The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong: The Anti-extradition Movement [1st ed.] 9789811567117, 9789811567124

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The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong The Anti-extradition Movement Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo Steven Chung-Fun Hung Jeff Hai-Chi Loo

The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong

Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo Steven Chung-Fun Hung Jeff Hai-Chi Loo

The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong The Anti-extradition Movement

Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo HKU School of Professional and Continuing Education (HKU SPACE) Fortress Tower Fortress Hill, Hong Kong

Steven Chung-Fun Hung Department of Social Sciences Education University of Hong Kong Tai Po, Hong Kong

Jeff Hai-Chi Loo Balsillie School of International Affairs University of Waterloo Waterloo, ON, Canada

ISBN 978-981-15-6711-7    ISBN 978-981-15-6712-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgment

This book was completed at a time when Covid-19 affected many parts of the world. The authors worked very diligently at homes during this difficult period. We have to thank a number of people for support of our book. First, we are grateful to Jacob Dreyer for supporting our book project and to Anushangi Weerakoon for her professional assistance. We need to express our deepest gratitude to eight diplomats who were sent to work in Hong Kong, and who shared with us informally and friendly their insights on Hong Kong during the protests, including their assessment of the protesters and police performance. We are also deeply grateful to a few protesters who told us informally how they saw the protests from June to December 2019. We also had the chances to chat with several reporters and journalists, who were willing to share their insights with us. Methodologically, we rely extensively on government documents and press releases to delineate the official interpretations of various events so that a balanced perspective can be maintained. Finally, we dedicate this book to all those people who are deeply concerned about the political development and future of Hong Kong. April 26, 2020

Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo Steven Chung-Fun Hung Jeff Hai-Chi Loo

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Contents

1 Toward a Comprehensive Framework of Studying Peaceful and Violent Protests  1 2 The Legal and Political Origins of the Extradition Bill 51 3 From Protests in June to the Occupation of Legislative Council on July 1 79 4 The Politics of Policing Protests and Incidents of July 21 and August 31117 5 National Security and Beijing’s Responses to the Hong Kong Crisis167 6 Populist Protesters, October 1 Confrontation and Opposition to Anti-mask Law211

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7 Two Final Battles, District Elections, United States and Taiwan263 8 Conclusion311 Bibliography345 Index371

Abbreviations

AmCham ASPDMC BLC BLCC BLDC BPA CCP CDIC CEFC CGLO CHRF CIA CMC CPLAC CPPCC CTU CUHK CYL DAB DPP ERO EU ExCo FTU

American Chamber of Commerce Alliance in Support of Patriotic and Democratic Movement in China Basic Law Committee Basic Law Consultative Committee Basic Law Drafting Committee Business and Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong Chinese Communist Party Central Discipline Inspection Commission China Energy Fund Committee Central Government Liaison Office Civil Human Rights Front Central Intelligence Agency Central Military Commission Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Confederation of Trade Unions Chinese University of Hong Kong Communist Youth League Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong Democratic Progressive Party Emergency Regulations Ordinance European Union Executive Council Federation of Trade Unions

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Abbreviations

HKBA HKGCC HKMAO HKMSA HKSAR HKUST HSBC ICAC IPCC LegCo LRT MTR NPC OMELCO PAP PICO PLA PolyU PRC ROC SAR UK US

Hong Kong Bar Association Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office Hong Kong and Macau Study Association Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation Independent Commission Against Corruption Independent Police Complaints Council Legislative Council Light Rail Transit Mass Transit Railway National People’s Congress Office for the Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils People’s Armed Police Policy Innovation and Coordination Office People’s Liberation Army Polytechnic University of Hong Kong People’s Republic of China Republic of China Special Administrative Region United Kingdom United States

List of Diagrams

Diagram 3.1 The composition of the Hong Kong protesters Diagram 5.1 Vertical accountability of key Hong Kong principal officials. (Source: This diagram is deduced from the protests from July to December 2019 when the authors observed the line of reporting by the three Hong Kong principal officials who visited Beijing) Diagram 6.1 Interactions between Beijing, HKSAR government, nationalistic populists, socialist populists and democratic populists Diagram 7.1 Rating of public satisfaction with the Hong Kong police. (Sources: “People’s Satisfaction with the Disciplinary Force,” in https://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/ disciplinary-force, access date: April 16, 2020) Diagram 7.2 Recorded police arrests from June 2019 to February 2020. (Source: Constructed from the police figures, June 2019 to February 2020. Note: The figures in July included 37 thugs who were not protesters) Diagram 7.3 Police arrests and age groups Diagram 8.1 Public confidence in “One Country, Two Systems.” (Source: “People’s Confidence in ‘One Country, Two Systems,’” in https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/pori_ table_chart/Trust/K006_Conf_OCTS/K006_chart.html, access date: April 16, 2020)

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201 228

285

285 286

320

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 4.7 Table 4.8

Position of the Hong Kong Bar Association on the extradition bill 66 Remarks of mainland legal experts on the extradition bill 71 Remarks of Hong Kong Basic Law Committee members on the extradition bill 73 Foreign countries’ position on the extradition bill 76 Detailed events leading to the occupation of Legislative Council on July 1, 2019 86 The occupation of Legislative Council on July 1, 2019 101 Social media tools used by protesters and their functions 107 Responses of Chinese officials to the occupation of Legislative Council108 Turnout of Hong Kong’s annual July 1st march 118 Key events in July 2019 after the occupation of Legislative Council119 Detailed events of the Yuen Long Triad attack on passengers of Mass Transit Railway on July 21 123 The confrontations between police and citizens in shopping malls133 Citizens’ criticisms of police power at San Uk Ling Holding Center136 Events leading to the incident of Prince Edward MTR Station on August 31, 2019 141 Politicians who were arrested on August 30 147 Events on the August 31 incident in Prince Edward Mass Transit Railway 149

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List of Tables

Table 4.9 Table 4.10 Table 4.11 Table 4.12 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6 Table 5.7 Table 5.8 Table 5.9 Table 5.10 Table 5.11 Table 5.12 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 6.5 Table 6.6 Table 6.7 Table 6.8

Peaceful protests that were allowed by the police and turning 153 to be peaceful, July–December 2019 Peaceful protests that were disallowed by the police and turning to be peaceful, July–December 2019 159 Violent protests, July–December 2019 162 Parades that were disallowed by the police turned out to be violent, July–December 2019 164 Movement and training operations for People’s Armed Police in Shenzhen, August 2019 169 Article 7 of the law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Armed Police 174 Key points of the Basic Law’s article 14 and article 18 176 Articles 1, 5 and 6 of the Garrison law of the HKSAR of the People’s Republic of China 176 Press conferences of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office 177 Remarks of Chinese officials on Hong Kong’s protests, July–December 2019 182 Statements on Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan in the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, November 2019 187 President Xi Jinping’s remarks on comprehensively governing the country in accordance with law 198 Remarks of Zhao Kezhi on Hong Kong and National Security 202 Criticisms of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC) on Jimmy Lai, Martin Lee, Anson Chan and Albert Ho 203 Remarks of Pro-Beijing media on the opposition from July 2019 to November 2019 205 Key points of Luo Huining’s open letter for the NPC deputies and CPPCC members in Hong Kong 208 A comparison between democratic populists and nationalistic populists215 Events of localist movements 221 Carrie Lam’s controversial policies before the extradition bill controversy226 Number of mainland visitors to Hong Kong, June–December 2019227 Events in September leading to the October 1 protests 233 Detailed events of the October 1 protest in Hong Kong Island 235 Detailed events of the October 1 protests in other districts 238 Main content of the Emergency Regulations 249

  List of Tables 

Table 6.9 Table 6.10 Table 6.11 Table 6.12 Table 6.13 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 7.6 Table 7.7 Table 7.8 Table 7.9 Table 7.10 Table 7.11 Table 7.12 Table 7.13 Table 7.14 Table 7.15 Table 7.16 Table 7.17 Table 7.18 Table 8.1

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The remarks of Pro-Beijing’s elites remarks on Emergency Regulations251 Major content of the anti-mask regulation 252 Statements of Liaison Office, Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office and Foreign Ministry on the anti-mask law 253 Detailed events of October 4 and October 5 protests against the anti-mask law 256 Remarks of government officials and Pro-Beijing politicians on the “Yellow Economy” 261 The battle of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, November 11–15, 2019 265 The battle of the Polytechnic University of Hong Kong 268 The last stage of the battle of Polytechnic University, November 20–26 273 The responses of PRC, Taiwan and foreign countries to the Battle of Polytechnic University 275 Tougher police action after Chris Tang’s visit to Beijing to meet Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi 277 Police use of weapons and police arrests 280 District Council elections: critical function as a channel for voicing public anger 287 Protest leaders and activists who were elected to District Councils in 2019 290 Remarks of American politicians on Hong Kong 292 US President Donald Trump’s remarks on Hong Kong 293 Key points in the US Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act 294 Pro-American peaceful protests in Hong Kong 295 Key points of the US State Department’s 2019 country reports on human rights practices in Hong Kong 296 Taiwan’s political parties and Hong Kong protesters 299 Remarks of Taiwan political leaders on the Hong Kong extradition bill 301 Remarks of other foreign leaders on Hong Kong’s antiextradition movement 304 Business tycoon’s remarks on Hong Kong’s protests 305 Mass arrests on April 18, 2020 308 Comparative populist movement in Chile, Iraq, France and Lebanon340

CHAPTER 1

Toward a Comprehensive Framework of Studying Peaceful and Violent Protests

Little research has been conducted on the dynamics and interrelationships of peaceful and violent protests. This book aims at designing an analytical framework for us to comprehend the origins, dynamics and interrelationships of peaceful and violent protests. Peaceful protests refer to those demonstrations, rallies, marches and petitions that do not involve any confrontation and conflicts between the participants on the one hand and law-enforcement authorities, notably the police, on the other. Violent protests mean those confrontational encounters and conflict-ridden relations between the protesters and law-enforcement authorities, including the police, paramilitary and military. This chapter will firstly review the literature and conceptual issues shaping the politics of protests, and secondly will come up with a comprehensive framework for us to comprehend the complex relationships between peaceful and violent protests. The objective of this book is to use the case study of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to explore why an anti-extradition movement, which began from June 2019, continued to last until December 2019. After the outbreak of Covid-19 in China and Hong Kong in early 2020, the protests in the HKSAR have subsided but taken place occasionally. The 2019 movement could be seen as a series of protests against firstly the extradition bill put forward suddenly by the HKSAR government to transfer criminal suspects from Hong Kong to the mainland, and secondly the increasingly assertive police force, which has been playing a crucial role in maintaining © The Author(s) 2021 S. S.-H. Lo et al., The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4_1

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law and order since the eruption of the peaceful and violent protests in Hong Kong in June 2019. As a matter of fact, the Hong Kong protests from June to December 2019 could be divided into three overlapping stages: (1) the anti-extradition movement from June to early September when the bill was eventually withdrawn by the HKSAR government; (2) the anti-police protests starting from July 21, 2019, when some triad members went out to attack the passengers of the Mass Transit Railway (MTR) in Yuen Long district; and (3) the anti-authoritarianism and anti-­ mainlandization protests from June to the present. The ideologies of anti-­ authoritarianism and anti-mainlandization are intertwined, because the former represents the people’s movement against the transformation of a previously “soft” authoritarian regime of the HKSAR to a much “harder” one characterized by the common phenomenon of the police’s determination to exercise their power more arbitrarily against protesters and to arrest them massively.1 This drift from “soft” authoritarianism to “hard” authoritarianism is ideologically in conformity with the ideology and action of many Hong Kong people, especially protesters, to prevent the HKSAR from becoming more like mainland China politically, economically and socially. Some Hong Kong people, including the protesters, are determined to resist the mainlandization of Hong Kong. The term “mainlandization” is academically referred to a process of making the polity, economy and society of Hong Kong more like the mainland’s monolithic political system, where the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is powerful and hegemonic, and where its society and economy witness the extensive penetration of the Party-state.2 At the time of writing, the Hong Kong protests continue to be sporadic, taking place occasionally on the streets of Hong Kong especially during weekends. The protests in Hong Kong are complex, as this book will discuss in detail, and it is academically and practically significant for us to understand its origins, dynamics and the interrelationships between peaceful and violent demonstrations. One main argument of this book is that, for us to understand the politics of protests in the HKSAR, the China factor has to be understood. The HKSAR is territorially an indispensable 1  Edwin Wincker argued that in “soft” authoritarianism, the regime was characterized by occasional repression. See Edwin Wincker, “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?” The China Quarterly, vol. 99 (1984), pp. 481–499. 2  See Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan? (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2008).

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part of China after its return of sovereignty from Britain to the PRC on July 1, 1997. As such, the mainland Chinese policy toward the HKSAR must be considered when we study the politics of peaceful and violent protests. After all, the triangular issues of the extradition bill, anti-­authoritarianism and anti-mainlandization are all directly related to the role of the PRC, as will be discussed later. Once dubbed as “Asia’s finest,” the Hong Kong police force is forefront and prominent in the handling of this tripod of protests against the extradition bill, authoritarian politics and the drift of Hong Kong toward mainlandization. First, it could have played the role of an implementation agent if the extradition bill were passed by the Legislative Council (LegCo). Second, even if it were eventually abandoned, as was the case with Hong Kong in early September when the Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, shelved the bill indefinitely, the police had to maintain law and order by coping with both peaceful and violent protests. Third, the Hong Kong police themselves have to encounter the brunt of public criticisms on whether their actions and performance have already propelled the HKSAR toward a “hard” authoritarian city-state. These actions and performance in 2019 included, for example, the more intensive use of tear gas, the more frequent arrests of political dissidents, the more charges laid upon the protesters who were deemed to violate the law, the increased intensity of conflicts with protesters and the more assertive actions of countering media coverage and reports. Objectively speaking, the police are playing a critical role in maintaining law and order in Hong Kong. At the same time, they are like a political sandwich not only between the HKSAR government and protesters, but also between the PRC regime and local protesters. As such, the Hong Kong police are occupying a pivotal role in the “one country, two systems” principle, which means that the HKSAR can maintain its existing lifestyle and freedom for at least 50 years after July 1, 1997. Whatever actions taken by the local police are bound to be controversial and problematic. The perspective from law enforcement has to be appreciated and understood by the critics of the police. This book is going to adopt an academic, relatively objective, critical and balanced perspective to comprehend the role of Hong Kong police in the dynamic operations of the “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR.

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Toward A Comprehensive Framework of Understanding Peaceful and Violent Protests This chapter is going to review 15 perspectives on the politics of protests, namely (1) legitimacy; (2) state violence and repression; (3) organized crime, vandalism and violence; (4) political violence; (5) democratization and violence; (6) citizenship and violence; (7) social movement and violence; (8) the art of peaceful protests; (9) the relevance of totalitarianism; (10) the psychology of public fear; (11) populism and violence; (12) political symbolism; (13) anarchism and “uncivil society”; (14) insurgency; and (15) the role of the failed state. All these perspectives can help us understand the origins, dynamics and interrelationships of peaceful and violent protests in the case of Hong Kong in a deeper way. Legitimacy The concept of legitimacy is useful for us to understand not only groups but also regimes and violence. Group legitimacy refers to the degree of cohesion of a collection of people, who may have a sense of belonging among themselves, and who see themselves as a “distinct entity.”3 This unique entity can lead to the formation of groupings or groups in which people share their views, interests and common destiny. This kind of group legitimacy can be extended further to become “regime legitimacy,” which can be defined as an “internal type of government and societal organization that characterizes a given unit.”4 If a regime possesses legitimacy, a large segment of the population considers it as politically acceptable. The late Samuel Huntington reminded us of the importance of distinguishing procedural legitimacy from performance legitimacy.5 His concepts of procedural and performance legitimacy are important for us to understand the developing states and societies, particularly cities where their legitimacy is based not on the Western notion of choosing their political leaders through competitive elections, but on a non-Western practice of demonstrating the governmental authority through sustained and successful economic performance. The implication for Huntington’s 3  John H. Herz, “Legitimacy: Can We Retrieve It?,” Comparative Politics, vol. 10, no. 3 (April, 1978), pp. 317–343. 4  Ibid. 5  Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

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notions of procedural and performance legitimacy is that, if citizens of a developing state are eager to advocate procedural reforms that can enhance a regime’s legitimacy, like electoral reforms as with the case of Hong Kong that will be discussed later, the existence of performance legitimacy alone cannot consolidate the overall legitimacy of the state. On performance legitimacy, a regime cannot have strong legitimacy if it continues to adopt a clientelist approach to ruling its peoples, say, favoring the whites and discriminating against the indigenous peoples, as with the situation of an apartheid regime dominated by its white population.6 While a high degree of legitimacy secures public support of the regime in power, a crisis of legitimacy occurs when a regime whose procedural or performance legitimacy is seriously questioned by its populace. As John Herz wrote: Legitimacy runs the scale from complete acclaim (where legitimacy feelings are often unpronounced because taken for granted) to complete rejection, or absence of such feelings, ranging all the way from support, consent, compliance through decline to erosion and loss. In the case of conscious rejection, we may speak of ‘illegitimacy.’ But there is also another pole opposed to complete legitimacy: mere absence of any feeling of either loyalty or disapproval—something that should be distinguished from illegitimacy sentiments and which I would call an attitude of ‘sullen toleration.’ Where there is neither acceptance nor rejection of rulership, discussion of legitimacy becomes meaningless.7

If legitimacy and “complete acclaim” are located on one side of the spectrum, then “illegitimacy” and “sullen toleration” are situated at the other end, with varying public attitudes being found in the middle. These varying public attitudes may range from lukewarm support to profound distrust toward the regime concerned. If any regime faces a crisis of legitimacy, peaceful and violent protests can occur, showing public dissatisfaction with the regime. As Wilson Carey McWilliams remarked, the crisis of legitimacy  Herz, “Legitimacy: Can We Retrieve It?,” p. 319.  Ibid., p. 320.

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involves a challenge to our procedures [and] … does demand change, if only to decrease the likelihood of the worst form of physical violence. In the simplest sense, the crisis requires a rapid expansion of the sense of right and significance among the disadvantaged, and, if violence on the part of the marginal classes is to be avoided, the crisis requires a similar expansion among them (though, obviously, at a lesser rate). In fact, the requirement is one in which all our people have a claim.8

Violence is therefore a means to change a situation and to fight for “a rapid expansion of the sense of right” perceived by some citizens, who see the regime as having legitimacy deficit. Legitimacy and violence can be studied from two different vantage points, namely “a macro-perspective emphasizing formal system properties, and a micro-view emphasizing citizens’ attitudes and actions.”9 Legitimacy in terms of systemic properties embraces four attributes, namely accountability, efficiency, procedural fairness and distributive fairness. If the rulers are accountable to the governed through effective public participation, peaceful rather than violent protests are the hallmark of such regime. If a government can accomplish the society’s wishes without undue waste of resources, peaceful rather than violent protests can be a feature of efficient governance. If procedural fairness is observed through the protection of public access to “decisional arenas” such as policy-­ making processes and social justice,10 then peaceful rather than violent protests can be anticipated in such political system. Finally, if distributive fairness is observed through the implementation of an equity principle in tax collection and income redistribution,11 more citizens would be satisfied with the regime and peaceful rather than violent protests are the hallmark of the political system. In short, the operations of macro-level systemic properties can shape whether a regime is characterized by peaceful or violent protests. Violent protests are arguably triggered by a regime that is politically unaccountable, administratively inefficient, procedurally unfair and in lack of distributive fairness. Legitimacy represents “the construction of social reality” which is expected to be “consistent with cultural beliefs, norms, and values that are presumed to be shared by others in the local situation and perhaps more  Wilson Carey McWilliams, “On Violence and Legitimacy,” The Yale Law Journal, vol. 79 (1970), p. 645. 9  M. Stephen Weatherford, “Measuring Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 1 (March 1992), pp. 149–166. 10  Ibid., p. 150. 11  Ibid., p. 151. 8

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broadly by actors in a broader community.”12 Legitimacy is contingent upon an apparent consensus among social actors in local circumstances in which most people accept the “construction of social reality” as acceptable and satisfactory. This process involved “an implicit and sometimes explicit process in which widespread consensual beliefs about how things should be or typically are done creates strong expectations for what is likely to occur in that local situation.”13 In the process of creating “new social objects,” four stages are involved: (1) social innovations are created at the local level of actors in response to changing conditions; (2) social innovations that acquire legitimacy must be locally accepted or validated; (3) once social objects are locally validated, they are carried out and diffused into new local circumstances; (4) as a result of this diffusion process, the appearance of consensus creates a general consensus in society.14 Once “new social objects” become a part of the status quo, socio-political stability can be maintained and the regime concerned has its legitimacy recognized by its citizens. Compliance within and across interest groups to new practices is commonplace.15 Groups and individuals agree to follow all these new practices, which are then authorized and endorsed by the public. Authorization may come from various professional groups, including for example managers, lawyers, accountants, engineers and teachers. Yet, such authorization may also perpetuate the existing inequalities in the social system.16 For a minority of groups and individuals that do not accept the new social objects and practices, they may apply sanctions and boycotts, but such resistance cannot harm the overall legitimacy. In other words, legitimacy continues in a regime that can adapt to changing circumstances by creating social reality that is accepted by most of the citizens. If not, a legitimacy crisis can emerge if a regime fails to adapt and respond to the changing social, political and economic circumstances. From a Marxist perspective, the legitimacy of a capitalist state attempts at perpetuating itself through reforms, which can be a means through which the capitalist class continues to “exploit” the working class.17 The “construction of social reality” and the creation of “new social objects” and “practices” are bound to be limited in the capitalist context of reforms and changes. The ideologies of citizens in a capitalist state that undertakes 12  Cathryn Johnson, Timothy J. Dowd, and Cecilia L. Ridgeway, “Legitimacy as a Social Process,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 32 (2006), p. 56. 13  Ibid. 14  Ibid., p. 73. 15  Ibid. 16  Ibid., pp. 73–74. 17  Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1977).

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reforms are pertinent in our analysis of public attitudes toward g ­ overnmental adaptation to the changing circumstances. If most citizens are increasingly adopting a Marxist perspective on the state reforms, the capitalist state is arguably encountering a crisis of governance, because its reforms and changes are seen to be piecemeal, inadequate and biased in favor of the dominant capitalist class. As will be discussed later, the Hong Kong case is particularly relevant to this Marxist ideology, because in the recent years more citizens, especially young people, have been perceiving the post-colonial capitalist state as failing to care for the interests of the poor, the needy and the proletariat. As a result, any reforms formulated and implemented by the post-colonial capitalist state in the HKSAR have been seen as partial and in lack of genuine legitimacy. In other words, the capitalist state’s reforms and adaptational policies in response to changing circumstances can be seen as a failure in the minds of its citizens, who may be increasingly attracted by the Marxist ideology to perceive the social and political reality. Even if some citizens are not necessarily adopting a Marxist exploitative perspective to comprehend social changes and reforms in a capitalist regime, the non-Marxist citizens may harbor different aspirations that cannot be tackled and addressed by the government in power. The challenge here is to design a political system which can be representative of the population and reflective of public demands and aspirations. If the representational system is “democratic” and public policies are decided according to the rules of this political accountability system, citizens will regard political decisions as legitimate, as with the precept in mainstream democratic theory.18 To use Huntington’s term, procedural legitimacy is important in the minds of some citizens in a developing state, for they aspire to possess a political system where they can elect the chief executive directly through universal suffrage. If a regime demonstrates its performance legitimacy, including good governance free from the influence of corruption, its legitimacy remains flimsy and weak if its citizens increasingly demand a more representative and accountable political system. As such, the political culture and maturity of citizens in a capitalist state is extremely important. If most citizens are politically apathetic and resign their political destiny to a regime, then the regime’s performance alone can perhaps produce public satisfaction and socio-political stability. If most citizens are increasingly politically active and mature, however, they expect the regime that 18  Bo Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government,” American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 53, no. 3 (2009), pp. 311–330.

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­ erforms well economically to consider and implement reforms that will p propel the entire political system to be more democratic, accountable, transparent and representative. As will be shown in this book, the Hong Kong case appears to show an increasingly politically demanding and mature citizenry supportive of a more democratic political system. If many citizens are increasingly politically assertive and mature, they may tend to use peaceful means to make their demands heard, like holding peaceful rallies and protests. Nevertheless, a minority of citizens may be politically impatient and attempt to use violence to make their demands heard. Violence may become a means by which some increasingly politicized and ideologized citizens lobby the government to undertake drastic reforms. If we recall David Easton’s political system theory in which inputs from citizens and groups are channeled into the “black box” where the government has to produce outputs accordingly,19 then violence can be comprehended as a kind of “input” so that the government is pressured to change its policy and introduce more drastic reforms. If the government fails to do so, more violence may be used by some radical and politicized citizens, thereby perpetuating a vicious cycle in which insufficient reforms bring about violence, and yet violence leads to state suppression and inaction in response to public demands. Hence, the character of the administration is “decisive for the way in which the political system is viewed.”20 Bo Rothstein has argued that “impartiality as the basic norm for generating legitimacy on the output side of the political system is the equivalent of political equality as the basic norm on the input side.”21 If these norms of impartiality and equality were accepted by the government concerned, its legitimacy can be enhanced. Conversely, political biases on the output side and inequality on the input side can harm the legitimacy of the state. In the case of Hong Kong, as will be examined in this book, the protracted process of protests from June to December 2019 showed political biases on the output side and inequalities on the input side, thereby plunging the entire political system into instability and turbulence. For a regime to gain legitimacy as it undertakes democratic reforms, three elements are essential: the existence of a political opposition, the 19  David Easton, The Political System. An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Knopf, 1953). 20  Bo Rothstein, “Creating Political Legitimacy Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government,” American Behavioral Scientist, Volume 53, Number 3 (2009), 311–330. (p. 325). 21  Ibid., pp. 325–326.

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presence of fair and free election and the presence of political elites to receive, appreciate and understand public sentiments.22 If political opposition is suppressed, elections are unfair and political elites are blind to public opinion, the regime legitimacy can be in a deep crisis, leading to a scenario in which protests, both peaceful and violent, can be a commonplace. Objectively speaking, the case of Hong Kong, which will be examined in this book, is marked fortunately by the presence of political opposition and fair elections at the legislative and district levels, even though the political elites may be arguably turning a blind eye to public sentiments, especially in the protests from June to December 2019. State Violence and Repression If a state responds to citizen actions, like rallies, petitions and protests, by hardline measures such as repression and putting dissidents into jail, the result is to generate more confrontations between citizens and police. State repression and violence are theoretically and practically intertwined. State repression can take the forms of police crackdown of protesters and dissidents, the infiltration of agents into the opposition to divide its leaders and members, the cancelation and rigging of elections and the arrest of protest leaders. An authoritarian regime calculates politically that its repressive tactics would unlikely bring about strong reactions from the opposition and dissidents, partly because of the weaknesses of the political opposition, and partly because the repressive state apparatuses, such as the police and military, can utilize coercion and force easily and effectively. Yet, in the era of globalization in which human rights activists and non-­ governmental organizations can cooperate across territorial boundaries and fight against authoritarian repression, they can gather collectively and constitute a strong resistance to state repressive tactics. As James Ron observes: Populations, situated outside of traditional state structures, are sometimes able to act successfully in global arenas and to substantially affect state behavior. To the extent that both a state and the population it targets are deeply embedded in the structures of the world polity, patterns of state repression will tend to be more bureaucratized, professionalized, and rationalized. Repressive states will cloak their activities in a mantle of  Ibid., pp. 325–326.

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­ seudo-­legality that channels their techniques of repression into ways that p appear, at least to the outside observer, to follow legitimate patterns of violence. Legitimate repression, above all, eschews methods such as disappearances, massacres, arbitrary executions, and the most obvious forms of torture. These methods are easily picked up by global monitoring agencies and have become so reviled that they become a significant liability to their practitioners.23

State security forces, global auditors and targeted populations are enmeshed in a complex process of negotiations. In other words, the targeted populations can globalize state repression and seek protection from “illegitimate violence” while exposing themselves to state coercion.24 In short, state repression may not bring about the result that authoritarian regime wishes to see. Rather, by using repression, authoritarian regimes may have counterproductive results in which the targeted population can fight back more effectively with the assistance of global human rights organizations and external actors, thereby exacerbating an already legitimacy crisis that the authoritarian regimes encounter. The new methods of internationalizing the domestic conflicts between political dissidents and the authoritarian regime can “restrict the repressive state’s freedom of action.”25 Ron concludes that “as populations, states, and world polity agents negotiate the parameters of modern conflicts, they call into question traditional notions of state sovereignty.”26 Ron’s insights on the counterproductive result of state repression, as we will discuss, have implications for the case of Hong Kong from June to December 2019. Some targeted protesters tended to fight back with the help from global human rights groups and, most importantly, the United States as an external factor that enacted the US Hong Kong Democracy and Human Rights Act. As a result, the already deepened crisis of legitimacy endured by the HKSAR government was exacerbated further as it was undermined severely by a democratic deficit. This democratic deficit prolongs the crisis of legitimacy of the Hong Kong administration, making the protests persist and occur sporadically on the anniversary dates in 23  James Ron, “Varying Methods of State Violence,” International Organization, vol. 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 275–300. 24  James Ron, “Varying Methods of State Violence,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring, 1997), pp. 275–300. (p. 298). 25  Ibid., p. 298. 26  Ibid., p. 299.

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2020. By anniversary dates they refer to those signature dates in 2019 when the protesters clashed with the police seriously and fiercely. Yet, as Ron mentions, by “internationalizing” domestic conflicts, the protesters provoked external actors’ intervention, “state sovereignty” can be challenged because “populations, states and world polity agents” may “negotiate the parameters of modern conflicts”—a phenomenon that is applicable to Hong Kong where the PRC has remained highly sensitive to “external” intervention. Christian Davenport observes that three aspects of political conflicts— conflict frequency, strategic variety and the deviance from cultural norms— can shape the degree of state repression.27 Most importantly, different regimes respond to domestic threats in varying ways.28 He found that “non-democratic governments” tend to increase political repression when they encounter more strategic conflicts and deviance from cultural norms. Moreover, “transitional regimes” tend to increase repression significantly in the face of the deviance from cultural norms, while “democratic regimes” followed “a similar pattern of threat perception and response to that identified within the transitional category.”29 Democracies tend to tolerate some aspects of the behavior of political dissidents, notably their strategic conflicts and conflict frequency. Davenport concludes that “the repressive response of the regime is probably attributed to their low level of regulatory capacity: i.e., the capacity of the regime to monitor acts of political conflict and respond to these acts in an efficient manner.”30 In other words, when “the culturally defined parameters of acceptable dissent had been violated, then censorship and political restrictions would be applied at relatively high rates.”31 Regimes tend to stick to their “culturally defined parameters of acceptable dissent” beyond which political repression is bound to be increased. While “non-democratic” regimes show their sensitivity to all kinds of threats, the “transitional” and “democratic” regimes tend to apply sanctions on those threats that undermine the existing cultural norms.32 27  Christian Davenport, “Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 683–713. 28  Ibid., p. 707. 29  Ibid., pp. 707–708. 30  Ibid., p. 708. 31  Ibid. 32  Ibid., pp. 708–709.

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Other scholars have found that the effect of political dissent on state repression is a function of two strategic processes.33 Governments engage in “preventive repression,” such as the adoption of curfews and the prohibitions on assembly, to undermine the mobilization of political dissidents.34 Interestingly, “when authorities repress in expectation of dissent, most dissent will not occur”; nevertheless, in the absence of preventive repression, political dissidents who “are not tested by direct government intervention” may “self-censor in expectation of a repressive response.”35As a result, “governments who did not engage in ex ante repression will be quite likely to do it ex post.”36 The dynamic interactions between political dissents and the government will be later examined in this book by using the Hong Kong case. Organized Crime, Vandalism and Violence Organized criminal violence is a hallmark of state-building processes in which a transition from war to peace often witnesses violent activities that involve former combatants and military personnel.37 These combatants and military officers may join either the state security apparatus or criminal organizations to gain access to resources and to protect themselves from being penalized. Some members of the security apparatus may continue to act as “informal powerbrokers, allowing impunity and violence to continue despite transitions to electoral democracy.”38 In some Latin American states, the transition from authoritarianism to democracy was characterized by the collaboration between some state actors and “criminal and extralegal actors in their search for higher levels of political legitimacy.”39 In other words, if state actors are involved in the participation and endorsement of criminal activities, the boundaries between legality and illegality 33  Emily Hencken Ritter, “Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 110, Issue. 1, (Feb 2016): pp. 85–99. 34  Ibid. 35  Ibid. 36  Emily Hencken Ritter, “Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression,” American Political Science Review, vol. 110, no. 1 (February 2016), pp. 85–99. 37  Nicholas Barnes, “Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 15, no. 4 (2017), pp. 967–987. 38  Ibid. 39  Ibid., p. 970.

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can be blurred. Political violence may be committed by not only criminal elements but also some state actors. This “organized violence” can become “important underlying mechanisms such as demand for looting, desire for political change, opportunity to mobilize, and the mechanisms that lead to claim making and resource extraction.”40 In short, the state-building processes are complex, involving explicitly criminal activities and the hidden collaboration between some criminal elements and state actors.41 Criminal elements may confront state security forces, assassinate politicians and judges and threaten bureaucrats. On the other hand, they may infiltrate political parties, state agencies and public security apparatuses, generating a complex but symbiotic relationship between organized crime and politics. The relationships between organized crime and politics can involve manipulation, confrontation, interdependence, mistrust, cooperation and conflicts.42 While organized crime and the state are intertwined, organized crime often “maintains its autonomy” even when it is incorporated into the state apparatus through corruption and collaboration in electoral campaigns.43 Although violence between criminal organizations and the state is commonplace, it usually does not involve an all-out war for territorial hegemony, mainly because organized crime elements are content with their gains and do not want to “rock the boat” by confronting with the state directly and comprehensively through insurgency. The relations between organized crime and the state “are often fluid, shifting back and forth between these various arrangements over time,” with these arrangements being either short-lived or persistent for decades.44 Finally, because organized crime groups tend to carve out their own territories narrowly, they are quite different from informal criminal groupings, such as hooligans, riot crowds or looters.45 These insights have implications for Hong Kong, as will be discussed, because the protests in the HKSAR from June to December 2019 were punctuated by many informal groupings, including riot crowds, flash mobs and sudden looters, who were a far cry from the organized crime organizations that have vested interests in their businesses, such as nightclubs, bars, saunas and even restaurants where  Ibid., p. 971.  Ibid. 42  Ibid., pp. 972–973. 43  Ibid., p. 973. 44  Ibid., pp. 973–974. 45  Ibid., p. 973. 40 41

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­ rganized crime elements can earn their lucrative income and launder o dirty money easily. While organized crime and politics have been studied productively by scholars, the question of vandalism has been relatively neglected. “Urban vandalism” is defined as “deliberate damage of property” including the acts of wall painting, windows breaking and throwing stones in municipal transport.46 Vandalism as an individual act of undermining or destroying the properties of others can be regarded as criminal. If vandalism turns into an act of a group of like-minded persons, then it can be regarded as organized crime. As such, vandalism falls into the gray areas between organized crime and violence. “Urban vandalism” is different from “body vandalism,” with the former focusing its target at properties and the latter attempting at manipulating “an incapacitated individual through the addition of markings, objects or substances, removal of property or hair, or a relocation of a body.”47 Urban vandalism may stem from individual or group behavior that damages properties for the sake of expressing their personal freedom and views, including political declaration that may ultimately aim at a regime. On the other hand, body vandalism tends to be committed by some young people who are alcoholic and who target at individuals whom they dislike. Both urban and body vandalism have one thing in common: the ultimate target is disliked or hated by the individuals or groups who perform the act of vandalism. Some psychologists have found that vandalism is conducted by those people who have a sadistic tendency of finding pleasure through their vandal actions.48 In brief, vandalism is accompanied by sadism. Apart from sadism, people who commit vandalism are more likely to be hedonistic, to perceive themselves as personally capable to control the situation and enhance their efficacy, and to identify themselves with a group that unifies

46  N. V. Pavlova, Y. G. Pavlov and K. V. Zlokazov, “Visual Perception of Urban Vandalism,” International Journal of Psychophysiology, vol. 131 (October 2018), pp. 121–122. 47  Heather Krieger, Angelo M.  DiBello, and Clayton Neighbors, “An Introduction to Body Vandalism: What is this? Who does it? When does it happen?,” Addictive Behaviors, vol. 64 (2017), pp. 89–92. 48  Stefan Pfattheicher, Johannes Keller, and Goran Knezevic, “Destroying things for pleasure: On the relation of sadism and vandalism,” Personality and Individual Differences, vol. 140 (2019), pp. 52–56.

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its members.49 Other social scientists have postulated that vandalism occurs more likely in lower socio-economic districts than higher ones.50 However, one anonymous writer remarked that the principal victims of vandalism are those “relatively poor families” and that the targets of vandalism are usually “semi-public, communal areas of local authority-­ administered buildings which are ‘out of sight of residents and passers-by,’ such as corridors and lifts in apartment buildings, public lavatories and shopping precincts.”51 In the case of Hong Kong, we will discuss whether vandalism tends to be committed by people who tend to be anti-­ governmental, sadistic, hedonistic, group-oriented and whether it is more likely to take place in lower-class districts and “semi-public” areas. Street art, which refers to the drawing and painting on public or private properties, may be regarded as an expression of freedom and creativity by some people.52 However, street art can also be a kind of vandalism with the political objective of using words and slogans to discredit and delegitimize any regime. The protests in Hong Kong from June to December 2019 fully illustrated the utilization of street art by some protesters to discredit, delegitimize and criticize the post-colonial government, including the police force. The transformation of street art to urban vandalism in Hong Kong will also be examined later. Political Violence Political violence can be defined generally as the activities of a group or groups to run against the prevailing socio-cultural norms and to challenge the legitimacy of the state. Protest actions are “by definition un-­ institutionalized, disruptive forms of collective action” and “have long been unlawful, even if tolerated and semi-institutionalized.”53 Indeed, 49  V. L. Allen, “Toward an understanding of the hedonistic component of vandalism,” in Claude Levy-Leboyer, ed., Vandalism, Behavior and Motivations (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1984), pp. 77–90. 50  William Bates, “Caste, Class and Vandalism,” Social Problems, vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring 1962), pp. 349–353. 51  G. B. T., “Vandalism,” The British Journal of Criminology, vol. 19, no. 2 (April 1979), pp. 168–170. Note that the full name of G. B. T. is unclear. 52  Yasmine El Rashidi, “Art of Vandalism?,” Index on Censorship, vol. 40, no. 3 (October 2011), pp. 78–88. 53  Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 3.

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some “unlawful” protests can be peaceful, meaning that the participants can use parade and marches to express their views, even though protests have not been approved by the police. Yet, once protests turn violent, the question of political violence is under the media spotlight, involving both protesters and police. Such political violence may include attacks on property, when damage or theft of property is the main goal; rioting, when unorganized disorder leads to damage to property; violent confrontation, when members of opposing political groups fight with one another; clashes with the police, when protesters interact violently with the police; violent attacks directed against persons, when one political group attacks another group, or members of the elite or the public, causing injuries or deaths; random violent attacks, when organized violence is directed against persons, regardless of their political or social identities; armed seizure of places or people, including armed trespassing, holdups and hijacking. It is worth noting that, in all these forms of action, the main objective is a de facto display of physical force.54 Political violence embodies “a heterogeneous repertoire of actions oriented at inflicting physical, psychological and symbolic damage to individuals and/or property with the intention of influencing various audiences for affecting or resisting political, social, and/or cultural change.”55 It is used by political actors across the ideological spectrum and includes actions such as attacks on property, bodily harm, the planting of explosive devices, shooting attacks, kidnappings, hostage-taking, stone-throwing, the seizure of aircraft or ships, the occupation of a parliament, assassinations and public self-immolation.56 However, political violence is also “culture-dependent,”57 meaning that all these forms of contentious politics may be called either terrorism or resistance “depending on the circumstances and who is doing the naming.”58 In a nutshell, it is politics that decides whether the acts of political violence are “terrorists” or “ ­ resistance.”  Ibid., p. 4.  Ibid. 56  Lorenzo Bosi and Stefan Malthaner, “Political Violence,” in Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani eds., The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 439–440. 57  D. Rucht, “Movement Allies, Adversaries, and Third Parties” in D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule and H.  Kriesi, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 369. 58  Patricia Steinhoff and Gilda Zwerman, “Introduction to the Special Issue on Political Violence.” Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31, no. 3 (2008), pp. 213–220. 54 55

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In the context of Hong Kong under the PRC sovereignty, who controls the naming of these acts belong to the political leaders. As this book will discuss, there has been a fierce power struggle between the ruling political elites in the HKSAR and the protesters. For the ruling elites, political violence has been committed by the “terrorists,” but it represents a “resistance” movement in the eyes of protesters. Political violence is a broad term for contested actions and political events which involve the use of physical force. These events may be labeled as terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency, self-defense, retribution, security policing, national defense, national liberation, state-­ sponsored terrorism or even genocide, depending on the circumstances and on who controls the political power of naming.59 The term political violence is arguably neutral, allowing us to focus on the sequences of such violent activities, their content and context, and who are the powerful actors controlling the naming of these acts. In a sense, power struggle is embedded in the process of how political violence is tackled. The political sociology of violence helps us focus on “the naming of acts and the interpretation of their meaning” within the “messy, contested real-world contexts.”60 It is important to note that political actors “not only shift back and forth between violent and non-violent forms of action, but also use them in various combinations.”61 In brief, violence is not an exceptional form of political action, but it has to be understood in the context of other non-­ violent and “routine” forms of political action.62 The decision of political actors to use violent means or not is heavily shaped by the groups’ objectives, strategies, identity orientations and their adaptative response to the changing circumstances, including the actions of their opponents and even allies.63 A hallmark of political violence is that the decision to adopt violent means is considered to be influenced by the fact that “groups are embedded in complex webs of contingent relationships and strategic interactions among a variety of actors—including state agents, rival groups, or counter-movements—all of whom shape the evolution of the conflict as  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 213. 61  Bosi and Malthaner, “Political Violence,” in Porta and Diani, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, pp. 439–440. 62  Ibid. 63  Ibid. 59 60

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they are linked by asymmetrical power balances.”64 These insights are, as will be discussed in this book, extremely useful for us to comprehend the dynamics of peaceful and violent protests in the HKSAR from June to December 2019. Political violence can be situated in a broader context of social movement. The social movement perspective recognizes that violent interactions between protesters and the state “are embedded in the wider processes of political contentions that shape relations between actors and the trajectory of violent conflicts.”65 Violent action can be contextualized in three aspects.66 Firstly, it is one of several forms of confrontation within a wider repertoire of oppositional strategies. Secondly, militant and radical groups are embedded within the broader field of political actors involved in the conflicts. Thirdly, violent interactions are built into the wider processes of political contentions, involving the state agents and security apparatus. Such interactions are the outcomes of dynamic relations between the violent and non-violent actors on the one hand and the state actors on the other. Hence, violence becomes “de-exceptionalized and de-essentialized.”67 Last but not the least, political violence “does not constitute a single strategic form” and it has various forms and levels, “entailing transformations of political conflicts that are complicated as much as they are significant—hence a richness which the analysis must capture.”68 The analyses above are useful for us to comprehend the complex interactional dynamics between violent and non-violent protesters on the one hand and the state actors, such as government leaders and the police, in the HKSAR from June to December 2019 on the other hand. The relations between violent and non-violent actors in Hong Kong have not been carefully studied and this book is going to fill in the crucial gap in the existing literature.

 Ibid., pp. 441–442.  Ibid., p. 442. 66  Lorenzo Bosi, Chares Demetriou and Stefan Malthaner, “A Contentious Politics Approach to the Explanation of Radicalization,” in Lorenzo Bosi, ed., Dynamics of Political Violence A Process–Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014), pp. 1–26. 67  Ibid., p. 2. 68  Ibid., p. 5. 64 65

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Democratization and Violence The literature on the relationships between democratization and violence can contribute to our deeper understanding of the dynamics of political violence. Violence is produced within a wider bargaining process over political change: protests mobilized by opponents to the ruling elites in power brings about public order policing; the ruling regime deploys special forces in coping with opposition protests; and political actors can manipulate local conflicts and utilize protests in the context of party formation and even national elections.69 In the theory of democratic transitions, “if violence-producing mechanisms are linked to bargaining, violence may decline rapidly once its roots are exposed and/or an agreement is formally or tacitly reached.”70 Political actors may make agreements with the regime by utilizing violence as a bargaining chip. If agreements can be reached, the perceptions of bargainers on the effects of violence on their political stance may also change. From the perspective of rational choice, in an authoritarian state, the opportunity for collective political action and chances of success are low, and the costs of such action are high, thereby reducing the likelihood of protest and political challenges to the regime.71 In a democratic state, the opportunity for peaceful collective action and probability of success are higher than that for violent action.72 In between two types of regimes is the intermediate state, where “opportunities exist for protests and challenges to incumbents but the probability of success through peaceful means is low.”73 The incentives for violent tactics exist on the part of both political challengers and the regime incumbents. These observations will be useful for us to understand the case of the HKSAR, which can be regarded as “an intermediate state” that was arguably neither democratic nor authoritarian in 2019. But it has become more authoritarian since the promulgation of the National Security Law on June 30, 2020. Four propositions were put forward on how different political actors may employ violence as an indispensable part of the bargaining process.74 69  Jacqueline M.  Klopp and Elke Zuern, “The Politics of Violence in Democratization: Lessons from Kenya and South Africa,” Comparative Politics, vol. 39, no. 2 (January 2007), pp. 127–146. 70  Ibid., p. 129. 71  Ibid. 72  Ibid. 73  Ibid. 74  Ibid., p. 130.

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First, hardliners in a government may utilize violence to undermine the opposition actors and to derail any liberal reform. Softliners in the government may not support violence, but they can still benefit from violence during negotiations. Second, moderate opposition actors use protests to test the regime’s promises of liberalization and democratization, mobilizing both domestic and international support for reforms. If such opposition actions are peaceful but encounter state-sponsored violence, then the circumstances may strengthen the position of the opposition. Third, if there is a split in the regime between hardliners and softliners, any revelations of the use of violence by hardliners against opposition actors may strengthen the softliners’ position. The threat of any full-scale civil war may lead to a phenomenon that more political actors support the reformist position of softliners in the regime. Fourth, the radicals or hardliners in the opposition camp may use internal rivalries to fuel conflicts and to weaken the position of their political foes. In short, all political actors can calculate the costs and benefits of conflicts, which become the instruments of achieving their own interests. Once an agreement is reached between the opposition and the regime, incentives to use violence decline among actors. This explains how some “newly democratic institutions might emerge out of violence, producing bargaining processes that, sadly, often leave significant authoritarian and violent legacies.”75 All these bargaining calculations and considerations can be applied to our study of the case of Hong Kong, where the political opposition is fragmented and divided into hardliners (radicals) and moderates. Resistant Citizenship and Violence According to Charles Tilly, identities shape the politics of collective violence.76 Political actors rarely describe themselves as networks; instead, they use collective nouns such as workers, women, fighters, heroic protesters, to name just a few examples. Such political identities offer the collective answers to the question of who the protesters are. Tilly remarked that political identities assemble the crucial elements of separating the boundaries between a group from its enemy, sharing stories about the group’s attributes and delineating the social relations across and within the  Ibid., p. 142.  Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 75 76

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­ oundaries.77 Violent groups may identify themselves because of having a b common enemy, sharing stories of victimization among themselves and defending their own boundaries at all costs. In response to political identities, “governmental agents sort political identities into legitimate and illegitimate, recognized and unrecognized.”78 Democratic regimes tolerate interest groups like Greenpeace and Boy Scouts as legitimate political actors, while other authoritarian regimes may not tolerate non-governmental associations of any kind. For interest groups that speak for ethnic, religious and racial categories, they may claim to have a legitimate right to exist, but it is another matter for regimes to recognize these organizations as legitimate. As such, “political rights come into existence through struggles for recognition.”79 In the case of Hong Kong, what is politically recognized and legitimate will be discussed in this book, especially for the protest groups that were active from June to December 2019. The rise of nationalism has been shaping the politics of recognition struggles. From the late eighteenth century onward, nationalism gained increasing importance as a political principle: a nation should ideally have its own independent state, and an independent state should have its own nation.80 Two versions of nationalism became prominent. A top-down version of nationalism has claimed that the existing rulers have the right to impose their preferred definitions of national culture on their subjects. But a bottom-up version has asserted “the right of distinct nations within heterogeneous states to acquire political independence.”81 The top-down nationalism is interacting with the bottom-up one. If rulers try to impose national cultures and obligations on their subjects, then distinct minorities are more likely to call for self-determination and independence. Because people have their political identities and organized networks of trust and solidarity, top-down nationalism can “wound minority self-esteem” and threaten their survival.82 Minorities and ethnic groups try to gain power by gaining political recognition as the representatives or spokespersons of their nations. After the Second World War, many large-scale violent conflicts stemmed from the claims of minorities and ethnic groups to have  Ibid., p. 88.  Ibid., pp. 88–89. 79  Ibid., pp. 88–89. 80  Ibid., pp. 90–91. 81  Ibid. 82  Ibid., p. 91. 77 78

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their right of self-determination and independence.83 From the perspective of citizenship, these minorities and ethnic groups firmly believe that citizenship means the realization of their self-determination and call for independence. Indeed, the denial of full citizenship rights to minority individuals and ethnic groups has triggered political violence in many parts of the world. The incumbent regimes have “felt compelled to resort to constitutional gymnastics to justify their political exclusion on the basis of citizenship.”84 To the minorities and many ethnic groups, the regimes in power can manipulate the political processes, hold the power of recognition and shape the meaning of citizenship. From a bottom-up perspective, citizenship refers to the realization of the rights of the minorities and those ethnic groups whose rights are deprived by the regime in power. As such, protests emerge because of the citizenship claims from these minority groups. They may resort to resistant actions, using protests, petitions and rallies to make their voices heard. The radical elements may even resort to rebellion and uprising. Violence, to the minorities and ethnic groups that are politically suppressed, is a means for them to resist the repressive regime, to achieve their political ends of being recognized and to realize their right of self-determination and independence. Political resistance can be both passive and active. Passively, citizen resistance to a regime may embrace mass boycott and mass strike. Actively, resistant citizenship entails assertive actions of opposing the regime and sees violence as strategic. Radical citizens, who see their resistance to the state actions as rightful, tend to use violence to achieve their political objective of exerting pressure on the government to make concessions. On the other hand, other radicals may see violence as an ultimate objective in which they find self-enjoyment. In response, the ruling regime must deploy the police and military to suppress violent resistance fighters. In the context of Hong Kong, some radical protesters believe that they have the right of “self-determination,” a right that was denied by both Britain and China in 1982–1984, when the Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong took place, and when both countries equated self-­ determination with independence. As will be discussed by this book, a  Ibid., pp. 91–92.  Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Citizenship, Political Violence, and Democratization in Africa,” Global Governance, vol. 10, no. 4 (October–December 2004), pp. 403–409. 83 84

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minority of radical protesters in the HKSAR appear to imagine that Hong Kong is their “nation,”85 but most protesters tend to fight for other political rights, notably their right to elect their Chief Executive through universal suffrage, rather than achieving any territorial “independence.” Social Movement and Violence Collective violence is a common feature in social movements. It involves social interactions with the characteristics of inflicting damages on persons and/or objects, gathering at least two perpetrators of damage and resulting from coordination among those people who commit such violent acts.86 From the perspective of social movement, violence can be understood in the broader context of political conflicts and social environment, including the relational dynamics that shape violent actions.87 Violence represents an “escalation of action repertoires within protest cycles.”88 Charles Tilly’s concept of “repertoires of action” not only describes the forms of protests at a particular time and place but also entails a learning process from previous waves of protests so that forms of actions can be adapted across nations.89 There can be clusters of protest activities, which are called “protest cycles” with a sharp peak and then decline. The “repertoires of action” develop during the intense interactions between protesters and the law-enforcement agents within a protest cycle. The analysis of protest cycles is useful for us to understand political violence, which is “frequently one of the outcomes of a cycle of protests.”90 The “repertoires of action” are regarded as “a relational dynamic, developing from the interactions between challengers and elites.”91

85  For an argument that nationalism in Hong Kong is a “myth,” see Jeff Hai-chi Loo, “The Myth of ‘Hong Kong Nationalism,’” Asian Education and Development Studies, https:// doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-10-2018-0161, forthcoming 2020. 86  Ibid., p. 22. 87   Bosi and Malthaner, “Political Violence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, p. 442. 88   Donatella della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence,” Qualitative Sociology, vol 31 (2008), pp. 221–230. 89  Ibid., p. 222. 90  Ibid. 91  Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

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Some sociologists have utilized the concept of “political opportunity” to comprehend the dynamics of social movement and violence.92 Political opportunities include regime shifts, periods of political instability and changes in the composition of political elites that may provide an opening for social movements. Furthermore, “a political environment that was initially more open to social movements may close as the state tries to reassert control over protest, or as new groups come to power that are more hostile to the demands of social movements.”93 Encounters between social movements and the state apparatuses can produce violence easily. The conditions that favor the escalation of violence in the left-wing or right-wing movements often stimulate radical counter-movements, leading to violent confrontations among these groups.94 Italy was a case in point as student activists clashed with neo-­ Fascists in the 1970s while conflicts erupted among young members of right-wing and left-wing underground groups who fired at each other right in front of some high schools.95 Radical groups also used terror against civil rights activists in the United States, Northern Ireland and Spain. In response to violence, the policing of protests derives from several characteristics of the police forces, including their structures, culture, training and the degree of professionalization. These elements influence police strategies and their knowledge about their changing environment, thereby affecting their assessment and perception of the rights of protesters. Police strategies depend upon their political choices, which must be studied in the changing political opportunity structure.96 From an organizational perspective, resource mobilization plays a key role in shaping the politics of social movement and violence. Underground organizations can evolve among themselves and then break away from the larger, non-violent, social movement organizations.97 Yet, political violence can be symbolic: “the cultural and emotional effects that it produces

92   Donatella Della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence,” Qualitative Sociology, vol 31 (2008), pp. 223–224. 93  Ibid. 94  Ibid. 95  Donatella Della Porta, D. Social Movements, Political violence and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 96   Donatella Della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence,” Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31 (2008), pp. 223–224. 97  Ibid., pp. 225–226.

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are more important than the material damage.”98 Governmental policies are influenced by the “symbolic struggles” between a “law-and-order” and a “civil rights” coalition.99 In Italy, Germany, Northern Ireland and the Basque region in the 1970s, different political actors coalesced to form two opposing camps: “a law and order coalition asking for tough measures against protesters, and a civil rights coalition asking for more democracy.”100 Both used the mass media to shape public opinion about the legitimate forms of protest and acceptable forms of policing, affecting the social movement and state strategies. In general, the emergence of protests increased public concern about law and order, prompting the conservative elites to support and call for hardline tactics, but simultaneously the demands for a more liberal approach to the rights of citizens became widespread in the society. The development of political violence was seen as a phenomenon that polarized the debate over democratization, resulting in “a weakening of the civil rights coalition.”101 The ideas used by different groups to justify their actions are often the “frames” which identify protagonists and antagonists and which mobilize public support for their chosen course of action.102 They develop their “explanatory consistency and emotional power through narratives or stories that connect the group’s collective past to their present situation.”103 The Art of Peaceful Protests Protests can be peaceful and cultural. According to T. V. Reed, there are three elements in the cultural study of social movements: movements in culture, movement cultures and culture in movements.104 Movements in culture mean “the processes by which movements emerge from, and return to, broad cultural contexts.”105 Movement cultures refer to “the 98  Donatella Della Porta, D. Social Movements, Political Violence and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 99   Donatella Della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence,” Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31 (2008), pp. 225–226. 100  Ibid. 101  Ibid. 102  Ibid. 103  Ibid. 104  T.V. Reed, The Art of Protest: Culture and Activism from the Civil Rights Movement to the Streets of Seattle (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 296. 105  Ibid.

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general meaning-making patterns that develop among participants in the subculture formed by a given movement.”106 Culture in movements includes “those specific aesthetic-cultural artifacts (songs, poems, murals, and so forth) deployed within the shifting orbit of a movement culture.”107 The cultural dimension of protests is characterized by “three-stage dialectical process.”108 First, movements emerge out of a cultural environment in which they develop new cultural features, which are then channeled back into the wider culture. For example, the act of challenging conventional politics may bring about possibilities for the masses to develop a new culture of questioning whether any government action or policy is justifiable and good for public interest. Second, this reviewing process becomes more intensive and extensive, developing into a new movement culture in which citizens are imbued with a novel pattern of questioning the authorities. Third, over the course of developing movement cultures, citizens begin to use artifacts, artworks, creative songs and poems to express their views. These new elements of the movement culture can be diffused back into the wider culture.109 Reed’s insights are, as this book will show, extremely enlightening in the case study of Hong Kong. During the Occupy Central Movement in the HKSAR from September to December 2014, when some democrats pushed for the direct election of the Chief Executive through universal suffrage and the direct election of the entire Legislative Council (LegCo), numerous artworks were displayed and showed not only tremendous creativity on the part of the participants, but also the freedom of expression, of thought, and of speech in the entire movement.110 These artworks, including posters, stickers and paintings, developed into a new movement culture, stimulating the citizens and participants to think about political events critically and innovatively. Some participants debated over political issues on the streets, while others formed discussion groups to examine  Ibid.  Ibid. 108  Ibid. 109  Ibid., pp. 296–297. 110  As early as 2012, when the Hong Kong Chief Executive election was held, some netizens began to show their political creativity in their political discourse and opposition to the authorities. See Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, “Political Comics and Freedom of Expression: The 2012 Chief Executive Election in Hong Kong,” in C.  C. Leung and Sonny Lo, eds., Creativity and Culture in Contemporary Greater China: The Role of Governments, Individuals and Groups (Santa Monica, Los Angeles: Bridge21 Publications, 2014). 106 107

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the strategies of and solutions to the social and political movement. Culturally speaking, the Occupy Central Movement in the HKSAR from September to December 2014 had long-term ramifications for Hong Kong’s political development, because it fully utilized the existing political space in the territory to generate a new movement culture with the special features of arousing the political awareness of citizens and stimulating to think about a whole range of issues, including politics, political reform, Hong Kong’s relations with mainland China, and their own social, cultural and political identities. The Occupy Central Movement in the HKSAR challenged the mainstream culture of maintaining the status quo and seeing the rule of law as “sacred.” As law professor Benny Tai, one of the three leaders of the movement, remarked, the Occupy Central Movement did “violate the law to achieve justice.”111 The anti-extradition, anti-police and anti-authoritarianism movement in Hong Kong from June to December 2019 was, as this book will elaborate, characterized by the proliferation of artworks and artifacts that challenged the authorities in both the HKSAR and the central government in Beijing. If Reed has noted that the “diffusion of movement culture back into mainstream culture can at times be the most important impact a given movement may have,”112 then the case study of Hong Kong is prominent in illustrating this kind of diffusion. Other observations made by Reed are also significant for us to study the politics of peaceful protests. He identifies different “functions of cultural forms” within movements: namely encouraging individuals to feel the strength of a group through singing in mass rallies; empowering an individual to feel deeply his or her commitment in the movement; informing participants of the values, ideas and tactics of the movement; educating outsiders about the movement’s values and ideas; achieving the goals of the movement; focusing on the historical aspects of the movement; transforming the group’s emotions and attentions; challenging dominant ideas and values; and providing pleasure, self-satisfaction and respite from the rigors of the movement.113

111  “Benny Tai must be deprived of his teaching post who breaks the law and violates,” Ta Kung Pao, April 10, 2018, in http://www.takungpao.com.hk/p1/2018/0410/157608. html, access date: March 14, 2020. 112  Ibid. 113  Ibid., pp. 299–300.

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The Relevance of Totalitarianism Political scientists often see regime types as a crucial factor shaping violence, including both the state violence and the violent resistance from the dissidents. In a totalitarian political system, the ruling elites are characterized by the utilization of personality cult, the mobilization of public support through propaganda, the suppression of political dissent and the imposition of ideological control. As Hannah Arendt observed, a paradox of totalitarian regime is that “the possession of all instruments of governmental power and violence in one country is not an unmixed blessing for a totalitarian movement.”114 She elaborated: Power means a direct confrontation with reality, and totalitarianism in power is constantly concerned with overcoming this challenge. Propaganda and organization no longer suffice to assert that the impossible is possible, that the incredible is true, that an insane consistency rules the world; the chief psychological support of totalitarian fiction—the active resentment of the status quo, which the masses refused to accept as the only possible world—is no longer there; every bit of factual information that leaks through the iron curtain, set up against the ever-threatening flood of reality from the other, non-totalitarian side, is a greater menace to totalitarian domination than counterpropaganda has been to totalitarian movements. Totalitarianism in power uses the state administration for its long-range goal of world conquest and for the direction of the branches of the movement; it establishes the secret police as the executors and guardians of its domestic experiment in constantly transforming reality into fiction; and it finally erects concentration camps as special laboratories to carry through its experiment in total domination.115

Arendt argued that the principle of authority “is in all important respects diametrically opposed to that of totalitarian domination,” which aimed at “abolishing freedom, even at eliminating human spontaneity in general, and by no means a restriction of freedom no matter how tyrannical.”116 The most powerful leader had an “absolute monopoly of power and authority” over all his subordinates.117 Arendt contended that 114  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt: Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 391. 115  Ibid., p. 404. 116  Ibid. 117  Ibid.

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totalitarianism was not characterized by the rule of a clique or a gang, but by the dictator’s “complete independence” from all inferiors and his ability to “make swift and surprising changes in policy.”118 The body politic of the totalitarian state is “shock-proof because of its shapelessness.”119 Furthermore, the “fanaticism of the elite cadres” is “absolutely essential” for the functioning of the totalitarian movement.120 This fanatic mentality pervades the entire population, leading to the constant removal, demotion and promotion of elites and masses on the basis of political loyalty.121 Totalitarian rulers aspire to conquer the world, as with Adolf Hitler. They “reckon victories and defeats in terms of centuries or millennia” and believe that “the global interests always overrule the local interests of their own territory.”122 Arendt delineated the power base of totalitarian rulers. The entire population is organized as his supporters and sympathizers, who are checked by a “super-party.”123 She wrote: Multiplication of offices, duplication of functions, and adaptation of the party-sympathizer relationship to the new conditions mean simply that the peculiar onion-like structure of the movement, in which every layer was the front of the next more militant formation, is retained. The state machine is transformed into a front organization of sympathizing bureaucrats whose function in domestic affairs is to spread confidence among the masses of merely coordinated citizens and whose foreign affairs consist in fooling the outside, nontotalitarian world. The Leader, in his dual capacity as chief of the state and leader of the movement, again combines in his person the acme of militant ruthlessness and confidence inspiring normality.124

To build up his empire, the totalitarian dictator squeezes the local economic resources for the sake of achieving his aggressive territorial expansion.125 Totalitarian dictators, to Arendt, are idealistic, self-interested and see power as lying “exclusively in the force produced through

 Ibid., pp. 406–407.  Ibid., pp. 408–409. 120  Ibid. 121  Ibid., p. 409. 122  Ibid., p. 411. 123  Ibid. 124  Ibid., pp. 412–413. 125  Ibid., pp. 414–415. 118 119

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organization.”126 As such, the totalitarian organization and police are efficient, enforcing their power ruthlessly, making politics unpredictable and achieving the dictator’s goals and ambitions.127 The totalitarian political system is marked by a mixture of the ruling party and the state. Arendt wrote: “The goal of one-party systems is not only to seize the government administration but, by filling all offices with party members, to achieve a complete amalgamation of state and party, so that after the seizure of power the party becomes a kind of propaganda organization for the government.”128 The ruling party suppresses all other parties and opposition forces, utilizing the army to perpetuate its governance. Arendt went so far as to maintain that “the power of the party rests on a monopoly guaranteed by the state and the party no longer possesses its own power center.”129 Totalitarian rulers deal with non-totalitarian governments in a way like how they tackle domestic politics and opposition forces. They present “a semblance of normality and common sense to the normal outside world.”130 Domestically, totalitarian dictators rely on the secret police as the sole organ of power, while the military forces are trained to “fight a foreign aggressor” and to become “a dubious instrument for civil-war purposes.”131 Some recent studies of China have argued the PRC under Xi Jinping since his rapid rise to political power in 2012 has transformed the mainland Chinese state from authoritarianism to the path of neo-­totalitarianism. David Shambaugh wrote in 2016 that China would perhaps lurch back to “neo-totalitarianism,” partly because its conservative leaders might see “hard authoritarianism” as being insufficient to deliver the necessary reforms for the maintenance of social stability and partly because they would close the PRC’s door to the outside world.132 Shambaugh predicted that citizens would resist such a move as China has already been integrated into the global economy. Jean-Philippe Beja has argued in 2019 that China has been mixing state capitalism with neo-totalitarianism in its publicity of the China model of development, that it has been cracking down  Ibid., pp. 417–418.  Ibid., pp. 418–419. 128  Ibid., p. 419. 129  Ibid., p. 419. 130  Ibid., pp. 419–420. 131  Ibid., p. 420. 132  David Shambaugh, “Contemplating China’s Future,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 3 (Fall 2016), pp. 121–130, especially pp. 126–127. 126 127

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on the labor groups and non-governmental organizations that were unleashed in the Hu Jintao era, that the two-term limit for the president was relaxed in spring 2018, and that President Xi has been deepening his anti-corruption campaign and tightening his personal control over the entire political system.133 The new “Chinese fascist” regime, according to Beja, has elevated the importance of party dictatorship, the top leader’s personality cult, the semi-autonomous market economy, the exaltation of nationalism, the emphasis on the heritage of the empire—characteristics that showed commonalities with Italy under Mussolini.134 Objectively speaking, the PRC under President Xi Jinping has been gradually drifting from hard authoritarianism to neo-totalitarianism, as predicted by Shambaugh, but its economy remains state capitalist, as mentioned by Beja. The most prominent features of the PRC’s neo-­ totalitarianism include its personality cult of the top helmsman, the suppression of the civil society, the dominance of police forces, the mixture of the ideology of Marxism and Confucianism, and the omnipresence of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the mainland’s society, economy and politics.135 Xiaoguang Kang elaborated the hallmarks of China’s “neo-totalitarianism” in detail: In the economic realm, the neo-totalitarian regime is associated with “state capitalism.” In the political realm, this neo-totalitarian regime perseveres in Leninism, centralized political power, a unified party-state system, and an unchecked government. Ideologically, China’s neo-totalitarianism adheres to Marxism and, more importantly, depends on Confucian political cultures as well as nationalism for its political legitimacy. In the social realm, China’s neo-totalitarian regime constrains the people’s freedom of speech, assembly, and association and regulates social organizations via the governing system of administrative absorption of society. Finally, China’s neo-totalitarianism maintains its foreign policies of opening up the country and embracing free trade.136 133  Jean-Philippe Beja, “Xi Jinping’s China: On the Road to Neo-totalitarianism,” Social Research: An International Quarterly, vol. 86, no. 1 (Spring 2019), pp. 203–230. 134  Ibid., p. 226. 135  For the mixture between Marxism and Confucianism, see Xiaoguang Kang, “Moving Toward Neo-Totalitarianism: A Political-Sociological Analysis of the Evolution of the Administrative Absorption of Society in China,” Nonprofit Policy Forum (September 2018), in https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/npf.2018.9.issue-1/npf-2017-0026/npf2017-0026.pdf, access date: March 15, 2020. 136  Ibid.

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As a mainland scholar, Kang was sharp in identifying the gradual transformations of the PRC regime. Originally, in the presidency of the Hu Jintao era, civil society groups emerged and later played a crucial role in forming a partnership with the state in the rescue efforts during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.137 However, with the inception of the Xi Jinping era, civil society groups were increasingly brought under the CCP’s legal framework and political control. On the other hand, “state capitalism” persists and therefore the “Chinese fascist” regime as mentioned by Beja is generally accurate in capturing the political metamorphosis of China from the Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping era. In the context of Hong Kong, as this book will argue, the drift from hard authoritarianism to neo-totalitarianism had corresponding impacts on Beijing’s policy toward the HKSAR. The central government has since 2012 been adopting a far more hardline policy toward the growth of Hong Kong’s civil society, which coincidentally has surged by leaps and bounds through the mobilization of the anti-national education campaign in 2012, the launching of the 2014 Occupy Central Movement, the eruption of the Mongkok riot in early 2016, the emergence of provocative oath-taking behavior of two legislators-elect (Yau Wai-ching and Baggio Leung) in late 2016, and the occurrence of the anti-extradition, anti-­ police and anti-authoritarianism movement from June to December 2019. All these movements in Hong Kong reinforced the PRC’s perception of the HKSAR as a politically and practically “subversive” territory whose politics and civil society must be controlled and tamed. In Hong Kong, a pluralistic perception of the civil society persists, meaning that interest groups’ existence is natural and conducive to social divert and political checks and balances. This pluralist perspective clashes with the neo-­ totalitarian vision of civil society, which to the totalitarian leaders must be curbed, tamed and crushed. As such, there are two competing visions of civil society between the Hong Kong and the PRC. The PRC transformation from hard authoritarianism to neo-totalitarianism has arguably brought about a process of reverse democratization and increased authoritarianism in the HKSAR.138 In other words, the advancement of authoritarianism politics in Hong Kong could be seen in how the HKSAR  Ibid.  Jeff Loo, “A Localist’s critique of Hong Kong’s political development: Political decay, legitimacy crisis and reverse democratization,” Asian Education and Development Studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2018), pp. 76–88. 137 138

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government and its police apparatus adopted an increasingly hardline policy toward the protests from June to December 2019. The endurance of protests in the HKSAR can reflect the failure of mainland China’s united from work in the HKSAR.139 The Psychology of Fear and Mass Movement Public fear can be caused and exacerbated by news and popular culture, leading to mass actions to participate in social and political movements. David Altheide has reminded us that messages about fear are repetitious, stereotypical of outside “threats” and especially suspect and “evil others.” These messages also resonate moral panics, with the implication that action must be taken to not only defeat a specific enemy, but to also save civilization. Since so much is at stake, it follows that drastic measures must be taken. … In addition to propaganda effects, the constant use of fear pervades crises and normal times: it becomes part of the taken-for-granted word of “how things are,” and one consequence is that it begins to influence how we perceive and talk about everyday life, including mundane as well as significant events.140

Mass media can stimulate public fear, shape public agenda and influence the degree of public fear. The ways in which issues and policies are described, packaged and presented can shape public opinion. In short, the politics of public fear can be triggered by news media that frame the “problems” concerned.141 Public fear can also be presented and exaggerated in the news media as “a feature of entertainment.”142 The most important consequence of the discourse of fear is “to promote a sense of disorder and a belief that ‘things are out of control.’”143 If things are really getting out of control, then the conditions are favorable to mass movements that represent public attempts at stopping, delaying or removing a controversial government policy. 139  For China’s new united front work in Hong Kong, see Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, Steven Chung-fun Hung, and Jeff Hai-chi Loo, China’s New United Front Work in Hong Kong: Penetrative Politics and Its Implications (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). 140  David L. Altheide, “Notes Towards A Politics of Fear,” Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media, vol. 1, no. 1, (2003) pp. 37–54. 141  Ibid. 142  Ibid., p. 38. 143  Ibid., pp. 38–39.

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The politics of fear may be shaped by cultures and values, policies and issues. For example, terrorist attacks may trigger public fear and discourse of terrorism. If news reports and advertisements connect drug use with terrorism, they may shift “drugs” from criminal nature to the “unpatriotic” act of terrorism.144 Numerous “crises” and public fears involving crime, violence and uncertainty were important for the public definitions of the situation after attack of terrorists in New York on September 11, 2001.145 In response to the politics of fear, politicians had to make a choice. Many of them dared not stand up against the politics of fear after the September 11 attack as they could be labeled as “unpatriotic.” Most citizens sought “protection within the symbolic order of the politics of fear.”146 After the attack, fear was perceived as “crime and terrorism,” while police and military forces were viewed as “protectors.”147 The politics of fear in the United States led to the need for intensive public surveillance with the use of video cameras scanning public places for all suspicious activities. As Altheide concludes: “The staple of the politics of fear— crime—is now linked with terrorism, and victimization.”148 In the case of Hong Kong’s protests from June to December 2019, the issue of extradition was portrayed by the mass media as an attempt by the government to send the people of Hong Kong back to mainland China, namely sung zhong in Cantonese. The public fear of seeing some residents to be sent to the mainland was widely reported by the mass media, backed up by public opinion polls. As a result, the politics of fear generated a huge social and political movement against the extradition bill, as this book will analyze. In short, the psychology of public fear can stimulate mass movements against a regime. Populism and Violence In the political science literature, populism has at least four perspectives, including Marxist, ideational, political-strategic and socio-cultural, each with its connections with peaceful and violent protests. Populism can be defined as movements that appeal to public opinion against elitist rule. Its  Ibid., p. 45.  Ibid., p. 48. 146  Ibid. 147  Ibid. 148  Ibid., pp. 52–53. 144 145

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four perspectives have unique characteristics. First, the Marxist dimension defines populism in terms of class struggle, which highlights the significance of market conditions, economic production and social contradictions. The developmental conditions of a state shape the unorganized masses politically, leading to some elites taking a leadership role.149 Populism is a response of the subordinate classes to the exploitation of the dominant capitalist class and elites.150 The populist political parties, from the Marxist perspective, concentrate on the development of a mass-elite class coalition that could promote socio-economic development at the peripheral regions vis-à-vis an exploitative center. In short, populism is defined by Marxists as a political movement that cultivates a close mass-­ elite and class linkage to address the problem of socio-economic inequality. Second, the ideational perspective has insisted that populism is an ideology concerned about power structure of society. Populism is defined here as “an ideology that considers the split of society,” demonstrating the clashes between the masses and dominant ruling elites.151 Populism is also a discourse focusing on three major concepts, namely “the people or masses,” “democracy” and “sovereignty.”152 It is also a phenomenon in which appeals are made to mobilize the masses against the dominant establishment who monopolize ideas and values in the society. This elite monopoly over ideas and values may alienate some citizens in a society as they are relatively powerless.153 The masses may take actions against the ruling elites through peaceful or even violent protests to assert the popular sovereignty, especially when populists see politics as an immediate

149  Torcuato S. Di Tella, “Populism and Reform in Latin America.” in Claudio Veliz, ed., Obstacles to Change in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 47–74. Also see Alistair Hennessy, “Latin America,” in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner eds., Populism and Its Meaning and National Characteristics (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 28–61. 150  Anibal Quijano, “Tendencies in Peruvian Development in Class Structure,” in James Petras and Maurice Zetlin, eds., Latin America: Reform or Revolution (Greenwich: Fawcett, 1968), pp. 289–328. 151  Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition, vol. 39, no. 4 (2004), pp. 542–563. 152  Koen Abets and Stefan Rummens, “Populism versus Democracy,” Political Studies, vol. 55 (2007), pp. 405–424. 153  Andreas Schedler, “Anti-Political-Establishment Parties,” Party Politics, vol. 2, no. 3 (1996), pp. 291–312.

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expression to protect the interest of the general public.154 Populists favor direct forms of democracy to replace the current political and institutional arrangements that are manipulated and dominated by the ruling elites. They also see public opinion as of paramount importance in shaping government policies. Populists tend to define the people as “homogenous,” “unified” and “collective” group.155 Third, populism can be a political strategy for politicians to win the hearts and minds of the people. These strategies have its national and regional concerns. Populism can be a strategy for charismatic political leaders to link themselves with the masses to obtain enough support during elections.156 It can also be an electoral strategy used by populist politicians to legitimize their actions in the legislature.157 Populism can be utilized by personalistic leaders to mobilize supporters against dominant elites.158 It can be a means by which different factions deal with their power struggles.159 In brief, political mobilization is often utilized by charismatic leaders for achieving their political objectives, including the need to bolster their legitimacy, to engage in factional and power struggle, and to win the hearts and minds of the masses against their political foes. Fourth, populism can be understood in terms of social and cultural context. Populism can be defined as not only a “particular form of political relationship between leaders and a social basis” but also a phenomenon deeply influenced by social, cultural and historical factors.160 In other words, populism is shaped by the social and cultural background of a 154  Margaret Canovan, “Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy,” in Yves Mény and Yves Surel, eds., Democracies and the Populist Challenge (London: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 25–40. 155  Koen Abets and Stefan Rummens, “Populism versus Democracy,” Political Studies, vol. 55 (2007), pp. 408–409. 156  Danielle Resnick, “Varieties of African Populism in Comparative Perspective,” in Carlos De la Torre, ed., The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015). 157  Rene Antonio Mayorga, “Outsiders and Neo-populism: The Road to Plebiscitarian Democracy,” in S. Mainwaring, A. M. Bejarano, and E. P. Leongómez, eds., The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 158  Kenneth M. Roberts, “Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics, vol. 38, no. 2, (2006), pp. 127–148. 159  Takis S.  Pappas, “Populism Emergent: A Framework for Analyzing Its Contexts, Mechanics, and Outcomes,” EUI Working Paper RSCAS, no. 1 (Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2012). 160  Pierre Ostiguy, “Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach,” in Ostiguyy Ochoa, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 73–97.

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s­ociety, where ideologies are complex and cannot be simply divided into left and right. Hence, we must understand the existing ideologies in the society.161 In the case of Hong Kong, these four perspectives as outlined above are useful for us to comprehend the dynamics of the protests from June to December 2019. The Marxist perspective helps us understand the protests from the vantage point of class exploitation and class dominance in the capitalistic society of Hong Kong. The ideational perspective highlights the values and ideas of the populists, who exist not just in the pro-­ democracy camp but also in the pro-government side. Strategically, populism can be a tool of political mobilization by politicians to achieve their objectives and ambitions. Most importantly, populism can shape how protesters strategize among themselves, choosing peaceful protests or violent means to make their demands heard. It is the strategic perspective on populism that can contribute to our deeper understanding of the Hong Kong case. Socially and culturally, the protests in Hong Kong can be regarded as populist movement reflecting the conflict-ridden values in the society that interacts with the PRC. Political Symbolism Symbols exist independently of human beings and may “transmit meanings from person to person despite vast distances of space and time.”162 While symbols depend on human interpretations to shape their meanings, they do have some degree of autonomy from the social and psychological interpretations by human communities.163 Lowell Dittmer asserts that the study of political symbolism can help us understand political culture. He wrote: Political symbolism as the most promising unit of analysis for studies of political culture than it is to define the term. Symbolism is one of the essential identifying characteristics of mankind, and its study is of ancient provenance: symbols have been studied from so many different perspectives and 161  Gary Pollock, Tom Brock and Mark Ellison, “Populism, Ideology and Contradiction: Mapping Young People’s Political Views,” The Sociological Review, vol. 63, no. 2 (2015), pp. 141–166. 162  Lowell Dittmer, “Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” World Politics, vol. 29, no. 4 (July 1977), pp. 552–583. 163  Ibid., p. 557.

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for so many different purposes that the term has become even “softer” and more ambiguous than the notion of political culture. It is difficult to define the term either synthetically (that is, by distinguishing it from related concepts) or analytically (that is, by specifying its characteristics). In synthetic definitions, symbols tend to merge with “language” on the one hand and with the substantive “reality” that language represents on the other.164

There are many symbols, ranging from public to private, religious to artistic, logical to linguistic and tangible to intangible. All these symbols are used to express, communicate and represent “logical relationships, intangible cosmic forces, and repressed drives and feelings.”165 Dittmer’s emphasis on political symbolism can be applied to the case of Hong Kong’s protests from June to December 2019. As this book will examine, political symbols proliferated in this period, showing how participants acted in a way that represented symbols with tremendous meaning and implications. Anarchism and Uncivil Society In the minds of some young radical activists, anarchism refers to “a decentralized organizational structure, based on affinity groups that work together on an ad hoc basis, and decision-making by consensus.”166 Anti-­ globalization radicals believe that anarchism also means “egalitarianism; opposition to all hierarchies; suspicion of authority, especially that of the state; and commitment to living according to one’s values.”167 Young radical activists, who regard themselves as anarchists, are likely to be hostile to capitalism, multinational corporations and dictatorship. Many of them envision a stateless society based on egalitarianism and anti-authoritarianism.168 Anarchists share some values with socialists. They share a critique of the capitalist society, despise its exploitative nature and commit to achieving egalitarianism. However, anarchists are hostile to the state and tend to adopt a moral perspective to see social change. On the contrary, socialists  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 559. 166  Barbara Epstein, “Anarchism and the anti-globalization movement,” Monthly Review, vol. 53, no. 4, (September 2001), pp. 1–14. 167  Ibid. 168  Ibid., pp. 2–4. 164 165

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tend to be reform-minded, hoping for a transition to socialism and believing in better planning and strategy.169 Barbara Epstein has made the following observations: There are also things that Marxists could learn from the anti-globalist activists. Their anarchism combines both ideology and imagination, expressing its fundamentally moral perspective through actions that are intended to make power visible (in your face) while undermining it. Historically, anarchism has often provided a too-often ignored moral compass for the left. Today, anarchism is attracting young activists, while Marxist socialism is not, or at least not, in the same numbers.170

Anarchists do not see the working class as the agents of political change. Rather they see violent action as necessary to express themselves. It is important to note that some anarchists in the United States during the Vietnam War even went so far as to see attempts at damaging missiles as “part of non-violent direct action,” while “destruction of property can be part of non-violent politics.”171 Little research has connected the action of anarchists with the concept of “uncivil society,” which refers to the “dark side” of civil society where groups resorted to political activism and protests to challenge the state.172 These groups may be excluded from the civil society and are determined to take actions to confront the state. Here, anarchists may be one of the interest groups excluded from the mainstream civil society. Carlo Ruzza has alerted us to the fact that “uncivil” society groups can include extremist organizations from both the left and the right.173 These “uncivil” society organizations can be seen as an alternative type of political participation, articulating anti-political sentiments and displaying the features of racism, nationalism, populism, biological essentialism and territorial or cultural exclusionism.174

 Ibid., pp. 3–4.  Ibid. 171  Ibid., pp. 13–14. 172  Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, eds., Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in PostCommunist Europe (London: Routledge, 2012). 173  Carlo Ruzza, “Populism and Euroscepticism: Towards uncivil society?,” Policy and Society, vol. 28, no. 1 (2009), pp. 87–98. 174  Ibid. 169 170

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The combined concepts of anarchism and uncivil society can be borrowed for us to understand the politics of protests in the HKSAR from June to December 2019. Specifically, some groups tended to exhibit anarchist features, utilizing violence to challenge the post-colonial state, especially the police which to them represented both the Hong Kong administration and Beijing. Moreover, this tendency of anarchist groups utilizing violence is an indispensable part of the “uncivil society.” Violent anarchists have traditionally been excluded from the mainstream civil society of Hong Kong. As this book will explore, some of the violent groups were not necessarily anarchist, but localist extremist to the extent of seeing violence as an ultimate objective. That was why the Hong Kong police also referred to these extremist groups as “home-grown” or “localist terrorists.”175 The Politics of Insurgency The literature on insurgency can also be used for us to develop a comprehensive framework of understanding the politics of violent protests. Insurgency can be defined as an anti-government uprising launched by rebellious activists who are determined to delegitimize and even overthrow the existing leaders and regime. The typical supporters can be young men who use violence and disorder to enrich themselves, while challenging the economies and political system of the corrupt states where patron-client relations are serious, and where public maladministration pervades the society.176 Many young people believe that possessing weapons and supporting a local strongman can offer the chance for them to improve the socio-economic predicament. Youths who join the insurgency may have various grievances and they tend to see conflicts as inevitable and beneficial to their self-interests. They hate the regime and its political leaders, who in their minds are corrupt, power-hungry and interested in only personal gains. When public order of a corrupt state collapsed, as with Liberia’s war in the 1990s, the young rebels rose up and participated in 175  Remarks made by the new Hong Kong Police Commissioner Chris Tang. See Christy Leung, “New Hong Kong police chief Chris Tang tells residents: the force cannot end the protests alone,” South China Morning Post, November 19, 2019, in https://www.scmp. com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3038305/incoming-police-chief-christang-tells-hongkongers, access date: March 15, 2020. 176  William Reno, “The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States,” Development and Change, vol. 33, no. 5 (2002), pp. 837–858.

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insurgency, filling a political vacuum and believing that they became “dare devils” participating in “an uprising with the prospect of creating material wealth.”177 Under these circumstances, locally organized home guard units, religious groups and community associations sprung up, forming private armies led by local strongmen and using their weapons to challenge the existing regime. If their capacity to cause insecurity and chaos were recognized, they were even given further incentives to fight, because “predatory violence is a ticket to a seat in negotiations.”178 Insurgency entails the likelihood of capturing political power. Once the insurgents seize political power, they can gain diplomatic recognitions, dominate the control over economic resources, become the most powerful actors enjoying all kinds of prerogatives in the political arena.179 Hence, the violent strategies adopted by insurgents comprise a range of behaviors, including murder, violence and even genocide. Jeremy Weinstein has remarked: While variation in levels of violence is relatively easy to assess, differences in the character of violence are reflected in its selectivity and brutality. Violence is selective if it targets individuals or groups that threaten to undermine a rebel organization; selective violence has a tactical purpose for the group. When violence is used selectively, civilians can be relatively certain that cooperation can be exchanged for the right to survive. Indiscriminate violence makes no distinction among potential victims, neither protecting supporters nor punishing defectors.180

Hence, violence can be selective or indiscriminate, depending on the choice and decision of the insurgents concerned. If a total war is not launched by insurgents, civil conflicts are often characterized by “bargains, deals, and norms that structure patterns of violence, from collusion to spheres of influence to guerrilla disorder.”181 Civil conflicts are complex, including cooperation and control between states and non-state armed groups.182 To counter insurgency and violent groups, the ruling elites rely on counterinsurgency, which means the  Ibid., pp. 854–855.  Ibid. 179  Ibid., p. 855. 180  Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 13. 181  Paul Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 10, no. 2 (June 2012), pp. 243–264. 182  Ibid. 177 178

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­ rovision of national security, the building of political and economic instip tutions and the need to restore socio-political order. State-insurgent cooperation can be difficult to sustain and can spiral into breakdown, because regimes and insurgents may be reluctant to bargain, make concessions and reach compromises. The policy of counterinsurgency was to “create an institutionalized environment for security and goods provision,” including the need for “security, good government, and progress” in countries supported by America during the Cold War.183 The concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency can be used in our analysis of the dynamics of protests. In the case of Hong Kong’s protests from June to December 2019, since some localist extremists did utilize home-made petrol bombs to attack the police, the ruling elites in both Hong Kong and Beijing saw them as “insurgents” trying to topple the HKSAR regime. As such, the Hong Kong police were expected to play a critical role in the counterinsurgency operations. This book will examine the detailed operations of the police in their counterinsurgency, and the selective violence approach adopted by the radical protesters. The Role of Failed State The concept of failed state can help us understand why protests are launched by citizens to challenge the regime concerned. In 2019, the Fund for Peace came up with some indicators of the fragility of states, including indicators in the aspects of cohesion, political, economic, social and cross-cutting indicators.184 Cohesion indicators embrace the security apparatus, the factionalized elites and group grievances. Economic indicators include economic decline, uneven economic development and human rights and brain drain. Social indicators are composed of demographic pressures, refugees and external intervention. Political indicators comprise state legitimacy, public services and human rights and the rule of law. In the eyes of the United States and its Western allies, failed states can be a political liability because they provide the bleeding ground for terrorism, leading to the occurrence of the terrorist attack on the New  York Tower on September 11, 2001. Failed states can undermine the national security interests of the United States and its allies. These states, like  Ibid., p. 256.  See “Fragile states index,” in https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/, access date: March 15, 2020. 183 184

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Afghanistan, failed because of their inability to protect their own population’s security, welfare and rights, posing great danger for Western security interests. As a result, terrorist groups emerged and prospered in these failed states, constituting a threat to the United States.185 The necessity of combatting terrorism has led to the urgency of strengthening the capacities of these failed or fragile states. Although security is a sine qua non for sustained regime legitimacy and development, external efforts at increasing the coercive capabilities of these failed states can be regarded as political moves to “bolster abusive, predatory and illegitimate states.”186 While definitions of failed states vary, most observers have seen failed states as being unable to fulfill the conditions of successful states, such as controlling defined territories and populations, conducting diplomatic relations with other states, monopolizing legitimate violence within their territories, providing adequate social goods to their populations and maintaining peace and stability. Failed states cannot ensure economic growth and achieve a reasonable distribution of social goods. In other words, they are often characterized by “massive economic inequities, warlordism, and violent competition for resources.”187 Failed states can present tremendous challenges for the international system. Some challenges are humanitarian because state failure can bring about poverty, hunger, disease, violence and massive refugee flows that can strain foreign aid and affect the budgets and social stability of other countries. Failed states can be characterized by anarchy where a political vacuum provides for the easy entry and emergence of terrorist and extremist groups, whose activities can impact on neighboring countries. Failed states can upset the international system because they cannot enter into or abide by treaties; cannot participate in the dense network of international trade, environmental and human rights agreements; and cannot enforce contracts between their citizens and foreigners.188 In short, the legitimacy of failed states is at stake. Even if some states are not failing, they can be weak ones. Weak states include a broad continuum and they are inherently weak because of a range of factors, such as internal antagonisms, public maladministration, 185  Charles T. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State,’” Third World Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 8 (2008), pp. 1491–1507. 186  Ibid., p. 1505. 187  Rosa Ehrenreich Brookst, “Failed States, or the State as Failure?,” The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 72, no. 4 (2005), pp. 1159–1196. 188  Ibid., p. 1162.

