for what purposes the treatise is useful. There are three purposes— intellectual training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences. That it is useful as training is obvious on the face of it. The possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to argue about the subject proposed. For purposes of casual encounters, it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the basis, not of other people’s convictions, but of their own, shifting the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. For the study of the philosophical sciences the treatise is useful because the ability to consider both sides of a subject will allow us to detect more easily truth and error regarding the several points that arise. It has a further purpose in relation to the principles used in the several sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all starting from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that such principles are primary in relation to everything else: it is through reputable opinions about them that these principles have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic; for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries69.

The purposes enumerated are thus three: the treatise is useful for intellectual training, casual discussions and the philosophical sciences. Regarding the first purpose, the method described in the treatise is, as discussed, one that the aspiring dialectician can practice assiduously even by himself, learning to argue for or against a thesis by developing the objections that can be adduced in both directions70. Since the practice 69 70

Aristotle, Topica, I 2, 101a25-101b4 (modified Engl. transl. p. 168). Cf. supra, pp. XX-XXIII.

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of dialectic is, however, ideally a debate between interlocutors, the second purpose of the treatise is to give the dialectician the upper hand in conversations. In such contexts, the dialectician, when assuming the role of questioner, is more likely to prevail if he is able to anticipate his opponent’s answers, while in the role of answerer he will be able to avoid contradicting himself if he knows in advance the premises to which he must never consent regarding the thesis he defends. Moreover, on the basis of the third element of the method, that of cataloguing all the endoxical opinions in an orderly manner, the dialectician can also work out his opponents’ particular opinions, rendering his refutation more effective. The third purpose of the dialectical method relates to philosophy, affirming the foundational nature of dialectic for the other sciences. This purpose is then articulated in two ways. On the one hand, the method develops the consequences that proceed from the contradictory thesis, giving the dialectician the advantage when it comes to discerning the true thesis from the false one, this time in relation to specific problems in various fields of investigation. On the other hand, the ultimate goal of dialectic is to explore the first principles of all sciences, principles that are, in fact, necessarily true but incapable of proof, and therefore cannot be in turn the objects of demonstration, but can instead be investigated by means of endoxa, the endoxical opinions. A principle then can be apprehended in two ways, in itself or from the point of view of the one who learns it. In other words, the things that are well known are those that have been perceived as particular and individual entities; things known in themselves, on the other hand, are more distant because they are more universal. Therefore, to discover the first principles of each science, the nature of which is universal (for otherwise there would be no science), it is necessary to go through known principles because these are more general, i.e. related to the experience and observation of the facts, namely the endoxical opinions, which form the premises of dialectical syllogism. The performance of dialectic is, then, the scientific utility of the Topica, since it is capable of leading to the discovery of the principles of all sciences. In the course of the reception of Aristotle’s Topica within the Greek tradition, two main components are irretrievably lost. On the one hand, by focusing on the schematic formalities of the tópoi, those who inherit Aristotelian dialectic tend to move progressively away from the original endoxical background of the tópoi; in fact, classification of dialectical and scientific discourse under one formal aspect occurred at the expense of

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the material aspect of the discipline, i.e. the concept of the probable. On the other hand, there was also an obvious loss of the interlocutory context in which dialectic was conceived. Scholars have described this change as a process of axiomatization implemented through the reduction of the premises of dialectical discourse to the premises of scientific discourse. Themistius remains the most important witness of this transformation, but, in order to appreciate Themistius’s contribution, it is necessary first to consider the work of Theophrastus. 4.1.2 Theophrastus Based on what Alexander of Aphrodisias reports in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica (composed ca. AD 200), Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor as leader of the Peripatetics in 322 BC, wrote a text entitled Τοπικά, though nothing of it remains71. Fortunately, Alexander comments on Theophrastus’s conception of the tópos in his own commentary: For the topic, as Theophrastus says, «is a starting point or element from which we take the starting-points concerning each matter by focusing our thought upon it. It is delimited in compass – for either it includes those common and universal things which are the principal ingredients of syllogisms, or these are at least capable of being proved and obtained from them – but unlimited as to the number of individual instances which come under it». For starting from these one may be supplied with an approved premise with respect to the issue: for this is the starting-point72.

It is of great interest that Alexander of Aphrodisias was concerned about transmitting what was missing in Aristotle’s text, namely the defini71

Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo commentaria, ed. M. WALLIES, G. Reimer, Berlin 1891, p. 55, 22-27 (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, II/II); which is cited in the English translation. Cf. Id. On Aristotle Topics 1, translated by J. M. VAN OPHUIJSEN, Duckworth, London 2001, 55, p. 59, 2227: «For these reasons it is not possible to call all problems definitional, or to find some one ‘method universally’ applying to them. Theophrastus in his Topics took trouble to offer a single general method: he separated the accidental from the rest as not coming under the definition and tried to subordinate the others to the definition, which made his treatment more indistinct». 72 Ivi, 5, 21-26 (Engl. transl. p. 7, 21-26).

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tion of tópos. Theophrastus defines tópos as a principle (ἀρχή) or an element (στοιχεῖον) from which it is possible to adduce principles appropriate for solving the question. From the material point of view, i.e. with respect to content, these principles are fixed, because they are applicable within a defined area. Thus one tópos may relate to oppositions, another to the genus, another to the species, and so on; each tópos is useful for solving some questions, but unsuitable for others. Conversely, from the formal point of view, these principles are undetermined because their nature is abstract and universal, and they are therefore able to encompass all the particular terms; thus, if a tópos has to do with oppositions, this means that all the contrary terms (true-false, up-down, right-wrong etc.) are contained within it. Finally, starting from these universal tópoi, it is possible to adduce in turn endoxical premises useful for answering the specific question that was asked. In sum, then, the tópos is for Theophrastus divided into three distinct logical levels, and at the highest of these levels is the tópos intended as a principle that remains unique because it is undivided. At a lower level are the tópoi now understood as principles suitable to solve the question. Finally, at the lowest level, the endoxical premises are drawn from these tópoi that are useful for forming a dialectical syllogism. All of this is perfectly consistent with what Alexander reports again in the second book of his commentary on the Topica with regard to Theophrastus’s conception of tópos: One must not fail to recognize that Theophrastus says that there is a difference between a paraggelma and a topos. For a paraggelma is stated in more common, more general, and more simple terms, and is that from which a topos is identified, just as a topos is a dialectical proof. A paraggelma is, for example, to say that it is necessary to proceed from the opposites, [or] from the correspondences; but a topos is, for example, «if the opposite belongs to the opposite, the converse is also true», and «if one thing is opposite to another, the latter is also opposite to the former», and again, «as is the case with one of the correspondences, so also with the rest». For a topos is a kind of proposition that comes about from the paraggelma73.

This text manifests the distinction that Theophrastus sought to make between Aristotle’s conceptions of the instruction (παράγγελμα) and 73

Ivi, II 2, 135, 2-11 (Engl. transl. by Jim Marks).

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the real tópos. The instruction, as seen above, suggests the abstract and universal viewpoint in order to analyse the proposition that the dialectician seeks either to establish or refute, and therefore enables him to identify the premise to be used; an example of instruction reported by Alexander is: «When it is said that it is necessary to argue from the contraries». This simple statement alerts the dialectician to the opportunity to observe the opposites of the terms of the proposition in order to build an argumentation from them. The real tópos provides, instead, a proposition, either hypothetical or categorical, that is used as the law of logical inference to link the premise (found again through the instruction) to the conclusion that must be established: «If the contrary belongs to the contrary, then so also vice versa». So it is not a coincidence that Theophrastus, based on Alexander’s testimony, long studied the mechanism of logical implication contained in the approximately three hundred Aristotelian tópoi and was the first to develop a theory of hypothetical syllogisms74.

4.1.3 Themistius’s tópos After Theophrastus, the history of the transmission of Aristotle’s Topica within the Greek tradition becomes uncertain; it is known only that Strato of Lampsacus, who succeeded Theophrastus as leader of the Peripatetics around 288 BC and died in 269, also worked on the tópoi, though only the titles of some of his works survive. There follows a gap of nearly two centuries in which there is no word of the reception of Aristotle’s Topica in the West. Interest in the treatise then resurfaces in the Latin tradition, with Cicero’s De oratore in 55 BC. This latter work, from the hand of the most authoritative Latin rhetorician, includes a list of tópoi, which is reproduced in a later work bearing the same title as the Aristotelian treatise, Topica75. For the period after the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias, which appeared ca. AD 200, it is necessary to draw information from Boethius and Averroes regarding the reception of Aristotle’s Topica. Both attest that Themistius, a rhetorician and senior official of the Roman Empire who died ca. AD 388, wrote a paraphrase on Aristotle’s Topica. As mentioned above, Boethius in the second book of his De topicis differentiis 74 75

Cf. SLOMKOWSKI, Aristotle’s Topics, pp. 95-132. Cf. infra, § 4.2.

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transmits and comments on a list of tópoi that he attributes directly to Themistius, while Averroes, in his own commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, gives repeated consideration to Themistius’s conception of the tópoi. Although Themistius’s paraphrase was lost, Boethius and Averroes provide indisputable proof that Aristotle’s doctrine underwent significant changes. Witnesses from the Latin tradition: Boethius In the second book of the De topicis differentiis, Boethius describes Themistius’s concept of the locus as a maxima propositio (this is likely Boethius’s translation of the Greek ἀξίωμα)76 that can be placed either inside the syllogism (as a premise) or outside of it: «Sed huiusmodi propositio aliquotiens quidem intra argumenti ambitum continetur, aliquotiens vero extra posita argumenti vires supplet ac perficit»77. The example of a maxima propositio placed inside the syllogism (present either in the De topicis differentiis or in the commentary on Cicero’s Topica) is very close to the example that Averroes will attribute to Themistius in his commentary:

Minor propositio (maxima propositio)

Rule by a king lasts longer than rule by a consul, when both are good but a good that lasts longer is better than one which lasts a short time

Conclusio

therefore, rule by a king is better than rule by a consul

Maior propositio

The maxima propositio can be easily identified in the minor premise: («quae diuturniora sunt bona melioris sunt meriti quam ea quae parvi sunt 76

Cf. infra, pp. LII-LVII. De top. diff., II, III, 5, 185B, p. 26, 2-4. Boethius presents the dual usage of the maxima proposito also in the commentary on Cicero’s Topica. Cf. In Top., I, 1051D: «Has autem aliquoties quidem in ipsis syllogismis atque argumentationibus inhaerere conspicimus, aliae vero in ipsis quidem argumentationibus minime continentur: vim tamen argumentationibus subministrat» (Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica, transl. with notes and introd. by E. STUMP, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1988, p. 33: «Sometimes, we observe, maximal propositions inhere in syllogisms and argumentations themselves; other times, however, they are not contained in the argumentations themselves but nonetheless supply force to them»). 77

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temporis»), and Boethius points out that it contains the entire proof of a syllogism («haec propositio totam continet probationem»)78. Things become complicated, however, when the maxima propositio is placed outside of the syllogism, as in the example given by Boethius: Maior propositio: «An envious man is one who disparages the good of others»; Minor propositio: «But a wise man does not disparage the good of others»; Conclusio: «Therefore, an envious man is not wise»79. 78 Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 2.3.1; De topicis differentiis, II, III, 6-8, 1185BC, p. 26, 4-14: «Et exemplum quidem eius argumenti, quod maximam retinet propositionem, huiusmodi est. Sit enim quaestio: ‘An sit regno melior consulatus’; ita igitur dicemus: ‘Regnum diuturnius bonum est quam consulates, cum utrumque sit bonum; at vero quod diuturnius bonum est eo quod parvi est temporis melius est; regnum igitur melius est quam consulatus’. Huic igitur argumentationi maxima propositio, id est locus, insertus est, ille scilicet: ‘Quia quae diuturniora sunt bona melioris sunt meriti quam ea quae parvi sunt temporis’. Hoc enim ita notum est, ut extrinsecus probatione non egeat, et ipsum aliis possit esse probatio. Atque ideo haec propositio totam continet probationem et, cum inde nascitur argumentum, recte locus, id est argumenti sedes, vocatur». Cf. In Top., I, 1051D-1052A: «Ut si velimus ostendere regnum melius esse quam consulatum, dicemus: Regnum cum sit bonum, diuturnius est quam consulatu; omne vero quod est diuturnius bonum, melius est eo quod parvi est temporis: regnum igitur melius est consulatu. Hic igitur maxima propositio atque universalis et per se cognita, neque indigens probatione, argumentationi inserta est» (Engl. transl. p. 33: «For example, if we want to show that a kingdom is better than a consulate, we will say, ‘When it is good, a kingdom is longer lasting than a consulate; but every good that is longer lasting is better than that which is of shorter duration; therefore a kingdom is better than a consulate’. Here the proposition that is maximal, universal, known per se, and in need of no proof is incorporated in the argumentation; this is ‘All goods that are longer lasting are better than those which are restricted to a short time’»). This locus is found also in Aristotle’s Topica: cf. Topica, III, 116a13-14 (Engl. transl. p. 194): «First, then, that which is more lasting or secure is more desirable than that which is less so». 79 Cf. De top. diff., II, III, 9-10, 1185CD, pp. 26, 14-27, 3: «Ut vero extra posita maxima propositio vires afferat argumento tale sit exemplum; sit enim propositum demonstrare quoniam ‘invidus sapiens non est’: ‘Qui enim invidus est alienis bonis affligitur; sapiens autem bonis non affligitur alienis; invidus igitur sapiens non est’. In hac igitur argumentatione propositio quidem maxima non videtur inclusa, sed argumentationi vires ipsa maxima subministrat; est enim huic syllogismo fides ex ea propositione, per quam cognoscimus: ‘Quorum diversa est definitio, ipsa quoque esse diversa’. Est autem in definitione quidem invidi ‘alienis bonis tabescere’; quod quoniam non venit in sapientem, idcirco invidus a sapiente seiungitur». The same

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Boethius states that the maxima propositio for this syllogism is «quorum diversa est definitio ipsa quoque esse diversa» («that things whose definitions are different are themselves also different»). Ebbesen, the leading scholar on the subject, has explained this example with admirable clarity: once the maxima propositio is inserted, the manner in which it performs the function of locus, and indeed the dependence of the whole force of the syllogism on it, can then be understood. Diagram no. 4 (Appendix, p. 326) illustrates how the premises of a syllogism (major and minor) represent the variables that substitute for the terms of the maxima propositio where the latter are instead the constants80. In this regard, quoting Ebbesen again: «The implication of the Boethian theory seems to be that all the demonstrations proceed, implicitly or explicitly, by substitution of the constants in variables place and by assertion example is present also in Boethius’s commentary on Cicero’s Topica; cf. In Top., I, 1052A: «At si velimus ostendere non esse invidum qui sapiens sit, dicamus: Invidus est qui moeret aliena felicitate; non autem sapiens est quem felicitas aliena contristat: non est invidus sapiens. Hic maxima propositio argumentationi non videtur inclusa, sed extrisecus posita, syllogismo tamen vires ministrat. Haec vero est, quorum diversa sunt definitiones, diversas esse substantias necesse est» (Engl. transl. pp. 33-34): «But if we want to show that someone who is wise is not envious, we say, ‘An envious man is one who grieves at the happiness of another; but a man who is made sad by the happiness of another is not wise; therefore an envious man is not wise’. Here the maximal proposition does not appear included in the argumentation, but although it is located outside the argumentation, it still supplies force to the syllogism. The maximal proposition is ‘Things that have different definitions have different substances». 80 Cf. S. EBBESEN, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi: a Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies, Brill, Leiden 1981, p. 119: «In the following argument the axiom is implicit: (a) The envious is one who is annoyed at other’s prosperity; (b) The sage is not annoyed at other’s prosperity; (c) Therefore the envious is no sage. This example stems from Aristotle’s Topics II c. 2 109b 35-38. Boethius informs us that the implicit axiom is ‘Those whose definition are different, are essentially different’. [...] To make the argument conform to the same scheme as (I) we must insert the axiom and consider the premisses (a) and (b) as substitutes for the conclusion derivable from them, that the envious and the sage have different definitions. The conclusion (c) is equivalent to ‘the envious and the sage are essentially different’». Cf. Aristotle, Topica, II 109b35-39 (Engl. transl. p. 183): «Again, to see if the good man is jealous, ask who is the jealous man and what is jealousy. For if jealousy is pain at the apparent success of some honest person, clearly the good man is not jealous; for then he would be bad».

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of the consequent without the antecedent»81. The maxima propositio is thus a «complex» proposition that performs the function of a locus, since it has the capacity to «contain» within itself all of the propositions of which a syllogism is composed.82 In view of what Boethius has transmitted, it is possible to assimilate Themistius’s maxima propositio to Theophrastus’s logical law, the latter being one of the two aspects assigned to the Aristotelian tópos. Moreover, the original function of the Aristotelian tópos remains the same in Themistius: the one who demonstrates, dialectically or scientifically, must establish or refute a given thesis (originally the thesis that contradicts the one supported by the opponent) that will be the conclusion of his syllogism; therefore, what he needs are suitable premises to elaborate the syllogism. The maxima propositio, artfully identified by the one who demonstrates it, is then a formal principle from which it is possible to articulate all of the propositions of a given syllogism, and its main function is to validate a prior conclusion.

81

S. EBBESEN, «Ancient Scholastic Logic as the Source of Medieval Scholastic Logic», in N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG – E. STUMP (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From The Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, p. 112; cf. ivi: «In the theory Boethius presents, every inference owes its cogency to an axiom. Arguments of the form ‘non-axiomatic premis(es) .’. conclusion’ are abbreviations of ‘axiom, non-axiomatic premiss(es) .’. conclusion’. Boethius describes an axiom as a self-evident, primitive, general proposition. His axioms are, in fact, laws of inference, whose only constants, besides ‘if... then’, ‘and’, etc., are relations (be predicated of, be the genus of, be the opposite of, etc.); the relata are variables (though there may be restrictions of domain; for instance, they may all have to be good things). The non-axiomatic premisses and the conclusion are assertions of the antecedent and the consequent, respectively, of the axiom, with proper constants substituted for the variables». 82 Cf. De top. diff., II, III, 11-13, 1185D-1186A, p. 27, 3-11: «Est igitur uno quidem modo locus (ut dictum est) maxima et universalis, et principalis, atque indemonstrabilis, ac per se nota propositio, quae in argumentationibus, vel inter ipsas propositiones, vel exterius posita, vim tamen argumentis et conclusionibus subministrat. Ideo et universales et maximae propositiones loci dictae sunt, quoniam ipsae sunt quae continent ceteras propositiones et per eas fit consequens et rata conclusio. Ac sicut locus in se corporis continet quantitatem, ita hae propositiones quae sunt maximae intra se omnem vim posteriorum atque ipsius conclusionis consequentiam tenent». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.1.

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Witnesses from the Arabic tradition: Averroes Another important witness to Themistius’s paraphrase is Averroes (died 1198), who also wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, in which he included short summaries of the opinions of other authors83. Ahmed Asnawi has identified another valuable source for Themistius’s tópoi, a chapter of the text al-Kitab al-mu’ tabar (Le livre Médité) by Abû alBarakât al-Baghdâdî, written after AD 116484. But while the Arabic 83 Cf. Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, ed. by C. E. BUTTERWORTH – ABD AL-MAGID AL-HARIDI, The General Egyptian Book Organization – The American Research Center in Egypt, Le Caire 1986 (Bulletin critique des Annales Islamologiques, 3). There exist at least two Latin translations of Averroes’s Arabic commentary on Aristotle’s Topica; cf. Averroes Paraphrasis Topicorum, in Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera, vol. I, Part. 3, Topicorum atque Elenchorum libri cum Averrois Cordubensis in eos media expositione Abramo de Balmes et Mantino interpretibus, Venetiis apud Junctas 1562-1574 (reprint. Minerva, Frankfurt am Main 1962). All the sections of the original text in Arabic in which Averroes mentions Themistius have been translated into French; cf. A. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî, témoins des écrits de Thémistius sur les Topiques d’Aristote», Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 17 (2007) 203-265. Cf. ID. «Topic and Analysis: The Arabic Tradition», in R.W. SHARPLES (ed.), Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, Ashgate, Aldershot 2001, pp. 28-62; ID., «Taxinomie topique: la classification thémistéenne des lieux chez Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», in R. ARNZEN – J. THIELMANN (eds.), Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea, Peeters, Leuven 2004, pp. 245-258. Eleonore Stump has highlighted in the Latin version all the passages (19 in total) in which Averroes mentions Themistius; cf. E. STUMP, «Boethius’s Works on the Topics», Vivarium, 12 (1974) 77-93. In addition to his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Topica, Themistius composed also paraphrases of the Categories and Prior Analytics, though both have been lost; there remains, however, his paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics; cf. Themistii Analyticorum Posteriorum Paraphrasis, ed. M. WALLIES, G. Reimer, Berlin 1900 (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, V/1). 84 Cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî». On the basis of the research he conducted, Ahmed Hasnawi has come up with a hypothesis regarding the existence of two compositions by Themistius on the Topica; cf. pp. 232-233: «En emprunant un double chemin, celui ouvert par le genre et l’intitulé des écrits de Thémistius, tels qu’on peut s’en faire une idée grâce aux données des bibliographes arabes et aux analyses d’al Farabi et d’Avicenne d’une part, et celui où nous a engagé la classification des lieux telle qu’elle se trouve recueillie chez Boèce, Abû al-Barakât et Averroès d’autre part, nous arrivons à la conclusion de l’existence de deux écrits de Thémistius sur les Topiques: l’un qui serait une paraphrase, restreinte aux livres centraux de cet ouvrage, l’autre qui serait une œuvre ‘personelle’».

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tradition provides these valuable witnesses, the evidence contained therein has not demonstrated that the Neoplatonists, of either the Alexandrian or Athenian schools, ever had any real interest in Aristotle’s Topica85. Hasnawi confirms that the Arabs undoubtedly knew a commentary by Themistius on the Topica in the form of a paraphrase. What remains unclear is whether Themistius wrote one or rather two commentaries86. Averroes’s reference to Themistius’s conception of the tópos is substantially in agreement with what Boethius has transmitted: Quant a Themistius, il affirme que le lieu est la prémisse universelle qui est la plus appropriée au syllogisme. Et il affirme que la prémisse qui a cette caractéristique tantôt est utilisée elle-même dans le syllogisme, et tantôt c’est sa signification et sa force qui sont utilisées. Sa preuve, en cela, est, que l’on trouve à la fois ces deux sortes [d’emploi] dans les énoncés qu’Aristote utilise dans les traités des lieux de ce livre-ci – par exemple son énoncé: ce qui dure plus longtemps est préférable à nos yeux, ou son énoncé: ce qui est préférable pour lui-même est préférable à ce qui est préférable à cause d’autre chose que lui- même. En effet, il est manifeste à propos de ces énoncés et de ceux qui leur sont semblables, qu’ils ne sont énumérés que pour être utilisés comme des prémisses majeures 85 Hasnawi has focused on the very important fact that Ibn al-Nadim in the text of Fihirst witnesses the existence of a commentary of Ammonius on the first four books of Aristotle’s Topica, although from the extant Greek tradition (known to us) there is no mention of it. Cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî». Boethius and Averroes thus represent two very valuable sources available to scholars to reconstruct the Themistian conception of the Topica. This reconstruction involves either the scholars of the Latin tradition of the Topica, since Boethius was the main turning point of transmission of the Themistian teaching in the West, the scholars of Arab tradition, for whom Boethius’s testimony represents a substantial confirmation of what Averroes reported on the Themistian topica, or the scholars of the Greek tradition, since Themistius is one of the group of Greek commentators of Aristotle. 86 Cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», p. 205: «L’élément décisif réside en ce que les Arabes semblent bien avoir connu un commentaire, sans doute sous forme de paraphrase, de Thémistius aux Topiques. L’aspect problématique est lié à la question de savoir s’ils ont connu un seul ou deux écrits de cet auteur sur le Topiques». In this article, the author suggests that Themistius’s paraphrase was probably limited to books II-VII of the Topica. Besides Averroes, at least two other Arab authors quote Themistius, Ibn al Nadim and Abu Sahl al-Masihi; the study of these authors therefore could provide an important contribution to the understanding of the Boethian discipline of topica.

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dans chacun des syllogismes [orientés vers] des quaesita particuliers – par exemple notre énoncé: le plaisir de l’ivresse est préférable au plaisir du coït parce qu’il dure plus longtemps87.

For Themistius, the tópos is a universal premise, a principle appropriate for the formation of a syllogism. This premise can in turn be placed inside the syllogism, thus constituting the major premise, or it can be placed outside of the syllogism, in which case a particular premise that is derived from it is used instead. Themistius bases his interpretation on Aristotle, who he says used the tópoi in this double way in the Topica. In the text quoted above, the example of a tópos in the capacity of a universal premise is «ce qui dure plus longtemps est préférable à nos yeux», while the particular premise, applied to a specific case, is «le plaisir de l’ivresse est préférable au plaisir du coït parce qu’il dure plus longtemps»88. On the other hand, if the development of a tópos as a proposition is mainly intended to further the construction of a syllogism, then it rightly can become part of the syllogism as major premise, because it is from this latter premise, once it is in position, that the conclusion arises. Themistius’s tópoi: axiomatization and classification Boethius therefore clarifies how Themistius assimilated the concept of tópos (Latin locus) to that of ἀξίωμα (Latin maxima); indeed, Ebbesen has aptly described Themistius’s discipline as «topical axiomatic»89. The 87

HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», p. 235. All of the texts in which Averroes refers to Themistius’s tópos in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica will be duly discussed in the course of the argumentation here in order to demonstrate the substantial agreement between Boethius and Averroes on the subject. 89 Cf. EBBESEN, Commentators and Commentaries, p. 117: «The combination of axiomatics and topics is not evidenced before Themistius. But can we attribute such a stroke of originality to him? I think it is safer to assume that Themistius depended on some unknown third century commentator on the Topics»; ivi, pp. 120-121: «It is, however, clear that maxima propositio is a translation of ἀξίωμα, not only because Boethius adorns his maxims with epithets only suitable to an Aristotelian axiom, but also because he uses the same phrase to render ἀξίωμα in his translation of Topics VIII c.1 155b15 [...] He clearly found it difficult to render ἀξίωμα in Latin. A literal equivalent would be dignitas, but that was too clumsy for Boethius, though not for mediaeval translators»; ivi, p. 121: «Axioma is a transliteration, and Boethius 88

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question remains why Themistius identified the tópoi with the axioms. It seems reasonable to conclude that, during the transmission of these ideas, the tópoi, expressing systems of inferential implication between propositions, were assimilated to the analogous manner in which the axioms operate in the service of scientific demonstration (an example being, «if two equal numbers are removed from two equal numbers, the remainders are the same»). However, even if indeed the tópoi came to be regarded as similar to the axioms because of the function they perform in syllogistic deduction, it is not possible to affirm also the opposite, i.e. that every axiom is always a tópos90. Ebbesen has proposed a theory that accounts for the profound change that this discipline underwent after Aristotle: «The axiomatic topics came from Themistius, who had produced (or inherited) a combination of Galenic ideas about axiomatic proof with a Theophrastean conception of what an Aristotelian topos is. Galen had identified axioms in the sense intended by the Stoic Posidonius with Aristotelian axioms»91. Whatever wanted to translate; confusion with axioma in the Stoic sense might also be feared. Propositio was too general a term, so he decided on maxima propositio for use in De differentiis topicis and the commentary on Cicero. Was it his own invention? Perhaps»; cf. also ID., «The Theory of Loci in Antiquity and the Middle Ages», in K. JACOBI (ed.), Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, Brill, Leiden – New York – Cologne 1993, pp. 14-39; ID., «Ancient Scholastic Logic», in N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG – E. STUMP (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 101-127; E. STUMP, «Topics: Their Development and Absorption into the Consequences», in N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, pp. 315-334. 90 Cf. GREEN-PEDERSEN, The Tradition of the Topics, p. 62: «The maxim in the ddt are at least as heterogeneous as the ‘reasons’ in Aristotle’s loci, and very few among them qualify as axioms». 91 EBBESEN, «Ancient Scholastic Logic», in N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG – E. STUMP (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, op. cit., p. 113. Ebbesen has presented this theory in numerous articles; cf. ID., Commentators and Commentaries, p. 120: «In my opinion, the strange initial identification of topical proposition with demonstrative axioms and the talk about the power (vis in Boethius) they lend to the arguments is the best explained on the hypothesis that the Themistian theory of topical arguments arose when he or a predecessor saw that Galenic axiomatic proof had many similarities with Aristotelian topical proof. This led to the description of the tópoi as axioms in the strict sense, though even Themistius must have seen

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the precise nature of the change, scholars agree that it included a process of «axiomatization» to which Boethius bears witness. Moreover, the quite numerous topoi (over three hundred) and the maximae propositiones (as loci) were divided up and then collected on the basis of their constitutive differentiae. Since, as mentioned, some maximae propositiones have to do with oppositions, others with genus, and so on, it was possible to classify them accordingly. In turn, the constitutive differentiae, being more universal, were transformed into loci with regard to the maximae propositiones they contain92. The list of loci that Boethius attributes directly to Themistius is in fact the list of differentiae of the maximae propositiones indicated by name only (a definitione, a genere, etc.). Stump suggests that the first to use the differentiae were the Greek commentators, whose purpose was to gather, in classes, the considerable quantity of tópoi listed by Aristotle into an abbreviated list in order to facilitate memorization93. In that not all tópoi are strictly demonstrative axioms». Cf. ID., «The Theory of Loci», in K. JACOBI (ed.), Argumentationstheorie, op. cit.; M. POHLENZ, La Stoa. Storia di un movimento spirituale, Italian translation by O. DE GREGORIO and B. PROTO, Bompiani, Milano 2005, pp. 474-475; G. E. R. LLOYD, «Mathematics as a Model of Method in Galen», in R. W. SHARPLES (ed.), Philosophy and the Sciences in Antiquity, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005, pp. 110-130. 92 Cf. De top. diff., II, III, 13-16, 1186AB, p. 27, 11-19: «Et uno quidem modo locus, id est argumenti sedes, dicitur maxima, principalisque propositio fidem ceteris subministrans. Alio vero modo loci vocantur maximarum differentiae propositionum, quae scilicet ab his ducuntur terminis, qui in quaestione sunt constituti, de quibus deinceps disserendum est. Cum enim sint plurimae propositiones quae maximae vocantur haeque inter se dissimiles, quibus inter se differentiis discrepant, eas omnes locos vocamus. Nam si ipsae propositiones maximae argumentorum loci sunt, et differentias earum argumentorum locos esse necesse est». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.2. 93 Cf. De top. diff., II, X, 1, 1194AB, p. 45, 15-17: «Et Graeci quidem Themistii, diligentissimi scriptoris ac lucidi et omnia ad facilitatem intelligentiae revocantis, talis locorum videtur esse partitio». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.9. Cf. STUMP, «Dialectic and Boethius’s De topicis differentiis», in EAD., Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, p. 201: «I think that the Differentiae in Boethius’s work arose as a list of abbreviated Aristotelian strategies and that the explanation Boethius gives for them – that they are the differentiae of maximal propositions that find arguments by providing an intermediate – was added later, perhaps by Greek commentators, as the potentialities of such shortened strategies began to be seen». The choice of using a list of differentiae in place of the approximately three hundred Aristotelian tópoi, seems to be, as Boethius affirms, for didactic purposes. Cf. De top. diff., II, III, 17-19, 1186B, pp. 27, 21-28, 6: «Atque ideo pauciores hi loci esse deprehenduntur, qui in differentiis positi sunt, quam

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Diagram no. 5 (Appendix, p. 327), all the maximae propositiones stated in the second book of the De topicis differentiis are shown, and Diagram no. 6 (Appendix, p. 328) lists Themistius’s differentiae. A quick comparison of these diagrams demonstrates that the constitutive differentiae assume the name of the logical entity that the respective maximae propositiones contain (a definitione, a descriptione, etc.); on the other hand, this is exactly what differentiates the maximae propositiones because, if these all belong to the same species, since they are all maximae, it is their constitutive differentiae that enable their identification and classification. Hasnawi has called the change that led to the classification of the Aristotelian tópoi «programme de réductionnisme épistémique» and said that Themistius could have been its author: «par là, il faut entendre l’entreprise qui consiste à réduire, moyennant certaines transformations, un lieu non démonstratif à un lieu démonstratif. Ce programme lui-même suppose, comme condition de ce geste, la classification et la hiérarchisation des lieux selon la valeur épistémique qu’on leur assigne»94. The clearest and most decisive evidence of this tendency is found in a passage of Averroes’s commentary on the propositiones ipsae, quarum sunt differentiae; omnia enim, quae universaliora sunt, pauciora semper esse contingit. Et ideo facile sub scientiam possunt cadere; quorum tam multus numerus non est, ut cito a memoria discentis elabantur». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.2. According to the same American scholar, the maximae propositiones and their differentiae (being both loci, although with respect to different things) play a different function. Cf. E. STUMP, «Boethius’s Theory of Topics and Its Place in Early Scholastic Logic», in L. OBERTELLO (ed.), Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani (Pavia, 5-8 ottobre 1981), Herder, Roma 1981, [pp. 249-262], p. 250: «Maximal propositions have two functions in De top. diff. First, they are general premisses which are essential to the validity of certain dialectical arguments, though they are not always an explicit part of the argument. Secondly, they help in finding argument because, on Boethius’s view, they are the principles that give arguments their force and the generalizations on which arguments depend. [...] Differentiae must function to find argument by aiding in the discovery of such intermediates». The same appears in GREEN-PEDERSEN, The Tradition of the Topics, pp. 60-65. Cf. also E. STUMP, «Dialectic in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries: Garlandus Composita», History and Philosophy of Logic, 1 (1980) 1-18; EAD., «Dialectic», in D. WAGNER (ed.), The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1983, pp. 125-146; EAD., Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic, Cornell University Press, Ithaca – London 1989; EAD, «Topics: Their Development and Absorption», in N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG (eds.), The Cambridge History, op. cit., pp. 315-334. 94 HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», p. 219.

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Topica in which, with regard to the «preferable places», the Arab scholar seems to have mentioned Themistius’s scheme: Il faut qu’à propos de ces lieux tu considères attentivement trois points: 1) le premier est de savoir lesquels sont propres aux préférables et lesquels sont communs à tout ce qui se dit par comparaison; 2) le deuxième est de savoir lesquels sont pris de la substance de la chose, lesquels sont pris de l’extérieur et lesquels sont intermédiaires entre ces deux; 3) le troisième est [de savoir] lesquels [de ces lieux] sont aptes à être utilisés dans les démonstrations et lesquels non95.

Hasnawi notes the many similarities between the classification of Themistius’s loci as presented by Boethius in the De topicis differentiis and that presented by Averroes in his commentary on the Topica. There is to begin with the distinction among intrinsic, extrinsic, and intermediate tópoi96, which drew students’ attention to another aspect of the list of the loci, which Hasnawi calls «taxonomic reductionism» («réductionnisme taxinomique»), in reference to the two-fold didactic and epistemic tendency of the scheme97. In didactic terms, as stated earlier, the classification of the loci facilitates memorization. In epistemic terms, a hierarchy of the tópoi themselves is created on the basis of their greater or lesser probative force: some tópoi are better suited for deployment in 95

Ivi, p. 221. Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.4 - 2.5 - 2.5.1. 97 HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», p. 222: «Il faut distinguer de ce réductionnisme taxinomique à visée didactique, qui tend d’abord à ordonner et à systématiser l’enseignement sur les lieux, un réductionnisme taxinomique à visée épistémique qui se manifeste dans la classification des lieux en lieux intrinsèques, extrinsèques et intermédiaires. La visée de cette classification est épistémique car on constate une coïncidence entre les lieux intrinsèques et les lieux démonstratifs, c’està-dire les lieux qui permettent de construire des syllogismes démonstratifs. Boèce le dit explicitement et ce recouvrement se retrouve tout au long du Commentaire moyen d’Averroès sur le Topiques». The many similarities between Averroes and Boethius lead Hasnawi to conclude that both draw on a shared tradition, of which Themistius is undoubtedly one of the transmitters. Cf. ID., «Topic and Analysis», in R.W. SHARPLES (ed.), Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, op. cit., p. 51: «This rapid survey of these similar features shows adequately that we are in the presence of a shared tradition of which Themistius was, for these different authors, the transmitter, or at least one of the transmitters». 96

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demonstrative syllogisms, others in dialectical syllogisms. Boethius in the De topicis differentiis presents Themistius’s division first, followed by Cicero’s, while at the end of the third book he attempts to reconcile the two, which actions could indicate his awareness of an orderly arrangement of the loci based on their greater or lesser epistemic status, an arrangement undoubtedly inherited from Themistius. So it is that Boethius concludes the second book of the De topicis differentiis: Sed ea quidem, quae ex definitione vel genere vel differentia vel causis argumenta ducuntur, demonstrativis maxime syllogismis vires atque ordinem subministrant, reliqua verisimilibus ac dialecticis. Atque hi loci, qui maxime in eorum substantia sunt de quibus in quaestione dubitatur, ad praedicativos ac simplices, reliqui vero ad hypotheticos et conditionales respiciunt syllogismos98.

On the other hand, if the various logical entities (genus, species, opposition, etc.), before becoming loci, are understood as res that possess a precise logical function, the ordo locorum is able to reflect also the same order in which the mind comes to recognize the truth. The definition, for example, is the first and most important instrument for the acquisition of new knowledge; the division comes immediately after because everything that can be defined can be also divided; and so on for the rest of the loci, the order of which also makes sense from a gnoseological perspective99. A last question remains to be dealt with in this context, namely whether Themistius’s tópos can be matched with Theophrastus’s: given that the latter understood the concept as a logical law, what became of the other constitutive component of Aristotle’s tópos, the one that Theophrastus called «instruction»? The theory of Pinborg is that the differentiae re-echo the instruction in some way, although it is equally plausible that differentiae is simply one way of referring to the Aristotelian tópoi (e.g. a genere, a contraria, etc.)100.

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De top. diff., II, XI, 8-9, 1194A-1196A, p. 47, 14-20. Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.10. Cf. infra, Chap. 3, § 3.7. 100 Cf. J. PINBORG, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter: ein Überblick, Frommann – Holzboog, Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt 1972. 99

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4.1.4. The tópos of Aristotle’s Rhetoric Aristotle introduces the uses of the tópoi also in his discussion of the formulation of enthymemes101. These are the twenty-nine tópoi presented in the second book of the Rhetoric, some of which also appear in the Topica; others, however, are valid only in the context of rhetoric. Here, for example, is how the tópos drawn from definition is presented: Another is secured by defining your terms. Thus, ‘What is the supernatural? Surely it is either a god or the work of a god. Well, anyone who believes that the work of a god exists, cannot help also believing that gods exist’. Or take the argument of Iphicrates, ‘Goodness is true nobility; neither Harmodius nor Aristogeiton had any nobility before they did a noble deed’. He also argued that he himself was more akin to Harmodius and Aristogeiton than his opponent was. ‘At any rate, my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than yours are’. […] All the persons mentioned define their term and get at its essential meaning, and then use the result when reasoning on the point at issue102.

The precise nature, function, and role of the tópos of Aristotle’s Rhetoric are beyond the scope of this study. Here it is enough to observe that, in presenting the tópos relating to definition, Aristotle provides only the name of the tópos, followed by an example, leaving therefore the reader to infer its role in the demonstration. In other words, there is no theoretical analysis of the proposition from the perspective of logic, i.e. with regard to its signification, because the tópoi of Aristotle’s Rhetoric seem disconnected from the theory of the predicables, unlike those exhibited in the Topica. In the above example, it is possible to understand that the definition constitutes a tópos because the definition, in explaining what is defined, is obviously more convincing and persuasive than the term that it defines. The strategy of topica, so to speak, shown by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, will exert an influence in both the Greek and Latin traditions, for which development Cicero is certainly the most important witness. 101

Many studies are dedicated to the tópoi in Aristotle’s Rhetoric; for an updated bibliography, cf. S. RUBINELLI, Ars topica. 102 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II 1398a15-26 (Engl. transl. p. 2228).

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4.2 Boethius’s sources for Cicero’s locus As seen, Boethius’s book represents the main turning point in the transmission of the Aristotelian-Themistian conception of the tópos among Latin writers, thereby ensuring the survival of this conception in the West. Boethius’s aim, however, was not simply to pass on this teaching; his main objective was to reconcile Themistius’s and Cicero’s understandings of the topica. The main sources from which Boethius drew his interpretation of the Latin tradition on the loci are Cicero’s De oratore (55 BC) and Topica (44 BC). Cicero’s work is especially prominent in the third book of the De topicis differentiis, which is devoted to a presentation of the Ciceronian loci, while in the fourth book, which is devoted entirely to rhetoric and the loci rhetorici, Boethius draws freely on Cicero’s De inventione (ca. 84 BC). However, Cicero’s conceptions of the locus in the De inventione are very different from those found in De Oratore and the Topica, which fact bears witness to Cicero’s intellectual evolution on the subject. It will therefore be useful to examine first the nature of the locus in the earlier De inventione, before turning to the De oratore and Topica, in order to understand Boethius’s over-arching interpretive method with regard to the Ciceronian locus.

4.2.1 The loci of Cicero’s De inventione103 The varying Greek conceptions of rhetoric that exerted particular influence on Latin writers date back to the Peripatetic tradition transmitted in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (fourth century BC) and to the tradition represented by Hermagoras of Temnos (second half of the second century BC), whose teaching incorporated elements of Stoic logic of the Hellenistic period. It is important to keep in mind the different ways in which these two traditions understood the term tópos, for while in the De inventione Cicero is clearly indebted to Hermagoras’s rhetorical tradition, in the De oratore and the 103 For Cicero’s texts, the citations are in Marcus Tullius Cicero, Rhetorici libri duo qui vocantur de inventione, ed. E. STROEBEL, Teubneri, Stuttgart 1955 (M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia, 2) [= De inventione]; Id., De Oratore, ed. K. F. Kumaniecki, B. G. Teubner, Stuttgart 1969 (M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia, 3).

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Topica he introduces material belonging to the Peripatetic rhetorical tradition, and the most significant differences between Cicero’s earlier and later approaches to rhetoric concern his conception of inventio and locus. As the title indicates, Cicero’s De inventione (again, the earliest of the three treatises, dating around 84 BC) explores inventio, which is the first of the five phases in the composition of an oration, «quae princeps est omnium partium»104. However, the treatise also considers the nature of rhetoric, including its role, purpose, material, and parts, the genera of the disputes, the criteria useful to find the arguments, the conditions of the case, and the parts of the speech. A summary of these elements will provide the basis for a greater appreciation of the function of the locus in this text. Cicero identifies the broadest genus to which rhetoric belongs as political science, and inasmuch as the task of rhetoric is to convince, the means is by verbal persuasion105. Cicero follows closely Aristotle in considering the object of rhetoric in relation to the three areas in which it is used, i.e. the three kinds of genera causarum: demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial; for him, the parts of rhetoric are five, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio106. After this Aristotelian tripartition 104

Cicero, De inventione, I, VII, 9, p. 9, 11-12. Cf. ivi, I, V, 6, p. 9, 13: «Quare hanc oratoriam facultatem in eo genere ponemus, ut eam civilis scientiae partem esse dicamus. Officium autem eius facultatis videtur esse dicere adposite ad persuasionem; finis persuadere dictione». 106 Cf. ivi, I, V, 7, p. 7, 1-12: «Aristoteles autem, qui huic arti plurima adiumenta atque ornamenta subministravit, tribus in generibus rerum versari retori officium putavit, demonstrativo, deliberativo, iudiciali. Demonstrativo est, quod tribuitur in alicuius certae personae laudem aut vituperationem; deliberativum, quod positum in disceptatione civili habet in se sententiae dictionem: iudiciale, quod positum in iudicio habet in accusationem et defensionem aut petitionem et recusationem. Et, quemadmodum nostra quidem fert opinio, oratoris ars et facultas in hac materia tripertita versari existimanda est»; Id., De oratore, I, 31, 141, pp. 53, 17-54, 2: «Sed causarum, quae sint a communi quaestione seiunctae, partim in iudiciis versari partim in deliberationibus; esse etiam genus tertium, quod in laudandis aut vituperandis hominibus poneretur». For the art of Rhetoric, cf. Id., De inventione, I, VII, 9, pp. 8, 16-9, 2: «Quare materia quidem nobis rhetoricae videtur artis ea, quam Aristoteli visam esse diximus; partes autem eae, quas plerique dixerunt, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio. Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut verisimilium, quae causam probabilem reddant; dispositio est rerum inventarum in ordinem distributio; elocutio est idoneorum verborum [et sententiarum] ad inventionem accommodatio; memoria est firma animi rerum ac verborum ad inventionem perceptio; pronuntiatio est ex rerum et verborum dignitate vocis et corporis moderatio». Id., De oratore, I, 42, 187, pp. 71, 24-72, 2: «In hac denique ipsa ratione 105

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of the genera of rhetoric, the De inventione presents the division of the material that traces back to Hermagoras and that operated on the basis of constitutiones (or status causae), i.e. on the basis of the possible questions that may give rise to a case. It is therefore in regard to the genera of the disputes – because every case may refer to a fact (constitutio coniecturalis) – that it is necessary to know either who is the author of a controversial case, the name (constitutio definitiva) in cases where the main issue is how a criminal action should be defined, or the nature of a fact (constitutio generalis) when the intent behind the act is at issue. Finally, a case may concern a judicial action (constitutio translativa) in which the crucial issue is whether the judge is qualified to handle the case or whether it should instead be transferred to another court. It thus becomes clear that Hermagoras’s quadripartition of the genera of disputes applies mainly to the judicial field107. There is then the analytical presentation of the intricate doctrine of the constitutiones, i.e. the many distinctions that can be made within the status causae described above. Once the genus of the case is identified, Cicero adds, «we will have to examine afterwards what is the question, what is the reason, what is the point to judge, what is the support of the case»108. Only after learning the doctrine of the constitutiones can the rhetorician therefore dedicate himself to finding the arguments to prove his accusation or his defence, «so when they will be found diligently, according to the rules of rhetoric, and when they have been carefully studied, both the point to judge and the arguments that are necessary to prove and to support it, then, finally, an order should be given to the other parts of the speech»109. Six parts are said to make up a speech: exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, and peroratio110. It is the confirmatio and reprehensio that are relevant to the dicendi excogitare, ornare, disponere, meminisse, agere ignota quondam omnibus et diffusa late videbantur»; ivi, II, 19, 79, p. 135, 20: «Deinde quinque faciunt quasi membra eloquentiae: invenire quid dicas, inventa disponere, deinde ornare verbis, post memoriae mandare, tum ad extremum agere ac pronuntiare». 107 Cf. Id., De inventione, I, X, 14, pp. 12, 26-15, 6. 108 Ivi, I, XIII, 18, p. 18, 9-12: «deinde erit videndum, quae quaestio, quae ratio, quae iudicatio, quod firmamentum causae sit» (Engl. transl. by Jim Marks). 109 Ivi, I, XIV, 19, p. 18, 9-12: «Quare cum iudicatio et ea, quae ad iudicationem oportet argumenta inveniri, diligenter erunt artificio reperta, cura et cogitatione pertractata, tum denique ordinandae sunt ceterae partes orationis» (Engl. transl. by Jim Marks). 110 Cf. ivi, I, XIV, 19, p. 18, 12-14: «Eae partes sex esse omnino nobis videntur: exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, conclusio». The exordium, or prooemium, is the starting point from which the rhetorical speech begins, and with

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theory of the loci, because in them the rhetorician must consolidate his thesis and refute that of his opponent through argumentation. The source of the rhetorician’s evidence is summed up as follows: «Every matter is confirmed through argumentation, or from that which is attributed to either persons or affairs»111. Since a case comes about because a person has said a certain thing or taken a certain action, the evidence must derive from the persons involved or from the facts in question. These elements are termed adtributa, circumstantiae, fontes confirmationis, reprehensionis, and, finally, also loci112. Diagram no. 7a (Appendix, p. 329) lists the loci adtributa in the De inventione. The «attributes» (adtributa) referring to people are eleven in all (nomen, natura, victus, fortuna, habitus, affectio, studia, consilia, facta, casus, orationes), while the attributes related to the facts are grouped into four categories: those inherent in the facts themselves (continentia cum ipso negotio), those gathered from the circumstances that accompany the facts (in gestione negotii), accessories (adiuncta negotii), and those due to the fact (negotium consequuntur)113. The question remains regarding the extent to which the adtributa are to be considered loci. Boethius also refers to loci as circumstantiae because, on closer examination, these are the elements that determine the occurrence of the case, i.e. the conditions that have led a certain person to do a certain thing. Therefore, the term locus refers precisely to the material aspect of an argument, to the exclusion of its formal aspect. In other words, the circumstantiae or adtributa of the person and the act are the starting point for the inquiry, in the course of which the rhetorician must look for the material suitable to the arguments that form his accusation or defence. Michael Leff identifies Hermagoras as Cicero’s source for which the rhetorician tries to gain the favour of the listener; the narratio comes after the proem, being a concise and clear statement of the facts; next comes the partitio, with which the plan of the argumentation is announced; in the confirmatio and reprehensio the rhetorician makes his arguments and refutes those of his opponent; finally, with the peroratio, also called conclusio, the rhetorician concludes the speech, often with an appeal to the emotions. 111 Ivi, I, XXIV, 34, p. 31, 26-27: «Omnes res argumentando confirmantur aut ex eo, quod personis, aut ex eo, quod negotiis est adtributum» (Engl. transl. by Jim Marks). 112 Cf. ivi, I, XXIX, 44, pp. 37, 27-38, 2: «Omnis autem argumentatio, quae ex iis locis, quos commemoravimus, sumetur, aut probabilis aut necessaria debebit». 113 In the second book Cicero discusses in detail the loci of confirmation and refutation related to every kind of case.

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distinguishing the attributes of the person and of the fact114. Hermagoras, in fact, separated rhetorical questions into thesis and hypothesis: the theses are abstract and universal questions, while the hypotheses are concrete questions included in particular circumstances; thus Cicero’s division of the attributes of the person and of the fact recalls Hermagoras’s division of the circumstances. The rhetorical inventio of Cicero’s text, therefore, is the act of identifying the material with which to compose the arguments. This task is accomplished by distinguishing different kinds of cases, and was facilitated and systematized by the masters of rhetoric, in this case Hermagoras, who codified elements that may apply to any case, i.e. the circumstances, which are always relevant, either to a person or to a fact. By presenting inventio in this way, as research and discovery of the material that will support a rhetorician’s arguments, Cicero does not here in the De inventione betray any awareness of the concept of tópos transmitted in Aristotle’s Topica and Rhetoric, a concept that, as has been seen, concerns the rhetorician’s identifying not so much the material but the form, i.e. the patterns that will help to structure his arguments.

4.2.2 The loci of Cicero’s Topica When Cicero again took up the subject of inventio and locus many years later, in the De oratore (55 BC) and Topica (44), his approach proved very different from that in the De inventione. For, as alluded to earlier, both of these later texts include a list of loci that derives from the rhetorical tradition surrounding Aristotle’s Rhetoric. The only difference between the two lists of loci lies in their different contexts: the De oratore places its list within a rhetorical context, while the one in the Topica, which treatise is formally addressed to the jurist Trebatius, occurs within a legal context, and the supporting examples are all from Roman law115. It is this latter list that Boethius cites in the third book of the De topicis differentiis. 114 Cf. M. C. LEFF, «The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to Boethius», Rhetorica, 1 (1983) 23-44; he has pointed out that, in the Latin tradition, the term locus has different meanings; this is the main reason, according to him, that it is impossible to reconstruct today the exact history of this term. Sara Rubinelli has analyzed the different meanings of locus in the De inventione: cf. S. RUBINELLI, Ars topica, pp. 93-109. 115 Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 163-173; Id., Topica, 8, p. 118, 29-33.

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From the beginning, the radically different way in which Cicero presents inventio in comparison with how he presents it in the De inventione is apparent: All methodical treatment of rational discourse involves two skills, invention and judgement; Aristotle came first in both, it seems to me. The Stoics on the other hand concerned themselves with one of the two skills only; that is, they pursued ways of judging (arguments) diligently by means of that science which they call dialectic. The skill of invention, however, which is called topice and which was both of more immediate practical use and certainly prior in the order of nature, they completely neglected116.

Benedetto Riposati and Tobias Reinhardt both conclude that behind the Cicero’s expression ratio disserendi is the Greek λογική, a term that recalls one of the three kinds of philosophy distinguished by the Academics, namely ethical, physical, and logical. The divisions of λογική are many, as is the case with the Stoics, among which the best known is the distinction among logic (called διαλεκτική), epistemology, and rhetoric, where often λογική is associated only with διαλεκτική, to the exclusion of epistemology and rhetoric. Cicero in the Topica distinguishes, within the ratio disserendi (λογική), an ars inveniendi and an ars iudicandi; he is not, however, proposing here a new division of λογική, because this distinction is exclusively functional, intended to emphasize the fact that the Stoics, in their treatment of λογική (which, again, they identify with διαλεκτική), have dealt only with what Cicero called the ars iudicandi, and neglected completely the ars inveniendi, Greek τοπική. Therefore, inventio and iudicium are in the Topica understood as two aspects of a unique logical operation, and Cicero’s aim is simply to restore the full breadth of meaning to λογική (ratio disserendi), including τοπική, in place of the truncated meaning proffered by the Stoics. What Cicero determined to do with this 116

Ivi, 6, p. 118, 15-21, Topica, ed. with an introd., transl. and commentary by T. REINHARDT, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 119): «Cum omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat artes, unam inveniendi alteram iudicandi, utriusque princeps, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles fuit. Stoici autem in altera elaboraverunt; iudicandi enim vias diligenter persecuti sunt ea scientia quam διαλεκτικήν appellant, inveniendi artem quae τοπική dicitur, quae et ad usum potior erat et ordine naturae certe prior, totam relinquerunt». For the meaning of the expression ratio disserendi: cf. infra, § 6; cf. also MAGNANO, «Boezio e l’assiomatizzazione».

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treatise was to trace the discussion back to its (pre-Stoic) source, namely Aristotle. The following diagram illustrates these distinctions: CICERO STOICI

RATIO DISSERENDI

ars inveniendi τοπική

ars iudicandi διαλεκτική

1

via iudicandi διαλεκτική

What, then, has happened to the concept of rhetorical inventio in the De inventione, understood as the first and most important of the five phases of the composition of an oration? One thing is certain, the concept of the ars inveniendi presented in the Topica clearly indicates that inventio is no longer confined to rhetoric; rather, going back to Aristotle, Cicero now understands the concept as the disciplina inveniendorum argumentorum, the focus of which is on the loci. Thus the Topica defines the locus and argumentum as follows: Just as it is easy to find hidden things, once their hiding-places have been pointed out and marked down, so we need to know the right «places» if we wish to track down a certain argument; «places» is the name Aristotle gave those locations, so to speak, from which we can draw arguments. Therefore we may define a Place as the location of an argument, and an argument as a reason that lends belief to a doubtful issue 117.

The locus is first of all referred to as a sedes, and the two terms can be considered synonyms; the metaphor of the place essentially recalls the idea of «containing», since, as the material place is the physical space that embraces in itself the extension of a body, in the same way the «places» of the discipline of the topica contain the principles of every kind of 117 Cicero, Topica, 7-8, p. 118, 21-28 (modified Eng. transl. p. 119): «Ut igitur earum rerum quae absconditae sunt demonstrato et notato loco facilis inventio est, sic cum pervestigare argumentum aliquod volumus, locos nosse debemus; sic enim appellatae ab Aristotele sunt eae quasis sedes, e quibus argumenta promuntur. Itaque licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem, argumentum autem, rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem».

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argumentation, the argumenta. The direct reference, compared with the use of the term locus, is to Aristotle, although Cicero’s definition of locus is not Aristotelian: Aristotle in fact, at least in his Topica, as we have seen, never supplies a definition of the term tópos, while in his Rhetoric he offers but a brief description118. The argumentum, then, is defined as a ratio, i.e. a norm or a rule, capable of generating fides with which to confirm a doubtful issue. There are many things that produce fides, but evidently not all can be considered rationes, because not all have normative value. However, the fundamentally rhetorical conception of Cicero’s argumentum should be noted, and therefore also that of the locus from which it proceeds: if a locus generates fides in the face of res dubiae, this means that the argumentum is not able to show that these res are true and necessary, evidently because the argumentum does not have the character of necessity, but only of probability. Therefore, the locus and the Ciceronian argumentum, i.e. the sources from which it is possible to demonstrate the fides that compels assent, involve the conception that, in the argumentation of topica, the element of persuasiveness incorporates and includes that of demonstrability. Cicero continues with the division of the loci because some are placed inside the terms of the dubious proposition (loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur), while others are placed outside of these terms (loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus). Diagram no. 7b (Appendix, p. 330) thus lists the nineteen loci adduced in the Topica. Cicero does not explain how a locus and an argumentum generate fides in the face of res dubiae, that is, the way in which, in a real demonstrative process, these two elements would intervene to render the still dubious proposition in a scientific manner; he merely provides the name for each locus, followed immediately by an example: But when a definition is applied to the entire subject under discussion, then that which is at issue and as it were wrapped up is unfolded. The standard phrasing of this pattern of argument is as follows: The civil law is equity put in place for the benefit of those who are (citizens) of the same state, for the purpose of securing the possession of what is theirs. But the knowledge of this equity is useful. Therefore, the science of the civil law is useful119. 118

Cf. supra, § 4.1.1. Cicero, Topica, 9, p. 120, 1-5 (Engl. transl. p. 121): «Sed ad id totum de quo disseritur cum definitio adhibetur, quasi involutum evolvitur id de quo quaeritur; eius argumenti talis est formula: Ius civile est aequitas constituta iis qui eiusdem civitatis 119

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The first locus of the list presented by Cicero is the locus a definitione; observing the example, the reader can go back to the elements that structure the argumentation of the topica. In order to give order to these elements, it is necessary to begin by identifying the quaestio that initiates the demonstrative process: «is civil law useful or not?» The proposition that «civil law is useful» constitutes the res dubia that needs to be proved through an argumentum; the argumentum in turn is drawn from a locus. Therefore, the one who seeks to demonstrate identifies from the list of loci the locus a definitione that is suitable for generating fides for the dubious proposition (res dubia). The inventio of this locus points the way to formulating the definition of the subject of the dubious proposition: «The civil law is equity put in place for the benefit of those who are (citizens) of the same state, for the purpose of securing the possession of what is theirs»; at this point, all that remains is to arrange everything into an argumentatio, as illustrated in Diagram no. 8 (Appendix, p. 330). Reinhardt explains that two theoretical presuppositions form the basis of the logical inference for this syllogism. The first is that all that is true of the definiens, i.e. of the definition, is also true of the definiendum, i.e. of what is defined, and vice versa; thus, if the definitio of civil law is useful (equity put in place for the benefit of those who are [citizens] of the same state for the purpose of securing the possession of what is theirs), it must also be true that «civil law is useful», because these elements are interchangeable. The second presupposition is that the definition is capable of establishing credibility and acting as a function of a locus because it, by explaining and revealing the essence of the term that is defined, exists within the context of a demonstrative process, making it more persuasive than that term120. As can be seen, the definition, understood from a universal point of view, acts as a function of the locus, and thus the term locus is used in reference to the function that a logical entity (in this case, the definition) performs in the service of a demonstrative process. Finally, it can be observed that, in the above-mentioned syllogism, the definitio of civil law has served as a mediating term that connects the subject and predicate of the dubious proposition. In fact, the definitio is a predicate in the major sunt ad res suas obtinendas; eius autem aequitatis utilis cognitio est; utilis ergo est iuris civilis scientia». 120 Cf. T. REINHARDT, «Commentary», in Cicero, Topica, ed. with an introduction, translation and commentary by T. REINHARDT, op. cit., pp. 200-202.

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premise and a subject in the minor premise, and for this reason Boethius in his commentary to Cicero’s Topica says: «an argument is nothing other than the discovery of an intermediate»121. Again, Cicero explains none of this, but leaves the reader with the tools to perceive and to reconstruct intuitively the strategy that guides the formulation of the argumentation. In any case, it can now be understood how Cicero conceives of the loci as positions for argumentation schemes: «locum invenire» means, in fact, to find the argumentum that can be applied to the dubious proposition in order to lend it scientific status.

4.2.3. The Aristotelian origin of the Ciceronian locus Despite Cicero’s declaration that his treatise is a summary of Aristotle’s Topica, there is a great distance that separates his locus from the tópos of the latter work. Numerous studies have tried to establish the original link between the two types of loci. Sara Rubinelli has recently demonstrated conclusively that the list of the loci in Cicero’s Topica derives from a selection from the list of tópoi in the second book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric122. With her findings in mind, an attempt will now be made to shed light on how Cicero derived his later concept of the locus from Aristotle. The differences and similarities between the tópos of Aristotle’s Topica and the Rhetoric on the one hand, and the locus of Cicero’s Topica on the other, can be summarized as follows. First of all, Cicero’s explanation of the loci suggests that their function is not bound to an analysis of the proposition from the perspective of logic, i.e. that of its signification; in other words, his loci operate in a manner disconnected from the theory of the predicables, which theory on the contrary plays a fundamental role in Aristotle’s Topica. In that work, the organization of the material distinguishes the practical application of Aristotle’s method for each of the predicables, so that the dialectician’s first operation is to identify the nature of the dialectical question. In the Rhetoric, however, the treatment of the tópoi is much closer to Cicero’s, likewise giving 121

In top., I, 1051A (Engl. transl. p. 32): «nihil est aliud argumentum quam medietatis inventio». 122 Cf. RUBINELLI, Ars topica, pp. 141-144.

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little importance to the examination of the proposition from a logical point of view123. Second, the strategy of Aristotle’s Topica involves many elements, the most important of which are those that Theophrastus called «instruction» and tópos, i.e. the logical law. The instruction suggests the abstract point of view through which to examine the thesis that is to be established, and it enables the identification of one or more particular premises. The logical law indicates instead the logical connection between the premises (found by means of the instruction) and the thesis to be established. As discussed earlier, Cicero merely provides the name of the locus according to a form now evidently codified (e.g. ex or a definitione), followed immediately by the example, thus taking for granted the reader’s capacity to intuit the strategy behind it. Yet if, on the one hand, the name of the Ciceronian locus recalls the instruction (because it suggests the premise), the logical law is entirely absent from Cicero’s strategy. As has been seen, however, even in the Rhetoric Aristotle (like Cicero) merely gives the name of the tópos followed immediately by the example, again leaving the reader with the capacity to deduce at once the way in which the tópos works in the service of the demonstrative process. It is in these respects that the Ciceronian locus is closer to the tópos of Aristotle’s Rhetoric than to that of his Topica. Finally, it will be useful to summarize and draw attention to the difference that exists between Cicero’s conceptions of inventio and locus in the De inventione and in the later Topica, which, again, suggests considerable intellectual evolution. In the earlier text, the list of loci represents the classification of the elements that the rhetorician must keep in mind in formulating the arguments. The loci are thus here the circumstances, corresponding to the attributes of the person and the act, where these principles are understood from a purely material perspective, i.e. as pertaining to the content. In the Topica, on the other hand, the term locus refers to the useful principle from which the argumentative strategy proceeds, this time understood from the formal, rather than material, perspective. Therefore, Cicero, having entered into 123

As has been seen, apart from the first book, in which the elements of the method in general are shown, and the eighth, which illustrates the rules of dialectical debate, the remaining six books of Aristotle’s Topica are subdivided on the basis of the four predicables. Cf. supra, § 4.1.1.

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contact with Aristotelian rhetorical traditions, has decided to reform the conception of inventio and locus, transposing both on a logicalformal level, and elevating inventio, up to that moment confined to rhetorical contexts, to the rank of a real philosophical discipline, the ars inveniendi. Based on this analysis, it has proved possible to identify the origin of Aristotle’s influence on the Ciceronian locus. With these findings in mind, it will now be easier to understand the way in which Boethius altered the original meaning of the Ciceronian locus in order to make it resemble more Themistius’s tópos.

5. Boethius’s reconciliation of the Aristotelian-Themistian tópos with the Ciceronian locus In order fully to appreciate the ways in which Boethius attempted to reconcile the Themistian tópos with the Ciceronian locus, it is first of all useful to visualize this project as a mosaic with many tiles, with the result achieved by the De topicis differentiis being but the last step in a much broader design. As discussed, the topica were already in use among Latin writers, but in an exclusively rhetorical context; as a consequence, a vocabulary suitable to this subject had already been elaborated. But Boethius, having translated and commented on Aristotle’s Topica, and having entered into contact with the Greek tradition of the Aristotelian tópoi through Themistius, intended to restore the dialectical value of the Latin loci. Thus, on the one hand, he used the Latin translation of the corresponding Greek concepts of the topica (maxima propositio and maximae differentia propositionis). On the other hand, however, he adapted the Latin terms to further his own aims. In fact, the concepts of inventio, locus, and argumentum that were borrowed from the Ciceronian topica take on, from Boethius onwards, a decidedly dialectical meaning. Boethius justified the legitimacy of his innovation by stressing, in the fourth book of the De topicis differentiis, that rhetoric itself is a product of dialectic. For Boethius, rhetoric is born, in fact, from the contractio of the ambitus of the loci dialectici, for which reason the rhetorician must always proceed from the loci dialectici, while the dialectician by definition begins from first principles, because dialectic always starts from what is prior by

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nature, i.e. the universal124. Based on these considerations, it is clear that Boethius’s fundamental goal was to reclaim for the discipline of topica its original status, which transcended the context of rhetoric125. 124 Cf. De top. diff., IV, XII, 1, 1215D-1216A, p. 91, 15: «Differentiae illae sunt, quod dialectici etiam thesibus apti sunt, rhetorici tantum ad hypothesis, id est, ad quaestiones informatas circumstantiis assumuntur; nam sicut ipsae facultates a semetipsis universalitate et particularitate distinctae sunt, ita etiam earum loci ambitu et contractione discreti sunt». Cf. infra, Chap. 4, § 4.7. 125 In the last part of De topicis differentiis, Boethius shows unmistakable awareness of the rhetorical origin of the Ciceronian locus on the one hand, and of the dialectical origin of the Aristotelian-Themistian tópoi on the other. Cf. De top. diff., IV, XIII, 1-2, 1216CD, p. 92, 10-17: «Omnibus igitur, quae superius proposuimus, expeditis, illud arbitror apponendum, quod M. Tullius Topica, quae ad C. Trebatium peritum iuris edidit, non eo modo, quo de ipsis disputari possit, disseruit, sed quem ad modum rhetoricae facultatis argumenta ducerentur, quod in his commentariis diligentius expedivimus, qui a nobis in eiusdem Ciceronis Topica conscripti sunt. Quo autem modo de his dialecticis rationibus disputetur, in his commentariis quos in Aristotelis Topica a nobis translata conscripsimus, expeditum est». Cf. infra, Chap. 4, § 4.7. James Shiel and Eleonore Stump disagree about Boethius’s rationes dialecticae; according to the former, the expression suggests that Boethius had at hand not the entire paraphrase, but only Themistius’ diagram of the loci from that philosopher’s lost commentary on Aristotle’s Topica. Stump, by contrast, basing her argument on Averroes’s testimony regarding Themistius’s topica, avers that Boethius possessed not only the diagram, but the entire paraphrase, including even Themistius’s commentary on Aristotle’s Topica. Cf. J. SHIEL, «Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle», Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 4 (1958) 217- 244; this same article appears now in an updated version: «Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle», in R. SORABJI (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, Duckworth, London 1990, [pp. 349-372] p. 367: «All the dialecticae rationes used in the de differentiis topicis by including the long discussion of magis, minus, etc., are elaborated from the simple Themistian diagram given in contrast to Cicero’s at 1202c-d. Boethius’ other references to Themistius (1214a, 1215a) are obviously based also on that diagram. The diagram came from Themistius’ commentary on the Topics, now lost. And since it is precisely for this Themistian material that Boethius refers to his own commentary on the Topics, I take it for certain that the diagram was a scholion in his Greaca volumina of the Topics»; STUMP, «Boethius’s Works on the Topics», pp. 88-89: «Thus, all the points that Shiel adduces for his conclusion here that the Themistian diagram was a scholion to the Topics in Boethius’s copy of the Organon turn out to be either unsupported assertions or mistaken claims, and there is no reason for supposing that the Themistian diagram was such a scholion or that Boethius took his discussion of the Themistian Topics from such a scholion. A fortiori, there is no reason for thinking that the entire treatise derives from scholia or for rejecting the common-sense view that

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In the first of a number of approaches to this task of recontextualising the topica, Boethius tried to reconcile Cicero’s division of the logic of the ratio disserendi with Aristotle’s division of logic, λογική. Thus he translated Aristotle’s Topica, and composed a commentary on that work and on Cicero’s Topica, in order to bring out the originally axiomatic nature and dialectical value of the Ciceronian loci as loci dialectici, a process completed in the third book of the De topicis differentiis, in which the Ciceronian loci are in every respect presented as loci dialectici126. So it is that the most significant statements made by Boethius regarding the Latin topica concern the concepts of locus and argumentum, as will now be seen. The agreement between the two lists of loci was in fact achieved in the first instance through a redefinition of the concept of locus as it was conceived by Cicero: «Locus namque est, ut M. Tullio placet, argumenti sedes. Cuius definitionis quae sit vis paucis absolvam. Argumenti enim sedes partim maxima propositio intellegi potest, partim propositionis maximae differentia»127. This definition is not in fact consistent with Cicero’s observations on the locus; instead, it points to a new conception. For where the Ciceronian locus (sedes argumenti) does not belong to propositional logic, Themistius’s locus has a twofold nature: the maxima propositio is this treatise is Boethis’s own and not just a translation. But, in addition, there is good evidence on the other side to suggest that Boethius knew much more of Themistius’s commentary on the Topics than the diagram which is supposed to have come from that commentary Averroes has preserved portions of Themistius’s commentary of his own work on the Topics». 126 Benedetto Riposati, one of the leading authorities on Cicero’s Topica, wanted to see in Boethius the most faithful interpreter of the Ciceronian argumentum, but his analysis was unable to benefit from the latest research regarding the Arab tradition of Aristotle’s Topica, which reveals more about Boethius’s Greek source and his reasons for composing the commentary, namely to axiomatise the Ciceronian topica and to show how the same locus can be used in the service both of the dialectic and the rhetoric. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, p. 30: «Così inteso l’argomento topico è, nell’ambito dell’argomentazione dialettica, la più precisa espressione del locus, perché, o serva esso a provare una verità, già enucleata nella proposizione generale, o a ricavare sillogisticamente da questa gli elementi differenziali per un più ampio sviluppo discorsivo, predicabile a verità che con la proposizione principale si connettono o sono in essa virtualmente contenute, l’argumentum discende sempre da quelle maximae propositionis differentiae, che costituiscono il locus ciceroniano»; cf. MAGNANO, «Boezio e l’assiomatizzazione». 127 De top. diff., II, III, 1-2, 1185A, p. 25, 8-11. Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.

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by definition propositional, while the differentia takes only the name of genus of the maximae that it contains (a definitione, a genere, etc.), and therefore is not propositional. In this regard, it may be observed that, in his commentary on the Topica, in which he also attributes to Cicero the use of the maximae propositiones (and in so doing completely misrepresents the latter’s intent), Boethius never mentions Themistius as his source; he instead attributes the use of the maximae propositiones directly to Aristotle128. In so doing, Boethius may be indicating that, on the basis of the sources in his possession, he has distinguished the two types of loci, attributing to Aristotle the maximae propositiones and their classification by means of differentiae to Themistius. It is indeed no coincidence that the connection between Themistius and Cicero regarding the topica resides precisely in this aspect: both authors refer to the loci as the differentiae of the maximae propositiones. However, while Themistius in his paraphrase on the Topica probably listed also the corresponding maximae (equivalent to the list of maximae in the second book of the De topicis differentiis), Cicero did not do so, and Boethius wanted to remedy precisely what was lacking by attributing to each Ciceronian locus a corresponding maxima, which he does in both the commentary on Cicero’s Topica and in the De topicis differentiis129. Diagrams nos. 9 and 10 (Appendix, pp. 331332) illustrate the maximal propositions that Boethius assigned to Cicero in his commentary and in the third book of the De topicis differentiis, respectively. Boethius has not merely reformed the concept of the Ciceronian locus expressed in the Topica, however, but he has extended this process of axiomatization even to the loci rhetorici of the De inventione, i.e. to the loci adtributa, so much so that, in the fourth book of the De topicis 128

Cf. In Top., I, 1054B: «Ex his etiam quae superius dicta sunt quid distent Topica Ciceronis atque Aristotelis apparuit. Aristoteles namque de maximis propositionibus disserit, has enim locos argumentorum esse posuit, ut nos quoque supra retulimus. Tullius vero locos non maximas propositiones, sed earum continentes differentias vocat, ac de his docere contendit» (Engl. transl. p. 36: «From what I have said above, the difference between Aristotle’s Topics and Cicero’s Topica should be clear. Aristotle discusses maximal propositions, for he asserted that these are the Topics for arguments, as we also related above; Cicero, however, calls Topics not maximal propositions but rather their constitutive differentiae, which is what he directs his attention toward teaching»). 129 Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.2.

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differentiis, he makes the categories of the loci correspond to each member of Cicero’s four-fold division of the loci adtributa by proposing a twofold combination130. However, in submitting the loci of the De inventione to the same process of axiomatization, Boethius has again certainly misinterpreted Cicero. As has been seen, the diverse meanings of the term locus in Cicero’s writings is rather a sign of intellectual evolution: acquaintance with the Aristotelian meaning of the tópos led Cicero to rethink rhetorical inventio, shifting his focus beyond acquisition of the material to the shaping of his arguments through the use of loci. Given these considerations, it seems clear that Boethius’s reading was informed by undeclared theoretical presuppositions, with the consistent aim of identifying Cicero’s locus with Themistius’s. Boethius in effect empties Cicero’s rhetorical language of its original meaning in order to recast it in logical-dialectical terms. In abandoning Cicero’s original intentions, Boethius reaped the benefit of a Latin vocabulary suited to articulating the Aristotelian-Themistian tópoi that rendered his arguments comprehensible to his Latin readership. In this respect, the Ciceronian locus was actually, in its intentions and aims, closer to Aristotle’s tópos than to Boethius’s interpretation of it owing to the latter’s desire to reconcile Cicero’s locus at all costs with the Aristotelian-Themistian tópos. These relationships between Themistius’s and Cicero’s conceptions of the tópos are illustrated in Diagram no. 11 (Appendix, p. 333). The missing link in Boethius’s articulation of the Ciceronian locus is the maxima propositio, and in the case of the Themistian locus the concept of argumentum. Boethius then filled in the missing terms: on the one hand, apropos of Cicero’s Topica, he in the third book of the De topicis differentiis attributes the corresponding maximae propositiones to each Ciceronian locus (loci being understood by him as differentiae); on the other hand, in showing that a locus cannot be a sedes for another locus (because a locus is always and only a sedes argumenti), Boethius shows that both the differentia and the maxima can be understood as sedes argumenti, though in different respects. The differentia is interpreted as a sedes of the maximae propositiones, because the latter, when they are drawn from their differentia, do not act as a function of the loci, but rather express the argumenta; the maxima instead is a locus because it contains in itself the entire development of the argumentatio (the syllogism), inside or outside 130

Cf. infra, Chap. 4, § 4.7.

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of which it may be placed131. On closer examination, it becomes apparent that the necessary preconditions for identifying the two concepts of locus are, first, that the differentia of the maxima propositio is understood as an argumenti sedes and, second, that the maxima propositio (when it is drawn from its differentia, rather than serving as a locus for other propositions) expresses an argumentum. Returning to an earlier discussion, the very title, De topicis differentiis, refers, in all probability, to the unifying element that Boethius identified between the two approaches, i.e. the «topical differences», that, not by chance, remain the highest principles (being not propositional and therefore not conversational) from which all kinds of argumentation can be drawn. It is therefore undeniable that his adaptation of the Ciceronian concepts of locus and argumentum to Themistius’s concepts of maxima propositio 131 Cf. In Top., I, 1058C: «Ita nunc sit divisio locorum, nec hoc superius dictis videatur esse contrarium, cum et maximas propositiones, et earum differentias continentes communi nomine appellavimus locos. Nam maximae propositiones, licet eo ipso quo maximae sint includant caeteras et vocentur loci, tamen quia sunt notissimae possunt rebus dubiis esse argumenta. Iure igitur earum differentiae loci nominantur, quod in locorum speciebus, aliter sese habet, quae prorsus argumenta esse non possunt: nam in ipso locus velut species quasdam dividitur in eos qui sunt ex toto, ex partibus, ex nota, ex affectis. Unusquisque enim horum locorum primi loci integrum videtur ferre vocabulum, nam ut hominem animal dicimus, itemque equum atque bovem animalia nuncupamus, sic is locus qui ex toto est in ipso esse dicitur, itemque qui ex partibus ac nota, atque ex affectis in ipso sunt. Sed ex his locis argumenta quidem duci possibile est, ipsa vera argumenta ut sint, fieri nequit» (Engl. transl. p. 41: «This point should not appear to contradict what was said above when we called both maximal propositions and their constitutive differentiae by the common name of Topics. Although maximal propositions insofar as they are maximal include other propositions and are called Topics, nevertheless because they are most known they can serve as an argument for things that are in doubt. Therefore the differentiae of these maximal propositions are rightly given the name ‘Topics’. But things are different in the case of the species of Topics that certainly cannot be arguments. The Topic that inheres in the thing at issue is divided into Topics from the whole, from the parts, from a sign, and from related things, as if it were being divided into its ‘species’. Every one of these Topics seems to bear the whole name of the first Topic. For as we say that a man is an animal and similarly we call a horse and a cow ‘animals’, so the Topic from the whole is said to be in the thing at issue, and similarly the Topics from the parts, from a sign, and from related things are in the things at issue. But though it is possible to draw arguments from these Topics, they themselves cannot be arguments»). Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.2.

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and maximae differentia propositionis represents Boethius’s own original contribution to the study of rhetoric and dialectic.

6. The place of the discipline of topica in the division of logic Another important question that remains to be discussed concerns the place that the discipline of topica occupies within the division of logic. Boethius had tried, starting already in his second commentary on the Isagoge (ca. AD 507 to 509), to reconcile the division schemes of Greek and Latin logic, so it is possible to observe something of his intellectual evolution over time, in like manner as it was possible to observe Cicero’s. Boethius begins the De topicis differentiis by presenting the Ciceronian ratio disserendi and its division: The whole theory of discourse, which the ancient Peripatetics called logic, is divided into two parts: one the art of discovering, the other that of judging arguments. In particular, that part which purges and informs judgment they call analytice, and we can call it resolutoria. That part, however, which regulates the ability of discovering arguments is called by the Greeks topice, and by us localis132.

To review briefly, the ratio disserendi is at the outset identified with what the ancients Peripatetics called λογική, which is then subdivided into an ars iudicandi, called by the Greeks ἀναλυτική and by the Latins resolutoria, and an ars inveniendi, Greek τοπική and Latin localis; the treatise deals only with the ars inveniendi or τοπική. In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius shows how the division of the Ciceronian ratio disserendi coincides with λογική, the latter being directly attributed to Aristotle: 132

De top. diff., I, I, 1-2, 1173B, p. 1, 4-9 (the English translation is mine): «Omnis ratio disserendi, quam logicen Peripatetici veteres appellaverunt, in duas distribuitur partes, unam inveniendi, alteram iudicandi. Et ea quidem pars, quae iudicium purgat atque instruit, ab illis analytice vocata est, a nobis potest resolutoria nuncupari. Ea vero, quae inveniendi facultatem ministrat, a Graecis topice, a nobis localis dicitur. Ac de illa quidem parte, quae iudicandi magistra est, alias disputabitur». Cf. F. MAGNANO, «Boethius: the Division of Logic between Greek and Latin Traditions», in J. BRUMBERG (ed.), L’Organon dans la translatio studiorum à l’époque d’Albert le Grand, Brepols, Turnhout 2013, pp. 141-171 (Studia Artistarum, 37).

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In one way, there is a threefold partition of logic, for the whole force of the logical discipline defines something, divides something, or deduces something. Moreover, the skill of deducing itself consists of three different parts, for disputation progresses by means of true and necessary argumentations (this is called a discipline and demonstration), by means of readily believable argumentations only (this is said to be dialectic), or by means of argumentations that are very clearly false (this is taken to be sophistry or trickery). So logic, which is expertise in discourse, deals with definition, partition or deduction – that is, with true and necessary argumentations, with readily believable (that is, verisimilar) argumentations, or with sophistical (that is, deceptive) argumentations, for (as we said before) these are the parts of deduction. And this is one partition of logic, in accordance with which Aristotle calls dialectic the skill of deduction, which uses what is readily believable133.

The entire force of logic is expressed in the tripartition of its operations. The mind, in order to gain a more perfect knowledge of reality, first of all defines the objects of its knowledge (definitio), subsequently producing a division in order to enumerate the parts of which every res is constituted (partitio); finally, the mind formulates argumentation (collectio). The latter skill has three components because the facultas colligendi is able to provide real and necessary argumentations (from which the science called disciplina or demonstratio arises), probable argumentations (whence the dialectica), and openly false argumentations (whence the sophistica or cavillatoria)134. 133

In Top., I, 1045BC (modified Engl. transl. pp. 25-26): «Et huius uno quidem modo trina partitio est: omnis namque vis logicae disciplinae aut definit aliquid, aut partitur, aut colligit. Colligendi autem facultas triplicis diversitate tractatur: aut enim veris ac necessariis argumentationibus disputatio decurrit, et disciplina vel demonstratio nuncupatur; aut tantum probabilibus, et dialectica dicitur; aut apertissime falsis, et sophistica, id est, cavillatoria perhibetur. Logica igitur, quae est peritia disserendi, vel de diffinitione, vel de partitione, vel de collectione, id est, vel de veris ac necessariis, vel de probabilibus, id est verisimilibus, vel de sophisticis, id est, cavillatoriis argumentationibus tractat, has enim collectionis partes esse praediximus. Atque haec est una logicae partitio, in qua dialecticam Aristoteles vocat facultatem per probabilia colligendi». 134 Boethius presents the same tripartition also in his commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge, in which he dwells at length on the latter’s insistence that the quinque res are useful not only as an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, but also for the proper formulation of definitions, division, and demonstration. Cf. Boethius, In Isagogen

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Thus, logica remains associated with the definitio, partitio, and collectio of the argumentationes necessariae, probabiles, or sophisticae135. Boethius’s precise understanding may thus be observed: Aristotle called dialectica the discipline that deals with the argumentationes probabiles, which means that it cannot be identified with the ars inveniendi. The situation is illustrated in Diagram no. 12 (Appendix, p. 333). Boethius next introduces the division of the Ciceronian ratio disserendi:

Porphyrii commenta, editio prima, ed. G. SCHEPPS, rev. S. BRANDT, G. Freytag, Leipzig 1906 (in PL 64, coll. 9-70) (Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, 48) [= In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio prima], I, 4, 13AB, pp. 11, 23-12, 2: «Ad grammaticam vero non minor huius rei usus est, quando per orationem genus, octo vero partes orationis per genera, species, differentias propriaque metimur. Est vero huius rei perquam rhetoricae amica coniunctaque cognitio. Ita enim rhetoricam in tribus causarum possumus separare generibus et eas in subiectis constitutionibus dissecare. Definitionum quoque, quod ad logicam pertinet, magna atque utilis uberrimaque cognitio est; quas definitiones nisi per genera, species, differentiae proprietatesque tractaveris, nullus umquam definitionibus terminus inponetur. [...] In divisione vero tantum prodest, ut nisi per horum scientiam nulla res recte distribui secarique possit. Nam quae generum vel specierum recta distributio divisione erit, ubi ipsarum per quas dividitur rerum nulla scientiae cognitione dirigimur? Probationum vero veritas in his maxime constituta est, quod per ea quae dividis, id quod dividis vel quid aliud probas»; cf. ivi., 18AC, pp. 22, 13-23, 16; cf. also G. D’ONOFRIO, «La scala ricamata. La philosophiae divisio di Severino Boezio, tra essere e conoscere», in ID. (ed.), La divisione della filosofia e le sue ragioni. Lettura di testi medievali (VI-XIII secolo). Atti del Settimo Convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (Assisi, 14-15 novembre 1977), Avagliano, Cava de’ Tirreni 2001, pp. 1163 (Schola Salernitana, Studi e testi, 5). 135 The definitio is the logical operation whereby the mind, coming to know an object, tries to explain all of the object’s characteristics in order to reveal its nature, using the genus and specific difference, which are the elements that enable identification of the species to which the res belongs. The partitio is rather the operation by which the mind identifies and enumerates all of the elements that are part of the res, unlike the divisio. The partitio actually occurs when an object of knowledge is considered as a whole to be subdivided into parts, while with the divisio a whole is considered as a genus to be subdivided into species; therefore, in the case of partitio, the parts are always less than the whole (an example being a wall subdivisible into bricks that compose it), while the whole genus is present in the species (an example being the species «man», in which the whole genus «animal» is present). cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, p. 192; ivi, pp. 183-194, 219-255.

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A different division of logic is that in accordance with which the whole careful system of discourse is separated into two parts, one of discovery and the other of judgment. The very definition of logic seems also to make this manifest. Because logic is a system of discourse, it cannot be separated from discovery; for since no one can engage in discourse without discovery, the system of discourse is the system of discovery. On the other hand, since logic is the careful system of discourse, judgment cannot be absent from it; for the carefulness of the system of discourse is judgment, and no one can discourse carefully unless he has judged the quality of the material he uses in arguing. And if the carefulness of the system is applied to the thread of the discourse, then judgment is undoubtedly suited to a variety of discoveries136.

A quick preliminary comparison with the division previously attributed to Aristotle suggests that the Ciceronian ratio disserendi, subdividable into an ars inveniendi and an ars iudicandi, differs not only in the sequence of its proposed elements, but also in its contents. The Ciceronian paraphrase ratio diligens disserendi expresses the essentially conversational context for every logical operation, so that logic is seen as the whole system of rules that regulates all kinds of speech. Within this orderly set of rules regarding how to build effective speeches and to reason correctly in each area of knowledge, pride of place goes to the ars inveniendi. This art, in fact, indicates first of all where and how to find the principles from which all forms of reasoning necessarily proceed (those that can be easily identified in the premises that are the basis of every kind of argumentation). The rules of the ars iudicandi instead serve to verify the formal correctness by which, from these premises, it is possible to draw the conclusions. Boethius points out that these two logical operations (inventio 136

In Top., I, 1045CD (Engl. transl. p. 26): «Rursus eiusdem logicae altera divisio est, per quam diducitur tota diligens ratio disserendi in duas partes, unam inveniendi, et alteram iudicandi. Id autem videtur etiam ipsa logices definitio monstrare, nam quia logica ratio disserendi est, non potest ab inventione esse separata. Cum enim nemo praeter inventionem disserere possit, disserendi ratio inventionis est ratio. Rursus quoniam logice diligens est ratio disserendi, ab ea iudicium non potest abesse, ipsa enim diligentia rationis in disserendo posita iudicium est. Neque enim potest quisquam diligenter disserere, nisi quale sit iudicaverit id quod in disputationem sumitur. Quod si ad disserendi ordinem diligentia rationis adhibetur, non est dubium quin hoc iudicium ad inventionum varietatem sit accommodatum».

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and iudicium) are inseparable: in fact, no one can discuss a topic properly without first identifying the principles that will inform his reasoning; for this reason Boethius points out that ratio disserendi is first of all a ratio inventionis. On the other hand, if logic is understood as a theory of debate, it is inseparable from the moment of iudicium in which the mind discerns true from false reasoning. This means that a ratio disserendi must be understood also as a ratio iudicii137. It is from this perspective, then, that diligent, i.e. correct, discussion is impossible for anyone who has not first judged the scope of the dispute. If, in fact, the diligentia rationis is directed first of all ad disserendi ordinem, i.e. to the verification of the orderly arrangement of the speech, then there can be no doubt that the iudicium adapts to suit a variety of inventiones. According to Boethius, then, in the three-fold logical operation in which the mind defines, divides, and argues, the Ciceronian conception of logic is reaffirmed, according to which the mind first of all searches for the principles of all forms of debate (ars inveniendi), and then looks to the correct and orderly arrangement of these principles within a definition, division, or argument (ars iudicandi). Boethius connects the Aristotelian and Ciceronian division schemes by considering the latter to be subsumed under the former: Now that we have explained these things in this way, we must consider how these divisions of logic are related to one another. Discovery is the basis for all the others, holding the place, as it were, of their matter in the following way. For without discovery, there cannot be definition or partition, since we divide or even define a thing by the discovery of genera or differentiae. Moreover, without discovery there cannot be deduction, and so there will not be the necessary, the verisimilar, or the sophistical, for these three are added to discovery so that an argument becomes necessary, readily believable, or sophistical. Necessity, ready believability, and sophistry are forms of a sort; when they come to discoveries, they make arguments necessary, readily believable, or sophistical. The same point applies to partitions and definitions, for the undifferentiated power of discovery can be called definitive or divisive when it is used to define or to partition things138. 137 In the text quoted above, Boethius never uses the expression ratio iudicii, but only ratio inventionis. Use of this terminology here is intended to convey the general meaning of the text while maintaining the clarity of the argumentation. 138 In Top., I, 1045D-1046A (Engl. transl. p. 26): «His igitur ita expeditis, videndum est, hae divisiones, quanam se cognatione contingant. Inventio quippe

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Full understanding of this passage requires a distinction between two phases (see Diagram no. 13, Appendix p. 334). In the first phase of composition, it is inventio, of the two divisions of logic, that constitutes the «matter» of all the operations, because it contains all of them, in like manner as, in Boethius’s metaphor, place may contain the bodies139. This means that, without inventio, no kind of definition, division, or deduction of the necessary, probable, and sophistic argumentations can take place. The first and most important consideration is the «ratio topicae facultatis»140 that, in another effective metaphor, represents material capable of receiving and accepting the forms. At this point it will be useful to clarify, first, the source of the materia disserendi on which the mind exerts its creativity, and, second, the specific contents that this kind of materia inventiva brings about. Regarding the first question, Boethius explains that: «Every art imitates nature; taking its matter from nature, the art fashions principles and a path, so that what caeteris omnibus, veluti materiae loco, supponitur, hoc modo. Nisi enim inventio fuerit, non potest esse vel definitio, vel partitio, quoniam unumquodque generum vel differentiarum inventione, vel specierum collectione, aut dividimus, aut etiam definimus. Jam vero si absit inventio, nequi esse collectio. Non erit igitur necessaria, nec verisimilis, nec sophistica argumentatio: haec enim tria inventioni superveniunt, ut vel necessarium, vel probabile, vel cavillatorium sit argumentum. Necessitas enimvero, et probabilitas, et cavillatio formae quaedam sunt, quae dum inventionibus assistunt, necessaria vel probabilia vel cavillatoria faciunt argumenta. Eadem quoque ratio partitiones definitionesque complectitur. Indiscreta namque inventionis potestas, cum diffinitiva, tum divisibilis appellari potest, cum definiendis partiendisve rebus adhibetur». 139 The metaphor of the place is the same that Boethius will soon use to indicate the way in which all the propositiones are included and contained in the maximae propositiones. Cf. In Top., I, 1051D: «Quod enim maxima sunt, id est universales propositiones, reliquas in se velut loci corpora complectuntur» (Engl. transl. p. 33: «Because they are maximal [that is, universal] propositions, they embrace other propositions within themselves as places embrace bodies»). At the end of the second book of this same commentary on Cicero, Boethius makes clear that everything that this contains by this very fact is the principle of what is contained. Cf. ivi, II, 1083A: «Omne autem quod continet, eius quod continetur principium est» (Engl. transl. p. 74: «Everything that contains something is a principle of what it contains»). 140 Cf. ivi, I, 1041D: «Sed antequam de topicae facultatis ratione pertractem, prooemium, quo ad Trebatium M. Tullius utitur, paucis absolvam» (Engl. transl. p. 22: «But before I deal with the theory of the Topical discipline, let me explain in a few words the proemium in which Cicero addresses Trebatius»).

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the art promises may occur not only more easily but also more elegantly. For example, we can construct a wall by our natural abilities, but we do it better by art»141. Nature is in every case the source: the mind, by imitating nature, is able to construct arts that facilitate its functions. Thus the ars inveniendi is an art that, receiving its material from nature and imitating it, teaches us to arrive more easily and quickly at what the mind accomplishes spontaneously142. Regarding the second question, about the specific contents of inventio, the text analysed previously described the materia inventionis as the basis for every kind of logical operation. It is through inventio that the principles of definitio, partitio, and collectio are discovered. The principles of definitio and partitio, in turn, correspond to the genus and the specific difference, while the principles of the argumentations correspond to, respectively, the necessary, probable, and sophistic argumenta. The most significant aspect of this first phase in the composition of the two divisions of logic is that what arises through the triple operation of the unique inventionis potestas, subdivided into inventio diffinitiva, inventio divisiva, and inventio collectiva, is not immediately a definition, division, or the argumentations, but only the underlying principles143. The manner 141

Ivi, I, 1048B (Engl. transl. p. 29): «Omnis quippe ars imitatur naturam, atque ab hac materia suscepta, rationes ipsa viamque conformat, ut cum facilius id quod ars quaeque promittit, tum elegantius fiat, velut parietem struere naturalis ingenii est, sed arte fit melius»; ivi, VI, 1155D: «Omnem quidem artem sui materiam effectus ex natura suscipere, sed in ea tamen ratione propriam facultatem elegantiamque experiri» (Engl. transl. p. 167: «One can obtain a thing by reason, but an artificer will do so better and more easily if he avails himself of art’s elegance and ease in the task of construction»). 142 To be completely clear, the argument is that the ars inveniendi and ars iudicandi reflect first of all the activities that the mind accomplishes spontaneously; afterwards, the mind itself tends to establish a method so that it may proceed more quickly and without error in performing its logical operations. In the De topicis differentiis, the areas of investigation will be specified in which the mind forms questions about logic, nature and morals. Cf. De top. diff., I, V, 50, 1180AB, p. 15, 2-7: «Facta igitur praedicativarum et conditionalium quaestionum divisione illud insuper videtur addendum, quod omnis quaestio vel ex ratione disserendi vel ex naturali vel ex morali trahitur speculatione; ex disserendi ratione hoc modo: ‘an affirmatio et negatio species sint enuntiationis’; ex naturali ita: ‘an caelum rotundum sit’; ex morali sic: ‘an virtus ad beatitudinem sola sufficiat’». Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.4.3. 143 The expression inventio collectiva never actually appears in Cicero’s text or in Boethius’s commentary. However, considering the neologisms invented by Boethius to

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in which Boethius uses the metaphor of material, which is understood as interchangeable with the metaphor of the locus, is particularly interesting. With reference to the discovery of the principles of the collectio, the three forms of necessitas, probabilitas, and cavillatio arise in the materia inventionis. From this union of material and form, the principles of the argumentation arise, i.e. the different types of argumenta144. The verb used to express this action of inventionis potestas is supervenio, meaning «turn up», «arrive suddenly», «add», «overlap», «exceed», or «go beyond». This Latin verb is equal to the Greek ἐπαναβαίνω that in its specific philosophical sense means «return to the beginnings», «arrive at the first cause», «find again the principle»: this is, therefore, the action that distinguishes the inventionis potestas. Boethius uses supervenio also in his translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge: «Est autem generalissimum quidem super quod nullum ultra aliud sit superveniens genus, specialissimum autem post quod non erit alia inferior species; inter generalissimum autem et specialissimum et generae et species sunt eadem, ad aliud quidem et aliud sumpta»145. In this case, explain how the division of Ciceronian and Aristotelian logic reach perfect agreement (as inventio diffinitiva and inventio divisibilis), it seems reasonable to introduce this terminology in order to make Boethius’s methods more comprehensible. 144 The metaphor of material and form is repeatedly used by Boethius also in the De topicis differentiis. It is reasonable to assume that he takes it again from Aristotle via Porphyry. In Isagoge, in fact, the genus is assimilated to the material, and the specific difference to the form. Cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, ed. A. BUSSE, Reimer, Berlin 1895, reprint. 1957, p. 11, 12-17 (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, IV/I) (for the quotes from the English translation, see Porphyry, Introduction, Transl. with Introd. and Commentary by J. BARNES, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003, p 11): «For in the case of objects which are constituted of matter and form or which have a constitution at least analogous to matter and form, just as a statue is constituted of bronze as matter and its figure as form, so too the common and special man is constituted of the genus analogously to matter and of the difference as shape, and these—rational mortal animal—taken as a whole are the man, just as there they are the statue». 145 Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta, editio secunda, ed. G. SCHEPPS, rev. S. BRANDT, G. Freytag, Leipzig 1906 (in PL 64, coll. 71-158) (Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, 48) [= In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda], III, 3, 101D, pp. 205, 15-206, 1. Cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, p. 4, 16-20. (Engl. transl.) pp. 5-6: «Most general is that above which there will be no other superordinate genus; most special, that after which there will be no other subordinate extremes they call subaltern genera and species, and they posit that each of them is a species and a genus (but taken in relation now to one thing and now to another)». In Porphyry’s text, the substantival

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the verb supervenio is used to indicate the impossibility of identifying any first principle higher than the supreme genus; thus the negative definition of supreme genus as that above which there will be no other superordinate genus146. In Boethius’s commentary on Cicero, the metaphor of «turning up» or «happening» is also used to indicate the origin of the principles of definitio and partitio: «The same point applies to partitions and definitions, for the undifferentiated power of discovery can be called definitive or divisive when it is used to define or to partition things. In this way, composed of the discovery as matter and of the superimposed differentiae as forms, they become in turn matter for judgment»147. participle ἐπαναβεβηκός can be placed in parallel with another participle a few lines below that represents its opposite, i.e. ὑπόβεβηκός. 146 Boethius uses the verb supervenio also in his second commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. In this text, the verb appears three times, and it is perhaps significant that it always refers to the way in which the intelligence reaches and goes beyond the image provided by the senses and imagination, making clear what is represented confusingly by them. Cf. Boethius, Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis Periermeneias vel De interpretatione, editio secunda, ed. C. MEISER, 2 vols., B. G. Teubneri, Leipzig 1879-1880, (in PL 64, coll. 393-640) [= In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio secunda], II, 406D-407A, pp. 28, 28-29, 10: «Sensus enim atque imaginatio quaedam primae figurae sunt, supra quas velut fundamento quodam superveniens intelligentia nititur. Nam sicut pictores solent designare lineatim corpus atque substernere in corpore ubi coloribus cuiuslibet exprimant vultum, sic sensus atque imaginatio naturaliter in animae perceptione substernitur. Nam cum res aliqua sub sensum vel cogitationem cadit, prius eius necesse est ut quaedam imaginatio nascatur. Post vero plenior superveniat intellectus, cunctas eius explicans partes quae confuse fuerant imaginatione praesumpta»; ivi, 409CD, pp. 33, 33-34, 13: «Passus enim quilibet eius rei proprietatem, quam intellectu conplectitur, ad eius enuntiationem designationemque contendit. Cum enim quis aliquam rem intellegit, prius imaginatione formam necesse est intellectae rei proprietatemque suscipiat et fiat vel passio cum passione quadam intellectus perceptio. Hac vero posita atque in mentis sedibus conlocata fit indicandae ad alterum passionis voluntas, cui actus quidam continuandae intellegentiae protinus ex intimae rationis potestate supervenit, quem scilicet explicat et effundit oratio nitens ea quae primitus in mente fundata est passione, sive, quod est verius, significatione progressa oratione progrediente simul et significantis se orationi motibus adaequante». 147 In Top., I, 1046AB (Engl. transl. p. 26): «Eadem quoque ratio partitiones definitionesque complectitur. Indiscreta namque inventionis potestas, cum diffinitiva, tum divisibilis appellari potest, cum definiendis partiendisve rebus adhibetur. Quae hoc modo ex inventionis materia et differentiarum supra positarum forma composita rursus iudicatione materia fiunt»

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The definitions and partitions can be understood through the indistinct (because indivisible and unique) power of the inventionis potestas, also called inventio diffinitiva and divisiva. In this way, the definitions and the partitions emerge from the composition of the materia inventionis in the context of which the differentiae «supervene». The differentiae, in fact, being added to the genus, enable either the definition of a species (if it is a definitio), or enumeration of the species or parts (if it is a divisio or partitio). In the second phase in the composition of the two divisions, Aristotelian and Ciceronian, the principles arising from the materia inventionis (the genus and specific difference, and the necessary, probable and sophistic argumenta) become the material for the iudicium. The iudicium, in turn, is now understood as a form: For the previous division of logic into three parts sets forth the parts in such a way that discovery is the matter for each of them, but the whole division itself furnishes the matter for judgment. When someone defines or makes a division of a thing, he discovers differentiae suitable for making a division and a definition, but judgment considers whether he has defined or divided rightly. In this way, these first parts of logic are conjoined to the members of the second division: they have discovery as their matter but are themselves the matter for judgment. This is the case also with the remaining part of logic, namely, deduction. The part of deduction which deals with readily believable things is based on discovery as its matter because it finds verisimilar arguments; judgment considers arguments of this sort, for there is a judgment that consists in discerning that what is discovered is not necessary but has verisimilitude. The part of deduction suited to necessary argumentations is based on the discovery of what is necessary as its matter; the judgment of it consists in the fact that because the things discovered are necessary, judgment considers them to be necessary. The part of deduction which is sophistical also contains within itself both discovery and judgment since false things can be discovered and can also be determined to be false by judgment148. 148

Ivi, 1046BC (Engl. transl. p. 26): «Nam prior illa partitio, logice tribus partibus segregata, ita partes explicat, ut habeat inventionem materiam singularum, ipsa vero iudicatione materiam praestat. Etenim cum definit aliquis, vel rei propositae divisionem facit, invenit quidem divisioni definitionique differentias

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The forms of judgment for the definitio and the divisio that occur in the context of the inventio now are understood as material, as the rules for the correct formulation of a recta definito and a recta divisio or partitio. The rules of judgement for the collectio, by contrast, are the same ones that govern the construction of a recta argumentatio, i.e. the rules of syllogism and enthymeme. As a consequence, the ars inveniendi and ars iudicandi represent two aspects, two activities or ways of functioning, of the same faculty of reason. From a different perspective, the definitio, partitio, and collectio serve as the material to which the forms of judgment will be applied. In fact, when it is necessary to formulate a definition, a division, or an argumentation, the appropriate differentiae or most suitable argumenta must be identified, after which consideration can then be given to whether something has been correctly defined, divided, or argued by means of the ars iudicandi. Boethius thus concludes at the end of this complex analysis of the relationship between the two divisions: So the first division of logic seems to contain the second division; for definition, partition, and deduction contain discovery and judgment, because without discovery they cannot exist and without judgment they cannot be recognized. But because all discovery is the basis for judgment and because the parts of the first division of logic cannot exist without both discovery and judgment, the first division conjoins both discovery and judgment. The second division, however (in accordance with which Cicero partitions logic), isolates accommodatas, sed an recte vel diffiniat, vel dividat, iudicatione perpendit. Ita priores logicae partes secundae divisionis membra coniungunt, ut materiam quidem sui habeant inventionem, iudicationi vero fiant ipsae materia. Quod in reliqua etiam colligendi parte contingit, nam et ea quae de probabilibus tractat, habeat et inveniendi suppositam materiam, quae verisimilia reperit argumenta, et de huiusmodi argumento iudicatio perpendit. Est enim iudicium hoc ipsum internoscendi, quod non necessaria inventio est, sed verisimilitudinem tenet. Illa quoque pars quae de necessariis argumentationibus aptatur, habet subiectam materiam necessariae inventionis, eiusque est iudicium, ut cum necessaria sunt quae invenit, necessaria quoque esse perpendat. Nec non cavillandi pars utraque in se continet, quandoquidem et inveniri falsa possunt, et falsa esse iudicatione discerni».

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these skills and severs the matter that is discovery from the part that is judgment149.

The Aristotelian division contains the Ciceronian division, because the definitio, partitio, and collectio contain inventio and iudicium: inventio is a necessary precondition for these activities because it identifies the principles from which they can proceed; and without iudicium, it is impossible to assess the correctness, i.e. the veracity, of the definitio, divisio, and collectio. The first division therefore unites elements that the second separates and isolates. This is more evident immediately later, when Boethius describes more accurately the iudicium of the only collectio : Furthermore, judgment too has parts appropriate to it with regard to the nature of deduction. For every argumentation and every syllogism are constructed of propositions, but everything that is a composite has two things of some sort in it, and these things, it seems, ought to be examined. One thing to examine is the nature of those things of which a composite is understood to be made up, and another is the conjunction of the parts by means of which the whole is composed. For example, in the case of a wall, if you examine the stones themselves by which the wall is constructed, you are looking at the ‘matter’ of the wall. On the other hand, if you observe the arrangement and composition of the junctures of the stones, you are considering the nature of the ‘form’. Similarly with regards to argumentations, which (as we relate above) are conjoined and bound together by propositions, examination and judgment take place in two ways. One way determines and judges the nature of the propositions themselves – whether they are true and necessary, whether they are verisimilar, or whether they are used in sophistries. This is a contemplation of ‘the matter’ of argumentations. The other way, however, considers the junctures and composition of the propositions among themselves, and it is a part of judgment. This way judges ‘the form’ of arguments150. 149 Ivi, 1046C (Engl. transl. p. 27): «Quo fit ut prior logices divisio secundam etiam continere videatur; nam definitio, partitio atque collectio inventionem continent et iudicium, quia neque existere praeter inventionem, neque agnosci praeter iudicium possunt». 150 Ivi, 1046D-1047A (Engl. transl. p. 27): «Iudicium vero, in colligendi ratione proprias partes habet, nam omnis argumentatio, omnisque syllogismus propositionibus

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The collectio, also called ratio colligendi, regards the argumentatio, the main form of which is the syllogism151. As does the inventio, so also the iudicium has its own matter (i.e. the inventio) and form (i.e. forma iudicii)152. Here the metaphor used by Boethius for the iudicium of the only collectio is that of a wall: on the one hand, one can consider the matter looking at the nature of the stones of which the wall is made up («ut in pariete siquidem lapides ipsos quibus paries structus est inspicias, quasi materiam spectes»); on the other hand, one can observe the form by looking at the order and at the arrangement by means of which the stones are conjoined to each other («si vero ordinem compositionemque iuncturae consideres, tanquam de formae ratione perpendas»). So too in a syllogism one can distinguish its matter from its form. Through the via speculationis, which corresponds to the judgment of the inventio, the results of which are the arguments, one examines the nature of the propositions in discerning whether they are true and necessary, verisimilar or sophistic («una quae propositionum ipsarum naturam discernit ac iudicat utrum verae ac necessariae sint, an verisimiles, an sophisticis applicentur»), and this sort of judgment is called materiae speculatio. Through the via iudicandi, which is the judgment of the form of an argument (forma argumentorum), one considers the junctures and composition of the propositions among themselves («altera vero iudicii pars struitur, omnemque compositum duo in se quaedam retinet, quae speculanda esse videantur. Et quidem continet unum quae illa sint, ex quibus id quod compositum est intelligatur esse connexum, aliud vero quanam sit suarum partium coniunctione compositum: ut in pariete siquidem lapides ipsos quibus paries structus est inspicias, quasi materiam spectes; si vero ordinem compositionemque iuncturae consideres, tanquam de formae ratione perpendas. Ita in argumentationibus quas propositionibus compaginari atque coniungi supra retulimus, gemina erit speculationis et iudicandi via. Una quae propositionum ipsarum naturam discernit ac iudicat utrum verae ac necessariae sint, an verisimiles, an sophisticis applicentur, et haec quasi materiae speculatio est. Altera vero iudicii pars est quae inter se propositionum iuncturas compositionesque perpendit; haec quasi formam iudicat argumentorum». 151 Cf. De top. diff., II, II, 21-23, pp. 24, 19-25, 7: «Ita igitur duae quidem sunt argumentandi species principales: una quae dicitur syllogismus, altera quae vocatur inductio. Sub his autem et velut ex his manantia enthymema atque exemplum. Quae quidem omnia ex syllogismo ducuntur et ex syllogismo vires accipiunt; sive enim sit enthymema sive inductio sive etiam exemplum, ex syllogismo quam maxime fidem capit, quod in Prioribus Resolutoriis, quos ab Aristotele transtulimus, demonstratum est. Quocirca satis est de syllogismo disserere quasi principali et ceteras argumentandi species continente. Restat nunc quid sit locus aperire». 152 See Diagram no. 13 in the Appendix.

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est quae inter se propositionum iuncturas compositionesque perpendit»). This means that in the iudicium matter and form refer to two different kind of judgments: (1) the judgment of what has been invented (i.e. the arguments), which is a form for invention and in turn matter on which to exercise the second kind of judgment (2), i.e. the judgment of the form of what has been invented, which is the form of judgment itself153. This extended examination of the ways in which it is possible to reconcile the divisions of Aristotelian and Ciceronian logic helped Boethius to introduce his own, one that closely follows the order of Aristotelian logical treatises: Hence, in this way a division comes to be made in what is continuous. The careful system of discourse has two parts, one of invention and the other of judgment — sometimes judgment of the invention itself, sometimes judgment of the deduction of the invention, which is the form of an argumentation. The part that teaches about invention supplies in abundance certain tools for inventions and is called ‘Topics’. [Why it is called by this name, I will say later on]. The part that had to do with judgment profers certain rules making determinations and is called ‘Analytics’. If it makes observations about the junctures of propositions, it is named ‘Prior Analytics’. But if it deals with the inventions themselves, then the part that discusses the determining of necessary arguments is named ‘Posterior Analytics’, and the part that discusses false and tricky [that is, sophistical] arguments is named ‘Refutations’. The judgment of verisimilar argumentations is apparently not dealt with 153 As regards the collectio, the materia iudicii, which is the inventio, must not be confused with the materia inventionis which is rather what was referred to as materia disserendi. It is necessary to keep in mind that in Boethius’s view both inventio and iudicium have their own matter and form. On the one hand, the matter of invention (materia inventionis) is the genus and the materia disserendi, while its forms (forma inventionis) are the differences, the necessary, the readily believable, and the sophistical. Therefore, the result of the inventio is the genus, the differences and the arguments necessary, readily believable, or sophistical. On the other hand, the matter of judgment (materia iudicii) is the same inventio (i.e. the genus, the differences and the arguments necessary, readily believable or sophistical), while its forms (forma iudicii) are the rules necessary to formulate a correct definition or a correct partition, together with the rules of the syllogism. Finally, the result of the judgement is a definition, a partition or an argumentation necessary, readily believable or sophistical (See Diagram no. 13, p. 334).

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because the nature of judgment concerning the middle is clear and uncomplicated when one is acquainted with the extremes. For if one knows how to judge discerningly what is necessary and is also able to judge false arguments, it is no trouble for him to determine verisimilar arguments, which are in the middle154.

Here Boethius explains that the part that teaches about invention, i.e. the pars inveniendi, is called topice, and the part that has to do with judgment, i.e. the pars iudicandi, is called analytice. Moreover, if the analytice makes observations about the junctures of propositions, and hence it has to do with the inventionis collocatio, it is named analytice prior; but when it has to do with the ipsa inventio, it is respectively called analytice posterior if it deals with the discerning of necessary arguments or Sophistici Elenchi if it deals with the discerning of false arguments. Boethius also stresses that there is no specific part regarding the judgment of verisimilar argumentations («De verisimilium vero argumentationum iudicio nihil videtur esse tractatum»), though it is not easy to understand this last statement, since the discipline that involves the judgment of verisimilar arguments should be precisely that which, in the first commentary on the Isagoge, he classified as one of the primi resolutorii, apart from the secundi resolutorii. There, he refers to topica and states that Aristotle «dialecticam in Topicis suis exercuit», the same science that in Aristotle’ division of logic (Diagram 12) was called dialectica («dialectica Aristoteles vocat facultatem per probabilia colligendi») and deals with dialectical syllogism. 154 Ivi, 1047AB (Engl. transl. pp. 27-28): «Quae cum ita sint, hoc modo fit in continuum ducta partitio, ut ratio diligens disserendi, unam habeat inveniendi partem, alteram vero iudicandi. Tum de ipsa inventione, tum de inventionis collocatione, quae forma est argumentationis. Atque ea quidem pars quae de inventione docet, quaedam inventionibus instrumenta suppeditat, et vocatur topice: cur autem hoc nomine nuncupata sit, posterius dicam. Illa vero pars quae in indicando posita est, quasdam discernendi regulas subministrat, et vocatur analytice; et si de propositionum iunctura consideret, analytice prior; sin vero de ipsis inventionibus tractet, ea quidem pars ubi de discernendis necessariis argumentis dicitur, analytice posterior nuncupatur; ea vero quae de falsis atque cavillatoriis, id est de sophisticis, elenchi. De verisimilium vero argumentationum iudicio nihil videtur esse tractatum, idcirco quoniam plana, est atque expedita ratio iudicandi de medietate, cum quid extrema cognoverit. Si enim quis dijudicare necessaria sciat, idemque falsorum argumentorum possit habere iudicium, verisimilia, quae in medio collocata sunt, discernere non laborat». (See Diagram no. 14, p. 335).

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All of this therefore leaves open the question of whether, for Boethius, the discipline of topica that is the subject of the De topicis differentiis is ultimately the same discipline that Aristotle presents in the Topica as dialectica. The study of Boethius’s monograph on logic points to a positive answer to this question, despite the fact that the identification of the two disciplines remains problematic in many ways.

7. The literary success of the De topicis differentiis The De topicis differentiis was well known and influential during the Middle Ages, though it is little studied today. The discipline of topica as it was transmitted by Boethius, became, in fact, a part of logic, and as such an instrument in the service of other disciplines. Thus medieval authors used the loci in philosophical, rhetorical, legal, theological, and medical arguments. Yet while considerable effort has gone into assessing the contribution Boethius made to the development of medieval logic, much remains to be done with regard to the influence of the discipline of topica transmitted in his treatise. Study of the reception of the fourth book of the De topicis differentiis is particularly significant because of the profound influence that this text exerted on the understanding of rhetoric. Moreover, the De topicis differentiis found success not only in the Western Latin tradition, but in the Byzantine as well155. Dimitrios Nikitas, as mentioned, has published the first critical edition, as well as critical editions of the Greek translation of the scholia of Manuel Holobolos (a Byzantine rhetorician of the thirteenth century), the Greek translation made by Prochorus Cydones, and of the concise summary by Giorgio Pachimere (ca. 1242 to ca. 1310). The following is a highly selective summary of the reception of the De topicis differentiis in the Latin West in the fields of logic, philosophy, and theology. Boethius’s logical-rhetorical monographs were catalogued in Constantinople by Martius Novatus Renatus around 522 to 526 and gathered into a single codex that was then brought to the West by Renato 155

Cf. A. PERTUSI, «La fortuna di Boezio a Bisanzio», Annuaire de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et Slaves, 11 (1951) 310-322.

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himself or by others156. However, the credit for transmitting the larger part of Boethius’s works belongs first of all to Cassiodorus (485 to 585) who, after abandoning political life, founded a monastery at Vivarium with the intention of creating a cultural centre for the conservation and transmission of texts. In his Institutiones, Cassiodorus catalogues the books in his monastery’s library, but only in the second edition of this text (perhaps the product of an editor other than Cassiodorus) are there found some extracts of the first, the second and the fourth books of the De topicis differentiis. In any case, Cassiodorus was also the first to use the loci in Biblical exegesis, duly indicating, in his Explanation of the Psalms, dialectical and rhetorical arguments in the Psalms157. The Etymologiae of Isidore of Seville (ca. 560 to 636) depend on the first edition of Cassiodorus’s Institutiones, and so do not quote the extracts of Boethius’s monograph that are in the second edition. Later, however, many texts from Cassiodorus’s monastery were received by the library of the Lateran and the library of the monastery of Bobbio, which were the leading cultural centres of the early Middle Ages. But beyond the transmission of the text, between the eighth and tenth centuries various authors show awareness of Boethius’s teaching with their effective use of loci. Alcuin (735 to 804), for example, transmits the Ciceronian-Boethian list of loci in his De dialectica158. The strategy of topica is also evident in the De divina praedestinatione liber of John Scotus Eriugena (ca. 810 to after 877), while Gerbert of Aurillac (950 to 1003 A.D.), as is well known, made full use of Boethius’s dialectic in his work, including the logical-rhetorical writings159. Lanfranc of Pavia (1005 to 1089), like Cassiodorus, uses the loci to comment on the Pauline 156 For the transmission of the De topicis differentiis, cf. NIKITAS, «Eἰσαγωγή»», pp. XLIX-LXXVIII; OBERTELLO, Severino Boezio, I, pp. 343-382. For the usefulness of the topica according to Boethius, cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.7. 157 Cf. Cassiodorus, Expositio Psalmorum, ed. M. Adriaen, 2 vols., Brepols, Turnhout 1958 (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 97), in PL 70, 25-1056C; D’ONOFRIO, «Topica e sapere teologico», in J. BIARD – F. MARIANI ZINI (eds.), Les lieux de l’argumentation, op. cit.; F. MAGNANO, «La teologia ‘topica’ dell’Expositio Psalmorum di Cassiodoro», in XLI Incontro di studiosi dell’Antichità Cristiana: La teologia dal V all’VIII secolo fra sviluppo e crisi, Istitutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 2014, pp. 361-393 (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 140). 158 Cf. Alcuinus Eboracensis [= Alcuinus], De Dialectica, PL 101, coll. 949-976B. 159 Cf. A. VAN DE VEYER, «Les Étapes du développement Philosohique du Haut Moyen Âge», Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire, 8 (1929) 425-452.