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political corruption, despotism, ethnic rivalries, religious tensions, domestic crime, external attacks on their territories. Some weak states show deterioration in their physical infrastructure, such as the neglect of schools and hospitals, the decline in the rule of law and the deterioration in economies. Weak states are often ruled by despots, elected or not, but they tend to harass the civil society.189 Violence is an enduring characteristic of the failed states. In a failed state, the ruling elites encounter insurgencies, civil unrest, communal discontent and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state.190 Civil wars that characterize failed states usually stem from ethnic, religious, linguistic and intercommunal hostilities. Disharmony between communities is serious in failed states, where the society is deeply divided between haves and have-nots, and where the minorities are usually oppressed with brutal force. Eventually, failed states cannot control their borders and lose legitimacy and authority over their own territories. Rebel groups may threaten the personal security of citizens in the failed states, leading to a climate of public fear. Violence grows in failed states as criminal gangs take over the streets of some cities and as arms trafficking becomes commonplace. The police force becomes paralyzed and citizens must turn to their own clans and warlords for self-protection. Institutionally, failed states are punctuated by the failure of legislatures, which may be either rubber-stamping political machines or divided chambers without compromise and consensus. The judiciary becomes an arm of the executive rather than being independent, and citizens know that they cannot rely on the court system for their redress or remedy against the arbitrary powers exercised by the state apparatus, notably the police and the military.191 The bureaucracy has lost its sense of professional responsibility and tends to carry out the executive orders without impartiality and efficiency. Even the military may be highly politicized and lack the esprit they once demonstrated.192 The concept of failed state has been utilized by a journalist to refer to Hong Kong’s sluggish response to the PRC’s outbreak of the Coronavirus in early 2020. Clara Ferreira Marques has observed that citizens were 189  Robert Rotberg, “Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: causes and indicators,” in Robert Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2003), p. 5. 190  Ibid. 191  Ibid., pp. 7–8. 192  Ibid.

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panicking and trying to buy masks which were woefully inadequate in January and February 2020. She wrote: A fragile state is usually defined by its inability to protect citizens, to provide basic services and by questions over the legitimacy of its government. After an epidemic and months of poorly handled pro-democracy demonstrations, Hong Kong is ticking most of those boxes. Add in a strained judicial system, and the prognosis for its future as a financial hub looks poor.193

This book will later address the question of whether the HKSAR is showing signs of a failed state, especially considering how its government tackled the June–December protests in 2019.

An Analytical Framework of the State, Society, Protests and Violence Figure 1.1 develops an analytical framework of understanding the relations between the state, society, protests and violence. First and foremost, the state can be understood and analyzed at the central and local levels. At the central level, socialist states, such as the PRC, Vietnam and North Korea, are led by a communist party, like the CCP in mainland China. Moreover, socialist regimes led by the communist parties tend to merge the ruling parties with the state apparatus. As such, the term party-state can be used to describe the regime at the central level. The local state obviously includes local governments that interact with the central administration. The central party-state may have two major considerations in its governance: (1) the protection of its territorial sovereignty and (2) the consolidation of its national security. Socialist regimes tend to see their legitimacy as of paramount importance, especially in the PRC, Vietnam and North Korea where their ruling party’s legitimacy stemmed from revolutions. Yet, legitimacy, in the minds of the central party-state, can be undermined by any threats to national security and sovereignty. Socialist regimes have elections held for their law-marking bodies and local party 193   Clara Ferreira Marques, “Hong Kong is showing symptoms of a failed state,” Bloomberg, February 9, 2020, in https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-02-09/coronavirus-hong-kong-shows-symptoms-of-a-failed-state, access date: March 15, 2020.

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Fig. 1.1  An analytical framework of the state, society, protests and violence

congresses, although such elections are characterized by some degree of political control over the participation of candidates, their campaign activities and the impacts on the ruling party’s hegemonic leadership. Candidates must be screened by the party, and no political force can challenge the ruling communist party. Electoral authoritarianism can be referred to the phenomenon that, although elections are held in communist regimes, the elements of authoritarianism are present, such as the censorship of the mass media, the control over the content of the campaign platform of candidates, the suppression of political dissent and the predictable victorious result of the ruling party. Although the central state appears to be powerful vis-à-vis the local state, the latter can be a political sandwich between the center and the society. Specifically, the society is composed of citizens and groups resistant to both the ruling regime at the central level and the local state. Furthermore, social movements, such as populist and democracy movements, can exert tremendous pressure on the local state to democratize and liberalize the political system. Social movements may also be influenced by external actors, including foreign countries that may have connections with the leaders of such movement. Compounded by the public fear and anger over a controversial government policy, these social movements can bring about citizens’ protests. Whenever protests take place,

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they can easily turn into violence, especially when protesters clash with the police, or when the police adopt a high-handed policy toward protesters. If protesters demonstrate against the local and central states in a prolonged period, organized crime elements may come into the picture by disrupting the ongoing protests and restoring social and political order quickly. The reason is that organized crime groups may be supportive of the status quo, seeing any social disorder as detrimental to their business operations. Alternatively, organized crime elements may participate in protests, if such protests can achieve their common interests. If the central and local states are infiltrated by organized crime elements, then the security and police apparatuses may even mobilize organized crime groups to be an intermediary in the retaliation and violent actions against protesters. In the context of Hong Kong, this framework, which has been built up by utilizing the perspectives we have examined in this chapter, is useful for us to comprehend the dynamics of peaceful protests and violence. The HKSAR can be viewed as the local state, which is like a political sandwich between the central party-state in Beijing and the civil society of Hong Kong. From Beijing’s party-state perspective, the maintenance of national security and the protection of territorial sovereignty are of paramount importance in its regime legitimacy. Hence, even if elections are held at the national, provincial and local levels in the PRC, they are bound to be politically controlled and manipulated by the CCP. The Chief Executive election has arguably been controlled by Beijing to ensure that the elected Chief Executive would be politically loyal to the central government—a sign of electoral authoritarianism in the HKSAR. The local state of Hong Kong, however, is far more pluralistic than the central party-state, particularly at the civil society level. The civil society of the HKSAR comprises citizens and groups not only resistant to both the central and local states, but also assertive in their push for populist and pro-democracy movements.194 Those movements can be activated and stimulated by public fear and anger, as this book will show in the case of the protests from June to December 2019. Social movements in Hong Kong naturally use peaceful protests to make their demands heard by the central and local states. Yet, under the possible influence from the authoritarian central party-state, the 194  Steven Chung-fun Hung, “Interest groups and democracy movement in Hong Kong: A historical perspective,” in Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, ed., Interest Groups and New Democracy Movement in Hong Kong (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 14–33.

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local state in the HKSAR can be hard-pressed to mobilize the police to adopt hardline tactics against protesters, who in turn resort to violence to articulate their demands and protect themselves. On the other hand, alongside the civil society of Hong Kong is the “uncivil” aspect in which violence has been cherished by some extremist groups. As such, violence is both a means to an end and an end in itself. Most significantly, Hong Kong’s social movements, including populist and pro-democracy activities, can be supported, if not necessarily funded, by external actors, including neighboring Taiwan and the superpower, the United States. From the US perspective, it supported the pro-democracy demand of the peaceful protesters, not the violent ones. The role of Taiwan, however, was more complex, as will be discussed in Chap. 7. If the PRC perceives any existence of external support of the protest movement in the HKSAR, it naturally sees the protests in Hong Kong as being a conspiracy orchestrated by some local activists and foreign actors to “subvert” not only the HKSAR government but also the central government in Beijing. In other words, any external intervention in Hong Kong’s populist and democracy movement can challenge the legitimacy of the central party-state in Beijing, which perceives such interference as undermining its national security and territorial sovereignty. If this perception exists among the political leaders at the central level, they can exert pressure on the leaders at the local state in the adoption of hardline measures against protesters. At this juncture, violent confrontation between the protesters and local police becomes inevitable. The analytical framework designed in this chapter may also be applicable to other places and countries which have been affected by peaceful and violent protests, including populist and democracy movements. The following chapters will examine the chronological development of the protests from June to December 2019 and then conclude our findings by using the aforesaid perspectives and analytical framework. Chapter 2 is going to trace the historical development of the anti-extradition movement by examining the arrangements over the transfer of fugitives between Hong Kong and the PRC, and by exploring the origins of the extradition bill in early 2019. Chapter 3 will focus on the protests in June to the occupation of LegCo on July 1. Chapter 4 will examine the politics of policing protests, including the incidents of July 21 and August 31. Chapter 5 will explore Beijing’s responses to the Hong Kong crisis from its national security perspective. Chapter 6 will examine the populist protesters, the October 1 protests and the opposition to the anti-mask law. Chapter 7 will

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study the two critical battles of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Polytechnic University, and it will also seek to understand the role of District Council elections on November 24, the policy of the United States and the responses from Taiwan. The conclusion will sum up the arguments of this book and go through different perspectives on the dynamics of peaceful and violent protests.

CHAPTER 2

The Legal and Political Origins of the Extradition Bill

This chapter aims at examining the origins of the extradition bill that was initiated by the HKSAR government in early 2019 with reference to the considerations of the PRC authorities. It will first review the historical evolution of the transfer of fugitives between Hong Kong and China, and then explore the origins of the amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance. This chapter will also discuss the reactions of the local business community and foreign countries, especially the United States, to the content of the bill.

The Evolution of Fugitives Transfer Between Hong Kong and China Historically speaking, the transfer of fugitives between Hong Kong and mainland China could be traced back to the year 1858, when the Treaty of Tientsin reached between Britain and the Qing dynasty stipulated that the British colony would have to extradite Chinese criminals from Hong Kong to the mainland. Article 21 of the Treaty of Tientsin said: If criminals, subjects of China, shall take refuge in Hong Kong or on board the British ships there, they shall, upon due recognition by the Chinese authorities, he searched for, and, on proof of their guilt, be delivered up. In the manner, if Chinese offenders take refuge in the houses or on board the vessels of British subjects at the open ports, they shall not be harboured or

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concealed, but shall be delivered up, on due requisition by the Chinese authorities, addressed to the British Consul.1

In fact, the British colonial government also enacted a law of extraditing mainland Chinese criminals, who did not reside in Hong Kong for six months within the past year, and who received judgments from the Hong Kong court, to the Qing dynasty.2 After the founding of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912, the new Nationalist government inherited the “political rights and judicial arrangements” of the Qing dynasty.3 In 1930, the Chiang Kai-shek government refused to accept all unequal treaties between the Qing dynasty and foreign countries. It therefore did not continue to implement the Treaty of Tientsin. Similarly, when the PRC was established in 1949, it followed the ROC’s judicial arrangements. The British colonial government’s law of extraditing Chinese to the mainland was not implemented until 1997, when the NPC Standing Committee repealed it. The extradition arrangements between colonial Hong Kong and other countries followed the British law. According to the Extradition Act of 1870, it was applicable to foreign countries, the British colonies and its dependent territories, including Hong Kong.4 The question of extradition was identified and discussed in the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) and the Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC), which were set up by China shortly after the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 to prepare for the transitional arrangements of Hong Kong until July 1, 1997. In 1987, the BLDC had a sub-committee submitting a report on the question of extradition, saying that if a criminal offender, regardless of whether he or she was a Hong Kong or mainland resident, committed an offense in Hong Kong, then he or she would stand trial in the Hong Kong court.5 1  “Treaty of Tientsin, June 26, 1858,” in “Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online Website, in https://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/items/show/1025, access date: February 28, 2020. 2  Chow Hin, “In-depth Discussion on the Extradition Bill and Extradition Law,” Orange News, August 13, 2019, in https://www.orangenews/hk/finance/system/2019/08/13/010123738.shtml, access date: February 28, 2020. 3  Ibid. 4  See Chow Hin, He Anger of Reverse Rights (in Chinese) (Hong Kong: Hashtag, 2019). 5  Special Group on Law, the Consultative Committee of the Basic Law. “Final Report of Conflict of Laws, Extradition, and other related issues,” June 12, 1987. Website: https:// ebook.lib.hku.hk/bldho/pdf/078.pdf, access date: February 28, 2020.

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In 1992, Britain began to help Hong Kong arrange extradition agreements in such a way as to consider the human rights conditions of the countries concerned. Specifically, colonial Hong Kong entered into relations with governments “whose judicial system, penal conditions and human rights standards are of an acceptable level.”6 The PRC was excluded from the arrangements for the surrender of fugitive offenders from Hong Kong to other countries. Because Macau was considered a part of the PRC, both places were also excluded from the extradition arrangements. Due to the concerns about Hong Kong’s existing freedoms as promised in the “one country, two systems,” the British administration in Hong Kong during the final years of colonial rule maintained the status quo of excluding the PRC, Macau and Taiwan from the extradition arrangements. After July 1, 1997, both the HKSAR and the PRC did not reach an agreement over the transfer of fugitives until early 2019, when the extradition bill was proposed by the Carrie Lam administration. In August 1998, Cheung Tze-keung, who was a gangster kidnapping Victor Li Tzar-kuoi in May 1996 and Walter Kwok in September 1997, was arrested in mainland China in August 1998 and then executed in December.7 According to the former Secretary for Security, Regina Ip, both the HKSAR and PRC governments did not negotiate over the detailed arrangements over the transfer of fugitives after the execution of Cheung, who was nicknamed the Big Spender, in December 1998, because both places had very different legal systems. China has death penalty whereas Hong Kong’s common-law system does not have it. From 2000 to 2015, the PRC’s public security informed the Hong Kong police that 6172 Hong Kong people were under “sanctions” from the mainland, and that the Hong Kong side took measures to “sanction” 6934 mainlanders in the HKSAR during the same period.8 Moreover, from 2000 to 2015, the mainland police returned 170 criminal suspects who stayed in the PRC to the HKSAR side, while the Hong Kong side did not return any mainland criminal suspect to the mainland.9 From the mainland perspective, this phenomenon was due to the fact that both the HKSAR and PRC had 6  “Extradition in Hong Kong before 1997 excluded China,” in https://www.thestandnews.com/politics, access date: March 1, 2020. 7  For the case of Cheung Tze-keung, see Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater China (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009). 8  Editorial, “IS the Proportion of 170 to 0 in the Mutual Exchange of Criminal Suspects from Mainland to Hong Kong normal,” Global Times, June 28, 2016. 9  Ibid.

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­ ifferent legal systems, and that the Hong Kong side found it difficult to d “conform” with the mainland’s execution of its laws.10 Above all, Hong Kong’s public opinion could exert pressure on the local police, for many people of Hong Kong were “sensitive” toward the “rights” of criminal suspects and “distrustful” of the mainland’s politics.11 As a result, the Hong Kong police encountered structural constraints in handling back mainland criminal suspects to the PRC.

The Snowden Case The case of Edward Snowden in 2013 highlighted the political sensitivity of extradition in Hong Kong. Snowden was a former employee of a subcontractor working for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He believed that the US government conducted extensive surveillance on its own citizens and other foreign countries. Snowden escaped from Hawaii to Hong Kong in May 2013 and hid in a hotel, revealing that the US collected data on some Hong Kong people through Internet technology and surveillance. On June 23, 2013, he left Hong Kong for Moscow where he could stay there as a refugee. The US government sought to extradite Snowden from Hong Kong to the US in June 2013, but the HKSAR government rejected its request. On June 23, 2013, the HKSAR government issued the following statement: Mr. Edward Snowden left Hong Kong today (June 23) on his own accord for a third country through a lawful and normal channel. The US government earlier on made a request to the HKSAR government for the issue of a provisional warrant of arrest against Mr. Snowden. Since the documents provided by the US government did not fully comply with the legal requirements under Hong Kong law, the HKSAR government has requested the US government to provide additional information so that the Department of Justice could consider whether the US government’s request can meet the relevant legal conditions. As the HKSAR government has yet to have sufficient information to process the request for provisional warrant of arrest, there is no legal basis to restrict Mr. Snowden from leaving Hong Kong. The HKSAR government has already informed the US government of Mr. Snowden’s departure. Meanwhile, the HKSAR government has formally written to the US government requesting clarification on earlier  Ibid.  Ibid.

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reports about the hacking of computer systems in Hong Kong by US government agencies. The HKSAR government will continue to follow up on the matter so as to protect the legal rights of the people of Hong Kong.12

Although the Snowden case appeared to be unrelated to China, it was reported that the PRC decided to ask the HKSAR government to let Snowden leave the territory for Moscow.13 As the HKSAR’s foreign affairs are under the jurisdiction of the central government in Beijing, it was natural that Beijing had the final say on where Snowden should go.

The Publishers of the Causeway Bay Bookstore Another case that directly impacted on the relations between the HKSAR and the PRC was the disappearance of five people connected with the Causeway Bay Bookstore from October to December 2015. The bookstore published a series of Chinese books revealing the PRC’s corruption scandals, sex scandals, military information, leadership struggles and inside politics. One of the shareholders, Gui Minhai, disappeared from his house in Thailand. In January 2016, he appeared on the mainland television, openly renounced his Swedish citizenship and confessed that he had violated the Chinese law in a car accident. In February 2020, he was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment by the mainland Chinese court. Critics said that he could not easily renounce his Swedish citizenship through a television interview, and that he was detained for a lengthy period. Apart from Gui, Lee Bo disappeared from his home at Hong Kong, but he later returned to Hong Kong in March 2016, saying that he had made a mistake by publishing those Chinese books.14 Unlike Lee who kept silent, Lam Wing-kei, who disappeared in Shenzhen in October 2015, returned to the HKSAR in June 2016. Lam revealed the horror of his disappearance, saying that PRC authorities set up a task force to investigate the content of the books published by the Causeway Bay Bookstore, 12  “HKSAR government issues statement of Edward Snowden,” June 23, 2013, in https://info.gov.hk/gia/general/201306/23/P201306230476.html, access date: March 9, 2020. 13  Jane Perlez and Keith Bradsher, “China Sad to Have Made Call to Let Leaker Depart.” The New York Times, June 23, 2013, in https://nytimes.com/2013/06/24/world/asia/ china-said-to-have-made-call-to-let-leaker-depart.html, access date: March 9, 2020. 14  “Missing Hong Kong book editor Lee Bo returns home.” Associated Press, March 24, 2016.

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including a book that unveiled President Xi Jinping’s desire to prolong his presidency.15 The other two publishers, Lui Bo and Cheung Jiping, also disappeared in their homes at Shenzhen and Dongguan respectively in late 2015, but they kept tight-lipped about their experiences. Lam’s revelation and Gui’s predicament highlighted the precarious nature of publishers who published books critical of the PRC. In April 2019, Lam migrated to Taiwan in response to the extradition bill initiated by the HKSAR government. While Gui is serving his prison sentences in the mainland, the other three former publishers have adopted a low profile to protect themselves. The book publishers’ experiences exposed not only the personal safety of publishers who published politically sensitive books about China, but also the threats to their personal freedom and the freedom of press in the HKSAR.

The Cases of Iat Hong and Xiao Jianhua Another case that illustrated the influence of the China factor on the HKSAR was the US government’s request in October 2017 that the Hong Kong government should extradite a Macau resident, Iat Hong, who was arrested in Hong Kong in December 2016 and who had been reportedly hacking into two American law firms to “steal” some information.16 According to the US government, Iat Hong cooperated with two other persons to hack into the US companies and illegally “stole” US $3 million after they got inside information of some investment companies concerned.17 However, Iat Hong was not extradited from Hong Kong to the United States. The Hong case showed that on the extradition request from a foreign country, especially the United States, the HKSAR government tended to consult, listen and follow the decision from Beijing.

15  “Phila Siu, Ng Kang-chung and Owen Fung, “Bookseller Lam Wing-kei reveals explosive details of his mainland China detention, claims Lee Po told his he was taken away from Hong,’” South China Morning Post, June 16, 2016. 16  “The Carrie Lam government rejects the US request to extradite a suspect,” China Labour Forum, July 5, 2018, in https://chinaworker.info/zh/2018/07/05/18059/, access date: March 1, 2020. 17  “America Report that Carrie Lam rejected the US request for extradition and returned the suspect to the mainland by following Beijing’s request.” The Stand News, May 30, 2018, in https://www.thestandnews.com/politics/, access date: March 1, 2020.

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In January 2017, it was reported that a mainland business tycoon named Xiao Jianhua was “abducted” in the HKSAR.18 Xiao was a Canadian citizen, but he was reportedly involved in the mainland’s commercial fraud. During his stay at the Four Seasons Hotel in the HKSAR, he was accompanied by a female bodyguard. Nevertheless, it was reported that five or six mainland agents accompanied him to return to the mainland for investigation.19 The Hong Kong police said that Xiao’s relatives canceled their case of a missing person one day after they filed a report on January 28, 2017. Obviously, Xiao was brought back to the PRC for investigation and his relatives wanted to maintain a low profile instead of alienating the mainland authorities. Even though Xiao held a Canadian passport, he appeared to be treated as a mainland Chinese citizen legally by the mainland authorities. His case illustrated that overseas mainland Chinese who hold foreign citizenships but who commit any crime in the PRC can be regarded as mainland Chinese citizens in Hong Kong, Macau and the mainland. The Xiao case highlighted the problem of “extraditing” corrupt mainland officials and businesspeople from the HKSAR to the PRC. First, PRC authorities might not be pleased with the phenomenon in which the HKSAR government did not have to return mainland criminal suspects, who could be hiding in Hong Kong, to the mainland. Second, the practice of sending mainland agents to “kidnap” or “bring back” the targeted persons from the HKSAR to the mainland aroused considerable controversies. After the book publishers’ incident, the former Secretary of Justice of the HKSAR government, Rimsky Yuen, visited to Beijing in July 2016, reaching a new reciprocal notification mechanism in which each of the mainland and Hong Kong sides would inform the other party if one or more of its residents were detained.20 Four principles were reached between the two sides: acting in accordance with the law, embracing differences, identifying mutually beneficial grounds and protecting human rights. Both sides did not reach a formal rendition agreement. A Hong Kong suspect named Kit Kwun-kwok was simultaneously arrested from the mainland for his suspected involvement in the killing of a money 18  Jamil Anderlini, Ben Bland and Gloria Cheung, “Chinese billionaire abducted from Hong Kong,” Financial Times, February 1, 2017, in https://ff.com/content/8e54c51ce7a7-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539, access date March 9, 2020. 19  Ibid. 20  Sonny Lo, “Goodwill and trust can prevail,” China Daily, August 3, 2016.

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exchange operator in Tai Po on March 14, 2016. Kit was transferred from the mainland to the HKSAR police on Lok Ma Chau bridge on July 28, 2016, marking a more formal administrative transfer of fugitives. The case of Iat Hong in October 2017 raised a question concerning the extradition arrangements between the HKSAR and foreign countries. From 2014 to 2019, the HKSAR extradited 10 fugitives to foreign countries.21 The Secretary for Justice of the HKSAR government, Teresa Cheng, stressed that Hong Kong did not extradite fugitives to other countries “without adequate legal grounds.”22 However, the HKSAR government “does not necessarily handle the foreign request under some circumstances.”23Such “circumstances” might involve the China factor, because Iat Hong was eventually sent to the PRC.24 From Beijing’s perspective, it had the legal jurisdiction over Iat Hong instead of handling him to the US side.

The China Factor The China factor had an important bearing on the Xiao Jianhua case, with implications for the introduction of the extradition bill by the HKSAR government in early 2019. It was reported that Xiao was responsible for managing the assets of the taizidang (“princeling party”), which was composed of the children of the high-ranking party cadres and officials.25 When Xiao was “sent back” to the PRC from Hong Kong by the mainland agents, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), which is an anti-corruption agency focusing on CCP members in the mainland, was reportedly “frustrated by the fact that it had to resort to extraordinary rendition and thereafter pushed for an extradition treaty” between Hong 21  “The Secretary for Justice reveals 10 extradited fugitives within 5 years, but does not explain the rejection of US request,” May 30, 2018, in https://www.hk01.com/, access date: March 1, 2020. 22  Ibid. 23  Ibid. 24  “Young Macau hacker stole US $3 million, Carrie Lam rejects US extradition request, and the whole incident is revealed,” May 30, 2018, in https://www.hk01.com/, access date: February 20, 2020. 25  Choi Chi-yuk, “The big questions about missing tycoon: why and why now?” South China Morning Post, February 19, 2017, in https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitices/article/2071780/big-questions-about-missing-tycoon-why-and-now, access date: February 20, 2020.

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Kong and China.26 Xiao’s company issued a statement on January 31, 2017, saying that he underwent on overseas medical treatment, that “the Chinese government is civilized,” and that “there is no such incident as kidnapping him back to the mainland.”27 However, it was reported that Xiao had helped some high-ranking CCP members to earn billions of dollars through his global investment in the banking, insurance and real estate industries.28 Xiao was regarded as a “banker” for the children of high-­ ranking CCP officials.29 As such, his return to the PRC prior to the annual March NPC meeting in Beijing might indicate that some “influential” power-holders wanted to stop Xiao’s friends from launching any political attack at a ruling faction.30 His disappearance from Hong Kong, however, was seen by local democrats as a “violation” of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” by the PRC.31 If Xiao’s disappearance pointed to the determination of PRC leaders and their ruling faction to pursue those mainland Chinese, who appeared to earn a huge amount of money through their global investment and who stayed in Hong Kong as a temporary sanctuary, then the extradition bill proposed by the HKSAR government in early 2019 could be a coordinated outcome between mainland authorities and their Hong Kong counterparts. In fact, when the extradition bill was proposed by the HKSAR government in early 2019, there was evidence to show that it communicated and 26  Ibid. Also see Zhou Xin, “Disappearing Chinese billionaire Xiao Jianhua awaits day in court as flagship’s asses sale stalls,” South China Morning Post, May 29, 2018, in https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2148154/disappearning-chinese-billionaire-xiao-jianhua-awaits-day-court, access date: February 28, 2020, and “Topic: Xiao Jianhue,” in https://www.scmp.com/topics/xiao-jianhua, access date: February 28, 2020. David Lague, James Pomfret and Greg Torade, “Special Report: How murder, kidnappings and miscalculation set off Hong Kong’s revolt,” Reuters, December 20, 2019, in https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/hongkong-protests-extradition-narrative/, access date: March 9, 2020. 27  “Secretary for Justice returns 10 extradited fugitives with 5 years, but it has not explained the rejection of US requests,” May 28, 2018, in https://www.hk01.com, access date: March 1, 2020. 28  Yi Kaixing, “Why did China bring back Xiao Jianhua from Hong Kong,” BBC Chinese, February 8, 2017, in https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/indepth-38906633, access date: March 3, 2020. 29  Ibid. 30  Ibid. 31  Fu Caide and Meng Baoli, “Inside Story of Xiao Jianhua’s Disappearance,” New York Times (Chinese version), December 12, 2017, in https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20170212/ xiao-jianhua-hong-kong-disappearance/zh-hant/, access date: March 9, 2020.

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coordinated with PRC officials. The former LegCo President, Jasper Tsang, revealed that one Executive Council member informed him of Beijing’s “concession” because the amended bill would not “extradite” those fugitives involved in death sentence.32 Furthermore, the Liaison Office’s deputy director Chen Dong openly supported the extradition bill, while the deputy director of the Basic Law Committee, Zhang Yong, went so far as to assert that “Hong Kong should be a shopping paradise rather than a paradise for fugitives.”33 The deputy chairman of the PRC’s Hong Kong and Macau Study Association, Lau-Siu-kai, remarked that if the HKSAR government did not amend the extradition bill, it would create “hidden worries for national security.”34 Due to the fact that President Xi Jinping was keen to continue his anti-corruption campaign, the HKSAR government’s amendment to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance aimed at helping the central government to target at those corrupt officials, party cadres and businesspeople who stayed in Hong Kong as their hiding place.35 Chen Zhimin, a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), responded to the Hong Kong media’s question on the extradition bill by saying explicitly that there were “more than 300 fugitives hiding in Hong Kong,” and that PRC authorities “have the name of every single one of them.”36

The Extradition Bill On the other hand, Chief Executive Carrie Lam remarked that the amended extradition bill aimed at plugging the loopholes in the existing Hong Kong law, and that the move required the understanding, respect and support from the central government.37 The death of Amber Poon Hiu-wing, a 20-year-old woman from Hong Kong, in Taipei in February 2018 provided a golden opportunity for the HKSAR government to 32  Kwan Hing-ling, “Will Hong Kong become ‘a paradise for fugitives?,’” May 19, 2019, in https://www.hkcnews.com/article/20558, access date: March 3, 2020. 33  Ibid. 34  Ibid. 35  Ibid. 36  “Over 300 Mainland fugitives hiding in Hong Kong, a CPPCC member says,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, March 14, 2019  in https://www.ejinsight.com/20190314-over300-mainland-fugitives-hiding-in-hk-cppcc-member-says/, access date: March 1, 2020. 37  Kwan Hing-ling, “Will Hong Kong become ‘a paradise for fugitives?,’” May 19, 2019, in https://www.hkcnews.com/acrticle/20558, access date: March 2, 2020.

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amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance. At the age of 20, Poon was murdered by a 19-year-old Hong Kong man named Chan Tong-kai. Both went to Taipei, but Chan immediately escaped back to Hong Kong after the murder. On March 26, 2019, the Chief Executive and the Executive Council endorsed the submission of the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 to the LegCo. The bill would be published in the government gazette on March 29 and it would go through LegCo’s first reading on April 3. The explicit “objectives of the bill are to address the Taiwan homicide case and to plug the loopholes in Hong Kong’s overall mechanism in juridical assistance.”38 During a period of 20-day public consultation, the government received 4500 written submissions of which two-thirds supported the proposal.39 Above all, the surrender arrangements would cover 37 of the 46 items of offenses, which were punishable with more than three years’ imprisonment in the HKSAR. A total of nine offenses would not be tackled in the amended bill after the government heard some dissenting views and objections from the business sector. Furthermore, a certificate issued by the Chief Executive would be required to activate the surrender arrangements. The government said: Such activation does not mean that the fugitive will definitely be surrendered as the request must go through all statutory procedures, including the issuance of an authority to proceed by the Chief Executive, the committee hearing by the court and the eventual making of the surrender order by the Chief Executive. Other procedural safeguards, such as application for habeas corpus, application for discharge in case of delay, and judicial review of the Chief Executive’s decision … will remain unchanged.40

Perspectives from the United States From the US perspective, several cases in addition to Iat Hong might have implications for the American perception of the extradition bill proposed by the HKSAR government. First in January 2003, economist Steven 38  “Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 to be submitted to LegCo,” March 26, 2019, in https://www.info. gov.hk/gia/general/201903/26/P2019032600708.html, access date: March 9, 2020. 39  Ibid. 40  Ibid.

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Ng-sheong Cheung, who formerly worked at the University of Hong Kong and who was a US citizen, was indicted by a US court for failing to file income tax returns. Cheung said that he did not know he was required to report his income concerned.41 He has been staying in the PRC. His case appeared to show that the US government was concerned about possible tax evasion of its overseas US citizens. While the HKSAR has extradition arrangement with the US, China does not have a similar formal agreement. The Cheung case highlighted the different legal systems between Hong Kong and the mainland. From the US perspective, if the extradition bill were passed in Hong Kong in 2019, the question was whether some US citizens in the HKSAR would be extradited from Hong Kong to the mainland. Second, the case of Patrick Ho Chi-ping, a former secretary for Home Affairs of the HKSAR government and a former member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was arrested together with former Senegal foreign minister Cheikh Gradis in November 2017 for violating the US anti-corruption and anti-money laundering laws.42 The two persons allegedly offered a US $2 million bribe to the President of Chad to acquire “oil rights” and they also paid a diplomat of Uganda.43 Ho led a Hong Kong-based China Energy Fund Committee (CEFC) which was funded by the CEFC China Energy. The bribes were reportedly processed in US banks under the disguise of donations. The case showed that Ho appeared to act as a representative for the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative, helping the Chinese energy company to establish a stronghold in African states, but his lobbying efforts were conducted in the United States. His case also showed that the US government took swift action to arrest him when he was in the United States instead of allowing him to leave the United States for Hong Kong or other places. Third, Sabrina Meng, who was the deputy chair and chief financial officer of Huawei, was arrested in Vancouver in December 2018 by the Canadian police in response to a request from the US government to 41  Duff Wilson, “Economist tied to take art faces tax charges,” The Seattle Times, January 29, 2003, in https://www.archire.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=200301298&slug=che ung29, access date: March 11, 2020. 42  “Former Hong Kong home secretary Patrick Ho arrested in US over alleged Africa bribery scheme,” AFP, November 21, 2017, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/law-crime/article/2020784/us-arrests-former-hong-kong-home-secretary-patrickho, access date: March 11, 2020. 43  Ibid.

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extradite her for financial fraud that violated the US ban on transactions with Iran.44 As with the Patrick Ho case, Meng was detained in Canada, rather than in the United States as with Ho, for their alleged violations of the US laws. In other words, American law-enforcement agencies have taken prompt action against Chinese from both Hong Kong and mainland China for their possible breach of US laws rather than allowing them to leave the United States or Canada for Hong Kong, where the Snowden case showed that even the US request for extraditing him could fail. Perhaps the cases of Snowden, Cheung, Ho and Meng demonstrated that, from the national security interest of the United States, the American government was naturally concerned about the content of the extradition bill proposed by the HKSAR government in early 2019. On June 10, 2019, the US State Department issued the following statement in response to the amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance in the HKSAR: The United States expresses its grave concern about the Hong Kong government’s proposed amendments to its Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, which, if passed, would permit Chinese authorities to request the extradition of individuals to mainland China. … The United States shares the concerns of many in Hong Kong that the lack of procedural protections in the proposed amendments could undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy and negatively impact the territory’s longstanding protections of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democratic values, as enshrined in the Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration. We are also concerned that the amendments could damage Hong Kong’s business environment and subject our citizens residing in or visiting Hong Kong to China’s capricious judicial system. … Continued erosion of the “one country, two systems” framework puts at risk Hong Kong’s long-established special status in international affairs.45

Clearly, the United States was deeply concerned about the likelihood that its citizens, who worked and stayed in the HKSAR, might be transferred

44  Julia Horowitz, “Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou arrested in Canada, faces extradition to United States.” CNN, December 6, 2018, in https://www.edition.cnn.com/2018/12/05/ teach/huawei-cfo-arrested-canada/index.html, access date: March 11, 2020. 45  “Statement from the State Department Spokesperson on the Hong Kong government’s proposed amendments to its proposed amendments to its Fugitive Offenders Ordinance,” June 10, 2019, in https://www.hk.usconsulate.gov/n-201961001/, access date: March 11, 2020.

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from the HKSAR to the PRC, whose legal system was viewed as “capricious.” The US concerns about the extradition bill were articulated openly and forcefully by the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in the HKSAR. In March 2019, the AmCham issued the following statement on the extradition bill: Those concerns flow primarily from the fact that the new arrangements could be used for rendition from Hong Kong to a number of jurisdictions with criminal procedure systems very different from those of Hong Kong— which provides strong protections for the legitimate rights of defendants— without the opportunity for publish and legislative scrutiny of the fairness of those systems and the specified safeguards that should be sought in cases originating from them. We strongly believe that the proposed arrangements will reduce the appeal of Hong Kong to international companies considering Hong Kong as a base for regional operations.46

It was obvious that the AmCham was concerned about the broader implications of extraditing suspected “criminal” elements from Hong Kong to “jurisdictions with criminal procedure systems very different from those of Hong Kong.” On May 30, 2019, the AmCham revealed its position after its meeting with Matthew Cheung, the Chief Secretary for Administration of the HKSAR government. It argued that some issues of the legislation should be addressed before the LegCo would deliberate the bill further. The AmCham raised eight issues concerning the bill. First, it appealed to the HKSAR government to address the concerns raised by 30 foreign diplomats in the HKSAR.47 Second, given that three local judges openly opposed the bill, the AmCham argued that the rule of law would be compromised if the bill would be forced ahead. Third, it called for the HKSAR government to clarify whether the extradition request would come from mainland Chinese courts rather than from any recognized individuals 46  “Press release: Fugitive Offenders Ordinance,” March 29, 2019, in https://www. amcham.org.hk/news/media-statement%2D%2Dfugitive-offenders-ordinance, access date: March 11, 2020. 47  “Press release: Proposed Fugitive Offenders Ordinance,” May 30, 2019, in https:// www.amcham.org.hk/news/press-release-proposed-fugitive-offenders-ordinance, access date: March 11, 2020. A diplomat told the authors that he found the briefing as failing to address the concerns of foreign diplomats. Discussion with the diplomat in June 2019.

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from the PRC government. Fourth, the AmCham urged the HKSAR government to safeguard Hong Kong’s freedom of the press and speech as promised in the Basic Law and Hong Kong Law, implying that the Causeway Bookstore case was still haunting many Hong Kong people, including foreigners. Fifth, the AmCham argued that, given Hong Kong’s relatively low crime rate, the proposed extradition bill would risk undermining Hong Kong’s reputation for the rule of law. Sixth, it asked the HKSAR government to differentiate fugitives from local ordinary citizens. Seventh, the AmCham appealed to the HKSAR administration to ensure that the requesting jurisdiction for fugitives to guarantee fair trial. Eighth, it asked the Hong Kong authorities to maintain business confidence, because the business sector was concerned about the bill’s provision that the PRC government could request the freezing of assets of a person who was “deemed to be a fugitive from the mainland.”48 Overall, the AmCham opposed the extradition bill as it expressed grave concerns about its impacts on the rule of law, personal freedom, the freedom of press, fair trial and business confidence.

Local Concerns and Governmental Response In response to local and foreign concerns, the HKSAR government on May 30, 2019, announced a series of safeguards in a last minute to sell the amended bill to the business community and LegCo.49 The bill, which was due for LegCo’s second reading on June 12, originally stipulated that suspects wanted for 37 crimes punishable by three years or more could be sent to the PRC. After hearing local and foreign views, the Secretary for Security John Lee raised the bar to those offenses that could be imprisoned for seven years. Another concession from the HKSAR government was that it would process and accept requests for the transfer of fugitives from top legal authorities from the requesting jurisdictions, including the Supreme People’s Procuratorate or Supreme People’s Court in the PRC. John Lee added that the government might introduce human rights protections to the transfer agreements on a case-by-case basis, like clauses  Ibid.  Alvin Lum, Sum Lok-kei and Jeffie lam, “Hong Kong extradition bill: security chief announces safeguards to win support of major business groups and political allies,” South China Morning Post, May 30, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3012498/hong-kong-security-chief-john-lee-rolls-out-new-measures, access date: March 11, 2020. 48 49

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that would specify the right of defendant to have legal representation and fair trial. The local business groups were positive toward these changes, including the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC), the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries and the Hong Kong Chinese Importers’ and Exporters’ Association. However, the AmCham continued to have reservations and objections, judging from its statement released on the same day when the HKSAR government announced the changes to the content of the bill. One of the most vociferous oppositions to the extradition bill was made by the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA). Table  2.1 shows that the HKBA regarded the government’s failure to withdraw the bill as “wholly unsatisfactory” and that it hoped for a “full and open consultation” with the members of the public. In fact, the HKBA maintained its original position in March and April 2019, when it stated several arguments regarding the extradition bill. First, it did not believe in the necessity of liberalizing the Fugitive Offenders’ Ordinance to include mainland China to enable rendition of the suspect in the Taiwan murder case.50 Second, the HKBA questioned whether the proposed amendments would be effective in Table 2.1  Position of the Hong Kong Bar Association on the extradition bill 1. The government’s proposals of amending the two ordinances “fundamentally imperil” the rule of law in Hong Kong. 2. “Notwithstanding that the Bill is unlikely to be re-introduced this term, HKBA considers that the Government’s failure to withdraw the Bill is wholly unsatisfactory because it gives rise to concerns that any future consultation to be conducted by the Government on the topics of the surrender of fugitives and cross-border legal assistance will still be curtailed by the parameters set by the Bill.” 3. “HKBA therefore asks the Government to withdraw the Bill and make a commitment that it will not introduce any legislation on the question of surrender of fugitives and cross-border legal assistance without full and open consultation involving the Hong Kong public and others who have an interest in the subject matter.” Source: Press Statement of the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA), “On the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 (‘The Bill’),” June 21, in https://www.hkba.org/events-publication/press-releases-coverage, access date: February 5, 2020 50  “Additional Observations of the HKBA on the HKSAR Government’s proposed further changes to the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019,” June 6, 2019, in https://www.hkba.org/events-publication/press-releases-coverage, access date: March 16, 2020.

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achieving the rendition case in Taiwan. Third, it appealed to the HKSAR government to explain why sudden changes were made to the ordinance concerned. Fourth, the HKBA argued that amendments to other legislation could be made to achieve the same impact. Fifth, it advocated a case-­ based arrangement to become a norm for fugitives to be surrendered from Hong Kong to mainland China. Sixth, if the LegCo would not be able to scrutinize any surrender agreement, then the court should have an expanded role in vetting the requests for human rights compliance in the requesting country. Seventh, the HKBA argued that there was no principled basis for the exclusion of criminal offenses that carried a maximum sentence of less than 3 years’ imprisonment. On May 30, 2019, the Secretary for Security John Lee announced several changes in response to the local and international concerns. These changes included the following amendments: (1) increasing the threshold of imprisonment for an offense to a maximum sentence of at least seven years; (2) fixing a time limit for offenses in the requesting place so that there would not be retrospective requests; (3) allowing the Chief Executive to require the requesting jurisdiction to respect the principles of the presumption of innocence, open trial, visiting rights, banning forced concessions and the right to appeal; and (4) requiring surrender and confiscation requests to be made by the PRC Supreme People’s Procuratorate or the Supreme People’s Court. On June 1, 2019, John Lee confirmed that only the increase in the penalty threshold to 7 years would be written into the fugitive bill. The other three proposed changes would be in the form of policy statements and practices instead of being written into the extradition bill.51 Furthermore, the government admitted that raising the penalty threshold to seven years would exclude some serious offenses, such as criminal intimidation, giving the possession of firearms to unlicensed person, possession of child pornography, procuring unlawful sexual act by false pretenses, unlawful sexual intercourse with young persons under 16, using young persons under 18 for making pornography or live pornographic performances, procuring a girl under 21 to have unlawful sexual intercourse with a third person.52 The HKBA argued that these exclusions appeared to contradict the government’s commitment to fight against cross-border crimes. It also contended that there was no principled policy justification behind in  Ibid.  Ibid.

51 52

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choosing seven years’ imprisonment of maximum penalty as the threshold. The HKBA added that the threshold in cases where there were regular reciprocal arrangements was lower, such as Canada, Australia and United Kingdom where long-term surrender agreements had one year’s imprisonment as the threshold term. In short, the immunity given to individuals who received less than seven years’ imprisonment “does not make sense in legal policy terms.”53 The HKBA added that there were many offenses in which there was a liability to surrender the fugitives concerned, such as the possession of property by deception, theft, fraud, conspiracy to defraud, money laundering, blackmail, the possession of false instruments, bribery, corruption and perjury.54 Most importantly, the HKBA was unhappy with the arrangement that most “safeguards” would not be written into the amended ordinance, because these “safeguards” would “depend entirely on the goodwill of the requesting state” and they “do not have the force of law.”55 For the role of the Chief Executive in dealing with the requesting place, the HKBA remarked: The level of protection depends on the Chief Executive’s ability to negotiate with the requesting party and its relations with the HKSAR. Where there is an asymmetrical relationship, as there is with the mainland, it is doubtful that the Chief Executive could go so far as to say that requests from there will not be entertained unless there is 100 percent compliance with promises about a fair trial procedure, humane conditions of detention, access to lawyers, etc.56

The HKBA added that independent courts would be the most suitable and persuasive authority to protect the fugitive’s basic rights. Moreover, if the safeguards were not honored by the requesting party, the HKSAR government would find it difficult to ensure compliance. The HKBA concluded: “It is also difficult for the HKSAR government to refuse to entertain future extradition requests given the asymmetrical relationship between the HKSAR government and the mainland and in light of the duty to comply with any instructions from the central government regarding extradition requests.”57 As such, the Bar Association adopted the view  Ibid.  Ibid. 55  Ibid. 56  Ibid. 57  Ibid. 53 54

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that it would be appropriate for the local court to refuse the surrender of the fugitive concerned if there was a risk to human rights abuse. Finally, the HKBA made the comments on Articles 87, 88 and 89 of the PRC Criminal Law, questioning the limitations on the time of prosecution in the mainland. It said: It is noteworthy that Article 89 of the PRC Criminal Law provides that: “if further crime is committed during a limitation period for prosecution, the limitation period for prosecution of the former crime shall be counted from the date the latter crime is committed.” In other words, the limitation period for an “old crime” can be extended indefinitely so long as there is an allegation of a new offence within that period. The HKBA takes the view that this “safeguard” is riddled with uncertainties and it offers scarcely any reliable assurances that a person is safe from being prosecuted for an apparently time-barred offence as one or more of these exceptions may apply.58

It is understandable that the HKBA commented on the PRC Criminal Law because of its relevance to the content of the fugitive bill in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, by questioning the mainland Criminal Law, the HKBA might run the risk of antagonizing PRC authorities dealing with the fugitive transfer with the HKSAR government.59 Moreover, even though the HKSAR government made some concessions in response to local and international concerns, the HKBA remained dissatisfied with the ways in which the rendition arrangements were handled. From the perspective of pro-Beijing mouthpiece, Wen Wei Po, the HKBA appeared to team up with the political opposition to reject the extradition bill amended by the HKSAR government. Commentator Kung Chi-ping wrote: Apart from blackening the mainland’s rule of law, the opposition faction exaggerates the political question and makes it the main content of the transfer of fugitives, including the claims of “the death of Hong Kong press freedom,” “everyone would likely become political criminals,” “Carrie Lam must extradite once the central authorities order it,” and “Hong Kong becoming an extradition harbor for the Chinese Communists.” The HKBA  Ibid.  Kung Chi-ping accused the Hong Kong political opposition and the HKBA of “blackening the image of the rule of law in the mainland.” He said that the PRC had made tremendous progress in its legal development. See Kung Chi-ping, “Lies cannot cover the truth, the opposition’s credibility bankrupt,” Wen Wei Po, June 12, 2019, in http://news.wenweipo. com/2019/06/12/IN1906120001.htm, access date: March 16, 2020. 58 59

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even manufactures 24 questions and answers for people to understand the issues lazily, totally deviating from the original intent of the bill’s amendment. The political opposition has clear objective, namely creating ideological confrontations, stirring up social fear and mobilizing more citizens to take to the streets.60

From the united front perspective, PRC officials refrained from openly criticizing the HKBA. But reading between the lines of the commentaries of Wen Wei Po, the HKBA was grouped into the discussion of the “political opposition” and its strategies. As such, while the HKBA adopted a legalistic perspective to comment on the amended ordinance and the PRC Criminal Law, the pro-Beijing mouthpiece, which was and is under the supervision and organization of the Liaison Office, viewed its position as not only legal but ultimately political.

Perspectives from Mainland and Pro-Beijing Hong Kong Legal Experts Table 2.2 shows the remarks and position of the mainland legal experts on the extradition bill. Rao Geping, a mainland member of the Basic Law Committee (BLC) that deals with the interpretations of the Basic Law, said that the people of Hong Kong should “trust” the “dual safeguards” of having the Chief Executive and local courts to scrutinize the process of transferring fugitives from Hong Kong to the mainland. He added that the bill was politicized with a “deliberately obscured” debate over the legal principles. As such, he made an implicit criticism of the Hong Kong lawyers, including the HKBA’s executive committee members, who were critical of the bill’s content and amendments. The other two mainland members of the Hong Kong and Macau Study Association, Tian Feilong and Lin Feng, were staunchly supportive of the amended bill. Tian argued that the amended bill aimed at preventing Hong Kong from becoming “a haven for fugitives,” implying that the bill did have an objective of transferring mainland criminal suspects, who might launder dirty money and who might be corrupt but hiding in Hong Kong, to the mainland. He also went so far as to assert that the anti-PRC forces aimed at undermining “freedom and the rule of law” in the territory. However, a pro-Beijing legal expert, Lin Feng, criticized the HKSAR government for rushing  Ibid.

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Table 2.2  Remarks of mainland legal experts on the extradition bill Rao Geping

Tian Feilong

Lin Feng

1. Hong Kong people should trust the “dual safeguards” of the Chief Executive and the courts which are spelt out the in the legislation. 2. The bill is politicized with the debate over the legal principles being deliberately obscured. The legislation is long overdue, because extradition mechanisms with various countries were necessary. 1. Amending the ordinance is a standard administrative act of the HKSAR government to enforce the Basic Law and to improve the rule of law in the Special Administrative Region. 2. It aims at facilitating the transfer of cases between Hong Kong and jurisdictions with which it has not reached an agreement on the exchange of fugitives. It can also prevent Hong Kong from becoming a “haven for fugitives.” 3. The autonomous legislative process has been “stigmatized” by foreign and anti-China forces that are “undermining” freedom and the rule of law in Hong Kong. 4. The anti-amendment movement has gone way beyond the paradigm of peaceful demonstrations and public involvement in the legislative process. It has almost become “an action against the rule of law.” 1. The content of the bill is “reasonable” and would remove two major obstacles for the conclusion of a bilateral agreement between Hong Kong and mainland China in the future. 2. The necessity of the bill is “unquestionable.” Its consultation was too “hasty,” the timing was “inappropriate,” and its promotion was “unsatisfactory.” 3. The legislative process is both “legal and political”; the “legislation reaches its limits when politics manages to mobilize many people against the bill.”

Sources: South China Moring Post, June 11, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3013929/one-extradition-bill-hundreds-thousands-protesters-why-hong, access date: February 5, 2020; “Anti-amendment movement risks undermining Hong Kong’s rule of law,” available in: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-06-14/Anti-amendment-movement-risks-undermining-HongKong-s-rule-of-law-HvI4Cvstz2/index.html, access date: February 5, 2020; Lin Feng, “From “Occupying Central” to “Anti-extradition”—Limits of Law and Power of Politics,” in https://www.uib. no/en/jur/132707/occupying-central%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%9Canti-extradition%E2%80%9D%E2%80%93-limits-law-and-power-politics, access date: February 5, 2020

through the amended bill and for initiating a “hasty” consultation, although the bill’s amendment was “reasonable.” Overall, the three mainland legal experts supported the extradition bill, but while Rao and Tian shied away from commenting on the HKSAR government’s handling of the consultation, Lin admitted that the local administration put forward the amended bill hurriedly and untimely.

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Table 2.3 demonstrates that three of the five Hong Kong members of the BLC expressed their views of the fugitive bill. A moderately pro-­ Beijing legal expert, Albert Chen, said that the HKSAR government should explore improvements of the extradition bill, that it should introduce more safeguards and that legislators should focus on how the content should be strengthened rather than rejecting the bill entirely. His views were highlighted by the mass media as early as May 2019, when he said that local courts should be empowered to hand over fugitives to jurisdictions which could provide fair trial.61 Interestingly, Chen’s moderate view appeared to be brushed aside by the HKSAR government officials and Beijing’s authorities, who had already backed the extradition bill in mid-May. Chen’s suggestion was backed up by another pro-Beijing legal expert, Alan Hoo, who suggested that the government should bring in safeguards under a model extradition treaty by the United Nations or Commonwealth countries.62 The treaty confers upon the courts the power of examining whether the requesting place can provide fair trial. Hoo also suggested that the HKSAR government could raise the threshold by allowing extraditions only for those offenses punishable by five years’ imprisonment rather than three years, and that the requests for extradition should be heard in District Courts instead of magistrate. The crux of the problem was that PRC authorities, such as Han Zheng who chaired the CCP Coordination Committee on Hong Kong and Macau, had already remarked on May 20 that Beijing fully supported Chief Executive Carrie Lam, and that the amended bill would be beneficial to Hong Kong’s “rule of law, fairness and justice.”63 Han also told a group of delegates from Hong Kong’s Fujianese community: “The central government completely supports the work launched by the Hong Kong government, and strongly believes that through the hard work of the government and the rational debate held by different sectors, doubts will surely be cleared and a consensus reached.”64 Han’s remarks represented the political stance of Beijing to support the Carrie Lam administration and the amended 61  Alvin Lum and Shum Lok-kei, “Hong Kong extradition law: Beijing-friendly legal heavyweight Albert Chen breaks silence to call for extra safeguards on contentious proposal,” South China Morning Post, May 24, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/politics/article/3011577/hong-kong-extradition-law-beijing-friendly-legal, access date: March 16, 2020. 62  Ibid. 63  Ibid. 64  Ibid.

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Table 2.3  Remarks of Hong Kong Basic Law Committee members on the extradition bill Name

Remarks

Albert Chen

1. “The government should still explore improvements on the current proposal by introducing more safeguards.” 2. “There is a good chance that the bill will be passed in the Legislative Council and so we should work to improve its content instead of rejecting it entirely.” 1. “If amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance are approved, this will help resolve the Taiwan murder case that involves a Hong Kong citizen.” 2. “It would also provide a legal basis for Hong Kong to enter into extradition agreements with some 150 jurisdictions, including other parts of China, on a case-by-case basis.” 3. “Many critics doubt whether the Chief Executive will refuse to surrender fugitive offenders demanded by the central government. But it must be noted that if the Court of Final Appeal rules that an offender should not be surrendered, the Chief Executive or the government cannot surrender that offender.” 4. “If the Taiwan authorities refuse to accept the murderer whom Hong Kong is willing to surrender, then it is their responsibility. The Hong Kong people have tried their very best to see that justice prevail.” 1. “This amendment aims at protecting citizen rights and private properties. Because of close interactions between Hong Kong and China, criminal elements can easily escape to Hong Kong. This loophole is easily seen and there is a real need for the legislation.” 2. “In the past 20 years, mainland’s judicial process and trials were making great progress. They have become more transparent than ever before although some trials were not properly conducted.” 3. “The case of Sabrina Meng shows that America’s judicial processes can be “unfair,” including “unfair” requests for extradition.” No prominent remark on the extradition bill.

Maria Tam

Priscilla Leung

Jonny Mok Wong No prominent remark on the extradition bill. Yuk-shan

Sources: “Hong Kong extradition law: Beijing-friendly legal heavyweight Albert Chen breaks silence to call for extra safeguards on contentious proposal,” South China Morning Post, May 24, 2019, in https:// www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3011577/hong-kong-extradition-law-beijingfriendly-legal, access date: February 5, 2020; “Maria Tam: HK right to pass extradition bill,” China Daily, May 29, 2019, in, https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/184/45/183/1559098489628.html, access date: February 5, 2020. The Stand News, March 27, 2019

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e­ xtradition bill. However, the legalistic arguments articulated by lawyers and even pro-Beijing legal experts appeared to be brushed aside in May 2019. As early as May 3, 2019, Albert Chen published an influential commentary in a legal blog, calling for a two-stage process in which the Taiwan murder case could be tackled quickly first, and then the extradition bill would be amended. He wrote: Consideration may also be given to whether Hong Kong residents should be excluded from ad hoc extradition, just as section 13(6) of the existing Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and most extradition treaties which Hong Kong has entered into reserve the right of the Hong Kong authorities not to extradite Chinese nationals. This provision was originally designed as a restriction to extradition between Hong Kong and foreign states. It does not make sense as far as extradition or rendition between Hong Kong and mainland China is concerned. A modified version of this principle as adapted to rendition between Hong Kong and mainland may be that Hong Kong will not extradite Hong Kong residents to the mainland, but will prosecute them instead in Hong Kong, just as it is commonly provided in extradition treaties that where Hong Kong exercises its right not to extradite a Chinese national, the requesting state may request that Hong Kong initiate proceedings to prosecute the person concerned in Hong Kong. This is the proposal recently put forward by Mr. Michael Tien, a Legislative Councilor in Hong Kong, and it deserves further study and serious consideration.65

Tien proposed the two-stage reform process in which the first stage was marked by a reform of the existing law to tackle the Taiwan murder case, and the second phase dealt with a special surrender arrangement. However, all the aforesaid proposals from Tien, Chen and Hoo appeared to be a bit late, because PRC authorities had made up their minds to support the extradition bill politically and wholeheartedly. The other BLC members were supportive of the amended bill. Maria Tam said that it would help solving the Taiwan murder case and provide a legal basis for the HKSAR to enter into other extradition agreements with foreign countries and other parts of the mainland on a case-by-case basis. She responded to the critics of the bill, saying that the Chief Executive and 65  Albert Chen, “A Commentary on the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019,” HKU Legal Scholarship Blog, May 3, 2019, in http://researchblog.law.hku.hk/2019/05/albert-chens-commentary-onproposed.html, access date: March 16, 2020.

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the government would not override any decision made by the Court of Final Appeal to reject the surrender of a fugitive. Another BLC member, Priscilla Leung, remarked that the amended bill could protect citizen rights and private properties, that the mainland’s judiciary had made “great” progress and become “more transparent” than before, and that the Sabrina Meng case proved the “unfair” American judicial process. Leung’s remark of connecting the extradition bill with the Sabrina Meng case was noteworthy. However, such connection might have an unintended consequence of raising an interesting but unresolved question of whether the amended fugitive bill in the HKSAR was a retaliatory response to an American attempt at extraditing Sabrina Meng from Canada to the United States. The other two BLC members, Johnny Mok and Wong Yuk-shan, did not have any comments on the extradition bill.

Perspectives from Other Countries While the US concerns raised the eyebrows and political sensitivity of the PRC officials, other countries did express their opinions on the extradition bill (Table 2.4). The EU, which was outspoken in the Gui Minhai case, expressed its concern about the bill and hoped that the HKSAR government would listen to public opinion because the bill could impact on the European citizens living and visiting Hong Kong. The UK government emphasized that Hong Kong must ensure that its “high degree of autonomy” and the rule of law would continue to be enshrined and practiced. It also remarked that the bill might have a “chilling” impact on Hong Kong’s existing rights and freedom. Japan adopted a more moderate position, reiterating that it was concerned about the bill and that “free and open Hong Kong” remained very important in the principle of “one country, two systems.” Germany felt that the bill increased public fears and adopted a wait-and-see attitude to observe whether the bill’s second reading in LegCo would be postponed. As with the UK government, Canada expressed its deep concern about the bill because of its enormous number of citizens working and residing in the HKSAR. The two governments had issued a joint statement as early as March 2019: It is important that these proposals are subject to the highest levels of scrutiny, including in the Legislative Council. We urge the Hong Kong government to engage meaningfully with Hong Kong’s broad range of local and international stakeholders in order to ensure their concerns are fully

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Table 2.4  Foreign countries’ position on the extradition bill Country

Position

European Union

1. It was concerned about the Hong Kong government proposal to allow fugitives to be handed over to mainland China. 2. It believed that the HKSAR government should have a better idea of the public view on the sensitive issue before moving ahead, and that such extradition arrangement could have the potential impact on European citizens living in or visiting the city. 1. The extradition to China might have a “chilling” effect on Hong Kong’s rights and freedoms and it would result in increased self-censorship. 2. “Hong Kong must enjoy the full measure of its high degree of autonomy and rule of law as set out in the joint declaration and enshrined in the Basic Law.” 1.  It was concerned about the amendment of the bill. 2. It highlighted the significance of a “free and open Hong Kong” under the “one country, two systems” framework. 1. “The extradition bill increased the fears shared by entrepreneurs, legal professionals and the international community.” 2. “The German government adopts a wait-and-see attitude to observe whether the bill’s second reading in Legislative Council would be postponed.” 1. “We are concerned about the potential effect of these proposals on the large number of Canadian and UK citizens in Hong Kong, on business confidence and on Hong Kong’s international reputation. Furthermore, we believe that there is a risk that the proposals could impact negatively on the rights and freedoms set down in the Sino-British Joint Declaration. It is vital that extradition arrangements in Hong Kong are in line with ‘one country, two systems’ and fully respect Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy. We have made these views clear in our respective conversations with the Hong Kong government.”

United Kingdom

Japan

Germany

Canada

Sources: “European Union voices concern over Hong Kong’s plan to allow extraditions to mainland China,” South China Morning Post, March 15, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3001905/european-union-voices-concern-over-hong-kongs-plan-allow, access date: March 3, 2020; “UK gov’t ‘unequivocal’ over Hong Kong extradition law concerns, as US warns of risk to trade policy,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 12, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/12/ukgovt-unequivocal-hong-kong-extradition-law-concerns-us-warns-risk-trade-policy/, access date: March 3, 2020; “Germany looking at current extradition law with HK,” RTHK, June 13, 2019, in https:// news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1462720-20190613.htm, access date: March 3, 2020; “G20: Protests in Osaka over Hong Kong extradition law, as Japan’s Abe raises concerns with China’s Xi Jinping,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 28, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/28/g20protests-osaka-hong-kong-extradition-law-japans-abe-raises-concerns-chinas-xi-jinping/, access date: March 3, 2020; “Joint Statement by Canada and the United Kingdom on Hong Kong’s Extradition Law,” in https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/05/joint-statement-by-canada-andthe-united-kingdom-on-hong-kongs-extradition-law.html, access date: March 3, 2020

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c­ onsidered. We believe that the Hong Kong government should allow time to give proper consideration to all alternative options and safeguards.66

The PRC government tended to listen to the views of these countries as mentioned above, but it tended to be far more sensitive to the remarks made by US officials and businesspeople. Perhaps due to the Sino-­ American rivalries over trade and military issues, the United States was seen by PRC authorities as the most important competitor, whose comments on the Hong Kong extradition bill were naturally regarded as a menace to Beijing’s national security.

Conclusion This chapter examines the origins of the extradition bill, arguing that it originated from not only the need to tackle the Taiwan murder case, but also the necessity of the central government to pursue and extradite mainland corrupt officials and businesspeople who stayed in the HKSAR. There is no evidence to prove that the extradition bill in the HKSAR was related to any attempt by Beijing to react to and retaliate against the US attempt at extraditing Sabrina Meng from Canada to the United States. However, the US concerns about the extradition bill heightened the PRC’s political sensitivity. Beijing often sees Washington as a hegemonic power in the world that seeks to promote Hong Kong’s democratization and to use the HKSAR as “a base of subversion.” This sinister perception was seen in how the PRC viewed the United States when Washington expressed its concerns about the extradition bill. The AmCham’s lobbying efforts against the bill were also seen by PRC authorities as attempts by the United States to sabotage, undermine and postpone the bill. In the context of Sino-US rivalries over a full range of issues, including trade negotiations and Chinese military moves in the Asia-Pacific region, it was perhaps natural that the controversies over the extradition bill was shadowed by their power struggle. Even though the concerns made by the United States and AmCham shared similarities with the views of some local people and other foreign countries, the perception of PRC 66  “Joint Statement by Canada and the United Kingdom on Hong Kong’s Extradition Law,” available in: https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/05/joint-statement-by-canada-and-the-united-kingdom-on-hong-kongs-extradition-law.html, access date: March 3, 2020.

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authorities on the United States as a political “troublemaker” in the extradition bill controversy was deep-rooted. Han Zheng’s repeated and firm political stance in support of the extradition bill on May 20 was an important move that showed the PRC’s firmness. Such firm position, however, tended to be more political than legalistic, for many Hong Kong-based legal experts voiced their views on how the bill’s content could and should be improved, including Basic Law Committee member Albert Chen and pro-Beijing barrister Alan Hoo. Unfortunately, although the HKSAR government made some concessions in response to local concerns, the time schedule of rushing the amended bill through the LegCo in June remained unchanged. As such, the firm position adopted by both Beijing and the HKSAR government appeared to propel Hong Kong into a period of political turbulence, which was marked by both peaceful and violent protests from June to December 2019.

CHAPTER 3

From Protests in June to the Occupation of Legislative Council on July 1

This chapter examines the political events, including peaceful and violent protests, that led to the occupation of the Legislative Council (LegCo) on July 1. The protesters’ occupation of LegCo on July 1, 2019, was unprecedented and delegitimizing to the entire HKSAR government. It also angered the central government in Beijing. The violent protests on July 1 had deep repercussions on the political development of Hong Kong, for they raised an array of issues, ranging from the protesters’ strategies to the policing tactics, from the participation of radicals to their escape to overseas places like Taiwan and the United States and from the responses of Beijing to the following violent confrontations between protesters and police.

Political Developments Leading to the Occupation of LegCo Table 3.1 sums up the events that led to the protesters’ violent occupation of LegCo. Because of the controversial nature of the extradition bill, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) began to organize the first peaceful protests on March 31, followed by a second protest march on April 28. The two protests did not attract many participants, while the police constantly gave a smaller number of estimated participants. On May 26, the Alliance in Support of Patriotic and Democratic Movement in China

© The Author(s) 2021 S. S.-H. Lo et al., The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4_3

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(ASPDMC) organized a small protest, followed by a much larger annual candlelight vigil in commemoration of the June 4 incident in the PRC at the Hong Kong Victoria Park. The Alliance claimed that 180,000 people participated in the candlelight vigil, but the police estimated 37,000 people. The significance of all these protests was that the number of participants gradually increased, and that the annual June 4 candlelight vigil could galvanize the participation of more pro-democracy people. The snowballing effects of these protests could not be underestimated, for they served as catalysts triggering more people to participate in the ensuing protests leading to the explosive development on July 1. Little research has been conducted on how a series of protests can lead to an explosively violent event that catches the surprise of most people. Oliver Cansdell and Eva Grobbink, however, have made their sharp observations that collective action can have “snowballing” effects. They write: “Collective action should not be seen as merely a sum of individuals doing things. It’s about communicating better, fostering empathy and mutual understanding, and learning from each other. Collective action, by definition, snowballs into something that is bigger than the sum of its parts.”1 The political developments of the HKSAR in June 2019 could illustrate the validity of this transformation of collective action into snowballing impacts. On June 4, two Hong Kong political dissidents, Roy Wong and Alan Li Tung-sing spoke in a conference held by the German Green Party after the two youngsters were given refugee protection status in Germany.2 Both of them said that they left Hong Kong because they believed that the Hong Kong court trial against their participation in the 2016 Mongkok riot would be “unfair.” Roy added that the extradition bill would break the “firewall” between the HKSAR and the PRC and that it would signal the “end” of the “one country, two systems.”3 Their appearance in Germany was politically significant, for it was the first time since the establishment of the HKSAR that two young Hong Kong men became political dissidents seeking refugee protection status in a European 1  Oliver Cansdell and Eva Grobbink, “Collective action: from snowflake to snowball,” Nesta, December 9, 2019, in https://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/collective-action-snowflakesnowball/, access date: March 21, 2020. 2  Cherie Chan, “Fugitives granted asylum in Germany say they faced ‘unfair trial’ and call on international community to oppose Hong Kong’s extradition bill,” South China Morning Post, June 5, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3013169/hong-kong-fugitives-granted-asylum-germany-say-they-faced, access date: March 22, 2020. 3  Ibid.

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country. Their appeal to the Hong Kong people against the extradition bill provided the ammunition for public participation in a series of protests in Hong Kong in June 2019. After the June 4 candlelight vigil, which attracted the participation of ordinary citizens, including some mainlanders who silently participated in the annual commemoration, a high-profile parade by 3000 barristers, lawyers and law students on June 6 was another watershed that would mobilize more ordinary citizens to take to the streets. The June 6 parade by the barristers was highlighted in the mass media, including the remarks of famous barristers on the extradition bill. Those who led the lawyers’ march included two former Bar Association chairpersons, Martin Lee and Dennis Chang, and former court judges such as Ambrose Ho Pui-him, Joseph Tse Wah-yuen, Nigel Kat and Nicholas Cooney.4 Kat remarked that the bill affected the “substance of the rule of law,” which “should not be made a servant to expediency, or political demands.”5 Pro-democracy legislator and lawyer Dennis Kwok maintained that “the legal sector will not bow to the government” and he called on the government to withdraw the bill.6 Former deputy director of prosecutions John Reading asked the government why it had to rush through the bill, while senior counsel Lawrence Lok criticized the administration for engaging in a “monologue” and “talking to itself.”7 Other lawyers such as Albert Ho, Stephen Char, Edward Chan, Alan Leong and Bruce Liu Shing-lee also joined the silent parade. Since lawyers have a highly respectable status in the society of Hong Kong, where most people cherish the rule of law and see the legal profession as the bulwark of their civil liberties, the parade on June 6 was a watershed that would mobilize more ordinary people to take to the streets. Three days later, almost 1  million people joined the rally and parade in opposition to the extradition bill. These two events alone could have alarmed the HKSAR government, which however remained insensitive to the snowballing impacts of a series of protests. Chief Executive Carrie Lam still intended to push the bill to LegCo for second reading on June 12. 4  Alvin Lum and Sum Lok-kei, “Record 3000 lawyers in silent march against controversial extradition bill,” South China Morning Post, June 6, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/ news/hong-kong/politics/article/3013461/thousands-hong-kong-lawyers-launch-silentmarch-against, access date: March 21, 2020. 5  Ibid. 6  Ibid. 7  Ibid.

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On the morning of June 12, about 100,000 citizens flocked to the LegCo building, making it difficult for legislators to enter the complex. Some protesters gave a deadline of 3 pm for the HKSAR government to abandon the extradition bill. Of course, the HKSAR government did not make any concession at that time. Chief Executive Carrie Lam rejected the public call to withdraw the bill, while Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung called on the protesters to withdraw from the LegCo building’s surrounding areas peacefully.8 The LegCo announced that the bill’s second reading would be postponed, but the move was too little and too late. Pro-Beijing lawmakers went on a vehicle that left the police station in the Central district. The protesters outnumbered the police and they wore masks, goggles and helmets outside the legislature. After the deadline of 3 pm expired, protesters threw metal bars at the police. In response, the police fired tear gas, pepper spray and used baton to disperse the protesters who gathered outside the LegCo building. In view of the fact that many protesters included students and young people, lawmaker Fernando Cheung said: “Because the situation is very tense, if [Carrie Lam] forces it through and asks the police to use violence, I’m afraid Hong Kong’s children will be hurt, will bleed.”9 The pro-Beijing legislators who dominated the LegCo originally wanted to collaborate with the HKSAR government to rush through the bill, which was expected to have a vote in the legislature on June 20, eight days after the second reading on June 12. Such a rush alienated and frightened many protesters, who believed that the bill would really curb their civil liberties. Indeed, the pro-democracy forces publicized the bill as an attempt by the HKSAR government to “hand back” the Hong Kong people to the PRC government, or sung zhong in Cantonese. This description appeared to galvanize many people to take action against the bill. The June 12 protests was an important catalyst leading to the occupation of LegCo on July 1 because of the controversial way in which the HKSAR government dealt with the protests. On June 12, the police condemned the protesters for blocking the roads at Admiralty and using

8  Helen Roxburgh and Elaine Yu, “’Hong Kong will bleed’: Hong Kong police use tear gas as protestors try to storm legislature,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 12, 2019, in https:// www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/12/hong-kong-will-bleed-hong-kong-police-use-teargas-protesters-try-storm-legislature/, access date: March 21, 2020. 9  Ibid.

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violence to endanger public order and safety.10 Police Commissioner Stephen Lo said that some protesters used metal bars “to stab our colleagues” and he referred to the protests as a “riot” although ruling out the possibility of imposing a curfew or asking the assistance from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).11 On June 13, Lo clarified that 11 protesters were arrested at Admiralty on June 12 and he condemned the “violent behavior of the rioters.”12 According to Lo, “low fatality weapons” were used by the police to deal with the protesters.13 Echoing Lo’s remarks, Chief Executive Carrie Lam said: Starting in the afternoon, some people repeatedly charged toward the police cordon line and carried out dangerous and even life-threatening acts, including setting fire, using sharpened iron poles and bricks to attack the police and damaging nearby public facilities, thereby posing serious threats to the safety of the general public, the young people who intended to express their views peacefully, the reporters, police officers and civil servants. We must strongly condemn them. … I understand that the amendment to the ordinance by the government this time has drawn strong positive and negative opinions in society and the government has actively responded and explained many times. The fact is that since the return to the motherland, issue involving the central government and the HKSAR, the mainland and Hong Kong, will be used by some people to stir up controversies and disputes. Intense confrontation is surely not the solution to ease disputes and resolve controversies.14 10  “Police condemns violent acts,” Hong Kong government news, June 12, 2019, in https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2019/06/20190612/20190612_174707_173.html, access date: March 21, 2020. 11  Tom Grundy, “Hong Kong police use rubber bullets, bean bags, tear gas to clear protests; curfew and PLA deployment ruled out,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 12, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/12/hong-kong-police-use-rubber-bullets-beanbags-tear-gas-clear-protests-curfew-pla-deployment-ruled/, access date: March 21, 2020. 12  “11 arrested over Admiralty riot,” Hong Kong government news, June 13, 2019, in https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2019/06/20190613/20190613_170011_946.html, access date: March 21, 2020. 13  Kris Cheng, “‘Very Restrained’: Hong Kong police say 150 rounds of tear gas, 20 bean bag shots fired during anti-extradition law ‘riot,’” Hong Kong Free Press, June 13, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/13/just-restrained-hong-kong-police-say-150rounds-tears-gas-20-bean-bag-shots-fired-anti-extradition-law-riot/, access date: March 21, 2020. 14  “CE urges restoration of order,” Hong Kong government news, June 12, 2019, in https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2019/06/20190612/20190612_205047_758.html, access date: March 21, 2020.

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Both Lam and Lo condemned the violent acts of some radical protesters, while Lam revealed her belief that “some people” attempted to “stir up controversies and disputes.” Assessing the situation in which some protesters and members of the political opposition confronted the HKSAR government, Lam stood firm and decided not to make any concession at this juncture when violence was perceived as being instigated by radical protesters. In response to the massive protests on June 12, the HKSAR government failed to take effective measures to defuse the political crisis. Many protesters were dissatisfied with the way in which Stephen Lo and Carrie Lam referred to them as “rioters.” Public criticisms of Lo’s remark of using the “riot” to label protesters were abound. On June 15, Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced that the government decided to suspend the fugitive law amendment and that it would resume its dialogue with all sectors of the society. She remarked: My relevant colleagues and I have made our best efforts. But I have to admit that our explanation and communication work has not been sufficient or effective. … As a responsible government, we have to maintain law and order on the one hand, and evaluate the situation for the greatest interest of Hong Kong, including restoring calmness in society as soon as possible and avoiding any more injuries to law enforcement officers and citizens. After repeated internal deliberations over the last two days, I now announce that the government had decided to suspend the legislative amendment exercise, restart our communication with all sectors of society, do more explanation work and listen to different views of society.15

Lam expressed her gratitude to pro-government legislators and members of the public for supporting the bill. She expressed her regret for causing the political row, saying that “I feel sorrow and regret that the deficiencies in our work and various other factors have stirred up substantial controversies and dispute in society following the relatively calm periods of the past two years.”16 On June 18, Lam offered a verbal apology, but the minor concession of suspending the bill could not appease the anger of many protesters and people who opposed the bill. They argued that 15  “HK suspends fugitive bill work,” Hong Kong government news, June 15, 2019, in https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2019/06/20190615/20190615_151123_795.html, access date: March 21, 2020. 16  Ibid.

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suspending the bill did not mean its withdrawal, and that the government would restart the discussion of the bill later when the time would be politically ripe. Moreover, her opponents contended that the government should retract the use of the term “riot” to refer to protesters on June 12. On June 17, Stephen Lo clarified the term “riot” by saying that protesters who did not engage in any violent acts on June 12 should not worry about the possibility of committing a rioting offense.17 His remarks aimed at distinguishing those violent protesters from the peaceful ones, trying to appease the anger of many people who originally had found the term “riot” as a sweeping generalization. However, the political impasse continued, because protesters remained adamant that the HKSAR government should withdraw the bill and that Lo’s clarification did not fundamentally change the “riot” description of the protests on June 12. The Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) insisted that “none of the protesters on June 12 was a rioter” because “they all took to the streets out of their love for Hong Kong.”18 It rejected Lo’s attempt at separating five “rioters” from other protesters on June 12. Democratic Party legislator, Roy Kwong, added that Lo should apologize on behalf of the police, and that the level of violence used by the police “could be life-threatening to all.”19 Obviously, the political opposition refused to accept the government’s minimal concessions. Two significant issues from June 15 to June 30 began to emerge as the stimulating factors triggering a large-scale violent protest on July 1, when radical protesters plunged into the legislature and vandalized the building and its meeting rooms. The first issue was the death of three citizens on June 15, 29 and 30. A man named Leung Ling-kit held up a sign about the anti-extradition bill, but he fell to his death at Admiralty. His demands were the “complete withdrawal of the extradition bill; we are not rioting; release the injured students; and resignation of Carrie Lam (see Table 3.1).” The second person who died on June 29 was a woman, who left a note saying: “Though our struggle will be long, we must not forget what we 17  “Police chief clarifies ‘riot’ term,” Hong Kong government news, June 17, 2019, in https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2019/06/20190617/20190617_224726_031.html, access date: March 21, 2020. 18  Kris Cheng, “Hong Kong police chief backs down on categorization of unrest, saying only five people were rioters,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 18, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/18/hong-kong-police-chief-backs-categorisation-unrest-sayingfive-people-rioters/, access date: March 21, 2020. 19  Ibid.

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Table 3.1  Detailed events leading to the occupation of Legislative Council on July 1, 2019 On March 31, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), a platform for 50 pro-democracy interest groups, launched its first protest march against the bill from Southorn Playground in Wan Chai to the central government headquarters in Admiralty. The first protest had 12,000 pro-democracy participants, but the police put the peak figure at 5200. On April 28, the second protest march against the extradition bill began at East Point Road, Causeway Bay and headed to the LegCo in Admiralty. The march lasted over four hours. While police estimated 22,800 protesters, organizers claimed 130,000 participants. On May 26, about 2200 citizens participated in a pro-democracy march organized by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic and Democratic Movement in China. On June 4, a candlelight vigil was organized at the Victoria Park to commemorate the 1989 June 4 incident in China, attracting 180,000 participants. But the police estimated 37,000 people. On June 4, Hong Kong’s political dissidents Roy Wong and Alan Li Tung-sing, who were given refugee protection status in Germany, spoke at a conference organized by the German Green Party and said the Hong Kong trial against their participation in the 2016 Mongkok riot was “unfair.” On June 6, some 3000 legal professionals participated in a parade against the extradition bill. On June 9, about 1.03 million people marched from Victoria Park to Admiralty to oppose the extradition bill. On June 12, protesters called for the first strike and about 100 shops joined. About 100,000 protesters gathered outside the LegCo building. The Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) appealed to workers to join the protests; when protesters gathered at the CITIC Tower, the police shot tear gas at them. The only way for protesters to escape was a single revolving door entrance of the CITIC building. Pro-democracy legislators criticized the police action which almost caused a stampede among the protesters. On June 14, a group of mothers organized the Hong Kong mothers’ anti-extradition rally at the Chater Garden. On June 15, Hong Kong government announced the suspension of the bill. The pro-Beijing camp expected the suspension to be “permanent.” However, according to critics, the word “suspension” did not have any legally binding status. A man named Leung Ling-kit held up a sign about anti-extradition Bill and fell to his death at Admiralty. The demands listed were “complete withdrawal of the extradition bill; we are not rioting; release the injured students; and resignation of Carrie Lam.” On June 16, another anti-extradition march was organized with 2,000,000 people. Chief Executive Carrie Lam issued an apology without mentioning whether the extradition bill would be withdrawn. She did not address the conflicts between the police and protesters. On the other hand, some citizens gathered on the streets outside the Pacific Place to mourn the death of Leung Ling-kit, who committed suicide to protest the extradition bill. Thousands lined up to put down white flowers at the place where Leung fell. An alter was set up near the Lennon Wall at Admiralty. (continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) On June 21, thousands of protesters gathered at the central government headquarters in the morning, with some proceeding to the Revenue Tower and Immigration Tower. Prior to this event, several online organizations fixed a deadline on June 20 for the government to respond to the “five demands.” Protesters surrounded the police headquarters in Wan Chai after assembling at the central government headquarters. As a result, the central government headquarters were shut down. The police did not act to disperse protesters. The siege ended peacefully at 2:40 am on June 22. On June 22, hundreds of pro-Beijing supporters gathered at the Chater Garden under the banner “Support Hong Kong Police Force, Blessing to Hong Kong.” Pro-Beijing figures, such as legislator Priscilla Leung, and pro-police campaigner Leticia Lee joined the rally. On June 26, protesters organized a global crowdfunded advertising campaign on the day when G20 summit was held. The campaign was to place advertisements on major newspapers around the world, appealing to G20 leaders to act on Hong Kong’s extradition controversy and bringing international attention to police “brutality.” On June 29, a woman died and left a note saying: “Though our struggle will be long, we must not forget what we have been holding on to as our beliefs.” On June 30, a demonstration was organized by pro-Beijing legislator Junius Ho Kwan-yiu to show solidarity for the police and support for the extradition bill. It took place in front of the government headquarters in Tamar. The organizers claimed that 165,000 people attended, but the police cited 53,000. There were confrontations as pro-police supporters ran into anti-bill protesters, getting into arguments and scuffles with them. A woman died but she left a note on Facebook before committing suicide, saying that she was desolated, and that she would not be able to attend the July 1 march. She encouraged Hong Kong to persevere and hoped to see the Hong Kong people prevail in their cause. On July 1, Golden Bauhinia Square was packed with water-filled barriers. The flag-raising ceremony was held indoor at 8:00 am at the Convention and Exhibition Center. The CHRF claimed a record turnout of 550,000 for their march on July 1, while the police estimated 190,000 at the peak. The protest was peaceful. But later the LegCo building was occupied by protesters for three hours. The protesters smeared at the HKSAR emblem in the hall, flied a blackened Bauhinia flag and a blackened flag of Hong Kong. On July 2, Chief Executive Carrie Lam called a press conference at 4 am and said that the extradition bill was “dead.” Lam said that the expression of opinions should be peaceful and rational, and that she was “saddened” and “shocked” by the “extreme use of violence” and “vandalism” when protesters stormed the LegCo building.

have been holding on to as our beliefs.” The third person died on June 30, leaving a note on Facebook claiming that she was not able to attend the July 1 march. She encouraged Hong Kong to persevere, expressing her hope to see Hong Kong people prevail in their cause. These three events

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stirred up the political emotions of netizens and protesters, who said in their social media, such as LIHKG, that they would have to struggle against the extradition bill as the three dead citizens were like “heroes.” The second issue that triggered the participation of protesters was the propolice and pro-government rallies organized by some pro-Beijing interest groups, such as Politihk Social Strategic.20 On June 22, hundreds of pro-Beijing supporters gathered at the Chater Garden and they waved the banner “Support Hong Kong Police Force, Blessing to Hong Kong.” Pro-Beijing legislator Priscilla Leung and pro-police campaigner Leticia Lee joined the rally. On June 30, a demonstration was organized by pro-­Beijing groups at the government headquarters in Tamar. It aimed at showing public support of the extradition bill and solidarity for the police. The organizers claimed that 165,000 people attended, but the police cited 53,000. There were confrontations as pro-police supporters ran into anti-­bill protesters, getting into arguments and leading to scuffles. These pro-­ government rallies appeared to escalate the political tensions further, because the anti-extradition protesters vowed to mobilize more people to protest the extradition bill on July 1.

The Failure of Legislative Council If the late Samuel Huntington argued that the lack of political institutionalization could bring about not only the failure of absorbing social forces into the existing institutions but also the occurrence of political instability,21 this phenomenon could be seen in Hong Kong’s disputes over the extradition bill. The Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) failed to function as an effective institution resolving the political disputes among various political camps and it exacerbated their conflicts, directly or indirectly triggering massive public protests outside the legislature. As early as May 11, the LegCo broke down as the pro-government and pro-democracy camps clashed with each other after their attempts at holding separate hearings into the extradition bill.22 Both groups filed reports to the police, forcing  See its Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/politihkss/, access date: April 23, 2020.  Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 22  Sum Lok-kei, Su Xinqi and Alvin Lum, “Hong Kong government condemns ‘disorderly and uncontrollable conditions’ after LegCo chaos halts meeting of committee reviewing extradition bill,” South China Morning Post, May 11, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/ news/hong-kong/politics/article/3009821/lawmaker-injured-legislative-council-clashbattle-over, access date: March 21, 2020. 20 21

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the meeting to adjourn with one legislator hospitalized and three others claiming injuries. Three meetings of the bills committee were held but they failed to elect the chairperson. A newly appointed presiding member of the committee, 73-year-old Abraham Razack, replaced James To, a pro-­ democracy member, who had presided over the first two meetings that were characterized by filibustering efforts from those lawmakers opposing the extradition bill. The pan-democrats refused to support the new chair of the bills committee, pressing ahead with their own committee meeting. They tried to stop Razack from proceeding to the committee meeting room, causing chaos, fights and injuries. The chaotic operations of the bills committee demonstrated the failure of the pro-government and pro-­ democracy camps to make compromise, respect each other and make concessions. The LegCo’s failure was also partly attributable to the lack of authority of its President, Andrew Leung, and partly due to the government’s decision to push the extradition bill through the legislature. Leung was the chairman of the pro-business and pro-Beijing Business and Professional Alliance for Hong Kong (BPA). Unlike his predecessors like Andrew Wong, Rita Fan and Jasper Tsang who appeared to be at least more politically neutral and impartial, Leung appeared to lack the necessary authority in the eyes of the pro-democracy camp. For example, in an oath-taking controversy involving two legislators-elect, Yau Wai-ching and Baggio Leung, Leung handled the situation controversially by yielding to the pressure from his pro-Beijing legislators. After Yau and Leung made provocative remarks, such as using the word “Chee-na” to refer to China, Leung banned the two members of the Youngspiration from retaking their oaths, partly because the government asked the court to declare their seats as “vacant” and partly due to the threat of pro-Beijing legislators to boycott LegCo meetings.23 Leung’s decision was made after Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying had warned that the PRC government might take action if the situation in the LegCo’s oath-taking controversies were not “rectified.”24 Although Leung justified his decision on the basis of his powers conferred upon him by the Basic Law, his position had initially 23  Joyce Ng, “Hong Kong LegCo president makes U-turn on oath-taking by localists,” South China Morning Post, October 25, 2016, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/politics/article/2039928/hong-kong-legco-president-makes-u-turn-oath-takinglocalists, access date: March 21, 2020. 24  Ibid.

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adopted a LegCo lawyer’s advice that banning Yau and Leung from retaking the oath would “seriously deprive them of constitutional rights.”25 Civic Party’s lawyer Dennis Kwok remarked that the pro-democracy camp no longer had confidence on Leung, who made a “completely shameless decision” without performing his duties impartially.26 Leung might have the discretion and power to prevent Yau and Leung from retaking the oath. But the fact that he made a U-turn decision after the government’s action to mount a legal challenge to prevent the duo from retaking the oath, and after the pro-government legislators’ pressure, showed his move to bow to external legal and internal political pressure. The crux of the problem of LegCo from October 2016 to 2019 was that neither the pro-establishment force nor the pro-democracy camp came up with any effective solution to reconcile their opinion differences and political disputes. In the LegCo under the colonial British administration, an Office for the Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO) was set up from 1963 to 1989, trying to hammer out solutions for the members of the top policy-making Executive Council (ExCo) and LegCo. In 1989, the OMELCO reached a consensus on how the LegCo should be reformed electorally from 1991 to 2007, an impressive compromise among legislators from different political camps.27 Unfortunately, after July 1, 1997, due to ideological polarization and serious politicization, the pro-government camp and pro-democracy force have often failed to reach political compromises. The extradition bill worsened their political struggle partly because the division between the two camps became prominent, and partly due to the dissatisfaction of the pro-­ democracy camp toward the minor concessions made by the government. Another factor that undermined LegCo’s function as a body that could bridge the communication gap between the government and the people’s representatives was the HKSAR government’s decision to push the bill through the legislature regardless of public opinion. Even after the two political camps failed to reach any consensus in LegCo on May 11, Secretary for Security John Lee Ka-chiu said that the government wrote to the LegCo’s House Committee, asking for a second reading of the bill on

 Ibid.  Ibid. 27  Lo Shiu-Hing, The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 127–128. 25 26

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June 12.28 The first reading of the bill had been conducted on April 3, but John Lee was eager to rail through the bill in the LegCo’s House Committee where pro-government legislators remained a dominant faction that would be able to vote for the amended bill easily. He said, “The bills committee has lost its function to scrutinize the bill and I see no other way out in the current situation.”29 It was a political custom for the bills committee to hold two rounds of public hearing so that the bill could go through a rigorous process of scrutiny, apart from the questions raised by legislators and answers required from government officials. However, skipping the bills committee meant that the HKSAR government appeared to yield to the pressure from Beijing. Pro-democracy lawmaker Dennis Kwok observed that after the Liaison Office, Beijing’s representative office in the HKSAR, supported the bill, the HKSAR administration decided to push the bill through LegCo.30 Believing that the government ignored public opinion, the CHRF vowed to organize a mass protest on June 9. Even the pro-government and pro-business Liberal Party had reservations; its leader Felix Chung Kwok-pan opposed the bill and believed the government’s move “set a bad precedent in that any controversial bill might skip scrutiny.”31 Finally, pro-Beijing legislators themselves failed to act as a bridge to narrow the communication gap between the pro-democracy camp and the government. The pro-Beijing camp is often blindly pro-government to the extent that it can be hurt by controversial government policies, as with the situation in 2003 when it fully supported the Tung Chee-hwa government to enact Article 23 of the Basic Law that banned subversion, treason, sedition and secession. The massive protests against the legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law on July 1, 2003, plunged the HKSAR government into a crisis of legitimacy and undermined the popularity of the pro-­ Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB). During the controversy over the extradition bill, the DAB again demonstrated its political loyalty to the HKSAR government at the expense of its popularity. DAB member Tam Yiu-chung, who was also a 28  Sum Lok-kei and Alvin Lum, “Hong Kong government to take drastic step in fasttracking controversial fugitive bill,” South China Morning Post, May 20, 2019, in https:// www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3010946/hong-kongs-controversialfugitive-bill-skip-legislative, access date: March 21, 2020. 29  Ibid. 30  Ibid. 31  Ibid.

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Hong Kong member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), insisted that bypassing the bills committee would still have sufficient time to go through and scrutinize the bill in the House Committee.32 The DAB supported the government’s move, but its position slightly differed from an earlier appeal by its chairwoman, Starry Lee, to ask legislators to submit their written proposals after the failure of pro-­ Beijing and pro-democracy camps to reach any compromise on May 11. Furthermore, LegCo President Andrew Leung appeared to shift from a required position of neutrality and impartiality to a more pro-government stance, saying that it was permissible for a bill to be directly sent to the full LegCo because the Rules of Procedure allowed the government to make its decision on when a bill’s second reading would be resumed.33 Under these circumstances, a showdown between the protesters and the government on the streets and outside LegCo would become inevitable. The Hong Kong case proved the validity of Huntington’s hypothesis that the failure of political institutionalization could trigger social forces to fight for their interests through protests, thereby bringing about political instability.

Political Disunity and Continuous Deadlock The emergence of almost a million protesters against the amended Fugitive Offender’s Ordinance on June 9, followed by police-protesters confrontation on June 12, the bill’s suspension by Chief Executive Carrie Lam on June 15, and then her public apology on June 18 demonstrated not only political chaos but also the disunited pro-government and pro-Beijing forces. Beijing as the central government felt embarrassed because the events on June 9 and 12 became not just the spotlight of international media attention but also one of the topics that might be raised by US President Donald Trump in his forthcoming meeting with President Xi Jinping in the G20 meeting. On June 26, Hong Kong’s protesters organized a global crowdfunded advertising campaign at a time when the G20 summit was held. The campaign aimed at placing advertisements on major 32  Holmes Chan, “Hong Kong extradition bill to bypass legislative committee scrutiny, as government fast-tracks controversial law,” Hong Kong Free Press, May 20, 2019, in https:// www.hongkongfp.com/2019/05/20/just-hong-kong-extradition-bill-bypass-legislativecommittee-scrutiny-govt-fast-tracks-controversial-law/, access date: March 21, 2020. 33  Ibid.

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newspapers around the world, appealing to G20 leaders to be concerned about Hong Kong’s extradition controversy and bringing international attention to the police “brutality.” It was reported that Carrie Lam’s decision to suspend the bill was made on the night of June 14 when she went to Shenzhen to meet Han Zheng, the head of Beijing’s coordination committee on Hong Kong affairs.34 Unconfirmed reports said she was criticized for her administration’s handling of the bill. What was most interesting was that Beijing’s officials, including the Chinese Ambassador to United Kingdom, Liu Xiaoming, denied that the central government was the initiator of the bill, deliberately distancing the responsibility of the political chaos from the Hong Kong leadership.35 Carrie Lam herself admitted publicly that the Hong Kong government initiated the bill, but she revealed that Beijing was consulted in the second round of amending the bill, including the role of the mainland’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate in issuing documents to request extradition and the possibility of the Hong Kong people who commit crime in the mainland to return to Hong Kong to serve prison sentences. With the benefit of hindsight, it was doubtful whether Liu as the PRC ambassador to Britain knew the inside politics of the extradition bill, especially the report saying that the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) exerted pressure on the HKSAR government to amend the bill for the sake of pursuing corrupt mainland officials and businesspeople who stayed in Hong Kong. On the other hand, Carrie Lam’s public remark admitting that her administration initiated the bill might be a political move that deflected public criticisms from the target of Beijing to that of the HKSAR. The entire controversy over the extradition bill was politically significant in several aspects, including the tremendous outpour of public fear and anger, the strong reactions from the legal community, the cracks of a disunited pro-Beijing front, the role of the Liaison Office in backing up the bill, the concerns of many foreign countries, the reactions of Taiwan 34  Elson Tong and Tom Grundy, “Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam to meet press at 3 pm, amid rumors controversial extradition bill may be postponed,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 15, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/15/just-hong-kong-leader-carrielam-pause-controversial-extradition-bill-reports/, access date: March 22, 2020. 35  Kinling Lo, “Chinese ambassador to Britain rejects claims that Beijing had a hand in Hong Kong extradition bill,” South China Morning Post, June 13, 2019, in https://www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3014358/no-extradition-law-order-beijingchinese-ambassador-rejects, access date: March 22, 2020.

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authorities, the absence of political risks assessment made by Hong Kong officials, the clumsy way in which Carrie Lam and her advisers in coping with the entire crisis and the controversial response of the police to some protesters on June 12. First, although the amended ordinance might not transfer criminal suspects from Hong Kong to the mainland on political grounds, many Hong Kong people were so frightened that they saw the bill as a serious threat to their existing civil liberties. As mentioned before, the term “handling (you) to China” (sung zhong in Cantonese) illustrated how the democratic opposition portrayed the gist of the bill and frightened many ordinary people. Even worse, government officials failed to explain the rationale behind the bill, only harping on the same theme that it aimed at dealing with the Taiwan murder case, and that it would plug the “loopholes” of not having extradition arrangements with the mainland and many other countries. But in the eyes of many Hong Kong people, the bill appeared to undermine their freedoms and they deeply distrusted the mainland legal system. As mentioned before, the strong reactions of the legal community did demonstrate the problematic nature of the bill. The silent protest of 3000 local lawyers, legal academics and law students against the bill undermined the Hong Kong government’s legitimacy, stimulating more young people and other citizens to take to the streets on June 9. According to many legal experts, the amended bill was put out in a hurried manner with numerous gaps. Some criticized the sweeping nature and content of the bill instead of focusing on the Taiwan case alone. Others questioned why extradition arrangements were suddenly extended to the mainland. Educated in the common-law system and accepting its core values of upholding the rule of law, most local lawyers saw the mainland legal system as problematic, distrusted the PRC legal reforms and regarded the bill as undermining the rule of law in Hong Kong. Most importantly, the pro-government camp was in disarray. The business community had strong reservations about the bill, exerting pressure on the government to make nine amendments to appease the anxiety of some business people. On February 12, 2019, the pro-government DAB originally brought the mother of Poon Hiu-wing, the murdered victim in Taiwan, to hold a press conference and to meet Secretary for Security John

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Lee and Chief Executive Carrie Lam.36 The DAB’s press conference called for “social justice” and lobbied the government to amend the extradition bill. While Lee had a track record of trying to push the bill through the LegCo, Carrie Lam was reportedly moved by the case, thereby triggering the initiation of the bill. Yet, when Carrie Lam apologized to the members of the public for the bill and retracted it from the legislature, pro-­ government legislator Alice Mak Mei-kuen reportedly swore at the Chief Executive and feared that voters would vote against the pro-government District Council members in the November 2019 district elections.37 While the DAB was faulted by some protesters as lobbying the government for the amendment of the extradition bill, other pro-government legislators, like Alice Mak, were criticized as political opportunists. Clearly, the image of a minority of pro-government elites was tarnished in the eyes of their critics. Interestingly, a member of the Executive Council (ExCo), Regina Ip, openly criticized the Chief Executive on June 16, asking her to make an apology.38 If collective responsibility was a principle of ExCo members, the sudden isolation of Carrie Lam was a corroboration of the political disunity among pro-government elites. The Liaison Office did back up the government over the bill, and its mouthpieces saw the controversy as a “conspiracy” of foreign countries with the collaboration of democratic oppositionists. Such a view, however, perpetuated a huge gap between pro-government forces and the democratic opposition, exacerbating a vicious cycle of political impasse, hyper-­ politicization and zero-sum view of politics. As early as mid-May, the former director of the Liaison Office, Wang Zhimin, summoned the Hong Kong members of the NPC and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), asking them to fully support the extradition bill.39 He appealed to the pro-Beijing Hong Kong elites to believe in “ ­ themselves, 36  Kris Cheng, “Clock is ticking on Hong Kong’s plan to update China extradition law, says Chief Executive Carrie Lam,” Hong Kong Free Press, March 19, 2019, in https://www. hongkongfp.com/2019/03/19/clock-ticking-hong-kongs-plan-update-china-extraditionlaw-says-chief-exec-carrie-lam/, access date: March 22, 2020. 37  Gary Cheung and Tony Cheung, “Swear words heaped on Carrie Lam as pro-establishment lawmakers express fears of election rout over Hong Kong extradition bill fracas,” South China Morning Post, June 20, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3015274/swear-words-heaped-carrie-lam-pro-establishment-lawmakers, access date: March 22, 2020. 38  TVB news, June 16, 2019. 39  Holmes Chan, “Beijing’s office in Hong Kong summons over 100 loyalists to receive marching orders on extradition bill,” Hong Kong Free Press, May 18, 2019, in https://www.

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the administration, the local courts and the rule of law.”40 On May 17, Wang singled out the US Consul General in Hong Kong Kurt Tong and the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo for meeting the members of the Hong Kong opposition and for intervening in Hong Kong’s matters.41 However, Wang’s stance was more political than legalistic, failing to grasp the legalistic side of the opposition to the bill, and illustrating perhaps why he was eventually replaced in January 2020. Ideally, in May and June 2019, the central government in Beijing should have sent an independent delegation to Hong Kong to look into the complexities of the entire dispute, just like a batch of mainland researchers who were sent to Hong Kong to investigate after half a million people protested against the government on July 1, 2003.42 Nor were the concerns of foreign countries addressed effectively by the Hong Kong leadership. Foreign countries were afraid of the possibility that some of their enemy countries would use the amended ordinance to request extradition of their citizens who stay in Hong Kong, thus endangering their national security interest.43 Moreover, some foreign countries were concerned about the human rights of those people who would become the targets of extradition. The hurried way in which the bill was put forward, with just 20 days of consultation in February 2019, raised the eyebrows of some foreign countries. Normally, bills that were less contentious than the extradition bill had a few months of public consultation.44 James Tien, the former chairman of the Liberal Party and a former ExCo member who resigned in early July 2003  in opposition to the hongkongfp.com/2019/05/18/beijings-office-hong-kong-summons-100-loyalistsreceive-marching-orders-extradition-bill/, access date: March 22, 2020. 40  Ibid. 41  Tony Cheung, Alvin Lum, Su Xinqi and Kimmy Chung, “Beijing’s top man in Hong Kong lashes out at international critics of contentious extradition bill and vows to ‘take them on all the way,’” South China Morning Post, May 17, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/ news/hong-kong/politics/article/3010735/beijings-top-man-hong-kong-lashes-outinternational-critics, access date: March 22, 2020. 42  One of the authors, Sonny Lo, met a mainland researcher sent by Beijing to Hong Kong shortly after the protest by half a million people on July 1, 2003. 43  Sonny Lo’s discussion with two foreign diplomats who expressed such a perspective, June 2019. 44  Mike Ives, “Pro-Beijing lawmaker in Hong Kong urges restraint in extradition bill, signaling discord,” The New  York Times, June 14, 2019, in https://www.nytimes. com/2019/06/14/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-extradition-law.html, access date: March 22, 2020.

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national security legislation put forward by the Tung Chee-hwa government, said that he did not understand why Chief Executive Carrie Lam was “adamant” in pushing the extradition bill through the legislature.45 Interestingly, the Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council said in May 2019 that the Hong Kong government offered “conditional talks” over the fate of Chan Tong-kai, but the Hong Kong side denied any precondition attached.46 According to the Hong Kong government, its meeting with Taiwan discussed what help Hong Kong could provide, such as the provision of evidence. In any case, the amended extradition bill did not get the support of Taiwan, whose pro-independence ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its leader Tsai Ing-wen grasped the chance to criticize the bill as a failure of the “one country, two systems.”47 The failure of the bill in getting Taiwan’s support undermined its objective of dealing with the Taiwan murder case. There was a lack of political risks assessment by the Carrie Lam administration over the bill’s consultative and legislative processes. Perhaps this absence of political sensitivity pointed to the socialization of some former senior civil servants, who in the past did not have to undergo rigorous training in politics. Perhaps it demonstrated the lack of political advisers who gave good advice and policy options to Carrie Lam. The entire controversy over the extradition bill repeated the political failure of legislating on Article 23 of the Basic Law in July 2003, when half a million people were provoked to protest on the streets, directly or indirectly leading to the later resignation of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in March 2005. What was shocking in the 2019 crisis was that none of the principal officials appointed by Carrie Lam resigned in the immediate aftermath of June 12 confrontation. Yet, principal officials were supposed to adopt the practice of ministerial resignation when Tung introduced it in 2002 to protect the Chief Executive. Rather, in the 2019 crisis, Chief Executive Lam shouldered all the individual responsibilities and apologized in  Ibid.  Naomi Ng, “Taiwan lukewarm on Hong Kong’s proposal of conditional talks over extradition of murder suspect,” South China Morning Post, May 3, 2019, in https://www.scmp. com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3008699/taiwan-lukewarm-hong-kongs-proposal-conditional-talks-over, access date: March 22, 2020. 47  “China’s hardline in Hong Kong boosts Beijing critics in Taiwan,” Bloomberg, June 14, 2019, in https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/06/14/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/chinas-hard-line-hong-kong-boosts-beijing-critics-taiwan/#. XncVGogzbIU, access date: March 22, 2020. 45 46

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writing on the night of June 16 and then offered verbal apology on June 18. Strictly speaking, the predicament of Lam from June 16 to 18 illustrated the immaturity and failure of the Principal Official Accountability System. John Burns writes: Before we tackle the fundamental sources of the community’s discontent the government must take responsibility for the crisis it created. This is a prerequisite for re-building trust. First, the Chief Executive must immediately replace the two policy secretaries most directly responsible for failings that led us here, especially their incompetent (or absent) assessment of political risk. They are political appointees and have failed us miserably. Second, the Chief Executive should clean out the ExCo echo chamber, which apparently did not carry out its duty to advise the Chief Executive on an appropriate course of action. An appointment system that focuses only on yes-men and women out of touch with the community has been a disaster.48

The public call for ministerial resignation was not heard by either Carrie Lam or her PRC authorities. The lack of political risks and the absence of the concept of ministerial accountability merely exacerbated the crisis of legitimacy of the HKSAR government in the controversy over the extradition bill. Unlike 2003, the 2019 controversy pointed to the problematic way in which the police coped with protesters. Critics of the police said that the police applied excessive forces on June 12 by utilizing rubber bullets and tear gas canisters, but Police Commissioner Stephen Lo explained that some violent protesters attacked the police with metal pipes and that police had to react. Some democrats suggested the need for the government to set up a commission of inquiry, just like what the British colonial administration did in the Kowloon disturbances in 1956. The immediate use of the term “riot” by Stephen Lo to refer to some protesters on June 12 angered many young people, who were alienated further and who were stimulated to protest in massive numbers on June 16. At the same time, four police associations, which represented superintendents, inspectors, overseas inspectors and junior police, opposed the idea of setting up any commission of inquiry to look into the police use of force on June 12. The 48  John Burns, “Carrie Lam, throw away the old playbook if you want to rebuild trust in the Hong Kong government,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 14, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/07/14/carrie-lam-throw-away-old-playbook-want-rebuild-trust-hongkong-govt/, access date: March 22, 2020.

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controversy over the police handling of protesters led to a continuous tug-­ of-­war between many young protesters and the Carrie Lam administration. After all, many young people were deeply unhappy with the failure of the 2014 Occupy Central Movement, the outcome of the 2016 Mongkok riot, and the court’s decision to follow the NPC Standing Committee’s ruling on oath-taking behavior and to disqualify two legislators-elect (Yau Wai-ching and Baggio Leung) and four other democratic legislators (Nathan Law, Lau Siu-lai, Edward Yiu and Leung Kwok-hung) from November 2016 to July 2017.49 The Occupy Central Movement ended up in having some core leaders being imprisoned, including law professor Benny Tai and sociologist Chan Kin-man. The Mongkok riot resulted in the imprisonment of Hong Kong Indigenous Edward Leung Tin-kei.50 Many young localists were politically alienated and saw the police as an instrument of an increasingly “repressive” regime since the late 2014. Some democrats also found the absence of numbers on the shoulders of some police officers from the special anti-riot unit as unacceptable and vowed to pursue the police for accountability. Although the police later ensured that their officers must carry work numbers on their shoulders while on duty, the initial encounters between police and protesters in June were conflict-ridden, acrimonious and hostile. The suspension, and arguably de facto withdrawal, of the bill dealt a severe blow to the legitimacy and capacity of the Hong Kong government. It was urgent for the pro-government forces to repair the damages by having more constructive dialogue with the democratic opposition. Unfortunately, both sides refused to talk to each other constructively because of profound personal animosity and ideological polarization. The political wounds left by the extradition bill could not be easily healed, especially as many liberal-minded people saw the police handling of protesters on June 12 as a symbol of “authoritarianism.” The central government in Beijing was unhappy with the political crisis in Hong Kong, 49  For the court’s decision to disqualify legislators, see Benjamin Hass, “Hong Kong prodemocracy legislators disqualified from parliament,” The Guardian, July 14, 2019, in https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/14/hong-kong-pro-democracy-legislators-disqualified-parliament, access date: March 22, 2020. 50  Leung was jailed for six years for his participation in the 2016 Mongkok riot. See Chris Lau and Jeffie Lam, “Hong Kong activist Edward Leung, the face of city’s independence movement, jailed for six years over Mongkok riot,” South China Morning Post, June 11, 2018, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-law-and-crime/article/2150156/hong-kong-activist-edward-leung-face-citys, access date: March 22, 2020.

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because the “one country, two systems” aimed at wooing Taiwan into the Beijing’s economic and political orbit. But the debacle over the extradition bill had an unintended consequence of stimulating the increasing popularity of the ruling DPP in Taiwan. Given the hyper-politicization of Hong Kong in June 2019, even though the government suspended the bill, it could not appease the anger of many citizens and protesters. The frightened citizens and angry protesters insisted that the bill should be formally withdrawn rather than verbally suspended. They also demanded that the term “riot” should not be used to describe any protesters—a position adopted by the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF). Stimulated by three suicidal cases before July 1, and by the pro-­police and pro-government rallies held by pro-Beijing groups, the snowballing effects of all these political events gathered together and propelled another huge political crisis, namely the occupation of LegCo on July 1.

The Politics of Occupying the Legislative Council Table 3.2 sums up the events on July 1, when some protesters originally demonstrated outside the LegCo’s protest zone in the early afternoon and later broke into the LegCo building at night time. Originally, a small group of protesters tried to disrupt the flag-raising ceremony in Wanchai, but the police and government moved the ceremony to indoor to prevent it from being interrupted and disturbed by them. The breakthrough of the protesters came in the afternoon, when many of them gathered outside the LegCo and tried to storm into the building from 1:30 to 5:30 pm. Surprisingly, the police acted in a very restrained manner, adopting a defensive posture without using tear gas canisters extensively outside the LegCo building to disperse the crowd. It looked like the police adopted a more defensive and passive posture after the June 12 protests, when protesters and democrats accused the police of utilizing “excessive” force outside the CITIC Tower. At around 8:55 pm, radical protesters stormed into the LegCo building and began to vandalize its meeting rooms, and to deface the HKSAR emblem and the pictures of the past presidents of LegCo. When a group of radical protesters defaced the HKSAR emblem in the LegCo’s meeting room, they opened their umbrellas to hide their faces and actions—a political symbol of defying, disobeying and disrespecting the authorities in both Hong Kong and Beijing. The radicals displayed the colonial flag at the chairperson’s position inside the LegCo chamber, showing a banner saying that “there is no violent rioter, but

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Table 3.2  The occupation of Legislative Council on July 1, 2019 Time

Event

July 1, 2019 1:00 am 4:00

There were 1000 protesters staying in LegCo’s protest zone.

5:00 5:40 7:00 7:20 7:30 8:00 9:30

10:30 12:30 pm 13:30

14:30

14:40 14:50

14:52 15:10 17:19 17:20

Some protesters began to obstruct the traffic in Lung Wo Road, Tamar Road and Harcourt Road. About 100 anti-riot police confront the protesters near the Wanchai Convention and Exhibition Center. Protesters blocked all the traffic at Harcourt Road. Some protesters waved a black HKSAR flag, while the government changed the venue of the flag-raising ceremony from outdoor to indoor. About 40 minutes before the flag-raising ceremony, protesters clashed with the police, who used batons and pepper spray to disperse the crowd. Police used pepper spray to dispose protesters. The flag-raising ceremony was held. Protesters pushed through the police defense line and attacked police by using corrosive liquid and powder. At least 13 police officers were injured with respiratory difficulty and burnt skin. Police retreated to the headquarters from Harcourt Road. Protesters continued to obstruct the traffic at Lung Wo Road and Harcourt Road. Suddenly, some protesters plunged into LegCo building and smashed LegCo’s glass panel wall. They sprayed corrosive powder into LegCo’s glass panel wall. They sprayed corrosive powder into LegCo building through a hole. The police inside LegCo building retreated and two officers were injured and went to hospital. Pro-democracy legislators, such as Kwok Kar-kei, Leung Yiu-chung and Lam Cheuk-ting, tried to stop protesters from plunging into LegCo building, but they failed. Interest groups that initiated the July 1 parade began their march, but they changed their destination to the Central district’s Landmark. Protesters succeeded in using a caged trolley to smash the LegCo’s glass panel at its front gate. The police raised red flag and used pepper spray at protesters. The police tried to pull the steel cage into LegCo building, but protesters continued to attack the LegCo building. Protesters eventually smashed LegCo’s glass panel, but they stopped for a while and discussed the next move. Protesters pushed the caged trolley through the front door of LegCo building. Protesters threw smoke pellets into the public entrance of LegCo building. Protesters smashed and opened a glass door at the entrance and police stayed inside LegCo building. (continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Time

Event

17:55

LegCo building showed red signal to warn people to leave. The police condemned this move and expressed their deepest regret. Twenty protesters went through the broken glass door into LegCo building, trying to use hard objects to open the lobby gate. LegCo announced that two committee meetings on July 2 would be canceled. Protesters transported ladders, rubbish bins and iron bars to LegCo building’s front gate area. Protesters used their hard objects to break through the lobby gate. The police suddenly withdrew and let protesters occupy the LegCo buildings. About 100 protesters went into the LegCo and defaced the pictures of former LegCo Presidents and the HKSAR emblem. But some antiques were surprisingly retained. Hong Kong Government announced that the government headquarters were temporarily closed on July 2. Police condemned the protesters’ action and said they would use force to clear LegCo building. Most protesters left LegCo building except for three of them. Police went to LegCo from their headquarters. Many protesters returned to LegCo and carried away those who insisted to stay inside the building. Police cleared the LegCo’s compound.

18:30 20:43 20:55 20:55 21:00

21:45 22:30 23:47 23:50 July 2, 2019 00:00 00:04 00:15 01:00

Police used tear gas to clear LegCo’s surroundings. Anti-riot police entered LegCo building. By the time anti-riot police went into LegCo building through Tamar Road, protesters withdraw and ran away.

Sources: Apple Daily, July 2, 2019, pp. A01–A02; Ming Po Daily News, July 2, 2019, pp. A01–A02; Tai Kung Pao, July 2, 2019, p. A01, and Wen Wei Po, July 2, 2019, p. A01. Cable TV News, July 1, 2019

there is a violent regime.” On the walls of the chamber, protesters used black inks to paint words like “Sunflower Movement,” “Carrie Lam resigns,” “abolishing functional constituencies,” “withdrawing the bill,” and “releasing the heroes.” Obviously, some radical protesters were stimulated by the success of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan from March 18 to April 10, 2014, when students and protesters also occupied the Legislative Assembly. On the corridors of the LegCo building, words like “Hong Kong is not China” and “dog officials” were painted. At 11:50 pm, police went to LegCo and protesters began to escape. Although the police recaptured the LegCo building, questions were raised on why they

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did not stop the protesters from storming into the LegCo and why they chose to withdraw continuously. On the morning of July 2 at 4 am, Carrie Lam suddenly appeared in a press conference with Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung, Secretary for Security John Lee and Police Commissioner Stephen Lo. Lam said that she was “outraged” and “distressed” by the ugly scenes inside the LegCo building.51 She remarked: We have seen two entirely different public scenes. One is a regular march on July 1. Regardless of the number of participants in the march, the march was peaceful and generally orderly. This fully reflects the inclusiveness of Hong Kong society, and the core values we attach to peace and order. The second scene, which really saddens and shocks a lot of people, is the extreme use of violence and vandalism by protesters who stormed into the LegCo building. This is something that we should seriously condemn, because nothing is more important than the rule of law in Hong Kong.52

She added that the government would pursue the lawbreakers who vandalized the LegCo building. On the extradition bill, Lam remarked: “The bill will expire, or the bill will die, in July 2020 when the current LegCo term expires. This is a very positive response to the demands we have heard.”53 When asked by reporters why the police continued to withdraw from the LegCo building and whether a trap was set up for the protesters to vandalize it, Police Commissioner Lo rejected the idea that the police withdrew too easily and that they trapped the protesters. He added that the police had “no choice” but to retreat temporarily and reorganize their strategy, because the police defended the LegCo building for eight hours.54 Lo argued that many protesters used violent tactics to force through the LegCo’s entrance door, and that they played with the electricity box where some lights went out. Fearing an electricity blackout, Lo was “afraid there would be people stamping on people or maybe there would be a wrong 51  “Angry Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam emerges after day of unprecedented violence and slams protestors but says she is willing to listen,” South China Morning Post, July 2, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3016851/angry-hong-kongleader-carrie-lam-emerges-after-day, access date: March 22, 2020. 52  Ibid. 53  Ibid. 54  Ibid.

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move on either side.”55 Finally, protesters threw some white smoke, such as lime, at the police. Lo summed up in this way: “There had already been a toxic powder attack on my officers, so without knowing if this was another toxic powder attack, we had no other choice but to temporarily retreat from LegCo.”56 If these were really the justifications behind the police inaction and withdrawal, the ability of protesters to storm into LegCo, vandalize its chamber and meeting rooms and defaced the HKSAR emblem represented a humiliation to the 22nd anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to the PRC. Arguably, the police inaction and withdrawal resulted in a huge political cost, for many citizens were watching how the LegCo was stormed and defaced by protesters. Lo’s explanation was unconvincing to many observers, some of whom believed that the police set up the trap for protesters to go into the LegCo building and vandalize it for the sake of discrediting the radical protesters and strengthening the public image of them as violent lawbreakers. To quote Steve Vines at length: Pro-democracy lawmaker Fernando Cheung was quick to describe what happened as protesters falling into a trap laid by the police. The demonstrators themselves are hardly likely to admit that they were gullible enough to have played into police hands. The wider pro-democratic camp has chosen to ignore this assertion, while government officials, not unexpectedly, have denied it. Yet they have seized on the sacking of LegCo to portray the massive protests against the extradition laws as being essentially a threat to law and order. This narrative now dominates the official Chinese media. … The decision to assault the legislature was made through a process of messaging and spontaneous meetings. There was no “leader” leading the way although, inevitably, some individuals had stronger voices than others. Crucially, particularly when it came to online dialogue, most participants were not aware of who was talking to who. The possibility of agent provocateurs being at work cannot be discounted.57

There was no evidence to prove that there were “agents provocateurs” at work. Nor was there concrete evidence to prove that the police laid a trap  Ibid.  Ibid. 57  Stephen Vines, “Was Hong Kong protestors’ occupation of the legislature a dangerous trap laid by the police?,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 9, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp. com/2019/07/09/hong-kong-protesters-occupation-legislature-dangerous-trap-laidpolice/, access date: March 22, 2020. 55 56

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for the protesters to storm and vandalize the LegCo building. Yet, as argued above, if the police did trap the protesters, such an action of allowing protesters to vandalize the “parliament” of the Hong Kong and deface the HKSAR emblem was an affront to the 22nd anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to its motherland. The political costs of mouse-trapping protesters were huge, for Hong Kong was also portrayed as a base of “subverting” the HKSAR administration and the central government in Beijing. Yet, there was evidence to show that the occupation of LegCo was a “spontaneous” event triggered by a small group of protesters. According to a documentary of the Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) on the July 1 occupation of LegCo building, “A Leaderless Uprising,” there were no leading opinion leaders in the occupation movement.58 A group of young protesters improvised and decided to abandon any political party’s leadership. They used the slogan “be water,” meaning that the protest strategies were flexible and adaptable to the changing circumstances. On June 21, when Joshua Wong and a group of protesters surrounded the police station in Wanchai, some protesters wanted to utilize voting online to make decisions, but their attempt failed.59 Joshua Wong admitted that even if there was no “main leadership,” there should be a “platform” for protesters to organize their activities. On July 1, three hours before the protesters went to surround and attack the LegCo building, they gathered to discuss the strategies. A small group of 200 protesters cast their ballots on paper, while some of them used walkie talkie to communicate with each other to avoid police surveillance. They also decided the time to attack the LegCo building, while another group went to raise a black flag at the Golden Bauhinia Square. The slogan, namely “Brothers climbing mountain have to try their very best without dividing among themselves, without cutting their relations, and without criticizing each other,” was extremely important in shaping a tacit consensus and mutual cooperation among the peaceful and violent protesters.60 It meant that whatever the strategies adopted by each side, they coexisted together without pointing accusing fingers at the other. It was this two-pronged strategy of mutual 58   “A Leaderless Uprising,” RTHK, July 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp. com/2019/07/09/hong-kong-protesters-occupation-legislature-dangerous-trap-laidpolice/, access date: March 22, 2020. 59  Ibid. 60  Ibid.

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coexistence that brought about a peaceful parade on the one hand and a violent occupation of LegCo building on the other hand. Table 3.3 shows the social media tools used by protesters and their functions were to communicate and strategize among themselves and to mobilize their supporters. These social media included Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram, LIHKG, Airdrop, Signal, Twitch and HK.map.live. The most frequently used media was LIHKG, while Twitch broadcasted the specific locations of the police so that protesters could plan their next step in their demonstration. Telegram, Airdrop and Signal allowed protesters to communicate among themselves secretly without being detected by outsiders and the police easily. The HK.map.live could provide a means through which protesters identified the police action and response, and then planned how to escape from their protest scenes. All these tools together became powerful weapons that the police could not cope with protesters’ adaptable and flexible strategies in a relatively short period of time.

Political Significance of Occupying LegCo The Occupy LegCo movement led by a small group of young radical protesters in Hong Kong on July 1, 2019, represented an unprecedented violent event that not only shocked the entire territory but also carried tremendous political significance. Not only was the violent attack condemned by the government and local pro-establishment elites, but it was also seen by the mainland Chinese officials responsible for Hong Kong matters as politically and legally unacceptable. Table  3.4 sums up the responses from PRC officials responsible for Hong Kong matters. Xie Fei, Geng Shuang, Yang Guang and Wang Zhimin all condemned the violent actions as undermining the rule of law and “one country, two systems.” The narrative was to describe the violent protesters as intolerable criminals while foreign countries were criticized for intervening in Hong Kong affairs. On the other hand, a minority of local democrats demanded that the Carrie Lam administration should exonerate those protesters who confronted the police on June 12 and those radical protesters who vandalized the LegCo building on July 1. This demand for an amnesty was rejected by Chief Executive Carrie Lam on July 9, when she said that the bill was

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Table 3.3  Social media tools used by protesters and their functions Tools

Functions

1. Facebook

1. Use broadcast to show the realities and developments of peaceful protests. 2. Mobilize people to participate in peaceful protests. 3. Share some slogans, controversial pictures and videos to the public. 4. Provide linkages to communicate with pro-democracy legislators and district councilors. 5. Provide the latest updated information about the peaceful and violent protests. 1. Communicate with officials from foreign countries, such as the United States and European Union. 2. Express the political ideals of protesters. 3. Garner the international support for Hong Kong. 4. Mobilize the people in different protests. 5. Provide the latest updates on the peaceful and violent protests. 1. Express the views of protesters on peaceful and violent protests. 2. Share slogans relating to peaceful and violent protests. 3. Provide linkages to communicate with pro-democracy legislators and district councilors. 4. Provide the latest updates on the peaceful and violent protests. 1. Coordinate with protesters in their operation of peaceful and violent protests. 2. Organize peaceful and violent protests. 3. Avoid police detection of the protests. 1. Provide and suggest strategies of peaceful and violent protesters. 2. Leak out some information on controversial incidents. 3. Sharing information on police actions and responses. 4. Exchange protest strategies. 5. Mobilize the people in different protests. 1. Organize peaceful and violent protests. 2. Avoid police detection. 3. Coordinate with protesters in their operation of peaceful and violent protests. 1. Broadcast live on how police deployed their manpower on July 1, 2019, when protesters planned to plunge into LegCo building and to commit vandalism. 2. Plan protest strategies. 1. Allow protesters to communicate with each other without being detected by outsiders. 1. Detect the movement and deployment of the police force, including police vehicles. 2. Plan and show the strategies and routes of withdrawal.

2. Twitter

3. Instagram

4. Telegram

5. LIHKG

6. Signal

7. Twitch

8. Airdrop 9. HK.map.live

Sources: Authors’ observations from these social media and reading from various Chinese news reports in Hong Kong

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Table 3.4  Responses of Chinese officials to the occupation of Legislative Council Name of the officials (position)

Remarks

Xie Feng, Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the HKSAR.

“The actions of violent criminals are outrageous. Anyone with conscience and the rule of law should be righteous and angry with the enemy. A few countries and organizations deliberately confused the peaceful marches with violent crimes. In the face of violent criminal acts that attacked the Hong Kong Legislative Council building and brutally damaged its facilities ‘these foreigners and foreign organizations turn a blind eye to what is black and white.’ They even went so far as to talk about the so-called freedom and rights, protecting the ‘peaceful protest right’ of the violent criminals, supporting them and raising flags to praise them.” “The violence in the HKSAR hit the Legislative Council building and damaged its facilities. This action was a serious violation of the rule of law, endangering social order. We strongly condemn such action. The central government firmly supports the HKSAR government and police in handling the incident in accordance with the law. Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China and Hong Kong affairs are ‘purely’ China’s internal affairs. The PRC Foreign Ministry expresses its strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition to the countries’ interference in Hong Kong and China’s internal affairs. We once again warn the countries concerned to exercise due diligence and refrain from interfering with Hong Kong’s internal affairs in any way. They must not support the violent lawbreakers in any form. They must not send any misleading signals or make any wrong moves.” “July 1 is an important day for Hong Kong, However, those extremist protesters use such opportunity to oppose the anti-­ extradition bill by using violent tactics to attack and vandalize the LegCo building. They challenge the rule of law and undermine the prosperity of Hong Kong. Such action destroys Hong Kong’s social order and is harmful to Hong Kong’s fundamental interests. It also challenges the bottom line of the principle of the “one country, two systems.” The HKMAO strongly condemns such action. The Central Government “support” HKSAR government and Hong Kong police to perform duties in accordance with the law, and to support the relevant institutions in the HKSAR to investigate the criminal responsibility of violent offenders in accordance with the law, restore normal social order as soon as possible, protect the safety of people and property, and maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.”

Geng Shuang, Deputy Director of Foreign Ministry Information Department of the PRC.

Yang Guang, spokesman of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office

(continued)

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Table 3.4 (continued) Name of the officials (position)

Remarks

Wang Zhimin, Director of the Liaison Office

“There extremists used violent methods to assault the LegCo building. Such vandalism inside LegCo building is unacceptable and challenges the rule of law in Hong Kong. It should not be tolerated because their action undermines Hong Kong’s prosperity.”

Sources: Wen Wei Po, July 3, 2019, p. A06 and Ta Kung Pao, July 3, 2019, pp. A03–A05

“dead.”61 Even before her public rejection of an amnesty on the grounds of maintaining the rule of law and judicial independence, the pro-Beijing media had already argued that any amnesty of lawbreakers was unacceptable. Granting amnesty to protesters would, to both Carrie Lam and Beijing, constitute a surrender of the HKSAR government to the pressure and violence from protesters, thereby encouraging radical protesters to become even more extremist. Hence, it was understandable that Carrie Lam did not make any further concessions except for saying that the bill was “dead.” To the democrats, however, the word “dead” did not mean a formal withdrawal of the bill. As such, the CHRF and other protesters continued to fight for the so-called five demands, namely asking the government to retract the use of the term “riot” to refer to the June 12 protests, to release all protesters who were arrested, to establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate police “brutality,” to withdraw the extradition bill formally, and to kickstart the discussion on the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage. The five demands, to the government, could not be easily met. Stephen Lo had already made a minor concession saying that only those violent protesters who were arrested and charged belonged to the rioters, and that other protesters needed not worry. To Carrie Lam, the demand for releasing all arrested protesters would violate the rule of law. The idea of setting up the independent commission of inquiry into the police handling of the June 12 and July 1 incidents was rejected by Carrie Lam, who 61  “Fugitive bill is dead, Chief Executive,” Hong Kong government news, July 9, 2019, in https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2019/07/20190709/20190709_104811_661.html, access date: March 22, 2020.

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remarked on July 9 that the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) had already decided to look into the events from June 9 to July 2.62 On the withdrawal of the bill, Lam had already used words such as “suspend” and “dead” to refer to its status, implying that the extradition bill was shelved. But to the democrats, a formal withdrawal announced by the Chief Executive was necessary because the words “suspend” and “dead” might mean a temporary retreat with the possibility that the bill would be raised again at a politically ripe time later. Finally, the question of universal suffrage was highly controversial, as the events in the Occupy Central Movement in 2014 showed. Even in 2015, the government’s proposed reform blueprint for the Chief Executive election was rejected by the legislators. As such, the so-called five demands raised by the CHRF and protesters could not be met by the HKSAR government. The question of violence was also controversial as the government and protesters had two conflict-ridden perspectives. From the perspective of the government, violent actions break the law and must be punished. But from the vantage point of protesters, political violence in Hong Kong stemmed from their angry reactions to a kind of “institutional violence,” including the disqualification of two legislators-elect, Yau Wa-ching and Baggio Leung, in November 2016 to the disqualification of another four legislators in July 2017, including Nathan Law, Edward Yiu, Lau Siu-lai and Leung Kwok-hung. Moreover, the mysterious disappearance of Causeway Bay Bookstore’s publishers, who published politically sensitive books on China in late 2015, represented a kind of institutional oppression by the mainland authorities. The disappearance of the publishers reminded the people of Hong Kong that the PRC system was “neo-­ totalitarian” and that it could suppress freedom of speech, of press and of publications. Furthermore, the imprisonment of the leaders of the 2014 Occupy Central Movement, namely Benny Tai and Chan Kin-man, reminded the protesters of the human cost of political participation in Hong Kong. Political activists participating in the local democracy movement were bound to be politically “persecuted,” in the minds of the young protesters. Similarly, the fate of Edward Leung after the 2016 Mongkok riot reminded the protesters of the drift of the Hong Kong polity from softly authoritarianism to hard authoritarianism. All these events proved to the protesters that, due to the transformation of Hong Kong to a more  Ibid.

62

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authoritarian system, “institutional violence” did take place in the HKSAR. If “institutional violence” is defined as the utilization of political power to cause harm and to exert structural oppression, it did occur in the minds of some young radicals and violent protesters from 2016 to 2019. The malfunctioning and failure of the LegCo compounded the protesters’ sentiment that the existing political institutions were “unfair,” “unjust” and “violent.” That was the reason why a young protestor who kept pushing the caged trolley to the glass entrance door of the LegCo building on the afternoon of July 1 shouted loudly in front of the television news media that he believed the legislature was already “dead.”63 Indeed, the pro-establishment elites pointed to the 2014 Occupy Central Movement as the culprit and origin of such “institutional violence,” saying that the movement destabilized Hong Kong and politicized and radicalized many young people. However, supporters of the 2014 Occupy Central Movement argued that it aimed at promoting democracy and that it rejected a pseudo-democratic model of selecting the Chief Executive. Ideological polarization propelled the HKSAR to the point of inevitable political showdown and conflicts. The crux of political violence in the HKSAR was that both the pro-­ establishment and pro-democracy sides developed the tendency of pointing their accusing fingers at each other, leading to not only polarization and hyper-politicization, but also mutual political hatred. Such political hatred was expressed in the form of fist fights among legislative councilors, and the vandalism committed by young radical protesters in LegCo building on July 1. If political hate crime was seldom seen in Hong Kong under the British colonial rule, except for the 1967 riots in which some leftists assassinated a radio program host named Lam Bun, it has become increasingly prominent in the HKSAR since the 2014 Occupy Central Movement, and especially on the July 1 Occupy LegCo Movement. Objectively speaking, the political hatred of the pro-establishment elites in power was attributable to the seriousness of patron-client politics in Hong Kong after July 1, 1997.64 Friends of the government have been politically rewarded with appointed positions in various advisory bodies and medals have been conferred upon them. Critics of the government have been constantly regarded as the enemies of the post-colonial state  Cable TV news, July 1, 2019.  Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan? (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009). 63 64

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and excluded from all the co-opted political bodies. The line between political friends and enemies became so visible that a kind of zero-sum game of politics emerged in legislative politics. As mentioned before, the LegCo failed completely as an institution expected to bridge the communication gap between the ruling elites and the ordinary people. The democratic opposition within the legislature was seen by the pro-establishment elites as politically “undesirable” and the rules of the game in LegCo had to be changed to favor the ruling elites, such as the shortening of the time for filibustering in favor of the easier passage of government bills. Under these circumstances, politics became radicalized and polarized. Political violence in Hong Kong on July 1, 2019, had tremendous political implications. First, the view of politics as zero-sum game was prevalent in the HKSAR where political stakeholders could not calm down and reflect on themselves critically so that politics would become a give-­ and-­take exercise. To the pro-government elites, their view of politics is to exercise power for the sake of suppressing the opposition. Their authoritarian nature made Hong Kong’s political development detrimental to compromise, negotiation and democratic change. On the other hand, the pro-democracy elites also harbored some authoritarian tendencies, failing to make concessions and mobilizing the public to oppose the regime at all costs. Ideally and objectively, politics does not mean outright oppression by the economically rich and politically powerful, but it does entail the art of dialogue, diplomacy and compromise. The political class in Hong Kong failed to learn the dictum of politics as espoused by Bismarck, namely politics as the art of the possible. Seeing politics as the art of suppression, the political class in Hong Kong must develop a far more sophisticated view of politics. Similarly, the political opposition must nurture a concept of politics as compromise and negotiation rather than persistent struggles. Second, political trust had to be built up gradually by utilizing more intermediaries, who could come from the moderates of the political spectrum.65 From 2014 to 2019, the political moderates were politically sidelined, socially marginalized, sometimes ostracized and constantly neglected. These moderates might not participate in politics actively, including commentators, academics and think tank members. They could be fully utilized to act as the middlemen between the government and the 65  The absence of political intermediaries was discussed in Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, “Ideologies and Factionalism in Beijing-Hong Kong Relations,” Asian Survey, vol. 58, no. 3 (2018), pp. 392–415.

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young people, between the ruling elites and democratic opposition and between the Chief Executive and youths. The middle sector in Hong Kong politics should ideally be fully respected and utilized in a more meaningful manner. Unfortunately, political development in the HKSAR has long swept under the carpet the middle sector composed of silent individuals conducting research, writing commentaries, sharing their views rather than participating in either the pro-democracy force or pro-­ establishment camp. Third, unpopular policies had to be jettisoned by utilizing public opinion polls more effectively. The extradition ordinance was poorly orchestrated by the Hong Kong government to deal with three objectives: the resolution of the Taiwan murder case, the legal relations between the mainland and Hong Kong and the legal relations between Hong Kong and other countries. The amended ordinance was over-ambitious and riddle with hidden agenda, including the need to help the PRC chase the corrupt officials and businesspeople staying in Hong Kong, and perhaps building up a legal instrument in retaliation of how Sabrina Meng was treated in North America. Unfortunately, the Taiwan authorities found the amended ordinance unacceptable. Nor did the HKSAR government and the Taiwan counterpart come to any consensus on how to deal with Chan Tong-kai on a case-by-case basis. If the HKSAR government had a hidden agenda to push the extradition bill through LegCo for the sake of assisting Beijing to pursue the corrupt businesspeople and officials staying in Hong Kong, then the dialogue between Hong Kong and Taiwan over the fate of Chan was destined to fail. Fourth, many local people saw the extradition bill as a collaborative attempt by the HKSAR authorities and the PRC to “persecute” them and transfer the politically “undesirables” to the mainland. Radicals saw it as a sign of deepening the mainlandization of Hong Kong. Foreign countries regarded it as endangering the human rights of their citizens in the HKSAR.  An unpopular policy brought about political violence as some protesters were afraid of its impacts and determined to use violent means to express their anger and frustrations. The Fugitive Offenders Ordinance was a “complete disaster,” as Carrie Lam admitted on July 9, because of the lack of its opinion polls. Principal officials who handled this ordinance lacked the necessary political sensitivity to detect large-scale public opposition. Unlike Chris Patten who utilized his British political advisers to study

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how they should react to public opinion every day,66 Carrie Lam dissolved the Central Policy Unit and downplayed the importance of using opinion polls to tap the views of the public toward her government policies. The Policy Innovation and Coordination Office (PICO) set up by Lam to advise her on government policies did not conduct opinion surveys on the public views toward the extradition bill. As such, institutional failure became prominent in the government’s handling of the amended ordinance. Fifth, although the young people of Hong Kong constitute the pillar of its society, many of them were frustrated by the lack of social mobility, the democratic deficit in the polity and the worsening income gap between the rich and the poor. Many of them gradually developed a sense of political hatred and hopelessness, social immobility, sub-cultural marginalization and economic powerlessness in a capitalistic city where the rich and the powerful were enjoying the fruits of economic hegemony and successes. As such, the deeper issues of political hatred, social inequality, public housing inadequacy, urban poverty and youth discontent should have been addressed. Unfortunately, the mishandling of the extradition bill served to galvanize the alienated citizens and provided a catalyst for them to oppose the government for the sake of not just opposition but also expressing their grievances and profound alienation. Arguably, it was a myth that Hong Kong in 2019 represented a success story of social development, economic prosperity and political stability. Sixth, protesters came from different strata of the society, forming a cross-class coalition composed of both peaceful demonstrators and violent vandalizers. Diagram 3.1 highlights the composition of Hong Kong protesters. The valiant elements formed the first tier with a tiny minority of protesters. These valiant elements emphasized that peaceful protests were ineffective in pressuring the HKSAR government to make concessions to public demands. They believed that violence not only aroused the attention and reactions from the government but could also increase international concerns. Some students from secondary schools and universities belonged to the second tier of protesters. They believed that the extradition bill represented an unjust policy dictated and imposed by the HKSAR government and Beijing. As such, many students were determined to oppose the bill. Their participation was crucial to maintain the 66  Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay (New York: Nova Science, 2001).

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Diagram 3.1  The composition of the Hong Kong protesters

momentum of the anti-extradition movement. They were backed up by the third tier of protesters, who included middle-class citizens, social workers and some “street-level” children who often played in playgrounds.67 Some middle-class protesters provided logistical support to front-line protesters and second-tier demonstrators. The elderly people, intellectuals and lumpen-proletariat formed the major back-up supporters for the third-­tiers of protesters. The lumpen-proletariat is referred to some unemployed people, while intellectuals included the educated people like teachers, first-aid helpers and social workers. The composition of protesters was therefore mainly composed of students and demonstrated crossclasses and cross-sectoral characteristics. Organizationally, the protesters formed various groups to coordinate among themselves, including logistical supplies, strategy, propaganda and publicity work, mobilization and first aid. The logistical supplies included a complete range of materials, including masks, helmets, umbrellas, food  The authors’ discussion with a “brother” of these street-level children, August 2019.

67

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supply, water bottles and medical supplies. Some protesters held 29 press conferences from August to December 2019, informing the members of the public their position and responses to the position of the government and police. They utilized social media skillfully to discuss strategies, mobilize supporters and deal with their responses to the police actions. The most violent section of the protesters was obviously the “valiant elements,” or yongwu (brave fighters) in Cantonese. They were regarded by the police as the most dangerous, for petrol bombs and Molotov cocktails were prepared and manufactured by this group. Some of these violent yongwu have been regarded as the “home-grown terrorists” by the police.

Conclusion This chapter argues that the snowballing effects from a series of protests in June eventually led to the occupation of the LegCo. The snowballing effects stemmed from a combination of several factors, including the hurried way in which the government pushed the extradition bill through the LegCo, the imbalanced nature of the LegCo in which the pro-­government elites sought to dominate and suppress their pro-democracy foes, the mobilization of protesters through the escalating usage of various social media instruments, the determination of many protesters to adopt a flexible strategy while accommodating their two-line struggles (peaceful and violent) without internal split, and the failure of the Carrie Lam administration to conduct public opinion polls to understand public sentiments. Regardless of whether the police set up a “trap” for the protesters to storm the LegCo and vandalize the chamber, the price of allowing them to plunge into the legislature was too high. PRC officials saw the occupation movement as an affront to the “one country, two systems” and a breach of the rule of law. As a result, a hardline policy would have to be adopted by the Carrie Lam administration to cope with the protests after July 1.

CHAPTER 4

The Politics of Policing Protests and Incidents of July 21 and August 31

This chapter examines the events leading to the controversial ways in which the police handled the suspected triad members who went out to attack the passengers of the Yuen Long Mass Transit Railway (MTR) on July 21. The July 21 incident had long-term and profound repercussions on how ordinary people saw the role of the police in dealing with triad members. Most significantly, the triad attack on Yuen Long MTR passengers shocked many citizens, who believed that the Hong Kong police had a crisis of performance legitimacy. After the incident of July 21, the protests began to turn to target at the police. As such, the antiextradition movement in Hong Kong overlapped with the inception of an anti-police movement. The anti-police movement evolved on August 31, when the police entered the Prince Edward MTR station to pursue, beat up and arrest some protesters. The August 31 incident was another turning point that not only angered many protesters, who firmly believed that the police “abused” their power, but also plunged the police into a deeper crisis of legitimacy. If the Hong Kong police had previously been regarded as “Asia’s finest,” the incidents of July 21 and August 31 delegitimized its performance, undermined its image in the eyes of some ordinary citizens and generated a vicious cycle in the antiextradition movement in which the new “legitimate” target of protesters became the police.

© The Author(s) 2021 S. S.-H. Lo et al., The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4_4

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Events Leading to the July 21 Triad Attack on Passengers Traditionally, the Hong Kong police have been effectively handling the annual peaceful rally and protest on July 1. Table 4.1 shows the turnout of the annual July 1 march from the Victoria Park to the Central district. The policing of these peaceful protests was characterized by the deployment of both uniform and undercover police officers, the issuance of the letter of no objection to the organizers before the annual rally, the use of the police’s public relations officers to communicate with the leaders of organizers in the event of disputes and the orderly ending of all parades in the Central district. On the other hand, the pro-democracy organizers must mobilize their like-minded supporters, political parties and interest groups to participate in the annual event. The most important benefit of the annual parade to the pan-democrats is that public donation boxes are put in various stations along the routes of the march so that ordinary citizens can donate their money to the pro-democracy movement. From a financial perspective, the annual march can help the pro-democracy forces secure a stable source of income, thereby allowing them to organize other Table 4.1  Turnout of Hong Kong’s annual July 1st march

Year

Police figure

Organizers’ figure

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

150,000 330,000 4,000 32,000 48,000 31,500 48,000 32,000 164,000 337,000 364,000 411,400 28,400 90,700 44,500 40,200 190,000

500,000 530,000 17,000 58,000 68,000 46,000 76,000 52,000 218,000 400,000 430,000 510,000 48,000 110,000 60,000 50,000 550,000

Sources: Various Hong Kong Chinese newspapers on July 2 from 2003 to 2019

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activities. Indeed, the number of participants estimated by the organizers must be much larger than the police calculations. The parade on July 1, 2019, attracted 550,000 according to the organizers, while the police estimated only 190,000. Nevertheless, the number of peaceful participants in the march on July 1, 2019, was far less significant than the violent occupation of LegCo, which as discussed in the last chapter constituted an affront to the HKSAR government and the 22nd anniversary of the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to the PRC. Table 4.2 illustrates the main events leading to the triad attack on the passengers in the Yuen Long MTR station on July 21. The July 1 occupation of LegCo emboldened the radical protesters. On July 3, when the Table 4.2  Key events in July 2019 after the occupation of Legislative Council July 2: At 4:00 am, Chief Executive Carrie Lam called a press conference and said that the expression of opinion should be peaceful and rational, and that she was “saddened” and “shocked” by the “extreme use of violence” and “vandalism” when protesters stormed the LegCo building. July 3: The fourth protester committed suicide, who left a note saying that “a government not elected by the people will not respond to the demands. What Hong Kong needs is a revolution.” July 5: A rally at the Chater Garden was organized by a group of local mothers, who said 8000 people took part. Thousands of people called for the Carrie Lam administration to listen to the demands of young demonstrators, who were determined to oppose the extradition bill. July 6: A large crowd of protesters gathered in Tuen Mun Park against the noisy middle-aged female “dama” singers from mainland China. The police eventually escorted a mainland female singer away from the park. July 7: Protesters organized a march to disseminate information like leaflets about the anti-extradition movement to the mainland visitors. Conflicts erupted between protesters and police in Mongkok. Some protesters marched from Salisbury Garden to High-Speed Rail West Kowloon Station to express their dissatisfaction and repeated their five demands. July 9: Carrie Lam claimed that “the bill is dead.” According to the LegCo Rules of Procedure, a bill cannot be “suspended”; it can only be “postponed” or “withdrawn.” As such, protesters remained unhappy with her remarks. July 13: Protesters organized a “Reclaim Sheung Shui” march to protest against parallel traders. The police escorted violent instigators away but conflicts with other protesters followed. July 14: About 115,000 protesters joined a march against the bill and they walked from Tai Wai to Sha Tin. The police surrounded the protesters from three sides. The protesters escaped into a shopping mall in the New Town Plaza, but the police went into the mall, trapped bystanders and fought with protesters. The scene was broadcast by many television and Internet news programs. (continued)

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Table 4.2 (continued) July 17: About 9000 elderly people protested against the government at the Chater Garden. July 20: A demonstration organized by pro-Beijing coalition, namely Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance, occurred at the Tamar Park to show solidarity for the police and to support the extradition bill. The organizers claimed that 316,000 people attended, but the police estimated 103,000 participants. July 21: The Front organized the sixth march against the extradition bill, saying that there should be “five demands, not one less.” The Front claimed that 430,000 people attended the protest, but the police put the figure at 138,000. On the same day, the national emblem of the PRC at the Liaison Office building was damaged by the inks from protesters. The police fired tear gas, rubber bullets and sponge grenades. Fifty-five shots of tear gas, 24 shots of sponge grenade and 5 shots of rubber bullets were recorded. Protesters retreated and used MTR stations to escape. On the same night, the Yuen Long triads assaulted MTR passengers, but the police did not arrive at the scene until 39 minutes later. The Yuen Long terror shocked many people on the night of July 21, especially as two Yuen Long police officers who were questioned by the media were evasive. To many ordinary citizens, the police owed them an explanation of the very tragic and ugly event in Yuen Long. July 22: A man suddenly committed suicide at 10:00 pm. He was hospitalized and pronounced dead later. The police stated that they did not find any note left behind by him, but instead 8 empty beer cans were found on the staircase of the 16th floor. July 26: A “Fly to Freedom” rally was held at the Hong Kong International Airport. The sit-in protest mobilized airline industry workers, airport staff and members of the Cathay Pacific Flight Attendants’ Union. They aimed at informing the tourists of the situation in the HKSAR. The airport protesters set up a huge television monitor, which showed the Yuen Long incident, and they also established a Lennon Wall, which allowed protesters to leave their messages. About 15,000 people attended the sit-in protest. July 27: Protesters demonstrated against “a collusion between Hong Kong police and the triads.” Despite the police ban on the rally, thousands of protesters turned up and they marched on the main roads in Yuen Long, and surrounded the Yuen Long police station. To disperse the protesters, the police fired tear gas. July 28: A mass demonstration was held in Sheung Wan to protest against the police “abuse” of power. The protesters marched on the streets toward Causeway Bay and Sai Wan in defiance of police restrictions. They chanted in slogans like “Hong Kong police knowingly break the law” and “Liberate Hong Kong, the revolution of our times.” July 30: A non-cooperation movement was launched, targeting multiple MTR stations and preventing the trains from leaving the stations. Some citizens gathered outside the Kwai Chung police station to support 44 protesters charged for rioting. Police used pepper spray and batons to disperse protesters outside the police station. Protesters gathered outside Tin Shui Wai police station to support those people who were arrested. Sources: Various Hong Kong Chinese newspapers from July 3, 2019, to July 31, 2019

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fourth protester committed suicide, a note was left with the political content that the HKSAR “needs a revolution.” On July 5, a rally against the police was held by some mothers who supported the young protesters. On the next day, protesters went to the Tuen Mun Park against the mainland singers, who not only disrupted the quiet life in the district but also became a political symbol of the mainlandization of Hong Kong. On July 7, protesters continued to target the mainland visitors and distributed information on the anti-extradition movement to them. When Chief Executive Carrie Lam remarked that the bill was “dead” on July 9, many protesters remained dissatisfied. On July 13, protesters continued to fight against the mainlandization of Hong Kong by targeting at the parallel traders, who bought a lot of daily necessities in the HKSAR and who carried the goods back to the PRC. Some protesters vandalized the shops in Sheung Shui, including pharmacies where mainland visitors bought their necessities, cosmetics and other products. The protesters fought with the police in Sheung Shui, signaling the persistent protesters-police conflicts. On July 14, about 115,000 protesters joined a march against the extradition bill and they walked from Tai Wai to Sha Tin. The police surrounded the protesters, who escaped into a shopping mall in the New Town Plaza. However, the police pursued protesters and fought with them inside the mall, scaring bystanders and spectators. The scene was broadcast live by various television and Internet news programs, raising a question of whether the police should enter the New Town Plaza to fight against protesters. The police operation and legitimacy were challenged. On July 20, a pro-government rally was held at the Tamar Park in response to a series of protests. The pro-Beijing coalition, namely Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance, organized the rally that claimed to attract 316,000 people.1 The police estimated 103,000 participants. Former police commissioners, business leaders and pro-Beijing politicians appeared on the stage, appealing to the people of Hong Kong to oppose violence observe the rule of law. However, this rally did not bode well for the incident on 1  For details, see the website of the Alliance, which is a pro-Beijing united front group, in https://safeguardhongkong.hk/post/371, access date: March 27, 2020.

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the night of July 21, when triad members came out to attack passengers in the Yuen Long MTR station. On July 21, the Front organized the sixth march against the extradition bill, saying that there should be “five demands, not one less.” It claimed that 430,000 people attended the protest, but the police put the figure at 138,000. While the Front’s rally attracted protesters who were peaceful, other radical and violent protesters went to protest at the Liaison Office building in Sheung Wan. Some of them damaged the PRC’s national emblem by using inks. The police fired tear gas, rubber bullets and sponge grenades. The protesters retreated to the nearby MTR station and escaped with the police chasing them. On the same night, suddenly some triad members dressed in white shirts came out to the Yuen Long MTR station, believing that some protesters returned to the district and attacking them with rattans, sticks and metal bars. On the morning of July 22, 45 people were found to be injured and hospitalized.2 The police later arrested some suspected triad members. Table 4.3 shows the detailed rundown of the developments on July 21. A critical moment came at 7:15 pm, when some radical and violent protesters pelted eggs at the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO) building and threw bags of inks to deface the PRC’s national emblem. It seemed that their action provoked the pro-Beijing triad members to prepare for an immediate retaliation. At 9:20 pm, many white shirts were seen in Yuen Long and they vowed to “protect their garden,” implying that they would go all out to attack some protesters who returned to the district. At 11 pm, they started to attack passengers at the Yuen Long MTR station without the presence of any police officers. Two police constables walked past the MTR station, but they seemed to be ignorant of the clash that began at the station. Police inspector Yau Nai-keung, who was questioned by the media, appeared to fail to satisfy some ordinary people who watched his interview on the television news. He claimed that weapons of attack were not seen. Yau revealed that at 10:41 pm on July 21, the police received citizens’ complaints about criminal intimidation, but when

2  Jeffie Lam, Danny Mok and Alvin Lum, “At least 45 injured as rod-wielding mob dressed in white rampages through Yuen Long MTR station, beating screaming protestors,” South China Morning Post, July 22, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/lawand-crime/article/3019524/least-10-injured-baton-wielding-mob-suspected-triad, access date: March 27, 2020.

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Table 4.3  Detailed events of the Yuen Long Triad attack on passengers of Mass Transit Railway on July 21 Time

Event

July 21, 2019 15:39 The parade began at Victoria Park where some democrats showed a slogan of “setting up our independent commission, safeguarding the rule of law, and protecting the truth.” 15:50 Originally the police opened some routes, but they did not stop the marchers, some of whom shouted: “Down with Carrie Lam.” 16:02 Police appealed to participants of the parade to leave Central district and Wanchai for Happy Valley. 16:10 There were so many protesters that the entire Lockhart Road was occupied. 16:20 The marchers reached their destination, but Causeway Bay remained congested. 17:09 Protesters began to occupy Harcourt Road. 17:30 Protesters moved toward the Central district. 18:02 Protesters occupied Connaught Road. 18:55 Some protesters reached the Liaison Office. 19:01 Police appealed to protesters to leave the Liaison Office. 19:15 Some protesters pelted eggs at the Liaison Office and threw bags of inks at the PRC’s national emblem, and they shouted that “Wang Zhimin comes out!” 21:20 Yuen Long saw many people dressed in white and gathered in Yoho Shopping Mall. They showed placards that said: “Protect our home and garden.” Some held PRC national flags. Some people worried that they might target at some protesters who returned to Yuen Long. 22:27 Some white shirts attacked black shirts near the Yuen Long West Rail Station. 23:02 In Yuen Long MTR station, hundreds of white shirts began to attack citizens, injuring a reporter. The MTR decided not to stop the train at Yuen Long. 23:15 Democratic Party legislator, Lam Cheuk-ting, was beaten up and injured at Yuen Long MTR. 23:20 The Yuen Long MTR resumed service. 23:27 The Civil Human Rights Front strongly condemned the attacks on citizens. July 22, 2019 00:06 Some black shirts still held wooden clubs to pursue and beat up citizens in Yuen Long. 00:16 The government condemned the violent actions in Yuen Long. 00:19 Some white shirts went into MTR station to attack citizens. A few police who had gone through MTR were no longer seen. Eight citizens were injured and went to hospitals. 00:26 The Journalist Association condemned the attack on citizens and appealed to the police to protect citizens and reporters. 00:40 Some angry citizens went to Tin Shiu Wai police station and demanded that police should be sent to protect citizens in Yuen Long. 01:17 Three hours after the attack, anti-riot police went into patrol at the Yuen Long West Rail station. The white shirts went into a village near the station. (continued)

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Table 4.3 (continued) Time

Event

01:34 The white shirts held long clubs and iron pipes in a village, but the police stood outside the village and did not enter. 01:45 In another village named Nam Bin Wai, a large number of white shirts gathered together, with some holding iron pipes. Some police left the vicinity around the village. 01:55 A lot of white shirts gathered at Nam Bin Wai village. More white shirts went into the village. 02:24 In total, 15 citizens were injured and sent to hospital. 02:28 Some white shirts shouted at Nam Bin Wai village. The police went there and discussed with them. 02:57 LegCo member Junius Ho said he had “absolutely no relations” with the clash between white shirts and black shirts. He said he supported the police to maintain law and order. 03:00 The MTR reprimanded the attacks on citizens and said its outnumbered staff members tried their best in Yuen Long MTR. 03:38 Some anti-riot and plainclothes police went into a village to investigate the attack incident. 03:58 The police brought one villager to have further investigation. 04:06 Some white shirts left the Nam Bin Wai village and refused to answer questions from reporters. 04:17 The police brought a pile of iron pipes from the Nam Bin Wai village for further investigation. 05:15 A police inspector said weapons of attack were not seen. But reporters pursued him and asked why the police did not arrive at the scene where citizens were attacked. He said the police needed citizens to provide more information for investigation. The police inspector added that at 10:41 pm yesterday the police received citizens’ complaints of criminal intimidation. A small patrol team of police arrived at the scene, but there were 100 people from two camps fighting. Because of manpower shortage, a rapid response team had to be sent to stop the fight. He said 25 people were injured, including 22 men and 3 women. When reporters asked him why the police allowed the white shirts to leave the villagers, the police inspector said those who dressed in white shirts might not participate in the fights. He said the police condemned the violence and would conduct full-scale investigation. Sources: Apple Daily, July 22, 2019, pp. A01–A04.; Ming Pao Daily News, July 22, 2019, pp. A01–A03; Tai Kung Pao, July 22, 2019, p. A01; and Wen Wei Po, July 22, 2019, p. A01

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a small team of police arrived at the scene, 100 people were fighting.3 The small team did not have sufficient manpower and therefore a rapid response team had to be sent to stop the fight. When reporters asked him why the police allowed the white shirts to leave the villages, Yau said those who dressed in white shirts might not participate in the fights. He said the police condemned the violence. Yau’s answers were accurate and procedural from the policing perspective. But the overall sluggish police response alienated many citizens and protesters who watched the triad attack on the MTR passengers vividly. The police performance on the night of July 21 failed to win the hearts and minds of many citizens and protesters. As a result, the police legitimacy was undermined.

The Political Role of Police in “One Country, Two Systems” The tragic events on the night of July 21, when a group of radical protesters defaced the wall of the CGLO and the PRC national emblem, and when a group of white-clad villagers violently attacked passengers in the Yuen Long MTR station, plunged the HKSAR government into a deeper crisis of legitimacy. This deeper crisis was on top of the already unprecedented crisis of governance triggered by the controversy over the extradition bill. The violent attacks on the CGLO were condemned immediately by the Director of the Liaison Office, Wang Zhimin, and the HKSAR leadership on July 22. Chief Executive Carrie Lam condemned the violence on July 21, but many ordinary citizens were shocked by the fact she appeared to regard the triad attack on MTR passengers as of secondary importance. Most importantly, Police Commissioner Stephen Lo handled the situation weakly, saying that while many police officers were deployed to handle protesters on the Hong Kong Island, the police manpower was stretched so that they could not have sufficient officers to tackle the Yuen Long triad attack.4 Lo’s explanation was clearly unsatisfactory to many ordinary citizens, especially protesters some of whom were attacked by the 3  Kris Cheng, “Hong Kong police made no arrests after mob assaulted commuters, protestors and journalists in Yuen Long,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 22, 2019, in https://www. hongkongfp.com/2019/07/22/hong-kong-police-made-no-arrests-mob-assaulted-commuters-protesters-journalists-yuen-long/, access date: March 28, 2020. 4  Holmes Chan, “Hong Kong Chief Carrie Lam condemns protestors, defacing national emblem; says Yuen Long attacks ‘shocking,’” Hong Kong Free Press, July 22, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/07/22/breaking-hong-kong-chief-carrie-lam-con-

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triads in Yuen Long. While Carrie Lam had to stick to the principle of political loyalty to Beijing by first condemning the violence directed at the CGLO, Lo’s answers unveiled the poor police preparation on the night of July 21, their lack of manpower and the failure of operational deployment. Most importantly, due to the failure of the police to deploy manpower to various police stations, the dispatch of police to the Yuen Long MTR station was slow. In fact, many MTR stations were in lack of police patrol and presence, providing a golden opportunity for the triads in Yuen Long to take action against protesters. Operationally speaking, the Hong Kong police performance on July 21 was of substandard level. The police did not take any prompt action to stop violent protesters from approaching and attacking the CGLO building. Nor were they deployed to guard the Yuen Long MTR station and protect the citizens from being attacked by triads. The July 21 incident was another turning point in the Hong Kong protests, because violence involved not only the extremist protesters but also the triads. The events in June and July showed a persistent weakness of the Hong Kong police, namely the relatively unbalanced in the way in which their operations were conducted in various incidents, ranging from the exercise of force on June 12, the undefended legislature on July 1, the problematic entry into the very crowded New Town Plaza on July 12, the undefended premises outside the CGLO on July 21 and the lack of spontaneous and effective response to the Yuen Long attacks on the night of July 21. Interestingly, the Hong Kong police did not use any water cannons to deal with protesters on June 12, July 1 and July 12.5 In the Yuen Long triad attack, the police officers’ way of handling media questions was severely criticized, leading to unnecessary public speculations on any suspicious linkage between the police at the grassroots level and the village thugs. Clearly, some police commanders and officers lacked rigorous training on how to deal with both crisis management and media relations simultaneously, relying excessively on public relations

demns-protesters-defacing-national-emblem-says-yuen-long-attacks-shocking/, access date: March 28, 2020. 5  The “weakness” of the Hong Kong police in dealing with protests was also identified by a few diplomats who discussed the protests with one of the authors, Sonny Lo, from July to August 2019. They came to a consensus that the Hong Kong police failed to deploy their officers to different scenes effectively and that they appeared to lack crisis management training.

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officers. Unsurprisingly, police legitimacy was seriously questioned by many citizens, plunging Hong Kong into a deeper legitimacy crisis. The root of triad violence in Hong Kong was deep and could be traced back to the colonial era, when British colonial authorities co-opted many village elders and representatives, some of whom with suspicious linkages with criminal elements, and turned them into political loyalists.6 The village elders and leaders were politically co-opted by colonial authorities to support government policies, ranging from small house policy to the requisition of land for urban and railway development. The same cooptation strategy has unfortunately been inherited by some post-1997 Hong Kong and mainland authorities, especially those who work in the New Territories where triads are hidden but active. It was reported that a mainland official in the CGLO’s branch office in the New Territories, Li Jiyi, had appealed to the Yuen Long village elders not to allow protesters to enter Yuen Long before the July 21 incident.7 The crux of the problem is that PRC officials conduct united front work on the people of Hong Kong regardless of whether their background is criminal or not. Realpolitik dominates the mentality of China’s united front work on the people in the New Territories. Yet, those protesters who call for democracy are seen by hardline PRC officials as the enemies of both the Hong Kong government and the PRC party-state. As such, some co-opted village elders and leaders with suspected criminal background were even regarded as far more politically reliable and correct than the anti-extradition and anti-police protesters. The triad attack on MTR passengers on July 21 was tragic, partly because of the British colonial legacy and partly because of the fact that PRC officials conducting united front work failed to distinguish the pro-democracy idealists from pro-Beijing “criminal” elements in the HKSAR. As a result, many netizens and ordinary citizens were angry with not only the police performance but also the suspicious connections between any PRC officials and the underworld. The Yuen Long terror undermined public confidence because of the sluggishness of police responses on July 21. Police commissioner Stephen Lo on July 22 promised a review of police operations, but the damage was 6  Elson Tong, “Explainer: The Yuen Long mob attacks and Hong Kong’s triads—why do some consider the New Territories ‘lawless’?” Hong Kong Free Press, July 27, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/07/27/explainer-yuen-long-mob-attacks-hongkongs-triads-consider-new-territories-lawless/, access date: March 28, 2020. 7  Ibid.

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already done. It is understandable that police manpower was really overstretched on the night of July 21, when anti-riot police were deployed to deal with radical protesters in Western and Central districts. Still, the lack of immediate responses from the police in Yuen Long was highly disturbing to many citizens, for 45 passengers were injured. Two district councilors in Yuen Long claimed on July 23 that while PRC official Li Jiyi had appealed to villagers to protect Yuen Long from the entry of protesters, the district police on July 20 had admitted receiving information about a possible attack from village thugs on July 21.8 These revelations and assertions were serious, questioning not only the appropriate targets of the PRC’s united front work in the New Territories but also the local police intelligence, operation and legitimacy. Other angry citizens pointed to the slowness of police arrival at the Yuen Long MTR station and, most importantly, the indifferent attitude of district-level police officers’ answers to media questions. If the Hong Kong police were in the past seen as “Asia’s finest,” the Hong Kong disturbances from June to July 2019 tarnished their image and reputation. The July 21, 2019, incident could arguably be regarded as a serious and permanent blemish in the history of the Hong Kong police. One of the key implications of police failure on July 21 was whether the HKSAR became so ungovernable that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would have to be deployed. Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said that the PLA was “following the developments in Hong Kong, especially the violent attack against the CGLO by radicals on July 21” and that it was “intolerable” for radical protesters to “challenge the authority of the central government and the bottom line of ‘one country, two systems.’”9 Alternatively, should curfew be ordered by the Hong Kong leadership at least in some districts, if not all, so that public confidence in law and order could be restored? If curfew were not used, should the police continue to allow protesters to hold their peaceful marches and protests that eventually stimulated extremist actions? If protests were traditionally seen as the right of many citizens to exercise their freedom of assembly, any  Cable TV news, July 23, 2019.  Catherine Wong, Gary Cheung, Denise Tsang and Teddy Ng, “Chinese military can be deployed at Hong Kong’s request to contain protests, Beijing says,” South China Morning Post, July 24, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3019854/ chinese-military-can-be-deployed-hong-kongs-request-contain, access date: March 28, 2020. 8 9

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police action to tighten protests and marches could be easily criticized. Yet, even if curfew were adopted, radical protesters would likely ignore it and continue to confront the police. On the other hand, if the PLA were deployed, the feasibility of the “one country, two systems” model in Hong Kong would be seriously undermined. Hence, the July 21 incident raised a serious question on how the HKSAR government and its police should handle both peaceful and violent protests. Ideally, the police handling of peaceful and violent protests had to be decisive, swift and effective as to prevent the legitimacy crisis from deteriorating further. Any further deterioration would necessitate the PLA’s intervention. If the Hong Kong situation became ungovernable, then the PLA deployment to maintain law and order in the territory would increasingly become a demand articulated by more people than ever before. Article 14 of the Garrison Law says: In accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law of the HKSAR, the Government of the HKSAR may, when necessary, ask the Central People’s Government for assistance from the Hong Kong Garrison in the maintenance of public order and in disaster relief. In the event that the application of the Government of the HKSAR has been approved by the Central People’s Government, the Hong Kong Garrison shall send out troops to carry out the task of assistance in maintenance of public order and in disaster relief according to the order from the Central Military Commission, and the troops shall immediately return to their station after the task has been accomplished.10

If the HKSAR government requested the PLA help to restore public order, the Hong Kong police would lose its entire credibility and legitimacy. Most significantly, the image of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” would be damaged severely. Hong Kong would be widely viewed as ungovernable to the extent that the PRC’s military intervention would be inevitable. Furthermore, if “one country, two systems” is regarded as unworkable, the pro-independence forces in Taiwan would be stimulated further with increasing popularity on the island republic, thereby undermining Beijing’s original objective of using “one country, two systems” to appeal to Taiwan for political talks and reunification. Hence, the police 10  “Garrison Law of the HKSAR of the PRC,” promulgated by the NPC Standing Committee on December 30, 1996, and effective since July 1, 1997, in http://www.asianlii. org/cn/legis/cen/laws/glothksarotproc785/#3, access date: March 28, 2020.

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leadership in Hong Kong must understand their highly critical role in the very complex political interplay underlying the formula of “one country, two systems.” Quite fortunately and yet ironically, the Macao situation witnesses its frozen political development, unlike Hong Kong where hyper-­politicization and polarization became out of control from 2012 to 2019.11 The Macau police have been maintaining law and order effectively since the territory’s return to China on December 20, 1999. The PLA was deployed once in August 2017 with public support to help Macau clean up all the debris left over from the attack of Typhoon Hato.12 Still, the Macau police had to guard against and combat the activities of local triads to avoid any possible return to the lawlessness situation in 1998 and the early half of 1999.13 Ultimately, the “one country, two systems” formula in both Hong Kong and Macau demands a highly clean, efficient, effective, responsive and professional police force. Any crisis of police operation and police legitimacy is detrimental to not only the legitimacy of the special administrative regions but also the entire development of the “one country, two systems.”

Difficulties of Hong Kong Police in Handling the New Style of Protests From the perspective of policing, the Hong Kong police did show tremendous difficulties of handling the mixture of peaceful and violent protests from July to August 2019. Managing protests is a highly political issue in any city. Hong Kong is no exception to this rule. After June 12, 2019, the police-protesters relations were deteriorating rapidly. The way in which the police managed protests became a highly politically contentious issue, for it involved the political question of who gets what, when and how. Above all, the police are often a symbol of the regime in power and they become a target of a minority of politically alienated citizens, who vent 11   Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, Casino Capitalism, Society and Politics of China’s Macau (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020). 12  Ernest Kao and Raquel Carvalho, “Insulting or indispensable? PLA presence in Macau for Typhoon Hato clean-up welcomed by most, but not all,” South China Morning Post, August 28, 2017, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2108518/ insulting-or-indispensable-pla-presence-macau-typhoon-hato, access date: March 28, 2020. 13  Benjamin Carson, “Broken Tooth and New Macau,” Foreign Policy, January 28, 2013, in https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/28/broken-tooth-and-new-macau/, access date: March 28, 2020.

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their grievances at police officers by various means, including peaceful and violent ones. There were four main characteristics in the difficulties of Hong Kong police in dealing with the unique blending of peaceful and violent protests in 2019: the response to social media tools, operational problems, the entry into shopping malls and the alleged “abuse of power” by using the San Uk Ling Holding Center. First and foremost, the unprecedented utilization of various tools of social media by the protesters to confront the police on June 12, including the use of Telegram groups, Twitch, Airdrop, LIHKG and other means, proved to be quite effective in their collective mobilization and strategic moves. Twitch was used by protesters to identify how the police deployed their manpower to guard various areas outside the LegCo on June 12, while Airdrop was used by them to communicate with each other strategically to avoid police surveillance. Some observers labeled the protests as “leaderless,” but the well-­ coordinated protests showed that there were a loosely organized group of individual leaders behind the scene. In response to the sophisticated usage of social media, the Hong Kong police sent undercover agents to penetrate into some social media chatrooms, but they appeared to fail to cope with the large number of protesters, some of whom used peaceful means while some adopted violent means to confront the police. Second, operationally speaking, the police often fired tear gas canisters aimlessly and did not capture those targeted positions,14 while protesters adopted the tactic of “be water.” Protesters advanced when the police retreated; they withdrew when the police chased them. Radical protesters often picked up tear gas canisters and threw them back at the police. Some of them used traffic cones to distinguish the smoke from the canisters. The result was a time-consuming deadlock in the police handling of protests, which lasted for many hours. Police officers felt fatigued while protesters strategically retreated from the streets easily. Protesters also chose Mongkok and Causeway Bay and those places with many streets and alleys so that logistical supplies could come from different routes and that escape paths could be easily found. 14  A diplomat with military background told the authors that the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong police did not have effective targets, and that the Hong Kong police officers did not move to capture those targets of tear gas firing. This observation was quite true because, in many cases, the police officers either stood still after shooting tear gas canisters or even withdrew in some instances.

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Other operational problems of the Hong Kong police in dealing with the protests from June to December 2019 were obvious. They included attempts by an individual police officer, or a small group of officers, to chase and arrest protesters without sufficient colleagues to accompany them, leading to a scenario in which the officers could be isolated and surrounded by a group of protesters. As a result, the nervous or self-­protective police had to open fire at the protesters. A good example was in Tsuen Wan on the night of August 25, when three police officers who were seen by the media as drawing their service revolvers and when one officer fired his gun after being surrounded by protesters who wielded bamboo and metal sticks.15 Third, the police entry into shopping malls was strategically unwise, for they arrested protesters and pursued them in the midst of ordinary people who had dinner in restaurants and who were shopping. The July 14 confrontation between the police and protesters inside the shopping mall at the New Town Plaza produced an ugly scene of bitter conflicts with both protesters and non-protesters. Some people who attacked the police were arrested, while some police officers were injured. The pro-police mass media and politicians accused the protesters and pro-democracy politicians as a “pro-violence faction,” while the pro-protesters media, politicians and citizens criticized the police as “abusing their powers” and “scaring” some citizens in the plaza.16 After the New Town Plaza incident, some angry citizens went to the plaza management and questioned the managers why the police were allowed to enter the shopping mall. Indeed, the police had the right to enter the shopping mall to pursue protesters, but in terms of police-citizens relations, such a move was destined to be unpopular and unacceptable from the perspective of ordinary citizens. Table 4.4 illustrates a persistent pattern of police confrontations with ordinary citizens in shopping malls from July to December 2019. Following the battle at the New Town Plaza on July 14, other confrontations inside shopping malls took place in the airport in early August, the Kowloon Bay on September 14, the New Harbor City on October 7, the City Plaza on November 3, the Festival Walk on November 10 and 15  Holmes Chan, “Hong Kong police officer shoots live round amid clashes with protestors in Tsuen Wan,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 25, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp. com/2019/08/25/hong-kong-police-officer-shoots-live-round-air-amid-clashes-protesters-tsuen-wan/, access date: March 29, 2020. 16  See the editorials of the pro-police Wen Wei Po and Apple Daily which remained critical of the police, July 2019.

Consequences

(continued)

The organizer claimed 115,000 marchers participating in the protest while police estimated around 28,000. At 8:55 pm, the police warned that if the crowd did not leave, they would face arrest. At 10 pm, the police started using pepper spray on some protesters in the plaza. When some protesters tried to leave through the MTR, police blocked the entrance of the train station from inside the mall. Protesters and bystanders were trapped inside the New Town Plaza until the police started allowing people to enter the railway station later. Critics said that the police should not pursue protesters in the plaza where police-protesters confrontations took place. Demonstrators occupied parts of the departure and arrival halls, using luggage trolleys to block travelers from reaching the gates. The Airport Authority closed check-in services and advised passengers to leave as soon as possible. The protests forced the airport to suspend check-ins, leading to long delay for passengers and forcing airlines to cancel hundreds of flights. Eventually, the police began to pursue protesters. A group of protesters surrounded a police officer, taking his baton and beating him with it. They retreated after he pulled a gun, according to video footage and the police statement. Some officers in riot gear began running after demonstrators, wrestling some to the ground. Critics said that while protesters should not paralyze the airport, the police appeared to be weak in defending the airport. On September 14, pro-Beijing groups gathered to sing the PRC The police subdued a dozen of people outside the Amoy Garden residential national anthem, March of the Volunteers, and waved PRC flags at estate and took away several people inside the Kowloon Bay shopping mall. a rally in the Amoy Plaza’s shopping mall in Kowloon Bay. They Scuffles and bloody clashes intensified with flags and umbrellas used by cleared a nearby Lennon Wall where protesters plastered proprotesters as weapons. Twenty-five people were sent to hospitals. Critics said democracy and anti-government messages, stickers and posters. that pro-Beijing and pro-democracy protesters should refrain from using force, The pro-Beijing residents clashed violently with pro-democracy while the police appeared to perform their duties biasedly in favor of the protesters. The pro-democracy protesters responded by the signing pro-government protesters and they tended to arrest pro-democracy their new song, “Glory to Hong Kong.” demonstrators.

On July 14, the anti-extradition bill protest in the New Territories was held at Sha Tin. The rally started from Chui Tin Street soccer pitch near Che Kung Temple, passing the Hong Kong Heritage Museum and heading to the Sha Tin station Bus Terminus. After the march, protesters moved to the streets near the Shatin Jockey Club’s swimming pool. They set up barricades and threw objects, such as traffic cones and bottles, at the police at 5 pm. Because the police letter of no objection to protests expired at that time, protesters moved to the nearby shopping mall, namely the New Town Plaza. From August 9 to 13, protesters demonstrated at the airport. Some protesters clashed with the anti-riot police, crippling the airport for the second day and targeting the city’s position as a global center of commerce and finance which was crucial to the PRC. Protesters tried to exert pressure on the government, which refused to meet their demands. At the airport, protesters handed out pamphlets in different languages to tourists by explaining their position.

Date and events

Table 4.4  The confrontations between police and citizens in shopping malls

Source: Various Hong Kong Chinese newspapers from July 15, 2019, to December 25, 2019

On December 24, protesters went to Harbor City and Langham Place and sang “Glory to Hong Kong.” At 7:00 pm, some protesters vandalized Starbucks inside the Langham Place.

Conflicts first erupted in Sha Tin where protesters vandalized the Sha Tin station and vandalized a Maxim restaurant. Inside Festival Walk, protesters vandalized a branch of Simplylife, which was under Maxim’s operation. The police stormed into the mall, beat up protesters with batons and used pepper spray to disperse them. At 8:00 pm, the police went into Langham Place to maintain law and order. Protesters threw objects at the police who in turn used pepper spray. On the other hand, the police went into the Harbor City and subdued some protesters.

The anti-riot police arrived at the Center, where security guards tried to stop them from entering the mall. The police eventually went inside the mall and arrested a few protesters. The police eventually stormed into the mall after the masked protesters used spray to paint the entrances of two restaurants. Several people were arrested, including two journalists.

On October 7, hundreds of protesters sang “Glory to Hong Kong” in Ma On Shan’s New Harbor City Center.

On November 3, without any planned large-scale demonstrations, some protesters called for “shopping” stunts in seven districts, including Admiralty, Mongkok, Tsuen Wan, Wong Tai Sin, Tai Po, Sha Tin and Tuen Mun. One peaceful protest took place around City Plaza, a shopping mall in the eastern part of the Hong Kong Island, in the evening. At the City Plaza, protesters formed human chains and sang protest songs. While some masked protesters vandalized a restaurant in the mall. Outside the mall, a man dressed in a gray shirt slashed several people with a knife. A crowd confronted him, including Democratic Party member Andrew Chiu. At around 7:30 pm, he bit Chiu’s left ear off, which fell to the ground. On November 10, protesters gathered in shopping malls, including the New Town Plaza in Sha Tin, and the Festival Walk in Kowloon Tong. They were mobilized by online calls to “shop” in these malls.

Consequences

Date and events

Table 4.4 (continued)

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Lanham Place on December 24. It can be argued that the police action in all these shopping malls was necessary because radical protesters vandalized the restaurants and became highly destructive. The controversy over how the police handled protesters near Amoy Garden and inside the Kowloon Bay shopping mall showed that, in the minds of protesters and critics, the police appeared to be slightly biased in favor of the pro-­ government protesters. The crux of the problem was that when both pro-­ government and anti-government protesters argued and clashed, the police usually gave an impression that they tended to subdue and arrest those anti-government ones. This public perception became more popular as the two populist sides—one anti-government and the other pro-­ establishment—argued verbally and clashed physically over minor issues, including singing songs, raising flags and pointing accusing fingers at each other inside the relatively congested shopping malls. Yet, in policing protesters inside shopping malls, the police learnt a lesson from the New Town Plaza incident on July 14 and began more cautious and sophisticated from September onward. First, the police deployed plainclothes officers to follow protesters who went into shopping malls and vandalized restaurants. Second, the police took action against violent protesters more swiftly, with the support of security guards in the shopping malls, as with the case in Festival Walk on November 10. Third, learning from the confrontation in the airport’s arrival hall where a police officer almost pulled a pistol, the police avoided any officer using pistols but tended to use pepper spray to subdue protesters inside shopping malls from September onward. Hence, some degree of learning could be seen on the part of police in dealing with protesters in shopping malls. Some radical protesters retaliated against those shopping malls that collaborated with the police. The most notable example was the Festival Walk. After the police arrested protesters who vandalized some shops at Festival Walk, some radical protesters went into the mall on the night of November 12, when they broke glass and railings on several floors while some hurled a petrol bomb at the mall’s signature Christmas tree that eventually went up in flames.17 The battles between protesters and police

17  Kanis Leung and Denise Tsang, “Hong Kong protests: vandalized Festival Walk to remain closed until first quarter of 2020 for repairs, hitting retail and catering brands,” South China Morning Post, December 5, 2019, in https://today.line.me/hk/pc/article/Hong+K ong+protests+vandalised+Festival+Walk+to+remain+closed+until+first+quarter+of+2020+f or+repairs+hitting+retail+and+catering+brands-Kr5j9a, access date: March 38, 2020.

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incurred the costs of retaliation by radical protesters, leading to inevitable financial loss of shopping malls and shopkeepers. Fourth and finally, the police were criticized for “abusing their power” by holding detained protesters at the San Uk Ling Holding Center. According to news reports (Table 4.5), the police sent some arrested protesters to the San Uk Ling Holding Center after their confrontations on August 5 and 11, while a female protester claimed that she was arrested on August 31 and sent first to the Kwai Chung police station and transferred to the center. After the mass media highlighted the existence and usage of the San Uk Ling Holding Center, public outcry led to the police action of abandoning the use of the center. The San Uk Ling Holding Center was a detention center located at Man Kam To in the New Territories. It was set up in 1979 and located at 1.5 km from the border between Hong Kong and Shenzhen. In 2005, it Table 4.5  Citizens’ criticisms of police power at San Uk Ling Holding Center Content of protests

Consequences

On August 5, there was a city-wide general strike, with protests and sit-ins in different districts. The Cross-Harbor Tunnel was blocked by street barricades and major roadways were obstructed. On August 11, protests were launched in Causeway Bay and Tsimshatsui.

The first group of protesters was sent to the center by the police.

Fifty-four people were arrested and 31 of them were later hospitalized. Six were found to have fractured bones. Some appeared to be sent to the center. On August 31, the police went into the Prince One female protester claimed she was Edward MTR to pursue and arrest some arrested, sent to the Kwai Chung police protesters. station, transferred to the center and was “harassed” by the police. Sources: Christy Leung, “Why Hong Kong police stopped sending anti-government protesters to the remote and controversial San Uk Ling Holding Centre,” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3030709/why-hong-kongpolice-stopped-sending-anti-government, access date: March 28, 2020; Sum Lok-kei, “Hong Kong justices of the peace denied entry to police detention center where anti-government protesters were allegedly mistreated,” South China Morning Post, September 8, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/politics/article/3026162/hong-kong-justices-peace-denied-entry-police-detention, access date: March 28, 2020; “Police halt detentions at San Uk Ling,” The Standard, September 27, 2019, in https:// www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/3/135196/Police-halt-detentions-at-San-Uk-Ling, access date: March 28, 2020; and Szeto Hiu-lam, “The arrested males and females talk about the dark side of San Uk Ling Center and they were sexually assaulted, beaten up and stopped from seeing their lawyers,” September 28, 2019, in https://www.inmediahk.net/node/1067523, access date: March 28, 2020

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was used to hold some militant South Korean farmers who were arrested during their clashes with the police during the anti-globalization protests of a World Trade Organization meeting in Hong Kong.18 A police insider told the media that the arrested protesters were generally held at police stations when the unrest began in early June 2019, and that San Uk Ling was used as a temporary option when the number of arrests grew, especially when protesters constantly besieged police stations to support detainees.19 In mid-August, some lawyers wrote to Police Commissioner Stephen Lo and complained that procedural justice and human rights were not followed and respected respectively, because their clients were confined to give their statements to the police before they could see their lawyers.20 The first group of protesters was sent to the facility on August 5, after the police cracked down on a city-wide general strike. Protesters arrested in three other operations, including Causeway Bay and Tsimshatsui on 11 August and Prince Edward on 31 August, were sent to San Uk Ling. Moreover, 31 of the 54 protesters who were arrested on August 11 and sent to the center were later hospitalized, with 6 of them having fractured bones.21 When six Justices of the Peace (JPs) requested to see the detainees at the center, they were denied entry. A girl who studied at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) said that she was sent to the center after the protest and arrest at the Prince Edward MTR station.22 She accused the police of “sexual violence” during her detention, a case that aroused public concern when CUHK Vice Chancellor Rocky Tuan met 18  Christy Leung, “Why Hong Kong police stopped sending anti-government protesters to the remote and controversial San Uk Ling Holding Centre,” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3030709/why-hong-kong-police-stopped-sending-anti-government, access date: March 28, 2020. 19  Ibid. 20  Ming Pao, August 13, 2019. 21  Sum Lok-kei, “Hong Kong justices of the peace denied entry to police detention center where anti-government protesters were allegedly mistreated,” South China Morning Post, September 8, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3026162/hong-kong-justices-peace-denied-entry-police-detention, access date: March 28, 2020. 22  Kris Cheng, “‘I am not the only one’: Hong Kong student removes mask and accuses police of sexual assault,” Hong Kong Free Press, October 11, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/10/11/i-not-one-hong-kong-student-removes-mask-accuses-policesexual-assault/, access date: March 28, 2020.