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Epistolae, and Boethius’s method may underlie the unum argumentum of Anselm of Aosta (1033/34 to 1109)160. While Boethius’s logical and rhetorical monographs are absent from library catalogues from the time of Cassiodorus to the tenth century, the eleventh and twelfth centuries mark an era of renaissance in which his works are to be found in the most prestigious cultural centres: Monte Cassino, Fleury, Chartres, Saint-Amand, Cluny, Saint’Emmeram at Regensburg, and St. Gallen. The work of two scholars has been especially valuable for understand the influence of Boethian loci on the study of logic in pedagogical contexts. Niels Jørgen Green Pedersen has catalogued twenty-five commentaries on the De topicis differentiis written between the eleventh and the fourteenth century by authors still mostly unknown, apart from Peter Abelard (1079 to 1142), who used Boethian topica in his theological writings, Nicola of Paris (active in the thirteenth century), Martin of Dacia (died 1304), and Radulfo Brito (ca. 1275 to 1320). Second, Stump has identified, from among the critical editions of numerous texts of twelfth-century logic textbooks published by Lambertus De Rijk, fourteen that treat specifically the exhibition of the instruments of the topica161. Both the commentary on Cicero’s Topica and the De topicis differentiis were, in fact, part of the corpus of the so-called Logica vetus, the late antique interpretation of Aristotelian logic. It should also be kept in mind that Aristotle’s Topica did not yet circulate in the West, and that Latin writers considered the De topicis differentiis a summary of the method taught by Aristotle. In the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth, the translations, commentaries and logical and rhetorical writings of Boethius were therefore an integral part of the curriculum studiorum162. 160 Cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp 275-320; ID., «Topica e sapere teologico», in J. BIARD – F. MARIANI ZINI (eds.), Les lieux de l’argumentation, op. cit. 161 Cf. GREEN-PEDERSEN, The Tradition of the Topics, pp. 418-431; STUMP, «Boethius’s Theory»; EAD, Dialectic and Its Place. 162 Cf. P. DELHAYE, «L’organisation scholaire au XIIe siècle», Traditio, 5 (1947) 211-268; J. PINBORG, Logik und Semantik; D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae. M. ASZTALOS, «Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the Latin West: the Categories», Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 95 (1993) 367-407; J. MARENBON, «La logique en occident latin (ca. 780-ca. 1150): le programme des études et ses enjeux», in J. BRUMBERG (ed.), Ad notitiam ignoti. L’Organon dans la translatio studiorum à l’époque d’Albert le Grand, Brepols, Turnhout 2013, pp. 173-191 (Studia Artistarum, 37). In addition to the commentaries on Cicero’s Topica and the De topicis differentiis, Boethius’s texts were part of the logica vetus, including his two commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge,

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Beginning in the second half of the twelfth century, the Logica nova replaces the Logica vetus, bringing with it new translations of Aristotle’s Organon, among which the Topica are included. The rediscovery of Aristotle’s Topica does not, however, mark a loss of interest in Boethius, whose work continues to attract the attention of the most important scholars of logic of the thirteenth century, as evidenced by the Tractatus or Summule Logicales of Peter of Spain (ca. 1205 to 1277), the Introductiones in logicam of William of Sherwood (died 1266/72), the Logica (or Summa Lamberti) of Lambert of Auxerre (published in the 1250s)163, the Notule Topicorum of Walter Burley (1275 to 1347), and the Quaestiones topicorum of John Buridan (ca. 1290 to after 1358)164. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, Boethius’s treatise continued to be used in schools. In terms of printed editions, the Venetian editio princeps dates to 1491 or 1492. In the following centuries, Peter Ramus (1515 to 1572) and Leibniz (1646 to 1716), as well as Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762) demonstrate continued interest in the argumentation of the topica165. the two on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias, the Introduction to categorical syllogisms, the De syllogismis categoricis, and the De divisione. Cf. Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos, ed. C. THOMSEN THÖRNQVIST, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg 2008, in PL 64, coll. 761-794; De syllogismo categorico, ed. C. THOMSEN THÖRNQVIST, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, Gothenburg 2008, in PL 64, coll. 793-832; De Divisione Liber, ed. J. MAGEE, Brill, Leiden 1988, in PL 64, coll. 480-524. Cf. F. SOLMSEN, «Boethius and the History of the Organon», American Journal of Philology, 65 (1944) 69-74; J. BARNES, «Boethius and the Study of Logic», in M. GIBSON (ed.), Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence, Blackwell, Oxford 1981, pp. 73-89; R. PINZANI, La logica di Boezio, F. Angeli, Milano 2003; C. MILITELLO, I commentari all’Isagoge di Porfirio tra V e VI secolo, Bonanno Editore, Roma 2010. 163 Cf. Petrus Hispanus, Tractatus called afterwards Summulae Logicales, ed. L. DE RIJK, J. BENJAMINS, Assen 1972; Guillelmus de Shyreswood, Introductiones in logicam, ed. H. BRANDS, Meiner, Hamburg 1995; Lambertus d’Auxerre, Logica (Summa Lamberti), ed. F. ALESSIO, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1971. 164 Gualterus Burlaeus, Notule topicorum, Città del Vaticano, MS. Vat. Lat. 2146, ff. 113ra-197ra; Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones Topicorum, ed. N. J. GREEN PEDERSEN, Brepols, Turnhout 2008 (Studia Artistarum, 12); Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Aesthetica, G. Olms, Hildesheim, 1970. 165 Cf. I. DANNEBERG, «Die Eine Logik des Petrus Ramus», in J. BIARD – F. MARIANI ZINI (eds.), Les lieux de l’argumentation, op. cit., pp. 385-408; A. THIERCELIN, «Ce que la logique fait au droit, ce que le droit fait à la logique: conditionnels et droits conditionnels dans la doctrine des conditions juridiques de Leibniz», in ivi, pp. 467-479.

CHAPTER ONE THE FIRST BOOK OF THE DE TOPICIS DIFFERENTIIS

1. The preliminary concepts for learning the discipline of topica The first book of the De topicis differentiis has the aim of preparing the reader to acquire the basic logical concepts necessary for learning the discipline of topica. After the presentation of the intentio operis, the concepts of propositio, maxima propositio, quaestio, conclusio, and argumentum are explained.

1.1 The ratio disserendi: ars inveniendi et ars iudicandi The beginning of the first book opens with the presentation of the ratio disserendi and its division: Omnis ratio disserendi, quam logicen Peripatetici veteres appellaverunt, in duas distribuitur partes, unam inveniendi, alteram iudicandi. Et ea quidem pars, quae iudicium purgat atque instruit, ab illis analytice vocata est, a nobis potest resolutoria nuncupari. Ea vero, quae inveniendi facultatem ministrat, a Graecis topice, a nobis localis dicitur. Ac de illa quidem parte, quae iudicandi magistra est, alias disputabitur1.

The ratio disserendi is a Ciceronian locution that expresses the essentially conversational context in which all forms of logic operate2. The first indication is revealed in the identification of the ratio disserendi with what the ancient Peripatetics called λογική, subsequently subdivided into an ars iudicandi, called by the Greeks ἀναλυτική and by the Romans 1

De top. diff., I, I, 1-2, 1173B, p. 1, 4-9. For the meaning of the Ciceronian ratio disserendi: cf. supra, Introd., § 6. Cf. also RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 1-14; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 189-198. For Boethius’s commentary on the Ciceronian text, cf. In Top., I, 1044C-1048A. For the study of dialectic in late antiquity, cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae. 2

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resolutoria, and an ars inveniendi, Greek τοπική and Latin localis3. The aim of this introduction is essentially to attract the reader’s attention to the subject that will be examined in the treatise, namely the analysis of the ars inveniendi to the exclusion of the part that instructs and purifies judgment, i.e. the ars iudicandi. In this regard, it is interesting to observe how Martianus Capella in his De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, following Varro in the quadripartite division of the dialectical rules (de loquendo, de eloquendo, de proloquendo, and de proloquiorum summa) does not situate the Ciceronian Topica among the teachings of dialectic: in fact, a summary is found only in his fifth book, which is dedicated to rhetoric4. Probably as a result of Boethius’s interpretation of Cicero, and even more so of the discipline of topica that is presented in the De topicis differentiis, both Cassiodorus and Isidore position this teaching instead at the end of their presentations of dialectical rules, following the introduction of various forms of demonstration, a move that indicates a clear absorption of the ars inveniendi into the teachings of dialectic5.

1.2 The intentio operis After the division of the ratio disserendi comes the presentation of the intentio operis, which lists three main objectives: Nunc aperire vero consilium est qui sint loci, quae horum differentiae, qui etiam quibus apti sint syllogismis. Nec id 3 Boethius proposed the Latin translation of the Greek term λογική as rationalis in Porphyry’s first commentary on Isagoge. Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio prima, I, 3, 12A, pp. 9, 23-10, 2: «Ad haec igitur ut fieri possint et ut superiora intellegi queant, necessarius maxime uberrimusque fructus est artis eius quam Graeci λογικήν, nos rationalem possumus dicere, quod recta orationi ratione quid verum quidque decens sit, nullo erroris flexu diverticulove fallatur». The term localis is an adjective deriving from the term locus, used in this context to define the subject of the ars inveniendi. Cf. STUMP, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, pp. 97-98 note 6: «Boethius’s word (localis) here is the adjective formed from ‘locus’, the Latin word for the Greek τόποι. ‘Locus’ is the standard Latin term for ‘topic’, and Boethius is trying to introduce the adjectival form of the word as a technical term also». 4 Cf. Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 474-501. 5 Cf. Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, XV-XVI; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX. Cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 257-274.

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simpliciter atque uniformiter videtur esse faciendum, verum duplex est tradenda partitio, una quidem ex Graecis voluminibus eruta, altera vero ex M. Tullii Topicis sumpta. Atque in his illud ad perfectionem speculationis est astruendum, ut quibus utraque divisio differat quibusque conveniat explicetur quoque modo altera alteram vicissim possit includere6.

The first objective of the treatise is to explain what the loci (understood as maximae propositiones) are, what their differentiae are, and the syllogisms to which they are connected7. The term differentia, although not explained in this context, refers directly to the title of the book (De topicis differentiis), and in this case specifically to the constitutive differentiae into which the division of the loci is made, i.e. the differentiae through which it is possible to divide and collect the respective maximae propositiones8. 6 De top. diff., I, I, 2-3, 1173BC, pp. 1, 9-2, 7. Another clearer formulation of the intentio operis is the one that is proposed along with the utilitas topicorum at the end of the first book. When the explanation of all the logical concepts that serve as a basic preparation for the understanding of the discipline of topica is complete, Boethius in fact returns to a discussion of the intentio operis, presenting it in a broader way. Cf. De top. diff., I, VII, 21, 1182A, p. 19, 4-5: «Topicorum intentio est verisimilium argumentorum copiam demonstrare». Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.7. 7 As will become clearer in the following discussion, it is important to keep in mind that a locus is always an argumenti sedes, while the argumentum, whenever it is expressed, is an argumentatio; so it is that, in the intentio operis, Boethius takes care to explain also the syllogisms to which the loci are connected. At the end of the second book, in fact, once the entire division of Themistius’s loci has been shown, Boethius specifies how some loci (specifically the loci ex definitione, ex genere, ex differentia, and ex causis) are more suitable to development by means of demonstrative syllogisms expressed in categorical form, while the remaining loci are more suitable to dialectical syllogisms in hypothetical form. Cf. De top. diff., II, XI, 8, 1194A-1196A, p. 47, 14-20: «Sed ea quidem, quae ex definitione vel genere vel differentia vel causis argumenta ducuntur, demonstrativis maxime syllogismis vires atque ordinem subministrant, reliqua verisimilibus ac dialecticis. Atque hi loci, qui maxime in eorum substantia sunt de quibus in quaestione dubitatur, ad praedicativos ac simplices, reliqui vero ad hypotheticos et conditionales respiciunt syllogismos». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.10. Cicero also stresses that the loci can be at the service of different quaestiones. Cf. Cicero, Topica, 79, p. 158, 10-14: «Expositis omnibus argumentandi locis primum illud intellegendum est nec ullam esse disputationem in quam non aliquis locus incurrat nec fere omnis locos incidere in omnem quaestionem et quibusdam quaestionibus alios quibusdam alios esse aptiores locos». 8 Cf. supra, Introd.

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Boethius immediately informs the reader about the difficulty he encountered in completing such an operation: to explain what the loci are, what their differentiae are, and the syllogisms to which they are connected is not a task that can be done in a simple and uniform manner. The greatest obstacle is presented by Boethius’s awareness of two different divisions of the loci that belong to two different traditions. The first of these is a division found in some books vaguely identified by the expression Graecis volumina, which dates it back to the Greek tradition. The other division of the loci is the one given by Cicero in the Topica and belonging to the Latin tradition. The difficulty arises from the obvious fact that these two divisions of the loci do not coincide perfectly: though each author deals with the same subject, each divides it in a different way. The first objective of the intentio operis, therefore, is organized so as to illustrate three main aspects of the divisions: to show first of all in what respect the two divisions are distinguished, that is, to present their differences; second, to highlight how the divisions can be reconciled, that is, to bring out their similarities; and, finally, to indicate how each division may be contained within the other. This is the only way in which, according to Boethius, it will be possible to transmit to the Latin reader a complete picture of the teaching of the topica. In fact, he assumes the task of clarifying the differences and similarities between the two divisions for the sole purpose of handing down a unified vision of the teaching that the Greeks called τοπική and the Romans called localis or ars inveniendi. However, since it would take too long to present both divisions in an analytical way, Boethius for greater detail refers to the respective sources for thorough study of each division. In this regard, one of the sources that is certainly to be numbered among the Graecis volumina just mentioned is here revealed: Et nunc quidem non in singulis immorabimur, sed de tota divisione communiter disseremus, locorum tantum ex quibus argumenta nascuntur definitiones, exempla differentiasque colligentes. Singula vero diligentius pro qualitate operis vel octo his voluminibus expedita sunt, quibus Aristotelis Topica in Latinam vertimus orationem vel his septem, quibus M. Tullii Topicis lucem plenae expositionis infudimus. Illic igitur cuncta sunt propriis atque enodatis partibus expedita; hic vero quae alias per membra patefacta sunt communi speculationi tractantur9. 9

De top. diff., I, I, 4-5, 1173C, p. 2, 7-15.

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Boethius therefore informs the reader that he wants to demonstrate both divisions, but only in a general way. The choice to present such a synthetic vision of the two divisions is fully understandable when we give due consideration to the fact that Boethius has already commented in an analytical way on both of the sources to which he refers: in the case of the Latin tradition, he has in fact written a six-book commentary on Cicero’s Topica; and for the Greek tradition, the reader may make use of his Latin translation of the eight books of Aristotle’s Topica. In addition, during his treatment of the latter text, Boethius states that he has composed a commentary on it, though this has not reached us10. Finally, for each locus, viewed as a maxima propositio, three elements will be provided: the definition; an example that helps to show concretely how the locus operates in the formation of a syllogism; and the respective constitutive differentia to which the maxima propositio may be reduced. The last element is particularly important in that it enables further delimitation of the specific subject of the treatise: only those loci from which it is possible to draw argumenta will be on display11. The presentation of the intentio operis is not yet complete, for next comes the presentation of what can be identified as the second and third objectives of the treatise: Nec dialecticos solum locos, sed rhetoricos etiam, quidve hi inter se atque dialecticis differant cura est exsequendi, ut omnibus undique locis plena consideratione propositis eorumque inter se differentiis 10

Cf. De top. diff., IV, XIII, 2, 1216D, p. 92, 15-17: «Quo autem modo de his dialecticis rationibus disputetur, in his commentariis quos in Aristotelis Topica a nobis translata conscripsimus expeditum est». 11 On the basis of the fourfold division of the argumentum that is presented at the end of the first book, Boethius will affirm that the not probable and not necessary argumenta cannot be considered argumenta in the proper sense because they are neither true nor able to persuade the listener and therefore must be considered false. As a consequence, in principle, it must be assumed that there are also some false loci that produce false argumenta, which could be identified with the loci sophistici, to which moreover Aristotle dedicates the last of the six treatises on logic of the Organon, the De sophisticis elenchis. Boethius’s specification, according to which, in the treatise, only the loci from which it is possible to draw real argumenta will be presented, thus serves to emphasize the fact that only the loci dialectici and the loci rhetorici will be presented, i.e. those that, being probable, are able to make certain a proposition that is in doubt. Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.6.2.

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et communitatibus pernotatis et argumentorum copia comparetur et clara locorum possit esse distinctio12.

The second objective of the intentio operis consists of exhibiting various kinds of loci rhetorici and explaining their differences. Once the loci rhetorici are known thoroughly, it will then be possible to complete the third objective, namely to compare the loci dialectici with the loci rhetorici in order to show their similarities and differences13. Thus, one who wishes to learn the discipline of topica must first of all learn to make clear distinctions, and therefore be able to recognize the specific nature of each locus, so that he may be properly derive an abundance of argumenta. The De topicis differentiis therefore transmits a discipline that teaches the way in which the loci play a role in both dialectic and rhetoric, although with different aims and outcomes. The combination of two distinct fields of investigation in one treatment is certainly made possible by the particularly universal nature of the locus, which is evidently placed before and above its every subsequent articulation.

1.3 The propositio (or enuntiatio or proloquium) Since the purpose of the first book is to introduce the student to the acquisition of basic logical concepts necessary for learning the discipline of the topica, the definitions of propositio, quaestio, conclusio, argumentum, and locus are provided first of all, each of which will be discussed analytically later on: Ut igitur cuncta perspicuis rationibus constent, paulo altius ordiendum est. Propositio est oratio verum falsumve significans, ut si quis dicat «caelum esse volubile»; haec et enuntiatio et proloquium nuncupatur. Quaestio vero est in dubitationem ambiguitatemque adducta propositio, ut si quis quaerat «an sit caelum volubile». Conclusio est argumentis approbata propositio, ut si quis ex aliis 12

De top. diff., I, I, 6, 1173C-1174A, p. 2, 15-21. The first objective of the intentio operis is completed in the second and third books with the presentation of the loci dialectici of Themistius and Cicero. The second and third objectives of the intentio operis are completed in the fourth book with the presentation of the loci rhetorici. 13

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rebus probet «caelum esse volubile». Enuntiatio quippe, sive sui tantum causa dicitur sive ad aliud affertur approbandum, propositio est; si de ipsa quaeritur, quaestio; si ipsa est approbata, conclusio. Idem est igitur propositio, quaestio et conclusio, sed differunt supradicto modo. Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem. Non vero idem est argumentum quod argumentatio: nam vis sententiae ratioque ea, quae clauditur oratione, cum aliquid probatur ambiguum, argumentum vocatur; ipsa vero argumenti elocutio argumentatio dicitur. Quo fit ut argumentum quidem virtus vel mens argumentationis sit atque sententia, argumentatio vero argumenti per orationem explicatio. Locus vero est argumenti sedes vel unde ad propositam quaestionem conveniens trahitur argumentum14.

A student who hopes to understand the discipline of topica must first of all learn the meaning of this terminology. Looking more closely, these logical concepts are the ones necessary for building a syllogism; the articulation of a locus in fact occurs by means of an argumentatio, because the latter represents the proper way in which an argumentum can be expressed («ipsa vero argumenti elocutio, argumentatio dicitur»)15. On the other hand, the logical concepts shown in the first book of the De topicis differentiis are the same as those found also in the compendia of logic of Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore, which indicates clearly that the terminology used by Boethius was part of a vocabulary that had already been fully consolidated. Martianus in particular, in the fourth book of his De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, orders the dialectical teachings by subdividing them into four parts: in de loquendo the doctrine of the meaning is presented, in de eloquendo the speech, in de proloquendo the formulation of the real and its distinction from the false, and finally, in de proloquiorum summa, various forms of demonstration are exhibited16. A 14

De top. diff., I, I, 6 - II, 8, 1174BC, pp. 2, 20-3, 14. For the sake of demonstration and sensitivity to the development of Boethius’s thought, each of these definitions will be explained, followed immediately by the comment that Boethius provides only afterwards in his text. 15 The concept of argumentatio will be introduced in the second book, when the presentation of the discipline of topica will begin in earnest with the exhibition of the loci belonging to Themistius’s division. Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.2. 16 Cf. Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 414, pp. 202, 18-203, 14: «Condicionalis syllogismus est, cuius propositio et plenum argumentum et plenum id de quo quaestio est continet ita, ut assumpto argumento iam certum inferri possit, de quo quaestio erat,

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quick comparison between the concepts of logic presented by Boethius in the first book and the quadripartition of dialectical teachings presented by Martianus makes it clear that Boethius’s concepts coincide essentially with those that Martianus considers necessary for understanding syllogisms, which are presented as the fourth and last part of the dialectical teachings. Thus, the propositio, also called proloquium, constitutes the major premise of a conditional syllogism; the quaestio is a part or the entire second premise (also called assumptio); and, finally, the conclusio completes the syllogism. It is not by chance that the first logical concept to be presented in Boethius’s treatise is the propositio, also called enuntiatio or proloquium, defined as an oratio, the meaning of which is either true or false («propositio est oratio verum falsumve significans»). The propositio is outlined first of all as a species of the genus oratio, the latter concept having been widely discussed and analysed by Aristotle in his De Interpretatione17. The term oratio is, in fact, a Latin translation of Greek λόγος, defined by Aristotle, ad hunc modum; ponamus quaestionem esse, utrum sit utilis rhetorica, et volentes utilem probare, argumentum ab huius definitione capiamus, quod est bene dicendi scientia. Ex hoc argumento et illa quaestione condicionalis syllogismus ponitur sic: ‘si rhetorica est bene dicendi scientia, utilis est’. Assumimus argumentum ita: ‘est autem rhetorica bene dicendi scientia’. Haec duo qui concesserit, etiam invitus concedat necesse est utilem esse rhetoricam, quod erat dubium, antequam propositio et assumptio concederetur. Nihil tamen in assumptione accessit extrinsecus, quod est proprium praedicativi syllogismi. Hic primus modus a dialecticis appellatur, qui est ab antecedentibus, propterea quoniam argumentum, quemadmodum positum est, ita et assumptum, hoc tantummodo differens, quod cum condicione positum est et sine condicione assumptum». Cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 244-245. 17 Cf. Aristotle, De Interpretatione, IV, 16b26-17a7. Boethius commented twice on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione; in the De topicis differentiis, once the concept of propositio is presented, he himself refers the reader back to his two commentaries. Cf. De top. diff., I, IV, 23, 1176A, p. 6, 13-14: «Sed de huiusmodi propositionibus in his commentariis, quod de Peri hermeneias Aristotelis libro conscripsimus, diligentius disseruimus»; cf. Boethius, Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis Periermeneias vel De interpretatione, editio prima, ed. C. MEISER, 2 vols., B. G. Teubneri, Leipzig 18791880, (in PL 64, coll. 293-392) [= In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio prima], I, 33, p. 17, 35. Oratio is not just the aggregate meaning of the entire statement, but includes the sense conveyed by every element of the speech; this means that an oratio could be only the nomen without the verbum and vice versa. Moreover, an oratio may include more than a single nomen or verbum, or be accompanied by complements, as Boethius himself will specify shortly after.

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according to Boethius’s Latin version, in the following way: «oratio autem est vox significativa cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatum»18. The oratio is a vox significativa that comes from the union of a nomen with a verbum and is capable of producing a new semantic unit; the name and the verb represent also many voces significativae. The characteristic of the oratio, however, is to produce a new meaning deriving from the union of parts that, if taken individually, would have different meanings. There are various types of orationes, but not all speeches that are delivered constitute meaningful judgments, since not all speeches depend on affirmation or negation and are therefore capable of being judged true or false (consider, for example, a curse or command). Therefore, within the genus oratio, the only species that concerns logic is the apophantic one, i.e. the one that can be judged as true or false and is called oratio enuntiativa. For Boethius, propositio, enuntiatio, or proloquium, which correspond to the species of ἀξίωμα in Stoic terminology, belong to the genus of λεκτόν19. The term proloquium is mainly used by Martianus Capella, who borrowed it from Varro, and it is in fact Apuleius who reports the different terms that various authors have used to describe this species of oratio concerning logic: 18

In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio secunda, II, 4, 434C, p. 80, 18-20. The same definition is present also in Cassiodorus, probably tracing back to Boethius himself, and in Isidore, who in turn refers back to Cassiodorus. Cf. Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, III, p. 115, 6-7: «oratio est vox significativa de eo quod est aliquid vel non est, ut Socrates est, Socrates non est»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXVII, 5, 48: «Oratio est vox significativa, cuius partium aliquid separatum significativum est, ut Socrates disputat. Enuntiativa oratio est vox significativa de eo quod est aliquid vel non est, ut Socrates est, Socrates non est». For an overview of the significance of oratio in late-antique logic manuals, cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 200-205. 19 Among the various types of logical representation, the Stoics recognize the category of the incorporeal. In fact, they made a strict distinction among the external object that has a body, τυγχάνον, that which can also be the voice of the one who is speaking physically (σημαῖνον), and the meaning of the perceived thing (the λεκτόν), defined as expressible and incorporeal. The Stoics recognized four categories of the incorporeal: time, emptiness, space or just the meanings or, more technically, the expressibles or λεκτά. These in turn could be incomplete or complete; more categories belong to the latter class, the most important of which is the ἀξίωμα, an enunciation that is not lacking in any of its parts, has a precise meaning, and therefore can only be either true or false. Cf. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. H. VON ARNIM, 4 vols., B. G. Teubneri, Leipzig 1903-1905 [= SVF], II, 166, p. 48, 13-26; E. BRÉHIER, La théorie des incorporels dans l’ancien stoïcisme, J. Vrin, Paris 1908; M. POHLENZ, La Stoa; M. MIGNUCCI, Il significato della logica stoica, R. Patron, Bologna 1965.

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The one of these which is the most important for my topic is that which is called statemental [pronuntiabilis]. It expresses a complete meaning and is the only one of all of them that is subject to truth or falsity. Sergius calls it an effatum, Varro a proloquium, Cicero an enuntiatum, the Greeks a πρότασις; and then ἀξίωμα, while I, rendering literally, call it both a protensio and a rogamentum; but it will be more appropriately called a proposition [propositio]20.

According to the quadripartition of the dialectical teachings made by Martianus, the oratio therefore belongs to the second part, de eloquendo. By pointing out the identity of meaning between propositio and proloquium, Boethius indicates that it is the propositions that form a syllogism21.

1.3.1 The quality and quantity of the propositions The propositio can be considered from a qualitative or quantitative perspective: Quae cum ita sint, singulorum diligentius natura tractanda est eorumque per species ac membra figurasque facienda divisio. Ac primum de propositione est disserendum. Hanc esse diximus orationem veritatem vel mendacium continentem. Huius duae sunt species, affirmatio una, altera vero negatio. Affirmatio est, si quis 20

The Logic of Apuleius: Including a Complete Latin Text and English Translation of the Peri hermeneias of Apuleius of Madaura, D. LONDEY – C. JOHANSON (eds.), Brill, Leiden 1987, p. 83; Apuleius Madaurensis [= Apuleius], Liber Peri Hermeneias, in Apuleii platonici Madaurensis Opera quae supersunt, III, De philosophia libri, ed. C. MORESCHINI, B. G. Teubneri, Leipzig 1991 [= Peri Hermeneias], I, 265-266, p. 190, 1-8: «Est una inter has [ = orationis species] ad propositum potissima, quae pronuntiabilis appellatur, absolutam sententiam comprehendens, sola ex omnibus veritati aut falsitati obnoxia, quam vocat Sergius effatum, Varro proloquium, Cicero enuntiatum, Graeci πρότασις tum ἀξίωμα, ego verbum e verbo tum protensionem tum rogamentum; familiarius tamen dicetur propositio». Cf. Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 390, p. 186, 9-12: «Quod ergo fuerit ex nominativo casu nominis et tertia verbi persona coniunctum, proloquium dicitur, ita ut iam necessario aut verum sit aut falsum aut dubium». 21 Cf. ivi, 396-403, pp. 190, 1-196, 10. For a synthesis of the various ways in which Latin authors presented the dialectical teachings exhibited by Martianus Capella, see the section called de proloquendo: cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 208-218.

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sic efferat: «Caelum volubile est». Negatio, si quis ita pronuntiet: «Caelum volubile non est». Harum vero aliae sunt universales, aliae particulares, aliae indefinitae, aliae singulares. Universales quidem, ut si quis ita proponat: «Omnis homo iustus est», «nullus homo iustus est». Particulares vero, si quis hoc modo: «Quidam homo iustus est», «quidam homo iustus non est». Indefinitae sic: «Homo iustus est», «homo iustus non est». Singulares vero sunt quae individuum aliquid singulareque proponunt, ut «Cato iustus est», «Cato iustus non est»; etenim Cato individuus est ac singularis22.

The oratio enuntiativa is defined as a proposition in which it is possible to verify the truth or falsity of what is pronounced because it represents a significant judgment. The first two species of proposition presented are affirmation and negation23. Affirmation involves the attribution of a 22 De top. diff., I, III-IV, 1-9, 1174C-1175A, pp. 3, 15-4, 11. Cf. Aristotle, Analytica priora, I, 24a16-25 (Engl. transl. p. 2): «A proposition, then, is a statement affirming or denying something of something; and this is either universal or particular or indefinite. By universal I mean a statement that something belongs to all or none of something; by particular that it belongs to some or not to some or not to all; by indefinite that it does or does not belong, without any mark of being universal or particular, e.g. ‘contraries are subjects of the same science’, or ‘pleasure is not good’. A demonstrative proposition differs from a dialectical one, because a demonstrative proposition is the assumption of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his premiss, but lays it down), whereas a dialectical proposition choice between two contradictories». 23 In the De Interpretatione, Aristotle says explicitly that the affirmation comes before the negation. Boethius and other commentators give great attention to this aspect. Cf. Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 5, 17a8-9; In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio secunda, II, 442C, p. 96, 18-19: «Est autem una prima oratio enuntiativa, affirmatio, deinde negatio». For a comparison of the various ways in which the Latin authors have presented the idea of «proposition», cf. M. Fabius Quintilianus [= Quintilian], Institutiones oratoriae libri XII, ed. L. RADERMACHER, 2 vols., B. G. Teubner, Leipzig 1971 (reprint. Leipzig 1959) [= Institutio oratoria], IV, IV, 1-9, pp. 226-228; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, a cura di L. CALBOLI MONTEFUSCO, Patron, Bologna 1979, II, 22, p. 129, 12-14: «Propositio omnis, id est πρόθεσις, qualis est? Aut simplex aut coniuncta. Coniuncta qualis est? Aut nostrarum quaestionum aut adversarii aut utriusque»; C. Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica Hermagorae, Ciceronis, Quintiliani, Aquili, Marcomanni, Tatiani, XIII, in Rhetores latini minores ex codicibus maximam partem primum adhibitis, ed. K. HALM, Minerva, Leipzig 1863 (reprint. Frankfurt a. M. 1964) [= Ars rhetorica], [pp. 371-448], pp. 416, 29-417, 27; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 553-555, pp. 275-276; Apuleius, Peri Hermeneias, 265.

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predicate to a subject (for example, «caelum volubile est»); conversely, negation denies that a predicate is inherent in a subject (for example, «caelum volubile non est»). Both propositions are possible ways of predication, in which the latter, negation, is therefore considered from a qualitative point of view. Martianus presents the species proloquiorum in the third part of the dialectical teachings, in the section entitled de proloquendo, in which it is explained how the quality of a proposition depends essentially on the verb, according to whether it is expressed in affirmative or negative way24. Considering the enuntiationes now from a quantitative perspective, what determines the quantity of a proposition is the subject, and the propositiones therefore are divided into universales, particulares, indefinitae, and singulares, each of which can be expressed either affirmatively or negatively. Boethius’s example about the attribution of a subject to a predicate from the universal point of view («omnis homo iustus est» or «nullus homo iustus est») shows how the propositio universalis as it were intends to signify that the predicate either belongs to every subject or does not belong to any subject. The example of the particularis propositio instead shows how this kind of quantification indicates whether the predicate belongs to some subjects or does not belong to any subject: «Quidam homo iustus est» or «quidam homo iustus non est». Next come the propositiones indefinitae, so called because they do not contain any specification regarding the quantity of the subjects to which the predicate refers: «Homo iustus est» or «homo iustus non est». Finally, if the subject is 24

Cf. Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 396-403, pp. 190, 1-196, 10. Aristotle discusses the quality and quantity of the propositiones in chapters five, six, and seven of Peri Hermeneias, and Boethius gives extended attention to these aspects in his two commentaries. Cf. In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio prima, I, 5-7, 314A-327B , pp. 72, 3-100, 3; ivi, editio secunda, II, 5-7, 442C-484A, pp. 96, 18-178, 9. Regarding the qualitative aspect of the propositio and the distinction between affirmation and negation, cf. In Top., I, 1051BC: «Omnis enim simplex propositio vel affirmativa est, vel negativa. Earumque aliae sunt universales, ut omnis homo iustus est, nullus homo iustus est; aliae particulares, ut quidam homo iustus est; aliae indefinitae, ut homo iustus est, homo iustus non est; aliae singulares aliquid atque individuum continentes, ut Cato iustus est, Cato iustus non est» (Engl. transl. p. 33: «Every simple proposition is either affirmative or negative. Of these, some are universal [as, for example, ‘Every man is just’; ‘No man is just’]; some are particular [as, for example, ‘Some man is just’; ‘Some man is not just’]; some are indefinite [as, for example, ‘Man is just’ ‘Man is not just’]; and some are singular, containing something singular and individual [as, for example, ‘Cato is just’; ‘Cato is not just’]»).

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just one individual, the proposition is called singularis «Cato iustus est» or «Cato iustus non est». Apuleius and Martianus present only three of these four species, passing over the propositiones singulares. It is also interesting to note that, in the uncertainty that attends the unexpressed quantification of the propositiones indefinitae, Apuleius states that these latter are better understood as propositiones particulares25. These observations are important, considering the fact that Boethius goes on to enunciate all of the maximae propositiones in indefinite form; but while the propositiones indefinitae can be understood both as universales and particulares, one can easily deduce from Boethius’s definition of the maximae propositiones that he understands them as propositiones universales26. In this first book, Boethius presents the various logical concepts rapidly and in summary fashion; he gives little consideration to the conversion of 25

Cf. Apuleius, Peri Hermeneias, 266, III, pp. 190, 17-191, 1: «Sunt et aliae differentiae, quantitatis et qualitatis. Quantitatis quidem, quod aliae universales sunt, ut: Omne spirans vivit, aliae particulares, ut: Quaedam animalia non spirant, aliae indefinitae, ut: Animal spirat; non enim definit, utrum omne an aliquod, sed tamen pro particulari semper valet, quia tutius est id ex incerto accipere, quod minus est». (Engl. transl. p. 83: «There are, too, other differences of quantity and quality. There are certainly those of quantity, because some are universal, e. g., Every breathing thing lives; others are particular, e.g., Some animals do not breathe; others are indefinite, e.g., An animal breathes for this does not determine whether every or some [animal breathes], but nevertheless it always holds as the particular, because it is safer to take that which is less from what is uncertain»). Apuleius therefore revisits the propositiones indefinitae among the particulares because, in the uncertainty regarding their quantity, they are seen as propositions having limited, rather than universal, extension. Cf. Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 396, p. 190, 1-17: «Tertia pars sequitur, in qua dicendum iam est de ipsis proloquiis, ad quorum intellectum in superiore parte pervenimus. Proloquia igitur differentias habent binas in quantitate et qualitate. Quantitatis differentia est, quod alia sunt universalia, alia particularia, alia indefinita. universale est, ut ‘omnis homo animale est’; particulare, ut ‘quidam homo ambulat’; indefinitum, ut ‘homo ambulat’. Quod igitur indefinitae dicimus, necessario particulariter accipimus, non necessario generaliter universaliter; quoniam que id potissimum numerandum, quod securum habet intellectum, indefinitum pro particulari accipitur. Erunt ergo duae differentiae in quantitate, quod aliud est universale proloquium, aliud particulare; in qualitate item duae, quarum alia dedicativa, altera abdicativa. Dedicativum est, ut ‘omnis voluptas bonum’, abdicativum, ut ‘omnis voluptas non bonum’». It can be seen how Boethius, compared with Apuleius and Martianus, adds as well a fourth species of propositio, namely the propositio singularis, which is also presented by Aristotle. Cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 207-213. 26 Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.3.3.

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the propositions, having presented this aspect of the subject in a treatise dedicated to the categorical syllogism27.

1.3.2 The form of the propositions A further, formal distinction between various types of propositiones is articulated as follows: Harum vero alias praedicativas, alias conditionales vocamus. Praedicativae sunt quae simpliciter proponuntur, id est quibus nulla vis conditionis adiungitur, ut si quis simpliciter dicat «caelum esse volubile». At si huic conditio copuletur, fit ex duabus propositionibus una conditionalis hoc modo: «caelum si rotundum est, volubile est». Hic enim conditio id efficit, ut ita demum «caelum volubile esse» intelligatur, «si sit rotundum»28.

A praedicativa propositio is distinct in that it affirms or denies the attribution of a subject to a predicate, «caelum est volubile»; it differs, in terms of form, from the conditionalis propositio in that the latter is instead made up of two predicative propositions joined by means of the vis conditionis: «caelum si rotundum est, volubile est»29. 27

Cf. De syllogismo categorico, I, 805A-806A, pp. 31, 13-34, 3. Boethius refers the reader back to the second book, in which he introduces the concept of argumentatio. Cf. De top. diff., II, II, 3-5, 1183AB, p. 21, 13-17: «Syllogismus est oratio, in qua positis quibusdam et concessis aliud quiddam per ea ipsa quae concessa sunt evenire necesse est quam sunt ipsa quae concessa sunt. Huius definitionis rationem secundus quidem liber eorum, quibus institutionem in categoricos scripsimus syllogismos, plene continet». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.2.1. Both Apuleius and Martianus refer to the rules for the conversion of the propositions; cf. Apuleius, Peri Hermeneias, 270, VI, pp. 196, 15-198, 17; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 397-403, pp. 190, 18-196, 10; cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 215-218. 28 De top. diff., I, IV, 10-12, 1175AB, p. 4, 11-17. Cf. Boethius, De hypotheticis syllogismis, ed. L. OBERTELLO, Paideia, Brescia 1969, in PL 64, coll. 831- 876C, I, I-II, 4-7, pp. 206, 37-214, 72. 29 Cf. Apuleius, Peri Hermeneias, 266, II, p. 190, 9-16: «Propositionum igitur, perinde ut ipsarum conclusionum, duae species: altera praedicativa, quae etiam simplex est, ut si dicamus: Qui regnat, beatus est, altera substitutiva vel condicionalis, quae iam composita est, ut si aias: Qui regnat, si sapit, beatus est (substituis enim condicionem, qua, nisi sapiens est, non sit beatus), nos nunc de praedicativa dicemus,

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A further distinction between predicative and conditional propositions is evident in the term used to indicate their components: Quoniam igitur aliae propositiones praedicativae sunt, aliae conditionales, praedicativarum partes terminos appellamus. Hi sunt praedicatus atque subiectus. Terminos autem voco verba et nomina, quibus propositio, nectitur, ut in ea propositione, qua dicimus: «Homo iustus est»; haec duo nomina, id est «homo» et «iustus», propositionis partes vocamus; eosdem etiam terminos dicimus, quorum quidem alter subiectus est, alter praedicatus30.

quia natura prior est ac velut elementum substitutivae» (Engl. transl. p. 83: «Now, propositions, just like their consequences, are of two kinds. One is the predicative, which, furthermore, is simple, as if we were to say: He who reigns is happy. The other is the substitutive or conditional, which, furthermore, is composite, as if you were to say: He who reigns is happy, if he is wise; for you set a condition, according to which he may not be happy unless he is wise. We shall now go on to talk about the predicative proposition, because it is prior by nature and occurs as an element of the substitutive»). Note how Apuleius clearly gives priority to the propositio praedicativa in regard to the propositio conditionalis. 30 De top. diff., I, IV, 13-15, 1175B, pp. 4, 17-5, 3. Cf. In Top., I, 1049D-1050A: «Omnis autem simplex propositio duas habet partes in terminis constitutas. Simplex vero propositio est huiusmodi, omnis homo animal est. Terminos vero voco simplices orationis partes, quae continent propositionem, ut animal et homo. Illi vero sunt praedicatus atque subiectus. Praedicatus est in propositione maior terminus collocatus; subiectus vero minor. Maior vero terminus de subiecto dicitur; minor autem de maiore nullo modo praedicatur, ut animal quoniam maius est quam homo, de homine praedicatur: dicitur enim, omnis homo animal est. Homo vero de animali non dicitur, nemo enim vere dicit, omne animal homo est. Hac igitur ratione internoscere possumus qui terminus in propositione maior, qui vero sit minor» (Engl. transl. p. 31: «Now every simple proposition has two parts consisting of terms. A simple proposition is of this sort: ‘Every man is an animal’. Terms are what I call the simple parts of speech which comprise the proposition, such as ‘animal’ and ‘man’. These are the predicate and the subject. A predicate is classified as the greater term in a proposition, the subject as the lesser term. The greater term is said of the subject, but the lesser term is never in any way predicated of the greater term. For example, since animal is greater than man, it is predicated of man, for we say, ‘Every man is an animal’. But man is not said of animal, for no one says truly ‘Every animal is a man’. So by this criterion we can discern which term in a proposition is greater and which is lesser»). Cf. Aristotle, Analytica priora, 24b16-18 (Engl. transl. p. 40): «I call a term that into which the proposition is resolved, i.e. both the predicate and that of which it is predicated, ‘is’ or ‘is not’ being added».

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Each of the two parts that make up the predicative proposition is called a terminus, whether the subiectus and praedicatus or even the nomen and verbum; these latter two concepts are then the same voces significativae that are explored in Aristotle’s De interpretatione31. It is important to make clear, however, that the subiectus and the predicatus do not always identify the one with the nomen and the other with the verbum; it may be the case, for example, that the subject of a proposition is a verb, e.g. «studying is good»32. There follows the exhibition of the important rules regarding predication: Subiectus est terminus qui minor est, praedicatus vero qui maior, ut in ea propositione, qua dicitur: «homo iustus est»; «homo» quidem minus est quam «iustus». Non enim in solo homine iustitia esse potest; verum etiam incorporeis divinisque substantiis. Atque ideo maior est terminus «iustus», «homo» vero minor, quo fit ut «homo» quidem subiectus sit terminus, «iustus» vero praedicatus. Quoniam vero huiusmodi simplices propositiones alterum habent praedicatum terminum, alterum vero subiectum, a maioris privilegio partis propositio praedicativa vocata est33.

In this proposition, «homo iustus est», the subject homo is the minor term, while the predicate iustus is the major term, affirming that the 31

The two concepts are widely commented upon by Boethius in his two commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione; cf. In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio prima, 301C-311D, pp. 45, 30-66, 25; ivi, editio secunda, I, 419C-434B, pp. 52, 28-78, 28. The termini are the point of departure from which it is possible to construct any form of discourse, and therefore constitute the very beginning of logic. Cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 159-160: «[Il termine] è l’elemento più semplice del linguaggio stesso, ma dal punto di vista logico viene considerato non tanto in rapporto alla sua posizione nell’ambito del discorso [...] bensì in quanto capace di esprimere un preciso ed unitario significato anziché un altro: questo vuol dire che il termine viene accolto come principio della logica in quanto si riconosce in esso l’esteriorizzazione, mediante una vox (che è una realtà sensibile), di un contenuto mentale corrispondente ad una res. In tal modo la vox stessa viene dotata della capacità di rinviare dalla sensibilità sonora al concetto mentale, ossia essa viene accolta come signum o nota di qualcosa di determinato». Cf. also R. A. MARCUS, «St. Augustine on Signs», Phronesis, 2 (1957) 60-83. 32 Apuleius, Peri Hermeneias, 267, IV, pp. 191, 16-193, 13; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 388, pp. 184, 15-186, 14. 33 De top. diff., I, IV, 16-17, 1175BC, p. 5, 4-12.

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subject homo belongs to the predicate iustus. Ultimately, every predicative proposition expresses whether the semantic unit of the subject does or does not belong to the semantic unit of the predicate, for which reason the subject must have an extension inferior or equal to that of the predicate; otherwise, no predication could take place (iustus, for example, can refer not only to a man but also to divine substance). This proposition is furthermore called «predicative» simply by virtue of the special condition in which the predicate plays the role of major term, i.e. when the predicate, according to its semantic capacity, can always and only be greater than or equal to the subject to which it refers. There may be also cases in which the subject and the predicate have equal predicative extension: Saepe autem evenit ut hi termini sibimet inveniantur aequales hoc modo: «homo risibilis est»; «homo» namque et «risibilis», uterque, sibi aequus est terminus; nam neque «risibile» ultra «hominem», nec ultra «risibile» «homo» porrigitur. Sed in his necesse est hoc evenire, ut, si quidem inaequales termini sint, maior semper de subiecto praedicetur; si vero aequales, uterque conversa de se praedicatione dicatur; ut vero minor de maiori praedicetur in nulla propositione contingit34.

For example, if «homo risibilis est», homo and risibilis are said to be equal terms because their semantic extension is the same and is therefore convertible, being able to laugh does not have a semantic extension greater than being a man, so it is as if both terms are subjects. This proposition is therefore perfectly equivalent to «risibilis est homo». By contrast, the subject can never be greater than the predicate because under these conditions the affirmative proposition, as noted above, would make no sense, and without any predicative act, no significant judgment can be produced and there is no way either to affirm or deny a real relationship between the things expressed by means of the terms. Thus, for example, it cannot be said that «substantia est homo», but only that «homo est substantia», because the predicative extension of the term «man» is not greater than that of the term «substance», and therefore, at the propositional level, «man» can never be the subject of the predicate «substance». 34

Ivi, 18-19, 1175CD, p. 5, 12-19.

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The subject and the predicate, which have been called termini, can be constituted not only by individual names but also by orationes with more elements: Fieri autem potest ut propositionum partes, quos terminos dicimus, non solum in nominibus singulis, verum in orationibus inveniamus. Nam saepe oratio de oratione praedicatur hoc modo: «Socrates cum Platone et discipulis de philosophiae ratione pertractat». Haec quippe oratio, quae est: «Socrates cum Platone et discipulis», subiecta est. Illa vero, quae est: «de philosophiae ratione pertractat», praedicatur. Rursus aliquando nomen subiectum est, oratio praedicatum hoc modo: «Socrates de philosophiae ratione pertractat». Hic enim «Socrates» solus subiectus est. Oratio vero, qua dicimus: «De philosophiae ratione pertractat», praedicatur35.

In the example cited in this passage, «Socrates cum Platone et discipulis de philosophiae ratione pertractat», the subject is not made up of a single nomen, but of an oratio that consists of a proper name and a complement expressing partnership: «Socrates cum Platone et discipulis». Similarly, the predicate «de philosophiae ratione pertractat» is also an oratio formed by a verbum and a complement. In his commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, Boethius displays all of the characteristics of the nomen and the verbum, making clear how each one in turn may be simplex or compositum. The nomen simplex is so called because it cannot be subdivided into parts that by themselves would have no meaning; conversely, the nomen compositum is made up of parts which, although they have meaning when taken separately, nevertheless cannot be separated from the whole of which they are a part, as is the case in the example shown above36. Another possibility is the following: «Rursus aliquando nomen subiectum est, oratio praedicatum hoc modo: ‘Socrates de philosophiae ratione pertractat’. Hic enim ‘Socrates’ solus subiectus est. Oratio vero, qua dicimus: ‘De philosophiae ratione pertractat’, praedicatur»37. It may happen that the subject is made up of a nomen simplex (in the example,

35 36

Ivi, 20-21, 1175D, pp. 5, 19-6, 5. Cf. In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio secunda, I-II, 419C-434D, pp. 52, 28-

80, 17. 37

De top. diff., I, IV, 21, 1175D-1176A, p. 6, 6-9.

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«Socrates»), together with the predicate of an oratio consisting of a verb and a complement of the argument («de philosophiae ratione pertractat»). A further possibility is the following: «Evenit etiam ut supponatur oratio, et simplex vocabulum praedicetur hoc modo: ‘Similitudo cum supernis divinisque substantiis iustitia est’; hic enim oratio per quam profertur: ‘Similitudo cum supernis divinisque substantiis’, subicitur, ‘iustitia’ vero praedicatur»38. The example, «similitudo cum supernis divinisque substantiis iustitia est», shows how, in this case, the subject is made up of a nomen compositum, i.e. an oratio formed by a name and a complement in this way, «similitudo cum supernis divinisque substantiis», while the predicate is only made up of a nomen simplex, here «iustitia». At this point, Boethius refers the reader back to his commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione for an in-depth study of what has been gone over so far: «Sed de huiusmodi propositionibus in his commentariis, quos de Peri hermeneias Aristotelis libro conscripsimus, diligentius disseruimus»39. Next comes the description of the parts of the conditionalis propositio, which had earlier been introduced because this proposition is different, with regard to form, from the propositio praedicativa: Conditionalium vero propositionum, quas Graeci hypotheticas vocant, partes sunt simplices propositiones; quarum quidem ea pars quae prius dicitur antecedens, quae posterius consequens appellatur, ut in hac propositione, quae dicit: «Si rotundum est, volubile est»; «rotundum esse» antecedit «volubile esse» consequitur40.

The conditionales propositiones, which correspond to what the Greeks termed hypotheticae, represent the union of two simple propositions. These components, termed respectively antecedens and consequens, concern situations in which the attribution of a subject to a predicate is not, so to speak, predicated, but only those in which, when something has been established, something else must follow. These propositions are, therefore, entirely supported by the vis conditionis, since it is the conditio established 38

Ivi, 22, 1176A, p. 6, 9-13. Ivi, 23, 1176A, p. 6, 13-14. Cf. J. ISAAC, Le Peri hermeneias en Occident de Boèce à Saint Thomas. Histoire littéraire d’un traité d’Aristote, J. Vrin, Paris 1953. 40 De top. diff., I, IV, 24, 1176AB, p. 6, 15-19. 39

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by the antecedent that enables and justifies passing on to the consequent «si rotundum est, volubile est»41. The conditionales propositiones are further divided into simplices and coniunctae: Harum quoque aliae simplices conditionales, aliae vero coniunctae sunt. Simplices sunt quae praedicativas habent propositiones in partibus, ut ea, quam superius diximus: «Si rotundum est, volubile est». «Rotundum est» enim et «volubile est» utraeque divisae ac singillatim intellectae praedicativae sunt. Coniunctarum vero multiplex differentia est, de quibus in his voluminibus diligentissime perspeximus, quae de hypotheticis composuimus syllogismis. Simplicium vero hypotheticarum propositionum sunt quattuor differentiae: aut enim ex duabus affirmativis categoricis constant, ut «si rotundum est, volubile est»: utraque enim affirmativa est; aut ex duabus negativis, ut «si [caelum] rotundum non est, volubile non est»: nam «rotundum non esse» et «volubile non esse» utraeque sunt negationes; aut ex affirmativa et negativa, ut «si quadrantal est, volubile non est»: «quadrantal» enim «esse» affirmatio est, «volubile non esse», negatio est; aut ex negativa et affirmativa, ut «si rotundum non est, stabile est»: «rotundum» enim «non esse» negatio est, «stabile» vero «esse» affirmatio42.

41

In the De topicis differentiis, Boethius does not present the parts of the conditionalis propositio called repugnantes, i.e. the two terms that are part of the conditional proposition but are expressed in disjunctive form (for example, «either it is day or it is night»). In the commentaries on Cicero’s Topica, he instead provides a precise definition respectively of the antecedens, consequens and repugnans. Cf. In Top., IV, 1124BC: «Primum igitur singularum partium diffinitio prodenda est. Itaque antecedens est, quo posito aliud necesse est consequatur: itemque consequens alicuius est, quod esse necesse est, si illud cuius est consequens praecessisse constiterit. Repugnans est quod simul cum eo cui repugnare dicitur esse non possit» (Engl. transl. pp. 123-124: «First we should provide a definition of the individual parts of the Topic. An antecedent is such that when it has been asserted, something else must follow. Similarly, a consequent of something is what must be if the thing whose consequent it is has definitely gone before. An incompatible is that which cannot exist simultaneously with the thing with which it is said to be incompatible»). The antecedens, therefore, is that which, on the one hand, requires something to follow, namely the antecedens; lastly, the repugnans is defined as that which cannot be simultaneous to what is said to be incompatible. 42 De top. diff., I, IV, 25-28, 1176BC, pp. 6, 19-7, 13.

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The simplices conditionales consist of two predicative propositions united by means of the condition, for example, «si rotundum est, volubile est». The simple conditional propositions are then four, representing the four possible combinations of the two predicative propositions; either: the two predicative propositions are both affirmative, as in «si rotundum est, volubile est»; both are negative, «si caelum rotundum non est, volubile non est»; the first is affirmative and the second is negative, «si quadrantal est, volubile non est»; or the first is negative and the second is affirmative, «si rotundum non est, stabile est»43. The coniunctae conditionales instead possess many differences, so, as noted, Boethius refers his readers to the monograph he dedicated to hypothetical syllogisms for a wider discussion44. 43

From each of the four combinations of the parts of the simple conditional proposition comes the fourfold form of the third figure of a hypothetical syllogism, the vis logica of which derives entirely from the repugnantes and in which only the major premise is a conditional proposition. In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius illustrates at length each of the four forms in which the third figure of a hypothetical syllogism can be expressed. Cf. In Top., V, 1133D-1135B. The following is an example in which a simple conditional proposition is made up of two affirmatives in order to show how the first of the four possibilities for the third figure of a hypothetical syllogism may derive from it: «if it is day, there is light». In this simple conditional proposition, it is enough to insert a double negation, «it is not the case that, if it is day, there is no light», with the result of obtaining a «hyper-negative» (Latin superabnegativa, Greek ὑπεραποφατικός). Hyper-negatives are therefore all those propositions in which negation is placed before negation to create affirmation; thus the following hypothetical syllogism would proceed from the above-mentioned proposition: Non si dies est, lux non est; atqui dies est; lux igitur est. This is very different from the first and second figures of a hypothetical syllogism; here, in fact, the objective is to position the antecedent so as to eliminate the consequent; in the first two figures, by contrast, the antecent is positioned respectively to confirm the consequent, or the consequent is denied in order to eliminate the antecedent. Moreover, it is useful to note that this third way contains the parts that are mutually incompatible; in fact, it is not possible for it to be day if there is no light. This incompatibility is, then, corrected by the negation that precedes the entire proposition through which the previous proposition is eliminated; again, double negation is equal to affirmation. The proposition «it is not the case that, if it is day, there is no light» therefore is equal to the one that states, «if it is day, there is light». As is evident, in this argumentation the vis argumenti derives from the mutually incompatible parts. 44 In the De hypotheticis syllogismis, Boethius fixes very precisely the differences that exist between predicative and conditional propositions. Cf. De hypotheticis syllogismis, I, I, 6-II, 1, 832C-833A, pp. 208, 56-210, 7: «Primum igitur dicendum est

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1.3.3 The propositio per se nota The classification of the propositiones so far has been substantially presented for the maximae propositiones introduced below: Propositionum quoque aliae sunt per se notae et quarum probatio non queat inveniri, aliae vero quas, tametsi animus audientis probet eisque consentiat, tamen possint aliis superioribus approbari. Et illae quidem, quarum nulla probatio est, maximae ac principales vocantur, quod his illas necesse est approbari, quae ut demonstrari valeant, non recusant. Est autem maxima propositio, ut haec: «si quod praedicativa propositio vim suam non in conditione, sed in sola praedicatione constituit, in conditionali vero consequentiae ratio ex conditione suscipitur. Rursus praedicativa simplex est propositio, conditionalis vero esse non poterit, nisi ex praedicativis propositionibus coniungatur, ut cum dicimus: ‘Si dies est, lux est’, ‘dies est’, atque ‘lux est’, duae sunt praedicativae, id est simplices propositiones. Ad hoc illud est, quo maxime declaratur utrarumque proprietas, quod praedicativa quidem propositio habet unum terminum subiectum, alterum praedicatum; et id quod in praedicativa propositione subicitur, illius suscipere nomen videtur quod in eadem propositione praedicatur hoc modo, ut cum dicimus: ‘Homo animal est’, ‘homo’ subiectum est, ‘animal’ praedicatum, et homo animalis suscipit nomen, cum ipse homo animal esse proponitur. At in his propositionibus quae conditionales dicuntur non est idem praedicationis modus; neque enim omnino alterum de altero praedicatur, sed id tantum dicitur esse alterum, si alterum fuerit, veluti cum dicimus: ‘Si peperit, cum viro concubuit’. Non enim tunc dicitur ipsum peperisse id esse quod est cum viro concumbere, sed id tantum proponitur quod partus numquam esse potuisset nisi fuisset cum viro concubitus». The differences presented in this text are three. First of all, the substance of the predicative proposition is constituted by predication alone, while the substance of the hypothetical proposition is posed in conditional terms, since the reason and cause of the consequence (consequentiae ratio) lies entirely in the condition. Second, the predicative proposition is simple, because it can also be made up of only two terms; conversely, the conditional proposition cannot exist if it is not composed of two predicative propositions. Finally, the most important difference lies in the ratio expressed by each of the two propositions: the terms of the predicative proposition are the subject and the predicate, whereas the first seems to accept the name of the second, as in the saying, «man is an animal», in which case the term «man» receives the name «animal». In the conditional proposition, the way of predication is very different because of the affirmation that the one exists if the other does, for example, «if she has born a child, she has lain with a man». This proposition does not contain any predicative act, because it is not by saying that «having lain with a man» is the same as «having born a child»; rather, it affirms that, if a woman has born a child, this means that she has lain with a man.

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aequalibus aequalia demas, quae relinquuntur aequalia sunt». Ita enim hoc per se notum est, ut aliud notius, quo approbari valeat, esse non possit. Quae propositiones, cum fidem sui natura propriam gerant, non solum alieno ad fidem non egent argumento, verum ceteris quoque probationis solent esse principium. Igitur per se notae propositiones, quibus nihil est notius, indemonstrabiles et maximae ac principales vocantur. Quae vero, quamvis auditoris iudicio comprobentur, habent tamen aliquid notius naturaliter, ex quo, si de eis fiat quaestio, velut ex alieno fidem capiant, hae demonstrabiles ac minores posterioresque dicuntur. Et de propositionibus quidem ista sufficiant45.

The maxima propositio is distinguished from all other species of proposition based on the particular content that it is able to convey, described here as per se notum, that which is known in and of itself and does not require anything else in order to be considered true. This is equivalent to recognizing in these propositions the quality of self-evidence owing to the force with which they strike the listener’s mind as true. In this passage, it seems that the introduction of these kinds of propositions is made by means of comparison, or opposition, with regard to all other propositions that perhaps may thereby qualify as probable or likely. On the one hand, in fact, there are «propositiones per se notae quarum probatio non queat inveniri», and «aliae quas, tametsi animus audientibus probet eisque consentiat, possunt aliis superioribus approbari». It is therefore possible that this is a twofold classification based on three main criteria, namely the notum, the probatio, and the consensus, in which the propositions per se notae are those that require neither probatio nor consensus to be true, and that represent the maximae propositiones. Then there are the propositiones that, despite receiving the consensus and the probatio, nevertheless still lack the qualities that would make them true, namely the per se notum; what therefore remains is that, considered separately, they are only probable. Such propositiones in fact have a better known quality that adds credibility, and for this reason they are demonstrated through other propositions. It must be deduced that the real discriminating factor between these two kinds of propositions is contained entirely in what is per se notum, on the basis of which the propositions are divided into maximae or minores, 45

De top. diff., I, IV, 29-33, 1176CD, pp. 7, 13-8, 7.

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indemostrabiles or demonstrabiles, principales or posteriores46. The maximae propositiones will be presented again in the second book of the De topicis differentiis, where their function is also clarified, namely that of establishing the premises of a dialectical syllogism47. The specific qualities attributed to the propositiones per se notae in the text can be summarised as follows: they require no demonstration to be considered proved because they are unprovable and in fact serve as the principle of demonstration for all the others; furthermore, they are by nature capable of generating appropriate faith in themselves. Eleonore Stump and Sten Ebbesen suggest that Boethius is translating the Greek word ἀξίωμα 46

The distinction that Boethius has just made between maximae and minores propositions is also confirmed by the way he introduces their use in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica; cf. In Top., I, 1051B: «Natura igitur rerum fert ut ubi quid maius ac minus est, ibi maximum quoque aliquid inesse necesse sit. Quo fit sint quaedam maximae propositiones, quoniam minores maioresque esse monstravimus» (Engl. transl. p. 33: «The nature of things requires that where there is something greater and lesser, there must also be something greatest or maximal. Hence, there are certain maximal propositions, in the way in which we have shown that there are greater and lesser propositions»). In the third book of the De consolatione philsophiae, Boethius uses a very similar distinction to introduce the demonstration of the existence of the Supreme Good; cf. Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica, C. MORESCHINI (ed.), K. G. Saur, München 2005 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), III, 10, 3-5, p. 81, 7-17: «Sed quin exsistat sitque hoc veluti quidam omnium fons bonorum, negari nequit; omne enim quod imperfectum esse dicitur id imminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit ut, si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit; etenim, perfectione sublata, unde illud quod imperfectum perhibetur exstiterit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim ab deminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum coepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema atque effeta dilabitur» (Boethius, The Theological Tractates; The Consolation of Philosophy, with an English Translation by H. F. STEWART [for The Theological Tractates], E. K. RAND and S. J. TESTER [for The Consolation of Philosophy], Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA – London 1973 [The Loeb classical library, 74], p. 267: «But it cannot be denied that there is some such thing extant which is as it were the fountain of all goodness. For all that is said to be imperfect is so termed for the want it hath of perfection. Whence it followeth that if in any kind we find something imperfect, there must needs be something perfect also in the same kind. For if we take away perfection we cannot so much as devise how there should be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that which is defective and not complete, but, proceeding from entire and absolute, falleth into that which is extreme and enfeebled»). 47 Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.1.

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with the term maxima propositio. Proof of this contention can be found in a passage of the Latin translation of Aristotle’s Topica that Minio-Paluello attributes to Boethius48. These observations create many difficulties: for Aristotle, the ἀξιώματα are the immediate premises of demonstrative syllogism through which to enter into a kind of scientific knowledge, and to which he assigns six characteristics in the Posterior Analytics: By demonstration I mean a scientific deduction; and by scientific I mean one in virtue of which, by having it, we understand something. If, then, understanding is as we posited, it is necessary for demonstrative understanding in particular to depend on things which are true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion (for in this way the principles will also be appropriate to what is being proved). For there will be deduction even without these conditions, but there will not be demonstration; for it will not produce understanding49. 48 Cf. Topica. Translatio Boethii, VIII, 155b7-16, p. 156, 7-15: «Ergo donec inveniat locum similiter philosophi et dialectici consideratio, iam vero haec ordinare et interrogare proprium dialectici; ad alterum enim quod huiusmodi est; philosopho autem et quaerenti per se nihil pertinet, si vera quidem sint et nota per quae syllogismus, non ponat autem ea qui respondet eo quod propinqua sint eorum quae ex principio et praevideat quod accidere est; sed fortasse et festinabit quoniam maxime notae et propinquae sunt maximae propositiones; ex his enim disciplinales syllogismi». Cf. STUMP, «Topics: Their Development and Absorption into the Consequences», in N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG (eds.), The Cambridge History, op. cit.; EBBESEN, Commentators and Commentaries, p. 121; MINIO-PALUELLO, «The Text of Aristotle’s Topics and Elenchi». 49 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b18-25 (Engl. transl. p. 115). On Aristotle’s immediate premises, cf. I. HUSIK, «Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction and the Basis of the Syllogism», Mind, 15 (1906) 218-220; H. D. P. LEE, «Geometrical Method and Aristotle’s Account of the First Principles», Classical Quarterly, 29 (1935) 113-124; K. VON FRITZ, «Noos and Noein in the Homeric Poems», Classical Philology, 38 (1943) 79-93; E. H. ZIEGELMEYER, «The Discovery of the First Principles according to Aristotle», Modern Schoolman, 22 (1945) 132-143; E. TRÉPANIER, «La connaissance des premiers principes», in Laval Théologique et Philosophique 4 (1948) 289310; V. N. GULLEY, «Greek Geometrical Analysis», Phronesis, 3 (1958) 1-14; G. R. EVANS, «Causality and Explanation in the Logic of Aristotle», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 19 (1958-1959) 466-485; BARNES, Aristotle’s Theory; J. H. LESHER, «The Meaning of νόος in the «Posterior Analytics», Phronesis, 18 (1973) 44-68; L. A. KOSMAN, «Understanding, Explanation and Insight in Aristotle’s ‘Posterior Analytics’», in W. N. LEE – A. P. D. MOURELATOS – R. M. RORTY (eds.), Exegesis and

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The first three characteristics relate to the premises considered in themselves, for which reason they are true, in the sense of necessary; they are the primitive, i.e. the primary or the principal, as principles of the demonstration; and finally they are immediate, because they cannot be deduced from others, so their immediacy is equal to their indemonstrability. If the premises are considered rather with reference to the conclusion, they are best known and anterior because they constitute the reasons for the conclusion. According to Michael Ferejohn, these characteristics would refer to the causal condition of a metaphysical nature that is implicit in the immediate premises that reveal the true nature of things, namely their Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V., Assen 1973, pp. 374-392; D. GUERRIERE, «The Aristotelian Concept of Episteme», The Thomist, 39 (1975) 341-348; H. SCHOLZ, «The Ancient Axiomatic Theory», in J. BARNES – M. SCHOFIELD – R. SORABJI (eds.), Articles on Aristotle 1. Science, Duckworth, London 1975, pp. 50-64; W. WIELAND, «Aristotle’s Physics and the Problem of Inquiry into Principles», in ivi, pp. 127-140; A. GÓMEZ-LOBO, «Aristotle’s Hypotheses and the Euclidean Postulates», The Review of Metaphysics, 30 (1977) 430439; ID., «Aristotle’s First Philosophy and the Principles of Particular Disciplines», Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 32 (1977) 183-194; T. IRWIN, Aristotle’s First Principles, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988; W. R. KNORR, «On the Early History of Axiomatics: The Interaction of Mathematics and Philosophy in Greek Antiquity», in J. HINTIKKA – D. GRUENDER – E. AGAZZI (eds.), Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa conference on the History and Philosophy of Science, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1978, pp. 145-186; ID., «On the Early History of Axiomatics: A Reply to Some Criticisms», in ivi, pp. 193-196; ID., «Construction and Existence Proof in Ancient Geometry», Ancient Philosophy, 3 (1980) 125-148; C. KAHN, «The Role of ‘Nous’ in the Cognition of First Principles in ‘Posterior Analytics’», in E. BERTI (ed.), Aristotle on Science. The «Posterior Analytics» (Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium Aristotelicum), Editrice Antenore, Padova 1981, pp. 385-414; V. B. LANDOR, «Definitions and Hypotheses in ‘Posterior Analytics’ 72a19-25 and 76b35-77a4», in Phronesis 26 (1981) pp. 308-318; S. MANSION, «‘Plus connus en soi’, ‘plus connus pour nous’. Une distinction épistémologique importante chez Aristote», in S. MANSION (ed.), Études aristotéliciennes, Éditions de l’Institut Superieur de Philosophie, Louvain-la-Neuve 1984, pp. 213-222; V. KAL, On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle, Brill, Leiden – New York – Köln 1988; W. WIANS, «Aristotle, Demonstration and Teaching», Ancient Philosophy, 9 (1989) 245-253; L. COLOUBARITIS, «Y a-t-il une intuition des principes chez Aristote?», Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 34 (1980) 440-471; M. T. FEREJOHN, «The Immediate Premises of Aristotelian Demonstration», Ancient Philosophy, 14 (1994) 79-97; A. R. PERREIAH, «Aristotle’s Axiomatic Science: Peripatetic Notation or Pedagogical Plan?», History and Philosophy of Logic, 14 (1993) 87-99; G. BAYER, «Coming to Know Principles in the ‘Posterior Analytics’ II 19», Apeiron, 30 (1997) 109-141.

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essence50. These characteristics are not very different from those that Boethius attributes to the maximae propositiones. In this regard, consider the definition of the maximae propositiones presented in Boethius’s commentary on the Topica: We call highest and maximal propositions those propositions that are universal and known and manifest to such an extent that they need no proof but rather themselves provide proof for things that are in doubt, for those propositions that are undoubted are generally the principles of demonstration for those propositions that are uncertain. Propositions of this sort are ‘Every number is either even or odd’ and ‘If equals are subtracted from equals, equals remain’, and others whose truth is known and unquestioned. In Aristotle’s Topics, as we have observed, maximal propositions, that is, universal and most known propositions from which the conclusion of syllogisms is derived, are called Topics. Because they are maximal (that is, universal) propositions, they embrace other propositions within themselves as places embrace bodies; because, however, they are most known and manifest, they furnish belief for questions and in this way contain proofs for things that are uncertain51.

50

Cf. M. T. FEREJOHN, The Immediate Premises. In Top., I, 1051CD (Engl. transl. p. 33): «Supremas igitur ac maximas propositiones vocamus, quae et universales sunt, et ita notae atque manifestae, ut probatione non egeant, eaque potius quae in dubitatione sunt probent. Nam quae indubitata sunt, ambiguorum demonstrationi solent esse principia, qualis est, omnem numerum vel parem esse vel imparem, et aequalia relinqui, si aequalibus aequalia detrahuntur; caeteraeque de quarum nota veritate non quaeritur. Maximas igitur, id est universales ac notissimas propositiones, ex quibus syllogismorum conclusio descendit, in Topicis ab Aristotele conscriptis locos appellatos esse perspeximus; quod enim maximae sunt, id est universales propositiones, reliquas in se velut loci corpora complectuntur, quod vero notissimae atque manifestae sunt, fidem quaestionibus praestant, eoque modo ambiguarum rerum continent probationes». Boethius’s choice to include the use of maximae propositiones and their differentiae is undoubtedly a matter of greater originality than emerges from his commentary on Cicero’s text. Cicero never speaks about maximal propositions, so it is possible that Boethius wrote this commentary for the De topicis differentiis, since it is precisely there that he declares openly his desire to identify the Ciceronian locus with the Aristotelian-Themistian tópoi. On the other hand, that Boethius was already writing the De topicis differentiis while still commenting on Cicero can be seen from some explicit references in the commentary. Cf. Introd., note 12. 51

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As is evident, this definition is very similar to that found in the De topicis differentiis, and it will be useful to identify its fundamental elements, namely the genus and the specific differences. Regarding the genus, a maxima propositio is a propositio, also called enuntiatio or proloquium, so it is an apophantic judgment. The specific differences are said to be many: there are the maximal («maximae»), universal («universales»), best known («notissimae»), and manifest («manifestae»); there are those that do not require demonstration («probatione non egeant»), those that prove what is in doubt («ea quae in dubitatione sunt probent»), those that are the principles for the demonstration of ambiguous things («ambiguorum demonstrationi esse principia»), those that provide the conclusions of syllogisms («ex quibus syllogismorum conclusio descendit»), those that enclose and embrace in themselves all other things («reliquas in se velut loci corpora complectuntur»), those that lend credibility to questions in doubt («fidem questionibus praestant»), those that are known per se («per se notae propositiones»), and those that by nature produce faith in themselves («cum fidem sui natura propriam gerant»). Other differences are specified during the discussion: the maximal proposition is recognized by itself («per se cognita»); it does not need demonstration («neque indigens probatione»); it is inserted into the argumentation («argumentatione inserta est»)52; and it produces the consequence and confirms the conclusion («per eam fit consequens et rata conclusio»)53. A quick comparison with the six characteristics of Aristotle’s immediate premises reveals a high degree of similarity: the premises considered in themselves in fact are true, i.e. per se necessariae; they are primary, i.e. principales they are immediate, i.e. indemostrabiles; and, compared to the conclusion, they are best known, i.e. notius naturaliter. Priority does not seem to be given by any precise term; rather it can be considered to be included within the «best known»; finally, the premises are the reasons for the conclusion, since «ex quibus syllogismorum conclusio discendit», and because «per eas fit consequens et rata conclusio». Evidently, the problem arises in view of the difficulty 52 Cf. ivi, I, 1052A: «Hic igitur maxima propositio atque universalis et per se cognita, neque indigens probatione, argumentationi inserta est» (Engl. transl. p. 33: «Here the proposition that is maximal, universal, known per se, and in need of no proof is incorporated in the argumentation»). 53 Cf. De top. diff., II, III, 12, 1185D-1186A, p. 27, 7-9: «Ideo et universales et maximae propositiones loci dictae sunt, quoniam ipsae sunt quae continent ceteras propositiones et per eas fit consequens et rata conclusio». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.1.

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of distinguishing, given that the maximae propositiones have such great probative capacity, the dialectic from the apodictic. Moreover, the characteristics of the maximal propositions now presented describe fully the place that they occupy among other propositions, the source from which they come, and their form, content, and function; moreover, these are the same propositions that Boethius describes as Aristotelian loci in his commentary on Cicero54. Boethius makes explicit reference to the maximal propositions in other texts as well, beginning with his second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge. The context is an observation on the predicable among the differentia that Porphyry defines as «that by which the species exceeds the genus»55, since the difference only potentially possesses all the differences subordinated to it, but does not actually possess them. With this solution, the principle stands firm, so that neither is anything generated from that which does not exist, nor are contraries present simultaneously in the same subject. In Boethius’s translation, Porphyry’s reference text is the following: Quas etiam determinantes dicunt: differentia est qua abundat species a genere. Homo enim ab animali plus habet rationale et mortale: animal enim neque ipsum nihil horum est - nam unde habebunt species differentias? - neque enim omnes oppositas habet - nam in eodem simul habebunt oppositas -. Sed, quemadmodum probant, potestate quidem omnes habet sub se differentias, actu vero nullam. Ac sic neque ex his quae non sunt, aliquid fit neque opposita circa idem sunt56.

So then Boethius, commenting on these last two affirmations of Porphyry, calls them propositiones per se notae: «Sed huic definitioni quaedam quaestio videtur occurrere habens principium ex duabus per se propositionibus notis, una quidem, quoniam duo contraria in eodem esse non possunt, alia vero, quoniam ex nihilo nihil fit»57. It is interesting that both propositions known per se and formulated in this way («quoniam duo 54

Cf. In Top., I, 1051D. Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, IV, 9, 125C, p. 262, 4: «Differentia est qua abundat specie a genere». 56 Ivi, IV, 9, 125C, p. 262, 4-13. 57 Ivi, IV, 9, 125D, p. 263, 2-6. 55

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contraria in eodem esse non possunt» and «quoniam ex nihilo nihil fit») are absent from the commentary on Cicero’s Topica and from the De topicis differentiis. Another valuable clue enables us to connect the maximae propositiones with the De hebdomadibus. In this text, in fact, is found the same example of a maxima propositio quoted both in the De topicis differentiis and in the commentary on the Topica, «si de aequalibus aequalia demas, quae derelinquuntur aequalia sunt»58. In the De hebdomadibus, this axiom is offered as an example of communis animi conceptio, a Latin translation of the Greek word κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, where the term animus indicates the source from which these concepts come, «si duobus aequalibus aequalia auferas, quae relinquuntur aequalia esse, nullus id intellegens negat»59. It is not by chance that this axiom corresponds to the second of the nine κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι pointed out by Euclid in his Geometry; this is also the same axiom that Aristotle uses in the Posterior Analytics as an example of a principle shared by various sciences and from which the proper principles of each may arise60. It is therefore possible to begin to identify tentatively the 58

De top. diff., I, IV, 29-33, 1176C, p. 7, 19-20; Cf. In Top., I, 1051C: «omnem numerum vel parem esse vel imparem, et aequalia relinqui, si aequalibus aequalia detrahuntur» (Engl. transl. p. 33: «’Every number is either even or odd’ and ‘If equals are subtracted from equals, equals remain’»). 59 Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona, in De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica, ed. C. MORESCHINI, K. G. Saur, München 2005 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), [= De hebdomadibus], p. 187, 20-22; Cf. Boethius De institutione arithmetica libri duo, De institutione musica libri quinque. Accedit geometria quae fertur Boetii, ed. G. FRIEDLEIN, B. G. Teubneri, Lipsia 1867 (reprint. Frankfurt 1966) [= De institutione arithmetica], pp. 377, 20-378, 1: «Communes igitur animi conceptiones sunt quae a Graecis κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι vocantur». For a thorough investigation of the specific geometrical significance that Boethius attributes to this axiom, cf. M. LEJBOWICZ, «‘Cassiodorii Eluclides’: Éléments de bibliographie boécienne», in A. GALLONIER (éd.), Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs, Actes du Colloque International de la Fondation Singer-Polignac (Paris, 8-12 juin 1999), Peeters, Louvain – Paris 2003, pp. 301-339 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 44). 60 Cf. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora, 77a26-31 (Engl. transl. p. 126): «All the sciences associate with one another in respect of the common items (I call common those which they use as demonstrating from them—not those about which they prove nor what they prove); and dialectic associates with them all, and so would any science that attempted to prove universally the common items—e.g. that everything is affirmed or denied, or that equals from equals leave equals, or any things of the sort». Cf.

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various ways in which Boethius refers to this special kind of proposition using the different names of maximae propositiones and propositiones per se notae61. In sum, it is useful to observe here how the regulatory formalities of the self-evident propositions must be read in terms of generality: when viewed in the light of the theory of the predicable, the situation is easier to understand because it is possible to find a clear affirmation of the ontological priority of the genus over the species, and of the species over the individual. The basic belief is that that which is more universal is prior to that which is less universal, in accordance with an understanding of universality that in logic is represented by the predicative extension of the maximal propositions. This belief is clearly derived from what Porphyry discusses in his Isagoge, a text upon which Boethius twice wrote a commentary and in which, through simple affirmation of the priority of the genus over the species and of the species over the individual, Porphyry allows his desire to mediate between Plato and Aristotle to emerge62. Aristotle, in fact, certainly would not agree to the priority of the genus over the species, or of the species over the individual, since for him the first substances are the individuals, while the forms are secondary substances. The observation of reality enables simple verification that, where there is a more and a less, there must also be a most (otherwise it would be impossible to understand the principle by which one thing could be said to be greater or lesser than another), and Boethius applies this principle to such logical constructs as the propositions and to GREEN-PEDERSEN, The Tradition of the Topics, p. 61: «Thus undoubtedly, what Boethius has in mind in his general description of the maxim is sentences like the Aristotelian axioms». Cf. PERREIAH, Aristotle’s Axiomatic Science; E. TORMOD, «Aristotelian Topos and Greek Geometry», Symbolae Osloenses, 70 (1995) 5-21; J. HINTIKKA, «Aristotelian Axiomatics and Geometrical Axiomatics», in ID. (ed.), Analyses of Aristotle, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 2004, pp. 133-144. 61 Several scholars have emphasized the high degree of similarity between the maxima propositio and the communis animi conceptio, revealing their possible identification by ancient authors. Cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 267-274; GREENPEDERSEN, The Tradition of the Topics, p. 61; G. R. EVANS, «Communis animi conceptio. The Self-evident Statement», Archivium Latinitas Medii Aevi, 41 (1977-78) 123-126; F. L. TUNINETTI, «Boethius: ‘communis animi conceptio’ und ‘propositio per se nota’», in ID., «Per se notum». Die logische Beschaffenheit des Selbsverständlichen im Denken des Thomas von Aquin, Brill, Leiden 1996, pp. 49-67; LEJBOWICZ, «‘Cassiodorii Eluclides’». 62 Cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, p. 17, 9-10.

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their predicative extension. Therefore, if there are propositions of greater or lesser predicative capacity, there must also be propositions of maximal predicative capacity owing to their relatively greater universality63. Thus, 63 Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, I, 9, 81B-81D, pp. 157, 10-158, 13: «Fit enim demonstratio, id est alicuius quaesitate rei certa rationis collectio, ex ante cognitis naturaliter, ex convenientibus, ex primis, ex causa, ex necessariis, ex per se inhaerentibus. Sed genera speciebus propriis priora sunt naturaliter. Ex generibus enim species fluunt. Item species sub se positis vel speciebus vel individuis priores naturaliter esse manifestum est. Quae vero priora sunt, ea et praenoscuntur et notiora sunt subsequentibus naturaliter. Duobus enim modis primum aliquid et notum dicitur, secundum nos scilicet, et secundum natura. Nobis enim illa magis cognita sunt, quae sunt proxima, ut individua, dehinc species, postremo genera: at vero natura converso modo ea sunt magis cognita, quae nobis minime proxima. Atque ideo quantumlibet se longius a nobis genera protulerunt tanto magis erunt lucida et naturaliter nota. Differentiae vero substantiales illae sunt quas per se his rebus inesse quae demonstrantur agnoscimus. Praecedere autem debet generum ac differentiarum cognitio, ut in unaquaque disciplina quae sint eius rei quae demonstratur convenientia principia possit intelligi. Necessaria vero esse ea ipsa, quae genera et differentias dicimus, nullus dubitat qui speciem sine genera et differentia intelligit esse non posse. Genera vero et differentiae sunt causae specierum. Idcirco enim species sunt quia genera earum et differentiae sunt quae in syllogismis posita demonstrantibus non rei solum, verum etiam conclusionis causae sunt, quod postremi resolutorii locupletius dicent». The demonstration, as a sure inference of reasoning related to any given thing, can be produced alternatively by the things that are naturally known first (ex ante cognitis naturaliter), by the arranged things (ex convenientibus), by the principles (ex primis), by the cause (ex causis), by the necessary things (ex necessariis), and/ or by the things united in themselves (ex inhaerentibus). However, Boethius draws attention to the fact that the genus is naturally prior to the species because the species derive from the genus, and in turn the species are naturally prior to the things that are subordinated to them, whether they are other species or individuals. Therefore, a thing can be described as anterior in two senses: anterior compared to the way it is known, or anterior from the viewpoint of its nature. Compared to the way knowledge is acquired, the things that come first are the individuals, after which come the species and finally the genera; but starting from a consideration of the nature of things, the genus comes first, followed by the species, and, lastly, the individuals. Consequently, the things that come first from the viewpoint of their nature are in fact those most distant. On the other hand, of the five predicables (genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident), the most important instrument that enables knowledge is the substantial difference, because with it the genus is divided into species, and thus can be subject of knowledge (the mind in fact divides and separates what is united in nature). What is anterior by nature consists of the genus and specific difference because these are the cause of the species; so even in a demonstrative syllogism, the genus and the specific

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for example, the proposition that «everything that belongs to the entire genus, belongs also to each of its species» expresses the rule of predication, according to which all the properties of a genus are necessarily and entirely contained in its every species64. This proposition is universal in at least two ways: first because it contains no individual element (such as a name of a person), and second in the general sense, since it regulates the relationship of every genus with its species, and for this reason can be useful in solving questions that concern this specific relationship of predication.

1.4 The quaestio and its species Boethius defines quaestio as follows: «quaestio vero est dubitabilis propositio, in qua necesse est eadem omnia considerari, quae dudum in propositione praediximus»65. The quaestio therefore belongs to the genus of the propositio, the specific difference of which is the state of being dubitabilis; it is in fact, as mentioned previously, the second element of a syllogism, for which reason what has been said so far about the enuntiatio applies equally to the quaestio66. It may thus appear that every proposition can become a quaestio if given the proper form. The quaestio, then, is classified as follows: Aliae namque sunt simplices, aliae vero compositae. Simplices, ut hae, quae ex simplici propositione descendunt hoc modo, ut si quaeratur «an sit caelum volubile». Haec enim ab ea venit propositione, quae dicit «caelum esse volubile». At si ex conditionali difference are the causes not only of the things, but also of the conclusion itself. Cf. GIRGENTI, «Introduzione», in Porfirio, Isagoge, prefazione, introduzione, traduzione e apparati a cura di G. Girgenti, Bompiani, Milano 2004, pp. 7-50. 64 It is the argumentum a genere, as is made clear by Boethius through the following maxima propositio; cf. In Top., II, 1070B: «Cui convenit omne genus, eidem unamquamque speciem convenire» (Engl. transl. p. 57: «Any species of a genus belongs to whatever the whole genus belongs to»). 65 De top. diff., I, v, 1, 1176D, p. 8, 8-9. At the beginning of the treatise Boethius has already given the definition of the quaestio, substantially equivalent to the one that is now presented. Cf. ivi, I, II, 2, 1174B, p. 3, 1-2: «Quaestio est in dubitationem ambiguitatemque adducta propositio, ut si quis quaerat ‘an sit caelum volubile’». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3. 66 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3.

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composita propositione principium sumat, ipsa erit conditionalis atque composita hoc modo, «an, si caelum rotundum est, volubile sit»; haec namque a conditionali propositione sumpsit initium, quae est: «si caelum rotundum est, volubile est». Ergo et quaestio alias quidem praedicativa est, alias vero conditionalis. Quo fit ut eaedem quoque sint partes quaestionis, quae dudum esse dictae sunt propositionis. Praedicativae igitur quaestiones habent terminum praedicatum atque subiectum, ut in ea, in qua dubitatur «an caelum sit volubile»; nam «volubile» praedicatum, «caelum» vero subiectum est. Maior est enim terminus «volubile» quam «caelum»; neque enim solum «caelum» «volubile» dici potest. Quae vero coniuncta est quaestio habebit partes quod antecedit et quod sequitur, ut in ea, quae est: «An si, caelum rotundum est, volubile est?». Antecedit quidem «rotundum esse», sequitur «volubile esse». Quae cum ita sint, in praedicativa solum quaestione dubitatur an subiecto termino praedicatus inhaereat. In hypotheticis vero quaestionibus id tantum quaeritur, an illam rem quae praecedit comitetur id, quod consequens esse proponitur67.

From a formal perspective, the quaestiones simplices and quaestiones compositae correspond respectively to the predicative propositions and the conditional propositions. In fact, a quaestio simplex can be also called a quaestio praedicativa because it consists of a predicate and a subject, as in such questions as «an caelum sit volubile», by means of which the attempt is made to determine whether the volubile predicate is inherent in the subject caelum. Conversely, in the case of a quaestio coniuncta, which derives from a conditional proposition, the form will be that of a quaestio conditionalis, because it is made up of a question regarding two predicative propositions that are united by the vis conditionis, for example, «an si caelum est rotundum, volubile est». The parts of which the quaestio simplex or praedicativa is composed are the same as those of which the propositio praedicativa is composed, namely the subiectum and the praedicatum, in which the doubt expressed by the quaestio is related to the way in which the predicate is inherent in the subject. Similarly, the parts of the quaestio coniuncta or hypothetica are the same ones that make up the propositio conditionalis, namely the antecedens and the consequens, in which the issue is whether, once the antecedent (caelum) is proposed, the consequence (rotundum) follows. 67

De top. diff., I, V, 1-10, 1176D-1177B, pp. 8, 9-9, 9.

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As was the case with the propositiones praedicativae, the quaestiones praedicativae are likewise divided from a quantitative point of view into universales, particulares, indefinitae, and singulares: «Omnia vero, quae de praedicativis propositionibus dicta sunt, id est quod aliae universales, aliae particulares, aliae indefinitae sint, aliae singulares, eadem dici etiam in praedicativa quaestione convenit»68. For Boethius, the only difference that exists between the propositio and the quaestio is the following: Hoc enim tantum quaestio a propositione diversa est, quod propositio quidem, vel enuntiata simpliciter vel aliud probans, oratio est verum falsumve significans. Quaestio vero, cum sit ipsa quoque oratio, tamen est dubitabilis propositio. Addita igitur dubitatione, quae in propositione considerantur, eadem etiam convenit in quaestione tractari69.

The propositio is a species of the genus oratio distinguished as an oratio enuntiativa because it is a subject of discourse that is to be judged as either true or false. Thus the propositio, situated as it is in connection with several propositions, i.e. as reasoning or argumentation, can in turn simply be enunciated or used to prove another proposition. The quaestio instead is a propositio dubitabilis because the specific difference of doubt is added to the genus of the proposition, resulting in a kind of propositio made in the form of a question; this is in fact, as mentioned, the meaning that Martianus attributes to the quaestio, the second element of the syllogism. It is thus clear why every propositio, except the maximae, can be converted into a quaestio: ultimately, to settle the doubt of the quaestio, what is required is an understanding of how the predicate is inherent in the subject, or whether the consequence derives from the antecedent. These considerations mean that the quaestio is by nature ambiguous: though 68

Ivi, I, V, 12, 1177B, p. 9, 10-12. Ivi, I, V, 12, 1177B, p. 9, 12-17. Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I, 101b26-37 (Engl. transl. p. 169): «The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. For if it be put in this way, ‘Is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition of man?’ or ‘Is animal the genus of man?’ the result is a proposition; but if thus, ‘Is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition of man or not?’ and ‘Is animal the genus of man or not?’ the result is a problem. Similarly too in other cases. Naturally, then, problems and propositions are equal in number; for out of every proposition you will make a problem if you change the turn of phrase». 69

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constituting a single proposition, it carries within itself two alternatives, one of which will certainly be true and the other false. From this perspective, the maximae propositiones cannot then be converted into quaestiones, since the relationship between the subject and predicate (in cases in which they are predicative propositions), or between antecedent and consequent (when these are conditional propositions), is always and only true, and as such is shared by all intelligent people. It therefore almost seems that the quaestio, with two possible underlying solutions, manifests the ambiguity of each propositio demonstrabilis, and requires that the principle be identified as the basis on which to establish the truth of a proposition and the consequent falsity of the contrary assertion. On the other hand, all propositions are divided into either maximae and indemonstrabiles (i.e. those lacking ambiguity, known per se, and serving as principles of demonstration for all others), or into minores and demonstrabiles that have yet to be demonstrated by means of the maximae70.

1.4.1 The thesis The discipline of topica begins always and only in the presence of a quaestio, which is the reason why Boethius spends so much time examining 70 After presenting various ways in which a quaestio can be subdivided, Boethius adds another distinction between the quaestio simplex and composita: the first contains an affirmative and a negative, while the second requires a choice among two or more alternatives. Cf. De top. diff., I, V, 51-54, 1180B, p. 15, 7-16: «Praeterea quaestio omnis vel simplex est vel composita. Simplex, quoties affirmatione et negatione dividitur, ita ut totum alteri affirmare, alteri negare necesse sit hoc modo: ‘Sit an caelum rotundum necne’; hic enim una pars quaestionis affirmationem tenet, alia negationem. Nam cum alter esse defendit, affirmat, negat alter vero, cum non esse contendit. Composita vero quaestio est quae in plures distrahitur affirmationes hoc modo ‘utrum caelum rotundum sit an quadratum an longum aut cuiuslibet alterius formae’; hic enim plurimas affirmationes probare necesse est qui diversa defendunt». Cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.4.4. The formulation of the quaestio in disjunctive terms seems to be the most correct manner in which to express it, since, while Boethius says that every propositio can be converted into a quaestio, it is necessary that the quaestio express the doubt and ambiguity contained in the propositio by formulating both of the contradictories that may arise. The interlocutor must then choose one of the two alternatives; however, what is thereby obtained is still only a dubia propositio to which the teaching of the discipline of the topica must be applied in order to identify the principle of truth hidden within one of the two terms of the proposition, either the subject or the predicate. This principle serves to make the dubia propositio scientific, and this is the locus.

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different kinds of quaestio71. In fact, he follows a classification based on the differing nature of quaestiones: Quaestionis autem duae sunt species: una quae dicitur a dialecticis thesis; haec huiusmodi est, quae de re ceteris circumstantiis nuda quaerat ac disserat, quales a dialecticis maxime ad disputationem sumuntur, ut «voluptasne summum bonum sit», «ducendane uxor». Haec a nobis propositio vel propositum dicitur. Altera vero est quae vocatur a Graecis hypothesis; a nobis dicitur causa. Haec est quaestio personis, temporibus, factis, ceterisque circumstantiis implicata; ea est huiusmodi: «Iurene Cicero in exilium dubio reipublicae tempore detrudatur, quia iniussu populi cives Romanos necaverit». Huius autem duplicis quaestionis subdivisiones alias esse necesse est et thesis quidem philosophis, hypothesis vero oratoribus attributae sunt72. 71 Inasmuch as the discipline of topica begins always and only in the presence of a quaestio, from the generative point of view, the mind can invenire a locus (subdividing it subsequently in argumentum and argumentatio) only if a proposition in doubt has to be ascertained. The loci therefore are not pre-existing forms, but the mind discovers them and uses them whenever it must argue for or against a certain thesis or hypothesis. 72 De top. diff., I, V, 13-16, 1177CD, pp. 9, 18-10, 10. The distinction of the quaestiones in thesis and hypothesis is undoubtedly taken back by Cicero; cf. Cicero, Topica, 79-80, p. 158, 14-22: «Quaestionum duo genera: alterum infinitum, definitum alterum. Definitum est quod ὑπόθεσις in Graeci, nos causam; infinitum quod θέσις illi appellant, nos propositum possumus nominare. Causa certis personis, locis, temporibus, actionibus, negotiis cernitur aut in omnibus aut in plerisque eorum, propositum autem aut in aliquo eorum aut in pluribus nec tamen in maximis. Itaque propositum pars est causae. Sed omnis quaestio earum aliqua de re est quibus causae continentur, aut una aut pluribus aut non numquam omnibus» (Engl. transl. p. 159: « There are two types of question: one is infinite, the other definite. ‘Definite’ is the one which the Greeks call hypothesis, and we ‘case’; ‘infinite’ is the one which they call thesis, and we may call ‘problem’. A case is determinate with respect to certain persons, places, times, actions, or affairs, with respect either to all of them or to most of them; a problem with respect to some one of them or to several, but never to the most important. Therefore the problem is a part of the case. And every question is concerned with one of the aspects cases are about, either with one or with several or sometimes even with all of them»). In the Topica as well, Aristotle uses the term θέσις; in fact, he presents two classes thereof: the paradoxical opinions of the philosophers and the well known opinions (ἔνδοξα) that are opposite to those of the common opinion. Both species of thesis belong to the genus of the questions of dialectical nature. The term ὑπόθεσις, with the meaning used by Cicero, is not present in Aristotle’s text; cf. Aristotle, Topica, I, 104b19-28 (Engl. transl. p. 174): «A thesis is a paradoxical belief of some eminent

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So far, a distinction has been made among various types of quaestiones with regard to form and quantity. The distinction that is next presented regards content: the thesis, so called by the Greeks, and corresponding to Latin propositio or propositum, is used primarily by dialecticians, since the quaestiones are universal, i.e. free from any particular reference to such factors as the circumstances, an example being, «voluptasne summum bonum sit». Conversely, the hypothesis is instead the province of orators, since it is in fact a kind of question relating to specific circumstances such as people, time, or facts. Introducing this distinction, which can be found in many Latin rhetoric texts, Boethius emphasizes simultaneously the difference that exists between the dialectical and rhetorical areas of investigation73. Therefore, while on the one hand the nature of the loci philosopher; e.g. the view that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said; or the view of Heraclitus that all things are in motion; or that what exists is one, as Melissus says; for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly. Or it may be a view contrary to men’s usual opinions about which we have an argument, e.g. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come to be or be eternal; for a musician who is a grammarian is so without ever having come to be so, or being so eternally. For even if some do not accept this view, a man might do so on the ground that it has an argument in its favour». 73 The same distinction between thesis and hypothesis is present in many Latin authors, cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, III, V, 5, pp. 137, 28-138, 10: «Item convenit quaestiones esse aut infinitas aut finitas. Infinitae sunt, quae remotis personis et temporibus et locis ceterisque similibus in utramque partem tractantur, quod Graeci θέσιν dicunt, Cicero propositum, alii quaestiones universales civiles, alii quaestiones philosopho convenientis, Athenaeus partem causae appellat. Hoc genus Cicero scientia et actione distinguit, ut sit scientiae ‘an providentia mundus regatur’, actionis ‘an accedendum ad rem publicam administrandam’. Prius trium generum ‘an sit, quid sit, quale sit’; omnia enim haec ignorari possunt: sequens duorum ‘quo modo adipiscamur, quo modo utamur’. Finitae autem sunt ex complexu rerum, personarum, temporum ceterorumque: hae ὑπόθεσις in a Graecis dicuntur, causae a nostris»; Aurelius Augustinus, De rhetorica quae supersunt, 5, in Rhetores latini minores ex codicibus maximam partem primum adhibitis, ed. K. HALM, Minerva, Leipzig 1863 (reprint. Frankfurt a. M. 1964) [= De rhetorica], [pp. 135-151], p. 139, 23-30: «Duo sunt primi et quasi generales civilium modi quaestionum, quorum alter thesis, alter hypothesis vocatur a Graecis. Nos priori nomen nisi Graecum dare non possumus, ne posteriori quidem, quamquam videamur Latinum dedisse, dedimus: quippe controversiam dicimus, quod nomen tam in thesin quam in hypothesin potest cadere; in utroque enim quaestio, id est controversia est. Porro hypotheseos significatio et declaratur ex ipso conposito nomine esse aliquid, quod est ὑπὸ τὴν θέσιν, id est sub illo genere quasi

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is universal, they have on the other hand a disciplinary polyvalence because all the ways of approaching the investigation originate with them. Therefore, in this specific aspect, the same value that Aristotle established for the τόποι is maintained74. Both the thesis and the hypothesis are further subdivided into species. Regarding the thesis, this subdivision depends only on the four ways in which a predicate may be inherent in the subject, as is the case with predicative proposition:

species»; (Augustinus’ authorship of the De rhetorica is uncertain); Sulpicius Victor, Institutiones oratoriae, in Rhetores latini minores ex codicibus maximam partem primum adhibitis, ed. K. HALM, Minerva, Leipzig 1863 (reprint. Frankfurt a. M. 1964), [pp. 311-352], 3, p. 314, 6-8: «Civilis quaestionis partes sunt duae: et harum Graeca sunt nomina θέσις et ὑπόθεσις. Thesin nos propositum dicimus, hypothesin sive controversiam sive causam: sed definitionem utriusque videamus»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 441, pp. 216, 18-217, 7: «Quaestio ipsa aut finita est aut infinita. Finita est, cum nascitur de certo facto demonstratque personam, ut in Rosciana quaeritur Ciceronis, utrum interfecerit patrem Roscius. Infinita illa est, quae generaliter quaerit, utrum sit aliquid appetendum, ut, an philosophandum sit, in Hortensio disputatur. In superiore autem crebro assidueque colluctor, atque eam Graecis placuit ὑπόθεσιν nominari. In infinita vero universitatis astruendae sibi fiduciam vindicante tunc potius versor, cum otium ac disputationes aggredior, licet plerumque etiam pars ipsa, quae thesis dicitur, in causis mihi elatius anhelanti amentatas hastas crebro et pila plurimum valentia ministrarit»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, xv, 8-14: «Genera quaestionum duo sunt, quorum unum est finitum alterum infinitum. Finitum ὑπόθεσιν Graece, Latine causa dicitur, ubi cum certa persona controversia est. Infinitum quod Graece θέσις, Latine propositum nominatur. Hoc personam non habet certam, nec inest [in] aliqua certa circumstantia, id est, nec locus, nec tempus. In causa vero certa omnia sunt, unde quasi pars causae est propositum»; Excerpta rhetorica e codice parisino 7530 edita, in Rhetores latini minores ex codicibus maximam partem primum adhibitis, ed. K. HALM, Minerva, Leipzig 1863 (reprint. Frankfurt a. M. 1964) [= Exc. Rhet.], [pp. 585-592], pp. 585, 17-586, 2: «Thesis est quaestio generalis, hypothesis specialis. In thesi, id est in generali quaestione, tantummodo de rebus ipsis sine persona quaeritur: adhibitis personis res quoque communiter; nam quos genus causae premit, species saepe defendit. Si enim secundum thesin, id est generalem quaestionem, quaeratur an animadvertendum sit in matricidam, dubium non erit quin debeat animadverti; sed si ex hypothesi persona accesserit, invenit defensionem: ut si quaeratur, animadvertendum sit in Oresten matricidam, dubium non erit, quam debet animadverti; hac enim se Orestes ratione defendit, quod patrem vindicaverit». 74 Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I, 101a25-101b4. On the utilitas topicorum: cf. infra, Chap. 1, § 1.7.

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Sed eius quidem quaestionis, quae est hypothesis, posterius divisiones dabo. Nunc vero de theseos divisione pertractabo, quae in quattuor dividitur species. In omni enim dialectica quaestione praedicativa dubitatur an ei quod subiectum est id quod praedicatur inhaereat. Cum vero aliquid alicui inesse proponitur, id aut maius erit eo de quo praedicatur eique substantialiter inesse contenditur aut maius quidem eo erit, sed non de eius substantia praedicabitur, aut ei erit aequale et in substantia praedicabitur aut ei erit aequale, sed minime eius substantiam continebit. Nam ut id quod minus est de eo quod maius est praedicemus fieri non potest75.

In every predicative dialectical question, then, what is in doubt is whether the predicate is inherent in the subject76. There are in fact four possible ways in which a given thing can be said to be inherent in something else, depending on whether it has: greater semantic extension than that upon which it is predicated and is inherent in the substance; a value greater than that upon which it is predicated but is not inherent in its substance; a similar semantic extension to that upon which it is predicated and is inherent in its substance; or, finally, a similar semantic extension to that upon which it is predicated but does not belong to its substance. In this fourfold classification scheme, therefore, the possibility that the predicate has an inferior semantic extension of the subject is excluded because in this case no actual predication would occur77. 75

De top. diff., I, V, 17-20, 1177D-1178A, p. 10, 10-19. In the second book, before the presentation of the list of the Themistian loci, Boethius again takes time to summarise the species of the thesis. Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.4. 76 It is important to remember that a term in itself has its own semantic extension, even before being placed in relation to other terms. In this regard: cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, p. 161: «In base allora all’operazione immediata che la mente deve compiere nei confronti del termine per enuclearne il significato, e cioè la misurazione dell’estensione della sua predicabilità (il significato viene infatti precisato quando è chiaro quante e quali siano le res che rientrano in esso), il termine stesso è in grado di rivelare una sua natura di maggiore o minore capacità semantica già quando viene preso in quanto tale. In questo modo esso viene perciò ad occupare innanzi tutto una collocazione precisa nell’ambito di una classificazione secondo la sua maggiore o minore estensione, e dunque, in senso inversamente proporzionale, secondo il minore o maggiore incremento della sua determinazione significativa». The five predicables presented by Porphyry in his Isagoge represent therefore the five possible semantic extensions of a term. 77 Cf. D. W. HAMLYN, «Aristotle on Predication», Phronesis, 6 (1961) 110-126; C. EVANGELIOU, «Aristotle’s Doctrine of Predicables and Porphyry’s ‘Isagoge’», Journal

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In sum, then, there are four species of thesis: Sed si tale est quod in quaestione proponitur, ut subiecto sit maius et de subiecti substantia praedicetur, erit genus; omne enim genus maius est eo de quo praedicatur et de substantia eius dicitur, ut «animal hominis». At si maius quidem fuerit, sed minime de substantia eius praedicetur, erit accidens, ut «album homini». Quod si aequale quidem sit, sed substantiale, subiecti erit definitio, ut «animal rationale mortale homini»; haec namque convertitur et subiecti, id est «hominis», substantiam monstrat. Quod si aequale quidem sit, sed a substantiae ratione seiunctum, erit proprium, ut «risibile homini». Itaque dialecticae simplices quaestiones aut de genere aut de accidente aut de definitione aut de proprio fiunt78.

In this classification scheme, substantially the same as the previous one, indication is now given regarding which predicable of the typology of predication is assimilable to each quaestio. If the predicate is greater than the subject and is inherent in its substance, it is the same as the genus of the subject; every genus, in fact, is greater than that upon which it is predicated and which is said to be its substance, such as «animal» is of «man». If, however, the predicate is greater than the subject but is not inherent in its substance, then it is an accident, such as «white» is an accident of «man». Similarly, if the predicate is equal to the subject and is inherent in its of the History of Philosophy, 23 (1985) 15-34; F. BEETS, «Theories of Predication from Boethius to Thomas Aquinas», in H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS – C. H. KNEEPKENS (eds.), Aristotle’s Perihermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition, Brepols, Turnhout 2003, pp. 305-319. 78 De top. diff., I, V, 21-25, 1178AB, pp. 10, 19-11, 10. Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I, 101b13-25 (Engl. transl. p. 169): «Now the materials with which arguments start are equal in number, and are identical, with the subjects on which deductions take place. For arguments start with propositions, while the subjects on which deductions take place are problems. Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a property or an accident—for the differentia too, being generic, should be ranked together with the genus. Since, however, of what is proper to anything part signifies its essence, while part does not, let us divide the proper into both the aforesaid parts, and call that part which indicates the essence a definition, while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology which is generally current about these things, and speak of it as a property. What we have said, then, makes it clear that according to our present division, the elements turn out to be four, all told, namely either property or definition or genus or accident».

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substance, it is the same as the definition of the subject, as «mortal rational animal» is the definition of «man». Finally, to complete the classification, if the predicate is equal to the subject but it is not part of its substance, it then corresponds to a property of the subject, as for instance «able to laugh» may be a property of «man». These considerations imply that the reader knows already the doctrine of the predicables as it is presented by Porphyry in the Isagoge, a treatise upon which, as mentioned, Boethius twice composed a commentary79. Each dialectical question, therefore, may concern the genus, accident, definition, or property. This quadripartite classification of the quaestiones of the Aristotelian matrix seems at first sight to exclude the predicables of species and difference. In fact Porphyry, in his Isagoge, alters this classification scheme by omitting definition and introducing species and difference (genus, species, difference, property, and accident). Boethius, for his part, at once proceeds to consider the quaestiones regarding the predicables of the differentia, demonstrating as well how this kind of quaestio is easily reconcilable with the doctrine of the five predicables now under discussion: Possunt vero fieri etiam de differentia, cum quaeritur «caelestia corpora rationabilia sint necne» vel cum dubitatur «eane sit tyranni ac principis differentia, quod hic legibus sumpsit imperium, ille 79

Cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, p. 163, n. 7: «In epoca tardo-antica le fonti prnicipali che trasmettono [la dottrina dei cinque predicabili] sono comunque l’Isagoge di Porfirio e le due edizioni del commento boeziano». Cf. Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 344-348, pp. 157, 17-160, 19; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, III, 8, pp. 112, 7-113, 4; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, 25. For a bibliographical guide to Porphyry, cf. G. GIRGENTI, Porfirio negli ultimi cinquant’anni, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1994. For the relationship between Porphyry and Boethius, cf. J. BIDEZ, «Boèce et Porphyre», Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire, 2 (1923) 189-201; L. ADAMO, «Boezio e Mario Vittorino traduttori e interpreti dell’Isagoge di Porfirio», Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 13 (1967) 141-164; G. SAVA, «Boezio e la tradizione latina del primo commento all’Isagoge di Porfirio», Bollettino di storia della filosofia. Università degli studi di Lecce, 2 (1974) 348-366; J. JOLIVET, «Quand Boèce aborde Porphyre», in A. GALLONIER (éd.), Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs, Acte du Colloque International de la Fondation Singer-Polignac (Paris 8-12 juin 1999), Peeters, Louvain – Paris 2003, pp. 229-240 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 44); R. CHIARADONNA, «Concetti generali, forme e astrazioni in Porfirio», in Ch. ERISMANN (ed.), De la logique à l’ontologie. Études sur la philosophie de Porphyre et son influence durant l’Antiquité tardive et le haut Moyen Âge, J. Vrin, Paris 2007, pp. 123-140.

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violenta dominatione populum premit». Sed tantumdem est de differentia quaerere, quantum, si de genere dubitetur. Aut enim constitutiva erit differentia aut divisibilis. Sed si constitutiva fuerit, quasi generis obtinet locum, ut «rationabilitas» homini vel, si ratione degunt, caelestibus quoque corporibus; at si divisibilis, velut species consideratur; omnis enim species cum divisibili differentia est. Quod si differentia nunc quidem loco generis, nunc vero speciei loco est, ambigi non potest, cum de ea quaeritur, de genere dubitari80.

First of all, it is necessary to keep in mind that difference, as a predicable, can be constitutive or divisive, though always with respect to different things: it is divisive of the genus but constitutive of the species. So, for instance, bearing in mind the «tree» of Porphyry’s quinque res, «rational» and «irrational» are contrary and divisive differences of the genus «animal»; but the «rational» difference is in turn constitutive of the species «man», while the «irrational» difference is constitutive of the species «horse»81. By way of further example, the question of whether the 80

De top. diff., I, V, 26-29, 1178BC, p. 11, 10-20. In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius points out twice that the constitutive difference should be assimilated to the genus, and the divisive difference to the species. The first occasion is during the presentation of the maximarum propositionum differentiae, where Boethius specifies that the latter are intended to be constitutive differences and therefore are assimilable to the genus. The second occasion is in the commentary on the Ciceronian locus ex differentia, where it is specified that, while the difference acts as a function of locus, it is always a divisive difference, and therefore assimilable to the species. Cf. In Top., I, 1052C: «Sed istae locorum, id est propositionum maximarum, differentiae, quas etiam ipsos locos nominamus, possunt subiectarum propositionum etiam genera nuncupari. Nam differentiae continentes etiam genera communiter possunt videri, ut irrationale cum a rationali velut divisibili differentia dissideat; tamen equi vel canis, differentia specifica est, et ad eos locum generis tenet. Namque animal irrationabile equi genus est. Ita etiam in maximis propositionibus. Nam quod aliae sunt ex toto, aliae ex partibus, hae inter se comparatae differentiae divisibiles sunt, ad ipsas vero maximas propositiones differentiarum continentiae velut generis loco sunt. Nam propositionis ex toto venientis genus est idipsum quod vocatur ex toto. Item propositiones a partibus ductae, quamvis notae sint atque manifestae, genus est, quod a partibus, et caeterae differentiae earum propositionum quae cum sint maximae, tamen eisdem videntur includi, velut quaedam genera sint»; (Engl. transl. p. 34: «The differentiae of Topics or maximal propositions are themselves also given the name ‘Topics’ and can also be called genera of the propositions subordinated under them; for constitutive differentiae can usually also be regarded as genera. For example, although irrational is a divisive differentia distinct from rational, it is nonetheless also 81

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heavenly bodies are rational or not concerns the constitutive difference, because what is in doubt is whether the substantial difference, expressed by the predicate «rational», is inherent in the substance of the subject, the «celestial bodies». This, therefore, is a question concerning the genus. In the case of a question such as whether the difference between a prince and a tyrant is that a prince derives his power from the laws, it could be said that, since a tyrant dominates the people by force, the matter concerns a divisive difference. In this case, in fact, we need to know whether «the power derived from laws» and «domination by force» are or are not divisive differences, and therefore contrary differences with regard only to the genus, «power». If so, the difference between the government of a prince and that of a tyrant would reside only in the different way each practises the same genus, power; being in fact species of the same genus, the a specific differentia for horse and dog and holds the place of a genus with respect to them, for irrational animal is the genus of horse. Things are the same in the case of maximal propositions. Since some maximal propositions are from the whole and others are from parts, from the whole and from parts in relation to one another are divisive differentiae. But in relation to maximal propositions themselves, which are constituted from the differentiae, they have the place of ‘a genus’. The genus of a proposition arising from the whole is just from the whole. Similarly, the genus of a proposition drawn from parts (however known and manifest the proposition) is from parts, and other differentiae are also ‘genera’ of some sort for propositions that are maximal and yet seem to be included in these differentiae»); ivi, 1118D: «Item differentiae aliae aliquo modo sunt generum divisibiles, aliae aliquo modo specierum constitutivae; sed si a constitutivis argumentum ducatur, velut a genere ducitur. Nam sicut genus continet speciem, ita differentiae continent species. Sane si differentiae constitutivae ut genera intelligentur, fides ab his ad ea aptabitur quae constituunt. Haec enim talium differentiarum veluti formae quaedam sunt. Sin vero sint divisibiles, siquidem ad ea probanda, id est genera, quae dividunt, earum ducitur fides, a forma argumentum fieri videtur, nam tales differentiae eorum quae dividuntur formae quaedam sunt. Quod si ad ea probanda referuntur quae in contrariam partem genus dividunt, tunc proprie a differentia fieri argumentum videtur, quia contrariae veluti differentiae comparantur» (Engl. transl. p. 117: «Again, some differentiae are in one way divisive of genera and in another way constitutive of species. But if an argument is drawn from constitutive differentiae, it is as if it were drawn from a genus; for as a genus encompasses a species, so differentiae encompass species. Certainly, if constitutive differentiae are understood as genera, the belief they furnish will be suited to the things the differentiae constitute, for these things are [as it were] kinds of a sort for such differentiae. But if those differentiae that divide a genus into contrary parts are brought to bear on the things to be proved, then the argument seems to arise from a differentia properly speaking, because contraries are related to one another as differentiae»).

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differences are to be considered in the same way. If, on the contrary, the two species of power are not divisive differences of the same genus, they are not equal and therefore are not comparable; the distinction would then be artificial because it does not inhere in the substance of the genus «power», a way of thinking with consequences that Roman citizens of the sixth century AD might perhaps have connected with questions regarding the legitimacy of the reign of the Ostrogothic king Theodoric. For Boethius, therefore, the questions relating to difference are mostly referable to those relating to genus, since it is sufficient that the predicate be greater than the subject and inherent in its substance, so that the difference would be assimilated to the genus82. Something, however, must also be said about the questions concerning species, for each species is logically broader than the species inferior to it, and so serves as the genus of the lesser species (except that most special one, which is species and therefore is predicated only of individuals; but there is no science of individuals, for which reason logic does not deal with this class). Therefore, any question that has to do with the species is similar to a question having to do with the genus83. 82

Cf. STUMP, «Differentia», in Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, pp. 248-261. The so-called «Porphyry’s tree» is described concisely in the following passage of Isagoge: cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, p. 4, 16-32 (Engl. transl. pp. 5-7): «Most general is that above which there will be no other superordinate genus; most special, that after which there will be no other subordinate species; and between the most general and the most special are other items which are at the same time both genera and species (but taken in relation now to one thing and now to another). What I mean should become clear in the case of a single type of predication. Substance is itself a genus. Under it is body, and under body animate body, under which is animal; under animal is rational animal, under which is man; and under man are Socrates and Plato and particular men. Of these items, substance is the most general and is only a genus, while man is the most special and is only a species. Body is a species of substance and a genus of animate body. Animate body is a species of body and a genus of animal. Again, animal is a species of animate body and a genus of rational animal. Rational animal is a species of animal and a genus of man. Man is a species of rational animal, but not a genus of particular men—only a species». The supreme genus is the genus that no other genus supervenes; and since the genus is necessary for formulating a definition, there cannot be any definition of the supreme genus, but only the description. The same can be said about the very special species under which it is not possible that any other species fall, because in order to form a definition, in addition to the genus, the specific difference also is necessary, so the definition of the very special species does not exist. For Boethius’s representation of Porphyry’s tree, cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, III, 9, 103BD, p. 209. Cf. EVANGELIOU, Aristotle’s Doctrine; S. EBBESEN, 83

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Finally, there are also predicative questions that concern a comparatio or the identical: Accidere vero potest ut aliquid in certamen comparationemque ducatur, velut cum ambigitur «an melior sit fortitudo iustitia». Sed haec quaestio in accidentis necesse est dubitatione ponatur; namque ad comparationem nihil nisi accidens venit; hoc enim solum recipit maius et minus. Rursus potest de eo quod est idem fieri certamen, ut «an idem sit utile quod honestum». Sed haec quaestio definitioni est aggreganda; quarum enim rerum eadem definitio est, ipsae quoque eaedem sunt; quarum vero diversa substantiae ratio est, ipsae etiam sunt diversae. Igitur simplicis dialecticae quaestionis recte quattuor species esse dicuntur, de quibus sufficienter dictum est84.

For example, the question «is courage better than justice?» is related to a comparison; such a quaestio, however, can easily be associated with one concerning the accident, because only accidents admit a valuation of greater or lesser85. The object of a question may be also the identical; for example, such a question as «is what is useful the same as what is honest?» can easily be referred to the question concerning the definitio, because two or more things with the same definition are the same («quarum enim rerum eadem definitio est, ipsae quoque eaedem sunt»); conversely, two or more things with different definitions are themselves different («quarum vero diversa substantiae ratio est, ipsae sunt diversae »)86. Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic: A Reconstruction, in R. SORABJI (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, Duckworth, London 1990, pp. 141-171; P. HADOT, The Harmony of Plotinus and Aristotle according to Porphyry, in ivi, pp. 125140; G. GIRGENTI, Il pensiero forte di Porfirio, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1996; J. BARNES, «Commentary», in Porphyry, Introduction, Transl. with Introduction and Commentary by J. Barnes, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003. 84 De top. diff., I, V, 30-32, 1178CD, pp. 11, 20-12, 9. 85 Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I 1, 102b14-20 (Engl. transl. p. 170): «To accident are to be attached also all comparisons of things together, when expressed in language that is derived in any kind of way from accident; such as, for example, the question, ‘Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?’ and ‘Is the life of virtue or the life of selfindulgence the pleasanter?’, and any other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these. For in all such cases the question is ‘of which of the two is the predicate more properly an accident?’». 86 Note that the last two affirmations («quarum enim rerum eadem definitio est, ipsae quoque eaedem sunt» and «quarum vero diversa substantiae ratio est, ipsae sunt

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1.4.2 The hypothesis Having catalogued the species of the thesis, the next issue is the classification of the different species of the hypothesis (called causa by the Romans), which is the second species of quaestio, the one that is mainly the concern of rhetoricians since it is associated with persons, facts, and circumstances. Mention has already been made of the simplex propositio conditionalis, which consists of two predicative propositions united by the vis conditionis, and from this combination a fourfold classification scheme arises. The same considerations regarding the simple hypotheses are now transferred to the simplices quaestiones conditionales: Nunc igitur de conditionalibus quaestionibus pertractandum est. Quarum quidem aliae constant ex duabus affirmativis, aliae ex duabus negativis, aliae ex affirmatione et negatione, aliae ex negatione et affirmatione. Si igitur ex duabus affirmationibus conditionalis propositio constat, id quaeritur, an affirmatio affirmationem sequatur; quod si ex duabus negationibus propositio iuncta sit, id in disceptatione est, an negationem negatio comitetur; quod si ex affirmatione et negatione vel ex negatione atque affirmatione copuletur, id ambigitur, vel an affirmationem negatio vel an negationem affirmatio comitetur87.

Since every conditional proposition establishes that, once the antecedent is proposed, the consequent immediately follows, there are four possible combinations according to which the two predicative propositions of the simplex hypothetica quaestio may come to an agreement. If the predicative propositions are both in the affirmative, the quaestio will concern whether the affirmative placed in the consequent follows from the affirmative placed in the antecedent. If the predicative propositions are both diversae») are certainly maximae propositiones, although Boethius does not say so explicitly. The evidence lies in the fact that, in the second book, he enunciates the second of these two propositions, presenting it as an example of maxima propositio placed outside the syllogism. Cf. De top. diff., II, III, 10, 1185D, pp. 26, 21-27, 1: «Quorum diversa est definitio, ipsa quoque diversa est»; In Top., I, 1052A: «Quorum diversae sunt definitiones, diversas esse substantias necesse est» (Engl. transl. p. 34: «Things that have different definitions have different substances»). Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.1. 87 De top. diff., I, V, 33-34, 1178D, p. 12, 9-18.

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negative, the issue becomes whether the negative placed in the consequent follows from that in the antecedent. If the predicate propositions include an affirmative and a negative, the question requires a determination of whether the negative placed in the consequent follows from the affirmative in the antecedent. Finally, if the propositions are a negative and an affirmative, the doubt to be settled is whether the affirmative placed in the consequent follows from the negative in the antecedent. After this fourfold classification of simple hypothetical questions, Boethius continues with a display of all the possible combinations that may arise from it, which therefore constitute the hypothetical syllogisms. In particular, he seems to have in mind the first figure of a hypothetical syllogism made according to the form of modus ponens, in which it is necessary to insert the antecedent into the minor premise so that the consequent may be confirmed in the conclusion; for example, «if it is day, there is light»; «but it is day»; «so there is light». In fact, Boethius immediately thereafter explores in depth the same four combinations, and shows for each of them which species of consequent follows from which antecedents: Ac prius quidem eius quaestionis divisio facienda est, in qua disceptatur an affirmationem affirmatio consequatur, quae praedicativarum propositionum non effugiunt divisionem. Nam ut praecedat aliquid atque aliud consequatur in his fere rebus evenire solet, quas paulo superius commemoravi. Speciem quippe sequitur vel genus vel differentia vel definitio vel proprium vel inseparabile accidens. Item proprium ac definitionem sequitur species, proprium quoque sequitur differentia et definitio et definitionem sequitur proprium vel differentia, accidentia quoque comitatur id quod subiectum est hoc modo: nam «si homo est, animal est»; «si homo est, rationale est»; «si homo est, animal rationale mortale est»; «si homo est, risibile est»; «si Aethiops est, niger est»; «si risibile est, homo est»; «si animal rationale mortale est, homo est»; «si risibilis est, rationalis est»; «si risibilis est, animal rationale mortale est»; «si animal rationale mortale est, risibile est vel bipes»; «si album est, corpus est»88.

The first species of the simplex hypothetica quaestio is made up of two affirmatives. The classification that follows describes which species 88

Ivi, I, V, 35-38, 1178D-1179B, pp. 12, 18-13, 11.

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of affirmative placed in the consequent follows necessarily from which affirmative placed in the antecedent; in the case of predicables: 1.1 The genus, the difference, the definition, the property, and the inseparable accident placed in the consequens always follow from the species placed in the antecedens. 1.2 The species placed in the consequens follows from the property or the definition in the antecedens. 1.3 If the consequens is a difference or a definition, these properties follow from the property placed in the antecedens. 1.4 The property and the difference placed in the consequens follow from the definition in the antecedens. 1.5 From the accident placed in the antecedens follows the subject in which it is inherent when placed in the consequens. Diagram no. 15 (Appendix, p. 335) summarizes the twelve rules set out in the case in which the antecedent and the consequent are predicables with respective examples. The following rules concern other possible elements that can be established as antecedent and consequent: «Praeter haec autem alias quidem effectus causam, alias effectum causa consequitur. Effectus causam ita: ‘Si sol praesto est, lucet’. Rursus effectum causa hoc modo: ‘Si quid exustum est, ignis adfuit’; vel sic: ‘Si sol videtur, lucet’»89. Represented schematically: 1.6 An effectus follows from its causa, an example being, «if the sun is present, there is light». 1.7 Sometimes a causa can be followed by its effectus, for example, «if something is burning, there must be the fire». The other rules follow: «Item totum partes sequuntur, ut ‘si integra domus est, et tectum et parietes et fundamenta consistunt’»90. 1.8 Similarly, the partes follow from the totum, such as «if the house is complete, a roof, walls, and foundations exist». Finally: «Modus etiam nomen sequitur principale, ut ‘si iustitia bona est, et quod iuste est bene est’. Nomen etiam principale sequitur modum, ut ‘si quod iuste est bene est, et iustitia bona est’»91. 89

De top. diff., I, v, 39, 1179B, p. 13, 11-14. Ivi, I, V, 40, 1179B, p. 13, 15-16. 91 Ivi, I, V, 41-42, 1179B, p. 13, 16-19. 90

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1.9

The nomen principale follows from its inflection (modus), such as, «if justice is good, also what is done justly is good». 1.10 The inflection of a term (modus) also follows from the nomen principale from which it is derived, for example, «if what is done justly is good, justice is also good». This concludes this first part, in which the formal rules regulating the relations between antecedent and consequent are articulated that concern the case in which the predicative propositions, united by the vis conditionis, are two affirmatives: Quae cum ita sint, conditionalis quoque simplicis ex duabus affirmationibus copulatae illa fere divisio est quaestionis, quod in ea vel de genere vel de proprio vel de definitione vel de accidente vel de causa atque effectu vel de toto ac partibus vel de modo ac principali nomine dubitatur. Atque haec de ea quaestione intelligenda sunt, quae, cum sit hypothetica simplex, ex duabus tamen iungitur affirmativis92.

It is therefore clear that, during the presentation of the various species of the simplex hypothetica quaestio, Boethius at the same time gives a glimpse of the method by which these species are developed through the forms of a conditional syllogism. Although this section may seem somewhat formal, and indeed tangential to the main purpose of the treatise, it is important to remember that these rules are the ones that enable the dialectician and rhetorician to identify easily and quickly the locus, the principle of truth capable of resolving the doubt expressed by the quaestio. Beginning with the third book, in which the loci ex antecedentibus, ex consequentibus, and ex repugnantibus of Cicero are presented, it will at last become clear that the seven forms of hypothetical syllogisms derive entirely from these three loci. In order to form correct hypothetical syllogisms, however, it is crucial to recognize what is placed in the antecedent and consequent (genus, difference, species, property, definition, accident, cause, effect, whole, parts, principal name and its inflection) so that the rules that are now on display may be applied correctly93. As mentioned, a simple hypothetical question can be made up of two negative propositions (the second species of a simple hypothetical 92 93

Ivi, I, V, 43-44, 1179BC, pp. 13, 19-14, 4. Cf. infra, Chap. 3, § 3.4.8.

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question), and in this case the same formal rules as those expressed in the previous classification remain valid, though they are clearly reversed: In hisdem etiam differentiis illas quoque consistere necesse est quaestiones, quae ab his veniunt propositionibus, quae ex utraque negatione consistunt. Nam si genus non est, species non est; item si differentia vel definitio vel proprium non sit, species non erit. Et de ceteris quidem, quae superius dicta sunt, eodem modo considerandum est. Quicquid enim antecedit, ut aliud consequatur, si id quod consequitur non fuerit, nec illud quidem est quod antecedit.94

The typologies of inferences exhibited so far concern those forms that in logic are commonly called modus ponendo ponens and modus tollendo tollens. In the first case, the antecedens is affirmed in order to affirm the consequens, for example, «if it is day, there is light; but it is day, so there is light»; in the case of modus tollens, conversely, the consequens is negated in order to negate the antecedens, for example: «if it is day, there is light, but there is no light, so it is not day» («Quicquid enim antecedit, ut aliud consequatur, si id quod consequitur non fuerit, nec illud quidem est quod antecedit»). With regard to instruments of resolvability for the third and fourth species of the simplex hypothetica quaestio, it seems that Boethius has in mind the third form of hypothetical syllogism, the one that is based on disjunctive conditional propositions: Earum vero quaestionum, quae ex affirmatione et negatione consistunt, illa fere divisio est, quod vel in diversis generibus vel in diversis speciebus vel in contrariis vel in privatione atque habitu continentur; ut enim affirmationem negatio consequatur, aut diversum ponitur genus, ut quod ab eo diversum est abnuatur hoc modo: «Si homo est, albedo non est»; vel: «Si substantia est, qualitas non est»; vel si sub eodem genere diversae species proponantur hoc modo: «Si homo est, equus non est»; vel si contraria: «Si album est, nigrum non est»; vel si privationes: «Si caecus est, non videt»; et postremo in omnibus, quaecumque eadem non sunt, convenit, si unum est, alterum non esse. Itaque ut propositam affirmationem negatio comitetur, aut diversa erunt 94

De top. diff., I, V, 45-46, 1179CD, p. 14, 4-11.

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genera aut diversae species aut contraria aut privantia aut quolibet alio modo sibimet inconvenientia95.

The third species of simple hypothetical question is made up of an affirmative and a negative, in which the doubt concerns whether what is negated in the consequent may follow from what is affirmed in the antecedent, for example, «if it is day, it is not dark, is it?». It is therefore apparent that these are the elements which, when united by the vis conditionis, negate and oppose each other: – Antecedens and consequens may contain two different genera, for example «if it is a man, it is not a color». – Antecedens and consequens may contain two different species, for example «if it is a man, it is not a horse». – Antecedens and consequens may also be opposites: «If it is white, it is not black». – Finally, antecedens and consequens may concern also privatio, i.e. the lack of something that should be there by nature («blindness»), as well as habitus, the possession of something («sight»), for example, «if it is blind, it does not see». All things that are in mutual conflict belong to this third species. The fourth and last species of the simplex hypothetica quaestio is made up of a negative and an affirmative proposition: «Ut autem negationem affirmatio consequatur, quae erat quarta conditionalis propositionis differentia, fieri non potest, nisi in his contrariis, quae medio carent et quorum alterum semper esse necesse est, hoc modo: ‘Si dies non est, nox est’; ‘si tenebrae non sunt, lux est’»96. An affirmation can follow from a negation only in cases in which the two are contraria, since their characteristic feature is the impossibility of being both present in the same subject: when one is present, the other is necessarily absent, for example «if it is not day, it is night», or even «if it is night, there is no light»97. 95 Ivi, I, V, 47-48, 1179D-1180A, p. 14, 11-23. It is not clear why Boethius does not refer to the parts of the third and fourth species of the simplices hypothetices quaestiones as repugnantes, his term for them in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica. 96 Ivi, I, V, 49, 1180A, pp. 14, 23-15, 2. 97 In the Aristotelian classification of the opposite, this kind of contraria corresponds to the immediata contraria; cf. Aristotle, Categoriae, 11b17-14a25;

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It may be observed that only the conditional propositions and the respective questions from which it is possible to draw the first three forms of hypothetical syllogism are presented. The reason for this is not specified here, but it is contained in the commentary on the Topica. In this text Boethius, following Cicero, says that, although from the conditional propositions and the respective hypothetical syllogisms there may arise innumerable argumentations in which the entire dialectic is ultimately contained, only the loci ex antecedentibus, ex consequentibus, and ex repugnantibus concern the discipline of topica, i.e. the loci from which it is possible to draw the first three forms of hypothetical syllogism98.

1.4.3 The material of the quaestio The material for the investigation of the predicative and conditional questions may concern three different disciplinary areas: Facta igitur praedicativarum et conditionalium quaestionum divisione illud insuper videtur addendum, quod omnis quaestio vel ex ratione disserendi vel ex naturali vel ex morali trahitur speculatione; ex disserendi ratione hoc modo: «An affirmatio et negatio species sint enuntiationis»; ex naturali ita: «an caelum rotundum sit»; ex morali sic: «An virtus ad beatitudinem sola sufficiat»99. Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor, in PL 64, coll. 159-294 [= In Aristotelis Categorias], IV, 264B-283D; cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.7.6. In the commentary on Cicero’s Topica, with regard to the locus ex contrario, Boethius presents the Ciceronian classification of the contraria, and since he himself sees the substantial divergence from the Aristotelian classification of the opposita, he introduces Aristotle’s as well in order to show how the two classifications may be reconciled; cf. In Top., IV, 1119C-1120C. It is in this context useful to observe also how the doctrine of opposition constitutes one of the most important arguments among what were called postpreaedicamenta by the commentators of the scholastic era, for the simple reason that they appear in the last chapters of Aristotle’s text (10-15), after the categories: cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 181-183. 98 Cf. In Top., V, 1145B: «Atque in his, inquit, omnis fere est dialectica, sed ad topicos locos tres primi modi sunt necessarii, qui antecessionem, consecutionem et repugnantiam tenent» (Engl. transl. p. 154: «Dialectic, Cicero says, consists almost entirely in these modes; but the first three modes, which contain antecedence, consequence, and incompatibility, are necessary for the Topic»). 99 De top. diff., I, V, 50, 1180AB, p. 15, 2-7.

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The quaestio, investigated in this text from a merely logical point of view, represents essentially the question asked by a person about different aspects of reality; every problem ultimately reflects the capacity that a person has to question everything that surrounds him. Boethius says that the sources from which it is possible to draw a quaestio are three: ex ratione disserendi, ex naturali, and ex morali. In exploring what may serve as the subject of investigation and discussion, the decision is made to refer to this quantity as the materia of the quaestio. The distinction among these three disciplinary areas (ratio disserendi, naturalis, and moralis) on the one hand recalls the distinction of the contents of the propositions and questions posed by Aristotle in the Topica, and on the other hand the Stoic division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics100. First of all, it is important to recall that the ratio disserendi is mentioned at the beginning of the treatise, where it is clearly identified with what the Peripatetics called λογική. The latter, constituting the entire system of the rules that regulate all kinds of discourse, evidently includes also the rhetorical, dialectical, philosophical, and sophistic fields101. A quaestio ex ratione disserendi is, for example, one that asks whether affirmation and negation may be species of the genus enuntiatio102. The speculatio ex naturali corresponds to the third of the 100

Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I, 105b19-25 (Engl. transl. pp. 175-176): «Of propositions and problems there are—to comprehend the matter in outline—three divisions; for some are ethical propositions, some are on natural science, while some are logical. Propositions such as the following are ethical, e.g. ‘Ought one rather to obey one’s parents or the laws, if they disagree?’; such as this are logical, e.g. ‘Is the knowledge of opposites the same or not?’; while such as this are on natural science, e.g. ‘Is the universe eternal or not?’ Likewise also with problems». Cf. SVF I, 45, p. 15, 26-29; ivi, II, 35, p. 15, 3-10. A. VIRIEUX-REYMOND, La logique et l’épistémologie des stoïciens et la pensée contemporaine, Librairie de l’Universite, Lausanne 1950; ID., Pour connaître la pensée des stoïciens, Bordas, Paris 1976; B. MATES, Stoic Logic, University of California Press, Berkeley 1953; M. BALDASSARRI, Introduzione alla logica stoica, Malinverno, Como 1985; M. ISNARDI PARENTE, Introduzione allo stoicismo ellenistico, Laterza, Bari 1993; J. B. GOURINAT, La dialeticque des stoïciens, J. Vrin, Paris 2000; S. BOBZIEN, «Stoic Logic», in B. INWOOD (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 85-123. 101 Cf. De top. diff., I, I, 1, 1173B, p. 1, 4-5: «Omnis ratio disserendi, quam logicen Peripatetici veteres appellaverunt, in duas distribuitur partes, unam inveniendi, alteram iudicandi». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.1. 102 This quaestio is discussed by Boethius and many commentators on Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias; it is a question of understanding whether affirmation and negation are to be considered as two species of the genus oratio, as Porphyry says, or whether

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disciplines that are part of theoretical philosophy, also called physiologia, according to what Boethius demonstrates in his first commentary on the Isagoge and has proposed repeatedly and consistently in the De Trinitate: it is the science that observes the nature and the affection of bodies, and therefore focuses on the shapes of bodies immersed in the subject.103 An example of a quaestio ex naturali would be, «is the sky spherical?». Finally, a speculatio ex morali concerns a kind of moral question, and refers more generally to behaviour. It is therefore practical philosophy that, together

affirmation comes before negation; the latter is the thesis supported by Alexander of Aphrodisias, on the grounds that every negation is always a negation of an affirmation and therefore only after affirming something is it possible to deny it. Cf. In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio secunda, 399D-402B, pp. 15, 25-20, 12. 103 Cf. In Porphyrii Isagoge, editio prima, I, 3, 11B, p. 8, 6-9: «Est igitur theoretices, id est contemplativae vel speculativae, triplex diversitas atque ipsa pars philosophiae in tres species dividitur. Est enim una theoretices pars de intellectibilibus, alia de intellegibilibus, alia de naturalibus»; ivi, I, 3, 11D, p. 9, 6-8: «Tertia theoretices species est quae circa corpora atque eorum scientiam cognitionemque versatur: quae est physiologia, quae naturas corporum passionesque declarat»; De Sancta Trinitate, in De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica, ed. C. MORESCHINI, K. G. Saur, München 2005 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), 2, 1250AB, pp. 168, 68-169, 78: «Nam cum tres sint speculativae partes, naturalis, in motu inabstracta, ἀνυπεξαίρετος (considerat enim corporum formas cum materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt: quae corpora in motu sunt, ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, habetque motum forma materiae coniuncta), mathematica, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim formas corporum speculator sine materia ac per hoc sine motu: quae formae cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), theologica, sine motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam Dei substantia et materia et motu caret)» (Engl. transl. p. 9: «Speculative Science may be divided into three kinds: Physics, Mathematics, and Theology. Physics deals with motion and is not abstract or separable [i.e. ἀνυπεξαίρετος]; for it is concerned with the forms of bodies together with their constituent matter, which forms cannot be separated in reality from their bodies. As the bodies are in motion the earth, for instance, tending downwards, and fire tending upwards, form takes on the movement of the particular thing to which it is annexed. Mathematics does not deal with motion and is not abstract, for it investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, and therefore apart from movement, which forms, however, being connected with matter cannot be really separated from bodies. Theology does not deal with motion and is abstract and separable, for the Divine Substance is without either matter or motion»). Cf. D’ONOFRIO, «La scala ricamata»; ID., «Boezio filosofo», in A. GALLONIER (éd.), Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs, Actes du Colloque International de la Fondation Singer-Polignac (Paris, 8-12 juin 1999), Peeters, Louvain – Paris 2003, pp. 381-419 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 44).

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with theoretical philosophy, is the second of the species into which the genus of philosophy is divided.104 An example of a quaestio ex morali would be, «is virtue alone sufficient for happiness?».

1.4.4 The form of the quaestio The last distinction concerns the ways in which a quaestio may be expressed: Praeterea quaestio omnis vel simplex est vel composita. Simplex, quotiens affirmatione et negatione dividitur, ita ut totum alteri affirmare, alteri negare necesse sit, hoc modo: «Sit caelum rotundum necne»; hic enim una pars quaestionis affirmationem tenet, altera negationem. Nam cum alter esse defendit, affirmat, negat vero alter, cum non esse contendit. Composita vero quaestio est quae in plures distrahitur affirmationes hoc modo: «Utrum caelum rotundum sit an quadratum an longum an cuiuslibet alterius formae»; hic enim plurimas affirmationes probare necesse est qui diversa defendunt. Et de quaestione quidem, quantum ad praesens negotium pertinebat, sufficienter dictum est105.

The distinction between a quaestio simplex and a quaestio composita has already been presented; in particular, the quaestio simplex is placed near the quaestio praedicativa because it is formed by a predicative proposition, while the quaestio composita is assimilated to the quaestio conditionalis because it draws its beginning from a conditional proposition106. This 104 Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio prima, I, 3, 11AB, p. 8, 1-2: «Est enim philosophia genus, species vero duae, una quae theoretica dicitur, altera quae practica, id est speculativa et activa»; ivi, I, 3, 11D-12A, p. 9, 3-22: «Practicae vero philosophiae, quam activam superius dici demonstratum est, huius quoque triplex est divisio. Est enim prima quae sui curam gerens cunctis sese erigit, exornat augetque virtutibus, nihil in vita admittens quo non gaudet, nihil faciens paenitendum. Secunda vero est quae rei publicae curam suscipiens cunctorum saluti suae providentiae sollertia et iustitiae libra et fortitudinis stabilitate et temperantiae patientia medetur; tertia vero, quae familiaris rei officium mediocri componens dispositione distribuit. Sunt harum etiam aliae subdivisions, quas nunc persequi supersedendum est». 105 De top. diff., I, V, 51-54, 1180B, p. 15, 7-17. 106 Cf. De top. diff., I, V, 1-5, 1176D-1177A, p. 8, 18: «Aliae namque sunt simplices, aliae vero compositae. Simplices, ut hae, quae ex simplici propositione

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new distinction between quaestiones simplex and composita refers indiscriminately to the way in which either a predicative or a conditional question can be expressed: a simplex quaestio is constructed in accordance with the form of a disjunctive interrogative that contains an alternative between an affirmation and a negation: «is the spherical sky, or is it not?». If the quaestio were to be inserted within the context of a dispute, the one who plays the role of the answerer would have to choose which of the two alternatives to defend, the affirmative or the negative, while the questioner would attempt disprove the answerer’s chosen alternative by demonstrating its falsity. Conversely, in a composita quaestio, a series of alternatives is proposed, from which the answerer must choose one to defend, for example, «is the sky spherical, square, and rectangular, or is it of some other form?».

1.5 The conclusio The importance of the logical concepts presented so far for proper learning of the discipline of topica is apparent. Starting from the position of a quaestio, one of two alternatives is selected for defense; what is chosen remains but a dubia propositio, to which the rules of the ars inveniendi are applied. These rules point the way to the principle of truth hidden within one of the two terms of the propositio, either the subject or the predicate, if it is a predicative proposition, or the antecedent or the consequent, if it is a conditional proposition. This principle, the locus (in Greek τόπος), is able to restore the dubia propositio to a condition of certainty and place it on a scientific basis. What is obtained at the end of this demonstrative process is still another proposition, now called the conclusio, which is characterized by the fact that it no longer bears any trace of ambiguity, but is only true. This long section of the first book in which the concepts of propositio, quaestio, and conclusio are presented ends with a new definition of the conclusio: «Conclusio vero est argumentis probata propositio, de qua descendunt hoc modo, ut si quaeratur ‘an sit caelum volubile’. Haec enim ab ea venit propositione, quae dicit ‘caelum esse volubile’. At si ex conditionali composita propositione principium sumat, ipsa erit conditionalis atque composita hoc modo, ‘an, si caelum rotundum est, volubile sit’; haec namque a conditionali propositione sumpsit initium, quae est: ‘Si caelum rotundum est, volubile est’. Ergo et quaestio alias quidem praedicativa est, alias vero conditionalis». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.4.

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eadem fere dici possunt, quae de propositione. Quae quoniam diligenter superius explicata sunt, de argumento deinceps tractandum videtur»107. Although the conclusio should be considered simply as a propositio, it retains a specific difference that distinguishes it from all other species of propositions and from the quaestio itself: it is argumentis probata, i.e. it has been demonstrated by means of the argumentum. On the other hand, at the beginning of the text, Boethius has already pointed out that the propositio, quaestio, and conclusio are essentially the same thing: «Enuntiatio quippe, sive sui tantum causa dicitur sive ad aliud affertur approbandum, propositio est; si de ipsa quaeritur, quaestio; si ipsa est approbata, conclusio. Idem est igitur propositio, quaestio et conclusio, sed differunt supradicto modo»108. This means that, from a formal point of view, a proposition, a question, and a conclusion are the same thing (idem) because all alike are made up of a subject and a predicate. What is changed, however, is their truth value: a propositio can be in fact, or it can be a maxima (that which is always and only true because it is per se nota), or demonstrabilis and so still dubia, in which case the latter remains to be proved by means of the maxima. A quaestio instead is always and only dubia because, despite being only one propositio, it bears within itself two alternatives. Finally, a conclusio is always and only true because it has already been proved by means of an argumentum.

1.6 The argumentum 1.6.1 The definition of the argumentum The conclusio recalls the concept of the argumentum, the definition of which, quoted below, belongs entirely to Cicero: «argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem»109. In the De topicis differentiis, only the definition 107 De top. diff., I, VI, 1-2, 1180C, p. 15, 18-20. Cf. ivi, I, II, 3, 1174B, p. 3, 2-4: «Conclusio est argumentis approbata propositio, ut si quis ex aliis rebus probet ‘caelum esse volubile’». 108 Ivi, I, II, 4, 1174BC, p. 3, 4-7. 109 De top. diff., I, VII, 1, 1180C, p. 16, 1. Cf. Cicero, Topica, 8, pp. 118, 27-28: «Itaque licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem, argumentum autem rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem»; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, V, X, p. 249, 1-19; ivi, V, X, p.

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is provided, while in the commentary on Cicero’s Topica it is possible to find a thorough examination of this logical concept listed among the most important associated with the discipline of topica: An argument is a reason that produces belief regarding something that was in doubt. Many things produce belief, but because they are not reasons, they cannot be arguments either. For example, sight produces belief in the things seen, but because sight is not a reason, it cannot be an argument either. In addition, Cicero provided one differentia, namely, which produces belief, for every argument produces belief. If we then join this genus and differentia and say that an argument is equivalent to a reason that produces belief, would we have shown the whole nature of an argument? Not at all. Why not? Suppose someone wants to produce belief by means of a reason but regarding something about which no one is in doubt, will the reason that produces belief therefore be called an argument? In no way. For an argument is something that argues for (that is, proves) a thing, but nothing can be proved unless it was in doubt. Therefore, unless something is uncertain and a reason producing belief in it is adduced, there cannot be an argument. Once another differentia has been added, namely, regarding something that was in doubt, the whole definition of argument, consisting of the genus and two differentiae, has been produced. The genus is a reason; one differentia is which produces belief, and the other is regarding something that was in doubt. The whole definition, then, is this: an argument is a reason producing belief regarding something that was in doubt110. 249, 1-2, pp. 249, 28-250, 7: «Nunc de argumentis: hoc enim nomine complectimur omnia, quae Graeci ἐνθυμήματα, ἐπιχειρήματα, ἀποδείξις,vocant, quamquam apud illos est aliqua horum nominum differentia, etiam si vis eodem fere tendit. Nam enthymema (quod nos commentum sane aut commentationem interpretemus, quia alter non possumus, Graeco melius usuri) unum intellectum habet, quo omnia mente concepta significat (sed nunc non de eo loquimur), alterum, quo sententiam cum ratione, tertium, quo certam quandam argumenti conclusionem vel ex consequentibus vel ex repugnantibus: quamquam de hoc parum convenit»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 474, p. 236, 23-25: «Argumentum est ratio, quae rei dubiae fidem facit. Res dubia est intentio et depulsio, vel ratio et infirmatio rationis»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, Appendix A, p. 164, 1-3: «Topica sunt argumentorum sedes, fontes sensuum, origines dictionum». 110 In Top., I, 1048BD (Engl. transl. p. 29): «Argumentum ratio est quae rei dubiae faciat fidem. Multa enim sunt quae faciunt fidem, sed quia rationes non sunt, ne

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The argumentum is defined as a ratio, i.e. a regulation or a rule that gives credibility (fides) to a doubtful thing. There are many things that produce credibility, but not all are considered rationes because not all have normative value. Thus, for example, sight is capable of producing faith in what is seen, but sight is not for this reason a ratio, still less it could be an argumentum: the faculty of sight, in fact, allows data to be recorded inductively, but the result of this operation has no normative value with regard to what is seen. In order to be complete, each definition must be made up of the genus and the specific difference, so Boethius identifies the genus of the argumentum in the ratio, while the specific differences are «quae rei dubiae» and «faciat fidem»; this means that, in the absence of these requirements, there cannot be an argumentum. In this way, the Ciceronian definition is made explicit and is expanded so as to embrace the fundamentally dialectical nature of the argumentum: definition is a principle capable of generating credibility and of lending to what remains in doubt the condition of certainty and a scientific basis. Where there is an argumentum, there must also be a res dubia to be confirmed; the two elements are ever present, closely related, and indeed inseparable: everything that is part of the definition is an essential part of that which is defined, because it is an explication thereof. This interpretation, which comes directly from the definition of the argumentum, serves also as a reminder of how the ars inveniendi is active only in the presence of a quaestio. In other words, people do not possess an innate knowledge of the principles and must therefore find them through a kind of logical operation; the starting point always lies in the investigation of reality, from which arises the doubt that is reflected in the quaestio. The object argumenta quidem esse possunt, ut visus facit fidem iis quae videntur, sed quia ratio non est visus, ne argumentum quidem esse potest. Differentiam vero unam sumpsit, eam quae faciat fidem, omne enim argumentum facit fidem. Si igitur iunxerimus genus ac differentiam, et idem argumentum dicamus, quod rationem quae faciat fidem, num tota argumenti natura monstrata sit? Minime. Quid? Si eius rei, de qua nemo dubitat, aliqua ratione facere quis fidem velit, num idcirco illa, quod fidem faciat, vocabitur argumentum? Nullo modo: argumentum namque est quod rem arguit, id est probat, nihil vero probari, nisi dubium, potest. Nisi ergo sit res ambigua, et ad eam ratio fidem faciens afferatur, argumentum esse non poterit. Addita igitur alia differentia quae est rei dubiae, facta est integra definitio argumenti, ex genere et duabus differentiis constans, genere quidem, ratione: una vero differentia, quod faciat fidem; altera vero, quod rei dubiae est, ut sit tota definitio, id esse argumentum quod sit ratio, rei dubiae faciens fidem».

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of understanding is in fact the essence of those things that are the subject of the inquiry because it is the essence that animates the inquiry and constitutes its principle. As will become clearer in the discussion to follow, the locus from which to draw the argumentum must be sought from the terms (subject and predicate) that are part of the proposition in doubt, and never the inverse, i.e. starting from the locus and then choosing what is more suitable to resolve the doubt created by the quaestio. From the point of view of logic, it is necessary in fact to start from the things best known to us; but the reconstruction of reality that people carry out in terms of logic corresponds, in the reverse sense, to the ontological order in which their reality has been generated. It is therefore correct to proceed in this ontological order, starting from what is more universal in order to reach an understanding of the particular. It is therefore possible to begin to outline the way in which the inventio proceeds. The starting point is always a quaestio, for example «is every man is an animal, or not?»; what next remains is to choose one of the two possibilities: «every man is an animal», or «every man is not an animal». Once the choice between the alternatives posed by the quaestio is made, what is obtained remains but a dubious proposition awaiting demonstration, constituting the material on which to practise the creative capacity of the mind. The mind, for its part, is activated to find suitable rationes with which to produce faith and the conviction that the proposition is true, and that its contrary is as a consequence false. These rationes are revealed from an analysis of the terms of the proposition in doubt, namely the subject and the predicate. What is in doubt in the proposition that is to be proved is in fact the way in which the predicate is inherent in the subject, and in this regard there are only two possibilities: the predicate has a predicative extension that is either greater than or is equal to that of the subject. Given that every question bears within itself two alternatives, along with the argumenta that can serve to prove the certainty of one of them, the argumentum must first of all be expressed in propositions: But an argument will not be able to produce belief for something in doubt unless it is expressed in speech and arranged with the interweaving of propositions. The expression and arrangement of an argument by means of propositions is called an argumentation, and this is said to be an enthymeme or a syllogism (We will explain the definitions of these more fully in connection with the Differentiae of

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Topics) And every syllogism or enthymeme consists of propositions. So every argument is expressed by a syllogism or an enthymeme111.

The argumentum cannot generate credibility regarding what is in doubt if it is not expressed by means of an oratio and by the orderly composition of enunciations called argumentatio; the latter, in turn, can be both an enthymeme and a syllogism. This means that not all discourses can convey an argumentum, but only those expressed in syllogistic form. In fact, it is in the syllogism that the entire force of the logic is contained; in other words, every time the argumentum is expressed through an argumentatio, the latter constitutes a syllogism or an enthymeme. In the De topicis differentiis, the relationship between argumentum and argumentatio is analyzed in even greater depth: Non vero idem est argumentum quod argumentatio: nam vis sententiae ratioque ea, quae clauditur oratione, cum aliquid probatur ambiguum, argumentum vocatur; ipsa vero argumenti elocutio argumentatio dicitur. Quo fit ut argumentum quidem virtus vel mens argumentationis sit atque sententia, argumentatio vero argumenti per orationem explicatio112.

The argumentum and the argumentatio are not the same thing. Once something that was uncertain has been demonstrated, then the force (vis) and the norm (ratio) of the meaning (sententia) of the things that have been concluded (because they have been demonstrated) through an oratio are called the argumentum; the expression of the argumentum is rather called argumentatio. It turns out that the argumentum resembles the virtus, mens, and sententia of the argumentatio, while the argumentatio is rather the development and explication of the argumentum through an oratio. The content of the argumentum and the argumentatio is then the same, but the former remains unexpressed and therefore only registers at an inward 111 Ivi, I, 1050B (Engl. transl. p. 31): «Argumentum vero nisi sit oratione prolatum, et propositionum contexione dispositum, fidem facere dubitationi non poterit. Ergo illa per propositiones prolatio ac dispositio argumenti, argumentatio nuncupatur, quae dicitur enthymema vel syllogismus, cuius definitionem in Topicis differentiis apertius explanabimus. Omnis vero syllogismus vel enthymema propositionibus constat; omne igitur argumentum syllogismo vel enthymemate profertur». 112 De top. diff., I, II, 6-8, 1174C, p. 3, 8-13.

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level, as if it were an animi conceptio; the latter, conversely, is enunciated and is formulated entirely through the orderly arrangement of the premises and the conclusion of which every syllogism or enthymeme is composed. In sum, the argumentum is compressed and contains as it were potential energy that has yet to be exploited, while the argumentatio is rather the corresponding propositional development of the argumentum in syllogistic form. The argumentum and the argumentatio are therefore to be considered two different moments in a unique argumentative process113. Again, the argumentum is defined as the virtus, mens, and sententia of the argumentatio, and Boethius uses these terms to emphasize the particular status to which it is entitled owing to the source from which it emanates, a source that at this point seems to have a kind of pre-rational nature; it is the locus, defined by Cicero as argumenti sedes. The loci are in fact unifying principles, and as such they are still undivided and indivisible, being understood as vires logicae, operational locations of the 113

In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius compares the relationship that exists among argumentum, argumentatio, and maxima propositio. Cf. In Top., I, 1053BC: «Nam ex his quatuor significationibus appellationum duarum, argumentationis scilicet atque argumenti, unam quamlibet esse necesse est. Aut enim elocutio et contextio ipsa propositionum cum maximis propositionibus, vel extra syllogismum positis, vel in eodem inclusis, argumentatio vocatur. Argumentum vero mens et sententia syllogismi, aut elocutio ratiocinationis cum maximis propositionibus et sententia syllogismi argumentum esse dicetur, ut idem sit argumentum quod argumentatio. Aut argumentatio quidem vocabitur tota contextio syllogismi cum sententia, sed argumentum maxima propositio, aut integer ratiocinationis ordo praeter maximas propositiones argumentatio dicetur, sententia vero argumentationis argumentum. Reliqua vero maxima propositio, locus» (Engl. transl. p. 35: «The two names ‘argumentation’ and ‘argument’ must have one of the following four significations. Either the expression and interweaving of the propositions together with the maximal propositions [whether located outside the syllogism or included within it] is called the argumentation, while the argument is the thought and meaning of the syllogism. Or the expression of the reasoning together with the maximal propositions and the meaning of the syllogism will be said to be the argument, and so argument and argumentation will be the same. Or the whole interweaving of the syllogism together with the meaning will be called the argumentation, but the maximal proposition will be called the argument. Or the whole arrangement of the reasoning apart from the maximal propositions will be said to be the argumentation, but the meaning of the argumentation is the argument, and the maximal proposition that remains is the Topic»). Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.2.

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mind, the specific potential of which is precisely to produce argumenta114. The discipline of the topica therefore reflects the process by which the human mind, in answering a quaestio, goes back first of all to the mental place that is the principle of truth and is responsible for every subsequent propositional enunciation capable of expressing the content of this same truth. In this process of ascent, there is reflected the need to begin a phase of recomposition that is activated in order to unify the formal rules of each logical operation115. In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius provides a concrete example of the way in which to obtain an argumentum, and this example provides further insight into how the force of the argumentum unfolds through the argumentatio: Suppose there is a question whether a man is a substance or not. I adopt one part of the question in need of proof, namely, ‘Man is a substance’. In this part there are two terms, substance and man; of these, substance is the greater and man is the lesser. This can be 114

The concept of locus, defined as an argumenti sedes, is the one that Boethius presents immediately after the concept of argumentum. However, it is not clear why he decided to reverse their presentation; it would be more reasonable to explain first the concept of locus and then that of argumentum. The reason may be methodological in nature, since it is possible to understand fully the concept of the locus only after understanding that of the argumentum. 115 In fact, this need for re-composition does not seem to diverge greatly from the much more important movement of ascent, present in the Consolatio Philosophiae, that begins precisely with the invitation of philosophy to turn our gaze in exactly the opposite direction. Cf. De consolatione philosophiae, III, IX, 24, p. 78, 72-73. The compositio, in fact, starts always from what is more known in order to reach the true principles and true causes of sensible realities through timely arrangement of the genera, the qualities and the figures; cf. A. GHISALBERTI, «L’ascesa boeziana a Dio nel libro III della Consolatio», in L. OBERTELLO (ed.), Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani (Pavia, 5-8 Ottobre), Herder, Roma 1981, pp. 183-189; S. VARVIS, The Consolation of Boethius: an Analytical Inquiry into his Intellectual Processes and Goals, Mellen Research University Press, San Francisco CA 1991; G. D’ONOFRIO, «In cubiculum mentis. L’intellectus anselmiano e la gnoseologia platonica altomedievale», in C. VIOLA – J. KORMOS (eds.), Rationality from Saint Augustine to Saint Anselm, Proceedings of the International Anselm Conference, Coloman Viola, Piliscsaba (Hungary) 2005, pp. 61-88; R. MCMAHON, Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent: Augustine, Anselm, Boethius and Dante, Catholic University of America Press, Washington 2006.

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shown also from the fact that substance is expressed later in the expression; for example, in ‘A man is a substance’, we give the name ‘man’ first and the name ‘substance’ later. So in order for us to join man and substance, we must find a middle term that might unite both terms. Let this be animal and let this be one premise: ‘Every man is an animal’. In this proposition animal is the predicate, and man is the subject. Then I add ‘But every animal is a substance’. In this proposition animal is now the subject and substance is the predicate. And in this way I conclude, ‘Every man is a substance’. Throughout this argument man is always the subject. Animal, however, is predicated of man but made the subject for substance; substance itself remains always a predicate. Hence man is the lesser term, substance is a term greater than man, and animal is the middle term. Thus the extreme terms are united by the insertion of a middle term, and in this way the members of the question are coupled with each other and the doubt is resolved by the proof employed. Hence an argument is nothing other than the discovery of an intermediate, for an intermediate will be able to conjoin the extremes, if an affirmation is being maintained, or to disjoin them, if a negation is being asserted116.

When the quaestio to be solved is, «is man a substance, or not?», the choice is made to prove that «man is a substance». In this proposition that is in doubt, the minor term is made up of the subject «man», while 116

In Top., I, 1050C-1051A (Engl. transl. p. 32): «Sit enim quaestio utrum homo substantia sit an minime. Sumo mihi quaestionis partem alteram comprobandam, ea est, hominem esse substantiam; in hac igitur duo sunt termini, substantia atque homo, quorum maior substantia, homo vero minor, quod ex eo quoque poterit ostendi, quoniam posterius substantia in prolatione profertur, vel ut in hoc ipso quod dicimus homo substantia est, prius hominem, posterius substantiam nominamus. Ut igitur substantiam atque hominem iungamus, necesse est medium terminum reperiri, qui utrosque copulet terminos, hic sit animal, fiatque una propositio, omnis homo animal est; in hac igitur propositione animal praedicatur, homo subjicitur. Rursus adjungo, omne autem animal substantia est; in hac rursus animal supponitur, substantia praedicatur. Itaque concludo, omnis igitur homo substantia est; ac per hoc homo quidem semper subiectus est. Animal vero ad hominem quidem praedicatum est, ad substantiam vero subiectum. Substantia vero ipsa semper praedicata persistit, unde fit ut minor quidem sit homo, maior vero homine substantia, medius autem terminus animal. Quoniam igitur extremi termini medii interpositione copulantur, eoque modo quaestionis inter se membra conveniunt, adhibitaque probatione solvitur dubitatio».

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«substance» is the major term and is the predicate. Ultimately, what is to be demonstrated is whether the term «substance» can be predicated of «man», or, in other words, whether the predicative extension of the term «substance» can be subsumed by the predicative extension of the term «man». At this point, there is need for a middle term capable of joining the two terms, namely «animal». Boethius does not explain how he found this middle term, but it is clear that, in light of Porphyry’s subdivision of the first category of substance, the term «animal» forms the genus into which the term «man» falls. Once the middle term is found, which in this example was taken from the genus to which the subject of the proposition in doubt belongs («man»), the following syllogism can be constructed: «every man is an animal», where the term «man» remains the subject, and «animal» the predicate, to which is added the second premise, «every animal is a substance», in which the term «animal» is now the subject, while the term «substance» remains the predicate. The conclusion that follows directly from these two premises is the same as the doubtful proposition for which proof was sought: «every man is a substance». However, the proposition in doubt differs from the conclusion because the conclusion is now certain, being the result obtained from the application of the creative capacity of the human mind. Boethius finishes his discussion of this point by asserting that «Hence an argument is nothing other than the discovery of an intermediate, for an intermediate will be able to conjoin the extremes, if an affirmation is being maintained, or to disjoin them, if a negation is being asserted»117. The argumentum is therefore the medietatis inventio, because an affirmation that must be defended brings together the extremes, while it separates the extremes when it is necessary to assert a negation118. 117

Ivi, I, 1051A (Engl. transl. p. 32): «nihil est aliud argumentum quam medietatis inventio, haec enim vel coniungere, si affirmatio defendatur, vel disiungere, si negatio vindicetur, poterit extremos». 118 In this regard, Boethius offers an interesting clarification: since minor things derive from major things, the major premise must be the one that more specifically constitutes the «creative cause» (effectrix) of the conclusion, although the latter is said to descend from both premises (major and minor). For a complete understanding of the syllogism and its parts, Boethius refers to his Latin translation of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics. Cf. ivi, I, 1051AB: «Quae cum ita sint, duarum propositionum et tertiae conclusionis, maior quidem propositio dicitur ea quae maiorem terminum continet, id est in qua maior quidem praedicatur;

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The De topicis differentiis for its part asserts rather the need for the argumentum to be better known than the quaestio «Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem. Hanc semper notiorem quaestione esse necesse est; nam si ignota notis probantur, argumentum vero rem dubiam probat, necesse est ut quod ad fidem quaestionis affertur sit ipsa notius quaestione»119. Since the argumentum is a reason that gives credibility to a doubtful proposition, it must be better known than the quaestio because it is used in the latter’s service. This clarification serves to explicate how the acquisition of any true content is made possible only through the application of the so-called «topical» rules, the nature of which is exclusively formal, since these rules do not regulate the relationship between things that exist in the medius vero supponitur, ut omne animal substantia est; minor vero propositio est quae medium quidem terminum praedicat, subjicit autem minorem, ut omnis homo animal est. Sed quoniam a maioribus necesse est minora descendere, eius conclusionis, quae ex duabus propositionibus nascitur, illa quasi effectrix et propria propositio videtur esse, quae prima est; haec autem est, omnis homo substantia est. Quod qui priores posterioresque nostros Analyticos, quos ab Aristotele transtulimus, legit, minime dubitat. Sed si quis quae illic scripta sunt nesciens, ad haec legenda proruperit, etiam si rationem rerum quas non intelligit minime comprehendit, ita tamen ut dictum est esse confidat, seque in Aristotelis Analyticis uberius inventurum esse, si legerit, arbitretur» (Engl. transl. pp. 32-33: «Of the two propositions and the conclusion [which is the third], the one that contains the greater term, that is, the one in which the greater term is the predicate and the middle term is the subject, is called the greater or major proposition—for example, ‘Every man is an animal’. Since lesser things must be derived from greater things, the first premise appears to be the specific ‘producer’ of the conclusion ‘Every man is a substance’, although the conclusion arises from two premises. Anyone who has read our Prior and Posterior Analytics, which we translated from Aristotle, is not in the least doubt about this. But if someone who does not know what is written in those books has rushed ahead to read these things, then even if he finds incomprehensible the explanation of those things that he does not understand, he should nonetheless believe that it is as I have said, and he should think that he himself would discover this more fully in Aristotle’s Analytics if he were to read them»). Unfortunately, no translation by Boethius of the Posterior Analytics has survived; there are however two versions of the Latin translation attributed by Minio-Paluello to Boethius; cf. Analytica priora. Translatio Boethii (recensiones duae), Translatio anonyma, Pseudo-Philoponi aliorumque Scholia, ed. L. MINIO-PALUELLO, Bruges 1962 (Aristoteles Latinus, III. 1-4). Cf. S. EBBESEN, «Manlius Boethius on Aristotle’s ‘Analytica Posteriora’», in Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin, 9 (1973) 68-73. 119 De top. diff., I, VII, 1-2, p. 16, 1-4.

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reality, but have an exclusively logical nature, regulating the relationships between the logical entities that the mind itself generates, such as definition, genus, species, and opposites.

1.6.2 The division of the argumentum From the definition of the argumentum follows its division: Argumentorum vero omnium alia sunt probabilia et necessaria, alia vero probabilia quidem, sed non necessaria, alia vero necessaria, sed non probabilia, alia nec probabilia nec necessaria. Probabile vero est quod videtur vel omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus et his vel omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime notis atque praecipuis vel quod unicuique artifici secundum propriam facultatem, ut de medicina medico, gubernatori de navibus gubernandis, et praeterea quod videtur ei, cum quo sermo conseritur, vel ipsi, qui iudicat, in quo nihil attinet verum falsumve sit argumentum, si tantum verisimilitudinem tenet. Necessarium vero est quod, ut dicitur, ita est, atque aliter esse non potest. Et probabile quidem ac necessarium est, ut est hoc: «Si quid cuilibet rei sit additum, totum maius efficitur». Neque enim quisquam ab hac propositione dissentiet et ita sese habere necesse est. Probabilia vero ac non necessaria sunt quibus facile quidem animus acquiescit, sed veritatis non tenent firmitatem, ut hoc: «Si mater est, diligit filium». Necessaria vero sunt ac non probabilia quae ita quidem sese, ut dicuntur, habere necesse est, sed his facile non consentit auditor, ut hoc, «obiectu lunaris corporis solis evenire defectum». Neque necessaria vero neque probabilia sunt quae neque in opinione hominum neque in veritate consistunt, ut hoc, «habere quae non perdiderit cornua Diogenem, quoniam habeat id quisque, quod non perdiderit». Quae quidem nec argumenta dici possunt; argumenta enim rei dubiae faciunt fidem. Ex his autem nulla fides est, quae neque in opinione neque in veritate sunt constituta120.

This division is first of all made based on the relationship between the probable and the necessary, and it reflects the distinct nature of the argumentum, which remains by definition «a reason that gives credibility 120

Ivi, I, VII, 3-10, 1180C-1181A, pp. 16, 4-17, 8.

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to something in doubt», and is thus different in terms of the materia disserendi in the service of which it is utilised. In keeping with a scheme already discussed, the probable is defined as, alternatively, that which seems true to all, or to the majority, or to the wise, and among the wise, that which seems true either to all, or to most, or to the most famous and illustrious, or that which seems true to experts in particular fields, such as a doctor with regard to medicine, or, finally, that which is believed to be true by the person with whom one is either engaged in a conversation, or by the person who is judging the argument. This definition is quite similar to that provided by Aristotle for the ἔνδοξα, the premises on which the entirety of dialectic is based: «On the other hand, those opinions are reputable which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the wise—i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them»121. It appears that Boethius identifies the probable with what Aristotle identified as the premises of a dialectical syllogism, i.e. endoxical opinions. As in the Aristotelian definition, so also in Boethius’s it is possible to see a hierarchy with respect to the degree of probability that is based on the authority accorded the endoxical opinions. Two levels, then, can be distinguished with regard to opinions. The first level is that of what seems true, which can be ranked in order of descending veracity in terms of whether an assertion is considered true by either: – all or the majority – all the wise men or the majority of them – the most famous and illustrious wise men – the experts in relevant fields At a second level comes what seems true to the person with whom one is having a conversation or to the person who is judging the argument, as just discussed, and in this case the most important thing is not so much that the argument be true, but that it be plausible122. 121 Aristotle, Topica, I 1, 100b21-23 (Engl. transl. p. 167). Cf. also ivi, 104a8-37; ivi, 105a34-105b35. Cf. infra, Introd., § 4.1.1. (See Diagram no. 1, p. 353). 122 Cf. CAVINI, «Modalità dialettiche nei Topici di Aristotele», P. FAIT, «Argomentazioni e comparazioni endossali: sulla struttura del metodo dialettico aristotelico», Annali del dipartimento di filosofia, 7 (1991) 3-40; ID., «Endoxa e consenso: per la distinzione di due concetti in Aristotele», Annali dell’Istituto Italiano

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That which is necessary is defined by Boethius as «what is as it is said to be and cannot be otherwise» («necessarium vero est quod, ut dicitur, ita est, atque aliter esse non potest»), a definition that emphasizes the need for truth and is capable of establishing itself because it is self-evident. The possible combinations between the necessary and the probable at this point are four. An argumentum can be either: simultaneously probable and necessary, probable but not necessary, necessary but not probable, or neither probable nor necessary. The aim here is to provide a logical division that includes again all the possible affirmative and negative combinations that can be established between the probable and necessary, as is represented by means of a logical square in Diagram no. 16 (Appendix, p. 336). A different argumentum is placed in each corner of the square, all four being necessary for the unity and completeness of the classification. To explain the diversity that exists among these argumenta, Boethius defines them using two specific differences that are drawn directly from the definitions per gli Studi Storici, 15 (1998) 15-48; SEMINARA, Carattere e funzione. It should be kept in mind that the term «probability» does not simply indicate that, being uncertain, something has the same possibility of being true or false; rather, the term always refers to something that possesses the quality of being worthy of being accepted in and of itself. Boethius has already given the same definition of the probable in his commentary on Cicero’s Topics, when he describes the «locus qui extrinsecus sumatur», which is founded entirely on testimony that should possess overall the requirement of authority; i.e., it must have been authoritative testimony. Cf. In Top., II, 1081D-1082A: «Hic vero est qui sumitur ab auctoritate iudicii locus valde probabilis, etiamsi non maximae necessitatis. Quae enim necessaria sunt, haec ex propria considerantur natura. Quae vero probabilia sunt, plurimorum iudicium exspectant. Ea namque sunt probabilia, quae videntur vel omnibus, vel pluribus, vel maxime famosis atque praecipuis, vel secundum unamquamque artem scientiamque eruditis, ut medico in medicina, geometrae in geometria, caeterisque in propria studiorum facultate versatis» (Engl. transl. p. 72): «This Topic is taken from an authoritative judgment and is certainly readily believable even if it does not have the greatest necessity. For things that are necessary are considered on the basis of their own nature, but things that are readily believable depend on the judgment of the multitude. For things that are readily believable are those which seem true to everyone or to most people or to the most famous and distinguished or to the experts in any individual art and science [as, for example, a doctor in the field of medicine, a geometer in the field of geometry, and others experienced in the appropriate skill of their studies»]). Boethius observes that the «locus ex auctoritate iudicii», belonging to a category very different from that of the «loci qui in ipso de quo agitur haerent», is based entirely on the probability of the judgment of the majority.

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of the probable and the necessary: consent, the fundamental characteristic concerning the probability with which the argumentum is accepted as true, and certainty, the main characteristic with which the necessary claims by its very nature to be true. The probable and necessary argumentum is one of which no one disapproves («neque quisquam ab hac propositione dissentiet»), and must be so («et ita sese habere necesse est»), an example being, «if something is added to something, the whole is greater than either part». This is the argumentum par excellence when it comes to representing the logical operation through which the mind, in reaching out to the intuition supplied by the universal principle that regulates the laws of thought, is able to reveal all of its demonstrative power by means of something that, in addition to being necessary, is also probable. The probable but not necessary argumentum is one that is easily approved by the minds of those who hear it («quibus facile mens auditoris acquiescit»), but does lacks a firm basis in truth («sed veritatis non tenet firmitatem»), such as, for example «if she is a mother, then she loves her child». This argument, though presenting itself as probable, is not confirmed in the necessity, so it is exactly the opposite of the previous argument. The necessary but not probable argumentum is one that should be as it is said to be («quae ita ut dicuntur sese habere necesse est»), but those who hear it do not grant approval easily («sed his facile non consentit auditor»), for example, «a solar eclipse occurs due to the interposition of the moon between the earth and sun». From a certain perspective, this argument might seem the strongest, because it is entirely based on truth; in reality, however, it must be borne in mind that the argumentum serves to generate credibility (fides), from which perspective the starting point has to be something that is simultaneously probable and necessary. Finally, the argumentum that is neither necessary and nor probable is one based neither on the truth («neque in veritate») nor on human opinion («neque in opinione hominum»). However, since, in its definition, the essence of the argumentum is revealed simultaneously - argumentum being only a ratio capable of producing fides in the face of doubt - this fourth kind of argumentum cannot be considered legitimate: that which is based neither on human opinion nor on truth is incapable of generating fides, and although an argumentatio can always descend from such an argumentum, it will be false, an example being sophistry.

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After making this division of the argumentum, Boethius embarks upon a more thorough redefinition of the concept. As just discussed, an argumentum that is neither necessary nor probable is no real argumentum at all; for the same reasons, however, an argumentum that is necessary and not probable is likewise illegitimate: Dici tamen potest ne illa quidem esse argumenta, quae, cum sint necessaria, minime tamen audientibus approbantur. Nam si rei dubiae sit fides, cogendus est animus auditoris per ea, quibus ipse acquiescit, ut conclusioni quoque, quam nondum probat, possit accedere. Quod si quae tantum necessaria sunt ac non probabilia non probat ille, qui iudicat, necesse est ut ne illud quidem probet, quod ex huiusmodi ratione conficitur. Itaque evenit ex huiusmodi ratiocinatione quae tantum necessaria sunt ac non probabilia non esse argumenta123.

Bearing always in mind the definition of an argumentum as a principle that generates credibility when something is in doubt, it must first of all elicit consent from the listener. The necessary but not probable argumentum, however, is only true and not also probable; in other words, it does not possess the specific difference that qualifies an argumentum, namely probability, and is thus unable to elicit approval from those who hear it (and only in this way, in fact, is it possibile to come to a conclusion). The probable is thus to consent what the necessary is to certainty and truth, and probability and consent are two elements that an argumentum must possess. This means that the starting point for any kind of human inquiry is always and only something in doubt; for if there were not any doubt, there would be no reason to conduct an inquiry. After making this fourfold classification of the argumenta, then, Boethius explains that the last two classes, that which is only necessary and that is neither necessary nor probable, cannot be considered real argumenta. So, since an argumentum that is only probable is capable of generating approval, but is not necessarily based on truth, what remains is that the argumentum in the true sense of the word be based on what is simultaneously necessary and probable. The consent to which the probable argumentum refers in this context is not intended as a mere psychological fact, because, with doubt being the starting point, consent is but the point of 123

De top. diff., I, VII, 11-12, 1181AB, p. 17, 8-16.

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arrival; the probative force is not transferred or referred back to consent, but remains fixed on the probative capacity of the argumentum itself and on the source from which it derives124. Arguments that are probable and necessary at the same time are those to which consent is granted spontaneously, as soon as they are heard, evidently because they are drawn from a heritage of formal structures of thought that belongs to all mankind, making these arguments shared and therefore universal. Consent as such confirms only their validity, and is not prejudicial regarding the probative force of the argumentum, which rather owes its effectiveness to the character of necessity of the locus from which it derives. Boethius, however, is not yet fully satisfied with his explanation of the probable and the necessary, for which reason he introduces a fresh example to clarify further what has just been said: Sed non ita est atque haec interpretatio non recte probabilitatis intelligentiam tenet. Ea sunt enim probabilia, quibus sponte atque ultro consensus adiungitur, scilicet ut, mox audita sint, approbentur. Quae vero necessaria sunt ac non probabilia aliis probabilibus ac necessariis argumentis antea demonstrantur cognitaque et credita ad alterius rei, de qua dubitatur, fidem trahuntur, ut sunt speculationes omnes, id est theoremata, quae in geometria considerantur. Nam quae illic proponuntur non sunt talia, ut his sponte animus discentis accedat, sed quoniam demonstrantur aliis argumentis, illa quoque scita et cognita ad aliarum speculationum argumenta fidem ducuntur. Itaque quae probabilia per se non sunt, sed sunt necessaria, his quidem auditoribus, quibus nondum demonstrata 124 In this regard, the present analysis is at variance with the eminently psychological trait that Eleonore Stump assigns to the argumentum; cf. STUMP, Boethius’s De topicis differentis, pp. 189-190: «Why bother with all the complexities of dialectical argument when straightforward syllogism seems so much simpler? To see the answer to the question, it is important to notice that Boethius defines an argument in psychological rather than logical terms: an argument, he says, is what produces belief regarding what was in doubt. The word to emphasize here, I think, is ‘belief’: the dialectician’s purpose is to produce belief. The aim of the questioner in a dialectical disputation is to get the answerer to agree to the questioner’s thesis; both the questioner and the answerer work at producing conviction for their positions». The term fides refers to the consent that the listener must grant, but this consent is not given on a purely subjectivist and therefore psychological basis; rather, consent is a requirement that serves to confirm what is contained in the probative force of the argumentum, but it is not prejudicial by reason of its very validity.

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sunt, ad aliud aliquid approbandum argumenta esse non possunt; hi autem, qui prioribus rationibus eorum, quibus non acquiescebant, fidem ceperunt, possunt ea, si quid ambigunt, ad argumentum vocare125.

Probable arguments, again, are those to which consent is given spontaneously by those who hear them as soon as they are enunciated; arguments that are only necessary, and not also probable, are strengthened by those that are necessary and probable. An example borrowed from geometry helps to clarify this notion. A theorem can be understood only through the support of argumentations capable of demonstrating the principles (priores rationes) from which these same argumentations derive; these principles are the axioms, which in this case exemplify the necessary arguments, for example, «if two equal numbers are subtracted from two equal numbers, the remainders are the same». The necessary arguments, just like the principles of geometry, are essentially prepared for the demonstration of the theorems, and can be understood only by those who know that discipline, for which reason they cannot be easily assessed and approved by all. In turn, however, these same geometric axioms are the result of previous mental operations because they derive from even more general arguments, namely necessary and probable arguments, for example, «if something is added to anything, the whole becomes greater». Therefore, although the demonstration of a theorem already enjoys the character of necessity, it is only when the first principles from which the theorems derive (priores rationes) are first shown, or better, only when other knowledge of the necessary order that influences a theorem’s necessity is first highlighted, that the theorems can be known and therefore understood. On the other hand, since it is not possible to demonstrate per se the axioms in the proper sense, one can, in order to know and understand them, go back instead to the maximal generalization from which they arose: these are precisely the loci, the sedes argumenti, that are the specific subject of Boethius’s treatise. In the context of the argumentum, credibility, assent, approval, and consent are all principles that refer to the same act by which the mind perceives necessary and probable truth simultaneously. The high degree of probability associated with these principles is due to the fact that they are explicative of the same formal structures that all human minds possess. 125

De top. diff., I, VII, 13-15, 1181BC, pp. 17, 16-18, 8.

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While these principles are thus used in the service of specific fields of investigation, they are also capable of generating knowledge; in fact, it is from them that the principles of all the ways of advancing an inquiry arise. In the second and third books of the De topicis differentiis, it becomes possible to understand how the division of the argumentum, initiated in the first book, is essentially aimed at raising the concept of the Ciceronian argumentum, which originally possessed an eminently rhetorical value, to the rank of a dialectical concept in all respects. If the argumentum must be able to generate credibility, it in fact only need be probable, as rhetorical arguments are; but if, instead, it should also have logical, that is, dialectical, value, then the argumentum must be not only probable but also necessary. From the fourfold classification of the argumenta now exhibited, what emerges is that the argumentum par excellence is the one that is simultaneously probable and necessary: in this way, it can be as much at the service of dialectic as of rhetoric.

1.7 The intentio ac utilitas topicorum After embarking upon the fourfold division of the argumenta based on the probable and the necessary, Boethius specifies the disciplines for which these argumenta are useful: Sed quia quattuor facultatibus disserendi omne artificium continetur, dicendum est quae quibus uti noverit argumentis, ut cui potissimum disciplinae locorum atque argumentorum paretur ubertas evidenter appareat. Quattuor igitur facultatibus earumque velut opificibus disserendi omnis ratio subiecta est, id est dialectico, oratori, philosopho, sophistae. Quorum quidem dialecticus atque orator in communi argumentorum materia versantur; uterque enim, sive sint necessaria sive minime, probabilia tamen sequitur argumenta. His igitur illae duae species argumenti famulantur, quae sunt probabile ac necessarium, probabile ac non necessarium. Philosophus vero ac demonstrator de sola tantum veritate pertractat atque ideo, sive sint probabilia sive non sint, nihil refert, modo dum sint necessaria. Hic quoque his duabus speciebus utitur argumenti, quae sunt probabile ac necessarium, necessarium ac non probabile. Patet igitur in quo philosophus ab oratore ac dialectico in propria consideratione dissideat, in eo scilicet, quod illis probabilitatem, huic veritatem constat esse propositam. Quarta vero species argumenti, quam ne

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argumentum quidem recte dici supra monstravimus, sophistis solis est attributa126.

The whole science of discourses, namely the ratio disserendi, which at the beginning of the text is identified with λογική, is here divided into four disciplines: dialectic, rhetoric, philosophy, and sophistry. Since the discipline of topica is the science that helps in the discovery of the principles for all kinds of argumentations produced by these various disciplines, it is necessary at this point to establish which of the argumenta listed above are useful for each discipline. When the proper distinctions have been made, it will then be possible to draw easily an abundance of argumenta; in this way the usefulness of this teaching will simultaneously be revealed, the fecundity of which is such that it constitutes the science itself. As illustrated in Diagram no. 17 (Appendix, p. 336), there are four categories of specialist interested in the discipline of the topica, namely the dialectician, the rhetorician, the philosopher, and the sophist. The dialectician and rhetorician share the same argumenta, namely the probable ones, either necessary or unnecessary; the philosopher, who examines only what is true, makes use instead of necessary argumenta, regardless of whether or not these argumenta are probable; finally, the sophist uses argumenta that are not strictly classifiable even as such, because they are neither necessary nor probable. In this classification lies a further confirmation of what is said regarding the nature of the argumentum: the difference between the dialectician and the rhetorician on the one hand and the philosopher on the other lies in their respective fields of investigation. For while dialecticians and rhetoricians start from probable things without concern for necessity, philosophers start from necessary things without concern for probability. Therefore, it is clear that the differences between these two categories of specialist can be traced to their respective starting points: while the dialectician and rhetorician always start from the probable, the philosopher instead starts from the necessary. Boethius has already defined the intentio operis at the beginning of the text, so what is now presented is rather the intentio and the utilitas topicorum:

126

Ivi, I, VII, 16-20, 1181D-1182A, pp. 18, 8-19, 4.

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Topicorum vero intentio est verisimilium argumentorum copiam demonstrare. Designatis enim locis, ex quibus probabilia argumenta ducuntur, abundans et copiosa necesse est fiat materia disserendi. Sed quoniam, ut supra dictum est, probabilium argumentorum alia sunt necessaria, alia non necessaria, cum loci probabilium argumentorum dicuntur, evenit ut necessariorum quoque doceantur. Quo fit ut oratoribus quidem ac dialecticis haec principaliter facultas paretur, secundo vero loco philosophis. Nam in quo probabilia quidem omnia conquiruntur, dialectici atque oratores iuvantur; in quibus vero probabilia ac necessaria docentur, philosophicae demonstrationi ministratur ubertas. Non modo igitur dialecticus atque orator, verum etiam demonstrator ac verae argumentationis effector habet quod ex positis locis sibi possit assumere, cum inter argumentorum probabilium locos necessariorum quoque principia traditio mixta contineat. Illa vero argumenta, quae necessaria quidem sunt, sed non probabilia, atque illud ultimum genus, scilicet nec probabile nec necessarium, a propositi operis consideratione seiunctum est, nisi quod interdum quidam sophistici loci exercendi gratia lectoribus adhibentur127.

The considerations placed by Boethius at the end of the first book are particularly illuminating with regard to his conception of the discipline of topica. The main purpose of this discipline is, first of all, to reveal an abundance of probable arguments, the argumenta that have a high degree of credibility. Once the loci of the argumenta probabilia have been indicated, an abundance of materia disserendi is revealed; however, since the argumenta probabilia may be either necessaria or non necessaria, to the extent to which the loci of the argumenta probabilia are established, the loci of the argumenta necessaria are also revealed at the same time. In fact, without having specified it, Boethius has made a new classification in pairs, within the division of the argumenta, on the basis of their materia disserendi: – argumentum probabile ac non necessarium vel necessarium, which concerns dialecticians and orators; – argumentum necessarium ac probabile vel non probabile, which concerns philosophers.

127

Ivi, I, VII, 21-25, 1182AC, p. 19, 4-21.

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In this new division, the argumentum non necessarium ac non probabile is entirely excluded, for reasons already explained: it cannot be considered as a true argumentum, because it is based on neither the opinio hominum nor on the truth. Returning to Boethius’s affirmation that the loci of the argumenta probabilia serve to demonstrate the loci of the argumenta necessaria, the most correct interpretation would seem to be as follows: once the loci of the argumenta probabilia, either necessaria or non necessaria, are drawn, simultaneously also the loci of the argumenta necessaria, either probabilia or non probabilia, manifest themselves; this is possible once again thanks to the argumentum, which is probabile and necessarium at the same time. In fact, only this argumentum is capable of garnering assent and approaching the certainty of things that are only true; it is not by chance that this is also what dialecticians, orators, and philosophers have in common. The discipline of topica, then, is not by nature only of use for dialecticians and rhetoricians, but also for philosophers, because, as was just said, it is the teaching (traditio) of the latter that indicates where the loci of the argumenta probabilia are to be found and in which the principle (principium) of the argumenta necessaria is contained. It is clear that the reference here is to the loci of the argumenta probabilia and necessaria that are the specific subject of the treatise; the question is therefore one regarding how some loci generate others in terms of form. With these observations, it is possible to find again the clear conviction that dialectic is capable of producing knowledge, since it contains the principles of the latter; this is a concept that clearly belongs to the Aristotelian matrix128. Boethius specifies and defines further the subject of the treatise: only the argumenta probabilia ac necessaria vel non necessaria, i.e. the loci that are, first of all, dialectici and rhetorici, will be examined, and, second, 128

Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I 1, 101a25-101b4; O. BIRD, «Dialectic in Philosophical Inquiry», Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 29 (1955) 234-246; ID., «The Formalizing of the Topics in Mediaeval Logic», Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1 (1960) 138-149; ID., «The Logical Interest of the Topics as Seen in Abelard», Modern Schoolman, 37 (1959) 53-57; ID., «The Re-discovery of the Topics: Prof. Toulmin’s Inference-Warrants», Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 34 (1960) 200-205; ID., «Topic and Consequence in Ockham’s Logic», Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2 (1961) 65-78; ID., «The Tradition of the Logical Topics: Aristotle to Ockham», Journal of the History of Ideas, 23 (1962) 307-323. Cf. Introd., § 4.1.1.

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are of potential concern also for philosophers. What is excluded from the discussion, then, will be the argumenta necessaria ac non probabilia and the argumenta non necessaria ac non probabilia, i.e. the loci that are exclusively philosophici or sophistici; on the other hand, as already seen, these categories cannot be regarded as argumenta in the strict sense, being devoid of probabilitas, which is one of the specific differences on which the very definition of argumentum was built, and which is the quality that can elicit approval from listeners. In the final analysis, then, the utilitas topicorum is as follows: Quocirca topicorum pariter utilitas intentioque patefacta est. His enim et dicendi facultas et investigatio veritatis augetur. Nam quod dialecticos atque oratores locorum iuvat agnitio, orationi per inventionem copiam praestat; quod vero necessariorum doctrinam locorum philosophis tradit, viam quodammodo veritatis illustrat129.

This utility is expressed in two respects: the loci are at the service of both the dicendi facultas and the investigatio veritatis, since, in the hands of dialecticians and rhetoricians, they help to produce an abundance of argumenta that are of use in dialectical disputes and rhetorical orations. To the extent that they are also used by philosophers to discover the principles that produce the argumenta necessaria, however, the loci are able to carry out a higher function, that of illuminating and making evident, in a sense, the way of the truth (via veritatis)130. These affirmations fully justify the pre-eminence assigned to the discipline of the topica: «Quo magis pervestiganda est rimandaque ulterius disciplina eaque, cum cognitione percepta sit, usu atque exercitatione firmanda»131. It is a science, therefore, that, for the reasons stated above, deserves to be studied and thoroughly examined, and that, once known and understood, can be strengthened by practice and experience. The first book of the De topicis differentiis, understood as a short introduction to the discipline of topica, concludes with the following considerations: «Magnum enim aliquid locorum consideratio pollicetur, 129

De top. diff., I, VII, 26, 1182C, pp. 19, 22-20, 3. In the light of these considerations, it is clear therefore that the argumentum able to perform the highest function, i.e. to illuminate and to manifest the way of truth, is the argumentum probabile ac necessarium. 131 De top. diff., I, VII, 27, 1182C, p. 20, 3-5. 130

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scilicet inveniendi vias. Quod quidem hi, qui sunt huius rationis expertes, soli prorsus ingenio deputant neque intellegunt quantum hac consideratione quaeratur, quae in artem redigit vim et potestatemque naturae. Sed de his hactenus. Nunc de reliquis explicemus»132. What the study of this discipline promises is, therefore, something of great significance, namely the viae inveniendi, i.e. the ways for finding solutions to all kinds of quaestiones, which is the same function that Aristotle attributed in the highest degree to dialectic: «for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries»133. Those who have none of this ratio, however, impute everything to natural talent alone, since they do not understand what is obtained by means of this teaching, which derives its rules and principles from nature because it reflects an activity that the mind accomplishes spontaneously.

132 133

Ivi, I, VII, 27-28, 1182CD, p. 20, 5-9. Aristotle, Topica, I, 101b3-4 (Engl. transl. p. 4).

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2. The division of Themistius’s loci In the second book of the De topicis differentiis, after the introduction of the concept of argumentatio, the two species of loci dating back to Themistius are presented, namely the maxima propositio and the differentia maximarum propositionum. The rest of the book is dedicated entirely to the list of the Themistian loci.

2.1 The didactic goal of the text From the beginning of the second book, the eminently didactic aim of the text can be clearly perceived: Omnia quidem, quae superioris serie voluminis expedita sunt, minus quibusdam forsitan eruditis supervacanea quodammodo et quasi dependentia videantur. Nam cum «de topicis differentiis» librorum titulum legerint, omissis doctrinae gradibus statim ad finem operis tendent. Mihi autem vel necessarium videtur, quod nisi sit praecognitum, ad ulteriora discentis animus pervenire non possit; hi etiam, qui nunc quoque omnem primi voluminis disputationem superfluam putant, si cuncta perlegant contextionemque operis mente ac ratione collustrent, desinent profecto iudicare superfluum quod necessario viderint in parte operis collocatum1.

Speaking to those who judge the study of the first book unnecessary in the mistaken belief that it is irrelevant to the overall purpose of the treatise, Boethius has the opportunity to explain either the ratio by which he ordered the presentation of various parts of the text, or the audience he intends to address. The treatise is in fact most likely addressed to students wanting to undertake the study of the principles of logic, and the circulation of this text is thought to have been mainly in schools. 1

De top. diff., II, I, 1-3, 1182D-1183A, pp. 20, 11-21, 8.

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2.2 The argumentatio Immediately after this brief preamble, the second book introduces another concept fundamental for understanding the discipline of topica, namely the argumentatio: «Atque haec hactenus. Sed quoniam de his, quae antea praeposuimus, id est de propositione, quaestione, conclusione, argumento sufficienter dictum est, nunc de argumentatione tractemus»2. It makes a certain amount of sense to give careful attention to the choice to introduce the argumentatio only here in the second book, rather than together with other logical concepts in the first book. The second book, in fact, begins with the presentation of the discipline of topica proper, with the list of Themistius’s tópoi3. The organization of a locus, however, takes place only by means of a syllogism or an enthymeme, both of which are species of the genus argumentatio: «Argumentatio est per orationem argumenti explicatio. Huius autem species duae sunt, una quidem quae syllogismus, altera quae vocatur inductio»4. 2

Ivi, II, I, 4, 1183A, p. 21, 8-10. It is only at the end of the second book that Boethius will attribute explicitly the list of loci presented during the second book to Themistius. Cf. ivi, II, X, 1, 1194AB, p. 45, 15-17: «Et Graeci quidem Themistii, diigentissimi scriptoris ac lucidi et omnia ad facilitatem intelligentiae revocantis, talis locorum videtur esse partitio». Cf. G. DAGRON, «L’empire romain d’Orient au IVe siècle et les traditions politiques de l’hellénisme: le témoignage de Thémistios», Travaux et Mémoires, 3 (1968) 163-185; P. VOLPE CACCIATORE, «La parafrasi di Temistio al secondo libro degli Analitici Posteriori di Aristotele», in C. MORESCHINI (ed.), Esegesi, Parafrasi e Compilazione in Età Tardoantica, M. D’AURIA, Napoli 1995, pp. 389-395; J. VANDERSPOEL, Themistius and the Imperial Court: Oratory, Civic Duty, and Paideia from Constantius to Theodosius, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1998; H. J. BLUMENTHAL, «Themistius, the Last Peripatetic Commentator on Aristotle?», in R. SORABJI (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, Duckworth, London 1990, pp. 113-124; M. ACHARD, «La paraphrase de Thémistius sur les lignes 71 a 1-11 des Seconds Analytiques», Dionysius, 23 (2005) 105-116; ID., «Themistius’ Paraphrase of Posterior Analytics 71a17-b8. An example of Rearrangement of an Aristotelian Text», Laval théologique et philosophique, 64 (2008) 15-31. 4 De top. diff., II, II, 1-2, 1183A, p. 21, 11-13. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, XXXI, 51, p. 41, 21-22: «Omnis igitur argumentatio aut per ratiocinationem tractanda est aut per ratiociantionem»; [Lucius Cornificius], Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, ed. G. CALBOLI, Patron, Bologna 1969 (2nd edition 1993), II, XVIII, 28, p. 122: «Ergo absolutissima et perfectissima est argumentatio ea, quae in quinque partes 3

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The concept of argumentatio becomes understandable if placed in relation to that of argumentum, since the former is nothing but the explication of the latter5. The first book explains the purpose of the discipline of topica, understood as the art by which the argumenta that can be used in each area of learning are discovered6. However, since the argumentum has an inner nature that remains unexpressed, it still needs to be articulated in propositional form; the argumentatio, therefore, represents the argumenti explicatio that can be made known only by means of an oratio. The argumentatio, as a species of the genus of oratio, is in turn understood as a genus divided into two species, syllogism and induction. It is therefore clear that the propaedeutic concepts presented in the first book are intended mainly to provide a correct understanding of argumentatio; the propositio, conclusio, quaestio, and argumentum are in fact elements closely related to the syllogism, which is one of the two species of argumentatio.

est distributa: propositionem, rationem, rationis confirmationem, exornationem, conplexionem. Propositio est, per quam ostendimus summatim, quid sit quod probari volumus. Ratio est, quae causam demonstrat, verum esse id, quod intendimus, brevi subiectione. Rationis confirmatio est ea, quae pluribus argumentis conroborat breviter expositam rationem. Exornatio est, qua utimur rei honestandae et conlocuplentandae causam, confirmata argumentatione. Conplexio est, quae concludit breviter, conligens partes argumentationis»; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, II, 28, p. 135, 3-7: «Quid est argumentatio? oratio ipsa, qua exequimur argumentum quo probamus. Quod sunt genera argumentationum? duo, per inductionem, quam Graeci ἐπαγωγή vocant, et per ratiocinationem, quam ἐνθύμημα appellant»; C. Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica, p. 408, 14-18: «Probabilis argumentatio in eo genere est, quod credibile est, quod fere solet fieri, quod in opinione positum est, quod sine ullo teste auditoris opinio confirmat, ut ‘si mater est, diliget filium’; ‘si avarus est, contemnit ius iurandum’. In hoc omnis argumentatio aut per inductionem tractanda est aut per ratiocinationem»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 11, p. 105, 1-3: «Argumentatio dicta est quasi argutae mentis oratio; argumentatio est enim oratio ipsa, qua inventum probabile exsequimur agumentum»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, IX, 13-15: «Syllogismus Graece, Latine argumentatio appellatur. Argumentatio autem dicta est, quasi argutae mentis oratio, qua inventum probabile exequimur»; ivi, II, IX, 25-26: «Syllogismorum apud rhetores principalia genera duo sunt: inductio et ratiocinatio». 5 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.6.1. 6 Cf. De top. diff., I, VII, 21, 1182A, p. 19, 4-5: «Topicorum vero intentio est verisimilium argumentorum copiam demonstrare». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.7.

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2.2.1 The syllogismus The definition of syllogism is as follows: «Syllogismus est oratio, in qua positis quibusdam et concessis aliud quiddam per ea ipsa quae concessa sunt evenire necesse est quam sunt ipsa quae concessa sunt. Huius definitionis rationem secundus quidem liber eorum, quibus institutionem in categoricos scripsimus syllogismos, plene continet»7. The syllogism, as 7

De top. diff., II, II, 3-4, 1183AB, p. 21, 13-17. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, 57, p. 45, 21-28: «Ratiocinatio est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquid eliciens, quod expositum et per se cognitum sua se vi et ratione confirmet. Hoc de genere qui diligentius considerandum putaverunt, cum idem in usu dicendi sequerentur, paululum in praecipiendi ratione dissenserunt. Nam partim quinque eius partes esse dixerunt, partim non plus quam in tres partes posse distribui putaverunt»; ivi, XXXIVXLI, 57-77; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, II, 28, pp. 135, 23-136, 5: «Quid ratiocinatio? quo aliquid adprobamus. Hoc Graeci quid vocant? enthymema, quod differt a se syllogismus philosophorum et enthymema rhetorum? Syllogismus alte habet probationem, enthymema ex proximo; item quod syllogismus plenus est omnibus probationis, enthymema non omnibus»; C. Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica, VIII-IX, p. 409, 17-19: «Ratiocinatio, id est syllogismus, est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquid eliciens, quod expositum et per se cognitum sua se vi et ratione confirmet»; Apuleius, Peri Hermeneias, 272, VII, p. 200, 9-12: «Secundum Aristotelem commodissime potest ita definiri: Oratio, in qua concessis aliquibus aliud quiddam praeter illa, quae concessa sunt, necessario evenit, sed per illa ipsa concessa»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 406, p. 197, 3-13: «Hoc totum, quod constat ex duobus sumptis et illatione, ratiocinatio a nobis, a Graecis συλλογισμός appellatur. Est ergo ratiocinatio ex duobus pluribusve concessis ad id, quod non conceditur, necessaria perventio. Possunt ergo plura esse sumpta, sed minus a duobus esse non possunt. Etenim est integra ratiocinatio, si ad illud, quod volumus ostendere, utilem esse voluptatem, tribus etiam sumptis pervenire velimus, ut ‘omnis voluptas secundum naturam est, omne quod secundum naturam est bonum est, omne bonum utile est, omnis igitur voluptas utilis est’»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 12, p. 105, 13-14: «Ratiocinatio est oratio, qua id de quo est quaestio comprobamus»; Isidorus, Etymologiae, II, IX, 1-4, 5-25: «Syllogismus igitur est propositionis et adsumptionis confirmationisque extrema conclusio aut ex ambigentis incerto, aut ex fiducia conprobantis. Constat enim tribus partibus: propositione, adsumptione, conclusione. Propositione, ut puta, ‘quod bonum est, turpem usum habere non potest’. Consensit audiens; adsumpsit ille ‘pecunia turpem usum habet’. Concluditur, ‘ergo pecunia bonum non est’. Syllogismis autem non solum rhetores, sed maxime dialectici utuntur, licet Apostolus saepe proponat, adsumat, confirmet atque concludat; quae, ut diximus, propriae artis Dialecticae et Rhetoricae sunt»; ivi, II, IX, 7, 10-14: «Ratiocinatio est oratio, qua id, de quo est quaestio, conprobatur. Ratiocinationis modi sunt duo. Primus enthymema, qui est inperfectus syllogismus atque rhetoricus. Secundus epichirema, qui est in rhetoricus et latior syllogismus». XXXIV,

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a species of argumentatio, is also equally a species of oratio. Boethius’s definition of a syllogism corresponds substantially to that proposed by Aristotle, according to whom it is a speech in which, once certain premises have been proposed and accepted, certain conclusions must necessarily follow8. Boethius dedicated two monographs to the study of categorical syllogisms and one to the study of hypothetical syllogisms, and for an in-depth account of the definition just presented he refers the reader to the second book of his De Syllogismo Categorico9. To facilitate the understanding of syllogisms, an example is proposed:

8

Cf. Aristotle, Analytica priora, 24b18-22 (Engl. transl. p. 40): «A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. I mean by the last phrase that it follows because of them, and by this, that no further term is required from without in order to make the consequence necessary». Cf. BARNES, Aristotle’s Theory; M. T. FEREJOHN, The Origins of Aristotelian Science, Yale University Press, New Haven – London 1991; V. B. LANDOR, «Aristotle on Demonstrating Essence», Apeiron, 19 (1985) 116-132; R. MCKIRAHAN, Principles and Proofs. Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1992; G. BAYER, «Definition Through Demonstration. The two Types of Syllogism in “Posterior Analytics” II 19», Apeiron, 40 (1995) 241-264. 9 De syllogismo categorico, II, 821A, p. 69, 8-11: «His igitur expeditis, quid syllogismus ipse sit, definiendum est. Definitur autem sic: Syllogismus est oratio, in qua positis quibusdam et concessis aliud quoddam, quam sunt ea, quae posita et concessa sunt, necessario contingit per ipsa, quae concessa sunt». Cf. L. MINIOPALUELLO, «The Text of the Categoriae: the Latin Tradition», The Classical Quarterly, 39 (1945) 63-74; G. RIGHI, A. M. S. Boezio De syllogismo categorico. Studio sul I libro, Marzorati, Milano 1984; S. EBBESEN, «Boethius as an Aristotelian Scholar», in R. SORABJI (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, Duckworth, London 1990, pp. 373-391; A. TISSERAND, «Métaphore et translatio in divinis: la théorie de la prédication et la conversion des catégories chez Boèce», in A. GALLONIER (ed.), Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs, Actes du Colloque International de la Fondation Singer-Polignac (Paris, 8-12 juin 1999), Peeters, Louvain – Paris 2003, pp. 434-463 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 44); ID., Pars theologica: logique et théologie chez Boèce, Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 2008. Cf. also In Top., I, 1050B: «Ergo illa per propositiones prolatio ac dispositio argumenti, argumentatio nuncupatur, quae dicitur enthymema vel syllogismus, cuius definitionem in Topicis differentiis apertius explanabimus» (Engl. transl. p. 31: «The expression and arrangement of an argument by means of propositions is called an argumentation, and this is said to be an enthymeme or a syllogism [We will explain the definitions of these more fully in connection with the Differentiae of Topics]»).

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Sed propter intellectus facilitatem idem breviter aperiemus exemplo. Sit enim syllogismus hic: «omnis homo animal est, omne animal substantia est, omnis igitur homo substantia est». Totum igitur hoc oratio est, in qua positis quibusdam et concessis, id est duabus propositionibus, quae sunt: «omnis homo animal est», et «omne animal substantia est», per ea ipsa quae concessa sunt efficitur aliud aliquid, id scilicet, quod est conclusio: «omnis igitur homo substantia est». Per propositiones enim quae concessae sunt consequentia necessario conclusionis infertur. Sunt autem propositiones: «omnis homo animal est», et «omne animal substantia est» atque ex his efficitur aliud quiddam quam sunt ipsa quae concessa sunt. Concluditur enim: «omnis igitur homo substantia est», quod longe diversum est et ab ea propositione, quae dicit: «Omnis homo animal est», et ab ea, quae proponit «omne animal esse substantiam»10.

An example of a syllogism therefore is the following: Maior propositio: «every man is an animal». Minor propositio: «every animal is a substance». Conclusio: «therefore, every man is a substance». The sequence of the propositions as a whole constitutes an oratio, i.e. a speech, in which it is possible to distinguish, on the one hand, that which has previously been proposed and accepted in the major and minor premises («every man is an animal» and «every animal is a substance») and, on the other hand, the conclusion that follows from the premises («therefore, every man is a substance»). The characteristic of the conclusion is then twofold: first, it is the result of what follows from the premises once they have been accepted; second, it is presented as a new result with respect to the very premises from which it follows. The conclusion thus makes clear what is in some sense already contained within the premises, although in an as yet inarticulate and unexpressed form. The syllogism, in turn, can be understood as a genus that is divided into its species: Syllogismorum vero alii sunt praedicativi, qui categorici vocantur, alii conditionales, quos hypotheticos dicimus. Et praedicativi quidem sunt qui ex omnibus praedicativis propositionibus connectuntur, ut is, quem exempli gratia superius adnotavi; omnibus enim 10

De top. diff., II, II, 5-6, 1183BC, pp. 21, 17-22, 8.

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praedicativis propositionibus texitur. Hypothetici vero sunt quorum propositiones conditione nectuntur, ut hic: «si dies est, lux est; est autem dies, lux igitur est»; propositio enim prima conditionem tenet hanc, quoniam «ita demum lux est, si dies est». Atque ideo syllogismus hic hypotheticus, id est conditionalis, vocatur11.

If the syllogism is a genus, its species are the predicative or categorical syllogism, and the conditional or hypothetical syllogism; the first species is characterized by the fact that it is only made up of predicative or categorical propositions, while the second species, as major premise, 11 Ivi, II, II, 7-9, 1183CD, p. 22, 8-16. Boethius recognises a double distinction within the syllogism that is intended as a genus; the first distinction is the one just shown, namely the distinction between the two species of categorical and conditional syllogism; the second refers to the distinction between the species of dialectical and apodictic or demonstrative syllogisms, presented in the first commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge. In this text, the opportunity to introduce this distinction is provided by the presentation of the order of the treaties of Aristotelian logic, and by Boethius’s attempt to explain its ratio. Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio prima, I, 5, 13C-14A, pp. 12, 23-14, 7: «Aristoteles enim, quoniam dialecticae atque apodicticae disciplinae volebat posteris ordinem scientiamque contradere, vidit apodicticam dialecticamque vim uno syllogismi ordine contineri. Scribit itaque priores resolutorios quos Graeci ἀναλυτικούς vocant, qui legendi essent antequam aliquid dialecticae vel apodicticae artis attingerent. In primis enim resolutoriis de syllogismorum ordine complexione figuris que tractatur. Et quoniam syllogismus genus est apodictici et dialectici syllogismi, dialecticam vero in Topicis suis exercuit, ἀπόδειξιν in secundis resolutoriis ordinavit: horum disciplina, quam ille in monstrandis syllogismis ante collegerat, prius etiam in studiis lectitatur. Itaque prius primi resolutorii qui de *** syllogismi sunt, quam secundi resolutorii, qui de apodicto syllogismo, vel Topica quae de dialectico syllogismo sunt, accipiuntur. Traxit igitur Aristoteles dialecticam atque apodicticam scientiam, adunavitque in syllogismorum resolutoria disputatione. Sed quoniam syllogismum ex propositionibus constare necesse est, librum Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, qui inscribitur de Propositionibus, adnotavit. Omnes vero propositiones ex sermonibus aliquid significantibus componuntur. Itaque liber quem de decem praedicamentis scripsit, quae apud Graecos κατηγορίαι dicuntur, de primis rerum nominibus significantibusque est. Vidit enim Aristoteles infinitam miscellamque esse rerum omnium, verborumque disparilitatem et, ut eorum ordinem reperiret, in decem primis sermonibus, prima rerum genera significantibus, omne quidquid illud vel rerum, vel sermonum poterat esse, collegit». Cf. also Apuleius, Peri Hermeneias, 272, VII; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 407, p. 197, 23-25: «Ratiocinatio igitur sive propriam et suam sive confinem habens conclusionem dividitur in duo genera: praedicativum et condicionalem syllogismum»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, III, 1213, pp. 115-119; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXVIII, 1-26.

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has two predicative propositions joined by means of the condition (vis conditionis). An example of a categorical syllogism is the one diagrammed above. An example of a hypothetical syllogism is as follows: Maior propositio: «if it is day, there is light». Minor propositio: «but it is day». Conclusio: «so there is light». «It is day» and «there is light» are two predicative propositions connected by means of the conditio, represented by the hypothetical conjunction «if»; this means that the proposition proposed in the consequent is true only if what is proposed in the antecedent is true. It is thus apparent that the definition of syllogism provided previously is related only to categorical syllogisms. For a definition of hypothetical syllogisms, it is enough to observe what is stated in the De hypotheticis syllogismis: «Nam in quibus propositiones praedicativae sunt, eos praedicativos syllogismos vocamus, in quibus vero hypothetica propositio prima est (potest namque et assumptio et conclusio esse predicativa), hi tantum per unius hypotheticae propositionis naturam hypothetici et conditionales dicuntur»12. Inasmuch as predicative syllogisms are defined by having only predicative propositions, hypothetical syllogisms are defined by the nature of the hypothetical proposition that is proposed in the major premise, while the minor premise and conclusion are predicative propositions13. 12

De hypotheticis syllogismis, I, II, 3, 833B, p. 210, 23-27. In this same passage of the De hypotheticis syllogismis, Boethius calls categorical syllogisms simple syllogisms, while he refers to hypothetical syllogisms as composed syllogisms. The explanation for this terminology is that categorical syllogisms are formed by predicative propositions that have only two terms (subject and predicate), while hypothetical syllogisms are formed by conditional propositions that in turn are composed of the union of two predicative propositions. Cf. ivi, I, II, 3-4, 833BC, pp. 210, 27-212, 38: «At de simplicibus quidem, id est praedicativis syllogismis, duobus libellis explicuimus, quod de eorum institutione confecimus. Post simplicium vero syllogismorum disputationem, ordo est ut de non simplicibus disseramus. Non simplices autem syllogismi sunt qui hypothetici dicuntur, quod latino nomine conditionales vocamus. Non simplices vero dicuntur quoniam ex simplicibus constant, atque in eosdem ultimos resolvuntur, cum praesertim primae eorum propositiones vim propriae consequentiae ex categoricis, id est simplicibus, capiant syllogismis. Namque prima propositio hypothetici syllogismi, si dubitetur an vera sit, praedicativa conclusio demonstrabitur». 13

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In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius explains in detail the difference between predicative and conditional propositions: Now everything that can be expressed by means of a categorical syllogism can also be said by means of a conditional syllogism, for every predicative proposition can be turned into a conditional, in the following way. ‘Every man is an animal’ is predicative; this is easily turned into a conditional in this way: ‘if it is a man, it is an animal’. But it is not the case that every conditional proposition can be turned into a predicative proposition, as, for example, in this case: ‘if she has borne a child, she has lain with a man’, for no one can say that having borne a child is that thing which is lying with a man, in the way that we say a man is that thing which is an animal. For there is a different idea in those propositions which are expressed in this way: ‘She who has borne a child has lain with a man’, for this is similar to the proposition that says, ‘if she has borne a child, she has lain with a man’. But the predicative proposition says that the subject is that thing that is the predicate, while a conditional proposition maintains that if the antecedent is, then the consequent necessarily follows. And so when a predicative proposition is turned into a conditional, it is indisputably rendered a different proposition14.

Starting from the consideration that it is always possible to form a categorical syllogism from a predicative proposition, in like manner as it is always possible to obtain a hypothetical syllogism from a conditional proposition, Boethius adds that every categorical syllogism may always be converted into a conditional syllogism, but that, to the contrary, not every 14 In Top., IV, 1128C-1129A (Engl. transl. p. 129): «Omnia vero quaecumque per categoricum syllogismum proferri possunt, eadem per conditionalem syllogismum dici queunt. Omnis namque praedicativa propositio in conditionalem verti potest, hoc modo: omnis homo animal est, praedicativa est; haec facile vertitur in conditionalem ita, si homo est, animal est. Non vero omnis conditionalis in praedicativam verti potest, velut haec: si peperit, cum viro concubuit. Nemo enim dicere potest ipsum peperisse, id esse quod cum viro concumbere, quomodo dicimus hominem id esse quod animal sit. Alia enim ratio est in iis propositionibus quae ita dicuntur, quae peperit, cum viro concubuit. Haec enim similis est ei quae dicit, si peperit, cum viro concubuit, sed praedicativa propositio id esse subiectum dicit, quod fuerit praedicatum. Conditionalis vero id ponit, ut si id quod antecedens fuerit necessario comitetur quod subsequitur. Cum vero praedicativa est propositio, si ea vertatur in conditionalem, alia nimirum redditur propositio».

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hypothetical syllogism may be expressed in categorical terms without at the same time changing the meaning. In fact, the ratio is not altered in the conversion of the major premise of a categorical syllogism from predicative to conditional (i.e. so that «every man is an animal» becomes «if he is a man, he is an animal»). Conversely, if the major premise of a hypothetical syllogism is converted from conditional to predicative (so that «if she has born a child, she has lain with a man» then becomes «the one who has born a child, has lain with a man»), the proposition assumes a different meaning. Boethius’s conclusions about the relationship between categorical and conditional syllogisms would prove to have great influence on the development of logic in the Middle Ages: Therefore, whether a conditional syllogism, which is formulated in terms of preceding and following, arises by means of a definition, enumeration of parts, conjugation, or in any other way. It nevertheless has its own form specific to it and is conditional (that is, it uses a condition, which is specific to it), so that in a certain way a conditional syllogism seems to have the other arguments subordinated to its own ‘nature’15.

The conditional syllogism, built from a conditional proposition, regardless of the fact that the antecedent and the consequent constitute a genus, species, or any other logical entity, has its own specific form, one that is contained entirely in the vis conditionis. In this way, a conditional syllogism contains in its nature all the other forms in which it is possible to express an argumentum; and since the latter can be expressed through a syllogism (categorical or conditional) or an enthymeme, it is clear that the reference in this case is to categorical syllogisms. It thus almost seems that, in terms of generality, the conditional syllogism is more universal and as such precedes and includes within itself the categorical syllogism.

15 Ivi, IV, 1129AB (Engl. transl. pp. 129-130): «Ergo conditionalis syllogismus in antecessione et consecutione positus, licet per diffinitionem, et per partium enumeratione, et per coniugationem, et quolibet alio fiat modo, tamen in propria forma se continet, et est conditionalis, id est utens propria potestate, ut quodammodo caetera argumenta suae veluti naturae videatur habere subiecta». Cf. STUMP, «Topics: Their Development and Absorption into the Consequences», in N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG (eds.), The Cambridge History, op. cit.

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2.2.2 The inductio Again, the argumentatio is said to be a genus divided into the two species of syllogism and induction. The syllogism, in turn, is divided into categorical and hypothetical species. The meaning of the second species of argumentatio, namely the inductio, is explained as follows: Inductio vero est oratio, per quam fit a particularibus ad universalia progressio hoc modo: «Si in regendis navidus non sorte sed arte legitur gubernator, si in regendis equis auriga non sortis eventu, sed commendatione artis assumitur, si in administranda republica non sors principem facit, sed peritia moderandi» similiaque in pluribus conquiruntur, quibus infertur: «Et in omni quoque re, quam quisque regi atque administrari naviter volet, non sorte accommodat sed arte rectorem». Vides igitur quemadmodum per singulas res currat oratio, ut ad universale perveniat; nam cum non sorte regi sed arte navim, currum, rempublicam collegisset, quasi in ceteris quoque ita sese habeat, quod erat universale conclusit hoc modo: «In omnibus quoque rebus non sorte ductum, sed arte praecipuum debere praeponi»16. 16

De top. diff., II, II, 10-11, 1183D-1184A, pp. 22, 16-23, 6. The division of the species of argumentationes in syllogismus and induction is taken back by Aristotle. Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I, 105a10-19 (Engl. transl. p. 52: «Having made these distinctions, we must distinguish how many species there are of dialectical arguments. There are induction and deduction. Now what deduction is has been said before; induction is a passage from particulars to universals, e.g. the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. Induction is more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men; but deduction is more forcible and more effective against contradictious people»); Id., Analytica priora, 68b9-35; Cicero, De inventione, I, XXXI, 51, pp. 41, 23-42, 3: «Inductio est oratio, quae rebus non dubiis captat assensionem eius, qui cum instituta est; quibus assensionibus facit, ut illi dubia quaedam res propter similitudinem earum rerum, quibus assensit, probetur»; ivi, I, XXXI-XXXIII, 51-56; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, II, 28, p. 135, 8-22: «Quid est inductio? oratio, quae rebus non dubiis captat adsensiones eius, cum quo instituta est. In hoc genere quid observandum est? ut illud, quod inducimus per similitudinem, eiusmodi sit ut ab adversario necesse sit concedi, et ne intellegat quo spectent illae primae inductiones. Cur ita? quoniam aut inductioni nostrae non respondebit, aut male respondendo longius procedere interrogationem non sinet, et tamen hoc extremum est, ut aut taceat aut concedat aut neget. Si negabit, quid faciemus? ostendenda similitudo est earum rerum quae ante concessae sunt. Quid si

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The inductio is qualified, first of all, as being an oratio, a speech by means of which a progression from the particular to the universal is accomplished. The example in the passage shows how the argumentation proceeds through the recording and inductive collection of data: «if concedet? concludenda argumentatio est. Quid si tacebit? aut elicienda responsio est aut, quoniam taciturnitas imitatur confessionem, pro eo ac si concessum sit, concludemus»; Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica, VIII, p. 408, 18- 21: «Inductio est oratio, quae rebus non dubiis captat assensiones eius, qui cum instituta est; quibus assensionibus facit, ut illi dubia quaedam res propter similitudinem earum rerum, quibus assensit, probetur»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 11, p. 105, 3-12: «Inductio est oratio quae rebus non dubiis captat assensionem eius cum quo instituta est, sive inter philosophos sive inter rethores sive inter sermocinantes. Propositio inductionis est quae similitudines concedendae rei necessario unius inducit aut plurium. Illatio inductionis est, quae et assumptio dicitur, quae rem de qua contenditur, et cuius causa similitudines habitae sunt, introducit. Conclusio inductionis est quae aut concessionem illationis confirmat, aut quid ex ea conficiatur ostendit»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, IX, 1-10: «Inductio est, quae rebus non dubiis captat adsensionem eius cum instituta est, sive inter philosophos, sive inter rhetores, sive inter sermocinantes. Propositio inductionis est, quae similitudines concedendae rei necessario unius inducit aut plurimu. Inlatio inductionis est, quae et adsumptio dicitur, quae rem, de qua contenditur, et cuius causa similitudines habitae sunt, introducit. Conclusio inductionis est, quae aut concessionem inlationis confirmat, aut quid ex ea conficiatur declarat». It is possible to trace further definitions of inductio that are substantially identical to that presented in the De topicis differentiis and other of Boethius’s writings; cf. In Aristotelis Categorias, IV, 281D: «Inductio autem est singulorum exemplorum collectio, et ad universalem per ea cognitionem collectionemque reductio, ut si quis dicat qui musicam novit musicus est, et ab ea denominatur, et medicus qui medicinam, rursus qui grammaticam grammaticus, et ex his singulis rebus colligat universaliter, et quicunque aliquam artem novit eiusdem denominatione signatur, ut a grammatica grammaticus, a medicina medicus, et caetera huiusmodi». There are also found in the commentary on Cicero’s Topica considerations ralting to inductio that are connected to the locus a similitudine. In fact, Cicero presents similitudo as a genus divided into two species ex rerum conlatione, namely the similarity identified by comparing most things (also called inductio) that correspond in the Greek tradition to ἐπαγωγή; and the similarity ex singularum comparatione, which arises from the characterization brought about among individual things. Cf. Cicero, Topica, 41-45, pp. 136, 22-138, 11. For a commentary on Cicero’s text, cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 99-106; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 285-292. For the section of Boethius’s commentary dedicated to the analysis of locus ex similitudine, cf. In Top., 1115D-1118A. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that, in the De topicis differentiis, inductio is located within the discipline of topica and not as a form of argumentatio. As Giulio D’ONOFRIO says, this means that the inductio in this perspective is seen as an active principle of rationality rather than a demonstrative form. Cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, p. 263.

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a helmsman in directing ships is chosen not by lot but according to his skill, if a coachman in ruling horses is chosen not by lot but by the recommendation of his skill, and if not chance but experience in governing a republic produces a prince, then whoever wants to govern and administrate diligently any kind of thing, this leader is chosen not by chance but because of his skill». Therefore, without having examined all the possible cases concerning this aspect of the argumentation, on the basis of the collected data, it is assumed that the same thing will happen in the remaining cases as well. It is for this reason that universal conclusions are drawn starting from the collection of particular data. However, if the conclusion of an induction is compared with that of the syllogism, it is possible to recognize how inferior the demonstrative force of the former is to that of the latter. The conclusion of a syllogism in fact preserves the universal character of the truth of the premises from which it was inferred; conversely, the conclusion of an induction, descending from particular premises, will be true for most of that specific set of circumstances, but there is no guarantee that it must be true also for the other cases. Inductive reasoning is also useful to show that an event, observed in a number of cases, can be expected to happen in another case considered similar to cases in which it has been observed: «Saepe autem multorum collecta particularitas aliud quiddam particulare demonstrat, ut si quis sic dicat: ‘Si neque navibus neque curribus neque agris sorte praeponuntur, ne rebus quidem publicis rectores sorte ducendi sunt’»17. In the example («if the leaders in ships, wagons, or fields are not placed in command by lot, the leaders also should not be chosen by lot in public affairs»), the attempt is made to demonstrate the truth of a particular case using other cases similar to it; however, the conclusion is not yet universal, since the argumentation has only served to show that what is observed may be compared to another case that has the same characteristics. There is thus a profound difference between syllogism and induction, as Boethius presently observes: Quod argumentationis genus maxime solet esse probabile, etsi non aequam syllogismo habeat firmitatem. Syllogismus namque ab universalibus in particularia decurrit estque in eo, si veris propositionibus contexatur, firma atque immutabilis veritas. At 17

De top. diff., II, II, 12, 1184A, p. 23, 6-9.

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inductio habet quidem maximam probabilitatem, sed interdum veritate deficit, ut in hac: «qui scit canere, cantor est et qui luctari, luctator quique aedificare, aedificator». Quibus multis simili ratione collectis inferri potest: «qui scit igitur malum, malus est», quod non procedit. Mali quippe notitia deesse non potest bono; virtus enim sese diligit aspernaturque contraria nec vitare vitium nisi cognitum queat18.

The process of the two species of the argumentation is exactly the opposite: the syllogism proceeds from the universal in order to reach the particular; the induction, conversely, ascends from the particular to the universal. The difference is therefore in the starting point, i.e. the premises, in which reside the corresponding degree of inference that determines the force of the consequence of the conclusion: if the premises are true and universal, the conclusion of the syllogism cannot but be true. Conversely, if the premises refer only to particular cases, the conclusion of induction will certainly have the greatest degree of probability, but it will never have the same certainty and stability enjoyed by the conclusion of a syllogism, since the inductive procedure is not universal to the point that it can be considered true for all cases to which it may refer. The example illustrates the mistake that can be made by attempting to universalise the observation of particular cases: «whoever knows singing is a singer and whoever knows wrestling is a wrestler and whoever knows building is a builder; so whoever knows evil is an evildoer». The particular cases cited in this example can be empirically observed and verified (the singer, the wrestler, the builder), but the same inductive reasoning is not valid when applied to the realm of morals; if someone knows evil, this does not in fact mean that he is also an evildoer. The knowledge of evil is possessed also by those who are not evildoers; thus, for example, a man who pursues virtue will certainly know evil in order to avoid it. Therefore, the quality that distinguishes induction is that of possessing the maxima probabilitas that can at least sometimes enable true conclusions to be reached. Conversely, the syllogism has always firma et immutabilis veritas.

18

Ivi, II, II, 13-15, 1184AB, p. 23, 9-18.

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2.2.3 The enthymema In addition to syllogism and induction, there are two other species of argumentationes, the enthymema and exemplum: His igitur duobus velut principiis et generibus argumentandi duo quidem alii deprehenduntur argumentationis modi: unus quidem syllogismo, alter vero inductioni suppositus; in quibus quidem promptum sit considerare quod ille quidem a syllogismo, ille vero ab inductione ducat exordium, non tamen aut hic syllogismum aut ille impleat inductionem. Haec autem sunt enthymema atque exemplum19.

The enthymeme and the example derive from, respectively, the syllogism and induction, as if they were subspecies thereof, although with different characteristics. The enthymeme is defined as follows: Enthymema quippe est imperfectus syllogismus, id est oratio, in qua non omnibus antea propositionibus constitutis infertur festinata conclusio, ut si quis sic dicat: «homo animal est, substantia igitur est». Praetermisit enim alteram propositionem, qua proponitur «omne animal esse substantiam». Ergo quoniam enthymema ab universalibus ad particularia probanda contendit, quasi simile syllogismo est; quod vero non omnibus quae conveniunt syllogismo propositionibus utitur, a syllogismi ratione discedit atque ideo imperfectus vocatus est syllogismus20.

19

Ivi, II, II, 16, 1184B, pp. 23, 19-24, 1. Ivi, II, II, 17-18, 1184BC, p. 24, 1-9. Cf. In Top., I, 1050B: «Enthymema vero est imperfectus syllogismus, cuius aliquae partes, vel propter brevitatem, vel propter notitiam, praetermissae sunt. Itaque haec quoque argumentatio a syllogismi genere non recedit» (Engl. transl. p. 31: «But an enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism, some of whose parts are omitted either for the sake of brevity or because they are already known, and so argumentation of this sort also does not fall outside the genus of syllogism»); ivi, V, 1142D-1143A: «Ex his nasci dicit enthymemata ex contrariis conclusa, quibus plurimum rhetores uti solent; atque haec enthymemata nuncupantur, non quod eodem nomine omnis inventio nuncupari non possit (enthymema namque est mentis conceptio, quod potest omnibus inventionibus convenire), sed quia haec inventa, quae breviter ex contrariis colliguntur, maxime acuta sunt, propter excellentiam speciemque inventionis commune enthymematis nomen proprium factum est, ut haec a rhetoribus quasi proprio nomine enthymemata vocentur» (Engl. transl. p. 149: «From these, Cicero says, 20

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The enthymeme derives its principle from the syllogism, since it too proceeds from universal things to reach particular things, but does not coincide fully with it, since the enthymeme does not respect the rules necessary for the formation of a syllogism; thus, for example: Propositio: «man is an animal». Conclusio: «therefore, he is a substance». enthymemes arise which are inferred from contraries and which are for the most part generally used by rhetoricians. Although every discovery can be called an enthymeme [for an enthymeme is a conception of the mind, and this can apply to all discoveries], these are called enthymemes because the things discovered, which are concisely deduced from contraries, are especially pointed. Therefore, they have appropriated the common name ‘enthymeme’ on account of the excellence and elegance of their discovery, so that the rhetoricians call them ‘enthymemes’ as if that were a proper name»). The enthymeme, which is also called imperfectus syllogismus, constitutes for Cicero the more perfect way to express the vis logica of the locus a repugnantibus, which will be presented in the course of the third book of the De topicis differentiis. Cf. infra, Chap. 3, § 3.4.8. Cf. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 24b23-26 (Engl. transl. p. 40): «I call perfect a deduction which needs nothing other than what has been stated to make the necessity evident; a deduction is imperfect if it needs either one or more things, which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms set down, but have not been assumed in the propositions»; ivi, 70a2-70b38; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, V, XIV, 24; C. Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica, X, p. 411; ivi, X, p. 411, 1-10: «Enthymema est imperfectus syllogismus: non est enim in eo necesse primum proponere, deinde argumentari et postremo concludere, sed vel primam propositionem praeterire licebit, propterea quod ipsa tantum praesumptione iudicis vel auditoris contenta esse poterit, et solam ratiocinationem exsequi et conclusionem superaddere, vel certe conclusionem praetermittere et sensibus iudicis id, quod ratiocinatus est, colligendum relinquere. Quare ergo dialecticis illud necessarium est, ut omnibus partibus colligant, oratoribus non semper? Quoniam illis veri inveniendi ratio, his suadendi propositia est»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 12, p. 105, 14-22: «Enthymema igitur est quod Latine interpretatur mentis conceptio, quam imperfectum syllogismum solent artigraphi nuncupare. Nam in duabus partibus haec argumenti forma consistit, quando id quod ad finem pertinet faciendam utitur, syllogismorum lege praeterita, ut est illud: ‘Si tempestas vitanda est, non est igitur navigandum’. Ex sola enim propositione constat esse perfectum, unde magis orationibus quam dialecticis convenire iudicatum est. De dialecticis autem syllogismis suo loco dicemus»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, IX, 8, 14-21: «Enthymema igitur Latine interpretatur mentis conceptio, quem inperfectum syllogismus solent artigraphi nuncupare. Nam in duabus partibus eius argumenti forma consistit, quando id, quod ad finem pertinet faciendam, utitur, syllogismorum lege praeterita, ut est illud: ‘Si tempestas vitanda est, non est igitur navigandum’. Ex sola enim propositione et conclusione constat esse perfectum, unde magis rhetoribus quam dialecticis convenire iudicatum est».

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The enthymeme, then, is defined as a syllogismus imperfectus because a premise is lacking («every animal is a substance»); for purposes of economy and demonstrative effectiveness, that premise is not expressed, but is meant to be inferred, and therefore represents a different form of reasoning21.

2.2.4 The exemplum The exemplum or example is instead defined as follows: Exemplum quoque inductioni simili ratione et copulatur et ab ea dissidet; est enim exemplum quod per particulare propositum particulare quiddam contendat ostendere hoc modo: «oportet a Tullio consule necari Catilinam, cum a Scipione Gracchus fuerit interemptus»; approbatum est enim «Catilinam a Cicerone debere perimi, quod a Scipione Gracchus fuerit occisus». Quae utraque particularia esse ac non universalia singularium designat interpositio personarum. Quoniam igitur ex parte pars approbatur, quasi inductionis similitudinem tenet id, quod exemplum vocamus. Quoniam vero non plures, quibus id efficiat, colligit partes, ab inductione discedit22.

The species of argumentation called exemplum is characterized by being composed entirely of particular propositions that contain proper names, facts, or particular circumstances. The example is thus more similar to induction, which is its principle; in fact, the purpose is to demonstrate a 21 In the fourth book, when Boethius illustrates the differences between dialectic and rhetoric, it is also clarified that perfect syllogisms concern dialectic, while rhetoric makes use of the brevity of the enthymemes. Cf. De top. diff., IV, I, 9-10, 1206C, p. 72, 10-11: «Item dialectica perfectis utitur syllogismis. Rhetorica enthymematum brevitate contenta est». Cf. infra, Chap. 4, § 4.1. 22 De top. diff., II, II, 19-20, 1184CD, p. 24, 9-18. Cf. Aristotle, Analytica priora, 39 68b -69a19; Cicero, De inventione, I, xxx, 49, p. 40, 21-29: «Conparabile autem est, quod in rebus diversis similem aliquam rationem continet. Eius partes sunt tres: imago, conlatio, exemplum. Imago est oratio demonstrans corporum aut naturarum similitudinem. Conlatio est oratio rem cum re ex similitudine conferens. Exemplum est, quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negotii confirmat aut infirmat. Horum exempla et descriptiones in praeceptis elocutionis cognoscentur»; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, V, XI.

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particular case based on another particular case. In the exemplum, however, unlike in induction, the collectio of the parts is limited to only one case. The exemplum reflects therefore a mental process based essentially on comparison between two particular things, for example: «It is right for Tullius (Cicero) the consul to kill Catiline, since Gracchus was killed by Scipio»; through this procedure, the aim is to demonstrate that «Catiline should be killed by Cicero, given the fact that Gracchus was killed by Scipio». Therefore, the conclusion reached by an exemplum, from the point of view of demonstrative skill, is very weak, because it can never be necessarily true, but only probable. Further, the degree of probability will never be maximal, as it is for a conclusion reached by induction, because argument by exemplum simply concludes from the observation of a single case that another is similar to it. Once the presentation of the quadripartite division of argumentatio in its species is complete, Boethius adds a last observation that is somewhat difficult to understand: Ita igitur duae quidem sunt argumentandi species principales: una quae dicitur syllogismus, altera quae vocatur inductio. Sub his autem et velut ex his manantia enthymema atque exemplum. Quae quidem omnia ex syllogismo ducuntur et ex syllogismo vires accipiunt; sive enim sit enthymema sive inductio sive etiam exemplum, ex syllogismo quam maxime fidem capit, quod in Prioribus Resolutoriis, quos ab Aristotele transtulimus, demonstratum est. Quocirca satis est de syllogismo disserere quasi principali et ceteras argumentandi species continente. Restat nunc quid sit locus aperire23.

Contradictions are apparent in this passage: Boethius has just presented argumentatio as a genus and syllogismus and inductio as its species, of which enthymema and exemplum are in turn considered subspecies. It is therefore less than self-evident that all forms of argumentatio would derive ultimately from the syllogism. One possible solution is that the particular propositions of which induction and exemplum are composed derive from universal propositions possessed by the syllogism and enthymeme; and since an enthymeme has been defined as an imperfect syllogism, it could be said that all the propositions, and other species of argumentatio that 23

De top. diff., II, II, 21-23, 1184D-1185A, pp. 24, 19-25, 7. Cf. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, II, 68b15-69a19; ivi, II, 70a11-70b5.

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share the same structure, are ultimately contained within the syllogism, which at this point constitutes not only the formal but also the propositional principle. There is another possible interpretation, one that does not exclude but complements the previous one, namely that, in the quadripartite division of argumentatio, it is possible to perceive a hierarchy at the level of epistemology. The syllogism is the only species able to reach the solid and immutable truth («firma et immutabilis veritas»); the enthymeme, in turn, although it may reach true conclusions, nevertheless possesses an imperfect structure, since a premise is lacking (syllogismus imperfectus); induction then, although it tends to the universal, is only able to achieve the maximal degree of probability (maxima probabilitas). In sum, the example, in establishing a comparison between two similar things, must remain no more than probable. The syllogism is, therefore, the most perfect form of argumentatio, compared to which the others are mere imitations; from the syllogism to the enthymeme to induction and to exemplum there is thus a kind of reduction in degree, not only formal but also epistemic, and for this reason it is for Boethius sufficient to deal for the most part only with the syllogism. After embarking upon a quadripartite division of argumentatio, he has returned the focus of the entire division to the only species able to represent the most excellent form, the syllogism, which, being universal, is able to contain in itself the particular, where «contain» means to serve as its principle at the same time.

2.3 Themistius’s locus The next logical concept to be introduced is that of the locus: «Locus namque est, ut M. Tullio placet, argumenti sedes. Cuius definitionis quae sit vis paucis absolvam. Argumenti enim sedes partim maxima propositio intellegi potest, partim propositionis maximae differentia»24. Returning to themes discussed in the Introduction and previous chapter, the definition of locus has already been given in the first book, though, unlike the other logical concepts presented there, it is not followed by any comment25. In 24

Ivi, II, III, 1-2, 1185A, p. 25, 8-11. Cf. ivi, I, I, 8, 1174C, p. 3, 13-14: «Locus vero est argumenti sedes vel unde ad propositam quaestionem conveniens trahitur argumentum». 25

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the second book, the locus is first of all defined as a sedes, so that these two terms can be considered synonyms; however, the «place» invoked by sedes is not physical, since the topica, being a logical discipline, are to be considered rather «places of the mind». The metaphor of place essentially refers to the idea of «containing»: in like manner as a material place is physical space that allows in itself the extension of a body, in the same way the places of the discipline of topica represent the maximal forms of universalization in which the principles of every kind of reasoning originate, namely the argumenta26. Given that the purpose of the treatise is, again, to explain what the loci are, what their differentiae are, and the syllogisms to which they are connected, it is, as just observed, not immediately clear why Boethius did not choose to explain the meaning of locus in the first book27. Given the extremely systematic nature of his treatise, it is reasonable to conclude that his choice here was informed by methodological considerations: the locus is in fact an argumenti sedes; therefore, if we do not understand first what an argumentum is, it is not possible to understand fully what a locus is. On the other hand, beginning right with the discussion of the meaning of locus, the difficulty that the author himself admits at the beginning of the treatise begins to emerge, namely that of reconciling the teaching of the discipline of topica that derives from the Greek tradition with that deriving from the Latin tradition. In fact, inasmuch as the definition of locus presented above was undoubtedly made by Cicero, while the second book of the De topicis differentiis is reserved exclusively for the presentation of the Themistian loci, Boethius evidently chose to use Cicero’s definition to explain Themistius’s locus. Given the significance of these considerations for Boethius’s conception of the locus, it should be emphasized that, in this attempt at identification, the purpose of the book is effectively achieved: 26

The metaphor of place is, during the presentation of the discipline of topica, privileged by Boethius; it is found again also with reference to the relationship between the ars inveniendi and the ars iudicandi, the two parts of which constitute the Ciceronian ratio disserendi. Cf. In Top., I, 1045D: «Inventio quippe caeteris omnibus, veluti materiae loco, supponitur, hoc modo» (Engl. transl. p. 26: «Discovery is the basis for all the others, holding the place, as it were, of their matter in the following way»). Cf. Introd., § 6. 27 Cf. De top. diff., I, I, 2, 1173B, pp. 1, 8-2, 2: «Nunc vero aperire consilium est qui sint loci, quae horum differentiae, qui etiam quibus apti sint syllogismis». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3.