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students in a public forum on October 10, 2019.23 Other protesters claimed that the center’s police “intimidated” them to reveal the code numbers of their cell phones, and that “sexual assault” took place in the center.24 One unsubstantiated and bold complaint was about a secondary school girl, who according to protesters was “raped” by four police officers.25 Although the Hong Kong police said in a press briefing on September 27, 2019, that the San Uk Ling Center would cease its operation,26 the damage to its reputation was already done.

After July 21: Events Leading to the August 31 Incident in Prince Edward MTR After the tragic events on July 21, protesters escalated their activities. On July 26, a “Fly to Freedom” rally was held at the Hong Kong International Airport (Table 4.2). The sit-in protest mobilized airline industry workers, airport staff and members of the Cathay Pacific Flight Attendants’ Union. They aimed at informing the tourists of the political development in the HKSAR. The airport protesters set up a huge television monitor, which showed the Yuen Long incident, and they established a Lennon Wall, which allowed protesters to leave their messages. About 15,000 people attended the sit-in protest.27 On July 27, protesters demonstrated against “a collusion between Hong Kong police and the triads.” Despite the police ban on the rally, thousands of protesters turned up, marched on the main roads in Yuen Long and surrounded the police station. The streets of Yuen Long were packed with protesters of all ages. Demonstrators  Ibid.  Szeto Hiu-lam, “The arrested males and females talk about the dark side of San Uk Ling Center and they were sexually assaulted, beaten up and stopped from seeing their lawyers,” September 28, 2019, in https://www.inmediahk.net/node/1067523, access date: March 28, 2020. 25  GM09, “Hong Kong police gang-rape San Uk Ling victims, including schoolgirls and schoolboys!,” November 1, 2019, in https://gnews.org/25321/, access date: March 28, 2020. 26  “Police halt detentions at San Uk Ling,” The Standard, September 27, 2019, in https:// www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/3/135196/Police-halt-detentions-atSan-Uk-Ling, access date: March 28, 2020. 27  Christy Choi, “Pro-democracy protesters flood Hong Kong’s airport in bid to raise international pressure,” Telegraph, July 26, 2019, in https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2019/07/26/pro-democracy-protesters-flood-hong-kongs-airport-bid-raise/?WT. mc_id=tmg_share_tw, access date: March 27, 2020. 23 24

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marched through Yuen Long, hoisting umbrellas, posters and even the British colonial flag. Some went to the border of Nam Pin Wai, a village thought to be home to some triad members who attacked passengers at the Yuen Long railway station on July 21.28 The police used tear gas throughout the afternoon and evening in Yuen Long after tense standoffs with protesters, some of whom threw projectiles and surrounded a police van.29 On July 28, another demonstration was held in Sheung Wan to protest against the police “abuse” of power. The protesters marched on the streets toward Causeway Bay and Sai Wan in defiance of police restrictions. They chanted slogans like “Hong Kong police knowingly break the law” and “Liberate Hong Kong, the revolution of our times.” On July 30, a non-cooperation movement was launched, targeting multiple MTR stations and preventing trains from leaving the stations. Protesters stood between platform doors so that MTR train could not move, leading to the MTR Corporation to replace services in some stations with extra bus services.30 Some MTR passengers were angry at the destructive action of protesters, but some were tolerant of them. The police did not take action against peaceful protesters who disrupted MTR services, letting the MTR Corporation’s security personnel to handle them. The non-cooperation movement on July 30 was coincidentally accompanied by a protest group of prosecutors, who issued an open letter criticizing the Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng. This letter came after the Department of Justice charged 44 protesters of rioting. The group of prosecutors used a letterhead of the Department of Justice’s Prosecutions Division, saying that two major principles of prosecution included whether there was a reasonable prospect of conviction, and whether it was in line with the public interest. However, the “Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng and Director of Public Prosecutions David Leung have apparently 28  John Lyons, Fan Wenxin and Steven Russolillo, “Hong Kong Clashes Flare, Sparking Fears for Territory’s Future,” Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2019, in https://www.wsj.com/ articles/hong-kong-police-fire-tear-gas-at-demonstrators-as-tensions-flare-11564319424, access date: March 2, 2020. 29  Jeremy Koh and Fang Hao, “Hong Kong protesters defy police ban and march again,” Channel News Asia, July 28, 2019, in https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/ hong-kong-protests-central-extradition-bill-china-11760438, access date: March 28, 2020. 30  Kris Cheng, “Hong Kong protestors bring metro services to a halt in fresh action against government,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 30, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp. com/2019/07/30/hong-kong-protesters-bring-metro-services-halt-fresh-action-govt/, access date: March 28, 2020.

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forgotten about the above principles. … When handling cases involving large-­scale public events, [Cheng] mainly considered political factors, and insisted on prosecution when there was not adequate evidence, no reasonable prospect of conviction, or when it was not in line with public interest, treating the prosecution code as trash.”31 This open protest delegitimized the HKSAR government further. Table 4.6 delineates the events in July that led to another serious confrontation between police and protesters in the Prince Edward MTR station on August 31, 2019. The August protests displayed five characteristics. First, flash mobs were combined with rallies, but these peaceful protests were usually followed by violent clashes between radical protesters and police. The August 1 and 2 protests were peaceful, especially the August 2 rally by 40,000 civil servants. This rally attended by civil servants was significant in that government employees openly supported the anti-­ extradition and anti-police protesters. The pro-Beijing media and politicians severely criticized those civil servants who participated in the rally as violating the principle of “neutrality.” However, the concept of political neutrality had two different versions, one adopted by the government which defined it as disallowing open participation in protests and rallies, and the other one held by liberal-minded public employees who believed that they had the right to express their political views for the sake of Hong Kong’s public interest. Second, the protests from August 3 to 30 were marked by chaotic scenes in which there were triangular conflicts between the protesters, police and even thugs. On August 5 and 11, thugs came out in North Point district and attacked some protesters. Some media reports revealed that these thugs were composed of Fujianese people, some of whom were mobilized from the mainland’s Dongguan city and resided in North Point’s hotels for several days.32 Such mobilization was reminiscent of the July 21 incident in which triads were mobilized by some mysterious 31  Kris Cheng, “Hong Kong government lawyers slam ‘kowtowing’ justice chief following decision to prosecute 44 protesters for rioting,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 1, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/08/01/hong-kong-govt-lawyers-slam-kowtowingjustice-chief-following-decision-prosecute-44-protesters-rioting/, access date: March 28, 2020. Also see “Prosecutors’ open letter criticizing Teresa Cheng for using political factor as the main consideration of prosecution,” July 31, 2019, in https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/ch/ component/k2/1471728-20190731.htm, access date: March 8, 2020. 32  Information from various social media in August 2019, with pictures showing vehicles that displayed Fujianese group affiliations came to Hong Kong from Dongguan.

(continued)

August 1: A flash-mob rally by finance professionals was held at the Central district. Professionals in financial, banking and insurance sectors held a flash-mob rally with theme “Freedom Now, or Money Out” in Chater Garden, Central. Participants filled up the whole venue. Chants of “Hong Kongers, Strike Now,” “Never Give Up, Hongkongers,” “We are not Warmongers; the Government is” and “Liberate Hong Kong; Revolution of Our Times” were heard and echoed by participants. August 2: “We Stand by Our Citizens” was the slogan of a rally organized by civil servant. About 40,000 civil servants attended the rally. The rally said: “Civil servants shall be forever loyal to social institution and citizens, and rule of law shall never be hijacked by misinterpretation of political neutrality and the Chief Executive.” A group of medical professionals held a rally to protest against the Hospital Authority’s lack of care for patients’ confidentiality by allowing the police to arrest protesters inside hospitals, a move which prevented doctors and nurses from carrying out their duty. Protesters claimed that the lives of injured citizens were threatened. August 3: A demonstration was held in Mongkok. A blockade was also held at Cross-Harbor tunnel. Protesters occupied the Cross-Harbor tunnel in Hunghom. The police used tear gas in multiple districts including Mongkok, Tsimshatsui and Wong Tai Sin. They arrested some citizens inside the Wong Tai Sin MTR station. Local residents in Wong Tai Sin quickly gathered and surrounded a police car, which led to the police firing of tear gas. August 4: A rally was held in Western district of the Hong Kong Island. The demonstration spread to Tseung Kwan O. An original plan of the demonstration was to march from Kennedy Town to the Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Park, but police objected to the route. Only the rally at Belcher’s Street received a letter of no objection. Another march was launched in Tseng Kwan O where the police station became a target of sabotage. The police charged at a resident, attacking him with batons and causing him to suffer head injury. Residents in different districts surrounded the police stations in Wong Tai Sin, Mei Foo, Kwun Tong and Tin Shui Wai. Police used tear gas to disperse protesters in the residential areas in Sai Wan and Causeway Bay. August 5: Near the Tin Shui Wai police station, a female protester was carried away by male police officers, an action leading to public criticism. Feminist groups and activists criticized the police for ignoring the rights of female detainees. Protests were organized in seven districts, including Tai Po. In Tsuen Wan, some blue shirt thugs attacked civilians and protesters with machetes. In Shatin, a taxi ran into a crowd of protesters at high speed. Other protests were launched in Tin Shui Wai, Admiralty and Mongkok. Protests were held in North Point where the white shirts and blue shirts, who looked like thugs, attacked some protesters at night time. In Shumshuipo, a journalist from the pro-Beijing and pro-government Tai Kung Pao was attacked by protesters. Protests took place in Wong Tai Sin where streetlights were switched off to force protesters to disperse. The whole day was characterized by guerilla-style of protests, fights between thugs and protesters and conflicts between police and protesters.

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August 6: Thousands of legal sector professionals staged their second “black clothes” march in two months, calling for an end to political prosecutions, for the Department of Justice to retain its independence and for the government to set up an independent commission of inquiry to investigate events from June to August. The lawyers gathered at the Court of Final Appeal before marching in silence to Department of Justice’s office nearby. Lawmaker Dennis Kwok said that 3000 joined the protest. On the same day, protesters went to Shumshuipo police station to demand the release of those arrested. On the night of August 6, Keith Fong Chung-yin, the chairman of the Student Union of the Hong Kong Baptist University, was arrested for possessing ten laser pointers, which the police said were “offensive weapons.” Many supporters of Fong went to surround the Shumshuipo police station. The police eventually used tear gas to disperse 300 protesters outside the police station. August 7: Legal professionals organized a march and spoke out against the prosecutions of protesters. A “star-gazing” night was held at the Hong Kong Space Museum where laser pointers were used by protesters to launch a silent protest against the police treatment of Keith Fong on the night of August 6. August 9: Some netizens mobilized supporters to jam the airport’s departure halls for a three-day protest. They shouted slogans at the arrival hall to alert travelers of the Hong Kong developments. Some travelers argued with protesters because the former wished to leave Hong Kong smoothly. The pro-Beijing and pro-government Federation of Trade Unions appealed to the protesters to abandon activities that would harm the economy. Protesters in Wong Tai Sin held a celebration of the hungry ghost festival by burning papers. Later, as more protesters gathered, police in riot gear carrying shields lined up outside the Wong Tai Sin Disciplined Services Quarters, across the road from where the protesters were burning the papers. Many protesters began to leave shortly before 1:00 am after police displayed a blue flag that warned protesters of an illegal assembly they participated. August 10: Rallies and flash-mob style blockades occurred in multiple areas, including Tai Po. The police dispersed protesters outside the Tai Wai train station. August 11: Protesters organized demonstration in Shumshuipo and flash-mob style blockade of roads and streets in various districts. A march in Hong Kong Island was changed to a rally at Victoria Park in the face of police objection. In Tsimshatsui, the police fired one bean bag round at a protester’s head and busted her protective goggles. The protester was injured, sparking public criticisms at the police on the following days and week. Protesters continued to use guerilla-style protests. Some Fujianese people openly attacked protesters in the North Point district, while a number of protesters were arrested by police in Tai Koo Shing MTR station. A police officer was seen as shooting pepper balls inside the Tai Koo Shing MTR station. The police also fired tear gas into an enclosed space at the Kwai Fong MTR station. The whole day was marked by chaotic scenes in which protesters fought against the police while thugs also clashed with protesters. August 12: An unidentified man in white shirt suddenly assaulted innocent pedestrians in Tsuen Wan. On the same day, a rally against police “brutality” was held at the Hong Kong International Airport. August 14: Protesters celebrated the ghost festival by burning paper effigies and they mocked at the police.

Table 4.6 (continued)

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Sources: Various Hong Kong Chinese newspapers from August 2, 2019, to September 1, 2019; For the civil servants’ rally on August 2, see https://tl.hkrev.info/en/ portfolio/2019-08-02-we-stand-by-our-citizens-rally-by-civil-servants-of-hong-kong/, access date: March 28, 2020

August 18: On a rainy day, about 1.7 million people participated in a mass demonstration to restate the “five demands” and to reunite the pacifists and activists in the anti-extradition movement. August 21: An anti-terrorist sit-in was organized by protesters in Yuen Long. August 22: Secondary school students organized a demonstration. August 23: Hong Kong protesters formed city-wide human chains in a bid to support freedom. Thousands of accountants organized a protest march. August 24: “Ignite Hong Kong, Ignite Hope” was a theme of the Kwun Tong mass demonstration. An estimated participation of 200,000 people joined the protest. Scuffles broke out between police and protesters in housing estates where the management allegedly barred people in black shirts from entering the premises. August 25: Protesters organized a march from Kwai Chung to Tsuen Wan. A water cannon vehicle was deployed by the police for the first time. August 28: A rally was held by aviation employees A MeToo rally was held to protect women’s rights against sexual harassment by men. August 29: A girl whose eye was injured on August 11 appeared in a press conference and expressed her hope that the government should respond to the demands. “I hope that my eye can become a beacon of hope that supports the Hong Kong people,” said the girl who was allegedly shot in her eye by the police. Some rumors claimed that her eye was injured by the protesters. August 30: Joshua Wong and Agnes Chow were arrested for alleged involvement in “illegal assembly” and they appeared in the court. Seven other political activists were also arrested and charged by the police. August 31: The Civil Human Rights Front organized a rally, namely “Prayers for Hong Kong Sinners.” Its supporters gathered at the Southorn Playground in Wan Chai. The police used water cannon to disperse the crowd. The police also sent undercover agents to dress in black and mingled with protesters. They were filmed by the mass media to tie up the hands of a protester in Causeway Bay. When asked by reporters whether they were police, the officers refused to answer. On the night of August 31, the police raptor squad went into the Prince Edward MTR station and pursued some protesters, beating them up with batons, releasing pepper spray and frightening many commuters and passengers.

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people to attack the passengers in Yuen Long railway station. Although the conflicts between the North Point thugs and protesters were relatively less severe than the July 21 incident, the presence and mobilization of white shirts and blue shirts reminded ordinary citizens and protesters of the tragedy on July 21, when triad members were dressed in white shirts. On August 5, when some blue shirts went out to attack protesters, they looked like a triad different from the white shirts. In short, the conflicts in August were a testimony to the complex societal composition in Hong Kong where triads have factions in which some triad members saw protests as undermining their legitimate businesses, like restaurants and shops invested and protected by them. Third, the August protests were characterized by protesters who surrounded, sieged and attacked police stations. Basically, the police adopted a relatively tolerant attitude toward these protesters unless they attacked police stations with lasers and petrol bombs. Strictly speaking, the police could have adopted a tougher policy by chasing the protesters who surrounded police stations. However, they did not do so, reflecting a manpower problem within the police force. Due to the daily protests from July to August, many police officers were reportedly tired and exhausted by working days and nights. The rotation of police officers from one district to another was a common phenomenon.33 Such rotation had immediate consequences in dealing with the protests effectively. Quite often, when the police were sent to deal with protesters, it took them a long period of time to assemble in groups. A good example was the police handling of the protests in Tsimshatsui on the night of August 11. When the police took action by firing tear gas canisters and bean bags, the targets were chaotic and often missed the core protesters. However, on the night of August 11, a female protester had her eye allegedly injured by the police’s bean bag round. On the next day, protesters and the pro-democracy media, such as Apple Daily, severely criticized the police. But there were reports claiming that the girl was unintentionally injured by a plastic bullet shot by a protester. There was insufficient evidence to prove whether her eye was injured by the police or protester. Yet, the chaotic confrontation between protesters and police put the police performance into the media spotlight. The reactive nature of the police force, which sent spokespersons to answer questions from reporters daily, was ineffective in repairing  Information from a source close to the police force, August 2019.

33

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the serious damages inflicted on the police by the previous events, ranging from the handling of protests on June 12, the lack of police inside LegCo on July 1, the absence of police reinforcement during the triad attack on Yuen Long railway passengers on July 21 and the usage of San Uk Ling to detain arrested protesters. Fourth, since August 2, the combination of peaceful with violent protests became a persistent pattern. On August 3, an estimated 150,000 people marched in Tseung Kwan O, followed by the radicals’ attack on the police station. Some protesters hurled insults at police officers inside the station, calling them “rubbish.”34 At the same time, the strike by some airline employees, who applied for sick leave at the same time, forced the airport to cancel some 250 flights. In early August, the Cathay Pacific Airways and Cathay Dragon canceled 140 flights to and from the city, budget carrier HK Express axed 10 services and Hong Kong Airlines pulled 37 flights.35 In response to the mixture of peaceful and violent protests, Chief Executive Carrie Lam said that Hong Kong was no longer a safe city, and that violent protesters were challenging the PRC’s national sovereignty and the principle of “one country, two systems.” Lam added that the nature of the protests changed as protesters were now advocating “a revolution” and no longer targeting the now-suspended extradition bill.36 A good example showing the mix of peaceful protests with violent ones was the protest in Tin Shui Wai. The police on the midnight of August 4 arrested a female protester and tore her skirt and underwear off. Angry residents surrounded the Tin Shui Wai police station on the next day. The police spokeswoman, Yu Hoi-kwan, claimed that the protester’s skirt was accidentally torn off because the protester refused to be arrested. The arrested female protester was successfully bailed out with the assistance of 34  “Hong Kong police station after Tseung Kwan O march turns ugly, with police warning they will disperse protesters,” South China Morning Post, August 4, 2019, in https://www. scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3021360/thousands-march-tseung-kwan-ohong-kong-continues-weekend, access date: March 28, 2020. 35  Danny Lee, “Flights cancelled leaving travelers facing chaos as citywide strike action hits Hong Kong International Airport,” South China Morning Post, August 5, 2019, in https:// www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3021412/hundreds-flights-cancelledleaving-travellers-facing-chaos, access date: March 28, 2020. 36  “Protests challenging nation’s sovereignty: Chief Executive,” Radio Television Hong Kong, August 5, 2019, in https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/ k2/1472702-20190805.htm, access date: March 28, 2020.

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her lawyers. But many feminist groups, such as Gender and Sexual Justice in Action and the Association for the Advancement of Feminism, condemned the police for “violating basic human rights,” “sexually humiliating” a female citizen, and “committing indecent assault.”37 They planned an assembly and then tensions began to rise as other protesters showed up and holding signs emphasizing the “sexual violence of the police” and calling the police “perverts” and “rapists.”38 Since protesters surrounded the Tin Shui Wai police station, the police used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse them at night and arrested 76 people. The Tin Shui Wai conflicts started peacefully but ended up violently. Even when peaceful protests were launched at the airport, the result was disruption to airline services. About 1000 protesters joined the three-­ day demonstration at the airport starting from August 9. Protesters made posters, greeted travelers and chanted “adding oil, Hong Kong.” Some black-clad demonstrators went to the airport to support the second day of an illegal anti-government sit-in.39 On August 12, all flights in and out of Hong Kong were canceled.40 The problem of the airport protest was that it created inconvenience to travelers unrelated to the Hong Kong protests. Furthermore, the protests forced the cancelation of flights, antagonizing many people and incurring financial losses to various stakeholders. From the perspective of winning the hearts and minds of the people of Hong Kong, the airport protests were poorly thought out by their organizers, who believed that such protests could and would raise the international 37  “Police fire tear gas in Tin Shui Wai as protesters gather to condemn woman’s arrest,” Coconuts Hong Kong, August 5, 2019, in https://coconuts.co/hongkong/news/policefire-tear-gas-in-tin-shui-wai-as-protesters-gather-to-condemn-womans-arrest/, access date: March 28, 2020. 38  “Tear gas fired at Tin Shui Wai protesters,” Radio Television Hong Kong, August 6, 2019, in https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1472744-20190805. htm?spTabChangeable=0, access date: March 28, 2020. 39  Dary Choo, “Hong Kong protests: hundreds of demonstrators occupy airport for second day,” South China Morning Post, August 10, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/transport/article/3022251/numbers-.dwindle-hong-kong-international-airport-protest, access date: March 28, 2020. 40  “Other than the departure flights that have completed the check-in process and the arrival flights that are already heading to Hong Kong, all other flights have been cancelled for the rest of today,” the Airport Authority said in a statement. See “Hong Kong airport cancels all flights on Monday due to protests,” Channel News Asia, August 12, 2019, in https:// www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/hong-kong-airport-cancels-all-flights-due-to-protests-11802674, access date: March 28, 2020.

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concerns. Nevertheless, the unintended consequences were to undermine Hong Kong’s airport services, alienate many travelers and fail to win the hearts and minds of many pragmatic Hong Kong people. The fifth and final hallmark of the protests in August was that the police began to chase protesters into the MTR stations and use weapons against them. For instance, a police officer was seen shooting pepper balls at close range against protesters when they left the protest scene through the Tai Koo MTR station.41 The relatively assertive policing tactic deployed by the police directly or indirectly led to the incident of August 31, when the police chased protesters into the Prince Edward MTR station. The arrest of young protesters and political activists on August 30 paved the way for the violent confrontation between protesters and police on the night of August 31. Table  4.7 shows that Andy Chan, Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, Lam Long-yin, Hui Yiu-yu and Suen Hui-nam were arrested by the police, together with legislators Au Nok-him, Cheng Chung-tai and Tam Man-ho. The mass arrests of young activists, Table 4.7  Politicians who were arrested on August 30 Political activist

Background

Andy Chan Joshua Wong Agnes Chow, Demosisto Deputy Secretary Lam Long-yin Hui Yiu-yu

Convener of the banned Hong Kong National Party Secretary of the political group, Demosisto Deputy secretary of Demosisto

Suen Hui-nam Cheng Chung-tai Au Nok-hin Tam Man-ho

Chairman, Demosisto Member of a political group, namely Shatin District Political Affairs Former chairman of the Student Union of the University of Hong Kong LegCo member LegCo member LegCo member

Source: For the details of police charges, see Lam Ting-chun, “Full record of August 31,” Initium Media, August 31, 2019, in https://theinitium.com/article/20190831-whatsnew-hk-831-protest-live-update/, access date: March 28, 2020

41  Kris Cheng. “Hong Kong police shoot projectiles at close range in Tai Koo, as protester suffers ruptured eye in Tsimshatsui,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 12, 201, in https:// www.hongkongfp.com/2019/08/12/hong-kong-police-shoot-projectiles-close-range-taikoo-protester-suffers-ruptured-eye-tst/, access date: March 28, 2020.

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protesters and legislators appeared to stimulate protesters to struggle against the police further, thus sowing the seeds of more confrontations on the night of August 31.

The August 31 Incident The protests on August 31 were stimulated by the memory of the August 31 decision made by the Standing Committee of the NPC on Hong Kong’s electoral reform in 2014, an event that triggered the 2014 Occupy Central Movement. The August 31, 2019, protests were also stimulated by the mass arrests that were made on August 30. Furthermore, some organizers of the protests against the extradition bill, such as Jimmy Sham of the Civil Human Rights Front and Chung Kin-ping who organized a large protest in Yuen Long a week after the July 21 terror, were mysteriously attacked by thugs.42 The August 31 incident in 2019 was characterized by several features pertinent to the politics of policing protests (see Table 4.8). First, it began with a series of guerilla-style protests in various districts, stretching police manpower and creating traffic disruptions in many places. The police began to adapt to the flexible and mobile strategy of protesters by acting swiftly and decisively. As the reactions to protesters’ attack at LegCo and police headquarters showed, the police became more effective and faster than before, including arrests and the deployment of the water cannon vehicles. Second, the police secured the cooperation of the MTR Corporation in closing some stations, exits and lines to facilitate the arrest of protesters inside some stations, notably the Prince Edward MTR station. In the minds of protesters, the MTR collaborated with the police in countering their activities, thereby leading to their retaliation of damaging MTR properties frequently. As a public corporation, however, the MTR had the legal obligation to comply with the police and work with them to maintain law and order. Third, the police action on the night of August 31 was controversial because of their violent nature. The television news broadcasts that showed police entering the train at Prince Edward MTR station and beating up protesters did raise a question of whether the police exercised their power arbitrarily. Indeed, the police identified some protesters who escaped into the MTR train as the enemies who had to be 42  “The Record of August 31, 2019,” in https://theinitium.com/article/20190831whatsnew-hk-831-protest-live-update/, access date: March 14, 2020.

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Table 4.8  Events on the August 31 incident in Prince Edward Mass Transit Railway Time

Event

August 31, 2019 13:18 A rally was held in Wanchai but it did not receive the letter of no objection from the police. Protesters walked to the Wanchai police station to “pray” outside. 14:13 Some protesters occupied the streets on the way from Admiralty to the Central district, paralyzing the traffic on both sides of the road. 14:43 Protesters occupied Hennessey Road, the Admiralty and Garden Road and parts of the roads near Sogo department store at Causeway Bay. 16:09 Many protesters blocked the traffic lanes at Des Voeux Road and Connaught Road in the Central district. Then they went to block Harcourt Road. 17:05 Protesters began to use hard objects to attack a glass panel door of the LegCo Complex. 17:25 The police gave warnings to protesters outside LegCo and began to fire tear gas canisters. Some protesters fought back by throwing petrol bombs at the police. 17:40 The police water cannon vehicle arrived at the government headquarters and began to shoot blue-colored water at protesters. The protesters retreated. 17:57 Protesters planned for their next move, digging out bricks and throwing petrol bombs at the police. 18:49 Many police came to Harcourt Road’s bridge and protesters threw petrol bombs at them. The police fired tear gas at the attackers. 19:03 The police controlled the Harcourt Road and began to disperse protesters. 19:10 Protesters burnt all kinds of objects near the police headquarters, leading to explosions and heavy smoke. 20:19 Firemen arrived at the scene and distinguished the fire, while the water cannon vehicle shot water at protesters. The police arrested some protesters. 20:28 The police tactical squad went to Causeway Bay to disperse and arrest some protesters. Outside Sogo department store, the police fired tear gas canisters at protesters who retreated to Percival Street. 20:46 The black-clad protesters began to set fire on the streets of Wanchai and Causeway Bay. 20:47 Many black-clad protesters blocked the roads in Tsimshatshui’s Nathan Road and Granville Road. The police fired tear gas to disperse protesters. 21:48 After the police dispersed protesters, the traffic at Nathan Road resumed to normal situation. 22:00 The MTR Corporation announced that, in Mongkok MTR station, some protesters damaged the control room. To protect passengers, the train would not stop in Mongkok and the MTR Corporation called the police. Some protesters said that they heard the police chased the protesters into the MTR station. Other protesters went to assist the trapped protesters in the station by destroying a window of the control room. (continued)

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Table 4.8 (continued) Time

Event

22:25 Black-clad protesters went to block the roads in North Point and Tin Hau. The police arrived at the scene and dispersed them. 22:30 Many police went into the Mongkok MTR station to chase and arrest protesters, while asking and pushing the passengers to leave the train. 22:40 Some protesters turned to struggle in the Kowloon side. A team of police arrived at Exit E of the Mongkok MTR station, but half of the protesters left the Nathan Road and entered the station. The police chased them inside the Mongkok MTR station, going into the train to arrest some protesters. Some citizens argued with the police, but the police announced that they had already cut off all the exit gates of the Mongkok station. The police were determined to arrest protesters who stayed inside. 22:45 There was a dispute on a Kwun Tong train. Trains stopped and a message broadcast on loudspeakers told the passengers to leave the train as the MTR staff reported the incident to the police. 22:50 About 100 protesters turned to protest in Kwun Tong Road, using barricades to block the road. The police arrived at the scene. Protesters went into the Kowloon Bay station and discussed their next move. 22:59 The live broadcast by TVB and Cable TV news showed that police officers went into the Prince Edward MTR station to arrest protesters. The police used pepper spray to target at protesters inside the train while forbidding reporters to cover the entire process. The police reportedly used batons to beat up some protesters. Some protesters opened their umbrellas to protect themselves, while some screamed loudly and cried out desperately. 23:00 The MTR station in Prince Edward announced that, due to serious accident, passengers should get off the train. About 100 police officers rushed to the platform that had a train destined to go to Central district. They held batons to chase and beat up citizens and passengers, including protesters. Some police officers pulled the citizens out of the train and subdued them. A few police officers went into the train, shooting pepper spray and tear gas liquid at protesters. Some passengers knelt down and begged by saying “sorry, sorry, please do not beat us up.” But one police officer was seen as continuing to beat up a passenger. 23:05 Police intercepted a man and a woman on a platform. 23:09 The police continued to arrest protesters inside the MTR station. The MTR Corporation announced that the Jordon station was closed, and that the trains would not stop at Admiralty, Jordan, Mongkok and Prince Edward. Meanwhile, three stations were closed, including Admiralty, Wanchai and Sai Ying Pun. Some exits at the Sheung Wan station, Central station and Hong Kong station were temporarily closed. 23:10 Police asked reporters to leave the train platform. (continued)

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Table 4.8 (continued) Time

Event

23:22 Because some citizens fought against each other at the Prince Edward MTR station, the Kwun Tong train line was obstructed. Some protesters trapped in the train were angry. Some protesters used umbrellas to attack the window of a control room, the ticket selling machines and the video cameras. 23:30 Police requested that reporters inside the Prince Edward MTR station should leave because the scene was a criminal one that needed the collection of evidence. Except for the police, arrested protesters and ambulance officers, all other people had to leave the station. 23:33 The police asked reporters and ambulance officers to leave the Prince Edward MTR station by using Exit B1 and then they locked the gate. Many citizens got upset outside the station. 23:40 The police subdued some protesters inside the Yaumatei MTR station. 23:54 Several train lines were stopped, including the Tsuen Wan line, Kwun Tong line, Hong Kong Island line, Tseung Kwan O line and South Island line. 23:57 The Yaumatei MTR station was closed but three ambulance officers were trapped inside. They were ordered by the police to stay inside the station and to face the wall. At the same time, some ambulance officers were stopped outside the MTR station and they could not get into the station. Those ambulance officers who could not leave the station said that there were four injured citizens inside the Yaumatei station. But the police said that the injured citizens were sent to hospital and did not allow ambulance officers outside the station to go inside and rescue the citizens concerned. One ambulance officer outside the MTR station cried out loudly and hoped that the police allowed him to go into the station and rescue the injured citizens. September 1, 2019 00:23 The ambulance officers outside Exit E of Prince Edward station stayed for 30 minutes and then the police allowed them to go into the station. The MTR staff told the ambulance officers that there were 9 people injured inside the station. 00:30 Many protesters and citizens complained outside the Mongkok police station that the police had gone onto the train at Prince Edward MTR station and that they attacked protesters and passengers by using pepper spray. 01:20 The MTR Corporation arranged a special train to take away the injured citizens. All the injured people were sent up to the ground through the use of a lift at least five times. 01:30 The special train arrived at the Lai Chi Kok station where the injured citizens were taken to hospital by ambulance vehicles. Sources: Apple Daily, September 1, 2019, pp. A01–A05.; Ming Pao Daily News, September 1, 2019, pp. A01–A05.; Tai Kung Po, September 1, 2019, p. A01; Wen Wei Po, September 1, 2019, p. A01; and Lam Ting-chun, “Full record of August 31,” Initium Media, August 31, 2019, in https://theinitium.com/ article/20190831-whatsnew-hk-831-protest-live-update/, access date: March 28, 2020

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pursued and arrested. Yet, from the perspective of ordinary citizens, the police action of beating up some protesters and using pepper spray and baton against them appeared to abuse their power. As such, the politics of policing protests inside MTR stations remained highly contentious. In particular, there were reports saying that the police did not allow ambulance officers to go into MTR station to rescue and assist the injured citizens, raising suspicions on whether the police had any cover-up issues. In fact, immediately after the August 31 incident, the propaganda arm of the protesters claimed that there were a few citizens who “died” inside the Prince Edward MTR station, leading to a strange phenomenon in which many citizens placed white flowers outside the station to mourn the “dead” protesters. Although the police insisted that nobody died inside the station, some protesters and ordinary citizens perpetuated a myth that a few protesters were “victimized” and “passed away” due to the “arbitrary” excise of police power.

Patterns of Peaceful and Violent Protests Objectively speaking, although violence became a commonplace in the protests between June and December 2019, a lot of peaceful protests that were given the police letters of no objection turned out to be really peaceful. Table  4.9 shows that from March to December 2019, at least 42 major peaceful protests that were allowed by the police turned out to remain peaceful.43 This phenomenon showed that the peaceful protesters fully utilized the freedom of assembly as conferred on them by the Basic Law. On the other hand, the police were tolerant of all these peaceful protests. Moreover, there were quite a lot of peaceful protests, which were not given the police letter of no objection and which turned out to be peaceful. Table 4.10 tabulates the major peaceful protests that could be regarded as illegal assemblies, but they turned out to be peaceful in nature. At least 18 “illegal” assemblies remained peaceful, showing that some moderate protesters wanted to demonstrate against the government, but they were not allowed by the police. Still, the assemblies went on smoothly and peacefully. As such, it can be argued that the HKSAR remained a city

43  The actual figure of peaceful protests could be larger than 42 because we calculate only those major protests over 1,000 people.

The organizers claimed that 12,000 people took part in the march, while police put the figure at 5200.

On March 31, The Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), a platform for 50 pro-democracy interest groups, launched its protest march against the bill. The march started from Southorn Playground in Wanchai and ended at the Central Government Complex in Admiralty. On April 28, another protest march against the extradition bill began at East Point Road in Causeway Bay and its destination was LegCo. On May 26, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic and Democratic China held a parade to protest against the extradition bill, and to call for the reversal of the PRC government’s verdict on the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen incident. On June 5, thousands of Hong Kong’s legal professionals took to the streets in a silent protest against extradition bill, exerting pressure on the government to avoid rushing it through the legislature. On June 9, the Front organized a large-scale protest march, starting from the Victoria Park and ending at the government headquarters. Demonstrators brought the traffic to a halt, chanting slogans such as “Scrap the evil law,” “Oppose China extradition” and “Carrie Lam resign.”

(continued)

The organizers said that 2200 people participated in the annual parade, which had attracted 1100 people in 2018. The police estimated 2100 participants in 2019, compared with 610 participants in 2018. Organizers estimated the turnout to be between 2500 and 3000, but the police said only 880 people participated in the peaceful protect. Jimmy Sham, a spokesperson for the organizers, said that 1.03 million participated in the march, but the police estimated 240,000 people turned up in the rally. Seven people were arrested, one for assault near the flyover at Canal Street and six others for criminal destruction, including theft at a street stand, according to the police. On June 14, some others participated in the anti-extradition protest The organizers said 6000 people participated in the protest, but at the Chater Garden, shouting slogans such as “I walk with the the police said the figure was 980. youth,” “loving the young people” and “do not open fire.” On June 16, the Front organized another protest march. The Front said 2 million people participated. But the police estimated 338,000 participants.

While police estimated 22,800 protesters, the organizers claimed that there were 130,000 participants.

Consequences

Content of protests

Table 4.9  Peaceful protests that were allowed by the police and turning to be peaceful, July–December 2019 4  THE POLITICS OF POLICING PROTESTS AND INCIDENTS OF JULY 21… 

153

Consequences

About 1500 people participated in the march that lasted for five hours. The Russian consulate had no representative to receive the letter from protesters, while the Indian and Indonesian consulates had no representative meeting then. The Front claimed that 550,000 participated, but the police estimated 190,000 participants. Some radicals went to storm the LegCo building. On July 5, a group of mothers gathered at the Chater Garden to The organizers claimed that 8000 people participated, but the appeal to the government to respond to the demands of young people. police estimated 1300 participants. On July 17, elderly people from the “silver generation” organized a Organizers said 9000 people participated, but the police march at Chater Garden to support the young people. The estimated 1500 participants. protesters called for the Chief Executive to resign and the Police Commissioner to step down. On July 26, front-line nurses and hospital workers organized The Airport Authority removed the long chairs inside the assemblies at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, the Chinese University of airport. While hundreds of nurses and hospital workers Hong Kong and the airport. They said the government ignored participated in the assemblies, about 15,000 employees in the public demand and the police neglected citizens’ safety. At the same aviation industry protested at the airport. About 21,000 people time, employees in the aviation industry protested against the signed their names in a signature campaign to call for the government at the airport. They sang songs and showed placards to government to listen to public opinion, including 8700 alert travelers. Some of them protested against the triad attack at Yuen employees in the aviation sector. Long and distributed leaflets and flyers to travelers at the airport. On August 2, some civil servants organized an assembly at the About 4000 civil servants participated in the assembly—an Chater Garden to call for the government to respond to the five unprecedented turnout of civil servants who participated in the demands of protesters. protest at the HKSAR. They came from various departments, including education, labor and welfare, food and health, environment and development, transport and housing, innovation and technology, home affairs, finance and treasury, constitutional affairs, security and personnel departments.

On June 26, protesters organized a march to the consulates of G20, including the consulates of Canada, Japan, South Africa, Italy and Saudi Arabia. They also marched to the US and UK consulates and the European Union office. On July 1, the Front organized a large-scale protest march from the Victoria Park.

Content of protests

Table 4.9 (continued)

154  S. S.-H. LO ET AL.

On September 6, an assembly in protest against police power and authoritarianism was held at the Chater Garden.

On August 5, workers and employees in the art and cultural sectors organized a mass strike and assembly at Edinburg Place. On August 16, academics and intellectuals organized an assembly at the Chater Garden, calling for an alliance between Hong Kong and the United States and the United Kingdom, and saying “sovereignty rests with the people.” On August 22, some secondary school students participated in the anti-extradition assembly. Some organized groups to discuss the issue with the participation and guidance of their teachers. On August 23, employees in the accounting profession organized a parade. On August 25, some relatives of the police organized an assembly at the Edinburg Place, calling for the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry and saying the police become a “political shield.” On August 28, a protest was organized by the employees of the Cathy Pacific at the Edinburg Place, complaining about the dismissal of a few colleagues because of their views against the extradition bill. On the night of August 28, some women organized an assembly at the Chater Garden, calling for equality and criticizing the police for “abusing” their powers. On September 2, university students organized an assembly at the Chinese University. A two-day strike was launched by some protesters from September 2 to 3, attracting supporters from 21 occupational professions. Moreover, some secondary students organized protests outsides their schools.

(continued)

About 3000 university students attended the assembly at the Chinese University. The strikers organized an assembly at Tamar Garden where 4000 people attended. But the police said only 3700 people participated. About 4000 students protested outside their schools. They wore masks and carried a slogan asking Hong Kong to work harder on the anti-extradition movement. Organizers said 23,000 people participated and they criticized the police for using force against elected councilors and their assistants. The police estimated 3850 participants.

Some police relatives said their families became divided. One of them said the police need “excessive force.” This was the first time that police relatives came out to oppose the government. The organizers said that 2000 people joined the protest, but the police estimated 730 participants. The evening assembly of women attracted 30,000 participants, but the police estimated 11,500 participants at the peak of the assembly.

About 2000–3000 students participated and some shouted “recovering Hong Kong” and “five demands must be maintained.” Organizers said that 5000 people participated in the parade.

About 1770 employees in the art and cultural industry joined the strike and assembly at the Edinburg Place. Exiles Ray Wong and Brian Leung broadcasted their remarks in the assembly where 60,000 people attended, but the police estimated 7100 participants.

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The anti-riot police were sent to the parade scene, leading to the anger of some protesters. The parade finally developed into police-protesters confrontation. The police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. Organizers claimed that 50,000 people attended the assembly. Videos with self-description from the arrested protesters and their lawyers were shown. A female protector said she was “harassed” by a police officer. Demosisto vice-chair Cheng Kar-long criticized the police for patrolling at the assembly, affecting students’ emotions. About 1500 students attended the rally. Protesters waved the US and UK flags in their protests at Tsuen Wan. The assembly in Tsuen Wan stimulated other protesters to take action in various districts, such as Shatin, Wong Tai Sin and Shamshuipo. The organizers said that 400 students attended and most participants were dressed in school uniforms and wore face masks. Organizers aimed at appealing for international humanitarian support for Hong Kong protesters. The police estimated 1600 participants. Protesters wore masks and raised the Catalan flag to appeal to Spain to deal with protesters peacefully without police violence.

On September 21, a health concern group in Tuen Mun organized a parade from Tuen Mun Park to Tuen Mun government headquarters, calling for a ban on begging and on activities that solicited money from audience in the park. On September 27, protesters organized an assembly at the Edinburg Place against the San UK Ling Holding Center where some detainees were reportedly beaten up by police.

On October 19, netizens mobilized supporters to attend a session for prayers of international humanitarian aid at the Edinburg Place. Videos were shown and organizers made declarations at the forum. On October 24, some protesters organized an assembly at the Chater Garden to support human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong and Catalonia. They claimed that the two places had the “same” situation. On October 26, hospital employees assembled at the Chater Garden Protesters from the medical profession criticized the police for and claimed that “white terror” infiltrated the medical profession—a entering hospitals and affecting hospital tranquility. They situation everting much pressure on them. reiterated their support of five demands.

On September 30, secondary school students organized a strike and an assembly at the Chater Garden, calling for the five demands to be met. On October 2, netizens mobilized supporters to join an assembly at Tsuen Wan, expressing their concern about the injured students because one of them was injured by a police bullet in Tsuen Wan on October 1. On October 18, secondary school students from schools organized an anti-police assembly at the University of Hong Kong.

Consequences

Content of protests

Table 4.9 (continued)

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On December 12, protesters gathered at the Edinburg Place to mourn for the dead citizens.

On December 8, a march was organized by the Front. About 800,000 people marched from the Victoria Park to the Central district.

On November 8, a concern group composed of schools in Kwun Tong assembled at the Harborside Park to call for public support of the arrested, injured and dead students. On November 9, protesters prayed for the “dead heroes” at the Tamar Park and many citizens brought white flowers to mourn those “heroes.” On November 10, another praying session was held at the Chater Garden to mourn the death of Alex Chow. On November 15, some elderly people from the silver generation assembled at the Chater Garden to criticize police for being violent. On November 28, thousands of protesters gathered at a rally at the Edinburg Place to celebrate the signing of the US Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act by President Donald Trump, who supported the pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong. On November 30, netizens mobilized some young and old people to assemble at the Chater Garden. On December 1, protesters organized a parade staring from Tsimshatsui’s Cultural Center to Hunghom’s Hong Kong Coliseum to thank the United States for supporting Hong Kong.

(continued)

After the parade, the police went to Whampao Garden and arrested a few protesters. In return, some protesters vandalized the shops in Hunghom and committed arson at the Whampao MTR station. The anti-riot police stayed at the Central Market to stop protesters from moving further west. They deployed a water cannon vehicle and warned that they would adopt a zero-tolerance policy toward any violent or illegal act. At about 6:20 pm, protesters on the Percival Street used loudspeakers to say goodbye to the police, telling them that they were going to have dinner. Some protesters waved flags, sang songs and shouted slogans. The assembly was peaceful.

Participants opposed the police to use tear gas excessively.

About 500 students and citizens attended. They mourned the death of Alex Chow, a student at the University of Science and Technology. The police inspected the belongings of five black shirts near the police headquarters and they asked all protesters to leave the scene. About 1000 people attended, including Catholic leader Ha Chi-shing and Reverend Chu Yiu-ming. The assembly was peaceful with the participation of some children. The organizers claimed that 100,000 people, including different age groups, participated in the rally.

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The organizers said 1500 people participated in the rally.

On December 17, employees in the social sector organized a three-day strike and participated in a rally to mourn for the “humanitarian disaster” in Hong Kong. On December 22, a group of students organized a rally at the Edinburg Place to call for the international concern about the situation in Xinjiang. They said that “Xinjiang today would become Hong Kong tomorrow.” On the night of December 22, some groups held a rally at Edinburg Place to support four members of the Spark Alliance, who were arrested by the police for “moneylaundering” activities. On December 29, protesters organized a rally at the Edinburg Place to show photos of the anti-extradition movement in the past six months.

Note: We only calculate the major peaceful protests in this table. By major, we refer to those protests over 1000 people

Sources: Various Hong Kong Chinese newspapers from April 1, 2019, to December 30, 2019

The rally and show were peaceful.

At 5:00 pm, protesters destroyed the PRC flag and raised the flags of Tibet, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China. They clashed with the police, who arrested two people and who used pepper spray to disperse protesters. The rally at the Edinburg Place turned out to be peaceful.

Consequences

Content of protests

Table 4.9 (continued)

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Consequences

(continued)

At 9:43 pm, the police called the ambulance services and condemned protesters for blocking police headquarters, leading to the injuries of nine female and four male employees. On the morning of June 22, protesters began to leave and 200 police officers and employees eventually left their offices. On June 27, about 300 protesters demonstrated outside the office of the The police inspected the personal belongings and bags of the black shirts, Secretary for Justice, Teresa Cheng. They shouted at a few undercover recording their identity cards. They also used water barriers to stop protesters police, who eventually formed human chains to disperse them. from proceeding into the offices of the Justice Department. On July 6, protesters mobilized their supporters to attend a rally to Protesters put their stickers and posters on posting boards to commemorate the commemorate the death of a woman who fell down from a building dead woman. Singer Deannie Yip attended the rally and she appealed to the Hong on June 30. Kong people to prepare a long-term struggle, to keep calm and to maintain peace. On August 6, some protesters surrounded the Shumshuipo police The student union leader, Fong Chung-yin, was charged by the police for station to protest against the police arrest of a student union leader at possessing “offensive weapons,” but protesters accused the police of initiating the Baptist University for possessing laser pointers. “white terror.” On August 10, Tai Po protesters organized a march to call for the The result turned out to be peaceful. government to accept their “five demands.” On August 13, netizens mobilized 10,000 supporters to jam the The sit-in protests were peaceful as protesters wished to raise the awareness of the airport and sit in the protest zone, explaining to travelers the Hong public and travelers. Kong anti-extradition movement. At the same time, some hospital workers launched a silent rally and protest. On August 14, netizens mobilized 700 supporters to burn papers for From 9:00 to 11:00 pm, the police fired 35 tear gas canisters and dispersed protesters. the dead outside the Shumshuipo police station. But critics said the police even used tear gas in some streets without protesters. On August 18, the Front organized a march to appeal to Carrie Lam The Front claimed that 1.7 million people participated, but the police estimated to have dialogue with protesters. 128,000 participants. On August 21, many angry citizens held sit-in protests near the Yuen The police used pepper spray and rubber bullets to disperse protesters at the Long MTR station and Yoho Mall against the triad attack on Yuen railway station. Long MTR passengers on July 21.

On June 21, protesters surrounded the Wan Chai police headquarters. Joshua Wong of Demosisto appealed to protesters to surround it. At night, many protesters shouted slogans.

Content of protests

Table 4.10  Peaceful protests that were disallowed by the police and turning to be peaceful, July–December 2019

Consequences

Note: Major protests over 1000 people Note: We calculate only those major protests with more than 1000 participants

Sources: Various Hong Kong Chinese newspapers from June 22, 2019, to October 19, 2019

Protesters sang the song, “Do you hear the people sing?” Organizers said 210,000 people participated in the formation of human chains that lasted for 60 kilometers long. Several entry gates at the airport were closed. Anti-riot police had to disperse protesters who finally walked through the highway along the Lantau Island and Tsing Ma bridge to leave the airport. On the next day, Apple Daily portrayed the escape as a “heroic” mission. On September 6, protesters requested that the MTR should release At night, protesters blocked the traffic at Nathan Road. The police used tear gas its videos on the night of August 31. In response, the MTR said the to disperse protesters, some of whom committed arson and damaged MTR related videos would be preserved for three years. facilities. The MTR had to stop its services from Tsuen Wan to Central district. On September 7, protesters asked the MTR to release the videos on Protesters set fire outside Mongkok police station, but police later used pepper the night of August 31. spray to disperse them. On September 10, protesters sang “Glory to Hong Kong” in About 1000 supporters also joined the singing campaign in the shopping malls in Fanling. Diamond Hill, Tsuen Wan, Kowloon Bay, Western district and Yau Tong. On September 19, protesters sang “Glory to Hong Kong” and formed a Protesters shouted: “Free Hong Kong, Democracy Now” and “Restoring Hong human chain at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Kong in revolutionary times.” On September 21, some protesters held a sit-in protest in Yuen Long. Some protesters threw petrol bombs at the police who used tear gas to disperse them. On October 3, protesters called for the support of others against the About 500 students were unhappy with Tuan’s answers and some painted the arrest of university students at the Chinese University. Vice walls of the university’s administrative building. Tuan promised to have another Chancellor Rocky Tuan had a dialogue with students and refused to dialogue with students. comment on the police action. On October 18, protesters organized flash mobs at lunchtime in the The mass gatherings were peaceful with participants wearing masks and leaving Central district, Tsimshatsui, Mongkok, Shumshuipo and Kwun voluntarily later. Tong to oppose the anti-mask law and commemorate the mysterious death of a girl named Chan Yin-hang.

On August 23, Carrie Lam had dialogue with some formed officials. Protesters held their hands and formed human chains in the Hong Kong Island, Tsuen Wan and Kwun Tong. On September 1, protesters mobilized their supporters to jam the routes and block the traffic to the airport.

Content of protests

Table 4.10 (continued)

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where the police were generally tolerant of protests, including those which were not granted the letter of no objection. However, violent protests were commonplace from July to December 2019. Table  4.11 shows that at least 11 protests became violent, while Table 4.12 reveals that at least 11 parades that did not receive the letter of no objection from the police turned out to be violent. In total, at least 22 protests and parades turned out to have violent confrontations between protesters and police. Within a timeframe of five months from July to December 2019, the police had to deal with at least four to five violent protests every month, mostly occurring during the weekends. This situation explained why the police were exhausted and their manpower and resources were overstretched. As such, the police required the assistance of the Correctional Services Department (CSD) to deploy their staff members to work as a special police unit to guard various sites, such as the official residence of the Chief Executive.44 Originally, the police deployed 200 elites to guard key buildings, such as the government headquarters at Admiralty. But when protests became more common, all these elites had to be redeployed to the front line to tackle the violent protesters. In March 2020, Reuters reported that there were as many as 4000 officers of the PRC People’s Armed Police (PAP) coming into the HKSAR during the protests in 2019 to observe the developments.45 There were and are no evidence to prove this claim. However, a diplomat told the authors of this book that he identified the PRC’s military vehicle with a license plate that actually belonged to the PAP.46 If this observation was accurate, the PAP might be sent into Hong Kong to monitor the development of the protests, although there was and is no evidence to corroborate that they participated in the policing of protests in the HKSAR. Still, during the protests from July to December 2019, a few videos were shown by netizens that a number of police officers appeared to speak in Mandarin, an indication that some individual police officers might come from the 44  Christy Leung, “Hong Kong protests: ‘special police units’ will be unveiled this week to ease pressure on embattled force, sources say,” South China Morning Post, November 13, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3037425/ hong-kong-protests-special-police-unit-will-be, access date: March 29, 2020. 45  Greg Torode, “Exclusive: China’s internal security force on frontlines of Hong Kong protests,” Reuters, March 18, 2020, in https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkongprotests-military-exclusive/exclusive-chinas-internal-security-force-on-frontlines-of-hongkong-protests-idUSKBN2150JZ, access date: March 29, 2020. 46  Informal discussion with the diplomat, December 2019.

Organizers said that 10,000 people protested, but the police estimated 1800 participants. The police eventually used pepper spray to disperse some protesters who surrounded the Tuen Mun police station. At 7:00 pm, protesters defaced the PRC emblem on the Liaison Office building and they pelted eggs. The police used tear gas to disperse them.

On July 6, protesters marched in Tuen Mun Park against mainland female singers and local male audiences, saying that the singing harassed residents. On July 21, the Front organized a march to call for Carrie Lam to withdraw the extradition bill and to set up an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the conflicts between police and protesters. Some protesters surrounded the Liaison Office. On July 28, protesters organized a march from Sheung Wan to Causeway Bay to protest against the individual police officers who opened fire. On August 4, protesters organized a march in Tseung Kwan O.

At 7:00 pm, the police used tear gas, pepper bullets and rubber bullets to disperse protesters. Serious clashes occurred. The police arrested 49 people. Sixteen people were injured. The organizers claimed 150,000 participated, but the police estimated 27,000 participants. Protesters threw bricks at the police station. The police used dogs and tear gas to disperse them. On August 5, protesters launched a mass strike calling for The police used tear gas to disperse protesters in Harcourt Road at 150,000 people to participate. The mass strikes covered the 3:30 pm. On the other hand, some protesters surrounded the laborers, schools and markets. The MTR had to stop services at police station and dormitory at Wong Tai Sin. The police used tear eight stations. gas to disperse them. The police also clashed with protesters in Mongkok, Tsuen Wan, Tai Po, Tuen Mun and Tin Shiu Wai where a lot of tear gas canisters were used. In total, the police fired 1002 tear gas canisters, 170 rubber bullets and 28 sponge grenades. Moreover, 148 people were arrested, including 95 males and 53 females with ages ranging from 13 to 63. On August 24, protesters organized their parade in Kwun Tong The parade’s organizer, Lau Wing-hong, was arrested together with and called for the government to respond to five demands. They 16 other volunteers. Clashes between the police and protesters took also destroyed a smart light post. place in Wong Tai Sin and Shumshuipo.

Consequences

Content of protests

Table 4.11  Violent protests, July–December 2019

162  S. S.-H. LO ET AL.

Note: These were the major protests with over 1000 people

Sources: Various Hong Kong Chinese newspapers from July 7, 2019, to December 23, 2019

At 4:00 pm, protesters destroyed iron bars to form blockade on the streets. The police used tear gas, but protesters used petrol bombs. The police deployed water cannon vehicles. In total, 41 people were injured and 36 people ranging from 12 to 48 years old were arrested. On October 1, the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, The protests were initially peaceful, but violent incidents occurred Hong Kong protesters initiated a “national day of mourning.” In later during the day. The MTR stations and businesses related to defiance of a police ban on the annual march for which the Front China were vandalized. The police arrested 269 people, including 178 applied, its leaders organized a rally from Causeway Bay to the males and 91 females. Thirty police officers were injured. In total, the Central district, mourning the dissident victims in China and police fired 1400 tear gas canisters, 900 rubber bullets, 190 bean bags calling for an end to one-party rule in the mainland. and 230 sponge grenades. Six real shots were also fired by the police. On November 2, 128 pro-democracy candidates organized The police declared that the people were participating in an illegal election rallies at the Victoria Park, although the police had assembly and warned them to leave immediately. Pro-democracy earlier banned rallies at that location. district council candidates organized separate campaign rallies there to try to get around the ban. A large number of people started marching from the park toward Central. But they encountered tear gas fired by police at them in Sogo in Causeway Bay, and Wan Chai. On December 1, protesters organized three parades that were At 4:00 pm, the police warned some protesters of illegal given the letter of no objection from the police. obstruction of roads. In Tsimshatsui and Whampao, tear gas canisters were fired and pepper spray was used. On December 22, protesters gathered at the Edinburg Place to At 5:00 pm, police used pepper spray to confront and disperse raise public and global concerns about the situation of Uyghurs some protesters. in Xinjiang. Some of them damaged the PRC flag and rose the flags of the United States, the United Kingdom, ROC and Tibet “separatists.”

On August 25, protesters organized marches in Tsuen Wan and Kwai Tsing districts.

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At 7:00 pm, the police clashed with protesters and used tear gas canisters and sponge grenades. Protesters threw bricks at police and 11 of them were arrested. Four police were injured. Protesters found a vehicle stored with rattans and swords. Traffic was paralyzed, and 13 police stations were attacked. The police used tear gas and rubber bullets to confront protesters. In Tsuen Wan, a “pro-government” triad member was injured. Protesters damaged not only properties in Admiralty and Wan Chai MTR but also a banner celebrating the PRC’s 70th anniversary. The police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse protesters, who used petrol bombs to attack the water cannon vehicle. The police attempted to disperse the crowd by shooting tear gas canisters. The march escalated into intense conflicts. The police pounced on demonstrators, grinding their faces into the ground. The police and protesters fought open street battles with tear gas, rubber bullets, bricks and Molotov cocktails. The Front estimated 100,000 people participated, but some protesters burnt the PRC flag in Causeway Bay. At 4:00 pm, protesters occupied Harcourt Road and police used water cannon. Clashes between the two sides occurred and the police used tear gas to disperse protesters. The MTR said that 83 of its 91 stations were vandalized in recent months. The police reportedly relaxed the guideline of using lethal force. A teenage student was shot and injured by a police officer at close distance.

On July 27, a citizen named Chung Kin-ping applied for a letter of no objection from the police to have a parade in Yuen Long. The police rejected the application, but eventually 288,000 people joined the parade in the afternoon. On August 5, protesters organized strikes at their workplace, schools and markets and held rallies at 7 districts.

On October 3, the media reported that the HKSAR government might invoke the Emergency Regulations to deal with protests. Protesters came out to vandalize MTR stations.

On October 1, protesters organized a parade rejected by the police. They appealed to the protest appeal committee which allowed them to have the parade from Causeway Bay to Chater Garden.

On September 29, thousands of people marched on the streets of Hong Kong Island to voice their opposition to the PRC government. Protesters held placards that display slogans such as “Stand with Hong Kong, fight for freedom.”

On September 15, the Front organized a parade rejected by the police. But many people still participated in the anti-police protests, which saw slogans such as “red Nazis.”

Consequences

Content of protests

Table 4.12  Parades that were disallowed by the police turned out to be violent, July–December 2019

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Sources: Various Hong Kong Chinese newspapers from July 28, 2019, to December 25, 2019

Many MTR stations were vandalized. The railway track in the New Territories was also attacked. Mainland banks had their ATMs and windows vandalized. On October 6, protesters organized “Kowloon revolution, Hong Protesters used bricks to obstruct roads and vandalized Kong uprising.” They mobilized supporters against the anti-mask government offices in Cheung Sha Wan. The Wan Chai China law in Causeway Bay, Admiralty, SheungWan, Tsimshatsui and Travel Agency was set fire. The police used tear gas to disperse Shumshaipo. protesters. On November 8, protesters organized protests to commemorate the The Sogo Department stores were closed in Causeway Bay and death of Alex Chow, a UST student, in Tseung Kwan O, followed Tsimshatsui. Many shops, public facilities, MTR stations and by protests in various districts. electricity boxes were vandalized. From November 11 to 19, protesters abandoned their previous The police stormed the two campuses and used tear gas while strategy of spontaneous demonstrations and began occupying two CUHK protesters withdrew from their sites. Many protesters at university campuses, the Chinese University of Hong Kong Polytechnic University were eventually arrested. (CUHK) and Polytechnic University. On December 24, protesters sang “Glory to Hong Kong” in various The police used tear gas and rubber bullets to confront districts in the Hong Kong Island. protesters in Causeway Bay and Tsimshatsui.

On October 4, the government enacted the anti-mask law. Protests erupted on the same night in 18 districts.

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mainland. It was not known whether they belonged to the PAP or not. However, given the overstretched manpower of the Hong Kong police force, it was not surprising that mainland PAP officers might join them to deal with the protesters.

Conclusion This chapter argues that the July 21 and August 31 incidents delegitimized the police in the HKSAR. In particular, the absence of police in the Yuen Long MTR station on July 21, when triad members went out to attack passengers, proved to be a scandal undermining police legitimacy and performance in the eyes of many citizens. Although the police eventually arrested some triad members, the suspicion of a collusion between a tiny minority of police officers and suspected triad members in Yuen Long remains lingering in the minds of the critics of the Hong Kong police. Unless the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) investigated this incident and issued a report accessible to the members of the public, the mysteries surrounding the July 21 scandal cannot and will not fade away easily. Rather it would likely continue to be a permanent blemish tarnishing the image and reputation of the police. The August 31 incident highlighted the problem of police power in the HKSAR at a time when protests demanded swift, decisive and hardline action from the police. Together with the San Uk Ling Holding Center, the August 31 incident exposed the problem of the exercise of police power amid the proliferation of protests in Hong Kong from June to December 2019. Overall, the Hong Kong police play a central, critical and political role in maintaining the law and order of the “one country, two systems.” From a bureaucratic politics perspective, the police are like a political sandwich in the dispute over the extradition bill between the HKSAR government and protesters. Because the police are an indispensable part of the HKSAR government, the protesters targeted at them from June to December 2019. The July 21 incident was a turning point in consolidating the protesters’ target at the police, a phenomenon exacerbated by the August 31 incident. The anti-extradition movement that began from June took an anti-police character starting from July 21 onward, leading to a chaotic situation in which the central government toyed with the idea of sending the People’s Armed Police to the Shenzhen border.

CHAPTER 5

National Security and Beijing’s Responses to the Hong Kong Crisis

As the sovereign power of the HKSAR, the PRC’s responses to the anti-­ extradition, anti-police and anti-mainlandization movement in Hong Kong must be analyzed and understood. This chapter firstly traces the deployment of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) to Shenzhen’s border with Hong Kong, secondly examines the relevant laws and stipulations governing the PRC’s military intervention in the HKSAR and finally explores the remarks made by mainland officials and leaders on Hong Kong’s political development. From a security perspective, the Hong Kong protests did challenge Beijing’s national security. Nevertheless, Beijing did not wish to deploy the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to assist the Hong Kong police directly, because doing so would have undermined the image of “one country, two systems” and defeated the purposes of using the formula to appeal to Taiwan for reunification, and portraying to the international world that China was a rising power behaving rationally in the era of globalization. Hong Kong as a cosmopolitan city was under the international media spotlight in the latter half of 2019, when the capitalist enclave was engulfed in the intensive protests. Any intervention from the PRC could be an indicator of whether it stuck to the promises laid out in the “one country, two systems.” As such, the deployment of the PAP to the Shenzhen border had profound political significance for not only the principle and operation of the “one country, two systems” but also China’s international image and status. Beijing had to strike a fine balance between its consideration of national security interest in Hong Kong and its good image of tolerating the rule of law in Hong Kong and the international world. © The Author(s) 2021 S. S.-H. Lo et al., The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4_5

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The Deployment of People’s Armed Police to Shenzhen Table 5.1 shows that the PAP started to move into Shenzhen’s Bao’an district in early August 2019 and began its training operations. From August 4 to 6, the PAP began to conduct exercises on how to deal with mock protesters, whose appearance and actions imitated the Hong Kong counterparts. The PAP used tear gas, shield arrays and pepper spray to deal with the “demonstrators.” Its exercises involved 12,000 officers, including sea, land and air operations. Most importantly, the exercises were broadcast live by China’s Police Network and the Shenzhen Public Security on the Internet. Although the broadcast video lasted for only ten minutes, about 50,000 netizens watched it, demonstrating the support of many mainland citizens. Most significantly, the exercises aimed to show to the Hong Kong people, including protesters, that if the HKSAR had any turmoil, the PAP would be able to intervene in such turmoil effectively and restore social stability. The exercises from August 4 to 6 were designed to send clear political messages to the people of Hong Kong, especially a warning to radical protesters. On August 10, Shenzhen citizens video-­ taped the entry of the PAP’s armored vehicles and trucks into Shenzhen through a highway and gas station.1 The description of a mainland official video said that according to the PAP law, it “shall execute security protection missions, participating in handling riots, disturbances, severe violent crimes, terrorist attacks and other social peace incidents.”2 This video was officially broadcasted by the Internet version of the People’s Daily on August 12.3 It was rumored that President Xi Jinping, who was and is the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), ordered the PAP to go to Shenzhen.4 Clearly, the message broadcasted in the mainland media was an open deployment and mobilization of the PAP to Shenzhen, making a political gesture that it could be sent to deal with any “riots,” “disturbances” and “severe violent crimes” in the HKSAR. 1  “Mainland videos showing PAP vehicles and trucks assembling in Shenzhen, a video with Chinese and English description,” August 12, 2019, in https://hk01.com/, access date: March 29, 2020. 2  Ibid. 3  “Rumor says that Xi Jinping had made an order on Hong Kong, the PAP assembling in Shenzhen,” New Tang Dynasty Television, August 13, 2019, in https://www.ntdtv.com/ b5/2019/08/13/a102643117.html, access date: March 29, 2020. 4  Ibid.

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Table 5.1  Movement and training operations for People’s Armed Police in Shenzhen, August 2019 Date

Details of the movement and training operations

August 4–6, 2019

1. The PAP began its operation in the Waterfront Plaza of the Bao’an district in Shenzhen. 2. Xu Wenhai, the director and deputy director of Shenzhen Public Security, presided over an oath-taking ceremony of 20,000 police officers before the PAP exercise. The exercise simulated mass demonstrations and trained the PAP responses. Black-shirted “demonstrators” wearing yellow or red hard hats and masks actively attacked the PAP’s defense line. They also used sticks and umbrellas as weapons to attack the anti-riot police armed with shields. “Demonstrators” kept shouting slogans, throwing artillery battles and petrol bombs at the armed police and pushing the fired mud carts to the police. Explosions occurred. The PAP displayed their shield array and raised a red flag to warn demonstrators “to leave immediately, or forcibly disperse.” After spraying pepper spray and tear gas canisters at demonstrators, the armed police dispatched police dogs to suppress and control the protesters. 3. This exercise involved 12,000 personnel. Sea, land and air exercises were conducted, including special police exercises and emergency response. 4. China’s Police Network and Shenzhen Public Security both broadcasted live the exercises on the Internet. The entire broadcast lasted for 10 minutes and attracted more than 50,000 netizens to watch it simultaneously. 1. The PAP vehicles and personnel gathered at the Shenzhen Bay Sports Center. 2.  PAP officers practiced marches and conducted crowd control measures. 3. PAP officers were equipped with shields, sticks, anti-riot steel forks and other equipment. The front-row policemen raised their shields, while those at the back row raised red flags and yelled out slogans with the words “maintaining the law” and “prosecuting offenders.” 1. Shenzhen Public Security and the PAP conducted joint exercises, simulating a clash between “demonstrators” and the police. 2. The PAP conducted drilling in the Shenzhen Bay Sports Center. Its officers lined up and some officers held anti-riot forks. 3. About ten PAP officers were walking with fire extinguishers on their backs. 4. The Associated Press took photos showing about 20 people dressing as protesters, wearing casual clothes and helmets and holding sticks to confront the police. 5. The PAP raised a red flag. Some people said in Cantonese, “Stop violence, return to the shore!” The PAP officers held shields and pushed forward to the side of protesters. Some PAP officers raised a red flag saying that “unity and stability are good, violence and harm are evil.” 6. The PAP also simulated the use of a water cannon vehicle, firing tear gas to disperse demonstrators and pointing guns forward to the opponents. 1. The PAP officers conducted another anti-riot exercise. 2. They used long shields to form multiple square arrays and dispatched water cannons to drive protesters out of the protest zone.

August 16, 2019

August 18, 2019

August 29, 2019

Sources: Apple Daily, August 7, 2019, p. A10; August 12, 2019, p. A07; August 30, 2019, p. A06; Ming Pao Daily, August 17, 2019, p. A08; August 19, 2019, p. A03

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Other PAP exercises followed on August 16, 18 and 29 (Table 5.1). A photo taken by the Associated Press showed that, on August 16, there were at least 19 armed vehicles, 31 trucks, 9 jeeps, 6 water cannon vehicles and 2 buses.5 When asked whether the PAP intervention in Hong Kong would be inevitable, the Hong Kong police commander Yeung Man-pun said that while they encountered tremendous pressure, “I can tell you we’re confident the police have the capability to maintain law and order.”6 Although it would be a heavy blow to the morale and image of the Hong Kong police if the PAP were sent into the HKSAR, the PAP moves in early August could also be interpreted as a sign that the Hong Kong police had to be tougher in dealing with radical protesters. If not, the central government in Beijing would have no choice but to utilize the PAP to stabilize the situation in Hong Kong. A report said that 4000 PAP officers were sent to Shenzhen in the first batch of deployment, followed by at least 6000 others in the second batch, because radical protesters in Hong Kong attempted to block the Hong Kong International Airport on August 12 and 13.7 Altogether, there were at least 10,000 PAP officers being sent to Shenzhen, including 11 small teams.8 A Taiwan report said that, according to the Associated Press’s utilization of Maxar technologies, there were about 500 vehicles, armored cars, trucks and jeeps of the PAP arriving Shenzhen.9 In terms of the timing of the PAP deployment, Beijing appeared to be deeply concerned about the action of Hong Kong’s radical protesters to block and occupy the arrival and departure halls of the international airport. As a matter of fact, the actions of Hong Kong protesters to block the Cross-Harbor Tunnel and international airport, to attack and vandalize the LegCo and to deface the national emblem at the Liaison Office directly challenged the national security of Beijing. Even before the deployment of the PAP to station in the Shenzhen border, the PLA and other police forces in Guangdong had movements 5  Dake Kang and Yves Dam Van, “China flexes muscle near Hong Kong amid more weekend rallies,” Associated Press, August 17, 2019, in https://apnews.com/93fffd5672f54b3d 9a2a51c983c50ce6, access date: March 29, 2020. 6  Ibid. 7  “10,000 PAP officers gather in Shenzhen which is only 9 kilometers away from Hong Kong. What is the difference between PAP and PLA?” The News Lens, August 16, 2019, in https://www.thenewslens.com/article/123575, access date: March 29, 2020. 8  Ibid. 9  Ibid.

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that pointed to the likelihood of a larger mobilization of military or paramilitary forces to deal with the Hong Kong protests. On July 22, the PLA’s 74th army suddenly conducted an anti-terrorist military exercise in Zhanjiang city in Guangdong.10 The 74th army was stationed in Huizhou city and its anti-terrorist exercise appeared to demonstrate that its commanding officers acquired inside knowledge about a possible mobilization of either the PLA or the PAP in response to the Hong Kong protests. The PLA officers in Zhanjiang were holding batons, shields and even guns to deal with the mock terrorists. A retired PLA colonel Yue Gang told the Hong Kong Now TV news that the PLA’s anti-terrorist exercise might be related to the Hong Kong turmoil, and that the PLA could be sent into Hong Kong to restore social order.11 On July 30, 2019, almost a week after the PLA’s Zhanjiang exercise, the Guangdong police force conducted a large-scale exercise in Foshan city, mobilizing 3700 officers to participate.12 Eight other places also mobilized their police to join the exercise, including those from Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shantou, Shaoguan, Meizhou and Maoming. Altogether 160,000 police and civilians were reportedly joining the exercise. Armored vehicles, helicopters and motorcycles were seen. Both male and female police officers participated in the exercise, together with police dogs. The Guangdong provincial governor and public security chief, Li Chunsheng, was present, demonstrating the importance of the high-level leadership attached to the exercise. As early as January 28, 2019, when the Guangdong NPC meeting was held, Li remarked that Guangdong would have to protect “the great southern gate” of the PRC because “the Western enemy forces collaborate with some people to create some issues.”13 The party-secretary of the Guangdong Political and Law Committee, He Zhongyu, said in the opening ceremony on the July 30 exercise that all the police officers and citizens in the province “must win the offensive and defensive war, and fully protect the nation’s political 10  “PLA’s anti-terrorist exercise in Zhanjiang raises speculations,” Headline News, July 23, 2019, in https://hd.stheadline.com/, access date: March 29, 2020. 11  “Preparing to suppress? PLA Zhanjiang exercise may be related to the Hong Kong situation,” Liberty Times, July 22, 2019, in https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/2860624, access date: March 29, 2020. 12  “160,000 Guangdong police and civilians join forces and about 4,000 people conduct big military training in Foshan,” July 30, 2019, in https://www.hk01.com/, access date: March 29, 2020. 13  Ibid.

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security and social stability.”14 In view of the Hong Kong disturbances, the Guangdong police leadership was aware of the need to mobilize the province’s police to conduct the July exercise in anticipation of an imminent mobilization of the PAP into the Shenzhen border. The mobilization of mainland police raised the concerns of some Hong Kong netizens, who criticized the move as “intimidating” the HKSAR.15 The pro-Beijing elites in the HKSAR, however, saw such mobilization as an encouraging sign of the PRC’s support of the Hong Kong government and the local police. For the mainlanders, the Communist Youth League (CYL) issued an official message on its Internet, saying that the PAP law empowered the paramilitary police to cope with riots, disturbances, serious violent incidents and terrorist attacks.16 Other mainland netizens believed that the police exercise in Shenzhen was a move of participating in the summer exercise to be conducted by the Guangdong public security.17 Some mainland netizens went so far as to assert openly that an anti-­ terrorist exercise conducted by the PAP, public security and aviation authorities in Guangzhou’s Baiyun airport on August 14 was designed to put up “a show to Hong Kong’s rubbish youth.”18 Although the PAP was stationed in Shenzhen, some observers believed that some PAP officers were actually sent to work with the police in the HKSAR. As mentioned in the last Chapter, Reuters reported in March 2020 that 4000 PAP officers were sent to Hong Kong to observe the protests. Political scientist Jean-Pierre Cabestan of the Hong Kong Baptist University reportedly claimed that PAP officers were dispatched to mingle with the Hong Kong police, especially those mainland police who could speak Cantonese.19 However, there was no concrete evidence to prove that PAP officers were sent to work with Hong Kong police to cope with the protesters from early August to December 2019. Still, there were rumors during the protests that a few individual Hong Kong police were seen by ordinary citizens to speak Mandarin, and that a former retired Hong Kong police officer’s identity was used by a mainland police officer. Again, there was no evidence to corroborate these claims made by the Hong Kong netizens.  Ibid.  Apple Daily, July 31, 2019. 16  Ming Pao, August 12, 2019, p. A12. 17  Ibid. 18  Ta Kung Pao, August 15, 2019, p. A24. 19  Apple Daily, August 9, 2019. 14 15

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Objective speaking, it was likely that some PAP officers were sent to the HKSAR to observe the protests. The exchange visits between the mainland and Hong Kong police provided a legitimate channel through which mainland police could be sent to monitor and study the Hong Kong developments.20 The Global Times editorialized and said: Washington in recent days has ratcheted up rhetoric on the Hong Kong issue and grossly intervened in China’s domestic affairs. US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi demanded that the Hong Kong Chief Executive and Legislative Council accept the conditions raised by the extreme opposition. John Bolton, US national security adviser, warned the Chinese government against any potential crackdown on the Hong Kong protestors, saying ‘it would be a big mistake’ to create a new memory like the June 4th political incident in Hong Kong. US politicians are blatantly pointing their fingers at China. It’s obvious that they fail to understand the era they are living in. … After the US launched its trade war and exerted enormous economic pressure on China, Washington has had no additional cards to play on China. All US sanction threats on China are empty shouts now. Beijing hasn’t decided to force fully intervene to quell the Hong Kong riots, but this option is clearly at Beijing’s disposal.21

Clearly, when the PAP was sent to Shenzhen, the CMC presided over by President Xi Jinping did not decide whether it would be sent to intervene in Hong Kong’s protests. On August 29, the PLA in the HKSAR underwent a process of rotation the twentieth-second time after the establishment of the HKSAR since July 1997.22 PLA trucks went into Hong Kong from Huangguang checkpoint, arriving at various camps in the HKSAR through the Tolo Harbor and Kwun Tong district. According to the PLA spokesman, the rotation of PLA officers was conducted regularly. Before a new batch of officers arrived Hong Kong, they had “grasped the situation in the HKSAR and studied the relevant laws.”23 On the same day, the PAP in Shenzhen conducted another anti-riot exercise. Some PAP officers pretended as mock

 Apply Daily, August 9, 2019, p. E3.  “Futile for Washington to play Hong Kong card,” Global Times, August 15, 2019, in https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1161632.shtml, access date: March 30 2020. 22  Apple Daily, August 30, 2019. 23  Ibid. 20 21

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protesters, while water cannons and shields were used by the uniform PAP to quell the mock riot.24 Strictly speaking, Beijing’s decision of sending the PAP to the Shenzhen border rather than using the PLA to intervene in the Hong Kong protests was a mild measure that sent a warning to Hong Kong protesters on the one hand and refrained from undermining Hong Kong “one country, two systems” on the other. Article 7 of the PAP Law says that the PAP is expected to perform the following missions: guarding major activities as designated by the state; protecting major facilities; defending bridges and tunnels; guarding prisons and detention houses; patrolling key areas; assisting public security organs in the process of arrests, pursuits and escorts; handling riots and disturbances; and dealing with other security missions (Table 5.2). Since the Hong Kong protests fell into the category of riots and disturbances, the PAP deployment to Table 5.2  Article 7 of the law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Armed Police The PAPF shall execute the following security protection missions: 1. “armed guard for the guarded objects and targets and major activities as prescribed by the state; 2. armed guard for the important parts of major public facilities, enterprises, warehouses, water resources, water conservancy projects, electric power facilities and communications hubs relating to the national economy and the people’s livelihood; 3. armed guard for bridges and tunnels at the important places of the main traffic arteries; 4.  peripheral armed guard for prisons and detention houses; 5. armed patrol during an unusual period of time in the key areas of a municipality directly under the Central Government, a city where the people’s government of a province or autonomous region is located or any other important city; 6. assisting the public security organs, state security organs, justice administrative organs, prosecution organs and judicial organs in their execution of missions of arrest, pursuit and escort in accordance with law, and assisting other relevant authorities in their execution of important escort missions; 7. participating in handling riots, disturbances, severe violent crimes, terrorist attacks and other social peace incidents; and 8.  other security protection missions assigned by the state.” Source: “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Armed Police Force,” in http://www. lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7647&CGid=#menu6, access date: March 27, 2020

 Ibid.

24

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Shenzhen was appropriate. Yet, the PAP stopped at the Shenzhen border to avoid creating any regional and international image that mainland China undermined the autonomy of Hong Kong. The PAP’s stationing in Shenzhen also backed up the Hong Kong police, giving the latter the necessary confidence, mianzi (face or dignity) and exerting suitable pressure on them to deal with local protests more decisively and effectively. According to the Hong Kong Basic Law, the PLA is responsible for the defense and the maintenance of public order and it shall not interfere in the local affairs (Table 5.3 and Article 14). Moreover, the central government is responsible for the expenditure of the PLA garrison in the HKSAR.  Article 18 states that if the Standing Committee of the NPC declares a state of war, turmoil or emergency in the HKSAR, the central government may issue an order applying the relevant national laws in Hong Kong (Table 5.3). The PLA garrison performs the duties of guarding against aggression, protecting the security of Hong Kong, dealing with defense, taking change of military installations and undertaking foreign military affairs (Table 5.4 and Article 5 of the Garrison Law). While the PAP is responsible for tackling domestic riots, turmoil and disturbances, the PLA is focusing on military defense. There was and is a clear division of labor between the PAP and the PLA. The PAP deployment to Shenzhen triggered an immediate reaction from the United States. On the morning of August 14, US President Donald Trump remarked in his twitter: “Our intelligence has informed us that the Chinese Government is moving troops to the border with Hong Kong. Everyone should be safe!”25 Later, he added: “Many are blaming me, and the United States, for the problems going on in Hong Kong. I can’t imagine why?” For the PRC government, Trump’s remarks on the HKSAR, as with other US officials and politicians, constituted an act of “interference” with Hong Kong matters. However, the US perspective was that they had the right to comment on the HKSAR development, especially if Hong Kong’s rule of law and civil liberties represented the universal values held by not only Washington but also other parts of the world.

25   See Donald Trump’s Twitter, in https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump, August 14, 2019.

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Table 5.3  Key points of the Basic Law’s article 14 and article 18 1.  Article 14: “The Central People’s Government shall be responsible for the defense of the HKSAR. HKSAR shall be responsible for the maintenance of public order in the Region. Military forces stationed by the Central People’s Government in the HKSAR for defense shall not interfere in the local affairs of the Region. The Government of the HKSAR may, when necessary, ask the Central People’s Government for assistance from the garrison in the maintenance of public order and in disaster relief. In addition to abiding by national laws, members of the garrison shall abide by the laws of the HKSAR. Expenditure for the garrison shall be borne by the Central People’s Government.” 2.  Article 18: “In the event that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress decides to declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil within the HKSAR which endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control of the government of the Region, decides that the Region is in a state of emergency, the Central People’s Government may issue an order applying the relevant national laws in the Region.” Source: “The Basic Law of the HKSAR of the People’s Republic of China,” in https://www.basiclaw.gov. hk/pda/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html, access date: March 27, 2020

Table 5.4  Articles 1, 5 and 6 of the Garrison law of the HKSAR of the People’s Republic of China 1.  Article 1: “This Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution and the Basic Law of the HKSAR with a view to ensuring that the military forces stationed by the Central People’s Government in the HKSAR for defense shall perform its duties in accordance with law, and to upholding national sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity and Hong Kong’s security.” 2.  Article 5: “The Hong Kong Garrison performs the following duties:   • To guard against and to resist aggression, and to guarantee the security of the HKSAR;  •  To shoulder the responsibility of defense and patrol duty;  •  To take charge of military installations; and  •  To undertake relevant foreign military affairs.” 3.  Article 6: “In the event that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress decides to declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil within the HKSAR which endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control of the Government of the HKSAR, decides that the Region is in a state of emergency, the Hong Kong Garrison shall perform its duties in accordance with the provisions of national laws decided to be applied in the HKSAR by the Central People’s Government.” Source: “Garrison Law of the HKSAR of the People’s Republic of China,” in http://www.asianlii.org/ cn/legis/cen/laws/glothksarotproc785/, access date: March 27, 2020

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Reactions of the Hong Kong Macau Office to Hong Kong Protests The Hong Kong protests from June to December 2019 were characterized by a series of press briefings conducted by the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO). Four press briefings were held, the first one in July, the second and third ones in August and the last one in early September (Table 5.5). All these press conferences showed the hardline position of the HKMAO. The first briefing on July 29 was presided over by the HKMAO spokesperson, Yang Guang.26 He emphasized that the societal sectors of Hong Kong should resolutely oppose and resist violence, protect the rule of law and focus on the development of economy and people’s livelihood so that Hong Kong would go out from the pitfalls of political disputes. Second, Yang said that the HKMAO resolutely supported the Carrie Lam administration, backed up the police action of Table 5.5  Press conferences of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office Time

Prior events

Key sentences

First press briefing July 29

July 21: Yuen Long triad attack July 27: Yuen Long parade August 5: Mass strikes

“Three bottom lines cannot be touched. Sacrificing the police has pressure. External forces increase their intervention.”

Second briefing August 6

Third briefing August 12

Fourth briefing September 3

August 11: Police action to clear and arrest protesters in Tai Koo Shing MTR station August 31: Police action to arrest protesters in the Prince Edward MTR station

“Resolutely support the Chief Executive. The PLA stationing in Hong Kong does things according to law. Hong Kong’s national education is problematic.” “Protestors lose their heart and are crazily sick. We are absolutely furious and strongly condemn them. Terrorism is emerging in Hong Kong.”

“Protestors want to grasp and capture the HKSAR’s ruling power, turning Hong Kong into an independent or semi-independent entity, making the ‘one country, two systems’ exist in name only.”

Source: “One essay understands the four press briefings of HKMAO,” Hong Kong Economic Times, September 3, 2019, in https://china.hket.com/article/2443109/, access date: March 28, 2020

 Business Focus, July 29, 2019.

26

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maintaining law and order, supported the judicial authorities of Hong Kong to penalize violent and criminal elements in accordance with the law and shored up the action of the patriotic forces to defend the rule of law. Third, the HKMAO laid down three bottom lines of Beijing’s limit of tolerance, namely disallowing any action to undermine national sovereignty and safety, forbidding any action of challenging the power of the central authorities and the authority of the Basic Law, and prohibiting any action of using Hong Kong to infiltrate into the mainland and to conduct “damaging” activities. The HKMAO’s position remained hardline, implementing the Hong Kong policy that had already been established in the 2014 White Paper on the practice of the “one country, two systems.” The White Paper emphasized Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong, setting the tone for a hardline policy toward the HKSAR.27 It can be argued that Yang Gang’s messages on July 29 were a continuation of the PRC’s hardline policy toward Hong Kong since the issuance of the 2014 White Paper. The second briefing on August 6 emphasized that the PLA garrison was stationed in the HKSAR according to law and that Beijing fully supported the Hong Kong police. Yang Guang elucidated that “the very small group of unscrupulous and violent criminals and the dirty forces behind them” would have to be held accountable to the law.28 He also supported the Hong Kong judiciary to punish these protesters who violated the law. The third briefing on August 12 was characterized by Yang Guang’s criticism of the violent protests in Hong Kong as “the emergence of terrorism.”29 The fourth briefing on September 3 was marked by Yang’s remark that the protesters wanted to change Hong Kong into “an independent or semi-independent political entity.”30 He emphasized three major points on the Hong Kong disturbances: (1) the hope for consensus and collective action for the government and society of Hong Kong to 27  “The Practice of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, June 10, 2014,” in http://www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/eng/xwdt/gsxw/ t1164057.htm, access date: March 31, 2020. 28  “Hong Kong people urged to stop violence and chaos, bring back order,” Xinhua, August 6, 2019, in http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/06/c_138288627.htm, access date: March 31, 2020. 29  “Hong Kong protests have the emergence of terrorism,” August 12, 2019, in https:// theinitium.com/article/20190812-whatsnew-china-bill/, access date: March 28, 2020. 30  “Terminating violence is the most urgent task,” September 3, 2019, in https://www. hk01.com, access date: March 28, 2020.

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“stop violence and terminate chaos”; (2) the expectation that the people of Hong Kong could distinguish the peaceful expression of views from violent criminal acts; and (3) the need for Hong Kong people to focus on economic development and the improvement of livelihood issues.31 Yang Guang added that the “five demands” of some Hong Kong people constituted not only an attempt of “political hijacking” but also a move to challenge the bottom line of the “one country, two systems.” These demands could be regarded as, according to him, “political intimidation.” The political opposition in Hong Kong, according to Yang, was trying to grasp political power and any discussion of “universal suffrage” had to return to the PRC parameters that were set out on August 31, 2014. The demand for universal suffrage in Hong Kong, according to Beijing, had to accept the central government’s political bottom line clearly delineated on August 31, 2014, meaning that the Chief Executive would be directly elected by eligible voters after a process of having half of the members of an Election Committee to support two to three candidates, who would finally compete among themselves for votes and whose final victory would get the PRC’s formal approval. The HKMAO implied that it was a blunder made by the local democrats to reject the political reform package in mid-2015. Finally, if the Hong Kong situation did not improve and even worsened, and if the PAP or even the PLA were deployed to assist the Hong Kong police, such a move, according to Yang Guang on September 3, would still be in conformity with the content of the Basic Law. This position was a clear warning to those Hong Kong protesters who, from the PRC vantage point, constantly challenged the national security and sovereignty of the central government. All these briefings did not see the presence of the HKMAO Director, Zhang Xiaoming, who only held a closed-door meeting on August 6 with some 500 pro-Beijing elites in Shenzhen. On August 7, he said that the Hong Kong protests showed signs of a “colour revolution,” and that the disturbances and violence had to be terminated. Yet, Zhang’s reluctance to appear in the four press briefings was puzzling, but the way in which he delegated the authority to subordinate Yang Guang to make pronouncement did not appear to win the hearts and minds of the people of Hong

31  “Spokesperson condemns criminality by small number of rioters in Hong Kong,” Xinhua, September 3, 2019, in http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/03/c_ 138361972.htm, access date: March 31, 2020.

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Kong, for Zhang looked bureaucratic without taking the responsibility to inform the lines of Beijing in a more transparent manner. As early as mid-May 2019, Zhang Xiaoming told a Hong Kong Executive Council (ExCo) member, Ronny Tong, that the people of Hong Kong should not worry about the extradition bill, and that the amended ordinance was “necessary, proper, reasonable and legalistic.”32 This hardline position of the HKMAO was echoed and supported by the Director of the Liaison Office, Wang Zhimin, who on May 14 held a meeting in the HKSAR among mainland officials to convey President Xi Jinping’s message of maintaining law and order in the nation’s police work conference.33 Wang said in the meeting that the extradition bill had “legalistic foundation” and that it “conformed to the needs of the realities.”34 The Liaison Office added that, after 1997, the PRC returned some 260 fugitives from the mainland to Hong Kong, and that the HKSAR did not return any mainland fugitive back to the PRC.35 According to the Liaison Office, the extradition bill could “help the victims achieve social justice, plug the existing legal loopholes, punish the serious criminal suspects, and avoid Hong Kong becoming a paradise for criminal fugitives and a sanctuary for criminal escapees.”36 Finally, the Liaison Office hoped that the people of Hong Kong should “understand the facts and truths,” “reject all those rumors and fears manufactured by others” and “believe in the rule of law held by the HKSAR government and the courts.”37 At the beginning of the controversy over the extradition bill, both the HKMAO led by Zhang Xiaoming and the Liaison Office led by Wang Zhimin adopted a hardline position, insisting that the bill conformed to the interests of Hong Kong and the central government. Their obstinacy and refusal to listen to the criticisms from many Hong Kong people perhaps explained why the central government eventually replaced both, because if they had listened to public opinion much earlier and adopted a more flexible line, the Hong Kong crisis and protests could have been avoided.