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for after showing the differences and similarities between the two divisions of the loci, Boethius proceeds to indicate also how each division may be contained in the other. This very important cultural operation, which looks to the explicit assimilation of the Ciceronian and Themistian understandings of the locus, has many problematic aspects. Boethius affirms, in fact, that the Themistian locus is explained in two ways: a locus can be either the maxima propositio or the propositionis maximae differentia28. However, while Cicero’s definition has already specified for what a locus serves as a sedes (i.e. for the argumenta), it remains unclear in what sense the maxima and the differentia are sedes argumenti for the two Themistian loci. A preliminary answer to this question can be found by simply proceeding from the meaning of argumentum. Although Boethius in the first book provides merely the definition of this concept, while he devotes considerable attention to presenting its division, it is in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica that one of its fundamental characteristics is revealed, namely that of having a nature that is completely interior since it is still unexpressed29. Conversely, argumentatio has been defined as the expression of argumentum; in sum, it has been said that the only species of argumentationes able to express an argumentum are the syllogism and enthymeme.30 What therefore remains is to understand the real link between the maxima propositio and both the maximarum differentia propositionum and the argumentatio: this seems 28

The reason why these two logical concepts act as loci or sedes will shortly be explained by Boethius himself. Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.1 and § 2.3.2. 29 Cf. De top. diff., I, I, 5, 1174C, p. 3, 7-8: «Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.6 , § 1.6.1 and § 1.6.2. 30 Cf. In Top., I, 1050B: «Argumentum vero nisi sit oratione prolatum, et propositionum contextione dispositum, fidem facere dubitationi non poterit. Ergo illa per propositiones prolatio ac dispositio argumenti, argumentatio nuncupatur, quae dicitur enthymema vel syllogismus, cuius definitionem in Topicis differentiis apertius explanabimus. Omnis vero syllogismus vel enthymema propositionibus constat; omne igitur argumentum syllogismo vel enthymemate profertur» (Engl. transl. p. 31: «But an argument will not be able to produce belief for something in doubt unless it is expressed in speech and arranged with the interweaving of propositions. The expression and arrangement of an argument by means of propositions is called an argumentation, and this is said to be an enthymeme or a syllogism. [We will explain the definitions of these more fully in connection with the Differentiae of Topics]. And every syllogism or enthymeme consists of propositions. So every argument is expressed by a syllogism or an enthymeme»).

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in fact the only way to understand in what sense the two Themistian loci are to be understood also as sedes argumentorum. To achieve this goal, however, it is first necessary to analyse in depth the logical nature of the two Themistian loci.

2.3.1 The maxima propositio The logical concept of the propositio is widely analysed in the first book, and among the various kinds of propositiones one is very particular because of the content that it alone is able to convey, namely the per se notum; this is the propositio per se nota or maxima propositio31. In the first book, the special logical status that these propositions have by virtue of their self-evidence is put into evidence, and in the second book, their function is revealed: they are instruments in the service of the discipline of topica to the extent that the maximal propositions function as loci: Nam cum sint aliae propositiones, quae, cum per se notae sint, tum nihil ulterius habeant, quo demonstrentur, atque hae maximae et principales vocentur sintque aliae, quarum fidem primae ac maximae suppleant propositiones, necesse est ut omnium, quae dubitantur, illae antiquissimam teneant probationem, quae ita aliis fidem facere possint, ut ipsis nihil queat notius inveniri. Nam si argumentum est quod rei dubiae faciat fidem idque notius ac probabilius esse oportet quam illud est quod probatur, necesse est ut argumentis omnibus illa maximam fidem tribuant, quae ita per se nota sunt, ut aliena probatione non egeant32.

First of all, the qualities that should characterize a maxima propositio are again reaffirmed. As in the first book, the specific difference by means of which the definition of these propositions is made is found in the substantive aspect that is capable of differentiating it from all the others, again, the per se notum; thus, there are to begin with the «propositiones per se notae, tum nihil ulterius habeant, quo demonstrentur» and «aliae, quarum fidem primae ac maximae suppleant propositiones». Therefore, in apophantic terms, all propositions are either true or false; some, 31 32

Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3.3. De top. diff., II, III, 3-4, 1185AB, pp. 25, 11-26, 2.

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however, are certain (known), while others are not, and therefore remain in the realm of probability. The difference therefore is gnoseological (that is, a matter of certainty) and not alethic (that is, a matter of truth). The function of the first set, i.e. the maximal propositions, is to demonstrate the truth or the falsity of the second set, which are called minor or probable propositions. The relationship between the first and the second sets is the same that can be established between antecedent things (antiquissima probatio) and consequent things; the minor or posterior propositions can, in fact, be proved only by means of the maximal ones. The acquisition of all forms of knowledge is therefore subordinated to acquisition of the maximal propositions, without which it would not be possible to establish the truth or falsity of any kind of proposition. In this specific sense, the maxima propositio is placed in direct relation to the argumentum: like the argumentum, in fact, the maxima propositio should also be better known and more clear than that which it proves, since it must generate credibility for something dubious. However, Boethius has not directly identified the maxima propositio with the argumentum, but has rather affirmed how the maxima gives force to all the argumenta, and consequently also to all the argumentationes. On the other hand, identification of the propositio with the argumentum would be quite problematic for at least three reasons. First, Boethius explains that the argumentum is expressed by means of a syllogism or an enthymeme, and it is known that these latter concepts are constituted by three or two propositions respectively; the maxima propositio, conversely, constitutes only one proposition. Second, the maxima propositio, in its capacity as a locus, cannot be directly assimilated to the argumentum because it is thus considered rather a sedes argumenti on the basis of Cicero’s definition. Finally, while the maxima propositio is a truth enunciated or enunciable in itself, the argumentum represents instead a truth that is unexpressed because it remains entirely interior, waiting to be enunciated by means of the argumentatio. The similarity between these two concepts is rather based on the same logical force that is placed in them; in fact, the entirety of the vis logica that is developed through the argumentatio resides either in the maxima or in the argumentum33. It is 33

Cf. In Top., II, 1083A: «Ergo quoniam loci superius designati argumentorum quasi quaedam principia sunt (ipsi enim sunt qui continent argumenta; omne autem quod continet, eius quod continetur principium est), idcirco ait Cicero veluti quaedam

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then possible to understand thoroughly the relationship between, on the one hand, argumentum and argumentatio, and, on the other, a maxima propositio, when Boethius takes time to analyse the exact role that the latter plays in the formation of syllogisms, whether they are complete or incomplete: «Sed huiusmodi propositio aliquotiens quidem intra argumenti ambitum continetur, aliquotiens vero extra posita argumenti vires supplet ac perficit»34. The maxima can transmit its vis logica to a syllogism either from within, when it directly constitutes one of its premises, or from without, since even when it does not appear among the premises, it constitutes the principle from which the syllogism is formed. Significant confirmation of what is related by Boethius with regard to the Themistian locus can be found in the commentary on Aristotle’s Topica by Averroes: «Quant a Themistius, il affirme que le lieu est la prémisse universelle qui est la plus appropriée au syllogisme. Et il affirme que la prémisse qui a cette caractéristique tantôt est utilisée elle-même dans le syllogisme, et tantôt c’est sa signification et sa force qui sont utilisées»35. There is therefore no doubt that the double elementa argumentorum videri locos eos quos superius posuit» (Engl. transl. p. 74: «Therefore since the Topics designated above are “principles” of a sort for arguments [for they themselves contain arguments, and everything that contains something is a principle of what it contains], Cicero says that the Topics he presented above appear as if they were elements of a sort for arguments»). 34 De top. diff., II, III, 5, 1185B p. 26, 2-4. The double way of using the maxima propositio is shown also in the commentary on Cicero’s Topica. Cf. In Top., I, 1051D: «Has autem aliquoties quidem in ipsis syllogismis atque argumentationibus inhaerere conspicimus, alias vero in ipsis quidem argumentationibus minime continentur: vim tamen argumentationibus subministrat» (Engl. transl. p. 33: «Sometimes, we observe, maximal propositions inhere in syllogisms and argumentations themselves; other times, however, they are not contained in the argumentations themselves but nonetheless supply force to them»). Boethius clarifies the meaning and the reason why the maxima propositio is said to act as a locus immediately after presenting the two respective examples in which it is included within or without the syllogism. Cf. Introd. 35 HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», T. 1, p. 235. There are two Latin translations of the commentary on Averroes’s Topica, those of Abraham de Balmes and of Jacob Mantino, both of which were published in synopsis form. All of the sections of the commentary in which Averroes mentions Themistius have been translated from Arabic into French by Hasnawi and will be included here in the footnotes, where necessary, throughout this second chapter. Having translated directly these passages from Arabic, Hasnawi pointed out that the Latin translation

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way of using the maxima propositio shown by Boethius traces back to Themistius. In this regard, in fact, Sten Ebbesen emphasizes that «The parallels in Boethius allow the following reconstructions of Themistius’ text. An Aristotelian tópoi is an axiom, that is, a self-evident, primitive, universal proposition. All arguments derive their force from such axioms. In some arguments the axiom is explicitly stated, in others it is implicit»36. An example is now provided for each of these two ways: Et exemplum quidem eius argumenti, quod maximam retinet propositionem, huiusmodi est. Sit enim quaestio: «an sit regno melior consulatus»; ita igitur dicemus: «regnum diuturnius est quam consulatus, cum utrumque sit bonum; at vero quod diuturnius bonum est eo quod parvi est temporis melius est; regnum igitur melius est quam consulatus». Huic igitur argumentationi maxima propositio, id est locus, insertus est, ille scilicet: «quia quae diuturniora sunt bona melioris sunt meriti quam ea quae parvi sunt temporis». Hoc enim ita notum est, ut extrinsecus probatione non egeat, et ipsum aliis possit esse probatio. Atque ideo haec propositio totam continet probationem et, cum inde nascitur argumentum, recte locus, id est argumenti sedes, vocatur37. contains some contradictions; based on his analysis, in fact, the main characteristic of Themistius’s locus (according to the testimony of Averroes) is not so much its immediate evidence, but the fact that this universal premise is the most suitable and appropriate for syllogism: «Quant a Themistius, il affirme que le lieu est la prémisse universelle qui est la plus appropriée au syllogisme». Eleonore Stump, approaching the Latin translation without the benefit of Hasnawi’s valuable contribution, placed in parallel some passages of Mantino’s translation regarding the conception of Themistius’s locus, together with some passages of Boethius’s De topicis differentiis; her conclusion is that what Boethius says about Themistius corresponds substantially to what Averroes says. 36 EBBESEN, Commentators and Commentaries, p. 118. 37 De top. diff., II, III, 6-8, 1185BC, p. 26, 4-14. Boethius presented this same example also in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica. Cf. In Top., I, 1051D-1052A: «Ut si velimus ostendere regnum melius esse quam consulatum, dicemus: Regnum cum sit bonum, diuturnius est quam consulatus; omne vero quod est diuturnius bonum, melius est eo quod parvi est temporis: regnum igitur melius est consulatu. Hic igitur maxima propositio atque universalis et per se cognita, neque indigens probatione, argumentationi inserta est» (Engl. transl. p. 33: «For example, if we want to show that a kingdom is better than a consulate, we will say, ‘When it is good, a kingdom is longer lasting than a consulate; but every good that is longer lasting is better than that which is of shorter duration; therefore a kingdom is better than a consulate’. Here

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When the maxima propositio is placed within the syllogism so as to constitute one of its premises, its function becomes clear: Quaestio: «is a government run by consuls better than a monarchy or not?». Dubia propositio: «a monarchy is better than a government run by consuls». Propositio maior: «a monarchy lasts longer than a government run by consuls, when both are good». Propositio minor: «a benefit that endures is better than one that lasts a short while». Conclusio: «therefore, a monarchy is better than a government run by consuls»38. It is easy to identify the maxima propositio with the minor premise of this syllogism and to observe how it enables the transition from the major premise to the conclusion. This maxima propositio («quae diuturniora sunt bona melioris sunt meriti quam ea quae parvi sunt temporis») constitutes a logical law, expressed in universal terms, capable of including within itself all propositions with the same relationship between the subject and its predicate; in other words: «every lasting benefit is better than a benefit that is less lasting»39. The per se notum of the maxima propositio is based on a comparison, since the maxima is explicative of the relationship that can be established between two terms: «that which is more lasting» is in fact considered as such because it is placed in relationship with «that which is less lasting», and vice versa. Therefore, the opposite proposition the proposition that is maximal, universal, known per se, and in need of no proof is incorporated in the argumentation»). Cf. Introd. 38 In order to prevent any passage from remaining implicit, it is preferable to pose the quaestio in direct form so as to highlight its fundamentally ambiguous nature. According to what Boethius explains in the first book, the quaestio is a proposition that bears doubt within itself because it always poses two possibilities and requires knowledge of which one is true. In turn, the dubia propositio constitutes the proposition that is selected to be proved. Cf. De top. diff., I, II, 2, 1174B, p. 3, 1-2: «Quaestio est in dubitationem ambiguitatemque adducta propositio, ut si quis quaerat an caelum sit volubile»; ivi, I, V, 1, 1176D, p. 8, 8-9: «Quaestio vero est dubitabilis propositio, in qua necesse est eadem omnia considerari, quae dudum in propositione praediximus». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.4. 39 This locus is present also in Aristotle’s Topica. Cf. Aristotle, Topica, III, 13-14 116a (Engl. transl. p. 194): «First, then, that which is more lasting or secure is more desirable than that which is less so».

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must also be equally true: «a benefit that lasts for a short time is not as good as one that lasts longer». Moreover, in the syllogism shown above, the maxima is the maximal generalization in which either one of the two alternatives posed by the quaestio («is a kingdom better than a government run by consuls?»), the dubia propositio that is chosen to be proved («a kingdom is better than a government run by consuls»), or the conclusio («a kingdom is better than a government run by consuls») may be included again. In a manner consistent with what is presented in the first book, these three concepts are the same from the standpoint of their relationship of predication, though different with regard to their truth value: the quaestio and the dubia propositio remain ambiguous, while the conclusio, having been proved, has become certain; therefore, these propositiones minores are particular instances of the corresponding maxima40. The procedure then is to start from the dubia propositio and trace back to the maximal generalization from which it derives. For Boethius, in fact, all the propositions are either maximal, and therefore always and only true, or they are not maximal, and still need to be traced back to the maximal proposition from which they derive. It must, however, be recalled that the predicative relationship expressed by this proposition is a formal one, which means that, in itself, the relationship contained in the maxima does not refer immediately to any particular relationship that actually exists; rather, it enunciates a universal law to which all the particular cases that derive from the maxima can be traced. The same example, with a slight variation, is also reported by Themistius according to the testimony of Averroes: Sa preuve, en cela, est, que l’on trouve à la fois ces deux sortes [d’emploi] dans les énoncés qu’Aristote utilise dans les traités des lieux de ce livre ci par exemple son énoncé: ce qui dure plus longtemps est préférable à nos yeux, ou son énoncé: ce qui est préférable pour lui-même est préférable à ce qui est préférable à cause d’autre chose que lui- même. En effet, il est manifeste à propos de ces énoncés et de ceus qui leur sont semblables, qu’ils ne sont énumérés que pour être utilisés comme des prémisses majeures 40

Cf. De top. diff., I, II, 4, 1174BC, p. 3, 4-7: «Enuntiatio quippe, sive sui tantum causa dicitur sive ad aliud affertur approbandum, propositio est; si de ipsa quaeritur, quaestio; si ipsa est approbata, conclusio. Idem est igitur propositio, quaestio et conclusio, sed differunt supradicto modo». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.5.

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dans chacun des syllogismes [orientés vers] des quaesita particuliers par exemple notre énoncé: le plaisir de l’ivresse est préférable au plaisir du coït parce qu’il dure plus longtemps41.

Sten Ebbesen has accordingly proposed the following analysis: «The following is an example of an argument with explicit statement of the axiom: A. (Axiom): That which is of longer duration is preferable to that which is of shorter duration. B. The pleasure of drinking is of longer duration than the pleasure of sexual intercourse. C. Therefore the pleasure of drinking is preferable to the pleasure of sexual intercourse»42. The next example, in which the maxima propositio placed outside the syllogism, is a bit more complex: Ut vero extra posita maxima propositio vires afferat argumento tale sit exemplum; sit enim propositum demonstrare quoniam «invidus sapiens non est»: «qui enim invidus est alienis bonis affligitur; sapiens autem bonis non affligitur alienis; invidus igitur sapiens non est». In hac igitur argumentatione propositio quidem maxima non videtur inclusa, sed argumentationi vires ipsa maxima subministrat; est enim huic syllogismo fides ex ea propositione, per quam cognoscimus: «quorum diversa est definitio, ipsa quoque esse diversa». Est autem in definitione quidem invidi «alienis bonis tabescere»; quod quoniam non venit in sapientem, idcirco invidus a sapiente seiungitur43. 41

HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», T.1, p. 235. Cf. EBBESEN, Commentators and Commentaries, pp. 118-119. Sten Ebbesen probably did not have access to Hasnawi’s French translation of the Arabic, and he too used the Latin translations of de Balmes and Mantino. 43 De top. diff., II, III, 9-10, 1185CD, pp. 26, 14-27, 3. The same example is presented in the commentary on Cicero’s Topica. Cf. In Top., I, 1052A: «At si velimus ostendere non esse invidum qui sapiens sit, dicimus: Invidus est qui maeret aliena felicitate; non autem sapiens est quem felicitas aliena contristat: non est invidus sapiens. Hic maxima propositio argumentationi non videtur inclusa, sed extrinsecus posita, syllogismo tamen vires ministrat. Haec vero est, quorum diversa sunt definitiones, diversas esse substantias necesse est» (Engl. transl. pp. 33-34: «But if we want to show 42

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The implicit quaestio that serves as the starting point is, «is the envious man wise or not?»; with the aim of demonstrating that «the envious man is not wise», the following syllogism is built: Maior propositio: «an envious man is the one who disparages the good fortune of others». Minor propositio: «a wise man does not disparage the good fortune of others». Conclusio: «therefore, an envious man is not wise». This second example, though more complex than the previous one, is, once understood, capable of showing exactly what the discipline of topica consists of. The discipline expresses the movement through which the mind is directed towards the discovery of universal principles that govern the entire range of relationships regarding the predicability of the things that are under consideration. Even careful observation of the propositions of which the syllogism is composed leaves unclear precisely what the function of the maxima is; in order to be valid, a syllogism does not in fact require the intervention of any rule from outside. The maxima for which «things that have different definitions are themselves different» («quorum diversa est definitio, ipsa quoque esse diversa») does not guarantee the truth of both the first and second premises, and does not constitute even a rule of logical inference for the transition from the premises to the conclusion44. The maxima propositio constitutes rather the generalization that someone who is wise is not envious, we say, ‘An envious man is one who grieves at the happiness of another; but a man who is made sad by the happiness of another is not wise; therefore an envious man is not wise’. Here the maximal proposition does not appear included in the argumentation, but although it is located outside the argumentation, it still supplies force to the syllogism. The maximal proposition is ‘Things that have different definitions have different substances’»). 44 Eleonore Stump draws attention to the fact that Boethius always expresses his maximal propositions in indefinite form, since an indefinite proposition in turn can be understood both as particular and as universal. However, because the maximal propositions is used exclusively in syllogixms, it is clear that we should prefer its development in universal form. Cf. STUMP, «Dialectic and Boethius’s De topicis differentiis», in EAD, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, pp. 184-185. A probable explanation of this choice is that the maximae propositiones, as becomes more evident when rhetoric is presented in the fourth book, play a role in both dialectical and rhetorical hypotheses, for which reason the indefinite form seems appropriate to

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of a principle that is fundamental to the development of the premises, and it is in this specific aspect that the speed and effectiveness particular to the art of topica are demonstrated. As illustrated in Diagram no. 18 (Appendix, p. 336), the key to understanding this example is to read it in the opposite way, i.e. starting from the conclusion. The conclusion, in fact, as well as the quaestio and the dubia propositio, are equivalent with respect to their predicative value, «an envious man is not wise»; this proposition is a particular instance of one of the terms of the maxima propositio. Once the dubious proposition is traced back to the maximal universalization from which it derives, what remains is to build the syllogism by formulating the definitions of the envious man and the wise man, a process that begins with the definition of the species of the genus «man» («envious man») made by means of an accident («disparages the good fortune of others»). Only one definition of the species by means of accidents need be formulated (that of «envious man»), for the reason that, if only one of the accidents fails to fall within the definition of the species «wise man», it becomes unnecessary to complete the entire definition45. In other words, if, given two species of the same genus, neither species shares even one accident with the other, this fact alone is enough to demonstrate that their substances (as expressed by the definition) differ46. express the perspective way of using these propositions that possess a special status. Sten Ebbesen attributes the use of indefinite propositions for the development of the Aristotelian τόποι to Theophrastus; cf. EBBESEN, Commentators and Commentaries, p. 112: «We can now state that in the first century B. C. (1) the Boethian thesis that Aristotle’s τόποι are the indefinite propositions had been stated by Theophrastus. But, to all appearance, not the thesis that they can themselves be used in an argument, nor the thesis that they are axiom; (2) a systematic list of τόποι in another sense (notion, relations) had been drawn up, facilitating the use of topics as a method of finding arguments». 45 Eleonore Stump emphasizes that the definition presented in the premises is not a definition of a substantial nature, because «envious man» and «wise man», although being species of «man», are such only by means of accidental things, such as «wisdom» and «envy». These are in fact accidents because they do not enter directly in the substantial definition of «man», which is rather that of «mortal rational animal». These definitions are therefore of species for accidents. Cf. Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica, transl. with notes and Introd. by E. STUMP, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1988, pp. 184-185. Cf. also Introd., § 4.1.3. 46 Eleonore Stump seeks to explain what remains implicit in the example that Boethius now supplies («if an envious man is wise»), and in the process makes clear the decisive role that the maxima propositio plays: cf. STUMP, «Dialectic and Boethius’s

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Soon thereafter, Boethius explains at length the sense in which these propositions are called loci: Est igitur uno quidem modo locus, ut dictum est, maxima et universalis et principalis atque indemonstrabilis ac per se nota propositio, quae in argumentationibus, vel inter ipsas propositiones vel exterius posita vim tamen argumentis et conclusionibus subministrat. Ideo autem et universales et maximae propositiones loci dictae sunt, quoniam ipsae sunt quae continent ceteras propositiones et per eas fit consequens et rata conclusio. Ac sicut locus in se continet corporis quantitatem, ita hae propositiones quae sunt maximae intra se omnem vim posteriorum atque ipsius conclusionis consequentiam tenent47.

The maxima propositio is the first category of locus attributed to Themistius; its function is to «contain» within itself all the propositions of which a syllogism is composed. The metaphor used now is that of a physical place: in like manner as place is a principle of bodies that occupy a certain space (because, without space, bodies could not have extension and weight), so also the places of the mind, when understood as maximal propositions, and being placed inside or outside the syllogism, contain within themselves the entire development of the premises, and through them the result of the conclusion is produced and confirmed («per eas fit consequens et rata conclusio»).

2.3.2 The maximarum differentia propositionum There are two ways in which a locus can be understood, and Boethius naturally proceeds to the second after completing the first: De topicis differentiis», in EAD, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, pp. 183-184: «1) One who disparages the good of others is a definition of envious man; 2) A wise man does not disparage the good of others; 3) Every definition is predicated (primarily) of its species and (secondarily) of every individual under that species; 4) Therefore, one who disparages the good of others is not a definition of wise man; 5) Everything that is defined has one and only one definition; 6) Therefore, the definition of envious man is different from the definition of wise man; 7) Things whose definition are different are themselves also different; 8) Therefore, an envious man is not wise». 47 De top. diff., II, III, 11-13, 1185D-1186A, p. 27, 3-11.

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Et uno quidem modo locus, id est argumenti sedes, dicitur maxima principalisque propositio fidem ceteris subministrans. Alio vero modo loci vocantur maximarum differentiae propositionum, quae scilicet ab his ducuntur terminis, qui in quaestione sunt constituti, de quibus deinceps disserendum est. Cum enim sint plurimae propositiones quae maximae vocantur haeque inter se dissimiles, quibus inter se differentiis discrepant, eas omnes locos vocamus. Nam si ipsae propositiones maximae argumentorum loci sunt, et differentias earum argumentorum locos esse necesse est48.

The maximal propositions are many because there are many ways in which reality in its complexity can be conceived and predicated by human reason. This countless series of maxims is, however, precisely what prevents the mind from moving forward and advancing the inquiry; Boethius thus justifies the need to find an instrument to propel and to augment the ratio speculationis49. The maximal propositions can in fact be divided by species, since some will have to do with the definition, others with the genus, others with the cause, and so on. The instrument that enables the mind to put in order the maximal propositions, to rise up and progress beyond them, is therefore the specific difference, which

48 Ivi, II, III, 13-16, 1186AB, p. 27, 11-20. The function of the differentia of the maxima propositio in the development of a syllogism becomes clearer through the examples that Boethius provides for each locus. Niels Green-Pedersen explains how it is possible to identify its differentia in a maxima propositio: cf. GREEN-PEDERSEN, The Tradition of the Topics, p. 64: «Where precisely in a particular maxim do we find its differentia? This is nowhere explained by Boethius but we can easily discover it by running through his list of loci and comparing the maxims he states with his indications of the differentiae. In all cases we find that the differentia is what we may call the central word in the first clause (the antecedent) of the compound sentence which is the maxim». 49 In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius provides a more concrete justification for classifying the maximal propositions through their differentiae: cf. In Top., I, 1052B: «Sed quoniam has propositiones plures ac paene innumerabiles esse necesse est, restat adhuc quo amplius ratio speculationis ascendat» (Engl. transl. p. 34: «But since such propositions must be many—in fact nearly innumerable—we are still in need of something that will enable the reasoning of our investigation to advance further»). The choice of the verb ascendere and of the expression ratio speculationis is significant, since these terms clearly indicate a path of ascent of the mind, a concept that reflects the ars inveniendi through which the mind obtains the principles of all forms of reasoning.

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is what at the same time divides the genus of maxima propositio and constitutes the different species of maximae propositiones. This process of gradual re-composition that the mind accomplishes on a logical level undoubtedly maintains an ontological and metaphysical significance. The constitutive differences of maximal propositions, the second type of locus attributed to Themistius, are drawn directly from the terms included in the quaestio, namely the subject and the predicate. Again, given that the maximal propositions are loci because they, as sedes argumenti, contain all the propositions of the syllogism, and therefore the entire development of the argumentatio, it is equally the case that the differences of the maximal propositions are sedes argumenti, since they contain in turn either all of the maximae propositiones or their corresponding development into argumentationes50. A fundamental characteristic of the differentia is certainly that of being more universal than the maxima: Nam uniuscuiusque substantia ex propriis differentiis constat, ut «hominis ex rationabilitate», quae eius est differentia. Et hi loci, qui sunt differentiae propositionum, ipsis propositionibus universaliores existunt, velut universalior est «rationabilitas homine». Atque ideo pauciores hi loci esse deprehenduntur, qui in differentiis positi sunt, quam propositiones ipsae, quarum sunt differentiae; omnia enim, quae universaliora sunt, pauciora semper esse contingit. Et ideo facile sub scientiam possunt cadere; quorum tam multus numerus non est, ut cito a memoria discentis elabantur51.

50 The commentary on Cicero’s Topica provides more details with respect to the characteristics of the differences of the maximal propositions. Cf. ivi, I, 1052C: «Et sicut illae reliquarum propositionum loci esse dicebantur, quod eas intra suum ambitum continerent, ita ipsarum maximarum atque universalium propositionum, quas minorum propositionum locos esse praediximus, illae differentiae, etsi non vere, tamen quadam veluti imagine loci esse videbuntur, in quas fuerint convenienti ratione reductae» (Engl. transl. p. 34: «As maximal propositions were said to be places or Topics for other propositions because maximal propositions contain the others within their scope, so these differentiae, to which maximal propositions have been reduced by an appropriate criterion, appear to be places or Topics [if not literally, then figuratively anyway] of those maximal, universal propositions that, as we said previously, are places or Topics for lesser propositions»). 51 De top. diff., II, III, 17-19, 1186B, pp. 27, 20-28, 6.

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The characteristics of the differences of the maximal propositions are essentially three. First, the difference of the maximal proposition must be understood as substantial in nature; in fact, this difference is said to be more universal than the species that it constitutes. Second, universality is the characteristic that makes it possible to catalogue differences in a predetermined number: being in fact more universal, they are fewer than the very maximal propositions that they divide and collect. Finally, the fact that the differences can be catalogued and fixed in a precise number facilitates their memorisation. A characteristic regarding the differences of the maximal propositions that is of great importance, and that is not specified in this text but is clearly evident in the commentary on Cicero’s Topica, is that the differences of the maximal propositions must be understood exclusively as constitutive and never as divisive. This is in fact the reason that they can be assimilated to the predicable of the genus: The differentiae of Topics or maximal propositions are themselves also given the name ‘Topics’ and can also be called genera of the propositions subordinated under them; for constitutive differentiae can usually also be regarded as genera. For example, although irrational is a divisive differentia distinct from rational, it is nonetheless also a specific differentia for horse and dog and holds the place of a genus with respect to them, for irrational animal is the genus of horse. Things are the same in the case of maximal propositions. Since some maximal propositions are from the whole and others are from parts, from the whole and from parts in relation to one another are divisive differentiae. But in relation to maximal propositions themselves, which are constituted from the differentiae, they have the place of ‘a genus’. The genus of a proposition arising from the whole is just from the whole. Similarly, the genus of a proposition drawn from parts (however known and manifest the proposition) is from parts, and other differentiae are also ‘genera’ of some sort for propositions that are maximal and yet seem to be included in these differentiae52. 52 In Top., I, 1052C (Engl. transl. p. 34): «Sed istae locorum, id est propositionum maximarum, differentiae, quas etiam ipsas locos nominamus, possunt subiectarum propositionum etiam genera nuncupari. Nam differentiae continentes etiam genera communiter possunt videri, ut irrationale cum a rationali velut divisibili differentia dissideat; tamen equi vel canis, differentia specifica est, et ad eos locum generis tenet. Namque animal irrationabile equi genus est. Ita etiam in maximis propositionibus.

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The difference is what makes it possible to identify the species within its genus, which means that it is the instrument that makes it possible to ascend again from the species to the genus, and therefore from the particular to the universal. As noted, the substantial difference is simultaneously divisive and constitutive, though with regard to different things: divisive with regard to the genus, and constitutive with regard to the species. Thus, for example, bearing in mind Porphyry’s tree of quinque res, the «rational» and «irrational» differences are divisive of the genus «animal», but the «rational» difference is constitutive of the species «man», while the «irrational» difference is constitutive of the species «horse». Similarly, the differences of the maximal propositions are constitutive if they are seen as that which constitutes the species of the maximal propositions; in this case, they constitute the genus of the maximal propositions called loci, since they contain the species that they constitute. On the other hand, the differences of the maximal propositions can also be understood as divisive in nature, but only insofar as they would be representative of various species of the maximal propositions53. Consequently, only the constitutive difference enables the ascent again from the species to the genus, for which reason Porphyry refers to difference as «something that leads to being, and that it is an integral part of the essence of the thing»54. The difference can lead to being because it can reflect at the same time those things that are identical or different, singular or complex in their organization, generating in this way the knowledge of things. Therefore, either the maximal propositions or their differences are loci, but the latter constitute the genus of the former, being the same constitutive differences that form the species of the maximal propositions. Nam quod aliae sunt ex toto, aliae ex partibus, hae inter se comparatae differentiae divisibiles sunt, ad ipsas vero maximas propositiones differentiarum continentiae velut generis loco sunt. Nam propositionis ex toto venientis genus est id ipsum quod vocatur ex toto. Item propositiones a partibus ductae, quamvis notae sint atque manifestae, genus est, quod a partibus, et caeterae differentiae earum propositionum quae cum sint maximae, tamen eisdem videntur includi, velut quaedam genera sint». 53 The distinction of the substantial difference into constitutive and divisive belongs to Porphyry. Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, IV, 8, 124C, p. 260, 6-11: «Quoniam ergo eaedem aliquo modo quidem acceptae fiunt constitutivae, aliquo modo autem divisivae, specificae omnes vocantur. Et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum et definitiones, sed non his quae secundum accidens inseparabiles sunt, nec magis his quae sunt separabiles». 54 Porphyry, Isagoge, 12, p. 85. Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, IV, 14, 129B, p. 272, 3-4: «sed quod ad esse conducit et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est».

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Up to this point, the term locus has been explained using the metaphor of a physical place, but in this case the locus is made equivalent to the differentia constitutiva, which is in turn equivalent to the genus. These considerations allow for a clearer understanding of what Boethius meant by locus: if a locus is equivalent to the specific difference, then it is also the most appropriate term for expressing the prospective importance and totality of the logical operations. Difference, when considered in its divisive aspect, enables progress from the universal genus to the multiplicity of various species through a descending movement. When considered instead in the constitutive sense, difference determines conversely an ascending movement capable of unifying the genus. The constitutive difference is, however, also fundamental from the point of view of ratio cognoscendi, since it is the place that, by arranging the maximal propositions according to species, enables us to identify and therefore also to recognize them. Boethius so far has tried in every way to adapt the Ciceronian definition of locus (sedes argumenti) to the Themistian conception, the latter understood in the double sense of maxima and differentia. It is, however, only in his commentary on Cicero that Boethius explains in depth the manner in which he intends to effect a similar identification: Here Cicero begins to deal with the Topics that contain and include the maximal propositions discussed above (that is, propositions that are universal and known per se); these Topics are the differentiae of maximal propositions. So he discusses the differentiae of statements that are universal and known per se, and he says that a Topic is just the seat of an argument. Every argument is brought to its conclusion by means of propositions, and all other propositions are contained in a first and maximal proposition, which sometimes is part of an argumentation or syllogism and sometimes supplies force to an argumentation from without (and so in either case it appears to be a certain part of the argumentation since it completes the argument). Therefore, those differentiae which contain maximal propositions undoubtedly also contain all argumentations, so that the differentiae of maximal propositions are rightly regarded as Topics or places and as a sort of ultimate seat of arguments55. 55

In Top., I, 1052D-1053B (Engl. transl. p. 35): «De his igitur nunc locis tractare Tullius instituit qui maximas propositiones quas superius diximus, id est per se notas atque universales, continent atque includunt. Hae vero sunt maximarum differentiae propositionum. De universalium igitur enuntiationum per se que notarum

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According to Boethius, Cicero, by defining the locus as an argumenti sedes, intended to refer to the differentiae of the maximal propositions. An argumentum does, in fact, still need to be made explicit by means of the propositions of which the syllogism is composed; but if the premises together with the conclusion are entirely contained within the maxima propositio (placed inside or outside the syllogism), it is then the maxima propositio that simultaneously makes explicit the interior nature of the argumentum. Since, then, the constitutive differences in turn contain either the maximal propositions or the respective argumentationes, they resemble the ultimate places, i.e. the highest loci, in that they are more universal («et quasi quaedam ultimae sedes esse videantur»). Moreover, the relationship established by Boethius between argumentum and argumentatio, with particular attention to the role played by the maxima propositio, is of great importance for understanding the discipline of topica56. This relationship is widely apparent in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica: The two names ‘argumentation’ and ‘argument’ must have one of the following four significations. Either the expression and interweaving of the propositions together with the maximal propositions (whether located outside the syllogism or included within it) is called the argumentation, while the argument is the thought and meaning of differentiis disserit, ut sit integre locus argumenti sedes. Nam si argumentum omne per propositiones ad conclusionem usque perducitur, omnes vero reliquae propositiones in prima maximaque propositione continentur, ipsaque prima ac maxima propositio, tum pars est argumentationis, id est syllogismi, tum extraposita argumentationi vires ministrat, ut utroque modo quoniam perficit argumentum, pars argumentationis quaedam esse videatur, non est dubium quin hae differentiae, quae propositiones maximas continent, eaedem omnes etiam contineant argumentationes, ut maximarum propositionum differentiae iure loci argumentorum et quasi quaedam ultimae sedes esse videantur». 56 In the first book, Boethius goes into detail specifying the relationship between argumentum and argumentatio. In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, what is to be placed into evidence is rather the relationship among the argumentum, argumentatio, and maxima propositio. Cf. De top. diff., I, II, 6-8, 1174C, p. 3, 8-13: «Non vero idem est argumentum et argumentatio: nam vis sententiae ratioque ea, quae clauditur oratione, cum aliquid probatur ambiguum, argumentum vocatur; ipsa vero argumenti elocutio argumentatio dicitur. Quo fit ut argumentum quidem virtus vel mens argumentationis sit atque sententia, argumentatio vero argumenti per orationem explicatio». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.6.1.

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the syllogism. Or the expression of the reasoning together with the maximal propositions and the meaning of the syllogism will be said to be the argument, and so argument and argumentation will be the same. Or the whole interweaving of the syllogism together with the meaning will be called the argumentation, but the maximal proposition will be called the argument. Or the whole arrangement of the reasoning apart from the maximal propositions will be said to be the argumentation, but the meaning of the argumentation is the argument, and the maximal proposition that remains is the Topic57.

Boethius thus embarks on a quadripartite division of the different relationships between the argumentum and argumentatio. This division is especially significant for understanding the ways in which Boethius intends to identify the Ciceronian locus with one of the two Themistian loci. Boethius states clearly that only one of the following four possibilities is valid, although he does not specify which one: 1. The argumentum is the thought and meaning of a syllogism («mens et sententia syllogismi»), while the argumentatio together with the maxima propositio constitute the expression and composition of the same propositions, regardless of whether the maxima propositio is placed inside or outside the syllogism («elocutio et contextio ipsa propositionum cum maximis propositionibus»). 2. The argumentum is the meaning of the syllogism and at the same time the expression and composition of the propositions, including the maximal ones; in this case, however, the argumentatio would be the same as argumentum («elocutio ratiocinationis cum maximis propositionibus et sententia syllogismi argumentum esse dicetur»). 57 In Top., I, 1053BC (Engl. transl. p. 35): «Nam ex his quatuor significationibus appellationum duarum, argumentationis scilicet atque argumenti, unam quamlibet esse necesse est. Aut enim elocutio et contextio ipsa propositionum cum maximis propositionibus, vel extra syllogismum positis, vel in eodem inclusis, argumentatio vocatur. Argumentum vero mens et sententia syllogismi, aut elocutio ratiocinationis cum maximis propositionibus et sententia syllogismi argumentum esse dicetur, ut idem sit argumentum quod argumentatio. Aut argumentatio quidem vocabitur tota contextio syllogismi cum sententia, sed argumentum maxima propositio, aut integer ratiocinationis ordo praeter maximas propositiones argumentatio, sententia vero argumentationis argumentum. Reliqua vero maxima propositio, locus». The punctuation of the text of the Patrologia Latina should be corrected, but there is no critical edition in which to correct these mistakes.

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3. The argumentum is the maxima propositio, while the argumentatio constitutes the meaning and the entire composition of the syllogism («tota contextio syllogismi cum sententia»). 4. The maxima propositio is the locus and the argumentum is the meaning of the argumentatio «sententia argumentationis», while argumentatio refers to the entire development of the syllogism, with the exception of course of the maxima propositio («integer ratiocinationis ordo praeter maximas propositiones»). On the basis of the examples provided during the presentation of various loci, it is reasonable to suppose that the valid type of relationship would be the last of these. In beginning this quadripartite division, however, Boethius’s greater interest is elsewhere: «For since a differentia contains a maximal proposition and is a place or Topic for it, while a maximal propositiones supplies the force for an argumentation or argument, the differentia seems undoubtedly to be a Topic for the whole argument because it includes within itself the whole scope of the maximal proposition»58. Whichever model is chosen among the four types of relationship, in every case the differentiae remain always the loci of the maximae propositions that, in turn, give force to the argumentum and argumentatio. Therefore, the differentiae, including within themselves the entire purpose of the maximae propositiones, are loci also for the entire argumentum. The problems with this way of presenting the discipline of topica all arise from Boethius’s desire to demonstrate the identity of the Ciceronian locus with the Themistian one. Whereas Cicero spoke only about locus and argumentum, Boethius decides to use these concepts to interpret also 58 Ivi, I, 1053D-1054A (Engl. trans. p. 36): «Nam cum differentia ipsa maximam propositionem contineat, eiusque sit locus, maxima vero propositio argumentationi vel argumento vires ministret, non est dubium quin ea toti argumento locus esse videatur, quod totum intra se maximae propositionis ambitum claudit». In this regard Benedetto Riposati believes that Boethius, in his desire to reconcile the Ciceronian tópos with the Aristotelian one, is the most faithful interpreter of the Ciceronian argumentum; cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, p. 30: «Così inteso l’argomento topico è, nell’ambito dell’argomentazione dialettica, la più precisa espressione del locus, perché, o serva esso a provare una verità, già enucleata nella proposizione generale, o a ricavare sillogisticamente da questa gli elementi differenziali per un più ampio sviluppo discorsivo, predicabile a verità che con la proposizione principale si connettono o sono in essa virtualmente contenute, l’argumentum discende sempre da quelle maximae propositionis differentiae, che costituiscono il locus ciceroniano».

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the maxima propositio and their differentiae, justifying this approach by affirming that: From what I have said above, the difference between Aristotle’s Topics and Cicero’s Topica should be clear. Aristotle discusses maximal propositions, for he asserted that these are the Topics for arguments, as we also related above; Cicero, however, calls Topics not maximal propositions but rather their constitutive differentiae, which is what he directs his attention toward teaching59.

While Aristotle calls loci the maximae propositiones, in that the sedes contain the argumenta, Cicero uses the same term to refer to the differentiae of the maximae propositiones, rather than to the maximae propositiones themselves. Thus the term locus can indicate both concepts, but with respect to different things: the maximae propositiones are loci for all the other propositiones, and as principles they contain within themselves the entire development of the argumentum and therefore of the argumentatio; the differentiae, on the other hand, are loci for the maximae propositiones, and consequently also for all the argumenta and argumentationes. Before proceeding with the list of Themistian loci in the second book, it will be useful to consider one last issue that is dealt with throughout Boethius’s commentary on Cicero’s Topica. Specifically, when the mind 59

In Top., I, 1054B (Engl. transl. p. 36): «Ex his etiam quae superius dicta sunt quid distent Topica Ciceronis atque Aristotelis apparuit. Aristoteles namque de maximis propositionibus disserit, has enim locos argumentorum esse posuit, ut nos quoque supra retulimus. Tullius vero locos non maximas propositiones, sed earum continentes differentias vocat, ac de his docere contendit». In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius never mentions Themistius as his source, but rather attributes the use of maximae propositiones directly to Aristotle. This is perhaps evidence that Boethius knew that Aristotle’s Topica utilized a classification made through the differentiae; in fact, it is only at the end of the second book of the De topicis differentiis that he mentions Themistius as his main source. This is perhaps why, in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius attributes the use of maximae propositiones directly to Aristotle, while in the De topicis differentiis he attributes the use of the differentiae to Themistius. There is in fact a reason why this is the point that Boethius chooses to identify the two lists of loci, i.e. the fact that both Cicero and Themistius referred to the differentiae; however, while Themistius provided also the corresponding maximae, Cicero did not do so, and it is clear that Boethius merely desired to compensate for what was lacking by composing a commentary on Cicero’s Topica. Cf. Introd.

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begins considering the locus from which to draw the argumentum that is suitable to bestow upon the dubious proposition the condition of certainty, it cannot continue doing so endlessly. In fact, once the locus is identified, the entire vis logica to be used in the service of the quaestio has also been located. The proof that the locus is the principle from which all the argumentation derives lies in the fact that it must be impossible to ascend further: What we have left here is a question that we should apparently consider, namely, whether the Topics that are divided into other Topics can be Topics for the Topics they contain within themselves, for example, whether what is in the thing at issue is a kind of Topic for the Topics from the whole, from the parts, from a sign, and from related things. Now in fact there is nothing that would directly prevent us from thinking that there are Topics of Topics, for it can happen that a broader Topic contains narrower Topics within its scope, as provinces contain cities. But this example is not appropriate here. For a Topic is that from which an argument is drawn, that is, that in which an argument is located. So if there could be a Topic of a Topic and if what is in the thing at issue (taken as a Topic of a sort) could include the Topics from the whole, from the parts, from a sign, or from related things, these would not be Topics from the whole, from the parts, from a sign, and from related things but arguments since they would inhere in the Topic that (as we said previously) is in the very term at issue. So there cannot be a Topic of a Topic. The division of Topics here occurs instead in the manner of the division of a genus into its species60.

60 In Top., I, 1058BC (Engl. transl. p. 41): «Restat autem nunc unum quod videtur esse quaerendum, an hi loci qui in locos alios dividuntur, eorum quos intra se continent locorum loci esse possint, ut eorum qui sunt ex toto, ex partibus, ex nota, ex affectis, is unus quidam quasi locus sit, qui est in ipso. Nihil quidem prorsus officeret locorum locos putare, fieri enim potest ut locus amplior intra semet angustiores contineat locos, velut provinciae civitates, sed nunc haec similitudo non convenit. Locus enim est ex quo ducitur id in quo argumentum est positum. Quod si loci locus esse posset, et is qui est in ipso de quo agitur, eos qui sunt ex toto, vel ex partibus, vel ex nota, vel ex affectis, velut quidam locus includeret, non essent, ex toto, ex partibus, ex nota, vel ex affectis loci, sed argumenta quoniam in eo haererent loco, qui in eo ipso de quo agitur termino esse praedictus est; non igitur locus esse poterit loci, sed velut genera in species».

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In fact, it may be asked whether there are loci of loci; that is, whether, once the locus has been found, it is possible to advance further to another locus that in turn contains the original locus as its principle. The answer must certainly be negative; otherwise it would be necessary to admit an infinite regression that would not enable the mind either to search or actually to find anything. On the other hand, exclusion of the hypothesis that there may be loci for loci is based on the same definition of locus, namely, as an argumenti sedes: if a locus by definition contains only argumenta, it cannot in turn contain another locus. This means that the division of loci, for both Cicero and Themistius, must be understood as a division of the genus into its species. However, what has just been said seems to contradict the earlier affirmation that the differentiae are loci for the maximae propositiones they contain, but that the maximae propositiones in turn are also loci with regard to the propositions of the respective argumentationes: This point should not appear to contradict what was said above when we called both maximal propositions and their constitutive differentiae by the common name of Topics. Although maximal propositions insofar as they are maximal include other propositions and are called Topics, nevertheless because they are most known they can serve as an argument for things that are in doubt. Therefore the differentiae of these maximal propositions are rightly given the name Topics. But things are different in the case of the species of Topics that certainly cannot be arguments. The Topic that inheres in the thing at issue is divided into Topics from the whole, from the parts, from a sign, and from related things, as if it were being divided into its “specie”. Every one of these Topics seems to bear the whole name of the first Topic. For as we say that a man is an animal and similarly we call a horse and a cow ‘animals’, so the Topic from the whole is said to be in the thing at issue, and similarly the Topics from the parts, from a sign, and from related things are in the things at issue. But though it is possible to draw arguments from these Topics, they themselves cannot be arguments61. 61 Ivi, I, 1058C (Engl. transl. p. 41): «Ita nunc sit divisio locorum, nec hoc superius dictis videatur esse contrarium, cum et maximas propositiones, et earum differentias continentes communi nomine appellavimus locos. Nam maximae propositiones, licet eo ipso quod maximae sint includant caeteras et vocentur loci, tamen quia sunt notissimae possunt rebus dubiis esse argumenta. Iure igitur earum differentiae loci

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If the differentiae, in their capacity as loci, contain within themselves the maximae propositiones, it is reasonable to suppose that one locus may contain another locus. This observation enables us to clarify and distinguish further the two species of loci: the maxima propositio acts as a function of the locus to the extent that it contains all the propositions of which a syllogism or an enthymeme is made up, i.e. the entire development of the argumentatio. However, when the maxima propositio is drawn from its differentia, it no longer acts as a function of the locus, since it is the result of that which has been drawn, and not that from which something is drawn. There are two ways in which a quaestio may be solved because there are two categories of loci at the disposal of the dialectician and rhetorician: the argumenta, having a completely interior and therefore unexpressed nature, are proposed and therefore can be made explicit through either the maxima propositio, or through the differentia thereof. In this way, the rule according to which there cannot be loci for loci is respected, because a locus is always and only an argumenti sedes, i.e. a principle from which it must be possible to draw only argumenta. In conclusion, it has been observed that all of the theoretical difficulties encountered thus far have arisen from the fact that Boethius, in defining the logical concept of locus, wanted to advance the Ciceronian definition (argumenti sedes), but chose to present also the Themistian loci, namely the maxima propositio and its differentia, that initially seem to have nothing to do with Cicero’s definition. This latter identification has not been justified at all in the text of the De topicis differentiis, probably because Boethius felt that he had already treated fully and resolved the problem in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica. It is, however, understood that the identification of Cicero’s locus with Themistius’s is possible only when one proceeds from the supposition that the differentia and the maxima propositio are both sedes argumenta62. nominantur, quod in locorum speciebus, aliter sese habet, quae prorsus argumenta esse non possunt: nam in ipso locus velut in species quasdam dividitur in eos qui sunt ex toto, ex partibus, ex nota, ex affectis. Unusquisque enim horum locorum primi loci integrum videtur ferre vocabulum, nam ut hominem animal dicimus, itemque equum atque bovem animalia nuncupamus, sic is locus qui ex toto est in ipso esse dicitur, itemque qui ex partibus ac nota, atque ex affectis in ipso sunt. Sed ex his argumenta quidem duci possibile est, ipsa vero argumenta ut sint, fieri nequit». 62 The title of the monograph itself, De topicis differentiis, evidently refers to the unifying element that Boethius has identified between Cicero’s and Themistius’s

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2.4 The Themistii locorum divisio Now that the meanings of the two Themistian loci have been explained, the reader is able to understand the division as well. First a brief summary is given of the ways in which, in predicative questions, the predicate may be inherent in the subject63: Quae vero sint hae differentiae melius divisione produntur. In praedicativis autem quaestionibus unus quidem subiectus terminus dicitur, alius vero praedicatus; nihilque in praedicativis quaestionibus aliud quaeritur, nisi an subiecto praedicatus inhaereat. Quod si inesse constiterit, quaeritur itane insit ut genus an ut accidens an ut proprium an ut definitio. Nam si ostenditur non inesse, nihil de quaestione relinquitur. Nam quod non inest, nec ut accidens nec ut genus nec ut definitio nec ut proprium inesse potest. Quod si inesse constiterit, restat quaestio quinam modus sit de quattuor inhaerendi. Solum vero inesse ad accidens maxime pertinet; nam cum neque ut genus neque ut definitio neque ut proprium inest, sed inest tamen, ut accidens inesse necesse est64.

The differences of the maximal propositions are drawn directly from the terms of the quaestio, i.e. the subject and the predicate65. There are therefore four possible ways in which the predicate can be part of the semantic area of the subject: as the genus of the subject (e.g. as «animal» discipline of topica. In Boethius’s manner of presenting the two teachings thus far, it appears that both authors agree on considering the «topical differences» those from which all kinds of argumentation can be obtained. Cf. Introd. 63 These distinctions have already been fully explained in the first book. Boethius revisits them quickly before presenting the division of the «topical differences». A reversal in the presentation of the predicables is evident; in the first book, the sequence was genus, accident, definition, and property, while the second book reverses the order between the third and fourth predicable, with genus, accident, property, and definition. Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.4.1. 64 De top. diff., II, III, 20-23, 1186BC, p. 28, 6-17. 65 Cf. ivi, I, IV, 13-15, 1175BC, pp. 4, 17-5, 2: «Quoniam igitur aliae propositiones praedicativae sunt, aliae conditionales, praedicativarum partes terminus appellamus. Hi sunt praedicatus atque subiectus. Terminos autem voco verba et nomina, quibus propositio, nectitur, ut in ea propositione, qua dicimus: ‘Homo iustus est’; haec duo nomina, id est ‘homo’ et ‘iustus’, propositionis partes vocamus». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3.2.

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is the genus of «man»), in which case the predicate is greater than and belongs to the substance of the subject; as an accident, so that, despite being greater than the subject, it is not, however, inherent in its substance (e.g. as «white» is an accident of «man»); as a property, by having the same semantic extension as the subject, without belonging to its substance (e.g. as the «capacity to laugh» applies only to a «man»); finally, by being the definition of the subject, and therefore equal to it and coincident with its substance (e.g. as «mortal rational animal» is the definition of «man»). If instead it is verified that the predicate is not in any way inherent in the subject, this will simply mean that the dubia propositio is false, and therefore its opposite is true. In order to facilitate the inquiry into the way in which a predicate is inherent in the subject, Boethius seems to suggest a strategy of proceeding by exclusion, first verifying that the predicate is neither the genus, the property, nor the definition. If it is not in fact inherent in any of these, but is in some way inherent in the subject, then the predicate will be the accident. In fact, many more terms belong to the category of the accident than to the categories of other predicables, because the latter, being ever more universal, are clearly fewer in number. After this brief summary, Boethius begins to present the division of the Themistian loci: Quae cum ita sint, eorum locorum, quos in maximarum propositionum differentia constituimus, facienda divisio est. Per singula vero quaeque currentibus manifestius apparebit exemplis quid maximae propositiones a suis differentiis distent. Etenim quaestiones, argumenta, propositiones maximas ac principales earumque locos, id est differentias, per unumquodque dabimus exemplum. Omnes igitur loci, id est maximarum differentiae propositionum, aut ab his ducantur necesse est terminis, qui in quaestione sunt positi, praedicato scilicet atque subiecto, aut extrinsecus assumantur aut horum medii, qui inter utrosque versantur66.

The division of loci, understood as maximae propositiones, determines their classification through their differentiae, the ultimae sedes being ranked more highly because of their greater universality. Thus, starting from a quaestio, the argumentum, expressed through an argumentatio, will be provided for each example; the argumentatio will then be fully expressed 66

De top. diff., II, IV, 1-3, 1186CD, pp. 28, 17-29, 6.

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and included again in only one maxima propositio, which propositio in turn will be traced back to the respective differentia in which it is contained. Themistius’s division of loci involves a threefold classification: those placed inside the terms of the question («loci qui in quaestione sunt positi»), those taken from outside («loci qui extrinsecus assumantur»), and those termed intermediate («loci medii, qui inter utrosque versantur») because of their position relative to the first two classes67. 67

Hasnawi’s translation includes an important passage of the commentary on Averroes’s Topica concerning the classification of the loci that most likely traces back to Themistius's, cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», T. 2, pp. 236-237: «Que [les lieux] soient limités et en nombre fini, cela est manifeste à partir de ce que je dis: il a déjà été montré que tout quaesitum n’est démontré que par autre chose qui est différent de lui et, qu’entre cette chose prise dans sa démonstration et le quaesitum, il y a nécessairement une certaine connexion; car sinon, il n’aurait pas été possible que de cette chose, il résultat, à propos de la chose recherchée, une affirmation ni une négation. S’il en est ainsi, il est nécessaire que la chose – à partir de laquelle il a été montré que la chose recherchée, en tant que celle-ci est en connexion [avec celle-là], existe ou n’existe pas de telle manière – soit ou bien une réalité prise de la substance du quaesitum, ou bien de choses de l’extérieur qui ont avec le quaesitum un rapport ou une ressemblance, ou bien de choses intermédiaires entre les réalités qui sont de l’extérieur et celles qui sont de la substance de la chose. Or, étant donné que chaque quaesitum se divise en prédicat et en sujet et que les lieux pris de la substance de la chose ou bien sont pris de la définition du prédicat ou du sujet, ou d’une partie de leur définition – et cela est ou genre ou différence – ou bien sont [pris] des parties même du prédicat ou du sujet – je veux dire le espèces du prédicat ou du sujet – [étant donné cela], il est nécessaire que les lieux pris de la substance de la chose soient ou des lieux de la définition ou du genre ou de la différence ou des lieux de la division – je veux dire ceux dans lequels le prédicat ou le sujet se divisent en leurs espèces. Et étant donné que les concomitants de la chose aussi sont ou des accidents ou des propres – et cela se trouve dans chacune de neuf catégories –, il faut que le nombre de ceux lieux soit aussi ce nombre. Et étant donné aussi que les réalités qui sont de l’extérieur sont ou bien le témoignage d’un garant – qui est soit un seul, agréé, soit le plus grand nombre, soit tous – ou bien une notion et que les notions qui sont de l’extérieur sont ou bien similaires ou bien opposées ou bien composées des deux, il faut que les [lieux] qui sont de l’extérieus soient contenus dans les limites de cette division. Les composées des deux sont les lieux du moins et du plus: les opposés sont, comme on te l’a indiqué précédemment, quatre et les semblables sont de deux sortes. Quant aux lieux intermédiaire entre les réalités qui sont de l’extérieur et celles qui sont de la substance de la chose, l’on croit que ce sont les lieux des inflexions et le lieux des coordonéès. En règle générale, nécessairement tout lieu entre dans l’une de ses divisions ou est intérmediaire entre elles. Cela apparaîtra par induction quand on passera en revue les lieux eux-mêmes, Deo volente».

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In turn, the loci of the first category («loci qui in quaestione sunt positi») are further subdivided: «Eorum vero locorum qui ab his ducuntur terminis de quibus in quaestione dubitatur duplex modus est: unus quidem ab eorum substantia, alter vero ab his quae eorum substantiam consequuntur»68. The «loci qui in quaestione sunt positi» are those taken from the same subtstance as the terms («loci qui a terminorum substantia ducuntur») and those that follow the substance of the terms («loci qui terminorum substantiam consequuntur»).

2.5. The loci qui in questione sunt positi et qui a terminorum substantia ducuntur First in Boethius’s discussion of this classification scheme comes the presentation of the differentiae that are positioned inside the terms of the question («loci qui in quaestione sunt positi»), and that are drawn from their substance («loci qui a terminorum substantia ducuntur»).

2.5.1. The locus a definitione Hi vero qui a substantia sunt, in sola definitione consistunt. Definitio enim substantiam monstrat et substantiae integra demonstratio definitio est. Sed id, quod dicimus, patefaciamus exemplis, ut omnis vel quaestionum vel argumentationum vel locorum ratio colliquescat. Age enim, quaeratur «an arbores animalia sint», fiatque huiusmodi syllogismus: «animal est substantia animata sensibilis; arbor vero substantia animata sensibilis non est; arbor igitur animal non est». Hic quaestio de genere est; «utrum enim arbores sub animalium genere ponendae sint» quaeritur. Locus qui in universali propositione consistit hic: «cui generis definitio non convenit, id eius cuius ea definitio est species non est». Loci superior differentia, qui locus nihilominus nuncupatur, a definitione. Vides igitur ut tota dubitatio quaestionis syllogismi argumentatione tractata sit per convenientes et congruas propositiones, quae vim suam ex prima et maxima propositione custodiunt, ex ea scilicet, quae negat esse speciem, cui non conveniat generis definitio, atque 68

De top. diff., II, V, 1, 1186D, p. 29, 6-9.

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ipsa universalis propositio a substantia tracta est unius eorum termini qui in quaestione locati sunt, ut «animalis», id est ab eius definitione, quae est «substantia animata sensibilis»69.

The first locus taken from the substance of the terms of the question is the definition, which is the exact logical analogue of what the substance of any res is on an ontological level. The definition is therefore the first mental operation through which the mind is directed towards the knowledge of reality, because through the definition it tries to become acquainted with the res by discovering its genus and its specific difference. Just as, from the perspective of ontology, every res possesses its own substance within itself, in the same way, from the perspective of logic, every term keeps its own definition within itself. Thus, to enunciate a definition is also to show the substance of the defined70. The definition can also act as a function of the locus, as is illustrated in Diagram no. 19 (Appendix, p. 337)71; but it must first be determined 69

Ivi, II, V, 2-6, 1187AB, pp. 29, 9-30, 6. Substance is the first of the ten Aristotelian categories. All reality can be, and therefore can be stated, according to the category of substance or of the nine accidents (quantity, quality, relation, where, when, being in a position, having, doing, and being affected). Porphyry’s Isagoge is designed merely as an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, and in the former text substance is the only category for which Porphyry provides his so-called tree, i.e. the complete division of the genus of substance into its specific differences extending all the way to the very special species and individuals (though a tree could equally be built for the remaining nine categories of accidents). Bearing Porphyry’s tree in mind, it is important to recall that it is possible to provide a definition only of the genera and the intermediate species, because only for these it is possible to find the genus and the specific difference and to define in what way the species belongs to that which is defined. Conversely, it is not possible to formulate any definition of the maximal genera, i.e. of the ten categories, because they themselves are the supreme genera of all things, so there is no genus above which another genus may supersede (with the definition being built by negative way), and without the genus it is impossible to build any definition. It is therefore possible to describe only the very general genera. The same can be said of the very special species, for which it is not possible to formulate any definition there is no inferior species since below them. 71 For every locus that is presented, Boethius shows the quaestio, argumentatio, maxima propositio, and differentia; however, in order to articulate a locus more clearly, I decided to develop the quaestio always in a disjunctive interrogative form (so as to highlight its ambiguous nature) and to add the dubia propositio in order to indicate which of the two alternatives is the object of the demonstration. This, therefore, is the 70

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what kind of question it is, whether relating to genus, accident, property, or definition. In this case, the question asks whether the term «animal» is the genus of the species «tree», marking it as a question concerning the genus (quaestio de genere); the propositio dubia to be defended is «a tree is not an animal». The search for the maxima propositio, the maximal generalization in which the dubia propositio is contained, follows an ascending path. In his Isagoge, Porphyry states that whatever a species is predicated on will also serve as the predication of the genus of the species, and the genus of the genus as far as the most general item; the species in fact will be predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual, and the most general item both of the genus or of the intermediate genera and of the species and of the individuals72. Consequently, the one who argues understands intuitively what must be established, i.e. whether the term «animal» is the genus of «tree». At this point, what remains is to build the argumentatio, so that the entire demonstrative force contained in the maxima is revealed, which represents a law of logical inference. In the major premise, in fact, the definition of «animal» is positioned so as to be recognized immediately thereafter, in the minor premise, as one that fails to fit the word «tree», generating the conclusion that «a tree is not an animal»73. The maxima propositio, which relates to the definition, is in turn contained in the differentia placed at a still higher level because sequence of the elements that will be identified: quaestio, dubia propositio, differentia, maxima propositio, and argumentatio. 72 Cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, p. 7, 8-15 (Engl. transl. p. 8): « Of whatever a species is predicated, of those items, by necessity, will the genus of the species also be predicated—and the genus of the genus as far as the most general item. For if it is true to say that Socrates is a man, man is an animal, and animal is a substance, then it is also true to say that Socrates is an animal and a substance. For, the upper items being always predicated of the lower, a species will be predicated of the individual, a genus both of the species and of the individual, and a most general item both of the genus (or of the genera, should there be several intermediate and subaltern items) and of the species and of the individual». 73 This example is very similar to the one provided previously and likewise aims to show how a maximal proposition gives force to the argumentation from outside («is the envious man wise or not?»). In fact, even in this case the maximal proposition is placed outside the syllogism, and it is not in any way necessary that the syllogism be valid. It is probably the identity of the predicative value of the quaestio, the dubia propositio, and the conclusio that enables the search for the maximal generalization to which this proposition traces back in order subsequently to form the syllogism.

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it is more universal than the maxima, and is simply called a definitione. Therefore, the definition is placed inside the terms of the question when it performs the function of a locus by enabling argumenta to be drawn and then expressed in argumentationes. In sum, the discipline of topica is always activated in the presence of a quaestio, and it provides for the articulation of the differentia, maxima propositio, and argumentum developed through argumentatio. The choice of the maxima or the differentia is then entrusted to the intuition of the one who poses the argument: «Ita igitur in ceteris quaestionibus strictim ac breviter locorum differentiis commemoratis oportet uniuscuiusque proprietatem vigilantis animi alacritate percipere»74. In order to resolve a quaestio, all that is required is to activate the memory and to scan quickly through the various differentiae for one that suits the case, and from which can be drawn the maxima to be articulated in argumentatio. Indeed, the De topicis differentiis is essentially designed to facilitate just this task; Boethius, as discussed, seems to have composed this book to help students to acquire the list of differentiae, which can be accomplished by simple memorization of the terms used to describe them. It is accordingly important to make clear that every differentia certainly contains multiple maximae, and the proof is in the fact that, while the maxima propositio, concerning for example the definition, is contained in the differentia a definitione, there must also be in the same locus at least the maxima propositio that is opposite to it: «that to which the definition of the genus belongs is a species of the genus defined»75.

2.5.2 The locus a descriptione The definition, which can indicate the substance, is one of the most important logical operations through which the mind perceives reality. Bearing in mind Porphyry’s tree, however, since a definition is composed of a genus and specific differences, a definition of all the genera and 74

De top. diff., II, V, 7, 1187B, p. 30, 6-8. In the third book, Boethius provides the same example also for Cicero’s locus a definitione, though the maxima propositio is different. This constitutes further proof that a differentia can contain multiple maximae propositiones. Cf. infra, Chap. 3, § 3.3.1. 75

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intermediate species can certainly be formulated, but a definition of the supreme genera cannot be produced, still less definitions of the most special items. The supreme genus is that which cannot be superseded by another genus; and, since it does not possess a genus, it cannot be defined; or rather, its definition is built in a negative way. Conversely, the most special item that supersedes no other species, and so cannot be further subdivided into its differences, is equally incapable of definition. Porphyry’s quinque res are not therefore useful for the formation of the definition of either supreme genera or of the most special items76. Nevertheless, Boethius takes care to explain, we can to some extent compensate for the lack of definitions for the supreme genera in at least two ways: Huius autem loci qui ex substantia ducitur duplex modus est: partim namque a definitione, partim a descriptione argumenta ducuntur. Differt autem definitio a descriptione, quod definitio genus ac differentias sumit, descriptio vero subiecti intelligentiam claudit quibusdam vel accidentibus et unam efficientibus proprietatem vel substantialibus differentiis praeter genus conveniens aggregatis. Sed hae definitiones quae ab accidentibus fiunt, tametsi videntur nullo modo substantiam demonstrare, tamen, quoniam saepe verae definitionis vice ponuntur, quae substantiam monstrat, illae etiam propositiones quae a descriptione sumuntur a substantiae loco videntur assumi77. 76

Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio prima, I, 8, 16CD, pp. 19, 19-20, 2: «Definitionis vero disciplinam superius diximus praeter genera, species, differentias et propria non posse tractari. Sed quoniam sunt quaedam genera quae genus habere non possunt, ut est substantia vel alia quae Aristotele in praedicamentis constituit, dicat quis ad haec horum cognitionem nihil omnino prodesse, quod non sit in his a genere trahenda definitio in quibus genus inveniri non possit, quod, si qua res genus non haberet, species non esset; hoc ita posito ad generalissimorum generum definitionem nihil genera et species utilitatis habere». 77 De top. diff., II, VI, 1-3, 1187BC, p. 30, 9-18. Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, I, 7, 79CD, pp. 153, 10-154, 2: «Substantiae ratio alia quidem in descriptione ponitur, alia vero in definitione. Sed ea quae in descriptione est, proprietatem quandam colligit eius rei cuius substantiae rationem prodit, ac non modo proprietate id quod monstrat informat, verum etiam ipsa fit proprium, quod in definitionum quoque venire necesse est; si quis enim quantitatis rationem reddere velit, dicat licebit: quantitas est secundum quam aequale atque inaequale dicitur. Sicut igitur proprietatem quidem quantitatis in ratione posuit quantitatis et ipsa tota ratio ipsius quantitatis propria est, ita descriptio et proprietatem colligit et propria non colligit, sed ipsa quoque fit

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In the first category of loci, those drawn from the substance of the terms of the question, the differentia a definitione cannot exist alone, since, as was just said, it is impossible to form a definition of all things. Therefore, in cases where there can be no definition, namely the supreme genera and most special items, use can be made of their descriptiones. Descriptions can be formed in two ways: through the collection of a certain number of accidents that join together to form a single property, or through the aggregation of substantial differences, but without the genus. In cases where one of the two terms is a supreme genus or a most special item, attempts to resolve the quaestio that proceed from the definition can make use of the descriptio, which should also be placed inside the terms of the question, since it too refers to the substance of the term. Thus, for example: Huius vero tale sit exemplum: quaeratur enim «an albedo substantia sit»; hic quaeritur «an albedo substantiae velut generi supponatur». propria. Definitio namque substantiam monstrat, genus differentiis iungit et ea quae per se sunt communia atque multorum in unum redigens uni speciei quam definit reddit aequalia. Ita igitur ad descriptionem utilis est proprii cognitio, quoniam sola proprietas in descriptione colligitur et ipsa fit propria sicut definitio quoque, ad definitionem vero genus, quod primum ponitur, et species, ad quam genus illus aptatur, et differentiae, quibus iunctis cum genere species definitur». Cf. ivi, II, 91BC, pp. 180, 20-181, 13: «Diligenter vero ait describentes, non definientes; definitio enim fit ex genere, genus autem aliud genus habere non poterit. Idque obscurius est quam ut primo aditu dictum pateat. Fieri autem potest ut res quae alii genus sit, alii generi supponatur, non quasi genus, sed tamquam species sub alio collocata. Unde non in eo quod genus est, supponi alicui potest, sed cum supponitur, ilico species fit. Quae cum ita sint, ostenditur genus ipsum in eo quod genus est, genus habere non posse. Si igitur voluisset genus definitione concludere, nullo modo potuisset; genus enim aliud quod ei posset praeponere, non haberet, atque idcirco descriptionem ait esse factam, non definitionem. Descriptio vero est, ut in priore volumine dictum est, ex proprietatibus informatio quaedam rei et tamquam coloribus quibusdam depictio. Cum enim plura in unum convenerint, ita ut omnia simul rei cui applicantur aequentur, nisi ex genere vel differentiis haec collectio fiat, descriptio nuncupatur»; Cf. also Q. Fabius Laurentius Victorinus, Explanationum in rhetoricam M. Tullii Ciceronis libri duo, in Rhetores latini minores ex codicibus maximam partem primum adhibitis, ed. K. HALM, Minerva, Leipzig 1863 (reprint. Frankfurt a. M. 1964) [= Expl. in rhet.], I, 9, [pp. 153-304], p. 182,16-23: «Definitio talis est: homo animal est rationale, bipes, risus capax. Descriptio talis est: homo est, qui erectum verticem rotundo capitis attollit, cui sunt sub collo omeri brachiaque demissa, et cetera in hunc modum, sed, ut ipse ait, ‘breviter describenda’. Ergo quoniam de fine tractavimus, nunc quoque quid tractetur de qualitate videamus».

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Dicimus igitur: «substantia est quae omnibus accidentibus possit esse subiectum; albedo autem nullis accidentibus subiecta est; albedo igitur substantia non est». Locus, id est, maxima propositio, eadem quae superius: «cuius enim definitio vel descriptio ei quod dicitur species esse non convenit, id eius quod esse species perhibetur genus non est». Descriptio vero substantiae albedini non convenit; albedo igitur substantia non est. Loci differentia superior a descriptione, quam dudum locavimus in ratione substantiae78.

As illustrated in Diagram 20 (Appendix, p. 337), the maxima propositio, which is substantially the same as the previous one, expresses the relationship between the definition (or description) of a genus and its species, and is in turn contained in the differentia, which is called simply a descriptione. The whole demonstrative process thus proceeds from a description that is capable of producing laws of logical inference representing the specific function of the locus79.

2.5.3 The locus a nominis interpretatione The last locus, among those drawn from the substance of the terms, is taken from the interpretation of the name: Sunt etiam definitiones, quae non a rei substantia, sed a nominis significatione ducuntur atque ita rei de qua quaeritur applicantur; ut si sit quaestio «utrum philosophiae studendum sit», erit argumentatio talis: «philosophia sapientiae amor est; huic studendum nemo dubitat; studendum igitur est philosophiae». Hic enim non definitio rei, sed nominis interpretatio argumentum dedit, quo etiam Tullius in Hortensio in eiusdem philosophiae usus est defensione, et vocatur Graece quidem ὀνομαστικὸς ὄρος, Latine autem nominis definitio.80 78

De top. diff., II, VI, 4-6, 1187CD, pp. 30, 18-31, 7. Bearing in mind that there is no definition, but only the description of the substance as a supreme genus, it is noteworthy that, in the major premise of the syllogism, there is only its description, obtained by means of only one substantial difference, namely the capacity of the substance to be the basis for a certain number of accidents. 80 Ivi, II, vi, 7-8, 1187D-1188A, p. 31, 7-14. Cf. Appendix, Diagram n. 21, p. 338. 79

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The substantial definition is the only one able to express the substance of that which is defined, since it is composed of the genus and specific differences, though definitions (despite not being substantial) can also explain the meaning of a name; hence the interpretatio nominis. Nevertheless, the difference that exists between the definition of a term and the interpretation of a name is considerable. The substance is a res with an ontological importance that, as an idea of the thought, possesses also a logical status expressed by the definition. The meaning of a name, conversely, has an exclusively logical nature, since it is people who give names to things, in the process arranging also their meaning through the interpretation of the name81. In the example given by Boethius (cf. Diagram 21, Appendix p. 338), it can be seen that the corresponding maxima propositio is unexpressed, though the locus is very similar to the previous two, wherein the major premise posed is, rather than definition or description, the interpretation of the term «philosophy» («love of wisdom»). Boethius thus concludes his presentation of the first three loci drawn from the substance of the term, or from the meaning of the name: «Ac de his quidem argumentis quae ex substantia terminorum in quaestione positorum sumuntur claris, ut arbitror, patefecimus exemplis»82. The definition, description, and interpretation of a name are placed inside the term, although each is joined to the substance in a different way. The definition is joined to the substance by means of the genus and the specific differences, and it indicates the whole substance of the res to which the term refers. The description simply refers to the substance (because it is not possible to formulate any definition for it) through the aggregation of a certain number of accidents or of the substantial differences. The interpretation of the name, since it explains the meaning, refers not to the substance of the term but to the definition of its name. Therefore, the common characteristic of these three loci resides in the definition of the term, whether it is substantial or is formulated by accidents, by substantial differences, or by onomastic interpretation. This is why Boethius initially states that the first category of the loci a 81

The nomen is a vox significativa that, together with the verbum, is capable of forming an oratio, i.e. a new semantic unit. The propositio is an oratio that comes from the union of a nomen with a verbum. Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3 and §1.3.2. 82 De top. diff., II, VI, 9, 1188A, p. 31, 15-17.

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substantia consists only in the definition: «Hi vero qui a substantia sunt, in sola definitione consistunt»83.

2.6. The loci qui in quaestione sunt positi et qui terminorum substantiam consequuntur Next comes the presentation of the loci put in the terms of the questions that follow from their substance: Nunc de his dicendum est qui terminorum substantiam consequuntur. Horum multifaria divisio est; plura enim sunt, quae singulis substantiis adhaerescunt. Ab his igitur quae cuiuslibet substantiam comitantur argumenta duci solent aut ex toto aut ex partibus aut ex causis, vel efficientibus vel materia vel fine vel forma. Et est efficiens quidem causa quae movet atque operatur, ut aliquid explicetur. Materia vero ex qua fit aliquid vel in qua fit. Finis propter quod fit. Sunt etiam inter eos locos qui ex his sumuntur quae substantiam consequuntur aut ab effectibus aut a corruptionibus aut ab usibus aut praeter hos omnes a communiter accidentibus84.

The second category of loci is not inherent directly in the substance of the res denoted by the terms, but derives from the res, and the loci are seven in all; however, bearing in mind that the loci a toto, a partibus, and a causis are further subdivided, a total of twelve loci may be enumerated: a genere, ab integro, a generis partibus, ab integri partibus, ex efficientibus causis, ex materia, ex fine, ex forma, ab effectibus, a corruptionibus, ab usibus, and a communiter accidentibus.

2.6.1 The locus a toto The first locus that derives from the substance of the terms is locus a toto: «Quae cum ita sint, eum prius locum qui a toto sumitur inspiciamus. Totum duobus modis dici solet: aut ut genus aut ut id, quod ex pluribus 83 84

Ivi, II, V, 2, 1187a, p. 29, 9-10. Ivi, II, VII, 1-5, 1188AB, pp. 31, 18-32, 8.

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integrum partibus constat»85. Any term, when considered in relation to itself, possesses a definition that indicates the substance of the res to which it relates; but a term can also be considered in relation to another term. For example, if a term is considered as a species, it is possible to go back to its genus; similarly, if a term is considered as a part, it is possible to go back to the whole of which it is a part. The genus and the whole therefore derive from the substance of the term and act as a function of the locus, of which the term constitutes, respectively, a species or a part. Therefore, it is correct to affirm that the locus resides in the things that derive from the substance of the term, because it is not the term included in the quaestio that acts as the locus, but what is correlated to it, namely its genus or its entirety86. The locus a genere If the term is considered as a species, its genus may be determined in the manner illustrated by the following example: 85

Ivi, II, VII, 6, 1188B, p. 32, 8-10. The whole, understood as a genus divided into its species, or as a whole composed of its parts, refers to the distinction between the divisio and partitio: the divisio is in fact produced by the enumeration of substantial parts, namely the genus and specific differences (as the definition of «man» is «mortal rational animal»). Conversely, the partitio consists of the enumeration of the parts, namely the members of which a whole is made up (such as the foundation, walls and roof constitute the entirety of a house). Cicero in the Topica considers divisio and partitio as forms, of the definition. Cf. Cicero, Topica, 28, p. 128, 1-9: «Atque etiam definitiones aliae sunt partitionum aliae divisionum; partitionum, cum res ea quae proposita est quasi in membra discerpitur, ut si quis dicat ius civile id esse quod in legibus, senatus consultis, rebus iudicatis, iuris perito rum auctoritate, edictis magistratuum, more aequitate consistat. Divisionum autem definitio formas omnis complectitur quae sub eo genere sunt quod definitur hoc modo: Abalienatio est eius rei qua emancipi est aut traditio alteri nexu aut in iure cessio inter quos ea iure civili fieri possunt» (Engl. transl. p. 129: «Further, some definitions consist of partitions, others of divisions; of partitions when the subject at issue is, as it were, dismembered into its parts, e.g. if one were to say the civil law was that which consists of laws, decrees of the senate, previous decisions, the authority of the jurisconsults, the edicts of the magistrates, custom, and equity. A definition based on division, on the other hand, comprises all species which are subordinate to the species which is being defined, in the following way: A legal transfer of property is either transfer with legal obligation or cession at law, of things which can be bought, between parties who can do this in accordance with the civil law»). Cf. infra, Chap. 3, § 3.3.2 86

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Et illud quidem quod ut genus totum est hoc modo saepe quaestionibus argumenta suppeditat; ut si sit quaestio «an iustitia utilis sit», fit syllogismus: «omnis virtus utilis est; iustitia autem virtus est; iustitia igitur utilis est». Hic quaestio de accidente, id est «an accidat iustitiae utilitas». Locus is qui in maxima propositione consistit: «quae generi adsunt, et speciei». Huius superior locus est a toto, id est a genere, virtus scilicet, quae iustitiae genus est.87

The first example given is that of the totum understood as a genus, the locus a genere88. As can be seen in Diagram no. 22 (Appendix, p. 338), 87 De top. diff., II, VII, 7, 1188BC, p. 32, 11-17. Averroes, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, with reference to the locus a genere, attributes to Themistius the following considerations: cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât alBaghdâdî», T. 9, p. 241: «Les éléments de ces lieux sont, ainsi que le dit Thémistius, quatre. Le premier d’entre eux est que le genre ne soit pas séparable de la chose dont il est le genre, mais qu’il s’en prédique nécessairement. Car s’il [en] était séparable, il serait un accident. Le deuxième [élément] est que [le genre] se prédique de la totalité de son sujet – comme par exemple la prédication d’animal de la totalité d’homme. Car s’il se prédiquait de façon particulière, il serait aussi un accident. Le troisième [élément] est que [le genre] surpasse, dans sa portée prédicative, le sujet – je veux dire qu’il soit plus générale et non égal – comme animal surpasse homme. Car s’il était égal, il serait un propre ou une différence. Et le quatrième [élément] est que [le genre] soit prédique du sujet par voie du ce que c’est. Car s’il ne l’était pas par voie du ce que c’est, il serait un accident». 88 At the end of the second book, when Boethius summarizes the whole divisio locorum, he indiscriminately refers to the locus a differentia as locus a genere. Cf. De top. diff., II, x, 7, 1194C, p. 46, 6-9: «Quae vero ea velut substantias continentia consequuntur talia sunt, ut vel generis, [vel differentiae] vel integri, vel specierum vel partium loco circa ea quae inquiruntur assistant». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.10. In fact, Boethius believes that any question that has to do with the difference is always referable to the genus because the difference is more universal than the species. Cf. In Top., IV, 1118BD: «Item differentiae aliae aliquo modo vero sunt generum divisibiles, aliquo modo specierum constitutivae; sed si a constitutivis argumentum ducatur, velut a genere ducitur. Nam sicut genus continet speciem, ita differentiae continent species. Sane si differentiae constitutivae ut genera intelligentur, fides ab his ad ea aptabitur quae constituunt. Haec enim talium differentiarum veluti formae quaedam sunt. Sin vero sint divisibiles, siquidem ad ea probanda, id est genera, quae dividunt, earum ducitur fides, a forma argumentum fieri videtur, nam tales differentiae eorum quae dividuntur formae quaedam sunt. Quod si ad ea probanda referuntur quae in contrariam partem genus dividunt, tunc proprie a differentia fieri argumentum videtur, quia contrariae veluti differentiae comparantur» (Engl. transl. p. 117: «Again, some differentiae are in one way divisive of genera and in another way constitutive of species. But if an argument is drawn from constitutive

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the syllogism shown is correct in itself and does not require any external confirmation to be valid. Nevertheless, the maxima propositio, placed outside of the syllogism, contains in itself the whole force of the syllogism. The procedure is to draw, from one of the terms of the question («justice»), its genus («virtue»); the universal of the genus acts as a function of the locus, to the extent that it indicates that «things that are present in the genus [are present] also in the species». The genus of «justice» («virtue») can be seen to constitute the middle term that enables us to merge the two extreme terms («justice» and «advantageous»), which is why, in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius affirms that «nihil est aliud argumentum quam medietatis inventio»89. The differentia, unlike the maxima that expresses a logical law, provides simple instructions regarding where to find the maxima. The differentia acts as the supreme genus of all middle terms able to unite the extreme terms of a syllogism. The locus ab integro If the term is considered to be a part, the whole of which it is a part, and that acts as a function of locus, can be determined in the manner illustrated in the following example: Rursus sit quaestio «an humanae res providentia regantur». Dicemus: «Si mundus providentia regitur, homines autem pars mundi sunt, humanae igitur res providentia reguntur». Quaestio de accidenti. Locus: «Quod toti convenit, id conveniat etiam parti». Supremus locus a toto, id est ab integro, quod partibus constat; id vero est «mundus, qui hominum totum est». A partibus etiam duobus modis argumenta nascuntur: aut enim a generis partibus, quae sunt species, aut ab integri, id est totius, quae partes tantum proprio vocabulo nuncupantur90. differentiae, it is as if it were drawn from a genus; for as a genus encompasses a species, so differentiae encompass species. Certainly, if constitutive differentiae are understood as genera, the belief they furnish will be suited to the things the differentiae constitute, for these things are [as it were] kinds of a sort for such differentiae. But if those differentiae that divide a genus into contrary parts are brought to bear on the things to be proved, then the argument seems to arise from a differentia properly speaking, because contraries are related to one another as differentiae»). Cf. De top. diff., I, V, 27, 1178B, p. 11, 13-14: «Sed tantumdem est de differentia quaerere quantum, si de genere dubitetur». 89 In Top., I, 1051A. 90 De top. diff., II, VII, 8-9, 1188c, pp. 32, 16-33-5.

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As illustrated in Diagram no. 23 (Appendix, p. 339), it is enough to reverse the perspective from which the previous locus was examined in order to understand how this locus behaves. In fact, if the term is considered as a genus or as a whole, it is possible to go back respectively to its species or its parts. In turn, the species or the parts of a term act as loci, since they can contain valid principles for building the argumentations. In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius shows very precisely the differences between the partes of a whole and the species of a genus. These differences are very important for the discipline of topica and can be summarized as follows: – The parts of a whole unite the whole; the species instead divide a genus91. – The species receive the entire name of the genus that they divide, as for instance the species «man» receives the name of the whole genus «animal». Conversely, the parts do not receive the name of the whole that unites then: a «brick», for example, cannot be called a «wall», because it is only a part of a «wall», which is the whole. The whole is not universal in the way that, for example, the genus «animal» is universal; in fact, the characteristic of the universal is to be present entirely in the species into which it is divided92. The parts, therefore, compose a whole, while the species divide a universal; but if the species receive the name of the universal that they divide, a single part can never represent the whole93. 91

Cf. In Top., III, 1105B: «Differunt vero haec a se, quoniam partes totius membra coniungunt, species vero genus dividit atque dispertit» (Engl. transl. p. 101: «Parts and species differ from one another, because a part conjoins members of a whole, but a species divides and distributes a genus»). 92 Cf. ivi, 1105C: «Nam, ut superius quoque dictum est, partes eius quod copulant non suscipiunt nomen totius. Neque enim fundamenta vel tectum domus esse dici possunt, nam nisi omnia quae quid efficiunt iuncta sint, totius vocabulum singula non habebunt; at vero species etiam singulae generis suscipiunt nomen, ut homo animalis» (Engl. transl. p. 101: «For [as we said above also] parts do not receive the name of the whole that they unite; foundations or a roof cannot be said to be a house since the individual parts will not take the name of the whole unless all the parts that produce it are joined together. But species, even taken individually, receive the name of their genus, as, for example, man receives the name of animal»). 93 Cf. ivi, 1105CD: «Quo fit, ut in his illa quoque differentia possit agnosci, quod partes quidem, totius partes, species vero non totius, scilicet universalis rei, id est generis, species esse dicuntur. Differt vero totum a genere, quod genus quidem universale est, totum vero minime, quod probatur hoc modo. Si enim id quod totum

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– Another fundamental difference is related to an observation already found in the first and second commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge: the genus, as a universal, is prior to the species; the whole is constituted only after the union of its parts. This also means that, if a genus is eliminated, its species will at the same time be eliminated; conversely, if a species comes to an end, the genus remains unchanged. The parts, when they are eliminated, take away also the whole; when the whole is dissolved, by contrast, the parts are not eliminated, but remain intact, though they are separated from each other94. When Boethius, at the beginning of the fourth book of his commentary on Cicero, comments on the locus ex partibus enumeratione, another difference between the species and the partes is presented: in a divisio, no species should be omitted, because the species are limited in number. In the dicitur, ut domus, universale esset, partes quoque eius totius susciperent nomen; at non suscipiunt, ut saepe monstratum est; quod igitur totum est, universale non est. Genus vero universale esse manifestum est, quoniam eius nomen deductae ab eo formae suscipiunt» (Engl. transl. pp. 101-102: «So, we can also recognize as a differentia between species and parts that parts are said to be parts of a whole, while species are said to be species not of a whole but of a universal thing, namely, a genus. A whole differs from a genus, because a genus is universal but a whole is not. This is proved in the following way. If what is said to be a whole, such as a house, were universal, its parts would also receive the name of that whole; but [as we have often shown] they do not receive the name of the whole, and therefore a whole is not universal. It is clear, however, that a genus is universal, because the kinds drawn from it receive its name»). 94 Cf. ivi, 1105D: «Item alia differentia. Genus semper speciebus suis prius est, totum vero suis partibus posterius invenitur. Nisi enim partes fuerint, totum non potest coniungi. Quo fit ut si genus pereat, species quoque perimantur; si species intereat, maneat genus quod in partibus totoque contrarium est. Nam si pars quaelibet una pereat, totum necesse est interire; si vero totum, quod partes iunxerant, dissipetur, partes maneant distributae: velut si domus, tecta et parietes, et fundamenta a semetipsis extrinsecus posita intelligantur, domus quidem non erit, quia coniunctio destructa est, partes tamen manebunt» (Engl. transl. p. 102: «Again, another differentia is this. A genus is always prior to its species, but a whole is found to be posterior to its parts, for a whole cannot be joined together unless its parts exist. Hence, if a genus is eliminated, its species are also taken away; but if a species is lost, the genus remains—and this is the contrary of what is the case for a whole and its parts. For if any one part is eliminated, the whole is necessarily lost; but if the whole that the parts joined together is dispersed, the parts that were divided from one another remain. For example, if the roofs, walls, and foundations of a house are understood as placed apart from one another, there will be no house because the conjoining of the parts is destroyed, and yet the parts will remain»).

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case of partitio, however, the parts may be either limited or unlimited in number; for demonstrative purposes, therefore, the omission of some parts does not involve a transgression of the rule that, in the enumeration of the parts, none should be omitted95. One who engages in an argument, if he wishes to construct or to destroy a thesis starting from the locus a partibus, should be familiar with all of these differences; in particular, it must be borne in mind that the destruction of a whole does not necessarily involve the destruction also of its parts (consider again the «bricks» that compose a «wall»); if its parts were eliminated, the whole would no longer exist. In any case, reversing the perspective, the existence of a part does not guarantee the existence of the whole, while the existence of a whole does guarantee the existence also of its parts. The case is exactly the opposite if the whole is constituted by a universal: the elimination of a genus does not involve the elimination of its species (consider again the genus «animal» and the species «man»), but, if a species is eliminated, it is not for this reason that the respective genus is eliminated as well; on the other hand, it is enough to demonstrate that only one species exists in order to demonstrate that the genus also exists.

2.6.2 The locus a partibus96 The locus a generis speciebus The first example that is provided regards the locus taken from species of a genus: Et de his quidem partibus quae species sunt hoc modo: sit quaestio «an virtus mentis bene constitutae sit habitus». Quaestio de definitione, id est «an habitus bene constitutae virtutis sit definitio». Faciemus itaque a speciebus argumentationem sic: «si iustitia, fortitudo, moderatio atque prudentia habitus mentis bene constitutae mentis sunt, haec autem quattuor uni virtuti veluti generi subiciuntur; virtus 95

Cf. ivi, V, 1060B-1062B. In the presentation of the following examples, it is preferable to refer to the various uses of this locus in different ways in order to highlight the specificity of each. It is however important to keep in mind that Boethius understands all these loci as belonging to the only locus simply called locus a partibus. 96

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igitur bene constitutae mentis est habitus». Maxima propositio: «quod enim singulis partibus inest, idem toti inesse necesse est». Argumentum vero a partibus, id est a generis partibus, quae species nuncupantur: «iustitia enim, fortitudo, modestia, et prudentia virtutis species sunt»97.

Diagram no. 24 (Appendix, p. 339) illustrates how the maxima proposito, although placed outside the syllogism, is the principle from which the premises are developed («quod enim singulis partibus inest, idem toti inesse necesse est»). The procedure involves considering the subject of the quaestio («virtue») as a genus, and consequently drawing therefrom its species («justice, courage, temperance, and prudence»). The species, acting as loci, also play the role of the middle term, because they unite the major and minor terms of the dubia propositio, that is, the subject («virtue») and the predicate («the habit of a well-ordered mind»). The locus ab integri partibus The second example concerns the locus taken from parts of a whole: Item ab his partibus, quae integri partes esse dicuntur, sit quaestio «an sit utilis medicina»; haec in accidentis dubitatione constituta est. Dicimus igitur: «si depelli morbos salutemque servari mederique vulneribus mortalibus utile est, utilis medicina est; at depelli morbos, salutemque servari mederique vulneribus utile est; utilis igitur medicina est»98.

In the example given by Boethius, and represented in Diagram no. 25 (Appendix, p. 340), the maxima is unexpressed, but we understand that it is substantially the same as the one shown in the previous example, though here developed in hypothetical form «si aliquid singulis partibus inest, idem toti inesse necesse est»; in this case, the maxima constitutes the generalization of the entire major premise, the one that has enabled the construction of a hypothetical syllogism according to the form of modus ponens. The procedure that made it possible to find the locus was to 97 98

De top. diff., II, VII, 10, 1188CD, p. 33, 5-14. Ivi, II, VII, 11, 1188D-1189A, p. 33, 14-19.

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consider the subject «medicine» as a whole, obtaining afterwards its parts, which have acted as a function of the loci99. The locus ab una generis species The locus a partibus is multiform because it can be used in multiple ways; and since a single species, or a single part, can act as a function of a locus, this locus could also be called simply locus a parte: «Saepe autem et una quaelibet pars valet, ut argumentationis firmitas constet, hoc modo, ut si de aliquo dubitetur ‘an sit liber’; ‘si eum vel censu, vel testamento, vel vindicta manumissum esse’ monstremus, ‘liber’ ostensus est; atque hae partes erant dandae libertatis»100. The example illustrated in Diagram 26 (Appendix, p. 340) shows how the principle of an argumentation may be drawn from a single species; the maxima propositio is not explicit, though it may reasonably be supposed that it is the same as the locus a partibus, of which the locus a generis species constitutes one possible usage, to be made in conditional form: «quod enim singulis partibus inest, idem toti inesse necesse est»101. In this case, 99

This interpretation is supported and fully explained by Eleonore Stump: the formulation of the maxima propositio in conditional form, though not found in Boethius, is proposed here for the sole purpose of rendering Boethius’s example more understandable. Cf. STUMP, «Dialectic and Boethius’s De topicis differentiis», in EAD, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, pp. 186-190. In this regard, the question remains whether all the maximae propositiones could also be developed in conditional form, since Boethius never expresses an opinion in this regard. 100 De top. diff., II, VII, 12, 1189A, pp. 33, 19-34, 2. An example is again drawn from Cicero’s Topica, specifically a passage in which it is presented as an example of the locus a partibus enumeratione. Cf. Cicero, Topica, 10, p. 120, 6-8: «Tum partium enumeratio quae tractatur hoc modo: Si neque censu nec vindicta nec testamento liber factus est, non est liber; neque ulla est earum rerum; non est igitur liber» (Engl. transl. p. 121: « Next, the enumeration of the parts [sc. of the whole], which is handled in the following way: If someone has not been freed by either having his name entered in the census-roll or by being touched with the rod or by a provision in a will, then he is not free. None of these applies to the individual in question. Therefore he is not free»). For a commentary on Cicero’s example, cf. REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 205-213. 101 The argumentation is not fully developed; however, based on the previous example expressed in hypothetical form, it can reasonably be assumed that Boethius had in mind a kind of conditional syllogism. Expressed in categorical form, it would be as follows: «a man is free when he has been emancipated by [enrollment in] the census, by a will, or by the manumission staff»; «but this man is free by [enrollment in] the census»; «then this man is free.»

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it is enough to affirm the antecedent in order to confirm the consequent. The predicate «free» is considered as a genus, and so it, as it were, goes in search of the species identified in the census, the will, or the manumission staff that concern the slave in the act of the release102. Since the demonstrative purpose is to argue in favour of the thesis that «this man has been set free», it is enough to demonstrate the presence of a single species for the whole genus to be so. The locus ab una integri parte The second example concerns an argumentation drawn instead from a single part of the whole, where the latter acts as a function of the locus: «Vel rursus si dubitetur ‘an sit domus, quod eminus prospicitur’, dicemus quoniam ‘non est; nam vel tectum ei vel parietes vel fundamenta desunt’. Ab una rursus parte factum est argumentum»103. As can be seen in Diagram no. 27 (Appendix p. 341), the maxima propositio is opposite to the one given previously («quod enim singulis partibus inest, idem toti inesse necesse est»), that is, it is equally known per se, «what is not inherent in the individual parts, must not be inherent in the whole»104. The locus a toto ad partem secundum tempus The whole or the parts, besides the substances, can also refer to manner, time, quantity, and place, for which reason they follow the locus a toto vel a partibus in modo, temporibus, quantitatibus et loco:

102 In ancient Rome, manumissio, the voluntary release of a slave by his or her master, also called liberation, could be obtained in three ways: 1) manumissio per vindictam: an assertor in libertatem of the slave, in agreement with the master, challenged the latter’s right of ownership in front of a judge and, obtaining his grant, the judge touched him with a staff (vindicta) on his head and called him liberus, declaring «hunc hominem ex iure Quiritium meum esse aio secundum suam causam», to which the master answered «hunc hominem liberum esse volo»; 2) manumissio censu: the magistrate registered the slave in the censors’ lists as Roman citizen; 3) manumissio testamento: through a stipulation in a master’s will, the slave was released from any obligation to his or her former owner. 103 De top. diff., II, VII, 13, 1189A, p. 34, 2-5. 104 As in the previous example, since Boethius does not develop the whole syllogism, a hypothetical syllogism could also be constructed: «if there is a roof, walls, or foundation, what is seen from afar is a house»; «but there is no roof»; «then what is seen from afar is not house».

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Licet autem non solum in substantiis, verum etiam in modo, temporibus, quantitatibus et loco totum partesque respicere. Id enim quod dicimus «semper» in tempore totum est. Id quod dicimus «aliquando» in tempore pars est. Rursus si simpliciter aliquid proponamus, in modo totum est; si cum adiectione, aliqua pars fit in modo. Item si omnia dicamus in quantitate, totum diximus. Si aliquid quantitatis excerpsimus, quantitatis ponimus partem. Eodem modo et in loco: quod ubique est totum est, quod alicubi pars. Horum autem omnium haec communiter dentur exempla. A toto ad partem secundum tempus: «si deus semper est, et nunc est». A parte ad totum secundum modum: «si anima aliquo modo movetur, et simpliciter movetur; movetur autem, cum irascitur; universaliter igitur et simpliciter movetur». Rursum a toto ad partem in quantitate: «Si verus est in omnibus Apollo vates, verum erit Pyrrhum Romanos superare». Rursus a toto ad partem in loco: «Si deus ubique est, et hic igitur est»105.

All that can be said regarding the aforementioned categories of time, manner, quantity, and place can be divided into parts; consequently, it is possible to predicate a part or the whole according to these quantities. It is therefore evident that these loci may belong to both the locus ex toto and to the locus ex partibus, depending on whether the vis logica of the argumentation consists in the whole or in the part. Time can be intended as a whole; unlimited duration, for example, can be expressed using the temporal adverb «always». Conversely, if the intended duration is something less than the whole, adverbs of time such as «sometimes» or «often» restrict and somehow delimit the duration. Boethius does not provide the corresponding maximae propositiones for any of these loci; it is, however, reasonable to suppose that these latter are all similar if not equal to that given for the locus a partibus. In fact, these loci also draw their principles from the same vis logica contained in the parts of which a whole is composed (whether it is a universal divided in its species, or a whole composed of its parts). The relationship of the part to the whole according to time is illustrated in this way: «si deus semper est, et nunc est». To develop the hypothetical syllogism, it is enough to place the antecedent in the minor premise and the consequent in the conclusion: 105

Ivi, II, VII, 14-21, 1189AC, pp. 34, 5-35, 2.

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Maior propositio: «if God is eternal, then He is now». Minor propositio, «but God is eternal». Conclusio: «so He is now». In fact, this argumentation comes from the locus a toto, the correspondent maxima propositio of which could be the following: «if something is eternal, then it exists now», although in this way the argumentative force is transferred to the condition rather than to the entire relationship106. The locus a parte ad totum secundum modum A term can be considered as a whole or as a part in relation to a certain way of being or to a certain quality. In this case, it is enough to demonstrate that the manner or quality is present in one part, so that manner and that quality are inherent in the whole substance. The quaestio could be the following: «does the soul move?», where the intention is to demonstrate that «the soul moves». Boethius provides as an example a hypothetical syllogism: Maior propositio: «if the soul moves somehow, then it moves simply». Minor propositio: «but when the soul is angry it moves». Conclusio: «then the soul moves in general and simply». Taking the predicate of the dubia propositio «moves» under the aspect of the modality, we observe that the soul, when, for example, it is angry, «somehow» moves; therefore, since it is not possible that it moves only in part, the soul moves simply and as one. It is therefore enough to see that the predicate is inherent in the subject according to a certain way of being, and to demonstrate immediately thereafter that this modality must be inherent in the whole substance of the subject. Although unexpressed, the maxima could be illustrated as follows: «if a quality is inherent in the part, it must also be inherent in the whole»; therefore this locus also constitutes one of the possible ways of using the unique locus a partibus. 106

This locus could also belong to the locus ex partibus, if the vis logica of the argumentation were based only on a part with reference to time, for example: «what happens sometimes, does not happen always».

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The locus a toto ad partem in quantitate Something can be inherent in the part or in the whole according to quantity; when this is the case, therefore, something must also be inherent in the part. Accordingly, the maxima would be: «that which is present in the whole according to quantity is also present in the part». Boethius proposes the following example: «if it is true that Apollo is a fortune teller in all respects, it will be true that Pyrrhus conquers the Romans». The locus a toto ad partem in loco Finally, something can be inherent in the whole or in the part according to place; therefore, if something is inherent in the whole in this manner, it is inherent in every one of its parts. Boethius proposes the following example: «if God is everywhere, then He is here too». The maxima propositio could thus be, «that which is present in the whole according to place is also present in part». This locus constitutes one of the possible applications of the locus a toto.

2.6.3 The locus a causis The third locus that derives from the substance of the terms proposed in the question is the locus a causis, which is in turn quadripartite: «Sequitur locus qui nuncupatur a causis. Sunt vero plures causae, id est quae vel principium praestant motus atque efficiunt vel specierum formas subiectae suscipiunt vel propter eas aliquid fit vel quae cuiuslibet forma est»107. The distinction among the four kinds of causes derives from Aristotle; in fact, Boethius has already provided a definition of each of the four.108 The first species is the efficient cause («quae movet atque operatur») that is able to produce movement, such as, «the father is the efficient cause of the son». The second species is the material cause («materia vero ex qua fit aliquid, vel in qua fit»), in which case 107

Ivi, II, VII, 22, 1189C, p. 35, 2-5. Cf. ivi, II, VII, 4, 1188AB, p. 32, 3-6: «Et est efficiens quidem causa quae movet atque operatur, ut aliquid explicetur. Materia vero ex qua fit aliquid, vel in qua fit. Finis propter quod fit. ». Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.6. 108

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the material is that from which or of which something is made, such as, «bronze is the material cause of a statue». The third species is the final cause («finis propter quod fit [aliquid]») towards which something tends to be directed, such as, «being an adult is the goal towards which being a child is directed». The fourth and last species is the formal cause («forma qua fit [aliquid]»); the specific qualities of the essence of any res in fact constitute also its formal cause, as for instance the genus and the specific differences are formal causes of the definition. The four Aristotelian causes therefore do not concern only physics or metaphysics, but also the discipline of topica, since they can act as a function of the loci and thus become argumenti sedes. However, it is necessary to state that here the locus is not the actual cause, but rather the universal concept of causa. The locus ab efficientibus causis Examples are now provided to explain how each of these four causes may act as a function of a locus. The first example concerns an argumentum, expressed in turn through an argumentatio, that is drawn from the locus ab efficientibus causis: Argumentum igitur ab efficienti causa, ut si quis «iustitiam naturalem» velit ostendere, dicat: «Congregatio hominum naturalis est; iustitiam vero congregatio hominum fecit; iustitia igitur naturalis est». Quaestio de accidente. Maxima propositio: «Quorum efficientes causae naturales sunt, ipsa quoque sunt naturalia». Locus ab efficientibus: «Quod enim uniuscuiusque causa est, id efficit eam rem cuius causa est»109.

In the example outlined in Diagram no. 28 (Appendix, p. 341), it is possible to view the various parts of which the syllogism is composed. Considering the subject of the quaestio («justice») as an effect, it is possible to search for its efficient cause («the community of men»), but «those things whose efficient causes are natural are themselves natural», and if the cause of «justice» («the community of men») is natural, so also its effect must be natural. The natural efficient cause («the community of men») is the middle term that links the subject and the predicate, while the 109

De top. diff., II, VII, 23, 1189C, p. 35, 6-11.

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two premises and the conclusion are particular instances of the maximal generalization on which they fall back. The locus a materia Boethius proceeds with an example concerning the locus a materia: Rursus si quis «Mauros arma non habere» contendat, dicet «idcirco eos minime armis uti, quia his ferrum desit». Maxima propositio: «Ubi materia deest, et quod ex materia efficitur desit». Locus a materia110.

As can be seen in Diagram 29 (Appendix, p. 342), the differentia, as the material cause, is the genus of the particular middle term («iron»). As the ten categories are the ten supreme genera of reality, it would seem that «the topical differences», since they are thought to be finite in number, are the maximal genera of all the middle terms with which it is possible to solve a quaestio using the syllogism. However, the categories and the differentiae belong to two different logical planes, and the similarity just established is understood only with reference to the capacity of being both universal and, therefore, of «containing» all that is particular. After completing the presentation of these first two loci a causis, and before moving on to the analysis of two other causes, Boethius states: «Utrumque vero, id est ab efficientibus atque materia, uno nomine a causa dicitur; aeque enim id quod efficit atque id quod operantis actum suscipit eius rei quae efficitur causae sunt»111. The two loci now presented (ab efficientibus causis e a materia) have both been called a causis, because what produces the act and what is subjected to it are equally causes of what is produced. The locus a fine As stated, the aim is the goal towards which something strives, and for this reason the aim itself is the cause of this striving: «Rursus a fine sit propositum sic: ‘an iustitia bona sit’; fiet argumentatio talis: ‘si 110 111

Ivi, II, VII, 24, 1189CD, p. 35, 11-14. Ivi, II, VII, 24, 1189D, p. 35, 14-17.

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beatum esse bonum est, et iustitia bona est; hic est enim iustitiae finis, ut qui secundum iustitiam vivat ad beatitudinem perducatur’. Maxima propositio: ‘cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est’. Locus a fine»112. As can be seen in Diagram no. 30 (Appendix p. 342), starting from the subject of the quaestio («justice»), the subject is considered to be that which tends towards something; its final cause in fact is «to be happy». As in the previous examples, the maxima propositio constitutes the maximal generalization in which the major premise can be included again as its particular instance. The locus a forma The fourth and last locus a causis is taken from the formal cause: «Ab eo vero quae cuiuslibet forma est ita, ‘non potuisse volare Daedalum, quoniam nullas naturali forma pennas habuisset’. Maxima propositio: ‘tantum quemque posse, quantum forma permisit’. Locus a forma»113. The formal cause is that through which everything is what it is. A bronze statue, for example, is a statue because of its shape; it could not, in fact, be distinguished from other bronze objects except by its shape114. Consulting Diagram no. 31 (Appendix p. 343), it is possible to view all the elements in this example. The procedure is the same as that observed in the previous loci; the subject of the quaestio («Daedalus») is considered according to its specific form, the formal cause of which provides that Daedalus has no wings. The formal cause («to have the wings») acts as the middle term to unite the major and minor terms of the dubia propositio. 112

Ivi, II, VII, 25, 1189D, p. 35, 17-21. Ivi, II, VII, 26, 1189D-1190A, pp. 35, 21-36, 3. 114 Cf. De Sancta Trinitate, pp. 169, 83-170, 91: «Omne namque esse ex forma est. Statua enim non secundum aes, quod est materia, sed secundum formam, qua in eo insignita est, effigies animalis dicitur, ipsumque aes non secundum terram, quod eius materia, sed dicitur secundum aeris figuram. Terra quoque ipsa non κατὰ τὴν ὕλην dicitur, sed secundum siccitatem gravitatemque, quae sunt formae. Nihil igitur secundum materiam esse dicitur, sed secundum propriam formam» (Engl. transl. p. 9-11: « For everything owes its being to Form. Thus a statue is not a statue on account of the brass which is its matter, but on account of the form whereby the likeness of a living thing is impressed upon it: the brass itself is not brass because of the earth which is its matter, but because of its form. Likewise earth is not earth by reason of unqualified matter, but by reason of dryness and weight, which are forms. So nothing is said to be because it has matter, but because it has a distinctive form»). 113

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2.6.4 The locus ab effectibus The locus ab effectibus is the fourth «place» derived from that which comes from the substance of the terms posed in the question, and is closely related to the locus a causis. If every cause should be followed by an effect, then it is also true that every effect must have its cause. Boethius proposes together the examples and the principles of the two following loci (a corruptionibus and ab usibus); however, to understand them better, it will be useful to analyze them separately: Ab effectibus vero et corruptionibus et usibus hoc modo: «nam si bonum est domus, et constructio bonum est domus; et si constructio bonum est domus, bonum est domus». Rursus «si malum est destructio domus, bona est domus; et si bona est domus, malum est destructio domus». Et «si bonum est equitare, bonum est equus; et si bonum est equus, bonum est equitare». Est autem primum quidem exemplum a generationibus, quod idem ab effectibus vocari potest, secundum a corruptionibus, tertium ab usibus. Omnium autem maximae propositiones: «cuius effectio bona est, ipsum quoque bonum est» et e converso; et «cuius corruptio mala est, ipsum quoque bonum est» et e converso; et «cuius usus bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est» et e converso115. 115

De top. diff., II, VII, 27-28, 1190AB, p. 36, 3-14. Cf. Appendix, Diagram no. 32, p. 343. Cf. Aristotle, Topica, II, 114b16-24 (Engl. transl. p. 191): «Moreover, look at the modes of generation and destruction of a thing, and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it, both in demolishing and in establishing a view. For those things whose modes of generation rank among good things, are themselves also good; and if they themselves are good, so also are their modes of generation. If, on the other hand, their modes of generation are evil, then they themselves also are evil. In regard to modes of destruction the converse is true; for if the modes of destruction rank as good things, then they themselves rank as evil things; whereas if the modes of destruction count as evil, they themselves count as good. The same argument applies also to things tending to produce and destroy; for things whose productive causes are good, themselves also rank as good; whereas if causes destructive of them are good, they themselves rank as evil»; cf. ivi, II, 124a24-34. Averroes, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, mentions Themistius’s connection of the locus a generationibus with the a corruptionibus. Cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», T. 3, pp. 237-238: «Le vingt-troisième lieu est pris de la géneration et de la corruption et des réalités génératrices et corruptrices; ce lieu sert à l’établissement et à la réfutation. Et il faut – ainsi que le dit Thémistius – que l’on ajoute à cela les agents, les fins et les actions.

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The treatment of the subject is very concise, which is a clear sign that the author expects from the reader a quick intuition of how these loci work. The example for the locus ab effectibus - or also a generationibus - is outlined in Diagram no. 32 (Appendix, p. 343). The decision is made to develop the argumentatio, and to place the maxima propositio within the syllogism, so that it constitutes its entire minor premise. In addition, for each maxima propositio, Boethius makes clear that the opposite is also valid. 2.6.5 The locus a corruptionibus The locus a corruptionibus is exactly opposite to the previous locus because it moves from the opposite locus. In order to argue in favour of one’s thesis, one tries to play on what follows from the corruption or alteration of the substance of one of the terms of the thesis to be proven. Boethius does not explain in detail what exactly the corruptio is; however, since the previous locus is taken from the generatio, it is clear that he is dealing with what for Aristotle is the substantial species of «becoming»116. Boethius does not develop the entire argumentation, and Diagram no. 33 (Appendix, p. 344) represents only one example of how it could be developed. 2.6.6 The locus ab usibus Boethius presents the examples for these three loci together, evidently because the ways in which they are divided are very similar, though the En effett, le réalités dont la génération est un bien sont elles aussi un bien; et si ces réalités sont aussi un bien, leur génération sera un bien. Et [le lieu] pris de la corruption est à l’inverse du [lieu de la génération]. Car ce dont la corruption est un bien est lui-même un mal et ce dont la corruption est un mal est lui même un bien. De même, les choses dont l’agent est un bien sont elles-mêmes un bien, et les choses dont les corrupteurs sont un bien sont elles-mêmes un mal. Ce lieu est notoire, car il ne suit pas nécessairement que l’agent du mal soit mauvais ni que l’agent du bien soit bon. Il en est de même [pour le lieux pris] des fins et des actions, et de tels [lieux] sont à portée de main et évidents». 116 For Aristotle there are four species of becoming: substantial (for generation and corruption), quantitative (for growth and decrease), qualitative (change), and spatial (movement).

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mental place in which the vis logica resides is different. Diagram no. 34 (Appendix, p. 344) illustrates the way in which the locus ab usibus can be developed.

2.6.7 The locus a communiter accidentibus The sixth locus from the things that come from the substance of the terms is taken from the accidents: A communiter autem accidentibus argumenta fiunt, quotiens ea sumuntur accidentia, quae relinquere subiectum vel non possunt vel non solent, ut si quis hoc modo dicat: «Sapiens non paenitebit; paenitentia enim malum factum comitatur; quod quia in sapiente non convenit, ne paenitentia quidem». Quaestio de accidente. Propositio maxima: «cui non inest aliquid, ei ne illud quidem, quod eius est consequens inesse potest». Locus a communiter accidentibus117.

As can be seen, of the five predicables presented by Porphyry in his Isagoge, two act as a function of the locus of those so far discussed: the genus and the species. However, considering that, for Boethius, the difference can be assimilated to the genus, the three predicables are at the service of the discipline of topica, to which now the accident is also added as the sixth locus of the Themistian division. Diagram no. 35 (Appendix, p. 345) illustrates the procedure, which is to start from the subject of the quaestio, namely the «repentance», and then to search for an accident correlated to it («an evil action»), since the two accidents are connected to one another. If, therefore, it is proved that «an evil action» does not suit the wise, contemporaneously it is proved that «repentance» does not suit the wise man. The accident plays the role of a middle term, and for this reason gives the locus its name. The differentia is not identifiable with the particular middle term («an evil action»), but with its universal genus, which in this case is the accident.

117

De top. diff., II, VII, 29, 1190B, pp. 36, 14-37, 4.

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2.7 The loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur After completing the presentation of the six loci that derive from the substance of the terms, the second category of loci is next presented, namely those that take their terms from the outside: «Expeditis igitur locis his, qui ab ipsis terminis in propositione positis assumuntur, nunc de his dicendum est, qui, licet extrinsecus positi, argumenta tamen quaestionibus subministrant. Hi vero sunt vel ex rei iudicio vel ex similibus vel a maiore vel a minore vel a proportione vel ex oppositis vel ex transumptione»118. There are a total of seven of these loci qui exstrinsecus assumuntur, though some can be further subdivided, specifically the loci a rei iudicio, a similibus, a maiore, a minore, a proportione, ab oppositis, and a transumptione. The characteristic of this category of loci derives from something that is established outside the substance of the terms.

2.7.1 The locus a rei iudicio The first locus taken from outside is drawn from the judgment of the thing: Et ille quidem locus qui rei iudicium tenet huiusmodi est: ut id dicamus esse, quod vel omnes iudicant vel plures et hi vel sapientes vel secundum unamquamque artem penitus eruditi. Huius exemplum est «caelum esse volubile, quod ita sapientes atque in astrologia doctissimi iudicaverunt». Quaestio de accidente. Maxima propositio: «Quod omnibus vel pluribus vel doctis videtur hominibus, ei contradici non oportere». Locus a rei iudicio119.

This time judgment acts as a function of the locus, and is placed outside the substance of the terms of the quaestio; and since this locus is 118

Ivi, II, VIII, 1-2, 1190BC, p. 37, 5-9. Ivi, II, VIII, 3, 1190C, p. 37, 9-15. When Boethius, at the end of the second book, provides a brief summary of the entire divisio locorum, he also specifies that the locus a rei iudicio is a locus inartificialis, and is therefore completely separate from the substance of the terms. Cf. ivi, II, XI, 6, 1195A, p. 47, 6-9: «Ex rei vero iudicio quae sunt argumenta quasi testimonium praeebent et sunt inartificiales loci atque omnino disiuncti nec rem potius quam opinionem iudiciumque sectantes». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.10. 119

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substantially the same as Cicero’s locus ab auctoritate, the fundamental characteristic that judgment must possess is authoritativeness120; the latter, in turn, is based entirely on the concept of the probable, the definition of which has already been presented in the first book121. It is necessary to infer that the probable acts as a function of the locus. It is evident that this locus possesses a vis logica inferior to that of the loci presented so far; the logical force, in fact, derives from the authoritative judgment of, returning to a now familiar formulation, that which is granted by all people, or the majority of people, or the wise, or the majority of the wise, or the best known and illustrious wise men, or the specialists in the relevant field. Therefore, it is not the one who argues who takes advantage of this locus, because it is not the result of a logical operation. Rather, the dialectician must categorize and place in order the opinions believed to be true by the classes just mentioned (the majority, the wise, or the experts) since, having a high degree of probability, these opinions can be deduced in support of dialectical argumentation. The argumentatio in the proposed example can be schematized as in Diagram no. 36 (Appendix, p. 345): the maxima propositio is inserted within the syllogism and constitutes the entire major premise. The demonstrative force of the syllogism thus derives entirely from the authoritative judgment of those who are specialists in the subject, in this case the wise and the astrologers.

2.7.2 The locus a similibus The locus a similibus is the second kind that is placed outside the terms of the question:

120

Boethius does not comment in detail on this locus, but important insights are presented in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica. Cf. infra, Chap. 3, § 3.5. 121 Cf. De top. diff., I, VII, 4, 1180CD, p. 16, 7-13: «Probabile vero est quod videtur vel omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus et his vel omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime notis atque praecipuis vel quod unicuique artifici secundum propriam facultatem, ut de medecina medico, gubernatori de navibus gubernandis, et praeterea quod videtur ei, cum quo sermo conseritur, vel ipsi, qui iudicat, in quo nihil attinet verum falsumve sit argumentum, si tantum verisimilitudinem tenet». As was seen, this definition is in turn derived from the one that Aristotle provides about “reputable opinions” that constitute the premises that are the basis of the entirety of dialectic». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.6.2.

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A similibus vero hoc modo: si dubitetur «an hominis proprium sit esse bipedem», dicimus: «similiter inest equo quadrupes, ut homini bipes; non est autem equi quadrupes proprium; non est igitur hominis proprium bipes». Quaestio de proprio. Maxima propositio: «si quod similiter inest non est proprium, ne id quidem de quo quaeritur esse proprium potest». Locus a similibus122.

Similarity can act as a function of a locus; however, it is neither inherent in the substance of the terms, nor does it derive from them, for which reason it is rightly said that this locus is placed outside the terms of the question123. 122

De top. diff., II, VIII, 4, 1190CD, pp. 37, 15-38, 1. Cf. Aristotle, Topica, II, (Engl. transl. p. 191): «Again, look at things which are like the subject in 114b question, and see if they are in like case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge has more than one object, so also will one opinion; and if to possess sight is to see, then also to possess hearing will be to hear. Likewise also in the case of other things, both those which are and those which are held to be like. The rule in question is useful for both purposes; for if it is as stated in the case of some one like thing, it is so with the other like things as well, whereas if it is not so in the case of some one of them, neither is it so in the case of the others. Look and see also whether the cases are alike as regards a single thing and a number of things; for sometimes there is a discrepancy. Thus, if to know a thing is to think of it, then also to know many things is to be thinking of many things; whereas this is not true; for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them. If, then, the latter is not true, neither was the former that dealt with a single thing, viz. that to know a thing is to think of it». Cf. ivi, 115a5-24; 117b10-27; 124a15-20; 136b34-137a8. 123 Cf. Aristotle, Topica, IV, 133a35-133b14 (Engl. transl. pp. 224-225): «Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that are the same in kind fails to be always the same in kind; for then neither will what is stated to be a property be a property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a property of a horse to stand still by his own initiative, it will not be a property of a man to move by his own initiative; for to stand still and to move by one’s own initiative are the same in kind, because they belong to each of them in so far as each is an animal. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if of things that are the same in kind the property is always the same in kind; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) since it is a property of man to be two-footed and terrestrial, it will also be a property of a bird to be two-footed and winged; for each of these is the same in kind, in so far as the one pair are species that fall under the same genus, being under the genus animal, while the other pair are differentiae of the genus, viz. of animal. This commonplace rule is false whenever one of the properties mentioned belongs to some one species only while the other belongs to many, as does terrestrial quadruped». 25-36

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As can be seen in Diagram no. 37 (Appendix, p. 346), this is the first case in which Boethius expresses the maxima propositio in conditional terms, though the argumentatio is then developed in categorical form. The procedure is to start from the subject («being two-footed for a man») and to go in search of what is similar («being four-footed is for a horse»). What is most important to see is that, although «being two-footed» and «being four-footed» are similar, the latter term acts as a locus, while «being twofooted» is the term of the dubia propositio; otherwise the reason why the locus a similibus is placed outside the terms of the quaestio could not be understood. Finally, Boethius points out that the similarities among more things may become clear with reference to two different aspects: «Hic vero in gemina dividitur: haec enim similitudo aut in qualitate aut in quantitate consistit; sed in qualitate similitudo, in quantitate paritas nuncupatur, id est aequalitas»124. Similarity can be measured quantitatively, and in this case it is more appropriate to refer to it as paritas or aequalitas, or with reference to its qualitative aspect, then it is a matter of a similitude understood as an affinity125.