 Sing Tao Daily, May 16, 2019.  Ibid. 34  Ibid. 35  Ibid. 36  Ibid. 37  Ibid. 32 33

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Other Chinese Leaders’ Responses to the Hong Kong Crisis A closer analysis of the remarks made by other top-level PRC leaders and officials on the Hong Kong crisis shows that the hardline approach was adopted across all levels, including not only the HKMAO but also the higher-level leaders and party cadres. Apart from the remarks made by Zhang and Wang on August 7, other PRC leaders who talked about Hong Kong included President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, CPPCC chairman Wang Yang, Hong Kong and Macau Coordination Committee chairman Han Zheng, Public Security chief Zhao Kezhi and Political and Legal Affairs Commission chief Guo Shengkun (Table  5.6). All their remarks were displaying toughness and political correctness. In a speech delivered at the Central Party School on September 3, President Xi Jinping said that “persistent struggle” was necessary in response to all the challenges to the CCP leadership and the mainland socialist system; China’s national sovereignty, security and developmental interests; its core interests and major principles; the people’s fundamental interests; and the objective of realizing the renaissance of the Chinese nation.38 President Xi added that the principle of “persistent struggle” was a must in dealing with the challenges of the “complex” work on Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan as well as the PRC’s foreign relations. Obviously, the PRC President adopted a Marxist dialectical perspective to “struggle” against the Hong Kong protests that threatened China’s sovereignty and national security. President Xi Jinping on November 4 backed up Chief Executive Carrie Lam, offering the central government’s strongest support and endorsement of her work. Xi’s remarks could be interpreted as a sign of Beijing’s staunch support of Lam amid the intervention of external forces, such as the United States whose politicians severely criticized the extradition bill. Moreover, there were rumors that Lam wished to resign her position as the Chief Executive in June 2019, but the central government did not allow her to do so.39 Asking Lam to punish the violent protesters, President Xi appealed to her to have more dialogue with the people 38   “Xi Focus: Xi emphasizes ‘struggles’ to achieve national rejuvenation,” Xinhua, September 3, 2019. 39  James Pomfret, “China won’t allow Hong Kong leader to step down despite mass unrest: Hong Kong official,” Reuters, June 17, 2019, in https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-hongkong-extradition-lam/china-wont-allow-hong-kong-leader-to-step-down-despitemass-unrest-hk-official-idUSKCN1TI0WX, access date: March 30, 2020.

September 3, 2019

August 7, 2019

Zhang Xiaoming, HKMAO Director

August 7, 2019

Remarks

“The central government attaches great importance to the current situation in Hong Kong and makes judgments and assessment from an overall strategic perspective.” The Hong Kong protests show “signs of color revolution.” “We do not tolerate any action against the bottom line of the principle of ‘one country, two systems.’ The central authorities do support the Chief Executive and the police force, which are the keys to stabilize the situation in Hong Kong.” “Although there are various public opinions and demands in the society, the largest public opinion in Hong Kong is to protect stability and prosperity and to restore normal social order. The patriotic forces remain the pillar of the Hong Kong society.” Wang Zhimin, “I hope that everyone will continue to stand up for the Chief Executive and the government, and Liaison Office resolutely uphold the authority of the Special Administrative Region.” Director “I hope everyone will continue to firmly support the police force decisively and strictly, back up their law enforcement and resolutely maintain the harmony and tranquility of the Hong Kong society.” “I hope that everyone will take an active part in organizing and participating in various activities to improve the social atmosphere and positive energy of the society. I hope everyone will work tirelessly to conduct youth work.” President Xi Jinping In a speech delivered at the Central Party School, President Xi Jinping said that “persistent struggle” was necessary in response to all the challenges to (1) the CCP leadership and the mainland socialist system; (2) China’s national sovereignty, security and developmental interests; (3) its core interests and major principles; (4) the people’s fundamental interests and (5) the objective of realizing the renaissance of the Chinese nation. President Xi added that struggle was an “art” that needed to maintain its justifications, “reasonable choices,” methods and momentum while simultaneously retaining an ingredient of flexibility in its strategic response. In the process of struggle, he said that solidarity was of utmost importance. President Xi stressed that the principle of “persistent struggle” was a must in dealing with the challenges of the “complex” work on Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan as well as the PRC’s foreign relations.

Chinese official name

Date

Table 5.6  Remarks of Chinese officials on Hong Kong’s protests, July–December 2019

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Han Zheng, Head of the CCP Coordination Committee on Hong Kong and Macau

November 6, 2019

November 4, 2019

Wang Yang, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference President Xi Jinping

September 28, 2019

(continued)

“You (Carrie Lam) as the Chief Executive have led the HKSAR government to fulfill its due diligence, strive to stabilize the situation and improve the social atmosphere, and have done a lot of arduous work. The central government has a high degree of trust in you and it is fully affirmative of the work from you and your governing team. Stopping riots and restoring order are still the most important tasks in Hong Kong. Stopping and punishing violent activities in accordance with the law is to safeguard the well-being of the public in Hong Kong. At the same time, we must do a decent job in having dialogue with all sectors of society and in improving the people’s livelihood. It is hoped that people from all walks of life in Hong Kong will fully and accurately implement the ‘one country, two systems’ policy and the Basic Law, and work together to safeguard Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.” “The storm of amending the legislation has evolved into continuous violence, jeopardizing the overall interests of the Hong Kong society and the vital interests of the general public.” “Mrs. Carrie Lam, the Chief Executive and her Governing Team and the Hong Kong police force are fully fulfilling their due diligence. Stopping riots and restoring order are still the most important tasks of Hong Kong at the present. These are also the common responsibilities of the executive, legislative and judicial organs of Hong Kong.” “It is hoped that all sectors of Hong Kong will further gather positive energy to fight against violence, protect the rule of law and maintain stability.” “We are full of confidence in ‘one country, two systems.’ We must persist and improve in practice to make ‘one country, two systems’ stable and far-reaching.” “The central government has always been a dedicated supporter for Hong Kong to maintain its prosperity and stability. We firmly support the SAR government to take more active and effective measures to solve Hong Kong’s livelihood issues, especially the housing and employment problems of low-income and middle-income families and the young people. Hong Kong’s development will benefit the public much better.”

“After the return of Hong Kong and Macau to China, the original social system is fully respected. The people of Hong Kong and Macau are now the masters having unprecedented democratic rights and freedom. We resolutely implement the ‘one country, two systems’ to support the Chief Executive and her government to protect national sovereignty, security and development interests. The motherland is the protective shield of both Hong Kong and Macau forever.”

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December 7, 2019

December 6, 2019

President Xi Jinping “The central government has three firm support. We will continue to firmly support the Chief Executive in leading the HKSAR government to govern Hong Kong according to the law, firmly support the Hong Kong police in its strict law-enforcement work and firmly support the Hong Kong judicial body in punishing violent criminals in accordance with the law.” “Our three unwavering supports are as follows: The Chinese government is unwavering to safeguard its national sovereignty, security, and development interests. It is also unwavering in implementing the principle of the ‘one country, two systems’ in Hong Kong.” Zhao Kezhi, deputy “President Xi Jinping on November 14 made important remarks and pointed to the dangerous party-secretary of nature of the radical criminal elements. He also revealed the central government’s basic position the Political and and clear attitude toward the termination of violence and the restoration of order in Hong Kong. Legal Affairs Since the anti-extradition issue, the Hong Kong police has been loyal and has dealt with the Commission and challenges faithfully, protecting social stability and prosperity and remaining a pillar of the minister and protection of national security. We hope that Police Commissioner Chris Tang can maintain the party-secretary of confidence of the police force, retain the high morale of officers and help terminate violence and the Ministry of restore social order. The central government and public security are forever the strong shield of Public Security the Hong Kong police and they will continue to support the police in their execution of the law, and their consolidation of cooperation with mainland police and exchanges with them.” Guo Shengkun, “Under the leadership of Hong Kong police, a lot of work has been done to maintain law and Secretary of the order. We hope that the Hong Kong police continue to fight criminal activities to protect citizens’ Political and Legal safety and properties. We support the police to implement the law strictly and to restore social Affairs Commission order diligently.”

November 14, 2019

Remarks

Chinese official name

Date

Table 5.6 (continued)

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“The Central Government will, as always, firmly implement the ‘one country, two systems’ policy, firmly support you (Carrie Lam) as the Chief Executive to lead the SAR Government to govern Hong Kong according to the law, and firmly maintain the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. Facing on unprecedented and a complicated situation, you led the SAR Government to make every effort to maintain social stability, and successively introduce a series of relief measures to support enterprises and protect employment. These tasks are all difficult. The Central Government is fully affirming the efforts from you and the Special Administrative Region Government. Hong Kong has not yet come out of its predicament. The SAR Government must continue its efforts to stop riots and restore order in accordance with the law, and intensively study and resolve some of the deep-­rooted contradictions and problems existing in the economic and social development of Hong Kong to maintain its long-term prosperity and stability.” President Xi Jinping “The year 2019 has been the most difficult and complicated year for Hong Kong since its return to the motherland. In the face of various difficulties and pressures, you adhere to the bottom line of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, to govern Hong Kong according to the law, to perform your duties with due diligence, and do a lot of challenging work. You also lead the SAR Government to actively respond to social concerns, adopt a series of policies and measures to help enterprises, alleviate the plight of the people, and seriously study and resolve the deep social contradictions and problems. The Central Government is fully affirming the courage and responsibility you have shown during the extraordinary period of Hong Kong.”

Premier Li Keqiang

Sources: Ta Kung Pao, November 5, 2019, p. A01., November 7, 2019, p. A01., November 15, 2019, p. A01, and December 17, 2019, p. A01; Wen Wei Po, September 29, 2019, p. A03, December 7, 2019, p. A03, and December 8, 2019, p. A03. Also see “Xi Focus: Xi emphasizes ‘struggles’ to achieve national rejuvenation.” Xinhua, September 3, 2019

December 16, 2020

December 16, 2020

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of Hong Kong—an implicit criticism from the Chinese leader. In December, Xi Jinping again affirmed Lam’s work, praising her while encouraging her to deal with social contradictions and problems in Hong Kong. Xi’s remarks were quite consistent in November and December, showing that Beijing trusted and empowered Carrie Lam to tackle the Hong Kong protests decisively. Echoing President Xi Jinping’s views toward Hong Kong, Premier Li Keqiang openly supported Lam but asked her to provide more relief measures to solve the livelihood issues in Hong Kong. CPPCC chairman Wang Yang adopted a united front approach to stress the “protective shield” provided by Beijing to both Hong Kong and Macau. Han Zheng, the head of the CCP Coordination Committee on Hong Kong and Macau, praised the work of Lam and the police, while reiterating Xi and Li’s remark that the Hong Kong government must tackle the predicament of the middle-lower classes. Obviously, Xi, Li and Han agreed that the root of Hong Kong disturbances and social unrest was due to the profound social contradictions in the capitalist society of the HKSAR. The two security chiefs, Zhao Kezhi and Guo Shengkun, focused on the role of the police in Hong Kong. Zhao hoped that the new Police Commissioner, Chris Tang, could maintain the confidence of the police, retain the high morale of rank-and-file officers and stop violence and restore social order. Similarly, Guo expressed his hope that the Hong Kong police continued to combat criminal activities, protect citizens’ safety, implement the law strictly and restore social order quickly. A clear division of labor existed between the top leaders, such as Xi, Li, Wang and Han, and the security chiefs, like Zhao and Guo. The top leaders supported and trusted Carrie Lam, but encouraged her to enhance communications with the members of the public and deal with social contradictions more assertively. Zhao and Guo spoke to the police force, giving them confidence and support. In addition to the remarks made by PRC leaders and officials on Hong Kong, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP in November 2019 made some statements on the HKSAR (Table 5.7). Reiterating the principle of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong,” the Fourth Plenum affirmed Beijing’s staunch support of Hong Kong’s competitiveness. Yet, Beijing was determined to improve the mechanisms regarding the implementation of the Chinese constitution and the Basic Law, and to “perfect” the system of the central government’s exercise of its “comprehensive jurisdiction” over the

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Table 5.7  Statements on Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan in the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, November 2019   1. “Fully and accurately implement the ‘one country, two systems,’ ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong,’ ‘Macau people ruling Macau,’ and a high degree of autonomy.”   2. “Insisting on the need to administer Hong Kong and Macau in accordance with the law, maintaining the constitutional order established by the Constitution and the Basic Law, upholding the ‘one country’ principle and respecting the differences between the ‘two systems,’ safeguarding the central government’s comprehensive governing power over the SAR, and protecting the SAR’s high degree of autonomy. The staunch support of the motherland and the enhancement of competitiveness of the SAR itself are integrated together.”   3. “Improve the systems and mechanisms related to the implementation of the constitution and the Basic Law, adhere to the principle of ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ and ‘Macau people ruling Macau’ with patriots as the mainstay, and elevate the SAR’s capability and standard of governance in accordance with the law.”   4. “Perfect the system in which the central government exercises its comprehensive jurisdiction over the SAR in accordance with the constitution and the Basic Law.”   5. “Improve the system and mechanism of the appointment and removal of the Chief Executive and principal officials of the SAR, the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the NPC, and the exercise of all the powers given to the central authorities by the Constitution and the Basic Law.”   6. “Establish and improve the legal system and enforcement mechanism for the SAR to maintain national security, and support the SAR to strengthen law enforcement. Improve the system in which the Chief Executive of the SAR is accountable to the central government, and support the Chief Executive in governing the SAR in governing according to law.”   7. “Improve the integration of Hong Kong and Macau into the overall national development, complement with each other’s advantages, coordinate developmental mechanisms, promote the construction of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area, support Hong Kong and Macau’s economic development, improve the people’s livelihood, and strive to resolve the deep-seated contradictions and problems that affect social stability and long-term development.”   8. “Strengthen the constitutional and Basic Law education, national education, Chinese history, and Chinese cultural education for Hong Kong and Macau’s society, especially civil servants and young people, and enhance the national awareness and patriotism of Hong Kong and Macau compatriots.”   9. “Resolutely prevent and curb external forces from not only interfering with Hong Kong and Macau affairs but also carrying out activities of division, subversion, infiltration and sabotage to ensure the long-term security of Hong Kong and Macau.” 10. “Firmly promote the process of peaceful reunification of the motherland. Solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the complete reunification of the motherland are not only common aspirations of all Chinese children but also the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.” (continued)

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Table 5.7 (continued)  11. “Promote cross-strait institutional arrangements for peaceful development. Improve the institutional arrangements and policy measures to promote crossstrait exchanges and cooperation, deepen cross-strait integration and development, protect the well-being of Taiwan compatriots, and unite most Taiwan compatriots to jointly oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ and to promote reunification.”  12. “Under the preconditions of protecting national sovereignty, security, and development interests, after peaceful reunification, the social system and lifestyle of Taiwan compatriots will be fully respected, and their private property, religious beliefs, and legitimate rights and interests will be fully guaranteed.” Source: “Decision of the Central Committee on Upholding and Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics,” in http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2019/1105/c1001-31439380.html, access date: February 17, 2020

HKSAR.  Furthermore, Beijing also wished to improve the system and mechanism of appointing and removing the Chief Executive and principal officials of the HKSAR. Other areas of improvement included the system of maintaining national security in the HKSAR, enhancing the Chief Executive’s accountable relations with the central government, integrating Hong Kong and Macau into the Greater Bay Area, resolving deep-­ rooted social contradictions, enhancing the Basic Law and Chinese cultural-national education and preventing foreign forces from intervening in Hong Kong and Macau affairs. It is noteworthy that the Plenum attached importance to Taiwan’s development in the future, saying that the CCP would promote the peaceful reunification of Taiwan, promote cross-strait interactions and integration and maintain Taiwan’s lifestyle and social system. Clearly, the CCP believed that if the HKSAR development could be improved, it would lay the foundation for the better relationships between Beijing and Taipei. In other words, the Hong Kong protests had to be controlled so that the PRC’s plan on Taiwan would not be disrupted.

Triangular Relations Between Protests, Beijing’s Response and Hong Kong Government Analytically speaking, Beijing’s hardline response was a move to deal with the increasing intensity and frequency of the protests in Hong Kong, leading to a tendency of the local police to adopt a more strategic, if not necessarily hardline, tactic to deal with protesters. Triangular and chain reactions

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between protests, PRC officials and the Hong Kong government, including the Chief Executive and the police, could be seen in August 2019. First, some employees of the Cathay Pacific participated in the anti-­ extradition movement. On July 28, a Cathay Pacific pilot was arrested by the police in the protests. Then on August 14, the Cathay Pacific fired the pilot who was arrested and another cockpit crew member who was “suspended for misusing company information related to the protests.”40 Meanwhile, two other airport ground employees had been dismissed for “leaking passenger information details of a Hong Kong police soccer team.”41 On August 9, Civil Aviation Administration of the PRC required Cathay Pacific to submit information on its airline staff members on its flights to the mainland.42 The PRC’s tighter measures against those Cathay Pacific employees who were anti-extradition activists were understandable, especially in light of the hardline remarks made by Zhang Xiaoming and Wang Zhimin on August 7. PRC officials were deeply concerned about the challenges of Hong Kong protests to Beijing’s national security. Second, the events in August showed signs of a worsening situation in the HKSAR, thereby necessitating not only the PRC to deploy the PAP to Shenzhen’s border with Hong Kong but also the frequent remarks made by HKMAO officials. On August 11, protesters adopted guerrilla tactics to march to police stations in Shumshuipo and Cheung Sha Wan, where the police fired tear gas to disperse the crowd. A small group of protesters attacked the Golden Bauhinia Flower in Wanchai and vandalized it by using black paint.43 Some protesters went to surround the Tsimshatsui police station where police fired teargas, some of which were not targeted accurately. During the confrontation between protesters and police, a girl’s eye was seriously injured, sparking a debate between protesters and pro-government supporters over whether she was hurt by the police’s bean bag round or a protester’s steel pellet gun. She had her right eye 40  Danny Lee, “Cathay Pacific sacks two pilots over Hong Kong protest-related incidents,” South China Morning Post, August 14, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/transport/article/3022750/cathay-pacific-says-55000-passengers-stranded-hongkong, access date: March 31, 2020. 41  Ibid. 42  “China says crew information submitted by Cathay Pacific meets requirements,” Reuters, August 15, 2019, in https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-cathaypacific/china-says-crew-information-submitted-by-cathay-pacific-meets-requirementsidUSKCN1V509Q, access date: March 31, 2020. 43  Cable TV news, August 11, 2019.

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injured, triggering more protesters to occupy the airport on August 12 and 13 in opposition to police power. The mass sit-in on August 12 and the blockade on August 13 paralyzed the airport, causing tremendous inconvenience to tourists and travelers. The Airport Authority got a court injunction swiftly on August 14 to stop protesters from occupying the airport and to tighten security for the sake of restoring order in the airport immediately. Third, tougher tactics were deployed by the Hong Kong police after the repeatedly hardline remarks from Zhang Xiaoming, Wang Zhimin and other HKMAO officials like Yang Guang. Zhang used the term “signs of colour revolution” to refer to the Hong Kong protests on August 7, a code word that appeared to harden the Hong Kong police’s handling of the protests. The afternoon of August 11 witnessed some protesters going to Wanchai to set up their barricades near the police headquarters. The police sent undercover agents to infiltrate protesters and arrest some “valiant” elements.44 On the same day, protesters abandoned going to the North Point where a strong pro-Beijing and Fujianese community resided, and where some Fujianese from Dongguan were visiting Hong Kong for three days to “defend” their community against any intrusion from protesters. Some reporters and citizens were intimidated and beaten by some angry people in North Point, while police were sent to intervene in mediating their disputes. The mobilization of the “patriotic” Fujianese from the mainland could be seen as a kneejerk reaction to the hardline remarks made by PRC officials on Hong Kong protests. On the night of August 11, the police chased some protesters into the Taikoo Shing and Kwai Fong MTR stations. At Taikoo Shing, the police subdued and arrested several protesters who escaped into the underground station—an unprecedented police action that precipitated the August 31 incident in the Prince Edward MTR station. At the Kwai Fong MTR station, the police fired tear gas and rubber bullets, generating public criticism from ­commuters who feared that the tear gas residue inside the MTR station would pose health hazards. The overall tougher and swift action of the police was like an automatic response to the hardline remarks made by PRC officials. Backing up the police on August 12, the HKMAO spokesman Yang Guang stated that the protest movement approached an early

 Ibid.

44

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stage of “terrorism,” and that the violent crime in Hong Kong should be cracked down with an “iron fist.”45 Fourth, there was a tendency that the Chief Executive’s remarks were a strategic response to the mainland’s hardline comments and move. Three days after August 10, when the news reported the movement of PAP to Shenzhen border, Chief Executive Carrie Lam met the press and appealed to the citizens to maintain calmness, stop violence and to consider the best interests of Hong Kong. Otherwise, Hong Kong would be plunged into a “deep abyss” and it would be “smashed into pieces.”46 According to the Hong Kong public opinion research institute, on a scale of 0 to 100, Carrie Lam received a support rating of only 27.9, showing an all-time low for all Chief Executives in Hong Kong.47 Yet, on the same day of August 13, the police went to the airport to arrest a few protesters, but they intentionally or unintentionally let the protesters beat up two mainland journalists, one being a reporter of the Global Times and the other believed to be an “undercover agent.”48 The incident aroused the anger of mainland media and netizens immediately, but the strong remarks of Carrie Lam were not matched by a tougher police action immediately. Perhaps the police deliberately allowed the protesters to make themselves unpopular by occupying the airport. In fact, the protesters who occupied the airport discredited themselves. On the morning of August 14, some protesters issued an apology to reporters for causing inconvenience and troubles to travelers, but their behavior had already undermined public support. On August 14, pro-establishment and some pro-democracy elites also criticized the action of protesters, who failed to understand that public opinion could turn against them easily, and who were ignorant of the police’s deliberately minimal intervention in their occupation airport campaign.  Cable TV, August 12, 2019.  “Chief Executive questions if people want Hong Kong smashed into pieces,” Radio Television Hong Kong, August 13, 2019, in https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/ k2/1474340-20190813.htm?spTabChangeable=0, access date: March 31, 2020. 47  “Carrie Lam’s popularity ‘worst among all Chief Executives,’” Radio Television Hong Kong, August 13, 2019, in https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/147441220190813.htm, access date: March 31, 2020. 48  Elizabeth Cheung, “Global Times journalist beaten by Hong Kong protestors given hero’s welcome after being discharged from hospital,” South China Morning Post, August 14, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3022782/globaltimes-journalist-beaten-hong-kong-protesters-given, access date: March 31, 2020. 45 46

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In short, the hardline responses from Beijing, marked by Zhang Xiaoming’s “colour revolution” comment on August 7, appeared to stimulate the hardline tactics adopted by the police on August 11. In response to the hardline policing tactics, protesters occupied the airport on August 12 and 13, paralyzing its operation and plunging air traffic into chaos. Flights were canceled and delayed. On August 12, the PAP swiftly moved to Shenzhen to conduct an exercise involving 12,000 officers and 50 armored vehicles. This was clearly a political gesture demonstrating the possibility of sending the PAP to the HKSAR. Fifth and finally, because the PRC leaders saw the Hong Kong protests as “signs of a colour revolution” instigated by external forces, the extradition bill could not be formally withdrawn until September 4, when Carrie Lam made the open announcement. It was reported that Lam got the direct approval from President Xi Jinping before she made the announcement.49 Due to the fact that the PRC elevated the Hong Kong protests to the level of national security, specifically in the context of the struggle between China and the United States, the formal withdrawal of the extradition bill needed Xi’s endorsement. Hence, on the day when Carrie Lam made the announcement of withdrawing the bill, she appeared to be more relaxed than ever before, pointing to the likelihood that her immediate superiors, namely Wang Zhimin and Zhang Xiaoming, were perhaps more hardline than conventional wisdom assumed. The elevation of the extradition bill sage to the national security struggle between China and the United States could also explain why President Xi adopted a high-profile approach to praise the work of Carrie Lam on November 4 and 14 and December 16. Indeed, Chief Executive Carrie Lam was panicking from mid-June to September, especially when she had to clarify her remarks on September 3 shortly after a report from Reuters revealing her emotional and inappropriate remarks during a gathering with a group of businesspeople.50 Carrie Lam told the business elites that if she had a choice, she would resign and make a deep apology for her 49  Gary Cheung, “Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam sought Xi Jinping’s approval to formally withdraw extradition bill that triggered anti-government protests,” South China Morning Post, September 28, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3030735/hong-kong-leader-carrie-lam-sought-president-xi-jinpings, access date: March 31, 2020. 50  Greg Torode, James Pormfret and Anne Marie Roantree, “Special Report: Hong Kong leader soup she would ‘quit’ if she could, fears for ability to resolve crisis now ‘very limited,’” Reuters September 2, 2019

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“unforgivable havoc” that wrecked Hong Kong.51 She had also admitted that the extradition saga was elevated to the level of Beijing’s national security and sovereignty, especially at a time when the United States and China were engaging in a trade war. On September 3, Carrie Lam tried to repair the damage of the business elite’s leakage of her comments by saying that she had not chosen to resign. Nevertheless, her image as a weak political leader with fluctuating mood and decisions became irreparable. As the Chief Executive in Hong Kong, Carrie Lam was expected by Beijing to follow the President Xi Jinping’s instruction on September 3, namely adopting an attitude of “persistent struggle” with the forces that challenged the central government’s national security and sovereignty. The remarks made by President Xi on September 3 had an immediate effect on some members of the Hong Kong and Macau Study Association (HKMSA), which advertised in Tai Kung Pao on September 4 that the people of Hong Kong should realize the truth of the current disturbances, especially the fact that Hong Kong had already been used by external forces as a chess game in the international geopolitical struggle between China and the United States.52 The advertisement added that the image of the “one country, two systems” needed to be protected regionally and internationally, and that the people of Hong Kong should support both the Chief Executive and the police force to restore public and social order in the territory. Clearly, the HKMSA was a united front organization under the PRC, putting out the advertisement immediately after President Xi pointed to the need to engage in a “permanent struggle” with external forces. The strong and explicit position adopted by President Xi on September 3 was politically significant in the context of how Beijing responded to the ferocity of the Hong Kong protests. On top of the violent occupation of LegCo on July 1 and the defacement of the PRC at the Liaison Office building on the night of July 21, the radical protesters threw some 100 self-made petrol bombs and launched extensive arson attacks in places like Wanchai and Tsimshatsui districts on August 31. On September 1, radical protesters damaged half of the MTR stations, desecrated the PRC national flags in Tung Chung district, blocked access routes to the airport, forced travelers to walk from Tung Chung into the airport terminals and crippled airport train services. All these violent activities, in the mind of Beijing, were endangering the PRC’s national security, sovereignty and dignity.  Ibid.  Ta Kung Pao, September 4, 2019, p. A1

51 52

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Hence, President Xi used the term “permanent struggle” to implicitly refer to the need to deal with the Hong Kong protests, which to Beijing had the support of external forces. On July 31, Tung Chee-hwa, the vice-­ chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), said that external forces were suspected of being involved in the anti-extradition movement, including Taiwan and the United States.53 These “external forces” will be discussed in Chap. 7. On September 4, Carrie Lam met the pro-government elites to explain her intention of withdrawing the extradition bill.54 She refused to use the word “withdrawal” from June to August, except for suspending the bill and saying that it was “dead.” Her formal announcement that the extradition bill was withdrawn in the late afternoon of September 4 was an attempt by the government to appease the anger of many ordinary citizens, trying to calm down some protesters and to defuse the entire crisis. While some Hong Kong people saw her move as a positive step, others regarded it as long overdue and still hoped that she would set up an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the causes and remedies of the entire disturbances, including police performance. The HKSAR government was reluctant to set up an independent commission, but the membership of the existing Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) was expanded to involve two new members. This mild measure could be explained by the fact that the police force opposed any move by the government to establish an independent commission of inquiry.

Hardliners and Softliners in the Hong Kong Government and on the Beijing Side Within the HKSAR government, there were hardliners and softliners in the extradition bill saga. Hardliners included the Secretary for Security John Lee and Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng, who tended to support the bill. In particular, John Lee played the role of the initiator and 53  Tony Cheung, “Former Hong Kong leader Tung Chee-hwa accuses the United States and Taiwan of orchestrating ‘well-organized’ recent protests,” South China Morning Post, July 31, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3020829/formerhong-kong-leader-tung-chee-hwa-accuses-united-states, access date: March 31, 2020. 54  “Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam announces formal withdrawal of the extradition bill and sets up a platform to look into key causes of protest crises,” South China Morning Post, September 4, 2019,” in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3025641/hongkong-leader-carrie-lam-announce-formal-withdrawal, access date: April 26, 2020.

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promoter of the extradition bill, explaining its content to different business chambers and consulate officials. Teresa Cheng appeared to adopt a relatively low-profile approach, but she supported the bill in public. However, Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung appeared to be a softliner. After the confrontations between protesters and police on June 12, Cheung did mention in the mass media that the government might consider an independent commission of inquiry. However, he quickly abandoned his view after police associations expressed their opposition to such an idea. Moreover, several days after the Yuen Long triad attack on passengers in the MTR station, Cheung issued a public apology to the people of Hong Kong—a move that was quickly criticized by the police associations as “writing off” the police efforts at maintaining law and order.55 Police Commissioner Stephen Lo sought an “urgent meeting” with Cheung after the latter made the apology to the public over the July 21 incident.56 The police force was clearly a hardliner in the Hong Kong protests. Naturally, Beijing sided with the Hong Kong police, as evidenced by the frequent remarks of PRC officials and leaders praising and supporting them. The Hong Kong police, in the eyes of Beijing, played a critical role in maintaining Hong Kong’s law and order and preventing it from becoming “a base of subversion” in collaboration with external forces. As such, the remarks made by Zhao Kezhi on December 6 and Guo Shengkun on December 7 to support the Hong Kong police were politically significant (Table 5.6). As a matter of fact, after Chris Tang succeeded Stephen Lo as the new Police Commissioner, the policing tactics on the protesters became much faster, more decisive and more pre-emptive in arresting protesters who were suspected of stirring troubles, storing and manufacturing explosive weapons and instigating others to confront the police and undermine the law and order. Chief Executive Carrie Lam was a hardliner at the beginning of the extradition bill controversy, refusing to make major concessions, but she 55  Yonden Lhatoo, Christy Leung and Clifford Lo, “How Hong Kong’s embattled police force is holding the city back from the brink against all odds,” South China Morning Post, August 19, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3023324/ police-story-how-hong-kongs-embattled-law-enforcers-are, access date: March 31, 2020. 56  Christy Leung and Victor Ting, “Police anger after Hong Kong No 2 Matthew Cheung says sorry for Yuen Long attack response,” South China Morning Post, July 26, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3020251/hong-kong-no2-matthew-cheung-says-sorry-police-response, access date: March 31, 2020.

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shifted to a more softline position toward the end of August and early September, as seen in the formal withdrawal of the bill. However, her action was seen by critics as being too little and too late, partly because the legitimacy of her government had already been severely undermined and partly because the wounds incurred to the society could not be easily healed. Furthermore, the guerilla-style and tech-savvy protests in Hong Kong became a new normal not only taking place frequently on Saturdays and Sundays but also constituting a new mode of political participation that constantly challenged the legitimacy of the HKSAR government and the bottom line of the central authorities in Beijing. Objectively speaking, the five demands put forward by the protesters could not be easily achieved unless the softliners dominated both the HKSAR leadership and the Beijing side. As argued above, only Matthew Cheung appeared to be the lonely softliner in the Hong Kong leadership. He was numerically and politically overwhelmed by other hardliners, some of whom were ExCo members. As hardliners dominated the political leadership of both the HKSAR and Beijing, they collectively responded to the five demands in a concerted manner. As mentioned above, PRC officials like Yang Guang asked the pro-democracy protesters to return to the August 31, 2014, parameters set out by the NPC Standing Committee on the election method of the Chief Executive in the HKSAR. The demand for the release of arrested protesters, to both Carrie Lam and Beijing, was unacceptable. Lam said that such a move would violate the rule of law. On the other hand, the PRC’s rule by law perspective was by no means conducive to the advocacy of releasing arrested protesters. President Xi Jinping and his party colleagues all saw Hong Kong’s radical and violent protesters as those people who breached the law, and who failed to observe the rule of law. As such, Beijing expected the Hong Kong courts to punish the lawbreakers. For the demand that the term “riot” should not be used by Police Commissioner Stephen Lo to refer to the June 12 protesters, Lo had already backtracked and said that only those law-breakers were “rioters.” As Beijing was and is led by hardliners supportive of the equally hardline Hong Kong police, both must reject the idea of setting up any independent commission of inquiry into the police performance and operation. The hardliners in the Hong Kong police were and are afraid that any independent commission would look for evidence unfavorable to individual police officers with legal ramifications, just like seven police officers who were convicted in February 2017 of attacking a protester named Ken

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Tsang during the Occupy Central Movement in 2014.57 Finally, with the formal withdrawal of the extradition bill by Carrie Lam in early September, it became a non-issue. Nevertheless, the peaceful and violent protesters continued to share the same target of their socio-political movement, namely the police whose exercise of power was criticized as “excessive” and “arbitrary.”

China’s Legal Culture and National Security Many Hong Kong people and protesters did not care about how PRC authorities viewed the rule of law. President Xi Jinping’s beliefs in the rule of law could be traced back to his speech as early as August 2018, when he delivered an important speech. His concept of the “comprehensively governing the country in accordance with law” is basically putting the implementation of law and citizens’ obedience to the law on the top priorities (Table 5.8). Although he talked about the need to be people-centered, the people are expected to observe, obey and carry out the law without copying from the Western concepts of constitutionalism, “separation of powers” and “judicial independence.” Obviously, President Xi’s view of the rule of law and the role of citizens is different from many Hong Kong people, especially protesters, who see the law as challengeable and human rights of individuals and groups as of paramount importance. Most importantly, President Xi emphasizes that “every citizen, social organization and state agency must adopt the constitution and the law as their behavioral criteria, and they must exercise their right and power in accordance with the constitution and the law. They cannot surpass the privileges allowed to them by the constitution and the law. Any act violating the constitution and the law will have to be pursued legally and investigated.”58 Xi’s concept of law is in conformity with the legalist tradition in ancient China, emphasizing the supremacy of law in governing the country. He also stresses the importance of talents and virtues in building up the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics. Unlike many Hong Kong people 57  Jasmine Siu and Eddie Lee, “Seven policemen convicted of assaulting Occupy activist Ken Tsang,” South China Morning Post, February 14, 2017, in https://www.scmp.com/ news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/2070641/seven-police-officers-accused-beatingoccupy-activist-ken, access date: March 31, 2020. 58  Xi Jinping, “Strengthening the party’s leadership over the comprehensive rule of law in the country,” in: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-02/15/c_1124120391.htm, access date: March 31, 2020.

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Table 5.8  President Xi Jinping’s remarks on comprehensively governing the country in accordance with law 1. “Insist on strengthening the party’s leadership in governing the country according to law. Party leadership is the most fundamental guarantee of the socialist rule of law. Comprehensively governing the country in accordance with the law does not weaken the party’s leadership, but it can strengthen and improve leadership, continuously improve the party’s governing ability and level and consolidate the party’s ruling position. We must adhere to the party leadership in initiating legislation, guaranteeing the law enforcement, supporting the judiciary, taking the lead in abiding by the law, improving the system and mechanism of party leadership in comprehensively governing the country, making the party’s platform into the will of the country, forming laws and passing them to protect the implementation of party policies, and ensuring the correct direction of comprehensively governing the country in accordance with the law.” 2. “Adhere to the people-centered status. The construction of the rule of law must be for the people, rely on them, benefit them and protect them. We must firmly grasp the pursuit of social justice and the value of the rule of law, and strive to make the people feel that there are fairness and justice in every legal system, every law-enforcement decision, and every judicial case. It is necessary to implement the entire process of governing the country according to the law, reflecting the interests of the people, reflecting the wishes of the people, protecting the rights and interests of the people, and ensuring that the people manage the state affairs, economic and cultural undertakings, and social affairs under the party leadership.” 3. “The promotion of comprehensively governing the country according to law must go the right way. We must proceed from China’s national conditions and realities and follow the path of the rule of law that is suitable for ourselves. We must not copy the models and practices of other countries and follow the path of Western ‘constitutionalism,’ ‘the separation of powers’ and ‘judicial independence.’” 4. “Insist on building a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics. The socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics is the legal manifestation of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics. We must seize and grasp the construction of a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics, and strive to form a complete legal scope and system, an efficient implementation system, a rigorous supervision system, and a strong rule of law protection system.” 5. “We must insist on governing the country and implement policies according to the constitution. … The party leadership is necessary to lead the people to formulate the law and constitution. The party must operate with the constitution and the law. Every citizen, social organization and state agency must adopt the constitution and the law as their behavioral criteria, and they must exercise their right and power in accordance with the constitution and the law. They cannot surpass the privileges allowed to them by the constitution and the law. Any act violating the constitution and the law will have to be pursued legally and investigated.” (continued)

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Table 5.8 (continued) 6. “We must persist in handling the dialectical relationship of administering the country in accordance with the law. To fully govern the country according to law, we must correctly handle the relationship between politics and the rule of law, and between reforms and the rule of law. … Socialist legality relies on the party leadership. We must insist on the need to integrate the governance of the country with the rule by virtues. … We need to ensure that the party governs the country in accordance with the constitution and law and that the party is governed seriously in accordance with the party law and regulations.” 7. “Insist on building a high-quality rule of law team with both morals and talents. To comprehensively advance the rule of law, we must focus on building a socialist rule of law workforce that is loyal to the party, the country, the people, and the law. It is necessary to strengthen education on ideals and beliefs, carry out in-depth education on the core values of socialism and the concept of the socialist rule of law, and promote the regularization, specialization, and professionalization of the rule of law specialized teams. We must persist in building people with morality and talents, innovating the training mechanism for the rule of law talents, and cultivating many high-quality rule of law talents and their reserve forces.” Source: Xi Jinping, “Strengthening the party’s leadership over the comprehensive rule of law in the country,” in: http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2019-02/15/c_1124114454.htm, access date: March 31, 2020. Also see http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-02/15/c_1124120391.htm, access date: March 31, 2020

whose concept of the rule of law is to see it as an instrument to check the arbitrary power of the state and ruling authorities, including the police, the mainland leaders view law as an instrument of consolidating party leadership. Two conflicting versions of law could be seen in Hong Kong’s protests from June to December 2019, one that was very “Western” and the other very paternalistically “Chinese.”59 The “Western” rule of law cherishes human rights, civil liberties and checks and balances on the state power, but “rule by law” rather than rule of law is arguably the hallmark of the PRC legal system.60 China’s legal culture of emphasizing social harmony, police supremacy and political stability means that the Hong Kong protests from June to December 2019 were destined to be regarded as the enemy of the PRC party-state. The political cultures of the PRC and HKSAR remain very different. In China, democracy is supposed to be led by the state, 59  For the paternalistic Chinese legal system, see Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 60  Ibid., p. 8.

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characterized by social harmony and shaped by group interests rather than individual ones.61 Hong Kong’s political culture tends to be far more pluralistic, emphasizing individual interests, human rights, civil liberties and social movement.62 The Chinese legal culture that emphasizes the rule by law is necessarily supportive of the hardline approach adopted by the Hong Kong police in dealing with the protests. In a nutshell, so long as the Hong Kong police is seen as the bastion of China’s national security in the HKSAR, its tactics in coping with protesters are bound to be expected to be decisive, swift and iron-fisted. As Yang Guang said on July 29, the urgent task for Hong Kong was to punish the criminal and violent ­elements. One day after his statement, the Hong Kong police on the night of July 30 arrested 49 protesters who confronted the police in the Western and Central districts. Of the 49 arrested persons, 44 of them were charged for rioting.

China’s National Security Policy Toward Hong Kong Judging from the Fourth Plenum’s emphasis on the need to improve the mechanism and system of principal officials of the HKSAR government, and from the mainland officials whom the Hong Kong counterparts have met since June 2019, it is quite likely that the anti-extradition movement from June to December 2019 produced a new vertical accountability of Hong Kong officials to the central government in Beijing. Diagram 5.1 shows that, on the HKSAR side, the Police Commissioner is now accountable directly to both the Minister of Public Security and the party-secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC). Moreover, the Secretary for Security of the HKSAR government is directly accountable to the party-secretary of the CPLAC. Finally, the Secretary for Justice of the Hong Kong government is accountable to not only the President of the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC, but also the party-secretary of the CPLAC.  The role of the party-secretary of the CPLAC is increasingly important in Beijing’s relations with the HKSAR. Table 5.9 illustrates the main remarks made by the Minister of Public Security, Zhao Kezhi, whose position on the HKSAR has increasingly  Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).  Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions: Hong Kong vs. Beijing on Democracy (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2010). 61 62

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Diagram 5.1  Vertical accountability of key Hong Kong principal officials. (Source: This diagram is deduced from the protests from July to December 2019 when the authors observed the line of reporting by the three Hong Kong principal officials who visited Beijing)

become significant since the June 2019 protests. As early as June 2019, he stressed the importance of preventing “foreign enemies and forces” from infiltrating the Chinese soil and therefore the need to protect China’s political security. Moreover, he stressed that the public security agency was a valuable tool of China’s “democratic dictatorship” and the ruling CCP. Zhao also elaborated that public security work must be loyal to the CCP, to “protect the political security of our ‘southern gate,’ and to consolidate our nation’s political security.” His comments appeared to target at Hong Kong, which is located at the “southern gate” of the PRC. Finally, he stressed that while the mainland public security is the “protective shield” of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong police must strengthen cooperation with the mainland counterpart and maintain social stability of the HKSAR. Since the CPLAC occupies a central position in Beijing’s national security policy toward the HKSAR, its criticisms of four politicians in the HKSAR in 2019 were noteworthy. Table  5.10 shows that the CPLAC targeted at media tycoon Jimmy Lai, barrister Martin Lee, former Chief Secretary Anson Chan and pro-democracy lawyer Albert Ho. All of them are pro-democracy. They were accused of working with external forces, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Lai’s Next Media

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Table 5.9  Remarks of Zhao Kezhi on Hong Kong and National Security Date

Event

June 12, 2019

Attending a Public Security Ministry Meeting in Beijing

August 26, 2019

December 6, 2019

Zhao Kezhi’s remark

1. Stresses that public security work is to “prevent foreign enemies and forces from infiltrating and subverting China and we need to protect political security.” 2. The public security agency is “a valuable tool of the people’s democratic dictatorship.” “Loyalty to the Party is the basic political principle of public security. Ideologically, organizationally and in terms of action, public security has to implement the work designated by Party leadership so that the Party principles and policy directions are carried out.” 3. “In the new era, public security work must be well positioned and requires an ideology of worrying about problems, consolidating our bottom-line thinking, preventing enemy forces from conducting sabotage activities, and protecting our political security. Public security also needs to deal with the relations between reform and developmental stability, to maintain stability and protect interests properly, and to resolve the emerging problems and contradictions at the grassroots level.” Investigation and “Public security work has to resolutely and inspection in absolutely follow and insist on the Party leadership, Guangdong Province implementing wholeheartedly Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important directives and spirit and carrying out the Party’s policy plans and directions. We have to accurately recognize the current circumstances, risks and challenges, to take action to prevent all kinds of subversive and violent activities, to protect the political security of our ‘southern gate,’ and to consolidate our nation’s political security.” Meeting the new “The central government and public security are Hong Kong Police the protective shields of Hong Kong forever, Commissioner, Chris continuously supporting the Hong Kong police to Tang, in Beijing execute the laws. The Hong Kong police can strengthen cooperation with the mainland counterpart, increase their exchanges and maintain national security and Hong Kong’s social stability.”

Sources: Ta Kung Po, June 13, 2019, p. A15; August 28, 2019, p. A15 and December 7, 2019, p. A05

Table 5.10  Criticisms of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC) on Jimmy Lai, Martin Lee, Anson Chan and Albert Ho Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activists

Main criticisms from CPLAC

Jimmy Lai

1.  “Instigating extreme moves and willing to be a US running dog.” 2. “Using the Next Media to let US and UK political forces to intervene in Hong Kong matters. The Apple Daily uses its pages and coverage to mobilize people to take to the streets, listing parade routes and time, organizing and leading violent actions.” 3. “Conducting political donations and betray Hong Kong while joining the US and UK.” 1. “Martin Lee takes the lead in raising legal loopholes of the extradition bill, visited the US and complained to foreigners, and suggested that the US should oppose the bill to create chaos in Hong Kong.” 2. “Cultivating anti-China forces in Hong Kong and grooming agents for them. Developing outstanding talents to betray Hong Kong and creating chaos to China.” 3. “Since May 2017, he has appealed to the international society to intervene in Hong Kong matters, to blacken the image of ‘one country, two systems,’ and visited the US, UK, Canada and other countries to complain about the extradition bill.” 4. “Before the anti-extradition movement erupted, Lee had written a large number of political articles to stir up public sentiments and increase public concern about the extradition bill, implying that readers should use violent confrontation to protect their human rights, democracy and freedom.” 1. “As the second person in command, Anson Chan disagreed with Chief Executive Tung Chee-haw, leading to two headquarters at the top leadership.” 2. “From 2013 to 2014, she accepted political donations of HK$3.5 million from Jimmy Lai three times, helping him to engage in activities that created chaos in Hong Kong.” 3. “Using the status of the former Chief Secretary, she openly encourages Hong Kong civil servants to participate in strikes and protests, trying to paralyze the government operation and weakening the governing capacity of the Carrie Lam administration.” 1. “Using his former status as District Councilor and legislator, he increases his media coverage and adopts a high profile, becoming a person oscillating between anti-China and pro-China positions. He eventually was contacted by the US intelligence agency and gradually becomes a political spokesperson for the US in Hong Kong.” 2. “In the anti-extradition violent protests, Albert Ho curbed police power by raising the banner of democracy and freedom for the violent protestors who adopt terrorism to undermine Hong Kong’s public order.”

Martin Lee

Anson Chan

Albert Ho

Sources: “Four Politicians who Portray Hong Kong,” in http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/ c54219/2019-08/18/content_12281219.shtml, access date: March 6, 2020

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which publicizes and supports the democrats has been regarded as the enemy of the HKSAR government and the PRC’s party-state, for its Apple Daily has been covering all kinds of stories exposing the authoritarian governance of China and public maladministration of the HKSAR government. Lai was also accused of donating money to the pro-democracy movement, playing a crucial role as a financier and leader behind the scene. Martin Lee as the former chairman of the Democratic Party has been frequently visiting foreign countries to discuss Hong Kong’s democratic movement—a move regarded by the CPLAC as collaborating with foreign political forces. Anson Chan was the former Chief Secretary who disagreed with the former Chief Executive Tung Chee-haw on policy issues. After her retirement from the government, she was participating in the prodemocracy movement—a move regarded by the CPLAC as reversing her previously pro-government role. Moreover, she was criticized for supporting those civil servants who openly participated in the anti-­extradition movement and for encouraging them to “violate” their political neutrality. Finally, Albert Ho from the Democratic Party has also been criticized as being too close to the United States and “curbing police power.” Clearly, the CPLAC’s high-profile approach to targeting at the four political activists in the HKSAR illustrated the dominance of hardliners on the PRC policy toward Hong Kong. Because of the PRC’s national security policy, the pro-Beijing mass media, such as Wen Wei Po, Ta Kung Pao and Oriental Daily, have carried reports and commentaries critical of the democrats in the HKSAR (Table 5.11). They use the term “opposition” to refer to the democrats. During the protests from June to December 2019, Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao used the term “pro-violent faction” to refer to the democrats who participated actively in the protests. The task of the pro-Beijing media was to staunchly support China’s national security policy toward Hong Kong, single out the opposition politicians whose activities were deemed to be socially disruptive and violent, and severely criticize those radical and violent protesters for undermining the social stability of the HKSAR. They also accused the peaceful protesters for teaming up with the violent ones, collaborating and participating in the local elections in November 2019.

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Table 5.11  Remarks of Pro-Beijing media on the opposition from July 2019 to November 2019 Date

Remarks

July 2, 2019

1. The opposition and its mouthpiece “beautify” the violent people, labeling them as “heroes” but making them bolder and more violent. 2. The opposition utilizes the violent protesters for political gains but they “set themselves on fire.” July 22, 2019 1. “The opposition form “an alliance with protestors, formulating a strategy of this storm with ‘the Hong Kong independents’ and making ‘peace and unity’ with them.” 2. “The opposition turns a blind eye to the violent behavior of independenists, using their status of legislators to obstruct police work, and accusing the police work, and accusing the police of ‘abusing power.’” 3. “The opposition tries to achieve its electoral interest, absorbing radical votes for District Council elections, refusing to cut relations with the radicals, and supporting their violent behavior.” October 13, 1. The pan-democrats become “pan-violent” faction that aims at acquiring 2019 more voters in the District Council elections. 2. “The pan-violent faction leads the violent protestors” and provide them with a “protective umbrella.” 3. The “pan-violent” faction violates the law and breaks its own promises. 4. The “pan-violent” faction is “unscrupulous.” October 17, 1. The opposition legislators are not only “pro-violence but also exercising 2019 violence.” 2. The opposition legislators do not consider public interest and Hong Kong’s future and they are “professional political rascals.” 3. “Hong Kong is going to decline because of the failure to stop violence, terminate social turbulence and cease societal split.” 4. “The opposition faction extends its tentacles to LegCo and cooperates with violent protestors at the street level, trying to paralyze the government and capture its governing power.” 5. “The opposition legislators sacrifice the interests of Hong Kong and the people’s welfare. They must shoulder the responsibility of the grave consequences.” November 4, 1. “The opposition faction tolerates and stirs up the violent protestors, 2019 refusing to cut relations with them and dividing the society.” November 1. “The pan-violent faction beautifies the violent protestors and we should 12, 2020 not let them use LegCo to publicize violence.” 2. The “pan-violent” faction blames the police and government for the escalation of violence. 3. The “pan-violent” legislators often appear in violent scenes, allowing violent protesters time to escape and providing “protective umbrellas” for them. (continued)

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Table 5.11 (continued) Date

Remarks

November 25, 2020

1. “The pan-violent” faction stirs up black violence for 5 months. On the election day, violence continued. Its members infiltrated elections and undermined the tradition of fair and just electoral culture. Their behavior is contrary to the universal democratic values. They rely on violence to win the elections. This is disgraceful and unconvincing. The most damaging impact is to hurt the feeling and confidence of citizens on fair and just elections.” 2. “The pan-violent faction reaps the fruits of the elections and benefits from the violent campaigns. Although the pan-violent faction wins the elections, their victory is actually a conspiratorial strategy.”

Sources: Wen Wei Po, July 2, 2019, p. A10; July 22, 2019, p. A10; October 13, 2019, p. A10; October 17, 2019, in http://news.wenweipo.com/2019/10/17/IN1910170006.htm, access date: March 5, 2020; November 25, 2019, p. A04; Oriental Daily, November 4, 2019, in https://orientaldaily.on.cc/ cnt/news/20191104/00176_018.html, access date: March 5, 2020; Ta Kung Pao, November 13, 2019, p. A05

Reshuffle of PRC Officials on Hong Kong Affairs in Early 2020 On January 4, 2020, Liaison Office Director Wang Zhimin was suddenly replaced by Luo Huining. Luo was born in Zhejiang province in 1954 and he participated in the CCP in March 1982. Luo got a doctorate in economics from the Renmin University of China and became the party-­ secretary of Shanxi province in November 2019.63 At the same time, Luo was selected as the deputy director of the NPC’s financial and economic committee. Although Beijing said that Wang Zhimin’s work in the HKSAR was “confirmed,” his replacement by the 65-year-old Luo Huining raised speculations. Wang maintained a hardline position on Hong Kong matters. In November 2019, Reuters reported that Beijing was unhappy with Wang’s performance and considered to replace him.64 The defeat of the pro-Beijing forces in the District Council elections in November 2019, which will be discussed in Chap. 7, appeared to anger the central 63  “State Council” Dismissing Wang Zhimin as the Liaison Office Director and replaced by former Shanxi party-secretary Luo Huining.” HK01, January 4, 2020, in https://www. hk01.com/, access date: March 20, 2020. 64  Keith Zhai, James Pomfret and David Kirton, “Exclusive: China sets up Hong Kong crisis center in mainland, considers replacing chief liaison,” Reuters, November 26, 2019.

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government in Beijing. At the age of 62, Wang did not reach his retirement age and he was sent to work in the CCP Party History and Documentary Research Academy as a deputy dean.65 It looked as if Wang was demoted, although the position of deputy dean was equivalent to a ministerial level. Luo’s appointment as the new Liaison Office director raised the concern of the US Secretary for State Mike Pompeo, who said on January 6 that he hoped the Hong Kong situation would return to normal.66 It was reported that President Xi Jinping made the decision to replace Wang with Luo by the end of December 2019.67 Apart from his experiences in Shanxi, Luo also worked in Qinghai for ten years. He also tackled corruption in Shanxi, a characteristic that might make President Xi choose him as Wang’s successor. In February 2020, Beijing made another personnel reshuffle, replacing HKMAO Director Zhang Xiaoming with Xia Baolong, who was 67 years old. Xia was the vice chairman of the CPPCC. Zhang would become a deputy director of the HKMAO, a move that clearly pointed to his demotion. Xia had a reputation of being a hardline party-secretary in the Zhejiang province in 2014 and 2015, when crosses on the roofs of churches were pulled down in the mainland.68 Acquiring a doctorate in economics from Peking University, Xia worked in Zhejiang province from 2003 to 2017, having rich experiences in governing the coastal province. Like Luo, Xia has strong economics background—a credential showing perhaps why both were selected by the top PRC leaders as the new officials responsible for Hong Kong affairs. After the new Liaison Office director arrived Hong Kong, Covid-19 broke out in the PRC in early 2020. He wrote an open letter to the Hong Kong NPC and CPPCC members (Table 5.12), encouraging them to unite together to fight the pandemic and to build trust. Luo criticized the political  Ming, Pao, January 9, 2020  “Guo Wengui: Luo would be handline.” Epoch Times, March 30, 2020. 67  William Zheng, “Beijing’s new Hong Kong envoy Luo Huining was a surprise choice. Here’s why,” South China Morning Post, January 7, 2020, in https://www.scmp.com/ news/china/politics/artricle/3044905/beijings-new-hong-kong-envoy-luo-huining-wassurprises-choice, access date: March 20, 2020. 68  “China’s New Hong Kong Boss Used to Rip Crosses from Churches,” Macau Daily Times, February 14, 2020. Also see “Architect of China’s cross removed to oversee Hong Kong, Macau Affairs,” Catholic Philly, February 14, 2020, in https://catholicphilly. com/2020/02/news/world-news/architect-of-chinas-cross-removal-to-oversee-hongkong-macua-affairs/, access date: March 20, 2020. 65 66

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Table 5.12  Key points of Luo Huining’s open letter for the NPC deputies and CPPCC members in Hong Kong 1. He encouraged NPC and CPPCC members in Hong Kong to be “united and work together to fight the epidemic.” 2. He said: “Trust is the most effective vaccine of the disease. Today’s China had good governance system and good citizen attitudes.” “Hong Kong must prevail if the people can be cohesive and have faith.” 3. “The PRC government makes every effort to pay attention to the situation of Hong Kong compatriots in the mainland, and to cooperate with the HKSAR government in controlling the customs and to fully protect the logistical supply of Hong Kong citizens.” He added that 17,000,000 masks from China would be sent to the HKSAR. 4.  “Respect the doctors and nurses who are fearless and who stick to their posts.” 5. “The flesh-and-blood relationships between the mainland and Hong Kong is thicker than water and the spiritual heritage of the Chinese nation in coming together in distress and suffering cannot be changed at any time, and no force can stop it.” 6. “For both the PRC and Hong Kong, the epidemic prevention and control work have reached the most strenuous stage. Only by working together can we overcome the difficulties.” 7. “If a few people are still generating all kinds of opposition for their political self-interest during this period, and even manipulate the use of strike, are these actions not a new political coronavirus?” 8. “Those who grasp the opportunities to spread the feeling of dissatisfaction, artificially create divisions, and deliberately destroy the relationships between the mainland and Hong Kong will eventually be unpopular. ‘More Hong Kong compatriots will agree that no individual can be an island and that Hong Kong should not be an isolated city.’” Sources: Wen Wei Po, February 21, 2020, p. A02

opposition for having self-interest and manipulating the use of strikes, implicitly referring to the nurses and doctors who threatened to launch strikes to push the HKSAR government to adopt tighter measures to deal with the Coronavirus. Luo’s tone appeared to be more moderate than his predecessor Wang Zhimin, but he had continued to be an equally hardliner dealing with Hong Kong matters. On April 15, 2020, Luo commented publicity that the PRC had to continue to “struggle” against enemies forces in the HKSAR—a remark in line with President Xi’s “persistent struggle” with political foes.69

 Cable TV News, April 15, 2020.

69

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Conclusion This chapter examines the responses of PRC leaders and officials to the Hong Kong protests. Basically, they maintained a hardline position; nevertheless, the removal of Wang Zhimin and Zhang Xiaoming appeared to demonstrate that the top leadership, including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, were displeased with the former Directors of the Liaison Office and the HKMAO. Two possibilities existed. The first was the failure of Wang and Zhang to withdraw the extradition bill much earlier, rather than pushing it through the LegCo and plunging the HKSAR into a deeper crisis of legitimacy, thereby affecting Beijing’s united front work on Taipei. The victory of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, in the presidential election in Taiwan in January 2020 proved the failure of Beijing’s hardline policy toward Hong Kong. As such, reshuffling Wang and Zhang might bring a glimmer of hope in Beijing’s new policy toward both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Yet, it remains to be seen whether Beijing will really adopt a new policy with substantial differences from its traditionally hardline policy toward the two places. The second possibility of replacing Wang and Zhang was their failure to anticipate the failure of proBeijing forces in the November 2019 District Council elections, a topic that will be addressed in Chap. 7. The debacle of the pro-Beijing forces in the November local elections represented an indictment of the Beijing’s policy toward Hong Kong. As the PRC leadership lost face in their handling of the Hong Kong protests, partly due to the electoral tsunami in November and partly because of the easy victory of the DPP in Taiwan’s presidential election, the mainland officials responsible for Hong Kong matters, namely Wang and Zhang, had to be replaced and demoted—a move signaling the PRC-­style of political accountability. Whatever the personnel change in Beijing’s officials dealing with the HKSAR, the continuity of adopting a hardline national security policy toward Hong Kong is prominent. The structural relations between the principal officials of the HKSAR, especially those dealing with security, justice and policing, appear to be directly and vertically accountable to the security-related officials in the PRC. As such, Beijing has already reformed and improved the mechanism and system of principal officials in Hong Kong and their relationships with the central authorities. With the benefit of hindsight, the promulgation of the National Security Law in the HKSAR on June 30, 2020 demonstrated the continuation of the PRC’s hardline policy toward Hong Kong.

CHAPTER 6

Populist Protesters, October 1 Confrontation and Opposition to Anti-mask Law

This chapter is going to argue that the protesters in the HKSAR from June to December 2019 could be understood from the perspective of populism, that the October 1 confrontation between protesters and police revealed a new pattern of peaceful and violent protests and that the opposition to the anti-mask law on October 4 and 5 was a continuation of the populist struggles against not only the police but also the mainlandization of Hong Kong. In other words, the anti-mask law’s promulgation and implementation were regarded by protesters as a crucial step of making the HKSAR more akin to the mainland’s authoritarian political system. As such, the pro-democracy populist protesters were determined to oppose the anti-mask law by both peaceful and violent means.

Populism and Its Factions in Hong Kong Protests If populism is a term used by social scientists to refer to political movements mobilizing public opinion against the elite rule, it did contribute to political violence in Hong Kong. Populism exists in two different ends of a political spectrum, ranging from left to right. It can be found in democracies and authoritarian regimes. In Hong Kong, populist political movements have become far more prominent since July 2003, when half a million people protested against the policies of the Tung Chee-hwa government, and particularly since the anti-national education movement in the summer of 2012, when the HKSAR government clumsily put forward © The Author(s) 2021 S. S.-H. Lo et al., The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4_6

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its national education policy and when tens of thousands of students, parents and intellectuals succeeded in opposing it and accusing the regime of “brainwashing” the school children. After 2012, more populist movements have sprung up, including the 2014 Occupy Central Movement, the “Fishball Revolution” in Mongkok in early 2016 and most importantly the 2019 anti-extradition movement. All these populist movements shared one commonality: the strong appeals to public opinion against the elitist rule in Hong Kong. Elite rule has been regarded by many populists as undemocratic, non-consultative and at worst socially exploitative. In the political science literature, populism contains at least four perspectives, including Marxist, ideational, strategic and socio-cultural ones with different considerations and characteristics. First, Marxists define populism in social terms and highlight the significance of market condition and production. The developmental condition of a state shapes the unorganized masses politically, bringing about the leadership role of some elite fractions.1 Populism, to Marxists, is a response to the exploitation of the lower classes by the dominance capitalist class and elites.2 The populist parties and groups focus on the need to cultivate a mass-elite class coalition that promotes a specific peripheral development. In short, Marxists interpret populism as a phenomenon that cultivates close elite-mass and cross-classes linkages in response to social inequality. Secondly, the ideational perspective asserts that populism is an ideology concerned about the structure of power in society. According to Cas Muddle, populism is defined as “an ideology that consider the split of society,” demonstrating the clashes between the masses and dominant ruling elites, and between the “pure people” and “the corrupt elites.”3 Koen Abets and Stefan Rummens have elaborated that populism is a discourse 1  Torcuato S. Di Tella, “Populism and Reform in Latin America.” in Claudio Veliz (eds.), Obstacles to change in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 47–74. Alistair Hennessy, “Latin America.” in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., Populism and Its Meaning and National Characteristics (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 28–61. 2  A. Quijano, 1968, “Tendencies in Peruvian Development in Class Structure,” in James Petras and Maurice Zetlin, eds., Latin America: Reform or Revolution (Greenwich: Fawcett, 1968), pp. 289–328. 3  Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition, vol. 39, no.4 (2004), pp. 541–63. Also see Cas Muddle and Cristobel Rovira Kalwaser, “Voices of the Peoples: Populism in Europe and Latin America Compared,” Kellogg Institute, working paper no. 378 (July 2011), in https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/378_0.pdf, access date: April 2, 2020.

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focusing on the three major concepts, namely “the people or masses,” “democracy” and “sovereignty.”4 In other words, populism is a discourse highlighting the distinction between dominant elites and masses. As a matter of fact, populists often appeal to the masses to take action against the dominant elites who monopolize the ideas and values of the entire society. Populists also see politics as an immediate expression to the general public, utilizing the concept of “popular sovereignty” as an appeal.5 It is crystal clear that populist ideology advocates the direct forms of democratic institution to replace the current institutional arrangement dominated by the ruling elites. Public opinion is often the tool of populists to appeal to their supporters, mobilizing the will of the masses against the ruling elites. Thirdly, populism can be seen as a political strategy for politicians to win the hearts and minds of the people and followers. Charismatic leaders often use populism as a link with the masses to obtain sufficient support during elections.6 Some politicians use populism as a means to legitimize their action in the legislature.7 Personalistic leaders can manipulate populism in such a way as to mobilize the masses to challenge the dominant elites.8 In other words, populism is a strategy for politicians to attract mass behavior, to exert their influence on the political arena and to demonstrate their legitimacy in any controversy over government policies. It can also be a means by which politicians engage in power struggle between different political factions.9 Populism can exist within any political party. It is the common strategy used by politicians to grasp political power, to enhance their popularity and to achieve their ambitions and ideals. 4  Koen Abets and Stefan Rummens, “Populism versus Democracy,” Political Studies, vol. 55 (2007), pp. 405–424. 5  M. Canovan, “Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy,” in Yves Mény and Yves Surel, eds., Democracies and the Populist Challenge (London: Macmillan 2002), pp. 25–40. 6  D.  Resnick, “Varieties of African Populism in Comparative Perspective,” in C.  De la Torre, ed. The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015). 7  R. A. Mayorga, “Outsiders and Neopopulism: The Road to Plebiscitarian Democracy,” in S.  Mainwaring, A.  M. Bejarano, and E.  P. Leongómez, eds., The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 8  K.  M. Roberts, “Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2006), pp. 127–148. 9  T. S. Pappas, “Populism Emergent: A Framework for Analyzing Its Contexts, Mechanics, and Outcomes,” EUI Working Paper RSCAS, no. 1, (Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2012).

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Lastly, populism can be a reflection of the existing social and cultural context. Populism is defined as a “particular form of political relationship between leaders and a social basis” deeply influenced by socio-cultural and historical factors.10 Populism emerges from a society deeply divided by different ideologies, ranging from left to right. It can be a mixture of different political ideologies in the complex society. As such, the concerns of the people at the local and regional levels can be utilized by populists to obtain popular support, for different places have their local and regional political cultures. These four perspectives on populism can be combined for us to comprehend the politics of peaceful and violent protests in the HKSAR. From a Marxist perspective, some of the populists in the Hong Kong protests from June to December 2019 did see the post-colonial regime as one that was biased in favor of the dominant class and elites. As such, they were determined to mobilize the ordinary people against the extradition bill, which some populists saw as detrimental to the interests of the people, especially those who spoke out against the PRC government, and those who were involved in the local pro-democracy movement. From the ideational perspective, the populists who were fighting against the extradition bill from June to December 2019 believed that “popular sovereignty” was absent in Hong Kong, where “democracy” was also obstructed by both the ruling elites in the HKSAR and PRC authorities. From the strategic vantage point, populism became a means by which the pro-democracy politicians struggled against the ruling elites, while it also came out as a weapon used by the pro-Beijing politicians to stir up anti-democratic sentiments in Hong Kong. The populists in Hong Kong, from the socio-­ cultural perspective, were and are by no means homogeneous. They remained heterogeneous from 2012 to 2019, because the society was deeply ideologically divided into at least two main factions, the democratic populists and the nationalistic ones. The democratic populists refer to those who are liberal-minded and pro-democracy, believing that the HKSAR should be more democratic by having universal suffrage as soon as possible, namely the direct election of the Chief Executive by ordinary citizens and the direct election of the entire LegCo. They also believe in the necessity of protecting the present civil liberties, the rule of law and Hong Kong’s autonomy vis-à-vis the central government in Beijing. The nationalistic populists tend to be pro-Beijing and pro-government, 10  P. Ostiguy, “Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach,” in Ochoa Ostiguy, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 73–97.

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believing that political reform in the HKSAR must be gradual and must listen to the whims and decisions of the central government in Beijing. Table 6.1 sums up the main differences between democratic populists and nationalistic populists. In terms of political identity, the democratic populists are much stronger in their local Hong Kong identity, whereas the Table 6.1  A comparison between democratic populists and nationalistic populists Features

Nationalistic populists

Democratic populists

Political identity

Strong Chinese identity

Values orientation

Materialistic, pragmatic and opportunistic.

Strong local Hong Kong identity. Post-materialistic (supportive of human rights, democracy, sustainable development) and politically idealistic. See Beijing as an authoritarian, if not necessarily a neototalitarian, regime.

Attitude toward Beijing

Politically loyal to Beijing’s authority and obedient to its representatives and agents in Hong Kong. Attitudes toward Support the HKSAR HKSAR government government.

Attitude toward the implementation of “one country, two systems”

Attitude toward the extradition bill

Attitude toward the anti-extradition movement

HKSAR government is increasingly “mainlandized” or prominently a “puppet” of the central government in Beijing. Emphasize the importance of Highlight the significance of a “one country” and Beijing’s proper balance between “one “comprehensive jurisdiction” country” and “two systems” over Hong Kong. and stress the importance of realizing the idea of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.” The Fugitive Offenders The extradition bill was full of Ordinance should be amended to legal loopholes and it had the plug the existing legal loopholes danger of undermining Hong so that the Taiwan murder case Kong’s core values such as civil would be settled. liberties and the rule of law. The anti-extradition movement They saw the anti-extradition became a means by which the movement as necessary to political opposition challenged express public concerns, to the legitimacy and authority of force the government to the Hong Kong government and withdraw the bill and to push the central authorities in Beijing. for the process of democratizing Hong Kong along the path of achieving universal suffrage. (continued)

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Table 6.1 (continued) Features

Nationalistic populists

Democratic populists

Attitudes toward the five demands proposed by protesters

The five demands were politically unacceptable and incorrect, and they showed the conspiracy of the democrats to delegitimize the HKSAR government and to grasp political power. They saw the five demands as the democratic plot to subvert the “one country, two systems,” ignoring the authority of the central government in Beijing. The protesters were irrational, violent and “criminal” and they should be arrested by the police and punished by the court.

The five demands were necessary for the people of Hong Kong to retain the Hong Kong uniqueness in the implementation of the “one country, two systems.”

They see the United States, United Kingdom, Taiwan and other foreign countries as making remarks that constituted “interference” with Hong Kong affairs and China’s internal matters.

They believe that Hong Kong civil society’s international linkages would further assist the anti-extradition movement, exerting pressure on both the HKSAR and PRC governments.

Attitude toward radical protesters who became violent and vandalized public and private properties Attitude toward foreign actors in the controversy over the extradition bill

They avoid criticizing the radical protesters, but are concerned about the human rights of protesters.

Note: This table derives from the authors’ observations

nationalistic populists tend to harbor strong Chinese identity. While the democratic populists tend to see Beijing as an authoritarian, if not necessarily a neo-totalitarian regime, the nationalists tend to be politically loyal to Beijing and obedient to its representative Liaison Office. The democrats adopt a critical attitude toward the HKSAR government, seeing it as increasingly “mainlandized” and a “puppet” of the PRC. Yet, the nationalists support the HKSAR government and most of its policies, including the extradition bill. The democrats emphasize the need to strike a balance between “one country” and “two systems,” but the nationalists argue that “one country” is far more important than the “two systems.” The democratic populists also refuse to criticize the violent protesters, who are seen by the nationalists as “criminals” and “terrorists.” The democratic populists

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also see Hong Kong’s civil society as having positive interactions with the international actors, like the United States and United Kingdom, because the HKSAR remains a cosmopolitan city with shared universal values such as human rights and democracy. Yet, the nationalists see the internationalization of Hong Kong as a negative phenomenon inviting foreign intervention into Hong Kong’s matters. The sharp dichotomy between democratic populists and nationalist populists could be easily seen in the debate over the extradition bill from June to December 2019.

The Localists, Democratic Populists and Socialist Fraction Many democratic populists in the HKSAR are also the localists who are imbued with a powerful sense of local Hong Kong identity. The localists hate the entry of many mainlanders into the HKSAR after mid-2003 to the extent that they are strongly anti-mainland and anti-PRC.11 The democrats tend to be generally more moderate. However, there has been another fraction within the pro-democracy populists, namely the socialist populists. The socialist populists are like the democratic socialists in Western democracies, believing in the benefits of welfare states and the necessity of income redistribution. In the context of Hong Kong, the socialist populists rose up very quickly in the 2012 LegCo direct elections, when Leung Kwok-hung of the League of Social Democrats and three members of People Power (Raymond Wong, Ray Chan and Albert Chan) were directly elected into the legislature. These democratic socialists were populists in the sense that they appealed to mass support against the ruling elites. They were critical of the PRC policy toward the HKSAR. However, they tended to be more radical in political orientations than the democrats because the socialist populists advocated tax reform and a fundamental overhaul of the existing political system. Overall, the socialist populists are characterized by their very strong Hong Kong identity, post-materialistic and redistributive advocacy, their view of a totalitarian China and their belief in the “bankruptcy” of the “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR. They cannot get along 11  They also uphold post-materialistic values such as human rights, civil liberties, democracy and sustainable development. See Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo and Jeff Hai-chi Loo, “An Anatomy of the post-materialistic values of Hong Kong youth: opposition to China’s rising ‘sharp power,” in David Trotman and Stan Tucker, eds., Youth: Global Challenges and Issues of the 21st Century (New York: Nova Science), pp. 95–126.

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with the mainstream democrats easily, partly because the former sees the latter as far more politically moderate and opportunistic, and partly because the latter also views the former as politically extreme demagogues. In recent years, the socialist populists have lost their influence electorally. Raymond Wong resigned from People Power in May 2013 and was defeated in the 2016 LegCo direct election. Leung Kwok-hung’s legislator status was annulled by the court in July 2017 due to his controversial oath-taking behavior in late 2016.12 Since 2016, the socialist populists have their media spotlight overwhelmed by the increasingly political assertive localists. The occurrence of the Mongkok riot in early 2016 and the banning of the Hong Kong National Party (HKNP) in February 2019 marked the rapid rise and fall of radical localists and populists. The ban on the HKNP marked a collaborative effort by Beijing and the HKSAR government to clamp down on a minority of radical populists led by the HKNP leader Andy Chan Ho-tin.13 Andy Chan, who was disqualified to run for the 2016 LegCo election, made the following remarks that epitomized the dream and desire of many radical localists: The HKNP—it all started in 2016, when my friends and I founded what was truly the first political party that had “Hong Kong independence” clearly stated as one of its central goals. Due to the nature of how the Chinese propaganda machine works, the National Party was instantly demonized as some sort of extremist group due to this single word: “independence.” In reality, what the National Party is chasing after is no different from what many Hong Kongers wish for: the dream of democracy, here, in our home, Hong Kong. What is different is how much people wish to face the truth: the truth that a democracy is nothing if final, ultimate power does not rest with the people. In political terms, the National Party understands that, if Hong Kong were to become truly democratic, Hong Kong’s sovereignty must rest with the people of Hong Kong. And there is only one way to achieve this: independence.14 12  Chris Lau, “Ousted pro-democracy legislator ‘Long Hair’ Leung Kwok-hung loses bid to take case to Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal,” South China Morning Post, June 13, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3014375/ousted-prodemocracy-legislator-long-hair-leung-kwok, access date: April 3, 2020. 13  Jeffie Lam, Tony Cheung, Sum Lok-kei, Kimmy Chung and Alvin Lum, “Beijing backs city government’s ban on Hong Kong National Party, leader Carrie Lam says,” South China Morning Post, February 26, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/ article/2187744/beijing-backs-city-governments-ban-hong-kong-national-party, access date: April 3, 2020. 14  “Video: In full—Activist Andy Chan says Hong Kong independence is the only path to democracy at press club talk,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 14, 2018, in https://www.

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Of course, both the HKSAR government and Beijing regarded Chan’s political platform as unacceptable, for “independence” was and is a politically taboo term with ramifications for Beijing’s national security in Hong Kong. Yet, Andy Chan’s “imagined community” included those radical localists who harbored the unrealizable dream of making Hong Kong both “democratic” in the Western sense and “independent.”15 While Andy Chan’s radical platform did not apparently attract many followers,16 localist Edward Leung Tin-kei was and is different. Imprisoned in June 2018 for six years for his involvement in the 2016 Mongkok riot, Leung’s slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times” became the most important hallmark of mass mobilization in the protests from June to December 2019. Born in Wuhan city in mainland China, Leung migrated to Hong Kong at the age of one with his mainland mother. He studied at a Catholic school for some years and later enrolled at the University of Hong Kong, majoring in philosophy and minoring in politics. Unlike many other localists, Leung is a political philosopher and activist, believing that Hong Kong’s democratic development was obstructed by both the HKSAR government and Beijing. He developed his political beliefs by participating in various social movements, such as the 2014 Occupy Central Movement which Leung believed in its failure. In a by-election held for the LegCo in February 2016, he represented the Hong Kong Indigenous and succeeded in acquiring 66,000 votes. Although he was not directly elected, Leung’s political consciousness was awoken by a series of political events, including the PRC’s decision in August 2014 of setting out the parameter of the direct election of the Chief Executive and the disappearance of several publishers of the Causeway Bay Bookstore in late 2015. Philosophically, the disqualification of Leung’s candidacy in the 2016 LegCo direct election, to him, was the result of the “total control of Hong Kong by the CCP” and the necessity of having “revolution.”17 Leung argued that Hong Kong should be “self-­ sufficient” rather than relying on mainland China for water and ­agricultural hongkongfp.com/2018/08/14/video-full-activist-andy-chan-says-hong-kong-independence-path-democracy-press-club-talk/, access date: April 3, 2020. 15  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 16  Jeff Hai-chi Loo, “The Myth of ‘Hong Kong Nationalism,’” Asian Education and Development Studies, https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-10-2018-0161, forthcoming 2020. 17  His remarks after the government disqualified him from running in the September 2016 LegCo election. See “Hong Kong’s forever leader: the golden remarks made by Hong

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products—a dependency which to him was “absorbing the blood of the HKSAR.”18 He contended that the “basic rights of the Hong Kong people are exploited and deprived” by the authoritarian Hong Kong regime. Leung provided a critique of the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) for being responsible for the “violent situation” in the HKSAR.19 He criticized the moderate democrats for “cutting relations” with the action-oriented localists, adding that the society of Hong Kong was “unjust” and that street confrontation was necessary because of the failure of LegCo.20 Leung argued that the struggle against an “authoritarian” regime in Hong Kong did not need any “bottom line.”21 The political radicalization of Leung was a testimony to the gradual alienation of localists in the HKSAR, whose political space was increasingly narrowed and compressed by the HKSAR authorities in collaboration with the PRC officials responsible for Hong Kong matters. The imprisonment of Leung and many radical localists after the Mongkok riot triggered the determination of his followers and the like-­minded populists to resort to violent actions against the HKSAR government over not only the extradition bill but also the police power from June to December 2019. The democratic populists in Hong Kong evolved rapidly from the localist movement between 2012 and 2019 (Table 6.2). The populist movements in 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2019 carried a very strong localist and yet anti-mainland ideology. Because of the influx of many mainland visitors and tourists into the HKSAR after the adoption of the individual visits scheme in the summer of 2003, many Hong Kong people who had strong local identity found that their daily necessities were insufficient due to the buying spree from mainlanders. The 2012 anti-national education movement witnessed the reform of the education curriculum toward the direction of instilling more nationalistic sentiment among the young Hong Kong students. The policy intention was apparently well-intentioned, but the government explained the national education policy poorly and failed to use the expansion of the Chinese history subject as a tool of national education. As such, many students and parents regarded the national Kong’s confrontational leader Edward Leung Tin-kei,” January 11, 2020, in https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=ME8WLcQ6tEw, access date: April 3, 2020. 18  Ibid. 19  Ibid. 20  Ibid. 21  Ibid.

September– December 2014

(continued)

The anti-national 1. The government put forward a national education curriculum to let students understand China, strengthen their identification with the motherland and cultivate their Chinese education national pride. movement 2. Opponents argued that this curriculum had the political objectives of indoctrinating students, “brainwashing” them and strengthening Chinese patriotism and nationalism. 3. Critics said that the curriculum covered up the dark side of the PRC, distorting its history and political development and undermining the Hong Kong youth’s critical thinking. 4. The government finally shelved the reform and let the schools decide whether they would experiment with the proposed curriculum. Occupy Central 1. To some democrats, Hong Kong’s electoral system was “unfair” and they fought for an Movement electoral system that would meet the “international” requirements of universal suffrage, including the criteria of each citizen having an equal number of votes and the right of citizens to participate in elections without “unreasonable restrictions.” 2. The bone of contention was the method of selecting the Chief Executive. China decided on August 31, 2014, that two to three candidates would be firstly selected by an Election Committee through a majority vote, and then eligible voters would elect the Chief Executive by universal suffrage. 3. Opponents of Beijing and the HKSAR government said that this electoral model was “pseudo-democratic.” 4. The HKSAR government ignored the arguments of democrats and failed to reach a consensus with political activists and leaders of the Occupy Central Movement. 5. A political reform model along Beijing’s parameter on August 31, 2014, was later proposed and debated in LegCo. It was rejected by most LegCo members in mid-2015.

May–September 2012

Content of the event

Event

Date

Table 6.2  Events of localist movements

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Event

The Causeway Bay Bookstore Incident

“Fishball Revolution” or the Mongkok Riot

Oath-Taking Controversy

Date

October– December 2015

February 8–9, 2016

October 2016

Table 6.2 (continued)

1. Several publishers disappeared in Hong Kong, Thailand and mainland China for publishing in Hong Kong some Chinese books critical of the PRC. They disappeared one by one, including Lee Po and Lam Wing-kei. 2. Although Lee and Lam finally returned to Hong Kong, Lam revealed how he had been abducted in Shenzhen and sent to Zhejiang for investigation by national security agents. Lee kept silent. 3. Gui Minhai, another publisher, disappeared in Thailand. He was sentenced by the Chinese court for ten years of imprisonment in the mainland in February 2020. 4. The abductions shocked many Hong Kong people and foreign countries, which saw Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” as problematic. 1. The way in which the government cleared some street hawkers was seen by some localists as undermining Hong Kong’s indigenous culture. 2. Some localists led by Roy Wong and Edward Leung clashed with the police and many of them were later arrested by the police. 3. The clashes, to many localists, were caused by a variety of social and political problems, such as housing shortage, poverty and the lack of democratic reforms. They believed that the government could not put the blame on the localists. 1. Two legislators-elect, Yau Wai-ching and Baggio Leung, used foul language in their oath-taking ceremony at LegCo after they were directly elected. In response, the NPC Standing Committee interpreted the Basic Law’s stipulation on the oath-taking ceremony, which to China should be solemn and respectful. 2. The interpretation of Basic Law, to the localists, jeopardized the “one country, two systems.” 3. The NPC’s interpretation of the Basic Law led to the local court’s decision of repealing Yau’s and Leung’s status as legislators-elect. Four other legislators whose oath-taking behavior was controversial were later deprived of their LegCo members’ status. 4. The result was to alienate more localists in Hong Kong.

Content of the event

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Event

Content of the event

Sources: “The main problem of National Education is the issue about ‘Nation’” (in Chinese), in http://www.inmediahk.net/, access date: March 3, 2020; “The Ultimate Aim for Occupy Central Movement,” in http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/faq_detail&faq_id=1, access date: March 3, 2020; “The saga of Hong Kong’s abducted booksellers takes a darker turn,” in https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/17/completelawlessness-booksellers-dramatic-tale-spooks-hong-kong-underlines-concern-for-swede/, access date: March 3, 2020; “Local university student unions stand united with Mongkok protesters, condemn police action,” Hong Kong Free Press, February 11, 2020, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/02/11/ local-university-student-unions-stand-united-with-mong-kok-protesters-condemn-police-action/, access date: March 3, 2020; and “Four arrested after violence at thousands-strong rally over Beijing’s review of Basic Law,” South China Morning Post, November 6, 2016, in https://www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/politics/article/2043425/thousands-hongkongers-join-protest-march-against-beijings, access date: March 3, 2020

Date

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education policy as having the “sinister” motive of brainstorming school children.22 The government also used reference materials that were clearly biased in favor of the CCP regime in the mainland, leading to a chaotic situation in which the democratic populists mobilized their supporters against the national education policy. The 2014 Occupy Central Movement aimed at changing the democracy deficit in Hong Kong to a democratic system akin to the West, intentionally democratizing the HKSAR but unintentionally threatening the PRC’s national security. In the eyes of Beijing, Hong Kong’s democratic populism was potentially “subversive” to both the HKSAR government and central authorities. The failure of the 2014 Occupy Central Movement to propel democratic reforms in the HKSAR worsened the relations between Hong Kong and the PRC. The localists, who were and are Hong Kong people imbued with a very strong local identity, began to see the mainland tourists negatively. Social tensions gradually erupted in 2015, with some localists clashing with some mainland tourists on the streets and inside shopping malls.23 The 2016 Fishball Revolution in Mongkok aimed at protecting Hong Kong’s cultural and social heritage but carrying a very strong anti-mainland overtone.24 The Mongkok riot took place shortly after the disappearance of the publishers at the Causeway Bay Bookstore. Many young localists saw the PRC as an authoritarian regime leading to the disappearance of the publishers. The government’s mishandling of hawkers in early 2016 provided a fertile ground for the localists to confront with the police. The NPC interpretation of the Basic Law over the oath-taking controversy in November 2016 alienated the localists further, because they believed that the candidates for whom they voted were eventually “suppressed” by the PRC regime. All these events exacerbated the anti-mainland sentiments among many localists. Similarly, the 2019 anti-extradition movement remained highly anti-­ mainland, trying to retain the “purity” of Hong Kong’s existing lifestyle and civil liberties. De-mainlandization has become a hallmark of the pro-­ democracy populist movements in Hong Kong.

22  Alexis Lai, “National education raises furor in Hong Kong,” CNN, July 30, 2012, in https://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/30/world/asia/hong-kong-national-education-controversy/index.html, access date: April 2, 2020. 23  Amie Tsang, “Hong Kong anger at Chinese ‘locust” shoppers intensifies,” Financial Times, February 16, 2015, in https://www.ft.com/content/895bc3de-b5a5-11e4b58d-00144feab7de, access date: April 2, 2020. 24  Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, The Politics of Policing in Greater China (London: Palgrave, 2016).

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Prior to the debate over the extradition bill, the policies of the Carrie Lam administration alienated the localists (see Table 6.3). In June 2018, the LegCo passed a bill to set up a joint railway checkpoint with the PRC immigration authorities in Hong Kong, namely West Kowloon terminal— a move that made the localists feel that Hong Kong’s territorial jurisdiction was abandoned in favor of the mainland, and that the entire policy decision was imposed by Beijing and the HKSAR government on the people of Hong Kong.25 The co-location debate angered not only the localists but also democrats and human rights activists. In March 2019, the HKSAR government revealed an ambitious Lantau Tomorrow Vision in which about HK$624 billion would be spent to build 1700 hectares of artificial islands by using extensive reclamation in the waters around Kau Yi Chau and Hei Ling Chau near the Lantau Island.26 In April 2019, the HKSAR government put forward the National Anthem Bill, but later postponed its discussion and deliberation in LegCo due to the chaos created by the extradition bill. The Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) accepted that the rationale for a national anthem law, and that “certain conduct that is disrespectful to the national anthem should be prohibited by law.”27 However, the HKBA added that “if and when conduct is to be criminalized, the prohibited conduct should be clearly defined in compliance with the principle of certainty of the law, could be easily understood by citizens and should not unduly restrict citizens’ constitutional right to freedom of expression.”28 To many localists who booed the PRC national

25  Kimmy Chung, Shum Lok-kei, Ng Kang-chung and Alvin Lum, “Hong Kong’s controversial China rail checkpoint, bill finally passed by lawmakers amid protests, delays and expulsions,” South China Morning Post, June 14, 2018, in https://www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/politics/article/2150873/hong-kongs-controversial-china-rail-checkpointbill-finally, access date: April 2, 2020. 26  Shirley Zhao, “Explainer: Lantau Tomorrow Vision is arguably Hong Kong’s most important and controversial project. Here’s what you need to know about the HK$624 billion plan,” South China Morning Post, March 21, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3002583/lantau-tomorrow-vision-arguablyhong-kongs-most, access date: April 3, 2020. 27  “Submission of the Hong Kong Bar Association in respect of the National Anthem Bill,” April 2, 2019, in https://www.hkba.org/sites/default/files/National%20Anthem%20 Bill%20CCAHR.pdf, access date: April 3, 2020. 28  Ibid.

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Table 6.3  Carrie Lam’s controversial policies before the extradition bill controversy Policy

Main criticisms of the policy

High Speed 1. The railway’s co-location inside Hong Railway Kong provided an opportunity for the Co-location, June mainland authorities to intervene deeper 2018 in Hong Kong’s affairs. 2. As the arrangement affected Hong Kong’s legal jurisdictions, it arguably “violated” the Basic Law in the minds of the localists and democratic populists. 3. Local democrats argued that it was unnecessary for Hong Kong to give up the local territorial jurisdiction. 4.  Public consultations were inadequate. 5. The co-location plan was imposed by Beijing and the HKSAR government on the people of Hong Kong. Lantau 1. Although the vision would construct a Tomorrow large piece of land through the Vision, March reclamation of some islands off the 2019 Lantau Island, it is regarded as too expensive and causing environmental hazards. 2. It is seen by critics as a plan of allowing more mainland Chinese to migrate to Hong Kong, diluting Hong Kong’s uniqueness. 3. It is also a plan of integrating Hong Kong with mainland China in terms of social and economic development. 4. The plan is both costly and ecologically damaging. 5. The plan ignores other better solutions that can solve Hong Kong’s housing problems. National Anthem 1. The bill, according to critics, limits the Bill, April 2019 freedom of expression in Hong Kong. 2. It “violates” the freedom of thought. 3. It “suppresses” the freedom of creativity.

Groups that were alienated 1. Localists. 2. Human right activists. 3. Democrats.

1. Environmentalists. 2. Human right activists. 3. Democrats. 4. Localists.

1. Students. 2. Youths. 3. Localists. 4. Human rights activists. 5. Democrats.

Sources: HK01, June 22, 2018, in https://www.hk01.com/, access date: February 28, 2020; October 10, 2018, in https://www.hk01.com/, access date: February 28, 2020, and February 19, 2020, in https://www.hk01.com/, access date: February 28, 2020

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anthem during Hong Kong’s international soccer matches, the proposed National Anthem Bill would restrict their freedom of expression.29 One commonality between the democratic and socialist populists is their anti-mainlandization orientation. Mainlandization refers to the beliefs that Hong Kong’s political, social and economic system is increasingly like the mainland’s authoritarian polity, weak civil society and centrally led economy. The democratic and socialist populists in the HKSAR dislike the phenomenon of an influx of mainland visitors into the territory, thereby changing the availability of daily necessities, which remain the targeted products of parallel traders and mainlanders. With the completion of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge in September 2018 and the High Speed Railway in December 2018, it could be anticipated that more mainlanders would visit the HKSAR. Table 6.4 shows that the number of mainland visitors dropped sharply from August to December 2019 by almost 11 million compared to the same period in 2018. Many mainland visitors Table 6.4  Number of mainland visitors to Hong Kong, June–December 2019 Year Month

2018 Mainland Other places

2019 Total

Mainland

Other places

Total

January 4,113,241 1,220,321 5333,562 5,542,896 1,241,510 6,784,406 February 4,399,696 881,275 5,280,971 4,560,963 1,028,665 5,589,628 March 3,668,375 1,326,747 4,995,122 4,478,389 1,381,957 5,860,346 April 4,056,097 1,245,505 5,301,602 4,272,755 1,304,446 5,577,201 May 3,817,370 1,135,633 4,953,003 4,717,520 1,199,021 5,916,541 June 3,634,089 1,107,690 4,741,779 4,000,994 1,142,740 5,143,734 July 4,402,955 1,058,267 5,461,222 4,160,688 1,036,281 5,196,969 August 4,825,547 1,070,404 5,895,951 2,782,897 807,674 3,590,571 September 3,713,464 1,005,072 4,718,536 2,412,459 691,590 3,104,049 October 4,654,391 1,230,121 5,884,512 2,519,243 792,328 3,311,571 November 4,631,378 1,363,649 5,995,027 1,927,649 718,478 2,646,127 December 5,121,627 1,464,641 6,586,268 2,398,232 793,234 3,191,466 Total 44,445,259 14,026,898 58,472,157 55,912,609 43,774,685 12,137,924 Source: “Visitor arrival,” Hong Kong Tourism Board, in http://www.discoverhongkong.com/in/abouthktb/news/visitor-arrival.jsp, access date: February 28, 2020

29  Mike Cherney and Joyu Wang, “Hong Kong Soccer Fans Boo Chinese Anthem—While They Still Can,” The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2019, in https://www.wsj.com/ articles/hong-kong-soccer-fans-boo-chinese-anthemwhile-they-still-can-11568135746, access date: April 3, 2020.

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Diagram 6.1  Interactions between Beijing, HKSAR government, nationalistic populists, socialist populists and democratic populists

were frightened by the Hong Kong protests, including a minority who were harassed on the streets of the HKSAR during the apex of the protests from August to November. On the other hand, the mainland mass media highlighted the “criminal” and “violent” nature of the Hong Kong protests, dampening the desire of many mainlanders to visit Hong Kong. The relations between Beijing, the HKSAR government, the democratic populists, socialist populists and nationalistic populists can be seen in Diagram 6.1. While the nationalistic populists support both the central authorities and the HKSAR government, the relations between the nationalists on the one hand and the democratic and socialist populists on the other hand remain contentious. Similarly, the democratic and socialist populists confront and clash with both the HKSAR government and Beijing. The clashes between the pro-Beijing nationalistic populists and the democratic/socialist populists could be easily seen in the 2019 protests. The mobilization of the triad members to attack the passengers at the Yuen Long MTR station was widely seen and orchestrated by nationalistic populist politicians and elites. Junius Ho, a nationalistic populist politician, was seen by the media as coincidentally shaking hands with a group of people in white shirts in Yuen Long before the triad attack

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occurred. Although there was no concrete evidence to prove his involvement in the ensuing attack, many protesters disliked him and his ancestors’ grave was later mysteriously vandalized.30 In early November 2019, he was stabbed and injured by an attacker with a knife.31 Ho’s political rise was attributable to the political patronage of PRC officials in the New Territories as they groomed him to be a pro-Beijing politician to replace another faction led by the late Lau Wong-fat in the rural political arena.32 Factional rivalries among the rural leaders provided a golden opportunity for Ho to rise up quickly under the tutelage of PRC authorities in the New Territories. His meteoric emergence and high-profile approach to dealing with political controversies demonstrated the PRC’s search for its staunch supporters to back up the HKSAR government. In short, the nationalistic populists have been incorporated into the umbrella of China’s united front work in the HKSAR,33 competing with the democratic and socialist populists and balancing the overall pan-democratic influence on Hong Kong’s political development. During the protests from June to December 2019, the nationalistic populists played several political functions. First, as mentioned above, they constituted a useful networking platform of mobilizing the pro-Beijing forces to participate in pro-extradition bill gatherings and rallies, acting as the shapers of public opinion and an indispensable arm of China’s propaganda machine. A pro-Beijing group named the Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance held a rally on July 20, 2019. According to one of its leaders, Kennedy Wang, the anti-extradition protests and assemblies had detrimental impacts on the Hong Kong economy and “we hope the society can 30  Sum Lok-kei and Christy Leung, “Hong Kong lawmaker Junius Ho told to resize parents’ graves found to be in breach of license,” South China Morning Post, September 29, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3030779/after-vandals-attack-hong-kong-lawmaker-junius-hos-family, access date: April 3, 2020. 31  Kanis Leung, Alvin Lum and Clifford Lo, “Knife attack on Hong Kong lawmaker Junius Ho sparks security concerns ahead of district council elections,” South China Morning Post, November 6, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3036492/ hong-kong-lawmaker-junius-ho-injured-along-two-others-knife, access date: April 3, 2020. 32  See an in-depth report, “Behind the clashes between Ho Kwan-yiu and Chow Wingken: The Liaison Office and the Struggle with the Rural Factions,” August 29, 2016, in https://theinitium.com/article/20160829-hongkong-legcoelection-ntw/, access date: April 3, 2020. 33  For details, see Sonny Shiu-hing Lo, Steven Chung-fun Hung and Jeff Hai-chi Loo, China’s New United Front Work in Hong Kong: Penetrative Politics and Implications (London: Palgrave Macmillan, July 2019).

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restore its peace and develop the economy, and allow the government to continue to press on and to develop its policy for people’s livelihood.”34 The pro-Beijing clan associations, political parties and rural leaders were mobilized by providing subsidies and lunches to attract their members and supporters in all the rallies. A pro-democracy newspaper, Apple Daily, discovered that some protesters received money from a representative of pro-­ Beijing clans groups.35 Clearly, political mobilization was a strategy of counter-insurgency in the minds of the nationalistic populist groups. Second, some nationalistic populists might have mysterious relations with the underworld and could perhaps orchestrate the pro-Beijing triads to target at some protesters, like the Yuen Long triad attack on ordinary citizens on the night of July 21 and the action of some people in North Point to chase and beat up protesters. However, such political mobilization of triad members entailed huge political costs. Many protesters developed more hatred toward the nationalistic populists than ever before, and they suspected that some PRC officials appeared to cultivate improper relations with the underworld which was supposed to refrain from utilizing violence against ordinary citizens unrelated to triad interests. The nationalistic populists acted as a counter-balancing force against the peaceful protesters in June–December 2019, mobilizing their supporters to remove the stickers, posters and plasters on the Lennon Wall, waving PRC flags and singing the national anthem in shopping malls and utilizing social media to criticize and demonize the protesters. In a nutshell, the nationalistic populists were politically utilized by PRC authorities as the agents of the mainland state to counter and balance the influence of the protesters. Third, nationalistic populists played the role of being the hardliners on the pro-Beijing camp, voicing extremist views that had the unintended consequences of provoking and alienating the protesters further. In July 2019, lawmaker Ann Chiang claimed that foreign forces were like a commander mobilizing the protesters to clash with police.36 In August, Junius Ho contended that Beijing should “declare Hong Kong is in a state of emergency and issue an order applying the relevant national laws to the 34  “Pro-government side plan rival ‘safeguard HK’ rallies,” Radio Television Hong Kong, in https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1469059-20190718.htm, access date: September 24, 2019. 35  Apple Daily, July 21, 2019. 36  HK01, July 15, 2019, available at: https://www.hk01.com/, access date: September 24, 2019.

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region” so as to stop the “riot” and maintain the city’s stability.37 Quite often, since Hong Kong’s transfer of its sovereignty from Britain to China, the nationalistic populists have increasingly become the fighter of the pro-­ Beijing forces, presenting the hardline and intolerant perspectives that have often raised the eyebrows of some ordinary people and the democrats. They have become the megaphone of the hardline policy advocated by the hardliners PRC officials toward Hong Kong. It must be noted that a minority of localists are extremists interested in using violence to confront the police. These extremists prepared self-made petrol bombs, manufactured weapons, deposited dangerous chemicals and were determined to struggle against the police. They did not appear to have coherent ideologies to fight for Hong Kong’s democracy, but entailed inherently violent tendency in their view of politics in the HKSAR.  In August 2019, eight people, who included Andy Chan of the outlawed HKPA, were arrested in an industrial building for being suspicious of possessing offensive weapons, such as petrol bombs, bows and arrows.38 In January 2020, four people were arrested in a plot of building remote-­ controlled bombs in an industrial site where flare gun, three pistols, a bow, a samurai sword, an axe and metal balls were also found.39 In March 2020, a bomb-making factory with 2.6 tons of chemicals was uncovered by the police, who arrested 17 people.40 Although the police did not reveal the details of those who were suspected of possessing offensive weapons, it seems that some localists became radicalized and more extreme than before. As such, some localist extremists have become “home-grown” terrorists in the eyes of the police. Political violence in the HKSAR during the anti-extradition and anti-­ police protests was characterized by various new methods of confrontation 37  Jeff Pao, “Pro-Beijing camp wants HK water supply cut off,” Asia Times, August 19, 2019 https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/08/article/pro-beijing-camp-wants-hk-watersupply-cut-off/, access date: September 24, 2019. 38  “Hong Kong police arrest 8 in building raid, seize bomb-making materials, weapons,” The Strait Times, August 2, 2019, in https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/hongkong-police-arrest-8-in-building-raid-seize-bomb-making-materials-weapons, access date: April 3, 2020. 39  Alvin Lum, “Hong Kong police arrest four for ‘supporting role’ in alleged plot to build remote-controlled bomb,” South China Morning Post, January 24, 2020, in https://www. scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3047601/hong-kong-police-arrest-foursupporting-role-alleged-plot, access date: April 3, 2020. 40  “Bomb-making factory raided by Hong Kong police, 17 arrested,” Hong Kong Free Press, March 8, 2020, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2020/03/08/bomb-making-factory-raided-hong-kong-police-17-arrested/, access date: April 3, 2020.

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with the police and political targets. First, violent protesters occupied the LegCo on July 1 and vandalized its conference and meeting rooms. Second, they went to vandalize some pharmacies in Sheung Shui where mainland tourists and parallel traders went there to buy cosmetics, daily necessities and other products. Third, they attacked the Liaison Office building, defaced its national emblem and destroyed the PRC national flag—a symbol of anti-PRC and anti-CCP activities. Fourth, they painted political slogans on the streets and at the MTR stations and pro-Beijing organizations and buildings. Fifth, they blocked roads in different districts to overstretch police manpower. Sixth, they smashed the facilities of the MTR station in retaliation of the MTR Corporation’s cooperation with the police. Seventh, they manufactured self-made petrol bombs and threw them at the police, police stations and police vehicles. Eighth, they jammed transport infrastructure such as the airport, routes leading to the airport and entrances and exits of the Cross-Harbor tunnel. Ninth, they targeted at pro-Beijing shops, such as Maxim restaurants, and banks and vandalized them. Tenth, protesters and anti-protesters engaged in private brawls, leading to bloodshed on the streets and in the shopping malls. In one case, a man was set fire by violent protesters after he criticized their behavior.41 Another case involved an old man whose head was hit by bricks thrown by two teenage protesters and he unfortunately died.42 Eleventh, they attempted to use remote-controlled bombs to attack the police. All these violent activities were a testimony to the escalated polarization, hyper-­ politicization and radicalization of violent protesters in the HKSAR.

The October 1 Protests: Strategy of Protesters and Police Performance The October 1 protests were precipitated by a series of events in September that were characterized by active student participation and some Hong Kong people’s lobbying activities in the United States. Table 6.5 sums up the main events in September. Many students began to form human chains and participated in class boycott and rallies. At the same time, democrats 41  “Hong Kong police say man was set alight after arguing with protestors,” AFP, November 11, 2019, in https://hongkongfp.com/2019/11/11/hong-kong-police-sayman-set-alight-arguing-protesters/, access date: April 25, 2020. 42  Joyu Wang, “Hong Kong charges teens with murder tied to protests,” The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2020, in https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-charges-teens-withmurder-tied-to-protests-11587562477, access date: April 25, 2020.

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Table 6.5  Events in September leading to the October 1 protests Time

Event

September 2

Some secondary school students continued to support the anti-extradition movement, but the Wong Cho Bau Secondary School prohibited them to chant slogans in their school uniforms. Still, some students persisted in their protests after removing their uniforms. On the same day, the police went to La Salle College to search some alumni who went to support the student protesters. About 4000 students also participated in a rally at the Edinburg Place. On the other hand, thousands of students at the Chinese University of Hong Kong gathered at the University Mall to join a large-scale student strike. On the night, a police helicopter sprayed fluorescent powder above a crowd of protesters at the Tamar Park. A human chain was formed by some students in the Po Leung Kuk Lee Shing Pik College in Tsuen Wan. About 50 medical staff members launched a strike at the Kowloon Hospital without stopping their medical services. Students from the Chinese Foundation Secondary School in Siu Sai Wan planned a walk-out, but it was canceled under the school’s pressure. The school said that they required permission letters from parents; otherwise, students would be penalized if they violated the rules. Students at Po Leung Kuk Celine Ho Yam Tong College attended an opening ceremony in which they sang “Do you hear the people sing, Les Misérables,” followed by “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times.” At 6 pm, Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced that the extradition bill would be withdrawn after the end of the legislative session in October. At 11 pm, a woman jumped off a building in Fanling and, before committing suicide, she told a man to yell out the slogan of the anti-extradition movement. A young woman knelt at the Prince Edward MTR station to demand the MTR to reveal the security tapes on the night of August 31. The MTR worked with the police to stop services and shut down some stations. Many netizens opposed the MTR Corporation by windowshopping at some MTR-owned shopping malls. On the same day, the Front called for another rally and its supporters went to the US Consulate to call for a democracy legislation on Hong Kong, The MTR Corporation released CCTV screenshots on the night of August 31, but its move could not satisfy many protesters. On the day of the Mid-Autumn Festival, some people climbed up the Lion Rock mountain and formed a glowing chain, using color lasers to light up the mountain. At 11:30 pm, the police arrested five people in Hunghom. A police officer had a wedding in Hunghom, but 100 protesters went to “congratulate” him sarcastically. Police supporters attacked some anti-extradition protesters in Amoy Plaza. The police arrested several teenagers.

September 3

September 4

September 6 September 8

September 9 September 13

September 14

(continued)

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Table 6.5 (continued) Time

Event

September 15

About 100,000 people were organized by the Front to join a rally on the International Democracy Day. Medical staff members at the Prince of Wales Hospital shouted, “Five demands, no one less.” Joshua Wong and Denise Ho delivered their speeches at the US Congress, calling for the United States to stand up for human rights and democracy for Hong Kong. Some victims of police “brutality” and volunteer lawyers of the Front launched a crowdfunding scheme to aim at gathering HK$10 million and claiming compensation from the police later. At 12:30 pm, about 500 students at the University of Science and Technology (UST) formed a human chain and chanted “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times.” Netizens gathered at the Tuen Mun Park for a march, but conflicts broke out between police and protesters. The San Uk Ling Human Rights Concern Group gathered at the Central district to raise public awareness and concern about the predicament of detainees at the center. An anti-authoritarian rally was initiated by some netizens in conformity with the 929 Global Anti-Totalitarianism rally at 65 cities in 24 countries. On the same day, over 100,000 people joined a rainy parade to support the Hong Kong protests in Taipei. At 5 pm, an Indonesian journalist, Veby Mega Indah, was shot in her right eye and injured by the Hong Kong police.

September 16 September 17

September 19

September 21 September 27

September 29

Source: For details, see “Timeline,” in https://tl.hkrev.info/en/timeline/, access date: April 4, 2020

like Joshua Wong and singer Denise Ho went to the hearings at the US Congress, lobbying the US government to enact legislation to protect and promote democracy and human rights in the HKSAR.  The events in September were generally more peaceful than August, but they led to a more violent confrontation between the protesters and police on October 1. On the morning of October 1, protesters adopted a flexible strategy to  focus on several locations on the Hong Kong Island (Table  6.6). They targeted at the police headquarters but were repelled by the police who used tear gas and water cannon. Protesters retreated to Queensway while their supporters confronted the police with self-made petrol bombs in Wanchai. The guerilla-like warfare between protesters and police spread to other areas, like North Point and Tin Hau where protesters eventually withdrew. The confrontations on the Hong Kong Island were

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Table 6.6  Detailed events of the October 1 protest in Hong Kong Island Time

Event

October The Front launched the October 1 protest and rally, but it did not receive the 1, 2019 police letter of no objection. Lee Cheuk-yan, Leung Kwok-hung, Albert Ho 13:11 and Figo Chan appealed to citizens to march in their personal names. The parade started at Causeway Bay, earlier than 1:30 pm. Many citizens showed up, wearing black clothes and masks, and some carrying different flags that represented different countries. 14:05 The marchers arrived at the Wan Chai police headquarters and about ten riot police were stationed on the flyover. The protesters shouted, “opening the umbrellas.” 14:33 A banner with the words “Warm Congratulations to the National Day of the PRC” was originally posted on an overpass at the Pacific Place in Admiralty. Protesters in black shirts climbed up to the top of the overpass to remove the words and replace them with foul language in Cantonese colloquial, namely “congratulating her mother.” 14:38 The protesters continued to shout, “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our Times,” passing through the Pacific Place, High Court, Court of Final Appeal, and going into the Chater Road pedestrian zone. 15:28 In Sai Wan, police officers found that the demonstrators on Connaught Road West had completely dispersed. Some protesters waved with a smile and said “goodbye” to the police. Many police officers were on guard at the Connaught Road West. 15:42 Several police cars and a water cannon vehicle parked at the Des Voeux Road West and Connaught Road West in Sheung Wan. About 50 riot police with long shields were on alert. The police raised a blue flag on the Des Voeux Road West, instructing protesters to participate in an illegal assembly, calling on them to leave as soon as possible. But only about 30 citizens wore plain clothes and slippers and gathered 100 meters in front of the police line. 16:44 On the Harcourt Road, demonstrators demolished a celebration banner of a foreign country at the Hutchison Building. The police began to fire tear gas canisters and water cannons from the government headquarters. Most protesters retreated to the direction of Queensway, while a few remained to throw bricks at the police. 17:07 Under the leadership of the water cannon vehicle, more than 20 police cars drove into Admiralty. Over a hundred riot police and the special tactical squad members got off at Connaught Road Central and proceeded to Harcourt Road. David Jordan, one of the assistant commissioners, commanded the police on the scene. 17:26 Protesters on the Harcourt Road retreated. The police removed the barricades constructed by protesters, fired tear gas and the blue color water cannon. Protesters continued to withdraw from the scene. 17:41 The police fired dozens of tear gas canisters from Queensway while advancing toward the Queen’s Road East. The police arrived in Wan Chai, acting as a pincer movement to surround the protesters located at Queensway and Wanchai. The police arrested at least two people in front of the St. Francis Street intersection. (continued)

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Table 6.6 (continued) Time

Event

17:55

On Wanchai’s Hennessy Road, police chased the protesters at the Southorn Stadium, subdued the young ones, took off their masks and searched their bags and personal belongings. Protesters in Wan Chai retreated to the junction of Hennessy Road and Stewart Road and threw at least ten self-made petrol bombs. After fire ambulances arrived, the police fired tear gas to disperse protesters. The water cannon vehicle was mobilized to the scene. The protesters continued to throw petrol bombs at the police. At least two people were arrested. Police moved toward Causeway Bay outside the C.C. Wu Building. Tear gas canisters were fired to disperse protesters. Some protesters burned debris and threw gas bombs to prevent the police from advancing. After more than a hundred police advanced to the junction of Causeway Road and Triton Terrace, they again raised the black flag toward protesters. Later, the police went in their police cars and left toward the direction of Causeway Bay. About five of them drove toward direction of Fortress Hill. After clearance in the Causeway Bay, the police continued to advance to Tin Hau, the King’s Road and Shell Street, to set up roadblocks to inspect vehicles and to intercept a No. 19 bus. During the inspection of citizens and bus passengers, about ten police officers were armed with long shields. Police officers were scolded by more than 30 citizens when they got out of the cars. A police commander asked an officer to take photos at those citizens who stirred up troubles. But a citizen challenged the police by saying “is Hong Kong now lacking the freedom of speech?” One police angrily replied, “You do not condemn violent protestors who commit arson, are you making Hong Kong chaotic?” Some angry citizens shouted at the police, who eventually left in their police vehicles. Protesters in Causeway Bay retreated to North Point. When they walked to the City Garden Hotel, police cars arrived and about 50 police got out of the vehicles to chase the protesters. The police hit a reporter with a shield and another reporter was knocked down. The police fired tear gas canisters on the King’s Road without warning. They arrested at least three people and left. Three women were searched at a building on the Electric Road and were taken in a police vehicle. A LegCo member, Ray Chan, asked for the identity of the three detained women and complained about the police action. Police officers retreated to the Tin Hau MTR Station on the Causeway Road and were scolded by some citizens. A reporter wanted to go forward to take photos, but the police officer used pepper spray to point at the reporter. Some citizens were angry at the police action and shouted that “rats are better than you the police.”

18:29

19:15

19:41

20:37

22:15

22:17

22:47

Sources: Ming Pao, October 2, 2020, pp. A01–A04. Also see “Citizens self-organize the October 1 Protest in Causeway Bay,” The Inmedia, October 1, 2019, in https://www.inmediahk.net/node/1067588, access date: April 1, 2020

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characterized by a cat-and-mouse game in which protesters deliberately stretched the police manpower. At the same time, the police adopted a faster tactic to arrest and search protesters in Wanchai and other places, while using tear gas canisters and water cannons swiftly and decisively. The police action on the morning of October 1 showed that they were sensitive to the PRC’s national day and were determined to subdue and arrest protesters quickly. The protests spread to other districts in Kowloon and the New Territories, demonstrating a deliberate strategy of using guerilla-style tactics on October 1 (see Table  6.7). Protesters went to create chaos and committed arson and vandalism in various districts, including Wong Tai Sin, Hunghom, Tsuen Wan, Shatin, Cheung Sha Wan, Shumshuipo, Prince Edward and Mongkok. They changed the arenas of struggle and adopted the tactic of overstretching police manpower simultaneously. Interestingly, although the police on the Hong Kong Island appeared to be more assertive, decisive and swift in their action against protesters, the same situation could not be seen in the Kowloon side. In particular, the Shumshuipo police station became the weakest spot of attack by protesters. The police station appeared to lack manpower and adopted a defensive strategy. Although there were rumors before October 1 that the police would perhaps adopt a shoot-to-kill policy toward violent protesters, the reality was that the police use of force was unbalanced on October 1, when the police on the Hong Kong Island acted in a far more effective way that their counterpart in the Kowloon and the New Territories. Obviously, the police on the Hong Kong Island were under pressure to defend the Liaison Office from the advancement and possible attack of protesters, leaving the Kowloon side to local police commanders. This unbalanced way in which the police dealt with protesters on the Hong Kong Island and in the Kowloon side demonstrated the lack of coherent command at the top level of police leadership. Analytically speaking, a new pattern of protests emerged in the HKSAR on the PRC national day on October 1. The protests became increasingly violent and strategic with profound socio-political impacts. First, it was the first time in the political history of the HKSAR that violence and serious police-protesters confrontations took place on October 1. A young 18-year-old secondary school student, Tsang Chi-kin, was shot by a live

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Table 6.7  Detailed events of the October 1 protests in other districts Time

Event

October 1, 2019 12:21 12:42

Nearly 200 citizens responded to an online mobilization to participate in a rally at Che Gong Temple in Tai Wai.

13:05

13:12

13:50

13:57

13:59

14:18

Police intercepted and inspected some residents outside the Wong Tai Sin Centre and Wong Tai Sin Plaza. Most of the people searched were young men. One 15-year-old boy said that he was just out for shopping and was released after being questioned and searched by the police. Another teenager in black was searched for a mask and was finally released. In the Wong Tai Sin Plaza, a young man in black was found with a helmet. He explained to police officers that the helmet was used to protect himself. Police officers opened the man’s long umbrella for inspection on the spot, but they found nothing. Police officers then photographed the man and recorded his identity card and released him. Citizens who had originally gathered at Che Kung Temple set off to Lik Yuen Village once three police cars arrived at the football stadium. They chanted slogans such as “Liberating Hong Kong, revolution of our times.” After citizens began their parade, more than 30 police officers stood at the Che Temple Road and recorded the parade by video cameras. Police officers followed the parade and later returned to their vehicles. A pedestrian bridge at the Sha Tsui Road Stadium in Tsuen Wan saw many citizens who shouted the slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times.” The police arrived at the stadium and then left. Nearly 300 protesters marched from the Che Kung Temple but faced 100 police near the Yuen Woo Road. Protesters spread out and ran to the Lik Yuen bridge. The police chased them. Protesters who gathered at the Shing Mun River entered the Shatin Central Park to take shelter. Many black-shirt protesters appeared on the Lung Cheung Road. Some of them confronted the police. The police raised a blue flag for a while, and protesters retreated to the direction of Tsz Wan Shan. After they retreated to Wong Tai Sin Road, they dismantled the roadside’s bamboo branches to block the road and set up a line of defense. Some people called for an “active attack.” Many protesters picked up bamboo poles to re-advance to Lung Cheung Road. They faced the police on the Shatin Pass Road. Many protesters gathered outside Sha Tsui Road Stadium in Tsuen Wan. They sprinkled paper money from a flyover and shouted slogans. Protesters removed a flagpole and hit it with hard objects. Riot police fired multiple tear gas canisters along the Lung Cheung Road in Wong Tai Sin. Some protesters occupied the road outside the North Hall of Wong Tai Sin Centre and set up roadblocks. They cut off the iron chains at the exit of a shopping mall. (continued)

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Table 6.7 (continued) Time

Event

14:54

A large number of citizens gathered at an open space in Tuen Mun Town Hall. Police rushed out of a side door of the City Hall, causing chaos at the scene. Citizens threw objects at them. Police arrested six people, some of whom were beaten up with blood left on the ground. During the arrests, pepper spray was repeatedly fired by police on the protesters, who retreated outside the Tuen Mun Central Post Office. Then protesters threw water bombs filled with black liquid at police officers. They counter-attacked and mobilized supporters to surround the police. At least two reporters, including one from TVB, were injured and were splashed with black liquid thrown by demonstrators. Demonstrators erected roadblocks at the junction of the Tuen Mun Heung Sze Wui Road and Pui To Road. Police continued to fire tear gas at protesters near the Tuen Mun police station. Nearly 50 riot police raised several black flags outside the Castle Peak Road and Tsuen Chang Centre in Tsuen Wan, dispersing protesters and setting up a line of defense at the junction of Chung On Street and Castle Peak Road. Protesters erected barricades and threw petrol bombs and bricks at the police. The police immediately fired rubber bullets and tear gas, asking reporters to give way to the police to disperse protesters. An 18-year-old form five student was shot by a live revolver round from a police officer at close range on Tai Ho Street and he was injured and taken to hospital. At the junction of Tuen Mun’s Heung Sze Wui Road and Pui To Road, protesters erected barricades and set fire. Firefighters arrived at the scene. At the Tuen Mun police station, police fired tear gas, pepper balls and sponge grenades. Protesters tried to advance their defensive line to the V City bus stop, but they failed. Later, the police suddenly advanced on the Tuen Mun Rural Committee Road and pursued protesters. At least two people were arrested. Police officers used batons to beat up the arrested protesters. Protesters confronted the police at Hoi Ba Street in Tsuen Wan with only 50 meters away from each other. The police subdued three men and one woman. Protesters regrouped on Hoi Ba Street and threw debris at police. Police fired tear gas arrested two people on the Tai Ho Road. Police fired multiple tear gas canisters at Yuen Wo Road in Shatin to disperse demonstrators. Many demonstrators gathered near the Sha Tin Town Hall and road barriers were set up. Police pushed their line of defense northward to Lung Cheung Road in Wong Tai Sin, where tear gas and bean bags rounds were fired. Protesters left in the direction of Tian Ma Court. Police officers slammed a reporter with a shield while another police officer raised a gun and pointed it at the protesters near the South Hall of Wong Tai Sin Centre. The two sides confronted each other at Lung Cheung Road where protesters threw petrol bombs.

15:40

15:50

16:00

16:13

16:23

16:25

16:58

(continued)

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Table 6.7 (continued) Time

Event

17:03

In Tsuen Wan, demonstrators gathered outside the Alison Centre on Sha Tsui Road, raised their umbrellas toward the police line and threw bricks and petrol bombs. Police fired multiple tear gas canisters. Protesters seized the Hoi Ba Street intersection and attempted to attack the police line from the flank. Tear gas smoke was used by the police to disperse protesters. The special tactical squad of the police went to disperse protesters outside the Shatin Square, but protesters had already left. Police officers asked reporters to step back and fired at least ten tear gas canisters to disperse protesters at the Shatin Main Street. Some protesters set up barricades outside the Cultural Museum. Police fired tear gas canisters at the protesters on Hoi Ba Street in Tsuen Wan. Two people were subdued. In Wong Tai Sin, protesters attacked the offices of pro-Beijing legislators, Wong Kwok-kin and Ho Kai-ming. Windows of their offices were smashed, and petrol bombs were thrown by protesters. Their offices were painted with words “traitor selling out Hong Kong.” Some citizens distinguished the fire at their offices and protesters began to leave the scene. In Shumshuipo, protesters threw petrol bombs at the glass curtain wall of the Cheung Sha Wan Government Offices, breaking its windows. The police fired 30 tear gas canisters and rubber bullets, and protesters escaped in the direction of Prince Edward and Nanchang Street. During the retreat, protesters burned papers and boxes, emitting thick smoke to prevent the police from chasing them. Some protesters returned to Cheung Sha Wan Road and advanced to the Shumshuipo police station. The police fired multiple tear gas canisters and rubber bullets from the platform of the Shumshuipo police station. More than ten protesters threw petrol bombs into the police station. Police fired rubber bullets at protesters at close range, but no protester was arrested. At night, protesters went to set fire at the Tsuen Wan MTR station and then went to paint words like “triad” on a mahjong parlor. They set fire at the door of the mahjong parlor, used wooden sticks to smash the signs of shops and shouted “Fujian people come out.” Protesters went to vandalize a cake shop under the Maxim group’s management. They also went to vandalize Best Mart 360 with iron bars. Some citizens told protesters not to steal products in the shop. In turn, protesters used umbrellas and iron bars to smash all the products of the shop on the floor. Protesters set up roadblocks at the roundabout of Che Kung Temple Road with water horses, iron rails, bamboo branches, long ladders, ice cream barricades, wooden ladders and traffic cones, leaving only one lane for vehicles to pass. They entered the Tai Wai MTR station and destroyed the CCTV, ticket-selling machines and the glass windows of the control room. They threw petrol bombs at the MTR station. Firemen rushed to the scene and protesters left.

17:32

17:43 18:04

18:32

19:10

19:55

(continued)

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Table 6.7 (continued) Time

Event

20:09

At the junction of Yum Chau Street and Lai Chi Kok Road, a taxi bumped onto the onlookers, leading to chaotic traffic without police to mediate. An elderly man was crossing the road at that time and the taxi hit him. The man was seriously injured, bleeding from his head while his left shoulder was swollen. Firemen arrived at the scene to rescue those who were injured. Some citizens criticized the police for obstructing the firemen to conduct the rescue operation. Protesters outside the Cheung Sha Wan Government Offices advanced to the Shumshuipo police station, where police officers fired tear gas at them. At the same time, protesters walked inside the West Kowloon Centre bus station, using laser points to target at three police officers, and throwing petrol bombs at the police line inside the bus station. Protesters committed arson at the Tuen Mun Rural Committee Road, burning debris, then retreated to a Light Rail Transit (LRT) station and left. Some of them damaged the facilities inside the LRT station, smashed the ticket machines and CCTV with hard objects and painted the LRT station with spray paint and words “Liberating Hong Kong, revolution of our times,” and “destroying the CCP.” The Tai Hing Government Office’s front glass door was smashed by protesters. Many protesters gathered outside Exit D of the Prince Edward station, setting up a barricade and throwing petrol bombs to the station inside. The police fired tear gas and firemen rushed to the scene. Protesters retreated to the Nathan Road, set up barricades and set fire on the road. Firemen arrived at the scene while police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd.

20:50

21:28

21:54

Sources: Ming Pao Daily News, October 2, 2020, pp. A01–A04. Also see The Inmedia, October 1, 2019, in https://www.inmediahk.net/node/1067589, access date: April 1, 2020

revolver from a police officer at Tai Ho Road in Tsuen Wan.43 The incident shocked the society, marking a tense relationship between students and police. Other violent activities included arson, vandalism at MTR ­stations, and the hurling of numerous petrol bombs at the police and police stations. From the police perspective, the protests no longer aimed at achieving their political demands, as Police Commissioner Stephen Lo asserted, but they were violent in both form and objective. From the 43  Emma Graham-Harrison, “Hong Kong: thousands protest over police shooting of teenager,” The Guardian, October 2, 2019, in https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/ oct/02/hong-kong-protests-police-teenager-shooting-students-violence-, access date: April 5, 2020.

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violent protesters’ perspective, they used violence to express their anger, vandalizing the MTR stations to retaliate against the MTR Corporation’s cooperation with the police, attacking government offices and the China Travel Services, smashing the offices of pro-Beijing legislators and disrupting the services of stores and restaurants owned by pro-Beijing business elites. The entire day of violence led to 269 arrests made by the police, including 178 males and 91 females aging from 12 to 71 years old. The police used 1400 tear gas canisters, 900 rubber bullets, 100 bean bag rounds and 230 sponge grenades. Above all, six real shots were fired by police officers. Although no protester died, the October 1 confrontation was by far the most violent day in the history of the HKSAR. Second, the violent protesters utilized much stronger self-made petrol bombs to attack the police, police vehicles and police stations. The fire from these bombs was stronger and lasted longer than before, showing that some radical protesters knew how to make “better” weapons.44 Protesters also learnt how to throw the petrol bombs in a longer distance at the police, as evidenced in their confrontation in Wanchai. Two protesters even shot fireworks to the sky in the Shumshuipo residential district at night.45 The frequent use of petrol bombs could be seen in many districts, especially as violent protesters retreated and attempted to prevent the police from chasing them. In the Tuen Mun City Hall, a large group of protesters attacked a small group of police. Corrosive liquid was used by a few protesters to spread on police officers. At the juncture of the Waterloo Road and Nathan Road, police officers were outnumbered by protesters and two shots were fired to frighten them away. The chaotic situation plunged the HKSAR into a battle zone. Third, the desecration of the PRC’s national flag could be seen in the Central district and in Causeway Bay—an act of political symbolism showing the anti-PRC character of some violent protesters. A lot of police were sent to prevent protesters from approaching the Liaison Office headquarters, showing the lesson learnt by the police after the PRC national emblem was defaced on the Liaison Office building on the night of July 21. The persistence of protesters in desecrating the PRC national flag demonstrated that, even after the extradition bill was withdrawn in early September, the protests took on a new character of having the anti-police 44  Observation made by Sonny Lo and it was also identified by at least two foreign diplomats in their discussion, October 2019. 45  Cable TV news, October 1, 2019.

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and anti-mainland objectives after the July 21 triad attack on Yuen Long MTR passengers. From a crisis management perspective, many buildings that raised the PRC national flags could and should have conducted risks assessment by removing the flags shortly before October 1. Although some pro-Beijing Hong Kong people vowed to form vigilante groups to protect PRC national flags, still some protesters damaged them—a sign of disrespect illustrating a profound sense of political hatred in the city. Fourth, the injury of the 18-year-old boy by a real bullet in Tsuen Wan’s Tai Ho Road stimulated more students to participate in the struggle against the police. A debate began over whether the police officer concerned should fire the pistol at the student. Of course, the police side of the story was that the student attempted to attack the police officer, who had no choice but to defend himself by firing a shot. However, from an operational vantage point, the police officer who fired the shot chased a group of protesters with one or two of his colleagues, leading to a situation in which the small group of police was outnumbered by protesters. The advancement of a few police officers into a larger group of protesters led to the easy isolation of the police team itself, thereby increasing the possibility of being surrounded and attacked by protesters and enhancing the risks of human injuries through the firing of pistols for the sake of self-­ defense.46 Police Commissioner Stephen Lo and Assistant Commissioner Tang Ping-keung said the officer’s act was “legal” and there was no “shoot to kill” order respectively.47 Pro-government lawmakers and mass media supported the police action to protect themselves, because the police were attacked by protesters in the first place. However, the unfortunate incident, as will be discussed, triggered more students to participate in the anti-police and anti-government protests in October and November. The shooting incident in Tsuen Wan on the afternoon of October 1 had deeper socio-political implications. Pro-democracy lawmakers questioned whether the police should fire six shots on October 1. The debate demonstrated the deep fissures in the society of Hong Kong, implying that the political coloration of “blue” (pro-government side) versus “yellow” (pro-democracy side) was heavily polarized. Hyper-politicization took place in Hong Kong since the anti-national education movement in 2012, reaching a peak in the 2014 Occupy Central Movement, and 46  At least two foreign diplomats with military background shared this view with one of the authors, Sonny Lo, in October 2019. 47  Cable TV news, October 2, 2019.

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escalating into political violence in the anti-extradition movement of 2019.48 The over-simplification of politics as having either “blue” or “yellow” colors illustrated the tragedy of Hong Kong, where many people were depoliticized for so long before 1997 that the post-colonial era witnessed continuous escalations of political bickering, biases and struggles. The deeper significance of the ongoing debate over the shooting incidents on October 1 had to be understood historically. In a colonial society that was depoliticized for a long duration, its post-colonial political landscape could be gradually polarized, ideologically radicalized and eventually conflicts-­ridden with bitter violence. Fifth, many young people, including students, were arrested. The youngest arrested protester was only 12 years old. This was a disturbing sign pointing to the likelihood of having “a lost generation.” If generational change became a hallmark of confrontational politics in Hong Kong, then an entire generation was perhaps lost in the sense that many young people saw the government as failing to meet public demands and govern the territory. From 1997 to 2019, the living standard of Hong Kong increased continuously and yet there was a lack of youth policy to help the young people to move up the ladder of the society, to find affordable housing and to engage them in a meaningful dialogue with the government. The Youth Development Commission set up by the HKSAR government co-opted a relatively few young elites from the upper and middle classes without taking into consideration the young people from the middle-lower classes.49 Young people from the lower classes who wished to apply for public housing units needed to wait for at least five and a half years to get onto the units if they were fortunate to undergo the eligibility screening. The entry of many mainland talents into the HKSAR led to a highly competitive market environment in which local youths who lacked knowledge and education were destined to be the members of lower classes without prospects of career advancement. The ceaseless influx of mainland talents and university students, who could stay working in Hong Kong after graduation, aroused the jealousies of some local students who could not compete effectively with them. Mainland students 48  Sonny Lo, “Hyperpoliticization in Hong Kong Hurts Everyone,” August 22, 2016, in http://www.vohk.hk/2016/08/22/hyperpolitisation-in-hong-kong-hurts-everyone/, access date: April 5, 2020. 49  For the Youth Development Commission, see https://www.ydc.gov.hk/en/index. html, access date: April 5, 2020.

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who graduated from overseas universities and who found jobs in the HKSAR could work in multinational corporations, becoming a new class in the society but again arousing the jealousies of some locals. Hong Kong from July 1997 to June 2019 evolved slowly into a society in which many localists felt that they were increasingly marginalized without being addressed by the ruling elites, who had the vested interest to maintain the status quo. In other words, a serious crisis of legitimacy persisted in the HKSAR. Arguably, the extradition bill served as a stimulus to galvanize and mobilize the disgruntled citizens, angry youths and disappointed intellectuals to take to the streets. The police action from June to early October only solidified such political opposition to the government. Sixth, the police were caught in a political dilemma, but police officers themselves who were responsible for implementing the law were not in a proper position to solve political disputes. On the one hand, President Xi Jinping reportedly hoped that Hong Kong could handle its own affairs smoothly without any bloodshed. On the other hand, the police officers on the streets had to protect their own lives if they were under attack by violent protesters. As such, the police exercise of force had to be ideally cautious but practically self-protective. In the event that police were seen by Beijing as relatively too “weak,” then the deployment of the PAP into the HKSAR would be necessary. Hence, it was understandable why some police officers had to fire their pistols due to the necessity of either protecting themselves or warning the protesters to leave the riot scene. Despite the fact that some foreign diplomats estimated that the number of PLA soldiers and officers in the HKSAR approached 10,000 or 12,000  in September 2019, Beijing refrained from deploying either the PAP or the PLA to deal with the Hong Kong disturbances. Doing so would undermine the image of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems.” As such, Beijing remained restraint but did hope that the HKSAR government to impose strong measures, notably the anti-mask law that will be discussed later. Seventh, the system of handling the applications for peaceful protests broke down. The application for a peaceful protest by the Civil Human Rights Front on October 1 was rejected by the police and the appeal board, because it was believed that violence would follow the peaceful protests. Still, peaceful protesters joined the Front’s rally, whereas violent protests did flare up after the relatively peaceful parade. As such, regardless of whether the police issued the letter of no objection to protest organizers, this policy of allowing or disallowing protests became virtually

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ineffective. Once protests gathered a momentum of their own, they had to go ahead with or without the letter of no objection from the police. As it turned out, violence did break out after the end of many peaceful protests. From the perspective of peaceful protesters, however, they insisted on their right to mobilize supporters to join the march to express their political demands. From the vantage point of violent protesters, peace could not solve the political problems and disputes in the existing polity. Hence, political violence became the means of their last resort to force the HKSAR government to change its policies in response to the five demands. All sides stood firm and did not make any concessions. Political struggle made the HKSAR drift toward the point of no return and profound mistrust. Eighth, a kind of semi-curfew could actually be seen in Hong Kong on October 1, when a few MTR stations were closed in the morning, but the maximum number of closed stations reached 47 at night.50 While the MTR stations became the targets of vandalism, they remained very resilient and were frequently open the next morning. Ironically, exactly because of the MTR’s tenacity after protests, radical protesters continued to target at the MTR stations and were determined to vandalize them for the sake of opposing the government. In short, the MTR Corporation, which cooperated with the police, was seen by radical protesters as part and parcel of the HKSAR regime. Ninth, many young protesters formed logistical groups to support the protests. Some climbed up hills of Wanchai to find their escape routes amid the police action of clearing the streets. Originally, the government estimated that 2000 protesters were “violent” ones. The disturbances on October 1 showed that, even after the arrests of some 1500 protesters from July to early October, the number of the so-called valiant elements, a term used by protesters themselves, exceeded 2000. However, most of these “valiant” elements were later arrested in the key battle of the Polytechnic University of Hong Kong. Tenth and finally, the solutions of minimizing violence remained distant because of ideological intolerance. Although Chief Executive Carrie Lam and her officials went out to listen to the views of citizens in community halls, such dialogue was seen by some protesters as a “political show.” On September 26, Carrie Lam and her officials were trapped in the Wanchai Stadium for four hours after they had met ordinary citizens to

 Cable TV News, October 1, 2019.

50

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listen to their opinions.51 The most effective solution was arguably the setting up of an independent commission of inquiry to investigate police actions and performance. However, both the police and Beijing opposed the formation of an independent commission. Some police officers, who used the term “cockroaches” to refer to protesters, adopted a negative attitude toward the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry. While some police argued that the term “cockroaches” could refer to the “vitality” of protesters, some radical netizens targeted at the police and about 3000 police officers were unfortunately doxed.52 The act of some protesters in revealing the private identities of police was malicious and illustrative of political intolerance and ideological hatred. Underlying the debate over the meaning of the term “cockroaches” was perhaps a zero-sum view of politics held by both radical protesters and some police officers. Radical protesters saw the police as “devils,” whereas the police saw protesters as undesirable troublemakers.53 Yet, the perspective of some police in rejecting an independent commission of inquiry perhaps reflected a hidden ideology of political authoritarianism, which had much in common with the mentality of PRC hardliners to maintain political correctness in their policy toward Hong Kong.

Anti-mask Law and Its Opposition The origin of the anti-mask law could be traced back to the period shortly after August 25, when the HKSAR government considered the application of Emergency Regulations to control protests. August 25 marked the date on which water cannon vehicles were deployed for the first time, and a few police officers who were attacked violently tried to defend themselves by pointing their pistols at protesters. On August 27, Carrie Lam revealed that the government was studying various legal tools, including the Emergency Regulations, to deal with the protests. Her remarks were followed 51  Kris Cheng, “Hong Kong’s Carrie Lam trapped in stadium for 4 hours as protestors rallied outside first town hall session,” Hong Kong Free Press, September 27, 2019, in https:// www.hongkongfp.com/2019/09/27/hong-kongs-carrie-lam-trapped-stadium-4-hoursprotesters-rallied-outside-first-town-hall-session/, access date: April 5, 2020. 52  “Cockroach tag a term of endearment: police,” Radio Television Hong Kong, December 23, 2019, in https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1499200-20191223.htm, access date: April 25, 2020. 53  The term “devil police” could be traced back to the 2014 Occupy Central Movement when some protesters drew posters that depicted the police as “devils.”

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immediately by the united front work from pro-Beijing media, elites and groups to advocate a stronger approach to be adopted by the government. A few members of the top policy-making ExCo voiced their views in support of the use of a stronger legal instrument. Tam Yiu-chung, a Hong Kong member of the NPC Standing Committee, said that, in order to stop violence, the government should consider all kinds of legal tools. According to Xinhua news on August 27, two pro-Beijing Hong Kong legal experts, namely Priscilla Leung and Maggie Chan, pointed to the possible application of Article 17 of the Public Order Ordinance to tighten control over protests and rallies.54 Edward Yau, the Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development of the HKSAR government, remarked that the international communities would understand the possible use of the Emergency Regulations to control protests in Hong Kong. His remark was echoed by ExCo member Ronny Tong, who added that, if Emergency Regulations were used, the government would need to consider how to implement it. Another ExCo member Regina Ip remarked that, if masks were disallowed and banned under Emergency Regulations, the government would have to ponder how to deal with those people who would still wear masks. The idea of taking stronger legal measures to control protests was criticized by pan-democrats as a move toward “authoritarianism.” Some democrats argued that if Emergency Regulations were used, the move would be tantamount to a curfew, thereby undermining not only “one country, two systems” but also Hong Kong’s international status. Pro-Beijing hardliners contended that tougher legal measures and even the deployment of PAP from Shenzhen would be in conformity with the Basic Law and in protection of the “one country, two systems.” Overall, the HKSAR government’s study of using the Emergency Regulations demonstrated that the Hong Kong leadership was under the pressure from PRC hardliners, notably Zhang Xiaoming and Wang Zhimin, to deploy legal means to “terminate violence and control chaos.” Table 6.8 shows the main content of the Emergency Regulations, which were applied by the British colonial authorities to control the 1967 riots in Hong Kong. On July 20, 1967, the British colonial government brought into nine Emergency Regulations, which had been enacted in 1949, including the seizure of weapons; orders for the opening and 54  “Legal experts: The HKSAR government can use legal means to stop the violence,” August 28, 2019, in https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-08-28/How-the-HKSAR-gov-tcan-use-legal-means-to-stop-the-violence-Jx1X8HNYJ2/index.html, access date: April 5, 2020.

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Table 6.8  Main content of the Emergency Regulations 1. “On any occasion which the Chief Executive in Council may consider to be an occasion of emergency or public danger he may make any regulations whatsoever which he may consider desirable in the public interest.” 2. “Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), such regulations may provide for—  (a) censorship, and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication;  (b)  arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation;  (c) control of the harbors, ports and waters of Hong Kong, and the movements of vessels;  (d) transportation by land, air or water, and the control of the transport of persons and things;  (e)  trading, exportation, importation, production and manufacture;  (f)  appropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property, and of the use thereof;  (g) amending any enactment, suspending the operation of any enactment and applying any enactment with or without modification;  (h)  authorizing the entry and search of premises;  (i)  empowering such authorities or persons as may be specified in the regulations to make orders and rules and to make or issue notices, licenses, permits, certificates or other documents for the purposes of the regulations;  (j)  charging, in respect of the grant or issue of any licenses, permit, certificate or other document for the purposes of the regulations, such fees as may be prescribed by the regulations;  (k) the taking of possession or control on behalf of the Chief Executive of any property or undertaking;  (l)  requiring persons to do work or render services;  (m) payment of compensation and remuneration to persons affected by the regulations and the determination of such compensation; and  (n) the apprehension, trial and punishment of persons offending against the regulations or against any law in force in Hong Kong, and may contain such incidental and supplementary provisions as appear to the Chief Executive to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the regulations.” Source: “Cap. 241 Emergency Regulations Ordinance,” in https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap241, access date: February 23, 2020

closing of premises; an obligation to give one’s name and address to police officers; the power to disperse assemblies; the obstruction of armed forces in the course of their duties; the powers to prohibit meetings held in private and public; offenses arising from interference with any vehicles of the armed forces or police; empowerment of a court to hold criminal trial; and

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the offense of spreading false report and statement.55 Later, the British evoked other Emergency Regulations, embracing the arrest and detention of conspirators and instigators, the empowerment of the Colonial Secretary to detain suspects for one year; and the empowerment of District Court to raise the maximum term of imprisonment from five to ten years.56 In 2019, the HKSAR government could deal with protesters by using “arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation,” authorizing the police to enter and search premises, and censoring and controlling those publications, writings and communications that were deemed as causing public danger. Of course, the situation of 2019 was vastly different from that of 1967, for civil society grew in such a way that citizens and protesters could legally challenge the HKSAR government’s use of the Emergency Regulations. Table 6.9 shows that pro-government and pro-Beijing elites voiced their support of the government’s utilization of Emergency Regulations to control protests. Ronny Tong and Lawrence Ma added that if the people of Hong Kong were unhappy with the use of Emergency Regulations to control the protests, they could launch a legal challenge to the HKSAR government. On October 4, Chief Executive Carrie Lam invoked the Emergency Regulations in a dramatic move to curb the escalating violence in the city, banning the use of face masks by ordinary citizens. Lam said that it was a necessary decision to consider the “critical” danger for the HKSAR.  While pro-Beijing elites voiced their views in support of Emergency Regulations (Table  6.9), PRC officials fully backed up the tougher measures taken by the Lam administration (Table  6.11). The anti-mask law empowered the police to remove the face masks of protesters and to require protesters to take them off (Table 6.10). However, the anti-mask legislation implemented by the HKSAR government through Emergency Regulations on October 4 triggered serious debate, immediate riots and numerous conspiracy theories, illustrating profound distrust in the society of Hong Kong. The anti-mask law intended to curb the ongoing riots and social unrests, but critics of the government argued that the law bypassed the LegCo and they questioned its constitutionality. The government replied that the  John Cooper, Colony in Conflict: The Hong Kong Disturbances May 1967–January 1968 (Hong Kong: Winsome, 1970), p. 157. 56  Ibid. 55

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Table 6.9  The remarks of Pro-Beijing’s elites remarks on Emergency Regulations Name (political party affiliation)

Remarks

Tam Yiu-chung (DAB) Chan Yung (DAB)

“Some police officers were injured by violence. To stop violence, the use of law is necessary.” “The violent acts are more serious than before. The Emergency Regulations can be effective in stopping people to ‘play with fire.’” Stanley Ng Chau-pei “As violence increases, citizens’ properties and lives are (Federation of Trade endangered. The Regulations are one of the government options Unions, or FTU) and those intimidating remarks on the Internet can also be controlled.” Ronny Tong (Path “If public order is endangered, Emergency Regulations can be of Democracy) implemented without LegCo deliberations. The valid date of such Regulations can be decided by the Chief Executive in the Executive Council. Because the Hong Kong people believe in judicial review, many matters are put forward to the courts. Hence, there would not be ‘powers without restraints.’” Lawrence Ma (no “The Regulations can control publications telecommunications, party affiliation) transport and trade. If the Regulations violate the Basic Law, it can be challenged through judicial review.” Christopher K. W. “The Regulations are like a sword to stop violence and can help Wong (no party police to use ‘minimum force’ to terminate the violent situation.” affiliation) Sources: Wen Wei Po, August 28, 2019, p. A01

LegCo would still be able to scrutinize the legislation. Still, some democrats were unhappy and challenged the constitutionality of the legislation through the court proceedings. In early November 2019, the High Court ruled that the ban on face masks was unconstitutional, saying that it “goes further than necessary” in the restriction of the fundamental rights of ordinary citizens.57 The High Court criticized the section of the anti-mask law that empowered the police to remove face masks from citizens. The court judgment said:

57  Holmes Chan, “Hong Kong’s High Court rules anti-mask law unconstitutional,” Hong Kong Free Press, November 18, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/11/18/ breaking-hong-kongs-high-court-rules-anti-mask-law-unconstitutional/, access date: April 5, 2020.

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Table 6.10  Major content of the anti-mask regulation 1. “It is a defense for a person charged with an offence under section 3(2) to establish that, at the time of the alleged offence, the person had lawful authority or reasonable excuse for using a facial covering. 2. A person is taken to have established that the person had lawful authority or reasonable excuse for using a facial covering if—(a) there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue that the person had such lawful authority or reasonable excuse; and (b) the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 3. Without limiting the scope of the reasonable excuse referred to in subsection (1), a person had a reasonable excuse if, at the assembly, meeting or procession concerned— (a) the person was engaged in a profession or employment and was using the facial covering for the physical safety of the person while performing an act or activity connected with the profession or employment; (b) the person was using the facial covering for religious reasons or (c) the person was using the facial covering for a pre-existing medical or health reason. 4. Power to require removal in public place of facial covering:  (1) This section applies in relation to a person in a public place who is using a facial covering that a police officer reasonably believes is likely to prevent identification.  (2) The police officer may—(a) stop the person and require the person to remove the facial covering to enable the officer to verify the identity of the person; and (b) if the person fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (a)—remove the facial covering.  (3) A person who fails to comply with a requirement under subsection (2)(a) commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine at level 3 and to imprisonment for 6 months. 5. Prosecution deadline for offences: A prosecution for an offence under section 3(2) or 5(3) may only be started before the end of 12 months beginning on the date on which the offence is committed.” Source: “Prohibition on Face Covering Regulation,” in https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap241k, access date: February 23, 2020

The power may, on its face, be used by a police officer for random stoppage of anyone found wearing a facial covering in any public place. There is practically no limit on the circumstances in which the power under that section can be exercised by a police officer. We consider it to be clear that the measure … exceeds what is reasonably necessary to achieve the aim of law enforcement, investigation and prosecution of violent protestors even in the prevailing turbulent circumstances in Hong Kong, and that it fails to strike a reasonable balance between the societal benefits promoted and the inroads made into the protected rights.58

 Ibid.

58

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Table 6.11  Statements of Liaison Office, Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office and Foreign Ministry on the anti-mask law Agency

Remarks

Liaison Office

1. “On October 1, the violent people with masks caused traffic congestion, attacked shops and MTR, committed arson, threw petrol bombs and surrounded police station. They attacked police and ordinary people. These violent acts seriously undermined the rule of law and social calmness, threatened the police and personal safety of citizens, and endangered public order. We strongly condemn these acts.” 2. “The central government insists that the principle of ‘one country, two systems’ will not change. But the violent people with masks publicly denigrate the national flag and challenge the bottom line. We must penalize them in accordance with law.” 3. “The central government believes that the Chief Executive and the HKSAR government can use the existing laws to stop violence and restore order. We support them.” 4. “All sectors of Hong Kong must recognize the serious consequences of violence on the society and citizens. We resolutely support the actions of HKSAR government and police to take measures to maintain Hong Kong’s social stability.” 1. “Hong Kong’s violence has escalated for three months. October 1 was the national celebration of the PRC and yet Hong Kong’s opposition and violent radicals chose to have illegal assembly and create chaos. We strongly condemn their violent actions such as arson and the acts of throwing petrol bombs and destroying public properties. 30 police officers were injured, forcing one of them to open fire to protest himself.” 2. “The Hong Kong situation has changed its nature to be another ‘Hong Kong-style color revolution’ as foreign forces are intervening in Hong Kong, and street protests are premeditated, pre-arranged and well organized. The anti-mask law is reasonable and necessary. Many other countries have already enacted it. The law does not affect the freedom of assembly and other civil liberties.” 3. “We strongly support Carrie Lam, the police and the judiciary to adopt measures to punish the violent elements, especially those core violent instigators, organizers and leaders. We firmly believe that Chief Executive Carrie Lam can lead our government to protect the rule of law and restore social order.” 4. “The central government resolutely support the Carrie Lam administration to govern Hong Kong in accordance with the law, to have dialogue with social sectors, to forge social cohesion, to explore solutions to tackle deep social contradictions, and to promote social stability and harmony.”

Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office

(continued)

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Table 6.11 (continued) Agency

Remarks

Office of the 1. “The masked violent people were crazy on October 1 and engaged in Commissioner arson, robbery, attacks on the police and citizens and the burning of of the Ministry national flag. They seriously challenged the ‘one country, two systems’ of Foreign and its bottom line. We strongly support the HKSAR government to Affairs in the take measures to punish them.” HKSAR 2. “We urge the foreign forces to stop interfering with Hong Kong affairs. We appeal to the international society to support the HKSAR government to stop violence and restore order as an act of justice.” Source: Wen Wei Po, October 5, 2019, p. A04

The court judgment dealt a serious blow to the authority of the HKSAR government and boosted the moral of protesters, who continued to use face masks despite the imposition of the anti-mask law on them. When the anti-mask law was imposed and implemented, some hardline supporters of the government said that it could and should have been introduced in August immediately after its feasibility had been studied. Yet, the government decided not to implement it until after more violence took place on October 1. Other critics of the government believed that the anti-mask law would stimulate more protests and riots. Nevertheless, the government said that the riots on the night of October 4 and the morning of October 5 were anticipated, and it believed that social stability would be restored in the long run. The High Court’s decision in early November delegitimized the HKSAR government further by challenging the inability of the anti-mask law to strike a balance between public interest and human rights. In April 2020, however, the Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the government’s move to invoke the Emergency Regulations to enforce the anti-mask law.59 In early October 2019, when the anti-mask law was introduced, conspiracy theories grew rapidly in the territory, showing the deep mutual distrust between some citizens and the government. One conspiracy theory was that the anti-mask law would pave the way for the government to

59  Rachel Wong, “Appeal Court rules Hong Kong’s mask ban is constitutional at unauthorized protests,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 9, 2020, in https://hongkongfp. com/2020/04/09/breaking-appeal-court-rules-hong-kongs-mask-ban-is-constitutionalat-unauthorised-protests/, access date: April 25, 2020.

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use Emergency Regulations to impose capital control over the territory.60 This theory was consistent with the early interpretation of why the extradition bill was introduced, namely the need to pursue those mainland business people and cadres who laundered dirty money in the HKSAR.  By circulating the rumor that the HKSAR government aimed at imposing capital control, some people appeared to fear that Hong Kong would strengthen cooperation with Beijing in anti-money laundering and anti-­ corruption activities. This rumor might also be circulated by some local and mainland businesspeople who were concerned about the possibility that the HKSAR would also become more “socialist” in its economic operation, for their private properties and assets would be undermined by capital control. Such rumors about capital control might trigger the immediate riots in which some protesters damaged MTR stations and even mainland-related banks. Rumors were rife that some black shirts who went to vandalize the MTR stations and mainland-related banks spoke Mandarin. There was no evidence to prove such rumors, but the chaotic situation illustrated widespread anger at the anti-mask law. Protesters who came out on the night of October 4 and the morning of October 5 to commit arson and attack stations and banks included not only Hong Kong protesters but also mysterious people. After all, protesters and vandalizers who wore masks were difficult to be identified. Other conspiracy theories circulated in the social media included protesters who “pretended” to be police officers to check vehicles on roads to see whether some drivers were police; protesters who received payment from mysterious persons; and even police officers who “disguised” themselves as protesters to create the chaotic night and morning and to discredit protesters in the eyes of the public. Again, there were no evidence to prove all these claims, but the proliferation of rumors illustrated the profound political and social mistrust in the HKSAR.  The emergence of conspiracy theories was detrimental to the authority and legitimacy of the HKSAR government and to its cordial relations with citizens. Table 6.12 shows the detailed events on the afternoon and night of October 4 and the morning of October 5, when protesters went out to demonstrate against the anti-mask law. The protests were characterized 60  This rumor could be heard in the social media and some YouTube channels hosted by Hong Kong commentators, October 2019.

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Table 6.12  Detailed events of October 4 and October 5 protests against the anti-mask law Time

Event

October 4, 2019 12:30

In response to the government’s intention of using Emergency Regulations to enact anti-mask law, netizens called for an assembly to be held in Chater Garden. There are hundreds of people from different age groups in Chater Garden, all wearing masks and some wearing sunglasses. Some of the attendees worked nearby and arrived during lunch time. By 12:45, more people gathered and shouted anti-extradition slogans together. Citizens who participated in the assembly march along the Queen’s Road Central outside the Court of Final Appeal occupied some of the lanes and tramways. The parade later occupied Des Voeux Road’s westbound lane and protesters shouted: “All Together.” Passengers on the trams stretched out their hands to show “five” to show their support. Thousands of people marched along the Connaught Road, shouting that “Hong Kong people resist” and “masks are not guilty, legislation is unreasonable.” A large number of demonstrators gathered on the Connaught Road and Pedder Street. Some protesters blocked the roads. Chief Executive Carrie Lam and all principal officials announced at 3 pm that the anti-mask law would take effect on October 5 at 12:00 am. Some citizens gathered at Festival Walk in the afternoon and shouted slogans. Some walked out of the Waterloo Road, blocking the road with debris. Then they left the road for Festival Walk shopping center. More than 20 students in school uniforms marched and shouted slogans on the Nathan Road in Mongkok district, including “six major demands all of which are indispensable” and “masked innocent, shameful evil.” There were students wearing the uniform of the Diocesan Girls’ School in the parade. Protesters in the Central district called out the slogan “Dissolve the police force.” Some protesters burnt debris across the street at the Global Mall. Citizens on the street kept shouting new slogans, including “Hong Kong people resist,” “I want to wear a mask” and “wearing masks is guilty but the legislation is unreasonable.” Nearly a hundred people gathered outside the Mongkok police station, and police targeted at the crowd with intense light. Some protesters set fire outside the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce in the Central district, burning trash and some debris. Some citizens turned on the lights of their mobile phones on the Avenue of Stars in Tsimshatsui. In Shatin, citizens gathered at the New City Plaza, but the shopping mall turned off the lights, and then they stepped out of the road near the Shatin Government Office. Demonstrators walked into the Shatin MTR station to destroy the facilities.

12:50

13:15

16:30 16:45

17:30

17:50 18:46

18:47 19:00 19:59

20:04

(continued)

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Table 6.12 (continued) Time

Event

20:07 20:11

In Wong Tai Sin, demonstrators started blocking the Lung Cheung Road. At the Mongkok police station, the police called on the public to stop throwing objects at the station. Otherwise, they would be arrested. Earlier, some protesters near the Mongkok police station were pepper-sprayed by police. An automatic sprinkler system at the Shatin MTR station was destroyed and water came out continuously. In Wanchai, demonstrators confronted police at the police headquarters. A demonstration was held in the Southern district. Some protesters walked out of the road around the Aberdeen Centre and blocked the road with traffic cones and trash cans. They damaged the glasses of some shops. In Tsuen Wan, some protesters vandalized a branch of the Bank of China. Some demonstrators blocked the junction of Nathan Road and Mongkok Road. The Hong Kong Island’s entrance to the Cross-Harbor tunnel was blocked. In Causeway Bay, demonstrators damaged the Causeway Bay MTR station’s Exit D1 and its lifts on the Lockhart Road. Other protesters damaged the Lok Fu MTR station. Outside the Ginza shopping mall in Tin Shui Wai, demonstrators were preparing to demolish the PRC’s national flag. Hundreds of people in masks gathered and shouted anti-extradition slogans. Most shops in the mall were closed. Demonstrators set fire at an exit in the Causeway Bay MTR station. The scene was filled with dense smoke and the fire sprinkler system was damaged. Demonstrators poured gasoline on Exit C2 of the Mongkok MTR station which was on fire quickly. A plain clothes police officer drove to Yuen Long and he argued with citizens. He got out of the car and held a pistol while being attacked by protesters, who threw petrol bombs at him. Gunfire was heard but fortunately nobody was injured. Police used tear gas to disperse protesters in Aberdeen and Causeway Bay. A glass door at the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk in Shatin was damaged and broken. Many masked black-shirt protesters in Tin Yiu Village at Tin Shui Wai damaged the traffic lights and blocked the roads outside the Tin Lake Road. Some citizens threw objects at protesters in the Yzu Shing House. At the same time, protesters in Mongkok and Yaumatei damaged PRC-owned companies and shops along Nathan Road. Police officers fired several tear gas canisters outside the Ma On Shan police station. Nearly a hundred people gathered at the scene and used laser pointers to beam at the police station.

20:12 20:18 20:26

20:36 20:48 20:52 20:57

21:06

21:15 21:30 22:03

22:03 22:18 22:27

22:32

(continued)

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Table 6.12 (continued) Time

Event

22:38

At about 10.30 pm, many police vehicles advanced quickly to Admiralty. Originally there were hundreds of demonstrators on the road. But they ran away to the west. Demonstrators in Tin Shui Wai destroyed various Light Rail Transit (LRT) stations and used flammable liquid at the scene, smashing the card readers and destroying light posts. Demonstrators in Tin Shui Wai set fire on the Tin Chi LRT station. A large amount of smoke came out from the scene. Protesters went to the Tin Chi station and continued their destruction. About 50 demonstrators gathered at the Mobil MasterCard Plaza, some holding American, British and Hong Kong flags. The crowd sang the song “Glory to Hong Kong” and shouted that “it is urgent to dissolve the police.” Demonstrators damaged a glass and an iron gate at Exit C2 of the Mei Foo MTR station. Demonstrators kept pouring flammable liquid outside the Tin Chi LRT station and fire emerged from the station. On the other hand, in Queen’s Road Central, demonstrators threw flammable objects into a Bank of China branch and shouted: “Let’s leave as we have tomorrow.” A 14-year-old boy in Yuen Long was shot in his thigh and taken to Pok Oi Hospital for treatment. The boy was in serious condition. He would undergo surgery to remove the bullet. Police deployed armored vehicles to Tsuen Wan. On the Nathan Road at Yaumatei and Mongkok, the police dispersed protesters. In Wong Tai Sin, demonstrators confronted police on a flyover. The police fired tear gas canisters. Some protesters on the Hong Kong Island went to the escalators leading to mid-level district, while many police vehicles stayed at the Queen’s Road. Police at the Lung Cheung Road in Wong Tai Sin fired multiple tear gas canisters to disperse the crowd. Demonstrators set fire on the Lung Cheung Road, while some people threw flammable objects into the Wong Tai Sin MTR station. Netizens participated in an anti-mask law march at 2 pm from Sogo department store at Causeway Bay.

22:43

22:50

22:51

22:57

23:10 23:15

23:29 23:51 October 5, 2019 14:00 14:30

Hundreds of citizens outside Sogo store in Causeway Bay began to march toward the Central. Many of them wore face masks and held a large banner that read “Glory to Hong Kong.” A leader of the Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands, Koo Sze-yiu, and secretary-general of Demosisto, Joshua Wong, joined the march. (continued)

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Table 6.12 (continued) Time

Event

15:05

The MTR announced that airport express restored services starting from 2:30 pm, while other lines including LRT continued to be suspended. Some protesters gathered at San Hong Street in Sheung Shui to build up barricades. Some protesters launched a “Liberate Sheung Shui” campaign to oppose the anti-mask law, targeting at drugstores and cosmetics shops that were popular because of the parallel traders from mainland China. Dozens of protesters vandalized Genki Sushi, Best Mart 360 and Arome Bakery inside the Sheung Shui Centre, all of which were either supported by mainlanders or owned by the Maxim group. Protesters sabotaged the Sheung Shui MTR station by using fire extinguishers and damaging CCTVs. Near the Tsimshatsui pier, around a hundred mask-wearing citizens formed a chain and marched peacefully toward the direction of the Harbor City. Police suddenly rushed out from the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) building in Central and searched some citizens wearing face masks. Other citizens were angered by the police action and immediately shouted “releasing them!” The face mask-wearing citizens were later released. In the Central district, police took a man in black clothes onto a police vehicle, but they did not explain to citizens why he was arrested. They maintained that journalists should stay a certain distance away from them. Citizens shouted: “How come you can wear masks, but we can’t?” They and the journalists kept pressuring the police to provide justifications of why the man was arrested. A human chain from Tsimshatsui reached the Waterloo Road and protesters marched in the direction to the Mongkok police station. They chanted “seeing you in Victoria Park tomorrow” and “I have the right to wear masks.” Protesters walked from Tsimshatsui to the Maple Street playground in Shumshuipo. They sang “Glory to Hong Kong.” There was a moment of silence for protesters to mourn the loss of lives during the anti-extradition movement, after which they called for other citizens to demonstrate on the coming day.

15:35 16:26

16:39 16:43 17:35

17:48

18:07

19:15

Sources: Apple Daily, October 5, 2019, pp. A01–A03; Ming Pao, October 5, 2019, pp. A01–A06; “More than 1000 citizens participate protest against Anti-mask law, the riot police arrest some citizens who wear masks,” The Stand News, available in: https://www.thestandnews.com/, access date: April 1, 2020

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by the continuation of protesters wearing masks in defiance of the antimask law, vandalism at MTR stations and mainland-related organizations, the utilization of guerilla-style tactics to harass and stretch the police manpower and the widespread disruption of transport so as to paralyze traffic. The tactics deployed by protesters were consistent with that adopted on October 1, but the targets at mainland-related banks and pro-Beijing shops tended to be far more prominent than ever before. Although the police performance on October 1 appeared to be more assertive on the Hong Kong Island than before, the overall police action in October left much to be desired because of its relatively imbalanced approach to dealing with protesters. In some districts, police were weak. The most embarrassing event took place on October 20, when a police water canon vehicle sprayed blue dye at a mosque in Tsimshatsui, necessitating the visit of Carrie Lam to apologize to the Muslim leaders on the following day.61 Operationally, the police had to learn a lesson from the 2019 protests on how to tackle territory-wide and guerilla-style protests more skillfully. The anti-mask law protests were accompanied by a new move of the protesters to launch a so-called yellow economy, which meant that shops supportive of the anti-extradition movement should and could gather together as an economic entity in opposition to pro-Beijing and pro-­ government economic organizations. However, given the fact that not many shops were explicitly anti-extradition movement, the idea of establishing a “yellow economy” could not gain any breakthrough. Predictably, the HKSAR government officials and pro-Beijing politicians reacted to the idea of forming a “yellow economy” negatively (Table 6.13). Edward Yau said that the idea would face tremendous challenges and be “unsustainable” in the long run, and that those who floated it violated the principle of laissez faire. Other businesspeople believed that protesters who raised the idea of constructing the “yellow economy” undermined their businesses based on political views. Objectively speaking, given that most businesspeople in the HKSAR were politically pragmatic, the innovative idea of creating the “yellow economy” became a castle in the air. In late 61  Chris Cheng and Jennifer Creery, “Video: Hong Kong police accused of targeting mosque with water cannon blue dye as communities conduct clean-up,” Hong Kong Free Press, October 20, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/10/20/hong-kongpolice-accused-targeting-mosque-water-cannon-blue-dye-communities-conduct-clean/, access date: April 5, 2020.

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Table 6.13  Remarks of government officials and Pro-Beijing politicians on the “Yellow Economy” Name (Position)

Remarks

Edward Yau Tang-wah (Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development)

1. “A campaign promoting the ‘yellow economic circle’ will face challenges during its implementation and be unsustainable in the long term.” 2. “Those who try to categorize shops and restaurants by political stance violate the free economy principle, which encourages businesses to attract their customers with their services and brands.” 3. “Whoever promotes the ‘yellow economic circle’ will become the first and biggest victim in the campaign.” 1.  “Yellow Economy is not a real phenomenon.” 2. “Political standpoint will not be beneficial to the development of business.” 3. “The Hong Kong people may not really support yellow economy.” 1. “Yellow economy is a way of oppressing the businessman who have different political views and undermining Hong Kong’s economic development.” 2. “Yellow economy is a means of encouraging violent protesters and misleading the youth to confront the HKSAR government.” 1. “Yellow Economy is a way of differentiating among the Hong Kong citizens politically.” 2. “We should not boycott businesses on the basis of political standpoints.”

Tommy Cheung (ExCo member)

Tam Kam-kou (CPPCC member)

Elizabeth Quat (LegCo member)

Sources: Jeff Pao, “Hong Kong official knocks ‘color’-coded shopping,” Asia Times, December 18, 2019, in https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/12/article/hong-kong-official-knocks-color-coded-shopping/?nocache=1, access date: February 2, 2020; The Stand News, January 12, 2020, in https://www.thestandnews. com/, access date: March 9, 2020; Wen Wei Po, January 12, 2020, p. A03 and January 16, 2020, p. A03

2019, there were almost 3000 yellow shops mainly in the food and catering sector. They contributed a potentially influential economic sector. As such, if they were united collectively, the political influence of the so-­called yellow economy could not be totally underestimated.

Conclusion This chapter argues that the protesters can be understood from the perspective of populism. Yet, they were fragmented, including democratic and socialist fractions. Furthermore, the pro-government and pro-Beijing forces

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were nationalistic populists trying to compete and counter-balance the democratic and socialist populists. The result was a complex political struggle between the nationalistic populists on the one hand and democratic and socialist populists on the other. The protesters, both peaceful and violent, were stimulated spiritually and philosophically by the localist leaders, notably Edward Leung whose slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times” became the political symbol and cornerstone of mass protests from June to December 2019. Another influential figure was Andy Chan, whose banned Hong Kong National Party and whose ideal of having a “democratic” Hong Kong with “sovereignty” belonging to the people provided another theoretical underpinning for the anti-extradition, anti-police and anti-mainlandization movement from June to December 2019. The October 1 protests marked a new pattern of Hong Kong protests due to their violent, strategically flexible and strong anti-CCP as well as anti-PRC characteristics. The October 1 violence was a marked contrast to the October 10 parade in which many protesters showed the flags of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan—an indication that many protesters saw the realization of Taiwan-style of democracy as their political ideal in the HKSAR. The violence on October 1 prompted both the HKSAR government and PRC authorities to decide on the implementation of the anti-mask law, which however provoked fierce protests on the night of October 4 and the morning of October 5. The resistance of protesters to the anti-mask law was politically significant, for they saw it as a political symbol of authoritarianism in Hong Kong, a sign of the PRC’s attempt at mainlandizing the city further and a means of empowering the police to suppress them. The entire protests in October were also punctuated by the active participation of students; one of them was injured by a live bullet from a police officer in Tsuen Wan. Since students were active participants in the anti-extradition, anti-police and anti-mainlandization movement, they were determined to have further battles with the police at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Polytechnic University.

CHAPTER 7

Two Final Battles, District Elections, United States and Taiwan

This chapter examines the two final and critical battles in the anti-­ extradition, anti-police and anti-mainlandization protests, namely the battles at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) and the Polytechnic University of Hong Kong (PolyU). These two battles marked the final stage of a showdown between protesters and police. The confrontations at the PolyU led to the defeat of many radical protesters, who were arrested, surrendered to the police or escaped. After the battle at the PolyU, the protest movement downsized although it has been lingering on since early 2020. The outbreak of Covid-19 in China in February 2020 and then in Hong Kong from late February onward have become the dampers temporarily minimizing the quantity of protests. The whole protest movement became more moderate than ever before when District Council elections were held on November 25, when the democrats won many of the directly elected seats. The elections were functional as they provided safety-valves for the disgruntled citizens to vent their anger through the exercise of their ballots. On the other hand, the US Congress passed the US Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, which was then signed into law by President Trump. The combined impacts of pan-­ democratic electoral victory, the onset of Covid-19 and the US Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act alleviated the tense political atmosphere in the HKSAR, diverting the attention of protesters to electoral politics, the combat against infectious disease and the expectation of

© The Author(s) 2021 S. S.-H. Lo et al., The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4_7

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a more assertive US policy toward the HKSAR.  Finally, the role of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan in the Hong Kong protests will be examined.

The Battle of the CUHK The most important trigger of the battle of the CUHK could be traced back to the mysterious death of Alex Chow Tsz-lok, a 22-year-old student at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), on November 8. Chow fell down from a car park in Cheung Kwan O on the night of November 4, when the police chased the protesters with the use of tear gas in the district. It was unclear how Chow died. He appeared to suffer a severe brain injury after falling from the car park. The HKUST president, Wei Shyy, said that he would condemn police violence if officers were found to violate the guideline of firing tear gas.1 Chow’s death raised the students’ memory of the mysterious death of another 15-year-old female student named Chan Yin-lam, who disappeared on September 19 and who was found dead on September 22. An autopsy in early November found Chan’s death as non-suspicious and she appeared to commit suicide.2 Still, some netizens accused the police of being implicated in the death of Chan and Chow. Due to all the unverifiable messages circulated in social media, many young protesters were determined to confront the police, believing that the police had “abused their power.” The battle at the CUHK took place from November 11 to 12 (Table  7.1). The battle stemmed from the entry of the police into the CUHK campus, firing tear gas canisters and rubber bullets at the protesters, who were then determined to battle the police and attempted to occupy the strategic position of Number 2 bridge, which cut across the Tolo Highway. The battle became fierce on the second day, November 12, when students and protesters vowed to defend the CUHK with the logistical support from outsiders. On the other hand, the CUHK Vice-­ Chancellor Rocky Tuan tried to mediate between police and protesters, 1  Alvin Lum, “Hong Kong student Chow Tsz-lok dies after suffering severe brain injury in car park fall,” South China Morning Post, November 8, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/ news/hong-kong/politics/article/3036833/hong-kong-student-who-suffered-severebrain-injury-after, access date: April 6, 2020. 2  “Police say the death of Chan Yin-law whose body was found on waters did not have any suspicion after autopsy,” The Stand News, November 10, 2019, in https://www.thestandnews.com, access date: April 6, 2020.

Event

(continued)

A graduation ceremony was held at the CUHK where graduates showed up in masks and they were against the anti-mask law. They raised a banner with words “Heaven will eliminate the CCP.” Other banners showed the words “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times” and “we are not afraid of guns and bullets but defend the truths.” November 11 On the morning, a call for general strike was supported by most local universities. The police entered the CUHK campus from Number 2 bridge. A tear gas canister was fired to the path along the Chung Chi College. On the bridge, a door panel was used by protesters to protect themselves from the tear gas and rubber bullets from the police. Yet, under the barrage of tear gas, the protesters’ umbrellas and goggles could not protect themselves. On the wall of a tunnel leading to CUHK, protesters painted the words “retreat is no longer our option.” They mobilized the use of umbrellas, swimming boards, gas masks and helmets for their protection. Some protesters attempted to extinguish the tear gas canisters fired by police. Some went to the front line to confront police. Protesters used anything they had to cover themselves, including garbage bins, tables, chairs and football goalposts. Police eventually went into the campus and fired tear gas and pepper pellets, arresting several protesters. Some reporters were injured. LegCo member Roy Kwong arrived at CUHK and tried to negotiate between protesters and police. November 12 After a prolonged confrontation between protesters and police, serious clashes broke out at 3:30 pm. Police again entered the campus to arrest some protesters. A car and other objects were set fire. More protesters arrived at the scene to support those who defended the CUHK. Inside a tunnel at CUHK, protesters wrote that on July 21, white shirts committed terror; that on August 31, the Prince Edward MTR station was closed for 48 hours and “any possible dead might be hidden”; and that on October 1, a boy’s heart was almost shot by a police officer. These words showed the anger and hatred of protesters toward the police. Other words in the tunnel included “we were painfully tortured and how can you ignore this?” The words reminded students and protesters of the San Uk Ling Holding Center in which a CUHK student claimed to be “harassed” by the police. The CUHK Vice-Chancellor Rocky Sung-chi Tuan eventually intervened as a middleman between protesters and police. After he discussed with the police, Tuan gave a briefing to protesters who demanded the unconditional release of four protesters. Accompanied by the students, Tuan went to the police for further discussion, but on his way he and protesters were hit by tear gas. Police used Number 2 bridge as a front-line to fire tear gas, bean bag rounds and rubber bullets at protesters, who in turn threw bricks, debris and Molotov cocktails. Some protesters used bows and arrows to light up roadblocks. At night, former CUHK Vice-Chancellor Joseph Jao-yiu Sung arrived at the campus to rescue those injured protesters and students. Many citizens went to the CUHK to provide logistical supplies to students. Some drove to the CUHK and blocked the police reinforcement to take over Number 2 bridge, causing traffic jam at the Tolo Harbor.

November 7

Time

Table 7.1  The battle of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, November 11–15, 2019

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Event

Source: Free HK: Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Time (Hong Kong: Epoch Times, December 24, 2019), pp. 6–31. Also see “CUHK Student Union: Have not heard and agree with the front-line protesters’ action and demands,” Radio Television Hong Kong, November 15, 2019, in https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/ch/ component/k2/1492304-20191115.htm?archive_date=2019-11-15, access date: April 6, 2020

November 13 Protesters went to occupy Number 2 bridge and set up the roadblocks at the university entrance and in front of the Chung Chi College gate. A board with the words “Heaven will eliminate the CCP” was placed on the front line. November 14 Protesters set up barricades on the Tolo Highway, blocking traffic. They built up their stronghold on the bridge, asking the government to respond to the protesters’ five demands. They also set up entry point to the bridge which was strategic in their defense of CUHK. November 15 Three protesters at CUHK held a press conference and said that, in view of the upcoming District Council election, protesters opened one lane in each direction on the Tolo Highway for 24 hours to reduce traffic disruption. This gesture was made in good faith and protesters demanded that the government should release the arrested people and establish an independent commission of inquiry in 24 hours. Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung rejected their demands. On the other hand, the CUHK Student Union said none of its members participated in the press conference, showing a rift within protesters. Traffic resumed on the Tolo Highway. At night, protesters began to leave the CUHK as there were internal divisions. Some contended that the flexible strategy of “be water” meant that protesters should change tactics rather than just occupying the CUHK.

Time

Table 7.1 (continued)

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267

but he was hit by tear gas. The protesters later occupied the bridge and set up roadblock that paralyzed the traffic on the Tolo Highway until November 15, when protesters were divided into softliners and hardliners. Softliners decided to retreat from the bridge on good faith and opened a lane on each side of the Tolo Highway, while hardliners from the Student Union denied that this move gained their support. The battle at the CUHK stopped, but another much fierce battle would be waged at the PolyU.

The Battle of Polytechnic University of Hong Kong: A Bridge Too Far The confrontations between protesters and police at the PolyU began from November 13 to 15, when students and protesters constructed barricades inside and outside the campus. Originally, protests and police had skirmishes, but on November 17 protesters were determined to defend the PolyU campus—a strategic error that led to many arrests at the end of the battle on November 19 and 20. Table 7.2 delineates the developments of the entire battle of the PolyU. On the afternoon and night of November 17, police began to surround PolyU, besieging the protesters who would find it very difficult to escape on the following days. The strategic errors made by protesters were twofold. First, unlike the CUHK campus where flat land, physical spaces and steep hillside could provide CUHK protesters more escape routes and better logistical supplies, the PolyU campus could be surrounded by police much more easily, especially when protesters themselves blocked their own exits and entrances on November 16. Second, the intuitive instinct of some protesters to defend a site like PolyU assertively ran against the tactic of “be water,” adopting a rigidly defensive approach contrary to a flexible tactic that characterized the protesters on July 1 and October 1. Hence, when some protesters said on November 18 that logistical supplies were inadequate, they made the strategic error of committing to defend PolyU while abandoning the usual tactic of maintaining flexibility. This strategic error was attributed to two factors. First, the idea of “be water” remained a slogan in the entire protests but it left to protesters themselves to interpret and implement the strategy. The room for interpretation and implementation at the battle of PolyU was shaped much by the earlier clashes between protesters and police at the CUHK.  The final withdrawal of protesters at CUHK was due to an

Writings and posters were seen on the campus and filled with slogans of the resistance movement. Protesters began standing on the road outside the university, decorated with small items to form roadblocks. They formed a defense line with umbrellas, while building a brick wall to keep out police intrusion. Day and night without rest, protesters were tired and slept by the roadside. There were protesters staying inside the university, whereas barricades were set up along the Hunghom Cross-Harbor tunnel. Protesters practiced self-defense and set up barricades at the main entrance to keep the police out. A night, the police fired tear gas canisters at protesters, who then set up a line of fire to prevent them from passing through the roadblocks. By 1 am the police suddenly withdrew and built up a front line at the junction of Austin Road and Austin Avenue. Protesters retreated to the campus, blocking the entrance and exit, and setting up defensive lines made up of umbrellas. The move of protesters indicated that they adopted a defensive posture at PolyU. Violent clashes broke out. Police deployed water cannons and armor vehicles. Protesters retaliated with bricks and petrol bombs. Later, police fired numerous rounds of tear gas, rubber bullets and sponge grenades. Protesters used umbrellas for their protection. The police’s special tactical squad fired tear gas from an armor truck. Protesters built up barricades on the top of a bridge to prevent the police from advancing further into the campus. At the same time, colorless and blue liquids containing nerve agents were sprayed by the police water cannon vehicles. Protesters said that “we will remember the days we go through together, shoulder to shoulder.” The protesters on the bridge defended PolyU campus against the attack from water cannons and tear gas canisters. Some of them shouted, “Force is with you” and “Heaven will eliminate the CCP.” Around 3 am, the police posted a statement on the Facebook, requesting all protesters in the campus to leave through the Lee Shau Kee Building (Y Core), and asking protesters to abide by their instructions. However, many who followed the instruction were arrested, including medical professionals and first-aiders who wore reflective vets. Their hands were tied together at the back by the police. A surgeon wrote to Lancet, saying that Hong Kong was in a “humanitarian” crisis, and criticized the way in which the police handled the situation. At 5:56 pm, the police issued a statement saying that a mob had confronted them near the PolyU in the past hour. At Chatham Road South, some protesters set up roadblocks on the Cheong Wan Road to prevent police from advancing. The protesters threw dozens of petrol bombs at the police, who warned those who supported protesters of participating in a “riot.” The police deployed two water cannon vehicles and a long-range acoustic device, but later two armor vehicles were hit by Molotov cocktails. PolyU was heavily besieged. Smoke could be seen throughout the campus where protesters had little protective gears and had to run away from tear gas. Some got injured and required swift medical attention from first-aiders. At 9:22 pm, police fired three tear gas canisters to the Cheong Wan Road flyover. At 9:30 pm, to ensure personal safety, the police again urged everyone on campus to immediately use the exit of Li Shu-Kee Building (Block Y) and follow police instructions. The police planned further operations to surround die-hard protesters in the campus. At 11:54 pm, the water cannon vehicle fired blue water cannons at the Cheong Wan Road demonstrators, who threw multiple petrol bombs.

November 13–15

November 17

November 16

Event

Time

Table 7.2  The battle of the Polytechnic University of Hong Kong

November 18

(continued)

Many protesters felt exhausted after being sprayed by the blue liquid from water cannon vehicles. A volunteer chef said that students put up with the pain they suffered from the blue spray and slept with their shoes and socks on in case the police would break into the campus. A message in the hallway said: “Brothers: Sorry for all the troubles brought to you as a result of inadequate provisions here at the campus.” Some besieged protesters tried to break through to get out of the campus but were met with tear gas used by police. Many were arrested. Some were climbing over a fence to try to break through the police siege. But the police fired tear gas and rubber bullets at those trying to break through while protesters provided cover for each other. In the abortive breakthrough, the police arrested many protesters. At 3:34 pm, five to six parents said that their children were inside PolyU. They asked the police to let them go inside the campus to see their children. A mother knelt down to the police and wept bitterly, saying “If my daughter dies, I jump off the building.” Another parent wanted to see the police commander and said that the police could arrest his children. At 4:25 pm, a zone at PolyU, namely D Core, saw explosions. At 5:05 pm, in response to PolyU’s situation, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that there were some extremely “violent criminals” on the campus, and it strongly supported police to enforce law and order. At 6:15 pm, demonstrators inside PolyU held meetings to discuss their action. A 14-year-old suggested a determined retreat. Protesters started to blame and scold each other, while some appealed to them for a calm attitude. At 6:23 pm, legislator Yip Kin-yun said on his Facebook that dozens of secondary school principals were heading to PolyU to support their students. There were about 100 middle-school students inside the PolyU. Red Cross officers started going into the campus and took care of 40 injured protesters. At 7 pm, some staff members from secondary schools were hindered from entering the campus to assist the students. Many parents and teachers were worried and hoped that the police could allow principals and teachers to enter the campus to be mediators, and to accompany students to leave. Many civilians made attempts to go into PolyU, hoping to divert the attention of police who surrounded protesters at PolyU. At 8:40 pm, hundreds of people walked out of the Salisbury Road in Tsimshatsui toward the Centennial Park and shouted, “Going to PolyU to rescue students.” They proceeded to PolyU, but the police set up defensive lines at the Science Museum Road and Salisbury Road and fired tear gas. Many supporters came from Jordan, Yaumatei, Tsimshatsui East and Hunghom. At the Chinachem Golden Plaza near PolyU, hundreds of new protesters were caught, searched and arrested by the police. From Jordan to Tsimshatsui, police continued to fire tear gas canisters to disperse protesters on the Nathan Road. At 9:45 pm, more than 100 protesters at the PolyU jumped off from a footbridge at Core Z and escaped onto the Chatham Road’s northbound flyover to the direction of Hunghom. Once the mass media reported their escape, the police arrived and fired tear gas canisters at the footbridge. Protesters ran for cover; some retaliated by using bows and arrows. Some of them were picked up by motorbikes on the footbridge and escaped. But some were arrested.

November 19

Time

At the same time, Ip Kin-yuen, a LegCo member, met the media along with 20 secondary school principals, expressing their wish to take students safely out of PolyU. Six religious leaders appealed to all sides to stop fighting to allow protesters and the injured to leave the campus. At 11 pm, the police used tear gas to disperse protesters on the Nathan Road near Pitt Street. Numerous protesters rushed into narrow alleys, causing stampede. The passage between Yaumatei MTR’s Exit A1 and Po Ning Building witnessed protesters being piled up to six to eight layers. First-aiders and firemen arrived at the scene to help and rescue protesters, but they were driven away by the police who used pepper spray and batons. Being pulled out from the layers of human bodies, the injured protesters were ordered by the police to kneel on the ground for their arrest. At 11:24 pm, Ip Kin-yuen said that after his coordination with the police, the principals of middle schools were preparing to enter PolyU. Students under the age of 18 could go to a specific location to find their principals. The police would not arrest them. They could leave the campus for home after police took their pictures and recorded their ID cards information. But the police reserved the right of prosecution. Yet, if protesters were over 18 years old, they would be arrested. The arrested students could be accompanied by their school principals with the assistance of lawyers. The former chairman of LegCo, Jasper Tsang, and lecturer Eric Cheung Tat-ming appeared at the PolyU. Both held discussions with the parents and representatives of young protesters. Tsang and Cheung tried to be the mediators. On the morning, many protesters were worrying about police “brutality” and they tried to escape through an underground sewer pipe. About 17 people crawled inside, with 3 turning back for fear of the relatively high water-level, but the rest made it safely outside the tunnel and miraculously escaped. Some unconfirmed reports said that the number of escapees through the tunnel approached 100. Firefighters came to investigate after suspecting that protesters might have been trapped inside the sewer. They searched the tunnel, but no one was found. Those protesters who decided not to take the underground tunnel route gathered to discuss alternative plans. PolyU Council Chair Lam Tai-fai entered the campus. He hoped that the protesters and students could cherish their life and leave the campus as soon as possible. He hoped that the police would not use force to enter the PolyU campus. Reverend William Devlin, an American priest, visited the campus and prayed for protesters. Some parents of the students who were trapped inside PolyU staged a sit-in on the footbridge near the campus, hoping that their children would leave the campus safely. They expressed discontent with the “riot” charges laid by the police on their children.