2.7.3 The locus ab eo quod magis est Next comes the presentation of the third locus taken from the res placed outside the terms of the quaestio, namely the locus a maiore: Rursus ab eo quod est magis: si quaeratur «an sit animalis definitio, quod ex se moveri possit», dicemus sic: «magis oportet animalis definitionem quod naturaliter vivat quam quod ex se moveri possit; non est autem haec definitio animalis, quod naturaliter vivat; nec ea quidem, quae minus videtur esse definitio, quod ex se moveri possit, 124

De top. diff., II, VIII, 5, 1190D, p. 38, 1-3. Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, I, 6-7, 79AC, pp. 152, 11-153, 16. 125 When at the end of the second book Boethius summarizes briefly the entire division of the loci, he refers to the locus a similibus and specifies that similitudo may concern the similitudo rei that refers to the qualitative aspect of similitude, or to the ratio proportionis that establishes the quantitative aspect of similitude under. Cf. De top. diff., II, XI, 11, 1194a, pp. 46, 21-47, 1: «In similitudine enim tum rei similitude, tum proportionis ratio continetur». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.10.

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animalis diffinitio putanda est». Quaestio de definitione. Propositio maxima: «si id quod magis inesse videbitur non inest, nec id quidem quod minus inesse videbitur inerit». Locus ab eo quod magis est126.

Although not specified, it is clear that the aim here is to establish a comparison between two terms on the basis of a certain viewpoint, according to which one will be considered greater than the other. As Diagram no. 38, p. 378 shows, the maxima, as in the previous case, is expressed in conditional form, which suggests that the argumentatio may be developed by way of a hypothetical syllogism. Boethius instead develops the argumentatio in categorical form, where it is clear, to a greater extent, that its demonstrative force depends entirely on the maius. The argumentatio starts in fact from the subject of the quaestio, the definition of an animal as «that which can move by itself», and places the latter in comparison with another definition, «that which by nature lives», and it is established that the second is a more appropriate definition than the first; in other words, through the comparatio, the aim is to demonstrate which definition is more or less suitable for expressing the substance of the term «animal». The maius is then a vis logica that is articulated in the argumentatio.

2.7.4 The locus ab eo quod minus est As can easily be inferred, within the comparison, the minor term can act as a function of a locus, giving rise to the locus a minore. Although arising from the same mental operation as comparison, the maius and the minus in the Themistian division constitute two different loci:

126

De top. diff., II, XI, 11, 1194a, pp. 46, 21-27, 1. Averroes, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, attributes to Themistius the following considerations concerning the locus a comparatione: cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât alBaghdâdî», 8, p. 240: «Le trente-sixième lieu est pris de l’addition [...] Thémistius est Thèophraste sont d’avis que la force de ce lieu est très manifeste, car une réalité est plus grande [qu’une autre] car, [de deux réalités], la plus grande est celle qui, [ajoutée à] une même chose, la rend plus grande [que ne le ferait l’autre], et qui, retranchée de cette même chose, la rend, de ce fait, moindre. Et ce lieu est général pour tous le quaesita comparatifs».

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A minoribus vero converso modo. Nam si est hominis definitio «animal gressibile bipes» cumque id minus videatur esse definitio hominis quam «animal rationale mortale», sitque definitio ea hominis, quae dicit «animal gressibile bipes», erit definitio hominis «animal rationale mortale». Quaestio de definitione. Maxima propositio: «si id quod minus videtur inesse inest, et id quod magis videtur inesse inerit»127.

The locus ab eo quod minus est is arranged in a manner exactly opposite to the previous locus. Therefore, once what is less and what is more from a certain viewpoint is established in the comparison, the principle for the solution of the question starting from the minus can easily be deduced, as can be seen in Diagram no. 39 (Appendix, p. 347). This time there is agreement between the maxima and the argumentatio, because both were made in hypothetical form. Starting, then, from the subject of the dubia propositio, the definition of man as a «rational mortal animal» (built from the genus and two specific differences) is compared with the definition «two-footed and capable of walking» (composed of the genus and two accidents); therefore, if the second is a definition of «man», a fortiori, the first one will be so as well. There are very many possibilities for using the loci a maiore and a minore, and in this regard Boethius’s reference to his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica is especially valuable: «Multae autem diversitates locorum sunt ab eo quod est magis et minus argumenta ministrantium, quos in expositione Topicorum Aristotelis diligentius persecuti sumus»128. This affirmation is one of the few surviving testimonia that Boethius composed a commentary on Aristotle’s Topica129. 127 De top. diff., II, VIII, 7, 1191A, p. 38, 11-17. Averroes, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, after emunerating the four loci of the more and the less, reports Themistius’s point of view also. Cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», T. 5, p. 239: «Ces lieux sont, ainsi que le dit Thémistius, composés du semblable et de l’opposé, du fait qu’ils sont semblables par leur rapport au sujet et différent par le plus et le moins». 128 De top. diff., II, VIII, 8, 1191A, pp. 38, 17- 39, 2. 129 In De topicis differentiis Boethius refers at least once more to his translation and commentary on Aristotle’s Topica. Cf. ivi, IV, XIII, 2, 1216D, p. 92, 15-17: «Quo autem modo de his dialecticis rationibus disputetur, in his commentariis, quos in Aristotelis Topica a nobis translata conscripsimus, expeditum est». When Boethius in the first book informs the reader of the difficulty that he himself encountered in

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2.7.5 The locus a proportione The locus a proportione is the fifth type that is placed outside the terms of the question: Item ex proportione: ut si quaeratur «an sorte sint eligendi in civitatibus magistratus», dicamus: «minime, quia ne in navibus quidem gubernator sorte praeficitur». Est enim proportio: «nam ut sese gubernator habet ad navim, ita magistratus ad civitatem». Hic autem locus distat ab eo qui a similibus ducitur: ibi enim una res unicuilibet alii comparatur; in proportione vero non est similitudo rerum, sed quaedam habitudinis comparatio. Quaestio de accidente. Maxima propositio: «quod in unaquaque re evenit, id in eius proportionali evenire necesse est». Locus a proportione130.

The proportio is defined as a habitudinis comparatio, a comparison of the relationship, and it differs from the similitudo, wherein only one of the two terms of the quaestio is considered similar to another term, from the viewpoint of quantity or quality. The proportio, on the other hand, considers the relationship of predication between two terms of the quaestio that are similar to another. It will be useful, in this regard, to refer to the analogy. As can be seen from the example in Diagram no. 40 (Appendix, p. 347), the proportio concerns the relationship that exists between a judge and a city with respect to the election of the former, a relationship considered similar to that between a helmsman and his ship. The proportio is revealed to be in many ways similar to the exemplum; there as well seeking to demonstrate how to reconcile the discipline of topica from the Greek and Latin traditions, he refers to the texts that he used in the study of the Greek tradition with the expression ex Graecis voluminibus (cf. ivi, I, I, 3, 1173B, p. 2, 2-4: «Nec id simpliciter atque uniformiter videtur esse faciendum, verum duplex est tradenda partitio, una quidem ex Graecis voluminibus eruta, altera vero ex M. Tullii Topicis sumpta»). It is therefore reasonable to think that Aristotle’s Topica would constitute at least one of these Greek books mentioned by Boethius, which is significant in terms of research into the sources on which Boethius drew when composing the De topicis differentiis. According to the chronological reconstruction of Boethius’s logical works made by Lambertus De Rijk, Boethius would have composed the translation of the Topica not after 520 A.D., and the commentary or commentaries on this text before 523 A.D. Cf. L. DE RIJK, «On the Chronology», p. 161. 130 De top. diff., II, VIII, 9, 1191AB, p. 39, 2-10. Cf. Aristotle, Topica, II, 114b3711 115b .

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a comparison demonstrates the truth of a given thesis. Boethius in fact affirms that the exemplum derives its principle from the inductio, being a subspecies thereof131.

2.7.6 The locus ab oppositis The sixth type derived from the things placed outside the terms of the quaestio is the locus ab oppositis, which is multi-faceted: Ex oppositis vero multiplex locus est; quattuor enim sibimet opponuntur modis: aut enim ut contraria adverso sese loco constituta respiciunt aut ut privatio et habitus aut ut relatio aut ut affirmatio et negatio. Quorum discretiones in eo libro, qui de Decem praedicamentis scriptus est, commemoratae sunt. Ab his hoc modo argumenta nascuntur132.

Boethius indicates to the reader that a complete presentation of the doctrine of opposites that was theorized by Aristotle is to be found in the last chapters of the Categories133. The terms can oppose each other in four 131

Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.2.4. De top. diff., II, VIII, 10-12, 1191BC, p. 39, 10-15. Cf. Diagrams no. 41-44, Appendix pp. 348-349. Cf. De Divisione Liber, 881D-884B, pp. 18-28; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, IV, 384-387, pp. 180-184; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXXI, 1-8. 133 In the Categories, Aristotle presents the doctrine of the opposites (11b17-14a25), and Boethius in his commentary on the Categories does not neglect this matter: cf. In Aristotelis Categoriae, IV, 264B-283D. There is also a concise reference in Boethius’s commentary on Cicero’s Topica in which he, after having considered Cicero’s division of the contraria on the basis of Aristotle’s division of the opposita, refers to having dealt with the subject in some of his books in the manner of Aristotle, which is a clear allusion to the commentary on the Categories; cf. ivi, IV, 1120D: «nos vero in caeteris quod edidimus libris eo nuncupavimus modo, quo superius in Aristotelis dictum est divisione». It may also be observed that the doctrine of opposition constitutes one of the more important arguments among those that were called by the commentators of the scholastic era postpraedicamenta because they were located in the final chapters of Aristotle’s text, after the categories (cc. 10-15): cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 181-183. Cf. MINIOPALUELLO, The Text of the Categoriae; M. ASZTALOS, Boethius as a Transmitter; ID., «Boethius on the Categories», in A. GALLONIER (ed.), Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs, Actes du Colloque International de la Fondation Singer-Polignac (Paris, 8-12 juin 1999), Peeters, Louvain – Paris 2003, pp. 195-205 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 44). 132

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ways: as opposites, put one facing the other, with regard to the category of opposition; two terms can oppose one another in like manner as privation is opposed to possession; the opposition can also arise from relative terms; finally, two terms can oppose one another in like manner as affirmation is the opposite of negation. Boethius does not detail the differences among these four kinds of opposition; in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, however, where the aim is to show how the Ciceronian division of the contraria differs from that of the Aristotelian opposita, he does go into detail regarding all kinds of opposita. The contraria, as the first species of opposita, are in turn subdivided into two species: the mediata contraria, such as white and black, that admit between them an intermediate state, in this case for instance grey, for which reason it is not necessary that one of the two contraria be inherent in a body, but only such an intermediate state. Conversely, immediata contraria, such as heaviness and lightness, do not possess any intermediate state, so that, when one is present, the other cannot be also present at the same time, as a body for example may be either heavy or light.134 134

Cf. In Top., IV, 1119C-1120A: «Nam quae contraria sunt, partim mediata sunt, partim vero medio carent. Mediata sunt, ut album, nigrum: est enim horum medius quilibet alius color, ut rubeus vel pallidus, et horum contrariorum non necesse est alterum semper inesse corporibus. Neque enim omne corpus aut album aut nigrum est; sed aliquoties in horum medietate est constitutum, ut sit rubrum vel pallidum. Immediata vero contraria sunt quorum nihil medium poterit inveniri, ut gravitas et levitas: horum enim nihil est medium. Nam quae levia sunt, sursum feruntur, quae gravia, deorsum. Quod autem sit corpus quod neque sursum neque deorsum feratur, nihil poterit inveniri. Sed immediata contraria talia sunt, ut alterum eorum cui potest accidere semper inhaereat, ut in proposito superius exemplo. Necesse est enim omne corpus vel leve esse vel grave, quia levitas et gravitas medium non habent, quod praeterea inesse corporibus possit» (Engl. transl. p. 118: «Some contraries admit of an intermediate and some lack an intermediate. Those that admit of an intermediate are, for example, black and white, for there is some other color intermediate between them, such as red or gray. And it is not necessary that one or the other of these contraries always be in bodies, for it is not the case that every body is either white or black; sometimes it is intermediate between these, as when it is red or gray. Exclusive contraries are those for which no intermediate can be found, such as weightiness and lightness, for there is no intermediate for these. Those things which are light are borne upward, and those things which are weighty are borne downward, but it is not possible to find something that is a body and is borne neither upward nor downward. Exclusive contraries are such that one or the other of them always inheres in that to which it can belong, as in the example presented above; for every body must be either light or

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Then there are the opposites called privatio and habitus, deprivation and possession. These terms either indicate the condition in which something that should by nature be present is instead missing, for example, blindness, or indicate the possession of something, for example, sight. The opposites of this category differ from the mediata contraria because they do not admit any intermediate states; they differ also from the immediata contraria because the privatio or habitus must necessarily always be inherent in the subject; for example, if a child is in the mother’s womb, it cannot yet be said whether or not it is blind. Finally, while the contraria always refer to specific qualities, the privationes instead indicate the absence of what should be possessed. In other words, the privationes do not indicate a res, but rather the absence of a res, such as blindness is the absence and therefore deprivation of sight135. weighty, because weightiness and lightness have no intermediate that can also be in bodies»). 135 Cf. ivi, 1120AB: «At ea quae in privatione et habitu sunt, ut caecitas et visus, distant quidem ab his contrariis quae claudunt aliquam medietatem, quod ipsa medietatem non habent; ab his vero contrariis differunt quae sunt immediata, quoniam horum contrariorum alterum semper subiecto inesse est, ut corpori gravitatem vel levitatem; privationem vero et habitum non semper, ut cum sit habitus quidem visus, privatio autem caecitas, non omne quod videri potest, aut videt, aut caecum est: infans quippe nondum editus neque videt, quia nondum processit in luce, neque caecus est, quia nondum habuit visum, quem potuisset amittere. Idem de catulis dici potest, qui statim nati nequeunt intueri, nam tunc eos nec caecos dicere possumus, nec videntes. Et postremo contraria semper in suis qualitatibus considerantur; privationes autem, non quod ipsae sint aliquid, sed ex habitus absentia colliguntur; neque enim caecitas est aliquid, sed a visus intelligitur abscessu» (Engl. transl. pp. 118-119: «Opposites that consist in privation and possession, such as blindness and sight, differ from those contraries which include an intermediate, because they themselves have no intermediate; they also differ from exclusive contraries, since one or another of those contraries must always be in a subject [such as weightiness or lightness in a body], but privation and possession need not always be in a subject. For example, when sight is the possession and blindness the privation, not everything that can see either sees or is blind; for a baby that is not yet born neither sees, since it has not yet come forth into the light, nor is it blind, since it has not yet had sight that it could have lost. The same can be said of the young of animals which are not able to see as soon as they are born, for we are not able to say that they are then either blind or seeing. Finally, contraries are always observed in their own qualities, but privations are obtained from the absence of the possession and not because the privations themselves are anything, for blindness is not anything but is understood from the absence of sight»).

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The relativa are terms that are opposed by virtue of a relationship, and that in turn differ from the contraria, privatio, and habitus because they can exist simultaneously. Their specific characteristic is that they can never exist separately: the existence of one finds its raison d’être in its relationship with the other, for example the terms «father» and «son». However, the contraria, privatio, and habitus relate to one another, but not in the same way; the latter in fact exist based on the mutual relationship of predication that comes from their relationship itself, as for example double and half136. Finally, the contradictoria differ from the contraria and the relativa because they are expressed by means of entire propositions, one affirmative and the other negative, in which only one is true, while the other is necessarily false. The contraria, privativa, and relativa can also be single terms, such as white and black, or blindness and sight; the union of a subject and a predicate is required to obtain two contradictories, such as, «it is day» and «it is not day»137. This is precisely the characteristic of 136

Cf. ivi, 1120BC: «tam vero privatio quam contrarietas differt a relationis oppositione, eo quod neque contraria, neque privatoria simul esse possunt; idem enim in uno eodemque tempore, uno eodemque in loco album et nigrum, videns et caecum esse non poterit; sed relativa a se nequeunt separari, neque enim potest esse filius sine patre, nec servus, si dominus non sit. Amplius, contraria ad se et privatoria non referuntur. Nemo enim dicit album nigri, vel nigrum albi, vel caecitatem visus, vel visum caecitatis. Quae vero in relatione sunt posita in ipsa relationis praedicatione consistunt, ut duplum dimidii, dominus servi, et caetera ad hunc modum» (Engl. transl. p. 119: «Both privation and contrariety differ from the opposition of a relation in that neither contraries nor privatives can exist at the same time, for the same thing cannot be white and black, or seeing and blind, at one and the same time in one and the same place; but relatives cannot be separated from one another, for there cannot be a son without a father, nor can there be a slave if there is not a master. Moreover, contraries and privatives do not hark back to one another, for no one says that a white thing is of a black thing or that a black thing is of a white thing, or that blindness is of sight or that sight is of blindness. Those things which are in a relation, however, exist just in the predication of the relation, as double is double of a half, a master is a master of a slave, and so on»). 137 Cf. ivi, 1120C: «Tam vero contraria quam etiam relationes differunta contradictionibus, quoniam contradictiones quidem semper in oratione consistunt, et in altera earum parte veritas, in altera falsitas invenitur; contraria vero et privatoria et relationes in simplicibus partibus orationis invenitur [ an. inveniuntur?], et in his neque veritas neque falsitas in est. Nam cum dico album, nigrum, caecitas, visus, dominus, servus, simplices orationis partes sunt, neque verum, neque mendacium continentes;

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the two dubious propositions that result from the double alternative of a quaestio: they are called «apophantic» because only one of the two is true, while the other is necessarily false. The respective examples for each of these opposita are now given. The locus a contrario The first locus ab oppositis is the locus ex contrario: «A contrariis: si quaeratur ‘an sit virtutis proprium laudari’, dicam: ‘minime, quoniam nec vitii quidem vituperari’. Quaestio de proprio. Maxima propositio quoniam “contrariis contraria conveniunt”. Locus ab oppositis, id est ex contrario»138. As illustrated in Diagram 41 (Appendix, p. 348), a beginning in simplicibus enim partibus orationis veritas vel falsitas nulla est: cum autem dico dies est, dies non est, utraeque propositiones, una in affirmatione, altera in negatione posita, orationes sunt» (Engl. transl. p. 119: «Contraries as well as relatives also differ from contradictories, because contradictories always consist in sentences, and truth is found in one of the contradictories and falsity in the other. Contraries, privatives, and relatives, on the other hand, are found in simple parts of sentences, and neither truth nor falsity is in them. For when I say ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘blindness’, ‘sight’, ‘master’, ‘slave’, these are simple parts of sentences and contain neither what is true nor what is untrue, for there is no truth or falsity in simple parts of sentences. But when I say, ‘It is day’, ‘It is not day’, both propositions [one presented as an affirmation and the other as a negation] are sentences»). 138 De top. diff., II, VIII, 13, 1191C, p. 39, 15-19. Cf. Aristotele, Topica, V, 135b737 136a ; ivi, 113b15-114a26; ivi, 135b8- 136b14. Regarding the locus a contrariis, Averroes, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, attributes to Themistius the following considerations: cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», T. 11, pp. 242-243: «Le vingt et-unième lieu est pris des contraires. Ce lieu se divise en plusieurs modes, dont les uns sont proches de la natura de la chose, et dont les autres sont notoires et pris des choses qui sont externes. Premièrement, si l’espèce a un contraire, on a de deux choses l’une: ou bien le genre a un contraire ou bien il n’en a pas; et dans le cas où [le genre] n’a pas de contraire, nécessairement l’espèce et son contraire existent dans le genre – sans quoi il ne serait pas un genre. Duexième lieu: si [le genre] a un contraire, il est nécessaire que le contraire de l’espèce soit dans le contraire du genre. Troisième lieu: si le contraire de l’espèce n’existe absolument dans aucun genre mais qu’il soit en lui- même un genre supérieur, alors l’espèce [ellemême] n’aura pas de genre et elle sera, elle aussi, un genre en lui-même supérieur: par exemple si le bien n’est pas une espèce sous un genre, alors son contraire, à savoir le mal, n’aura pas non plus de genre. De ces trois lieux, Thémistius dit qu’ils son proches de la nature de la chose. Il veut dire qu’ils sont vrais, car nécessairement deux contraires seront ou bien sou un même et unique genre, ou bien sous deux genres contraires, ou

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is made therefore from the subject of the quaestio («being praised»), which was considered as an opposite term because it was put in relation to «being blamed». The doubt of the quaestio was thus transferred to the opposite of the predicate, which acted as a function of locus, because if the property of «being blamed» is not inherent in the opposite of the predicate, then its opposite («being praised») cannot also be inherent. The locus ab oppositis secundum habitum et privationem The second way in which two terms can oppose one another concerns the privatio and the habitus: Rursus in quaestione sit positum «an sit proprium oculos habentium videre». Dicam: «minime; eos namque qui vident alias etiam caecos esse contingit; nam in quibus est habitus, in eisdem poterit esse privatio et quod est proprium non potest a subiecto discedere et, quoniam veniente caecitate visus abscedit, non proprium esse oculos habentium videre convincitur». Quaestio de proprio. Maxima propositio quod: «ubi privatio adesse potest, habitus proprium non est». Locus ab oppositis secundum habitum ac privationem139.

As illustrated in Diagram no. 42 (Appendix, p. 348), the subject of the quaestio, «seeing», is considered an opposite term with respect to possession, the deprivation of which is «blindness». The latter acts as a function of locus because, if the term of privation does not really apply bien deux genres pour des choses contraires. Et telle est aussi la situation de l’espèce vis-à-vis de son genre – je veux dire qu’elle tombe nécessairement sous l’une de ces trois divisions. Cela est manifeste par l’induction»; ivi, T. 12, p. 243: «Un autre lieu: se le genre est le contraire d’une chose et que l’espèce ne soit le contraire d’aucune chose, alors on n’a pas affaire à un genre. En effet, si le genre a un contraire, l’espèce aura aussi un contraire, comme c’est le cas de la vertu et du vice, et de la justice et de l’injustice qui entrent sous elles. Thémistius dit que ce lieu est démonstratif et qu’Aristote l’a utilisée en certains endroits. Ainsi, lorsque ce dernier montre que le temps n’est pas un mouvement, en arguant que le mouvement a pour contraire le repos alors que le temps n’a pas de contraire. Ainsi en est-il [encore] de la démonstration par laquelle [Aristote] montre que la composition et l’ordre ne sont pas un genre de l’âme, en arguant que la composition peut avoir pour contraire la non- composition alors que l’âme n’a pas de contraire». 139 De top. diff., II, VIII, 14, 1191CD, pp. 39, 19-40, 6.

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to the subject to which it refers, then its opposite is not valid either. The entire argumentation, therefore, has been made starting from a principle drawn from the term opposite to the subject according to privation, onto which quantity the entire doubt of the quaestio has been transferred. The maxima propositio is the maximal generalization in which the propositional development of the entire syllogism can be included again. The locus a relativis oppositis The third way in which two terms oppose one another is that of the relativa: Rursus sit in quaestione positum «an patris sit proprium procreatorem esse». Dicam «recte videri, quia filii est proprium procreatum esse; ut enim sese habet pater ad filium, ita procreator ad procreatum». Quaestio de proprio. Propositio maxima: «oppositorum ad se relativorum propria et ipsa ad se referuntur». Locus a relativis oppositis140.

Diagram no. 43 (Appendix, p. 349) illustrates how the subject and predicate of the dubia propositio, in this case «being procreator» and «father», are considered related to the terms «being procreated» and «son»; and since all the properties of things that are related are themselves related to each other, «being procreated» relates to «son» precisely as «being procreator» relates to «father». Doubt is thus transferred and resolved through a principle that derives from the relative terms that are part of the quaestio. The locus ex oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem The fourth and last way in which two terms may be in opposition is in terms of affirmation and negation, i.e. the contradictoria: Item sit in quaestione positum «an sit animalis proprium moveri». Negem, «quia nec inanimati quidem est proprium non moveri». Quaestio de proprio. Maxima propositio «oppositorum opposita esse propria oportere». Locus ab oppositis secundum affirmationem 140

Ivi, II, VIII, 15, 1191D, p. 40, 6-11.

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ac negationem; «moveri» enim et «non moveri» secundum affirmationem negationemque sibimet opponuntur141.

As Diagram no. 44 (Appendix, p. 349) illustrates, the subject and predicate of the dubia propositio, in this case «being moved» and «animal», are considered opposites with respect to «not being moved» and «inanimate», since all the properties of the opposites are themselves opposites; thus, if «not being moved» is not a property of what is «inanimate», then neither «being moved» is a property of the animal. The doubt of the quaestio is thus transferred to the opposites of the terms of the quaestio, from which a valid principle for the solution of the quaestio is drawn.

2.7.7 The locus a transumptione The last locus of the things that are placed outside the terms of the question is the locus a transumptione: Ex transumptione vero hoc modo fit, cum ex his terminis in quibus quaestio constituta est ad aliud quiddam notius dubitatio transfertur et ex eius probatione ea quae in quaestione sunt posita confirmantur, ut «Socrates, cum quid posset in uno quoque iustitia quaereret, omnem tractatum ad reipublicae transtulit magnitudinem atque ex eo quod illic efficeret in singulis etiam valere firmavit»142. 141

Ivi, II, VIII, 16, 1191D-1192A, p. 40, 11-16. Ivi, II, VIII, 17, 1192A, p. 40, 16-22. Cf. Aristotle, Topica, II, 112a32-38 (Engl. transl. p. 157): «Moreover, you may attack by reinterpreting a word in respect of its account, with the implication that it is most fitting so to take it rather than in its established meaning: e.g. it is not, as established use has it, the courageous man who is strong-hearted, but rather the man the state of whose heart is strong—just as the man whose arms are strong is strong-armed. Likewise also the man whose star is good is well-starred—as Xenocrates says, he who has a noble soul is well-starred. For a man’s star is his soul». Averroes, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, attributes to Themistius the following: cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû alBarakât al-Baghdâdî», T. 4, p. 238: «Le vingt-quatrième lieu est pris du semblable. Or le semblable est, comme il a été dit précédemment, de deux sortes: ou bien semblable par un accident – par exemple, quand nous disons: si une science une est [science] de plusiers choses, alors une opinion une est [opinion] de plusieurs choses –, ou bien semblable selon une mode de l’analogie – par exemple, quand nous disons: si le rapport du roi à la cité est celui du pilote au naivre, et si le pilote ne doit pas être ivre, 142

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The transumptio is, first of all, a rhetorical figure in which the meaning of a term is explained using one or more metaphors rather than simply through a similar term. Boethius, however, does not seem to use the term transumptio in this way; rather, as he explains, it corresponds to the quest for a more familiar term (notius) able to explain and demonstrate the term of the dubia propositio. It will accordingly be useful to distinguish the characteristic of the term taken from the transumptio, expressed by the superlative adjective notius, from the very similar term attributed instead to the maxima propositio, that is, rather, per se nota. The term of the transumptio is in fact better known from the viewpoint of the one who knows it; the maximae, by contrast, are better known per se. In the proposed example, Socrates demonstrates the meaning of justice by explaining what it means for the republic: if justice is useful for the republic, even more will it be so for individuals. Boethius, however, does not provide the corresponding maxima propositio for this locus, but focuses instead on adding other details: Qui locus a toto forsitan esse videretur. Sed quoniam non inhaeret in his de quibus proponitur terminis, sed extra posita res hoc tantum, quia notior videtur, assumitur, idcirco ex transumptione locus hic convenienti vocabulo nuncupatus est. Fit vero haec transumptio et in nomine, quoties ab obscuro vocabulo ad notius argumentatio transfertur, hoc modo: ut si quaeratur «an philosophus invideat», sitque incognitum «quid philosophi significet nomen». Dicemus ad vocabulum notius transferentes «non invidere qui sapiens sit; notius vero est sapientis vocabulum quam philosophi»143.

First of all, this locus should not be confused with the locus a toto, because the term acquired through the transumptio is not necessarily the genus of the term of the quaestio, but simply a better-known word (notius), and therefore is not inherent in the substance of the terms of the quaestio. alors le roi ne doit pas être ivre. Thémistius propose un deuxème lieu du semblable, et c’est celui qui est pris par voie de substition et de transfert. En effett, lorsque nous voulons montrer [l’appartenence d’une] chose donnée à une réalité donnée et que la démonstration de [cette appartenence] est plus manifeste dans le semblable [de cette réalité], nous transférons cette démonstration au semblable plus manifeste. Et dès que [l’appartenence] de cette notion à [ce semblable] plus caché, à l’instar de ce qu’a fait Platon montrant [appartenence] de la justice à la cité et à l’âme». 143 De top. diff., II, VIII, 18-19, 1192AB, pp. 40, 22-41, 8.

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Moreover, the transumptio can be applied to a term whenever «ab obscuro vocabulo ad notius argumentatio transfertur». For example, if the question is «is the philosopher envious?», the aim is to demonstrate that he cannot envy because he is «wise». The meaning of the word «wise» is in fact better known than that of «philosopher», and if the wise man is not envious, the philosopher is not so either144. 2.8 The loci medii vel mixti The Themistian division of the loci involves a triple classification: the first category is that of the loci qui in quaestione sunt positi, further divided into loci qui ab terminorum substantia ducuntur and loci qui terminorum substantiam consequuntur; the second category is that of the loci qui extrinsecus assumantur; and the third category is that of the loci medii, qui inter utrosque versantur. Then follows the presentation of the loci medii: «Ac de his quidem locis qui extrinsecus assumuntur idonee dictum est. Nunc de mediis disputabitur. Medii enim loci sumuntur vel ex casu vel ex coniugatis vel ex divisione nascentes»145. There are only three loci medii: the locus ex casu, locus ex coniugata, and locus ex divisione.

2.8.1 The locus ex casu The first intermediate locus is the locus ex casu: «Casus est alicuius nominis principalis inflexio in adverbium, ut a ‘iustitia’ inflectitur ‘iuste’. Casus igitur est a ‘iustitia’ id quod dicimus ‘iuste’»146. The casus is defined 144 When Boethius, at the end of the second book, provides a new brief summary of the entire Themistian divisio locorum, he specifies that the locus ex transumptione can be re-connected to equality on the one hand, and to the comparison of the major or minor on the other. Since this locus is absent from the list of Cicero’s loci, specification of it here anticipates how Boethius will make this Themistian locus correspond to the Ciceronian locus a comparatione. Cf. ivi, II, XI, 7, 1195A, p. 47, 9-10: «Transumptionis vero locus nunc quidem in aequalitate, nunc vero in maioris minorisve comparatione consistit». Cf. infra, Chap. 2, § 2.10. 145 Ivi, II, VIII-IX, 20-1, 1192B, p. 41, 8-11. 146 Ivi, II, IX, 2, 1192B, p. 41, 11-13. Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I, 106b29-107a2 (Engl. transl. p. 177): «Moreover, examine the inflected forms. For if ‘justly’ is used in more than one way, the ‘just’, also, will be used in more than one way; for there will be a

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as «inflexio nominis principalis in adverbium», so if the principal noun is «justice», the inflection in the adverb will be «rightly», and this is a rule that can clearly refer to all adjectives as well. The casus can act as a function of the locus when placed in the service of dialectical demonstration; here again, however, Boethius provides neither an example that makes clear exactly how this locus works to build an argumentation nor the corresponding maxima propositio.

2.8.2 The locus a coniugatis The second locus is taken from the coniugata: Coniugata vero dicuntur quae ab eodem diverso modo deducta fluxerunt, ut a «iustitia», «iustum», «iustus». Haec igitur inter se et cum ipsa «iustitia» coniugata dicuntur, ex quibus omnibus in promptu sunt argumenta. Nam «si id quod iustum est bonum est, et id quod iuste est bene et qui iustus est bonus est et iustitia bona est». Haec igitur secundum proprii nominis similitudinem consequuntur147.

In the case of the inflection of the principal noun into an adverb, the inflection of the conjugates evidently concerns the inflection of the principal name into other parts of speech, such as adjectives or nouns. This kind of conjugation is made on the basis of similarity to the corresponding name («secundum proprii nominis similitudinem»), for example, the noun «justice» and the adjective «just» (referring to a noun), or the noun «the righteous man» (referring to a person). If the coniugata are used in the service of the discipline of topica, this means that any quality attributed to a principal noun must also be attributed to all of its conjugates; therefore, ‘just’ corresponding to each ‘justly’; e.g. if ‘justly’ is used of judging according to one’s own opinion, and also of judging as one ought, then ‘just’ also will be used in like manner. In the same way also, if ‘healthy’ is used in more than one way, then ‘healthily’ also will be used in more than one way: e.g. if healthy is what produces health and what preserves health and what betokens health, then ‘healthily’ also will be used to mean ‘in such a way as to produce’ or ‘preserve’ or ‘betoken’ health. Likewise also in other cases, whenever the original term is used in more than one way, the inflexion also that is formed from it will be used in more than one way, and vice versa». Cf. also ivi, 114a27-114b15; ivi, 118a34-39; ivi, 124a10-14; ivi, 136b15-33. 147 De top. diff., II, IX, 3-4, 1192BC, pp. 41, 13-42, 1.

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if «justice is good», «a just thing», «a just man», or «what is done rightly» are also «good». Boethius takes time also to explain why these loci are medii, i.e. why they are placed in an intermediate position with respect to loci inside and outside the substance of the terms of the quaestio: Mixti vel medii vero loci appellantur, quoniam, si «de iustitia» quaeritur, et a casu vel a coniugatis argumenta ducuntur neque ab ipsa proprie atque coniuncte neque ab his quae sunt extrinsecus posita videntur trahi, sed ex ipsorum casibus, id est quadam ab ipsis levi immutatione deductis. Iure igitur hi loci medii inter eos qui ab ipsis et eos qui sunt extrinsecus collocantur148.

The inflection of the principal noun and the similarity with the noun itself are res that are derived neither from the substance of the terms of the quaestio, such as the definition, the description or the interpretation of the noun nor from the substance of the term, such as the genus or the species. These elements may therefore be placed neither among the loci qui ab terminorum substantia ducuntur nor among the loci qui terminorum substantiam consequuntur. On the other hand, the cases of principal nouns and their conjugates are not even entirely separated from the terms of which they are inflections, such as the similar or the opposite; therefore, they cannot even be placed among the loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus. What remains therefore is that these loci, being deduced from their own cases through a levis immutatio of the term, are rightly called medii or mixti because they are placed between the first and second categories of loci. 2.8.3. The locus a divisione The last of the loci medii is the locus a divisione: Restat locus a divisione, qui tractatur hoc modo: omnis divisio vel negatione fit vel partitione. Negatione fit, ut si quis ita pronuntiet: «omne animal aut habet pedes aut non habet». Partitione vero, velut si quis dividat: «omnis homo aut sanus aut aeger est»149. 148

Ivi, II, IX, 5-6, 1192C, p. 42, 2-7. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 63-65, 256-261, pp. 213-216. 149 De top. diff., II, IX, 7, 1192CD, p. 42, 7-10. Hasnawi notes that the main difference between the two lists of loci attributed by Boethius and Averroes to

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A divisio can be made by means of the negatio or the partitio: the divisio per negationem occurs whenever we affirm or deny that a predicate does or does not belong to a subject. The divisio per partitionem is instead made by posing two opposite terms that are mutually exclusive; this is in fact the immediata contraria, where the presence of one excludes immediately the presence of the other; for example, a man is either healthy or sick150. Outside of the species of the divisiones used in the discipline of topica, however, there are also other kinds of divisio: Fit autem universa divisio vel generis in species vel totius in partes vel vocis in proprias significationes vel accidentis in subiecta vel subiecti in accidentia vel accidentis in accidentia. Quorum omnium rationem in eo libro diligentius explicavi, quem De divisione composui. Atque idcirco inde ad horum cognitionem congrua petantur exempla. Fiunt vero argumentationes per divisionem tum ea segregatione quae per negationem fit, tum ea quae per partitionem151.

Boethius therefore takes advantage of the presentation of this locus to recall other species of the universa divisio, namely the divisiones of the genus in species, the totus in partes, the vox in proprias significationes, the accidens in subiecta, the subiectum in accidentia, and, finally, the accidens in accidentia. Boethius dedicated a treatise to the analysis of the universal division, his De divisione, to which he refers the reader152. It is Themistius is regarding the locus a divisione, which is totally absent from Averroes’s list: cf. HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», p. 225: «La grande différence entre ces deux listes est la présence du lieu de la division dans la liste des lieux intermédiaires chez Boèce et son absence dans celle d’Averroès». 150 Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.7.6. 151 De top. diff., II, IX, 8-10, 1192D, p. 42, 10-17. 152 Cf. De Divisione Liber, 877BC, p. 6, 17-26: «Nunc divisionis ipsius nomen dividendum est et secundum unumquodque vocabulum uniuscuiusque propositi proprietates partesque tractandae sunt. Divisio namque multis dicitur modis. Est enim divisio generis in species, est rursus divisio cum totum in proprias distribuitur partes, est alia cum vox multa significans in significationes proprias recipit sectionem. Praeter has autem tres, est alia divisio quae secundum accidens fieri dicitur. Huius est triplex modus, unus cum subiectum in accidentia separamus, alius cum accidens in subiecta dividimus, tertius cum accidens in accidentia secamus (hoc ita fit, si utraque eidem subiecto inesse videantur)». On divisio cf. also In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda,

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necessary, however, to keep in mind that the species of the division in the discipline of topica are only two, the divisiones per negationem and per partitionem. The locus a divisione per negationem Boethius first presents the locus that is taken from the divisio per negationem: «Sed qui his divisionibus utuntur aut directa ratiocinatione contendunt aut in aliquid impossibile atque inconveniens ducunt atque ita id quod reliquerant, rursus assumunt. Quae facilius quisque cognoscet, si Prioribus Analyticis operam dederit»153. The divisio per negationem is undertaken in order to settle the doubt of the quaestio using two possible demonstrative processes, by either applying the directa ratiocinatio (which is after all the principle of noncontradiction), or by demonstrating that which is impossible (impossibile) and contrasting (inconveniens) regarding one of the terms included in the quaestio. In the latter case, the reductio ad absurdum acts primarily through the principle of the excluded middle. The direct source to which Boethius refers for in-depth study of these species of demonstration is Aristotle’s Prior Analytics154. The divisio per negationem a directa ratiocinatione The two species of divisio per negationem are now illustrated with some examples. The first quaestio is solved with recourse to the directa ratiocinatio: Horum tamen in praesens talia praestabunt exempla notitiam. Sit in quaestione propositum «an ulla sit origo temporis». Quod qui negare volet, id nimirum ratiocinatione firmabit «nullo modo esse ortum», idque directa ratiocinatione monstrabit hoc modo: «tempus aut originem habet aut non; sed quoniam mundus aeternus est (id enim paulisper argumenti gratia concedatur), mundus vero sine I, 8, 80A-81B, pp. 154, 9-157, 6. Cf. J. MAGEE, «Commentary», in Boethius De Divisione Liber, ed. and English transl. by J. Magee, Brill, Leiden 1988, pp. 55-170; ID., «The Text of Boethius’s “De divisione”», Vivarium, 32 (1994) 1-50. 153 De top. diff., II, IX, 11-12, 1192D-1193A, pp. 42, 17-43, 1. 154 Cf. Aristotle, Analytica priora, 29a31 ss; ivi, 41a21-38; ivi, 45a23-45b16; ivi, 50a29-38.

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tempore esse non potuit, tempus quoque aeternum est; sed quod aeternum est caret origine; tempus igitur originem non habet»155.

As can be seen in Diagram no. 45 (Appendix, p. 350), the corresponding maxima propositio is not provided for this locus either156. What is of most interest, however, is understanding the role that the divisio per negationem a directa ratiocinatione plays in the demonstrative process. The use of the directa ratiocinatio consists in the choice of defending one’s thesis by dividing it. In fact, a divisio per negationem was essentially placed in the major premise by clarifying the uncertain nature of the quaestio and by positioning both dubiae propositiones («time does or does not have a beginning»). Next, in the minor premise, something is granted that remains to be demonstrated («the world is eternal»). However, once it is assumed that «the world is eternal», the conclusion that «time is eternal» is quickly reached. In sum, the second syllogism simply makes clear the conclusion reached by the first one. The divisio per negationem ad impossibilitatem Consideration is now given to the example in which the solution of the same quaestio proceeds through the divisio per negationem ad impossibilitatem: At si per impossibilitatem idem desideretur ostendi, dicetur hoc modo: «tempus aut originem habet aut non; sed si tempus habet originem, non fuit semper tempus; habet autem originem; fuit igitur, quando non fuit tempus; sed ‘fuisse’ significatio est temporis; fuit igitur tempus, quando non fuit tempus, quod fieri non potest. Non est igitur ullum principio temporis; posito namque, ut ab ullo principium coeperit, inconveniens quiddam atque impossibile contingit, fuisse tempus, quando non fuerit tempus». Reditur itaque ad alteram partem, quod origine careat. Sed haec quae ex negatione divisio est, cum per eam quaelibet argumenta sumuntur, 155

De top. diff., II, IX, 13, 1193A, p. 43, 1-8. Although Boethius does not provide the maxima propositio that corresponds to the locus a divisione per negationem, its content is perfectly compatible with the principle of non-contradiction enunciated by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, 1005b19-20 (Engl. transl. p. 1588): «it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be». 156

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nequit fieri ut utrumque sit, quod affirmatione et negatione dividitur. Itaque sublato uno alterum manet positoque altero reliquum tollitur vocaturque hic a divisione locus medius inter eos qui ab ipsis duci solent atque eos qui extrinsecus assumuntur. Cum enim quaeritur «an ulla temporis sit origo», sumit quidem esse originem et ex ea per propriam consequentiam re ipsa quae quaeritur fit impossibilitatis et mendacii syllogismus. Quo concluso reditur ad prius, quod verum esse necesse est, siquidem id quod ei oppositum est ad impossibile aliquid inconveniensque producitur. Itaque quoniam ex ipsa re de qua quaeritur fieri syllogismus solet, quasi ab ipsis locus est ductus, quoniam vero non in eo permanet, sed ad oppositum redit, quasi extrinsecus sumitur. Idcirco igitur hic a divisione locus inter utrumque medius collocatur157.

As illustrated in Diagram no. 46 (Appendix, p. 350), the corresponding maxima propositio is not expressed for this locus either158. The same divisio per negationem is placed in the major premise as in the previous example, which is accomplished by arranging the opposita secundum affirmationem et negationem, which are contradictoria, since the presence of one excludes that of the other. However, the minor premise takes on the thesis opposite to that which is to be proved: «time has a beginning» generates an impossibilitatis et mendacii syllogismus because the result, when placed in the conclusion, creates a contradiction: «there was a time when time was not», in which the same thing is simultaneously denied and affirmed. By showing the falsity of the thesis that is opposite the one for which proof is sought, the impossible (because contradictory) syllogism demonstrates simultaneously the truth of the thesis to be defended. In other words, the attempt is made to demonstrate one side of the quaestio by showing the absurdity and contradiction of the opposite side159. 157

De top. diff., II, IX, 14-19, 1193AC, pp. 43, 8-44, 10. Although the content of this maxima is not expressed, it can easily be referred to the principle of the excluded middle enunciated by Aristotle in his Metaphysica, 1011b23-24 (Engl. transl. p. 1597): «there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate». 159 Boethius has already spoken about the opposites and, going back to the Aristotelian division, divided them into four categories; the fourth of these is the opposita secundum affirmationem et negationem, the defining characteristic of which is being constituted by an entire proposition, rather than by a single term, as is the case with the other opposita. Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.7.6. 158

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Finally, this locus is placed between the loci medii because the demonstration is made by means of res that are in some way connected with the substance of the terms of the quaestio, but are at the same time placed outside it. The locus a divisione per partitionem The discipline of topica also makes use of the divisio per partitionem: At vero hi qui ex partitione sumuntur duplici fiunt modo; aliquotiens enim quae dividuntur simul esse possunt, ut si vocem in significationes dividamus, omnes simul esse possunt, veluti cum dicimus: «amplector», aut actionem significat aut passionem utrumque simul significare potest. Aliquotiens velut in negationis modo quae dividuntur simul esse non possunt, ut «aut sanus est aut aeger». Fit autem ratiocinatio in priore quidem modo divisionis, tum quia omnibus adest quod quaeritur vel non adest, tum vero idcirco alicui adesse vel non adesse, quod aliis adsit aut minime. Nec in his explicandis diutius laboramus, si Priores Resolutorii vel Topica Aristotelis diligentis ingenium lectoris instruxerint160.

First of all, it is necessary to keep in mind that the divisio concerns always one of the two terms of the quaestio, for which reason the parts arising from this division are the parts of a term. There are also two species of divisio per partitionem, namely that in which the divided parts may all coexist simultaneously; an example would be voice and its significations, in terms of which a verb such as «embrace» can have two meanings, one active and one passive, and both meanings coexist when the term is enunciated. The second species of divisio per partitionem is that in which the divided parts cannot co-exist, in this case, the immediata contraria, the example being that a man is either healthy or sick161. In turn, the first species of the divisio per partitionem can be explained in two ways: either the parts of the term that has been divided are all 160

De top. diff., II, IX, 20-22, 1193CD, p. 44, 10-20. This occurs also in the divisio per negationem, though there is a difference between it and the divisio per partitionem: in the former, the divided parts are constituted by the entire proposition (the opposita secundum affiirmationem et negationem); in the latter, by constrast, the divided parts are only terms (the opposita called immediata contraria). 161

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present or are all absent, or only some of the divided parts are present, regardless of whether they are or are not also present in other things. Both of these typologies of the divisio per partitionem are used in the discipline of topica, and Boethius scrupulously refers the reader to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics and Topica for further details on the subject. An example is now provided to show how the divisio per partitionem can be used to build an argumentatio. This is the first species of divisio, that in which the divided parts are all present in the term that is part of the quaestio: Nam si quaeratur «utrum canis substantia sit» atque hanc divisionem faciat collocutor: «canis vel latrabilis animalis est vel marinae belluae vel caelestis sideris nomen» demonstretque per singula et «animal latrabile substantiam esse, marinam quoque belluam et sidus substantiae posse supponi» monstravit «canem esse substantiam». Atque hic quidem ex ipsis in quaestione propositis videbitur argumenta traxisse162.

As shown in Diagram 47 (Appendix, p. 351), a divisio per partitionem of the subject of the quaestio («dog») is made first, after which it becomes apparent that the predicate is inherent in all its parts, so that it is plainly inherent in the subject of the quaestio. The example for the second species of divisio per partitionem, regarding the case in which the divided parts cannot co-exist, is as follows: At in talibus syllogismis: «aut sanus est aut aeger; sed sanus est; non est igitur aeger; sed sanus non est; aeger igitur est; vel ita: sed aeger est; sanus igitur non est; vel ita: sed aeger non est; sanus igitur est» ab his quae sunt extrinsecus sumptus est syllogismus, id est ab oppositis. Idcirco ergo totus hic a divisione locus inter utrosque medius esse perhibetur, quia, si in negatione sit constitutus, aliquo modo quidem ex ipsis sumitur, aliquo modo vero ab exterioribus venit. Si vero a partitione argumenta ducantur, nunc quidem ab ipsis, nunc vero ab exterioribus copiam praestant163.

Starting from a quaestio «is the man healthy, or not?», a reply is given by making a division in the major premise using the immediata contraria, 162 163

Ivi, II, IX, 23, 1193D-1194A, pp. 44, 20-45, 5. Ivi, II, IX, 24-25, 1194A, p. 45, 5-14.

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where the presence of one excludes the presence of the other. There are then four possible situations that may arise once the divisio per partitionem is placed in the major premise: Maior propositio: «the man is either healthy or sick». Minor propositio, «but he is healthy». Conclusio: «so he is not sick». Minor propositio: «but he is not healthy». Conclusio: «so he is sick». Minor propositio, «but he is not sick». Conclusio: «so he is healthy». Minor propositio: «but he is sick». Conclusio: «so he is not healthy». Finally, the reason for placing the locus a divisione between the loci medii is repeated. The parts into which the term is divided are certainly related to the term itself; however, in relation to the terms of the quaestio from which they are derived, these loci are placed outside the substance.

2.9 Themistius: diligentissimus scriptor Graecus After presenting all the loci, Boethius informs the reader about the source from which he has drawn his list: «Et Graeci quidem Themistii, diligentissimi scriptoris ac lucidi et omnia ad facilitatem intelligentiae revocantis, talis locorum videtur esse partitio»164. The list of loci therefore belongs to Themistius, who certainly wrote paraphrases of Aristotle’s Topica, Categories, and Prior Analytics; and though, unfortunately, these texts were lost, his paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics does survive165. The second book of the De topicis differentiis is therefore a 164

Ivi, II, X, 1, 1194AB, p. 45, 15-17. The fact that Themistius adopts the genus of the paraphrase and that his interest is directed to Aristotle’s works suggests that he was a Peripatetic; the testimony of Photius (IX century A.D.) regarding a commentator on Themistius, Aristotle, and 165

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valuable witness for the reconstruction of Themistius’s paraphrase. In this regard, as has been seen, another source is certainly the commentary on Aristotle’s Topica composed by Averroes, who repeatedly mentions the Themistian conception of loci. Boethius and Averroes thus remain today the only sources available for reconstructing Themistius’s conception of the discipline of topica, a reconstruction that is in turn extremely important for understanding the way in which the doctrine of Aristotle’s Topica was received and transformed over the centuries.

2.10 The divisio locorum At the end of the second book, Boethius offers a fresh, brief summary of the entire Themistian division of the loci: Quae cum ita sint, breviter mihi locorum divisio commemoranda est, ut nihil praeterea relictum esse monstretur, quod non intra eam probetur inclusum. De quo enim in qualibet quaestione dubitatur, id ita firmabitur argumentis, ut ea vel ex his ipsis sumantur quae in quaestione sunt constituta vel extrinsecus ducantur vel quasi in confinio horum posita vestigentur. Ac praeter hanc quidem divisionem nihil extra inveniri potest. Sed si ab ipsis sumitur argumentum, aut ab ipsorum necesse est substantia sumatur aut ab is quae eam consequuntur aut ab his quae inseparabiliter accidunt vel eis adhaerent et ab eorum substantia separari seiungique vel non possunt vel non solent. Quae vero ab eorum substantia ducuntur, ea aut in descriptione aut in definitione sunt et praeter haec a nominis interpretatione. Quae vero ea velut substantias continentia consequuntur talia sunt, ut vel generis, [vel differentiae] vel integri, vel specierum vel partium loco circa ea quae inquiruntur assistant. Item vel causae, vel efficientes vel materiae vel finis vel formae, vel effectus vel corruptiones vel usus vel quantitates vel tempus vel modi vel locus. Quod vero proprie inseparabile vel adhaerens accidens nuncupatur, id in communiter accidentibus numerabitur. Et praeter haec quid aliud cuiquam inesse possit non Plato is ambiguous. In general, the Neoplatonists of the school of Alexandria never seem to have had an interest in Aristotelian dialectic nor therefore in the Topica; there is in fact no mention by the exponents of this school before Boethius’s De topicis differentiis.

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potest inveniri. Quibus ita positis inspiciamus nunc eos locos, quos dudum extrinsecus pronuntiabamus assumi. Ea enim quae extrinsecus assumuntur non sunt ita separata atque disiuncta, ut non aliquo modo quasi e regione quadam ea quae quaeruntur aspiciant. Nam et similitudines et opposita ad ea sine dubio referuntur, quibus similia vel opposita sunt, licet iure atque ordine videantur extrinsecus collocata. Sunt autem haec: similitudo, oppositio, magis ac minus, rei iudicium. In similitudine enim tum rei similitudo, tum proportionis ratio continetur. Omnia enim similitudinem tenent. Opposita vero in contrariis, in privationibus, in relationibus, in negationibus constant. Comparatio vero maioris ad minus quaedam quasi similium dissimilitudo est. Rerum enim per se similium in quantitate discretio maius facit ac minus. Quod enim omni qualitate omnique ratione disiunctum est, id nullo modo poterit comparari. Ex rei vero iudicio quae sunt argumenta quasi testimonium praeebent et sunt inartificiales loci atque omnino disiuncti nec rem potius quam opinionem iudiciumque sectantes. Transumptionis vero locus nunc quidem in aequalitate, nunc vero in maioris minorisve comparatione consistit. Aut enim ad id quod est simile aut ad id quod est maius aut minus fit argumentorum rationumque transumptio. Hi vero loci, quos mixtos esse praediximus, aut ex casibus aut ex coniugatis aut ex divisione nascuntur. In quibus omnibus consequentia et repugnantia custoditur166. 166

Ivi, II, X-XI, 2-8, 1194B-1195A, pp. 45, 17-47, 14. (See Diagram no. 57, p. 356). With regard to Boethius’s last affirmation, that the consequentia and the repugnantia reside in the intermediate loci («Hi vero loci, quos mixtos esse praediximus, aut ex casibus aut ex coniugatis aut ex divisione nascuntur. In quibus omnibus consequentia et repugnantia custoditur»), both Niel Green-Pedersen and Sten Ebbesen consider the possibility that this is Boethius’s addition, in which he preserves traces of a tradition that linked the loci with hypothetical syllogisms. Cf. GREEN-PEDERSEN, The Tradition of the Topics, pp. 78-81; EBBESEN, «The Theory of Loci in Antiquity and the Middle Ages», in K. JACOBI (ed.), Argumentationstheorie, op. cit., pp. 32-33: «The way to understand obscure passages in Boethius is to translate them back into Greek. Consequentia, or consequence, and repugnantia, or incompatibility, obviously render akolouthia and mache. Akolouthia is the relation holding between antecedent and consequent of a true conditional; mache the relation holding between the constituent propositions of a true exclusive disjunctive. Conditionals and disjunctive propositions are the species of hypothetical proposition that most hypothetical syllogism build on. Two of the three loci in which Boethius says that consequence and incompatibility are preserved do actually involve a relation of consequence (a casibus, a coniugatis) whereas the

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In this summary, the division of Themistius’s loci first of all involves a triple classification that distinguishes among loci taken from the res placed inside the terms of the quaestio (loci qui in quaestione sunt positi), those drawn from the res placed outside the terms of the quaestio (loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur), and those taken from the res placed in an intermediate position between the other classes (loci medii, qui inter utrosque versantur). The loci qui in quaestione sunt positi are in turn further divided into two categories, those derived from the res of the substance of the terms (loci qui a terminorum substantia ducuntur), and those derived from the res that follow from the substance of the terms (loci qui terminorum substantiam consequuntur)167. 1. Loci qui in quaestione sunt positi: 1.1 Loci qui a terminorum substantia ducuntur: third builds on a relation of incompatibility (a divisione). Thus Boethius’ remark about middle loci is likely to be another case of his preserving traces of a tradition that linked topics with hypothetical syllogistic and used topical differentiae in an analysis showing how the relations of consequence or incompatibility between the constituent propositions of one hypothetical, i.e. complex, proposition can be grounded in relationship obtaining between the terms of those propositions». 167 Hasnawi has collected first all the similarities and the differences between the list of the loci attributed to Themistius by Boethius and Averroes, and then between the lists of Boethius and Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî; for his conclusions, see HASNAWI, «Boèce, Averroès et Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî», pp. 231-232: «Que nous apprennent ces comparaisons entre Boèce et Averroès d’une part, et entre le premier et Abû alBarakât d’autre part? Certainement, qu’une source thémistienne – ce que sans Boèce on n’aurait pas su aussi immédiatement – s’est réfractée différemment chez ces trois auteurs. Ce qui est sûr aussi, c’est que le mode de réfraction de cette source rapproche Abû alBarakât de Boèce, et le “eloignent” tous deux d’Averroès. Les deux hypothèses les plus plausibles pour expliquer un tel état de choses semblent être les suivantes: ou bien un même texte de Thémistius est à l’origine des trois témoignages que nous avons sous les yeux, les différences entre eux s’expliquant par un chemin de transmission différent et / ou par un travail de l’un, ou de plus d’un, des auteurs sur sa source; ou bien ce sont deux textes différents de Thémistius qui ont inspiré Averroès d’une part, Boèce et Abû al-Barakât d’autre part. Cette dernière hypothèse n’est pas impossible; elle l’est d’autant moins que, comme l’on a vu plus haut, les données des bibliographes arabes suggèrent la possibilité de l’existence de deux textes de Thémistius traitant de la topique. Le texte qui a inspiré Averroès proviendrait alors d’une introduction à une paraphrase des Topiques par Thémistius, dans le style des paraphrases que ce dernier a faites d’autres œuvres d’Aristote; alors que le texte qui a inspiré Boèce et Abû al-Barakât serait une œuvre originale, peut-être plus brève, et où la classification des lieux serait plus étendue que dans l’introduction de la paraphrase des Topiques. Cette œuvre serait L’examen des lieux».

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1) A definitione 2) A descriptione 3) A nominis interpretatione 1.2 Loci qui terminorum substantia consequuntur: 4) A toto: vel a genere, vel ab integro 5) A partibus: vel a generis speciebus, vel ab integri partibus 6) A causis: vel ab efficentibus causis, vel a materia, vel a fine, vel a forma 7) Ab effectibus, vel a generationibus, 8) A corruptionibus 9) Ab usibus 10) A communiter accidentibus 2.

Loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur:

11) 12) 13) 14) 15)

A rei iudicio A similibus: vel in quantitate, vel in qualitate A maiore A minore Ab oppositis: vel a contrariis, vel secundum privationem et habitum, vel relativis, vel secundum affirmationem et negationem 16) A proportione 17) A transumptione 3.

Loci medii vel mixti:

18) A casu 19) A coniugatis 20) A divisione: vel per negationem, vel per partitionem The final considerations are the most important: Sed ea quidem, quae ex definitione vel genere vel differentia vel causis argumenta ducuntur, demonstrativis maxime syllogismis vires atque ordinem subministrant, reliqua vero verisimilibus ac dialecticis. Atque hi loci, qui maxime in eorum substantia sunt de quibus in quaestione dubitatur, ad praedicativos ac

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simplices, reliqui vero ad hypotheticos et conditionales respiciunt syllogismos168.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the loci ex definitione, ex genere vel differentia, and ex causis have a demonstrative force far superior to that of all other loci. In fact, they are used especially in the construction of demonstrative syllogisms, i.e. in the sciences, and are developed mainly in categorical or predicative form. Conversely, all other loci are developed mainly by means of dialectical syllogisms according to hypothetical forms. Boethius confirms these observations in the first book, when he says that the discipline of topica by its nature serves not only dialecticians and rhetoricians, but also philosophers, because the principle of the argumenta necessaria is contained in that very discipline, which indicates where the loci of the argumenta probabilia are found169. The second book concludes with an explanation of the reason why these loci should be understood as the differentiae of the maximae propositiones: Expeditis igitur locis et diligenter tam definitione quam exemplorum luce patefactis dicendum videtur quomodo hi loci maximarum sint differentiae propositionum idque brevi; neque enim longa disputatione res eget. Omnes enim maximae propositiones vel definitionem continent vel descriptionem vel nominis interpretationem vel totum vel genus vel partes vel species vel cetera, quibus differunt inter se maximae propositiones. Nam in eo, quod sunt maximae, non differunt, sed in eo, quod haec quidem a definitione, illa vero a genere, aliae veniunt ab aliis locis, et his iure differre hique earum differentiae dicuntur. Sed quoniam Themistii divisio patefacta est, nunc ad M. Tullii transeamus170.

Every maxima propositio differs from every other based on the content that each is able to convey; some concern the definition, others the genus, and so on. The substance, that is, the genus, of all the maximae propositiones is nevertheless the same, namely the per se notum. The difference that distinguishes these propositions, therefore, though substantial, is understood as a constitutive one because, when the genus 168

De top. diff., II, XI, 8, 1194A-1196A, p. 47, 14-20. Cf. Introd. Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.7. 170 De top. diff., II, XII, 1-4, 1196AB, pp. 47, 21-48, 3. 169

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is divided, the differentiae constitute the maximae propositiones, being at the same time instruments that enable their collection, ordering, and memorization. The student who learns a new discipline needs a strategy that will facilitate acquiring the contents of the subject, and this need is met by the maximal propositions. Finally, it is to be noted that Boethius is able to treat the entire list of Themistian loci in a fairly limited space. The reason perhaps is once again to be found in the eminently didactic purpose of the text: the strategy of the ars topica was probably already known in schools, so the concern was to provide a list of the Themistian loci that was heretofore unknown to the Romans. After all, for those who knew this art well, a list of loci in diagram form would have been sufficient to encapsulate the entire discipline.

CHAPTER THREE THE THIRD BOOK OF THE DE TOPICIS DIFFERENTIIS

3. The division of Cicero’s loci The third book begins with the exhibition of the division of the loci according to Cicero. In the first book, Boethius indicates the source from which he has drawn this division, namely Cicero’s brief Topica, on which he composed a long commentary in six books1. Since both Cicero’s treatise and Boethius’s commentary, at least for this second list of loci, survive, scholars are privileged to possess not only the source from which Boethius drew his material, but also his entire interpretation of Cicero’s text. Boethius’s commentary analyses each locus in depth, and each example is organized and explained in detail. This direct comparison makes it possible to affirm with certainty that Cicero never presented, neither in the Topica nor in another text, any maxima propositio. Rather, Boethius’s choice of attributing to Cicero the use of the maximae propositiones and their differentiae is undoubtedly a matter of great originality that emerges from his experience as a commentator. It is not, therefore, entirely unreasonable to think that Boethius wrote this commentary with the De topicis differentiis in mind, since the purpose of this latter text is in fact to demonstrate the 1

Cf. De top. diff., I, I, 3, 1173B, p. 2, 2-4: «Nec id simpliciter atque uniformiter videtur esse faciendum, verum duplex est tradenda partitio, una quidem ex Graecis voluminibus eruta, altera vero ex M. Tullii Topicis sumpta». On Cicero’s Topica, cf. REINHARDT, «Commentary»; RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica; K. REILEY, Studies in the Philosophical Terminology of Lucretius and Cicero, Columbia University Press, New York 1949; S. E. SMETHURST, «Cicero’s Rhetorical and Philosophical Works: A Bibliographical Survey», Classical World, 51 (1957-1958) 1-4, 24, 32-41; D. A. INFANTE, «The Influence in a Topical System on the Discovery of Arguments», Speech Monographs, 38 (1971) 125-128; M. WINTERBOTTOM, «The Integri of Cicero’s “Topica”», The Classical Quarterly, 46 (1996) 403-410; S. TOULMIN, The Use of Argument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003; RUBINELLI, Ars topica. Since Boethius has dedicated a long commentary to Cicero’s Topica, in this third book of the De topicis differentiis he often presents the Ciceronian loci in an overly synthetic way, so it will be necessary to refer from time to time to Boethius’s commentary to understand thoroughly his conception of the Ciceronian loci.

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basic equivalency of the Ciceronian and Themistian loci2. However, it will be Boethius’s interpretation of Cicero’s Topica that ensures that this latter text is considered during the Middle Ages as more of a dialectical than a rhetorical work.

3.1 Cicero’s locus In the previous chapter, the specific way in which Boethius intended to identify the Ciceronian locus with the Themistian locus was discussed in some detail3. It is, however, only at the end of the third book that Boethius will finally accomplish one of the two objectives declared in the intentio operis, that of demonstrating how both divisions are contained in one another4. The beginning of the third book thus prepares the reader for an understanding of this difficult operation: Quod locorum differentias varie multipliciterque tractamus nihil mirum diligentibus ingeniis videri debet, cum manifestum sit unamquamque rem multis saepe differentiis atque in varias divisionis figuras posse partiri. Nam quia singulas res non una, sed saepe plures differentiae comprehendunt, necesse est ut secundum differentiarum varietatem fiat etiam diversitas divisionum, ut numeri nunc eas colligimus differentias, quod alii sint pares, alii vero impares, nunc vero quod alii primi atque incompositi, alii secundi atque compositi. Triangulorum etiam multis modis fieri partitionem geometricae disciplinae tenor ostendit. Id tamen in omnibus pervidendum est, si nihil extra in qualibet divisionis forma relinquatur, nihil ultra superfluum ac praeter quam necesse est aggregetur5.

The difference that exists between the division of the Ciceronian and Themistian loci should not be understood as substantial in nature, for it is 2

In the commentary on Cicero’s Topica there are several points where it is evident that Boethius was already writing the De topicis differentiis. Cf. Introd., note 12. 3 Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.3. As was seen, Boethius defines the two Themistian loci (the maxima propositio and its differentia) using the definition of the Ciceronian locus (as a sedes argumenti) and provides his reasons for this identification in his commentary on Cicero. Cf. In Top., I, 1052D-1053B. 4 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.2. 5 De top. diff., III, I, 1-3, 1195BC, p. 48, 5-16.

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simply a different way in which the same subject can be divided. There are many criteria by which the species that belongs to a certain genus may be identified, and so also there are many ways in which this genus may be divided. Numbers, for example, can be classified as odd or even, prime and not composite, secondary and composite and so on. The same is true in geometry regarding the division of triangles6. It therefore comes as no surprise that the division of Cicero’s loci that will soon be presented differs from that of Themistius; what requires verification is that, when starting from the specific criterion with which each division was made, nothing superfluous has been added. On the other hand, the effective achievement of the intentio operis depends on proceeding precisely from this starting point: Qua in re quid mirum videri debet, si, cum antea secundum Themistium locorum differentias dederimus, nunc diversas secundum M. Tullium depromamus? Cuius proposita breviter partitione atque exemplis convenientibus expedita, tum demum quid differat vel quo congruat superius digestae divisioni, quomodo etiam altera claudat alteram commemorabo. Nam, cum M. Tullius omnem logicam facultatem, quam rationem diligentem disserendi dixit, duas habere partes proposuerit, unam inveniendi, alteram iudicandi, cumque locos esse definierit argumenti sedes, de quibus scilicet argumenta promuntur, argumentum etiam rationem, quae rei dubiae faciat fidem, divisionem locorum omnium facit hoc modo7.

The fact that there are different criteria by which the maximae propositiones may be classified means that there are multiple differentiae into which the maximae propositiones may be collected. The systematic order in which Boethius proceeds is tightened, in that the presentation of the contents of the third book is already fixed. After the presentation of all the Ciceronian loci through appropriate examples, attention is then directed toward how the two divisions converge, how they differ, and how, again, the one can in turn be contained in the other. This manner of presentation also 6 The reference to the discipline of geometry is not random, since at the end of the third book Boethius uses as an example the different ways in which the division of triangles may occur in the process of explaining how the Themistian and Ciceronian divisions of loci are contained in each other. Cf. infra, Chap. 3, § 3.7. 7 De top. diff., III, II, 1-2, 1195CD, p. 49, 1-11.

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recalls terminology that traces back to Cicero, specifically the expression diligens ratio disserendi with which he refers to the science that the ancient Peripatetics called logic; it recalls his distinction, within the science of logic itself, of the two faculties of an ars inveniendi and an ars iudicandi8; his definition of locus as an argumenti sedes; and, finally, his definition of the argumentum as a ratio quae rei dubiae faciat fidem9. After this brief introduction, there follows immediately the presentation of the division of Cicero’s loci: «‘Ex his’, inquit, ‘locis, in quibus argumenta inclusa sunt, alii in ipso haerent de quo agitur, alii assumuntur extrinsecus’. Duas igitur species locorum fecit: alios enim in ipsis quaestionum terminis haerere proposuit, alios extrinsecus assumi»10. Cicero has therefore divided the loci into two species, rather than three as did Themistius; these are the «loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur», which is placed inside the very terms of the quaestio (the subject or the predicate), and the «loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur», which is placed outside the terms of the quaestio. In his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius provides valuable indications regarding the nature of Cicero’s locus:

8

Boethius has already introduced and explained at the beginning of the text the Ciceronian meaning of ratio disserendi as well as the division of ars inveniendi and ars iudicandi. Cf. supra, Introd. and Chap. 1, § 1.1. 9 The concept of locus, understood as an argumenti sedes, has already been presented in both the first and second books. Boethius, however, attributes Cicero’s definition of locus to Themistius, though he still has not explained exactly what Cicero’s meaning is. Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3 and Chap. 2, § 2.3. The definition of argumentum, along with its division, is introduced and commented on in the first book. Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.6.1 and §1.6.2. 10 De top. diff., III, II, 3, 1195D, p. 49, 11-14. Cf. Cicero, Topica, 8, p. 118, 2930: «Sed ex his locis in quibus argumenta inclusa sunt alii in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent, alii assumuntur extrinsecus» (Engl. transl. p. 119: «But of those Places in which the arguments are contained, some are attached to the subject under discussion itself, others are drawn from without»); Id., De oratore, II, 39, 162-166, pp. 170-171; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, V, X, 23-94; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 474, pp. 236, 23-237, 7: «Argumentum est ratio, quae rei dubiae fidem facit. Res dubia est intentio et depulsio, vel ratio et infirmatio rationis. Cum enim obieceris ‘occidisti’, ut doceas, argumentatione firmabis, maxime cum negatur. Etiam ipsum ‘non occidi’ exigit argumentum, licet ad faciendam fidem etiam illa, quae inartificialia nominantur, debeant adhiberi, ut tabulae, testimonia, quaestiones, quae post discutienda servabo. Nunc argumenta tractentur, quae aut in negotio, de quo agitur, posita sunt, aut illud attingunt».

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With this settled, we should understand the thing at issue as one of the terms in the question, either the predicate or the subject. Since these in themselves are things, they cannot themselves be an argument, but they can have within them that in which arguments are gathered and which is understood to be the seat of arguments. Although these apparently inhere in the terms at issue, they are nevertheless not yet arguments but are rather places or Topics embracing arguments and establishing them as it were on a natural foundation. The same must be said of the Topics taken from without. These Topics are exterior to and somewhat distant from the terms of the proposition; they are things of a sort, but they enclose an abundance of arguments11.

The first specification is the most important: when Cicero uses the expression «ipsum de quo agitur», he intends to refer to the subject and the predicate of the dubia propositio that are in themselves res («per se res sunt»)12. The terms, in fact, since they are voces significativae, refer directly 11 In Top., I, 1055CD (Engl. transl. p. 38): «Hoc igitur praemisso intelligamus ipsum de quo agitur quemlibet terminum in quaestione propositum, sive praedicatum, sive subiectum, qui cum per se res sint, ipsi quidem argumentum esse non possunt, habere autem in se quaedam possunt, in quibus argumenta sint collocata, et quae sedes argumentorum esse intelligantur. Quae quidem cum terminis his de quibus agitur inhaerere videantur, nondum tamen sunt argumenta, sed quasi iam argumenta complectentes loci, et velut naturali sede condentes. Idem de iis locis qui extrinsecus assumuntur dicendum est, ipsi namque positi sunt exterius et quodammodo a propositionum terminis ablegati, et res quaedam sunt, sed intra se argumentorum copiam claudunt». 12 This affirmation corresponds essentially to the definition of the nomen and of the verbum given in Boethius’s commentary on Aristotle’s Categories: the ten categories indicate the ten possible ways in which reality can be signified by means of the vox, through the mediation of the conceptio. Cf. In Aristotelis Categorias, I, 160A: «Est igitur huius operis intentio de vocibus res significantibus, in eo quod significantes sunt pertractare»; In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio secunda, 395AB, p. 7, 9-27: «Erunt ergo interpretationis duae primae partes nomen et verbum. His enim quidquid est in animi intellectibus designatur; his namque totus ordo orationis efficitur. Et in quantum vox ipsa quidem intellectus significat, in duas (ut dictum est) secatur partes, nomen et verbum, in quantum vero vox per intellectuum medietatem subiectas intellectui res demonstrat, significantium vocum Aristotele numerum in decem praedicamenta partitus est. Atque hoc distat libri huius intentio a praedicamentorum in denariam multitudidem numerositate collecta, ut hic quidem tantum de numero significantium vocum quaeratur, quantum ad ipsas attinet voces, quibus significativis vocibus intellectus animi designentur, quae sunt scilicet simplicia quidem nomina

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to the animi conceptiones of which they are an enunciation, and indirectly to the res included within the animi conceptiones. The term itself, therefore, cannot be an argumentum; there is rather something that is inherent in the term itself and that is not identified with it, and this is the locus that forms the sedes naturalis for the argumenta. The «loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur», therefore, are such because they are placed inside the terms of the quaestio. Likewise but conversely, the «loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur», despite being taken from res («res quaedam sunt»), are nevertheless placed outside the terms of the quaestio. Boethius provides further clarification: To summarize briefly, the thing at issue is just one of the terms in the question. But these terms cannot be arguments, nor can any argument be drawn from them. Hence the terms located in the question are neither arguments nor Topics, but only things. Furthermore, anything inhering in what is at issue is obviously itself a thing but contains in itself an abundance of arguments, so that when it is appropriate to take an argument, from it, it acts as a Topic. Thus if someone contemplates it in its own right, it is a thing, but if someone seeks to base an argument on it, it becomes a Topic13.

He again focusses his attention on the necessary distinction between the term («ipsum de quo agitur») and what is inherent within it (the locus). et verba, ex his vero conpositae orationes: praedicamentorum vero haec intentio est: de significativis rerum vocibus in tantum, quantum eas animi medius significet intellectus». Cf. J. MAGEE, Boethius on Signification and Mind, Brill, Leiden – New York – København – Köln 1989; S. EBBESEN, «Medieval Theories of Language», in E. CRAIG (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 5, Routledge, London – New York 1998, pp. 389-414; ID., «Boethius on the Metaphysics of Words», in A. GALLONIER (ed.), Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs, Actes du Colloque International de la Fondation Singer-Polignac (Paris, 8-12 juin 1999), Peeters, Louvain – Paris 2003, pp. 257-275 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 44). 13 In Top., I, 1055D-1056A (Engl. transl. p. 38): «Ut brevi sententia colligam, ipsum de quo agitur nihil est aliud nisi quilibet in quaestione terminus collocatus. Hi argumenta esse non possunt, neque ab his trahi aliquod argumentum. Quo fit ut termini ipsi qui in quaestione sunt positi, nec argumenta, nec loci sint, sed tantum res. Rursus ea quae in iis haerent de quibus agitur, ipsa quidem res esse manifestum est, sed claudunt in se argumentorum copiam, ut cum ex his sumi aliquod oporteat argumentum, locorum vice fungantur. Itaque si quis per se ea speculetur, res sunt; si quis ab iis aliquod argumentum quaerat educere, loci fiunt».

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The term, when viewed in itself, is a res that refers indirectly to another res that exists in reality and is therefore included within the animi conceptio (for example, the term «man»). However, there is something inside the term capable of acting as a function of the locus, i.e. something able to assume the same res, but from a universal point of view, such as, for example, its definition («mortal rational animal») or its genus («animal»). The definition or the genus assume therefore the res indicated by the term from a universal point of view, and being res universales by nature they are also able to act as a function of loci from which to draw argumenta. The distinction between the term and the locus is shown starting from the simple observation that «nothing can be inherent in itself», for which reason that which is inherent in the term should be different from the term itself: «For nothing could inhere in itself, and therefore that which inheres in something is different from that in which it inheres»14. It is possible to find confirmation of what is said here in the third book at the end of the second book of the commentary on the Topica, where, once the first presentation of all the loci is complete, Boethius again analyses the term locus15: Every element is a principle of the thing whose element it is judged to be, since the elements must hold the place of a principle for the thing that arises from them. Therefore since the Topics designated above are “principles” of a sort for arguments (for they themselves contain 14

Ivi, I, 1056CD (Engl. transl. p. 39): «nihil enim in se ipso haerere potest, ac per hoc quod in aliquo haeret ab eo in quo haeret diversum est». 15 For Cicero’s text, which is the subject of Boethius’s commentary, cf. Cicero, Topica, 25, p. 126, 7-12: «His igitur locis qui sunt expositi ad omne argumentum tamquam elementis quibusdam significatio et demonstratio [ad reperiendum] datur. Utrum igitur hactenus satis est? Tibi quidem tam acuto et tam occupato puto. Sed quoniam avidum hominem ad has discendi epulas recepi, sic accipiam ut reliquiarum sit potius aliquid quam te hinc patiar non satiatum discedere» (Engl. transl. p. 127: «So the Places which we have expounded are as it were basic principles which can indicate and point the way to any argument. So is this enough? For someone who is as acute and as busy as you, I imagine it is. But because I have asked such a greedy soul to this banquet of learning, I shall entertain him in such a way that something is left over, rather than let you go away from here unsatisfied»). Cicero therefore, after concluding the first brief presentation of the nineteen loci, observes how they are like an elementary [elementum] principle, a direction, or a sign [significatio], and an indication [demonstratio] for the discovery of the arguments.

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arguments, and everything that contains something is a principle of what it contains), Cicero says that the Topics he presented above appear as if they were elements of a sort for arguments. And he added very cautiously, “as if they were elements of a sort”, for the Topics adopted to produce arguments are not entirely elements but resemble elements in a way, since they seem to be principles of a sort for arguments. In general, every element is a minimal part of the thing of which it is an element, and it conjoins the thing produced from the elements as if it were a part, as, for example, letters conjoin a phrase. A Topic, however, is not a part of an argument but rather the whole of it. For it is a sort of indication and demonstration given in order to find an argument16.

To explain what a locus is, Cicero uses three different terms: elementum, significatio, and demonstratio. Just as the elementum is a principle of that of which it is an element, so also the loci are principles because they contain within themselves the development of argumenta, and that which contains something is at the same time the principle of that which is contained within it. Thus, for example, consonants and vowels are the principles of words, since words are formed only through the combination of the former with the latter. Boethius, however, is concerned to clarify that the term elementum, in referring to the locus, is to be understood in exclusively metaphorical terms («quasi quaedam elementa [sunt]»). The elementum is in fact able to represent always and only a part of that which it connects, such as letters, which, taken in isolation, would not be able to refer to a word that they form once they have been put together. On the contrary, the locus is not only a part of the argumentum it produces, but also constitutes its 16 In Top., II, 1083AB (Engl. transl. p. 74): «Omne elementum principium est eius rei cuius elementum esse perpenditur. Nam eius quod ex elementis fit, ipsa elementa necesse est loco esse principii; ergo quoniam hi loci superius designati argumentorum quasi quaedam principia sunt (ipsi enim sunt qui continent argumenta; omne autem quod continet, eius quod continetur principium est), idcirco ait Cicero veluti quaedam elementa argumentorum videri locos eos quos superius posuit. Cautissimeque adiecit, quasi quaedam elementa; non enim integre elementa, sed quasi in similitudine elementorum sunt ii loci qui in argumentis efficiendis sumuntur. Idcirco quoniam argumentorum quaedam videntur esse principia, alioqui elementum omne, minima pars eius est cuius elementum est, et id quod ex elementis efficitur, partis invicem coniungit, ut litterae orationem. At vero locus, non pars argumenti, sed totum est. Est enim significatio quaedam, et demonstratio ad reperiendum argumentum data, ut si locum respexeris, noveris ubi conditur, unde duci debeat argumentum».

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entirety («locus, non pars argumenti, sed totum est»). This interpretation of the locus enables us to assimilate it to the genus, which, being a causative principle, and even dividing itself, is able to indicate the entire substance of the species that derive from its division. The relationship between the locus and the argumenta is therefore comparable to that between the genus and its species. Cicero’s metaphors of the significatio and demonstratio instead seem to refer to what Theophrastus indicated in the Aristotelian τόπος under the name of «instruction», according to the testimony of Alexander of Aphrodisias17. Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor as the leader of the School of Athens, had thus distinguished within the Aristotelian τόπος the «instruction» (παράγγελμα) from the real τόπος, where the latter is the logical «law»18. Thus, if the metaphor of the elementum highlights the nature of the locus as a principle, the metaphors of the significatio and demonstratio instead seem to refer to its intentional nature, while the name by which the locus is called represents in fact an instruction regarding where to find the argumentum, for example a toto19. In this regard, therefore, Cicero’s locus, being constituted only by the name (a toto, a partium enumeratione, etc.), indicates the proper direction for finding the argumentum. The metaphors of the significatio and demonstratio, such as that of the elementum, are also insufficient to express the total meaning of the locus. These metaphors are only, so to speak, a mere «indication» of the fruitful direction from which to approach a particular destination; the locus, rather, sums up in itself the entire path. This means that the intuition of the pure intentionality of a locus represents already in itself the discovery of the entire solution of the quaestio: the argumentum and the argumentatio do nothing but reveal what has been already acquired through a simple and unitary vision of the real.

17

Cf. supra, Introd., § 4.1.2. Cf. PINBORG, Logik und Semantik; DE PATER, Les Topiques d’Aristote; ID., «La fonction du lieu». 19 Cf. De top. diff., I, VII, 26, 1182C, pp. 19, 22-20, 3: «Quocirca topicorum pariter utilitas intentioque patefacta est. His enim et dicendi facultas et investigatio veritatis augetur. Nam quod dialecticos atque oratores locorum iuvat agnitio, orationi per inventionem copiam praestat; quod vero necessariorum doctrinam locorum philosophis tradit, viam quodammodo veritatis illustrat». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.7. 18

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3.2. The divisio locorum Returning to the third book of the De topicis differentiis, Cicero’s division of the loci according is again taken up: Atque eos quidem qui in ipsis haerent de quibus quaeritur tali divisione partitur: «in ipso», inquit, «tum ex toto, tum ex partibus eius, tum ex nota, tum ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur. Extrinsecus autem ea dicuntur, quae absunt longeque disiuncta sunt». Post haec eum locum qui ab affectis ducitur in convenientia membra partitus est hoc modo: «alia enim eius», inquit, «sunt coniugata, alia ex genere, alia ex forma, alia ex similitudine, alia ex differentia, alia ex contrario, alia ex coniunctis, alia ex antecedentibus, alia ex consequentibus, alia ex repugnantibus, alia ex causis, alia ex effectis, alia ex comparatione maiorum aut minorum aut parium». Quorum quidem omnium et natura breviter attingenda est et exempla ponenda20. 20

De top. diff., III, II, 4-8, 1195D-1196C, pp. 49, 15-50, 6. Cf. Cicero, Topica, 8, p. 118, 30- 33: «In ipso tum ex toto, tum ex partibus eius, tum ex nota, tum ex iis rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur. Extrinsecus autem ea ducuntur quae absunt longeque disiuncta sunt» (Engl. transl. p. 119: «Attached to the subject under discussion are arguments drawn from the whole, from its parts, from etymology, and from those things which are somehow related to the subject at issue. Arguments drawn from outside are those which stand apart and are clearly dissociated»); Id., De oratore, II, 39, 163-164, pp. 170, 17-171, 7: «qui illi sedes et quasi domicilia omnium argumentorum commonstret et ea breviter inlustret verbisque definiat. Quid enim est in quo haeret qui viderit omne, quod sumatur in oratione aut ad probandum aut ad refellendum, aut ex sua sumi vi atque natura aut adsumi foris? ex sua vi, cum aut res quae sit tota quaeratur, aut pars eius, aut vocabulum quod habeat, aut quippiam, rem illam quod attingat; extrinsecus autem, cum ea quae sunt foris neque haerent in rei natura, colliguntur»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 474, p. 237, 5-18: «Nunc argumenta tractentur, quae aut in negotio, de quo agitur, posita sunt, aut illud attingunt. In ipso tum totum, tum pars eius, tum nota, quam Graeci etymologiam dicunt; attingunt vero negotium, quae ad id relativorum ratione ducuntur. Et sunt numero tredecim: a coniugatis, a genere, a forma vel specie, a simili, a differenti, a contrario, a coniunctis, ab antecedentibus, a consequentibus, a repugnantibus, a causis, ab effectis, a comparatione. Cuius sunt partes tres: maiora, minora, paria. Apparet in omnibus relativam inesse rationem; nam coniugatum alterum alteri nominatur, et genus et species ad se relata fiunt. Ipsum etiam simile alicuius assimile est, et omnes loci argumentorum non ex se, sed ex alio nomen accipiunt»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 125, 1-4: «Divisio topicorum, sive locorum ex quibus argumenta ducuntur:

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The category of «loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur» is formed by the loci ex toto, ex partibus, and ex nota, together with the category of «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur». In turn, the latter category includes fifteen loci: ex coniugatis, ex genere, ex forma, ex similitudine, ex differentia, ex contrario, ex coniunctis, ex antecedentibus, ex consequentibus, ex repugnantibus, ex causis, ex effectis, ex comparatione maiorum, ex comparatione minorum, and ex comparatione parium. Nothing is said yet about the «loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur», except that they constitute a res completely separate from the terms of the quaestio. As soon as all the loci have been commented upon, the reason for this will be clear, since the category of the «loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur» is formed by only one locus, the locus a rei iudicio, which is entirely constituted of the probable21. Cicero’s loci therefore appear to number nineteen in total.

3.3 The loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur 3.3.1 The locus a toto22 The first category of the «loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur» is the locus a toto: Eorum igitur locorum qui in ipso de quo agitur haerent primum esse dixit a toto. Totum autem uniuscuiusque rei in definitione alia in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent – nonnulla dicuntur affecta quae quodammodo ex rebus aliis tracta noscuntur – alia assumuntur extrinsecus»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, xxx, 1, 8-12: «Topica est disciplina inveniendorum argumentorum. Divisio Topicorum, sive locorum ex quibus argumenta dicuntur, triplex est. Nam alia in eo ipso, de quo agitur, haerent; alia, quae dicuntur affecta, quae quodammodo ex rebus aliis tracta noscuntur; alia, qua adsumuntur extrinsecus». 21 Cf. De top. diff., III, IV, 1, 1199C, p. 57, 10-11: «Restat is locus, quem extrinsecus dixit assumi. Hic iudicio nititur et auctoritate et totus probabilis est nihil dixit assumi». Cf. infra, Chap. 3, § 3.5. 22 For the locus a toto of Cicero’s Topica: cf. Cicero, Topica, 26-27, p. 126, 16-27. For a commentary on Cicero’s text, cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 53-79; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 256-273. The sections of Boethius’s commentary that are dedicated to the analysis of the locus ex toto are: In Top., I, 1059B-1060B; ivi, II, 1090D-1108B.

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constituit. Omnis enim definitio rei quam definit adaequatur; quod si unaquaeque res tota est (nihil enim integrum esse nisi totum potest), definitione quoque totum esse necesse est, id est quae totam rei quam definit substantiam claudit. Definitio vero est oratio, quae uniuscuiusque rei quidem esse designat. Ab hac ita ducitur argumentum, ut si sit quaestio «an arbores quoque animalia sint», dicam: «animal est substantia animata sensibilis; at arbor non est substantia animata sensibilis»; concludam: «non sunt igitur arbores animalia». Quaestio de genere. Maxima propositio: «unde definitio abest, inde illud quoque abesse quod definitur». Locus a definitione23.

The term totum indicates the whole, or the substance of the term, where the latter can be fully expressed only through the definition. This means,

23 De top. diff., III, III, 1-3, 1196CD, p. 50, 7-18. Boethius makes clear that the conception of the Ciceronian definition differs from the Aristotelian one. Cf. In Top., III, 1091D-1092A: «Aristotele vero eodem paene modo definitionem determinat, dicens: definitio est oratio quid est esse significans» (Engl. transl. pp. 85-86: «Aristotle delimited definition in almost exactly the same way: a definition is an expression signifying the being-what-it-is»); Aristotle, Topica, I, 102a2-5 (Engl. transl. p. 169): «A definition is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence. It is rendered in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a name, or of a phrase in lieu of another phrase; for it is sometimes possible to define the meaning of a phrase as well». Cf. also Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 164, p. 171, 7-11: «Si res tota quaeritur, definitione universa vis explicanda est sic: si maiestas est amplitudo ac dignitas civitatis, is eam minuit, qui exercitum hostibus populi Romani tradidit, non qui eum qui id fecisset populi Romani potestati tradidit»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 475, pp. 237, 19-238, 8: «Igitur totum, quod dubium discutitur, definiri primitus oportebit, et sic argumenta tractari hoc modo: sit res dubia ‘utrum utilis eloquentia videatur’. Eloquentia totum est; [in] totum igitur definiendum est sic: ‘eloquentia est bene dicendi scientia. Bene dicere autem utile est; utilis igitur eloquentia’. Cui loco tractando subsidio est Dialectica, quam nuper audistis, per quam cognitum puto, quid sit genus, quid species vel differentia, proprium, accidens ceteraque, quae eius praecepta tenuerunt. Tamen haec ut potero breviter strictimque percurram»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 125, 4-8: «Argumenta quae de eo ipso de quo agitur haerent: a toto – a partibus – a nota. Argumentum a toto est, cum definitio adhibetur ad id quod quaeritur, sicut ait Cicero: ‘Gloria est laus recte factorum, magnorumque in republica fama meritorum’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 1-2, 12-17: «Argumenta, quae in eo ipso, de quo agitur, haerent, in tribus divisa sunt. Prima, a toto; secunda, a parte; tertia, a nota. Argumentum a toto, cum definitio adhibetur ad id, quod quaeritur, sicut ait Cicero (Marcell. 26): ‘Gloria est laus recte factorum magnorumque in republica fama meritorum’».

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therefore, that the locus a toto is taken from the definition: «definitio vero est oratio quae uniuscuiusque rei quidem esse designat». Each term has in fact a definition able to express everything that is its substance. The definition thus coincides with the very thing that is defined, since it is able to show its essence. The term placed in the quaestio expresses a reality considered individually and separately. To find the definition, the intelligentia should further separate the thing from its definition, i.e. distinguish what is learned individually from what is instead understood universally; thus, for example, in the case of the word «man», the definition («mortal rational animal») is interior to it and still needs to be made explicit. The definition, in fact, in showing the genus and the specific differences of the res, divides, distributes, and manifests that which is understood on a particular level24. 24

In the commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius dedicates a long section to the analysis of the definition of the locus a toto; very important is the section of the commentary on the distinction between the term, its definition, and the locus a toto. Cf. In Top., I, 1084AC: «Sed haec differentia ipsum est quod confuse ac singulariter intelligitur, ut homo, in eo inest totum suum, quod est definitio ipsius; igitur totum, ab eo quod ipsum est, intelligentia separatur, quod illud quidem singulariter intelligitur, hoc vero sub generis ac differentiarum enumeratione monstratur. Dividit enim definitio atque dispertit, totumque patefacit quod in re ipsa singulariter intelligebatur; de partibus quoque eadem ratio est. Si enim ad membrorum multitudinem, vel specierum omnium enumerationem, singularem termini referas intellectum, statim ipsius ac partium differentias comprehendas» (Engl. transl. pp. 75-76: «The differentia between a Topic and the thing asked about is this. The thing asked about is the thing understood as taken in isolation from other things and undifferentiated [for example, man]; its whole, which is the definition, is in it. Our understanding separates the whole of a thing from the thing itself, because the thing itself is understood as taken in isolation; but the whole of the thing is shown by the enumeration of a genus and differentiae, for a definition divides, distributes and reveals the whole that in the thing itself was understood in isolation from other things. The same reasoning applies also to parts, for if you were to compare the concept of a term taken in isolation to the multitude of its members or to the enumeration of all its species, you would immediately grasp the differentiae between the thing itself and its parts»). Boethius presents his theory on the definition extensively in other texts also. In his first commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, regarding the definition of very general genera (the ten Aristotelian categories), Boethius observes how the genera, though they are not by nature subject to definition (because they are the genera from which all things come), need in any case to be explained and understood, for which reason it is possible to give only a description of them; the term used to indicate this genus of definition is subscritivae rationes («eorum subscriptivam quamdam et demonstrativam rationem reddi necesse est»). Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio prima, I, 15, 27A-28A, pp. 42, 8-43, 5. In his

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Thus, just as, ontologically, every res has its own substance, in the same way, logically, each term hides within itself its own definition25. Therefore, when the definition of a term acts as a function of a locus, this means that the term is considered from a universal point of view, i.e. according to the whole that is its substance. In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius presents the most important rule for the formation of the definition: the ratio definiendi26. The definition consists of the genus, or of second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, a different way is instead specified in which either the definitio or the descriptio is able to show the substantiae ratio. Cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, I, 7, 79CD, pp. 153, 7-154, 2. 25 Cicero in the Topica presents only two kinds of definition, divisio and partitio, on which, however, Boethius imposes a quadripartite classification, according to which a definition is obtained (1) when its substantial parts (substantiales partes) are revealed; (2) when its properties (proprietatis partes; that is, the descriptio) are enunciated; (3) when the parts of the whole (totius membra) are enumerated; and (4) when its species are divided and enumerated. Each of these definitions differs from the other on the basis of the parts of which the definition is formed. In this way, Boethius shows that the definition in the strict sense (definitio substantialis) and the descriptio must be attributed to the definition for divisio; a definition instead does not always correspond to the partitio (understood either as the division of the totum in partes or as the division of the genus in species). In fact, only if the enumerated partes are exclusively related to what is defined can a partitio also be a definitio. From this text, it is clear that Boethius’s concern is to attribute to the definition only that which is directly related to what is defined, either substantially or accidentally; cf. In Top., III, 1096C-1097D. Finally, to complete the presentation, Boethius adds the list of the fifteen definitions exhibited by Victorinus in his De definitionibus, in the process, however, criticizing him for having included in his list some definitions that cannot be classified as such; for example, the first three Ciceronian loci (a toto, a partium enumeratione, a nota) are all intended by Victorinus as forms of substantial definition, while for Boethius only the first locus is attributable to the substantial definition. Cf. In Top., III, 1098A-1110B. For a critical edition of Victorinus’s text, cf. P. HADOT, Marius Victorinus: recherches sur sa vie et ses œuvres, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1971, pp. 329-362. For a synthesis of the list of Victorinus’s definitions, cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 187-191. 26 Cf. In Top., III, 1101A «Est autem una atque omnibus communis definiendi ratio, ut ex communitatibus inter semet iunctis atque compositis in unam proprietatem rei definitio colligatur. Omnia enim quae communia atque universalia sunt, si quid eis fuerit adiectum, determinatione minuuntur, et ad particularitatem redeunt, atque eo ambitu quo concludebant cuncta, cohibentur, veluti cum generi adjicitur differentia, et fit species» (Engl. transl. p. 96: «Common to all definitions is one formula for defining: a definition of a thing is gathered from common characteristics joined with one another and together making up one nature. For if something is added to any common and universal things, they are diminished by being bounded and are reduced

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the characteristics that the res has in common with the other res that, once joined to each other, form a single property. When the specific difference is added to the genus, the universal undergoes a sort of reduction, since the genus is determined, i.e. delimited and brought back to the particularity. The res are therefore defined when they are contained within a limit that is, precisely, the definition able to contain the whole that is its substance. To find a definition involves therefore a double operation, since after an addition there will be a subtraction; for example, to define the term «man», it is necessary first of all to deduce the genus to which it belongs («animal»), which also contains other species. If the specific difference («rational») is added to this genus, the universal «animal» will be determined and taken back to the particularity. In fact, «rational animal» has a predicative extension less than the universal «animal» because the latter includes both the «rational» and «irrational» difference. The addition of the difference must be made until the definition becomes equal, which means interchangeable or convertible with the defined. The rule of convertibility thus guarantees that the definition be perfectly interchangeable with the defined, while the operations of addition and subtraction, represented by the genus and the specific difference, are aimed at conferring on the definition the same semantic extension as the defined. Since the locus a toto is constituted by the definition of the term, it is necessary that the definition satisfy a fundamental «topical rule»: since it must always refer to the term taken in its total meaning, so it must always be constituted of parts that are closely related to the term. The example given by Boethius in the third book of the De topicis differentiis is the same shown in the second book for Themistius’s locus a definitione, although with a different maxima propositio27. As can be seen in Diagram no. 48 (Appendix, p. 351), starting from the predicate of the dubia propositio («animal»), its definition («sensitive animated substance») is formulated; but «where the definition is lacking, to particularity, and they are confined by the boundry in which they enclose everything, as, for example, when a differentia is added to a genus and a species arises»). 27 Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.5.1. The fact that, for a locus, two different maximae propositiones are given confirms that the same locus may contain multiple maximae. Such is the case with the examples of the Themistian loci, and for the articulation of each Ciceronian locus; the various elements presented by Boethius are shown in the diagrams in the appendix, namely quaestio, dubia propositio, differentia, maxima propositio and argumentatio.

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what is defined is also lacking». This means that, if the definition of «animal» does not fit the word «tree», then a «tree» is not an «animal». The term «animal» and its definition are in fact the same thing. The maxima propositio is the maximal generalization within which the two premises and the conclusion of the syllogism can be contained, while the definition of «animal» plays the role of middle term able to re-join the major term («animal») with the minor term («tree») of the dubia propositio28.

3.3.2 The locus a partibus29 The second category of the «loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur» is the locus a partibus: Partes vero sunt quarum conventu efficitur totum. Partes etiam vocantur quae dividunt totum; hae autem species vel formae nuncupari solent. A quibus hoc modo sumitur argumentum, ab his quidem partibus, quarum coniunctione componitur totum hoc modo: ut si sit dubitatio «an sit anima corporea», partiemur animam velut his tribus partibus, quod «vel vegetabilem vim vel sensibilem vel intelligibilem 28 It is worth mentioning, once again, that Cicero never in his treatise refers to any maxima propositio. Rather, all the maximae attributed to Cicero by Boethius in the third book of the De topicis differentiis, as well as in his commentary on Cicero’s text itself, were probably considered necessary to show the basic concordance between the division of Cicero’s loci and that of Themistius. In the commentary on Cicero, Boethius presents moreover at least two other formulations of the same maxima propositio. Cf. In Top., I, 1060A: «omnia quae definitioni alicuius coniunguntur, ipsa quoque illis quorum definitio est, ex necessitate copulari» (Engl. transl. p. 43: «all things conjoined to the definition of something are necessarily also united with the things defined»); ivi, I, 1060AB: «Quibus aliquorum definitio iungitur, eisdem necessario ea quae definiuntur aptantur» (Engl. transl. p. 43: «things defined are necessarily suited to anything to which the definition of those things is joined»). Michael Leff has drawn attention to the fact that Cicero never conceives of the loci in propositional form; cf. LEFF, «The Topics of Argumentative Invention», p. 30: «Aside from his analysis of a few Stoic concepts, Cicero totally ignored the proposition, and he did not use the predicables as the basis for organizing the topics». 29 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 33-34, p. 132, 1-14. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 80-84; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 272-273. For the sections of the Boethian commentary dedicated to the locus a partium enumeratione: In Top., I, 1062B-1064B; ivi, IV, 1108C-1110D.

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praestet»; at neque ipsum «vegetare» neque «sentire» neque «intelligere» corporale est; cumque nulla sit pars animae corporalis, omnino «anima corporalis non esse» monstrata est. Quaestio de genere, id est «an anima corpori subiciatur ut generi», argumentum a partibus. Maxima propositio: «a quibus partes absunt, totum quoque abesse». Argumentum a partibus totum coniungentibus30.

The parts can be of two kinds: either the partes that from their union result in the composition of a whole, or the species that divide the whole that is represented by a genus. The enumeration of the partes or the division of the species represent two of the possible articulations in which thought is activated to know the real. However, as has been said for the definition, it is necessary to specify that the term and the partes are not the same thing because, although both indicate the same res, the term refers to the res from a particular point of view, while the partes assume a universal point of view. It is of great significance for one who engages in an argument to have clearly in mind all the differences that exist between the partes of the partitio and the species of the divisio. Among the many differences shown in the commentary on Cicero’s Topica, it is particularly important 30

De top. diff., III, III, 4-5, 1196D-1197A, pp. 50, 18-51, 9. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 165, p. 171, 11-15: «Sin pars, partitione hoc modo: aut senatui parendum de salute rei publicae fuit, aut aliud consilium instituendum, aut sua sponte faciendum: aliud consilium superbum, suum adrogans; utendum igitur fuit consilio senatus»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 481-482, pp. 238, 28-239, 20: «A parte vero argumentum non ad totum probandum ducitur, sed ad aliam partem, quae continet quaestionem. Nec enim probata pars totum probat, ut puta, si oculus videt, non ideo totum corpus videt, cum refutetur totum videre corpus; sed dialecticus iste tractatus est. Nunc quemadmodum argumentum a parte ad partem sumatur, ostendam ‘si pedes, si bracchia tueri debemus, utique oculos diligentius asservare’. Cuius argumenti loco incurrere aliquando et aliud potest, quod maiore ad minus ducitur. Nec tamen ideo principalis argumenti ratio perturbatur, quia geminari aliqua argumenta natura permittit. Hoc saepe contingere et in figuris solet, de quibus postea nobis erit dicendum. Fit nonnumquam et hoc modo a partibus argumentum, cum inducta partitione et propositis partibus pluribus ceteris refutatis aliquam concludimus partem, in qua sit quaestio constituta, ut si dicamus ‘equum hunc, quem habes, aut emisti aut dono accepisti, aut natus est domi aut furatus es. Non autem emisti nec dono tibi datus est neque natus est domi: furatus es igitur’»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 125, 8-10: «A partibus est argumentum cum is qui se defendit aut negat factum, aut factum esse iure defendit»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 3, 17-19: «A partibus est argumentum, cum is, qui se defendit, aut negat factum, aut factum esse iure defendit».

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to recall that, while the partes can be either finite or indefinite in number, there is always a finite number of species31. Consequently, when the partes of the term in question are finite in number, it would be a serious mistake for one engaged in an argument to omit some of them in the enumeration; conversely, when there is an indefinite number of partes, a person engaged in the argument would reduce his inaccuracy if he were to forget to enumerate some of them32. The opposite happens in the case of the divisio of the species: since these are always finite in number, omission of some would compromise the argumentation33. 31 All the differences between the partes and the species enumerated by Boethius in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica are reported in the second chapter of this book with reference to Themistius’s locus a partibus. It is clear that they are valid also for Cicero’s locus a partibus. Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.6.2 32 Cf. In Top., IV, 1108D-1109A: «In iis igitur partibus quae sunt paucae ac facile sub intelligentiam cadunt, vel maximum vitium est, si partiendo aliquid relinquatur. In iis vero quarum, ut ipse ait, infinitior numerus est, et confusior perspectio minus vitiosum est, si qua dividentem pars in enumeratione praetereat» (Engl. transl. p. 106: «With regard to the parts that are few in number and readily grasped by the understanding, it is certainly a serious fault if any is omitted in the process of partition. But with regard to the parts that are more indefinite in number and less distinguishable from one another by observation, it is a less serious fault if the person who is making the division misses a part in his enumeration»). Cf. ivi, IV, 1110A: «At si divisionem facias, id est formarum a genere partitionem, summum est vitium aliquid praetermittere, quoniam cum sit finitus formarum numerus, si quid omissum sit, inscitia praeteritur» (Engl. transl. p. 107: «If you do make a division [that is, a partition of kinds from a genus], the worst fault is to omit any, because since there is a limited number of kinds, the omission of any is a result of ignorance»). 33 Cf. ivi, IV, 1109BC: «At si quis genus dividat, perniciosum est aliquam praeterire formam, quoniam formarum finita quantitas est. Nam quia semper in contrarium dividuntur, aut duae sunt semper species generis, aut tres, et tunc tres, cum ea tertia, quae sumitur, ex contrariorum permixtione perficitur, ut si colorem dividamus, dicendum est ita. Coloris aliud est album, aliud nigrum, aliud medium. Idque medium ex albi coloris ac nigri commistione coniunctum est, quamvis in quamlibet aliam coloris speciem transferatur, seu purpurei, seu rubri, seu viridis» (Engl. transl. p. 106: «But if someone divides a genus, it is ruinous if any kind is omitted since the number of kinds is limited. For since genera are always divided into contraries, there are always two or three species of a genus. [There are three species when the third species adopted is produced from a mixing together of contraries]. For example, if we divide color, we should speak in this way: With regard to color, some is white, some is black, and some is intermediate. The intermediate is made up of a mixture of white and black colors, no matter what other species of color is referred to, whether purple, red, or green»).

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The locus a partibus totum coniungentibus The first example relates to the partes that connect a totum, as outlined in Diagram no. 49 (Appendix, p. 352). Starting from the subject of the quaestio («the soul»), the parts of which it is composed have been enumerated («vegetative, perceptive, and intelligible»). Since the number of parts is finite, it is necessary that none be omitted; in fact, if it is demonstrated that the predicate is not inherent in any of the parts of which the whole (that is, the subject) is composed, it is demonstrated simultaneously that the predicate is not inherent in the subject in any way34. The maxima propositio, placed outside the syllogism, contains the development of the premises and the conclusion. Finally, the partes of which the subject is composed play the role of middle term separating the major term («corporeal») from the minor term («soul») of the dubia propositio, while the constitutive differentia, placed on a higher level because it is more universal, is simply called a partibus. The locus a partibus totum dividentibus The second example presents a quaestio solved using the division of the species of a genus: Item ab his partibus quae totum dividunt hoc modo: sit in quaestione «an anima secundum locum moveatur». Dicam «motus secundum locum tres species sunt: crementum, diminutio, permutatio; anima vero neque crescit neque minuitur neque ab alio loco transit ad alium; non igitur movetur». Quaestio de accidente. Maxima propositio eadem quae superius; locus a partibus totum dividentibus35.

As can be seen in Diagram no. 50 (Appendix, p. 352), in order to demonstrate that the whole (that is, the genus) does not exist, it is necessary to demonstrate that none of its species exists without omitting any of them 34 In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius gives another formulation of the maxima propositio related to the locus a partibus. Cf. In Top., I, 1061D: «cuius partium nihil rei propositae copulatum est, ei ne totum quidem esse potest coniunctum» (Engl. transl. p. 45: «a thing to which none of the parts of something are united cannot have the whole conjoined to it either»). 35 De top. diff., III, III, 6, 1197A, p. 51, 9-15.

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in the enumeration. Conversely, in order to use this locus in a constructive way, that is, to demonstrate the existence of the whole, it would be sufficient to demonstrate the existence of just one species, since each species carries the entire name of the genus. Therefore, in the example in question, the locus has been used in a destructive sense because, in order to demonstrate that the soul does not move spatially, it is necessary to demonstrate that it does not move according to any of the three species of spatial motion. The maxima propositio is placed outside the syllogism and, as in the previous example, the species play the role of middle term separating the major term («to move spatially») from the minor term («soul») of the dubia propositio. 3.3.3 The locus a notatione36 The third of the «loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur» is the locus a notatione: A nota vero argumentum est, quoties ab interpretatione nominis rei dubiae fides quaeritur hoc modo, ut si dubitetur «an philosophia bonum sit», dicemus, «philosophia est amor sapientiae; at id bonum est; philosophia igitur bonum est». Hic igitur non rem definivimus, sed nomen definitione prodidimus. Et est quaestio de genere. Propositio maxima: «nominis interpretatione rem declarari». Locus a notatione37. 36

Cf. Cicero, Topica, 35-37, pp. 132, 30-134, 7. For Tobias Reinhardt, the value attributed to the technique of etymological explanation of a term all depends on the conception given to the language. Cf. REINHARDT, «Commentary», p. 85: «The way in which one employs the technique of etymological explanation in an argument may be determined by one’s – not necessarily conscious – conception of language. The two main approaches towards etymology are intimately linked to the naturalist and the conventionalist view of language. The naturalist believes that there is a natural relationship between a word and the thing it denotes, while the conventionalist takes this relationship to be conventional and arbitrary. The naturalist will assume that by enquiring into the etymology of a word he can learn something about the reality designated by this word and hence about the ‘true meaning’ of the word, while the conventionalist will infer from an etymology at best historical data, i.e. a previous, original meaning of the word analysed». Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 85-88; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 208-211, 273-276. The sections of Boethius’s commentary on Cicero’s Topica that are dedicated to the locus a notatione are: In Top., I, 1062B-1064B; ivi, IV, 1110D-1112B. 37 De top. diff., III, III, 7, 1197AB, p. 51, 15-21. Cf. Diagram no. 51, Appendix p. 353. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 165-166, p. 171, 15-18: «Si ex vocabulo, ut Carbo:

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First of all, it is necessary to consider carefully what the notatio is, which is defined by Cicero as «verbum ex verbo veriloquium»38 and is called in Greek ἐτυμολογία and in Aristotelian terms corresponds to the σύμβολον. Boethius explains that the notatio is nothing but the nominis interpretatio, or the explanation of the meaning of the name (nota)39; and as the nota is ‘Si consul est qui consulit patriae, quid fecit Opimius?’ Sin ab eo quod rem attingit, plures sunt argumentorum sedes ac loci»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 483, pp. 239, 20-240, 3: «A nota vel etymologia, ut Graeci dicunt, sumimus argumentum, ‘si consul est, qui consulit rei publicae, quid aliud Tullius fecit, cum affecit supplicio coniuratos?’ quo in loco originem vocabuli tantum oportet attendere»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 125, 10-13: «A nota est argumentum, cum ex vi nominis argumentum aliquod elicitur, ut Cicero: ‘Consulem, consulem, inquam quaerebam, quem in isto maiali invenire non poteram’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 4, 19-22: «A nota est argumentum, cum ex vi nominis argumentum aliquod eligatur, ut Cicero (Pis. 19): ‘Consulem, inquam, quaerebam, quem in isto maiali invenire non poteram’». 38 Cicero, Topica, 35, p. 132, 17. 39 Cf. In Top., IV, 1111B: «Notatio igitur est quoties ex nota aliqua rei quae dubia est, capitur argumenta. Nota vero est quae rem quamque designat. Quo fit ut omne nomen nota sit, idcirco quod notam facit rem de qua praedicatur, id Aristotele σύμβολον nominavit. Ex notatione autem sumitur argumentum quoties aliquid ex nominis interpretatione colligitur» (Engl. transl. pp. 109-110: «Designation occurs when an argument is taken from a sign of the thing that is in doubt. A sign is that which designates any thing. Hence, every name is a sign because it makes known the thing of which it is predicated [Aristotle named this symbolon]. And an argument is taken from designation when something is inferred from the explanation of a name »); ivi, I, 1084C: «Nota etiam ab eo cuius nota est facile distat, quia illud vox et significatio est, illud res significationi supposita» (Engl. transl. p. 76: «A sign also is very different from the thing whose sign it is, because it is an utterance and a signification, but the thing itself what underlies the signification»). It is important to recall that Boethius uses the term nota in his translation of Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias. In that text, the word nota translates the Greek σύμβολον, the term with which Aristotle indicates the specific characteristic of the significant items (voces significativae) of being signs (notae) of the affections in the soul (passiones animae). Cf. In Aristotelis Periermeneias, editio secunda, I, 405AB, p. 25, 6-14: «Sunt ergo quae sunt in voce earum sunt in anima passionum notae, et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce. Ac quemadmodum nec litterae eaedem omnibus, sic nec eaedem voces. Quorum autem hae primorum notae sunt, eaedem omnibus passiones animae sunt, et quorum hae similitudines sunt, res eaedem. De his itaque dictum est in his quae dicta sunt de anima, alterius enim est negotii». The passiones animae are interpreted by Boethius as animi conceptiones or intellectus; therefore, in his language, nota indicates the intentionality with which the voces significativae refer directly (because they show existence) to the conceptions present in the soul, and indirectly to the res existing in reality. Cf. MAGEE, Boethius on Signification.

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inherent in that of which it is a sign (res), so also the nominis interpretatio is inherent in precisely the nomen of which it is the explanation; it is in fact the same animi conceptio that is to be the reference point both for the nota and for the notatio (or nominis interpretatio). However, while the former indicates the res from a particular point of view, the latter indicates the res from a universal point of view. Finally, as the name (nota) is different from that of which it is a sign (res), so also the interpretation of the name (notatio) is different from the name of which it is the explanation (nota). Crucial insight into what exactly Boethius means by the term nota is found at the end of the sixth book of his commentary on Cicero’s Topica: But since it is the nature of men generally to give utterance to what they understand, a name, which is used to express a concept, must also show some characteristics of the thing it signifies. In fact, it captures a quality of the concept of the thing understood, and therefore a name also designates a quality of a concept. And so it is rightly said that a word signifies certain characteristics of a thing; in this way from a word we can draw an argument, and this is called from a sign40.

Based on similar considerations, we can say with certainty that, in Boethius’s language, nota corresponds to nomen (or vocabulum), or to the vox enuntiativa in which man indicates his intellectus (or animi conceptio), the concept of the res that is formed from within. It is in fact human nature to manifest through the vox that which is understood by means of the conceptio. The nota, therefore, means the animi conceptio, just as the latter refers in turn to the res; but whereas the nota manifests in some way certain characteristics of the animi conceptio, the notatio is able to reveal the nature and characteristics of the animi conceptio itself. It seems therefore reasonable to say that the notatio constitutes a locus to the extent that, from the interpretation of the name, it is possible to draw argumenta that have to do with the nature of the conceptio. 40 In Top., VI, 1164CD (Engl. transl. p. 177): «Sed quoniam natura hominum id quod intelligit, voce saepius prodit, necesse est ut nomen quoque quod ad intellectus declarationem adhibetur, ostendat aliquam rei quam significat proprietatem, intellectus quippe, qualitatem rei quam intelligit, significat. Quocirca nomen quoque intellectus qualitatem designat. Iure igitur dictum est proprietatem quamdam rei vocabulo significari, atque ita ex eo trahi argumentum potest, quod vocatur a nota».

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Therefore, since the notatio (or interpretatio nominis) is the same as the nota (or nomen), it is the case that, when the first («love of wisdom») is positively valorized, so also must the second be («philosophy»).

3.4 The loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur The fourth species of «loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur» is composed of «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur», of which there is a total of fifteen. As mentioned previously, the loci are, first of all, res capable of expressing the different ways in which a term enters into a relationship with another term. In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius defines the res affectae in the following way: «For related things are those that can somehow be traced back to something (namely, to the thing to which they are traced back)»41. In fact, this kind of relationship implies that things that are related to each other cannot be considered separately, since they exist by virtue of the very relationship that connects them to one another, whether of affinity or of incompatibility42. In the discipline of topica, this means that the term that is discussed («id de quo quaeritur») is considered a relative term, since it is placed in relation with one of its res affectae, for example with its genus (when the term is considered as a species), with its species (when the term is considered as a genus), and so on. When the res affectae act as a function of loci, this means that they become the natural places for the argumenta43. 41 Ivi, II, 1064D (Engl. transl. p. 50): «Sunt enim affecta quae quodammodo aliquid referri possunt, ad id ad quod referuntur». 42 In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius classifies the fifteen res affectae according to different relationships that can be (1) of affinity (amicus) or (2) of opposition (dissidentia). If the relationship is one of affinity, then the res affectae are classified depending on whether they are connected (1.1) with the substance (the genus, forma, antecedens, consequens, causa, and effectum); (1.2) with the quality (the coniugata, similitudo, and coniuncta); (1.3) or with the quantity (the paria). The relationship of opposition can be one either of simple difference (the differentia) (2.1) or of contrariety according to quality (the contrarium and repugnans) or to quantity (the maior and minus) (2.2). Cf. In Top., II, 1064C-1065B. 43 Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 166, pp. 171, 18-172, 2: «Nam et coniuncta quaeremus et genera et partis generibus subiectas et similitudines et dissimilitudines

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3.4.1 The locus a coniugatis44 The first of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus a coniugatis: Coniugata sunt quae ab eodem nomine flectuntur, ut a «iustitia», «iustus», «iuste» «iustum». Ab hoc ita capitur argumentum, ut si quaeratur «an ridere gaudere sit», dicemus: «si risus gaudium est, et ridere gaudere est». Quaestio de accidente. Maxima propositio: «coniugatorum eandem esse naturam». Locus a coniugatis45.

et contraria et consequentia et consentanea et quasi praecurrentia et repugnantia et causas rerum vestigabimus et ea, quae ex causis orta sint, et maiora, paria, minora quaremus»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 125, 13-19: «Effecta argumenta sunt, quae quodammodo ex rebus aliis tracta noscuntur: coniugata – a genere – a forma generis – a similitudine – a differentia – ex contrario – ab adiunctis – ab antecedentibus – a consequentibus – a repugnantibus – a causis – ab effectibus – a comparatione, quae fit a maiore ad minus, a minore ad maius, a pari ad parem»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 5, 22-23: «Effecta argumentum sunt, quae quodammodo ex rebus aliis tracta noscuntur. Sunt autem numero quattuordecim». 44 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 38, p. 134, 8-15. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 9194; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 215-217, 279-283. The sections of Boethius’s commentary dedicated to the locus ex coniugatis are In Top., IV, 1112B-1113A. 45 De top. diff., III, III, 8-9, 1197B, pp. 51, 21-52, 4. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 167, p. 172, 2-4: «Ex coniunctis sic argumenta ducuntur: si pietati summa tribuenda laus est, debetis moveri, cum Q. Metellum tam pie lugere videatis»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 484, p. 240, 3-11: «Ab his vero quae negotium videntur attingere, argumenta ducuntur hoc modo: primum a coniugatis, cum uno nomine proposito principali per eius derivationem casu aut tempore commutato aliquid approbamus, ut ‘si pietas virtus est, quod pie factum est, laudari oportet’; constat enim laudabilem esse virtutem. Qui locus a superiore hoc differt, quia aliud est, unde nomen impositum fuerit, perscrutari, aliud per cognationem verbi ab alio deflexi argumenti vim sumere»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 125, 19-24: «A coniugatis argumentum est, cum declinatur a nomine et fit verbum, ut Cicero Verrem dicit ‘everisse’ provinciam, vel nomen a verbo, cum latrocinari dicitur latro – nomen a nomine Terentius: ‘Inceptio est amentium, haut amantium’ – dummodo distet unius appellationis postremitas in alia vocis declinatione formata»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 5, 23-25: «Primum a coniugatis argumentum est, cum declinatur a nomine et fit verbum, ut Cicero Verrem dicit everrisse provinciam; vel nomen a verbo, cum latrocinari dicitur latro. Nomen est a nomine; Terentius (Andr. 218): ‘Interceptio est amentium, haud amantium’; dummodo distet unius appellationis postremitas, in alia vocis declinatione formata».

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It is necessary, first of all, to understand what the coniugata are; Cicero’s definition, as Boethius observes, is the following: «Conjugates are said to be those which are based on words of the same genus, that is, those which are inflected from one word in various ways»46. The terms therefore derive from the inflection, i.e. from the modification of the root of a word, just as «just thing», «justly», and «just man» can derive from the word «justice»47. The example, outlined in Diagram 52 (Appendix, p. 353), shows how the coniugata may act concretely as a function of loci: the coniugata («laughter and joy») have the same nature as the terms from which they derive («to laugh and to rejoice»), so if «laughter is joy», then it is also the case that «to laugh is to rejoice». Boethius develops the argumentatio using a hypothetical syllogism; it is not immediately clear, however, how the maxima propositio, expressed instead in predicative form, determines the development of the entire syllogism.

3.4.2 The locus a genere48 The second category of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus a genere: Genus est quod de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quid sit praedicatur. Ab hoc ita ducitur argumentum, ut si quaeratur «utrum 46

In Top., II, 1068D (Engl. transl. p. 55): «coniugata dicuntur quae sunt ex verbis generis eiusdem, id est quae ab uno verbo variis inflectuntur modis». 47 There is a certain similarity between coniugatum and notatio (the third locus formed by the interpretation of the name); however, in his commentary on Cicero, Boethius makes clear the distinction between these two res. Cf. ibid, IV, 1112D: «notatio expositione nominis, coniugatio similitudine vocabuli ac derivatione perficitur» (Engl. transl. p. 110: «Designation is produced by the exposition of a name, while conjugation is produced by linguistic similarity and derivation»). While the notatio is always the description of the name, the coniugatio is produced instead by the similarity and the linguistic derivation of the term. 48 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 39, p. 134, 16-22. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 94-99; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 280-285. The sections of the Boethian commentary on locus ex genere are: In Top., IV, 1113A-1114C. Cf. also Aristotle, Topica, I, 102a31-102b3, (Engl. transl. p. 170): «A genus is what is predicated in what a thing is of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. We should treat as predicates in what a thing is all such things as it would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question, ‘What

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anima numerus sit sese ipsum movens, ut Xenocrati placuit», dicemus: «anima substantia est; numerus vero substantia non est; igitur anima numerus non est». Quaestio de definitione, locus a genere. Maxima propositio «quorum diversa sunt genera, ipsa quoque esse diversa»49.

This locus is taken from the genus of one of the terms included in the quaestio, with the latter evidently being considered as one of its species. The definition of the genus provided by Porphyry in his Isagoge, according to Boethius’s own Latin translation, is the following: «quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatur»50. Since the genus is predicated in relation to the essence, it reveals the entire substance of the species on which it is predicated because it constitutes the basis of these species, and therefore is more universal than the species it contains; is the object in question?’; as, for example, in the case of man, if asked that question, it is appropriate to say ‘He is an animal’. The question, ‘Is one thing in the same genus as another or in a different one?’ is also a generic question; for a question of that kind as well falls under the same branch of inquiry as the genus; for having argued that animal is the genus of man, and likewise also of ox, we shall have argued that they are in the same genus; whereas if we show that it is the genus of the one but not of the other, we shall have argued that these things are not in the same genus». 49 De top. diff., III, III, 10-11, 1197BC, p. 52, 5-10. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 167, p. 172, 4-7: «Ex genere autem: si magistratus in populi Romani esse potestate debent, quid Norbanum accusas, cuius tribunatus voluntati paruit civitatis?»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 485, p. 240, 12-22: «A genere autem, cum quod in toto valet ad speciem quoque deducitur, ut ‘si varium et mutabile quiddam est femina, Dido etiam varia mutabilisque videantur possitque ex amore in odium commutari’. Hac ratione illud Ciceronis astruitur: ‘nam cum omnium provinciarum sociorumque rationem diligenter habere debeatis tum praecipue Siciliae, iudices’. Hunc locum ille a toto videtur imitari. Sed interest illud, quod in illo a definitione, hic a ipsa ratione, qua genus est, argumenta ducuntur, et quod in genere totum est, quod totum divisione perit, genus manet etiam partibus distributum»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, pp. 125, 24-126, 1: «A genere argumentum est, cum de eodem genere sententia ducitur, ut Vergilius: ‘Varium et mutabile semper femina’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 6, 2-5: «Secundum argumentum a genere est, cum de eodem genere sententia dicitur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 4, 569): ‘Varium et mutabile genus’». 50 In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, II, 4, 91A, pp. 179, 19-180, 3. Cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, p. 2, 15-16 (Engl. transl. p. 6): «a genus is what is predicated, in answer to ‘What is it?’, of several items which differ in species». For the sections of Boethius’s two commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge dedicated to the analysis of the predicable of the genus, cf. In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio prima, I, 12, 22B-37B, pp. 32, 20-63, 16; In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, II, 2, 87B-98D, pp. 171, 8-196, 12.

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the genus, moreover, is entirely present in its species, and can never be separated from them51. The locus a genere is placed between the res that are connected with the term at issue, and not between the loci that are placed inside its substance, since, even though the genus belongs to the substance of the term, it does not consider it in its entirety; in fact, without the specific difference, the genus is not able to predicate the whole substance of the term, as in the case of the definition. The genus indicates, therefore, only a part, though a substantial part, of the res. However, when the locus a genere is articulated by means of an argumentatio, this means that the vis logica on which the syllogism is established derives from the genus of one of the terms of the quaestio, the latter being one of its species. The example outlined in Diagram no. 53 (Appendix, p. 354) clarifies how the genus can act as a function of a locus: the doubt of the quaestio is resolved starting from the genus of the subject of the quaestio, the «substance», that is the middle term and that has enabled the separation of the subject and predicate of the dubia propositio.

3.4.3 The locus a forma52 The third of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus a forma: 51

In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius explains how the relationship between genus and species may be understood in two senses. Cf. In Top., IV, 1113AB: «Talis generum specierumque intelligitur esse natura, ut cum colliguntur vel etiam dividuntur, ab individuis per species et genera usque ad maxima genera possit ascendi, itemque a maximis generibus per infra posita genera usque ad individua valeat esse descensus» (Engl. transl. p. 111: «The nature of genera and species is understood to be this: when they are gathered together and also when they are divided, it is possible to ascend by means of species and genera from individuals to the highest genera; again from the highest genera by means of the genera and species located below them there can be a descent to individuals»). Starting from individuals, it is possible to ascend again through the species to the genus until reaching the maximal genera in a movement of ascension (ascendo) that is fulfilled through the union of the species with their genus. It is also possible to start, on the contrary, from the supreme genera and to descend again (descendo) to individuals through the division of the genus into its species. 52 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 40, p. 134, 23-28. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 94-99; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 284-285. The section of Boethius’s commentary on Cicero’s Topica dedicated to the locus ex forma generis is In Top., IV, 1114C-1115D.

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Forma est quod de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit praedicatur. Ab hac fit argumentum hoc modo, ut si quaeratur «an color in subiecto sit», id approbabimus eo, quoniam «album vel nigrum in subiecto sunt», a specie scilicet ad genus ducentes. Quaestio de genere; nam in subiecto esse vel non esse accidens vel substantia significat, quae sunt prima rerum genera. Maxima propositio: «in formis spectari generum proprietates». Locus a forma53.

This is the locus taken from the species of one of the two terms of the quaestio, the latter evidently being considered as its genus54. According to Boethius’s Latin translation, Porphyry defines the species as follows: «Specie est quod de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit praedicatur»55. In his Topica, Cicero defines the genus and species with the 53 De top. diff., III, III, 12-13, 1197C, p. 52, 11-17. Cf. Diagram no. 54 (Appendix, p. 354). Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 168, p. 172, 7-11: «Ex parte autem ea, quae est subiecta generi: si omnes, qui rei p(ublicae) consulunt cari nobis esse debent, certe in primis imperatores, quorum consiliis, virtute, periculis retinemus et nostram salutem et imperii dignitatem»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 486, pp. 240, 23-241, 3: «Ab specie vel a forma ducitur argumentum, ut fidem generali faciat quaestioni, ut Cicero in Philippicis ‘, quam lex? Actum enim genus est legis, quod ab specie, id est lege lata a Caesare comprobatum est, quod item confirmat a similibus ‘quaere acta Gracchi, leges Semproniae proferentur, quaere Syllae, Corneliae’»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 126, 1-3: «Ab specie argumentum est, cum generali quaestioni fidem species facit: ‘At non sic Phrygius penetrat Lacedaemona pastor’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 7, 6-8: «Tertium ab specie argumentum est, cum generali quaestioni fidem species facit, ut (Virg. Aen. 7, 363): ‘Non sic Phrygius penetrat Lacedaemona pastor’». 54 The decision to refer to the predicable of the species with the term forma, rather than species, can be attributed to Cicero, in which he is followed by Boethius. This choice was motivated by reasons of linguistic order, since in the Latin language terms such as formarum or formis seem to Cicero more suitable than specierum or speciebus. Cf. Cicero, Topica, 30, p. 130, 1-10. 55 In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, III, 2, p. 201, 13-16. Cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, 4, 11-12 (Engl. transl. p. 6): « that which is predicated, in answer to ‘What is it?’, of several items which differ in number »; In Top., II, 1070C: «Species est, quae propriis differentiis informata sub praedicatione generis collocatur». The sections of Boethius’s two commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge dedicated to the analysis of the predicable of the species are: In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio prima, I, 21, 37B-48B, pp. 63, 27-83, 5; In Isagogen Porphyrii, editio secunda, III, 2, 99B-116B, pp. 199, 12-237, 23.

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term notio56, while Boethius in his commentary uses the term intellectus or even simplex mentis conceptio: Since a kind cannot exist without a genus (for nothing can exist without its source), Cicero added definitions of both genus and species and said that a genus is an idea relating to many differentiae. An idea, however, is a concept and a simple mental comprehension that is related to many things differing from one another. […] A kind is an idea whose differentia can be related to a head and ‘fount’ in the genus. And he was right to do so, for if kinds are drawn from a genus, the species must be related to the genus. So if a genus is a sort of source and ‘fount’ of a kind, the concept of a kind must revert to its origin namely, to the idea of the genus; for the concept of man (and also of horse and others) is related to animal. Cicero calls an idea what the Greeks refer to as ennoia or prolepsis. The definition of an idea is this: an idea is ingrafted and previously obtained cognizance of some form, which is in need of elucidatio57.

Since the species are taken from the genus, the latter is understood as the fons formae. The conception of the species (intellectus formae) needs to return to its principle, i.e. to the concept of the genus, as for instance the species «man» needs to return to the genus «animal». Commenting on Cicero, Boethius explains that the term notio corresponds to what the Greeks call ἔννοια, or even πρόληψις. However, the presence of these concepts does not imply, for the intellect, a kind of innate knowledge (which would be in a kind of Platonic interpretation), since the notiones of the genus and the species are still to be developed, while at the same time they involve knowledge already imprinted and brought forward in the soul 56

Cf. Cicero, Topica, 30, p. 130, 11-15. In Top., III, 1106AC (Engl. transl. pp. 102-103): «Et quoniam forma praeter genus esse non potest (nihil enim praeter suum potest esse principium), utrorumque apposuit definitiones, dicens genus esse notionem ad plures differentias pertinentem. Notio vero intellectus est quidam et simplex mentis conceptio, quae ad res plures pertineat a se invicem differentes. […] Forma est notio cuius differentia ad caput generis, quasi fontem, referri potest, et recte. Nam si formae a genere deducuntur, species necesse est referantur ad genus. Si igitur principium quoddam et fons formae genus est, necesse est ut intellectus formae ad primordium suum, id est notionem generis, revertatur. Intellectus enim hominis refertur ad animal, itemque equi et caeterorum. Notionem vero appellat quod Graeci ἔννοια dicunt, huius haec est definitio: Notio est insita et ante percepta cuiusque formae cognitio enodationis indigens». 57

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of the learner. It might then be thought that the genus and the species are the same structures in which the mind receives and articulates knowledge of the real; they are not so much the conceptions of the forms understood in Platonic terms, but the forms of the conception itself; this is a vision in which Platonism is somehow maintained, if it is true that the genus is prior to the species. This in fact could mean that the notio of the genus is placed higher than that of the species, and since the notio functions exclusively in the area of logic, and the reference is to the structures of the intellect, the result is that the notio of the species needs to go back to the notio of the genus, because the latter constitutes its source, namely the principle of intelligibility. Now this movement of universalisation is presented as infinitely perfectible; for Boethius, in fact, the whole truth is based on the divine mind, the latter understood as the concept that knows everything («cernens omnia notio»), i.e. that is the greater and more perfect universal, because it is the principle from which reality itself originates58. The notiones of the genus and of the species are therefore a priori structures of the mind, to the extent that they determine the way in which reality can be conceived and learned by man. However, the notiones are only forms that, should they be considered in themselves, would be empty and therefore, though anticipating the structure of reality, cannot express it fully. If genus and species can be understood as mental structures that anticipate reality, and if the species should always be brought back to the genus so that it may find the principle of its intelligibility, the conclusion could be that the very structure of the mind bears the sign of the transcendent. The affirmation repeatedly emphasized in various Boethian texts, and picked up by Porphyry, for whom the genus is prior to the species, implies, besides an ontological reference (representative of the descent of the One in the many), the exponential verticalization in which the human mind is, already at a structural level, directed towards the contemplation of divine models from which all reality derives, and from which the knowledge of the things that really are obtained59. 58 Cf. G. D’ONOFRIO, «Cernens omnia notio (Cons., V, IV, 17). Boezio e il mutamento dei modelli epistemologico-conoscitivi fra tarda antichità e alto medioevo», in M. L. SILVESTRE – M. SQUILLANTE (eds.), Mutatio Rerum. Letteratura Filosofia Scienza tra tardo antico e alto medioevo. Atti del convegno di studi (Napoli, 25-26 novembre 1996), La città del sole, Napoli 1997, pp. 185-218. 59 Immediately after commenting on this section of the Topica, Boethius states that Cicero has taken the definition of the genus and the species from Plato, who

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When a genus is divided by means of two divisive differences, the species are constituted. Therefore, a species is formed by the genus and by the specific difference, which is called constitutive for this reason60. If the species are used as a function of loci, this means that loci are taken from one of the two terms of the quaestio, where the latter is evidently considered their genus, which raises the question of what the difference is between the locus a forma and the locus a partibus. In fact, even in the locus a partibus, the term is considered as a genus divided into its species or its parts. In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius takes pains to explain the differences between the locus a forma and the locus a partibus; therefore, although the locus a forma leads to the division of the genus into its species, the vis logica is nevertheless not based on the entire division, but only on one or more species of the genus that has been divided61, which believed that there were some forms understood as incorporeal species, i.e. substances separated from bodies because of their nature (for example, the idea of «man», in which every man must participate in order to exist). For Aristotle, on the contrary, there are no separate substances, and the genus and species represent the substantial similarity found and understood in things different from each other; for example, a man is different from a horse because one is rational, the other is irrational; however, the two species are similar because they share the same genus, «animal». Boethius concludes by saying that the difference between Aristotle on the one hand, and Plato and Cicero on the other, is that, while for Aristotle the universal (which man abstracts by observing the substantial similarity among several individuals belonging to only one species) is a genus, for Plato and Cicero, the universal understood by the mind is still and only one species, one that needs, in order to be understood, to be traced back to the genus from which it derives, which, in turn, exists in a separate way. Cf. In Top., I, 1106C-1107B 60 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.4.1. 61 Cf. In Top., IV, 1114D-1115B: «Locus vero hic ab eo qui est a partium enumeratione diversus est. Nec si enumeramus partes, id est formas aut species, idcirco non a genere, sed ab enumeratione partium ducitur argumentum. Quoties enim ipsa partium enumeratione utimur ad argumentationem, tunc ab eadem partitione argumentum tractum esse dicimus, ut hoc modo: Si fundamenta, et parietes, et tectum habet, et habitationi est destinatus locus, domus est. Ipsa igitur partitione utentes, domum esse probavimus. Quoties vero sub genere aliquid collocandum est, divisisque partibus alicui eorum quae a genere deducuntur id de quo quaeritur aggregamus, ut hoc modo: Si Ciceronem animal esse monstremus, dicemus ita: Omne animal aut rationale est, aut irrationale; sed Cicero rationalis est, animal igitur est: non partitione utimur principaliter ad argumentum constituendum, sed idcirco genus divisimus, ut in unaqualibet divisione id quod nitebamur ostendere posset includi, id est ut id de quo dubitatur in assumpti continentia generis redigeretur,

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means that, when arguing from the locus a forma, the aim is to prove that «that which is predicated of a genus may also be predicated of its species», or «that which is predicated essentially of a species cannot be referred to other species». Conversely, the locus a partibus, having the aim of showing the whole substance of the term, argues starting from all species or from all parts. Both loci therefore aim to express the force of correlation that binds a genus to its species and vice versa. However, while the locus a partibus takes into consideration the whole division of the genus (into its parts or in its species), the locus a forma, by contrast, is based on only one or more parts (or on one or more species) that derive from the division of the genus62. This is, therefore, the same reason that the locus a forma belongs itaque de eo per generis naturam fides fieret. Sic ergo a genere facta argumentatio iure dicetur» (Engl. transl. p. 113: «This Topic is different from the Topic that is from the enumeration of parts. Although we enumerate parts [that is, kinds or species], the argument is not therefore drawn from the enumeration of parts rather than from a genus. For when we make use of the enumerating of parts for an argumentation, we say that the argument in that case is drawn from that very partition—for example, in the following way. If a place has foundations, walls, and a roof and is intended for habitation, then it is a house. So by using this very partition, we have proved that it is a house. But when something is to be classified under a genus, and we divide the parts of the genus and lump the things asked about with one of the parts drawn from the genus [for example, in this way: if we are showing that Cicero is an animal, we will say, ‘Every animal is either rational or irrational, but Cicero is rational; therefore, Cicero is an animal’], then we are not using principally partition to construct the argument. Rather we divided the genus so that what we were trying to show could be included within one division, that is, so that the thing in doubt might be brought within the compass of the genus adopted and that belief concerning the thing in doubt might arise from the nature of the genus. And so in this way an argumentation will rightly be said to be made from a genus»). 62 Cf. ivi, IV, 1115B: «Amplius ita partium enumeratio totius efficere substantiam solet, sive illud universale sit, ut genus, sive partium coniunctione copuletur, ut totum. At vero haec divisio generis in cuius parte quaelibet illa res de qua contenditur includenda est, non id efficit, ut totius substantia constituatur, sed ut illud quod approbare quaerimus intra genus collocetur. Quem argumentationis modum imprimis M. Tullius validum esse confirmat. Illa enim regula satis vera est atque necessaria. Quae de genere praedicantur, eadem de specie modis omnibus praedicari» (Engl. transl. p. 113: «Furthermore, an enumeration of parts generally produces the substance of the whole, whether it be a universal, such as a genus, or united by the conjunction of parts, such as a whole. But the division of a genus, in some part of which we are to include the thing in contention, does not produce the substance of the whole; rather it places within the genus the thing that we seek to prove. Cicero asserts that this mode

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to the category of «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» and not to that of «loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur», namely because it expresses the relationship that exists between one or more species and their genus. In the process of argumentation, this means that the thesis is proved when the existence of one or more species belonging to the same genus is demonstrated. The example shows how the locus a forma can be used in the service of a quaestio, as can be seen in Diagram no. 54 (Appendix, p. 354): the term «colour» is considered a genus, and afterwards its species are deduced («white» and «black»). If the aim is to establish that a colour belongs to a subject, then it is enough to observe its species, since when the species «white» and «black» are found in a subject, then the genus «colour» will be found in it too.

3.4.4 The locus a similibus63 The fourth of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus a similibus: Similitudo est eadem rerum differentium qualitas. Ab hac ita fieri argumentum videtur, ut si quaeratur «sorte an electione rectores civitatibus dandi sint», negetur, quoniam «ne in navi quidem sorte, of argumentation is highly effective, for the rule ‘Whatever things are predicated of a genus are certainly predicated of the species’ is most true and necessary»). 63 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 41-45, pp. 136, 22-138, 11. Cicero presents a division of the genus of similitude in two species: ex rerum conlatione, i.e. from the similarity identified in the comparison between several things (also called inductio, corresponding in the Greek tradition to ἐπαγωγή) and ex singularum comparatione (which comes from a comparison made between individual things). The latter is further subdivided into two subspecies: the exempla vera (i.e. examples obtained from things that really happened), and the exempla ficta (i.e. examples invented for the sole purpose of convincing the listener). Cicero observes, in fact, that orators and philosophers, in practising their profession, use also invented examples, making things and animals speak, or even evoking the dead from the other world. In this way they cross the border into what he calls hyperbole (ὑπερβολή), succeeding also in ensuring that what could never happen has happened. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 99-106; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 285-292. The sections of Boethius’s commentary dedicated to the analysis of the locus a similitudine are: In Top., IV, 1115D-1118A.

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sed electione peritus rector eligitur». Similis est enim navis quidem civitati, gubernator autem magistratui. Quaestio de accidente, locus a similibus. Maxima propositio: «de similibus idem esse iudicium»64.

The term similitudo is first of all defined as «eadem rerum differentium qualitas»65. Similarity thus consists of finding the same quality in things that are different from each other. The mind is in fact capable of establishing relations of similarity among things, based on which the same things are said to be similar66. 64 De top. diff., III, III, 14-15, 1197CD, pp. 52, 17-53, 6. Cf. Diagram no. 55 (Appendix, p. 355). Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 168, p. 172, 11-12: «ex similitudine autem: si ferae partus suos diligunt, qua nos in liberos nostros indulgentia esse debemus?»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 487, p. 241, 3-6: «A simili per se, ‘ut Helena Troianis sic civibus belli semen tu fuisti’. Item ‘ut saepe homines aegri morbo gravi, cum aestu febrique iactantur’ et cetera»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 126, 3-7: «A simili argumentum est, quando rebus aliquibus similia proferuntur, ut Vergilius: ‘Suggere tela mihi: non ullum dextera frustra torserit in Rutulos, steterunt quae in corpore Graium Iliacis campis’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 7, 9-13: «A simili argumentum est, quando rebus aliquibus similia proferuntur (Virg. Aen. 10, 333): ‘Suggere tela mihi: non ullum dextera frustra torserit in Rutulos, steterunt quae in corpore Graium Iliacis campis’». 65 Cf. In Top., II, 1072A: «similia dicuntur, quae eiusdem sunt qualitatis» (Engl. transl. p. 59: «similars are things that have the same quality»). 66 Cicero points out the extreme usefulness of this locus for rhetoricians and philosophers in particular, and Boethius stresses that philosophers use it because, although they start from premises that are always and only true, it is sometimes better to start from probable premises, so that what is proved would be acceptable to all because it would be considered highly probable. Cf. In Top., IV, 1116C: «Idcirco ex similitudine tractae argumentationes magnum oratoribus usum praestant, philosophis quoque, quoniam non in omnibus quaestionibus demonstratione utuntur, sed aliquoties verisimilia colligunt, quo id facilius persuadeant quod nituntur ostendere, similitudo rerum saepe est inquirenda, atque idcirco locus a similitudine oratoribus maxime philosophisque conducit, non tamen solis. Omnes enim loci communes sunt cuiusque materiae, sed in aliis uberius incidunt, in aliis angustius inveniuntur. Quocirca cognitis atque ante perceptis locis quaestiones ipsae quae tractabuntur quibus locis uti debeat solertem animum poterunt admonere» (Engl. transl. p. 114: «Therefore, argumentations drawn from similarity are very useful for orators. Similarity among things is often to be sought after by philosophers also, since they do not use demonstration for all questions but sometimes draw conclusions from verisimilar premises in order that what they are trying to show may be more readily believed. And therefore the Topic from similarity is chiefly profitable to orators and philosophers, but not exclusively to them; for all the Topics are common to every sort of subject matter, but they occur more abundantly in

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Although Boethius makes no reference to the importance of similitudo in the field of metaphysics, he does not fail to observe that it is, after all, the basic assumption of Platonic gnoseology, that for which «the similar knows the similar»67. It is enough to read, in this regard, what Boethius himself says in the ninth axiom he presents in his De hebdomadibus68. In any case, in the discipline of topica, similitudo constitutes a vis logica, a place of the mind capable of producing argumenta from which to impart credibility to that which is still a doubt. The example given by Boethius and summarized in Diagram no. 55 (Appendix, p. 355) shows how the development of this locus may be arranged through an argumentatio: the doubt of the quaestio is transferred from the subject («the magistrate») to that which is similar to him («helmsman»). Since the relationship of similarity justifies the principle that «the judgment of similar things is the same», if the helmsman is appointed by choice, this must also be done in some subjects and are more restricted in others. So when the Topics are grasped and known in advance, the questions under discussion will themselves be able to suggest to an adroit mind which Topics should be used»). 67 Desire, understood in a metaphysical sense, represents the aim of one reality towards another reality, and, according to the Platonic theory that «the similar knows the similar», this tension is determined by a similarity between the two realities, since in the absence of affinity there could be no tension. Tending toward what is similar, everything seeks its own unity at the same time: for this reason similarity, understood in a metaphysical sense, should be found, since it is the source of harmony, unlike the dissimilarity that is a source of discord. 68 Cf. De hebdomadibus, p. 188, 44-46 : «Omnis diversitas discors, similitudo vero appetenda est; et quod appetit aliud, tale ipsum esse naturaliter ostenditur quale est illud hoc ipsum quod appetit» (Engl. transl. p 43: «Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it seeks»). The same concept is expressed in the proemium to the De institutione musica, where the harmony of sounds reflects the harmony present in a human being and in the entire cosmos. Cf. Boethius De institutione arithmetica libri duo, De institutione musica libri quinque. Accedit geometria quae fertur Boetii, ed. G. Friedlein, B. G. Teubneri, Lipsia 1867 (reprint. Frankfurt 1966) [= De institutione musica], I, I, p. 180, 9-10: «Amica est enim similitudo, dissimilitudo odiosa atque contraria». Cf. J. CALDWELL, «The De Institutione Arithmetica and the De Institutione Musica», in M. GIBSON (ed.), Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence, Blackwell, Oxford 1981, pp. 135-153; J. GUILLAMIN, «Le statut des mathématiques chez Boèce», Revue des Études Anciennes, 92 (1990) 121-126; D. J. O’MEARA, «The Music of Philosophy in Late Antiquity», in R. W. SHARPLES (ed.), Philosophy and the Sciences in Antiquity, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005, pp. 131-147.

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the case of the magistrate. The vis argumenti, however, does not come from the term of the quaestio («the magistrate»), but from the relationship of similarity between the magistrate and the helmsman.

3.4.5 The locus a differentia69 The fifth of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus a differentia: «Item a differentia, ut si quaeratur ‘an idem sit rex quod tyrannus’, dicemus: ‘minime; nam in rege, pietas, mansuetudo, iustitia; in tyranno cuncta diversa sunt’. Quaestio de definitione, locus a differentia. Maxima propositio: ‘differentium rerum non idem esse iudicium’»70. After the locus a similibus, then, there follows immediately the locus opposite to it, i.e. the locus a differentia, the principle of argumentation for which arises from the relationship of dissimilarity that exists among things. This relationship is different from opposition, since in the latter the terms are considered not simply different but opposite. Boethius explains fully in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica that the mental operation in which the intellect recognizes the similar and the different is unique: «the recognition of similarities and the recognition of differentiae are part of the same skill, for whoever knows what is the same will also be able to know what is 69

Cf. Cicero, Topica, 46, p. 138, 12-16. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 107108; REINHARDT, «Commentary», p. 293. The sections that Boethius dedicates to the locus a differentia in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica are: In Top., IV, 1118A-1119A. 70 De top. diff., III, III, 16, 1197D, p. 53, 6-10. Cf. Diagram no. 56 (Appendix, p. 355). Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 169, p. 172, 12-17: «At ex dissimiltudine: si barbarorum est in diem vivere, nostra consilia sempiternum tempus spectare debent. Atque utroque in genere et similitudinis et dissimilitudinis exempla sunt ex aliorum factis aut dictis aut eventis et fictae narrationes saepe ponendae»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 487, p. 241, 6-12: «Huic dissimilitudo contraria est, quae a Cicerone differentia nominatur, quae res inter se diversas non adversas ostendit, cuius Cicero ponit exemplum in Verrem ‘sed tu idem fecisse eris existimandus, si eodem consilio fecisti’. Hoc et in personis ostenditur et in rebus et in tempore et in locis et in aliis, quae nunc memorare longissimum est»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 126, 7-9: «A differentia argumentum est, quando per differentiam aliqua separantur – Vergilius: ‘Non Diomedis equos nec currum cernis Achillis’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 8, 14-16: «A differentia argumentum est, quando per differentiam aliqua separantur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 10, 581): ‘Non Diomedis equos, nec currum cernis Achillis’».

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different»71. The mind therefore is able to seize upon similarity, but only through a process of separation as regards what is different; in the same way, dissimilarity is captured by the intellect only when similarity is recognized simultaneously. The knowledge of the similia and the differentiae is thus simultaneous: «therefore, the same mind and intelligence recognize both a similarity and a differentia»72. Moreover, similarity and difference can be predicated in relation to each of the ten categories; it is possible to observe similarity and difference as regards substance, quantity, quality, and so on. Something is said to be similar to something else, however, always and only by virtue of a similarity, and in the same way something is said to be different from something else always and only by virtue of a difference73. 71

In Top., IV, 1118A (Engl. transl. p. 116): «eiusdem facultatis est similitudines differentiasque cognoscere; qui enim scit quid sit idem, nosse poterit quid sit diversum». 72 Ivi, IV, 1118B (Engl. transl. p. 116: «idem igitur animus eademque intelligentia similitudinem differentiamque cognoscit»). It is perhaps appropriate to mention here how important this locus will be in the history of the reception of the discipline of topica, which can perhaps be considered as the basis of the subsequent development of the doctrine of analogy. Moreover, the use of such terms as animus and intelligentia, which indicate the faculties of knowledge directly involved, deserve notice. 73 Cf. ivi, IV, 1118AB: «Omnis vero similitudo idem aliquid esse constituit, quod enim idem est secundum qualitatem, id simile esse necesse est. Omnis quippe res aut substantia eaedem sunt, aut qualitate, aut caeteris praedicamentis. Quod si ita est, et animus intelligere hoc idem in pluribus praedicamentis potest. Sed cum hoc ipsum idem in praedicamentis notat, eodem modo in eisdem praedicamentis quod diversum est intuetur; sed simile idem est, differentia vero diversum» (Engl. transl. p. 116: «Every similarity establishes that something is the same, for what is the same in quality must be similar. Indeed, all things are the same in substance or in quality or in the other categories. And if this is the case, the mind can also understand this sameness in several categories. When it observes this sameness in the categories, however, it also perceives in the same way and in the same categories what is different. But something is the same by means of a similar and different by means of a differentia»). In the commentary on Cicero, Boethius has presented all the species of differences. Cf. ivi, IV, 1118B: «Differentiarum vero multae sunt species; aliae quippe sunt substantiales, ut homini rationale, aliae non substantiales, sed inseparabiles, ut nigrum Aethiopi atque corvo; aliae vero mobiles neque constantes, ut sedere, stare, huiuscemodi caeterae quibus et ab aliis hominibus et a nobis ipsis saepe distamus» (Engl. transl. pp. 116-117: «There are many species of differentiae. Some are substantial [as, for example rational is a substantial differentia for man]; some are not substantial but are nonetheless inseparable [as, for example, black is a nonsubstantial but inseparable differentia for Ethiopian and raven]; others are changeable and unstable [as, for example, sitting, standing, and others

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Finally, Boethius’s commentary again offers an important specification; since the difference can be either constitutive or divisive, only the latter is suitable for the discipline of topica: Again, some differentiae are in one way divisive of genera and in another way constitutive of species. But if an argument is drawn from constitutive differentiae, it is as if it were drawn from a genus; for as a genus encompasses a species, so differentiae encompass species. Certainly, if constitutive differentiae are understood as genera, the belief they furnish will be suited to the things the differentiae constitute, for these things are (as it were) kinds of a sort of this sort, by which we differ from other men and often from ourselves as well»). Thus, there is a distinction between the substantial difference, the not substantial but inseparable difference, and the changeable and inconstant difference. In his Isagoge, Porphyry presents the following division of the difference: difference can be discussed in the context of common sense, strictly speaking, and also in an even more precise sense. Only in the latter case is the specific difference further divided into separable and inseparable differences. The inseparable differences then can be inherent in themselves or can be accidents. Finally, the inseparable differences in themselves can be divisive or constitutive. A comparison between the difference presented by Boethius and that presented by Porphyry reveals that the substantial difference corresponds to the inseparable specific difference, which in itself is inherent in the thing, and is therefore an integral part in the definition of its essence (for example, in a man, «being rational», or «being mortal», constitute inseparable differences necessary for the formation of the definition, since they show the essence of the species «man»). The not substantial but inseparable difference corresponds to the accidentally inseparable difference that is not an integral part of the essence of the thing, and therefore need not to be included in the definition, since it does not make the thing other than itself, but simply alters it. Porphyry, however, specifies that, while the differences in themselves do not admit the more and the less, the accidental ones, despite being inseparable, admit of increase and decrease. An example of the accidentally inseparable difference is «being black» for an Ethiopian or for a crow. Finally, the inconstant and changeable differences correspond to the separable differences (for example, «remains seated» or «standing»). Although Boethius, in his commentary on the Topica, does not provide a definition of the difference, one is present in his two commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge, and it is clear that he is thinking as much of the specific differences capable of determining alterity (because by adding themselves to the genus, they alter it and determine the constitution in the essence of a species) as he is of the differences that determine simple alterations («remains seated» or «standing» do not change the substance of the subject, but produce only changes in its way of being). Finally, Boethius presents also the distinction between the divisive difference and the constitutive difference that is in turn taken from the Isagoge.

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for such differentiae. But if those differentiae that divide a genus into contrary parts are brought to bear on the things to be proved, then the argument seems to arise from a differentia properly speaking, because contraries are related to one another as differentiae74.

Just as in the first book of the De topicis differentiis, and also in his commentary on Cicero, Boethius reiterates the point that the constitutive difference of the species can be considered as a genus, because it is greater, or more universal, than the species75. Just as the genus contains in itself the species and is its principle, so also difference contains in itself the species and is its principle; genus and specific difference are in fact the constitutive principles of the essence of the species, and are the elements from which a definition should be composed to perfection. Boethius, however, states that only the divisive difference can act as a function of a locus, since the latter is the most suitable difference by which to express the vis logica of this locus, which proceeds always from dissimilarity. The pairs of divisive differences arising from the division of a genus are in fact always opposite to each other, such as «mortal» and «immortal», «rational» and «irrational». The example offered in the De topicis differentiis and summarized in Diagram no. 56 (Appendix, p. 355) shows the way in which this locus is articulated, namely by using the differentia divisiva. The subject of the quaestio («the king») is considered as a genus, and it is divided into its divisive differences («devotion» and «not devotion», «mercy» 74

Ivi, IV, 1118BD (Engl. transl. p. 117): «Item differentiae aliae aliquo modo sunt generum divisibiles, aliae aliquo modo specierum constitutivae; sed si a constitutivis argumentum ducatur, velut a genere ducitur. Nam sicut genus continet speciem, ita differentiae continent species. Sane si differentiae constitutivae ut genera intelligentur, fides ab his ad ea aptabitur quae constituunt. Haec enim talium differentiarum veluti formae quaedam sunt. Sin vero sint divisibiles, siquidem ad ea probanda, id est genera, quae dividunt, earum ducitur fides, a forma argumentum fieri videtur, nam tales differentiae eorum quae dividuntur formae quaedam sunt. Quod si ad ea probanda referuntur quae in contrariam partem genus dividunt, tunc proprie a differentia fieri argumentum videtur, quia contrariae veluti differentiae comparantur». 75 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.4.1. Another explanation for the desire to consider the constitutive difference as a genus is that, in generative terms, the difference is prior to the constitution of the species, because the species is generated only by means of the specific difference that is added to the genus; being therefore prior to the species, the difference is even more universal, and for this reason it is also called a genus.

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and «not mercy», «justice» and «not justice»), which constitute the specific characteristics that make a man who rules a king. The same divisive differences do not also belong to the «tyrant». When the specific characteristics that make a man who rules a king are different from those that form a tyrant, their species, i.e. their definitions, must also be different.

3.4.6 The locus a contrariis76 The sixth of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus a contrariis: Contraria vero quae Cicero appellat quattuor dividuntur modis: aut enim adversa sunt, ut «album, nigrum», aut privantia, ut «iustitia, iniustitia», aut relativa, ut «dominus, servus», aut negativa, ut «vivere, et non vivere». Ab his omnibus ita argumenta sumuntur. Ab adversis: «si bona est sanitas, mala est aegritudo»; a privantibus: «si iniustitiam fugimus, iustitiam sequamur»; a relativis quidem: «quisquis pater esse vult, habeat filium»; a negantibus: «non me accusas fecisse quod me non fecisse defendis». Quaestiones de accidentibus. Maxima propositio: «in adversis, privantibus et negantibus contraria sibi convenire non posse, in relativis absque se esse non posse». Locus a contrariis, quae melius opposita vocarentur77. 76

Cf. Cicero, Topica, 47-49, pp. 138, 17-139, 7; RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 108-113; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 294-299; G. CRIFO, «L’argumentum ex contrario in Cicerone e Boezio con particolare riferimento a Cicerone Top. 3.17», in J. BIBAUW (ed.), Hommages à Marcel Renard, 3 vols., Latomus, Brussels 1969, I, pp. 280-292. The sections of Boethius’s commentary that are dedicated to the Ciceronian locus a contrariis are: In Top., IV, 1119A-1122B. Cf. also Aristotle, Topica, II, 113b15114a23. 77 De top. diff., III, III, 17-18, 1197D-1198A, pp. 53, 10-54, 1. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 169-170, p. 172, 17-18: «Iam ex contrario: si Gracchus nefarie, praeclare Opimius»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 488, pp. 241, 22-242, 1: «A contrario, ut vitae mors, ex quibus Terentius sic: ‘nam si illum obiurges, vitae qui auxilium tulit, quid facias illi, qui dederit damnum aut malum?’ Cicero ‘si ille consul fustuarium meruerit, legiones quid, quae consulem reliquerunt?’»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 126, 9-12: «A contrariis argumentum dicitur, quando res discrepantes sibimet opponuntur – Vergilius: ‘Mortaline manu factae immortale carinae fas habeant, certusque incerta pericula lustret Aeneas?’»; Isidore, Etymologiae,

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This locus is formed by the fourfold relationship of opposition that can be established between the terms. When this relationship is used in the discipline of topica, this means that one of the two terms included in the quaestio is considered an opposite, for the simple reason that it is placed in relation to its opposite. Cicero’s division of the contraria, as reported by Boethius in the De topicis differentiis, is substantially faithful to that presented in the former’s Topica; in this text, Cicero in fact proposes a quadripartite division of the contraria: the adversa, or the opposites that differ from each other within the same genus (such as «wisdom» and «foolishness»); the privantia (called by the Greeks στερητικά), or the privatives that derive from the simple addition of a privative prefix (for example «human» and «inhuman»); «ea quae cum aliquo conferuntur», i.e. the relativa, which exist only by virtue of the relationship that binds them to each other (for example «half-double», «minimum-maximum»); finally, the negativa (called by the Greeks ἀποφατικά), i.e. the negatives, which are formed by negating the same word (for example «white» and «notwhite»). In his commentary, however, Boethius clarifies that the Ciceronian division does not coincide entirely with the one presented by Aristotle, where the major difference between the two philosophers lies in the terminology they use. In fact, Cicero calls contraria what Aristotle calls opposita (ἀντικείμενα)78. For this reason, Boethius finds it useful to start the presentation of the Aristotelian division of the opposita as follows: «Now let us consider Aristotle’s division. According to Aristotle, some opposites are contraries, some consist in privation and possession, some II, XXX, 8, 17-21: «A contrariis argumentum dicitur, quando res discrepantes sibimet opponuntur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 9, 95): ‘Mortaline manu factae immortale carinae fas habeant, certusque incerta pericula lustres, Aeneas?’». 78 Cf. In Top., IV, 1119BC: «Quare uti rerum ordo clarius colliquescat, pauca mihi ex Aristotele sumenda sunt quae ille vir omnium longe doctissimus de hac divisione tractavit, quanquam M. Tullius re quidem Aristoteli fere consentit, sed ab eo nominum interpretatione diversus est. Nam quae Aristotele opposite, id est ἀντικείμενα, vocat, ea Tullius contraria nominat» (Engl. transl. pp. 117-118: «And to clarify the order of things a little more, I should take up a few points that Aristotle, that most learned of all men, made concerning this division, for although Cicero agrees almost entirely with Aristotle as far as content goes, he differs from him on the explanation of names. Those things which Aristotle calls ‘opposites’ [that is, ‘anti-keimena’] Cicero names ‘contraries’»).

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are relatives, and some are contradictories»79. Boethius’s aim is clear, namely to re-compose the Ciceronian quadripartition of the contraria on the basis of the Aristotelian quadripartition of the opposita. In fact, he specifies that Cicero called contraria what Aristotle called opposita, as just mentioned, and called adversa what Aristotle called contraria, while the relativa are taken through collatio (i.e. through comparison); and, finally, Cicero called negativa what Aristotle called contradictoria. It is not by chance, in fact, that, in the De topicis differentiis, Boethius specifies that the most appropriate term for the contraria is opposita. The examples given for the four species of opposites are very short, and are developed mostly in conditional form: «if health is good, disease is bad» (adversa for Cicero and contraria immediata for Aristotle); «if we flee injustice, we follow justice» (privantia for Cicero and privatio and habitus for Aristotle); «whoever wants to be a father should have a child» (relativa for Cicero and Aristotle); «do not accuse me of having done that which you defend me for not having done» (negativa for Cicero or contradictoria for Aristotle). The maxima propositio for all these examples is provided in common: «In adversis, privantibus et negantibus contraria sibi convenire non posse, in relativis absque se esse non posse» («contraries cannot agree with each other when they are adverse, privative, or negative; and when they are relative, they cannot occur without each other»)80. Therefore, that which suits something cannot also suit its opposite; the relationship between contraries is established precisely by virtue of their mutual exclusion, because where there is the one, the other cannot exist, and it is only in the case of the relativa that the inverse happens, since the presence of the one recalls necessarily the presence of the other (for example, «double-half» or «father-son»).

79

Ivi, IV, 1119C (Engl. transl. p. 118): «Nunc Aristotelis divisio consideretur. Oppositorum igitur secundum Aristotelem alia sunt contraria, alia privatio, et habitus, alia relativa, alia contradictoria». The way to present the division of the opposita according to Aristotle has already been discussed in the context of Themistius’s locus ab oppositis: cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.7.6. 80 In the commentary on Cicero is another formulation of the same maxima propositio. Cf. ivi, II, 1074A: «quod alicui convenit, id eius contrario non convenire». (Engl. transl. p. 62: «What is appropriate for a thing is not appropriate for its contrary»).

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3.4.7 The locus ab adiunctis81 The seventh of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus ab adiunctis: Adiuncta sunt quae finitimum locum tenent ita, ut temporibus quoque tum praecedant, ut «amorem congressio», tum rei, cui adiuncta sunt, haereant, ut «ambulationi pedum strepitus», tum consequantur, ut «atrox facinus mentis trepidatio». Neque haec necessaria sunt, sed frequenter eveniunt; nam «neque qui congressus est modis omnibus amavit et qui congressus non est uno semel aspectu in amorem incidit; et potest cum ambulante aliquo non esse strepitus pedum, et non ambulante pedes strepere, si uno eodemque loco consistens pedes moveat, et trepidare quis, cum nihil atrox fecerit, et non trepidare qui fecerit». Ab his ducitur argumentum, vel cum «amare aliquem» suspicamur, «quia fuerit ante congressus», vel «ambulasse aliquem in loco, cum pedum strepitus fuerit auditus», vel «atrox facinus commisisse quem trepidare videamus»; atque in his quaestiones de accidentibus, loci ab adiunctis. Maxima propositio: «ex adiunctis adiuncta perpendi»82.

The adiuncta are terms linked by a relationship of connection; when an adiunctum occurs it is in fact extremely likely that the corresponding adiunctum either has already occurred, is occurring, or will occur. Therefore, the specific property of this category of terms is proximity and spatial and/or temporal contiguity: these terms are connected since they recall each other. The way in which this proximity can be carried out is threefold, depending on whether an adiunctum is antecedent, concomitant, or consequent to its adiunctum. The relation of the adiuncta is, however, based on mere supposition and not on necessity. This means 81

Cf. Cicero, Topica, 50-52, p. 140, 8-27. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 114116; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 300-305. The sections of Boethius’s commentary dedicated to the locus ex adiunctis are: In Top., IV, 1122B-1124B. 82 De top. diff., III, III, 19-21, 1198AB, p. 54, 1-15. Boethius presents a very thorough analysis of the adiuncta in his commentary on Cicero. Cf. In Top., II, 1074A. Cf. also Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 489, p. 242, 1-6: «A coniunctis autem fides petitur, cum quae singula infirma sunt, ea coniuncta vim veritatis assumunt, ut ‘quid si accedit, ut tenuis antea fueris? quid si ut avarus? quid si ut audax? quid si ut eius, qui occisus est, inimicus?’ Singula haec quia non sufficiunt idcirco congregata ponuntur».

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that the occurrence of the one creates the supposition that the other occurs; for example, one who has met someone in private very probably, though not certainly, has fallen in love before («adiunctum quod praecedit adiunctum»), and if we hear the noise of footsteps, it is reasonable to think that someone is walking («adiunctum quod haeret adiuncti»); likewise, if someone is in distress and agitated, he may have committed a crime («adiunctum quod consequitur adiuctum»). Therefore, although it is in the nature of the adiuncta, unlike the similarities (similia), to refer to one another, the different terms (differentiae), and the opposites (contraria), the occurrence of an adiunctum does not necessarily involve the occurrence of its corresponding adiunctum83. Cicero says, in fact, that this locus is used mainly by orators and is completely unknown to jurists and philosophers. On the other hand, the search for adiuncta reflects the typical attitude that is taken in conjectural cases: when in fact a case is to be solved, it is necessary first of all to examine thoroughly all of the hypotheses, and the locus ab adiunctis reflects the rhetorician’s search for the vis logica through which to solve a hypothesis84. 83

In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius points out the difference that separates the locus ab adiunctis from the locus ex antecedentibus and the ex consequentibus; while the relationship between the adiuncta is not necessary, and is understood only if put in relation to time, the relationship between the antecedens and the consequens is on the contrary necessary and simultaneous. The vis argumentationis of these two loci is, therefore, exactly opposite, since that of the antecedens and consequens is of an exclusively logical nature. Cf. In Top., IV, 1123D-1124A. 84 In the text of the Topica, Cicero also proposes the classification of the respective elements that are part of the investigation on the basis of the moment in which they come about: 1) ante rem refers to what happened before the fact in question; 2) cum re refers to what happened during the fact in question; and 3) post rem refers to what happened after the fact in question. In turn, Boethius, commenting on Cicero’s text, specifies that: (1) with respect to what was near the occurrence of the fact in question (ante rem), it is necessary to investigate (1.1) the apparatus, namely the preparation that each individual made before doing something, (1.2) the conloquia, namely the conversations made before the event, and (1.3) the locus, namely the investigation of the choice of the place in which something occurred; (2) with respect to what was near and concomitant in relation to what has happened (cum re), it is possible to investigate the pedum crepitus and the corporum umbrae, namely all the facts that were concomitant with the event; and (3) with respect to what is near but has happened after the fact (post rem), it is possible to investigate the pallor, rubor, and titubatio, that is, all the psychological factors that betray the guilty conscience of the one who has committed a crime. Cf. In Top., IV, 1123CD.

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If adiuncta are used in the discipline of topica, this means that one of the terms included in the quaestio is considered to be connected to something else, and as a consequence it is examined and judged exclusively on the basis of its adiunctum. The questions obviously will always have to do with the accidents, and the maxima propositio provided by Boethius expresses the relationship that binds the adiuncta «ex adiunctis adiuncta perpendi» («things that are connected are considered on the basis of connected things»)85. The highest differentia of the maxima propositio, which is its differentia, takes only the name, ab adiunctis.

3.4.8 The loci ab antecedentibus, a consequentibus, and a repugnantibus86 The eighth of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is entirely made up of the locus that could be called a conditione, the force of which is carried out in a three-fold manner: locus ab antecedentibus, locus a consequentibus and locus a repugnantibus: Antecedentia vero sunt quibus positis statim necesse est aliud consequatur, velut cum dicimus: «si homo est, animal est». Neque 85 In the commentary on Cicero, there are two maximae propositiones relative to the locus ab adiunctis, one of which is the same as that presented in the De topicis differentiis. Cf. In Top., II, 1075B: «Ex adiunctis adiuncta perpendi»; (Engl. transl. p, 63: «Associated things are judged on the same basis»); ivi, II, 1123A: «Ab adiunctis locus est cum ex aliquibus, quae sunt proxima eis de quibus quaeritur rebus, id quod quaeritur vel fuisse, vel esse, vel futurum esse monstratur». (Engl. transl. p. 122: «the Topic from associated things occurs when, from things that are near to the things asked about, we show that the thing asked about was or is or will be»). 86 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 19-21, p. 124, 12; ivi, 53-57, pp. 142, 1-144, 19. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 116-129; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 232-241, 305320. The sections of Boethius’s commentary dedicated to the analysis of these loci are In Top., II, 1075B-1078C; ivi, IV-V, 1124A-1145B; Cf. L. OBERTELLO, «Introduzione», in Anicio Manlio Severino Boezio, De hypotheticis syllogismis, testo critico, trad., intr. e commento di L. Obertello, Paideia, Brescia 1969, pp. 15-196; D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 239-252. Cf. also C. MARTIN, «Embarrassing Arguments and Surprising Conclusions in the Development of Theories of the Conditional in the Twelfth century», in J. JOLIVET – A. DE LIBERA (eds.), Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: aux origines de la logica modernorum, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1987, pp. 377-400; ID., «Non-reductive Arguments from Impossible Hypotheses in Boethius and Philoponus», Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 17 (1999) 279-302.

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in his temporum ratio nec rerum necessitas varia est, sed statim, ut dictum fuerit, id quod antecedit comitatur id quod est subsequens. Hic vero locus totus in conditione est constitutus; posita enim conditione si sit antecedens, esse necesse est quod consequitur hoc modo: «si peperit, cum viro concubuit», antecedens est «peperisse», «cum viro concubuisse» consequens. Nam neque illud quaeritur, quid prius tempore sit, quid posterius; et saepe ista ita variantur, ut id quod posterius est tempore antecedens esse videatur in propositione (ut «peperisse» posterius est quam «concubuisse»; tamen, «si peperit, modis omnibus cum viro concubuit»), et ut illo praecedente et prius posito illud necesse est intelligatur. Aliquoties vero simul sunt, ut: «si sol ortus est, dies est»; aliquoties prius est quod praecedit, posterius quod consequitur, ut: «si arrogans est, odiosus est», ex arrogantia enim quisque fit odiosus. Ex antecedente igitur ita sumitur argumentum: «si peperit, cum viro concubuit»; sumo quod antecedit: «at peperit»; concludo quod consequitur: «cum viro igitur concubuit». A consequentibus ita; sumo quod sequitur: «at non concubuit cum viro»; concludo quod antecedit: «non igitur peperit». Quaestio de accidente, locus ab antecedentibus et consequentibus. Maximae propositiones: «posito antecedente comitari quod subsequitur, perempto consequente perimi quod antecedit». Repugnantia vero sunt contrariorum consequentia, ut «vigilare, dormire» contraria sunt, «stertere» «dormientibus» adiunctum est. «Stertere» igitur ac «vigilare» repugnantia sunt; ab his ita fit argumentum: «tunc eum dicas vigilare, qui stertit?». Quaestio de accidente, argumentum a repugnantibus. Maxima propositio: «repugnantia sibi convenire non posse»87. 87

De top. diff., III, III, 22-27, 1198B-1199A, pp. 54, 15-56, 3. In the first book Boethius explains that every conditional proposition may be formed by, alternatively, two affirmative propositions, two negatives, an affirmative and a negative, or by a negative and an affirmative. Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3.2. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 170, pp. 172, 18-173, 9: «Ex consequentibus: si et ferro interfectus ille et tu inimicus ei cum gladio cruento comprensus in illo ipso loco et nemo praeter te ibi visus est et causa nemini et tu semper audax, quid est quod de facinore dubitare possimus? ex consentaneis et ex praecurrentibus et ex repugnantibus ut olim Crassus adulescens: ‘Non si Opimium defendisti, Carbo, idcirco te isti bonum civem putabunt. Simulasse te et aliquid quaesisse perspicuum est, quod Ti. Gracchi mortem saepe in contionibus deplorasti, quod P. Africani necis socius fuisti, quod eam legem in tribunatu tulisti quod semper a bonis dissedisti’»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 490-492, pp. 242, 6-243, 7: «Ab antecedentibus Cicero ‘cum ille non dubitaverit aperire quid cogitaret, vos potestis dubitare quid fecerit?’ Praecessit enim praedictio, ubi est argumentum; secutum est factum, unde est quaestio. A consequentibus vero conversim, ut quaestio

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This locus is completely absent from Themistius’s list of loci, but it is perhaps the most important on Cicero’s list and deserves a detailed discussion. In the first book, Boethius has already explained the conditional proposition, how it differs from the predicative proposition, and the nature of its parts, namely the antecedens and the consequens88. In the third book is revealed a further function of the antecedens, consequens, and repugnans, namely their roles in the discipline of topica. This means that the vis conditionis acts as a function of a locus whenever the dialectician or rhetorician argues after choosing to start on the hypothesis. To understand thoroughly this section of the De topicis differentiis, it is essential to refer also to the commentary on Cicero’s Topica, where Boethius dedicates a long section to the analysis of this locus and presents also the seven forms of hypothetical syllogism. The first question that needs to be clarified concerns the way in which this locus, though being subdivided into three parts, must be considered unique: in antecedentibus sit, argumentum in subsequentibus hoc modo: ut si hoc secutum est, illud praecesserit, ut ‘si peperit, cum viro concubuit’. Exemplum de Verrinis ‘si finem edicto praetoris afferunt kalendae Ianuariae, cur non initium quoque nascitur a kalendis Ianuariis?’ A repugnantibus argumentum, cum ostenditur duo sibi cohaerere non posse, verbi causa, ut et parasitus quis sit et ridiculus non sit, quae per negationem simul esse non posse praedicantur hoc modo: ‘non est parasitus est Gnatho et ridiculosus non est’. Eius loci exemplum est in re magis ipsa quam forma verborum, ut ‘is igitur non modo a te periculo liberatus, sed etiam honore amplissimo ornatus arguitur domi suae te iterficere voluisse’. Et in Cornelia prima repugnare dicit, ut ‘divisores, quos honoris sui ministros esse voluerat, lege ambitus vellet affligere’»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 126, 12-22: «A consequentibus argumentum est, quando positam rem aliquid inevitabiliter consequitur – Vergilius: ‘Non ea vis animo, nec tanta superbia victis’. Ab antecedentibus argumentum est, quando aliqua ex his quae prius gesta sunt comprobantur – Cicero pro Milone: ‘Cum non dubitaverit aperire quid cogitaverit, vos potestis dubitare quid fecerit?’ A repugnantibus argumentum est quando illud, quod obicitur, aliqua contrarietate destruitur, ut Cicero: ‘Is igitur non modo tali periculo liberatus, sed honore amplissimo ditatus, domi te interficere voluisset’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 9-10, 2230/1-2: «A consequentibus argumentum dicitur, quando positam rem aliquid inevitabiliter consequitur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 1, 529): ‘Non ea vis animo, nec tanta superbia victis’. Ab antecedentibus argumentum est, quando aliqua ex his, quae prius gesta sunt, conprobatur, ut Cicero pro Milone (44): ‘Cum non dubitaverit aperire quid cogitaverit, vos potestis dubitare quid fecerit?’ A repugnantibus argumentum est, quando illud, quod obicitur, aliqua contrarietate destruitur, ut Cicero (Deiot. 15): ‘Is igitur non modo de tali periculo liberatus, sed honore amplissimo ditatus, domi te interficere voluisset’». 88 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3.2.

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Cicero is silent about the designation for this Topic, but it seems to me that the whole Topic should be called ‘conditional’. When the nature of this Topic has become perfectly clear, this name which we have proposed will also more plainly appear correctly imposed on the Topic. First we should provide a definition of the individual parts of the Topic. An antecedent is such that when it has been asserted, something else must follow. Similarly, a consequent of something is what must be if the thing whose consequent it is has definitely gone before. An incompatible is that which cannot exist simultaneously with the thing with which it is said to be incompatible. As we said before, the Topic from antecedents, consequents, and incompatibles is one Topic; here I will show briefly the way in which it is one. First of all, when there was a question how the Topic from consequents, antecedents, and incompatibles is one Topic, we said that this Topic appears to be one because the same intellectual faculties and understanding provide both things that agree with one another and things that are discordant with one another. With regard to things that agree with one another, there are two parts: one is the antecedent, and the other is the consequent. They must agree with one another in a succession of nature since when one precedes, the other follows. With regard to incompatibles, there are two parts and yet only one designation for them both, for they are both given the name ‘incompatible’, although there is no one who does not recognize that things that are incompatible and discordant with one another are two. But they differ from antecedents and consequents in virtue of the fact that there are two names for antecedents and consequents, even though there is one agreement between them both89. 89 In Top., IV, 1124CD (Engl. transl. pp. 123-124): «M. quidem Tullius loci huius vocabulum tacuit, mihi autem totus conditionalis appellandus videtur. Cuius cum promptissime natura claruerit, nomen quoque ei, quod nos posuimus, recte inditum manifestius apparebit. Primum igitur singularum partium diffinitio prodenda est. Itaque antecedens est, quo posito aliud necesse est consequatur: itemque consequens alicuius est, quod esse necesse est, si illud cuius est consequens praecessisse constiterit. Repugnans est quod simul cum eo cui repugnare dicitur esse non possit. Antecedentium igitur, atque consequentium, et repugnantium, unum esse locum praediximus, qui quomodo sit unus, paucis ostendam. Primum igitur dum quaereretur quonam modo unus esset locus a consequentibus, antecedentibus et repugnantibus, dicebatur quoniam eiusdem mentis esset atque intelligentiae tam consentanea sibimet quam dissidentia praevidere, idcirco hunc quoque locum unum videri. Consentaneorum namque duae sunt partes, antecedens una, altera

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In the De topicis differentiis, Boethius merely states that this locus is entirely composed of and based on the condition («hic vero locus totus in conditione est constitutus»); in the commentary, there is also the reason that the locus that is taken from the «condition» is unique because the act of knowledge by which the mind (mens) and the intelligence (intelligentia) provide (praevideo) things suited (consentanea) to themselves and those discordant (dissidentia) among themselves is also unique. Moreover, while the consentanea are called by different names (antecedens and consequens) – although the agreement (consensus) by which they are compatible among themselves is unique – the dissidentia are instead called by the same name (repugnantes), because the disagreement (dissensus) by which they are recognised as incompatible among themselves is unique. Therefore, the locus a conditione is unique because the act of consequens. Nam cum altero praecedente comitatur alterum, illa sibi in ipsa naturae consequentia consentire necesse est. Repugnantium vero tametsi duae partes sint, unum tamen est utriusque vocabulum, utraque enim repugnantia nominantur. Duae vero esse, quae sibimet repugnent, atque a se dissentiant nullus ignorat; sed eo distant quod antecedentium et consequentium duo sunt nomina, licet unus sit utriusque consensus; repugnantibus vero unum nomen est, cum sit unus in utrisque dissensus, ergo eadem mens, eademque intelligentiae ratio id quod praecedit si id quod comitatur, intelligit». Immediately after this section follows an extension of the same argumentation; cf. ivi, IV, 1124D-1125A: «Neque enim fieri potest ut antecedens aliquid intelligatur, nisi in eodem quid sit consequens consideretur; eodem quoque modo nec consequens, nisi appareat quid praecedat; item repugnans aliquod intelligere nemo potest, nisi intelligat cui repugnet: sed quoniam eadem ratio potest similia dissimiliaque perspicere, antecedentium vero et consequentium consensus quidam et per naturae similitudinem concordia est, dissensus vero in repugnantibus dissimilitudo, necesse est ut una atque eadem ratio antecedentium consequentiumque naturam et repugnantium spectet; quo fit ut unus quoque locus sit eorum quae una intelligentia comprehendit» (Engl. transl. p. 124: «for it cannot happen that we understand something to be an antecedent unless at the same time we consider what the consequent is, and in the same way we cannot understand something to be a consequent unless it is clear what the antecedent is. Similarly, no one can understand something to be an incompatible unless he understands what it is incompatible with. So since the same reason can perceive similars and dissimilars, and since there is a certain agreement and harmony as a result of a similarity of natures in the case of antecedents and consequents, and discord and dissimilarity in the case of incompatibles, one and the same reason must see both the nature of antecedents and consequents and the nature of incompatibles. And what is grasped by one understanding is also one Topic»).

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the intellection of the dissidentia is unique90. A second reason why the vis logica is based entirely on the conditio is that, once the condition is removed that unites the two predicative propositions into one conditional proposition, any form of relationship between the two propositions declines at the same time. Thus, for example, by removing the conditio from the following conditional proposition «if it is day, there is light», two different predicative propositions are obtained, both main ones («it is day and there is light,» or «it is day and there is no light»), between which any kind of logical connection is missing. In the commentary, there remain valuable considerations regarding the specificity that distinguishes this locus from others, considerations that will be of great importance in the development of medieval logic91. If the condition expresses the principle that, when something is proposed, something else must necessarily follow, it is not apparent in what respect the loci a genere, a specie, or a contraria are different from the locus a conditione. The bond that unites the antecedent and the consequent seems in fact the same as the one that binds the genus to its species, since, as long as there is a genus, at least two species must follow, or as long as there is a species, its genus must also exist. Furthermore, the difference between the relationship of opposition of the repugnantes and that of the contraria is not equally clear92. Insofar as Boethius lets the differences emerge in which 90

The same argumentation was used also to demonstrate that the faculty of the intelligentia is itself able to see at the same time similarity and dissimilarity. Cf. ivi, IV, 1118B: «Idem igitur animus eademque intelligentia similitudinem differentiamque cognoscit». In neither his commentary on Cicero’s Topica nor in the De topicis differentiis does Boethius ever linger on questions of an explicitly gnoseological nature; in other words, he never specifies which faculties of knowledge are directly involved in practising the discipline of topica. Nevertheless, the use of such terms in this text as animus, mens, and intelligentia, in regard to the locus a similitudo and the locus a differentia seems a clear indication of a desire to assign the highest faculty of knowledge to the action of the inventionis potestas. 91 Cf. STUMP, «Topics: Their Development and Absorption into the Consequences», in N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG (eds.), The Cambridge History, op. cit. 92 Cf. In Top., IV, 1127B: «Quae cum ita sint, quaestio difficilis vehementer oboritur, videtur enim minus intuentibus nihil hic locus differre his locis qui dicti sunt vel a genere, vel a specie, vel a contrariis. Nam genus speciem sequitur, speciem genus praecedit, contraria simul esse non possunt» (Engl. transl. p. 127: «In virtue of this, an exceedingly difficult question arises, for to those without much insight this Topic does not seem at all different from the Topics that are said to be from a genus, from

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each of these loci differs from the others, their specificity also appears at the same time: Next, when an argument arises from a genus, the genus itself is taken in the argument, and the same thing holds for species, when we want to prove something on the basis of a species. But when we are trying to show something on the basis of antecedents and consequents, we use what preceded in the conditional proposition as a premise in our argument, even if it was not a genus. Similarly, if an argument arises from a consequent, the argument is drawn from the consequent part of the conditional proposition, even if it is not a species93.

First of all, it must be made clear that, in the conditional proposition, the antecedent should not necessarily be considered a species, nor the consequent a genus, but, on the contrary, these can be any two terms that are connected only through the condition that unites them. The same applies to the repugnantes, which should not necessarily be contraria; these are rather the consequence of the opposites (for example «either asleep or awake»). However, there is another, even more important reason these loci differ from one another. For when an argumentum is drawn from the locus a genere, this means that the sedes on which the whole vis logica is based is the genus, and so also for all the other loci that take their names from the res that serves as the source of the demonstrative force. But when the vis logica is based on the conditio, the force of the argumentation is based entirely on the antecedens, the consequens, or the repugnantes, regardless of whether they are a genus, a species, or contraries. The greatest attention must therefore be directed to the vis argumenti on which the whole argumentatio is to depend, since each locus expresses an operating principle in which the mind acts in a different way, starting from the terms of the a species, or from contraries. For a genus always follows from a species, a species always precedes a genus, and contraries cannot exist simultaneously»). 93 Ivi, IV, 1127CD (Engl. transl. pp. 127-128): «Dehinc quia cum a genere fit argumentum, ipsum genus assumitur, eodem quoque modo et species, cum ab ea aliquid volumus approbare; cum vero ab antecedentibus aliquid monstrare contendimus, eo quod in conditionali propositione praecessit utimur in assumptione, etiamsi non fuerit genus. Item si a consequenti argumentum fiat, etiamsi species non sit, a consequenti parte conditionalis propositionis ducitur argumentum».

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quaestio. Failure to distinguish the nature of each locus means failure to recognize the difference between the genus and species or between the divisive and the constitutive difference, and this involves certainly a failure in the defence of one’s thesis. Boethius, however, seems to be aware that the inner nature of each locus might after all be expressed in hypothetical, rather than in categorical, form without the meaning undergoing any apparent modification: Now everything that can be expressed by means of a categorical syllogism can also be said by means of a conditional syllogism, for every predicative proposition can be turned into a conditional, in the following way. ‘Every man is an animal’ is predicative; this is easily turned into a conditional in this way: ‘if he is a man, he is an animal’. But it is not the case that every conditional proposition can be turned into a predicative proposition, as, for example, in this case: ‘if she has borne a child, she has lain with a man’, for no one can say that having borne a child is that thing which is lying with a man, in the way that we say a man is that thing which is an animal. For there is a different idea in those propositions which are expressed in this way: ‘She who has borne a child has lain with a man’, for this is similar to the proposition that says, ‘if she has borne a child, she has lain with a man’. But the predicative proposition says that the subject is that thing that is the predicate, while a conditional proposition maintains that if the antecedent is, then the consequent necessarily follows. And so when a predicative proposition is turned into a conditional, it is indisputably rendered a different proposition94. 94 Ivi, IV, 1128C-1129A (Engl. transl. p. 129): «Omnia vero quaecunque per categoricum syllogismum proferri possunt, eadem per conditionalem syllogismum dici queunt. Omnis namque praedicativa propositio in conditionalem verti potest, hoc modo: omnis homo animal est, praedicativa est; haec facile vertitur in conditionalem ita, si homo est, animal est. Non vero omnis conditionalis in praedicativam verti potest, velut haec: si peperit, cum viro concubuit. Nemo enim dicere potest ipsum peperisse, id esse quod cum viro concumbere, quo modo dicimus hominem id esse quod animal sit. Alia enim ratio est in his propositionibus quae ita dicuntur, quae peperit, cum viro concubuit. Haec enim similis est ei quae dicit, si peperit, cum viro concubuit, sed praedicativa propositio id esse subiectum dicit, quod fuerit praedicatum. Conditionalis vero id ponit, ut si id quod antecedens fuerit necessario comitetur quod subsequitur. Cum vero praedicativa est propositio, si ea vertatur in conditionalem, alia nimirum redditur propositio». Cf. EBBESEN, «The Theory of Loci in Antiquity and the Middle Ages», in K. JACOBI (ed.), Argumentationstheorie, op. cit., p. 35: «Thus via the view

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Any categorical syllogism can be expressed by means of a conditional syllogism; it is in fact enough to convert the predicative proposition posed in the major premise into conditional one; (for example, «every man is an animal» can become «if he is a man, he is an animal»). The same thing, however, does not hold in the opposite case, because not every conditional proposition can be expressed in categorical form without changing the meaning of the entire proposition; for example, the proposition «if she has born a child, she has lain with a man» has a different meaning from «She who has born a child has lain with a man»; the difference between the two propositions is in the ratio, because in the predicative proposition it is affirmed that the subject is what is the predicate, while in the conditional proposition it is affirmed simply that, when the antecedent is posed, the consequent follows necessarily. Thus, although a predicative proposition may always be converted and expressed in conditional form, it is necessary to pay special attention to the meaning, because in every case what emerges is a different proposition. The fact remains, however, that every categorical syllogism can be converted to and expressed in hypothetical form, and it is just this aspect that gives the hypothetical syllogism pre-eminence over the categorical syllogism: Therefore, whether a conditional syllogism, which is formulated in terms of preceding and following, arises by means of a definition, enumeration of parts, conjugation, or in any other way, it nevertheless has its own form specific to it and is conditional (that is, it uses a condition, which is specific to it), so that in a certain way a conditional syllogism seems to have the other arguments subordinated to its own ‘nature’95.

Although the antecedent and consequent in a conditional syllogism can be any res (a genus, a species, a definition, the parts etc.), the syllogism that any argument is one complex proposition, enthymemes and categorical syllogisms alike are assimilated to hypothetical syllogisms». 95 In Top., IV, 1129AB (Engl. transl. pp. 129-130): «Ergo conditionalis syllogismus in antecessione et consecutione positus, licet per diffinitionem, et per partium enumerationem, et per coniugationem, et quolibet alio fiat modo, tamen in propria forma se continet, et est conditionalis, id est utens propria potestate, ut quodammodo caetera argumenta suae veluti naturae videatur habere subiecta».

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itself always preserves its conditional form unchanged; for this reason, the hypothetical syllogism seems by nature to contain and to include again within itself the nature of all the argumenta, including therefore also the categorical syllogism96. When, however, the definition, parts, or interpretation of the name, or of the genus, along with all other res that act as loci, when all these things are developed through a hypothetical syllogism, the vis logica of the syllogism is then no longer based on each of these res, but solely on the condition97.

96 In the first book, Boethius explains that there are two typologies of quaestiones, namely the thesis (belonging to philosophers) and the hypothesis (belonging to rhetoricians). The latter is in turn subdivided into either a simplex hypothetica quaestio or a composita hypothetica quaestio. In this regard, Boethius presents also all the possible combinations that arise among various res (genus, species, definition, etc.) once they are posed as antecedent or consequent. Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.4.2. 97 Cf. In Top., IV, 1129BC: «Ut cum sit a diffinitione argumentum, si quidem per praedicativam formam factus fuerit syllogismus, a diffinitione ductum esse dicatur. Sin vero per hypothesin facta fuerit argumentatio, conditionalis fit syllogismus, quem discernat assumptio, utrum ab antecedentis, an a consequentis parte promatur. Quo fit ut etiamsi per caeteros locos conditionale argumentum proferatur, tamen suam quamdam habeat formam, quandoquidem in antecessione et consecutione est constitutus. Tunc enim diffinitio, partes, conjugatio, et caetera veluti res ipsae fiunt ac non locus, cum venerint in conditionem; at si conditio cesset, ex ipsis profectum videbitur argumentum. Quod si propositionem conditio copulaverit, ipsa quidem ea sunt quae in propositionibus continentur veluti quaedam argumenti partes, locus vero in conditione est constitutus» (Engl. transl. p. 130: «Hence, when an argument is from a definition, if the syllogism was constructed with a categorical form, the argument is said to be drawn from definition. If, however, the argumentation was made with a hypothesis, the syllogism is conditional, and the minor premise determines whether it is an argument produced from an antecedent or from a consequent. So even if a conditional argument might be obtained by means of the other Topics, it nevertheless has a certain form of its own since it is constructed in terms of preceding and following. For when definition, parts, conjugation, and the rest enter into a condition, they become “things” in their own right and not Topics; if there is a condition, the argument will appear to have been completed by those things. And if a condition has united a proposition, those things which are included in the propositions are parts of a sort of the argument, but the Topic consists in the condition»). In his commentary on this section of Cicero’s text, Boethius demonstrates a thorough knowledge of Stoic logic that goes far beyond simple comment, so much that Luca Obertello, contrary to Karl Dürr, affirms that Boethius was able to use as his source the logic of Chrysippus, though he never in fact mentions doing so. Cf. K. DÜRR, The Propositional Logic of Boethius, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam 1951, p. 11 (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics); OBERTELLO, «Introduzione», pp. 85-86; E.

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It can now be understood why, in the De topicis differentiis, Boethius says that it is not important to establish either a temporal relationship or a relationship of necessity between antecedent and consequent, since the relationship is instead based exclusively on the vis conditionis, which simply means that, once the antecedent is posed, the consequent must follow. It may therefore happen that the relationship between antecedent and consequent respects the temporal relationship of the res that it contains (for example, «if the sun has risen, it is day»). On other occasions it is possible to reverse the temporal order by placing what happens later in the antecedent, and placing in the consequent that which logically happens first (for example, «if she has born a child, she has lain with a man», where «having lain with a man» certainly precedes «having born a child»). Finally, the antecedent and consequent, from the point of view of temporal relation, can also be simultaneous res (for example, «if he is arrogant, he is hateful», for one comes to be hateful from arrogance). Consequently, the argumentatio that derives its vis from the conditio is a hypothetical syllogism in which the major premise is a conditional proposition, while the minor premise and the conclusion are predicative propositions. The seven forms of hypothetical syllogism derive from the way the minor premise is developed98. Only the first three figures of the hypothetical syllogism, however, are used in the discipline of topica99. The first figure derives from the locus ex antecedentibus and corresponds to the form of the modus ponens. The example given in the De topicis differentiis is as follows: STUMP, «Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica and Stoic Logic», in J. F. WIPPEL (ed.), Studies in Medieval Philosophy, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 1987, pp. 1-22; cf. J. ASHWORTH EARLINE, «Boethius on Topics, Conditionals and ArgumentForms», History and Philosophy of Logic, 10 (1989) 213-225; A. SPECA, Hypothetical Syllogistic and Stoic Logic, Brill, Leiden 2001; M. NASTI DE VINCENTIS, «Boethiana. La logica stoica nelle testimonianze di Boezio: nuovi strumenti di ricerca», Elenchos, 27 (2006) 377-407. 98 In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius presents the seven forms of hypothetical syllogism, while in the De hypotheticis syllogismis he presents only the first five figures (called by Chrysippus «indemonstrables»), excluding the sixth and seventh that are instead listed by Cicero and Martianus Capella. For this reason, Luca Obertello assumes that, in the commentary on Cicero, Boethius has followed closely a Greek original source or a source deriving from a Greek original. Cf. OBERTELLO, «Introduction», pp. 86-87, 137-154. 99 Cf. In Top., V, 1145B.

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Propositio maior: «if she has born a child, she has lain with a man» Propositio minor: «but she has born a child» Conclusio: «then she has lain with a man» In the major premise, a conditional proposition is posed; in the minor premise, the antecedent is drawn; and in the conclusion, the consequent is affirmed. The purpose of this way of proceeding is to affirm the consequent by affirming the antecedent, for which reason the vis conditionis is said to be based on the antecedens100. When the aim is to draw an argumentatio from the locus a consequentibus, the argumentatio is developed according to the form of modus tollens: Propositio maior: «if she has born a child, she has lain with a man» Propositio minor: «but she hasn’t lain with a man» Conclusio: «so she hasn’t born a child» It is therefore necessary to employ the consequent in the minor premise in a negative form, in order to deny the antecedent in the conclusion. The objective of this procedure is to eliminate the antecedent by eliminating the consequent, and for this reason it is said that the vis conditionis is taken from the consequens, according to the form of modus tollens101. The maxima propositio provided to express the double operational formalities in which this locus works is unique: «posito antecedenti comitari quod subsequitur, perempto consequenti perimi quod antecedit» («when the antecedent is posed, it is accompanied by what follows; when the consequent is eliminated, that which precedes is eliminated»)102. The locus a repugnantibus works in a manifestly more complex way. In fact, the third figure of the hypothetical syllogism derives from it, a derivation that can be carried out in four different ways, depending 100

Cf. ivi, V, 1133AB. Cf. ivi, V, 1133CD. 102 In Boethius’s commentary on Cicero, two different maximae propositiones are provided respectively for the locus ab antecedentibus and the locus a consequentibus. Cf. ivi, II, 1076C: «Ubi est antecedens, ibi erit et consequens» (Engl. transl.: «when the antecedent is posed, it is accompanied by what follows»); ivi, 1077D: «Ubi consequens non est, ibi ne antecedens quidem esse potest» (Engl. transl.: «when the consequent is eliminated, that which precedes is eliminated»). 101

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on whether the conditional proposition is formed by two affirmative predicative propositions, by two negative ones, by an affirmative and a negative, or by a negative and an affirmative. In the De topicis differentiis, Boethius presents only the first combination, the one made up of two affirmative propositions («then you say that the sleeper is awake?»), the maxima propositio of which is «repugnantia sibi convenire non posse» («the incompatibles cannot occur together»)103. To understand thoroughly at least the first of these four ways in which the locus ex repugnantibus originates, it is necessary once again to refer to Boethius’s commentary on Cicero’s Topica: The third mode occurs when a negation is inserted among the parts of a connected proposition composed of two affirmations and the negation itself is negated. (This proposition is called ὑπεραποφατική in Greek). For example, if a negation is interposed among the parts of the proposition that we presented above—’if it is day, there is light’— it will become ‘if it is day, there is not light’. If we negate it further, it will be this, it is not the case that ‘if it is day, there is not light’; the meaning of this proposition is that if it is day, it is not possible that there is not light. This proposition is called ‘supernegative’; all propositions in which a negation is prefixed to a negation are supernegative, such as ‘it is not the case that it is not day’, and also it is not the case that ‘the Ausonians are not the Trojan people sent as colonists’. In this case, if we assert in the minor premise the former part of this supernegative proposition, namely, that it is day, it also follows that there is light, in the following way: ‘It is not the case that if it is day’, ‘there is not light’. ‘But it is day’. ‘Therefore, there is light’. This mode differs a great deal from the previous modes, because in the mode that arises from antecedents, the antecedent is asserted in order to support the consequent, and in the mode that arises from consequences, the consequent is destroyed in order to remove the antecedent; but in this mode neither of these things occurs. The antecedent is not asserted to corroborate the consequent, nor is the consequent destroyed in order to subvert the antecedent; rather the antecedent is asserted in order to destroy the consequent. Moreover, this mode contains parts of a proposition which are 103

In his commentary on Cicero, regarding the locus ex repugnantibus Boethius attributes to Cicero the same maxima propositio found in the De topicis differentiis. Cf. In Top., II, 1078C: «Repugnantia convenire non posse» (Engl. transl. p. 68: «Incompatibles cannot occur together»). Cf. ASHWORTH EARLINE, Boethius on Topics.

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incompatible with each other; that it is not light is in fact opposite to and incompatible with ‘if it is day’. But the proposition is made true because the incompatibility of the consequent that is produced by the mediating negation is destroyed by the other negation, and the whole proposition regains the force of an affirmation. For because it is understood to follow and to be true that if it is day, it is light, it is incompatible and false that ‘if it is day, there is not light’. When this is itself in turn negated, it is true, in this way: ‘it is not the case that if it is day, there is not light’. And it becomes similar to the affirmation ‘if it is day, there is light’, because a double negation produces an affirmation. Similarly, arguments arise from incompatible parts of a proposition if they are made up of two negations, a negation and an affirmation, or an affirmation and a negation104.

The example given is a conditional proposition made up of two affirmatives, «if it is day, there is light», in which a negation is first inserted, 104 In Top., V, 1133D-1134A (Engl. transl. modified pp. 137-138): « Tertius modus est, cum inter partes connexae atque ex duabus affirmationibus copulatae propositionis negatio interponitur, eaque ipsa negatio denegatur, quae propositio ὑπεραποφατική Graeco sermone appellatur, ut in hac ipsa quam superius proposuimus, si dies est, lux est; si inter huius propositionis partes negatio interveniat, fiet hoc modo, si dies est, lux non est; hanc si ulterius denegemus, erit ita, non si dies est, lux non est: cuius propositionis ista sententia est, quia si dies est, fieri non potest ut lux non sit. Quae propositio superabnegativa appellatur, talesque sunt omnes in quibus negatio proponitur negationi, ut non est dies, et rursus, Nec non Ausonii Troia gens missa coloni. In hac igitur si priorem partem, id est diem esse, in assumptione ponamus, consequitur etiam lucem esse hoc modo, non si dies est, lux non est, atqui dies est, lux igitur est. Qui modus a superioribus plurimum distat, quod in eo modo qui sit ab antecedentibus, ponitur antecedens, ut id quod sequitur astruatur. In modo vero qui sit a consequentibus, perimitur consequens, ut id quod praecesserat, auferatur. In hoc vero neutrum est, nam neque antecedens ponitur, ut quod sequitur, confirmetur, nec interimitur subsequens, ut id quod praecesserat, evertatur; sed ponitur antecedens, ut id quod sequitur, interimatur. Hic autem propositionis modus partes inter se suas continet repugnantes, adversum quippe est ac repugnat, si dies est, non esse lucem. Sed idcirco rata positio est, quia consequentium repugnantia facta per mediam negationem alia negatione destruitur, et ad vim affirmationis omnino revocatur. Nam quia consequens esse intelligitur, ac verum, si dies est, esse lucem, repugnat ac falsum est, si dies est, non esse lucem, quae denegata rursus vera est ita, non si dies est, lux non est, et sit consimilis affirmationi, si dies est, lux est, quia facit affirmationem geminata negatio. Similiter vero fiunt ex repugnantibus propositionis partibus argumenta, vel si duabus negationibus, vel si negatione et affirmatione, vel si affirmatione et negatione iungatur».

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«if it is day, there is no light»; the parts are now opposing, since it is not possible that it be day and there be no light. Next, another negation is added, «it is not the case that, if it is day, there is no light», resulting in a hyper-negative (superabnegativa, in Greek ὑπεραποφατική). Hypernegatives are those propositions in which a negation is placed in front of another negation, with the result of obtaining an affirmation: Propositio maior: «non si dies est, lux non est» Propositio minor: «atqui dies est» Conclusio: «lux igitur est» This first way of deriving the third figure is very different from that used in the previous two, since the purpose here is to propose the antecedent in order to affirm the consequent, and this is done through the repugnantes. The proposition «it is not the case that, if it is day, there is no light» in fact is the same as «if it is day, there is light». In this argumentation, the vis argumenti is therefore based on the repugnantes105. Cicero, after stating that the locus a conditionis belongs to the province of the dialecticians, refers in particular to the locus ex repugnantibus, which he also calls locus ex disiunctionibus or even, as the rhetoricians call it, ἐνθύμημα, and adds that many conclusions may be derived in this third way, since after all almost the entirety of dialectic is contained in this area. The reason lies in the fact that the most excellent form of deduction derives from sentences drawn from the contraria, which is the most evident of all106. These considerations enable Boethius to report, in his commentary, further valuable observations: From these, Cicero says, enthymemes arise which are inferred from contraries and which are for the most part generally used by rhetoricians. Although every discovery can be called an enthymeme (for an enthymeme is a conception of the mind, and this can apply to all discoveries), these are called enthymemes because the things 105 Boethius reports also the other three cases in which the proposition is composed of either two negatives, a negative and an affirmative, or an affirmative and a negative. In the third figure, therefore, there are a total of four conclusions drawn from opposing propositions. Moreover, Boethius notices that Cicero reports only three forms, omitting the one composed of a negative and an affirmative. Cf. ivi, V, 1134A-1135B. 106 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 53-55.

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discovered, which are concisely deduced from contraries, are especially pointed. Therefore, they have appropriated the common name ‘enthymeme’ on account of the excellence and elegance of their discovery, so that the rhetoricians call them ‘enthymemes’ as if that were a proper name107.

The term «enthymeme», again, derives from Greek and means «thought», «reasoning», or «concept», but also indicates a kind of syllogism used in rhetoric that is particularly effective because its conclusion is drawn from the contraries. The enthymemata therefore seem to have greater demonstrative efficacy than all other loci because their conclusions are especially penetrating (maxime acuta), while the vis logica is based entirely on the locus ex repugnantibus from which they derive. Much more important is Boethius’s explanation of what an enthymeme is, because he defines it as a mentis conceptio108 or brevis animi conceptio109, an appellation that, according to him, could refer to all inventiones, i.e. to all the loci («enthymema namque est mentis conceptio, quod potest omnibus inventionibus convenire»). It is in this regard helpful to recall that the term animi conceptio is the same with which Boethius, always in 107

In Top., V, 1142D-1143A (Engl. transl. p. 149): «Ex his nasci dicit enthymemata ex contrariis conclusa, quibus plurimum rhetores uti solent; atque haec enthymemata nuncupantur, non quod eodem nomine omnis inventio nuncupari non possit (enthymema namque est mentis conceptio, quod potest omnibus inventionibus convenire), sed quia haec inventa, quae breviter ex contrariis colliguntur, maxime acuta sunt, propter excellentiam speciemque inventionis commune enthymematis nomen proprium factum est, ut haec a rhetoribus quasi proprio nomine enthymemata vocentur». In the De topicis differentiis, Boethius has already furnished an exact definition of the enthymeme. Cf. De top. diff., II, II, 17-18, 1184BC, p. 24, 1-9: «Enthymema quippe est imperfectus syllogismus, id est oratio, in qua non omnibus antea propositionibus constitutis infertur festinata conclusio, ut si quis sic dicat: ‘homo animal est, substantia igitur est’. Praetermisit enim alteram propositionem, qua proponitur ‘omne animal esse substantiam’. Ergo quoniam enthymema ab universalibus ad particularia probanda contendit, quasi simile syllogismo est; quod vero non omnibus quae conveniunt syllogismo propositionibus utitur, a syllogismi ratione discedit atque ideo imperfectus vocatus est syllogismus». Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.2.3. 108 Giulio d’Onofrio observes that the explanation of the term enthymeme as a mentis conceptio is found again in Cassiodorus’s Institutiones, who cites as his source Fortunatianus, but mentions also a similar doctrine coming from Marius Victorinus, who may have been Boethius’s source. Cf. D’ONOFRIO, Fons Scientiae, pp. 254-255. 109 In Top., V, 1143C.

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the commentary, explains the term notio, which Cicero uses to describe the concepts of genus and forma110. On that occasion, it was also said that the notiones are not to be understood as conceptions of Platonic forms, but as forms of conception itself, that is, as precisely the way in which the mind receives and structures in advance the data coming from reality, or more simply as the way in which the intellect considers what is universal111. In the present passage, Boethius says that all the inventiones, or loci, are ultimately animi conceptiones. It is therefore probable that the loci are the same res, since they are the basic intellectual principles of the possibility of conceiving everything; the loci in dialectic therefore constitute the principles of reasoning because they are the unifying principles from which all forms of reasoning must necessarily proceed in order to be correct. Every form of reasoning proceeds from the same principle by which the knowledge of things is learned. The loci represent the instruments through which to establish the truth or falsity of a dubia propositio because they are the criteria, namely that starting from which any kind of knowledge can be acquired, and therefore they are also that with which, or through which, it is possible to demonstrate the truth or the falsity of a proposition.

3.4.9 The locus ab efficientibus causis112 The ninth of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus ab efficientibus causis:

110 Cf. Cicero, Topica 31, p. 130, 11-15: «Genus est notio ad plures differentias pertinens. Forma est notio cuius differentia ad caput generis, quasi fontem, referri potest. Notionem appello quod Graeci tum ἔννοια, tum πρόληψις dicunt. Ea est insita et ante praecepta cuiusque formae cognitio enodationis indigens» (Engl. transl. p. 131: « A genus is a notion applying to several different things; a species is a notion whose difference can be referred back to the genus as its source, as it were. I call notion what the Greeks sometimes call ἔννοια and sometimes πρόληψις»). Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.4.3. 111 Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.4.3. 112 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 58-66, pp. 144, 20-150, 12. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 129-135; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 241-246, 320-337. The sections of Boethius’s commentary dedicated to the analysis of the locus a causis are: In Top., II, 1078C-1079B; ivi, V, 1145B-1158D. Cicero provides four different divisions of the cause, and Boethius in his commentary dedicates a long section to each of them. As

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Causa est efficiens quae quamlibet rem praecedens efficit non tempore sed proprietate naturae, ut «sol diem». Ab hac ita sumitur argumentum: «cur esse dubites diem, cum solem in coelo esse conspicias?». Quaestio de accidente: «nam diem esse accidit aëri, id est esse per solem lucidum». Argumentum ab efficientibus causis. Maxima propositio «ubi causa est, inde effectum deesse non posse»113.

in the case of the opposita, so also for the analysis of the concept of causa Boethius feels the need to introduce the division of the Aristotelian causes in order to compound the Ciceronian and Aristotelian divisions. The first Ciceronian division distinguishes two main kinds of causes: 1) causes that produce something («in ea quae efficiant aliquid»), such as fire that lights, because the fire is the cause of what is lit, and therefore produces its effect; 2) causes without which nothing can be produced («in ea sine quibus effici nequeant»), such as the bronze in a statue, because without bronze the statue could not exist, making it therefore the material cause. The second Ciceronian division of the cause is made based on another parameter, not that of efficiency but of the will. Boethius often includes precious details: 1) there are causes that act «sine ulla appetitione animi, sine voluntate e sine opinione», such as the fact of being born, which determines the fact of having to die; 2) there are causes that come from the voluntas (such as reading a book), from the perturbatione animi (as when someone is afraid of what might happen), from the habitus (as when people become angry for trivial reasons), from the natura (as when one has a defect that grows worse over time), from the ars (such as one who paints well owing to his technical skill), or from the casus (such as things that are not in our power, but nevertheless happen; happiness, for example, can occur in one who makes a journey by sea). Each of these things has its own cause, but in no case is it a necessary cause. The third division of the Ciceronian causes distinguishes simply the causes in costantes, leaving aside the costantes themselves. With respect to the causes listed in the previous division, those coming from the ars and from natura are costantes; the remaining ones are causae non costantes (voluntas, perturbatio animi, habitus, casus). The third and last Ciceronian division distinguishes the causes in voluntariae and ignoratae, in that those accomplished by means of an act of deliberation are voluntary (quae consilio), while those that happen by necessity («quae necessitate effecta sunt») are unknown causes that include certainly the natura and the case. For Boethius, what matters is being able to distinguish various kinds of causes in order to discern those that are necessary from those that are not. Cf. In Top., V, 1149BC: «Quae cum ita sint, discernendae sunt causae et pervidenda necessitas, nec omnis causae praemittenda ut subsequatur effectus, sed ea tantum in qua est efficienti necessitas, etiamsi extrinsecus adiumenta defuerint» (Engl. transl. p. 159: «Hence we must distinguish causes and discern necessity; not every cause should be taken as a premise in order that an effect might follow, but only the cause that necessarily produces something even when extrinsic aids are lacking»). 113 De top. diff., III, III, 28-29, 1199A, p. 56, 3-8. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 171, p. 173, 9-11: «Ex causis autem rerum sic: avaritiam si tollere voltis, mater

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The locus ab efficientibus causis is closely connected with the subsequent locus, i.e. with the locus ab effectis, because there can be no cause without an effect and vice versa. The efficient cause is first of all defined in the following way: «Causa est efficiens quae quamlibet rem praecedens efficit non tempore sed proprietate naturae». It is what produces something, not in consideration of time, but of natural capacity (for example, it is day because of the sun; therefore the sun is the efficient cause of it being day)114. Boethius does not provide the whole argumentatio, but merely enunciates a quaestio, the parts of which are opposing: «why do you doubt that it is day when you see that the sun is in the sky?». It is not therefore easy to understand the function from which the maxima propositio develops («ubi causa est, inde effectum abesse non posse»)115. eius est tollenda, luxuries»; Martianus Capella, De Nuptiis, V, 493, p. 243, 7-12: «Causarum locus late patet et multa disputatione tractatur. Sed nunc formam eius satis fuerit demonstrare sub hoc exemplo: ‘sed cum ob tua decreta, ob iudicia, ob imperia dabantur, non est ita quaerendum, cuius manu numerarentur, sed cuius iniuria cogerentur’. Sic et Vergilius ‘me ne fugis?’»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, pp. 126, 25-127, 2: «A causis argumentum est, quando consuetudine communi res quaeque tractatur – Terentius: ‘Ego nonnihil veritus sum dudum abs te, Dave, ne faceres quod vulgus servorum solet, dolis ut me deluderes’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 12, 7-10: «A causis argumentum est, quando consuetudine communi res quaeque tractatur, ut Terentius (Andr. 582): ‘Ego nonnihil veritus sum dudum abs te cavere, ne faceres quod vulgus servorum solet, dolis ut me deluderes’». 114 Boethius gives the same definition of efficient cause also in his commentary on Cicero. Cf. In Top., II, 1078C: «Efficiens vero causa est qua praecedente aliquod effectum est, non tempore, sed proprietate naturae» (Engl. transl. p. 68: «An efficient cause is such that when it precedes [not in time but in its particular nature] something is effected»). 115 In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius presents the following formulation of the maxima propositio relative to the cause, cf. In Top., II, 1079B: «Unamquamque rem ex causis spectari oportere» (Engl. transl. p. 69: «A thing ought to be judged on the basis of its cause»). Always in the commentary, he dwelled on considering the importance of this locus especially for the philosophers. Cf. ivi, V, 1157BC: «Primum enim, inquit, oratoribus ac philosophis, quorum in disputationibus larga materia est, multa ex causarum loco argumentorum suppetit copia. Communis quippe oratoribus ac philosophis hic locus esse prospicitur qui est a causis, his naturas rerum quod est philosophiae proprium, illis quod oratoriae facultatis est, facta probantibus. Nam et cum res quaelibet quaeritur, eius causae a philosophis vestigari solent. Quibus praemissis, ut superius dictum est, comitatur statim quod concludendum est, et oratores ad suspicionem movendam detergendamve factorum causas requirunt. Hoc quippe stabile in hominum mentibus manet, quod neque factum, neque res ulla praeter illam omnium

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3.4.10 The locus ab effectis116 The tenth category of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus ab effectis: «Effectum est quod efficit causa. Ab hoc ita sumitur argumentum: ‘an tu dubites amasse quem rapuit?’. Quaestio de accidente, argumentum ab effectis. Maxima propositio: ‘ubi effectus est, causam abesse non posse’, veluti ‘non afuit amor’, qui fuit causa ‘cur rapuerit’, quod est effectus»117. This locus is principem naturam, sine propriis causis possit existere. Quo fit ut uberrimus causarum usus sit in rhetorum orationibus, philosophorumque tractatu» (Engl. transl. p. 169: «First, he says, there is a great store of arguments from the Topic from causes for orators and philosophers, whose discussions contain a generous amount of material. In fact, this Topic from causes is observed to be common to orators and philosophers, because causes show philosophers the natures of things, which is proper to philosophy, and they show orators deeds, which belongs to rhetorical skill. For when any thing is investigated, philosophers customarily inquire into its causes; when they have been presented, what is to be concluded follows immediately, as we said above. And orators look for the causes of deeds to excite or remove suspicion. In fact, it is fixed in the minds of men that, apart from the most noble nature of all, neither any deed nor any thing can exist without its appropriate causes. Hence, there is an abundant use of causes in the speeches of rhetoricians and the discussions of philosophers»). Philosophers are necessarily interested in the locus ex causis because the causes are able to show the true nature of things, which is the main purpose for which philosophy strives. Once the cause is discovered, it is the reason and the principle of all things, so, in a certain sense, everything is already contained in the cause. The same can be said of rhetoricians who, to understand the reason something has occurred, examine all typologies of the causes that have determined those facts. Ultimately, therefore, no thing (res), just as no fact (factum), can exist without the appropriate cause («sine propriis causis») that has produced it, except for the most illustrious nature of all things («omnium princeps natura»), which is the cause of itself. 116 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 67, p. 150, 12-18. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 135137; REINHARDT, «Commentary», p. 337. The sections of Boethius’s commentary dedicated to the analysis of the locus ex effectis are In Top., II, 1079B-1080B; ivi, V, 1158D-1159B. 117 De top. diff., III, III, 30-31, 1199AB, p. 56, 9-13. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 171, p. 173, 11-13: «Ex iis autem quae sunt orta de causis: si aerarii copiis et ad belli adiumenta et ad ornamenta pacis utimur, vectigalibus serviamus»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 494, p. 243, 12-20: «Ab effectis fit argumentum, cum in causa dubitatio est, ut fatum probetur ex eo, quod homines etiam inviti servabantur in vita. Fatum enim est causa vel vitae vel mortis; illa vero effecta sunt fati: vivere posse vel mori. Cicero hinc probat Auli Hirtii vitam populo caram esse, quod ei populus plaudit.

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taken from the effectum, defined in the following way: «Effectum est quod efficit causa». The effect, therefore, is what the cause produces; by this definition the connection of the effect with its cause emerges, since, as has been said, these concepts cannot be separated, in that the one necessarily recalls the other118. Therefore, since each cause corresponds to an effect, and for every effect there is a cause, then the effect, when it is used in the discipline of topica, is the source of as many arguments as there are for the locus a causis119. The procedure for solving a quaestio starting from the locus ab effectis is exactly the opposite of that starting from the locus a causis. Boethius Hoc est Vergilii ‘degeneres animos timor arguit’, nam timor est causa, ut degener sit animus, quod timoris effectum est»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 127, 3-5: «Ab effectis argumentum est, cum ex his quae facta sunt aliquid approbatur, ut Vergilius: ‘Degeneres animos timor arguit’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 12, 11-13: «Ab effectis argumentum est, cum [ex] his, quae facta sunt, aliquid adprobatur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 4, 13): ‘Degeneres animos timor arguit’». 118 In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius offers the following definition of effectum, cf. In Top., II, 1079C: «Effecta sunt quae aliquibus efficiuntur causis, non tempore praecedentibus, sed natura». (Engl. transl. p. 69: «Effects are those things effected by causes that precede not in time but in nature»). 119 Cf. ivi, VI, 1159AB: «Omnia quae ad se referuntur recte dicuntur esse coniuncta; ipsa enim relatio rerum efficit coniunctionem; quod si causa alicuius causa est, non alterius, nisi sui effectus est causa, itemque si est aliquis effectus, ex causarum principiis venit; iure igitur ab effectis locus, causarum loco debet esse coniunctus. Quoniam vero semper quae ad se referuntur aequantur, necesse est, quae ubertas sit causarum, eadem quoque sit effectorum. Quoniam enim causa praeter effectum esse non potest, cum sit causa super effectum, necesse est ut ex eventibus quoque atque effectibus, plurima suppetant argumenta, siquidem ex causis etiam plurima contrahuntur. Nam sicut cuiuslibet effectus potest causa tractari, si ex qualibet causa potest, qui sit eventus ostendi, recteque, ait, causarum cognitio eventuum cognitionem facit; ut enim in praedicamentis ostenditur, sciri relativum aliquod non potest, praeter reliqui scientiam relativi» (Engl. transl. p. 171: «All things that are related to one another are rightly said to be conjoined, for any relation between things produces a conjoining. And if a cause is a cause of something, it is the cause precisely of its effects. Similarly, if something is an effect, its sources are its causes. And so it is right that we should conjoin the Topic from effects to the Topic from causes. And since things related to one another are always equal in number, there must be the same abundance of effects as there is of causes. For a cause cannot exist apart from its effect, since a cause is always a cause of effects; therefore if many arguments are obtained from causes, there must also be many arguments from effects and outcomes. For just as from any effect a cause can be drawn, so from any cause one can show what the outcome is. And so Cicero rightly says, “an understanding of causes produces an understanding of outcomes”. For as is shown in the Categories, one relative cannot be known without knowledge of the other relative»).

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does not this time even develop the whole argumentatio, but simply provides the quaestio («perhaps you doubt that he who carried her off by force was burning with passion?») and the maxima propositio: «ubi effectus est, causam abesse non posse»120.

3.4.11 The locus a comparatione121 The eleventh category of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur» is the locus a comparatione: Comparatio vero maioris est, quoties id quod minus est maiori comparatur. Ab hoc loco ita sumitur argumentum: «si is, qui patriam bello persecutus est, tandem a civibus veniam meruit, cur non is quoque mereatur, qui ob seditionem motam actus est in exsilium?». Quaestio de accidente, argumentum a comparatione maioris. Maxima propositio: «quod in re maiore valet, valeat in minore»122.

120

In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius provides the following maxima propositio for the locus ab effectis: cf. In Top., II, 1080B: «Causas ab effectis suis non separari» (Engl. transl. p. 70: «Causes are not separated from their effects»). 121 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 68-71, p. 150, 23-152, 25 . Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 137-143; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 337-339. The sections of Boethius’s commentary dedicated to the analysis of the Ciceronian locus a comparatione are: In Top., V, 1159B-1164A. 122 De top. diff., III, III, 32-33, 1199B, p. 56, 13-18. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 172, p. 173, 13-16: «Maiora autem et minora et paria comparabimus sic: ex maiore: si bona existimatio divitiis praestat et pecunia tanto opere expetitur, quanto gloria magis est expetenda!»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 495, pp. 243, 20-244, 7: «A comparatione maiorum, ‘quis dubitet a Siculis petisse pecuniam Verrem, cum a Marco Octavio Ligure postularit?’. Vergilius: ‘tu potes unanimos armare in proelia fratres’. Ex hoc utique probat et alienos posse, quod minus est. Terentius: ‘nam qui mentiri aut fallere instituerit patrem aut audebit, tanto magis audebit ceteros’»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 15, p. 127, 5-9: «A comparatione argumentum est, quando per collationem personarum sive causarum sententiae ratio sub imputatione formatur – Vergilius: ‘Tu potes Aenean manibus subducere Graium; nos aliquid contra Rutulos iuvisse nefandum est?’»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, xxx, 13, 14-18: «A conparatione argumentum est, quando per conlationem personarum sive causarum sententiae ratio sub inputatione formatur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 10, 81): ‘Tu potes Aenean manibus subducere Graium, nos aliquid contra Rutulos iuvisse nefandum est?’».

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The last of the loci on the Ciceronian list derives from comparatio, and while Boethius does not give any definition of the latter concept, valuable insights are provided in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica. First of all, each comparatio is made in a double way: Every comparison is twofold, for either equals or unequals are compared to one another. In the case where the things being compared are equal, the equality is observed to be always the same. Unequals, however, are divided into two “parts”, namely, the lesser and the greater. For what is lesser is not lesser in itself but in comparison to what is greater; similarly, what is greater is said to be greater in comparison to what is lesser123.

A comparatio can be established between terms that are aequalia or inaequalia. In the first case, the result of the comparison is the same, because what is observed is always and only the aequalitas that the terms possess. Conversely, if the comparatio is among terms that are inaequalia, the result is inevitably double, producing one maior and one minor term. These are, therefore, relative terms that cannot be separated in any way because the maior is such when placed in relation to the minor, and vice versa. For the same reason, Boethius states that the locus a comparatione must be tripartite: «The Topic said to be from comparison is split into three parts, for it arises from comparison of greater, lesser, or equal things»124. Given the double way in which the comparison may be established (between equal or unequal terms), three typologies of relative terms arise: the paria, maior, and minus, just as there are also three possible ways that this locus can be used in the discipline of topica. In his Topica, Cicero states that the comparatio can be established on the basis of four criteria: according to number (numerus), species (species), or efficiency (vis), or with reference to something outside of 123

In Top., VI, 1160A (Engl. transl. p. 171): «Omnis comparatio duplex est: aut enim aequalia sibimet comparantur, aut inaequalia; sed in his quae sunt aequalia semper eadem esse notatur aequalitas. Inaequalia autem in gemina veluti membra dividuntur, minoris scilicet atque maioris. Nam quod minus est, non per se minus est, sed comparatione maioris. Itemque quod maius est, minoris comparatione dicitur maius»). 124 Ivi, II, 1080C (Engl. transl. p. 70): «A comparatione locus qui dicitur, tripartito scinditur; aut enim a comparatione maiorum, aut a comparatione minorum, aut a comparatione parium nascitur».

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that which is being compared125. Boethius dedicates a long section in his commentary to the analysis of each of these four possibilities, providing numerous maximae propositiones, the most important of which relates to the comparatio secundum numerum. Elsewhere, in his De arithmetica, Boethius in fact explains how the very order of reality is based on number: Quae igitur ex hisce prima discenda est nisi ea quae principium matrisque quodammodo ad ceteras obtinet portionem? Haec est autem arithmetica. Haec enim cunctis prior est, non modo quod hanc ille huius mundanae molis conditor deus primam suae habuit ratiocinationis exemplar et ad hanc cuncta constituit quaecumque fabricante ratione per numeros adsignati ordinis invenire concordiam126.

Arithmetic is the first discipline within the quadrivium, since it is the source and principle of all the others. The underlying reason for this is that God himself, in creating the world, has recourse to arithmetic as ratiocinationis exemplar; all created reality, in fact, was able to find harmony in a prearranged order only thanks to numbers. In this text, Boethius also explains how the scientiae of the quadrivium are valuable instruments through which man can raise his eyes to contemplate the truth, and therefore to achieve sapientia. Arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy have in fact the task of studying the essentiae, which, though having an incorporeal nature because of the unchanging character of their substance, understand change because they are in contact with corporeal things. These essentiae are thus to be indicated by sapientia as the object of scientia127. 125 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 68, p. 150, 21-23: «Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur; in quibus spectantur haec: numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio» (Engl. transl. p. 151: «Comparison, then, is between things which are larger, smaller, or equal. In these one looks at the following: number, kind, force, a certain relationship to some things»). 126 De institutione arithmetica, I 1, 1082A, p. 10, 8-15. 127 Ivi, I 1, 1079D-1081A, pp. 7, 27-8, 15: «Est enim sapientia rerum quae sunt suique immutabilem substantiam sortiuntur comprehensio veritatis. Esse autem illa dicimus quae nec intentione crescunt nec retractione minuuntur nec variationibus permutantur, sed in propria semper vi suae se naturae subsidiis nixa custodiunt. Haec autem sunt qualitates, quantitates, formae, magnitudines, parvitates, aequalitates, habitudines, actus, dispositiones, loca, tempora et quiqduid adunatum quodammodo

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Since the order of reality is based on arithmetic, the locus a comparatione is a privileged «place of the mind» because it is able to reflect the mind’s skill in recognizing the same order in which reality was generated in the distinction of various kinds of greatness, and in elevating itself towards the contemplation of the primordial model from which it derives. On the other hand, in the De topicis differentiis, the same maximae propositions are not simply maiores but are maximae128. This means that they are placed outside of any possible comparison, being the criterion and the measure on the basis of which the truth of all other propositions may be judged; they are in fact per se notae129. corporibus invenitur, quae ipsa quidem natura incorporea sunt et immutabili substantiae ratione vigentia, participatione vero corporis permutantur et tactu variabilis rei invertibilem inconstantiam transeunt. Haec igitur quoniam, ut dictum est, natura immutabilem substantiam vimque sortita sunt, vere proprique esse dicuntur. Horum igitur, id est quae sunt proprie quaeque suo nomine essentiae nominantur, scientiam sapientia profitetur». It is not by chance that Boethius, in referring to the manner in which Cicero presents the locus a comparatione, attributes to him the credit for having furnished contextually a sort of inventionis exemplar to which the soul of the seeker may turn. Cf. In Top., VI, 1160AB: «Quae cum ita sint, dividit atque ante oculos ponit omnium comparationum modus, et quod raro in superioribus locis fecit, ipsas maximas propositiones ponit in comparationibus constitutas, ut si quando loco sit nobis comparationis utendum, habeamus quoddam, velut inventionis exemplar, ad quod quaerentem animum possimus advertere» (Engl. transl. p. 171: « Hence, Cicero divides and places before our eyes the modes of all comparisons. And, something that he did only rarely in the case of the preceding Topics, he presents the very maximal propositions involved in the comparisons, so that whenever we need to use the Topic from comparison, we have a certain “paradigm” of discovery to which we can direct our searching»). 128 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.3.3 e Chap. 2, § 2.3.1. 129 Cf. In Top., I, 1051B: «Natura igitur rerum fert ut ubi quid maius ac minus est, ibi maximum quoque aliquid inesse necesse sit» (Engl. transl. p 33: «The nature of things requires that where there is something greater and lesser, there must also be something greatest or maximal»). A representative example of how Boethius uses this locus can be found in the third book of the Consolatio philosophiae, where he presents the demonstration of the existence of the Prime Good, subsequently identified with God, the highest point toward which the entire discussion converges. Cf. De consolatione philosophiae, III 10, 1-4, pp. 80, 30-81, 15: «In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod huiusmodi bonum, quale paulo ante definisti, in rerum natura possit existere, ne nos praeter rei subiectae veritatem cassa cogitatonis imago decipiat. Sed quin existat sitque hoc veluti quidam omnium fons honorum, negari nequit; omne enim quod imperfectum esse dicitur id imminutione perfecti imperfectum

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The locus a comparatione maioris Returning to the example of the locus a comparatione maioris in the De topicis differentiis, the reference here seems to be to a case more relevant to rhetoric than dialectic: «if one who fought against his country in war nevertheless merited a pardon from the citizens, why should one who was driven into exile for instigating insurrection not also a merit pardon?». The aim here is to show that «he who was driven into exile for instigating insurrection» (the minor term), merits a pardon from the citizens because the pardon was granted to the one who has committed a far more serious act, «he fought against his country in war» (the maior term). The propositio per se nota grants an immediately evident principle for which «what holds good in the greater thing holds good in the lesser » («quod in re maiore valet, valeat in minore»). The argumentation adduced in support of this thesis is drawn from the maior because, if a pardon is granted to one who committed a more serious act, it must also be granted to one who committed a less serious act. The locus a comparatione minoris Minoris est comparatio, quoties maior res confertur minori. Atque ex eo capitur argumentum hoc modo: «si Ti. Gracchum mediocriter labefactantem statum reipublicae Scipio privatus interfecit, cur non Catilinam orbem terrae caede atque incendio vastare cupientem consules persequantur?». Quaestio de accidente, argumentum esse perhibetur. Quo fit ut, si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit; etenim, perfectione sublata, unde illud quod imperfectum perhibetur exstiterit, ne fingi quidem postest» (Engl. transl. p. 267: «And inquire first whether there can be any such good extant in the world, as thou hast defined; lest, contrary to truth, we be deceived with an empty show of thought. But it cannot be denied that there is some such thing extant which is as it were the fountain of all goodness. For all that is said to be imperfect is so termed for the want it hath of perfection. Whence it followeth that if in any kind we find something imperfect, there must needs be something perfect also in the same kind. For if we take away perfection we cannot so much as devise how there should be any imperfection»). The simple statement that there exist in nature things that are more or less perfect demonstrates the existence of that which is maximally perfect; absent this explanation, it is in fact incomprehensible why things would be termed greater or lesser in the hierarchy of perfection.

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a comparatione minoris. Maxima propositio: «quod in re minore valet, valeat in maiore»130.

When the aim is to defend a thesis starting from the locus a comparatione minoris, the procedure is exactly the opposite of the previous one, as in the example: «if Scipio, a private citizen, killed Tiberius Gracchus, who had done moderate damage to the state of the republic, why should the consuls not take vengeance on Catiline, who is eager to ravage the whole world with carnage and conflagration?». The aim of this rhetorical question is to urge that the consuls take vengeance on Catiline, who wants to ravage the whole world with carnage and conflagration (maior term), because Scipio, a mere citizen, killed Gracchus, who had done less damage to the state of the republic (minor term). The maxima propositio highlights exactly the relationship that has to be established in order to arrive at an argumentation by starting from what is lesser: «Quod in re minore valet, valeat in maiore» («what holds good in the lesser thing holds good in the greater»). The locus a comparatione parium Paria sunt quae eiusdem quantitatis sunt et semper paritas similitudo est quantitatis. Ab hac ita fit argumentum: «si Demosthenem quis laudare desideret, cur vituperet Tullium?». Quaestio de accidente, argumentum a comparatione parium. Maxima propositio: «rerum parium idem esse iudicium»131. 130

De top. diff., III, III, 34-35, 1199BC, p. 56, 18-57, 5. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 172, pp. 173, 16-174, 3: «Ex minore: hic parvae consuetudinis causa huius mortem tam fert familiariter: quid si ipsa amasset? Quid hic mihi faciet patri?»; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, V, IV, 13, p. 102, 5-16: «Nam hoc mihi ostendendum est, augendi gratia non tota modo totis, sed etiam partes partibus comparari, sicut hoc loco: ‘an vero vir aplissimus P. Scipio pontifex maximus Ti. Gracchum mediocriter labefactantem statum rei publicae privatus interfecit: Catilinam orbem terrae caede atque incendio vastare cupientem nos consules perferemus?’ hic et Catilina Graccho et status rei publicae orbi terrarum et mediocris labefactatio caedi et incendiis et vastationi et privatus consulibus conparatur: quae si quis dilatare velit, plenos singula locos habent»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 496, p. 244, 7-14: «A minorum comparatione, ut ‘Publius Scipio pontifex maximus Tiberium Gracchum mediocriter labefactantem statum rei publicae privatus interfecit’; deinde iungit quaestionem, ubi maius est quiddam ‘Catilinam orbem terrae caede atque incendiis vastare cupientem non consules perferemus?’ Et hoc Terentius loco illud ‘hic parvae consuetudinis causa huius mortem tam fert familiariter’». 131 De top. diff., III, III, 36-37, 1199C, p. 57, 5-9. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 172- 173, p. 174, 4-5: «Ex pari: est eiusdem et eripere et contra rem publicam

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The comparison between the aequalia does not require a separate discussion because all that is equal in number, form, capacity, and relation is to be considered simply equal. Boethius, however, points out that the paria express an equality intended as a similarity according to quantity. The implicit reference is to Themistius’s locus a similibus, where it was said that the similitudo can be established according to quantity, which is called equality (paritas or aequalitas), or according to quality, and in this case called similitude (similitudo)132. The example is again borrowed from the field of rhetoric: «if someone wants to praise Demosthenes, why does he criticize Tullius [Cicero]?». This rhetorical question implicitly considers Demosthenes and Tullius equals, and since «the judgment of equal things is the same» («rerum parium idem esse iudicium»), it is not reasonable to praise one and criticise the other. This locus concludes the presentation of the category of the «loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur».

3.5 The loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur 3.5.1 The locus a rei iudicio133 Now the only locus that is placed outside the terms of the quaestio is presented: largiri pecunias»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 497, p. 244, 14-19: «A parium comparatione, Cicero ‘et si non minus iucundi atque illustres sunt ii dies, quibus nascimur. Et in Pisonem ‘nihil interesse, utrum ipse consul improbis contionibus, perniciosis legibus rem publicam vexet, an alios vexare patiatur’». 132 Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.7.2. Cf. De top. diff., II, VIII, 5, 1190D, p. 38, 1-3: «Hic vero in gemina dividitur: haec enim similitudo aut in qualitate aut in quantitate consistit; sed in qualitate similitudo, in quantitate paritas nuncupatur, id est aequalitas». This precision is not casual, because when a little later Boethius demonstrates how the two divisions of the loci presented in the second and third books can be reconciled, he pairs Cicero’s locus a comparatione parium with Themistius’s locus a similibus. Cf. infra, Chap. 3, § 3.7. 133 Cf. Cicero, Topica, 24-25, p. 126, 1-10; ivi, 72-76, pp. 154, 30-156, 13. Cf. REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 252-256, 339-346. The sections of Boethius’s commentary dedicated to the analysis of this locus are: In Top., II, 1082D; ivi, VI, 1166B-1169D. Boethius’s commentary stops with the seventy-sixth paragraph, with

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Restat is locus, quem extrinsecus dixit assumi. Hic iudicio nititur et auctoritate et totus probabilis est nihil continens necessarium. Probabile autem est quod videtur vel omnibus vel pluribus vel doctis et sapientibus et inter hos famosis atque praestantibus vel his, qui secundum unamquamque artem peritiam consecuti sunt, ut medico in medicina, geometrae in geometria. Ab hoc loco tale est argumentum, veluti si dicam: «difficile est esse cum Carthaginensibus bellum, quoniam id P. Scipio Cornelius Africanus dixit, qui saepe fuerat expertus». Hic vero locus extrinsecus dicitur constitutus, quoniam non de his qui praedicati vel subiecti sunt termini sumitur, sed ab extrinsecus posito iudicio venit. Hic etiam inartificialis et artis expers vocatur, quoniam hinc non sibi ipse conficit argumentum orator, sed praeparatis positisque utitur testimoniis134.

no comments on paragraphs 77 to 100. Although it is not possible to know for certain whether the text as it survives is incomplete, or whether alternatively Boethius never finished it, it is nevertheless case that Boethius never failed to complete any of the other texts that he is known to have written. Another possible, indeed probable, explanation is that the incompleteness of Boethius’s commentary is the result of his free choice: from paragraph 79, in fact, a new section of the Topica begins, in which Cicero shows how to apply this discipline to rhetoric. 134 De top. diff., III, IV, 1-5, 1199CD, p. 57, 10-21. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, II, 39, 172-173, p. 174, 5-9: «Foris autem adsumuntur ea, quae non sua vi sed extranea sublevantur ut haec: hoc verum est; dixit enim Q. Lutatius. Hoc falsum est; habita enim quaestio est. Hoc sequi necesse est; recito enim tabulas. De quo genere toto paulo ante dixi»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 498-501, p. 245, 1-22: «His igitur breviter demonstratis illa, quae non exogitantur ab oratore, sed a causa aut a reis suggeruntur, in tribus, ut diximus, rebus posita sunt: in scriptura, ut tabularum, in auctoritate, ut testium, in necessitate, ut tormentorum. Ab scripto argumentum petitur, cum ad dubiae rei probationem vel chirographum vel testamentum transactionis tabulae recitantur ceteraque huius modi, quae ita nota sunt, ut exempla de oratione non quaerant. Ab auctoritate vero, ut ‘Africanum dixisse iure caesum esse Tiberium Gracchum’, aut cum testimonium, quo veritas nudetur, affertur, ut ‘Gnaeum Pompeium de misso frumento celeriter testem nobis inducit’; auctoritas igitur aut iudicantis aut testis est. Huic parti adiunguntur oracula ceteraque id genus. Necessitas vero dat fidem ex tormentis, aut somno, aut furore, aut vinolentia, quae vocem alicuius rei extorquet inviti. Quae omnia cum ad coniecturam de causa, persona, facto adduntur, id est ipso testimonio, vel confessione, vel scripto capiunt fidem vel amittunt. Nam et causa dicentis attenditur, et persona tractatur, et ipsius scripturae secum aut cum causa qualitas comparatur»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 16, p. 127, 10-26; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 14-17.