Event

Table 7.2  (continued)

Source: Free HK: Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Time (Hong Kong: Epoch Times, December 24, 2019); Ming Pao Daily, November 18, 2019, pp. A01–A05; Apple Daily, November 18, 2019, pp. A01–A05; Ming Pao Daily, November 19, 2019, pp. A01–A08 and November 20, 2019, pp. A01–A04; Apple Daily, November 19, 2019, pp. A01–A03 and November 20, 2019, pp. A01–A05

November 20

At 10 pm, some people who assisted middle-school students to leave said that originally about 150 people were in PolyU, but the number of people who chose to leave on November 18 far exceeded the original estimate, together with adults who left voluntarily. Altogether 300 people left the campus. At 11:30 pm, 100 people who were unwell at PolyU went to the ambulances. Most of them were covered with tin foil to keep themselves warm. Many protesters suffered foot injuries. Some people needed to be taken out by stretcher beds. Police said at a regular press conference that 1100 people had been arrested and registered in PolyU, of which about 600 had left voluntarily, including 400 adults and 200 minors. Most voluntary leavers were not PolyU students. At 10:21 pm, Police Commissioner Chris Tang was accompanied by a group of police to walk toward the campus and inspected the development. At 11 pm, six demonstrators tried to escape and climb through a barbed wire into the red tunnel area, but they were arrested by police. At 11:41 pm, other protesters stepped out PolyU and were accompanied by adults. The police announced that at 11 pm, a total of 800 people had left the campus and were under investigation. A protester designed a big SOS sign with towels on the platform in front of the Shaw Amenities building, sending a message to the international society and saying that “people are badly injured, there will be a humanitarian crisis. The situation is critical, please help us immediately!” After four days of siege, over hundred protesters were stranded inside the campus, including students and civilians. But food and gas were running out. The campus looked abandoned with lots of debris and trashes all over the ground. The Chinese word “resist” was sprayed on a big pillar of the campus. Many protesters and students suffered from hypothermia following the multiple bursts of water cannon fired by the police on them a few days ago. These injured protesters waited for ambulances to take them out of the campus. Gradually, protesters either left or escaped.

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internal split among them into softliners, who argued for an approach to stick to the principle of “be water,” and hardliners, who included members of the Student Unions adopting a more uncompromising tactic. The PolyU defense was dominated by the more uncompromising and hardline protesters, who failed to anticipate the difficulties of achieving a breakthrough in the final stage of the battle. Hence, the two final battles, one at the CUHK and the other at the PolyU, were punctuated partly by strategic flexibility versus rigidity, and partly by the determination of protesters to have an escalation of violent showdown with police before the upcoming November 24 District Council elections. This increased intensity of violent clashes, however, would lead to the massive arrests of protesters at the PolyU campus, which could be regarded as the battle of Waterloo in the anti-extradition, anti-police and anti-mainlandization movement from June to December 2019. The PolyU battle initiated by protesters underestimated the determination of the new Police Commissioner Chris Tang. In November 2019, he was appointed as the new commissioner succeeding Stephen Lo. Trained in Pudong’s China Executive Leadership Academy and equipped with a master’s degree in international security and strategy, Tang was determined to win the battle of PolyU once he became the new leader of the police force.3 As such, the movement of hardline protesters into the defense of PolyU, which was geo-strategically far more easily isolated than the CUHK campus, unintentionally fell into the police trap. The final stage of the battle at PolyU was characterized by two main events, namely the visit by former LegCo President Jasper Tsang and law lecturer Eric Cheung to the campus on the night of November 18, and the intervention of intermediary groups and individuals to find out the hiding protesters in the campus from November 19 to 26 (Table 7.3). The visits by Tsang, Cheung and lawmaker Ip Kin-yuen signaled the importance of third-party intermediaries to mediate between protesters and police. At the same time, the police made a concession. The protesters could choose to leave the campus voluntarily, but they all had to be registered by the police, who then reserved the right of prosecution. For those protesters aged 18 or above who opted to leave, the police had to arrest them, but they were allowed to be accompanied by principals and

3  For Tang’s training, see “Senior Officers: Hong Kong Police Force,” in https://www. police.gov.hk/ppp_en/01_about_us/os_sofficers.html, access date: April 10, 2020.

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Table 7.3  The last stage of the battle of Polytechnic University, November 20–26 November 20, 2019 9:15 13:15

14:19

21:42

November 22, 2019 11:05 November 23, 21:09 November 24, 10:31 17:02

19:05

23:30

23:58

Many protesters who stayed at the campus took an American flag, bows and arrows on the morning and walked to the platform at Block A facing Chatham Road South. The Assistant Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, Joseph Ha Chi-shing, went to PolyU to accompany a young man to leave PolyU. Ha talked to 7–8 people in the campus. Eric Cheung Tat-ming, a lecturer of the School of Law at the University of Hong Kong, said on Facebook that more than 600 people stranded at PolyU had left safely, and that many people did not leave for distinct reasons. Cheung hoped that every effort could be made to reduce unnecessary conflicts and avoid bloodshed and tragedies. Following a move by 30 volunteer first-aiders to leave PolyU campus on November 19, the last batch of 7 volunteer first-aiders would leave at night. Before they left, they firstly treated the injured protesters on the campus. Six protesters left the campus hand in hand and were registered by police.

Former CPPCC Standing Committee member Lew Mon-hung entered PolyU at 8 pm. He said that 32 people were still staying at PolyU. He hoped that all of them would leave before November 24. Lew Mon-hung left the campus with some protesters in the early morning. There was white smoke and charred smell from a restaurant on the campus. In the afternoon, a representative of the left-behind protesters met with the media and said that some people were trapped for many days and were under extreme psychological pressure. They refused to eat and could not utter complete sentences. However, because they were still hiding, it was difficult for social workers and other members of the society to contact them. Police called for those staying at PolyU to leave peacefully and reiterated that they hoped to resolve the incident with two principles, namely a peaceful approach and flexibility. Police said medical staff and clinical psychologists were arranged to provide appropriate assistance to those in need at the campus. Another protester was accompanied by a social worker and sent to the hospital by ambulance. He was found in Block Q. Social workers persuaded him to leave for and he finally agreed to do so. Some religious priests and their assistants tried to contact the rest of protesters through mobile phones. These protesters hoped to acquire some medicine. The religious priests and helpers left the medicine in designated position. (continued)

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Table 7.3 (continued) November 25, 4:32

November 26, 8:39 16:34

Two City University male students left the campus under the arrangement of volunteers and they were taken to Queen Elizabeth Hospital by an ambulance. The volunteers who assisted them said that at least five demonstrators at PolyU had been contacted. Some of them tried to mutilate their wrists and inflicted self-harm on themselves. There were still 20 people hiding on the campus. A male protester who left the campus thanked citizens for their support. He said he was encouraged by some citizens’ discussion in LIHKG to call for solidarity. A team from the University of Science and Technology team started to search for the remaining protesters on the campus. The vice president of PolyU, Wei Bingjiang, said that another 50 assistants were divided into 7 teams which thoroughly searched each building on the campus. Only one adult was found in the student union building. Another woman was found, but she was not a PolyU student. The sanitation situation on campus was poor.

Sources: Ming Pao Daily, November 19, 2019, pp. A01–A08; November 20, 2019, pp. A01–A04, November 21, 2019, pp. A03–05; November 22, 2019, pp. A04–06; November 23, 2019, pp. A05–07; November 24, 2019, pp. A04–06; November 25, 2019, p. A06; November 26, 2019, p. A05; November 27, 2019, pp. A06–A07; and Apple Daily, November 19, 2019, pp. A01–A03; November 20, 2019, pp. A01–A05; November 21, 2019, pp. A04–05; November 22, 2019, pp. A03–05; November 23, 2019, pp. A02–04; November 24, 2019, p. A03; November 25, 2019, p. A06; November 26, 2019, p. A07; and November 27, 2019, p. A08

lawyers.4 These important conditions were clearly a compromise made between mediators and police. Some die-hard protesters chose to stay in the campus until the day after the November 24 District Council elections were held. Intentionally or unintentionally, the hardline protesters who were determined to stay in the campus until the election day appeared to have a mobilizing impact on those voters supportive of protesters. Overall, although the battle of the PolyU was like a bridge too far for protesters to win the anti-police campaign, their failure incurred international responses. Table 7.4 outlines the responses from the PRC, Taiwan and other foreign countries to the battle of PolyU.  Predictably, Beijing condemned the violent protesters, supported the HKSAR government and police and expected the local courts to punish the lawbreakers. The Taiwan government appealed for the Hong Kong police to be tolerant, 4  “Underaged protestors at PolyU campus allowed to go home,” November 19, 2019, in https://www.ejinsight.com/eji/article/id/2307354/20191119-underage-protestors-atpolyu-campus-allowed-to-go-home, access date: April 10, 2020.

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Table 7.4  The responses of PRC, Taiwan and foreign countries to the Battle of Polytechnic University Government

Remarks

PRC

1. “The situation in Hong Kong is no longer a simple peaceful demonstration, but it shows a handful of extreme violent criminals who are using violence against ordinary citizens in an attempt to interfere with the normal operation of Hong Kong society and endanger public order.” 2. “Hong Kong’s top priority is to stop violence and restore order. The central government firmly supports not only the Hong Kong government’s administration to act in accordance with the law, but also the Hong Kong police to maintain social order. The central government also supports the Hong Kong judiciary to severely punish violent criminals in accordance with the law.” 1. “Hong Kong police’s firepower to suppress demonstrations has risen. The continued blockade of the university seriously threatens campus democracy and security, and it has an opportunity of increasing the risk of a collective humanitarian crisis.” 2. “Condemns all acts of violence and tough crackdowns and calls on all parties to calm down and prevent the situation from deteriorating.” 3. “The situation in Hong Kong is worrying. It should end early. The Hong Kong and Beijing governments should face the demands for freedom and human rights, rather than using shields, bullets and pistols.” 1. “The rapidly changing social conflicts and violence in Hong Kong call on both parties to exercise restraint, and violence on either side is unacceptable.” 2. “Law enforcement alone cannot resolve turbulence and violence. The government must respond to social demands, including the establishment of an independent investigative committee to increase accountability. The Hong Kong government has a fundamental responsibility to restore Hong Kong to peace.” 3. “The US reiterates our hope that Beijing will honor its commitments in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and protect Hong Kong’s liberal democracy and legal system.” 1. “The Hong Kong government has the responsibility to make every effort to prevent the confrontation, and the police should refrain from using live ammunition and other lethal force, because any bloodshed would have a devastating effect on Hong Kong.” 2. “Violence from both police and students should be condemned.” “Restraint and peaceful dialogue should be adopted by the parties concerned to resolve the incident as soon as possible.”

Taiwan

United States

United Kingdom

Japan

(continued)

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Table 7.4  (continued) Government

Remarks

European Union

It expressed concern about some nursing and medical staff members who were arrested by the police, for such a move could violate the Geneva Convention.

Sources: The Stand News, November 18, 2019, in https://www.thestandnews.com/politics/, access date: March 23, 2020; The Liberty Times, November 18, 2019, in https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/ breakingnews/2981873, access date: March 23, 2020; Oriental Daily, November 18, 2019, available in: https://hk.on.cc/hk/bkn/cnt/news/20191118/bkn-20191118153854406-1118_00822_001.html, access date: March 23, 2020; Headline Daily, November 19, 2019, in https://hd.stheadline.com, access date: March 23, 2020

and for Beijing and the Hong Kong government to face the demands of protesters positively. The US government appealed to all sides to adopt restraints, asked the Hong Kong government to set up an investigatory committee and urged Beijing to respect the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong. While the British government appealed to all sides for restraint and peace, Japan advocated dialogue for all the parties concerned, especially as one Japanese student was arrested at the PolyU conflict. The European Union expressed its concern about the phenomenon that some medical staff members who went to assist protesters were eventually arrested by the police.

Tactical Changes of the Police From the perspective of policing, there has been a noticeable tendency of the Hong Kong police to adopt a tougher, swifter and assertive action against protesters since the battle of the PolyU, especially after Chris Tang’s visit to Beijing to meet the Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi. Table 7.5 shows these tougher actions by the police against protesters in December 2019 and January 2020, just prior to the outbreak of Covid-19 which has temporarily dampened the frequency and intensity of the anti-­ police and anti-mainlandization protests. In a sense, the onset of Covid-19 has propelled many Hong Kong protesters to focus on their personal health, especially as more Hong Kong people have lost their jobs in the midst of the Coronavirus. Table 7.5 shows that the police have been changing their tactics of policing protests since Chris Tang became the new commissioner. First,

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277

Table 7.5  Tougher police action after Chris Tang’s visit to Beijing to meet Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi Date

Details of police action

December 15, 2019

Several clashes occurred between police and protesters in Kowloon. Around 9:00 pm, police arrested 2 people during their clearance of a gathering of about 100 people outside the Langham Place in Mongkok. At 10:40 pm, police fired pepper spray at protesters, residents and journalists at the intersection of Nathan Road and Shantung Street. The police headed toward Sai Yeung Choi Street South, where they fired tear gas canisters. At 11:25 pm, several police officers pushed back a group of reporters near the intersection of Shantung and Portland Streets. A photojournalist for Mad Dog Daily argued with police near and was pepper-sprayed, beaten by batons, arrested and taken to Mongkok police station. The police cracked down on the Spark Alliance, a non-profit group providing financial aid to pro-democracy protesters, over alleged activities of money laundering. The police seized HK$70 million of funds, including bank deposits, as well as investment and insurance products. Police arrested four suspects involved in the management of the Spark Alliance. Hong Kong police swept into several shopping malls, chasing and arresting some demonstrators. They also pursued protesters at the Harbor City. Police clashed with protesters in shopping centers and hotels across Hong Kong. Protesters threw umbrellas and other objects at the police, who in turn fired tear gas and beat up protesters with batons. One police pointed a pistol at a crowd. In Mongkok, police used pepper spray to disperse protesters. At Mira Place shopping mall in Kowloon, 100 protesters broke the glass counters and sprayed anti-China graffiti on the walls and windows of the Starbucks coffee shop. In Yoho Mall, Yuen Long, a nervous man ran away from the police and injured himself after falling from the second floor of the mall. During a stand-off on the Nathan Road in Mongkok in the early morning, police fired tear gas and pepper pellets at protesters who blocked roads, vandalized banks and threw petrol bombs at police vehicles. At about 2 am, a 16-year-old boy fell from a rooftop balcony of a Taiwanese restaurant, after police searched the premises for protesters. He was hospitalized with hand and leg injuries. Police denied using any force inside the restaurant. During daytime, protesters went to various malls to launch “shopping protests.” The police confronted them with pepper sprays in Shatin, Mongkok and Kowloon Bay. For the third consecutive day, protesters and police clashed inside shopping malls. The police fired pepper spray and blue water liquid at protesters, arresting 300 people.

December 19, 2019

December 21, 2019 December 24, 2019

December 25, 2019

December 26, 2019

(continued)

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Table 7.5  (continued) Date

Details of police action

December 28, 2019

Around 150 protesters gathered at the Sheung Shui Plaza without notifying the police beforehand. Police fired pepper spray and arrested 20 people, including a 13-year-old boy. Police made several arrests after thousands of protesters occupied a road in Kowloon, while spectators counted down to midnight along the Victoria Harbor. The police arrested six people in Tin Shui Wai for putting posters and writings on the Lennon Wall. They forced them to kneel, including a pregnant woman who started to vomit. She had to wait for a long time before being sent to hospital. The police arrested 400 people across Hong Kong after a peaceful pro-democracy New Year’s Day march with the participation of hundreds of thousands of people. Scuffles broke out near the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation branch in Wan Chai. The police fired tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowds. During the protest, a policeman was seen by the mass media taking off the protective goggles of Ted Hui, a Democratic Party lawmaker, and then pepper-sprayed his face. During a candlelight vigil in Tseung Kwan O to mark the second month of remembering the death of UST student Alex Chow Tsz-lok, 200 protesters clashed with the police. A plainclothes officer subdued a man, while uniform police sprayed another man in the face with blue liquid and detained two people. Police arrested a teenager for putting up pro-democracy posters outside the British consulate, sparking concern among UK legislators about the way in which the police enforced the law in Hong Kong. About 150,000 people attended an anti-CCP rally at the Chater Garden. Police stopped the rally on short notice and arrested its organizer Ventus Lau. In Mongkok, police fired tear gas at the protesters and used pepper spray at reporters. On the first day of Lunar New Year, just before 11 pm, protesters blocked the Portland Street and remembering the fourth anniversary of the Mongkok “Fishball Revolution.” Police arrived at the scene and fired tear gas to disperse the crowd.

December 31, 2019

January 1, 2020

January 8, 2020

January 11, 2020 January 19, 2020

January 25, 2020

Sources: Various Hong Kong Chinese Newspaper form December 16, 2019, to January 26, 2020

the police were determined to eliminate and arrest the “valiant” elements of the protesters in relatively larger battles, such as the battle at the PolyU where 1100 protesters were registered and left the campus. Although some protesters at PolyU escaped through the footbridge on the night of November 18 and via the underground tunnel, the relatively more radical and violent protesters were all trapped inside the campus and had no

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279

choice but to leave later. Since the battle of PolyU, the “valiant” elements in the anti-police and anti-mainlandization movement have been keeping a very low profile, understanding the need for a more flexible strategy to oppose the government. Second, the police have been making swift and massive arrests once protesters are seen in shopping malls and on the streets. The idea is to pre-empt the action of protesters before the “valiant” elements join them. Third, the police targeted at the alleged financial sources of protesters, like arresting four organizers of the Stark Alliance on December 19, for this funding group appeared to collect donations for protesters and play a crucial role as a provider of legal aid for arrested protesters. Fourth, the police have been adopting a strong tactic in dealing with many reporters, who were criticized by the pro-Beijing mass media as supportive of protesters. To avoid reporters providing a “protective umbrella” for protesters, the police have been taken strong measures against them by using pepper spray. In fact, many reporters “hated” the police during the anti-extradition movement from June to December 2019.5 They were the target of police arrests and pepper spray, suffering from the inhalation of tear gas canisters fired by the police. The pro-Beijing media accused some protesters of disguising themselves as reporters, but it appeared the police could also use undercover agents to pretend as reporters and infiltrate front-line protesters. At the same time, some reporters of pro-Beijing dailies acted as the informants of both the police and PRC authorities. Under these chaotic circumstances, the worsening relations between police and reporters were inevitable. However, due to the hardline measures adopted by Chris Tang since November 2019, there has been no sign that the police have attempted to repair their already harmed relations with many reporters. Table 7.6 illustrates the police use of their weapons and the number of arrests in the major protests from June 2019 to March 2020 as reported in the mass media. At the beginning of the anti-extradition protests, the mass media portrayed Rupert Dover and David John Jordan as relatively hardline commanders whose subordinate officers used tear gas, rubber bullets, bean bag rounds and sponge grenades extensively, just like the protests on June 12, July 14, July 21 and July 28. Interestingly, the police handling of the protests on July 1, from the perspective of using weapons, tended to be comparatively much milder, directly or indirectly leading to the occupation of LegCo by some radical protesters. The October 1  Discussion with two reporters, December 2019.

5

280 

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Table 7.6  Police use of weapons and police arrests Date

Event and place

Commander as reported by mass media

Weapons used

Number of protesters who were arrested

June 9

Anti-extradition protest at Admiralty Anti-extradition protest at Admiralty

Rupert Dover

Batons and pepper spray

19

Rupert Dover and David John Jordan

32

Police headquarters Anti-extradition protest outside Legislative Council Kowloon March Sheung Shui Shatin Protests in Sheung Wan

Rupert Dover

240 tear gas canisters, 19 rubber bullets, 3 bean bag rounds, 30 sponge grenades None

June 12

June 21 July 1

July 7 July 13 July 14 July 21

4

Rupert Dover

27 tear gas canisters, 30 sponge grenades

9

Rupert Dover Rupert Dover Rupert Dover David John Jordan

Unclear Unclear Pepper spray 55 tear gas canisters, 9 rubber bullets, 25 sponge grenades 118 tear gas canisters, 30 rubber bullets, 1 bean bag round, 33 sponge grenades 408 tear gas canisters, 95 rubber bullets, 2 bean bag rounds, 50 sponge grenades Batons, pepper smoke, pepper spray, tear gas canisters (numbers were not reported in the media)

6 2 48 23

July 27

Anti-triad protest Local in Yuen Long commanders

July 28

Protests in Sheung Wan

August 4

Rallies at Local Mongkok, commanders Cheung Kwan O and Hong Kong Island West

David John Jordan

11

49

44

(continued)

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281

Table 7.6  (continued) Date

Event and place

Commander as reported by mass media

Weapons used

Number of protesters who were arrested

August 5

Protests at 7 districts

Local commanders

148

August 9–12

Protests in Tai Po, Shum Shui Po, Hong Kong Island East

Local commanders

August 24

Protest in Kwun Tong

David John Jordan

August 25

Protests in Tsuen David John Wan and Kwai Jordan Tsing

August 31

Protest in Admiralty

David John Jordan

September 8

Rally in support of human rights and democracy

Local commanders

800 tear gas canisters, 140 rubber bullets, 24 sponge grenades Bean bag rounds, tear gas canisters (numbers not reported in the mass media) 70 tear gas canisters, 24 rubber bullets, 31 sponge grenades 145 tear gas canisters, 50 rubber bullets, 4 bean bag rounds, 13 sponge grenades, 1 shot from a pistol, water cannon 241 tear gas canisters, 92 rubber bullets, 1 bean bag rounds, 13 sponge grenades, 2 shots from pistol, blue water cannon Water cannon, rubber bullets, tear gas canisters (numbers unclear) Unclear Tear gas canisters, blue water cannon (numbers unclear)

55 (48 males and 7 females)

September 14 Amoy Plaza September 15 Protests in support of five demands

Local commanders Local commanders

149 (including 111 males and 38 females)

32

54

159 (63 arrested in Prince Edward and 16 in Causeway Bay)

At least 6 were arrested

24 (all males)

(continued)

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Table 7.6 (continued) Date

Event and place

Commander as reported by mass media

Weapons used

Number of protesters who were arrested

September 29 Antiauthoritarian protests in Admiralty and Mongkok

Local commanders

146

October 1

Protests at various districts

Local commanders

October 4–7

Protests against anti-mask law

Local commanders

Protest in Tuen Mun November 11 Dawn Action

Local commanders Local commanders

328 tear gas canisters, 306 rubber bullets, 95 bean bag rounds, 72 sponge grenades, water cannon 1400 tear gas canisters, 900 rubber bullets, 190 bean bag rounds, 230 sponge grenades, 6 shots from pistols, blue water cannons Tear gas canisters, rubber bullet (numbers unclear) Unclear 255 tear gas canisters, 204 rubber bullets, 45 bean bag rounds, 96 sponge grenades 2330 tear gas canisters, 1770 rubber bullets, 434 bean bag rounds, 159 sponge grenades 578 tear gas canisters, 471 rubber bullets, 71 bean bag rounds, 22 sponge grenades

277 (206 males and 71 females)

October 30

November 12 Daybreak Action Local commanders

November 13 Protests at various districts

Local commanders

269 (178 males and 91 females)

241 (170 males and 71 females) 70

142 (97 males and 45 females)

224 (152 males and 72 females)

(continued)

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283

Table 7.6 (continued) Date

Event and place

Commander as reported by mass media

Weapons used

Number of protesters who were arrested

November 11–16

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Local commanders

5

November 13–26

Hong Kong Polytechnic

Local commanders

2000 tear gas canisters, rubber bullets (numbers unclear) Tear gas canisters, water cannon (numbers unclear) Unclear 27 tear gas canisters, 5 rubber bullets Pepper spray, batons, 2 rubber bullets

99

Tear gas canisters, rubber bullets Pepper spray, blue water liquid Pepper spray

165

Unclear

About 400

Local commanders Local commanders Cheung Kwan O Local commanders

Tear gas

At least 30

Unclear

February 29

Mongkok protest Local commanders

Unclear

March 8

Protests in Tai Po and Cheung Kwan O

Unclear

7 (4 males and 3 females) 117 (94 males and 23 females) 115 (71 males and 44 females) 63 (46 males and 17 females)

November 21 Protest at Yuen Long Station December 15 Protest in Kowloon

Local commanders Local commanders

December 22 A rally supportive of Uyghurs in China December 24 Protest at 5 districts December 26 Protests during Christmas December 28 Protest in Sheng Shui Plaza January 1 Rally on the Hong Kong Island January 19 Protest against the CCP January 31 Mongkok protest

Local commanders

February 8

Local commanders Local commanders Local commanders Local commanders

Local commanders

Unclear

1377

6

2

300 20

(continued)

284 

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Table 7.6 (continued) Date

Event and place

March 12

Mongkok protest Local commanders Yuen Long Local protest commanders Mongkok protest Local commanders

March 21 March 31

Commander as reported by mass media

Weapons used

Number of protesters who were arrested

Unclear

6

Pepper spray, tear gas canisters Unclear

61 54 (43 males and 11 females)

Sources: Compiled from the authors by using various Chinese newspapers from June 2019 to March 2020 Note: The data are based on the recorded figures in the media and from the police

protests proved to be a turning point, for the number of arrests on a single day topped all the protests from June to October, leading to another large-scale arrest on November 11, when 287 people were arrested. The battle of the PolyU turned out to be the most decisive one, because 1377 people were arrested and registered by the police. All the arrests from mid-­ November onward have been quite massive in terms of single-day action by the police, like the protests on January 1, February 8 and February 19. Hence, the overall trend is for the police to take swift action and arrest protesters immediately, serving as a deterrent against the spread of protests to attract more supporters and radicals. Interestingly, with the increase in police assertiveness, public satisfaction with the police declined over time. Diagram 7.1 shows that the ratings of public satisfaction with the Hong Kong police dropped from 61 out of 100 points in June 2019 to 39.42 in September, and finally to 35.34 in November 2019. Clearly, many citizens were unhappy with the police performance, including the ways in which they exercised power over the protesters. Indeed, from the perspective of Beijing, the Hong Kong police performed well in maintaining law and order. But from the perspective of Hong Kong citizens, the police could better strike a balance between the use of force to maintain law and order and their accountability to the public. Diagram 7.2 shows the recorded police arrests and the battles at CUHK and PolyU proved to be the final battles in which 2637 protesters were arrested. Diagram 7.3 shows that many arrested protesters were young people. The number of arrested protesters who were aged 17 or below

285

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70.00 61.03

60.00 50.00 40.00

39.42

35.34

30.00 20.00 10.00 -

June, 2019

September, 2019

November, 2019

134 RY

RY

A

A FE

BR

U

U N JA

EC D

V O N

EM

EM

BE

BE

R

R

274

410

620 R BE O CT O

PT SE

A

U

G

EM

U

BE

R

ST

173 JU

LY

77 E N JU

433

659

2637

Diagram 7.1  Rating of public satisfaction with the Hong Kong police. (Sources: “People’s Satisfaction with the Disciplinary Force,” in https://www.pori.hk/poppoll/disciplinary-force, access date: April 16, 2020)

Diagram 7.2  Recorded police arrests from June 2019 to February 2020. (Source: Constructed from the police figures, June 2019 to February 2020. Note: The figures in July included 37 thugs who were not protesters)

286 

S. S.-H. LO ET AL.

1765

2000 1800 1600 1400 1200

Jun-19

Jul-19

Aug-19

Oct-19

Nov-19

Age 18-20

Dec-19

429 Jan-20

102 79 165

183 142

373

485 649

252 248

501 Sep-19

Age 17 or below

132 106

13 28

0

7 13 53

200

183

400

114 149

600

45 115

591

800

689

1000

Feb-20

Age 21 or above

Diagram 7.3  Police arrests and age groups

rose from June to November 2019 and it declined after the battles at CUHK and PolyU. Similarly, the number of arresting those aged between 18 and 20 increased from June to November, after which it also dropped. However, the number of arrested protesters who were aged between 21 and above fluctuated over time, increasing from June to August, declining slightly in September but rising continuously and drastically until November after which the number of arrested protesters decreased.

The Function of 2019 District Council Elections: A Channel of Expressing Public Anger The battle of PolyU preceded the District Council elections that would be held on November 24. As mentioned before, the tragedy of besieging protesters at PolyU appeared to have mobilizing impacts on the voters supportive of them. Table 7.7 shows the results of District Council elections, which proved to have an important function of allowing voters to express their preferences after months of protests and societal disputes. The election results were shocking to most ordinary people, the HKSAR government and the central authorities in Beijing. The pro-democracy candidates, who got 124 directly elected seats in the 2015 district elections, acquired 389 directly elected seats in 2019. On the contrary, the

287

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Table 7.7  District Council elections: critical function as a channel for voicing public anger District

Central and Western Wan Chai Eastern Southern Yau Tsim Mong Sham Shui Po Kowloon City Wong Tai Sin Kwun Tong Tsuen Wan Tuen Mun Yuen Long North Tai Po Sai Kung Sha Tin Kwai Tsing Islands Total

Number of pro-­ democracy candidates elected in 2015 election

Number of pro-Beijing candidates elected in 2015 election

Number of other candidates elected in 2015 election

Number of pro-­ democracy candidates elected in 2019 election

Number of pro-Beijing candidates elected in 2019 election

Number of other candidates elected in 2019 election

5

10

0

14

1

0

2 10 5 3

11 25 12 16

0 0 0 0

9 32 15 17

4 3 2 3

0 0 0 0

11

11

1

23

2

0

4

20

0

15

10

0

9

16

0

25

0

0

9

28

0

28

12

0

4

15

1

16

4

1

8

22

0

28

4

0

5

36

0

33

12

0

4 6 9 19 9

18 15 16 20 20

0 0 4 0 1

15 19 26 40 27

7 2 2 2 5

0 0 3 0 0

2 124

16 327a

0 7

7 389

11 86a

0 4

A comparison of District Council election results, 2015 and 2019 Sources: For details, see https://www.elections.gov.hk/dc2019/eng/index.html and https://www.elections.gov.hk/dc2019/eng/index.html, access date, April 9, 2020 These figures included 27 elected representatives in rural villages in 2019

a

288 

S. S.-H. LO ET AL.

pro-Beijing forces, which obtained 327 directly elected seats in the 2015 district elections, only grasped 86 directly elected seats in the 2019 district elections. The results proved to be a tsunami reversing the pro-Beijing victory in 2015 to the pan-democratic landslide in 2019. The shocking result of the Hong Kong democrats in grasping 389 of the 452 directly elected seats in 18 District Councils, together with an unprecedented voter turnout of 71.2 percent, demonstrated the anger of many Hong Kong people with the performance of the HKSAR government, ranging from the introduction of the deeply unpopular extradition bill to LegCo in June 2019 to the handling of both peaceful and violent protests by the police from July to November. The pan-democrats captured most of the seats of 17 of the 18 District Councils—a completely astounding result. The pro-Beijing political party, Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), suffered a devastating defeat. In the 2015 District Council elections, it gained 117 seats. In November 2019, the DAB only captured 21 seats out of its 181 nominated candidates. The huge defeat of the DAB sent shock waves to the PRC authorities handling Hong Kong matters. With the benefit of hindsight, the removal of Zhang Xiaoming from his director position at the HKMAO and Wang Zhimin from his post at the Liaison Office meant that, from Beijing’s perspective, the two top PRC officials had to be held accountable not only for the poor election result of pro-Beijing forces, but also perhaps for their obstinacy in pushing the extradition bill forward in the HKSAR. This electoral victory of the democrats and the electoral debacle of pro-­ Beijing and pro-government forces had significant implications for Beijing’s policy toward Hong Kong and the political development of the HKSAR. Since the democrats will likely be able to grasp an additional 117 seats in the Election Committee that will select the Chief Executive in 2022, Beijing will likely be more cautious and conservative in the reform of the Chief Executive election in the HKSAR in the coming years. In other words, a cycle of Beijing’s tight policy on Hong Kong through the imposition of the extradition bill had a boomerang effect of stimulating the victory of democrats in district elections, a result which ironically would lead to a more conservative-minded attitude of Beijing toward electoral reforms in Hong Kong. This vicious cycle of Beijing’s control, which leads to democratic rebound in elections and then the center’s more cautious attitudes toward the city’s electoral reform, is becoming a new feature of Beijing-Hong Kong relations.

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The outcome of the November 24 District Council elections seriously questioned Beijing’s policy toward Hong Kong. Beijing’s officials responsible for Hong Kong matters failed to understand the aspirations of many Hong Kong people. Their policy directives remained hardline. On the implementation side, the Hong Kong leaders were also adopting a hardline approach without any softline measures. As a result, many voters had no choice but to express their anger over the Hong Kong government. If Beijing and the Hong Kong leaders remain adamant in their hardline approach, the Hong Kong crisis will likely persist with violent confrontations between protesters and police. If Beijing adjusts its policy toward Hong Kong, a calmer atmosphere will be conducive to Beijing’s relations with many Hong Kong people. On the other hand, quite a number of protest leaders and activists were directly elected. Table  7.8 shows that some protesters were eventually directly elected to District Councils. They included Fergus Leung, Sam Yip, Leung Pak-kin, Siu Tak-kin, Janelle Rosalynn Leung, Michael Mo, Tommy Cheung, Richard Chan and Jimmy Sham. As a leader of the CHRF, Sham was mysteriously attacked by thugs twice and fortunately escaped the second attack alive. His experiences showed that the political participation of some Hong Kong democrats to oppose the policies of the central government and the HKSAR administration did entail huge political risks and the danger of personal safety. Yet, the experiences of these protest activists did appear to confirm an argument made by the pro-­ Beijing local media, which contended that some protest activists did have the political intention of participating in district elections and being directly elected as councilors.

The Role of United States and the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act If district elections in the HKSAR in November 2019 had the political function of allowing voters to express their preferences, this democratic choice made by voters was in conformity with the US policy toward Hong Kong, namely supportive of the development of democracy locally. Table 7.9 shows the remarks made by US politicians on the Hong Kong protests, including Marco Rubio, Ben Cardin, Jim Risch, Nancy Pelosi, Bob Menendez and Ted Cruz. They all supported the aspirations of protesters in Hong Kong—a move that led to PRC criticisms that US politicians “interfered” with Hong Kong matters.

Sam Yip Kam-lung

Leung Pak-kin

Jocelyn Chau Hui-yan

Siu Tak-kin

Shek Tong Tsui Tai Fat Hau

City Garden

Mongkok North Yuet Wah

Sam Shing Yuen Lung

Fergus Leung

Kwun Lung

Janelle Rosalynn Leung Michael Mo Kwan-tai Tommy Cheung Sau-yin

Protest leaders or activists elected as district councilors

Constituency

1.  He was an organizer of two rallies at Tuen Mun. 1. He was a former member of Scholarism and a former student leader in the 2014 Umbrella Movement.

1.  He is a journalist who covered the August 31 incident in the Prince Edward MTR station. 2. He also stayed at the Polytechnic University during the battle between protesters and police in November 2019. 1.  She was arrested by police during protest on August 11, 2019. 2.  She was mysteriously attacked by pro-Beijing supporters on October 12, 2019. 1. He is a research associate and was the only candidate who put on a helmet and mask in the election campaign. 1.  She was mysteriously attacked by pro-Beijing supporters on October 8, 2019.

1. He was one of the members of the Hong Kong Higher Institutions of International Affairs Delegation, an organization formed by 12 Higher Institution Students’ Unions, which is dedicated to conducting civic diplomacy and internationalizing Hong Kong’s affairs. 1.  He is the organizer of August 5 rally in Sai Wan.

Prominent participation in anti-extradition movement

Table 7.8  Protest leaders and activists who were elected to District Councils in 2019

290  S. S.-H. LO ET AL.

Jimmy Sham Tsz-kit

Lek Yuen

On August 13, a netizen launched a rally at the Hong Kong International Airport. After having dinner at the airport hotel, Chen went to the airport to observe the conflict between police and protesters. He said, “I was astonished by the movement. I participated as a mediator” between police and demonstrators. He eventually got the title of “uncle airport” as labeled by protesters and the media. On November 2, 128 candidates running for the District Council elections held an election rally at in Victoria Park in Causeway Bay. Later, the police fired tear gas at the Victoria Park. Chan argued with the police and was met with pepper spray. He was subdued and arrested. 1.  He was and is the convener of the Civil Human Rights Front. 2. He organized various important assemblies and rallies in the anti-extradition movement on June 9, June 16, July 1 and August 18, 2019. 3. He was mysteriously attacked by some thugs at Tak Hing Street on August 29 and later at Mongkok in October 16.

Sources: Various Chinese newspapers and online newspapers reports from October 6, 2019 to November 31, 2019

Richard Chan

Lam Tsuen Valley

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292 

S. S.-H. LO ET AL.

Table 7.9  Remarks of American politicians on Hong Kong Name (party affiliation)

Remarks

Marco Rubio (Republican Party)

“As over one million Hong Kong people take to the streets protesting amendments to the territory’s extradition law, the US must send a strong message that ‘we stand with those peacefully advocating for freedom and the rule of law and against Beijing’s growing interference in Hong Kong affairs.’” Ben Cardin “America’s strength has been and always will be in our values. We cannot (Democratic stand idly by as the rights of the people of Hong Kong are trampled on Party) by China.” Jim Risch “A Hong Kong that safeguards its autonomy, upholds fundamental (Republican freedoms, and maintains an open business environment is good for Party) Hong Kong, good for the United States, and good for the world.” Nancy Pelosi “The people of Hong Kong deserve a future of justice and autonomy (Democratic and freedom from fear that they were promised when Basic Law—and Party) for which they have long been courageously fighting.” Bob Menendez “As the world bears witness to the brutality with which security forces in (Democratic Hong Kong are responding to tens of thousands of pro-democracy Party) activists in a display of force not seen in years, I am proud to join my colleagues in introducing this important legislation to reaffirm our steadfast support for Hong Kong’s autonomy, democracy and respect for human rights.” Ted Cruz “Today brave men and women [and] boys and girls are standing up and (Republican demanding that the Chinese Communist Party protect Hong Kong’s Party) autonomy, protect free speech, and defend human rights. Despite these peaceful protests, the Chinese Communist Party is fighting back with brutality and violence. The police brutality that we’ve seen and the Chinese Communist Party’s larger assault on the people of Hong Kong has been shameful. Just this past weekend, the Hong Kong police began attacking young, innocent students who were peacefully protesting that brutality.” Sources: “Rubio, Cardin, Risch, Menendez Reintroduce Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act,” in https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/6/rubio-cardin-risch-menendez-reintroduce-hong-kong-human-rights-and-democracy-act, access date: February 5, 2020; “Pelosi Remarks at Press Event on Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act,” in https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/91819-0, access date: February 5, 2020 and “Sen. Cruz: ‘The People of America Stand With Hong Kong,’” in https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=4777, access date: February 5, 2020

Similarly, US President Donald Trump made unprecedented comments on Hong Kong’s developments (Table 7.10). He paid special attention to Hong Kong shortly after the PAP was moved to the Shenzhen border with Hong Kong. On August 15, Trump said that he trusted President Xi Jinping could “quickly and humanely solve the Hong Kong problem”—a

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Table 7.10  US President Donald Trump’s remarks on Hong Kong Date

Remarks

August 14, 2019

“Our Intelligence has informed us that the Chinese Government is moving troops to the border with Hong Kong. Everyone should be calm and safe!” August 15, “I know President Xi of China very well. He is a great leader who very 2019 much has the respect of his people. He is also a good man in a ‘tough business.’ I have zero doubt that if President Xi wants to quickly and humanely solve the Hong Kong problem, he can do it.” “If President Xi would meet directly and personally with the protestors, there would be a happy and enlightened ending to the Hong Kong problem. I have no doubt!” August 28, “So interesting to read and see all of the free and interesting advice I am 2019 getting on China, from people who have tried to handle it before and failed miserably—In fact, they got taken to the cleaners. We are doing very well with China. This has never happened to them before!” December 20, “Had a very good talk with President Xi of China concerning our giant 2019 trade deal. China has already started large scale purchase of agricultural product & more. Formal signing being arranged. Also talked about North Korea, where we are working with China, and Hong Kong progress!” Sources: Compiled from the reports of Hong Kong newspapers on President Trump’s remarks, August  to  December 2019. Also see Trump’s Twitter, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/ 1166683442098163712?lang=en, access date: April 10, 2020

kind of diplomatic pressure exerted on the PRC to refrain from taking strong action against Hong Kong’s protesters. Most importantly, the Hong Kong protests took place at a time when China and the United States were engaging in a trade war. As such, the US action on Hong Kong, including the passage of the US Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, was seen by the PRC as an “explicit” interference with the HKSAR matters. But from the perspective of the United States, it had the legitimate concern about Hong Kong, where civil liberties and its rule of law were and are the universal values cherished by the US government. On September 15, 2019, the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act acquired the support from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. On November 20, the House of Representatives passed the Senate version of the Act. Seven days later, President Trump signed the bill into law, marking a crucial step made by the US to promote democracy and human rights in the HKSAR amid the protests. The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 can sanction those Hong Kong officials and elites responsible for the “violation” of

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Table 7.11  Key points in the US Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act 1. “This bill directs various departments to assess whether political developments in Hong Kong justify changing Hong Kong’s unique treatment under U.S. law.” 2. The Department of State shall “report and certify annually to Congress as to whether Hong Kong is sufficiently autonomous from China to justify its unique treatment.” 3. The Department of Commerce shall “report annually to Congress on China’s efforts to use Hong Kong to evade U.S. export controls and sanctions and the extent of such violations occurring in Hong Kong generally.” 4. If “Hong Kong has proposed or enacted legislation that puts U.S. citizens at risk of extradition to mainland China or to another country that lacks defendants’ rights protections, the President shall report to Congress on (1) a strategy for protecting U.S. citizens and businesses in Hong Kong, and (2) whether Hong Kong is legally competent to administer various law-enforcement agreements between Hong Kong and the United States.” 5 The State Department “may not deny work- or student-visa applications from an otherwise qualified Hong Kong resident due to a politically motivated adverse action by the Hong Kong government against the applicant. The State Department shall encourage other democratic countries to take a similar approach.” 6. The President shall “report to Congress a list of individuals responsible for committing acts that violate internationally recognized human rights in Hong Kong, including the extrajudicial rendition or torture of any person in Hong Kong. The bill bars such individuals from entering the United States and imposes sanctions on them.” Sources: “Summery of Public Law No: 116-76 (11/27/2019)—Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019,” in https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate%20bill/1838?q= %7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Hong+Kong+Human+Rights+and+Democracy+Act+of+2019%22%5D% 7D&s=1&r=1, access date: February 5, 2020

internationally recognized human rights in Hong Kong (see Table  7.11). The Hong Kong democrats and protesters were emboldened and empowered by their success in lobbying the US Congressmen, Senators and officials on the need for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019. The pro-Beijing mass media had already leveled criticisms at these democrats, including the young activists, calling them “traitors.” In fact, many Hong Kong people share the universal values of human rights, democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law as the American political elites. Table 7.12 shows the rallies organized by the Hong Kong protesters in support of the American deeper involvement into Hong Kong’s democratic development. As such, while some Hong Kong democrats who share US values will continue to fight for local democratic change, they will be destined to be labeled by the pro-Beijing mass media as “pro-American traitors.” The shared values between the protesters and the US government can be seen in Table  7.13, which sums up how the United States saw the

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Table 7.12  Pro-American peaceful protests in Hong Kong Date

Theme of the peaceful Objective(s) protest

Number of participants according to organizer (police estimates)

August 16, 2019

Rally to stand with Hong Kong, power to the people

60,000 (7100)

September 8, 2019

October 14, 2019

November 2, 2019

November 28, 2019

To demand for Hong Kong’s democracy and government accountability through the influences from the United States and United Kingdom. Rally for the Hong Submit the protesters’ signed Kong Human letter to the American Consulate Rights and in Hong Kong to urge the Democracy Act United States to pass the Act. Rally of fighting Calling for the US Congress to with Hong Kong, pass an act that would punish Justice to our those Hong Kong people Victims responsible for suppressing freedoms in Hong Kong. The sanctions include the act of freezing their US-based assets and denying their entry into the United States. Rally in support of Urge the US Senate and Human Rights and Congress to pass the Hong Kong Democracy Act Human Rights and Democracy Act. Thanksgiving Express their gratitude to the assembly on the United States for passing the Hong Kong Human Hong Kong Human Rights and Rights and Democracy Act. Democracy Act

5000 (police did not have any estimate) 130,000 (25,200)

1000

100,000 (9600)

Sources: “Watch again: Hong Kong students hold a ‘Power of the People’ rally,” in https://www. euronews.com/2019/08/16/watch-live-hong-kong-students-hold-a-power-of-the-people-rally, access date: April 4, 2020; “‘Fight with Hong Kong’: 130,000 gather to urge US to pass human rights act to monitor city’s autonomy, organizers say,” Hong Kong Free Press, in https://www.hongkongfp. com/2019/10/15/fight-hong-kong-130000-gather-urge-us-pass-human-rights-act-monitor-citysautonomy-organisers-say/, access date: April 4, 2020; “In Pictures: Thousands attend Thanksgiving rally as US passes Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act,” Hong Kong Free Press, in https://www. hongkongfp.com/2019/11/29/pictures-thousands-attend-thanksgiving-rally-us-passes-hong-konghuman-rights-democracy-act/, access date: April 4, 2020; “Rally for HK act in US congress gets police nod,” The Standard, https://www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news/section/11/212530/Rally-forHK-act-in-US-congress-gets-police-nod, access date: April 4, 2020

 1. “Throughout the year, however, domestic and international observers continued to express concerns about central PRC government encroachment on the SAR’s autonomy.”  2. “From June to year’s end, Hong Kong experienced frequent protests, with some exceeding more than one million participants. Most protesters were peaceful, but some engaged in violence and vandalism. The protests began as a movement against the government’s introduction of legislation that would have allowed the extradition of criminal suspects to any jurisdiction, including mainland China, but subsequently evolved to encompass broader concerns.”   3. “Significant human rights issues included: police brutality against protesters and persons in custody; arbitrary arrest; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; and restrictions on political participation.”   4. “The government took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed human rights abuses but resisted widespread calls for a special inquiry into alleged police brutality that occurred during the demonstrations. The government continued to rely on the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) to review allegations against the police.”  5. “Many Hong Kong residents and experts alleged that police officers on several occasions used excessive force to disperse crowds or arrest individuals suspected of participating in violent protests. For example, on August 31, police rushed onto a subway train and beat several individuals while making arrests. In August the UN Human Rights Office stated there was ‘credible evidence’ the Hong Kong police were ‘employing less lethal weapons in ways that are prohibited by international norms and standards’ when conducting crowd dispersal operations. Critics also noted that police officers frequently did not show identification when conducting crowd dispersal operations, which made it difficult to identify officers who may have committed abuses.”  6. “In August the government blocked legislators, journalists, and justices of the peace from visiting the San Uk Ling Holding Center, where many protesters were detained. In September Chief Executive Lam announced that the police would no longer hold protesters at the San Uk Ling Holding Center. The IPCC announced it visited the San Uk Ling Holding Center on October 8 and affirmed that it would ‘make recommendations to the Police should any area of improvement has been identified.’ As of the year’s end, however, the IPCC provided no report on its findings.”  7. “Police officers frequently did not display identification when conducting crowd dispersal operations, a practice which made it difficult to identify officers who may have committed abuses. In August the head of the IPCC, the police watchdog, criticized police for not clearly displaying identification on uniforms, but the practice continued after August.”  8. “Police generally apprehended suspects openly when they observed suspects committing a crime or with warrants based on sufficient evidence and issued by a duly authorized official. Police must promptly charge arrested suspects. The government respected this right and generally brought arrested persons before a judicial officer within 48 hours. Detainees were generally informed promptly of charges against them. There was a functioning bail system.”

Table 7.13  Key points of the US State Department’s 2019 country reports on human rights practices in Hong Kong

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Source: “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)—Hong Kong,” in https://www.state.gov/ reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/hong-kong/, access date: March 13, 2020

 9. “Authorities allowed detainees access to a lawyer of their choice, although the Hong Kong Bar Association reported that lawyers experienced obstruction at police stations and delays in seeing clients arrested during protests. Suspects were not detained incommunicado or held under house arrest. Interviews of suspects are required to be videotaped.” 10. “Some SAR and central government actions restricted or sought to restrict the right to express or report on dissenting political views, particularly support for Hong Kong independence.” 11. “Some legal restrictions on the ability of individuals to criticize the government publicly without reprisal. Police arrested several individuals for damaging the national flag, which is illegal. For example, in May police arrested a pro-independence activist for damaging the Chinese national flag during a protest against the controversial extradition bill. In October, media reported police asked Facebook to remove user posts about police handling of protests. Facebook reportedly declined to do so.” 12. “Media reports indicated that on several occasions police arrested onlookers not involved in protests. Police also fired thousands of rounds of tear gas to disperse crowds. Several human rights organizations repeated longstanding concerns that the SAR’s legal definitions of illegal assembly and rioting, charges frequently brought against protesters, were overly broad.” 13. “In October Chief Executive Lam, through executive fiat under the colonial-era Emergency Regulations Ordinance (ERO), banned the wearing of masks. Protesters frequently wore masks to protect themselves from tear gas and to hide their identity from police and from employers who might be pressured to punish employees who support the protests. In November a Hong Kong court ruled the government’s use of the ERO to implement the mask ban unconstitutional.” 14. “In August, two unknown men attacked Jimmy Sham, the leader of the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), with baseball bats the day before the CHRF was scheduled to lead a large protest march. In October unknown men used hammers to attack Jimmy Sham again. The CHRF was the organizer of the year’s largest protests. On several occasions, prodemocracy protesters also physically attacked allegedly pro-government individuals. For example, in November, one protester lit a man who was heckling him on fire.”

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protests in Hong Kong from June to December 2019. The US State Department remained critical of how the HKSAR government and police handled the protests, ranging from Beijing’s “encroachment” to the extradition bill, from police action to government prosecution of protesters, from the need to set up a special inquiry commission to the police use of “excessive” force, from the San Uk Ling center to the police’s arbitrary behavior and from the anti-mask law to the mysterious attacks on pro-­ democracy protesters. The list compiled by the US State Department was comprehensive. Indeed, from the vantage point of the PRC, such US comments constituted external “interference” with China’s domestic affairs. Strategically speaking, the United States used the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act to exert pressure on the PRC over Hong Kong while using Sino-US trade negotiations as another means of reducing American trade deficits vis-à-vis China. This two-pronged strategy revealed the American geopolitical and geo-economic strategy in an era of China’s rapid rise, both economically and politically. As the United States tried to portray its democracy and human rights as universal values, the Hong Kong protests presented a golden opportunity for US leaders and politicians to pressure the PRC. On the other hand, the PRC realized the American strategy of reasserting its “superpower” status. As such, the entire anti-extradition, anti-police and anti-mainlandization movement had to be understood in the context of Sino-American rivalries, both economically and politically.

The Role of Taiwan in Hong Kong Protests Given that the ROC on Taiwan shares the ideology of supporting democracy and human rights as with the US government, the role of Taiwan in the Hong Kong protests deserves attention. First and foremost, some radical protesters who plunged into LegCo building on July 1 escaped to Taiwan, preferring to stay in a democratic society and polity rather than being “punished” and “persecuted” in the HKSAR.  Second, the pro-­ Beijing media criticized the pro-independence Taiwan State-Building Party for supporting Hong Kong protesters. The website and Facebook of the Taiwan State-Building Party showed that it sent helmets and logistical supplies to Hong Kong protesters through airline passengers traveling between the two places. After local media reports revealed the Taiwan

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Table 7.14  Taiwan’s political parties and Hong Kong protesters Details of any relationship with Hong Kong protesters Taiwan State-Building 1 Supplying helmet, masks and other resources to Hong Kong’s Party protesters. 2. Lobbying the Taiwan government to pass a legislation on the Refugee Law to help Hong Kong’s political dissidents. 3.  Organizing pro-Hong Kong rallies and assemblies. 4. Supporting and cooperating with non-governmental organizations to assist Hong Kong’s political dissidents in Taiwan. Democratic 1.  Organizing pro-Hong Kong rallies and assemblies. Progressive Party 2. Coordinating with Taiwan’s non-governmental organizations to help Hong Kong’s political dissidents in Taiwan. New Power Party 1.  Organizing pro-Hong Kong rallies, assemblies and petitions. 2. Supporting and cooperating with non-governmental organizations to help Hong Kong’s political dissidents in Taiwan. 3.  Interacting with political activists from Hong Kong Kuomintang No prominent interaction with Hong Kong protesters People First Party No prominent interaction with Hong Kong protesters Taiwan People’s Party No prominent interaction with Hong Kong protesters Sources: The Liberty Times, September 23, 2019, in https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2924205 access date: April 15, 2020, November 8, 2019, in https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2971654 access date: April 15, 2020, United Daily News, September 25, 2019, in https://udn.com/news/story/120538/4067325 access date: April 15, 2020, Newstalk, June 17, 2019, in https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2019-06-17/260750 access date: April 15, 2020

connections with Hong Kong protests, the Hong Kong police occasionally checked the suitcases of the travelers between the two places, trying to inspect whether helmets and other logistical supplies were provided to the Hong Kong protesters. Table 7.14 shows that the State-Building Party appeared to be the most active one supportive of Hong Kong protesters, including the lobbying efforts at helping Hong Kong’s protesters who escaped to Taiwan shortly after July 1, 2019, through the enactment of a Refugee Law. The DPP helped Hong Kong’s protesters, whereas the New Power Party interacted with some Hong Kong political activists. The Kuomintang (KMT) remained relatively inactive, so as the People First Party and Taiwan People’s Party. Moreover, the Chi-Nan Presbyterian Church in Taipei was reportedly helping 200 Hong Kong protesters to stay in Taiwan,

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providing the necessary assistance and arranging living subsidies through non-­governmental organizations for the young political dissidents.6 Some Hong Kong protesters who escaped to Taiwan and who are staying there have expressed their feelings in writings. They have encountered tremendous psychological pressure due to their need to adapt to a new living environment.7 Some also need to cope with financial difficulties; some wanted to study and work in a new place; some felt regretful of their exile to Taiwan. Their commonality is their distrust in the rule of law in the HKSAR.8 The Hong Kong protesters who stay in Taiwan tend to have some nostalgic feelings about the HKSAR.  Some feel painful, but they slowly adapt to life in Taiwan, perhaps becoming political exiles who are deeply dissatisfied with Hong Kong’s political system. As with Lam Wing-­ kei, one of the publishers of the Causeway Bay Bookstore who eventually migrated to Taiwan and opened a bookstore in Taipei in April 2020,9 these Hong Kong protesters have become a new breed of political dissidents who have chosen to vote with their feet and who left the HKSAR for a democratic political system with values shared by them. As with the US politicians, the Taiwan counterparts made frequent comments on the Hong Kong protests. Table  7.15 shows the remarks made by Taiwan’s political leaders on the Hong Kong extradition bill and the inapplicability of the “one country, two systems” in Taiwan. All of them denounced the way in which the protesters were handled by the HKSAR government. While Han Kuo-yu of the Kuomintang refrained from criticizing the PRC, Chiang Wan-an from the same party criticized the “one country, two systems” and supported the Hong Kong protesters. The DPP leaders like Tsai Ing-wen and Lin Fei-fan utilized the Hong Kong protests to point their fingers at not only the PRC regime but also the need for the Taiwan people to defend and cherish their existing freedom and lifestyle. As such, the Taiwan politicians all used the Hong Kong

6  “Many ‘traumatized’ protestors find refuge in Taiwan church,” The Standard, December 31, 2019, in https://www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news/section/11/214946/Many‘traumatized’-protesters%2D%2Dfind-refuge-in-Taiwan-church, access date: April 25, 2020. 7  See their feelings that were expressed through their writings, published in https://m. facebook.com/aegisvahk/?refid=52&__tn__=C-R, access date: April 26, 2020. 8  The observation from Jeff Loo who had an indirect communication with a Hong Kong protester through a worker of a Taiwan interest group that helped Hong Kong’s protesters. The protester also wrote down his feelings on a sheet of paper, September 7, 2019. 9  Apple Daily, April 26, 2020, p. A1.

(continued)

1 “Anyone concerning themselves with freedom, democracy and human rights around the world will also be following the march and will also be very supportive of the people of Hong Kong.” 2. “Taiwan is no exception, and we also support the people of Hong Kong in their pursuit of freedom, democracy and human rights.” 3. “Freedom is like the air: you only become aware of its existence when you start to suffocate.” 4. “I emphasize once again that ‘one country, two systems’ is absolutely unacceptable to Taiwan.” 5. “Taiwan could never accept ‘one country, two systems.’ Once we accept the framework, we will lose our rights to defend freedom and democracy, we will lose our rights to decide on our future.” 6. “I want to urge Taiwanese people to pay attention to Hong Kong’s development, to support Hong Kong and to defend Taiwan.” 1. “It’s not so much today Hong Kong, tomorrow Taiwan, but today Hong Kong, today Taiwan.” 2. “If Hong Kong is facing this evil law today, then we will suffer too.” 3. “We need more Taiwanese friends to stand on the front line. We must send a clear message to the international community, to Hong Kong, to the Chinese government and to the Taiwanese government: We know, and we care.” 1. “‘One country, two systems’ plan wasn’t working for Hong Kong. Do we even have to talk about it? Everyone knows.” 2. “The rule of law in Hong Kong has always attracted the attention of Hong Kong society and all walks of life.” 3. “According to the Basic Law of Hong Kong, Hong Kong has the power of final adjudication.” 4. “Law, clean and competent government, liberalization, and efficiency are the four pillars of Hong Kong’s economic development.” 5. “We hope that the Hong Kong government will make a decision to reassure the people of Hong Kong in response to the concerns of the people of Hong Kong and the outside world.” 6. “As a sovereign country, the ROC is totally different from Hong Kong’s past history and political reality. The overwhelming majority of Taiwan people believe that Hong Kong’s ‘one country, two systems,’ whether successful or unsuccessful, is not applicable to Taiwan. Although we have no confidence in the DPP’s governance, we are confident in Taiwan’s democracy and people.”

Tsai Ing-wen (Democratic Progressive Party)

Lin Fei-fan (Democratic Progressive Party) Han Kuo-yu (Kuomintang)

Remark(s)

Name (Party Affiliation)

Table 7.15  Remarks of Taiwan political leaders on the Hong Kong extradition bill

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1. “Students and young people in Hong Kong are not afraid of the forceful crackdown by the Hong Kong police. [To those who] raise a voice and shout to the world in order to defend freedom and democracy, I must pay the highest respect for such bravery.” 2. “In Taiwan, there is no room for ‘one country, two systems,’ and the constitutional system of democracy and freedom cannot be damaged or compromised.” 3. “In addition to paying close attention to and maintaining the personal safety of Taiwanese students studying and working in Hong Kong, the government should also provide Hong Kong people with humanitarian assistance when necessary.” 1. “As the authorities were preparing to use emergency legislation and martial law to control education and transportation, and to oppress the people of Hong Kong, it was important for the people of Taiwan to stand together and rally in Hong Kong’s support.”

Chiang Wan-an (Kuomintang)

Sources: “Taiwanese Come Out in Support of Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Protestors,” Radio Free Asia, June 10, 2019, in https://www.rfa.org/english/ news/china/hongkong-taiwan-06102019141346.html, access date: April 6, 2020; “The ripple effect of the Hong Kong anti-extradition protests on Taiwan politics,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 15, 2019, in https://hongkongfp.com/2019/07/15/ripple-effect-hong-kong-anti-extradition-protests-taiwan-politics/, access date: April 6, 2020; “‘I don’t know’ says Kaohsiung Mayor Han when asked about Hong Kong protests,” Taiwan News, in https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3720972, access date: April 6, 2020; “Hong Kong democracy activists visit Taiwan’s political parties,” Taiwan News, in https:// www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3771048, access date: April 6, 2020, and “Chiang Kai-shek’s great-grandson says ‘no room for one country, two systems’ in Taiwan,” Taiwan News, in https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3816825, access date: April 6, 2020

Huang Kuo-chang (New Power Party)

Remark(s)

Name (Party Affiliation)

Table 7.15 (continued)

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protests to serve their campaigns in the presidential and legislative elections in January 2020. As a matter of fact, the concerns expressed by the United States and Taiwan on Hong Kong’s protests were shared by some other foreign countries. Table  7.16 shows that UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson expressed his concern about the violence resulting from the protests and he hoped for dialogue between the stakeholders. The French Prime Minister Emmanuel Macron appealed to the political stakeholders in the HKSAR to engage in dialogue and de-escalate violence, while the German Prime Minister Angela Merkel also called for mutual dialogue. The Hong Kong protests clearly became an international concern about how the PRC and Hong Kong government dealt with protesters. Unlike the position of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong believed that the demands made by protesters were intended to “humiliate and bring down the government,” adopting a more pro-Beijing position. However, Lee appealed to the HKSAR government to consider a more liberal approach to tackling the political impasse. The Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammad Mahathir even went so far as to ask Carrie Lam to resign.

The Continuation of Hardline Approach to Hong Kong: Mass Arrests on April 18, 2020 The replacement of Zhang Xiaoming of the HKMAO and Wang Zhimin of the Liaison Office with Xia Baolong and Luo Huining in early 2020 signaled a continuation of the PRC’s hardline approach to dealing with the Hong Kong protesters, including peaceful ones led by the moderate democrats. The new PRC authorities have continued to consolidate their united front work on the pro-Beijing elites, including businesspeople, whose political orientations in the 2019 protests tended to be relatively politically conservative and nationalistic. In fact, the response of some Hong Kong business tycoons was noteworthy, for their orientations mirrored the divided opinions between a more pro-Beijing line and a more pro-democracy stance as with the foreign countries. Table 7.17 shows that business tycoon Li Ka-shing was more sympathetic with the protesters, appealing to the HKSAR government to understand the aspirations of the young people. In September 2019, Li remarked that political problems needed political solutions, and that the government should “forgive”

Table 7.16  Remarks of other foreign leaders on Hong Kong’s anti-extradition movement Name (Country)

Remarks

Boris Johnson (United Kingdom)

1. “We are seriously concerned by the ongoing violence, and the escalation between protesters and police.” 2. “Political dialogue is the only way forward and we want to see the HK authorities agree a path to resolve this situation.” 1. “I don’t see any easy way forward because the demonstrators, they say they have five major demands, and not one can be compromised.” 2. “But those are not demands which are meant to be a program to solve Hong Kong’s problems.” 3. “Those are demands which are intended to humiliate and bring down the government.” 4. “So far, the SAR government has gone for conservative approaches and problems have not really significantly improved.” 1. “For the administrator (Lam), I think (the) best thing is to resign.” 2. “Carrie Lam conscientiously says that the people of Hong Kong are right in rejecting the (extradition) law.” 3. “Carrie Lam has to obey the masters, at the same time she has to ask her conscience.” 4. “I think in the end, that is what China will do (in Hong Kong).” 1. “I shared our concerns (on Hong Kong Issue) and those of Europe.” 2. “We have repeatedly called on the parties involved to dialogue, to show restraint, to de-escalate.” 3. He said he had told President Xi the “core of the issue was to stress the need for a de-escalation through dialogue.” 1. She told the Chinese government that the “rights and freedoms in Hong Kong must of course be guaranteed.” 2. “In the current situation, everything must be done to avoid violence.” 3. “And the solutions can only be found in a political process— meaning through dialogue.”

Lee Hsien Loong (Singapore)

Mohamad Mahathir (Malaysia)

Emmanuel Macron (France)

Angela Merkel (Germany)

Sources: “Hong Kong protest violence ‘deeply disturbing,’ says UK government as Boris Johnson calls for ‘restraint on all sides,’” Hong Kong Free Press, in https://hongkongfp.com/2019/11/11/hong-kongprotest-violence-deeply-disturbing-says-uk-govt-boris-johnson-calls-restraint-sides/, access date: April 6, 2020; Dewey Sim, “Singapore’s Lee Hsien Loong a social media hero in China for Hong Kong protest comments,” South China Morning Post, October 18, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3033441/singapores-lee-hsien-loong-social-media-hero-china-hong-kong, access date: April 6, 2020; “Hong Kong’s Carrie Lam should resign, says Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad,” Hong Kong Free Press, in https://hongkongfp.com/2019/10/04/hong-kongs-carrie-lam-resign-says-malaysianpm-mahathir-mohamad/, access date: April 6, 2020; “France’s Macron says he raised the Hong Kong situation with Xi Jinping,” Reuters, November 6, 2019, in https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-macron/frances-macron-says-he-raised-the-hong-kong-situation-with-xi-jinping-idUSKBN1XG1JO, access date: April 6, 2020; “Hong Kong: Angela Merkel says China must ‘guarantee’ rights and freedoms,” The Guardian, in https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/07/hong-kongangela-merkel-says-china-must-guarantee-rights-and-freedoms-in, access date: April 6, 2020

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Table 7.17  Business tycoon’s remarks on Hong Kong’s protests Name

Remarks

Li Ka-shing

 .  “The best intentions can bring the worst results.” 1 2.  “Cease the anger with love.” 3. “Love China, love Hong Kong, love oneself; love freedom, love empathy, love rule of law.” 4. “The road to Hell is often paved with good intentions. We need to be mindful of unintended consequences.” 5. “It is hard to imagine a better world when the community is highly charged. Violence in thoughts and actions is not a means to accomplish any vision because they misrepresent—peaceful situations can come to feel dangerous, the percolation thereafter will be self-fulfilling.” 6. “I think the government heard the messages from the protestors loud and clear and is diligently racking their brains now for solutions” 7. “The young always fear, the future has nothing to do with them. Investing in our next generation will always bear fruit for our city. Investing in the future matters.” 1. “The views of a small group of radical protestors do not represent the views of all 7.5 million Hongkongers.” 2. “I have given up hope [on these youngsters] and will not waste my time talking to them, as they have no idea what they are doing and what they should do. … Their brains have been occupied by other ideas and that is irrevocable.” 1. “Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor is a Hong Kong daughter. Her proposal on the extradition bill have good intentions to Hong Kong’s future.” 2. “The unlawful act of violence and intimidation, against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims—some say this is the definition of terrorism by the Oxford English Dictionary.” 3. “I call on those whichever group they are from: red, yellow, blue, white or black, please don’t resort to violence.” 4. “The extradition bill is now game over. … The current five demands are just some pretenses to fight for what they failed to achieve in the ‘Occupy Central’ movement that go beyond what is permitted by the Basic Law.” 5. “There will be zero gain like what happened in the Occupy Central movement five years ago. … Please don’t make Hong Kong pay a heavy price again.”

Annie Wu Suk-ching

Peter Woo Kwong-­ching

(continued)

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Table 7.17 (continued) Name

Remarks

Gordon Wu

1. “Young people are particularly ‘desperate’ for Hong Kong to get full democracy.” 2. “The recent protests were actually sparked by anger over the city’s wealth gap and housing woes.” 3. “Is our government not doing enough? Or not doing anything? I don’t know the answer.” 4. “Solemnly says no to Hong Kong independence and violence and pays tribute to those safeguarding rule of law—in particular the police.” 5. “If people continue to encourage violence and disregard the law, Hong Kong will go downhill, and people will live in poverty, and it will be too late to regret.”

Sources: “Hong Kong’s richest man Li Ka-shing breaks silence on crisis: love good, violence bad,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 16, 2019, in https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/08/16/hong-kongs-richestman-li-ka-shing-breaks-silence-crisis-love-good-violence-bad/, access date: March 4, 2020; “Daughter of Maxim’s founder hits out again at Hong Kong protestors, saying she has lost hope in the next two generations,” South China Morning Post, November 16, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/ politics/article/3036260/daughter-maxims-founder-hits-out-again-hong-kong-protestors, access date: March 4, 2020; “Hong Kong protests: billionaire businessman Peter Woo pleads with Hongkongers to stop the violence, warns of terrorism threat as tensions escalate,” South China Morning Post, August 12, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3022425/hong-kong-protests-billionairebusinessman-peter-woo-pleads, access date: March 4, 2020; “China has ‘many, many, many’ ways to grab fugitives, Gordon Wu says,” The Standard, July 12, 2019, in https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breakingnews/section/4/130683/China-has-‘many,-many,-many’-ways-to-grab-fugitives,-Gordon-Wu-says, access date: March 4, 2020; and “Gordon Wu rejects violence, independence in ad,” The Standard, August 19, 2019, in https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/3/133177/-Gordon-Wu-rejectsviolence,-independence-in-ad, access date: March 4, 2020

those young people who would be “the masters” in the future.10 Li also advertised in newspapers appealing to the people of Hong Kong to maintain harmony, but the Chinese poem he used were to open to different interpretations. Li’s position supportive of the young people, however, was not welcome by the mainland netizens, who kept on criticizing him for not “patriotic” enough toward the PRC. Unlike Li who appeared to be more pro-protesters, Annie Wu and Peter Woo tended to be far more pro-Beijing. Annie Wu’s position alienated some radical protesters who then targeted at Maxim group’s restaurants by vandalism. Gordon Wu emphasized the need for the government to tackle the wealth gap and housing inadequacy—a more pragmatic approach to viewing the protests.  Next Magazine, January 8, 2020, pp. 6–7.

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If the views of foreign countries toward the Hong Kong protests were divided between pro-PRC and pro-protesters, a similar pattern can be seen among the Hong Kong business tycoons. However, Li Ka-shing’s relatively pro-youth, and by implication slightly pro-protesters, perspective appeared to be a tiny minority among the business elites in the HKSAR.  Apart from Li Ka-shing who was sympathetic with the young people, business tycoon Joseph Lau Luen-hung, who had been involved in a five-year jail sentence in Macau, made a U-turn by dropping his legal challenge to the HKSAR government’s extradition bill in May 2019. He filed a lawsuit against the controversial bill in early April but later withdrew it on the grounds that he “loves his country and Hong Kong.”11 Lau’s changing position showed that most business elites in the HKSAR adopted a positive attitude toward the extradition bill. On April 18, 2020, the Hong Kong police arrested 15 moderate democrats for their participation in the “unlawful” assemblies in 2019 (Table 7.18). These democrats included former chairs of the Democratic Party, barrister Martin Lee, lawyer Albert Ho, lecturer Yeung Sum, former chair of Labor Party Lee Cheuk-yan, lawmaker Leung Yiu-chung, former legislator Margaret Ng and other democrats like Cyd Ho, Au Nok-hin, Richard Tsoi and Sin Chung-kai.12 Media tycoon Jimmy Lai was arrested. The League of Social Democrats chair Raphael Wong, vice-chair Leung Kwokhung, secretary-general Avery Ng and the Civil Human Rights Front vice-­ convener Figo Chan were all arrested by the police. The arrests could be seen as part of the collaborative plan of both Beijing and the HKSAR government to pursue those lawbreakers and to “terminate violence and stop chaos” in Hong Kong. The mass arrests raised the concerns of many foreign countries, including the United States and United Kingdom. The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the US government condemned the arrests, and that “Beijing and its representatives in Hong Kong continue to take actions inconsistent with commitments made 11  Denise Tsang, Alvin Lum and Sum Lok-kei, “Fugitive tycoon Joseph Lau withdraws legal challenge against Hong Kong’s controversial extradition bill,” South China Morning Post, May 29, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3012230/fugitive-tycoon-joseph-lau-withdraws-legal-challenge, access date: April 25, 2020. 12  Rachel Wong, “15 Hong Kong pro-democracy figures arrested in latest police round up,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 18, 2020, in https://hongkongfp.com/2020/04/18/8hong-kong-pro-democracy-figures-arrested-in-latest-police-round-up-party-says/, access date: April 19, 2020.

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Table 7.18  Mass arrests on April 18, 2020 Name

Background

Jimmy Lai Martin Lee

A media tycoon and the owner of Next Digital Limited. The founder and former chairman of Democratic Party. A Senior Counsel and former legislative councilor. Margret Ng Member of the Civic Party. A barrister and former legislative councilor. Yeung Sum Member and former chair of Democratic Party. A former legislative councilor. Lecturer. Albert Ho Member and former chair of Democratic Party. A solicitor and former legislative councilor. A lawyer who helped Edward Snowden who stayed in Hong Kong. Lee Cheuk-yan Former chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic and Democratic Movements in China. A labor activist and the founding member of the Labor Party. A former legislative councilor. Leung Vice-chairman of League of Social Democrats. Kwok-hung Former legislative councilor. Richard Tsoi Member of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic and Democratic Movements in China. Cyd Ho Founding member of the Labor Party. A former legislative councilor. Au Nok-hin A former member of Democratic Party. A former legislative councilor. Raphael Wong An activist who participates in social movements. Chairman of the League of Social Democrats. Figo Chan Member of the League of Social Democrats. Deputy convener of the Civil Human Rights Front. Avery Ng Former chairman of the League of Social Democrats. Sin Chung-kai Member of Democratic Party. A former legislative councilor. Chairman of the Kwai Tsing District Council. Leung A labor activist who formed the Neighborhood and Worker’s Service Yiu-chung Centre. He is a district councilor and legislative councilor. Sources: Rachel Wong, “15 Hong Kong pro-democracy figures arrested in latest police round up,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 18, 2020, in: https://hongkongfp.com/2020/04/18/8-hong-kong-pro-democracy-figures-arrested-in-latest-police-round-up-party-says/, access date: April 19, 2020

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under the Sino-British Joint Declaration that include transparency, the rule of law, and guarantees that Hong Kong will continue to ‘enjoy a high degree of autonomy.’”13 The UK government said that it expected the trial to be conducted in a fair and transparent manner. Nevertheless, since President Xi Jinping became the CCP party-secretary in November 2012, his subordinates responsible for Hong Kong matters have virtually abandoned any talk about the Sino-British Joint Declaration. As such, the US demand for China to stick to the promises in the Sino-British Joint Declaration is increasingly futile. The rise of China economically, politically and militarily has meant that its policy toward the HKSAR has to guard against and ward off any foreign intervention. Hence, even though foreign countries like the United States and United Kingdom expressed their concerns about the mass arrests on April 18, 2020, the reality is that the Hong Kong police is now directly accountable to the Ministry of Public Security in Beijing. The hardline approach to dealing with the protest leaders, regardless of whether they were moderate democrats or not, has been adopted by the Hong Kong police and the HKSAR government in conformity with Beijing’s policy directive of “terminating violence and stopping chaos” in Hong Kong.

Conclusion This chapter argued that the battles of the CUHK and PolyU were the two final but critical battles leading to the surprisingly landslide electoral victory of the democrats in the 2019 District Council elections. The battle of the PolyU could be seen as the result of a strategic error of protesters who abandoned the traditionally adaptable and flexible tactic of “be water.” However, their failure to defend the PolyU was compensated by the pan-democratic victory in district elections, which had a significant political function of allowing both pro-government and anti-government voters to express their preferences through ballot boxes. Since the onset of the Coronavirus in January 2020, the anti-police and anti-­mainlandization protests have subsided temporarily. The police, on the other hand, have hardened their approaches and tactics since the new Police Commissioner Chris Tang was appointed. More arrests were made quickly in all the recent protests, serving as the deterrent against the spread of protests in the HKSAR. On the other hand, with the deteriorating battles between protesters and police, the US Congress passed the US Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, trying to protect the progress of Hong Kong’s 13  “US and UK condemn arrest of Hong Kong democracy activists,” Reuters, April 19, 2020, in https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/19/us-and-uk-condemnarrest-of-hong-kong-democracy-activists, access date: April 19, 2020.

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democratic development and boosting the morale of Hong Kong protesters. However, the PRC saw the US move as transgressing into its internal affairs. Similarly, Taiwan was an American ally which provided a sanctuary to some radical protesters in Hong Kong, while its political leaders across the ideological spectrum criticized the Hong Kong model of “one country, two systems.” Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2020 witnessed the easy victory of the DPP under the leadership of Tsai Ing-wen. As such, the entire protests in the HKSAR from June to December 2019 turned out to be an electoral campaign in favor of the Taiwan DPP, thereby defeating the purpose of Beijing’s attempt at using Hong Kong as a means to conduct united front work on the ROC. Nevertheless, the pro-democracy victory in the November 2019 district elections did not mean that both Beijing and the HKSAR government abandoned their hardline policy toward protesters, both peaceful and violent. The mass arrests of moderate democrats on April 18, 2020, proved that both Beijing and the HKSAR authorities have continued to maintain the hardline policy toward protest leaders.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

The case study of the HKSAR under the PRC’s sovereignty shows that the dynamics of peaceful and violent protests are shaped by several factors. The persistence of civil liberties in the HKSAR did contribute to the proliferation of peaceful protests. However, the main catalyst for a series of combined peaceful and violent protests in Hong Kong from June to December 2019 was the introduction of the extradition bill, which to many Hong Kong people constituted a real threat to their existing civil liberties and the rule of law. The extradition bill, as argued in Chap. 2, was attributable to not only the Taiwan murder case but also the desire of Beijing to pursue corrupt mainland businesspeople and officials who were laundering money, hiding and staying in Hong Kong. The decision of the Hong Kong government to push through the bill through the LegCo, a problem compounded by the absence of any opinion poll conducted by its think tank, propelled the HKSAR along the path of combined peaceful and violent protests from June to December 2019. The miscalculation of PRC officials responsible for Hong Kong matters, notably Zhang Xiaoming of the HKMAO and Wang Zhimin of the Liaison Office, led to their hardline pressure on the HKSAR government led by Chief Executive Carrie Lam to push the bill through the legislature. John Lee as the Secretary for Security was politically insensitive to the complex political environment in which the local barristers, lawyers, youths, intellectuals and even civil servants rose up to oppose the extradition bill. © The Author(s) 2021 S. S.-H. Lo et al., The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4_8

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Compounding the local opposition to the bill was the outspoken way in which US officials and politicians expressed their deep concerns about Hong Kong’s civil liberties, especially after the Causeway Bay book publishers’ disappearance in late 2015. Rising up against the extradition bill was the rapid emergence and pent-up anger of the localists, who were politically frustrated in the 2014 Occupy Central Movement, explicitly suppressed in the 2016 Mongkok riot and then deprived of the chance of being legislators in November 2016 when the NPC Standing Committee interpreted the Basic Law’s stipulation on the oath-taking behavior of two legislators-elect. The localists were further politically alienated in June 2018 when their spiritual leader Edward Leung was imprisoned for six years for his involvement in the Mongkok riot, and in July 2018 when the Hong Kong National Party led by Andy Chan was banned. All these moves against the localist leaders in the HKSAR provided a fertile ground for the growing discontent of radical localists, who later made use of the opposition to the extradition bill as a cohesive glue that galvanized their like-minded supporters to oppose the HKSAR government and Beijing. The localists teamed up with the pan-democratic forces to organize a series of peaceful protests in June, trying to overturn the government’s decision of railing the extradition bill through the LegCo. While LegCo as a representative body was supposed to tackle the bill through rational debate and political consensus, the reality was that the legislature in the HKSAR from May to December 2019 failed absolutely as a mechanism of resolving ideological disputes. The debate over the extradition bill was highly ideological because it pitted the two camps— pro-Beijing and pro-democracy—against each other. No concession could be made from either side, while the LegCo president failed to mediate as an effective arbitrator. As a result, the breakdown of LegCo’s deliberation led to the phenomenon that opponents of the extradition bill had to resort to a mix of peaceful and violent protests. While moderate localists and democrats opted for the path of using peaceful protests, the radical elements were determined to occupy the LegCo to surprise the ordinary people, the government, Beijing and the world. Intentionally or unintentionally, the Hong Kong police did not deploy forces to disperse and evict the radical protesters outside the LegCo, but tolerantly allowed them to plunge into the LegCo and to commit vandalism. Although the radical protesters who plunged into LegCo committed strategic vandalism, ransacking the offices of pro-Beijing legislators and defacing the walls instead of stealing any antiques, the damage done to the

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LegCo building was an explicit humiliation to the HKSAR government, Beijing and the “one country, two systems.” Some radical protesters who vandalized the LegCo building eventually escaped to Taiwan, while a prominent protester who pulled down his face mask eventually returned to the US for his study.1 The deeper ideology underlying the intention of radical protesters was that they hoped to spread the liberal values of the HKSAR into the PRC. The fierce opposition to the CCP could be seen in the words written down on the walls of the LegCo conference hall on July 1. The determination of radical protesters to occupy the LegCo was to send a strong message to Beijing, namely Hong Kong remained and will remain a bastion of civil liberties and any menace to the existing freedom had to be repelled. Yet, the July 1 occupation of LegCo had ripple effects immediately on the dynamics of peaceful and violent protests in the HKSAR. The events on July 1 demonstrated a division of labor between peaceful and violent protesters, diverting the attention and stretching the manpower of the police. Failing to adapt to the flexible, unpredictable and guerilla-style strategies of protesters, who also used a variety of social media tools for their communication and mobilization, the Hong Kong police force failed to perform the task of defending the LegCo on July 1. Even worse, on the night of July 21, radical protesters were allowed to penetrate deep into the vicinity of the Liaison Office building, defacing the PRC emblem. The weaknesses of the Hong Kong police on the night of July 21 were exposed in the triad attack of passengers in the Yuen Long MTR station, where police were virtually absent. Even though rumors were rife that the police command in Yuen Long had been tipped about an imminent attack by triads on protesters, curiously there was little preparation from the police force. While the occupation of LegCo on July 1 questioned whether there was a plot by the police to discredit radical protesters through the abandonment of the legislature’s defense, the July 21 incident sadly tarnished the image of the Hong Kong police in the history of the 1  He was Brian Leung Kai-ping. See Alvin Lum and Christy Leung, “The only unmasked protestor at Hong Kong LegCo takeover has fled the city, but whereabouts not confirmed,” South China Morning Post, July 6, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3017530/only-unmasked-protestor-hong-kong-legco-takeover-has-fled, access date: April 11, 2020. He eventually went to continue his doctoral studies in the US. See Brian Leung Kai-ping, “Hong Kong can be a gateway to liberal values for China,” The Economist, September 10, 2019, in https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/09/10/hongkong-can-be-a-gateway-to-liberal-values-for-china, access date: April 11, 2020.

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HKSAR. The absence of an independent commission of inquiry into the police performance and action deepened the crisis of performance legitimacy of the Hong Kong police. Even though the police arrested 37 people for their suspected involvement in the July 21 incident, many citizens found the tragic event as the failure of police to take swift action to protect Yuen Long MTR passengers from the attack of alleged triad members.2 The imbalanced performance of the Hong Kong police in various districts engulfed in the protests from June to November 2019 was disturbing to some ordinary citizens, including the usage of the San Uk Ling Holding Center for a short period of time, the apparently excessive use of tear gas canisters and the nervousness of some individual officers firing their pistols. Operationally, these actions were defensible from the policing perspective. But from the perspective of achieving the accountability of policing, all these actions were highly problematic. While protests influenced police operations, the ways in which the police managed protests shaped the degree of violence. A vicious cycle emerged in the dynamic interactions between protests and policing operations. Exactly because of the problematic way in which the police operation was conducted, the anti-extradition movement gradually evolved into a mix of anti-police and anti-mainlandization campaign. The anti-­ mainlandization aspect of the movement was already deeply entrenched when the extradition bill was seen as a threat to the existing freedom and civil liberties enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong. Yet, the anti-police character of the anti-extradition movement began to take shape very prominently after the July 21 incident. The August 31 encounter between protesters and police inside the Prince Edward MTR station worsened and prolonged the anti-police nature of the political movement. Hence, the snowballing effects of protests on their ensuing demonstrations could be seen in Hong Kong. The momentum of the peaceful and violent protests came from their previous developments, which were accumulated further into a series of continuous confrontations between protesters and police. The October 1 protest was another good example showing the fluidity and flexibility of protesters in their opposition to Beijing, the HKSAR government and the police. The enforcement of the anti-mask law in early October merely exacerbated their confrontations, because protesters perceived that the HKSAR was driven into an 2  On April 25, 2020, the police announced that 37 people were arrested after the July 21 incident. Cable TV news, April 25, 2020.

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authoritarian system in which their rights and civil liberties would be curtailed further. Hence, on the night of October 4 and the morning of October 5, radical protesters engaged in oppositional activities, including vandalism, arson and violence. Political violence in the HKSAR from June to December 2019 was unprecedented: violent protesters committed vandalism and arson, engaged in private brawls and traffic blockage, threw self-made petrol bombs at police and police stations, hurled bricks and stones at police, prepared weapons at arsenals and defaced the PRC national flag and emblem. All these acts were illegal and plunged the HKSAR into social disorder. The series of arrests made by police mean that the process of gathering evidence and prosecution is a long one, dragging on for some years and leaving the judiciary with the task of adjudicating various cases. An explosion of court cases related to political violence has increasingly indicated the deterioration of the entire political and social landscape of Hong Kong, where the wounds of the 2019 protests, like the 2014 Occupy Central Movement, cannot be easily healed. The entire protests, both peaceful and violent, were also shaped by the perception of victimization. Radical localists have seen Hong Kong as a highly exploitative capitalist state in which the gap between the rich and poor was not addressed, the inadequacy of public housing units persisted and the tax system was biased in favor of the big capitalists. Young people, especially students, were seen as the victims of the anti-extradition and anti-police movement, for a number of them died mysteriously, like Alex Chow of HKUST, and two were injured by bullets fired at close range by police officers.3 This perception of the victimization of youths led to the determination of protesters to launch two battles with the police, one at the CUHK and the other at PolyU. Nevertheless, these two battles had mixed results. The battle of CUHK led to a split within the protesters and their withdrawal, but the obstinacy of radical protesters to defend the indefensible PolyU led to their failure and massive arrests. The battle of PolyU could be seen as the battle of Waterloo for the protesters in the entire anti-extradition and anti-police 3  One was shot and injured in Tsuen Wan on October 1, while the other was also shot and injured in Sai Wan Ho on November 12, 2019. See Chris Lau and Elizabeth Cheung, “Hong Kong protests: shot student remains in critical condition after surgery to remove right kidney, part of liver and bullet, as arguments raged over force used,” South China Morning Post, November 12, 2019, in https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3037265/hong-kong-protests-shot-student-remains-critical, access date: April 25, 2020.

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movement because of the massive arrests made by police, who surrounded the university campus with determination and with the inception of the new Police Commissioner Chris Tang. However, the battle of PolyU did have the unintended consequences of stimulating more voters supportive of democracy and protesters to cast their ballots on the November 24 District Council elections, leading to the landslide victory of pan-­ democrats and the utter defeat of pro-Beijing forces. Although protests lingered on occasionally during weekends from December 2019 to January 2020, the coming of Covid-19 in the PRC and Hong Kong in late January and February 2020 temporarily stemmed the tide of political protests. On the other hand, the Hong Kong police have changed their tactics of policing protests since November, adopting a swift strategy of apprehending protesters and pre-empting their action of mobilizing other supporters. The critical role of the Hong Kong police in the “one country, two systems” is obvious. If they failed to control the protests, any PAP or PLA intervention would have constituted a failure of “one country, two systems.” If the police could cope with local protests, both peaceful and violent ones, then the image of “one country, two systems” can be at least defensible, even though the HKSAR in recent years has witnessed a rolling back of some civil liberties, notably the disappearance of the Causeway Bay book publishers and the continuous suppression of localists. In short, the police became the political sandwich between protesters and the HKSAR government on the one hand, and between protesters and Beijing on the other hand. Beijing must support the Hong Kong police to maintain law and order. As such, protesters saw the police as a representative agent of the central government. This explained why the protests became increasingly fierce and violent as the radicals believed that the police became an arm of not only the HKSAR regime but also the CCP. Objectively speaking, the police became a political victim as it could not solve the political disputes and problems for the HKSAR government, which was supposed to deal with these issues and engage the residents through meaningful dialogue and consultation. Sadly, the HKSAR government failed in the extradition bill controversy until it was too late to suspend the bill in early September, when the anti-extradition protests had already turned into the anti-police campaign. Beijing saw the protests in the HKSAR as a national security threat. Its hardline officials responsible for Hong Kong matters, Zhang Xiaoming and Wang Zhimin, harped on the same theme of hoping the HKSAR government to curb and terminate violence. However, the PRC’s hardline

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policy backfired in the first place. The crux of the problem was that once the extradition bill was put forward, it was criticized by not only local legal experts but also pro-democracy legislators and politicians. The pro-­ democracy politicians went to lobby the US government, expressing their opposition to the bill. Coincidentally, the US government, politicians and officials also raised their concerns about the bill. The convergence of opposition internally within Hong Kong and externally from the United States led the PRC to believe in a plot between some Hong Kong democrats and the United States to “subvert” the HKSAR government. This PRC perception was deep-rooted, especially when Beijing and Washington engaged in a trade war and technological competition. Under the circumstances of Sino-American rivalry economically and technologically, the debate over the Hong Kong extradition bill provided a golden opportunity for US Congressmen to put forward and support the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, which was eventually passed by the two Houses and signed into law by President Trump. These actions again confirmed the PRC’s perception of the US attempt at utilizing the extradition controversy to exert pressure on Beijing, to tarnish the image of “one country, two systems” and to support pro-democracy protesters to “subvert” the HKSAR government. Hence, Beijing had to make the necessary political gesture by deploying the PAP into the Shenzhen border. But it did not send the PAP openly into the HKSAR, although there were rumors saying that some PAP officers were sent into Hong Kong as “observers.” Beijing’s action of sending the PAP to Shenzhen was arguably a moderate move. The reason was that if the PAP were dispatched into the HKSAR openly, such a move would have incurred international criticisms, providing a golden opportunity for the anti-China elements to portray Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” as an absolute failure. At most, only some PLA officers in the HKSAR were deployed to clean the debris on the streets of Hong Kong in mid-November 2019, signaling the restraint exercised by the central government on Hong Kong matters.4 After the debacle of the pro-Beijing forces in District Council elections in November 2019, President Xi Jinping and his advisers understood the failure of the PRC’s united front work in Hong Kong. If united front 4  “China’s military defends PLA clean-up of Hong Kong protest debris,” Hong Kong Free Press, November 18, 2019, in https://hongkongfp.com/2019/11/18/chinas-militarydefends-pla-clean-hong-kong-protest-debris/, access date: April 11, 2020.