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This locus coincides with that already encountered in Themistius’s list, and is in fact called by the same name, locus a rei iudicio; it is also placed outside the terms of the quaestio135. As already said in the second book, this locus is entirely composed of the probable, for which Boethius, for the third time in the De topicis differentiis, provides a definition136. This locus is identified essentially with what is called the principle of authority because its demonstrative efficacy is activated to the extent that the argumentation is made depending on the auctoritates, i.e. on authoritative testimonies. Within the definition of the probable, it is in fact possible to perceive a kind of hierarchy of the authoritativeness of the opinions to be taken into account, as discussed in previous chapters. To review, since the judgment on which this locus is based must be authoritative, first of all come the opinions that seem true to everyone (omnibus) or to most 135

Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.7.1. Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.6.2 e Chap. 2, § 2.7.1. Cf. De top. diff., I, VII, 4, 1180CD, 16, 7-13: «Probabile vero est quod videtur vel omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus et his vel omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime notis atque praecipuis vel quod unicuique artifici secundum propriam facultatem, ut de medicina medico, gubernatori de navibus gubernandis, id praeterea quod videtur, cum quo sermo conseritur, vel ipsi qui iudicat, in quo nihil attinet verum falsumve sit argumentum, si tantum verisimilitudinem tenet»; ivi, II, VIII, 3, 1190BC, p. 37, 9-13: «Et ille quidem locus qui rei iudicium tenet huiusmodi est: ut id dicamus esse, quod vel omnes iudicant vel plures et hi vel sapientes vel secundum unamquamque artem penitus eruditi. Huius exemplum est, ». Another definition can also be found in the commentary on Cicero’s Topica; cf. In Top., II, 1081D-1082A: «Hic vero est qui sumitur ab auctoritate iudicii locus valde probabilis, etiamsi non maximae necessitatis. Quae enim necessaria sunt, haec ex propria considerantur natura. Quae vero probabilia sunt, plurimorum iudicium exspectant. Ea namque sunt probabilia, quae videntur vel omnibus, vel pluribus, vel maxime famosis atque praecipuis, vel secundum unamquamque artem scientiamque eruditis, ut quod medico in medicina, geometrae in geometria, caeterisque in propria studiorum facultate veritatis» (Engl. transl. p. 72: «This Topic is taken from an authoritative judgment and is certainly readily believable even if it does not have the greatest necessity. For things that are necessary are considered on the basis of their own nature, but things that are readily believable depend on the judgment of the multitude. For things that are readily believable are those which seem true to everyone or to most people or to the most famous and distinguished or to the experts in any individual art and science [as, for example, a doctor in the field of medicine, a geometer in the field of geometry, and others experienced in the appropriate skill of their studies»]). It was pointed out above how similar this definition is to the one given by Aristotle of authoritative opinions (ἔνδοξα), the premises of dialectical syllogisms. 136

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people (pluribus); then there are the opinions of the learned (docti) and the wise (sapientes), and among these what count are the opinions of the most famous (famosae) and illustrious (praestantes); finally there are the opinions formulated by various experts in their own fields of investigation, such as the doctor in medicine or the mathematician in the geometry. It is therefore clear that the nature of this locus is profoundly different from that of the loci presented so far, since it is not the result of a mental operation accomplished by the dialectician or rhetorician starting from the terms in the quaestio; it is rather the testimonies that the rhetorician adduces in support of his thesis. For a similar reason, this locus is considered to be without art (inartificialis) and to lack of any form of skill (artis expers). Therefore, while the «loci in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent» produce argumenta, the «loci ab extrinsecus assumuntur» consist of testimonium. This is the goal toward which both move, to garner credibility with regard to the thing in doubt, to associate the argumentum and testimonium - and this is perhaps the reason why even this locus is part of the discipline of topica137. 137

In his commentary on Cicero, Boethius goes into detail on the differences that exist between the argumentum and the testimonium. Cf. In Top., VI, 1167AB: «Quod ex affectis argumenta quae fiunt, ab oratore inveniuntur, eiusque opera atque industria nascuntur. Ea vero quae extrinsecus posita sunt, rei tantum testimoniunt praebent, non enim inveniuntur ab oratore, sed his orator utitur positis atque constitutis. Nam quae a genere, vel a specie, vel a caeteris affectis argumenta sunt, ab ipso quodammodo oratore reperiuntur. Testimonia vero sibi ipse non efficit, sed ad causam utitur ante praeparatis. Quo fit, ut argumenta ex affectis in causa statim atque ex tempore nascantur; ea vero quae in testimoniis posita sunt, ante rem praecurrentia confirmando usum negotio posterius praestent, et in adiunctis ab oratore coniectura colligitur, et auditorum mentibus intimatur. Testimonia vero non in coniecturis, aut in suspicionibus, sed in rei gestae narratione consistunt» (Engl. transl. p. 180: «Arguments that arise from related things are found by an orator and are produced by his effort and industry; arguments taken from without, however, offer only testimony concerning the matter at issue, for they are not found by an orator, but the orator uses them already existing and constituted. Arguments from a genus or from a species or from other related things are prepared by the orator himself in some way. But the orator does not produce testimonies for himself; rather he uses them for his case ready-made. Hence, arguments from related things in a case arise from the start and as occasion offers, but arguments consisting in testimony exist before the matter at issue and afterward are useful as confirming evidence for a legal action. And in the case of associated things, the orator draws a conclusion and impresses it on his audience; in the case of testimony, however, the arguments consist not in drawing conclusions or making inferences but in the narration of the action that was done»).

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3.6 Distinctions among some loci of Cicero’s division Having completed the presentation of all of the loci of Cicero’s division, and before moving on to engage directly with Themistius’s division, Boethius considers it necessary to take time once again to discuss the differences that exist among some Cicero’s loci which could at first sight seem similar. Expeditis igitur M. Tullii differentiis, quibus a se maximas propositiones, quas locos esse diximus, separavit, pertractanda mihi breviter videtur superius digesta partitio, ut ea, quae similia videntur, a semetipsis ratione congrua segregentur. Similis enim videtur locus a toto ei qui est a nota; uterque enim in definitione est constitutus. Nam interpretatio nominis quaedam ipsius nominis definitio est. Sed illa eorum maxima est differentia, quia locus a toto rem definit, a nota vero non rem definit, sed nomen interpretatur. Diversa vero sunt res ac nomen; hoc enim significat, illud significatur. Item locus a partium enumeratione consimilis videtur esse ei qui est a forma. Nam et forma pars est et qui genus dividit enumerat; neque enim aliter fieri ex forma argumentum potest, nisi dividatur a genere; sumi enim omnino forma non potest, nisi per divisionem. Sed hic quoque multa est differentia: nam partium enumeratio totas necesse est dividat partes easque universas ad fidem argumentationis assumat, sive illae partes sive illae sint species, ut speciebus quidem genus totum vero partibus approbetur. In forma vero sufficit ad demonstrandum quod de genere dicitur una quaelibet. Item locus a contrario et repugnantibus videtur esse consimilis. Sed habet differentiam quod contraria primis sibimet frontibus opponuntur. Repugnantia vero per contrariorum coniunctionem sibi approbantur adversa hoc modo, ut «dormire» ac «vigilare» statim sibi contraria sunt. «Stertere» vero repugnat «vigilationi» idcirco, quia somno coniungitur. Adiuncta vero et antecedentia et consequentia quasi finitima sunt. Sed distant, quod in adiunctis nulla necessitas est, in antecedentibus vero et consequentibus maxima; in adiunctis tempora nimium valent. Nam quod adiunctum est vel praecedere rem solet vel cum ea uno eodemque esse tempore vel subsequi posterius. At in antecedentibus nihil horum est, sed non habita temporis ratione mox, ut fuerit antecedens, mox consequens esse necesse est et, si consequens non fuerit, antecedens necesse est interire138. 138

De top. diff., III, V, 1-9, 1199D-1200C, pp. 58, 1-59, 9. In the first book of the commentary on Cicero’s Topica, where a first short presentation of all the loci is made,

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The first difference concerns the loci a toto and a nota, which in fact may seem similar since the former is drawn from the definition of the res and the latter from the interpretation of its name, which is a kind of definition. The difference between these two loci is more clear when the difference between the res that act as functions of loci are borne in mind, namely the definitio and the interpretatio nominis (or notatio). The definition shows the substance of the definitio («a definition is an expression signifying the substance of any individual thing»139) by means of the genus and specific differences140. The nota is rather a vox significativa, that is, the name by which the res is signified, while the notatio is the explanation of the name, which people establish conventionally141. Therefore, although definitio and notatio both act to define, the res defined by them are different: the object of the definitio is the res existing in reality, while that of the notatio (or better, of the interpretation) is the nota. The res and the nota are obviously very different; the res is in fact signified by means of the definitio, while the nota instead signifies and can in turn be defined by the notatio. The second difference to keep in mind is that between the locus a partibus enumeratione and the locus a forma, both of which are taken from the division of the genus into its species, or of the whole into its parts. In the locus a partibus, however, the entire division is to act as a function of the locus, and it is therefore necessary to enumerate all of the species or parts without omitting any. On the contrary, in the locus a forma, only one of the species, or simply one of the parts, is able to act as a function of the locus142. The third difference to keep in mind is that between the loci a contrariis and a repugnantibus. The contraria and the repugnantes may Boethius includes systematically for each of Cicero’s loci also the corresponding maxima propositio. The aim is clear; as Boethius says, since Cicero speaks only about the loci understood as the differentiae of the maximae propositones, while Aristotle speaks about the loci understood as the maximae propositiones themselves, he has himself done nothing but include the missing link to Cicero’s Topica in order to reconcile his approach with that of Themistius. Cf. In Top., I, 1054B, Introd. note 128. Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.3.2. This explains why, in the text mentioned above, Boethius affirms that Cicero himself has separated the corresponding maximae from their differentiae, while Cicero in the Topica in fact never discusses either. 139 In Top., I, 1059B (Engl. transl. p. 42): «definitio enim est oratio substantiam uniuscuiuscque significans». 140 Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.3.1. 141 Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.3.3. 142 Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.3.1., § 3.3.2, § 3.4.3.

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seem to be similar, but while the contraria are always terms relative to each other, since the relationship of opposition implies that a term is opposite only because it is in relation to its opposite, the repugnantes on the other hand are all the terms connected by a relationship of incompatibility; this incompatibility, in turn, is what leads to the opposition (such as «sleeping» and «waking» are immediately contraries, while «snoring» is opposed to «waking» because it is connected with sleep)143. Finally, the difference that exists between the locus ab adiunctis on the one hand and the locus ab antecedentibus and a consequentibus on the other deserves special emphasis144. The adiuncta are connected with one another in a kind of temporal relationship, since what is connected to something can happen before, during, or after that with which it is connected. Consequently, if the adiuncta are used in the discipline of topica, the entire argumentation centres on the temporal connection that is the main topic. Conversely, the relationship between the antecedent and consequent is purely logical; i.e. it is a necessary relationship that can be schematized as follows: Ab antecedentibus: If it is A, then it is B, but it is A, so it is B. A consequentibus: If it is A, then it is B, but it is not B, so it is not A.

3.7 Themistius’s and Cicero’s divisions compared At the end of the exhibition of the two divisions, the full achievement of the first part of the intentio operis is still lacking, namely to understand in what respects the two divisions are different or are equal in order to show how the one can be included in the other. Ac de M. Tullii locis sufficienter dictum est; nunc ad Themistii redeamus quoque modo sibi superius digestae partitiones consentire possunt breviter explicemus. Ac primum quidem totius partitionis communiter differentias colligamus. Superior divisio docuit alios esse locos Themistii qui in ipsis terminis de quibus quaeritur insunt, alios qui extrinsecus assumuntur, alios qui inter utrosque versantur, ut haec trina intelligatur esse divisio. At M. Tullii divisio 143 144

Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.4.6, § 3.4.8. Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.4.7, § 3.4.8.

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locos bifariam ostendit. Alios enim in eo ipso de quo agitur haerere proponit, alios extrinsecus assumi. Hic igitur omnes eos locos, quos medios Themistius proposuit, his applicuit atque coniunxit qui sunt in ipsis de quibus agitur terminis costituti et communiter quidem talis divisionum est differentia, quae clarius apparebit, si singula persequamur. Eos igitur locos qui positi sunt in terminis de quibus in quaestione dubitatur priore partitione Themistius tum in substantia posuit, tum in substantiae consequentia. In substantia, definitio, descriptio, nominis interpretatio. Substantiae vero consequentia sunt genus, totum, species, pars, causa (efficiens, materia, forma, finis), effectus, corruptio, usus, communiter accidentia. Eos vero qui extrinsecus proponuntur assumi tum in iudicio, tum in similitudine (tum in quantitatis comparatione, , tum in oppositione, separavit. Quos vero inter utrosque posuit hos in casibus et coniugatis et divisione constituit. Sed M. Tullius eos qui in ipso sunt de quo quaeritur tum ex toto, tum ex partibus eius, tum ex nota, tum ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur posuit. Ipsa vero quae affecta sunt multifaria divisione partitus est, solum vero iudicium extrinsecus segregavit pluresque partes eorum quae in divisione Themistii posita sunt substantiae consequentia. Itemque locos medios inter affecta numeravit145.

The first difference between the two divisions is that Themistius classifies the loci into three categories («loci qui in quaestione sunt positi», «loci qui extrinsecus assumantur», and «loci medii, qui inter utrosque versantur»), while Cicero classifies them into only two categories («loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur» and «loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus»). It at first appears that the only difference between the two divisions is in the category of Themistius’s loci medii, which is completely absent from Cicero’s division. Moreover, Boethius observes that all the Themistian loci medii are present in the Ciceronian division between the «loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur», and certainly this is the biggest difference between the two divisions. At the beginning of the third book, Boethius specifies that the same subject can be divided into different parts in accordance with different 145

De top. diff., III, VI, 1-14, 1200C-1201B, pp. 59, 10-60, 15. Cf. Diagrams nos. 57-58 (Appendix, pp. 356-357).

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criteria depending on the variety of differences taken into account, just as in geometry it is possible to divide the same triangles in different ways, according to the point of view from which they are considered146. On the other hand, the metaphor of geometry, enunciated at the beginning of the third book, is not adduced entirely at random, since Boethius in fact proceeds to explain the division of loci using the division of triangles as an example: In tam vero varia partitione necesse est ut utraeque sibi non eadem parte conveniant. Id vero in cunctis multipliciter divisis fieri potest, velut si quis dividat triangulorum formas sic: «triangulorum aliae sunt aequilaterae formae, aliae duo tantum latera habentes aequalia, aliae vero totis inaequalibus lateribus iunctae». Rursus sit ista divisio, ut alias dicat aliquis rectum habentes angulum, quae orthogoniae nuncupantur, alias dicat tribus acutis angulis contineri, quae sunt oxygoniae, alias vero in obtusum angulum tendi, quae sunt amblygoniae. Necesse est igitur ut utraeque sibi diversa partium ratione conveniant. Nam quod est orthogonium, id semper vel duobus lateribus aequalibus continetur, vel tribus inaequalibus. Quod vero est amblygonium, id vel duobus lateribus aequalibus continetur vel tribus inaequalibus. Sed quod est oxygonium, id vel tribus lateribus vel duobus aequalibus continetur. Rursus id quod est aequilaterum semper est oxygonium, id vero quod duobus aequalibus lateribus continetur vel orthogonium vel amblygonium vel oxygonium esse potest. Quod vero tribus inaequalibus lateribus continetur vel orthogonium, vel amblygonium esse necesse est. Secundum igitur hunc modum cunctam M. Tullii atque Themistii divisionem a principio pariter ordientes invicem sibimet clausas esse monstremus, in quibus omnibus et exemplorum et intelligentiae superius expeditae praesens esse debet memoria. Disponamus igitur omnem Themistii divisionem et post hanc subiciatur Tulliana partitio, ut ea, quae dicenda sunt, apertius oculis subiecta clarescant147.

The example of geometry evidently reflects the mental schema in which Boethius conceives the possibility of reconciling Themistius’s Greek discipline of topica with Cicero’s Latin one. On the other hand, this

146 147

Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.1. De top. diff., III, VI, 15-19, 1201B-1202B, pp. 60, 15-61, 16.

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is precisely the purpose of the book, i.e. to restore the dialectical value to the discipline of topica that, although being already present in the Latin understanding of topica, possesses in fact an eminently rhetorical value. Triangles, then, can be classified according to the number of equal sides that they possess: they may have three equal sides (equilateral triangles), only two equal sides (isosceles triangles), or three unequal sides (scalene triangles). Triangles, however, can also be classified on the basis of their angles: they may have 90º angles (rectangular triangles), an angle greater than 90º (obtuse-angled triangles), or three angles less than 90º (acute-angled triangles). Although the two divisions have been fulfilled by taking different points of view into consideration, each is able to contain the other. Thus the second division is contained in the first in the following way: – a rectangular triangle can be both isosceles and scalene – an obtuse-angled triangle can be both isosceles and scalene – an acute-angled triangle can be both equilateral and isosceles148 In turn, the first division is contained in the second: – a equilateral triangle can be acute-angled – an isosceles triangle can be rectangular, obtuse-angled, and also acute-angled – a scalene triangle can be rectangular or obtuse-angled Starting from the same criterion, the divisions of Themistius’s and Cicero’s loci must also be able to be reconciled:

148

The critical edition of the De topicis differentiis by Dmitrios Nikitas corrects an important mistake in the text of the Latin Patristics. Cf. De diff. top., PL 64, III, 1202A: «Sed quod est oxygonium, id vel tribus lateribus aequalibus, vel duobus inaequalibus continetur». Cf. De top. diff., III, VI, 17, p. 61, 4-5: «Sed quod est oxygonium, id vel tribus lateribus vel duobus aequalibus continetur». The same mistake is present also in the English translation of E. Stump, who had at her disposal only the text of the Latin Patristics. Cf. also STUMP, Boethius’s De topicis, p. 72, 31-32: «that which is oxygonal is contained by three equal sides or by two unequal sides». This specification is significant because otherwise it would not be possible for an acute-angled triangle to have two unequal sides.

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Quibus ita descriptis nunc quemadmodum M. Tullii divisio Themistii partitioni conveniat explicemus. Eum igitur locum, quem Cicero dixit a toto, a substantia Themistius esse proposuit. Uterque enim in definitione consistit, sive illa substantialis sit sive descriptio. A partium vero enumeratione locus ex Ciceronis Topicis positus idem est qui in Themistii divisione inter medios a divisione est nominatus. Quotiens enim aliquid vel esse vel non esse monstrare contendimus, si fidem a partium enumeratione capiamus, id ex divisione necessario faciendum est. Divisio vero aut formarum praecessit aut partium, quamquam locus quoque qui ex divisione a Themistio inter medios collocatus est a Cicerone in generis tractatione ponatur; ait enim Tullius, cum de genere loqueretur, hoc modo: «Commode etiam tractatur haec argumentatio quae ex genere sumitur, cum ex toto partes persequare hoc modo: ‘si dolus malus est, cum aliud agitur, aliud simulatur, enumerare licet quibus modis id fiat, deinde in eorum aliquem id quod arguas dolo malo factum includere’. Quod genus argumenti in primis firmum videri solet». A notatione Tullii locus est is qui Themistii a nominis interpretatione. A coniugatis communis est locus, eum Themistius inter medios collocavit. A genere quem M. Tullius posuit a toto Themistius. A forma Ciceronis a parte, id est specie, Themistii. A similitudine communis. A differentia M. Tullii a toto in Themistii divisione vel a parte intelligi potest: a toto quidem, si sit constitutiva differentia, de qua sumitur argumentum, a parte vero, si sit divisibilis. A contrario idem Ciceronis locus est qui a Themistio ab oppositis dictus est et extrinsecus constitutus. Ab adiunctis ille est qui in Themistii partitione a communiter accidentibus dicitur inter consequentia substantiae nominatus. Ab antecedentibus et consequentibus locus multifariam spargitur; nam et definitio et descriptio et antecedere rem et consequi possunt. Itemque nominis interpretatio; item species antecedit, genus sequitur. Causa etiam efficiens antecedit et sequitur effectus; materiam vero antecedit effectus. Communiter quoque accidentia, si inseparabilia sint, necesse est ut consequantur. Coniugata etiam sese vel antecedunt, vel consequuntur. Itaque hic locus pluribus mixtus est, non tam in rebus ab aliis quam in tractatione diversus; ipsa enim conditio consequentiae locum alium facit, cum ipsa conditio consequentiae vel in definitione vel in descriptione vel in forma vel in causa vel in ceteris posita sit. Repugnantia vero oppositis aggregantur, efficientia causis efficientibus vel materiae. Effecta illi sunt consimilia loco quem Themistius posuit a fine; nam causarum effectus finis est. A comparatione maioris vel minoris idem locus est qui apud Themistium inter extrinsecus locos

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ponitur a maiore vel minore. A comparatione parium inter eos qui a simili ducuntur esse putandus est; dictum est enim in quantitate similitudinem esse paritatem. Restat locus utrisque communis qui est extrinsecus collocatus, quem Cicero sicut Themistius quoque a iudicio rei esse proposuit. Et M. Tullii quidem divisio superiori Themistii partitioni tali modo poterit includi, quod licet in subiecta descriptione prospicere149.

First, it is demonstrated that Cicero’s division is contained in that of Themistius by showing how each Ciceronian locus corresponds to a Themistian locus; lastly, a scheme is provided, as illustrated in Diagram no. 59 (Appendix, p. 358), so that the reader may see better this connection. Afterwards, it is shown how the division of Themistius’s loci is contained in that of Cicero: Omnis quidem M. Tullii partitio locorum in Themistii divisione superioris descriptionis formula videtur inclusa. Nunc Themistii divisio ad M. Tullii divisionem reducenda est. Cuius quidem multa pars Ciceronis convenit, sicut prior etiam descriptio docet.³ Quod vero ex Themistii superest divisione, id si ad Tullianae partitionis ordinem referatur, facili compendio quemadmodum ad se invicem partitiones reducantur ostenditur. Nam continue M. Tullii divisioni ex Themistii locis in superiore descriptione convenerant: Ciceronis quidem a toto Themistii a substantia. A partium enumeratione Ciceronis a divisione Themistii. A notatione Ciceronis a nominis interpretatione Themistii. A coniugatis utrorumque communis. A genere Ciceronis a toto Themistii. A forma Ciceronis a parte, id est specie, Themistii. A similitudine communis. A differentia Ciceronis vel a toto vel a parte Themistii. A contrario Ciceronis, idem apud Themistium ab oppositis. Ab adiunctis Ciceronis, eundem a communiter accidentibus Themistius dixit. Ab antece dentibus et consequentibus mixti cum pluribus. A repugnantibus Ciceronis, idem a Themistio ab oppositis dicitur. Ab efficientibus Ciceronis a causis Themistii. Ab effectis Tullii a fine Themistii. A comparatione maioris ac minoris M. Tullii, idem sunt a maiore ac minore Themistii. A comparatione parium Ciceronis a similibus Themistii. 150.

149 150

De top. diff., III, VII, 1-22, 1203A-1204C, pp. 65, 1-67, 11. Ivi, III, VIII, 1-21, 1204C-1205A, pp. 68, 1-69, 12.

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The list of the connections previously provided is then repeated, since, in order to determine which Ciceronian locus fits which Themistian locus, it is enough to reverse the scheme previously proposed. The re-composition may not be complete, however, because some Themistian loci that still need to be integrated into Cicero’s division remain excluded: Cum igitur Ciceronis plena divisio aliquibus membris Themistianae divisionis aptetur, fieri non potest ut non membra Themistianae divisionis statim ad Tullianae convenientia reducantur. Quocirca si quid reliquum est ex Themistii divisione, id est quod superiori formulae non videtur ascriptum, plene M. Tullii divisioni poterimus aptare: invicem enim sibi divisiones alterna reciprocatione coniunctae sunt. Restant autem ex Themistii locis hi: ab usibus, ab effectibus et corruptionibus, a proportione et transumptione. Quorum quidem ab usibus, si usus alicuius rei semper effector est, ei loco Ciceronis aptandus est qui ab efficientibus nuncupatur. Quod si ipse usus efficitur, ei loco Ciceronis adhibendus est qui ab effectis vocatur. Ab effectibus vero, siquidem efficit aliquid effectus, ab efficientibus causis est; si vero ipse effectus aliquid plenum confectumque demonstrat, is locus est quem ab effectis Tullius dixit. A corruptionibus vero ab efficientibus dici potest. Nam cum omnis generatio efficiat aliquid, id est substantiam formet, corruptio rursus ipsa quoque efficit quiddam, id est substantiali forma spoliat ac privat, velut «mors facit corporis dissolutionem». A proportione vero idem est, quem Tullius a similibus dixit; nam multorum in multis similitudo proportio est. Transumptio vero siquidem ad maiora sit, locus est a maiorum comparatione, sin vero ad minora, locus est a minorum comparatione, quod si ad paria, locus a parium. Atque in his omnibus reducendis tale satis est descriptionis exemplum151.

151

Ivi, III, VIII, 22-31, 1205A-1206C, pp. 69, 12-70, 22. Cf. Diagram no. 60 (Appendix, p. 359).

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ab usibus

ab effectibus

a corruptionibus a proportione a transumptione

{ {

{

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ab efficientibus ab effectis ab efficientibus ab effectis ab efficientibus a similibus a comparatione maiorum vel minorum vel parium

The Themistian loci that at first seem completely absent from Cicero’s division are the loci ab usibus, ab effectibus (id est a generationibus), a corruptionibus, a proportione, and a transumptione. Each of these loci, however, is made to correspond to more than one Ciceronian locus, according to the perspective from which it is understood. The Themistian locus ab usibus can correspond both to the locus ab efficientibus causis and to the Ciceronian locus ab effectis, depending on whether the use is intended as that which produces something, or as that which is produced by something. The same occurs in the case of the Themistian locus ab effectibus (also called a generationibus), which may correspond, in Cicero, both to the locus ab efficientibus causis and to the locus ab effectis, depending on whether the generation produces something or is produced by something. The Themistian locus a corruptionibus corresponds only to the Ciceronian locus ab efficientibus causis because the destruction produces gradual ruin of the substantial form of something and cannot in turn be destroyed by anything. The Themistian locus a proportione corresponds to the Ciceronian locus a simili because proportion can be established only between similar things and therefore involves the observation of similarity. Finally, the Themistian locus a transumptione may correspond to the Ciceronian locus a comparatione maiorum, vel minorum vel parium, depending on whether the doubt of the quaestio is solved by a term that is better known, by an equal term, or by a term less known than the one placed in the dubia propositio. The only one of Themistius’s loci not discussed is the locus a casu, which is placed between the loci medii. However, since this locus involves the inflection of a main name in the form of an adverb, it is perhaps possible to assimilate it to the locus a coniugatis, especially since, in describing

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Cicero’s locus a coniugatis, Boethius adduces an adverb as an example of inflection152. Moreover, on the basis of the re-composition quoted above, excluding just the locus a casu, it seems that it was also possible to reduce the two divisions to the same number of loci; in fact, Cicero’s loci are nineteen, and now those of Themistius seem to be an equal number. The first aim of the book has thus been completed, since it is demonstrated that each division, although made in a different way, is complete in itself: «Ac de dialecticis quidem locis, quantum propositi operis ratio postulabat, explicuimus. Nunc vero de rhetoricis dicendum videtur, quid sint vel quid a dialecticis discrepare videantur, ad cuius plenam disputationem integri quarti voluminis spatium reservemus»153. In this way, the section of the book that is dedicated to the presentation of the dialectical loci (which occupies the second and third books) concludes. The fourth book is entirely dedicated to the presentation of loci rhetorici and how they differ from loci dialectici. Insofar as the underlying objective of the treatise is to show the fundamental concordance of the lists of the Themistian and Ciceronian loci to the Roman world, the operation can be considered successful. Themistius and Cicero have ultimately collected, each in his own way, the constitutive differences of the loci (understood as maximae propositiones). Since the maximae propositiones are numerous, and since each concerns sometimes the definition, sometimes the genus, sometimes the cause, etc., they are collected and divided according to their constitutive differentiae, which, being more universal, contain them and themselves act as loci. Since the same subject can be subdivided in several ways, depending on the differences that are used to make the division, it is clear that Themistius and Cicero have simply divided and collected the maximae propositiones in different ways, and that this is one of the pieces of information lacking to the reader who strives today to reconstruct this doctrine, which requires a concrete understanding of how each of these divisions was made. Eleonore Stump in this regard deserves credit for having shown how the Themistian maximae propositiones were divided in order to obtain the list of twentyeight constitutive differentiae154.

152

Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.4.1. Cf. De top. diff., III, III, 8, 1197B, pp. 51, 21-52, 1: «Coniugata sunt quae ab eodem nomine flectuntur, ut a ‘iustitia’, ‘iustum’, ‘iuste’». 153 De top. diff., III, IX, 1-2, 1205BC, p. 71, 1-4. 154 Cf. STUMP, «Differentia», in Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, pp. 237-247.

CHAPTER FOUR THE FOURTH BOOK OF DE TOPICIS DIFFERENTIIS

4. Rhetoric and the loci rhetorici The fourth book of the De topicis differentiis is entirely dedicated to the discipline of rhetoric, the loci rhetorici, and the analysis of the similarities and differences between dialectic and rhetoric and between dialectical loci and rhetorical loci. The analysis of rhetoric certainly deserves a separate discussion, and Boethius accordingly feels the need to instruct the reader briefly on this subject, for which reason the first part of the fourth book offers a concise but complete presentation of the entire ars rhetorica1. On the other hand, Boethius in the first book emphasises that dialecticians and rhetoricians have the same starting point, that in fact both formulate their argumentations beginning from an argumentum probabile ac necessarium or from an argumentum probabile ac non necessarium. The nature of the loci therefore is undivided in itself, and is placed higher than the distinctions that derive from the subsequent use of the loci in the service of dialectic or rhetoric2. It may seem superfluous to emphasize how important rhetoric was in Roman juridical culture, but it is certainly worth pointing out that the way 1

For a concise but complete overview of rhetoric, cf. R. P. MCKEON, «Rhetoric in the Middle Ages», Speculum, 17 (1942) 1-32 (also in R. S. CRANE [ed.], Critics and Criticism, University Press, Chicago 1952, pp. 260-296); ID., «Methods of Rhetorical and Philosophical Invention and Judgment», in I. WALLACH (ed.), The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Chaplan, Cornell University Press, Ithaca – New York 1966, pp. 365-373; ID., «The Hellenistic and Roman Foundation of the Tradition of Aristotle in the West», Review of Metaphysics, 32-4 (1979) 677-715; A. PLEBE, Breve storia della retorica antica, Laterza, Bari 1968; J. J. MURPHY, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages. A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustin to the Renaissance, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1974; LEFF, «The Topics of Argumentative Invention»; ID., «Boethius and the History of Medieval Rhetoric», Central States Speech Journal, 25 (1974) 135-141; ID., «The Logician’s Rhetoric: Boethius’ De Differentiis Topicis, book IV», in J. MURPHY (ed.), Medieval Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practise of Medieval Rhetoric, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 1978, pp. 3-24. 2 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.7.

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Boethius passed on this teaching to Latin readers changed radically the way of understanding the rhetoric in the Middle Ages3.

4.1 The differences between dialectic and rhetoric Boethius begins his discussion in the fourth book by outlining the second part of the intentio operis: Si quis operis titulum diligens examinator inspiciat, cum «de topicis differentiis» conscribamus, non id a nobis tantum exspectare debebit, ut locorum inter se dialecticorum vel etiam rhetoricorum differentias demus, verum id multo magis, ut dialecticos locos a rhetoricis segregemus, quod nos efficacius aggredi posse arbitramur, si ab ipsa facultatum natura disputandi sumamus exordium. Ostensa enim dialecticae ac rhetoricae similitudine ac dissimilitudine ab ipsarum facultatum necesse est formis etiam locorum, qui eisdem facultatibus deserviunt, communitates discrepantiasque ducamus4. 3

The sources for the fourth book of the De topicis differentiis are especially Cicero’s Topica, De oratore, and De inventione. Some scholars date the composition of the De inventione between 82 and 80 B.C., others between 94 and 91 B.C. Cf. M. GRECO, «Introduzione», in Cicerone, De inventione, a cura di M. Greco, Mario Congedo, Galatina 1998; A. MICHEL, Les Rapports de la rhétorique et de la philosophie dans l’oeuvre de Cicéron, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1960; ID., Rhétorique et philosophie chez Cicéron: essai sur les fondements philosophiques de l’art de persuader, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1961. 4 De top. diff., IV, I, 1-2, 1205C, p. 71, 6-14. Cf. LEFF, «The Topics of Argumentative Invention», p. 25: «The nature of inference in dialectic and rhetoric, however, differs significantly, and hence the topics proper to each of these faculties assume a different character. Dialectical argument is predicative, and its fundamental elements are the terms of a propositions. As Eleonore Stump observes, ‘arguing for a dialectical proposition’ consists ‘in showing that a predicate is or is not a predicate of a subject at issue’. Consequently, dialectical topics provide a lot of predicables, and the key issue is the way in which terms relate to one another within the propositions of an argument. In rhetoric, however, it is the proposition and not the term which emerges as the atomic unit of discourse. Apparently, any attempt to refine analysis below the propositional level would badly distort the way that speakers present and the audiences process rhetorical argument. The predicable play no role in rhetorical invention, since inference depends upon perceived connections between propositions taken as whole units. Moreover, in rhetorical argumentation, the required connectives are relative to the audience addressed, and thus they arise from and are verified by social knowledge existing within a community».

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Boethius declares immediately his basic objective in writing the fourth book: the exhibition of the loci rhetorici is essentially intended to clarify how these loci are distinguished from the loci dialectici. He believes that the most appropriate way to accomplish this purpose is to begin by presenting all of the differences between dialectic and rhetoric, since only when the distinction between the two disciplines has been clarified will it be possible to grasp the similarities and differences among their respective loci. It is thus apparent now, if it was not before, that the title of the book, De topicis differentiis, is intentionally generic, and can be interpreted in different ways, as Boethius himself suggests. The title could, in fact, refer equally to the three objectives of the intentio operis that were announced in the first book, namely to address the constitutive differentiae of the loci (the latter understood as the maximae propositiones), the differences among the loci rhetorici, and, finally, the differentiae between the loci dialectici and loci rhetorici. If this interpretation is correct, Boethius has chosen a title able to show prospectively the entire contents of the book, since all three interpretations are plausible at the same time5. In any case, the differences between dialectica and rhetorica are presented first: Dialectica igitur facultas thesin tantum considerat. Thesis vero est sine circumstantiis quaestio. Rhetorica vero de hypothesibus, id est de quaestionibus circumstantiarum multitudine inclusis, tractat ac disserit. Circumstantiae vero sunt: quis, quid, ubi, quando, cur, quomodo, quibus adminiculis. Rursus dialectica quidem, si quando circumstantias veluti personam factumve aliquod ad disputationem sumit, non principaliter, sed omnem eius vim ad thesin, de qua disserit, transfert. Rhetorica vero, si thesin assumpserit, ad hypothesin trahit et utraque suam quidem materiam tractat, sed alterius assumit, ut pro more in sua materia facultate nitatur. Rursus dialectica interrogatione ac responsione constricta est. Rhetorica vero rem propositam perpetua oratione decurrit. Item dialectica perfectis utitur syllogismis. Rhetorica enthymematum brevitate contenta est. Illud etiam differentiam facit, quod rhetor habet aliquem praeter adversarium iudicem, qui inter utrosque disceptet. Dialectico vero ille fert sententiam, qui adversarius sedet. Ab adversario enim responsio veluti quaedam sententia subtilitate interrogationis elicitur. Quae cum ita sint, omnis earum differentia vel in materia vel in usu vel in fine est constituta: in materia, quod 5

Cf. Supra, Chap. 1, §1.2.

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thesis atque hypothesis materia utrisque subiecta est; in usibus, quod haec interrogatione, illa perpetua oratione disceptat, vel quod haec integris syllogismis, illa vero enthymematibus gaudet; fine vero, quod haec persuadere iudici, illa quod vult adversario extorquere conatur6.

The differences between dialectica and rhetorica are evident in three aspects: in materia, in usu, and in fine. The difference in materia is in regard to the distinct areas that concern each discipline: the dialectician argues for or against a certain thesis, while the rhetorician deals with a hypothesis. In the first book, Boethius has already explained the differences between the thesis and the hypothesis, where the latter are considered as two species belonging to the same genus that is the quaestio, and both have been further divided into their species7. The thesis therefore is a question posed in universal form, i.e. without any reference to specific facts and circumstances (for example, «is animal a substance?»); the hypothesis, on the other hand, is a question that concerns particular circumstances: who,

6

De top. diff., IV, I, 3-13, 1205C-1206D, pp. 71, 14-72, 21. For the notion of the circumstantia: cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, V, x, 104, p. 269, 1-3: «Hoc genus argumentorum sane dicamus ex circumstantia, quia περίστασιν dicere aliter non possumus, vel ex iis, quae cuiusque causae propria sunt»; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, II, 1, p. 107, 6-7: «Quae sunt circumstantiae? persona, res, causa, tempus, locus, modus, materia»; Aurelius Augustinus, De rhetorica, 7, p. 141, 11-13: «Est igitur circumstantia rerum, quam περίστασιν Hermagoras vocat, sine qua ulla omnino controversia non potest esse»; Q. Fabius Laurentius Victorinus, Expl. in rhet., 21, p. 207, 1-3: «Septem illa superiora, quis, quid, cur, ubi, quando, quemadmodum, quibus adminiculis, omnes artium scriptores tractarunt et in praeceptis suarum artium reliquerunt»; C. Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica, I, p. 374, 22-24: «Accepto igitur themate primum circumstantiam sectari debes, cuius partes sunt septem hae: quis, quid, quando, ubi, cur quemadmodum, quibus adminiculis»; Exc. Rhet., p. 586, 3-4: «Partes circumstantiae sunt VII: quis, quid, quando, ubi, cur, quemadmodum, quibus adminiculis». For the distinction between dialectic, limited to question and answer, and rhetoric, which develops the question with an uninterrupted speech, cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, II, 20, 7, p. 121, 29-31: «Itaque cum duo sint genera orationi, altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera concisa, quae dialectice». Boethius recalls this specific distinction between dialectic and rhetoric at least two other times in the course of the fourth book. Cf. De top. diff., IV, I, 13, p. 72, 17-18: «In usibus quod haec interrogatione, illa perpetua oratione disceptat»; ivi, IV, V, 5, p. 76, 8-9: «Dehinc, quod illa continua oratione, illa intercisa peragitur». 7 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.4.1.

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what, where, when, why, how, by what means. It may however happen that a dialectician deals with a hypothesis; nevertheless, in discussing it, he must first to bring it back to the level of universality, excluding any reference to particular facts and circumstances. Similarly, a rhetorician may deal with a thesis; however, in discussing it he will have to contextualize it in advance with regard to particular facts and circumstances. Thus, although a dialectician may deal with a hypothesis and a rhetorician with a thesis, both questions must, however, be made according to the form and with instruments proper to the disciplines within the field of each specialist: again, the dialectician must bring the hypothesis back to the thesis, while the rhetorician must take up the thesis in the form of a hypothesis. The second difference between dialectica and rhetorica is identified in the usus, namely in the way that each discipline is used. Dialectic presupposes a dispute in which two interlocutors engage in a discussion using an orderly sequence of questions and answers; rhetorical discourse, especially that made in court, is on the contrary enunciated without interruption and before a judge, after which the latter decides on the truth or falsity of what has been said. Moreover, while the dialectician uses complete syllogisms, which have two premises and a conclusion, the rhetorician uses mostly the formation of enthymemes, or incomplete syllogisms, which have only one premise8. The third and last difference is found in the finis, since the dialectician’s objective is to demonstrate the falsity of his opponent’s thesis, that is, to exact the latter’s consent by causing him to fall into contradiction; the rhetorician with his speech, on the other hand, tries to persuade a judge.

4.2 The ars rhetorica The rigorous procedure through which Boethius has presented the contents of the work so far shows the systematic formulation that he wanted to give to his treatise. A concise but complete discussion of rhetoric is then presented, however, that at first seems extraneous to the purpose of the work and to interrupt the natural flow of the discussion:

8

The difference between syllogism and enthymeme has already been fully explained in the second book. Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.2.1 and § 2.2.3.

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Quibus ita praecognitis paulo posterius et quaestiones rhetoricas, quae in constitutionibus positae sunt, et proprii generis enumerabimus locos. Nunc paulisper mihi videtur de tota admodum breviter facultate tractandum, magnum opus atque difficile. Quanta enim sibimet ars rhetorica cognatione iungatur non facile considerari potest vixque est etiam ut auditu animadverti queat, ne dum sit facile repertu. De cuius quidem rei traditione nihil ab antiquis praeceptoribus accepimus; de unoquoque enim praecipiunt nihil de communi laborantes. Quam partem doctrinae vacuam, ut possumus, aggrediemur. Dicemus igitur de gener artis et speciebus et materia et partibus, instrumento instrumentique partibus, opere etiam officioque actoris et fine, post haec de quaestionibus ac de locis. Quocirca quod in communi speculandum est, hinc disserendi sumamus exordium9.

A careful reading of this passage helps to clarify why Boethius presents this synthetic vision of rhetoric. First of all, it seems that none of the auctoritates in the past has made the effort to offer a general picture of this discipline, perhaps because rhetoric was so well known to the Romans that it seemed unnecessary to dedicate an entire treatise solely to the general presentation of its aspects. However, from what Boethius himself says, another explanation is equally probable, namely that the extreme complexity of the subject discouraged the antiqui praeceptores from elaborating a comprehensive vision, the same complexity that, on the other hand, prevented them from reaching agreement on certain aspects of the discipline; for this reason, perhaps, each one limited himself to an in-depth discussion of only individual parts rather than the whole. The question thus remains why Boethius decided to take on the task of presenting a comprehensive vision of rhetoric when he himself recognizes it to be so great and difficult («magnum opus atque difficile»). Moreover, as noted above, the choice to present the entire ars rhetorica seems forced and generally tangential to the purpose of the treatise, the achievement of which still requires presentation of the loci rhetorici and their differences, as well as, finally, the differences between them and loci 9

De top. diff., IV, I, 14-19, 1206D-1207A, pp. 72, 21-73, 11. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, IV, 5, p. 5, 27-29: «Sed antequam de praeceptis oratoriis dicimus, videtur dicendum de genere ipsius artis, de officio, de fine, de materia, de partibus».

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dialectici. No answer then appears more plausible than the one indicated at the end of the fourth book. The need to convey a general picture of rhetoric depends essentially on Boethius’s desire to re-establish this discipline by assigning to it a role subordinate to dialectic10. Undertaking a task untried by any of his predecessors («quam partem doctrinae vacuam, ut possumus, aggrediemur») is undoubtedly a testament to Boethius’s originality as a thinker; moreover, from this specific point of view, his originality here is in keeping with his approach elsewhere in the De topicis differentiis, since the agreement he forges between the divisions of Themistius’s and Cicero’s loci, illustrated in the third book, is equally unprecedented. The general presentation of rhetoric therefore extends to all of its parts: the genus, species, materia and its partes, instrumentum, instrumenti partes, opus, officium actoris, and finis.

4.2.1 The genus of rhetoric Rhetoric, as a species, belongs primarily to a genus: «rhetoricae igitur genus est facultas»11. To define something means first of all to recognize its genus and specific differences; thus, the genus of rhetoric is identified in the facultas, while nothing is said with regard to the specific difference12.

10

Cf. infra, Chap. 4, § 4.7. De top. diff., IV, II, 1, 1207AB, p. 73, 12. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, v, p. 6, 9-11: «Quare hanc oratoriam facultatem in eo genere ponemus, ut eam civilis scientiae partem esse dicamus». 12 It is possible to find an indication regarding the specific difference that divides the genus from the facultas, thus creating the species of rhetoric, at the end of the first book, in the context of the presentation of the utilitas topicorum. Here Boethius, in referring to rhetoric, uses the expression dicendi facultas; this is, therefore, literally the art of speaking, because it offers the method of organizing human speech for the purpose of persuading the interlocutor. Cf. De top. diff., I, VII, 26, 1182C, pp. 19, 22-20, 3: «Quocirca topicorum pariter utilitas intentioque patefacta est. His enim et dicendi facultas et investigatio veritatis augetur. Nam quod dialecticos atque oratores locorum iuvat agnitio, orationi per inventionem copiam praestat; quod vero necessariorum doctrinam locorum philosophis tradit, viam quodammodo veritatis illustrat». Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.7. 11

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4.2.2 The species of rhetoric: the genera causarum The second concept to be learned by those wishing to engage in the study of rhetoric is that of the divisions of the species of rhetoric, which essentially represent the genus through which the cases can be classified, i.e. the genera causarum: Species vero tres, iudiciale, demonstrativum, deliberativum, et genus quidem id esse, quod diximus, patet. Species autem idcirco sunt, quas superius enumeravimus, quoniam in his est tota rhetorica: in iudiciali genere causarum integra, item in demonstrativo vel deliberativo. Sed haec genera sunt causarum. Omnes enim causae vel speciales vel individuae sub horum unum trium generum cadunt, ut sub iudiciali quidem speciales, ut «maiestatis» vel «repetundarum», individuae vero, ut «Cornelii maiestatis» vel «Verris repetundarum». Sub deliberativum vero quaecumque causae consultationem habent: ut si specialiter accipias «de bello vel de pace», si vero individue, ut «de bello Pyrrhi vel pace». Eodem modo etiam in demonstrativis, quaecumque veniunt in laudem vel vituperationem, specialiter quidem, ut «laus viri fortis», individue vero, ut «laus Scipionis», sub demonstratione ponuntur13. 13 De top. diff., IV, II, 2-6, 1207BC, pp. 73, 12-74, 5. For the species of rhetoric, or the genera causarum: cf. Cornificius, Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, I, II, 2, pp. 95-96: «Tria genera sunt causarum, quae recipere debet orator: demonstrativum, deliberativum, iudiciale. Demonstrativum est, quod tribuitur in alicuius certae personae laudem vel vituperationem. Deliberativum est in consultatione, quod habet in se suasionem et dissuasionem. Iudiciale est, quod positum est in controversia et quod habet accusationem aut petitionem cum defensione»; Cicero, De inventione, I, V, 7, p. 7, 1-12: «Aristotele autem, qui huic arti plurima adiumenta atque ornamenta subministravit, tribus in generibus rerum versari retori officium putavit, demonstrativo, deliberativo, iudiciali. Demonstrativum est, quod tribuitur in alicuius certae personae laudem aut vituperationem; deliberativum, quod positum in disceptatione civili habet in se sententiae dictionem: iudiciale, quod positum in iudicio habet in se accusationem et defensionem aut petitionem et recusationem. Et, quemadmodum nostra quidem fert opinio, oratoris ars et facultas in hac materia tripertita versari existimanda est»; Id., De oratore, I, 31, 141, pp. 53, 17-54, 2: «Sed causarum, quae sint a communi quaestione seiunctae, partim in iudiciis versari partim in deliberationibus; esse etiam genus tertium, quod in laudandis aut vituperandis hominibus poneretur»; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, I, III, 15; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, I, 1, p. 66, 5-7: «Genera civilium quaestionum quot sunt? tria: Quae? demonstrativum, deliberativum, iudiciale. Haec ab aliis quae appellantur? genera dicendi»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones,

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The genera of the rhetorical cases are three in total. The first is the genus iudiciale, which includes speeches made by the speakers during the proceedings that either accuse or defend the accused in order to obtain condemnation or acquittal. The second is the genus demonstrativum, with which the living or dead who have earned great recognition for their activities on behalf of the country are praised; in this kind of rhetorical discourse, therefore, the virtus of the laudandus is exalted; this genus also includes funeral and panegyric orations, and even speeches that blame public persons guilty of particularly brutal crimes or of moral turpitude. Third and last is the genus deliberativum, which includes political speeches made before the Senate or the assembly of the people or in the forum. On these occasions, the speaker illustrates his proposals in order to convince the audience to support his motion, which naturally requires a consultatio beforehand. Boethius establishes that the relationship between the genus of rhetoric (that is, the facultas) and the genera causarum is the same that exists between the genus and its species, except that the entire genus is always present in all the three species. Rhetorical discourse may therefore concern the three kinds of cases just outlined, the causae iudicialis, demonstrativa, or deliberativa. In turn, judicial, epideictic, and deliberative cases can be speciales or individuae, depending on whether they refer to a general case or to a specific person. For every genus of a case, an example is given: a causa iudicialis specialis concerns, for example «authority»; a causa II, II, 3, p. 98, 9-15: «Genera causarum rhetoricae sunt tria principale: demonstrativum genus est cum aliquid demonstramus, in quo est laus et vituperatio. Deliberativum genus est in quo est suasio et dissuasio. Iudiciale genus est in quo est accusatio et defensio, vel praemii petitio et negatio». The example given by Boethius of the Cornelii maiestatis is also found in Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 444, p. 218, 17-21: «Principales igitur status sunt numero tres, an sit, quid sit, quale sit. An sit coniectura est, ut ‘an patrem occiderit Roscius’. Quid sit finis, ut ‘an minuerit Cornelius maiestatem’. Quale sit qualitas, ut ‘an Saturninus iure necatus sit’». The name Verres is found in ivi, 449, p. 221, 19-21: «Ergo oportet attentius intueri, ne ea, quae auditoris officium habuerit, intendamus, ut si Verri, quod damnandus sit, edicatur»; ivi, 447, p. 220, 9-18: «Auditoris autem sunt genera tria: unum eius, qui secundum aequitatem aliquid statuit, et is est perpense iudex. Aliud eius, qui honestate vel utilitate incerta dubius alienae sententiae persuasionem inexplicabilis deliberator exspectat. Tertium genus eius est, qui facti honestatem vel turpitudinem libera aestimatione perpendit: hunc aestimatorem convenit nominari. Haec igitur sunt tria causarum genera, quae hypothesi continentur, id est iudicialis, deliberativum et demonstrativum».

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iudicialis individua concerns something specific, such as «the authority of Cornelius»; a causa demonstrativa specialis concerns such subjects as «praise of the strong man»; a causa demonstrativa individua would be of the sort, «the praise of Scipio»; finally, a causa deliberativa specialis would concern, for example «war and peace», and a causa deliberativa individua «the war and peace of Pyrrhus». As mentioned, a rhetorical speech is always followed by a consultation of the Senate or the assembly of the people.

4.2.3 The material of rhetoric: the civilis quaestio The material of rhetoric is now defined as follows: Materia vero huius facultatis est omnis quidem res proposita ad dictionem. Fere autem civilis quaestio. In hanc species a rhetorica venientes quasi quaedam formae capiunt sibi materiam et triplici informatam tenent figura, quod posterius liquebit, ut civilis quaestio, quae adhuc informis secundum species erat, fiat accepto fine unicuique specierum rhetoricae subiecta. Ut informis adhuc civilis quaestio, cum acceperit ex iudiciali finem iusti, fiat ipsa civilis quaestio in iudiciali genere constituta. Cum vero ex deliberativo sumpserit utile vel honestum, tunc fiet ipsa civilis quaestio in deliberativo causarum genere constituta. Si vero ex demonstratione sumpserit bonum, tunc fit demonstrativa civilis quaestio. Veniunt autem in materiam species ex rhetorica idcirco, quod aliter in materia sua quaelibet facultas non potest operari, quam si suas adhibeat partes. Absentibus enim cunctis partibus suis rhetorica ipsa quoque est absens. Sed quoniam de speciebus dictum est rhetoricae, quoniam sunt genera causarum, ita sunt, ut omnium negotiorum, quae in civili quaestione constituta sunt, informatorum a fine iusto iudiciale sit genus; omnium vero, quae constituta in civili quaestione, honestum vel utilem finem ceperunt, deliberativum sit genus; omniumque, quae in civili quaestione posita finem honesti tantum bonive sumpserunt, sit demonstrativum genus. Sed de his hactenus14. 14

De top. diff., IV, III, 2-6, 1207CD, pp. 74, 6-75, 2. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, v, 7, p. 6, 21-22: «Materiam artis eam dicimus, in qua omnis ars et ea facultas, quae conficitur ex arte, versatur»; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, II, XXI, 1-24; Sulpicius Victor, Institutiones oratoriae, 3, p. 314.

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The material of rhetoric is the civilis quaestio, although no definition of this latter concept is given15. The way in which a civilis quaestio becomes pertinent to one of the three genera causarum is, rather, described through the metaphor of material and form. The situation is illustrated in Diagram no. 61 (Appendix, p. 360): regarding the material, that is, the civilis quaestio, the three formae come up that are the three species of rhetoric16. In fact, it is necessary first of all to bring the quaestio back to the specific field to which it belongs, and to identify the category in which to classify the quaestio. This operation is entirely assimilable to that required for the formation of a definition. The definition, in fact, circumscribes that which is defined through the identification of the genus and the specific differences. When a civilis quaestio has to do with «the just», it belongs to the species of judicial cases. The task of circumscribing the material of the quaestio is up to the constitutive difference (the «just») that «divides», so to speak, the genus (civilis quaestio), thus enabling the identification of the species of judicial cases (species iudiciales). When a civilis quaestio has to do with what is useful or honest, it belongs to the field of deliberative cases. Finally, when the civilis quaestio concerns what is good, it belongs to the field of demonstrative cases. In this way of presenting rhetoric, it is particularly noteworthy that this discipline does not seem at all to be confined to the juridical field; rather, a kind of philosophical value is attributed to it, since rhetoric represents the skill of the mind to find in the quaestio the forms by means of which it is constituted in the form of science. The identification of the species 15

It is possible to find a precise definition of civilis quaestio in Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, p. 66, 2-4: «Quae sunt quaestiones civiles? quae in communem animi conceptionem possunt cadere, id est, quas unusquisque potest intellegere, ut cum quaeritur de aequo et bono». Therefore, a civilis quaestio should be understood as a question that may concern the just and the good, with a clear overlap of questions classifiable as both juridical and moral. The Ars rhetorica, consisting of three books and intended for use in schools, was written by Fortunatianus around the mid-fourth century A.D; for a summary of the contents: cf. R. DE FILIPPIS, Loquax pagina. La retorica nell’Occidente tardo-antico e alto-medievale, Città Nuova, Roma 2013, pp. 137-149 (Institutiones, 2). 16 The metaphor of material and form has already been used by Boethius in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica to illustrate how the argumentum probabile, necessarium or sophisticum arise from the union of materia disserendi (materia inventionis) with the three forms of necessitas, probabilitas, and cavillatio (inventionis formae), respectively. Cf. Introd.

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corresponds in fact to the recognition of various genera of the cases, a preliminary and essential operation without which the rhetorician would be unable to build his own speech. Examined closely, therefore, the order in which Boethius arranges the presentation of the various parts of rhetoric corresponds to the same order in which the mind advances in the conquest of knowledge that will enable it to achieve the aim to which rhetoric aspires.

4.2.4 The partes of rhetoric Boethius presents the parts of rhetoric as follows: Nunc de partibus rhetoricae pervidendum est. Partes enim rhetoricae sunt quinque, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio. Partes autem vocantur idcirco, quia, si quid harum defuerit oratori, imperfecta facultas est; atque ideo, quae universam formant oratoriam facultatem, ea partes facultatis eius dicere ius est. Sed hae partes, quoniam rhetoricae facultatis sunt, totamque rhetoricam facultatem componunt, necesse est, ubi fuerit rhetorica, ipsae quoque subsequantur; ac est rhetorica in propriis speciebus integra; omnes igitur rethoricae partes inerunt rhetoricae speciebus. Quocirca etiam his civilibus negotiis tractandis adhibebuntur, quae a supradictis rhetoricae speciebus informantur; aeque igitur in iudiciali negotio et in deliberativo et in demonstrativo inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatioque conveniunt17.

17

De top. diff., IV, IV, 2-5, 1207D-1208B, p. 75, 3-15. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, VII, 9, pp. 8, 16-9, 2: «Quare materia quidem nobis rhetoricae videtur artis ea, quam Aristoteli visam esse diximus; partes autem eae, quas plerique dixerunt, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio. Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium, quae causam probabilem reddant; dispositio est rerum inventarum in ordinem distributio; elocutio est idoneorum verborum [et sententiarum] ad inventionem accommodatio; memoria est firma animi rerum ac verborum ad inventionem perceptio; pronuntiatio est ex rerum et verborum dignitate vocis et corporis moderatio». Id., De oratore, I, 42, 187, pp. 71, 24-72, 2: «in hac denique ipsa ratione dicendi excogitare, ornare, disponere, meminisse, agere ignota quondam omnibus et diffusa late videbantur»; ivi, II, 19, 79, p. 135, 20: «Deinde quinque faciunt quasi membra eloquentiae: invenire quid dicas, inventa disponere, deinde ornare verbis, post memoriae mandare, tum ad extremum agere ac pronuntiare»; Cornificius, Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, I, II, 3, p. 96: «Oportet igitur esse in oratore inventionem, dispositionem, elocutionem, memoriam, pronuntiationem. Inventio est excogitatio

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The partes rhetoricae are five in all: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio. They correspond to the five stages that a rhetorician must carefully observe when he presents his own speech. The term inventio, from which ars inveniendi takes its name, refers to the research phase of the loci rhetorici, and consists of finding the principles on which the entire oratorical speech will be built. This is clearly the pars that interests Boethius the most, so much so that, once the presentation of rhetoric is finished, he dedicates a new analysis to inventio with regard to the presentation of the loci rhetorici18. Moreover, inventio is the most important phase because it reveals the speaker’s skill at finding suitable arguments with which to persuade his listeners. rerum versarum aut veri similium, quae causam probabilem reddant. Dispositio est ordo et distributio rerum, quae demonstrat, quid quibus locis sit conlocandum. Elocutio est idoneorum verborum et sententiarum ad inventionem adcommodatio. Memoria est firma animi rerum et verborum et dispositionis perceptio. Pronuntiatio est vocis, vultus, gestus moderatio cum venustate»; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, III, III, 1, p. 232, 4-7: «Omnis autem orandi oratio, ut plurimi maximique auctores tradiderunt, quinque partibus constat: inventione, dispositione, elocutione, memoria, pronuntiatione sive actione, utroque enim modo dicitur»; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, I, 1, p. 66, 14-15: «Partes oratoris officii quot sunt? quinque: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio»; Aurelius Augustinus, De rhetorica, 1, p. 137, 4-9: «Oratoris officium est proposita quaestione civili dumtaxat primum ipsam intellegere, generalis sit an specialis, simplex an coniuncta ex pluribus, absoluta an comparativa: deinde cum intellexerit, invenire in eam congruentes partitioni locos et his morales seu naturales adcommodare sententias: exinde iudicare de inventis, repudiare quae parum commode occurrerint, tum iis quae iudicio examinarit dare ordinem certum»; Q. Fabius Laurentius Victorinus, Expl. in rhet., I, 7, p. 177, 39-40: «Eorum et sententiam Cicero secutus quinque partes esse confirmat: inventionem, dispositionem, elocutionem, memoriam, pronuntiationem»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 442, p. 217, 16-18: «Iam vero partes officii mei quinque esse non dubium est; nam est inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 2, p. 98, 1-8: «Partes igitur rhetoricae sunt v: inventio dispositio elocutio memoria pronuntiatio. Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut verisimilium, quae causam probabilem reddunt. Dispositio est rerum inventarum in ordinem pulchra distributio. Elocutio est idoneorum verborum ad inventionem accommodata perceptio. Memoria est rerum et verborum animi firma perceptio. Pronuntiatio est ex rerum et verborum dignitate vocis et corporis decora moderatio». 18 Cf. infra, Chap. 4, § 4.3. Cicero himself points out that inventio is to be considered the most important of the five parts of rhetoric. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, VII, 9, p. 9, 11-13: «Quare inventio, quae princeps est omnium partium, potissimum in omni causarum genere, qualis debeat esse, consideretur».

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The dispositio is an orderly exhibition of that which has been found by means of inventio, and thus provides for the construction of a harmonious and fluent speech that is suitable to the topic. The success of each phase is a fundamental pre-condition for the correct outcome of the previous phase and the certain fulfilment of the following part. Thus, if the rhetorician were in fact to find suitable principles from which to draw his own argumentations (the loci rhetorici), but then did not know how to argue in a clear and effective way, the effort of inventio would certainly be pointless. The term elocutio refers to the manner of expression, i.e. the skill in presenting one’s thoughts in a suitable way, for example by choosing appropriate rhetorical figures with which to induce the audience to give its consent. A good dispositio facilitates the memorization of the speech. In fact, the fourth phase is called memoria because it refers to the rhetorician’s skill in memorising every part of the speech; this skill, therefore, includes effective techniques of memorisation19. Finally, pronuntiatio, also called actio, refers to the way in which the rhetorician conducts and delivers the speech, for example with regard to the tone of voice, body posture, or gestures. Boethius does not present any of these aspects at length, but simply lists them. His objective, after all, is only to provide a general picture of rhetoric. In any case, he is clearly always more interested in the philosophical aspect of rhetoric; the use of the term partes indicates clearly that the five phases just described should be thought as partes of a whole. As a logical consequence, if only one pars should be missing, the speech would be considered incomplete. Since the entire discipline of rhetoric is present in each of its species, each of these five partes must also be present in all three species; thus rhetorical speeches given for the negotium iuridiciale, deliberativum, and demonstrativum, should always include the inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio20.

19 Cf. F. YATES, The Art of Memory, Routledge, London 1966; ID., «The Ciceronian Art of Memory», in Medioevo e Rinascimento, 2 vols., Sansoni, Firenze 1955, II, pp. 871-903. 20 The term negotium will be defined by Boethius later on. Cf. De top. diff., IV, IX, 4, 1212A, p. 84, 8-9: «Negotium factum dictumve personae, propter quod in iudicium vocatur». It is, then, the reason why the case was filed, namely that which has been done or said. Cf. infra, Chap. 4, § 4. 4.

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4.2.5 The instrumentum rhetoricae and the partes instrumenti rhetoricae The knowledge of the instrumentum rhetoricae is described as follows: Quoniam vero omnis fere facultas instrumento utitur ad faciendum quod potest, erit etiam rhetoricae facultatis aliquod instrumentum. Hoc vero est oratio, quae partim in civili genere versatur, partim minime. De ea autem oratione nunc loquimur, quae habet aliquam quaestionem vel quae ad finem expediendae quaestionis accommodatur. Ea vero oratio, quae in civili genere versatur, continue decurrit; ea vero, quae non est in civilibus causis, interrogatione et responsione explicatur. Sed prior rhetorica, secunda dialectica nuncupatur, quae hoc superiore differt: primum, quod illa civilis hypothesis, illa thesis considerat; dehinc, quod illa continua oratione, illa intercisa peragitur et quod rhetorica oratio habet praeter adversarium iudicem, dialectica vero eodem iudice quo adversario utitur. Haec igitur rhetorica oratio habet partes sex: prooemium, quod exordium est, narrationem, partitionem, confirmationem, reprehensionem, perorationem. Quae partes instrumenti rhetoricae facultatis, quoniam rhetorica in omnibus suis speciebus inest, eisdem inerunt; nec potius inerunt quam eisdem ea, quae peragunt, administrabunt. Itaque et in iudiciali genere causarum necessarius est ordo prooemii et narrationis atque ceterorum et in demonstrativo deliberativoque necessaria sunt21. 21

De top. diff., IV, v, 1-8, 1208BC, pp. 75, 16-76, 18. For the instrumentum rhetoricae, cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, II, XXI, 24, p. 126, 13-20: «Quaesitum a paucissimis et de instrumento est. Instrumentum voco, sine quo formari materia in id quod velimus effici opus non possit. Verum hoc ego non artem credo egere, sed artificem. Neque enim scientia desiderat instrumentum, quae potest esse consummata, etiam si nihil faciat, sed ille opifex, ut caelator caelum et pictor penicilla. Itaque haec in eum locum, quo de oratore dicturi sumus, differamus»; ivi, V, X, 51, p. 258, 28-31: «Facultati autem licet instrumentum coniungere; sunt enim in parte facultatis et copiae. Sed ex instrumento aliquando etiam signa nascuntur, ut spiculum in corpore inventum». On the six parts of the instrument of rhetoric cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, XIV, 19, p. 18, 9-14: «Quare cum iudicatio et ea, quae ad iudicationem oportet argumenta inveniri, diligenter erunt artificio reperta, cura et cogitatione pertractata, tum denique ordinandae sunt ceterae partes orationis. Eae partes sex esse omnino nobis videntur: exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, conclusio»; Cornificius, Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, I, III, 4, p. 96: «Inventio in sex partes orationis consumitur: in exordium, narrationem, divisionem, confirmationem, confutationem, conclusionem. Exordium est principium orationis, per quod animus auditoris constituitur ad audiendum. Narratio

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The instrument of rhetoric is the oratio, understood as a genus, the species of which are rhetorical and dialectical discourse. As mentioned, rhetorical discourse takes into consideration the hypothesis and concerns a civilis quaestio; it is a monologue delivered in court cases in front of a judge. Dialectical discourse concerns instead the thesis and is developed between two interlocutors in the form of question and answer. The parts of the instrument of rhetoric, that is, of rhetorical discourse, are six in all: the prooemium (or exordium), narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, and peroratio. The prooemium is the starting point from which rhetorical discourse is advanced, and with it the rhetorician tries to gain the listener’s favour. After the proem comes the narratio, i.e. a simple statement of the facts that must be clear and concise. Next follows the partitio, with which the plan of the argumentation is shown, while in the confirmatio and reprehensio the speaker presents his argumentations and refutes those of his opponent. Finally, in the part of the speech called the peroratio or conclusio, the speaker finishes up, often with an attempt to play on the listener’s feelings. Boethius provides no definition of these six parts of rhetorical discourse, but he emphasises that, since rhetoric as a genus is entirely contained within the three species (namely in the genera causarum, which are judicial, deliberative, and epideictic), so also the six parts of rhetorical discourse should be entirely present in the three species of cases. This means that, in every rhetorical discourse, whether it is delivered in a judicial, deliberative, or demonstrative context, the rhetorician must always take care to present the prooemium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, and peroratio. est rerum gestarum aut proinde ut gestarum expositio. Divisio est, per quam aperimus, quid conveniat, quid in controversia sit, et per quam exponimus, quibus de rebus simus acturi. Confirmatio est nostrorum argumentorum expositio cum adseveratione. Confutatio est contrariorum locorum dissolutio. Conclusio est artificiosus orationis terminus»; Sulpicius Victor, Institutiones oratoriae, pp. 321-325; ivi, 16, p. 322, 5-7: «Qui videntur plenius tradere, partes orationis faciunt sex: exordium, narrationem, partitionem, confirmationem, reprehensionem, perorationem»; Cassiodorus, De arte rhetorica, 9, pp. 497, 35-498, 6: «Partes orationis rhetoricae sunt sex: exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, conclusio. Exordium est oratio animum auditoris idonee comparans ad reliquam dictionem. Narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expositio. Partitio est quae, si recte habita fuerit, inlustrem et perspicuam totam efficit orationem. Confirmatio est, per quam argumentando nostrae causae fidem et auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit oratio. Reprehensio est, per quam argumentando adversariorum confirmatio diluitur aut elevatur. Conclusio est exitus et determinatio totius orationis, ubi interdum et epilogorum allegatio flebilis adhibetur».

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4.2.6 The opus of rhetoric Boethius describes the opus rhetoricae as follows: Opus autem rhetoricae facultatis est docere et movere, quod nihilominus hisdem fere sex instrumentis, id est orationis partibus, administratur. Partes autem rhetoricae, quoniam partes sunt facultatis, ipsae quoque sunt facultates. Quocirca ipsae quoque orationis partibus quasi instrumentis utentur in partem atque, ut his operentur, eisdem inerunt. Nam in exordiis, nisi quinque sint supradictae rhetoricae partes, ut inveniat, eloquatur, disponat, meminerit, pronuntiet, nihil agit orator. Eodemque modo et reliquae fere partes instrumenti, nisi habeant omnes rhetoricae partes, frustra sunt22.

The purpose of rhetoric is twofold, namely docere and movere, which means both conveying an educational message to the listeners and moving them in order to persuade them to grant their consent. This task is, as just discussed, carried out through the proper use of the six parts of rhetorical discourse (prooemium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, and peroratio), in which the five parts of rhetoric must be also present (inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio). Therefore, in every prooemium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, and peroratio, the rhetorician must always search for the most suitable arguments, arrange them in an orderly way, display them clearly, memorize them effectively, and finally deliver them with the appropriate tone, gestures and so on. It is once again logic that dictates this way of presenting rhetoric. Since the five partes of rhetoric (inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio) are considered as six disciplines, each of the six parts of rhetorical discourse just named should be built by using all five disciplines; otherwise, they are without foundation («frustra sunt»).

4.2.7 The officium actoris Next comes the presentation of the speaker’s function: «Huius autem facultatis effector orator est, cuius est officium dicere apposite ad 22

De top. diff., IV, VI, 1-4, 1208CD, p. 77, 1-9.

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persuasionem»23. The speaker’s task is therefore to speak in a manner that is suitable for persuasion. This task is, however, different from the overall aim that he himself will have to pursue, which is discussed immediately afterward.

4.2.8 The finis of rhetoric The exhibition of the finis rhetoricae is as follows: Finis tum in ipso, tum in altero. In ipso quidem bene dixisse, id est dixisse apposite ad persuasionem; in altero vero persuasisse. Neque enim, si qua impediunt oratorem, quominus persuadeat, facto officio finis non est consecutus, sed is quidem, qui officio fuit contiguus et cognatus, consequitur facto officio. Is vero, qui extra est, saepe non consequitur, neque tamen rhetoricam suo fine contentam honore vacuavit; haec quidem ita sunt mixta, ut rhetorica insit speciebus, species vero insint causis24. 23

Ivi, IV, VI, 5, 1208D, p. 77, 9-10. Ivi, IV, VI, 6-8, 1208D-1209A, p. 77, 10-17. For the officium and the finis of rhetoric: cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, V, 6, p. 6, 11-20: «Officium autem eius facultatis videtur esse dicere adposite ad persuasionem; finis persuadere dictione. Inter officium et finem hoc interest, quod in officio, quid fieri, in fine, quid effici conveniat, consideratur. Ut medici officium dicimus esse curare ad sanandum apposite, finem sanare curatione, item, oratoris quid officium et quid finem esse dicamus, intellegimus, cum id, quod facere debet, officium esse dicimus, illud, cuius causa facere debet, finem appellamus»; Id., De oratore, I, 31, 138, p. 53, 5-7: «primum oratoris officium esse dicere ad persuadendum accommodate»; Cornificius, Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, I, II, 2, p. 95: «Oratoris officium est de iis rebus posse dicere, quae res ad usum civilem moribus et legibus constitutae sunt, cum adsensione auditorum, quoad eius fieri poterit»; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, II, XV; ivi, III, v, 2; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, I, 1, pp. 65, 6-66, 1: «Quod est oratoris officium? Bene dicere in civilibus quaestionibus. Qui finis? Persuadere quatenus rerum et personarum condicio patiatur in civilibus quaestionibus»; Sulpicius Victor, Institutiones oratoriae, 1, p. 313, 1315: «Ergo commodissime definiemus illo modo: ‘rhetorica est bene dicendi scientia in quaestione civili’. Sic enim fiet, ut proprium finem dedisse videamur»; Q. Fabius Laurentius Victorinus, Expl. in rhet., pp. 173, 1-176, 26; C. Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica, p. 373, 12: «Oratoris officium est in ea quaestione, quae versantur in negotiis civilibus, posse probabili et apta ad persuadendum orationi uti»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 439, p. 216, 10-12: «Officium vero meum est dicere apposite ad persuadendum, Finis persuadere id, quod est propositum, dictione»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 24

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The finis of rhetoric, which is always to persuade, must be different from the speaker’s officium, which in fact depends entirely on the speaker’s skill; the achievement of the finis, by contrast, depends also on the person to be persuaded. It is therefore possible to distinguish two parts within the finis: one part is, so to speak, inside, the achievement of which depends on the speaker’s ability to speak in a manner suited to persuade; the second part is outside, and its fulfilment depends on whether the listener grants his consent. It may happen that the speaker, though he does his officium well, achieves only the internal finis but not the external one; in other words, the speaker may, despite having spoken well (bene dicere), be unable to gain the consent of the judge or the audience, in which case he may at least be considered to have partially achieved his aim and performed his officium.

4.2.9 The partes causarum Boethius next presents the difficult and controversial doctrine of the constitutiones, which are interpreted by different Roman authors in different ways25: 1, p. 97, 10-13: «Oratoris autem officium est apposite dicere ad persuadendum; finis persuadere dictione, quatenus rerum et personarum condicio videtur ammittere, in civilibus questionibus»; Exc. Rhet., p. 585, 7-8: «Finis oratoris officii est bene dicere; finis bene dicendi persuadere, id est optinere, quatenus rerum et personarum condicio patiatur». 25 Cicero presents the doctrine of constitutiones in the Topica in paragraphs 92-96. Cf. Cicero, Topica, 92-96, pp. 164, 15-166, 26; RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, pp. 234263; For the notion of status, cf. Cicero, Topica, 93, p. 164, 24-31: «Refutatio autem accusationis in qua est depulsio criminis, quoniam Graece στάσις dicitur, appelletur Latine status; in quo primum insistit quasi ad repugnandum congressa defensio. Atque in deliberationibus etiam et laudationibus idem existunt status. Nam et negantur saepe ea futura quae ab aliquo in sententia dicta sunt fore sed aut omnino fieri non possint aut sine summa difficultate non possint; in qua argumentatione status coniecturalis exsistit»; Id, De inventione, I, VIII, 10, p. 9, 17-22: «Eam igitur quaestionem, ex qua causa nascitur, constitutionem appellamus. Constitutio est prima conflictio causarum ex depulsione intentionis profecta, hoc modo: ‘fecisti’: ‘non feci’ aut ‘iure feci’»; REINHARDT, «Commentary», pp. 363-366; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, III, VI; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, I, 12, p. 81, 1-2: «Repertis generibus controversiarum, quid deinde quaeritur? Status. Quid est status? Quo consistit controversia»; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 443, p. 218, 9-12: «Quaestionum vero duplex species: aliae sunt enim principales, aliae incidentes. Principales sunt status, ex quibus nascitur causa, quas

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Causarum vero partes status esse dicuntur, quos etiam aliis nominibus, tum constitutiones, tum quaestiones nominare licet; qui quidem dividuntur ita, ut rerum quoque natura divisa est. Sed a principio quaestionum differentias ordinamur. Quoniam rhetoricae quaestiones circumstantiis involutae sunt, omnes aut in scripti alicuius controversia versantur aut praeter scriptum ex re ipsa sumunt contentionis exordium26.

Boethius gives no definition of constitutio, though he states that it is also called status or quaestio, and adds that the constitutiones coincide essentially with the causarum partes. It seems necessary, however, to clarify first of all what a constitutio is. Cicero defines it as follows: «Refutatio autem accusationis in qua est depulsio criminis, quoniam Graece stásis dicitur, appelletur Latine status; in quo primum insistit quasi ad repugnandam congressa defensio»27. The constitutio, called status by Tullius constitutiones appellat»; Aurelius Augustinus, De rhetorica, 12, p. 144, 11-13: «Hanc quidam, ut nos usque adhuc diximus, quaestionem vocaverunt, quidam statum nominaverunt, ab eo videlicet, quod in ea et exordium quaestionis et summa consisteret»; Sulpicius Victor, Institutiones oratoriae, 24, p. 325, 3-17; Iulius Severianus, Praecepta artis rhetoricae, in Rhetores latini minores ex codicibus maximam partem primum adhibitis, ed. K. HALM, Minerva, Leipzig 1863 (reprint. Frankfurt a. M. 1964), [pp. 353-370], 12, p. 361, 11-15: «Status tres sunt. Ubi, quod a te factum obicitur, negas, coniectura est: ubi, quod a te factum, fateris, sed negas eam vim nominis habere, quam adversarius criminatur, finis est: at si neque de facto neque de nomine ambigitur, sed iure factum contendis, qualitas nominatur»; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 4, p. 99, 1-2: «Status vero dicitur ea res in qua causa consistit; fit autem ex intentione et depulsione». For a synthesis of the doctrine of the constitutiones as it has been presented in the various Latin treatises cf. R. DE FILIPPIS, Loquax pagina, pp. 75-88. 26 De top. diff., IV, VII, 1-2, 1209A, p. 78, 1-7. On the two-fold distinctions of rhetorical questions: cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, XII, 17, p. 15, 27-29: «Deinde considerandum est, in ratione an in scripto sit controversia; nam scripti controversia est ea, quae ex scriptionis genere nascitur»; ivi, II, XXXIX, 115, p. 128, 21-23: «Ac de constitutionibus quidem satis dictum est: nunc de iis controversiis, quae in scripto versantur, dicendum videtur». 27 Cicero, Topica, 93, p. 164, 24-27. Cf. Id., De inventione, I, 8, 10, p. 9, 1420: «Omnis res, quae habet in se positam in dictione ac disceptatione aliquam controversiam, aut facti aut nominis aut generis aut actionis continet quaestionem, eam igitur quaestionem ex qua causa nascitur, constitutionem appellamus. Constitutio est prima conflictio causarum ex depulsione intentionis profecta, hoc modo: ‘fecisti’: ‘non feci’ aut ‘iure feci’»; Cornificius, Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, I, 11, 18, p. 103: «Constitutio est prima deprecatio defensoris cum accusatoris insimulatione coniuncta».

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Cicero, is the central point of the debate in a case, i.e. that which is defended by one side and challenged by the other, and it therefore represents the very reason why a case is introduced28. It is therefore apparent that the doctrine of constitutiones concerns mainly forensics, which is the proper sphere for discussion of the causae iudiciales. Boethius divides the constitutiones causarum into two species: «quae in scripto sunt», i.e. disputes that arise from different interpretations of a written text, and «quae ex re ipsa sumunt contentionis exordium», disputes that arise from different interpretations of a fact. He therefore proceeds with the division of these two species. The status causae qui in scripto sunt The species of the «constitutiones causarum quae in scripto sunt» is further divided: Et illae quidem quaestiones quae in scripto sunt quinque modis fieri possunt. Uno quidem, cum hic scriptoris verba defendit, ille sententiam; atque hic appellatur scriptum et voluntas. Alio vero, si inter se leges quadam contrarietate dissentiant, quas, cum ex adversa parte defendunt, faciunt controversiam: atque hic vocatur status legis contrariae. Tertio, cum scriptum de quo contenditur sententiam claudit ambiguam; haec suo nomine ambiguitas nuncupatur. Quarto vero, cum ex eo quod scriptum est aliud non scriptum intelligitur; quod quia per ratiocinationem et quandam syllogismi consequentiam vestigatur, ratiocinativus vel syllogismus dicitur. Quinto, cum sermo est scriptus, cuius non facile vis ac natura clarescat, nisi definitione detecta sit; hic vocatur finis in scripto. Quos omnes a se differre non est nostri operis, verum rhetorici demonstrare; haec enim speculanda doctis, non rudibus discenda proponimus, quamvis de eorum differentia in Topicorum commentis per transitum disseruerimus29. 28 Benedetto Riposati argues that in all probability the originator of the doctrine of constitutiones was Hermagoras (II° century B. C.), though he himself points out that this doctrine is already found partly, though not systematically, in Aristotle. Cf. RIPOSATI, Studi sui Topica, p. 235. 29 De top. diff., IV, VII, 3-9, 1209AC, pp. 78, 7-79, 2. About the quadripartition of the «status causae qui in scripto sunt»: cf. Cornificius, Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, I, XI, 19, p. 103: «Legitima est constitutio, cum scripto aut e scripto aliquid controversiae

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There are thus five ways in which a dispute may arise from divergences in the interpretation of a written text. The first species of «constitutiones causarum quae in scripto sunt» is called «scriptum et voluntas» and occurs when one party defends the literal interpretation of the written text of a law, while the other party defends its deeper meaning. The second species is called «status legis contrariae» and occurs when two laws are in conflict with each other, with one party defending one law and the other party the other. The third species is called ambiguitas in reference to cases where the divergent interpretations of the written text are due to the ambiguity of the text itself. The fourth species is called ratiocinativus or syllogismus because the parties use syllogistic argumentations to deduce and defend something that is not written in the text. The fifth and last species is called finis in scripto because the parties try to clarify the text using the definition of what is written. nascitur. Ea dividitur in partes sex: scriptum et sententiam, contrarias leges, ambiguum, definitionem, translationem, ratiocinationem»; ivi, II, XI, 13, p. 115-116; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, I, 23, p. 97, 6-8: «Legales status quot sunt? Secundum Hermagoran quattuor: scriptum et voluntas, leges contrariae, ambiguitas, collectio»; ivi, I, 23-29, pp. 97-105; Q. Favius Laurentius Victorinus, Expl. in rhet., 12-13, p. 193, 18-25: «Dein considerandum est, in ratione an scripto sit controversia. Primo inquit, constitutio invenienda est, secundo, utrum causa sit simplex an iuncta, tertio, in ratione an in scripto sit controversia. Scriptum non tantum leges accipiamus, sed et senatus consultum et testamentum et verba sola et multa huius modi. Huius scriptionis genera sunt quinque, ut ipse primum rebus, dein nominibus indicavit, id est primum scriptum et voluntas, secundum leges contrariae, tertium ambiguitas, quartum collectio sive ratiocinatio, quintum definitio legalis, ut est in Caeciniana»; ivi, 39, p. 290-291; Aurelius Augustinus, De rhetorica, 11, p. 143, 18-24: «Sunt item aliae quaestiones quattuor, quas inventores νομικά …, nos legales appellamus. His nomina sunt scriptum et voluntas, quod illi ῥητόν καὶ διάνοιαν appellant, ἀντινομία, quam nos contentionem legum contrariarum vocamus, ambiguitas, quam illi ἀμφιβολία, conlectio, quam illi συλλογισμόν. Verum haec paulo post diligentius tractabimus, ita ut significantia cuiusque evidentius exprimatur et species generibus addantur»; Sulpicius Victor, Institutiones oratoriae, p. 325, 15-17: «Legales autem status sunt quattuor: scriptum et voluntas, leges contrariae, collectio, ambiguitas. Horum unumquodque et locos per ordinem persequamur. A coniectura sit exordium»; ivi, 61-62, pp. 351-352; C. Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica, 11, p. 383, 1-5: «Sunt autem legales status, sicut supra dictum est, quattuor: ambiguitas, quam Graeci ἀμφιβολίαν vocant; collectio, quam Graeci συλλογισμόν vocant; contrariae leges, quam Graeci ἀντινομία vocant; scriptum et voluntas, quam Graeci ῥητόν καὶ διάνοιαν vocant»; ivi, 12-15, pp. 383-385; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 4, p. 99, 13-15: «Legales sunt : scriptum et voluntas – leges contrariae – ambiguitas – collectio sive ratiocinatio – definitio legalis»; ivi, II, II, 5-6, pp. 100-102.

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It is not clear to which passage of his commentary on Cicero’s Topica Boethius refers when he affirms, «de eorum differentia in Topicorum commentis per transitum disseruerimus». In the commentary as it survives, there is in fact no reference to the status causae. This could then be a reference to that part of the commentary that is not available to us, related to paragraphs 76-100. The status causae qui in ipsarum rerum contentione sunt positae The second species of constitutiones, «quae ex re ipsa sumunt contentionis exordium», comes from different interpretation of a fact: Earum autem constitutionum, quae praeter scriptum in ipsarum rerum contentione sunt positae, ita differentiae segregantur, ut rerum quoque ipsarum natura diversa est. In omni enim rhetorica quaestione dubitatur an sit, quid sit, quale sit et praeter haec an iure vel more possit exerceri iudicium. Sed si factum vel res quae intenditur ab adversario negatur, quaestio est utrum sit ea, quae coniecturalis constitutio nominatur. Quod si factum quidem esse constiterit, sed quidnam id sit quod factum est ignoretur, quoniam vis eius definitione monstranda est, definitiva dicitur constitutio. At si et esse constiterit et de rei definitione conveniat, sed quale sit inquiratur tunc, quia cui generi subici debeat ambigitur, generalis qualitas nuncupatur. In hac vero quaestione et qualitatis et quantitatis et comparationis ratio versatur. Sed quoniam de genere quaestio est, secundum generis formam in plura necesse est hanc constitutionem membra distribui. Omnis enim quaestio generalis, id est cum de genere et qualitate et quantitate quaeritur facti, in duas distribuitur partes; nam aut in praeteritum quaeritur de qualitate propositi aut in praesens aut in futurum. Si in praeteritum, iuridicialis constitutio nuncupatur. Si praesentis vel futuri temporis teneat quaestionem, negotialis dicitur30. 30

De top. diff., IV, vii, 10-18, 1209CD, pp. 79, 2-80, 6. On the division of this second species of staus, cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, VIII, 10, p. 9, 14-16: «Omnis res, quae habet in se positam in dictione ac disceptatione aliquam controversiam, aut facti aut nominis aut generis aut actionis continet quaestionem»; ivi, I, VIII, 10, pp. 9, 20-10, 5: «Cum facti controversia est, quoniam coniecturis causa firmatur, constitutio coniecturalis appellatur. Cum autem nominis, quia vis vocabuli definienda verbis est, constitutio definitiva nominatur. Cum vero, qualis res sit, quaeritur, quia et de vi et de genere negotii controversia est, constitutio generalis vocatur. At cum causa ex eo

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In every rhetorical question, it is possible to doubt «whether something is» (an sit), «what it is» (quid sit), «of what species it is» (quale sit), and «whether the judgment may be made according to the law or to morality» («praeter haec an iure vel more possit exerceri iudicium»). There are in turn four species belonging to this second category of constitutiones. When it is necessary to determine whether a fact really happened (an sit), the status causae is called constitutio coniecturalis. When it is certain that the fact really happened, but it remains necessary to determine what it is (quid sit), the status causae is called constitutio definitiva, where the aim is to show the nature of the fact starting from its definition. When it is certain that the fact happened and its definition has been agreed upon, but the species to which the fact belongs (quale sit) is in doubt, the status causae is called qualitas generalis. Boethius points out that the nature of a quaestio can be identified not only based on qualitas, but also by observing the quantitas and by making use of comparatio: the qualitas is then examined in relation to time, with the thesis that concerns the past being called a constitutio iuridicialis, and the thesis concerning the present or the future being called a constitutio negotialis31. pendet, quia non aut si agere videtur, quem oportet, aut non cum eo, quicum oportet, aut non apud quos, quo tempore, qua lege, quo crimine, qua poena oportet, translativa dicitur constitutio, quia actio translationis et commutationis indigere videtur»; ivi, II, XVI-XVIII, 50-57; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, III, VI, 44, p. 148, 25-30: «A plurimis tres sunt facti generales status, quibus et Cicero in Oratore utitur et omnia, quae aut in controversiam aut in contentionem veniant, contineri putat: sitne? Quid sit? Quale sit? Quorum nomina apertiora sunt, quam ut dicenda sint»; ivi, III, VI, 45-62, pp. 148-152; ivi, V, x, 53, p. 259, 5-9: «In rebus autem omnibus, de quarum vi ac natura quaeritur quasque etiam citra complexum personarum ceterorumque, ex quibus fit causa, per se intueri possumus, tria sine dubio rursus spectanda sunt: an sit, quid sit, quale sit»; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, I, 27-28, pp. 102-103; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 443, p. 218, 9-18: «Quaestionum vero duplex species: aliae sunt enim principales, aliae incidentes. principales sunt status, ex quibus nascitur causa, quas Tullius constitutiones appellat. Incidentes vero, quae, dum tractatur causa, nascuntur, dum argumenta vel scripta refutando in plures causa diducitur quaestiones, ut sit principalis ‘utrum Clodium iure occiderit Milo’ incidens ‘uter utri insidias compararit’». 31 On the distinction between constitutio negotialis and constitutio iuridicialis, cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, XI, 14-15, pp. 13, 16-14, 1: «Haec ergo constitutio, quam generalem nominamus, partes videtur nobis duas habere, iuridicialem et negotialem. Iuridicialis est, in qua aequi et recti natura aut praemii aut poenae ratio quaeritur; negotialis, in qua, quid iuris ex civili more et aequitate sit, consideratur; cui diligentiae

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The fourth and last species is called «an iure vel more possit exerceri iudicium», but it receives no explanation. Further distinctions within the constitutio iuridicialis are as follows: Iuridicialis vero, cuius inquisitio praeteritum respicit, duabus partibus segregatur; aut enim in ipso facto vis defensionis inest et absoluta qualitas nuncupatur aut extrinsecus assumitur et assumptiva dicitur constitutio. Sed haec in partes quattuor derivatur; aut enim conceditur crimen aut removetur aut refertur aut, quod est ultimum, comparatur. Conceditur crimen, cum nulla introducitur facti defensio, sed venia postulatur. Id fieri duobus modis potest, si depreceris aut purges. Deprecaris, cum nihil excusationis attuleris; purgas, cum facti culpa in his ascribitur, quibus obsisti obviarique non possit neque tamen personae sint; id enim in aliam constitutionem cadet. Sunt vero haec imprudentia, casus atque necessitas. Removetur vero crimen, cum ab eo qui incessitur transfertur in alium. Sed remotio criminis duobus fieri modis potest, si aut causa referatur aut factum. Causa refertur, cum aliena potestate aliquid factum esse contenditur. Factum vero cum alius aut potuisse aut debuisse facere demonstratur. Atque haec in his maxime valent, si eius nominis in nos intendatur actio, quod non fecerimus id quod oportuit fieri. Refertur crimen, cum iuste in aliquem facinus commissum esse contenditur, quoniam is in quem commissum sit iniurius saepe fuerit atque id quod intenditur meruerit pati. Comparatio est, cum propter meliorem utilioremve rem factum, quod adversarius arguit commissum esse, defenditur. Horum vero omnium sunt propriae differentiae atque ideo minutissimae divisiones, quas rhetorum in his docendis explicandisque conscripti libri diligentius continent32.

praeesse apud nos iure consulti existimantur. Ac iuridicialis quidem ipsa [et] in duas tribuitur partes, absolutam et adsumptivam. Absoluta est, quae ipsa in se continet iuris et iniuriae quaestionem; adsumptiva, quae ipsa ex se nihil dat firmi ad recusationem, foris autem aliquid defensionis adsumit. Eius partes sunt quattuor, concessio, remotio criminis, relatio criminis, conparatio»; ivi, II, XXI-XXXIX, 62-115; Cornificius, Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, I, XIV, 24, pp. 105-106; ivi, II, XIV-XVII, 23-26, pp. 120121; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, I, 15-18, pp. 86-92; Q. Fabius Laurentius Victorinus, Expl. in rhet., I, 11, pp. 189, 34-192, 18; Sulpicius Victor, Institutiones oratoriae, 42-60, pp. 338-351; C. Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica, III, 5-6, pp. 379-380; Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 453-458, pp. 224-227; Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 5, pp. 100-101. 32 De top. diff., IV, VII, 19-30, 1209D-1210B, pp. 80, 7-81, 1.

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A constitutio iuridicialis can be solved on the basis of something that is inside the fact itself, in which case the status causae is called qualitas absoluta; but if the fact is solved by something outside of itself, it is called a constitutio assumptiva. A constitutio assumptiva can in turn be solved in four different ways, depending on whether the crime is forgiven (conceditur), removed (removetur), transferred (refertur), or compared (comparatur). A crime can be forgiven when no defence of the deed is introduced and the accused assumes full responsibility for what has been done and begs for pardon («venia postulatur») or offers a justification («si depreceris aut purges») when the crime is ascribed to ignorance, chance events, or necessity («imprudentia, casus atque necessitas»). A crime is removed when responsibility for it is shifted from the accused to someone else. Removal may, therefore, relate to the cause of the crime or to the crime itself. The cause of the crime, in turn, is removed when it is proved that the act was committed not under one’s own volition, but because of the influence of others («causa refertur, cum aliena potestate aliquid factum esse contenditur»). A crime is likewise removed if the speaker is able to convince the judge that someone else could have done it («factum vero cum alius aut potuisse aut debuisse facere demonstratur»). A crime is transferred when the speaker shows that the person against whom it was committed deserved to suffer it, and that the accused has therefore acted justly («is in quem commissum sit iniurius saepe fuerit atque id quod intenditur meruerit pati»). Finally, a crime is compared when we try to prove that it was committed for the sake of that which is better and more useful («comparatio est cum propter meliorem utilioremve rem factum, quod adversarius arguit commissum esse, defenditur»). Other rhetorical treatises by Roman authors offer further specific distinctions within the individual constitutiones, but Boethius, following Cicero’s De inventione, ends his presentation of various species of constitutiones without doing so. The status: partes vel species causae? The last question regarding to the complicated doctrine of the constitutiones is logical in nature:

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Sed nos haec a M. Tullio sumpsisse sufficiat. Ad aliud enim tota operis festinat intentio. De quibus omnibus hoc dispiciendum est modo. M. enim Tullius causarum partes constitutiones esse demonstrat eo loco, quo contra Hermagoram nititur, dicens: «quod si generis causae partes non possunt recte putari, multo minus recte partis causae partes putabuntur. Pars autem causae constitutio omnis est», partes causae constitutiones esse designans. De qua re multa quaestio est. Quomodo enim partes esse putabantur causae? Si enim ita partes ut species, quomodo fieri potest ut in una causa plures constitutiones sint? Nam species sibimet impermixtae sunt. At veniunt in causam plurimae constitutiones; non sunt igitur partes causarum velut species status. llud quoque, quod nulla species aliam sibi oppositam speciem ad substantiam iuvat, constitutio vero constitutionem confirmat ad fidem. Nec vero fieri potest ut ita sint causarum quasi totius partes; nullum enim compositum ex una parte totum atque integrum esse potest. At in causa constitutio una idonea est constituere causam. Quid igitur est dicendum? Patet via rationi. Neque enim causae eius pars esse dicitur constitutio, quae in controversiam venit et quam status constituit, cum praesertim qui additur ad causam status una iam constitutione firmata non sit principalis, sed accidens atque in uno negotio tot eveniant controversiae, quot sunt constitutiones; sed quot controversiae tot causae. Et licet eas unum contineat negotium, causae tamen impermixtae sibi variantur, ut «qui iuvenem de lupanari exeuntem vidit paulo post de eodem loco uxorem suam vidit egressam, accusat iuvenem adulterii»; hic unum negotium, hoc quod vertitur est, causae autem duae: una coniecturalis, si neget se fecisse, altera definitiva, si in lupanari concubitum dicat non posse adulterium putari. Sed neque neganti pars est eiusdem controversiae coniecturalis status neque definienti definitio; totam enim continet causam. Causam autem voco non generaliter, sed controversiam constitutione aliqua formatam. Sunt autem partes constitutiones causae generalis hoc modo: si enim omnis causa coniecturalis esset nec alius status inveniretur, non esset status coniecturalis causae pars, sed ipsa causa esset sine dubio coniectura; sed quoniam partim coniectura, partim sine, partim qualitate, partim translatione causae omnes tenentur, pars est constitutio causae non eius quam tenendo informat, sed eius quam dividit generalis, cuius scilicet quasi membrum aliquod abscindens suum facit unaquaeque constitutio. Sunt igitur partes ut species constitutiones causae generalis, non eius quam unaquaeque tenens informaverit33. 33

De top. diff., IV, VII, 31-41, 1210C-1211B, pp. 81, 1-82, 17. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, X, 13, p. 12, 3-7: «Quodsi generis causae partes non possunt recte putari,

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The genera causarum (iudicialis, demonstrativum, deliberativum) are considered as species because they, arising from the quaestiones civiles, act as forms that define the rhetorical sphere to which each quaestio belongs. The doctrine of the constitutiones thus at first seems to refer exclusively to the causae iudicialis, i.e. to cases in the forensic sphere, as discussed. Nevertheless, in criticizing Hermagoras of Temnos, who would have affirmed that the doctrine of the status causae belongs particularly to the judicial genus, Cicero emphasises in the De inventione that this doctrine concerns the demonstrative and deliberative genera as well34. Boethius is inspired by Cicero’s criticism of Hermagoras to raise another question of a quite logical nature, namely whether the status causae should be considered as partes or species of a causa. In other words, the question is whether the constitutiones, as essential points of the debate on which a dispute centres, should be considered as parts of a whole or as species of a genus with regard to the causa. It does not seem possible to understand them as species because a case may be made up of more constitutiones, while the species are distinguished from each other, each one in fact belonging to a different genus; therefore, if the constitutiones were species of a causa, they could not co-exist inside the same case. On the other hand, the constitutiones cannot be seen as partes either, since the whole is such only when all the parts are present, while one constitutio alone is enough to constitute a case. The question can be solved by clarifying in exactly what respect the constitutiones should be considered as partes or species. A case is any dispute formed by at least one constitutio. A dispute is therefore introduced multo minus recte partis causae partes putabuntur. Pars autem causae est constitutio omnis; non enim causa ad constitutionem, sed constitutio ad causam adcommodatur»; ivi, I, IX, 12. 34 Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, IX, 12, pp. 11, 16-12, 2: «Si deliberatio et demonstratio genera sunt causarum, non possunt recte partes alicuius generis causae putari; eadem enim res alii genus esse, alii pars potest, eidem genus esse et pars non potest. Deliberatio autem et demonstratio genera sunt causarum. Nam aut nullum causae genus est aut iudiciale solum aut et iudiciale et demonstrativum et deliberativum. Nullum dicere causae esse genus, cum causas esse multas dicat et in eas praecepta det, amentia est; unum iudiciale autem solum esse qui potest, cum deliberatio et demonstratio neque ipsae similes inter se sint et ab iudiciali genere plurimum dissideant et suum quaeque finem habeat, quo referri debeat? Relinquitur ergo, ut omnia tria genera sint causarum deliberatio et demonstratio non possunt recte partes alicuius generis causae putari. Male igitur eas generalis constitutionis partes esse dixit».

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starting from a fact (negotium), in the course of which one or more key points of discussion are then identified, namely the constitutiones or status. An example is the case in which a young man is accused of adultery because he was seen coming out of a brothel, and shortly thereafter his wife was seen coming out of the same place35. Although there is only one fact at issue, from it at least two constitutiones may arise: a constitutio coniecturalis, if the young man denies the accusation, or a constitutio definitiva, if he claims that the act is not adultery. These two species of the status causae remain in each case distinct from one another. Neither of these constitutiones can be considered part of the causa coniecturalis, or of the causa definitiva that they themselves have established; they are rather species of the causa generalis (the causa iuridicialis). The confusion thus arises from the double meaning that can be attributed to the term causa, which may indicate not only the case in which a quaestio civilis is formed, i.e. the causa generalis, but may also indicate the dispute that the constitutio identifies when one or more essential points within the same causa generalis are recognized. The constitutiones behave then as the species, since each status causae (in the example proposed above, the causa coniecturalis and the causa definitiva), by bringing the whole name of the genus that they have divided, are able to sum up in themselves the whole causa generalis. An act (negotium) therefore contains as many disputes (controversiae) as there are conditions of the cases (constitutiones), and as many cases (causae) as there are disputes, since just as the existence of one species alone leads to the existence of the entire genus, so also each status causae is able to form by itself a causa. If there were in fact only the status causae coniecturalis, there would be only the causa coniecturalis, and ultimately the whole case would be a coniectura, so that it would be impossible to identify other constitutiones within the same causa. The causa generalis should rather be seen as a genus divided into its species, which are the status. To conclude, then, the status causae are not parts of the case that each single status forms, but parts of the general case in 35 Cf. Martianus Capella, De nuptiis, V, 451, pp. 223, 17-224, 3: «Quod si intentioni non ius facti, sed negatio nominis opponatur, quamvis negatio depulsionis vice dicatur, tamen non faciet coniecturam, quia non factum, sed nomen facti destruitur, ut in hoc: adulterii actio sit. ‘Cum repudiata uxore stupratorem qui repudiaverat maritus invenit, accusat adulterii. Reus contra dicit nec factum negat, sed adulterii nomen excludit et quaerit, quid sit adulterium’, quod est definitione controversiae».

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which the person, based on what he has done or has said, has been called to judgment36.

4.3 General summary Before presenting the loci rhetorici, Boethius presents again a brief summary of what has been said so far regarding the ars rhetorica: Quare est genus rhetoricae facultas. Rhetoricae vero species tres, iudiciale, demonstrativum, deliberativum. Materia autem civilis quaestio, quae dicitur causa; partes huius materiae constitutiones. Rhetoricae partes, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio vel actio. Instrumentum oratio; instrumenti partes exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, peroratio. Opera docere et movere; actor orator. Officium bene dicere; finis tum bene dixisse, tum persuadere. Est vero tota rhetorica in speciebus. Species vero ita totam materiam informant, ut tamen vicissim totam sibi vindicent, quod ex hoc intellegi potest, quoniam omnes sibi materiae partes singulae species tenent. Nam in iudiciali quattuor constitutiones invenies et in deliberativo demonstrativoque easdem quattuor invenire queas. Unde ostenditur, si omnes partes causae generalis, quae est civilis quaestio, singulae species habent, omnes vero partes causa ipsa est, causam, id est civilem quaestionem, ab speciebus vicissim vindicari totam eo modo, quo vox uno tempore ad plurimorum aures pervenit cum suis integra partibus, id est elementis; nam eodem tempore tota causa ad diversas species cum suis partibus transit. Sed cum species in materiam venerint, id est in civilem quaestionem, et eam cum suis obtinuerint partibus, inferunt secum etiam ipsam rhetoricae facultatem. Quare etiam rhetoricae partes in singulis constitutionibus inerunt. Sed illata materia rhetorica infert secum instrumentum suum, infert igitur 36

Boethius presents four kinds of constitutiones, but speaks only about the first three; he explains that, in every rhetorical question, an sit can be doubted (constitutio coniecturalis), quid sit (constitutio definitiva), quale sit (qualitas generalis) and «an iure vel more possit exerceri iudicium». Cf. De top. diff., IV, VII, 10-11, 1209C, p. 79, 2-6: «Earum autem constitutionum, quae praeter scriptum in ipsarum rerum contentione sunt positae, ita differentiae segregantur, ut rerum quoque ipsarum natura diversa est. In omni enim rhetorica quaestione dubitatur an sit, quid sit, quale sit et praeter haec an iure vel more possit exerceri iudicium».

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secum orationem et haec proprias partes eritque in constitutionibus tractandis exordium et narratio et cetera. Sed cum instrumentum venerit in civilem quaestionem, operam quoque suam simul infert; et docebit igitur ac persuadebit in omni constitutione. Sed haec per se venire non poterunt, nisi sit qui haec moveat velut artifex atque architectus. Hic autem est orator, qui, cum ad causam accesserit, faciet officium suum; bene igitur dicet in omni genere causarum et in omni constitutione; orator faciet etiam finem, tum ut bene dixerit in omni constitutione, tum ut persuaserit. De singulis igitur nunc quidem in commune tractavimus. De unoquoque vero separatim post, si erit commodum, disseremus. Atque haec hactenus37.

As is illustrated in Diagram no. 62 (Appendix, p. 360), inasmuch as rhetoric is understood as a genus, it is entirely present within its species (iuridiciale, demonstrativum, and deliberativum). However, since the species shape the materia (that is, the causa generalis, i.e. the quaestio civilis), each species must possess the four partes in which the material has been divided (constitutio coniecturalis, constitutio definitiva, qualitas generalis, an iure vel more possit exerceri iudicium). The material, however, bearing within itself the five parts of rhetoric (inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio), the instrument of rhetoric (oratio), and the six parts of the instrument (exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, and peroratio), transfers these elements also to each constitutio. The instrument of rhetoric, in turn, bears within itself the task of rhetoric («docere et movere») that is accomplished by the orator who, in turn, tries to carry out his officium (bene dicere), and therefore to reach his finis, i.e. to speak well in every constitutio in order to persuade the judge. This way of presenting rhetoric is essentially intended to show how it derives entirely from its genus, namely the disciplina38. Moreover, as has been seen, the metaphor of material and form is preferred for illustrating the idea that the multiplicity of the species derives from the unity of the genus39. 37 De top. diff., IV, VIII, 1-15, 1211B-1212A, pp. 82, 18-84, 5. On the term actor: cf. Cicero, De oratore, I, 26, 118, p. 46, 7-10: «Nullae enim lites neque controversiae sunt, quae cogant homines, sicut in foro non bonos oratores, item in theatro actores malos perpeti». 38 Cf. De top. diff., IV, II, 1, 1207AB, p. 73, 12: «Rhetoricae igitur genus est facultas». Cf. supra, Chap. 4, § 4.2.1. 39 Cf. supra, Introd.

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4.4 De inventione: the loci rhetorici The presentation of the entire ars rhetorica is essentially intended to examine the first of the five parts of rhetoric, inventio, where the loci rhetorici are located. On the other hand, inventio is the part that joins dialectic with rhetoric, and it is not by chance that this last discipline is the part of greatest interest for logic: Nunc de inventione tractandum est. Et enim prius quidem dialecticos dedimus, nunc rhetoricos promimus locos, quos ex attributis personae ac negotio venire necesse est. Persona est quae in iudicium vocatur cuius dictum aliquod factumve reprehenditur. Negotium factum dictumve personae, propter quod in iudicium vocatur. Itaque in his duobus omnis locorum ratio constituta est; quae enim habent reprehensionis occasionem, eadem nisi omnino ad inexcusabilem partem vergunt, defensionis copiam subministrant; ex hisdem enim locis omnis accusatio defensioque consistit. Si igitur persona in iudicium vocatur neque factum dictumve ullum reprehenditur, causa esse non poterit. Nec vero factum dictumve aliquod in iudicium proferri potest, si persona non exstet. Itaque in his duobus omnis iudiciorum ratio versatur, in persona scilicet atque negotio. Sed ut dictum est, persona est quae in iudicium vocatur, negotium factum dictumve personae, propter quod reus statuitur; persona igitur et negotium suggerere argumenta non possunt. De ipsis enim quaestio est. De quibus autem dubitatur, ea dubitationi fidem facere nequeunt. Argumentum vero erat ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem. Faciunt autem negotio fidem ea, quae sunt personis ac negotiis attributa. Ac si quando persona negotio faciat fidem veluti «si credatur contra rempublicam sensisse Catilinam, quoniam persona est vitiorum turpitudine denotata», tunc non in eo, quod persona est et in iudicium vocatur, fidem negotio facit, sed in eo, quod ex attributis personae quandam suscipit qualitatem. Sed ut rerum ordo clarius colliquescat, de circumstantiis arbitror esse dicendum40.

As was seen above, inventio is the initial stage in which the speaker goes in search of the arguments on which he will have to base his speech41. In 40

De top. diff., IV, XI, 1-11, 1212AC, pp. 84, 6-85, 5. Cicero, when he was young, dedicated an unfinished treatise to this part of rhetoric, his De inventione; four more books were to have followed, each dedicated 41

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other words, this phase consists of the search for the loci, where, according to Cicero, a locus is a sedes argumenti, a definition that Boethius in the second book attempts to attribute also to Themistius’s locus42. The loci rhetorici, then, are obtained first of all from the attributa of the person and the act («ex attributis personae et negotii»). The persona and the negotium are, in fact, the two elements on the basis of which a case is introduced. The persona is the one who bears the accusation for which he has been brought to trial; the negotium is the reason why the persona has been brought to trial, a reason that can in turn refer to something that the persona said or did. In the absence of the persona and negotium, therefore, no case may exist, for which reason any form of accusation or defence must necessarily be based on one of these elements. It is noteworthy that the manner in which Boethius presents the loci rhetorici is the same in which he examines the loci dialectici in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica. In fact, he states precisely that the persona and the negotium, although they are elements from which a case proceeds, cannot be the loci because they are instead the res dubiae, i.e. the elements that it is still necessary to clarify. A locus, rather, is a principle that produces argumenta, and the argumentum, in turn, is a «ratio quae rei dubiae faciat fidem», a principle capable of generating credibility in favour of a thing that is in doubt. However, the persona and the negotium, while not being loci, contain within themselves something that allows them to act as such, namely their attributa. Thus, for example, if Catiline has been accused of plotting against the Republic, the accusation could be confirmed and strengthened by appealing to Catiline’s specific attribute, namely that he is a person always marked by the baseness of his vices. Since the accusation is founded on the persona of Catiline, it might appear that the persona has been acting as a function of the locus; in fact, the locus is rather an attribute of the persona of Catiline, this attribute being his habitus. Therefore, a thorough knowledge of all the loci rhetorici ultimately includes knowledge of the attributa of the person and the act, which are also called circumstantiae.

to one of the four parts of rhetoric (elocutio, dispositio, memoria, pronuntiatio vel actio). As already mentioned, Boethius makes particular use of this Ciceronian work in composing the fourth book of the De topicis differentiis. 42 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.6 and Chap. 2, § 2.3.

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4.5 The circumstantiae As far as the enumeration of the circumstantiae is concerned, Boethius again follows Cicero’s presentation in the De inventione: Circumstantiae sunt quae convenientes substantiam quaestionis efficiunt. Nisi enim sit qui fecerit et quod fecerit causaque cur fecerit, locus tempusque quo fecerit, modus etiam facultatesque si desint, causa non stabit. Has igitur circumstantias in gemina Cicero partitur, ut eam quae est «quis» circumstantiam in attributis personae ponat. Reliquas vero circumstantias in attributis negotio constituat. Et primam quidem ex circumstantiis eam quae est «quis», quam personae attribuit, secat in undecim partes: nomen ut «Verres», natura ut «barbarus», victus ut «amicus nobilium», fortuna ut «dives», studium ut «geometra», casus ut «exsul», affectio ut «amans», habitus ut «sapiens», consilium, facta, et orationes, ea, quae extra illud factum dictumque sunt, quod nunc in iudicium devocatur. Reliquas vero circumstantias, quae sunt «quid», «cur», «quando», «ubi», «quomodo», «quibus auxiliis», in attributis negotio ponit, «quid» et «cur» dicens continentia cum ipso negotio, «cur» in causa constituens; ea enim causa est uniuscuiusque facti, propter quam factum est. «Quid» vero secat in quattuor partes: in summam facti, ut «parentis occisio» (ex hac maxime locus sumitur amplificationis), ante factum, ut «concitus rapuit gladium», dum fit: «vehementer percussit», post factum: «in abdito sepelivit». Quae omnia cum sint facta, tamen quoniam ad gestum negotium de quo quaeritur pertinent, non sunt ea facta, quae in attributis personae numerata sunt. Illa enim extra negotium de quo agitur posita personam informantia fidem ei negotio praestant de quo versatur intentio; haec vero facta, quae continentia sunt cum ipso negotio, ad ipsum negotium de quo quaeritur pertinent. Postremas vero quattuor circumstantias Cicero ponit in gestione negotii, quae est secunda pars attributorum negotiis. Et eam quidem circumstantiam quae est «quando» dividit in tempus, ut «nocte fecit», et in occasionem, ut «cunctis dormientibus». Eam vero circumstantiam quae est «ubi» locum dicit, ut «in cubiculo fecit», «quomodo» vero ex circumstantiis modum, ut «clam fecit». «Quibus auxiliis» circumstantiam facultatem appellat, ut «cum multo exercitu»43. 43

De top. diff., IV, X, 1-13, 1212C-1213B, pp. 85, 6-86, 17. On the circumstantiae, cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, XXIV- XXVIII, 34-43; ivi, XXIV, 34, p. 32, 1-3: «Ac personis

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The circumstantia of the quis is composed of eleven elements: name (nomen), for example «Verres»; nature (natura), such as sex, country, kinship, age, or ethnicity, an example being «barbarian»; way of life (victum), for example «friend of nobles»; fortune (fortuna), for example «rich»; studies (studium), understood as a constant intellectual occupation, for example, «geometrician»; luck (casus), i.e. what happened to a person, for example, «exile»; feelings (affectiones), for example, «loving»; disposition (habitus), understood as physical and moral accomplishment in a certain area, for example, «wise»; a plan to do (or not do) something (consilium); deeds (facta); and, finally, discourses (orationes) of the persona who has been brought to court, but beyond what he has done or has said. The circumstantia of the quid is composed of four elements that are closely connected to the deed in question, and in fact inseparable from it, because they concern what happened, whether: in the substance of the deed (in summam facti), for example, «the killing of a parent»; before the deed (ante factum), for example, «he seized a sword in a state of excitement»; during the deed (dum fit), for example, «he struck violently»; or after the deed (post factum), for example, «he buried it in a secret place». Boethius states that this species of facta includes the attributes of the negotium (i.e. these deeds pertain to the action to be investigated), and must therefore be carefully distinguished from the facta that have been counted among the attributes of the persona (which are facta, but ones not directly related to what the person has said or has done). has res adtributas putamus: nomen, naturam, victum, fortunam, habitum, affectionem, studia, consilia, facta, casus, orationes»; ivi, II, IX-XII, 28-42; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, V, X, 23-52, pp. 253, 31-259, 4; Consultus Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica, II, 1, pp. 107, 7-111, 3; Q. Fabius Laurentius Victorinus, Expl. in rhet., I, 21, pp. 207, 1-208, 36; Incerti auctoris tractatus de adtributis personae et negotio, in Rhetores latini minores ex codicibus maximam partem primum adhibitis, ed. K. HALM, Minerva, Leipzig 1863 (reprint. Frankfurt a. M. 1964), [pp. 305-310], pp. 305,1310,35; Aurelius Augustinus, De rhetorica, 7, pp. 141, 11-142, 14; Sulpicius Victor, Institutiones oratoriae, 25, p. 326, 4-5: «Circumstantia autem personarum est genus, natura, aetas, disciplina, fortuna, studia, nomen, ante facta, habitus»; C. Iulius Victor, Ars rhetorica, I, p. 374, 22-27: «Accepto igitur themate primum circumstantiam sectari debes, cuius partes sunt septem hae: ‘quis, quid, quando, ubi, cur, quemadmodum, quibus adminiculis’. Harum vero omnium aut plurimam rationalis congregatio facit causam, et hac primum perspicitur, an consistat controversiae ratio, an vero materia, quae proposita est, asystatos sit»; Exc. Rhet., p. 586, 3-19.

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The circumstantia of «why» (cur) is posed in the case (in causa) because the reason why every single deed was done resides in the case of that deed. The circumstantia of «when» (quando) is composed of two elements: the moment in which the deed was accomplished (in tempus), for example, «he carried it out by night», and also «on the occasion» that it was done (in occasionem), for example «when everyone was sleeping». The circumstantia of «where» (ubi) refers to the place where the deed was done, and in fact is also called the locus; for example, «he carried it out in the bedroom». The circumstantia of «how» (quomodo) entails investigation of the ways in which the deed was accomplished and is thus also called the modum, for example, «he carried it out secretly». The last circumstantia concerns the means by which a deed was accomplished (quibus auxlilis), also called «possibility» (facultas); for example, «with a large band of men». These are, then, the loci rhetorici. Boethius at first collects all of the circumstantiae into two categories. The first relates to the attributes inherent in the deed (continentia cum ipso negotio) and includes the first three circumstances, which are closely linked to the deed, namely quis, quid, cur. The second category relates to the circumstances related to the fullfillment of the deed (in gestione negotii) and includes the remaining four circumstantiae, namely quando, ubi, quomodo, and quibus auxilis44.

4.5.1 The loci continentia cum ipso negotio and in gestione negotii Boethius now addresses some distinctions among loci that might seem similar by defining them precisely: 44

In the De inventione, when dealing with the fourth part of rhetorical speech, called confirmatio, Cicero subdivides the attributa negotiis into four categories; the attributes of the person are rather the eleven parts into which the circumstance of quis has been subdivided. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, XXVI, 37, pp. 33, 25-34, 2: «Ac personis quidem haec videntur esse adtributa: negotiis autem quae sunt adtributa, partim sunt continentia cum ipso negotio, partim in gestione negotii considerantur, partim adiuncta negotio sunt, partim negotium consequuntur». Boethius uses this four-fold classification because he wants to adapt and subordinate the four classes of loci rhetorici to the classes of loci dialectici of the Themistian and Ciceronian divisions. Cf. infra, Chap. 4, § 4.6.

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Quorum quidem locorum, etsi ex circumstantiarum natura discretio clara est, nos tamen benevolentius faciemus, si uberius eorum a se differentias ostendamus. Nam cum ex circumstantiis alia M. Tullius proposuerit esse continentia cum ipso negotio, alia vero in gestione negotii atque in continentibus cum ipso negotio illum adnumeraverit locum quem appellavit «dum fit»; ex ipsa prolationis significatione idem videtur esse locus hic, «dum fit», ei qui est in gestione negotii. Sed non ita est, quia «dum fit» illud est, quod eo tempore admissum est, dum facinus perpetratur, ut «percussit». In gestione vero negotii ea sunt, quae ante factum et dum fit et post factum quod gestum est continent; in omnibus enim tempus, locus, occasio, modus, facultas inquiritur. Rursus «dum fit» factum est, quo administratum est negotium. Quae ergo sunt in gestione negotii non sunt facta, sed facto adhaerentia. Nullus enim tempus, occasionem, locum, modum, facultatem facta esse consenserit, sed, ut dictum est, quae cuilibet facto adhaerentia sint atque id nullo modo derelinquant, quia quadam relatione subiecta sunt ipsi quod gestum est negotio. Item ea quae sunt in gestione negotii sine his quae sunt continentia cum ipso negotio esse possunt. Potest enim et locus et tempus et occasio et modus et facultas facti cuiuslibet intelligi, etiamsi nemo faciat, quod illo in loco vel tempore vel occasione vel modo vel facultate fieri posset. Itaque ea quae sunt in gestione negotii sine his quae continentia sunt cum ipso negotio esse possunt, illa vero sine his esse non possunt; factum enim praeter locum, tempus, occasionem, modum facultatemque esse non poterit45.

The analysis of similarities and differences among the loci rhetorici is parallel to that found in the second and third books with regard to the loci dialectici and, as declared, it represents the development of the second objective of the intentio operis46. As shown in Diagram no. 63 (Appendix, 45

De top. diff., IV, X, 14-22, 1213BD, pp. 86, 18-87, 19. Cicero explains the «attributa quae continentia cum ipso negotio» in the following way; cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, XXVI, 37, p. 34, 3-12: «Continentia cum ipso negotio sunt ea, quae semper affixa esse videntur ad rem neque ab ea possunt separari. Ex his prima est brevis conplexio totius negotii, quae summam continet facti, hoc modo: parentis occisio, patriae proditio; deinde causa eius summae, per quam et quam ob rem et cuius rei causa factum sit, quaeritur; deinde ante gestam rem quae facta sint continenter usque ad ipsum negotium; deinde, in ipso gerendo negotio quid actum sit; deinde, quid postea factum sit». The description of the «attributa in gestione negotii» is rather longer. cf. ivi, I, XXVI-XXVII, 38-41, pp. 34, 13-36, 14. 46 Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.2.

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p. 361), Boethius emphasizes first of all the need to avoid confusing the locus called dum fit, which is one of the four parts of the circumstance of quid and belongs to the category «continentia cum ipso negotio», with the quando placed in tempus, which instead falls in the category of loci «in gestione negotii». The dum fit, in fact, concerns something that occurred while the crime was being done (for example, «he struck»), and belongs to the category of loci called «continentia cum ipso negotio» for the simple reason that it is a deed closely linked to the action for which the case was brought; the other two circumstantiae belonging to this category (quid and cur) also have the same nature. Conversely, the locus called in tempus refers to what happened before, during, or after the deed. It is not, therefore, purely a question of deeds, but of elements related to the fulfillment of the action («in gestione negotii»), for example, «he struck by night». The same, in fact, applies also to other circumstantiae that belong to this category of loci (in occasionem, locus, modum, and facultas) that are not the deed itself, but rather elements related to it («adherentia facto»). In conclusion, then, the category of loci called «continentia cum ipso negotio» contains facta, while the category «in gestione negotii» contains adherentia facto elements. The circumstantiae posed «in gestione negotii» can exist without the circumstantiae «continentia cum ipso negotio», but the latter cannot exist without the former. This means that, whenever a persona has said or has done something for which a case has been brought, it is possible to know when (in tempus), on what occasion (in occasionem), in what place (ubi), how (quomodo), and by what means (quibus auxiliis) it happened. What remains unknown, on the other hand, is who did it (quis), what he did (quid), and why he did it (cur), and the answers to these latter questions can only be understood through a consideration of time, occasion, place, method, and means.

4.5.2 The loci adiuncta negotio Next come two other categories of loci rhetorici to which the following circumstantiae will be traced back: Atque haec sunt, quae in attributis personae ac negotio constant, veluti in dialecticis locis ea, quae in ipsis haerent de quibus quaeritur. Reliqua vero, quae vel sunt adiuncta negotio vel gestum

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negotium consequuntur, talia sunt, qualia in dialecticis locis ea, quae secundum Themistium partim rei substantiam consequuntur, partim sunt extrinsecus, partim versantur in mediis; secundum Ciceronem vero inter affecta numerata sunt vel extrinsecus posita. Sunt enim adiuncta negotio ipsa etiam quae fidem faciunt quaestioni, affecta quodammodo ad id de quo quaeritur et respicientia negotium de quo agitur hoc modo: nam circumstantiae septem, quae in attributis personae vel negotio numeratae sunt, hae, cum coeperint comparari et quasi in relationem venire, si quidem ad se continens referatur vel ad id quod continet, fit aut species aut genus. At si ad id referatur, quod ab eo longissime distet, contrarium; at si ad finem suum atque exitum referatur, eventus est. Eodem quoque modo ad maiora et minora et paria comparantur. Atque omnino tales loci in his quae sunt ad aliquid considerantur; nam maius aut minus aut simile aut aeque magnum aut disparatum accidunt circumstantiis, quae in attributis negotio atque personae numeratae sunt, ut, dum ipsae circumstantiae aliis comparantur, fiat ex his argumentum facti dictive, quod in iudicium trahitur. Distant autem a superioribus, quod superiores loci vel facta continebant vel factis ita adhaerebant, ut separari non possint, ut locus, tempus et cetera, quae gestum negotium non relinquunt. Haec vero quae sunt adiuncta negotio non inhaerent ipsi negotio, sed accidunt circumstantiis et tunc demum argumenta praestant, cum ad comparationem venerint. Sumuntur vero argumenta non ex contrarietate, sed ex contrario et non ex similitudine, sed ex simili, ut appareat ex relatione sumi argumenta, in adiunctis negotio et ea esse adiuncta negotio, quae sint ad ipsum de quo agitur negotium affecta47. 47 De top. diff., IV, X, 23-31, 1213D-1214C, pp. 87, 19-89, 1. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, XXVIII, 41-42, pp. 36, 15-37, 8: «Adiunctum negotio autem id intellegitur, quod maius et quod minus et quod aeque magnum et quod simile erit ei negotio, quo de agitur, et quod contrario et quod disparatum, et genus et pars et eventus. Maius et minus et aeque magnum ex vi et ex numero et ex figura negotii, sicut ex statura corporis, consideratur. Simile autem ex specie conparabili aut ex conferunda atque assimulanda natura iudicatur. Contrarium est, quod positum in genere diverso ab eodem, cui contrarium dicitur, plurimum distat, ut frigus calori, vitae mors. Disparatum autem est id, quod ab aliqua re praepositione negationis separatur, hoc modo: sapere et non sapere. Genus est, quod partes aliquas amplectitur, ut cupiditas. Pars est, quae subest generi, ut amor, avaritia. Eventus est exitus alicuius negotii, in quo quaeri solet, quid ex quaque re evenerit, eveniat, eventurum sit. Quare hoc in genere, ut commode, quid eventurum sit, ante animo colligi possit, quid quaque ex re soleat evenire, considerandum est, hoc modo: ex arrogantia odium ex insolentia arrogantia».

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Boethius first of all compares the two categories of loci rhetorici now under consideration with the divisions of Themistius’s and Cicero’s loci dialectici. The category of loci «continentia cum ipso negotio» and «in gestione negotii», which concerns circumstantiae related to the deed for which a case is introduced, resembles, in Themistius’s division, the category of loci taken from the substance of the terms of the question («loci qui in questione sunt positi et qui ab terminorum substantia ducuntur»). In Cicero’s division, the loci «continentia cum ipso negotio» and «in gestione negotii» resemble the loci related to the things being discussed («loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur»)48. Two other categories of loci rhetorici, «adiuncta negotio» and «qui gestum negotium consenquuntur», are introduced. The «adiuncta negotio» are the additional circumstances of a deed, which are obtained when the seven circumstantiae now listed are compared with other circumstantiae outside of the deed in an effort to establish relations of genus and species, causality, contrariness, similarity, comparison, or equality. Unfortunately, Boethius does adduce any examples of the loci of this category; he simply lists the five kinds, namely the greater (maius), lesser (minus), similar (simile), equally great (aeque magnum), and antithetical (disparatum)49. Finally, it is specified that the argumenta in this category are not drawn from contrariness but from a contrary circumstance, and not from similarity but from a similar circumstance, which means that the five circumstantiae of the «adiuncta negotio» are not drawn directly from contrariness, understood as a universal genus, but rather from a contrary circumstance intended as specific genus of that category. Lastly, from the perspective of Themistius’s division, the loci «adiuncta negotio» are like the loci placed among the things that follow the substance («loci qui terminorum substantia consequuntur»), like those placed in an intermediate position (loci medii), or like the external ones («loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus»). In Cicero’s division, by contrast, the loci rhetorici «adiuncta negotio» are either like the loci taken from things related to what is being discussed («loci ex his rebus quae quodammodo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur»), or like the loci positioned externally («loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus»)50. 48

Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.7. Cf. Diagram no. 63 (Appendix, p. 361). Cf. Diagram no. 7a (Appendix, p. 329). 50 Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.7. Cf. Diagrams nos. 57 and 58 (Appendix, pp. 356-357). 49

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4.5.3 The consecutio Boethius at last presents the fourth category of loci rhetorici: Consecutio vero, quae pars quarta est eorum quae negotiis attributa sunt, neque in ipsis inest rebus neque in his quae rerum substantiam non relinquunt neque ex comparatione reperitur, sed rem gestam vel antecedit vel etiam subsequitur. Atque hic totus locus extrinsecus est. «Primum» enim in eo quaeritur «id quod factum est quo nomine appellari conveniat (in quo non de re, sed de vocabulo laboratur); qui deinde auctores eius facti et inventionis comprobatores atque aemuli (id totum ex iudicio et quodam testimonio extrinsecus posito ad subsidium confluit argumenti); deinde et quae eius rei sit lex, consuetudo, pactio, iudicium, scientia, artificium; deinde natura eius evenire vulgo soleat an insolenter et raro; et utrum homines id sua auctoritate comprobare an offendere in his consueverint et cetera, quae factum aliquod similiter confestim aut intervallo solent consequi», quae necesse est extrinsecus posita ad opinionem magis tendere quam ad ipsam rerum naturam. Itaque in haec quattuor licet negotiis attributa dividere, ut sint partim continentia cum ipso negotio (quae facta esse superius dictum est), partim in gestione negotii (quae non esse facta, sed factis adhaerentia dudum monstravimus), partim adiuncta negotio (haec, ut dictum est, partim in relatione ponuntur), partim gestum negotium consequuntur (horum fides extrinsecus sumitur). Ac de rhetoricis quidem locis satis dictum est51.

51 De top. diff., IV, X, 32-35, 1214C-1215A, pp. 89, 1-90, 2. Cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, XXVIII, 43, p. 37, 9-26: «Quarta autem pars est ex iis , quas negotiis dicebamus esse adtributas, consecutio. In hac eae res quaeruntur, quae gestum negotium consequuntur: primum quod factum est, quo id nomine appellari conveniat; deinde eius facti qui sint principes et inventores, qui denique auctoritatis eius et inventionis comprobatores atque emuli; deinde quae de ea re aut eius rei sit lex, consuetudo, pactio, iudicium, scientia, artificium; deinde natura eius, evenire vulgo soleat an insolenter et raro; postea homines id sua auctoritate comprobare an offendere in iis consueverint; et cetera, quae factum aliquid similiter confestim aut ex intervallo solent consequi. Deinde postremo adtendendum est, num quae res ex iis rebus, quae positae sunt in partibus honestatis aut utilitatis, consequantur; de quibus in deliberativo genere causae distinctius erit dicendum. Ac negotiis quidem fere res haec, quas commemoravimus, sunt adtributae».

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The fourth category of loci rhetorici is simply called consecutio, and it concerns all things that came before or after the deed that led to the case. It is a matter of establishing the following elements: – «id quod factum est quo nomine appellari conveniat», i.e. the choice of the name by which it is appropriate to refer to the deed; – «qui sunt auctores eius facti et inventionis comprobatores atque aemuli», i.e. those who did the deed, those who first learned of it, those who approved it, and those who imitate it; – «quae eius rei sit lex, consuetudo, pactio, iudicium, scientia, artificium», i.e. the law that regulates the deed, as well as custom, agreement, judgment, science, and theory regarding it; – «si natura eius evenire vulgo soleat an insolenter et raro», i.e. the frequency with which the deed occurs, starting from its nature; – «utrum homines id sua auctoritate comprobare an offendere in his consueverint», i.e. the extent to which people approve of or are repulsed by the deed, which means that it is necessary to take into consideration the moral judgment that people pronounce upon it. For Boethius, the consecutio, both in Themistius’s and Cicero’s divisions, is equivalent to the category of «loci qui extrinsecus assumuntur», since it is a question of elements that derive from opinion and are not based on the nature of the deed in question, and are therefore are entirely outside of the case.

4.6 The communitates inter dialecticos et rhetoricos locos Boethius again lists the similarities between loci dialectici and loci rhetorici with reference to Themistius’s and Cicero’s divisions: Nunc illud est explicandum, quae sit his similitudo cum dialecticis, quae vero diversitas, quod cum idonee convenienterque monstravero, propositi operis explebitur intentio. Primo adeo, ut in dialecticis locis, sicut Themistio placet, alii sunt qui in ipsis haerent de quibus quaeritur, alii assumuntur extrinsecus, alii vero medii inter utrosque locati sunt, sic in rhetoricis quoque locis alii in persona atque negotio consistunt, de quibus ex adversa parte certatur, alii vero extrinsecus, ut hi qui gestum negotium consequuntur, alii vero medii. Quorum

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proximi quidem negotio sunt hi qui ex circumstantiis, reliqui in gestione negotii considerantur. Illi vero qui in adiunctis negotio collocantur ipsi quoque inter medios locos positi sunt, quoniam negotium de quo agitur quadam affectione respiciunt. Vel si quis ea quidem quae personis attributa sunt vel quae continentia sunt cum ipso negotio vel quae in gestione negotii considerantur his similia locis dicat, qui ab ipsis in dialectica trahuntur de quibus in quaestione dubitatur, consequentia vero negotium ponat extrinsecus, adiuncta vero inter utrumque constituat. Ciceronis vero divisioni hoc modo fit similis. Nam ea quae continentia sunt cum ipso negotio vel ea quae in gestione negotii considerantur in ipsis haerent de quibus quaeritur; ea vero quae adiuncta sunt inter affecta ponuntur; sed ea quae gestum negotium consequuntur extrinsecus collocata sunt. Vel si quis ea quidem quae continentia sunt cum ipso negotio in ipsis haerere arbitretur, affecta vero esse ea quae sunt in gestione negotii vel adiuncta negotio, extrinsecus vero ea quae gestum negotium consequuntur. Nam iam illae perspicuae communitates sunt, quod quidam ipsi paene in utrisque facultatibus versantur loci, ut genus, ut pars, ut similitudo, ut contrarium, ut maius ac minus. De communitatibus quidem satis dictum est52.

As can be seen in Diagrams 64-67 (Appendix, pp. 362-363), Boethius establishes for each division of Themistius’s and Cicero’s loci a double combination, obtaining as a result a fourfold correspondence of loci dialectici and rhetorici. These are therefore the topical differences indicated by the title of the treatise.

4.7 The diversitates inter dialecticos et rhetoricos locos Finally, the differences between loci dialectici and rhetorici are presented: Differentiae vero illae sunt, quod dialectici etiam thesibus apti sunt, rhetorici tantum ad hypothesis, id est, ad quaestiones informatas circumstantiis assumuntur; nam sicut ipsae facultates a semetipsis universalitate et particularitate distinctae sunt, ita etiam earum loci ambitu et contractione discreti sunt. Nam dialecticorum locorum 52

De top. diff., IV, XI, 1-8, 1215AD, p. 90, 3-29.

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maior est ambitus et, quoniam praeter circumstantias sunt, quae singulares faciunt causas, non modo ad thesis utiles sunt, verum etiam ad argumenta, quae in hypothesibus posita sunt, eorumque locos, qui ex circumstantiis constant, claudunt atque ambiunt. Itaque fit ut semper egeat rhetor dialecticis locis, dialecticus vero suit possit esse contentus. Rhetor enim, quoniam causas ex circumstantis tractat, ex hisdem circumstantiis argumenta persumet, quae necesse est ab universalibus et simplicibus confirmari, qui sunt dialectici. Dialecticus vero, qui prior est, posteriore non eget, nisi aliquando inciderit quaestio personae, ut, cum sit incidens dialectico ad probandam suam thesin causa circumstantiis inclusa, tunc demum rhetoricis utatur locis. Itaque in dialecticis locis, si ita contingit, a genere argumenta sumuntur, id est ipsa generis natura. Sed in rhetoricis ab eo genere, quod illic genus est de quo agitur, nec a natura generis, sed a re scilicet ipsa, quae genus est. Sed ut progrediatur, ratio ex eo pendet, quod natura generis ante praecognita est; ut si dubitetur «an fuerit aliquis ebrius», dicetur, si refellere velimus, «non fuisse, quoniam nulla in eo luxuries antecesserit; idcirco nimirum, quia, cum luxuries ebrietatis quasi quoddam genus sit, cum luxuries nulla fuerit, nec ebrietas quidem fuit». Sed hoc pendet ex altero. Cur enim, si luxuries non fuit, ebrietas esse non potuit? Ex natura generis demonstratur, quod dialectica ratio subministrat; unde enim genus abest, inde etiam species abesse necesse est, quoniam genus species non relinquit. Et de similibus quidem et de contrariis eodem modo, in quibus maxima similitudo est inter rhetoricos ac dialecticos locos. Dialectica enim ex ipsis qualitatibus, rhetorica ex qualitate suscipientibus rebus argumenta vestigat. Ut dialecticus ex genere, id est ex ipsa generis natura, rhetor ex ea re, quae genus est; dialecticus ex similitudine, rhetor ex simili, id est ex ea re, quae similitudinem cepit. Eodem modo ille ex contrarietate, hic ex contrario53. 53

De top. diff., IV, XII, 1-12, 1215D-1216C, pp. 91, 1-92, 9. Cf. Cassiodorus, Institutiones, II, II, 17, pp. 127, 27-128, 10: «Memoriae quoque condendum est, topica oratoribus, dialecticis, poetis et iurisperitis communiter quidem argumenta praestare; sed quando aliquid specialiter probant ad rethores, poetas iurisperitosque pertinent, quando vero generaliter disputant, ad philosophos attinere manifestum est. Mirabile plane genus operis, - in unum potuisse colligi quicquid mobilitas ac varietas humanae mentis in sensibus exquirendis per diversas causas potera invenire, - conclusit liberum ac voluntarium intellectum; nam quocumque se verterit, quascumque cogitatione intraverit, in aliquid eorum, quae praedicta sunt, necesse est ut humanum cadat ingenium»; Isidore, Etymologiae, II, XXX, 17-18, 12-22: «Memoriae quoque

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The presentation of the differences between loci dialectici and loci rhetorici reveals the underlying theoretical goal that animates the entire fourth book, i.e. the desire to demonstrate that rhetoric is completely contained within dialectic, since the same loci rhetorici are obtained from loci dialectici. The double combinations of the two divisions of loci dialectici with loci rhetorici therefore suggest a kind of generative relation such as that between genus and species, or between universal and particular54. Consequently, all the differences that are enumerated must be seen according to a kind of hierarchical criterion. The first difference is that the loci dialectici are used for both dialectical theses and for rhetorical hypotheses, while the loci rhetorici are valid only for rhetorical hypotheses. This is possible because the thesis is a universal matter, while the hypothesis is a particular matter, since it always refers to people and individual facts. As discussed, however, the particular for Boethius derives from and is contained within the universal, just as the species derives from and is contained within the genus. Although both the dialectician and the rhetorician can use the loci dialectici, they use them in different ways, in that the former uses the loci according to universal aims and outcomes, while the latter instead uses them for particular aims and outcomes. Inasmuch as science according to Aristotle always has to do with universals, it is understandable why Boethius makes an effort to trace the particular nature of the loci rhetorici back to the universal nature of the loci dialectici. In fact, in order to maintain the foundational function of dialectic concerning any scientific knowledge, it will be necessary for rhetoric also to have recourse to universal rules, but these are to be applied to particular cases and situations. condendum est Topica oratoribus, Dialecticis, poetis et iurisperitis communiter quidem argumenta praestare; sed quando aliquid specialiter probant, ad Rhetores, poetas, iurisperitosque pertinent; quando vero generaliter disputant, ad philosophos attinere manifestum est. Mirabile plane genus operis, in unum potuisse colligi, quidquid mobilitas ac varietas humanae mentis in sensibus exquirendis per diversas causas poterat invenire, conclusum liberum ac voluntarium intellectum. Nam quocumque se verterit, quascumque cogitationes intraverit, in aliquid eorum, quae praedicta sunt, necesse est cadat ingenium». 54 Cf. LEFF, «The Topics of Argumentative Invention», p. 40: «Rhetorical topics are subordinate, concrete instances of the purer forms of inference contained in dialectical theory».

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The second difference between loci dialectici and loci rhetorici is a consequence of the fact that the former have a universal ambitus, while the latter are obtained through the contractio of the ambitus of the loci dialectici. The true nature of a locus, therefore, is always and only universal; this true nature may, however, be subjected to a contractio if a locus is used in a practical discipline like rhetoric. For Boethius, in fact, rhetoric is a science to the extent that the instruments it uses for its investigations are universal loci, though again they are here applied to particular cases. On the other hand, not just rhetoric, but all sciences arise from dialectic, or rather from the loci dialectici; this has already been explained in the first book, where it is said that the rhetorician, as well as the philosopher and the sophist, should refer to the loci dialectici because in them are found the principles of their argumentations55. The dialectician, conversely, does not need to go back further once the principles are found because the loci dialectici are already the highest universal forms through which the mind can understand reality, for which reason they also become the very forms from which it is possible to argue. The rhetorician, however, in order to justify, or even simply to know thoroughly the principle on which he bases his argument, must go back beyond the argumentum rhetoricum, freeing the latter from the contractio to which it was restricted and restoring to it the universal ambitus that is its own. A third difference between the two kinds of loci is in the starting points from which the dialectician and the rhetorician begin. When the dialectician uses the locus a genere, his argumentation is based entirely on the nature of the genus, which is universal56; when a rhetorician argues starting from the genus, however, it is a matter of a particular genus relating to the persona or to the negotium that is discussed in the case. Thus, for example, a hypothesis that asks whether «X was drunk», where the aim to demonstrate that «X was not drunk», allows for an answer with the following enthymeme: Propositio: «X has never been dissolute» Conclusio: «then X has never even been drunk» Since drunkenness is defined as a certain kind of dissoluteness, where there is no dissoluteness, there cannot be drunkenness. Dissoluteness, 55 56

Cf. supra, Chap. 1, § 1.7. Cf. supra, Chap. 2, § 2.6.1.1 and Chap. 3, § 3.4.2.

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however, is the specific genus of drunkenness, and not the genus seen in a universal way, and for this reason the rhetorician must confirm his argumentum a genere by bringing it back to the locus a genere of the dialectician from which it arose, i.e. «unde enim genus abest, inde etiam species abesse necesse est, quoniam genus species non relinquit» («where the genus is absent, the species must also be absent, since the genus is inseparable from the species»)57. The dialectician thus obtains his locus directly from similarity, while the rhetorician obtains it from similar things, that is, from the thing itself that is characterised by similarity; mutatis mutandis, the same applies to contrariness, and contrary things, respectively. Finally, Boethius points out something very important here. The ratio dialectica that is the dialectical locus (in the example, the nature of a universal genus) is known in advance (ante praecognita) compared to the particular genus that is the purview of rhetoric. In this affirmation, gnoseological considerations seem to emerge; the fact 57

Stephen Gersh claims that Boethius in the De topicis differentiis presents four categories of loci: the maxima propositio and maximae differentia propositionis (in the second and third book), and the circumstantia and accident of a circumstantia in the fourth book. However, given the divergence between the loci dialectici and loci rhetorici that Boethius places in evidence, Gersh’s interpretation seems incorrect. Boethius states clearly that either the maxima propositio or the difference of maximae propositions may act as a function of a locus. The loci rhetorici appear rather to be the application of these loci, the nature of which is exclusively universal, in a particular area such as rhetoric, which means, as Boethius himself says, a contractio of the universal ambitus of the loci dialectici. Cf. De top. diff., II, III, 1-2, 1185A, p. 25, 8-11: «Locus namque est, ut M. Tullio placet, argumenti sedes. Cuius definitionis quae sit vis paucis absolvam. Argumenti enim sedes partim maxima propositio intellegi potest, partim propositionis maximae differentia». Cf. S. GERSH, «Dialectical and Rhetorical Space. The Boethian Theory of Topics and its Influence during the Early Middle Ages», in J. A. AERTSEN – A. SPEER (eds.), Raum und Raumvorstellungen im Mittelalter, De Gruyter, Berlin – New York 1997, [pp. 391-401], pp. 391-392: «Turning first to the more summary treatment in ‘De topicis differentiis’ we find that topic-place – in English one has to separate two components which are neatly fused in the Latin locus – can signify four things. In the first place, there is a ‘maximal proposition’ (propositio maxima) [...] i.e. a proposition which i. is self-evident and ii. can form the starting point of an argument. [...] A second type of topic is the ‘differentia of a maximal proposition’ (maximae differentia propositionis) [...] As a third category there is a ‘circumstance’ (circumstantia) [...] The fourth kind of topic is an ‘accident of a circumstance’ (accidere...circumstantia)».

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that the dialectical loci may be considered as the same principles of intelligibility that govern the acquisition of any form of knowledge in fact strengthens the hypothesis58. These principles are known in advance, not because they are a priori structures of the mind, but because they are first of all the very forms in which reality can be understood and thus be known; it is for this reason that they may play a role in dialectic and become loci. Finally, it is noteworthy that Boethius’s re-reading of rhetoric as a function of dialectic had already emerged in his works before the De topicis differentiis. Thus his commentary on Cicero’s Topica preserves an underlying theoretical impetus, and, although it is an almost exclusively rhetorical text, Boethius emphasizes its eminently dialectical value; moreover, with frequent reference to Aristotle, he corrects, broadens, and deepens many of Cicero’s theories, such as those of definitio, contraria, and causae59. On the other hand, it is in the De topicis differentiis that this process of the slow absorption of rhetoric into dialectic is brought to a definitive conclusion, wherein the list of Cicero’s loci in the Topica is presented in all respects as a list of loci dialectici; in the fourth book in particular, Boethius demonstrates how the loci rhetorici of the De inventione arise from the loci dialectici.

4.8 Conclusions about the fourth book Boethius concludes the fourth book, and with it the entire treatise, with the following considerations: Omnibus igitur, quae superius proposuimus, expeditis, illud arbitror apponendum, quod M. Tullius Topica, quae ad C. Trebatium peritum iuris edidit, non eo modo, quo de ipsis disputari possit, disseruit, sed quem ad modum rhetoricae facultatis argumenta ducerentur, quod in his commentariis diligentius expedivimus, qui a nobis in eiusdem Ciceronis Topica conscripti sunt. Quo autem modo de his dialecticis rationibus disputetur, in his commentariis 58

The specifically gnoseological aspect of the loci was emphasized above in the third chapter apropos of Boethius’ commentary on Cicero’s Topica. Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.4.3. 59 Cf. supra, Chap. 3, § 3.3.1, § 3.4.6 and § 3.4.9.

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quos in Aristotelis Topica a nobis translata conscripsimus, expeditum est60.

An important conclusion emerges from these affirmations: Boethius was certainly aware of the eminently rhetorical aim of Cicero’s Topica, so inconsistency arises, especially from the standpoint of his commentary, in which he endeavours to bring out the dialectical nature of Cicero’s loci. With the fourth book of De topicis differentiis, then, Boethius has posed and explained clearly the theoretical presuppositions that are the foundation of the definitive assimilation of rhetoric into dialectic. Although the fourth book at first may seem tangential to the aim of the work, it provides the key to interpreting the spirit of the whole enterprise. Since the ars inveniendi was a discipline very much in use in Roman legal culture, but one belonging exclusively to rhetoric, Boethius’s objective was to claim the ars inveniendi definitively for dialectic. In fact, given that the loci rhetorici derive ultimately from the loci dialectici, the first three books simply aim at revealing and educating Roman readers about the originally dialectical nature of Cicero’s loci rhetorici61. To accomplish this difficult operation, Boethius shows considerable originality in referring to the undisputed authority that was Aristotle, an authority who was for him even greater than Cicero62. However, the difficulties that he encountered 60

De top. diff., IV, XIII, 1-2, 1216CD, p. 92, 10-17. Cf. supra, Introd. Boethius’s attempt to theorize the derivation of the loci rhetorici from the loci dialectici is in direct contrast with Cicero’s attempt to unify them, which is one reason that Cicero was a source of inspiration for the humanists of the Renaissance period. Cf. LEFF, «The Topics of Argumentative Invention», p. 25: «Cicero’s attempt to unify, rather than merely conflate, the topics of rhetoric and dialectic, was to be a source of inspiration to the Renaissance humanist who sought and integrated theory of practical argument». 62 Cf. OBERTELLO, Severino Boezio, I, p. 562: «Il debito di Boezio verso i suoi predecessori, da Cicerone a Vittorino, è senza dubbio grande; non lo si deve tuttavia esagerare dal momento che, pur ispirandosi al loro esempio e alle loro opere, egli effettua nei loro confronti un rinnovamento radicale, svincolando la trattazione della dialettica da una subordinazione troppo strumentale alla retorica (quale si era progressivamente consolidata nella cultura latina) e riportandosi alle più significative fonti greche. L’importanza di questo ritorno alle origini, che implica un cambiamento di natura e di finalità anche concrete nella considerazione della dialettica, la si può valutare a pieno solo quando si consideri l’influsso degli scritti boeziani su tutto il Medioevo e oltre, sia per quel che riguarda le forme dell’insegnamento, sia gli orientamenti del pensiero filosofico». 61

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in this project were many, starting from the different underlying theoretical frameworks in which Aristotle contextualized his Topica, Cicero contextualized his own Topica, and Themistius contextualized his paraphrase, though we cannot know the extent to which Boethius was really aware of such difficulties63.

63 Scholars of rhetoric have not failed to emphasize the radical change that Boethius’s theory of rhetoric, completely contained again in dialectic, brought about. Cf. LEFF, «The Topics of Argumentative Invention», p. 40: «Boethius’ theory obviously revives the Aristotelian interest in topics as principles of inference, but it also overpowers the delicate balance Aristotle strikes between rhetorical and dialectical invention».

CONCLUSION

The absence of truly original thought from the work of Boethius remains one of the most durable commonplaces in all of philosophy. Scholars have rightly stressed the Neoplatonic background that animates Boethius’s entire philosophic universe, rediscovering from time to time the sources of his logical, ontological, or gnoseological thought. Nevertheless, on the basis of the sources that are available today, it seems undeniable that none of the Neoplatonists who are cited by scholars as Boethius’s probable sources - as much from the Alexandrian school as the Athenian - show any real interest in one of the texts that also formed part of the corpus of Aristotelian logic, namely the Topica. The great age of commentators produced numerous commentaries on the Categories, De interpretatione, and Prior and Posterior Analytics, in which is found the clear desire to assign to Aristotelian logic the propaedeutic role of an introduction to Platonic theology. To date, however, it has not yet been possible to find any commentary on Aristotle’s Topica from the “age of commentators”. On the other hand, given that Aristotelian dialectic proceeds from what is probable, it is quite likely that this propaedeutic function continued to remain for Neoplatonists the point of greatest distance from Aristotelian logic, and therefore the least acceptable. True knowledge, for a Neoplatonist, is, in fact, guaranteed by the possibility that man may ascend to the contemplation of divine examples through pre-existing forms in his rational soul, namely the innate ideas. The Aristotelian abstraction of the immanent forms that begins with induction simply plays the role of initiating the process of reminiscence. This process is in turn carried through to implementation by means of the innate ideas, reproducing in the rational soul the first intelligible things, or those transcendent ideas that reside in the divine mind. Yet there is found in the fundamental cultural operation of reorganizing the entire logical material of antiquity that was realized by the Neoplatonist Boethius the clear desire not only to rehabilitate the dialectical force of the discipline of topica, but also to restore to it the centrality that it possessed for the entirety of a system that could authentically be called Aristotelian. The changes that Aristotle’s Topica underwent in the course of transmission were numerous and profound, the most important of which has been referred to by scholars as a process of «axiomatization»,

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FIORELLA MAGNANO

to which Boethius himself bears witness. In this respect, Themistius was undoubtedly the main figure in transmitting the «axiomatic topics» that influenced both the Greek tradition of the topica and the Latin and Arab traditions: they bear witness to the close similarity of Cicero’s list of places («loci») to Themistius’s (the same similarity that must have led Boethius to try to demonstrate their identity), as does the continued interest of Averroes and the space that the latter reserved in his commentary on the Topica for Themistius’s topica. On the other hand, the discipline of topica already existed in the Latin tradition thanks to Cicero, but this art now became almost entirely divorced from its original dialectical nature, emerging as a discipline devoted to rhetoric called by the name of ars inveniendi. To Boethius, therefore, fell the delicate task of showing the possible path to reconciling Themistius’s topica, characterized by Aristotelian ancestry and an eminently dialectical force, with the topica of Cicero, which belong essentially to the realm of rhetoric. This could not happen, however, without at the same time giving rise to something new. It was, in fact, inevitable not only that two separate teachings be transmitted, but also that Boethius demonstrate originality in synthesizing them in the treatise he entitled De topicis differentiis. This discussion takes up the fourth book of the treatise, which is entirely dedicated to rhetoric and to the rhetorical loci, and it is this book in which it is possible to discover the greatest degree of originality in the entire work. Deeply convinced of the need to reclaim for dialectic the original status of the Topica, Boethius comes, in fact, to demonstrate how the loci rhetorici arise from the loci dialectici, since the entirety of rhetoric is certainly contained within dialectic. In Boethius’s system, the two disciplines are, in fact, in the same relationship as genus and species, as universal and particular, and the Roman philosopher has established theoretically the direction in which, together with dialectic, rhetoric must look to achieve its aim: the search for Truth.

APPENDIX Diagram no. 1 (cf. p. XXVII) (1a) the opinion shared by all people (1b) the opinion shared by the majority of people (2a) the opinion shared by all the wise (2b) the opinion of the majority of the wise (2c) the opinion of the most famous wise men

(3) the opinion of the experts on the subject

Diagram no. 2 (cf. p. XXXIX) INSTRUCTION

(FIRST PART) EXAMPLE

INSTRUCTION

(SECOND PART) LOGICAL LAW EXAMPLE DEMONSTRATIVE PURPOSE LOGICAL LAW EXAMPLE LOGICAL LAW EXAMPLE DEMONSTRATIVE PURPOSE LOGICAL LAW LOGICAL LAW

In order to prove that contrary attributes belong to the same thing, look at its genus. If we want to prove that rightness and wrongness are possible in regard to perception: to perceive is to judge, and it is possible to judge rightly or wrongly; thus in regard to perception as well rightness and wrongness must be possible. In the present instance the demonstration proceeds from the genus and relates to the species; for judging is the genus of perceiving; for the man who perceives judges in a certain way. for all the attributes that belong to the species belong to the genus as well; e.g. if there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good disposition; for disposition is the genus of knowledge. Now the former commonplace argument is false for purposes of establishing a view, while the second is true For there is no necessity that all the attributes that belong to the genus should belong also to the species; for animal is winged and quadruped, but not so man. All the attributes, on the other hand, that belong to the species must of necessity belong also to the genus for if man is good, then animal also is good. On the other hand, for purposes of overthrowing a view, the former argument is true while the latter is false for all the attributes which do not belong to the genus do not belong to the species either; whereas all those that are wanting to the species are not of necessity wanting to the genus

326

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 3 (cf. p. XL)

FROM THE GENUS TO THE SPECIES

CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSE

DESTRUCTIVE PURPOSE

FALSE:

that which belongs to the species belongs also to the genus that which does not belong to the species does not belong to the genus either TRUE:

TRUE: that which does not belong to the species does not belong to the genus either FALSE: that which belongs to the species belongs also to the genus

FROM THE SPECIES TO THE GENUS

CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSE

DESTRUCTIVE PURPOSE

TRUE:

that which belongs to the species belongs also to the genus that which does not belong to the species does not belong to the genus either FALSE:

FALSE: that which does not belong to the species does not belong to the genus either TRUE: that which belongs to the species belongs also to the genus

Diagram no. 4 (cf. p. XLVIII) MAXIMA PROPOSITIO

That things whose definitions are different

are themselves also different

ARGUMENTATIO

Maior propositio: an envious man is one who disparages the good of others

Minor propositio: a wise man does not disparage the good of others

Conclusio: therefore, an envious man is not wise

APPENDIX

327

Diagram no. 5 (cf. p. LV) MAXIMAE PROPOSITIONES «Cui generis definitio non convenit, id eius cuius ea definitio est species A definitione non est» De top. diff., II, V, 5, 1187A, p. 29, 18-19. «Cuius enim definitio vel descriptio ei quod dicitur species esse non A descriptione convenit, id eius quod esse species perhibetur genus non est» Ivi, II, VI, 5, 1187D, p. 31, 3-5 «Quae generi adsunt, et speciei» A genere Ivi, II, VII, 7, 1188BC, p. 32, 15-16. «Quod toti convenit, id conveniat etiam parti» Ab integro Ivi, II, VII, 8, 1188C, p. 32, 20. «Quod enim singulis partibus inest, idem toti inesse necesse est» A generis speciebus Ivi, II, VII, 10, 1188D, p. 33, 11-12. «Quorum efficientes causae naturales sunt, ipsa quoque sunt naturalia» Ab efficientibus Ivi, II, VII, 23, 1189C, p. 35, 9-10. «Ubi materia deest, et quod ex materia efficitur desit» A materia Ivi, II, VII, 24, 1189D, p. 35, 13-14. «Cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est» A fine Ivi, II, VII, 25, 1189D, p. 35, 20-21. «Tantum quemque posse, quantum forma permisit» A forma Ivi, II, VII, 26, 1189D, p. 35, 20-21. «cuius effectio bona est, ipsum quoque bonum est» A generationibus Ivi, II, VII, 28, 1190A, p. 36, 11-12. «cuius corruptio mala est, ipsum quoque bonum est» A corruptionibus Ivi, II, VII, 28, 1190AB, p. 36, 12-13. «cuius usus bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est» Ab usibus Ivi, II, VII, 28, 1190B, p. 36, 14-15. «cui non inest aliquid, ei nec illud quidem, quod eius est consequens inesse A communiter potest» accidentibus: Ivi, II, VII, 29, 1190B, p. 37, 3-4. «quod omnibus vel pluribus vel doctis videtur hominibus, ei contradici non A rei iudicio oportere» Ivi, II, VIII, 3, 1190C, p. 37, 14-15. «si quod similiter inest non est proprium, ne id quidem de quo quaeritur A similibus esse proprium potest» Ivi, II, VIII, 4, 1190D, p. 37, 19-20. «si id quod magis inesse videbitur non inest, nec id quidem quod minus Ab eo quod est magis inesse videbitur inerit» Ivi, II, XI, 3, 1194D, p. 46, 21-47, 1. «si id quod minus videtur inesse inest, et id quod magis videbitur inesse Ab eo quod est minus inerit» Ivi, II, VIII, 7, 1191A, p. 38, 16-17. «quod in unaquaque re evenit, id in eius proportionali evenire necesse est» A proportione Ivi, II, VIII, 9, 1191A, p. 39, 9-10. «contrariis contraria conveniunt» Ex contrario Ivi, II, VIII, 13, 1191C, p. 39, 18-19. Ab oppositis secundum «ubi privatio adesse potest, habitus proprium non est» habitum et privationem Ivi, II, VIII, 14, 1191CD, p. 40, 5-6 . «oppositorum ad se relativorum propria et ipsa ad se referuntur» A relativis oppositis Ivi, II, VIII, 15, 1191D, p. 40, 10-11. Ab oppositis secundum «oppositorum opposita esse propria oportere» affirmationem ac Ivi, II, VIII, 16, 1191D, p. 40, 13-15. negationem

328

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 6 (cf. p. LV) THEMISTII DIVISIO LOCORUM LOCI QUI AB TERMINORUM SUBSTANTIA DUCUNTUR

LOCI QUI IN QUAESTIONE SUNT POSITI

LOCI QUI AB TERMINORUM SUBSTANTIA CONSEQUUNTUR

LOCI QUI ASSUMUNTUR EXTRINSECUS

LOCI MEDII

A definitione A descriptione A nominis interpretatione A toto (vel genere vel integro) A partibus (vel generis vel integri) A causis (vel efficientibus vel materia vel fine vel forma) A generationibus (id est ab effectibus) A corruptionibus Ab usibus A communiter accidentibus

A rei iudicio A similibus (vel in qualitate vel in quantitate) A maiore A minore Ab oppositis (vel contrariis vel relativis vel secundum privationem et habitum vel secundum affirmationem et negationem) A proportione A transumptione A casu A coniugatis A divisione

APPENDIX

329

Diagram no. 7a (cf. p. LXII) ATTRIBUTA

EX PERSONIS

Nomen Natura Victum Fortuna Habitus Affectio Studium Consilium Facta Casus Orationes

CONTINENTIA CUM IPSO NEGOTIO

EX NEGOTII

IN GESTIONE NEGOTII

ADIUNCTA NEGOTIO

QUAE NEGOTIO CONSEQUUNTUR

(CONSECUTIO)

Brevis conplexio Causa Ante gesta rem In ipso gerendo negotio quid actum sit Quid postea factum sit Locus Tempus Modus Occasio Facultas Maius magnum Minus magnum Aeque magnum Simile Contrarium Disparatum Genus Pars Eventus Quo id nomine appellari conveniat Qui sunt principes et inventores, qui denique auctoritatis eius et inventionis comprobatores atque aemuli Quae eius rei sit lex, consuetudo, pactio, iudicium, scientia, artificium Si natura eius evenire vulgo soleat an insolenter et raro Utrum homines id sua auctoritate comprobare an offendere in his consueverint

330

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 7b (cf. p. LXVI) CICERONIS DIVISIO LOCORUM

a toto a partibus a nota

In ipso

Loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur

Ab his quae sunt affecta ad ea de quibus quaeritur

a coniugatis a genere a forma a similitudine a differentia a contrario ab adiunctiis ab antecedentibus a consequentibus a repugnantibus a causis ab effectis a comparatione maiorum vel minorum vel parium

Loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus

a rei iudicio

Diagram no. 8 (cf. p. LXVII) MAIOR PROPOSITIO SOGGETTO

PREDICATO (DEFINITIO)

The civil law is

equity put in place for the benefit of those who are (citizens) of the same state, for the purpose of securing the possession of what is theirs MINOR PROPOSITIO

SOGGETTO (DEFINITIO)

PREDICATO

But this equity

is useful CONCLUSIO

SOGGETTO

PREDICATO

Therefore, the civil law

is useful

APPENDIX

331

Diagram no. 9 (cf. p. LXXIII) MAXIMAE PROPOSITIONES (In Top.) «quae diuturniora sunt bona, meliora esse his quae sunt temporis brevitate constricta» «quorum diversae sunt definitiones, diversas esse substantias necesse est» In Top., I, 1052A.

A definitione

«quibus aliquorum diffinitio iungitur, eisdem necessario ea que diffiniuntur aptantur» Ivi, I, 1060AB.

A partium enumeratione A notatione A coniugata

«cuius partium nihil rei propositae copulatum est, ei ne totum quidem esse potest coniunctum» Ivi, I, 1061D.

«interpretationem nomina idem valere quod nomen» Ivi, I, 1063A.

«coniugatorum in eo quod coniugata sunt, unam atque eamdem esse naturam, vel sic, cui convenit aliquid, huic etiam coniugatum eius posse sociari» Ivi, II, 1069B.

A genere A forma A similitudine A differentia A contrario Ab adiunctis Ab antecedentibus A consequentibus A repugnantibus A causis Ab effectis A comparatione maiorum A comparatione minorum A comparatione parium

«cui convenit omne genus, eidem unamquamque speciem convenire»; Ivi, II,1070B.

«quod de una specie dicitur, id in alteram non convenire» Ivi, II, 1071D.

«similibus rebus eadem convenire» Ivi, II, 1072C.

«de rebus plurimum differentibus, idem intellegi non posse» Ivi, II, 1073B.

«quod alicui convenit, id eius contrario non convenire» Ivi, II, 1074A.

«ex adiunctis adiuncta perpendi» Ivi, II, 1075B.

«ubi est antecedens, ibi erit et consequens» Ivi, II, 1076C.

«ubi consequens non est, ibi ne antecedens quidem esse potest» Ivi, II, 1077D.

«repugnantia convenire non posse» Ivi, II, 1078C.

«unamquamque rem ex causis spectari oportere» Ivi, II, 1079B.

«causas ab effectis suis non separari» Ivi, II, 1080B.

«quod in re maiori valet, valeat in minori»; Ivi, II, 1080D.

«quod enim in re minori vale, valeat in maiori» Ivi, II, 1081A.

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APPENDIX

Diagram no. 10 (cf. p. LXXIII) MAXIMAE PROPOSITIONES (De Top. diff.) A definitione A partibus totum coniungentibus vel dividentibus A notatione A coniugatis A genere A forma A similitudine A differentia A contrariis

«unde definitio abest, inde illud quoque abesse quod definitur» De top. diff., III, III, 3, 1196D, p. 50, 16-18.

«a quibus partes absunt, totum quoque abesse» Ivi, III, III, 5, 1197A, p. 51, 8-9.

«nominis interpretatione rem declarari» Ivi, III, III, 7, 1197B, p. 51, 20-21.

«coniugatorum eandem esse naturam» Ivi, III, III, 7, 1197B, p. 52, 4.

«quorum diversa sunt genera, ipsa quoque esse diversa» Ivi, III, III, 11, 1197C, p. 52, 9-10.

«in formis spectari generum proprietates» Ivi, III, III, 13, 1197C, p. 52, 16-17.

«de similibus idem est iudicium» Ivi, III, III, 15, 1197D, p. 53, 5-6.

«differentium rerum non idem esse iudicium» Ivi, III, III, 16, 1197D, p. 53, 9-10.

«in adversis, privantibus et negantibus contraria sibi convenire non posse, in relativis absque se esse non posse» Ivi, III, III, 18, 1198A, p. 53, 18-19.

Ab adiunctis Ab antecedentibus et a consequentibus A repugnantibus Ab efficientibus causis Ab effectis A maioris A minoris A paria

«ex adiunctis adiuncta perpendi» Ivi, III, III, 21, 1198B, p. 54, 14-15.

«posito antecedenti comitari quod subsequitur, perempto consequente perimi quod antecedit» Ivi, III, III, 26, 1198D, p. 55, 17-18.

«repugnantia sibi convenire non posse» Ivi, III, III, 27, 1199A, p. 56, 2-3.

«ubi causa est, inde effectum abesse non posse» Ivi, III, III, 29, 1199A, p. 56, 8.

«ubi effectus est, causam abesse non posse» Ivi, III, III, 31, 1199B, p. 56, 11-12.

«quod in re maiore valet, valeat in minore» Ivi, III, III, 33, 1199B, p. 56, 17-18.

«quod in re minore valet, valeat in maiore» Ivi, III, III, 35, 1199C p. 56, 4-5.

«rerum parium idem esse iudicium» Ivi, III, III, 37, 1199C, p. 57, 9.

APPENDIX

333

Diagram no. 11 (cf. p. LXXIV) CICERO

THEMISTIUS

locus (argumenti sedes)

differentia (locus)

argumentum maxima propositio (locus) argumentatio

argumentatio

Diagram no. 12 (cf. p. LXXVIII) logik» (ARISTOTELES) DEFINITIO

PARTITIO

COLLECTIO

DISCIPLINA

(demonstratio) argumentationes verae ac necessariae DIALECTICA

argumentationes verisimiles vel probabiles [in qua dialecticam aristoteles vocat facultatem per probabilia colligendi] SOPHISTICA

cavillatoria argumentationes falsae

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APPENDIX

Diagram no. 13 (cf. p. LXXXI) MATERIA INVENTIONIS GENUS

(MATERIA DISSERENDI)

GENUS

+ FORMAE INVENTIONIS QUAE SUPERVENIUNT NECESSITAS DIFFERENTIAE

DIFFERENTIAE

PROBABILITAS CAVILLATIO

= INVENTIO DIFFINITIVA

GENUS

+ DIFFERENTIAE

INVENTIO DIVISIBILIS

GENUS

+ DIFFERENTIAE

(INVENTIO COLLECTIVA) ARGUMENTUM PROBABILE ARGUMENTUM NECESSARIUM ARGUMENTUM SOPHISTICUM

INVENTIO= MATERIA IUDICII INVENTIO DIFFINITIVA

INVENTIO DIVISIBILIS

(INVENTIO COLLECTIVA)

MATERIA IUDICII + (FORMAE IUDICII) RECTA DEFINITIO

RECTA PARTITIO

(RECTA ARGUMENTATIO)

= IUDICIUM = ARS IUDICANDI DEFINITIO

PARTITIO-DIVISIO

COLLECTIO

ARGUMENTATIO PROBABILIS ARGUMENTATIO NECESSARIA ARGUMENTATIO SOPHISTICA

APPENDIX

335

Diagram no. 14 (cf. p. XC) PARS INVENIENDI

TOPICE De inventionis collocatione

ANALYTICE PRIOR De iunctura propositionis

RATIO DISSERENDI

ANALYTICE POSTERIOR De discernendis necessariis argumentis

PARS IUDICANDI ANALYTICE De ipsa inventione

DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS De discernendis falsis atque cavillatoris argumentis

Diagram no. 15 (cf. p. 49) ANTECEDENS

CONSEQUENS

ESEMPI

Species

Genus

«si homo est, animal est»

Species

Differentia

«si homo est, rationale est»

Species

Definitio

«si homo est, animal rationale mortale est»

Species

Proprium

«si homo est, risibile est»

Species

Inseparabilis accidens

«si Aethiops est, niger est»

Proprium

Species

«si risibile est, homo est»

Definitio

Species

«si animal rationale mortale est, homo est»

Proprium

Differentia

«si risibilis est, rationalis est»

Proprium

Definitio

Definitio

Proprium

Definitio

Differentia

«si animal rationale mortale est, bipes est»

Accidentia

Subiectum

«si album est, corpus est»

«si risibile est, animal rationale mortale est» «si animal rationale mortale est, risibile est»

336

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 16 (cf. p. 70)

ARGUMENTUM

ARGUMENTUM

PROBABILE AC NECESSARIUM

PROBABILE AC NON NECESSARIUM

ARGUMENTUM

ARGUMENTUM NECESSARIUM AC NON PROBABILE

NON NECESSARIUM AC NON PROBABILE

Diagram no. 17 (cf. p. 76) Dialecticus

Argumentum probabile ac necessarium Argumentum probabile ac non necessarium

Orator

Argumentum probabile ac necessarium Argumentum probabile ac non necessarium

Philosophus

Argumentum necessarium ac non probabile Argumentum necessarium ac probabile

Sophista

Argumentum non necessarium ac non probabile

Diagram no. 18 (cf. p. 110) MAXIMA PROPOSITIO

That things whose definitions are different

are themselves also different

ARGUMENTATIO

Maior propositio: an envious man is one who disparages the good of others

Minor propositio: a wise man does not disparage the good of others

Conclusio: therefore, an envious man is not wise

APPENDIX

337

Diagram no. 19 (cf. p. 128) Quaestio (de genere)

Are the trees animals or not ?

Dubia propositio

A tree is not an animal

Differentia

A definitione

Maxima propositio

that to which the definition of the genus does not belong

is not a species of the genus defined

Maior propositio: An animal is an animate substance capable of perceiving Argumentatio Minor propositio: A tree is not an animate substance capable of Conclusio: therefore, a tree perceiving; is not an animal

Diagram no. 20 (cf. p. 133) Quaestio (de genere)

Is whiteness a substance or not?

Dubia propositio

Whiteness is not a substance

Differentia

A descriptione

Maxima propositio

Argumentatio

That whose definition or description does not belong to what is called [its] species

is not the genus of that which is asserted to be [its] species

Maior propositio: Substance is that which can be the-subject for any accident Minor propositio: Whiteness is the Conclusio: therefore, subject for no accident whiteness is not a substance

338

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 21 (cf. p. 134)

Quaestio

Should philosophy be pursued or not?

Dubia propositio

Philosophy should be pursued

Differentia

A nominis interpretatione

Maxima propositio Maior propositio: Philosophy is the love of wisdom Argumentatio Minor propositio: no one doubts that Conclusio: therefore, philosophy this should be pursued should be pursued

Diagram no. 22 (cf. p. 137) Quaestio (de accidente)

Is justice advantageous or not?

Dubia propositio

Justice is advantageous

Differentia

A genere

Maxima propositio

Argumentatio

things that are present in the genus

[are present] also in the species

Maior propositio: Every virtue is advantageous Minor propositio: Justice is a virtue

Conclusio: therefore, justice is advantageous

APPENDIX

339

Diagram no. 23 (cf. p. 139) Quaestio (de accidente)

Are human affairs ruled by providence or not?

Dubia propositio

Human affairs are ruled by providence

Differentia

A toto (id est ab integro)

Maxima propositio

what suits the whole

fits the part also

Maior propositio: The world is ruled by providence Argumentatio Minor propositio: but men are Conclusio: therefore, human affairs part of the world are ruled by providence

Diagram no. 24 (cf. p. 142) Quaestio (de definitione)

Is the virtue the habit of a well-ordered mind or not?

Dubia propositio

The virtue is the habit of a well-ordered mind

Differentia

A generis speciebus

Maxima propositio

Argumentatio

what inheres in the individual parts

must inhere in the whole

Maior propositio: Justice, courage, temperance, and prudence are habits of a wellordered mind Minor propositio: but these four are put under virtue as [their] Conclusio: therefore, virtue is the genus habit of a well-ordered mind

340

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 25 (cf. p. 142) Quaestio (de accidente)

Is the art of medicine advantageous or not?

Dubia propositio

The art of medicine is advantageous

Differentia

Ab integri partibus

Maxima propositio

If something inheres in the individual parts Maior propositio: If it is advantageous to drive out disease and minister to health and heal wounds

it must inhere in the whole

then the art of medicine is advantageous

Argumentatio Minor propositio: but to drive out disease, minister to health, and heal wounds is advantageous Conclusio: therefore, the art of medicine is advantageous

Diagram no. 26 (cf. p. 143) Quaestio (de accidente)

Has this man been set free or not?

Dubia propositio

This man has been set free

Differentia

Ab una generis specie

Maxima propositio

If something inheres in a single species

it must inhere in the whole genus

Maior propositio: If this man has been emancipated by [enrollment in] the census, by a will, or by the manumission staff

he has been set free

Argumentatio Minor propositio: but this man has been emancipated by [enrollment in] the census, by a will, or by the manumission staff Conclusio: therefore, he has been set free

APPENDIX

341

Diagram no. 27 (cf. p. 144) Quaestio

Is what is seen from afar a house or not?

Dubia propositio

What is seen from afar is a house

Differentia

Ab una integri parte

Maxima propositio

what is not inherent in the individual parts

must not be inherent in the whole

Maior propositio: A house must have a roof or walls or a foundation Argumentatio Minor propositio: but what is seen Conclusio: therefore, what is seen from afar has not a roof from afar is a house

Diagram no. 28 (cf. p. 148) Quaestio (de accidente)

Is justice natural or not?

Dubia propositio

Justice is natural

Differentia

Ab efficentibus causis

Maxima propositio

Those things whose efficient causes are natural

are themselves also natural

Maior propositio: the community of men is natural Argumentatio Minor propositio: the community of Conclusio: therefore, justice is men produced justice natural

342

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 29 (cf. p. 149) Quaestio (de accidente)

Do the Moors have weapons or not?

Dubia propositio

The Moors do not have weapons

Differentia

A materia

Maxima propositio

what is made from the matter is also lacking

Where the matter is lacking

Maior propositio: The Moors lack iron Argumentatio Minor propositio: The iron is the Conclusio: therefore, the Moors do matter for the weapons not have weapons

Diagram no. 30 (cf. p. 150) Quaestio (de genere)

Is justice good or not?

Dubia propositio

Justice is good

Differentia

A fine

Maxima propositio

that whose end is good

is itself also good

Maior propositio: To be happy is good Argumentatio

Minor propositio: but the end of justice is that who lives according Conclusio: therefore, justice is to justice be brought to happiness. good

APPENDIX

343

Diagram no. 31 (cf. p. 150) Quaestio (de proprio)

Could Dedalus fly or not?

Dubia propositio

Daedalus could not fly

Differentia

A forma

Maxima propositio

A thing was capable only

of what its natural form allowed

Maior propositio: Dedalus had not the wings in his natural form Argumentatio

Minor propositio: but to have the wings in its natural form allows to Conclusio: therefore, fly could not fly

Daedalus

Diagram no. 32 (cf. p. 152)

Quaestio

Is building a house good or not?

Dubia propositio

Building a house is good

Differentia

Ab effectibus

Maxima propositio

that whose production is good

is itself also good

If a house is good

building a house is also good

But a house is good

therefore, building a house is also good

Argumentatio

344

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 33 (cf. p. 152)

Quaestio

Is a house good or not?

Dubia propositio

A house is good

Differentia

A corruptionibus

Maxima propositio

that whose destruction is bad

is itself also good

if demolition of a house is bad

a house is good

But demolition of a house is bad

therefore, a house is good

Argumentatio

Diagram no. 34 (cf. p. 153)

Quaestio

Is a horse good or not?

Dubia propositio

A horse is good

Differentia

Ab usibus

Maxima propositio

that whose use is good

is itself also good

If riding is good

a horse is good

But riding is good

therefore, a horse is good

Argumentatio

APPENDIX

345

Diagram no. 35 (cf. p. 153) Quaestio (de accidente)

Does repentance suit the wise, or not?

Dubia propositio

Repentance does not suit the wise

Differentia

A communiter accidentibus

Maxima propositio

that in which something is not inherent

neither that which is its consequence can be inherent in it

Maior propositio: Repentance does suit an evil action Argumentatio Minor propositio: but an evil Conclusio: therefore, repentance does action does not suit the wise not suit the wise

Diagram no. 36 (cf. p. 155) Quaestio (de accidente)

Is the heaven revolvable, or not?

Dubia propositio

the heaven is revolvable

Differentia

A rei iudicio

Maxima propositio

what seems true to everyone or the many or the wise should not be gainsaid Maior propositio: things are as they are judged to be either by all people or most people, and also either by the wise or those deeply learned in any one of the arts

Argumentatio

Minor propositio: those who are wise and very learned astronomers have judged that the heaven is revolvable Conclusio: therefore, the heaven is revolvable

346

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 37 (cf. p. 157) Quaestio (de proprio)

Is being two-footed a property of man or not?

Dubia propositio

Being two-footed is not a property of man

Differentia

A similibus

Maxima propositio

Argumentatio

if something inheres in a way similar [to the thing asked about] and is not a property

neither can the thing asked about be a property

Maior propositio: as in a horse inheres being four-footed, so too in a man inheres being two-footed Conclusio: therefore, being twoMinor propositio: but being fourfooted is property of man footed is not a property of the horse

Diagram no. 38 (cf. p. 158) Quaestio (de definitione)

Is the definition of animal that which can move by itself or not?

Dubia propositio

that which can move by itself is not the definition of animal

Differentia

Ab eo quod magis est

Maxima propositio

if what seems the more to inhere does not inhere

neither will that inhere which seems the less to inhere.

Maior propositio: That which by nature lives is more appropriate as the definition of animal than that Conclusio: therefore, what seems which can move by itself. Argumentatio to be even less the definition—that Minor propositio: But that which which can move by itself—ought by nature lives is not the definition not to be thought the definition of animal either. of animal

APPENDIX

347

Diagram no. 39 (cf. p. 159) Quaestio (de definitione)

Is rational mortal animal the definition of man or not?

Dubia propositio

Rational mortal animal is the definition of man

Differentia

Ab eo quod minus est

Maxima propositio

if what seems the less to inhere inheres

then what seems the more to inhere will inhere

If two-footed animal capable of walking is the definition of man

then the definition of man will be [also] mortal rational animal.

but two-footed animal capable of walking is the definition of man

therefore, the definition of man will be [also] mortal rational animal.

Argumentatio

Diagram no. 40 (cf. p. 160) Quaestio (de accidente)

Should the rulers of cities be chosen by lot or not?

Dubia propositio

The rulers of cities should not be chosen by lot

Differentia

A proportione

Maxima propositio

what occurs in one thing

must occur also in what is proportional to that thing

Maior propositio: In the ships a helmsman is not appointed by lot Argumentatio

Conclusio: therefore, neither in Minor propositio: but a helmsman is the cities the rulers should be related to a ship as a ruler to a city chosen by lot

348

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 41 (cf. p. 165) Quaestio (de proprio)

Is being praised a property of virtue or not?

Dubia propositio

Being praised is not a property of virtue

Differentia

Ex contrario

Maxima propositio

Argumentatio

Contraries

are suited to contraries

Maior propositio: Being blamed is contrary to being praised as the vice is contrary to the virtue Conclusio: therefore, neither being Minor propositio: but being blamed praised is a property of virtue is not a property of the vice

Diagram no. 42 (cf. p. 166) Quaestio (de proprio)

Is seeing a property of those having eyes o not?

Dubia propositio

Seeing is not a property of those having eyes

Differentia

Ab oppositis secundum habitum et privationem

Maxima propositio

where the privation can be present

the possession is not a property

Maior propositio: The view is the possession of which blindness is the privation Argumentatio Minor propositio: but the blindness Conclusio: therefore, seeing is not is not a property of those not having a property of those having eyes eyes

APPENDIX

349

Diagram no. 43 (cf. p. 167) Quaestio (de proprio)

Is being procreator a property of a father or not?

Dubia propositio

Being procreator is a property of a father

Differentia

A relativis oppositis

Maxima propositio

Argumentatio

properties of opposites which are related to each other Maior propositio: A father is related to his son as being procreator to being procreated Minor propositio: but being procreated is a property of a son

are themselves also related to each other

Conclusio: therefore, being procreator is a property of a father

Diagram no. 44 (cf. p. 168) Quaestio (de proprio)

Is being moved a property of animal or not?

Dubia propositio

Being moved is not a property of animal

Differentia

Ab oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem

Maxima propositio

Argumentatio

The properties of opposites

must be opposites

Maior propositio: Being moved is opposite to not being moved, as animal is opposite to what is inanimate Conclusio: therefore, neither Minor propositio: but not being being moved is a property of moved is not a property of what is animal inanimate

350

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 45 (cf. p. 175) Quaestio

Does or does not time have a beginning?

Dubia propositio

Time does not have a beginning

Differentia

A divisione

Maxima propositio Maior propositio: Time does or does not have a beginning Minor propositio: but the world is eternal and the world could not Conclusio: therefore, time is also eternal Argumentationes exist without time Maior propositio: time is eternal Minor propositio: but what is Conclusio: therefore, time does eternal does not have a beginning not have a beginning

Diagram no. 46 (cf. p. 176) Quaestio

Does or does not time have a beginning?

Dubia propositio

Time does not have a beginning

Differentia

A divisione

Maxima propositio Maior propositio: Time does or does not have a beginning Argumentatio

Conclusio: therefore, there was a Minor propositio: but if time has a time when time was not. beginning, it was not always

APPENDIX

351

Diagram no. 47 (cf. p. 178)

Quaestio

Is a dog a substance or not?

Dubia propositio

A dog is a substance

Differentia

A divisione

Maxima propositio Maior propositio: Dog is the name of an animal capable of barking or a marine animal or a celestial star Argumentatio

Minor propositio: but an animal capable of barking is a substance and a marine animal and a star can Conclusio: therefore, a dog is a be put under substance substance

Diagram no. 48 (cf. p. 201) Quaestio (de genere)

Are trees animals or not?

Dubia propositio

Trees are animals

Differentia

A definitione

Maxima propositio

where the definition is lacking

what is defined is also lacking

Maior propositio: An animal is a sensitive animated substance Argumentatio Minor propositio: but a tree is not Conclusio: therefore, trees are not a sensitive animated substance animals

352

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 49 (cf. p. 205) Quaestio (de genere)

Is the soul corporeal or not?

Dubia propositio

The soul is corporeal

Differentia

A partibus

Maxima propositio

where the parts are lacking

the whole is also lacking

Maior propositio: The soul manifests [itself as] vegetative, perceptive, or intellective Argumentatio Minor propositio: but to be Conclusio: therefore, the alive (vege-tare), perceive, or corporeal understand is not corporeal

soul is

Diagram no. 50 (cf. p. 205) Quaestio (de accidente)

Does the soul moves spatially or not?

Dubia propositio

The soul does not moves spatially

Differentia

A partibus totum dividentibus

Maxima propositio

where the parts are lacking

the whole is also lacking

Maior propositio: There are three species of spatial motion: increase, decrease, and change Argumentatio

Minor propositio: but the soul does not increase or decrease, Conclusio: therefore, the soul does nor does it go from one place to not move another

APPENDIX

353

Diagram no. 51 (cf. p. 206) Questio (de genere)

Is philosophy good or not?

Dubia propositio

Philosophy is good

Differentia

A notatione

Maxima propositio

A thing is clarified

by the explanation of its name

Maior propositio: Philosophy is the love of wisdom Argumentatio Minor propositio: but the love of wisdom is good

Conclusio: therefore, philosophy is good

Diagram no. 52 (cf. p. 211)

Quaestio

To laugh is to rejoice or not?

Dubia propositio

To laugh is to rejoice

Differentia

A coniugatis

Maxima propositio

the nature of conjugates

is the same

Maior propositio: If laughter is joy, to laugh is also to rejoice Argumentatio Minor propositio: but laughter is Conclusio: therefore, to laugh is to joy rejoice

354

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 53 (cf. p. 213) Quaestio (de definitione)

Is a soul a measure (numerus) moving itself or not?

Dubia propositio

The soul is not a measure (numerus) moving itself

Differentia

A genere

Maxima propositio

things whose genera are different Maior propositio: substance

Soul

is

are themselves also different

a

Argumentatio Minor propositio: but a measure is Conclusio: therefore, a soul is not a not a substance measure (numerus)

Diagram no. 54 (cf. p. 219) Quaestio (de genere)

Is the color in a subject or not?

Dubia propositio

The color is in a subject

Differentia

A forma

Maxima propositio

The attributes (proprietates) of genera

are observed in [their] kinds

Maior propositio: White or black are species of the genus ‘color’ Argumentatio Minor propositio: but white or Conclusio: therefore, the color is in black are in a subject a subject

APPENDIX

355

Diagram no. 55 (cf. p. 221) Quaestio (de accidente)

Should a magistrate be acquired by choice, or not?

Dubia propositio

A magistrate should be acquired by choice

Differentia

A similitudo

Maxima propositio

the judgment of similar things

is the same

Maior propositio: A ship is similar to a state as a helmsman to a magistrate. Argumentatio Minor propositio: but for a ship a Conclusio: therefore, a magistrate skilled ruler is selected not by choice should be acquired by choice

Diagram no. 56 (cf. p. 225) Quaestio (de definitione)

Is a king the same as a tyrant or not?

Dubia propositio

A king is not the same as a tyrant

Differentia

A differentia

Maxima propositio

the judgment of different things

is not the same

Maior propositio: a king there is devotion, mercy and justice Argumentatio

Conclusio: therefore, a king is Minor propositio: but in a tyrant there not the same as a tyrant is not devotion, mercy and justice

a definitione

Cf. De top. diff., III, VI, 20, 1202B, p. 62.

a nominis interpretatione

a transumptione

a proportione

a minore a partibus: ab oppositis: vel contrariis vel relativis vel secundum privationem et habitum vel secundum affirmationem et negationem

a maiore

a divisione

a coniugatis

a casu

a rei iudicio a similibus: vel in qualitate vel in quantitate

Medii

Extrinsecus

THEMISTII DIVISIO

a communiter accidentibus

a corruptionibus ab usibus

a generationibus (id est ab effectibus)

a causis vel efficientibus vel materia vel fine vel forma

vel generis vel integri

a toto: vel genere vel integro

a descriptione

A consequentibus substantiam

A substantia

Ab ipsis

Diagram no. 57 (cf. p. 265)

356 APPENDIX

M. TULLII DIVISIO

Cf. De top. diff., III, VI, 20, 1202B, p. 64.

a genere

a comparatione maiorum vel minorum vel parium

ab effectis

a causis

a repugnantibus

a consequentibus

ab antecedentibus

ab adiunctiis

a contrario

a differentia

a similitudine

a forma

a coniugatis

a nota

Ab his quae sunt affecta ad ea de quibus quaeritur:

a partibus

a toto

In ipso (Loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur)

Diagram no. 58 (cf. p. 265)

a rei iudicio

Extrinsecus (Loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus)

APPENDIX 357

358

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 59 (cf. p. 269). M. Tullii divisio

Themistii divisio

a toto

a substantia, id est a definitione

a partium enumeratione

a divisione

a notatione

a nominis interpretatione

a coniugatis

a coniugatis

a genere

a toto

a forma

a parte id est a specie

a similitudine

a similitudine

a differentia

a toto vel a parte

a contrario

ab oppositis

ab adiunctis

a communiter accidentibus

ab antecedentibus a consequentibus

mixti cum pluribus

a repugnantibus

ab oppositis

ab efficientibus

a causis

ab effectis

a fine

a comparatione maiorum

a maiore

a comparatione minorum

a minore

a comparatione parium

a simili

a rei iudicio

a rei iudicio

APPENDIX

359

Diagram no. 60 (cf. p. 270) Themistii divisio

Ciceronis divisio

a definitione

a toto vel ab antecedentibus vel a consequentibus

a descriptione

a genere vel ab antecedentibus vel a consequentibus

a nominis interpretatione

a notatio vel ab antecedentibus vel a consequentibus

a toto

a genere vel ab antecedentibus vel a consequentibus

a partibus

a differentia

a causis

ab efficientibus causis vel ab antecedentibus vel a consequentibus

a generationibus id est ab effectibus

ab efficientibus causis vel ab effectis

a corruptionibus

ab efficientibus causis

ab usibus

ab efficientibus causis vel ab effectis

a communiter accidentibus

ab adiunctis vel ab antecedentibus vel a consequentibus

a rei iudicio

a rei iudicio

a similibus

a comparatione parium

a maiore

a comparatione maiorum

a minore

a comparatione minorum

ab oppositis

a repugnantibus

a proportione

a similibus

a transumptione

a comparatione maiorum vel minorum vel parium

a coniugatis

a coniugatis vel ab antecedentibus vel a consequentibus

a divisione

a partium enumeratione

360

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 61 (cf. p. 283) DIFFERENTIA CONSTITUTIVA IUSTUM MATERIA RHETORICAE

DIFFERENTIA CONSTITUTIVA

CIVILIS QUAESTIO

UTILE VEL ONESTUM

DIFFERENTIA CONSTITUTIVA BONUM

SPECIES IUDICIALES

SPECIES DELIBERATIVA

SPECIES DEMONSTRATIVA

Diagram no. 62 (cf. p. 303) ARS RHETORICA

GENUS

SPECIES

(GENERA CAUSARUM)

MATERIA PARTES MATERIAE

(ID EST PARTES CAUSAE)

Disciplina Iudiciale Demonstrativum Deliberativum Quaestio civilis (id est causa generalis) Constitutio (vel status vel quaestio)

PARTES RHETORICAE

Inventio Dispositio Elocutio Memoria Pronuntiatio (vel Actio)

INSTRUMENTUM

Oratio

INSTRUMENTI PARTES

Exordium Narratio Partitio Confirmatio Reprehensio Peroratio

OPERA

Docere et movere

ACTOR

Orator

OFFICIUM

Bene dicere

FINIS

Tum bene dixisse Tum persuadere

APPENDIX

361

CONTINENTIA CUM IPSO NEGOTIO

Diagram no. 63 (cf. p. 310) Nomen Natura Victum Fortuna Studium Casus Affectio Habitus Consilium Facta Orationes

Quis (Attributum personae)

In summam facti Post factum Dum fit Ante factum

Quid (Attributum negotii)

NEGOTIO

CONSECUTIO

ADIUNCTA

IN GESTIONE NEGOTII

Cur (Attributum negotii)

Quando (Attributum negotii)

In tempus In occasionem

Ubi vel locus Quomodo vel modus Quibus auxiliis vel facultas (Attributa negotii) Maius magnum Minus magnum Simile Aeque magnum Disparatum Id quod factum est quo nomine appellari conveniat Qui sunt auctores eius facti et inventionis comprobatores atque aemuli Quae eius rei sit lex, consuetudo, pactio, iudicium, scientia, artificium Si natura eius evenire vulgo soleat an insolenter et raro Utrum homines id sua auctoritate comprobare an offendere in his consueverint

362

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 64 (cf. p. 315) Loci qui in quaestione sunt positi Loci qui ab terminorum substantia ducuntur

Themistii divisio Loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus

Loci medii

Loci qui terminorum substantiam consequuntur

Continentia cum ipso negotio

Diagram no. 65 (cf. p. 315)

Consecutio

In gestione negotii

Adiuncta negotio

Themistii divisio

Loci qui in quaestione sunt positi

Loci qui ab terminorum substantia ducuntur

Loci qui terminorum substantiam consequuntur

Continentia cum ipso negotio

In gestione negotii

Loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus

Loci medii

Consecutio

Adiuncta negotio

APPENDIX

Diagram no. 66 (cf. p. 315)

363

Ciceronis divisio

Loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur

Loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus

Loci ab his quae sunt affecta ad ea de quibus quaeritur Continentia cum ipso negotio

In gestione negotii

Diagram no. 67 (cf. p. 315)

Adiuncta negotio

Consecutio

Ciceronis divisio

Loci qui in ipso haerent de quo agitur

Loci qui assumuntur extrinsecus

Loci ab his quae sunt affecta ad ea de quibus quaeritur Continentia cum ipso negotio

In gestione negotii

Adiuncta negotio

Consecutio

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INDEX ANCIENT AND MODERN AUTHORS Abaelardus, Petrus: XCIII Abû al-Barakât al-Baghdâdî: L, 182n Abu Sahl al-Masihi: LI Augustinus, Aurelius: 38n, 39n, 276n, 285n, 292n, 294n, 307n Alcuinus Eboracensis: XCII, XCIIn al-Fārā´bī, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad: Ln Alexander Aphrodisiensis: XXXVIII, XL, XLIII, XLIIIn, XLIV, XLV, 55n, 195 Ammonius Saccas: LIn, Anselmus Cantuariensis: XCIII Antisthenes: 38n Apuleius, Lucius: 9, 13, 13n, 14n, 15n Aristogeiton: LVIII Aristoteles: X, Xn, XI, XIn, XII, XIIn, XIII, XIIIn, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIIn, XVIII, XVIIIn, XIX, XIXn, XX, XXIn, XXII, XXIIn, XXIII, XXIV, XXIVn, XXV, XXVn, XXVI, XXVIn, XXVIIn, XXVIII, XXXn, XXXIn, XXXIIn, XXXIIIn, XXXIV, XXXIVn, XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVIn, XXXVII, XXXVIIn, XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL, XLn, XLI, XLIn XLII, XLIIIn, XLIIIn, XLIV, XLV, XLVn, XLVI, XLVIIn, XLVIIIn, XLIXn, L, Ln, LI, LIn, LII, LIIn, LIII, LIIIn, LIV, LVI, LVII, LVIII, LVIIIn, LIX, LX, LXn, LXIII, LXIV, LXIVn, LXV, LXVn, LXVI, LXVIII, LXIX, LXIXn, LXX, LXXIn, LXXII, LXXIIn, LXXIII, LXXIIIn, LXXIV, LXXVI,

LXXVII, LXXVIIn, LXXVIII, LXXIX, LXXXIIIn,

LXXXIVn,

LXXXVIIIn,

XC, XCI, XCIII, XCIV, XCIVn,

4, 5, 5n, 8, 8n, 9n, 11n, 12n, 13n, 16, 18, 18n, 19, 19n, 25, 25n, 26n, 27, 27n, 28, 30, 30n, 31, 31n, 35n, 37n, 39, 39n, 40n, 40n, 45n, 46n, 52n, 53n, 54, 54n, 55n, 66n, 67n, 69, 69n, 78n, 78n, 80, 80n, 82n, 84n, 85, 85n, 87n, 91n, 92n, 96n, 97n, 98, 98n, 104n, 106n, 107, 110, 120, 120n, 128n, 131, 137n, 147, 151n, 152, 152n, 155n, 156n, 158n, 159, 159n, 160n, 161, 161n, 165n, 166n, 168n, 170n, 174, 174n, 175n, 176n, 177, 178, 179, 180, 180n, 182n, 191, 191n, 195, 195n, 198n, 207n, 211n, 217n, 226n, 227n, 227n, 228, 228n, 260n, 263n, 273n, 280n, 284n, 293n, 317, 320, 321, 322, 322, 323, 333 Averroes: XLV, XLVI, L, Ln, LI, LIn, LIIn, LV, LVn, LVI, LVIn, LXXIn, LXXIIn, 104, 104n, 105,107, 108n, 126n, 137, 151n, 158n, 159n, 165n, 168n, 172n, 173n, 180, 182n, 324 Avicenna: Ln Carbo, Gnaeus Papirius: 206, 232n Cassiodorus: XIII, XIIIn, XCII, XCIIn, XCIII, 2, 2n, 7, 9n, 30n, 31n, 42n, 59, 83n, 84n, 87n, 92n,

394

INDEX ANCIENT AND MODERN AUTHORS

96n, 196, 198n, 203n, 207n, 210n, 212n, 214n, 220n, 222n, 226n, 233n, 246n, 249n, 251n, 252n, 259n, 280n, 285n, 288n, 290n, 292n, 294n, 297n, 316n Catilina, Lucius Sergius: 97, 98, 256, 257, 257n, 304, 305 Catulus, Quintus Lutatius: 259n Caesar, Gaius Iulius: 214n Cicero, Marcus Tullius: V, VII, IX, XII, XIIn, XIIIn, XIVn, XV, XVn, XVI, XVII, XLV, XLVI, XLVIn, XLVIIIn, LIIIn, LVII, LVIII, LIX, LIXn, LX, LXn, LXI, LXII, LXIIn, LXIII, LXIIIn, LXIV, LXV, LXVn, LXVI, LXVIn, LXVII, LXVIIn, LXVIII, LXIX, LXXIn, LXXII, LXXIIn, LXXIII, LXXIIIn, LXXIV, LXXVI, LXXXIn, LXXXIIn, LXXXIV, LXXXVI, XCIII, XCIIIn, 2, 3n, 4, 5, 6n, 10, 10n, 11n, 20n, 21n, 24n, 27n, 29, 30, 37, 37n, 38n, 39n, 43n, 50, 52n, 53, 53n, 58, 59, 63, 63n, 64, 70, 82n, 84n, 89, 91n, 92n, 95n, 96n, 97, 97n, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104n, 105n, 108n, 110n, 112n, 113n, 114n, 116, 117, 117n, 119, 120, 120n, 122, 123, 123n, 130n, 132n, 136n, 138, 139, 140, 143n, 155, 155n, 161n, 162, 170n, 172n, 187, 187n, 188, 188n, 189, 190, 190n, 191, 193n, 194, 194n, 195, 196, 196n, 197, 197n, 198n, 199n, 200, 200n, 202n, 203, 203n, 204n, 205n, 206n, 207, 207n, 208, 209, 209n, 210,

211, 211n, 212n, 213n, 214, 214n, 215, 215n, 216n, 217, 217n, 218n, 219n, 220n, 222, 222n, 223n, 225, 226, 226n, 227, 227n, 228, 228n, 229n, 230, 230n, 231n, 232n, 233, 233n, 234, 236n, 240n, 241n, 242n, 243, 243n, 245, 245n, 247, 247n, 248n, 249n, 250n, 251n, 252n, 253, 254n, 255n, 257n, 258, 259n, 260n, 261n, 262, 262n, 263n, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274n, 278n, 279, 279n, 280n, 282n, 283n, 284n, 285n, 287n, 290n, 291n, 292, 292n, 293, 295, 295n, 296n, 298, 299n, 300, 300n, 303n, 304n, 305, 306, 306n, 308n, 309n, 311, 311n, 312, 313n, 314, 315, 320, 320n, 321, 321n, 322, 324, 330, 33, 359, 362, 363 Cornificius: 82n, 280n, 284n, 287n, 290n, 292n, 293n, 297n Crassus, Marcus Licinius: 232n Chrysippos: 240n, 241n de Balmes, Abraham: Ln, 104n, 108n Dēmosthénēs: 257, 258 Hermagŏras: LIX, LXI, LXII, LXIII, 11n, 276n, 293n, 294n, 299, 300 Eukléidēs: 30 Fortunatianus, Consultus: 11n, 83n, 84n, 91n, 246n, 276n, 280n, 283n, 285n, 290n, 291n, 294n, 296n, 297n, 307n,

INDEX ANCIENT AND MODERN AUTHORS

Galenus: LIII, LIV Gerbertus de Aurillac: XCII Gnaeus, Pompeius: 259n Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius: 97, 98, 214n, 226n, 232n, 256, 257, 257n, 259n Gualterus Burlaeus: XCIV, XCIVn Guillelmus de Shyreswood: XCIV, XCIVn Harmodius: LVIII Hērákleitos: 38n Hirtius, Aulus: 250n Holobolos, Manuel: XIn, XCI Ibn an-Nadī´m: LIn Iohannes Buridanus: XCIV, XCIVn Iohannes Scotus Eriugena: XCII Iphicràtes: LVIII Isidorus Hispalensis: XIII, XIIIn, XCII, 2, 2n, 7, 9n, 39n, 42n, 83n, 84n, 87n, 92n, 96n, 161n, 197n, 198n, 203n, 207, 210n, 212n, 214n, 220n, 222, 226, 233n, 249n, 251n, 252n, 259n, 316n Iulius Gaius Victor: 11n, 83n, 84n, 92n, 96n, 276n, 290n, 292n, 294n, 297n, 307n Iulius Severianus: 292n Lambertus Autissiodorensis: XCIV, XCIVn Lanfrancus Cantuariensis: XCII Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von: XCIV, XCIVn Mantino, Jacob: 104n, 105n, 108n Marius Victorinus, Caius: XIIIn, 132n, 200n, 246n, 276n, 285n, 290n, 294n, 297n, 307n Martinus de Dacia: XCIII

395

Martianus Mineus Felix Capella: XIIn, XIIIn, 2, 2n, 7, 7n, 8, 9, 10, 10n, 11n, 12, 12n, 13, 13n, 14n, 16n, 35, 39, 42, 59n, 84n, 87n, 161n, 190n, 196n, 198n, 203n, 207n, 210n, 212n, 214n, 220n, 222n, 226n, 229n, 232n, 241n, 249n, 250n, 252n, 257n, 258n, 259n, 281, 285n, 290n, 291n, 296n, 297n, 301n Martius Novatus Renatus: XCI Melissos: 38n Nicolaus Parisiensis: XCIII Opimius, Lucius: 207n, 226n, 232n Octavius, Marcus Ligure: 252n Pachymeres, Georgios: XCI Phótios: 179n Petrus Hispanus: XCIV, XCIVn Petrus Ramus: XCIV, XCIVn Pýrrhos: 145, 147, 280, 282 Plato: XVIII, XIXn, 18, 31, 45n, 169, 180n, 216n, 217n Porphyrios: XIIn, XXIXn, LXXVIIn, LXXXIIIn, LXXXIVn, XCIIIn, 2n, 29, 29n, 31, 31n, 32n, 40, 42, 42n, 43, 45n, 46n, 54n, 55n, 56n, 66, 87n, 115, 115n, 128n, 129, 129n, 130, 131, 131n, 140, 153, 157n, 173n, 199n, 200n, 212, 212n, 214, 214n, 216, 224n Poseidónios: LIII Prochorus Cydones: XCI Quintilianus, Marcus Fabius: 11n, 38n, 58n, 96n, 97n, 190n, 257n, 276n, 280n, 282n, 285n, 287n, 290n, 291n, 296n, 307n Radulphus Brito: XCIII

396

INDEX ANCIENT AND MODERN AUTHORS

Roscius Sextus Amerinus: 39n, 281n Scipio, Publius Cornelius: 97, 98, 256, 257, 257n, 259, 280, 282 Silla, Lucius Cornelius: 214n Socrates: 9n, 18, 19, 45n, 129n, 168, 169 Straton: XLV Sulpicius, Victor: 39n, 282n, 288n, 290n, 292n, 294n, 297n, 307n Theodoricus: 45 Theophrastus: V, XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL, XLI, XLIII, XLIIIn, XLIV, XLV, XLIX, LIII, LVII, LXIX, 110n, 158n, 195 Themistius: V, VI, VII, XII, XIII, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIIn, XLIII, XLV, XLVI, XLIX, L, Ln, LI, LIn, LII, LIIn, LIII, LIIIn, LIV, LIVn, LV, LVI, LVIn, LVII, LIX, LXX, LXXIn, LXXII, LXXIIn, LXXIII, LXXIV, LXXV, 3n, 6n, 7n, 27n, 81, 82, 82n, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 104n, 105, 105n,

107, 111, 113, 116, 120n, 122, 123, 123n, 124, 126, 126n, 137n, 151n, 158n, 159n, 165n, 166n, 168n, 169n, 173n, 179, 179, 180, 182, 182n, 184, 189, 190, 190n, 201, 202, 204n, 228n, 233, 258, 258n, 260, 262, 263n, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269,270, 271, 272, 279, 305, 311, 312, 314, 315, 322, 324, 328, 333, 356, 358, 359, 362 Terentius Afer, Publius: 210n, 226n, 249n, 252n, 257n Trebatius Testa, Gaius: XV, LXIII, LXXIn, LXXXIn, 320 Varro, Marcus Terentius: 2, 9, 10, 10n Vergilius Maro, Publius: 212n, 220n, 226n, 227n, 233n, 249n, 251n, 252n Xenocrătes: 168n, 212

INDEX CONTEMPORARY AUTHORS Abbagnano, N.: Xn, XIXn, XXIVn Abd al-Magid al-Haridi: L Achard, M.: 82n Adamo, L.: 42n Aertsen, J. A.: 319n Agazzi, E.: 26n Alessio, F.: XCIVn Arnzen, R.: Ln Ashworth Earline, J.: 241n, 243n Asztalos, M.: XCIIIn, 161n Baldassarri, M.: 54n Barnes, J.: Xn, XXIVn, LXXXIIIn, XCIVn, 25n, 26n, 46n, 85n Bayer, G.: 26n, 85n Beets, F.: 41n Berti, E.: XIn, XXIVn, 26n Biard, J.: XIn, XIIIn, XXIIn, XCIIn, XCIVn Bibauw, J.: 226n Bidez, J.: 42n Bird, O.: 78n Blumenthal, J.: 82n Bobzien, S.: 54n Bolton, R.: XIn Braakhuis, H. A. G.: 41n Brands, H.: XCIVn Brandt, S.: XIVn, LXXVIIIn, LXXXIIIn Brehier, E.: 9n Brumberg, J.: IXn, XCIIIn Brunschwig, J.: XVIIIn, XIXn, XXVIn, XXVIIn, XXXVIIIn, XXXVIIIn Butterworth, C. E.: Ln Calboli, G.: 11n Calboli Montefusco, L.: 82n Caldwell, J.: 221n

Cavini, W.: XXIVn, 69n Chadwick, H.: IX Chiaradonna, R.: 42n Colli, G.: XVIIIn, XXVn Coloubaritis, L.: 26n Corsi, G.: XXIVn Craig, E.: 192n Crane, R. S.: 273n Crifo, G.: 226n Dagron, G.: 82n Danneberg, L.: XCIVn De Blic, J.: XVIIIn De Gregorio, O.: LIVn de Filippis, R.: 283n, 292n Delhaye, P.: XCIIIn de Libera, A.: 231n De Pater, W. A.: Xn, XXXVIIIn, 195n De Rijk, L. M.: IXn, XIVn, XCIII, XCIVn, 160 Devereux, D.: XIn d’Onofrio, G.: IXn, XIIIn, LXXVIIIn, LXXVIII, XCIIn, XCIIIn, 1n, 2n, 8n, 9n, 10n, 13n, 14n, 16n, 31n, 40n, 42n, 53n, 55n, 64n, 92n, 161n, 200n, 216n, 231, 246n Dürr, K.: 240n Ebbesen, S.: XLVIII, XLVIIIn, XLIXn, LII, LIIn, LIII, LIIIn, 24, 25n, 45n, 67n, 85n, 105, 105n, 108, 108n, 110n, 181n, 192n, 238n Erismann, Ch.: 42n Evangeliou, C.: 40n, 45n Evans, G. R.: 25n, 31n Fait, P.: 69n

398

INDEX CONTEMPORARY AUTHORS

Ferejohn, M. T.: 26n, 27n, 85n Forster, E. S.: XIXn, XXVn Fortenbaugh, W. W.: XIn Friedlein, G.: 30n, 221n Gallonier, A.: 30n, 42n, 55n, 85n, 161n, 192n Gersh, S.: 319n Ghisalberti, A.: 64n Gibson, M. T.: IXn, XCIVn, 221n Girgenti, G.: 33n, 42n, 46n Gohlke, P.: XIXn Gómez-Lobo, A.: 26n Gourinat, J. B.: 54n Greco, M.: 274n Green Pedersen, N. J.: XIn, LIIIn, LVn, XCIIIn, XCIIIn, XCIVn, 30n, 112n, 181n Gruber, J.: IXn Gruender, D.: 26n Guerriere, D.: 26n Guillamin, J.: 221n Gulley, V. N.: 25n Hadgoupoulos, D. J.: XXXIIn Hadot, P.: 46n, 200n Hakkert, A. M.: XIIn Halm, K.: 11n, 38n, 39n, 132n, 292n, 307n Hamlyn, W.: 40n Hasnawi, A.: Ln, LI, LIn, LIIn, LV, LVn, LVI, LVIn, 104n, 108n, 126n, 137n, 151n, 158n, 159n, 165n, 168n, 172n, 173n, 182n Hintikka, J.: 26n, 31n Husik, I.: 25n Infante, D. A.: 187n Inwood, B.: 54n Irwin, T.: 26n Isaac, J.: 19n

Isnardi-Parente, M.: 54n Jacobi, K.: LIIIn, LIVn, 181n, 238n Jolivet, J.: 42n, 231n Kahn, C.: 26n Kal, V.: 26n Kaylor, H.: IXn Kenny, J.: XLIXn, LIIIn, LVn, 25n, 90n, 236n Kneepkens, C. H.: 41n Knorr, W. R.: 26n Kormos, J.: 64n Kosman, L. A.: 25n Kretzmann, N.: XLIXn, LIIIn, LVn, 25n, 90n, 236n Kumaniecki, K. F.: LIXn Landor, V. B.: 26n, 85n Lee, H. D. P.: 25n Lee, W. N.: 25n Leff, M.: LXIIn, LXIIIn, 202n, 273n, 274n, 317n, 321n, 322n Lejbowicz, M.: 30n, 31n Lemaire, J.: XXIIn Lesher, J. H.: 25n Lindsay, W. M.: XIIIn Lloyd, G. E. R.: LIVn Lozano, M. B.: XIVn Magee, J.: IXn, XCIVn, 174n, 192n, 207n Magnano, F.: IXn, LXIVn, LXXIIn, XCIIn Mangione, C.: XXIVn Mansion, S.: 26n Marcus, R. A.: 16n Marenbon, J.: IXn, XCIIIn Mariani Zini, F.: XIn, XIIIn, XXIIn, XCIIn, XCIIIn, XCIVn Martin, C.: 231n Mates, B.: 54n

INDEX CONTEMPORARY AUTHORS

McKeon, R. P.: V, 273n Mckirahan, R.: 85n McMahon, R.: 64n Meiser, C.: LXXXIVn, 8n Michel, A.: 274n Mignucci, M.: 9n Milanese, A.: IXn, XIVn Militello, C.: XCIVn Minio-Paluello, L.: XIIn, 25, 25n, 67n Mirhady, D. C.: XIn Moraux, P.: XVIIIn Moreschini, C.: 10n, 24n, 30n, 55n, 82n Mourelatos, P. D.: 25n Mugnai, M.: XXIVn Murphy, J. J.: 273n Mynors, A. B.: XIIIn Nasti de Vincentis, M.: 241n, XIVn Nikitas, D. Z.: IXn, XIn, XIV, XVIIn, XCIn, XCIIn, 267n Obertello L.: IXn, XIVn, LVn, XCIIn, 14n, 64n, 231n, 240n, 241n, 321n O’Meara, D. J.: 221n Owen, G. E. L.: Xn, XVIIIn Pellegrin, P.: XIn Perelman, C.: Xn Perreiah, A. R.: 26n, 31n Pertusi, A.: XCIn Phillips, P. E.: IXn Pinborg, J.: Xn, XLIXn, LIIIn, LIIIn, LVn, LVII, LVIIn, XCIIIn, 25n, 90n, 195n, 236n Pinzani, R.: XCIVn Plebe, A.: 273n Pohlenz, M.: LIVn, 9n Primavesi, O.: XXXIXn

399

Proto, B.: LIVn Radermacher, L.: 11n Régis, L. M.: XXVn, XXVIn, XXVIn Reiley, K.: 187n Reimer, G.: Xn, XLIIIn, Ln, LXXXIIIn Reinhardt, T.: XIIn, LXIV, LXVII, LXVIIn, 1n, 92n, 143n, 187n, 197n, 202n, 206n, 210n, 211n, 213n, 219n, 222n, 226n, 229n, 231n, 247n, 250n, 252n, 258n, 291n Righi, G.: 85n Riposati, B.: XIIn, LXIV, LXXII, LXXIIn, 1n, 92n, 119n, 187n, 197n, 202n, 206n, 210n, 211n, 213n, 219n, 222n, 226n, 229n, 231n, 247n, 250n, 252n, 291n, 293n Robinson, R.: XVIIIn Rolfes, E.: XIXn Rorty, R. M.: 25n Ross, W. D.: Xn Rubinelli, S.: XIIn, XXXVIIn, XXXIXn, XXXIXn, LVIIIn, LXIIIn, LXVIII, LXVIIIn, 187n Ryle, G.: XVIIIn Sava, G.: 42n Schepps, G.: LXXVIIIn, LXXVIIIn Schofield, M.: 26n Scholz, H.: 26n Seminara, L.: XIn, XXVn, XXVIIn, XXVIIn, XXXIIn, 70n Sestan, E.: XIIn Sharples, R. W.: Ln, LIVn, LVIn, 221n Shiel, J.: LXXIn Silvestre, M. L.: 216n, XVIIIn Slomkowski, P.: Xn, XXn, XXXVIIn, XLn, XLVn

400

INDEX CONTEMPORARY AUTHORS

Smethurst, S. E.: 187n Solmsen, F.: XCIVn Sorabji, R.: LXXIn, 26n, 46n, 82n, 85n Speca, A.: 241n Speer, A.: 319n Squillante, M.: 216n Stump, E.: XIVn, XLIXn, Ln, LIIIn, LIV, LIVn, LVn, LXXIn, XCIII, XCIIIn, 2n, 24n, 25n, 45n, 73n, 90n, 105n, 109n, 110n, 143n, 236n, 241n, 267n, 272n, 274n Thielmann, J.: Ln Thiercelin, A.: XCIVn Thionville, E.: Xn, XXXVIIIn Thörnqvist, C. T.: XCIVn Tisserand, A.: 85n Tormod, E.: 31n Toulmin, S.: 78n, 187n Trépanier, E.: 25n Tricot, J.: XVIIIn, XIXn Tuninetti, F. L.: 31n Vanderspoel, J.: 82n

van de Veyer, A.: XCIIn van Ophuijsen, J. M.: XIn, XLIIIn Varvis, S.: 64n Viano, C. A.: Xn, XIXn Viola, C.: 64n Virieux-Reymond, A.: 54n Volpe Cacciatori, P.: 82n von Arnim, H.: 9n von Fritz, K.: 25n von Kirchmann, J. H.: XIXn Wagner, D.: LVn Wallach, L.: 273n Wallies, M.: XLIIIn, Ln Weil, E.: XVIIIn Wians, W.: 26n Wieland, W.: 26n Willis, J.: XIIIn Winterbottom, M.: 187n Wippel, F.: 241n Yates, F.: 286n Zadro, A.: XVIIIn Zanatta, M.: XIXn Ziegelmeyer, E. H.: 25n

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Filosofia e Teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi a cura di L. BIANCHI, Louvain-la-Neuve 1995. VII + 575 p. 54 Euros

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3.

Bilan et perspectives des études médiévales en Europe, Actes du premier Congrès européen d’études médiévales (Spoleto, 27-29 mai 1993), édités par J. HAMESSE, 54 Euros Louvain-la-Neuve 1995. XIII + 522 p. et 32 ill. h.-t.

4.

Les manuscrits des lexiques et glossaires de l’Antiquité tardive à la fin du Moyen Âge, Actes du Colloque international organisé par le «Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture» (Erice, 23-30 septembre 1994), édités par J. HAMESSE, Louvain67 Euros la-Neuve 1996. XIII + 723 p.

5.

Models of Holiness in Medieval Studies, Proceedings of the International Symposium (Kalamazoo, 4-7 May 1995), edited by B.M. KIENZLE, E. WILKS DOLNIKOWSKI, R. DRAGE HALE, D. PRYDS, A.T. THAYER, Louvain-la-Neuve 1996. XX + 402 p. 49 Euros

6.

Écrit et pouvoir dans les chancelleries médiévales : espace français, espace anglais, Actes du Colloque international de Montréal (7-9 septembre 1995) édités par K. FIANU et D.J. GUTH, Louvain-la-Neuve 1997. VIII + 342 p. 49 Euros

7.

P.-A. BURTON, Bibliotheca Aelrediana secunda (1962-1996). Ouvrage publié avec le concours de la Fondation Universitaire de Belgique et de la Fondation Francqui, Louvain-la-Neuve 1997. 208 p. 27 Euros

8.

Aux origines du lexique philosophique européen. L’influence de la « latinitas », Actes du Colloque international de Rome (23-25 mai 1996) édités par J. HAMESSE, 34 Euros Louvain-la-Neuve 1997. XIV + 298 p.

9.

Medieval Sermons and Society : Cloisters, City, University, Proceedings of International Symposia at Kalamazoo and New York, edited by J. HAMESSE, B.M. KIENZLE, D.L. STOUDT, A.T. THAYER, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998. VIII + 414 p. et 7 ill. h.-t. 54 Euros

10. Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Mélanges offerts au Père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire, édités par J. HAMESSE. Ouvrage publié avec le concours de la Homeland Foundation (New York), Louvain-la-Neuve épuisé 1998. vol. I-II : XII + 1030 p. ; vol. III : VI + 406 p. 11. Filosofia e scienza classica, arabo-latina medievale e l’età moderna. Ciclo di seminari internazionali (26-27 gennaio 1996) a cura di G. FEDERICI VESCOVINI, 39 Euros Louvain-la-Neuve 1999. VIII + 331 p. 12. J.L. JANSSENS, An annotated Bibliography of Ibn Sînæ. First Supplement (1990-1994), uitgegeven met steun van de Universitaire Stichting van België en het Francqui26 Euros Fonds, Louvain-la-Neuve 1999. XXI + 218 p. 13. L.E. BOYLE, O.P., Facing history: A different Thomas Aquinas, with an introduction by J.-P. TORRELL, O.P., Louvain-la-Neuve 2000. XXXIV + 170 p. et 2 ill. h.- t. 33 Euros

14. Lexiques bilingues dans les domaines philosophique et scientifique (Moyen Âge – Renaissance), Actes du Colloque international organisé par l’École Pratique des Hautes Etudes – IVe Section et l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université Catholique de Louvain (Paris, 12-14 juin 1997) édités par J. HAMESSE et D. JACQUART, Turnhout 2001. XII + 240 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51176-4 35 Euros 15. Les prologues médiévaux, Actes du Colloque international organisé par l’Academia Belgica et l’École française de Rome avec le concours de la F.I.D.E.M. (Rome, 26-28 mars 1998) édités par J. HAMESSE, Turnhout 2000. 716 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51124-5 75 Euros 16. L.E. BOYLE, O.P., Integral Palaeography, with an introduction by F. TRONCARELLI, Turnhout 2001. 174 p. et 9 ill. h.-t., ISBN 978-2-503-51177-1 33 Euros 17. La figura di San Pietro nelle fonti del Medioevo, Atti del convegno tenutosi in occasione dello Studiorum universitatum docentium congressus (Viterbo e Roma, 5-8 settembre 2000) a cura di L. LAZZARI e A.M. VALENTE BACCI, Louvain-la-Neuve 2001. 708 p. et 153 ill. h.-t. 85 Euros 18. Les Traducteurs au travail. Leurs manuscrits et leurs méthodes. Actes du Colloque international organisé par le « Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture » (Erice, 30 septembre – 6 octobre 1999) édités par J. HAMESSE, Turnhout 2001. XVIII + 455 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51219-8 55 Euros 19. Metaphysics in the Twelfth Century. Proceedings of the International Colloquium (Frankfurt, june 2001) edited by M. LUTZ-BACHMANN et al., Turnhout 2003. XIV + 220 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52202-9 43 Euros 20. Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza éditées par P.J.J.M. BAKKER avec la collaboration de E. FAYE et Ch. GRELLARD, Turnhout 2002. XXIX + 778 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51178-8 68 Euros 21. Filosofia in volgare nel medioevo. Atti del Colloquio Internazionale de la S.I.S.P.M. (Lecce, 27-28 settembre 2002) a cura di L. STURLESE, Louvain-la-Neuve 2003. 540 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51503-8 43 Euros 22. Bilan et perspectives des études médiévales en Europe (1993-1998). Actes du deuxième Congrès européen d’études médiévales (Euroconference, Barcelone, 8-12 juin 1999), édités par J. HAMESSE, Turnhout 2003. XXXII + 656 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51615-865 Euros 23. Lexiques et glossaires philosophiques de la Renaissance. Actes du Colloque International organisé en collaboration à Rome (3-4 novembre 2000) par l’Academia Belgica, le projet « Le corrispondenze scientifiche, letterarie ed erudite dal Rinascimento all’ età moderna » et l’Università degli studi di Roma « La Sapienza », édités par J. HAMESSE et M. FATTORI, Louvain-la-Neuve 2003. IX + 321 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51535-9 39 Euros 24. Ratio et superstitio. Essays in Honor of Graziella Federici Vescovini edited by G. MARCHETTI, V. SORGE and O. RIGNANI, Louvain-la-Neuve 2003. XXX + 676 p. – 5 ill. h.-t., ISBN 978-2-503-51523-6 54 Euros 25. « In principio erat verbum » . Mélanges offerts à Paul Tombeur par ses anciens élèves édités par B.-M. TOCK, Turnhout 2004. 450 p., ISBN 978-2-503-51672-6 54 Euros 26. Duns Scot à Paris, 1302-2002. Actes du colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre 2002, édités par O. BOULNOIS, E. KARGER, J.-L. SOLÈRE et G. SONDAG, Turnhout 2005. XXIV + 683 p., ISBN 2-503-51810-9 54 Euros 27. Medieval Memory. Image and text, edited by F. WILLAERT, Turnhout 2004. XXV + 265 p., ISBN 2-503-51683-1 54 Euros 28. La Vie culturelle, intellectuelle et scientifique à la Cour des Papes d’Avignon. Volume en collaboration internationale édité par J. HAMESSE, Turnhout 2006. XI + 413 p. – 16 ill. h.t., ISBN 2-503-51877-X 43 Euros

29. G. MURANO, Opere diffuse per «exemplar» e pecia, Turnhout 2005. 897 p., ISBN 2-503-51922-9 75 Euros 30. Corpo e anima, sensi interni e intelletto dai secoli XIII-XIV ai post-cartesiani e spinoziani. Atti del Colloquio internazionale (Firenze, 18-20 settembre 2003) a cura di G. FEDERICI VESCOVINI, V. SORGE e C. VINTI, Turnhout 2005. 576 p., ISBN 2-503-51988-1 54 Euros 31. Le felicità nel medioevo. Atti del Convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S.I.S.P.M.) (Milano, 12-13 settembre 2003), a cura di M. BETTETINI e F. D. PAPARELLA, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005. XVI + 464 p., ISBN 2-503-51875-3 43 Euros 32. Itinéraires de la raison. Études de philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Cândida Pacheco, éditées par J. MEIRINHOS, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005. XXVIII + 444 p., ISBN 2-503-51987-3 43 Euros 33. Testi cosmografici, geografici e odeporici del medioevo germanico. Atti del XXXI Convegno dell’Associazione italiana di filologia germanica (A.I.F.G.), Lecce, 26-28 maggio 2004, a cura di D. GOTTSCHALL, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005. XV + 276 p., ISBN 2-503-52271-8 34 Euros 34. Écriture et réécriture des textes philosophiques médiévaux. Mélanges offerts à C. Sirat édités par J. HAMESSE et O. WEIJERS, Turnhout 2006. XXVI + 499 p., ISBN 2-503-52424-9 54 Euros 35. Frontiers in the Middle Ages. Proceedings of the Third European Congress of the FIDEM (Jyväskylä, june 2003), edited by O. MERISALO and P. PAHTA, Louvain-laNeuve 2006. XII + 761p., ISBN 2-503-52420-6 65 Euros 36. Classica et beneventana. Essays presented to Virginia Brown on the Occasion of her 65th Birthday edited by F.T. COULSON and A. A. GROTANS, Turnhout 2006. XXIV + 444 p. – 20 ill. h.t., ISBN 978-2-503-2434-4 54 Euros 37. G. MURANO, Copisti a Bologna (1265-1270), Turnhout 2006. 214 p., ISBN 2-50352468-9 44 Euros 38. «Ad ingenii acuitionem». Studies in honour of Alfonso Maierù, edited by S. CAROTI, R. IMBACH, Z. KALUZA, G. STABILE and L. STURLESE. Louvain-la-Neuve 2006. VIII + 590 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52532-7 54 Euros 39. Form and Content of Instruction in Anglo-saxon England in the Light of Contemporary Manuscript Evidence. Papers from the International Conference (Udine, April 6th-8th 2006) edited by P. LENDINARA, L. LAZZARI, M.A. D’ARONCO, Turnhout 2007. XIII + 552 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52591-0 65 Euros 40. Averroès et les averroïsmes latin et juif. Actes du Colloque International (Paris, juin 2005) édités par J.-B. BRENET, Turnhout 2007. 367 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52742-0 54 Euros 41. P. LUCENTINI, Platonismo, ermetismo, eresia nel medioevo. Introduzione di L. STURLESE. Volume publié en co-édition et avec le concours de l’Università degli Studi di Napoli « l’Orientale » (Dipartimento di Filosofia e Politica). Louvain-laNeuve 2007. XVI + 517 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52726-0 54 Euros 42.1. Repertorium initiorum manuscriptorum Latinorum Medii Aevi curante J. HAMESSE, auxiliante S. SZYLLER. Tome I : A-C. Louvain-la-Neuve 2007. XXXIV + 697 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52727-7 59 Euros 42.2. Repertorium initiorum manuscriptorum Latinorum Medii Aevi curante J. HAMESSE, auxiliante S. SZYLLER. Tome II : D-O. Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. 802 p., ISBN 978-2503-53045-1 59 Euros

42.3. Repertorium initiorum manuscriptorum Latinorum Medii Aevi curante J. HAMESSE, auxiliante S. SZYLLER. Tome III : P-Z. Louvain-la-Neuve 2009, 792 p., ISBN 978-2503-53321-6 59 Euros 42.4. Repertorium initiorum manuscriptorum Latinorum Medii Aevi curante J. HAMESSE, auxiliante S. SZYLLER. Tome IV : Supplementum. Indices. Louvain-la-Neuve 2010. 597 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53603-3 59 Euros 43. New Essays on Metaphysics as «Scientia Transcendens». Proceedings of the Second International Conference of Medieval Philosophy, held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre / Brazil, 15-18 August 2006, ed. R. H. PICH. Louvain-la-Neuve 2007. 388 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52787-1 43 Euros 44. A.-M. VALENTE, San Pietro nella letteratura tedesca medievale, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. 240 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52846-5 43 Euros 45. B. FERNÁNDEZ DE LA CUESTA GONZÁLEZ, En la senda del «Florilegium Gallicum». Edición y estudio del florilegio del manuscrito Córdoba, Archivo Capitular 150, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. 542 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52879-3 54 Euros 46. Cosmogonie e cosmologie nel Medioevo. Atti del convegno della Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Catania, 22-24 settembre 2006. A cura di C. MARTELLO, C. MILITELLO, A. VELLA, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. XVI + 526 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52951-6 54 Euros 47. M. J. MUÑOZ JIMÉNEZ, Un florilegio de biografías latinas: edición y estudio del manuscrito 7805 de la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. 317 p., ISBN 978-2-503-52983-7 43 Euros 48. Continuities and Disruptions Between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Proceedings of the colloquium held at the Warburg Institute, 15-16 June 2007, jointly organised by the Warburg Institute and the Gabinete de Filosofia Medieval. Ed. by C. BURNETT, J. MEIRINHOS, J. HAMESSE, Louvain-la-Neuve 2008. X + 181 p., ISBN 9782-503-53014-7 43 Euros 50. Florilegium mediaevale. Études offertes à Jacqueline Hamesse à l’occasion de son éméritat. Éditées par J. MEIRINHOS et O. WEIJERS, Louvain-la-Neuve 2009. XXXIV + 636 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53146-5 60 Euros 51. Immaginario e immaginazione nel Medioevo. Atti del convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Milano, 25-27 settembre 2008. A cura di M. BETTETINI e F. PAPARELLA, con la collaborazione di R. FURLAN. Louvainla-Neuve 2009. 428 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53150-2 55 Euros 52. Lo scotismo nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia. Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Bitonto 25-28 marzo 2008), in occasione del VII Centenario della morte di del beato Giovanni Duns Scoto. A cura di F. FIORENTINO, Porto 2010. 514 p., ISBN 978-2-50353448-0 55 Euros 53. E. MONTERO CARTELLE, Tipología de la literatura médica latina: Antigüedad, Edad Media, Renacimiento, Porto 2010. 243 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53513-5 43 Euros 54. Rethinking and Recontextualizing Glosses: New Perspectives in the Study of Late Anglo-Saxon Glossography, edited by P. LENDINARA, L. LAZZARI, C. DI SCIACCA, 60 Euros Porto 2011. XX + 564 p. + XVI ill., ISBN 978-2-503-54253-9 55. I beni di questo mondo. Teorie etico-economiche nel laboratorio dell’Europa medievale. Atti del convegno della Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale (S.I.S.P.M.) Roma, 19-21 settembre 2005. A cura di R. LAMBERTINI e 49 Euros L. SILEO, Porto 2010. 367 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53528-9 56. Medicina y filología. Estudios de léxico médico latino en la Edad Media, edición de A. I. MARTÍN FERREIRA, Porto 2010. 256 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53895-2 49 Euros

57. Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach, édité par I. ATUCHA, D. CALMA, C. KONIGPRALONG, I. ZAVATTERO, Porto 2011. 797 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53528-9 75 Euros 58. El florilegio, espacio de encuentro de los autores antiguos y medievales, editado por M. J. MUÑOZ JIMÉNEZ, Porto 2011. 289 p., ISBN 978-2-503-53596-8 45 Euros 59. Glossaires et lexiques médiévaux inédits. Bilan et perspectives. Actes du Colloque de Paris (7 mai 2010), Édités par J. HAMESSE et J. MEIRINHOS, Porto 2011. XII + 291 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54175-4 45 Euros 60. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109): Philosophical Theology and Ethics. Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Medieval Philosophy, held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre / Brazil (02-04 September 2009), Edited by R. Hofmeister PICH, Porto 2011. XVI + 244 p., ISBN 978-2-50354265-2 45 Euros 61. L’antichità classica nel pensiero medievale. Atti del Convegno de la Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Trento, 27-29 settembre 2010. A cura 59 Euros di A. PALAZZO. Porto 2011. VI + 492, p., ISBN 978-2-503-54289-8 62. M. C. DE BONIS, The Interlinear Glosses to the Regula Sancti Benedicti in London, British Library, Cotton Tiberius A. III. ISBN 978-2-503-54266-9 (en préparation) 63. J. P. BARRAGÁN NIETO, El «De secretis mulierum» atribuido a Alberto Magno: Estudio, edición crítica y traducción. I Premio Internacional de Tesis Doctorales Fundación Ana María Aldama Roy de Estudios Latinos, Porto 2012. 600 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54392-5 65 Euros 64. Tolerancia: teoría y práctica en la Edad Media. Actas del Coloquio de Mendoza (1518 de Junio de 2011), editadas por R. PERETÓ RIVAS, Porto 2012. XXI + 295 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54553-0 49 Euros 65. Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers, édité par C. ANGOTTI, M. BRÎNZEI, 65 Euros M. TEEUWEN, Porto 2012. 521 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54801-2 66. L. TROMBONI, Inter omnes Plato et Aristoteles: Gli appunti filosofici di Girolamo Savonarola. Introduzione, edizione critica e comento, Prefazione di G. C. 55 Euros GARFAGNINI, Porto 2012. XV + 326 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54803-6 67. M. MARCHIARO, La biblioteca di Pietro Crinito. Manoscritti e libri a stampa della raccolta libraria di un umanista fiorentino. II Premio de la Fundación Ana María Aldama Roy de Estudios Latinos, Porto 2013. 342 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54949-1 55 Euros 68. Phronêsis – Prudentia – Klugheit. Das Wissen des Klugen in Mittelalter, Renaissance und Neuzeit. Il sapere del saggio nel Medioevo, nel Rinascimento e nell’Età Moderna. Herausgegeben von / A cura di A. FIDORA, A. NIEDERBERGER, M. SCATTOLA, Porto 2013. 348 p., ISBN 978-2-503-54989-7 59 Euros 69. La compilación del saber en la Edad Media. La Compilation du savoir au Moyen Âge. The Compilation of Knowledge in the Middle Ages. Editado por M. J. MUÑOZ, P. CAÑIZARES y C. MARTÍN, Porto 2013. 632 p., ISBN 978-2-50355034-3 65 Euros 70. W. CHILDS, Trade and Shipping in the Medieval West: Portugal, Castile and England, Porto 2013. 187 p., ISBN 978-2-503-55128-9 35 Euros 71. L. LANZA, «Ei autem qui de politia considerat ...» Aristotele nel pensiero politico medievale, Barcelona – Madrid 2013. 305 p., ISBN 978-2-503-55127-2 49 Euros 72. «Scholastica colonialis». Reception and Development of Baroque Scholasticism in Latin America, 16th-18th Centuries, Edited by R. H. PICH and A. S. CULLETON, 49 Euros Barcelona – Roma 2016. VIII + 338 p., ISBN 978-2-503-55200-2

73. Hagiography in Anglo-Saxon England: Adopting and Adapting Saints’ Lives into Old English Prose (c. 950-1150), Edited by L. LAZZARI, P. LENDINARA, C. DI SCIACCA, 65 Euros Barcelona – Madrid 2014. XVIII + 589 p., ISBN 978-2-503-55199-9 74. Dictionarium Latinum Andrologiae, Gynecologiae et Embryologiae. Diccionario latino de andrología, ginecología y embriología (DILAGE), dir. E. MONTERO (en préparation) CARTELLE. 75. La Typologie biblique comme forme de pensée dans l’historiographie médiévale, sous la direction de M.T. KRETSCHMER, Turnhout 2014. XII + 279 p., ISBN 978-2-50355447-1 54 Euros 76. Portuguese Studies on Medieval illuminated manuscripts, Edited by M. A. MIRANDA and A. MIGUÉLEZ CAVERO, Barcelona – Madrid 2014. XV + 195 p., ISBN 978-2-50355473-0 49 Euros 77. S. ALLÉS TORRENT, Las «Vitae Hannibalis et Scipionis» de Donato Acciaiuoli, traducidas por Alfonso de Palencia (1491), III Premio de la Fundación Ana María Aldama Roy de Estudios Latinos, Barcelona – Madrid 2014. CLXXVI + 245 p., ISBN 978-2-50355606-2 55 Euros 78. Guido Terreni, O. Carm. (†1342): Studies and Texts, Edited by A. FIDORA, Barcelona – 55 Euros Madrid 2015. XIII + 405 p., ISBN 978-2-503-55528-7 79. Sigebert de Gembloux, Édité par J.-P. STRAUS, Barcelona – Madrid 2015. et 24 ill. h.-t., ISBN 978-2-503-56519-4

IX

+ 210 p. 45 Euros

80. Reading sacred scripture with Thomas Aquinas. Hermeneutical tools, theological questions and new perspectives, Edited by P. ROSZAK and J. VIJGEN, Turnhout 2015. XVI + 601 p., ISBN 978-2-503-56227-8 65 Euros 81. V. MANGRAVITI, L’«Odissea» marciana di Leonzio tra Boccaccio e Petrarca, IV Premio de la Fundación Ana María Aldama Roy de Estudios Latinos (accésit), 79 Euros Barcelona – Roma 2016. CLXXVII + 941 p., ISBN 978-2-503-56733-4 82. Formal Approaches and natural Language in Medieval Logic, Edited by L. CESALLI, F. GOUBIER and A. DE LIBERA, with the collaboration of M. G. ISAAC, Barcelona – 69 Euros Roma 2016. VIII + 538 p., ISBN 978-2-503-56735-8 83. Les « Auctoritates Aristotelis », leur utilisation et leur influence chez les auteurs médiévaux, édité par J. HAMESSE et J. MEIRINHOS, Barcelona – Madrid 2015. X + 362 p., ISBN 978-2-503-56738-9 55 Euros 84. Formas de acceso al saber en la Antigüedad Tardía y en la Alta Edad Media. La transmisión del conocimiento dentro y fuera de la escuela, editado por D. PANIAGUA y M.ª A. ANDRÉS SANZ, Barcelona – Roma 2016. XII + 311 p., ISBN 978-2-503-56987-1 50 Euros 85. C. TARLAZZI, Individui universali. Il realismo di Gualtiero di Mortagne nel XII secolo, IV Premio Internacional de Tesis Doctorales de la Fundación Ana María Aldama Roy de Estudios Latinos, Barcelona – Roma 2017. XL + 426 p., ISBN 978-2503-57565-0 55 Euros 86. Lieu, espace, mouvement : physique, métaphysique et cosmologie (XIIe-XVIe siècles), Actes du Colloque International, Université de Fribourg (Suisse), 12-14 mars 2015, édités par T. SUAREZ-NANI, O. RIBORDY et A. PETAGINE, Barcelona – Roma 2017. XXIII + 318 p., ISBN 978-2-503-57552-0 49 Euros 87. La letteratura di istruzione nel medioevo germanico. Studi in onore di Fabrizio D. Raschellà, a cura di M. CAPARRINI, M. R. DIGILIO, F. FERRARI, Barcelona – Roma 2017. X + 330 p., ISBN 978-2-503-57927-6 49 Euros

88. Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism: Philosophical and Theological Exchanges between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions, Edited by A. FIDORA and N. POLLONI, Barcelona – Roma 2017. XI + 336 p., ISBN 978-2-50357744-9 49 Euros 89. Boethius, On Topical Differences, A commentary edited by F. MAGNANO, Barcelona – 59 Euros Roma 2017. XCIV + 400 p., ISBN 978-2-503-57931-3

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