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work was conducted successfully, the election result would not have seen the utter defeat of pro-Beijing forces. The electoral tsunami in the HKSAR prompted Beijing to remove the two top officials responsible for Hong Kong matters, namely Zhang Xiaoming and Wang Zhimin. Although Zhang remained as the deputy director of the HKMAO, he was substantially demoted, signaling the PRC-style of political accountability imposed on its officials dealing with Hong Kong matters. Such demotion was unprecedented in the history of the HKSAR and illustrated the seriousness of Beijing’s policy failure in the HKSAR. However, Beijing’s hardliners responsible for Hong Kong matters do not perceive their policy as a failure. Instead, the mass arrests of Hong Kong democrats on April 18, 2020, proved that Beijing’s policy toward the HKSAR remains hardline and uncompromising. Even the moderate democrats like Martin Lee were all arrested. Obviously, the PRC and the HKSAR authorities collaborate to “terminate violence and stop chaos” in Hong Kong by arresting and prosecuting protest leaders, regardless of whether they were and are moderate or radical democrats. The crux of the problem is that once the PRC and the HKSAR authorities continue their hardline approach to dealing with the Hong Kong democrats, there can be political backlash. Many pro-democracy and liberal-minded Hong Kong people continue to be politically alienated. Moderate democrats may be driven to adopt a more radical line of resistance, whereas radical democrats may be determined to use violence to express their deep political discontent during those “anniversary dates” in the HKSAR, such as July 1, July 21, August 31, October 1 and the dates in November 2019 when the CUHK and PolyU were engulfed in the battles with the police. The mass arrests on April 18, 2020, in the HKSAR were politically significant. The arrests demonstrated that while the PRC regime under President Xi Jinping is neo-totalitarian, the HKSAR regime has been propelled from “soft” authoritarianism to a harder one. The police under the new commissioner Chris Tang has apparently become an instrument of the central government in Beijing to control, curb and suppress the political dissidents in the HKSAR, for the local police has already been brought under the vertical accountability system in which it has to be loyal to the policy directives of the central government, especially the Minister of Public Security. Yet, the beneficiary of Beijing’s policy failure was Taiwan’s political gains. The DPP presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, won the presidential election comfortably on January 11, 2020. Ideologically, Taiwan shares

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the values of democracy, human rights and civil liberties with the United States. It also shared the same values held by the protesters in the HKSAR. Taiwan also aided some Hong Kong protesters by providing a sanctuary for them after the occupation of LegCo on July 1. Its pro-­ democracy and pro-independence activists, such as some members of the Taiwan State-Building Party, did provide helmets and logistical support for the Hong Kong protesters. Such political assistance was seen by the PRC as “subversive,” but PRC officials refrained from criticizing Taiwan explicitly for fear of having negative impacts on their united front work on the island republic. The criticisms leveled on Taiwan’s interference with Hong Kong protests were made instead by the PRC’s agents in the HKSAR, the locally pro-Beijing mass media and activists.

Performance Legitimacy, Procedural Legitimacy and “One Country, Two Systems” This book also argues that the China factor has to be considered when we study Hong Kong’s political development. The case of the anti-­extradition movement in the latter half of 2019 proved that the late Huntington’s concepts of procedural and performance legitimacy are important for us to study Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” and its interaction with the China factor. Because many pro-democracy and liberal-minded Hong Kong people believe that, although the performance legitimacy of the HKSAR government may be acceptable to them, its procedural legitimacy should be enhanced by having a faster pace and larger scope of electoral reform. That was the reason why protesters maintained their demand for universal suffrage, meaning that the LegCo should be fully directly elected and ordinary citizens should be empowered to vote for their Chief Executive through direct election. However, the China factor comes into play whenever the question of universal suffrage is raised. The introduction of the extradition bill plunged the Carrie Lam administration into an unprecedented legitimacy crisis, because many citizens, especially the protesters, firmly believed that the bill’s initiation represented a crisis of performance legitimacy. Without sufficient public consultation and pushing the bill hurriedly to the LegCo, the Lam administration opted for a recipe for political disaster. Yet, the entire process of introducing and propelling the extradition bill forward was fully supported by the China factor. As such, the entire image of “one country, two systems” was at stake during

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80.00% 70.00% 67.90% 61.50% 60.00% 55.30% 50.00% 40.00% 43.00% 33.80% 30.00% 27.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% Mar-19 Apr-19 May-19 Jun-19 Jul-19 Aug-19 Sep-19 Oct-19 Nov-19 Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Confident Not Confident

Diagram 8.1  Public confidence in “One Country, Two Systems.” (Source: “People’s Confidence in ‘One Country, Two Systems,’” in https://www.hkupop. hku.hk/pori_table_chart/Trust/K006_Conf_OCTS/K006_chart.html, access date: April 16, 2020)

the protests from June to December 2019. In particular, as long as the PRC officials responsible for Hong Kong remain dominated by hardliners, the prospects of “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR will continue to be conflict-ridden and controversial. Diagram 8.1 shows that public confidence in the “one country, two systems” continued to decline from 43 percent in March 2019 to 33.8 percent in August, and then to 27 percent in February 2020. Even though the PRC government changed its directors of the HKMAO and Liaison Office, public confidence in the “one country, two systems” remained relatively low. Those ordinary people who were not confident of the “one country, two systems” continued to climb up from 55.3 percent in March 2019 to 61.5 percent in August and finally to 67.0 percent in February 2020. Hence, from a critical perspective, PRC leaders have to reflect upon the findings and assess whether a more softline policy toward the HKSAR would be the most appropriate one conducive to its united front work on Taiwan. If not, the Hong Kong model of “one country, two systems” will remain unattractive to Taiwan, while the HKSAR will continue to be inflicted with political squabbling, power struggle, social conflicts and protest violence. On May 28, 2020, the Standing Committee of the PRC National People’s Congress passed a resolution for the introduction of a national security law for the HKSAR. It is crystal clear that the PRC officials and leaders responsible for Hong Kong matters remain very hardline, believing that the national security law will hopefully have maximal deterrence

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impacts on both peaceful and violent protesters. Although foreign ­powers, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the European Union, expressed their grave concerns about Hong Kong’s autonomy and civil liberties, the PRC’s neo-totalitarian regime has swept under the carpet all the foreign views and its diplomats and officials have been adopting a politically intransigent and assertively nationalistic attitude.5 While anti-foreignism has remained traditional and deep-rooted in contemporary Chinese history, especially in light of the foreign invasion and humiliation of China under the Qing dynasty, the PRC regime’s xenophobic sentiments can be clearly seen in how it has handled the aftermath of the 2019 Hong Kong protests, which constituted not only a challenge but also a humiliation to Beijing’s sovereignty and national security. Critics of the national security law have remarked that it is going to propel Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” into “one country, one system.” Beijing set up the Office of the National Security Commission, while the HKSAR also established its Protection of National Security Commission with a national security adviser appointed by the central government. From the perspective of PRC leaders, Hong Kong remains “one country, two systems,” but their Marxist-Leninist ideology has made their struggle against the political opponents in the HKSAR persistent. It can be said that Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” is gradually drifting toward “one country, two mixed systems” in which the political, economic, socio-cultural, and legal systems of the two places have demonstrated tensions and clashed with ceaseless arguments, political struggles, and social conflicts. Perhaps as long as China’s political system remains neo-totalitarian, any “thesis,” to adopt the Marxist terminology, of combining peaceful with violent protests in the HKSAR is destined to encounter the “anti-thesis” of unilaterally imposing the national security law on Hong Kong so that hopefully a “synthesis” of political, economic, and social harmony between the HKSAR and the mainland would be achieved. This Marxist ideology, however, is resisted by many people of Hong Kong, meaning that while some of them are determined to vote with their feet and migrate to other countries, another wave of protests would perhaps erupt when Hong Kong approaches 2047, which is regarded by many 5  Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, “Assertive Chinese Nationalism: Implications for Hong Kong and ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomacy,” Macau Business, June 14, 2020, in https://www.macaubusiness. com/opinion-assertive-chinese-nationalism-implications-for-hong-kong-and-wolf-warriordiplomacy/, access date: June 26, 2020.

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frustrated, angry, and radical localists as another “deadline” for them to resist and fight against not only the deeper mainlandization of Hong Kong but also Beijing’s gradual “emasculation” of such core values as judicial independence, the rule of law, and the freedom of speech, of publications, of assembly, and of protests. Hong Kong represents a classic case of the “clash of civilizations,” as the late Samuel Huntington argued, between the Chinese civilization and the Western civilization.6

Revisiting Different Perspectives on Hong Kong’s Peaceful and Violent Protests The concept of legitimacy is useful for us to understand not only groups but also regimes and violence. The peaceful protest groups in Hong Kong from June to December 2019 gained their own legitimacy in the eyes of supporters. On the other hand, the HKSAR government was seen as a clientelist regime with a narrow political base, putting forward the deeply unpopular extradition bill. The HKSAR government suffered from a serious crisis of legitimacy, for it did not even consult public opinion properly and adequately on the content and desirability of the bill. Even worse, no principal official had to resign soon after a series of massive protests, pointing to the democratic deficit in the HKSAR and reaffirming to protesters that democratic reform along the path of achieving universal suffrage to select the Chief Executive was really necessary. Violent protests occurred in Hong Kong because of the legitimacy crisis emanated from a poorly designed extradition bill. The policy of initiating the bill, forcing it through the LegCo without adequate consultation and study, illustrated the failure of governance of the HKSAR. Such governance crisis loomed when Carrie Lam took over as the Chief Executive in March 2017, inheriting the hardline policy of the Leung Chun-ying administration toward the localists and pushing through the West Rail co-location arrangement without much public consultation. Arguably, the seeds of misrule were already sowed prior to Carrie Lam’s election as the Chief Executive, but her problematic governance continued and reached an apex as the extradition bill was suddenly put forward. 6  Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996). For an early argument about Hong Kong as an example of “the clash of civilizations,” see Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay (New York: Nova Science, 2001).

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Her regime was seen by protesters as lacking both distributive and procedural fairness, for housing policy was lopsided in favor of the rich capitalist class and land developers. Procedurally, the extradition bill was pushed through a failing legislature where people’s representatives appeared to be dominated by the pro-government and pro-Beijing cronies. From a Marxist perspective, the Hong Kong capitalist state continued to be ruled by a pro-Beijing ruling class out of touch with the realities and predicament of the poor and the needy. Hong Kong’s political system as depicted by David Easton failed to achieve the outputs to the satisfaction of many ordinary people, while their inputs were not fed into the system. As the government stuck to its unpopular policy, like the extradition bill, opponents were arguably forced to resort to violence to make their voices heard. Hong Kong’s political system was perceived by many protesters as having the problems of social inequities and political favoritism, leading to the occurrence of street-level violence in which alienated citizens were determined to voice out their anger and grievances through arson, vandalism and confrontations with the police. The Hong Kong case shows that regime violence and repression had counterproductive results. The suppression of localists from 2016 to 2018 laid the groundwork for political violence in the HKSAR; the extradition bill was arguably a catalyst. The police handling of the protests from June to August worsened the situation, generating an impression of a repressive post-colonial state without any political accountability. Some protesters and localists were determined to fight back with the help from global human rights groups and most importantly, the United States as an external factor that enacted the US Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. By “internationalizing” domestic conflicts, the Hong Kong protesters provoked external actors’ intervention. Yet, the PRC’s sovereignty over the HKSAR was challenged. Christian Davenport observes that regimes tend to stick to their “culturally defined parameters of acceptable dissent” beyond which political repression is bound to be increased. The case of Hong Kong shows that while peaceful protests were tolerated, the police increasingly adopted hardline tactics to deal with violent protesters, combining the usage of tear gas canisters, rubber bullets, pepper pellets, sponge grenades, batons and water cannons. After the protests in 2019, the Hong Kong police in January 2020 considered the possibility of arming officers with stun guns—a move that signaled the likely increase in “political repression” if the “culturally defined parameters of acceptable

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dissent” is ignored and crossed over by radical protesters.7 The HKSAR government also adopted “preventive repression” to “undermine the mobilization of political dissidents” by enacting the anti-mask law on October 4, a move that triggered immediate protests and riots on the same night and the following morning.8 If organized crime violence represents an alliance between some state actors and criminal actors,9 this phenomenon could be seen in Hong Kong on July 21 as some mysterious state actors appeared to ally with the triads to attack protesters returning to Yuen Long from the MTR station. Unless the HKSAR government sets up an independent commission of inquiry with the support of Beijing to look into the police actions in the protests, some protesters and ordinary citizens would likely perceive a mysterious state-crime alliance on the night of July 21, 2019, when harmless and armless citizens were attacked by triad members. Although the Hong Kong police eventually arrested some suspected triad members after the tragedy, the public perception of suspected state-crime nexus persists. On the other hand, the Hong Kong protests from June to December 2019 were marked by some informal criminal groupings, such as hooligans, riot crowds or looters.10 These groupings were a far cry from the organized crime organizations that came out to attack passengers at the MTR station. If urban vandalism stems from individual or group behavior that damages properties for the sake of expressing their personal freedom and political declaration, the Hong Kong protests in 2019 illustrated the validity of this statement, especially the painting of words and slogans in the vandalized areas. The Hong Kong protests carried a highly anti-CCP tone, for the slogan “Heaven eliminates the CCP” originated from the Falun Gong supporters, members of an exercise group which was banned by the PRC government in 1999. This slogan was often used by protesters on the streets and during the occupation of LegCo. Furthermore, “Liberate 7  Christy Leung, “Hong Kong police consider arming officers with electroshock devices and net guns amid protests,” South China Morning Post, January 15, 2020, in https://www. scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3046049/hong-kong-police-consider-arming-officers-electroshock, access date: April 11, 2020. 8  Emily Hencken Ritter, “Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 110, Issue. 1, (Feb 2016): pp. 85–99. 9  Nicholas Barnes, “Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 15, no. 4 (2017), pp. 967–987. 10  Ibid., p. 973.

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Hong Kong, revolution of our times” became the most favorite slogan used by protesters, both peaceful and violent ones. In a sense, protesters who painted all these slogans on the vandalized properties expressed their political hatred of the CCP regime in the mainland. These slogans became the political symbols of the anti-extradition and anti-mainlandization movement in the HKSAR. Many radical protesters appeared to find their pleasure in committing vandalism. In addition, some vandalized acts were strategic. For example, the vandalized action of damaging MTR exits was strategic in the sense that protesters wanted to prevent the police, who were hiding inside MTR stations, from pursuing them easily. Hence, the literature on vandalism appeared to neglect its strategic aspect, which could be easily seen in Hong Kong’s protests in the latter half of 2019. Moreover, vandalism in the Hong Kong case could be retaliatory; protesters who were angered by the MTR Corporation’s collaboration with the police were determined to vandalize MTR stations. Similarly, the vandalism committed in some shopping malls, especially the Festival Walk, was an act in retaliation of the mall’s cooperation of the police to chase and arrest some protesters. Street art, which refers to the drawing and painting on public or private properties, can be regarded as an expression of freedom and creativity.11 In the case of Hong Kong, street art can also be a kind of vandalism with the objective of using words, drawings and slogans to discredit and delegitimize any regime. The protests in Hong Kong from June to December 2019 fully illustrated the utilization of street art by some protesters to discredit, delegitimize and criticize the post-colonial government, including the police force. Other more peaceful way of street art was to paste stickers, posters and drawings on the Lennon Wall that proliferated on the pillars, walls of the buildings and inside various tunnels in the HKSAR. Political violence in Hong Kong is “culture-dependent,”12 meaning that all forms of contentious politics may be called either terrorism or resistance “depending on the circumstances and who is doing the naming.”13 It is politics that decides whether the acts of political violence 11  Yasmine El Rashidi, “Art of Vandalism?,” Index on Censorship, vol. 40, no. 3 (October 2011), pp. 78–88. 12  D. Rucht, “Movement Allies, Adversaries, and Third Parties” in D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule and H.  Kriesi, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 369. 13  Patricia Steinhoff and Gilda Zwerman, “Introduction to the Special Issue on Political Violence.” Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31, no. 3 (2008), pp. 213–220.

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are “terrorists” or “resistance.” The political leaders of Hong Kong and PRC officials controlled the naming of these acts. To them, political violence was committed by the local “terrorists.” Yet, there was a fierce power struggle between the ruling political elites in the HKSAR and the protesters. To the protesters, political violence represented their “resistance” movement. It is important to note that Hong Kong’s protesters “not only shift back and forth between violent and non-violent forms of action, but also use them in various combinations.”14 The fact that peaceful protesters did not cut their relations with violent ones openly meant that some of their organizers did have a tactic consensus, namely they delineated their division of labor in which peaceful rallies attracted the moderate democrats while violent ones served as a magnet to lure the support of radicals and extremists. A hallmark of political violence is that the decision to adopt violent means is considered to be influenced by the fact that “groups are embedded in complex webs of contingent relationships and strategic interactions among a variety of actors—including state agents, rival groups, or counter-movements—all of whom shape the evolution of the conflict as they are linked by asymmetrical power balances.”15 These observations were accurate in the case of Hong Kong as protest groups planned their strategies through social media and they acted in response to how the police operated and reacted to their tactics. Political violence in Hong Kong was embedded in the wider process of the power struggle between radical protesters and the police, between protesters and triads, between protesters and pro-Beijing populist groups and between peaceful protesters and violent elements. Their interactions were complex and dynamic, depending on their own calculations and strategic moves. The relations between democratization and violence in the HKSAR deserve our attention. Hong Kong as an undemocratic political system gave rise to the determination of radical protesters to use violence to make their demands heard. In turn, the conservative ruling elites were determined to suppress them, a move that sparked further violence from the radicals. As Hong Kong’s sovereignty belongs to a neo-totalitarian overlord, mainland China, the protesters’ violent action was bound to be met with state violence from the Hong Kong police. Beijing had to support 14  Lorenzo Bosi and Stefan Malthaner, “Political Violence,” in Porta & Diani, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 15  Ibid., pp. 441–442.

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the Hong Kong police fully for the sake of protecting its national security interest in the HKSAR.  As such, there was a vicious cycle in the Hong Kong protests. Radical protesters resorted to violence to push for democratization, but their tactics were met with post-colonial state violence and police arrests, which in turn stimulated more violence from the radical elements among protesters. The radical elements among protesters could be regarded as the hardliners, who believed that violence was the only means for them to achieve their political ends—a belief articulated by some localists who were politically persecuted, suppressed or imprisoned. The identity of radical localists shaped political violence in Hong Kong. Protest groups perceived the HKSAR government, the police and Beijing as their enemies. They shared a very strong local identity, so strong that their localism became political extremism. These radical localists exchanged their views, plans and strategies in a variety of social media. They perceived that it was their political right to oppose the “oppressive” governments of the PRC and Hong Kong and their “bad” policies, such as the extradition bill. Hence, the Hong Kong protesters were imbued with the idea of resistant citizenship, which to them could use violence as a rightful means to achieve their political ends. Some protest groups, such as the Hong Kong Indigenous led by Ray Wong and Edward Leung, and the Hong Kong National Party led by Andy Chan, perceived themselves as being politically “victimized” and having the “legitimate right to exist,” but of course it was another matter for the HKSAR government and Beijing to reject and ban them.16 Some radical localists adopted a bottom-up version of nationalism. They possessed a distinct identity that, in their minds, should be recognized by the post-colonial state in Hong Kong and the central government in Beijing. Nevertheless, the HKSAR government is bound to be the loyal client of Beijing, which is ruled by the Hans-dominated CCP while suppressing some ethnic minorities to quest for self-determination in the mainland. Under the circumstances in which the PRC remained a neo-­ totalitarian state, the radical localists who wished to achieve “self-­ determination” in the local state of Hong Kong were naturally seen as the enemies of Beijing and must be suppressed. Many radical localists also believed that they had the right of “self-determination,” a right that was denied by both Britain and China in 1982–1984, when the Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong took place, and when both countries  Ibid., pp. 88–89.

16

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equated self-determination with independence. In fact, in the minds of many localists, self-determination refers to the ability of the people of Hong Kong to shape how their political system should be designed and democratized, instead of achieving “territorial independence.” A minority of radical protesters in the HKSAR believed that Hong Kong was their “nation,” but most protesters tended to be more pragmatic and to fight for other political rights, notably their right to elect their Chief Executive through universal suffrage and to achieve a fully directly elected LegCo—a political dream that can be regarded as “institutional independence.” “Territorial independence” remains a castle in the air, but “institutional independence” is arguable achievable in accordance with the Basic Law. This “achievable” dream of achieving “institutional independence” was what the protesters argued for during the anti-extradition and anti-­ mainlandization movement in Hong Kong from June to December 2019. Unfortunately, both the PRC regime and the HKSAR authorities appeared to view the term “independence” as a politically taboo subject, regardless of whether it was about “institutional” reform or not. Collective violence is a common feature in social movements—a phenomenon that could be seen in the Hong Kong protests.17 Violence represents an “escalation of action repertoires within protest cycles.”18 Charles Tilly’s concept of “repertoires of action” entails a learning process from previous waves of protests so that forms of actions can be adapted across nations.19 There can be clusters of protest activities, which are called “protest cycles” with a sharp peak and then decline. The protest cycle in Hong Kong began in June and lasted until the battle of PolyU, after which there has been a steady decline in protest activities, especially after the November 2019 District Council elections and the outbreak of Covid-19 in early 2020. From the perspective of political opportunity, the extradition bill and its related mishandling by the HKSAR government provided a golden opportunity for the oppositionists and protesters to organize themselves, to launch the social movement and to grasp far more directly elected seats in the November 2019 District Council elections. To put it in another 17   Bosi and Malthaner, “Political Violence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, p. 442. 18   Donatella della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence,” Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31 (2008), pp. 221–230. 19  Ibid., p. 222.

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way, both the Hong Kong government and PRC officials responsible for the HKSAR failed to depoliticize the territory and to reduce the political opportunities for collective action. Collective political violence was arguably an outcome of misrule and the mishandling by Hong Kong and PRC authorities of “one country, two systems” in the first place. Organizationally, resource mobilization plays a key role in shaping the politics of social movement and violence.20 Underground organizations evolve among themselves and break away from the larger, non-violent, social movement organizations.21 These phenomena could be seen in Hong Kong as many underground protest groups evolved and broke away from all the pro-democracy political parties. Even the Civil Human Rights Front could only mobilize some but not all peaceful protesters. The violent protesters grouped themselves through the social media, having a distinct identity of utilizing vandalism to voice their grievances and vent their anger at the political enemies. In the social media, they developed their “explanatory consistency and emotional power through narratives or stories that connect the group’s collective past to their present situation.”22 The organizational dynamics of radical protesters were totally beyond the expectation and control of the ruling elites in Hong Kong, not to mention the police force which showed some difficulties in their adaptation to the flexible tactics of radicals and extremists. Reed’s insights on the culture of social movements are applicable to the HKSAR not only in the 2014 Occupy Central Movement but also in the anti-extradition, anti-mainlandization and anti-police movement in the latter half of 2019.23 Numerous artworks were displayed on the Lennon Wall across the territory in 2019, while they had been restricted to the protest sites in Admiralty, Mongkok and Causeway Bay in late 2014. These artworks were composed of posters, drawings, political satires, poems and individual messages in stickers, showing the existence of the freedom of expression, of thought and of speech in the entire movement. These artworks developed into a new movement culture, stimulating the citizens and participants to think about political events critically and innovatively. 20   Donatella Della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence,” Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31 (2008), pp. 223–224. 21  Ibid., pp. 225–226. 22   Donatella Della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence,” Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31 (2008), pp. 225–226. 23  T.V. Reed, The Art of Protest: Culture and Activism from the Civil Rights Movement to the Streets of Seattle (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 296.

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The Lennon Walls in various districts carried political messages and discourses that were unprecedented, educating the society of Hong Kong silently. Indeed, those ordinary citizens who were opposed to the anti-­ extradition activists hated the Lennon Walls, trying to remove and destroy the posters, drawings and stickers. If Reed has noted that the “diffusion of movement culture back into mainstream culture can at times be the most important impact a given movement may have,”24 then the case study of Hong Kong is prominent in illustrating this kind of diffusion. What Reed might not have anticipated was that the Hong Kong case showed a new ideology that was anti-hegemonic. The emergence of the idea of creating a “yellow” economy was a good example showing this anti-hegemonic ideology. Of course, the government and business elites opposed the “yellow” economy in the name of protecting the existing laissez-faire system. But underlying the idea of “yellow” economy was a deep dissatisfaction with the dominance of the economy by the existing capitalist class. The Hong Kong economy appeared to be a laissez-faire system, but its tax system has been consistently biased in favor of the capitalists and the rich people. Without redistributive measures, like comprehensive social welfare reform and the introduction of a progressive tax system to increase the tax burden on the rich people, the idea of creating a “yellow” economy represents a castle in the air. Some democrats supportive of the protesters desired to change the capitalists-dominated economic system and to encourage the capitalists to be more politically liberal and democratic than ever before. In a totalitarian political system, the ruling elites are characterized by the utilization of personality cult, the mobilization of public support through propaganda, the suppression of political dissent and the imposition of ideological control.25 Domestically, totalitarian dictators rely on the secret police as the sole organ of power, while the military forces are trained to “fight a foreign aggressor” and to become “a dubious instrument for civil-war purposes.”26 Some of these features of totalitarianism can be seen in the PRC under President Xi Jinping, whose regime tolerates the existence of a relatively marketized economy and yet suppresses political dissent swiftly. The PRC regime remains neo-totalitarian, partly because  Ibid.  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt: Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 391. 26  Ibid., p. 420. 24 25

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of the extensive use of technological surveillance on citizens, and partly due to the tight ideological control and indoctrination of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.27 Indeed, the neo-totalitarian nature of the PRC regime has been seen in its mobilization capability to impose lockdown of cities affected by Covid-19 from January to April 2020. The most important instrument used by the neo-totalitarian state in the PRC to deal with the Hong Kong protests was the Hong Kong police force, whose performance was controversial and whose operations from June to December were outside the scope of police accountability. Regardless of whether an independent commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the protests from June to December 2019, police accountability in Hong Kong remains to be substantially improved. The existing IPCC is perceived as not autonomous enough and lacking sufficient members critical of the government, while the Ombudsman does not have the jurisdiction of investigating the police.28 Strictly speaking, the protest movement from June to December 2019 casts a shadow on the imbalanced performance and problematic operation of the Hong Kong police. In short, the China factor played a critical role in shaping how the HKSAR government and its police force to deal with the protests in 2019. Objectively speaking, if the mass media can stimulate public fear, shape public agenda and influence the degree of public fear, the series of protests from June to July 1, 2019, did demonstrate how the media could mobilize ordinary people to oppose the extradition bill, which was portrayed as a great danger to the existing civil liberties and the rule of law. The politics of public fear in Hong Kong could be shaped by the political culture and values of ordinary citizens, who were determined to take to the streets to fight for their freedom and the rule of law. The protests by barristers and lawyers in late June 2019 galvanized the members of the public to oppose the extradition bill further. Hence, to some extent, the politics of public fear could be easily seen in the case of Hong Kong. The political 27  Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrests by Algorithm,” November 24, 2019, in https://www.icij.org/investigations/ china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorit hm/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI8tmZ1LaD6QIVzdaWCh1IRwK1EAAYASAAEgIu_fD_BwE, access date: April 25, 2020. 28  For the work of the IPCC, see https://www.ipcc.gov.hk/en/about_us/membership. html, access date: April 25, 2020. For the Ombudsman’s role and jurisdictions, https:// www.ombudsman.hk/en-us/about_this_office/role_and_jurisdiction.html, access date: April 25, 2020.

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opposition also used the term sung zhong (sending people back to China) as an effective appeal to mobilize the public to oppose the “bad” policy. Together with the proliferation and the full utilization of social media, anti-government protesters proved to be a formidable force to the HKSAR government and the police. Anti-government propaganda and publicity became effective through the extensive use of social media tools, plunging the HKSAR government into an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy. While the term sung zhong represented a “bad government policy,” it was a political symbol skillfully used by the pan-democratic camp to oppose the extradition bill. Symbols exist independently of human beings and may “transmit meanings from person to person despite vast distances of space and time.”29 There are many symbols, ranging from public to private, religious to artistic, logical to linguistic and tangible to intangible. All these symbols are used to express, communicate and represent “logical relationships, intangible cosmic forces, and repressed drives and feelings.”30 Other symbols of the protest movement in the HKSAR were numerous, including the slogan of “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times.” This was arguably the most significant slogan used by protesters to symbolize the spirit of citizenship resistance, the determination of making the HKSAR genuinely autonomous and the dream of making Hong Kong a “nation” as mentioned by radical localist leaders like Edward Leung and Andy Chan. Some radical protesters in the HKSAR were arguably anarchists, who saw violent actions as necessary to express themselves. Carlo Ruzza has alerted us to the fact that “uncivil” society groups include extremist organizations from both the left and the right.31 These “uncivil” society organizations can be seen as an alternative type of political participation, displaying the features of racism, nationalism, populism and territorial or cultural exclusionism.32 Those radical protesters who resorted to violence in Hong Kong were imbued with the idea of anarchism, trying to create an “uncivil society” intolerant of the mainlanders and those local people who conducted businesses with the mainlanders. Hence, this explained why many shops with mainland connections and investment became the 29  Lowell Dittmer, “Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” World Politics, vol. 29, no. 4 (July 1977), pp. 552–583. 30  Ibid. 31  Carlo Ruzza, “Populism and Euroscepticism: Towards uncivil society?,” Policy and Society, vol. 28, no. 1 (2009), pp. 87–98. 32  Ibid.

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targets of political violence. Violent anarchists have traditionally been excluded from the mainstream civil society of Hong Kong. Some violent protesters were not necessarily anarchist, but they were localist extremist to the extent of seeing violence as an end in itself. They were also localist exclusionists trying to exclude the mainlanders from the society of Hong Kong. That was why the Hong Kong police referred to these anarchists and extremists as “home-grown terrorists.”33 If insurgency is defined as an anti-government uprising launched by rebellious activists who are determined to delegitimize and even overthrow the existing leaders and regime, the Hong Kong protests from June to December 2019 did fit into the features of insurgency. This explained why both the HKSAR government and Beijing were deeply concerned about the protests, trying to clamp down political dissent with the necessary force. The police action against protesters intensified after Chris Tang was appointed as the new commissioner. He has been fully supported by the mainland security officials, notably the Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi. Therefore, counterinsurgency becomes the foremost task of the Hong Kong police, which is expected to maintain law and order effectively in the HKSAR and protect the PRC’s national security interest. The literature on insurgency points to the phenomenon that its typical supporters are the young people who use violence and disorder to enrich themselves, who challenge the political system of the states where patron-­ client relations are serious, and who oppose public maladministration.34 Many young people believe that possessing weapons and supporting a local strongman can offer the chance for them to improve the socio-economic predicament. Youths who join the insurgency may have various grievances and they tend to see conflicts as inevitable and beneficial to their self-­ interests. They hate the regime and its political leaders, who in their minds are power-hungry and interested in personal gains. All these features could be found in the Hong Kong protests. Without social welfare reform and adequate supply of public housing units, the HKSAR government from July 1997 to mid-2019 was arguably characterized by public 33  Remarks made by the new Hong Kong Police Commissioner Chris Tang. See Christy Leung, “New Hong Kong police chief Chris Tang tells residents: the force cannot end the protests alone,” South China Morning Post, November 19, 2019, in https://www.scmp. com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3038305/incoming-police-chief-christang-tells-hongkongers, access date: March 15, 2020. 34  William Reno, “The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States,” Development and Change, vol. 33, no. 5 (2002), pp. 837–858.

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maladministration. Social immobility, the rising gap between the rich and the poor, the influx of many mainlanders into Hong Kong and the failure of the government to consult public opinion on the extradition bill, all demonstrated the degree of public maladministration in the HKSAR. Under these circumstances, the young radicals used “selective violence” to oppose the HKSAR government, which they saw as the loyal client of the CCP, another target that they opposed. The use of petrol bombs, the defacement of PRC flags and emblem, the occupation of LegCo and the arson targeted at mainland banks and mainland-related shops were all evidence of insurgency operations aimed at toppling the HKSAR government. No wonder the PRC hardliners stood tough once the protesters engaged in violent activities. As PRC hardliners identified that some external actors, notably US politicians, were involved in opposing the extradition bill, their sensitivity to the insurgency in the HKSAR was heightened to the national security level. If failed states are characterized by economic decline, uneven economic development, human rights violations and brain drain, Hong Kong in 2019 did not fit into these features, because its economy was in general sound until the outbreak of Covid-19 in early 2020. Human rights violations, however, loomed in the HKSAR because of the mysterious disappearance of the book publishers of the Causeway Bay Bookstore. Although their disappearance was not related directly to how the HKSAR government dealt with them but more about how PRC security agents tackled them, the local administration was expected to at least defend the rights of the Hong Kong residents. However, the disappearance of the publishers only resulted in an improved mechanism between the mainland police and Hong Kong counterpart in August 2016, namely each side informing the other within 14 days of cases where one or more of its residents would be detained. This improved mechanism, however, occurred after the disappearance of the publishers, failing to calm down those local people who were already frightened by the prospect of being “kidnapped” into the mainland for political reasons. Although Hong Kong in 2019 was not a failed state, it could be seen as a weak state. Its autonomy vis-à-vis the PRC had declined because of the explicit intervention from the mainland. As mentioned above, the disappearance of book publishers was politically disturbing. They failed to have the freedom of publication and of press in the HKSAR, whose border with the PRC could be seen as increasingly porous. Mainland security agents

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could go into Hong Kong easily, bringing back their targets, such as Lee Bo and businessman Xiao Jianhua, back to the PRC easily. Although the book publishers did publish books critical of China, most people of Hong Kong did not take their books seriously, except for those who were deeply interested in the inside politics of the PRC. In short, Hong Kong was a relatively weak state, in the minds of many Hong Kong people, in light of the disappearance of the book publishers in late 2015. This public image of a weak state persisted from 2017 to 2019 when the Carrie Lam administration pushed through the West Rail co-location the LegCo without adequate public consultation in mid-2018. To many localists, this co-location arrangement meant that Hong Kong’s territorial jurisdiction was abandoned in favor of the PRC and the High-Speed Rail could have its terminal extending into West Kowloon where mainland custom officials could station and work there.35 The problem of the relatively weak post-colonial state in the HKSAR is due to the clientelist mentality of its Chief Executive and principal officials, who have since July 1, 1997, seen Beijing as the most powerful patron to whom they should be loyal and obedient. Ideally, the operation of “one country, two systems” requires a batch of Chief Executive and principal officials who defend the interests of Hong Kong, who retain the uniqueness of the “two systems,” and who could and can strike a balance between the interests of Hong Kong and that of the PRC. Unfortunately, since 1997, all the Chief Executives, ranging from Tung Chee-hwa to Donald Tsang, from C. Y. Leung to Carrie Lam, have all been the loyal and obedient clients of Beijing. To many Hong Kong protesters, especially democrats and localists, the ruling elites in the HKSAR should protect the uniqueness of the “two systems.” Yet, the Carrie Lam administration in 2018 and 2019 was a weak one, failing to protect the interest of many Hong Kong people who had a very strong local identity. In short, Hong Kong in 2019 was not a failed state, but the relatively weak post-colonial state did stimulate both peaceful and violent protests. 35  Kimmy Chung, Shum Lok-kei, Ng Kang-chung and Alvin Lum, “Hong Kong’s controversial China rail checkpoint bill finally passed by lawmakers amid protests, delays and expulsions,” South China Morning Post, June 14, 2018, in https://www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/politics/article/2150873/hong-kongs-controversial-china-rail-checkpointbill-finally, access date: April 25, 2020.

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The Central and Local States, Uncivil Society and Political Violence Chapter 1 has developed an analytical framework of understanding the relations between the state, society, protests and violence. During the Hong Kong protests in 2019, the central party-state in Beijing clearly had two major considerations in its policy toward the HKSAR: the protection of its territorial sovereignty and the consolidation of its national security. Legitimacy, in the minds of the central party-state in Beijing, was undermined by the Hong Kong protests, which could threaten its national security and sovereignty. The central state remained a powerful patron vis-à-vis the local state, which was like a political sandwich between the center and the Hong Kong society. During the 2019 protests, the Hong Kong society was composed of citizens and groups resistant to both the ruling regime at the central and local levels. Furthermore, social movements, such as populist and democracy movements, exerted tremendous pressure on the local state to stabilize the political system. Since the Hong Kong protests were shaped by external actors, including the United States and Taiwan, the PRC’s sensitivity to its national security was heightened. Compounded by public fear and anger over the extradition bill, the Hong Kong protest movement turned into violent confrontations with the police. Ironically, some triad members, who wished to maintain the status quo for their businesses, saw protests as undermining their self-interest and profits. As such, some of them went out to attack the protesters on the night of July 21. In short, organized crime groups share the political conservatism of the ruling elites, seeing any social disorder as detrimental to their business operations. The case of Hong Kong proves that political violence could grow out from some triads that shared common interests with the ruling elites. Under the pressure from the neo-totalitarian central party-state, the local state in the HKSAR was hard-pressed to mobilize the police to adopt hardline tactics against protesters, who in turn resorted to violence. Alongside with the civil society of Hong Kong was the “uncivil” aspect in which violence was cherished by some radical and extremist groups. Hence, the case of Hong Kong corroborates that the political violence of protesters became both a means to an end and an end in itself. Most significantly, Hong Kong’s social movements, including populist and pro-­democracy activities, were supported by external actors, including neighboring Taiwan and the superpower, the United States. Such support was moral, financial and logistical, as with how the people of Taiwan, including the Taiwan

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State-Building Party and religious activists, aided the Hong Kong protesters. The support from the United States was ideological, strategic and geopolitical. The US politicians shared the same values with the Hong Kong protesters, as argued in this book. At the same time, once the United States was dragged into the trade and technological war with the PRC, Washington used the Hong Kong protests as a means to push for its political agenda of supporting human rights and democracy in the HKSAR, thereby exerting pressure on Beijing to make possible concessions on the trade negotiations with the American negotiators. Geopolitically, Taiwan’s support of the Hong Kong protests was in conformity with both the ideology and strategic interest of the United States. From Beijing’s perspective, Washington continues to contain the PRC because the rise of China presents a threat to the United States politically, economically, technologically and militarily. Furthermore, Beijing was upset about the ways in which the United States supported Taiwan ideologically and militarily, seeing Washington as having a plot to work with Taiwan to “overthrow” Hong Kong’s political system. If perception is critical in shaping international politics,36 the case of Hong Kong from June to December 2019 fully demonstrated the perceptions of Beijing on both Washington and Taipei. If the PRC perceives the existence of external support of the protest movement in the HKSAR, it naturally sees the Hong Kong protests as being a conspiracy orchestrated by some localists, democrats and foreign actors to “subvert” not only the HKSAR government but also the central government in Beijing. In other words, any external intervention in Hong Kong’s populist and democracy movement in 2019 challenged the legitimacy of the central party-state in Beijing, which perceived such interference as undermining its national security and territorial sovereignty. This perception became deep-rooted in the psyche of Beijing’s political leaders, leading to a relatively hardline policy toward Hong Kong. Yet, the constraint on such hardline policy was ironically the international and regional image of “one country, two systems.” So long as “one country, two systems” remains the PRC’s policy toward the reunification of the ROC on Taiwan, Beijing did not want to send the PAP directly and openly into the HKSAR in August 2019. Its stationing of the PAP in Shenzhen was arguably a mild move, considering the negative international image on the Hong Kong model of “one country, two systems.” 36  Robert Jarvis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Massachusetts: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1976).

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The Politics of Populism: Hong Kong, France, Chile, Iraq and Lebanon If populism has at least four perspectives, including Marxist, ideational, political-strategic and socio-cultural, each with its connections with protests, it can be applied to our deeper understanding of the Hong Kong protests. Marxists define populism in terms of class struggle, highlighting the significance of market conditions, economic production and social contradictions. Populism is defined by Marxists as a political movement that cultivates close mass-elite and class linkages to address the problem of socio-economic inequality. From an ideational perspective, populism is a discourse focusing on the people, democracy and sovereignty. The masses may take actions against the ruling elites through peaceful or violent protests to assert their popular sovereignty. Populists favor direct forms of democracy to replace the current political arrangements and see public opinion as of paramount importance in shaping government policies. Strategically, populism can be a tool for charismatic politicians to win the hearts and minds of the people, to obtain support during elections, to legitimize their actions in the legislature, to struggle against other factions and to oppose the ruling elites. Socio-culturally, populism can be a phenomenon shaped by social, cultural and historical factors. All these findings on populism could be seen in the case of Hong Kong. The Marxist perspective helps us understand the Hong Kong protests from the vantage point of class exploitation and class dominance in the capitalistic society of Hong Kong. As mentioned above, Hong Kong was conceived by many radical protesters as an exploitative capitalist state that bowed to the pressure of both capitalists and PRC authorities. The rise of social democrats in Hong Kong’s electoral politics since 2012 has been accompanied by the rising gap between the rich and the poor. Unfortunately, the HKSAR government failed to address the wealth gap for so long that, once the extradition bill was put forward, it galvanized all those people dissatisfied with government performance. From the Marxist perspective, the anti-extradition, anti-police and anti-mainlandization movement from June to December 2019 signaled a populist movement that saw the post-­ colonial state of Hong Kong as highly exploitative and lopsided in favor of the rich capitalist class and land developers. The ideational perspective on populism could be seen in the Hong Kong protests in 2019, when protesters, both peaceful and violent ones, saw not only the people as having their own sovereignty but also

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democracy as absent in the HKSAR. Strategically, the populist movement that opposed the extradition bill, police and mainlandization of Hong Kong was utilized by some leaders and activists as a ploy to consolidate their popular support during the November 2019 District Council elections. Populist protesters strategized among themselves, using a mix of peaceful and violent protests to achieve their political objectives and ambitions. Exactly because of this phenomenon, pro-Beijing and pro-government elites and mass media saw them as those “troublemakers” who opposed both Hong Kong and mainland China. Socially and culturally, the protests in Hong Kong in 2019 can be regarded as populist movement reflecting the profound values in the society that has conflict-ridden interactions with the PRC. The pro-democracy Hong Kong people cherish the rule of law, existing civil liberties, Western-style democracy and police accountability. Nevertheless, the pro-Beijing and pro-government elites treasure the maintenance of the status quo, a more restrictive view of civil liberties, a gradualist approach to implementing democratic reform and minimal police accountability. Both sides had deep conflict-ridden values and divided identities. Chapter 6 argues that populism in the HKSAR has several factions: the nationalistic populists who are pro-Beijing and pro-government; the democratic populists who are liberal-minded; the socialist populists who are more pro-welfare; and the localists who have a very strong local and exclusionist Hong Kong identity. All these factions or fractions shaped the ways in which the protests and confrontations in Hong Kong were played out. The anti-extradition, anti-police and anti-mainlandization movement in the HKSAR was complex, involving the interplay between the democratic populists, socialist populists and localists. Their common enemy was the nationalistic populists, who they saw were like PRC’s “puppets” supportive of the HKSAR government. From the perspective of comparative populism (Table 8.1), the Hong Kong protests gained inspirations from the populist movement in France in 2018 and the early half of 2019, when the yellow vest protesters confronted the French government. As with the French case, the Hong Kong protests started with a single issue, namely the extradition bill versus the energy policy in France, and then snowballed into large-scale and continuous protests. This pattern of snowballing effects could also be found in Chile, where the issue of transport fares was the original target of public discontent. Unlike the single-issue trigger that occurred in Hong Kong, France and Chile, the protests in Lebanon and Iraq tended to focus on a

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Table 8.1  Comparative populist movement in Chile, Iraq, France and Lebanon Country Details of the movement Chile

France

1. It began with a student-led demonstration against transport fares in October 2019. 2. Other issues were raised as Chileans were frustrated with the increasing cost of living, low wages and pensions, a lack of education rights, a poor public health system and crippling inequality. 3. The movement stimulated more people to come out to the streets while the police force in Chile attempted to stop the protesters with force. 4. Most protesters were peaceful, with many banging spoons against cooking pots—a form of protest known as cacerolazo. However, some protesters adopted violent tactics targeting at metro stations, supermarkets and petrol stations. 5. Petrol stations were burnt, and the riot led the president to declare a state of emergency and to suspend certain freedoms, including the people’s movement and assembly. 6. There were frequent clashes between police and protesters. Police used tear gas, water cannon, rubber bullets and pellets, prompting the allegations of rights abuses.  7.  In response to the protests, President Sebastian Pinera replaced eight cabinet members, including the Minister of the Economy and Minister of Internal Affairs, Andres Chadwick, who was Pinera’s cousin. 8. In the series of protests, 20 people died as a result of the unrest, including 11 who died in arson attempts, looting and rioting and 5 who were killed by military officers. 1. Originally, the protests focused on the government’s energy policies in 2018. Then other concerns were raised, such as inequality and poor governance. 2. The protests started in the French provinces but gradually spread to Paris, where demonstrations turned into riots over the weekend and scenes of violent civil unrest could be seen in the city’s famous Avenue des Champs Élysées. 3. Most yellow vests at blockades around France were peaceful protesters. Violent protests erupted over the weekend in Paris, where rioters defaced the Arc de Triomphe and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, looted shops, vandalized buildings and attacked police. 4. Their initial demand was to repeal the green tax on diesel. Other demands included an increase in the minimum wage, the dissolution of the National Assembly, the holding of new elections and the resignation of the president. 5. The movement had apparently no official leadership and was organized initially through social media groups. 6. Many people supported the movement; however, many of them opposed the violent tactics that protesters deployed. 7.  It began in November 2018 and continued throughout 2019. (continued)

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Table 8.1 (continued) Country Details of the movement Iraq

1. The protests began in October 2019 as protesters were unhappy with endemic corruption, high unemployment and dire public services. 2. The protesters blocked roads, obstructed oil facilities and ports and clashed with security forces, which fired live ammunition in response. 3. The Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi resigned in response, but some protesters wanted to sweep away the entire political establishment. Lebanon 1. The main demands of protesters in 2019 included the removal of the elite political class, an early election and an end to the sectarian power-­sharing system that institutionalized clientelism and corruption in the country. 2. Protesters were unhappy about the governing system that had routinely failed to deliver jobs, affordable health care and education. 3. Major means of opposition tactics deployed by protesters included demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, civil resistance, the construction of barricades and Internet activism. 4. The protest did not have leaders. Non-centralized leadership allowed the protesters to express other issues that raised public concerns. 5. The protesters fully utilized the social media as a means to keep the momentum of the protests. 6. Clashes existed between police and protesters and police fired tear gas on demonstrators. 7. Prime Minister Saad Hariri eventually resigned in October 2019. Sources: Charis McGowan, “Chile protests: What prompted the unrest?,” Aljazeera, October 31, 2019, in https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/chile-protests-prompted-unrest-191022160029869.html, access date: April 8, 2020; Anchal Vohra, “Lebanon Is Broken. So Are Its Protests.,” Foreign Policy, February 18, 2020, in https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/18/lebanon-protests-politics-leadership/, access date: April 8, 2020; Jake Cigainero, “Who Are France’s Yellow Vest Protesters, And What Do They Want?,” in https://www.npr.org/2018/12/03/672862353/who-are-frances-yellow-vest-protesters-and-what-dothey-want, access date: April 8, 2020; “The Iraq protests explained in 100 and 500 words,” in https://www. bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50595212, access date: April 8, 2020

variety of issues related to public maladministration. Hence, the snowballing effect of the French populist movement on the Hong Kong protests in 2019 existed, whereas the snowballing impacts of earlier protests on the ensuing ones could be found in all the populist movements in France, Hong Kong, Chile, Iraq and Lebanon. Like France where President Macron stays in power safely without the need for resignation, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam was perhaps fortunate. Rumors were rife that she wanted to resign in the early phase of the protests in 2019, but the central government in Beijing decided to keep her. Changing the Chief Executive at that critical juncture

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would have created an image of a weak Beijing that yielded pressure from not only the protesters but also the external actors, notably US politicians and officials who expressed their deep concerns about the extradition bill. Carrie Lam’s predicament improved in early 2020 when Covid-19 broke out, and as the society of Hong Kong had to be more united than ever to combat the rapidly spreading contagious disease. Unlike Chile whose President had to reshuffle the cabinet ministers, Carrie Lam did not do so from June to December 2019. The concept of the accountability of principal officials was introduced into the HKSAR in 2002 with the idea that ministers would shoulder the responsibility of policy errors and would then resign. Nevertheless, the controversy over the extradition bill did not witness any official to resign. Perhaps the central government in Beijing maintained a very hardline approach; resignation of any official would send a message to the outside world and to protesters that both the HKSAR government and the central authorities were weak. Unlike Lebanon and Iraq where the Prime Ministers resigned in the midst of protests, Carrie Lam persisted with the support of the PRC President Xi Jinping.37 In April 2020, the Carrie Lam administration reshuffled five principal officials, but none of them included the critical positions of the Secretary for Justice and the Secretary for Security. The 2019 protests in Hong Kong highlighted that, from Beijing’s perspective, three principal officials were particularly significant apart from the Chief Executive, namely the Police Commissioner, the Secretary for Justice and the Secretary for Security. Tactically speaking, the Hong Kong protesters adopted similar tactics as with other countries, such as the construction of barricades, the practice of vandalism, the hit-and-run tactics against the police and the use of artworks to express themselves. The mix of peaceful and violent protests was a common feature cutting across all these protests. Moreover, protesters in all the five places fully utilized the advanced technology of the social media to strategize and mobilize themselves flexibly and effectively. A decentralized leadership pattern of all these protests made it difficult for the police to handle all these populist movements. The new method of using social media in the interest articulation, political discourse and protest planning of protesters meant that, on the surface, all these populist movements were leaderless, even though there might be many small leaders hiding 37  One reporter told the authors that President Xi was personally impressed by Carrie Lam. Discussion with the authors in December 2019.

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behind the scene. In a sense, there was no single prominent leader in all these populist and protest movements. If there was any single prominent leader in organizing rallies and protests, just like Jimmy Sham and a few others, then they could become the easy target of attacks from mysterious organized crime groups. The Hong Kong experiences showed that if a few protest leaders were identified by their opponents, their personal safety could be at stake. Underlying the grievances of all these protests was the profound social and economic discontent. This phenomenon raised a critical issue of whether the capitalist states of Hong Kong, France, Chile and Lebanon, except for Iraq which has a mixed capitalist and socialist planning economy, have encountered a serious crisis in which the income gap between the rich and the poor remains unaddressed, public maladministration is not tackled effectively, and whether the political systems need to be reformed in such a way as to reduce the elite-mass gap in the society and polity. In conclusion, the populist movement in Hong Kong from June to December 2019 had profound implications for our study of the dynamics of peaceful and violent protests. Inspired by the French populist movement and triggered by the highly controversial extradition bill, the protesters in Hong Kong combined peaceful with violent means, strategically utilizing the social media skillfully for their planning, execution and mobilization of protests against the HKSAR government, the police and Beijing. The anti-governmental, anti-police and anti-CCP nature of the Hong Kong populist movement was striking, raising the immediate alarm of the central government in the PRC. Complicating the entire populist movement was the involvement of external actors, notably the US politicians and Taiwan, whose activities heightened the sensitivity of Beijing to the national security level. This explained why the HKSAR government refused to suspend the extradition bill from mid-June to early September 2019. The action of Beijing was relatively mild, sending the PAP to the Shenzhen border rather than dispatching it or the PLA to crack down on the protesters. Any action of cracking down on the protesters from the PRC would constitute another Tiananmen incident in Hong Kong. Hence, a powerful constraint on the PRC’s action on Hong Kong protests was the regional and international perception of the “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR.  If the mix of peaceful and violent protests in Hong Kong in the latter half of 2019 tested the responses of the central government in Beijing, the PRC’s political bottom line was clear, namely any political act in opposition to the HKSAR government must be

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condemned and yet the punitive action was left to the local Hong Kong police and judiciary. However, the unskillful way in which the HKSAR government handled the extradition bill and the controversial way in which the police operated from June to December 2019 have already undermined the legitimacy of the local state in Hong Kong. If so, the politics of populist, pro-democracy, anti-police and anti-mainlandization movements in Hong Kong will persist and deserve our study in the coming years. The entire protests from June to December 2019 proved to generate a lose-lose situation for all the stakeholders, except for the pro-­independence Taiwan politicians and activists. The “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong was discredited and its image was undermined in the eyes of most Hong Kong people and foreign countries. Beijing’s attempt at utilizing the model of “one country, two systems” to appeal to Taiwan for reunification is destined to be unattractive to most Taiwan people. The “one country, two systems” was undermined by Hong Kong’s inept governance and Beijing’s relatively hardline policy toward the HKSAR. All the political players in Hong Kong failed to achieve political gains. Even worse, the Hong Kong police became a political victim and sandwich, losing its performance legitimacy in the eyes of many ordinary people. Although the PRC’s neo-totalitarian regime staunchly supports the Hong Kong police, the HKSAR political system is seen by many ordinary people as drifting toward politically intolerant authoritarianism. Unless PRC leaders responsible for Hong Kong matters reflect upon their hardline policy critically and unless the HKSAR’s ruling elites ponder the deeper meaning of autonomy, the development of “one country, two systems” does not bode well for not only Hong Kong internally but also Beijing’s attempt at reunifying Taipei in the coming decades.

Bibliography

Books and Articles Abets, Koen and Rummens, Stefan, “Populism versus Democracy,” Political Studies, vol. 55 (2007), pp. 405–424. Allen, V.L., “Toward an Understanding of the Hedonistic Component of Vandalism,” in Claude Levy-Leboyer, ed., Vandalism, Behavior and Motivations (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1984), pp. 77–90. Altheide, David L., “Notes Towards a Politics of Fear,” Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media, vol. 1, no. 1 (2003), pp. 37–54. Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt: Brace Jovanovich, 1973). Barnes, Nicholas, “Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 15, no. 4 (2017), pp. 967–987. Bates, William, “Caste, Class and Vandalism,” Social Problems, vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring 1962), pp. 349–353. Beja, Jean-Philippe, “Xi Jinping’s China: On the Road to Neo-totalitarianism,” Social Research: An International Quarterly, vol. 86, no. 1 (Spring 2019), pp. 203–230. Bosi, Lorenzo and Malthaner, Stefan, “Political Violence,” in Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani eds., The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 439–440.

© The Author(s) 2021 S. S.-H. Lo et al., The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4

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Index1

A Accountability, 6, 8, 98, 99, 200, 201, 209, 284, 314, 318, 323, 331, 339, 342 Activists, 10, 25, 39–41, 49, 110, 141, 143, 147, 189, 204, 219, 225, 289–291, 294, 299, 319, 330, 333, 337, 339, 344 Administration, 9, 11, 29, 31, 41, 46, 53, 65, 71, 72, 81, 90, 91, 93, 96–99, 105, 106, 116, 119, 177, 225, 250, 289, 319, 322, 334, 335, 342 Admiralty, 82, 83, 85, 86, 141, 161, 329 Airdrop, 106, 131 America, 43 American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham), 64–66, 77 Anarchism, 4, 39–41, 332 Anderson, Benedict, 219n15 Annual, 59, 80, 81, 118

Antagonism, 44 Antagonizing, 2, 146 Anti-authoritarianism, 2, 3, 28, 33, 39 Anti-extradition movement, 1, 2, 49, 115, 117, 143, 166, 189, 194, 200, 204, 244, 260, 279, 304, 314, 319 Anti-hegemonic ideology, 330 Anti-mainlandization, 2, 3, 167, 262, 263, 276, 279, 298, 309, 314, 325, 329, 338, 339, 344 Anti-mask law, 49, 211–262, 298, 314, 324 Anti-police, 28, 33, 117, 166, 242, 243, 262, 263, 272, 274, 276, 298, 309, 314–316, 329, 338, 339, 343, 344 Anti-police protests, 2, 127, 140, 231 Anti-riot, 99, 128, 173 Apology, 84, 86, 92, 95, 98, 191, 192, 195 Armored vehicles, 168, 171, 192

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2021 S. S.-H. Lo et al., The Dynamics of Peaceful and Violent Protests in Hong Kong, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6712-4

371

372 

INDEX

Arrest, 2, 3, 10, 54, 62, 117, 132, 135, 137, 141, 147, 148, 174, 190, 191, 237, 242, 246, 250, 267, 272, 278–286, 303, 309, 310, 315, 316, 318, 325, 327 Arson, 193, 237, 241, 255, 315, 323, 334 Assembly, 13, 32, 128, 142, 146, 152, 229, 249, 307, 322 Assertive, 1, 3, 9, 23, 48, 147, 218, 237, 260, 264, 276 Attack, 2, 17, 35, 43, 45, 59, 83, 104–106, 117–123, 125–128, 130, 144, 145, 148, 166, 168, 170, 172, 193, 195, 228–230, 232, 237, 242, 243, 245, 255, 289, 298, 313, 314, 324, 336, 343 Authoritarianism, 2, 13, 31–33, 47, 48, 99, 110, 247, 248, 262, 318, 344 B Barricades, 190, 267, 342 Barristers, 78, 81, 201, 307, 311, 331 Basic Law, 63, 65, 70, 89, 91, 97, 129, 152, 175, 176, 178, 179, 186, 188, 224, 248, 312, 328 Basic Law Committee (BLC), 60, 70, 72–75, 78 Batons, 82, 120, 141, 143, 152, 171, 323 Battle, 50, 132, 135, 242, 246, 262–310, 315, 316, 318, 328 Beijing, 28, 33, 41, 43, 48, 49, 55–60, 72, 77–79, 91–93, 96, 99, 100, 105, 109, 113, 114, 126, 129, 167–209, 214–216, 218, 219, 224, 225, 228, 230, 245, 247, 255, 274, 276–278, 284, 286, 288, 289, 298, 307, 309–314, 316–318, 321, 322, 324, 326, 327, 333, 335–337, 341–344

Big Spender, 53 Businesspeople, 57, 60, 77, 93, 113, 192, 255, 260, 303, 311 C Cadres, 58, 60, 181, 255 Canada, 63, 68, 75, 77, 321 Capitalist class, 7, 8, 36, 212, 323, 330, 338 Capitalist state, 7, 8, 315, 323, 338, 343 Causeway Bay book publishers, 55–56, 110, 219, 224, 300, 312, 316, 334 Central government, 28, 33, 48, 49, 60, 68, 72, 77, 79, 83, 86, 87, 92, 93, 96, 99, 105, 128, 166, 170, 174, 175, 179–181, 186, 188, 193, 200, 206–207, 214, 215, 289, 316–318, 321, 327, 337, 341–343 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 54 Central Policy Unit, 114 Central state, 47, 48, 336 Chain reaction, 188 Chan, Andy, 147, 218, 219, 231, 262, 312, 327, 332 Chaos, 42, 89, 92, 93, 192, 225, 237 Chen, Albert, 72, 74, 78 Cheng, Teresa, 58, 139, 140, 194, 195 Cheung, Matthew, 64, 82, 103, 195, 196 Cheung, Steven, 62 Chief Executive, 3, 8, 24, 27, 48, 60, 61, 67, 68, 70, 72, 74, 81–84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 95, 97, 98, 106, 109–111, 113, 121, 125, 141, 145, 161, 173, 179, 181, 188, 189, 191–193, 195, 196, 204, 214, 219, 246, 250, 288, 311, 319, 322, 328, 335, 341, 342

 INDEX 

Chile, 338–344 China, 1–3, 23, 28, 31–35, 46, 51–56, 59, 62, 63, 66, 67, 74, 89, 110, 127, 130, 167, 168, 173–176, 181, 192, 193, 197–206, 217, 219, 229, 231, 263, 272, 293, 298, 309, 321, 326, 327, 332, 335, 337, 339 China factor, 2, 56, 58–60, 319, 331 Chinese Communist Party(CCP), 2, 32, 33, 46, 48, 58, 59, 181, 186–188, 201, 206, 207, 224, 309, 313, 316, 325, 327, 334 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 60, 62, 95, 181, 186, 194, 207, 208 Chow, Agnes, 143, 147 Chow, Alex, 264, 315 Citizenship, 4, 21–24, 55, 57, 327, 332 Civil liberties, 81, 82, 94, 175, 199, 200, 214, 217, 224, 293, 294, 311–316, 319, 321, 331, 339 Civil servants, 83, 97, 140, 141, 204, 311 Clashes, 17, 33, 36, 137, 140, 212, 228, 267, 272 Classes, 6–8, 36, 38, 40, 112, 212, 214, 232, 244, 245, 323, 330, 338 Clientelist regime, 322 Collective violence, 21, 24, 328 Co-location, 225, 322, 335 Colonial, 52, 53, 90, 98, 100, 111, 127, 139, 244, 248 Colonial authorities, 127, 248 Common interest, 48, 336 Communication, 84, 90, 91, 112, 186, 250, 300n8, 313 Compromise, 43, 45, 89, 90, 92, 112, 274 Concessions, 23, 43, 60, 65, 67, 69, 78, 82, 84, 85, 89, 90, 109, 112, 114, 195, 246, 272, 312, 337

373

Confrontational, 1, 244 Confrontations, 1, 10, 14, 17, 19, 25, 29, 49, 70, 79, 83, 87, 88, 92, 97, 132–136, 140, 144, 147, 148, 161, 189, 195, 211–263, 267, 289, 314, 323, 336, 339 Conservative, 26, 31, 288, 303, 326 Control, 15, 18, 25, 29, 32–34, 42, 45, 47, 130, 247, 248, 250, 255, 288, 316, 318, 329–331 Corrupt, 41, 57, 60, 70, 77, 93, 113, 212, 311 Corruption, 8, 14, 45, 55, 68, 207 Court, 45, 52, 55, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67–70, 72, 80, 81, 89, 96, 99, 143, 180, 190, 196, 218, 249, 251, 254, 274, 315 Court of Appeal, 254 Court of Final Appeal, 75, 142 Covid-19, 1, 207, 263, 276, 316, 328, 331, 334, 342 Creativity, 16, 27, 325 Crisis, 6–8, 10, 11, 49, 84, 94, 97–100, 117, 125–127, 129, 130, 167–209, 243, 289, 314, 319, 322, 343 Crisis of legitimacy, 5, 7, 10, 11, 91, 98, 117, 125, 127, 129, 130, 209, 245, 314, 319, 322, 332 Crowd, 14, 100, 141, 143, 189 Crowdfunding, 87, 92 Culture-dependent, 17, 325 Culture in movements, 26, 27 D Death, 17, 53, 60, 69, 85, 86, 264, 264n2 Debate, 26, 70, 72, 189, 217, 225, 243, 244, 247, 250, 312, 317 Decentralized, 39, 342 Deface, 100, 105, 122, 170 Delegitimizing, 79

374 

INDEX

Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), 91, 92, 94, 95, 220, 288 Democratic deficit, 11, 114, 322 Democratic Party, 85, 204, 307 Democratic populists, 214–232, 339 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 97, 100, 209, 299, 300, 310, 318 Democratic reform, 9, 224, 322, 339 Democratization, 4, 20–21, 26, 33, 77, 326, 327 Demonstrations, 1, 2, 46, 87, 88, 106, 120, 139, 141–143, 146, 314 Deployment, 118, 126, 129, 148, 167–175, 245, 248 Detain, 145, 250 Direct elections, 27, 214, 217–219, 319 Directly elected, 179, 217, 219, 263, 286, 288, 289, 319, 328 Discontent, 45, 98, 114, 312, 318, 339, 343 Discourse, 27, 34–36, 212, 213, 330, 338, 342 Disqualification, 110, 219 Dissidents, 3, 10–13, 29, 80, 86, 300, 318, 324 District Council, 95, 288–291 District Council election, 50, 206, 209, 263, 272, 274, 286–289, 309, 316, 317, 328, 339 Disturbances, 98, 128, 168, 172, 174, 175, 178, 179, 186, 193, 194, 245, 246 Drilling, 169 E Easton, David, 9, 323 Elections, 4, 10, 20, 27, 37, 46–48, 50, 95, 110, 196, 204, 206, 209, 213, 218, 219, 263–310, 316–319, 322, 328, 338, 339

Electoral authoritarianism, 47, 48 Elite-mass gap, 343 Elites, 10, 17, 18, 20, 24–26, 29, 30, 36, 37, 42, 43, 45, 95, 106, 111–113, 116, 161, 172, 179, 191–194, 211–214, 217, 228, 242, 244, 245, 248, 250, 251, 293, 294, 303, 307, 326, 329, 330, 335, 336, 338, 339, 344 Emblem, 87, 100, 104, 105, 120, 122, 125, 170, 232, 242, 313, 315, 334 Enemy/enemies, 21, 22, 34, 96, 111, 112, 127, 148, 171, 199, 201, 204, 208, 327, 329, 339 Estimate, 3, 4, 79, 80, 86, 120, 133, 145, 153, 245, 246, 260, 271, 272 Executive Council (ExCo), 60, 61, 90, 95, 96, 98, 180, 196, 248 Exploited, 220 External actors, 11, 12, 47, 49, 323, 334, 336, 342, 343 External intervention, 12, 43, 49, 337 Extradition bill, 1, 3, 35, 49, 51–82, 85–91, 93, 95–100, 103, 109, 110, 113, 114, 116, 119–122, 125, 145, 148, 166, 180, 181, 192, 194, 195, 197, 209, 214, 216, 217, 220, 225, 226, 242, 245, 255, 288, 298, 300–302, 307, 311, 312, 314, 316, 317, 319, 322, 323, 327, 328, 331, 332, 334, 336, 338, 339, 342–344 Extremist organizations, 40, 332 Extremists, 41, 43, 44, 49, 109, 126, 128, 218, 230, 231, 326, 329, 333, 336 F Facebook, 87, 106, 298 Failed state, 4, 43–46, 334, 335 Falun Gong, 324

 INDEX 

Festival Walk, 132, 135, 325 Fierce, 18, 262, 264, 267, 313, 316, 326 Fishball Revolution, 212, 224 Five demands, 87, 109, 110, 122, 179, 196, 246 Foreign Ministry, 253–254 Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee, 186–188 France, 303, 338–344 Freedom, 3, 11, 15, 16, 27, 29, 32, 53, 56, 63, 65, 69, 70, 75, 94, 110, 128, 152, 225, 227, 300, 313, 314, 322, 324, 325, 329, 331, 334 Fugitives, 49, 51–54, 58, 60, 61, 65, 67–70, 72, 75, 84, 180 Functional constituencies, 102 G Garrison law, 129, 175, 176 Geopolitical, 193, 298, 337 Geo-strategic, 272 German Green Party, 80, 86 Globalization, 10, 167 Global Times, 173, 191 Government, 1, 52, 79, 81, 119, 129, 141, 170, 176, 188–197, 211, 274, 311 Group legitimacy, 4 Groups, 4, 7, 9, 11, 14–19, 21–23, 25–28, 32, 33, 37, 39–45, 47–49, 65, 66, 72, 86, 88, 100, 105, 106, 115, 116, 118, 119, 125, 131, 132, 137, 139–141, 144, 146, 178, 189, 192, 197, 200, 212, 218, 228–230, 242, 243, 246, 248, 272, 279, 286, 300n8, 322–324, 326, 327, 329, 332, 336, 343 G20 meeting, 92 Guerrilla, 5, 18, 42, 189 Guo, Shengkun, 181, 186, 195

375

H Han Zheng, 72, 78, 93, 181, 186 Hard authoritarianism, 1, 110 Hard-liners, 21 Helmets, 82, 115, 298, 299, 319 Hijacking, 17, 179 Ho, Albert, 81, 201, 203, 204, 307 Home-grown terrorist, 41, 116, 231, 333 Hong Kong and Macau Study Association (HKMSA), 60, 70, 193 Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA), 66–70, 225 Hong Kong Human Right and Democracy Act, 263, 289–298, 309, 317, 323 Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO), 177–181, 189, 190, 207, 209, 253–254, 288, 303, 311, 318, 320 Hong Kong police, 3, 41, 43, 53, 54, 57, 117, 118, 120, 125, 126, 128–139, 145, 147, 166, 167, 170, 172, 173, 175, 178, 179, 186, 189, 190, 195, 196, 200, 201, 231, 232, 260, 274, 276, 284, 285, 299, 307, 309, 312–314, 316, 323, 324, 326, 327, 331, 333, 344 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), 1, 51, 54, 79, 119, 167, 211, 263, 311 Huntington, Samuel, 4, 8, 88, 92, 319, 322 Hyperpoliticization, 95 I Identity, 17, 18, 21, 22, 28, 172, 215–217, 220, 224, 247, 327, 329, 335, 339 Ideologies, 2, 7, 8, 32, 36, 38, 40, 212–214, 220, 231, 247, 298, 313, 321, 330, 337

376 

INDEX

Imagined community, 219 Imbalance, 116, 254, 314, 331 Imprison, 65, 219, 312, 327 Imprisonment, 55, 61, 67, 68, 72, 99, 110, 220, 222, 250, 252 Income gap, 114, 343 Independence institutional independence, 328 territorial independence, 328 Independent commission of inquiry, 109, 194–196, 247, 314, 324, 331 Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC), 110, 194, 331 Injured, 85, 122, 128, 132, 144, 152, 189, 190, 229, 262, 315 Institutional independence, 328 Institutional violence, 110, 111 Insurgency, 4, 14, 18, 41–43, 45, 333, 334 Intellectuals, 115, 212, 245, 311 International image, 167, 175, 337 Internet, 54, 121, 168, 172 Interpretation of the Basic Law, 70, 224 Iraq, 338–344 J Japan, 75, 276 K Kuomintang (KMT), 299, 300 L Lai, Jimmy, 201, 203, 204, 307 Lam, Carrie, 3, 53, 56, 58, 60, 69, 72, 81–85, 92–95, 97–99, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 113, 114, 116, 121, 125, 126, 145, 177, 181,

186, 191–197, 225, 226, 246, 247, 250, 260, 303, 311, 319, 322, 335, 341, 342 Lam, Wing-kei, 55, 56, 300 Land developers, 323, 338 Lantau Tomorrow Vision, 225 Law, Nathan, 99, 110 Law-enforcement, 1, 3, 24, 63, 84, 252 Lawyers, 7, 68, 70, 74, 81, 90, 94, 137, 138, 140, 142, 146, 201, 274, 307, 311, 331 Lebanon, 338–344 Lee, Bo, 55, 335 Lee, Hsien Loong, 303 Lee, John, 65, 67, 90, 91, 94–95, 103, 194, 311 Lee, Martin, 81, 201, 203, 204, 307, 318 Lee, Starry, 92 Legal culture, 197–200 Legal expert, 70–73, 78, 94, 248, 317 Legislative Council (LegCo), 3, 27, 49, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 75, 78–116, 119–120, 131, 145, 148, 170, 173, 193, 209, 214, 217–220, 225, 232, 250, 251, 272, 279, 288, 298, 311–313, 319, 322, 324, 328, 334, 335 Legitimacy, 4–11, 13, 16, 32, 37, 43–46, 48, 49, 91, 94, 98, 99, 121, 125, 127–130, 166, 196, 209, 213, 255, 314, 319–322, 332, 336, 337, 344 Legitimacy deficit, 6 Lennon Wall, 86, 138, 230, 325, 329, 330 Leung, Baggio, 33, 89, 90, 99, 110 Leung, Brian, 155 Leung, C. Y., 89, 322, 335 Leung, Edward, 99, 110, 219, 220, 262, 312, 327, 332

 INDEX 

Leung, Priscilla, 75, 88 Li, Keqiang, 181, 186, 209 Liaison Office, 60, 70, 91, 93, 95, 122, 125, 170, 180, 193, 206, 207, 209, 216, 232, 237, 242, 253–254, 288, 303, 311, 313, 320 Liberal, 21, 26, 303, 313, 330 liberal-minded, 99, 140, 214, 318, 319 Liberalization, 21 Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times, 139, 219, 262, 325, 332 LIHKG, 88, 106, 131 Lo, Sonny Shiu-Hing, 2n2, 27n110, 34n139, 48n194, 53n7, 57n20, 96n42, 96n43, 111n64, 112n65, 114n66, 126n5, 130n11, 200n62, 217n11, 224n24, 229n33, 242n44, 243n46, 244n48, 321n5, 322n6 Lo, Stephen, 83–85, 98, 103, 104, 109, 125–127, 137, 195, 196, 241, 243, 272 Localists, 41, 43, 99, 217–232, 245, 262, 312, 315, 316, 322, 323, 327, 328, 332, 333, 335, 337, 339 Local state, 46–49, 327, 336–337, 344 Lumpen-proletariat, 115 Luo, Huining, 206–208, 303 M Mainland, 1–3, 28, 31–35, 46, 51–60, 62–73, 77, 83, 93, 94, 96, 106, 110, 113, 121, 127, 140, 166–168, 172, 173, 175, 178, 180, 181, 189–191, 199–201, 207, 209, 219, 220, 224, 225,

377

227, 228, 230, 232, 244, 255, 306, 311, 321, 325–327, 332–335, 339 Mainlanders, 53, 81, 172, 217, 220, 227, 228, 332–334 Mainlandization, 2, 3, 113, 121, 227, 322, 339 Marches, 1, 17, 128, 129 Marxist, 7, 8, 35, 36, 38, 40, 181, 212, 214, 321, 323, 338 Masses, 23, 27–30, 34–37, 91, 147, 148, 190, 212, 213, 217, 219, 262, 303–310, 318, 338 Mass Transit Railway (MTR), 2, 122–127, 139, 147, 148, 152, 190, 193, 195, 232, 241, 242, 246, 255, 260, 324, 325 Mass Transit Railway (MTR) Corporation, 139, 148, 232, 242, 246, 325 Maxim, 232, 306 Meng, Sabrina, 62, 63, 75, 77, 113 Middle-lower class, 186 Military, 1, 10, 13, 23, 31, 35, 45, 55, 77, 129, 131, 161, 167, 171, 175, 243, 317, 330 Misrule, 322, 329 Mobilization, 13, 25, 29, 33, 37, 38, 115, 116, 131, 140, 144, 168, 171, 172, 190, 219, 228, 230, 313, 324, 329–331, 343 Mobilize, 14, 26, 36, 37, 48, 49, 81, 88, 106, 116, 118, 172, 213, 214, 245, 246, 329, 331, 332, 336, 342 Momentum, 115, 246, 314 Money laundering, 68 Mongkok, 119, 131, 212, 224, 237, 329 Mongkok riot, 33, 80, 99, 110, 218–220, 224, 312 Mosque, 260

378 

INDEX

Movement cultures, 26–28, 329, 330 Muslim, 260 Mysterious death, 264 N National anthem law, 225 National flag, 193, 232, 242, 243, 315 Nationalism, 22, 32, 40, 327, 332 Nationalistic, 214, 220, 303, 321 Nationalistic populists, 214–216, 228–231, 262, 339 National People's Congress (NPC), 52, 59, 92, 95, 99, 148, 171, 175, 176, 196, 206–208, 224, 248, 312, 320 National security, 43, 46, 48, 49, 60, 77, 97, 167–209, 219, 224, 316, 320, 321, 334, 336, 337, 343 National security interest, 43, 63, 96, 167, 327, 333 National security policy, 200–206, 209 Neo-totalitarian, 32, 33, 110, 318, 321, 326, 327, 330, 331, 336, 344 Neo-totalitarianism, 31–33 O Occupation of Legislative Council, 79–116, 119–120 Occupy Central Movement, 27, 28, 33, 99, 110, 111, 148, 197, 212, 219, 224, 243, 247, 312, 315, 329 Officials, 57–60, 70, 72, 75, 77, 91, 93, 94, 97, 102, 104, 106, 108–109, 113, 116, 127, 128, 161, 167, 168, 172, 175, 180–186, 188–190, 195, 196, 200, 201, 206–209, 220, 229–231, 246, 250, 260, 261,

288, 289, 293, 294, 311, 312, 316–322, 326, 329, 333, 335, 342 One country, two systems, 3, 53, 59, 63, 75, 80, 97, 100, 106, 116, 125–130, 145, 166, 167, 174, 178, 179, 193, 216, 217, 245, 248, 300, 310, 313, 316, 317, 319–322, 329, 335, 337, 343, 344 Operation, 3, 6, 43, 48, 64, 89, 121, 126–128, 130, 137, 138, 167–169, 192, 196, 255, 314, 331, 334–336 Opposition, 9, 10, 20, 21, 27, 31, 39, 49, 66, 69, 70, 81, 84, 85, 94–96, 99, 112–114, 173, 179, 190, 195, 204–206, 208, 211–262, 312–314, 317, 332, 343 Organized crime, 4, 13–16, 48, 324, 336, 343 P Parameter, 11, 12, 179, 196, 219, 323 Paramilitary, 1, 171, 172 Party cadres, 58, 60, 181 Party officials, 58 Party-state, 2, 32, 46, 48, 49, 127, 199, 204, 336, 337 Patrick Chi-ping, Ho, 62, 63 Patron, 335, 336 Patron-client relations, 41, 333 Pattern, 10–12, 27, 42, 132, 145, 152–164, 211, 237, 262, 307, 339, 342 Peaceful protests, 1–50, 78, 79, 114, 118, 129–131, 140, 145, 146, 152–164, 211, 214, 245, 246, 288, 295, 311–314, 322–335, 339, 342, 343

 INDEX 

Pelosi, Nancy, 173, 289 Penetration, 2 People’s Armed Police (PAP), 161, 166–175, 179, 189, 191, 192, 245, 248, 292, 316, 317, 337, 343 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 83, 128–130, 167, 170, 171, 173–175, 178, 179, 245, 316, 317, 343 People’s movement, 2, 191 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1, 3, 12, 18, 31–33, 38, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51–60, 62, 64, 65, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, 89, 93, 94, 98, 104, 106, 110, 113, 116, 119–122, 125, 127–129, 145, 161, 167, 171, 172, 174–176, 178–181, 186, 188–190, 192, 193, 195–197, 199–201, 204, 206–209, 214, 216, 217, 219, 220, 224, 225, 229–232, 237, 242, 243, 247, 248, 250, 262, 274–276, 279, 288, 289, 293, 298, 300, 303, 306, 310, 311, 313, 315–321, 323, 324, 326–331, 333–339, 342–344 Pepper pellets, 323 Pepper spray, 82, 120, 135, 143, 152, 168, 279 Performance, 3, 4, 8, 67, 117, 125–127, 144, 166, 194, 196, 206, 232–247, 260, 284, 288, 314, 331, 338 Performance legitimacy, 4, 5, 8, 117, 314, 319–322, 344 Petitions, 1, 10, 23 Petrol bombs, 43, 116, 135, 144, 193, 231, 232, 234, 241, 242, 315, 334 Plaza, 132

379

Police, 1, 53, 79, 117, 125–138, 167, 211, 220, 232–247, 263, 276–286, 312 Police Commissioner, 83, 98, 103, 121, 125, 127, 137, 186, 195, 196, 200, 241, 243, 272, 309, 316, 342 Police headquarters, 87, 148, 190, 234 Police station, 82, 105, 120, 126, 136–138, 141, 142, 144–146, 189, 232, 237, 241, 242, 315 Policing, 18, 20, 25, 26, 49, 79, 117–166, 192, 195, 209, 276, 314, 316 Political actors, 17–22, 26 Political and Legal Affairs Commission, 181 Political conflicts, 12, 19, 24 Political enemies, 112, 329 Political extremism, 327 Political hatred, 111, 114, 243, 325 Political opportunity, 14, 25, 328, 329 Political opposition, 9, 10, 21, 27, 69, 70, 84, 85, 112, 179, 207–208, 245, 331, 343 Political participation, 40, 110, 196, 289, 332 Political reality, 8 Political symbolism, 4, 38–39, 242 Political system, 2, 6, 8, 9, 29, 31, 32, 41, 47, 211, 217, 300, 321, 323, 326, 328, 330, 333, 336, 337, 343, 344 Political violence, 4, 14, 16–20, 23–26, 110–113, 211, 231, 244, 246, 315, 323, 325–327, 329, 333, 336–337 Populism, 4, 35–38, 40, 211–215, 224, 261, 332, 338–344 Populist movement, 38, 212, 220, 224, 338–343

380 

INDEX

Posters, 27, 139, 146, 230, 247, 325, 329, 330 Power struggle, 18, 37, 77, 213, 320, 326 Prince Edward MTR station, 117, 137, 140–143, 147, 148, 152, 190, 314 Pro-Beijing, 69–74, 78, 82, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 100, 109, 120–122, 127, 140–142, 172, 179, 190, 204–206, 214, 220, 228–230, 232, 242, 243, 248, 250, 251, 260, 261, 279, 288, 289, 294, 298, 303, 306, 312, 319, 323, 326, 339 Pro-Beijing forces, 92, 206, 209, 229, 231, 261, 288, 316–318 Procedural legitimacy, 4, 5, 8, 319–322 Pro-democracy, 38, 46, 48, 49, 80–82, 86, 88–92, 104, 111–113, 116, 118, 127, 132, 144, 196, 201, 204, 211, 214, 217, 224, 230, 243, 286, 298, 303, 310, 312, 317–319, 329, 336, 339, 344 Pro-government, 38, 84, 88–92, 94, 95, 99, 100, 112, 116, 121, 135, 141, 142, 189, 194, 204, 214, 243, 250, 260, 261, 288, 309, 323, 339 Prosecute, 74 Protesters, 1, 79, 117, 168, 211–263, 312 Protests, 1–50, 78–167, 177–180, 188–194, 211–215, 232–247, 263, 298–303, 311, 322–335 Pro-welfare, 339 Public fear, 4, 34, 35, 45, 47, 48, 75, 93, 331, 336 Public maladministration, 41, 44, 204, 333–334, 341, 343

Public opinion, 10, 26, 34, 35, 37, 54, 75, 90, 91, 113, 114, 116, 180, 191, 211–213, 229, 322, 334, 338 Puppet, 216, 339 Q Qing dynasty, 51, 52, 321 R Radicals, 9, 19, 21, 23–25, 39, 43, 84, 85, 100, 102, 104, 106, 109, 111, 113, 119, 122, 125, 128, 129, 131, 135, 136, 140, 145, 168, 170, 193, 196, 204, 217–220, 242, 246, 247, 263, 278, 279, 284, 298, 306, 310, 312, 313, 315, 316, 318, 322, 324–329, 332, 334, 336, 338 Rallies, 1, 9, 10, 23, 28, 81, 86–88, 100, 118–122, 138, 140–143, 229, 230, 232, 245, 248, 294, 326, 343 Reaction, 10, 51, 93, 94, 110, 114, 148, 175, 177–180, 188, 190 Redistributive, 217, 330 Regime, 3–12, 15, 16, 20–23, 25, 29, 32, 33, 35, 41–44, 46–48, 99, 102, 112, 130, 211, 212, 214, 216, 220, 224, 246, 300, 316, 318, 321–323, 325, 328, 330, 331, 333, 336, 344 Regional, 37, 64, 175, 214, 337, 343 Repertoires of action, 24, 328 Repression, 4, 10–13, 323 Resistance, 7, 10, 17, 23, 29, 262, 318, 325, 326, 332 Resistance movement, 18, 326 Resistant citizenship, 21–24, 327 Resource mobilization, 25, 329

 INDEX 

Response, 7–9, 12, 13, 18, 22, 23, 25, 35, 36, 45, 49, 50, 56, 62, 63, 65–70, 75, 78, 82, 84, 94, 103, 106, 108–109, 116, 121, 125–128, 131, 145, 167–209, 212, 246, 274–276, 303, 326, 343 Riots, 14, 33, 80, 83–86, 98–100, 109–111, 142, 168, 172–175, 196, 231, 245, 248, 250, 254, 255, 312, 324 Roadblocks, 267 Rubber bullets, 98, 120, 122, 146, 190, 242, 264, 279, 323 Rule of law, 28, 43, 45, 64, 65, 69, 70, 72, 75, 81, 94, 96, 103, 106, 109, 116, 121, 141, 167, 177, 178, 180, 196, 197, 199, 214, 293, 294, 300, 309, 311, 322, 331, 339 S San Uk Ling Holding Center, 131, 136, 166, 314 Secretary for Justice, 58, 139, 194, 200, 342 Secretary for Security, 53, 65, 67, 94, 103, 194, 200, 311, 342 Security, 11, 13, 14, 18, 43–46, 48, 49, 53, 60, 63, 77, 96, 97, 135, 139, 167–209, 219, 224, 272, 316, 320, 321, 327, 333, 334, 336, 337, 343 Security agents, 334 Self-determination, 22, 23, 327, 328 Self-interest, 41, 208, 333, 336 Sensitivity, 12, 54, 75, 77, 97, 113, 334, 336, 343 Set fire, 232 Sham, Jimmy, 148, 289, 343

381

Shenzhen, 55, 56, 93, 136, 166–175, 179, 189, 191, 192, 248, 292, 317, 337, 343 Shield, 142, 168, 171, 174 Shopping mall, 119, 121, 131–136, 224, 230, 232, 279, 325 Signal, 80, 106 Singapore, 303 Sino-British Joint Declaration, 52, 63, 276, 309 Smoke pellets, 101 Snowballing effect, 80, 100, 116, 314, 339, 341 Socialist populists, 217, 218, 227–229, 262, 339 Social media, 88, 106, 107, 116, 131, 140, 230, 255, 264, 313, 326, 327, 329, 332, 342, 343 Social movement, 4, 19, 24–26, 47–49, 200, 219, 328, 329, 336 Soft authoritarian regime, 2 Soft-liners, 21 Sovereignty, 3, 11, 18, 36, 46, 48, 49, 119, 145, 178, 179, 181, 193, 213, 218, 231, 262, 311, 321, 323, 326, 336–338 Sponge grenades, 120, 122, 242, 279, 323 Standing Committee of the National People's (NPC), 52, 59, 92, 95, 99, 148, 171, 175, 176, 196, 206–208, 224, 248, 312 Stark Alliance, 279 State-crime alliance, 324 State security, 11, 13, 14 State violence, 4, 10–13, 29, 326, 327 Status quo, 7, 28, 29, 48, 53, 245, 336, 339 Stickers, 27, 230, 325, 329, 330 Street art, 16, 325 Strike, 23, 137, 145, 167, 208, 216, 252, 254, 284, 335

382 

INDEX

Subside, 1, 309 Subversive, 33, 224, 319 Suicide, 86, 87, 121, 264 Sung zhong, 35, 82, 94, 332 Suppress, 23, 110, 116, 262, 318, 326 Suspend, 84, 93, 110, 316, 343 T Tactics, 10, 20, 26, 28, 49, 79, 103, 189, 190, 192, 195, 200, 237, 260, 276, 309, 316, 323, 326, 327, 329, 336, 342 Taiwan, 49, 50, 53, 56, 61, 66, 67, 74, 77, 79, 93, 94, 97, 100, 102, 113, 129, 167, 170, 181, 187–188, 194, 209, 262–311, 313, 318–320, 336, 337, 343, 344 Taiwan State-Building Party, 298, 319, 336 Tam, Maria, 74 Tang, Chris, 186, 195, 272, 276–279, 309, 316, 318, 333 Tear gas, 3, 82, 86, 120, 122, 131, 139, 141, 142, 146, 168, 189, 190, 234, 264, 267, 279 Tear gas canisters, 98, 100, 131, 144, 237, 242, 264, 279, 314, 323 Territorial independence, 328 Territorial jurisdiction, 225, 335 Terrorism, 17, 18, 35, 43, 44, 191, 325 Think tank, 112, 311 Thugs, 126, 128, 140–142, 144, 148, 289 Tiananmen incident, 343 Tilly, Charles, 21 Totalitarianism, 4, 29–34, 330 Tragedy, 144, 244, 286, 324 Treaty of Tientsin, 51, 52 Triad members, 2, 117, 122, 139, 144, 166, 228, 230, 314, 324, 336

Triads, 117–123, 125–127, 130, 138, 140, 144, 145, 195, 228, 230, 243, 313, 324, 326, 336 Trump, Donald, 92, 175, 263, 292, 293, 317 Tsang, Donald, 335 Tsimshatsui, 137, 141, 142, 144, 189, 193, 260 Tung, Chee-hwa, 91, 97, 194, 204, 211, 335 Turbulence, 9, 78 Twitch, 106, 131 Twitter, 106, 175 Two-line struggles, 116 U Uncivil society, 4, 39–41, 332, 336–337 United front work, 127, 128, 209, 229, 248, 303, 310, 317, 319, 320 United Kingdom (UK), 68, 75, 93, 201, 217, 303, 307, 309, 321 United Nations (UN), 72 United States (US), 11, 25, 35, 40, 43, 44, 49–51, 54–56, 58, 61–65, 75, 77–79, 92, 96, 173, 175, 181, 192–194, 201, 204, 207, 217, 232, 234, 263–310, 312, 313, 317, 319, 321, 323, 334, 336, 337, 342, 343 US Human Rights and Democracy Act, 263, 289–298, 309, 317, 323 V Valiant elements, 114, 116, 190, 246, 278, 279 Vandalism, 4, 13–16, 87, 103, 111, 237, 241, 246, 260, 306, 312, 315, 323–325, 329, 342

 INDEX 

Vertical accountability, 200, 201, 318 Vested interest, 14, 245 Violence, 4, 6, 9–26, 35–38, 42, 45–50, 82, 121, 177, 264, 314, 328, 336–337 Violent protests, 1–50, 78, 79, 85, 129–131, 145, 152–164, 178, 214, 245, 288, 311–314, 321–335, 338, 339, 342, 343 Vote, 82, 91, 95, 179, 219, 300, 319, 321 W Walkie talkie, 105 Wan Chai, 86, 87, 143 Wang, Yang, 181, 186 Wang, Zhimin, 95, 96, 106, 125, 180, 181, 189, 190, 192, 206–209, 248, 288, 303, 311, 316, 318 Washington, 77, 173, 175, 317, 337 Water cannon, 126, 143, 148, 170, 174, 234, 237, 247, 260, 323 Weak state, 44, 45, 334, 335 Wealth gap, 306, 338 Weapons, 41, 42, 83, 106, 142, 147, 195, 214, 231, 242, 248, 279–284, 315, 333 West Rail, 322, 335 Withdraw, 66, 81, 82, 85, 103, 109, 192, 209, 307n11

383

Wong, Joshua, 105, 143, 147, 234 Wong, Roy, 80, 86 Wu, Annie, 306 X Xi, Jinping, 31–33, 56, 60, 92, 168, 173, 180, 181, 186, 192–194, 196–199, 207, 209, 245, 292, 309, 317, 318, 330, 342 Xia Baolong, 207, 303 Xiao Jianhua, 56–58, 335 Xinhua, 248 Y Yau, Wai-ching, 33, 89, 90, 99, 110 Yellow economy, 260, 261, 330 Yellow vest movement, 339 Youngspiration, 89 Youths, 41, 113, 114, 172, 244, 245, 311, 315, 333 Yuen Long, 2, 117, 120, 122–128, 138, 139, 144, 145, 148, 166, 195, 228, 243, 313, 314, 324 Z Zhang, Xiaoming, 179–181, 189, 190, 192, 207, 209, 248, 288, 303, 311, 316, 318 Zhao, Kezhi, 181, 186, 195, 200–202, 276–278, 333